THE PALGRAVE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF FOOTBALL AND POLITICS

Edited by Jean-Michel De Waele, Suzan Gibril,
Ekaterina Gloriozova and Ramón Spaaij

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Editors

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Editors
Jean-Michel De Waele
Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences
Université libre de Bruxelles
Brussels, Belgium

Suzan Gibril
Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL)
Université libre de Bruxelles
Brussels, Belgium

Ekaterina Gloriozova
Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL)
Université libre de Bruxelles
Brussels, Belgium

Ramón Spaaij
Institute for Health and Sport
Victoria University
Melbourne, Australia

and

Department of Sociology
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, Netherlands

Contents

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Jean-Michel De Waele, Ph.D. Professor in Political Science at the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium.

Suzan Gibril, Ph.D. Researcher at Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium.

Ekaterina Gloriozova, Ph.D. Researcher at Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium.

Contributors

Pablo Alabarces, Ph.D. Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires (Universidad de Bunenos Aires), and Researcher at CONICET (National Council for Scientific and Technical Research [Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas]), Argentina.

Mahfoud Amara, Ph.D. Assistant Professor in Sport Policy and Management (Sport Science Program) at College of Arts and Sciences, Qatar University, Qatar.

Torbjörn Andersson Associate Professor in Sport Science at Malmö University, Sweden.

Fabien Archambault Senior Lecturer of Modern History at the University of Limoges (Université de Limoges), and Researcher at CRIHAM (Interdisciplinary Research Center in History, Art History and Musicology [Centre de recherche interdisciplinaire en histoire, histoire de l'art et musicologie]), France.

Kausik Bandyopadhyay, Ph.D. Professor of History at the Department of History, West Bengal State University, Barasat, India.

Lincoln Bizzozero Revelez, Ph.D. Professor and Researcher at International Studies Program, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of the Republic (Universidad de la Republica), Uruguay.

Youcef Bouandel, Ph.D. Professor in Political Science at College of Arts and Sciences, Qatar University, Qatar.

Bernardo Buarque de Hollanda, Ph.D. Professor and Researcher at the CPDOC-FGV (Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History [Centro de Documentação e Pesquisa de História Contemporânea do Brasil], and School of Social Sciences of the Foundation Getúlio Vargas [Escola de Ciências Sociais da Fundação Getúlio Vargas]), São Paulo, Brasil.

Thomas Busset Historian and Scientific Collaborator at the International Centre for Sports Studies (CIES), University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland.

Manase Kudzai Chiweshe Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Development Studies, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Zimbabwe.

Rosana Da Câmara Teixeira, Ph.D. Adjunct Professor at the Faculty of Education, Federal University Fluminense (Universidade Federal Fluminense), Brasil.

Florin Faje, Ph.D. Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

Andy Fuller, Ph.D. Honorary Fellow at the Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne, Australia.

Yair Galily, Ph.D. Founder and Head of *Sport, Media and Society* (SMS), Research Lab at the Sammy Ofer School of Communications, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel.

José Garriga Zucal, Ph.D. Professor at the University of San Martin (Universidad de San Martin), and Researcher at CONICET (National Council for Scientific and Technical Research [Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas]), Argentina.

Gabriela Garton, Ph.D. Researcher at the University of Buenos Aires (Universidad de Bunenos Aires), and Fellow at CONICET (National Council for Scientific and Technical Research [Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas]), Argentina.

Roy Hay Honorary Fellow at Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Australia.

María Nemesia Hijós, Ph.D. Researcher at the University of Buenos Aires (Universidad de Bunenos Aires), and Fellow at CONICET (National Council for Scientific and Technical Research [Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas]), Argentina.

John Horne Professor at the School of Sport and Wellbeing, University of Central Lancashire, United Kingdom.

Nicolas Hourcade Adjunct Professor of Social Sciences at Central School of Lyon (École Centrale de Lyon), France.

Dağhan Irak, Ph.D. Faculty of Sport Sciences, Strasbourg University (Université de Strasbourg), France.

Christos Kassimeris Professor in Political Science at the School of Humanities, Social and Education Sciences, European University Cyprus.

Christian Koller, Ph.D. Historian, Director of the Swiss Social Archives and Adjunct Professor of Modern History at the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

Daniel Künzler, Ph.D. Lecturer in Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

Leelannee Malin, Ph.D. Assistant Professor at Howard University Washington, USA.

Wolfram Manzenreiter, Ph.D. Professor at the Department of East Asian Studies—East Asian Economy and Society, University of Vienna, Austria.

Richard Mills, Ph.D. Professor of Modern European History at the School of History, University of East Anglia, United Kingdom.

Verónica Moreira, Ph.D. Professor at the University of Buenos Aires (Universidad de Bunenos Aires), and Researcher at CONICET (National Council for Scientific and Technical Research [Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas]), Argentina.

Chuka Onwumechili, Ph.D. Professor at Howard University, Washington, USA.

Charles Parrish, Ph.D. Assistant Professor at the College of Business, Western Carolina University, USA.

Jamee Pelcher MBA Candidate, Western Carolina University, USA.

Jean-François Polo, Ph.D. Associate Professor in Political Science at the Institute of Political Sciences of Rennes, France.

Gabriel Quirici, Ph.D. Professor of History, University of the Republic (Universidad de la Republica), Uruguay.

Aage Radmann, Ph.D. Head of Department for Physical Education, Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Oslo, Norway.

David Ranc, Ph.D. Assistant Professor at ESSCA School of Management, Paris, France.

Olga Ruzhelnyk, Ph.D. Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences of Politics (Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique), University of Paris Nanterre (Université Paris Nanterre), France.

Tal Samuel-Azran, Ph.D. Head of the International Program at the Sammy Ofer School of Communications, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel.

Albrecht Sonntag, Ph.D. Professor at ESSCA School of Management, Paris, France.

Ramón Spaaij, Ph.D. Professor in the Institute for Health and Sport, Victoria University, Australia, and Special Chair of Sociology of Sport at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Grégory Sterck MA in European Studies, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium.

Ian Syson, Ph.D. Senior Lecturer at the College of Arts and Education, Victoria University, Australia.

Matthew Taylor, Ph.D. Professor of History at the School of Humanities, De Montfort University, and Researcher at the International Centre for Sports History and Culture, Leicester, United Kingdom.

Totty O. Totty, Ph.D. Adjunct Professor at Allen University, Columbia, USA.

Loïc Tregoures, Ph.D. Lecturer at the Catholic University of Paris (Institut Catholique de Paris), France.

Gustav Venter, Ph.D. Research Coordinator at the Centre for Human Performance Sciences, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.

Sergio Varela Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.

Carles Viñas, Ph.D. Professor at the Faculty of History, University of Barcelona (Universitat de Barcelona), Spain.

Wojciech Woźniak Researcher-Lecturer at the Department of Sociology of Social Structure and Social Change, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Łódź, Poland.

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Part I

Introduction

Football and Politics: Between the Local and the Global

Ramón Spaaij, Jean-Michel De Waele, Suzan Gibril and Ekaterina Gloriozova

It is football […] that inspires you to learn, however poorly or inadequately, if not a new language then a new set of (deeply political) terms in a language not your own, to familiarize yourself with a new history. *Fútbol* is foundational, if not singular, in its ability to move you to take sides in a long-standing political animosity. (Farred 2008, 9)

Grant Farred's (2008) passionate account of his long-distance love for Liverpool Football Club is one of a number of literary works that explore Association

R. Spaaij (✉)
Institute for Health and Sport, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: ramon.spaaij@vu.edu.au

R. Spaaij
Department of Sociology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

J.-M. De Waele
Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Université libre de Bruxelles,
Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: jmdewael@ulb.ac.be

S. Gibril · E. Gloriozova
Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles,
Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: sgibril@ulb.ac.be

E. Gloriozova
e-mail: eglorioz@ulb.ac.be

football (soccer), the world game, as a window onto profound transformations in politics, culture and society. The cultural, social, historical, political, economic and organisational bases and impacts of the sport have received considerable academic scrutiny over the past three decades (Giulianotti 1999; Goldblatt 2007; Hughson et al. 2016; Murray 1994). This body of literature foregrounds the complex interplay between football, politics and society, giving the lie to the cliché that football and politics should not, or do not, mix.

1   Outline of the Handbook

The aim of this handbook is to provide a systematic analysis of the links between football and politics. Though football references are commonplace in the political world, as evidenced by the widespread use of sports metaphors in political speeches, we aim to focus on the ways in and through which football is politicised. This handbook presents a detailed picture of the relations between football and politics in a wide number of European, American, African, and Asian states, as well as a comparative assessment of football and politics in a global perspective. Our ambition is to offer an analysis of the relations between football and politics based on 32 case studies covering five continents. All case study chapters follow the same structure: the political dimensions of the origins and historical development of football; the most relevant historical club rivalries; the political aspects of football as a sports spectacle; and contemporary issues associated with the political use of football. The use of a common framework ensures the comparative nature of the book, therefore enabling the investigation of largely studied cases, along with cases that have seldom been addressed with regard to the examined themes. These cases have been selected based on the premise that football is an important national, economic, political and social issue in the studied country. These countries were also chosen because of the popularity of the game of football among (large segments of) the population.

The first section of each chapter focuses on the **political origins of football**. It addresses how each country introduced a historically English game to the specificities of the local culture. How did the local cultures adapt or resist this global phenomenon? How did the introduction of football affect the construction of a relationship towards England, and more broadly, towards the Western World? These questions are closely linked to the role football played in the construction of the nation (Hobsbawm 2001, 143), and the way local political powers used the rapidly growing popularity of the game of football as a unifying tool. Furthermore, we also pose the question of the dual use of football as a means of both reinforcing political

authorities' international image and reputation and enhancing their internal legitimacy. Finally, football often acts as a catalyst for socio-political tensions and conflicts in society. This effect is linked to the strong symbolic and identity charge bestowed on sports competition, constituting an ideal breeding ground for the construction and reinforcement of national identities, sporting issues being superimposed on ethnic tensions.

The second section of each chapter examines **historical and contemporary club rivalries**. What sets football apart from other forms of popular culture is the centrality of opposition and rivalry, which have a strong symbolic and affective charge (Benkwitz and Molnar 2012). How does the game provide a "ready background for the expression of deeper social and cultural antagonisms" (Armstrong and Giulianotti 2001, 1)? Though this particular issue has been addressed rather thoroughly in the literature, the aim of this section is to add to this knowledge base by providing a systematic overview of the various forms and configurations of rivalry.

The third section of each chapter addresses **football as a sports spectacle**. This includes relatively general inquiries such as the perception and significance of football within a given society, but also more specific issues concerning football supporters and their mobilisation inside and outside of the stadium, including violence and (anti-)racism. Most studies essentially focus on the most radicalised and mediatised forms of football fandom in Western Europe. Part of the literature focuses on the way football fandom can stimulate the emergence of radical political tendencies (right or left) (Testa 2009). This is primarily explained by football supporters' attraction to the claims, organisational models or methods of action of certain extremist groups. On the other hand, supporter groups can constitute a major wager for radical currents or political parties that see the stadium as an arena allowing them to acquire the visibility they struggle to achieve in the public debate. They can use and politicise these supporter circles by infiltrating them (Hourcade 2000). However, authors disagree on the issue of the true permeability of supporters in relation to radical political ideas. While some studies conclude that there is a genuine support and engagement among supporters in relation to political ideologies (Balestri et al. 2002), others show that supporters' political expressions aim particularly at provoking, disqualifying the opponent, distinguishing themselves from other groups and constructing identity (Bromberger 2002; Spaaij and Viñas 2005, 2013).

A more recent and promising field of research examines how football fandom can lead to the mobilisation of its members and their participation in large-scale events, hence hinting at the existence of a politicisation process among its members. Here, authors explore the internal resources used by football supporter groups within the scope of their activities, which

can in turn, lead to the development of different forms of collective action (Testa 2009; Lestrelin 2012). This approach is embedded in the broader theory of resource mobilisation that describes supporter groups as sites of political socialisation, consequently enabling them to extend their participation beyond the sporting arena and into society as a whole. Accordingly, authors have shown that football supporters are able to mobilise for general issues linked to the commercialisation of their football clubs, the protection of civil liberties (Lestrelin and Basson 2014) or against police brutality (Beshir 2011).

Finally, we allowed each author space to examine a specific political issue relevant to their case study, providing the basis for a comparison of cases following an inductive approach. This fourth section thus examines **contemporary issues** linked to each case specifically, relating to issues such as religion, gender, corruption, geopolitical interests, social integration or economic dimensions. In the next section, we identify the main cross-cutting themes and patterns from these case studies.

2   Assessing the Politicisation of Football

Research on football and politics consistently shows the dynamic ways in which football is implicated in the production and contestation of collective identities, community and globalisation. In *How Soccer Explains the World*, the American journalist Franklin Foer (2004) argues that we can consider football as a way of thinking about how people identify, organise and express themselves in the global age. The wide-ranging collection of case studies presented in this handbook both illustrates and deepens our understanding of the nexus between football and politics. The handbook sheds light on the complex and dynamic interplay between universalism and particularism in football, politics and society (Armstrong and Giulianotti 1999; Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). On the one hand, it highlights the embeddedness of football and politics in global networks, cosmopolitanism, transnational capitalism and global cultural consumption (e.g. Sandvoss 2003; Giulianotti and Robertson 2007). On the other hand, it reveals myriad particularisms of cultural appropriation, adaptation and socio-political contestation in relation to both the sociogenesis and development of football and the contemporary sociocultural, political, economic and ethical issues it experiences in different countries across the globe.

The case studies presented in this handbook foreground the interdependence of local and global processes within football identities and institutions;

that is, the *glocalisation* of the intersections between football and politics (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004). This interplay is evident in, for example, Taylor's chapter on the United Kingdom, which concludes that many English Premier League clubs have become "global brands operating in transnational as well as local and national space." Local forces remain significant, writes Taylor, "but they are closely connected to, and partly shaped by, the global networks through which money, ideas and information flow." The glocal dynamics of football and politics play out differently in each country, but there are also important cross-national homologies.

The contributions to this handbook reveal a number of historical and contemporary patterns, themes and issues. In the remainder of this chapter, we identify several specific, cross-cutting themes that relate to the politicisation process. In order to do so, it is necessary to propose a definition of the concept of politicisation that applies to football.

Jacques Lagroye (2003) defines the politicisation process in terms of both diversion of purpose and surpassing of limits. Diversion of purpose stems from an appropriation by political actors, of a series of issues and activities that are usually situated outside of the institutionalised political sphere (Lagroye 2003). This relates to the issue of the instrumentalisation of sport, and particularly football, by political power(s) at an international, national and local level. The surpassing of limits on the other hand, involves attempts by actors situated outside the specialised political sphere to requalify their action by giving them a political dimension. In other words, it is a way for these actors to surpass the limits imposed by the sectorisation of certain types of activity. It generally derives from a certain "awareness" of the actors evolving outside the ordinary games of political space and its specific issues, regarding what they call the "dimension" or "scope" of their political activities (Lagroye 2003, 365). These include football supporters who use the stadium to express a series of political demands, or football players who engage in political activism or who make political statements.

Throughout this handbook, we examine both levels of politicisation that Lagroye outlines, all the while adding a third dimension. We argue that in order to fully observe and account for the politicisation process as it applies to football, it is essential to integrate a broader definition of the concept of politicisation; one that goes beyond the mere reference to a specialised political knowledge or to factors that influence electoral choice or collective action. This suggests the adoption of an anthropological definition of politicisation, referring to the norms, values and symbols structuring behaviour towards a given political community (Balandier 1985). In this sense, politicisation is based not only on the requalification of activities, but also on the

construction of representations preceding these same activities. Following this definition, football can produce, articulate and communicate feelings, representations and symbols that influence and guide political ideologies and actions.

Diversion of Purpose: Political Origins and Politicisation of Football

Football is a potent source of, and platform for, social and political distinction, regulation and self-expression. The sport has frequently been a political affair involving social groups engaged in status contests. In the modern era, political actors have often used football as a site for political propaganda and mobilisation. Questions of power are Central to grasping the role of sport in global processes and (political) identity formation (Maguire 2005). The case studies reveal the structural relations and "fault lines" (Dunning et al. 2002) that shape and fuel football-centred politics and the dynamics of the relationship between football, politics and society.

Several chapters from the Global South foreground the legacies of *colonisation and imperialism* on trajectories and cultural meanings of football. In a number of countries, football was very much part of colonial or imperial projects. Several chapters describe how the development of football and white settlement/colonisation were intrinsically linked. The game came to these countries via British, French or Spanish colonial or imperial routes, while other groups of European immigrants and local elites played important roles in the consolidation of the sport (see for example Varela's chapter on Mexico). Football in these countries was part of systematic efforts to build colonies, both as a tool of social acculturation, identify formation and social closure among white settlers, and as a form of regulation and social control over colonised populations. For example, in Ivory Coast (Chapter 20 by Künzler), French colonisers sought to promote mass physical education, including football, as an essential part of its civilising mission, while in Egypt the introduction of modern football was part of the British government's political and cultural invasion, coupled with a westernisation movement that sought to imitate the colonists (Chapter 18 by Gibril). In Nigeria, this also included a focus by the colonial regime on recruiting and converting people to Christianity (Chapter 21 by Onwumechili, Totty and Malin).

Similar to other sporting codes such as cricket (James 1963; Guha 2002), the colonial stronghold over football and the symbolic and social boundaries associated with the game were not without its contradictions, conflicts

or contestations. Venter (on South Africa), Chiweshe (on Zimbabwe), Onwumechili et al. (on Nigeria), Bandyopadhyay (on India) and Varela (on Mexico) all discuss the emergence of an indigenous football culture and its growing significance as a tool for self-assertion, self-affirmation and "a cultural weapon to fight the Imperialist" (Bandyopadhyay). For example, Chiweshe discusses in detail how in Zimbabwe, sport, and football in particular, transformed over time from a tool for Rhodesian community and national building to a platform where black people "strove to carve out and control their own space and lives and to blunt and mitigate the impact of colonial policies and practices." In a similar vein, Bandyopadhyay argues that the appropriation of football in colonial India for nationalist purposes "points to football's transformed role as an instrument of reaction, resistance and subversion." In addition, Künzler shows that Ivorians were reluctant to adopt the sporting agenda of the colonisers and instead began to establish their own football clubs; even though, Künzler reminds us, these clubs did not play a considerable role in the struggle for independence in Ivory Coast.

The case studies presented in this handbook reveal various contemporary forms of *instrumentalisation of football by political powers* that align with Lagroye's notion of diversion of purpose. In several countries, football competitions have been potent proxy battles between rival political factions, or served as platforms to advance particular political agendas. In Indonesia, politicians have used football clubs to access a mass audience and to push their nationalist agendas (Chapter 31 by Fuller); in Egypt (Chapter 18 by Gibril) and in Turkey (Chapter 33 by Irak and Polo), football has long been a space that players, administrators, politicians and spectators invest into express political demands, assert political identities, and challenge or support government actions; in Uruguay, it has been common for politicians to hold seats in football clubs or association committees (Bizzozero Revelez and Quirici chapter); and politicians in Spain have long been aligning themselves with particular football clubs in the formation and contestation of Spanish and local nationalisms (especially Catalan and Basque) (Viñas chapter); to name but a few examples.

Japan is a noteworthy exception in this regard. Horne and Manzenreiter conclude that political elites in Japan have rarely used football as a political resource, as the game's historical significance is relatively thin compared to baseball. Yet, in recent years, the Japanese government has used football for diplomatic purposes, in an effort to garner positive foreign policy relationships. Their chapter describes, for instance, how political actors invoked football following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku as part of the discourse of community development and involvement. Horne and

Manzenreiter also point to *Captain Tsubasa*, a football manga and television cartoon series that portrays a highly idealised image of football and its relationship to societal values of cooperation, collective orientation, determination and persistence.

Surpassing of Limits: More Than a Game

A key dimension of the politicisation of football is the surpassing of limits (Lagroye 2003), which is evident in attempts by actors within the field of football to give political meanings to their agendas and actions. The chapters in this handbook offer countless illustrations of the political awareness, strategies and actions of actors within football. Common examples include: football administrators who pursue political careers; football club or team owners who frame football in terms of its public value and the "public good" in order to attract public funding and political support for their stadiums and operations; and football supporter groups and players who use the stadium and mass media coverage to express political demands and engage in political activism.

The surpassing of limits is demonstrated in the construction and reproduction of football-related oppositions that are an expression of, but also fuel, wider socio-political conflicts and divisions. Football rivalries have long been a prominent area of focus in football studies. Existing research shows that football rivalries are often idiosyncratic, complex and fluid, underpinned by social, historical, cultural, economic, political and geographical factors. Some studies have sought to identify patterns and typologies of football rivalries which highlight the structured relations of power that exist beneath them (Armstrong and Giulianotti 2001; Benkwitz and Molnar 2012; Dmowski 2013; Tyler and Cobbs 2017). The case studies presented in this book provide rich illustrations of several of these patterns and types of football rivalry, but they also offer novel insights that complement the existing knowledge base concerning football-related oppositions. The chapters on Australia (by Hay) and Japan (by Horne and Manzenreiter) show that opposition and competition exists not only *within* football but also *between* different sporting codes, in these cases between rival football codes (Australia) and with other sports (baseball in Japan) competing for hegemony in the national imagination and economy. Hay writes that, in the Australian context, the rivalries between the different codes of football (soccer, Australian Rules football, rugby League) "have been equally, if not more, important" than oppositions between different football clubs. However, he also suggests

that this could "change in the future as the demography of the supporters of the codes becomes more alike."

An important conclusion from the case studies is that football rivalries are dynamic and evolve over time according to circumstance and to changes in the wider contexts in which rivalries develop. Similar to political cleavage structures, the fault lines that "fuel and contour" (Dunning et al. 2002) football rivalries are mutable. Changes can occur because of changes in the social divisions that underpin cleavages, because of changes in the collective identity that allows cleavages to be perceived by those involved, or because of changes in the organisational structure (e.g. a football club) that gives expression to cleavages (Gallagher et al. 1995). The chapters on Germany and the United States provide interesting insights into such changes. Sonntag's chapter analyses the emergence of "new fault lines" in German football that resemble wider oppositions between traditional and modernising forces (Armstrong and Giulianotti 2001) and, especially, the perceived tension between tradition and commerce in the production and consumption of football (e.g. King 1997; Torchia 2016). Sonntag signals that these new fault lines run between clubs that are perceived to be traditional (mainstay) and relatively new ventures, or "test tube clubs", that are perceived to be created for (money-driven) business purposes only and have no long-established fan base. Moreover, Parrish and Pelcher show how in the United States, the Major League Soccer (MLS) has actively sought to foster rivalries among teams, for example through carefully planning fixtures, and to construct new rivalries based on geography when selecting new markets for its expansion teams. In other words, football rivalries are actively constructed and maintained not only by football supporters, but also in a more top-down way by football governing bodies and commercial actors (e.g. media corporations) with vested economic interests.

The contributions to this handbook show that football rivalries occasionally take on forms that are more sinister; for example, when they spill over into hooliganism or collective racism or when they become a vehicle for violent extremism. The case studies illustrate the glocalisation of football-related violence and hooliganism (Giulianotti et al. 1994; Dunning et al. 2002; Spaaij 2007). Distinctive football supporter identities and practices that have been implicated in the performance of football-related violence exist across the globe, especially through large parts of Europe and South America. These supporter practices are often highly mediated (Krøvel and Roksvold 2012), as for example in Scandinavia where football hooligans actively produce and consume new (social) media to construct their identities and reputations (Chapter 8 by Radmann and Andersson).

Yet, supporters' use of (organised) violence varies greatly, both quantitatively and qualitatively, across different local and national contexts. For example, Gloriozova highlights the emergence of a codification of hooligan violence, resulting in a "sportification" (Elias 1971; Ingham 2004) of the Russian hooligan scene. Indeed, Russian hooliganism today presents all the attributes of a sports competition (rules and rankings). In contrast, Parrish and Pelcher note the lack of organised fan violence as a "conspicuous distinction" between MLS supporter groups and those in other parts of the world. Moreover, some chapters in this handbook draw attention to the potential harmful effects of security measures ostensibly designed to tackle football hooliganism, thereby continuing a strong tradition of critical social science research on security and risk management in football (e.g. Mastrogiannakis and Dorville 2012). In this context, Ranc and Hourcade identify a tension in French football that equally applies to several other countries included in this handbook: the tension between the desire on the part of shareholders, media and fans to have an active and vocal supporter base, and the governmental will to control (especially working-class) audiences and ensure total security.

In certain parts of the world, football-related violence has long had a distinctively political dimension (see e.g. the chapters on Spain, Italy, Russia, Poland, Germany, Croatia, Serbia and Argentina). There appears to be trend toward the (attempted) fusing of far-right political movements and militant football fans in a number of European countries. For example, the English Defence League (EDL) has sought to attract disaffected football fans to its cause. There are links between the EDL and hooligan groups from a range of English football clubs (Garland and Treadwell 2010). These groups share much of the EDL's anti-Islamic thinking and have been mobilised as "street fighters" to EDL demonstrations. According to Garland and Treadwell (2010), this present fusing of football hooligan culture and extremist politics surpasses the limits of football as a social field and poses a threat to community cohesion in Britain's cities more broadly. The chapters on Russia (by Gloriozova), Poland (by Wozniak), Germany (by Sonntag) and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland (by Busset and Koller), similarly illustrate the relationship between football fandom and right-wing politics. Sonntag notes how in Germany "the fight against hooliganism is always at the same time a fight against the influence of neo-Nazi groups in the stadiums." Kassimeris argues that racism is still an issue of concern in football in Greece and Cyprus and, in the case of Cyprus, is institutionalised, as evidenced by the "kind of myopia that characterises football officials" regarding this issue.

The case studies offer various rich descriptions regarding the ways in which football supporters have used the game to make political demands or engage in political activism. First, a number of chapters add to recent studies of football governance and supporter activism (García and Zheng 2017; Kennedy and Kennedy 2014; Millward 2011). Across the globe, football supporters have organised and been involved in political protests, petitions, campaigns, conferences and lobbying. A noteworthy example is the civic initiatives football supporters have launched to campaign for more democratic, accountable and transparent football club governance, and to prevent foreign corporate ownership of football clubs. Tregoures's chapter on Croatia, for instance, analyses a number of these initiatives in different Croatian football clubs. Moreover, football supporters have at times been active participants in campaigns against team relocation or for/against stadium development. Supporters' political activism surrounding stadium development is examined in Parrish and Pelcher's chapter on the United States, which shows the role football supporters can play as actors in, or opponents to, "local growth coalitions" (Delaney and Eckstein 2004).

Supporter activism frequently exceeds the realm of football to address broader issues of social justice and discrimination. A feature of several supporter groups worldwide is their commitment to and involvement in particular forms of community service and social justice. For example, the chapters on Germany and Switzerland discuss local, national and transnational social projects and anti-racism initiatives that football supporters have organised and participated in. Comparable forms of supporter activism exist in various other countries included in this handbook. In some cases, supporters have further been involved and participated in revolutionary events in Egypt (Chapter 18 by Gibril), Ukraine (Chapter 16 by Ruzhelnyk) and Turkey (Chapter 33 by Irak and Polo).

Representations and Symbolic Meanings

As a form of popular culture that reaches massive audiences and permeates the national and global imagination in many parts of the world, football offers a site for the production and articulation of feelings, representations and symbolic meanings that can influence and guide political ideologies and actions. The aforementioned discussion on the political origins and politicisation of football provides tangible examples of this process. As noted, football is a social field in which the complex and dynamic intertwinement of the local and the global plays out in highly visible ways. In a global age

in which the political economy and governance of football are evolving at a rapid pace (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007), it is unsurprising that the cultures of particular Leagues and clubs share many elements. Yet, each football culture also exhibits distinct forms of ritual behaviour and symbolism (Back et al. 2001; Kassimeris 2010). In many (but not all) nation-states examined in this handbook football is a potent site for the construction and transmission of collective memory and a sense of local, national and global (cosmopolitan) community. In Belgium, for example, De Waele and Sterck show that the national team acts as one of the few rallying points for Flemish and Walloons. Other chapters provide rich insight into the symbolic meanings of football and how these meanings connect with political ideologies and action.

The symbolic meanings associated with football, its institutions and its places can be, and indeed have been, directed towards social change. However, the chapters in this handbook also indicate that football can reinforce nationalistic, authoritarian, class-based and gender-specific notions of identity and community. Bar-On (1997) has pointed out that in both Latin America and Europe, professional football clubs, individual players and supporters have failed to tackle wider systemic and structural issues in late capitalist societies. Football, Bar-On (1997) concludes, "unwittingly acts as an agent of mass indoctrination rather than challenging established dogmas, or serving as a vehicle for deeper, systemic social change." The chapters in this handbook offer some evidence for this claim, but overall they provide a more nuanced and at times more optimistic interpretation. Throughout the book, the authors invite us to reflect on the *cultural politics* of football and, in particular, on changes and continuities along the lines of diversity and inequality—a well-established topic in the social sciences of football (e.g. Giulianotti 1999).

The representation of gender in and through football is a recurring theme in a number of case studies included in this handbook. In doing so, the chapters continue the growing scholarly engagement with the perceived "feminisation" of football, which was a sub-project in the *Football Research in an Enlarged Europe* (FREE) study (Mintert 2015). For example, Radmann and Andersson analyse the development of women's football in Sweden and identify its paradoxical history: while always in the shadow of men's football in terms of economy and media attention, compared to international female club football Sweden is world class. They further argue that the highly successful player and coach Pia Sundhage symbolises Sweden as a football nation. Hay's chapter on Australia reveals a similar paradox. He concludes that while women's football in Australia has become increasingly

competitive and reputable, it has not yet achieved the profile its practitioners warrant, and that traces of gender discrimination remain. Other axes of diversity and inequality covered at length in this handbook include class, race, ethnicity and, to a lesser extent, sexuality.

The contributions to the handbook present intricate analyses of both politics in football and the role of football in politics. In conjunction, they enable a more systematic and comparative synthesis of the links between football and politics, one that is sensitive to the evolving interplay between universalism and particularism, and between the global and the local, within the context of ongoing political, social, cultural and economic transformations in and beyond the world game.

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Part II

Western Europe

Belgium

Jean-Michel De Waele and Grégory Sterck

From the moment that it appeared and became widespread in the middle of the nineteenth century, football has succeeded in making itself one of the most popular sports in the world, a trend in which Belgium has been no exception. More than 150 years since the first balls were kicked on Belgian pitches, football is now the most played sport in the country, with the national federation counting more than 400,000 members among more than 1500 clubs. The main aim of this chapter will be to cover different social phenomena by approaching several aspects of Belgian football.

As a first move, we will pass the ball backwards by tackling the controversial birth of football in Belgium, and the way it was structurally adapted in the country, taking a chronological approach. Then, making our way up the field, we will deal in the second part with the first rivalries that emerged on Belgian pitches, looking at their roots as well as the degree to which they still exist. Controlling the middle of the pitch, we will look at the mobilisation of supporters, both at national and club level. Finally, entering the penalty area, we will focus on the issue of limits on foreign players, and Belgium's actual performance as a national team.

J.-M. De Waele (✉)
Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: jmdewael@ulb.ac.be

G. Sterck
Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium

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1   The Political Origins of Football

For years, the literature on the history of football in Belgium was unanimous: its origins were to be found in Flanders. However, a small sheet of paper has recently cast a doubt on that statement, and as always in Belgium, fuelled the ongoing quarrel between the two main linguistic communities.[1] Is it possible that Belgian football actually has its roots South of the linguistic border, in Wallonia?

Until 2010, it was commonly agreed that football had been introduced in Belgium around 1865 by a young Irish student, Cyrille Bernard Morrogh, in the Josephite College of Melle-lez-Gand, located in the suburban area of Ghent (Vanysacker 2010, 34). However, a facsimile of a document officially establishing a football club in the well-known Ardennes city of Spa has been a game changer. Indeed, according to this statement, a Scottish nobleman, Sir Edward Hunter Blair, founded the "Foot Ball Club Spa" back in 1863, that is to say just a couple of years before football appeared in Ghent (Govers 2013, 85–89; 2015, 93). It would, therefore, appear that the birthplace of Belgian football lies in the French-speaking part of the country. A minor dispute on the Belgian origins of the beautiful game, the matter could have ended there. But some people point out that at that time, Brussels and its surrounding area counted more Englishmen than any other place in the country. This demographic element, combined with the fact that half of the founding clubs of the first Belgian football League came from the capital, has led them to argue that the game could actually have made its first appearance there (Govers 2015, 94).

During the following years, the enthusiasm around football grew rapidly, and it is no surprise to see the first clubs founded in port and industrial cities, that is to say in areas with a strong British presence (Vanysacker 2010, 35–36). Furthermore, the appearance of these sports clubs led some of their members to think that an organisational body was needed in order to structure the new game on a national level.

If one looks at a nineteenth-century map of Belgium from a footballing perspective, one can identify four main zones: Antwerp, West Flanders, Liège and Brussels. Antwerp Football Club, which was founded in 1880 as a multisport structure under the name Antwerp Athletic Club, is regarded as the oldest football club in Belgium, hence its nickname "The Great Old". The second area encompasses the well-known cities of Bruges and Ghent with the Brugsche Football Club, later renamed FC Brugeois and nowadays known as Club Brugge KV, and the Association Athlétique La Gantoise, today AA Gent. It is also interesting at this point to mention the

francophone political, economic and linguistic domination during the nine-teenth century in Belgium. Indeed, despite being geographically rooted in Flanders, these two Flemish clubs had a French-speaking birth name, which only took a Flemish tone decades later in the 1970s with the growth of Flemish nationalism (Vanysacker 2010, 253).

As mentioned above, there is some evidence to mark out Liège as a possible birthplace of Belgian football. It is, therefore, not surprising that some of the first football clubs appear there as well. Regardless of the "Foot Ball Club Spa", which seems to have been short-lived, other sport entities were founded in the region, such as the Liège Foot-Ball Club—considered as the oldest Walloon football club—or Verviers Football Club. However, the heart of Belgian football at the end of the nineteenth century seemed to lie in the capital. Indeed, no less than five sport entities were founded there: Athletic and Running Club Bruxelles, Léopold Club Bruxelles, Racing Club Bruxelles, Sporting Club Bruxelles and Union FC Ixelles. It is worth noting that of all these pioneer clubs, only two are still competing in the highest League today, namely Club Brugge KV and AA Gent.

On 1 September 1895, the "Union Belge des Sociétés des Sports athlétiques" (UBSSA; *Belgian Union of Athletics Sports*)—later to become the "Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football-Association" (URBSFA; *Royal Belgian Union of Association Football Clubs*)[2]—was founded by 10 clubs playing football, cricket, athletics and cycling (URBSFA 2015): they were Antwerp FC, AA La Gantoise, Athletic and Running Club Bruxelles, FC Brugeois, FC Liégeois, Léopold Club Bruxelles, Racing Club Bruxelles, Sporting Club Bruxelles, Union FC Ixelles and Verviers FC. Only seven of them took part in the first official competition organised by the federation that same year, since AA La Gantoise, Athletic and Running Club Bruxelles and Verviers FC did not have a competitive team. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that only six of these clubs still exist today, Athletic and Running Club, RC Bruxelles, SC Bruxelles and Union FC Ixelles having disappeared or merged with other clubs. This first competition looks quite different from today's organised and standardised leagues. Indeed, while it was decided that each team would play each other twice, there was no real season calendar as such, each club being responsible for organising its own matches. Despite this chaotic aspect, that first competition was a success, FC Liégeois writing its name on the first line of the long list of Belgian football champions.

In a short span of time, the URSBFA took the lead of Belgian football governance, pushing the other emerging entities—regional or political organising bodies—into the background. It is no coincidence to find the URBSFA among the federations lobbying for the creation of an international

football governing body, and becoming a founding member of FIFA in 1904 (URBSFA 2015). Indeed, this allowed the URBSFA to kill two birds with one stone by establishing its position at both national and international level.

As in other European countries, there was a gradual democratisation of football, which saw the birth of more and more clubs after the First World War (Govers 2014, 87). As a result, there was a pressing need to bring more structure to Belgian football, and in 1926, the URBSFA took the decision to assign identification numbers or "matricules" to its affiliated clubs. From that point on, this "matricule" would become even more important than the club's name. Such a registration system was not only an organisational matter, but also a political one, and was quite uncommon compared to the systems in place in other countries. Indeed, since FIFA's statutes stipulate that only one federation from each country can be recognised as its representative (Fédération Internationale de Football Association 2016, 10), any Belgian club with the slightest ounce of ambition needs to affiliate itself to the URBSFA. This decision allowed the federation to strengthen its position against other national rival leagues and to definitely establish itself as the only official football governing body in Belgium.

This new system of identification numbers, and with it the advent of the URBSFA, is not without raising some issues. First, on a historical level, since affiliated clubs that had disappeared or merged before 1926 were not given any registration number: It is as if some 1070 football clubs had never existed and simply vanished into thin air. Secondly, on the level of the politics of sport, since this number is assigned according to the date of affiliation. Thus, the matricules are not only been seen by clubs as mere identification numbers, but also as testimony of their longevity and fidelity to the URBSFA, and as such have become a bone of contention among several football clubs. Hence, if the "Matricule One" awarded to Antwerp FC is uncontested, some number assignments are seen as mere cronyism on the side of some clubs (Govers 2013, 87).

2   Historical Club Rivalries

By pitching against each other two teams mirroring specific identities on several levels—geographical, cultural, socio-economical, etc.—football constitutes "the most potent dramatization of binary opposition within sport" (Giulianotti 1999, 10). As opposition is inherent to the beautiful game, it not only seems important to cover briefly some of the original rivalries of

Belgian football and their roots, but also to give a short description of the actual Belgian typography of such rivalries.

The First Turf Wars

With the development of football and official competitions at the turn of the twentieth century come the first rivalries, whose origins cover different aspects depending on the clubs involved. Furthermore, it comes as no surprise that these rivalries first emerged in the main football areas mentioned above.

The Western Flemish city of Bruges is the scene of one of these first pitch rivalries. It is an antagonism between two "football foes" that goes beyond the boundaries of the pitch and is marked by a strong social identification. Indeed, its roots are twofold: political and religious. If Club Brugge KV was seen as the club of the liberal and secular bourgeoisie, as well as the working class, Cercle Brugge represented the elitist and Catholic bourgeoisie, as it was founded in 1899 by former students of the Catholic college of Saint-François-Xavier (Vanysacker 2010, 52).

In the same year, another bellicose relationship arose between Antwerp FC and Beerschoot AC. While its causes might be less socially rooted, it stands as a real, intense hatred. Beerschoot AC was founded by dissident players of Antwerp FC, who argued that the "Great Old" had failed to act according to its glorious standing. It was a "family" dispute that would deeply weaken the oldest club, to the extent that it would forfeit the 1900–1901 season, with the rival brothers only confronting each other on the pitch during the following season (*Sport Foot Magazine*, 17 September 2003).

Antagonisms in Belgian football are not limited to North of the country, and the rivalry between RFC Liégeois and Standard is even a bit older. However, it appears more as a healthy sporting rivalry than a "turf war". Indeed, this is not a tale of pride or conflicting politico-religious ideologies, but of supporters' bitterness. After winning the very first competition, RFC Liégeois was unable to repeat its performance in the next season. It was a hard and sad blow for a fringe of supporters from the College Saint-Servais, who decided to form their own team in response, thus creating Standard de Liège in 1898.

It may seem surprising that despite the number of teams competing, there is little evidence of rivalry among the Brussels clubs. One explanation could be the short existence of most of them. For instance, Sporting CB and Union FC Ixelles ceased their activities respectively in 1897 and 1901, just a

couple of years after the launch of the first competition. However, after the First World War, Brussels' pitches would also be the scenes of famous enmities, the most significant being the one opposing Union Saint-Gilloise and Daring Club Bruxelles. An opposition that also underlines how football and culture are intertwined, as it is the main narrative of the famous Belgian play *Bossemans et Coppenolle*.[3]

Today, after a century and a half of football in Belgium, how vivid are these ancient grudges?

Remnants of the Past

In Flanders, Club Brugge KV is regarded as one of Belgium's best and most successful club, but Cercle Brugge has known less fortunate years, having even been relegated to the second division. However, even though matches between the two rival clubs of the Flemish Venice of the North seem a bit imbalanced, they still remain a symbolic battle, with each side fighting to be crowned "Ploeg van't stad".[4] The port city of Antwerp also remains the stage of an undying enmity. Indeed, while Beerschoot AC and its matricule 13 may have disappeared in 1999, its soul was kept alive thanks to two "resurrections". First, through the merger with Germinal Ekeren, giving birth to Germinal Beerschoot Antwerpen, whose name was changed in 2012 into Beerschoot AC, only to vanish again two years later. Then, through a second merger with FC Olympia Wilrijk, creating the brand new KFCO Beerschoot Wilrijk. Therefore, it seems as if the rivalry between the two foes is bound to last against all twists of fate. Furthermore, in addition to these centennial acrimonies, the Flanders derby between AA Gent and Club Brugge KV also draws all the attention, given an added twist by the little coincidence that they are the last remaining founder clubs of the URBSFA still active today in the highest League. With Gent and Brugge the capitals of East and West Flanders respectively, this derby is underpinned by both geographical and cultural factors.

In Wallonia, the rivalry between the two main clubs from Liege remains, but the opportunities to play it out on the pitch have been extremely rare in recent years. RFC Liege has been playing in the lower divisions for the last two decades, whereas Standard is more used to compete for the first places in Jupiler Pro League.[5] Nowadays, the main animosity lies in the "Derby Wallon" opposing Standard and Charleroi. As for the capital city, football rivalries look quite different. Numerous disappearances, mergers and sporting issues, as well as the hegemony of RSC Anderlecht[6] seemed to have brought an end to the ancient Brussels derbies. Furthermore, since only two

clubs from Brussels are still active at the professional level—RSC Anderlecht in the first division and Union Saint-Gilloise in the second—top football rivalries are rare in the capital.

Finally, on a national level, the main rivalries involve a well-known "triumvirate": RSC Anderlecht, Club Brugge KV and Standard. The roots are typical of such football resentments: success and geography. Club Brugge KV is by far the best Flemish club, Standard the most successful and popular Walloon club and Anderlecht, as well as being the natural leader of Belgian football due to its hegemonic success, stands as the club from the "Capitale".[7] Such animosities are also fuelled by a symbolic geographical factor, the periphery—Standard de Liège or Club Brugge KV—competing against the centre—RSC Anderlecht. It is also of interest to note that there are few opportunities to witness the antagonism between Flemish- and French-speakers. Indeed, only the two first divisions of Belgian football are national, while clubs in the lower leagues are sorted according to their region, with Walloon and Flemish clubs only competing among themselves.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

One cannot study a social issue such as football without approaching the topic of supporters' mobilisation. Just as opposition is an inherent part of the game, so the opposition of supporters is a fundamental component of it. Indeed, by creating a sense of belonging among its members, football makes the "We" of the imagined community more perceptible. Besides, stadiums serve as the mirror of social trends and issues in the society in which they occur (Sonntag 2008, 52). In this respect, Belgium presents a very interesting research topic. Unlike in other countries, where support for the national team is a "given", this has not always been the case in Belgium, since the sense of belonging to the national community is weaker. In addition, tackling the issue of supporters' mobilisation also allows us to deal with what can be labelled as a domestic form of racism in Belgian fan culture. Finally, we could not discuss this topic without addressing the 1985 Heysel Stadium disaster and its consequences.

United Around the National Team

Thousands of Belgians swarm into the streets of Lille and millions gather in front of their television sets, as Belgium prepares to play against Wales in the quarter-finals of Euro 2016. If these numbers are no longer a surprise to

Belgian fans and sport journalists, such an enthusiasm around the national team has only reappeared recently. This renewed national football fever is partially the result of a well-organised communication strategy, backed up by good results on the pitch. The key pillar of this communication campaign was the "Défi des Diables", which saw Belgian national players challenging their fans to prove their unfailing support by giving fans a mission to complete by the next match on the road to qualification for the 2014 World Cup. The main aim of such actions is, on the one hand, to create a sense of bonding between players and supporters, and on the other to broaden the fan base. Indeed, some of these "challenges" are expressly directed towards women (*Le Soir*, 28 May 2013) and younger supporters (*Le Soir*, 25 February 2013). On top of that, the use of social networks such as Facebook or Twitter to spread the campaign strengthens the sense of belonging among members of this imagined community, the Belgian fandom. This is significant, at a time when we are increasingly experiencing the advent of "fandom 2.0" (Gauthier 2013). The first "fan day" in the history of Belgian national team proved the success of this initiative, with no less than 20,000 people crowding the Stade Roi Baudoin in Brussels to meet the national team (*Le Soir*, 2 June 2013), an attendance bigger than for some League matches.

However, one should be careful not to exaggerate the meaning of such a renewed enthusiasm, by seeing it as evidence of a newly unleashed nationalism. Actually, it looks more like a fleeting trend, an opportunity for Belgians to enjoy good times together at a time where the country has been going through political and social tensions for years—tensions that are perceived and reflected at the local club fan base.

Belgian Stadiums as the Scene of "Belgo-Belgian Racism"

Since the electoral success of the NVA, the Flemish nationalist party, at the 2006 federal elections, Belgium has been facing domestic political, economic and social issues that have weakened the relationship between Flemish- and French-speakers in the country. Some even suggest that the country is on the verge to collapse and that it is nothing more than a forced coexistence for both parts. Although the truthfulness of such a statement remains debatable, there is no doubt that social and political tensions have infiltrated stadiums through supporters' actions.

In August 2016, during a first division match between Club Brugge KV and Standard, a small group of home supporters unfurled an insulting banner in French, aimed not only at the opposing fans, but at the people of Liège as a whole: "Votre avenir est comme votre ville: gris, miserable et débile" (*Le Soir*, 28 August 2016). The event could have been nothing more than an anecdote if it had not reminded everyone of past supporters' behaviours tinged with a sort of "Belgo-Belgian" racism. Indeed, during the 2009–2010 season, local Flemish supporters sang abusive anti-Walloon songs at several matches (Danvoy 2009, 42–45). So we see political and socio-economic issues arise again on the terraces, used to strengthen a broader "We", as the words seem not only to involve the thoughts of supporters, but also of a broader Flemish community against Walloons.

Beyond exacerbating the political and linguistic issues, these incidents have also highlighted the lack of action from the URBSFA, with the federation describing these songs as "funny". This failure to react was even more criticised given that the federation at the time was promoting respect and fair-play, campaigning along with FIFA to banish racism both inside and outside the stadiums, presenting football as an example of tolerance for young people (*Le Soir*, 26 September 2011). Taking steps on an international level, but unable to tackle its own domestic racist issues, the URBSFA kept acting according to its reputation for amateurism. However, one might wonder if this absence of strong reaction from the national federation was something more than complete amateurism or weakness, as some have suggested. In fact, Flemish football clubs occupy most of the places in the national first division. By taking concrete measures, such as imposing fines, banning supporters or ordering matches to be played behind closed doors, the URBSFA ran the risk of alienating not only a significant number of supporters, but also important Flemish club leaders. Once more, the governing body's reaction looks more like a politically reasoned decision than a mere random attempt to minimise the issue.

Yet, in the light of unexpected fallout, in the form of legal action taken by Walloon football club leaders and politicians after these events, the federation seems to have been forced to change its stand. When only a few months later, similar abusive acts were committed again, the URBSFA stressed its determination to curb this escalation of bad behaviour immediately by punishing both supporters and clubs involved (Donnay 2009). Its words were followed by action, as, for instance, the Flemish club of Genk was fined when its supporters sang exactly the same anti-Walloon words as the ones that had triggered it all (*Le Soir*, 20 September 2011).

Fan Coaching: A Belgian Specificity

In football and in Belgium's history, the 1985 European Cup final between Juventus FC and Liverpool FC remains a painful milestone. Beyond marking public opinion by its tragic human toll—39 supporters perished and hundreds were injured (*Sport Foot Magazine*, 2005)—the events of 29 May 1985, known today as the "Heysel Stadium disaster", had both direct and lasting consequences.

On the sporting side, UEFA ordered an indefinite ban on all English clubs, with Liverpool subjected to a further three-year suspension—a ban eventually lifted in the 1990–1991 season—and also imposed a 10-year sanction preventing any hosting of a European final on Belgian territory. Then on a legal level, the criminal investigation and proceedings concluded with the imprisonment of 13 English hooligans. However, the violence of the hooligans was not alone to blame, and responsibility also fell on the organisers for their unpreparedness. As a result, prison sentences and fines were also issued against the two police chiefs in charge of security, and on both the URBSFA and UEFA General Secretaries of the time, Albert Roosens and Hans Bangerter. Finally, aware that measures had to be taken in order to prevent any such shortcomings in the future, the Belgian government launched an inspection mission in charge of controlling the good coordination and communication between organisers, police and emergency services, as well as immediately inspecting the security infrastructure of all Belgian first division stadiums (*Sport Foot Magazine*, 2005). Since 1985, violent supporters face more severe penalties; police forces are better trained and in greater numbers, both in and outside stadiums; Belgian stadiums' security infrastructure is thoroughly checked, and they are all equipped with CCTV cameras.

Furthermore, in the early 1990s, the reflection on violence among supporters led to the development of what seems to be a unique Belgian initiative in terms of tackling this issue, with the creation of "fan-coaching". These are socio-educational programmes aimed at high-risk supporters, funded by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and implemented locally by municipalities (Comeron 1997, 109; Fincoeur 2014, 1–2). Thus, rather than responding to hooliganism with dissuasive and repressive measures alone, the Belgian federal government sought to curb the issue upstream with preventive actions; in other words, educating and coaching football fans in order to avoid punishing them. It comes as no surprise that such programmes first appeared in cities and clubs known for their hard-core groups of supporters, such as Standard de Liège or Antwerp FC (Comeron 1997, 109).

However, such projects have been short-lived, and by the late 1990s only a few remained, mainly in Liège and Charleroi, the two biggest Walloon cities, whereas Flemish cities simply abandoned fan-coaching and embedded the initiative into police forces' prevention services. Nowadays, some even doubt the real impact of these actions in decreasing violence at football matches, pointing instead to the legal and repressive measures developed ahead of the Euro 2000 tournament jointly organised and hosted by Belgium and the Netherlands, and known as the "Loi Football", as a more effective tool (Fincoeur 2014, 3–4). They also underline the difficulty experienced by fan-coaching in catching up with the recent evolution of risk supporters' landscape. Hence, new risk group such as so-called Ultras movements seem totally absent from fan-coaching actions, as if both were developing in parallel worlds (Fincoeur 2014, 5). Yet, the blame for this shortcoming could be put on both sides. Indeed, there seems to be an original mistrust towards those programmes among the Ultras movements that are sceptical of tools perceived as social control emanating from political sphere, and are inclined bluntly to reject them (Fincoeur 2014, 6–7). Nevertheless, if fan-coaching in Belgium seems to be on in decline or stagnating, it has inspired other countries such as Switzerland or Germany. There, the idea has been revived through actions promoting a positive supporter ethos and including the whole of fandom rather than focusing on a particular group (Fincoeur 2014, 7–8).

4   Belgian Football in the Post-Bosman Ruling Era

If young football fans across Europe now consider it very common to see foreign players wearing their favourite team shirt and clubs trading footballers for incredible amounts during each transfer window, this has not always been the case, and older fans might even remember a time when it was the exception and not the rule. Thus, one cannot write an article about football in Belgium without bringing up the event that triggered it all, the well-known Bosman ruling.

Removing European Football Barriers

The Belgian footballer, Jean-Marc Bosman—after whom the ruling is known—would have been forgotten had it not been for the momentous

consequences that followed the European Court of Justice decision twenty years ago, unanimously acknowledged as a critical turning point, both for European Union integration and for European sports law (Kesenne 1997, 6–9; 2000, 95–101; Kadous 1997, 151–168). Indeed, the 1995 decision to ban the restrictions of the day on foreign EU players in national leagues, and to allow players to sign for another club at the end of their contract without any fee being paid back to their former club, seems to have opened a Pandora's Box upon the world of football in Europe. Together with globalisation, this ruling is said to have caused the trends that one can observe nowadays: numerous foreign players on national League pitches, a frenetic European transfer market marked by eye-watering and ever-spiralling transfer fees.

However, one should not blame the Court decision for all these modern football evils. In fact, it did not leave national federations entirely helpless, for, even though they can no longer set quotas to limit the number of EU foreign players, they can still take positive measures seen as being in the best interests of national football development. Moreover, as mentioned, the restrictions that were lifted concerned only foreign players from the European Economic Area, and from countries having signed agreements with the EU—namely Russia, as well as some Maghreb and ACP states. Access for other foreign players—mainly from South America and Asia—can still be restricted.

Like in other European countries, the URBSFA has decided to adopt certain rules in order to face the "undesirable" effects of the Bosman ruling in Belgium. Belgian football knows no restriction whatsoever regarding non-EU players, but the federation has set quotas regarding homegrown talent. Therefore, out of the maximum 25 players of each club's first team squad (Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football-Association 2016, 88), at least eight must be home-trained. There are three ways to be considered as such; (i) a legally Belgian player who has played at least three years in a national club, (ii) an EEA player who has played three entire years in a Belgian club before turning 23 and (iii) non-EEA players who have played three entire consecutive years in a Belgian club before turning 23. Moreover, since 2009, each club is compelled to register a minimum of six homegrown footballers on the match day team sheet (Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football-Association 2016, 88).

This is the theoretical legal framework, but what is the real practical impact of the rule? Has the number of foreign players in the Belgian first division increased over the last decade? And what about the homegrown

players? Furthermore, one might wonder about the impact on the national team's performance, since the aim of such positive measures should have been to enhance Belgian football as a whole.

The Particularity of the Belgian Case

When it comes to explaining the successful performances or the failures of national teams in Europe, one factor is almost unanimously put forward. The more your national selection is composed of footballers playing in domestic clubs and the more native players perform on the pitches of your top domestic League, the greater the likelihood of success at national level. To illustrate this conclusive equation, football experts and analysts usually underline the examples of Germany or Spain, and tend to point out England as the counterexample, that is to say a top national League mainly made up of foreign players preventing the blooming of talented native players and hence jeopardising the future of the national team. Yet the Belgian case seems to be the exception that proves the rule.

After long wilderness years and a 66th place in the FIFA world ranking in 2009, the national team is now writing glorious pages in Belgium's football history. Now, it has to shoulder an unusual status of favourite in international tournaments, after reaching quarterfinals in both the World Cup 2014 and Euro 2016, and, as icing on the cake, a first place in FIFA's world ranking. However, if one looks closer at the players included in the squad, we can see that a great majority of them are not playing in the domestic League, but at top European clubs–Chelsea, Liverpool or Atletico Madrid for instance. Some point out the lack of a strong Belgian identity as a key to their success abroad: growing up in a country that looks more like a patchwork of cultures, Belgian players tend to adapt more easily to a different culture than their foreign counterparts.

If it looks like Belgian players have benefited from Bosman ruling: by allowing players to export their skills to the best clubs on the European continent, the legal decision has most significantly impacted the Belgian football landscape. Indeed, whereas foreign players only represented 28% of top-flight footballers in the 1994–1995 season—the last pre-Bosman—they made up 40% at the turn of the century. Moreover, they even reached the record high amount of 56% after 2016's winter transfer window, putting Belgium as the second European country in terms of foreign footballers active on domestic first division pitches (Créteur and T'kint 2016, 83).

Pros and Cons of the Belgian Football Reform

Belgian football thus seems far from meeting the pre-conditions for successful performance at international level. So what are the possible explanations of such a peculiar situation? Is it just the result of a golden generation of gifted young footballers, and as such a short-lived phenomenon, or on the contrary does it have deeper causes?

Certainly, as always in football, there is a bit of fate in Belgium's golden period, but there is also a reform policy hidden behind the good performance of such a talented generation. After the poor results of the Red Devils at the beginning of the century, many pointed to the lack of a real youth training policy and modern training facilities, as the causes of failure. A decade later, the new policy on youth development set in motion by the clubs, along with investments in new infrastructures, seem to have borne fruit, with the quality of Belgian training methods being recognised internationally. An acknowledgment supported by statistics, since 16 out of the 23 players selected for the 2014 World Cup and Euro 2016 had risen up through Belgium's youth system. Furthermore, if one looks at the U17 and U21 national squads, homegrown players account for 75% of players. However, if Belgian players are so talented and Belgian clubs so proud of their training system, how is it that the country has a record-breaking number of foreigners on its fields?

There are many reasons. Some point to the new League system with play-offs as a cause, forcing clubs to be more active during transfer windows to cope with poor results. Others the ineffectiveness of a too-high minimum wage for both EU and non-EU players, leading to a kind of unfair dumping, since it becomes more lucrative for clubs to hire cheaper foreign players than their Belgian counterparts (Créteur and T'kint 2016, 84–85). However, what is apparent behind all this is that the cornerstone of this situation is a real lack of post-training policy. Indeed, it seems as if, in their wish to establish an effective youth training system, Belgian clubs have totally forgotten the post-phase question—an unwelcome fact that is quite evident when you look at the figures. In 2015, homegrown footballers in Belgium's first division only accounted for 11.6% of players, far from the 22.8% in Spain, another renowned football training land (Créteur and T'kint 2016, 84). In addition, when looking at the national team's figures, the conclusion remains the same: Out of the 23 Red Devils present at the 2014 World Cup and Euro 2016, ten signed their first professional contract at a foreign club. This is if we stick to the strict meaning of post-training, that is to say the phase beginning after a player signs his first professional contract.

When one considers a wider meaning of the term, the figures become even higher. Thus, when including the players who signed their first professional contract at a very young age—often before their majority—and transferred abroad only one or two seasons later, benefiting from some kind of professional training in their new club, the number rises up to 13 in 2014 and 15 in 2016. Such a case would include for example Chelsea FC signing the young goalkeeper Thibaut Courtois and directly loaning him out to Atletico Madrid.

Detractors might stress that this exodus of talent often starts earlier, already during the training phase, when other European clubs come looking for good players in other countries' youth squads, and this looks like an argument in support of their claim for lowering the legal age limit for footballers to sign a contract. Indeed, if one sticks to the figures regarding Belgium's national youth teams, one can see that only a quarter of players are playing abroad, mainly in neighbouring top Dutch clubs (Créteur and T'kint 2016, 84). Nevertheless, it is not enough to identifying the roots of the problem, and many people are calling for corrective measures to curb the current situation. Two measures are often put forward as first steps. First is the need to set an effective minimum wage for foreign players to dissuade Belgian clubs from hiring cheaper footballers from abroad; second, the number of eight minimum home-grown players should be raised to 50% of a club's squad, so that more and more Belgian footballers get a chance to play for their training clubs.

5   Conclusion

Beyond the anecdotal birthplace of football in Belgium, one can identify a certain pattern, which is similar to other countries where the game was introduced. Indeed, it seems that football appeared and developed among the members of a privileged elite and in areas where a British presence or influence was important. There, the enthusiasm grows steadily with the creation of several football entities and the organisation of the first national competitions. Beyond simple games of sport, matches soon become a battleground for deeply rooted rivalries, either ideological, social or religious, some of which are still alive today more than a century later. Those cleavages were not only limited to football, but also affected other social entities, such as schools or youth movements.

The early years of Belgian football are also marked by the first attempts to bring some structure to the game in the forms of various organisational

bodies. Among them, the ancestor of today's URBSFA managed to establish its authority. And even if today some might argue that the URBSFA is failing to take important decisions and trying to avoid taking measures that might be perceived as political, one has to admit that the federation—both then and now—is playing a role that goes well beyond mere organisation and governance. From the "matricule" system back in the 1920s, to its lack of action or belated response in more recent domestic Belgian racism issues, the federation has seemed to show a degree of political opportunism throughout its history.

Unfortunately, issues of this kind tend to happen in stadiums across the European continent and are not specific to Belgium. However, one can observe a certain peculiarity as far as the fandom around Belgium's national team is concerned. Indeed, due to a weak sense of nationalism and a tense political climate, there seems to be a need to trigger an enthusiasm around the Red Devils by means of initiatives and events, which are normally used by clubs to create a sense of belonging and strengthen links with their fans.

Finally, the Bosman ruling has changed the face of European football, and Belgium stands as an example of its effects. However, the study of the Belgian case allows us to qualify the pros and cons of such impacts. It is actually in order to curb their side-effects that clubs took actions a decade ago by developing a real youth training policy, whose results are now evident through the successful and record-breaking performance of a talented national selection. Nevertheless, a less optimistic situation hides behind this golden period, with young Belgian players being forced to export their talents. Although some interesting suggestions have been brought forward on how to rectify the imbalance between homegrown and foreign players on Belgian pitches, these remain ideas waiting for politics to put them into practice.

Notes

1. As a federal state, Belgium is divided into several political entities. As such, it is composed of three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital), as well as three linguistic communities (Flemish-, French- and German-speaking).
2. In 1912, the UBSSA changed its name to UBSFA ("Union belge des Sociétés de Football Association"; *Belgian Union of Association Football*) and was granted the "Royal" recognition in 1920 becoming the URBSFA. For more convenience and understanding, we will only use URSBFA in this paper for further occurrences. For more details, see Vanysacker (2010, 37–38).

3. Comedy written by Joris d'Hanswyck and Paul Van Stalle in 1938. It parodies the famous Romeo and Juliet play with two families supporting rival teams.
4. Literally "Team of the city".
5. The name of Belgium's top football division.
6. RSC Anderlecht, founded in 1908, is by far the most successful Belgian club with 33 champion's titles.
7. With its 14 champion's titles, Club Brugge KV is the second most successful Belgian club. In third and fourth places come Union Saint-Gilloise (11 titles, the last one in 1935) and Standard de Liège (10 titles).

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France

David Ranc and Nicolas Hourcade

"Le foot', as it is known in France, occupies a very specific place within the sports" sphere of the country today. Without doubt, it is the most popular team sport, both in terms of participation, and as a spectator sport (at least in the media). However, football was (probably) not the national sport until 1998. Pundits (academics included) have indeed long lamented: "La France n'est pas un pays de football" (France is not a football country). Historical reasons (the politics surrounding the introduction of the sports in the country) may explain both the lack of historically strong rivalries and the ambiguous relationship the country enjoys with football which has recently been best illustrated in the case of Paris Saint-Germain (PSG).

1   The Political Origins of Football

Historically, the reasons lie first in the politics surrounding the introduction of English sports in France (Holt 1981, 2011) which have delayed the nationalisation of the sport.

D. Ranc (✉)
ESSCA School of Management, Paris, France
e-mail: David.RANC@essca.fr

N. Hourcade
École Centrale de Lyon, Lyon, France
e-mail: nicolas.hourcade@ec-lyon.fr

Politics and the Constitution of a Specifically French Popular Sports' Sphere

Following Eugen Weber (1970, 1971), Richard Holt explains that France's 1870 defeat against Prussia, changed the way English sports were seen in France. An object of scorn, epitomising the "brutality" and "hypocrisy" of England after the 1814 fall of Napoleon I, English sports became after the 1870 fall of Napoleon III synonymous with modernity and colonial expansion for a small minority of anglophiles from the French elite, including for example Pierre de Coubertin who founded the modern Olympic games later (Dietschy and Clastres 2006). This minority tried to introduce English sports to the country in the 1880s. However, the population (probably) remained predominantly Anglophobic. Consequently, the same issue (rebuilding a nation defeated by Prussia, now Germany) found two different answers, successively, which both opposed the introduction of English sports. The first answer was to emulate the victors, the Prussians. Gymnastics, an activity seen as Prussian or German therefore developed rapidly after 1873 and may have become the dominant sporting practice in France at the end of the nineteenth century. A large fraction of those nationalists promoting gymnastics having ended up displaying sympathies for the ultra-nationalistic general Boulanger, radical republicans had to foster their own movement of national rebirth through sport. Introducing sports from a country (England) living under the rule of a monarch, a powerful aristocracy and an established Church was not an option. The radical republicans then developed a second answer, a programme that, in explicit reference to Gaelic sports, aimed at fostering a specifically French sporting culture, and one for the masses. They promoted, among others, walking, shooting, jumping, "French" boxing, fencing, swimming, and cycling. However, following the 1904 Entente Cordiale between France and England, opposition to English sports decreased and vanished at the very time that these sports become nationalised.

By 1914, three of the main components of the French sporting culture were thus established. Firstly, the French sporting culture revolved around several sports (no sport could claim, like football in England, to be the sole or main sport of the masses). Secondly, rugby became established in the South-West of France through the combined promotion of anglophiles and radical Republicans. In this process, rugby became a regional specialty, and more interestingly a French sport. References to England dwindled and disappeared, only to be replaced, oddly enough, with references to Spain

(a strong regional influence). Thirdly, France's true national sport emerged; but it was not football, it was cycling. Like rugby, cycling may have had English origins (racing bicycles were first seen in England), but they were easily forgotten. Cycling fulfilled most the radical republicans' goals: it promoted modernity; it was a mass sport from the beginning; it allowed upward social mobility for working-class champions as it was soon professional; and, from the moment the Tour de France began (1903), it defined geography imaginaries of the country (Fumey 2006).

The Development of Football and the Role of the Public Sector

Interestingly, football has so far been conspicuous by its absence, even though it first spread in France in the 1880s (Wahl 1989). A "Championnat de France" (national championship—in fact limited to the capital) emerged as early as 1894. Once again, the sports sphere was impacted by the main political quarrel of the time: the painfully slow separation between Church and state (finalised in 1905). The lay (non-religious) championship was challenged by a championship established by religious charities, the "patronages", keen on maintaining influence over the country's youth through sport. French representatives of the lay championship contributed to the 1904 founding of FIFA (in Paris), but football long remained divided and a minority sport. Until 1907, it was even behind rugby in terms of the number of clubs and practitioners (Wahl 1989). From then on, football spread rapidly through the country and slowly put divisions behind, leading to the 1917 creation of a real countrywide "Coupe de France" (French Cup), the 1919 foundation of the united "Fédération Française de Football Association" (French FA, later simply, the FFF) then the 1932 establishment of a professional championship (Dietschy 2010).

After humble beginnings in anglophile circles concerned with educating an elite, football could become a mass sport in the interwar period. After WW2, football's development was even more clearly linked with the intervention of public institutions (Dietschy and Clastres 2006) than before. Firstly, the 1901 law on the freedom of association had already provided a legal framework for the establishment of football clubs. Even today, most clubs have remained "Associations Loi 1901", fostering an amateur and voluntary (unpaid) culture in the sport that still lingers on outside the professional sports sphere (Hare 2003). Secondly, municipalities, a major part of the French public sector, already provided subsidies to local football clubs.

In the second after-war, these municipal grants became particularly important (up to 50% of a club's budget) until the state limited these subsidies and phased them out for professional clubs between 1984 and 2001. They are still allowed for grassroots sport, though (Hare 2003). Municipalities may still indirectly help football clubs: owning the stadiums and other infrastructures, and renting them to professional clubs at a fraction of the cost. State intervention provides the third kind of public sector involvement. Sports clubs and national sports federations are seen as providing a republican public service (Miège 1993): educating children (grassroots sport), helping the masses to stay healthy (sport for all), and promoting the prestige of the country (elite sport, organisation of international events). Consequently, France has long been the country where direct spending from the state in sport is the largest (Hare 2003).

The Nationalisation of Football, Hindered by History and Geography

Political reasons aside, and notwithstanding the competition from other sports (cycling and rugby), history and geography explain why French football became the prominent national sport very late. Historically speaking, the industrial revolution started later in France than it did in Belgium, the UK and Western Germany; and it was slower, especially the rural flight. Also, France has remained in large parts empty by European standards: with a comparable population, the country is roughly twice the size of Great Britain, Western Germany, and Italy. This is in stark contrast with most of northern Europe, where football became popular among the working class of rapidly growing cities that became major centres of large-scale industries: Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham and the cities of the Ruhr, arguably Milan or Turin too. Football's main clubs were indeed long found in small and medium-sized cities that (like Reims, Saint-Étienne, Sochaux, Roubaix, Sedan…) typically included some large-scale industry but also small-scale industries reminiscent of the proto-industrial era (Marseille 1990) and were industrial pockets within a very rural country. Marseilles was the exception: a top-3 French city with one successful club (OM). Football therefore had difficulties conquering a large audience in France. Footballers often played in front of nearly-empty stadiums for clubs that were successful neither economically, nor sportingly (Hare 2003; Dietschy 2010).

It is only in the 1980s that, for several reasons, attendances grew sufficiently for football to take the role of national sport heretofore played by

cycling. As municipal subsidies gradually decreased after 1984, football started to attract investors from industry in the largest French cities (local accountant Claude Bez in Bordeaux, business magnate Bernard Tapie in Marseilles, the head of a local IT firm Jean-Michel Aulas in Lyons, Canal+ in Paris). A virtuous cycle of investment in players and infrastructure allowed their clubs to improve European results (Olympique de Marseille, OM, won the first edition of the Champions League in 1993; PSG the Cup Winners Cup in 1996), and attract a younger audience of native urban dwellers, introduced to football earlier in their lifetime than ever, and more committed in the long run (Mignon 1998). Television played a major role too, especially after the 1984 foundation of subscription based channel Canal+, which used football to gain paying subscribers, and turned it into a modern show. In parallel, the organisation of two Euros (1984 and 2016) and the 1998 World Cup led the country to build or renovate stadiums and transportation means in the major cities (Hare and Dauncey 2002). For the past 20 years, the League has often been topped by the 5 or 7 largest French cities.

1998 a Turning Point—2010, Another?

The real turning point, the moment that football entered the French consciousness as the national sport, is France's 1998 victory in the World Cup (Dietschy 2010). In France, the passion for football has always been for the national team, more than for clubs (Mignon 1998; Hare 2003). And although the FFF can now boast to be the only Football Association in the world where all male national teams have won the major trophy in their category (World and European Cups, at senior and all junior levels, plus the Olympics), for long the national team was commended for producing beautiful losers. France's 1958 World Cup best player (ahead of Pelé) and Ballon d'Or winner Raymond Kopa became a cult figure for leading France into the semi-finals. Michel Platini did very much the same in both 1982 and 1986, additionally winning the Euro 1984 on home soil. But it is Zinédine Zidane's two goals in the final of the 1998 World Cup that changed the way football was perceived in France. Although the three main heroes of French football (Kopa, Platini, Zidane) are all French-born, in France, but from foreign descent, it is only the World Cup victory that led to a discourse on immigration and assimilation (rather than mere integration) (Hare and Dauncey 2002; Boli et al. 2010). The team was hailed as "Black Blanc Beur" (meaning "black, white and second-generation-Arab"), as epitomising the

success of a now racially-mixed France. After 1998, there is no doubt that football truly became the leading sport in France, eclipsing even cycling in terms of press coverage (Ranc 2012) but not in terms of attendance.

The 2010 World Cup may be another turning point. The French team was eliminated in the first round and a scandal made the headlines in France for weeks: one player was sent home after insulting the coach; other players consequently refused to train. At this point, a discourse on a generation of badly behaved kids who had betrayed the nation also appeared (Beaud and Guimard 2011)—the discourse on assimilation and integration of players from foreign descent subsided but the opposition between this and the new discourse with its negative outlook on players from migrant descent mirrored more closely the main opposing political discourses in the public sphere. The Central question may revolve around the "Beur" players. There have been "black" players in the French team continuously since the 1930s (Diestchy 2010). Between 1958, when the most prominent Algerian players clandestinely left French clubs to join the team of the FLN (fighting for the independence of Algeria from France), and 1994 Zidane's first cap, there were barely any players of "Arabic" descent in the French team—mostly because children of North-African migrants stayed in their fatherland until 1976 and the start of the "regroupement familial" policy. Thus, integrating players of Northern-African descent is, comparatively, a new question for the French team, and for the French sports media. It has also revealed important tensions in the French political and media discourse on second- or even third-generation Frenchmen and Frenchwomen from Northern-African descent, all the more so after the 2015 terrorist attacks, when Islam became the main focus of the debates.

It might be too early to tell but it seems that qualification to the WC2014, and making it to the final of Euro2016, as well as the de facto exclusion of emblematic players (i.e. Benzema) led to a change of discourse again—criticisms of the badly behaved kids were replaced by a new discourse promoting unity behind the National Team (Beaud and Sorez 2016).

From the beginning, the place of football in France has revolved around a political debate—oppositions between an anglophile, an ultra-nationalistic and a radical republican camp. Consequently, football has found a specific place in the French sports landscape: it is certainly very different from the Northern-European model but may have a lot of common points with other countries (Spain, Italy, Belgium or the Netherlands for instance). Nevertheless, where France probably stands apart is in the comparative weakness of football as a national sport (for historical and geographical reasons). And it is only following 1998 that football has become dominant, for

sportive but also, most importantly political reasons—since it has provided support for competing discourses on the nation today, with a neo-republican camp adopting a positive view on people from North-African descent, and a neo-nationalistic camp promoting opposite views.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

The change in the football map from the 1980s onward and the fact that city councils in France are numerous (over 36,000) but small and impoverished means that most favoured funding one elite club only (Ravenel 1998) explain another French peculiarity: the world-famous social, religious, neighbourhood rivalries that occur in other countries are nowhere to be seen in France. For example, there are 7 major urban areas in France (Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Lille, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nice): each has a population of over 1 million (Paris has more than 12, and Lyon more than 2) but only one top-flight club. Since football's rise in popularity is comparatively recent in France, today's rivalries are also new. For example, the main antagonism in France, between PSG and OM rivalry is barely 25.

Regional Antagonisms and Sporting Rivalries

The major French rivalries are primarily between geographically close cities. With a few exceptions (Lens, Saint-Étienne) French clubs only mobilise a large audience at the very time that they obtain success on the field. Therefore, regional rivalries only set and become of national importance when two clubs reach comparable sporting status for an extended period. For example, the Marseilles-Toulon rivalry was strong in the 1980s (Bromberger et al. 1995) but, except for a few hardcore supporters, has disappeared when Toulon left the top divisions. The closeness Nîmes and Montpellier also creates some hostility between the two clubs. Yet Montpellier's undoubted success (two Cups and one League) happened after Nîmes left the top divisions. Therefore, the rivalry has failed to capture national fame. The same happens with several local rivalries in Brittany (a football stronghold). Only 8-times League winner Nantes has enjoyed enough sporting success to gain national prestige. Interestingly Guingamp's more recent two victories in the French Cup are often forgotten: Guingamp being a tiny city, the club is presented in a paternalistic media discourse as minnows, whose victories can only be exceptional.

The major French geographic rivalry is between "Association Sportive de Saint-Étienne" (ASSE) and "Olympique Lyonnais" (OL) (Charroin 2004). They have both had the kind of stupendous national success needed to make a mark on the French psyche: ASSE won 10 Leagues and 6 Cups between 1957 and 1981 and Lyon 7 Leagues in a row (2002–2008). Also, their cities are 60 km apart, very close by French standards. They have opposing characteristics: Lyons is the second city in France, Saint-Étienne is between a fifth and a tenth of Lyons's size. Lyons is a modern metropolis; Saint-Étienne a declining industrial city. With some exaggeration, given its size, and the socially mixed audience of OL, Lyons is seen as bourgeois, Saint-Étienne as working-class. More importantly, all actors of the football scene constantly feed and maintain the "myth" of the OL-ASSE derby, regularly celebrating the anniversary of "legendary" encounters. Supporters also stage their opposition in the stands, with numerous ironic and vindictive banners and choreographies. This all leads to vivid tensions between rival supporters.

The North of France also hosts a comparable intense and long-lasting opposition between "Lille Olympique Sporting Club" (LOSC) and "Racing Club de Lens" (RCL). LOSC is a city club, anchored in the 4th largest urban area in France. Lens is the standard-bearer of the local mining region and has been extensively studied by academics (Demazière 1998; Nuytens 2004; Fontaine 2010b). Another important so-called "derby" is in Lorraine between the largest regional cities of Metz and Nancy which, despite a tumultuous history, have both remained in the top flight. In Corsica, "Sporting Club de Bastia" (SCB) has embodied the identity of the island since the 1970s (Rey 2003) and the antagonism is with the club of Nice, on the "Côte d'Azur". Games between OGC Nice and SCB create strong tensions and sometimes violent outbursts.

Given the size of the country and the lack of local opposition, the concept of "derby" can be overstretched in France. Nantes and Bordeaux are 300 km apart but the game between their clubs is called "the Atlantic derby". This opposition mostly harks back to the era the two clubs were fighting for the top honours and the discourse on the clubs whereby in the 1960s Nantes came to embody a flamboyant, technical way of playing football "à la nantaise" (Faure and Suaud 2011) and Bordeaux was seen as playing a physical game. In the 1980s Nantes was described as selecting, training and developing young talent in their academy; Bordeaux as buying confirmed star players (including from Nantes).

Similarly, it is in the 1970s that the development of French professional football led to the map we now know and today's sporting rivalries appeared.

For example, ASSE and OM, then OM and Bordeaux became rival clubs because of their attempts to dominate on the field; and because of turmoil surrounding transfers between the clubs (Bromberger et al. 1995). In the 1980s, the appearance of radical partisanship (a few violent hooligan firms and the more significant growth of groups claiming they belonged to the Ultras movement) changed the landscape. Ultras are bent on providing the most passionate (and arguably, at times, extreme) support to their club and have strengthened these geographical and (or) sporting oppositions. This development also created tensions specific to the dynamics of partisanship, for example between the supporters of Lyons and Nice (two clubs which the general audience does not see as entertaining any rivalry).

Rise, Intensity and Easing of the PSG-OM *"Clásico"*

For a quarter of a century, the main rivalry in France has been between PSG and OM. The media went even as far as calling it by the name that SkySports gave to the Barça-Real opposition in the 1990s (O'Brien 2013): "Clásico"—in French: "classique". Journalists (Pérès and Riolo 2003) have popularised the thesis that this rivalry was entirely fabricated. In 1990, TV channel Canal+, known for its closeness to President Mitterrand's circles, bought PSG, mostly to ensure a competitor for OM, just bought by then-successful businessman Bernard Tapie, and to provide suspense in the League competition that provided most of Canal+'s income.

The specific dynamics of support may be as important in fostering the rivalry as decisions from the clubs' managements. Tensions had already been running high between Marseilles's Ultras groups and Paris's hooligan firms before Canal+ bought PSG. Interestingly, this rivalry revealed, or arguably staged, national and political splits and cleavage lines between the two cities. Schematically speaking, the PSG-OM antagonism embodies the opposition between North and South; between the capital of a heavily centralised country and the province; between the elites and the "people". In France elites are (oddly) always seen as "Parisians", and various types of elites, economic, cultural, political have indeed been associated with the management of PSG. Conversely, Bernard Tapie managed to convince people there was a link between his ascending social trajectory, and Marseilles's popular culture. Furthermore, in the 1990s, OM became the emblematic club of the French "banlieues", literally the suburbs, a word which, in France, is always used to describe working-class or even poverty-stricken, multicultural neighbourhoods

on the fringe of the cities. In the 1980s, the stand of Boulogne (in PSG's Parc des Princes' stadium) developed a nationalist image in the media. From the early 1990s, many Marseilles supporters' groups took an opposite stand and publicised their anti-racism (Hourcade 2015b). In real political terms, however, it is in Marseilles that the far-right has gathered votes and gained elected officials; in Paris, the far-right has always received their lowest share of the votes. The inversion is most likely due to football's ability to give a voice to those who are deprived of one, in the local context too.

Also, OM dominated French football at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s and acquired a large base of supporters in the whole country (Lestrelin 2010). However, unlike Reims and Saint-Étienne which were largely seen at the time of their success in the 1950s and 1970s as representing the whole country (Dietschy 2010), OM was the first club to be both loved and loathed countrywide because of its rivalry with PSG and its cosmopolitan image, in a country were the far-right was growing. The opposition between Paris and Marseilles also became important even beyond the boundaries of football, as evidenced in the frequent use made by local actors of a text entitled "Marseilles is not France" (Bromberger et al. 1995) published by OM supporters feeling victimised when the club lost its 1993 League title after a cheating scandal and which contrasts the traits deemed characteristic of Marseilles and of French people (most particularly Parisians).

Afterwards, in the nineties and noughties impassioned debates and polemics regularly flared up between managers, players and supporters of OM and PSG. There were outbursts of violence too: between supporters; and on the pitch between players—the rivalry between OM and PSG went even as far as undermining the cohesion of the French team. Central though the rivalry remains in media and public discourse, it has eased considerably. For example, local young people may wear PSG jerseys in Marseilles today—something impossible even a few years ago. The rivalry has become uneven, OM has declined (relegated, then long unsuccessful in the top flight) and PSG has taken a new dimension since its 2011 purchase by Qatari shareholders. Local supporting scenes have changed too, especially in Paris. From 2000 onwards, a second supporters' stand developed in the Auteuil end; it became gradually opposed to Boulogne, embracing supporters from all origins and proudly stating its multiculturalism. In recent years, the repression faced by PSG supporters (groups were disbanded, and supporters were not allowed to regroup in the stadium) also, importantly, led Marseilles's Ultras to show them support in banners displayed during games.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: An Ambiguous Relationship to Football, a Developing Partisanship

What authors have come to call "the French exception" (Mignon 1998; Dietschy 2010) is the ambiguous relationship to this sport in France. Pundits have repeatedly emphasised that France is not a "football country". Indeed, stadium attendances are far lower than in the other "big-5" European countries: in 2015–2016, 21,000 spectators on average; half the German figure (42,000), far less than in England (36,500) and Spain (28,000) and a little less than Italy, where attendances have recently dwindled (22,000). Also, the French intellectual elites have typically shown contempt for the sport and badmouthed it. Football's image may have improved since the 1998 WC but its cultural legitimacy remains weak. Criticising football as an "opium of the people" and an "emotional plague" remains common in some French intellectual circles (Brohm and Perelman 2006). More than any other sport (especially rugby, which benefits from a more positive social image), football is accused of turning people away from the things that matter, of mobilising delirious amounts of money, of encouraging chauvinism and fanaticism, of putting into place exacerbated competition and of resulting in dangerous or illicit habits (doping, violence, money-laundering, trafficking of players…). Professional football players are often slurred, criticised for being overpaid while displaying their bad education: they are the victims of a social and ethnic stigma largely based on their popular and sometimes foreign origins (Beaud and Guimard 2011). Social sciences works on football have increased in France since the 1990s, but researchers are often feel compelled to defend that "taking football seriously" is enlightening (Beaud 2014).

Still, football is the most commonly played sport: over 2.1 million players were registered with the FFF at the beginning of 2017—the second federation in terms of licensed players (tennis) has half (1.05 millions). As a show, football also raises enthusiasm. The largest TV audiences in France are always for national team football games, and can be as large as 20 million viewers (a third of the population). The passion for football remains mostly masculine but women increasingly share it. The number of female players is growing (to a meagre 5.7% of all licensed players). Media interest for women's football is on the rise: the Women's national team is starting to feature in international tournaments and Lyons is a four-time winner of the European Cup. Men's clubs also try to attract more female spectators, but no

figure is available to show the extent to which progress has been real. Low as they may seem, football's stadium gates are higher than rugby's (c.13 000). Furthermore, "football is a show that transcends cleavages between social groups" (Bromberger and Lestrelin 2008); the publics of football come from very varied social backgrounds, although they sit in different areas of the stadiums. In the stadium, the principal differentiation criterion may be age—young supporters assemble behind the goals.

Of course, France's national team success needs no further reminder: if one of the 8 countries that won the World Cup is not a "football country", who is? Perhaps less known outside of France, is that Frenchmen and the French Association played a major role in the international development of the beautiful game: FIFA was founded in Paris (1904); the creation of the World Cup was largely the work of FIFA president Jules Rimet; and the Euro of UEFA's secretary general Henry Delaunay; the European Cup was the brainchild of French daily, *L'Équipe*; and the Ballon d'Or of French magazine *France Football*. Finally, the abovementioned importance that the French national team has taken in political debates on immigration and national identity (Beaud and Sorez 2016) shows the importance of football in the French psyche.

The Development of Partisanship in France

What those who think (and generally regret) that France has not been a "football country" are essentially saying that French people have less passion for club football than their European counterparts and that they behave as spectators more than supporters. Indeed, the first supporters' associations that appeared as early as the 1910–1920, long remained anonymous. They existed only to establish links between fervid supporters and the club management and players; they had no impact on the show in the stands. In the 1970s, the physiognomy of the crowd in the stadiums changed considerably. Spectators dropped their Sunday outfits and proudly wore their team's colours. Showing the most committed supporters from France and abroad, television—available to most—also contributed to this "coloration" of the stands (Fontaine 2010a). From the end of the 1970s, the most active supporters typically started to regroup in one sector of their stadium (called, after Anfield's stand, a "kop"). The atmosphere became more intense: flags, foghorns, "pyrotechnic devices" started to be more commonly used. In the middle of the 1980s, radical supporters' groups developed. On the

one hand, those who claimed to be hooligans drew their inspiration from England: they bonded into informal "gangs", centred on violence towards other teams' supporters and the police. On the other hand, some supporters modelled their support on the most committed Italian fans, and called themselves Ultras. Ultras typically invest a great amount of time and money in supporting their team; they enliven the stands in spectacular and organised fashion; they claim their autonomy from other "actors" of football and never hesitate to defend their own point of view; they even consent to the use of violence to make their claims heard or to resolve conflicts with supporters of opposing teams. France has therefore been at the crossroads between the two major footballing countries of the 1970s and 1980s: England and Italy (Mignon 1998). However, since the middle of the 1990s, the Ultras model has spread and become dominant. Ultras groups, each with a membership of hundreds and sometimes thousands, have dwarfed hooligan firms which barely developed in France—except for Paris, which constituted a stronghold of European hooliganism. Being the most active and visible supporters, Ultras logically overshadow all others and have imposed their supporting culture where there was none.

It is also because they want to position themselves as the "best" supporters, and against hooligans' practices, that French Ultras tend to resort to violence less often than their southern-European counterparts. Even though some French hooligans are ostensibly nationalistic, Ultras groups often declare themselves antiracist or, more often, apolitical. This apoliticism includes two different situations: in some cases, all political tendencies are represented in the group; in other cases, the nationalistic tendency has the majority; however, the group refrains from publicising so that their support for the club is not discredited (Hourcade 2015b).

The atmosphere in the French stadiums also profoundly changed between the 1970s and 1990s. Being a supporter—and no longer a spectator—has become the norm: the audience is constantly asked to behave as supporters by their club's players and club management, this call is relayed in the local media and by the stadium's speaker. Supporters' groups have grown and diversified: there are traditional groups which are close to the clubs and centre on socialising members; Ultras groups that make it their mission to enliven the stands, and have a more dissenting, anti-establishment stance; delocalised sections… Although the rise of partisanship came before the WC1998, the French victory and the ensuing craze for football certainly strengthened it.

Changes in the "Order" Within Stadiums

Despite the craze for football it developed, the WC1998 has been seen by French sporting and public authorities as a failure in terms of infrastructure. Several existing stadiums were renovated but money was focused on building a large, 80,000 seats, stadium ("Stade de France") leaders thought the country was lacking. In contrast, the success of the WC2006 in Germany, as well as the good (economic, and sporting) health of German clubs has led the top management of French football to draw from the "German model" (a behaviour which is extremely frequent among French leaders) and to consider that the French clubs' lack of competitiveness at European level is mostly due to the lack of modern, comfortable and functional stadiums.

Based on this diagnosis, French authorities used the occasion of the Euro2016 in France to renovate existing stadiums and build new ones in Lille, Nice, Bordeaux and Lyons. Designed as points of consumption, where services and entertainment are offered to spectators; usually benefitting from a naming contract, these new stadiums are meant to widen the audience of football and increase clubs' resources. This new outlook on stadiums goes hand in hand with a significant strengthening of the fight against "hooliganism". This fight now claims 'zero tolerance' against supporters seen as devious; and centres on repressive, police measures.

Therefore, it is a profound renewal in the "order" of the stadiums that is happening (Hourcade 2015a). Until the 1970s, the "order" of the French stadiums, that is to say the forms of behaviours and modes of control that are deployed in the stadiums, as well as the relationship between actors, was consensual. This order became conflictual in the middle of the 1980s. Firstly: verbal and physical violence increased significantly during and around professional football games, and public opinion became particularly sensitive to the topic after the 1985 Heysel tragedy and the first misdemeanours of Parisian hooligans. Secondly, Ultras put into question the public and football authorities, claiming pyrotechnic devices (forbidden by law) are festive accessories, and criticised the changes in football they started to call a "business", they opposed to a "popular" football they claimed to represent. In such a context, the fight against hooliganism aimed at making stadiums safe and reassure the mass audience, spectators and supporters alike; but also, to increase the control of authorities on Ultras groups that had colonised the ends.

It is indeed a new "order" that the French public and sporting authorities have wanted to impose on the stadiums for around ten years. Ultras are the core target of these changes, since they are, for the organisers of the show,

at the same time those who invest most in the expected role of 12th man (therefore increase the value of the show, which comes from the stands too), and those who disturb the show, when they are occasionally turbulent or violent. PSG has even tried to dispense entirely with Ultras. Still, most clubs try to maintain their active supporters' basis, while concurrently opening to new audiences, and enforcing security. Significantly, the French law on sport evolved in 2016: it strengthened the tools to fight hooliganism; it also recognised for the first time that supporters are actors of the sport and tried to create the conditions of a dialogue with them.

This programme of renovation of the football show is facing another difficulty: the enlarged stadiums are not filling. Contrary to what was hoped, these stadiums have not mechanically and durably attracted a larger audience. This is even truer if the club no longer has good sporting results, and if the stadium is in a peripheral, difficult to access area, as in Nice, Bordeaux and Lyons. Economically, this situation creates two problems linked with the fact that, except in Lyons, the club does not own the stadium and only cashes in a modest part of the benefits from the stadium. Therefore, when match audiences are small, benefits are also reduced for clubs. Furthermore, the solution that was chosen has proved costlier than expected: the partnership between a private actor that builds and manages the stadiums, and local authorities which fund the project, typically makes a greater negative impact than expected on local public finances.

4   Paris Saint-Germain, an Atypical Club

By European standards, PSG is a very atypical club. However, its case study remarkably underlines several specificities of the French football culture—particularly, in relationship with political issues. First and foremost PSG is a young club. It was indeed founded in 1970 and re-founded in 1973. More tellingly, both foundations are politically motivated. Football in Paris has a long and arguably glorious past: to a large extent, Paris (including its suburbs) is the cradle of French football and Parisian clubs both dominated the first era of French professional football and contributed to its development (Sorez 2013). However, after 1945, Parisian football was deeply shaken by a crisis that prevented the lasting establishment of Parisian derbies. By the end of the 1960s, clubs from Paris had disappeared (e.g. Olympique de Pantin, first Coupe de France winners) or were no longer in the top flight. The FFF therefore decided to found a club by popular subscription. It was named Paris FC, and remained absolutely theoretical until it merged with Stade

Saint-Germain (founded in 1904), when the latter accessed the top flight in 1970. PSG was born.

A Short and Winding History

Two years later, however, reverting to the name Paris FC was a condition made by the then mayor-less Paris city council to any subvention it could make. This led to a demerger and the professional part of the club remained in the top flight as Paris FC; the amateur PSG team left was in Division 3. The narrative is that Paris Saint-Germain was somehow founded again a year later, when Daniel Hechter, a successful ready-to-wear designer bought the club. In 1974, Paris FC and PSG FC ironically crossed paths when the former was relegated to Division 2, and the latter promoted to Division 1. The City Council soon decided to back PSG, and Paris FC has mostly remained in the lower divisions ever since. Political involvement was twice Central to the birth of PSG—and more importantly, this odd episode in the club history demonstrates the relevance of Loïc Ravenel's (1998) main thesis: what distinguishes the geographical structure of French football is that local entrepreneurs (here Hechter) may be involved, and key to a club's success; however, the commitment of municipalities is essential too, and since most city councils may only fund one team at a time, French cities end up having only one club per sport. It is therefore a political matter that ends up making Paris the sole major European capital with one top-flight football club only, and other major European cities typically may have two clubs as well.

The whole development of the club, throughout its entire history can be attributed to this mix of private initiative and public involvement. In 1978, Hechter was forced to leave PSG after a slush fund scandal, and the club continued to grow under the direction of his old associates. More importantly, in 1977, Paris elected a mayor for the first time in over a century and the support of the (resurrected) "Mairie de Paris" played an important role in the development of PSG: subsidies became huge until EU law finally banned subventions to professional sport, in accordance with European restrictions on state aid leading to unfair competitions. Indeed, the city council saw PSG as way to promote a different, local, image of the capital and hence gain support in popular sections of the Parisian population. For example, at some point, the contract that ruled the relationship between the club and City Hall demanded that the club had to wear the very shade of blue used in the Mairie's logo, that PSG's jersey sported an Eiffel Tower, and that the Mayor was given the most prominent seat in the stadium,

even in the presence of the French President (Ranc 2009). The club kept on developing under private ownership: Canal+ bought the club for economic interest. The next owners of PSG was a hedge fund named Colony Capital, apparently intent on buying cheap and making money when selling the club. However, as they failed to do so, media reported that current owners of the club, Qatar Sport Investments (QSI), were driven to buy it after personal intervention from Nicolas Sarkozy, then the Head of State (Verdez and Hermant 2013). QSI may want to benefit from the club's image (and its association with what is largely seen as the most famous city in the world) and are managing PSG as a business, and growing it. The acquisition of PSG is also part of Qatar's political strategy to invest in sport (Champagne 2012).

This mix of business and political involvement in PSG's history have played an important role in its perception by the general audience. The French ambiguous relationship with money (and with their capital city) have led to the widely shared belief that PSG is a not the "real" thing, the genuine article. In other regards, PSG is rather typical of French football. In particular, it has had difficulty to gather an audience of its own. In the first decade or so of the club's history, the Parc des Princes was often empty, and it was not infrequent to find more supporters of the visiting than the home team, especially when PSG was playing against clubs from Britanny or Corsica, which have provided a great number of internal migrants to the capital (Mignon 1998). Consequently, PSG repeatedly hired players of North-African, Portuguese, or even Yugoslav descent in order to attract the large minorities from the Maghreb and Portugal, and the football mad but comparatively smaller communities from what was then Yugoslavia. Mustapha Dahleb, Safet Susic, Pauleta were therefore long the heroes of the crowd at the Parc des Princes. At the beginning of the 2000s, in order to gain market shares in its own suburbs, where the majority of youth had gradually come to support OM, PSG similarly signed Dalmat, Luccin and Anelka who had origins in the Parisian suburbs. Another way to conquest fans was to sign international football stars as Weah, Rai or Ronaldinho.

Peculiar and Virulent Support for an Atypical Club

PSG also multiplied initiatives to develop a public of supporters, offering notably, at the end of the 1970s, very preferential prices to young members of the audience and favouring their sitting together in one part of the stadium. Young fans started to gather in the Boulogne end of the stadium and adopted English support practices (Mignon 1998). A 1984 friendly

match between France and England became the occasion when radical Parisian supporters entered the history of hooliganism through their confrontation with their English "masters". Henceforth, a tradition of violent support settled in the so-called "kop of Boulogne". The stand even started to include local far-right skinheads, which lent their image to the stand for nearly two decades. The heavily politicised fans always remained a tiny minority; and the links between radical supporters and political activists remained individual: it is indeed the hooligan leaders that were at the helm of the stand, and not nationalistic political groups from outside the world of football. However, this active minority managed to make the stand a white preserve—for safety reasons, the club itself encouraged non-white supporters to avoid this stand. For some time, racist aggressions were commonplace around PSG's stadium. Boulogne was therefore known as the territory of "fascists" from the Paris area (Hourcade 2015b).

When Canal+ bought PSG at the beginning of the 1990s, the new club managers tried to fight the ghastly image of Boulogne through regrouping supporters put off by the violence and racism in the "kop". A second active stand developed in the opposite end, "Auteuil". While Boulogne claimed to be under the English influence, Auteuil draws on the Italian model. The atmosphere and audience grew considerably in the 1990s, especially since PSG had continuous good sporting results but the moral and physical dominance of Boulogne was not put into question by Auteuil yet. In the 2000s, Auteuil's Ultras groups affirmed their cosmopolitism, their refusal to bow under the pressure of Boulogne's hooligans and their autonomy from PSG's management. The most radical fringes of both stands started a very vivid and violent conflict: competition between supporters' groups and the will to dominate the "Parc"; opposite models of partisanship; political tensions; diverging conceptions of Parisian identity (Boulogne carried a white identity anchored in the centre and the West of the city while Auteuil carried a more cosmopolitan identity and attracted young men from the suburbs and of migrant descent). Therefore in the 2000s, the "Parc" was at the same time the French stadium with the greatest atmosphere because of the intense commitment of Parisian fans; the stadium where the club policy (ticket prices, jersey design, sporting stakes) was most heavily contested and the one where violence and racism were the most intense.

In 2006, a Boulogne supporter was accidentally killed by a policeman trying to protect an Israeli fan. In 2010, a hooligan from Boulogne was beaten to death by rivals from Auteuil. Public authorities and the club then decided an emergency plan at the "Parc": most hooligan bands from Boulogne and

Ultras groups from Auteuil were disbanded; year tickets were abandoned; random seating was imposed in the ends (so fans could not choose either Boulogne or Auteuil). Supporters from all origins could then go to Boulogne which lost its nationalistic tone. But many active fans boycotted the Parc, thinking they were punished for a minority of violent and racist fans.

When Qatari shareholders bought the club in 2011, they maintained this security plan, while trying to change the atmosphere of the stadium. The inside of the stadium is redecorated, works are undertaken to increase the number of VIP seats. Supporters' groups are banished while family events are multiplying; ticket prices considerably increase. The goal is to develop a high-class club, with stars on the field (Ibrahimovic, Cavani) and in the VIP area; as well as a consumerist, peaceful audience. Building on a tight control of supporters, the policy succeeded insofar as supporters from all origins may now mix in the stadium and violence is clearly contained. Only a few incidents have taken place in the city on the occasion of European Cup games.

However, this change causes two important problems. It heavily limits the individual freedoms of Parisian supporters, to the extent that national media (including a few articles in *Le Monde*) even raised the point. The more peaceful atmosphere also became rather tepid: players complained and Qatari shareholders were unhappy as it did not match the atmosphere of passion that they wanted to develop around the stadium. Consequently, at the Autumn 2016, PSG management accepted the comeback of an Ultras group in the Auteuil end, against the advice of police authorities. The future of the Parc des Princes is therefore uncertain: will it become the stadium of sound and fury it was in the 1990s and 2000s, as some fear (and others hope)? Soon after Ultras were allowed back in the stadium, incidents between opposing factions of Parisians supporters started to happen. Will these put an end to the experiment? Will the "Parc" become like an American stadium, with docile, high purchasing power consumer-supporters? Or will the Parc manage to reconcile the comeback of a popular atmosphere while maintaining a high level of security?

The major laws on supporters of the past 25 years were all based on the behaviour of Parisian supporters, and the media attention being focused on the "Parc", the future of the stadium will no doubt have an influence on the way French football will see its supporters; on the sporting show it will put forward and on the way it will resolve the tensions just mentioned: between the will to have an active "12th man" and the will to control the audiences and ensure security.

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Germany

Albrecht Sonntag

The day after Germany's 7-1 victory over Brazil in the 2014 World Cup semi-final, the Parisian correspondent of a major Brazilian daily sent an E-mail informing his friends that he would no longer use the famous Brazilian self-description "*O país do futebol*" but replace it by "*Das Land des Fußballs*". What was meant to be a somewhat bitter witticism is actually a rather accurate depiction of today's Germany, whose long-lasting, on-going love affair with "the beautiful game" seems to be deeply anchored in the country's collective memory and contemporary culture.

This is, of course, partly due to the remarkable track record of the national team and its unequalled regularity on the highest level. Germany has competed in two World Cups less than Brazil (it dropped out of the first one in 1930 and was banned from participating in 1950), but the *Nationalmannschaft* has played more World Cup matches (106) than the *Seleção* (104). It has played eight World Cup finals (losing four of them), reached the semi-finals a record thirteen times, and never finished below the quarterfinals in its fifteen consecutive tournaments since World War II. The all-time record holder with the most World Cup matches played is former German captain Lothar Matthäus (25 matches between 1982 and 1998), and since that famous semi-final in 2014 Miroslav Klose has become the all-time top scorer with a total of 16 goals.

A. Sonntag (✉)
ESSCA School of Management, Paris, France
e-mail: albrecht.sonntag@essca.fr

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On the European level, in twelve participations in the European Championship Germany has won three times, lost three other finals, and reached the semi-finals a total of nine times. This regularity is matched by the performance of the women's team, which has won two World Cups (making Germany the only country to have won both the men's and the women's World Cup), one Olympic gold medal and eight of the nine European Championships in which it has participated.

This unique record of accomplishment notwithstanding, the widely shared passion for football in Germany reaches far beyond the enjoyment of its national teams' performances in major international tournaments. It is also based on a genuine enthusiasm across all social categories for the *Bundesliga*, its professional championship introduced in 1963.

For a non-native speaker, it is difficult to seize the affective connotation that the two terms *Bundesliga* and *Nationalmannschaft* possess for the average German citizen. For decades, the national football team was, together with the *Deutsche Mark*, the only uncontested national symbol in a republic that was not only rather weary of flags and anthems, but had even managed to ban the adjective "national" in mainstream public discourse (Sonntag 1997). As for the *Bundesliga*, it may well be considered as constitutive for German cultural identity as the legendary "black bread" or the "*Tagesschau*", the evening news on public television. It is taken for granted, part of the social and cultural fabric of the country, and sorely missed when abroad, as suggested by numerous testimonials of German expats around the world (John et al. 2010, 75).

The *Bundesliga* has also become, in only fifty years, a full-fledged site of memory ("*lieu de mémoire*") according to the definition of Pierre Nora (Nora 1993). As argued in the monumental collective volume "*Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*", its role in the collective memory of post-war Germany should not be underestimated (Gebauer 2001). It is part and parcel of the construction of a new collective identity during the "economic miracle", a child of the Federal Republic untainted by the dark years of the first half of the century: "The narratives on the *Bundesliga* are at the same time epic narratives on the Federal Republic" (ibid., 465). It is not exaggerated to say that for a large number of German citizens in their fifties or sixties, socialised in the Germany of the 1960s and 1970s, the *Bundesliga* is one of the big cultural unifiers across the administrative, linguistic and cultural divides of a heavily federalised state.

It is not a coincidence that over thirteen consecutive years it has consistently attracted the biggest audience among European football leagues, with an average attendance of 43,300 spectators per match in 2015–2016

(EFS 2016). And it is telling that the *Deutsche Fußball-Liga* (DFL), which administers the professional League, has so far heroically resisted to sell its name to a sponsor or to increase the number of teams beyond the traditional eighteen clubs. The *Bundesliga*, clearly, is a symbol in itself, and its halo is only second to the *Nationalmannschaft*.

Given the picture described above, it is not surprising that the German expression "*König Fußball*" ("King Football") goes beyond the mere assignation of football as the most popular of sports. It refers at the same time to the almost disproportionate role which this sociocultural phenomenon plays in German society today. Some may wonder whether football is indeed still "the most important secondary matter in the world" ("*die wichtigste Nebensache der Welt*") as it has been traditionally referred to, or whether it has not become much more than that.

It probably has. At least this is what is suggested by the results of a representative survey (FREE 2014), carried out in nine European countries half a year before the 2014 World Cup, intentionally at a moment (mid-December), where football is not as high on the media agenda as compared to the end of the season or during a major tournament. In major footballing countries like Spain or England the number of respondents declaring themselves "interested" or "very interested" in football was 59.1% and 63.3% respectively, slightly above the score in Germany (55.6%). When asked, however, about their "relation with football", 72% of the German respondents declared they "liked" or "loved" football, while the scores in the other countries were all below 60% (ranging between 58% in Spain and 37.2% in Italy), the overall tendency being to score lower in 'liking' football than in "being interested" in it (a tendency that is coherent with the respondents' other statements about unpleasant recent developments in the game and its governance).

Very clearly, Germany is a wonderful case study for investigating "the role of football in the sedimentation of national identities and collective representations" (De Waele and Louault 2016, 11). More than that, German society has developed a very "special relationship" with football, and this chapter attempts to provide some explanations for this "love affair".

It should not be forgotten, though, that over almost forty years, between 1952 and 1990, there were two German football federations, each with its own League and national team, their rivalry culminating in the legendary victory of the East German team in their unique match against their Western neighbours during the group phase of the 1974 World Cup. The particular constellation resulting from the cold-war division of Germany will be dealt with in more detail below. There is no doubt, however, that there

was only one Germany—albeit quite a different one from today's Federal Republic—when the strange new English game was imported by enthusiastic Anglophiles in the 1870s.

1   Political Origins of Football

The story of the football pioneer Konrad Koch who introduced the game to Germany in 1874 by using it as educational tool in the grammar school of Brunswick where he was teaching ancient Greek and Latin (Oberschelp 2010), has been widely popularised over recent years. In 2011 a major motion picture with the title *Lessons of a Dream* (German original *Der ganz große Traum*) and a follow-up novel based on the script (Moritz 2011) imposed the endearing narrative of the young Anglophile teacher whose passion for the new ball game overcomes the resistance of an arch-conservative establishment.

The reality is of course more complex. Koch was not alone (and had not even spent a significant period of time in England), and there is a handful of German cities with English expat communities who claim the organisation of the first football match and the foundation of the first "real" football club. To the historians of German football (Hopf 1979; Lindner 1983; Mason 1986; Schulze-Marmeling 1992; Heinrich 2000; Brüggemeier et al. 2000) the question of where exactly the first-ever football game on German soil was played is an overall rather secondary matter anyway. Particularisms of cultural appropriation and adaptation are of higher relevance (Eisenberg 1997, 1999). In this respect, several features of the early history of German football are striking.

First, for a number of reasons such as basic English skills and contact with English expats, as well as purchase power and leisure habits, the early adopters of the new English game were definitely not working-class people, but rather of bourgeois origin (students, lawyers, professionals in commerce and engineering, higher civil servants, etc.), a social pattern that did hardly change until World War I. And when the working class finally appropriated football and the membership of the football clubs soared as of the early 1920s (Eggers 2001), the middle and upper classes did not turn their back on the game, which explains its astonishing, "class-independent" (Pyta 2006, 4) appeal across all social categories of German society until today.

Secondly, a remarkably radical "Germanisation" of the game's rules and terminology occurred very quickly. While the numerous military connotations of football-specific terms were generally appreciated by the *Zeitgeist*,

the consistent elimination of foreign terms was requested and obtained by critical nationalistic voices and carried out by the football pioneers themselves (Eisenberg 1997, 98).

Thirdly, there was a strong ideological insistence on the amateur principle, which was adamantly defended by the *Deutscher Fußball-Bund* (DFB) founded in 1900, and which remained unchallenged until the end of World War I. When towards the end of the Weimar Republic, the DFB started to give into the commercialisation pressure and considered the creation of a professional League in 1932, the project was immediately cancelled by the National-Socialists after they had seized power in early 1933. On the ground, however, "fake amateurism" was booming and German football settled for decades in a schizophrenic configuration, with professional football in all but name, accompanied by an official discourse in full denial. It took until 1963 to recognise the professionalisation of the game and provide it with a legal framework and a professional, nation-wide first division, the *Bundesliga* (Pyta 2004). And even then, the framework remained largely hypocritical (especially concerning the official salary caps) and was systematically circumvented by all actors on the ground. If today German football may rightly be considered one of the best managed on the planet, both with regard to financial practices and governance patterns, this clearly is a very recent phenomenon. As Nils Havemann has shown in his path-breaking history of the *Bundesliga* (Havemann 2013), its first decades were marked by a complete lack of transparency, a consistent hypocrisy in official discourse, and a staggering amount of incompetence, mismanagement and corruption.

Football was introduced into a Germany, in which the "nationalisation of the masses" (Mosse 1976), following the creation of the *Kaiserreich* on the ashes of the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian War, was under way. It was appropriated by the population in a context of assertive, jingoist nationalism, and its extraordinary identification potential was quickly identified by the authorities. As I have argued elsewhere, "for better or for worse, football and the nation form an old couple" (Sonntag 2015), a metaphor that seems to be particularly adequate for Germany. Whatever the regime and government during the massive disruptions that Germany has gone through over the last 150 years—an aggressive empire, a weak democracy, a totalitarian dictatorship, two parallel republics based on opposing ideologies, and finally the unified Berlin Republic slowly growing together—the country has permanently been under nation-building pressure. And football was always there, a handy tool for identity construction.

As Christiane Eisenberg (1997, 94) has pointed out, German football was "state oriented" from its early beginnings. The primary purpose of the DFB

was to organise football with regard to the glory of the new *Deutschland*, and the most important trophy of the early days was the "Crown Prince's Cup", which opposed regional selections with the aim of identifying the elite for the *Nationalmannschaft* (Eisenberg 1997, 94). The consistently military rhetoric with which football was presented by the media found both a culmination and a bitter catharsis when the real war came about in 1914 (Sonntag 2008a, 64–71).

During the Weimar Republic, when football practice and spectatorship exploded in metropolitan areas and municipal authorities were keen to provide their top clubs with state-of-the-art stadiums that could host large crowds, football almost naturally adapted to traditional German regionalism, all the more so as there still was no nation-wide League and the national champion emerged from knock-out play-offs between the champions of the seven regional leagues. Still, the national team was "used" in international relations, especially when it finally played for the first time a friendly against its "arch-enemy" France in spring 1931.

Football Under the Swastika

Given the immense popularity football had reached at the beginning of the 1930s, the Nazi regime was eager to exploit the potential of this popular game for its own purposes. It met with a good deal of "anticipated obedience" from the side of the football authorities and clubs, whose directors went out of their way to please the new regime, partly for ideological proximity, partly for opportunist motives and fear of losing their licence in case of insufficient "aryanisation" of their membership and squads (see the remarkable volume on football's "*Gleichschaltung*" by Herzog 2016). It has been only since the turn of the century that historians have scrutinised the role played by football in the Third Reich. For half a century both the football authorities and the clubs were not too keen on opening their archives to researchers. Rather than exploring and discussing the facts, they preferred to refer to the very vague, often exonerating narratives that could be found in the occasional commemorative publication.

This has changed over the first fifteen years of the new century, and historians have been able to shed some new light on the behaviour of football organisations between 1933 and 1945. Not all of the research was of the same quality as Nils Havemann's *Football under the Swastika* (2005)—an independent study sponsored by a DFB finally willing to come to terms with its own past—or the very good case study on Schalke 04 (six times

champions under the Nazi regime), aptly titled *Between Blue and White, there's Grey* (Goch and Silberbach 2005). Other publications, not always necessarily based on the same painstaking archival research, regularly triggered controversies between different interpretations of the role various actors played in aligning football on the ideological premises imposed by the Nazis, thus echoing in the modest scope of football history what has been known as "*Historikerstreit*" ("historians' quarrel") in the second half of the 1980s (Craig 1987). As always in such debates on the past, there are myths and legends that are defended by some against better evidence, but the heterogeneity of the research on this topic notwithstanding, it must be recognised that the volume of work produced on German football's historical responsibility in the years 1933–1945 as well as on the fate of Jewish players and officials (and other minorities) testifies to a widely spread open-mindedness and interest in this period of history that would have been unimaginable a quarter century ago.

In an ironic twist of fate and despite their efforts, the Nazi's intentions of instrumentalising football for their own glory failed twice miserably. First, the planned gold medal at the 1936 Olympics was lost as early as in the first round with a 0-2 defeat against Norway. Worse, the team of "Great Germany" formed after the "*Anschluss*" and including five players of the Austrian "Wunderteam" was also eliminated in the first round of the French World Cup two years later, against Switzerland. It may be argued that this double failure is, in retrospect, the greatest stroke of luck German football has ever had (Sonntag 2016). As a matter of fact, thanks to these two defeats, Germany has been spared historical pictures of Nazi dignitaries with the World Cup in their hands or their national team making the Hitler salute in a World Cup final. This is not without relevance with regard to what happened in 1954.

The Miracle of Berne

The story of the German team's surprise victory in the 1954 World Cup final in the Swiss capital—a 3-2 win against the overwhelming Hungarian favourites who had not been defeated for years—has been told so often and with so much insistence that it is firmly anchored in German collective memory as one of the defining moments of the fledgling West German Republic created only five years earlier. In the aforementioned representative FREE survey, more than 90% of Germans knew the meaning of the expression "the miracle of Berne". The event has been compared by some

authors—half-jokingly but also half-seriously—to the "foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Wankdorf Stadium of Berne" (Heinrich 1994; see also Mikos 1997; Busche 1994; or Pfeil 1998). It is only coherent that at the destruction of the old stadium in 2001 a piece of the turf offered by Switzerland was planted in the lawn of the Federal Chancellery in Berlin.

The importance of this first World Cup victory and the narratives it produced may however have been over-emphasised by the new generation of historians who put everyday culture on the academic agenda towards the end of the century and published extensively on the "miracle of Berne" as of the commemoration of its 40th in 1994. In the 1950s, football certainly did not have the same penetration in German society as it has now. It did, however, already then possess an almost disproportionate symbolic meaning in a country where traditional symbols of national identity were met with distrust after the nationalist propaganda brainwash of the Third Reich. Football, like the D-Mark, filled this symbolic void in post-war West Germany, in compensation of what Wolfram Pyta called an "exceptional situation of symbolic devastation" (Pyta 2006, 2). The World Cup fitted well with the newly gained self-confidence during the years of the "economic miracle" in the 1950s.

Nation-Building on Both Sides of the Wall

All throughout the existence of what is now called the Bonn Republic (1949–1990) football had a strong impact on the formation of collective identity in a nation divided into two. In West Germany, both the *Nationalmannschaft* and the *Bundesliga* provided a reassuring and emblematic "imagined community" (Anderson 1983) in an overall rather fragile, often soul-searching democracy. Successive generations of star players, from Uwe Seeler to Franz Beckenbauer, Günter Netzer or Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, appeared to be good representatives of their respective decade's mood and values. In the 1970s academics and essayists increasingly became interested in the capacity and role of football as a producer of meaning for a society entering into late modernity (e.g. Harig and Kühn 1974; Hortleder 1974; or Lindner 1983). They triggered an intellectual discourse about football that has since then been firmly anchored and developed in the public sphere, initiated an extensive editorial activity, and reinforced the game's all-encompassing appreciation across social classes.

By the mid-1970s high-level football had become indissociable from West German self-perception (if not auto-stereotype), to the same extent as the

faith in the "Made in Germany" label, the almost obsessive concern with currency stability or the firmly held conviction to build the world's best and most reliable automobiles. Sport was also part and parcel of the process of reintegration into the international community. Obtaining the right to host the Olympics in 1972 and the World Cup in 1974 was widely perceived as evidence of rehabilitation a quarter century after the war, just like the Nobel prizes awarded to Willy Brand (for peace, in 1971) and Heinrich Böll (for literature, in 1972). When the *Nationalmannschaft* won its second World Cup in the Munich Olympic Stadium—once again against an overwhelming favourite and after having been down a goal right from the start of the game—the victory was widely perceived to be "in the logic of events", almost taken for granted by large parts of the population.

The 1974 World Cup was a watershed event with regard to the radical modernisation, commercialisation and globalisation of the game (Schiller 2014). In Germany, however, it is probably best remembered as one of the most remarkable sporting events of the Cold War, the only official football match between the national teams of West and East Germany. The surprise 1-0 victory of the GDR "*Auswahl*" (selection) in the first-round match in Hamburg was a good illustration of the competitiveness East German football had reached by the mid-70s, despite very humble beginnings (McDougall 2014). Some weeks before, 1.FC Magdeburg had won the European Cup Winner's Cup against AC Milan, and in 1976 the national team—officially composed of so-called *State Amateurs*—won the gold medal at the Olympic tournament in Montreal.

Football was, like in the West, the number one sport in East Germany in terms of popularity, attendance, and general public interest, despite the abundance of Olympic medals and heroes produced by other disciplines. Given that sport in general was a major tool for the young East German state's quest for legitimacy and international recognition, football should have been predestined for strong and consistent promotion by the authorities. The reality was, however, more ambiguous. While the GDR was quick to make best use of the chance to overcome international isolation and become embedded in international sporting networks made possible by the Europeanisation of football—it joined FIFA in 1952 and was an inaugural member of UEFA in 1954—direct confrontations with the "class enemy" in the West were conspicuously avoided and "something of an inferiority complex remained" until the 1980s (McDougall 2015, 556). At the same time, both the *Volkspolizei* and the *Stasi* appeared incapable of understanding and interpreting fan behaviour within East Germany, let along controlling the

surprisingly high number of hooligans (Dennis 2006), and thus "continuously alienated supporters" (Hesselmann and Ide 2006, 40).

As a result, football strongly contributed to nation building in the East, too, although in a different manner than hoped for by the state authorities. East German football fans developed great expertise in living flexible identities, taking sincere interest in their domestic championship—despite the often scandalous interference in favour of the Stasi-endorsed East Berlin side of BFC Dynamo (Leske 2004)—while following closely (and illegally) the *Bundesliga* on West German television, travelling to locations in Central and Eastern Europe in order to support Bayern Munich and other West German top teams in their European Cup games, and taking pride in West German footballing success overall. There was nothing schizophrenic in relishing the victory against the big-mouthed Western neighbours on that famous Hamburg night at the 1974 World Cup and rejoicing in the West German's final victory at the same tournament only two weeks later.

After German reunification and the ensuing reintegration of East German clubs and regional federations into the structures of the DFB, it became quickly clear that the economic potential of established West German professionalism was bound to push former East German football bastions into a slow decline. If clubs like Hansa Rostock or Energie Cottbus managed to uphold the illusion of the valiant underdogs keeping their place in the *Bundesliga* against all odds, there was no antidote against losing talent to the West. Matthias Sammer, until today the last German player to have won the *Ballon d'Or* for the best European footballer of the year (1996), did not become German champion with his home club Dynamo Dresden, but with VfB Stuttgart as a player in 1992 and with Borussia Dortmund as head coach in 2002. And Michael Ballack, the star player of the last generation raised and trained behind the Iron Curtain, won three League titles and cups with Bayern Munich before joining Chelsea FC. In the 2017–2018 season, the only Eastern club in the *Bundesliga* is an entirely new creation: RB Leipzig was established in 2009 only, almost two decades after the end of the GDR, and has since moved up the ladder to the top-flight of German football. Concerning the traditional clubs of East Germany, only three of them play in 2nd division and six others in 3rd division.

Paradoxically it may be argued that East German football has today, a quarter century after reunification, a stronger impact on a distinctly East German identity than during the existence of the GDR. Over the last fifteen years there has been a flurry of book publications on the history (and histories) of East German football (e.g. Baingo and Horn 2003; Willmann 2004;

Leske 2004, 2007; Horn and Weise 2004). These have visibly met with a strong demand for preserving the memory of a past era and making sense of a feeling of collective nostalgia for a shared everyday culture.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

Bayern Munich vs. the Rest of Germany

Like other traditional football nations, Germany has its fair share of club rivalries. And according to the logic of the "Derby", the most important rivalries oppose clubs from the same city—mainly major regional capitals—or from neighbouring communities in larger conurbations. The capital, however, is an exception to this pattern: isolated and divided over four decades, Berlin does not have two clubs of comparable appeal as can be found in Rome, Madrid or Lisbon, let alone multiple traditional rivalries like London, Vienna or Istanbul. For the time being, the flagship club of West Berlin, Hertha BSC (whose home ground is the Olympic Stadium built for the 1936 Olympic Games and host of the 2006 World Cup final) is without a local rival in the top-tier of German football. Should its Eastern counterpart 1.FC Union Berlin manage to establish itself in the Bundesliga, the potential for a very particular, history-loaded rivalry would no doubt exist. Given the relatively limited economic potential of Berlin, the prospects of this happening remain rather slim.

The fiercest rivalries are therefore to be found in other important urban areas. In historical perspective, the first one that attracted nation-wide attention was the derby between the clubs of Nuremberg and its suburb Fürth, which dominated the championship in the 1920s. Other derbies became famous because of the differences—real or imagined—between the socio-economic categories to which certain clubs appealed. While Bayern Munich was said to have a rather bourgeois following, TSV Munich of 1860 saw itself as a working-class club. The same could be said of the very "chic" Hamburg SV and its distinctly leftist local rival, FC Sankt Pauli. Other urban rivalries at top-level could intermittently be found in Cologne (FC vs. Fortuna) or Stuttgart (VfB vs Kickers). Hardly any of these oppositions have preserved their relevance, since these clubs do not play in the same League anymore and, given the economics of contemporary football, the respective underdogs are no longer likely to be able to catch up with their richer neighbours.

Except in the Ruhr region, of course. This almost uninterrupted industrial conurbation of over 50 municipalities and 5 million inhabitants has been called "the land of the 1000 derbies" (Hering 2002), and is still host to the most passionate of German football rivalries, FC Schalke 04 against Borussia Dortmund. These two clubs, located at a mere half-hour drive from each other, have won fifteen German championships between them. They are hosted in two of Germany's finest stadia with a capacity of 62,000 and 81,000 respectively, and are each owned by over 140,000 club members (which ranks them fourth and fifth biggest sports clubs worldwide in terms of membership). It is not exaggerated to say that the "Ruhr derbies", as they are known, are highlights of each season, and the half-ironical, half-serious rhetoric of mutual inferiorisation that accompanies each of the matches in the media are followed with amused smiles by football fans across the nation.

Germany never really had a long-standing "duopoly" like Spain or Scotland. In the 1970s, FC Bayern Munich and Borussia Mönchengladbach simultaneously emerged on the top-level due to the coincidence of a "golden generation" of players evenly spread across the two teams. Their decade-long rivalry—between 1969 and 1981 they won eleven championships between them—produced a massive discourse on their respective "style". Bayern was portrayed as cold-blooded, defensive and purely result-oriented, while the Borussia squad, tenderly nick-named "foals" were celebrated as playing an enthusiastic, attacking and aesthetically pleasing football, a dichotomy for which an unbiased retrospective analysis would have trouble finding hard evidence (Havemann 2013). The Bayern vs. Mönchengladbach rivalry, however, was not sustainable, given the huge asymmetry in economic power between the glamourous Bavarian metropolis—self-proclaimed "secret capital of Germany"—and the modest town in the lower Rhineland close to the Dutch border. While the former reinforced its stronghold on German club football—winning more than half of the championships since 1969—the latter inevitably entered a period of decline and spent considerable periods in second division.

In recent years the sportive and economic renaissance of Borussia Dortmund provided a new regular challenger to arch-dominant Bayern Munich. Regular confrontations between the two clubs on top-level—including several Cup finals and even one Champions League final—enabled the media to construct a pseudo '*clasico*' ('*Klassiker*'). The imaginary "authenticity" of Borussia as the miners' club from the economically distressed industrial city in the Ruhr was artificially blown up in order to contrast with the embodiment of rational management at Bayern, whose

accumulated wealth allowed the club to systematically weaken all potential competitors by ruthlessly luring promising talent and even established stars from other clubs. The "*Klassiker*"—discourse does, however, not make much sense: there is no tangible historical dimension to this opposition of two top-tier European clubs that hardly differ anyway in their practices and ambitions.

Actually, the lack of a real long-term rival to Bayern Munich is becoming a serious problem for the attractiveness of the Bundesliga. In 2017, the club won its fifth championship in a row, an unprecedented event in German football history. And there is little reason to believe this dominance is likely to weaken any time soon.

The New Fault Lines

There are, however, new rivalries that have emerged over recent years among supporters and that run much deeper than the old antagonisms between neighbouring clubs. These new fault lines run between clubs that are perceived to be "*Traditions-Klubs*"—in other words, all those household names of German football history that were created at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century—and relatively new ventures that are perceived to be created for business purposes only, have no long-established fan base, and seem to consecrate the "rule of money". The two most conspicuous examples of such "test tube clubs" are TSG Hoffenheim and RB Leipzig.

Hoffenheim is a small village in Southwestern Germany, which happens to be the home club of Dietmar Hopp, a billionaire philanthropist who had made his fortune in the software industry. Since its accession to the Bundesliga in 2008—thanks to the money injected by its president, but also brilliant management and an excellent youth academy—the club has been the object of much slandering and vilification by traditional supporters. RB Leipzig is considered even worse by many. Launched and owned by the Austrian *Red Bull* energy drink company, the club is considered the incarnation of an entirely "artificial" creation and its legitimacy is aggressively contested by supporters across the country. In spring 2017 a red line was crossed by Borussia Dortmund supporters who violently aggressed a peaceful crowd of visitors from Leipzig on their way to the stadium.

There is a good deal of inconsistency in the wrath with which a large number of supporters virulently defend "tradition" against "commerce". TSG Hoffenheim is not a new creation: the club was founded as early as

1899, it only played on a low level for most of its existence. And RB Leipzig has brought top-level football back into a city and region that had a long-standing tradition: Leipzig was where the DFB was founded in 1900 and (the no longer existing) VfB Leipzig was the first ever German champion in 1903.

As irrational as the supporters' fury may appear, it becomes understandable in the context of the so-called 50 + 1 rule' that plays an important role in German football's self-perception.

The 50 + 1 Rule

The 50 + 1 rule is a feature of German club governance that is considered exemplary by many organised football supporters around the continent (García and Zheng 2017). It provides supporters, who are fee-paying members of their club, with a say in the club's affairs. The 50 + 1 rule stipulates that a football club, i.e. in principle an association made up by equal members, has to hold at least 50% of the total votes plus one vote within the Annual General Assembly, regardless of whether the professional football department has been established as a separate capital company or not. This means that control has to remain with the club and, eventually, with its members. The only exceptions to this rule are corporate clubs with a long tradition, such as Bayer 04 Leverkusen of VfL Wolfsburg (the latter founded and owned by the Volkswagen AG).

The 50 + 1 rule is clearly dissuasive for foreign corporate or private investors. This may lead in theory to a competitive disadvantage in terms of capital, but its maintenance has protected German football from takeovers by investors with a focus on return on investment and little or no interest in local traditions, as can be found in the English Premier League for instance. For the time being, the rule has withstood all attempts to abolish it, although it is of course a fragile relic of not-for-profit civil society associations in an age where rules of "free and undistorted competition" apply in a transnational market. It does, however, play a role in "preserving the soul" of German football, and is perceived as such by the supporters.

Against this backdrop, both Hoffenheim and Leipzig, while paying lip-service in their statutes to the 50 + 1 rule, are perceived by supporters of traditional clubs as the undertakers of a football that is not only ruled by financial interests. The anger that is—often inappropriately—articulated in protests against these two clubs is but the expression of a widely shared premonition that German football is about to "sell its soul".

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

Political and Social Impact

As has become clear from this chapter already, football has, ever since its introduction and for various reasons linked to the vicissitudes of German history, always had an extraordinary political impact on German society. This is not likely to change over the coming years in a country where the female chancellor happily takes selfies in the national team's dressing room.

Within its 21 regional federations and more than 25,000 clubs, the DFB counts a total of over 7 million members in 2017 (over one million of whom are female). Given this figure, it is hardly surprising that football is omnipresent in the German public sphere. It is, of course, a major topic in the tabloid press, but also dealt with on the cultural pages of major quality papers. It feeds a voluminous output in scholarly and journalistic book publications and is seriously reported upon in all mainstream audio-visual media. But most of all, football has given German society an opportunity to redefine itself.

Midsummer Night's Tales

Much has been written about the 2006 World Cup held in German and the many surprises it held in store for everybody, including the Germans themselves. The joyful spirit of the entire event was due to a particularly lucky combination of circumstances: the sincere hospitality nourished by the wish to overcome traditional stereotypes against "humourless", overly "disciplined" and altogether "sullen" Germans; the unexpected performance of an exuberant and competitive host team spectacularly revamped by the coaching tandem Jürgen Klinsmann and Joachim Löw and offering a high potential for identification; the explosion of public viewing and the invention of large-scale "fan miles"; the "party patriotism" displayed by a public eager to re-appropriate their national symbols in an enthusiastic but light-hearted manner; not to forget the exceptionally sunny weather—everything came together to make of this World Cup a re-invention of twenty-first century Germany.

The term "*Sommermärchen*" ("summer tale"), launched by a *Spiegel* headline during the tournament, imposed itself almost naturally with its numerous semantic connotations (Raithel 2014), and was further consolidated by the very successful movie (and book) "*Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen*" by Sönke Wortmann about the inner life of the *Nationalmannschaft*.

Interpretations of the event may of course vary, between warnings of an upsurge of assertive nationalism funnelled by football and a post-modern perspective on spectator behaviour. A certain scepticism about the long-term sociocultural heritage of such mega-events is also justified. What remains, however, is that football offered German society what all the political and diplomatic endeavour and merits of its post-war governments never managed to fully achieve: a collective experience of "normalisation". The relief about what I called elsewhere "the unbearable lightness of belonging" (Sonntag 2008b) turned this World Cup into a highly political event, which will be fondly remembered for the numerous "photos in the family photo album" that it has left in collective memory (Sonntag 2007a, b).

