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Adeoye O. Akinola *Editor*

The Political Economy of Xenophobia in Africa

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Adeoye O. Akinola
Editor

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Editor
Adeoye O. Akinola
University of Zululand
KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

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Contributors

Tolulope Adeogun College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Adeoye O. Akinola University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

Lere Amusan North-West University, Mahikeng, South Africa

Everisto Benyera Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa

Collins Adu-Bempah Brobbey Institute of Journalism, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana

Olumuyiwa Faluyi College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Omololu Fagbadebo Public Governance School of Management, IT and Governance, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Lukong Stella Shulika Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Lulu Magam University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Olusola Ogunnubi Mangosuthu University of Technology, Umlazi, Durban, South Africa

Samuel K. Okunade Department of Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Samuel Oloruntoba Thabo Mbeki Institute, University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa

Ebenezer O. Oni Department of Political Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa (UKZN), South Africa

Fayth Ruffin Public Governance School of Management, IT and Governance, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville Campus, Durban, South Africa

Stella Chewe Sabi Food Security, African Centre for Food Security, School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Oluwaseun Tella University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa

Regis Wilson University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa

Chapter 1
Introduction: Understanding Xenophobia in Africa

Adeoye O. Akinola

Colonialism militarised African societies and imposed a violent character upon the state, leading to the institutionalization of a culture of violence within the state and society. This explains the diverse forms of political instability, insurgency, terrorism and civil war experienced in many African countries. Recently, xenophobic violence has become part of the African story. Although this is not a new phenomenon, its destructive nature is cause for concern among stakeholders in African peace, security and development projects. From Ghana to Nigeria and Zambia to South Africa hostility has been directed against 'the others' and non-nationals of African descent. While there is a rich literature on the violent manifestation of xenophobia in Africa, few studies have explored the non-violent expression of xenophobia in countries like Botswana. This book captures both violent and non-violent manifestations of xenophobia and its effects on the state, economy and economy.

"Are you xenophobic?" a student asked me during class in 2013. I hesitated and said, "Better still, what is xenophobia?" Xenophobia is a derivative of a Greek word 'xenos', which means 'stranger' or 'foreigner' and 'phobos', which connotes 'fear'. Xenophobia can be best conceived as a deep hatred of immigrants by nationals of the host state. Crush and Ramachandran refer to xenophobia as "highly negative perceptions and practices that discriminate against non-citizen groups on the basis of their foreign origin or nationality" (Dassah 2015).

The terms racism and xenophobia have often been conflated in the literature. Although racism is a branch of xenophobia, it refers to discrimination based on biological attributes or skin pigmentation, while xenophobia captures all forms of discrimination against those considered to be 'different', and non-national. In South Africa for example, locals seem to accommodate citizens from Ghana and Senegal,

A.O. Akinola (✉)
University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa
e-mail: oyeakinola@yahoo.com; AkinolaA@unizulu.ac.za

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while displaying acute hostility to those from Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Somalia. Kaluba situates the xenophobia-racism nexus in context:

> *In countries where people of different races live, xenophobia and racism often overlap although they are distinct phenomena since unlike xenophobia racism usually entails distinction based on physical characteristic differences such as skin colour, hair type, facial features, while xenophobia implies behaviour based on the idea that the other is foreign to or originates from outside the community or nation* (Kaluba 2016).

Xenophobia thus captures all forms of intolerance and hostility towards those regarded as 'foreigners', 'non-nationals' or 'the others'. It could manifest in the form of 'racephobia' (racism), 'genophobia' (genocide), 'ethnophobia' (ethnic conflict), 'afrophobia' (hostilities among Africans of different nationalities) or 'foreignphobia' (intolerance of anything foreign). The question that thus arises is how did Africa become entangled in this mode of discrimination and ostracization of the 'other'?

In post-colonial Africa, Ghana was the first country to show signs of official xenophobia. The country's Aliens Compliance Order of 1969 was followed by the infamous 'Ghana-must-go' anti-immigration acts of Nigerian governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In contemporary times, South Africa has become synonymous with xenophobia. While many reasons have been cited for intolerance of 'the others', the two most common are perceptions that immigrants limit the economic prospects of host countries and are responsible for the rising social ills in recipient societies. Such allegations cannot justify the bloody attacks on foreigners and destruction of their properties.

Although African states and multilateral institutions on the continent invest significantly in security, Africa is still not secured. Several decades after independence, post-colonial African states are still searching for sustainable peace and security, and socio-economic and political development. In many states, threats to peace and security have stunted the quest for accelerated and sustainable economic development. Despite the transformation of the Organization of African Unity to become the African Union (AU) and renewed efforts at Pan-Africanism, the continent continues to battle to achieve integrated development. Xenophobia is a major impediment to peace, security and development as well as multilateralism. If not checked, it has the potential to degenerate into all-out civil war and even genocide. In an intellectual conversation in 2014, I asserted that,

> *The intolerance that triggered genocide in Rwanda in the 1990s looms, not only in South Africa, but in several other parts of Africa. What often begins as mild expressions of dislike can easily develop into institutionalized discrimination, psychological trauma, physical abuse, hate crimes and brutal killings* (Akinola 2014: 56).

According to Gomo (2010), foreigners are often perceived in a negative, derogatory and dehumanizing manner that categorizes them as inferior people, enabling them to be subjected to unfair treatment. Xenophobia is characterised by extreme nationalism, expansive economic protectionism, identity formation, blatant intolerance and hostility towards 'the others' and violent acts against non-locals. Colonial merging of heterogeneous societies and the division of homogenous societies

reinforces these inter-group conflicts. Historically and in the contemporary period, xenophobia is a systemic political, social and economic expression of imperialism. At the global level, discrimination is deep-rooted and systemic and should be understood from a socio-cultural, economic and political perspective. While colonialism determined Africa's heritage, neo-colonialism defines the current condition of the African people with globalization deepening impoverishment and xenophobia providing the evidence and symptom of these realities (Khoapa 2016).

Although globalization promises accelerated flows of capital, labour and people across state borders, ironically, it has been marked by what Nyamnjoh (2006: 1) described as "accelerated closures". He notes that, "the rhetoric of free flows and dissolving boundaries is countered by the intensifying reality of borders, divisions and violent strategies of exclusion" (Nyamnjoh 2006: 1). Globalization exemplifies the elimination of state's borders and enhances inter-state labour mobility, but it also deepens identity formation and the mass impoverishment of the underprivileged. The IPSA Congress Theme for 2018, Borders and Margins, notes that:

> *Borders are more than territorial lines demarcated by road signs, official checkpoints, even barbed-wire fences and fortified walls, but institutions in themselves. They have a dynamic character arising from their formal or informal functions and impacts. At a time when entire regions have been destabilized by the implosion of borders – often imposed by former and current imperialisms rather than arising through freely negotiated or democratic means – these margins are now conflict zones and flash points in national and international politics* (IPSA/AISP 2017).

Many scholars have investigated globalization's impact on the evolution and character of modern states' borders. Gradual global integration has promoted easy movement of people, goods and services across states' borders. In 2012, about three million people immigrated to South Africa, including 171,702 asylum seekers and 57,899 refugees (Gomo 2010). While this would undoubtedly put pressure on the country's resources (especially in light of the need to redress apartheid injustices), this is no justification for xenophobia. Adam and Moodley (2003: 15) questioned whether competition for economic opportunities or the apartheid legacy explain xenophobia, and instead locate it in the broad spectrum of poor governance:

> *But xenophobia cannot be reduced to problems of a labour market alone and we soon had to question whether an impoverished township life suffices to explain scapegoating. The neglect of shanty towns was embedded in the overall political development of South Africa, where an urban elite continues to pay only lip service to the fate of the poor…blaming the apartheid legacy for most of the current political deficiencies too easily exempts inept, self-indulgent new rulers. Failing to deliver textbooks in Limpopo or a teachers' union paralysing Eastern Cape education cannot be explained or excused by simply invoking Verwoerd's Bantu education of six decades ago* (Adam and Moodley 2003: 15).

Despite intense efforts to reduce public sector corruption in the late 1990s, "corruption eruption" remains an endemic feature of the African political economy (Akinola and Uzodike 2014). The influx of immigrants does not explain the political corruption that rocked xenophobic-prone African states like Nigeria and South Africa; neither does it account for intra-party conflict and the dwindling legitimacy of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Politicization of xenophobia

will thus, not solve the deep-rooted socio-economic and political crises in many African countries. As in other societies in Africa,

> *there has been little attempt by officials to acknowledge that the abject living conditions of millions of poor South Africans and the lack of social services, is a contributing factor, particularly in a context of gross corruption and kleptocracy within government circles* (Kajee 2015).

Addressing this issue would be a sure path to pro-immigration attitudes and acts.

Structure of the Book

The contributions to this volume cover the realities of xenophobic dispositions and acts in different African societies. It presents the research work and experiences of the contributors as well as their personal observation of xenophobia (including racism and ethnophobic) across the continent. The book adopts a theoretical, empirical, comparative, and case-study approach to understanding this vexed phenomenon in its broader and narrow form, which is generally applied in the case of Africa. It is located in critical thinking; the research and philosophical methodology that guides each chapter is presented and the contributions draw on historical experiences as well as contemporary realities to explore societies and states' disposition to immigrants. Primary and secondary sources of data were gathered and analysed. Aside from published text, official and newspaper reports and unstructured interviews were employed to gather the new data required for a robust analysis of xenophobia in Africa. The contributions were carefully selected after rigorous editorial and double blind reviews.

The political economy approach adopted to analyze and understand xenophobia is one of this book's strengths. Previous studies did not establish the fact that xenophobia in many African countries is a major impediment to the continent's economic and political integration. The book relates the story of a failed African integration project and questions the utility of the principle of *Ubuntu* in South Africa, and the relevance of the Pan-Africanism discourse on the continent. Scholars tend to analyze xenophobia from the perspective of immigrants. The literature is quick to condemn xenophobic attitudes and acts without making concerted efforts to interrogate the nefarious activities of some foreigners in their host countries, especially in South Africa, where some, with police complicity, engage in the sex trade, drug peddling and other fraudulent activities. This book systematically reveals such as drivers of xenophobia.

Among others, this book addresses the following questions: Who is xenophobic? How best can we understand xenophobia? How are foreigners perceived in countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe? What are the motivations for xenophobia? Has xenophobia become a political strategy by the elites to divert attention from poor service delivery and weak leadership? Are there theoretical explanations for hate speech or intolerance of foreigners? Have African states

adopted institutional mechanisms that support xenophobia? Is the resurgence of economic protectionism in Africa a reflection of xenophobia? Does xenophobia explain the continent's inability to achieve effective regionalism? What are the implications of xenophobia for the regionalism project? The book thus provides a theoretical understanding of this phenomenon and offers practical policy options to combat its proliferation. It critically assesses how xenophobia has impacted on the three elements of political economy: the state, economy and society. Across Africa, particularly in South Africa, where hundreds of lives have been lost to xenophobic attacks and property worth millions of dollars has been destroyed, hostilities to foreigners – usually tagged 'the others' are potent impediments to peace, security and development.

It is pertinent to explore the motivations for xenophobia in Africa and trace its roots to colonialism, which created the modern state system, divided homogenous communities into different countries in some cases, and merged opposing communities in others. This distortion of African communalism and community spirit goes a long way in explaining the spate of xenophobia. Some scholars also ascribe xenophobia to state failure, especially governments' inability to provide effective service delivery and generate gainful employment for their teeming populations. This engenders frustration and attacks on foreigners.

Despite the manifestations of xenophobia, and its influence on the political economy of Africa, some schools of thought persist in regarding it as a myth. This book also interrogates this assertion and validates the reality of xenophobia.

The introductory chapter – *Understanding Xenophobia in Africa* – contextualizes xenophobia and provides an overall background. Chapter 2 – *Crisis of identity and Xenophobia in Africa: The Imperative of a Pan-African Thought Liberation* – by Oloruntoba explores identity assertiveness as a display of ignorance or a result of the deliberate denial of ethnic, national or racial identity in the prevailing global order. Employing a historical materialism and political economy theoretical approach, the author argues for proper understanding of the shared identity of Africans and their subordinate position in the international division of labour, which has the potential to combat xenophobia. In conclusion, the author advocates for the reconstruction of African identity through the ideological and intellectual project of Pan Africanism. In Chap. 3 – *The Scourge of Xenophobia: From Botswana to Zambia* – Akinola explores the manifestation of xenophobia in two Southern African states, Zambia and Botswana. While immigrants are scapegoated in both countries, in Zambia, Rwandans are singled out for attack, while in Botswana, Zimbabweans were specifically targeted. The author highlights the distinctive features of xenophobia in the two countries. While Zambia has recently witnessed violent xenophobia, Botswana has consistently manifested subtle forms of discrimination against immigrants. As reinforced by personal communication, pervasive governance failures in the two countries explain xenophobic attitudes and acts.

In Chap. 4 – *The Context of Xenophobia in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in Comparison* – Okunade and Oni historicise anti-immigration dispositions in these African giants. They identify economic protectionism and identity consciousness as factors causing xenophobia and explore the implications for Pan-Africanism.

Chapter 5 – *Nigeria's attitude towards South Africa's perceived xenophobia: Exploring a shared hegemonic power for Africa's development* – compares xenophobia in Nigeria and South Africa, and notes that both occupy hegemonic positions. The author establishes linkages between xenophobic incidents in South Africa and its claim to regional hegemony. He highlights that Nigeria focuses on South Africa's status as a xenophobic nation to reinforce the former's claim to hegemony on the continent.

Chapter 6 – *Democratization and Legitimization of Xenophobia in Ghana* – examines xenophobic attitudes and acts in Ghana, a country hitherto regarded as the epitome of peace and tranquillity. Collins attributes the anti-immigration debacle to the socio-economic crisis experienced in the late 1960s. Based on open-ended interviews, he reveals how the ruling elites politicized and employed xenophobia to mobilize support during the elections and recommends a pragmatic national agenda to contest xenophobia in the country. In Chap. 7 – *South African Higher Education: the Paradox of Soft Power and Xenophobia* – Tella decries the dearth of studies on the actual or potential role of higher education in the projection of South Africa's soft power in the consciousness of international students enrolled at the country's tertiary institutions. He asserts that xenophobia impedes this sector's capacity to portray the country in a positive light and enhance the state's soft power on the continent.

In Chap. 8, Wilson and Magam offer a theoretical understanding of the factors responsible for xenophobia in South Africa. Under the title, *Frustration-Aggression, Afrophobia and the Psycho-Social Consequences of Corruption in South Africa*, the authors identify corruption and the inability of successive post-apartheid governments to meet the expectations of South Africans as decisive motivations for anti-immigration sentiments. Fagbadebo and Ruffin expand the discourse on xenophobia in South Africa in Chap. 9 – *From hate to love: Black South Africans and the Xenophobia Project*. They reinforce the prevalence of xenophobia in the country and advocate that foreigners' skills and expertise be used to build the capacity of the local population through skills transfer and partnerships. Faluyi and Adeogun address *Xenophobia, Racism and the Travails of 'Black' immigrants in South Africa* in Chap. 10. Pointing to the double-jeopardy experienced by black immigrants and drawing on South Africa's history, they analyze the travail of black immigrants that suffer racial discrimination from white settlers and violent attacks from black South Africans.

In Chap. 11 – *Xenophobia-Coloniality Nexus: The Zimbabwean Experience* – Banyera locates xenophobia in colonialism. Through unstructured interviews, he found that colonialism either created or reinforced most of the clashes of identity (race, tribal cleavages and ethnicity) upon which xenophobia feeds. He employs the three categories of violence postulated by Slavoj Zizek (subjective, symbolic and systemic) to assert that xenophobia has a logic which perpetuates coloniality through various forms of reproduced 'violences', which was evident in Zimbabwe. Therefore, xenophobia cannot be explained without recourse to Africa's historical heritage. Chapter 12 – *The Quest for Development in Zimbabwe: Rethinking the Xeno-Ethnophobia Tint and the Land Reform Question* – by Lukong and Sabi

engages the land reform-xenophobia nexus. This chapter critically investigates Zimbabwe's post-2000 land reform programme to identify the prejudices that tinted the implementation process and its implications for the country's development prospects. They note that land reform disregarded the rule of law, created massive antagonism, and led to severe human rights violations, and xenophobic incidents, particularly against white Zimbabweans of European ancestry. The authors characterise discrimination and prejudices as 'xeno-ethnophobic' towards white commercial farm owners, who are treated as 'the others'.

Finally, in Chap. 13 – *Xenophobia and the Paradox of Regionalism in Africa: The West African Experience* – Akinola analyzes the impact of xenophobia on West Africa's regionalism. He notes that, anti-immigration movements in the sub-region are impediments to peace and development and that, hostilities and violence against foreign nationals have contributed to the difficulties associated with a vibrant economic bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). They have impeded efforts to implement the ECOWAS Protocol, which promotes the integration of all West African citizens. The author is also critical of diverse institutional support for xenophobia, decries ECOWAS' indifference in the face of this phenomenon and calls for multilateral strategies to combat xenophobia in West Africa, and Africa at large.

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Chapter 2
Crisis of Identity and Xenophobia in Africa: The Imperative of a Pan-African Thought Liberation

Samuel Oloruntoba

Introduction

Africa experiences with other parts of the world have been broadly characterised by exploitation, degradation, denigration and usurpation of the personality of Africas (Mazrui 1999; Nabudere 2001). Named by the Europeans to describe people that live in the present geographical space, some form of solidarity has been formed among Africans to resist, reject and repudiate the global domination, especially that of the West and Arab, on the continent. In this regard, Pan-Africanism provided the rallying point of resistance against colonialism in the twentieth century, resulting in the successful political decolonisation of the continent. Paradoxically, this movement and the ideology of unity and collectiveness that underpin was not effectively sustained to the point that it can lead to both economic, psychological and mental decolonisation of the continent.

Given the infamous and particularly destructive form of slave trade that the Arabs carried out and continue to carry out in one form or the other in Africa, there have been debates on whether or not they should be regarded as Africans (Prah 2001, 2006, 2010; Chinweizu 2011). Although the Arabs were also colonised by the West and indeed paid dearly in the form of massive loss of lives during the struggle for independence, they have identified more with the West than the other parts of the continent. Thus, references to Africa identity in this chapter refers largely to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite the near uniformity in the experiences of Africans in their relationships with the rest in terms of socio-economic marginalisation, disrespect and the continuity of their collective struggle for a better deal, Africans have continued to suffer from a crisis of identity, in which they differentiate themselves on the basis of what

S. Oloruntoba (✉)
Thabo Mbeki Institute, University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: soloruntoba09@gmail.com

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some scholars have described as bondage of boundaries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga 2013). The bondage of boundary represents the decision to maintain the colonially defined boundaries at the Berlin Conference of 1884 and 1885, where the world imperial powers arbitrarily divided African lands and the resources therein among themselves. In what Adebajo (2010) calls the 'Curse of the Berlin', sustenance of these boundaries have defined citizens and subjects in the post-colonial Africa. The crisis of identity has been reinforced by self-hate and the resultant xenophobic or more properly put, Afrophobic attacks on other Africans at regular interval (Nyamnjoh 2006; Prah 2001).

Some scholars attribute xenophobia to struggle over limited economic resources and opportunities, owing essentially to the increasing marginalisation of Africa in a globalised world, (which now appears to be in retreat due to the rise of ultra-nationalist forces in advanced countries such as the United States of America and Europe) (Ajulu 2010).Others argue that these violent attacks are products of narrow nationalism and the deliberate efforts of political elites to deflect the anger of the frustrated citizens at foreigners, with the ultimate aim of scoring cheap political points (see Nyamnjoh 2006; Neocosmos 2010; Oloruntoba 2016). In this chapter, I extend this debate to argue that while these factors contribute to the challenges of xenophobia, a more nuanced and pertinent cause of self-hate is the crisis of identity in which the oneness of Africans as a racial category is neither understood nor appreciated. Furthermore, while many see Africa (despite their ethnic differences) as one people, politics of difference, underpinned by political expediency, anchored on the principle of self-negation, ignorance, distorted thought processes and the struggle for relevance in an atmosphere of scarcity have continued to foster the differentiation of Africans as a people on the basis of national boundaries, ethnicity and tribal allegiance.

Consequently, it becomes imperative to engage in thought liberation[1] of Africans to resolve the problem of identity, and its resulting xenophobia. The liberation of thought will also include but not limited to the de-sentimentalisation of the mindset and perspectives of Africans in their relationship with the one another. In this context, it is important to emphasise that whereas the rest of the world relates to Africa on the basis of cold and self-calculating pursuit of national interest, in which power is the main denominator, Africans have been very un-scrutinising and unsuspecting in welcoming, applauding and patronising people from other continent. While this humanistic disposition is both commendable and culturally nuanced, it has been abused to the extent that the global environment, especially the West and other parts of the world misconstrue such African's hospitable nature to mean intellectual weakness, group inferiority and absence of sound business elites.

Although the achievement of liberation thought processes will not be easy especially in the light of the unending coloniality of knowledge, where Eurocentric theories, languages, history and production of knowledge still define the curricula in

[1] By thought liberation, I mean the conscious deconstruction of the inherited, dominant, dependent, destructive and self-hating thinking processes that have defined an average African in his or her relationship with fellow Africans.

virtually all African institutions of learning. In such ways, the sense of self-knowing, appreciation, identification, stronger voice and solidarity that it will foster could reconcile the current crisis of identity and the resultant serial xenophobic attacks that have come to be the defining characteristic of many postcolonial Africa such as Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Gabon, Guinea among others. For instance, while Ghana deported Nigerians in 1968, Nigeria deported Ghanaians in 1983. Since 2008, South Africa has been the hotbed of xenophobic attacks against foreigners, especially other Africans, the most recent being February 2017 (Neocosmos 2010).

After the introduction, the rest of the chapter is divided into many sections. In section two, I explicate on the crisis of identity in terms of conceptual, theoretical and historical underpinnings. Section three examines xenophobia as it has manifested in its various dimensions, as well as the arguments that have dominated its occurrences, while section four makes the case for a Pan African thought liberation as a necessary condition for addressing the crisis of identity in Africa. This section connects the core of the argument to the history of Pan-Africanism and its roles toward the political decolonisation of the continent. Section five concludes. This is followed by the conclusion.

The Crisis of Identity in Africa: A Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations

Identity crisis has been one of the main challenges facing post-independent Africa. Although there is a sense of commonality among Africans as people who belongs to a race, occupy a geographical space, share similar cultures, history and in some instances language, a combination of past experiences, cultural practices and the political economy of survival have led to differentiation on the basis of artificial borders and ethnicity. Scholars have argued that one major contributory factor to the crisis of identity in Africa was the legacy of colonialism. Maathai (2009) and Osoro (1993) posit that colonialism led to the loss of identity through the disintegration of the societal hierarchies that had developed for centuries. While precolonial Africa might not have been spared the normality of conflict as people competed for scarce resources such as lands, water and power, by forcefully separating people with shared heritage, cultures, religious practices into different nations, imperialism and its successor, colonialism accentuated the crisis of identity in Africa (Ki-Zerbo 2005). As Mamdani (1996) argues, in order to establish a traditional system of administration that was pliant, beholding and sympathetic to their cause of domination and exploitation, the colonialists destroyed existing traditional system of governance and administration. They also prop up new ethnic identities and tribes, while playing one against the other in what he later calls define and rule (Mamdani 2012). In his review of the latter works, Kennedy notes the following about Mamadani's two books (*Citizens and Subjects: Legacy of late colonialism* as well

as *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity*) on the effects of colonialism on the construction of African identity, both in the past and in contemporary epochs:

> The system of indirect rule that the British instituted across much of Africa was 'quintessentially modern' mode of governance that sought 'not just to acknowledge difference but also to shape it'…Mamdani argues that colonial authorities reified the types of difference-race and tribe-which distinguishes those who were subject to civil law (Europeans and other immigrants as racial outsiders) from those who were subject to customary law (Africans and tribal natives). The aim of the colonial state was to create a classified structure that contained Africans within a multiplicity of mutually exclusive tribal categories, each with its own distinct traditions and territories; divide and rule, thus became 'define and rule' (Kennedy 2013).

This observation is very poignant as it is evident to see the fruits of the seed of discord sowed by the colonialists in post-independent Africa. This manifested in the form of wars and conflict over boundaries, struggle for power among ethnic groups, leading to genocide (as in the case of the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda), civil wars in Nigeria, Liberia, Ivory Coast and other places on the continent.

Beyond the macro-challenges of conflict and internecine wars that the legacy of slave trade and colonialism fostered in Africa are other micro effects such as mistrust, distrust and loss of confidence in one another as Africans. Osoro (1993) argues that part of the challenges of leadership in post-colonial Africa is the preoccupation with replicating the domination of the weak segments of the society in ways that replicate what the colonialists did to the natives. He notes that the crisis of identity in Africa manifests in societal retreat into tribalism, class domination and political intolerance of Africans against Africans. Linking such contradictions to the legacy of colonialism, Osoro maintains that self-negation of Africans against Africans was borne out of the subtlety of the colonial masters, who relished in playing the people against themselves, through the imposition of religious, political and foreign value systems.

The salience of this argument is visible in most of the postcolonial states in Africa where the two main religions, Christianity and Islam, have continued to serve as the basis for conflict for decades. In this regard, Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, which is roughly divided by half between Christianity and Islam is a classic case of a society where recurrent conflicts over religious practices have led to the death of thousands of people and displacement of millions more. For instance, the Boko Haram insurgency that started in 2009 has led to the death of over 20,000 Nigerians as the adherents of the Salafist Islamic movements engaged in killing both Muslims and Christians as well as combatant and civillians, based on the flimsy excuse that these victims are not practising their brand of Islamic religion (Akinola and Uzodike 2014). It is even more paradoxical that despite the large number of churches and mosques in the various African countries, spirituality, broadly conceived here as love and kindness toward others, has not taken root on the continent. The checks and balances that traditional religion provided in pre-colonial times, which to a great extent helped to foster high level of morality due to the fear of instant judgement by the gods have taken flight.

Another dimension of the crisis of identity which colonialism fostered on Africa is language. Although the language of the colonialists appeared to have fostered easier communication among Africans, this fact is only part of the narratives.

Language imperialism has further alienated Africans to the extent that many Africans, under different colonial authorities, can hardly communicate among themselves as they are particularly stuck in the languages of their former colonialists such as Britain, Portugal and France. This also sharply deepened the hostilities among Africans who are divided along the colonial language cleavages. The deleterious effects of the continuity of the domination of foreign language on construction of an African identity and socio-economic development has been the subject of many scholarly works like that of Ngugi Wathiogo (Wathiogo 1981).

Apart from the historical factors that have continued to shape the construction of African identity, the globalisation processes and the uncritical acceptance of Euro-American ways of life, under the garb of modernisation have fundamentally altered the cultural patterns of interaction among Africans. Understandably, identity, like culture, changes with time, Africa has been unduly affected by the rampaging force of globalisation, with the result that today many educated Africans are disconnected from their roots, linguistically, culturally, and philosophically. To a great extent, individualism and the pursuit of self-interest have taken centre stage in a way that undermine the communitarian nature of the African society. On this score, some scholars such as Mvuselelo (2009) and Murithi (2006) as well as African political elites, have argued that the communalistic nature of the African society, broadly exemplified by the Ubuntu philosophy of living through the prism of others, have been at the core of the challenges facing Africa today, in terms of underdevelopment, creativity and innovation. Kochalumchuvatti (2010:112) argues that, any close examination of African cultures and traditions will reveal the simple fact that all too often scant attention is paid to self- individuation. The self is defined in relation to a larger social or ethnic group which encompasses not only the living but also the dead, the spirits, and the unborn. He then concludes that based on the above, African thought requires a new emphasis on the development of subjectivity which, in turn, will permit self-individuation. This approach holds out hope of a positive future for a troubled continent. It is only the mature and responsible subjects (persons) who can perceive, understand and make critical evaluations of their situations and then act responsibly. There are some merits in this argument, and I elaborate more on them in the penultimate section. Suffice is to note that the contradictions that result from the antimony of so called modernity and traditionalism have fostered self-hate, self-negation, and self-denigration. One of the results of such contradictions is xenophobia, as presented in the following section.

Xenophobia in Africa: Origins, Dimensions and Implications for African Identity

Central to the discourses on xenophobia in Africa is inter-state migration of both skilled and unskilled citizens. Migration has been an age long experience in Africa, as reflected in the migration of the Bantu from the Central to Southern part of Africa,

and the movement of people across the West coast to other parts of the continent (Adepoju 2001, 2008; Afolayan 1988). Nshimbi and Fioramonti (2014) reiterate how migration has been a normal part of life for the Southern Africans for centuries as they moved both northward and southward in search for economic opportunities in the copper belt of Zambia and Gold mines in South Africa. The frustrations that resulted from the economic failures of most post-independent African countries have led to mass migration of people from different parts of the continent. In similar case, Ghanaians flooded to Nigeria to take advantage of the oil boom in Nigeria in the 1970s through the 1980s, while people from other parts of West Africa migrated to Ivory Coast to become farm workers in the emergent country's agrarian economy from the 1960s. In Southern Africa, the economic crisis that affected Zimbabwe since 2000s have led to a surge of economic migrants from that country to South Africa (Neocosmos 2010).

Apart from form the search for economic security, which has fostered migration in Africa, another critical factor was security of lives and properties. A distinctive feature of post-independent Africa has been wars and conflicts, which have ravaged different parts of the continent. Countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Angola, Nigeria, Burundi, among others have passed through conflicts that led to the forceful emigration of many of their citizens to relatively safer neigbouring countries (Prah 2010). Also, many Africans, who were subjected to political persecution escaped from their countries of origin to neighbouring African countries in the 1970s and 1980s. This was particularly true of Southern African countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The settler colonial practices in these countries prolonged the struggle for independence as the settlers engaged in violent resistance to the demand for independence. Despite the artificial differences that the imperialists have constructed for the continent, Africans rallied around these 'brother-states' towards ensuring their political decolonisation. In this connection, it is important to emphasise that contrary to the narrow thinking and self-sufficient presumption of the advocates of xenophobia, many of their 'political idols' like Nelson Mandela[2] were received and supported during the struggle against minority rule. This scenario was particularly relevant to South Africa, where fleeing members of the African National Congress (ANC) were treated with dignity, respect and brotherhood during the apartheid regime (Ndlovu 2010) Many of the citizens who flew to other African countries received scholarships to further their studies. The cyclical nature of movement of people outside their countries of origin underscores the imperative of tolerance, accommodation and hospitality – features that have defined Africans cosmic and world view for centuries.

As noted above, xenophobia (dislike or hatred for foreigners or strangers) has been a recurrent problem in post-independent Africa. Kwesi Prah, one of the leading intellectuals on Pan-Africanism and African Unity, express the historical trajectories of the incidences of xenophobia in Africa thus:

[2] The globally respected President Nelson Mandela stayed in some African countries like Egypt at the height of the struggle against the Apartheid regime in South Africa.

> In Africa, in my lifetime, I have seen Ghanaians throw out Nigerians and other West Africans, under provisions of a so -called *Aliens Compliance Act,* during the Busia era, only for Ghanaians and other West Africans in turn, at a later stage, to be kicked out of Nigeria. Xenophobia against Somalis in Kenya has been well within the notice of my experience. Angolans are not loved in Namibia. In Botswana, since the 1970s, *anti-makwerekwere* language has been common. Eritreans, during the period of their war of independence were, as refugees, despised in the Sudan. Basuto, from what I know from the years I was there, sometimes treated other Africans, particularly with contempt…Rwandans are not loved in the Congo. There was a time, in the 1980s, when Zimbabweans became in wider Africa circles infamous for their ill-regard for other Africans (Prah 2010: 116).

While the above narrative may not capture the full extent of xenophobia in Africa, it shows how ingrained this socio-psychological problem has been on the continent.

Prah (2009) argues that xenophobia is not only caused by the fear that foreigners have come to take over jobs and in the case of South Africa, take over women, but it is borne out of the denigration of the host by the immigrants. In what may fit to what Osoro (1993) calls self-negation, African immigrants always see themselves as being better than their hosts. For instance, the South Africans consider Nigerians living in their country to be too brash, loud and dishonest, the latter consider the former to be too slow, passive and indifferent to life. Foreigners do bear the brunt of being responsible for almost all criminal activities, including tax evasion, an offense that knows no nationality.

In his seminal book on Insiders and Outsiders, Francis Nyamjoh provides a multidimensional analysis of the factors that foster xenophobia in Africa, with special focus on South Africa and Botswana. He locates the problem within the global structure of accumulation in which African occupy a peripheral position. Framed within the anthropological theory of insider and insider, in which some participants in economic activities have more privilege than the others, Nyamnjoh (2006) argues that the so-called citizens of the countries where xenophobia have taken place are not citizens in the real sense. However, because they assume themselves to be citizens who are entitled to live like the members of the transnational class or even with the semblance of such lifestyles, they see the foreigners as a threat to the attainment of such lives. Hence, the foreigners must be deported or ejected in order to preserve the privileges and maximise the opportunities of the locals. The author also explicates on the force of globalisation, liberal democracy and bounded citizenship as the main drivers of xenophobia. In the same vein, the author touches among other things, on the challenges that Zimbabweans faced in their home country. One of the main reason is the failure of the government to meet their needs, hence risked everything, including their lives to sojourn in South Africa and Botswana. This point is very apt and relevant to the experiences of other Africans that have left their countries of origin. Indeed, as mentioned earlier on, the failure of the post-colonial state to meet the yearnings of the people have contributed to the mass movement of people in one African country to the other. Beyond the usual loud newspaper headlines of violent attacks against foreigners in South Africa for instance, which has made xenophobia assume a life of its own, there are the subtle incidences of xenophobia in different parts of the continent. These manifests in the forms of discrimi-

nation on jobs, incentives, privileges and access to basic services. Even though virtually all African countries are signatories to the Universal Convention on Treatment of Foreigners or Refugees, many Africans living in foreign countries have been victims of deliberate discrimination in various ways. The wanton looting of the shops of other Africans and some Asians since in Asian Africa since 2008, are done under the banner of xenophobia.

Nyamnjoh (2006) stresses this point that in the particular cases of South Africa and Botswana, employers took advantage of the desperate conditions of migrants for exploitation. In his words, employers 'are determined to strip those they employ of personhood and dignity' (Nyamnjoh 2006: 235). In both case studies, the author also shows the complicity and denialism of the political elites on xenophobia and associated travails of migrants in these countries. For instance, former President Thabo Mbeki has argued severally that South Africans have been historically hospitable to other Africans. Hence, attacks against other Africans cannot be said to be an act of xenophobia but criminal acts carried out by the underclass, especially in the townships. Recent experiences have moderated this position of the former President. Even though he still rightly characterised the incidences as criminal acts, he singled out the attacks on Africans as unacceptable. In the wake of the attacks on foreigners in 2017, Mbeki (2017:2) commented thus:

> I must express my grave concern at events which took place in this city last week in the context of what was reported as 'an anti-immigrant' march…As South Africans, we should never forget the enormous sacrifices that were made by the sister peoples of Africa to help us achieve our liberation, and cannot now behave in a manner which treats other Africans who are now residing in our country as enemies or unwelcome guests, neither should we commit the offense of viewing or characterising the Africans in our country as criminals.

However, this perspective contrasts with the view of the current President Jacob Zuma, who somehow justified the looting of shops by saying there are too many immigrants in such diplomatic reactions have been countered by other observers of how African migrants in South Africa have suffered the indignities of subtle attacks on account of their nationalities.

In the wake of the widely reported xenophobic attacks of March and April 2015, Trevor Ncube, the publisher of Mail and Guardian in South Africa, wrote a scathing piece of how xenophobia in South Africa is from the boardroom to the street. He narrated a personal experience of how a very close South African friend expressed anger at the success of other Africans living in South Africa and the need for them to return to their countries. Ncube also makes an interesting point on the need to differentiate xenophobia from Afrophobia. He notes, rather correctly that all the incidences of xenophobia in South Africa have been largely directed at fellow Africans. Although this is not limited to South Africa,it is an African problem. Except in the incidences of terrorism or militancy against environmental activists, hardly has it occurred to many that non-Africans are attacked or despised on the continent as fellow Africans are wont to be treated. In all our airports, the light skinned people of various hues and cries are given red carpet welcome, mostly entering African countries without visa. Paradoxically, Africans, regardless of their level of skills and means, are made to complete all manners of forms and pass

through the eyes of the needle in a bid to secure visa to enter other African countries. This I particularly so for relatively more developed countries such as South Africa, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea and a few others. Herein lies the crisis of identity on the continent. It is commendable to see countries like Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia and a few others have changed their visa regimes to ensure that people get visa on arrival, without much hiccup. The adoption of an African Passport on the side-line of the African Union meeting in Kigali, Rwanda in 2016 is a welcome development. However, the feasibility of its domestication into the national laws of member countries remain contentious and problematic.

Pan-African Thought Liberation: An Imperative for Constructing African Identity

The imperative for thought liberation in Africa is underscored by the damages that several years of violent encounter with the West has caused on the psychology of an average African. As earlier presented, this has led to self-negation, abrogation of trust and preference for anything that is non-Africa, particularly western. On account of the violence and the associated damage that have been visited on Africans, the dominant victimhood of Africans in history books and the narratives in the media that nothing good can come of Africa, majority of our people hold the Caucasians in awe and accord them undeserving respect.

The political economy of post-independent African states and the associated struggle for existence have fostered both macro and micro challenges which undermine the development of African identity based on collective commitment to socio-cultural, economic and political development. Indeed, in a bid to secure maximum control over the resources of the state, political leaders and other emergent elites have mastered the art of instrumentalisation of ethnic and national identities for selfish objectives. In most instances, these elites have also surrendered the will and interest of their people in exchange for the interests of external predators, whose only motive for engaging with Africa is the continued exploitation and plundering of the human and material resources of the continent (see Ake 1996, 1981; Rodney 1972). Most African states has taken the posture of an enemy state, and so distant from their people, atomistic and disconnected from the society, with prebendal tendencies (Joseph 1987). Given the artificial nature of most African state, its dependent and external orientation as well as its limited capacity to foster either the construction of national identity or development, it has become imperative to think beyond this space in order to achieve a truly African liberation. In the same vein, the colonial origin of the creation of ethnic identities, which have stifled initiatives towards building nation-states from the mosaic of nations that the colonialists forcefully wedged together, underscores the need for thought liberation.

Any thought on constructing a Pan-African thought liberation must be located in Pan-Africanism itself. Various scholars have examined the origin, the triumphs and

the travails of Pan-Africanism (Mazrui 2001; Mudimbe 1998; Nkrumah 1963). Oloruntoba (2015) provides a contextual analysis on Pan-Africanism and maintains that Pan-Africanism is not just a movement but an ideological force that propel the decolonisation of the continent from imperial control. According to Kasanda (2016), Pan-Africanism, originated from the Diaspora as race based theory, anchored on the idea that black people all over the world would constitute a single nation and have a common destiny. Given this realisation of a common destiny among Africas, both home and abroad, there was a commitment towards fighting discrimination and exploitation, which they hitherto endured from the colonial powers and their associates (Kasanda 2016:179). The author shows that both in the past and in the contemporary times, Pan-Africanism have been subjected to intellectual scrutiny by other theories such as Afropolitanism, cosmopolitanism, postcolonial theories, and globalisation theories. While these may be relevant to some extent in contextualising and explaining the position of the black race in relations to other races, they are not sufficient to render Pan-Africanism obsolete. Pan-Africanism, as Kansanda would argue is,

> neither outdated nor incongruous with regard to contemporary black people's realities because its fundamental purpose is not reducible to a defense of both black and black identity as an end in itself; this movement aims at supporting the struggle for human dignity and freedom which was embodied through categories of race and black people's identity (Kasanda 2016: 179)

Despite the author's liberal approach to the understanding of Pan-Africanism, he concurs on the great historical role that the ideology has played in galvanising Africans across the continent to seek for the emancipation of those few Africans under the vestiges of colonial control. His advocacy for a less radical approach to the utilisation of Pan-Africanism as a tool for construction of black identity is only useful to the extent that race as a marker of respect, dignity, power and privileges is less latent in our contemporary times. Since race remains a potent force who gets what at the global level, it serves no useful purpose to diminish or limit the force of Pan-Africanism is the pursuit of complete liberation of Africans. With adherence to the principles of Pan-Africanism, incidents of xenophobia are unimaginable.

It is essentially on the basis of the significant contributions of Pan-Africanism to crystallisation of African identity during the colonial period and the continued manifestations of neo-colonialism that motivated my construction of a Pan-African thought liberation as a basis for an African identity. Definitely, Pan-Africanism was and is still about the improvements in the conditions of the black race across the world, who had to suffer the indignities of slave trade, the exploitation of colonialism and the continued marginalisation under the neoliberal global capitalist order. This is not to discount the fact that many of the inhabitants of Africa today have become citizens under various constitutional or forceful territorial arrangements. This are more prevalent in former settler colonial enclaves in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Kenya, and the Arabs who have occupied the Northern part of Africa for centuries.

The Pan-African thought liberation, which constitutes the core argument of this chapter necessarily implies a reconstruction of identity beyond the ethnic groups and the nation-states. It includes a reconfiguration of self in terms of mental orientation away from the current physically (on the basis of the artificial borders) and mentally bounded (on the basis of received socialisations) differences that have kept Africans apart from that of an African personality. This cause was at the core of the agitation of early champions of Pan-Africanism like Kwame Nkrumah Apart from the above, thought liberation must also take place at the micro-level. In this case, individuals should be free to act alone without being bogged down by what others will feel or think. This is particularly so if such actions are geared towards positive endeavours. While the Ubuntu philosophy which many African subscribe to can be good in promoting communitarianism, it becomes a liability when the tyranny of majority or crowd mentality prevents people from exercising their free will. In building an African identity, it is very important for Africans to extricate themselves from their dependent orientation on the global environment; West or East or South. As Adedeji argues in respect of the expectations that Africa has on the West in respect of granting foreign aid towards the execution of the New Partnership for African Development,

> There is always a child-like naivety among African leaders and policy makers that rhetoric and reality are the same and that claiming ownership is tantamount to having ownership. It is the Africans who are claiming that they are forging a partnership. The other side will no doubt continue to see it as a donor-recipient relationship (Adedeji 2002: 11).

He was right. A dependent outlook to life, which has defined Africa relations with the other parts of the world only speaks to an acceptance of inferiority and lack of capacity to galvanise autonomous development. This ahistorical world view needs to be corrected through an immersion into the history of great accomplishments that were recorded in pre-colonial Africa in form of building of great empires and creation of viable political institutions, development of agro and industrial economies and operation of wide inter-African trade networks (Gates Jr. 2017; Zeleza 1993). To achieve the above will require a change in the educational system from kindergarten to higher institution levels in such a way that the history of Africa will be correctly narrated to the learners. Africans leaders and citizens must also build on the current momentum towards higher level of integration not just for the purposes of trade but for the construction of African identity.

Conclusion

This chapter historicises the convergence between xenophobia and identity and examines the crisis of identity in Africa and how this fuel xenophobia. It particularly argue in support of the need to reverse the trend through a Pan African thought liberation. I have argued that while we cannot deny ethnic and tribal identity, they are suboptimal in their capacity to restore the dignity of the black race and the

transformation of the continent. Cobbled by both physical and mental boundaries, post-independent African leaders have failed to move beyond the artificially and arbitrarily contrived boundaries designed by the colonialists over the past centuries. This has rubbed off the mass of the people, majority of who are at the forefront of 'foreigners must go' campaign as witnessed in South Africa for instance.