Other summer nights' tales followed. In 2010, the world discovered a multicultural German squad whose ethnic composition had been greatly altered by the mid-term impact of the new citizenship law voted in 1999 by the newly elected government coalition of Social Democrats and Greens. At the French World Cup in 1998, the French press had labelled the German team "white, old, and tired" (Haget 1998); twelve years later they celebrated the "*United Colors of Germany*" (*France Football*, 22 June 2010) and the ethnic diversity of their neighbour's new "*Inter-Nationalmannschaft*" (Champel 2010).

Within Germany the integration of players with migrant origins in the national team was widely perceived as a logical consequence of their integration in grassroots football and youth elite teams. It helped, of course, that thanks to the deep-reaching reform of the DFB's talent detection and youth training system launched in 2000 the playing style of the new Germany was pleasant, on high technical level, and overall spectacular, without betraying the famous "old German virtues". When the team finally crowned its series of good performances in international tournaments with the World Champion title in 2014, a rather exceptional case study of social change had been brought to a happy ending.

After decades of stubborn ideological insistence on the *ius sanguinis* against evidence that Germany was de facto a destination of mass immigration, the speed with which German society has overall accepted and adopted ethnic and cultural diversity as a positively connoted value reflecting the demographic reality of the country is quite surprising. It may reasonably be argued that football has played a greater role in this evolution than many would suspect (see in detail Sonntag 2015). In the FREE survey 80% of the Germans agreed or strongly agreed with the claim that "players with migrant background in national teams make an important contribution to social

integration in the countries they play for" (FREE 2014), a significantly higher score than, for instance, in France and Britain.

Supporters and Stakeholders

Another field, in which German football may be considered playing a leading role is the established and regular dialogue with its most important stakeholders, organised supporters. This has not always been so. Both the DFB and clubs had, for many decades, a rather ambivalent relationship with football fans, especially with critical supporter groups like the leftist *Bündnis aktiver Fußball-Fans* (*BAFF*), which has been instrumental, since the end of the 1990s, in forcing the national federation to face its own past and raising awareness on the side of the clubs for current problems like persisting racism and discrimination, neo-Nazi movements and violence.

Dialogue with organised fan representatives has been institutionalised and seems to work overall very well, even though topics like the use of pyrotechnical devices and recent developments like increased security controls or fixtures and kick-off times dictated by television remain sources of friction. Thanks to this collaboration, die-hard German football fans still can enjoy their game on their beloved standing terraces, even in stadiums that need to be transformed into all-seaters for the European mid-week- fixtures. One of the best-known and most commendable fan-oriented initiatives is the so-called *Koordinationsstelle Fanprojekte* (*KOS*), which provides logistical support and know-how for social projects run by local fan groups, in collaboration (and co-financing) with the public authorities.

Constructive collaboration with open-minded, socially active supporters has yielded tangible results. Over the last fifteen years the Bundesliga has seen expressions of violence, racism and discrimination diminish significantly, due mainly to the patient self-regulation of fans rather than mere repression by the authorities (UNESCO 2015). Overall, as a large number of foreign visitors attest in articles and blogposts (see for instance Jackson 2010; or Williams 2015), it is not exaggerated to say that the Bundesliga stadium experience is today among the safest and most enjoyable in the world.

4   Contemporary Issues

If German football appears overall in rather good shape, none of its main actors has reasons to be complacent.

Ethical Credibility

The federation itself is currently seriously shaken by revelations in the wake of the recent FIFA scandals, and the German public discovers that its fondly remembered "summer fairy tale" of 2006 may have been obtained with the help of bribery and million-dollar payments that seem to be impossible to backtrack.

DFB President Wolfgang Niersbach, former (2001–2006) Vice-president of the German World Cup Organising Committee, had to resign in November 2015; and football legend Franz Beckenbauer is under increased pressure to be more transparent about his own role and behaviour in the bidding process. The current president Reinhard Grindel, a former journalist and Member of Parliament, is now facing the task of establishing new ethical guidelines, making sure they are respected, and recovering the organisation's good reputation over time.

Social Challenges

The greatest immediate challenge for German football is, however, a social one. An industry that reports a turnover of €2.62 bn produced by the 36 professional clubs of the first two divisions and their more than 50,000 employees (DFL 2016) can of course not escape questions about its corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its behaviour with regard to the various dimensions of sustainable development. Between 2010 and 2013, the DFB engaged in a rather exemplary self-assessment according to the international criteria of the "Global Reporting Initiative" (GRI) and published a complete sustainability report (DFB 2013). There seems, however, to have been no follow-up in this field, since the Sustainability Commission was dissolved shortly afterwards. Overall, German football—neither the federal instances nor the clubs themselves—does not yet seem to have any consistent long-term CSR strategy. Social commitment, often delegated to modestly endowed foundations, oscillates, as journalist Ronny Blaschke put it in his recent detailed inventory, between "helping hands and hypocrisy" (Blaschke 2016).

Moreover, football, as global cultural practice without linguistic borders, is necessarily called to play a major role in welcoming many of the over one million refugees and asylum seekers who have entered Germany since 2015. In collaboration with the German government's Commissary for Migration, Refugees and Integration, the DFB has launched, through its Egidius-Braun Foundation,

a large-scale initiative named "1-0 to open arms" ("*1:0 für ein Willkommen*") supporting in a quick and un-bureaucratic manner—membership fees, local transport, language courses, insurance, kits and boots etc.—grassroots clubs in their initiatives in favour of establishing an initial contact between these newly arrived migrants and the host country's civil society.

The tremendous success of this initiative notwithstanding—in just eighteen months more than 3000 amateur clubs have applied for help and obtained support—the federation and its foundation are well aware of the fact that the need for concerted action will remain (if not grow) and that a long-term follow-up on the initial measures taken will be required if a sustainable social integration of these individuals is to be attained.

The Fight Against Hooliganism

In Germany, the fight against hooliganism is always at the same time a fight against the influence of neo-Nazi groups in the stadiums. In 1993, the standing commission of the sixteen federal ministers of the interior launched the "National Concept for Sport and Security" (NKSS), which brought all stakeholders around the table for a coordinated programme. Since then, the NKSS has been continuously updated. While its overall success is extremely encouraging, especially with regard to the steady decline of hooliganism, German football would be well advised to avoid all complacency. As a recent, rather exhaustive, edited volume on the dark side of German football has shown, neo-Nazism raises its ugly head again and violent groups dominate the discourse in entire stadia, especially at some lower-league clubs (Endemann et al. 2016). Even at international tournaments, the federation and the authorities will need to remain vigilant in order to avoid a repetition of the violent assault against the French police officer Daniel Nivel at the 1998 World Cup. The continuous fight against football-related violence in its various forms, as well as against racism and discrimination of all sorts in football stadia, is one of the Central social challenges that German football needs to be aware of over the forthcoming decades.

It may of course be argued that it is not football's role to solve society's most urgent problems. But football, as this chapter has shown, has a particular place in the heart of German society. Its fantastic development has benefited much from historical circumstances, and its current economic weight is due to what was referred to as an exceptional "love affair" in the introduction to this text. If there is one country where it is only coherent to assign a good deal of social responsibility to football and to expect that

football authorities and clubs give something back to the society that helps them flourish, it must be the Federal Republic of Germany.

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Greece and Cyprus

Christos Kassimeris

The nation-building qualities of the game of football are better reflected in Eric Hobsbawm's remark, suggesting that any nation is best represented in "a team of eleven named people" (Hobsbawm 1990, 43). More graphically, perhaps, Richard Giulianotti noted that "Football matches involve two teams that represent specific geographical and cultural identities. Football clubs establish cultural identities through rivalry and opposition. […] The meanings of these football rivalries have tended to be underpinned by deeper historical and cultural divisions" (Giulianotti 1999, 10). It is precisely these historical and cultural divisions, the kind of rivalry and opposition that the game of football is ingrained with, that allow considerable room for political interference. Needless to say, the case of football in Greece and Cyprus differs little, if any at all.

Greece and Cyprus share a common political and historical past and thus the joint venture in exploring the development of the popular game of football in these two countries. Marred by wars, ethnocentric struggle, and political turmoil, the history of both Greece and Cyprus is often accurately depicted on the rich canvas that is the sport of football. The historical part of this chapter, in particular, attempts a semiotic analysis (in disguise),

C. Kassimeris (✉)
The School of Humanities, Social and Education Sciences,
European University Cyprus, Engomi, Cyprus
e-mail: c.kassimeris@euc.ac.cy

casually employed to examine the richness of symbolism clearly illustrated on club crests and badges so to exemplify the historico-cultural link between the two countries.

1   Political Origins of Football

Greece

The game of football arrived in Greece at the very beginning of the twentieth century much because of the all-pervading English influence, political and otherwise. By the early 1920s football had expanded throughout the country during what was quite a tumultuous period of time for Greek nationalism. In essence, the Asia Minor catastrophe not only coincided with the development of the popular game in Greece (Bogiopoulos and Milakas 2005, 192), but had also facilitated its development. That was because of the massive waves of Greek migrants returning to their motherland and, as a consequence, the intense urbanisation of the capital city Athens and the largest city of northern Greece Thessaloniki (Bogiopoulos and Milakas 2005, 194–195). As history dictates, the arriving migrants set up associations devoted to all things cultural in order to commemorate the lost homelands. As a matter of fact, those were cultural associations destined to celebrate old traditions and featured dance clubs, poetry clubs and gymnastics, and in some cases included the predecessors of the first football clubs in Greece. Such was the case of *Athlitiki Enosi Konstantinoupoleos* (AEK, originally based in Constantinople), *Apollon Smyrnis* and *Panionios Gymnastikos Syllogos Smyrnis* (both founded in Smyrna) in Athens, whereas Thessaloniki became the new home of *Panthessalonikios Athlitikos Omilos Konstantinoupoliton* (*PAOK*), representing the migrant community from Constantinople, *Iraklis*, *Aris*, and *Apollon Kalamarias*, to name a few. Interestingly, the choice of colours of most football clubs was anything but accidental for they denoted more often than not political ideology. In point of fact, clubs inclined to the political right played in blue, just as red was a symbol of the revival (rebirth) of a community. Along similar lines, certain football club names featured either the word *Asteras*—Greek for "star"—or *Anagennisi* to reflect a community's rebirth (actually, *anagennisi* translates better into renaissance).

Cyprus

As in the case of Greece, the game of football was also introduced to Cyprus by the English in the early twentieth century during the times of colonialism. It gained considerable popularity with the founding members of the early clubs, since they were members of the educated elite, also associated to the Church and in favour of union with Greece–even though some Cypriots promoted the idea of Cyprus' independence. Similar to the development of football in Greece, again, those early clubs functioned more like cultural societies, given that their activities aimed predominantly at promoting Greek values and ideals through music, poetry and theatre, as well as athletics (football). By 1934, the Cyprus Football Association was founded and the first national League was set up. When the Cyprus Communist Party was set up in 1926, it exploited the presence of those cultural societies in order to promote the Communist ideology on the island and by the late 1930s the Communist party had succeeded in drawing the attention of the working class in Cyprus. The party gained unparalleled popularity to the extent where AKEL (*Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou*—Progressive Party of Working People) was set up in 1941, thus replacing the old and rigid Communist party of Cyprus, for the sole purpose of recruiting those communists that did not follow the hardcore Marxist ideology of its predecessor. In view of the all-expanding AKEL, right-wing politics in Cyprus was conducted by the Cypriot National Party (*Kipriako Ethniko Komma*), with the two ideological rivals defending their political objectives in all things Cypriot, including football. Their ideological clash was soon heightened, reaching its peak during the civil war in Greece (1946–1949).

2   Historical Club Rivalries

To better assess the content of the various historical club rivalries, the following section of this chapter is devoted to an exploration of the conditions under which certain football clubs were founded and will provide a modest semiotic analysis of each club's football badge.

Greece

In Smyrna, a club named *Orfeas Smyrnis* was formed in 1890 in order to serve the needs of the local Greek community, as well as to promote the

Hellenic culture and values. The club's life and overall activities came to a sudden end, nevertheless, due to the Asia Minor catastrophe of 1922. The club's members were forced to return to Greece, with those settling in Athens taking the decision to form *Apollon Smyrnis*. Initially, the emblem of the club displayed a symbol that was closely associated to that of the swastika. As soon as the Second World War came to an end and sporting activities were resumed in Greece, the club's officials replaced the original emblem with the head of ancient god Apollo on a blue-and-white background, thus reflecting the colours of the Greek national flag.

City rivals, by today's sporting standards, *Panionios Gymnastikos Syllogos Smyrnis* features a badge that holds little heraldic significance, if anything; nevertheless, it is the club's name that makes direct reference to the historical land of Ionia where Smyrna—İzmir in Turkish—is located. The city of Smyrna in Asia Minor was home to a sports club named *Orfeas Smyrnis*, as mentioned above. Identical to the history of *Apollon Smyrnis*, some of the Greeks that had founded *Orfeas Smyrnis* and were forced to repatriate decided to form *Panionions GSS* in Athens. The club's badge displays its red-and-blue colours in what is a red shield with a diagonal blue stripe displaying the club's initials, with its first name near the top of the shield and the year of foundation at the bottom. Interestingly, red represents the blood that was spilled during the Asia Minor catastrophe, just as blue symbolises the sea of the port-city of Smyrna. Today, *Panionios* claims the title of the oldest Greek football club and is known as *Istorikos* (historical).

Moving from Smyrna to Constantinople, another migrant club is *AEK Athens*. The club's origins can be traced back to 1875 when the Greek population in the district of Galata in Constantinople formed the sports club Hermes, named after the Greek god that was the messenger of all Olympian gods, but also god of commerce (thus representing the thriving Greek community of tradesmen) and protector of athletes among other things. As in other similar cases, the club's main role was to promote a sense of collective identity among those that comprised the local Greek community and to safeguard Hellenism. Hermes' activities, too, were disrupted by the Asia Minor catastrophe, forcing again its members to migrate to Greece. Those who decided to settle in Athens aimed at resuming their sporting activities and formed *AEK Athens*. The initials of the club stand for *Athlitiki Enosis Konstantinoupoleos*, which translates into Athletic Union of Constantinople, thus maintaining the all-important historical, as well as spiritual, links with the lost homeland. It is the club's badge, however, that merits discussion for it displays a double-headed eagle with spread wings against a yellow background. History suggests that the double-headed eagle is almost by

definition associated with the Byzantine Empire and symbolises the religious and secular authority of the emperor. In some way re-enacting the conditions that its founders had to endure a century ago, *AEK Athens* is today "homeless", playing its matches at the Olympic stadium of Athens.

The history of *Panthessalonikios Athlitikos Omilos Konstantinoupoliton* (*PAOK*) can be also traced back to the same club Hermes in Constantinople, with a pretty much similar account concerning how Greek migrants from Asia Minor set up *PAOK* in Thessaloniki. Originally, the badge of the newly formed club displayed a shamrock—each one of the four leaves featuring one of the club's initials—and a horseshoe, both artefacts known to symbolise good fortune and, therefore, the people's longing for a better future. The club's history dictates that *PAOK* merged with local rivals *AEK Thessalonikis*, another club founded by migrants, with the badge changing to the present-day double-headed eagle with folded wings in black-and-white, with black symbolising the grieving of the lost homeland and white representing hope.

Yet another club founded by Greek migrants is *Apollon Kalamarias*. The club was founded in 1926 by Pontians of Greek origin that settled, originally, in northern Greece immediately after the population exchange between Greece and Turkey. During its early days, the club was more devoted to cultural aspects of the local society, clearly aiming at the revival of the Pontians' traditions in Greece, but when the footballing department was set up it overshadowed all other activities. The club's badge displays the ancient Olympian god Apollo against a red-and-black background, the colours of the club symbolising the blood (red) of those who suffered at the hands of the Ottoman Turks and the sorrow (black) for the lost homeland, respectively.

Perhaps the most successful Greek football club is *Olympiacos Syndesmos Filathlon Pirea*. Claiming a humbly background, the club was founded after Piraeus FC and Piraeus Fan Club merged in 1925. Assuming the role of Cassandra, the ancient destiny teller, the founders of the newly formed club decorated its badge with a slightly bent head of a young adult crowned with laurel wreaths, therefore, symbolising ever-lasting success in the glory of Olympian terms. Interestingly, the club plays its football at the Georgios Karaiskakis stadium, named after a national hero of the 1821 revolution who was captured by the Ottoman Turks and died the horrible death of impalement. Bitter rivals *Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos* was founded in 1908 by English bankers, with its badge displaying a shamrock of unknown origins.

The origins of *Iraklis Thessalonikis* (Heracles or Hercules, in English) are traced back to the end of the nineteenth century when a sports club named Olympia and the Friends of Art Club (Leschi Filotehnon), comprising the local intelligentsia, assumed an instrumental role in developing

Thessaloniki's cultural life. The two clubs merged in 1908 and founded Iraklis. Originally, the club was known as *Othomaniko Elliniko Somateio Irakli Thessalonikis*, or else Ottoman Hellenic Club Iraklis Thessalonikis. The club's badge displays the mighty Heracles, son of Zeus (the King of Olympian Gods), on a blue-and-white background in what is, of course, the national colours of Greece. Soon after *Iraklis Thessalonikis* was founded, its arch-rival *Aris Thessalonikis* was set up in 1914. The club is obviously named after the ancient Greek god of war, Aris, with its name being the only available choice for and was, most probably, purposefully selected to competing against local rivals *Iraklis Thessalonikis*, since ancient Greek mythology dictates that Heracles and Aris were bitter enemies. The club's colours, yellow-and-black, derive from those of the Byzantine Empire.

Unlike most other Greek football clubs addressed above, *Athlitiki Enosi Larisas*, founded in 1964, was neither founded by Greek migrants from Asia Minor, nor does it relate to lost homelands. The club's badge displays an imposing horse raised on its hindlegs in a, seemingly, restless and defiant posture. According to local history and myths, the early settlers in the wider area of Thessaly dominated the surrounding plains with little effort simply by making good use of horses. Considering the fact that the first horse riders in ancient Greece came from the very same region, it is certainly no coincidence that the mythical creatures that were the centaurs have the very same geographical background. As a matter of fact, Greek mythology dictates that the centaurs "were often portrayed in Greece as the opponents of the Lapiths, a (human) tribe of the mountains of Thessaly: drunken centaurs had tried to abduct Lapith women" (Biedermann 1994, 62).

On a final note, as regards semiotics in Greek football, the Hellenic Football Federation, founded in 1926, sports an emblem displaying a ball in blue-and-white with the map of Greece at the centre. The emblem decorating the football shirts of the national team features the national flag of Greece, which consists of a cross that symbolises Christianity and nine blue-and-white horizontal lines that stand for "freedom or death," *Ελευθερία ή θάνατος* in Greek, taking into account the motto's nine syllabuses (E $_{(1)}$ λευ $_{(2)}$ θε $_{(3)}$ ρί $_{(4)}$ α $_{(5)}$ ή $_{(6)}$ θά $_{(7)}$ να $_{(8)}$ τος $_{(9)}$). Ultimately, Greek football supporters in the 1980s and early 1990s gradually came to occupy "curves of terraces located behind the goalposts … and behaved as they possessed the curves endowing them with symbols and meanings" (Zaimakis 2016, 4).

As concerns historical club rivalries in Greece, though much is said in and around football stadia or among football circles, very little is actually documented. The two obvious divides in Greek football, nevertheless, are the Athens vs. Piraeus clash, or else *Olympiacos Syndesmos Filathlon Pirea* vs.

Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos and the more widespread North vs. South, much in the same way that Italian football is divided geographically. In both instances, these two divides can be traced back to the social, political and economic conditions that characterised Greece during the interwar period, when Greek society as a whole was divided along similar lines much because class division and the essence of locality had become had gained tremendous significance (Bogiopoulos and Milakas 2005, 195–196).

Cyprus

In a similar account, the badges of a certain number of Greek-Cypriot football clubs reveal considerable detail about the kind of politicisation that the popular game has witnessed on the island. In contrast to the ideological background of the right-wing *APOEL*, the badge of *Omonoia* is highly symbolic given that it displays a green shamrock, with the colour green representing hope, while the shamrock itself is a symbol of harmony, therefore, reflecting the name of the club itself (the Greek word *omonoia* translates into concord, peace and harmony). The club badge of *APOEL*, on the other hand, may have no symbolic connotation in particular. Instead, it is the club's full name, Athletic Football Club of Nicosia's Greeks, that is noteworthy for it makes explicit references to the ethnocentric character of the club by emphasising its sheer Greekness. As a matter of fact, members of *APOEL* played a key role in the liberation struggle of EOKA (*Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston*, National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) against the British, including a Michalis Karaolis who was hanged by the local British authorities.

In general, the issue of the Greek identity is apparent on the badge of a large number of Greek-Cypriot football clubs. Certainly puzzling to any one considered illiterate in the field of geography, the badge of *Ethnikos Achnas* displays the map of Greece with Cyprus geographically located South in the Aegean Sea and right above Crete, clearly reflecting the Cypriots' long-held aspiration for union with motherland Greece. In much the same notion, the badge of *Enosis Neon Paralamniou* features the Parthenon on the Acropolis of Athens in Greece and a Greek soldier blowing a horn. Apart from the obvious Greekness of the club, the type of soldier displayed on the club's badge relates to the times when Greece was occupied by Ottoman Turkey, a bitter enemy throughout history to both countries. Along the same lines, the badge of *Apollon Limassol* displays the ancient Greek god of poetry and music, just as the badge of *Athlitiki Enosi Kitiou Larnacas* depicts the head

of Kimon, a well-known Athenian general who took charge of organising the defence of the ancient city of Kition, near Larnaca, against the military machine of the mighty Persian King Xerxes.

Among the Greek-Cypriot football clubs the badge of which reflects part of the history of Cyprus the one of *Athlitiki Enosi Paphou* certainly stands out considering that it displays the local hero Evagoras Pallikarides, known for his active role within EOKA's ranks and its anti-colonial struggle. For the record, Pallikarides had the same fate with Karaolis, mentioned above. The club *Digenis Akritas* has a badge that displays the legendary hero Digenis, the local myth portraying him as the giant who grabbed hold of Mount Pentadaktylos as he leaped over to Turkey in pursuit of Saracen pirates. Finally, *Anorthosis Ammohostou* displays a badge that displays "a phoenix rising from the ashes, an image redolent with political symbolism" (Duke and Crolley 1996, 80).

With regard to historical club rivalries in Cyprus, again, little, if anything, has been documented. One assumption that could be drawn from the above relates almost exclusively to the degree of politicisation of the game of football in Cyprus. Historically, political conditions in Cyprus, even predating the island's independence, clearly suggest that the local society has been consistently divided across the political spectrum between "left" and "right". In this respect, football clubs (and, of course, their fans) inclined to leftist political parties have over the years developed a rivalry with football clubs leaning to right-wing politics, with *Omonoia* (left) and *APOEL* (right) being the most passionate expressers of this ideological opposition. For instance, when the two clubs meet, the part of the stadium that hosts *Omonoia* fans is decorated by banners decorated with images of the internationally renowned Marxist revolutionary Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, the Communist symbol that is the hammer-and-sickle, and flags of Cyprus. On the other hand, what *APOEL* fans bring into the stadium usually include banners featuring the image of EOKA leader Georgios Grivas, the fascist symbol that is the swastika and flags of Greece. In other words, the political/football rivalry between these two football clubs has a rather strong element of ethnocentrism too.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

Greece

Greek football witnessed its greatest success at club level during the period of the 1967–1974 dictatorship, when *Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos* reached the 1971 European Cup final, the precursor of modern-day

Champions League, and was defeated at the hands (or rather feet) of the more illustrious AFC Ajax in what was the first ever European triumph of the Dutch club, with more to follow in the next two consecutive football seasons. Victories of historic proportions they definitely were, that is the elimination of English club Everton FC and Yugoslav side Red Star Belgrade on the way to the Wembley Stadium final, the success of *Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos* was overshadowed (and, still, is disputed today) by allegations of match-fixing. Taking into serious account the fact that the all-important evidence to support such a theory remains absent, researchers are limited to making hypotheses with regard to the Greek dictators' appetite for international recognition. For what it's worth, as regards their overall influence on the popular game at national level, the Greek dictators demanded that football commentators made use of Greek football terminology during match day, while referees were requested not to dismiss football players during the first and last ten minutes of the game in order not to aggravate the fans. Just as the first measure intended to nationalise the game of football, the second one aimed at preventing incidents that could well turn an ordinary football match into an unwelcome protest and, possibly, clashes between football fans and security forces (Bogiopoulos and Milakas 2005, 205).

From the 1980s onwards, the football spectacle in Greece was almost completely revamped as "organized fans appeared in the stadium curves. The phenomenon had emerged in Western countries, especially Italy, England and Spain and diffused in Greece by students abroad who carried home new patterns of fan behaviour. In addition, reportage of furious ultras fans in mass media and athletic press excited the interest of football society. The rise of the Greek fanatics was associated with the intensification of state apparatus surveillance in the terraces in the 1980s and, mainly, in the early 1990s, when police started to separate opponent fans in terraces setting railings among them in distinguished gates" (Zaimakis 2016, 4). Despite various fans' attempts to set up extreme right movements among their club's following (e.g. *Nazi Organization of Panatinaikos Fans* in the late 1970s, *Terrorist Organisation of AEK Supporters* in the early 1980s) they were swiftly marginalised by the football authorities, clubs and fans alike. Left-wing formations such as the Communist youth of KNE, on the other hand, maintained their position that football only helped promote the working people's alienation, nevertheless, football's apparent popularity could not be ignored and, therefore, the first left-wing fan movements were set up (e.g. *Original 21* among AEK Athens supporters).

In the 1990s, Greek football became more ethnocentric as "the mass immigration from the countries of ex-communist regimes in the Balkans to

Greece strengthened nationalist ideas, xenophobia and racism" (Zaimakis 2016, 6). The football matches of the national football team of Greece soon attracted an extreme right following that echoed the nationalistic, racist and xenophobic ideology reflected in the manifesto of the Golden Dawn political party. Two football matches, in particular, stand out for the kind of hostility that was demonstrated by a section of Greek fans against historico-political rivals Turkey (1990) and Albania (1999). Nationalism maintained a strong position among Greek football fans into the new millennium with the 2004 success in winning the EURO competition in Portugal sending national football (and nationalistic fervour) to unparalleled heights. By the end of the 2000s, the Right-Left political division of Greek football also reflected the divisions in Greek society, following the rapid decline of the country's economy. Football was hardly a sports spectacle alone, given the degree of politicisation that characterises Greek society ever since.

Cyprus

Taking into account the special relationship that characterises the two countries, the civil war in Greece had a lot of impact upon the political life in Cyprus too, thus dividing ideologically the entire island into "left" and "right". At the request of the Hellenic Athletics Federation, Cypriot sports clubs demanded in 1948 that their leftist members denounce their political ideology by means of signing a relevant declaration. Those athletes that resisted political intimidation were, ultimately, forced away from all sports associations, including the Cyprus Football Association and all football clubs in general. The more defiant football players made a bold decision when they set up new football clubs, such as *Alki Larnaca*, *Nea Salamina*, *Omonoia* and *Orfeas*. Together with *AMOL Limassol* and *Asteras Morphou*, those four clubs set up the Cyprus Amateur Football Federation in 1948 and a separate football League that run until 1953, when the two national football associations merged (Duke and Crolley 1996, 80). The merger was decided after the rapprochement of AKEL to the idea of union with Greece in alignment with the demand of the Greek Communist Party for unity in all things national. For the record, *Alki Larnaca* was founded to counterbalance local *EPA Larnaca*, *Nea Salamina* was the answer to right-wing *Anorthosis Ammohostou*, while *Omonoia* was formed by players that came from the ranks of *APOEL*.

Even though merging the two ideologically rival national football associations was completed with success, the game of football in Cyprus was

still quite a long way from attaining maturity, much because of colonialism. Clearly aiming at thwarting any independence claims, or worse any insurgency, the British authorities in Cyprus put into effect a number of oppressive measures during the early 1950s. In order to dissuade any sense of violence on the island, for instance, the British colonial office in Cyprus issued a decree prohibiting any sort of gathering that could turn into a demonstration, particularly in the capital city of Nicosia where football stadiums would remain closed for an indefinite period of time. Such developments left little room for manoeuvre and forced the Cyprus Football Association to restructure its League in such way so that football matches were hosted in the other major cities around the coastline of Cyprus, thus the name "coastal League", until the relevant decree was recalled after six games. Later on, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus brought about the de facto Partition of the island and, of course, the division of football clubs along ethnocentric lines. Ever since, the Cyprus Turkish Football Federation (*Kibris Turk Futbol Federasyoni*) operates in the occupied areas, in parallel to the official Cyprus Football Association.

Kartakoullis et al., in one of the very few studies available that are devoted to football in Cyprus, recently conducted a survey aiming to classify football fans across the various social strata. The authors attempted a categorisation along the following lines, "Social class A/B includes businessmen, managerial and professionals in academia. Some examples that showed up in our sample are: hotel manager, lawyer, police inspector, doctor, architect, professor, chartered accountant. Social class C-1 is composed of white-collar employees of lower ranks such as clerks, bank tellers, policemen, salesmen, nurses, postmen while social class C-2 is composed of blue-collar skilled workers such as builders, carpenters, mechanics, drivers, electricians, plumbers" (Kartakoullis et al. 2009, 232). From those football clubs usually contesting for honours, whether through the League or the Cup competition at the end of a football season, it becomes easily apparent that the vast majority of *APOEL* (crowned League champions on twenty-five occasion and claiming twenty-one cups) fans comes from the upper class (A/B class 34%, C-1 class 20% and C-2 class 16%), whereas fans supporting *Omonoia*, the second most successful football club in Cyprus with twenty League titles and fourteen cups, dominate the lower classes (A/B class 18%, C-1 class 28% and C-2 class 36%). Fans of *Anorthosis Ammohostou* (thirteen League titles and ten cups) are more evenly spread across the various social classes (A/B class 15%, C-1 class 18% and C-2 class 15%). In much the same way, those fans supporting *Apollon Limassol* are seemingly evenly spread, though with

an emphasis to the upper and upper-middle classes (A/B class 12%, C-1 class 15% and C-2 class 10%) (Kartakoullis et al. 2009, 233).

What the above translates into, according to the authors, is that "the most popular club on the island, Omonoia FC, draws its major fan support from C-2 class composed mainly of blue-collar workers. By contrast, APOEL football club draws its major portion of supporters from the A/B class composed of professionals. This unique distribution pattern of social class amongst the supporters can be meaningfully explained in terms of the 'politicization' of the game in Cyprus with teams being split between different political parties, especially the left wing party which is the 'peoples' party and the right wing party which represents the more affluent and educated Cypriot society" (Kartakoullis et al. 2009, 241–242). Evidently, the professed ideological background of the major Cypriot football clubs is almost perfectly aligned with the above findings. More precisely, the fans of left-wing *Omonoia* are heavily drawn from the working class; those supporting right-wing *APOEL* are situated within the upper middle and upper class; whereas the more moderate fans of *Apollon Limassol* and *Anorthosis Ammohostou* tend to populate the middle classes. In these terms, the entire ideological spectrum—as regards political parties in Cyprus—is effortlessly reflected in Cypriot football, thus rendering any given football stadium to a suitable arena readily available for all things political.

Further to the politicisation of the game of football in Cyprus, it is certainly worthy of note that Cypriot football fans tend to choose "as their second favourite teams that belong to the same 'political' domain. This issue of 'politicization' is indeed one of the major problems and challenges that football is facing today in Cyprus. Although only 1% of the respondents identified this as a major problem that needs to be addressed in Cypriot football, this indeed poses a threat to further development of football as it is deeply rooted in the political life of the island" (Kartakoullis et al. 2009, 242). It goes without saying that the interrelationship between politics and football in Cyprus is, indeed, an alarming issue of immense proportions for it allows sufficient room for non-football agents of all sorts, such as political parties and party ideology, to penetrate and influence negatively the proper development of the popular game that is football. All things considered, while the politicisation of football has become evident in a considerable number of countries the world over, it is the history (and size) of Cyprus that obviously amplify the reported degree of political intervention that the game has witnessed through time to an extent where it is today considered damaging.

Of equal interest is the distribution of Cypriot football fans across the major Greek football clubs. The majority of Cypriot football fans support

Olympiacos Syndesmos Filathlon Pirea (36.4%) and *Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos* (35.6%), whereas *AEK Athens* and *PAOK* are limited to 18.6 and 7.2%, respectively. In a more detailed account, *Olympiacos Syndesmos Filathlon Pirea*, as expected, draws heavily its support from the leftist *Omonoia* (64%) and to a lesser extent from *Apollon Limassol* (23%), *APOEL* (21%) and *Anorthosis Ammohostou* (13%). On the other hand, from those Cypriot football fans supporting *Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos* most support *Anorthosis Ammohostou* (59%), *Apollon Limassol* (44%) and *APOEL* (40%), and considerably less *Omonoia* (15%). The Cypriot football fans mostly associated with AEK Athens support *Apollon Limassol* (31%), with *APOEL*, *Omonoia* and *Anorthosis Ammohostou* fans claiming 24%, 16% and 15% support, respectively. Finally, *PAOK* is evidently the least supported Greek football club, among the major ones, claiming 13% support from *Anorthosis Ammohostou* fans, 9% from *APOEL* fans and an insignificant 3% from *Apollon Limassol* and *Omonoia* (Kartakoullis et al. 2009, 235). With regard to the two most celebrated football clubs in Greece, *Olympiacos Syndesmos Filathlon Pirea* and *Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos*, again, Cypriot football fans clearly choose to follow that one club the political ideology of which is clearly associated to that of their own football club in Cyprus. That the football badge of *Omonoia* is most certainly almost identical to that of *Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos*, apparently, has little significance, if any.

4   Contemporary Issues

Greece

Greek football has been recently tarnished by the ongoing conflict between the state and the national football governing body. More precisely, when the Greek government attempted in April 2015 to pass new legislation entitled "*Measures for the confrontation of violence in Greek sports and other provisions*", FIFA and UEFA threatened Greece with expulsion from all football-related activities at international level, since the statutes of both FIFA and UEFA include regulations against government interference in football (Wood 2015). Even though the relations among all parties were soon restored, after the Greek government modified accordingly the new set of sports regulations within the parliament, the two international football governing bodies were asked to intervene once more in Greek football when the Deputy Minister for Sport, Stavros Kontonis, cancelled the Greek Cup on March 2016 because of crowd-related violence during the first leg of the

semi-final match between *PAOK* and *Olympiacos Syndesmos Filathlon Pirea*, the world's football governing body (*Fédération Internationale de Football Association*—FIFA) alongside its European counterpart (Union of European Football Associations—UEFA) issued a joint declaration urging the Greek authorities to recall their decision or face sanctions, including the suspension of the Greek Football Federation, suspension of Greek football clubs from playing in European competitions, as well as suspension of the national football team from international matches (Wood 2016). Again, the dispute was soon resolved, as per FIFA and UEFA's indications, in order for the Greek clubs and national team alike to evade the humiliation of not competing at international level. The most recent episode took place in August 2016 when Mr. Kontonis decided to postpone the kick-off day of the 2016–2017 football season due to a dispute regarding the appointment of referees, which somehow became related to public safety (Rainbow 2016).

Another issue troubling Greek authorities is that of match-fixing. The Public Prosecutor's Office of District Court Judges published on December 3, 2014, a report naming a number of football officials, including club chairmen and referees, all involved in the scandal better known as *Koriopolis*—the name inspired by the relevant 2006 Italian football scandal *Calciopoli* and the word *korios*, Greek for phone tapping device. The report was drafted after UEFA revealed that some forty football matches during the 2009–2010 Greek football season were reported suspicious for betting fraud. By October 2016, the relevant judicial process conducted by the Greek legal authorities is still ongoing. More recently, UEFA match-fixing allegations concerning the owner of *Olympiacos Syndesmos Filathlon Pirea*, Evangelos Marinakis, the very same man who tried to buy Nottingham Forrest FC in England (Press Association 2016).

From fans making shouting racist chants, to players giving the Nazi salute, as a final issue of concern in Greek football, the existence of racism in its many forms is definitely undisputed. Though not properly codified by the relevant legal and sports authorities, racist incidents in Greek football do, of course, occur, but they often go unnoticed. That an *AEK Athens* football player, Giorgos Katidis, raised his arm to give a Nazi salute in March 2013 while celebrating the winning goal he had just scored a few moments earlier would be impossible to conceal with match attendance close to 8000 fans and live coverage. For the record, Katidis was banned for life from representing Greece at national level. An occasion certainly worthy of note concerns the death of Albanian fan Gramoz Palushi in September 2004 at the hands of Greek fans for celebrating his national football team's victory over

Greece, only a couple of months after the Greek national football team had been crowned European Champions in Portugal. What is alarming in the case of racism in Greek football, and generally in sports, is the fact that racist incidents are not recorded as such, thus the absence of any decent statistical data, and that the only sanctions available are those stipulated by the Greek football federation's disciplinary code. On the other hand, perhaps such measures are simply unnecessary, given that Greek Super League officials claim that "in Greece and the Greek football is not usual the phenomenon of racist behaviors and the few exceptions in the past have been condemned from the entire football and sports public opinion" (Super League of Greece 2014, 3). Should we rely on the evidence above, as documented in a statement signed by the President, Georgios Sarris, and Executive Secretary, Pafsanias Papanikolaou, of the Greek Football Federation, it becomes evident that no particular anti-racism measures are deemed necessary in Greek football. On the other hand, the sheer absence of any research conducted in this particular field is certainly an issue that one must take into serious consideration.

Cyprus

Taking into account the fact that the research paper on Cypriot football already mentioned above is one of the sporadic case studies available regarding football in Cyprus, the following account is, by all means, alarming, as regards the mentality of certain people and sporting agencies associated with the game of football.

> It should be pointed out at the outset that there is a limitation in this project as the sample only comprised men, since the Cyprus Football Association which funded the research asked for men to be included in the sample, working on the premise that football is still very much male dominated in the island. (Kartakoullis et al. 2009, 240)

Evidently, "the Cyprus Football Association which funded the research" clearly considers "that football is still very much male dominated in the island," the authors conclude. Certainly gender biased, the findings of the relevant survey obviously defy the epistemological norms given that the researchers responsible for codifying them were asked to exclude part of the population. In this particular case, the findings of the survey are not only gender biased but also extremely subjective for they reflect the views of a

very specific section of football fans in Cyprus, regardless of either the number of interviewees that responded to the survey or the size of the main body of football fans in Cyprus as a whole.

Match-fixing in Cyprus is equally alarming to the case in Greece, though not perhaps of the same proportions. Justice Minister, Ionas Nicolaou, met in June 2016 with officials from the Cyprus Football Association "to exchange views regarding the measures that could be put in place with the aim of acting more drastically in investigating and preventing these phenomena" (Psyllides 2016). UEFA had previously informed the Cypriot football governing body of fifty-nine football matches regarding suspicious betting activities, with twenty-one games concerning the 2015–2016 football season, of which sixteen were played in 2016. Indicative of the situation in Cyprus is the fact that it is not a "criminal offence for club officials and players to take part in betting concerning their team" (Psyllides 2016).

Echoing the title and content of one of Gerry Finn's book chapters (Finn 2000), racism in Cypriot football becomes all the more alarming because of the kind of myopia that characterises football officials, given "that not only racial incidents are continuing, but the sports authorities continue to deny the existence of the problem" (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2009, 46). The present author had a similar experience in 2006, when together with the Cyprus Footballers Association an anti-racism event was scheduled to take place during the annual Action Week Against Racism organised at European level by the Football Against Racism in Europe (FARE) network. Funded by FARE, the proposed activities would take place during matches of the first division and included a brief announcement against racism from the stadiums' PA systems, a number of banners that read "*Only the clubs' colours differ, say NO to racism*", and a press conference aimed at raising awareness about racial discrimination. The executive committee of the Cyprus Football Association did not approve of the campaign, despite the fact that the official websites of both FARE and UEFA made reference to the fact that Cyprus was about to stage an anti-racism campaign for the first time ever, claiming instead that racism in Cypriot football was not an issue. For the record, the year before the Cyprus Football Association had rejected a sum of 50,000 Swiss francs, made available by UEFA for holding a nationwide campaign against racism in football (Kassimeris 2007, 127–128). Needless to say, in the case of Cyprus one may well argue that there is strong evidence to suggest that racism in football may have been institutionalised.

5   Conclusion

The history and culture of Greece and Cyprus are to a great extent inseparable. Evidently, the British offered Cyprus to Greece twice (in 1914 and 1915), as if a miniscule piece of property of an otherwise vast empire, in an attempt to engage their Greeks in the First World War. That the governments of Eleftherios Venizelos and Alexandros Zaimis rejected both propositions, nevertheless, should not undervalue the fact that Greece was believed to be the natural heir to British rule in Cyprus.

As already mentioned above, Greece and Cyprus may also claim a similar background with regards to the development of the game of football. In both countries, it was the British based there that played an instrumental role in bringing the game closer to the Greeks and Cypriots, respectively, though under different social and political conditions. While Greece had to cater to the needs of the migrants returning home from the Asia Minor catastrophe, Cyprus had to accommodate the impact of a strong Communist element in its internal politics, with the two countries having to endure, alter on, the irreparable consequences—ideological and otherwise—of the civil war in Greece. During the very same period of time, the game of football was being channelled into the two societies as the catalyst for preserving all things ethnonational. To this end, it is hardly surprising that the badges that a great number of football clubs in Greece and Cyprus adopted were designed along ethnocentric lines, obviously serving as clear reminders of the past, thus the need for the kind of semiotic analysis attempted earlier in the present chapter. Key differences in the development of the popular game in Greece and Cyprus were the imposition of the dictatorship in Athens and the colonial attitude of the British authorities, respectively. In almost any other case, little really separates the development of football in both Greece and Cyprus, given that both countries suffered from issues pertaining to the dislocation of population, internal political strife and economic backwardness.

Obvious similarities also exist with regards to more contemporary issues, such as the phenomenon of racism and the case of match-fixing. Of course, these issues have long been tormenting the game of football the world over and they are nowadays common to most countries. While certainly not an excuse, these two issues have recently been magnified in Greece and Cyprus due to the financial crisis that has been troubling the two Mediterranean states over the past few years. Both in the case of racism, more often than not associated with the issue of migration, and match-fixing, it is the absence of a legal framework that has allowed these two phenomena to grow

out of proportion with the respective governments in Greece and Cyprus seemingly unable (and sometimes reluctant) to respond with effect.

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Italy

Fabien Archambault

When you cross the Alps into Italy from France, for instance, it is striking to see the political importance of football. Umberto Eco's 1969 observations would have seemed unimaginable in France at the same time:

> There is one thing that – even if it were considered essential – no student movement, urban protest or anything else would ever be able to do. And that is to occupy the football field on a Sunday. The very idea sounds ironic and absurd; try saying it in public and people will laugh in your face. Propose it seriously and you will be shunned as a provocateur [...] You can occupy a cathedral, and you'll have a bishop who protests, a few upset Catholics, a fringe of approving dissidents, an indulgent left-wing, the traditional secular parties (secretly) happy. And you can occupy a party's headquarters, and the other parties, with or without a show of solidarity, will think it serves them right. But if a stadium is occupied, [...] the disclaiming of responsibility would be total: Church, Left, Right, State, Judiciary, Chinese, League for Divorce, anarchist unions, all would send the criminals to the pillory. (Eco 2014, 239)

With these ironic comments, Eco, who saw the split between "high culture" and "mass culture" as artificial, highlights football's status as a key political issue. In order to understand how this singular culture of football was built

F. Archambault (✉)
Université de Limoges, Limoges, France
e-mail: fabien.archambault@unilim.fr

up in the twentieth century, it is important to understand the origins of the social and cultural construction of *calcio* by political movements. Indeed, after the downfall of fascism, the deliberate efforts of the Church and the Communist Party played a key role in turning football into the national sport. The two main post-war political movements saw football as a key instrument in their strategies of political control, grassroots social action and consensus building. This collusion between religion, *calcio* and politics gave rise to a powerful and highly politicised mass culture, which is a unique feature of the development of football in Italy.

1   The Political Origins of Football

The work of Pierre Lanfranchi (1998a, b, 2000) and Stefano Pivato (1989, 1990, 1991) has shown that "*foot-ball*", which arrived from two sources as an Anglo-Swiss and Austrian import in the late nineteenth century, enjoyed widespread take-up in Italy, probably because the liberal and nationalistic *bourgeoisie* of the *Risorgimento* turned it into a summer sport, a complementary partner to wintertime gymnastics activities. This was different to the way the sport was treated elsewhere in Europe, for instance in France and Germany.

In 1908, fifteen years after the first club had been established in Genoa, the term *calcio* was adopted. The use of this expression, referring to the historic "*calcio storico fiorentino*", perpetuated the myth of a pre-existing native version of the game. It was a classic example of the acculturation process which almost always requires a phase of nationalisation to ensure the success of an imported cultural practice. In the following decade, the modes of expression of the *tifo*—a neologism that appeared in around 1920[1]—started to show the influence of local cultures, providing a form of continuity with countryside traditions and partially contributing to its broad uptake across the country and in all strata of society.

As in other countries, Italian football went through a phase of "industrialisation" and rationalisation in the period between the two world wars. Football became a professional game in 1926,[2] and a national championship, *Serie A*, was established in 1929, modelled on the English championship, which had been in existence since 1888 (Archambault 2016). From this time on, a key feature of the Italian game was the involvement of politics in this process. As part of their aim to unify the nation and nationalise the masses, the fascist regime made sure that teams from the South were able not only to participate in a unified championship, but also to hold their own

against teams from Northern Italy. In some cases, the football sections of prestigious omni-sports clubs such as Lazio, Rome and SSC Napoli, which were founded by the local aristocracy in the early twentieth century, could serve this purpose. Elsewhere, however, the local fascist hierarchy felt the need to start clubs from scratch, as was the case in Florence in 1926, when the head of the Tuscany fascist federation, Luigi Ridolfi, founded Fiorentina, forcing several small clubs to merge to form a new entity. This also happened in Rome in 1927 when AS Roma was established. Only Lazio had the strength to resist this political project.

The capital was thus represented at the highest level by two rival clubs, which was already the case in Turin (Torino and Juventus) and Milan (AC Milan and Inter Milan),[3] and would also become a reality in Genoa in 1946 when Sampdoria was founded. In these big cities, the split between different expressions of *tifo* (fan culture) seemed to divide city centres and their outskirts. The teams bearing the name of the city won support chiefly within the city itself, whereas their local rival drew fans from a wide area. This is borne out in Lombardy, where more Inter supporters can be found in the Brianza plains than in Milan city centre—and also in Turin, where there are fewer Juventus supporters than Torino fans. Sociologists Riccardo Grozio and Mario Flamigni (1990) thus identified two opposing groups of clubs—"GeMiTo", which stands for Genoa, AC Milan and Torino, and "SaInJu" for Sampdoria, Inter Milan and Juventus. The names of first group of teams take the masculine gender (*il* Genoa, *il* Milan, *il* Torino), whereas the second group are feminine (*la* Sampdoria, *l'*Internazionale, *la* Juventus). However, this classification does not hold true for the capital, where AS Roma (mainly supported by Romans) and Lazio (with more fans from the wider region) both take the feminine gender. In big cities with only one club, such as Florence, Naples or Bologna, it was not unusual for people from the surrounding countryside to choose one of the big, Northern teams like Juventus or Inter Milan, with a wide-reaching recruitment policy, in order to be different from their city-dwelling neighbours.

In any case, it would be easy to fall for a charming retrospective illusion and imagine that the Italian attachment to football is a long-standing reality, dating back to the introduction of the sport to the peninsula. This would be a mistake, since Italy's big love affair was cycling, right up to the 1960s. Having said that, football was certainly not unheard-of. Although not the first choice for Italians, it came close behind cycling. It was only in the years following World War II that football gradually started to supplant cycling.

The big professional teams or *squadroni* started to draw in *tifosi* from right across the country with their sporting successes and their ability to symbolise

a new Italy—rich, modern and competitive on the world stage. The successes of *Grande Torino* between 1946 and 1949 positioned the nation as winners—or at least helped people to forget that they had in fact been on the losing side. Juventus, AC Milan and Inter Milan bought the best players in the 1950s and featured prominently in the European honours in the 1960s. During the Italian boom years of rural exodus and large-scale internal migration, football served as a transition ritual. People moving into the cities from the countryside for jobs in the new factories saw *tifo* as a symbol of modernity. Supporting a *Serie A* team or the national side, the *Squadra Azzurra*, became a distinctive marker of their new urban, salaried lifestyle, similarly to buying a Vespa scooter, a car and then a television. The Italian teams' results became a barometer for the health of the country as a whole, affecting all social classes and categories. In fact, this is probably why *calcio* ended up becoming the national sport, replacing cycling. Although a variety of international competitions had appeared in the twentieth century, providing a theatre where the prestige of nations would rise or fall, football became the sport that offered access—or at least so people hoped—to sporting excellence on a world stage. The performance of Italian teams in various tournaments was followed with remarkable collective fervour at the best of times and always provoked strong reactions. In Italy, there are very few institutions—yes, the *Squadra Azzurra* and *Serie A* have become institutions—that can generate such a sense of national belonging and common destiny. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that *tifo* fever can infect even the highest echelons of the state—witness Italian President Alessandro Pertini's exuberant demonstrations of joy when Italy won the World Cup in 1982.

In parallel with the construction of this fan culture across all social groups, the rise of football after the Second World War can also be explained by the rapid increase in the number of people playing the sport, particularly in the early 1950s. After the Liberation, this mass take-up of football had been structured since the Liberation by political movements using a "*collateralismo*" model. The term refers to the functioning of a network of organisations which, unlike other community groups, were placed under the umbrella of a particular political party. The aims of such associations could be educational, recreational or economic, and members of the parties adhered to these groups as individuals. The two big rivals were the *Unione Italiana Sport Popolare* (UISP), founded in 1948, which supported both the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), and the *Centro Sportivo Italiano* (CSI), born in 1944, while Rome was still occupied by the Germans, which formed part of the Catholic movement. The emergence of *tifo* and of "collateralism" is thus closely interrelated. Giulio

Andreotti, seven times Italian Prime Minister until 1992, is the perfect incarnation of these two dimensions. The former "Senator for Life", who died in 2013, had by his own admission always professed a double faith: in God and in AS Roma, one of the capital's football clubs (Andreotti 1999). In his role as the deputy Secretary of State to the Council Presidency in charge of sports from 1947 to 1953, Andreotti had steadily supported the development of the CSI. At the same time, he enthusiastically followed the professional game. Andreotti was a perfect example of the Catholic elite's interest in and consideration for football in the post-war period. This was true of political leaders (from the ruling Christian Democratic Party) or ecclesiastical figures. Eugenio Pacelli, also known as Pope Pius XII, was nick-named "the sportsmen's Pope".

For their part, the Communists were equally active on this front. Enrico Berlinguer, who was to become General Secretary of the PCI from 1972 to 1984, guided the USIP's destiny from its creation in 1948 until 1956. Berlinguer was then a young leader of the Italian Federation of Communist Youth. He was also a supporter of Cagliari, 1970 champions of Italy.

The interest of these Italian politicians in football is by no means unusual. Pierre Lanfranchi notes that in European countries, from the 1930s onwards, the State's relations with sports were chiefly motivated by three aims: "managing the youth, keeping the people healthy and asserting national prestige" (Lanfranchi 2000). What is exceptional in Italy's case, however, is the prominence of football in post-World War II society. The powerful culture of *calcio* did not remain unnoticed by the political class, which actively reinforced this power through sport. In this perspective, the Central role played by football in Italian society can be seen as an eminently political phenomenon, which directly results from the competition between the political forces present after the Liberation.

2   Historical Club Rivalries: Catholics vs Communists

Both the Catholics and Communists saw running sports activities as a way of mobilising young people and drawing them into their respective plans for the reconstruction of Italy, but football was a particular choice for the Catholics. It fitted well into the confined courtyards of the youth centres that adjoined Catholic churches, and required very little financial investment. The Communists, for their part, seemed to focus initially on cycling. Both political movements aimed to influence not only their circle of

activists, but to reach out the whole population. This proselytism required open organisations, mirroring the fascist model of the *dopolavoro*. They also drew on their own specific traditions. Recreational activities had long been run by the network of Catholic youth centres, and ball games were considered as a legitimate way of moralising young people. For its part, in the late 1930, the *Union populaire italienne*, an organisation of Italian emigrants in France dominated by Communists, acted as a testing ground for the *Partito Nuovo* envisaged by Palmiro Togliatti on his return to Italy. In line with the fundamental approach of many mass movements, the CSI and UISP therefore did not restrict their recruitment to members of Catholic Action or to PCI and PSI cardholders, respectively.

This process was scaled up at the turn of the 1950s. The number of football clubs belonging to the CSI tripled between 1950 and 1952. The UISP responded in kind with a strong focus on the sport, to the extent that in the mid-1950s some leaders of the Communist Youth bitterly complained that their young comrades preferred kicking a ball to following lessons in Marxism and Leninism (Archambault 2012).

Football was managed by very specific sectors of the religious or political movements. On the Catholic side, the "Roman Party", the conservative wing of the Holy See and Catholic Action, was the most active. It made the CSI its own and considered football to be one of the main ways to build a consensus around the Church. The growth of the organisation led to a twofold reaction. Firstly, when the left wing of Democrazia Cristiana (DC), led by Amintore Fanfani, took control of the party and sought to cut its ties with the Vatican in the mid-1950s, it tried to take over the CSI's footballing activities for its own benefit. This attempt ended in failure because in practice, the network of local church youth centres and Catholic Action youth groups, which were controlled by conservatives, held sway. *Libertas*, the DC's "collateral" association, had to fall back on other sports such as athletics or basketball. Secondly, within the conservative camp itself, the more hard-line Catholics were critical for spiritual reasons. In their view, the predominant place of football in Catholic youth organisations was too great a concession to modernity, a symptom of the dechristianisation of society. Nonetheless, for most militant clergy and lay people from Catholic Action, football was an intrinsically Christian practice that bolstered the struggle against secular and Communist forces.

Within the Communist movement, the political stream who were looking to strengthen party structures was instrumental in developing the UISP. The association fell under the control of the mass labour commission, led by the

head of the "hard-line" wing of the party, Pietro Secchia, in the early 1950s. Recruitment was increasingly tied to membership of the PCI. In the leaders' minds, football was principally a recruiting strategy, but in reality the young people generally played with the UISP because they were already militants. This was reflected in the location of the Communist clubs, concentrated in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, where the party's militant structures were well implanted. They struggled to spread beyond these borders.

The struggle between the CSI and UISP for control of football was a key driver in the spread of the game. "Red" regions had the most sports fields, with Communist municipal councils tending to build the infrastructure required by their teams. The churches responded to this challenge by doing exactly the same. In the "white" regions of the North (Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli and Trentino), the Church was dominant and had no trouble dominating in this field too. It was pretty difficult to play football in these regions anywhere other than church-owned facilities. This context of radical opposition between Catholics and Communists also influenced the style of play. A competitive spirit and the drive to win at all costs were the overriding motivations, since it was a matter of defending the honour of the Church or the cell. Discipline and team spirit were valued, all in the pursuit of victory for one's side.

The Catholics were the big winners in this contest. With a determined policy and a hierarchical, centralised sports association, they ended up with a monopoly over amateur and youth football. The efforts of the Church, an inter-class institution by definition, also made a decisive contribution to the nationwide development of football. With parishes throughout the country, it was able to reach out to all social classes, and it is chiefly through the action of the Church that *calcio* spread throughout society. By the end of the 1950s, football had become the national sport, in the sense of the most widely practiced sport, because the whole Church, from Pius XII down to the most humble of parish priests, had made it a key element of its presence and work in public life. The success of this political and religious influence adds a little nuance to the oft-repeated cliché about Italian football: that it is watched and followed by many, but played by few. This assumption has generally been based on the size of the Italian Football Federation, which is much smaller in numbers than other equivalent bodies across Europe, for instance in Germany, France or the UK. What is forgotten is that in Italy, the *Federcalcio* is not the leading body for organising non-professional football. The Church plays this role. And even the statistics produced by CSI only cover registered players in their championships; they do not include

the much larger crowd of people who come and just play at local church facilities.

There was probably a three-pronged approach to the way Catholics viewed sport after the Second World War: a local church view, with the involvement of Catholic Action and parish life; a political approach, with *Democrazia Cristiana* in power; and finally a moral and religious perspective, within a broadened pastoral context. The latter view tends to remain dominant, as the work of Michel Lagrée (1992) demonstrated for France, fostering the consolidation of a "catholic milieu". What were the implications of *collateralismo* in football? The practice of this sport was connected to faith (people went to mass before the game), morals (the virtues of the teamwork were promoted through the game), social class (football fostered inter-class relations) and, to a subtle but effective extent, to politics—football was practiced within the "Catholic movement" in the broader sense, or the Christian Democracy Party in the case of active party members. Football thus played a key part in the construction of a collective Catholic identity in post-war Italy. This probably explains why the Catholics won the battle, and why the Catholic Action's gradual disengagement from football has not really had an impact on *calcio d'oratorio*, as this practice was based on a wider interpretative system that was more structured and more sustainable, both materially and culturally.

The Communists were beaten by the effectiveness and systematic nature of the Catholic undertaking. Their "collateral" association, the UISP, focused on its Communist bastions, and they were unable to respond to this competition, either in terms of organisation or ideology. The Communist leaders and activists were much less interested in grassroots football (*calcio popolare*) than in the professional Serie A teams—and with these big clubs, there was much less opportunity to get involved. "Sporting faith", or the *tifo*'s choice of a team to support, remained a personal and independent decision, related most of all to a city-based identity, beyond any partisan commitment. Supporters of Juventus, for example, included Gianni Agnelli, owner of Fiat and a senator affiliated with the Italian Liberal Party; Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary General of the PCI; Luciano Lama, Secretary General of the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the Communist-linked trade union body; but also Giorgio Almirante, founder and President of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). Despite its divisions, the Church remained firmly in contact with this mass culture and sought to influence it, for instance by buying *La Gazzetta dello sport*, Italy's biggest sports newspaper in 1945.

3   Football as a Sport Spectacle: The Politicisation of the *tifo*

When thinking about *tifo* culture, it is again important to remember that football has not always been such a powerful shared culture. Immediately after the War, even in the cities, most *tifosi* rarely went to watch matches, because the tickets were too expensive, and people's disposable income was too low. In the 1950s, the total gates were only 200,000 even on the most exciting matchdays—and these figures mainly driven by the big crowds in Milan, Turin and Rome (Papa and Panico 2000, 43). When people did want to go to a game, they had to get tickets from the owner of the nearest sports bar. Once inside the grounds, people would gather around the flag of their neighbourhood or parish. Small banners or standards were waved, highlighting the links between groups of *tifosi* and their urban environment. By the late 1950s, Rome had around 80 such groups, often attracting as many as 30,000 people, mostly from the lower middle class, tradesmen, shopkeepers and employees (Impiglia 1998, 48). Fan culture was chiefly rooted in the urban environment and mainly drew in the middle classes. It was often very spontaneous, yet continued to express parish-based identities. Most broadcast and media outlets, such as the radio and sports press, were controlled by the Catholics. The language of the *tifo* therefore drew strongly on a religious vocabulary. The expression "football *faith*" (*fede calcistica*) became a well-used saying in the 1950s.

At the turn of the 1960s, there was a significant leap forward in turning *tifo* culture into a mass culture. As living standards rose following the economic boom mainly between 1958 and 1963, watching live football became more affordable. There was a near-30% increase in gates between 1953 and 1963. By the end of the 1960s, approximately seven million people went to *Serie A* games every year, and twelve-to-thirteen million people attended matches across all divisions. At the same time, encouraged by the industrialists who owned the big clubs, the modes of expression used by the *tifosi* were renewed and enriched. This is when flags were seen for the first time. Television enabled the entertainment of football to be broadcast, turning it into a mass phenomenon, bringing people together across geographic and class boundaries. Virtual spaces with a national or even international dimension (because of emigration) began to emerge, determined by the *tifo* of clubs such as Internazionale, Juventus and AC Milan. The *tifo* became a broad-reaching phenomenon across the country, as neighbourhoods lost their importance as a reference, and the "ultras" supporters groups

emerged as organisations that were independent of either the Catholics or the Communists. These groups, mainly comprising young men aged 15 to 35, were autonomous and did not draw on any particular urban or territorial location. The first ultras groups, *Boys* at Inter Milan and *Fossa dei Leoni* at AC Milan, were established in 1968. Shortly afterwards, others were formed, some openly referencing far-left political groupings, such as the *Comandos Rossoblu* (Bologna) in 1969, the *Ultrà* (Sampdoria) in 1970, and in 1974 the *Brigate Rossonere* and *Settembre Rossonero* (AC Milan), the *CUCS (Commando Unitario Curva Sud), Tupamaros* and *Fedayn* (Roma—Pozzoni 2005, 119–209). The *Brigate Rossonere* group, whose name echoes that of the terrorist organisation, was established by far-left militants who saw their *tifo* activities for AC Milan as a militant extension of their political commitment. *Settembre Rossonero* in Milan and the *Fedayn* in Rome referenced the Palestinian struggle.

Ultras groups were not political organisations as such, even though they were often genuinely politicised. Inter Milan's *Boys* were born out of the split provoked by militants from the MSI youth wing *Fronte della gioventù* within Inter's *tifosi* associations, themselves led by one of the club's managers, neo-fascist deputy Francesco Servello. Some members of the *Fedelissimi* of Torino FC, who were open about their links to the left, made banners with political statements, and at times brawled with people attending public meetings of the MSI, for example in Bergamo in 1964 (Calligarich 1965). The geopolitical foundations of the *ultrà tifo* were thus laid between 1968 and 1975. The nature of this politicisation is the subject of some debate. Some, like Christian Bromberger, highlight its fabricated nature. He believes that football is "an incredible machine for manufacturing opposition, a propensity to perceive the world in a binary fashion [that] consolidates boundaries, when a sense of belonging is not enough" (Bromberger 1995, 121). Journalistic literature generally puts forward the idea that the opposition between left-wing and right-wing clubs may have initially existed and died down, before re-emerging forcefully during the "years of lead".[4]

It could be suggested that the phenomenon is no more than a cultural construction, similar to the rivalry between cyclists Gino Bartali and Fausto Coppi, which Stefano Pivato has shown to have had an imaginary political element. From 1946 onwards, the walls and roads of the *Giro d'Italia* began to see openly political slogans: "*Viva Coppi comunista*, *abbasso Bartali democristiano*", or at the time of the 1948 parliamentary elections: "*Viva il Fronte popolare, viva Fausto Coppi*" (Pivato 1985, 46). The irony was that Fausto Coppi wasn't a Communist at all. Indeed, at these very elections, he had joined Bartali in signing a poster for the Civic Committees, calling electors

to vote for DC "against Bolshevism". Pivato attributes this political transposition of a sporting rivalry between the "*campionissimo*" and the model "Christian athlete" to "the popular imagination, which interpreted Coppi's victories over Bartali as the ideal humiliation of one of the most popular symbols of Catholic and Christian Democratic Italy, […] at a time when DC was developing a hegemony and pushing the left wing out of the country's political and social life" (Pivato 1985, 48).

The act of joining ultras groups was similarly surrounded by a cultural imaginaire that was structured by a strong sense of political oppositions. The new mass culture of the *tifo* was becoming powerful enough to carry representations that went beyond itself, representations that could be accepted and passed on by the whole of society. The political antagonism between two teams in the same city, expressed every time a derby was played, became a kind of shorthand that people constantly sought to confirm, particularly in Milan, Turin and Rome.

In the case of Rome, this political opposition was based on a partial overlap of territorial identity and voting preferences. In contrast to the city itself, the surrounding provinces of the Lazio region were not strongly left-leaning, but the bastions of AS Roma's *tifoseria*, Garbatella and Testaccio were seen as Communist-dominated "red districts". Sergio Terenzi, *capo tifosi* from Garbatella, for instance, was publicly quoted saying things that would have horrified Giulio Andreotti. Once he had completed his military service, Terenzi joined the PCI in the early 1950s: "I became a militant Communist, as well as a Roma supporter. The two forms of activism go well together". He added that he worked in a factory, *Ottica di precision meccanica*, where everyone supported Roma: "In the 1950s, I didn't know a single worker who supported Lazio" (Impiglia 1998, 196). In contrast, another worker from the same factory, Bruno Roscani, was also a Communist, but at the same time a Lazio *tifoso*, and proud of his convictions: "Yes, I am a Lazio fan and a Communist". He also considered his two commitments in the same light, explaining that he supported Lazio to differentiate himself from the local secretary of the fascist federation in the 1930s. "Despite what people say, our neighbourhood [Ponte Milvio] was all for Lazio. When you think about it, it's because Pallotta was for Roma. He was for Roma and was head of the local section of the fascist party. So in my view, the neighbourhood supported Lazio as an antifascist reaction" (Portelli 2005). Roscani also complained about having been asked to justify his footballing preferences in the 1970s. For pre-war generations, the politicisation of *tifo* culture seemed fairly incongruous. This was certainly true of Palmiro Togliatti, who died in 1964, a happy *Juventino*, and of Luca Pavolini, who was born in 1922,

supported Lazio and was nonetheless Editor-in-Chief of *l'Unità*, mouthpiece of the PCI, from 1946 to 1962. Pavolini saw a clear separation between politics and football, similarly to Giulio Andreotti: "When he was asked […] whether he worried that his stated commitment to Roma would not alienate the hearts and votes of Romans […] who supported Lazio, Giulio Andreotti replied without hesitation: 'There are some things on which one does not compromise.' Excellent, *signor deputato.* I respectfully salute an opponent who (on this point at least) knows how to be rigorous" (Pavolini 1982). Luciano Lama, Secretary General of the CGIL, explained his choice as a supporter through the rivalry between Bologna and Romagna: "I'm a Romagnol. I support Juventus and always have done, by tradition and the passion of the Romagnol people. I think the explanation lies in the conflict there has always been between the two regional components of Emilia-Romagna. […] Romagnols, who didn't much like the Bolognese, started supporting Juventus". Lama rejects any political objection: "My Romagnol love for Juventus, which remains alive and kicking to this day, and the choice of this team "from the heart", were never dampened by any symbols that were associated with the black and white stripes, for instance its role as the sporting representative of the biggest Italian industrialist, which it obviously is" (Lama 1982).

The quote highlights the fact that the expression identified by Communist journalist Gianfranco Calligarich in 1965 as an oxymoron—"PCI militant— Juventus *tifoso*"—is not relevant for everyone.[5] In 1964, a sociological study by Goffredo Fofi on Southern immigrants to Turin showed that the choice between Torino and Juventus reflected the supporter's place in the hierarchy of workers. On the one hand, skilled workers who had been Turin for at least two generations were Torino *tifosi*; on the other hand, more recently immigrated factory workers were *juventini* (Fofi 1964, 76). This split only partly reflected divergent political positions: the first group were unionised and voted PCI, while the others initially didn't belong to any union and preferred DC (De Luna and Barbieri Squarotti 1992). Urban, social and political representations thus overlapped in a tangle of contradictory and seemingly opposing representations.

The fact nonetheless remains that popular imagination helps construct reality. The second important element in building the mass *tifo* culture— the words on the terraces—was introduced by politics. In 1969 in Turin, the *Fedelissimi* sang an anti-Juventus chorus with a strong anti-capitalist undertone for the first time, which went on to be popularised in football grounds around the country. "È lunedì, che delusione/Si torna alla fabbrica/ al servizio del padrone/O Juve nera, lava i piedi/Di tutti quelli della famiglia

Agnelli" ("It's Monday, what a drag/Back to the factory/to toil for the boss/ Oh black Juve, go wash the feet/Of the whole Agnelli family"—Dal Lago and Moscati 1992, 118). In Bologna the same year, the *Comandos Rossoblu* chanted the first political slogan ever heard in the municipal stadium during a match with Inter Milan: "*Boys, carogne, tornate nelle fogne!*" ("Boys, carrion, go back down to the sewers"). The line was a direct transposition from the political chants heard in far-left demonstrations in 1968–1969: "*Fascisti, carogne, tornate nelle fogne!*". Similarly, the anthem of the *Brigate Rossonere* from 1975 onwards was based on the tune of Fausto Amodei's 1960 song *Per i morti di Reggio Emilia* ("For the dead of Reggio Emilia").

Football stadiums became places of political contestation, and matches were key moments when the *tifoserie* in the stands would face off with political chants, banners and flags. The baby-boomer generation that formed the first ultras groups thus mirrored their political commitment outside the stadium in their support for the club in the ground on a Sunday afternoon. This generation had grown up in an era when the development and control of football had been steeped in political issues—a time when Giovanni Guareschi could imagine Peppone and Don Camillo squaring up to each other after a goal for "*Gagliarda*" in the match against the "*Dynamos*".[6] It could be said that this generation had perfectly understood and owned this dimension, and as they reached maturity, it came out in places where no one expected. This political activism was projected into *tifo* culture, forcing a response from the political elites. Both Catholics and Communists chose to respond with denial, claiming there was no crossover between the political and sporting worlds. Whether they accepted or rejected it, the *tifosi* still felt they had to take a stance, given this new discourse around football. Although cultural empowerment is generally felt to be a source of depoliticisation, the mass effect of the references and behaviours within *tifo* culture developed in Italy on the back of political categories. Football thus illustrates the singular and decisive conjunction in Italy between mass culture, popular culture and a diffuse political culture.

4   From Andreotti to Berlusconi: Football and Politics as Ready Bedfellows

The groundswell of post-war interest in football did not pass the political class by. The best illustration is the action of Giulio Andreotti, as we saw it previously. In 1947, for instance, he prevailed upon the Italian Football Federation to ensure that Triestina, the team from Trieste, would not be

relegated to Serie B from Serie A, even offering finance from special government funds. It was a way of claiming the city of Trieste as belonging to the Italian nation (Archambault 2011). In May 1949, he officiated at the funeral ceremony for the Torino players whose plane had crashed into the Basilica of Superga, plunging Italy into national mourning (Archambault 2017). Finally, in May 1953 he made sure that the inauguration of Rome's *Stadio Olimpico* coincided with the parliamentary election campaign, pushing for a prestigious match between the *Squadra Azzurra* and one of the world's best teams at the time, Hungary, starring Puskás (Archambault 2008).

   Andreotti is emblematic of the attempts by many Italian politicians to use the popularity of professional football to bolster their own standing. Although it obviously was not necessary nor even sufficient to focus on *calcio* to make a successful political career, it could certainly help. Some even went as far as taking control of the clubs themselves. "Divine Julius", as he was known, also got involved in this way. AS Roma was run by two categories of directors that seemed to alternate: real estate developers and members of parliament. The first group were closely linked to the Christian Democracy Party and tended to throw in the towel after a few years of leadership, when they had lost hope of bringing the championship title to the capital, handing over to people who were close to Giulio Andreotti.[7] This succession of Christian Democrats was only interrupted by Communist Alvaro Marchini, who was mercilessly vilified by the conservative and Catholic press in Rome, and resigned in 1971, after only two years. Andreotti claimed, probably somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that the episode proved that "football and politics should never mix" (Andreotti 1999). He should nonetheless be credited with some sincerity. He was an authentic part of a cultural model that rubbed off on him, and in which he also played an important role. In a 1983 film directed by Alberto Sordi, *Il Tassinaro*, Andreotti played himself, and in the middle of the movie, he gets into a taxi driven by Pietro (Alberto Sordi), who says: "You're a big supporter of Roma, eh? A big *tifoso* of Roma. You've done lots of things for Rome and Roma". Andreotti replies: "I've been doing *tifo* since I was a little boy, back in the day at Testaccio [AS Roma's original stadium]. It may have been a bit more authentic back then, but now Roma is giving us satisfaction; at least now it seems to be on the right track [AS Roman had just won their second *scudetto* that year]". This example suggests that the more political elites were receptive to the norms of popular culture, the more effective their political communication could be. Political communication does not shape public opinion, but is moulded by it, operating as a form of exchange. If the *tifo*

values were used and exploited, it was often to reinforce a top-down political discourse with a sense of common solidarity.

The close links between Andreotti and the football world in Rome were not an isolated case. Of the approximately 120 clubs who have entered Italian professional championships since 1945, around thirty of those—one-quarter—were controlled at some stage or other by a member of parliament. Generally, the deputy would be appointed Chairman of the club after their election, as recognition of their local political influence and a reward for reaching the pinnacle of their cursus honorum. Moreover, most of the parliamentarians that got involved in running football clubs were members of Christian Democracy, which in this area like so many others, achieved its hegemonic aims.

The example of Silvio Berlusconi in the late twentieth century, eventually managing to be Italian Prime Minister and Chairman of AC Milan at the same time, was not unusual, instead forming part of a long tradition. Three years prior to the media magnate's takeover of AC Milan, sociologist Franco Ferrarotti and journalist Oliviero Beha (1983) had published an essay denouncing the "*calcistizzazione*" (footballisation) of Italian public life, which sought to paper over the cracks in society. In their view, this "football-based republic" had reached its "final stage" of decomposition. Their analysis highlighted the Central place the sport had taken in the symbolic landscape of Italian society—and Berlusconi was well aware of this. The exceptional thing that Berlusconi achieved was to combine local and national dimensions. His choice of AC Milan owed nothing to chance. The oldest club in Milan had been undermined by the *Totonero* match-fixing scandal of the early 1980s and was close to bankruptcy in 1986, but it was nonetheless, alongside Inter Milan and Juventus, one of the few big teams that could attract *tifosi* from right across Italy. The numerous victories achieved by AC Milan under Berlusconi—winning the Italian championship and European Cup several times between 1988 and 1994—endlessly feted on the Mediaset group's TV channels, contributed to expand the influence of the supporters' clubs and boost their numbers. The *Milan Clubs* network was a powerful structure and played a key role when Silvio Berlusconi decided, in his own words, to "get down onto the ground" and stand for the 1994 parliamentary elections. The core of *tifosi* became the earliest organising base for his new party *Forza Italia!*, whose very name highlighted the self-proclaimed crossover between football and politics (Porro 1995, 183–216). What had been achieved for AC Milan was constantly held up as a metaphor for what could be done for Italy. In parallel, Berlusconi sought

to take the symbolic benefits of his sporting competencies to a higher level. In 1991, Arrigo Sacchi, the manager who had won AC Milan their first few titles, was "proposed" as coach of the *Squadra Azzurra*, which went on, under his guidance, to reach the World Cup final in 1994. The penalty shootout defeat to Brazil was put down to mere bad luck. In contrast, when the national team went down to France in extra time of the 2000 European Championship final, Dino Zoff, who had not come from the *milanista* stable, received a barrage of abuse from *Il Cavaliere*. Zoff felt the criticism to be so damaging that he chose to resign in the immediate aftermath. Very naturally, Berlusconi's sporting legacy has been viewed in a controversial light. It is said that the young Silvio was a fervent *interista* (Beha 2005) and his subsequent conversion to AC Milan was thus judged by many from *tifo* culture as a betrayal. It is also alleged that the first championship title was "bought" via the Napolitan *camorra* (Petrini 2006). A whole panoply of pamphlets appeared at the time to denigrate Berlusconi politically by attacking him in the most intimate area of his life—football.

It has thus been shown that, in Italy, the phenomenon of the *tifo* did not emerge spontaneously from mass culture. To the contrary, it came about through intense involvement from the political world, which contributed to shaping its characteristics. Ongoing political oversight of the game continues to be a reality, although perhaps less explicitly, even today. The CSI and UISP have grown strongly right across Italy and continue to reflect the strength of the Catholic and Communist subcultures. They received official recognition from the Italian Football Federation in 1976, and both now have around a million members. Their rude health underlines how unique this Italian context is. Even though it has subsided over time, political antagonisms still spill over into sports, and football continues to be coveted by both political and religious forces. Alongside Silvio Berlusconi, the case of former Archbishop of Genoa Tarcisio Bertone is telling. In September 2006, shortly after his appointment as Secretary of State of the Holy See, he commissioned the CSI to organise the "Clericus Cup". The tournament is contested by sixteen teams of seminarians from the Roman Colleges and was established with an explicit purpose. Cardinal Bertone hoped that one day the Vatican might manage a "very high quality team" that would be "on the same level as the country's most decorated clubs" (Galeazzi 2007). This all goes to show how football is still considered by Catholic elites to be an effective instrument for promoting their societal aims. The tradition dating back to the end of World War II has not died out; instead, it continues with undiminished strength.

Football thus gives an illustration of general developments in Italy since the fall of fascism. Many histories of Italy in the Republican period have been published over the last thirty years. All these studies have tried to draw up a coherent interpretational framework to explain the multifarious crises of the 1970s and the implosion of the political system in 1992. Generally, the focus is on political developments marked by international forces, weighing on the destiny of a seized-up and fragmented society. Raffaele Romanelli (1994) criticises authors of these studies for implicitly using a "rigid model of modernisation" borrowed from other national realities, and thus contributing to "reinforce the worrying and rather unnecessary image of a *paese senza* [country lacking everything]". In a historiographical review, Francesco Bonini (1999) highlights the need to study the social mechanisms behind the consolidation and stabilisation of Italian democracy in the post-war period—a phenomenon with multiple mechanisms that was not necessarily, and not only expressed in political (im)balances. Football was undoubtedly a part of this process. The remarkable upsurge in the sport came at a time when Italian society was transitioning to an era of mass consumption. It became a place of consensus, beyond political dividing lines. While *calcio* did remain a driver for division between *tifosi* factions and between Catholic and Communist-linked clubs, it also acted as a factor for social cohesion, as illustrated by the common passion expressed by politicians of all persuasions. Football became a uniting force for Italy.

Notes

1. The term refers both to the supporter's actions and to a cultural "disease". The word may derive from the adjective *tifico*, which refers to a person who has typhoid fever. By extension, the term gradually came to embrace the various ways of supporting a football team—from mere statements of preference to regular stadium-going (Triani 1990, 72; Dal Lago and Moscati 1992, 36).
2. Football became a professional game in the same period in many countries of the world, for example Austria (1922), Latin America (1933) and France (1932). Only Germany, Scandinavia and the USSR preferred to keep the game amateur.
3. Inter, the familiarly-used abbreviation of Internazionale, was founded in 1908 by AC Milan dissents who wanted to protest against the Italian Federation's new rules against foreign players. In these key years when the game was being nationalised, the name of this new club highlighted the attachment of part of the Milanese liberal bourgeoisie to cosmopolitanism.

4. Sociologists such as Giorgio Triani (1990, 147), Alessandro Dal Lago and Roberto Moscati (1992, 43), who are interested in the ultras movement, are more dubious about whether the phenomenon really existed before the late 1960s and early 1970s.

5. In Turin, "all the Communists have been forever *tifosi* of Torino, with the unique and tragic exception of Togliatti". Gianfranco Calligarich thought he could detect in "young immigrants, who a few months after arriving switched allegiance from Juventus to Torino, a desire for emancipation: "'Because, at the end, you cannot support the team of your boss!'" (Calligarich 1965).

6. "La Disfatta" ("The Defeat"), one of the most famous episodes in the *Don Camillo* series, was published on the 17 May 1947 in the magazine *Candido* before being adapted for the screen twice. The author, Giovanni Guareschi, depicts the conflict between the mayor and the priest of a fictional town in the region of Parma caused by an upcoming match between their two respective football teams: the Catholic team "la Gagliarda" and the Communist team "la Dynamo". With its deliberately comical tone, this fictional passage provides an excellent illustration of two very real characteristics of post-war Italy (Guareschi 1962).

7. Pier Carlo Restagno (1949–1952), Director of San Paolo bank and Deputy for Cassino, Franco Evangelisti (1966–1969), Andreotti's right-hand man and Deputy for Rome and later Dino Viola (1979–1991), Senator for Rome.

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Spain

Carles Viñas

Football clubs are a key element in discerning the transformations and changes that have taken place in Spanish society since the end of the nineteenth century. Its concretion, following the importation of this sport discipline by the British, is the starting point of a set of constructions that have shaped through the soccer, and taking care of the different local and social contexts in which they arose, shared identities that have sustained imaginaries and intergenerational stories. This sociopolitical background, nonexistent in other countries, is fundamental to understand the uniqueness and complexity of the identities and myths associated with Spanish football.

1   The Political Origins of Football

Football arrived in Spain in the late nineteenth century by the hand of the British employees of British companies operating in the country. They started playing football in a convulsive context marked by the Third Carlist War (1872–1876) (Burns 2013).[1]

The expectation that raised during the first meetings aroused the interest of the local population, especially of the landlords and merchants who had studied in Britain. The alliance between foreign and native mixed teams

C. Viñas (✉)
Faculty of History, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: carlesvinas@ub.edu

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emerged first. Although soccer practice dates back to the 1870s,[2] the first club was not founded until 1889 in Andalusia. It was the Scottish doctor Alexander Mackay, employee of Rio Tinto Co. & Ltd. (Burns 2013), who promoted the foundation of Huelva Recreation Club, the dean of Spanish football.

Gradually the football spread to nearby destinations, mainly those that had port, one of the entryways of football in Spain in the late nineteenth century since they were the sailors who spread it with impromptu games, attracting the attention of natives.

The pioneering club joined in 1895 the Foot-ball Sky of Madrid and, three years later, the Bilbao Foot-ball Club and Palamos Foot-ball Club. Its existence was informal because none of them came to register. Therefore, the first "legal" club was FC Barcelona, registered as an official club on 29 November 1899, a decade after the creation of Huelva Recreation Club (Martínez 2001, 48). Thus, Andalusia, the Basque Country, Madrid and Catalonia were erected in the centres of irradiation of football in the late nineteenth century.

Pioneers came from the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. These sportsmen were characterised by practising together activities such as tennis, golf or fencing. Meanwhile, the popular classes did not have time to practise the sport. Their labour obligations reduced to a minimum their leisure time. In addition, football had a great competitor in the "fiesta nacional", term used to designate the bullfights,[3] the popular spectacle par excellence of the time with *pelota* and cockfighting.

The Spanish colonial debacle of 1898 after the defeat in the Spanish–American War—which led Spain to lose Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines colonies—generated a stream of animus towards the foreigner. In part, this explains why football, a British discipline, took nearly two decades to establish itself as a mass sport.

Slowly step would be opened, a slipstream of the extension of the current hygienists sponsored liberalism, gymnastics, athletics and cycling. On the contrary, football was severely criticised. His detractors associated it to a "crazy game", while others perceived it as "an attack on the moral to be exhibited in underclothes kicking a ball" (Martínez 2001, 49). Slowly they came into being core fans that were limited to playing without becoming clubs. Soccer practice remained spontaneous and disconnected from officialdom. This disorganisation contributed to the fact that the games were played, ignoring the rules established in 1863 by the English Football Association, in open fields without signalling and without goalposts.

Another focus of football irradiation was Madrid. There were also the children of the aristocracy and the upper classes, who had completed their studies at British institutions, who favoured its extension. Members of the English and Scottish colonies of Madrid shared this enthusiasm. One of the first clubs to be established was the Foot-ball Sky (1895), promoted by the Swiss Paul Heubi, precedent of Madrid Foot-Ball Club, an entity concocted in 1900, that did not regularise its founding to 1902 and whose first president was the Catalan businessman Juan Padrós.[4] They joined societies like Amicale, Retiro, Moncloa, Moderno, Español or Racing.

Other football way in was Northern Spain given its relative proximity to the British Isles and established maritime routes. These enabled the spread of football from the Basque Country to Galicia. Bilbao was where it took root more strongly because of its residents of British origin, many of them being Consulate officials or employees of steel companies. In May 1892, the first match between the crew of a British ship docked in the estuary and a team formed by locals was played. Six years later, he founded the Bilbao Foot-ball Club. Shortly thereafter, in 1901 Athletic was established, created three years before by young boys of Zamacois Gymnasium. Both clubs would merge in March 1903 resulting the Athletic Club from Bilbao. The Union FC, the University Hispania, Iberia or Baracaldo followed his example.

Gipuzkoa followed the example of Biscay and soon emerged societies in San Sebastian and Irun, including Irun Foot-ball Club (1902), which three years later was renamed Sporting Club of Irun, the San Sebastian Recreation Club (1903) and other contemporary local entities such as Vasconia, Fortuna Old Boys, Small or Esperanza.

The spread of football also reached Asturias, Cantabria and Galicia, as evidenced by the establishment of teams like Santander (1902), Vigo Foot-ball Club (1903), Fortuna Foot-ball Club (1905), Sporting Gijon (1905), Club Deportivo de la Sala Calvet (1906) or Sociedad Gimnástica de Torrelavega (1907).

In parallel, the sociopolitical context of Catalonia was different. In that respect, the criticism against football aroused in Madrid due to its foreign origins was absent there. The Catalans considered the new sport as another example of the modernity, innovation and cultural trends, proper of Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, this favourable opinion was proof of the Catalan aspiration of becoming a modern European country after being, along with the Basque Country, the only pieces of the Spanish territory to have experienced an Industrial Revolution. In that period, the region lived its own-cultural, economic and political revival characterised by its desire to modernise. Barcelona, who craved compete with Paris or

London, organised in 1888 the Universal Exhibition that the city released internationally. It was a time when fencing, sailing, rowing and equestrian sports were practised by the most privileged sectors of society.

The emergence of football, then, was part of the set of Renaissance initiatives linked to promoting physical education and hygienist. For this it was in gyms as Tolosa or Solé, meeting places for foreign sportsmen, where the first Barcelona sets were developed in 1899: the Foot-ball Club Català and Football Club Barcelona.

Although there were Germans and Swiss, it was mostly the English and Scottish textile-industry-employees who participated in the founding of Barcelona clubs. So in 1900 the Club Escocés and the Team Rojo, which would eventually merge to form Hispania Athletic Club, a leading group until his disappearance in 1903. In those years the Sociedad Española de Foot-ball (1900) was also created, the precedent of Real Club Deportivo Español.

The development of football in the city was so fast that in 1902 there were already 32 clubs. This facilitated the organisation of the first competitions such as the Copa Macaya (1900), considered the first edition of the Cup of Catalonia and the Barcelona Cup. Football very quickly spread to industrial areas and large urban agglomerations. Thus, in 1902 the Asociación de Clubs de Foot-ball, a first attempt to bring together teams of Barcelona was established. That entity was the ancestor of the Federación Catalana de Football, created in 1907.

In short, in Spain football was imported in three ways: foreign residents working in the country, British sailors ships docked in Spanish ports and young native of upper classes who had studied in Britain.

Welcoming the same was also very uneven due to the existing social political context. While in Catalonia it quickly became popular, to be noted as a Europeanised and regenerating avant-garde trend linked to hygienism and physical culture in the capital football did not enjoy the same acceptance given its provenance.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

If the League has a great international support, it is because of a match that captures the attention of fans around the world, the misnamed "El Clásico", the game between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. Beyond the media label that has made a fortune, the Madrid–Barcelona as it is popularly known, is the best example of a game with a more than evident extrasport background.

The rivalry between the two sides dates back to the early twentieth century. In 1916, while European nations were fighting in the Great War, in Spain neutral one football conflict originated. The first frictions between the teams of Madrid and Barcelona were seen during a match of Spain's Championship. The trigger were three penalties against the Catalans in the same party that led to the withdrawal of the FC Barcelona players and the resignation of Rafael Llopart, president of the Catalan club (*Público* 19 March 2015).

The rivalry reflects two divergent models: the industrialism of Barcelona as an economic engine and the administrative centralism that Madrid embodies. An antagonism that obeys a conception of the nation state model dating back to the eighteenth century and also incorporated—from the beginning of the last century—confrontation between nationalisms (i.e. Spanish versus peripheral nationalisms).

Despite experiencing commodification football clubs are resisting relocation that involves losing its identity. This explains the extreme social background that Spanish football rivalries. These respond to various reasons essentially confined to territorial and political arena. Geographical proximity, localism, social inequalities and ideological disparities are some of the keys to its perpetuation.

All teams have their own alter ego, the common enemy that represents the fans, reinforces the emotional attachment to the club and strengthens its identity. Prime examples would be clubs like Betis and Sevilla, the protagonists of Sevilla's derby which was formerly associated with classism (with *beticismo* linked to the popular classes and the chieftaincy *sevillismo* embodied by the *señoritos*/gentlemen)[5] and currently in decline due to the mainstreaming of their fans. Other examples can be found between Osasuna and Zaragoza, two clubs that have a hostile rivalry. The enmity between *rojillos* and *maños* dates back to 1987 when they got into a fight in the stands La Romareda after an object hit the Osasuna goalkeeper. The episode, which ended with a police charge against the visiting supporters, became the source of professed aversion, as evidenced by their respective fans radical factions: Indar Gorri (IG) close to the Basque separatists and Ligallo Fondo Norte (LFN) linked to the extreme right.

Local and inter-regional rivalries combine localism and political identity. This is the case for RC Celta de Vigo and RC Deportivo La Coruña. The Galician derby combines various elements that show its complexity. The historical component, two cities competing in the economic and political level, joins the sport. The origin of enmity dates back to 1923 when Deportivo signed four Celta's players (Otero, Chiarroni, Gonzalez and Isidro),

who ended up being classified as "defectors" by the Vigo fans (Freire 2012, 44). From the 1980s, the rivalry was heightened by the emergence of radical fans: Celtarras and Riazor Blues, respectively. Despite some attempts to defuse hostilities by Siareir@s Galeg@s, the fan group of the Galician national team, these have remained although tension has subsided.[6] The rivalry between the contemptuously so-named Turkish and Portuguese[7] lies in the localism that characterises much of enmities.

In short, disparate elements support clubs' rivalries, although the territorial component is always present. However, its emphasis lies in the creation of the state of the autonomies under which the clubs acquired major regionalist or nationalistic significance (Llopis Goig 2009) and the incorporation of politics in the imaginary of fans. Its inclusion, key to understanding their exacerbation, also explains how traditional rivalries have been strengthened to ensure its perpetuation.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: Radicals Fans, Policy in the Stands

In Spain organised groups of fans they did not appear until the early 1980s. That is, somewhat later than their British and Italian counterparts, the two reference models of the time. The emergence of such fan groups was influenced by the celebration of the 1982 World Cup in Spain. The flow of supporters who visited the host-stadiums—Argentine, Italian, English and Scots—helped spread unknown forms of animation.[8] They tried to be emulated by young native who until then flocked to stadiums with their parents or official fan clubs.[9] Therefore, the emergence of organised fans assumed that teens cut themselves off of parental and institutional control.

In Spain, two different types of nationalism coexist. An "official" state nationalism promoted by the Central government in Madrid and diverse organisations identified with it, very often disguised as national patriotism, and peripheral nationalisms centred around the so-called historical nationalities (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia) and promoted with unequal intensity by the local governments. The first one is, essentially, an heir of the political project brought to Spain by the Bourbon dynasty at the beginning of the eighteenth century. A project of state organisation that mirrors the centralist French model, origin the first Spanish Bourbon, Philip V, coming from france. The second one, in a sense, is an heir of the first. Its aim is to defend the rights of the historical nationalities that existed previously to the arrival of

the Bourbons and that the new nationalism tried to abolish following the French pattern. This counter-hegemonic nationalisms that emerged in the nineteenth century (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) determined its appearance and development. Therefore, the characteristics of the sociopolitical framework after four decades of dictatorship, together with the transgressive desire of teenagers on their way to adulthood, explain the presence in the stands of extreme symbols ranging from the extreme right and neo-Nazism to the extreme left and separatism.

This politicisation should be qualified by what the historian Xavier Casals called *lumpenpolítica*, located on the periphery of politics where "the actions of small groups and acronyms of tiny entity, juvenile marginality (…) and gratuitous violence" converge (Casals 1995, 269). In this context, politics is reduced to mere display of political iconography and performance more linked to the transgressive vocation of the followers that any underlying ideological formation. All this, moreover, occurred in a period where ignorance influenced the shaping of the phenomenon, as evidenced by the mixture of elements belonging to the English and Italian models.

Policy in the stands was a defining element over the identity of the groups. A differentiating factor that, also, influenced their rivalries was territory. Beyond the territorial component, politicisation was another key to explain the evolution of radical fan groups in Spain. This was accentuated with the emergence of skinheads in stadiums in the late eighties. The appearance of the skinheads meant the spread of aesthetics in the stands and the proliferation of violent acts. After the emergence of the first neo-Nazi skinheads since 1985, an increase in far-right display of symbols (swastikas, Celtic crosses or Norse runes) and racist chanting was found.[10] Seduced by his defiant aesthetic, many members of these groups adopted the skin aesthetics, which became the fashion of the stadiums in the nineties.

After the extent of the phenomenon of radical groups to virtually all categories of Spanish football, police and institutional pressure imposed after episodes of vandalism carried out by its members and limited generational change accelerated its decline. Radical groups persisted without enjoying, however, the notoriety that the mass media previously gave them.

4   The Basque Origins of the "Spanish Fury"

In the set of sociopolitical identities inherent to football clubs, the case of Basque teams is relevant. The Francoism later exploited its primordial connection with local nationalism, traditional and Catholic, and its style of

characteristic physical game. Thus, it was that manly style that served to create around it the myth of the "furia española", a slogan profusely employed by the dictatorship to exalt the patriotism and indoctrinate the population.

Football came to the Basque Country through the British. The links between the Basque Country and the British Isles date back to the sixteenth century, when the Bilbao port of El Arenal was the gateway of wool for local manufacturing (Burns 2013). It later served for importing coal and iron and steel export. Despite the political instability in the late nineteenth century, the route linking the Cantabrian coast with the UK was consolidated.

Sailors, engineers and British workers spread football in Biscay. As in the case of Andalusia, ports and mines operated by British companies were crucial in spreading. The football fixtures served to strengthen ties with the local community and facilitate their integration. However, this British influence had to compete with a local identity marked by nationalism advocated by the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), a formation created in 1895 by Sabino Arana.[11] Just three years later, in the "Disaster of 98", was founded the Athletic, the same year that the PNV first participated in an election. Both come at a historical moment determined by the demographic effects of industrialisation challenging the traditional structure of Basque society (Unzueta 1999).

The Biscayne team was no stranger to political vicissitudes; it is therefore not surprising that it ended up being elevated in the club of reference of Basque nationalism (Gómez Amat 2007). This was evident in the attempt to control the club by the *jelkides*[12] families like the De la Sota.[13] And, above all, in the interest of urban leading sector to enhance and promote football to integrate his ideas in immigrants, something that was detrimental to the *pelota* and rural sport, more traditional disciplines considered genuine by conservative nationalists.

The reticence also obeyed to the concern that the rivalries between clubs would undermine inter-regional relations and be a source of conflict between Biscay and Gipuzkoa (Segurola 1999). It further aroused the distrust of the clergy since football distracted youth from attending religious services (Quiroga 2014). According to the testimony of a member of the Basque church: "Football is ugly (…) Football matches are detrimental to religious celebrations on Sundays and feast save (…) on account of football, the beautiful Basque customs of our home, our people will be lost" (DÍAZ-NOCI 2000).

In 1909, the Juventud Vasca of Bilbao, close to the PNV, founded the Euzkindarra, a club that depended on the football section of the PNV and whose president was Jose Maria Belaustegigoitia, who in 1905 played for

Athletic Club.[14] These young *abertzales* (Basque patriots) understand football as "a convenient and healthy sport that strengthens the body and gives much good warlike conditions" (Gómez Amat 2007).

Basque nationalism spread during the 1920s through the sports press. In 1924 *Excelsior* emerged, a newspaper that first promoted unsuccessfully a decade after a Basque Cup which defended the politicisation of football as "fast vehicle of our aspirations" (Gómez Amat 2007). Just in a period in which the style of play "direct, aggressive and spirited" (Burns 2013) that characterised the Athletic Club became a benchmark of Spanish football.

That same decade witnessed the creation of the Spanish national team for the 1920 Olympic Games in Antwerp, a team which comprised thirteen Basque players, four Catalan and four Galician. In the match between Spain vs Sweden, Belaustegigoitia scored one of two goals in the victory after shouting "¡A mi Sabino, que los arrollo!" ("To my Sabino, I will step over them!") (De Salazar 1996; Burns 2013). The goal of the player, linked to Basque nationalism serving as captain of the Spanish team, made with impetuosity and vigour and finished with three defenders and goalkeeper in the Swedish goal, forged the origin of the so-called *furia española* (Spanish fury).[15] It was the most obvious example of Basque fierce style based on speed, physical strength and hardness—that seems "very English"—personified on the field by Belaustegigoitia, a "prototype of virility" (Gómez Amat 2007). A style of "race" which started to incarnate "male Hispanic values: virility, impetuosity and fury" (Díaz-Noci 2000) and Franco strove to present as the essence of Spanish character (Quiroga 2014).

That was how the "Basque fury" morphed into "Spanish fury". And all thanks to a goal from a Bilbao player who had militated in youths of the PNV, had been a candidate to parliament, was imprisoned for participating in an anti-Spanish demonstration and pardoned by King Alfonso XIII and, subsequently, founded Basque Nationalist Action (ANV), a secular and leftist cleavage formation created by Arana (Rivas 2008). A year after marking that historic goal, Belaustegigoitia went into exile following pressure from the authorities after participating in a rally in Bilbao and shout "Death to Spain".[16]

However, this did not prevent that decades later the Falange, the party that emulated Mussolini's fascism, and the dictatorial regime serve the myth of fury to exalt patriotism (Shaw 1987; Llopis Goig 2009). Thus, the "Spanish fury" became part of the rhetoric of Francoism and was promoted in propaganda "as one of the main virtues of the New Spain" (Burns 2013). The military regime, through the narrative of myth quixotic fury, used football as a tool for indoctrination of the masses (Quiroga 2014).

Despite the efforts of the new leaders of the Club Atlético de Bilbao—renamed so after the Civil War—to disassociate the club from Basque nationalism, the institution was erected in a kind of spiritual reserve of the same. Especially by maintaining a policy of not signing foreign players, were they foreigners or non-Basque Spaniards. A non-established rule that date back to the Twenties (Segurola 1999), just the decade that the term "Spanish fury" was popularised. The rule has endured through generations becoming the largest and main hallmark of the Athletic Club. The fact that there were only Basque players, or Basques ancestors, caused the club to be erected as an unofficial Basque national team. Much of his fans understand this, as it is evidenced by the fact that in the stands of San Mames only *ikurriñas* (Basque flag) with nationalist slogans and banners are displayed.

Athletic Club went from being the model of a game style race, typically Spanish according to the Francoist authorities, to embody the evils of Basque separatism from the sixties, and served as a catalyst for new Basque nationalism (Quiroga 2014). This identification established an image of the indissoluble biscayne *abertzale* team.[17] A perception of the Athletic Club fans has been feeding in recent decades, as it was evident with the blasts against the Spanish anthem occurring in the finals of the Copa del Rey held in 2012 and 2015 when the Basque team faced FC Barcelona.

5   Conclusion

The arrival of football in Spain in a context of political crisis after the loss of its last colonies—which led to the emergence of peripheral nationalisms—conditioned its expansion. Its main centres of implantation were the great cities, a fact that places its origins in parallel with the incipient industrialisation occurring in Spain. All this determined the evolution of clubs founded in a convulsive environment that led to the concretion of identities with a strong sociopolitical background. The successive historical episodes influenced in a decisive way the development of Spanish football, perpetuating or exploiting these idiosyncrasies and turning clubs and national teams into a reliable social metaphor of the existing political situation.

Notes

1. The matches were played under British rules. Once completed, participants returned to the private club that vetoing access to the Spaniards (Burns 2013, 35).

2. In 1873, the Spanish government sold the Rio Tinto mines, the British company Rio Tinto Ltd. & Co. from 1880, which produced 10% of the world's copper. Exploitation led to the arrival of those Britons who played the first games of football in a makeshift field next to the Gas factory. Workers of the mining company besides playing among them also faced teams of crews docked at the port of Huelva city (Martínez 2001, 47). On the emergence of football in the area see Burns (2013, 25–42).

3. It was not until the fifties when football unseated bulls as a favourite pastime. This was made possible in part by the impact of internal migration (from rural areas to big cities) and the extension of radio and television. It was also decisively influenced by the promotion of sport that made the Franco dictatorship in order to dilute any political dissent (Burns 2013, 22).

4. Padrós was, in 1903, the founder of the Agrupación Madrileña de Sociedades de Foot-ball, a first attempt to create a kind of federation of clubs detached from the control of Federación Gimnástica Española which then ruled the Spanish sport (Martínez 2001, 52).

5. Paradoxically, this identification linked to the social background of partners from both entities is diametrically opposed to that adopted by radical supporters of both clubs. Thus, the most extremist of the Betis fans, Supporters Gol Sur (SGS) show their sympathy for the extreme right, while their sevillistas homonyms, the Biris Norte (BN) have exhibited iconography Andalusian nationalist and leftist symbols (Viñas 2005, 103–104).

6. Today both groups are positioned around Galician nationalism; hence, their common link is the Galician football team. However, in the emergence of the phenomenon of radical fans, a sector of the Deportivo supporters, the Nikis Sur, exhibited neo-fascist Spanish flags and symbols. The *celtistas* use this historical fact to criticise their rivals (Viñas 2005, 119–120).

7. *Deportivistas* called Portuguese by *celtistas* because of the proximity of Vigo with Portugal, while the latter called Turks their rivals given their "little galleguidad", something similar to what they claim happens with the Turks about Asia and its willingness being Europeans. On the origin of the terms associated with both clubs, there are various theories, such as that it is restricted to early twentieth century with the conservative intelligentsia of Santiago de Compostela as a protagonist. His confrontation with his homonyms of la Coruña, much more liberal, caused the compostelanos identify them ideologically with the Young Turks, the liberal secular nationalist organisation which militated Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the so-called father of the Turkish homeland.

8. Among the pioneering groups, we found Ultras Sur of Real Madrid (1980), Boixos Nois of FC Barcelona (1981), Ultra Boys of Sporting Gijon (1981), Brigadas Amarillas of Cádiz CF (1982) or Frente Atlético of Atlético Madrid (1982) (Viñas 2005, 70–95).

9. Although many authors use the term "ultra" to refer to the phenomenon of fans organised in the Spanish football, we believe most appropriate to use

the term "radical", since plasma more rigorously existing reality considering as some groups defining themselves as "antiultras" to differentiate themselves from the extreme right-wing groups or those who take on the Italian model (Viñas 2005, 13–18).

10. It was then that, following the emergence of neo-Nazi shaved heads in the stands, racist chanting in Spanish stadiums spread. Until then, the episodes of racism in Spanish football were punctual, partly due to the limited presence of foreign players in the state League. Something changed dramatically in the nineties following the Bosman ruling.

11. Arana, who has theorised about the existence of a Basque race, defended the recovery of the privileges and independence of a "Basque confederation". One approach under the leadership of the shipping industry Ramon de la Sota veered towards regionalism conservative turn (De Pablo et al. 1999).

12. Term in Euskera (Basque language) composed of two words *JEL* (PNV acronym motto *Juangoikoa eta lege Zaharra*, God and the old law) and *kide* (member). Therefore, the term is commonly used to designate the Basque nationalist militants of this formation.

13. This upward of PNV nationalism on the club continued after the Civil War. Since the seventies, most presidents of the institution were affiliated with the party, as Jesús María "*Beti*" Duñabeitia (1977–1982), Pedro Aurtenetxe (1982–1990), José Maria Arrate (1994–2001), Javier Uría (2001–2003) or Fernando Lamikiz (2004–2006).

14. On the figure of Belaustegigoitia see Bacigalupe (2008).

15. The term, used by the Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf* to define the aggressive play of the Spanish players, drew a parallel with the looting of the Spanish Army which took place in Antwerp in 1576. The origin of the episode was the bankruptcy of the Royal Treasury of king Felipe II, a fact that prevented the soldiers being charged their pay. The *Tercios* discontent led to a riot that in turn triggered the uprising of the provinces of Flanders who remained loyal to the Spanish Crown. Subsequently, the Spanish press started these negative nuances in positive national traits.

16. Decades later, another Basque player of Athletic Club, Zarraonaindia Telmo "Zarra", was erected an emblem of the Franco dictatorship coinciding with the dispute of the World Cup in Brazil in 1950 (Burns 2013, 23).

17. This was evident during the Transition when on 5 December 1976 the captains of the Athletic Club and Real Sociedad took the field in Atotxa stadium carrying a *ikurriña*, when it was still illegal (Gómez 2007, 63).

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Sweden

Aage Radmann and Torbjörn Andersson

1   Political Origins of Football

The British game of football came to Sweden at the end of the nineteenth century. Within England, the game had already split into an amateur variety for gentlemen and a professional sport with a working-class base.[1] The professionals attracted a good deal of attention in Swedish media but there was no doubt that amateurism was regarded as the role model to be implemented in Sweden. Indeed, until 1909 British professional clubs were forbidden to play in Sweden. Sweden has never officially introduced professional football—although in reality the highest League, Allsvenskan, has been fully professional since around the millennium. For a long time, amateurism was the over-ruling ideal and one part of the basic ideology was that football and government politics should remain strictly separated. No one in Sweden has ever won political votes through an alliance with a football club.

What Sweden did with football was to remodel a snobbish upper middle-class sport based on the amateur gentleman to a native, popular

A. Radmann (✉)
Department for Physical Education, Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: aage.radmann@mah.se

T. Andersson
Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden
e-mail: torbjorn.andersson@mah.se

amateur model based on the male working class. This was possible because all the popular movement groups in the country—not least the workers' and the teetotaller movements—were built on the idealism and voluntary efforts of the lower middle and working classes. It was self-evident that the sports movement would also be built on the same foundations. When the Swedish state extended its support to the home-grown Ling gymnastics, there were really no opportunities for sport in military and educational establishments. Football clubs developed entirely within civil society. The influential ideology of Ling gymnastics opposed the idea of competitive sport and was suspicious of all sport coming from the British Isles. Those who represented football had to be careful to ensure that the game satisfied the ideals of amateurism, fair play and a general high moral tone. Overall, there was not much room for mistakes. At the beginning of the 1900s, the nation's politicians—including those from the growing working class—usually supported the ideals of Ling gymnastics. The production of an all-round healthy body was considered to be more important than winning football matches, which could potentially release aggressive tendencies. The early centralisation of Swedish sports into the Swedish Sports Confederation in 1903 decreased the space available for football even further. This centralisation has continued up to the present and has had the result that all Swedish sports are organised along the same lines. The rules for amateurism were not repealed until 1967.[2] For football, the most important effect of this was that clubs could receive payments when players were sold to become professionals abroad. The Malmö FF players who lost the European Cup Final against Nottingham Forest 1979 and those from IFK Göteborg (IFK Gothenburg) who won the UEFA Cup final against Hamburg SV 1982 and Dundee United 1987 were all amateurs.

In fact, ice hockey was the driving force behind the commercialisation of Swedish sport. The players turned fully professional in the 1990s, at least 5 years before those in football. During this decade, ice hockey led an attack on the Swedish model that had been built on concepts from popular movements, amateurism and idealism. Ice hockey clubs wanted to attract money by stock exchange listing. The attack had limited success though: a 51% rule was introduced in Swedish sport in 1999 to ensure that the members of a club would continue to have the majority vote. An essentially united political opinion supported this model of the Swedish Sports Confederation which has been an effective disincentive for big investors and patrons to invest in Swedish football clubs. The neoliberalism which during recent years has made its entry into almost all walks of Swedish life has been kept at a distance in the sphere of sport. The effect of the Bosman ruling (introduced in 1995) has been to make Sweden into one of the major exporters

of male football players in Europe, which in turn has resulted in an anaemic development of its club football. Sweden has become a paradox in the world of men's football: a rich and highly developed country with poor football clubs.[3] Few voices from politicians have been heard to complain that Swedish football has been one of the bigger losers as a result of globalisation. The Swedish Parliament discusses popular sport, not elite sport.

The early political attention given to football was mostly negative. The industrial city of Gothenburg, with its closeness to the British Isles, was from the start the capital of Swedish football. Initially, there were no rules to prevent foreign players from membership of Swedish teams. At the beginning of the 1900s, the middle-class Gothenburg club Örgryte IS (founded 1887) became the leading football club thanks to recruiting a number of Scottish players. Örgryte was soon challenged for supremacy by IFK Göteborg (founded 1904), representing the male working class of the city. During the period after 1910, the matches were hotly disputed with incidents occurring repeatedly among the spectators. Local members of parliament reported these back to Stockholm, and even within the monarchy, concerns were raised on the problem. Indeed, the incidents cast a shadow over the whole future of the game in Gothenburg.[4] Although the Gothenburg crisis was overcome, the moral problems of football became of wide general interest to society. Many politicians at both local and national levels saw football as leading to problems of public disorder, drunkenness and a hidden threat towards professionalism. The illegal betting industry which developed during the 1920s contributed to a further decline in the public image of football in Sweden. The clubs countered this by forceful efforts to improve respectability; for example, in several clubs, members were fined for drunkenness, swearing and card-playing.

The desire for respectability that characterised the political struggles of the working class in Sweden at the time also formed the attitudes of the sports clubs. The difference was that the sports clubs were able to attract members who were turned off by the seriousness of the political organisations. Youth political organisations saw football as a powerful competitor for the limited amount of leisure time that was available. This made football controversial up to the beginning of World War II when the main conflicts around the game had been solved. One conflict was politically solved: in 1934, Sweden became the first country in the world to nationalise the controversial betting industry (Norberg 2009). In the same year, Malmö FF became the first large club to be punished for infringing the rules regulating amateurism; the leaders and players of the team were disqualified. This happened at a time when many European countries had realised that it was unreasonable to

defend the principle of "amateurism at any price". The consequence of this was the introduction of professional football in many continental countries. However, the only change made to Swedish football was to slightly liberalise the amateur rules (in contrast to the more purist approach to amateurism taken by Denmark, Sweden's main rival in football). A committee was formed with the tasks of controlling both accounts and morals. Clubs were not allowed to give players monetary rewards or excessive restaurant meals. Alcohol was highly controversial at this time, as in 1922 Sweden had introduced restrictions on the amounts of alcohol that could be purchased in the state liquor shops and consumed in restaurants (a morally based model that was in force until 1955).[5]

In spite of these restrictions, the popularity of the game grew rapidly. Football was so entertaining for all involved that it quite overwhelmed the much stricter Ling gymnastics. The most obvious turning point in the balance of power between sport and gymnastic came with the Olympics of 1912 in Stockholm, in which sport was given broad prominence in the media. Starting in 1913, the Swedish sports movement received annual state grants, which were managed through the centralised Swedish Sports Confederation. The potential for in-fighting between disciplines was diminished because most Swedish clubs organised a number of different sports. Football, track and field and skiing were the most popular. A number of football players also achieved eminence in other sports, such as ice hockey. Versatility was a hallmark of early Swedish sportsmen, in part as a consequence of the ideal of the balanced body purveyed by Ling gymnastics. The requirement for versatility resulted in the development of sports grounds that were able to cope with a variety of sporting activities; for example, a running track was always included around the football pitch.

The role that politics had in sport at the time, particularly at the municipal level, was to make financial contributions to sports facilities. The construction of municipal sports facilities began in the interwar period. The unemployment crises of the 20s and 30s were partially buffered by various forms of emergency relief works, which helped the construction of sports facilities in many communities. When betting was nationalised in 1934, a political decision was taken to give the surplus to the sports movement, in spite of the fact that only football matches, not least British ones, were the targets for betting. The surplus was much larger than predicted, and this made it possible to build many new small-scale sports grounds all over the country.

As Swedish industrialisation to a large extent was built on forestry and water resources, the countryside in many respects became as important as

the cities in creating the new modern society hence the wide distribution of sport and football over the entire country. On the continent, football was much more limited to the towns and cities. Throughout history, Stockholm has been an underachieving football town. In every period, the real talent has mostly developed in small industrial towns, frequently with only a few thousand inhabitants. Already by the end of the 30s, talents, such as Gunnar Nordahl, were coming from the freezing northerly part of the country. This broad talent base enabled Sweden to harvest important football successes during the golden era of the 40s and 50s, with an Olympic gold medal in 1948 and World Cup silver medal in 1958 as the high peaks. The amateur system was indeed rational and effective. The players—of which the majority came from the working class as early as the First World War—were prepared to accept serious training programmes without demanding payments for their efforts.

The motivating power behind this serious approach to football in Sweden was mainly provided by the desire to gain the first victory for Sweden against Denmark, the great power of continental football. A rational systematised training programme for the national team was among the novel approaches. The first international match against Denmark took place in 1913, and the totalised Swedish loss of 18-0 in two matches created a mania to catch up with the Scandinavian master. Matches against Denmark, especially up until the 1950s, were the high points of the Swedish sports year. A consequence of the matches against Denmark was the emergence of a broader, popular Swedish nationalism in sports. This was important for a nation that the beginning of the twentieth century was generally considered to have a weak sense of national pride. By that time, over a million people, out of a population of 5 million, had emigrated to the USA. Neither farmers nor workers could see a future for themselves in their homeland. Even players on the national team chose to emigrate. A strong nationalism during this time period was only found in the upper class. This lack of national feeling was a source of concern to the ruling class, and it was in this context that the increasing strength of a national identity connected with the matches against Denmark was viewed as marking a new trend. These developments fitted in well with the political developments that resulted in the social democrats achieving power in 1932—and keeping it until 1976. Per Albin Hansson, the social democratic "Father of the Nation", was himself passionately interested in football, characterised by his comment that he wanted to turn somersaults when he heard about Swedish national team victories. The first occasion on which the Swedish national anthem was heard at a football match was apparently in 1918 at an away match in Copenhagen. According

to comments in the Swedish press, the majority of the Swedish supporters didn't seem to recognise the song. However, this state of affairs soon changed and nationalistic rituals became incorporated into international matches. In the interwar years, the crowd regularly sang the national anthem before the kick-off and the Stockholm Stadium was decked out with Swedish banners—a symbol which in 1916 had had to be made more popular by a campaign called "The Day of the Swedish flag". Another early element of the ritual was supporters waving Swedish flags in the arena and the flags themselves were of course on sale in connection with games. US-style organised cheering came to be intimately connected with international events. The classic chant was: *Heja Sverige, friskt humör! Det är det, som susen gör! Heja! Heja! HEJA!* (Come on, Sweden, show some spirit! That will help us on to win it! Come on! Come on! COME ON!). It is notable that from the very first of international match, against Norway in Gothenburg in 1908, a decision was taken that only the Swedish national team was allowed to play in yellow and blue kit.

A specific problem associated with the early international matches was the regional conflicts connected with the selection of team members. These conflicts demonstrate that Sweden was still not a functional sporting *imagined community*. The players from the two largest football metropoles, Gothenburg and Stockholm, were unable to pull together, a situation that was further exacerbated by players from the rival southern Scanian towns of Malmö and Helsingborg. As a result of such disjointedness, matches in the decade following 1910 were often contested by teams consisting of players from a single region instead of the most skilful individuals. The general opinion was that Gothenburg, where the best players lived, had trouble seeing things from a national perspective. Things went so far that in 1919 at a banquet for the national team, the powerful secretary of the Swedish Football Association Anton Johanson commented that Gothenburgers were not proper Swedes. The situation was more reminiscent of the attitude to be found in countries such as Italy and Spain. However, by the next decade these regional tensions had dissolved and the national team was a unifying element for the whole country.

The policy of the Swedish Football Association was that Sweden should observe a neutral attitude and play against all kinds of nations. Swedish clubs were therefore the first to resume exchanges with German clubs (1919); the Swedish national team was the first of the neutral nations to play against one of the Central powers (Austria in 1921) and against England (1923). The blockade that FIFA had proclaimed against England was first broken by Sweden (1928). Swedish teams were also early enthusiasts over

the prospect of matches against the Soviet Union. However, not all friendly gestures fell on fertile soil, as for example when the Swedish team performed a Fascist salute in front of Mussolini during the World Cup in Bologna (1934). Protests at home over this ensured that a similar situation was not repeated, yet Sweden was still able to play two celebrated matches against Germany during the Second World War, the first in Stockholm (1941) and the second in Berlin (1942). The two Swedish victories resulted in ecstatic reviews in the newspapers. German appreciation of the Swedish efforts was also notable. The matches had received political approval at home, and the spectators included both the Prime Minster and the King.

The connection between sport and politics was none the less generally weak, as expressed by the popular slogan "*Sport and politics should be kept separate*". This did not signify that politicians were not involved with the sport. In 1936, the well-known liberal politician Elof Ericsson was elected as Chairman of the Swedish Football Association. But this rather emphasised the party-political neutrality that football now enjoyed throughout the social democratic country. Football was seen as a non-political, democratic sphere that overarched class boundaries. This political independence was demonstrated when neither state nor municipal finances were provided to build a new arena for the 1958 World Cup in Stockholm. After the tournament, in which Sweden took the silver medal, it was still possible for the leading daily newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* to maintain that the World Cup possessed no other values over and above pure entertainment.[6]

2   Historical Club Rivalries

In comparison with most other European countries, Swedish club football had a relatively short period dominated by male middle-class clubs and players, lasting no longer than ten or fifteen years. Players from working-class clubs dominated the game already by the outbreak of World War I. A whole group of middle-class clubs, established around the turn of the century, were contesting against local or regional working-class rivals by 1910. Swedish towns experienced a veritable explosion of football clubs, a situation that can be said to have continued up to the present day. In many places, matches were symbolically laden with the class struggle, in which the middle-class supporters occupied the relatively few seats, while the working-class supporters were to be found standing around the pitch. These local derbies strongly stimulated public interest. Such matches were also among the first occasions of unruliness among the spectators. The oldest rivalry of all in Swedish

football can be dated to 1899 when AIK played Djurgården in Stockholm and 1907 when Örgryte IS played IFK Göteborg in Gothenburg. Other local derbies of importance were played for many decades in the industrial towns of Malmö and Norrköping. Here, the middle-class IFK Malmö and IFK Norrköping contested against respectively the working-class Malmö FF and IK Sleipner.

In the capital of Stockholm, the matches between AIK and Djurgården were not marked by the overtones of class struggle, as both clubs had a middle-class background. The reason for this unique situation, in comparison with other towns, was that both clubs had their beginnings close to the upper-class district of Östermalm, where the only areas for playing football could be found. Södermalm, the classical working-class district of Stockholm, established its first strong team Hammarby IF during World War I. It took a very long time—until the 1970s—before Hammarby became a genuine rival to the so-called twin clubs of AIK and Djurgården, both of which were founded in 1891. Even today the indubitably strongest rivalry is to be found between these two clubs in spite of the fact that they are in many respects very similar.[7] A clearer geographical difference was established when in 1937 AIK moved from the centrally located Stockholm Stadium to the more northerly neighbouring municipality of Solna and Råsunda, the then newly built national arena of the Swedish Football Association. From that point, AIK became the most significant representative for the northern suburbs of Stockholm, whereas Djurgården got a wider distribution with supporters spread across the whole city. Djurgården, with Stockholm Stadium as its home arena since 1970, had to build new supporter bases because inner Stockholm started losing a large proportion of its residents when families moved to the suburbs. Hammarby on the other hand came to represent the less well-off segments of southern Stockholm. By the millennium, a genuine football boom had started in Stockholm and this was reinforced by the clear geographical separation between the home grounds of the three clubs. The result has been a situation in which the geographical differences between the clubs have been almost endlessly discussed. These discussions have continued although all three clubs moved to new ultramodern stadiums in 2013. AIK moved nearby to the new national stadium Friends, while the situation was more complicated for Djurgården as they moved into Hammarby's heartland when the two clubs came to share the Tele2 Arena. Both AIK and Djurgården have found it necessary to single out the other as the more snobbish club. Swedish football has always valued its popular image, a relationship that was certainly made easier by the long social democratic grasp on political power. Hammarby has historically been

the most genuinely working-class club but that has not been enough to prevent it from being perceived as a less important rival. To some extent, this has changed in the new century as Hammarby has grown so much as a club that currently it has the highest attendance figures in the country. Taken all round, the genuine class differences between the clubs have become more difficult to untangle. Hammarby's own home district, Södermalm, is the most gentrified district in Stockholm, thereby challenging the mythology of its working-class connections as expressed on the stands. AIK is the major Swedish club that has changed most during its history. From a kind of aristocratic Swedish Arsenal during the 1930s, by the 1980s it was facing the biggest challenge from its hardcore supporters; the club was more and more coming to resemble a Millwall. In contrast to its rivals, since the 80s Djurgården has been associated with the yuppies who made their mark on the glamorous nightlife around Stureplan, not far from the Stockholm Stadium.

If geography has been a Central issue for football development in Stockholm, aspects of class have always been important in Gothenburg.[8] Örgryte IS has always been seen as the only club in Sweden rooted in the middle class and with something of a connection to liberalism (Örgryte is the name of a well-to-do district near Central Gothenburg). IFK Göteborg, on the other hand, has been a kind of flagship for social democracy and the common man. A third club emerged as a major contender after World War I, Göteborgs Atlet- och Idrottssällskap, always referred to as GAIS. These three major clubs all had their base in Central Gothenburg but the political differences were further accentuated by GAIS, which around 1930 had some Communist sympathies among its leadership and in more modern times has developed a leaning towards subcultural and alternative movements among its supporters. Interestingly, these differences have not been reflected in more intense rivalries than those between the Stockholm clubs. One reason may be that IFK Göteborg has become much larger than its competitors. But other reasons, as important, are that the three Gothenburg teams built an alliance in the 1920s and have also shared the same home arena for a long time. Finally, there is an understanding in Gothenburg—the second city of the nation—that putting Stockholm in its place takes precedence over home rivalries. This attitude is general and by no means only limited to football. Gothenburg likes to confront the capital Stockholm. One result of this is that the matches between IFK Göteborg and AIK have become the most important mark of regional rivalry. This situation serves to emphasise that AIK—perceived as the most potent symbol of Stockholm and its political power—is the very epicentre of Swedish club rivalries.

The situation in Gothenburg is mirrored by the situation in the most southerly district, Scania.[9] With its distinctive cultural and geographical features and its closeness to Denmark, Scania might almost be characterised as the "Catalonia of Sweden". The currently inflamed rivalry between Malmö FF and Helsingborgs IF is a by-product of the growth of a vociferous supporter culture, leading to strong feelings of "us against them". Earlier generations of Scanians made the same choice as Gothenburgers, who preferred to see a Scanian rival win the top series rather than a club such as AIK. This generous attitude has since disappeared completely between the supporters of Malmö FF and Helsingborgs IF.[10]

Overall the rivalries between Swedish club teams are of long standing. The successful new Gothenburg club BK Häcken, nowadays the second-ranking club in the city, has not managed to engage large support. Tradition runs deep. Unlike the situation in Denmark, where club amalgamations have been legion in the past two decades, in Sweden this approach has not been successful. In 2007, plans were announced for the amalgamation of Örgryte, GAIS and Häcken but supporter opposition, especially strong from GAIS, soon caused them to be dropped. Tradition also manifests itself in the lack of genuinely strong rivalries within Swedish women's football, although this has a successful position internationally. The only new rivalry that has emerged in the past two to three decades is from the city of Södertälje, just South of Stockholm. There immigrants of a Christian minority from the Middle East have managed to create, not one, but two male teams: Assyriska and Syrianska. Both clubs made it to the highest League, in 2005 and 2011–2013, respectively. Some of the most intense emotions in Swedish football are expressed in lower series matches between the two clubs (Andersson 2009; Rommel 2011).

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

Perceptions and Significance of Football

Sport has a strong position in contemporary Sweden. Out of a total of approximately 10 million inhabitants, there are 3,145,000 between the ages of 16 and 80 who are members of a sports organisation: of these 44% are women. A total of 871,000 are engaged as some type of official, such as managers, coaches and referees: 49% of these are women. As one of the

biggest sports for both girls and boys, men and women, football has played an important part in this process. In 2014, there were 441,869 active football players in Sweden, of which 145,816 were females (Swedish Sports Confederation 2015).

Without a doubt, football is the largest sport in Sweden, whether judged on the numbers of spectators or active players. The sport has always had intimate connections with the more general political and social developments in Sweden, although you will not find politicians who actively use football clubs for personal benefits. Scandinavian (Swedish, Danish and Norwegian) football has been a mixture of voluntary and commercial forces and has developed hand in hand with the social democratic model of the welfare state.

Football has since around 1970 been a part of the Swedish sports concept in which "Sport for Everyone" is given a high priority. Swedish social democracy, which held power from 1932 to 1976, regarded football, and sport in general, as an influential tool to help create the Swedish welfare state. In turn, the welfare state expected everyone to pay their taxes and contribute to social and economic cohesiveness. The Swedish government gave economic support to the sports movement by grants to the thousands of sports clubs scattered throughout Sweden's elongated land. This served not only to implement the concept of a sound mind in a sound body but also encouraged the growth of social democratic values. A government report, published in 1969, propagated the ideas that all citizens should be able to partake in sport and the sports clubs should be the driving force in the process (SOU 1969, 29). Since then, there has always been an "implicit contract" between the clubs and the state so that the clubs have a high degree of autonomy as long as they continue to foster decent, democratic members of society. Young people shall learn to cooperate and respect each other, and the concept of every person's equal value is Central to the Swedish context (Hedenborg and Peterson 2016).

Football has always had a strong local affiliation in Sweden, and the game has been played all over the country, even though the northern regions are covered in snow for almost half the year. This has produced a large number of individuals who have played the game as youngsters and who continue to play as adults and old-boys, that is to say over 35 years old. This has a direct effect on supporter attitudes as, in comparison with other countries, many Swedish and Scandinavian supporters have had experience as players or indeed are still active in the game.

Football Supporters

Although the Nordic nations (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland) have many common perceptions of the development and the role of sport in the welfare state, this is not the case when it comes to supporter culture. In the Nordic context, it is clear that Sweden has had the greatest problems with sport-related violence and hooliganism. During the 1980s, Denmark became best known for its "Roligans", supporters of the national team who were characterised by a carnival spirit and positive behaviour. On the other hand, at the level of club football, Denmark has challenges from various constellations of "firms"—hardcore hooligans. Norway, Finland and Iceland have had insignificant incidents of spectator violence (Radmann 2012). Sweden has a very active and partisan football public, particularly in the case of men's football. The power to define what is a good supporter behaviour has been repeatedly discussed throughout the 120 years during which the game has been played in Sweden. A good deal of the focus has been on rowdyism and other disturbances, including, for example, what should be permitted and what should be forbidden in the stands. The year 2016 had been marked by an intensive debate about the use of pyrotechnics on Swedish football stands, where fireworks were often ignited even though this is prohibited. The limits of tolerance are under constant debate, and the media and their portrayal of football and supporter cultures have been particularly influential in setting the agenda regarding what is a "good" football and supporter culture. But let's take it from the beginning.

The first public row in Sweden to receive attention occurred in 1906 but even before that event an official Swedish document required that the referee should be given protection from aggression from public and players and that a lane from the changing rooms to the pitch should be roped-off. Three out of four of the early public disturbances in Sweden between 1920 and 1950 were aimed at the referee and players, while only a small number involved aggression between spectators. It seems that the rowdies of a century ago comprised of the same group as today: young men affected by alcohol. Starting from 1920, there are numerous examples of newspapers deploring "football gangsters" in Sweden and the problem seems to have extended to quite young individuals (Andersson 2002, 566–576). The current debate about forbidding entry is nearly 100 years old, and it was not unusual at the time, for those who had misbehaved at previous matches to be denied entry to the arenas. Spectators in the post-war years were mostly well-behaved despite high attendance figures, with an attendance record for the Allsvenskan of 13,369 spectators per match in 1959.

In 1965, the term "hooligan" was used for the first time by a Swedish newspaper, *Idrottsbladet*, in connection with matches between Liverpool and Manchester United. Four years later, in 1969, live transmissions of English football matches began in Swedish TV and in 1970 both "hooliganism" and "hardcore supporters" made their appearance on Swedish stands. This was the start of the modern form of supporter culture, of which hooliganism is an off-shoot. The start of modern hooliganism in Sweden can be dated to 25 October 1970. During a match between IFK Göteborg and Örebro SK, more than 1000 supporters invaded the pitch before the end of the match and the referee decided to pause the game. IFK Göteborg risked relegation from the top series if they lost, and the team was down when the supporters invaded the pitch. The match was stopped for 45 minutes and approximately twenty arrests were made. The large number of arrests and fights between the teams' supporters was something completely new in Swedish football culture and gained nationwide publicity as the match was being televised across the country.[11]

The Swedish hooligan culture has its origin in the stands, and from early on, the culture was strongly inspired by the British firms and the subculture surrounding them. In 1981, the first organised supporter clubs started and "klackarna" (a Swedish term for the most dedicated fans who stand together and create atmosphere) developed further, when the three big Stockholm clubs started their own "klack": Black Army for AIK, Blue Saints for Djurgården and Bajen Fans for Hammarby. "Klackarna" attracted a new sort of supporter who wanted to create his own identity and voice on the stands, directed as much against his own club as against the older supporters and society in general (Hagström et al. 2010). A further ten years passed before the first firms made their appearance. What can be seen as the first organised fight between firms took place in 1991 between "Firman Boys" (AIK) and "Järngänget" (The Iron Gang) of Djurgården.