Given the success of Pan-African movement during the march against colonialism and minority regimes in Africa, this ideological force can provide yet another rallying point for the construction of an African identity, where the pride, dignity and voice of the African man and woman can be assured in the global scheme of things. As with any effort towards social construction, this will not be easy as many interests are at stake. However, with mass mobilisation, participation of African citizens as well as effective communication of the benefits of this identity, there is a high likelihood of success. Success recorded will eventually eradicate the spates of violent conflicts and other hate cromes in some African societies. Lastly, given the continuity of race as marker of success and power in many aspects of our contemporary world, as well as the rise of negative nationalist movements across Europe and the United States of America, Africa has little or no choice than to build an identity that is sustained with technological, industrial and military power. To achieve this, there is a need for a Pan-African thought liberation that will foster the removal of the psychological inferiority, dependency, sense of helplessness and several abnormalities that define African experiences today. The attainment of peace, security, human and physical development depend on the indoctrination of Pan-African thought liberation.

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Chapter 3
The Scourge of Xenophobia: From Botswana to Zambia

Adeoye O. Akinola

Introduction

While subtle forms of xenophobia have been a consistent feature of Botswana's policymaking and social reality for decades, Zambia has only recently awoken to this scourge. Although the people of Botswana are not known to violently attack immigrants, attitudes towards foreigners are hardening (Nyamnjoh 2006). While violence against foreigners in Zambia is mainly directed against Rwandans, Botswana singled out Zimbabweans. Hostilities towards non-nationals have become very prevalent in Africa, particularly in Southern Africa. The lack of prompt intervention by state and non-state actors to restore law and order has reinforced arguments that most states in Africa manifest the attributes of a failed state.

Furthermore, the spill-over effects of xenophobic attacks are of grave concern in Southern Africa. Nyamnjoh and Musasa (2013: 1) note that, "the major political and economic transitions that Southern Africa has experienced in the past are likely to recur and create similar conflict in contemporary patterns and trends in migration". Although, socio-biologists conceive of xenophobia as a universal phenomenon, social scientists regard it as a mode of reaction generated by anomic situations in the contemporary state system (Kaluba 2016). According to Postel (2015), "almost half of the world's estimated 321.5 million international migrants reside in a developing country; 36 percent (82.3 million) were born and still reside in the global South".

The evolution of the state system in Africa and its nature and character resulted in the amalgamation of diverse people within geographical boundaries, while globalization has brought about a high degree of inter-state movement of people. The end result has been hostilities between locals and foreigners. While the United Nations noted that there were 173 million international migrants in the year 2000,

A.O. Akinola (✉)
University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa
e-mail: oyeakinola@yahoo.com; AkinolaA@unizulu.ac.za

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by 2015, this had increased to 244 million (Kaluba 2016). Increased movement of people across state borders is directly linked to the high degree of socio-economic and political convergence that characterises the new international order, tagged globalization. Globalization opens borders, enabling inter-state labour migration. This also manifests in South-North mobility. While access to economic opportunities is a major motivation for migration, it has aggravated unemployment in many host countries. This is true of Southern Africa. According to the World Development Indicators, the unemployment rate in Botswana reached its highest rate of 23.8% in 2003, and fell to 17.6% in 2006 and 17.7% in 2010. In Zambia, it stood at 15.9% in 2005, 7.8% in 2008 and 7.9% in 2012 (Kalitanyi and Visser 2010).

However, Botswana and Zambia are home to far fewer immigrants than South Africa. In 2011, an estimated 16,500 permit applications were submitted in Zambia, the highest level in recent years (Postel 2015). Nonetheless, Zambia, which was noted for its peace-loving nature and openness to foreigners, has joined other violent xenophobia-prone countries in Africa, where a cross-section of the local population treats non-nationals with suspicion and disdain. Many Zambians suffer an inferiority complex and are wary of immigrants who are regarded as financially more successful than locals. Immigrants from Rwanda, Lebanon and China are engaged in successful businesses. This explains why "xenophobic sentiments in the recent riots were more potent in some shanty townships than in middle-class and high-class residential areas" (Kaluba 2016). From the time of independence, Zambia never experienced the levels of xenophobic violence recently witnessed against Rwandans whose shops were looted in the infamous riots that spread to some townships in Lusaka.

Despite the fact that ethnic identity was succeeded by a universal political and legal citizenship and nation-building, there has recently been a resurgence of identity politics (Nyamnjoh 2006). Furthermore, hostilities have arisen, as diverse groups seek equity, better representation and improved access to economic prospects and mineral resources. Foreigners are perceived as a threat to the country's economic prospects. However, Botswana profits immensely from migrant workers (Nyamnjoh 2006: 20). Immigrants, many of whom are expert professionals, have made a significant contribution to the country's development. For example, they make up significant numbers of academics in the higher education sector (Personal communication, Sandton, September 2015). Zambia had similar experiences. Many of the foreigners living in the country are educated professionals that have invested in various sectors and offer diverse expertise and management experience, which immensely contribute to the expansion of local economy (Postel 2015). For instance, China has invested billions of dollars in the country's most viable industries, and is at the forefront of major infrastructure projects. According to Postel (2015), "migration reflects the pattern of investment, which has risen by about 60 percent since 2009".

Despite immigrants' contributions to the development of these economies, foreigners have been consistently blamed for inadequate infrastructure in Botswana and held responsible for social ills in Zambia. This chapter examines incidents and the nature of xenophobia in these countries and explores the theory of scapegoating in explaining this phenomenon. It begins with an introduction, followed by an

exploration of the theoretical root causes of xenophobia. The third section examines the prevalence of xenophobia in Southern Africa and its link with the regional agenda. The fourth section presents the realities of xenophobia in Zambia and Botswana, and the last section contains the conclusion.

Theoretical Framework

While most studies describe xenophobia as irrational fear and discriminatory attitudes towards non-nationals of a country, this definition does not fully capture the phenomenon, especially its manifestation in violent acts. Xenophobia goes beyond feelings or attitudes to involve hostile acts and "violent physical action: beating, burning, ejection and displacement, dispossession, dehumanisation and loss of human dignity, killing, looting, rape, torture and other forms of violence that constitute the experience of African migrants" (Dassah 2015: 128). Xenophobia is pervasive in Africa and is a powerful mechanism for mass mobilization and a tool in the hands of the political class. Xenophobia knows no boundaries. It has reared its head in both strong and weak states, even in hitherto Pan-Africanist-inclined countries like Nigeria and Ghana that have been at the forefront in promoting African unity since the 1960s (Dassah 2015).

The motivation for xenophobia in Africa is a question that preoccupies academics and policymakers alike. What explains the resurgence of an anti-immigration movement in Africa? What is responsible for hostilities against foreigners? How can we understand attacks on non-nationals? Is there a theoretical framework that explains the rise in xenophobia among many African states? Scholars have located xenophobia in many theoretical discourses, including isolation theory (for example, it has been posited that South Africa's international isolation during apartheid explains xenophobia in the country (Morris 1998)); frustration-aggression theory (poor infrastructure and economic prospect breed anger, which translates to aggressiveness (Misago 2015)), and scapegoating theory (foreigners are responsible for social ills and crime in host countries (Harris 2002)). Based on the nature and manifestation of xenophobia, this chapter adopts the scapegoating theory to explain the reality of this phenomenon in Botswana and Zambia.

Explaining the rationale for anti-immigration sentiments and acts, Kaluba (2016) maintains that "the mechanism, called the behavioural immune system, tells us to avoid things that are unfamiliar because they might contaminate our way of life". Foreigners are thus sometimes treated like lice, and the rise in immigration reported by the media and government officials deepens fears of increased social immorality and contamination of the local population. A survey found that Southern African states seem to exaggerate the number of immigrants in their countries in order to mobilize locals to regard foreigners within the region as a 'problem' rather than as an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-nationals (Crush and Pendleton 2007). This was also the case in South Africa. Applying the theory of scapegoating to South African xenophobic conflict, Misago explains,

> *Local residents in these areas have become increasingly convinced that foreign nationals are to blame for all their socioeconomic ills and hardships including poverty, unemployment, poor service delivery, lack of business space and opportunities; crime; prostitution; drug and alcohol abuse; and deadly diseases* (Misago 2017).

Zambians have responded in similar fashion. Dismissing this attitude, Catholic priest, Father Lungu maintains that foreigners are mostly law abiding and believes that attacks on foreigners could be acts of "scapegoating for our own problems of poverty and unemployment…huge numbers of young people are unemployed" (Phiri 2016). Inflation, and the rising cost of commodities cause hardship in the country, while unemployment has soared. The World Bank reports that inflation has risen above 20%, and that more than 60% of Zambians comprising 15.7 million people live on less than $1.90 per day (Phiri 2016). In other words, the 2015 xenophobic attacks in Zambia were not simply due to social decadence or criminality in the form of alleged ritual killings, but were also as a result of the economic misfortune that led to locals attacking those that they regarded as competitors for economic resources.

Locals cite social offences to "justify defensive reactions to a perceived threat… The crowd looks for a cause that will satisfy the appetite for violence. Mobs form to purge their community of 'corrupting elements', condemning them as the traitors who undermine it." (Isaacs-Martin 2012: 4). Immigrants are often accused of selling drugs, prostitution, rape and corruption, while the local population convince themselves that they are morally upright and immune from such acts. In Botswana, scapegoating has been relegated to the background due to the non-violent nature of acts of castigation against foreigners (Personal communication, Pietermaritzburg, December 2016). Nyamnjoh (2006) notes that, locals, especially those competing with foreigners, have a tendency to scapegoat non-nationals, who are referred to as *Makwerekwere*, a derogatory term mainly used in South Africa to stereotype foreigners and meaning 'outsider or perfect stranger'.

In contrast, the 2016 attacks in Zambia were triggered by alleged ritual killings by immigrants, particularly Rwandans. However, locals accused of the same crime were not attacked. Why are foreigners so vulnerable? A study revealed that, "foreigners are easy targets. Since they struggle to assimilate into and participate in the social infrastructure, they are targeted by persecutors simply because they have little recourse to the authorities… Foreigners are targeted because they are poor outsiders" (Isaacs-Martin 2012: 3). The impoverished status of many refugees and many unskilled immigrants have aggravated their socio-political exclusion, which extends to the police refusing to protect them.

Prevalence of Xenophobia in Southern Africa

As noted earlier, xenophobia is not peculiar to Southern Africa, with incidents recorded from West to East Africa. A new wave of xenophobia has emerged in East Africa that, if not nipped in the bud, could undermine on-going efforts at

political federation, the much-cherished goal of the sub-regional organization, the East African Union (Oscar 2006). In recent months, thousands of Rwandans were expelled from Tanzania where, as minorities, they have lived in accord with locals since the 1930s. Xenophobia has reared its head even in Uganda that prides itself on tolerance after the reign of Idi Amin inflicted harm on the Asian population, following protests over the planned government giveaway of areas of national forest (Izama 2011). This prompted the observation that "it is premature to have political integration among the East African countries" (Oscar 2006).

A similar fate has befallen the South African Development Community (SADC), the umbrella sub-regional body. Although the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) is more advanced in its integration efforts, xenophobia has also threatened this project. The East African population's reluctance to drop visa requirements in the sub-region is understandable, although not justifiable. A survey conducted by Steadman Associates in Dar es Salaam in early 2007 revealed that unlike Kenyans and Ugandans, who supported the union, most Tanzanians polled were opposed to the integration of the East African region as they feared that this would spawn crime, land clashes, tribalism and unfair competition to Tanzania, mainly from Kenya (Ondego 2007).

Tanzania was a safe haven for liberation fighters from Southern African countries like Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. However, in recent times, the peaceful co-existence of foreigners and locals have been distorted, the government and the local population have succumbed to the lure of xenophobia (Sikuka 2015). The *Tanzania Daily News*, which refers to illegal immigrants as "unwelcome aliens", reports that,

> *The tide of illegal immigrant arrivals is so huge the immigration officers have virtually failed to control them. Some come into this country to pursue economic prosperity. Others are smugglers of counterfeit goods…In some cases the aliens collude with locals including corrupt immigration officers and members of the Police Force* (Editorial 2017).

In a recent outburst, the country's Deputy Interior Minister, Pereira Silima maintained that, "Tanzania is for indigenous Tanzanians. Illegal migrants and criminals must stay away" (Editorial 2017). As in South Africa and Zambia, immigrants have become the scapegoat for social immorality and crime. This does not reflect the post-independence Pan-Africanist movement that promotes communalism and brotherhood across the continent.

The South African state recognises the damage caused by xenophobia and publicly apologised to African communities in Pretoria after the 2015 xenophobic attacks. On behalf of the government, International Relations Minister, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, said,

> *It is therefore with a deep sense of pain and regret that we as the South African government humbled ourselves before the African diplomatic community in our meeting with them today; and we expressed, through them, our heartfelt apologies to the African continent and people for the actions of those of our citizens who have behaved in a shameful manner* (The Africa Report 2015).

Despite the public apology, two years later, another wave of xenophobia resulted in the loss of more lives and property and the government was complicit. Recurrent attacks on non-nationals, especially from the SADC region, contradict the objectives of sub-regional initiatives. Southern Africa's longstanding dream is a united, peaceful, vibrant, viable and integrated sub-region. Unrestrained mobility within the sub-region is regarded as a necessity. The 2005 SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People was adopted to ensure the free flow of goods, labour and SADC citizens (without visas), for a maximum period of 90 days (Nyamnjoh and Musasa 2013). This was expected to enhance growth and development at sub-regional level. Despite this SADC members have embraced economic protectionism and closed their borders to citizens of other member states. Initiatives to implement visa-free bilateral agreements between some states are being treated with suspicion.

After the xenophobic crisis that ravaged Pretoria and Johannesburg in South Africa, the Mozambican and South African governments agreed to extend their free-visa agreement for inter-state visits ranging from 30 to 90 days (Maputo 2017). This project has been in operation since 2005. It covers Mozambicans visiting South Africa or South Africans travelling to Mozambique for "purposes of tourism, family visits, health care, business, conferences, seminars, workshops, student exchanges and sporting visits" (Maputo 2017). The question that arises is: of what good is such an agreement when Mozambicans are suppressed, attacked, maimed and killed by some South Africans and citizens of other SADC states? Citizens of SADC member states that found their ways across the borders, and perhaps Mozambicans that took advantage of the visa-free programme, have been at the receiving end of recurrent anti-immigration sentiments and violent acts in South Africa and other parts of Southern Africa. A respondent maintained that people from Southern African countries are reluctant to visit South Africa as, "no one knows when the spirit of xenophobia and violence will descend on them. It is better to be cautious despite any 'free-mobility' programmes within SADC" (Personal communication, Sandton, September 2015).

At its inception in April 1980, and its transformation from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to SADC in 1992, the sub-regional body has deeply invested in the South African liberation struggle (Sikuka 2015). Despite its weaknesses, SADC is still committed to the regional project. It aims to break down colonial barriers by opening up borders to facilitate the smooth movement of goods, services and people within Southern Africa. The ultimate aim is "improving intra-regional trade and facilitating the movement of skilled personnel in the region, as well as deepen people-to-people exchanges" (Sikuka 2015). Former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki stated,

> *We have always known that regardless of the boundaries drawn by others to define us as different and separate from our kith and kin, and even despise our occupation of different spaces across the divides occasioned by the existence of the oceans that nature has formed, we share with those of whom we are part, a common destiny (Sikuka 2015).*

This echoes the vision of African first-generation political leaders like Kwame Nkrumah as reflected in Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism is more than an ideology, it is a vision of an Africa 'that we have not seen' (Personal communication, Sandton,

September 2015). One of the challenges confronting SADC is the lack of citizen participation in regional initiatives and programmes. Citizens are not familiar with its policies on migration and its programmes are only known to government officials, SADC officials and other stakeholders in the integration process (Sikuka 2015). Just like other regional integration initiatives in Africa, the public are disassociated with SADC. This remains a clog in the wheel of the sub-regional body (Personal communication, Sandton, September 2015).

Like Zambia, other countries in the sub-region, including Botswana, are facing an unemployment crisis that has aggravated xenophobia, with locals accusing foreigners of 'stealing' their jobs. And the popular slogan, 'give us back our jobs' commands legitimacy in the Southern African region.

Realities of Xenophobia in Botswana and Zambia

The Case of Botswana

Just like other Southern African states, the culture of xenophobia that characterized the sub-region was evident in Botswana. During the early 2000s, the Botswana government adopted harsh policies towards migrants, culminating in the erection of an electric fence between Botswana and Zimbabwe. While the government denied that this was to deter illegal migration and claimed that the fence aimed to stop the spread of foot and mouth disease, illegal immigrants face deportation, with more than 50,000 people deported to Zimbabwe in 2009 alone (Louw-Vaudran 2014). Dube notes the subtle manifestation of xenophobia:

> *Clearly, dislike for foreigners is on the rise in Botswana, with Zimbabweans, the biggest foreigner population in the diamond-rich country, becoming the major target of a growing vigilante movement. Though rather less blatant than what happened in South Africa a while back, xenophobia knows no boundaries. It happens everywhere and anywhere; in homesteads, at work place, public service institutions such as hospitals, police stations, prisons, cattle posts, bars and even in political meetings* (Dube 2014).

Xenophobia is entrenched in public institutions like the police, government agencies, and traditional authorities (personal interview, Pietermaritzburg, December 2016). Dube (2014) notes that, Botswana's government extends its hostilities outside the range of refugees and average citizens of foreign origin to include those regarded as Africa's celebrated personalities. For instance, Gordon Bennett, the lawyer representing the marginalised Khomani San, who have been engaged in a legal battle with the government over the reinstatement of their land rights, was denied entry to the country to represent his clients in court. Industrial icon and Africa's richest man, Aliko Dangote of Nigeria, was also reportedly denied a visa in 2014.

Dube adds that Hollywood star, Rick Yune was refused entry and declared a 'prohibited immigrant' due to his support for Duma Boko, the main opposition to the ruling party, Umbrella for Democratic Change. The leader of South Africa's

Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and avowed opponent of President Zuma of South Africa, Julius Malema was also prevented from entering Botswana. In 2014, about 300 immigrants from Nigeria were deported. In an address to the African Leadership Forum in Dar es Salaam, 'Mogae', an organisation that conducts research into deportation, noted that, "we were a small country that ran an open economy and open society. But our present government has expelled over 2,000 foreign professionals over the past six years" (Dube 2014).

The Regional Commissioner in the Kagera region, Salum Kijuu warned against National Identification Cards falling into the wrong hands, meaning foreigners (Mulisa 2017). He advised all concerned "to conduct the exercise diligently and with maximum caution, considering that Kagera Region borders four neighbouring countries - Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya" (Mulisa 2017). The screening exercise was to be closely supervised to avoid issuing the cards to 'aliens'.

Intolerance of citizens of SADC member states was highlighted when Botswana announced it would no longer grant refugee status to Zimbabwean asylum seekers based on the belief that the political crisis in Zimbabwe had abated (Louw-Vaudran 2014). The Minister of Defence, Justice and Security, Ramadeluka Seretse, made it clear that political refugees from Zimbabwe should return home. He noted that the electoral logjam had been resolved and that the 2014 presidential elections in Zimbabwe were considered "free and credible" by SADC observers (Louw-Vaudran 2014). However, keen observers of the Zimbabwean political system would agree that as long as the incumbent, President Mugabe, is in power, it would be erroneous to call for the return of his political opponents.

In response, Alice Mogwe of the Botswana Centre for Human Rights noted continued breaches of human rights in Zimbabwe (Louw-Vaudran 2014) and added that "the information from our colleagues in Zimbabwe is that the situation is not conducive for refugees to return" (Louw-Vaudran 2014). Aside from President Mugabe's political intolerance, and on-going electoral violence, Zimbabwe's economic decline is a major motivation for emigration.

While Botswana has been home to immigrants from several countries including Nigeria and China as well as political refugees from Somalia, Zimbabweans constitute the vast majority of immigrants in the country. Despite the prevalence of xenophobia, respondents in a 2012 study on 'Unfriendly Neighbours: Contemporary Migration from Zimbabwe to Botswana', agreed that the country was more accommodating of foreigners than South Africa (Louw-Vaudran 2014). This explains the choice of migration to Botswana for employment rather than the richer and more industrialised South Africa. Moreover, no country in Africa has experienced such violent attacks on immigrants as South Africa.

An influx of immigrants comes at a price. While there can be no doubt that, Botswana has benefited from the brain drain from Zimbabwe, with the number of work permits issued to Zimbabweans rising from 1,000 in 2003 to about 8,000 in 2009 (Louw-Vaudran 2014), this has restricted employment opportunities for the local population. A lecturer at the University of Botswana noted that, the dire economic situation in the country has also limited employment prospects for foreigners: "unlike in the past, when there were so many job opportunities, it has become

very difficult, even for our own graduates" (Louw-Vaudran 2014). Faced with such situation, many states would protect citizens' employment opportunities; however, this can be done without castigating foreigners as job-poachers and unleashing violence on them.

Zambia and the Xenophobic Reign of Terror

The fact that Zambia has only experienced xenophobic attacks once in its history does not exclude the country from the 'hall of infamous and xenophobic states'. In 2006, about 62 Rwandan-owned shops were looted across the country (Kaluba 2016; Lusaka Times 2016). Violence broke out on 18 April in a heavily populated low-income area of Lusaka after locals accused a Rwandan tuck-shop owner of ritual killings. The homes of mainly Rwandans were destroyed and their shops were looted and vandalised. By the following day, the attacks had spread throughout the city's poor residential zones and involved other immigrants. Between 200 and 250 people were arrested in Lusaka. Rwandans who fled their country during the 1994 genocide were at the receiving end of another attack in their host country. It was estimated that there were about 6,000 refugees at the time of the crisis.

All-out attacks on foreigners followed. The security apparatus called for calm and arrested those looting Rwandan-owned shops in Lusaka. The locals accused non-nationals of masterminding series of alleged ritual killings in the country. Home Affairs Minister, Davis Mwila accused local criminals of taking advantage of the protest to commit crime (Lusaka Times 2016). He called for the maintenance of law and order and urged locals to continue to show hospitality to foreigners. Home Affairs Permanent Secretary, Chileshe stated: "Zambia did not experience xenophobia. Criminals only took advantage to steal private properties as members of the public also joined in looting goods and merchandises in homes and shops" (Lusaka Times 2016). Chileshe castigated journalists for insinuating that the attacks were xenophobic, and therefore related to the South African anti-immigration movement.

Reports revealed that locals were among those suspected of being involved in the alleged ritual killings (Karuhanga 2016). If this was simply criminality, why were the alleged culprits not attacked? Zambian President, Edgar Lungu was not deceived. He said, "it's a shame that this has happened in Zambia. The country is known for its peace and it was done to refugees. I will not allow this to happen again and I will make sure that police bring every culprit to book" (Karuhanga 2016). This is in stark contrast to the utterances of South African President, Jacob Zuma. For instance, in reaction to the 2015 xenophobic attacks on foreigners, leading to the destruction of lives and properties, Zuma said,

> *Our brother countries contribute to this. Why are their citizens not in their countries? It is not useful to criticise South Africa as if we mushroom these foreign nationals and then ill-treat them…Everybody criticises South Africa as if we have manufactured the problem.*

> *Even if people who are xenophobic are a minority, but what prompts these refugees to be in South Africa? It's a matter we cannot shy away from discussing* (ANA 2015).

In the past few years, Zambia has experienced a steady influx of immigrants, many of whom enter the country illegally. Simengwa (2014) notes that, "while there are many genuine foreign nationals in search of job and business opportunities, there is a multitude of others who have only succeeded in giving immigrants an unflattering image". Zambia is a very superstitious society that has experienced ritual killings in the recent past. In many cases, the local population have been the alleged perpetrators. A few days before the attacks, at least seven Zambians were murdered and their body parts removed, which seemed to point to ritual killings (Kaluba 2016). Rwandans were accused of masterminding the slaughter for sacrificial purposes.

Although, the 2016 attacks was the first major xenophobic incident in Zambia, there have always been stereotypes of foreigners. Kaluba notes that,

> *Most Zambians feel Indians are a parasitic, aloof, proud and isolated group that looks down on indigenous Zambians. For the Chinese, although many Zambians accept them for their readiness to integrate, some locals have misgivings about their intended goal in the country. For Lebanese, stereotypes also abound that the foreigners are crooks who put up a front of a genuine business while engaging in clandestine activities. Since Rwandese are black like us, the main bone of contention against them is that they are usually successful since they run businesses and compete favourably despite arriving in the country quite recently* (Kaluba 2016).

Unlike South Africa, the Zambian government prioritizes immigrants with high socio-economic standing. The largest groups of immigrants in Zambia are from China, India, and South Africa, followed by Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, and the United States, while the number of Somali, Rwandan and Congolese immigrants has also increased (Postel 2015). The state's immigration policy is founded on four pillars: for an immigrant to be allowed to stay, he/she must have a contribution to make in the form of skills, a profession, or capital; they should not deprive a Zambian of employment, should not be a burden on the state, and must be in possession of a permit (Postel 2015).

Aside from political and economic exclusion, foreigners also experienced social and marital discrimination. For instance, on 11 January 2017, the Inspector General of Police, Kakoma Kanganja issued a memorandum prohibiting police officers from marrying immigrants and stated that those already married to them should openly state this (BBC 2017). Police spokeswoman Esther Katongo observed:

> *Issues of security are delicate. If not careful, spouses can be spies and can sell the security of the country…When you get married, they say that you are one. You know what marriage is - you share secrets. And you can tell officers 'do not disclose' but you have no control. You won't be in their homes to always check on them…The security of the nation is what is paramount* (BBC 2017).

The government is also engaged in labour discrimination. The Home Affairs Ministry has cautioned employers to refrain from offering expatriate workers jobs which could be done by the local population:

> *There is no justification in having foreigners working as cleaners, plumbers, brick-layers and shopkeepers in Zambia when thousands of our well-qualified citizens in those fields are*

> *roaming the streets in search of anything they can do to earn a decent living. If such jobs, for which there is no shortage of skills on the local market, can be swallowed up by foreign nationals, then when are our people ever going to be empowered? We are not being xenophobic. Far from it; we are just stating the facts as they are everywhere else in the world, except in Zambia* (Zambian Department of Immigration 2017).

Denial of foreigners' right to labour is not peculiar to Zambia, but is a common practise in Southern Africa, Africa and the world over. The difference seems to be that some countries are flexible in its implementation, putting needs before legality.

Conclusion

The chapter critically examined anti-immigration attitudes and acts in Botswana and Zambia. It noted that xenophobia is not simply a feeling or attitude; it is also an act. The citizens and governments of both countries have perpetrated acts that singled out foreigners as scapegoats for the diverse social ills and economic challenges facing these countries. Although Zambia is not renowned for xenophobic occurrences, reports have confirmed its prevalence among the masses and the 2016 violence against immigrants dented the country's image as a haven for refugees and other categories of immigrants. In the case of Botswana, incidents of xenophobia, although non-violent, abound. While Zambians target and scapegoat Rwandans, Zimbabweans were targeted by people in Botswana. Although foreigners have been blamed for spiralling crime and other social ills in the two countries, dwindling economic opportunities and challenging economic realities, political discontent, and poor service delivery continue to aggravate social tension and reinforce xenophobia in the Southern African region. There is thus a need for mass sensitization programmes to promote attitudinal change. Civic education should be part of education curricula, from primary school to university. This would promote understanding of citizens' responsibilities and obligations to immigrants.

In previous decades, most xenophobic attacks were carried out in the Southern African sub-region. South Africans attacked foreigners during nation-wide violence in 2015 and Zambians violently assaulted foreigners and blamed them for social ills in 2016. In South Africa, locals accused immigrants of being responsible for crime. This is the spill-over effect of xenophobia. It is thus imperative for stakeholders in the African peace and security architecture to take the issue of xenophobia very seriously and formulate effective mechanisms to nip acts of hate in the bud.

As in the case of ECOWAS, xenophobia in the SADC region, particularly in South Africa, reveals the depth and nature of the challenges confronting the sub-region in promoting deeper integration. There is no trust among SADC member states and their citizens. Identity politics and extreme nationalism clog the integration process. This has threatened peace and security, which is regarded as an essential ingredient for sustainable socio-economic and political development. Southern African efforts at socio-economic convergence are located within the broad African integration project. Xenophobia constitutes a threat to integration of the Southern

African region. Therefore, SADC's failure is indirectly a limitation to the emergence and vibrancy of the United States of Africa.

The government has a very germane responsibility to curtailing xenophobia. The outbreak of xenophobic violence in Zambia was an isolated case, and the government, through its security apparatus, quickly restored order within a short period of time. In the case of Botswana, xenophobia is mainly expressed in a legitimate subtle way, but with institutional support, mostly through visa controls. In conclusion, governance failure explains xenophobic attitudes and attacks in the two case studies. States have the responsibility to provide effective governance. There is also a need to address the root causes of acts of hate by devising an holistic approach to addressing the possible root causes of xenophobia such as poverty, dwindling socio-economic conditions and unemployment. These are the foundation of the anti-immigration movements in Africa. Aside from providing infrastructure, governments should exploit the opportunities presented by foreigners in terms of skills acquisition and transfer, for human development. Ultimately, improvement in the livelihood of the masses will stem the tide of xenophobia in Southern Africa.

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Chapter 4
The Context of Xenophobia in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in Comparison

Ebenezer O. Oni and Samuel K. Okunade

Introduction

The frequency at which people migrate from one clime to another has continued to attract scholarly attention (Bauder 2006; Chaichian 2014). The reality of the global order explains the migration of people either temporarily or permanently. Various reasons have been offered for such movements and these include economic, social, political and environmental. However, economic and social considerations are the greatest motivations for migration. Economically, people migrate for improved livelihood, employment opportunities or realization of carrier objectives which may be more lucrative or enterprising in the newly found destination. Furthermore, globalization has increased the demand for labour in industrial countries. In respect of social factors, people move to other locations to enjoy better quality of lives in terms of access to infrastructure, education and healthcare which may be elusive in their home of origins (UNFPA 2015).

Having emphasized the fact that diverse factors explain migration, it is important to basically categorize them as 'push' and 'pull' factors. In respect of the 'push' factor, migrants are forced to move out of their homelands due to civil war, famine, poverty, religious, ethnic, political, racial and gender persecution, but in the case of the 'pull' classification, migrants are attracted by opportunities offered by new

E.O. Oni (✉)
Department of Political Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa (UKZN), South Africa
e-mail: ebinotopsy9@gmail.com

S.K. Okunade
Department of Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
e-mail: Samuel_okunade@yahoo.com

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locations or territories (Ballyn 2011; Siddiqui 2012). However, citizens of most host countries display hostilities and hatred against migrants based on the assumption that they may increase competition for resources. The hostility may often degenerate into violent attacks against foreigners. The nationals are not only culpable for the attacks, their governments are complicit through anti-foreigner's dispositions and laws. Ballyn (2011) alluded to this possibility when she observed that 'if we move back through history, we will find multiple examples of violent expulsion of people from their homelands often going hand in hand with persecution and genocide'. Observably, while citizens are persecuted and expunged from their homelands, they are also subjected to such heinous acts in foreign countries as migrants. As a matter of fact, South Africa during the apartheid regime caused a massive removal of African people from the cities into black townships. Worst still, many leading freedom fighters and opposition figures were exiled within or deported from South Africa, tortured, executed or murdered (Ballyn 2011). Simply put, this was an attack on race perpetuated by the ruling whites as blacks were subjected to every form of human degradation on their own soil.

On the other hand, local population often find it difficult to cope with foreigners, who migrates in search of greener pastures, and willing to accept lower remuneration for their labour and services, thereby leading to job loss for the natives. This often sparks a frosty relationship between the natives and the immigrants, leading to xenophobic attacks as a medium of communicating their discomfort and disapproval against foreigners. Xenophobic incidents, a recurring phenomenon in many African countries with attendant consequences for lives and properties, have threatened diplomatic relations between governments and nationalities. Though the borders between countries are increasingly becoming loosened and multiculturalism taking center stage of global human interactions, ethnic and identity consciousness exacerbated by xenophobia still define the basis of such cross-border and global human interactions. Therefore, this chapter assesses incidents of xenophobia in Nigeria during the 1980s in which nationals of neighbouring West African countries especially Ghanaians were expunged from the Nigerian territory and in comparison, undertakes a critical analysis of the manifestation of xenophobia in South African against the backdrop of the 2008 and 2015 violent attacks against foreigners. What is intended in the chapter is to compare notes on the nature, pattern and triggering factors of xenophobia in Nigeria and South Africa. The chapter is divided into different sections. The first, introduction, presents the background of the chapter. This is followed by a conceptual analysis of xenophobia in section two. Section three is an overview of xenophobia in Africa while section four critically assesses xenophobia in Nigeria and South Africa with the view to understanding its nature, pattern and triggering factors. Section five explores the implications of xenophobia in Africa on pan-africanism while section six concludes the study and makes discerning policy recommendations.

Conceptual Construct of Xenophobia

Xenophobia has over the years gained the status of a global phenomenon. It is not a one-continent affair as it has been practically experienced in one form or the other across different continents of the world. Literature is replete on the concept of xenophobia (Peil 1974; Harper 2010; Marsella and Ring 2003; Aremu 2013); however, there are no adequate works on its dynamism, nature and divergent manifestations in Africa. Yakushko (2009) defines xenophobia as a form of attitudinal, affective, and behavioral prejudice toward immigrants and those perceived as foreigners. Reynolds and Vine (1987) maintain that xenophobia is a psycho-logical state of hostility or fear towards outsiders.

Observably, xenophobia is intricately tied to notions of nationalism and ethnocentrism, both of which are characterized by belief in the superiority of one's nation-state over others (Licata and Klein 2002; Schirmer 1998). Watts (1996: 97) hypothesize that xenophobia is a "discriminatory potential", which is activated when ideology such as ethnocentrism is connected to a sense of threat on a personal or group level. For instance, there is a cultural perception that foreigners are snatching jobs meant for local workers. Watts further suggested that this prejudice produces political xenophobia, which results in the desire to create and apply public policies that actively discriminate against foreign individuals. Similarly, Radkiewicz (2003: 5) postulated that xenophobia is related to an ethnocentric "syndrome" with two separate dimensions: beliefs about national superiority, and hostile, reluctant attitudes toward the representatives of other countries.

According to the Centre for Human Rights (2009), Xenophobia is the perceived fear, hatred or dislike of a non-native or foreigner in a particular country. The word 'xenophobia' derives from two Greek words 'xénos' which conjures person that appears different, a guest, stranger or in common parlance a foreigner and 'phóbos' which translates literally to an experience of fear, aversion or horror (Hussein and Hitomi 2013). Xenophobia thus means the 'fear of a stranger or foreigner' (Bordeau 2010: 4). If applied in the context of cross-border interactions fuelled by globalization, it would mean the fear expressed by citizens of host or receiving countries against foreigners or citizens from other homelands over competition on resources they have hitherto been enjoying solely. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Rapporteur) defines xenophobia as 'a rejection of outsiders' (United Nations General Assembly 1994: 29). According to the Rapporteur, xenophobia is currently fed by such theories and movements as "national preference", "ethnic cleansing", by exclusions and by a desire on the part of communities to turn inward and reserve society's benefits in order to share them with people of the same culture or the same level of development. While the notion of xenophobia bears close links to concepts like racism and ethnic intolerance, its semantic distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is rooted in national identity, citizenship and a rejection of foreigners belonging to other borders, states or nations (Commission of the European Communities 1993: 14).

Marsella and Ring (2003) averred that xenophobia is often associated with times of economic and political instability. National economic inequality lures individuals toward countries that guarantee prospects for improved labour conditions, higher earnings or sheer survival. This explains why at some point, there was mass migration of Ghanaians into Nigeria and Southern Africans like the Malawians, Zimbabweans, Zambians and so on into South Africa. When such mass migration occurs across borders, it is often natural for the most affected host communities to react negatively. As opined by (Esses et al. 2001) the migration of large groups of people across borders can threaten the security (physical and economic) of the local population because of perceptions of economic strain or of cultural dissimilarity.

International Labour Organisation (2001: 2) identified some modes through which xenophobia manifests. These include prejudices, attitudinal orientations and behaviours against a foreigner, which can be prompted by political incitements, declining economic conditions or concerns relating to national security, particularly in the current era of terror attacks. While foreigners are generally affected, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants are often the central targets in xenophobic situations.

Trend and Forms of Xenophobia in Africa

In Africa, some of the evident manifestations of xenophobia have been the threat of expulsion of foreign nationals, unjust deportation, and in many instances, violent attacks against non-nationals have forced many to return to their countries. These manifestations dated as far back as the 1960s (Romola 2015). Romola distinguished different forms of xenophobia in Africa. In Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Uganda and South Africa, xenophobic reactions were majorly ignited by economic considerations. In Chad and Kenya, xenophobic prejudices were informed by the war on terror. In Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, politics as well as economic considerations triggered xenophobic expulsions. In Tanzania, Burundi and Congo Brazzaville, xenophobic actions were largely spurred by the rhetoric that foreigners were committing crime. In Congo Kinshasa, the expulsion of Angolans was political. Although, xenophobia takes different dimensions, they all have a unified goal; hatred for foreigners.

In November 1969 in Ghana, forty-nine days after Kofi Busia occupied the Prime Ministerial position, he introduced the Aliens Compliance Order (the Aliens Order), aimed at expelling undocumented aliens. Specifically, 'the Aliens Order required aliens who lacked work permit to get them within a period of two weeks or leave the country' (Gocking 2005: 156). Prior to the introduction of the order, there had been an emerging general perception of foreigners as the cause of 'large-scale unemployment that had befallen Ghana' (Aremu and Ajayi 2014: 176). Albinitio, the composition of the foreign population in Ghana comprised of nationals from other West African states such as Togo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. However, in 1931, Nigerians constituted the majority due to the successes recorded by those that

initially immigrated to the country, especially the buoyancy of their businesses. Therefore, the increasing entry of foreigners and the dire socio-economic conditions of Ghanaians gradually raised tensions in the country. Peil captured this thus:

> *They (Nigerians) are target workers; immediately they get a few Cedes they go into retail trade and they prosper too. They don't part with their money easily; they are unfriendly and do not help friends when they are in financial difficulty. They are impatient with buyers, arrogant and difficult to come to terms with. They are thrifty and clannish. They don't seem to trust Ghanaians and confide in them (Peil 1974).*

In response to increased pressure from Ghanaians, certain measures were initiated by the government such as the Aliens Order and the Ghanaian Business Promotion (GBP) which was specifically meant to enforce economic protectionism and preserve certain businesses for Ghanaians (Asamoah 2014: 187). He explained further that, in a bid by the Ghanaian government to facilitate the GBP, foreigners, tagged 'aliens' were restricted in respect of the kind of businesses they could engage in. Expansion of their businesses was dependent on meeting certain economic conditions in form of the provision of capital in monetary value. Oppong (2002: 26) noted that the order 'led to the mass exodus of between 900,000 to 1,200,000 individuals from Ghana.' According to Aremu and Ajayi (2014: 176), Ghanaians approved and celebrated the institutionalization of xenophobia as a nationalistic initiative to ensure the availability of jobs for Ghanaians.

In Kenya, there has been a display of forms of xenophobia. The waves of terrorist attacks by the Somali al-Shabaab group spurred up negative reactions against Somalis in Kenya (Harper 2010; Wambua-Soi 2012; Hatcher 2015). This reaction spilled over to the Somali refugees in Kenya. The Westgate attacks in 2013, prompted the Kenyan government authorities to threaten to shut the Dadaab camp which catered for about half a million Somali refugees (Romola 2015). This was based upon the discovery that al-Shabaab group was mainly dominated by Somalis. In 2014, approximately 4,000 Somalis were arrested in Operation Usalama Watch initiated by the government under the counter-terrorism policy to address the security challenges in the state (Boru-Halakhe 2014). Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake (2015) observed that 'in Kenya's attempts to address the threat of violent extremism, the Somali Kenyan community is often stigmatized.' They have therefore, been subjected to xenophobia.

Also, there has been a manifestation of xenophobia in Gabon. According to Henckaerts (1995: 16), Gabon took a decision to repatriate all Beninese from the country in 1978. Gray (1998: 396) pointed out that the decision was premised on the 'hatred' President Kérékou of Benin had for President Bongo and the citizens of Gabon. Gray further explained that the reason for this was not far-fetched. It was borne out of the accusation made by President Kerokou in May 1977. He accused officials of Gabon of an attempted mercenary coup that sought to oust him from power and as a result told African leaders that he would consider anyone who attended the regional summit in Libreville a traitor. In reaction, Gabon banned Beninese from coming into the country. Gray (1998: 396) revealed that, 'the person of Bongo and the image of the state were (…) merged in the minds of many Gabonese citizens.' In July 1978, when President Kérékou accussed Bongo at the

Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Sudan, expectedly, President Bongo became enraged (Gray 1998: 396). President Bongo in his response to the Chairman of the OAU stated that 'the anger of an entire people, which has been controlled for a whole year, literally exploded after the verbal vulgarities and insanities uttered at the OAU' (Gray 1998: 396). This led to the expulsion of about 9,000 Beninese from the country (Henckaerts 1995: 16). Whenever xenophobia manifests, the individual character is not taken into account, emphasis is directed at one's country of origin. That is all it takes to be attacked. According to Henckaerts (1995: 17), 'the sole factor of being a Benin national triggered the expulsion decisions without an examination of individual behaviour'. Gray (1998: 397) asserted that although the expulsion had implications on the economy and on the education system of Gabon, 'the Gabonese state was able to avert more serious political unrest through an exercise in citizenship promotion'.

There has also been a demonstration of xenophobia in Angola. This reflected in several mass expulsions of Congolese from Angola as a result of perceived theft of natural resources that belonged to Angola. In 2004, the Angolan government expelled an estimated 100,000 Congolese from Angola (Siegel 2009: 23). It did not stop there; over 160,000 Congolese were expelled between December 2008 and December 2009 (Adebajo 2011: 91). Angolan government reiterated its stand through its Foreign Minister who stated that Angola, 'will never give up its right to protect its natural resources and its right to repatriate citizens who are acting in a way which do not benefit the country'.

In response, the Congo Kinshasa government in 2009 expelled 50, 000 Angolans in retaliation to the mass expulsion of Congolese from Angola (Siegel 2009: 23). This was done 'amid a rising wave of popular anger over the humiliating treatment of those expelled by Angola' (Human Rights Watch 2012: 11). One reducible observation from the foregoing is that competition over resources and space has threatened or, in some instances, eroded the idea of multiculturalism and global citizenship upon which globalization is anchored.

Xenophobia in Nigeria and South Africa

Experiences of xenophobia in Nigeria and South Africa presented contrasting dynamics in the West African and Southern African countries respectively. By way of summary, the political economy of oil boom in Nigeria in the early 1970s through the early 1980s and the prosperity that followed was a major factor that attracted other nationals into Nigeria, particularly Ghanaians who took up menial jobs and occupied the small and medium enterprises sector in Nigeria. Again, the mismanagement and inherent contradictions of the oil glut of the 1980s as well as its attendant economic disarticulation led to job loss and inadvertently precipitated Nigeria's xenophobic attitudes against her neighbouring immigrants, particularly Ghanaians to reduce competition for scarce resources. This invariably led to the

formulation of the tag, 'Ghana must go' and its introduction into Nigeria's socio-political discourse.

South Africa case offers a contrasting reality. Xenophobia is a function of a long-standing life of domination and oppression orchestrated by a white minority rule system and white-black segregation which subjected the black majority to every form of suffering, denial, subjugation, oppression and repression. Freedom from apartheid regime meant that black South Africans would put in place resistance strategy against whoever intends to subject them to another form of neo-apartheid experience. However, this resistance has often targeted the African race, considered to be 'brothers and sisters', and not the whites who subjected them to the repressive Apartheid regime. It is thus important to ask, who is a foreigner in South Africa - Africans or Europeans? Who should be feared - African brothers and sisters that vehemently fought apartheid or whites that propagated it? How can we conceptualize the hostilities towards foreigners from Africa descent, is it xenophobia or Afrophobia?

Economic Recession, Revenge and Xenophobia in Nigeria

The oil boom experienced by Nigeria in the mid 1970s, occasioned by the embargo placed on the supply of crude oil from the Middle East to the West because of the Israeli-Arab war, transformed Nigeria into a big player in the international oil market. Not only this, Nigeria's public expenditure profile rose due to the oil wealth. The period saw Nigeria evolve from a poor agrarian economy into a relatively rich, oil-dominated economy (NCEMA 2013). This reflected much in the expansion of public investment, though on costly infrastructural projects, internally-driven industrial policy and expectedly a dominant economy in Africa. Arguably, this made Nigeria a toast of other African countries and a haven for greener pasture. It was in the light of this that many nationals of neighbouring West African countries particularly Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria in search of better life.

The immigrants were mainly engaged in menial jobs including house cleaning and services, street petty trading while few others got teaching jobs. However, there was a turn of event as Nigeria regressed economically and experienced decline in oil wealth due to the mismanagement of oil wealth and the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s. The over-reliance of the government on oil revenue and its failure to divest the economy away from oil with sustainable investments in such sectors as agriculture and solid minerals compounded Nigeria's economic woes and policy failure. The reality of the 'Dutch disease' associated with oil-exporting countries of the global south seemingly described Nigeria's economic crisis of the 1980s (Ismail 2010). Ismail noted of the Dutch disease thus:

> *The Dutch disease is the process by which a boom in a natural resource sector results in shrinking non-resource tradables. This process leads to increased specialization in the resource and non-tradable sectors leaving the economy more vulnerable to resource-specific shocks (Ismail 2010: 4.)*

The worsening and crippling economic fortunes of Nigeria predicated on the oil doom of the 1980s left the country with economic decline, increasing unemployment, galloping inflation, worsening balance of payment, debilitating debt burden and increasing unsustainable fiscal deficits, high incidence of poverty among others (NCEMA 2013). Hart 2016 aptly captured this when he noted that:

> *'the majority of the Ghanaian migrants were drawn to Nigeria during the oil boom of the seventies. But by 1983, the Nigerian economy was suffering. And it was an election year; Nigerian politicians hoped the expulsion would prove popular…(Hart 2016).*

To reverse the worsening situation, the government of President Shehu Shagari embarked on austerity measures in 1982 (NCEMA 2013). Meanwhile, the worsening economic condition and increasing crime rate were attributed in large measure to the influx of immigrants (The New York Times 1985). Due to the waned global demand for oil and the consequential drop in its price, Nigeria's foreign debt soared while its economy went into steep decline. Subsequently and as part of the recovery plan, President Shagari blamed the foreigners in Nigeria for the widespread unemployment and crime rate that followed (The New York Times 1985).

Thus, it can be argued that xenophobia reigned in Nigeria because of the declining economic conditions witnessed in the early 1980s after a period of economic boom in the 1970s that expanded the labour market and the need for cheap labour (Owusu 2012). Precisely, in 1983, the government expelled over 2 million foreigners from the country, more than a million of these foreigners were from Ghana (Aremu 2013: 340; Otoghile and Obakhedo 2011: 139). In addition to the decline in economic conditions, another key reason given for the expulsion of foreigners from the country was the alleged criminal activities of foreigners in the country (Aremu 2013: 341). In 1985, another wave of expulsion was carried out in which about 300, 000 Ghanaians were expelled from the country (Otoghile and Obakhedo 2011: 139–140). As with the first wave of expulsions, the worsening economic conditions constituted the basis for the deportation (Otoghile and Obakhedo 2011: 139).

Although the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria on both occasions (1983 and 1985) was linked to the retarding economic situation of the country at that time, the action could also be located within revenge and retaliatory theory. While this argument may be subject to debate, its strength is evidenced by the harsh expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969, the emphasis on nationals of Ghana and the ease with which the Nigerian government reached the decision to expel Ghanaians in the 1980s. As earlier presented, under former Ghanaian President Kofi Busia's Aliens Compliance Order, Ghana enacted the Aliens Compliance Order, and immigrants (mostly Nigerian) were expelled from the country. All foreigners in Ghana were required to have residence permit and, if they did not have it, obtain it within a two-week period. Kofi Busia expelled 20,000 to 500,000 Nigerians in about 3 months. The order drew admonitions from some West African governments, especially Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Mali, Niger, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso (Owusu 2012). The immigrants' marching orders of 1983 and 1985 could thus been seen as a combination of Nigeria's socio-economic woes and an act of retaliation. As a matter

of fact, the mass exodus of Ghanaians from Nigeria soiled Nigeria-Ghana diplomatic relations (Aremu 2013: 347). It is important to mention that the nature of xenophobia in both Nigeria and Ghana was subtle and non-violent. The expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969 and the retaliatory expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 were overseen by the governments of both countries through 'Alien and Immigrants laws' thereby reducing the tendency for citizens' expressions of aggression or violence. There were no records of violent attacks, death and injuries to lives and properties of affected foreigners in both countries. However, the 1983 xenophobia against Ghanaians in Nigeria created an opportunistic avenue for Nigerians who acquired the properties of Ghanaians cheap and the transporters who more than doubled the price of conveying the Ghanaians to the borders (Hart 2016).

Apartheid and Xenophobia in South Africa

The history of xenophobic violence in South Africa is arguably rooted in the legacies of apartheid and the failures of successive post-apartheid governments in effectively accommodating foreigners (Hanekom and Webster 2009/2010: 105; Adam and Moodley 2013: 37). Xenophobic attacks date back to 1995 when immigrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique living in the Alexandra township were "physically assaulted over a period of several weeks in January 1995, as armed gangs identified suspected undocumented migrants and marched them to the police station to 'clean' the township of foreigners" (Human Rights Watch 1998).

Crush and McDonald (2001: 7) asserted that native South Africans have a perception that legal immigrants are depriving them (the locals) of jobs and services while "illegal immigrants" allegedly lures the security operatives to corruption, this aggravates crime and denied the locals of accessing scarce resources. It is these perceptions that have led to rising hatred culminating into a high level of hostility and intolerance towards immigrants, particularly Africans. Arguably, this action can be linked to their experiences of apartheid which culminated in their sufferings, discrimination and denial and any attempt by foreigners to compete with them on benefits accruable to local nationals after apartheid would be resisted. Significantly, there have been frustrations over job positions and education admissions purportedly lost to foreign nationals. However, the major concern is the misplacement of their target against foreigners as a result of deep-rooted frustrations and anger.

The first widely known attack against immigrants occur on 11 May 2008 in the Alexandria settlement in Johannesburg. Migrants attacked were mainly from Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe, killing two people and injuring 40 others. It was further reported that in the week, the violence spread to other townships across the Gauteng Province of South Africa with riots reported in several settlements including Diepsloot, Johannesburg central, Jeppestown, Hillbrow and others.

In the event, a man was burnt to death near Reiger Park on the East Rand. By the end of May 2008, over 60 people had been allegedly killed and tens of thousands were displaced (Tafira 2011: 114; Hankela 2014: 75).

Tafira (2011) identified some derogatory nomenclature construct for black African migrants in South Africa. In Alexandra, non-South Africans are known by and given a wide array of names. These are labels which carry racial, ethnocentric and xenophobic connotations. Some of these are outright degrading; others are jocular but offensive nonetheless. These labels emanate from culture contact, a result of the presence of other people of other identities and ethnic groups. Each of the tag is value laden; all denote the social and cultural origin of the carrier. Such nomenclatures include 'Makwerekwere', which is the oldest label used for black immigrants who speak different languages and have completely different phonetic sounds as the South Africans. Also, 'Magrigamba' became a name given to West Africa men who are presumed to come into South Africa without any valuables and after some time in South Africa, returned to their countries with monies, wealth, and properties.

Other derogatory names abound. 'MaNigeria' and 'Broder'. 'MaNigeria' denote the social-geographical origin of the Nigerians in South Africa. 'Broder' is an imitation of Nigerian speech: "my broder from anoder moder", literarily means, 'my brother from another mother'. On the surface these labels seem 'harmless', it became hurtful in consideration of the intent of the user and the way it is used. These considerations reinforce its social significance in the process of social and human interaction. Furthermore, words like 'Maforeigner' and 'AmaXenophobia' are labels which came about in the May/June 2008 xenophobic violence. When the term xenophobia was widely mentioned in the media, perpetrators, especially those in Alexandra refer to displaced immigrants as 'amaxenophobia' (Tafira 2011). Those who were caught up in the inferno were equally called 'maforeigner'. The Star (a Johannesburg daily newspaper) of May 30, 2008 explains: "the most used term in the past weeks has been xenophobia, generally understood to mean fear or hatred of foreigners and their culture."

The term amaxenophobia, like amaforeigner, has been incorporated into the daily linguistic repertoire of Alexandra residents and has become discrimination labels. However, like other labels, it is also used interchangeably to refer to all non-South Africans. Others include AmaKalanga, MaNyasa, Ngwangwa, Padrao, Omotswagai, Mkwevho, MaShangani, and MaZimbabwe. Tafira (2011) maintained that these labels are mostly used in Alexandra while other labels still exist in other part of the state. In 2015, a new wave of attacks against foreigners was incited by the Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu following the death of a South African teenager at the hands of a Somali (Romola 2015). The rhetoric that underscored the 2008 attacks that foreigners were stealing jobs and committing crimes resonated in the new wave of attacks (Mwakikagile 2008: 335) that resulted in the loss of properties owned by foreigners, the death of about 7 people and the displacement of thousands of foreigners (Essa 2015).

Implications of Xenophobia for Pan-Africanism

Incessant xenophobic attacks in different African countries against Africans cannot but have significant implications for pan-africanism. Pan-africanism, like the Zionist movement has as its main drive, the centralization of race effort and the recognition of a racial fount (Legum 1965: 14). It speaks to Africa's sense of common hospitality and communalism. Since the scramble for and the partitioning of Africa by Europe in 1884, which reinforced imperialism, colonialism and globalization, Africa's united and development potentials have been dealt a serious blow (Rodney 1972; Ake 1981; Salami 2005; Ariyo 2005). Pan-africanism thus strives to mobilize Africa's voice against the slavery of its people, identity and resources through the process of decolonization driven primarily by the faith, will and extraordinary determination of the nationalist leaders (Sylvester and Anthony 2014: 8–9). In this respect, Africans have emphasised the ideas of 'united we stand, divided we fall' and 'Africa for Africans' as the basic principles that guide inter-state and cross-border relations on the continent. These efforts culminated in the establishment of many socio-economic, cultural and political institutions to galvanize and protect Africa's common interests. Sylvester and Anthony submitted that:

> *The idea of 'united we stand, divided we fall' gives credence to various efforts across the world as attempts were made at various times not only to liberate a people from any form of domination but also to make room for development predicated on self-defined terms. Africans are not left out (Sylvester and Anthony 2014).*

The question that agitates the mind is: since the emancipation of African countries from slavery, colonialism and apartheid, are the actions and commitment of African leaders and people reflecting genuine support toward the continued actualization of the lofty ideals of pan-africanism? Documented xenophobic attacks across the continent do not underscore a united African people and government, rather a more fragmented, self-centered and self-serving people supported by state actions and regulations encapsulated in national interests. It is in this sense that one interrogates the aggressiveness of Africans against fellow Africans who have migrated in search of greener pasture. Rather, efforts should be directed towards the liberation of Africa from the clutches of western domination and oppression. Despite the much-acclaimed political independence, these European powers and their agents still dominates the juicy sectors of the African economies to the detriments of African people. Against this background, one should ask, is attack against Africans on the African continent by fellow Africans xenophobia or afrophobia? A useful response to this dilemma is captured by a South African parliamentarian, Motsoko Pheko, in the wave of the 2008 xenophobic violence in South Africa thus:

> *What is called "xenophobia" in South Africa is brother hating or disliking brother. This signals that the colonial mentality is too deep-seated in this country, if this is not the work of hooligans or a "third force" to derail the Pan-African agenda, which fathers of the liberation struggle in Africa such as Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Julius Nyerere, Robert Sobukwe, Patrice Lumumba, Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, Malcolm X and many more embraced (cited in New African Magazine 2015).*

Afrophobia is a systematic reawakening of tribalism and ethnicity, two related potent weapons used by the colonial powers to divide Africans. It constantly challenges African unity, common identity and brotherly spirit. If unchecked, it has the potency of robbing Africa and its people of cross-cultural advantages and the much needed socio-economic and political development.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the context of xenophobic attitudes in Nigeria and South Africa and noted that both countries presented contrasting dynamics of the manifestation of the phenomenon. Xenophobia in Nigeria was induced by the economic crises of the 1980s explained by the mismanagement of oil wealth and compounded by the collapse of oil prices in the international market. However, its victims largely were Ghanaians hence the actions of the Nigerian government to expel foreigners especially Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 could be seen in the light of the need to avenge similar actions melted against Nigerians in Ghana in 1969. The South African experiences are associated with violent attacks, resulting in the death of lives and wanton destructions of properties belonging to foreigners. This makes the classifications of xenophobia to be mild, non-violent or confrontational and violent.

The chapter observed that xenophobia in Nigeria was mild, subtle, non-violent and driven by the ruling class and politically motivated. Xenophobic attitude in Nigeria was occasioned by state's response to the prevailing economic situation at that period of time. The President, Shehu Shagari had thought the 'Ghana-must-go' policy would make increase its popularity, legitimacy and enhance its electoral victory in the 1983 electoral process. However, the historical trajectory of xenophobia in South Africa is situated within the rhetoric of apartheid which predisposes South African nationals to violently attack foreigners whom they see as agents of neo-apartheid. Obviously, xenophobic attitudes in Nigeria are distinct from what is experienced in South Africa. The phenomenon was state-driven in Nigeria on both occasions it occurred in 1983 and 1985 through 'immigration order' but the situation in South African is often citizens-driven with deep expression of aggression. However, there is similarity in the motivating factor, which is, attempts to reduce competition with nationals over socio-economic benefits.

Arguably, the linkage between xenophobia and apartheid increases the prospects of the re-occurrence of the phenomenon in South Africa unless certain progressive policy actions are taken by the government of South Africa. These policy actions must include the revision of the history and civic education curriculum of South Africa to accommodate the various human and material contributions of fellow African countries toward the liberation of the country from the clutches of apartheid regime. This should be complemented by the establishment of a National Orientation Agency, a semblance of what is available in Nigeria, to design and run advocacy programmes aimed at inculcating the African spirit of brotherliness in South African citizens.

This, if spiritedly implemented, will stem the tides of incessant violent attacks against fellow Africans sojourning in the gold-rich country. Importantly, xenophobia or afrophobia, African people and governments need to rethink the basis of their relations and come to the realization that the phenomenon can negatively impact their politics, economy and society.

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Chapter 5
Nigeria's Attitude Towards South Africa's Perceived Xenophobia: Exploring a Shared Hegemonic Power for Africa's Development

Olusola Ogunnubi and Lere Amusan

Introduction

Barely two years after South Africa hosted the much-celebrated FIFA World Cup in 2010 (the first time on African soil), the country has continued to remain in the spotlight for many unsavoury reasons. From 'Gupta-gate' to its repeated refusal to allow an entry visa for the Dalai Lama, the yellow-fever vaccine saga that led to the deportation of 125 Nigerians in 2012, the Marikana massacre, the Oscar Pistorius murder trial, the 'Nkandla gate', to recent corruption scandals over allegations of illicitly securing the right to host the Word Cup with a $10 million bribe (that brought fame and glory to the country), South Africa is again caught in a diplomatic welter, following the refusal of its government to heed a court order for the arrest of Sudan's President Omar Bashir during his visit to Johannesburg for the June 2015 African Union Summit. In the heat of the Omar Bashir debacle, wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, one South African parliamentarian vented that South Africa has become "a shame to the rest of the world" (eNCA News, 24 June, 2015). On 24th June 2015, South Africans had to contend with the unpalatable UN Report that placed the country's soldiers on United Nations peacekeeping missions at the top of a list of sexual offences (Mail and Guardian 24 June 2015b). In addition, there is also the rampant xenophobic attacks directed mainly at African migrants. Pointedly, the culmination of these events has put South Africa under palpable international cynosure, despite its putative status as Africa's regional power and leader (Alden and Schoeman 2015; Zaaiman 2015; Ogunnubi 2014).

O. Ogunnubi (✉)
Mangosuthu University of Technology, Umlazi, Durban, South Africa
e-mail: olusola.ogunnubi@yahoo.com

L. Amusan
North-West University, Mahikeng, South Africa

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In addition to its staggering economy, South Africa's policy of inconsistencies have, no doubt, opened the pathway for other contending secondary powers to consider the prospect of expanding leadership vacuum in Africa. Some analysts have suggested that based on South Africa's pervasive culture of xenophobia, the country loses the credibility to act the role of Africa's regional hegemon (Tella and Ogunnubi 2014; le Pere 2014). As Zaaiman points out, in Africa, South Africa's "soft power – the power of attraction – risks being replaced by practices of rivalry and suspicion; while internationally, there is a distinctly sour taste in the mouths of many countries when the name of South Africa is mentioned" (Zaaiman 2015).

From Nigeria's perspective, South Africa is often considered as an ungrateful state from 1994 when majoritarianism was introduced to Pretoria as though the state was not a legally, politically and internationally sovereign state (Krasner 2004). The nadir of perceived diplomatic row was experienced in 2015 due to xenophobic/Afrophobic attacks on foreign nationals, particularly of African origin and attributed to undiplomatic utterances of the king of the Zulu nation in South Africa. Before this time, incessant attacks were registered against African citizens from the Horn of Africa and Southern African states. In some occasions, reprisal attacks have been launched against South African business for instance in Nigeria in solidarity of the victims of xenophobic violence South Africa. Claims and counter-claims of foreigners being the agents of criminality, all sorts of diseases previously unknown and sources of unemployment for South Africans are rife in the country.

This chapter interrogates the twin concepts of hegemony and xenophobia as the driving forces for Nigeria's assertion of its strategic power position in the continent over and above South Africa. In trying to do this, the most common triple features of xenophobia – cultural preservation, the fear of the unknown and the need to preserve certain political-economic *status quo* are interrogated as opportunities which Nigeria has used to exploit South Africa's vulnerability as a relatively new participant in the comity of nations.

This chapter, therefore, attempts to push further, the theoretical debate on regional hegemony, particularly from a regional (African) context. Specifically, by examining the nexus between the triad phenomenon of *hegemony*, *xenophobia* and *regionalism*, substantial conclusions can be drawn about the substance of hegemonic influence in Africa. Two critical questions are raised in the chapter as follows: Does South Africa's incessant xenophobic culture detract its hegemonic credential and capacity in the African continent? Also, how have countries such as Nigeria, used the pervasive xenophobic brutality in South Africa to push through a hegemonic discourse to its advantage? In answering these questions, the theoretical foundations of hegemony and xenophobia within available literature are explored. Subsequently, the historical relationship between Nigeria and South Africa is examined within the context of the post-apartheid dispensation. Within this analytical purview, we critically engage the implication of xenophobia for the ascription of hegemonic identity in Africa with emphasis on Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria has consistently been able to deploy uncoordinated policy dispositions in South Africa that brought about xenophobia to assert a subtle hegemonic claim on the

continent. South Africa's "symbolic representivity"[1] as Africa's hegemon, is increasingly becoming eroded as a result of the state's repeated xenophobic character, among other factors (Alden and Schoeman 2015; Tella and Ogunnubi 2014; le Pere 2014).

Theoretical Understanding of the Hegemonic and Xenophobia Discourse

In the field of international relations, the concept of hegemony is perhaps one of the most extremely difficult term to define. As a concept, hegemony has enjoyed expansive scholarly interpretation by different authors although it commonly invokes negative images of a bully and domineering power that imposes its will on weaker states (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003). Destradi (2010) attributes this complexity of meaning to the fact that hegemony is often used interchangeably with both leadership and empire and secondly, that it is "employed by authors belonging to extremely different schools of thought with sometimes, radically divergent research interests" (See also Cafruny 1990). He also notes the normative application of the term, particularly in its application to the US as cooperative or benevolent hegemon through what is referred to as integral hegemony.

On the origin of the concept, the most celebrated work on hegemony can be attributed to the works of Antonio Gramsci (the Italian Marxist) in his series on *Prison Notebooks* written between 1929 and 1935 (Bates 1975). His analysis of hegemony draws on the context of social relations. Gramsci opines that ideas that drive the world are so powerful as to render silent the agitation against power struggles. The core of his piece-meal prison notes, from which his adherents gathered his thought, is that the world is not marshalled by power alone; it is also led by ideas. The link that these ideas have with power is that any age has been dominated by the ideas of illustrious and powerful individuals. In the words of Karl Marx, "the ideas of any age have been the ideas of the powerful, the ruling class" (Bates 1975:26). The Marxist theory – as can be inferred from the previous sentence – was intimately linked to economic power; the rich decided what ideas are going to drive a particular epoch and ultimately have the power to even dictate what knowledge is. Another twentieth century figure to ever argue in this vein was the French philosopher, Michel Foucault who toyed with Francis Bacon's assertion that knowledge is power and maintained that power is knowledge (Lemert and Gillan 1982).

Gramsci divided society and *ipso facto,* the world into two realms; civil society and political society. The latter is replete with apolitical sectors such as churches, schools and academics. In the civil service, are found intellectuals who mull over ideas that can promote better lives in society. These intellectuals then offer their ideas to political individuals who can decide whether to implement these ideas.

[1] Alden and Schoeman used this term to refer to the regional hegemonic preference of South Africa in Africa on the basis of its global reputation.

If intellectual ideas are espoused by the political sphere – which comprises government, courts, police and the army – then the political society employs its coercive power to solicit adherence from people. This inevitably led Gramsci to accept that hegemony and dictatorship or coercive leadership intersect on certain zones.

Gramsci, in his build up to the hegemonic theory, departed from Marx who maintained that every society is a tyrannical one with powerfully positioned individuals lording over those who are economically enfeebled. Gramsci concedes the fact that society can be transmuted into a dictatorship when threatened by fierce opposition from within or without. However, his contention was that despotism or tyranny was not the only mode of political leadership. At this stage, Gramsci introduced an alternative mode of political rule which he referred to as *hegemony.* According to him, "the concept of hegemony…means political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularisation of the worldview of the ruling class" (see Bates 1975: 352). Therefore, as Gramsci notes, "hegemony implies the ability of the hegemon to let subordinates believe that power rests upon the consensus of the majority" (Destradi 2010: 913). A hegemon can be endorsed (similar to Gramsci's consent) because it proffers certain goods and services that benefit less powerful states (Gilpin 1981; Taylor 2011).

Nye (1990), on the other hand, considers hegemony as the capability to dictate or at least, dominate the rules and arrangement by which international relations politics and economics are conducted. Due to their military and economic superiorities, hegemons are in most cases, able to control natural resources, markets, capital, technological advantage as well as prestige and moral supremacy. However, predominance of power does not necessarily imply simultaneous superiority (or control) with respect to both military and non-military resources (Cox 1996). Therefore, to suggest that a preponderant power must necessarily be animated with moral credentials is quite a stretch since that only occurs when the hegemon's control is based on authority or influence rather than fear. This is often represented as the non-material bases (ideology and norm), usually referred to as *ideational* value by some scholars (Prys 2010). The hegemon is thus, strategically positioned to promote and inspire sets of principles, ideas and values that authenticate its status as a dominant power (Gilpin 1987).

Daniel et al. (2005) also admit that hegemony refers to a "power relationship of domination and subordination between two or more parties; on which, if not intentionally crafted, is deliberately perpetuated". In drawing a distinction between hegemony, empire and leadership, Destradi (2010) argues that even though hegemony is very often used synonymously with the two other concepts, it can, nonetheless, be differentiated in the context of the means through which power is exercised and the end result of the hegemonic behaviour. He considers hegemony as "a form of power exercised through strategies which are subtler than those employed by states behaving like imperial powers" (Destradi 2010: 912). His distinction places emphasis on the means through which power is exercised and the end (objective) of this exercise of power. According to him, the means may vary from "the exertion of pressure to the provision of material incentives, up to the discursive propagation of the hegemon's norms and values", while the "end of hegemonic behaviour is primarily the realisation of the hegemon's own goals" (Destradi 2010: 912–913).

In contextualising hegemonic power in an environment where there is no clear hegemon due to inadequacy of basic attributes of material and non-material attributes as discussed above, it is important to introduce shared hegemonic power between the most powerful because the two states are 'hybrid powers'. They are established continental and emerging powers in the same way that China and India have been exerting their influence in Asia in recent times (Bajpaee 2015). This brings the discussion to the roles played by Germany and France during the formative years of Iron and Steel international regime that eventually metamorphosed into the European Union (EU). This was displayed during the economic implosion between 2007 and 2013 when the two states had to bail out the rest of the EU out of the effects of America's economic mismanagement that had direct effects at the global level. In such a scenario, there may be no clear command of basic financial institutions, labour markets to absolve distressed goods from other members, lender of last resort, serve as a steward for members' currencies and clear-cut consensus among members' states on the need to accord such power to a state. There is also a need that when a hegemon acts unilaterally, it is for the general development of the whole system. When all these are absent, there is a need to look for a credible hegemon or to share the power between the powerful as explained on the roles played by Germany and France in Europe. In the case of Africa, intellectual unity among the elites in a regime is needed to promote Africanism. This was, unfortunately, absent from the formative years of the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to date.[2]

Cafruny (1990) describes what a minimal and declining hegemon represents. This occur where a perceived hegemon may not be able to provide public goods because of factors such as economic disarticulation, interference from external environment and a possible change in political leadership. These explain why no single and credible hegemon may receive general acceptance in Africa as neither Nigeria nor South Africa may be able to claim hegemonic power on the continent. While South Africa has technological and economic power, Nigeria has the labour, the market and diplomatic dexterity. In their respective spheres of influence, both states hardly command respect as they always face stiff competition from perceived satellite/secondary states. In West Africa, perhaps to check its perceived dominance and to resist Anglophone domination in the region, Nigeria often finds itself in a tug-of-war with France and powerful Francophone states such as Senegal and Côte d'Ivore. In southern Africa, Angola and Zimbabwe, and until recently, Mozambique, are competing with South Africa for different reasons.[3] South Africa is perceived in the continent as an undue hegemon that wants to participate in every international regime irrespective of the position of other African Union (AU) members. Abuja is

[2] There was a Cold War display at the time as the continent was divided into two water-tight ideological compartments of the Casablanca and Brazzaville (Lagos and Monrovia) groups that led to a functional approach to a united states of Africa.

[3] Zimbabwe sees South Africa as a new comer in southern African politics where Harare was in the driving seat during the liberation struggle. On the other hand, the fossil fuel power of Angola and Mozambique contributes to their perceived economic power house in the sub-region.

also seen as a cog on the wheel of Africa's development due to the series of challenges to South Africa's developmental ambition.[4] Unlike in Nigeria, there is crisis of social integration, culture of violence and disarticulation type of education (Bantu system) that the new South Africa inherited from apartheid system. These contribute to negrophobia/afrophobia/xenophobia which reduced the state to a semi-pariah status between 2008 and 2015 (Everatt 2011).

A state that has a saturated pool of labour and eventually export excess to other countries may eventually, create social tension in the host state, especially when citizens of the host state cannot compete with the influx of skilled labourers. In this case, the movement is from Nigeria to South Africa. Such tensions may translate into *we* and *them*, the very basis of xenophobia in different parts of the international system. Based on no clear-cut attributes of a hegemon in Africa, there is a need for Nigeria and South Africa to share the power for the development of the continent and to maintain a *cold-war* free continent.

Nigeria-South Africa Relations in Historical Context

Adebajo (2012) contextualise the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa in history, particularly since the 1960s through the periods of regime type and regime change in both countries. In his theatrical account of four 'Acts', he lays bare a sequence of the existing deep seated historical rivalries between both countries dating back to the 1960s and efforts towards mending broken diplomatic fences between the two, particularly in the post-apartheid years. He points to the contrast and similarities in the continental ambitions of both countries to lead Africa. In his account, the first Act (1960–1993) opened with the birth of Nigeria in 1960 which brought anticipation of the coming of age of an African political and economic giant. It was during this period that South Africa's political profile plummeted after its expulsion from the Commonwealth following the Sharpeville massacre. In other words, the three decades witnessed Nigeria's attempt at seeking greater sub-regional influence in West Africa through economic development and regional partnership, although hampered for the most part by France's support for francophone states.

On the other hand, South Africa's dominance in Southern Africa was unrivalled but its influence was restrained by the brunt of international sanction. By implication, during this period, Nigeria was the 'prophet' and South Africa the pariah. Nelson Mandela's release in 1990 from prison and his eventual emergence as president in 1994 set the stage for a second Act (1994–1998). Adebajo (2012) argues that this second epoch was typified by a dash of any possible hope of a 'special

[4] Nigeria was instrumental to anti-South Africa on the issue of the AU scribe that produced Nkosana Dlamini-Zuma. In 2015, though claimed for security reasons and a war against Boko-Haram movement, Nigeria fined South Africa's MTN the sum of $5.2 billion for failing to register about 5.2 million MTN lines, though reduced to $3.9 billion in December 2015, but South Africa perceived this as an unfriendly act.

relationship' between Abuja and Pretoria highlighted by a political conflict[5] between Nigeria's Sani Abacha and South Africa's Nelson Mandela culminating in the latter's failed call for oil sanctions against Abacha's regime and its expulsion from the Commonwealth. However, the call yielded results as Nigeria was suspended from the commonwealth. According to Adebajo, this period witnessed a reversal of international status for both countries with Nigeria becoming the pariah and South Africa the saint:

> It was now Nigeria, and not South Africa, that was being considered for expulsion from the Commonwealth. It was Nigeria under a repressive military regime, that was facing mounting criticism over its human rights record; it was Nigeria that was becoming increasingly isolated in international society; and it was Nigeria that was considered to be possibly heading towards civil war (Adebajo 2007:4–5).

However, the relationship between both countries was resuscitated by Mbeki's concerted efforts to restore cooperative engagement between both states.

The third scene (spanning between 1999 and 2008) opened with the induction of Obasanjo and Mbeki as heads of state of Nigeria and South Africa respectively in 1999. This period ushered in a new wave of political and economic collaborative efforts between both states (even though interjected by a few hiccups that occurred because they did not have the same ideology on how the continent should develop) (Orderson and Smith 2015). The fourth Act (2009–2012) witnessed the tenures of two former vice presidents (Goodluck Jonathan and Jacob Zuma) who went on to become presidents of their respective countries. Diplomatic rivalry during this period took another sour turn with South Africa's increasing romance with other allies such as Angola and further exacerbated by its ascendancy as a result of its membership of G20 and BRICS. There diplomatic hostilities to one another manifested in the conflicting stance of both countries in international issues relating to regime security and human security as played out in the Côte d'Ivoire and Libya's political turmoil in 2011. The highlight of this period, however, was South Africa's deportation of 125 Nigerians on 2nd March 2012 over fake yellow fever vaccination cards followed by Nigeria's reciprocal deportation of 28, 56 and 42 South Africans on March 4, 6 and 7 in retaliation. Adebajo, however, notes a measure of optimism in Nigeria-South Africa relations based on recent efforts at strengthening bilateral ties.

Framing the Hegemonic Debate: Nigeria and South Africa

It is important to also briefly review some of the existing literature on Nigeria and/or South Africa's presumed hegemonic status in Africa. This becomes necessary because much of the studies in this domain focuses on a single country case analysis of Nigeria (see Bach 2007; Adebajo and Mustapha 2008; Ogunnubi and Uzodike

[5] The uneventful execution of environmental activist, Ken Saro Wiwa was in defiance of Mandela's plea and sparked wide animosity between both leaders leading to an anti-climax of bilateral relations.

2016; Ogunnubi 2016) or South Africa (Alden and Schoeman 2015; Flemes 2009; Habib 2009; Scholvin 2012; Ogunnubi 2015). In essence, there is limited literature on a comparative assessment of both countries (Adebajo 1995; Daniel et al. 2005; Flemes and Wojczewski 2010; Amusan 2002, 2006; Amusan and van Wyk 2011; Adebajo 2012; Ogunnubi 2014; Ogunnubi and Isike 2015). In the 2005 *State of the Nation*, Daniel et al. (2005: 558) examine the issue of Nigeria and South Africa's hegemony by foregrounding their analysis on the importance of African markets for South Africa's corporate and parastatal economic involvement. They examine the increasing economic chemistry between Nigeria and South Africa in the light of the growing substantial economic stake of the latter on the former in the past couple of years. According to them, "South Africa's capital appears to be the entity most willing and capable of breathing new life into the enfeebled body of the Nigerian economy" (Daniel et al. 2005: 558).

Landsberg's (2008) chapter in *Gulliver's Troubles: Nigeria's foreign policy after the Cold War* examines the success of Nigeria and South Africa's partnership since 1999, particularly in constructing an African 'concert of powers'.[6] He focuses on the formidable role played by both countries in the formation of New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the AU in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The author also sets for himself, two main ambitious tasks of investigating whether the African 'concert of power' was a deliberate or coincidental policy of strategic partnership of both countries and also examines some of the tensions that have emerged as a result of this important bilateral 'special' relationship. Landsberg notes that NEPAD and the AU emerged as a result of the recognition by Nigeria and South Africa that Africa's marginalisation and under-development could only be reversed if both countries acted together as a 'concert of powers' in Africa (Landsberg 2008: 203). He points to two distinct periods of Nigeria-South Africa relations; first, between 1999 to 2004 accompanied by a strong bilateral relation between both countries while the second was the period between 2005 and 2007, characterised by a deterioration of bilateral ties due partly to the accusation of Obasanjo as playing second fiddle to Mbeki and the controversy over the contest for a permanent seat for Africa at the United Nations (UN).

Amusan and van Wyk (2011) provide an elaborate analysis of the nature of the existing relationship between both countries, which in their argument, is embedded in the complex interdependence paradigm where the two states are dependent on each other. They explain that any attempt by both states to 'do it all alone', would do nothing more than expose the sensitivity and vulnerability of the two states, particularly in the economic and political spheres. The main thrust of their argument, therefore, is that both Nigeria and South Africa need each other for their own development and ultimately for the development of Africa. According to them, "[a]s long as both states are dominant powers in their respective sub-regions, there is always a need for them to co-formulate some functional policy for African development" (Amusan and van Wyk 2011: 37). This chapter therefore foreshadows that given the

[6] The idea of a 'concert of power' was first coined by Rosecrance (1992) in his publication on "A new Concert of Power"; Foreign Affairs. 71(3): 64–82.

increasing degree of interdependence between Nigeria and South Africa, future relationships would likely be mutually inclusive and driven by collaboration, integration and conflict, but would nevertheless, remain conditioned by more efforts towards cooperation.

Understandably, Amusan and van Wyk's analysis of the relationship between the two countriesis limited to the context of the complex interdependence theory presuming that relationship between states are always cooperative while forgetting that states in seeking to further their self-interests, enter into conflictual relationships with other states. Again, even when states behave cooperatively with other states, it is still within the ambits of trying to advance its own interest because states would not cooperate with other states if this relationship stands to disadvantage them in any way (both in the short and long-term). Simply put, South Africa would only relate with Nigeria if it stands to gain in this relationship. This ideology has perhaps influenced its economic relationship with Nigeria since the end of apartheid; a relationship it has benefited from immensely. By implication, this analysis falls short of balanced application of theory to the pattern and context of Nigeria's relationship with South Africa.

Nigeria and South Africa: Xenophobia and Its Discontents

With the dismantling of the apartheid regime and the emergence of constitutional democracy in 1994, immigration inflow into South Africa witnessed a sharp increase particularly from neighbouring African countries. As a result, South Africa confronts a number of immigration-related politics and policy dilemmas which was evident in the spate of xenophobic attacks since 2008.

Focusing mainly on two major horrendous xenophobic episodes in South Africa which occurred between 2008 and 2015, we examine critically, the actions, attitudes and responses of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to these events. The intention is to draw useful inferences from the resulting diplomatic tensions between both countries arising mainly from South Africa's xenophobic attitudes towards African migrants. This is to provide insights for understanding how and why Nigeria has used xenophobia to advance a hegemonic discourse in its favour.

Since 1994 when South Africa emerged from apartheid isolation, the country has continued to focus its foreign policy on the African continent. Scholars argue, however, that despite South Africa's overwhelming commitment towards Africa, the international legitimacy and moral authority that it enjoyed because of the ideational value of its post-apartheid foreign policy – which has attracted membership of many international political-economic forums as Africa's lone representative – is increasingly coming under pressure due largely to its xenophobic outlook (Alden and Schoeman 2015; Tella and Ogunnubi 2014; le Pere 2014).

Coupled with its dwindling economic profile and the consequent loss of its position as Africa's biggest economy, countries such as Nigeria, have recognised this

seemingly widening leadership vacuum in Africa and perhaps, consider that this presents a valuable opportunity to once again, reassert a leadership position as Africa's reputed leader. Among other factors, in the aftermath of Nigeria's 2015 general elections, the events leading to its celebratory democratic transformation, given the way the erstwhile leadership of President Jonathan relinquished power to current President Muhammadu Buhari, added fresh steam to this perception. Viewed against its current status as Africa's largest economy, Nigeria's democratic success suggests its readiness to regain its identity as Africa's 'true' representative and regional hegemon. To further reinforce this perception, in the past 5 years, Nigeria has on two occasions, represented Africa at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (in 2010–11 and 2014–15 respectively). Clearly, these are indications of a state strategically positioning itself to take up greater role in regional and global affairs.

Persuaded by its manifest destiny as Africa's 'big brother', evident in the speeches of its founding leaders, Nigeria has always nursed the historic ambition of ensuring peace, security and development in Africa. For instance, despite its geographic remoteness from southern Africa, Nigeria declared itself a frontline state during the Murtala Mohammed regime, in total commitment to the liberation struggles in South Africa. In a respondent's assessment, historically, the reference to Nigeria as indisputably a giant in Africa has been premised essentially on its demography and economy (personal communication, Ile Ife, September 2013). However, what has often blighted Nigeria's stake on regional hegemony in Africa has been its abysmal state of development and overwhelming domestic contradictions (Mustapha 2008). Over the years, Nigeria has repeatedly felt the inclination to speak on behalf of the continent even when such matters did not directly involve the country. It is on the basis of this 'self-imposed' ambition of being at the forefront of issues affecting Africa and its people that we examine the country's involvement with South Africa's pervasive xenophobic posture.

South Africa's re-emergence into the political scene in Africa in 1994 was perceived as a threat to Nigeria's erstwhile dominance and hegemonic ambition in Africa. This has invariably led to combustive and conflicting relationship between both countries. With a superiority of economy at the time, South Africa's entry had reconfigured the power equilibrium in Africa deepened further by Nigeria's dwindling economy and long years of despotic military rule. In essence, the hegemonic/leadership ambition of both countries has continued to shape and configure its interaction with each other, particularly since the post-apartheid era. Acknowledging the apparent losses made by South Africa in the aftermath of the xenophobic violence of 2008, Ngwenya (2012) observed that "the deterioration of relations between South Africa and Nigeria since 2009, is instructive in understanding what can be achieved and lost, based on how relations with anchor states are managed". According to her, the unsavory relations between both countries have continued to deepen with Nigeria's refusal to support South Africa's nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as AU Chairperson despite President Zuma's last minute visit to President Jonathan.

In the aftermath of the xenophobic attacks in 2008, President Yar Adua was in South Africa to address the issue of xenophobia. Although there were no evidences to suggest that Nigerians or their businesses were directly affected by the attack, the country's leadership at the time felt the urge to address the issue on behalf of the affected countries. This is an indication that Nigeria's action to wade into the crisis despite little impact on its people and resources is a way of representing the whole of Africa. Since 2008, several pockets of attacks targeted at African migrants have continued in South Africa with some insinuating was a result of poor governance and government's inability to address issues of unemployment, inequality, poverty in general and perhaps, the hangover of colonialism and apartheid system. During apartheid, foreigners were always kept in hostels and not many of them were exposed to the ethnic-based locations which served as a basis for promoting solid mineral exploitation. Many have also queried the responses of South Africa to xenophobic attacks on foreigners. For instance, the devolution of its power by the Department of Home Affairs to the Police and other security agents to arrest and send people to *Lindela* (waiting place in Zulu language literarily means a repatriation centre) without prosecution before deportation indicates a serious gap that leads to corruption in the security cluster.

In the wake of the xenophobic violence that erupted in 2015 around parts of South Africa, many African countries watched in horror as shops belonging to African immigrants were looted with hundreds, especially from southern Africa, seeking shelter in refugee camps. Since social media was inundated and proliferated with pictures of the havoc, it took a while for the South African government to publicly condemn the violence. Again, the Nigerian government promptly prevent attacks led by concerned Nigerians to shut South African multinational businesses in Nigeria such as MTN, Shorprite, Nandos, Pep and Game, among others. However, as a show of its discontent, Nigeria recalled its senior diplomats from South Africa. This was consistent with Nigeria's previous actions of taking advantage of the situation in South Africa to seek credibility for itself. Clearly, South Africa lacks diplomatic nitty-gritty as the country was unable to distinguish between 'recall' and 'summon for briefing' leading to undiplomatic statements by Clayson Monyela who is currently under investigation for corruption in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).

Ironically, like the attack in 2008, the 2015 violence on foreign nationals was left largely unaddressed by the South African government. Government officials and politicians hoped that foreigners would be treated as second class citizens irrespective of their type of permit. The empowerment of communities to address the issue of illegal immigrant in line with the 2002 Migration Law (Tati 2008) could have inspired Goodwill Zwelithini (paramount ruler of Zulu nation, the largest tribe in South Africa) and Edward Zuma (a son of President Jacob Zuma) to call for the deportation of migrants which eventually led to global embarrassment. Spiked by King Goodwill's utterances after his *Imbizo* that foreigners under his jurisdiction should be introduced to his palace by the foreigner's ambassador, is against normal inter-state relations.

In fact, President Zuma, while addressing the issue, repeatedly blamed African governments for the xenophobic attacks by insisting that poor governance and lack of development in Africa were responsible for the influx of African migrants into South Africa. In his words, "as much as we have a problem that is alleged to be xenophobic, our sister countries contribute to this. Why are their citizens not in their countries and are in South Africa?" (Mail and Guardian 27 April 2015a). He continued by saying "It is not useful to criticise South Africa as if we mushroom these foreign nationals and then ill-treat them." (Enca 28 April 2015).