The Swedish Sports Confederation (*Riksidrottsförbundet—RF*) made approximately 800 on-site observations at matches between 1989 and 2006. A conclusion was that the highest number of disturbances to public order occurred between 1995 and 2004. Up to 1996, the disturbances were integrated in "klackarna" and usually took place in the arena or on the way to or from the match. After 1997, most of the rows and fights were the result of actions by firms and the violence was more planned and structured.

Sweden seems to have a relatively constant number of men who have been members of firm culture during the preceding decades, about 600 to 700 distributed over nine main firms: about 400 are from Stockholm clubs, about 175 in the Gothenburg district and the remaining mostly in Helsingborg and Malmö.[12]

The development of football-related violence in Sweden appears to have followed the same track as in other countries in which hooliganism has been a problem. Initially, during stage one of development, sporadic violence is aimed at the referee and players, stage two is marked by disturbances between supporter groups or between supporters and the police or guards in or around the arenas, and stage three is distinguished by an escalation of violence outside the arenas and an increasingly open firms culture. So far two fans have been killed in Sweden, in 2002 and 2014, due to football-related violence. Hooliganism has led to public investigation reports and decisions (SOU 2012, 23; 2013, 19).

In the new digital media landscape, the fans themselves participate actively in the production of media content for their own web-based home pages and other digital platforms, such as closed Facebook groups. This new medial production process has radically changed the interpretation of the supporter culture. Earlier the right of interpretation was limited to the journalists of the traditional media. Today the story of Swedish supporter culture is told by a multitude of voices and narratives. The biggest digital web forum in Sweden is Svenska Fans (Swedish Fans). This is "made for fans, by fans" and has 175,262 members, in 2016, who mainly follow football. The members can contribute text and pictures to the forum and this transforms them, at least in theory, to "prosumers", i.e. both consumers and producers of football and supporter culture. A supporter category that has taken more space in the Swedish narrative of football culture during recent years is that of the hooligans themselves. Several Swedish hooligan groups produce their own websites and by this process alter the selection criteria for the supporter cultural narrative. This multitude of voices and narratives has resulted in the inclusion of both supporter culture and hooliganism in a hypertextuality linking various types of media—web pages, films, links, blogs, YouTube, Facebook—to each other, thereby creating a continuous flood of new narratives and interpretations. Traditionally, the "old media" had an ascendency of power regarding the hooligan narrative, which enabled it to set the agenda, define the selection criteria and exercise a "gatekeeper" function—deciding what, who and how the supporter culture should be rolled out. Today thousands of new voices can be heard, with the result that sports reporting is far more diversified and multi-facetted. This is most clearly seen in the firms' own media reporting. The hooligan group Firman Boys, for example, runs the website www.sverigescenen.com, which is the largest hooligan site in the Nordic countries. Its ambition is to provide detailed reports of every incidence of sports-related violence occurring in Sweden. The reports provide information on who was fighting with whom, the time, place, number of

participants in each "team", how the "match" developed and who was the perceived as the victor. The content on the hooligan site parallels reports from genuine matches. Social media play an increasingly important role in creating supporter cultures in general and the subculture of the firms in particular, not least for the younger generation of football supporters (SOU 2012, 23; Radmann 2015). The sharing of personal supporter experiences on social media has created a shared cultural ownership of each individual's favourite club.

Even if hooliganism has been a problem for Swedish football, it would be unfair not to mention the enormous positive supporter culture that has been created since 2000. The atmosphere on the terraces is often among the best in Europe and usually considered far superior to the actual football performance on the pitch. In Sweden, you find that the crowds are better than the players. Racism that was a big problem at the terraces around 1990 has decreased a lot in recent years thanks to self-regulating work from the supporter clubs.[13]

4   Contemporary Issues

Women's Football

Although women's football is one of the most popular sports in Sweden, it has lived a life in the shadows compared with male football.

Women's football will celebrate its centenary jubilee in 2018—the first match between two women's teams was played in 1918 in front of 500 spectators. This was a controversial event and many opposed that women should be playing football at all. Women were welcome to participate in so-called merry matches, but playing "real" teams against one another in matches was not approved. Women were strongly opposed by men in the world of sport. There was a general fear that football would fuel the flames of women's equality and support their emancipation. This feeling was so strong that women's football was unable to become established throughout the interwar years, in spite of the interest of many women. Women's football had to wait until the period 1965–1980 before it became a popular sport with gradually increasing legitimacy. The modern game of women's football in Sweden had its roots in the universities of Stockholm, Gothenburg and Lund in the late 1960s. The countryside club Öxabäck IF, which is considered to be the first modern women's football team in Sweden was founded in 1966. Two years later, leagues for women's football had started in several districts. None the

less an All-Sweden women's football series was not established until 1988. The number of female players accelerated rapidly from 1970: in that year, there were 728 licensed women players and by 1980 the figure had grown to 26,000.[14] At the time of writing, the figure is 145,000, including girl players. The first Swedish championship for women, arranged in 1973, was won by Öxabäck.

The decade starting in 1960 was a time of great social change in Sweden, and discussions of female emancipation and gender equality were increasingly prominent. These took place at many different social levels and in various structures. At the same time that women's football was recruiting thousands of participants in a bottom-up movement, politicians were formulating increasingly feminist policies. This combination created the conditions for a more gender-equal society with a better balance between the opportunities for men and women. Women who transgressed norms and values by playing football instead of merely watching it created positive waves in society in general. These pioneering women came to lay the foundations of the national team that has given Sweden so many successes.

The first official women's international match for the Swedish team was against Finland in 1973 and the result was a draw, 0–0. From this point onwards, the Swedish women's football team has been able to consider itself as one of the more successful national teams. Initially, the toughest opponents were Denmark, Italy, England and France but more recently Norway, China and USA have contested the major championship titles.

The team has won several championship medals, gold medal in European Championship in 1984, silver in World Cup 2003 and silver in the Olympics 2016.

The picture presented here of women's football in Sweden seems to mirror the historical development of women's football internationally. This has been characterised by "negative integration", as discussed by Jean Williams in her book *A Beautiful Game* (2007). This documents how both national and international associations hindered women's football over long periods. Women's football was even prohibited in several instances. In 1921, those clubs that were members of the English Football Association were not allowed to rent out their grounds to Women's football (Tate 2013). Although this ruling did not catch on in Sweden, it had a major effect in promoting the perception of football as a male sport in which women had no place. Williams also makes it clear that the premises of women's football have always been different from those of the men's game—"equal, but unequal". Women's football isn't real football but as just—"women's football".

Williams (2007) has also documented how FIFA doesn't appoint women to top positions. More recent research has shown that women players must still continually reaffirm their right to a "football existence" and actively defend their right to a sports existence, in contrast to the overarching economic, social and cultural power of men's football (Williams 2013). Sweden has a paradoxical history when it comes to women's football: compared to men's football they are always behind in terms of economy and media attention but compared to international female club football Sweden is one of the most successful countries in the world. Sweden has had and continues to have some of the best players in the world. Marta, voted as the best player five years in a row between 2006 and 2010, has been playing for several clubs in Sweden. She started her Swedish career in Umeå IK, a club that won the League seven times during a nine-year period and the UEFA Women's Cup 2003 and 2004. Marta now plays for the Malmö club FC Rosengård, a true cosmopolitan club.[15] The players in the 2016 team come from nine different countries: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Brazil, Australia, Canada, France, USA and Macedonia. So when it comes to football performances, the women's teams in Sweden are world class.

Two Players Who Symbolise Swedish Football Culture

Pia Sundhage and Zlatan Ibrahimović symbolise Sweden as a football nation. They combine the national sports cultures and club cultures, and the trajectories of their individual lives mirror developments in Sweden over the past thirty years.

Pia Sundhage is considered to be one of the most successful women's footballers in the world. Sundhage played for several Swedish clubs, as well as the Italian Lazio, during her long career. She made her debut in the national team as a 15-year-old in 1975; she played in a total of 146 internationals and scored 71 goals. The fantastic successes that Sundhage achieved as a player were crowned when Sweden won the 1984 (unofficial) European Championship, during which Sundhage was the top scorer in the tournament. Her achievements as a player include successes at both the national and international levels: Swedish champion four times, Swedish Cup-winner four times, gold medallist in the 1984 European Championship and silver medallist in 1987 and 1995 and bronze medallist in 1989, as well as the bronze medal in the 1991 World Cup. Her portrait was put on a Swedish postage stamp in 1988, and in 2000, UEFA voted her the sixth best player of the century.

Notwithstanding her achievements as a player, she may well be most remembered as a coach. This career took off in 2007 when she was appointed to coach the US national team. When her appointment ended in 2012, she could look back on a series of brilliant results. She led the US team to Olympic gold medals in 2008 and 2012 and the silver medal in the 2011 World Cup. In 2012, she took over as head coach for the Swedish women's national team. As of writing (2016), this has resulted in a bronze medal in the 2013 European Championship and a silver medal in the 2016 Olympic games.

Pia Sundhage publically "came out" as a lesbian during an interview with Swedish television in 2010 during which she said that she never had had any problem with her open homosexuality during her time as coach for the US team. Sundhage has been a norm-breaker in football throughout her life. When she started to play football as a seven-year-old, there were not many girl players, so she had to play on boys' teams. Girls were not allowed in teams so Pia had to be called "Pelle", a Swedish boy's name. Her courageous and norm-breaking careers as both expert player and trainer have helped to continuously make football culture more equal and open, from her beginnings as 7-year-old "Pelle" to her position today as one of the highest achieving coaches in the world. None the less she is frequently still reminded—and reminds the world—that football is essentially a male culture: when she was asked during an interview in 2014 if she thought that a woman would be capable of training a male team she retorted: "Well, then, let me ask you a question; does it work with a female chancellor in Germany? Angela Merkel runs a whole fucking country. Clearly it works!"

It is scarcely possible to write about Swedish football without mentioning Zlatan Ibrahimović. Without any doubt he is the most renown football player from Sweden and has achieved fantastic successes both as a player and off the pitch. His extraordinary career is also tightly connected to the social changes in Sweden that have taken place over the past two decades. At that time a country characterised by a collective welfare state mode of thought in which the group was always more important than the individual, today a Sweden deeply involved in globalisation and the EU, and a country that has experienced almost a revolution of rampant neoliberalism and privatisation.

That Zlatan Ibrahimović would become a symbol for the "new Sweden" (he might appropriately be called "The Moving Sign of Sweden") was far from self-evident at the start of his life as a footballer. Born in 1981 in the multicultural city of Malmö in southern Sweden, with a father from Bosnia and a mother from Croatia, he had a tough start in life. He has described his childhood as a constant trek from one to the other of his divorced

parents, a time of often-empty refrigerators, beatings and having to go to training with an empty stomach. He made his debut for Malmö FF in the Allsvenskan 1999 and since then has played for a number of clubs in several countries: Ajax, Juventus, Inter, FC Barcelona, AC Milan, Paris Saint-Germain and Manchester United. He has won about 30 titles at club level and scored nearly 400 goals in approximately 700 club matches during 18 seasons. In 2013, he was ranked as the fourth best player in the world. In addition to his club career, he has had a decisive position in the Swedish national team from his first match in 2001 up to 2016, when he announced that he had played his last match for the national team. Looking back on his international career, he can see 62 goals, the rank of the most potent goal-scorer of all time and no fewer than 10 "Gold Footballs", a trophy awarded to the best Swedish player of the season. In parallel with his career, Sweden has changed a lot from a country characterised by a "Holy Grail" of nationalised institutions such as the Swedish railways, the postal service, the telecommunications department, hospitals and schools into a country that no longer imposes limits, even to profits in welfare services—a situation that was unimaginable twenty years ago. Individual freedom has challenged collective needs in both society in general and on the football pitch. Despite this individualisation and neoliberal process, Sweden is still considered one of the best welfare states in the world and consistently ranked in the top five among the best countries to live in.

Today Zlatan Ibrahimović is a global name as a sportsman and he has earned billions from his football career. Numerous actors and agencies queue up for the chance to work with him: the United Nations and businesses like Volvo and Nike, as well as politicians and celebrities, all want a bit of Zlatan. He was, and still is, a role model for millions of football players all around the globe and the "Zlatan effect" is still discussed, in Swedish football. The long journey that Sweden has made as a society historically focusing on collectivism to a more individualistic approach, during Zlatan's career, has, to no little extent, been influenced by Zlatan's example. In his text "The new Sweden", the rap artist Dani M epitomised the change and his song was chosen as the signature melody for the Under 21 national team when they won the gold medal in the European Championships in 2016. The chorus went: "Black or white, yellow or blue, we fly high and grasp every chance, we made it here and if we pull together nothing is impossible. Because we are the new Sweden, the new, new, new, new, new, new Sweden. We represent our own future, the new generation, we are as good as we can be".

Is there any truth in the idea that Ibrahimović has had an important influence for an improvement of integration in Sweden, and especially in the

sports context? One can find statistics to support this; in 1999, the Swedish national team had 5.9% of members with a foreign background; in 2004, the figure was 15.4%; and in 2008 as much as 22.4% (Lundh 2016).

Even if it is hard to be sure of the extent to which Ibrahimović has contributed to the increase of multiculturalism in Swedish football, it is beyond doubt that he has had an important effect on multiculturalism in society. He has metamorphosed from the troublesome "immigrant guy" with an inflated ego to a successful individualist who symbolises multicultural global Sweden. His book *I am Zlatan Ibrahimović* has sold over one million copies in Sweden alone and has been translated into 20 languages. It has even encouraged reading skills, not least among boys. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the world's most visible Swede is now going to disappear from the public eye and the media—Ibrahimović has skilfully built up his trademark through established companies and his own start-ups, such as in perfumes and fashion. He is also the first sportsman to start his own app, "Zlatan unplugged", and this gives him the possibility to influence his media image to quite an extent. He has himself said in an interview: "I don't need the media, they need me. It feels like they need me to help sell their magazines. I should get a 20% commission on sales" (Lundh 2016).

In 2014, Zlatan's portrait appeared on a postage stamp, with Pia Sundhage on another one. Apart from this honour, there is a gigantic gulf between the conditions for men's and women's football in Sweden, one of the world's most gender-equal nations, whether this is judged on interest levels, attention, money or status.

In 2015, Allsvenskan men's football series was watched by 2,392,098 spectators, an average of 9967 per match: the corresponding figures for the women's Allsvenskan were 119,762 and 907, a good number in an international context. The average salary for a male football player was approximately 9000 euros (72,619 Swedish crones) per month and for women 1300 euros (10,411 Swedish crones). Although the male salary is considered low and the female quite high in an international comparison, the female salary is just higher than the maximum social support provided by the state, i.e. the support provided to a person without any other source of income.

Despite these sex differences, Swedish football, whether played by men or women, appears to enjoy a massive support from society at all levels—micro-, meso- and macro-levels. The most recent Prime Ministers, Fredrik Reinfeldt and Stefan Löfven, were/are frequent visitors to the different social arenas of football: the changing rooms, the stands, the European and World Championships and, not the least, the debate on the importance of football for the Swedish nation.

Notes

1. Unless otherwise noted all references are to Andersson (2002). An English summary is provided at the end of the book.
2. A short history of the Swedish Sports Confederation can be found in Norberg (2011). The Swedish Sport Model is also discussed in Hedenborg and Peterson (2016).
3. A viewpoint on the development of the crisis within Swedish club football has been dealt with in Andersson and Carlsson (2009), and Andersson et al. (2011). A longer and more up-to-date analysis can be found in Andersson (2016, 472–495).
4. The early history of Swedish football hooliganism has been treated in Andersson (2001).
5. The role of alcohol in Swedish football has been examined in Andersson (2005).
6. The World Cup 1958 has been treated in Andersson (2014).
7. The rivalries between Stockholm clubs have been treated in Andersson (2016).
8. The rivalries in Gothenburg football have been treated in Andersson (2011).
9. The rivalries in Scanian club football are discussed in Andersson (2011).
10. Katarzyna Herd, at Lund University, is currently working on a dissertation in English about the rivalries between Malmö FF and Helsingborgs IF and AIK and Djurgården.
11. The start of modern hooliganism in Sweden is discussed in Andersson and Radmann (1998).
12. The Swedish contemporary hooligan scene is discussed in Radmann (2013, 2015).
13. Racism in Swedish football is fully explored in Scott (2015).
14. Early developments in Swedish women's football is discussed in Hjelm and Olofsson (2003).
15. The story of LdB FC Malmö, the predecessor of FC Rosengård, a club created by entrepreneurs in Malmö, is analysed in Melkersson (2013).

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Switzerland

Thomas Busset and Christian Koller

Football in Switzerland hardly enjoys the same status as in the big neighbour states Italy, Germany and France. This is down to a relative lack of success on the international stage, but also to a generally different approach towards sport in Switzerland. Since the nineteenth century, governmental sport policies have focussed on mass sport, especially gymnastics, as a means to support military training and boost public health (Giuliani 2001). Football, despite having arrived and spread in Switzerland at a relatively early point, was only acknowledged as a national game during the 1930s in the context of the so-called spiritual national defence, a political and cultural tendency trying to push back influences from Nazi Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union and fascist Italy. It was Switzerland's sensational victory against "Greater Germany" at the 1938 World Cup that resulted in the national football team being seen as a symbol of tenable national unity (Gamper 2005; Koller 2009a). After having lost its status as a respectable middle power during the 1950s, the Swiss national team in the second half of the twentieth century went through a long period of disappointment and "honourable" defeats.

T. Busset (✉)
International Centre for Sports Studies (CIES), University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
e-mail: thomas.busset@unine.ch

C. Koller
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: koller@sozarch.uzh.ch

Hence, the team largely became dysfunctional as a symbol of the "nation" in political discourses. Only recently, with Switzerland's renewed regular presence at major international tournaments since the 1990s, the national team has again become seen as a representative of Swissness. Since most of today's national players have a migrant background, the team is seen by many as a symbol of a cosmopolitan and successful Switzerland.

1   The Political Origins of Football

In its pioneer phase, football clearly reflected Switzerland's quality as a quickly modernising country that disposed of many transnational links and networks all over the continent and beyond. As early as in the 1850s and 1860s (according to some, however, rather dubious sources even around 1830), the first football games were played on Swiss soil with the first clubs emerging during the 1870s (Koller 2017b). The main routes of cultural transfer from the British Isles to Switzerland included elite boarding schools at the Lakes of Geneva and of Constance, British merchants and students in Switzerland as well as Swiss expats returning from the UK. While the founding of the Swiss Football Association in 1895 was still mainly the work of British expats, football had already been included in gymnastic schemes of some Swiss secondary schools during the 1880s, become a game played by the urban and rural youth on streets and fields by the 1890s and spread over most of the country with a total of 115 clubs by 1914. At the same time, Switzerland became a bridgehead in the game's cultural transfer from the British Isles to the continent. Many football pioneers first kicked the ball while studying in Switzerland. Furthermore, travelling Swiss merchants, academics and teachers would promote football in other European countries and beyond. Football pioneers with such affiliations to Switzerland can be found in Germany, France, Italy, Spain (most notably Hans "Joan" Gamper who founded the FC Barcelona in 1899), Russia, South Eastern Europe, North Africa and even Brazil (Lanfranchi 1998; Koller 2017b). In 1904, the Swiss Football Association, which had convened a national championship since 1898, became a founding member of Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).

Swiss football experienced its first wave of politicisation shortly before the outbreak of World War I in the context of increasing tensions between Switzerland's two largest linguistic communities, German-speakers and French-speakers. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, German-speakers were under strong cultural and political influence from Germany, while French-speakers would favour a closer connection with

France. During World War I, this translated into differing sympathies for belligerent coalitions in neutral Switzerland (the so-called ditch), with many German-speakers hoping for a German victory, while French-speakers strongly identified with the Entente cause. These debates would affect football as well. The split-off of many teams of the French-speaking part from the Swiss Football Association and their formation of the "Ligue Romande" in 1899 had not yet resulted from political animosities, but from the question of Sunday games. However, at the 1914 Swiss National Exhibition in Berne, a fixture between select teams from the two linguistic communities took on the character of a serious confrontation rather than a friendly game among compatriots. During World War I, clubs from the French-speaking part of the country repeatedly demonstrated their sympathies for the Entente with friendly fixtures against French teams and charity games for wounded Entente soldiers. And in 1916, a separate "Coupe Romande" was convened (Koller 2015).

After the war, in the summer of 1920, the Swiss Football Association very narrowly avoided a split along this linguistic frontier. The Association had agreed to a friendly international against banned Germany, which was boycotted by French-speaking players. Subsequently, the Association recalled their participation in the 1920 Olympic football tournament, partly for financial reasons, but partly in order to protest against the politically motivated exclusion of Germany, Austria and Hungary. At the association's general assembly in August 1920, long debates between the delegates from the two linguistic communities took place with the French-speakers even threatening to found an autonomous Football Association of Western Switzerland. These debates resulted in the adoption of a new mode to conduct the association's "foreign policy", which was from now on to be pursued by two international delegates, one originating from the German-speaking and one from the French-speaking part of the country.

The interwar period witnessed the emergence of several competing football organisations, some of them clearly ideology-driven (Koller 2009b; Koller and Brändle 2014). While they wouldn't really jeopardise the dominance of the Swiss Football Association, which during the 1920s experienced steady growth from 20.696 to 66.966 members, they nevertheless produced a certain organisational fragmentation of the football scene along political lines. The Swiss Workers Sports Federation SATUS, which worked closely together with the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party, started convening their own football championship in 1920. Furthermore, they sent a football selection to the Workers Olympics of 1925, 1931 and 1937 as well as the (cancelled) 1936 anti-Hitler Popular Olympics in Barcelona and the

Workers Football European Championship 1932–1934. In 1930, a competing Communist Red Sport organisation was created that convened their own football championship, but in 1936, under the auspices of the newly adopted Popular Front strategy, merged into SATUS again. After World War II, SATUS would depoliticise its activities step by step with many of their football clubs eventually switching to the Swiss Football Association. New leftist football organisations would only emerge in the late 1970s with the Alternative Leagues promoted by intellectuals from the post-68 alternative milieu.

As a reaction to the establishment of workers sports organisations, corporation sport embracing the rightist philosophy of "corporation community" (*Betriebsgemeinschaft*) was quickly expanded in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1943, the first national championship of corporation football took place. During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Geneva branch of the Italian fascist leisure organisation "Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro" run a football team participating in the lower leagues as well as the Swiss Cup. Furthermore, football was also played in the framework of the Catholic Gymnastic and Sport Federation that was founded in 1919. The Swiss branch of the Zionist Maccabi Organisation, founded in 1918, only sent a football team to the third Maccabiah games in 1950; however, as early as in 1921, Switzerland's first Jewish football club, Hakoah Zurich, was founded, which would participate in the lower leagues of the Swiss Football Association (Koller 2017a).

While the aforementioned developments during the first third of the twentieth century reflected a political and ideological fragmentation of Swiss society, a new cultural policy of the 1930s would push towards national unification: the so-called "Spiritual National Defence" of Swiss values against National Socialism, fascism and communism that was officially formulated by the Swiss government in their 1938 "Message on the preservation and propaganda of Swiss culture". Defining Switzerland as an independent, democratic, federative and pluricultural nation, this cultural policy would nevertheless include nationalistic elements hardly different from those of the neighbouring fascist powers' propaganda. Towards the end of the 1930s, football became a catalyst of Swiss national consciousness (Koller 2009a). The seminal event in this respect was the 1938 victory against "Greater Germany" in the preliminary round of the World Cup in France that triggered an outburst of patriotic enthusiasm. At the 1939 National Exhibition in Zurich, which is considered as the apogee of the "Spiritual National Defence", three games of the national football team against select squads of the three big neighbour states were scheduled.

The "Spiritual National Defence's" ambivalent character was clearly inherent to the football games between Switzerland and several fascist powers during World War II (Koller 2015). From September 1939 on, Switzerland played 11 official internationals against the Axis powers and their allies (Germany, Italy, Hungary and Vichy France) as well as two games against the fascist neutrals Spain and Portugal and three non-official internationals against Croatia. The home matches used to be big national events attended by General Henri Guisan, supreme commander of the Swiss army, as well as members of federal, cantonal and local governments and diplomats. Especially, the games against Germany had an ambivalent character, stressing good neighbourhood, but at the same time also Switzerland's claim to remain an independent and democratic country. Thus, these games quite accurately reflected Switzerland's policy of wide-ranging economic cooperation with the Axis powers without political nor ideological integration into their European system of power. Two friendly internationals against Sweden in 1942 and 1943, on the other hand, were widely interpreted as a "peaceful demonstration of the neutral stance" (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 16 November 1942).

After both world wars, Swiss football played a major role in the reintegration of Germany into the international sporting system starting with club games shortly after the end of the wars and culminating in Germany's first post-war international (Koller 2010). The aforementioned game between Switzerland and Germany in the summer of 1920 triggered fierce protest not only from Western Switzerland, but also from the UK, Belgium and France. After World War II, first games between Swiss and Southern German clubs took place in 1946 and 1947. In autumn 1948, city selections of Zurich, St. Gallen and Basel played friendly games in Stuttgart, Munich and Karlsruhe. While they were heavily criticised by the countries that had been occupied by Nazi Germany, the Swiss Football Association would only penalise the organisers with a symbolic sum. In the same year, Switzerland tried to obtain Germany's re-entry to FIFA, however, would first fail. In 1950, after intensive lobbying by the Swiss Football Association, the FIFA Congress decided to lift their ban against Germany, after which the first international of the newly established Federal Republic of Germany took place in November 1950 in Stuttgart against Switzerland and was attended by 115,000 spectators (Wahlig 2008).

Another politically loaded question of these years was sporting contacts to the Soviet Union and the emerging Eastern Bloc. For a short time immediately after the war, Switzerland attempted to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. After the Swiss government had pursued a fierce

anti-Bolshevik policy from 1918 to 1943, this stance would change with the Soviet victory in World War II. In 1946, diplomatic relations between the two countries that had been discontinued by Switzerland in November 1918 were re-established. Football became involved into this short-lived change as well. In 1934, the Swiss government had refused entry visa to a Soviet select team, which had been invited by the Swiss Red Sport Association. After the Soviet victory in World War II, the Swiss envoy to Moscow arranged a friendly international in Switzerland, which was scheduled for spring 1947. However, the game had to be cancelled due to an overburdening of the Soviet team with internationals. Thereafter, the emerging Cold War made an encounter with the Eastern superpower no longer desirable.

After Stalin's death in 1953, there would be a new attempt to invigorate Swiss-Soviet sporting relations, and in November 1954, Dynamo Moscow was the first soviet football team to visit Switzerland for two friendly games. The Hungarian crisis in 1956, however, that created a regular anti-Communist hysteria in Switzerland, would interrupt this development with the Swiss National Federation for Physical Culture, the umbrella organisation of the Swiss associations for sport and gymnastics, recommending its members in April 1957 not to conduct any bilateral relations to Eastern Bloc countries for the time being. Only in April 1966, the first game between the national teams of Switzerland and the Soviet Union took place, and it would last another twelve years until the Swiss Football Association would agree to a friendly international against the German Democratic Republic.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

Swiss football knows a number of historical club rivalries. As in other countries, they originate from a complex mixture of cultural, social, political, economic and sporting factors and their meaning today is often difficult to discern. Neither political nor linguistic or religious divisions have triggered enduring football rivalries in Switzerland. Thanks to a strongly federative system, Switzerland knows no separatist movements using a football club as their symbol. Sometimes, there is talk about alleged privilege of clubs from German-speaking regions before the French-speakers by referees or the Football Association; however, such polemical allegations have never been corroborated. Economic disparities hardly play a role, either. Institutionalised mechanisms of adjustment payments between and within the cantons moderate the different regions' financial strength. In Swiss ice hockey, antagonisms between urban centres and the peripheries during the

1970s and 1980s were symbolised by special club rivalries between rural and urban teams (Langnau vs Berne, Ambrì-Piotta vs. Lugano), however, nowadays these divisions have largely become defunct. In today's elite football, FC Sion is the only representative of a peripheral alpine region, yet more than this fact, Sion's supporters tend to stress their belonging to the Canton of Valais with its alleged peculiarities (Berthoud 2007).

From a long-term perspective, the centres of Swiss football have repeatedly moved. During the first two decades after World War II, when Swiss horology witnessed its heyday, clubs from the Jurassic Arc such as La Chaux-de-Fonds, Bienne and Grenchen played an important role in Swiss elite football. The 1970s and early 1980s were dominated by clubs from the big urban centres (Zurich, Geneva, Basel), while the 1980s and early 1990s saw successful teams from medium-sized towns such as Neuchâtel, Lucerne, Sion and Aarau (Schuler 2000). Furthermore, the collapse of elite football in the French- and Italian-speaking parts of the country during the 2000s has resulted in an underrepresentation of Latin Switzerland in the Super League. On balance, it's hardly possible to discern any overall trends in the regional development of Swiss elite football.

As far as derbies are concerned, the golden age of such football rivalries was during the first three decades of the twentieth century. The subdivision of the national championship into three regional groups (East, Central and West) resulted in many games between geographically neighbouring teams. These derbies included rivalries between Old Boys and FC Basel (Switzerland's oldest derbies starting in 1893–1894), between FC Berne and Young Boys (that already played their 43rd encounter as early as in 1924), and between FC Genève (and its successor FC Urania Genève Sport) and FC Servette. The medium-sized city of St. Gallen in the early twentieth century would muster no less than three elite clubs with differing social profiles. The FC St. Gallen, founded by young merchants in 1879 as Switzerland's oldest club that still exists and winner of the 1903 championship, was clearly linked to the city's bourgeoisie. Even more elitist were the Blue Stars that pursued a highly selective membership policy and conducted their meetings in English. Brühl St. Gallen, on the other hand, founded in 1901 and Swiss champion in 1915, despite roots in the grammar school milieu admitted members from all social strata.

The establishment of the Swiss National League in the early 1930s resulted in a limitation of elite football from 12 to 16 clubs. With the exception of Zurich, no city managed to have more than one elite club for a longer period. This triggered the emergence of new club rivalries, for instance between FC Servette and Lausanne-Sports, whose encounters became

known as "Derby of the Lake of Geneva" (*derby lémanique*). In 1935, 12,550 spectators attended this match, creating a new record for Swiss club games that would not be topped for a decade (Ducret 1994). Lausanne-Sport would permanently belong to the highest Swiss League until 2002, when it was stripped from its first-level licence. One year later, the club faced bankruptcy. In 2004, Servette suffered the same fate. Thus, two of the six most successful teams of Swiss football history—Lausanne-Sports had won seven championships and Servette even 17—and the only two of this group in the French-speaking part of the country had disappeared from elite football and together with them one of the most traditional football rivalries.

The two major clubs of Switzerland's largest city Zurich, Grasshopper Club and FC Zurich, preserve a historical rivalry that traces back to the late nineteenth century. The first game between the two teams in the framework of a competition took place as early as in November 1897 during the very first national championship. Since then, more than 250 games between the two clubs in the framework of the Swiss championship, Cup and League Cup have taken place, and they usually attract much bigger audiences than "ordinary" games. The 266th derby in October 2011 had to be abandoned due to spectator riots, becoming known as the "shame of Zurich".

The polysportive Grasshopper Club was founded in 1886 and soon acquired an elitist image as the club of the upper bourgeoisie from Zurich and the so-called Gold coast of the Lake of Zurich. During the 1940s and 1950s, the club seems to have pursued an anti-Semitic stance largely excluding Jews from membership of their different branches (Koller 2017a). Furthermore, it is said that at that period the social background of applicants for membership was checked up and workers' sons turned down. With 27 championships and 19 Cup wins, Grasshopper Club is Switzerland's most successful football club. The FC Zurich, on the other hand, emerged between 1896 and 1898 from several mergers of older clubs. Their first president, Hans Enderli, a lawyer and journalist, would become a socialist politician in the following decade. When the Grasshopper Club temporarily left the Swiss Football Association in 1909, the FC Zurich switched their colours from red and white to blue and white, thus taking over the Grasshoppers' colours, which are also the colours of the city of Zurich. The two clubs now having the same colours would increase tensions among their supporters, even more so, as many people got used to refer to the FC Zurich as the "City's Club". A history of the club published in 2010 and entitled "One City – One Club – One History" was referring to this notion (Lütscher 2010). With twelve championships and nine Cup wins, the FC Zurich is Switzerland's fourth successful club. Despite having been headed by entrepreneurs for decades,

the club has preserved its image as a "workers" club to this day. This, how-ever, reflects the rivalry with the "bourgeois" Grasshoppers rather than socio-logical facts.

From the mid-1920s to the end of the twentieth century, Zurich's foot-ball topography had been fixed by two stadiums geographically close to each other but separated by a major railway track. For decades, it was highly taboo for players "to cross the tracks", thus to switch from one club to the other. Traditionally, the FC Zurich, despite being less successful, has man-aged to attract more spectators than the Grasshoppers. Since 2007, the clubs play in the same stadium, which has sparked fears by supporters of both clubs that a merger of the two clubs—like it had happened in ice hockey in 1997—might become an option.

Another, quite complex rivalry persists between the FC Basel and the two major clubs from Zurich. This rivalry is embedded in a general rivalry between the two cities, which is, however, rather asymmetrical and much more important in Basel than in Zurich. Zurich and its inhabitants have traditionally been one of the two main targets (besides the Germans) of Basel's carnival cantastoria songs. While the two cities don't differ much in their political leaning and both of them are economically in a strong posi-tion, Basel has embraced a much stronger sense of regionalism than Zurich, which is, inter alia, reflected in extensive cultural sponsorship by the city's social elite. Founded in 1893, the FC Basel first had to deal with several rival clubs in the same city: Old Boys Basel that used to be a leading team of Switzerland from the 1890s to the 1930s; Concordia Basel that belonged to the highest Swiss League during the 1920s and 1930s; and Nordstern Basel, a club enjoying support mainly from working-class spectators, that belonged to the highest League from 1911 to 1943 and again for some seasons in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Only by the end of World War II, the FC Basel had largely won over the local monopoly in elite football.

The first golden age of the FC Basel during the 1960s and 1970s was characterised by a fierce competition with the FC Zurich. Between 1966 and 1981, Basel won seven championships and Zurich six with only three championships going to other clubs. Basel's second golden age started shortly after the millennium: in 1998, Basel's old stadium was knocked down and replaced by a new building opened in 2001. From then on, the FC Basel, which since 1999 enjoyed generous support by a wealthy female sponsor, registered much higher spectator numbers than any other club in Switzerland. Between 2002 and 2017, Basel won 12 championships, eight of which in a row from 2010 to 2017, making them the second successful club of Switzerland's football history. The only other clubs becoming Swiss

champions in this period were the FC Zurich (2006, 2007, 2009) and the Grasshoppers (2003). Fixtures between Basel and the clubs from Zurich during that period have been classified as high-risk games and were indeed regularly marked by violent clashes among fan groups and against the police. When Basel lost the 2006 championship against the FC Zurich due to a goal scored in the 93rd minute of the last game, hours of rioting by disappointed Basel fans in the stadium and then in the inner city of Basel followed, leaving 115 people injured.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: The Stadium as a Political Space

Except for the period of the "Spiritual National Defence" of the 1930s and 1940s, football spectatorship in Switzerland has hardly ever been of political significance. During this period, however, the political use of the national team was twofold. Officially, football internationals were celebrated as national events and attended by senior political and military figures. This was to demonstrate both Switzerland's readiness of self-defence and its neutral stance. However, especially the games against Germany also displayed a deeply rooted popular anti-fascism. When in 1937 more than 10,000 German supporters travelled to Zurich for a friendly international, they were booed by workers and left-wing activists all along their route through Eastern Switzerland. Swastika flags were seized and ripped. Two Swiss victories against "Greater Germany", at the 1938 World Cup and in a friendly international in 1941, triggered widespread and clearly politically charged celebrations all over Switzerland.

More recently, football stadiums have become a space of sporadic political protest of all sorts. In 1983, Jurassic separatists burnt the slogan "Jura Libre" into the pitch of the Wankdorf Stadium for everyone to see on TV watching a Euro qualifier against the GDR. Later on, Swiss football stadiums were used to draw the audience's attention to ethnic conflicts abroad: in 1998, Kurdish exiles protested during a game between Grasshoppers and Galatasaray Istanbul, and in 2003, a match between Switzerland and Israel was accompanied by a Palestinian demonstration. Most famously, the Swiss national team conveyed their protest against French nuclear weapons tests by displaying a banner with the slogan "Stop it Chirac" before an away game in Sweden in 1995 (Desiderato 2007). And in 2013, Greenpeace activists hoisted a huge banner with the slogan "Gazprom – don't foul the arctic" during a Champions League game in Basel.

British-style hooliganism reached Switzerland at a relatively late point. As public safety in Switzerland is a cantonal matter, the issue of football spectator violence is handled by cantonal and communal police forces. Only during the 1980s, the Confederation started to be concerned with football spectatorship when it became obvious that far-right groups had infiltrated some football stadiums (Busset et al. 2009). The federal government convened some studies that confirmed this fact; however, no further action was taken for more than two decades. Only after the millennium, federal authorities became involved after the law on domestic security was revised in the run-up to the European Championship 2008 jointly hosted by Switzerland and Austria. The so-called anti-hooligan bill tied into international legislation in this area, including registration of violent fans in a national database, the possibility of restricting their movements at both home and abroad, obliging them to regularly report to the police and even detaining them. Yet, the bill contains no measures against racism and extremism (Jaccoud et al. 2009).

Nevertheless, it appears that the extremist element in the stadium has declined after the millennium. There are various possible explanations for this. First, repressive measures and the uncertainty surrounding legislation that could be taken with a view to Euro 08 have had an effect. In addition, since the inclusion of an anti-racist clause in the Swiss Penal Code in 1995 the authorities now have a tool for punishing those found guilty of racial discrimination—which, however, happens rather infrequently. The deterrent effect of this legislation is all the stronger in that Swiss stadiums hold relatively small crowds and it is therefore quite easy to identify political troublemakers. Thus, extreme right groups use other opportunities to express their opinion and make themselves known. Second, anti-racist initiatives (like FARE) have been launched in the stadiums and the general public. Authorities and sports federations have become more aware of the problem that hitherto had rather been trivialised. Third, several cities, including Basel, Berne, Lucerne, Zurich and St. Gallen, have initiated fan projects following the German model since 2003. They mediate between the authorities, clubs and supporters, speak up for the fans, but also exert control. And fourth, there are people in the stadiums who object to the spectators' being used for political purposes (self-declared distancing). As emphasised by ultra supporters, bringing politics into the football stadium threatens the cohesion of the section for militant supporters (Busset et al. 2009).

Still, the stadiums are by no means fully depoliticised now. On the one hand, some supporter groups according to their acts and slogans can clearly be identified as right-wing or left-wing although it is not always clear

whether such political identities are more than just an attempt to distinguish themselves before other groups. A recent incident has caused quite a stir and reignited discussions about far-right football supporterism: in 2015, several hundred fans of the FC Lucerne in the run-up of an away match marched through the centre of St. Gallen chanting an anti-Semitic song. In front of them, a man disguised as an orthodox Jew and wearing an FC St. Gallen scarf was walking. On the other hand, the supporter scene is much more politicised now when it comes to speak up for their own interests and commenting on the development of their club and football in general.

A political characterisation of the different clubs' supporter groups is hardly possible. Whereas since the early 1980s a clearly far-right hooligan group called "Hardturm front" has supported the Grasshoppers, most supporter groups of the two Zurich clubs don't have a clear-cut political profile. Parts of the "Southern curve" (which is an umbrella term for different supporter groups of the FC Zurich) identify with the transnational ultra culture and cultivate a leftist image. The political leaning of Basel's "Muttenz curve" is hard to discern as well. On the one hand, far-right influence has been clearly visible, for instance in 2007, when the Swiss television showed Basel fans chanting a highly anti-Semitic song originating from the German Nazi rock band "Kommando Freisler". On the other hand, there has been a certain commingling between Basel ultras and far-left activists fighting for "autonomous" spheres. This has even led to a rapprochement of FC Basel and FC Zurich fans, both of them considering the police as their overall "enemy". With both clubs' supporter groups, the display of Che Guevara portraits has been sporadically noticed.

A major change in Continental European fan cultures of the last two decades has been cooperation of different supporter groups, even rivalling ones, to stand up for their interests (e.g. regarding stadium infrastructure or game schedules). Ultra groups now convey such issues in the stadiums on banners. Ironically, they use means Italian ultras had taken over in the 1970s and 1980s from political movements, but adapted to demonstrate their allegiance to their clubs. These means have now returned to their political roots. As the overwhelming majority of the fans support these manifestations, stadiums have become a space of politicisation.

Switzerland was affected by these developments as well, not least under the influence of German fan culture, yet its political system with a highly federalist structure and the many instruments of direct democracy has resulted in some specifically Swiss traits. After the federal parliament had passed the anti-hooligan bill in 2005, a network of fan representatives attempted to collect the 50,000 signatures needed for triggering a

referendum over this bill. Despite support from leftist and green circles who feared that the scope of the bill could later be expanded to other groups, they didn't manage to collect the number of signatures needed, not least due to the many negative headlines about football and ice hockey fans during the preceding years. When the bill expired in 2010, many of its stipulations were transferred into cantonal laws, triggering new debates about anti-hooliganism legislation. Despite some of the measures even being tightened, speakers from different political parties in the cantonal parliaments opposed the general notion of all fans being hooligans (Busset 2014). Furthermore, in 2014, the federal parliament refused to change railway legislation in order to enable exclusion of football fans. This testifies the existence of a political lobby for fan interests. The same is true for the judicial sphere with some lawyers acting on behalf of accused fans in a regular basis.

During the last couple of years, the previous stir about hooliganism has rather calmed down. The balance between preventive and repressive measures has been largely successful. Communication between fans (especially through fan projects), clubs, the Swiss Football Association and the authorities has improved—yet, all fans don't seem to be happy with this development.

4   Football as a Space of Integration—But Just for Men

Two major issues in contemporary Swiss politics are immigration and gender equality. Both of them have links to football. Football pitches have proved to be a major space of integration for male immigrants, however, not without conflicts. Football has become a means for migrant workers to overcome workplace hierarchies and build up their reputation. Swiss women's football, on the other hand, still suffers from widespread neglect, which seems to reflect persisting gender inequalities on the labour market.

The topic of "overforeignization" had already emerged in Swiss political discourses around 1900, resulting in considerable restrictions to immigration and a strong bureaucratic control of foreigners from the end of World War I on. During the period of rapid economic expansion from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, Switzerland recruited many workers in Southern Europe (mainly Italy) for low-qualified jobs, many of them as seasonal workers without any chance of getting permanent residence rights. Starting in the 1960s, a new anti-immigration movement emerged that through the means of direct democracy unsuccessfully tried to reduce the

number of foreigners in Switzerland. During the 1990s, this movement was gradually absorbed by the populist Swiss People's Party that combines neo-liberal and anti-welfare state policies with agrarian protectionism, political isolationism and resistance against immigration and any rapprochement to the European Union, with which Switzerland has signed a number of bilateral treaties including the free movement of people. After the millennium, the People's Party would become the strongest force in the Swiss Federal Parliament.

Swiss football right from its beginnings has had a strong link to immigration. After the period of pioneering football clubs founded by British expats from the 1870s to the 1890s (most notably the Anglo-American Club Zurich that won the first official Swiss football championship in 1899), the first clubs founded by work immigrants from Southern Europe emerged shortly after the end of World War I in Geneva, Zurich and Lausanne (Koller 2008). After World War II, the history of migrant clubs became quite a precise mirror of Switzerland's overall immigration history. As a rule, only a couple of years after substantial immigration from a specific region respective football clubs would be founded. Thus, after 1945 the number of Italian clubs rapidly increased, which were soon joined by Spanish and Portuguese clubs. Shortly after the influx of many Hungarian refugees in 1956, the first Hungarian clubs emerged. Starting in the 1960s, Yugoslavian clubs were founded. While already around 1970 the first separate Croatian clubs were established, Serbian, Bosnian, Macedonian and Kosovar clubs only emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Starting in the 1970s, Turks and South Americans (first mainly refugees from Chile) founded their own clubs, followed by the Greeks in the 1980s. After the millennium, immigrants from Albania, North Africa, Thailand, Lebanon and Iraq would found their own football clubs, with immigrant clubs in urban regions now accounting for a quarter to a third of all football clubs.

In 2008, the percentage of foreigners of the total number of active footballers was 31.7%, thus significantly higher than the share of foreigners in the overall population of Switzerland (22.5%). However, numbers for different nationalities varied considerably: while the share of French nationals in Switzerland actively playing football was about the same as for the Swiss and the one for Germans even lower, it was especially South Europeans and even more so immigrants from the Balkans whose percentage of active footballers was far above average (Koller 2008). Hence, there seems to be an inverse proportionality between social status and percentage of active footballers: Those countries of origin with many low-qualified immigrants account for far more footballers than those sending rather well-qualified people.

Furthermore, it is notable that the percentage of active footballers correlates with geographic distance of the country of origin and linguistic difference. People with low social status, from relatively far away and speaking a language different from Switzerland's national languages are statistically most likely to become active footballers. Football thus appears to be a space for people confronted with high structural hurdles to integration, whereas footballing traditions of the country of origin seem to be rather irrelevant.

Politics and society preserve high expectations regarding the integrative force of sport. These, however, can hardly be met. Quite often "integration into sport" is confused with "integration through sport", resulting in the notion that established Swiss sport clubs should work as spaces of immigrants' social integration par excellence. At the same time, clubs founded and run by immigrants are perceived as spaces of seclusion and stigmatised. However, empirical evidence shows that immigrant clubs play a crucial role as mediators in the process of integration, for instance by familiarising newly arrived immigrants with peculiarities of their new country of residence (Poli et al. 2012). The fact that many club names referring to Italy (e.g. Azzurri and Juventus) have disappeared over time contradicts the seclusion thesis as well. Furthermore, the Central role of Swiss players with migration background in national and international elite football makes the symbiosis of football and immigration appear as a success story.

Starting in the late 1980s, the Swiss national team was more and more dominated by players with migrant background (so-called secondos). While such players, mainly of Italian extraction, had been present since the interwar period, they now became the backbone of the team, which after three decades of mediocrity re-entered the international stage of World Cups and European Championships during the 1990s (Koller 2008; Berthoud et al. 2016). At the 2014 World Cup, the Swiss national team was said to have fielded the greatest number of players with a migrant background of all 32 participants. The issue would become a standard topic with sport journalists asking about split loyalties and the right "mix of mentalities". Political discourses were concerned with the "secondos" in the national team as well. Whereas far-right politicians repeatedly complained about the high number of them, supporters of a cosmopolitan Switzerland in several referendum campaigns about immigration and naturalisation policies pointed at the footballers as excellent examples of how Switzerland profits from immigration. When the brethren Hakan and Murat Yakin were naturalised in 1994, then Sport Minister Adolf Ogi claimed that this was a matter "of considerable national interest".

It is, however, unclear whether the topic of footballers with migrant background ever had any impact on people's stance about immigration. Undoubtedly, the public have connected the good results of the Swiss national team in recent years to the achievements of players with migrant background. The fact that major Swiss corporations hire such players for advertisements hints at least indirectly at football's impact on immigrants' image. On the other hand, the many insults and even death threats that reached Ivan Rakitic and his family in 2007, when he decided to play for Croatia rather than for Switzerland, show a permanent possibility for xenophobia to flare up again.

The issue of gender equality has its links to football as well. As in other countries, women's football in Switzerland—one of the oldest democracies in the world that, however, only enfranchised women as late as in 1971—was literally inexistent for a long time (Meier 2004). After first unsuccessful attempts to establish female teams during the 1920s, the next female football activities known only date from the second half of the 1960s. It is yet to be explored how strongly they were linked to the emergence of the new women's liberation movement. In 1969–1970, a short-lived women's football association was founded in Western Switzerland and a first non-official championship took place. In April 1970, the Swiss Women's Football League was established with the first official championship taking place in the season 1970–1971. The same season also witnessed the first friendly international against Austria. The number of women's football teams grew steadily from 18 in 1970 to 55 in 1979 and 417 in 2001.

Nevertheless, media coverage remained minimal with the symptomatic exception of the case of the FC Wettswil-Bonstetten. In March 1994, the seven men who comprised the governing committee of the club decided that the women's team would be dissolved with immediate effect. The justification for this action was that the team allegedly corrupted the youth and that it included too many lesbians. Because the rules of the Swiss Football Association required at that time that women's teams had to be connected to a (male) football club, this meant that the team was finished. This case was just what the media had been waiting for. The "sex scandal" around the "lesbian team" made it onto the front page of the leading tabloid *Blick* and Swiss television aired a report with the title "Does Women's Football Corrupt the Youth?". Since then, significant change has taken place in two directions. On the one hand, media coverage of the Swiss women's national team has considerably increased. In the run-up to the 2015 World Cup, when the Swiss team for the first time qualified for a major international tournament, interviews and features familiarised the public with the team

and individual players. On the other hand, changing attitudes towards homosexuality enable players to publicly present themselves as lesbians without becoming the target of public indignation.

Nevertheless, despite this progress, women's football in Switzerland is still not very popular. Newspapers usually only print the results of League games and hardly ever comment on them. Women's clubs encounter big difficulties in securing funding. The Swiss Women's Football League remains a mere training body with most national team players switching to clubs abroad, especially in Germany. As an exception, the village club of FC Neunkirch managed to build a team mainly consisting of players from foreign national teams during the last couple of years. In 2017, this team won both the national championship and the Swiss Cup, however, only a couple of days later it became known that its manager had embezzled several hundreds of thousands of francs with his employer in order to fund the women's football miracle, and Neunkirch had to withdraw from the League.

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United Kingdom

Matthew Taylor

"If the workers put as much interest into their politics as they do into their football matches", the Labour politician and trade unionist Ellen Wilkinson was quoted as saying in 1930, "we could alter the face of England in the next ten years" (*Manchester Guardian*, 12 May 1930). At the time of Wilkinson's comment, football had been part of the fabric of popular culture in the UK for at least half a century. Its designation as the "people's game" encouraged it to be seen either as the possession of a particular section of the population, or the game of nations, as distinct national cups, leagues and governing bodies took form from the late nineteenth century onwards. Social commentators acknowledged that it mattered a great deal to "ordinary" citizens—especially men—and that it probably occupied too much of their time and energy. And like Wilkinson, some politicians, particularly on the left, argued that it diverted attention away from the serious business of workplace organisation and party politics. However, for many there was a difference between the British relationship to football, even that of the working classes, who may have been excited and moved by the game but ultimately recognised it as a small part of their cultural lives, and that of certain foreigners (South Americans, for instance) for whom the game had become the "passion of the people" and "the politics of the masses" (Mason 1995; Dewhurst 1969).

M. Taylor (✉)
School of Humanities, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
e-mail: mtaylor@dmu.ac.uk

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For most of its history, football in the UK, with certain notable exceptions, has rarely been considered overtly political. Seldom has it been acknowledged as a key concern for national or local politicians or an obvious site for political decision-making. Indeed because the organisation of British sport is assumed to have been predicated on voluntarism and non-interference, at least until the 1960s, football was often talked about as if it were somehow politically inert. This chapter will argue to the contrary that football and politics, broadly defined, were intertwined from the very beginnings of the game in the UK. It will explore the emergence of football as a popular expression of local and civic loyalties and will assess its role in helping to define and develop regional and national identities. The second section will focus on changes and continuities in club rivalries from the Victorian period until the present day. Thirdly, we will consider the political dimension of the football spectacle: how the game was perceived over time; attitudes to supporters in general and organised supporter groups in particular; and the particular issue of violence from the 1960s. The final section of the chapter will explore the contemporary globalisation of British football, assessing the degree to which foreign football labour and ownership of elite clubs have transformed the social and cultural place of the game in the UK and the meanings attached to it.

1   The Political Origins of Football

The process whereby various popular and localised forms of "football" were regulated and codified in mid-Victorian Britain is now the subject of considerable academic debate. This is not the place to explore the contrasting approaches of "orthodox" historians who emphasise the key role of the public schools and their alumni, and "revisionists", who argue for popular, working-class forms of football to be considered more important. But two points are worthy of our attention here. First of all, the game of association football (as codified by the Football Association in 1863) was neither the only nor necessarily the most popular football code in Britain through the 1860s, the 1870s and into the 1880s. Rather than seeing this period in terms of the earliest history of each sport, it makes more sense to recognise it as a transitional era where different variants of "football" were emerging through play and competition, discussion and debate. Only by the late 1880s is it really possible to distinguish rugby and association football as separate games with specific, though connected, trajectories; and even after this, it was not uncommon for clubs, even those that were fairly well estab-

lished, to switch from one code to the other for economic reasons, as both Bradford City and Bradford Park Avenue did during the 1900s (Arnold 1988; Pendleton 2015).

As clubs emerged out of neighbourhoods and districts—the most successful representing these places on regional and national stages—so football became an important site for the construction of identities of place. The Victorian era was a period of rapid urbanisation and civic progress. Football clubs appeared to be developing as an important focus for collective urban loyalty, representing in Richard Holt's words a form of "symbolic citizenship" (1989), that connected otherwise isolated individuals to each other and to the town or city they inhabited. A club could symbolise the town and act as a marker of its broader socio-economic and civic progress (Bassett 2014, 155; Croll 2000, 170–171). The triumphant homecoming of victorious teams, normally after a Cup success, was possibly the clearest example of the mark football was able to make on British urban culture in just a couple of decades. In the textiles towns of Lancashire, for example, the numbers of those celebrating were astonishing: between 30,000 and 40,000 out of a total population of 120,000 in Blackburn in 1890 to welcome the Rovers' fourth FA Cup win in seven seasons (Williams 1997, 128). Newspapers reporting the return of the team helped to construct a familiar narrative of enthusiastic celebration, civic belonging and local pride. In 1899, Sheffield United's homecoming was reportedly "accorded all the honours of a victorious army after a notable campaign", with "an enormous crowd" greeting the players at the railway station and following the procession through the city streets to a reception at a local theatre. Football had become "such an absorbing fascination for so many denizens of the great steel city who so identify themselves with the varying fortunes of the local teams", it was stated, "that a victory like Saturday's comes to have almost a personal element in it" (*Sheffield & Rotherham Independent*, 19 April 1899).

Whether or not working people initiated these ritualised celebrations, thereby drawing themselves "into the civic lives of towns", is open to question (Williams 1997, 131). The earliest popular football celebrations seem to have been citizen-led, with civic leaders taking some time to recognise the value of public association with the local team. It is noteworthy, for instance, that most towns and cities excluded football clubs from Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee Celebrations in 1897, suggesting that sporting success had yet to be considered a significant basis for enhancing civic status. "It is no duty of a Chief Magistrate to welcome home a successful football team", remarked the *Bury Times* in April 1903 after the mayor had done just that in the wake of Bury FC's first (and only) FA Cup win (Williams 1997,

131–132). However, by the 1900s it was rare for occasions of this kind to take place without a notable civic presence. MPs and municipal dignitaries increasingly understood the importance of football clubs as a source of local pride. Some just attended high-profile matches, especially around election time, but others, such as the Sheffield MP A. V. Alexander who joined the Sheffield Wednesday Supporters' Club in 1930, recognised the value of a permanent connection with such an important popular civic institution (Fishwick 1989, 137).

Football also stimulated regional loyalties. In the North of England, where professional football developed first, and where the Football League was based from its inception in 1888, local pride could easily merge into a wider sense of northern identity. The FA Cup and the Football League provided a canvas for the playing out of tensions between the North and South of England. The Blackburn Rovers side which competed in the 1882 FA Cup final was described by a local correspondent as representing "the town, the county and the provinces, against 'Metropolitan' protection and 'Metropolitan' authority" (Williams 1997, 133). Some fifty years later, similar tensions were evident when the London club Arsenal rose to prominence. The club won five first division championships and two FA Cups during the 1930s and was often the subject of intense animosity among fans of northern clubs. During one crucial championship decider at Preston in 1938 the booing of Arsenal was reportedly "almost continuous". Arsenal were disliked because they were successful, because of their unpopular counter-attacking style, and because they had the resources to buy some of the best players, such as David Jack from Bolton and Alex James from Preston. Above all, however, Arsenal represented southern domination, their achievements "held to mirror a (much simplified) wider socio-economic picture" (Russell 2004, 254).

In between towns and regions, counties became key administrative units in British football but have not been recognised as a vital source of identification (Huggins 2004, 205–206). County loyalties may have had more meaning for middle-class administrators than for working-class fans, with inter-county matches less appealing to supporters than inter-town affairs, but the county was not as insignificant as some have assumed. Recent research on Nottinghamshire, a key area in the development of football in the latter part of the nineteenth century, demonstrates that county attachments were frequently articulated and that city and county identities could exist together, and be combined, relatively smoothly. Not only were county competitions more important than town or regional ones, the leading clubs in the county, Notts County and Nottingham Forest, also actively promoted

themselves as county institutions. When success came, the two Nottingham clubs gathered increasing support across the county and this limited the appeal of local clubs in smaller towns who could no longer compete with institutions seen to be representative of shire as much as city (Dawes 2017). At some levels of the game—school and grassroots amateur, for instance—county-based competition and representation figured highly for most of the twentieth century (Kerrigan 2004). What is more, at the elite level a tendency to focus on the intense emotional commitment, and fierce rivalries, of certain groups of fans, often assumed to somehow be more "authentic", has led scholars to underplay other modes of support. "Followers" of football were always more numerous than "fanatics" and for these groups "a gentle regional or county patriotism mingled with an intelligent appreciation of football as art" (Russell 1999, 20). In such circumstances, football was marked less by the "us" versus "them" of intense rivalries (which are explored below) and more by the existence of gradations of attachment and loyalty.

Football's role in the construction of national identity varied across the countries of the UK. In English football, the nation was a much less significant focus of identity than locality or region up until the 1950s, and possibly beyond. Not only did the national team play infrequently, but victories and defeats were generally not invested with any wider significance as a barometer of national well-being. In Wales, too, it took some time for football to be appropriated as a symbol of national pride. The first Welsh international team in 1876 included a Scottish-born doctor and a solicitor from Shrewsbury in England. Players from the North dominated the Welsh side in the earliest decades and it initially had little popular following in the South, where rugby was the main focus for popular sporting loyalty (Johnes 2005, 34–35). In Irish football, divisions between Belfast and Dublin predated political Partition in 1921. The Irish Football Association (IFA), based in Belfast, was accused in the capital of being pro-Belfast and anti-Dublin in its selection of national teams, its distribution of resources and its adjudication in inter-club disputes. Indeed the Irish team was referred to simply as "Belfast" in some Dublin newspapers and one angry southern administrator complained in 1899 that "the Irish association existed for Belfast alone". Solidarity in Irish football was also complicated by the politics of nationalism and Unionism, although generally speaking before World War One the divisions in the sport were neither motivated by religion nor politics (Garnham 2004, 162). Of all the UK national teams, Scotland was the most conspicuous vehicle for national identification and pride. Scottish football may have been divided into a number of respects—between the "Old Firm" of Celtic and Rangers; the "Old Firm" and the rest; West and

East and North and South—but the national team seemed to offer a symbol of Scottish unity. This was particularly evident in the annual matches against England, which the Scots edged until the Second World War, and which drew the highest crowds in the UK. Proudly displaying their nationhood with scarves, thistles and tam o' shanters (an identifiably Scottish bonnet or cap), up to 30,000 Scots were travelling to the biennial match at Wembley by the 1930s. "Scottish resentment at its richer and more powerful footballing neighbour" was increasingly channelled into this "sporting 'battle' with England" (Taylor 2008, 167).

It would be a mistake, however, to overplay the nationalistic credentials of football in the UK. Up until 1939, and in certain respects beyond, football had a significant British dimension that is missed if we focus simply on its role as a beacon of Scottishness, Welshness, Irishness or Englishness. Scholars of football have tended to write discrete histories of the game in each nation, rather than using Britain or the UK as the key organising device. This might seem logical given that separate national teams, cups and leagues had been established in most cases by the beginning of the twentieth century, and that local newspapers were already beginning to emphasise the emergence of national traditions, playing styles and tactical approaches to football. Yet it neglected the important British context to the game's development. From its inauguration in 1871–1872 until the mid-1880s, Scottish, Irish and Welsh cups competed in the FA Cup. The competition was popularly known as the "English Cup", although the suggestion that both Association and Cup should be renamed as "National" and hence be considered "the National Association of the United Kingdom" was rejected in 1886. "[I]n these days of home rule politics", one English newspaper observed, such a suggestion "would arose the wrath and indignation of the other nationalities" (*Grantham Journal*, 24 December 1886). It would and it did. The Scottish FA barred its clubs from affiliating to the FA and entering its Cup competition at the end of the same season. Even so, Welsh clubs still competed in the "English Cup" and its principal professional leagues, while the British International Championship which began around the same time, in 1883, became a centrepiece of the football calendar. Administratively, the International Football Association Board (founded in 1886), the forum for changing the rules of the game, consisted of representatives of the four British associations (with FIFA admitted in 1913). Here, as well as in the collective approach the British associations were to take to FIFA and other supranational bodies, football in the territories of the UK developed within a noticeable British context (Taylor 2008, 12).

Similarly, the development of separate identities for football in each of the four nations did not mean that it ceased to be understood as a British game too. Matches between British teams (at national and club level) often became occasions for the celebration of collaborative sporting achievement and British unity. When the administrators gathered to celebrate the Scottish FA's Diamond Jubilee in March 1933 referred to football as the "people's game…built up on the sure rock of democracy" and as "an asset of great national value", the "people" and "nation" in question were clearly understood to be both Scottish and British (*The Scotsman*, 14 March 1933). Likewise, football was regularly defended as a "British national game", the peculiarities of which appealed particularly to "the British temperament"—especially when contrasted with the sports of other nations and football's rising popularity in other parts of the world (*Western Morning News*, 24 May 1926). Crucially, football in Britain was never sealed off in national cocoons, but bound together by a range of influences and interconnections. National and British football cultures therefore existed alongside one another, even if the latter often seemed to be submerged by the influence of the former.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

Observers of football from the late nineteenth century onwards were fascinated by the emotions the game could provoke and the animosities it could generate. In one of the best known reflections on the emergence of British football culture in the Edwardian era, H. F. Abell wrote of the "football fever" that gripped many of the spectators. "There is enthusiasm, plenty of it", Abell noted of the crowd, "but it is an ungenerous one-sided enthusiasm, without spark of chivalry or appreciation of alien worth in it" (Abell 1904). "The history of football", two sociologists have noted, "is the story of rivalry and opposition", with the game continuing to be "flavoured by these senses of difference and rivalry" well into the twenty-first century (Armstrong and Giulianotti 2001, 1–2). However, too much emphasis on club rivalry as the lifeblood of football's cultural identity through its history is potentially misleading. It ignores the wider contexts in which rivalries have developed, particularly the importance of cooperation between teams and the impact of civic, county or regional loyalties. Such allegiances often co-existed with, or cut across, the identification with a single club that is often assumed always to have been at the heart of "authentic" football support.

By and large, club rivalries in British football have been based on place rather than politics, religion or ethnicity. There are obvious exceptions to this, of course. In Glasgow, the two leading clubs, Celtic and Rangers, have been seen as representative of different communities within the city: the former connected to the Irish-Scots and Catholicism and the latter to Scottish Protestantism and Unionism. Historians disagree over how far Rangers, a club founded in 1873, fourteen years before Celtic, was already strongly Unionist and anti-Catholic (Murray 2000; Bradley 2004a, b). What is clear, however, is that the rivalry of the so-called Old Firm, and to a lesser extent that between Hibernian and Heart of Midlothian in Edinburgh and Dundee United and Dundee, both echoed and contributed to wider religious and ethnic divisions in working-class Scotland before the Second World War, in particular (Knox 1999, 141; Bairner 2000, 93–94). While acknowledging that much of the success of Celtic and Rangers, on the pitch and off, was explained by "the linkage of football to sectarian politics" (Bairner 2000, 93), club rivalries were always about more than this. First of all, from the late nineteenth century, Scottish professional football has been divided between city-based clubs and the rest and, more specifically, between the "Old Firm" and the rest. Glasgow's footballing hegemony, demonstrated not just by the sporting success of Celtic and Rangers, but also the fact that the Scottish FA and the Scottish League were based, and the majority of major international and Cup fixtures took place, in the city, has led to Scotland's two leading club's being widely disliked (Bairner 1994, 15). More specifically, at particular times, such as during the 1980s when Aberdeen emerged as Rangers' main competitor on the field, other factors drove the rivalry. Here, regional differences in the economy, political culture and divergent representations of Scottish identity—as well as closely contested football matches—all contributed to the fierce rivalry that emerged between the clubs (Giulianotti and Gerrard 2001, 32–34).

Most football rivalries in Britain developed initially around clubs in the same city or region. Contests between "civic siblings" generated particular interest and passion among supporters (Giulianotti 1999, 10). Spatial divisions were often a factor in reinforcing established rivalries. In Sheffield, United's Bramall Lane ground, based close to the city centre, initially drew larger crowds from the working-class residential estates nearby, while Wednesday's supporters were associated with the 1920s housing developments, and later the post-war housing estates, in the North of the city (Fishwick 1989, 54; Armstrong 1998, 207). In Nottingham, the rivalry between County and Forest was based less on locality—both clubs being seen as representatives of both "city" and "county"—and more on prestige

and social class. Initially, at least, County was considered more respectable and associated with the local middle-class, with Forest regarded as having a more popular following (Dawes 2017). Elsewhere, clubs representing a single town or city have long vied with one another for regional supremacy: Newcastle United and Sunderland in the North-East of England, Norwich City and Ipswich Town in East Anglia, Blackburn Rovers and Burnley in East Lancashire and Portsmouth and Southampton on the South coast, for instance. There is a tendency to perceive such rivalries as timeless but invariably they have waxed and waned over decades according to circumstance.

This, as well as the complex, multi-stranded character of club rivalries, is evident in the case of possibly the best supported and the most "hated" club in British football: Manchester United. United's closest and longest-standing adversaries, Manchester City, are significant as local rivals but the rivalry had different meanings at times when the two clubs were vying for domestic cups and championships, in the pre-First World War decade, for instance, in the 1960s and since City's transformation under the ownership of the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG) in 2008. The rivalries with both Liverpool and Leeds United are rooted in geography but have been inflamed by sporting interactions. Liverpool's dominance in domestic and European competition during the 1970s and 1980s, for example, aggrieved Manchester United fans, who considered themselves a "bigger" and more glamorous club. Ever since, Manchester United-Liverpool fixtures have been framed as both contests between England's most successful clubs and matches pitting the two major industrial and cultural centres of the North-West. The Leeds rivalry, while based on historical Lancashire (Manchester) and Yorkshire (Leeds) antagonism, is more recent, deriving from "the cultures of contemporary football" (Brick 2001, 19). The bitter relationship between fans of the two teams, provoked by hostile chants and taunts, particularly in the case of Leeds fans related to the 1958 Munich air crash, was intensified by Leeds pipping Manchester United for the 1991/1992 Championship, and the subsequent transfer of Leeds idol Eric Cantona to Manchester United the following season. Since then, the rivalry has simmered due mainly to Leeds' sporting decline, financial implosion and relegation from the Premier League. Manchester United's rivalry with Arsenal, meanwhile, is mainly the product of the Premier League era, rooted particularly in the public antipathy between managers Alex Ferguson and Arsene Wenger. Finally, the annual involvement, and periodic success, of Manchester United in European competition, has arguably transformed the perspective of some supporters, not so much in terms of forging new rivalries with continental clubs—although this has occurred—as in allowing them to express pride in their club and

city and assert their superiority over long-standing domestic rivals (King 2003, 209–219). The continental adventures of leading British clubs like Manchester United over the last twenty or so years have thus provided a transnational context through which existing domestic rivalries have been played out and, invariably, reinforced.

Football, then, was inherently oppositional and rivalries a natural reflection of "territorial and cultural divisions" within and between cities (Holt 1988, 80). But rivalries were also cooperative arrangements. Along with Cup ties, "Derby" games brought in the biggest crowds and the highest gate receipts: economically they were crucial for the coffers of the clubs concerned. Because of this, committees and directorates often worked closely together. This is hardly surprising as the men who ran the clubs were invariably drawn from the same social and political circles. Many knew one another across the overlapping worlds of business, civic politics, local philanthropy and sport. In Liverpool, for example, the two main clubs joined together to publish the "Everton and Liverpool Official Club Programme", which lasted from 1904 until 1935 (Mason 1985, 18). Relations between the Sheffield clubs were closer still. Not only did they share a chairman—FA President Charles Clegg—for many years but they also took joint decisions on player wages and bonuses, voted together at FA and Football League meetings and agreed a uniform ticket pricing policy. Public displays of friendship and mutual support—celebratory dinners and banquets, congratulations for achievements, commiserations for defeat and so on—cemented the bonds between clubs that considered themselves both "friends" and "rivals" (Taylor 2005, 192–194). For supporters, too, local rivalries were and are important as a source of social mixing and cultural bonding, given that rival fans often "lived, worked and socialised with each other, discussing, joking and theorising endlessly on past and future encounters" (Giulianotti 1999, 10).

More than this, the focus in the popular and academic literature on sporting rivalry as conflict, opposition and mutual aggression fits uneasily with historical patterns of football support in Britain (Armstrong and Giulianotti 2001; Benkwitz and Molnar 2012). Put simply, not all supporters or followers supported or followed just one club and many watched, took an interest in, and presumably identified with, clubs that we might now assume to have been "bitter" rivals. While we still need more detailed studies of this topic, research on Lancashire and Liverpool, covering different time periods, has suggested that multiple-club support was common. The *Liverpool Football Echo* in 1909 profiled a "staunch" Everton supporter since 1890 who "became a supporter" of Liverpool a couple of years later, watching each

side on alternate Saturdays. Whether or not spectators of this type should be viewed as "supporters" of both clubs, attendance figures certainly suggest that a large number of Liverpudlians watched both Everton and Liverpool at home on a regular basis before 1914 (Preston 2007, 234–235). Oral history has similarly revealed cross-club support to have been an important facet of football culture in post-war Lancashire. Some respondents would travel to watch particular star players, such as Tom Finney or Stanley Matthews, while others claimed to have "active respect and emotional attachment to a number of teams" and to support "football in Lancashire" in general. This even occurred in Manchester, a city normally associated with bitter footballing rivalries. "[I]t was City one week and United the next", one Manchester City fan recalled of the 1950s. "A lot of people used to go to both… I mean when you're a football supporter in your younger days you were glad to watch a football match and although I didn't support them [United] I just enjoyed watching them" (Mellor 2003, 211–212). While this sense of regional solidarity declined from the late 1950s onwards, with "one-club" parochialism becoming the dominant mode of football support in Lancashire, cross-club attachments never disappeared entirely (Mellor 2003, 254–268; Sheldon 2015, 235). Such evidence is important in modifying interpretations that focus on rival clubs as "perpetual antagonists" (Armstrong 1998), and which seem to regard certain modes of support as more "real" and "authentic" than others.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

It is difficult to pinpoint a precise moment when football became a part of British national culture. Some analyses have pointed to significant footballing events: such as the so-called Matthews Cup final, and the 6–3 defeat of the England team by Hungary, both in 1953, or England's 1966 World Cup victory (Johnes and Mellor 2006; Hughson 2016). Two leading historians of sport have seen 1953, in particular, as a turning point. Because it was a coronation year, they argue, many British people had bought televisions and so also watched Matthews, a national figure anyway, finally achieve recognition on a national stage. No longer "the preserve of the working class", football was supposedly now recognised as an element of the nation's cultural life (Holt and Mason 2000, 97). Such a view probably underestimates the degree to which, even between the wars, football had become accepted as a pastime with considerable social and moral benefits and therefore a sport of some national importance. The British elite, however, generally

distinguished between playing and watching sport. Mere "spectatorism" was often condemned. "First class football today is not a sport, it is a professional game played for money", wrote Sir John Foster Fraser in 1925. He went on: "for any group at a football match to be loudly contemptuous about the play of a visiting team is, to say the least, a departure from what ought to be our standard of English sportsmanship" (Huggins and Williams 2006, 19). Views of this type seem to have been common, too, across the middle and skilled working classes. A survey by the social research organisation Mass-Observation based on interviews in 41 different localities in Britain revealed football to be far and away the most popular sport to play (35%) and watch (43%). But a significant minority objected to the commercialisation and passive consumption of the professional game. "The average football fan", one member of Mass-Observation's National Panel suggested in 1949, "is about as sporting as this piece of paper. Many of them would cheerfully stand and watch if the 22 men in the centre of the field started gouging each others [sic.] eyes out" (M-O A, FR 3045, 3–11; M-O A, FR 3141, 13).

Despite these criticisms, the 1940s and early 1950s were perhaps *the* crucial period in the transformation of public attitudes towards football. Not only did attendances reach an all-time high (a total of over 41 million in the Football League and 6.2 million in the Scottish League during the 1948/1949 season) but football benefitted from a new-found recognition among cultural commentators and politicians. In his 1948 book *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, the poet T. S. Eliot included football Cup Finals alongside nineteenth-century Gothic churches, the music of Elgar and boiled cabbage as legitimate elements of English culture (Eliot 1948, 31). Discussing this passage a few years later, the historian Asa Briggs noted that of these the Cup final was the most important because for many Englishmen, football was "life itself" (Porter 2004, 31). While politicians of earlier generations had often denounced or ignored football, by the 1940s they were among its loudest advocates. In 1951, the Labour MP J. P. W. Mallalieu wrote a pamphlet entitled *This Football Business*, which celebrated the passion and camaraderie of the football crowd and the artistry of the game (Mallalieu 1951). Other politicians defended football in the House of Commons, stressing the important role of the game "in our national life". In 1945, the MP for Middlesbrough East called football the "great national game", and called on the government to protect and preserve it. According to the Conservative Joseph Braithwaite, football acted as a social "cement which enabled us to be a nation in times of stress". Football, he argued, was "something in British life well worth preserving" (Taylor 2015, 277).

Such positive assessments of football's social worth were not entirely new but they were given a major boost due to wartime circumstances. The Second World War represented a key turning point in British class relations. While working people came to see themselves as a "collective force" bound together by new shared experiences and needs, the government and the media portrayed them for the first time as "the backbone of the nation", a group whose interests were now "synonymous with those of the country". This did not mean that Britain somehow became a classless society. Rather, as Selina Todd has argued, class and nation emerged as complementary rather than contradictory categories (Todd 2014, 120–121). Already a sport of the working class, football was increasingly portrayed as belonging to the nation too (Taylor 2015). This manifested itself in different ways. Most significantly, football became widely valued as a means of improving civilian morale. Mass-Observation thought sports like football were "just as important to the masses as politics and religion" and that regular matches had "a major effect on the morale of the people" (M-O A, FR 13, 6). Previously the recreation of the ordinary worker in war and post-war austerity football became for the first time a genuinely national concern, helping to sustain a population under strain and stress.

Public perceptions of football after 1960 were closely tied up with the rise of spectator violence. Indeed, in some accounts it is difficult to disentangle the story of the British game between 1960 and the mid-1980s from that of hooliganism. In truth, there were two strands of spectator mobilisation that were generally distinct—though some scholars have attempted to link them—over this and subsequent periods. The first was the development of fan activism, most clearly associated with independent supporters' groups and fanzine culture. While supporter organisations had existed since the early days of the professional game, most were considered relatively benign institutions dedicated to fund-raising for their clubs rather than oppositional campaigns against the bodies that ran football. Founded in 1927, the National Federation of Football Supporters' Clubs (NFFSC) ultimately failed to offer a distinctive voice for ordinary fans on key issues such as crowd safety, racism and hooliganism. It was for the most part a conservative organisation, "reflecting the opinions of the football clubs and their administrators" (Taylor 1992, 184). A more radical fans' movement emerged after 1985, prompted by the Heysel Stadium disaster, and centred on the Football Supporters' Association (FSA), and scores of independent club-based supporters' organisations and fanzines. Cases of active fan involvement in the management of clubs were rare, however, until the establishment of Supporters Direct in 2000. A government-backed initiative to establish

Supporters' Trusts aimed at encouraging fan representation on club boards and financial involvement through the collective ownership of club shares, some saw Supporters Direct as "nothing less than the democratisation of football clubs" (Kennedy 2012, 411). Supporters' Trusts achieved considerable success in keeping smaller clubs, in particular, in business. But they had less impact at the bigger clubs where they could assert limited financial leverage and where it was much more difficult to establish a meaningful fan-club dialogue (Cleland 2010). As a result, many supporters continued to consider themselves excluded, and often alienated, from "their" clubs and those who owned them. In extreme cases, such as FC United in Manchester and AFC Wimbledon, this led to groups of disenchanted supporters creating breakaway clubs over which they had a greater degree of control and a shared sense of belonging (Brown 2008).

Organised violence was the second major strand of spectator mobilisation. Scholars have long debated definitions of hooliganism, figures for arrests and violent encounters, and the meanings of these acts for those involved. Most have accepted that the media played a key role in highlighting instances of football-related unrest and that hooliganism thus became "embedded in the national and governmental consciousness" during the 1970s (Giulianotti 1994). Many observers have identified a clear break in the state attitude to hooliganism in 1979, when the Thatcher government attempted through a series of legislative measures to crackdown on a perceived rise of violence on the terraces at home and when British fans travelled abroad. Outbreaks of hooliganism were denounced by the government "in much the same vocabulary and tones as those reserved for terrorism, street crime, strikers and demonstrators, and other perceived enemies within" (Hargreaves 1986, 249). The highpoint of government intervention in football was the proposed Football Spectators Bill which aimed to establish an identity card system to control entry into grounds. It was extremely controversial and was criticised from a range of angles, such as those who considered it an infringement of civil rights and others who regarded it as "valueless" in its aim of ensuring crowd safety, with the potential to actually increase disorder at grounds (The Football League 1985, 2). The Hillsborough Disaster of 1989 convinced supporters of the Bill that identity cards were more necessary than ever, but the Taylor Report into the Hillsborough disaster rejected the idea as "unwieldy, unworkable and likely to increase the potential for hooliganism" (Jefferys 2012, 186). The Taylor Report's recommendations for the removal of perimeter fencing and the introduction of all-seater stadia changed the focus of intervention from law-and-order to safety and allowed government ministers to "retreat

to their preferred stance, distancing themselves from active intervention in professional sport" (Jefferys 2012, 187). Hooliganism certainly did not disappear in Britain from the 1990s with the arrival of the Premier League, demographic changes in crowd composition, and a new emphasis on crowd management and public safety (Williams 2001; Bebber 2012, 235). But it ceased to be the major problem it had been for successive governments in the 1970s and 1980s.

4   British Football and Global Networks

One of the chief characteristics of British football over the last twenty or so years has been its cosmopolitanism. Prior to the 1990s, relatively few clubs employed non-UK players or coaches, clubs were owned almost exclusively by UK nationals and most fans were relatively local to the team they supported. The transformation that has occurred since then, particularly in the way in which it is now consumed, has arguably turned the English Premier League, at least, into the first "global football league" (Millward 2011). Many of its clubs have become global brands operating in transnational as well as local and national spaces. Local forces—identities, rivalries and jealousies—remain significant, in this view, but they are often connected to, and partly shaped by, the global networks through which money, ideas and information flow.

The institutional isolation of British football for much of the twentieth century influenced attitudes to foreign football talent. Outside FIFA for most of the interwar years, the English authorities (though not the Scottish) were also slow to recognise the value of official European competition in the 1950s. In line with these views, foreign footballers were considered both unnecessary and undesirable. In England and Wales, the FA imposed a two-year residential qualification in 1931 that effectively prevented clubs from signing non-British professionals. Top-level amateurs were similarly banned following Danish international Hans Jeppson's successful spell at Charlton Athletic in 1951, where he was instrumental in saving the London club from relegation to the Second Division (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001, 48–51). The door for foreign professionals was not opened until the mid-1970s. First, in 1976, the FA lifted its 2-year residential qualification and then two years later the Football League, pressed by the European Commission and UEFA, agreed a new regulation allowing clubs in the top two divisions to field a maximum of two nationals from outside the UK in any match. The first two foreign signings, the Argentinians Osvaldo Ardiles

and Ricardo Villa at Tottenham Hotspur, made a significant impression but there was a trickle rather than a deluge of imports over the next decade. By 1997, however, there were 218 foreign players in all English leagues, a figure which had risen to over 400 by the opening day of the 2000/2001 season (Taylor 2008, 396). By 2016, the Premier League had the highest percentage of foreign players (64.4%) of any European League, with some 61.8% (316 players in total) defined as "expatriate" footballers; that is, players trained by, and recruited from, a club in another country (Poli et al. 2016a, b).

Similarly, foreign investment in, and ownership of, British clubs has been on the rise. Early cases date back to the late 1990s, when the Egyptian Mohammed Al-Fayed took over Fulham, the Serbian-American business tycoon Milan Mandarić acquired Portsmouth and a Norwegian consortium took control of Wimbledon FC (Jones and Cook 2015, 119). But Roman Abramovich's acquisition of Chelsea in 2003 marked a significant expansion in foreign ownership, to the extent that by the 2008/2009 season nine out of the twenty Premier League clubs had major overseas shareholders. Most of the foreign-owned clubs (Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester City and Manchester United) were members of the league's elite and in the case of both Chelsea and Manchester City foreign investment was a major factor in securing championship titles, cups and regular Champions' League qualification. The popularity of foreign owners among supporters varied considerably. Whereas many Liverpool and Manchester United supporters protested vehemently against the takeover of their clubs by American businessmen George Gillett and Tom Hicks and Malcolm Glazer respectively, at Manchester City the ADUG takeover was generally regarded as a positive development. Here, poor relationships had existed previously between the fans and locally based shareholders, who had often been accused of profiteering and not investing in the playing squad. By contrast, many City supporters believed that the new owners had a greater "understanding" of the fans and the club's history and were impressed by plans to redevelop the area around the stadium, and most importantly, help to finance a successful championship-winning team (Millward 2011; Nauright and Ramfjord 2010, 438). At Leicester City, similarly, the Thai owners, Vichai Srivaddhanaprabha and the Asian Football Investments consortium, who bought the club from Milan Mandarić in 2010, have been especially popular, with careful investment and strategic appointments helping to deliver the club its first Premier League title in 2015/2016.

More broadly, attitudes to "foreigners" in British football, whether as players or owners, have been significantly shaped by, and have themselves helped to shape, wider political debates concerning Britain's place in Europe

and the wider world. The discussion of foreign players has often been couched in the same language as general fears about refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers. Non-British players have been considered a "threat" to the existing structures of the game and a potential barrier to the job security and opportunities enjoyed by UK players. English newspapers, it has been argued, long insular and parochial in their outlook, have more recently practised a casual form of xenophobia in relation to international and European football. As such, foreign players, even at clubs like Arsenal, which, contrary to some scholarly assumptions, has rarely framed itself in terms of a strictly English identity, have been regularly portrayed as "outsiders" by sections of the fan-base (Ranc 2012). Attitudes to foreign owners, meanwhile, have been significantly influenced by the agenda of parts of the right-wing UK press—and indeed far right parties across Europe. Here, "foreign" owners are inevitably seen as "outsiders", coming to take over "our" clubs, with little respect of understanding for traditional British culture. "Foreign" players, owners and other "alien" influences are generally conceived in this context as a "problem" that has prevented the British from performing at their best, negatively affecting the quality of "our" football, at club and national level (Millward 2011, 40).

While the 2016 referendum vote to leave the European Union inflamed attitudes to immigrants in the UK, fears of similar isolation in football has concerned those running the game. Prior to the referendum, the West Ham United vice-chair Karren Brady wrote to the chairmen of all professional clubs in England, Scotland and Wales, arguing that the UK "cutting ourselves off from Europe would have devastating consequences". For the Premier League chairman, Richard Scudamore, the "openness" of the Premier League in terms of EU playing talent, in particular, meant that it would be "incongruous" for him to support the UK leaving Europe (Stevens 2016). Every Premier League club came out in support of the Remain campaign, although there were others within the administration of the British game, such as the players' unions and some within the national federations, who believed Brexit would improve the opportunities for British players and, ultimately, the performances of the national teams (Schofield and Criddle 2016). As far as supporters are concerned, attitudes to Brexit were probably as mixed as in the rest of the population. But at a time when UK competitions—particularly the Premier League—are generally considered among the most cosmopolitan in the world, it is difficult to know how far views will change if restrictions are placed on the freedom of British clubs to buy—and fans to watch—some of the best players on the globe.

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Part III

Eastern Europe

Croatia

Loïc Tregoures

1 Political Origins of Football

The first football game ever recorded in Croatia took place in Rijeka in 1873, among English engineers and workers who came to build a factory and railways. However, this game would remain orphan until the 1880s. Following a usual pattern, the game first came by sea, through English sailors. A famous exhibition game among Navy sailors took place in Zadar in 1887 witnessed by the Prince of Edinburgh, son of Queen Victoria. Other games were played in public by English sailors in Trogir and Split around 1896. English engineers and forest experts also spread football in the countryside, notably in Zupanje, where the first game to have been played with local players along English ones is recorded in 1880. While it is recorded that football started to be played in some schools in Zadar and in Istria around 1900, a first club appeared in Zagreb in 1903 under the name of First Football and Sport Club (PNISK), followed by Football Club HASK (Croatian Academic Sport Club) Zagreb and Football Club HSK Concordia Zagreb in 1906.[1] Moreover, the first edition of the laws of the game was published in the local language in Zagreb in 1896 by Milovan Zoricic, to be published again in 1908 with the technical assistance of the English Football

L. Tregoures (✉)
Catholic University of Paris, Paris, France

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Association. Zoricic was to become the first president of the Croatian Football Federation founded in 1912.

However, the journey until this achievement was marked by deep political and identity considerations in the context of a conflict regarding the degree of political autonomy granted by Budapest to the kingdom of Croatia–Slavonia, officially associated with the kingdom of Hungary within the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1867. In the frame of the identity awakening movement within the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late nineteenth century, especially among Slavs (Hobsbawn 1992), football can be deemed an element through which a specific Croatian identity could be promoted above regional differences between Istria, Central Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. Thus, several points should be made in order to highlight this politicisation of football at the beginning of the twentieth century.

First, the Croatian football historiography retains that the very first game played by the Croatian national team, although unofficial, took place in Prague in June 1907 and the second one just three days later. That the games were played there is not casual. As mentioned above, Slavic people from the Empire were struggling at the same time for autonomy, and there was therefore a sense of solidarity between them. Besides, the Czechs were a bit ahead of the Croats in the development of football, be it through the creation of a Football Federation,[2] or through the creation of the two biggest Prague clubs, Slavia and Sparta. Moreover, two Czech players, Josip Tolivka and Jan Todl, were at that time playing for PNISK Zagreb. They were the ones who arranged the games to be played between Slavia Prague and a selection of the best Croatian players to be found among both Zagreb clubs of PNISK and HASK. These games are recorded to have been played with Croatian national symbols (flag and anthem) displayed, which is crucial in the incarnation of the "imagined community" (Anderson 1991).

On the other hand, above from Croatian national identity, solidarity between Slavic people was not at work only between Czech and Croats but also between Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the wake of a « Yugoslav » idea, or the unification of Slavs from South in one state. In the 1900s, the Serb-Croat Coalition founded by Fran Supilo and Ante Trumbic was a strong political movement under the Hungarian rule. As far as football is concerned, this Yugoslav idea can be exemplified by the creation of football club Jugoslavija in 1907 by high school boys from Gorizia in Slovenia. In Ljubljana too were created football clubs Hermes and Ilirija[3] which later merged in 1913 under a Czech coach.

Second, the creation of a Croatian Football Federation was also marked by political considerations. In Croatia like in other Slavic parts of the Empire,

sport and cultural activities were partly organised by the *Sokol* (Falcon) system, a gymnastic and cultural youth movement born among the Czech in 1862 in order to fuel both Czech nationalism and panslavism after the first Pan-Slavic Congress held in Prague in 1848. This model then spread among Slavic people. It emerged in Croatia from 1874 thanks to August Senoa, a Czech-Croat writer and Zagreb mayor of German descent. Yet it took three years of negotiations after the first public game in Zagreb between local teams of PNISK and HASK in October 1906, before both clubs' management created a Croatian sports federation in 1909. However, in this effort to create its own sport organisations, the Croats turned down an offer by Hungary to be included in a regional League in 1908. In return, the Croatian sport federation was denied any recognition by the Hungarian authorities embodied by the *Ban*[4] sent by Budapest in 1908 Pavao Rauch, unionist opposed to Croatian autonomy (Goldstein 1999). Only when Rauch was dismissed in 1910 was the Croatian Sport association recognised under new *Ban* Nikola Tomasic, with the Austrians' blessing, as Vienna was keen on annoying Budapest. This step led to the final one, the creation of a football section of this federation, which came into force in 1912 with Milovan Zoricic as the first president. Thus, this federation was able to organise the very first championship of Croatia and Slavonia in 1912–1913 with six teams, won by HASK Zagreb.

Third, in parallel with the process of setting up a Football Federation, clubs were still being created like HSK Gradanski Zagreb and Hajduk Split in 1911, the latter still existing to this day. In order to underline both its Croatianness and its belonging to the city of Zagreb, the former was named First Croatian Citizen Sport Club Zagreb shortened into Gradanski (citizen) Zagreb. On the other hand, Hajduk Split was created in 1911 by four Croatian students at the University of Prague on the model of Slavia Prague, hence the historical links between Slavia and Hajduk.[5] Austrian authorities in Zadar issued a permit so that the club could be created, again in an attempt to harm not only Budapest but also the Italian irredentism, very strong in Dalmatia and Istria. The very name Hajduk indicates a political aspect since this name means "outlaw", "freedom fighter" or "renegade" in Southeast Europe, and was meant, in this specific case, to represent the Croatian struggle for freedom, especially against the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly, Hajduk played its very first game against an Italian team from Split, Calcio Spalato.

However, links between football, politics and identity don't stop after the Croats finally succeeded in establishing their own Football Federation, championship and clubs. On the contrary, the politicisation of Croatian football

has been a pattern for the whole twentieth century. When Croatian clubs such as Gradanski, HASK, Concordia and Hajduk gathered after the First World War to set up a Croatian Football Federation that would no longer be a section of the Croatian sport federation but an independent structure, the section was finally absorbed into a new Yugoslavian Football Federation, following the emergence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, named Yugoslavia after the centralisation of the country following 1929 coup by the King Aleksandar. Therefore, Croatian clubs were thus designed to be at the vanguard of the Croatian identity representation during the interwar period, and managed to win 10 out of 17 championships organised between 1923 and 1940 (5 for Gradanski, 2 for Hajduk, 2 for Concordia, 1 for HASK) while their players often boycotted the Yugoslav national team. Nevertheless, an independent Croatian Football Federation was resuscitated in 1939 following a political agreement reached under huge nazi pressure according to which a new status of autonomy was conceded to regions (*ban*, which was designed precisely not to match ethnic lines) mostly inhabited by Croats but not only. This regime, under a territory called Banovina of Croatia,[6] would last until Yugoslavia was invaded by the Axis in 1941. Four games were played by a Croatian unofficial national team between 1939 and 1941.

The Second World War period is very controversial in Croatia as it gave birth in 1941 to a collaborationist brutal regime called Independent State of Croatia (NDH) ruled by Ante Pavelic's Ustashi movement, under which hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews and Roma were killed. Under the Ustasha regime, the Croatian Football Federation was recognised as a FIFA member as such for the first time in its history. The Croatian national team thus played 14 official games until 1945.[7] On the other hand though, Hajduk Split refused to play either in the Croatian League under Ustashi after 1943, or in the Italian League as Dalmatia was under fascist rule until 1943.[8] Despite being a symbol of Dalmatia and Croatian identity, Hajduk players chose to resist and were at the vanguard of the antifascist struggle led by Tito's Partisans. The team was formed again in 1944 to become the official Yugoslav resistance team, which explains why Hajduk was said to be Marshall Tito's favourite team although the Yugoslav army had its own team after 1945, Partizan Belgrade, created after Hajduk refused to move to Belgrade. General De Gaulle himself awarded Hajduk Split of the honorary team of the Free France in 1945.

However, one of the first moves by the new Communist regime was to ban several clubs that were considered to have been tools to nationalist propaganda and to create other clubs. Thus, most of Zagreb clubs disappeared while Dinamo Zagreb was founded. The Croatian club of Zrinjski Mostar,

in Bosnia-Herzegovina, also disappeared. Of the four strongest teams in Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991 (Dinamo Zagreb, Hajduk Split, Red Star Belgrade, Partizan Belgrade), Hajduk was the only one born before 1945. Nonetheless, given the federal structure of the regime, a Croatian Football Federation still existed, as a member of the Yugoslav one. Then again, Dinamo Zagreb and Hajduk Split, although rivals, embodied the Croatian identity that couldn't be expressed elsewhere, which became more and more obvious from the 1980s when the country started its journey to disaggregation and when the ultra and hooligan models of fandom spread all over Yugoslav stadiums.

This leads to the politicisation of football in the fight for independence and symbolic international recognition from 1990 to 1998 World Cup. To that extent, three major events took place in 1990. First, on May 13th, just few days after nationalist Franjo Tudjman was elected as president in the first free elections organised in Croatia, a huge fight broke out in Dinamo Zagreb's Maksimir stadium between Red Star Belgrade fans and Dinamo fans. The fight lasted about an hour and extended outside the stadium. The game was never played and became famous as young Dinamo's captain Zvonimir Boban high-kicked a policeman who was beating a Dinamo fan. According to some, including Serbian warlord Arkan who was then the head of Red Star fans, this game was evidence that it was only a matter of time before the real war broke out. Serbian anthropologist Ivan Djordjevic showed that there is a much-differentiated memory of Maksimir between Croatia and Serbia. While in Serbia this event has been mostly forgotten or seen as a Croatian plot to purge the Zagreb police from its Serbs, it is still considered to be a key event in Croatia, as far as resistance to the Communist regime and to Serbs is concerned (Djordjevic 2012).

Second, in June 1990, Yugoslavia played its last friendly game before the World Cup in Zagreb against the Netherlands. To the surprise of the Dutch, the Yugoslav anthem was so booed that it could not even be heard on the pitch. Disappointment, irony or sadness could be seen on some players' faces, while the coach Ivica Osim, a Yugoslav from Sarajevo, ironically applauded the crowd. Besides, the stadium was full of Dutch flags, which were the same as the Croatian flag. Therefore, this game served as evidence that the Croats no longer felt anything neither for the Yugoslavian team which was still theirs, nor for Yugoslavia itself and were on their way to independence.

Third, although FIFA doesn't recognise it, Croatia reckons to have played its first official international game post-World War II in October 1990 against the USA, even before Croatia became an independent state and

the recognition of Croatia's Football Federation by FIFA in 1992.[9] As a football fan himself, President Tudjman has always been aware of how powerful sport could be not only in terms of internal identity cementing, but also regarding *soft power* (Nye 1990) and public diplomacy abroad (Džankić 2012). A football game can thus be described as a "performance" according to Tim Edensor (2002). For him, the nation is embodied by a system of symbols and performances whose reproduction, in time and space, shape identity feelings into an imagined community, be it through a football game with the national team or any other "ancestral" ceremony (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983). Football, with the staging of flags, jerseys and the national anthem, as well as through its star players produces and develops a common sense of belonging and togetherness among the nation.[10] This October 1990 game against the USA (which Croatia won 2–1) was therefore for Zagreb and President Tudjman, celebrated as much as the team in the stadium, a political staging aimed to show that the most powerful country in the world was symbolically recognising that an independent nation state called Croatia existed, although the US diplomacy was then against any dissolution of Yugoslavia. It should be mentioned that Croatian players would still play for Yugoslavia until Croatia's declaration of independence in June 1991. Playing for this Croatian national team was therefore a real political choice.

Finally, thanks to its golden generation, Croatia could capitalise on immediate and tremendous successes with its national team as a mean to international branding. Croatia indeed made it to its first tournament in Euro 1996 and took an astonishing third place at World Cup 1998, fuelled by patriotic discourses of coach Miroslav Blazevic, a close friend to President Tudjman, delighted by his players whom he saw as Croatia's best ambassadors (Brentin 2013).[11] This patriotic trend somehow decreased after 2000, following both the democratic transition after Tudjman's death and the fact that Croatia was now more secure a country, which no longer needed to put so much emphasis on patriotism regarding the sport. Still, competitions in which a Croatian national team is competing (football, basketball, handball, water polo, tennis) are still followed with great passion.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

Before 1914, the Austrians were struggling against Italian irredentism in Istria and Dalmatia. To that extent, they allowed Croatian clubs to be formed while football was organised by the Italians with their own competitions.[12] However, very few games are recorded between Italian and Croatian teams out

of a game between Hajduk Split and Calcio Spalato in 1912. Few other games were played between Calcio Spalato, renamed Edera, and a local club named Anarh, founded by young Croatian anarchists, later to be called Jug on police order after troubles in a game with Hajduk Split. Those few games between Edera and Anarh were indeed full of tensions and violence, yet it stopped from 1919 when Dalmatia was given to Yugoslavia, minus the city of Zadar (Zara in Italian). In Zadar, football was still played according to the Italian system, and no game took place against any Croatian team. The same goes for Istria in Pula (Pola in Italian) and Rijeka (Fiume). It explains why Croatian clubs from Rijeka, Pula and Zadar were created after 1945. Before 1945, the other relevant rivalry was purely related to sport, between HASK Zagreb and Gradanski Zagreb, struggling for supremacy of football in Croatia but also in the whole Yugoslavia. It is therefore rather paradoxical that after Communist Yugoslavia collapsed, Dinamo Zagreb was first renamed HASK-Gradanski Zagreb from 1991 to 1993. This shift was politically ordered so to erase any vestige of communism and to go back to real roots of football in Zagreb, dismissing the fact that HASK and Gradanski were archrivals (Sindbaek 2013).

After 1945, rivalries among clubs existed according to two levels, the Croatian one, and the Yugoslav one. In Croatian historiography, including in football sphere, Yugoslavia is described as an illegitimate regime under Serbian control, turned against Croatian interests. It explains why even the Croatian Football Federation website claims that its main clubs, Dinamo Zagreb and Hajduk Split, were not treated fairly by the Yugoslav federation which tended to favour the other two giants from Serbia, Partizan and Red Star Belgrade. Therefore, as far as sport and identity issues are concerned, rivalries at the Yugoslav level between Dinamo and Hajduk on the one hand, and Red Star and Partizan on the other, were the most significant ones, including regarding fan groups and violence. When ultra and hooligan models of fandom rose in Yugoslavia from the end of the 1970s, fights would often break out between *Torcida* of Split, *Bad Blue Boys* of Dinamo Zagreb, *Grobari* of Partizan Belgrade, and *Delije* of Red Star Belgrade (Lalic 2012).

Yet already then another rivalry existed between Dinamo Zagreb and Hajduk Split since they were the two best Croatian clubs. The first embodied the Croatian identity including out of Croatia. Croats from elsewhere in Yugoslavia and diaspora would often cheer for Dinamo as a mean to claim their "croatianness" in an acceptable way given the regime's policy against any nationalist statement. On the other hand, Hajduk was a club aimed to defend Croatian identity, but also the Dalmatian one, which is why its fan base was (and still is) much more related to Dalmatia, be it in the region, or among those who have been moving to Zagreb for decades for economic or study reasons. Besides, Dinamo was the club of the capital city whereas

people from Split felt neglected and treated unfairly by local Communist authorities keener on Dinamo.

However, this rivalry really took another dimension after Croatia's independence on the same sport and geography grounds. In the new Croatian League, the opposition between Dinamo and Hajduk, the two best teams of the country, became the most important game of the season, not only in terms of football, but also, and above all, as far as fan groups are concerned. Tensions and violence between Torcida and Bad Blue Boys skyrocketed after Croatia's independence until nowadays, in order to show their supremacy over the other. Notwithstanding other minor rivalries such as the Istrian derby between NK Pula and NK Rijeka, the other relevant rivalry in Croatian football is between Rijeka and Hajduk in what is called "the Adriatic derby". In both Dinamo-Hajduk and Rijeka-Hajduk cases, rivalries are mostly geography and sport-related and are fed by a struggle for supremacy between fan groups, which are the three most numerous in the country, through violence, cheering, animations.

That those rivalries are sport-related and not politically oriented or linked to organised crime like in Serbia enables rival groups to agree on truces when necessary. They did so in order to oppose a decision made by the Croatian Football Federation to implement a voucher system for away fans after violence erupted during an Adriatic derby between Rijeka and Hajduk in 2013. Thus, for the first time since the war, fans from rival teams would demonstrate together in streets and share the same stands in the stadium, refraining from any violent behaviour, which was seen as an unbelievable move weeks before given the level of violence between groups (Tregoures 2017). Proven to be inapplicable, the measure was finally withdrawn by the federation. Besides, truces between fan groups are always implemented when the national team is at stake. Namely, groups travel side by side to competitions all over the world to cheer for the Croatian national team. They would not necessarily mix with each other, but at least they agree not to fight with each other on the ground that the national team is above their rivalries.

3   Political Aspects of Football as a Sports Spectacle

It is often alleged that football would serve as a metaphor to understand politics. Yet it can be argued that football is much more than a metaphor if football is to be defined by and through its actors, namely, players, football authorities, but also football fan groups. To that extent, the Croatian case

shows evidence that football is not only a metaphor, an observation window (Grix 2010), but also a political and social actor. This can be exemplified through three case studies. First, football clubs and fans were fully integrated to, and actors of the rise of the nationalist and warmonger wave that swept Yugoslavia from the end of the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, clubs embodying a national identity like Dinamo or Hajduk and their stadiums were used as political arenas to display separatist and nationalist messages. The same goes for the Serbs with Red Star Belgrade although the team itself was very Yugoslav. What matters here is the perception its fans had of the team. In Red Star's case, its fans, even above the hardcore ones, felt that the team was a symbol of the Serbian identity no matter who played for it. Every week, fan groups would travel, sing nationalist slogans, display hateful banners, fight with each other, echoing and giving strength to the idea that living together within Yugoslavia was no longer an option (Vrcan and Lalic 1999). This is the reason why the games Hajduk-Dinamo of April 1990 where both Bad Blue Boys and Torcida endorsed Tudjman's party HDZ through banners, Dinamo-Red Star of May 13th, Yugoslavia-Netherlands of June, and Hajduk-Partizan of October 1990, where Hajduk fans invaded the pitch and burnt the Yugoslav flag, are so crucial. Eventually, although much could be said about the interpretation of this phenomenon regarding a direct connection between football and war,[13] hundreds of football fans left stadiums at the beginning of the war and went to the battlefields, including with their club's patch on their military jacket.

Second, the war made it possible for the regime to mobilise on an emotional dimension for four years, dismissing any other topic. Therefore, the end of the war in 1995 entailed two consequences. The first was a hardening of the regime in terms of public expression, and authoritarian practices against any opposition in order to consolidate a regime that could no longer rely on the supreme objective of establishing an independent nation state. The second was the research for other symbolic and emotional objects to mobilise on as a substitute for the war in order for the regime to keep a somehow carnal relation with the people. Hence the role of football in that strategy, especially on the part of President Tudjman, a football-lover whose party HDZ had captured the state, and who ruled Croatia in a very personalised way. To that extent, football was seen as a very serious political matter for him, which is why he insisted so much to change Dinamo Zagreb's name, a club he was a big fan of, and for which he would fix results all over the 1990s. In 1993, after the HASK-Gradanski name was found unsuitable, he ordered the club to be renamed Croatia Zagreb, in order to emphasise the club's role as a symbol of Croatianness.

However, this allegedly irrelevant *fait du prince* sparked an open conflict between Tudjman and Bad Blue Boys which can be considered to be, according to sociologist Srdjan Vrcan, the first step towards the collapse of the Tudjman and HDZ regime from the local elections loss in 1996 to the loss of the 2000 general elections just after Tudjman died, leading to democratic transition (Vrcan 2002). While the name change was obvious for Tudjman in order to get rid of any sign of communism and Yugoslavia, Dinamo fans saw this move in a very different way. For them, Dinamo was not about communism but about their club, the one they suffered for, the one they won with, the one they fought for all over Yugoslavia in the name of "croatianness". Therefore, they felt unfairly deprived from what they felt was theirs, their name, their club, and decided to protest in various ways despite strong repression by the police. Paradoxically, while they didn't look for it and would agree with Tudjman regarding nationalism, the Bad Blue Boys became the first social group to rise up in a significant way against Tudjman, hence against the regime, as exemplified by a famous graffiti on Zagreb's walls: "if there was freedom and democracy, it would be Dinamo and not Croatia". After that and given the crackdown of the regime on opponents and media like popular Radio 101 in Zagreb, other social groups dared demonstrating along with Bad Blue Boys. Thus, the latter were at the vanguard of an opposition movement that would gather people with complete opposite political views, and would only agree on one thing : getting rid of the regime. The role of Bad Blue Boys is also underlined by alternative movement sociologist Benjamin Perasovic according to whom: "*BBB were the only ones to fight physically against the police under Tudjman, this is true. Then trade unions and workers did it too when they got desperate. Tudjman could use nationalism legitimacy against human rights people, but not against BBB. He tried to label them yugo nostalgic or Soros[14] men. Then, average people could see his stubbornness. In a way, he was over, he had lost sense of reality*".[15] Eventually, after Tudjman died in December 1999 and HDZ lost elections in January 2000, Bad Blue Boys got their club back with its real name Dinamo, putting an end to an authoritarian regime and to an overpoliticisation of football by the Croatian regime.

Third, football can be considered to be an innovative sphere of social and political mobilisations in nowadays Croatia, in the wake of different civic initiatives let by football fan groups. Namely, both Dinamo and Hajduk fans launched their own respective initiative in order to advocate a democratic and transparent management of their respective club.

Dinamo fans, way above Bad Blue Boys, launched in 2011 a civic initiative called Together for Dinamo, gathering older fans, lawyers, academics,

former players etc. Together for Dinamo was founded to push for the democratisation of Dinamo and can therefore be identified as "a campaign which aims to build a more accountable Dinamo, responsive to its fans" (Hodges and Stubbs 2016). It mainly emerged in reaction to the concerns of many fans with the club's ownership structure and particularly one individual, Zdravko Mamic. According to the fans, the "most influential man in Croatian football" serving as Dinamo executive vice-president, has for years used the club for his private business, extracting money and using the club for money laundering and tax evasion, for which he is under investigation and was several time arrested. Yet Dinamo is a public association, which means that every member should be entitled to vote for its leadership. This is what Together for Dinamo has been advocating for years, raising awareness on the illegal way Dinamo was ruled, and every illegal action its ruler was guilty of with impunity, thanks to its political protections. To that extent, Together for Dinamo cause goes far above football, and is as such a political cause about struggle against corruption, good and transparent governance, and democracy. As Tomislav, one of Together for Dinamo founders puts it: "*Together for Dinamo is only focused on Dinamo. Dinamo is an example of what happens in Croatia on a bigger level regarding corruption. So, Dinamo is a symbol, but it is our point. Still, we show people that we need to fight corruption on every level, if we can make an exemple with Dinamo, then it's good for everybody*".[16]

On the other hand, in Split, the civic association Our Hajduk was created by Hajduk Split fans in 2009 after a first attempt to buy shares of the club failed a year earlier. Hajduk fans then decided to change their strategy and gathered in a civic association in order to become a key player in the club's management. They did so through a pro-active lobbying campaign towards the municipality of Split, which owns the club,[17] and the media in order to generate popular support. Our Hajduk's aim was to lobby for a more democratic and transparent management of their club.[18] They mainly succeeded in it, after the club' general assembly adopted in 2010 a code of good governance called Codex supposed to spare the club from any political conflict of interest, or any corruption case through a transparent management, with a board elected in majority by members of the association, which presents its actions, results, and objectives in sport and financial matters every year.

Eventually, another kind of civic initiative should be mentioned. Football fan group White Angels from NK Zagreb, the only group in the region claiming to be anti-fascist, ended up creating its own football club, NK Zagreb 041, which plays in low Zagreb division. The club works according to direct democracy rules with working groups and no hierarchy, advocates

non-violence, tolerance for ethnic and sexual minorities and claims to go back to the roots of real football with fun and solidarity, following other fan groups, notably in the UK, who turned their back on professional football and created their own club.[19] Thus, these civic initiatives are part of a broader movement for a popular, democratic, durable football, respectful of identities, against a perceived gentrification and financialisation of football as elements of neoliberal globalisation. It is therefore another project of society that is being conceived throughout football with the ambition of turning it into a "total social fact" (Mauss 2012) with political (democratic management, focus on local), social (grassroots movements, respect of identities) and economic (sustainable, healthy finances) dimensions.

Nevertheless, widespread nationalism, celebration of war events such as operation Storm by which 200,000 Serbs were expelled from Krajina in 1995, and regular violence among hardcore fan groups ought to be mentioned, as it entails a growing contradiction between civic initiatives like Together for Dinamo or Our Hajduk on the one hand, and hardcore football fans Bad Blue Boys and Torcida on the other, regardless of their common interest and love for their respective club. Namely, according to testimonies of Together for Dinamo members, it seems that they have often been embarrassed by the violent behaviour of Bad Blue Boys and tried to adapt their relationship accordingly. This situation is less problematic in Split, because Torcida members used to be Our Hajduk members as well, meaning bridges are easier to cross in this case. However, advocating more transparency and democracy in football through expertise and lobbying, and raising awareness of corruption in the public opinion, requires being viewed as a legitimate actor to deal with at the political and civic level.

All in all, these mobilisations are part of a movement that has spread across Europe over the last decades, in which fans have ceased to see stadium terraces as their only space of activity and started to spread activities across diverse areas of society and politics. These supporters have stopped being politically passive, both towards the club and state structures (Haynes 1995; Cleland 2010), and became engaged in the fight for their rights or their visions of the sport and society. It can be said that, although they deny being labelled political, they started to become openly so, in the sense that they started to work for the *polis* and public good (Giulianotti 1999). Croatia is the country of South Eastern Europe in which this practice has been the most developed so far although other cases are emerging, in Bosnia for instance. It goes hand in hand with the development of a stronger civil society in Croatia over the years, thanks to the EU integration process and in response to worrying political moves, be it regarding corruption,

authoritarian practices or nationalism. The annual Subversive Festival held in Zagreb epitomises this point.

Still, although Our Hajduk's success, through huge mobilisation, shows that there are possibilities to implement a new business and political model of democratic governance, it is still questionable whether other sectors from Croatian society, including NGOs or trade unions, will view those football fans mobilisations as a model to follow.

4   Contemporary Issues

As a political and social fact, football makes it possible to highlight two dimensions of today's Croatia. The first one is related to geopolitics, thus an external dimension, while the second one is related to widespread corruption, thus an internal dimension.

25 years after its independence, the political and patriotic fever around football has indisputably calmed down, not only because of rather lower results of the national team, but also because the kind of frenzy and politicisation triggered off by Tudjman is now over. However, games played by the national team still give precious information regarding the geopolitics of the region which is reproduced in the microcosm of stadiums among fans and the media each time it is deemed relevant. Thus, in stands, the Serbs, the Greeks and the Russians are friends. And since the Croats are the Serbs' enemies, they become enemy to the Greeks and the Russians too, as exemplified by regular violence between them, for instance during a game Greece-Croatia in 2011 (*BBC*, 7 October 2011). On the other hand, the Albanians and the Croats share a common enemy, the Serbs, which is why Croatian and Albanian fans from Kosovo were fined by FIFA after they sang together insulting songs against the Serbs during the 2016 Kosovo-Croatia game. Therefore, there is no surprise that games like Serbia-Albania or Croatia-Serbia still provoke huge tensions before, during and after the game. The vocabulary of war is very often used as a grammar of stands in order to provoke the enemy. It explains why Serbian fans exhibited a huge banner writing "Vukovar" during 2013 Serbia-Croatia, or why the slogan "knife, barbwire, Srebrenica" became very common in order to provoke the Bosniaks.

Besides, this geopolitics of the region can also be assessed regarding crossed allegiances, namely citizens from one state but national from another. To that extent, Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrate the most accurately this tension. In Mostar, cheering for the Croatian national team,

as well as for the Croatian local club Zrinjski Mostar is not a matter of choice but rather a social obligation. During the 2014 World Cup in Mostar, one could feel in two different countries whether Bosnia or Croatia was playing. Regularly, violence between young hooligans erupts on game days. Football in Mostar is thus a way to understand how politics work there, through overinvestment on nationalism and symbolism in which Zagreb still claims a role to play to protect the interests of the Croats in Bosnia. It is not casual if the leaders of the so-called Herzegovinian lobby were known to be the most nationalist among the different fractions close to Tudjman.

As far as the internal dimension is concerned, football puts an emphasis on a more widespread issue in the country according to Transparency International ranking, namely generalised corruption and a questionable implementation of the rule of law. Not only are football fans trying through their civic initiatives to make an impact on the football sphere governance, but they also look for a politicisation of their cases including sometimes throughout seemingly detrimental repertoire of action. In November 2014, Hajduk Split president decided to withdraw from a game due to be played in Zagreb against Dinamo, arguing that some of their fans had been denied the entrance on the ground of an illegal blacklist, usually used by Dinamo management against its own fans with the help of police. This event was a huge blow for the Croatian Federation although its President, former legend Davor Suker, dismissed it as irrelevant. Still, a few days later, about 35000 people took the streets in Split, a particularly huge number on Split's scale, to protest against corruption and bad governance within Croatian football. The then President of the Republic of Croatia Ivo Josipovic even acknowledged that something had been wrong for a long time in the football business in Croatia (*Le Courrier des Balkans*, 26 November 2014). The politicisation of the issue of corruption and conflict of interest in football emerged following efforts by football fans to raise public awareness on it as mentioned earlier. Yet interestingly, football fans involved in civic initiatives went above their own claims on the respective club and behaved like professional lobbyists towards politicians in order to have a new law on sport adopted, which would impede conflict of interests. This law, advocated and basically written by jurists among football fans, finally came into force in 2015. However, the Croatian Football Federation refuses to implement it, and since January 2016, the government under HDZ, which has close relations with football leadership, turns a blind eye on it.

Confronted to this deadlock, some hardcore fans decided to change their tactic and take advantage of games of the national team to internationalise the issue, even at the price of harming themselves and their cause. Thus,

they threw flares on the pitch in Italy during Italy–Croatia game, and in France during Euro 2016 in order to stop the game, have their cause publicised and embarrass the Football Federation.[20] A swastika was even drawn on the pitch in Split before a game played behind closed doors after incidents in Italy.

The point here, for Croatia as well as for the whole region, is the tension between growing authoritarian political practices, persisting widespread corruption, non-ending economic transition, and re-emerging of social movements on both sides of the fringes of the political spectrum. As sociologists Igor Stiks and Srecko Horvat argue, from the desert of post-socialism can emerge new ways of doing politics from the fringes, with new actors (football fans), new repertoire of action (happenings, performances, violent or non-violent), and new causes (governance of a football club). This is why studying football from a political and social perspective makes sense.

Notes

1. It is worth noting that the H in acronyms means Hrvatski, or Croat, which emphasises the identity claim through sport clubs. It is also worth noting that most Croatian clubs, including in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are still named after acronym HNK for Croatian Football Club.
2. The Football Federation of Bohemia-Moravia, first a FIFA member in 1906, then quickly dismissed by FIFA under Austrian pressure in 1908.
3. Illyrism is a literary movement based on a common language spoken by South Slavs, which advocates a common political solution for South Slavs. This movement will be later called Yugoslavism, embodied notably by Croat Josip Strossmayer.
4. Viceroy sent by the Hungarian kingdom in the frame of the settlement agreed between Croatia and kingdom of Hungary after 1867.
5. Hajduk played its 100-year-old anniversary game against Slavia Prague in 2011.
6. This Banovina was composed of the actual Croatia as well as some parts of South West Bosnia-Herzegovina and North West Serbia.
7. Correspondence between FIFA and the Croatian federation are still in FIFA archives, in German language, and available for research.
8. People from Split were fiercely opposed to the Italian annexation, but also blamed the Ustashi regime for it agreed the Partition of Croatia that granted Dalmatia to Mussolini.
9. In order for FIFA and the Yugoslav federation to allow this game to be played, Croatian football authorities lied by pretending that the team would

just be a selection of players from Yugoslavia. In fact, out of a Slovenian and an Albanian who accepted the trick, the other players, as well as the crowd in Maksimir stadium of Zagreb were well aware that this game was about the celebration of a Croatian national team. See "Početak borbe za samostalnost: Hrvatska je za povijesnoj utakmici prijavljena kao momčad jugolige" ("The beginning of struggle for independence: for this game, Croatia is described as a selection of players from Yugoslavia"), *Index*, 17 October 2014. http://www.index.hr/sport/clanak/pocetak-borbe-za-samostalnost-hrvatska-je-u-povijesnoj-utakmici-prijavljena-kao-momcad-jugolige-/778026.aspx.

10. Croatia has a very specific jersey with a red and white chessboard. The one worn in October 1990 was very similar to the one worn during the NDH in the 1940s.
11. See also Brentin (2016).
12. See sport historian Igor Kramarsic's website on football in Dalmatia and Istria before 1945. http://igor.kramarsic.com/index.php.
13. This topic is discussed by Ivan Colovic regarding Red Star fans turned into warriors among Arkan's paramilitary unit Tigers. See Colovic (1998).
14. Reference to George Soros, Founder of Open Society Institute, and funder of human rights movements in Eastern Europe, thus seen as an enemy and US agent by every Eastern Europe strongman.
15. Interview with the author. NB: interviews quoted are part of the author's PhD research on political and identity dimensions of football in the post-Yugoslav space.
16. Interview with the author.
17. After it went on the verge of bankruptcy, the club was privatised in 2008 and its debts turned into shares. The municipality of Split thus owns 56% of the club. Our Hajduk initially owned a tiny percentage of the shares but launched in autumn 2016 a very successful crowdfunding campaign in order to acquire up to 25% of shares.
18. Our Hajduk has 40,000 members in 2016.
19. FC United of Manchester being one of the most famous example. See Brown (2008).
20. See our interview with one of the fans responsible for throwing flares on the pitch during Euro 2016 claiming that he did for justice although aware that it can harm the cause (*So Foot*, 21 June 2016).

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Poland

Wojciech Woźniak

1   Political Origins of Football

When in October 1863 English gentlemen met in London's Freemasons' Tavern to establish the Association, which paved the way to the institutionalisation and further development of football, war was raging on the territory of contemporary Poland. The three partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the eighteenth century left the territory of the formerly powerful state divided among three neighbouring powers: the Habsburg Monarchy, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Russian Empire. Warsaw and the major part of the country were under tsarist administration. The Kingdom of Poland (or Congress Poland), formed after the Congress of Vienna, preserved some sovereignty but effectively was just a puppet state where the growing process of Russification and repressions towards Poles led to several outbursts of violent uprising against the Tzar, including the largest January Uprising which took place exactly in year 1863. The circumstances allowing the emergence of Polski Związek Piłki Nożnej (Polish Football Association, hereafter PZPN) occurred only in 1919, more than half a century after the formation of its British counterpart. The social and political

W. Woźniak (✉)
Department of Sociology of Social Structure and Social Change,
Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Łódź, Łódź, Poland
e-mail: wojciech.wozniak@uni.lodz.pl

situation in each of the partitions was different, and therefore, the roots of football in Poland need to be traced separately for each of these cases.

Congress Poland

The situation in the largest part of the territory of formerly independent Poland in the nineteenth century, with a predominance of rural and undeveloped areas where the serfdom was abolished only in 1864, did not become a breeding ground for the development of modern sport. From the beginning of nineteenth century, one of the rapidly developing European cities was Łódź, which became an island of industrial modernisation within a predominantly rural society. Previously a meaningless agricultural settlement, it became a part of what in present-day terms should be called a special economic zone. Located at the easternmost periphery of the Russian Empire, it was a crucial subject of Russia's industrial policy. A feudal state, lagging behind the Western Europe in terms of industrialisation, provided entrepreneurs with tax exemptions for importing raw materials, machinery and know-how, mainly from Western Europe. The dynamic expansion of industry leads to the rapid growth in population, up to 315 thousands (Marzec and Zysiak 2011, 67–78). As elsewhere in Europe, industrialisation manufactured by foreigners was followed with the appearance of the working class's favourite pastime. Nicknamed: "Manchester of the East" Łódź was a multi-ethnic city with German entrepreneurs and top managerial staff, Jewish traders and workers, Russian administrators and a predominantly Polish working class. All ethnic groups were interested in sport, but as elsewhere, the formation of the first football clubs was inspired by the English and Scottish expats (Lenartowicz and Karwacki 2005). When in 1906 one of the local companies was taken over by the Scottish COATS Corporation, British engineers and workers came to the city tasked with the modernisation of local factories bringing their sport to the city. One of the first clubs was called "Newcastle" and was formed in 1910 by the German employees of one of the textile factories. The name was coined by its English coach to honour his city of origin. Touring Club, previously a cycling team from 1906, was also participating in football competitions. In 1909, *Lodzer Fußball Verband* was formed and the local championships begun (officially recognised as the championships of Lodz in 1912). The main trophy was a Cup funded by British entrepreneurs: Robert Smith and Alexander Gillchrist and the first season was won by TV Kraft. The two largest and most

decorated clubs from Łódź: Widzew and ŁKS were formed in this period, respectively in 1910 and 1908 as the Polish sport's associations, in both cases they defined themselves as Polish and Roman Catholic, but British and Jewish people were among the staff and more rarely among the players. Some of the clubs underwent the process of *polonization* after Poland regained independence in 1918, but the multicultural composition of the city remained and until the Second World War erupted at least 5 German (ŁTSG, Kraft, Union, Sturm, Union Touring) and 5 Jewish (Bar Kochba, Hakoah, Makabi, Kadimah, Hasmonea) teams were participating in competitions on various levels preserving their national and religious identity. Similar processes though on a smaller scale were occurring in Warsaw and the smaller cities of Congress Poland (Gowarzewski 1998).

Prussian Partition

Land, which used to belong to the Habsburg Empire during the partitions, was the only area of present-day Poland, where the industrial revolution had already in the nineteenth century substantially changed the social fibre and economic structure of society and economy. Two crucial regions under Prussian rule were Greater Poland and Upper Silesia. Both underwent modernisation with Upper Silesia being one of the world's largest bituminous coalfields and becoming one of the most industrialised areas of Europe. This was a multicultural region which until the mid-seventeenth century was divided between the Bohemian Crown, Polish Kingdom and Habsburg Monarchy. However, the monoculture of the coal-mining industry created a specific lifestyle and culture which dominated the region. As elsewhere, in this region at the forefront of industrial modernisation, the favourite pastime of the working class appeared very quickly. It was one of the most urbanised areas of Europe with numerous cities where social and economic life was organised around industrial establishments. Since the end of the nineteenth century and particularly at the start of the twentieth century, football clubs were mushrooming across the industrial cities and towns and Upper Silesia could undoubtedly be perceived as one of the cradles of the "beautiful game" in Poland. The early start contributed to the unprecedented role of Silesian football in the history of Polish competition (Woźniak 2015b; Łęcki 2009). Clubs from the Upper Silesia region, with approximately one-tenth of Poland's population and covering just 4% of territory, won thirty-one out of eighty-nine championships in Poland and altogether 16 towns from this region were represented in the top echelon of the

Polish League. The very first German football team in the region Sportverein Ratibor 03 was founded in 1903 in present-day Racibórz, whereas the first Polish team was established in 1910 by the name of VfR Königshütte, later the name of the team and the name of the city were translated to AKS Chorzów. The team Ruch Chorzów, established in 1920 in Bismarckhütte (present-day Chorzów Batory, one of the districts in the city of Chorzów), was formed in the aftermath of the First World War as a stronghold of Polish culture in the predominantly German region. In the aftermath of the First World War, it was partitioned between the Weimar Republic (subsequently replaced by the Third Reich) and the Second Polish Republic. The Polish domination was decided as the result of successful Silesian uprisings and plebiscites won by Polish Silesians. The Upper Silesian Football Association was formed in 1920 as a member of PZPN.

The region of Greater Poland witnessed similar processes. The very first team Posnania was formed already in 1907 as Normania and after 1913 became the very first only Polish football team in the region. Warta Poznań was established in 1912 by Polish players who previously used to play for German local teams. These two teams, together with Ostrovia 1909 from the smaller town Ostrów Wielkopolski, formed in 1913 the Greater Poland's Association of Sports' Associations under the umbrella of *Deutscher Fußball-Bund* (German Football Association). After the formation of the PZPN, it joined the national body becoming its regional branch (Owsiański and Siwiński 2013).

Galicia

Galicia was a common name of Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria covering the territories which after the partitions became a crownland of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was a poor rural country, heavily exploited by the core of the Austrian Empire, where next to the agricultural production, one of the main resources was its manpower, namely peasants conscripted to the army in large numbers. Cracow and Lviv were the only two large cities located within this territory, relatively wealthy with a strong bourgeoisie and *intelligentsia* with big universities (Jagiellonian University in Cracow and Lviv University). The political and cultural pressure from Habsburg authorities was milder than in the case of the Prussian and Russian Partition, thus Polish cultural and intellectual life was blossoming. Contrary to the more industrialised areas of the two other partitions, in both of these cities sporting activities were organised in and affiliated to educational

institutions. The oldest football clubs which could be described as ethnically Polish were established in Lviv in 1903. Sława (renamed later to Czarni) and Pogoń were formed by teachers in the secondary schools. Together with Sparta and the Jewish club Hasmonea, these four clubs played an important role in the development of football before the Second World War, with Pogoń winning the championships of Poland four times. All demised in the forthcoming war. Lviv surrendered on 22 of September to the invading Red Army and after the war this part of Galicia was annexed by the Soviet Union and now belongs to Western Ukraine. In 1906, Cracovia and Wisła were established in Cracow. Cracovia was since the beginning closely connected to the intellectual circles of Jagiellonian University, while Wisła was established by teachers from one of the secondary schools. The competition between Cracovia and Wisła is the oldest and probably fiercest derby rivalry in Poland. In the beginning of twentieth century, numerous Jewish clubs (the leading ones were Jutrzenka and Makkabi) were formed and this multi-ethnic aspect of purely historical significance is underplayed throughout the whole history. This deserves further elaboration which will be provided in the second subchapter. Galicia was a crucial territory for the institutionalisation of Polish football. Local sport activists used an opportunity of relative civic freedom in comparison with the other partitions and on 25 of June, 1911, Związek Polskiej Piłki Nożnej (Association of Polish Football) was established in Lviv from the inspiration of Cracovia Cracow. It was an autonomous entity with the rights to operate within the *Österreichischer Fußball-Verband* (Austrian Football Association) which had already been established in 1904. The association was organising the Championships of Galicia until the First World War erupted. Apart from the aforementioned Polish and Jewish clubs, also the teams from smaller towns joined the competitions. None of the Ukrainian teams from Galicia joined the Association of Polish Football, which seems significant for the overview of inter-ethnic relations in this multicultural region (Fortuna 2008; Gowarzewski 1997).

Independence and the Beginning of the National Football Association

Poland regained independence as a fully independent state in 1918, after 123 years of partitions. The aforementioned segregation of the world of sport in Poland makes it difficult to assess the impact of football on the nation-building processes. Nonetheless, it certainly played an important role for the popular recognition of the unification of the state in the interwar period.

In December 1919, the first congress of Polski Związek Piłki Nożnej (Polish Football Association) was held in Warsaw. It was established by delegates of 31 clubs from all over the territory of the newly re-united Poland, although precise information regarding which clubs were among the founders was lost with the original documents from this event. The ZPPN was disbanded the following year, but the members of the board of the new all-Poland PZPN were recruited almost exclusively from the former Galician association Cracow official seat for the headquarters of the association. The Polish national team was also established during the first congress and the management team was tasked with the preparations that would allow a male football national team to take part in the 1920 Summer Olympic Games in Antwerp. However, history interfered again in these plans. The Polish-Soviet War erupted in early 1919 (ultimately ending with a ceasefire only in October 1920) and the Polish Olympic Committee was forced to withdraw the national team from the Games. Thus, the Polish national team played its very first official game on 18 December 1921 in Budapest losing to Hungary 0-1. Half a year later the first win (2-1 against Sweden in Stockholm) was achieved. The Polish national team participated in the Paris 1924 Summer Olympic Games losing in the first round 0-5 to Hungary.

In all partitions, regional and local competitions were played. Between 1920 and 1926, the championship of Poland was decided during the final round where 5 teams which won regional competitions participated. Cracovia Cracow in 1921 became the first champions of Poland, which was followed by 4 years of consecutive wins by Pogoń Lviv. In 1926, the new all-Poland League competitions were formed which have been continuously organised until now, excluding the break for the Second World War when all organised sport was banned by the German occupant.

2   Historical Club Rivalries: What Were They and Are They Still Relevant Today?

Because of various historical processes, mainly the massive scale migrations resulting from wars, partitions, occupation, the regional identities in Poland of twentieth century were not very powerful. With the exception of Upper Silesia, mentioned above, the regional identity was rarely expressed as the defining characteristics of football clubs.

Dmowski (2013, 334–335) enumerates the forthcoming factors that usually are the basis for the most fierce football club rivalries: nationality, ethnic identity, religion, territory and origin (i.e. the indigenous vs. newcomers).

Present-day Poland is fully homogenous with more than 95% of the population sharing the same religion, language, ethnicity, skin colour and nationality and therefore much of the traditional background for club rivalries is non-existent. There is also a lack of pluralism if it comes to the political affiliation of the fans. The majority declare a right-wing orientation and there is no single case of a professional football club which could be affiliated with leftist politics. A Polish Livorno or Polish Sankt Pauli simply does not exist. Interestingly though, historical ethnic divisions and tensions still play a significant role in Polish fandom. Between the World Wars, when football gained a massive following, Poland was a multi-ethnic state. According to census data from 1931 the population of Poland was composed of 68.9% Polish people, 13.9% Ukrainians, 8.7% Jews, 3.1% Belarussians and 2.3% Germans (Jałowiecki and Szczepański 2007, 70). As elsewhere in Europe, anti-Semitic tension was growing in Poland during the 1920s and 1930s which also affected the social world of football.

Holy War in Cracow

The anti-Semitic context is important for the longest standing Polish derby rivalry between Wisła Cracow and Cracovia Cracow (the first derby game was played in 1908). As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were purely Jewish clubs in the city of Cracow (Jutrzenka and Makkabi, both belonging to the Maccabi World Union). Sometimes the terraces during the games were arenas of fierce and violent clashes between the fans, regardless of ethnic affiliation, for example Jutrzenka was a working-class club while Makkabi was affiliated with the Zionist Movement and the fans conflicted over a number of issues. This turned political, when the topic of civic rights for Jews became an important issue of contemporary Polish partisan politics. Some of the football officials, as well as fans and media, started to oppose the participation of Jewish clubs in Polish competitions (Wikipasy.pl 2013).

The two major Polish clubs from Cracow clashed over this topic when the formal motion to expel Jutrzenka from the regional branch of the PZPN was submitted by some officials. Wisła Cracow, which was declaratively a Roman Catholic club with *numerous nullus* clause excluding non-Polish and non-catholic players, was strongly in favour of the new rule, whereas Cracovia Cracow, embracing democratic principles and accepting players of all nationalities, was strongly opposing (Rympel 1964, 584). A similar clash occurred when in 1938 the same motion was discussed.

This only added to the numerous instances of anti-Semitic cases. One minor, though significant event was when Henryk Reyman, the star player of Wisła and the Polish national team, was sent off by a referee named Rosenfeld. Reyman, veteran of the First World War and Polish-Soviet War, refused stating that no Polish officer (he was captain at the time) shall ever obey orders from a Jew (Vogler 1994). The forthcoming Second World War brought the end to multicultural Poland. The map of the country was redrawn and almost the whole Jewish population perished in Holocaust. Yet, anti-Semitism without a Jews remained present in Polish football fandom. Up until today, the word Jew is used as an insult on many stands. This holds for example for major teams from the city of Łódź. Fans of both Widzew and ŁKS describe their opponent as "Jews", while during the games with opponents from other teams, the chant: "Jude, jude, jude all from Łódź" can be heard. Fans of Cracovia Cracow were the only group which embraced the "stigma" of Jews in a similar manner to Tottenham Hotspur fans and the famous Yid Army (Burski 2015).

This linguistic reclamation is visible also in stylised Stars of David present on many football scarves and in ultras choreographies. The brutal hooligan group of Cracovia called themselves Jude Gang. Embracing Jewish symbolism does not mean that the Jewish identity is in any other way accepted, neither is it a sign of an unquestionable acceptance for multiculturalism. There are examples of racist iconography on Cracovia-related T-shirts and scarves. The "Holy war" in Cracow is by far the most fierce and brutal rivalry. Hooligans from both sides do not subscribe to unwritten rules of the so-called Poznań agreement that bare fists should be the only weapon used during the pre-arranged (*ustawki*) or spontaneous fights; and they frequently use knives and machetes with instances of the possession of guns also reported (Kossakowski 2017a, 14). The detailed elaboration on the case of anti-Semitism in Polish fandom would require further elaboration, but it needs to be noted that while obviously rooted in the history of Polish-Jewish relations, in present-day Poland it is a part of the communicative strategy of "othering" the rival team (Burski 2015, 236–238). The numerous instances of using anti-Semitic slurs against the variety of individual and collective actors suggest that this terminology plays a role of "language fossil", to use a phrase of one of the most prominent researchers of Polish anti-Semitism, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir (2008). It could be understood in contemporary homogenous Poland only through reference to the long uneasy heritage of multi-ethnic Poland.

All Against Legia Warsaw

Dmowski (2013, 336), in his operationalisation of various types of football rivalries, claims that the conflict between Legia Warsaw and the rest of the country is the typical example of rivalry between the capital city and other parts of a given country. This stands true; hence, the historical roots of resentment against the team from the capital city in the Polish case are quite clearly connected with the period of communism. Many of the clubs were officially under the patronage of various branches of the state-owned economy or internal security and military forces. The full name of Legia Warsaw was a Central Military Sport Club. Football clubs were affiliated with the army with Legia being the most powerful and influential using universal conscription as a way to recruit talented young players from all over Poland (Lenartowicz and Karwacki 2005). There are numerous examples of footballers who ended up in Legia after displaying great skills at an early age. In some cases, their spell in the army effectively stopped the development of their careers. In others, they were allowed to come back to their previous teams when their military service period was over, particularly if they were not fulfilling the expectations on the football pitch. If they were too quick however, players could face serious repercussions. For example when Włodzimierz Smolarek, one of the best Polish players of the 1980s, left the barracks of his military unit to play in a friendly game of Widzew Łódź in 1979, he was threatened with desertion charges, even though he had already formally signed for Widzew (Perzyński 2012, 84–85). When players made their name while playing for Legia, they were quickly enlisted as regulars and the "military" career was open ahead of them. This was the case of Kazimierz Deyna, the legendary player of Legia and the only Polish footballer commemorated with a statue in front of the stadium. ŁKS Łódź, the club that contracted Deyna before his call-up for military service, attempted numerous times to bring him back without any success (Szczepłek 2012, 51–59). After 12 years at Legia, Deyna was discharged as the lieutenant of the Polish People's Army and allowed to move to Manchester City. Previously, his army affiliation was used as an excuse for not letting him sign to play football abroad as the offers were coming from NATO countries. Certainly, his military service was just a façade and similarly the footballers employed on contracts in various branches of industry were in reality paid for their sporting efforts. This "phony amateurism" was an open secret, maintained until the very last days of Polish People's Republic. The call-up for military service was in most the cases the final verdict with no option

for appeal. However, there are examples of successful attempts to block the move, which illustrate well the character of contemporary tensions in Communist Poland. In the 1950s, the Silesian star of Ruch Chorzów and national team, Gerard Cieślik, was formally called up for military service in Legia. This was heavily protested by the working class from Upper Silesia, the region of crucial significance for the socialist economy, because of its mining and heavy industry. The workforce from this sector was at least declaratively the most appreciated part of the working class under the communism. The protest was supported by Wiktor Markiewka, the most famous Polish *udarnik* and subsequently a member of the Communist parliament and a devoted fan of Ruch Chorzów, the home team of Cieślik (Szczepłek 2012, 58). His engagement undoubtedly helped in winning this clash over the player who in 1957 became a folk hero after scoring two goals which allowed Poland to secure its first-ever victory over the Soviet Union football team.

The memory of these practices is still alive among many football fans in Poland, although it needs to be noted that this context is probably vanishing from the collective memory; and Legia, one of two most successful clubs in Poland in the twenty-first century and the most successful in the last decade, has enjoyed a massive increase in its fan-base among fans unaffiliated with some rival teams.

Upper Silesia: The Very Dense Net of Derby Games and the Rivalry Against the Rest of Poland

Allegiance towards Upper Silesia and the affirmation of regional identity and local identities is a common characteristic for fans of all clubs in the region. As mentioned above, every single town from the densely populated area has its own football team. Many of them enjoyed certain successes on a national and international level. This refers in the first place to Ruch Chorzów and Górnik Zabrze, both teams hold the record of 14 championships of Poland. The latter club, established in 1948 and closely affiliated with the mining branch of the socialist economy, was the most successful under communism, winning all their 14 titles throughout this period and becoming the only Polish club to ever enter the final of a European Cup (losing 1-2 to Manchester City in the Cup Winner's Cup final in 1970). In the 1960s and 1970s, derby games between these two teams was attended by more than 100 thousands spectators. They were played at the Silesian Stadium in Chorzów, which as a recognition of the growing significance

of the region in the same period became an official stadium of the Polish national team. The decline in the significance of the region since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe went in parallel with the decline in the quality of Silesian football. The last Silesian club to win a championship was Ruch Chorzów in the symbolic year of 1989, just a couple of weeks after the first semi-free parliamentary elections were held in Poland bringing success to the anti-Communist Solidarity movement. This year in the winning squad of Ruch, just one player was born outside of Upper Silesia in the title-winning squad of Ruch Chorzów. In 2010, when Ruch made it to third place in the League, only one footballer in the team was born in the region (Woźniak 2015b).

Krzysztof Łęcki, writing about contemporary Upper Silesian identity, uses the label of postmodernism. He points at the heterogeneity of the contemporary Silesian fan-base claiming that the identity manifested by thousands of Silesian fans is in fact very loosely connected to their real ethno-cultural background (Łęcki 2009, 139). At the same time, the supporters constitute a group with a very strong rhetoric of separation, and antagonism towards the majority of the Polish population and particularly the Central Polish authorities.

The post-Communist period marked the demise of traditional mining monoculture, but strengthened regional identities. The results of the Polish National Census from 2002 shocked the mainstream media as 173 thousand Upper Silesian inhabitants declared Silesian nationality. This became a harbinger of the process which reinforced the political revival of the regional and ethnic movements in Upper Silesia and boosted the resurgence of the Silesian Movement Autonomy. In the next census of 2011 as many as 817,000 people declared Silesian nationality and more than half a million declared that Silesian dialect is their native language. The Polish Supreme Court in 2011 refused to recognise Silesians as a national minority in Poland, but the support for the autonomy movement is very much supported on the terraces. In almost fully homogenous Poland where the majority of football supporters embrace the right wing, conservative and nationalist sets of values, this stands out as a quite unique phenomenon. The main reference for the present-day fans of Ruch Chorzów is the German cultural heritage which seems paradoxical when considered that before the Second World War, Ruch was perceived as a depositary of Polish culture and values in Upper Silesia and the name of the club (Ruch means Movement) being a direct reference to the Polish uprising movements against German domination. The "imagined identity" is manifested via the emblems and choreographies prepared by the Ultras. Frequently they use gothic fonts and

German vocabulary, slogans "we the Silesian nation" *OberSchlesien* is on banners and tags. In questioning their allegiance towards Poland, Ruch's fans apply symbols, which would probably be unthinkable in any football-related iconography anywhere outside of Upper Silesia. The majority of Polish fans refer frequently to the significant patriotic episodes of Polish history, particularly from the period of the Second World War and the post-war guerrilla struggle against the Communist rulers of the country. At the same time, on the T-shirts of the fan clubs of Ruch, one can see iconography referring to the Third Reich, for instance the Nazi Germany emblem with a black eagle holding the oak wreath with Ruch's crest (instead of a swastika) and a stylised emblem of one of the deadliest Nazi formations with the runic letters: SS. Others depict the German black eagle holding the Celtic cross next to Ruch's crest and the golden eagle (the Upper Silesian coat of arms) undersigned *Schlesische Banditen* (Silesian bandits). The stylised Silesian eagle is also the official mascot of the club. The allegiance towards the Polish Republic is frequently questioned by fans of clubs from Silesia, with the most symbolic and unprecedented example being before the final game of the Polish Cup in 2010 in Kielce when Ruch's fans were booing the Polish anthem.

3   Political Aspects of Football as a Sports Spectacle

Football is by far the most popular sport in Poland (Grodecki 2016). Although the scale of interest declared in the national polls is not necessarily visible in attendances at the games of Polish Ekstraklasa (First Division). Newly built large stadiums in Wrocław, Poznań or Gdańsk, with a capacity of 40–45 thousands, are rarely even half-full, except for the major games. All were built before UEFA Euro 2012, the biggest sport mega event co-hosted in Poland and Ukraine.[1] The tournament was a sporting failure for the Polish national team, but the modern infrastructure remained. Since 2014, when Adam Nawałka took over the post of head coach of the national team, there has been a constant improvement in the quality of play and results of the national team and a rise in popularity of the games. The first-ever win against Germany, the quarter–final of the Euro 2016 and decent results in the qualifiers for the 2018 FIFA World Cup elevated the Polish team to sixth position in the global FIFA/Coca-Cola world ranking. The numbers of fans interested in watching the live match against Romania in June, 2017 was ten times bigger than the capacity of the National Stadium (app. 58 thousands).

This is a massive change in comparison with the situation in Polish football in the beginning of the post-socialist transformation. The period of the 1990s was marked with misery on the pitch and riots on the stands (Woźniak 2013a, 119). After taking part in four subsequent FIFA World Cups between 1974 and 1986, the Polish national team failed to qualify for any big tournament for 16 years. The institutionalisation of the Polish fan movement began in the late 1970s and 1980s.

The emergence of a football-related violence was probably delayed in authoritarian states of Eastern Europe due to the rigorous control, but it is also likely that incidents were not allowed to make it to the headlines due to state censorship and restricted media coverage. One of the first known large-scale cases was a riot between Lech Poznań and Legia Warszawa in Częstochowa in 1980 where at least one fan was killed and hundreds were injured. However, under the authoritarian regime with no free press and strict censorship, the story was silenced. The beginning of the nineties witnessed a significant growth of football-related violence, particularly in the rapidly de-industrialising cities which corresponds well with traditional Marxist explanation of this phenomenon (Kossakowski 2015). The sky-rocketing unemployment, anomie, lack of security and stability together with growing risk and polarisation of society were perceived as the crucial factors contributing to the pathologies among them football hooliganism.

In the course of the next decade, we have witnessed a growing institutionalisation of Polish fandom. Some authors describe this process as being part of the opposition to modern football aimed at preserving the spirit of the terraces. Antonowicz, Kossakowski and Szlendak on the basis of their extensive research distinguish tensions between *Aborigines,* the indigenous crowd from the terraces and *consumer–newcomers* who enjoy the modernisation and bourgeoisification of football (Antonowicz et al. 2015; 2016, 131–132). Privatisation and growing commercialisation of the game have led to several attempts to get rid of the traditional fan-base in order to attract new fans–customers. Yet, this was not successful in any club. Without traditional fanatic fans, the stands in many cities became empty. The modernisation turned out to be artificial and no crowding out effect was observed, although football-related violence at the stadiums had been steadily decreasing since the beginning of twenty-first century (Kosakowski 2015, 3). Football arenas witnessed a growth in grass-roots activities and in some cases without fans, the re-emergence of clubs that were bankrupt would not have been possible. This was particularly surprising considering the low level of engagement among Polish youth (Kossakowski 2017b).

Paradoxically, when football violence was vanishing from the terraces and hooligan firms were organising pre-arranged fights in remote areas where they rarely threatened innocent "citizens", during last decade we have witnessed a more and more restrictive approach to policing the crowds before, during and after games. The draconian regulations were supposed to increase the popularity of the liberal-right-wing government of Donald Tusk and Civic Platform. The image of football supporters created by the mainstream media contributed to the popular support of the hard line against football fans who seemed a perfect folk devil for the general public. Mateusz Grodecki and Dominik Antonowicz (2016) show that new legislation, allegedly modelled on European legislation, was far more restrictive if it comes to surveillance, identification of the fans and a ban on any kind of political manifestations at the stands (including on banners or ultras' choreographies). The foreign football fans during Euro 2012 were exempted from these restrictive rules and the police along with the government displayed a far more permissive approach which led to further criticism among the majority of radical fans towards the government and the way Euro 2012 was organised and handled (Burski 2013). Donald Tusk, the prime minister of the government of Civic Platform and Polish People's Party, became a public enemy for the Polish radical supporters. The most popular slogan: *"Donald [Tusk] you moron, hooligans are going to overthrow your government" (Donald matole, twój rząd obalą kibole)* was perceived in the mainstream media as not only anti-governmental, but also as a symbolic sign of their political affiliation towards Law and Justice, the major opposition party (Kossakowski et al. 2017, 2–3). Yet, this does not necessarily translate into an open support of the fans for the now ruling party of Law and Justice. The recent research on political affiliations of Polish fans shows that the choice is rather aimed at more radically anti-establishment and nationalist parties and definitely against the left (in the quantitative online survey four Polish left-wing parties together gained 3%, Kossakowski, Nosal, Woźniak, under review). My own small-scale research in the city of Łódź (the third biggest city in Poland with two heavily conflicted football clubs Widzew and ŁKS) shows also that the local fandom is constantly learning the rules of the political game. Both groups of fans could be considered as serious political interest groups which has been revealed during the debate about stadium investments in the city. Firstly, they were organising protests during the sessions of the local council, demonstrations in the streets and displaying banners during the football games. This has not proved very efficient from the perspective of realisation of their goals (concerning allocation of the fund to new stadiums). Therefore that have attempted to engage in institutionalised

local politics. Aligning for purely tactical purposes with various political parties, both clubs managed to introduce their representatives to a city council, where they have a real impact on the decision making processes concerning the distribution of resources and support for both clubs. In order to strengthen their political power, they were ready to affiliate with a post-Communist party or Civic Platform, two parties which are openly despised by the large majority of football fans. Political parties were interested in the deal, as getting more votes in electoral wards where fans-affiliated candidates were elected would be otherwise difficult if not impossible. In this way, they have received the additional support of some well-disciplined group of voters.

4   Polish Football in the Twenty-First Century: Modernisation, the Long Shadow of Communism and Massive Scale of Corruption[2]

Only since 1996 has the Ministry of Sport and Tourism allowed for the full privatisation of clubs which previously had remained public or semi-public entities. The clubs became Sport Companies Ltd. and many of them were acquired by the private entrepreneurs present on the lists of the wealthiest Poles. The belief in Premier League-style expansion was shared by many. Some of the clubs owned by the richest Polish businessmen enjoyed certain sporting successes while others went bankrupt spectacularly without bringing any harm to the owners' personal wealth.[3] This was the case of Polonia Warsaw, Widzew and ŁKS Łódź, all champions of the Polish League in the 1990s which are currently being rebuilt from scratch by the local fans' grassroots movements playing in the third or fourth League.

Nonetheless of the many failures, the neoliberal discourse dominating the mainstream in this period perceived the privatisation of formerly public entities and market-based management as the unquestionable way to improve the standards of services and the quality of management. It is difficult to assess the impact of businessmen entering the social world of football as they were faced with the reality governed by PZPN, whose institutional structure was largely unimpeded by the socio-economic transformation from state socialism to a market economy. Officially, all sport in the Soviet bloc was amateur. As in numerous instances of everyday life in Communist countries, the reality behind the formal façade looked different. As early

as the 1950s, sportsmen and sportswomen were employed in state-owned branches of the economy with all clubs being either affiliated with various branches of state-owned industries or closely connected to the military or security services of the Communist state. Numerous examples of this practice are described in memoires and biographies of contemporary coaches and footballers. The institutionalised system of deception was organised in the world of football under communism in order to maintain the multitude of façades: false amateurism, false military service, condemnation of commercialisation. The crucial role was played by sport associations, including the PZPN which were responsible for organised sport (Woźniak 2013a; Fryc and Ponczek 2009).

Post-war Poland, with limited sovereignty under Soviet dominance, did not encourage honesty and trustworthiness towards the state. Bribes and informal exchange were common practice for dealing with permanent shortages of goods.[4] This all allowed for the creating of a network of clientelist interrelations which were very well visible also in the world of sport. The knowledge about corruption in Polish football was an open secret, even becoming a main theme in some extremely popular movies. Sometimes, the unfair play was so open and obvious causing such a public outrage that PZPN decided to intervene. For instance in 1992 the association decided to verify the final scores of the games played during the final fixture of the Polish top League. Legia Warsaw and ŁKS Łódź were consequently stripped of the points earned during their wins 7-1 and 6-0 and consequentially, the third team in the table (Lech Poznań) won the championship. Both clubs were banned for a season from participating in European Cups and started with minus points. Having no means to conduct the investigation and without any formal evidence this decision was justified exclusively by the expectations of the general public and the formal justification was: "lack of spirit of sport rivalry" presented by the footballers.

In the democratic post-1989 Poland, the PZPN was constantly criticised by the media and all political parties and subsequent governments. Politicians were trying to force the PZPN to implement reforms and twice compulsory governmental administration was introduced temporarily. Every single attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the PZPN was hampered by the supranational umbrella bodies (FIFA and UEFA) assuring the full independence of the organisation and its authorities. They successfully maintained the façade of an independent and non-for-profit organisation blocking any kind of interference.

Other than that, the PZPN, while enjoying the status of a non-governmental and non-profit organisation subjected to numerous controlling

measures, was effectively exempted from any public control. No single government wanted to risk a public outrage caused by the expulsion of the Polish national team and clubs from international competitions, and therefore they were forced to step back. Contrary to the other fields of social reality, media control in the case of the PZPN did not work at all and the only exogenous impact on the shape and structure of the organisation was imposed by the juridical system: police investigations and prosecutor's charges leading to trials. When in 2007, to the surprise of all including Polish government, Poland was nominated by UEFA to co-host the Euro 2012 tournament, the situation changed substantially. The PZPN and UEFA became crucial partners in the course of preparations for the tournament. This was perceived as an opportunity for a massive modernisation leap for Poland and former tensions faded away. The most recent scandals concerning the scale of corruption that FIFA and UEFA were involved in, also casts new light on the organised system of covering any wrongdoings by the national associations. Other spheres of the state and economy were exposed to exogenous factors stemming, for example, from the harmonisation of the law before accession to the European Union (Czepil 2016). However, the world of football in Poland was exempted from the pressure of external forces (Woźniak 2015a; Włoch 2012).

Only since 1st of July 2003 has sport corruption been included in Polish penal code as a criminal offence.[5] One year later, the very first case of corruption was revealed by the local press from the city of Wrocław. This ignited the investigation of the local prosecutor's office. One year later, the former chairman of one of the major clubs from Upper Silesia reported to this office offering testimonies about the numerous instances of corruption which he witnessed while in charge of the first division team. Soon, the first arrest of a football referee was made and the snowball started to roll. Subsequently, 524 persons were charged with corruption, and as of January 2016, 443 had been convicted, with 68 clubs punished by the PZPN and 638 games presumed to be fixed. Among those convicted are the former coach of the Polish national team (Janusz Wójcik) and other coaches, members of the PZPN board, referees, active and retired footballers including star players of the national team (e.g. Łukasz Piszczek of Borussia Dortmund). The investigation is still ongoing. It is an open secret that numerous people approached voluntarily the prosecutor' office offering their testimonies in hope of a reduced sentence of withdrawal of the charges.

The scale of the corruption and sentences for some top officials from the PZPN including the chairman of referees committee suggests that it was institutionalised and that the organisation clearly failed to supervise the decency of the functioning of the system of competitions. Michał

Listkiewicz, the former famous international football referee, who was the PZPN chairmen at the time when the scandal was revealed, assured about the limited scope of the scandal, calling the first arrested referee: "a black sheep". Later, Listkiewicz claimed that under his rule corruption was overwhelming, but he was not aware of its scale (Białek 2017). Rafał Rostkowski, an international referee who formulated one of the harshest critics against the state of the affairs at PZPN prior to the scandal, stated that the bribery proposals were formulated openly and boldly. Sometimes representatives of the clubs blackmailed reluctant referees sure about their inviolacy (Białek 2017). Rostkowski numerous times notified the chairman of the referee committee in the PZPN about the bribery proposals. Only later he understood the lack of reaction when the chairman himself was charged with more than one hundred corruption charges. The scale of the investigation is so complicated and so large, that there is a serious threat that some of the charges will be barred by the statute of limitation in year 2018.

In parallel to this, the PZPN has been undergoing some structural changes in the course of the past few years. Particularly since 2012, when Zbigniew Boniek became a chairman of the organisation, a massive shift in public opinions about the organisation has been seen. Within four years the share of those who assess that the PZPN "works well" or "rather well" has almost tripled to 45% with just a 15% of respondents declare contrary statements. The approval poll ratings for Boniek himself remain high after five years in office (app. 69%). It is still too early to assess whether this is an effect of structural reforms or professional and efficient PR campaigns which stem from the assumption that it is not possible to rule Polish football with the public approval any more.

Interestingly though, people who were responsible for the prevalence of match-fixing in Polish football, even those who were convicted or pleaded guilty to wrongdoings, have not become *personae non gratae* neither as the members of the social world of institutional football, nor in the public eye. Michał Listkiewicz, the chairman of the PZPN from the period that the whole investigated corruption practices occurred, remained a columnist of Super Express, the oldest Polish tabloid. He is also a regular pundit in the public and private TV stations. He still performs various jobs for UEFA and since 2016 he has become chairman of the referees committee of the Football Association of the Czech Republic. Łukasz Piszczek remains a key player of the national team sometimes serving as the captain. The former coach of national teams published two books of memoirs which were heavily publicised by numerous media outlets and one of the coaches convicted of match-fixing was seriously considered as Polish national team coach after

the failure to qualify for the World Cup in 2014. It seems that no disgrace is associated with taking part in corruption and no embarrassment or shame-facedness is expected. After serving the sentences, when the suspension periods instigated by PZPN are over, coaches and players sign new contracts with no visible ostracism either from the sporting community or from the fans in the terraces. Contrary to previous periods, politicians rarely attempt any interference in the internal dealings in the world of football and the field remains rather excluded from contemporary political struggles.

Notes

1. The topic of Euro 2012 in its social, political and economic contexts was well researched and follows most of the patterns typical for sport mega events hosted in developing states, see: Woźniak (2013c, 2015a), Włoch (2012, 2016), Kowalska (2016), Cope (2015), Kozak (2017). In parallel to the preparations of the Euro 2012, the biggest ever investments in sport-related infrastructure were launched. All over Poland more than two and a half thousand all-purpose football pitches were built. Officially nicknamed *Orliki* (Baby-Eagles), they became a trademark of the Civic Platform government. Donald Tusk was using these investments heavily during his successful campaigning in 2011. He appeared in one of with electoral banners with the somewhat subversive slogan: "Let's not make politics. Let's build football pitches".

2. This subchapter is based on my work and research published in: Woźniak (2013a), under review.

3. The narrative about the advantages of private ownership was popular and widespread, but is important to note that the most costly investments in sport infrastructure, namely constructions or renovations of stadiums were funded either exclusively with public [either state or municipal] resources or using some form of public-private partnership which effectively channelled public resources into privately owned entities, see: Woźniak (2013b, 2015a).

4. Some historians explain the prevalence of corruption practices in Polish through the *longue durée* perspective dating back at least to the times of the Partitions of Poland (1795–1918), referring particularly to the bureaucratic rules imposed by the Tsarist administration in the Eastern Partition where informal exchange and paying for the services was a common everyday practice (Chwalba 1995).

5. The data about the corruption, the outcomes of trials, police and prosecutor's office' investigations was collected by Dominik Panek, Polish investigative journalist who follows the trail of match-fixing scandal since the very beginning. His blog (pilkarskamafia.blogspot.com) is the most comprehensive database about corruption in Polish football.

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Romania

Florin Faje

Romanian football success peaked in the 1980s and the 1990s, when the game was deeply embroiled into politics.[1] This is not to argue that football and politics can ever be separated. In modern times, sport and politics tend to mutually constitute and reinforce each other, modern Romania is no exception (Giulianotti 2007; Tomlinson and Young 2011). Nonetheless, football and politics reached a pinnacle of their alliance in a historical conjuncture that radically altered both. Two dimensions of this transformation are crucial to understand the past and present of their relation. First, for a century the Romanian state, under various political regimes, used football to promote and popularly disseminate its nation-building agendas. By the 1980s, this investment on the part of the state was finally delivering the goods, at both club and national team levels. Second, this period witnessed a massive shift in the politics of history, one that could not leave football unscathed. The aggressive nationalism of the late Romanian Communist regime was superseded by an equally aggressive anti-communism that tended to emphasise the supposed "liberal" traditions of the interwar (Poenaru 2017). State politics and the politics of history coupled with the Romanian footballing triumphs combined to create a nationalistic popular narrative of Romanian football, while doing away with the material and ideological developments that have made it possible.

F. Faje (✉)
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work,
Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

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Retrospectively, the deeds of the "golden generation" led by the midfielder Gheorghe Hagi were understood to have finally delivered on the promise of national glory that animated the game ever since the interwar. In many ways, the timing of the "golden generation's" emergence could hardly have been more ironic. The societies of post-1989 Eastern and Central Europe witnessed shocking patterns of transformation. Analysts were quick to dub the period that followed the collapse of Communist regimes in the region as "transition". In one way or another, the transition referred to the passage from state socialism to market capitalism (see Kideckel 2008; Pasti 2006; Verdery 1996). Its hallmark strategies were privatisation and reform. With a vivid experience and memory of late socialism in the background, opposition to economic restructuring became so morally loaded to be hardly tenable. The radical reconfiguration of social, political, economic and cultural relations in post-communism brought about insecurity, confusion, engendered personal and collective dramas, and created vast opportunities for financial gain and loss. In this context, the successes of the Romanian national football team were soon major rallying points of the nation.

However, as soon as the triumphs were evermore rare it became obvious that the system that made the emergence of the "golden generation" possible was nowhere to be found. In fact, the trajectory of the golden generation of Romanian footballers is yet another reminder of the structured nature of sporting performance as well as of the highly malleable nature of its interpretations. Romanian football was mobilised in the dissemination and instilling of national ideologies, of their accompanying images, of moral virtues and patterns of action. Specific to its historical making was the continuously renewed expectation for the coming of those Romanian sportsmen, and later sportswomen, able to make Romanian "qualities" manifest in the world of nations. The efforts of practitioners in the field were directed to devise and implement strategies and procedures that would make such manifestation possible. The sturdiness and resilience of these ideas in opposed and radically different political regimes, in face of massive social transformations, across shifting cultural points of emphasis, stress the strong alliance between football and nationalism in modern Romania.

Emphasising this alliance does not make a claim for its complete exceptionality. Similar expectations were at work and a key component of sporting ideologies wherever competitive sports took root. This is especially the case for the nations that led the way of the modern sporting revolution (Markovits and Rensmann 2010). For example, the successes of English, German or American athletes and teams often led to questions of how to best secure and preserve excellence and hegemony of winning. Traditions

of sporting triumph thus generated an altogether different set of problems, issues of maintaining and reinforcing a superiority that was already manifested and had proved its worth. For a nation and a sporting tradition that was later to emerge and affirm itself, the efforts, plans and ambitions of the world leaders become models to be partly or fully emulated. The Romanian case convincingly shows that such emulation risked jeopardising those emblematic features that gave specificity to the nation. Consequently, rising to the template fundamentally required the characterisation and postulation of a subject (athlete, team, club) and her or his particular features that would ultimately translate expectations into results. The Romanian sporting arena was thus made into a place where actual achievement would consecrate and give substance to a plethora of national traits, attributes or virtues extending and bound to make an impact well beyond the world of sport.

The strong alliance between football, nation and state leads to a focus on the early years of the game in Romania. It is during the interwar that this alliance was forged, only to be tight-knit in the post-war and partially unravelled in post-socialism. To emphasise Romania's democratic and capitalist credentials, the Romanian post-Communist reinterpretation of history favoured an often narrow and selective view of the interwar. The interbellum was made into an antithesis of the totalitarian post-bellum. Per this view, communism had done away with a Romanian tradition of parliamentarism, plural party politics, thriving national life or incipient small-size and middle-size capitalist firms premised on a domestic entrepreneurial spirit (Verdery 1991; Poenaru 2017). From this standpoint, a relational and processual understanding of the making of the Romanian nation state of the time and of the popular practices that worked to support or obstruct it could hardly emerge. Hence, the debates, the institutions and the popular appeal of football during the interwar afford an important and neglected entry point to explore Romanian nation-building and state formation. Football was geared to accomplish territorial unification, national integration and state centralisation between the two wars. The analysis of its emergence and evolution reveals the uneven, fragile and frail nature of Romania's development and stresses that rhetoric commonly surpassed the level of actual achievements.

Despite the meagre results, the formative years of Romanian football did create an institutional framework and a coherent enough legitimising narrative that have secured its functioning and crystallised its overall aims. Moreover, this framework and narrative were taken over and exponentially increased during the socialist period. The dismantling of this framework after 1989, precisely at the time when football success was finally

materialising, made it look as if the privatisation of clubs and the emergence of market relations in football are itself a success. However, the massive decline of Romanian football over the last two decades shows such hopes to have been unwarranted. In what follows, I will discuss the place of football in Romanian nation-building and state formation, with an emphasis on the formative years of the interwar; the major club rivalries that emerged during the interwar, post-war and post-communism; and the often-unexpected alliances of class, nation and region in the world of football that appeared in the turmoil that followed 1989. Overall, I argue that football has been Central to modern Romanian state formation and nation-building, irrespective of the political regimes that drove this project forward, and that the transformations of the Romanian state and society in the contemporary period turned football into an arena for protest as well as into an indicator of Romania's turbulent transition from state socialism to market capitalism.

1   Political Origins of Football

The birth of modern Romania is tied to the geopolitical rearrangements that appeared in the aftermath of World War I. The creation of "Greater Romania" in 1918–1920, that included the Old Kingdom of Romania (Moldova and Wallachia), Bessarabia, Bukovina, parts of the Banat and Transylvania, was a massive territorial expansion for a relatively small and peripheral Eastern European state. The incorporation of Transylvania and Bukovina, former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, came with the daunting tasks of administering regions with large "minority" populations that made large urban "majorities", which had their own modern institutions, such as sport clubs, and were economically and educationally better off relative to their overwhelmingly rural Romanian counterparts. No wonder, that these points of friction came to define "the Transylvanian question"—the political, economic and security conundrum that marked Central and Eastern Europe during and after the Paris Peace Treaties and the Hungarian—Romanian relations ever since (see Case 2009).

The efforts for Romanian unification after the First World War confronted two major obstacles. On the one hand, while clearly supporting the goals of the nation, Transylvanian Romanians were nonetheless continuing and establishing intense social connections with their neighbours: the Transylvanian Hungarians, Jews and Germans. Football was a prime arena of ethnic interaction. Due to the organisational format of modern sports, these sporting interactions were placing the politically feuding ethnics on an

equal footing, at a time when the agents of the Romanian state were making every effort to affirm their "rightful" control over this territory. On the other hand, the incorporation of Transylvania posed the problem of integrating a social formation more advanced and more endowed with modern institutions relative to the centre of power. Sports were again one major and immediately visible arena of such advancement.

Pace the anachronisms of unity, historical destiny or brotherhood professed by romantic nationalists, the integration of Transylvania into Romania was never a friction-free process (Bucur 2002; Livezeanu 1995). After a millennium of Imperial administration, with an elite, although vociferously nationalist, born, raised and educated in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and a massive Hungarian population that dominated all the important regional urban centres, many eyes and ears were as much oriented to Budapest as to Bucharest. The tumult from the stadiums of the old imperial capital certainly caught the attention and interest of many Transylvanians, Hungarians and Romanians alike. Invitations for Budapest-based clubs to come and play in Transylvania soon followed and were recurrent and highly popular events throughout the interwar. Talented players were soon signing contracts with these clubs and went all the way to play for the Hungarian national team. Unsurprisingly, for the Romanian politicians and bureaucrats, keen to develop national sports and to Romanianise Transylvania's urban spaces, such practices were soon anathema. These tensions came to the fore in a scandal surrounding the participation of the Romanian national football team at the Paris Olympics of 1924. The relevance of this scandal was heightened by the fact that it was the very first to be amply reported in the emerging Romanian language sports press.

The creation of Greater Romania in the aftermath of World War I soon posed the problem of affirming the new polity on the international scene. Major international sporting competitions, notably the modern Olympics, had already devised a framework geared precisely towards that end. The Paris Olympics of 1924 thus presented itself as a golden opportunity for a new nation to present its image to the world, not to mention the symbolic strength of a return to Paris, the place where the new map of Europe got its official consecration. What Romanian politicians, sports officials and sportsmen sought to present was an image of unity and national solidarity. What they ended up with showed that the task of national integration run into much deeper problems than expected. The story of the Romanian football team at the 1924 Olympics vibrantly makes this case, in that it draws together most of the problems of post-unification: a regional bias towards Transylvania in terms of recruitment, the overwhelming presence of ethnics

other than Romanians under the national flag, never-ending questions of betrayal and deceit voiced on both sides of the Carpathians, and the pressing problem of materialising and affirming Romanianness on the international stage.

The process set in motion by the need to recruit a Romanian representative laid bare most of the lines of fracture dividing Romanian society at the time, ethnic and regional ones ranking prominent among them. The Central figure of the process was the "national captain" Adrian Suciu. He was assigned the unenviable task of recruiting the best line-up out of a series of test games opposing local/regional teams to teams of the "Rest" of the country. After a good performance in Cluj-Napoca (*Sportul*, 10 April 1924), the series of selection games culminated with two humiliating defeats for "The Rest" at the hands of the regional teams of Timişoara and Bucharest. While the defeat in Timişoara was rather expected, as most of the footballing talent was concentrated in Western Romania, the result in Bucharest was utterly shocking, especially so in Transylvania. Although a test game, the match in the capital was largely perceived as an encounter between Bucharest and Transylvania, in this case all the players of "the Rest" were coming out of the latter region, most of them of Hungarian and German extraction. One sports reporter from Cluj-Napoca immediately stressed that "on this occasion an undeniable hostility towards Bucharesters" was felt in Cluj-Napoca and thus the result, when unofficially announced by a journalist in a local café, came down "like a lightning out of the blue" (*Sportul*, 15 May 1924).

The selection made for the Bucharest regional team said much about the strained relations between Transylvania and the Old Kingdom. It synthetically presented the dissonant understandings making up Romanian citizenship in the early interwar. Although the game was meant to aid the selection of the Romanian national team, most of the recruited players of Bucharest were Hungarians playing for Bucharest-based clubs, few of them being eligible for the national team. Hungarian language newspapers seized the opportunity to pronounce that a weak Hungarian team had defeated the Romanian Olympic team, pouring scorn over Romanians' inability to produce sporting talent (*Sportul*, 15 May 1924b). It appears that in the contemporary hierarchy of priorities it was much more important to clinch the game in the name of the capital in front of Transylvanians than to aid the selection of a Romanian national team.

The national captain completed his Olympic line-up in May 1924, but failed to select any player coming from a club outside the Carpathians. Out of nineteen players, six were from Cluj-based clubs, six from Timişoara, five from Oradea and two from Târgu-Mureş (*Sportul*, 18 May 1924).

The training plan of the team on its way to Paris included two test games in Bratislava and Vienna. The Bucharest-based sports press started questioning the selection as soon as the list was out, stressing the obvious: no player from the Old Kingdom got capped. In these circumstances, the first test game played in Bratislava represented the chance of proving the selection right. Unfortunately for Suciu and his lot, the football game was not announced as an encounter between Romania and Czechoslovakia, but was presented as a game opposing Transylvania (in some reports, the "the Representative of Transylvanian Hungarians") and Bratislava (or "the Representative of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia" or "the Association of Hungarian Footballers from Slovakia"). Agreeing to replace the national name with any other in an international sporting encounter was highly likely to destroy the public image of all those involved. It mattered little that in the early 1920s, Bratislava was a Hungarian-German town where teams fielding Hungarian players were much more likely to attract public interest and spectators. The accusations against Suciu went on to border national treason (*Sportul*, 22 May 1924); his Transylvanian background was invoked to suggest close relationships with the Hungarian "enemies" in a conspiracy against Romanian interests.

Suciu's national team went on to lose the second test game against Austria in Vienna, 4-1, before being utterly crushed by the Netherlands in the Olympic competition proper in Paris, 6-0. The case of the Romanian national team at the Paris Olympics shows the complex web of relations between regionalism, ethnicity, nationalism and statism historically at work in Romanian football. There is a discernible pattern emerging regionally and nationally throughout the interwar, linking sport and politics in a fluid dynamic of regional affirmation, reaffirmation of Central state power and ethnic backlash. Any success or failure against Bucharest was seized upon as affirming Transylvanian superiority and distinctiveness. Such claims were soon countered from the offices in Bucharest, regularly with an emphatic stress on the divisive nature of actions and plans attributed to minority populations, like the perceived Hungarian conspiracy regarding the recruitment of players in the national team. Crucially, as soon as such claims were made, the regional opinion shifted to denouncing the nefarious values and actions of ethnics other than Romanians. At the same time, the same regional voices called for *the state*, seen as the protector of national interests, to do its job of regulation and control. The failure of state agencies to do so usually prompted yet another cycle of this dynamic that the world of sport has so vividly dramatised on an almost daily basis for almost a century now.

During the formative years of national sporting traditions and movements, little straightforward attachment and loyalty can be granted to either the players, the officials or the sports enthusiasts. Overall, exploring the complex web of ethnic, regional and local relations during the formative years of Romanian football does reveal but one side of the efforts of nation-building and state formation. As a modern competitive team sport, football was bound to share into the tensions and conflicts of identification and belonging that defined the unstable Romanian society of the interwar. Depending on the social, cultural, political or ethnic position of its practitioners and supporters, it could be mobilised for or against the newly emerging Romanian nation state. As such, football never fully worked to exclusively promote the interests and programmes of the centralising and nationalising Romanian state of the time.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

The tumultuous history of football and nation-building did leave its mark on the rivalries that emerged in the world of football. It is important to note from the outset that the radical political changes that shaped modern Romania did also greatly alter the structures of opposition in the world of football. During the interwar, ethnic tensions and the tendency of the Romanian state to affirm itself through sport in predominantly non-Romanian urban spaces made ethnicity into a prime driver of rivalry. However, ethnic divides were often reinforced by class divisions. For example, Universitatea Cluj presented itself in ethnic terms and was certainly perceived as such by its local Hungarian competitors as well as their followers, but class was never far away. Universitatea's claim for elite Romanian status was soon despised in working-class towns with sizable Hungarian and German populations, such as Reşiţa or Baia Mare. The case of Cernăuţi, in the 1920s, shows an extreme case of the intricate nature of such rivalries.

In 1926, Cernăuţi, regional capital of Bukovina, probably the most cosmopolitan urban setting in Greater Romania, was the scene of an intricate feud between the German, Jewish, Polish and Romanian football clubs, dubiously mediated by the local and Central committees of the Romanian Federation. The end of the season hierarchy was hotly contested by the officials of the Jewish rivals "Maccabi" and "Hakoah", seconded by the players and followers of the German club "Jahn". According to one "Maccabi" representative, his club contested to the local subcommittee a game played by its rivals "Hakoah" against the local Polish club "Polonia" on an unapproved

pitch. They had initially won the appeal, only to see the decision overturned by the Central committee following the intervention of a rival official. In this situation, another contestation was made regarding "Hakoah's" right to field a certain player. At the same time, a local army major was pointing fingers at the workings of the local subcommittee, accusing the partiality of its leadership (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 3 August 1926).

Depending on the ways in which the hierarchy got altered, several clubs felt entitled to play the league's final. Things descended into chaos when the final eventually got organised. The local Germans felt that their club— "Jahn"—was the rightful winner of the local League. Meanwhile, the local subcommittee of the Federation failed to assign referees for the encounter, due to a boycott against "Hakoah". Prior to the game, an ad hoc meeting of the subcommittee was summoned on the pitch and only the intervention of the Central committee in Bucharest gave the go-ahead for the game. The game did finally kick-off, but was abruptly called off when the fans and players of "Jahn" invaded the pitch to request their favourites be declared winners. The referee decided to abandon the game for a later date, but when a venue was found for the rematch, the pitch was found devastated with broken goalposts and seats and pickaxe holes across the pitch. A police investigation found that an engineer in a local factory sent four of his workers to destroy it. Nonetheless, the game did somehow go-ahead on that day (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 15 July 1926) and was clinched by "Fulgerul" Chişinau against "Hakoah".

The situation in Cernăuţi shows the remarkable ethnic diversity at play in club football and the dominant position of minorities within it. As such, at a time when football was still largely amateur the passions were bound to flare quickly and remain high. At the institutional end of the spectrum, only a month prior to the events in Cernăuţi an anonymous member of the Federation was complaining in the sports press of "the lack of order" holding sway in the institution (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 27 May 1926). He identified two major problems that have brought this situation about: "unjust statutes" and "an abusive minority". One the one hand, reproaches were directed towards the autonomy and subsequent influence of committee presidents across the country, who were presumably able to pursue their personal interests, to protect their "friends" and to easily get re-elected, while the Central committee had no power "to intervene regarding selection, which would mean: determination, ample views, sporting management and strict financial control" (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 27 May 1926). On the other hand, one sports journalist noted that the "ruling minority is abusive" (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 27 May 1926). The minority that he had in mind was not that

of the usual suspects represented by non-Romanian ethnics, although this was obviously implied. This time, the minority hinted at was that of the Transylvanians in charge of the FSSR (*Federatia Societatilor Sportive din Romania*—Romanian Federation of Sport Societies). The reasoning rested on the simple calculus that Transylvania only had one hundred and ten clubs affiliated to the FSSR, while the rest of the county, "the disconsidered majority", was made of one hundred and sixty clubs (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 27 May 1926). In a series of radical allegations, the official went on to question the loyalty, leadership skills and financial ethics of the Federation's Transylvanian leaders. They were found wanting on every account: taking advantage of the national institution's financial resources, plotting for the creation of alternative, regionally based institutions, for example the Football Federation envisaged in Oradea and Timişoara (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 27 May 1926), and obstructing the financial Central committee in its regulatory dealings. With the "honor of Romanian sports" at play, the press went on to call for a thorough regulatory transformation, one that would suit the perceived need for Central coordination and control.

The anonymous observer correctly noted that a different organisational dynamics was at play in Transylvania and Banat. By the late 1920s, the Western town of Timişoara emerged as the hotbed of dissent in relation to Central sporting authorities. The professionalisation of the game in Hungary and Austria had placed a huge pressure on players, especially so among those of Transylvanian Hungarian extraction, to try their luck at Hungarian and Austrian clubs in search of substantially increased earnings. This posed a major dual problem for the Romanian administrators of the game. On the one hand, one might have expected Romanian officials to easily and happily dispose of the services of players that were members and visible representatives of a minority population. However, there was little "home-grown" talent springing up in their place. These were the finest players that could be recruited for both Romanian clubs and country. On the other hand, the departure of players to Hungary, the arch political rival and enemy, could easily be seized upon as an act of aggression, one strategically presented and used to undermine the legitimacy of claims coming from across the new border. The situation is telling for the ambiguous position of Hungarian Romanians, not only in football, but also in many other spheres of life. Hungarians made most of the urban Transylvanian population and were consequently better educated and much more familiar with the workings and opportunities offered by modern urban institutions relative to most Romanians in the region. Not only sheer numbers made them unavoidable. Their resources and skills were often critical for the functioning

of Romanian institutions. As one commentator aptly put it, at odds with stereotypical accounts of resentment between Romanians and Hungarians, "when the Romanian international Albi Ströck defended the Hungarian flag against Austria, we've all felt a painful heart ache" (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 21 January 1928). Moreover, with professionalisation, a new occupation was making its way into the world of football, that of player manager or impresario. This shadowy figure could not help but fuel the stories of conspiracy against Romanian interest. Thus, "the mirage of the Hungarian coin forcefully introduced in the minds of our round ball artists by Hungarian emissaries, swarming along our Western border, has bared fruit" (*Gazeta Sporturilor*, 21 January 1928). The efforts of Romanian administrators constituted strong reactions to such developments and there was a discernible tendency to support ever more statist and nationalistic forms of sport, which would ultimately culminate in their full militarisation in the late 1930s.

The statist and nationalist approach to football received increased support from the late 1940s onwards, with the establishment of socialism in Romania. Pace the internationalist rhetoric of communism, a simple comparison of clubs before and after the Second World War reveals that few ethnic clubs survived. The newly established regime radically reorganised the whole network of clubs in the country, usually be mergers, renaming and by mandatorily connecting them with institutions. For example, Dinamo Bucharest was created in 1948, out of a merger of two distinct clubs: Unirea Tricolor, a distinctively Romanian club, and Ciocanul (previously Maccabi), the Jewish club in the capital city, placed under the aegis of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Until today, the greatest feud in Romanian club football is that between Dinamo and Steaua, born as ASA (the Army's Sporting Association), in 1947. The sporting arms of the most powerful forces of the Romanian state, the police and the army, Dinamo and Steaua formed the apex of a hierarchy of clubs scattered across the country. By the 1980s, their position was so powerful that any other club was at least partially subordinated to one or the other, with few exceptions. This obviously skewed the competition in their favour, but also allowed for an unprecedented concentration of talent and resources, that saw Dinamo in the semi-finals of the European Champions Cup in the 1983–1984 season and Steaua lifting the trophy two years later, against FC Barcelona, and again in the final in 1989. Unsurprisingly, it was the two clubs that provided most of the players for the Romanian national team, during its successful 1990s.

In spite of its rigid and hierarchical nature, the system of clubs developed under socialism did produce several other notable rivalries that pitted clubs against each other, along regional, sectorial and oppositional lines.

Regionally, major feuds emerged in all of Romanian's regions, where clubs were struggling for supremacy in the area. Notorious among them were the rivalries between Timişoara and Arad in the Banat, between Baia Mare and Satu Mare in North Romania, between Galaţi and Brăila in Romanian Moldavia, to name but a few. Since many clubs were affiliated with factories, they soon turned into a symbol of one sector's supremacy over the others. The rivalry between Rapid Bucharest, the club of the railroad workers, and Petrolul Ploieşti, the club of the oilers, was chief among them. The club of the miners in Petroşani, Jiul, was opposing the other working-class clubs along the same lines. Rapid Bucharest also gained an aura of opposition from below towards Dinamo and Steaua. Aligned with one of the most powerful national companies, Rapid was strong enough to keep its autonomy and to pose a threat to the two hegemons. Although it failed to survive in the tumult of post-socialism, Rapid remains the symbol of resistance and defiance to socialism.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: The Politics of Football Fandom

The space and time of a sports club emergence and consolidation have a major bearing on its subsequent historical trajectory, identity and support. The centenarian history of "Universitatea" Cluj provides a major opening into the politics of football fandom. Since the territorial reconfigurations in the aftermath of the Great War, the town of Cluj-Napoca in Central Transylvania was a site of contention between the local Hungarian majority and the Romanian minority. By the early twentieth century, the railroads and the establishment of factories around the Hungarian town of Kolozsvar (Cluj) had helped create the second largest modern working class in Hungary after Budapest. The railroad workers, as elsewhere the avant-garde of the working class, established the K.V.S.C. (*Kolozsvari Vasutas Sport Club*—Cluj Railroads Sport Club) in 1907 (today called C.F.R. 1907 Cluj (*Caile Ferate Romane*—Romanian Railroads)). By the end of the nineteenth century, Cluj, an educational centre, was marked by strong competition between Hungarian- and Romanian-speaking students. Romanian students and professors supported nationalist activities (Brubaker 2006, 92–95) and launched *Universitatea*, the University's club, in 1919, when Kolozsvar became Cluj and Transylvania became Romanian. Both clubs have survived and still play significant symbolic roles in the class and national contestations over the city.

Since the late 1910s, the Romanianised University and its sports club were caught in the effort of promoting and ascertaining Romanianness locally, regionally and nationally. In navigating across these scales, the club soon found itself in support or at odds with the pressures and dispositions of a heavily centralising Romanian state. Universitatea's identity emerged out of this conundrum. In short, its identity was a fragile one made of an ever-renewed statement of allegiance to the Romanian national cause, one always underwritten by claims of superior civilisation due to its relation with the leading Transylvanian university. As such, Universitatea came to command popular appeal well beyond its hometown. Its football club, despite modest levels of performance for most of its history, attracted the loyalties of numerous Transylvanians and enjoyed a sympathetic following in the capital city of Bucharest. Faced with similar pressures, C.F.R. was, for most of its history, a low-key club, spending most of its time in the Romanian second division. It was only around the year 2000 that its fortunes dramatically changed after a substantial private investment. Since then, C.F.R. proposed a model of reform, both on and off the pitch, that reflected the contemporary transformations of the game. The club was the first to fully rely on the global market of football players in its recruitment and among the first to nurture a fan base committed to "tolerance", "decency" and "non-discrimination".

"Universitatea's" narrative got its outstanding formulation in the late 1960s. "The Red Caps" (*Şepcile roşii*) became the ultimate narrative of Universitatea, consecrating it as "the champion of unbridled élans" (see Chirilă 1969). The student's club in Cluj-Napoca became the repository of Romanian values in Transylvania and the epitome of honesty and disinterested effort on the playing field. The source of this outstanding position was to be found in the élan of its students shaped by the educational programmes of the University. The in-built vitalism of the postulated "élan" was a recurrent trope of Romanian interwar and post-war nationalism. The élan connected the Romanians with their Latin ancestors, distinguished them from their regional rivals and allowed for an interpretation of modern sports as a key arena of its manifestation.

The memories and histories of Universitatea gained a renewed relevance and a brighter aura after 1989. In the early 1990s, the universities in Cluj-Napoca found it impossible to financially support the sports club. Universitatea entered the fray of shady privatisations, loss of property and assets, restructurings, administrations turning into an elephant in the room of local politics. The last two and a half decades of the clubs' history would in themselves make for a revealing study of social and political change in contemporary Romania. Suffice to say, that Universitatea continued to

share the fortunes of its town and region, while striving to remain the icon of Romanianness that it once was. When Hagi and the Romanian national team were enchanting a global audience with their play at the World Cup 1994 in the USA, people all across Romania were pouring to the Sports Hall in Cluj-Napoca to claim their much-increased wealth from a notorious Ponzi scheme (Verdery 1995). An equally notorious bank, the first private Romanian bank to open after 1989, was running its dubious businesses from Cluj-Napoca and generously supporting the club. With this massive inflow of money, Universitatea found itself spoiled in the new pool of wealth, only to find itself in tatters as soon as the cash evaded the town. The turn of the millennium found the football team relegated to the third division, where it struggles again today, after yet another round of short-lived prosperity during the first decade of the new millennium. In many ways, the devotement and loyalty of its fans kept the club present in the public imagination, in a typically post-socialist mixture of heavily ethnicised class relations.[2]

Looking at the fan base of Universitatea and C.F.R. provides a chance to discuss the entanglement of class and ethno-nationalism in post-Communist Cluj-Napoca: first, it allows to see how ethno-national contentions in the city in the 1990s and early 2000s were driven by class tensions; second, it demonstrates the volatility of established social symbols, such as football clubs, in post-communism, as they are radically re-signified with surprising outcomes. I show that C.F.R., re-capitalised by a powerful entrepreneur in the early 2000s and playing by the rules of the market, started to attract mainly Hungarian and Romanian middle-class football enthusiasts, while *Universitatea* became increasingly associated with hooliganism by the declassed youth from the working-class neighbourhoods. The latter endorsed a strong nationalist discourse, as a powerful discursive tool to symbolically counter their economic marginalisation. In contrast, C.F.R fans adopted a tolerant multiculturalism as a specific middle-class civilisational project.

Up to the year 2000, Universitatea attracted the support of most football enthusiasts in Cluj-Napoca. The club reaped the benefits of football's hierarchical logic under socialism. It was nationally subordinated to the Bucharest-based clubs, but locally positioned above C.F.R, meaning that it was able to attract more funds as well as more talent. Its home ground, a stadium located near the town centre was redeveloped in the 1960s to accommodate more than 30,000 people. The club was sponsored by the university, to which it was affiliated until the fall of communism. In contrast, C.F.R.'s story as a club is marked by its desperate attempts to survive financially. Changing its name seven times throughout its history and steadily balancing at the point of bankruptcy, the club played mainly in the second and third Romanian divisions.

As major public icons, the two football clubs in the city were soon invested with conflicting and contested meanings, reproducing, reinforcing and re-signifying the old and new polarisations marking its urban space. Focusing on the followers of the two football clubs in Cluj-Napoca brings out the changing configurations of class, culture and nation triggered by the collapse of the socialist economy and the subsequent influx of new capital. The setting came to accommodate the mainly young working-class followers of a once elite club now grouped around a radicalised neo-nationalist outlook, as well as the ethnically diverse fans of a new contender, empowered by newly arrived capital, mobilised around a liberal discourse of tolerance and a shared vision of a multicultural local and regional history.

The middle-class fans that switched to the new and victorious club defined themselves in sharp contrast to Universitatea's loyal followers, who were increasingly depicted as violent and uneducated. Indeed, forty or more years after their parents' arrival in Cluj-Napoca they were again symbolically relegated as "peasants" who were obstructing the possible European future of the city. C.F.R.'s fans pictured themselves in contrast, as embodying the cosmopolitan future of Cluj-Napoca. When Romania acceded to the European Union, Cluj-Napoca became a prime recipient of capital investment, finally turning the dramatic industrial decline around and picturing Cluj-Napoca as a locale of the new European modernity in Romania (see Petrovici 2011). Better educated, C.F.R.'s fans were some of the first to profit from the new opportunities. Meanwhile, they celebrated a capitalist club that actively bought and sold players on the international market and proclaimed Cluj-Napoca a multiethnic city once more. The polarisation of football fans in Cluj-Napoca along class lines into a liberal/multicultural middle-class grouping and a neo-nationalist working-class crowd on the other shows the complex and mutually constitutive interplay between nationalism and class.

4   Contemporary Issues

The post-Communist history of Romanian football is one of the massive restructuring and decline. According to the new economic logic, football clubs were no longer an asset, but a liability, for the institutions previously supporting them. While the post-1989 back rolling of the Romanian state did away with the hierarchy that structured the arrangements of clubs, allowing them to pursue success unhampered, it simultaneously undercut their resources and left many of those that survived at the mercy of often dubious "investors". Romanian football found itself mired in corruption,

shady takeovers and chronically underfunded. A key trope during the first two post-Communist decades was that the old networks of influence remained in place, this time for the benefit of the select few that brokered with game results, the transfer of players, their promotion to the national team or with the privatisation of clubs. The corollary was that only "healthy" business practices could help save the further decline of Romanian football.

These developments were accompanied by the rapid and massive migration of the best Romanian players to foreign clubs, attracted by the high levels of payments and the quality of play elsewhere in Europe. Besides, the international migration of players had its domestic counterpart, the most successful Romanian clubs, especially the Bucharest-based ones, could quite easily attract talents from struggling clubs countrywide, thus consolidating their hegemony over the game and assuring that they would have the best "footballing goods" to sell on the quickly expanding European market for football players. As the world of football was soon to follow the newly emerging capitalist logic of accumulation, the Bucharest-based club's ability to attract capital due to their prestige and to their quasi-monopoly on the players' market made them attractive for investors. Many of these transactions, of either the clubs or players, were fraught with accusations of illegality and corruption.

In this context, some of the hardest hits were the football fans of clubs across the country. A favourite pastime for the many during socialism, football had altogether vanished in many of the smaller, working-class towns, with the demise of their industries. Even the better-established clubs in larger urban spaces found it difficult to continue operating, often trapped in a whirlpool of private investment, the withdrawal of investors and, maybe, reinvestment. Clubs such as Rapid Bucharest, Universitatea Craiova, Politehnica Timișoara, UTA Arad, Argeș Pitești, Petrolul Ploiești, to name but a few, were caught and severely affected by this dynamic. Even the fan base of one of the biggest and most prestigious Bucharest-based clubs witnessed massive patterns of transformation, with the emergence and consolidation of the *ultras* and *casuals* culture (Guțu 2012, 2017). Guțu has convincingly described the "survival networks and clientelism" supporting the operations of Dinamo Bucharest's fans and their relationships with networks of capital accumulation and patronage (2017). In face of growing economic inequality and financial insecurity, Dinamo's ultras increasingly came to rely on the goods, contacts, status and prestige flowing through networks developed in and around the stadium, practices that assured their belonging and hardened their loyalty and attachment to their peers and their club, often to the exclusion of outsiders (Guțu 2017).

The shift to a market economy and the accompanying reshaping of the Romanian economic geography created a highly fluid structure of club ownership and club development and operation. Symptomatic for this is the rapid shifts from sporting performance to decline, the judicial struggles for the ownership of the clubs' symbols and records, and the emergence of small-scale clubs from the new regions of capital accumulation onto the main stage of Romanian football. First, several of the domestic title holders of the last decade collapsed soon after their biggest ever success. Unirea Urziceni disbanded one year after winning the title and a noteworthy participation in the UEFA Champions' League group stage. Oţelul Galaţi found itself insolvent and relegated to the second division soon after becoming the first club from Romanian Moldavia to win the League title. Even C.F.R. Cluj-Napoca filed for bankruptcy and went into administration after a string of successes comprising three domestic championships. This pattern is at odds with the strive for continuity that grounds the tradition of any football club, but it does provide an insight into the business logic behind their operations. Given that the financial reward for a decent showing in the group stage of the UEFA Champions' League is on a par with the yearly operating budget of most Romanian football clubs, it might make more business sense to share the spoils rather than reinvest it.

Second, and intimately related to the issue of continuity and tradition, Romanian club football witnessed a plethora of court cases disputing the ownership of symbols and records, often pitting public and private authorities against each other. Steaua Bucharest (recently renamed FCSB by its private owner), Rapid Bucharest, Universitatea Craiova, Politehnica Timişoara, to name but a few, are involved in such disputes. A combination of shady privatisations of clubs, opportunities for financial gain, the effort to safeguard the history of the clubs are all at play in these struggles. Their outcome is hard to predict, given the muddled legal trajectory of football clubs since 1989. However, these disputes do create a sense of uncertainty and dishonesty that has brought interest and attendances at stadiums to record lows.

Third, while even the biggest and most solid football clubs in Romania are mired in intractable disputes, a series of new teams have made inroads into the first division. These are clubs burdened by little history, springing up from small towns and villages that have enjoyed economic success over the last decade. Concordia Chiajna and F.C. Voluntari (the winner of the 2016–2017 edition of the Romanian Cup) are both located in the wider metropolitan area of Bucharest, taking advantage of investment and development into the capital city. Tellingly, such clubs rely almost exclusively on

the support of public authorities, making them reliant on local politics and exposed to becoming instrumentalised in electoral politics. These dynamics offer a glimpse into the fluid nature of Romanian club football in the contemporary period, showing that its embracing of the private ideology of the market has brought little positive developments. For now, Gheorghe Hagi's football academy, F.C. Viitorul Constanţa, that managed to clinch its first title in the 2016–2017 season, appears to be the only solid model of club operation, stubbornly insisting to invest into the development of footballing talent from an early age. After delighting Romanian fans from the pitch, it might well be that Hagi returns to delight Romanian football as a club owner and coach.

Notes

1. In what follows, I draw on my doctoral dissertation (see Faje 2014) and two published analyses of the relations between football, nation and state in Romania (see Faje 2015 and 2016).
2. The discussion is based on my arguments in Faje (2011).

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Russia

Ekaterina Gloriozova

During the Soviet period, sport served different political functions: enhance physical force and productivity, promote Communist ideals and demonstrate the power of the Soviet state (Riordan 1977). In contemporary Russia, sport is particularly invested by patriotic discourse and has become, in the same way as Soviet sport, an important political resource. It is simultaneously used to restore the power of the Russian state at the international level, to create a feeling of national unity, as well as to re-mobilise citizens around a practice and values that still hold popular support (Dubrovskij 2007).

In this context, our contribution aims at exploring the political dimensions of football, guided by three main interrogations. First, we will examine the contentious potential of Russian football. We will show that it involves conformist dimensions, but that it is also able to supersede the official functions imposed by the authoritarian state. Second, we will look at the role of football as a mirror and a catalyst for social and political tensions. Here, we will see how football rivalries concurrently reflect the tensions specific to the Soviet period and the complex Russian federalism, as well as mirror the political and economic reconfigurations of post-Soviet Russia. Finally, we will explore how football can become a theatre of identitary predication, by trying to explain the presence of nationalism in Russian football fandom.

E. Gloriozova (✉)
Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: eglorioz@ulb.ac.be

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The material used in this chapter is part of a thesis research on the political dimensions of the football fandom in Russia.[1] This particular entry is based on works by sports historians and specialists of Soviet football, as well as interviews conducted in Moscow with sports journalists and with supporters (of all ages) of several Muscovite clubs (Dynamo, CSKA, Spartak and Torpedo).

1   Political Origins of Football in Russia

Pre-revolutionary Football: A Catalyst for New Identities and Social Tensions

The history of football in Russia began in the port cities of Saint Petersburg and Odessa, imported by English traders in the 1870s (Edelman 1993, 29; Riordan 1977, 22–27). It developed in Moscow two decades later, around British textile factories located on the outskirts of the city. Henry Charnock, the director of the Morozov textile factory in Orekhovo-Zuevo, formed the first documented Muscovite football team to compete against clubs of Saint Petersburg. Called *Groza Moskvy* ("the lightning of Moscow"), it was composed of English engineers and managers (Riordan 1977, 22). Played initially by British expats, football rapidly spread among the Muscovites and became the most popular sport of the capital already in 1910. In Russia, like in Western Europe, the popularisation of football was a product of urbanisation and industrialisation. Indeed, unlike the peasant way of life, the typical day of a (factory) worker was split between a working and a rest time, allowing for the development of leisure. Moreover, expanding transportation networks allowed the teams to compete at a regional level, as well as it enabled spectators to fill the stadiums (Frykholm 1997, 144).

Like in other European cities, football became a vehicle for an urban and local identity, as well as a factor of socialisation for men from the working class:

> Muscovites, by their participation in the rituals and forms of soccer as both players and spectators, articulated a self-image that signalled the disintegration of rural identity and the assertion of a new urban mentality. Participants, predominantly younger people, displayed a loss of interest in the forms of rural recreation practiced by their parents and grandparents. (Frykholm 1997, 145)

Catalyst of a new urban identity, Russian pre-revolutionary football exacerbated class tensions. The workers wishing to integrate a football team

were met with rejection by middle- and upper-class athletes. According to Frykholm (1997), these exclusionary rhetoric and practices were Central to pre-revolutionary football in Russia, even fuelling "the flames of class divisions". Tensions between social classes overlapped with Russian workers' resentment against foreign players, which represented the majority of the elite clubs. At the heart of these tensions was the willingness to demonstrate that the English were not the unique masters of football:

> For years, foreign players had dominated the leagues, and Russian players only gradually earned the right to participate. There was an ever-present, nagging feeling of inferiority in soccer and a desire to prove that Russians were just as adept in the sport as foreigners. As a result, toward the end of the first decade of the century, anti-British feelings began to increase. (Frykholm 1997, 147)

Nevertheless, the animosity against foreign players was accompanied by a willingness to imitate them (their way of playing or their style) as well as certain Western European aspects of the game. For instance, the appropriation of an English terminology related to football dates back to this period (*forward, penalty, goal, dribble, fault, time and pass*) (Frykholm 1997, 148).

Russian/Foreigner and working class/elites were not the only oppositions at work within Russian pre-revolutionary football. It also exacerbated the rivalries between Saint Petersburg (symbol of aristocracy and openness to Europe) and Moscow (old medieval capital and heart of Russian orthodoxy). Since 1907, the competitions between the champions of both cities unleashed the passions by simultaneously improving the general level of the game. Moreover, football heightened tensions between teams from the North and the South of the Russian empire. For example, Frykholm (1997, 149) relates that its rivals from the North did not accept the victory of the club from Odessa in the national championships. The national football council dominated by Saint Petersburg and Moscow nullified the result, on the grounds that Odessa played with too many foreigners on their team. Moreover, several stereotypes circulated about southern teams in the North of Russia, which can still be found today, for example describing the Southern way of playing as fast and full of energy but lacking technical skills (Frykholm 1997, 149).

These rivalries (Moscow/Saint Petersburg, North/South and Russian/Foreigner) increased the interest of spectators and stimulated the development of the passion for football in Russia (Riordan 1977, 25). In 20 years, football had thus become a Central element of the urban pre-revolutionary culture and continued to be so during the entire Soviet period.

Football in the USSR: A Subversive Game?

Political functions of Soviet sport in international relations have been widely assessed (Riordan 1977; Peppard and Riordan 1993; Wagg and Andrews 2007). Yet sport was also conceived as a tool aimed at serving various internal political functions. It turned out to be particularly compatible with the Communist's ideals of resistance, sacrifice, mental strength and control of emotions and thus became a convenient tool to promote the "communist way of life" and values of collectiveness (Grant 2014, 724–729). In addition to ideological functions, Soviet authorities attributed different social functions to sport culture. Besides health and hygienic objectives, sport was conceived as a way to establish discipline, to fight against undesirable social phenomena such as alcoholism or prostitution (Nekrasov 1985, 37–39) and also to replace leisure or activities perceived as bourgeois and harmful (including religion) (Riordan 1977, 117).

However, football hardly fitted in with the model of Soviet sport culture. Initially, Bolshevik leaders were quite hostile to this sport with elitist and British origins, constantly reminded by English football terms passed into the Russian language. Despite this ideological reluctance, Soviet authorities proved to be powerless in the face of the growing popularity of football, which quickly acquired a mass character (Dietschy 2010, 210). As shown by P. Dietschy, the Soviet power never really succeeded in establishing a true socialist football culture. First, its popularity made it particularly vulnerable to commercialisation and financial slides, facilitated by the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP):

> Placed under the tutelage of public enterprises and unions, teams emerged and began to recruit the best footballers by granting them housing, bribes and even jobs of convenience, completely contradicting the principles of "real Socialism." (Dietschy 2010, 210)

Moreover, Soviet football could not escape the emergence of players with a personal aura leading to an unavoidable hierarchy among the team members. Players' personal popularity thus became a medium of exchange:

> Each big club had its star players that would be paid to play friendly matches, sometimes as far as in Central Asia. In turn, the smaller teams would give them a substantial share of the proceeds. (Dietschy 2010, 212)

Finally, even if at first sight, the popularity of football could seem to be a useful tool to control the masses, in reality football crowds turned out to

be unpredictable, difficult to control and hardly compatible with the objectives of discipline and order attributed to Soviet sports. In the 1920s, football games often became the theatre of violence, as was the case in Odessa in 1926 where, after a fight between local and muscovite players, the spectators overran the field and brought about a riot (Edelman 1993, 53–54). This gap between the official values and functions assigned to sports and the practices of the football fans, which diverted or contradicted these values, turned out to be an essential feature of Soviet football throughout the whole Soviet period.

As shown by Edelman (2002), the subversive nature of football acquired a particular significance during the Stalinist period. The title of Edelman's work, *Serious Fun. A History of Spectator Sports in the URSS*, reflects the dichotomy between the "serious" political functions of sports and the subjective experience of football fans, motivated by the search for pleasure. Edelman describes the destabilising and subversive behaviour encouraged by the football spectacle:

> Everywhere, spectator sports have allowed people to carve out what Eric Dunning has called "enclaves of autonomy", where "mass audiences" can evade the goals of those who seek to control them. Even in the highly repressive conditions of the purges, Moscow working men used soccer in just this way. They found in the sport's liminality and spontaneity a way to demonstrate a measure of agency denied them in other parts of their lives. (2002, 1467)

Besides offering an "apolitical" time and space—in this context, understood as a way of escaping a ubiquitous state control—football allowed Soviets to choose their leisure and the team they wanted to support. Though this choice could seem derisory in another context, it had a special significance within the Stalinist regime:

> Those who sought "fun" in spectator sports were not simply engaged in a search for the apolitical in an over politicized society. In looking for entertainment, Soviet citizens were doing more than simply avoiding the messages of the state. They were also making choices about which entertainments they accepted and which they rejected. By doing this, they could, in limited but important ways, impose their own meanings and derive their own lessons from sports and from other forms of popular culture as well. (Edelman 1993, 13)

Moreover, in addition to encouraging undisciplined behaviour (violence, insults and alcohol consumption), football games offered a place of sharing, communication and even socialisation, possibly acting as a "factor of

cohesion" in the atomised society of the Stalinist period (Malia 1994). Even though the links forged inside the stadium were ephemeral, they created new meanings and identities, different from those assigned by the state. The Soviet power was for example preoccupied with the fact that, for some football fans, the identification to their team became more important than their proletarian or Soviet identity (Edelman 1993, 55).

What political significance can we give to the football spectators of that period? Admittedly, Edelman (1993) refuses to attribute a carnivalesque function to the footballing passion—in the Bakhtin sense of temporary inversion of hierarchies and values: indeed, if the football match could imply a questioning of the established order, it did not give rise to any challenge to the privileged positions occupied by the ruling elite (within the stadium or in other spheres). One could, however, refer to the French historian N. Werth who defined resistance during Stalinism as "any social behaviour revealing a limit to the total control of the regime" (Werth 2001, 132). In this sense, the footballing passion could be envisioned as a limit to the totalitarian objective of control of daily life. By creating communities chosen outside the structures determined by the state, and by contradicting the values of order and discipline, the footballing passion can thus be seen as a form of resistance to the Stalinist regime.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

Soviet Rivalries

The history of Russian football clubs is intrinsically linked to the Soviet institutions. In order to keep their members in a good physical shape, the Red Army and the Ministry of Interior founded "sports societies", which included football clubs. The Dynamo sports society (also the oldest Russian football club still in existence) was established in 1923. Derived from the Greek word meaning "power in motion", Dynamo would later become a sporting umbrella spawning clubs of other Soviet Socialist Republics such as Dynamo Tbilisi and Dynamo Kiev. The army formed football teams during the Civil war but officially founded the CDKA (Sports Club of Central House of the Red Army) in 1928 (renamed CSKA—"Central Sports Club of the Army" in 1960). This development gave rise to the construction of several stadia: the Dynamo Stadium in Moscow in 1928, with a capacity of 35,000 (55,000 ten years later); followed by the stadium of Leningrad, Tbilisi, Baku, Erevan, Odessa, Kharkov, Stalingrad and Kiev

in the 1930s (Edelman 1993, 47–48). The opening of the stadia contributed to transform Russian football into a mass spectacle, attracting as many spectators as in Western Europe (Edelman 1993, 47). In addition to the Ministry of Interior (Dynamo), the Army (CDKA) and the Ministry of Transportation (Lokomotiv), factory trade unions also created their sports societies and football teams. Spartak football club was founded in 1935 by *Promkooperaciâ*, a union of workers from the service sector (sailors, tailors, barbers and waiters), and Torpedo football club was patronised by the union of workers from the ZIS automobile factory ("Factory named from Stalin").[2]

Since the foundation of the Soviet football League in 1936 until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, the biggest and most important rivalry was the Muscovite derby opposing Dynamo Moscow and Spartak Moscow, referred to as "the greatest rivalry" (Bazhenov et al. 2006). Attracting large number of spectators, it is often presented, in a rather caricatural way, as an opposition between "the team of the authorities" (Dynamo) and the "team of the people" (Spartak). This denomination is based on the belief that Dynamo benefited from privileges and favours due to its links with the Ministry of the Interior and the powerful Soviet secret services, while Spartak remained independent from power, supporting passion and even popular protest. This romanticised image of Spartak as the "people's team" was particularly revived in the 1980s and after the collapse of the USSR. However, Soviet trade unions (patronising Spartak) were not independent from political power, far from it. They were specifically used as a political tool to centralise and control the sport movement, and acted as "the broadest transmission belt" between the party and the working people (Riordan 1977, 90; Grant 2012, 41–44). While Spartak was indeed the most popular team, it also enjoyed support in the highest circles of power. It benefited from the political patronage of the leader of the Komsomol (Young Communists League) and prominent Politburo[3] member (Dietschy 2010, 214). Additionally, both Dynamo and Spartak sports societies presented their athletes with numerous privileges: bursaries, rest breaks, material goods and housing, which were particularly sought after in a context of severe shortages (Dufraisse 2016; Grant 2012, 160). Thus, the Spartak/Dynamo opposition was more of a rivalry between the different Soviet institutions and leaders than a people/elites rivalry.

The appeal for Dynamo and Spartak quickly exceeded the initial circles linked to the staff of the security and police forces, and the workers of the *Promkooperaciâ*, spreading to a large number of supporters. The clubs' patronage was very little reflected in the identification of supporters: the choice to support Dynamo or CSKA (which also gathered a very large

number of supporters) was not connected to any sympathy for both ministries the clubs were attached to (possibly other than in the case of military families). Given the very specific social structure of Soviet cities, the logic of identification with Moscow clubs differed strongly from the oppositions at work in Western European football. Indeed, they reflect neither a geographical identification nor an identification in terms of social class (Dietschy 2010). The factors guiding the choice to support a particular Moscow team remain rather mysterious, as the supporters of Moscow clubs were characterised by a great homogeneity in terms of profession, social status and place of residence. The most plausible explanation for the transmission of passion for a specific team seems to be through family ties ("I support a specific team because my father did before me"), which is also frequently referred to by the supporters themselves.

Besides the Moscow derby, the Soviet Union was characterised by extremely complex football rivalries, crystallising different types of tensions. Despite the official conception of sports as a means of constructing and asserting a Soviet identity in a multi-ethnic state, football was not immune to what D. Dubrovskij (2007, 198) called the process of "ethnicisation" and "nationalisation". The club Dynamo Tbilisi was regularly presented as the Georgian team, Pakhtakor Tashkent club represented Uzbekistan, Kairat Almaty club, Kazakhstan, or Neftchi club, Azerbaijan. The strong rivalry between Georgian club Dynamo Tbilisi and Armenian club Ararat Yerevan demonstrated the classic opposition between two neighbouring nations fed by, and sustaining stereotypical representations on both sides. Football rivalries between the Soviet republics were also fuelled by national political elites who used football as a way to gain favours with the Kremlin. For instance, the personal rivalry between Sharof Rashidov, leader of Uzbekistan between 1959 and 1983, and Dinmukhamed Kunaev, head of Kazakhstan from 1964 to 1986, competing for the Politburo membership, fuelled the opposition between Pakhtakor Tashkent and Kairat Almaty. The games between both teams were so critically important that the prize for winning was 2–3 times higher than a football player's annual salary.

Football rivalries in the USSR also followed a centre/periphery oppositional logic. Since the foundation of the Soviet football League in 1936, the Muscovite clubs dominated the competition, winning 33 out of 53 championship titles during the Soviet period. The only non-muscovite Russian club to become USSR champion was Zenit St. Petersburg in 1984. Incidentally, when Moscow clubs travelled for their away games, they attracted an increasing number of spectators throughout the Soviet Union, becoming a particularly important issue for local teams. One of the most

significant rivalries with Moscow was between the most successful Ukrainian team—Dynamo Kiev and several Muscovite clubs, especially Spartak Moscow. Dynamo Kiev won 13 USSR championship titles, including 6 with famous coach (and former Dynamo Kiev player), Valeriy Lobanovskyi. The latter also made Dynamo Kiev the first team of the Soviet Union to triumph in a European competition, winning the UEFA Super Cup in 1975.

At the end of the Soviet period, football rivalries reinforced a sense of national belonging within certain Soviet Socialist Republics, giving rise to demands for independence. According to Sugden and Tomlinson (2000, 90–91), more than just being a mirror, football served as a powerful catalyst for these demands, by allowing the expression of grievances towards the Central government (Moscow). Finally, the Soviet football of the 1980s was presented as a catalyst of tensions in a decaying Soviet Union, as exemplified by the violence against Armenians that ensued in Azerbaijan in 1985, after the victory of the Armenian club Ararat in Baku against local club Neftchi.

Post-Soviet Rivalries

The end of the Soviet Union deeply changed the football championship, which consisted of a multi-ethnic League of 15 republics, also the most diversified national competition in the world. The first edition of the Russian championships took place from March to November 1992. Losing essential clubs such as Ukrainian champions Dynamo Kiev, and Georgian club Dynamo Tbilisi, Russian football also lost many players who were attracted to the Western dream. Other major breaking points included the privatisation of Russian football clubs, who became real companies with huge financial stakes. Part of the new Russian elite that got rich during the years of privatisation saw football as a good way to invest (or launder) its money (Riordan 2007). The rivalries between clubs became a competition between oligarchs: it was up to who would invest the most money, who would buy the most prominent star, who would lead the championship. This practice led to the rapid rise of certain clubs such as Anzhi Makhachkala—bought in 2011 by Russian billionaire from Dagestan, Suleyman Kerimov, recruiting world football stars such as Roberto Carlos, Samuel Eto'o or the coach Guus Hiddink. However, the dependence of these clubs on large fortunes in an unstable economic and political climate weakened them. At the beginning of August 2013, after a dip in value of his company's actions (*Uralkali*) and a number of woes with the Belarusian justice, Kerimov announced that the budget of Anzhi would be drastically

diminished. At the end of the 2013–2014 season, Anzhi finished last in the Russian Premier League and were relegated to the Russian National Football League (2nd Division) (Veth 2016).

The biggest, most tense and most followed derby in post-Soviet Russia is undoubtedly the Spartak-CSKA derby. Spartak, with the largest number of supporters since Soviet times, reigned supremely over the Russian championships in the 1990s (9 titles won from 1992 to 2001). CSKA, on the other hand, became the second most popular club in Moscow, winning the Russian championships 6 times, and especially becoming the first Russian club to win the UEFA Cup in 2005. The rivalry between the hooligans of these two clubs has given rise to the biggest and most spectacular clashes in the history of Russian hooliganism, as exemplified by the infamous fight of metro station "Ulica 1905go goda" in 2006, involving more than a hundred hooligans on both sides.

Zenit Saint Petersburg has also established itself as one of the best clubs in the Russian League. Taken over by Russian oil giant Gazprom in 2005, Zenit won the Russian League four times, as well as the UEFA Cup in 2008. Though it was never considered a serious rival by supporters of Moscow clubs during Soviet times, the large investment used to recruit international stars such as Hulk or Witsel (recruited for the 2012–2013 season), as well as the drafting of some of the best players at the national level, have fuelled and increased resentment. In their speeches, Moscow supporters sometimes describe Zenit as unfairly favoured by the state, using the Petersburg origins of V. Putin and D. Medvedev, along with the amounts received by Gazprom as an instrument in the hands of the state, as arguments to support their case.

Finally, since 2010, one can witness high levels of hostility among Muscovite and St. Petersburg supporters towards newly successful Nord-Caucasians clubs: the Daghestaneese Anzhi Makhachkala and the Chechen club Akhmat Grozny (former Terek Grozy). Akhmat Grozny is owned by Ramzan Kadyrov, the current president of the Chechen republic. In the supporters' discourses, the criticism towards Caucasian clubs is sometimes accompanied by discontent regarding the "oligarchization" of the North Caucasus, partly due to major subsides assigned to the North Caucasian republics in compensation for a relative stability in the region, as well as a support towards the federal government (Merlin 2007). The interplay between the football and the political registers sometimes lead to the exacerbation of nationalist and xenophobic feelings, especially against people from the Caucasus (see Sect. 4 of this chapter).

3   Football as a Sport Spectacle

The emergence of the first forms of organised support developed around the same time as the emergence of new practices among the Soviet youth in the 1970s. These were encouraged by a context of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and a general feeling of weariness and disenchantment with Soviet ideals (Komaromi 2007). These practices were rooted in an attempt to reproduce Western subcultures (hippies, skinheads or punks) (Hebdige 1979). The first groups of supporters were formed during the matches, organising and maintaining themselves through an appropriation of a part of the stadium. They are commonly known as *fanaty* (*fanat* for singular). Borrowed from English, this term distinguishes itself from the term *bolel'šik* (supporter) by specifically referring to more virulent supporters with visible support for their team. The supporters usually congregated in the stands and tried to imitate, somewhat awkwardly, their English counterparts. In their own way and using rudimentary material, they adopted the supporters' usual attributes, namely scarves, pins and buttons, flags and banners glorifying the club, and scribbled their clubs' initials on the different walls of their towns (Bushnell 1990, 205–235).

Opposition between supporters of rival teams—a pivotal feature of football fandom—was first manifested through words. As early as the 1960s, each team was given degrading nicknames. Those of Spartak were linked to the various endorsements enjoyed by the team. They were first called *torgaši*—"small merchants"—or *šnurki*—"shoe laces"—referring to the professions of the *Promkooperaciâ*. They were then nicknamed *mâso*— "meat"—and *svini*—"pigs"—in reference to the meat slaughtering and selling business. The army team, CSKA, whose training camps were located next to stables, inherited the nickname of *konûšnâ*—"stables"—and its supporters, *koni*—"horses". Dynamo, on the other hand, was reminded of its historical links with the Ministry of the Interior, its nickname being *menty*—"cops"—or *musor*—"waste"—in its original sense and, by extension, a derogatory way of designating a policeman. This opposition was also accompanied by high levels of violence. In this regard, the clashes between supporters can be seen as an extension of the territorial oppositions between groups of young people in the late Soviet Union, who were fighting *raïon* against *raïon* (neighbourhood)[4] or *dvor* against *dvor* (courtyard).[5]

In addition to the various fan rivalries, enemies also included the police, whose attitude towards the *fanaty* was quite ambiguous. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the police seemed unaware of how to respond to these new

forms of practices, seesawing between repression and laissez-faire. The authorities, however, hardened their stance following the Luzhniki Stadium tragedy on 20 October 1982. During a match between Spartak and Dutch club Haarlem, a mob caused the deaths of many supporters.[6] If it was proven later that the police forces were actually responsible for the tragedy, the authorities at the time blamed the fans and took it as an opportunity to tighten their grip. Some supporters describe this period as particularly difficult, because the mere use of distinctive signs (pins and scarves related to a specific club) or excessive screaming in the stadium was sufficient grounds for arrest.

The supporters' experience in confronting the police led some of the members to develop certain sensitivity to the attack on individual liberties. This, in turn, forged negative representations regarding the police forces, seen as emanations of the Soviet power. These confrontations also enabled the supporters to learn various strategies of circumvention or resistance to repression. The strategies were aimed at deceiving police forces, such as the use of the "casual style". Borrowed from British hooligans, the "casual style" technique allowed the supporters to go unnoticed by wearing brand clothes instead of their club colours. Some of them also applied non-violent means to expose the incoherence and arbitrariness of repression, using the Soviet laws as basis for their legal arguments. In that regard, one of the supporters mentioned that he always carried a copy of the Soviet Constitution, so as to help him defend his rights in case of an arbitrary arrest.[7]

More broadly, Soviet fandom in the 1970s and 1980s was characterised, like most other Soviet subcultures, by a fascination for the Western way of life, associated with freedom and insubordination. The reproduction of Western European practices thus served as a symbolic form of provocation and challenge towards the social order at the time.

At the same time, Soviet fandom was undeniably conformist, not only regarding some of the Soviet cultural codes (crafted, handmade and rooted in particular violent practices), but also with respect to the negotiation strategies put in place by the authorities to control the youth organisations. For instance, the Komsomols (Communist Youth organisations) received injunctions "to infiltrate the autonomous youth associations", or at least, to establish links by providing locations and material assistance (Yvert-Jalu 1991, 34). Some leaders of the supporter groups confessed to collaborating with the authorities who essentially asked them to provide lists of names of people involved in the fan movement in exchange for material means and spaces (buildings to host fan club or tickets for matches).

The fall of the Soviet Union was followed by an acute dip in supporting practices. Stadium attendance and the overall interest in football drastically declined in a context of economic crisis and widespread impoverishment. The first supporter groups that formed during the Soviet period were dismantled as a result of losing a great part of their members and leaders. In addition to the economic difficulties and a weakening in the level of play, the drop in the number of supporters is often attributed to drug and alcohol problems.

In the mid-1990s, Russian fandom gained new momentum with the creation of the first firms,[8] based on the English model of hooliganism. In 1994, the CSKA supporters established their first firm, the *Red Blue Warriors* (RBW), a reference to the American movie, *Warriors*, on street gangs. The *fanaty* of other clubs quickly followed with the establishment of Spartak's *Flint's Crew* and Dynamo's *Blue-White Dynamites*. At that time, English hooligans represented a reference in every way. Russian supporters copied their style by wearing English brands such as Ben Sherman or Fred Perry. In the stadium, the supporting style inherited from the Soviet era was quickly replaced: the banners were decorated with English flags and slogans, the Soviet songs being out-dated, were replaced by British slogans such as "we are the top League", to the extent that all those who continued to sing in Russian were stigmatised as second-class supporters.

The British model of hooliganism was particularly appealing to the Russian supporters because it suited the social and political context. The context of economic and political crisis of the beginning of the 1990s brought the levels of violence on the streets to a new high, with the rapid expansion of street gangs (Stephenson 2012). It also reached the economic and political spheres, with the development of mafia practices (Sergeev 1998). Hooligan violence started reaching its climax in Russia as of the mid-1990s. The interviewees agreed that this period was particularly destructive and chaotic. Clashes between hooligans often involved weapons such as iron bars, sticks and glass bottles, sometimes causing very serious injuries. The name given to the various weapons in the supporters' language—*argumenty* (arguments)—can be seen as a particularly good example of the euphemisation of violence, making the passage from word to deed easier. The legitimisation of violence also involved the use of the military register, as exemplified by the names of the firms, as well as in the supporters' songs and banners. The military register was also an important attraction for young people in a context that values warrior-like heroism and the militarisation of society (Le Huérou and Regamey 2008).

Between the late 2000s and the beginning of 2010, Russian hooliganism underwent a metamorphosis brought on by several factors. The violence of the clashes having reached its climax, the hooligan leaders seemed to have realised that things had gone further than they expected. Thus, began a "sportification" phase within Russian hooliganism, somewhat recalling the "pacification" undergone by sports throughout the eighteen and nineteenth centuries described by Norbert Elias (1994). The fights were gradually codified in order to regulate the violence and its effects on the participants. Out of this codification emerged what is called the "Russian style" of hooliganism, characterised by clashes where the use of weapons (*argumenty*) is strictly prohibited, and where the number of participants is more or less balanced on both sides. The rules were clarified and defined over the years so that from around 2010, Russian hooliganism presented all the attributes of a sports competition: a set of stable rules defining the course and the end of each fight, a number of criteria establishing winners and losers, a fluctuating ranking system between teams, the presence of people responsible for guaranteeing the physical integrity of participants and the smooth running of the clashes (*smotrâŝij*), first aid kits (*aptečki*) and finally, an audience who watch the videos of the different battles on social networks or on YouTube.

This "sportification" of Russian hooliganism was backed by a discourse showcasing the benefits of sport and the lifestyle associated with the practice of sport, particularly present in Russian fandom. Russian hooligans identify with the « ZOŽ » precepts (acronym for "healthy living"—*zdorovyj obraz žizni*), which involves giving up on drugs and alcohol as well as practice sports on a regular basis. While it is a strong argument used in order to evolve in the highly competitive hooligan world, the promotion of ZOŽ also aimed at fighting the consequences of alcoholism and drug abuse that decimated entire generations in the 1990s. More broadly, it reflects what Dubrovskij (2007) calls "the sportive-patriotic rhetoric", Central in the Putin regime. Sport is a particularly invested field by patriotic discourse and has become, like Soviet sport, an important political resource. Indeed, it is simultaneously used to restore the power of the Russian state at the international level, to create a feeling of national unity, as well as to re-mobilise citizens around a practice and values that still hold popular support. The promotion of sporting values is echoed in the most radical fan circles, backing the discourse on the necessity to build a healthy nation, able to protect itself against external threats. However, the discourse regarding the benefits of sports on health is also appealing to supporters far from those spheres.

Contemporary Russian hooliganism is thus very different from its original form, where the consumption of alcohol was fundamental. The English

model, once so admired, became repulsing, and the image of the drunken, paunchy hooligan was replaced by athletes who, in some cases, are not even interested in the club they fight for, or even football.

In addition to being codified, the hooligan fights were also moved outside of the city and into the suburbs: in fields, forests or plains. This solution is an integral part of this logic of pacification of hooliganism by diminishing its collateral damages. However, it is also described as a solution negotiated with the authorities, who accept to turn a blind eye on the illegality of their violent practices in exchange for pacification of the cities.

4   Nationalism and Xenophobia in the Russian Football Fandom

In order to explain the presence of nationalist and xenophobic ideologies in Russian football fandom, one must simultaneously pay attention to the factors linked to the subculture of fandom, and to explanations linked to the political and social context of Russia.

The fascination for British *hooligans* does not only relate to the external elements of fandom, it also includes the import of certain ideological elements associated with it. In the 1990s, Russian fans borrowed and adopted the symbolism, music and style associated with far-right ideologies present, to a certain extent, in English hooliganism (skulls, Celtic crosses and bulldogs).[9] In that way, the expressions and symbols linked to the far-right ideology were an integral part of a fashion trend, penetrating fandom practices.

The presence of radical ideologies in football fandom is often explained in reference to the intrinsic radical character of the subculture. The distinction between friends and foes, along with the value given to masculinity and militarism, Central in the ultra and hooligan culture, is presented as fertile ground for the development of these extreme ideologies (Bodin et al. 2008). Some sort of analogy is even established between the radical character of the fans' support and their emotions, on the one hand, and political radicalism on the other (Hourcade 2000). In the Russian case, Julia Glathe concludes that organised football fans have considerable potential for mobilisation by the radical-right, especially provided their readiness to fight and their sense of oppression regarding state policies (Glathe 2016). Though these explanations are insightful, we believe that the outrageous and provocative character of the fandom subculture, where mockery holds a Central role, is equally fundamental. Indeed, this provocative spirit fully participates in the "quest for excitement" (Elias and Dunning 1986) offered by sport, as well as it is

used to destabilise adversaries by all means necessary, including through the use of racist expressions. However, if football is a platform particularly adapted to radical political expressions, these often end up influencing and penetrating practices and ways of thinking in a more durable way, thus taking the form of a "banal nationalism" (Billig 1995).

These intrinsic characteristics of the fan subculture can shed light on nationalistic inclinations of Russian fandom structured during the 1990s. However, they are not sufficient to explain it entirely, which is why it is essential to take into account the specificities of the Russian sociopolitical context of that time.

These nationalistic inclinations were first and foremost linked to an ideological conjuncture that was favourable to nationalists after the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, communism and ideas linked to far-left tendencies were largely discredited (Tarasov 2001). Second, the newly found freedom of expression strongly benefitted the most radical ideologies who found a way of expressing themselves freely in the press and the media (Tarasov 2001). Finally, the economic difficulties that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union enabled the advocates of nationalism to associate the deterioration of living conditions with the fragmentation of state unity and the demoting of Russia as a Great Power, thus playing the "patriotism of despair" card (Oushakine 2009).

The noticeable proximity between supporters and radical nationalist tendencies established itself particularly through music, acting as a major bridging platform between subcultural and nationalist environments (Sokolov 2004). The punk, rock and heavy metal scenes are what notably linked the *fanaty* to the skinhead groups, which mostly developed from the second half of the 1990s and have left a significant stamp on the Russian hooligan subculture. In that sense, certain characteristic traits of skinhead subculture were adopted by Russian hooligans, such as their style—brands such as Lonsdale, Dr. Martens boots, black jeans, bomber jackets and shaved heads—and their use of certain symbols—swastikas, Celtic crosses, skulls and the numbers 18 and 88.[10]

Finally, one must especially take into account the progressive establishment of a large "consensus around nationalism" (Laruelle 2009) in Russia as of the second half of the 1990s. It is characterised by three main elements: the implementation of an official patriotic ideology adopting certain doctrines of the Russian nationalist movements; an extension of xenophobic attitudes within the Russian society and an increase of violence against people of "non-Slavic appearance" (Leonova 2009, 146); as well as the

dissemination of a nationalist discourse among intellectual, artistic and scholar circles that is no longer perceived as being marginal or radical.

The imprint of the Russian social and political context is perceptible in the themes invested by Russian fandom. The first theme that mobilised the *fanaty* outside the sporting arena was the military intervention of NATO in ex-Yugoslavia in 1999. According to certain statements, this event led to the first "truce" between hooligans of the different Moscow clubs. They put aside their rivalries and organised a joint action in front of the US Embassy. This particular mobilisation reflects the strongly developed Pan-Slavic discourse of Russian fandom, reaffirming the strong ties between Russians and Serbs, also reflected in the friendly ties between Russian and Serbian supporters (Spartak Moscow—Crvena Zvezda and CSKA—Partizan).

The anti-immigration position developed in the middle of the 2000s is another theme that is present among the *fanaty*, especially against immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Rooted in an ethnicised rapport with minorities, the main themes here include the attacks on "ethnic Russians" by Caucasians, and the necessity to resist "ethnocriminality".[11] The biggest and most mediatised manifestation of this rationale was the demonstrations of Manehnaya Square in Moscow in December 2010. Initiated by football fans after the death of a Spartak fan during a fight with people from the North Caucasus, the gathering quickly turned into large-scale clashes with the police, as well lynching of passers-by, who appeared to be members of ethnic minorities from the Caucasus region (Le Huérou 2011). This anti-Caucasian stance notably contributed to a reconfiguration of organised fandom in Russia as of 2010, cementing values of unity and solidarity between clubs. The enemies of yesterday (the supporters of other clubs) thus became the worthy adversaries of today as well as their allies in fighting the "common enemy" in the shape of the "Caucasian".

Finally, the positioning of supporters with regard to the recent events in Ukraine (Maidan, the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass war) is quite symptomatic of their dependence on the political context. The events of 2014 represent a breaking point in Russian nationalism, most notably due to divisions with regard to the issue of Maidan. On the one hand, certain Russian nationalists rally behind the Kremlin's position, seeing the Kiev uprisings as a consequence of a negative (political or ideological) Western influence, for some even as a coup organised by the USA associated with Ukrainian "fascists". On the other hand, Russian nationalists in favour of Maidan see it as an example of a legitimate revolution against an authoritarian and corrupt regime. The more radical nationalists are even quite

enthusiastic about the commitment and physical resistance of some of their close allies, Ukrainian far-right movements such as *Svoboda* and *Pravy Sektor* (Horvath 2015). Even though they represent a minority of the Russian nationalist spectrum, it is a position that was quite visible among the Russian organised supporters who share close ties with Ukrainian supporters.[12] These bonds were echoed by a speech on the unity of Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, describing them as one and same people unfairly divided by history. During the Kiev mobilisations of winter 2013–2014, Russian *fanaty* quite often expressed their support for the Ukrainian organised supporters who widely took part in the demonstrations.

Nonetheless, the annexation of Crimea in Spring 2014—positively received among the population (83% of the Russian population was favourable in August 2015)—was widely supported by the Russian nationalists. This consensus around Crimea (perceived as a "return to home"), enabled the regime to ensure continued support, as well as it allowed V. Putin to establish himself as the "main Russian nationalist" (Horvath 2015). Football stadiums exemplify these tendencies. At the end of 2013—beginning of 2014—one could find demonstrations of support for the mobilisations in Kiev, as well as enthusiastic comments on social media, regarding the role played by Ukrainian supporters in the overthrow of power in Ukraine. After the annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2014, however, these slogans disappeared completely from the stadiums, quickly replaced by messages approving the annexation of Crimea such as "*Krym Nash*!" (Crimea is ours!), as well as flags like the ones used by the separatists of Donbass. It is difficult to pinpoint with certainty what sparked this sudden reversal. It is hard to assert if it was brought on by a change of opinion of the *fanaty*, sensitive (like the rest of the population) to the vigorous media propaganda, or if it is attributable to the pressure from fan leaders to highlight certain messages to the detriment of others. While it probably is a mix of both, we can lean towards the second explanation, mostly given the persistence, on social networks, of messages of support to Kiev in the armed conflict against Donbass.

Notes

1. This research was partly funded by the FIFA Research Scholarship, from the International Centre for Sports Studies (CIES).
2. "Factory named after Stalin" was renamed ZIL or Zavod Imeni Likhacheva ("Factory named after Likhachev") during Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation phase in 1956. This Soviet and then Russian car manufacturer

produced trucks, buses, luxury cars reserved for dignitaries of the country as well as military vehicles.

3. The Politburo was the main organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Given that the effective power was in the hands of the CPSU, members of the Politburo were in fact, the true leaders of the Soviet Union.

4. Administrative subdivision of Russian cities or parts of certain cities (can be translated to "district" or "neighbourhood").

5. The multi-levelled Soviet housing was, for the most part, built around internal courtyards (*dvor*), and was very often turned into playgrounds, small shops or walkways. These were (and still are) important socialising spaces, creating a sense of belonging and identification for young Soviets.

6. Officially (according to the Soviet authorities at the time), 66 supporters died that night, but certain independent sources report 350 deaths (Riordan 2008).

7. A. 2014. Interview by author, Moscow, 15 April 2014.

8. *Firmy* in Russian, also called *grupirovki*, *kantory* or *kolektivy*.

9. *Bulldog* is the name of the British National Front's magazine.

10. The numbers 1 and 8 stand for the position of Adolf Hitler's initials in the alphabet, and 88, for "Heil Hitler".

11. Expression that links the ethnic origins of a person to their inclination to commit a crime. It suggests that foreigners (most commonly Caucasians) are the source of most of the committed crimes.

12. The organised supporters in Ukraine are also close to radical nationalist tendencies (Ruzhelnyk 2016).

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Serbia

Richard Mills

In May 2016, both UEFA and FIFA elevated Kosovo to the status of an independent football nation. Yet, politically the territory's position remains in flux. A constituent province of the Republic of Serbia prior to its independence declaration in 2008, by 2016 Kosovo had been recognised by 109 of 193 UN states. Among those yet to acknowledge Pristina's breakaway are Russia, China and Spain. Top of the latter list is Serbia itself, where, despite Kosovo's resounding Albanian majority, it remains an integral part of the Serbian national myth. Kosovo's Serbs have retained a toehold in the North of the disputed territory, while there has been a tenacious effort to underline Serbia's claim to its lost province in all aspects of society. Football is no exception. Yet, from the Serbian perspective, this is only the latest episode in a 25-year process of territorial contraction. The impact on football has been tumultuous at every step, and the game has provided a visible means of resisting internationally sanctioned border changes. Since the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, which, at least in terms of territorial amendments, began in 1991, self-identifying Serbian football clubs have flown the flag for communities cut adrift from their motherland.

Indeed, the game has performed a similar role ever since its Serbian pioneers brought the first footballs to the region at the turn of the century. The fact that all those who consider themselves part of the Serbian nation

R. Mills (✉)
Modern European History, School of History, University of East Anglia,
Norwich, UK
e-mail: r.mills@uea.ac.uk

have rarely been encompassed by Serbia as a political entity has been the cause of much unrest. This has been reflected and exacerbated through football. At the same time, the game has highlighted the inherent contradictions involved in equating the Serbian state with a narrow ethnic definition of nationality. For minorities living in a polity that has evolved constantly over the last one hundred years, football has been an equally suitable vehicle. Moreover, particularly in the aftermath of Yugoslavia's collapse, violence, organised crime and political extremism have never been far from the stadium.

1   Political Origins of Football

A cursory glance at the game's origins reveals the complexities entailed in any attempt to chart its development in relation to the Serbian state and Serbs as an ethnic nation. The nation and the state have rarely coalesced. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the Kingdom of Serbia was a young entity, of modest size. Its territorial reach was significantly less than that of the contemporary republic: the rich plains of Vojvodina were part of Austria–Hungary, while the Sandžak and Kosovo still belonged to Serbia's erstwhile master, the Ottoman Empire.

Efforts to categorise the history of Serbian football in narrow ethnic terms falter at the first hurdle. A Jewish student returning from Germany brought the first football to the Kingdom in 1896. Hugo Buli was the son of a wealthy Belgrade banker, and in many respects, he was typical of the pioneers of the Serbian game.[1] Children of the affluent bourgeoisie, who studied in universities across Europe, returned with a love of football and a desire to bring it to their homeland. These youths organised demonstration matches in city parks and established the first clubs. Talented foreign migrants joined their Serbian counterparts from the outset, becoming valued team members (Zec 2010, 137–143). The renowned Serbian intellectual Dobrica Ćosić (2006, 6–7) describes football as one of "the first buds of the modernisation and Europeanisation of Serbian society". Yet, in the early days, some older onlookers viewed this foreign import with hostility: it was a "childish pastime" that diverted military-age youth away from physically and patriotically uplifting Sokol gymnastics organisations (Zec 2010, 138–139).

The territorial upheavals that defined the twentieth-century Balkans present sports historians with a dilemma. Shifting borders make it difficult to establish even the most rudimentary origins of the Serbian game.

The *Šumadija* and *Soko* clubs, founded in 1903, were the first in the Kingdom. However, to the North, in what is today Serbian Vojvodina, the *Bačka* club was established two years earlier. Falling within the jurisdiction of Austria–Hungary, this team—with a number of Serbs among its ranks—competed in Hungarian competitions prior to the First World War (Todić 2006, 35–36). "Serbian" clubs on either side of the Kingdom's northern border played one another in friendly matches. Belgrade's *Velika Srbija* (Greater Serbia) played home and away games against a team from Novi Sad in 1913 and 1914. They were patriotic occasions:

> Serbs from Vojvodina prepared an entire spectacle for our players. Our people were delighted to see Serbs from Serbia proper (*srbijanci*) and a club carrying the amiable name *Greater Serbia* in their midst. … In contrast to the Serbs, the Hungarians and Germans did everything to ensure that our trip would not be a success. (Č*etvrt veka* 1939)

The foundations of Serbian football were laid in the years leading up to the First World War. Clubs mushroomed across the capital and in smaller provincial towns. From the outset, the relationship between football, politics and nationalism was clear. Many of the new teams embraced names imbued with national sentiment: from *Srpski mač* (Serbian Sword) in Belgrade to *Dušan Silni* (Dušan the Mighty[2]) in Šabac. When the players of the former embarked upon a foreign tour to Zagreb in 1911—then part of Austria–Hungary—they bestowed upon themselves the title of the "National football team of the Kingdom of Serbia". Heavy losses at the hands of more experienced Croatian opponents led the Belgrade press to castigate these "beardless youngsters" for having the audacity to masquerade as representatives of the Serbian state (Zec 2010, 141–143).

Emerging victorious from the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), Serbia expanded to the South. Alongside a large tract of Macedonia, the greatest prize was Kosovo and Metohija—the Serbian name for the contemporary entity of Kosovo. The 1389 Battle of Kosovo is a major element of the national myth. According to the legend, medieval Serbia was defeated by the advancing Ottomans, ushering in five hundred years of servitude. Passed down over the centuries through epic poetry, religiously imbued stories about the battle and the importance of this land ensured that its "liberation" in 1912, complete with its stunning monasteries, was a monumental moment in Serbian history. When the aforementioned *Velika Srbija* was founded in 1913, its name was inspired by these contemporary events (Vukadinović 1943, 5).

Immediately prior to the First World War, the Serbian Olympic Committee launched a Cup competition for football clubs, but it was not until after the devastating conflict that competitive play got underway in earnest. Shattered by a war which left a quarter of its population dead, "Gallant Serbia" nevertheless emerged as a victor around which a new state was formed. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—renamed Yugoslavia in 1929—brought the vast majority of Serbs into the same state for the first time. As the name suggests, the new Kingdom was envisaged as a national homeland for three South Slav "tribes", but in practice it was Serb dominated from the outset. The Serbian Karađorđević Monarchy stood at its head, while those entering the state on former Habsburg lands were frustrated in their efforts to fashion an equitable political solution. On the football pitch, the vastly enlarged state brought Serbian clubs face to face with talented Croatian teams. The Yugoslav Football Association (*Jugoslavenski nogometni savez*, JNS) was established in Zagreb in 1919, with a national competition following four years later.

The game reflected Croatian discontent with the prevailing political structure. The most notable incident occurred in 1929, after the king dissolved parliament to rule by dictatorship. This act followed the assassination of leading Croatian politician, Stjepan Radić, by an exasperated political opponent. Against a backdrop of deteriorating Serb–Croat relations, the elites of Serbian football had been trying to wrest control from their counterparts in Zagreb. They finally succeeded in 1930, when they moved the headquarters of football's governing body to Belgrade. It was a sporting manifestation of the centralising trends prevalent within the Kingdom. This had immediate consequences for the national football representation. Scheduled to participate in the first World Cup in Uruguay, the team was rocked by a boycott of Croatian players. Nevertheless, with a squad of predominantly Serbian footballers, Yugoslavia achieved what remained its greatest success in the international arena, reaching the semi-finals of the competition (Đorđević Čane 1973, 44–45).

By the turn of the 1940s, the Yugoslav state had made significant progress in the resolution of internal political divisions, while the turbulent football sphere had made even more radical leaps: the centralised football association had been replaced by a federation of three national bodies—complete with their own leagues and national teams. The Serbian organisation exercised jurisdiction over much of modern-day Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro (Đorđević Čane 1973, 64–65). Regardless, the Axis invasion of 1941 wiped it from the map.

When Josip Broz Tito's Communist partisans emerged victorious from the Second World War, it heralded the establishment of a new, federal Yugoslavia. Consciously designed to satisfy the ambitions of constituent nations, while minimising any sense of Serb domination, the new state boasted six republics. One of these, Serbia, contained two autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo. The capital remained in Belgrade, but Serbs were spread across four of the six republics. Football was revolutionised in the new circumstances. Ethnically exclusive clubs, and those which had collaborated with the occupiers, were forcibly disbanded. They were replaced by new teams imbued with the spirit of socialism and a multi-ethnic outlook. Though based in Belgrade, the new Football Association of Yugoslavia (*Fudbalski savez Jugoslavije*, FSJ), with its constituent republic associations, reflected the prevailing political realities (Mills 2017, Chapter 3; Đorđević Čane 1973, 134).

When Yugoslavia began to fall apart in the 1980s, resurgent Serbian nationalism was a primary driver. Politicians, academics and other public figures attacked the Communist solution to Yugoslavia's ethnic diversity, highlighting that, as the largest nation, Serbs were divided by the state's internal borders. This division had been exacerbated by constitutional changes made in 1974, when Serbia's autonomous provinces were effectively elevated to the status of republics. Unrest in Kosovo, where Albanians formed the vast majority of the population, fuelled calls for change. The populist Slobodan Milošević exploited rising Serbian nationalism in his political ascent. When Yugoslavia's Western republics, Croatia and Slovenia, rejected any form of increased centralisation, the stage was set for disintegration. Slovenia departed relatively peacefully, but in Croatia and Bosnia the sizeable Serbian minorities (12 and 31%, respectively) were unwilling to be dragged out of a Yugoslav state encompassing their ethnic compatriots. Civilian populations were deliberately targeted in the consequent wars (1991–1995), as ethnic cleansing became the means of achieving ethnic homogeneity in contested regions. As Croatian and Bosnian Serbs carved out their own entities, football underlined their desire to remain in a state with Serbia proper (Mills 2014).

When Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in 1992, sparking a three-year civil war, clubs in Bosnian Serb-held areas rejected any notion that they were no longer part of Yugoslavia. *Borac* (Fighter) Banja Luka participated in the Yugoslav leagues until the end of the war in 1995. *Borac* became the flagship club of the Bosnian Serbs, playing home matches at neutral Serbian grounds. Its continued presence in Yugoslav football competitions underlined Serb defiance of Bosnian secession. The incipient Serbian

states East of the Drina River—Republika Srpska Krajina on what had been Croatian territory and Republika Srpska in Bosnia—also established their own football associations, competitions and national teams. As early as 1992, Bosnian Serbs met their co-nationals from what had been Croatia in an "intranational" match. Throughout the conflicts, there was much talk by these associations, clubs and the media about amalgamation and eventual reunion within the Yugoslav football structure. The wars ended in absolute defeat for Croatian Serbs, whose football competitions were wiped off the map in 1995, as they fled eastward. Bosnian Serbs fared better, establishing their own republic within Bosnia. Although Serb teams eventually joined Bosnian federal competitions in 2002, Republika Srpska retains its own football association, Cup competition and lower leagues. It also has a national representation. Warm ties are maintained with Serbia proper. During the club's 75th anniversary celebrations in 2001, *Borac* hosted the elite of Yugoslav—that is, Serbian—football in Banja Luka. Belgrade's *Crvena zvezda* (Red Star) and *Partizan* were among the club sides, while the Yugoslav national team also graced the festivities (Mills 2014, 17–21). In this way, the game has proved a powerful means of resisting political change and fighting for the unity of the Serbian nation.

Only Serbia and Montenegro remained in the rump Yugoslavia. Never a popular construction, many of its citizens called for its dissolution from the outset. While both the royal and Communist Yugoslavias had served a purpose in uniting Serbs in a single state, the retention of the all-encompassing name was deemed absurd. Supporters of *Crvena zvezda* called upon Serbs to boycott the sham national team in 1998, linking the persistence of Yugoslavia to the failed socialist project:

> Only communists and people without an identity – consumers of media lies – support the national team. Every normal person who feels Serbian (and there is no reason to be ashamed of that) can only respect the sacred symbols and tradition of his own people, and not join in with the Bolshevik manipulation. The greatest evils in the history of Serbs were caused by the red atheists and they destroyed all genuine values of the Serbian national being. Today, Serbia is spiritually sick and blind as a result. … to support Yugoslavia means to support enemies and the greatest gravedigger of the Serbian spiritual being. Red Star and Serbia are all that is sacred! (Timić 1998, 21)

The state was renamed Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, but the discourse persisted. The Belgrade media downplayed the fact that the national team represented both of the state union's partners equally, instead treating it as

the national team of Serbia alone (Đorđević 2009, 92–94). Montenegro voted for independence in 2006, taking yet another group of self-defining Serbs out of Belgrade's orbit. As a result, Serbia finally emerged as an independent state once again, with a Serbian anthem, symbols and a national football team. But it came at the cost of leaving millions of Serbs beyond its modest borders. This situation is reflected in the crowds for national team games, when terraces are decorated with flags from Republika Srpska, Montenegro, Kosovo and other places no longer under Belgrade's jurisdiction.[3] At the same time, the ethnic symbolism of the Serbian national team and the media discourse surrounding it present it as an "ethnic" representation, rather than a national team representative of all of those who live in the modern Republic of Serbia, regardless of ethnicity (Đorđević 2009, 95–98).

In all the states that have encompassed Serbs over the last century, football has been a highly symbolic ethnic marker, as well as a means of upholding or challenging the territorial status quo. Throughout, Belgrade has stood at the centre.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

> The Belgrade derby is part of the history of our biggest clubs. (…) It is the only match which spans generations, from the beginning of football's development to today; it is the only genuinely traditional battle on the sports field which has been held from year to year, and which is sure to constitute the greatest attraction in our sporting life for a long time to come. (Vukadinović 1943, 137)

The words of the esteemed Serbian football writer Ljubomir Vukadinović are as valid today as when he wrote them in 1943. However, the derby which he was referring to was on the brink of oblivion. When the victorious partisans liberated Belgrade a year later, they wiped the capital's two leading clubs off the map. Until that point, *BSK* (*Beogradski sport klub*, Belgrade Sport Club) and *Jugoslavija* had been the pride of Serbian football. During the interwar years, these clubs enjoyed the backing of the Serbian elite, enabling them to erect modern stadiums and challenge for silverware (Zec 2014, 274–276). Between them, they lifted seven of 17 national championships. Politics was never far away. Indeed, even prior to the First World War, the kick-off of the very first derby match, played in September 1913, was delayed for over an hour, as the two teams waited for Ljubomir Jovanović, the Minister of

Education, and Ljubomir Davidović, politician and Mayor of Belgrade, to appear at the makeshift ground (Vukadinović 1943, 7–8).

BSK had only been in existence for two years when disaffected members broke away to form *Velika Srbija* in 1913. In the very different political climate that followed the First World War, the latter changed its name; the club became *Jugoslavija* over a decade before the title was embraced by the newly formed state. Yet, this said much about Serbian aspirations for Yugoslavia. For many, the new creation was merely Greater Serbia by another name. Relations between Belgrade's leading clubs were often fraught. As early as 1920, a derby was abandoned before halftime in the midst of accusations of biased refereeing (Vukadinović 1943, 11–13). By the 1930s, these games regularly attracted crowds in excess of 10,000, with derby matches relished as the highlight of the sporting calendar. Although the boards of the respective clubs jostled for power and influence in football's governing bodies, it is telling that these Serbian giants joined forces in their efforts to bring the JNS to Belgrade (Zec 2010, 148).

The Axis invasion of 1941 marked the end of both the interwar Kingdom and its football competitions, with Belgrade's stadiums suffering severe bomb damage, but the *BSK–Jugoslavija* rivalry endured. Within a month of the occupation, thousands of spectators were watching the first wartime derby. Admittedly, *Jugoslavija* had to adapt to the new circumstances, its name no longer appropriate in the tense wartime climate of an emasculated Serbian territory. Instead, the club was renamed *SK 1913* (Sport Club 1913), a change that the authorities deemed sufficient for its continued existence. Devoid of showpiece matches against the best Croatian clubs, Belgrade's football supporters flocked to the derby in large numbers. A crowd of 16,000 watched the August 1942 game (Vukadinović 1943, 95–96, 120). Football enabled them briefly to forget the hardships of war, as they were distracted by some remarkable young talent. Future star of the socialist era game, Rajko Mitić was among them.

The liberation of Belgrade by the Soviet Red Army and the domestic forces of Tito's partisans in late 1944 signed the death warrant for both of Belgrade's leading clubs. Castigated as bourgeois collaborators, they were among the many teams that were abolished in the wake of liberation. With the disgraced *BSK* and *Jugoslavija* out of the way, Communists established their own clubs in the capital of the new, socialist Yugoslavia. Two of them, *Partizan*—originally established as the team of the victorious Yugoslav People's Army—and *Crvena zvezda* still dominate the Serbian football landscape today (Todić 2006, 131). The break with the past was by no means a clean cut. *Partizan* and *Crvena zvezda* inherited the grounds of *BSK* and

Jugoslavija, respectively. The latter's red and white colours also lived on through *Crvena zvezda*, while some of the heroes of the pre-1945 game blossomed in the newly founded giants of Yugoslav football. Even the *BSK* name was resurrected by another club after a short period, only to disappear again in the late 1950s.

Despite the revolutionary changes of the mid-1940s, football in the Yugoslav capital continued to be entwined with politics. Modelled closely on its Soviet military counterpart, *Partizan* enjoyed a privileged position in the new state. Senior figures in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (*Komunistička partija Jugoslavije*, KPJ) ensured that the most talented players from across the country were concentrated in this flagship institution. The stars of disgraced Zagreb clubs formed the nucleus of the team, but military leaders also worked to deprive city rivals *Crvena zvezda* of their best players. When Rajko Mitić was called up by the army in 1946, it was with the intention of forcibly transferring the talented striker from *Crvena zvezda* to *Partizan*. The affair sparked a crisis in the highest echelons of the KPJ, as the prominent Communist and football enthusiast Vladimir Dedijer warned of the negative consequences that would ensue from such direct manipulation of the people's game. Eventually, the army backed down and Mitić matured into a *Crvena zvezda* legend (Dedijer 1981, 32–35). Nevertheless, the KPJ, army and Yugoslav security forces continued to interfere in the internal workings of Belgrade's leading clubs throughout the socialist era (Mills 2017, Chapter 4).

The Belgrade public quickly warmed to their new clubs, which became two of the best supported teams in socialist Yugoslavia. Both attracted support from across the country and across the ethnic spectrum, something which was mirrored in the diversity of the players themselves. They were also two of the most successful teams, which is unsurprising given the preferential treatment afforded to them in terms of player recruitment and facilities. Between 1945 and 1991, the clubs won a combined total of 29 League titles and 17 Marshal Tito Cups. They reached their zenith in different eras. First, the dominant *Partizan* team of the early 1960s made the 1966 European Cup Final. Then, in the last days of Yugoslavia's existence, *Crvena zvezda* went one better by becoming European champions in 1991 (Todić 2006, 144–147, 181–185). By the time that they added the world club championship to their trophy cabinet in December of the same year, Yugoslavia had descended into war.

During both Yugoslavias, Belgrade's clubs also fostered fierce rivalries with leading Croatian teams. The revolutionary tumult of the mid-1940s swept away Zagreb's illustrious interwar clubs in much the same way as their

Belgrade rivals. But, thanks to its impeccable contribution to the National Liberation Struggle, *Hajduk* (Brigand) Split was a rare survivor. In the socialist era, Hajduk was joined by a new Croatian club, *Dinamo* Zagreb. In combination with *Crvena zvezda* and *Partizan*, these teams dominated Yugoslav football. Encounters involving the "Big Four" were often marred by crowd disorder. From the outset, but especially in the final decade of the shared state, these clubs came to represent their respective nations. Belgrade's leading teams haemorrhaged non-Serb supporters in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as their supporters' groups increasingly portrayed an image of ethnic exclusivity and intolerance. *Crvena zvezda*, in particular, became a potent symbol of Serbian nationalism. Supporters' chants eagerly associated the club with the prevailing politics of the time: "Star, Star, that's a Serbian team, Slobodan Milošević is proud of it!" (Ćao tifo 1990). However, while some of the most high-profile clashes between rival supporters were motivated by nationalism, the Belgrade derby also generated significant levels of supporter unrest in the Yugoslav era. The final *Crvena zvezda–Partizan* encounter in the full Yugoslav First League, just months before the state's descent into armed conflict, was marred by violence (Kos 1991).

Following Yugoslavia's collapse, and the departure of Croatian clubs, Belgrade's giants remained the dominant force among inestimably weaker opposition. Yet, both clubs have been a shadow of their former selves. Racked by sanctions and mounting debts, faced with weak domestic opponents, and subject to the same forces of globalisation that have deprived Eastern Europe of its most talented footballers, neither club has been able to challenge for European silverware. On the terraces, in the absence of regular encounters with other national groups, the supporters of Belgrade's "eternal rivals" now compete for the title of being the "better Serb". Clashes between them have been every bit as violent as anything motivated by nationalism during Yugoslavia's twilight years.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

Since Yugoslavia's disintegration, the Serbian game has remained inextricably linked with political developments. At the outbreak of war in 1991, a group of the most ardent *Crvena zvezda* supporters formed the core of Željko Ražnatović Arkan's paramilitary organisation, the Serbian Volunteer Guard (*Srpska dobrovoljačka garda*). Better known as the Tigers, this unit terrorised civilian populations in Croatia and Bosnia, forming an important element in the project to ethnically cleanse "Serbian" territory of non-Serb

inhabitants (Čolović 2002, 275–279; Mills 2012, 568–574). In the relative calm of Serbia proper, football has been blighted by violence, crime and political extremism for decades. During the 1990s, the game "became synonymous with organized crime and the criminalization of the Serbian state" (Nielsen 2010, 87). President of Kosovo's *FK Priština* during the tense early 1990s (Morrison and Roberts 2013, 161–162), Arkan deepened his involvement with football by switching attention to a lower League Belgrade club, *FK Obilić*. Named after a heroic knight from the medieval Battle of Kosovo, the club was already suitably imbued with national content. In his pursuit of sporting success, Arkan loaded its board of directors with political figures, police officials, members of the judiciary and prominent businessmen. This, in combination with the bribing of referees, intimidation and an aggressive policy of signing talented players secured a remarkable rise up the football pyramid. In 1998, the club finished above esteemed neighbours *Crvena zvezda* and *Partizan* to become champions of the rump Yugoslavia. Moreover, Arkan's forays into elite football provided a lucrative opportunity for money laundering (Nielsen 2010, 91–92).

Arkan was not the only questionable figure in the Serbian game. His methods inspired other powerful members of the Belgrade underworld. In the two decades after 1991, eight club presidents were assassinated, including the notorious commander of the Tigers himself, whom the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had indicted shortly beforehand (Nielsen 2010, 92). Prominent political figures also openly associated with football throughout the Milošević years. Radmilo Bogdanović, a senior government figure who rose to the position of minister of the interior, was a member of *Crvena zvezda*'s board. Vladimir Cvetković, the club's general manager, also became a government minister. Even President Milošević, no lover of football, jumped on the bandwagon when *Crvena zvezda* lifted the European Cup in 1991. He could not miss the opportunity to associate with such a successful symbol of Serbian national identity (Mills 2017, Chapter 8). Though Milošević enjoyed support from *Crvena zvezda*'s terraces as Yugoslavia disintegrated, when the tide of war in Croatia and Bosnia turned against Serb forces, this backing rapidly dissipated. By 2000, the club's fans were indulging in chants of "save Serbia and kill yourself, Slobodan!" They played a direct role in the revolutionary events that removed him from power later in the same year (Đorđević 2016, 124–126).

On the terraces—where, because of hooliganism and the poor standard of football on offer, militant supporters' groups constitute the vast majority of small crowds—the situation has been equally troubling, with a string of football-related murders and violence.[4] The leading supporters' groups, with

Crvena zvezda's *Delije* (Valiants) and *Partizan*'s *Grobari* (Gravediggers) at their head, have engaged directly in intolerance, racism, homophobia and misogyny on a regular basis. Annual attempts to stage a gay pride parade in Belgrade since 2009 have provided an opportunity for supporters' groups to express their collective identities before the gaze of Serbian society and the wider world. Christian Axboe Nielsen describes the parade as "an annual contested event pitting progressive and pro-European forces against a "patriotic" coalition of extreme nationalist organizations, associations of football hooligans and the Serbian Orthodox Church" (Nielsen 2014, 96). The 2009 edition, which was effectively banned by the state in the face of menacing threats, coincided with the murder of a French football supporter by *Partizan* fans. In the aftermath, the Serbian authorities acknowledged the relationship between political extremism and the leading supporters' groups, while the state prosecutor called for the latter to be outlawed. The case was strengthened by his assertion that these groups were also involved in other forms of criminal activity, including the narcotics trade. Despite such strongly expressed opinions, the Serbian state has been lax in its efforts to prosecute acts of football hooliganism and related criminal activity. A major reason for this has been the entanglement of political parties, the police and judiciary with football clubs and their organised supporters. The presence of such powerful figures on club boards—including those of *Crvena zvezda* and *Partizan*—has regularly shielded culpable supporters from prosecution, contributing to a sense of impunity. The proposed ban for the most notorious supporters' groups was thrown out of court in 2011 (Nielsen 2010, 93–99; 2014, 103–106).

Throughout the post-Yugoslav era, the leading groups have proudly asserted their Serbian national identity. Nationalist songs, banners and choreography have been a regular feature in Serbian stadiums. Deeply offensive chants about the genocidal massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995, as well as flags and banners emblazoned with images of convicted and indicted war criminals from the wars of the 1940s and 1990s, are among the wide repertoire performed since socialist Yugoslavia's disintegration.[5] The *Delije* make much of their contribution to that process. At the rear of the Marakana Stadium's North terrace, where they congregate, the group has erected a commemorative plaque in honour of its fallen members. Flanked by murals that depict seminal moments in the history of the Serbian nation, the plaque is embossed with the Serbian Orthodox Cross and accompanied by a religious icon and votive candles. In combination, the space symbolically adds fallen football supporters to the pantheon of Serbian national heroes (Mills 2012, 571–572).

These religious rituals underline another prominent development in the last two decades. In their quest to be the best Serbs, many organised groups have adopted Serbian Orthodox Christianity as an important element of national identity. When interviewed by the religious newspaper *Pravoslavlje* (Orthodoxy), two *Delije* leaders explained how they had felt when they embraced the Orthodox faith at the end of the 1990s: "Come on! Let's see who we are and what we are, the extent to which we are Serbs. Let's learn what Serbdom is through these people from religion" (Olujić 2008, 42). Before long, *Delije* members were praying collectively at Belgrade's imposing Church of St. Mark and boycotting matches scheduled for the Easter weekend (Radonić 2010). The often close relationship between supporters' groups, "that openly cloak themselves in the robes of religious identity and patriotism", and the Church has been facilitated by shared outlooks on some of the most pressing issues (Nielsen 2014, 106–107). With violent homophobic rhetoric, they have coalesced over their opposition to gay pride, as well as the question of Serbia's deepening European integration. Ties between the two actors have been at their most prominent in the ongoing struggle to assert Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo.