The international murky waters in which South Africa has found itself in recent years, bring to the forefront, the moral fabric of its foreign policy. To all intents and purposes, xenophobia raises hard and critical questions as to whether South Africa still has the capacity to uphold the moral high ground which its late iconic leader and first democratic president – Nelson Mandela seemed to represent in the early years of the country's post-apartheid history. South Africa cannot be seen in international circles to be hunting with the hounds and running with the hare. This lay bare the immaturity of its international diplomatic skills. How South Africa chooses to deal with these pressing issues would, no doubt, impact on its continued international recognition as Africa's regional power in the long-term. As the various contradictory statements on xenophobia from President Zuma suggest, the South African government continues to act under the illusion that the April 2015 attacks were mere acts of criminality. In fact, literature abounds linking criminality with xenophobia.

We must be mindful, however, that, historically, as far as the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa is concerned, the likelihood for an admixture of conflict, cooperation and competition between the two states as sovereign states on the continent has been rife. In other words, their relationship must necessarily rest on a special cooperation in the spirit of *Ubuntu*, African renaissance and for economic union that is in the offing on the continent (Agbu 2010). Also worth looking into in the area of conflict is South Africa's intention to lead despite its paucity of human resources in the diplomatic field.

Agbu (2010: 454) posits that in its relations with South Africa, Nigeria has had the tendency to develop a foreign policy "geared towards undermining South Africa's interests and benefitting from its discomfort" and thus, weakening its strength. Describing a situation similar to a Cold War between Nigeria and South Africa, he warned that such conflictual relationship has the capacity to negatively affect the African continent. The point here is that although xenophobia did not directly affect Nigeria, the country used this episode to reinforce a hegemonic claim as a keeper of African interests. This is true, to the extent that the hegemon could go beyond its way to protect the interest of weaker African states. As a strong competitor in the continent, Nigeria can score diplomatic points by discrediting the South African government for its xenophobic posture. Nigeria has, therefore, used South Africa's xenophobic posture to portray itself as a benign or benevolent hegemon and legitimate regional power.

Conclusion

Nigeria and South Africa need to cooperate as regional hegemon at the continental level through shared hegemonic power as discussed extensively above. The competition between both countries has contradictory implications for the continent. This is necessary because in the foreseeable future, the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa will remain an admixture of conflict, cooperation and competition of which cooperation seems to dominate. Most of the time, their relationship should rest on cooperation in the name of *Ubuntu*, African renaissance and for economic union that is in the offing on the continent. Also, worth looking into in the area of conflict is South Africa's intention to lead despite its paucity of human resources in the diplomatic field.

The imperative for the two states to push for *anti-utis possidentis*, a source of imperialistic exploitation of the continent cannot be overstated. On the 1st of May 2015, Buhari, the President-elect of Nigeria, sent a prominent Nigerian to President Zuma regarding his support for the candidacy of Dr. Akinwumi Adesina who for the position of the African Development Bank after being held by Rwanda for 10 years. The foreign policy implications of this are that both states are vulnerable and sensitive to each other. Nigeria eventually got the post thanks to the diplomatic manoeuvring of Zuma-Atiku which appeared to have normalised relations between both countries since May 2015. Breaking the cycle of differences through shared hegemonic power will enhance the giants to pull in the same direction for the general development of the continent and for Africa to have its potentials economically exploited for the commonwealth of the continent.

Based on the argument and evidence presented in this chapter, a recommendation is made for shared hegemonic power for all-inclusive development in Africa in which both Nigeria and South Africa play complementary roles. This is because in the foreseeable future, the relationship between the two states will remain an admixture of conflict, cooperation and competition in which cooperation seems to dominate.

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Chapter 6
Democratization and Legitimization of Xenophobia in Ghana

Collins Adu-Bempah Brobbey

Introduction

Ghana's 1992 re-democratization experiences that were dubbed, 'a success story' (Huntington 1991; Nugent 1995; Abdulai and Crawford 2008), resulted from the country's six relatively successful elections with peaceful handing over of political power from the incumbent to the opposition. However, the country regarded as an oasis of peace and political stability, soon witnessed a resurgence of xenophobia. Ghana's electoral processes have been marred by waves of political violence, some of which was fuelled by xenophobic electioneering, tribal and personality clashes, and inter-party clashes (Abdulai and Crawford 2008). Like other variants of violence, xenophobia attitudes in Ghana at institutional and group level have historical antecedents. Xenophobic politics can be traced to the 1969 expulsion of Nigerian migrants from Ghana by the then President K.A. Busia (Oquaye 2004).

The euphoria with which Ghanaians embraced a multi-party system clearly showed high expectations of democracy. Democracy was seen as the 'magic wand' to dismantle the culture of political apathy, silence, intimidation, and oppressive and suppressive rule that characterised the political sphere. It was also meant to replace authoritarian, military adventurism and political adversaries as well as the xenophobic attitudes that manifested shortly after independence (Oquaye 2004). Despite the political stability recorded in Ghana, there has been an unprecedented prevalence of xenophobic politics in a country that has been described as the "Gateway to Africa" and has received global accolades for its hospitality (Nugent 1995).

Different official reasons were advanced for the expulsion, among which were limited employment opportunities resulting in about 600,000 registered unemployed Ghanaians, an economic downturn resulting in a balance of payments deficit

C.A.-B. Brobbey (✉)
Institute of Journalism, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
e-mail: cabbrobbey@gmail.com

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attributed to capital flight; and the criminal activities of immigrants who were alleged to be involved in smuggling diamonds (Aremu and Ajayi 2014; Oquaye 2004). The economic protectionism adopted by the government and the expulsion of immigrants increased the economic prospects of the local population, leading to improved livelihoods. Adomako-Sarfoh (1974) asserts that, prior to these expulsions, foreigners played vital roles in the economic development of Ghana, but this was not acknowledged by the extreme nationalism that emerged. Although, its authenticity remained a point of contention, the 1960 Ghana Census put the population of foreigners living in Ghana at over 830,000 (Aremu and Ajayi 2014).

In a reprisal anti-immigration policy in 1983, the President Shehu Shagari-led civilian administration in Nigeria launched a xenophobic attack on Ghanaians. The expulsion order was tagged, 'Ghana Must Go'. The President publicly announced that "all foreigners without the right paperwork have just weeks to leave the country" (Solomonov 2012), implying that the government was under no obligation to give notice ahead of the order. Nigerians were also instructed to expose any immigrants, which indirectly empowered locals to forcefully eject foreigners, mainly Ghanaians. Ghanaians left Nigeria with bitterness and condemned xenophobia; surprisingly, just two decades later, Ghana displayed xenophobic attitudes and violence.

This chapter assesses how political vagaries and other socio-economic considerations reinforce xenophobia in Ghana. It is divided into five parts: an introduction; intellectual discourse on the conceptual and theoretical perspectives of xenophobia; the trajectory and nature of xenophobia in Ghana; the reality and conceptions of xenophobic hostility in Ghana, and a conclusion.

Xenophobia: From Conceptualization to Theory

Often described as an attitude, xenophobia refers to fear and/ or hatred of foreigners and those considered strangers (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). However, some schools of thought dismiss this definition as simplistic. Oquaye (2004) is of the view that it should be extended to include acts of violence and physical abuse. Similarly, Solomonov (2012) contends that the term embodies action or practice and cannot be merely defined as an attitude or feeling. Beyond dislike and fear, xenophobia has resulted in acts of violence that result in bodily harm and damage to property (Antwi-Bosiakoh 2006). Cardinall maintains that the definition of xenophobia should be refined to include the specific target of individuals or groups against whom the fear, hatred or violence is directed (cited in Antwi-Bosiakoh 2006). The Ghanaian case presents all three ingredients: demonstrated fear or hated of foreigners accompanied by violent manifestation of xenophobia leading to loss of lives and property (Oquaye 2004).

Ghana has been host to African immigrants from diverse backgrounds for decades, many of them refugees fleeing political instability and humanitarian crises in their own countries (Oquaye 2004). While there were signs of communalism

and acceptance and integration of immigrants into Ghana's socio-economic environment, by 1969, xenophobic tendencies against foreign migrants, and more specifically African migrants, became evident, culminating in the expulsion order (Adomako-Sarfoh 1974). As the number of immigrants increased so did anti-immigrant attitudes and acts (Oquaye 2004; HSRC 2008). As in other societies like South Africa that stereotype immigrants and tag them 'Makwerekwere', foreigners in Ghana are known as "Amanfrafo" or "Ahoho", a derogatory term (Atta Owusu 2012).

A study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council in 2008 identified two major patterns of xenophobic culture in Ghana. Firstly, xenophobia was mostly directed at African immigrants and not against foreigners in general, and secondly, the violence was largely restricted to urban informal settlements in major cities (HSRC 2008). For instance, in 1969 and 1972 Nigerian, Togolese and Malian immigrants resident in Accra were targeted in a campaign known as "Mokomonko" (go back to your country). Locals accused them of perpetrating crime and sexual immorality, and held them responsible for increased unemployment and the prevalence of diseases like HIV/AIDS (Oguaye 2004; Atta Owusu 2012).

Scholars have located xenophobia in theoretical expositions, one of which is the scapegoating hypothesis (Antwi-Bosiakoh 2006). This sociological theory examines xenophobia within the context of social transition and change. Aside from crime, foreigners were also seen as the cause of social and economic crises in host countries. Thus, rejection of foreigners in any African country is mainly due to competition over limited resources, such as housing, education, health care and employment, in a period marked by high expectations. The waves of xenophobia that cut through Nigeria in the late 1970s and 1980s, resulting in the infamous 'Ghana must go' campaign, was associated with the economic crisis that befell the country due to the global oil glut and mismanagement of the oil boom of the mid-1970s. In the case of South Africa, it is commonly believed that every job given to a foreign national is one less job for locals; this is exacerbated by high unemployment rates, currently in the range of 20–30% (Antwi-Bosiakoh 2006). Foreigners are seen as the chief cause of the dwindling economic fortunes of the locals and are hence, treated as scapegoats. A much as these sentiments are reflected in many African countries, there is no empirical evidence to support them. Indeed, foreign investment and some migrants have increased employment opportunities and contributed to economic development in these countries (Antwi-Bosiakoh 2006).

Furthermore, many foreigners find shelter in informal urban settlements characterised by high levels of poverty, unemployment, poor service delivery and inadequate housing (McKnight 2008). Competition with poor locals in informal settlements is fierce due to the limited resources in such locations. This motivates locals to treat immigrants as scapegoats for increasing poverty and unemployment in the host country; they are regarded as opportunists who migrate for purely economic prospects (McKnight 2008). The Human Sciences Research Council categorised this situation as relative depravation, which explains the relationship between xenophobic violence and socio-economic factors; inequality and poverty generate

deprivation (HSRC 2008). Based on observation and the frequency and severity of the attacks on foreign nationals in 2008, Ghana is gradually becoming a xenophobic nation (Atta Owusu 2012).

Historicizing Xenophobia in Ghana

The historical trajectory of xenophobia in Ghana reflects the past and immediate factors that precipitated the exodus of Nigerian migrants from Ghana in November 1969 and its connection to the xenophobic attitudes displayed during subsequent elections in the country (Atta Owusu 2012). A critical examination of the role of xenophobia in the Ghanaian body politic brings to the fore the claim that the key driver of Ghana's xenophobic actions was the economic depression, especially the high rate of youth unemployment (Oquaye 2004).

After the enforcement of the expulsion order, cocoa farmers and the retail business sector enjoyed great relief due to the involvement of the local population in the farming sector. Adepoju (2005) reflects on the perspectives of the state and posits that the influx of foreigners was becoming unbearable. According to him, Nigerian immigrants constituted the largest single group of foreign residents in Ghana between 1931 and the 1960s, many of whom were traders, cocoa farmers, farm labourers and contractors, factory workers and unskilled workers on construction sites.

The population of Nigerians in Ghana thus appeared invasive between 1931 and 1960, accounting for their expulsion (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). From the mid-1960s, the overwhelming migrant stock became a matter of concern for the indigenous Ghanaian population who put tremendous pressure on the government for increased participation of native peoples in Ghana's economic life (Adepoju 2005). Calls for the localization of the country's economy intensified towards the end of 1969 when immigrants became the scapegoats for the economic misfortunes of the many unemployed locals (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). Government introduced a number of policies aimed at controlling the number of immigrants and restricting the exercise of certain activities by non-nationals (Atta Owusu 2012).

The Quit or Exodus Order

The "Immigrant Compliance Order" of 18 November, 1969 was the first anti-immigration promulgation of the post-colonial Ghanaian government (Adomako-Sarfoh 1974). Popularly known as the "Aliens Compliance Order', while it affected many migrants from other West African countries such as Togo, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast, the majority were Nigerian. Aremu and Ajayi (2014) posit that the past and immediate factors that propelled the expulsion of Nigerian migrants from Ghana in November 1969 were jealousy and xenophobia, with the latter playing a

more significant role. The vehemence that accompanied the deportation order was particularly alarming, and the urgency to rid the country of foreigners and brutal disposition of Ghanaian law enforcement agents, especially against illegal immigrants, left much to be desired. Nigerian immigrants were under pressure to legalize their stay (Oquaye 2004). While the Ghanaian government embarked on the expulsion to purge "undesirable elements" in the country, the expulsion order was discriminatory (Aremu and Ajayi 2014).

Evidence shows that Ghanaians hailed the government's anti-immigration disposition as "a patriotic move to garner jobs for Ghanaians and rid the country of crimes" (Adepoju 2005). Apart from economically-motivated agitation to expel immigrants from Ghana, there were also cases where Nigerians were expelled for official reasons between 1957 and 1961 (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). During the Nkrumah-led Convention Peoples' Party's (CPP) administration, pressure to expel immigrants were initially resisted by the government, but the CPP government passed the Deportation Act on 23 August 1957, enabling the government to expel all foreigners deemed "a threat to the nation" (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). On 19 November 1969, the then Prime Minister, Busia announced the intention to enforce the Immigrants Compliance Order (ICO) to expel all immigrants without valid residence permits within 2 weeks.

The Ministry of Interior was mandated to expel all defaulting immigrants. However, exemptions were granted to those born in Ghana that had lived in the country all their lives and lost contact with their countries of origin as well as immigrants who, though not born in the country, had lived there for many years and could show good behaviour and gainful employment (Adepoju 2005).

Rationalization of the 'Aliens Quit Order'

As noted earlier, the reasons for the expulsion have been rationalized by some scholars and policymakers, predominantly from Ghaha (Aremu and Ajayi 2014; Adomako-Sarfoh 1974). At the time of the Expulsion Order, immigrants had infiltrated all sectors of the economy and were found in all major occupations (Adomako-Sarfoh 1974). At the same time, more than 600,000 Ghanaian citizens were reported to be unemployed (Adepoju 2005). Given previous administrations' failure to address this issue, the new government of Busia was determined to ensure that the "citizens of Ghana play a far bigger role in the commercial and industrial life of the country than they do at present" (Aremu and Ajayi 2014).

It is thus evident that political and economic considerations largely propelled enforcement of the Quit Order in 1969 (Oquaye 2004). Relieving a large number of immigrants of their jobs was regarded as a way of providing Ghanaian youth with gainful employment as well as legitimising Busia's government (Oquaye 2004). The government wanted to be seen as the true 'protector' of the interests of its population.

The expulsion enhanced Busia's political ambitions because Nigerians employed in the Ghanaian civil service and those teaching in the various Teacher Training Colleges were exempted from deportation while those without the requisite papers were asked to regularize them. The question is, why grant such exemptions? Was this due to political expediency? Busia did not provide statistics on inmates of Ghanaian prisons at the time to indicate their countries of origin (Oquaye 2004). Were there no Ghanaians in prisons before and after the expulsion? No reasonable person would be convinced that only foreigners perpetrated crime in Ghana before the expulsion (Aremu and Ajayi 2014). It is thus argued that political sycophancy explains the expulsion.

While some immigrants (including Nigerians) were undoubtedly involved in crime in Ghana prior to the expulsion, this cannot be generalised to all Nigerian migrants, or any other immigrants, for that matter (Hundsalz 1972; Olaniyi 2012). Nigerian traders of Yoruba descent controlled markets in both rural and urban centres where they prospered tremendously (Olaniyi 2012). This resulted in the Yoruba population increasing from around 57,400 in 1931 to over 191,802 in 1960 (Olaniyi 2012). The rising commercial profile of the Yoruba migrants attracted competition and indignation among Ghanaians who felt displaced from their established socio-economic position (Adomako-Sarfoh 1974; Olaniyi 2012). For instance, conflict ensued between the Yoruba clan in Nigeria and local farmers. Tawiah reports,

> *It should be observed however that agitation for deportation of 'aliens' or 'strangers', as the foreign migrants were referred to by Ghanaian natives, started around the mid-20th century. In 1932, during the cocoa hold-up crisis, the Nigerian cocoa farmers in Akyem Abuakwa opposed the local cocoa hold-up led by the king of the town against the European firms. This instigated a far-reaching resolution of the town at a meeting of Okyeman in 1935. Then, the traditional council urged the colonial government to ensure that 'trouble-makers' (referring to the migrants) were kept out of Akyem Abuakwa* (Tawiah 2016).

The excessive profligacy of Yoruba merchants and their pseudo-capitalist tendencies also contributed to their expulsion. Tawiah (2016) recalls that Ghanaians alleged that the "Yoruba flaunted their wealth by wearing shoes decorated with Ghanaian currency while rich traders often had 'excessive gold decorations and abused the power of money'". This could have been exaggerated but the flamboyancy of the Nigerians could not be dismissed. Ultimately, Ghanaians labelled Nigerians of Yoruba descent as "clannish, callous, arrogant and thrifty" among other things (Adepoju 2005; Olaniyi 2012). Given such feelings of deprivation, complexes and subordination to Yoruba lifestyles, Ghanaians found it very easy to transform the Yoruba identity from traders to criminals who deserved nothing but expulsion (Olaniyi 2012). Yoruba migrants continued to be treated with disgust by their hosts, which deepened xenophobia and the use of derogatory slogans such as "Mubeko", meaning "you are going" (Olaniyi 2012).

The hostilities, insecurity and xenophobia experienced by Nigerians residing in Ghana and the reaction of the local population are not unique. Historically, societies have tended to reject other groups when the latter pose a perceived threat to their status and relative position in society (Oquaye 2004; Olaniyi 2012). Furthermore, marginalized local minority groups often perceive immigrant groups as a critical

threat to their already tenuous position in society. The literature on economic competition and inter-group rivalry shows that the response is to exclude immigrants from their economic playing field (Oquaye 2004; Olaniyi 2012). It is further observed that, threatened groups in host communities not only often press for legal restrictions on immigrant economic activity, but also agitate for more drastic measures such as expulsion (Oquaye 2004; Olaniyi 2012).

Empirical Perspective on Xenophobic Realities or Hostilities in Ghana

The previous sections set out the historical background to the eruption of xenophobic attitudes in Ghana's political sphere. This section draws on data gathered by means of unstructured interviews to locate the impact of xenophobia and intolerance of 'the other' in the country's political reality. Hate speech and xenophobic dispositions have marred the electoral system, especially during campaigns. For instance, a Member of Parliament revealed that, "the nature of campaign messages visually and verbally partly explain pervasive political adversaries as the content of the campaign messages do not only tend to promote such skirmishes but also facilitate xenophobic politics, a very destructive tool and divisive mechanism" (personal communication, Accra, March 2016).

This chapter interrogates the place of xenophobia and divide and rule tactics in democratic practices in Africa in general, and Ghana in particular. In other words, it investigates whether democratic practice facilitates xenophobic politics rather than counteracts it? Should Ghanaians be gratified by xenophobic campaign messages or condemn and dismiss them? Some of the empirical answers to these questions revealed the dynamics and trajectories of xenophobia in contemporary African politics in general and Ghanaian politics in particular.

The Convergence of Coloniality and Xenophobia in Ghana

Aside from the endogenous explanation of xenophobia, there is evidence of intergroup conflict and ethnic divisions that are enshrined in Africa's colonial heritage. According to Olaniyi (2012: 5), "the deportation orders were rooted in colonial ideology and imitation of German policy against the Jews during the World War II". A respondent offered a broad narrative of the genesis of political intolerance in Ghana. According to him,

> *The flooding wave of post-coloniality that characterized the countries of 'Third World' political dynamics was no longer in favour of continued imperialism. The departing imperialists therefore conceded under pressure to the quest for independence by the nationalist movements. As such the departed imperialist succeeded in relinquishing power but to their favoured African ruling class* (personal communication, Accra, March 2016).

Therefore, "the contradictions that underpinned the foundation of these state structures in Africa illustrates a continuous struggle between the informal institutions of neopatrimonial rule (Nugent 1995). Buttressing this point, a political activist commented on the systematic concentration of power with the use of state resources for personal gain and its attendant pervasive neopatrimonial and xenophobic politics which has dominated the affairs of the state (Personal communication, Accra, August 2016). Similarly, a lecturer at the University of Ghana linked acts of intolerance to capital formation in the periphery. According to him,

> *The commitment to capitalism and the creation of wealth led to the development of social class characterized by multinational domination later reinvigorated the contradictions which neo-colonial capitalism laid at the foundation of the newly independent states. Consequently, it created predatory politics, neopatrimonial proclivity and its attendant xenophobic politics in many parts of African states of which Ghana is no exception* (Personal communication, Accra, August 2016).

This assertion corroborates Nugent's observation that,

> *Unlike in developed countries where political class prior to the assumption of office are either established professionals or businessmen and women who would go back to their respective profession or business after their tenure, the African political elites are mostly from middle echelon of the society who are neither rich nor poor but they are known individuals whose quest for political office are nothing short of personal aggrandizement* (Nugent 1995:31).

A political scientist provided the reasons for extended tenure in political office in Africa, stating that, African political elites "are not prepared to return to their less lucrative profession nor prepared to lose political influence; African political class are not ready to relinquish power even when voted out." The cases of President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia are evidence of sit-tightism in Africa. The findings further revealed that,

> *The unpopularity of the incumbent regime as a result of growing social inequalities, unemployment, infrastructural decay and poor socio-economic conditions had inevitably led to growing popularity of the oppositions…the ruling political class immediately after the flag independence devised all unconstitutional strategies and methods to retain power, defend interests and cow all oppositions by all possible means* (Personal communication, Accra, July 2016).

Some scholars posit that this was made possible by the power of the state; for instance, in the newly-independent states of Ghana, Tanzania, Togo, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and other African countries, the state structure and power were wielded to unilaterally change the Constitution to a one party state, approve unlimited terms of office, ban the official opposition, rig presidential and parliamentary elections, and subjugate the electoral body to the control of the incumbent party (also see Oquaye 2004; Nugent 1995, 1995). In states where a one party state was not declared, like Nigeria, the incumbent Northern People's Congress (NPC), even though it was in coalition with the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) used the structure and apparatus of state power to rig elections, inflate population figures and intimidate the official opposition Action Group (AG) (Adomako-Sarfoh 1974; Abdulai and Crawford 2008; Oquaye 2004; Solomon 2012).

Another respondent established the connection between regime security and xenophobia. He maintained that,

> *The newly Africa ruling elite used the existing state structure to retain power perpetually, muzzle voice of dissent and intimidate political opponents and engage in one party dictatorial regime. The resultant effect of this xenophobic politics culminated in unsustainable political and constitutional crisis in Africa states, resulted in the long interregnum of military intervention in the polity* (Personal communication, Accra, July 2016).

The lecturer located the democratization of xenophobia in intellectualism. According to him,

> *Democratization of xenophobia simply means the process where democratic practices spurs xenophobia rather than counter act it. In this case xenophobia is seen as an instrument for distributing resources and wealth of the state as well as enforcing state power and control in the country. State institutions often resorted to xenophobic tactics in facilitating the control and management of state resources* (Personal communication, Accra, July 2016).

A social commentator noted that scapegoating foreigners in a climate of inadequate resources or competition for resources became endemic due to the character of the African state. He maintained that over-concentration of the bulk of resources and wealth in the state induces social frustration and extreme socioeconomic differentiation and inequality, compelling all classes to look to the state for a share of the national wealth (Personal communication, Accra, July 2016). According to him, "it was at this period that the class struggle and power tussle within the social class became so intense" (Personal communication, Accra July 2016). Successive political elites in Ghana reinforced the historical nature and character of post-colonial states.

Xenophobic Campaign Messages

The majority of the respondents attested to the fact that most politicians resort to xenophobic campaign messages when they have exhausted their political campaign messages.

The respondents were asked the following questions: Does xenophobia or bigotry exist in Ghana? If it exists, why does it exist and how is it coping with the democratization process? Is xenophobia not antithetical to liberalism? If it is, then, exactly how does it undermine democratic rule in Ghana's Fourth Republic? Would you say that xenophobia spurs divide and rule tactics and would you also say that it is a consequence of how democratic practices in Africa in general and Ghana in particular has been pursued? Why and how does democratic practice in Ghana's Fourth Republic spur xenophobia?

The findings reveal that the incumbent government often resorts to a xenophobic campaign strategy largely because there is no issue-based politics in Ghana. In other words, democratic practices in Ghana turn to spur neopatrimonial xenophobic

politics rather than combat it. It was also found that Ghanaians do not react positively to xenophobic campaign messages and use every opportunity to condemn and dismiss it in its totality. In some cases, the parties' executives allow any candidate who aspires to lead the party to register and compete at primaries, while others select candidates through a simple nomination process.

Electoral triumphalism occurs when the candidate is not only able to present a well-packaged message but to communicate it in an appealing manner to the audience. Although the content of campaign messages at the primaries and during national elections differs markedly, campaign trends tend to follow a pattern which is appealing to many Ghanaians and politicians. Generally, the offensive and damaging nature of the content of the campaign messages at all levels leaves much to be desired. The campaign is often characterized by personal insults, open confrontation and the use of abusive language. When a candidate has run out of issue-based messages, he/she ends up using bigotry, attacking personalities or resorting to 'divide and rule' tactics.

It is thus argued that the use of xenophobic politics not only undermines democratic electoral credentials but also heightens political tensions, resulting in electoral processes being marred by violent conflict. For instance, it was revealed that the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) issued a statement directing its security agents to clash with any person who would cross the Togo border to vote in Ghana since the opposition had earlier accused the incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC) of issuing National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) cards to Ghanaians living in parts of Togo. The findings highlight the correlation between xenophobic campaign messages and electoral violence and the credibility of the democratic electoral process in Ghana. The majority of the interviewees confirmed that politicians resort to xenophobic campaign strategies such as the use of inflammatory words like "all die be die"; "NPP is an Ashanti party" and "NDC is an Ewe party". This reflects the lack of issue-based politics and electoral campaigns.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Ghanaians have come to terms with the fact that there can be elections without democracy but there cannot be democracy without elections. Elections have thus come to occupy centre stage in the discourse on democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and Ghana is no exception. Given the level of Ghanaian political consciousness, it is a foregone conclusion that Ghanaians are discerning and so, would not only countenance neopatrimonial xenophobic politics but would vote against any politician who may resort to a xenophobic campaign strategy. Ghana has inherited a contradictory political legacy characterized by neopatrimonial xenophobic politics and the country thus continues to experience widespread political intimidation and adversary politics as opposed to issues-based politics. This has spurred xenophobic politics and undermined democratic credentials in the Ghanaian body politic.

Deregulation of electoral communities is recommended to address xenophobic traits in electoral processes in Ghana. A broad national programmatic agenda is also recommended from which political campaign messages could be sourced in order to promote issue-based politics. A typical example is Ghana's 40-year old development plan which sets out the broad national development agenda, national policies and programmatic agendas. Finally, it is recommended that politicians should formulate a campaign strategy that reflects national programmatic politics rather than resorting to a xenophobic and populist agenda which is often counterproductive to democratic governance and national development.

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Chapter 7
South African Higher Education: The Paradox of Soft Power and Xenophobia

Oluwaseun Tella

Introduction

South Africa is a viable option in the minds of many African migrants. However, the country also attracts migrants from faraway territories like the Americas, Asia and Europe whose citizens enter South Africa for activities such as pleasure, business, professional work and study. An important question addressed by the chapter is the position of South African universities in attracting foreign students and potential academics. South Africa plays host to tens of thousands of foreign students (Tati 2010; ICEF Monitor 2013) and international academics are visible across these universities. Among other factors that are highlighted in the following section, the institutions' high standards, provide impressive soft power that endears them to an international audience. Therefore, the high population of foreign students and academics in South Africa is a reflection of its soft power projection. Soft power refers to a source of power that depends on the attractiveness and appeal of a state's capabilities such as admirable culture, values, and policies, the visibility of its multinational corporations and the reputation of its universities (Nye 2004; Tella 2017). It is argued that rather than coercing other states into achieving its foreign policy objectives through the use of hard power resources (predominantly military and economic might), a state might deploy the attractiveness embedded in its values and qualities to pursue its economic, strategic and other interests. In the context of this chapter and in light of South Africa's core foreign policy objective of economic and cultural diplomacy in its relations with other states, its universities have become an important source of soft power.

On the other hand, over the past decade particularly following the 2008 and 2015 attacks on foreigners, recurrent incidents of xenophobia has painted South African

O. Tella (✉)
University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: tellaoluwaseun@yahoo.com

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in a negative light. Xenophobia is often defined as the irrational fear or hatred of foreigners (Harris 2002; Williams 2008). It is noteworthy that beyond this attitudinal tendency, xenophobia in South Africa is seldom characterised by violent manifestation evident in the 2008, 2015 and 2017 attacks on immigrants. The pervasiveness of xenophobia in the country including verbal and physical attacks have prompted Human Rights Watch (1998) to observe that South Africa has a culture of xenophobia. In light of the ubiquity of anti-immigrant sentiments across national cleavages, race, gender and levels of educational achievement, this description appears appropriate.

By their very nature, higher education institutions are embodied by intellectuals and boast of a cross-cultural environment. Thus, one would have expected that South African universities would be immune from the anti-immigrant sentiments that are demonstrated in the wider society. However, as this chapter will show these institutions are not excluded from this scourge. Undoubtedly, this contradicts their soft power appeal. In other words, while South African universities possess attractive attributes that serve as a pull factor to their admirers and would-be international students and academics, xenophobia presents a push factor that has the tendency to dent the soft power efficacy of these institutions. Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the place of soft power in South African higher education. Next, it engages the manifestation of xenophobia in South Africa's higher education sector and its implications for the institutions' soft power.

South African Higher Education and Soft Power: Potential or Reality?

In the African context, South Africa is the quintessential soft power. Indeed, the country's international profile has been largely enriched by its soft power rather than its hard power (Smith 2012) which stems from its progressive constitution, liberal democracy, and cultural exports in the form of music, media and soap operas. Its multinational corporations (MNCs) and universities are also important sources of Pretoria's soft power. These universities pride themselves on their research output, ranking positions and cutting-edge facilities. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 evince how South African universities fare in the Cybermetrics Lab and Times Higher education

Table 7.1 Webometrics top 5 universities in Africa

Africa rank	World rank	University	Country
1	273	University of Cape Town	South Africa
2	423	Stellenbosch University	South Africa
3	458	University of the Witwatersrand	South Africa
4	499	University of Pretoria	South Africa
5	611	University of Kwazulu-Natal	South Africa

Source: Cybermetrics Lab (2017)

Table 7.2 Times higher education top 5 universities in Africa

Africa rank	World rank	University	Country
1	148	University of Cape Town	South Africa
2	182	University of the Witwatersrand	South Africa
3	401–500	Stellenbosch University	South Africa
3	401–500	Makerere University	Uganda
5	501–600	University of Kwazulu-Natal	South Africa

Source: Times Higher Education (2016)

rankings of African universities. Clearly, South African universities are the five best institutions in Cybermetrics Lab survey (Webometrics). Times Higher Education presents a similar data barring Makerere University (Uganda) that shares third position with Stellenbosch University at the expense of the University of Pretoria.

The influx of migrants to the democratic South Africa resulted in an increase in the enrolment of international students (predominantly African) across the country's universities. For instance, while the number of doctoral students enroled between 2002 and 2012 increased from 6354 to 13,964, foreign student enrolments during the same period increased from 975 to 4698 and the number of students from other African countries increased from 573 to 3901 (Cloete et al. 2015). Thus, there has been a burgeoning of African students across South African universities as they continue to look inwards for their higher education. The reputation of some of these universities such as the Universities of Cape Town, Pretoria, Stellenbosch, the Witwatersrand and KwaZulu-Natal; and their relative affordability (compared to Western universities) are undoubtedly important pull factors. Universities such as Cape Town, the Western Cape, Pretoria and the Witwatersrand have also made conscious efforts to increase the number of international students (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015).

Table 7.3 shows the top ten countries of origin and the total number of international students in South Africa in 2013. It is impressive that the US features in the top ten countries. In particular, the large number of African students from different countries reveals the international dynamics in South African universities in the post-apartheid period. In 2006, South African institutions enroled 53,000 international students, 67% of who were African (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015). The proportion of African students has continued to increase; the Council on Higher Education reported that the number of international students increased from 48,197 to 73,859 between 2003 and 2013, with African students accounting for 89% of the total number for 2013, 73% of whom hailed from Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries and 16% from other African regions (Council on Higher Education 2016). This enhances South African higher education's comparative advantage of soft power on the continent. Beyond the academic skills acquired in universities, international students are exposed to South African culture and values which reinforce the country's soft power.

Culture is one of the most important sources of a state's soft power. Therefore, these universities offer a veritable platform for South African cultural values to be

Table 7.3 International students in South Africa in 2013

Country	Number of students
Zimbabwe	26,922
Namibia	5352
Lesotho	4892
Swaziland	4330
Nigeria	3386
DRC	3338
Botswana	3131
Zambia	1867
Kenya	1664
US	1388
Other Countries	17,586
Total	73,856

Source: Department of Higher Education and Training (2015)

transmitted to foreigners. Sehoole (2015) reveals that interest in the South African culture is one of the most important motivations for international students choosing the country as a higher education destination. It is instructive that South Africa not only has a great cultural heritage but has also demonstrated impressive appreciation of its culture, symbolised by its 11 official languages, including English and other local languages such as IsiZulu, IsiXhosa, Afrikaans, Setswana and Sesotho. This exposes international students to various South African languages in their daily activities, with some learning these languages and imbibing the culture of the various ethnic and racial groups. As might be expected, these institutions draw large numbers of students from the SADC countries, especially Zimbabwe due to proximity and lower tuition fees for students from the region. There are also many students from other African countries like Nigeria and Congo and to a lesser extent from Europe and the Americas. While France has maintained first position as the destination of African students, South Africa is placed second (ICEF Monitor 2013; Spooner 2014), above the US and UK that are known to attract many African students. An additional source of attraction is the possibility of being gainfully employed in South Africa on better terms than in the students' countries of origin.

Another important way that higher education institutions have projected Pretoria's soft power is their contribution to national wealth. Tati (2010) maintains that the South African education sector has undoubtedly emerged as one of the important sources of export earnings for Pretoria. Mail & Guardian journalist, Samantha Spooner argues that 'foreign students, especially from Africa, have become bread and butter for South Africa's universities and the economy of, especially the country's richest province Gauteng' (Spooner 2014: para. 7). Given South Africa's foreign policy shift to economic diplomacy under President Zuma's admin-

istration, the higher education sector serves as an important avenue to realise Pretoria's foreign policy objectives. This is the ultimate wielding of soft power because whether hard or soft, power is exercised to achieve desired outcomes in a state's international relations. South African universities' ability to attract international students and accrue valuable income for the national purse enhances Pretoria's soft power. It is perhaps in recognition of this and the need to remain globally competitive that there has been competition for international students among universities and South Africa's study permit policy and application process have become less cumbersome over the years (Tati 2010).

It is noteworthy that South African students have shown little interest in pursuing postgraduate studies (Masters and Doctoral) due to among other possible reasons the perceived sufficiency of undergraduate and honours degrees to be gainfully employed and family pressures to assume financial responsibilities. Accordingly, the continued existence of many postgraduate programmes and postdoctoral fellowships depends on enroling international students. The emphasis in a number of policy documents such as the National Plan for Higher Education, the National Development Plan 2030 and the White Paper for Post-School Education and Training on the enrolment of international students is testimony to the significance of foreign students in South African tertiary institutions. Due to their edge over other African universities, South African universities also attract many foreign academics that take up appointments in these institutions and many have made significant contributions to their profile and research output. Cloete et al. (2015) note that universities that have employed large numbers of foreign academics such as Fort Hare and North West (Mafikeng Campus) have experienced dramatic increases in publications productivity and the enrolment of international students. This enhances the ranking and international profile of these institutions and ultimately their soft power appeal. For instance, international outlook (the ratio of international staff and students to their domestic counterparts) is one of the five performance indicators evaluated by Times Higher Education. Others include teaching (the learning environment), research (volume, income and reputation), citations (research influence), and industry income (knowledge transfer) (Times Higher Education 2015).

Perhaps the most significant way through which higher education enhances a country's soft power is graduates from foreign universities that take up political appointments in their home countries and influence them to adopt conciliatory and friendly foreign policies towards their country of study. Evidence abounds of students that studied in US and Chinese universities taking such a stance (Tella 2016a, b). However, it remains to be seen if this will be the case with South Africa as there is little or no evidence that the African power house has benefitted from such soft power generated by its universities (Tella 2017). Among other possible factors, this might be the consequence of the late internationalisation of South African universities as well as xenophobia. However, soon, this inherent soft power potential could yield concrete political decisions across Africa and beyond in Pretoria's favour, if contradictions such as xenophobia is addressed.

Xenophobia in South African Higher Education

The literature is replete with various explanations for the high levels of xenophobia in South Africa. This has been classified into isolation, scapegoating and bio-cultural lenses. The isolation thesis posits that xenophobia is a direct consequence of apartheid that resulted in South Africa's isolation from the international community. The scapegoating approach views xenophobia within the purview of the socio-economic realities of the post-apartheid era including high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality that result in foreigners being blamed for the situation. Finally, the bio-cultural thesis emphasises cultural differences as the stimulus for xenophobic behaviour (Harris 2002). It is important to note that xenophobia is not limited to the masses in South Africa, but is pervasive, with politicians, traditional leaders, government departments, the South African Police, and the media demonstrating similar sentiments (Morris 2008; Neocosmos 2008; Tella 2016c). Thus, anti-immigrant sentiments across South African tertiary institutions reflect the intolerance that is evident in the country at large.

Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing (2015) note that while foreign students are expected to adjust to their new environment, challenges such as discrimination, and verbal and physical attacks within and outside their universities make this difficult. These challenges point to xenophobia which is ubiquitous across South African society. It is pertinent to note that xenophobia is part of broader discriminatory tendencies in the country at large and its universities in particular. For instance, many South African universities still grapple with racism in their day-to-day activities. While one would expect that given that a university is a cosmopolitan and intellectual community, it would embrace tolerance and be immune to the social ills of the broader society, ethnic, racial and gender discrimination as well as xenophobia is apparent even among the most reputable universities in the country (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015). What seemingly differentiates xenophobia in higher education from that of the broader society is its subtleness. While it manifests in negative attitudes and violence in society at large, it is largely attitudinal in universities. This is evident in anti-immigrant comments, exclusionary relationships and the denial of certain privileges.

In her study of xenophobic practices among university students in Limpopo, Singh (2013) illustrates that anti-immigrant attitudes experienced by foreign students include lecturers and students communicating in local languages to exclude them, using dehumanising and abusive local words such as *makwere-kwere* (a derogatory term to describe foreigners), making fun of foreign accents, and discrimination or denial of services within the university because they cannot speak the local language. Singh (2013) recounts the ordeal of a student who had challenges securing accommodation because some locals were unwilling to share their rooms with Zimbabweans. Weber (2016) observes that while international students from the Southern African region experience xenophobia, the levels are even higher against those from other parts of the continent such as Congo, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. The use of the local language in class discussions (both academic and non-academic) to deliberately exclude foreign students is common in South African universities (Singh 2013). Similarly, the accents and low level of English

proficiency, particularly among francophone students are often regarded as academic incompetence by their South African colleagues with adverse effects on these students' confidence and self-esteem (Pineteh and Mulu 2016). It is not therefore surprising that locals stick together and foreigners form separate groups in class. One of the respondents in Pineteh and Mulu's study reported:

> When the lecturers give group work, South African students do not want to work with us. When we ask them they will say it is because they want to talk their local language and we are not going to understand. But I think it is because South Africans don't like foreigners […] they think we are going to take their jobs when we finish studying. Like they are always asking us when are we going back home? 'Are you going back home after you finish?' You can see that they don't like us here (Pineteh and Mulu 2016: 395).

A question that South African students often ask international students is 'don't you have universities in your country?' (Singh 2013: 101). Again, this is a clear reflection of how attitudinal xenophobia manifests in broader South African society and reinforces in the universities. As in the wider society, white international students are largely exempt from this pathology. In a publication titled: National Development Plan: Vision for 2030, the National Planning Commission explicitly states that: "In 2030, 75 percent of University academic should hold PhDs. PhD graduates, either as staff or post-doctoral fellows, will be the dominant drivers of new knowledge production within the higher education and science innovation system" (National Planning Commission 2011: 267). Given this lofty goal and the National Development Plan's target to produce more than 5000 doctoral graduates annually by 2030 (National Planning Commission 2011) coupled with South African doctoral holders' inadequacies in supervising potential doctoral students, it goes without saying that South Africa require African academics with doctoral degrees to achieve the targets. However, South African tertiary institutions have been reluctant to employ foreigners. A foreign academic working at the University of KwaZulu-Natal recalled how South African academics in his department grumbled following the appointment of a foreigner (Personal Communication 2014). This is further complicated by the seemingly uncoordinated immigration policy on issuing work permits to foreign academics. The Department of Home Affairs has been noted to drag its feet in issuing work permits, let alone permanent residence or citizenship to foreign academics that are undeniably critical to South African tertiary institutions (Cloete et al. 2015). Despite acknowledgement of the shortage of skills and the resolve to accommodate and possibly employ scarce skills professionals, this is becoming mere rhetoric in the context of academics as vacant positions are re-advertised when no South African qualifies despite applications from qualified foreigners.

The Paradox of Soft Power and Xenophobia in South African Higher Education

As noted earlier, since the mid-twentieth century there have been a burgeoning number of international students, especially from Africa, in South African universities. The relatively lower tuition and subsistence costs in comparison to European

and American institutions are a major reason. Other considerations are the high standard of South African universities and the expectation of gainful employment after completion of studies in the country. These significant pull factors have enhanced the status and perceptions of South African universities and provide a fillip to these institutions' soft power. However, despite these universities' success, they are confronted with the inherent contradiction of xenophobia that serves as a push factor and has the tendency to prevent foreigners from enroling in South African universities as well as causing graduate international students to leave the country. This punctures universities' soft power, highlighting the need for strategies to address this issue.

A major source of a country's soft power is its culture. A country with a friendly and tolerant culture is admired in the international arena. The intolerant culture in South Africa that is visible in the country's universities has punctured the country, and these institutions' soft power (Tella and Ogunnubi 2014). Discrimination and verbal and physical attacks against foreign students have painted South Africa in a negative light in the hearts and minds of many international students (Dominguez-Whitehead and Sing 2015). In such an environment, there is a lack of motivation to imbibe the South African culture while, on the other hand, South Africans are not exposed to the cultures of the foreigners. Consequently, the cosmopolitan nature and cultural exchange that characterise a university are lost. This is understandable in light of the fact that many foreign students are excluded, isolated and feel unwelcome in the country as a result of the clustering of students along racial and national lines (Pineteh and Mulu 2016). Accordingly, substantial soft power that could be generated by South African culture is dampened.