4   "Kosovo Is Serbia"

Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 triggered violent protests in Belgrade. The US Embassy was stormed by vigilantes, many of whom belonged to the leading football supporters' groups. Discussing their motivations, *Delije* leaders noted that "Serbdom stands above all else for us, so we participated in that protest because of our national feelings" (Olujić 2008, 43). The Kosovo issue has been highly visible in stadiums since the war of 1998–1999, which culminated in the NATO bombing of what remained of Yugoslavia. The ensuing UN Security Council Resolution 1244 called for "substantial autonomy" for Kosovo, while reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This would be a key element of the subsequent Serbian legal case. Yet, as the province passed under the interim administration of the UN, it appeared unlikely that its Albanian majority—around 90% of the population—would ever accept a return to Belgrade rule (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 15–16). Nevertheless, both before and after the 2008 declaration, football banners and chants have consistently underlined Serbian claims. Serbian flags in the shape of the geographical outline of Kosovo are reproduced on t-shirts and other supporting paraphernalia.

Ironically, the most notorious incident to draw attention to the issue in recent years was not instigated by Serbs. During a 2014 international match between Serbia and Albania in Belgrade, a drone was piloted over the stadium, beneath which a large banner depicted an image of a Greater Albanian state, inclusive of Kosovo. This innovative form of goading sparked a wave of violent incidents across the Balkans (Mandić and Sivački 2015, 275–277).

The *Delije* have used their magazine in an attempt to educate members and mobilise them in defence of Kosovo. Detailed polemical articles discuss the historic, spiritual and emotional importance of the province. In the process, the territorial losses of the 1990s cast a long shadow and serve as a warning:

> If we consider how quickly we renounced and forgot about southern Serbia (the contemporary Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Republika Srpska Krajina (in today's Croatia), and how many are prepared *to write off* Montenegro and Republika Srpska as well, then we can't but worry about the future of Serbian Kosovo and Metohija. Many of our Belgrade citizens don't know that Skopje used to be the capital of the Serbian Empire before today's nation, who – in FYR Macedonia – have been left beyond the borders of their motherland, in a holy place which the Nemanjić dynasty built on this historic Serbian land. Will such a fate also happen to us with Kosovo and Metohija in the near future? (Delije 2008, 42)

The publication warned of an alleged global media campaign of misinformation, designed to belittle Serbian claims to Kosovo in favour of the "Albanian (*šiptarski*) terrorists". Given the severity of the situation, measures needed to be taken to resist the loss of the most sacred Serbian lands:

> We can't direct state politics, by instigating a war for the liberation of our occupied land, neither can we do anything of significance which will reverse the situation for the better over night. But we can't look the other way either, remaining silent and allowing them to dispossess us of our territory, to watch our nation suffer as our holy sites disappear in flames. We can't remain silent and do nothing. (Delije 2008, 42)

A year later, football supporters could be proud of their endeavours to spread the "truth" among fellow Serbs and across the world. *Srpski navijač* (Serbian supporter) (2009, 16–19) informed readers that "If all Serbs worked as much as the supporters, our side of the story would be heard

much further afield, as oppose to all of those lies about Serbia which have overwhelmed the world".

Despite the nationalist rhetoric, groups with reputations for violent hooliganism, intolerance and political extremism have done much for Kosovo's embattled Serbs. The *Delije* organise an annual fund-raising concert. For the 2008 event, their banked North terrace became an auditorium, as 7000 people attended a gathering steeped in symbolism. The line-up featured stars of the Serbian rock and pop scenes and a choir from Kosovo. Their rendition of the national anthem, *Bože pravde* (God of Justice), provoked "a storm of emotion" among a crowd who heightened the atmosphere with flares and chants drawn from their own repertoire. The whole affair was blessed by the Bishop of the Ras and Prizren Eparchy (which encompasses Kosovo), while a hundred children from the Serbian enclaves of Kosovo and Metohija were welcomed as special guests (Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva 2008). The *Delije* subsequently sought the advice of church leaders in determining how best to direct the substantial takings. Monasteries, soup kitchens and vulnerable individuals were among the beneficiaries. *Pravoslavlje* publicised these humanitarian actions in an attempt to downplay the *Delije*'s propensity for violence and present another aspect of their collective identity:

> Later, in the year 2000, when we started to comprehend the Orthodox faith and Serbdom in the correct manner – that is, not just that "I celebrate our feast day (*slava*) and go to church twice a year" … – the idea emerged for us to help the Serbian nation in Kosovo and Metohija. At that time, literally five people set out with five bags. (Olujić 2008, 42)

Since those humble beginnings, the group have made multiple visits to "the heart of Serbia". Keen to avoid accusations of being insufficiently patriotic, Serbia's other supporters' groups have also flocked to Kosovo's aid. *FK Vojvodina*'s *Firma* raised money and collected clothing, which they delivered personally. While in Kosovo, the group purchased firewood for an isolated Serbian village, visited soup kitchens and the Gračanica monastery (Firma 2013). Football clubs and the Serbian Football Association (*Fudbalski savez Srbije*, FSS) also engage in humanitarian actions. In 2016, the latter hosted a group of Kosovo Serb children, providing accommodation and laying on excursions as part of an "unforgettable experience" (Blic 2016).

In 2009, the leading supporters' groups travelled to Gračanica to partake in a memorial tournament. Held to commemorate the 2004 murder of a local Serb by an Albanian extremist, the event provided a platform for

supporters to gather in Kosovo. They were joined by eleven foreign supporters' organisations, all of which were sympathetic to Serbia's territorial claims. Alongside the football, these groups—from Russia, Poland, Greece and elsewhere—joined their Serbian counterparts in laying wreaths and praying at the monastery. Many of the participants were accommodated in monastic lodgings, while they were hosted for dinner by the local bishop, priests and monks. The sight of churchmen and supporters—many of whom have a justifiably poor reputation in wider Serbian (and European) society—convening over food highlights the extent to which Kosovo serves as a common cause. In the same year, many attended the annual commemoration of the legendary 1389 battle. Decked out in football paraphernalia, and armed with flares and Serbian flags, these predominantly male youths attended religious ceremonies in large numbers: "Without a single excess, not even the smallest, the supporters of many clubs, who visited the sacred Serbian land on that day, showed a high level of national and Christian consciousness" (Srpski navijač 2009, 19). Such actions had a reaffirming effect, providing groups with a reason to exist.

Alongside these supporters' group activities, football is harnessed as a direct means of underlining continued Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo.[6] Developments in the Serb-held North offer striking parallels with earlier Serbian uses of the game during the Bosnian War. At the beginning of the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians effectively established a "parallel state" in the face of escalating Serb repression. This symbolic withdrawal was reflected in football. The growing division between (and within) clubs harbouring Serbian and Albanian identities became a rupture with the war of 1998–1999. After Kosovo's independence declaration, Serbs living in the wedge of territory North of the Ibar River took concrete steps to distance themselves from the self-proclaimed independent authorities in Pristina. Supporters' groups were directly involved. The local Zvečan branch of the *Delije* was joined by fellow supporters from Belgrade in an action to seize the town's police station. Balaclava-clad youths also torched hated border posts as part of the unrest (Delije 2008, 44). Official figures are unavailable, but it is estimated that over 90% of the region's circa 70,000 inhabitants are ethnic Serbs. In defiance of Pristina's declaration, the region established its own political assembly and observers discussed a possible partition (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 6). However, Belgrade cooled its support for parallel institutions as part of the Brussels Agreement of 2013, which aims to integrate Serb majority municipalities into the Kosovo legal system.

In the midst of this tense political wrangling, Serbian football clubs from Kosovo—particularly those from the North—continue to represent the

province in FSS competitions.[7] At the time of writing, *Mokra Gora* from Zubin Potok compete at the third tier of the Serbian game, while their counterparts *Trepča* Kosovska Mitrovica play their football one level below in the regional fourth division (Morava Zone) (Srbijasport.net 2016a, b). In addition to these larger clubs, many other teams belong to the Football Association of Kosovo and Metohija, one of five constituent associations of the overarching FSS. Most of them participate near the foot of the Serbian football pyramid. Alongside the Kosovska Mitrovica District League (*Okružna liga Kosovska Mitrovica*) in the Serb-controlled North, Serbian clubs operating South of the Ibar compete in the Kosovo District League (*Kosovska okružna liga*) and the Kosovsko Pomoravlje District League (*Okružna liga Kosovskog pomoravlja*) (Srbijasport.net 2017a, b, c).

The winners of the Kosovo and Metohija Cup earn the right to represent the province in the Serbian Cup. This latter competition provides an opportunity for Kosovo Serb footballers to face elite opponents. In 2014, *Trepča* hosted *Vojvodina*, while two years later they travelled to Užice to play *FK Sloboda* (Freedom). This compact community evidently places much value on its continued membership of the Serbian family. Referring to its success in qualifying for the 2016–2017 Serbian Cup, *Trepča* announced: "we are proud that we will have the opportunity to represent not only our club and city, but the whole of Kosovo and Metohija, and to demonstrate in that manner that we will always be a part of the Serbian Football Association" (Radio Kontakt Plus 2016).

Aside from their visible presence in Serbian competitions, another parallel with the 1990s concerns the ethnic fracturing of particular clubs. When war broke out in Bosnia, rival incarnations of Sarajevo's leading teams emerged on both sides of the frontline (Mills 2014, 22–23). In Kosovska Mitrovica, this phenomenon has been repeated. During the Yugoslav era, *Trepča* was a multi-ethnic club that enjoyed some success. The team was promoted to the First League in 1977 and, in the following year, became the only Kosovo club to reach the Marshal Tito Cup Final. Now, multiple teams claim continuity: North of the Ibar River, the town's Serbs have *FK Trepča*, while the Albanian *KF Trepça* lies to the South. As the original club's stadium is also South of the river, the Serbian incarnation found itself homeless and plays in nearby Žitkovac.

When UEFA recognised Kosovo, *Trepča* released a defiant statement: football's European governing body was "a criminal organisation" whose ruling would be ignored. *Trepča* announced its intent to carry on in "our parent Football Association of Serbia" and its League structure (Fudbalska zona 2016). The FSS was of the same opinion. On the eve of the 2016 FIFA

Congress, which followed UEFA's lead, the FSS's vice president made his organisation's stance clear:

> One must bear in mind that in accordance with the valid UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo and Metohija is part of the Republic of Serbia, under United Nations administration. Football clubs (with Serbian players) from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija are incorporated into the football structure that is under the jurisdiction of the FSS. The question arises as to how these clubs will exist in the future, and how they will compete. (B92 2016a)

Protests were also lodged at a more modest level. In September 2016, the Kosovo national team played its first competitive international match, a World Cup qualifier against Finland. The proprietor of a northern Mitrovica betting shop refused to recognise this newly acquired football independence, defiantly listing the fixture as: "Finland v Kosovo is Serbia" (S. N. 2016). This new national team will not receive the support of Kosovo Serbs. Indeed, until 2011 Mitrovica-born Miloš Krašić was a proud member of the Serbian national team.

5   Conclusion

The Serbian game has been shaped by political upheavals and fluctuating borders ever since the first ball was imported 120 years ago. It has also served to reinforce or challenge the political status quo, particularly with regard to international frontiers. Even shorn of Kosovo, contemporary Serbia is not a homogenous entity. There too, football continues to present competing visions for "Serbian" territory. Serbs constitute just 16% of the population of Novi Pazar: the vast majority of this southern town's citizens self-identify as Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims in the ethnic sense) (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2011).[8] During the Yugoslav era, many in Novi Pazar rallied behind Belgrade's leading clubs, but the process of ethnic homogenisation within the *Delije* and *Grobari* alienated this community (Torcida Rebels Novi Pazar 1990). Increasingly, they focused their loyalties upon the local team: *FK Novi Pazar*. While the club is a multi-ethnic organisation, for many it is a symbol of Serbia's Bosniak community (Morrison and Roberts 2013, 241–242). Slurs directed at the club by groups across Serbia have accentuated this.

When *Crvena zvezda* visited Novi Pazar for a League match in August 2016, a section of the home fans indulged in ironic chants of "This is

Turkey!" and "Kosovo is next to Serbia!" The *Delije* responded with offensive slogans of their own. The bad-tempered match was halted for twenty minutes, when rough play resulted in seats being hurled at the *Crvena zvezda* bench (B92 2016b). Due to delicate interethnic relations, these incidents immediately assumed political importance. Accepting that fans were prone to offensive outbursts, the Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić stated:

> It pained me that they shouted "Vučić is a faggot" the most quietly. Much louder were their shouts of "Kill, slaughter, so that Serbs will not exist", and songs about (Bosniak war hero/criminal Naser) Orić, just as the others sang "Kill, slaughter so that the Turks will not exist". This has to stop, because Serbia is a country for all of its citizens. (B92 2016c)

The reactions of the clubs highlight the vast chasm that separates them. *Crvena zvezda* unequivocally blamed their opponents:

> *FK Novi Pazar* served as a firing range for the promotion of nationalism and chauvinism, and it is a fact that at the elite level of our football, the club has enabled messages with such content to be heard loud and clear. (…) Some are obviously unaware of which country they live in and endeavour to nullify and belittle it at every opportunity. … Nobody is preventing fans from supporting *Novi Pazar*, but it looks as though some have decided that it is more important to be against *Crvena zvezda* and Serbia. (FK Crvena zvezda 2016)

By contrast, the hosts drew attention to the provocative nationalist behaviour of visiting Serb fans and poor refereeing (B92 2016d).

Ongoing developments in Kosovo and southern Serbia, as well as the fragile nature of neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, suggest that little has changed since the Serbian government announced a crackdown on football extremism in 2009. Serbian football and the Serbian state have rarely shared the same external boundaries; the former continues to map onto the ethnic nation more faithfully than the latter.

Notes

1. Buli suffered the same fate as most of Serbia's Jewish community: he was murdered during the Nazi occupation (Todić 2006, 18–19).
2. Stefan Dušan, Tsar of Serbs and Greeks, conquered a large swathe of the Balkans for the fourteenth-century Serbian Empire.
3. Author's observations, 2007–2009.

4. Nielsen (2010, 94–95) documents seven fan deaths between 2005 and 2010, while there have been more in the intervening years (Nielsen 2014, 98–100).

5. The war criminals in question include Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović, and Bosnian Serbs Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. Author's observations, 2007–2014.

6. Events on the South side of the Ibar River, and the importance of sport in Kosovo's quest for diplomatic recognition, have been examined elsewhere (Brentin and Tregoures 2016). The experiences of the residual Serbian population offer a rather different perspective.

7. As they had before 2008 (Todić 2006, 252–255).

8. Since Yugoslavia's collapse, Muslim politicians in the Sandžak region have pressed—unsuccessfully—for some form of autonomy (Morrison and Roberts 2013).

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Ukraine

Olga Ruzhelnyk

The development of football movement in Ukraine has been taking place under the influence of different political systems and events. The existence of football in the Soviet era was determined by the influence of the political organisations of the USSR, such as the Komsomol, the Soviet trade unions and the Communist Party itself. Politicisation was taking place "from the top", i.e. football fans were a passive subject in the political sphere. However, with the change of political system, the level of politicisation and political activity of football fans has changed. Nowadays Ukrainian football fans are playing a very important role in the political life of the country—they were one of the driving forces of Euromaidan,[1] and they are taking an active part in hostilities and pro-Ukrainian civil actions. Thus, they have become an active actor in the political system of Ukraine, i.e. politicisation is taking place "from the bottom". The following change occurred—if originally the political system was influencing football fans, today football fans have an impact on the political system. Thus, a bidirectional process takes place— the politicisation of football-related sphere and the footballisation of political sphere. How has it happened?

O. Ruzhelnyk (✉)
Institute for Social Sciences of Politics, University of Paris Nanterre,
Nanterre, France

1   Political Origins of Football

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the first football teams appeared in many cities of the Russian Empire, including Ukraine, which was, at that time, under the rule of the Russian Empire. In large Ukrainian cities, following Moscow, sports circles of football enthusiasts began to emerge, matches began to be held, and football as a game started to be popularised in every way among the local population (Soroka 2012, 44).

As for the rules, the football matches of that time were quite unserious in following them. Players fought for the ball ruthlessly between their opponents, being knee-deep in the mud and playing harsh and peremptorily at times. Football players often left the fields with broken teeth, noses, arms and legs. The ball was rarely on the ground, most of the playing time flying through the air from player to player, from one half of the field to another. Such game was considered the top of skill. As for attackers, it was considered the highest valour for them to push the ball into the goal with the goalkeeper. Goalkeepers rarely caught the ball in their hands, trying to simply hit it away with legs or hands. At the same time, it was considered to be a special skill for the goalkeeper to hit away the flying ball with his fist towards the centre of the field or by kicking the ball from above. Hits, kicks, trips and even rugby-style grips were not considered a violation of the rules, rather a manifestation of real sporting character, courage and athleticism (Soroka 2012, 45). It was this kind of football that Ukraine first saw.

At the origins of the game in Ukrainian cities were mainly foreigners who were working or residing on its territory. For example, Englishmen working in Odessa became such enthusiasts. They created the first football club—"Odessa British Athletic Club" (OBAK). OBAK for a long time consisted exclusively of the Englishmen, and in addition to matches among themselves, the club's players held annual meetings with the team of the Romanian city of Galati. However, in 1899, the club had its first local players—Piotrovsky and Kryzhanovsky, who subsequently established the Odessa "Sporting Club" (Galinskiy 2005, 21).

Similarly, the situation developed in other southern industrial cities. The football movement in Nikolayev can be considered the same age as football in Odessa and very quickly became popular in this port city thanks to a large number of foreigners. Already during the first years of the twentieth

century, matches had been held there between English sailors and enthusiasts among the locals (Dvoynisyuk 1997, 11).

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the football movement has acquired all the signs of mass movement, i.e. the matches started to attract more and more spectators, as well as more and more football clubs started to appear, and not only in the port cities inhabited by a large number of foreigners. During the first decades of the new century, football clubs appeared in many cities of Ukraine. The initiators of their creation were mainly young people, high school and university students. Following Odessa and Nikolayev, the football movement appeared in Kiev. The first Kiev team "Yug" ("South"), created in 1902, although consisted mainly of Czechs, was not just a closed club for foreigners—the team included a number of indigenous people of Kiev (Soroka 2012, 50). Such picture was common in the East and in the Centre of Ukraine, which was part of the Russian Empire at that time.

As for the West of the country, here the passion for football began to develop rapidly, in the cities of Eastern and Central Ukraine, the British brought a football fashion. At the end of the nineteenth century, Lviv, a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the time, quickly became one of the centres of football life in Western Ukraine. In this city, the first documented match took place with the participation of the team composed of Ukrainian players. This happened on 24 July 1894 during the second congress of the Ukrainian sports club "Sokol" ("Falcon"), and this team from Lviv met a team from Krakow (Kobrin and Mikhalyuk 2005, 14).

Considering initially football clubs united in themselves mostly the representatives of a certain social group, like intellectuals, after the end of the First World War on the territory of Western Ukraine, they were increasingly created on the basis of national, religious and political principles. For example, to attract the voice of youth in elections, the Social Democrats created gymnastic associations and the People's Socialist Party supported the club "Sokol". Ethnic sports communities were also common; for example, sports circles "Hakoah" and "Kadima" were created under the aegis of the Jewish community, and the Ukrainian community created the sports society "Plast" (Soroka 2012, 71).

As for the part of Ukraine that turned out to be a part of the Ukrainian SSR, it should be noted that the new Soviet government adopted the position that the development of physical culture and sports of workers is one of the most important state tasks. Considered as a relic

of the past, the bourgeois football clubs began to be gradually disbanded, and in their place, sport clubs on the basis of plants and factories workers were established. The same situation took place in Western Ukraine, after its incorporation into the USSR, and the teams of the Soviet sports societies came to the place of former clubs: "Dynamo" (uniting the employees of the security forces, primarily the Cheka and the NKVD), "Spartak" (workers of services and culture sectors), "Lokomotiv" (railway transport workers, etc.).

In the Soviet period, there was a very close link between football and national and even nationalist views. Soviet authorities, naturally, fought all the nationalistic signs in football. Let's take as an example an extract from the newspaper *Proletarskaya Pravda* (Proletarian Truth), Kiev, on 3 July 1923, where the correspondent V. Bera wrote: "Sport is for working youth … Not like in the club 'Maccaby'… which retained some of the old nationalistic habits. Being the second district sports centre, it could not spread its nationalist propaganda among the whole mass of workers, and therefore its old organisers gathered around it a football section with up to twelve teams, which is over 130 people, among whom there is not a single Jew. During the entire spring season of League football matches, the team of 'Maccaby' club … comes out on the field in its old form of national-Jewish colours - white and blue. Often attending matches, I have heard the angry remarks of workers and Red Army men about this fact. Thus, it cannot continue like that".

Repressions by the authorities in relation to football clubs, which had a connection with the national Ukrainian movement, continued throughout the history of the Ukrainian SSR. For example, the football club of "Karpaty" (Lviv) was almost liquidated by their merger with the Lviv army team. In 1981, two teams represented Lviv in Soviet football: "Karpaty", playing in the 1st League and finishing on the eleventh place, and "SKA", finishing the season in ninth place in the fifth zone of the 2nd League. This situation did not satisfy the party leadership of the region. Therefore, at the beginning of 1982, the request for the unification of Lviv's teams "Karpaty" and "SKA" was sent to the Office of the Football Sports Committee of the USSR, with the "support" of the first secretary of the regional committee of the party V. Dobrik and the military leadership of the Carpathian region in the person of First Deputy Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General M. Abashin. The football players of "Karpaty" perceived this as a pressure on the team on a national basis. In his interview with *Ukrainsky Futbol*

(Ukrainian Football) in 1994, already after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lev Brovarsky, a team player of that time, said: "As for me, it was primarily a political action. 'Karpaty' was more than just a football team. It was like a symbol of movement, impoverishment, a national symbol. And very often it happened, especially after our big victories that the inhabitants of Lviv had poured out on the streets with national slogans. Of course, this could not have been appreciated by the region's leaders".

The same point of view was shared by another player Igor Kulchitsky in an interview with the same magazine: "This was the order of the first secretary of the regional committee Dobrik. He did not like the team—that is all. He did not like the fact that most players spoke Ukrainian".

Patriotic and nationalist views directly reflected on the fans of different teams. One could say that the basis of Ukrainian patriotism in the Soviet Union appeared in football stadiums in the 1960s. In 1961, FC "Dynamo" (Kiev) became the first non-Moscow club that won the Soviet championship in football. Thousands of Kiev fans, who were at that time at the stadium, set the newspaper "Soviet Sport" on fire. From the point of view of many supporters, since that time, football has become a mean of national self-identification.

Another example, the song named "*Жовто-блакитні наші прапори*/Yellow-blue is our flag" with a very clear pro-Ukrainian patriotic connotation was written in the 1970s by fans of FC "Karpaty" (Lviv) and was later, in 1980, actively used by fans of FC "Dynamo" (Kiev). The song had very provocative phrases by the standards of that time, like "*Буде Україна вільна*/Ukraine will be free" and "*Буде Ненька самостійна*/Our motherland will be independent". Such pro-independence appeals were outrageous within the realities of Soviet Union of the Era of Stagnation and before the introduction of glasnost.

However, with the development of fan football movement in Soviet Ukraine in the 1980s, the connection between football and nationalistic political views became apparent. The economic problems of the Perestroika period caused discontent with the Soviet authorities. It provoked the spread of anti-Soviet and anti-Communist views. By the late 1980s, separatist sentiments, which were spreading in many Soviet republics, significantly affected the relationship between fans. In Ukraine, the "anti-Moscow" unit was formed, which included fans of FC "Dynamo" (Kiev), FC "Dnipro" (Dnipropetrovsk), FC "Karpaty" (Lviv), FC "Skonto" (Riga), FC "Zalgiris" (Vilnius) and other Baltic clubs.

 Football fans of FC "Dynamo" (Kiev) were the most numerous, and they, along with the Lviv fans, were characterised with the presence of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism.

> In 1985–86, we began to constantly sing on the stands: "Yellow-blue is our flag, we are invincible, the swords up!". There was a clear understanding: "Dynamo" is a Ukrainian capital club, and the fans of this club should be patriots, always protect the honour of the nation and club colours. (Pavlo, FC "Dynamo" fan)[2]

In 1989, at the Dynamo Stadium in Kiev, yellow and blue flags began to appear and the slogans "Kiev is Ukraine" began to be heard, and since 1990, the singing of the song, which will become later the anthem, before and during the match has become a tradition.

And in recent years, national symbols are increasingly used during the matches of football clubs within the Football League of Ukraine. And if we look today at the home games of the Ukrainian national team, we could see a total dominance of the national symbols: the support songs consisting mainly of Ukrainian national songs and fans dressed in Ukrainian national costumes. The football stadium, as well as football itself, becomes a place of active demonstration of national identity.

2   Historical Club Rivalries: From the "Anti-Moscow" Unit to the General Truce

One of the main features of the development of football fan movement after the collapse of USSR was the construction of a new system of relations between fans of Ukrainian clubs. The basis of the new system of relations in the Ukrainian football community was the relationship with the Moscow clubs. Thus, a coalition was formed between the fans of FC "Dynamo" (Kiev), FC "Dnipro" (Dnipropetrovsk) and FC "Karpaty" (Lviv), which was based on the "anti-Moscow" block mentioned above. Central opposition was a confrontation between football fans of FC "Dynamo" (Kiev) and FC "Chernomorets" (Odessa), initiated by the fans of the capital club in 1988 and motivated by friendly relations of Odessa fans with Moscow fans, namely of FC "Spartak" (Moscow). This is how one fan of FC "Dynamo" (Kiev) recalled it:

> The opposition with "Chernomorets" began in 1988, when in Kiev, under the aegis of the Komsomol, a gathering of football fans from all over the Union

took place. Odessa thought and said literally: "It's better to be beaten once in Kiev than five times in Moscow" (during the season they played with us once, and in Moscow – five). For Kiev it was enough - the fans of "Chernomorets" were publicly identified by "Moscow prostitutes", their leader got a spit in his face … Battle actions began in 1989. (Almashyn 2006, 26)

The opposition between the fans of FC "Metalist" (Kharkiv) and FC "Dnipro" (Dnipropetrovsk) started also during the Soviet period (in the mid-1980s), and there were some rather ambiguous reasons.

Why we started the fight with "Dnipro", no one can say for sure. There is a main version: "Dnipro" purposely lost one of the games in the USSR championship and "Metalist" flew out from the first division. There is also a story that "Dynamo" told "Dnipro" that we called "Dnipro" shit… Whatever it was, but in the mid-80s we had the first fight with "Dnipro" (Vladislav, 52, FC "Metalist" fan).[3]

The rivalry of Kharkiv and Kiev was temporarily suspended in the second half of the 1990s on the initiative of Kiev fans due to joint actions on the side of the national team, but in the mid-2000s it was continued again.

We have always had complicated relations with "Dynamo". They could not forgive us for our club colours. Like, we disgrace the yellow-blue colours by our friendship with "CSKA" Moscow. I do not remember when exactly, in the mid-90s I think, we came with a group of 40, by today's standards - it would be 200 men, and they were standing across the road and were afraid to jump at us. And in 1997 their youth met us in Kiev with a proposal of friendship, but every time some moron talked about the coming war (Konstantin, 42, FC "Metalist" fan).[4]

The rivalry between the fans of "Metalurg" (Zaporizhzhya) and Kiev started in 1991. From an interview with Kiev football fan:

At first, there was a small conflict in the capital. We were joined by our allies from Dnipropetrovsk to our away-game with "Metalurg", and they started fighting. We joined them. As a result, "Metalurg" fans were forced to flee (Almashyn 2006, 27).

For a more or less understandable picture, let's define an approximate list of friends and enemies of the national fan scene that was valid throughout the post-Soviet period of development of Ukrainian football:

	FC "Dynamo" Kiev	FC "Shakhtar" (Donetsk)	FC "Dnipro"	FC "Chernomorets" (Od essa)	FC "Karpaty" (Lviv)	FC "Metalist" (Kharkiv)	FC "Metalurg" (Zaporizhzhya)	FC "Arsenal" (Kiev)	FC "Vorskla" (Poltava)	FC "Tavria" (Simferopol)
FC "Dynamo" Kiev	×	Enemies	Friends	Enemies	Friends	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies	Neutral	Neutral
FC "Shakhtar" (Donetsk)	Enemies	×	Enemies	Neutral	Neutral	Enemies	Enemies	Neutral	Friends	Neutral
FC "Dnipro"	Friends	Enemies	×	Enemies	Friends	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies	Neutral	Friends
FC "Chernomorets" (Odessa)	Enemies	Neutral	Enemies	×	Enemies	Friends	Enemies	Neutral	Friends	Neutral
FC "Karpaty" (Lviv)	Friends	Neutral	Friends	Enemies	×	Neutral	Enemies	Neutral	Enemies	Neutral
FC "Metalist" (Kharkiv)	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies	Friends	Neutral	×	Enemies	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
FC "Metalurg" (Zaporizhzhya)	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies	×	Enemies	Enemies	Enemies
FC "Arsenal" (Kiev)	Enemies	Neutral	Enemies	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Enemies	×	Neutral	Neutral
FC "Vorskla" (Poltava)	Neutral	Friends	Neutral	Friends	Enemies	Neutral	Enemies	Neutral	×	Neutral
FC "Tavria" (Simferopol)	Neutral	Neutral	Friends	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral	Enemies	Neutral	Neutral	×

For the most part, the following reasons were the basis for mutual hostility:

- the territorial proximity of the teams (e.g. rivalry between FC "Shakhtar" (Donetsk) and FC "Zoria" (Lugansk), FC "Karpaty" (Lviv) and FC "Volyn" (Lutsk));
- hostility that has developed historically (e.g. the opposition of fans of FC "Metalurg" (Zaporizhzhya) and FC "Tavria" (Simferopol), which began in Soviet times, when the Zaporozhian champions of Ukraine defeated "Tavria" with the score of 8: 0);
- the traditional rivalry between titled teams (e.g. FC "Dynamo" (Kiev) and FC "Shakhtar" (Donetsk) as the two most famous Ukrainian teams with the largest number of supporters);
- a rivalry caused by the event (e.g. the relations of FC "Shakhtar" and FC "Metalurg" became conflicting in nature after the unexpected attack on the fans from Donetsk by the fans from Zaporizhzhya).

It is possible to identify Ukrainian clubs that had the greatest number of enemies. FC "Dynamo" (Kiev), as the "face" of Ukrainian football, had both the largest army of supporters throughout the country and the largest army of enemies. FC "Shakhtar" (Donetsk) had a very solid list of enemies. Fans of other teams were set against this club because of the large number of legionaries in the team.

In contrast to the rivalries, there are examples of good relations between fans of different teams. The following friendly groupings of fans can be mentioned: FC "Vorskla" (Poltava)—FC "Chernomorets" (Odessa)—FC "Shakhtar" (Donetsk), FC "Volyn" (Lutsk)—FC "Metalurg" (Zaporizhzhya)—FC "Metalist" (Kharkiv), FC "Illichivets" (Mariupol)—FC "Metalurg" (Zaporizhzhya)—FC "Karpaty" (Lviv). Friendly relations were manifested in the fact that fans of friendly teams can freely come to the away matches to each other, without fear to openly walk the city with the symbols of his club.

However, everything changed in the autumn of 2014 during Euromaidan.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: Ukrainian Football Fans, Nationalism and Mobilisation

On 20 October 1987, FC "Dynamo" (Kiev) played against FC "Spartak" (Moscow). The first clashes between Kiev and Moscow fans began before the meeting in the city centre of Kiev. The defeat of "Dynamo" in its field

provoked even greater unrest. Thus, the most massive fight of football fans in the Soviet Union occurred at the Central station in Kiev—500 local fans and 300 fans of "Spartak" took part in this fight causing many injuries on both sides and seriously damaging the station (Babeshko 2010, 242). This is how one football fan from Kiev remembers this event:

> Kiev, 20 September 1987. "Dynamo" – "Spartak"… The Moscow press gave a zoological hysteria against our club, and there were incredible events on the football field and beyond. The tension literally hung in the air … Before the game there were no serious clashes, except for the Trinity Bath and local fights. Massive disturbances were caused by the result of the game - 1: 4, we lost. On your field! The reaction of the people: stones, bricks, bottles flew to the buses with "meat".[5] My friends and I came to the railway station and found ourselves at the epicentre of the events: the helpless police, flying bottles, stones, sticks, bricks… Full chaos. (Almashyn 2006, 23–24)

With the independence in 1991, the situation in Ukraine began to change gradually. The lack of regular meetings with stronger Russian clubs and their football fans has led to the gradual fading of interest in football and football-related practices. In conditions of a relatively small number of opponents among the Ukrainian football fans, the main enemy was the forces of law and order. Traditionally, in Ukraine, the police had a negative attitude to both local and foreign football fans, but in the late 1990s this antagonism grew into an open violent conflict. Formal reason for many clashes between fans and the police was the use of prohibited pyrotechnics at the stands. One of the first was the 1997 incident in Poltava, when Kiev fans had a fight with the police directly on the stands.

Each year, the number of such unrests was increasing. The active participants were Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa and other leading Ukrainian groups of football fans.

The active political position of the fans of FC "Dynamo" (Kiev) led to the fact that in March 2001, in Kiev, during massive street riots accompanied by clashes with the police and special forces, capital football fans were standing side by side with the opposition against President Kuchma.[6] Many participants were arrested and prosecuted.

In the same year, there were two events that significantly influenced the development of Ukrainian football fan movement. For the first time in the history, about 120 fans from different groups and cities have been at the stadium during the game against the national team of Belarus. The first indenters took place during the game of youth teams the day before the game

of the main national teams, but the main fight took place directly in the area of the "Olympic" stadium in Kiev. 80 Belarusian opponents opposed Ukrainian football fans. As a result of the use of improvised weapons during the fight, a large number of participants were seriously injured. The fight was stopped because of the intervention of the special forces "Berkut".

The fight in August 2001 was not less significant, involving hundreds of football fans from Kiev and Odessa. Shortly before the start of the football match in the very centre of the Ukrainian capital (in an underground passage under the Independence Square), a fight broke out between the teams' supporter. However, during which the parties did not use weapons according to the preliminary agreement.

The principle of "fair play" in Ukraine in the late 1990s turned into a certain set of rules for fights between football fans that was applicable to the vast majority of fights. This principle implied the following rules: do not use any weapon during a fight, do not hit an opponent who is lying on the ground, do not be violent against ordinary supporters of the opposing team (in the absence of provocations from them).

The formation of new forms of behaviour of Ukrainian football fans led to the emergence of a new practice, they called "levaky" (from the word "leviy" (левый)—left; "levak" is a slang word for "work done in off hours"), i.e. the violent actions aimed at "hostile" fans, which were carried out not on the day of the match of their teams.

Ukrainian football fans borrowed from the Polish and German football fans the practice called "zabivon". Given the great distance between the cities, only some of the leading fan movements of the country were capable of taking out a large number of fans; therefore, traditionally visiting football fan groups are much smaller than the hosting ones. In this regard, the practice of preliminary agreements on fights with an equal number of participants on both sides was widespread among the Ukrainian football fans. Another purpose of the "zabivon" was the combat testing of young members and new groups during the winter or summer break in the championship.

Due to the history of their development and current events (Euromaidan, war in Eastern Ukraine), the fans are extremely patriotic, even sharing nationalistic sentiments with the anti-Russian overtones.

Nationalistic ideas and far-right positions have an old presence among Ukrainian football fans long before the events of Euromaidan. There could have been the supporters of the pro-Russian views (e.g. some fan groups in Odessa who had had friendly relationships with Moscow football clubs), but after revolutionary events, this partition changed completely in favour of the pro-Ukrainian position of the fans.

Why is there the persistence of far-right views among fans? The answer can be quite obvious: the fan subculture is initially xenophobic. Fans of other clubs and the police are the targets of "legitimate" violence for football fans, the objects of their applied xenophobia. With a rather binary vision opposing the others to "us", the perpetuation of ostensibly nationalistic and racist ideas has taken root on this soil.

Why do some fans share far-right ideas specifically in Ukraine? Presumably, it depends on the prevalence of right-wing views among the general population (as a contrast-echo to the Soviet regime). More decisive thing is the more or less explicit tolerance of far-right temperaments and anti-Russian views on the part of the authorities, for example the ultra-conservative "Right Sector" party, the political party of far-right ideology "Freedom" and the radical party of Oleh Liachko, which are quite popular and influential in Ukrainian Parliament.

We can even say that football fans in Ukraine are the followers of ethno-nationalism, which has arisen as a response to social and political events in the country:

> We have a war in the country. And this is not a civil war, we have been attacked by another country. With this, they justify this attack by saying that we are not a nation, we are only a part of them, their offspring. Of course, it's a complete heresy. We are Ukrainians, we are a separate nation. We are united organically and we are different, we have our own culture, our own traditions, our own history. We are the people. I am ready to do anything for my people. (Dmytriy, 26, FC Metalist" fan)[7]

4   The Movement of Football Fans in Ukraine During and After Maidan

During Euromaidan's civil protests, the ultras were one of the forces actively participating in the confrontation. The laws passed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 16 January 2014 that violate human rights, including the rights of the fans' movement,[8] have caused an explosive effect among the protesters. From 19 January 2014, the ultras were involved in clashes on the streets, and they organised the opposition to those who are referred to by the term "titouchky".[9]

> We worked together with others. For example, a bus with titouchky leaves from Kharkiv, the guys call us and describe the bus, and we meet them here.

Or we divide into groups and search them in the city. Honestly, we have done everything we always did like it was the fans of the rival club, but here we are against titouchky. (Alexandr, 27, FC "Dynamo" fan)[10]

On 27 February 2014, Ukrainian fans signed a truce between the movements of all football clubs for an indefinite period. In the text of the statement, the fans mentioned the pressure of the police and government representatives on the movement of fans following declarations of their peaceful position. The leaders of the fan movements explained that the relationship between them should be "based on the principle that they are, first of all, Ukrainians. Thus, in the first place should be mutual understanding, trust and assistance". The alliance at the time of its announcement was supported by the fans of all the clubs of the first division and 21 groups of the second and third divisions and amateur League.

The truce between the ultras is still in force, therefore, there are no serious confrontations between football fans from different clubs.

In the opinion of all the fans with whom the interviews were conducted, the long-standing relationships of friendship and enmity have changed dramatically after the events of Euromaidan. For example, the rigid confrontation between the football movements of FC "Metalist" and FC "Dnipro" no longer exists. On the contrary, it is believed that "Metalist" and "Dnipro" will share a strong friendship.

We hated them. It was a frightening hate. I mean, I think it was a matter of time, which of us would be killed first. But after Euromaidan, we played football together, it was surrealistic. And after the guys from Dnipro have saved our guys in Illovaysk, we will never be enemies. (Artem, 27, FC "Metalist" fan)[11]

Nowadays, the meetings of these two movements are exceptionally friendly, even if there is an element of violent practices present. For example, occasionally there are initiation fighting between 10 young fans of FC "Metalist" (Kharkiv) fan movement and 10 young fans of the FC "Dnipro" fans movement. This practice of initiation was prepared by the leaders of both movements and had, according to the fans themselves, "a purely sporting character so that the guys can train".

Most of the fans were among the first who went to the Anti-Terrorist Operation (OAT)[12] zone after the beginning of the conflict. They mainly joined the voluntary battalions "Azov", "Aydar", "Dnepr-12" and "Donbass" and the volunteer unit "Pravyi Sector" ("Right Sector").

Fans, who do not take part in hostilities, are engaged in providing those who are in the front line of the conflict zone. They pay special attention to the "Azov" volunteer battalion, since it is the battalion with the largest number of fans.

> I was there from the beginning. There were about 50 people, 30 to 40 of whom were fans from different clubs, mainly from Dnipro, Kharkiv and Kiev. Then the number of fighters started to grow, but there were still a lot of fans. It has always been maintained at 50% in proportion, I think. (Radion, 24, FC "Dnipro" fan)[13]

It should be noted that the commander of the "Azov" battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrei Biletsky was also a head of the SNA organisations (the Social-National Assembly), which was located on the far right of the Ukrainian politics. The SNA was built around the "Patriot of Ukraine", a Ukrainian extreme nationalist organisation which could be considered as neo-Nazi (Shekhovtsov and Umland 2014, 61).

In the spring of 2015, the veterans of the "Azov" battalion created a civil-political movement of the right ideology named "Civil Corpus Azov". The objective of the movement is "the fight with internal enemies to pave the way for politics for young Ukrainian patriots". The "Civil Corpus" is the most popular organisation among young advocates of radicalism and the right-wing movement. The organisation's workforce is difficult to assess, but it exceeded the mark of 15,000 active members. From 1 January 2017, the "Civil Corpus" ceased to exist. It has been replaced by a political party "The National Corpus", which was founded in 2016. The party includes a large number of fans who took part in the hostilities within the "Azov" battalion.

5   Conclusion

Ukrainian football fans are formed into groups due to the specific history of their development. They are oppositional in their origin—they have been risen in the USSR, that is to say in an environment hostile to such phenomena. Initially, their existence did not imply only the confrontation between themselves (i.e. with other fans) and the police (the militia), but also the opposition to Communist governmental institutions (e.g. Komsomol), i.e. the state itself. Their anti-government position has continued in the independent Ukraine. This position has led to the reconversion of their actions according to the external conditions—under the influence of some external

factors (anti-government protests and manifestations, revolution, etc.), they are transformed into a combat unit. They transform themselves into the group that is led to make common cause despite its "tribal" functioning, re-arbitrate disputes and re-prioritise the group identity and national identity—the difference of "us" and "others" has reconfigured to bring out a broader "us" that subsumes the oppositions of the past in opposition to new "enemies" (police, government, Kremlin).

In Ukraine, national ideas and extreme right-wing positions have an old presence in the fan movement. During and after the revolutionary events, pro-Ukrainian nationalistic position of Ukrainian fans motivated them to take an active part in the action for the unity of the nation, thus creating a new image viewed by other Ukrainians. This image contributes to their acceptance and their transformation into active political actors in the new Ukrainian post-Euromaidan society, where activities in the political sphere are intensified and the far-right positions are revived due to the separatist activities in Eastern Ukraine and Russian aggression (Shekhovtsov 2014, 17).

Notes

1. Euromaidan was a *civil unrest* in *Ukraine*, which began on 21 November 2013 with public protests in *Kiev*. The protests led to the *2014 Ukrainian revolution*.
2. Interview made by author, March 2016, Kiev.
3. Interview made by author, August 2016, Kharkiv.
4. Interview made by author, August 2016, Kharkiv.
5. The nickname of FC "Spartak" fans.
6. Political action "Ukraine without Kuchma", during which fights with the police repeatedly occurred.
7. Interview made by author, July 2015, Kharkiv.
8. These laws include provisions on the possibility of opening criminal proceedings in absentia; the creation of criminal sanctions for blocking access to residential buildings; the prohibition of defamation; the prohibition of the unauthorised installation of tents, scenes and sound equipment; the prohibition of participating in peaceful gatherings by wearing masks, camouflage clothing, scarves, helmets or other means of concealing or protecting a face or a head; Internet censorship; the possibility of banning individuals from attending football games.
9. The term *titouchky* is commonly used to refer to criminals and gangsters suspected of being paid by the government. They are accused of forming an illegal combat formation, dressed in civilian clothes, whose objective is to

attack peaceful demonstrations opposing to the government and to attack the representatives of the media.

10. Interview made by author, March 2017, Kiev.
11. Interview made by author, March 2017, Kharkiv.
12. "The anti-terrorist operation" is the official denomination of The Donbass War, which is an ongoing armed conflict that began in 2014 during the Ukrainian crisis and takes place in the South-East of Ukraine.
13. Interview made by author, August 2016, Dnipro.

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Part IV

Africa and Middle East

Algeria

Mahfoud Amara and Youcef Bouandel

Football holds a distinctive and sometimes controversial place in Algeria. Its history and politics have mirrored the different phases that Algeria had undergone. In this chapter, we argue that football was used firstly as a tool to publicise the Algerian struggle for independence from France. In post-independence Algeria, it was used to further socialism and educate the masses, and lately as a tool to confer legitimacy on the regime in times of trouble post-Arab spring. In terms on content, the chapter discussed the political origin of football in colonial and post-independence Algeria, then examines political aspects of football as a sports spectacle, particularly in the 1990s in the midst of political violence. The last section is devoted to explore different levels of rivalries between football clubs in Algeria and beyond. The chapter concludes with an exposé of football as source of legitimacy.

M. Amara (✉)
Sport Science Program, College of Arts and Sciences, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
e-mail: mamara@qu.edu.qa

Y. Bouandel
College of Arts and Sciences, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
e-mail: ybouandel@qu.edu.qa

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1   Political Origins of Football in Algeria

The Founding "Myth" of Algerian Football

Football—the legacy of French colonialism in Algeria—has been Central in the nation-building process during pre-independence and even more in post-independence Algeria. We cannot examine the politicisation of football in Algeria without referring to the emergence of so-called Muslim clubs in twentieth century to counter the French colonial propaganda of Algeria's assimilation to France (the myth of l'*Algérie-Francaise or* French Algeria). Clubs such as *Mouloudia* (1921), *Club Sportif Constantine* (CSC) (1926), *Association Sportive Musulmane d'Oran* (USMA) (1932), *Union Sportive Musulmane de Sidi-bel-Abbès* (USMSB) (1933), *Union Sportive de la Médina d'Alger* (1937) and *Mouloudia Olympique de Constantine* (MOC) (1939) to name but a few were places for the formation of Algerian nationalist movements. The MOC, for instance, was founded by Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis, president of the Algerian Muslim *Ulama*, whose aim was to resist French occupation and raise the Algerian people's awareness about their identity and aspirations as Muslims. Indeed, a quick glance at the names emblems on these teams' shirt and colours reveals everything about their identity. The appellation of the teams outlined above gives them a special identity that is clearly distinct from the French one. *Mouloudia*, which refers to the birth of Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam, and *Musulmane* were common appellations of Algerian teams. The five-angled star and the crescent, which are easily identified with the Muslim faith, were emblems on these teams' shirt. Furthermore, white, red and green, which were adopted as the colours of the Algerian flag in the mid-1930s, were invariably worn by the majority of these teams. To be sure, Ben Badis chose the colour white as the official colour of the MOC he founded. These three colours, particularly white and green, it must be stressed, have a particular significance for Muslims.

Indeed, these clubs and the people associated with them, players, staff and supporters acted as intermediates between the different regions of the country. Nationalist leaders sought the help of these teams in order to strengthen nationalist drive for independence. This is despite the measures of colonial administration against "Arab Muslim" teams, which were perceived as a threat to the colonial project of French Algeria. Some of these clubs were simply banned or were forced to take European players to break up their nationalist drive. Indeed, in the mid-1930s, a colonial decree obliged these

Algerian teams to have at least five European players in an attempt to ensure inclusiveness (So Foot 2009). Despite these measures, the teams continued to have a distinct Muslim identity and their activities on the field were perceived as part of the struggle for independence. Thus, football helped to raise the political awareness of Algerian people regarding the realities of colonialism and the aspiration for independence. Stadia were a forum for political expression and a place to express peoples' pride in their teams, especially when the Muslim teams won. Indeed, in 1945, in a match between the Muslim team l'USM *de Ain Temouchent* and the European team of the city of *Bénisaf* in Western Algeria, supporters of the former team stunned everybody by singing the patriotic song "*min djibalina",* the lyrics (by Mohamed Al Aid Al-Khalifa) of which state:

> *Min djibalina tal'a3 sawt all ahrar younadina lil Istiqlal* (from our mountains came the voice of free men calling us to independence)
> *Younadina lil Istiqlal, listiqlal wantnina* (calling us for independence, the independence of our homeland)
> *Tadhiyatouna lil waten khairoun min el hayat* (our sacrifice for our homeland is better than life)
> *Oudhahi bi hayati wa bi mali a3layki* (I will sacrifice my life and my money for you (my country))
> *Ya bladi ya biladi, anti houbi wa hayati* (Oh my homeland, you are my love, you are my life)
> *Oukssimou bi Allah el A3dhimi, ana la ahwa siwaki* (I swear by al mighty God, that I love no one but you (my country))

The lyrics are unequivocal in calling Algerians to take up arms and fight French occupation. Independence of the country is the ultimate goal and no matter what the sacrifices are for this noble cause, it would be worth paying the price. The match came in the wake of the Second World War when France negated on its promise to grant Algeria its independence if Algerians fought on its side against Nazi Germany. The call for independence, it must be stressed, was a Central point in the Algerian People's Party, (*Parti du Peuple Algérien—PPA*) manifesto. Formed in 1937, under the charismatic leadership of Messali El Hadj, the party initially used peaceful methods against French occupation, but a combination of French repression against its activists and the realisation that only armed struggle would yield the expected results, several members of the party after it was outlawed, went on to form other organisations, such as the *Organization Spéciale* (Special Organisation—OS) and eventually the National Liberation Front

(FLN), that led the armed struggle against France in 1954. In a country where the level of illiteracy was high, the French administration was vigilant in its monitoring of clandestine nationalist activities. With an under-developed communication and transportation systems, football became a vehicle for spreading the nationalist message and a tool to mobilise people against colonisation. In this sense, stadia became theatres for political expression. Meetings on the football pitch represented the perfect opportunity for the Muslim teams to "beat" the oppressor. Winning a football game against the "enemy" had symbolic meaning to the Muslim teams and strengthened their identity and the cause they were fighting for. On 7 September 1954, a few weeks before the Algerian war broke on 1 November 1954, a football game between the French national team, including Raymond Kopa, faced a selection comprised of a number of players from French colonies in North Africa (mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), in the *Parc des Princes* in Paris. The proceedings of this friendly match were aimed to help the victims of the earthquake that hit the city Orleansville (known today as Chlef in Algeria). It was also an opportunity for France to prepare for its forthcoming friendly against former West Germany, newly crowned World Champion; and for players from the Maghreb to impress the French coach in order to be selected for the French team. Against all expectations, the team from North Africa, which included veteran Moroccan player Ben Barek and the Algerians Zitouni and Ben Tiffour, won the game by a comfortable score. "North Africa is stronger than France, that was what we heard in the terraces, then what we read in the newspaper" (Gastaut 2000). Despite the fact that this particular game was played for a noble cause, to help the victims of the earthquake, it provided militants in the three Maghrebin countries with the idea that united, the enemy could be defeated. Its seems that football succeeded where politicians had failed. The process of decolonisation in North Africa began in earnest.

With the take-off of the Algerian Revolution in 1954, FLN, the movement of the self-proclaimed leaders of the Algerian armed revolution, decided to boycott sport activities in Algeria and called for Algerian footballers to join the armed struggle. However, having understood the international dimension and impact of football, the FLN decided in late 1957, to establish the FLN national team (*Équipe* FLN) to represent the Algerian cause for independence internationally. A few months after the football team came into existence, the FLN leadership established the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA) in September 1958, based in Tunis. These moves suggest that the struggle for independence was fought on two fronts: domestically, through armed struggle and internationally,

through the diplomatic efforts of both the football team and the government. Football and politics went hand in hand in publicising the Algerian cause and winning new friends. This could be considered as a founding moment for independent Algeria's national sport system. The clandestine national team was formed by Algerian professional players in the French League, some of them such as Zitouni and Mekhloufi (the former together with another member of the FLN team, Ben Tiffour, was on the team that played against France in the Parc des Prince on 7 October 1954) were even selected to play with the French national team in the 1958 FIFA World Cup in Sweden. The fact that these iconic figures gave up further international exposure and realising every footballer's dream, to play in a FIFA World Cup tournament, gave the Algerian struggle for independence more exposure and the footballers more admirers. The players, while playing for French teams, still had connection with their country of origin and were concerned about the atrocities committed by the colonial system in Algeria. By conviction or fear of being shamed, these players decided to play their part in their country's long and bloody struggle for independence. After their tumultuous defection, the team, which took Tunis as its base, would play somewhere between 50 and 100 between 1958 and 1962. The games played were mainly against other Arab teams (e.g. Morocco, Iraq) and other teams from the Eastern Bloc including Vietnam and China. In addition to the technical skills displayed by this team, winning more than three quarters of the games played, the symbolic victory was the raising of the Algerian flag and the singing of the national anthem *Kassamen* before each game (Ross 2014).

Many stories, and myths, have been constructed around this team, which is usually represented as one and united, thus symbolising "the unity of the Algerian struggle", against "the enemy" of Algeria's independence. The narrative constructed around the team, which is being confronted today by members of the team themselves, is a reminder of how complex the process of nation formation is. For instance, the Egyptian national team refused to play against the FLN team because of the threat of the FIFA ban. It could also be the result of potential strained relations between the GPRA and Cairo. The latter, because of the perceived interference of Nasser in the Algerian war, decided in 1960, to move its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. This would partially explain the rivalry today between Algeria and Egypt. Despite the influence of Nasserism and the undeniable support to Algeria's nationalist movement, the rivalry is also between two competing nationalists ideologies in North Africa. Rhetoric on national formation in Algeria under the leadership of the FLN party, and its armed wing the National Liberation Army

(ALN), was geared toward the denial of individual histories, including the single sporting careers and experiences of individual players and their families, in favour of a collective history and memory. The people, under the direction of the FLN Party, were "the hero" of the Algerian armed and political struggles for independence. This shaping of sport in general and football in particular around the party-state system, and the so-called Algeria regime, continued after the independence.

Football and Socialist Algeria

In post-independence Algeria, football, like other societal aspects, was integrated into the FLN Party-State's project for nation-building founded around the principles of "authoritarian centralisation and the dissimulation of differences" (Stora 1998, p. 33). Algeria, from the 1960s to the 1980s, took the socialist ideology as its main doctrine for nation state formation as an attempt to break with the colonial past. In other words, it was the FLN's responsibility to ensure the hegemony of the state over society. One of its assignments was the coordination and orientation of the activities of the "masses", defined as "the social force of revolution", in every societal sphere, including in sport. To this end, identities of football clubs were constructed around the socialists' brands/symbols of national corporations which were also the main sources of funding for clubs. They provided social security for players and coaches who were also employees of these public companies. This was one of the measures taken by the state to uproot clubs from their local (often ethnic and regionalist) identities to reduce the level of regional rivalry and protect national cohesion. Despite some pockets of resistance to these measures, particularly among Berber population in the region of Kabylie, the financial support of the state for elite sport development produced good results for Algeria at continental and international levels (Amara and Houaoura 2015).

The victory of Algeria against France in the final of the 1975 Mediterranean Games hosted by Algeria, in the presence of President Houari Boumedienne in the 5th July stadium, represented a milestone in Algeria's strained relations with France. The Algerian president sent an envoy to the team's changing rooms reminding them that "the games were opened with *Kassamen*, the Algerian national anthem, and they should close with *Kassamen*". In other words, the game against France was a must win. A year later, the Algerian national football team won a gold medal in the African games, followed a few years later by the qualification of Algeria for the 1982

FIFA World Cup. The historic 2-1 victory against West Germany was celebrated as the result of socialist Algeria, that is to say "*Mina Echaab Oua Ila Echaab*", "for the people to the people". To be sure, the Algerian team, despite offers of a sponsorship from international sports manufacturers such as Puma and Adidas, opted for *Sonitex*, the national textile company. The front of the team's jerseys bore the country's name in Arabic; a testimony to the politics of Arabisation adopted a few years before. Just after the qualification, the Soviet head coach was replaced by an Algerian coach; Mohieddine Khalef. As explained by Fates (2009) there was a willingness of the Algerian state, following the model of socialist countries, "to confiscate the sporting affairs" (p. 21), at least in the 1970s and 1980s. Fates argues that "institutionally localised, as for other organisations representing civil society which were controlled by the state, sport became *an important national matter*" (emphasis added). The first stars of Algerian football such as Assad, Madjer and Belloumi, to name but of few, were represented in the controlled Algerian newspapers at that time, as pure products of the state's socialist reform of sport. In order to fight neo-imperialist, neo-colonial and mercantilist ideologies, Algerian football players were forbidden to sign professional contracts before the age of 28, without a special exemption from the Algerian football authorities, and sometimes from the president himself.[1] The generation of players that took part in the 1982 and 1986 World Cups was also called "the lost generation of post-independence Algerian football" because only a few of them made it to professional level despite the huge potential. This did not prevent the Algerian Football Federation to call Algerians of the diaspora and professionals such as Mustapha Dahleb (Paris Saint Germain), Noureddine Kourichi (Girondins de Bordeaux), Karim Maroc (Tours FC) and others to strengthen the national team. This caused many frictions within the team, or what was known as the divide between the Locals (amateurs) and the Others (professionals). In times of victory, the Algerian national team was portrayed in the Algerian media as truly Algerian patriots, the grand sons of "Équipe FLN". However, in time of defeat the "Others" (the sons of Algerian immigrants in France) were portrayed as "professionals", hence more interested in fame and money than honouring the Algerian flag. This friction continues even today, as most of the players selected in the current national squad are not playing in the Algerian national leagues, and most of them are born and raised in France. The situation of "double belonging" for Algerian diaspora is not always perceived in positive terms with regard to internal debate in France about national identity.

2   Historical Football Rivalries: Between Violence and Clandestine Politics

Despite the official discourse about national unity preached by Algerian political establishment, product of the struggle against colonialism, rivalry in football as in other countries and cultures is also the norm in Algeria. Indeed, this national unity can only be seen when the national football team is playing and the fans, with one voice, shouting, "*one, two, three, viva l'Algérie*". Apart from this, club rivalry is rife and has become more visible since the 1990s. The professionalisation of the sport along with the money injected by the government and the *nouveaux rich*es became important factors in the success of teams, allowing them to buy players who would guarantee such success. These rivalries can be seen as an expression of who the true representatives of the city are, for example, in cities that have more than one club such as Constantine, Oran and Algiers. They are also based on geographical areas, East vs. West, and Centre vs. Periphery within Algiers for instance. Certain clubs are not considered to be from Algiers, despite these clubs' assertions to the contrary. The rivalry could be a product of history as is the case of the *Union Sportive Médina d'Alger* (USMA) founded in 1937 to challenge Algiers' football supremacy of Mouloudia d'Alger, nicknamed (Nadi Al- Chaab) the "club of the people", founded in 1921. Both clubs claim and celebrate their roots from *l'Algerois (Algiers),* and particularly the heart of Algiers, which is *Bab El Oued, la Casbah and Soustara.* Inhabitants of these neighbourhoods claim to be *the true Algerois.* Although historically these neighbourhoods witnessed during the colonial and post-colonial era, a movement of populations including important community of European settlers, as well as migrants from rural areas and regions of Kabylie. For Mouloudia fans, the club represents the nationalist movement. USMA fans also explain how the colours of the shirt (black and red) symbolise the Algerian people. Mouloudia fans mock their rival as being "soft", calling them by women's names in their chants (the name Naima comes often). For USMA fans, Mouloudia supporters are quantity rather than quality, depicting them as "*Chanaoua*" (Chinese). China here is a reference to the number but also to the low and cheap quality of products, while USMA fans celebrate their small number, which represents quality and creativity. Quality in reference to their taste in clothing (top brands) and creativity in reference to their unique singing style. It is well known also that USMA supporters are also fans of AC Milan (the club share similar colours red and black), while Mouloudia supporters are fans of Juventus; Juventus being a dominant and prestigious club with a large fan base in Italy.

Having said this, and to further explain the complexity of fandom rivalry in Algerian football, and particularly in Algiers, both fans of Mouloudia and USMA can unite against the fans of El-Harrach, which is the football club of Algiers' periphery. The fans of El-Harrach are usually represented as "intruders". In other words, they are depicted as renegade, and as false *Algérois (not true inhabitant of the centre of Algiers)*. Although the notion of "the centre" here can change and be expanded or restricted depending on the levels of rivalry between clubs of the capital, Algiers, which in reality is becoming, as other capitals in the world, a cosmopolite with more than three million inhabitants and with extended transportation system of trams, metro and rails attaching the city to its periphery.

One could argue that rivalry (and sometimes animosity) between football clubs in Algeria is constructed around historical legitimacy, authenticity, territory, region and to lesser extent ethnicity, even though it is hard, ethnically speaking, to distinguish between Arabs and Berbers in Algeria, particularly in Urban settings. One could argue that the ethnical dimension has been played out, particularly after the Berber Spring in Kabylie region, to celebrate the difference of the region concerning its resistance of the so-called the Algerian regime and its anti-Berber policy, one the one hand, and anti-Arab racism among radical Berberist movements, on the other. The club JSK (Jeunesse sportive de Kabylie) was at the centre of this turmoil. This argument can easily be criticised as many strong figures of the Algerian regime (in politics and in the military) were born in the Kabylie region, and administrators of clubs in Kabylie region are known to be close to the political establishment, which is important to secure financial resources for the club.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

The economic crisis at the end of the 1980s transformed football stadia into political arena, as they were seen as symbols of the FLN state's failing authority and ideology. Between 1988 and 1991, with the collapse (momently) of the FLN hegemony and the emergence of new political parties as well as the revival of old ones (suppressed before by the FLN state), stadia became arenas for political mobilisation, and a space to display symbols in favour of political and cultural claims. Banners were deployed during football matches in favour for instance of political Islam by the followers of FIS (*le Front Islamique du Salut*), or the recognition of Berber language as an official national language along with Arabic by the sympathisers of secular

parties, RCD (*Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie*) and FFS (*Front des Forces Sociales*) (Amara and Henry 2004).

Flags of European countries were also displayed by young football fans to provoke the establishment and criticise the regime's control over the discourse on nationalism and the so-called supreme value of Algerian nation (*Tawabit El Oumma*). Football stadia turned into a space, as portrayed by Abdelkader Ensaad's fascinating documentary *L'Echo des stades,* where Algerian fans "could wear out and recreate a world according to their desires" (Ensaad 1998, in Amara and Henry 2004). In the midst of political violence in the 1990s, which caused the death and disappearance of thousands of Algerians, football was one of the few occasions to re-establish some "normality". It was also important for the Algerian authorities in its fight against so-called Islamist radicalism to maintain the football leagues running despite the threat of bombs and targeted assassinations, including those of football personalities. Among the victims of targeted assassinations was Rachid Haraigue, the president of the Football Federation, assassinated in his car on 21 January 1995. Condemned to death by the French during the revolution, and former player of CR Belcourt, he was also a militant of the party "Movement for the Republic" (Liberation 1995). A few months earlier, Ali Tahanouti, president of JS Bordj Menaiel was killed on 5 October 1994. Another victim of this violence was the famous football fan of CR Belcourt in Algiers who was killed in 11 June 1995. His name was Demihi Hocine, nicknamed by football fans as "*Yamaha*" (in reference to Yamaha motor cycle, popular among urban youth) (Amara and Henry 2004).

This blood-stained period witnessed the emergence of the first groups of *Ultras*. Their number mushroomed with the development of Internet and social media in Algeria. Learning from the experience of other football Ultras groups in Europe and in North Africa, they developed more sophisticated chanting and displays in and outside of the stadia. They compete with chanting, Tifos (creative display) and craquage (PyroShows or massive illumination of fireworks, flares and smoke bombs) in the streets and other symbolic places of cities and towns. These groups often take Italian names to associate themselves with the "authentic" Ultra's culture, but depending on the colour of the team they also take English or German names: *Fanatic Red, I Rossi Algerie; Ultras Red Lion; Loca Ragazzi; Ultras Vickings; Ultras Verde Leone; Ultras Mega Boys; Ultras inferno, to name by a few* (Amara and Houaoura 2015). They engage also with chanting pertaining to political, social and economic situations in Algeria and in the region (Amara 2012, p. 51). Their chants also target the political establishment and its business network, so-called *les nouveaux riches* who acquired wealth during the 1990s

mainly from import-import (rather than import-export as Algerians would joke). In other words, from importing general consumption goods from Europe and Asia (mainly China).

4   Football: A Source of Legitimacy

In the late 1980s, Algeria saw a transition to democracy that went horribly wrong. Throughout the 1990s, the country experienced a near civil war that had an impact on every aspects of daily life. Sports in general and football in particular were no exception. For more than a decade, Algeria's achievements in football were, at best, meagre, by comparison with previous decades. By the end of the 1990s, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power as the country, which had changed and been affected profoundly by what happened during the civil war, started to get back to "normality". The reforms that were introduced in the late 1980s put an end to socialism as the state's ideology and opened the way for a market economy. Several state-owned companies were either sold out or simply closed down because they were not making any profit. Football was not immune to these changes and *the system* turned professional. The government introduced generous tax breaks to businessmen who invested in football clubs. "Owners" of football clubs became very powerful figures in their communities. Nonetheless, the government continued to support these football clubs in different shapes and forms.[2] Furthermore, unlike the situation in the 1970s and 1980s, afraid of public gathering, the authorities decided that games involving the national team have invariably been played away from the 80,000 capacity 5 July stadium in Algiers. Despite the large support base of the national team, its games have been played in the 35,000 capacity Mustapha Chaker's Stadium in Blida, some 40 km West of Algiers, known to be a military zone.

For the first decade of his presidency, Bouteflika's achievements fell short of his promises and peoples' expectations. In November 2008, he amended one article in the Constitution that would have prevented him from seeking a third term in office[3] and in April 2009, he was re-elected again. The Algerian national team, composed mainly of players that graduated from different French football academies, was on course to secure qualification for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Bouteflika understood the power of football and used it to his advantage. Six months later, he was provided with the perfect opportunity to increase his esteem and support among the average Algerian. The final qualification game played on 14 November, in Cairo, was inconclusive. Egypt needed to win by at least a

three-goal margin to qualify, and a loss by one goal would have guaranteed Algeria's qualification. Algeria lost 2-0 and a final game to be played on a neutral ground would decide the winner. On 18 November, Oum Dorman in Sudan was the theatre to revive the old rivalry between Algeria and Egypt, not only in football terms, but also in political and strategic terms. After all, the game would decide who the only "Arab" representative in the World Cup would be; and both countries aspired to that honour. For Egypt, the game was an opportunity to confirm its perceived position as the most important player in the politics of the Arab word. For Algeria, it was an opportunity to challenge Egypt's perceived role, strengthen its national prestige and exposure and confer legitimacy on an authoritarian regime.[4] Given the proximity of Sudan to Egypt, the assumption was that Egyptian fans would outnumber their Algerian counterparts and that would be intimidating to the Algerian team and the few supporters that would be there, especially after the attacks on the Algerian team's bus in Cairo. To be sure, for the game in Oum Dorman, played less than two weeks before the Muslim *Eid El Adha*, Bouteflika ordered one of the biggest operations in modern Algeria. Within the space of three days about thirty flights, using civilian and military aircrafts were chartered. The speed and organisation by which Algerian fans were transported to Oum Dorman was meticulous as no efforts were spared to ensure the success of the operation. This even caught the attention of Israeli media (Molmen 2009).[5] On arrival, fans were provided with ruck sacks that contained sandwiches, drinks and snacks. Tents with beds were provided, and each fan was given the number of the tent and his bed.[6] The Algerian authorities even contacted their Sudanese counterparts to temporarily wave the visa requirements for Algerians entering the Sudan. Indeed, this game served as opportunity to show Arab unity and brotherhood, as far as Algeria and the Sudan are concerned, at their best. Many supporters travelled to the Sudan with just their identity cards and some of them with even their stamped birth certificates.[7]

The state-run television broadcasted the celebrations live throughout the country accompanied by a number of patriotic songs that emphasised the unity of the Algerian people. The president and his entourage began an orchestrated process to ensure that the qualification would serve their interests and confer legitimacy on a president who, about a year before, changed the Constitution so he could remain in power. The president was presented as a father figure who cared for his "children" and went out of his way to ensure that the team got the support it needed. His action led some to argue that qualifications for the World Cup were down to the president in the first

place. Regardless of what happened on the field, the team would not have qualified if it was not for his intervention. This was exemplified by the *Eid El Adha's* greetings exchanged between Algerians, a few days after the game in Oum Dorman, where they did not use the customary *Aidek Mubarak* (blessed Eid), preferring the *Aidek Bouteflika* instead.[8] To further play on the peoples' emotions, President Bouteflika, during a speech in front of certain representatives of the national sport community in Algeria, declared that his country would be able to host not just one FIFA World Cup tournament, but two.

In preparation for the tournament in South Africa, several adverts were aired on television. Perhaps the most significant one was the one representing a group of players of the 1980s led by former team captain Ali Fergani, giving the national flag to a group of players, led by captain Rafik Saifi. This advert suggests that responsibility is passed on from one generation to the other. While the team of the 1980s has done its part in honouring Algerian football,[9] it was now up to this new generation to carry on the torch. The advert suggested that the new generation was not only capable, but was also trusted with this mission. When asked about not being among the players that took part in the advert, a member of the team that played in 1982 stated: "I was contacted to take part in the advert, but I declined. I never felt that I had the torch and it was not mine to give away. I was just an instrument in the hands of the regime, used to advance the ideology of the power holders and their interests".[10] Another player stated, "I feel betrayed. They lectured about socialism and nationalism and these very same people had foreign passports. We were prevented from having professional careers in Europe. We were used".[11] A close look at Algeria's elite, civilian or military, reveals that the majority had passed retirement age in a country where the majority of the people are less than 40 years of age.

The Algerian national team went on to qualify for the 2014 FIFA World Cup tournament in Brazil. The same rhetoric was used to confer more legitimacy to the system in place. Not only was Algeria spared the chaos of the "Arab Spring" because of the president's vigilance, but under his tutelage the team was still making it to the biggest sporting events. In a message sent to the players, the president, whose last public speech was on 8 May 2012 and was hardly seen after that, described the team's qualification "as a national triumph" and his prime minister, Abdelmalek Sellal, reminded the players that the Algerian people were behind them and encouraged them to be united.[12] Furthermore, despite being absent from the scene, the president's entourage was quick to capitalise of the qualification. Public money

was used to subsidise fans who wished to make the trip to Brazil to support the team. In a bizarre move by the regime, it was decided that if the team progresses to the knockout stage, the government will pay for everything for the fans who are already there. One Algerian supporter told a reporter of the French news magazine, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, "Bouteflika is paying" (Chahine 2014). In Brazil, the Algerian team progressed past the group stage for the first time in its history. Commenting on Algeria's game against South Korea for the Qatari-owned beIn Sport, that earned Algeria a place in the last 16, the Algerian football commentator Hafid Derradji stated that the "legend" of the 1980s was dead and buried; the 2014 team surpassed the achievements of the 1980s team. Derradji, the then head of sport programme at the Algerian public channel before moving to Qatar, had simply attempted to justify and indeed legitimise the ready-made solutions adopted by these authorities: to import French players of Algerian decent to secure instant success. The success on the field served to mask the regime's failures in initiating policies to produce and develop local football talents and divert attention from the severe social and economic problems that the country was facing. Furthermore, the qualification to the World Cup and most importantly the team's progress to the knockout stage provided the regime with another opportunity to divert the public's attention from the daily headlines of corruption, terrorism and *herraga* (illegal immigration). Given the fact that the World Cup coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, as well as the time difference between Algeria and Brazil, the game against Germany was played during the fifth obligatory prayer of *Eisha* and the voluntary prayers of *Tarawih*,[13] presented Algerians with a moral dilemma. The regime was quick to lend a helping hand. The Ministry of Religious Affairs issued a *fatwa* that allowed to pray after the game.

5   Conclusion

It could be argued that football in Algeria has gone through three distinctive phases. The first coincides with the French colonial administration, where football was used as a tool (a) to raise people's awareness of the Algerian cause: colonialism should be fought and independence should be sought; and (b) to strengthen the Muslim identity of the Algerian people, which is distinctly different from France. The second period began after the independence in 1962 until the turn of the century. During that period, given the dominant socialist ideology, the state interfered in different aspects of

people's lives and football was no different. Football was used to educate people and advance the interests of the community at the expense of the individuals. Footballers, who were a product of the local teams, were not allowed to turn professional until they reached the age of 28. The aim was to ensure the development of a competitive local League. The majority of the players in the national team were, indeed, a product of the local football clubs, and the few players who operated in France were always scrutinised, at least by the fans, whether they were sons of *harkis* (those who collaborated with France during the Algerian war of independence) or Algerian-Others, i.e. Algerian immigrants in France with French-European culture. After, the civil war of the 1990s and the reforms that put an end to socialism as a state ideology, the country opted for capitalism. Football was no exception. Local football clubs were asked to turn to professional to follow the norm in international football. The policy of looking for nurturing and producing local talents no longer seemed to be the priority. Instant success with ready-made solutions took over. Hence, a campaign to enlist French players of Algerian descent became the norm and the majority of the players that participated in the 2010 and 2014 World Cup tournament were graduates of French football academies. The success of the team was used by the regime to confer legitimacy and to divert from the negative headlines that Algerian has been accustomed to over the past two and a half decades.

Rivalry between clubs also intensified over the last two decades, and this was fuelled by the amount of money available to clubs to buy players. Club owners were in a position to flex their financial muscles, and players were looking for the clubs that paid the most. This rivalry was much more vocal, and football stadia were not simply arenas for competition between football clubs, but were also spaces for rivalry between competing fans. In addition, the terraces seemed to have taken over the spectacle from the pitch. With, at best, an average League with average players, stadia became a forum for political participation and expression. For instance, some of the chanting during football games had nothing to do with the teams involved, rather reflecting the realities of Algeria's politics and society at large. This approach seemed to benefit all parties involved. On the one hand, the fans use these weekly gathering to voice their frustrations and dissatisfaction with the regime without fear of reprisal. The regime, on the other hand, is content that these activities are limited to the terraces of football stadia and do not spillover onto the streets. It also enables them to point to the fact that freedom of expression is allowed in the country, which is often a point that is held against it.

Notes

1. Indeed, President Houari Boumedienne (1965–1978) personally intervened to block Ali Bencheikh's proposed move to the French Club Nantes in 1978, after he scored the only goal in the final to help Algerian win the gold medal in the African games. Furthermore, it took the personal intervention of President Chadli Bendjedid (1979–1992) to allow Salah Assad to sign a professional contract with Mulhouse in 1982 after Algeria's first participation in the FIFA World Cup.

2. The state-owned oil company, *Sonatrach*, for instance, is the sponsor of the Algiers club Mouloudia.

3. It should be pointed out that the Algerian Constitution, adopted in November 1996, limited the president's tenure of office to just two mandate of five years each. Bouteflika came to power in April 1999 and was re-elected in 2004, under the provisions of this Constitution, was not eligible to run for a third term in 2009.

4. It should be pointed out that a number of academics, journalists, teachers and even some former players, interviewed in Algeria in the summer of 2009, expressed the wish that Algeria did not qualify for the World Cup. They stressed that they were patriotic and wanted to see their country participate in every major sports tournament, but were afraid that the authorities would use qualification for their own advantage.

5. "Forty-eight planes carried thousands of Algerians to the game, while Egyptian fans arrived on 18 planes, as well as via overland transportation". See Molmen, Y. (*Harretz*, 19 November 2009).

6. It should be pointed out that in winter 2011–2012, several parts of northern Eastern Algeria were covered in snow which led to the death of several people in remote areas. The authorities tried to help, but they fell very short of expectations. When asked to compare the efforts deployed in November 2009 and in winter 2011–2012, a high-ranking officer in the Algerian military was lost for words and agreed that they could have done better. Based on interviews in Algeria, February 2012.

7. This is based on several interviews conducted in Algiers with several Algerian supporters who went to Oum Dorman.

8. The game was seen as a personal triumph for the Algerian president, Bouteflika, and several Algerians did not use the word Mubarak (blessed) because it reminded them of the then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

9. It should be pointed out that Algeria, in its first World Cup tournament in Spain in 1982, came top of the group together with the former West Germany and Austria. The last group game between the former West Germany and Austria was, by all account a disgrace to integrity of football as the two teams ensure that the game ends in a score that would favour the

two teams to progress to the following round. As a result, FIFA changed the rules and the last game of the group stages would be played at the same time to limit incidents of this kind from occurring again.

10. Interview with a former member of the Algerian national team that played in the 1982 and 1986 World Cups. Algiers, August 2016.
11. Telephone interview with a former member of the Algerian national team that played in the 1982 World Cup. September, 2016.
12. *El Moudjahid* (Algiers), 14 November 2013.
13. The *Tarawish* prayers are performed during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

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Egypt

Suzan Gibril

The history of Egyptian football is deeply rooted in nationalism, struggle and pride that goes beyond the limited sporting arena. More than just one of the most popular sports in the country, football can be understood as a "multi-faceted mirror", revealing certain complexities and struggles present within Egyptian society, especially in a context where the ruling power has a close grip on its population. This chapter examines how Egypt adapted the historically English game to its social, economic and political realities and interests at different times in its history. It further aims at exploring the multi-levelled use of sport both at national and local levels, by the different actors at play. Specifically, it examines football as a space used both by the regime as an instrument of legitimacy and by the organised groups of football supporters—along with other portions of the population—as one of the few spaces that allows for the expression of opinions and grievances that cannot be voiced in the public arena. The material used in this article is part of a thesis research on the new spaces of contention that have emerged in revolutionary and post-revolutionary Egypt. This particular entry is based on interviews conducted with supporters of the two main football clubs in Cairo, namely Ahly and Zamalek, as well as participatory observation conducted between 2013 and 2015.

S. Gibril (✉)
Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique (CEVIPOL), Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: sgibril@ulb.ac.be

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1   The Origins of Football in Egypt

The history of modern Egyptian football began at the end of the nineteenth century, introduced to the country by the British in 1882. Though first practised within the confines of military camps, the game quickly spread outside those boundaries and onto the streets, encouraged by local Egyptians, as well as by the introduction of physical education (PE) as a mandatory activity in all Egyptian schools (Russell 2013). Football was most commonly used by the British colonial powers as a means of moral education and sense of unity among the student population of elite colleges in Cairo and Alexandria. Sport was then a key instrument in the colonial apparatus, allowing for the expansion of a "Westernised civilization", and the spreading of discipline and respect for authority (El-Zatmah 2011). For instance, between 1913 and 1932, matches were organised between the different schools (from elementary level to University) in Cairo with the purpose of disseminating the interest for the game of football to the rest of the country. During this period, the Law School team won the competition seven times, while the Engineering School won it six times, the Police School twice and both the Agriculture and Commerce schools once (Thabet 2013). The competition was, however, postponed in 1919 due to the revolution led by Saad Zaghloul.[1]

Following the same logic, the birth of the first local football clubs coincides with the inauguration of private leisure and sporting clubs in Egypt in the late nineteenth century. These private clubs were established for the purpose of creating elite havens around Cairo and Alexandria solely for Europeans, where all types of sports were practised (cricket, football, squash, tennis, swimming, horse races, etc…). Access to these private clubs was granted to a select number of Egyptians from the upper classes of society at the beginning of the twentieth century, although rigorous admittance procedures were maintained such as high membership fees, annual dues and having to be backed by an existing member, thus excluding an important part of the Egyptian population (Russell 2013, 303). In the face of such discrimination, elite Egyptians initiated their own clubs whose purpose was to serve as networking grounds for students after graduating as well as to instil the values of health, fitness and nationalism. The first and oldest club to be established in Egypt—and the Arab World—is *al-Sekka al-Hadid* (known as the Railway Club).[2] Founded in 1903 by British and Italian engineers affiliated with the Railway Authority at that time (El-Sayed 2012), it was closely followed by others such as *al-Ahly*—"National" (1907), *al-Mokhtalat*—"Mixed" (who eventually became *Zamalek*) and *al-Tersana*—Arsenal (1911) in Cairo;

and *al-Olympi* (1905) and *al-Ittihad* (1914) in Alexandria (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014). The birth and development of the different club rivalries will be discussed at a later stage.

After the First World War, football became so popular that an Egyptian-English Football Association (EEFA) was created in 1916. The EEFA was responsible for organising the first official competition between Egyptians and foreign teams, the "Sultani Cup" under the patronage of Sultan Hussein Kamel (Sultan of Egypt between 1914 and 1917). In the first years of the competition, the British teams dominated, until *al-Mukhtalat club* (the *Mixed club*, later known as *Farouk Club*) won the title in 1921 (El-Sayed 2012).

Around the same time, a conflict arose between the different sporting associations in the country, sparked by criticism addressed to the committee in charge of appointing the team that participated in the 1920 Olympics in Belgium. According to the EEFA among others, the team that was sent did not offer a realistic image of Egypt or the sport. This resulted in the establishment of the Egyptian Football Association (EFA) in 1921 (El-Sayed 2012). In 1923, two years after its founding, the EFA was officially recognised and allowed to become a member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), thus becoming its first Arab and African representative. After joining FIFA, the EFA carried out the terms of membership acceptance for local clubs, forming a specific department in charge of developing competition at a local level, such as the Cup of Egyptian Excellence (commonly known today as Egypt Cup) (Lopez 2012). The interest in the game of football itself fuelled its growth and revenue, despite the change of regimes (from a British protectorate to an independent nation in 1922). For example, the most significant impact of the 1952 revolution on the football arena turned out to be the renaming of the *King Farouk Cup* to *Egypt Cup*, as well as the renaming of *Farouk Club* to *Zamalek*.

Egyptian football has been used both as a tool of struggle and as a tool of control. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the football arena was used as a primary space of resistance to British rule, especially after Egypt's participation and success in the 1928 Olympic Games where the team reached the semi-finals. This performance was welcomed by the population as a confirmation that equality should be extended to all areas (Raab 2013). Even though football was first practised by the higher social classes, it rapidly expanded throughout Egypt, regardless of socio-economic status and class, which translated into a growing number of players from the poorer working classes being drafted and asked to play on the different local teams. What is more, certain affinities with political ideologies such as socialism,

Marxism as well as the religious ideology linked to the Muslim Brotherhood school of thought were developed around the pitch (among other areas), the stadium being one of the only spaces that was not constricted to colonial control (Goldblatt 2006). As we will see in the latter sections of this paper, the establishment of the different local clubs, as well as the development of rivalries, coincides with the different political and historical stages of Egypt's development and shows a clear connection and intertwinement between the sporting and political arenas.

The different successes of the Egyptian national football team throughout the 1920s and 1930s played an important role in the formation and consolidation of national identity. Football competitions provided an efficient space that highlighted performance at an international level, but it also allowed for different peoples to interact, not only with the Western powers, but also with countries that had only just recently gained their independence (Lopez 2009).

Whereas the first half of the twentieth century was characterised by the use of sport, and more specifically football as a tool of anti-colonial struggle, it soon became a powerful tool of propaganda for the subsequent dictatorial regimes. Indeed, since the abdication of King Farouk in 1952, the Egyptian political system has been characterised by a succession of authoritarian regimes. Several indicators account for this lack of political plurality, including the absence of a real national project since 1920s, the pre-eminence of personal interests over national interests as well as the proliferation of a high level of corruption and monopoly of power and wealth in the hands of a small ruling elite. By setting up complex institutional mechanisms to regulate access to the public service, along with the promise of career advancement, the ruling party managed to generate a sense of "security" among the different power holders, that their "immediate and long-term interests were better served by staying within the party" (Brownlee 2007, 39). Although authors do not fully agree on the analysis of the current political situation in Egypt, they agree that the combination of a lack or absence of a clear national project, the priority given to Western interests rather than the interests of its people as well as the priority given to privatisation gives way for a "marriage between power and wealth" (Shorbagy 2009, 529).

These authoritarian regimes, dating back to the time Nasser and his Free Officers movement[3] took power (Nasser followed Naguib as president of Egypt between 1956 and 1970), have long been interested in promoting mass and elite sport, using it both as a national construction strategy and as a means to maintain legitimacy on the international stage. Following this logic, the Egyptian national team was used as a tool to disseminate his vision

of Arab nationalism and counter the remnants of British rule. Although not a big football fan himself, Nasser made sure to attend as many games as possible as he believed it would reflect positively on the army and bring in more popular support (Nauright and Parrish 2012). After the six-day war of 1967, however, football competitions were banned in Egypt, Nasser claiming that it had become "a distraction" (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014, 104). Sadat (president between 1970 until his assassination in 1980) and his government on the other hand viewed a successful football team as a possible panacea, especially at a time when national pride and sentiment were declining (Bloomfield 2010, 23).

Notwithstanding certain punctual episodes in Egypt's history, football was a tool used for political advantage by Nasser and his successors. All successes of the national team competing on an international level were the concrete example of the president's leadership skills, benevolent and nurturing spirits, leading to the establishment of these leaders as "fathers of the nation" (Koch 2013). This, in turn, favoured a state of dependency and stimulated a feeling of gratitude, which eventually led to a heightened sense of patriotism and nationalism, "mobilizing citizens in ways that create an illusion of participation, without allowing any citizen input in the process" (Adams 2010, 96). Through sport, and more so through football, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and also Sisi have all succeeded in shifting the attention of the Egyptian people, using it both as a distraction and as an instrument of legitimisation of their grandeur and power: distraction from the social and political reality of what was going on (control over the executive and legislative bodies, centralisation of power in the hands of a small and faithful political, economic and social elite, high levels of corruption within the administration, etc.), and instrument of legitimisation as football was massively used to gage the success (or failure) of the *Raïs*.

The absolute control of the footballing arena by the different leaders in Egypt is crucial to their power, mainly because it is the only space where the ruler and the public share the same kind of passion that is only paralleled by religion. For instance, Mubarak (president from 1981 until the uprisings of 2011) took the habit of personally congratulating the players and coaches after each victory of the Egyptian national team. In this sense, the team's triumph becomes an expression of his leadership and success, which was widely used to counter the growing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, the leading Islamist and opposition group in Egypt (Dorsey 2016). During the 2005 elections, Mubarak used football as a political strategy, focusing all the attention on the al-Ahly-Zamalek derby as well as on the National team's campaign (commonly known as the *Pharaohs*). This was a way for

the regime to promote itself as well as identify with the people, stimulating nationalistic sentiment (Bloomfield 2010). The peak of nationalistic fervour was reached in 2009, during the qualification phase of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, which will be discussed at a later stage.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

While the successes of the national team acted as a compelling argument in the struggle for independence, local clubs emerged as powerful hubs of nationalistic sentiment and anti-colonial struggle, developing into prime sites for the establishment of Arab nationalist movements (Amara 2012, 20).

Unlike various European countries where the rivalries can be based on socio-economic, political or religious cleavages (Roma–Lazio, Celtic–Rangers, Arsenal–Chelsea, Real Madrid–Atlético Madrid, etc.), Egyptian club rivalries are mainly anchored in historical and/or regional divisions. While some follow a centre-periphery logic (an opposition between the main cities against the Capital), other are more rooted in an opposition based on performance, or as a result of historical rivalries dating back to the clubs' inception. The Ahly-Zamalek rivalry is unique in the sense that it is rooted in political and historical opposition between liberal and conservative ideologies. The main clubs in Egypt include *al-Ahly* and *Zamalek* in Cairo, *al-Ittihad* in Alexandria, *al-Masry* in Port Said (near the Mediterranean opening of the Suez Canal) and *Ismaily* in Ismailia (in the middle of the Suez Canal region, South of Port Said).

Besides the Ahly-Zamalek derby, other eminent rivalries are to be mentioned at the national level, for instance the derby between the two clubs of the Suez Canal region, al-Masry of Port Said and Ismaily of Ismailia. Also known as the Canal derby, the opposition between Masry and Ismaily dates back to their creation, both clubs sharing the top spots in their region. In this sense, their rivalry is mostly centred on performance and their ability to shine as the leaders in the Suez Canal area. Despite some isolated clashes between fans, both clubs share good relations, mostly because of the strong ties between the residents of the region, as well as the unity of the clubs and their fans who fight against the domination of the two clubs of Cairo. Other prominent derbies include the Zamalek-Tersana derby, the Ittihad-Ahly derby or more significantly the Masry-Ahly derby, rooted in a strong sporting rivalry between both clubs, as well as a long-standing animosity between the clubs' fans linked to the centre-periphery divide. This rejection of the capital is at the centre of most rivalries between either Cairo clubs and the

other prominent clubs of Alexandria and the Canal region. Fans explain their rejection by accusing the regime of favouring both Cairene clubs when allocating the budgets (Dorsey 2016).

The most prominent rivalry in Egyptian football, however, remains the Cairo derby, opposing al-Ahly and Zamalek sporting clubs, both sharing the top spots in the Egyptian Premier League performance leader board (39 victories for al-Ahly against 12 for Zamalek since 1948), as well as having become the most popular and decorated clubs in the Middle East and North Africa (Hawkey 2010). The Cairo derby is followed by millions in Egypt and North Africa, making it one of the most popular derbies in football (Lopez 2009). More than being just about sport, the Ahly-Zamalek rivalry divides not only their fan base, but also the whole of Egypt[4]: "In this country, you are *Ahlawy* or *Zamalkawy*. The rest can change […] your wife, your religion, but never your club!".[5] This division between Ahly and Zamalek structures the entire Egyptian society.

While al-Ahly was historically supported by nationalists and liberals, and represented the post-revolutionary era (post-1919 revolution) and the struggle against British colonial authority, Zamalek (formally al-Mokhtalat and Farouk) was historically backed by the royalists and the conservatives (Darby 2002), thus representing privilege and the bourgeoisie. However, these were not the only clubs to materialise around political cleavages. For instance, the al-Masry club[6] (which translates to "the Egyptian") of Port Said was founded a year after the 1919 revolution, as a way to assert Egyptian identity and resist British colonisation. This translated in the club only accepting players of Egyptian nationality in its early years, thus pinning it as a symbol of national identity and independence (Darby 2002).

The birth and development of al-Ahly date back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1907, a group of Egyptian pashas (men with titles, land and political connections) led by Omar Lotfi, president of the students union, established *al-Nadi al-Ahly* (the National Club) with the objective of using it as a backbone of struggle against colonialism. It was incidentally the only leisure club to allow Egyptians to have membership cards at the time of its creation (Darby 2002). Paradoxically, however, the Steering Committee elected a Briton, Mitchell Ince, as its first president. This turned out to be an effective strategy intended to take advantage of the Briton's influence and relationship with the authorities (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014, 102). The club additionally chose the red and white colours of the pre-colonial flag, as well as the eagle adorning a crown, symbolising strength (Bloomfield 2010, 21).

Zamalek, on the other hand, was founded in 1911 by Georges Merzbach, a Belgian lawyer established in Cairo. Originally known as *Qasr el-Nil* club

(which referred to the name of the Palace along the Nile that was made available to build the clubhouse), it was the first club in Cairo to be initiated by non-British foreigners (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014, 102). The club changed its name to *al-Nadi al-Mukhtalat* (The Mixed Club) in 1913. It was named that way because of its ambition and aspiration to be open to Europeans and Egyptians alike, allowing them to socialise and mix within the same playing ground. In 1941, it was changed again to *Farouk al-Awal* (King Farouk Club) following the royal sponsorship (Jacob 2011). It ultimately changed to *Zamalek* (using the name of its district location) after the 1952 revolution which saw the exile of King Farouk after the coup orchestrated by Nasser and his Free Officers (Woodward 1992). One of Zamalek's key traits resided in the fact that it did not restrict admittance to any particular social, economic or ethnic group, while al-Ahly quickly became a rallying point for anti-colonialists, anti-monarchists and nationalists.

After the newly foundindependence, Nasser was appointed al-Ahly's honorary president (the official president of the club being Ahmed Aboud Pasha at that time) while Field Marshal and Head Commander Abdelhakim Amer was named president of the EFA and General Abdelaziz Salem, head of the Confederation of African Football (CAF), among others (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014). The appointment of these revolutionary leaders to strategic and senior positions in sports is symptomatic of the tight political grip of the Nasserite regime and the will to use it as both a means of propaganda and control. What is more, the naming of Nasser as al-Ahly's honorary president in 1956 shows a fading of the original cleavages, brought on by the independence (Al Mistaki, 1997).

Indeed, the main rivalry between both Cairo-based clubs started in the 1920s, at a time where al-Ahly symbolised the anti-colonial sentiment and struggle for independence, which was epitomised by the club restricting membership to people of Egyptian nationality only—as opposed to Zamalek (then al-Mukhtalat), who had a more open policy regarding its membership (Raspaud and Lachheb 2014). This particular clause guaranteed Ahly's success as well as its status as the "club of the people" at that time, contrasting with Zamalek's reputation of being the club of the bourgeoisie and foreigners. When al-Mukhtalat club changed its name to Farouk al-Awal, the rivalry between both clubs increased, mainly due to the fact that the change of name suggested its links with the Royal family and its lavish lifestyle, which was a highly criticised matter in Egypt at the time (Russel 2013, 69–70). Even though one could argue that Farouk and Nasser share the common trait of being rulers of Egypt, they symbolised different ideals. While Nasser is depicted as the representative of Pan-Arabism and the

nationalist current (following in the footsteps of Saad Zaghloul, father of Egyptian nationalism), King Farouk is often portrayed as the epitome of privilege and aristocracy, hence accentuating social differences. This is additionally emphasised in the symbols chosen by each club, whether it may be in the name given to the supporters (the Red Devils of al-Ahly and the White Knights of Zamalek), or by the use of the club colours—the red of blood and the people for al-Ahly and the white of purity and aristocracy for Zamalek (Hawkey 2010).

So the naming of Nasser as honorary president of al-Ahly, as well as Sadat and Mubarak expressing their loyalty (in the sense of fandom) to al-Ahly club, negated, according to various supporter groups, the former belief that Ahly was "the club of the people" and Zamalek, "the club of the authorities". This led various Zamalek fans to invert the original premise and to coin al-Ahly as the "club of the regime" during the Sadat and Mubarak years, thus showing the appropriation and use of the concepts such as "people", "nation" and "struggle" by both sides. They further add that Zamalek has now come to symbolise the struggle against the almighty and corrupt Egyptian Football Federation and government. In the words of a former Zamalek board member, "*The federation and the government see Zamalek as the enemy. Zamalek represents the people who express their anger against the system. We view Ahly as the representative of corruption in Egypt*" (Dorsey 2016, 55).

This particular antagonistic vision of nationalistic vs. bourgeois values continues to prevail in the minds of a majority of supporters, mainly as a way for each team to discredit and undermine its rivals. In practice, however, this distinction no longer represents the reality of Egyptian society today nor is it a reflection of the socio-economic status of the fan base. Indeed, these divisions are rooted in a sociopolitical history that has faded over time, leaving only imagined representations of social and political groups.

Nonetheless, the rivalry between both clubs is so deeply implanted that the Mubarak regime insisted that the matches be played on a neutral ground, at the Cairo International Stadium, going as far as flying in foreign referees to oversee the game. Additionally, riot police are placed inside and outside of stadium grounds and are charged with maintaining security and avoiding clashes between rival supporter groups. Given the nature and extent of the rivalry between both clubs, it is commonplace to witness violent confrontations between members of the rival supporter groups, Ahly's Ultras Ahlawy (UA07) and Zamalek's Ultras White Knights (UWK). Each Ultra group "fights to impose its symbolic strength in terms of the beauty and impressiveness of the choreography…and in terms of displaying

courage. […] Before or after the match, the stadium and the open spaces surrounding the stadium [is] exclusive territory to be defended against the enemy's raids" (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994, 85–86).

This rivalry between the UA07 and the UWK was put on hold after the events of Port Said on 1 February 2012, in which 74 Ahly supporters were killed in what was presented as a "football riot gone wrong". Many of them, as well as an abundant portion of the protesters, believe the Port Said clashes to be a way for security forces—and by extension, the government—to take revenge for the supporters' participation in the uprisings of 2011. One of the respondents explained that in his opinion, "*we are a threat to them* [the police and regime] *because we were there in Tahrir. We know what they did.* […] *We know who the agents* [the undercover agents] *are so we mess with their investigations. We can also spot the baltagiyya* [armed thugs] *who help the police and that is why we get arrested and beaten up. And that is why they killed them in Port Said*".[7] From the Ultras' point of view, the whole incident raises too many questions to be dismissed as a violent act of hooliganism. Seen as an act orchestrated by the Ministry of Interior, and moving up the hierarchy as high as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the ruling force at the time of the events, the Ultras massively mobilised to voice their discontent, shifting their energy and activities from the stadium to civil society. Ahly and Zamalek's decision to suspend "all rival activities and unite in support to the victims" can be explained by the fact that the Ultras, as a group, felt under attack. Symbols of this union adorn the walls of Cairo, and other major cities around Egypt, as epitomised by the "Brotherhood in Blood" graffiti, referring to the strong solidary ties that exist between all Ultras groups in times of crisis. Incidentally, these messages were reproduced in other major cities such as Istanbul and Rome, revealing the extent of solidarity between these supporter groups and a strong supporters' identity which cuts through linguistic, cultural and territorial boundaries. Indeed, the Port Said incident threatened their identity as a social group, independent from their other activities, and explains their mobilisation (Gibril 2015, 317).

3 Football as a Sports Spectacle: Ultras, the Stadium and the Egyptian Revolution

The Ultra identity is revealed most frequently during matches, but is not limited to the sporting arena. They are an organised group of football supporters, dedicating their life, time and money to support their respective teams (Armstrong and Giulianotti 1999; Giulianotti 2002). Being an Ultra

in Egypt means "*you respect the code and live by it.* […] *It is about loving football, your team and your people.* […] *We look out for each other*".[8] Their activities are centred on the team and club and aim at inspiring a sense of belonging among its members, impressing the viewers with their *tifos* (choreography displayed by fans in the stands) and songs, as well as to intimidate the supporters of rival teams. These groups have a well-established structure and a high degree of organisation: the leadership is centralised, divided into regional structures, and local meetings are planned when important decisions need to be discussed (Woltering 2013, 292). In practice, however, the organisation is both centralised and decentralised. The predominance of a horizontal logic, brought forth by the existence of local and regional sections, helps reinforce group attitudes and reduces the occurrence of potentially divisive issues among members, particularly regarding ideologies, opinions and beliefs (may they be political or religious).

The first Ultras groups started forming in the early 2000s via the Internet and through forums before emerging as distinctive organisations in 2007, based on the Italian model (Beshir 2011). However, other forms of organised support existed prior to the establishment of the Ultras. Until the end of the 1990s, football fans were known as *Tersos*, derived from the Italian word *Terzo*, meaning "Three". In Egypt, *Terso* came to refer to the fans from lower social classes who could only afford to buy third-class tickets to see the games (El-Zatmah 2012, 801). Appearing as early as the 1920s, the Terso fans shaped Egyptian football with their chants and songs, making football an integral part of Egyptian national culture (El-Zatmah 2012, 801). The Terso phenomenon started to disappear at the beginning of the 1980s, mainly due to worsening socio-economic conditions of the lower classes, making it challenging for the fans to buy tickets. The worsening economic conditions, coupled with the rise of greater gender segregation measures limiting the presence and participation of women in the public sphere (brought forth by the rising Islamisation of the culture),[9] contributed to the third-class ticket seats to be mostly dominated by young males who would later come to form the Ultras (El-Zatmah 2012, 802).

Ultras Ahlawy and UWK of Ahly and Zamalek were the first groups to appear in 2007, quickly becoming the largest and most visible organisations in Egypt. Both Ultras Ahlawy and UWK have multiple sections in other major cities and governorates, highlighting the clubs' popularity around the country. Other groups quickly followed including Ismaily's Yellow Dragons, the Green Eagles of al-Masry and the Green Dragons of Ittihad among others (Beshir 2011, 192). Ultras live by a code,[10] which includes certain obligations such as singing and encouraging throughout the game,

whatever the outcome may be, attendance to as many matches as possible (home and away), regardless of distance and cost, and loyalty to the group. Other obligations, maybe more significant and characteristic of the Egyptian Ultra culture, include the obligation not to get involved politically (meaning the obligation to remain neutral with regard to political ideas, understood as referring to "party politics"); treat everyone equally, regardless of gender, religion, class, conviction; and always stand for what is right. Though most Ultras groups claim to be exclusively "supporter groups", the existence of such rules and codes may imply that their identity exceeds the sole purpose of supporting and conceals another, more deeper dimension.

The Ultras groups evolve in a context that strongly relies on "violent, state-based repression" (Earl 2006, 129), often resorting to violence in cases of self-defence, notably in their relations with the police as a consequence of their use of *shamarikh* (flares) and "politically incorrect" slogans, chants and songs (Beshir 2011, 21). It is commonplace for the police forces to arrest supporters the night before the game—or even on game day—for questioning, to ensure that they do not represent a threat to national security and release them the day after, sometimes in a bad shape (Dorsey 2012, 413). Their use of violence is not only limited to self-defence, however. Some of the more hard-core fans frequently organise street fights with rival supporter groups, bringing their activities closer to those of traditional hooligans.

The Ultras' clashes with the police are cultivated in a long history of violent encounters, of humiliations (the police often use the expression "*ya walad*" meaning "you boy", a condescending way of addressing people, regardless of their age) and harassment (Ismail 2012). One Ultra member explained his encounter with the police in these terms: "*I was arrested by the police because he recognised me. The day before we went to Tahrir with the Ultras and he saw us. He feared us when we walked by him. But felt so powerful when I was alone with him and his "friends". The difference is we didn't attack him. It's a question of principle*". He was released the day after and had been beaten up when he refused to give up information regarding his "suspicious activities" (he implied that they wanted information regarding his activities as an Ultra, but they never said it openly): "*It's easier to attack someone when they are alone and cannot defend himself. They are cowards*" (Gibril 2015, 309).

The anger and feeling of humiliation are an important feature of the relationship between the Ultras and the police, as it contributes to the development of a sense of injustice, which in turn encourages an upsurge of violence against police forces and shapes the supporters' identity (being an

Ultra implies being opposed to any kind of figure of authority), as well as it structures their motives for mobilisation, and cements their sense of belonging to the group. While part of the rivalry between the Ultras and police forces is played around the stadium ground, it took a new turn with the onset of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 and more so after the events of Port Said in 2012.

The implication of the Ultras in the Egyptian uprisings of 25 January 2011 was mainly and specifically aimed at defending the protesters against police brutality. Unlike what is commonly circulated among the population, the Ultras were not one of the driving forces of the movement. They responded to a call from organising social movements such as *Setah April* (6th of April Movement) and *Kefaya* (which translates to "Enough")[11] who turned to them because they are notorious for their clashes with police and security forces. Cultivated in a history of violence due to their football-related activities, the Ultras were seen, by the population, as one of the only groups, not only capable of resisting the riot police, but also competent enough to teach them the necessary guerrilla techniques to fight back. The Ultras responded by uploading a video to their YouTube channel where they assured those committed to demonstrate on 25 January, as well as those who feared police repression, that there would be an Egyptian *fasil* (squadron) present to defend them. In statements on their respective Facebook pages, they also stressed the fact that the Ultras were non-political organisations, but that their members were free, as individuals, to participate in the protests. It is therefore quite difficult to establish the Ultras' true intentions in the early days of the uprisings, and it seems unlikely that there was any collective decision to participate as a distinguished group.

Their role in these uprisings was essentially to bring all of their experience in fighting the police—as well as rival supporter groups—from the stadium to the streets, thus playing a key role both in breaking down the riot police and in major battles including the battle of the Camel and the infamous Battle of Mohammed Mahmoud.[12] Their involvement in these clashes was crucial because it marked the first big victory against the oppressive system. More importantly, it exposed the cracks of a declining regime, which, in turn, encouraged current and future demonstrators to take to the streets. One of the leaders of the UWK explains that they "*fought the police in the stadium,* [they] *fought for* [their] *rights. That prepared* [them] *for Tahrir* [referring to the uprisings]. *Failure was not an option*". He continued by explaining that their positions were "*in the front line. When the police attacked, we encouraged the people. We told them not be afraid so people started joining us*".

Their role in the early days of the demonstrations was pivotal in crushing what was described as the "fear and culture of fear created by humiliation, continuous monitoring surveillance and abuse" (Ismail 2006, 165).

More than being an independent body, the police in Egypt are seen, by a major portion of the population, as the representative of the Ministry of Interior (commonly referred to as *dakhliya*) and the regime's administrative arm (Chalcraft 2011). In addition to ensuring public and national security, the police's power covers other areas, such as the market, transport, roads, food supplies, public utilities, taxation and public morality (Ismail 2012). This intrusiveness can be attributable to several political factors that have consolidated the police's power, notably the role it was assigned in repressing the Islamist opposition, dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to serving the interests of the ruling elite, security forces developed their own corrupt culture, instating a system of bribes and placing what is known as "plain-clothes" policemen—civilians hired by police and security forces to collect information—in neighbourhoods under the pretence of ensuring stability and peace. To do so without raising suspicion, the police usually position their undercover informants in local communities by providing them with a vending kiosk or by appointing them to the carta system, shuttle buses and vans.

A key characteristic of the 25th of January Revolution was the fact that the extent of the protest caught the police off guard, as they were not expecting such an outcome. As their actions against riot police became increasingly visible, and their participation and numbers grew, the Ultras' reputation changed. They went from "stadium hooligans" to "national heroes" (Dorsey 2016). This newfound image was later heightened by the incidents of Port Said in February 2012.

More than a simple "football riot", the events of Port Said mark a breaking point in the Ultras' involvement and mobilisation. Even though their participation was undeniable in the early days of the uprisings, it was limited to a passive engagement centred on defence rather than fighting for a cause. Port Said, on the other hand, was interpreted by the Ultras, as a personal attack on the group and its ideals. While the Egyptian uprisings were used as a pretext to unleash anger and frustration fed by years of conflict and violent encounters with the police, Port Said epitomised the struggle of the Ultras to fight injustice. The will of rival camps to call a truce and make peace with one another and fight for the same cause, joined by other Ultras groups from around the country, is symptomatic of the level of identification with the nation. As one respondent put it: "We are the Ultras, we are Egypt".

4   Egypt's Pharaohs and the Campaigns for the 2010, 2014 and 2018 World Cups

Major sporting competitions are an opportunity to observe a reinforcement or revival of patriotism, and national identification. Being one of the most popular sports, football can be understood as a "multi-faceted" mirror, reflecting the different cultural angles of a society at a given moment in its history. It can additionally be perceived as an effective arena bringing together, reproducing and transforming new or existing identities.

As we previously mentioned, the Egyptian regime has actively tried to frame, limit and control the politicisation (or more so the lack thereof) of its population. If the interest in the country's political affairs found itself diminished, the passion for the game of football, to the contrary, was reinforced, or at least has remained steady over the years. This heightened devotion to football, along with the public investment in sport, came at a time when Egypt's influence in the region was slowly deteriorating in areas such as science, art, literature, music and technology. The importance of a successful national team, in such a context, was all the more important, as it was the concrete proof of the president's ability to embody national pride, which was an argument that was massively used during the 2010 World Cup qualifying campaign. The Egyptian national team has participated twice in the World Cup (in 1934 and 1990), which contrasts with the success of local clubs like Zamalek or al-Ahly, which are references on the continent. It is therefore interesting to analyse these discrepancies and examine the ambiguities of the support towards the national team.

The first decade of the new millennium symbolised the golden era of Egyptian football, with Ahly and Zamalek winning the CAF Champions League, respectively, eight and five times and the national team, under coach Hassan Shehata, winning the Africa Cup of the Nations (CAN) in 2006, 2008 and 2010 (Rommel 2014). Football was, at that time, at the centre of public discourse and popular culture, with expanding media coverage of matches, as well as an increase in the number of broadcasts and websites (such as *Fil.com* or *yallakora.com*) devoted to football, not to mention a significant increase in patriotic popular songs, praising the merits of the national team (Tawfiq 2010).

In an Egyptian context dominated by corruption and personal favours, football embodied one of the few spaces based on a certain form of merit and was an important source of pride for a large portion of the Egyptian population: "*When the* [national] *team plays, it's an opportunity for all Egyptians*

to come together and watch the game. You sing the national anthem with your neighbours, and that cousin you hate! It's one of the rare times you see the [Egyptian] *flag float with pride. When the match is over, you go back to your life, your team, your problems* […] *but for 90 min, it's a whole country, 80 something million behind eleven players…*".[13] It acted as a substitute to mainstream politics under the Mubarak era. But it also served as a powerful instrument of propaganda, mobilised by the regime to ensure its preservation—even partially.

In November 2009, Egypt played against Algeria in an attempt to qualify for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. The match was described by the media as the most important match in Egyptian football history, Egypt having failed to qualify since 1990 (Alegi 2010). The team needed either a three-goal margin to qualify, or two goals to equal Algeria's points. The stakes were high, which forced the teams to play the match on "neutral ground". Egypt won the match by a two-goal margin, resulting in nationwide celebrations where men, women, young, old, Muslims and Christians joined together to celebrate in the streets. Concurrently, however, violent clashes broke out between Egyptian and Algerian fans after the Egyptians attacked the Algerian's team bus.

The decisive game was held on 20 November 2009 in Khartoum and resulted in an Algerian victory, thus ending the Egyptian team's World Cup ambitions. What started out as a simple football game rapidly developed into a full-blown political crisis: the Algerian embassy in Cairo was attacked; violent confrontations broke out between frustrated demonstrators and security forces; the Egyptian Olympic Committee threatened to boycott any sporting exchange with Algeria; and al-Ahly made plans to sell its only Algerian player among others.

The first few days following the match were marked by a vivid expression of hatred towards Algeria. The media and the ruling power (Mubarak and especially his son Alaa spoke out on public television) used this opportunity to magnify national pride in an exacerbated and chauvinistic manner, going as far as spreading fake information such as alleged Algerian attacks on "Egyptian citizens" (Rommel 2014). Nevertheless, this emotionalism died down rapidly giving way to severe criticism from the media and the population, regarding the exploiting of football by the regime, thus creating a "empty" sense of nationalistic pride, as well as justifying a number of political decisions, including Mubarak's ambition to hand over power to his son, Gamal (Tawfiq 2010, 188).

Aside from the numerous debates that stemmed from the Egypt–Algeria match, there seems to have been a consensus regarding the significance of

the defeat. Indeed, it appears that this particular event emerged as a breaking point in the history of Egyptian football. It marked the end of the golden era, as well as the moment after which interest in the national team performance declined and a form of apathy and fatalism developed. After the failure to qualify for the World Cup, the support to the national team appears to have become more of an obligation, a duty to be fulfilled as an "Egyptian citizen" rather than the source of excitement: "*You have to support your team because you're Egyptian. It would be absurd to support another team.* [...] *But our team is not what it used to be. It is about time we focus on other, more important problems, like our future and trying to find a job*".[14]

The Egyptian campaign for the 2014 World Cup took place in a completely different context, with the 2011 Revolution as a backdrop. The support to the national team was, at times, ambiguous and contrasted, and the Revolution amplified this schizophrenia characterised both by a clear attachment to the country and a deep-rooted belief that the national team and its successes were used by the regime to assert and legitimise its power. This vision is exemplified by some of the Ultras, declaring their refusal to support the national team: "*The* [national] *team is Mubarak's team. If you support it, you support him ... The victories of the national team, are his victories. The national team is only a diversion to make us forget the injustice*".[15]

The popular uprisings contributed to changing the relations between local clubs, as epitomised by the collaboration between Ahly and Zamalek Ultras, as well as the relation towards the national team and its core supporter base: "*After Port Said, things changed. Egyptians started to see the cruelty of the regime,* [...] *able to kill its own people for revenge. They understood that the world of football was dirty* [to be understood in the sense of rotten, corrupt]. *Not enough players have stepped up and expressed solidarity with us,* [...] *the supporters, and for those who died supporting them ... Not a single boss ... Not a single coach ... Is that football today? And what about us?*".[16]

The play-off match for a place in the 2014 World Cup resulted in a major loss against the Ghanaian team (1-6). The reaction, however, was different to the one of 2009. Contrary to what the regime feared after the events of 2009 and 2012 (Port Said), very little violence broke out after the match, leaving the country in a state of apathy, or, in some cases, rejoicing over the team's defeat.

Through the disapproval and criticism of the national team, one perceives a deeper challenge to the abuses of the regime as well as a denunciation of the corruption at all levels of Egyptian society, including football. This disapproval was expressed in various ways, may it be through a certain form of bitterness, very present on the banners ("You collect millions but you do

not care about the poverty of Egyptians" in 2013, or "We have followed you everywhere but when times are hard, we do not find you" in 2014), or by invoking some sort of divine punishment: the idea that the defeat and the inability for the team to produce good results is understood as a divine sign proving the illegitimacy of the regime.

So the Egyptian national team's mission for the 2018 World Cup campaign was to restore a sense of *karama*, of dignity, as well as redeem itself in the eyes of the Egyptian people. The qualification of the Egyptian national team was met with great enthusiasm in the Egyptian media, propelling qualifying goal scorer, Mohamed Salah, to the status of Egyptian hero. Independently of the national feeling of pride resulting from this victory, the identification with the Egyptian national team remains somewhat problematic as it symbolises, in the collective representation of a majority of the population, an agent of the regime on the pitch—unlike the local teams, who continue to reap considerable support, especially because these are not values embodied by power, but rather the values of the group that supports the team.

Notes

1. The Saad Zaghloul revolution was carried out by Egyptian and Sudanese citizens as a response to the British-ordered exile of nationalistic leader, Saad Zaghlul, and a number of other members of the Wafd Party (nationalist liberal political party that came into existence after the First World War). It was more generally an uprising against the British occupation of Egypt and Sudan (Gerges 2013). This revolution later led to the recognition of Egyptian independence in 1922, as the Kingdom of Egypt. British troops did not, however, withdraw from Egypt, which would later be seen as one of the factors leading to the Egyptian revolution of 1952. For more information on the Saad Zaghlul uprisings and Egyptian nationalism, see Fahmy (2011) and Gerges (2013).
2. El-Sekka el-Hadid still exists to this day and is currently playing in the Egyptian Second Division.
3. The "Free Officers" (*Harakat ad-Dubbat al-Ahrar*) movement represented a group of nationalist officers in the Egyptian and Sudanese armed forces that prompted the Revolution of 1952. The core group stemmed from Brotherhood cells, though the ideological ties with the group were superficial. They joined the Muslim Brothers because they provided a structured framework (the most organised at the time) for political expression in the army. Ultimately, the Free Officers founders swore ultimate loyalty to

a movement in which religion would not play a role. They took power in 1952, General Mohamed Naguib becoming the first president until Nasser's election in 1956. For more on Nasserism and the Free Officers Movement, see Gordon (1992) and Woodward (1992).

4. This divide is so prominent that al-Ahly and Zamalek are often nicknamed "the true parties of Egypt". This can be partially explained by the fact that members are allowed to participate in the election of the club board, attracting a lot of media attention. Indeed, given the low level of opportunity for political transition in regimes such as the Egyptian one, the election of club presidents—and particularly for al-Ahly and Zamalek—gives the voters a true sense of power in the decision-making process.

5. Interview with an Ahly supporter, Cairo, 2014.

6. It is said that the club's name was derived from the song by popular Egyptian singer, Sayed Darwish, "*Oum Ya Masry*" (Rise, you Egyptian).

7. Interview, June 2013.

8. Interview with al-Ahly Ultra, Cairo, June 2013.

9. For more information on the underlying causes of the rise of Islamic movements in the 1970s and 1980s in Egypt, see Snow and Marshal (1989), Burgat and Dowell (1993), Ibrahim (1980), Kepel (1986).

10. This "Ultra Code" is a set of unwritten rules established, recognised and followed by the supporters of al-Ahly. A similar code exists for the Zamalek Ultras and other groups around Egypt. The respondents (one, Zamalek, interviewed on 1 June 2013; and one al-Ahly interviewed on 29 May 2013) both listed the same kinds of rules and emphasised the importance of abiding by those rules in order to be a part of the group.

11. The 6th of April Movement and *Kefaya* are two social movements in Egypt. At the grassroots of the 2011 Revolution, they were among the main platforms for protest against the Mubarak regime denouncing the transfer of power to his son Gamal, the political corruption, and the regime's repressive and coercive ways in dealing with opposition. For more information on *Kefaya* and other social movements in Egypt, see Beinin and Vairel (2013), and Shorbagy (2007).

12. The Battle of the Camel (February 2011) and later, the Battle of Mohammed Mahmoud street (November 2011) were two major battles of the Egyptian Uprisings and two major victories for the demonstrators of Tahrir square. Other important confrontations between security forces and demonstrators include the Maspero massacre. For more information on the day-to-day timeline of the Revolution and footage of the different battles, consult: www.858.ma.

13. Interview, Cairo, April 2014.

14. Interview, Cairo, February 2015.

15. Interview, Skype, January 2015.

16. Interview, Cairo, April 2014.

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Israel

Yair Galily and Tal Samuel-Azran

Located in the Middle East, bordering the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, Israel was established in 1948 after what was then Palestine had been ruled by Britain for more than 30 years. Almost 20 years ago, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the State of Israel, Yoel Marcus, one of Israel's senior journalists, wrote the following:

> Israel is the only country on earth that has been involved in at least one war for every decade of its existence. Israel is the only country on earth that, 50 years after it was created, is still not truly independent and does not have permanent borders. Israel is the only country on earth that is in a state of war with 50 percent of its neighbours. Israel is the only country on earth whose male citizens contribute a total of at least five years in active military service, including reserve duty. Israel is the only country on earth whose birth coincides with the renaissance of an ancient language and whose children teach the mother tongue to their own mothers. Israel is the only country on earth whose population increased by 500 percent through the mass immigration that poured through its gates when it was established. Israel is the only country

Y. Galily (✉) · T. Samuel-Azran
Sammy Ofer School of Communications, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC),
Herzliya, Israel

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on earth two-thirds of whose nation lives beyond its borders. Israel is the only country in the Middle East that has not been tempted, even for a brief moment, to shift from a democratic regime to a military junta, despite the centrality of security issues in our daily lives.

…Israel is a bona fide member of an exclusive club that includes the top five armies in the world. Israel is a bona fide member of an exclusive club that includes the seven nations in the world that possess nuclear weapons. Israel is a bona fide member of an exclusive club that includes the eight nations in the world that have a space satellite. Throughout its existence, Israel has been one of the 10 countries in the 185-member United Nations that head the list of international interest. As a state that has had to fight for its physical survival nearly every day of its life, Israel can pride itself on a number of impressive achievements… . (Marcus 1998)

Although a piece of ideology, Marcus's view of the State of Israel corresponds well with the relatively short history of the State of Israel. Israel is home to a widely diverse population from many different ethnic, religious, cultural and social backgrounds, a new society with ancient roots, which is still coalescing and developing today. Throughout this chapter, a developmental approach, one that Elias (Elias and Dunning 1986, 22) describes as "indispensable for advances in the study of human society", has been used to describe the process in which football (soccer) was developed and became a passion of the masses in the State of Israel.

1   Political Origins of Football

As documented by Harif and Galily (2003) and Ben-Porat (2000), association football (soccer) was played in Palestine before 1948, during the days of the British Mandate, the Palestine Football Association being established in 1928. The association was initiated by sports organisations from the Jewish sector of the population. However, in line with Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) policy, a representative of the Arab sector in Palestine was invited to participate in the management of the association, and Arab teams were invited to join the League structure. There was a partial response. Consequently, in 1929, 11 Arab teams played in three divisions.[1] Although football teams were almost ethnically separated, Arab and Jewish teams played against each other. Then, in 1934, the Arab sector established its own sports association and abandoned the Palestine Football Association.

From that date, each sector played in its own League until the outbreak of war in November 1947 called a halt to activities.

Israeli football, maybe more than any other cultural phenomenon, has changed radically since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Over the past seven decades, Israeli football has evolved from an amateur hobby of a few "sports freaks" to a passion of the masses. The transformation into a major cultural phenomenon is the result of general developments in Israeli and international society, but also of the enthusiastic efforts of key individuals. Thousands, and perhaps tens of thousands, of people—athletes, coaches, referees, politicians, officials, media people, and many others—have contributed to the development of Israeli football.

As Reshef and Paltiel (1989) and Galily (2007) have noted, Israel represents a unique case of an immigrant society formed on the basis of an ideological movement. This has had a profound impact on the development and organisation of sport and has led to the institutionalisation of sport within a highly politicised framework.

Sport in Israel was first assimilated into the ideological framework of Zionism when Zionist parties appropriated sports clubs as tools for partisan competition. From the early 1920s, football clubs (FCs) were incorporated into nationwide sports associations that were affiliated with a specific political organisation: Hapoel was an organ of the General Federation of Labour (Histadrut), Maccabi was affiliated with bourgeois political parties, Beitar was associated with the right-wing "Revisionists", and Elizur was related to the Religious-Zionist party. According to Reshef and Paltiel, sport eventually became a metaphor for politics, and marginalised groups used loyalties in sport to demonstrate disaffection with the political establishment.

Other processes were also intertwined with Israel's process of state formation: the processes of secularisation, population growth, urbanisation, militarisation and, most germane for present purposes, the development of sport. These are not isolated but rather interdependent processes and therefore of importance when discussing the development of football.

Three months after the establishment of the state, the Israeli football team participated in a tournament in the USA. The purpose of the tournament was to collect donations from the American community and to evoke global sympathy for the new state. The state sporting institutions established in Israel in the 1950s continued to enhance party affiliations established during the British Mandate period. This was reflected in the attempt to preserve a consensus regarding representation of the federations in sporting organisations. At first, this consensus was characterised by the equal representation

of the Hapoel and Maccabi federations, though during the 1950s this consensus came to be based on the proportional size of the federations.

This system created a clear advantage for Hapoel. Not only was it the sports federation of the ruling party, but it also sought to establish a foothold in as many communities as possible. This policy was one part of a larger world view of the Labour Movement, that is, sport for the masses as opposed to achievement-oriented sport. Another ideological aspect expressed through policy was the emphasis placed by the Labour Movement on pioneering and on a move from the urban centres to the peripheries. During the 1950s, a status quo was reached by which Maccabi would be the lesser of the two federations but would take part in the management and organisation of the sport. The cooperation between the two major federations reflected the balance of power and coalition politics between the patron parties within the political system proper.

Regular disputes between the two largest sports organisations, Hapoel and Maccabi, led to the establishment of separate football leagues. Yet, in November 1951, the two organisations signed an agreement that ensured that all sports institutes in the country, as well as the national teams, would have an equal number of representatives from each organisation.

The close identification between sports and political centres and the rivalry for control over Israeli sports created numerous problems. The choice of sports delegations and the composition of teams, especially football teams, were often made according to political interests rather than according to professional standards. Israeli sports were rife with "favoritism". When teams from the same centre played against one another, the stronger team would let the weaker one score so that it would not be "knocked down" to a lower League. Over the years, many attempts were made to combat this phenomenon by freezing the leagues or holding "friendly inside" games (teams from the same centre would first play against each other and only afterwards would teams from different centres compete), but none of these attempts managed to overcome the widespread phenomenon.

In the mid-1960s, Israeli sports began to lose their political-sectarian identity. The transition from a political sports federation to a commercial one was linked to the political, social and economic changes that Israeli society underwent and the radical changes that took place in world sports. After the Six-Day War (1967), the parties' ideological identities and the lines that differentiated parties began to blur. The main issue that concerned the parties (as it does to this day) was the future of the territories captured (or liberated) in that war. This issue has been so intense in Israel that it has overshadowed and almost blotted out the debate over the nature of the

society being created. The question of Israel's economic future ended with a triumph for capitalism, another "victory" that has made formerly clear differences between political parties extremely difficult to discern.

Subsequently, although the linkage between sports and politics has further declined since the 1970s, it has intensified in the international arena as the country's Arab neighbours have sought to isolate the Jewish state, from 1973 onwards. Ironically, this tactic has backfired. Although Israel was expelled from all Asian sports federations, it was eventually accepted into the European sports bodies, enabling the country to compete in many of the world's most prestigious competitions such as the European Athletics Championships, the European Swimming Championships, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) football cups, the European basketball cups, and all other major European tournaments.

The changes to Israeli society in the early 1980s, during which Israel was rapidly transformed into a Western capitalist-style society, also affected the development of football from a game to a commodity. The globalisation and capitalisation of Israeli society is reflected in the privatisation of the state and public economy (which in the past amounted to 40% of the entire economy), the accumulation of private and corporate capital, and the domination of a market economy that replaced the state-controlled system (Ben-Porat 2002). The neoliberal ideology and policies adopted by the major political parties (including those considered to be of the left) since the 1980s were translated into a policy of privatisation, decimation of the welfare state and global integration. These political-economic processes were paralleled (and supported) by the rapid infiltration of global or American culture (Azaryahu 2000). Israel's globalisation, however, was limited by its particular semi-peripheral position in the global framework of capitalist economies and even more so by continuous conflict with the Palestinians. The globalisation of the state economy, therefore, despite rapid liberalisation in the 1980s, remained, to the dismay of its business sector, uncompleted (Ben-Porat and Ben-Porat 2004).

Indeed, Israeli football in the 1980s was part of the internationalisation process. FCs already hired a few non-Israeli players (this was allowed by the Israeli Football Association [IFA] in 1989[2]) were searching for new management and ownership, and were eager to integrate into European football events (Ben-Porat 2002). Overall, the "political model" that had dominated Israeli football since the state-building period was transformed into the "commercial model" associated with Israel's economic liberalisation and globalisation. Nonetheless, like the rest of society, the globalisation of Israeli football was limited by its political-economic environments.

The Budget Control Authority, which was established in July 1990, required every football team to register as an association and to present a real, balanced budget. The Maliniak Committee report, which was submitted to Education Minister Amnon Rubinstein in 1993, explicitly recommended making the transition to full professionalism, separating sports and politics, putting an end to the Gambling Council's support of professional sport and cutting the Central organisations' budgets by 80%. The acquisition of the Maccabi Haifa FC by businessman Ya'akov Shahar in January 1993 was an important landmark in the privatisation process of sports clubs in Israel. In 1993, the quota of foreign players was raised to three in the first division and two in the second division. In 1999, the number of non-Israelis in first division teams—the premier League—was raised to five.

When business people took over FCs, their motives were either the belief that football is an ordinary economic activity or their passion and love of the game. During the 1990s, for many clubs the total investment in the club exceeded its total income. Very few clubs generated enough income in a given season to balance their budgets (Ben-Porat 2012).

During the season of 2008/2009, private investment in Israeli football reached an all-time peak. Three foreign businesspersons acquired FCs: Arcadi Gaydamak (Russia) bought the managing rights of the Beitar Jerusalem FC, Alexander Shnaider (Canada) bought the Maccabi Tel Aviv FC and Daniel Yammer (Germany) bought the Maccabi Natanya FC. It was the first time that non-Israeli (albeit still Jewish) money was invested in Israeli football. These foreign moguls were Jewish men acting in a philanthropic manner, willing to bequeath funds.

Another key development was the end of one-channel Israeli television and the beginning of the multichannel era. The one-channel era, which had lasted nearly a quarter of a century (1968–1993), left Israeli sports fans rather unsatisfied. Due to the channel's tight budget and full programme schedule, it could offer only limited broadcasts of sporting events. The first Israeli football League game was broadcast only in 1986, and a local basketball game was not broadcast until 1991, with the launch of Channel 2.

The establishment of a commercial channel (Channel 2) and cable TV channels started a revolution in the Israeli media. In fact, it would not be too far-fetched to say that not only the media, but also the whole of Israeli society became multichannel almost overnight. For the first time in Israel, people were exposed to sports channels, like Eurosport and Star Sport; these channels more than doubled the supply of sports programmes. Furthermore, the two 24-hour news channels, CNN and Sky, provided daily sportscasts that covered sporting events from all over the world.

The new local sports channel, Channel 5, significantly raised the standards of local basketball broadcasts, forcing Channels 1 and 2 to raise their standards to the international level, too. Channel 5 also devoted airtime to less-popular sports, and for the first time in Israel, people could watch broadcasts of the volleyball and handball leagues. Other factors besides the transformation of Israel into a multichannel society intertwined with Israel's process of state formation: secularisation, population growth, urbanisation, militarisation and, most germane for present purposes, the development of professional sports. As stated earlier, these processes are not isolated but rather interdependent processes and therefore of importance when discussing the development of sport in Israel (Galily and Bernstein 2008).

The introduction of team owners proved an imperative strategy. New team owners took advantage of this new media reality and of exposure in order to gain a new dimension within their social status in Israel. Some of the team owners used the exposure to promote their private businesses, whereas others promoted political interest in the daily lives of Israelis. Most owners had joined via their love of football and emotional commitment to one team or another. The addition of team owners, financial thinkers and business standards led to changes. While in the past, decisions were based on political impact and old school thinking, the consideration space of the decision-maker was now filled with commercialised and business elements.

The globalisation process the world is experiencing did not overlook Israeli football. Media development and fast data transfer have affected football in Israel. Football as an international field is not only managed in the local arena, but also impacted by the development of football around the world and the factors managing it. Similar processes and transfers have taken place in other countries, and it is only natural that Israeli football will be exposed to and affected by these developments. Joining UEFA in 1993 and the increased impact of UEFA on European football through organised games have been major factors in the promotion of Israeli football. Before joining, Israeli teams were travelling around the world to places where football was insufficiently developed; the connection to European football has enabled Israeli football to take a leap forward. In addition to the exposure in Europe to professional football that is being managed modernly and professionally, there is also funding from UEFA that provides more resources. It is difficult to imagine where Israeli football would have been in the beginning of the current millennium, without the connection to UEFA.