Another significant effect of xenophobia on the attractiveness of South African universities is that potential foreign students might begin to seek alternatives if the situation persists. Indeed, at a seminar on South African Foreign Policy organised by the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria, Professor Maxi Schoeman - the deputy dean of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Pretoria - noted the decline in the enrolment of international students in South African universities following xenophobic incidents (News24 2017). The Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI) notes that while South Africa is still viewed as a viable destination by many, due to ubiquitous xenophobic incidents, some foreigners have lost confidence in the country and have begun to find alternative countries to migrate to (CRAI 2009). Pineteh and Mulu aptly observe that:

> In the context of South Africa, African students including Francophones are becoming more and more transnational migrants, especially given the host country's culture of gratuitous violence against foreigners triggered by its own social challenges, xenophobia fervours and the politics of belonging and citizenship (Pineteh and Mulu 2016: 390).

It goes without saying that this might have a telling effect on the number of international students that will subsequently apply to South African universities. If this plays out, it will have significant negative effect on the status of South African universities. As noted earlier, postgraduate programmes and post-doctoral fellowships in these institutions rely heavily on the enrolment of international students and fresh doctoral graduates. A massive decline in the number of these students and

fellows might significantly affect the running of these programmes including a possible shut down of many. This would reduce the likelihood of meeting the target of 5000 doctoral graduates per year, undercut knowledge production and also undermine the attractiveness of these institutions, impacting on income generated. As noted previously, South African universities are increasingly becoming an important contributor to national wealth due to the tuition fees paid by international students. A significant drop in the number of international students would reduce this source of income, negatively impacting South Africa's economy as well as its foreign policy objective of economic diplomacy and soft power. Similarly, due to xenophobia, South Africa loses a large proportion of graduated students, especially at doctoral level to these students' home countries or other countries. A respondent cited in Pineteh and Mulu's study stated that:

> I came here just to study and after my degree I am going home. The way this South African people treat us, I can't stay here even during holidays; I want to be with my family. I only call or whatsapp them during school time and before the university closes, I already buy air-ticket to travel home and I am always going home…I know it is expensive but my parents understand because they see the xenophobia on TV and they know we are not safe here (Pineteh and Mulu 2016: 390).

South African universities lack staff capacity to cope with increasing student enrolment. Despite this reality and the policy imperative of increasing the proportion of black students and staff vis a vis their white counterparts, there is clear reluctance to include foreign Africans in this project (Nordling 2015). The expertise that could be tapped from these students and add significant diversity to South African research output and students' training is lost. This is instructive in light of foreign academics' contribution to the research output of universities such as North West and Fort Hare that have large numbers of such academics. Universities in the US have benefited enormously from the expertise of highly distinguished professors and PhDs from different backgrounds that migrated to the country. Xenophobia means that South Africa cannot access such benefits.

As mooted earlier, the ultimate manifestation of universities' soft power occurs when graduates of those universities become political office holders in their home countries and influence policies that are favourable to the country that provided their higher education. Countries such as the US and China have benefitted significantly in this regard. For instance, in the 1990s, many South Americans, including from those from Brazil and Chile, that trained in US universities and went back to become political office holders in their countries championed free trade (Tella 2016d). Similarly, US-trained African politicians such as Nigerian Okonjo Iweala a former Minister of Finance, and Ivorian President Allasane Ouattara have facilitated neo-liberal policies and tend to adopt cordial relations with the US (Tella 2016d). South African universities have not meaningfully accrued such soft power, partly due to their late arrival on the international scene but also possibly because of xenophobia. Given the experiences of foreigners in South African universities including discrimination and exclusion, foreign graduates might see no reason to influence their countries' policies in favour of South Africa. The edge universities in places like the US, Canada, the UK and China have is that students are integrated in the

system and embrace the cultures of these countries. The soft power that South African universities could wield in this regard will continue to be a mirage if foreign students continue to leave South Africa without establishing social contact and emulating the culture of their host country.

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that higher education contributes to South Africa's soft power portfolio. Institutions such as the Universities of Cape Town, Pretoria, Stellenbosch, the Witwatersrand and KwaZulu-Natal are well ranked among the world's top universities. This enhances their attractiveness to potential students and academics. It is not therefore surprising that South African universities attract tens of thousands of foreign students. While these students contribute to the cosmopolitan character of these communities, they also bring with them diverse skills and ideas that could enhance the capacity of these institutions. However, contradictory anti-immigrant sentiments have punctured the soft power of these institutions. Given that a university is a conglomeration of intellectuals, one might tend to assume that they are insulated from the xenophobic tendencies that characterise broader South African society. However, xenophobia is rife in these institutions among students and staff including academics. It only differs from the broader society in terms of its subtleness.

This is a major challenge to the soft power potential that could be generated by South African universities. Either hard or soft, the ultimate goal of deploying power is to achieve set goals. Due to xenophobia as well as other factors, South African universities have not maximised their soft power potential to achieve the country's foreign policy objectives. To enhance their capacity in this regard, universities must embrace tolerance and their curriculum should reflect this. For instance, there is a need for a sophisticated curriculum that examines African commonalities, achievements, Pan-Africanism, and other African countries' positive contributions to South Africa since most of the negative sentiments are directed against fellow Africans. South African academics (who students regard as role models) need to show more tolerance to their foreign counterparts and students. In a nutshell, a conscious effort to end xenophobia would elevate South African universities' soft power and thus the country's foreign policy objectives of economic and cultural diplomacy.

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Chapter 8
Frustration-Aggression, Afrophobia and the Psycho-Social Consequences of Corruption in South Africa

Regis Wilson and Lulu Magam

Introduction

The inauguration of the much-awaited majority rule in South Africa held great promises of socio-economic and political emancipation of the black race. Indeed, there was high optimism and much trust in the African National Congress (ANC) political leaderships. These expectations soon turned to frustrations due to the inability of successive post-Apartheid governments to significantly improve the livelihood of the mass of the people, especially those of the urban-rural and rural-rural (Akinola et al. 2015). Furthermore, the working-class groans under the burden of inflation and dwindling economic fortunes. The yawning gap of economic inequality and the inability of the ANC-led government to meet the socio-economic demands of the country's poor are possible triggers of frustration, which manifests in aggressive dispositions of the citizens (Keeton 2014; Cilliers and Aucoin 2016). We locate the South African state's failure, which engendered frustration, in political corruption. Frustration-aggression explains afrophobia: a phenomenon that describes an act of misplaced aggression towards immigrants. Therefore, the incidences of afrophobia become the veritable unintentional means to vent anger against the political system, which is characterized by high degree of corruption. Ultimately, there is a causal relationship between state's failure, corruption and afrophobia. In common parlance, the word xenophobia has often been employed to describe the attacks on foreigners in South Africa. The reality however is that during the spate of such violence, foreigners of African extract usually form a majority of the victims. As Matsinhe (2011: 296) avers that in South Africa, foreign nationals of African descent are more likely to fall victims of physical violence. Additionally, the

R. Wilson (✉) • L. Magam
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
e-mail: regisowilson@gmail.com

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patterns of the violence further props adoption of afrophobia rather than xenophobia in this chapter.

In January 2011 for instance, a Zimbabwean national was mobbed to death in Diesploot in Gauteng (Bearak 2011). Another case was the attack and looting of more than 50 Somali-owned shops in Motherwell Port Elizabeth in May 2011. Over 25 Somali shopkeepers were murdered in townships around Cape Town between May and June 2011 (Charman & Piper 2012). There are other instances where foreign nationals of African descent have been attacked and killed in a macabre manner (see for instance, Matlala 2011; Matsinhe 2011). The African Centre for Migration and Society in Johannesburg recorded over 360 xenophobic murders since 2008, particularly from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Somalia (Hiropoulus 2017).

Hiropoulus (2017: 1) further estimates that between January 2015 and January 2017, over 66 deaths of foreign nationals of African descent have been reported, 116 were assaulted, 571 businesses looted and about 11,140 people displaced. It is also recorded in several literature (see Isike & Isike 2012; Mamabolo 2015; Keohane and Maphunye 2015; Okyere-Manu 2016) that the inability to speak one of the local dialects and the colour of one's skin have been used to identify foreigners. Matsinhe (2011: 297) making an extrapolation from the biocultural theory of xenophobia, places "the uneven loathing of African foreign nationals squarely on their alleged visible otherness".

The chapter begins by construing corruption as a problem of governance defined as an abuse of discretionary power. It then gives an overview of the Closed List Proportional Representational System practiced in South Africa as a major contributing factor to the prevalence of corruption. The chapter argues that this system creates a form of party autocracy at the expense of popular participation and public scrutiny. The chapter is divided into several sections. The first, introduction, presents the background to the study. An explication of the concepts: corruption and afrophobia will follow in the second section. Corruption here will be conceptualized as a problem of governance, while afrophobia will be described as violent attacks and in some cases the murder of African immigrants. In section three, the nature and character of the South Africa is examined. An analysis of the modes of corruption in South Africa, and a demonstration of the link between corruption and afrophobia shapes sections four and five respectively. The last section comprises the conclusion and recommendations.

Overview of Concepts: Corruption and Afrophobia

Corruption is elusive; hence there are no universally acclaimed understanding of the term. Hellman et al. (2000) describe corruption primarily in terms of governance. The authors examines the key characteristics of government and its policies, with a special focus on the "extent of state intervention in the economy and the degree of discretionary power of bureaucrats" (Hellman et al. 2000: 1). Certain roles of the

state inevitably provides a fertile ground for corruption to inhere (Tanzi 1998: 3). Thus, there is a correlation between the quality of government and the spread of corruption in a country. Shwenke (2000: 140) notes that "in some cases, the word 'corruption' is replaced with the proxy term 'good governance'". Just like Hellman et al. (2000) and Shwenke (2000) also express a convergence between corruption and governance. According to Shwenke (2000: 140), "good governance is a positive and larger category that certainly embraces the notion of corruption avoidance and prevention".

Rose-Ackerman has a similar understanding of corruption by maintaining that, "corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong with the management of the state" (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 9). The preceding positions accentuate the notion that corruption and governance have a direct nexus (Johnston 2005; Rose-Ackerman 1996). That is, "bad quality governance fosters corruption" (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio 2009). Nye (1967) presents a divergent view of corruption. According to him, corruption is a behaviour that "deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types for private-regarding influence" (Nye 1967: 417). A set of factors are necessary for corruption to subsist. There must be the manifestation of discretionary power (the authority to allocate resources); there must be economic rents associated with this power; additionally, the probability of detection and punishment must be sufficiently low (Jain 2001; Lambsdorff 2007). Hence, corruption arises whenever discretionary power is used in a way that deviates from established rules and regulations – by accepting or demanding some form of remuneration to grant favorable treatment to one party over the other – in a way that is not beneficial to the common good. The consequences of corruption are weak political institutions, replacement of public interests with private aggrandizement, poor service delivery, impoverishment and poor governance (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). In such cases, the subjects assume a confrontational attitude towards the political system and in extension their environments. This explains the reality of the South African social-political environment. Thus, the hostilities against non-locals, termed Afrophobia, is a function of misplaced reaction to the effects of corruption in South Africa. Hence, what is Afrophobia?

A bulk of literature that deals with the nature of attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa, which are readily construed and represented as xenophobia (Misago et al. 2009)**.** The nature and the victims of these attacks however demands that these incidences need to be re-construed and rightly represented. Keohane and Maphunye (2015: 84), simply describe afrophobia as "black-on-black conflict and violence directed at other Africans". A similar conceptualization is recorded in Long et al. (2015) who suggest due to the reality that the violence is directed at African nationals, Afrophobia rather than xenophobia is a more accurate term. For Mamabolo (2015: 144) there is a link between the acts of xenophobic violence and the colour of the victim's skin. Mamabolo suggests that "it is actually *Afrophobia*. At its height, xenophobic attacks in South Africa have appeared to exclusively involve African immigrants" Mamabolo (2015: 144).

Dealing in drugs, promoting prostitution, spreading HIV *inter alia* have always been submitted as *raison d'etre* for afrophobia (Keohane and Maphunye 2015; Mamabolo 2015). The veracity of such claims however has been disputed in an array of literature. Of importance is Morris' (1998) suggestion that a scapegoat thesis and the bicultural hypothesis could aid us in understanding the reasons for xenophobia. According to Morris' employment of the scapegoat thesis, the loathing of foreign nationals which sees them getting blamed for social ills like unemployment, poverty, crime and the spread of the HIV pandemic is derived from the frustration of the poor and unemployed South Africans. The Biocultural hypothesis proposed by Morris goes a step further to assert that the loathing of foreign nationals hinge on an allegedly visible otherness. As Morris affirms, "the biocultural hypothesis locates xenophobia at the level of visible difference, or otherness, ie in terms of physical biological factors and cultural differences exhibited by African foreigners in the country" (Morris 1998: 1125). It is tenable to suggest that while the reasons for afrophobia can be hinged on a lot of misconstrued notions and beliefs, the role of the South African media and some influential public figures in criminalizing and scapegoating foreigners should not be ignored. Morris (1998: 1126) tellingly states that there is a pervasively negative image of Africans from other African countries in South Africa. Take for instance the case of Nigerians, Morris states that,

> *The widespread stereotype that all Nigerians in Johannesburg's inner city are drug-dealers and crooks is not surprising, since it is constantly voiced in the media and by those in positions of power. The information disseminated by the media and those in influential positions has undoubtedly had a significant impact.* (Morris 1998: 1126).

The effect was the pervasive negative view South Africans have towards foreigners from other African countries.

The Nature and Character of the South African Society

The influx of immigrants to South Africa is not a new phenomenon, but rather an age-old trend that was intensified by the discovery of minerals in the country. The country attracted migrants dating back to the nineteenth century with the discovery of precious minerals (Gold and Diamonds). This discovery led to the dire need of increased labour to work in the mines, this attracted labour from neigbouring countries. This was not limited to the discovery of mineral resources and the buoyancy of agricultural sector, the need of more farm-workers also motivated large immigrants into the country. Therefore, the mining and agriculture sectors have been dependent on migrant labour from Southern African countries, much of South Africa's mineral and natural wealth has been produced on the backs of migrant mine workers (Sibanda 2008).

In specific terms, the country's discovery of diamonds in the Orange Free State and gold in Witwatersrand in the nineteenth Century led to massive population movement and neighboring states became labour reservoirs to feed the hungry

demands of mining magnates for cheap unskilled black labour (Solomon 1996). The South African employers systematically recruited foreign migrants to supplement what they deemed to be an insufficient supply of domestic labour (Chirwa 1998). The country received skilled and semi-skilled workers from many of its neighbouring countries, especially Zimbabwe. This migration bulge necessitated the implementation of a policy that controlled the entry of migrant labourers. The recent Green Paper on International Migration released by the Department of Home Affairs in June 2016 suggest that while South Africa still has need for foreign migrant labourers, there is however a need to curtail the number of migrants that come in. This in the documents view is so as to "enable SA to adequately embrace global opportunities while safeguarding our sovereignty and ensuring public safety and national security" (DHA 2016: 24).

Crush et al. (1991), point out that was the migrant labour system to the mining and commercial farming sectors from neighbouring countries remained the pillar of the Apartheid immigration policy. The system was underwritten by bilateral treaties which worked in favour of the employers and governments, and solidly against the interests of migrants and their dependents. Notwithstanding, during colonialism and Apartheid dispensation, no intolerance was ever reported in South African communities, including in the mining and agricultural sector, which comprised large numbers of foreign nationals and South Africans.

Just shortly after the enthronement of majority rule in 1994, the optimism associated with the promise of democracy in South Africa was met with disappointed, (Akinola et al. 2015; Akinola 2014). Mamabolo (2015: 145) tellingly states that "despite lack of a comparable data, poverty and unemployment is perceived to have significantly increased after the country's democratic dispensation in 1994". Keeton (2014) also affirms that in spite of the implementation of a massive social welfare system post-apartheid, poverty and inequality still persists and they are identifiable along racial lines. The year 1994 presented South African's with new dawn of hope, not only freedom was to be enjoyed but the lives of all were to become better. The society entrusted their leaders with improved life for all South Africans irrespective of race, ethnic affiliation and class.

The government promised improved housing, welfare and infrastructures and job opportunities, none of which have fully materialized decades into democracy. The appalling conditions in which many South Africans have lived are directly responsible for the anger that is evident in the society. Democracy holds no promise to the majority who continue to live in poverty and hopelessness. High unemployment, poor living conditions as well as the inadequate provision of services, poverty aggravation (Institute for Security Studies 2009). The current unemployment rate as submitted by Statistics South Africa stands at 27.1% and is regarded as the highest since 2003 (BusinessTech 2016). About 17 million South Africans are recipients of one form of social grants, which was an exponential increase from the 4 million recipients recorded in 1994 (Ferreira 2015). Therefore, underdevelopment are at most the root cause of the frustration experienced by South Africans. The relentless strike and mass protests due to poor service delivery in the country are indicative of the monumental socio-economic challenges confronting the South African state and

its people (South African Institute of International Affairs 2011). For instance, it is believed that there were on average three protests (service delivery or labour related) per day between 2013 and 2015 (Bhardwaj 2016).

The inherent corruption by government officials[1] is by far the worst betrayal and a 'slap in the face' of the South African society. These factors have led to social crisis and stirred the aggression and anger that is evident in the violence against migrants. Graca Machel has referred to South Africa as an "angry and frustrated nation on the brink of something very dangerous" (Laing 2013: 2). It is unintended that foreign nationals are at the receiving end of this frustration expressed through aggression and violence. Any competition over limited resources leads to violent conflict, this reality coupled with the social crisis in South Africa meant that violence between competing parties is inevitable. In the case of South Africa, the revelation of corruption among public officials and public institutions like the police deepened the frustration of the mass of the people.

Modes of Corruption in South Africa

Although, official corruption manifests in diverse forms in South Africa, this chapter identifies corruption in regards of public procurement and abuse of power, as well as party autocracy as the most decisive.

Public Procurement and the Abuse of Discretionary Power

Public procurement is used to describe the contractual process of buying, hiring or obtaining of goods and services by a government for the discharge of its functions (Arrowsmith 2010). Through public procurement, the South African government aims to make efficient and effective use of scarce resources to promote socio-economic development. There are rules, regulations and codes of conduct that guide the process of public procurement and serve as protective parameters to enable an effective and efficient process (Arrowsmith 2010). Arrowsmith (2010) puts forward three phases of the public procurement process: procurement planning (a process of deciding which goods and services to be bought and when); the process of placing the contract, a form of evaluating suitable candidates for the contract; and lastly, the process of administering the contract to ensure effective and efficient performance.

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 217, Act No 108 of 1996 stipulates the objectives of the public procurement process; it also specifies the legal framework for the process. Essentially, the public procurement process in

[1] The president was embroiled in a corruption scandal regarding security upgrades at his private homestead; Ministers like Bathabile Dlamini have been implicated in different corruption/malfeasance scandal (travel gate and the recent SASSA debacle). Bheki Cele lost his job as the national police commissioner as a result of corruption related scandal and subsequent conviction.

South Africa has legislative, regulatory and ethical frameworks, which are supposed to guide the actions of the procurer (government) and the procured (private enterprise) (South African National Treasury 2003). The failure to abide by such rules amounts to corruption. Also, Hyslop's (2005: 776) position that corruption should be understood from a legal positivist's angle. An action earns the label corrupt to the extent that it "transgresses particular laws or regulations". In spite of the extensive legislative frameworks that have been put in place to guide the procurement process, Munzhedzhi opines corruption still,

> *Ensues during the process of procurement of goods and services. It is either that the prices are inflated, contracts are awarded to friends or family, tenders are not advertised, bid committees are not properly constituted or that panel members did not declare their interest before the sitting of the adjudication committee.* (Munzhedzi 2016: 2)

A case in point is the recent South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) debacle. It came to light that the process of awarding the distribution of social grants to Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) was fraught with irregularities and the constitutional court demanded that the tendering process should be reopened so as to make the process transparent. Despite the constitutional court's finding that the tender was improperly awarded to CPS, and the subsequent order that SASSA had to repeat the tendering process. There was a lot of reluctance on the part of the Social Development Minister to heed the ConCourt's injunction. Additionally, there are other cheaper alternatives that SASSA could use. Consequently, a news report demand an explanation to political corruption:

> *Especially given that, historically, there were allegations of corruption around the awarding of the grant distribution tender to Net1 under previous political heads. Originally, there were different service providers in different provinces and Net1 was just one of the companies doing the distribution. But after the government centralised the grants under the South African Social Security Agency (Sassa), Net1 won the tender to distribute the grants to the whole of SA, becoming the monopoly infrastructure provider, in effect.* (BusinessDay 2017)

This was one of the misdoing of the ANC-led leadership.

Closed List Proportional Representation, Party Autocracy, Party Dominance and Corruption

There is an assertion that "in a democracy, electoral voting rules and legislative processes interact with underlying political cleavages to affect opportunities for corruption" (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 127). The growth of corruption can thus be understood to be endogenous to a political system. A point in fact, is the Closed List Proportional Representation (CLPR) system as practiced in South Africa's national and regional legislatures. In the CLPR system, a political party's representation in a country's legislature correlates directly with the percentage of votes received in an election (Matlosa 2004).

One of the demerits of the CLPR is that politicians' malfeasance becomes difficult to monitor. The reason is that since "voters cast their votes for parties; the link

between individual politicians' re-election and their performance in office is weakened" (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2001: 2). For instance the different corruption allegations brought up against top ANC members have in no way deterred them from retaining their different status or positions in the ANC and government (Bruce 2014). President Zuma was accused of corruption, he denied it but the court mandated him to pay the treasury R7.8 million which allegedly went to non-security upgrades at his private homestead in Nkandla. Supposedly, elections are to "serve as a monitoring device to hold politicians accountable. Different electoral rules vary in their monitoring capacity and hence create stronger or weaker constraints on politicians" (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2001: 5). Election is a weapon to regulate the activities of political office holder (Leftwich 2000), but the case of South Africa, like other African countries present a contrary reality.

In the CLPR system, the politicians naturally owe their positions to the party and are not directly accountable to the voters. This severance of relationship between voters and representatives threatens the principles of accountability and transparency (Amtaika 2013: 104). The connection between an electoral system and the high rate of corruption may not be directly correlated. However, it is evident that through the CLPR, a fertile ground for corruption to thrive is created, in that power lie decisively and absolutely with party leaders at the expense of other "regular" party members and the electorate (Sibalukhulu 2012). Such a situation makes it susceptible to abuse. When a system operates in a way that permits for the abuse of power for the benefit of the few at the expense of the majority, that system is likely to be very corrupt (cited in Kalombo 2005: 116). The party leaders tend to protect corrupt office holders, based on the patronage system and other primordial or personal considerations (Mail and Guardian 2006).

There is also a concern that South Africa is leaning towards a *de facto* one party state. The ANC has been winning a resounding majority (over 60%) in most of the elections since 1994; it stands to reason, therefore, that the ANC is a dominant party in South Africa. Its successive election victories and an unforeseeable future defeat at the Presidential level further support its stance as a dominant party (Suttner 2006: 277). Although, the ANC lost the 'Mayorship' positions in South African major cities (Johannesburg and Pretoria), which was unprecedented in the post-Apartheid South Africa, the ANC still remained the dominant party in the country. Its waning influence might not be unconnected with massive disillusionment and corruption allegation hanging on the ruling party. Andrew Faull (2016: 3) describes ANC's unprecedented municipal and local government electoral defeat as a message from opposition parties and the electorate that the ANC and Zuma's 'arrogance' had gone too far. It was a vote against Nkandla, the Guptas, the abuses at the SABC, Prasa, South African Airways and political corruption. ANC's dominance has been attributed to "a function of both overwhelming electoral support and an electoral system that privileges the interests of political parties over those of the ordinary citizen" (Matshiqi 2012: 8).

ANC's dominance, an unforeseeable future defeat creates what Rose-Ackerman (1999) describes as "security of tenure". She further maintains that "too much security of tenure can further corrupt arrangement" (1999: 127). This implies that

political competition encourages accountability and reduces the possibility of public venality. ANC's hegemony also points to the reality that sometimes, performance does not guarantee regime's security. Since the electorates vote for the party, the chances of the politicians' on the list getting re-elected primarily depends on their ranking on the list, not on their performance. If lists are drawn up by party leaders, the ranking will likely reflect criteria unrelated to competence in providing benefits to voters, such as party loyalty, or effort within the party (rather than in office). Then, the incentives to perform are much weaker (Persson et al. 2002: 5).

Looting the economy has been cited as a demerit of a dominant party system and these negative impacts do not necessarily constitute impediments to regime consolidation (cited in Wieczorek 2012: 30). The absence of competition "ultimately eliminates the threat of losing power which affects the accountability of the government" (Wieczorek 2012: 30). The Travel Gate Scandal of 2004 and the Nkandla scandal[2] support the preceding argument**.** The number of cases and the tendency of ANC to dismiss allegation of corruption abound, but the enumerated cases of corruption attest to the impunity with which ANC members operate and the immunity they enjoy.

Hypothetically, a competitive political environment will ensure that political malfeasance is reduced, people based policies will be promoted, the electorate will be provided with better alternatives and ensure that government is accountable and transparent (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Leftwich 2002). The democratization should be "a process of institutionalizing uncertainty," (Leftwich 2002: 198). Essentially, democracy should not allow room for any form of what Rose-Ackerman called "too much security of tenure". Democracy should thus entail open competition for power devoid of foregone victors.

In a competitive political environment where corruption elicits heavy penalties, its occurrence can be greatly reduced. If the reverse is the case, corruption is bound to increase (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Persson et al. 2002). The scourge of corruption in the country as "an indication of how the interests of citizens may come under threat as a result of the distortions that come with single party dominance, which the dishonest among us deliberately confuse with a one party state" (Matshiqi's 2012: 8). Therefore, if a political system makes it possible for a single party to be dominant, a fertile ground for corruption may have been set in place. More so, "there would appear to be a correlation between corruption and longevity in power" (Bull and Newel 2003: 238). The ascension into power by ANC since 1994 led credence to this assertion.

[2] Regarding the Travel Gate Scandal, about 14 ANC MPs pleaded guilty to theft and fraud charges which resulted from their abuse of parliamentary travel vouchers (Maclennan 2006). In the Nkandla scandal, the public protector found that the President had unduly benefited from the R246 million security upgrade of his private homestead in Nkandla. He was asked to pay back some of the money (R7.8 million) by the constitutional court, based on the findings of the public protector.

Afrophobia and the Corruption Debacle

With the end of apartheid came a lot of hope and promises for majority of black South African. The ANC government also engaged in rhetoric to reinforce the optinism. It has been over 20 years since apartheid ended, but the expectations of the masses remains unattainable. Burger (2009) suggests that the frequent service delivery protests in South Africa point to a dissatisfaction and mass frustration. This in his opinion breeds the potential for a revolution, and the primary cause for revolution is "the widespread frustration with the socio-political situation in a particular country" (cited in Burger 2009).

Mbeki (2011) argues that political malfeasance, corruption, mismanagement and the inability of the ANC to make good its promises, have driven the country to the brink and left the masses frustrated and aggrieved. He decries the ineptitude of the ANC in running the country efficiently once it came into power. Mbeki strictly views some of the policies of the ANC (like the Affirmative Action and the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) as a means of satisfying personal and factional interests. According to him, the end result of some of these policies is the fostering of a number of extremely negative socioeconomic trends in South Africa. For him, the Affirmative Action promotes incompetence. He also believes that.

> *Corruption in the public sector by using ruling party allegiance and connections as the criteria for entry and promotion in the public service, instead of having tough public service entry examinations. Nepotism is rife – jobs for friends and families who are nowhere near qualified – and then hire consultants to actually get the work done- at additional cost of course!.* (Mbeki 2011)

Corruption which results from such socio-political arrangement is a malady that breeds dire consequences. A good example is the recurrence of afrophobia. The widespread violent incidences of 2008, 2015 and the most recent, 2016 highlight the height and the magnitude of the situation. The sheer thought that a South African can consider fellow African as a threat to be physically assaulted and eliminated in a macabre manner points to one thing; there is a lot of pent up anger and frustration in the country. The looting and senseless destruction of properties that have become a hallmark of these attacks corroborate this argument. The begging question remains, why are the masses angry?

James Davies' (1962) J-Curve theory offers robust insights into the anger-violence puzzle. Drawing from the work of Karl Marx, Davies submits that "degradation produces revolution" (Davies 1962: 5). The theory posits that with an improvement in the economy come certain expectations on the part of the citizens. Expectations and reality in such a situation is however not commensurate. To put it in context, the conditions of majority of South Africans are not commensurate to the socio-economic development recorded by the post-apartheid regimes. Presently, about 37.8% of the population is unemployed (Zwane 2015). Although, the state is rich and few South Africans are wealthy, but the living conditions of the majority are so deplorable to the extent that South Africa is described as one of the most unequal societies in the world (Keeton 2014).

Under apartheid, inequality was by design and racially-driven. Since the end of apartheid, only a tiny class of black elite has accrued great fortunes, and the masses have not significantly benefited from the wealth of the state. Reportedly, "South Africa's Gini coefficient—the best-known measure of inequality, in which 0 is the most equal and 1 the least—was 0.63 in 2009" (The Economists 2012). Evidently, most of the population is frustrated by this level of inequality and the brazen manifestation of ostentation by a minority of the blacks. Clearly, the socio-economic malaise and the chronic failure of services delivery are an indictment of South Africa's ruling elites. The consequence of such excites the anger of the citizens who are eager to take their grievances to the streets in protest (Grant 2014).

The frustration-aggression theory hypothesizes that all acts of aggression are a result of previous and growing frustration; and all frustration leads to aggression. Frustration is defined "as the act of blocking someone from gaining an expected gratification; aggression is any behavior which is intended to injure the individual to whom it is directed" (Dill and Anderson 1995: 360). Hence, when people get frustrated, several kinds of response are possible with violence being the most probable (Davies 1962; Dill and Anderson 1995; Lewis 2011). Some of the service delivery protests can be described as a channeling of aggression to the proper sources; the attacks on foreigners however leave a lot to be desired. Miller et al. (2003) describe these attacks as a triggered displaced aggression. In their opinion, such displacement of aggression usually occurs as a result of frustration,

> *In circumstances that preclude retaliation. When that person subsequently behaves aggressively toward an innocent other, it may reflect the displacement of the aggressive inclination toward the initial provocateur. If so, the assumption is that the actor would not have responded aggressively toward the innocent party that had he not previously been provoked.* (Miller et al. 2003: 75)

The attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa hinges on the notion that immigrants, mainly from other African countries, contributes to the dwindling economic fortune of South Africans. The locals accused foreigners of taking their jobs, thereby reducing the prospects of employment in a country with high unemployment ratio (Matsinhe 2011; Isike 2012; Mamabolo 2015; Cilliers and Aucoin 2016). While the masses are frustrated by the nature and quality of service delivery or the lack of it, the foreign national becomes another object of their aggression. The foreigners are however not the cause of the rising rate of unemployment or the Grand Canyon of inequality in the country. The frequent recourse to violence and the problem of South Africa as Gobodo-Madikizela (2013) would describe it results from a "moral rot" in the country. It is also

> *Visible in plain sight in the ANC's echelons of power. It is exemplified in the multiple scandals by the most senior members of the ANC…the rampant corruption scandals involving ANC officials – from the highest level of leadership in government to the very lowest in provincial offices and the country's border gates. Moral rot at the top can breed lack of trust in government, disillusionment and chaos in society.* (Gobodo-Madikizela 2013)

South Africa presents an evidence of the corruption-poor governance convergence.

Conclusion

This chapter has drawn a causal link between corruption, its attendant consequences, the frustration of disenchanted poor South Africans and the misplaced anger that the latter expressed towards fellow Africans, albeit non-South Africans. It utilizes the frustration-aggression discourse to locate the cause of Afrophobic sentiment in South Africa. Most South Africans, who are poor, have not enjoyed the benefits they envisaged at the onset of democracy in 1994. The ANC government, amid many gains, has not comprehensively managed, in the last two decades, to lift many previously disadvantaged groups from dire poverty.

Political domination and complacency, economic ineptitude, lack of adequate service delivery and glaring cases and levels of corruption have compounded the plight of poor South Africans. However, the ANC has still maintained a dominance of power because despite the blemishes of its specific members, South Africans in the main remain chronically indebted to the ANC as a party of liberation. In an event that people recoil from attacking the government as the real object of their frustration, an easier and more vulnerable scapegoat is found in other Africans who are viewed as coming to compete for limited opportunities found in the country.

A practical solution to Afrophobia in South Africa lies with the government capacity to redress the inequality that exist within communities. The government should acknowledge that Afrophobia is a serious issue in the country and refrain from attributing massive attacks on foreigners as mere criminal activity. The police should be called to maintain law and order without compromise. Lastly, there is the urgency to strengthen anti-corruption measures to deal with the high rate of political corruption in the country.

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Chapter 9
From Hate to Love: Black South Africans and the Xenophobia Project

Omololu Fagbadebo and Fayth Ruffin

Introduction

'DON'T HATE, LOVE' is one of the inscriptions on the placards displayed by the anti-xenophobic protesters in Johannesburg recently (eNCA 2017a). Though the protest march was broken up by the authorities, declaring it as illegal, the placards sent a message: the need for love and tolerance rather than hatred, between the locals and foreign African nationals resident in South Africa. The February 2017 anti-immigrant march organised by the Memolodi Concerned Residents in Pretoria West, was dubbed a movement against criminal activities of foreign African nationals, resident in the area. In spite of the condemnation that followed the crisis, a Pretoria politician, Mario Khumalo, announced the formation of a new political party, The South African First, which would be dedicated to championing the campaign for driving away of foreigners (Mabena 2017). Khumalo re-echoed the common sentiment that foreigners were the harbingers of criminal activities and as such, his political party would drive them out of South Africa within 48 hours if granted political power.

This kind of expression usually dominates the South African lexicon each time there exist any altercations between the locals and foreign African nationals. This was not however, the position of a number of black South African citizens, including President Jacob Zuma, who argued that not all foreign African nationals are criminals (The New Age 2017). Rather, their contributions to the economic growth,

O. Fagbadebo (✉)
Public Governance School of Management, IT and Governance,
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
e-mail: fagbadebo@ukzn.ac.za

F. Ruffin
Public Governance School of Management, IT and Governance,
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville Campus, Durban, South Africa

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especially the informal and artisan sectors are numerous. Similarly, Home Affairs Minister, Malusi Gigaba, debunked the assertion that all black African foreign nationals are criminals.

> Just as we do not talk black crime, or Sesotho crime, Zulu crime etc; let us not talk about immigrant crime. Just as a car hijacker who is Zulu does not mean all Zulus do crime, so a drug dealer who happens to be Nigerian does not mean all Nigerians do crime (cf. eNCA 2017b).

This does not mean, however, that foreigners are not involved in criminal activities, especially illicit drug business and prostitution. Just recently, a Nigerian citizen was jailed for sexually exploiting a 15-year-old girl and forcing her into prostitution (Shange 2017; Vanguard 2017). There are several other cases of criminal activities involving foreign national residents in South Arica. It will not, therefore be out of place if the citizens rise to protect and promote the integrity and future of the young generation. President Zuma made reference to this recently saying

> We cannot close our eyes to the concerns of the communities that most of the crimes, such as drug dealing, prostitution, and human trafficking are allegedly perpetuated by foreign nationals…We just cannot co-exist with crime. Criminals, whether they are South Africans or foreign nationals, must be dealt with harshly, but within the ambit of the law (cf. Villiers 2017).

In view of the recurring cases of attacks against African immigrants in South Africa, it is pertinent to explore measures capable of appropriating the benefits derivable from their participation in the various sectors of the South African society. We argue in this chapter that there is the need to liberate black South Africans from their hostile traditional conceptualisation of relationship and interaction with foreigners. We posit that mutual interaction with foreigners would provide the opportunity to break the barriers of tradition and stereotypes in their perception of foreigners. The promotion of good governance through an inclusive public policy is capable of arousing mutual interaction among black South Africans and their foreign counterparts. This would trigger a new orientation of cooperation and collaboration for the promotion of the informal sector through exchange of skills and ideas.

The chapter has four other sections aside from the introduction. The next section takes a look at the different perspectives of xenophobia in South Africa. In the third section, we interrogate the nexus between the apartheid policy of isolation and the 'job stealing' slogan. This is followed by the analysis of the public discourse on xenophobia in South Africa. The last section concludes with a cursory examination of the means of stemming the rising tide of xenophobia in South Africa.

Perspectives on Xenophobia in South Africa

Recurring hostilities against foreign African resident in South Africa has been put under the searchlight of academic and research activities. Different scholars and writers have looked at the phenomenon from different perspectives. It becomes

important to have a have an understanding of xenophobia. Steenkamp (2009, 439) defines xenophobia as 'the irrational fear of the unknown, or specifically, as the fear or hatred of those with a different nationality'. This phenomenon 'relies heavily on the circulation of myths and stereotypes about foreigners' (Steenkamp 2009, 439). Harris (2002) avers that xenophobia in South Africa as a terminology denoting hatred for foreigners is characterised by a negative attitudinal change that encompasses hatred, fear and dislike that generates tension and violence.

Steenkamp (2009) takes a look at xenophobia in South Africa from the trust perspective. According to her, 'trust refers to a belief in the goodwill of others towards one's own interests and wellbeing' (Steenkamp 2009, 440), a perception that forms the basis for co-operation and interaction between individuals and groups. She notes that the South African society was pervaded by persistent high levels of distrust among the people: between black Africans resident in South Africans; South Africans and foreigners; amongst South Africans; between foreigners and the state; and between locals and the state.

Nyamnjoh (2006) sees xenophobia in South Africa as a reaction to globalisation. He argues that globalisation exacerbated insecurities occasioned by borderless flow of capital, goods and information in a large scale. This, he notes, brought 'about an obsession with citizenship and belonging and the re-actualization of boundaries through xenophobia' (Nyamnjoh 2006, p. 1).

> Xenophobia has been defined as one among several possible forms of reaction generated by anomic situations in the societies of modern states. The new South Africa is a good candidate for a society in a condition of anomie . . . and we should therefore not be surprised to find unusual levels of moral confusion among the citizenry (Sichone 2008, p. 257).

There are literatures on the series of perspectives that explain the scourge of xenophobia in South Africa. Some of the works take cognisance of the effect of the cross-border migration streams into South Africa as well as the various immigration policies including the roles of the security agencies (Bekker 2015; Hassim et al. 2008, Misago et al. 2009). Harris (2002) categorises the various perspectives of xenophobia into three: scapegoating, isolation and biocultural. The scapegoating perspective explains xenophobia in relation to the frustration of the locals as a result of inadequate resources for social security for the people. Limited resources such as employment, health care delivery services, education, often generate hostility by the locals towards the foreigners. The locals often attribute such short supply of amenities to the presence of foreigners (Morris 1998; Tshitereke 1999). Therefore, 'foreigners have quickly become the scapegoats for the continuing social and economic ills facing many South Africans' (Steenkamp 2009, 440). In other words, the locals, with high expectations from the society, blame the foreigners rather than the government for the failure to meet their socio-economic needs.

The expectations of an average black South African was that the collapse of the apartheid regime would bring an immediate delivery of social amenities (Tshitereke 1999). The failure of this expectations brought discontentment arising from the consciousness of deprivation. The growing frustration of black South Africans arising from the 'unmet needs, competition over scarce resources, unemployment, and

disequilibrium in resource distribution fuelled a culture of disdain against their fellow black African national. Unequal distribution of resources and wealth in the post-apartheid South Africa further reinforce this consciousness. The blame game created what Tshitereke (1999) termed 'frustration-scapegoat' attitude by the locals towards the foreigners who are targeted as threats to the equal distribution of employments, education, health, among other social amenities in the society (Morris 1998; Tshitereke 1999). Thus, the gap between the aspirations and expectations of the people, and, the reality, brought social discontent among the locals who blame foreigners for the inadequate resources. The argument here is that xenophobic attacks are majorly perpetrated by the black South Africans who have developed a sense of deprivation because of their social status. In other words, this set of people attributes the persisting governance crisis to the existence of foreign black Africans in the society. The scapegoating perspective is the psychological manifestation of the realities of the socio-economic situation in South Africa based on comparison (Tshitereke 1999). The frustration and aggression arising from these inadequacies are mere subjective perception which should not be used to explain the outbreak of unrest or violence. The subjective perceptions of the people in the society are not sufficient to justify social unrest and violence against those categorised as 'the others'.

On the other hand, the isolation perspective explains xenophobia from the apartheid policy of insulating the black South Africans from foreign nationals (Morris 1998). The policy, through the boundary maintenance policy, also isolated black South African from each other. This internal isolation was exacerbated by the strict boundaries between the South Africans which did not encourage tolerance and accommodation. During the apartheid regime, black South Africans were shot out of limelight and interactions with the other nationals being regarded as unknown foreigners (Morris 1998; Neocosmos 2010, 2015).

> With the political transition, however, South Africa's borders have opened up and the country has become integrated into the international community. This has brought South Africans into direct contact with the unknown, with foreigners (Harris 2002, p. 172).

Thus, South Africans still see themselves as separated apart from the rest of Africa, as exceptional, and, therefore struggle to identify with other Africans. President Jacob Zuma gave this impression when he said 'We can't think like Africans in Africa generally' (cf. Campbell 2013), a statement indicating 'a holdover of an apartheid mentality' (Campbell 2013). This interface between the closed South Africa and an open South Africa engendered the development of a culture of hostility against nationals who were regarded as strangers. The absence of a history of cohabitation with strangers created repulsive attitudes towards foreign nationals unknown to the society (Morris 1998). The internal and international isolation created an environment of intolerance of people, local or foreign, that were not part of their historical development and growth. This boundary policy promoted the culture of difference whereby anyone, local or foreign, who is different from the people are regarded as 'the other', who are conceived as sources of threat and danger (Morris 1998).

Another manifestation of xenophobia in relation to the apartheid policy is 'the cultural and structural violence that was associated with apartheid' (Fungurai 2015). The exclusionary apartheid practices such as 'the politics of access and unmet needs' evoked 'cultural and structural violence, and coincide with identity, space and territory' (Fungurai 2015). Xenophobia, therefore, could be viewed as 'a social, psychological, attitudinal, either overt or indirect, hostility and tension towards foreigners manifesting as physical violence, social conflict or a mere latent dislike of foreigners' (Fungarai 2015). Thus, xenophobia in South Africa is driven primarily by the interplay of social and economic factors including 'disequilibrium in socio-economic resources coupled with basic amenities and lack thereof' (Fungurai 2015). This culture arose because the people have been psychologically secluded, forcefully, from the outer world, thereby making the South African citizens pariahs in the midst of African neighbours.

The lack of exposure of a large number of black South Africans, to the socio-cultural, economic and political environments of other African countries has remained a potent driver in the recurring cases of xenophobic attacks. Sean Jacobs expresses it this way:

> Most South Africans don't have passports and rarely travel into the rest of the continent…. anti-immigrant sentiments exist in South Africa despite relatively little direct contact with people from other countries….The misinformation and sentiments about foreigners come from elsewhere: the public utterances and collusion by political leaders and public officials (police, municipal officials) and more importantly from media images (Jacobs 2008).

This has increased a high sense of stereotypes among a majority of black South Africans who do not have the knowledge and understanding of the mutual benefits of cooperation with and tolerance of their fellow Africans from other nationalities. This lack of enlightenment has invariably affected the perception of the locals towards their fellow African nationals. A foreigner told the media:

> I think the major reason for these attacks is because people are not educated about different places in Africa – they only learn about what happened during apartheid but have little knowledge about what happened in other places in Africa (cf. de Wet 2015).