As discussed earlier, Israeli football underwent a commercialising process of recognition, resulting in football being seen not only as a communal, philanthropic activity ruled by a group of volunteers. With the end of public

funding of Israeli football and the entrance of media groups and sponsors, it has become obvious that football is no longer simply another game played between two distant villages in northern Israel, but a product with economic aspects, that needs to be renewed and nourished. The exposure of Israeli football and the increase in income that came from TV and sponsors have made it quite clear that football is undergoing a commercialisation process that has turned it into a marketed product. Branding football as a commodity for leisure time and a cultural product has sharpened the commercialisation process. Connecting football to its fans and the shifting view of the IFA and team owners, who are realising that football fans in Israel have similar characteristics to customers from other fields, have led to a different view of football games. IFA and the owners now see football fans as an inseparable part of the team. They are another economic channel impacting the team's success and cannot be ignored.

2   Historical Club Rivalries: The Tel Aviv Football Derby

The rivalry between the Hapoel and Maccabi sports associations led to the development of the famous rivalry between the Tel Aviv FCs. Maccabi Tel Aviv FC was founded in 1906, while Hapoel Tel Aviv FC was instituted in 1923. Although initially unwilling to play each other, in early 1928 the clubs came to an operating agreement, and the first friendly encounter between the teams took place on 25 February 1928 on Maccabi ground, with Maccabi winning 3-0. The two clubs have different support bases: Hapoel is linked to the working-class, whereas Maccabi is considered a more middle-class club. The clubs currently share the Bloomfield Stadium in Jaffa.

Maccabi Tel Aviv is the most successful FC in Israel with 20 League titles won in the club's history, while Hapoel Tel Aviv is not too far behind with 13. Prior to the country's independence, the clubs met 17 times in the League, out of which Hapoel won 9, Maccabi won 5 and 3 resulted in a draw. Post-statehood (1948), Maccabi has won 48 League victories, Hapoel has won 46, and there have been 52 draws. Overall (2017), since 1931, Hapoel has 55 League victories, Maccabi has 53, and 55 matches have ended with a draw.

Overall, Maccabi has enjoyed a bit more success both in League titles and in meetings between the two associations. And while the rivalry stretches further than just football—in basketball, Maccabi has been in the elite of Israel's League and European competition—Hapoel is known best for its

football programme and its impressive European run in the 2001–01 UEFA Cup season, in which the club managed to defeat Lokomotiv Moscow, Chelsea and Parma before losing in the quarter-finals to AC Milan in a close margin 2–1 on aggregate.

Some noteworthy figures in the derby include the Ghanaian footballer John Paintsil, who has played for both clubs and who waved an Israeli flag after scoring a goal during the 2006 World Cup; Nigerian goalkeeper Vincent Enyeama, who has also played for both clubs but spent four years with Hapoel and only one loan season with their rivals; former Chelsea FC manager Avram Grant, who coached Maccabi on two occasions; and the son of Dutch legend Johan Cruyff, Jordi, who is currently the sporting director at Maccabi Tel Aviv.

Conflicts between supporters of the two clubs are not infrequent. Fans of the two sides often engage in disputes inside and outside of the stadium, both on match days and otherwise.[3] For example, in 2014, the derby was called off after supporters from both teams broke into the pitch and confronted security guards and other spectators. The chaos began in the 33rd minute (the score was 1-1) when a Hapoel fan attacked Maccabi Tel Aviv's Eran Zahavi. Zahavi responded with a kick and was shown the second yellow card. The referee's decision caused an uproar on the pitch: Zahavi refused to step down, and Maccabi's general manager Jordi Cruyff threatened to tell his players to walk. The game was allowed to continue ten minutes later, but was again stopped when more supporters entered the pitch and attacked security guards. Maccabi players were attacked with objects thrown from the stands.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: Terror and Football

The wave of terrorist acts that have hit Israel since October 2000, as part of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, has taken a high toll on Israeli society. It has affected all forms of life, including the institution of sport, which has been significantly hurt as a result. Foreign sports teams from diverse branches have requested not to come to Israel, mainly due to fear for their safety. From 2001 to 2004, international sports organisations adopted different policies concerning this issue, in stark contrast to each other.

For a little over two years, UEFA barred Israel from hosting official football games for fear of endangering athletes and spectators. The sweeping ban included all competitions of all UEFA football teams to be held in Israel.

During those two-plus years, the organisation held many discussions in the presence of professionals and politicians, and only at the end of April 2004 did it allow the resumption of football games in Israel, with the qualification that they take place only in the Tel Aviv region.

The cancellation of games in Israel occurred at the very height of Israeli football's success. The chronology of the decision began in October 2001, when a decisive game between the Israeli and the Austrian national teams, which would determine who would advance to the World Cup, was scheduled to take place. Nine of the players from the Austrian team announced their refusal to come to Israel, and eventually FIFA, the international football association, decided to postpone the game. Because the game was to take place within the World Cup preliminaries framework, the organisation responsible for the event was FIFA, the international association, rather than UEFA, the European one.

During the year prior to this decision, Israel had been rife with terrorist attacks. During this period, international games had taken place in Israel as usual, and the month preceding the scheduled game had been relatively quiet. Only four days before the Israeli–Austrian game, an official Israeli football game took place in the European Championship preliminaries between the Israeli and Romanian youth teams. In a FIFA statement to the media, the Austrian team requested not to come to Israel following an explosion on a Siberian Airlines passenger flight on its way to Novosibirsk, three days before the game. The explosion took place far away from Israeli territory, and later it transpired that it was caused by an accident during a military drill by the Ukrainian army. The day after the explosion—prior to the scheduled game—the Ukrainian president was quoted as saying that the plane might have been shot down by a missile during a military exercise. Clarifications by the former chairman of the IFA, Gavri Levy, and the Israeli Minister of Sports at the time, Matan Vilnai, who tried to explain to the Austrians and FIFA that the downed plane and the security situation in Israel were unrelated, fell on deaf ears, and the game was cancelled.

The next link in the chain was a game in the UEFA Cup tournament between Hapoel Tel Aviv and the London team, Chelsea FC. Six players from Chelsea abstained from the game, which took place as planned in Israel some two weeks after the cancelled game with the Austrians. Here again, the downed Russian plane was the reason given for their absence. Moreover, Emmanuel Petit, one of the team's stars who chose not to come to Israel, claimed that he did not believe the plane came down by accident.

Two important points must be considered. First, Chelsea is one of the biggest and best-known teams in Europe. The objection to coming to Israel

for security reasons by well-known and admired players had a significant impact. The attention given to the issue placed it on both sports and political agendas. Second, the absence of a team's significant players can cost the team the game and lead them to lose their place in a prestigious competition, as happened in this case. Individual players also stand to lose considerable amounts of money (grants awarded for advancing in a competition) by being disqualified from the tournament. With so much at stake, it can be assumed that the players did in fact fear for their lives.

The last official international game that was played in Israel during the period under discussion took place at the end of February 2002, between Hapoel Tel Aviv and the Italian team Parma. Less than a week after the game, a terrorist attack took place in Israel that had far-reaching implications for sports. A terrorist entered a restaurant and shot dead three Israeli civilians. Among the restaurant guests during the attack were a number of football players from Hapoel Tel Aviv, which was supposed to host AC Milan's football team a week later. News of the attack and photos of the terrified football players reached across Europe. As a result, UEFA decided to bar the team from hosting the quarter-finals in Israel. Like the FIFA ruling on the game against Austria, UEFA's decision appears to have been driven by emotional influences. Following bigger attacks (bigger according to the problematic and limited criteria that the number of casualties indicates the size of the attack), such as those in the examples at the beginning of this section, the games had not been transferred from Israel. However, in this instance, the attack took place in the centre of Tel Aviv in the presence of football players and other celebrities.

Four months later, at the end of June 2002, UEFA decided on a sweeping ban of official international games in Israel, for security reasons. During those four months, additional terrorist attacks had been committed in various parts of Israel. Some had been significant in terms of their magnitude and impact. It was an extremely tense period, during which the Israel Defense Forces carried out widespread operations in Judea and Samaria. At this time UEFA's decision was accepted by Israeli actors as clear and legitimate. In its decision, UEFA clarified that it did not object to having games in Israel, as long as the rival team agreed and accepted responsibility for any possible outcome. Yet when European clubs expressed willingness, at least in the media, to come to Israel and compete against Maccabi Haifa in the prestigious Champions League, UEFA refused to grant approval.

The first meeting between representatives from UEFA and IFA following the sweeping ban took place in Istanbul on 19 September 2002. The president of UEFA appointed two of his deputies as members of a special

committee that would examine the situation in Israel and give its recommendations regarding continued activities. Gavri Levy, the chairman of IFA, claimed that as soon as the deputies (one from Spain and the other from Turkey) were appointed to the special committee, he realised that things were moving in the right direction, as both were personal friends of his (personal interview). That same day, a bomb exploded on a bus in Tel Aviv, which delayed the delegation's arrival and posed new obstacles.

In 2003, a number of discussions took place in UEFA on the issue of games in Israel, but despite the improved security situation in Israel, UEFA's previous decision was not reversed. The turning point began with the arrival of Joseph Blatter, FIFA president (superior to UEFA in the hierarchy), in Israel, in June 2003. During his visit to IFA's 75th anniversary celebrations, the president announced that in the World Championship preliminaries, which were to take place in 2004, Israel would play on its home field. As the date approached, FIFA sent UEFA the message that it should be prepared to allow games to resume in Israel. Gerhard Aigner, UEFA president, was not a great sympathiser of Israel, as Gavri Levy, who attended numerous meetings with him, testified (personal interview). Aigner's replacement by Morten Olsen as president of the organisation removed the final hurdle, and games were allowed to resume in Israel.

During the interview with Gavri Levy, he summarised the factors that allowed the games to resume in Israel. The two deputies appointed to the special committee helped. Blatter's statement was crucial. The replacement of President Aigner facilitated the decision, as did the political influence of a number of Israeli ministers (including Silvan Shalom and Tzachi Hanegbi; personal interview).

The renewal of games in Israel was under the provision that UEFA could reverse the decision at any given time, and that the games take place only in the Tel Aviv region. Paradoxically, it was the attack in the heart of Tel Aviv that had triggered the situation (Galily et al. 2012).

4   Contemporary Israeli Football: From IFA to IPFL

As of 2014, Israeli football has entered a new era in management, along with the transfer of the handling of the activities and championships of the two upper divisions of Israeli football to the hands of the Israeli Professional Football League (IPFL). A new legal entity was established and registered to operate and manage the activities of these divisions.

The failure to make this change previously had been mainly a result of the combination of two elements: (a) disputes between IFA and the clubs regarding the scope of responsibilities to be transferred, and (b) differences of opinion as well as disputes among the clubs themselves.

In March 2012, rioting by football fans ensued during a game between Hapoel Tel Aviv and Maccabi Tel Aviv, in addition to a violent match on the field among the players. At the end of the same season, Maccabi Petah-Tikva lost three points following the violent behaviour of some of its role holders. As a result, the team was relegated to the second professional League. Maccabi Petah-Tikva was under the auspices of the team of IFA chairman Avi Luzon, without formally being involved in that team's management. There were some public accusations against Luzon that implied that he had tried to influence the judicial system of IFA and its disciplinary committee in order to help his favoured FC. The disciplinary committee's decision led to harsh criticism, both among the public and on the field itself, which shook the position of the IFA's judiciary system. The claim was that this decision reflected Israeli football in its entirety in recent years, turning from a popular field to a violent one, which lacked sportive value.

The reactions in the Israeli public to these events supported a general feeling of "enough is enough" and an urgent need for a solution. A committee was established by IFA itself (the "Cohen Committee") and another by the Ministry of Sport, headed by the Minister of Culture and Sport, Limor Livnat (the "Zelicha Committee"). Some conclusions of the two committees were identical, and others differed. The two committees claimed that most of IFA's attention and resources were focused on handling the professional leagues. The entire football sphere and its activity was managed and handled by IFA. Common opinion was that IFA faced a difficult challenge to provide the managerial and professional attention required for complete fulfilment of the football field's potential.

Negotiations between IFA and the various clubs were necessary to conclude the fundamental agreement expected to regulate and establish every element of the relations and mutual undertakings between the IFA and the new professional League. The Ministry of Sport decided to take the initiative and intervene to pressure IFA and the clubs to conclude such an agreement. Avoiding a "direct intervention", the Ministry involved "TOTO", the national sports betting body, which is actually controlled and governed by the state. Separating sports from the state's authorities did not allow the Ministry to directly intervene with management within IFA nor demand the establishment of IPFL. The fact that IFA needed state funds in order to financially manage itself was used by the Ministry for its political

needs, and in fact pushed IFA to establish IPFL. A huge crisis and lack of confidence became inherent between the public and IFA. Team owners were also frustrated by the lack of cooperation between IFA and themselves. Some owners felt that the president of IFA, Avi Luzon, showed interest only in certain teams that he preferred. The increased public pressure was in fact a political tailwind for the Ministry, which was riding the popularity wave of football fans. Intense unanimity and general discord among the key stakeholders propelled the League to separate.

The overall interest of the parties including the following resulted in an agreement between IFA and the clubs for the establishment of a professional League: (a) the understanding of IFA that the establishment of a professional League could not be delayed, (b) the willingness of the clubs (mainly the "Big Clubs") to establish the professional League, and (c) the pressure or firm position of the Ministry of Sport. IFA and the clubs were not receiving financial distributions from TOTO; therefore, during this stage, it was in the interest of all the parties, especially IFA and the club owners, to reduce public pressure and improve their economic situation by finding a solution.

In the summer of 2014, an establishment agreement was signed between IFA and the Minhelet (Hebrew for IPFL) that represented all clubs from the IPFL—the Premier League and the National League—for a period of five years ("the agreement").

Article 2.1 of the agreement set up the aims and objectives of IPFL. IPFL's objectives were to manage the professional leagues' professional activities, and in this framework to receive the authorities granted to IFA by virtue of the Championship Regulations and to manage the financial operations and activities in a professional, transparent and impartial manner, including the management of the broadcasting, publishing, TOTO and sponsorship rights.

It was also agreed in Article 2.3 of the agreement that IPFL would only operate within the framework of the authorities delegated to it by IFA, according and in full cooperation with IFA. The clubs who are part of IPFL would continue to be an inseparable part of IFA, as ordinary members of IFA and of its general assembly, in accordance with what is stated in the Constitution Regulations of IFA.

Article 3 of the agreement stated the jurisdiction and the responsibilities of IPFL. IFA assigned IPFL the rights and the authorities deriving from them on the following matters: initially, financial, commercial and marketing management of the professional leagues, including television, Internet and cellular broadcasting rights of League games, and adoption, advertising, sponsorship, signage and branding of the League.

Furthermore, IPFL would manage the professional League games according to the Championship Regulations. The League and Cup committee, which operates the football games, would consist of three members: two from IPFL (IPFL's chairperson and IPFL's CEO), and an additional member from IFA (IFA's CEO).

The Cohen Committee analysed the desired model for IPFL using, inter alia, examples from Europe and the desired relationship between IPFL and IFA. In some models, IPFL was completely separate from IFA, such as in England and Germany, while in others there was a strong connection between the two, such as in Italy. Committee members accepted the sharing of opinions and cooperation between IPFL and IFA and based the desired model upon this. On the one hand, there was the will for an independent body that would operate with no limitations or direct influence by IFA, and on the other hand, there was an understanding of the need for and importance of IFA as a regulatory body.

5   Conclusion

As Ben-Porat (2012), among many others, asserts, the process of football's commodification is almost universal, mainly because of the results of the process, which turn the building elements of the game into commodities, thereby dictating its management, its new aims and its relationship with fans. This was and still is the story of football's commodification in Israel.

The story of football in Israel has three chapters: it began as a community project under the tutelage of national political sports federations. Carried along on the winds of change in the entire society, commodification was forced upon Israeli football, as it had been forced on football elsewhere. When the market economy became the dominant instance in Israel and when privatisation became the major mechanism, the individual club could no longer lean on the support of the sports federations or the state and had to initiate its own transformation, which manifested in new owners, new directors, new relationships with players and staff, and new attitudes towards fans. Although the position of the individual club has some unique cultural characteristics, in terms of the basic elements of commodification, the picture of Israeli football is a carbon copy of football elsewhere: an Israeli FC could be introduced to one of the European leagues and be completely assimilated with only a few adjustments.

Notes

1. While this chapter will deal mainly with Israeli football and Jewish origins, an Arab perspective can be found at Ben-Porat (2014, 175–189).
2. At the same time, Israeli football saw the acquisition of Israeli football players (like Ronny Rosenthal, Eyal Berkowitz and Haim Revivo) by leading European clubs. The constant transfer of athletes between clubs signalled the decline in the clubs' influence and the rise of athletic "stars".
3. For example, see the stories mentioned here: http://www.footyfair.com/2014/07/tel-aviv-derby-football-rivalries.html.

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Ivory Coast

Daniel Künzler

1   The Political Origins of Football

No thorough, internationally available historical study about the adaptation of football in Ivory Coast exists to date. However, a rough outline can be extracted from the work of historian Bernadette Deville-Danthu (1997, 1998) on the history of sport in French West Africa. In 1893, Ivory Coast became a French colony; it was integrated into French West Africa two years later. Its capital was in the colony of Senegal (Saint-Louis and later Dakar) which received directives from the Ministry of Overseas France and centrally administered French West Africa. After the First World War, concern over the health status of young male colonial subjects prompted the French to develop physical education and military preparation. Conceived in Dakar by the Governor General, the implementation of this policy depended on the support of the governors of the different colonies. The governor of Ivory Coast from 1925 to 1930, Maurice Lapalud, showed little interest in such activities as Africans, through their daily occupations and lifestyle, "made sport without knowing it" (Deville-Danthu 1997, 89). Ivorians also were reluctant to participate in these military preparation sessions "if it was not the day they were assured of receiving small gifts", as an official in Northern Ivory Coast put it (cited in Deville-Danthu 1997, 42). Consequently, from

D. Künzler (✉)
University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
e-mail: daniel.kuenzler@unifr.ch

1930 to 1932, a quarter of the budget for physical education in Ivory Coast was reserved for such rewards. Lapalud also noted the lack of interest among Europeans to motivate Africans to take part in physical education through their sporting clubs. Europeans were also reluctant to join the emerging African sports clubs. These, in turn, focused more on dancing and music than on sports and soon became dormant or were dissolved.

As in other French West African colonies, young male Ivorians mistrusted physical education. They defied the colonial policy by developing a strong interest in sports and particularly football. This interest started to rise towards the end of the 1920s and was fuelled by sporting events and competitions organised by the military and clubs reserved for colonialists. Football clubs with African members emerged in French West African colonies rather late compared to most British territories. Ivorian examples include *Jeunesse Club d'Abidjan* and *Réveil Club de Daloa*,[1] both founded in 1932. The colonial authorities did not overtly condemn this development, but tried to subvert it by offering support to clubs focusing on physical education and military training preparation. Continuing to laud mass physical education as an essential part of the colonial "civilising mission" in the early years of the Second World War, representatives of the colonial government gradually became more supportive of competitive sport in the post-war period. Still advancing arguments based on health and education, they had a special interest in athletics and imposed its introduction in schools. Ivorians were again reluctant to follow the agenda of the colonial masters by practising athletics. However, their position towards sporting clubs radically changed. Making use of the freedom of association, they founded sporting clubs of all kinds, which multiplied five-fold in the Ivory Coast colony between 1943 and 1957. This made the colony, together with Senegal, the area with most sports clubs per inhabitant in French West Africa. The financing of sporting activities in French West Africa grew considerably in this period. It was, however, unequal, and Ivory Coast received a bigger share than other colonies.

Among them were three of the most popular football clubs, all based in the economic capital Abidjan (Poli 2002). In 1947, three traders from the nearby Dahomey colony founded a multi-sport club called *Sol Béni* ("blessed soil") as an expression of gratitude for their economic success. Among them was François Ouégnin, the father of the club's current president. The club later was renamed *Amicale Sportive des Employés de Commerce Mimosas* (*ASEC Mimosas*), and its football branch is the most titled club in the country. *ASEC's* major rival *Africa Sports* was also founded in 1947.

The initial name *Cercle Sportif Bété* refers to the ethnic origins of the multi-sports club's founders in the South-West of the colony, the main cocoa-producing region. One of its players, Jean Tokpa, left the club in 1955 to play in France. He was followed by a number of other early Ivorian football migrants. The third major club, emerged from a fusion of three older clubs, all founded in the 1930s: *Union Sportive des Fonctionnaires d'Abidjan*, a club for French and local civil servants; *Union Sportive des Indigènes*, also founded by civil servants; and *Planification Industrielle Christian*, a club managed by the French. *Stade d'Abidjan*'s close links with the colonial administration are still visible nowadays in the colours of the club (the French blue, white and red). These early football clubs were thus founded in the economic and political centres of the colony by traders and civil servants. Football diffused along the railway and major roads from the coast to the interior. Schools were initially of secondary importance, as secondary and higher education was for a long time concentrated in Senegal. School football teams did not become more important until as late as the 1950s. While soldiers and industrial firms probably had little influence in Ivory Coast, the influence of seamen on the adaptation of football is under-explored.

Before the Second World War, friendly matches were mainly played on the occasion of national and religious holidays or visits by colonial officials and not on a regular basis. In 1946, the West African Football League was founded in Dakar. It was attached to the French Football Federation and organised a tournament that included teams from Ivory Coast after 1948. These Cup matches attracted huge and occasionally excessive crowds. After 1950, there was an Ivorian football League with a first and a second division.

In 1956, more than 400 football matches were played in Abidjan; the infrastructure, which included five stadiums, did not match the demand. By prioritising football over physical education and military preparation, urban male Ivorians evaded colonial control. They also adapted sporting clubs to their needs by focusing on dancing instead of the designated physical activities. This therefore constituted incidences of indirect resistance against colonial rule. Football, however, seems not to have played a significant role in the struggle for independence in the Ivory Coast. The main independence movement was rooted in the planter elite and turned into the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI). Led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who became the country's first president, it advocated a slow transition to independence.

2   Historical Football Rivalries: A Capitalistic Society Based on Patronage

"If there is one country where, in effect, independence involved hardly more than the raising of a new flag, that country is Côte d'Ivoire, where for decades the functions of sovereignty were exercised by French personnel and where even the country's security was guaranteed not by a national army but by (…) the permanent French garrison in Abidjan" (Banégas 2006, 548). In independent Ivory Coast, the PDCI was the state party in a single-party system. In contrast to most other West African independence leaders, Houphouët-Boigny was not only a staunch ally of France, but also a proponent of a capitalistic development path aiming at attracting foreign capital. Senegal, the privileged colony in French West Africa, chose a socialist path after independence. In both countries, sport in general and football in particular were under government control. After independence, the Ivorian Football Federation (FIF) was presided over by the Interior Minister Coffi Gadeau. He was followed by Mathieu Ekra, close collaborator with Houphouët-Boigny. Since assuming office, Houphouët-Boigny has made use of sporting successes to personally honour sportspeople representing the country in international competitions. This initially rarely concerned footballers. Departing sportspeople received instructions from the president, who was particularly keen on showcasing a friendly and hospitable nation to counteract his reputation for dividing French West African unity by preferring direct relations with France. While Senegalese sportspeople dominated the colonial period, Ivorian became more competitive thereafter. Sporting competitions, including football matches, increasingly became proxy competitions between two opposed presidents.

   This was even more the case with football matches opposing Ivorian and Guinean or Ghanaian teams. Again, football matches were proxy competitions between two political systems. Socialist Guinean President Ahmed Sékou Touré, who was known to be football mad, pushed Guinean football teams in general and his favourite club team *Hafia Conakry* in particular, with a measure of success in the 1970s. Similar competition reigned with Ghana, well beyond the rather short-lived socialist regime of Kwame Nkrumah. The ugliest outburst of this long-standing rivalry came later in 1993, when *ASEC* played the African Cup of Champions Clubs (ACCC) semi-final against *Ashanti Kotoko*. There are different accounts at to what exactly happened, but all agree that at least 20 Ghanaians were killed in Ivory Coast in revenge attacks after earlier clashes between supporters.

It took the countries more than a year to organise friendly football matches to calm the tensions.

To support footballing success, Peter Schnittger, a coach employed by the German Technical Cooperation, was sent to Ivory Coast. He led the country to the African Cup of Nations (CAN) semi-finals in 1970, where they lost against Ghana. However, the country failed to qualify for the CAN several times in the following years. Even at the home CAN in 1984, the team did not pass the group stage. After Ivory Coast qualified for CAN in 1986, Houphouët-Boigny received and rewarded the team. In his speech, he presented himself as the father of the nation. As such, he takes care of his "children" who are expected to be obedient. If they fail, they are punished. If they abandon the house and go into opposition, the father is angry, but will pardon them if they return and repent. This was a typical pattern of Houphouët-Boigny's politics, also in areas beyond football. Finally, in 1992, the Ivory Coast won the CAN for the first time.[2] To celebrate, Houphouët-Boigny declared a public holiday and received the players, giving them each a villa as a "personal gift". The achievement of "captain" Houphouët-Boigny and his team was widely celebrated. This came as a welcome relief for Houphouët-Boigny, whose grip on the country was contested by protests and the efforts of opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo following the introduction of a multiparty system in 1990 and a structural adjustment programme.

Some of the characteristics of Houphouët-Boigny's regime become apparent when looking at football clubs. In the first decade after independence, *Stade d'Abidjan* dominated the football League. The highlight was its victory in the ACCC final 1966 against *Real de Bamako*, a club from socialist Mali. At the time, *Stade d'Abidjan* predominantly had students as players, and the staff of the team was composed of civil servant cadres. Among its presidents was Interior Minister and FIF President Coffi Gadeau. The club had a reputation for being intellectual and cultivating fair play and style. Style was also attributed to the players of *ASEC*, who were said to play the game for its own sake. In contrast, the playing style of their main rival *Africa Sports* was characterised by physical power and fighting spirit. The club dominated during the 1980s and has won occasional national and international titles since then. Successful President Simplice de Messe Zinsou was Houphouët-Boigny's son-in-law. The most titled club, *ASEC*, dominated the 1970s and the period from 1990 to 2010. Its home stadium has been called Stade Félix Houphouët-Boigny since the 1960s and is nicknamed *Le Félicia*. The president has strong connections with the club's presidents. *ASEC* President Michel Kangha Ahoua Atchin-Kwassi was the paternal uncle of Houphouët-Boigny, ambassador and chief of staff of the general secretary of the PDCI.

His successor, Roger Ouégnin, had a brother who served as ambassador under Houphouët-Boigny. It is appropriate to briefly sketch some important developments in Ivorian club football after Houphouët-Boigny's death before characterising his regime.

In 1994, Ouégnin together with Frenchman Jean-Marc Guillou founded the *Mimosifcom* football academy, combining football training and academic education. In 1999, the continental Super Cup was won by a team entirely composed of the first graduates of the academy. Players of this team were the core of the national team for more than a decade to come. However, Guillou and Ouégnin fell out shortly thereafter. The club received an average transfer fee of €336,250 for the 24 players transferred abroad from 2000 to 2009, which is not as much as clubs from other continents receive (Poli 2010, 1002).

Africa Sports and *ASEC* had a highly organised fan base, and their derbies were fiercely contested. The climax of this rivalry was in May 2001, when riots left one person dead and 39 injured. However, the Ivorian football League has dwindled in popularity since the turn of the millennium and attendance figures have dropped, even at derbies. *Africa Sports* was rather occupied by an internal power fight and a president convicted for a toxic waste scandal. In 2014, *ASEC* had an average of a few hundred spectators per match. International successes have failed to materialise in recent years. Most Ivorians prefer European football, which is seen as more attractive and less subject to local identity politics. In recent years, teams from smaller Ivorian towns have won the championship. From 2012 to 2014, it was *Séwé Sports* of San Pedro, presided over by Eugène Marie Diomandé, a businessman whose father has been called "the journalist of Houphouët-Boigny". In 2015, *AS Tanda* from the North-East of the country won its first title. President Séverin Kouabénan Yoboua is a businessman and local politician close to the PDCI.

The close ties of several presidents of Ivorian football clubs with President Houphouët-Boigny point towards the extensive system of patronage characteristic of his regime, a system that extended to many domains of society. Houphouët-Boigny was a master of what locally was called *la géopolitique*, the complex art of regional and political balancing. This patronage system could easily be financed during the "Ivorian miracle" of remarkable economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. In continuation of colonial policy, Houphouët-Boigny turned the country into the world's biggest cocoa producer by encouraging domestic (northern and Central) and international labour migration with a liberal land policy of "the land belongs to whoever cultivates it".

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: Identity and Political Conflict

In the 1980s, this patronage system faced a severe crisis. The world market prices for cocoa were low, while a structural adjustment package limited opportunities for patronage, causing a return migration of the original inhabitants of the South-Western cocoa region and land conflicts. Redefinitions of nationalism and citizenship gradually became Central to politics, and football was later perceived in similar terms. Central to this was the introduction of the notion of *ivoirité* by Henri Konan Bédié. Bédié constitutionally succeeded Houphouët-Boigny after the country "became orphan", the term whereby then Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara announced Houphouët-Boigny's death in late 1993.

Bédié's *ivoirité* linked citizenship not to residency, as Houphouët-Boigny had, but rather to membership of a native group. With the help of new citizenship laws, Bédié used this concept to block the candidacy of Ouattara in the 1995 presidential election. Ouattara had good chances of winning that poll with the backing of the *Rally of Republicans* (RDR), a party mainly supported by northern or migrant voters. Both Ouattara and Gbagbo asked their followers to boycott the polls. Bédié won with 96% of the vote. However, he was notably uncharismatic. Shortly after the 1995 elections, he attended the return match of the ACCC final between *ASEC* and South African team *Orlando Pirates* in *Le Félicia*. Disappointed by their team's failure to win the elusive international title, many supporters of *ASEC* blamed Bédié for the defeat and chanted "Bédié, our misfortune" on the streets (Poli 2002, 10). The newspaper *La Voie*, close to Gbagbo's opposition party FPI, reported similarly. The responsible journalist and the editor were condemned to imprisonment and fines, and the newspaper was closed. This was just one instance of Bédié's repression of the press. Being reportedly quite ignorant about football, Bédié nevertheless wanted to instrumentalise the sport by attending that final only to realise that a football stadium is a place of veneration and contestation. Bédié avoided potential contestation on the occasion of the 1998 ACCC final, won by *ASEC* against Zimbabwean team *Dynamos FC*. He invited the team five days after the final match to honour the players. Bédié's unpopularity was obvious when I witnessed the coup d'état against him on Christmas Eve 1999. Ivorian troops, who had not been paid for their participation in a peacekeeping mission, toppled Bédié in a bloodless coup that put a lasting end to the relative stability of the country. France, blocked by a cohabitation government, did not intervene.

Général Robert Guéï assumed power. Guéï initially enjoyed the sympathies of the population, but his authoritative streak rapidly asserted itself. Among the early victims were the players of the national football team. Knocked out of a difficult group at the CAN in January 2000, on their return flight the players were diverted to Yamoussoukro and held in the military camp of Zambakro for four days. Guéï, on whose orders this had happened, personally preached at them about personal civism. Former player Basile Boli, who was mediating between the players and the president, reported that Guéï threatened them with 18 months in the army if they failed again, arguing that "if you play, the whole country plays".

Breaking earlier promises, Guéï excluded Ouattara from the 2000 presidential elections. While the RDR boycotted the election, many PDCI voters supported Gbagbo, who won the first round. Guéï, however, claimed victory, but a wave of protests drove him from power. Gbagbo was sworn in as president but faced protests from northerners who wanted new elections. There were repeated attacks on northerners and migrants, as Gbagbo continued a policy of land redistribution in the name of *ivoirité*.

On 19 September 2002, there was a coup attempt by former army officers mainly from the North of the country. They failed to take Abidjan but controlled the North. The French army acted as a buffer between the rebels and the South; they were subsequently replaced by UN troops. In the West, there were two rebel groups intent on plunder and revenge for the death of Guéï. They joined the northern *Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast* (MPCI) in a rebel coalition called *New Forces* (FN), whose quasi-government was led by a Christian former student leader, Guillaume Soro. Ouattara narrowly escaped. Subsequent massacres by the rebels and southern militias such as the *New Patriots* forced close to a million people to flee. There was thus a "war of rival patriotisms" about "the contours of the political community as well as the content and modes of citizenship" (Banégas 2006, 536), opposing Houphouët-Boigny's inclusive conception of citizenship to the narrower *ivoirité* based on autochthony and exclusion. It was also a conflict about access to different rights (vote, property) linked to citizenship. Arguments about autochthony, nationalism and tradition were also used to justify strategies aiming at the plundering of resources or at the emancipation of younger generations. Another register of legitimation is the call for a "second independence" from the former colonial power.[3] Relations with the former colonial power France were delicate. On the one hand, French troops organised a friendly football match between the rebels and the Ivorian army in 2004. On the other, after a series of attacks on rebels and the bombardment of the French base near Bouaké, French troops destroyed Gbagbo's air force.

This resulted in a coordinated attack on French targets in Abidjan, a mass evacuation of French nationals and the killing of dozens of Ivoirians. In the following year, Gbagbo tried to approach French President Chirac using the football friendly between France and the Ivory Coast as an occasion to send a messenger. There was a meeting at ministerial level during the break, but relations quickly soured again after a coup attempt.

After finishing last at the 2002 CAN[4] and failing to qualify for the next, the national football team, nicknamed the Elephants, played the combined qualification matches for CAN and World Cup 2006 with a new team. The FIF asked politicians and other stakeholders not to instrumentalise the team for particular interests and petitioned the major religious players for prayers and support. Politicians of all tendencies called for joint support of the team (N'Guessan 2006). Qualification matches were able to unify people across political, ethnic and religious lines. Football victories enabled the manifestation of a national collectivity. When the Ivory Coast lost against Cameroon in a match that would have qualified them for the World Cup, there were a few oppositional voices happy about Gbagbo not having an opportunity to instrumentalise the team. However, this opportunity came soon thereafter. As Cameroon drew against Egypt, having missed the deciding penalty in extra time, Ivory Coast won the group and qualified for the World Cup. The team was flown in and driven in an hours-long victory parade across Abidjan to the presidential palace. The players were honoured with orders of merit and promised a villa. The opposition, including the rebels, also congratulated the team. This was a welcome distraction for Gbagbo, who has become increasingly authoritarian and had postponed the elections scheduled that month. The players also used the successful qualification as a chance to make political statements. Several of them called for peace in interviews and the qualification turned into something of a mission to unite the country. The most prominent statement was made by player Didier Drogba on TV on the day of the qualification. He called the players, coming from different regions of the country, together and said that the national team had just proved that Ivorians could cohabit and play together to reach a common goal. He then made the players kneel and called for an end to the conflict. Many reports depicted the team as an example for the country to follow and referred to the glorious successes that can be achieved when ethnic and political differences are set aside. Interestingly, while they agree on the general meaning of Drogba's statement, different sources report the event with different words, always allegedly using direct quotes. According to his memoirs, Drogba (2008, 183) called for elections, while N'Guessan (2006, 451) cites an article of the daily *Fraternité Matin*, close to government, that asked politicians

in general—thus including the rebels and the opposition—to deliver peace. On the streets of Abidjan, some already enthusiastically celebrated the end of what is neither war nor peace. There were sceptical voices as well. Bonaventure Kalou stated that he did not believe that soccer was going to reunify the country, but that it would allow a moment of rapprochement and create a climate for potential conflict resolution (McShane 2008, 256).[5]

Drogba, ironically enough, grew up in France and started to play football there. He became a professional comparatively late and had started to score in the French League when the rebellion started. As an international footballer, he was to be a Central figure for the events to come, somewhat to his discomfort. It is important to underline from the beginning that what follows in this contribution is not about Drogba's or any other player's convictions and sentiments—whatever they might be—but about the way he is used and misused by others. It is frequently assumed that players support the political actors favourable to their region of origin. As Drogba (2008, 201) himself complained: "In the conventional analysis, constantly relayed, I was a necessarily close to the government because the president was Bété like me".

When the national football team played at the 2006 CAN, the political situation was again quite tense. Across the country, there were roadblocks and incidents of violence. According to press reports, this tension was quite palpable in the team's quarter in Kairo, where the player's thoughts were with the people back home and they felt a heavy responsibility to win on their shoulders. In the final match against host Egypt after a goalless draw, Drogba missed his opening penalty in the shoot-out that saw the host triumph. Nonetheless, the Ivorian players were received as heroes at the airport and had an audience with the president. Already during the competition, the matches occasioned moments of joy and relief. Gbagbo's supporters suspended their demonstrations against the international community, allegedly to allow a common front in support of the national team. Again, there were sceptical voices. Minister for National Reconciliation, Sébastien Dano Djédjé, for example, stated in an interview with BBC: "Football and the World Cup can be a major fact in bringing us together. (…) But we shouldn't have too many illusions - we have deep problems here and football cannot solve all of these". However, FIF President Jacques Anouma stated that he was somewhat disillusioned that the victories of the national team did not bring the country closer to a political solution. He reinforced his pleas for peace ahead of the upcoming World Cup. Anouma, by the way, was financial administrator of *ASEC* in the 1980s, later Air France manager, and became 2000 Chief Financial Officer of the Presidency under Gbagbo.

Ivory Coast played a warm-up fixture against former colonial power France. While some cautioned against exaggerated expectations, others expected a symbolic revenge for past injustices as a matter of national honour and explained the defeat away with the fact that the Ivorian coaching staff was French. Gbagbo tried to calm spirits. His sports minister even decorated the mothers of the players representing the Ivory Coast at the World Cup, for their services to the nation.

Excitement was high when the World Cup started. The national colours (orange, white and green) were omnipresent, also in the rebel area where the matches were shown, for example, on a big screen in their stronghold Bouaké. In a strong group, the team lost their first two matches against Argentine and the Netherlands and was eliminated. Euphoria turned into disillusionment, and debates about the reasons started. Drogba explained the elimination with a lack of team spirit: "In Egypt [where the Ivory Coast reached the final of the CAN], we had a working collective, at the World Cup, we discovered individualities. Every player wanted to achieve his own little thing, observing what was going on to make the best out of it" (Drogba 2008, 189). Drogba was suspended for the final match against Serbia and Montenegro. *Le Patriote*, a newspaper close to the opposition party RDR, interpreted the victory as a vindication of northern players: "It was necessary for the Ivorians to have a rebellion in order to get back to the match. Aruna Dindane, very strong and supported by a Kader Kéita successfully passing and a Zokora Didier, very authoritarian in recovering the ball, were able to bring back Côte d'Ivoire into the competition after the break" (Mehler 2008, 102f.). The reference to Aruna Dindane is especially significant, as this player was once dismissed by President Gbagbo as being a Burkinabé. Another explanation frequently brought forward was an assumed split in the team between the players trained in the *Mimosifcom* academy and the rest around Drogba. Drogba wanted to leave the national team but was convinced by Anouma to stay.[6]

Gbagbo praised Drogba, African Player of the Year 2006, as a symbol of national unity that put his country on the international map. When receiving the trophy, Drogba offered it to the Ivory Coast (and not to its president). He took his award to Bouaké, renewed his call for peace and added that the national team would play the CAN qualifier against Madagascar in the separatists' fief. The team needed a win to ensure qualification. In front of an enthusiastic crowd including soldiers from both camps, Madagascar was thrashed 5:0. Many people living in the South used the opportunity to visit family and friends for the first time in years. Just a little earlier, Gbagbo nominated Soro as prime minister following a peace agreement.

Soon after the elimination of Ivory Coast in the 2008 CAN semi-final, the qualification process for CAN and World Cup 2010 started. The new Bosnian coach Valid Halilhodžić repeated in a newspaper interview the lament about the national team being a group of superb individualists lacking team spirit and raised the spectre of a golden generation that might fail to win a title. On the sporting side, the qualification process went well. However, on 29 March 2009, the 5:0 victory against Malawi was marred by a stampede and the collapse of a wall in the massively overcrowded *Félicia* that killed at least 20 and injured more than 130. Security forces allegedly triggered panic firing tear gas in the stand ahead of the match. Ignoring the incident, Gbagbo shook hands with both teams. Albert Kacou Anzouan, head of the organising committee of the match, was later sentenced to six months in prison and a fine for printing too many tickets. Gbagbo had a hard time at football matches in 2009. He was criticised for his lack of sensitivity to the stampede, received less applause than the local music stars and the national team at the match against Burkina Faso, and was perceived as being humiliated by the defeat of his country's team at the African Nations Championship, whose first edition was held in the country. This competition is for players of the domestic leagues, and Ivory Coast finished distant last without scoring even one goal.

However, the most remarkable use of football as "a space where diverging conceptions of nation and citizenship clash" (Kamaté and Banégas 2010, 102) was the semi-final of the European Champions League in 2009. A few days before the match, national television RTI described the match as one between Ivory Coast, represented by Chelsea FC player Drogba, against Cameroon, represented by FC Barcelona striker Samuel Eto'o.[7] The reference to this long-standing football rivalry addressed national honour and purposefully denied Barcelona player Yaya Touré his Ivorian nationality, despite his playing for the national team. Some politicians and media reactivated the narrower conception of citizenship where only southerners are "real" Ivorians as opposed to "northerners" such as Yaya Touré, who were depicted as foreigners close to opposition politician Ouattara. Not only did Chelsea lose this match, but so did Ivory Coast, according to one TV journalist (Kamaté and Banégas 2010, 87f.). Northerners in return celebrated Barcelona's victory on the streets as some sort of revenge. In a populist move, Gbagbo tried for appeasement and invited Touré to present the trophy in the country. He emphasised that Touré was an Ivoirian and deserved praise for his merits. However, the presentation of the trophy attracted a massive crowd and numerous delegations from northern villages. It turned into the first big demonstration of northern claims in years. After the

semi-final, some northerners also described Drogba's rant against referee Øvrebø after some controversial decisions against Chelsea as an example of how the imagined South lacked fairness.[8] Wearing an Eto'o shirt, something quite common on Abidjan's streets during that time, might express genuine veneration of this player, but also opposition to Drogba and the South he represented. Discussing Drogba or Touré and even Eto'o became a proxy for discussing definitions of Ivorian identity and citizenship. Again, Drogba dissociated himself from these discussions.

Both Drogba and Touré participated in a country-wide publicity campaign for peaceful elections ahead of the 2010 CAN (Kamaté and Banégas 2010, 96). The sporting competition ended with a quarter-final defeat against Algeria that later became known as the "shame of Cabinda" and was frequently attributed to the lack of solidarity in the team. Kader Keita scored to put his side ahead in the 89th minute. However, two late goals from Algeria turned things around and cost coach Halilhodžić his job. According to media reports, this decision came from above, as the president had counted on a successful CAN campaign to boost his re-election campaign. Indeed, the discussion about "bad governance" extended from the staff of the national team to government.

Watching the group stage of the World Cup 2010 in Abidjan, I could witness at its beginning how media and many Ivorians invoked a "sacred union" behind the national team. This was in line with the argument of Kamaté and Banégas (2010, 96), who suppose that the identity divide is no longer important when it comes to the national team. In his interview with RTI before the first match, President Gbagbo downplayed the importance of the injured Drogba and emphasised the importance of the team as a whole. He explicitly included Yaya Touré to his list of Ivorian football achievements in Europe ("We have a champion of Spain") and thus continued the symbolic politics of inclusion he started after the 2009 Touré affair. On the day of the first match against Portugal, all three major sport journals also emphasised the collective on their front pages.

During the match, there was hardly any discussion in the open-air restaurant bar where I watched the match. People sat united in front of the television, tense and hopeful. The match ended in a rather unexpected draw, and many Ivorians were quite satisfied. Several commented after the match that the country "has a team now" and the following day, newspapers emphasised team work and the positive effects of solidarity. There were critical voices, however. The sport newspaper *Supersport* and pro-opposition *Le Mandat* both criticised the substitution of Drogba, still not fully recovered after an injury. Ordinary Ivorians also criticised Drogba's performance,

a few for political reasons, as they considered Drogba too close to Gbagbo. On 18 June, the headlines of the sport newspapers were dominated by the news that Drogba would play from the beginning in the next match against Brazil. This information was visually emphasised by cover photos heavily focused on this player. Again, there were both sporting and some political readings in the criticism of this focus on a single player. The match ended with a 3:1 defeat. Brazil's second goal was widely discussed in Abidjan, as Luís Fabiano touched the ball quite obviously twice with his arm before scoring. French referee Stéphane Lannoy talked with Fabiano, smiled and allowed the goal. For most Ivorians, this upsettingly proved that French people do not want Ivorians to evolve.[9] However, the consolation goal by Drogba was widely celebrated in the streets of Abidjan as the first goal by an African player against Brazil at a World Cup.

While President Gbagbo kept a low profile during the World Cup and never watched a match in the stadium, Prime Minister Soro did attend the Brazil match. For some Ivorians, he brought bad luck to the team. Others again focused on the internal division and lack of solidarity, a comment on both the team and the country. Both supporters and press widely demanded the inclusion of "northerner" Kader Keita in the line-up before the second and third matches. There were sporting reasons and regionalist undertones. These were also behind the criticism of Aruna Dindane.[10] The initial "sacred union" thus turned partly into regional contestation as the competition went on. The instrumentalisation of football by Gbagbo is in turn instrumental-ised by some of his political opponents, who are either quite satisfied with the elimination, because Gbagbo thus cannot instrumentalise a successful national team for his political goals, or even state that the Ivory Coast will never win anything as long as Gbagbo is in power.

4   Football and Identity in Post-conflict Ivory Coast

Gbagbo won the first round of the presidential election in October 2010, ahead of Ouattara and Bédié. When the spokesperson of the electoral commission was about to announce the results of the run-off, he was forcibly prevented from doing so by two commission members close to Gbagbo. While the provisional results put Ouattara ahead, the definitive results announced declared Gbagbo the winner. This triggered a post-election conflict with territorialised urban violence conducted by different political

militias and a resumption of the fighting between the army and the FN, first in Abidjan, then across the country. The FN quickly conquered large parts of the country and surrounded Abidjan. Within a few hours, the army and the gendarmerie dropped Gbagbo, who was protected by a small loyal army elite group. Finally, after ten days of fighting and the bombing of the presidential residence by French troops, Gbagbo was arrested. He and some key figures of his regime appeared before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Others were tried at home. Among their lawyers was Roger Ouégnin, the president of *ASEC*, who was Gbagbo's adviser for sport affairs. Among the accused was Narcisse Kuyo Téa, Gbagbo's last chief of staff and the president of *Africa Sport*. To come to terms with the past, a 10-person Truth and Reconciliation Commission was installed, with Drogba as vice-president. The creation of this commission was announced on the day Gbagbo was arrested by Ouattara, who was proclaimed president some weeks later.

Bringing back the Ivory Coast onto the global stage was one of Ouattara's electoral promises. He reminded the players about that on the eve of the final match at the 2012 CAN. The opportunity seemed favourable.[11] Several heavy weights did not qualify for the competition, and the opponent in the final, Zambia, was considered an easy prospect. However, Drogba missed a penalty, and the match had to be decided in a penalty shoot-out. Drogba converted his, but the final was lost. Some members of the Gbagbo camp pointed to the presence of Ouattara at the final match as a sign of bad luck; others joked that the UN would cancel the result of the final or that the Zambian goalkeeper would be transferred to the ICC, thus ironising Ouattara's advent to power. Some Ouattara supporters suspected that Drogba missed the penalty deliberately to deny Ouattara the opportunity of a continental title. However, Drogba was widely celebrated after winning the European Champions League with his club Chelsea a few months later, scoring the equaliser that kept his side in the match and converting the deciding penalty in the shoot-out.

Ouattara did not meet the national team for the usual send-off before the next important international competition, the 2013 CAN, which ended with a quarter-final defeat against the eventual champion Nigeria. However, the links between the presidency and football remained strong. The former head of the National Support Committee of the Elephants (CNSE), Jean-Louis Billon, was one of Ouattara's ministers. Billon's father used to control the coffee and cocoa sector as a confidant of Houphouët-Boigny. Billon was succeeded as head of CNSE by Parfait Kouassi, a local politician who headed the electoral campaign of Ouattara's coalition in the Central business

district of Abidjan. Kouassi also succeeded Billon as head of the chamber of commerce. The CNSE, where Ouattara became a member during the presidential election campaign in 2009, was founded by the state in 2008. For the 2014 World Cup, the president allocated an overall budget of more than US$500,000. The team started the competition with Yaya Touré as captain in the opening match, replacing Drogba, who was on the bench, allegedly on orders from the president, who wanted a northerner to lead the team. However, both goals in this win against Japan were scored after Drogba was introduced. Against Colombia, the introduction of Drogba was not enough to avert a 2:1 defeat. A draw against Greece in the third match would secure Ivory Coast's first-ever qualification for the round of 16 at a World Cup. At a breakfast with the players, Soro announced that Ouattara had doubled the players' premiums. In this match, Drogba played from the beginning and as captain. However, he was substituted and could not prevent his team from losing from an extra time penalty. After the competition, Drogba announced his retirement from international matches, justifying this with a lack of confidence shown him by the new coach.

For the 2015 CAN, the FIF presented a budget that was almost double the last World Cup budget. Government judged this excessive and replaced the premium for participation with a performance premium. Ouattara followed the final against Ghana at RTI and celebrated the title, won without Drogba, in the middle of a crowd of people in Abidjan. The team enjoyed a tremendous reception, each player more than 50,000 US$ and a villa of equal value. According to Ouattara, thanks to the players, the country was now at the "door of emergence", a reference to a campaign slogan, and added a call for unity. The opposition complained about this political recovery of the national team. A few months later, the sports minister was sacked, as the premiums promised had still not been settled.

To sum up, Ivorians preferred football to physical education and military preparation and contested the agenda of the colonial power. After independence and across different political regimes, officials of important clubs and the national team generally have had close connections to the centre of political power. All presidents tried to instrumentalise sport in general and football in particular from above, not least with speeches, audiences ahead of international competitions, and receptions and rewards after victories. However, football is an unstable signifier, and the presidents did not succeed in establishing a clear meaning of symbols such as players or identity markers. As this contribution shows, the meanings Ivorians relate to players and the national team are contested, dynamic and fluid. Players are also symbols of regional identities, politicians and parties. It is thus oversimplifying to

focus only on the nation-building effects of the national team and suppose that good performances of the national team contribute to peace. "We don't have the power to stop war", Drogba (2008, 200) stated realistically. Writing about meeting George Weah, Liberian footballer turned presidential candidate, Drogba (2008, 237) stated that he was not capable of entering politics and added "not for the moment".

Notes

1. Daloa is the centre of the cocoa-producing region.
2. The Ivorian Football Federation was led at that time by Dieng Ousseynou, one of the leading members of the PDCI.
3. In the context of this "second liberation", the word Eburnie is sometimes used for Ivory Coast.
4. This performance was, according to the sports minister, a purposeful act of sabotage by the northern-dominated "RDR team" to deny Gbagbo the triumph of a trophy (Kamaté and Banégas (2010, 93f.).
5. A note on methodological issues is also appropriate. Besides two periods of observation and conversation (around the coup d'état in 1999 and 2000 and during the World Cup in 2010), this contribution is based on newspaper articles and on the scientific literature, frequently also using newspaper sources. In these, possibly biased journalists working for frequently partisan newspapers select and comment on statements by political actors. This contribution thus reconstructs reconstructions by journalists and not what "objectively" happened. As has been alluded to already, even direct quotes cannot be trusted. Different media chose different formulations for directly citing the same speech. Mehler (2008) cites several examples of this.
6. A remarkable side story was the controversial presence of Salomon Kalou in the team. Kalou failed the language and culture test and was refused naturalisation in the Netherlands by the conservative minister Rita Verdonk ahead of the World Cup.
7. Similar discussions also emerged on the occasion of other international club matches featuring Ivorian players in Europe.
8. Also in the UK, Drogba had the reputation of being an unfair player.
9. The performance of the French national team that left this World Cup in disarray with only one point was commented on with a mixture of disbelieving astonishment and malicious joy.
10. Both Dindane and Keita reportedly have a "testy relationship" with Drogba.
11. Before the competition, Ouattara's wife received the association of the mothers of the players, donated money for the construction of a seat for the association and promised support for sending a delegation to the CAN.

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Nigeria

Chuka Onwumechili, Totty O. Totty and Leelannee Malin

Politics is essentially a transient term and its understanding can be difficult to grasp. For our purposes, we use the term in a broad sense referring to the struggle for power and resources within entities and the interactions that emerge therein. In football, particularly, this view of politics is essential because the more restrictive concept of politics, pertaining to state governance, is inadequate.

Nigerian football, as should be expected, is an important arena for the type of politics that we identify above. Not only is the country the most populated in Africa, its football teams have gained notoriety as some of the best to represent the continent. Nigeria's rank as No. 5 in the world in mid-1994 is the highest rank ever granted an African country in football by FIFA. Nigeria is the winningest team in the world at the U17 level for male football, its female national team has become a hegemon in African women football, and Nigeria is one of only two African countries to ever win an Olympic gold in men football. However, and in spite of these achievements, Nigerian football is also synonymous with administrative brigandage and

C. Onwumechili (✉) · L. Malin
Howard University, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: conwumechili@Howard.edu

L. Malin
e-mail: Leelannee.malin@howard.edu

T. O. Totty
Allen University, Columbia, SC, USA

wider political linkages in variety of forms. It is this mixture of football achievements and other activities which surround them that supports investigation of political intersection with football in Nigeria.

To fully understand linkages between football and politics in Nigeria requires exploring the early period of football in the country and the role of football in building the Nigerian state. While the role of politics in football was multiple, its discussion in this chapter is meant to illuminate critical junctions in the building of Nigeria. Importantly, the discourse leads us to examination of ethnicity and the rise of rivalries both on and off the field that pertain to football. This discourse includes the space occupied by football post the country's civil war. An important aspect of politics and football goes beyond examination of history and rivalries to touch deep political incursions into football that have persisted across time in the country. These incursions are best identified in terms of critical incidences that symbolise persistent intersections. The chapter's final section focuses on the scorched earth struggle for power and money in Nigerian football.

1　Political Origins of Football

The earliest encounters between football and politics in Nigeria can be traced to the introduction of the sport in the country in late nineteenth century. Christianity brought football and sport to Nigeria as part of Christian evangelism. The evangelists, upon arrival in Nigeria, did not meet people without religion. Instead, they encountered people who had their own traditional religion that was deeply and intricately wedded to their culture and life. This particular mixture of religion and daily life presented major obstacles to the evangelicals. It became a question of how to win converts in such a society where a different religion was already embedded in life practices.

One major strategy by Christian evangelicals was to focus on the youth and children and to attract them by offering not just meals but also play. This strategy was gradually effective as it brought the young to Christian worship and schools, where they were indoctrinated into Western religion and thought. The indoctrinated youth were later to assume positions of authority, or at least access to authoritative spaces, within Western colonial government in Nigeria.

This manoeuvre for social power by Christian evangelicals has been widely described by several scholars as muscular Christianity (Watson et al. 2005). Muscular Christianity had long existed in Christian life during Victorian Britain (Watson et al. 2005). According to Watson, Weir and Friend, the

premise was: "that participation in sport could contribute to the development of Christian morality, physical fitness, and 'manly' character….an antidote to the poison of effeminacy…" (2005, 1). Invariably, Muscular Christianity in Britain was designed to promote healthy youths, discipline and the breaking of class divisions.

In Nigeria, Muscular Christianity focused on similar goals but it also aspired for more. The fact that it was different, particularly in some of its goals, was to be expected. After all, its introduction in Britain was to serve interests of people who were already Christians but in Nigeria, the focus was to recruit and convert. It was effective; the sport drew youth away from their family homes and farms and brought them into Western ways.

Therefore, it is not surprising that early stars of Nigerian football were schoolboys. Football was first organised, in the country, within the schools established by Christian missionaries. Hope Wadell Training Institute in Calabar is an example. It was one of Nigeria's first tertiary-level schools, and it hosted what Boer (2004) describes as the first organised football match in Nigeria in 1904. This match involved Nigerian students and their expatriate teachers against sailors of a British ship that was docked at the port in Calabar. Early football in Nigeria also involved teams representing religious organisations. Just as Muscular Christianity existed, there was also the appearance of Muscular Islam in Nigeria (Onwumechili 2010a). For instance, in Lagos, there was a Muslim XI, which featured several student players. It is not surprising that religious schools won the first Cup games in port cities where the British first introduced football.

But while Christian evangelism brought the game to Nigeria, other institutions used the game for their own political purposes. The colonial government was one such institution that cultivated sport and used it ultimately for building a Nigerian nation from the myriad of smaller ethnic nations that coalesced to form the Nigerian state in 1914. The colonialists worked hard to use football to unify these disparate nations that had different cultures and languages. Barely four years after the Northern and Southern Protectorates were merged into a single country named Nigeria, the British colonialists established an annual competition—the War Memorial Cup. Teams in Lagos contested for the War Memorial Cup, and proceeds from the competition went towards funds to support British troops during the First World War. The first nationally contested trophy was the Governor-General's Cup, which was purposely named in 1945 to underline the unifying role of such a competition. The competition had been instituted three decades after ethnically diverse communities had been amalgamated. In fact, in the early days of the competition, the final game was postponed to enable

the then Governor General MacPherson to attend, which underlined the political significance of the Cup.

While the War Memorial Cup had been used clearly to support the British war efforts, Nigeria's football provided support for varying political issues during the next World War. Boer (2006) argues that the Zik Athletic Clubs (ZAC) that toured Nigeria between 1941 and 1943 begun as a publicised effort to support the British in World War II against Nazi Germany but at the tour grounds, Nnamdi Azikiwe who owned the ZAC teams used the event to build political backing for his call for an independent Nigeria (Darby 2013; Boer 2004). Boer wrote about the tour: "Organized under the auspices of raising funds for the war effort – forcing colonial officials to show support – Azikiwe would use post-match events to give speeches openly criticizing British colonial policy, exhibiting football's early use as a tool of political mobilization" (2004, 64).

But the use of politics in football by colonialists was more marked in attempt to genderise the game. The European colonisers introduced football as a strictly male preserve. This was in line with the game's association with masculinity in Europe. However, pre-colonial Nigerian societies were not as gender strict as the colonialists. Onwumechili has argued that: "...pre-colonial societies in the Southern Regions (of Nigeria) are at times described as almost 'genderless,' at times as 'complimentary'" (2011, 2207). Oyewunmi (1997) and Okeke-Ihejirika (2004) describe how colonialism inhibited women spaces within local cultures. One such example was employment where colonialists introduced gender roles by hiring, almost exclusively, males into the workforce and isolating females work to homes. In contrast, pre-colonial Nigerian societies featured both men and women working outside their homes. European colonialists similarly addressed sport. Football, boxing and cricket were designated male preserve compared to netball, which was a female preserve. Even in sports, which were not designated for males such as track and field, females were only allowed to compete against other females while men competed against other males. These dictates heightened gender roles and division.

It was a major break from practices in pre-colonial societies, particularly in southern Nigeria. In pre-colonial societies, biological sex did not immediately determine one's lifetime role. For instance, while in Western societies at the time, a biological male was always husband and biological female the wife, in pre-colonial Southern Nigeria this was not true. Among Igbos, for example, a woman could become a "husband" and marry another woman if her (the "husband") parents had no male child (Amadiume 1997). This practice is designed to ensure that a family's landed property remained

under family control since control was transferred on patriarchal basis. By marrying another woman, a male child from the marriage (i.e. where the "wife" sleeps with other males) has rights to the landed property. None of the males, who biologically fathered the child, could claim parental rights because they had not officially married "the wife" or the mother of the child. Furthermore, among Igbos, females who grow into menopause are considered males and rights that accrue in society to biological males also accrue to them.

Therefore, the exacerbation of gender roles in the field of sport was resisted by the local culture, which saw this to be an anomaly. While there were no organised females participating in football during its early years, females soon became interested. Unfortunately, there is no definitive record of the earliest date for female participation in Nigerian football. However, Boer (2004) and Onwumechili (2010b, 2011) indicate that females were well involved in games, played against other females, before mid-twentieth century. There are specific reports on females playing football by the 1930s. There were other games, labelled as novelty, involving both biological sexes. Not only were these games announced in the local newspapers, the games were also played on the official grounds of local football authorities. But the colonialists used their political authority to order a ban of female football to ensure football's status as a male preserve and maintain the gender roles that it indoctrinated in the colony. In 1950, citing orders from England, the then Nigerian Football Association Chairman, Captain Holley, banned women from playing football in Nigeria and prohibited the use of association facilities for women soccer. Daring any attempts at resistance, Captain Holley threatened the ban of the country's sports teams from touring Britain or participating in the British Empire Games if women continued to play football in the country. This announcement was clearly a strong political power play designed to impose the might of colonial Britain over resisting locals.

The British colonialists, however, did not always use naked power to impose political will in the colony. There were times, that it used soft power to impose its will. One such occasion is its use of a tour of Britain by a Nigerian selection in 1949. Vasili (1994) argues that the British colonialists organised the 1949 tour by Nigerians as a way to further Europeanise them and use them as agents of colonialists upon their return from the tour. This is not a far-fetched explanation of the tour. After all, introduction of football by evangelists in an earlier period in Nigeria sought similar ends, i.e. to use footballers to recruit converts to Christianity. After the 1949 tour, for instance, the players previously adept at playing football with their bare feet became convinced of the superiority of playing the game with cleats just like

their European counterparts. At home, observers noted that the tour players who used cleats lost ability to move the ball in subtle ways, which playing in bare feet made possible.

Culture Creates Its Own Football

It is inaccurate, however, to assume that British colonialists were all powerful in football matters in Nigeria. While it achieved some of its aims through football, the locals had their own influence on the game and adapted it to their own needs and interests. These adaptations can be seen in the influence of local culture on Nigerian football and traces of such influence remain even today. We see these influences in three areas: style of play, integration of the transcendental in everyday life and high power distance.

Onwuekwe (2009) and Monteiro and Wall (2011) have written about the centrality of expressive dance in most African and Nigerian co-cultures. It is pervasive to the point that all major cultural events must include a space for dance. In such events, the gaze is on the most expressive dancer, the one with the most tricks, the most athletic, acrobatic and the one with eye-catching creativity. Though the main objective of football is to score goals and for the team to win, for Nigerians there are additional objectives that sometimes trump codified objectives of the game. These objectives are that individuals in the game must have ability to dance with the ball, even when the dance provides no obvious advantage to the team. The dance, however, attracts applause from the audience because it is an expression similar to the performance of a virtuoso with the exquisite tricks, athleticism and creativity. Domingos notes "… virtuous action of the player over the opponent. Part of these (expressions) refers to the execution of technical gestures facing the opponents, namely the dribble and feint, gestures that in other geographical contexts are closely connected to dance" (2008, 49). Onwumechili describes the concept as *Ahia M'gbede* and compares it to the *Malandro* in Brazilian football. He notes that: "The *Ahia M'gbede* is the pinnacle of street soccer when each individual has the unfettered freedom to put on display their catalog of dribbling moves, strutting, and styling for the gaze of onlookers" (2010a, 83). It is a skill admired within the culture and one that is elevated often as more important than simply putting the ball into the net. The tricks of JJ Okocha, for instance, are considered more endearing than the goal scoring of Rashidi Yekini, among Nigerian football fans. Okocha is the ultimate dancer, the trickster whose next move is unpredictable and he is able to use this expressiveness to defeat his opponent and to embarrass him as in an individual competition.

While Christianity introduced football in order to recruit locals away from their traditional religion, traces of traditional religion remain. Mbiti explains by pointing out that traditional "Religion (permeates) into all departments of life so fully it is not easy or possible to always isolate it" (1975, 1). Arinze (2014), a Catholic cardinal, also supports this position by noting that the formal distinction between religion and secular in the West is absent in Africa, including Nigeria. Thus, it is not surprising that religion permeates football in Nigeria. Unfortunately, there are wide media misunderstandings of this phenomenon and it has led to numerous negative reports about the use of muti, juju, "black magic" and medicine man in African soccer. For instance, Schatzberg (2006) refers to juju as sorcery and Fumanti (2012) and Stollznow (2010) describe such activities in negative terms. Yet, there is little contextual realisation that muti, juju and others are part of traditional African religion and, thus, embedded in life of the African, including soccer. However, it is not only traditional religion that Africans have embedded in football, African Christians who play football also embed religion in the game and exhibit this through public prayers on the field before and after the game, along with making a sign of the cross upon scoring a goal. Though these religious demonstrations may occur elsewhere, they are pervasive in African football.

High power distance, as described by Pannenborg (2010), is another area where locals adapted football to social needs and culture. In Western societies, football players rarely encounter administrators on frequent basis as they do in Nigeria. Instead, in the West, players encounter their coaches regularly. In Nigeria, it is different. Top Nigerian administrators make themselves visible to players and the media and the intent is to establish, frequently, a hierarchy in football where administrators are at the very top. On match days, the administrators enter the technical space in the locker room to address footballers, cutting into time that the coach discusses tactics. Administrators take up space in media reports, visit training grounds and make unilateral decisions on player wages after poor or positive performances. This presence, which will be considered overbearing in the West, is part of African football's paternalism. Pannenborg adds: "There is a strict hierarchy and you do not want to make the mistake of underestimating who is in power…. The Big Man controls and gives orders, the Small Boy obeys and does not dare to speak his mind… it is important to realise that in Africa most relations are characterised as those between a patron and a client. This so-called system of patronage is visible in all levels of football" (2010, 10). It is this gulf between the powerful and powerless that defines distance of power in Nigerian football.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

As in many other places, club rivalries are part of Nigerian football from early days of competition. However, these rivalries are not as enduring as they may be in places like Egypt or Scotland where rivalries span almost a century. In Nigeria, football teams and their dominance are fleeting and dependent on the current wealth of their benefactor. Thus, they rarely last beyond few decades.

In any case, early rivalries between clubs, surprisingly, were not based on ethnicity but on how competitive the clubs were. For instance, the earliest rivalry was between Railways of Lagos and Marines, teams with the best players during the period from the 1940s until the late 1950s. But this is not to state that ethnicity was absent in Nigerian football. It existed, but it was not in club football during that period. Instead, ethnic rivalry arose from purposeful creation of ethnic-based selections for the Alex Oni Cup, which was organised from 1948 until 1957 and contested between ethnic nationalities. Football clubs were not eligible to participate in the Alex Oni Cup. Alex Oni was, at the time, the Chairman of the Lagos Football Association. The rivalry was intense, particularly between the Igbo and Yoruba teams that were the best two teams at the time. Yorubas often won the contests but frequent aggression and fighting finally put a stop to the competition.

Those ethnic rivalries, except for the fighting, were similar to rivalry between local Nigerian teams and the British colonialists during the early football period in Nigeria. At the time, the British organised their own League and did not play in the same League with Nigerians. Those colonial rivalries go as far back as 1915 when Friday evening games between Kings College students, made up of Nigerian students, played against a European selected team of Lagos. Later on, in the 1940s, an African XI played a European XI (His Majesty's Team) to open or end the football season in Lagos (Onwumechili 2010a). None of these rivalries persisted for more than a decade.

Perhaps, one of the longest sustained rivalries in Nigerian football appeared after the Nigerian Civil War, which took place between 1967 and 1970. It was an ethnic-based rivalry between Enugu Rangers supported largely by Igbos and the Shooting Stars of Ibadan supported largely by Yorubas. That rivalry was big from 1970 until the early 1990s when both teams began to fade from their lofty positions as Nigeria's best clubs. Onwumechili explains: "Shooting Stars were the biggest threat to Rangers' dominance and were seen as (the) representative team of the Yorubas, an ethnic rival of the Igbos. Thus, defeating Shooting Stars represented the greatness of the would-be Igbo nation" (2014, 126–127).

But while the ethnic-based support in Rangers/Shooting Stars rivalry is not prevalent in Nigeria, ethnic rivalry occurs in public comments about national team selections (Bello 2015; Monye 2015; Kickoff.com 2010). The rivalry is demonstrated by supporters of one ethnic group or the other challenging player invitations or selections to the national camp. This usually arises when the national team coach is Nigerian and his or her ethnicity is cited as example of bias if he/she selects player from his/her ethnic group.

Cleavages and Co-opting of National Opportunities

There is little doubt about the importance of football to Nigerian rulers and political class. After all, the popularity of the game in the country has been well documented by several scholars including Onwumechili (2011), Boer (2006) and Akpabot (1985). Popularity justifies the game's attraction for those who aspire to power and those who already occupy positions of power in the country. Football has always been important to power in Nigeria, particularly within communities. Football's connections to power are expressed in at least three ways: direct ownership or management of football teams, associating with winning teams and using social status to influence decisions in football teams.

Several state governments own football teams that have sustained themselves at the top tier of the country's football. This ownership serves the purpose of increasing or sustaining popularity of the governors who bask in glory when their state team wins a championship. Nigeria's Sports Minister, Solomon Dalung, was cited by Aiyejina as stating that: "Majority of clubs in the Nigerian domestic League are owned by state governments, who often use these clubs more as tools to score political points, rather than as professional and money-making ventures" (2016, 10). Importantly, those appointed to chairmanship of state-owned clubs may use the opportunity to build large public following that come in handy in politics. For instance, Chief James "Jim" Nwobodo's tenure as Chairman of Enugu Rangers coincided with the club's domination of Nigerian football in the 1970s, and Nwobodo used this success and popularity to contest and win the state governorship (Onyeama 1983). Governor Samuel Ogbemudia's popularity in his state in the 1970s is also linked to sports and football. He built one of the largest sports camps in the country at Afuze and ensured that his state sponsored four major football clubs and recruited players from all over the country (Moniedafe and Onwumechili 2016).

Those unable to earn government appointments to club chairmanships establish their own clubs and embark on recruitment of top players in order

to quickly bring the club to public awareness through victories. Nnamdi Azikiwe, later to become Nigeria's first president after the country's independence, established ZAC clubs as far back as 1938 and by the early 1940s, he increased his political popularity by touring with the club all over the country making political speeches (Boer 2006). Throughout football history in Nigeria, such private owners of football clubs have existed alongside state-owned clubs. In later years, individuals such as Chief M.K.O. Abiola (Abiola Babes), Alhaji Yusuf Adebayo Abdulsalam (Alyufsalam Rocks), Senator Olusola Saraki (ABS) and Reverend Lumumba Adeh (Jos City Raiders) established clubs that became known across the country. Though the likes of Abiola and Saraki were widely known in the country before they established their clubs, there is little doubt that many Nigerians at the lower rung of the society became aware of them through the exploits of their clubs.

However, club ownership or management is not the only way to advance politically in the country. Political visibility could be attained by strategically associating with a football club or team, particularly during periods of victory. Such association has a long history in Nigerian football and there are numerous examples of this phenomenon. For instance, the president or head of state may host the national teams to celebrate victory or accomplishments. Similar examples occur at a more local level. Even before such receptions, the president, head of state, governor or first lady may also talk to the team prior to an important game.

In later years, there are stories of Nigerian maximum dictator, Sani Abacha, associating himself with the Nigerian national team of the mid-1990s and several of the team's players (*Modern Ghana*, 26 April 2009). In fact, in an interview one of the team's top players, Daniel Amokachi, mentioned: "At that time also, Nigeria was in crisis and under sanction. The whole world didn't want anything to do with Nigeria…. So anybody in government would definitely support the team. Those in government then didn't have another option… Abacha too supported the team…" Abacha was a global pariah but he used football to score political points. He became closely associated with the national team and players, hosting and entertaining them. In 1996, he withdrew the team from participation at the Cup for African Nations hosted by South Africa. It was retaliation in a political row with South Africa. It was a calculated decision to undermine South Africa as a host because Nigeria's national team, at the time, was the best team in the continent and about to defend in South Africa a Cup the team won in 1994.

Besides Abacha, there are other political elites who made themselves visible by pledging large sums of financial support to Nigerian football teams. In several cases, these individuals use such pledges to promote themselves

in the media and later fail to redeem pledges made. Such failure to redeem pledges, however, is not restricted to political elites but also involve representatives of government. In fact, Ibelema (2016) provides a galling list of well-known Nigerians who had garnered public support by making huge promises to victorious Nigerian football teams but failed to redeem those promises several years after. Nevertheless, associating with Nigerian winning teams can be complex. In 2004, President Obasanjo welcomed the Nigerian female soccer team to his home to celebrate their African championship but it was an uncertain circumstance. The team's victory also brought embarrassment to the country when the team refused to travel home in protest over unpaid bonuses (Onwumechili 2010b). The story was reported globally but Obasanjo sent a jet to pay the debt and bring the players home. He then craftily evaded a political wire trap by making additional monetary awards to the players but left out officials of the government and football authorities who chaperoned the team at the championship. This sent the message that he had not supported the non-payment of bonuses to the team.

Political intersection with football is also evident in the direct interference with team activities by political actors. Goal.com in 2014 published several disheartening stories of how political actors use their status to affect player recruitment and selection in Nigeria. (Goal.com published verbatim emails from footballers adversely affected by political interferences). Below is one such email:

> My name is Bamidele…. my dad is late, but my mum (mother) is the one struggling for me to be a footballer…but due to (because) she is a woman and she did not know any coach, scout or agent to help me, I just go to many football trials and screening without being noticed … But I have one thing some don't have, which is GOD ALMIGHTY … and I know I will surely achieve my goal and dream…because I will never quit. (Goal.com 2014, para. 6–7)

The same publication quoted another player who stated: "…after screening session what you will hear is the slang 'who carry you come?' (Who is your godfather?) not minding your performance. Those ones who (have) one Alhaji or the other Alhaji sent will be picked (selected) and the sons of nobody will be dropped" (Goal.com 2014, para. 8). These mails demonstrate the powerful influence of the elite on football from behind the scenes. Yet, these issues do not get the attention that they deserve because Nigerian teams continue to do well. The reason is that the pool of gifted footballers is vast, and in spite of these politically influenced selections, team performance is rarely affected.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

As noted earlier, football supportership, which was deeply rooted in ethnocentrism in late twentieth century in Nigeria has largely dissipated because football players, from differing ethnic backgrounds, increasingly play together in the same team. It is a phenomenon that is an anomaly when compared to employment structure in other areas of labour in the country where nepotism and ethnocentrism define employment, according to Fatile (2012), Aluko and Adesopo (2004) and Olugbile (1997). However, some football club supporters resist this phenomenon. For instance, fans of Port Harcourt Sharks have been infamously reported, multiple times, for attacking coaches who do not include in the club's squad players who are locally born. Ogunleye reports on one attack: "(Coach) Ogunbote … was attacked by armed persons believed to be fans of Sharks FC for allegedly dropping (waiving) some players who are indigenes of Rivers state from the team" (2015, 2). In essence, Sharks' fans expect a team that is ethnically pure. However, this is an isolated case. Fans from other parts of the country rarely advocate for ethnically pure teams.

Notwithstanding, fans of local Nigerian teams increasingly expect their teams to win at home and often intimidate match officials to assure that result. This has led to teams rarely winning matches away from home except towards the end of the season when teams, without motivation to improve their positions on the League table, lose at home to teams needing to improve their position. This match-fixing phenomenon is believed to be one of the reasons that home fans intimidate match officials whom they largely perceive as corrupt. The effect is like a revolving door. Fans intimidate because they do not trust referees, referees comply with biased officiating in favour of the home teams, teams perform poorly away from home because they expect to lose. Ebipade reports a violent situation that partly explains poor results away from home: "There was an incident in Kano two years ago where supporters of the home team were using cutlasses to attack visiting fans. We had to lose that game after the Chairman of Sunshine Stars whom I was coaching then told me that it was the only way we could get out of the venue alive. He came down from where he was seated and instructed me to lose that game or we would lose lives" (n.d., para. 9).

State-Organised Fandom

Local football in Nigeria today can be best described as different from the past particularly in organised fandom. In the past, most clubs had large

numbers of supporters that supported their teams at home and, at times, away from home. However, these numbers have deeply declined because few football fans watch live local football. Large numbers of Nigerians watch football games on television at local bars and often their focus is the English Premier League or another European League (Onwumechili 2010a). Thus, there is absence of sustained rivalry between supporter groups compared to existence of several such rivalries from the 1960s until the early 1990s when transnational television diverted football supporter attention to televised European football. Nevertheless, organised supportership exists when a major competitive game takes place or when the Nigerian national football team is playing.

This organised support, however, is largely dependent on state mobilisation in preparation for games. At the club level, therefore, the state, which owns several major Nigerian clubs, chooses when to and when not to mobilise supporters. Often, mobilisation is based on political reasons. Thus, government seeking to take advantage of a club's accomplishment often tries to associate itself with the club's success by funding transportation of large number of fans to watch the state team during critical games and usually at the advanced stages of the Federation Cup. In critical League games, the local government may pay for match tickets allowing large number of spectators to enter the stadium free of charge. By these measures, the government seeks citizen support and goodwill. But even non-government-owned clubs have adopted similar strategy. At 2016, Football Club Ifeanyi Ubah (FCIU) announced free bus rides in Lagos to the stadium for its fans wishing to attend the Federation Cup final to watch the club (Amosu 2016).

The Nigerian Football Supporters Club is better organised to support the national teams. According to the NFF (n.d.) and Erewuba (2017), this club has been in existence since 1959. The NFF claims the club was established in response to Ghana, Nigeria's major international rival, "(invading) Nigeria in lorry loads (of fans) to support their team in those heady days (pre-1960) of the fiercest rivalry in West African football" (n.d., para. 1). The club currently has an official office in Lagos and chapters in several countries outside Nigeria. The membership comprises top professionals from different occupations in the country (Erewuba 2017, para. 18). They organise themselves under state chapters and use the club to secure travel and match ticket support from the government in order to attend games both inside and outside the country. These benefits are considered prime benefits and there are political tussles that result from electoral contests to secure administrative positions in the club because it not only provides control over membership funds but also political and social leverage. In recent years, some top officials have been accused of using the club's positions to

engage in visa racketeering where they demand funds from people seeking to emigrate from the country in return for visas and these prospective migrants are passed off as football supporters (Akpodonor 2017). However, beyond such shenanigans, the club provides musical band support for the national teams and dress colourfully to national team games.

4   Politics of Nigerian Football Administration: Power and Money

As we noted earlier, the relation between football and politics is not only varied but it is also complex. In Nigeria, that relationship has grown from colonial use of football as instrument for advancing its own interests and for nation-building to the use of football by political elite and other private interests. In this section, our focus is on politics of football administration, particularly in the area of competition for resource control pertaining to power and money.

Politics of Power

A position in football administration in Nigeria, particularly as president of the Football Federation, has become highly valued and is one of few public positions not answerable to the country's president. It is a position protected jealously by FIFA, which issues threats to ban a country from international football whenever a state attempts to interfere with the federation and its president. FIFA's threat has strengthened the power of the federation's president and makes the position a highly valued resource. While private individuals recognise the power of the position, the state also recognises this and has articulated various strategies to capture this power. For instance, the state often uses its agents and other resources to surreptitiously support identified and malleable electoral candidates. Invariably, high value attached to the position creates competition that becomes scorched earth where political intrigues and machinations are used and opponents are threatened, arrested and/or vilified.

The 2014 federation elections demonstrate the intense struggle to capture power in the federation. It began with a non-electoral congress where suddenly Nigerian Secret Service agents arrested the then president of the federation, Alhaji Aminu Maigari, along with two other federation officials

(Opara 2014). At the congress, the Sports Minister welcomed only few delegates because several others, hearing about the arrests, failed to show up. Notwithstanding, according to Opara (2014), the Minister's stooges called for a surprise election and the state-supported Chris Giwa was elected. FIFA, however, refused to recognise the votes following an account from Maigari. But these intrigues did not cease after a subsequent election was called by FIFA within a month. Instead, Pinnick Amaju, with state government support, used the secret service to prevent a rival candidate from arriving at the election venue. Amaju won the votes and became federation president but it only signalled the beginning of legal battles between Giwa and Amaju that played out in Nigerian courts and in the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) in Switzerland (Inyang 2016a, b; Ngobua 2014). Inyang cites the Nigerian Sports Minister as stating that: "The struggle for the glass house (federation office) has converted the place into another Nigerian Syria, where terrorists war style is mobilised to liquidate perceived enemies" (2016a, 4). The choice of words is strong and harsh but it ultimately describes the tussle for football power in Nigeria.

Politics of Money

But electoral political aspirations do not capture all the key reasons that football administration is highly valued. Increasingly, access to funds is becoming a reason for persons to aspire to those positions at both club and football association levels. In fact, access to federation funds, which is worth billions of Nigerian naira, creates a cesspit of corruption. Nwosu and Ugwuerua cite different types of corrupt practices involving the Nigerian Football Federation (NFF) and add that: "…people that vie for positions in the NFF do not have the interest of the game at heart… for selfish interests or for self-aggrandizement" (2016, 380). Not only does the federation receive large funds from FIFA, it also receives a huge annual budget from the Nigerian state.

Over the years, there have been doubts surrounding accounting practices at the Football Federation where it is believed officials help themselves to funds. Umoru and Shaibu (2012) report that the Nigerian Senate President once described the federation as the centre of corruption in the country and Olatunji claims that: "corruption and politics in the NFF is rampant and has spread like terminal cancer" (2016, para. 5). Olatunji (2016) lists several staffs of the federation who faced or were facing charges of corruption

and the staggering misuse of funds by federation officials. Though corruption in Nigeria is not unique to the Football Federation, it festers easily in the federation for two major reasons. One, the federation is not answerable to any other state agency in the country and relies on self-policing for the most part. In a situation where there is access to huge amounts of funds and little external accounting oversight, there is bound to be high levels of impropriety as demonstrated in the global indictments at FIFA in 2015. Second, the federation has accumulated power in its relationship with FIFA such that the Nigerian state has few checks on those powers. In essence, the state is powerless in removing corrupt federation officials, which in turn embolden those officials in corruption and other activities.

5   Conclusion

Politics of football in Nigeria is clearly ever present but also increasingly visible. The game arrived in the country through evangelists who used it to advance religious beliefs by competing successfully for human resources against local religion. Though evangelists were successful in this political struggle against local religion, football's contact with local culture led to a mutual impact, where football in Nigeria has taken on some cultural flavour. Notwithstanding, the colonial state further incorporated the game into its strategy for building a new Nigerian state. However, the building of such a state met competition from locals who sought an independent state, a political goal that differed remarkably from the goal of a colonial state.

Beyond football and politics in the colonial state, post-independent Nigeria welcomed football that became politicised in various ways including, briefly, on ethnic lines. The lack of sustained ethnic cleavages in Nigerian football is drastically different from what exists in other spheres of life in the country. Surprisingly, this difference, which is remarkable, remains largely understudied. Nonetheless, it is believed to be an outcome of the free movement of football labour across ethnic lines and cleavages. Other aspects of football politics have become evident in different strategies of the political elite seeking to take advantage of the popularity of the game.

The chapter also discusses one of the major contemporary issues in Nigeria's football, which is the political struggle to control increasing power in football administration and increasing resources available in the game. That struggle, which has become scorched earth, is currently front and centre of the Nigerian game.

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South Africa

Gustav Venter

1   The Political Origins of Football

Football on the southern tip of Africa dates to 1862 when the first documented matches were played between white civil servants and soldiers in the Cape Colony (Alegi and Bolsmann 2010, 1). By this point, the region that was later to become known as South Africa consisted of four disparate territories. These were the Cape and Natal coastal colonies under British control as well as the two "Boer"[1] colonies known as the South African Republic and the Orange Free State Republic in the interior. The divided nature of these territories was symbolic of the way football was to be diffused and played once it gained a foothold in the region.

Alegi (2004a, 15) points to the fact that these early contestations contained facets of both rugby and association football—something which was not unusual given that "different sets of football rules…existed at the time". However, it was the Natal Colony that played a decisive role in the spread of particularly the association game throughout the rest of the territory that is South Africa today (Hill 2010, 20). In this regard, association football was popularised in Natal largely due to an influx of working-class British soldiers as a result of the Anglo-Zulu War (1879) and the first Anglo-Boer War

G. Venter (✉)
Centre for Human Performance Sciences, Stellenbosch University,
Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: gbventer@sun.ac.za

(1880–1881). The year 1882 saw the establishment of the first regional football association, the Natal Football Association. Thereafter the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 served as "the major stimulus for the widespread diffusion of the association code" (Hill 2010, 20).

The nature of segregated colonial society meant that initially, football developed separately among the different race groups.[2] This occurred on the backdrop of rapid industrialisation of the region during the latter part of the nineteenth century due to the mineral boom. In 1892, the South African Football Association (SAFA)—a whites-only controlling body for the game countrywide—was formed (Bolsmann 2010, 30). As far as Africans were concerned, Alegi (2004, 19) points out that "both the literate *kholwa* [Christian African] elites and rural youth commoners who migrated to the Witwatersrand gold mines and the port cities of Durban and Cape Town, adopted British soccer to cope with the dislocations of urbanisation and build vital alternative networks".

Notable developments within the local game during the ensuing years included SAFA's affiliation to the English Football Association in 1897 as well as an incoming tour by the Corinthian Football Club—the first foreign team to visit South African shores—in the same year (Bolsmann 2010, 30). Corinthians would return for two more tours in 1903 and 1907 (Raath 2002, 6). The first local team to travel abroad was, in fact, a team consisting of sixteen African players from the Orange Free State Republic that visited Britain and France in 1899.[3]

Another considerable regional disruption followed in the form of the South African War (1899–1902) which brought an influx of approximately half a million British soldiers—a development which served to further popularise the game. In this regard, "African, Coloured and Indian men watched and, most likely, played the game with British soldiers in besieged towns such as Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking" (Alegi 2004b, 18). The following year the first black national football body—the South African Indian Football Association (SAIFA)—was founded in Kimberley (Alegi 2004b, 18).

A white South African touring team achieved significant success on a twelve-match tour to South America in 1906, winning eleven matches against various opponents from Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. As a result, Bolsmann (2010, 30) states that "South Africa was therefore at the forefront of globalizing football in the early twentieth century". This notion is supported by the fact that SAFA obtained membership of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1910—in the process becoming the first non-European member of the organisation (Bolsmann 2010, 30).

Organised white football in South Africa[4] maintained strong British links over the ensuing years. For example, prior to the outbreak of World War II, a number of British teams toured the country. These comprised four English Football Association representative teams (in 1910, 1920, 1929 and 1939) as well as Scottish clubs Aberdeen (1927 and 1937) and Motherwell (1931 and 1934) (Raath 2002, 13). The year 1924 saw the first tour to Europe by a SAFA representative team, with the latter playing matches in Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands. Results and attendances were positive, but ultimately the venture was "not a financial success" (Bolsmann 2010, 31).

These links to Britain found more pronounced expression both on and off the field of play with the arrival of professional football in South African in 1959. That year saw the formation of the National Football League (NFL), a whites-only League that contained numerous British players that migrated from the lower leagues in their home countries. A number of British coaches and managers were also present throughout the history of the League, which ultimately disbanded after the 1977 season. Consequently, there was a strong British footprint in terms of the playing styles of many of the white NFL teams. During the 1970s, this even led to questions over the league's on-field product as a lack of goal-scoring mimicked global tactical trends in the game.[5]

It is important to note that, despite the rise and initial popularity of the NFL during the 1960s, football was—from an overall perspective—secondary to rugby union among South African whites. This was largely the result of developments after the South African War. This included the poor on-field results obtained by local South African football teams against incoming British touring teams—a stark contrast to the international success experienced by the South African rugby Springboks on their tours to Britain in 1906–1907 and 1912–1913. Additional factors that led to the eventual subordination of football related to its exclusion from the national education system after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, as well as its increasing popularity within African communities (Hill 2010, 23).

Football soon became the game of the masses in South Africa. Alegi (2010, 16) points out that the *kholwa* "became instrumental in the rise of an indigenous football culture in Natal and Johannesburg". The contours of the game's spread and development mirrored those elsewhere on the continent as "players, teams and fans 'Africanized' the game". In this regard, the "use of magic and religious specialists infused the game with distinctive African traits" as a means towards forging team unity and a psychological advantage over opponents (Alegi 2010, 16). This was essentially the case from the outset of the game's development in the main urban centres. Alegi (2010, 27) elaborates:

> Ritual preparations included pregame consultations with a diviner who threw the bones to predict the outcomes of the match. *Izinyanga* (healers) also tried to strengthen athletes by rubbing players' legs with *umuthi* (traditional medicine) or making them inhale 'some smoke from herbs so that they bring fear and weakness on the opponents'…During the first decade of apartheid, these practices had become so widespread that it was common for black South African clubs to pay large amounts of money to acquire the services of an *inyanga*. Naturally, fierce competition for the best magicians developed.

Two further distinctive features of football among Africans are worth noting. The first of these relates to spectatorship. In this regard supporters often gave colourful nicknames to players in reference to specific physical attributes or their style of play. This practice was an extension of the rural tradition of giving praise names to warriors, for example (Alegi 2004a, 52). Alegi (2010, 31) points to some of the more notable nicknames which at times also "revealed interesting aspects of the everyday experiences and consciousness of urban Africans". During the interwar period, for example, nicknames such as "British Empire", "Cape to Cairo" and "Prince of Wales" were a reminder of colonial ties. In addition, there were references to educational achievements ("Junior Certificate"), reverence for American cars ("Buick" and "V8"), as well as other revealing names such as "Scotch Whiskey"—apparently because this particular player's play also drove away sorrows and brought great enjoyment to supporters (Alegi 2010, 31)! The final distinctive feature worth noting relates to African playing styles. Alegi (2010, 32) explains that

> [l]ocal circumstances fundamentally shaped how Africans played the game. Streets, sandlots, and open spaces honed boys' ball control, toughness, and improvisational skills. Street games had neither referees nor time limits and involved any number of players…Material poverty, lack of equipment (only the most privileged boys could afford football cleats, for example), and inadequate facilities influenced vernacular styles of play.

There was also a strong emphasis on individual skill and providing entertainment for supporters, and consequently—given the segregated nature of South African society—this represented a stark contrast to the way football was played among whites generally. During the 1970s debates over playing styles became widespread in the football press on account of the apartheid government's "multinational"[6] sports policy. The latter gradually allowed increased contact between South Africa's different race groups on the field of

play and spawned a number of notable racially defined football tournaments towards the middle of the decade. These contests then provided a means for "testing" the strength of "black" and "white" football teams against each other. White teams tended to dominate these encounters, and this was undoubtedly largely due to their access to superior facilities, specialised coaching and fitness training at the time.

There was a great deal of curiosity among contemporary football observers as to how the tactical training of white players, fused with the individual brilliance of black players, would combine in an integrated South African national team. These were major generalisations to be sure—but was put to the test on a few occasions once such integration became a reality in 1976. That year saw the first government-approved, racially mixed national football team take on an incoming touring team from Argentina—a tour which fell outside the auspices of FIFA since South Africa was suspended from the world body at that time. The South African team obtained a resounding 5-0 win in the opening fixture in Johannesburg—a result that was greeted with much fanfare in the press.[7] The following year another dominant result was achieved in a quasi-international fixture against Rhodesia which ended in a 7-0 South African win. This was incidentally the first occasion where black players were awarded Springbok blazers, the national symbol of South Africa's white sports teams at the time (Venter 2016, 147).[8] The highly politicised nature of apartheid football during the 1970s will be elaborated upon further below. At this point, it is necessary to briefly reflect on the role that football has played in shaping the South African nation.

The formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910—the first rendering of the territory that is known as South Africa today—was undoubtedly the product of geopolitical forces much larger than any particular influence exerted by football during the latter part of the nineteenth century. In fact, football's spread and development very much followed the contours of a rapidly changing region mostly as a result of conflict that sprouted either directly or indirectly from the mineral revolution which began with the discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1867. Football would, however, become much more politicised during the course of the twentieth century, particularly after the introduction of apartheid in South Africa in 1948.

Whereas the degree to which any sport code can truly shape a nation is always debatable, football did, at the very least, serve as one platform (along with other sport codes) from which to shed light on South Africa's segregationist policies. As was the case with the two other dominant team sports in the country, namely cricket and rugby union, there was a significant non-racial component of South African football comprising organisations,

administrators and players who rejected the principle of racialised sport. Through their efforts, in conjunction with those of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) and later the South African Council on Sport (SACOS), a significant amount of international pressure was applied on the apartheid regime within the sporting realm. Again, the role of sport in general and football in particular in ending apartheid should not be overstated. Apartheid ended primarily as a result of political and economic forces situated far beyond the sporting sphere. But football certainly played a prominent role as far as the changing face of apartheid sport was concerned, especially during the 1970s.

The introduction of the country's first truly democratic elections in 1994 saw the birth of the so-called new South Africa. Sport was an important terrain upon which attempts were made to forge a single, unified national identity. South Africa's victory in the 1995 Rugby World Cup on home soil occupies a significant place in the history of this nation-building process.[9] The sight of Nelson Mandela, clad in a Springbok rugby jersey, handing over the trophy to the team's white captain, Francois Pienaar, has a prominent place in the pantheon of iconic sports photographs. What has been somewhat neglected is the fact that the resulting national euphoria was extended the following year when the South African national football team won the 1996 African Cup of Nations (AFCON), also held on home soil. This occasion also produced some powerful imagery, with Mandela this time handing a different sporting trophy to South Africa's football captain, Neil Tovey. Despite a continental championship carrying less weight than a world championship, the AFCON title was particularly significant given the diverse racial makeup of the South African men's football squad in 1996. The rugby World Cup winning side of 1995, for example, contained only one black player. Consequently, the symbolic value of the AFCON victory at the time should not be underestimated. The place of football in the country's sport-political discourse today will be dealt with in the concluding section of this chapter.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

As far as historical club rivalries in South Africa are concerned one stands out above all others, namely the clash between the Soweto giants Orlando Pirates and Kaizer Chiefs. Today these encounters are colloquially referred to simply as "The Derby". It continues to be the showpiece fixture on the South African domestic football calendar. Pirates was founded in 1937 in

Orlando, an African township that was opened south-west of Johannesburg six years earlier. Alegi (2004, 65) points out that due to the difficult living conditions in the township

> football in Orlando was an exciting diversion from the dreariness of working life as well as a mobilising force. Through [football], people created a social institution that instilled civic pride and forged community bonds…While Pirates became synonymous with Orlando because of the residents' love for [football], the links between football team and township generated parochial loyalties, self-identification, and pride. Gradually, Orlando Pirates evolved into one of the country's most popular and successful [football] clubs.

Pirates became the dominant team in the Transvaal province and their position was first challenged in the early 1950s with the emergence of Moroka Swallows, a team founded in the sprawling slum of Moroka, just West of Orlando, in 1947. Swallows had a strong Basotho ethnic identity while Pirates—although not operating along strict ethnic lines—consisted mainly of Zulu-speakers.[10] The townships on the south-western periphery of Johannesburg would later become known as Soweto, an abbreviation for South Western Townships, its official name. Encounters between Pirates and Swallows, therefore, became known as a Soweto derby during the ensuing years. Soweto would eventually gain a third dominant team, namely Kaizer Chiefs.

The founding of Chiefs ironically came as a result of a split within Pirates. This was the consequence of an internal conflict in 1969 that resulted in a breakaway faction headed by the legendary Pirates striker, Kaizer Motaung, and the team's charismatic manager, Ewert "The Lip" Nene (Alegi 2004a, 138).[11] They initially formed an invitation team called Kaizer XI in January 1970, but Motaung later renamed it Kaizer Chiefs in 1971. This was a reference to the Atlanta Chiefs, the American team that he played for in the North American Soccer League (NASL) during the period 1968–1971. Motaung was impressed by the setup in Atlanta and set about emulating the club's structure and operations within a South African context. Chiefs supporters and players also adopted a countercultural identity which set them apart from Pirates and Swallows (Alegi 2004a, 138). Together these three clubs became Soweto's Big Three.

These teams had large support bases which later offered significant appeal to potential sponsors during the rapid commercialisation of South African football from the mid-1970s onwards. This was particularly the case after the belated arrival of television in South Africa in 1976. This was part of

the reason why these clubs were able to outlast the biggest teams from the white NFL once integrated professional football arrived in the late 1970s. Support for white football teams dwindled and the likes of Pirates, Chiefs and Swallows were able to attract significant revenue not only from sponsorships, but also from high attendance figures particularly in derby encounters. Today Pirates and Chiefs still represent the commercial pinnacle of domestic South African football. In recent years, Swallows have fallen on tough times, having suffered multiple relegations since the 2014–2015 season, and are currently floundering in South Africa's fourth tear.

The Soweto encounters are, however, not the only significant South African derbies historically speaking. The white NFL (1959–1977) also contained its fair share of high-profile encounters. Some of these were geographically based, such as the Cape Town derby between Cape Town City and Hellenic which drew particularly strong support during the NFL's golden period in the early 1970s. It was reported, for example, that a Cape Town-record crowd of 32,899 was in attendance for the encounter between these two teams played at Green Point during the 1971 season. The actual figure was likely closer to 40,000 since a number of unpaid spectators entered the ground after a gate was pushed over (Venter 2015, 275). Some NFL rivalries were based on the status, such as encounters between the league's premier club, Johannesburg-based Highlands Park, and Durban City, the most successful coastal team. These were the only two clubs that claimed more than two League titles each during the course of the NFL's existence, with Durban City earning four against Highlands Park's eight. Incidentally, the Cape Town-based NFL clubs enjoyed significant support from within the city's coloured community, while Durban City had a very strong Indian support base. These spectators sat in segregated spaces in the relevant stadiums due to the apartheid laws of the time.

The arrival of the government's multinational sports policy—to be explored in detail in the next section—also created temporary high-profile encounters between representative teams from each of South Africa's four race groups. There was also notable anticipation for fixtures between the top clubs from the African and white leagues. This continued into the early 1980s once these clubs competed in the same League as part of integrated professional football in the country. However, the dwindling numbers of white supporters within this integrated milieu was a key factor behind the eventual sale or disbandment of a number of former white teams, thereby confining these fixtures to the annals of history.[12]

As far as non-racial football was concerned the Federation Professional League (FPL) (1969–1990) contained a strong clustering of clubs along the

coastal belt in both Cape Town and Durban. The fact that the non-racial League rejected any participation with or against teams from government-sanctioned leagues such as the white NFL or the African (and later integrated) NPSL meant that its teams never clashed with the top teams from those leagues. Even within its own ranks the two most successful FPL clubs, namely Cape Town Spurs (seven League titles) and Santos (six League titles)—both based in Cape Town—never competed against each other in the League itself. This was on account of the fact that Cape Town Spurs defected to the integrated NPSL in 1982, the year that Santos was founded (Raath 2002, 116–119). There were some minor rivalries within the League, however, such as the one between the Transvaal-based teams Swaraj and Bluebells United which both hailed from the Indian group area known as Lenasia, South of Johannesburg.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

South Africa offers fertile and well-trodden ground for the exploration of the historical intersection between sport and politics. In this regard, Alegi (2004, 108) points out that "football evolved with and influenced the politics of South African liberation movements". He refers to the ANC electing Chief Albert Luthuli as its new president in 1952. Luthuli was a long-time football administrator and president of the Natal Inter-Race Soccer Board at the time. The overall politicisation of South African football can be traced back to the early years of apartheid when the white-controlled SAFA's membership of FIFA became a point of contention. The formation of the non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF) in 1951 was an important development in this regard. This organisation took up an anti-apartheid stance by rejecting racialised football and forming a football controlling body that was open to any member of the football fraternity, irrespective of their racial classification under apartheid law. The SASF was a merger of three racially defined football bodies, namely the SAFA, the South African Coloured Football Association and the South African Indian Football Association (Venter 2015, 272).

Over the next decade the SASF applied for FIFA membership on several occasions (1952, 1954, 1958 and 1960) and attempted to have SAFA expelled from world football's governing body (Bolsmann 2010, 36–37; Darby 2008, 261–263). They were ultimately successful in their efforts in September 1961 when the white controlling body was suspended by FIFA. Despite a brief reversal of the suspension during the period January 1963 to

October 1964 (Venter 2015, 272), it remained in effect until South Africa's eventual complete expulsion from world football at FIFA's 1976 congress in Montreal.

During this early period, South Africa's sporting discrimination was also an issue at a continental level. Having been a founding member—along with Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia—of the Confederation of African Football (CAF) in 1957, it did not take long for the issue of apartheid football to crop up. CAF's most important sporting task was to organise the AFCON tournament which "aimed to supersede the various regional competitions that had been established earlier [and] which no longer satisfied fans, players or administrators" (Alegi 2010, 66). The inaugural edition of the tournament took place in Khartoum as part of CAF's official launch in 1957 and the newly found organisation demanded that South Africa send a racially integrated team to compete in the event. SAFA ultimately refused to comply and did not take part in the competition. Alegi (2010, 67) points out that "the struggle against apartheid in football would become a powerful bond that united African nations for more than two decades". South Africa would have to wait nearly 40 years to finally participate in the AFCON in 1996.

These controversies at administrative level continued to make headlines throughout the 1960s and beyond, but there were also important developments on the field of play, none more so than the arrival of professional football in South Africa in 1959 with the formation of the white NFL. While this was a racially defined League it did not take long for the non-racial football authorities to follow suit as they established the semi-professional South African Soccer League in 1961. Alegi (2010, 53) points to the significance of this event:

> Attendance at SASL matches meant taking a stance against state-enforced racial discrimination and segregation. And people voted with their feet. SASL matches regularly drew crowds of ten thousand people, while marquee matches attracted up to forty thousand crammed into ramshackle grounds. Boosted by the extensive daily coverage of the black popular press, the SASL became immensely popular.

The League managed to survive for five years before the government, white football authorities and municipal officials conspired to deny these racially mixed teams access to municipal facilities. As a result, the SASL was forced to shut down in 1966 (Alegi 2010, 53). But non-racial professional football was not to be denied and a new League, the FPL, was formed in 1969. During the 1970s, the FPL occupied a significant place on the South

African football landscape along with the other two major professional leagues, namely the NFL (for whites) and the National Professional Soccer League (NPSL, for Africans).

The increasing pressure directed towards South African sport during the late 1960s and early 1970s from within the international community was a by-product of broader social and political trends internationally. Booth points to the fact that while "apartheid tightened during the 1960s, other countries began dismantling racial policies and practices…In this new environment pressure mounted on the Republic to abandon racial practices" (Booth 1998, 96). From a sporting perspective South Africa had been excluded from both the 1964 and 1968 Summer Olympic Games, eventually culminating in expulsion from the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1970—the first country to be dealt this fate (Anderson 1979, 72). The Basil d'Oliveira affair, which saw the 1968–1969 England cricket tour of South Africa cancelled on account of the apartheid government's refusal to accept a touring team that included a coloured cricketer formerly from Cape Town, served to focus further international attention on the situation in South Africa (Merrett 2010, 84). Overseas cricket tours to England (1970) and Australia (1971) were also subsequently cancelled, while Springbok rugby tours to Great Britain (1969–1670) and Australia (1971) were played on the backdrop of increasingly vociferous protest in those countries (Merrett 2010, 85).

In the wake of this pressure, the South African government reacted during the 1970s by amending certain apartheid restrictions previously applicable to sport, a move which Merrett (2010, 85) describes as "the most visible sign of reform measures designed to show that apartheid had a legitimate future". The introduction of the multinational sports policy in April 1971 was the most notable reform measure within sport and represented an attempt "to satisfy both foreign opinion and the [overall government] policy of separate development" (Archer and Bouillon 1982, 210). The policy allowed racially defined sports teams to compete against—but not with—each other under certain circumstances. The intention was to portray this as a form of integration to an international audience, while simultaneously easing the fears of white voters by pointing out that the race groups were still at least playing in separate teams.

It is argued here that football was Central to efforts by the minister of sport at the time, Piet Koornhof, to "reform" apartheid sport through multinationalism during the mid-1970s. In fact, one white club chairman recounted many years later that he was surprised by Koornhof's knowledge of the game during those years, including the players, structures and

foreign football (Kuper 1994, 143). The fact that Koornhof had extensive interaction with various football officials during the 1970s, and that football was a significant tool for experimentation within the overall multinational paradigm, perhaps places Koornhof's unexpected knowledge into context.

The arrival of multinationalism saw football in South Africa gain a dual politicisation. On the one hand, there was the anti-apartheid sports movement which sought to use football (and other codes) as lightning rods for international attention, while on the other hand, the government and white sports administrators attempted partial reforms within sport in order to deflect international pressure and to protect (or regain) their membership within international bodies. Multinationalism also resulted in a greater backlash from across the apartheid divide as activists were quick to label it as a government scam designed to fool the international community. This led, for example, to the formation of the non-racial SACOS in 1973 which came to act as the domestic umbrella body for non-racial sport. The non-racial SASF was its biggest affiliate.

While multinationalism was applicable across the South African sporting spectrum, football, in particular, carried great significance within this policy due to the fact that it was the only major team sport dominated by Africans. Hence any reforms rolled out within this domain potentially carried a great deal of symbolic value from Koornhof's perspective. In this regard, three major multinational football tournaments took place during the period 1973–1975. The first such competition formed part of the 1973 South African Games, a multisport event that functioned as South Africa's "own Olympics"—this in response to the country's expulsion from the IOC in 1970. The Games were significant for two reasons. First, overseas athletes—many of whom had competed in the Munich Olympic Games the year before—were recruited to participate to provide an international flavour to the event. Second, the event was also open to a limited number of African, coloured and Indian competitors. The football tournament, in particular, was highly anticipated on account that it consisted of four racially defined teams that would come in direct competition with each other (Venter 2016, 70–105).[13]

The football publication, *S.A. Soccer Weekly*, opined that the "competition could prove to be the key to the opening of the door of admission back to full time membership of the world ruling body FIFA" (Gray 1973, 3), while the *Rand Daily Mail*, a liberal-leaning daily newspaper, pointed to the novelty of measuring different playing styles against one another for the first time:

For many years claims have been made about the strength of South African soccer. The Africans said they were the best. The Whites merely shrugged their shoulders, and claimed they would be too tactically advanced and experienced for the Black players. The moment of truth has arrived. (Van der Zwan 1973, 28)

Anticipation in the black press also reached fever pitch, with the most popular black daily newspaper, *World*, pointing out that

although the S.A. Games officially kicked off in Pretoria on Friday [23 March 1973], for thousands of Blacks, the Games really start tonight with the [football] series…All [football] fans, both Black and White, will be closely watching the African XI. The whites would like to see just how good African players are while African fans want victory at all costs, to prove that without Africans, football in this country is in the doldrums. (*World*, 26 March 1973, 1 and 3)

The stakes were thus high for all parties involved—politicians, football administrators as well as supporters. Multinational football proved highly popular, particularly the high-profile encounters between the Africans and whites. The final match of the tournament, for example, drew 38,000 spectators (Venter 2016, 77). These developments, coupled with the white controlling body's desire to re-enter the international stage, led to the multinational football experiment being extended over the following years.

The 1974 Embassy Multinational Series was played as a stand-alone football competition along similar lines, although it contained a fifth team known as the "Continentals"—essentially consisting of white players with supposed foreign ancestry. In 1975, multinationalism was extended down to club level for the first time with the arrival of the Chevrolet Champion of Champions tournament. This was a competition containing the best club teams from each of the racially defined controlling bodies. It should be noted that the coloured and Indian teams tended to be extremely weak in multinational tournaments on account of the fact that the top players and teams from those racial groups played within the non-racial football structures at the time. The non-racial movement vociferously rejected multinationalism and refused to take part in any of these purported reforms. Their constant demand was for football to integrate at all levels within a single structure, and not only in limited pockets. While this was an admirable, principled stance, there is room for debate as to the practicality of these demands given South Africa's political climate at the time. The question remains as to whether some integration might have been better than none.[14]

The Embassy and Chevrolet multinational tournaments were also highly popular but brought the spectre of supporter violence to the fore. These tournaments were not played in a tightly controlled environment as was the case during the 1973 SA Games and consequently the dangers of these highly racialised—and at times controversial—encounters became evident. The final match of the Chevrolet tournament, for example, was nearly abandoned when trouble erupted in the African supporters' section after the white team, Hellenic, scored a goal against their African opponents, Kaizer Chiefs. The match was eventually restarted and completed, but there was a realisation among white football administrators that the experiment had run its course and a continuation along the same path would inevitably lead to disaster. From this point on they began calling for full integration at professional level. This was also the result of developments at FIFA's 1974 congress in Frankfurt when South Africa's full expulsion from world football's governing body became a distinct possibility.[15]

From an overall perspective, multinationalism was not having the desired effect. South Africa remained a pariah in the eyes of the international community and the pressure exerted on the apartheid state's sports teams was not easing off. As a result, Koornhof gave his blessing for further integration to be attempted within football which in turn led to a further watering down of multinationalism. In 1976, the first government-approved, integrated national football team played against a touring "Argentine Stars XI"—a tour funded by General Motors South Africa. While this event was greeted with much euphoria in the football press it was unable to stave off South Africa's expulsion from FIFA later that same year. The latter development came shortly after the June 16 Soweto uprising that thrust the country firmly into the international spotlight. From that point on no amount of reform on the football field could halt the greater political tide.

During the final years of the decade, the doors to full integration within football were thrown open. The Mainstay League Cup tournament in 1977 comprised of club teams from the different racially defined controlling bodies and Koornhof reluctantly allowed the temporary "loaning" of players to different teams across racial lines. At the end of that season the white NFL disbanded and consequently a number of former white teams were absorbed by the NPSL which, having become the dominant professional League in the country, became fully integrated from that point on. Some white teams even joined the non-racial FPL for one season in 1978, but this move was to prove short-lived due to administrative and ideological complications that arose within that environment.[16]

Throughout the 1980s, South Africa retained two professional leagues—one on either side of the ideological spectrum. The non-racial FPL continued to operate outside formal government structures, while the burgeoning NPSL (which became known as the National Soccer League (NSL) in 1985 due to an administrative breakaway) was now also integrated but with government and business support. Sponsors such as South African Breweries were particularly attracted to the league's large African consumer base and saw football as a key avenue through which to market their products.[17]

It is argued here that the 1970s represented the period during which South African football was most politicised. By the 1980s, South Africa had already been expelled from most major international sporting bodies and the country was being shaped by substantial forces outside the sporting realm. The apartheid regime's international reputation was at an all-time low and consequently, there was little more that the sports boycott movement could achieve, other than direct attention to incoming "rebel" tours in the predominantly white codes of rugby and cricket.

During the early 1990s, the winds of change began to sweep across South Africa, beginning with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison on 11 February 1990. Unity talks at a political level were mirrored in the sporting domain. In September 1990, an agreement was reached between the various football bodies at the time to form a single, non-racial controlling body for the game in South Africa. This body, which was to be known as the SAFA, was inaugurated the following year (Alegi and Bolsmann 2010, 16). This development was the product of broader developments along the sport-political axis in South Africa over the course of the preceding years.[18] An outflow of this process was a merger between the NSL and the non-racial FPL, concluded towards the latter stages of 1990. This brought about the effective unification of South African football at the professional level and this new League continues in its current guise as the Professional Soccer League (PSL) today.

4   Contemporary Issues

It was mentioned earlier that during the first few years of the post-apartheid era sport was utilised as a tool towards trying to forge a unified South African identity. Football played a notable role in this process as the national men's team, known colloquially as *Bafana Bafana* (The Boys), won the 1996 AFCON title on home soil, thereby building on the euphoria of South Africa's triumph in the Rugby World Cup the previous year. This was an

extension of the politicised nature of South African sport over the preceding decades, although this time within a positive framework and looking towards the future. The euphoria from such sporting triumphs are temporary, however, and the reality of post-apartheid South Africa—with its structural and economic challenges—soon began to hit home.

Today South Africa finds itself at the crossroads as it enters an uncertain 2018. Rising youth unemployment, a failing education system, low economic growth, a high crime rate and endemic state corruption all present significant challenges to a country still trying to free itself from the shackles of its racialised past. Sport continues to be used as a temporary band-aid for papering over these cracks, with the most notable football example being the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup—the first in Africa. While individual athletes and team sports such as cricket and rugby have delivered a steady stream of world-class performances since the turn of the millennium,[19] football has largely been absent from these celebrations as the on-field performance of the men's national team have trended in the wrong direction since the high point of 1996. In this regard, *Bafana Bafana* have, since 2002, reached the knockout stages of the AFCON tournament on only one occasion (2013). The team has also not qualified for a World Cup since 2002 (except as host in 2010) and will again be absent from the 2018 edition to be held in Russia. South Africa's apparent under-performance compared to its continental peers is particularly galling given that it has arguably the best commercial League on the continent, with the PSL enjoying a firm financial footing largely due to a longstanding broadcast deal with South African satellite broadcaster, Supersport.[20]

The 2010 World Cup, of course, brought with it a specific range of issues that come with hosting sporting events of this magnitude. Some of these related to stadium construction in preparation for the event. In his analysis regarding the building of expensive new stadiums in Cape Town and Durban—two cities with notable preexisting sports stadiums—Alegi (2008, 397) concluded that the "stadium building [showed] how the 2010 World Cup [could] be understood primarily as a national project aimed at enhancing the prestige and credibility of the South African nation-state and its leadership". He also pointed to the "external pressures exerted by a political economy of world football" which ultimately shaped local decision-making (Alegi 2008, 397). Such questions over the true impact of the 2010 World Cup were also considered elsewhere, such as Desai and Vahed's analysis (2010, 154–167) which looked at the purported benefits that were expected to accrue both for South Africa and the continent more broadly.

From a purely sporting perspective, the tournament was ultimately deemed a success. It was the most profitable World Cup up to that point and progressed largely without incident—despite a notable air of pessimism in some quarters of the foreign media prior to kickoff. The passage of time did, however, raise renewed questions as to the overall merits of the 2010 project and its legacy. Assessments of and justifications for hosting mega-events tend to consider both tangible and intangible factors. In the case of South Africa's World Cup, Bond and Cottle (2011, 39) point out that there "were two standard claims of benefits: a 'massive infusion of cash' into South Africa, resulting in higher gross domestic product (GDP) and state tax revenues as well as more jobs; and the 'rebranding' allegedly required for both new foreign direct investment and tourism". They argue, however, that the reality is far different from that which was originally promised or even subsequently reported. From an economic perspective, they are particularly scathing, stating that the "tangible benefits of the World Cup have been greatly exaggerated to legitimise a major rip-off and profiteering by FIFA, its commercial partners and local monopoly capitalists. [W]hile the original guesstimates in 2003 promised that South Africa could host the event with 'minimal tangible costs' involved and with 'significant' direct benefits, the outcome in reality is the converse" (Bond and Cottle 2011, 64).[21]

The construction of five costly new stadiums is arguably the most questionable component of the tournament's overall legacy, particularly when considering the high costs to local sports teams for renting these venues and the difficulty for some—such as Cape Town Stadium—in obtaining anchor tenants. Despite this criticism, there were some positive aspects related to World Cup spending, such as the upgrading of airports, transport networks and telecommunications infrastructure. However, these elements constitute only a small portion of the 2010 legacy and in this regard, much was also made of the purported intangible benefits—such as improving South Africa's image abroad, increased tourism spending and the forging of national pride during and after the event. These benefits are very difficult to measure and—in the case of national pride—at best temporary and at worst negligible. Even though positive images of the country were certainly beamed across the world during the course of the tournament, it is important to remember that aspects such as increased foreign direct investment are still largely dependent on factors relating to government policy and the general economic situation in the country, for example. All things considered, there is a strong argument to be made that the legacy of the 2010 World Cup is a highly questionable one.

Such an analysis is further supported by subsequent developments—most notably when corruption allegations surfaced in 2015 as part of the broader controversy that enveloped FIFA at the time. In this regard evidence emerged of a payment made by South African officials to Jack Warner, the former head of the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), apparently in return for his confederation's three crucial votes during the bidding process (Hartley 2016, 7). The South African government and football officials denied these allegations, but the competition's legacy was further tarnished by additional allegations relating to business collusion surrounding stadium contracts. It also emerged in 2012 that a series of friendly matches played by *Bafana Bafana* during the lead-up to the tournament had been fixed by an Asian syndicate—this after the latter had managed to convince the SAFA to use referees that were on the syndicate's payroll (Hartley 2016, 7). This ultimately led to the suspension of a number of SAFA officials—including its president at the time, Kirsten Nematandani—after a protracted investigation by FIFA's Ethics Committee (Hughes Neghaiwi 2016). As a result of these developments much of the gloss from the 2010 moment has since worn off.

South African football has also endured its fair share of controversies at domestic level over the past two decades. Periodic scandals around match-fixing and corruption within the local leagues have made headlines in this regard. A notable example was the Pickard Commission Report of 1997 which investigated financial irregularities at SAFA and the NSL—the PSL's forerunner—during the period 1993–1996. As far as match-fixing is concerned, "Operation Dribble" was instituted in 2004 and led to the arrest of more than 40 club officials, match commissioners and referees. However, the final outcome saw only a few minor convictions, while suspicions around powerful officials continued to swirl (*New African Magazine*, 15 February 2013). It is important to note that the majority of the match-fixing and bribery scandals relate to the lower divisions of South African football where the quest for promotion into the lucrative PSL is highly sought-after. The lower divisions also receive less scrutiny and media coverage and consequently, this creates an environment more conducive to attempting nefarious activities.

Early in 2017, SAFA conducted an internal review of its processes including those relating to the integrity and ethics within domestic football administration. Workshops were conducted to educate match officials and an "integrity phone line" was introduced for the reporting of maladministration, corruption and match-fixing (SAFA 2017). SAFA's current "integrity framework" aligns with FIFA's Code of Ethics and provides guidance

with regards to the prevention of unscrupulous conduct. Time will tell whether the implementation of these measures will make a tangible difference towards cleaning up the South African domestic game. At the time of writing the signs were not positive, as SAFA recently released a statement regarding an investigation into alleged match manipulation in the national women's League (Thudinyane 2017).

Apart from corruption there have also been periodic debates around supporter safety due to some notable stadium tragedies in derby fixtures between the country's two biggest clubs, Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates. The most recent of these resulted in the deaths of two supporters during a Cup match played at Soccer City in Johannesburg—the venue for the 2010 World Cup final—in July 2017. This was the result of a stampede outside the stadium (*Sport 24*, 29 July 2017). The worst stadium tragedy in South African sports history occurred at Johannesburg's other premier stadium, Ellis Park (traditionally a rugby venue), in 2001. On that occasion, Chiefs and Pirates were contesting the League title and an estimated 80,000 spectators crammed into the 62,000-capacity stadium. This again caused a stampede of supporters trying to get into the venue, ultimately resulting in the deaths of 43 people.[22]

Football in South Africa is arguably at a low point since the country's re-entry into the international fold in the early 1990s. *Bafana Bafana*'s results continue to disappoint at the continental and international level, the euphoria of the 2010 World Cup has dissipated, and the legacy of that event has certainly been tarnished given recent revelations. In addition, domestic football continues to grapple with organisational challenges relating to management and corruption. While football proved to be highly politicised during the 1970s, much of the contemporary issues facing the game are taking place outside the mainstream discourse surrounding South African sport, which continues to be highly politicised. In this regard, football—given that it is the one major team sport completely dominated by Africans at all levels—is situated outside debates regarding "transformation" in the South African sport. These debates primarily revolve around the racial composition of national and provincial teams in the codes traditionally dominated by whites in the country, with cricket and rugby being the two most prominent examples.[23]

The reality of post-apartheid South Africa is that sport provides an uncomfortable reflection of the country's many underlying divisions rooted in its painful history. While it can be argued that football is less politicised now than it was under apartheid, the game and its myriad of challenges, ambiguities and complexities continue to function as a metaphor for the national project as a whole. Football continues to tell the story of South Africa.

Notes

1. "Boers" were the descendants of primarily Dutch settlers that arrived in South Africa from the late 1600s onwards.
2. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "black" denotes an umbrella term for South Africa's "African", "coloured" and "Indian" race groups. These groups were officially classified into law through the Population Registration Act of 1950 during the early years of apartheid, but are used to refer to any period in this chapter for the sake of consistency. The term "coloured" refers primarily to the descendants of mixed relations between European settlers and the original inhabitants of the geographical area today known as South Africa. Citizens of mixed parentage also fall into this category. South Africa's significant Indian population was the result of indentured labourers brought from India to the Natal Colony by the British starting in 1860.
3. For a full account of this tour see Bolsmann (2011). The term "black" as used here constitutes an umbrella term for individuals from the race groups other than white.
4. The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 as a single territory comprising the four former British and Boer colonies that were at odds during the South African War at the turn of the nineteenth century.
5. For a summary of the league's history, the British influence and factors that led to its decline, see Bolsmann (2013) and Venter (2015).
6. The multinational sports policy, adopted in 1971 as a response to international pressure against South African sports teams, dictated that racially defined teams could play against (but not with) each other under certain limited circumstances. As the decade wore on it was expanded to allow further integration.
7. For more details regarding this tour and its implications, see Venter (2017).
8. A "springbok" is a small antelope found in South Africa.
9. For a detailed analysis of the national euphoria that accompanied South Africa's winning of the 1995 World Cup, see Grundlingh (2013).
10. For details regarding the emergence of these two clubs, see Alegi (2004, 65–85).
11. For a detailed account of the conflict see Sello (1991, 19–25) (as cited by Alegi).
12. For a detailed analysis of the disappearance of former white teams during the 1980s, see Venter (2016, 207–252).
13. For a full account of the multinational football tournaments, see Venter (2016, 70–105).
14. For an analysis regarding the political dynamics within South African football during this period, see Venter (2017).
15. For an analysis of this chain of events, see Venter (2017, 271–274).

16. For a full analysis, see Venter (2017, 177–206).
17. For an overview of these dynamics, see Alegi and Bolsmann (2010, 1–18).
18. For a detailed account of this chain of events, see Alegi and Bolsmann (2010, 12–17).
19. As examples, South Africa produced three world champion athletes in 2017, namely Wayde van Niekerk, Caster Semenya and Luvo Manyonga. Van Niekerk and Semenya are also current Olympic champions. The national cricket team, known as the Proteas, has been ranked as the world's top team at various intervals over the past twenty years, while the rugby Springboks added a second World Cup title in 2007.
20. SuperSport is the biggest sports broadcaster on the African continent. Its television rights deal with the PSL dates back ten years and was recently extended by another five. See *Supersport* (6 December 2017).
21. For a detailed analysis of the projected and actual expenditure in hosting the 2010 World Cup, see Bond and Cottle (2011, 40–49).
22. For a full account of this tragedy, see Alegi (2004). This came ten years after an earlier tragedy in a fixture between these teams at the Oppenheimer Stadium in Orkney, a mining town situated approximately 200 kilometres from Johannesburg. On that occasion, in 1991, a stampede ensued after trouble erupted among supporters, resulting in the deaths of 41 people.
23. Numerous policies have been tried by the government and sports administrators in recent decades to increase the number of black players at the top level within these codes. This has given rise to derogatory terms such as "quota players"—a reference to players included in teams primarily on the basis of their race in order to adhere to certain demographic requirements. The discourse surrounding the issue of transformation tends to be highly polarising and poses the question as to how far South Africa has truly progressed since the end of apartheid. It is interesting to note that the national men's cricket team, the Proteas, is currently being required to field a certain demographic ratio of players—on average—over the course of a season. It can be argued that such racial accounting is not too far removed from the bizarre days of multinationalism in the mid-1970s. For an edited volume containing a variety of content relating to transformation in South African sport, see Desai (2010).

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Zimbabwe

Manase Kudzai Chiweshe

The immense popularity of football in Zimbabwe invariably makes the sport an important arena of political contestation. In this chapter, the focus is on the multiple and complex interlinkages between football and politics in Zimbabwe. It provides both a historical and contemporary analysis of how football influences and is influenced by wider sociopolitical factors. Football in many ways mirrors the everyday sociopolitical contestations in society. In Zimbabwe football plays an important role in both the colonial and post-colonial political spaces. This is because of the continued popularity of the sport especially among poor urban communities. Controlling football thus becomes important political contestations as it allows access to voters. This chapter unpacks these various sociopolitical dynamics by focusing on a historical analysis of football in Zimbabwe. Such an approach traces the development of the game to highlight how the birth of football in the country was inherently a political enterprise. As a child of colonial political processes, football in Zimbabwe has thus remained entrenched within this space where matches represent more than a mere sporting event. The chapter also provides an analysis of contemporary political dynamics of football in Zimbabwe, focusing mainly on violence, corruption and match-fixing.

M. K. Chiweshe (✉)
Centre for Development Studies, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe

1   Political Origins of Football

Giulianotti (2004) provides a rich tapestry of how the Pioneer Column, which was a group put together by Cecil John Rhodes to spear head the colonial project in Zimbabwe, were the first to play football and rugby. Their sporting activities were thus part of the first efforts to build a colony. This explains why writers such as McDowell (2017) argue Rhodesia was partly built on deifying its sports heroes. Football among Africans grew out of this colonial imposition of several sporting codes which whites promoted for reasons discussed later in this section. Chiweshe (2017b) highlights that several sports clubs had been set up by 1900 in the emerging towns catering for competition in football and other sports but organised sport was the sole privilege of whites. Football was probably introduced to blacks from 1923 by black miner workers from Transvaal migrated North to arrive in Bulawayo and Midlands to look for work and playing football in their spare time. Zimbabwe (then known as Rhodesia) was colonised by the British and under colonial rule sport was used as a political tool in a multiplicity of ways. Local Africans thus favoured football because it required little economic and cultural capital compared to other sports. Thus the development of football in Zimbabwe and white settlement/colonisation are intrinsically linked. Hence football was from the beginning a political space fraught with contestations and conflicts. Novak (2012, 850) aptly concludes that in Rhodesia,

> Sport was an important tool of social acculturation and identity formation among white settlers themselves, but it also proved to be a tool of social control over the black African population. British colonisers viewed sport as a 'civilizing' device to teach important lessons of hygiene and fitness in a manner strictly controlled by the white state.

Sport had thus two functions in colonial Rhodesia. Firstly, sport and football in particular became an important space for the white government to promote their colonial agenda. Magirosa in a newspaper report on 3 July 2014 notes: "missionaries taught football because they saw the game as a tool to promote good behaviour, sobriety, obedience, discipline and co-operation". Ranger (1987) also notes how boxing was seen by the colonial authority as equally important in social control tool. Studies have shown how sport and in particular football was seen as a means of social acculturation which was meant to create a unified white culture (Novak 2012; Ranger 1987). Even in present-day post-colonial Zimbabwe football cultures tend to mimic foreign cultures in many ways as it will be discussed later in this chapter.

In the factories and mines, many football teams were formed by European employers. Secondly, sport was an important tool in creating a Rhodesian identity. Especially for the white settlers living in rural spaces, sport became an important tool for community and nation building as Godwin and Hancock (1993, 38) argue that like "other colonial societies, which used sporting achievements to define and enhance their national self-esteem, the Rhodesians deified their heroes and relied upon their national teams to restore or sustain national morale". Sport was such an important part of Rhodesian identity that the white government fought strenuously when the country was banned from international sporting events such as the Olympics (Novak 2006). With football however, a narrative of social protest emerges from various studies focusing on colonial Rhodesia (Novak 2012). Whilst sports such as cricket and rugby remained elitist and a space for segregation, football was a different story all together. This is mainly because the colonial government failed to capture the sport in the same manner they had with boxing especially within the black suburbs (Ranger 1987). Football teams were formed by whites in companies, mines, missionaries but also independently amongst Africans especially in segregated urban housing. Chiweshe (2017b) argues that by 1960 football was an established component of African urban culture in Zimbabwe. Africans have learned, adopted, and achieved a noticeable cultural appropriation of the game across the continent; and began to create their own football associations registered with the local councils.

Magirosi (2014) argues that football became an important social force especially in migrant worker communities where it became an important social capital together with burial societies. Football for a period of time was largely segregated with a white's only national League. In 1926 the first African team was formed in Makokoba suburb of Bulawayo by two grandson of the last Ndebele king Lobengula who had returned from studying in South Africa (Chitakasha 2015). The club was first known as Lions Football Club (Magirosa 2014). In 1936 the players changed the name to Matabeleland Highlanders Football Club.

In 1966, the all-white Rhodesia National Football League (RNFL) invited Highlanders to join them and within two years Highlanders had been drafted into the Second Division (Magirosa 2014). This club now called Highlanders remains one of the biggest clubs in Zimbabwe. In the 1970s, whites and blacks were playing in the same League which promoted the fallacy of equality within the ninety minutes of the game. The national team of 1969 that lost a world Cup qualifier against Australia was also multi-racial.

Under colonial rule political gatherings were prohibited for Africans. Football emerged as a space for Africans to meet and discuss politics. This was however curtailed by the constant police presence. The increased need to control football associations by colonial government and the control of playing spaces which gave the government a level of control over the games. McDowell (2017, 78) describes this control by noting how the colonial government:

> …established parallel European and African associations, with the African associations run through municipalities with a modicum of African administrative control. Football was especially popular in the industrial centres of Bulawayo and Wankie (now Hwange), with the former's African citizens successfully boycotting the City Council's football programme after the administrative seizure of its fully independent African Football Association during 1947–8. So, rather than being used successfully as a tool for placation, grassroots football was increasingly used during the period as an arena for protest.

Despite this, Chiweshe (2011) notes that games especially for popular teams such as Dynamos were political spaces. Mpondi (2014) argues that legal restrictions on public meetings turned football into one of the few areas in life in which Africans could gather legally. Football was thus an important element in the fight for independence in Zimbabwe not only by providing spaces for political meetings and orientation of the masses but also by allowing blacks to see that they can compete and actually defeat whites when the playing field is equal. Novak (2012, 855) notes that:

> …the white government never completely captured the field of association football, a long sphere of autonomous black African control. Legal restrictions on public meetings involving large groups of black Africans 'had turned football into one of the few arenas in which Africans could gather legally in large numbers', resulting inevitably in political dialogue. However, reflecting the incompleteness of white control, some African sports clubs accepted and recruited white players and officials. Football 'provided a rare leisure space in which whites were permitted by an increasingly repressive security system to interact with Africans'.

Chiweshe (2016) argues football was a way black people constantly strove to carve out and control their own space and lives and to blunt and mitigate the impact of colonial policies and practices as best they could under the circumstances. Stuart (1996) adds that sport provided a vehicle for self-assertion of Africans during the colonial period. He was critical of the

assumption that Africans were culturally helpless but highlighted through a cultural economy approach how black people were curving urban cultural spaces and football was one such important process.

It is important to note here that the ethnic dimensions of football in present-day Zimbabwe were also cultivated within the colonial period where football was also seen as a vehicle for ethnic identities. The formation of Matebeleland Highlanders in 1926 was thus viewed as a celebration of Ndebele identity and this was countered in 1936 by the formation of Mashonaland United which in 1975 became Zimbabwe Saints (Chitakasha 2015). In the capital Salisbury (now Harare), the formation of Dynamos in 1963 heralded another dimension on how football intertwines with politics. The formation of the club coincided with increased efforts of the Black Nationalist movement seeking independence. Northern Rhodesia under colonial rule practised a form of racial apartheid that led to the segregation in all walks of life including football. Hence black people were not allowed in the upper echelons of local football and thus relegated to the zonal township SADAFA amateur League (Chiweshe 2016). In providing a history of this team, Mutungamiri (1998) outlines how the actions of radical white players and administrators led to the formation of a multi-racial League with two black teams from Salisbury, namely Salisbury City and United in 1961. In 1962 the teams collapsed due to financial problems and as Chiweshe (2011, 75) notes:

> The players from the two black Salisbury teams were left in the cold but they continued to meet and train at the Number 5 Grounds in Harare Township (now Mbare, National). This was made easier since most of them worked together at Tobacco Sales Floor in the industrial site near Harare Township. These players then organized a match against Salisbury Yellow Peril, a team which was the best in the Salisbury Amateur League. The group could not play without an identity; thus one of the players, a certain Nercasio Murambiwa, having heard of Dinamo Kiev in Russia, suggested the name Dynamos. Sam Dauya who was the club's first secretary then liaised with Ken Walker who was Operations Manager at the Sales Floor, and the name was endorsed in consultation with other players.

The club became so popular in the capital city and an important vehicle for political emancipation of African people. Football was thus instrumental in the fight for independence as Darby (2000) highlights that the game became the centre and impetus of protest against colonialism.

Football and Nation-Building in Post-colonial Zimbabwe

Across Africa football national teams played and still play a critical role in nation and identity building projects. The popularity of the sport makes it an attractive space for political actors and thus football is never far away from politics in Africa. McDowell (2017) shows how Zambia's first president after independence, Kenneth Kaunda, was keen to use the sport as a tool for nation-building. In 1980 when Zimbabwe attained independence, a football match against Zambia was part of the activities. Football was thus part of the symbolic birth of a new nation. Using Zimbabwe as a case study, Chiweshe (2017c) shows how national teams often invoke unity and national consciousness. According to Tunon and Brey (2012) this makes sport ideological and political tools for bringing citizens together under one flag and for a moment make them forget the societal conflicts that separate them. The further add that "from the very beginning, football has been a useful tool in stimulating symbolic integration in order to build state (imagined communities) identities" (Tunon and Brey 2012, 12). Football has thus over the years become an imagery for national unity, a space for social unification which is almost impossible to achieve any other way in the post-colonial state. National pride brings together people beyond the realm of football creating and disseminating ritualistic and imagined national communities in the process (Armstrong and Mitchell 2001). The symbolic activity of supporting a football team thus reinforces the idea of nation and politicians across the world have understood that intrinsic power of football. Darby (2000) illustrates how during the 1950s football was an agent for the articulation of an emerging sense of national spirit in the Belgian Congo. The first Congolese national team in 1957 was thus important in heightening the awareness of nationhood and this culminated in independence in 1960. In the case of Zimbabwe, since 1980 the football national team popularly known as the Warriors have represented the ambitions of an oft-troubled nation and the fortunes of the team tend to affect the national psyche. Chiweshe (2017c) shows how winning and losing for the national team in Zimbabwe leads to collective feelings of national pride and disappointment. The results of the team go beyond football fans and affect all spheres of life in Zimbabwe including religion and politics. Within these national feelings and sentiments, Zimbabwean football is also characterised by serious club rivalries which are discussed in the section below.

2 Historical Club Rivalries

Rivalries are a part of football which has been globalised and thus form an important element across the globe (Guilianotti 2004). Football in post-independence Zimbabwe in 1980 is characterised by deep seated rivalries which are based variously on ethnic, regional, geographic and historical differences. The biggest of them is between Dynamos and Highlanders football clubs. Choto et al. (2017) locate the rivalry within ethno-regional factors which cannot be separated from the colonial project of divide and rule. This policy by the white colonial government was meant to weaken African and ensure fractures along ethnic lines. The colonial government took advantage of historical animosity between mainly the Ndebele and Shona which date back to the pre-colonial era when the dominance of the Ndebele military kingdom under kings Mzilikazi and Lobengula prevailed over Shonas and the rest of the territory now known as Zimbabwe. Ncube (2014a) argues that colonial government organised people into racial and ethnic categories of European, Asian, Coloured, and Native which was further categorised into Mashona and Matabele natives. Ncube (2017) locates ethnic nationalism within the fans of Highlanders Football Club which challenges narratives of a united Zimbabwe but rather illuminates how the team is a site where some people express feelings and aspirations towards establishment of a separate "independent Ndebele nation". There is thus a deep ethnic discourse surrounding this rivalry. Choto et al. (2017, 3) however argue that:

> …ethnic discourses alone are not adequate in analysing this rivalry but rather form a bedrock on which other regional and historical processes play out where the role of the media and competition for dominance come to the fore…ethnic discourses alone are insufficient in understanding the nuances of this football rivalry thus any attempt to do so will only hide important insights into how the intersection of ethnicity, history, politics, marginalization, media hype, competition and social spaces lead to the creation of rivalries that are often played out violently in both physical and cyberspace.

Zenenga (2012, 256) also includes regionalism as a cause of this rivalry, "competing power bases and contesting identities and places not only transform Dynamos–Highlanders games into an epic battle of the cities, but also heighten the dramatic elements in any match involving the two teams". The rivalry continues to the present era and matches in 2017 were marred by cases of violence with one of the games being abandoned.

Another long running rivalry lies in the capital city Harare which witnesses the country's biggest derby between Caps United and Dynamos F.C. Both teams were formed before independence with Caps coming into existence in 1976 as a team backed by Caps Pharmaceuticals (Chiweshe 2017a). The team provided an alternative to the dominance of Dynamos in the capital. The rivalry only deepened post 1980 and as the teams traded success, fans of each team have increased resent of the other. One rivalry which was steeped in colonial history was between Highlanders and Zimbabwe Saints. The teams are both based in Bulawayo and as earlier noted they were formed and named along ethnic lines. Highlanders were known as Matebeleland Highlanders and were formed first in 1926. In response to this mainly Shona residents in Bulawayo formed Mashonaland United which later became Zimbabwe Saints. Anecdotal reports claim that the team only changed its name in 1975 at the behest of the late national liberation war hero Joshua Nkomo who saw the name as divisive at a time when Africans needed to work together in the fight for independence. The rivalry of the teams continued after independence but ended when Zimbabwe Saints were relegated in 2006.

Another fairly new rivalry is the Zvishavane derby pitting 2017 League champions FC Platinum and Shabanie Mine football clubs. Shabanie Mine was a team owned by the asbestos mine in Zvishavane. The team represents an identity for residents in the town and is an aspiration for young boys and heroes for local communities. A young fan from Shabanie Mine remembers how at the turn of the century when the team got into the premier League players like Thomas Makwasha, Asani Juma and Francis Chandida became cult heroes at the mine. Home games at Maglas Stadium (allegedly named after a white mine manager who wore spectacles *maglass* as known by locals) were eagerly awaited by the whole community and on match day the town came to stand still. Football remains an important fabric of the community especially after the asbestos mine closed. In 2011 Mimosa, another mine backed team gained promotion into the Zimbabwe Premier League and changed their name to FC Platinum. The animosity between the two teams stem from the economic fortunes of the mines backing the teams. With the asbestos mine facing serious challenges and thus leaving many people unemployed, the platinum mine has being doing very well (FC Platinum on their website note that they are now owned by an entertainment company and not the mine). The workers of the two mines live in different parts of the town, thus there are pronounced neighbourhoods that support the two teams. Match audience figures shows that Shabanie has more fans attending games—especially during derbies but they cannot compete with

the financial muscle of their neighbours thus increasing the hatred between the teams. The above are the most pronounced rivalries in the local League. The following section focuses on the political dimensions of the game in contemporary Zimbabwe.

3 Football as a Sports Spectacle

Football is in many ways part of everyday life in Zimbabwe. As Chiweshe (2016, 101) argues:

> Being a fan is an important part of one's social identity and affects most aspects of one's life. There is something more to supporting a football team besides entertainment. Supporting a football team is a kind of marriage, a commitment similar to 'till death do us part'.

Both local and international football transcends all social spaces from public transport, to bars, saloons and living rooms across the country. Football is everywhere in Zimbabwe though the advent of satellite television and recently new media has led to the dominance of European football (especially English) at the expense of local football. Indeed the English Premier League is the most followed with Manchester United, Chelsea, Arsenal and Liverpool being the most popular teams. However there are significant followers of teams such as AC Milan (Italy), Real Madrid and Barcelona (Spain) especially in the European Champions League. The overwhelming majority of fans in Zimbabwe support a local and an international team (usually an English one). This form of football imperialism is closely tied to the mass migration of football talent from the continent. In Zimbabwe, this phenomenon is a bit different with the lure of the South African Rand providing a destination near home for the bulk of players. South African is the seventh richest League in the world going by sponsorship and prize money. The clubs afford high salaries and many talented players in Southern Africa end up in this League.

National political processes in Zimbabwe are intricately linked to everyday running of football. This is because of the close relationship between the game and political dynamics of both colonial and post-colonial state. In both epoch football has been used as a site of state control but also as a vehicle of resisting political oppression. Football administrators over the years have largely been either politicians or people with close political connections. The Zimbabwe Football Association (ZIFA) was at one time run by

the nephew of then President Robert Mugabe and in 2017 the chairman is a ZANU PF member and former member of parliament, Philip Chiyangwa. Politicians are also patrons of football clubs. For instance ZANU PF minister Webster Shamhu is patron for Dynamos, and the current President Emmerson Munangagwa is the patron of FC Platinum. For some analysts, these ties to politicians especially those in the ruling ZANU PF party reflect a commitment on the part of the ruling political establishment to continue the Rhodesian policy of using sport as a mechanism of social control (Muponde and Muchemwa 2011). Ncube (2014b) adds that football in Zimbabwe mirrors the mainstream politics, for example the controversy and alleged vote buying during ZIFA elections is similar to the contested nature of mainstream political elections in Zimbabwe. He also points how politicians such as the late president Caanan Banana and late vice presidents Simon Muzenda, Joseph Musika and John Landa Nkomo have all occupied the honorary position of the patron of the Zimbabwe senior men's football team.

Fans in Zimbabwe are rarely represented or consulted in the running of teams. This has to do specifically with the culture of the game in the country where fans are viewed only as paying customers and not as an integral part of football clubs. Football fans in Zimbabwe rarely participate in the day to day activities of their teams except attending matches or training sessions. In recent times Zimbabwe has witnessed the emergence of multiple fan groups. The most visible are the various Dynamos fan chapters (groups) in many towns and cities across the country. Chiweshe (2014a) credits this new wave of fan organising to the advent of social media which has made it easier for fans to network and organise. Facebook has especially provided space for fans to create online communities and a very visible way for imagined communities to virtually exist. Whatsapp group on mobile phones have also ensured easy and up to the minute access to other fans, news and team gossip. Chiweshe (2014a) also problematized the online platforms as they tend to provide a platform to entrench tribal and historical rivalries by the use of offensive and foul language. Online discussions involve distance and anonymity thus fans tend to make reference to hurtful ethnic insults especially fans of Dynamos and Highlanders football clubs. The fan groups are involved in organising trips to away matches; in the case of Dynamos Harare chapter (group) fans they have access to the team administrators and thus have of a way to air their views on the team. The groups are also involved in social causes, for example Dynamos fans Bulawayo chapter have in the past donated goods to a mental hospital in the city in 2017 (*Sunday News*, 12 February 2017). The group had thirty members as of February 2017 and

is led by an elected chairperson. The Harare chapter in 2015 initiated some social responsibility programmes including the cleaning of Chitungwiza Hospital (*Nehanda Radio*, 31 May 2015). There is no research yet on these emergent fan groups but they are becoming more important in any analysis of football fandom in Zimbabwe.

Violence and hooliganism have for long been part of the football fabric in Zimbabwe. Football has a gruesome past and present across the world related to violence from fans within and outside stadiums. Zimbabwean football has continuously experienced violence at football venues perpetrated by fans, players and administrators. Frosdick and Marsh (2005, 5) argue that "the game of football has been associated with violent rivalry since its beginnings in 13th century England. Medieval football matches involved hundreds of players, and were essentially pitched battles between the young men of rival villages and towns – often used as opportunities to settle old feuds, personal arguments and land disputes". Football in Zimbabwe is often built on already existent social fractures, which have promoted conflict and violence such as the rivalry based on regional and ethnic differences between Dynamos and Highlanders. Violence is an important feature to this rivalry. As noted earlier, one has to look at the colonial period to also understand this dislike exacerbated by the colonial policy of divide and rule. This led to animosity between the different tribal groups. Football as an enactment of physical superiority and prowess has played a significant part in such tribal battles where players are made to feel as if they are representing something bigger than a mere football team. The ethnicity of the players however does not matter, once they put on the teams jersey they are seen as part of group. At the turn of the century, when the team dominated the League for four years, the Bosso (nickname for Highlanders) road show (hordes of fans in their black and white regalia) would invade all towns when the team was playing. The team represents more than football but an important part of being Ndebele and this idea is passed to younger generations by old fans, transmitted through taking them to games. At one time the Soweto stand at Barbourfields was notorious for people being beaten up for failing to speak in Ndebele.

Physical violence seems to communicate the nature of the rivalry between the two clubs throughout its historical development. Most recently nine Highlanders fans were arrested in February 2013, after violence had erupted in a match featuring Highlanders and Dynamos at the Barbourfields stadium in Bulawayo. Data gathered through participant observation on 24 February 2013 confirms the outburst of violence after Dynamos had taken the lead against Highlanders in the "*Bob 89*" Cup final. *The Herald*

of 11 February 2013 on this incident notes that a section of Highlanders fans went on a rampage stoning vehicles and beating anyone suspected to be a Dynamos fan. On 21 April 2013 violence erupted again after the referee was alleged to have added on time to allow Dynamos to score an equalising goal. After Highlanders had taken the lead, their fans started throwing objects on the pitch in protest, and after the game some players went charging toward the referee in an attempt to physically assault him, blaming him for poor officiating as noted by *the Herald* of 21 April 2013. In 2011 a semi-final match of the Banc ABC super eight football tournament played at the Rufaro stadium featuring these two teams was abandoned midway after violence had erupted. In 2002 two fans died and seven police officers were injured after an outburst of violence in Bulawayo, in a match featuring the two teams. Physical violence seams not to express itself when the two teams play each other only, but it goes beyond that, for instance on Facebook they were claims that a Dynamos supporter had been attacked fatally by alleged Highlanders fans in Gweru in a match featuring Dynamos and Hardbody Football club. Highlanders fans are also point to the death of Thembelenkosini Hloli in August 2014 to show how violence is also perpetrated against them (*The Zimbabwean*, 19 August 2014).

The period between 2000 and 2008 Zimbabwe underwent a socio-economic and political crisis which resulted in hyperinflation, the near total collapse of the economy, a massive humanitarian crisis with 7 million people on food aid and a third of the population migrating to other countries especially South Africa (*The Zimbabwean*, 17 July 2016). The policies of former president Robert Mugabe which included the occupation of white owned farms, political violence and election irregularities led to economic ruin which was further worsened by economic sanctions on the country. Local football underwent serious challenges in terms of lacking sponsorship as companies closed, down scaled or moved to neighbouring countries. The premier League had no sponsor for the 2010 season with eventual winners Motor Action receiving nothing for their success. The national team faced multiple challenges to fulfil fixtures and over time the national football association failed to pay coaches such as the Brazilian Valinhos. Valinhos later reported the association to FIFA who subsequently disqualified Zimbabwe from 2018 World Cup qualifiers as punishment. Local players also migrated with high frequency many parts of the world including Vietnam as local clubs failed to pay wages. Football in this period faced multiple challenges including corruption, maladministration and poor governance as will be noted in the next section. Highlanders fans found the stadium as a space to not only assert their Ndebele identity but also protest ZANU PF

(Ncube 2017). As noted above most clubs continued to have ZANU PF politicians as patrons though it will be erroneous to claim the clubs were pro ZANU PF. There is need for more nuances of the political dynamics of this period given that the support base for the most popular teams such as Dynamos were poor urban centres which overwhelmingly voted for the opposition party during this period. During that period one of the most colourful Dynamos supporter, the late Stanley Nhau was a member of the ZANU PF youth group called Chipangano which was alleged to have committed many acts of political violence.

Under the repressive regime of Robert Mugabe football symbols and metaphors became an important part of the resistance. Zenenga (2012) shows how the main opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change appropriated football imagery including red cards and whistles as part of their campaigns. The red card was a symbol of removing Mugabe from the game. Ncube (2016) provides an analysis of how during the 2008 election there was an underground campaign within ZANU PF to vote out Mugabe. That campaign known as *bhora musango* (kicking the ball in the forest) appropriated football symbols to portray a situation where party members were encouraged to actively miss the target (in this case voting for Mugabe). The campaign almost successes with Mugabe losing a highly contested elections whose results took weeks to be released. The election went to a second round runoff in which Mugabe's loyalists especially veterans of the liberation struggle undertook a campaign named *bhora mugedhi* (kicking the ball into the net/scoring). Football has thus also played a role within the political context of the country. This is also supported by the fact that football matches are very much part of all nationalist celebrations including the Independence Cup and in the past there football tournaments for Heroes Day and Unity Day. The ZANU PF government has thus also used the popularity of football to ensure well attended nationalist events. Usually the games include handpicked teams to ensure the participation of teams with the biggest fan bases such as Dynamos and Highlanders.

4   Asiagate and Match-Fixing in Zimbabwe

No event has shaped in the political economy of Zimbabwean football in the past decade than the now infamous Asiagate saga. Asiagate is a media initiated name to describe the events surrounding a match-fixing scandal involving players, administrators and even sports reporters in Zimbabwe. Tendai Marima (2011) writing for Al Jazeera describes the scandal as:

> … between August 2007 and January 2010 the Zimbabwe national team
> and other local clubs went on tour, mainly in Asia, as well as the Middle East
> and North Africa, and were paid to play losing matches. The dodgy opera-
> tion was discovered when the Sports and Recreation Commission ordered an
> investigation into why the national team had toured Malaysia in December
> 2009 without official authorisation from the Zimbabwe Football Association
> (ZIFA). The probe revealed that, not only had Asian gaming syndicates paid
> each player in the Zimbabwe squad $2000-5000 in cash for each match lost,
> but also that, last July, Monomotapa Football Club had twice impersonated
> the country's national team and played Malaysia in international friendlies.

The scam was orchestrated by internationally recognised match-fixer Wilson
Raj Perumal. At one time in 2012, around 80 players were suspended owing
to their participation in the match-fixing racket. Perumal was reported say-
ing he had started working with Zimbabwean football officials in fixing
matches as far back as 1997. The match-fixing enterprise was well coordi-
nated, involving then chairman of ZIFA Wellington Nyatanga and chief
executive officer Henrietta Rushawya. Conway Tutani (2012) writing in the
Newsday paper sums it by arguing, "Asiagate was organised crime because it
was a highly centralised enterprise…with a form of structure and discipline
to it and carefully chosen strategically placed individuals running the scam,
pressuring players to participate in the same manner Mafia racketeers force
people to do business with them". Rushawya in particular was singled as an
important mastermind behind the scams.

ZIFA appointed a committee to investigate the scandal led by retired
judge Justice Ahmed Ebrahim. The committee faced multiple challenges in
meeting its mandate given the numerous attempts to stop its work. Excerpts
from the report paint a said picture of manipulation of players by adminis-
trators who took advantage to enrich themselves. Below are parts from the
report detailing events during one of the trips:

> There is conflicting evidence as to whether (one journalist) was present at the
> drinks party. The people who went to it were chauffeur-driven in five cars. The
> party was at a different hotel from the one the team was staying at (Wilson)
> Raj (the jailed Singaporean linked to the Asiagate match-fixing scandal) was
> present, together with the three people that met the team at the airport. The
> Malaysian FA (Football Association)'s protocol personnel did not come to
> the airport and somehow Raj and his team were in charge…The six officials
> were entertained by 16 young women from whom they chose and were pro-
> vided with a room for use and people were dashing up and down the stairs.

Meanwhile, back at the hotel, there were three Asian men freely mixing with the Zimbabwe players and talking to them…[The report further noted that the next morning, Raj attended the team training session with a clear instruction that the match they were going to play was a money game and that they should concede two goals] Gentlemen, this is a money game. You should concede two goals in the first half. I will pay \$1 000 for each player and \$1 500 for the officials. (Matenga 2012)

The report outlines that the players were mainly pawns who received very little when compared to what it described as the ZIFA "inner sanctum" that included the top administrators. At the end of the investigation around 15 players and administrators were given life bans but by 2017 most of them had been rescinded and no one went to prison over the whole scandal. The impact on football in Zimbabwe was immense with the loss of sponsors affecting the growth of the sport.

Africa (Zimbabwe included) has over the recent past provided an easy target for fixers with willing football administrators and poorly paid players and referees available to play along. The corrupt nature of football administration in Zimbabwe made Asiagate possible. The state of the game across the continent is such that in most countries football teams are struggling to keep afloat and players remain poorly remunerated. In Zimbabwe football does not provide a sustainable income for players who mainly play as a way to gain a transfer to South Africa or Europe where the returns are much higher. This makes footballers vulnerable to temptations. The failure to ensure proper punishments and closure of the Asiagate saga has meant the scourge of match-fixing will continuously hound Zimbabwe. Political will to fight corruption in football is missing given the widespread acceptance and practice of corruption in all other sectors of the economy. This explains why in March 2016 another match-fixing scandal emanating from South Africa emerged in Zimbabwe. Henrietta Rushwaya was again linked to this scandal which was coined as Limpopogate. The allegations by ZIFA were that they had unearthed evidence that an upcoming Zimbabwe 2017 Nations Cup qualifiers game against Swaziland was going to be fixed (*The Herald*, 10 March 2016). Rushwaya defended herself arguing that she was working undercover for investigators working with FIFA to unearth Asian match-fixers. Her account was corroborated by Terry Steans who was once a FIFA investigator (Sharuko 2016).

Limpopogate led to the arrest of Rushwaya together with the late ZIFA committee member Edzai Kasinauyo and former assistant coach for the

national football team, Nation Dube. The three were accused of working with former national team coach, Ian Gorowa, and Asian match-fixer, Chan Sankaran to fix matches (Taruvinga 2016). What is clear is the global networks of match-fixing which are intricately linked to politically connected individuals in developing nations like Zimbabwe. The failure to deal decisively has meant that match-fixing continues in various guises. Furthermore, the police are ill equipped to combat this type of criminal activity, the laws against it being vague. The global nature of the syndicates also provides complexities in investigating or prosecuting match-fixing. Countries such as Zimbabwe will remain easy targets for match-fixers if very little is done in developing the game, empowering players, increasing police and prosecutors knowledge on combating these syndicates, as well as political action through laws and prosecutions. The role of government is however affected by FIFA's policy of non-interference. Chiweshe (2014b) argues that FIFA's policy of non-political interference in football administration protects corrupt football administrators from direct political attempts to combat corruption. The threat of bans from football often cower national government into submission and prevents thorough inspection and monitoring of footballing authorities. Zimbabwean government has in the past cowered under such threats. FIFA are part of the problem in African football corruption and with evidence of so many cases of theft, it is surprising that little action has been taken to tackle the problem.

5   Conclusion

This chapter has provided a nuanced analysis of the political dimensions of football in Zimbabwe. It has taken a historical perspective which traces how the evolution of the game as a colonial product into a post-colonial favourite pastime. It has shown how football was used as a form of social control and cultural assimilation by the white colonial government. The game was however expropriated as a vehicle for the emancipation of black majority from colonial rule. The chapter also noted the politics of football within a post-colonial setting with a focus on historical and current rivalries, role of fans and the importance of football in everyday life. It ends by highlighting the political intricacies of match-fixing in Zimbabwe. The chapter concludes that football and politics in Zimbabwe are inseparable given how the game has evolved in the country.

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Part V

Americas

Argentina

Pablo Alabarces, José Garriga Zucal, Verónica Moreira, Gabriela Garton and María Nemesia Hijós

1   Political Origins of Football

Argentine football was historically constructed through a progressive—and perhaps conflictual—creolisation of a sport which originated from England. Since the first match, played in 1867 among members of the local British community, Argentine football was developed in three parallel areas:

a. The schools of the British community that, following the example of the metropolitan schools, began to incorporate the practice of national sports not only as part of an educational process but also of a colonial one: *mens sana in corpore sano*. At the same time, sports served to reproduce the rules of sociability and community isolation.

P. Alabarces (✉)
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
e-mail: palabarces@mail.fsoc.uba.ar

P. Alabarces · J. Garriga Zucal · V. Moreira · G. Garton · M. N. Hijós
CONICET (National Council for Scientific and Technical Research),
Buenos Aires, Argentina

J. Garriga Zucal
University of San Martin, Buenos Aires, Argentina

V. Moreira · G. Garton · M. N. Hijós
University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina

b. The first social and sports clubs belonged to the British community. These were quickly imitated by the dominant classes in Argentina, who were susceptible to any British influence and jealous cultivators of a strict mimesis. Language was part of this mimesis: The Argentine patrician families presumed their dominance of the English language. The first associations were given English names: The *Argentine Association Football League* was founded in 1891 and later refounded in 1893; only in 1946 was the name translated as *Asociación del Fútbol Argentino*.

c. The foundation of clubs by companies for their employees occurred later than the other two areas; the first appeared in 1890. They were rapidly efficient, however, and became the fundamental axis that permitted the appearance of new practicing subjects. This is where the middle classes appeared: They had come into being due to the influence of European immigration, accelerated urbanisation and modernisation of Argentine society. The railway companies were exceptional within this area: *Ferro Carril Oeste* or *Rosario Central Railway*, for example. At the end of the century, and with even more prominence in the first decade of the new century, more and more clubs were founded by these groups, based on new relationships often related to specific neighbourhoods or spaces, instead of being work-affiliated.

In 1893, this general expansion of football was consolidated in an association which quickly would become a bureaucratic and institutional structure. In the same way, the presidents were, in order: Alexander Watson Hutton, A. Boyd, Charles Wibberley and Francis Chevallier Boutell. In 1906, a well-known member of the Argentine oligarchy was chosen, Florencio Martínez de Hoz, indicating a partial change in direction (the replacement of a colonial aristocrat with a native one) confirmed by the adoption of Spanish as the official language of the association (Palomino and Scher 1988).

A similar process, also linguistic but more amply cultural, is that which took place on the playing fields. The first participants of the League tournaments were the clubs and schools that made up the groups already mentioned: All indicate membership in the British collectivity, both in the names of the teams and of the players. Teams included those of the Buenos Aires English High School, the Lomas Athletic Club, the Belgrano Athletic Club—all teams integrated by members with Anglo last names. In 1900, Watson Hutton's school won its first League, but at the same time was obliged to change its name: The League decided that the participating high schools had to abandon their original names to avoid the use of the team as

commercial propaganda. The members of the team chose the name Alumni, and between 1900 and 1911, the Alumni completely dominated the football map. They won every championship, except those of 1904 and 1908 (won by Belgrano Athletic). In 1912, an exclusive club of the British collectivity, Quilmes Athletic Club, won the championship of the Federación Argentina; in 1913, the tournament was won by Racing Club, a team formed by a group of young men from the industrial suburb of Avellaneda, whose team name was based on Racing of Paris. The historic narrative and customs insist on recognising Racing as the first *criollo* champion of Argentine football. Racing dominated the tournaments throughout the decade. During this period, a key moment in Argentine football, Alumni club was dissolved, and the Federation incorporated a large number of new teams made up of native Argentines. These players were often the sons of Italian and Spanish immigrants (or were immigrants themselves). This marked the beginning of the end of British participation in football; and the English begun to seek refuge in rugby. The British example was successful: The natives had adopted their sport. By 1912, in the city of Buenos Aires and its suburbs, there were 482 teams—as many in the two official Federations as in the independent Leagues, formed by local or labour affinities (Frydenberg 2013).

The role of these teams in the wider framework of Argentine society has been examined by Archetti (2001, 13), who observes:

> The expansion of sports in Argentina can be associated with the development of civil society, since the sports clubs and organizations generated spaces of autonomy and social participation at the State's margin. In this context, the practicing of sports, especially team sports, permits the establishment of a "national space" of real competitiveness and of social mobility—since the best players of the provinces can come to Buenos Aires to continue their career—and of territorial and symbolic unification. The media and the radio in the 1920s played a crucial role in this process. *El Gráfico* (…) emphasised the importance of team sports, since these permit the nation to express itself, while at the same time allowing the players to form a "national awareness" that overcomes the local identities of the club or the province. In addition, team sports make possible different styles, when competing with other teams; these can be considered manifestations of "national styles".

These new teams had not only replaced English last names with Italian and Spaniards but also had replaced an entire system of class and ideology. The oligarchy was displaced by the newly forming popular classes, but fair play—understood as a combination of ethical norms based conceptu-

ally on ideology and class—was also replaced. A new concept of masculinity was being created, linked to radically different conditions of life, in which free time and leisure were fought for—not given—within a context of worker unions. This process had to end necessarily in professionalism, the final mark of the democratisation of the institutional practice of Argentine football.

This process was simultaneously developed with the debate about an Argentine national identity, in crisis because of mass immigration from Southern Europe from the end of the nineteenth century. As Archetti argues (especially 1995), in the discussion of national identity, the sports journalists were doubly peripheral intellectuals—as Bourdieu (1997) defined them: peripheral as journalists, who are peripheral as intellectuals. These journalists intervened in an illegitimate construction of identity (because the legitimate place is in literature or essays), but this construction was based on the universe of their publics. Thus, football was transformed in the sports magazine *El Gráfico*, a publication fundamental in this area since the 1920s; football thus became "a cultural text, in a narrative that was useful for understanding both nationality and masculinity" (Archetti 1995, 440).

> *El Gráfico* is the middle-class sports weekly which has had, and continues to have, the greatest influence in Argentina. The analysis of the content of this magazine is, therefore, an analysis of the construction of middle-class male imagery. Whether or not it was hegemonic is debatable, but there is no doubt about its decisive influence on the definition of the different areas of national and masculine moral thought. The journalists of *El Gráfico*, excellent writers in the main, think as members of the middle-class but, at the same time, give space to the expression and dissemination of the voices, images and performances of football players and other sportsmen of popular and working-class origin. The transformation of the latter into 'heroes' or 'villains', into 'models' to be emulated or not, and the careful analysis of their performances are examples of the process of the symbolic construction of the 'national' through an examination of sporting virtues. The term 'national' is used to indicate that, in *El Gráfico*, voices, performances, successes or failures of popular actors are combined with the intellectual reflections of middle-class writers and journalists. This confluence is less apparent in specialist women's magazines or in the more political or literary weeklies, where the dominant voices are those of the upper or middle-classes. (Archetti 1999, 58)

It is important to note that this intervention was both later and consequent to the legitimate intervention. Initially, the construction of *gauchismo* as an ideology is owed to the intellectuals Leopoldo Lugones and Ricardo

Rojas, the founding fathers of intellectual nationalism; the *gauchesca* explanation of Argentine football nationalism, as argued by Eduardo Lorenzo, *Borocotó*, principal interpreter of the operations of *El Gráfico*, comes later. A convergence of cultural spheres was determined, as stated by Archetti, "the envisioned radical dichotomy between cultivated and popular writers in Argentina is no longer acceptable" (1999, 126–127). *El Gráfico* inaugurated a new series of interpretations of these narratives, transformed into *sports* tales and constructed for the new popular publics.

This process of constructing an *initial sport-based nationalism*, travelled down different paths:

a. Rites of passage: If national meanings are constructed through football, it is necessary to explain the passage from its British invention to its creolisation. This is resolved, according to the explanation given by sports journalists, by the melting pot and by a process that combines the cultural, economic and social spheres.
b. Sports victories are necessary to make national representation efficient (Arbena 1996): This is where Boca Junior's European tour in 1925 came into play, as did the silver medal won in the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics and the 2nd place in the 1930 World Cup in Uruguay.
c. Heroes that support the epic of the foundation are key: Players such as Tesorieri, Monti, Orsi and Seoane were Central in these beginnings, to name just a few.
d. Finally, a differentiation was necessary: The imaginary expression of the we/they duality lies in *playing styles*, more narrated than lived, but with a great capacity to produce meaning. The idea of a *criollo style*, which combined several tactical elements with original individual practices, was mixed with some mythical places, such as the *potrero*—in Argentina, empty lots where boys play football—and popular figures, like the *pibe*—the kid, a non-adult, not subject to the disciplinary and productive logic of the world/market (Archetti 1997).

This meaningful capacity of a *criollo style*, named as *la nuestra* (*what is ours*), functioned especially in the *mirror*, in its comparison with the *other* and the attention given to the *other's point of view*:

> One might conceive of a personal football-playing style as something totally imaginary, but, in general, style develops through comparison with other playing styles (…) However, in the fifteen years between 1913 and 1928 the transformation from the British to the *criollo* style was a gradual process. In this

transformation the gaze of the 'distant other', the Europeans, and the 'near other', the Uruguayans, would be important (Archetti 1999, 61).

The construction of this style incorporated the sons of immigrants who were not British, but excluded the rest; on the contrary, the Brit would become the *significant other*: "I think, however, that *El Gráfico* also contributed in this way, defining, in the field of sport, 'Britishness' as the relevant 'other' for the Argentinians" (Archetti 1999, 65).

Criollo style, in journalist Borocotó's interpretation, is an essentialist and naturalised construction:

> There is no melting-pot; there is a transference of qualities through the absorp-tion of fundamental substances [landscape-food] (…) Contact with the *pampa* and its culture transformed the immigrants. In this sense, something unique and untransferable becomes naturalised: the contact with nature allows the sons of immigrants –only some sons, of course– to be transformed. The style of play is thus derived from nature –it is a natural gift; a *criollo* player is born so, and cannot be made so. The 'natural', the *criollo*, appears as a bar-rier against cultural transference, against the importation of European styles, which was the main point of discussion in 1950. (Archetti 1999, 69)

The style was constructed, then, as a mechanism of incorporation (of the sons of legitimate immigrants—that is, Italians and Spaniards) and exclusion (of illegitimate immigrants: the British). The purpose was to create a new hybrid, *criollo* football, *what is ours*.

The construction of an Argentine playing style can be found in texts of the local English newspaper *The Standard* from 1912–1914. The articles reported the visits of Tottenham, Everton and Swindon to Argentina in 1912 and that of Exeter City in 1914. Exeter's coach affirmed that the locals "are clever in dribbling and fast, but their weak point is that they are indi-vidualists and try to shine each above their fellows. They will never achieve real success until they recognise that it takes eleven men to score a goal" (*The Standard*, July 7, 1914, 4, quoted in Archetti 1999, 56). Thus "the fiction of a *criollo* style as opposed to the British one is not only the creation of the Argentine media but also of the local British press. British journalists con-tinually set up an opposition between the tactical sense, discipline, method, force and physical power of the British and the agility and virtuosity of *cri-ollo* playing style" (Archetti 2001, 20).

However, if in this case the nation was constructed by the middle classes and not by the dominant classes, deviations started to appear: Confronted

with the idea of a nation that referred to the bucolic—in the double game of the *gauchesco* myth and of owning land, the dominant method of production—the nation, as constructed by football, assumed an urban time and space. Instead of the idea of a nation anchored in the heroic pantheon of the patrician families and the Hispanic tradition, football proposed a nation represented by popular subjects and the sons of poor immigrants. As for the *gauchesco* archetype, constructed on the suppression of the popular classes for the good of economic rural organisation, the organic intellectuals of football proposed real members of the urbanised, literate popular classes. These classes demanded to be included in the cultural and political spheres during the first Argentine Populism—the Radical Party of Yrigoyen. This is where their interpellating efficacy lay.

The early appearance and subsequent diffusion among the popular classes of a discourse of nationality related to football in the 1920s allowed its mythology to become the celebratory ritual of the *patria* (homeland) two decades later, when it would reach the pinnacle of its hegemony. For this climax, the most appropriate scenario will be the Populist experience of Peronism, which we won't address here.[1]

2   Historical Club Rivalries

Unlike the European case, based mainly on regional or intercity opposi-tions, the processes of antagonisation (the way in which different rivalries are structured) were markedly varied in Argentina. Moreover, this process began at the same time as the birth of Argentine football, which is why these rival-ries are already over a hundred years old—one cannot speak of more mod-ern rivalries: The vast majority of clubs which compete in official association tournaments were founded before 1930.

Romero (1994) argues that there are four modes of rivalry articulation:

Regional: among teams of different cities, regions or communities, within a nation state. In the Argentine case, this articulation is visible in the Buenos Aires other provinces dichotomy, in an ample way, and in a more particular way, in the inter-provincial confrontations between teams from Jujuy and Salta, from Córdoba and Tucumán, etc.

Intercity: among teams from the same city, with an historical dichotomy of representation (usually, rich vs. poor). For example, Nacional-Peñarol from Montevideo. This is once again clear in Argentina, although perhaps only out of Buenos Aires: In the capital, the abundance of teams makes the articulation of a single dichotomy of identities impossible. In contrast, this

appears in San Miguel de Tucumán (Atlético and San Martín), La Plata (Estudiantes and Gimnasia), Rosario (Newell's and Rosario Central), etc. In all the mentioned cases, one of the teams imaginarily represents the world of rich people and the other the popular world. However, there is not any kind of sociological correlation between the publics and a class belonging. That correlation could only be found in the tales of foundation and their first years of existence. In a few years, the accelerated process of popularisation democratised the affiliations. There is not any case of religious adscription, but rather an ethnical one: the traditional, mythical but not real, affiliation of Club Atlético Atlanta (Atlanta Athletic Club) with the Jewish community (Rein 2014). In other cases, just a few, some ethnic affiliations with immigrant communities can be seen, but they are not constituted rivalries (Deportivo Italiano, Club Español, Deportivo Paraguayo, etc.).

Inter-neighbourhood: in this case, these are teams which, within a single city, do not represent a dichotomy of symbolic reference, but do belong to a territory defined as a neighbourhood. This is typical of Buenos Aires, and, to a lesser extent, of Cordoba, where the existence of an enormous quantity of teams within the city leads to oppositions within smaller territories. The representation of the community disappears to give way to the micro-community, the neighbourhood. In the last few years, however, the category "neighbourhood" has been charged with a strong interpellating capacity. The physical space, usually vague and imprecise, ends in a *place*, that is, a space with meaning.

Finally, an absolutely exceptional case is that of *intra-neighbourhood* antagonisms: Romero sees this as exemplified in River-Boca, two teams which both originated in a single neighbourhood on the shores of the Río de la Plata. Nonetheless, the representation of both teams exceeds this reference (they are "national" teams, in the sense that they interpellate subjects from other regional communities outside of Buenos Aires). The example is not adequate, but the idea is that Argentine football is characterised by a progressive and microscopic fragmentation of the spaces represented. The existence of two teams from the same neighbourhood, in geographical-administrative terms, is legible in the case of Racing and Independiente, both from the town of Avellaneda in Greater Buenos Aires. Technically, Avellaneda is a city, but its integration within Greater Buenos Aires converts it into a symbolic territory of smaller dimensions. The district is home to five teams that dispute official tournaments within different categories (without counting the innumerable minor Leagues that do not produce significant strategies for creating identities). The function of the fans, in these cases, is the production of imaginary boundaries that do not correspond with official

divisions; they denominate a space—with limits that are vaguely spatial, but precisely symbolic—as a "neighbourhood", isolated from the territory of the *other*.

Romero sustains that, as the space of representation gets smaller, representativeness is lost (Romero 1994). By the contrary: The more segmented and atomised the territory, the more personal it becomes, thus acquiring greater capacity to interpellate subjects. The fragmented territory of the neighbourhood appears as a continent—a limit to identity—and as content: It points to a narrative of the traditions, of the *essences* and of the violent epics, in the case of militant fan groups that affirm their identity in violent confrontations and in the contest for the possession of *aguante*, as we will explain below. The neighbourhood does not appear as a metonymy of nations, but instead as a metaphor: The neighbourhood is the only possible nation. The abstraction implied by the jump to the category of nation, which modernity had fixed through its institutions—especially, public schools—has not disappeared; but it is revealed as a difficult territory, *vast and faraway*, lacking the warmth and the quality of the micro-space identity.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: Radicalised Identity and Violence

Violence in Argentine football has been a recurrent fact since its birth. Deaths, aggressions and various incidents have populated the geography of football since the beginning of the practice of this sport. Nevertheless, during the 1960s this recurrence took on another appearance. Archetti (1992) sustained that the football phenomenon combined both tragic and comic elements which produced a special type of ritual oscillating between the violent and the carnivalesque. Beatings, stonings, deaths and injuries were the counterpart of chants, rhythmic jumping, banners and jests. Violent elements had slowly entrenched themselves in Argentine football, occupying a protagonistic role in this ritual since the 1960s. Archetti affirmed that a change occurred in the masculine moral discourse around that decade, producing this displacement from a preponderance of the comic facet over the tragic one. Along this same line of reasoning, Amilcar Romero (1984) defined the death of Alberto Linker on 19 October 1958, during a match between the clubs Vélez Sarsfield and River Plate as a symbolic hinge that characterised the beginning of a "modern" era of violence in Argentine football. Toward the end of the 1960s, as a result of this development, organised

groups of spectators began to emerge based on their participation in acts of violence which later would be called *barras bravas*.

The multiple forms of violence present in Argentine football stadiums are impossible to reduce to simply the actions of *barras bravas*. The actors with violent practices are numerous: police, spectators who do not form part of the *barras bravas*, football players, directors of sports clubs, etc. Nevertheless, the forms of violence of the *barras bravas* are the most visible and most visibilised.

The multiplicity of practices and actors which protagonise violent acts can be analytically approached with the term *aguante*. Since the mid-1980s (Murzi et al. 2011) continuing uninterrupted through our time, violent actions have increased and have been legitimised through the configuration of a material and symbolic framework characteristic of the field of football, which we refer to in various places as the "logic of *aguante*" (Alabarces et al. 2012). That is to say, the phenomenon progressively mutated alongside social restructurations, but its growth did not cease. This term has different accepted meanings: It can refer to the fervour and fidelity of the *hinchas* or to the physical dispute in confrontations with rivals in which valour, courage and wisdom in fighting techniques are exhibited. The first of these meanings is relevant and recurrent among spectators, club directors, and journalists. It flourishes in repertoires where the exaltation of passion abounds and in the diverse practices of accompanying the club for which one sympathises. The other notion of *aguante* is more significant in the conformation of the sense of belonging to the *barras* and is always articulated with manifestations of violence.

Whether as a violent practice or as a fervent action, *aguante* constitutes signs of belonging, establishes othernesses and solidifies "us". The division is valid but not exclusive. The spectators who identify with the violent aspect of *aguante* also appeal to the festive practices which are relevant but not always definitive in the construction of their identity. In the same way, the spectators, journalists or directors who identify with the passionate side of *aguante* also protagonise violent actions, though they frequently deny this.

The so-called *barras bravas* have complex and dynamic organisational structures. The logics of organisation and functioning depend on a wide variety of factors by which each displays its specific nature. Nonetheless, we have significant evidence to be able to discuss a shared organisational matrix which is linked to the logic of violent *aguante* and which is common to every *barra brava* of Argentine football (Alabarces 2004; Garriga 2007; Moreira 2005; Gil 2007; Cabrera 2013; Csezli 2013). These collec-

tives are organised around a hierarchical iron structure, a quest for material resources and a desire for symbolic recognition obtained through participation in physical confrontations. According to their logic, the intervention in violent acts possesses a strong positivity that provides respect and prestige. It involves a recognition, conceded by peers and strangers, that converts the absence of violent action into a dishonour equivalent to a lack of virility and of honour. Moreover, *barras bravas* are organisations which are keen to acquire resources, and these are obtained through interactions with other social actors. Inserted in relationships of exchange, they obtain economic resources. Through interactions with politicians, club directors, football players, businessmen, etc., the members of the *barra* obtain money, work, a percentage of the sale of players, tickets to matches, trips, etc., but the preponderance of some connections over others has been modified over the passage of time. Within the universe of interactions which give the *barras* legitimacy or resources, we observe a wide range of actors who make reducing the phenomenon of violence to a highlighting of just one of the actors of the plot unsustainable.

We said that violent acts have existed since football's beginnings. However, what is new to the contemporary scene is the existence of a logic that legitimises these actions. *Aguante* as a conception which validates various aggressions is a relatively new phenomenon, germinating in the 1980s and later conquering the football scene in the 1990s. The evolution of this validity is related to the recent changes in our society. Groupalities constructed outside of conventional values have always existed, one of them taking violence as its diacritic. In spite of this, these pertinences were discredited, illegitimised, hidden and used only by a certain few in reduced contexts. The *tanguero*, the tango's mythical figure, illustrious exponent of these forms, would lose validity before his neighbourhood of origin. *Aguante*, which cannot be reduced to economic and social marginality, supposes a novelty which deserves a final reflection.

The identities, previously legitimate and now abandoned, make way for the validity of violence. Archetti (2003) sustained that a "free zone" exists where the construction of identity does not have a typical format, a space where both the state and the hegemonic "cultural machines" have lost their influence as constructors of identity. The weakening of the state over the last thirty years has increased the size of the free zones capable of influencing actors from different social sectors. These identities prosper, increasing their efficiency, in a sociocultural scene dominated by the devaluation of previously legitimate social credentials. Education and work no longer order the social world as

in the past (Svampa 2000; Kessler 2004), and their devaluation creates the conditions for the legitimacy of violent practices. Work, education, political militancy, among other activities, generated networks of belonging which integrated social actors and filled the void of identity. These plots, without disappearing, lost their density and left a hole uncovered to be filled by the *barra brava*, among other communities. The attraction that this network of belonging exercises is distributed differentially through the social framework. The *barras* are attractive because of the absence of competition from other narrations of identity, and they can lose their seduction insomuch as they are confronted with competitive groups which can satiate the desire to belong.

4   The Complex Relationship Between Politics and Football

An aspect Central to understanding the visibility of the violent actions of members of the *barras* is the recognition they obtain in their daily inter-action with politicians and directors; that is, with individuals situated in positions which enjoy legitimacy. The plot of relations initiated by such individuals is established upon very different criteria, in spaces which include and exceed football, criteria which range from the economic inter-est mentioned previously, passing through loyalty, fidelity and incondition-ality, until reaching the affective facet. In Argentina, clubs continue with their traditional format: that of non-profit civil associations. This singular-ity distinguishes them from their equivalents which respond to the model of the anonymous society. According to the legal model of associationism, every two, three or four years, depending on the regulations of the institu-tion, club members elect their directors. During the electoral process, the "time for politics" is constituted, a moment in which campaign duties for the promotion of the candidates take precedence (the organisation of meet-ings, dinners, celebrations; the distribution of flyers; and advertisements in the media). The democratic model of the clubs proposes that, in ideal terms, all the members with a certain tenure may present themselves as candidates for a position of leadership in representation of a political party. Beyond the accurate discussion regarding the free time necessary for those who occupy directive positions in these institutions, since the directors do not receive monetary remuneration for the duties they carry out (thus reducing the spectrum of potential candidates), it is true that the electoral process favours the entry of individuals who do not have a career in the footballing world,

who come from different fields of actuation (Bourdieu 1997). The cases of double pertinence are multiplied in Argentina: Businessmen with great capital, union leaders, individuals with a brief or extensive tradition in political parties, public officials from various levels of the national, provincial and municipal government, who become football directors in order to act simultaneously in both spheres.

So, how are football and politics related in Argentina? One aspect—out of a wide range of possibilities—is to consider, precisely, the circulation of the elites, fundamentally about the political elites. Another aspect is that of the electoral practices in the clubs, which we could trace back to certain practices of the traditional political field. For example, the exchange between "bosses" and "clients"—politicians/voters, translated in their football version to directors/fans—is materialised in political support—voting for the candidate—in return for a favour—i.e. finding a job for the voter—(Auyero 2001). Nevertheless, so as not to fall into a widely criticised reductionism, the exchanges can include both material and immaterial goods.

The fans participate as clients in these networks of asymmetric relationships with directors. They, who are the "violent ones of football", are invited to participate in the political game. How do they participate in club politics and in complementary or alternative spaces? The bosses and leaders of the *barras* display the virtues of *aguante* and thus are able to, through the exchanging of favours with directors and men dedicated to professional politics, reinforce the differential position within the hierarchical structure they oversee. The fans become creditors of a certification given to them by the sport directors when they are called upon to collaborate with the electoral campaigns and polls. The fans, while stigmatised as "beasts", "animals", "soldiers" and "mercenaries" by hegemonic common sense, become allies of the politicians. On the one hand, their corporal abilities, acquired in fights with rival groups, are put into play in the division of political work. The fans are summoned by a candidate to paint the walls of the city with inscriptions in his favour and to erase the paintings in favour of the opposing candidate. This implies a situation of conflict with the individuals who support the other candidate and who are destined to carry out the same task. The fans, in the case of physical battles, demonstrate their abilities against rival individuals.

During electoral campaigns, it is possible to observe the formation of factions or groups of action, that is, groups of individuals who unite around an objective impulsed by an ego (Mayer 1980). The formation of a group of action occurs at the moment in election season when a candidate fosters support through his contacts in order to win the political battle. As a

consequence, as part of the electoral strategies, those interested in garnering the greatest number of votes must construct and reinforce the relationships of alliance and clientele with other actors. Among many other individuals, the fans who form the *barras* participate in this process.

The candidates summon the well-positioned fans in the hierarchical structure because they have natural followers. They are fans who can prove their social capital—their own network of contacts, who later "bring people to vote". Having social capital is a highly esteemed merit. What is curious here is what can happen when a candidate for a directive role in a football club is also an official of local or provincial government or a union leader and calls on the fans who are well-positioned in the structure to "bring people to vote" both in the club and in his other sphere of actuation.

For this reason, for several years we have sustained that violence, which is the most strident and spectacular element of the field of national football, is an element that emerges from a scenario of relationships and exchanges in which the fans who make up the *barras*, the sport directors and the agents of different spaces of traditional politics participate. The crowning example of this process is the arrival to the presidency of the Argentine government of the conservative Mauricio Macri, whose initiation into political life consisted in presiding over the football club Boca Juniors, the most important club in the country. On the one hand, during his twelve years at the helm of the club, he was offered an unprecedented level of media visibility that a passage through "traditional" politics would have never given him; the crossing over to the world of "great" politics was produced as a simple displacement of spheres, not as an astonishing transition. On the other hand, as president of the club where the country's most important *barra brava* operates a status mediated by the business and sources of funding it manages—Macri did not place any kind of obstacle before the actions of the fans, even to the point of being legally accused as an accomplice. In spite of this, Macri won the elections, first as Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires (in 2007 and 2011) and later as president of the country (in 2015).

This case demonstrates several of our arguments, but highlights two in particular: first, the complex plot of relations between fans, *barras*, violence and politics in Argentina; and second, that nobody gives a damn.

Note

1. This period has been analysed in extent, especially in Alabarces (2002).

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Brazil

**Rosana Da Câmara Teixeira and
Bernardo Buarque de Hollanda**

The objective of this chapter is to set out a view of contemporary Brazilian football, with special attention given to "*Torcidas Jovens*", particular formation of organised fans, groups of football supporters who are usually related to social and behavioural problems in terms of urban violence, both inside and outside the stadiums. The article is structured into four constituent parts to achieve this objective.

The first part contextualises the political process of institutionalising football practices in Brazil, which is done through a system of leagues, championships and monopolistic public–private entities, organisation controllers and professional sport management. The purpose is to give an introductory historical backdrop to help the reader understand the popularity of football in Brazil, specifically over the course of the twentieth century.

The second section is focused on the makeup of rivalries among football fans in Brazil's two largest cities, which are responsible for the identity affiliations among a set of clubs in nearby urban areas: Rio de Janeiro, capital

R. Da Câmara Teixeira (✉)
Faculty of Education, Federal University Fluminense, Niterói, Brazil
e-mail: rosanat@id.uff.br

B. Buarque de Hollanda
CPDOC-FGV (Center for the Research and Documentation of Contemporary Brazilian History), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

B. Buarque de Hollanda
School of Social Sciences of the Foundation Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, Brazil

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of Brazil until 1960, to which Brazil's main political and cultural identity is associated, and São Paulo, the economic and financial centre of the country, also known as the "locomotive" of Brazil, constituting the largest metropolis in Latin America, on the same scale as Mexico City in terms of population. The Rio—São Paulo axis will be the observational basis for the relationship between the sporting organisations and their respective masses of spectators, fans and football enthusiasts, with their identities intrinsically linked to the logic of the rivalries that exist among clubs, resulting in collective invention by the fans with the advent of the first generation of organised and/or uniformed fans.

The third part of the article talks specifically about the subgroups of fans known as "*Torcidas Jovens*" (Young Fans), namely their emergence as observed from the 1960s onwards in Rio de Janeiro. With the goal of supporting the teams to which they are affiliated, we will cover the emergence and the conformation of the second generation of organised fans, this being a process that went on until the 1990s. According to consensus in the specialised literature, this was the point in which a segment of the fans, one might call them militants, began to empower themselves and embrace their youth, who subsequently became progressively associated with violence, juvenile delinquency and conduct typified as transgressive and anti-sport by the Brazilian society.

The fourth and final section deals with the contemporary era, emphasising the dynamics of conflict and cohesion that the organised fan groups have brought to the sphere of professional sports over the last twenty years. This is particularly true regarding the period prior to the advent of major sporting events in Brazil, namely the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Monothematic violence, whenever the press talks about organised fan groups, given a platform by the mass media and confirmed through common sense, will here be examined through a sociological and anthropological point of view. This view is less manicheistic and more open to understanding the senses and meanings attributed by these certain social actors to their practices, referred to as violent, and to their struggle for rights in a macrostructural framework of elitism in Brazil's stadiums.

1   Political Origins of Football

The origins and proliferation of football in Brazil at the end of the nineteenth century have been well documented in literature. Modern sport arrived on Brazil's shores in the post-slavery era (1888) inspired by the model from the United States of America; however, it was not extensively

adopted by the federalist republican regime (1889). Football, as is true for other sports, emerged during a period of intense social and political transformation. These sports affected the physiognomy of the major Brazilian cities, which were subsequently marked by a discourse of regeneration, modernization and sanitization of the urban environment.

The waves of immigrants, encouraged as part of state policy, with a view to replace slave labour and promote the whitening of the population, brought the habits and customs of these immigration flows with them. Little by little, many of these traditions and novelties started to grow and disseminate within these social clubs, which were largely created to meet the demand for cohesion between members of the British, German and Spanish colonies in Brazil.

Football was initially one of a number club-based leisure and entertainment activities. Football was a practice of young foreigners, but also students, children of Brazilian elites, who were in turn inspired by these activities, seen as imported modernism from Europe. If art and French culture occupied the most prominent position in terms of imitation by the locals, it was not long before the sports founded in England and popularised throughout continental Europe became a benchmark for fractions of Brazilian young people as a pastime.

The local scale of these games took on new dimension as the twentieth century progressed. Municipal leagues were created at the beginning of the 1900s, and the first championships disputed by clubs from the same town were played out. This began to happen in São Paulo from 1904 onwards, while in Rio de Janeiro competition between amateur clubs was instituted two years later, in 1906.

Despite professionalism only being adopted in the 1930s, researcher Leonardo Affonso de Miranda Pereira (2000), in a comprehensive survey of social history, identified the popularisation process of football, rather than horse racing and rowing, as the most popular sport towards the end of the 1910s. This was largely due to the beginning of international tournaments, particularly the 1916 South American Championship, organised by Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.

The transposition of national feelings—shirts, anthems and flags—towards football galvanised Brazil's young population, which was true in the big cities and the more rural cities in the countryside, wherever the press, the main means of communication at the time, were able to reach. The Brazilian football team's successful campaign in the 1919 South American Championship in Rio de Janeiro gave rise to national euphoria, and increasingly enabled the sport to overcome its social elitist origins.

Brazilianist Robert Levine supported claims regarding the idea of expanding interest in football as a practice of enjoyment, both in terms of society and the state. This scholar recognised the circumstances of this professionalist conformation, in the midst of an environment conducive to national assimilation in the 1930s, which was, until then, the expression of European modernity:

> The sport spread through the poorer classes when the English factory owners fielded teams composed of employees, but it only became a national institution in 1933, when it was declared professional under the management of the Brazilian Sports Confederation (*Confederação Brasileira de Desportos - CBD*). From one day to the next, the elite teams competed to contract athletes from the working class, thus creating an institution that combined the passions of the rich and poor. The Brazilian government took advantage of this movement by appropriating the nationalist symbol of the Brazilian team's victory at the 1932 South American Cup and allowed the involvement of black players (a policy that initially faced resistance from the CBD) in Brazilian teams in the early World Cups of the 1930s. (Levine 2001, 73)

The competitions among different countries from the South American continent gave rise to the first patriotic imagination that married the metaphor of the Brazilian nation to its football team, along with the organisation of political entities such as the CBD, responsible for structuring this sporting field, in a Bourdieusian sense, conformed to by a group of actors, organisers and consumers. The appeal of nationalism was subsequently grown with the creation, by FIFA, of the World Cup in 1930. This action empowered the metaphorical condition that links sport and nationalism. Constructing national identity and pride in a peripheral country such as Brazil makes the investment made in national mythology and symbology through football understandable.

The 1930s bore witness to the invention of the "pátria de chuteiras" (homeland of football boots). This idea grew in power at each four-yearly edition of the World Cup organised by FIFA, as it did in South America and Europe. The development of the media, a cornerstone of nationalist rhetoric, as theorised by the Englishman Benedict Anderson (2008), brought Brazil's ties with football closer still at the end of that decade. The mass media, particularly radio, would be a key mediator for catalysing the population's emotional sentiments. The media followed the Brazilian national team during the 1938 World Cup, when Brazil was under the dictatorial regime of the *Estado Novo* (new state), led by Getúlio Vargas, one of the architects of centralization politics and nationalist sentiment that was prevalent in Brazil.

The third instalment of the World Cup saw the Brazilian national team travel to France, which was commentated on live by Brazilian radio broadcasters, such as Gagliano Neto, and would be revered as a heroic achievement by Brazilian athletes overseas. The incredible reception given by the French press with regard to the performance of the Brazilian football players made the local reporters and enthusiasts believe that Brazil had performed very well during that World Cup. Black football player Leônidas da Silva, top scorer at that competition, was one of the most acclaimed, becoming the symbol and embodiment of a new era of Brazilian football, capable of overcoming its elitist and segregationist background.

Football went on to become the centre of an identity that reversed the country's problems, one example being miscegenation, into a set of virtues. One of the most prominent elements worth highlighting in football in Brazil was its porous condition, with the ability to synthesise and express the contradictions of the social condition of Brazil. This porosity drew interest from sociologist Gilberto Freyre, whose most important study was called "*Casa-Grande & Senzala*" (The Masters and the Slaves) (1933), a reinterpretation of the history of Portuguese colonisation, in which plasticity is exalted, hybridism and social democracy in Brazilian race relations. The author then wrote texts in which football was earmarked as one of the contemporary success vectors of miscegenation in Brazil, producing players such as Leonidas, characterised as creative, spontaneous and astonishing.

The 1930s saw the self-representation of Brazilian culture solidify (Fiorin 2009), with the principles of cultural and participation being seen as defining characteristics of modern Brazil. Thus, despite the poorly developed political-economic situation in Brazil being damaging aspects regarding its image, Brazil was internationally advertised in a positive way thanks to its attractive football, since this transcended their sporting condition and was converted into artistic and cultural expression. Therefore, according to Freyrean rhetoric, the influence of music, capoeira and religious syncretism was absorbed, among other selected elements, to represent the authenticity of a nation that was believed to be interclass and interracial.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

It is reasonable to say that professionalism in Brazilian football developed on two parallel paths: on one side, football clubs, and the national team on the other. As a general rule, the Brazilian national team often raises images related to the unity of the nation and to the gathering of the people who

follow their representative sports. On the other hand, the club associations appear under the umbrella of affirming local identity, necessarily in structural opposition to some other club based in their neighbourhood or city.

Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were not separate from the rule in terms of distributing the identities of their clubs among the inhabitants of the metropolitan area. As is the case in many English cities such as London, inhabitants of Brazilian municipalities developed preferences for a considerable number of clubs. Since the middle of the twentieth century, between 1940 and 1960, the division was focused in a hegemonic way among around four football teams per location. In Rio, the clubs were Botafogo, Flamengo, Fluminense and Vasco da Gama, while in São Paulo the most popular teams were Corinthians, Palmeiras, São Paulo and Santos.

Each organisation would naturally cultivate a myth regarding its origin in terms of its history and highlight a set of narratives to identify the contours of collective identity and social memory, passed down by successive generations. Many clubs emphasise their foreign origins (Palmeiras and Vasco), while others focus on their aristocratic values (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo). However, there are associations that emphasise their popular and working-class characters (Flamengo and Corinthians). As football became a professional activity, the clubs football grew in their support base as well as their diversity, but their original mystique is enshrined by partners, supporters and journalists.

It would be worth mentioning here a book written by an important contributor to Brazilian sports journalism. In 1945, Mario Filho (2014) published his book *Histórias do Flamengo*, which includes anecdotal accounts of the 50-year-existence of the *rubro-negro* (red-black) club based on the stories and memories of their associates. Despite being founded in 1895 as an elite club focused on rowing, there were a series of transformations that the football Department went through in 1930s that led to this *carioca* (noun or adjective used to refer to anything related to Rio de Janeiro) club assuming a national-popular identity, as was exalted by this journalist. In his discursive strategy, Mário Filho represents Flamengo as the "people's team", as opposed to Fluminense as the "team of the elite team" and Vasco da Gama as the "team of the Portuguese colony".

The growth of football club allegiances in the urban environment was due both to the professionalisation of football as a spectacle and the vertiginous process of urbanisation and industrialization experienced in the Rio-São Paulo axis, between the 1930s and 1980s. This change led to huge expansions in the urban fabric, with large numbers of internal migrants moving to the city, most of which from the Brazilian Northeast region. The radio also

made it possible for the city of Rio de Janeiro; capital of the Republic, to broadcast information on the city's clubs throughout Brazil, the major networks would broadcast the local games to the rest of the country.

In order to bring about the massification and nationalisation of football, the responsible authorities—state federations and national confederation—created interstate competitions and built new stadiums that were large in size. These sporting arenas became a target of interest, because they met the demand of fans for more of their kind, with the hope of seeing their sporting idols and supporting their preferred clubs. Private stadiums, such as the Laranjeiras, home to Fluminense and São Januário, of Vasco da Gama, gave way to public stadiums, built by the municipal administrations, with the support of the federal government. Examples would be the Pacaembu, in São Paulo, built in 1940 to hold 70,000 spectators, and the Maracanã, in Rio de Janeiro, opened in 1950, with a capacity of 150,000 fans.

The sheer size of these stadiums attracted the crowds, with paid entrances that further expanded the financial income of these football associations. The 1940s saw, to some extent spontaneously, or following the approval of the club directors, the initial appearance of the first football fans. In São Paulo, these groups called themselves the "uniformed fans", since they entered the stadiums in the same strip as the players on the field, a not unusual standard of dress in the stands. In Rio, the given name was the "organised fans", since, when faced with such huge crowds, the challenge was to "organise" the collective support of the fans for their clubs, which was done using musical instruments and festive/carnivalesque props.

Thus, between the 1940s and 1960s, the first generation of organised fans emerged in the cities of Rio and São Paulo. These fans were community groups, so to speak, of between 50 and 200 individuals, who gathered on game days to cheer on their respective times. The supporters were generally under the command of one leader, who was mostly the most charismatic character of the group, or part of "folklore", known by everyone in the stands due to their loyal, constant attendance or as a result of their enthusiasm in how they supported their club. These groups were therefore organisations with a low degree of formality. They carried flags, club emblems, banners and were "orchestrated" by a music band called the "charanga". Women and children were part of these groups, but they were mostly populated by young and adult males.

The spontaneity of the fan groups meant that the club directors would often help the organised fans. Many of these members were associated with the club, which made exchanges and mutual support easy. Seen in the imagination as the "12th player", the crowd was governed by a principle of

indivisible unity: one leader and one fan group per club. The fans' motto was the unconditional support of their team, regardless of victory or defeat. The mark of this first generation of fans was, naturally, the carnivalesque ethos from the stands. If there were fights in the stadiums, is important to stress that any cases of violence witnessed between the 1940s and 1960s would normally be attributed to unaffiliated fans, with no link to the organised fans.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: The *"Torcidas Jovens"* (Young Fans), and the Stadium as an Environment for Conflict

Football fans have been an object of study for several researchers dedicated to understanding this important social phenomenon in Brazil (Hollanda 2009; Teixeira 2003; Toledo 1996; Reis 2006). Since their inception, these entities existed in areas of social interaction for numerous young people, encouraging the creation of social ties as well as relationships of opposition and rivalry. In this way, they put revealing visions and social practices of distinct meaning into view, all of which this sport has assumed throughout its history in Brazil. Below we will not refer to the so-called *Young Fans* as (specifically) *cariocas*, as they synthesised the main features of this social experience in an exemplary manner, in addition to the contradictions currently experienced by these groups.

The first bureaucratized fan organisations emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Brazil was under a military dictatorship, ushering in a new relational pattern among themselves and with the club directors. In this context, the *Young Fans* from the 4 major clubs in Rio de Janeiro emerged: Botafogo, Flamengo, Fluminense and Vasco. These fans were mostly young males, aged between 14 and 25 years, with distinct sociocultural and economic origins and trajectories.

With registered names as "GrêmioRecreativo Social e Cultural", "a TorcidaJovem do Flamengo", "a TorcidaJovem do Botafogo", "a ForçaJovem do Vasco" and "a Young Flu" during the 1980s, the groups grew and subdivided among the city's neighbourhoods, through the headquarters, convivial spaces in which actions were defined, they prepared themselves to follow their teams on away games across Brazil, assuming an increasingly professional aspect. The groups were organised around common projects and, little by little, they gained visibility due to their adversarial character and belief

that they had in their political role in influencing club decisions, which involved questioning which players to hire and evaluating their performance. In the stands they produced their own knowledge and symbols, ritualization and songs to express their allegiance to their football club (Teixeira 2003).

Research has shown that, for some individuals, belonging to an organised fan group means, in addition to the passion—feeling of loyalty and dedication—, means having to be willing to fight, to defend one's club and his organisation against its "enemies". Situations of conflict are valued by those who believe that such events make them more honourable and courageous; enforcing certain standards of masculinity that exist in these groups (Teixeira 2003).

Between the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, there were a series of clashes between members of rival fan groups and the police, which put these groups under the microscope of the media and the authorities. Thus, they became classified as "delinquents" and "vandals" (due to the physically injures caused to both sides, including the use of firearms), being seen as responsible for spreading insecurity and fear. In 1991, the government in Rio de Janeiro created the Special Group for Policing in Stadiums (*Grupamento Especial de Policiamentoem Estádios—GEPE*) to confront the issue, whose mission was to reduce confrontation and mediate conflicts among fans, which was done through meetings, lectures, member registration and fan escorting on game days.

Two cases in particular contributed to what constitutes the "moral panic", regarding organised football fan groups: the death of Cléo, in 1988, who was leader and founder of the "Mancha Verde", of Palmeiras and the so-called "Pitched battle", a clash involving Palmeiras and São Paulo fans, which took place on the Pacaembu pitch in São Paulo in 1995. As a consequence, any fans who were in possession of specific objects, such as shirts, banners or flags were prohibited from entering the stadiums in this state. The associations involved in the dispute were dissolved in turn.

From then on, there was an observed growing process of criminalising any organised fans who were perceived as "a social problem", as "a police matter".

As a consequence, repression, a privileged approach used by the government as the only alternative to control violence, has been characterised by banning the use of pyrotechnics, props in the stadiums, along with suspensions, fines and bans. However, studies indicate that the systematic punishment of these associations, with the long-term objective to remove their participation from football, is not sufficient to solve this issue by itself

(Lopes 2013; Murad 1996; Hollanda 2014; Reis 2006; Teixeira 2003). This problem may be compounded because put the fans are forced further underground, thereby making the task of identifying those involved in the clashes ever more complex. Furthermore, as recently observed, there is always the possibility that the excluded individuals may create new groups.

4   Repressive Legislation and Mega Events in Brazil: The Fans and Their Involvement in the Fight for Their Rights

Brazil's hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games brought about significant changes in the landscape of sports stadiums: old arenas were renovated and new ones were built. This ongoing process of upgrading the stadiums, following the model of the European arenas, with reduced capacity and high ticket prices, resulted in a curtailment of fan activities in the name of control and security, the fans are monitored using cameras in order to endure their participation is disciplined (Gaffney and Mascarenhas 2004). These architectural alterations are in celebration of the emergence of the consumer-supporter and directly affect the party held by organised fans, who traditionally used to watch the game standing, with their actions being limited due to the older backless seats, which allowed greater mobility in the stands, being replaced.

On the other hand, the pressure of hosting the two biggest international sporting events led the federal government to impose sanctions in the Law 12,299 from 2010, which promoted some modifications to the *Estatuto de Defesa do Torcedor* (Fan Defense Statute) (Law 10,671/03), a Central document for the regulation and promotion of sport in Brazil. The articles included were specifically designed in regard to organised fans. In summary, in accordance with articles 1; 2-A; 39-A and 39-B, these groups are liable for any damage caused by their members inside and outside the stadiums. On the other hand, the Brazilian Ministry of Sport went on to hold national and regional seminars with representatives of organised fans, representing an important political sign that demonstrated "a movement towards institutional recognition of the existence of these groups" (Hollanda 2014, 153).

To face the adverse context that had been experienced, 2008 saw the creation of the Federation of Organised Fans in Rio de Janeiro (*Federação das Torcidas Organizadas do Rio de Janeiro—FTORJ*)[1] whose goal was to establish a channel of communication with the authorities and define collective

actions, the aim being to enforce the rights of these fans in the stadiums of Rio de Janeiro (Hollanda et al. 2015).

Today, the aforementioned Federation involves the membership of ten associations—Botachopp, Fla-Manguaça, Força-Flu, ForçaJovem do Vasco, FúriaJovem do Botafogo, Ira Jovem do Vasco, RaçaRubro-Negra, TorcidaJovem do Flamengo, Urubuzada and YoungFlu. The Federation has been engaged in the pursuit of dialogue between opposing groups, who have a history of fighting and killing, in order to make them aware of the importance of their union to protect their interests. The Federation's debut in public arenas was during the 1st Brazilian National Seminar of Organised Fans, which was promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Sport, in the city of São Paulo, on the 4th and 5th of July 2009. The FTORJ has since then gone on to act as a collective movement, participating in a complex and wide-ranging process of demands, claims and negotiations.

The accumulated experiences in its short trajectory in routes around the public arenas and the approximation with the fan leaders in several Brazilian states were fundamental for the national mobilisation, which resulted in the founding of the Brazilian National Association of Organised Fans (*Associação Nacional de Torcidas Organizadas—ANATORG*[2]) at the 3rd National Seminar sponsored by the Brazilian Ministry of Sport, in December 2014, in the city of Belo Horizonte, which was attended by representatives of 103 Brazilian fans. The organised fans used ANATORG with the intention of involving themselves in public policies that are aimed at them being legitimate participants and, in contrast, act as mediators, stimulating social campaigns and promoting, along with their associates, activities to reduce conflict events among fans (Trejo and Teixeira 2016).

The creation of the FTORJ and ANATORG demonstrated that, similar to what took place in several European countries, the regulations and laws that aim to monitor and control the behaviour of fans contributed to a significant portion being aware that they had common interests, stimulating the proposition of collective action to defend their style of supporting and their vision of football (Busset et al. 2014). However, if, through their actions, these entities discover a new side of fan associativism that envisages the establishment of solidarity and support networks in the fight against the football commercialization, then they will be permanently questioned by a section of their members who resist this closing of ties among rival fan groups. The fact is that many fan leaders have voiced concern regarding this process and admitted to having lost control of members belonging to subgroups who have been seduced by violent acts. In addition, many fans are more affiliated with the issues in their neighbourhood, with the community

to which they belong, and are indifferent to these broader actions promoted on a regional or national scale. It is for this reason that district leaders tend to have direct influence over their constituents. Another obstacle to be overcome regarding the dominant social representation that many consider "dangerous", promoters of the disorder, and, therefore, undesirable in the world of football.

In recent years, several events have confirmed that this is a Central dilemma in the project to build a broader, long-lasting coalition movement. During the 2013 Brazilian Championship, there were clashes at Brasília Arena at matches between Corinthians and Vasco da Gama; Flamengo and São Paulo; and, in the stands of the Arena Joinville, between Vasco da Gama and Atlético Paranaense fans during in the last round of the Championship, leaving several injured. There were further incidents around stadiums in Brazil, with 30 deaths recorded (Hollanda 2014). New security measures were announced by the federal Government, in addition to the fines being imposed, which ordered the arrest of some fans and temporarily banned others from stadiums.

It is important to note that the year 2013 was extremely troubled, particularly in terms of politics. During the Confederations Cup, an event that preceded the World Cup, there was a phenomenon in Brazil known as the "June Journeys" (*Jornadas de Junho*): the outbreak of demonstrations throughout the entire country. The protests were initially triggered by anger regarding the increase in bus fares, but perhaps can be better understood in the context of this important national celebration that is soccer.

Between 17 and 20 June, the slogan or hashtag *#NaoVaiTerCopa* (ThereWillBeNoCup) was spread to the streets and social networks. This hashtag referred to the indignation felt towards the pharaonic public spending on the mega event and the urban interventions conducted, among others, and represented the struggle for rights by various different social classes. If, on the one hand, the government idea behind hosting the Cup was to reinforce the idea of a national identity, a warmth through football, calling on the Brazilian nation to participate in this event, then, on the other, various segments of the population responded to this invitation with collective action. Hosting this mega-event in Brazil in this way galvanised public opinion regarding the accumulated contradictions that dissatisfaction, becoming an object for complaint and revolt (Ferreira 2015). However, contrary to popular belief, the protests did not repeat themselves with the same intensity in 2014, the World Cup went ahead without any major problems and, in November, Dilma Rousseff, from the Brazilian Workers Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT*), was re-elected as Brazilian President.

The Brazilian nation was going through a tense period in the politician world, with profound questioning by various sectors of the social classes in Brazil with regard to where Brazil was moving, representatives of organised fan groups met at seminars promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Sports, which are meeting to explore ideas, discuss dilemmas and advance national talks.

Meanwhile, images of new confrontations in the media contributed to the stigmatisation and moral condemnation of these groups. In 2014, there were 18 recorded deaths. In 2015, in Rio de Janeiro, there were numerous fights involving members of Young Fans, resulting in a number of fans being arrested, some of whom were minors, as well as some being banned from going to the stadiums.

During 2016, the gap became increasingly evident between the actions taken during President Dilma Rousseff's government—which benefited from the process of fan articulation—and those made by state governments, based solely by repression, and, therefore, going against the grain of discussions and decisions that had been under development in the federal scope.

However, the organised fans responded by expressing their dissatisfaction at sporting arenas across Brazil. The movement was initiated in the first half of the year by the "Gaviões da Fiel", the largest organised fan groups of the Sport Club Corinthians, during the São Paulo State Championship. The crowd assuming a combative posture, chanting war cries and the holding banners during the games against the São Paulo State Soccer Federation (*Federação Paulista de Futebol—FPF*), calling for a lifting of the ban on flags and banners and reducing the high cost of tickets. The crowds were also against the *RedeGlobo* television network, holders of the broadcasting rights for the national and state championships, criticising the 10:00 pm starting time of midweek games, which made it difficult for workers who had to make the trip home late at night.

The following target was Congressman Fernando Capez, who presided over the São Paulo State Legislative Assembly (*Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo—ALESP*) and was accused of being involved in corruption regarding school meal provision. This congressman gained notoriety for having led a fight against organised fans while holding the position of public prosecutor, having ordered two fan groups to be dissolved following a previously mentioned fight, known as the "*Batalhacampal*" (Pitched battle) at the Pacaembu Stadium, in 1995.

This wave of protests culminated with a public demonstration on the 15th of April, and was attended by approximately 3000 fans. The reaction from the police was not long in coming. The Civil Police subsequently

raided the headquarters of this fan group with the support of riot troops. Finally, as a result of a confrontation between the Palmeiras and Corinthians fans during which one person was killed by a stray bullet, the public security secretary, following a meeting between representatives of the São Paulo State Soccer Federation, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Military police and the Civilian police, an announcement was made stating that the city derbies in São Paulo would only be attended by home fans. Other Corinthians fans and organised fan groups from other clubs began to publicly show their support for the Gaviões, demonstrating against the excluding the coercive character of "modern football". The banners were confiscated within the stadiums in retaliation, and were subsequently banned based on the Fan Statute (Brazil, 2003).

The situation was explosive in nature when ANATORG issued a statement on its Web page supporting *Gaviões da Fiel* fan group, positioning themselves within the social movement fighting for the "inclusion, equality, freedom of expression for all", which were demands made not only in the football world. And, based on Art. 5 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution that deals with the guarantees and fundamental rights of citizens, and on article 220 that guarantees the free expression of thought, ANATORG denounced the procedures adopted by the government. During the second half of the year, as the political crisis in Brazil worsened with Michel Temer assuming the role of interim President of Brazil following the removal of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, there were growing protests in the Brazilian stadiums with banners demonstrating against what came to be denounced as a "political coup" along with the slogan "Temer Out", which spread from North to South in the stands.

On the 31st of August, the impeachment process being undertaken by the Brazilian National Congress came to an end with Dilma Rousseff being forced from office. Michel Temer subsequently assumed the Presidency of Brazil on a permanent basis. Despite any possible criticisms of the previous government policies and actions (2011–2016), there is no doubt that the organised fans then had an historic opportunity to participate in forums, submit and defend their points of view and voice their disagreement with the status of the Fan Statute (2003), which included their requests for change in such. This space opened by the Brazilian Ministry of Sport was instrumental in the creation of ANATORG. It is still too early to formulate a prediction regarding the future of this organisation; however, the organised fan leaders are fearful that the progress made in the public arenas will be threatened in the current social and political climate.

5   Conclusion

The objective of this chapter is to present some characteristics and dynamics of the organised fans in Brazil, giving special attention to the Young Fans from Rio. In addition, it is our intention to place some milestones regarding the history of these strategic groups and, particularly, concerning the new face of fan associations following the creation of entities such as FTORJ and the ANATORG in their fight for rights and social recognition.

However, this is no easy task. The authenticity of their purposes is subject to suspicion due to the clashes between rival fans that have been an ever-present in their history. The media spread accusations are given increased strength with each new conflict.

Brazilian anthropologist Roberto Da Matta (1993, 176) strongly highlighted the idea that violence in Brazil is treated using a normative lens, through which we produce a discourse that often only involves "for or against (or the legal or illegal), rejecting any attitude that firstly questions the nature of the phenomenon in its more general sense." Another interpretation is required to get away from the complex phenomenon of violence in football being solely attributed to the existence of the organised fans. This understanding does not consider its relationship with other social actors, such as: club directors, sectors of the media, public authorities, security officers and other kinds of fans.

As José Garriga Zucal warned about the Argentine "barras bravas", it is essential to go beyond the judicialization of the process: "The issue of violence in football cannot be resolved with judicialization. Because the legitimacy of violence is not changed by the law."[3] Understanding the special nature of this violence therefore involves the necessary of reflecting upon the different dimensions that this takes on in their own social body, expressing existing or latent crises therein. The recently published Brazilian Map of Violence revealed that 967,851 Brazilians between 1980 and 2014 were fatal victims of firearms. Most of this number were young black males.[4] These data explain the seriousness of the problem.

From an anthropological point of view, deconstructing the ideological position on football fans becomes relevant, going beyond the image that emphasises violence, with the aim of understanding the senses and meanings that this takes on for these social actors (Teixeira 2003).

Based on the consecrated perspective put forward by Norbert Elias (1992) in his book "The Quest for Excitement", sport studies that do not simultaneously investigate society and sport become devoid of context and,

therefore, have no validity. Assuming that this type of violence is consistent with reality, investigating the tensions is required to understand why football (and not only this sport) became a privileged context for expressing pleasure from fighting for some of these young people (Dunning et al. 1992).

It is worth considering that violent clashes among football fans are far from a product of mere causality, nor are they promoted by naturally mal-adjusted individuals, they obey certain arrangements that set standards for masculinity, they are disputes based on economic power, prestige, reciprocity and territoriality. The fact is that repression and punishment must include measures "of a re-educative, preventive and corrective nature that are systematic and permanent and not episodic" (Murad 1996, 117). In this way, the development of a socio-pedagogical work has been proposed as a regulatory alternative to conflicts involving supporters. The Belgian Fan Coaching was one of the pioneering efforts to adopt strategies of this kind (Fincoeur 2014). In Germany, the first *Fanprojekte* were established in 1981, involving social workers. Since 1993, these projects have been gathered into a nationally coordinated organisation (*Koordinationsstelle Fanprojekte*—KOS). With the main aims of fighting extremism and racism and reinforcing the positive aspects of the supporters' groups, the *Fanprojekte* have inspired initiatives in other countries in Europe (Busset et al. 2014).

The creation of ANATORG in 2014 symbolised an important step in this direction, which revealed the willingness of organised fan leaders in Brazil to fight for their rights, but at the same time, be of service in terms of mediating conflict through educational initiatives.

However, the increasing isolated use of repression as an action strategy by state governments has seen progress grind to a halt, precluding the possibility of dialogue being established. This adverse situation has led to protests by organised fan groups and other fan collectives who have found ways to evade security and enter stadiums clandestinely with banners, clearly demonstrating their insubordination. The demonstrations that have spread around the stands at Brazilian stadiums have transformed these new sporting arenas that were designed for comfort, safety and consumption, into effervescent environments. These arenas are home to the symbolic and material dispute regarding the right of these associations to continue their participation in professional football.

Thus, the Brazilian example reveals the aggressive manner in which football and politics go hand in hand, and that this sport, contrary to calls for common sense, cannot be reduced to mere leisure and entertainment experiences, and can become a powerful catalyst for claims and assertions of identity. The ongoing upgrading and sanitising process, whose intention is

to silence the voices of the discontented and banish the undesirables, awoke those in the stands, showing that the end of this story has not yet been written.

Notes

1. Go to the organisation's website at: https://ftorj.wordpress.com/.
2. For more information regarding the group, please go to: http://www.anatorg.com.br/. See also Comunicado ANATORG, 2016.
3. Transcript from "El problema de laviolenciaenelfútbol no se resuelveconlajudicialización" (05/04/2016). http://www.conicet.gov.ar/el-problema-de-la-violencia-en-el-futbol-no-se-resuelve-con-la-judicializacion/.
4. The Map of Violence composes a series of coordinated studies conducted from 1998 by sociologist Julio Jacobo Waiselfisz, director of research at the Sangari Institute and coordinator of studies on violence at the Latin American Social Sciences Institute (FLACSO). This edition focused on the evolution of homicides by firearms in Brazil. http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br. (Mapa da violência, 2016)

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Mexico

Sergio Varela

In the first place, this text criticises the "official" history of Mexican football, which establishes a linear sequence, free of contradictions and ambiguities. As we shall see, Cid and Mulet's (1962) book is a kind of canonical narrative on national football that speaks of its English "origins", the transition to "Spanish" control and finally its Mexicanization and massification.

It refutes the idea that the historical process of Mexican football can be understood with the simple chronological elucidation of its origins and later maturation. Rather, it is argued that the history of Mexican football is contradictory; that it has developed on different levels and that it is more important to understand the cultural, political, social and economic terrain in which it developed. Thus, emphasis is placed on the social and cultural environment of the European and American colonies that formed a sport socialité in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Likewise, it is argued that the Mexican confessional education networks (Jesuits and Marists) of the time had close relations with some European educational centres, especially of England, and they were very important in the process of sportivisation of Mexican society.

Subsequently, it is argued that the specific characteristics of the Spanish colony in Mexico at the early twentieth century allowed the transition of

S. Varela (✉)
Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico

socialité football to the domain of the general public, as well as they defined during the first decades of the twentieth century certain basic features of the national football rivalries.

However, as it is outlined later in the text, it is not until football became professionalised in the forties and even more with the foray of television in the late fifties that the system of rivalries and organisation of Mexican football took their modern forms.

With a system of "melodramatised" rivalries (proposed by the television owners), fans give meaning to their football affinities, but simultaneously they are able to recreate family's and gender roles so valued by the Mexican modernising project. The creation of family *porras* throughout the sixties and until the nineties exemplifies these valorisations anchored to domestic imaginaries of that time and perpetuated by the different apparatuses of political and commercial propaganda.

Finally, during late nineties, new forms of organisation and consolidation of identities and rivalries between clubs (derived from the rise of the Internet and cable television) allowed fans to "invent" the *barras*. With South American influence, young people of the late twentieth century tried to reconfigure the prototypical *aficionado* (passive and well behaved) by an extremely active and disruptive fan.

At the end of the chapter, based on the discussion of the organised forms of fandom, a series of reflections on machismo, misogyny and homophobia embedded in Mexican football fans is proposed as a contemporary issue. The cry of "Eh … puto" popularised by Mexican fans in national and international competitions will guide the discussion.

1   Political Origins of Football

Socialité Football: Sports Contagion in Mexico at the End of the Nineteenth Century

Historians have a certain (false) obsession to trace the origins of every process. As Bloch points out: "In its most characteristic form, this idol of the tribe of historians has a name: the obsession of origins" (Bloch 1982, 27). This is the case of Mexican football historians (professionals or amateurs). Concentrating on the origins doesn't really help to understand the development of sports in general and of football in particular.

The text *El libro de oro del futbol mexicano* (Cid y Mulet 1962) is an example of that obsession and it has left a deep mark in our country's football

history. As if football could be understood with the search of its origins, Cid y Mulet begins his work as follows: "Back in 1900 English technicians and miners of Pachuca's Real del Monte Co. […] formed the first football team in Mexico" and "British residents of the industrial regions were exclusively who introduced football in our Country" (Cid y Mulet 1962, 9).

Metaphorically Bloch says: "Every contagion involves two things: microbial generations and at the moment of contagion a terrain" (Bloch 1982, 31). Mexican historiography has devoted a great effort to describe with certain detail the microbial generations that "brought" football into the country, but have little interest in analysing the "terrain" in which the ill was caught and even less elucidating the changes of this "contagious disease" over time.

There is no doubt that European, American, Canadian and Mexican immigrants (who had intimate contact with the Central nations of the late nineteenth century) inoculated the microbes of sports contagion in Mexico. As in all Latin America, different industrial and commercial branches attracted a large number of temporary and definitive immigrants between the 1860s and the 1920s. As Buchenau puts it: "During the Porfiriato, the Mexican government sponsored the influx of foreign capital and immigrants as the key to its project of state- and nation-building" (Buchenau 2001, 31).

The process of globalisation of nineteenth-century capitalism crossed all dimensions of social, political and cultural life in Mexico. During the Porfiriato, journalism grew noticeably; photography and cinematography became entrenched in everyday life; cities were rebuilt; railway network and the mining industry grew sharply. Through an immigration policy that sought to "whiten" the country, banks, foreign railways and mining companies, among others, "[…] brought their own engineers and overseers, individuals who were paid many times as much as Mexicans working next to them" (Buchenau 2001, 34).

By 1900, there were in Mexico about three thousand Britons, four thousand French, three thousand German, sixteen thousand Spaniards, and fifteen thousand Americans (Buchenau 2001, 33). The cultural influence of these groups not only transformed the productive relations of Mexico, but their social and cultural life. In particular, the boom of sports "contagion" had a clear Anglo-Saxon line (although French and Germans, and as will be seen later Iberians, exerted their influence).

In 1880, journalist Enrique Chavarri, known as *Juvenal*, wrote that he had been informed that the "German club" had created an equestrian society that promoted the values of modern sport and reproached the Mexican youth of not doing the same:

> It is always pleasant to form such societies, which unfortunately we do not have among ourselves. As in dreams we hear of the Jockey-Club, the Veloz-Club and other elegant European associations. The foreign colonies give us the example, but our youth does not enjoy sport, they rather prefer the *dolce far niente.* (Juvenal 1880, 1)

The development of mining and railways allowed the American and British colonies to establish, in accordance with Porfirist policies of modernization, key institutions in their daily lives, such as schools, halls, religious temples and social clubs (Beezley 1983, 267).

The Massey-Gilbert Blue Book (Massey-Gilbert 1903) reported that Mexico City's Anglophone colony had a robust daily life that was felt in all sectors of Porfirian society. This yearbook reported activities of the different Protestant and Catholic churches, schools and social clubs in the Mexican capital, as well as announcing industries, banks, shops and railroads that this colony controlled.

The case of John Hubert Cornyn[1] is a good illustration. Cornyn became the first publisher of a sports magazine in Mexico: *The Mexican Sportsman* that went on sale from October 1896 to June 1897. Cornyn tried to establish an (advertising) journalism for the practice of the sports in Mexico. In its first number, he wrote: "We want to see the MEXICAN SPORTSMAN in the hands of every one interested in sport or pastime of any kind [...] in fact the word 'sport' is beginning to have a deep meaning In Spanish as in English". He added that Mexico "is fast becoming athletic and she is beginning to love the outdoor recreation of the Anglo-Saxon and the Frenchmen". Finally, he informed the Mexicans in a preacher's code that "The Mexican Sportsman will help you to understand the new movement. It has a mission to preach. It has taken for its text 'Sunshine and the open air.' We want everyone to help us preach the new gospel. Will you help us?" (Cornyn 1896, 1).

The important thing is to point out that the Porfirian modernization process, or as Beezley calls it, the "Porfirian Persuasion" (Beezley 1983), created a colonial environment in which foreign migrants and native peoples, or at least with Mexican roots, ambiguously interacted in the consolidation of sport and football in particular.

This historical development contrasts sharply with the widespread idea that sports (football in particular) were imported by foreigners and were incubated and grown in a (mostly male) passive native population. It should be emphasised that football, as a practice and spectacle, did not penetrate the popular mood without strong cultural, political and social resistance in Porfirian Mexico.[2]

Sports were not practices free from imperial contradictions. Thus, football, as an English cultural product, did not mature in the Porfiriato and then had to give its own "battles" against American sports, such as baseball, basketball, American football or lake races. Sports had no "manifest destiny" that could ensure their full development or disappearance in any nation. The consolidation of football was fortuitous in the post-Porfirian imaginary, as it was the debacle of lacustrine regattas in the Mexican highlands for example.[3]

It can be pointed out that the Porfirian social context allowed the development of a *socialité* football, in which its spectators were still undifferentiated from their practitioners, who were also unable to differentiate fully between footballers (in their different versions) cricketers, baseballers, etc. A note from the newspaper *El Mundo* clearly illustrates the football indeterminacy of the Anglo-Saxon colony at the time:

> It is said that the next season will be one of the most active in English football, as five clubs, "Reforma", "San Pedro", "Británico" and probably "Pachuca" and "Puebla" will take part in the League. The bad season of the latter may make it decide to accept another sport, perhaps cricket.
>
> Last year, cricket was limited to "Reforma" and "Mexico", which played two games, but the lack of variety in the matches, decided the players to choose a new sport for the new season. The first football games sparked the enthusiasm of those who now form the British club. (*El Mundo* 28 December 1904)

There is not such thing as the "birth" of Mexican football, since its practice is indeterminately inscribed in relation to other leisure practices (sporting and artistic) of the Anglo-Saxon settlers, in mutual dependence with other social sectors.

It could be said that *socialité* football at the beginning of the twentieth century began the organisation, administration and establishment of minimum criteria for competition and statistical record:

> Association football has been played in Mexico for a number of years, but the game received a strong foothold in 1901-1902. […] For the season of 1902-1903 the Mexico Association Football League was formed with Reforma A. C., the British Club, Pachuca, Orizaba and Mexico C. C. as members. G. Varley […] is the honorable secretary. (Massey-Gilbert 1903, 157)

The English-speaking colony created a small circuit of *socialité* football that initially span around Mexico City. Social and sports clubs such as Reforma Athletic Club, British Club, Mexico City Cricket Club, Pachuca Cricket Club, Puebla Cricket Club were the bases.

It should be emphasised that this football circuit had several social elements that cemented it: cricket, trains, mines, churches and schools. It's the turn to one more aspect of this cultural transformation of football: schools.

Pupils Football: The Role of Catholic School Institutions

Apart from the Englishmen, other groups of European immigrants and elite Mexicans (who studied abroad) played important roles in the consolidation of sports as part of the national "civilising" horizon. The cases of the Catholic orders of the Jesuits and Marists are basic to understand the Mexican football impulse during and after the revolutionary civil war.

It is also necessary to recognise that the Mexican elite maintained a close link with the imperial metropolis of the nineteenth century, especially England and France. There is no doubt that the English and French educational system generated an enormous influence on the thinking and "lifestyles" of the Mexican aristocratic and bourgeois elites.

The case of Stonyhurst College is very illustrative in this sense.[4] In her anecdotal book on travel to Mexico, Tweedie pointed out that at the beginning of the twentieth century "[In] Cuernavaca, I had a real Mexican dinner at Señor Ramon Olivero's, who, like so many Mexicans, had been educated at Stonyhurst College" (Tweedie 1902, 306).

Influential and powerful families of Porfirian Mexican elite sent their children to study at Catholic schools, especially Jesuits such as Stonyhurst and Beaumont in England. These were the cases of Escandón-Amor, Rincón Gallardo or Gómez-Parada families who throughout almost all the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century maintained a close relation with Stonyhurst College.

As Macías-González points out, "Stonyhurst embodied the Mexican aristocracy's ideals of stability and exclusivity" and the school environment and organisation allowed them, among many other things, to participate in "an annual field trip, social events, and sports matches with rival public schools. Such activities prepared youths for adulthood, installing important lessons about competition, self-reliance, and civil responsibilities" (Macías-González 2012, 696).

Among Mexican sportsmen who were educated under the aegis of what Macías-González characterises as the "informal empire" (Macías-González 2012, 691) of English public schools, such as Stonyhurst and Beaumont, is the case of Jorge Gómez de Parada Buch. Son of a prominent Porfirista landowner, Jorge Gómez de Parada studied in these schools and became

a polo, fronton and football player and later member of the International Olympic Committee, with ample recognition between the Mexican elites.[5] It is presumed that he was the "first" Mexican footballer to participate in an "official" match playing for the British Club in 1903 (Ballesteros 2010).

It is important to point out that Catholic educational institutions (foreign and national) played a significant role in the diffusion of many sports and football in particular. Jesuit and Marist orders developed a strong sense for sports, using physical activity as a great allied element: "The Jesuits, with their emphasis on the total dimension of the human being, body, heart, mind and soul – *mens sana in corpore sano* – have always promoted bodily training through gymnastics first, then through sport by giving it a leading part in their pedagogy" (Combeau-Mari 2011, 1648).

Brambila says that "the enthusiasm for sports and especially for football since the arrival of the [Marist] brothers to Mexico was one of the characteristics of Marist education". And he cites a document of the order:

> At Mexico City Marist schools, the 'great sport' [football] began around 1912, when the high school was founded in La Perpetua. During the first years teams were called 'Oncenas Colón' [Colon Elevens]. When Eugenio Cenoz was in charge of the Sports Club, these were renamed 'America' and with this name has made history in the Mexican national sport. (Brambila de la Mora 2012, 11)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Jesuit educational system had a fairly widespread presence in the national territory. Schools such as the Sacred Heart College of Puebla, the San Francisco de Borja Science Institute in Mexico City (better known as Mascarones), the San Juan Nepomuceno College in Saltillo and the San José Institute of Guadalajara, among others were key elements in the consolidation of an extensive sports and football network. The case of Guadalajara, in the Western state of Jalisco, illustrates the creation and consolidation of football this network. Mendirichaga says: "In the School of St. Joseph, at the beginning of the twentieth century there was gymnastics and sports. Several former alumni, along with other *tapatíos*, later founded the Atlas of Guadalajara FC" (Mendirichaga Dalzell 2007, 291).

The same applies for Marists system. Since their arrival in Mexico, the Marist Order rapidly expanded its school network to Jalisco, Yucatan, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Michoacan, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, Guanajuato and Mexico City (Pérez Siller 1998, 226–231).

In summary, with the combined impulse of Catholic schools in Mexico and the training received by the Mexican elite in English schools,

with growing networks of foreign and national white and blue collar workers especially at the railway and mining companies, the terrain for football contagion in Porfirian Mexico was becoming possible.

The National Imagery of Mexican Football at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

In this social and cultural context, football was another element that conformed the Mexican nationalistic imaginary. Students and workers of Mexican middle and popular classes were gaining ground in football practice with the simultaneous fact that English and aristocratic Mexicans of the Porfirian elite ceased to control all aspects of it.

Nevertheless, this transit to the massification and popularisation was mediated by another subject of the European immigration during the Porfiriato: Spaniards. Important differences rest between Spanish and English nature of their economic and daily activities in Mexico. Unlike the Englishmen, Spanish immigration had a more marked social and economic heterogeneity. Some consolidated themselves as great entrepreneurs, but many of them were wage earners who sought to improve the living conditions they had in native Spain (Moreno Lázaro 2007).

Club España marks precisely that transition. While English social and sports clubs were shaped as institutions of cultural "enclave", the associations of the Spaniards had a mutual aid logic (García Acosta 1979, 116). Club España emerged without a playing field and practically without the minimum conditions for the development of football. However, its association characteristics and contributions gave it a radical difference to English clubs. Its first partners were salaried and its founding chart said that the eight founders would acquire "a ball, two goals and an air pump", and to "obtain permission to play in another field as the actual [field] had not good conditions" (Cid y Mulet 1962, 94).

This different circumstance between Spanish and English allowed a more intense interaction with their Mexican counterparts. The Club España allowed immediate incorporation of Mexican players and after English clubs stopped dominating the League, Spanish clubs main competition would be against the "Mexican" clubs that had already been formed by the 1910s.

As noted above, some clubs emerged from the interaction of the Jesuit and Marist Catholic schools and the educational centres run by the Anglo-Saxon community in Mexico. From this interaction emerged the team today known as America. This was founded by alumni of confessional educational

institutions, strongly linked to hygienist and ethical pedagogies that saw sports as an outstanding educational element.

The foundation of the club is trapped in a relatively "dark" historical narrative that gives it an air of mysticism and mythology, necessary to base the invention of its "tradition". An element that helps consolidate the myth is the "national" character of its first members and founders. They were: Alonso Sordo, Fernando Sierra, Rubilio Torres, Carlos Garcés, Manuel Marroquín, Juan Andrade, Rafael Garza, Francisco Oribe and Jose Izquierdo (America FC, n.d.). These young Mexicans founded the club that some years later would dismantle the hegemony of the "Spanish" teams (America FC, n.d.).

Some clubs like Atlante,[6] Necaxa[7] disputed "Spanish" teams supremacy. It was nevertheless America FC the first Mexican club to obtain a League championship. During 1924–1928, it got four consecutive Mexico City Amateur League championships.

In other regions of the country as Veracruz, but very markedly in the city of Guadalajara Jalisco, football also became a phenomenon (mainly urban and popular) that over the decades would consolidate a nationalist imaginary and narrative. The case of the Guadalajara club, popularly known as Chivas, is in dialectical combination with its Mexico City counterparts. It has been a team that has sediment a very strong Mexican nationalist narrative (Aceves 2012, 91). It can even be pointed out that, as Fabregas wrote: "Chivas are a secular symbol of Mexican identity" (Fábregas Puig 2001, 25).

It is precisely this dialectical circumstance, contradictory in many ways (Mexico City/province, homeland/foreigners, urban/rural) that Chivas and their *chilango*[8] counterparts have developed national discourses that are expressed in the ensembles and overlaps of the professional football rivalry system.

It has been pointed out that the *socialité* football promoted by the Anglo-Saxon colony in Porfirian Mexico was characterised by its exclusionary forms. Only national elite was part of that closed circuit. During but mainly after the revolutionary civil war, the Spanish colony and Catholic schools network conformed what has been conceptualised as *pupils*' football. It allowed, in turn, a broader social base which gradually configured a rivalry system between clubs and country regions.

By the 1930s albeit oscillations and constraints, Mexican football had matured in organisational and administrative terms. Mexican Football Federation was founded in 1927 (FEMEXFUT, n.d.). After several decades, it gained control over regional structures, such as amateur leagues in Mexico City, Jalisco, Nuevo Leon and Veracruz, among others.

Another process was also being forged: amateurs (associated with the concept of practitioners) became observers and consumer of the football spectacle: it was the raise of amateur-spectator.

In several Latin American countries, the transition from amateur football to professional football was taking place. By 1934, in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile, football had been professionalised. In Mexico, the debates between those who opposed and inclined towards professionalisation of the game took great intensity. Thus, in 1943, professionalism overturned amateur resistance and finally consolidated a League with national aspirations.

In Mexico City, the process of "modernization" was being formalised. Spaces for the practice of football were changing to the rhythm of political guidelines, technological and social innovations. On May 4, 1924, the first stadium made of concrete, the "National Stadium" (Musacchio 2003, 131–132) was inaugurated in Mexico City (but not for football use). In 1936, the "Parque Asturias" was inaugurated in Chabacano, the last and largest of the wooden stadiums built in Mexico City throughout the 1930s, finally destroyed by fire (Páramo 2012). By 1946, the first concrete stadium at "Ciudad de los Deportes" (initially designed for the practice of American football) was built for association football practice (Televisa, n.d.).

Football show business was acquiring its own cultural strength as media and the cultural industry moulded it. Professionalism was fundamental to mature football spectacle. This could only be understood as football infrastructure was objectifying in new stadiums and clubs.

Football professionalisation led to a clear instrumental rationality organisation. The consolidation of the Professional League in 1943 forced the clubs to take an eminently entrepreneurial stance, subordinating any "traditional" or premodern elements in their structures. However, since the most important element of affiliation and identity between spectators and their respective clubs was a (supposedly) "irrational" and emotional (love) element, clubs had to cultivate and calculate their respective economic interests on a sentimental base to increase the number of their followers. In other words, to modernise and sell their own (emotional) trademark, Mexican clubs tended to "melodramatise" their identities (on a paradoxical rational basis).

2   Historical Club Rivalries

It is precisely in the 1940s that football clubs were forced to form their own "identity", which represented them as unique in the "sentimental market" of football rivalries. Behind the football identity is a market dimension,

no doubt. But other elements, such as the regional stamp were outstanding factors in the formation of football identities. Being from the capital of the republic meant a certain mark of identity and antagonism. Clubs as America, Atlante and Necaxa enjoyed this geographical category. Subsequently, clubs as Cruz Azul and Pumas de la UNAM became strong competitors.

Atlante directors, for example, sought to strengthen the club in the Mexican football market by emphasising its popular roots and exploiting the motto "team of the people" and "prietitos",[9] appealing to their poor and humble origins. This made two things clear: on the one hand, that the club really came from the lower classes of Mexico City and, on the other hand, that this popular identification could be quite commercially profitable in the sentimental market that professional football was imposing in Mexico (Atlante, n.d.).

Necaxa, at the professional era, appealed to its worker roots (they were workers of the electrical sector who founded it in 1923 and refunded it in 1950) and their owners openly exploited that characteristic but given the professional nature of Mexican football since the 1940s, it was no more than a relatively fictitious identification. However, given the massification of sport and the fact that most of the new adepts to football came from the working classes, generating these identifications with urban men was almost an inevitable consequence for the owners (*Excélsior* 2013).

America FC counted on the identity references of Mexicanity, its middle-class ascendant and collegial roots and, therefore, juvenile aspect coupling with its "capitalino" geographical reference.

In terms of its organisation, Mexican football was radically transformed by these dates. The regional and state leagues served as the most important instances of the national football organisation. These leagues had acted almost autonomously and practically without any contact. Two major institutions, however, dominated the landscape: the Liga Mayor (LM) and the Federación Mexicana del Centro or Federación Central (FMC). Due to government pressures and an increasingly entrepreneurial and capitalist logic, the different federations, including the LM and the FMC gave way to the Federación Mexicana de Futbol Association (FMFA) in 1937 (Saguilera 2013).

Disagreements between clubs, leagues, state federations and FMFA continued in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In 1942, a year before the professionalisation of football, LM and FMFA broke organisational ties. In 1943, the LM was erected in a basically business entity and it consolidated professionalism in Mexico.

The LM exacerbated and radicalised professionalism through the massive importation of South American players, especially Argentine. In 1945, at a request of America FC, seconded by Atlante FC, the LM negotiated to the president of the republic, Manuel Avila Camacho, the regulation and reduction of foreigners playing for professional teams in Mexico City (Salazar 2015; DOF 1945).

On December 13, 1948, the LM already professionalised and FMFA reconvened, to finally establish the Mexican Football Federation, which still is the organisational body of Mexican football, under eminently capitalist and business premises.

In the 1940s, the *tapatio*[10] and *capitalino*[11] teams hegemonised the football rivalries. To a large extent, because the professional football competition, along with the still incipient progress in other matters, such as transport and communications infrastructure, was not developed more evenly throughout the country.

In 1944–1945, the League was extended to thirteen teams, still concentrated in the Central zone of the country. Of the thirteen clubs that participated in the "national" competition, five were from Mexico City, three from Jalisco (Guadalajara), three from Veracruz (Orizaba and the port), one from Guanajuato (Leon) and one from Puebla.

It was in the following season, 1945–1946, when finally northern clubs appeared: Monterrey and Tampico. However, their presence was not long. Monterrey club remained only for that season and disappeared from the first division circuit for five years, until its return in the 1951–1952 season.

The centralization of national life was also evident in the geographic and administrative configuration of football in those years. Only three states of the federation were venues of 70% of the first division circuit. Under these incipient conditions of geographical rivalry and instability of the clubs themselves, the identities attached to the teams were not fully profiled.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

Socialité and *pupils'* football could be considered as early representative football processes. The subsequent rise and fall of the "Spanish" teams, besides the professionalisation in 1943, are the organisational cornerstones of Mexican football. However, it will be the process of television arrival, specifically of Telesistema Mexicano (later known as Televisa) as the most important process in the consolidation of Mexican professional football.

In 1956, Mexico City hosted the Second Pan American Football Championship. The National University Stadium was the venue for this event. Nevertheless, beyond its sporting relevance, the tournament was crucial in another sense: it marked the entrance of the television into Mexican professional football.

On Sunday, February 26, the Mexican team faced Costa Rica's. The fans who attended the stadium far exceeded the number of available locations. Initially, the press reported the opening of this competition as an "emotional and simple" ceremony in which the National University Stadium had been "full of euphoric fans" (*Esto*, 29 February 1956).

Two days later, on 28, Argentina faced Peru. Large contingents of fans with and without tickets went to the stadium. They jumped the fences of it. About a hundred thousand tickets went on sale. The stadium had only seats for seventy thousand. The press and the fans severely questioned the organisers. Attendance at the opening matches of the tournament exceeded the expectations and capacity of the facilities. For the local government, the tournament was becoming a matter of great relevance and concern, so they asked Telesistema Mexicano to broadcast the matches, which the owners of the broadcasting chain accepted with certain reluctance.

The owners of Mexican television, from that moment and in a random way, would begin their interest in Mexican professional football and thereby redefine the cultural, economic and social significance of football in our country.

February 1956 is, to put it somehow, the second and probably the most important foundation of Mexican football.

Following Sartori, television (the television landscape) and its new anthropos, the *homo videns*, created the contemporary football spectacle and a spectator completely different from the one that preceded the incursion of television in the field of professional football (Sartori 2013).

Mexican television strengthened the criteria of professionalisation and instrumental rationalisation for the football spectacle that would mark its institutional path definitively. The increasing influence of television on the football field allowed, in the first instance, the expansion of the base of followers on an unprecedented scale. Television football created, almost out of nowhere, a new way of "watching" football, which basically meant not leaving the house to see the matches. In the same way, it involved the intermediation of the "television eye", which had effects in several senses.

One of these effects was the conformation of football itself as a commercial product made and ready for television. Football was integrated into television and commercial narrative under criteria based on the logic of creating,

provoking and stimulating specific feelings. That logic could well be interpreted as melodramatic. But melodrama not understood as a literary genre, but as a key interpretive of culture to the extent that the ways in which different sectors of society (classes or genders, for example) are embedded or conformed by the guidelines of capitalism. In this way, Herlinghaus argues that melodrama, as an interpretative key of social and cultural aspects, is interesting "not so much as a theme, set of themes or genre, but as a matrix of theatrical and narrative imagination that helps produce meaning in the middle of daily experiences of diverse individuals and social groups" (Herlinghaus 2001, 23).

It is this ability to generate "meaning" what is culturally relevant about football. Football, seen as a melodrama, is a "producing product" of cultural and social sense. Football, specifically the professional, is a mercantile television creation that in turn produces cultural and symbolic meanings and orientations among its followers.

Professional footballers have simultaneously become subjects that have given meaning to the ways in which bodies are perceived and represented, atleast in two dimensions: on the one hand, in the consolidation of a masculinity that is inserted in the capitalist and urban modernity and, on the other hand, in the symbolic representation of national (real or invented) virtues through international sports participation.

Mexican footballers, mainly through commercial television, have enforced the idea of a healthy, hygienic and athletic masculinity. In a dialectical way, football is produced by cultural orientations of the national elite, which has been inexorably linked to the processes of capitalist globalisation. This phenomenon of football globalisation can only be understood by the linkage that football has had with television, which homogenised narrative, discursive and symbolic formats. But even more, television projected "emotional" and "sentimental" content to the masses of consumer–viewers.

In the Mexican case, professional football was televised through a dichotomy that sought to intensify the identity difference of the clubs, recognising America FC as the league's "villain" team in a polarised position to the "good guys" in the melodramatized football plot: first opposed to Guadalajara FC, then to Cruz Azul FC (integrated to the first division in 1963) and later to Pumas (integrated to the League in 1962). These identity differences, although they are expressed in "sentimental" formats, not only respond to simple sports connections, but to a larger extent as "ideal visions" about the nation, male behaviour, territorial belonging or class identification (Magazine 2007).

Similarly, the national team produces certain cultural meanings that allow us to locate some of the characteristics attributed to masculine Mexicanity, such as "picardy" in a positive sense or in a negative sense "mediocrity" or "corruption" that discursively seem to be inherent in the Mexican culture. (Magazine et al. 2014)

On the other hand, the cultural orientations of the popular sectors close the dialectical circuit posed by the elites through the intensive use of television. The fans, permeated by the media influence that television has exerted on them, unfold their practices under the light of melodramatized coordinates. In this way, football is a symbolic vehicle that imposes meaning on their daily lives, but which they constantly reformulate through their own experience. Throughout time and space, fans have generated different ways of "watching" and experiencing the professional football show.

These variations have a clear expression under the forms in which fans are organised at the stadiums. On the one hand, it is possible to observe the fans that are grouped in the family *porras* and on the other the fans who are organised in the so-called *barras*. I identify the former as a result of a sentimental education emanated in a context in which the role of the state is fundamental and the idea of the nuclear family is basic to establish relations and hierarchies of gender and generations. This form of organisation proclaims and implements vertical structures of command. They are clientelistic and corporatized groups (mainly by the clubs executives) that demonstrate their "love" to the clubs through practices of moderate sentimentality that rarely exceed the limits of a morality based on the loyalty, respect and honour. Older males are usually those who run these groups in a patriarchal and almost patrimonial style. These men are the link and those responsible to club officers. Women, children and the elderly belonging to the family *porras* are loyal followers of the leaders and usually act with respect towards the fans of other clubs.

In contrast, *barras* are youth groups that discursively claim to reject vertical forms of control and pretend to express love towards their respective club through a specific practice: *aguante* (kind of sentimental endurance). *Aguantar* for the young *barristas* is to submit the body to risky practices and permanent physical tests. Among these risky practices are the use and excessive consumption of alcohol and drugs. Physical tests are usually expressed in fights against other *barras* and, mainly, against the police.

However, *aguantar* also implies keeping the body in permanent movement, shouting, singing and dancing before, during and after the matches. *Aguantar* also involves performing spectacular actions on the stands, such as throwing coloured paper, lifting and shaking many flags, among others.

For these young people, life is lived once, sacrificially and melodramatically. They watch with suspicion the fans who, according to their point of view, are passive and have a "cold chest", that is to say, without passion.

In summary and contrary to what many football critics point out, as they consider it simply as part of the dominating apparatus of the capitalist state, football gives social orientations of fans daily life. The fact that television has reduced the spectrum of identity options can be criticised, since the melo-dramatic format is polarising, almost dichotomous. The plots and narratives of melodrama are simple, without sophistication and seem to arise from the daily life of the popular classes. But as Monsiváis points out, melodrama is "a forced, but perhaps not inaccurate, synthesis, the frenzied and ulti-mately amused expression of a necessity: the viewer wants to find in his life the theatrical, cinematic, radio-phonic or soap-operistic argument, whose greatest virtue is the guarantee of a very loyal audience: the viewer himself" (Monsiváis 2002).

Professional televised football, in any case, has endowed its viewers with meaning for their daily lives. Clubs are a kind of objectification of idealised national visions. But in the stadium, whether in the form of a family *porras* or *barras*, fans also find ways to idealise the country, the city, the neighbour-hood and the family they would like to have.

Finally, television found in football a first-order commercial prod-uct, which was configured under the coordinates of the Mexican post-revolutionary cultural industry. Already as a proven product, the melodrama established the guidelines that football would follow, inserting, or at least intensifying, in clubs and professional players, villainous or heroic charac-teristics and pretending to make epic tournaments of cyclic repetition main-taining the commercially exploitable dramatic tension.

4   Homophobia and Discrimination in Football and Mexican Society Today

As a derivation of melodramatic polarisation and cultural sense of football fans, I want to emphasise the theme of macho, misogynist and homophobic expressions around Mexican professional football today.

For some years, the cry "Eh, puto …" that Mexican fans have become popular in national and international matches has brought to the public a strong debate about the connotations of male violence in Mexican football (although not only In Mexico, since the debate has spread to other nations).

Around 2004, in the city of Guadalajara, among fans of Atlas FC, the shout become popular whenever the goalkeeper of a rival team made a clearance (Castillo and Noel 2014). The shout was quickly adopted by other clubs fans of the Mexican League and finally was intoned at international matches, where it gained worldwide relevance.

During the 2014 FIFA World Cup, FIFA issued a warning against the Mexican national team and acted with a harsh penalty for "homophobic songs" issued by the Mexican fans. According to the FIFA Disciplinary Code (FDC), at each international meeting:

> Competition regulations shall foresee a specialization (sic) official to be in the stadium to identify potential acts of racism or discrimination with the aim of easing the pressure on referees and facilitating the availability of evidence for judicial bodies to take decisions. (FIFA 2013)

Following the FDC's 67 article, paragraph 3,[12] early on 2016 FIFA applied a twenty thousand Swiss francs fine to the Mexican federation related to the shout against the goalkeeper of the Salvadoran National team at the Aztec stadium on 13 November 2015 (Redacción Animal Político, 2016). A second fine, under the same criteria, but this time in relation to the match between the Mexican and Honduran national teams played at the Aztec Stadium on 6 September 2015, was applied (Notimex 2016).

At first, it is very important to point out that managers, players, coaches, journalists and many of the fans have sought to defend in multiple ways the shout and have tried to minimise sanctions and controversy. The justifications range from open homophobia, through the supposed tradition of *albur*, Mexican double sexist meaning jargon.

According to the Secretary General of the Mexican Football Federation, Guillermo Cantú, "there is a different connotation of the word and the shout; in Mexico's context and history, the translation from Spanish to English of the word used in the shout, is very different and we want [FIFA] to see that".

For his part, the Mexican national team player Andrés Guardado stated at the beginning of the advertising campaign called "Ya párale!" (MiSeleccion, n.d.), which seeks to stop the shout at the stadiums: "We are in a campaign trying to change that habit. [However] I do not think they (the fans) do it offensively, but it's no longer funny when there are sanctions involved and [FIFA] can veto the stadium" (Atayde 2016).

Former Mexico coach Miguel Herrera, after noting that FIFA does not have "moral quality" to punish anyone, states bluntly: "It's not an

homophobic scream; those who say that are fooling people, because we (according to him, all Mexicans) do not use it that way. I can say hello to someone saying, 'What's up you faggot!' and it doesn't mean that it is homophobic or to point out, 'those faggots that are there', so we say, it is a colloquial language" (Rodríguez 2016).

The statements made by the goalkeeper of the Veracruz FC, Melitón Hernández, made in an interview define with some clarity the position (almost official) of those who participate in professional football in Mexico:

> "I honestly have fun, I think fans pay for a show, they go to the stadiums for relief, I don't know what happens at their homes," he said. He added: "Maybe it's not the right way because there are children, but you're not going to control 30,000 dolls. How do you do it? Thirty thousand policemen to put a knife in each one's throat? They pay for having fun". He doesn't consider the shout as homophobic: "No, why? Why are we so delicate if football is like that, fun, mischief, that's all, I do not think it's like that". (Presencia Noticias 2016)

For many decades, especially since the appearance of one of the foundational texts on Mexicanness, *El Laberinto de la Soledad*, by the poet and essayist Octavio Paz, the theme of what he called "forbidden words, secret, without clear content, and by their magical ambiguity we trust the expression of the most brutal or subtle of our emotions and reactions shines brightly today" (Paz 1999, 78).

According to Paz, the word "chingar" has a great plurality of meanings, depending on the context or intonation, but at the end all are reduced to an aggressive, fully masculine and sexually violent content. For Paz:

> [T] he magical power of the word is intensified by its forbidden character. Nobody says it in public. Only an excess of anger, an emotion or delirious enthusiasm justifies its frank use. It is a voice that can only be heard among men, or at great parties. When we shriek it, we break a veil of shame, silence or hypocrisy. We manifest ourselves as we really are. Bad words boil inside us, as our feelings boil. When they leave, they do it abruptly, brutally, in the form of a howl, a challenge, an offense. They are projectiles or knives. They tear. (Paz 1999, 81–82)

The case applies to the way the word "puto" comes out in public with the cry of Mexican fans. I do not subscribe to the almost essentialist hypothesis of Paz over Mexicanness, but without a doubt, his description of the use of "bad words" in the current Mexican context maintains coherence.

The meaning of the term *puto* must also be read under a key of *albur*. According to Szasz:

> *Albur* consists of a rhythmic play of words and gestures that combine humor with offense, which occurs mainly in spaces of male interaction. Mainly at puberty, a stage in which the affirmation of masculinity constitutes a considerable source of anxiety. They are verbal challenges that provoke hilarity and symbolic allusion to a sexual relationship in which one or more - the victors - penetrate and another - the loser - is penetrated (or his mother, wife or sister are penetrated). The offense that is established is an offense to the virility of the other, an outrage, a humiliation, and what is at stake is the involvement of active and passive roles in a sexual act figured between two or more protagonists. (Szasz 2000, 190)

In any case, the cry "Eh, puto" has opened a wide public debate in society, the press and social networks. That debate has not yet closed and will hardly end in the short term.

It should be noted that along with this debate, the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto pushed for a legislative initiative that would allow homosexual marriages throughout the country and the eventual adoption of children by such marriages (Montalvo 2016).

However, conservative and religious associations reacted quickly to stop the initiative:

> In different cities of the Republic, thousands of people from various religious organizations took the streets to express their support for the traditional family model and their rejection of the initiative that proposes equal marriage, adoption of minors among homosexual couples and the teaching of "Gender ideology" in public schools. (Corresponsales 2016)

The slogans "A man, a woman, marriage should be" or "No child was born of a gay relationship" (Nájar 2016) that protesters grouped in the National Front for the Family hoisted during the demonstrations throughout the country resemble that cried openly at football stadiums: "Eh, puto!".

After the June 5, 2016 elections, Catholic and Protestant churches and right-wing parties, such as the Partido Acción Nacional, capitalised on the homophobic bias of the Mexican population and severely punished the official party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, for the initiative of egalitarian marriage (Redacción Milenio Diario 2016). Finally, just a few days before the final draft of this text, the Chamber of Deputies threw down the presidency initiative mentioned above (Arellano García 2016).

Mexican society puts its conceptions of social, cultural and political order in a contradictory and polarised (melodramatized) way. While the electoral political terrain, the cultural battle for sexual diversity, has manifestations with a certain "political correctness", in the football field at the stadium, these manifestations, under the veil of joke and the *albur*, take a raw and open homophobia and misogyny.

5   Conclusions

It has been pointed out that football was initially consolidated in Mexico under Anglo-Saxon influence, without a doubt. However, giving a very high explicatory value tracking the first game, the first team or the first city that hosted them (picturesque anecdotal data) is little relevant to understand the historical process of Mexican football as a whole.

This text gave priority to the social context in which football developed: the weight of a local elite with strong cultural and economic links with the European and North American metropolis. It should be noted that football was a cultural product that was in constant contradiction with traditional practices (and values) inherited from the colony and other sports that accompanied the Anglo-Saxon and European colonies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In other words, nothing augured in 1890 that with the first games and clubs that were organised in Mexico, football would flourish and consolidate itself as the hegemonic sport. Other sporting activities, such as baseball or cricket, may well have become the most relevant disciplines in the decades to come. And in some sense they were: if we look closely, boxing, cycling and baseball have had great influence on Mexican social life in some periods.

A second break moment of great relevance that deserves more studies and deepening is the moment in which the football was professionalised in the forties. The business bias of the Mexican modernizer project also caught football up. The gradual but constant commercialization of Mexican football was sedimenting local and regional rivalries that interacted with the general idea of Mexican nationality. The clubs competed inside the court but at the same time, they established a struggle in the sentimental market of the Mexicans (mainly males). This led to a logic of creation of collective identities that clubs managed to commercially exploit.

By the end of the fifties, Mexican television not only penetrated into football, but took over. The proven formula of melodrama in other fields of cultural activity (film, theatre and radio) allowed the owners of the tele-

vision to set a melodramatic parameter to the clubs identities in the professional League. The polarisation between Chivas and America illustrates this circumstance.

Precisely, these melodramatic parameters have allowed the fans to find meaning not only to the soccer rivalry but to the ways in which these have organised to support their respective clubs. One of these forms, without doubt is the polarised identity that was established through gender. There is almost no speech or practice of fans (and practitioners) without strong macho biases. Regardless of the historical moment or the specific form of organisation (family *porras* or *barras*) fans have exercised various forms of macho expression in football stadiums.

One of the most recent forms of that masculine exercise has been the cry of "puto" in the games of the League and in international competitions. Attempts to minimise the powerful homophobic message of the scream are overtaken by Mexican social reality as a whole. While many federatives, players, coaches and fans have pointed out that the cry is no more than a joke that isn't intended to offend anyone (since Mexican society is very party like and joking, they argue), in contemporary Mexico a real cultural war is going on: On the one hand, the defenders of homosexual marriage and the full exercise of sexual preferences, and on the other hand, a considerable part of the conservative Mexican society that openly despises the gay sector.

In this way, we can observe that professional football allows to observe with some efficiency some of the specific characteristics of Mexican society, such as its marked gender, regional and intergenerational inequalities, among others. Many more studies will have to be done about it.

Notes

1. Cornyn was the Mexico City Grammar and High School director. He was active member of Mexico City YYMCA, Mexico City Dramatic Club and the Odd Fellows (Massey-Gilbert 1903, 72, 73, 133, 143, 147). Cornyn (1875–1941) was a Canadian writer, professor, translator, linguist, journalist and sportsman. The brief references on his biography indicate that he arrived in Mexico in 1900, but there are records that already locate him in Mexico in the mid-1890s. In the edition of 7 June 1896, *The Mexican Herald* lists the name of J.H. Cornyn as a school teacher.
2. Porfirian ideologues, called "scientists", identified a series of "behaviours" of the popular classes that made them especially reluctant to "civilised" innovations such as sports. See Weis (2008, 196).

3. A Mexican fever for lacustrine regattas exploded between 1890 and 1892. For a detailed explanation, see Schell (1993, 261–262).
4. According to Gruggen and Keating, football has been practiced in Stonyhurst since the middle of the eighteenth century, when the school was still in Liege. Subsequently, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, football in its association and rugby versions were widely developed in this school (Gruggen 1901, 144 and 162).
5. "Like Carlos Rincon-Gallardo, his Mexican predecessor on the IOC, he was educated at Stonyhurst College in England having previously briefly attended Beaumont College. From a land-owning family, he enjoyed facilities for polo and tennis at home and the palatial property later became the residence of the Russian Ambassador. A lawyer by profession, he was an international football player and was President of the Mexican polo and football federations" (Buchanan 2011, 63).
6. Also founded in 1916 (Parra 2006).
7. Founded in 1923 (El Universal 1999).
8. *Chilango* is a demonym (sometimes contemptuous) to define the born and inhabitants of Mexico City.
9. Prieto is a contemptuous word for brown skin people in Mexico.
10. Popular demonym for the people from Guadalajara, Jalisco.
11. Demonym for the people from Mexico City.
12. Improper conduct includes violence towards persons or objects, letting off incendiary devices, throwing missiles, displaying insulting or political slogans in any form, uttering insulting words or sounds, or invading the pitch (FIFA 2011).

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United States

Charles Parrish and Jamee Pelcher

1 Political Origins of Football

Long before the arrival of European settlers, Native Americans had played "a booting game that closely resembled soccer…a game called Pasuckquakkohowog" (Foulds and Harris 1979, 7). However, association football (soccer) in the United States is often attributed to the British, who introduced a variety of leisure pursuits to the American colonies. Following the American Revolution and through the middle of the nineteenth century alternative versions of football became popular throughout the northeastern United States. By the time the rules of association football were codified in England in 1863 numerous American universities in the Eastern United States, as well as the Oneida Football Club of Boston, had begun fielding teams and organising competitions. However, the various football codes that existed at the time created confusion regarding the rules of play.

Newspaper accounts suggest soccer was also being played beyond elite colleges in the northeastern United States as hundreds of students played the sport at the University of Virginia from 1870 to 1877 (*Washington Post*,

C. Parrish (✉)
The College of Business, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, USA
e-mail: ctparrish@email.wcu.edu

J. Pelcher
Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, USA
e-mail: japelcher1@catamount.wcu.edu

18 January 1913). In the decades that followed, rugby football continued to gain in popularity among collegians. Walter Camp at Yale University later spear-headed a series of significant modifications to the sport, which helped give rise to American gridiron football (Powel 1926; Smith 1998).

Soccer persisted in the margins of the American sporting landscape through the end of the nineteenth century. In addition to colleges and universities, athletic clubs across the United States facilitated the sport's development, though growth was isolated mainly among working class and immigrant communities in urban and industrial areas. For example, the Caledonian Athletic Club in Washington, DC, was founded in 1872 and offered association football as a leisure activity for its members, most of whom were of Scottish or English origin (Parrish and Nauright 2015). Up the coast in New Jersey, British immigrants played a pivotal role in growing the game in an area recognised as the "cradle of American soccer" (McCabe 2017; Allaway 2005). Athletic clubs in gateway cities, namely Chicago and St. Louis, in addition to select cities in the northwest supported soccer teams and leagues throughout the 1880s and 1890s (Wangerin 2006).[1] By the turn of the century, the sport was being played from coast to coast.