In other words, xenophobia thrives because of the mentality that foreigners, residents in South Africa, are unknown strangers, different from the indigenous black South Africans. Even though there have been long histories of labour migration and residence among its neighbouring countries, black South Africans have been stereotyped to think differently and regard others as strangers (Neocosmos 2015; Steenkamp 2009).

Scapegoating and isolation perspectives treat foreigners as homogenous entities. The biocultural perspective, however, explains xenophobia from the standpoint of the biological and cultural composition of foreigners thereby making some categories of foreigners to be more vulnerable to hostility than others. This perspective explains why African nationals have been vulnerable to attacks by the black South Africans by virtue of their physical differences (Morris 1998). The identifiable cultural differences in terms of physical appearance, colour of the skin, language, accent, ways of dressing and types of clothing, are used to identify foreign African

nationals. These identifiable traits make it possible to detect the difference between the locals and foreigners, who are regarded as the *other*.

Aside from these three broad perspectives, Harris (2002) argues that a more acceptable hypothesis to explain xenophobia in South Africa rests on the transition of the South African state from the culture of racism to nationalism. He notes that how the social institutions in South Africa present and represent migration activities offer more explanation for the hostile attitude of the locals towards their fellow black Africans. Social institutions, especially the media, offered 'generalisations and stereotypes…regarding Africa and African immigrants' that provided insight into the hostility of the locals towards foreign African nationals resident in South Africa (Harris 2002, 175). The media, in particular, projected a negative representation of the African migrants in South Africa, thereby increasing the pace of hostility by the locals (Neocosmos 2008; Harris 2002). Media coverage as well as reporting of migrants' activities in South Africa surreptitiously promotes the culture of resentment against African immigrants. Media comments such as 'migrants steal jobs', and that they are 'are mostly 'illegal', 'flooding into the country to find work' and 'unacceptably encroaching on the informal sector and therefore on the livelihoods of our huge number of unemployed people', are expression of hate (Neocosmos 2008, p. 590).

> Africa appears as a negative space 'out there', totally separate from the space 'in here'. This affords an interesting link back to the scapegoating hypothesis and the notion of the 'unknown', because Africa is portrayed as a negative collective force without specific form or identity thereby representing an easy object of blame and anxiety (Harris 2002, p. 175).

In this light, African migrants are represented as criminals and illegal entities contaminating the South African societies. In essence, xenophobia, from this perspective, is seeing as an act of nationalism aimed at promoting and protecting the interest and integrity of the South African society.

Isolation, 'Job Stealing' and Xenophobia in South Africa

The isolation policy of the apartheid regime denied the people the opportunity of acquiring skills capable of preparing them for self-development. Since they had limited or no contact with the outside world, they were incapacitated to identify and developed their entrepreneurial potentials and skills necessary for the development and growth of the informal sector of the economy. A majority of the unemployed black South Africans rely on the formal sector for employment. In South Africa, the informal sector is populated by foreigners of Africa descent.

The 2014 report of the Migrating for Work Research Consortium (MiWORC), indicated that in the informal sector South African economy, 32.65% of international migrants were employed while only 16.57% and 17.97% are "non-migrants" and "domestic migrants", respectively (Fauvelle-Aymar 2014). The 2014 unemployment data in South Africa shows that 26.16% of "non-migrants" and 32.51% of

domestic migrants were unemployed but only 14.68% of international migrants were unemployed (Fauvelle-Aymar 2014). A higher proportion of employed international migrants were found in the precarious employment where they work under poor conditions and occupy positions that nationals were not willing to take (Fauvelle-Aymar 2014). According to the report, of the people in the precarious employment, 30.25% and 28.68% were non migrants and domestic migrants, respectively, while 53.29% were international migrants.

One of the drivers of xenophobic attacks, especially at the locations and townships, is the domination of foreign African nationals in the informal sectors. Minister of small business, Lindiwe Zulu explains this frustration this way:

> The system of apartheid killed us black people. We were told not to trade and only a few would be allowed to do it. They didn't learn the skill. There was no reason to be innovative, to learn different trading methods, to be cost-effective. You ran a spaza and people bought from you because they were forced to, not out of choice. These guys [foreign owners] come here and they network with other small business owners. They buy in bulk and support each other. Individuals don't bulk buy; they come together, buy in bulk, get discounts and divide the goods among each other. Two, they don't sleep. They work hard and understand why they must work hard. They tighten their belts [and] they don't spend the money. Everything goes back into the business. Unfortunately for us, the impact of the apartheid regime will take a long time to undo, not just 20 years (cf. Zwane 2014).

The reality of this assertion abounds. In Gauteng, a Non-Profit Organisation (NGO), the Sustainable Live Foundation (SLF), in its study between 2010 and 2013, discovered that foreigners dominated the ownership of spaza shops with 51.5% (Steyn et al. 2015). This domination, however, is not borne out of advantaged access to facilities. Immigrants and foreigners operate within the realm of limited space in terms of benefits and access to public facilities.

> Immigrants and refugees find it either impossible or too expensive to access government healthcare, those who cannot legalise their residency status receive no social grants, they do not receive free or subsidised housing, and foreign traders do not benefit from the support and development schemes aimed at small businesses (Steyn et al. 2015).

The success recorded by foreign shop owners across townships and locations in South Africa is attributable to the differences in the attitudinal dispositions of the foreigners and their local counterparts to their enterprises (Steyn et al. 2015). In Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces, it was discovered that a number of factors combined to squeeze locals out of business rather than the domination of foreigners.

> Burgeoning shopping malls are drawing consumers away from smaller businesses. Higher food and electricity prices are reducing disposable income. Those who are most economically successful, and find a firm footing in the middle class, tend to move into the suburbs, taking their money with them (Steyn et al. 2015).

Rather than being deterred by this setback, foreigners in business, by their 'grim tenacity and desperations' (Steyn et al. 2015) forge ahead with ingenuity to work round to improve their businesses.

> Their families raise larger amounts of cheap capital among themselves and shop owners can stock a larger range of items. Foreign-owned shops stay open longer and price goods very carefully, rather than imposing a universal mark-up. So they cling on where others fail, or move into the vacuum left as local traders move out (Steyn et al. 2015).

South Africa's Minister of Small Business, Lindiwe Zulu, even confirmed this as a 'secret' that is innate to the foreign shop owners. He made this revelation,

> Let me tell you why they are better at running shops than the local owners – they have a great network system. And also that's how they live. From the moment they are born, they are introduced to trade. Their mothers, uncles – everyone trades. They start at an early age (cf. Zwane 2014).

This business and trading characteristics are lacking among black South Africans. The successes of foreign shop owners were therefore interpreted to mean 'stealing of jobs' by the foreigners, who dominated the business space. Nevertheless, black South Africans could benefit more from their foreign counterparts though learning of the 'secrets' behind the success story of their businesses. Minister Zulu agreed with this as a means of bridging the differences in the outputs.

> Our people need to learn what other people are doing. They must ask themselves: How are they able to be successful in a space where we fail? Then they must look, learn and do the same. They must do it; the government can't, the ministry can't. We can't just give money away. We have no money to give (cf. Zwane 2014).

This submission is instructive and germane to the central argument of this chapter. The learning of the art of successful businesses with a view to sharing the 'secrets' of the foreigners required an environment devoid of hostility generated by stereotypes. Such a learning process is built upon informal interaction and friendly disposition that naturally falls in place. For instance, during the 2015 xenophobic violence, a Mozambican shop owner at Mpophomeni was rescued by the locals when some people demanded that he should leave. That the grouse of the local shop owners was that the Mozambican was 'stealing' their customers through his business approach (Personal Communication, Mpophomeni, April 21, 2016). The Mozambican was known in the town for his customer-friendly business approach, a strategy that attracted a majority of the people to patronise him for their daily needs.

This sort of complaint by the locals according to Hickel (2014, 107), constitutes the consequence of 'neoliberalism [which] has undermined the modern dream of Industrial Man—or at least nostalgic versions of it—and threatened the gendered edifices upon which it was once built'. Hickel (2014, 108) also found that 'people often draw evocative connections between their ideas about foreigners and their ideas about witchcraft, or, in IsiZulu, *ubuthakathi*'. Accordingly, the steady economic progress of the foreigners as against the lot of the locals was attributable to the use of something extra ordinary other than human intelligent and strength. Thus, economic misfortunes as well as other negative social traits are often understood as the outcomes of invocation of witchcraft spirit mostly by the foreigners. Others argue that it is the consequence of economic decay and uneven development.

The South African Public Discourse and Xenophobia

This resentment is not limited to the individuals and organisations but government institutions and officials. According to Peberdy (2009), public representation of foreign black Africans depict the image of contamination; being considered as threat and danger to the nation.

> The focus of the state on what it sees as the parasitical relationship of non-South Africans to the nation's resources, and the way that the state criminalizes them, suggests that the state sees immigrants, and particularly undocumented migrants, as a threat to the nation and the post-1994 nation building process. The language of the state, which rarely attaches the prefix African, shows that it conceptualizes most immigrants as Africans, and Africans as potentially the most dangerous of all 'aliens' (Peberdy 2009, 296).

Reiterating this further, Neocosmos (2008, 588) notes that

> government departments, parliamentarians, the police,… and the law itself have all been reinforcing a one-way message since the 1990s: we are being invaded by illegal immigrants who are a threat to national stability,…our development, our social services, and the very fabric of our society.

According to de Wet (2015), political contestation in the South African communities united the locals against foreigners who are regarded as a common enemy. Aside from this, 'a lack of unequivocal condemnation from national government, and a failure of criminal consequences for the perpetrators, helped fan the flames' (de Wet 2015). Thus, 'public discourse of fear and xenophobia has become hegemonic in the public sphere' and this is 'founded on the notion that migrants from Africa are here to take and not to give (Neocosmos 2008, 590).

There were underlying forces that prepared the grounds for this outburst of anger by black South Africans. In January, 2015, six people were killed and several others displaced in Soweto following a 'looting frenzy of foreign-owned shops' (Bekker 2015). Probably, the reactions of some stakeholders and government officials to the development emboldened the brazen attitudes of the perpetrators. For instance, Lebogang Maile, a politician in Gauteng Province, subscribed to the frustration aggression paradigm to justify the January 2015 xenophobic attacks in Soweto. To him, the local entrepreneurs felt threatened by the domination of foreigners in businesses (Steyn et al. 2015). Thus, they 'feel demoralised, frustrated, and they feel they cannot thrive as business owners in their own communities' (Steyn et al. 2015). In a similar tone, South Africa's Minister of Small Business Development, Lindiwe Zulu, said: 'You cannot run away from the fact that there are underlying issues and that our people are being squeezed out by these foreign shop owners' (Steyn et al. 2015). On her part, she suggested that the foreigners must be compelled to share their business secret with their fellow black South Africans. In other words,

> Foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy, and, our priority is to the people of this country first and foremost. They cannot barricade themselves in and not share their practices with local business owners (cf. Pilane 2015).

It is evident that there is a disjoint between the nationalistic fervour and the actual delivery of public good by the political elites. The idea here is that while the mas of the unemployed black South Africans see a social scapegoat in foreign African nationals, the political elites failed to admit that crisis of governance is not the making of the foreigners. Thus, both the government and the people have made a social scape goat out of the black foreigners as a cover up for the failure of government to deliver public good.

Frantz Fanon had noted this danger of the mass of the people following in the steps of their 'political bourgeoisie', which is capable of promoting racism and chauvinism, whereby 'foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked … (Fanon 1990, 125). The claim that foreigners are taking the jobs in South Africa is not tenable. The discourse on indigeneity gives the black South Africans an advantage over other races in terms of employment opportunities. Besides that, foreign African nationals have very limited access to public social services. Thus, blaming the foreigners for the unmet needs of the people is misplaced.

> Our country is sick because it treats fellow human beings who exhibit differences from the supposed norm as outsiders to community and therefore as enemies of the nation who can then become legitimate targets for violence. But it is also sick because it is unaware of its own sickness; it is literally blind to its own inhumanity (Neocosmos 2015).

The opposition in the South African Government attributed the xenophobic incident to the failure of public policy. The leader of Democratic Alliance (DA), Mmusi Maime, attributed the attacks to the consequences of the persisting governance crisis in South Africa. According to him,

> The root of this problem lies in our inability to bring about economic growth and decrease the inequality that plagues our nation…we cannot allow people to brutalise others. Foreign business owners are not the enemy (cf. Bulbulia 2015).

The Economic and Freedom Fighter (EFF) leader, Julius Malema, described the xenophobic attack as part of the violent activities in the country being encouraged and supported by the ruling party (Bulbulia 2015). He specifically blamed President Zuma for his lacklustre attitude, especially his inability to 'whip your own son into line' (cf. Bulbulia 2015), when he expressed anti-foreigners' sentiment.

President Zuma's response to the latest attack depicted a somehow tactical support for xenophobia. He made public comment that the protest was against criminal activities rather than a display of xenophobia. According to him, 'we cannot close our eyes to the concerns of the communities that most of the crimes such as drug dealing, prostitution and human trafficking are allegedly perpetuated by foreign nationals (cf. The Citizen 2017). He noted that the frustrations of the people 'are sparked by high levels of criminal activities particularly drugs trafficking, under-age prostitution and human trafficking which are impacting on the youth negatively and are alleged to be perpetuated by the foreign nationals' (cf. The Citizen 2017). Statement such as this is tantamount to legitimising rather than challenging xenophobic attitudes by the political leaders (Fabricius 2017).

The economic space in South Africa is undergoing a dwindling fortune; a development that hampers sustainable growth. The economist in one of its reports in 2012 stated thus:

> Foreign investment is drying up. Protests against the state's failure to provide services are becoming angrier. Education is a disgrace: according to the World Economic Forum, South Africa ranks 132nd out of 144 countries for its primary education and 143rd in science and maths. The unemployment rate, officially 25%, is probably nearer 40%; half of South Africans under 24 looking for work have none. Of those who have jobs, a third earns less than $2 a day. Inequality has grown since apartheid, and the gap between rich and poor is now among the world's largest (The Economist 2012).

The growing inequality in the country has driven the people more into the dissenting group.

Conclusion: Stemming the Tide of Xenophobia Through an Inclusive Public Policy

The different perspectives for the explanation of xenophobia in South Africa as well as the various drivers that usually trigger its violence are rooted in hatred. There is therefore the need for government intervention in unpacking black South Africans through policies that focus on the development and transformation of the total man through inter-racial interaction and collaborations. The problem of unemployment in South Africa could not be blamed on the presence of foreign African nationals. Rather, the issue of governance crisis in the country is a manifestation of policy failure.

One of the issues to be addressed is the effort to combat the rising criminal activities. Foreigners, especially Nigerians and Zimbabweans, are alleged to be involved in illicit drug business. This has encouraged drug abuse that has left a number of young South Africans delinquent.

> There is an undeniable link between substance abuse and delinquency. It cannot be claimed that substance abuse causes delinquent behaviour or delinquency causes alcohol and other drug use. However, the two behaviours are strongly correlated and often bring about school and family problems, involvement with negative peer groups, lack of neighbourhood social control and physical or sexual abuse. Substance abuse is associated with both violent and income generating crimes by youths. Gangs, trafficking, prostitution and growing numbers of youth homicides are among the social and criminal justice problems often linked to adolescent substance abuse (Jordan 2013).

The argument is that if there are no drug peddlers, the rate of consumption would be minimised. South Africa has been identified as the largest market for illicit drugs within sub-Saharan Africa with a capacity to be an emerging drug hub in the continent (Peltzer et al. 2010). This is attributable to 'the influx of new international cultural trends among the more affluent segments of the population' (Peltzer et al. 2010). There has been an increase in drug use and abuse which has also influenced an upsurge in violent and organized crime (Peltzer et al. 2010).

In 2002, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) named South Africa as the hub of drug trafficking in the Southern African Region (Health Systems Trust 2002). The UN identified over 200 crime syndicates in South Africa whose activities are associated with the use and misuse of drugs.

> There were links between the drug trafficking activities of organised crime groups and other criminal acts, ranging from car hijackings and robberies to the smuggling of firearms, stolen cars, endangered species and precious metals, the report said. While Nigerian syndicates were heavily involved in cocaine and heroin trafficking the report noted that most Nigerian immigrants in South Africa were law abiding. However, there was also prominent involvement in the trade by nationals from Tanzania, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia, often under the misnomer West African nationals (Health Systems Trust 2002).

No responsible government anywhere in the world will condone criminal activities in its domain. Thus, anti-crime marches and violent should not be mistaken as xenophobia. Even though such legitimate protest and anti-social movements might be hijacked by hoodlums, it is pertinent that the South African police should be reformed with the capacity to detect and arrest criminal individuals irrespective of nationalities and be allowed to face the law. Rather than allow the individuals to take the laws into their hands, the police and other security agencies should be more alive in their responsibilities of preventing criminal activities.

Poor service delivery has been identified as a central driver for xenophobic violence in South Africa (Swart 2013; Holden 2012; Alexander 2012, 2010). Alexander argues that the pervasiveness crisis associated with service delivery often ignited what he calls 'a rebellion of the poor' and 'a massive rebellion of the poor', who are expressing their 'disappointment with the fruits of democracy (Alexander 2010, 37). This problem arose mostly because of the spate of inequality.

The Deputy Minister of Finance, Mcebisi Jonas, painted a not too satisfactory economic situation in South Africa blaming the projected worsening economic situation of persistence of rents. As noted by Jonas,

> Our country faces a combination of sustained low rates of economic growth – more pronounced since 2008, and predicted to continue over the next few years – along with an enduring concentration of ownership (meaning higher socioeconomic returns continue to accrue to those already endowed with capital and skills), chronically poor education and training outcomes (despite the not insignificant per capita spending on education), and patronage and corruption associated with rents controlled by the state (Jonas 2017).

Furthermore, there is a 'growing restlessness of our people, who are not blind to the obscene inequality which abounds and who are losing hope in a future of shared prosperity' (Jonas 2017). He noted that the country 'remains locked in a capital-intensive, energy-intensive and highly financialised historic growth path' (Jonas 2017). This situation has reproduced three types of 'self-serving rent-seeking' class of elites in the South African economy: 'the old white, foreign-owner and new black rentier classes' (Jonas 2017). Beside this, the national economy is 'too dependent on financial inflows and commodity booms, making the economy vulnerable to global shocks' and thus created 'very little new wealth in the productive economy' thereby excluded 'large numbers of South Africans [mostly backs] from participating either as owners of capital or as employees' (Jonas 2017).

> This development has reinforced the problem of high inequality and low growth. In advancing solutions to our current predicament, we need to accept that high inequality and low growth are mutually reinforcing. High inequality leads to low growth and stagnation because it reduces demand. Low growth reduces fiscal resources available for redistribution, as well as employment and wealth-creating opportunities (Jonas 2017).

Minister of Home Affairs, Malusi Gigaba, shared this same sentiment saying that deep-rooted socio-economic problems in the country have compounded frustrations against foreign nationals (eNCA 2017b).

The concept of black empowerment or economic transformation for the benefits of the black South Africans would only increase 'black rent-seeking' elites, thereby 'replacing white rent-seeking' elites (Jonas 2017).

> Economic transformation is not simply about increasing black ownership of the large JSE-listed corporations to the corresponding reduction of South African white and foreign ownership… it will not reduce overall inequality – in fact, inequality could increase. Instead, a fundamental restructuring of the economy is required, in which rent-seeking is incrementally replaced by the development of new productive capabilities in which the previously dispossessed have a correspondingly high share on a mass scale. This includes taking into account the real factors that exclude the poor and previously dispossessed from accumulating wealth and overcoming asset poverty, such as access to capital, productive assets (including land), skills, markets and, in the context of the fourth industrial revolution, technology. In essence, we need to shift government's policy from a focus on redistributing existing assets as an end in its own right, to linking redistribution to production outcomes to have sustained economic impact. This becomes the core business of the developmental state (Jonas 2017).

A media commentator sums up this problem this way:

> More introspectively, however, Xenophobia painfully mirrors the failure of governance in the country of the perpetrators and in the countries of their victims alike for at the root of xenophobia lies appalling discontent. As wrong as they seem and as grotesque as their means of voicing their frustrations appear, there is no denying the fact that at the roots of xenophobia is a painful failure of the South African government and its policies which have conduced to asphyxiating living conditions and an increasingly bleaker tomorrow for its most vibrant bodies and minds (Obiezu 2017).

The argument of this chapter is that good governance would calm the nerves of attackers. Rather than redistribution of wealth for black empowerment, there should be a restructuring of the national economy in a manner that would expand the coast of employment opportunities for the black citizens.

Employment policy in the formal sector in South Africa places South African nationals at an advantage position over and above their fellow African countries. Thus, in terms of competition for the limited space, South African nationals are given preferences. This means that foreign African national employability depends on the unavailability of South African nationals. The dwindling economic fortune of South Africa coupled with the rising unemployment rate will further stifle job opportunities in the formal sector. While the informal sector continues to expand in favour of foreign African nationals, the locals with no artisan expertise and experience would continue to struggle to compete with their foreign contemporaries.

The informal sector should therefore be expanded through deliberate policies that would empower black South Africans in the development of their skills in arts. This could be achieved through cooperation with their fellow African nationals who are engaged in the informal sector for training, apprenticeship and partnership. Deliberate friendly immigration policy that guarantees mutual interaction would go a long way in stimulating effective collaboration between the locals and their foreign counterpart in skill transfer. The imperative of skills transfer should not be a choice, but a necessity. There should be concerted efforts to replace the deep-rooted hatred and hostile attitudes with the perception of love. This could be achieved by attitudinal changes through public enlightenment programmes and a shift in national economic policy that guarantees access to employment by the black citizens.

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Chapter 10
Xenophobia, Racism and the Travails of 'Black' Immigrants in South Africa

Tolulope Adeogun and Olumuyiwa Faluyi

Introduction

In South Africa, racism was associated with the apartheid regime, while xenophobia has become a recurrent issue in the post-apartheid dispensation. The two phenomena are located in the country's historical reality. Historically, South Africa was a home to immigrants, especially from the Southern African region, in search of gainful employment and improved livelihoods. Its rich natural resources also mean that more labour (mostly unskilled) is required for exploration (Harington et al. 2004). Migration into the country increased due to the global economic meltdown that affected most neighbouring countries. Many African countries are confronted by insurgency, ethnic conflict and terrorism, which further increased migration into the country.

In the South African context, xenophobia and racism manifest as Siamese twins against black immigrants who are subjected to xenophobia by the black majority and racism by South African whites. Violent attacks on migrants by the former can generally be traced to competition for inadequate infrastructure and scarce resources, while the latter is associated with intolerance based on skin pigmentation and colour. Although South Africa is conceived as a rainbow nation due to its heterogeneous inhabitants, discrimination among these groups has negatively affected black immigrants. Like their South African counterparts, foreigners of African descent continue to face racial discrimination from the white minority. Discrimination against black foreigners thus emanates from two different groups: black and white South Africans.

T. Adeogun (✉) • O. Faluyi
College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
e-mail: tfor9@yahoo.com

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The chapter explores the bio-cultural hypothesis to locate the Siamese nature of discrimination against black 'outsiders' in intellectual discourse. According to this hypothesis, black immigrants are the most vulnerable victims of xenophobic attacks in South Africa (Maina et al. 2011). Although, there have been attacks on other non-black nationals like the Pakistanis and other minority non-African groups like the Chinese and Indians (cited in Fourchard and Segatti 2015), black South Africans of minority groups (sePedi and isiTsonga) have also been attacked (Fayomi et al. 2015). South Africa's neighbouring countries are the targets and are most hard hit by xenophobic violence. The bio-cultural hypothesis posits that discrimination against black immigrants is double-sided, they thus experience double jeopardy.

This chapter posits that xenophobia and racism in South Africa exist as Siamese twins based on the country's historical and contemporary socio-economic realities, and that this has also informed anti-immigration policies aimed at other African countries. This form of institutional xenophobia has been celebrated by the mass of the people, but could affect the economic prospects of the nation in the long run. The chapter is divided into five sections. The introduction provides the background to the chapter, followed by an historical overview and a discussion on the manifestation of xenophobia and racism in South Africa. The third section reflects on state polices on xenophobia and racism and the fourth examines black immigrants' contribution to South Africa's socio-economic development. Finally, the conclusion offers suggestions on how to limit the stigmatization of black immigrants in South Africa.

Xenophobia and Racism in South Africa

The word "xenophobia" is understood as holding a discriminative view of foreign nationals as threats to society, justifying their exclusion and at times, oppression (Fourchard and Segatti 2015: 6). Put differently, from the global perspective, it represents practices that are discriminatory against foreigners (Fourchard and Segatti 2015). According to Yakushko, "xenophobia, as a term, seems to more clearly indicate the presence of attitudinal and behavioral hostility toward non-native individuals" (Yakushko 2009: 44). Hostility against 'aliens' is driven by unreasonable fears in relation to scarce resources and their allocation. Shinsana defined xenophobia as follows:

> *Xenophobia is a dislike and/or fear of that which is unknown or different from one. It comes from the Greek words (xenos), meaning 'stranger', 'foreigner' and (Phobos), meaning 'fear'. The term is typically used to describe a fear or dislike [sic] foreigners or of people significantly different from oneself, usually in the context of visibly differentiated minorities* (cited in Fayomi et al. 2015: 1).

Such dislike is created by economic and political imbalances among countries, especially those in the same region. This engenders massive emigration from economically unstable and weak countries to those that have managed to achieve

appreciable economic development and political stability. The major motivation is economic security, leading to an improved standard of living. However, the influx of foreigners from different countries creates potent fear and constitutes a threat to the nationals of the host country. Orozco and Suarez-Orozco aptly captured this thus, "negative views of immigrants emerge from fears of diminished economic resources, rapid demographic changes, and diminished political influence" (cited in Yakushko 2009: 45).

Furthermore, on many continents, including Europe and America, black people have been at the receiving end of racial discrimination. Colonialism was the tool and a conduit used by the West to perpetrate racial discrimination against the black race. In South Africa, the end of colonialism ushered in the apartheid regime, which was characterised by racial segregation. Whites were categorised as first-class, followed by Indians, Coloureds and lastly Blacks (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013; Segregation in Action n.d.). The white political party, the National Party (NP) that came to power in 1948 embraced apartheid as government policy. The black majority were denied the political and economic rights enjoyed by the white minority (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). The post-apartheid era perpetrated racial discrimination against black people (Fayomi et al. 2015). For example, in August 2016, students at Pretoria Girls' High protested against a school rule that prohibits black girls from having cornrows, afros, dreadlocks, and any other African hairstyle (Zungu 2017).

South Africa might have been liberated politically but it has not achieved economic liberation. Whites still control the private sector and significant factors of production like land. Shortly after the end of the apartheid, whites controlled about 87% of the land (May and Lahiff 2007). Under apartheid, black people were forced to vacate their land and moved to underdeveloped townships while whites enjoyed all amenities (Moleah 2004). Black immigrants lived with black South Africans in the townships. While segregated residential areas have been abolished, most black people cannot afford to live in the formerly white areas (Moleah 2004). Whites are thus more economically and educationally advantaged than the black majority, comprised of locals and black migrants from other African countries. Vestiges of apartheid remain, with poor black South Africans living in substandard buildings in the urban areas (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). Adult illiteracy rates remain high at around 24% of adults over the age of 15 years (six to eight million adults are illiterate); teachers in township schools are not properly trained and township schools have much lower matric pass rates than those that predominantly serve whites, Indians and Coloureds (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013).

South Africa has employed foreign migrants since the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand at the end of the nineteenth century (Adam and Moodley 2013). Thereafter, it experienced an influx of migrants from up north, including SADC and other African countries. Black immigrants have been employed in the mining sector since apartheid times and black South Africans have always regarded them as a threat (Fayomi et al. 2015). This is due to the fact that they occupy jobs that could be given to black South Africans and that they compete for inadequate urban

infrastructure (Eliseev 2008; Glaser 2008). Of importance is that this is due to the fact that these migrants are willing to accept lower wages than their black South African counterparts. White farmers pay black migrants low wages and offer poor working conditions and any protest is met with the threat of deportation (Harris 2001). Black immigrants are employed in the mining sector and on farms at the expense of locals. This explains the cry; *foreigners are taking our jobs* (Kajee 2015).

The South African economy is stronger than those of neighbouring African countries, attracting migrants. Contemporary migration to South Africa is the result of a number of factors, ranging from individuals employed as contract labourers to work in the country's vibrant mining and agricultural industries to those seeking protection from persecution, human rights violations, and war (Hand maker and Parsley 2001). The socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe has compounded South Africa's migration problem (Glaser 2008), especially given the country's close proximity. However, these migrants are sandwiched between racial discrimination from white and xenophobia from black South Africans. Racism occurs on a one-on-one basis and might occur in economic or social interactions. It is often less violent. In contrast, xenophobic often results in violence (Fourchard and Segatti 2015; Hayem 2013; Worby et al. 2008). Xenophobic attacks also have the 'backing' of state institutions and traditional authorities. For instance, the statement (on 21 March 2015) by Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini that the government must make sure that all foreigners vacate South Africa was the root cause of the 2015 xenophobic attacks (Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016). Nonetheless, a government investigation found that the king's statement was not 'harmful' and he was absolved of instigating any violence (Human Rights Watch 2016). Only 22 people were arrested for perpetrating the 2015 violence and they were not thoroughly investigated or successfully prosecuted (Human Rights Watch 2016). The police later admitted that they failed to heed serious warnings from civil society organisations of possible xenophobic attacks (Amnesty International 2016). Hence, the 2015 xenophobic attacks could have been averted or the damage minimised.

Ultimately, xenophobic violence in South Africa is in many ways a legacy of the country's racist history (Hand maker and Parsley 2001). Racism has bolstered xenophobia with black migrants at the receiving end (Harris 2001). Apartheid and its draconian policies against the black majority obviously denied them economic privileges, and consequently promoted suspicion and hatred directed at foreigners (Fayomi et al. 2015). Hence, there is a nexus between racism and xenophobia. This is demonstrated by the fact that more black immigrants are the targets of xenophobic attacks than white immigrants (Harris 2001). Racism is seen as *old racism* and xenophobia is viewed as the *new racism*. Adjai and Lazaridis observe that,

> *Unlike old racism which is based on discriminatory treatment at the hands of a race (a biological group) different to one's own, xenophobia can be linked to new racism which is based on the discriminatory treatment of the 'other' on the basis of the other's national origin or ethnicity* (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013).

Black immigrants have been employed in the mining sector since apartheid, and are still employed in various sectors, although most are contract labour with temporary visas/permits, while many black South Africans occupy permanent positions (Fayomi 2015; Harris 2001). However, black South Africans regard black immigrants as competitors that are responsible for the country's declining economic fortunes and they are accused of fomenting crime and corrupting state officials (Akinola 2014; Harris 2001). A national survey in 2007 found that 80% of the South African respondents felt that government should restrict the migration of other Africans into South Africa especially those from troubled countries (Worby et al. 2008) as they 'import' crimes like prostitution and drug peddling, and other social ills into the country. The failed promises of successive post-apartheid governments, poor service delivery, deteriorating infrastructure, and deepened impoverishment of black South Africans have aggravated their frustrations (Fayomi et al. 2015).

Post-apartheid South Africa embraced welfarism to cushion the effects of historical injustice on black South Africans; however, this has not significantly improved their lives. The informal sector that enables many locals to survive has also attracted unskilled immigrants, restricting opportunities for South Africans. This is particularly true of refugees and asylum seekers who are unable to obtain formal jobs (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). South Africans who sell the same or similar goods experience declining sales due to infiltration of the market by foreigners who sell their goods at a lower price (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). This has been one of the reasons for hostilities between locals and 'outsiders'.

However, the new twist of racism in South Africa has assumed a striking dimension. In recent times and in many instances, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has resulted in white South Africans and black immigrants being discriminated against in terms of employment opportunities in the public sector, admission to higher education institutions and bursary opportunities (Fayomi et al. 2015). Table 10.1 shows recorded physical assaults on foreigners.

The 2008 xenophobic violence remains the deadliest, taking the lives of 62 people, with 700 injured and over 100,000 displaced, the majority of whom were African immigrants (Maina et al. 2011). In April 2015, xenophobic attacks claimed the lives of seven people, including a black South African (*The Guardian* 2015). About 5000 migrants fled their homes and abandoned their businesses to take refuge in official camps and informal settlements (Amnesty International 2016). This shows that the main targets of xenophobic attacks in South Africa are black immigrants (Aljazeera News 2017).

While acts of racism against blacks (both locals and migrants) are not as pronounced as those of xenophobia, there is compelling evidence of the existence of racism in South Africa (Dodson 2010). In schools, churches, shopping malls and universities, racism is perpetrated in varied forms against black people, both local and foreign. However, it is difficult to determine the degree of its prevalence against locals in comparison to immigrants.

Table 10.1 Violent attacks on immigrants

S/N	Date	Location/Nationalities	Casualties
1	1998	A Mozambican and two Senegalese were thrown from a moving train in Pretoria by a group returning from a protest on unemployment	The three foreigners died
2	1998	A Rwandan refugee was beaten up by a taxi driver because of his nationality	Sustained injuries
3	1999	Attacks on refugees	30 refugees killed and acid poured on one
4	August 2000	Shacks of Zimbabweans living in Zandspruit, KwaZulu-Natal were burnt	Properties destroyed
5	2001	A Sudanese refugee was thrown from a moving train in Pretoria by armed men	Sustained injuries
6	2001	Stabbings of migrants	22 stabbed
7	2005	Somalian and Zimbabwean refugees beaten in Bothaville	
8	2006	Somali shop owners close to Knysna chased out of their shops	About 30 shops destroyed
9	August 2007	Attacks on Somali shopkeepers in Cape Town	13 Somali shop keepers found dead in their shops
10	September 2007	Shops owned and staffed by foreigners were attacked and looted in the Western Cape	40 non-citizens fled and properties lost
11	March 2008	Foreigners attacked in Mamelodi township in Pretoria	Four foreigners killed
12	May 2008	Attacks started in Alexandra Johannesburg and later spread to Cape Town and Durban affecting 140 townships and informal settlements	62 dead, 700 injured and over 100,000 displaced
13	January 2011	Attacks on two Somali nationals in Butterworth	One of those attacked died

Sources: (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013; Fourchard and Segatti 2015; Hayem 2013; Worby et al. 2008)

From Racism to Xenophobia: A Reflection on the State's Policies

Policies adopted during the apartheid era continue to influence immigration policies in South Africa (Dodson 2010; Maharaj 2002). During both the apartheid and post-apartheid periods, preference was given to white immigrants in terms of applications for residence permits (Maharaj 2002). This reinforces racial discrimination. While black foreigners are mostly considered as rogues, illegal migrants and job snatchers, and are seen as threats to the state, economy and society, their white counterparts are regarded as investors, tourists and a blessing to the nation (Worby et al. 2008).

Furthermore, some organizations have forged statistics that show that the presence of both legal and illegal immigrants has become a threat to the nation's economy. The purpose was to incite the masses against non-nationals and reinforce

attacks on black immigrants. It is interesting to note that public officials like police and immigration officers, and some political office holders are citing these exaggerated numbers in order to remove black immigrants from the country (Maina et al. 2011). The media are also complicit in reinforcing these false claims. South African security agencies have aggravated xenophobia-racism in various ways. Black immigrants are 'screened' by the police on the basis of mode of dress, hair styles, shape of head, and accent, and subsequently subjected to racist or xenophobic violence (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013). Legal immigrants with residence permits are sometimes arrested by the police and their passports are destroyed; they hence have no way of proving their status and country of origin (Adjai and Lazaridis 2013).

Various policies and laws at micro and macro levels perpetuate xenophobia (Maina et al. 2011). While they are purportedly meant to protect South African citizens from 'aliens', the fundamental rights of immigrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, should be upheld by the state. Like all other states, South Africa has the responsibility to protect the lives all those within its territory. In his *State of the Nation Address*, 2016, President Zuma announced that foreigners will no longer enjoy land ownership in the country. He declared that the era of 'willing buyer and willing seller' is over; hence, foreigners will only be able to lease land (Property24 2015). Stakeholders feel that this will negatively impact the economy, both in the short and long run, as investors might consider alternative countries for investment.

South African labour law supports equality and protects against unfair treatment of workers, especially those of South African origin (South African Department of Labour 2017). However, discrimination against foreigners is justified on the basis of affirmative action. In such situations, jobs can only be given to foreigners if the employer has exhausted all internal and external avenues to recruit locals. This explains why many positions in critical sectors like tertiary education remain vacant due to the non-availability of South African candidates, and despite the suitability of foreign applicants.

Racism and xenophobia in South Africa thus draw strength from the system (Dodson 2010). They are not a mirage, but have become culturally legitimate and, in some respects, legal. Policy makers boldly make public statements that are discriminatory in nature, and this incites locals against foreigners. This is a political strategy used by a weak state to capture the souls of citizens. It is easy for political leaders to shift the blame from poor governance to the presence of the unwanted 'aliens' in the country. This diversionary tactic distracts the people from holding the African National Congress responsible for governance failure.

Black Immigrants: A Curse or Blessing?

As noted earlier, black/African foreigners in South Africa are regarded as 'parasites' who take from their host without making any contribution to its well-being and development. The derogatory stereotyping of foreigners from neighbouring

African countries has made it difficult for immigrants to achieve their goals. Furthermore, endless accusations against black foreigners have blurred the vision of the host country to the extent that the advantages of having these African foreigners are never really considered. The media does not help the situation. They focus on criminal acts by immigrants, portray locals as 'crime free' and attribute social ills to the nefarious activities of foreigners (*The Guardian* 2015). However, Meintjies notes,

> *Studies have shown that immigrants are, in fact, net contributors, not parasites. Immigrants are, on average, healthier, more energetic and better educated than people in the host population. Consequently, they draw comparatively less on social welfare and other social services. Many pay tax and, through their entrepreneurship, make a positive injection into local economic development* (cited in Maharaj, 2002).

Economically, many black immigrants are very skilled and they transfer their skills to locals. Many locals have learnt new trades/skills from black migrants, for instance, how to make a living using skills like embroidery, African hair styles, sewing and so on. This has led to self-employment of citizens, improving their livelihoods and boosting the economy. Apartheid prevented skills transfer from white professionals to black people and the post-apartheid government has not facilitated white-black economic engagement. For instance, the redistribution or restitution policy that granted large parcels of land to emerging black farmers has not yielded productive farms due to a lack of skills and skills transfer from white farmers to the new black farmers (Akinola forthcoming). Black foreigners are a repository of skills and knowledge, which could immensely benefit locals.

Socially, fashion trends among South African locals reveal significant foreign influences, especially in respect of traditional attire and hairstyles. South Africans are now fond of traditional textiles, popularly called 'Ankara' (from Nigeria) and 'Ghana-print' from Ghana. Many locals are starting businesses to cater for the growing appetite for such clothes (personal communication, Pietermaritzburg, February 2017). Prominent personalities in the media and fashion worlds and politicians have special affinity for the new style. Foreign hairstyles like 'Ghana weaves' and 'million braids' are attractive to black South Africans and immigrants from the West African sub-region are engaged in skills transfer to many South Africans (personal communication, Pietermaritzburg, March 2017). Some locals regard this as a form of an African-inclined cultural revolution that is required to bridge the historical separation from their African counterparts and heritage.

Conclusion

In conclusion, black immigrants should not be discriminated against or be made to take responsibility for economic instability in South Africa. Instead, policy makers should formulate policies that curb misconduct among immigration officers and among politicians. Non-governmental organizations concerned with human rights should monitor the implementation of such policies. Furthermore, the advantages offered by the presence of black immigrants should be stressed.

Policies that foster racism and xenophobia in the country should be fully implemented and if required amended, since it is obvious that racism and xenophobia in South Africa is systemic in nature. The system should be restructured in such a way as to accommodate foreigners without necessarily infringing on the rights of citizens. Apart from the police, another law enforcement agency should be put in place to handle cases related to racism and xenophobia and offenders should be punished by law. Cases of illegal immigration should be dealt with by the law rather than racism/xenophobic attacks. Human rights organizations, the media and civil society organizations should create awareness among locals and sensitize them on the dangers of racism and xenophobia, the benefits of having foreigners, especially black immigrants in the country and how to deal with grievances pertaining to illegal black immigrants within the confines of the law. In the same vein, the issue of racism should be addressed by the media and awareness campaigns, by promoting *Ubuntu* and making it clear that skin colour should not result in disunity and that there is unity in diversity.

In an era of globalization, South Africa cannot dwell in isolation, especially if it is to achieve sustainable economic growth. Discrimination of any kind against immigrants, especially those from Africa should be discouraged at all levels. If the government of South Africa were to place this issue at the centre of its foreign policies, this would create a conducive atmosphere for proper growth and development. Finally, the notion that black foreigners are parasites should be dispelled by the government and locals should be made aware of their contribution to South Africa's development. Aside from financial investment in the country, many are skilled professionals. The misconduct of few illegal immigrants that commit crimes that can be dealt with by the law should not be overemphasised to the extent of jeopardizing the peace and security of the country and that of foreign individuals and their property.

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Chapter 11
The Xenophobia-Coloniality Nexus: Zimbabwe's Experience

Everisto Benyera

Introduction

Modernity bequeathed many challenges to Africa. These include the evolution and 'misconstruction' of modern states as an offshoot of colonialism. These modern states transcend many nations, thereby creating cosmopolitan states. In such states, identity continues to shape human interactions, which results in the intersection of many identity forming processes such as, "the Atlantic slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010: 282). African identities were thus produced and reproduced by decades of identity forming processes and their antitheses such as wars of liberation and the various resistance movements and concomitant ideologies such as nationalism. I argue that the resultant product was Africans with problematic and complicated identities founded on mutative combinations and interactions between "diversities of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, class, region, language, culture, generation" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010: 281). For example, what constitutes the Ndebele nation in Zimbabwe is a product of decades of assimilation and absorption of the militarily defeated Ndebele neighbours of that time such as the Lemba, Venda, Tavara, Towa, Kalanga and the Rozvi (Cobbing 1977: 70). The result was the growth of the Ndebele nation as the defeated neighbours were assimilated and not humiliated or mutilated as was the case with colonial conquest. With colonialism and *coloniality* came a very sophisticated relationship between Africans which is sometimes expressed in violent means such as ethnic clashes and in extreme cases, genocide (Stiff 2000: 8; Tendi 2010: 219).

This chapter discusses xenophobia in Southern Africa, using the case of Zimbabwe and locates xenophobia as the mega form of violence with many variations. These include racism, ethnicity, ethnocentrism, sexism and classism.

E. Benyera (✉)
Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: benyee1@unisa.ac.za

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Walter Mignolo's concept of the 'darker side of modernity' is deployed to characterise how modernity bequeathed xenophobia to Africa (Mignolo 2011). I argue that xenophobia should not be analysed as a stand-alone form of violence but rather as the main 'reservoir' of what I term 'violences' which sums up the violence which colonialism either brought or exacerbated in Africa. If xenophobia is the fear (*phobos*) (Latin) and hatred of strangers (*xenos*) (Latin), then it is essentially the act of hating those different from oneself. Reduced to its basics, xenophobia is the hatred of foreigners, especially those of the same race. The ultimate motive of those perpetrating xenophobia is to expel them from the host country.

Forms of Xenophobia

If an 'object' is foreign, inimical and pernicious to the interest of the locals, drastic action is sought to 'normalise' or 'address' the situation by eradiating the foreign 'object'. In perpetrating xenophobia, the 'only' way of 'normalising' the situation is to get rid of the foreigner/outsider, thereby allowing the natives/locals to 'live peacefully'. Herein lies the logic of violent xenophobia; the urgent need to normalise the situation by eradicating the invasive foreigner. To reinforce this point, Slovak Zizek's (2009) three forms of violence: subjective violence, symbolic violence and systemic violence are efficacious in unpacking what appears *prima facie* as unnecessary or senseless violence as well as indefensible laws that normalise xenophobia.

There are three preconditions for xenophobic attitudes: identity, land and migration. These preconditions give rise to the binary notion of insiders and outsiders, and the self and the other (Boone 2014: 93). Thus, it is important to locate xenophobia in Zimbabwe as predicated on contestation over land. It is on the land that the insider lives and tries to exclude or subjugate the invading other/foreigner. Ultimately, this chapter draws a convergence between xenophobia and land issues in Zimbabwe and argues that land ownership and by extension exclusion from land ownership forms the basic condition for the perpetration of the various forms of xenophobia.

The forms of xenophobia range from the use of derogatory language to physical violence such as 'necklacing[1]', setting foreigners alight, assault and arson. Certain state actions also qualify as acts of xenophobia such as the 1982/83 Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe and Operation Crackdown in South Africa which was launched by the police in Johannesburg in March 2000. The Gukurahundi genocide resulted in the deaths of an estimated 20,000 people, predominantly Ndebele speakers and their sympathisers (Fontein 2010: 429). In South Africa, Operation Crackdown targeted immigrants and many were arrested and jailed in Lindela

[1] Necklacing is a ruthless apartheid era method of killing people, usually used in South Africa, in which the victim is placed in between used vehicle tyres which are then set alight. Such victims usually die painful deaths in full view of community members some of whom would have committed the offence. Very few necklacing victims survive.

Repatriation Centre in Krugersdorp while they awaited deportation. According to Steenkemp, "police officers reportedly stripped foreigners semi-naked on the streets to check whether their vaccination marks 'look South African'" (Steenkamp 2009: 441). Other forms of xenophobia are perpetrated by government institutions such as the Department of Home Affairs, more specifically immigration officials at the various ports of entry and exit. Many treat immigrants seeking to enter South Africa as dangerous criminals and with disrespect and disdain.

Financial institutions such as banks are also guilty of xenophobia. For instance, while it may be a statutory and legal requirement in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (38 of 2001) and Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements to verify client account details, the manner in which South African banks do it is criminalising and humiliating. Excessive interpretation and application of laws, amount to what I term institutionalised financial xenophobia. Reputable institutions such as South Africa's "Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) used derogatory terms such as 'hordes' and 'floods' to describe undocumented migrants" (Steenkamp 2009: 441). Writing about xenophobia in South Africa, Steenkamp notes:

> *Xenophobia relies heavily on the circulation of myths and stereotypes about foreigners. Foreigners in South Africa are typically accused of committing crimes; bringing disease (particularly HIV/Aids), 'stealing' employment and swamping social services. Foreigners have quickly become the scapegoats for the continuing social and economic ills facing many South Africans* (Steenkamp 2009: 339–440).

Land ownership is vital to the existence of xenophobia. It is upon land ownership that other auxiliary conditions such as culture, language, accent, dressing, cuisine and even physical appearance are then located and actualised. A case in point was the targeting of Malawian immigrants in Zimbabwe who predominantly spoke the Chewa language and were located in mining towns and agricultural farms during the 2000ff land reform programme in areas such as Mutorashanga, Mvurwi and Mazowe (Muzondidya 2007: 334–335). Colonialism and modernity are the drivers of this form of xenophobia. Walter Mignolo calls this the darker side of modernity and argues that, 'modernity' is a European narrative that hides its darker side, which is 'coloniality'. Coloniality, in other words, "is constitutive of modernity — there is no modernity without coloniality" (Mignolo 2007: 466).

Xenophobia occurs as a result of human movement. Migration implies 'crossing-the-borders' as people move. Border delineation and the issuance of national identity documents and passports are creations of modernity which act as the *condicio sine qua non* for 'legitimate' human movement across national borders. Of course, there are other internal and less manned 'borders' including those dividing ethnic nation-states such as the Ndebele state in southern Zimbabwe and its Shona, Tswana and Kalanga neighbours, among others.

Xenophobia in Zimbabwe is traceable to the creation of the modern day Zimbabwe in 1898.[2] The 'seed' of xenophobia was sown through the period of the

[2] Prior to that, the country was known as South Zambezia and became known as Rhodesia in 1895, Southern Rhodesia between 1923 and 1979 and finally Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979 before becoming Zimbabwe in 1980.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953–1936), to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) (1965–1979), and through the liberation struggle (1965–1979) and still persists. The colonial administration moved people between present day Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe as they sought cheap labour. As the three countries became independent as different times, people that had been moved say from Zambia to Zimbabwe or from Malawi to Zimbabwe found themselves almost trapped in their host countries. Some found no reason to move back to their countries of origin as they had settled well in their host countries. Such people became the target and victims of xenophobia in Zimbabwe.

As a colonial creation, xenophobia in Zimbabwe has remained un-addressed since independence in April 1980. As a product of modernity, it needs to be analysed not as episodic but as endemic, always taking various forms and shapes. It manifests with the same devastating effect, that of dehumanising and 'thingifying' the foreigner/other.[3] It should be noted that while pre-colonial Zimbabwe was indeed belligerent, there was room for the assimilation and absorption of the defeated people into the host society (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a: 126). It is on this basis that the Ndebele nation incorporated the Nguni, Sotho, Tswana, Kalanga, Shona, Venda and Tonga ethnic groups, among others (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009: 13).

In this chapter I deploy the three categories of violence postulated by Slavoj Zizek in his book, *Violence: The six sideway reflections* (Zizek 2009: 2–3) to analyse the manifestation of xenophobia in Zimbabwe. These categories are subjective violence, symbolic violence and systemic violence. The last two are part of what he termed objective violence. How do these three forms of violence describe xenophobia in Zimbabwe? The subsequent sections address this important question.

Xenophobia as Subjective Violence

Of the three forms of violence presented by Zizek, subjective violence is generally the most prevalent and most perpetrated. Subjective violence is perpetrated by identifiable and usually known people and has been described using terms such as criminality, terror, civil unrest, war and international conflict (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a: 127). Xenophobic subjective violence is the most noticeable form of xenophobia and constitutes acts such as necklacing foreigners, murdering them and physically assaulting 'the others' as was the fate in Zimbabwe of the foreign farm workers who resisted the occupation of the farms they worked on (Rutherford 2001, 2008). This form of violence has noticeable perpetrators and victims, with the victims usually sustaining visible bodily scars and invisible emotional ones. Subjective xenophobic violence is well articulated in scholarship.[4] Nahla Valji sums up the debate on sub-

[3] *Thingification* is the act of treating people as non-humans or a thing. It denotes the highest form of disrespect in which humans; usually black people are treated by others, usually colonisers, as mere objects.

[4] For example, for South Africa and Botswana see Crush (2002); Morapedi (2007).

jective xenophobic violence in South Africa by noting that "the difficulties of transition, socio-economic frustrations, a legacy of racial division, and an inherited culture of violence are just some of the factors contributing to violent xenophobia in South Africa today" (Valji 2003: 1). For Bronwyn Harris, there is a direct causal relationship between subjective xenophobic violence and political transition especially in South Africa (Harris 2005: 4).

Subjective xenophobic violence has been used by the Zimbabwean state as part of the transition from colonialism towards full democracy. In the case of Zimbabwe, subjective xenophobia was used as an instrument of nation and state building. Subjective violence was thus deployed to deal with those deemed to be foreign and hence, not belonging and worth being dispensed. Victims of this form of xenophobic violence were both black and white; as long as they did not agree with the government's ideology and policies, they were deemed to be the 'belligerent other' who deserves to be dispensed 'for the good of the country' (Daimon 2015).

In investigating the perpetration of xenophobia as depicted in the mainstream and social media, Banda and Mawadza undertook an empirical survey of 575 articles on Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa in 2015. The study concluded that subjective violence was perpetrated through the mainstream media and the authors noted that the media 'miseducated' more than it enlightened readers on migration issues (Banda and Mawadza 2015: 47). Banda and Mawadza argued that the media is complicit in furthering xenophobia when it publishes and broadcast, "contexts characterized by job scarcity, poverty, crime and wanting healthcare" (Banda and Mawadza 2015: 47) as being caused by foreigners. Such subjective dissemination of information, where foreigners, especially Zimbabweans, are portrayed as stealing jobs belonging to South Africans fuel subjective violence and is not limited to individuals at the grassroots but permeates society and is also evident in sentiments by state officials. This was articulated by Crush who noted that:

> *Meanwhile, South African MPs were receiving increasingly strident complaints from their constituents about the presence of foreign citizens in their neighbourhoods. Studies of media coverage of immigration issues and the public utterances of elected officials from all of South Africa's political parties suggested that the view on the streets was more than a grassroots phenomenon* (Crush 2000:107).

In Zimbabwe, subjective xenophobic assumes a different format wherein the foreign 'other' is given derogatory names. Daimon states:

> *Malawians are termed Manyasarande or Nyasas, implying those from Nyasaland, the colonial name of Malawi; or Mabhurandaya, which is colloquial for the city of Blantyre in Malawi. Some also call them Vatevera Njanji, in reference to those who trekked the railway line on foot during their migration to Zimbabwe. Zambians are also similarly stigmatised, while Mozambicans are occasionally labelled Makarushi in reference to the cashew tree that produces the cashew nut and the cashew apple and was mainly grown in Portuguese-owned Prazos in Mozambique. Others generally refer to African migrants as Mabwidi, meaning societal failures who have adopted an urban or commercial farm identity because of their lack of a rural home in Zimbabwe* (Daimon 2014: 142*).*

This is a clear case of symbolic violence. As it portrays the 'other' as sub-human when compared to the locals who in this case assumes the role of the prototype human.

Xenophobia as Symbolic Violence

Symbolic violence is more pervasive and difficult to identify as it usually hides behind freedom of speech and other democratic tendencies. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, this form of violence is contained in language and speech (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a: 127). Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, perpetrated symbolic xenophobia when he scorned Zimbabweans of Malawian origin as "undisciplined, totemless elements of alien origin" (Muzondidya 2007: 334). In the past, Malawian immigrants have been referred to, both officially and unofficially, in very derogatory terms. Diamon correctly described this form of symbolic violence thus, "the post-independent Zimbabwean state inherited the derogatory colonial construct and categorization by officially labelling non-indigenous Zimbabweans as 'Aliens' for purposes of governance, resources/rights access and electoral manipulation" (Daimon 2015: 3).

The same act is also prevalent in South Africa with the labelling of non-South Africans as *Makwerekewe* and *amagrigamba* (Tafira 2011: 116). This is a perpetration of symbolic violence. In South Africa, one way in which symbolic xenophobic violence has been perpetrated was via a song, *Dibula ibhunnu*, which literally means 'shoot the Boer'. Equally guilty of perpetrating symbolic xenophobia is Johannesburg's Mayor Herman Mashaba who announced on national radio that illegal immigrants are a problem in Johannesburg (Ra'eesa 2016). He emphatically stated, "You see, for me, when I call these criminals, criminals, I want them to understand that they are criminals, …they are holding our country to ransom and I am going to be the last South African to allow it" (cf. Mashego and Malefane 2016).

Such hate speech is not only unexpected but constitutes a human rights abuse based on the legal principle of *ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.* The principle puts the burden of proof on the one who declares, not on the one that denies and establishes one's presumption of innocence until proven guilty. The incident degenerated to subjective xenophobia when the homes and properties of foreign nationals were burnt by local residents in Rossettenville, Johannesburg on 10 February 2017 (Hiropoulos 2017). This was based on allegations that foreigners occupying those houses were dealing in drugs, and engaging in prostitution and other vices. In some instances, South African traditional and socio-political leaders have made derogatory public pronouncements (symbolic violence) regarding foreigners as was the case in KwaZulu-Natal in 2015 when Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, allegedly commented in public that, *Mababuyele ekhaya lababantu* (these people must go back home), calling for the deportation of illegal foreigners (Tella 2016). The pronouncement reinforced strong anti-immigration sentiments in the Zulu-dominated KwaZulu-Natal province, leading to waves of subjective violent xenophobic attacks on foreigners, mostly of African origin.

Such utterances by public office bearers, no matter how well meaning, reinforce stereotypes, legitimizes targets and confers a sense of impunity on the perpetrators who feel nationalistic duty bound rid the area of foreigners.

Xenophobia as Systemic Violence

Nothing is as pervasive and illusive in the perpetration of xenophobic violence as the role played by the system. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a: 127), this form of violence "is located within the economic, social, political systems and exists like the dark matter of physics but is the motive force of what otherwise seem to be irrational explosions of subjective violence." Most seemingly irrational and senseless acts of violence have a systemic explanation. During the colonial epoch, all forms of violence against blacks were justified as part of what Nelson Maldonado-Torres termed "imperial Manichean misanthropic scepticism" (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 245). This is the act of doubting the very humanity of blacks and was manifested in the dehumanisation of the black population by the colonisers.

Colonialism in Zimbabwe was perfected through the use and threat of subjective xenophobic violence underpinned by systemic xenophobic violence which was codified, *inter alia*, in various repressive laws, norms and logics. Zimbabwe was colonised through the violent dispossession of the black indigenous land owners. The 1889 Lippert Concession officially inaugurated xenophobic land dispossession in the country which gained momentum in 1890 via the arrival of the so called pioneer column (Cobbing 1988: 512). The Concession allowed white minority settlers to acquire land from the indigenous black population at no cost. The proceeds of the land grab were repatriated to the United Kingdom and were mostly used to develop the metropolis at the expense of the periphery, to use the term coined by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (Wallerstein 2007: 11). This marked the beginning of land contestations in Zimbabwe, which had a spill-over effect on other forms of violence such as the war of independence.

Another example of how minority white settler colonialism introduced and instituted systemic xenophobia in Zimbabwe was the promulgation of the Native Reserves Order in Council (1898). It created the infamous Native Reserves which were overcrowded, unproductive patches of land reserved for dispossessed blacks. This was in the face of systematic mass land expropriation by the white minority settler regime. The Order had several implications for blacks. Firstly it set the boundaries of the modern day Zimbabwe and it is responsible for creating Zimbabweans as we know them today. It also gave the 'new' territory the name Southern Rhodesia.

The Native Reserves Order in Council also established the colonial state machinery which dispensed subjective, systemic and symbolic xenophobic violence as well as the police and the native administration. These three arms of the colonial minority white settler regime were instrumental in promoting the kind of xenophobic violence currently facing Zimbabwe.

Equally complicit in xenophobia is the judiciary which was used to protect the strong from the weak rather than vice versa. After creating and naming Southern Rhodesia, the colonial order also set up an administration responsible for running the colony. Black people were forcibly grouped and named under the administration of a white minority population. The passing of this Act also recognised four other

present day countries in the process: Botswana, Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. Section 4 of the Native Reserves Order in Council (1898) was therefore the foundation of xenophobia because it created state borders that artificially divided people into different territorial delineations. It also inaugurated the white minority system of bureaucratic administration together with its concomitant tools such as identity cards and passports that are essential for differentiating locals from foreigners.

In Zimbabwe, colonial racism laid the foundation for contemporary xenophobia, which created the identities used to perpetrate xenophobic violence, created the boundaries used in identifying targets of xenophobia and established the countries that reinforce current national identities. This is in the context in which xenophobia is conceptualised in this chapter. It is not simply the denigration of people of a different race, but hostilities (mostly violent confrontations) towards foreigners in a bid to force them out of the host country and is more prevalent within people of the same race.

Xenophobia as a Mutative Rigmarole

Reduced to its most basic definition, xenophobia implies the fear of those perceived to be foreigners. In other words, for xenophobia to be perpetrated there must be two 'different' groups of people; those believing that they are locals and those that the locals perceive to be non-local or foreigners. In Zimbabwe, the fatal xenophobic violence mostly occurred during contestations over land ownership, popularly known as the land reform programme of 2000 onwards. The number of casualties is difficult to determine given the pervasive nature of the act in Zimbabwe and also how it is misrepresented, especially in the state media and by the state security apparatus.

Secondly and more importantly, the underlying factor in the manifestation of xenophobia is to discriminate against anyone different from you. If xenophobia is the fear and hatred of those perceived to be non-local or different from the locals, then these various forms of this phenomenon are prevalent in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Southern Africa. Suffice to state that the common denominator for all forms of xenophobia is the question of identity. Xenophobia is perpetrated in a paradoxical relationship consisting of the pure, original, belonging self and the 'other' that is strange and lacks all the aforementioned markers. The 'other' is created as a legitimate target and victim lacking ontological density and therefore dispensable. The local is pure and the 'other' is a pervert aggressor to the local's social harmony and cultural and biological purity. As correctly stated by Francis Nyamnjoh, the case becomes that of rightful insiders and intrusive outsiders (Nyamnjoh 2006: 3). These forms of xenophobia are exhibited in four main forms: racism; ethnicity, ethnocentrism and ethnic nationalism; sexism; and classism.

Racism which is predominantly the hatred of others based on their race and skin pigmentation is a form of xenophobia that denigrates those not perceived to be of

the same skin pigmentation. Perceptions of those with a darker skin colour as inferior to those with a pale skin colour were the predominant basis of forms of violence such as slavery and colonialism. Under racism, the supposedly superior oppress the inferior. But with xenophobia, the host population somehow feels threatened by the presence of foreigners; some feel inferior due to the dynamism and skills of some foreigners and vent their anger at their supposedly better livelihoods (Rossouw 2007; Morapedi 2007; Steenkamp 2009). If xenophobia is predominantly an intra-black affair, is it possible for blacks from the same ethnic group but different countries to be hostile to one another?

Venda: From South Africa or Venda from Zimbabwe?

The short answer to the above is, 'I am Venda Venda'. Prior to colonialism many nations such as the Venda were one unit with one identity. The same can be said about other nations such as the Tsonga, also known as the Shangaan and the Ndebele in Southern Africa. The Venda on either side of the Limpopo now have additional identities, in that one group is Zimbabwean Venda while the other is South African Venda, yet both are Venda. The Shangaan in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa also possess these additional and very divisive colonial-ascribed identities. Today the Ndebele people live in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Like the Venda and the Tsonga, the Ndebele suffered from colonialism's infamous 'divide and rule' strategy which feeds into the edifice of xenophobia. For the Venda, their primary identity has now been divided between Zimbabwe and South Africa. People that shared the same identity and cultural affinity in the Venda community have now found themselves separated by the iron walls of the modern-day state system. This reality requires individuals from Venda to obtain international passports when crossing the Limpopo River because the termed 'foreigners' will be adjudged to be stepping into 'another country' that belongs to 'other people'.

The creation of modern countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa formalises the creation of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Identity markers such as 'foreigner', 'illegal immigrant', 'undocumented immigrant' and 'asylum seeker' which are in common usage in Southern Africa are all traceable to colonialism and are presently deployed in identifying targets for xenophobic attacks. Once labelled as a 'foreigner', 'illegal immigrant', 'undocumented immigrant', 'asylum seeker' or 'migrant', one becomes a legitimate target for xenophobic attacks. These labels act like indelible ink which can only be deleted by crossing the 'border' and going back 'home' where you belong and are not a 'foreigner'.

In confronting the issue of colonially ascribed identities, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2010) and Chipkin (2007) pose a cardinal question: Do Zimbabweans or South Africans actually exist? I strongly claim that such do not exist; hence I question the colonially constructed identities which are based on what Anderson (1993) aptly calls imagined communities. If Zimbabwe, South Africa and other countries in Africa are imagined communities, what explains the recurrent violent conflicts and

deaths recorded through xenophobia? Why are people who have lived together as a community now at one another's throats on the basis of border separation? Castells (2004) asks three pertinent questions: from what were our identities constructed, by whom and for what purposes? The identities on whose basis xenophobia is perpetrated were created by colonialism. This is the foundation of the forms of violence that are currently being experienced. For Mbembe, it has three main functions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b: 51), which are to establish the colonial system and colonial order (authorised the right to conquest), normalise colonialism and finally to maintain colonial order and the colonial system. Mbembe termed them foundational, legitimating and maintenance violence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b: 51).

Foundational violence authorised the right to conquest and had an instituting function of creating Africans firstly as a people and secondly as its targets. Legitimating violence was used after conquest to construct the colonial order and 'routinise' colonial reality. In most cases this was done via the deployment of systemic violence. Maintenance violence was infused into colonial institutions and cultures and used to ensure the perpetuation of coloniality and was the epitomisation of structural violence. Songs, anthems, hate speech unreasonable laws, improper education, pass laws and the creation of reserves for blacks were some of the actions by the Rhodesian colonial government that qualify as maintenance violence. These three functions of violence are intimately linked to Zizek's subjective, systemic and symbolic violence.

Subjective violence is directly linked to foundational violence as it was through physical violence that Africa was colonised and the colonial system was inaugurated through the same mode. Therefore, institutionalisation of violence by the colonial powers is linked to systemic violence which was responsible for setting up colonial infrastructure such as identity cards, passports and border delineation. On the other hand, symbolic violence is linked to the form of violence deployed for the sustenance of the visible and invisible apparatus of colonialism such as colonial repressive laws, foreign languages and the western education system. With the operation of symbolic violence, colonialism continues to reproduce itself long after the physical departure of the colonialists. The prevalent xenophobia is a direct descendent of the foundational, legitimating and maintenance violence experienced since the conquest of Africa. Colonialism institutionalised the dehumanisation and subjugation of Africans. I argue that xenophobia is a consequence of colonialism, and therefore refute the notion of Afrophobia as a scapegoat for blaming Africans for the historical sins of colonialism.

Of course pre-colonial Africa was not a case of pristine village democracy where what we term human rights today were upheld because these communities constantly fought and reconciled only to fight again (Benyera 2016: 164). However, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues, "pre-colonial African socio-political formations had room for the full incorporation and successful assimilation of defeated communities into the host society" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a: 126). That is, based on communalism, pre-colonial Africa had no notion of foreigners. Traditional African societies accommodated Africans from other communities; they were regarded as potential citizens and not adversaries who came to exert pressure on resources. Pre-colonial violence

was different in that it was not meant to dehumanise, thingify or in Mahmood Mamdani's words create bifurcated citizens and subjects (Mamdani 1996). Pre-colonial identities were not static but evolved over time. This is different from current forms of identities which, "emerged out of a complex historical, political and social processes and events that sought to weave together, eliminate, blend or redefine a multiplicity of existing identities" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a: 251).

Xenophobia and Zimbabwe's Land Reform

Xenophobia in Zimbabwe has not been clearly articulated. The country has rarely been described as xenophobic, yet there are both visible and subtle forms of xenophobia that date back to 1898 when the country was colonised by the British. Every subsequent government in Zimbabwe has deployed various forms of xenophobia as a way of articulating its statecraft and this has been supported by the enactment of different legislation. For instance, the Communal Land Act (1981) legalised the creation of separate and rural residential areas for blacks, thereby making it illegal for black people to access land reserved for whites. This fed into the xenophobia edifice by reinforcing the colonial boundaries necessary for the creation of insiders and outsiders. This compartmentalisation of people into tribal or communal areas was inaugurated when the Native Reserves Order in Council (1898) was passed. The legislation created what it termed native reserves where all blacks were supposed to live while simultaneously guaranteeing white minority settlers vast tracts of the most fertile land. The formalisation of this race based land ownership pattern was further entrenched by the Land Apportionment Act (1930). The Morris Carter Commission of 1925 'corrected' what was deemed as the shortcomings of the Land Apportionment Act such as apportioning too much land to the blacks.

The Land Apportionment Act (1930) re-demarcated the reserves to ensure that the 1.1 million blacks were restricted to the 'barrenest', hottest and most unproductive low rainfall areas with the 500,000 white minority population taking over all the fertile, productive high rainfall areas which later became Zimbabwe's commercial farms. This had the subsequent effect of creating conditions conducive for blacks to fight among themselves for the small available patches of semi-fertile land. The Native Land Husbandry Act (1951) controlled black land ownership and livestock levels and enforced 'conservation'. Black people were forced to migrate to other regions and countries, primarily to South Africa's Witwatersrand for formal employment in the gold mines, in other mining towns of Zimbabwe and to the large commercial farms of Zimbabwe where they eked out a living as outside migrant labourers. Most settled permanently in their 'employment areas' and are the targets of xenophobia today.

The Tribal Trust Land Act (1965) was passed by the colonial government to create what it termed land trustees. This removed land ownership from the black majority and entrusted all so called 'native' land in the hands of colonially hand-picked, compliant traditional authorities, some of whom became complicit in the oppres-

sion of their own subjects in exchange for colonial favours such as keeping the chiefdom. In essence the Act rendered blacks foreigners in their own land. It established community land systems which still exist in Zimbabwe's rural areas. The same Act was later amended to become the Tribal Trust Land Act, 1979 (No.6 of 1979) and the tribal trust lands were changed into communal areas, a situation which resulted in the shift of the land tenure system away from the hands of traditional leader to those of the local authorities.

The disempowering of traditional authorities and subsequent empowerment of the state as the owners of and adjudicators over land rights and claims created the problem of dual accountability, wherein traditional authorities do not have the final say over land distribution and redistribution. This led to the development of bottom-up resentment by those who classified themselves as locals as the state distributed land and, at times, parcelled it out to those considered to be 'foreigners/outsiders', fuelling anger and violence among the locals/insiders. An example was the violent clashes between two villages in Mapanzure district, Masvingo province in March 2006 when the two villages accused each other of land theft (ZimOnline 2006).

The violence was founded on the colonial-inclined demarcation of a community into two villages. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the local chief has no power to adjudicate over community land boundaries. This authority now resides with the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing. What may ordinarily be classified as mere clashes by two villages over land boundaries is in actual fact a manifestation of subjective xenophobia. This is so because, the two villages fought because the foreigners/outsiders had encroached onto the land of the locals/insiders. This fulfils all the preconditions for xenophobia, which are land, human movement and identity.

On the issue of land resources, land reform and its relationship with xenophobia, I start by historicising land occupation in Zimbabwe. According to Zinyama and Tevera (2002: 49), Zimbabwe has been a country of net immigration. If this was so, who are the locals and insiders? Does it imply that those who arrived first became the indigenes, while late arrivals are the foreigners and outsiders? Zinyama and Tevera observes that since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has experienced involuntary and forced net emigration which only serves to affrim this chapter's contention that xenophobia is the grand form of violence. They argued that:

> *…, since 1980, the year of Zimbabwe's independence, migration patterns have shown a net loss in the population with emigration occurring in three main waves. First was the emigration of white Zimbabweans after independence, the second followed the massacres in Matabeleland in the 1980s, and the most recent wave occurred among black Zimbabweans for political and economic reasons* (Zinyama and Tevera 2002: 123).

Unpacking the above, the first wave of emigration after independence was predominantly whites 'running away' from the majority blacks who were hitherto their subjects, but who had taken over political power. This mass exodus was, *inter alia,* due to fear of retribution from the blacks. This constitutes subjective xenophobia as the whites feared and subsequently fled the blacks. The second wave of emigration from Zimbabwe was caused by the 1982–83 genocide in the two provinces of

Matebeleland and the Midlands (Pasura 2014: 40). Genocide is an extreme form of subjective xenophobia. According to Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), genocide is conceived as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; or causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. The Gukurahundi genocide that resulted in about 20,000 casualties among predominantly Ndebele speaking Zimbabweans, was the height of subjective xenophobia in Zimbabwe.

The third wave of emigration was the most recent and mainly occurred among black Zimbabweans for political and economic reasons. Essentially, there was violence over land ownership, land distribution and land redistribution which engendered economic hardship and mass emigration of Zimbabweans, mainly to South Africa, as economic and political refugees (Tshuma 2015: 309). Running away from xenophobic violence, xenophobic-induced human rights abuses and harsh economic conditions, they ironically found themselves at the receiving end of more xenophobic violence in South Africa.

During Zimbabwe's ill-fated land reform programme, which commenced around 2000 with the invasion of commercial farms by the Nhowe population under Chief Svosve, white Zimbabweans were portrayed in the scholarly literature and the media as the major targets of xenophobia by predominantly black landless citizens who operated under the guidance of ex-combatants. This constitutes part of the narrative. There were other victims of xenophobia, black migrant farm workers, who were hitherto employed on commercial farms as cheap labour. These victims of black-versus-black acts of xenophobia were natives from neighbouring Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. They were 'dumped' in Zimbabwe as part of the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and have since lived on the margins of Zimbabwe's economy, forming the backbone of the 'back-breaking' labour in the mines, farms and communal areas. Even their identity documents portray systemic violence as the space where their village of origin is supposed to be written is left blank and the district code is given as 00.

With the demise of the old farm system under which migrant labourers, mostly of Malawian and Mozambican descent worked, these formerly marginalised people now faced further marginalisation simply because they are now complete foreigners who, no matter how long they had stayed in Zimbabwe, were not granted Zimbabwean citizenship. Their condition was aptly described by The Jubilee Debt Campaign report in Ian Scoones:

> *The old system of employment, under the paternalistic 'domestic government', so well described by Blair Rutherford, has gone. In its place is a much more precarious existence, based on a range of unstable sources of income. Many work for the new settlers, others farm their own land, others do a range of off-farm activities, from brickmaking to mining to fishing* (Scoones 2014: 161).

It is thus important to ask, what explains the persistance of xenophobia in Zimbabwe? Xenophobia persists in Zimbabwe because there were no efforts at 'rehumanising' and 'dethingifying' the victims of colonial violence. In a way,

Zimbabweans are living in a perpetual *Chimurenga* (war) mode. This worked well for the post-independence Zimbabwean government as it invokes the *Chimurenga* narrative in which violence was justified as a way of 'defending the gains of independence'. This ultimately gives rise to acceptable forms of violence, all in defence of the state. Secondly, although there have been both official and unofficial denials, xenophobia continues to rear its head in Zimbabwe. Such denial makes it difficult for xenophobia to be confronted, simply because you cannot solve a problem that does not exist.

Thirdly, xenophobia is a political strategy employed by the political elites to manipulate their subjects (voters); hence, they consciously retain it as a veritable political asset. This is partly why there is no clear official strategy to deal with xenophobia in Zimbabwe. This could also be said of South Africa where xenophobia has become a recurrent phenomenon. Despite its prevalence and destructive tendencies, there remains a dearth of public repudiations from senior government officials. Therefore, I claim that xenophobia was 'normalized' in Zimbabwe by both perpetrators and victims. This was achieved by adopting various coping mechanisms like creating jokes around xenophobia, paying bribes to state officials to avoid deportation or to obtain services reserved for insiders and outright corruption. In South Africa, 'illegal immigrants' bribe government officials, including the police to avoid deportation; this is a case of note in the normalisation of xenophobia.

Conclusion

The chapter grappled with the problem of violence in Southern Africa in general, and specifically in Zimbabwe. It argued that xenophobia is far broader than it is presented in the scholarly literature. The chapter provided a more robust understanding of xenophobia by expanding its scope. This was achieved by unpacking the definition of xenophobia beyond mere hatred of foreigners to the concomitant actions taken by those that fear and hate foreigners. The three forms of violence, subjective, symbolic and systemic, postulated by Slovac Zizek were deployed to provide deeper analysis of on the manifestations of xenophobia in Zimbabwe. These were used in alignment with Achille Mbembe's three categories of colonial violence, foundational, legitimating and maintenance violence.

I argued that xenophobia is a colonial hangover which continues to haunt Africa. In contrast to precolonial societies that devised several mechanisms to assimilate war victims, colonialism had a dehumanising and 'thingification' effect. Three preconditions for the existence and execution of xenophobia were also identified, namely, colonially constructed and reinforced identities, land and migration. Based on these preconditions, insiders are distinguished from outsiders. In conclusion, I asserted that xenophobia remains a reproduced form of colonial violence.

From a policy perspective, the government of Zimbabwe should define, classify and then legislate against xenophobia as a way of halting the spate of this heinous act. However, given that the government is an accomplice and is complicit in

perpetrating xenophobia, non-governmental actors need to step up and hold the government and individuals to account in order to ensure a society free of recurrent xenophobia. If xenophobia continues in Zimbabwe, there will be serious repercussions and implications for the state, economy and society such as the continued absence of social cohesion, disunity and mistrust. Nationally, xenophobia harms the performance of the economy, deters investment and slows growth. Unchecked xenophobia also breeds ultra-nationalism that engenders secessionist tendencies. From a regional perspective, migration is inevitable; conflict management should thus be a key goal of regional organisations such as the SADC and AU. Xenophobia derails regional integration and perpetuates coloniality. Furthermore, it breeds poor governance. While foreigners are blamed for societal ills and economic downturn, persistent socio-economic challenges will fuel more anger and resentment among locals, leading to fresh waves of xenophobic violence.

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Chapter 12
Zimbabwe and the Quest for Development: Rethinking the Xeno-Ethnophobia Tint and the Land Reform Question

Lukong Stella Shulika and Stella Chewe Sabi

Introduction

History records that at the dawn of independence in April 1980, Zimbabwe – formerly Southern Rhodesia – was inborn into an askew and unsymmetrical configuration of land distribution along racial lines that began with British colonisation in 1890 (Onslow 2011). The legacy of Zimbabwe's inequitable land structure was established through 41 years (1923–1964) of British colonial rule, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930,[1] and 15 years (1965–1980) of white minority rule by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) under the leadership of Ian Douglas Smith (Hill and Katarere 2002). Paradza (2010) recounts that throughout colonial dispensation in Zimbabwe, the white minority controlled and owned vast majority of arable land, leaving peasants of African descent to subsist from their marginal Native Reserves known today as communal areas. As such, the imperative to emancipate the black majority citizenry from the imbalances and injustices of unequal access to land inherited from the colonial regime in the post-1980 epoch, saw Zimbabwe attempting different phases of land reforms. Major amongst the reform strategies was the Fast Track Land Reform policy of 2000, although its

[1] This Act, among other provisions, decreed the legal basis for land and resource distribution measures or what was termed white land policy because of the unequitable land allocation that favoured the whites over the indigenous black population (Herbst 1990).

L.S. Shulika (✉)
Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
e-mail: lukongstella@gmail.com

S.C. Sabi
Food Security, African Centre for Food Security, School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa
e-mail: Sabis@ukzn.ac.za

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implementation was clouded with antagonisms (Muzvidziwa 2003) and xenophobic repercussions. The antipathy upshots can be attributed to complex and overlapping issues of indigenous rights to land and the need for its repossession from white citizenry settlers and the challenges relating to debates on ethnicity, local and national identities, socio-economic exclusion and marginalisation, historical injustice as well as the quest for social justice (Muzvidziwa 2003).

Zimbabwe's controversy over land and its effects is a longstanding issue that traverse social, economic and political differences since from the colonial times. At post-colonial dispensation, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led-government of Robert Gabriel Mugabe, remained challenged by some restrictive clauses in the 1979 'Lancaster House Agreement' (Hall and Mengistu 2002), which established Zimbabwe as an independent state. The provisions of this covenant constrained sustainable land redistribution for 10 years following independence, where the new government was regulated from the compulsory acquisition of land without recompense and the apportionment of land to transpire only through the modus of the willing-buyer and willing-seller approach (Kariuki 2004:11). By the year 2000, Zimbabwe had adopted as one of its state building strategy the radical Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) and embarked on unlawful seizure and redistributing of the country's white commercial owned farms to new black citizenry occupants of African descent[2] (Mutasa 2015). Looking at issues of land and its reform in contemporary African states, Zimbabwe is no exception to the socio-political conflicts associated with land. While land reform has been among Zimbabwe's top development priorities since colonialism, it remains one of the most complex sources of economic and socio-political tension within the country.

Examining Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme and its implications for the country's economic and socio-political development, this chapter particularly focuses on identifying the prejudices that has clouded the prevailing implementation process. It assesses the manner in which the execution of the programme has, in several instances, been asserted as a matter of "rightful repossession or seizure". It identifies what we characterise as "xeno-ethnophobia", which constitutes hostility against the commercial white farm owners. Probing the land redistribution strategy from the later perspective, this chapter begins with a conceptual and contextual orientation of the terms xenophobia and ethnophobia. In exploring these concepts, the chapter builds on the understanding that they are phenomena with socio-economic and political prejudices and cleavages. This insight is embodied within the framework of what most scholars have basically hypothesised and averred to be the root or plausible reasons that instigate the "phobia" in the first instance.

[2] Referring to the citizens of Zimbabwe, the terms black people and citizens of African descent, and white people and citizens of European ancestry, are used interchangeably in this chapter. While the chapter does not seek to delve into the discourse of who is an African, it however notes that white people of European ancestry, though now citizens of Africa, Zimbabwe as the case in point of this chapter remain popularly perceived, especially through utterances as non-Africans and immigrants.

From the conceptual discourse, we develop a thought-provoking consideration about the operational processes of Zimbabwe's land reform programme by driving its analysis at the xeno-ethnophobia character of the land project. This analytical exposition has remained a knowledge gap and not subjected to serious consideration by most researchers and scholarships. For example, of the diverse and exhaustive literature on Zimbabwe's post-2000 land restructuration programme, just a few researchers like Kersting (2009) and Muzvidziwa (2003) create a convergence between land reform and xenophobia. However, these authors do not go beyond their concise assertions to provide an in-depth analysis of the xenophobic elements within the broader land arrangement. The chapter addresses this lacuna in knowledge production and expansion.

Taking cue from the fact that the "phobias" that clouded the Fast Track Land reform in Zimbabwe has not been the focus of most scholarship, this chapter then interrogates the prejudiced episodes of human rights violations and violence against white commercial farm proprietors by groups of black Zimbabweans. It also deliberates the salient role of government authorities in the phase of resentments that defined the land re-allocation or takeover processes. Establishing the logical tint of "phobias" from the conceptual frameworks and literature reviews, this chapters aims to make novel contributions to scholarship on this discourse, generate grounds for criticisms and questions, and constructive engagements on the subject. Furthermore, the chapter critically reflects on the impact of the operationalisation of this land reform policy on Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political development. Quite a number of scholarship maintain that the resultant effect of the post-2000 land reform has been predominantly unconstructive, resulting in its categorisation among the ten top listed high alert failed states[3] on the 'Failed States Index' of 2006–2013 (Haken et al. 2013; Makochekanwa and Kwaramba 2009).

Furthermore, this chapter presupposes the following inquiries: Had the land owners been black migrants/settlers, would same demise of land grapping and xeno-ethnophobia been perpetrated on them? How impactful was the implementation of the land reform had on Zimbabwe's socio-economic development? What explains the jettisoning of due process in the land redistribution question? While responding to these questions, we acknowledge that determining the right and wrong of the fast track land reform programme and its implementation processes necessitate actual understanding of the problem and consideration of the varying perspectives and orientation other researchers may have on the subject.

[3] A failed state as per the Foreign Policy's 'Failed States Index', is characterised by several indicators, such as economic, social and political inadequacies affecting the functionality of the state. Implicit from Robert I. Rotberg's (2003) chapter on *Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators*, a failed state can be defined as that which can no longer perform its primary responsibilities of providing security, education and governance to its populace due to extreme poverty or violence, corruption, poor governance, lack of the rule of law, declining economy and socio-political marginalisation and inequality, and unaccountable government.

Conceptual Clarification of Terms

The two terms that stand out in this chapter are land reform and xeno-ethnophobia. Xeno-ethnophobia is derived from the combination of xenophobia and ethnophobia. Literature is replete on what constitutes land reform or issues around its importance in development policies, as well as xenophobia in the given of our contemporary world.

Land Reform In simple terms, land reform means the redistribution or restitution of rights in land to beneficiaries, mostly the poor and people who had been disposed of their land or property owing to colonial or historical injustices of land appropriation, distribution, or restructuring (de Villiers 2003; Derman 2006; White et al. 2014). Thus, land reform transcends processes whereby entitlements for restitution or repossession are based purely on ancestral or familial land claims (de Villiers 2003). Given the centrality of land as a viable resource and prolific economic value for states, societies and human development (Derman 2006), its reform involves statutory division of arable land and its allocation and reallocation to the landless peasants, small scale farmers, and industrialists of African descent by the state (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2010). According White et al. (2014), the goals that define land reform are economically far-reaching in that it targets the promotion of agricultural production to support the development of the economic base of the economy.

To Ghimire (2001) and Moyo (2004), the impetus of Land reform is ingrained in the objectives of poverty alleviation, and the reform process that leads to access to land can also and often result to access to food and accommodation, it may also decrease concerns of economic inequality, while advancing social justice and welfare. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2010) states that the fundamentality of land reform implementation lies in the overall objective to address and eliminate the challenge of food insecurity, to further inclusivity, impartiality and efficient gains from land redistribution, as well as create a stable political environment and an acceptable rule of law over property and land rights. From these understandings of land reform, its significance to economic and socio-political security and development goals of a state and its people cannot be easily dismissed.

In Africa, the question of land reform is predominately linked to colonial history of land deprivation and exclusionary practices with regards to the exercise of land rights. Derman (2006) notes that African identity has been and in some cases remain customarily linked with land. Speaking land reform in Africa, the debate is not only specific to Zimbabwe, but spans to other regions in African, especially southern Africa like Zambia and South Africa where the discourse remain a piecemeal (de Villiers 2003). As for the case of Zimbabwe, some of its motivation for land reform policies and provision of land for the dispossessed or those in need is interlocked with the popular revolutionary conception that the whites should and are not supposed to own land in Africa (Derman 2006). It is therefore, not misplaced that land reform in Zimbabwe constitutes a complicated national policy concern (de Villiers 2003). It is pivotal to the country's economic and political welfare, and is a resource

for which part of Zimbabwe's quest for liberation, even in the matter of post-independence has been based (Makumbe 2002).

Moyo (2004) further asserts that the question of land reform in Zimbabwe rests within the broad context of development discourse and policy considerations on agricultural development as it relates to the economically marginalised African continent. In the given of these multiple views on land reform, the strategies through which its reform occurs is very vital. Ghimire (2001) pinpoints these different strategies to include the drastic or revolutionary and the restitution approaches of land distribution. The former involves endemic land grapping, as was the case in Zimbabwe's FTLRP, which as this chapter maintains, was prevalently prejudiced based on colonial and historical past of land exclusion and deprivation policies and the question of who African land rightly belongs to, in such that the rule of law and respect for human rights were undermined, leading to what this study describes as xeno-ethnophobia. In addition, Moyo (2004) avers that the lack of proper or the imprudent management of land reform and redistribution measures remain one of the main sources of socio-economic decline in most developing economies.

Xeno-ethnophobia Xenophobia is an irrational hatred and prejudice and against foreign nationals/immigrants or perceived "outsiders" (Laher 2009). It is also described as an irrational fear or contempt of something perceived as foreign or "unknown". Often, xenophobia motivates threat of violence against immigrants and fellow citizens of immigrant origin. This is to say victims of xenophobia, irrespective of their citizenship status, which may have been acquired either through ancestry, marriage, or naturalization, are perceived in situations of xenophobic actions as strangers or "outsiders" in their resident society or sovereign state. Xenophobia is driven by the following causes: negative beliefs and stereotypes (when "outsiders" are perceived to be endangering the existence of individuals, physically, politically economically); perceived threats national identity or culture; religious doctrine; competition for scarce resources (employment, land, housing, and healthcare). Xenophobic prejudice may be triggered by the following factors: intergroup anxiety; negative stereotypes; realistic threats and symbolic threats (Laher 2008). Xenophobic attacks and violence against the perceived "outsiders" have been a global phenomenon.

In Africa, xenophobic attacks have been reported in countries including South Africa, Ghana, and Nigeria where black immigrants have been the primary targets. Some analysts (Neocosmos 2006), have argued that in Africa xenophobia is a "post-colonial" problem which is associated with politics of dominance among groups in post-independence era. The *Southern African Immigrant Project* (Crush and Ramachandran 2014; Tsheola et al. 2015:241) indicated that South Africa exhibits one of the highest levels of xenophobia on the continent. In post-apartheid South Africa, xenophobia is racially[4] inclined towards black immigrants from other

[4] Racially is derived from racism, which in simple terms refer to the expression and manifestation of discrimination, antagonism or prejudice against/towards other humans beings on the basis of their race or ethnicity. So, while xenophobia and racism have two separate meanings, they are somehow interlinked, especially as both are fallout of intolerance, hostilities and hatred towards foreigners/the others.

African countries, of which Zimbabweans have been Prominent among such victims (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). It is in this context of such prejudices that other phobias such as ethnophobia arise. Conceptually, ethnophobia overlaps with xenophobia (Darity 2008). Ethnophobia is a form of "irrational" phobia associated with one's hatred, discrimination or resentment of another human being based solely on ethnicity despite being part of ones' own country or society (Urban dictionary 201:9). It is predominantly driven by ethnic cleavages among groups from the same nation. Ethnophobia emanates from similar contexts of xenophobia attributed to other negative societal attitudes such as Afrophobia and anti-Semitism with implication of antipathy and contempt. The Urban dictionary (201:9) contends that such societal attributes of ethnophobia are predominantly in multiethnic states where totalitarianism is a common feature of political system.

A study on 'Antagonism Toward African Immigrants in Johannesburg South Africa' by Laher (2008:27) revealed that 'realistic threats' or threats associated with "economic welfare" and "political power" affect prejudices that precipitate xenophobic attacks against perceived "outsiders". In the case of post-independence Zimbabwe, as presented in this chapter, such an ideology was institutionalised by the state. Thus, appraisal of the "phobias" in the context of Zimbabwe is attributed to persistent distrust because of its colonial history of white minority rule, power imbalances and marginalization, further instigated by the state through its land policies. As such, this phobias in present day Zimbabwe stems from the government's drastic land restructuration policy that not only resulted in fragmentation, but manifestation of the antagonistic sentiments against white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe.

Prejudices in the Zimbabwean Land Issue

Issues around land in Zimbabwe dates as far back as when it was colonised by the British. Zimbabwe's colonisation lasted for much of a twentieth century- from 1890 to 1980. It was characterised by widespread European occupation of the land and disposition of the majority of black peasant farmers from their native land. Several land policies deprived the majority their land rights while granting rights to few white elites. Mutusa (2015) argues that this system of state managed repression and racial segregation left the black population marginalised. This is substantiated by the detailing that by 1914, a small group of white settlers, numbering about 23, 730 owned about 19 million acres of land while an estimated 752,000 occupied a total of 21,390,080 acres of land (Mutusa 2015). During colonisation, the blacks lost their land through wholesale evictions and forced removals which reduced their agricultural economy to subsistence levels (Hill and Katarere 2002). In addition, most black communities were forcibly moved to areas designated as native reserves (communal land) with poor infertile soils-areas located in the inhospitable and tsetse-ridden areas of the country, such as Muzarabani and Gokwe (Mutasa 2015). As

a result, the first liberation wars against the land occupation (late 1800s) were suppressed by the settler's advanced military weapons.

The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was the first expressive outline of land law legislated by the white Rhodesians. The land legally enshrined the *de facto* land stratification designating half the country land as exclusively white only. In addition, the Land Act accorded greater portions of well-watered and fertile land to white farmers and made provisions for evicting indigenous farmers to drier and infertile agro-ecological areas. The Act also prohibited Africans from owning or occupying lands in designated white regions, thereby crowding them in less productive land and degrading the eco-system. As a result, the whites took the most productive land (51%), leaving the black Africans with poor infertile lands of (22%), while the remainder (27%) was set aside for forestry, national parks and other infrastructural. This process forced large number of black rural residents to abandon their farms in search of work on commercial farms or in urban areas (Mutasa 2015).

Efforts to address this racial discrimination and land inequality suffered another set-back when the Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith declared itself independent from British control (1965) and vowed to resist any impending black majority rule in the country. However, as part of the colonial segregation and land acquisition resistance, nationalist movements launched a guerrilla war campaign in 1960s and 1970s which paved way to negotiated peace settlement administered by the British government in 1979 held at Lancaster House in Britain. Noting that the land question was an epicenter of any initiatives aimed at resolving the problems in southern Rhodesia, the Lancaster House conference of 1979 centered on the issue of land (Paradza 2010), pioneered the roadmap to Zimbabwe's elections through a Constitution and the steps to land reform. The land reform involved the targeted resettlement, which was to be purchased by government from the white commercial farmers who had acquired huge tracts of underutilised land (Mutasa 2015).

Despite that the Lancaster House Agreement between the British government and southern Rhodesia had made provisions for embarking on a fairer redistribution of land between the racial groups (Zimbabweans of African descent and Zimbabweans of European ancestry), and to grant compensation for white commercial farmers, implementing the provisions was practically impossible. Few of the state-actors, Britain and the United States of America, did not live up to the part of their deal in offering financial assistance in support of the land redistribution programme (Mabaye 2005:8). In addition, white commercial farmers who had owned the largest portions of the land could only sell their land on voluntary basis. Therefore, the land reform initiative that was intended to alter the ethnic and racial skewed land arrangements and ownership lacked a proper land redistribution system in post-independence Zimbabwe (de Villiers 2003). It is not surprising that at the dawn of the new century, inadequate arable land had been redistributed based on the land reform laws that began in 1979. By 2000, out of the 21,000 farmers, about 4500 were commercial farmers of which 4000 were owned by Zimbabweans of European ancestry (Mlambo 2012).

The absence of an effective land redistribution programme compromised the implementation stage which was characterised by cumbersome procedures and corruption (Chitseke 2003:6). Not only did this engendered delays in sustainable redistribution of arable land to the beneficiaries (that is, primarily landless rural majority), but it also precipitated dissatisfactions and frustrations among some groups of the black population, which were affiliated to the ruling political party-ZANUPF. Prominent among these were the war liberation veterans who embarked on illegal acquisition of the white-owned commercial farms in the late 1990s. Likewise, from the inceptions of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in July 2000, the state legalised what began as isolated illegal land seizures by war veterans and villagers in late 1990s (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2010). This policy of land grab policy was in direct contrast to Mugabe's call for peace, unity, forgiveness, reconciliation and peaceful co-existence which he had publicly declared during independence (Mlambo 2012).

While, the government at the beginning of the illegal land acquisition supposedly made an effort to address the invasions by calling on landowners were to co-exist with the new owners and squatters (Chitsike 2003). Such a call by the President Mugabe's government was mere smokescreen show, seeing as the President in several public arena was blatant about his support for unlawful seizure of land by war veterans (Mutasa 2015). The façade of a rejoinder to the drastic farm reform basically did very little to impact or prevent the increasingly organised mobs of the invaders who terrorized the white-commercial farmers alongside their employees and drove them away from the land. This continuous invasion of the land eventually prompted hundreds of white farmers to flee to their neighbouring countries (Mutasa 2015).

By 2005, government had lost control of the continuous illegal acquisition of white-owned farms. Besides this, the remaining white farmers who were seemly reluctant to give up their land continued to face wide spread violence and property destruction from war veterans and nearby villagers and youth militia mostly affiliated to ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe Human Rights Report 2015). The situation was worsened in the 2008 election year, when there was a breakdown in the rule of law. It should be noted that alongside democracy, the rule of law is significant for the protection of human rights and a just and fair society. In the case of Zimbabwe, the radical approach to land expropriation in post-2000 and the breakdown in the rule of law that came with it, is a reflection of xeno-ethnophobia. Kersting (2009:7) articulates that such xenophobic tendencies are characterised by little to no punishment of the perpetrators of organised violence in an event due to "reasonable" justification. This radical reaction (land invasion) backed by the government's Fast Track Land Reform Programme also led to "ethnic" and "national" antagonism. Expectedly, the suspension of the rule of law furthered the continuous outbursts of youth militia and war veterans who went unpunished for engaging in unlawful activities against white owned farms and their proprietors.

Situating Xeno-Ethnophobic in FTLRP Implementation

While acknowledging that land was ranked highest among the grievances that initiated FTLRP, there were also cases of gross human rights violations against the white commercial farmers and in most cases the farm workers. Likewise, there was the break down in the rule of law as the government failed to curtail the perpetrators of land invasion and the violence that characterised it. According to Gonye, Moyo and Wasosa (2012), the most assertive attribute of the fast track land programme was/is the fact of it being blurred in "political posturing and xenophobic name-calling" and ideological narratives of "anti-white ethnocentricism and anti-minority exclusivism". Situating the xeno-ethnophobic elements in the FTLRP is therefore not farfetched, if consideration is to be made of some of President Mugabe's alterations in 2000, wherein he called on his party to *"Continue to strike fear in the heart of the whitemen, they must tremble. The Whiteman is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans"* (Gonye et al. 2012). Such declarations by the president eventually set the pace for the xenophobic antagonism that followed the implementation of the land reform programme.

Consequently and due to the carte blanche towards the white owned commercial farms, by early 2008, the population of white commercial farmers had significantly reduced from 5000 to 500. By June 2008, it was an estimation of 280 white commercial farmers who had remained on their farms continued to face intimidation, loss of property and eventually their farm land (Weston 2008). Many white commercial farmers had fled to neighbouring countries including Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa. Those who had remained on their farms continued to face intimidation as there was no protection from government. For example, following President Robert Mugabe's disputed re-election in 2008, several white farmers who had protested the seizure of the farms were beaten, burned, and killed by supporters of the ZANU-PF ruling government (Centre of Governance and Human Rights 2014:183).

A notable existence evidence of gross human rights violation and xeno-ethnophobia is the consolidated case of applicants (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others versus the Republic of Zimbabwe), which was decided by the Southern African Development Community-SADC. This was a case in which a British-born commercial farmer, Ben Freeth and his family members among them Mr. Campbell were abducted and physically assaulted for being in possession of publications, mostly in the British press, regarding the radical approach to land expropriation in Zimbabwe (SADC Tribunal 2008). It is instructive to note that Campbell farmland was legally owned and purchased in post-independence Zimbabwe, and that Mr. Campbell, who was a citizen of Zimbabwe was denied the opportunity to defend his case in Zimbabwean courts of law. Instead, he was subject to physical violence and racial slur by the black youth militia affiliated to the ZANU-PF. The "Campbell Case" was presented in November 2008, at the SADC Tribunal in Windhoek Namibia. The tribunal ruled that the Zimbabwean government had abused Campbell's rights when they confiscated the property (Mount Camel) in the district

of Chegutu and prevented him from defending his case in Zimbabwean courts of law on the basis of his race (SADC Tribunal 2008). More to these, a prominent white farmer was beaten to death in 2010 (News24 2010) and this incident was followed by the bemoaning of the commercial Famers' Union about the continuous attacks on the white minority without protection from government.

In 2014, President Robert Mugabe who had ruled the country for 34 years, publicly declared that "all" the remaining white Zimbabweans should leave the country. The BBC news (2014) reported the President said the following words to his supporters at a rally; "We say no to whites owning our land and they should go". According to the report, he called on the black peasant farmers whom he perceives to be the "rightful owners" of the country not to lease any agriculture land to the remaining white Zimbabwean farmers. More so, not only did he categorise white farmers "foreigners", but also declared "Don't be too kind to white farmers, for land is yours and not theirs". This caused anxiety to the remaining Zimbabwean white farmers whose land had already been repossessed. The President who had suspended the rule of law constantly blamed the white commercial farmers for betraying "his generosity" and threatening his regime. For example, earlier in September 1993, few years before FTLRP was initiated, President Robert Mugabe was of the view that "if white settlers just took the land from us without paying for it, we can in a similar way just take it from them, without paying for it, or entertaining any ideas of legality and constitutionality" (Chigara 2004:105). Statements of this nature, as alluded by Gonye et al. (2012), established the mood for the xenophobic actions of land and property invasion and deprivation that clouded the fast track land redistribution policy.

Also important in the context of this discourse is the detail that within the broad land reallocation policy of 2000, some ethnic groups, especially from where the President hails, were favoured over other groups, and in some cases, the redistribution was politically motivated. Scholars like Moore (2001) have argued that the ruling government of President Mugabe initiated the fast track land reform project owing to the fear of losing the 2000 elections, and blamed ensuing election violence and instability on the problem of land inequality. Meanwhile the real issue as further asserted by Moore (2001), was ZANU-PF's bad governance, authoritarianism and resistance against the ideal of democratisation following the establishment and contestations of the new opposition political party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In same light of manipulative developments, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Report (2015) draws attention to the fact that land evictions were also perpetrated in order to accommodate and expand the holdings and landed property of the head of state. For example, in Mazowe an estimate of 400 families were forcefully removed from their farm lands and dwellings by state police. In addition, farm or land redistributions were also highly politicised in that beneficiaries were mostly supporters and members of the ruling party, while some official in contravention to the land policy owned more than one farm land (Zimbabwe Human Rights Report 2015; Matondi 2012). These oddities signified the legitimization of illegality in the land reform programme.

Departing from there above, there is no denying the fact the policy objective of the FTLRP was based on economic and historical considerations. However, the 'unfair' approach to the redistribution of land and the mayhem that characterised the state-backed invasion of the white-only commercially owned land (Chitseke 2003:9) was to a large extent racially motivated. We also acknowledge Horowitz's (2001) view that "ethnic" or "national" antagonism, categorised among the forms of xenophobia, manifested in the unconstructive and ineffectual activities that characterised the post-2000 Zimbabwe's land reform programme. Consequently, Zimbabweans (whites and blacks alike) have suffered due to the ill-implemented FTLRP precipitated by the government under the guise of national and racial balance in land redistribution, which has devastated the economy and led to high unemployment levels and mass exodus of significant portion of the population to neighbouring countries.

Impact on Zimbabwe's Development Prospects

Agriculture was regarded as the pillar of the economy in Zimbabwe, since colonialism (Maiyaki 2010). However, the Fast Track Land Reform policy of 2000 had adverse effects not only of civil rights of the people, but also on food production and the economy in general. Prior to the inauguration of FTLRP, previously economically viable Zimbabwe, was already facing series of socio-economic and political crises, which to some extent can be attributed to its adoption of structural adjustment policies in 1990 (Bryceson 2000). The politicisation and ruthless strategy adopted for implementing its post-2000 land redistribution programme further plunged the country into complex humanitarian and development crises. The stark realities of the implementation approach used for FTLRP is diverse and hard felt in the economic and socio-political spheres, as variously asserted by researchers and scholars. However, literature, as indicated below, alludes to the view that impact was devastating on the country's development prospects.

In the economic domain, the impact of the radical FTLRP was extreme in terms of the massive decline in agricultural production and the rate of hyperinflation. According to the Human Rights Watch (2002) agriculture accounted for 40% of Zimbabwe's foreign currency earnings through export pre-FTLRP. However, with the implementation of the drastic FTLRP in 2000, Zimbabwe metamorphosed from an exporter to importer of food. This was due to the fact that white farmers lost substantial productive farms to landless blacks, most of whom did not have the necessary agricultural and farm management capacity and financial resources to maintain or improve agriculture production. Marongwe (2003) also asserts that the meltdown in Zimbabwe's export economy could be attributed to the 'foot and mouth disease' which affected most of the cattle farms. In similar trend of economic complexities, the country also experienced an enormous collapse of a regular annual output in the production of wheat by 20% in comparison to the mid-1990s, and maize from an estimated '1.7 million tonnes in the mid-1990s to about one million

tonnes and minus in 2000–2004, as well as 60% decline in tobacco exportation by 2005 (Sachikonye 2005; International Monetary Fund 2005).

The International Monetary Fund (2009) also notes that following post-FTLRP from 2000 to 2008, Zimbabwe's Gross Domestic Production (GDP) substantially diminished by more than 50%. Zimbabwe further witnessed a massive meltdown in expenditure from a valued USD 1.5 billion in 2005 8% in 2008, which greatly affected the functionality of it public services sectors (International Monetary Fund 2009). Summing up on the economic impact of the FTLRP implementation, Makochekanwa and Kwaramba (2009) underline that Zimbabwe's GDP growth rate suffered an aggregate breakdown such that by the close of the 2003 calendar year, about 80% of the population were living below poverty line, plus a 70% combined rise in poverty and unemployment from 2000 to 2007 (International Monetary Fund 2005, 2009). Hammar (2008) affirms that this collapse in the economy, especially the escalation of poverty levels, exposed most families to the susceptibility of food insecurity both at the urban and rural regions.

The decline of Zimbabwe's economy in connection with the FTLRP also had severe social ramifications on the country. The ripple effects of the land grapping strategy was also felt by especially the black farm employees, most of whom lost both their jobs and homes in the process (Sachikonye 2005). Makochekanwa and Kwaramba (2009) outline the social impacts to include: a hike of 94% in unemployment schools, clinics, hospitals, and health facilities by the end of 2008 due to lack of teachers, medications, nurses and doctors and doctors respectively. Not only did these challenges increase the levels of economic and social injustices in the country, it also led to the mass exodus of Zimbabweans to neighbouring Southern African countries, especially South Africa, and some made their ways to the West. Makochekanwa and Kwaramba (2009) relates that more than 25,000 educators migrated from Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008; more than 60% of doctors and 70% of nurses left the country within the timeframe of 1998 and 2008; as well as about 80% of university lecturers. To this effect, Hammar (2008) notes that the influx of Zimbabweans legally and illegally in to South Africa increased considerably. This inflow as Hammar further articulates, constituted one of the many causes of the major upsurge of xenophobic attacks in South Africa in May 2008, as Zimbabweans were the most targeted during the violent outbreak.

Politically, the resultant effects of the Fast Track land Programme was the corruption that clouded the redistribution of the invaded land, in which elite group of Zimbabweans such as politicians mostly from the ruling party ZANU-PF, senior civil servants and war veterans acquired large portions of land without agricultural experience and or necessary capital. Besides this, Makochekanwa and Kwaramba (2009) allude that political instability and human rights violations increased. Also, the country received international economic sanctions, and these coupled with the already dire socio-economic consequences resulted in Zimbabwe's constant listing (from 2006 to 2013) as one of the top ten high alert failed state on the 'Failed States Index' (Haken et al. 2013).

Conclusion

Zimbabwe's post-colonial and colonial land policies and initiatives did little to meaningfully address suspicions and frustrations regarding agricultural land ownership between the majority black population who were previously displaced and pushed into unproductive reserve areas, and the minority white who possessed and controlled much of the arable land in the country. Zimbabwe's experiences with the FTLRP and its impact on development is of particular significance to other African countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Namibia. The lesson from Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme is that a bias and hasty targeting of land beneficiaries can lead to corruption and flagrant disregard of rule of law as was the case with the government when it legalised the land invasion which targeted white owned commercial farms and generated anarchy.

As noted earlier, some white commercial farmers had purchased the land legally[5] as was the case with the Campbell property which was later illegally confiscated by the state largely due to "irrational" prejudice or the "common notion" that all white commercial farmers acquired Zimbabwe's native land illegally and that they were responsible for the continuous impoverishment of the black majority in the country. In addition, given that the prevalent land ownership is predominantly in the hands of the majority black population, (among them the peasant farmers) who lack the necessary capital and skills to produce the required agricultural products for food security, the Government of Zimbabwe should encourage and support the agricultural sector by giving income support through credit cash to peasant farmers improved productivity. This will help in revamping the agricultural sector and the economy which has suffered a huge set back since the inception of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme.

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[5]Though note is also taken that pre-independence white land system historically accorded the white minority the authorised means to dominate the country's main productive resources to the exclusion of the indigenous black population.

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Chapter 13
Xenophobia and the Paradox of Regionalism in Africa: The West African Experience

Adeoye O. Akinola

Introduction

Migration has occupied a central position on Africa's agenda for peace, security and development. It has also become a major social-political priority in many states in Africa, which has attracted the attention of regional bodies on the continent. In recent years, sub-regional and regional integration initiatives have made considerable progress in developing frameworks, legislation, and mechanisms for increased economic and social integration among states (Musonda 2006). At the regional level, the African Union (AU), South African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) have taken up the challenge of opening up borders and exploring greater labour mobility. However, renewed intolerance, manifesting as xenophobia, has been a clog in the wheel of regional integration.

Globalization and increased regional integration across the world have facilitated inter-state migration of people from all walks of life, resulting in heterogeneity. Increased acknowledgement of fundamental human rights also resulted in many more people being accorded the status of refugee or asylum seeker. Agyei and Clottey (2007) posit that within the milieu of growing and intensive economic, political and socio-cultural interdependence among state and non-state actors, mass intra- and inter-border movement of people has increased; inter-state migration in West Africa is thus not an exception.

A.O. Akinola (✉)
University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa
e-mail: oyeakinola@yahoo.com; AkinolaA@unizulu.ac.za

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West African citizens are one of the world's highly mobile populations. Population censuses reveal that the region's countries harbour approximately 7.5 million migrants from other West African countries, about 3% of the regional population.[1] As noted by Adepoju,

> *West Africa has experienced a variety of migrations caused by population pressure, poverty, poor economic performances and endemic conflicts. Historically, migrants regarded the sub-region as an economic unit within which trade in goods and services flowed, and people moved freely* (Adepoju 2005: 1).

The Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), the driver of West African integration programme, adopted a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment (ECOWAS Commission 2007). Along with the supplementary agreement, it testifies to member countries' determination to place free intra-regional movement of persons at the heart of the regional integration process. Jiman (2007) posits that the 1979 Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment of Businesses marked a watershed in efforts at sub-regional integration. Two supplementary protocols to enhance free mobility were signed in July 1985 and May 1990. However, xenophobic tendencies have triggered internal conflicts and humanitarian crises in the sub-region. ECOWAS envisaged that contradictions might arise and attempted to set up a system to monitor migration policies and an information system, but the plan did not materialize due to the reluctance of local political elites to abandon extreme nationalism (Adepoju 2005).

Migration among West Africans in general has been described as a way of life (Adepoju 2000), and dates back to the pre-colonial era. Although, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana were historically the main receivers of migrants, the oil boom in Nigeria in the 1970s with its associated employment boom in different sectors of the economy attracted many immigrants (Adepoju 2005). Over the generations, there has been significant migration of people in the region in response to demographic, political and economic factors. This generated conflict between nationals and foreigners, which continue to jeopardize attempts to foster regionalism in West Africa, and Africa at large. Aside from other threats to regional integration, increased xenophobia and attendant conflict could destabilize the moderate peace achieved by ECOWAS, through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

Xenophobia is prevalent throughout the African continent, endangering political and economic union as well as peace and security. The unprecedented 1994 Rwandan genocide was rooted in deep hatred between the Hutu and the Tutsi ethnic groups, while Rwandans have faced recurrent hostilities from the East African community, more recently from Tanzanians. Different reasons have been suggested for incessant violent confrontations between citizens and those they refer to as 'not belonging'. Drawing on recent studies, Noah and Levanon (2005) note that, national identity was empirically related to negative sentiments towards foreigners, and point to the lack of quantitative research on the relationship

[1] Available at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_38233741_38246823_38483911_1_1_1_1,00.html

between perceptions of the 'stranger' and forms of people's attachment to the nation-state. More specifically, they advocate for systematic examination of the relationship between national identity and xenophobia.

This presupposes that xenophobia is shaped by the specific nature of national identity in a given society. The process of building identities as individuals and members of a group implies becoming aware of diversity in society and one's difference from others, which is not necessarily negative as long as diversity is not conceived as threatening, and acceptance of diverse realities is not exploited for socio-political manipulation (Compass n.d.). For instance, since most South Africans prefer their national identity to any other type of identification, the major outcome is that nationality would become the prime source and proof of identity. This could lead to xenophobia being institutionalized, rampant and much more violent (Samari 2009: 36).

This chapter identifies xenophobia as a divisive phenomenon that has the potential to undermine the achievement of regional integration in West Africa. It is tempting to categorize xenophobia as genocide, racism, and ethnic violence as they all involve the manifestation of extreme hatred against those considered to be 'the others'. However, in the context of this chapter, xenophobia captures the display of intolerance, hatred, hostility and violence against non-citizens of a country. While this is a narrow conception, it is appropriate in the context of the waves of anti-immigration sentiments and violence across Africa, and the world at large. Following this introduction, the chapter presents an historical overview of xenophobia in West Africa followed by an analysis of the effects of xenophobia on ECOWAS' integration agenda.

Xenophobia in West Africa: Historical Background

The evolution of xenophobia in Africa can be traced to the political malaise that characterized the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president in 1969, and the ushering in of K.A. Busia as Prime Minister after a short period of military rule (Suhuyini 2012). The Busia-led government came up with the infamous 'Aliens Compliance Order' which prompted the abrupt and compulsory expulsion of those regarded as 'aliens', mostly from Nigeria and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). Suhuyini (2012) notes that Nigerians ejected Ghanaians in the early 1980s and set hundreds alight with the aim of flushing the 'aliens' out. This trend was repeated in many African countries. Adepoju presents the chronology of expulsion projects in West Africa thus,

> *Senegal expelled Guineans in 1967; Ivory Coast expelled about 16,000 Beninoise in 1964; Sierra-Leone, and later Guinea and Ivory Coast, expelled Ghanaian fishermen in 1968. Earlier on, Ivory Coast had expelled over 1,000 Benin and Togo nationals in 1958; Chad expelled thousands of Benin nationals who were 'illegal migrants' and not 'law abiding'. In early 1979 Togolese farmers were expelled from Ghana and Ivory Coast. Ghana expelled*

> *all illegal aliens without valid residence permit as from 2 December 1969… Nigerian traders were once expelled from Cameroon, Zaire and Ivory Coast* (Adepoju 2005: 4).

Anti-immigrant feelings were motivated by different factors. Most scholars cite economic concerns as the major factor. Crush and Pendleton (2004) notes that xenophobia is officially recognized as a major problem within national borders due to its tendency to undermine social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights.

In Ghana the raison d'être of the Aliens Compliance Order of the Progress Party was to give Ghanaians control over the market and business, which the authorities claimed had been dominated by immigrants (most of whom were actually farm labourers on the cocoa plantations). In Côte d'Ivoire, although the xenophobic pogrom was purely political, Ivoriens attacked and looted shops belonging to immigrants, while in Libya and Gambia, houses belonging to immigrants were destroyed on the grounds that foreigners were encouraging immoral and criminal practices (Suhuyini 2012). These acts contradicted the peaceful coexistence of the West African population which predated colonialism. Adepoju notes that,

> *Post-independence nationalism was manifested in several other ways, including changes in immigration laws that prescribed specific procedures for entry and employment of non-indigenous workers and later xenophobia against immigrants. As unemployment among young educated nationals reached a peak, governments resorted to expelling and deporting so-called illegal immigrants* (Adepoju 2005: 4).

In other words, dire economic conditions resulting from government failures and weak private sector capacity to generate employment explain extreme nationalism and xenophobia.

Xenophobia: An Impediment to ECOWAS' Integration Process

Post-colonial African leaders were quick to realize the need for regionalism to improve the livelihoods of the masses, eradicate impoverishment and enhance the productivity of the continent's human and natural resources. The ECOWAS treaty (Article 27) affirmed the need for economic integration to achieve these objectives. Rights of entry, residence and establishment were to be gradually integrated into the ECOWAS protocol. This includes free flow of persons, goods and services and capital and gradual removal of all obstacles to such (Agyei and Clottey 2007; Adepoju 2005). It was not until 1992 that ECOWAS "affirmed the right of citizens of the Community to entry, residence and settlement and enjoined member States to recognise these rights in their respective territories" (Adepoju 2005). Member states were required to jettison demanding visa and residence requirements and allow West Africans to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories. The re-creation of a borderless West Africa was in consonance with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and UN human rights.

Post-independence 'waves' of economic nationalism across African states led to the adoption of indigenization policies by nation states to promote economic protectionism and protect the few available jobs in addition to expulsion and stricter border controls, which constrained intra-state movement of people within the West African region. This type of migration can be explained by economic maximization theory which posits that since demand for and supply of labour is always in equilibrium in a standard competitive framework, improvement in wages and net income are the major motivation for labour migration (Gordon and Gardner 2013: 22). That is, the migration of skilled labour within West Africa was due to differences in remuneration and conditions of service. Regionalism called for free migration policies, and free movement of goods and services, leading to the adoption of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, and the right of Residence in 1979 (Agyei and Clottey 2007). The first phase of the ECOWAS Protocol provided for free entry of West African citizens without a visa for 90 days. This was ratified by member states in 1980. The second phase, right of residence, only became effective in July 1986 and was followed by sporadic transnational labour mobility and other forms of mobility within the region.

In December 2000, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in association with ECOWAS established a Regional Consultative Process (RCP) with the major goal of rapidly enhancing economic regionalism and combating divergent challenges in relation to migration issues (MIDWA 2012). According to the RCP, the institution was specifically established to encourage ECOWAS members to engage on collective migration issues and concerns at regional level, as these issues would be difficult to address at national level. The IOM aimed to support and empower ECOWAS' multilateral efforts against trafficking in persons. By July 2006, ECOWAS, in partnership with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), instituted mechanisms to further address the issue of immigration. A joint plan of action and a multilateral agreement on cooperation were signed.

Agyei and Clottey (2007) support the claim that the integration of West African states into a viable regional village entails the gradual withering away of state sovereignty. It was assumed that existing bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation within the region would create opportunities for more extensive cooperation. This reinforced the view that the region was poised to confront the political, economic and socio-cultural challenges confronting the mass of the people, in terms of improving their livelihoods; and pooling resources for sustainable growth and development. This was the main rationale for re-creating visa-free movement of people in the sub-region (Agyei and Clottey 2007: 12).

The ECOWAS' "free movement" project led to *cross-border* influx of people within the sub-region. The assumption that intra-state trade is a strong prerequisite for regionalism is also an impetus for inter-West African immigration of not only business-minded ECOWAS citizens, but of skilled and unskilled labour. Another motivation for immigration was the economic hardship prevalent (at particular epochs) in some member countries like Nigeria and Ghana. The belief that the social ills of the host countries resulted from the influx of foreigners, thereby

triggering xenophobic violence, is a misplaced one. Human beings' susceptibility to crime knows no boundaries, ethnic origins or national affiliations.

Despite the ratification of the regional pro-migration protocol, several border regulations and scrutiny continue to exist. This resulted in severe harassment and extortion of money from travelers by security personnel at the checkpoints. Free movement was also hampered by the different official languages spoken in member states and upheld at border posts. There were also allegations of hostility towards non-nationals as well as reports of torture and killings by security personnel in countries like Senegal and Gambia. The alleged killing of 44 Ghanaians in Gambia by security agencies in 2005 was an example of the difficulties faced by citizens of member states in exercising their rights to free migration within the region (Modern Ghana 2009; Jimam 2007). Four years after the killings, the families of the deceased had yet to receive the full story of what occurred. Although it took too much time for the supranational organization to react, through the United Nations-ECOWAS partnership, a fact finding team was eventually set up in 2009 to identify the immediate or remote cause and those complicit in the violence (Modern Ghana 2009). In 2000, more than half of 740,191 non-Ghanaians in the country were nationals of other West African countries. Agyei and Clottey (2007) note that more than 50% of the 740,610 Ghanaians born outside the country indicated that they were born in an ECOWAS member state.

The violent attacks on migrants were not peculiar to Ghana or Gambia. In July 2002, several Nigerian-owned businesses in Freetown, Sierra Leone were attacked during mass protests led by rampaging youths who sought to avenge the death of a businessman allegedly killed by Nigerian 'swindlers' (BBC 2002). Nigeria joined the bandwagon and launched the infamous 'Ghana-must-go' expulsion of Ghanaians in the late 1970s through the early 1980s. However, it can now be regarded as one of the most 'foreigner-friendly' countries in the world. This is possibly due to the government's neo-liberal belief that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and luring 'foreigners' to invest is a necessary ingredient for accelerated development. Nigeria could also be regarded as an epitome of 'ethnic violence'. The militancy and religious terrorism perpetrated by Niger Delta militant groups and *Boko Haram* respectively have been responsible for more deaths of citizens and destruction of property than anywhere else in contemporary Africa (Akinola and Uzodike 2014). Recurrent intolerance along ethnic cleavages and the violent activities of the armed groups have all but destroyed the peace and development recorded by the country in recent years. While xenophobia has the potential to dislodge the peace enjoyed by ECOWAS member states, Nigeria's insecurity is a threat to peace and security in West Africa, and Africa at large (Akinola 2011).

Other parts of Africa, particularly Southern Africa, have been part of the anti-immigration project. Nigerians have suffered subtle official xenophobic attitudes in South Africa. In 1997, shortly after the end of apartheid, former Home Affairs Minister, Mangosuthu Buthelezi identified the influx of foreigners into the country as a threat to South African survival and liberty. He declared that, "South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of

persons spells disaster for our country" (Misago et al. 2009). Such beliefs are held by many public officials and citizens.

Xenophobia among government officials caused confrontations between the governments of Nigeria and South Africa, reaching its peak when the South African authorities refused entry to 125 Nigerians over vaccination cards (news24 2012). Airport officials denied entry to the Nigerians due to their inability to produce a vaccination card, popularly referred to as the 'yellow fever card'. Nigeria reacted by denying entry and returning about 25 high-ranking South Africans to O.R. Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg. The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Olugbenga Ashiru, warned; "they should not take the friendly business environment we have in Nigeria, whereby companies including South African companies are making more profits in Nigeria than in South Africa, for granted" (news24 2012). This degenerated into a diplomatic row. As regional powers, these countries should take into account that the success of any regional arrangement in Africa depends on their cooperation and peaceful relations.

Ngomba (2011) sketches the political background for the manifestation of xenophobic sentiments, and the utility of 'hate' rhetoric for political purposes in countries like Cote d'Ivoire. The country is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, with a predominantly Muslim population in the north and a Christian one in the South. It is home to more than 60 different ethnic groups which are "classified into five cultural clusters" (Ngomba 2011). After the demise of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, successive presidents continued to indulge in ethnicity, which led to the evolution of the concept of 'Ivoirité', meaning Ivorians first. This was coined to separate 'true' nationals from 'diluted' citizens and outsiders. Xenophobia degenerated into open confrontation and the term 'Ivoirite' coined by Houphouet's successor, President Henri Konan-Bedie, became more popular and was frequently directed at immigrants (Quist-Arcton 2001).

The election of Laurent Gbagbo aggravated xenophobic sentiments, possibly due to its utility as a veritable instrument against his rival, Alassane Quattara. Former President, Gbagbo used his office to disqualify Quattara from contesting the presidential election, accusing him of non-citizenship, and when Quattara won the election, the incumbent refused to vacate office (Thompson 2011). The former President also accused foreigners, particularly those from Burkina Faso of plotting a coup to oust him from office and destabilize the country. This prompted his supporters to unleash terror against foreigners. At this time, Cote d'Ivoire had a population of about 16 million, 26% of which was non-citizens, mainly from other West African countries (United Nations 2016).

The intolerance directed against 'the others' that played out between the former Ivorian President, Gbagbo and Quattara resulted in serious electoral violence that threatened the peace of the country and that of the West African region. The term, 'Ivoirité' presents an ideology founded on the belief that the country's problems are grounded in decades of extensive immigration and thus the defilement of the true Ivorian identity. Based on this background, the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire could be seen as a result of historical cleavages built around ethnicity, nationality, religion and xenophobia.

Turning to the Guinea-Liberia migration crisis, Kamara (2000) reports, that, the immediate casualties of the xenophobia ignited by the raids into Guinea on the alleged orders of Liberia's former warlord and President, Charles Taylor were 125,000 Liberian, and 330,000 Sierra Leonean refugees. Many refugees suffered similar fates in Conakry in conflicts with locals. This was based on President Conte's orders to capture all Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, which was taken as carte blanche for the annihilation of the despised immigrants. Long before the attacks, xenophobia had escalated in the zone. Acting under the orders of Charles Taylor, Liberian soldiers were accused of burning border camps accommodating thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees in a continued spree of executions, harassment, arrests and imprisonment (Kelly 2009). In Cote d'Ivoire, Burkinabe immigrants have come under recurrent attacks from locals. The Gambian authorities have consistently resisted the accommodation of Liberian refugees. While they pay lip service to tolerance, refugees are requested to regularize their immigration documents for possible Ghanaian citizenship.

Violence against other nationals, which is prevalent in the majority of ECOWAS member states, has stunted improved inter-states relations and the economic development of the region. There is a strong link between regionalism, peace and security, and sustainable development. The literature reiterates that peace and stability is an essential condition of socio-economic development (Akinola 2011; Akinola and Uzodike 2014). Without exception, the human development outcomes of xenophobia for migrant and host populations are negative, pernicious, and damaging. The persistence of xenophobia and other hate attitudes in West Africa seriously diminishes the socio-economic prospects of the host countries. Xenophobia undoubtedly undermines democratic structures and the liberal values of humaneness, equality, fairness and social justice. It also erodes universally accepted human rights principles and creates a global environment characterized by discrimination against, and ill-treatment, of non-citizens (Crush and Sujata 2009: 60). It is clear that global governance structures have not invested significantly in the eradication of xenophobia in Africa. Samari (2009) argues that xenophobia is one of the greatest impediments to organizations such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) that seeks 'African solutions to African Problems'. Akinola (2011: 66) posits that "no meaningful development could take place in a crisis-ridden environment".

Xenophobia's effects are twofold: victims suffer physical and psychological violence, and the state is denied the benefits of migration and subjected to socio-economic and political instability. Samari (2009) contends that immigrants are more likely to perform the hardest, least attractive and remunerated, and least desired jobs in all nations, thereby expanding the country's productive base, but at the same time reducing employment prospects for the local population. Their insecurity and expulsion disrupt local and regional production, increasing the price of byproducts. In Côte d'Ivoire, attacks on presumed Burkina Faso-originated Mossi prompted many to flee the country, abandoning the cocoa plantations. This led to a dramatic decline in production, sinking the country's economy and jeopardizing the economic development of the Francophone region. Global prices of cocoa rose,

major chocolate producers and consumers paid the price, and the victims lost their livelihoods.

Studies have also demonstrated that ethnic-fractionalization, as in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, negatively affects the overall quality of governance in a country and that ethnically diverse societies are more "prone to corruption and poor governance, conflict and slow economic growth" (Kimenyi 2006: 65). The author maintains that the high degree of ethnic fractionalization in sub-Saharan Africa (that is home to more than 2000 distinct ethnic groups) could be "one of the reasons for poor governance in the continent", while resource allocation is influenced "more by political and ethnic considerations rather than established criteria of economic efficiency" (Kimenyi 2006: 64).

The West African political leadership recognizes the danger regional insecurity poses to sustainable development, and the place of immigration in the developmental agenda, yet, ECOWAS is not significantly empowered to guarantee the security of lives and property in the region, especially with regard to combating immigration-related violence. Agyei and Clottey (2007: 16) note, that, ECOWAS did not establish adequate and effective mechanisms to control the entry of illegal immigrants into member states. One of the reasons is probably the fact that many people in the sub-region do not have valid travel documents, including birth certificates. There are also concerns that the privileges enshrined in the ECOWAS free-movement protocol have been abused and exploited by some citizens of member states. These include smuggling of goods and illicit trade in narcotics. No responsible society or government would tolerate the debasement of its people, especially when there are strong indications that such criminal activities are mostly perpetrated by immigrants.

These crimes and acts of economic sabotage (like tax evasion) have led to expressions of resentment among officials and the general public against non-nationals. While one would expect government security agencies to be alive to their responsibilities and that governments or societies would address the specifics, the weakness of state institutions and corruption by public officials – an attribute of states that suffer capacity constraints – impede the maintenance of law and order. For instance, Ghana has established a Border Patrol Unit within the Ghana Immigration Service to police its borders, while Nigeria stationed the Nigerian Drugs and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) at its borders to curb the high rate of drug-related crimes in the region. Notwithstanding these efforts, cross-border criminal activities reign supreme in West Africa.

Agyei and Clottey (2007) argue that, in enacting the ECOWAS Protocol, insufficient consideration was given to the diversities in social, political and economic backgrounds of member states, leading to revocation of the protocol and expulsion of non-nationals during economic crises. The cases of Ghana and Nigeria support this argument. The authors add that institutional arrangements at the national and sub-regional levels promote divergence in policy implementation. Within member states, migration policies are handled by different ministries, departments and agencies, resulting in sporadic coordination. Poor coordination, competition and implementation lapses result in several challenges that hinder the free movement of people in the region and expose non-nationals to xenophobia.

Conclusion

Despite the realities of xenophobia, states have not paid sufficient attention to this phenomenon. While regional and global institutions have tried to act, mainly through the legal framework, greater commitment is required by both state and non-state organizations at all levels, national, regional and global. Xenophobia continues to thrive despite economic liberalization, the declaration of fundamental human rights and international regulations to eradicate all forms of discrimination and to promote regionalism and multilateralism that should render national borders easily accessible and immigration-friendly. The decision to implement free movement of people within the West African region is an open invitation to migration. As much as the policy is desirable, West African states, which are signatories to the protocol, should accommodate its realities.

The sub-regional security arrangement, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), has been very active in military intervention in cases of civil war (Liberia, Sierra Leone), but has never been involved in peacemaking or peacekeeping during xenophobic-related crises. The object of violence is easy to determine during wars (either civil or conventional), but xenophobia remains shrouded in complexity and is hence, more challenging to resolve through regional security arrangements. Furthermore, the violence is not systemic, but is sporadic with a very short life-span, and is mostly displayed through non-violent means.

This chapter drew attention to the convergence between security and development, and noted that economic prosperity is dependent on the peace and security of the state; not only in terms of regime security but the security of the lives of all those that live in the territory in question. The state has the utmost responsibility to enforce law and order and guarantee the security of lives and property without recourse to ethnic, national and racial considerations. Incidents of official xenophobia should be condemned, as should the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of violence against immigrants. In some countries like Ivory Coast, under former President Gbagbo, xenophobia became a veritable instrument of mass mobilization during electoral processes. The politicization of migration nearly destroyed the country during the Gbagbo-Quattara electoral face-off. Renewed insurgency, civil war or a complete breakdown of law and order in the country would have spelt doom for neighbouring countries, especially in terms of the humanitarian crisis as a result of the spill-over effect.

There can be no doubt that, citizens in the West African region still hold strongly to their national identities. The idea of regional citizenship is only seen in terms of free border-crossing, and does not blur the borderlines that separate the modern states created by the colonial powers. Furthermore, citizens in this region, and in Africa as a whole, are disconnected from their governments, and as such are not part of the regionalism project. Attempts to foster regional integration in Africa lack a human face, unlike the case of the Euro zone where citizens of the respective member states are active participants in the European integration system. ECOWAS and its member states are thus called upon to adopt proactive initiatives to engage

citizens in integration processes and embark on public enlightenment campaigns to change attitudes towards 'the others'. All cases of xenophobia result from intolerance, and intolerance remains the greatest cause of violent conflict, not only in West Africa or Africa, but in the world.

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