In 1894 founders of six professional baseball teams in the National Baseball League launched the "American League of Professional Football", the first professional soccer League in the United States. The purpose of the venture was to generate revenue during the baseball offseason, yet the experiment was quickly abandoned in a matter of weeks.[2] By the first decade of the twentieth-century "socker" was being promoted as a more cerebral or scientific alternative to the popular yet violent American gridiron football game (*Washington Post*, 17 October 1905 and 23 November 1909). Dangers associated with American football, including numerous deaths, resulted in a crisis requiring mitigation efforts from President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 (Smith 1998). Several universities, including Georgetown University in Washington, DC, and Columbia University in New York City, banned gridiron football and chose to sponsor soccer instead (*Washington Post*, 27 November 1906 and 5 December 1909). However, critics lamented the sport's affiliation with immigrant communities and the sport was branded as foreign and "un-American". Soccer's appeal was also limited due to other sports "crowding it out" (Markovits and Hellerman 2001, 52–98). Finally, many people viewed soccer "as a regular young ladies game" (*Washington Post*, 23 November 1909). Therefore, the sport struggled to gain mainstream popularity in the United States through early 1900s.

Despite the cultural obstacles, the sport maintained its place as a leisure pursuit in several regions in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

After World War I several amateur and professional leagues, notably the American Soccer League (ASL), supported a large number of teams and attracted significant crowds of paying spectators.[3] At this point in time, prominent European clubs toured the United States playing exhibition matches in some of the country's most important sports venues. Several of Europe's top players even transferred to ASL teams in pursuit of higher wages (Wangerin 2006, 64–69). Due to governance disputes and the impact of the Great Depression, the League collapsed in 1933 (Wangerin 2006, 76–80).

Following World War II, xenophobic rhetoric in the press and among civic leaders contributed to elevated suspicions of anything foreign, ensuring soccer remained firmly entrenched in the margins of American culture (Andrews et al. 1997). As David Keyes (2014) notes, strategic efforts to "domesticate" the sport in the 1960s and 1970s eliminated the "residual ethnicity" from the game thus enhancing its appeal among middle- and upper-class white Americans. Entities such as the American Youth Soccer Organization (AYSO) and United States Youth Soccer (USYS) emerged as safe family friendly organisations by which suburban families could either achieve or maintain social status within the newly defined boundaries of mainstream America.

By the 1960s, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) had sanctioned soccer as an official sport. This, along with an acute increase in university enrolment after World War II, resulted in a surge in the number of collegiate teams across the country (Reck and Dick 2015). In addition to a plethora of local amateur and semi-professional leagues in cities across the country, several professional soccer leagues launched in the 1960s, including the International Soccer League (ISL), the National Professional Soccer League (NPSL) and the one off United Soccer Association (USA).[4] The most notable League in the United States during the Cold War era was the first edition of the North American Soccer League (NASL). The NASL launched in 1968 and lasted until 1984. At its peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s, several of the world's top players were playing in the League, including Pelé, Johan Cruyff, Franz Beckenbauer, Eusébio, George Best and Gerd Muller (Plenderleith 2014). The grassroots marketing efforts of the teams, coupled with the rise of numerous youth soccer organisations across the country in the 1970s, spawned a generation of soccer enthusiasts who carried an affinity for the sport forward into the 1990s.[5]

Following the collapse of the NASL, professional soccer existed only as a niche indoor sport in the United States. In order to receive hosting rights for the 1994 FIFA World Cup, the United States Soccer Federation agreed to

re-establish a proper outdoor professional League. Two years after successfully staging the 1994 World Cup, Major League Soccer (MLS) launched as a ten team League in select markets across the country. The "bold investments" of businessman Phil Anschutz and American sports icon Lamar Hunt helped MLS survive its first decade of existence (Dure 2010, 129–133).[6] David Beckham's arrival in 2007, made possible only by changes in League policies, gave MLS the boost in interest it needed.[7] The "Designated Player" rule allowed teams to spend above the MLS salary cap and enabled an influx of global talent to the League. This, along with the development of soccer-specific stadiums, provided MLS the momentum it carries at present.

However, this momentum may be at risk given the league's efforts to restrict the number of international players through quotas. Duru (2010, 616) argues the legality of MLS' cap of eight international players per team is open to legal challenges on the grounds it discriminates against players of colour, "particularly blacks and Latinos". While the National Basketball Association's efforts to internationalise have effectively "whitened" its labour pool, the restrictions imposed by MLS on international players works to maintain its "whiteness" (Duru 2010). Though statistics provided by The Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport at the University of Central Florida indicate MLS is among the most diverse men's professional leagues in the United States in terms of its labour force (players, coaches, team executives, League executives), a closer examination of the numbers reveals a lack of representation of African-Americans, who represent just 11.8% of players, 4.5% of professional team staff, 0% of head coaches and 0% of team owners/investors (Lapchick and Toppin-Herbert 2016). With respect to youth soccer in the United States, the costs associated with participation in youth soccer clubs range between $2000–$10,000 in fees and expenses annually, depending on the level of play. This has created a barrier for minorities, who are disproportionately excluded from the "pay-to-play" structure. Addressing the economic barriers may be the key to unlocking the country's potential in competitive international competitions and sustaining interest in MLS in the future.

2   Historical Club Rivalries: MLS at a Glance

Most professional soccer leagues in countries around the world have been around much longer than MLS. Rivalries between teams in Europe, South America and beyond have longer heritages, but to assume intense rivalries don't exist in MLS would be erroneous. In fact, the League has gone to great

lengths to foster rivalries among teams (Hopkins 2010). Each season MLS celebrates two separate instalments of what it terms "Rivalry Week", which is a carefully planned set of fixtures designed to either enhance existing and longstanding rivalry matches or to construct new rivalries among select teams based on geography.[8] Additionally, MLS has factored in the opportunity to construct new rivalries based on geography when selecting new markets for its expansion teams (Davis 2016).

MLS routinely polls its fan base to better understand fan perception of rivalries. In the 2015 edition of the poll fans voted the Cascadia Rivalry between Seattle v. Portland as the "Best Rivalry". The result was not surprising given the teams are situated relatively close to one another and have longstanding animosities that date back to 1975. Other matchups receiving a large number of votes included LA Galaxy v. Seattle, DC United v. New York Red Bulls, Colorado Rapids v. Real Salt Lake and Houston Dynamo v. FC Dallas (Doyle 2015).

Of course, a single online poll should not be the lone authority on the matter as other polls sponsored by a variety of outlets show different results. Recently, researchers have developed a more sophisticated method of evaluating the intensity of rivalries guided by a theoretical position of what constitutes a rivalry. Using social identity theory as a guide, Tyler and Cobbs (2015, 230) define rivalry as "a highly salient out-group that poses acute threat to in-group identity and/or esteem". They also determined rivalries may stem from eleven antecedents, including defining moments, frequency of competition, parity (historical and recent), star factors, geography, competition for personnel, cultural similarity, cultural difference, relative dominance and unfairness (Tyler and Cobbs 2015, 230). The researchers later conducted a series of surveys among fans of a variety of professional and college sports teams to determine the most intense rivalries. Their methodology asked fans to identify their favourite team and then allowed them to allocate 100 points to one or multiple rival teams to allow the researchers to measure the intensity of the identified rivalries. With respect to the MLS study, the researchers found the most intense rivalries in MLS from the perspective of fans are Montreal Impact v. Toronto FC (401 Derby), San Jose v. LA Galaxy (California Clásico), Houston Dynamo v. FC Dallas (Texas Derby), DC United v. New York Red Bulls (Atlantic Cup), Portland Timbers v. Seattle Sounders (Cascadia Rivalry) (Cobbs and Tyler 2017).

An explanation as to why these particular rivalries were identified can be ascertained by considering the eleven rivalry antecedents. Although "a single rivalry is unlikely to feature all 11 elements", an exploration of key antecedents can help explain the factors that "set an opponent out as a

rival" (Tyler and Cobbs 2015, 246). For example, Parrish and Tyler (2017) explained three *superclásicos* in Latin America through an application of specific and salient antecedents, including geographic proximity, culture and parity. Using a similar approach, geography and frequency of competition contribute towards these MLS rivalries. Each dyad features teams based in the same region, with nicknames that highlight the geographic underpinning. Also, in each of the rivalries, the teams are guaranteed to face each other multiple times during the season as they compete in the same conference within the MLS League framework. For example, the Montreal Impact and Toronto FC rivalry features teams situated in cities in South-Eastern Canada connected by Highway 401, hence the "401 Derby" moniker. Both teams also compete in the Eastern Conference of MLS, meaning they must play each other a minimum of two times per year. To be sure, several of these rivalries play out more than twice annually as national Cup competitions and the MLS playoffs offer additional competitive opportunities. Beyond geography and frequency of competition, Cobbs and Tyler (2017) suggest cultural difference and perceived unfairness contribute to these particular rivalries. In their study, the researchers conducted an analysis of the factors leading towards feelings of animosity and found these two antecedents were significant. Their preliminary qualitative analysis of written responses indicates the projected image of the host city onto the team appears to contribute towards cultural difference while some fans perceived an unfair MLS bias exists with respect to the league's tendency to allocate high profile players to certain teams.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: Supporter Culture and Activism

MLS supporter culture is as diverse as it is vibrant. Each of the league's teams has active supporter groups typically organised as independent non-profit entities and feature a structured hierarchy, such as a board of directors, who provide a form a legitimate governance.[9] Individuals typically pay an annual fee to join a supporter group and in return gain access to a variety of member privileges, such as access to pregame tailgates, a dedicated entrance gate at the stadium, reserved members only tickets sold and distributed by the group's leadership, occasional discounts on team merchandise and opportunities to travel in unison to away matches at a reduced rate. The groups typically have close working relationships with team management as the teams and MLS seek to incorporate the voices and opinions of sup-

porters. In fact, standard operating procedures among MLS teams requires supporter groups to gain official recognition from team management and paid staff members serve as liaisons between the team and supporter groups to ensureproductive working relationships. This give and take relationship between teams and supporter groups may also be viewed as teams (and MLS) strategically creating a clientelistic relationship to ensure certain undesirable elements of organised supporter groups in other parts of the world can be effectively mitigated. For example, the League and several teams were able to wield influence to eradicate the offensive "FYA" chant from supporter sections in 2011 (West 2016, 175–177). In 2017, MLS imposed sanctions on multiple supporter groups affiliated with Houston Dynamo and Orlando City SC for violations of the league's fan code of conduct (Carlisle 2017).

While some teams feature a single unified supporter group, others enjoy support from multiple groups, which vary in culture and style (Carlisle 2017, 30–33, 166–170).[10] A conspicuous distinction between MLS supporter groups and those in other parts of the world is a lack of organised fan violence, which is in part attributable to the aforementioned structured relationships that exist among the teams and supporter groups. Another key factor contributing to the lack of hooliganism is geography. Historically, MLS teams have been located far enough apart to discourage a large number of supporters from travelling to away matches. However, as the League continues to expand, the distance between MLS teams is dwindling, leading to speculation that the number of violent altercations between groups will increase in the future. To be sure, isolated incidents of violence involving MLS supporters have occurred. For example, several clashes between fans of New York Red Bulls and New York City FC have occurred. To date, these types of occurrences have been rare and minor in scope when compared to the actions of hooligans, ultras, *torcidas* and *barras bravas* across Europe and South America (Table 1).

A unique inconspicuous feature of many of the MLS supporter groups is their commitment to community service and social justice. Considering Guschwan's broad framing of the term politics in the context of soccer fans, MLS supporter groups routinely engage in political activities in and out of the stadiums across the United States (Gushchwan 2016).[11] Space limitations prevent a full account of the political activities of supporter groups here, though these efforts are certainly deserving of more attention.

A noteworthy case of political activism occurred in Portland in 2012, in what amounted to an event seizure (Johnston 2011, 122).[12] In an act of solidarity with the perceived injustice related to the killing of teenager Treyvon

Table 1   MLS supporter groups organised by team (*Sources* Major League Soccer 2017; West 2017)

MLS team	Year joined MLS	Number of groups	Names of groups
Columbus Crew SC	1996	5	Crew Supporters' Union
			Hudson Street Hooligans
			La Turbina Amarilla
			Murderer's Row
			Yellow Nation Army
Houston Dynamo	1996	3	Brickwall Firm
			El Batallon
			Texian Army
Colorado Rapids	1996	1	Centennial 38
Sporting Kansas City	1996	10	La Barra KC
			Brookside Elite
			Mass St. Mob
			King City Yardbirds
			Omaha Boys
			Northland Noise
			Ladies of SKC
			KC Futbol Misfits
			The Wedge
			Ad Astra KC
New York Red Bulls	1996	3	Empire Supporters Club
			Garden State Ultras
			Viking Army
LA Galaxy	1996	3	Angel City Brigade
			The Galaxians
			L.A. Riot Squad
FC Dallas	1996	3	The Dallas Beer Guardians
			El Matador
			Lone Star Legion
D.C. United	1996	4	La Barra Brava
			District Ultras
			Screaming Eagles
New England Revolution	1996	3	The Midnight Riders
			La Barra Revolution Latina
			The Rebellion
Chicago Fire	1998	12	Section 8 Chicago
			Arsonists
			Blitzer Mob
			Husaria
			Fire Ultras 98
			Partisans
			Red Scare
			Second City North
			Sector Latino
			The Western Front
			Ultras Red-Side
			Whisky Brothers Aught-Five

Table 1 (continued)

MLS team	Year joined MLS	Number of groups	Names of groups
Real Salt Lake	2005	6	La Barra Real RioT Brigade Rogue Cavaliers Brigade Royal Army Section 26 Salt City United
Toronto FC	2007	5	Inebriatti Red Patch Boys U-Sector Kings in the North Original 109 Tribal Rhythm Nation
San Jose Earthquakes	2008	3	The Casbah San Jose Ultras The Faultline
Seattle Sounders FC	2009	4	Emerald City Supporters Gorilla FC North End Faithful Eastside Supporters
Philadelphia Union	2010	1	Sons of Ben
Vancouver Whitecaps FC	2011	3	Southsiders Curva Collective Rain City Brigade
Portland Timbers	2011	1	Timbers Army
Montreal Impact	2012	3	Ultras Montréal 127 Montréal 1642MTL
Orlando City SC	2015	2	Iron Lion Firm The Ruckus
New York City FC	2015	2	New York City SC The Third Rail
Atlanta United FC	2017	4	The Faction Footie Mob Resurgence Terminus Legion
Minnesota United FC	2017	3	Dark Clouds True North Elite Wolf's Head

Martin in Florida, the Timbers Army wore hooded sweatshirts during a match to protest the racial stereotyping of Martin and African-Americans in general. The effort received much attention in the press and was visible to millions of television viewers who either saw the game live or viewed replays of the scenes on news networks across the country in the days that followed.

In Washington, DC, a remarkable political effort by supporters occurred in 2011, when D.C. United and its supporter groups came together to create the "Keep D.C. United" movement. For years the team had unsuccessfully sought to gain support from the local government in pursuit of a new soccer-specific stadium to replace the ageing RFK Stadium. Team investors and MLS had grown impatient at the lack of progress and began exploring options to relocate the team to Baltimore, Maryland. The threat of losing their team mobilised supporters to become politically active in lobbying efforts of civic leaders. The *keepdcunited.org* web platform was launched to help frame the supporter groups' position for the general public and to educate supporter (and non-supporter) activists on strategies to tactfully engage elected officials to encourage them to work with the team to develop a new stadium. In this particular case, the efforts of supporters were not in vain. The city later agreed on a deal with the team and the new home of D.C. United, Audi Field, is scheduled to open during the 2018 season. While the political involvement of organised soccer supporters in support of a new stadium infrastructure may not be unique, political strife involving sports team investors and municipalities over the role of public subsidies in stadium development projects is as American as apple pie.

4   Stadium Games: Major League Soccer and the Politics of Stadium Development

When MLS launched in 1996 fans did not have access to stadiums designed and constructed specifically for soccer. Though the League expressed a desire for teams to play in venues accommodating between 20,000 and 30,000 spectators, all ten of the original MLS teams were secondary tenants operating out of predominantly publicly funded stadiums built to accommodate much larger football and baseball crowds. The oversized venues lacked an intimate feel and failed to deliver an ideal game day experience for fans (Dure 2010; Hopkins 2010; Masteralexis et al. 2015; West 2016). Further, MLS teams had little or no control over the venues they played in (Bushnell 2016).

Lamar Hunt, the late iconic professional sports entrepreneur and founding investor-operator of the Columbus Crew in Ohio, astutely recognised the aforementioned problems associated with the Crew playing as second tenants in Ohio Stadium, the home stadium of the Ohio State University Buckeyes (American) football team. Additionally, he and other stakeholders understood the optics of a half-empty American football stadium on television

provided an unwanted negative perception of the League. In 1998, Hunt announced plans to construct the first ever privately funded soccer-specific stadium (SSS) in MLS on the grounds of the Ohio Expo Center. The Crew played its first game in Columbus Crew Stadium (now named Mapfre Stadium) on May 15, 1999 to a sold-out crowd of 24,741. In the following years the venue hosted several additional marque football matches, including the 2000 MLS All-Star game as well as the 2001 MLS Cup (*Columbus Dispatch*, 6 October 2017). Later on, the venue earned a reputation as the de facto preferred ground for the US Men's National Team.

The strategic vision of Lamar Hunt and the immediate success of Crew Stadium provided a strategic direction for the League. Shortly after taking the reigns as MLS Commissioner in 1999, Don Garber strongly advised all MLS teams to follow Lamar Hunt's lead in pursuit of their own soccer-specific stadium. For Garber, the smaller purpose-built venues not only enhanced the game day experience but also "provided a sense of community for the team and the fans" (DelGallo 2017). Equally important, stadiums developed by MLS teams afforded the League and its investors an opportunity to assume greater control over potentially lucrative stadium-related revenue streams. Garber's SSS imperative, however, created a dilemma for investor-operators. They faced the decision to either assume the financial risk of funding the venues, as Lamar Hunt did, or pursue the daunting and politically charged task of securing the capital required to finance these new venues through partnerships with municipalities. Like other professional sports team owners in the United States had done for several decades, many soccer investors chose to minimise their own risks in an unproven professional sports League and opted to seek public funding in the form of municipal subsidies.

Historically, most professional sports teams in the United States played in privately owned venues (Rosentraub 1997, 11). By the 1960s many of these venues had become outdated and needed to be upgraded or replaced (Weiner 2004, 41–59). At the time, team owners and the municipalities in which they were located understood the financial benefits of developing multi-purpose stadiums capable of accommodating two or more sports teams. From the 1960s through the 1980s dozens of new stadiums were constructed across the United States for the purpose of hosting two sports tenants as well as a menu of other entertainment events. These stadiums were modern, featured artificial turf and looked similar in design, earning them the moniker "cookie-cutter stadiums". Another key common characteristic of the venues built in this era related to the politics of how they were financed. Team owners understood the political power they yielded and

many leveraged this power to save millions of dollars of their own money by negotiating deals that shifted the financial burden associated with stadium development projects to the municipal and state governments where they were located. In other words, either the cost of building these new venues would be assumed by the public sector or team owners would consider relocating their sports franchise to another municipality willing to meet their demands (Rosentraub 1997).

Through the early 1990s, an unprecedented number of new sports stadiums were constructed and financed, either in whole or in part, through government subsidies (Rosentraub 2010). Specifically, between 1970 and 1986, public subsidies funded by taxpayers were responsible for 93.05% of new stadium costs (Brown et al. 2016, 221). Of the more than $12 billion in stadium construction costs that occurred during the 1990s, an estimated $7.5 billion was paid by taxpayers (deMause and Cagan 2008, 27–28; Long 2014; Quirk and Fort 2010). Common subsidies were given in the form of favourable leases, direct cash payments, land donations, infrastructure improvements (e.g. roads, parking lots), tax abatements and the sale of general obligation and revenue bonds (Brown et al. 2016, 228).

For the most part, elected officials and voters in host cities were willing to pay for a large portion of new stadiums to keep their professional teams content (Mayer III 2005, 206). To be sure, several municipalities failed to meet team owner demands and this resulted in multiple franchises relocating to new host cities (e.g. Baltimore Colts moving to Indianapolis, Los Angeles Rams moving to St. Louis). Cities' willingness to heavily subsidise new stadiums materialised from a combination of factors. Notably, a professional sports team has the capacity to create a sense of pride and collective identity for a community (Rosentraub 2010). Also, civic leaders believe having a professional sports team and stadium can be a catalyst for the local economy (Mondello and Kellison 2016). Popular opinion was (and still is) major professional sports teams and stadiums create and support jobs, facilitate urban development and positively impact the financial status of local residents through the "multiplier effect" (Masteralexis et al. 2015).

By the mid to late 1990s "cookie-cutter" stadiums developed over the previous three decades were said to be inadequate. Most seats in the old stadiums had poor line-of-sight for fans and the venues lacked modern-day amenities fans and owners demanded. With teams threatening to relocate if new stadiums were not built, municipal governments scrambled to secure public funding for new stadiums to maintain their city's Major League status (Mayer III 2005; Rosentraub 2010).

The shift to single-sport stadium development projects occurred at about the same time Lamar Hunt and the Columbus Crew pioneered soccer-specific stadiums. Unfortunately for MLS investor-operators seeking public subsidies to finance similar stadium projects, research studies began to find their way into mainstream media outlets and fuelled heated political debates on the economics of stadium development. Findings from the studies overwhelmingly undermined the previously accepted narrative that funding professional sports stadiums was a sound investment of public dollars (Mondello and Kellison 2016). Interestingly and despite the clarity of research findings on the topic, the debate on using public monies to finance private professional sports teams has persisted. Some municipalities continue to subsidise sports stadiums in a variety of ways, though to a lesser degree, in an effort to retain or attract professional sport franchises with the hope of financial windfalls and with aspirations of being viewed as a "Major League" city (Masteralexis et al. 2015; Tisdale 2017).

Numerous MLS investor-operators and their teams have been able to fulfil Lamar Hunt's vision and Commissioner Don Garber's directive thanks, in part, to this unique political conundrum. Including Mapfre Stadium (formerly Columbus Crew Stadium), fourteen soccer-specific stadiums were constructed for MLS teams from 1999 to 2017. The table provides the financing of each existing MLS venue (multi-purpose and soccer-specific) as well as stadiums scheduled to come online in the near future. As the table shows, the level of public funding varies across the stadiums. Some venues are only partially funded by public monies, leaving the teams and the League to absorb the remaining costs (Table 2).

While public subsidies have created a path to the development of much-needed infrastructure for the League the investments did not necessarily guarantee fiscal success for stakeholders. In 2006, taxpayers in Bridgeview, Illinois fully financed the $98 million cost of Toyota Park, home of the Chicago Fire. The stadium, however, has not been able to generate sufficient funds to offset the debt service. In 2012, the municipality borrowed an additional $27 million to cover payments on the stadium debt, ultimately leaving taxpayers on the hook for more than $225 million (Smith 2013).[13] Despite the political turmoil caused by the financial burden of the venue, the Chicago Fire successfully secured and have benefited from an appropriately sized home ground without assuming the risk associated with its development.

In 2010, Red Bull Arena, home stadium of the New York Red Bulls, opened for business in Harrison, NJ. The $200 million stadium was part of

Table 2 Major League Soccer stadium construction financing (*Sources* Major League Soccer 2017; Georgia State University Sport and Urban Policy Initiative, Stadiatrack 2017; Propheter 2014; Baade and Matheson 2011)

Soccer specific stadium name	Location	Team	Capacity	Year completed or renovated	Total cost $US (in millions)	% Public
Orlando City Stadium	Orlando, FL	Orlando City SC	25,500	2017	155.0	0
BMO Field (remodel)	Toronto, ON	Toronto FC	30,000	2016	120	15
Avaya Stadium	San Jose, CA	San Jose Earthquakes	18,000	2015	100.0	0
BBVA Compass Stadium	Houston, TX	Houston Dynamo	22,039	2012	95.0	37
Providence Park (remodel)	Portland, OR	Portland Timbers	22,000	2011	31.0	100
Children's Mercy Park	Kansas City, KS	Sporting Kansas City	18,467	2011	200.0	75
Talen Energy Stadium	Chester, PA	Philadelphia Union	18,500	2010	120.0	64
Red Bull Arena	Harrison, NJ	New York Red Bulls	25,000	2010	200	50
Stade Saputo	Montreal, QC	Montreal Impact	20,801	2008	17	0
Rio Tinto Stadium	Sandy, UT	Real Salt Lake	21,030	2008	115.0	39
BMO Field	Toronto, ON	Toronto FC	28,500	2007	73	75
Dick's Sporting Goods Park	Commerce City, CO	Colorado Rapids	18,061	2007	131.0	50
Toyota Park	Bridgeview, IL	Chicago Fire	20,000	2006	98.0	100
Toyota Stadium	Frisco, TX	FC Dallas	16,000	2005	105.0	57
Stubhub Center	Carson, CA	LA Galaxy	27,167	2003	150.0	0
Mapfre Stadium	Columbus, OH	Columbus Crew SC	19,968	1999	37.0	0

Table 2 (continued)

Multi-use stadium name	Location	Team	Capacity	Year completed or renovated	Total cost (in millions)	% Public
Mercedes-Benz Stadium	Atlanta, GA	Atlanta United FC	40,000	2017	1500.0	13
BC Place (remodel)	Vancouver, BC	Vancouver Whitecaps FC	22,120	2011	563	100
Providence Park (remodel)	Portland, OR	Portland Timbers	22,000	2011	40.0	100
TCF Bank Stadium	Minneapolis, MN	Minnesota United FC	50,805	2009	288	52
Yankee Stadium	Bronx, NY	New York City FC	28,940	2009	1308.0	22
Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium (remodel)	Washington, DC	D.C. United	19,647	2005	19.0	100
CenturyLink Field	Seattle, WA	Seattle Sounders FC	72,000	2002	430.0	70
Gillette Stadium	Foxborough, MA	New England Revolution	20,000	2002	325	10

Future stadiums	Location	Team	Capacity	Expected completion	Estimated cost (in millions)	% Public
Audi Field	Washington, DC	D.C. United	20,000	2018	300	50
Banc of California Stadium	Los Angeles, CA	Los Angeles Football Club	22,000	2018	350	0
Allianze Field	Saint Paul, MN	Minnesota United FC	19,400	2019	150	0
TBD	Miami, FL	TBD	25,000	2020	220–300	0
TBD	Nashville, TN	TBD	30,000	2020	275	82

a much larger municipal redevelopment project, which ultimately was abandoned due to the Great Recession (Mascarenhas 2010). The city and county not only contributed a significant amount of public funds for construction (20%) but also for procuring land ($40 million) and improving transportation infrastructure near the venue ($215 million) (deMause 2012). In addition to helping to fund the construction of the venue, the Red Bulls agreed to pay a ceremonial $1 per year rental fee and $125,000 in payments in lieu of property taxes. Additional stadium revenue was to come from other property tax payments from new hotels and apartments that were to be constructed near the stadium, which never occurred (deMause 2015). The political turmoil that ensued included multiple court rulings, which sought to mitigate the disputes between the team and the municipalities of Harrison, NJ and Hudson County. Legal decisions required the team to contribute its fair share of funds to help offset the cost of Red Bull Arena, including $3.6 million in back property taxes and as well as future property tax payments (deMause 2012). Additionally, the $1 per year rental agreement rose to $1.3 million annually (Leir 2016). Nevertheless, like in Chicago, the New York Red Bulls and MLS were able to celebrate the development of yet another soccer-specific stadium.

The previous cases alongside dozens of other soccer, baseball and American football stadiums illustrate these type of projects involve significant financial risk and can result in politically charged controversies. Opposition to subsidising sports stadiums has gained momentum across the United States as civic groups and taxpayers call on civic leaders to provide better management of public resources. This sentiment has directly affected recent MLS expansion teams, resulting in complex and contentious political negotiations as well as increasing difficulties with accessing public subsidies for stadium projects. Initially, the city of Orlando committed to pay over $20 million for land and construction funding for Orlando City FC's new soccer-specific stadium. However, state funding was delayed in the legislature, jeopardising the team's ability to meet its obligations. Rather than engaging in additional and prolonged political negotiations, the ownership group opted to fund the entire project themselves in order to keep construction on schedule (Tenorio 2015). Other recent stadium projects have been funded largely through private investments. However, public subsidies still exist in the form of infrastructure improvements in areas around the stadiums. The new Banc of California Field in Los Angeles, future home of the Los Angeles FC expansion team, is set to open in 2018. While the venue itself is privately funded, the club is relying on elected city and state civic leaders to provide assistance for

strategic infrastructural improvements to enhance access and public safety. Minnesota United FC is fronting all of the costs for the construction of its new ground, Allianz Field, yet the city of St. Paul has allocated \$18.4 million in public funds for infrastructural improvements near the stadium (Van Berkel 2016).

With respect to the future growth of MLS, the League is poised to expand to 28 teams by the year 2022 and has emphasised a preference for prospective expansion team bids that include plans for soccer-specific stadiums. Investor-operators and civic leaders understand subsidising private sports based business carries high political risks and such activity is likely to be met with stern opposition moving forward. For example, in April of 2017, voters in St. Louis chose to direct public funds from a tax increase towards public services, such as public transportation, rather than towards the construction of a new soccer stadium. This referendum and Commissioner Don Garber's "no public stadium, no team" retort essentially put a damper on all hopes for a future MLS expansion team being awarded to St. Louis for the foreseeable future. Voters in San Diego eliminated their city as a potential future expansion market by rejecting the idea of public funding for as soccer stadium, acknowledging stadiums may not be the best economic choice for cities (Kelsey 2017).

Interestingly, despite the league's soccer-specific stadium imperative, the success of Atlanta United, which plays in a domed American football stadium, has given hope to prospective MLS investor groups with plans that include utilising existing American football stadiums. In Detroit, a prospective expansion investor group has received support from the Ford family, owners of the professional Detroit Lions American football team and the Ford Motor Company. Like Atlanta United, the group plans to make use of an existing domed football stadium (Ford Field) (Ellis 2017). Though not fully endorsed by the League, MLS has reluctantly expressed a willingness to make exceptions if ownership groups present viable stadium alternatives (DelGallo 2017). Other potential MLS expansion cities vying for the remaining three expansion bids include Cincinnati (Ohio), Sacramento (California), San Antonio (Texas), Indianapolis (Indiana), Charlotte (North Carolina), Raleigh (North Carolina), Phoenix (Arizona) and Tampa/St. Petersburg (Florida). Each prospective expansion team understands the political climate in their respective municipality features taxpayers and civic leaders weary of investing public dollars in soccer stadium projects. As voters in cities across the United States increasingly refuse to endorse the use of public funds for stadiums, prospective expansion teams and municipalities are tasked with finding creative ways to secure financing for the construction

of new stadiums in hopes of increasing their chances of having their expansion bid selected.

5 Conclusion: Beckham and Stadium Politics in Miami

Soccer in the United States has evolved from its beginnings as a marginal sport played primarily by immigrants into a multibillion-dollar enterprise. The flagship professional League, Major League Soccer, continues to nurture rivalries and has a vibrant supporter culture. The League has been in a perpetual state of growth for the past several years and is currently pushing forward with plans to continue expansion efforts. Much of the recent growth and popularity is often attributed to the arrival and hype associated with global icon David Beckham. When Beckham signed with the Los Angeles Galaxy for the 2007 season he negotiated a provision in his contract with MLS guaranteeing him an opportunity to purchase and operate an MLS team after his playing days had ended (Wahl 2009). Following his retirement in 2012 and after several years of prospecting markets across the United States, Beckham zeroed in on Miami, Florida and was formally awarded a team in 2014. At the close of 2017 Miami Beckham United (MBU), Beckham's investor group, had yet to launch their team due to a particularly toxic political climate towards professional sports teams in Miami. Like in other cities across the country, taxpayers and civic leaders have a low tolerance for using public resources to aid the development of yet another professional sports stadium. But unlike other cities, Miami was particularly resistant following the public financing fiasco involving Marlins Park, the home stadium of the Miami Marlins of Major League Baseball. To date, the municipality has been unwilling to subsidise any portion of a new stadium for the team.

Marlins Park opened in 2012 and quickly became an example of how relationships between sports team owners/investors, residents and local municipal governments can sour. In the years leading up to the construction of the venue, the city of Miami and Miami-Dade County agreed to subsidise the financing of Marlins Park through the sale of approximately $500 million in municipal bonds and a loan of $91 million (Loughney 2014). The bond sales process not only involves inviting private capital investors to purchase the bonds to acquire the needed funds to pay for the cost of construction, but also an obligation, on the part of the city, to pay back the

investors the full cost of the bonds plus interest over time. Shockingly, the total cost to pay off the sale of the bonds upon maturity, in this case, exceeds $2 billion, meaning taxpayers will end up paying more than four times the value of the bonds. As details of the bond sales spread, public officials affiliated with the deal suffered the political consequences, notably Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos Alvarez, who was deposed of his post as a result of a recall election in 2011. The scandal also prompted a criminal investigation by the United States Securities and Exchanges Commission, which has yet to conclude (Belson 2017).

Given this context, when Beckham was awarded an MLS team, Miami's elected officials were understandably poised to decline any requests for public assistance for developing a stadium due to the Marlins Park scandal. After all, some had been elected on a pledge to be better stewards of public resources. Beckham's initial plan for a home ground included a $300 million privately financed stadium on Dodge Island in Miami. The plan also called for the city to provide public land where the stadium was to be erected, which was a sticking point for a city unwilling to allocate public resources for the project. "Plan B" featured a picturesque site just North of downtown on Biscayne Bay near American Airlines Arena, home of the National Basketball Association's Miami Heat. The point of departure for this deal involved the Beckham group's unwillingness to pay the city for millions of dollars' worth of past land improvements to the area. "Plan C" involved a stadium site near Marlins Park, which was offered as a viable alternative by city officials. Both MLS and MBU found significant faults with the location and declined the site as an option (Ianelli 2017). In December 2015, MBU purchased six acres in the Miami neighbourhood of Overtown near the banks of the Miami River. The group later asked the city to approve the sale of an additional three acres of land for $9 million to ensure adequate space for the development of the stadium. A year and a half later Miami-Dade County commissioners voted in favour of the sale (Hanks 2017). The stadium and the land on which it would sit is to be privately owned and privately funded, with no tax breaks or other subsidies, prompting headlines of being "America's best stadium deal" (Grabar 2017). The final significant barrier preventing Beckham from moving forward entails a lawsuit from a local well-known landowner motivated to conserve undeveloped land in the region. The premise of the legal challenge claims state law requires land sales of this nature to go through a bidding process to allow for competition while simultaneously discouraging municipalities to pay favours to certain entities and individuals in the form of select land approvals. This challenge

to the legality of Beckham's land acquisition is expected to significantly delay progress and threatens to derail the team's plans to launch in 2021 (Hanks and Vassolo 2017).

The entire MBU saga demonstrates the political complexity associated with the process of developing a soccer stadium in an era where voters and civic leaders have become increasingly sceptical and resistant to private for-profit sports businesses seeking access to public subsidies in an effort to maximise revenue. The days of public subsidies covering all of the costs associated with developing sports infrastructure (stadiums) began in the 1960s yet, as previously outlined, this era appears to be coming to an end. Prospective MLS expansion teams seeking to position themselves to win one of the few remaining bids into the League will still need to satisfy League preferences for small intimate soccer-specific stadiums or present a compelling alternative (e.g. the Atlanta United model). With respect to the stadium development component, the path forward for future successful expansion bids includes increasing the level of private financing for the construction of the stadium structure itself while reducing or limiting public support assistance to general land and transportation improvements everyone can benefit from. However, as the Beckham case shows, even a socially responsible plan isn't immune from other forms of political barriers threatening the best stadium deal.

Notes

1. For a thorough account of soccer in St. Louis, see Lange (2011).
2. For an engaging and well-document account of the ALPF, see Wangerin (2006).
3. For a complete year by year account of the ASL, including player statistics, see Jose (1998).
4. For a thorough account of the USA, see Seese (2015).
5. For a description of the rise of youth soccer in the United States in the 1970s, see Keyes (2014).
6. In 2002, the two investors were responsible for the operation of all of the league's teams with the exception of the New England Revolution (Robert Kraft).
7. For a thorough account of the context surrounding David Beckham's arrival to MLS, see Wahl (2009).
8. MLS has monetized Rivalry Week by selling the naming rights. Currently, it is officially known as "Heineken Rivalry Week".

9. Currently, there are 84 recognised supporter groups in MLS. Some groups have memberships ranging from a few hundred while the larger groups exceed several thousand. For a basic description of the role of MLS teams in helping to construct supporter groups, see Hopkins (2010), and West (2016).

10. In Portland, the Timber's Army takes pride in operating as a single unified supporter group. On the other hand, in Washington, DC, United enjoys support from 3 separate supporter groups, including the Screaming Eagles, La Barra Brava and the District Ultras. Each operates as its own supporter group, though several of the groups do occasionally collaborate to create TIFO displays and organise road trips to away matches.

11. For Guschwan, political is broad to include anything that affects the lives lived in common rather than a focus on electoral politics.

12. Johnston notes sporting events are prime public events that can be "seized and given symbolic connotations".

13. This figure represents the total cost of the financing at maturity.

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Uruguay

Lincoln Bizzozero Revelez

1   Political Origins of Football

Uruguay is a small country of 176,000 square kilometres located in South America, with a population of 3.5 million. It is found in South America's Southern Cone bordered by the shores of the Atlantic Ocean and the River Plate, by Argentina to the West and Brazil to the North and Northeast. It was a land between the Spanish and Portuguese empires during colonial times, and between the two mayor Latin American Republics after their independence.

Like Argentina, Uruguay was a major destination for European migrants from the 1870s until the 1920s. Both countries experienced an early modernization, linked largely to the close diplomatic and trade relations they shared with the British Empire. Meat and wool exports to the European markets made the productive system, transports and communications modernization possible for both countries (Thomas 1994).

Along with the British investments came new organisational models, hobbies, cultural expressions and sports, like football. With football's popularity, a singular local game-style appeared, deriving in the chorus of a song: "Uruguayos campeones de América y del mundo" (Uruguayans are American and world champions).

L. Bizzozero Revelez (✉)
International Studies Program, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo, Uruguay

Contrasting with its geographical dimensions, with regard to football, this small country has been historically a relevant actor. Uruguay was Olympic Football Champion twice, in 1924 and 1928; Football World Champion twice in 1930 and 1950; South American Champion (Copa de América) fifteen times, which is more than any other South American national team (Argentina won fourteen while Brazil won eight). Adding to the latter both major local Uruguayan football teams, Nacional and Peñarol, sum up six Intercontinental Cups (three each) and eight Libertadores Cups (five for Peñarol and three for Nacional); while Nacional also won the Recopa once and the Inter-American Cup two times. On top of these accomplishments are the countless Uruguayan players who have made it in the world's major football leagues, like Luis Suárez, Diego Godín, Edinson Cavani, considered among the best players worldwide.

Football is linked to Uruguay's history since the late nineteenth century, having played an important role in the configuration of its national identity. The "Uruguayan game-style" was innovative both in tactics and techniques, but most importantly, it generated a new social sensitivity towards the game (Magariñoz Pittaluga 1942). Uruguay, a young and small country, known worldwide for its successes playing football. This is why football became one of Uruguay's most important cultural expressions.

The international relevance of Uruguayan football transformed it, as a social phenomenon, into much more than just a sporting competition. The performance in the game became associated with the fate of the country and its international acknowledgement. As historian Andrés Morales states: "… *understanding the football show as an ethnographic phenomenon is what makes it even more exhilarating. There is still a lot to be learned about Uruguayan and Argentinian mentalities, mind frames and stereotypes from football history*" (Morales 2014a: 44).

That is why, as throughout its history Uruguayan football has been internationally distinguished, it has become, as a professional sport and show, very important for the history of the Uruguayan people. The aim of the following pages is to illustrate this unique socio-political-sports reality that we know as Uruguayan Football.

Football's arrival to Uruguay coincided with a period of deep historical transformations. This might explain the rapid incorporation of this sport as one Uruguayan identity's most important cultural expressions. By 1900 Uruguay was living through a process of unparalleled economic, demographic, political and cultural modernization (Bertino and Millot 1990). It was a young and open society, sympathetic to international innovations. Uruguay was transitioning from an oligarchic/caudillo-led political reality to

a democratic and inclusive system. For the first time, a romantic and positivistic vision of the country flourished from its cultural atmosphere.

Football arrived around 1890 together with the British involvement in finance, commerce and services. Since 1870, British influence in Uruguay was increasing hand in hand with the local economy's growing participation in international trade during the "first globalisation" (Bértola 2000). Although British investments never reached the magnitude they did in neighbouring Buenos Aires, they "guided" Uruguay's agro-exporting economy: the interest laid on the wool and meat markets, the construction of railroads and trains, setting up of finance, service and communications companies, development of the port of Montevideo and the slaughterhouses, and even the beginning of a small British colony (Barrán and Nahúm 1986).

The first informal football matches took place on the shores of Montevideo, near the Punta Carretas Lighthouse, between British workers and sailors. Social encounters were organised during weekends to enjoy the landscape, the beaches and watch the "crazy Brits" run after a ball. The popular appeal was so great that a special tramway line was created on Saturdays and Sundays, which included lunch and drinks, to watch football. Other matches took place beyond Montevideo in other parts of the country: British citizens used their free time in railway stations and workshops to play football, and the residents of suburban areas gathered in mass to watch, organising pic-nics and social gatherings (Magariños Pittaluga 1942).

British and other European institutions (businesses and schools) became the first *clubs*: Albion, Montevideo Rowing, *Central Uruguay Railway Cricket Club* (CURCC), Montevideo Cricket, the Irlandés, the Alemán. In 1899 the Club Nacional de Football was founded, the first creole team (Morales 1969; Magariñoz Pittaluga 1942).

The "football fever" was uncontainable. Leasing land for matches became a lucrative business. Around 5 to 10 thousand spectators crowded to watch the most important matches, in a time were no stands nor stadiums had been built to cope with such an audience (Magariñoz Pittaluga 1942). The British sport had become the most popular public spectacle, surpassing bullfights (that were prohibited before long) and the carnival events. By the early twentieth century over 80 teams had been formed. Around ten of these competed in various first-rate championships and even played against Argentinean and European teams that visited Uruguay (Luzuriaga 2009).

Between 1900 and 1930 Uruguay's agro-exporting economy had positive results, enjoying an expansive period. Local GDP per capita reached levels like those of Belgium or New Zealand (Álvarez 2010). This allowed for the integration of masses of migrants and the development of social security

institutions, pioneering the field in the American context. This was the right context to play football: very positive results in cattle farming, excellent public services in the country's capital, universalization of public schooling, the beginning of a process of political democratisation and the recognition of worker's rights. The chronological coincidence of these processes with the appearance of three of Uruguayan football's main characteristics is not casual: (1) the classic rivalry between the two most popular local clubs (Peñarol-Nacional); (2) the national team's sky-blue jersey ("La Celeste"); and (3) The Uruguayan Football Association (AUF). It was through these pillars that the social and institutional idea on football was expressed.

Physical education and communications expert, Professor Piñeyrúa states: "*How can Uruguay's successes in football be explained? How is it that such a small country obtained such grand achievements?… The explanation must be in the creation of a local game-style and the personality of its players, forged from different immigrant cultures and used to represent their country from the first day, crafting its epic. The passion that football unleashed rapidly extended to the whole society and became entangled in the social structure of a country still moulding*" (2014).

Uruguayans changed from spectators to players, they flocked to football and so it "became Uruguayan". This was a vertiginous process that encompassed all social classes. As the historian Luzuriaga explains: "*Players could be British gentlemen and workshop workers or university students, either way spectators from all social classes would gather by the court's side-lines*" (Luzuriaga 2014). The practice of football became a part of the cultural identity through which nationalist feelings and collective optimism could be channelled, as long as Uruguayan representatives continued to triumph internationally.

Resulting from the cultural exchange given in those times of openness, an important sporting fusion resulted. English football key characteristics (the long pass, tactical discipline, fast offensive midfielders) were combined with those of the River Plate (short pass resembling that of Scottish football, zigzagging, dribbling, and individual improvisation) together with others of Italian origin. This way, Uruguayan football, of British origins, ended up combining local postures and attitudes, linked to tango, "*catenaccio*", Latin sensibility and the participation of several *players* of African descent (Magariñoz Pittaluga 1942; Morales 1969).

Thanks to this unusual combination, typical of the River Plate, the Uruguayan national team developed an agile, brave and original game-style that earned it three consecutive international titles. Surprising Europeans and Americans alike, "la Celeste" won the title in the Paris Olympic Games of 1924 facing Switzerland, and repeated the accomplishment in Amsterdam

facing Argentina in 1928. This performance allowed Uruguay to successfully present its candidacy to host the first FIFA World Cup in 1930.

At a time when Uruguay was celebrating its first century as an independent Republic, the state devoted itself to build, in less than nine months, South America's largest stadium to that date, so as to host the delegations that would compete in the 1930 World Cup (Jalabert 2016). As it had done so before, "la Celeste" conquered the title winning the final by 4 goals to 2 against Argentina. Thus, the existing relationship between football and national identity was strengthened: in the River Plate, a new approach to playing football had been born, and from it the first derby ("clásico"): Uruguay VS Argentina. "*Following the world final, headings reading "Uruguay World Champion for the third time" titled every page. Apart from an in-depth recount of the game and pictures… during celebrations the victory is seen as a triumph for «the Nation»*" (Morales 2014a: 39).

Victories over its larger neighbours, confirmed football's timely arrival at a time when Uruguay was building an optimistic modern national ideal. Far from the image portrayed by other oligarchic Latin American States, the small Uruguayan Republic saw itself as "America's Switzerland", and remained confident in its future development. The incorporation of football, a *modern sport*, that allowed it to compete with its neighbours and other nations, was yet another one of modernity's challenges. Due to its growing popularity and international successes, it became a sign of Uruguay's identity, just as it was being instituted through politics, education and the press.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

Football in Uruguay cuts across all social spheres, classes and institutions. Since Uruguay is a small country with just three and a half million inhabitants, football rivalries concentrate nationally in its two main clubs, which are the Club Nacional de Football and the Club Atlético Peñarol. Some regional rivalries also exist (Salto-Paysandú; Maldonado-Rocha), others between teams belonging to the same neighbourhood of Montevideo (River Plate—Montevideo Wanderers; Cerro—Rampla Juniors) and in other cities (Piriápolis—Tabaré; Deportivo Maldonado—Atenas).

The most important rivalry is the one between Nacional and Peñarol. Both their interpretations of their history and the image they portray, define the bases on which Uruguayan football is structured. That same history depicts their institutional differences and serves to model each team's image and determine their social bases.

This rivalry is even expressed through the discussion over which is the oldest Uruguayan football team. Probably incomprehensible for non-Uruguayans, this issue has prompted historians to devote investigations to vindicate the claim over seniority by both teams (Alvarez 2001). Nacional formed a committee with members such as Jorge Batlle (Uruguayan President from 1999 until 2004) and Enrique Tarigo (Uruguayan Vice-President from 1985 until 1989), both lawyers, so as to clarify the legal issues regarding Uruguayan football's seniority. The final report was published in 1991 by Enrique Tarigo, as a response to Peñarol's celebration over their one hundredth birthday (Comisión de Decanato 1991).

The controversy, which was resolved legally by an international court, stems from the issue of the continuity or not of the Central Uruguayan Railway Cricket Club (CURCC), a multipurpose club founded in 1891, with the Club Atlético Peñarol, founded in 1913. However, the controversy is not about which team was the first to play football in Uruguay, since other clubs pioneered at this. Montevideo Rowing, Montevideo Cricket and Albion were all founded before CURCC. In fact, Albion was the first dedicated football club. Nor was it about which team is the oldest belonging to the Uruguayan Football Association or that has participated from the most Uruguayan championships, which is Nacional (Piñeyrúa 2014).

The controversy is based on three issues: the trophies won by CURCC and claimed by Peñarol, the historic-cultural continuity between both teams and having yet another distinction compared to the rival team. In what refers to championships, since CURCC won several trophies, their consideration by Peñarol presents different equilibriums. For example, the Uruguayan Championship has had 113 editions, of which Nacional won 46 (counting the 2016 edition) and Peñarol 43. Since CURCC was champion five times, Peñarol's claim would take their overall amount to 48 Uruguayan Championships.

The other issue refers to the historic-cultural continuity between CURCC and Peñarol, being the first one a popular team formed by the railway employees and workers in a working-class neighbourhood (Peñarol). This continuity allows Peñarol to claim this working-class origin as its own, when 118 employees founded the CURCC in the railway workshops back in 1891.

Finally, the rivalry between Nacional and Peñarol has transformed over the years, polarising the discussion on the seniority of one team or the other. The lack of continuity between CURCC and Peñarol can be demonstrated with legal and objective arguments. It is a proven fact that both institutions co-existed for one whole year and even faced each other on the field

(Álvarez 2001; Comisión de Decanato. CNF 1991). Adding to this, at the time of CURCC's institutional closure it donated all its assets to the British Hospital, so, at least from a legal point of view, there is no institutional continuity with Peñarol. Other arguments supporting the continuity between both institutions are explained by Álvarez in his book (Álvarez 2001).

The controversy over the age of one of Uruguay's most popular teams is a testament to football's importance for the country. While most teams were born from neighbourhoods, towns and regions, Nacional and Peñarol were nationally relevant, their rivalry cutting across cities and sectors. Although there is evidence of certain social preference for one or the other based on national origins, social sectors, regions and political preferences, none of them prove to be decisive and conclusive.

This emphasis made on the origins of both teams hints at the different institutional identities: Peñarol is associated with the "gringos" and the common people, while Nacional is linked to the local traditional culture (America's first creole team). On the one side football's popularisation, on the other the nationalisation of the sport by the creoles. This division between popular and national tendencies resulted in preferences being determined by social and regional factors.

This explains why historically most of Peñarol's followers came from Italian origin, were working class and lived in the cities. It also had many followers from the Colorado Party, linked similarly to Italian immigration. On the other hand, Nacional got most of its followers from Spanish immigration, among merchants and from rural areas (mostly outside Montevideo).

As historian Juan Carlos Luzuriaga states "… *the short time it took both Nacional and Peñarol to earn the allegiance of the people during the early years of the twentieth century, resides mostly in the fact that both teams incarnated long-term national visions and sentiments, together with a great sporting parity that stimulated their rivalry*" (2014). Beyond the county's political traditions, these two teams channelled several social sensitivities from that time: "*Nacional, the most representative creole team… put together squads of Uruguayan players willing to challenge their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, or what they represented, in their own arena. Confronting with the Anglo-Saxon lifestyle and accomplishments model was a challenge emphasised by the young local intellectuality*" (Luzuriaga 2014).

These are no absolute divides, but they hint on the social expression that both team's historical origins had among different immigrant and social groups, cities and regions. Several polls conducted in the past twenty years show a trend in the facts explained above, toning down the divides existing during the clubs' first decades.

Nineteen 90s polls showed a greater percentage of Nacional sympathisers than Peñarol ones, while recent twenty-first century polls show that the preferences have inversed, with a greater percentage of Peñarol sympathisers (Bassorelli 2013). Polls also show a clear majority of preferences towards Nacional and Peñarol in comparison with all the other minor teams. In 1997 polls showed that there was a 45% preference for Nacional, 42% for Peñarol and 13% for all other teams put together. During 2005 a new poll showed that 32% of those surveyed sympathized with Nacional, 31% with Peñarol, 9% with other teams and 28% had no real preference. Finally, in 2013 a new survey resulted in 46% sympathising for Peñarol, 35% for Nacional, 6% for other teams and 13% with no preference (Bassorelli 2013).

There is also rivalry over the number of members each club has. In 2015, the company "Movement for a Better Football" placed Peñarol and Nacional in a ranking of the twenty clubs with more members worldwide. According to this ranking, Peñarol had 77 thousand members and was ranked 16th while Nacional had 76 thousand and ranked 17th (Barboza 2015). Both clubs have also competed concerning their football stadiums. Nacional's stadium, the Gran Parque Central, was inaugurated in 1900 and used to host the national team games. Apart from that, it was one of the stadiums used for the 1930 World Cup, where two inaugural games were played. Peñarol built its stadium recently, it being inaugurated on March 28, 2016. Peñarol's leadership have observed that their stadium, the Campeón del Siglo, complies with all of FIFA's requirements and can hold up to 40 thousand spectators. The Gran Parque Central does not reach that capacity, although a remodelling plan attempts to do so in several months.

Another issue that opposes both clubs concerns the number of championships won by each. The controversy surrounding Peñarol's continuity from CURCC has already been presented. Some historical issues, like the fact that Peñarol was de-affiliated from the Uruguayan Football Association for several years, are not that relevant regarding the aforementioned matter. It is on the issue of the number of official titles earned by each institution that both clubs argue the most. Were we to accept Peñarol's continuity from CURCC, then Nacional would be beaten (48–46). They are followed by Defensor and Danubio with four titles each. However, when considering all the official championships disputed in Uruguay, Nacional holds the lead over Peñarol (134 for Nacional and 118 for Peñarol). And when considering international titles, including FIFA-CONMEBOL tournaments and others organised by country associations, Nacional has 21 to Peñarol's 16. Statistics show a

CURCC/Peñarol superiority in the early years of the twentieth century, with Nacional dominating the scene from 1910 until the 1950s, even winning five years in a row during the 1940s. By the late 50s until the 70s Peñarol dominated again, winning themselves five years in a row during the 60s. Peñarol would repeat this feat during the 90s, proving its dominance over Nacional in the football scene during those years. The twenty-first Century will see the return of Nacional as the dominant team: Nacional has so far won ten championships over Peñarol's four.

Statistics might show the evolution that both institutions have had regarding their sporting results. However political and social aspects and other factors not linked directly to the game, like the intervention of businesses and the handling of money (and players), are elements to take into consideration, and will be addressed in the next section.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle: The "Football-Culture" and Its Interactions

As it was pointed out before, football became a popular sport, to play and to watch, in the early years of the twentieth century, coinciding with the birth of an optimistic Uruguayan national ideal. "Naturally" resulting from this, came football's symbolic and cultural significance and interrelation with politics and society.

The current Coach of Uruguay's National Team, Oscar Washington Tabárez, generally sums up Uruguayan football's exceptional character as follows: 'Uruguay has a "football-culture"' (Bianchi 2014). Every boy gets a ball for Christmas, 200 thousand young kids practice football, there are more than 20 dedicated radio stations, and football metaphors are used to relate to almost any topic of conversation amongst Uruguayans. And this is not a recent phenomenon, but exists since the origins of Uruguayan football.

Football's importance within the cities and countryside's social fabric is outstanding. It has become an important component of the young boys' (nowadays: and girls') upbringing, who socialise through football (complementing their formal schooling), learning values such as teamwork and good sportsmanship, and hoping that football will be their means for social promotion. The Uruguayan Government, in recent years, has found it fit to develop policies for economically depressed areas, so that the practice of football may be a source of motivation that keeps the youth away from idleness and consumerism.

Football and Party Politics, but no "Bread and Circuses"

Football and politics have been historically linked. There are numerous cases of political careers that started from a position in club leadership. Coping with club organisation, understanding certain popular codes that this task requires, the popular exposure that success in sports generates in Uruguay, are all elements that may help further the political career of anyone willing to pursue one. Although not a general rule, it has been common for Uruguayan politicians to hold seats either in football club management committees or in AUF's (Uruguayan Football Association) leadership itself.

Throughout the twentieth century, at club level, Peñarol has been generally linked with the Colorado Party, while Nacional has been associated with the Blanco Party. As previously stated, these parties identified with different immigrant communities and with one of the poles of the dichotomy countryside-capital city. Several club presidents and delegates at the AUF or CONMEBOL, have also been active members of the Blanco and Colorado parties, and held positions in Parliament, regional and national government (Morales 1969). Most of the club leaders have been lawyers and politicians, rather than businessmen, retired athletes or other social figures.

Nowadays these affiliations are not as clear as they used to be. Immigration ceased to be a relevant factor by the late 1940s, so today's fans are the grandchildren, at least, of those original European migrants. The end of the bi-party era, where the Blanco and Colorado parties dominated the political scene, has left a new, yet unstudied, situation. The growth in popularity of the left wing Frente Amplio party, founded in 1971, that has been the governing political force since 2004 and holds almost 50% of the electoral preferences implies a modification in the correspondence between fans and political parties. Given these facts, the twenty-first century will be a transitional period for the party-club correlations.

However, the general trend concerning football's connection to politics is still in force: President Tabaré Vázquez now in office, who belongs to the Frente Amplio party, can present as one of his "successes", that while he was raised by working class parents in a humble neighbourhood in the outskirts of Montevideo, he graduated as a Medical Doctor, and presided over a minor club, the Club Atlético Progreso, leading it to become Uruguayan Champion in 1989. This fact is interesting since in it the reality of football as a cultural expression meets the cultural identification with the story of David.[1]

This intimate relation between football and politics, does not mean that politicians can manipulate or use football for their own political ambitions.

In fact, there are several examples that prove just how difficult it is to use football as "Bread and Circuses": when the last Uruguayan Dictatorship organised a World Cup Champions Tournament in 1980, neither propaganda nor the large number of spectators stopped the crowds from chanting "it's going to end, it's going to end, the military dictatorship" ("se va acabar, se va acabar, la dictadura militar"). Confirming that popular expression, in November of that same year, most Uruguayans voted against a Constitution being proposed by the military government. This means that, although the fans flocked to see the games and celebrated their national team's unprecedented accomplishment of winning a World Cup Champions Trophy, they weren't "bewitched" by this, and still did not grant any legitimacy to the tournament organisers, their military dictators.

Uruguayan football, more than a public show is a *cultural expression*, consequently, though it might be a fundamental learning ground for a political career, the social scope of the football-culture helps to cushion any attempts to manipulate the sport for non-sporting ambitions, and Uruguayans, most of them greater football fans than the club managers themselves, have no trouble separating the scopes of football and politics.

Football as an Open Sport

The issue of racism in Uruguay is not easy to address. In the 1920's, there was a strong popular ideal of Uruguay as a "new", "white", "indigenous free" nation. However, the reality of a culturally and biologically multi-ethnic nation, with a white creole majority, but with great numbers of slave and Guaraní descendants and open to European immigration, made it impossible for a massive popular expression such as football not to resemble that social diversity.

Afro-descendants represent around 5–10% of the whole Uruguayan population. Although the early Republic eliminated discriminatory laws, socio-economic and cultural segregation are still today problematic (poverty levels and limited access to tertiary education compared to other social groups is still alarming today) (Cabella et al. 2013).

In spite of this, Uruguay was one of the first countries to integrate afro-descendant players in the practice of football: both the "Black Wonder" Andrade who played for Uruguay in the 20s, and the "Black Chief" Varela who was captain when the national team won the 1950 World Cup, are historical icons that hint on a relatively positive integration in the sport's realm. Several afro-descendant players, both Uruguayan and alien, have also

become football idols playing for the big teams (Atilio García, Artime and most recently Chengue Morales for Nacional; Spencer and Joya for Peñarol), confirming football's integration into society as a diverse and open sport (Reid Andrews 2011, 34).

There are no records of segregationist teams in Uruguay, or of racially biased policies in the sport. Consequently, there have been almost no racially triggered troubles between opposite club supporters, players and managers. Contrasting with the problems faced by afro-descendants to fully integrate within Uruguayan society, football can be considered a space where they can achieve social recognition and progress their careers. In general, limited racism could be alleged to exist, having a permanent presence of afro-descendants in the sport, many of them well-known, but conserving the use of the, sometimes affectionate but many times derogatory, "negro" appellative (Arocena 2009; Reid Andrews 2011).

Massive Support no Matter the Results

It is also interesting to analyse the massive support that the national team has and the big teams' large number of members. A recent poll indicated that 86% of Uruguayans show interest in football (Piñeyrúa 2014). The following periods could be presented considering Uruguayan international accomplishments:

(1) *From the origins until 1954: the "Celeste" among the elite.* Uruguay was among the elite of World football. Having won two Olympic Games and two World Cups, Uruguay surrendered its defence of the Jules Rimet Cup, in 1954, in a fantastic semi-final lost in extra time against Hungary (Vázquez 2017).

(2) *1960–1995: the national team's irregularity and the rise of the clubs.* The second half of the twentieth century saw poor results in World Cups, reaching 4th place in Mexico 1970. But on the other hand it was marked by great international successes both by Nacional and Peñarol, winning several Libertadores and Intercontinental Cups (a total of 14 between 1960 and 1988). One international triumph was achieved by Uruguay during the 90s when the national team won the America Cup of 1995 on Uruguayan national soil, however the late twentieth Century left a sense of lack of international relevance both at national team and club level.

(3) *2010 until today, return of the "Celeste"*: from 2010 onwards, following a renewed process in the management of the national team, Uruguay has managed to recover an almost permanent seat in FIFA's Top Ten ranking, and both the struggle for 3rd place in the South African World Cup against Germany and Forlan's Golden Ball award, were celebrated by massive crowds in the streets, by a populace eager to see Uruguay (and themselves) back in the top seats of World football. Uruguay went on to win the America Cup in 2011 marking its supremacy in American tournaments and reaffirming the fan's communion with their national team.

Beyond these cycles, support for the national team has shown a positive trend. Since the playoffs for the 1998 World Cup, Uruguay has sold more tickets than any other national team, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile, considering all South American tournaments.

A similar long-term evolution can be seen regarding the major clubs: although both teams have failed to produce any significant international results for the last 30 years (Nacional won its last Libertadores and Intercontinental Cup in 1988), their membership has kept growing, having found new ways to keep motivating fans to join their club, as several polls have revealed.

Violence and Values

From the very start the passion and agony with which football is experienced by fans has led to violent episodes. Skirmishes between teams and rival fans, crowds that overrun controls, all problems usually associated with a massive phenomenon that mobilises collective sentiments worldwide. News of clashes, suspended games, alleged pressures on referees and other "typical" football conflicts (Luzuriaga 2014).

The 1930 World Cup can be an example of such a massive event. Historian Andrés Morales recalls that "*there was a tense environment, several incidents were registered before, during and after the game. On one side, problems with oversold tickets, causing troubles during the tournament inauguration, on the other hostility between Uruguayan and Argentinian fans. Violent episodes got to the point where, after the end of the game, stones were hurled at the Uruguayan Consulate in Buenos Aires*" (Morales 2014a: 36). From then on until 1986, violence in Uruguayan football continued within the "acceptable" parameters of spontaneous conflicts—sometimes serious—but began and ended with the game.

During the mid-80s, the big teams' fan base adopted a new behaviour, resembling "hooliganism". These new groups of fans, called the "barras bravas", started to dominate the stadium stands. The term "barra brava" (brave band) originated in Argentina and refers to the group of organised fans that come up with chants, carry flags, receive their team with fireworks and exert pressure on the players (Aguiar 2014; Morales 2014b). Up until 1986, Nacional and Peñarol fans shared the Centenario Stadium stands when a derby was played. However, given the incidents concerning flag stealing by opposing "barra brava" members that year, fans were separated in unconnected stands from then on (Osaba 2015). During the 90s these groups grew in number and force and started to dominate areas within the stadiums, and other social aspects of the game. Their leaders (some of them with links to international organised crime) were directly supported by club managers, or these simply turned a blind eye on their activities, as did many fans, who shared in their violent conduct, participating from their chants and insults against their rivals. This was a tragic decade, marked by the death of several "barra brava" members in violent clashes, lacking the authorities an effective response against the rising tide.

In fact, given these groups' role as unrelenting team followers, who delivered a colourful show, even during a period of meagre international accomplishments, they were generally tolerated. By the early twenty-first century Nacional and Peñarol "barras" had their own "trademarked" outfits, they controlled stadium parking-lots and drug trafficking in the stands, and were given free tickets to attend international games. There were several incidents when the "barras" entered team training grounds to bully the players after a poor performance. The press was also responsible of frequently approving their actions, congratulating them on their support for the team. Families, given the show's unsafe and uncomfortable context, stopped attending the games: long ques, police controls, delayed exiting from the stadiums and fear of rival "barras". Economic and other kind of sanctions, including stadium closures, loss of points and championships, were imposed because of the "barras'" destructive actions that ended up hurting their team's competitive chances (Abal and Quirici 2017).

Nowadays, the social networks have maximised the potential to instigate violence and intolerance, sometimes promoting a sort of misplaced football passion that is expressed through street fights, flag stealing and wall paintings. In 2016 two young men were killed (one from Nacional and one from Peñarol) in violent incidents: one while painting a wall in one of Montevideo's peripheral neighbourhoods, the other while celebrating Peñarol's birthday in a town square, in one of Uruguay's small towns. Both incidents happened while there was no game being played, showing

how the "barra brava" problem has transcended the sport itself, making it almost impossible for team managers to control these groups that were tolerated or even supported for many years. The situation has become so serious that the last game between Nacional and Peñarol had to be suspended, since the leaders of the Peñarol "barra" organised a sabotage from jail, as a form of protest for not receiving free tickets. Groups of fans were instructed to force their way into the stadium, raid food and beverage stands and provoke a police reaction. Although Police Intelligence could deactivate the attempted sabotage and capture those responsible, violence once more dominated the scene (Fernández 2016).

Three decades after the beginning of this phenomenon, efforts have been made to control it. However, even though several government officials, club managers and security experts are working on the issue, the results have been few. This is a football related problematic framed in a difficult social context, that is experienced with great intensity by the big clubs but also by small neighbourhood teams that have many supporters. Police repression is insufficient to stop the "barras" since they find motivation in fighting law enforcement. Greater intervention by Police Intelligence and club management seems necessary, together with a modern legal framework to penalise violent actions. Though apparently a short-term solution, efforts have been made by Nacional to include some of its most well-known "barra" members, as part of the club's security detachment. Peñarol is going through an era of institutional reform, overwhelmed by a phenomenon completely out of its leadership's control (Aguiar 2014).

This phenomenon does not extend to the fans that attend the national team games: there is no such thing as a "Celeste's barra" and stadium attendance (the largest in America) is dominated by families, with a much bigger presence of women than in domestic games. Uruguay's coach, Tabárez, has fostered a set of values in the national team that have helped avoid "belligerent", anti-rival attitudes by the fans.[2] Uruguay's coach has tirelessly preached the importance of commitment and tenacity within the margins of "fair play", always remarking the competition's sporting, non-nationalistic quality. These values are very different from those "traditional" standards promoted by the big teams and the media, by which an alleged superiority (in seniority, supporters, titles, flags) admits sayings, irrationally assumed by the crowds, like "winning whatever way possible", referring to the rivals as "sons", "chickens", etc.

Government policies seem necessary to face this problem that is Central in Uruguay's football-culture, as to educate through media campaigns on both the fans' and athletes' behaviour. The example set by the national team could be a good starting point.

4   Contemporary Issues: The Ambivalent Image of Uruguayan Football

Uruguayan football has two very different identities. On the one side, following the fourth place achieved by Uruguay in the 2010 South African World Cup, victory in the 2011 America Cup and more recently the under 17 and under 20 youth teams' second places in youth World Cups, Uruguay has secured a good position in the FIFA ranking (FIFA 2017). These accomplishments, together with a generation of world-class players playing in the most important leagues (Suárez played in The Netherlands and England before reaching Barcelona), have made football—a sport already imprinted in Uruguay's culture—a Central piece of the Uruguay Brand. Football helps Uruguay strengthen its links with other countries and cultures. "El Chino" Álvaro Recoba's reception at a football-soccer championship held in China in 2016, and his disposition to aid the Uruguayan Government in expanding its links with the People's Republic of China, is a symptom of this new reality (La Red21 2016).

Uruguayan football's positive international image has been strengthened by the fact that several players, including Cavani, Godín and Suárez, are recognised among the world's elite, and continuously appear on the front pages of newspapers, television screens and other media. These players, together with many others, have helped to bring Uruguay back to football's centre stage.

On the other side, in the domestic scene, 2016 saw several infamous incidents that represent the tip of the iceberg concerning Uruguayan football's current situation. These incidents were the elections held at a neighbourhood club; deaths caused by confrontation between opposing fans; and the suspension of a match between Nacional and Peñarol. These episodes hint at football's current problematic context and the nature of the challenges that lay ahead. However, these local incidents have links to a larger international situation, related to local and global business interests and FIFA's role within the sport. This autonomous international organisation has allowed, for decades, all sort of illegal transactions, of which awareness has recently surfaced.

The close relationship between the firm that owns the television rights for the domestic and national team games, the Uruguayan Football Association and several teams has perverted (significantly) the competition itself. Player deals (player purchase rights), player rights and the clubs' institutional transparency are all at stake. A clear example was the case of Club Atlético Cerro's elections, were a local candidate won but was not recognised by the

opposing postulant and his thugs, supported by Tenfield, the company holding the television rights of Uruguayan football. Tenfield guarantees the club's operation but keeps the club's books sealed from external auditing. Cerro's elections ended up in a second round of voting, after threats and beatings to assure nothing changed, with the authorities refraining from any intervention (Montevideo Portal 2016).

The level of impunity with which Tenfield and several businessmen have acted in Uruguay has been shaken by two recent events impacting from abroad: the investigation, separation from office, and indictment of several FIFA authorities, and the denunciation, made by several national team players, of Tenfield's collection of player image rights. The latter has had a significant impact in Uruguay, due to the huge profit some businessmen have made from these rights (Núñez and Pujol 2016).

Since these accusations were made by players like Lugano, Suárez, Godin, among others who share massive popular support and are respected in the football world, their impact has surpassed all expectations. Moreover, other things started to surface, like Tenfield's links with the Football Players Union (that represents football players' interests), motivating hundreds of local footballers to sign a petition demanding the removal of the representatives that "don't represent them". Though this is still a running process, several other suspicious situations have started to surface. The issues at hand are so significant, that many players have mentioned the possibility of refusing to play for the national team, in case spurious interests intervene, damaging the team (Ovación 2017).

Uruguay's international image contrasts with its domestic reality that has alienated many spectators from the local games. This situation should not last for long, since the clubs need the support of their fans to maintain their sponsors, especially in a small country where football is so significant. In Uruguay's case, the imperative to change has come from the national team players and their coach. They have abandoned the idea of "winning whatever way possible", and played with the traditional Uruguayan tenacity ("garra" "garra charrúa") within the limits of "fair play", taking Uruguay back to the top. Moreover, thanks to the national team players' intervention, the issues of player rights and business interference in football have seen the light. The big clubs must necessarily address these issues if they do not wish to be left out from the process of football globalisation. However local processes, institutional and social realities don't necessarily go hand in hand with international developments. The violence experienced during 2016 shows just that, exposing Uruguayan football's bipolar reality, at least to the present day.

Notes

1. Around those years the possibility that Vazquez could be named as AUF's president was tangible. However, Uruguay's then President Julio Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party and linked to Peñarol, opposed the idea of a left-wing politician reaching the summit of Uruguayan football leadership.

2. "Before accepting to coach Uruguay, Tabárez demanded that his long-term project for the national team and its youth teams be approved. This project named "Institutionalisation of the processes concerning the national teams and the formation of players", includes a diagnosis, the setting up of objectives at national level, a calendar and even prescriptions regarding game strategy and player training" (Piñeyrúa 2014).

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Part VI

Asia and Oceania

Australia

Roy Hay and Ian Syson

In 2018, association football in Australia exists in one of the most competitive sporting environments anywhere in the world (Hay 2006). There are six codes of football alone, two of which are much stronger than the world game, if measured in political, financial media and cultural clout, though not in participation by males and females. Attendance and television audiences also favour the Australian Football League (AFL) and the National Rugby League (NRL).

Most of the recent relevant research has concentrated on the very early period when the game was codified, or even before, and very recent times when football has become part of the mainstream sporting calendar in a way that it was not in the previous century or earlier. The period in between is under-researched by comparison though very interesting work on the place of football in Australian culture is being done by Ian Syson (2009, 2013, 2015, 2018), Paul Mavroudis (2013), Joe Gorman (2017), Jorge Knijnik (2016), and Knijnik and Spaaij (2017). There is an overview of the story of the game since the early nineteenth century in Hay and Murray (2014). Excellent histories of the game in Western Australia (Kreider 2012),

R. Hay (✉)
Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Geelong, Australia
e-mail: haysoc@bigpond.com

I. Syson
College of Arts and Education, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: Ian.Syson@vu.edu.au

New South Wales (Mosely 2014), South Australia (Harlow 1998) and Tasmania (Hudson 1998) are available.

This chapter examines the origins of the game in the mid-nineteenth century, revising the currently accepted story significantly. It discusses the relations between the different codes as they emerged in the second half of the century. This leads into a discussion of the characteristics of club formation that emerged as waves of migration brought newcomers to Australia who had football as their sport. Club rivalries is a key theme in this book, but in the Australian context, the rivalries among the different codes of football have been equally, if not more, important. It is possible that this may change in the future as the demography of the supporters of the codes becomes more alike in the twenty-first century. The last part of the chapter looks at various aspects of the modern game and the culture within which it operates. It concludes with a brief resume of the modern women's game and the prospects for the future of the code.

1 Political Origins of Football: How Victoria Got a Game of Its Own and the Implications for Association Football

It is arguable that something more akin to football as it was codified in England in 1863 by the Football Association, that is small-sided, predominantly kicking games with very limited handling (usually played for money or other prizes), took place in Australia in the first 60 years of the nineteenth century (Hay 2014). Examples can be found in all the colonies, just as they can in the United Kingdom and the United States (Hay et al. 2015). Games are advertised and reported in the press, but there are very few detailed match descriptions, though named teams and participants have been found (*Tasmanian Telegraph*, 6 March 1859, 5). No ongoing football clubs have turned up before the late 1850s, though attempts to form clubs did occur.

In 1859, some members of the Melbourne Cricket Club sat down in the Parade Hotel and wrote a set of rules for a winter game of football. The document they produced has survived, though other similar efforts by clubs in South Yarra and Geelong have not. Most of the Melbourne group were former public-school boys, and recent arrivals from England, and the ten simple rules they drew up were cherry-picked from those of Eton and Rugby primarily, combining the virtues of both and excluding their vices, according to J.B. Thompson (1860). This meant that the Melbourne game was distinct

from those in England from the start but derived very closely from them. It was in this sense that the idea of "a game of our own" was used at the time, not as a hint that the game had domestic Indigenous antecedents. Since that idea was put forward more than 30 years ago no convincing evidence has been produced that Indigenous games using a ball had any influence on the origins of the Melbourne code (Ruddell 2015). Later in the century some of the very few remaining Indigenous people took up the new Victorian game mainly on the stations to which they were effectively confined on the margins of the colony (Hay and Zafiris 2017a). Athas Zafiris and Roy Hay sparked a controversy in 2017 when they asserted that the latter was a more important area for future research, rather than interminable, unhistorical and probably insoluble arguments about Indigenous antecedents (Hay and Zafiris 2017b).

Several of the people involved with the Melbourne game very quickly became contributors to the media, some as professional journalists, others as highly combative correspondents. What united them was a complete lack of knowledge of the games of football being played in Victoria prior to 1859, so it was ignorance rather than any malevolence that led them to the much-trumpeted belief that they introduced football to the colony. The new game quickly caught on in Melbourne and Geelong and the media campaign in its support was very effective. It benefited from two underlying changes—one demographic, the other the product of trade-union action.

In the 1850s, some 313,000 migrants arrived in the newly separate colony of Victoria, most of them chasing the gold that had recently been discovered. That constituted roughly half the total inward migration to Australia in the decade. For the next 20 years, inward migration to Victoria dropped sharply as the lure of gold declined. From 1860 to 1879 only 28,422 migrants, an average of 1421 a year, arrived in the colony. In several years there was a net outflow of people. Many of the migrants were not young men of the football-playing age, so for a critical period, the newly formed domestic Victorian code had little or no competition from newcomers with a background in either the newly codified association football or the rugby games, or indeed the public-school varieties of football. The Melbourne rules version of football had its first free kick (Hay 2016).

Though the inward migration to Victoria was exiguous after 1860, there was substantial relocation of population within the newly separate colony. The capital city grew spectacularly even before the huge upsurge of the 1880s when the city was labelled "Marvellous Melbourne". As gold discoveries became scarcer and mines became more capital intensive, disappointed gold seekers and those who had realised where less volatile incomes might be

obtained moved towards the metropolitan centre. Melbourne's population increased by 113% between 1861 and 1881, while Victoria's overall growth was 60%. The metropolitan centre had a growing and now significant number of people prepared to take part in recreational or sporting activities of a bewildering variety, including forms of football. They were involved as players, administrators, reporters and crucially, spectators.

Tony Ward argued that the precocious obtaining of the eight-hour day and Saturday half-holidays in Melbourne was the key to the growth of spectatorship, which underpinned the growth of football (and other sports) (Ward 2014). While his thesis about the eight-hour day and the Saturday half-holiday carries great weight in respect of some groups of skilled workers, the attendance of middle-class males and females, which is remarked upon in some reports, is probably not so dependent on these innovations. If crowds spanned the social classes in Melbourne then there must have been numbers of people present who had greater control over discretionary attendance at work and income to sustain a middle-class standard of living, which included attendance at or participating in sporting events, including football in winter. Some working-class males worked interrupted shifts on Saturday afternoons. The tramway men might have been able to use their enforced leisure to attend football matches.

The gender balance in Victoria was changing rapidly in the 1860s and 1870s. In 1861, there were 155 males to every 100 females; by 1881 there were just 110. A better gender balance probably contributed to the growth of the domestic population. Women who had survived the economic and social conditions in the young colony were far more resilient and assertive than conventional accounts of their subservient status allow. They became involved in the domestic game in significant numbers from its early days. As soon as crowds start attending games, there is the possibility of generating sport-related employment and rivalry. The absence of migrants and the Saturday half-day are vitally important in explaining in the Victorian story.

New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia had inflows of migrants between 1860 and 1880 when rugby was at the apogee of its relative popularity in the United Kingdom. The influence of muscular Christianity and *Tom Brown's Schooldays* and, at the personal level, the arrival of teachers imbued with a games ethic contributed to the foundation and growth of football games in schools, clubs and the metropolitan universities. Sydney's population grew rapidly in the 1860s, from 56,394 in 1861 to 134,736 in 1871. The increase of 138% left the northern metropolis with roughly the same number of people as Melbourne in 1861 (123,061), when Victorian football kicked off. In both colonies, in the 1860s, the capital

cities grew much faster than other urban and rural areas, so a critical mass of potential players, administrators and spectators was available to be drawn on by sports of all kinds, not just the football codes (Hay 2018).

Media and hence what was often English public-school influence, far from promoting association football in Australia, worked strongly against the code for most of the nineteenth century and indeed beyond. In Victoria, they promoted the new domestic code, while in New South Wales they adopted and proselytised on behalf of rugby union. Initially, this may have been the result of ignorance, but later it became institutionalised and soccer was framed as a nefarious foreign influence, rather than a domestic tradition that had been buried (Syson 2014). In the 1880s with a new wave of migration soccer reared its head again and this time some public-school involvement was evident, though only briefly. Phil Mosely's work on John Walter Fletcher and the founding generation of association football in Sydney is only partly published so far (Mosely 2014, 291–301). As he tells it, Fletcher and his colleagues with English public-school backgrounds were to the fore at the initial meetings and games but right from the start there were members of the lower orders involved and very quickly the latter were in the ascendancy in Sydney and Newcastle.

In the intervening period, much "code confusion" occurred as hybrid games took place and rules evolved (Syson 2013). Gavin Kitching noted the diminishing proportion of oddities in the United Kingdom as the nineteenth century wore on (Kitching 2015). In Australia, too uniform adherence to the rules of the Football Association only occurred gradually. The distance between major centres and the absence of any omnibus competition like the FA Cup allowed local variants to exist if not to flourish until the 1880s. Then a new wave of migration brought miners and others with a clearer understanding of association football to Australia and the intercolonial games began. By then Australian Rules had a firm foothold in Victoria and a marked presence in South Australia, Tasmania and in the West, while rugby union was established in New South Wales, particularly in and around Sydney.

2   Australia's Unique Football Rivalries

When football revived in the 1880s with another wave of inward migration primarily from the United Kingdom, the other codes had established a pattern where the geographical location was the prime determinant of allegiance among supporters. Hence, districts or suburbs within Melbourne

such as Carlton, South Melbourne, Fitzroy and Collingwood had their own Australian football teams. This pattern was replicated in the other capital cities and those regional centres large enough to have more than one team. Initially, soccer adopted a similar format, but very quickly the new migrants from Scotland, Ireland and the North of England gathered under banners that reflected their overseas heritage rather than their domestic location in Australia. Teams called Caledonians, Fifers, Thistles, Northumberland and Durhams, and Celtics began to appear in local competitions. District clubs continued to exist and the leagues in the major urban centres consisted of teams of both types. Games between Scotland and England, where the teams consisted of players of the relevant heritage but drawn from a range of clubs, attracted larger crowds than those between the St Kilda and Melbourne district clubs, for example. Before the First World War, the now annual Scotland v England game in Melbourne could attract over 6000 spectators. Otherwise, the game remained more participatory than a spectator sport. This meant that intense local rivalry was limited within the sport, unlike in the Australian code where large crowds developed district-based antagonisms (Hay and Murray 2014, 21–33).

Phil Mosely writes: "At the first-grade level, local district rivalries in New South Wales before the 1940s were scarce and arguably confined to the coalfields. In Newcastle, there was Wallsend versus Adamstown; in South Maitland, Kurri Kurri v Cessnock, and on the South Coast, Balgownie v Corrimal. In Sydney, things were rather muted. The only examples I'd consider without being convinced would be Granville v Pyrmont from about the mid-1880s to 1900, though in that period Granville versus everyone would be a reasonable statement borne of how dominant Granville was" (Mosely 2017).

It was not until after the Second World War that soccer became a significant domestic spectator sport, but now the fans were drawn from the recently arrived migrants, particularly those from non-British stock. At that time relatively few organisations were set up to cater for new migrants who lacked a knowledge of English, and of Australian institutions, laws, political arrangements and culture. In their absence football clubs often became more than simply sporting organisations, helping newcomers to meet those who had arrived earlier and allowing the newcomers to converse with them in their native languages. Clubs based on the overseas heritage sprang up wherever migrants settled in significant numbers. The British, who were still the largest single group of migrants, formed fewer clubs relative to their overall numbers in this period. It is arguable that British migrants, with no language barriers to overcome, greater awareness of Australian culture and

norms, and with a clear appreciation of the difference in standard between the game in Australia and that in the United Kingdom, made a rational choice not be involved in the code in this country, especially when it was portrayed in the media as an immigrants' game besmirched by violence and politics, even if that was a wild and often self-serving exaggeration.

Now rivalries developed within and among the various migrant groups. Most of the debate and research about migrant groups in Australia has focused on the national level, but within most migrant groups there are regional divisions (Hay and Guoth 2009). This is very evident among Greeks and Italians in Australia. There is nearly always tension between the levels. Sometimes the community comes together in a form of national identification; at other times, regional or local loyalties prove stronger. In Geelong, the bulk of Greek migrants came from the islands where soccer was not so strongly woven into social life, and there were only two relatively brief periods of club formation. In Melbourne, where the number of Greek migrants was much larger, there have been huge variations over time. Some of this can be attributed to differences between generations. Younger elements in the South Melbourne (Hellas) club today have been trying to maintain a Greek focus, while others have argued that this would hold back the club and prevent any reinvolvement in the new domestic national competition, the A-League. Similar debates have occurred among Serbians and Croatians (Hughson 1999; Hallinan et al. 2007). Yet, even among the Serbs and the Croats the soccer clubs could be neutral grounds where the various factions of overseas politics could meet. It was primarily when the struggle for Croatian independence was at its height that overt violence between Croats and Serbs occurred when the football teams met in Australia. Even then, without an analysis of the changes in Australian domestic politics in the 1970s, the replacement of the conservative hegemony under Robert Menzies by a Labour government led by Gough Whitlam and its subsequent overthrow, the understanding of the relationships among the soccer clubs representing Croatian and Yugoslav (Serbian) migrants is seriously deficient (Solly 2004; Hay 2001, 1998).

Public perceptions that ethnic violence was the prime cause of the problems of football in Australia have been overthrown by research, and the governance structure established in the late 1950s is now seen as largely responsible (Kallinikios 2007; Hay 2011). When the structure was changed after the Crawford report in 2003 the new A-League was set up with teams based on the location not ethnicity, apart from a skerrick of Dutch influence in what became Queensland, later Brisbane, Roar.

All the teams licensed for the new competition were based on the single-city franchised monopolies. This persisted until 2010 when a second Melbourne club was introduced, followed by Western Sydney Wanderers in 2012. While Wanderers has a clear geographic catchment area, Melbourne Heart, now Melbourne City, and part of the international City Group of clubs, had no clear geographic distinction in terms of fan base from Melbourne Victory. Yet an instant rivalry sprang up between the two Melbourne clubs though they had memberships virtually indistinguishable from each other, or from the supporter bases of the Melbourne Australian rules football clubs (Hay 2013). The demographics, and thus to a large extent the politics, of football in Australia at the top level mirror those of the national population and the game's recent growth is, for the first time, driven by the domestic population not waves of migration.

3   The Political Economy of Football: The Present and the Future

In 2006, Hay argued that the future for soccer in Australia did not have to be like its past and John O'Neill, then CEO of FFA, was quoted to the effect that "cultural diversity will indeed assist football to become a more popular sport" (Hay 2006, 179). Subsequently, Hay pointed out that "immigration into Australia may be at one of its periodic peaks, but football is not being driven by a migrant boom for the very first time in Australian history. It is the domestic population, consisting in part of the offspring of previous migrant generations, who are the fans and supporters of the game in 2010" (Hay 2011, 847; Hay and Warren 2008). Their children have taken up the game in droves and football is now the most popular game for boys and girls in Australia, despite the high costs of participation compared with netball and the other football codes. Participation at club level by adults and children outstrips all the other codes (Table 1).

So far, however, this huge participation base has not translated into equivalent spectatorship at matches or via the media, though soccer has now increased its impact both live and in the broadcast and digital media (Tables 2 and 3).

The incomes accruing to the various codes also vary widely (Tables 4 and 5).

In 2003, the National Soccer League, the premier competition in Australia under the auspices of the Australian Soccer Federation since 1977, was struggling to survive as clubs lost $52 million in its previous

Table 1 Club sport in Australia (adults and children combined) (*Source* AusPlay, participation data for the sport sector, survey results January to December 2016, sport data tables summary, 26 April 2017, Australian Sports Commission; https://www.clearinghouseforsport.gov.au/research/smi/ausplay/results/sport)

Top activities	Population estimate	% of population	% of club sport population
Football	1,104,815	4.5	18.6
Golf	724,141	3.0	12.2
Australian football	665,470	2.7	11.2
Netball	640,607	2.6	10.8
Tennis	568,248	2.3	9.6
Cricket	543,695	2.2	9.2
Basketball	539,998	2.2	9.1
Touch football	278,502	1.1	4.7
Swimming	256,111	1.0	4.3
Athletics, track and field (includes running/jogging)	251,393	1.0	4.2
Rugby League	236,593	1.0	4.0

Table 2 Match attendance and population shares by code (*Sources* Various)

Year	Aggregate attendance	Average attendance	Australian population	% of population
AFL 1990	4,178,884	24,296	14,807,370	28.22
AFL 2016	6,869,999	33,188	24,220,200	28.36
ASF/FFA 1990–1991	600,000	3500		4.50
2015–2016	1,661,722	12,309		6.86
NRL 2016	3,230,867	16,704		13.34

Table 3 Match attendances by code (*Sources* Annual League statistics, hence comparisons require reference to original sources)

Competition	Year	Clubs	Games	Aggregate attendance	Average attendance	Notes
AFL	2016	18	206	6,869,999	33,188	No finals
BBL	2016–2017	8	35	1,053,997	30,114	Cricket
NRL	2015	16	201	3,230,867	16,074	Inc. finals
A-League	2015–2016	10	135	1,661,722	12,309	No finals
Super rugby	2015	5		266,938	14,507	

three seasons. A major government-inspired report by David Crawford into the game and its latent support and dysfunctional government recommended a complete overhaul of the operation of the code (Crawford 2003). As one of the results of his recommendations a new national competition,

Table 4 Football codes in Australia: recent historical income (*Source* Annual financial reports for 2015)

Code	Year	Revenue $	Notes
AFL	2015	494,092,000	
NRL	2015	374,142,000	
FFA	2015	162,998,000	Inc. $58,375,000 from hosting Asian Cup
AFL	2014	460,529,000	
NRL	2014	350,902,000	
FFA	2014	128,060,000	

Table 5 Football codes in Australia: projected future income (*Source Age*, 25 March 2017)

Media contracts by code	
2017–2022	AFL $2.5 billion, $418 million per annum
2018–2022	NRL $1.8 billion, $360 million per annum
2018–2024	FFA $346 million, $57.5 million per annum

the A-League, began with franchised clubs on a one-city, one-club basis. Geographical location once again became the basis of club formation rather than ethnicity.

In 2018, the A-League will complete its 13th season. The A-League is 28th in average attendance at matches in a list of sports worldwide. It is 16th in association football at around an average of 12,000 at home-and-away games. It is the fourth in Asia behind only India, China and Japan. In terms of aggregate attendances in association football, then the A-League is further behind, coming in at 38th overall or 8th in Asia.

The early years of the A-League have been tumultuous. Stensholt and Mooney (2015) interviewed over a hundred of the movers and shakers of Australia's premier football competition about its genesis and its rollercoaster ride since 2005. They provided a clear appreciation of the precariousness of the whole adventure and the resilience and persistence of the major dramatis personae in the saga. The authors were admirably fair to all parties in the way they have presented them and allowed them to tell their stories, which is uncommon in Australian accounts of this game and its history.

The authors describe but they do not resolve the conundrum that lies at the heart of the relationship between FFA and its A-League—should they be structurally separate or was Frank Lowy, founding chairman of FFA, right to reject the advice of the Professional Footballers' Association, the Kemeny Report and the Crawford Report and go for a unitary model with all that entails (Hay and Murray 2014, 251–254)? Almost all the clubs have continued to lose money throughout the decade and several of them are or

have been on FFA life-support for significant periods. Their owners complain that they are prevented from generating sponsorship and other income by an unduly restrictive centralised policy. FFA counters with its insistence that competition in this area would result in conflicts that would undermine the precarious viability of the whole (Mullins 2013). The risk of an English Premier League-type breakaway by the clubs, which assert that they are the lifeblood of the game, has been mooted on occasion. In 2017, the A-League clubs were at loggerheads with FFA over the governance of the game while FIFA was demanding that FFA broaden the representation of the constituent parts of the code to include the Professional Footballers Association, the women's game and the referees.

FFA and its leadership have been recipients of significant amounts of public support from national, state and local governments, much to the loudly trumpeted complaints of rival codes, whose own games have benefited, sometimes even more, from the same sources. What makes FFA different from AFL is that it has to support international teams in junior and senior, male and female competitions, only one of which generates serious income, the male national team, the Socceroos. Nevertheless, as the Smith Report insisted, the game is going to have to generate more independent income if it is to survive and that means the A-League must become self-sustaining (Smith 2011; Dabscheck 2011).

Hay and Murray (2014) argued that the governance structure of the code with the clubs in control following a great split in the late 1950s was the underlying reason for many of the problems in the next generation as the game became national and then international. David Crawford agreed and insisted on a completely different structure in which a policy-making board governed the game. However, it is not clear that the resulting formal structure exemplified the practice under Frank Lowy or his son Steven, who have both been accused of running an effective dictatorship in practice. In that case, the nominal structure of the governance of the body has been a sham. If so, has it compromised its own future? A disastrous bid to host the World Cup in 2022 that secured only one vote undermined Frank Lowy's credibility, while the succession of his son Steven as chair of the board of FFA smacked of nepotism.

In 2017–2018, there is a major conflict between FFA and the A-League clubs over the distribution of the income from the game. It is compounded, as always, by a dispute over the governance of the game with the clubs individually and collectively seeking greater control over not only their revenues but their destinies, while FFA seeks to preserve its role as the guardian of the game covering everything from the Socceroos to children in remote rural areas.

One key issue is identified by Hall who has experience in both the USA and Australia: "Australian clubs are basically renters with a defined term. Why would you invest significantly in the A-League if you can legally be thrown out of the League when your licence is up? In MLS, the owners are the League and this allows for greater and more secure investment. In America, you can sell your licence but it can't be taken away" (Hall 2017).

Inter-code conflict continues with battles over access to major grounds in Sydney and Melbourne between FFA and NRL and AFL respectively. The 2017 grand final in Sydney was played on the "worst playing surface" in the A-League, Sydney's Allianz Stadium, the day after a rugby-league match. It was not helped by a wet autumn in New South Wales, but FFA has not yet found a way of guaranteeing the best conditions for its showpiece match of the season. Nevertheless, the game itself on 7 May was keenly contested, some might say almost brutally, though no one was sent off, and went to extra time and penalties before Sydney FC won. The attendance was 41,456 with all tickets sold for the stadium in Moore Park. Earlier that afternoon the Sydney Swans team drew 25,619 to the adjacent Sydney Cricket Ground for a Round 7 AFL match against Brisbane Lions. Even the local AFL derby on 22 April against the Greater Western Sydney Giants drew only 34,824 (Footywire AFL Statistics 2017). The equivalent soccer derby between Sydney and Western Sydney Wanderers in October 2016 had an attendance of over 61,880 at ANZ Stadium at Homebush. These are perhaps somewhat unrepresentative matches, chosen to highlight a couple of soccer successes in the harbour city, but they are a clear indication that things are changing in the football landscape today.

Football still struggles for media coverage in Australia. In the metropolitan daily press in Melbourne, there will be significantly more coverage of Australian rules during its close season from September to March than of soccer when the A-League is active. That generalisation will only be overturned when there is an incident at or near a soccer match that can be construed as "hooliganism" or "soccer violence". At the recent A-League grand final, one spectator heckled the host of the TV programme *MasterChef* for underpaying his workers, and when the host responded by pushing the complainant, it became national news ("MasterChef boils at soccer", *Age* 9 May 2017). The situation may be marginally better in the other capital cities but there the bias is towards AFL and NRL competitions. Below the top League, there is virtually no information about soccer to be found in the media. The AFL has been much more effective in its media influence, backed by its continued popular appeal and financial clout, whereas below the top-level football gets next to no coverage. Melbourne's *Age* will carry results and ladders

from leagues around the world but refuse to cover the National Premier League in Victoria that involves many of the teams who flourished before the reconstruction of the governance of the game in the early part of the twenty-first century, including those seeking entry to the A-League today.

League expansion is a hot topic in 2017 and is necessary if soccer is to increase its pool of elite players and satisfy a number of clubs seeking entry to the top competition. FIFA is also pressing FFA to introduce promotion and relegation, though it has allowed the National Soccer League in the United States dispensation from this otherwise near-universal practice in the world game. Several of the former National Soccer League clubs in Australia would like to rejoin the party and new consortia across the country are keen to mount bids as well. FFA continues to argue that the financial modelling does not support expansion in 2017 but is under increasing pressure from above and below to get moving.

4   Contemporary Issues

Is Competition Among the Codes for the Good of the Games?

The Socceroos' Asian Cup triumph in 2015 and the subsequent resumption of the A-League has ensured that football has had a somewhat higher media profile than formerly. Much of the discussion has centred on what the efflorescence of the world game means for the other codes of football. Some of the commentary is devoted to the impact of competition among the codes, in particular, the round-ball game, Australian Rules and rugby League.

However, interest in football is not a zero-sum game. Hay and Ward (2015) showed that many followers attend two (and sometimes even three) codes. Sports are inherently competitive, yet to produce an outcome that people will come to watch in numbers a degree of cooperation is necessary. The AFL, NRL and A-League are all cartels that produce a joint collective product. Cooperation is critical to the competitive success within the codes and the argument for cooperation among codes is becoming stronger in Australia today.

Many fans attend both soccer and Australian Rules in Victoria, and soccer and rugby League North of the "Barassi line", an imaginary boundary between the codes named after a great exponent of the Victorian game. The rise of one code does not necessarily mean the decline of others. This is evident from the memberships of the two Melbourne A-League clubs, Victory

and City (formerly Heart). Both have significant numbers of members who also regularly attend and are even members of Australian Rules clubs.

In 2013, at Melbourne Heart 43% of its members were also members of AFL clubs and the ranking among Heart members corresponded with the membership of the AFL clubs. Hence Collingwood, the best-supported AFL club, had the highest number of Heart members. Joffa Corfe, the head of the club's cheer squad, regularly attended Heart games.

Scott Munn, the chief executive officer of City, argues that the profile of his club's membership is similar to that of the AFL clubs and at a conference on football and its communities in 2013 researchers and officials of AFL clubs supported that conclusion. Richard Wilson, CEO at Victory, also noted that the fan base and their membership was a cross-section of the Australian population. The majority of Victory members support an AFL club, though they were not necessarily a member of one (Hay 2013).

These clubs' views are supported by detailed Australian Bureau of Statistics data from the most recent survey of spectator attendance at sporting events, 2009–2010, which indicate quite clearly that people who attend Australian Rules matches are more likely than the general population to attend soccer matches. Of those who went to AFL, 8% also went to soccer—significantly higher than the 5% soccer attendance rate for non-AFL fans.

The same is true in the reverse direction: people who go to the world game attend AFL matches at higher rates than the Australian population as a whole. Of those who went to soccer, 25% also went to AFL—much more than the 16% AFL attendance rate for non-soccer fans.

An even more substantial cross-over exists between soccer and rugby League. Of those who went to soccer, 20% also went to League—more than double the 8% League attendance rate for non-soccer fans. And of those who went to League, 12% also went to soccer—more than double the 5% soccer attendance rate for non-league fans.

There is a higher cross-over between League and soccer than for AFL and soccer, because soccer attendances are higher in the League states of NSW and Queensland.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that they both inhabit the Australian summer season there is also significant cross-over between soccer and cricket. Of those who went to soccer, 10% also went to cricket—more than double the 4% cricket attendance rate for non-soccer fans. The cross-over works the other way too: of those who went to cricket, 14% also went to soccer—getting close to triple the 5% soccer attendance rate for non-cricket fans.

One other result is true of both AFL and rugby League. The more often people went to soccer, the more likely they were to go to several AFL or rugby League games as well. The highest rate of occasional attendance (one to two times a year) at AFL and rugby League comes from those who did not go to any soccer games.

In another way, the convergence among the codes is becoming more pronounced. Until relatively recently soccer crowds were much more male-dominated than those at Australian football games. Now the gap between the codes has narrowed significantly. By 2009–2010, the year of the last relevant ABS survey, the gap between reported female attendance at soccer and Australian Rules matches was only a matter of 3% in Victoria, the heartland of the Australian code—38% of attendance at soccer was female and 41% at Australian Rules. Rugby League has 38%, the same as soccer. Moreover, while the absolute numbers of women going to AFL or League are higher, women are more frequent attenders at soccer games than at Australian Rules or rugby-league matches. The proportions of women going to six or more games a year are much higher.

So what does it all mean? The key point remains that there is a significant cross-over between support for the three codes and that this has implications for the ways in which they might relate to each other in future. Instead of denigrating each other at every opportunity, perhaps the codes might change strategy and actively seek ways of cooperating?

At the moment, competition rules and it can be insidious. When suggestions were advanced about raising the draft age for the AFL to 19 or 20 to avoid a clash with the final year of school exams it was turned down: "Our sport is seeking access to the best available talent. If we delayed opportunities we run the risk of having talented athletes choose other sport options" (Gleeson 2017). The interest of the code over-rides the interest of the young person.

Then there is the EPL and ECL effect. Until Australia reaches parity, the best football will be played in overseas competitions like the English Premier League and the European Champions League currently instantly available to Australians through various media and digital outlets. This results in unfavourable comparisons with the local game, whereas Australian rules and rugby League are played at their highest levels in Australia. There might be an occasionally question about rugby League, as there certainly is in the case of rugby union. The Socceroos were very successful when they could call on a generation of talented players turning out for teams that played in the top European competitions. These players came up against the best in the world and knew that their opponents were only flesh and blood and

hence believed that they could hold their own against them and beat them. Nowadays very few Australians play in the EPL or the ECL and the majority of overseas players are invisible to the broader sporting public except when they appear for the Socceroos. Not only that, but the standard is rising rapidly in Asia and while a few Australian players are taking part in the top Asian leagues, they are even less recognised by local audiences.

The Place of Football in Australian Popular Culture

John Harms, journalist and author, raised an issue on television and on his website about the meaning of the game to the ordinary Australian. He does not believe that football has established the same deep meaning for the mass of the Australian population that Australian rules and rugby League have, and until it does the code will still be unable to dislodge the others.

> The A-League is not meaningful enough to those marginal supporters for that to happen in the near future. Nor is it likely, in the short term, to replace the meaning Australian football and rugby league fans find, and need to find, in their codes and clubs and total footy experiences … When people's sense of being is connected to the game, when their identity is reflected in the game, then a depth of connection exists … That connection can then be exploited by the marketers … Push a product to them while they are doing something which means so much to them and sell by association. Irrespective of the sport. (Harms 2016)

Harms admits that the long-term future of football and the A-League depends not on him and his generation but on the next one:

> Given the exposure to soccer at school and the growth of the junior game, despite the significant expense, there is also every chance that they will find the game meaningful and they may come to follow a soccer team with all their hearts. But will they form a heartfelt connection to an A-League team? Or will it be a European team full of the superstars of the electronic FIFA game which inevitably captures them. To fulfil the aspirations it has, Australian soccer has to make itself more meaningful to more people. That's a massive challenge. (Harms 2016)

There are obstacles of many kinds to meeting that challenge. Boys and girls play in huge numbers, but there is only a tiny demand, and hence opportunity, for elite players in the current soccer structure. Ten clubs with, say,

25 contracted players mean that only 250 places are available in the current A-League and, since up to five of those can be imports, the places available are reduced to 200. There may be almost as many Australian players plying their trade overseas. David Davies's most recent list has 190 names, but that is a derisorily small number for a country of 23 million. Football Federation Australia needs to set and achieve much more expansive goals than it has done recently. The CEO of the Professional Footballers Association, John Didulica, said consolidation means death. Ange Postecoglou, until late 2017 the national coach, agreed and insisted that we must be looking at the next horizon and his vision is much wider than that for the current national team, and embraces raising standards and involvement throughout Asia.

The game is still missing huge opportunities in Asia and Australia and is still regarded with justified suspicion by the Asian Football Confederation. In 2017, Australia's Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, presented the President of China Xi Jinping with an Australian rules jumper rather than a soccer one at the G20 meeting, despite the fact that the latter is a soccer aficionado and has embarked on a drive to produce a competitive national team and eventually host a World Cup. As a country, Australia needs to invest heavily in promoting matches against Asian clubs and attracting good Asian players to the A-League if it is to help overcome the suspicion that it is in Asia solely for what it can get out of it. Mosely (2006) makes clear how self-interested Australians have been over the years in their relationships with the northern neighbours. It is not a new issue since the emergence of FFA, but it is now much more pressing. On the other hand, the Asian Cup was a huge success in Australia and for relations within the Asian countries that took part and their fans. The Football Federation of Australia needs to invest in matches against Asian clubs in season and out of season, here and overseas, so that matches in the region gain parity of esteem with those against European opposition.

The world game must start behaving like the world game in Australia, not trying to emulate the local codes but seeking to demonstrate an entirely different meaning—internationalist, open-minded, and above all inclusive and inspirational. That way John Harms' challenge can be met. After all, the game has led the way so often in the past, so it should set its sights on creating its own meanings in the future.

Strong claims are being made that Western Sydney Wanderers have done more to bring together the various communities in Western Sydney than anything else in a generation. Michael Visontay perhaps exaggerates the influence of the new club, but taken together with the rebadging of the University of Western Sydney as Western Sydney University there is

no doubt that there is a new sense of pride and identity developing in areas whose divisions often seemed to hold back their progress. "The message is loud and clear: the club will rise and fall, the team will have great seasons and lean, the staff and players will come and go but the Wanderers family is here to stay. The self-esteem they have liberated is permanent" (Visontay 2016).

Jorge Knijnik and Ramon Spaaij have a much more nuanced view of the impact of Wanderers and its supporters on Western Sydney. Their analysis of "everyday multiculturalism" as performed by the fans of the Wanderers includes oppositional elements as well, which challenge the official discourse of multiculturalism and the policies associated with it (Knijnik and Spaaij 2017).

Australia's Indigenous people are under-represented in football, while they are over-represented in the Australian game. This is another frontier for football, despite the best efforts of pioneering Indigenous players including Charles Perkins, John Moriarty and Harry Williams (Maynard 2011; Syson 2017).

Selling the game is not necessarily helped by international and inter-club friendlies that are largely money-making exercises for the visiting teams. It is helped even less when a contract with the Brazilian Federation requiring them to send their leading stars to play Argentina in Sydney and the Socceroos in Melbourne is ripped up and a second team is sent instead. In May 2017, Liverpool flew in and played Sydney FC's reserves in front of 70,000 people, collected several hundred thousand dollars and flew out later that day. It is not evident that the exercise did anything for the game in Australia.

The Women's Game

The women's game in Australia has gone ahead since 2006 (Hay and Murray 2014, 277–282). In 2010, Australia's women's national team, the Matildas, won the Asian Football Confederation championship, beating the Democratic Republic of Korea on penalty kicks after the teams had drawn one-all at the end of extra time. This was the first time a national team from Australia, male or female, had achieved success at this level. As a result, Australia qualified for the FIFA Women's 2011 World Cup in Germany where the Matildas reached the knockout round before losing to Sweden. In 2014, the Matildas just failed to defend their title as Asian champions, going down to Japan by a single goal in the final. That performance was enough

to ensure that the Matildas qualified for the World Cup in Canada in 2015, where they reached the knockout phase after beating Nigeria and drawing with Sweden. In the Round of 16, they accounted for Brazil and lost narrowly to Japan in the quarter-finals. In 2016, in Rio di Janeiro the Matildas lost to Brazil on penalties in the Olympic Games. These significant sporting achievements have helped improve the recognition of the women's game in this country, but it still lags well behind the men's game in public exposure, as do many other sports in Australia where women are high achievers (Downes et al. 2016). In 2017, the Matildas won a four-team competition in the United States involving Brazil and Japan and the home team. The Australian women won all three matches and Samantha Kerr, then the leading goal-scorer in the women's national competition in the USA, was nominated as FIFA's player of the year. Subsequently, the Matildas beat Brazil three times and China twice in Australia.

Greg Downes' recent research, which is based on the experiences of women playing football, indicates that traces of traditional and gendered discrimination associated with the early years of women's football remain today, and that these have a negative impact on women's ongoing involvement. This is particularly evident in the lack of women in leadership roles and in voluntary roles such as coaching and coach education, where gendered practices promote inequality and reinforce the idea of coaching as a male domain.

Though the women's game in Australia has become thoroughly established as a national, international and high-participation sport, it would be incorrect to suggest that it has achieved the profile its practitioners warrant. While the W-League is held in high regard by many, others argue it is not receiving the respect it needs to grow and develop. Only eight teams take part, playing a total of only 12 games. Women close to the game believe that to promote women's football at the elite level there needs to be a full home-and-away national League and a knockout Cup. Football Federation Australia often argues that the women's game's ambition outreaches its resources, but it is hard to accept that there is no residue of the discrimination against women's football that has existed since it began. In 2017–2018, the W-League is even more competitive and more attractive for a whole range of participants and supporters, but they are not yet on a level playing field.

On the other hand, the short W-League season has two incidental advantages: it allows for overseas experience and an income for a small number of elite players who join US and European leagues in the long off-season, and attracts superstars from overseas, including Nadine Angerer, the German national goalkeeper and World Player of the Year in 2013, and Jessica

Fishlock, captain of the Welsh national team who has also played in the USA and Germany. Both joined the W-league on short-term contracts. Fishlock acted as player-coach of the Melbourne City team in 2016–2017, as they won back-to-back League titles. In 2017, Samantha Kerr, the Australian striker, was Asian Player of the Year.

A key objective of FFA's women's football strategy is to make football the most played sport for Australian women and girls. Football Federation Australia received £536,000 in project funding from FIFA to help fulfil that ambition.

5   Conclusion

There have been significant changes since the "Wicked Foreign Game" article appeared (Hay 2006), but the code has not dislodged the dominance of Australian rules in Victoria, South and Western Australia, or of rugby League in New South Wales and Queensland. The huge increase in soccer's participant base has still not translated into equivalent gains in financial strength or cultural clout, but the disparity among the codes is lessening. The game and its people at all levels need to hold their collective nerves and pull together if the code is to prosper as it has done in the last decade. League expansion, the direct representation of the various constituents of the football family, and improving the quality and reducing the cost of coaching are among the most pressing issues with no agreed solution for any of them available as yet.

The rivalries within the code continue to evolve, as do those among the codes. Australia faces unique problems both domestically and in relation to the Asian Football Confederation and to FIFA and their resolution in future may not be determined by what has happened in the past. Competition requires opposition, but an attractive collective output requires cooperation. Australia may have some lessons to teach the world game, both positive and negative, as it wrestles with its rivalries within the code and among codes.

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India

Kausik Bandyopadhyay

Although India cut a sorry figure in FIFA rankings,[1] football in this country ranks high in terms of its culture, tradition and mass following. While Indian society and culture have shaped the history of football in the region, the game in turn has influenced the various processes at work in Indian society, politics and culture. Academic works on the history and evolution of football in India have to date centred around certain key themes—broad histories of football; history of the clubs, tournaments and associations; football's interface with colonialism, nationalism and communalism; regional growth, politics and rivalry of football; the impact of Partition; the club–nation conflict; place of India in international football; football culture; fandom and spectator violence; football literature and histories; professionalism and commercialism; the impact of globalisation and satellite revolution; women's football; and so on, against the backdrop of the game's evolution from its introduction and adoption as an unimportant pastime to its adaptation, popularisation and transformation as a mass spectator sport against the backdrop of anti-imperial nationalist movement and post-colonial political transition, social change and economic growth.[2] On the other hand, community connections, identity formations, club rivalries and national images have been some of the crucial political and cultural manifestations of the game in India. By revisiting these themes and manifestations, this essay will

K. Bandyopadhyay (✉)
Department of History, West Bengal State University, Barasat, India

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attempt to focus on some of the key aspects of politics, identity and culture associated with the game in India.

1   Political Origins of Football

It is reasonably clear that football came to India with the English East India Company. Football's early pioneers were the officers and men of Trading Farms and Regimental Battalions, European professors of educational institutions and naval men who used to play at ports of call like Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Karachi (Bandyopadhyay 2003, 1–4). The introduction and early organisation of the game in India are often interpreted in terms of a theory of "games ethic" popularised by J.A. Mangan (1986). The concept of "games ethic" was part of the notion of "muscular Christianity", propagated by the moral missionary, which considered sport as an instrument of imperial moral persuasion (Mangan 2003). In parts of India, the Anglo-Indian schools certainly integrated sports including football as an integral part in their educational curriculum. Football, to these early missionaries as well as public school teachers, was a moral tool to inculcate "a series of moral lessons, regarding hard work and perseverance, about team loyalty and obedience to authority and, indeed, involving concepts of correct physical development and 'manliness'" (Mangan 2002, 2003). However, along with this early inspirational role of the Indian middle-class schools, other imperial elements like soldiers, businessmen and administrators also might have had an early influence in the process. Yet, football's popularisation in India cannot solely be attributed to this process. The attitude and response of the general Indian public towards this mass spectator sport was rather different. Football's appropriation by the general public was a complex and both calculated and incidental process, especially in Bengal.

In the 1880s and 1890s, football was deemed as a cultural weapon to reassert Bengali/Indian physical prowess and masculinity and as a medium of social intercourse between the rulers and the ruled (Bandyopadhyay 2003, 2011; Dimeo 2002b). It was yet to become a cultural weapon to fight and beat the colonial masters in a true nationalist sense. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the game became an arena for competition and conflict between the British and Indians (Mitra 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2011). The Indian Football Association (IFA) was born in late 1892 to cater to the growing popularity of the game. Indian teams, however, had to face European discrimination on the football field for a long time. This became evident in the restrictive entry of Indian teams into the IFA Shield, started

in 1893, and the Calcutta Football League, started in 1898, as well as the limited Indian representation in the IFA. Against this backdrop, football, at the turn of the century, may be said to have become a new and unique cultural nationalist force in Indian society although the approach of different clubs to the game was not uniform.

It was Calcutta's Mohun Bagan Club which rose from the Indian clubs to symbolise the true nationalist response of the injured "cultural self" of Indians against the British. In 1911, the club, through its epic victory over the East York Regiment in the 1911 IFA Shield final, brought about nearly a national awakening in the arena of sports in India (Bandyopadhyay 2008a). While Mohun Bagan became a nationalist emblem in the 1910s and 1920s, it was the Mohammedan Sporting Club, originally founded in 1887, which came to the represent the Muslim community across India, achieved greater success in the 1930s winning nearly all the major titles in Indian football one by one, thereby demolishing the invincibility of the Raj in Indian football for ever (Bandyopadhyay 2009b). The East Bengal Club, founded in 1920 in Calcutta, on the other hand, became representative of Hindu Bengalis of East Bengal and began to dominate Indian football scene in the 1940s and 1950s, and its arch-rivalry with Mohun Bagan became the *batte royale* in Indian club football after independence (Bandyopadhyay 2011).

While football had already become a popular spectator sport in Bengal at the turn of the nineteenth century, most regions in the country began to promote the game in the 1920s and 1930s (Majumdar and Bandyopadhyay 2006; Kapadia 2017). In Bombay, the third oldest tournament of India—the Rovers Cup for European military teams—was inaugurated as far back as 1891[3] (Moitra 1961). The Bombay Football Association was formed in 1902 to run a local League, viz. the Harwood League. In 1911, the two bodies, the old Rovers Club running the Rovers Cup and the Bombay Football Association managing the League were amalgamated to form the Western India Football Association (WIFA) (Moitra 1961). To advance the cause of football among Indians, the WIFA took an important step in 1925 when they started a competition for the Nadkarni Cup for purely Indian teams. It was followed by more enthusiastic efforts on the part of the local clubs such as the Bengal Club which started the Indian Football League at Parel in 1928.

Besides Bombay, the states from the South promoted football in an organised manner in colonial India. The list begins with Mysore (present Karnataka), which became the third centre to establish a football association, viz. the Mysore Football Association (the former name of the Karnataka Football Association) in 1908 (Indian Football Association 1977). The Bangalore

Muslims became a strong club side in the 1930s. The Madras Football Association (present Tamil Nadu Football Association) was founded in 1934, while the Hyderabad Football Association was formed in 1939–1940 (Indian Football Association 1977). In fact, the 1930s was an important decade for the organisational progress of soccer in India. It opened with the formation of a controlling body for soccer in Bihar—Bihar Olympic Association—in 1931. This Association was one of the founder members of the AIFF and took part in the Santosh Trophy from the very first year. The North West Football Association was founded in 1932 at Lahore, capital of undivided Punjab (Indian Football Association 1977). The Rajputana Football Association was established in 1934. It later became the Rajasthan Football Association after the change in name of the state (Indian Football Association 1977). Two other Central sports bodies that took active interest in the development of soccer in both colonial and post-colonial India were the Army Sports Control Board (ASCB) and the Railways Athletic Association. The former, which was established in 1919 to control sports for the services personnel in the Army, Navy and the Air Force, played a crucial role in the foundation of the All India Football Federation (AIFF) in 1937. The Board was reconstituted as the Services Sport Control Board in 1945 (Indian Football Association 1977). The apex body for the control and coordination of sports activities of the staff of the Railways was set up in 1928 as the Indian Railways Athletic Association.

Nationalism at Play: Football, Nation and Politics in Colonial India

Within a span of three decades, football had become an important part of Bengali popular culture in colonial India. However, it transcended the recreational values speedily to become a cultural weapon to fight the Imperialist. At the turn of the century, Bengali youth came to look upon football "as an avenue through which they would be able to retrieve their sinking political prestige and establish their superiority over the semblance of power the Raj represented" (Mitra 1991, 46). The fact of the puny barefooted-Bengali players matching the more heavily built, better-equipped and booted Europeans took on the form of a cultural battle against foreign rulers. In the changed sociopolitical context of the early twentieth century when Bengal was engulfed by a spate of nationalist fervour in the wake of the anti-Partition movement during 1905–1908,[4] football came to be increasingly looked upon as a novel instrument of cultural nationalism in Bengal. Transcending the hitherto boundaries of sociability and assertion of masculinity, the game

became a cultural weapon to fight against the British on the cultural battlefield of *maidan*[5] and an emblem around which nationalist consciousness could be fostered. Any success against British teams on the football field began to be looked upon as a victory of the spirit of nationalism over the evil of colonialism. Incidentally, this was also the period when Mohun Bagan meteorically rose to prominence as the sole Indian club to earn a series of worthwhile successes in various tournaments beating, on many occasions, stronger European teams.[6] In July 1911, Mohun Bagan comprising ten barefooted Indian players in their rank created sporting history when it defeated booted European civil and military teams one by one to lift the coveted IFA Shield (Bandyopadhyay 2008a). Much of the discussion on football and the politics of nationalism in colonial India have focussed on this victory. It may be perceived as "the moment of departure"[7] in the history of Indian football, when an indigenous brand of Indian nationalism started appropriating a Western sport to assert its distinctive identity. Other observations on 1911 too seem to confirm, of course with minor variations, the view that the victory had deeper impact on Indian society with redefined political/nationalist meanings (Mookerjee 1990; Guha 2002; Mukherjee 2002; Sen 2007). In the aftermath of the victory, football not only came to represent a novel cultural sporting nationalism of Indian people but contributed to the formation of a unique footballing identity.

Once Mohun Bagan had achieved the memorable IFA Shield victory in 1911, football became a rallying point around which nationalist consciousness gained momentum. Playing and watching the game cut across the affiliations of indigenous caste, class or community in Indian society and provided a social bond for the nationalist-minded Indians. Football as a cultural weapon to fight and defeat the British added a new dimension to the anti-British national consciousness of the Indians particularly in Bengal. Thus, parallel to the political struggle against an oppressive colonial power, there began a social struggle of national liberation over a specific cultural component. The game as an outlet for aggression gradually came to reflect the "pent-up nationalism" of Bengali middle-class professionals, students and working-class people. In fact, many of these people across Indian society, who were hesitant or reluctant to actively take part in the national movement, considered the football field an ideal place to confront the British. Football became a potent nationalist gesture and beating the British produced a sort of immense emotional satisfaction for them. Indian spectators could express their nationalism freely only at the *maidan* through emotional outbursts during watching a match when Indian teams like Mohun Bagan got the better of a British side (Bandyopadhyay 2011).[8]

For European scholars like Mason and Dimeo, Indian victory over its colonial master on the football field was nothing but a success story of British cultural imperialism (Mason 1992, 150–151; Dimeo 2001, 71). They read in such football victories Indians' unwitting admiration for, acceptance of and submission to such cultural imperialism.[9] Richard Cashman has questioned the perspective that analyses the spread of colonial sports solely in terms of the ideology of colonialism and games ethic. For him, "while games are an effective vehicle for proselytization in some circumstances, they can be subverted in others" (Cashman 1988, 259–260). The appropriation of football in colonial India for nationalist purposes is definitely proof to a colonial reformulation of the imperial model of games ethic. It points to football's transformed role as an instrument of reaction, resistance and subversion (Bandyopadhyay 2010). Later on, the national movement led by M.K. Gandhi too influenced the Indian football field (Bandyopadhyay 2011).

Regional Politics of Football: The Birth of All India Football Federation

With the rise of regional soccer associations, the administration of the game began to undergo serious rifts at the Central level. The IFA, hitherto considered to be the sole arbiter of football in the country, began to face stiff challenges from new contenders like Bombay and Delhi, which tried to mobilise the support of other regional football associations to form a new all India apex body to control the game in the country. The IFA contended the challenge by emphasising its tradition, contribution and all India character and tried to evolve out of its own Constitution a restructured all India organisation. This regional politics of football reached its height in the mid-1930s when both Bengal on the one hand and other regional associations on the other tried to draw the support of England's Football Association (FA) and the ASCB of India to ensure their power and position. While this tussle over power and control of Indian soccer administration clearly reflected a regional power rivalry among the Indian states, it also pointed to the continuing importance of the British in the control and management of the game in India despite their apparent marginalisation as a football force in Indian competitions. The resultant cultural politics of soccer forced Bengal to adapt to the changing priorities of football administration against the backdrop of provincial power rivalry in colonial India.

There are two opposing points of view on this regional football politics of the 1930s. According to one view, "the British had stopped being

a significant presence in Indian football by the 1930s" (Dimeo and Mills 2001) and in the conflict over football administration "all the actors are Indian and the dispute concern which group of Indians would control the game" (Mills 2005, 9). According to James Mills, the British "were dismissed as simply representing European opinion and therefore of little bearing, while the English FA was dragged into the dispute only as a makeweight by one group of Indian disputants" (Mills 2005, 9). Boria Majumdar, on the other hand, has argued that British recognition and support was pivotal in shaping the development of Indian soccer in the 1930s and 1940s (Majumdar 2002, 22). For him, the IFA could successfully draw upon the support of the English FA, the "key player" in the situation, and the ASCB to combat the efforts of its regional rivals to establish and run a parallel governing body for the control of the game (Majumdar 2002, 23).

The reality of football politics in India in the 1930s, however, seems to be a little more complex. Bengal's desire to remain of the apex body of Indian football faced serious challenge from other state soccer associations, when they formed the All India Football Association (AIFA) in September 1935. This triggered the beginning of a bitter struggle between the Indian states, Bengal on the one hand and the Western and northern Indian states on the other, for the assertion of supremacy over the control of the game.[10] Although Bengal drew upon the British support in its fight to retain dominance over other provinces in soccer, the IFA–AIFA conflict reflected more a power rivalry between Indian regional states for the control of the game, with the British FA playing the role of a mere legitimating authority. Rather, at crucial junctures of the conflict it was the European-controlled ASCB, which came to play a decisive role in shaping and resolving the dispute. Both Bengal and its rivals tried to mobilise the support of the ASCB in strengthening their position vis-à-vis the other. That the Maharaja of Santosh, president of the IFA, ultimately could not persuade the ASCB in following his line of proposals in forming an All India Body by reforming and remodelling the IFA clearly shows that his rivals in the North and West were more successful in convincing the ASCB their point of view. As a result, even after continuously invoking the support of the FA of England, the Maharaja had to give up and comply with the ASCB's proposals, which resulted in the formation of the All India Football Federation (AIFF) in 1937.

Thus, while the view of Dimeo and Mills emphasising the insignificance of the British role in the administrative politics in Indian football between 1935 and 1937 is seriously flawed, the over-emphasis of Majumdar on the key role of the British FA in the episode is only partially correct. While the

main combatants of the controversy were the Indian groups, i.e. the regional soccer associations, the key player that controlled the fate of the dispute was the ASCB, a British association. That was why the IFA made a frantic attempt to enlist the support of that organisation in its fight to stem off the challenge posed by the AIFA. Even when the IFA tried to use the support of the British FA as a chief instrument of legitimisation of its authority, it did not bear much fruits. This was because the position of ASCB was most crucial in resolving the dispute between the two warring Indian parties, and the ASCB could always influence the mind of the FA authority through its War Office in London. In fact, the ASCB was in full sympathy with the cause and concern of the AIFA since its inception in September 1935.[11] That was the reason behind the IFA's ultimate compliance with the proposal to form the AIFF. By implication, therefore, the tussle in the Indian football administration in the late 1930s reflected a regional politics of football in which Bengal had to face serious challenges from other rising states like Bombay and Delhi and ultimately agree to the demand of a Central apex body in 1937. But the key to resolving the dispute remained in the hands of the British power represented mainly by the ASCB and partly by the FA.

2   Communalism on the Maidan: Community and Identity in Indian Football

While football provided a unique means of nationalist cultural self-expression to Indians in the first three decades of the twentieth century, it could not establish a lasting unitary identity. Differences and conflicts based on social, religious, regional and sub-regional affiliations split this identity into fragments. Regrettably, India's anti-British footballing nationalism came to be fractured from the mid-1930s along communal lines. With the meteoric rise of the Mohammedan Sporting Club[12] to football fame in the mid-1930s, rivalry in India football was no longer confined to the British versus Indians, but embraced the Hindu versus the Muslim, adding specific communal tensions to sport.

When Mohammedan Sporting Club began to emerge as a powerful team in Indian football in the mid-1930s, it was perhaps inevitable that the atmosphere around the club would change. While its achievements were undoubtedly *Indian* success stories, many among Hindu football-lovers felt only a mixture of respect and fear wit no real sensation of joy.[13] The Muslim League, by then a force hostile to the Congress, had not only the support of the British, but became an ally of the Krishak Praja Party,[14] the

ruling party in Bengal after 1937. Muslim nationalists could soon be seen holding the Congress flag in one hand and the black-and-white banner of Mohammedan Sporting in the other, and the Muslim League itself came to use the club as cultural example of Muslim superiority in Bengal. The unprecedented success of Mohammedan Sporting in lifting the Calcutta football League for a record five times in a row from 1934 to 1938 along with its victories as the first Indian team in all the all India tournaments including the IFA Shield, Rovers Cup and Durand Cup had a visibly mixed impact on Bengali/Indian society. For many irrespective of their caste, creed or community, it was a worthy victory for the Bengalis alias Indians on the sporting field. The supremacy the club began to master over British sides came to be hailed as an Indian victory in many quarters. It was expected to encourage other Indian clubs to follow in the footsteps of Mohammedan Sporting Club. For the Muslims in particular, Mohammedan's wins were seen in terms of the community's success to prove its mettle on the field of sport and were expected to inject confidence among them to gain similar victories in other spheres of life. For some, a section of Hindus to be particular, however, the development was of otherwise concern as it represented a victory of Muslim confidence and superiority (Mohammedan Sporting Club 1935, 28).

In the changing political equation in Bengal in the 1930s Mohammedan Sporting was said to have faced discrimination from the IFA. Despite their gallant performances against leading European teams, they were not given recognition anywhere near that accorded to Mohun Bagan after their victory in the IFA Shield in 1911. Key to the IFA's discriminatory attitude against Mohammedan Sporting was the Muslim political ascendancy in Bengal in the 1930s (Majumdar and Bandyopadhyay 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2011). The Bengali bhadroloks began to feel threatened by the Muslim political ascendancy in Bengal in the middle of the 1930s. With the accession of the Krishak Praja Party-Muslim League ministry led by Fazlul Haq in 1937, in almost every domain of public sphere from higher education to administrative and political appointments the Hindu bhadrolok preserves were under threat. It was in such situation that the Muslim ascendancy led them, leading patrons of sport, to look favourably upon British rule while in football they were opposed to the dominance of Mohammedan Sporting and tried their best to thwart it (Majumdar and Bandyopadhyay 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2011). Central grievances of the club were "maximum punishment for minimum offences, repeated bad referring, arbitrary decision with regard to the venue of matches and generally the tyranny of the majority of the council of the IFA against our club" (Mohammedan Sporting

Club 1939, 66–68). Interestingly, this atmosphere of hostility failed to deter the club from registering their fifth straight League triumph in July 1938.

Regardless of the administrative confrontations, victories by Mohammedan Sporting over strong European and Hindu teams certainly instilled a spirit of self-confidence and pride in the Muslims of Bengal, the vast majority of whom, through years of persecution and humiliation, had lost faith in the future (Ispahani 1996, 12). It can be argued, therefore, that Mohammedan Sporting Club contributed significantly to an atmosphere which enabled the Muslim League to gather increasing popular support in Bengal (Shamsuddin 1968, 154–158). The series of victories achieved by this club, even in the all India competitions, considerably increased the prestige of the party. Its effect on Muslim fans "was electrifying", (Momen 1972, 72), and a number of Muslim sporting clubs were established in the districts and sub-divisional towns. The fact that the Muslim League was in power also helped it in getting government patronage (Sen 1976, 110–111).

Along with this new Muslim interest in football came a more aggressive form of support for teams such as Mohammedan Sporting. Indeed, the Muslims who were said to be "rolling on the ground with joy" in 1911 at the victory of their Hindu brothers all appeared to disappear and were replaced by a new breed of supporters who came to watch games carrying knives and bottles of soda water. Indians had never displayed such aggressive spirits on the Calcutta sports field before. Suranjan Das notes, "reverses suffered by the Mohammadan Sporting Club in football matches enraged Muslim feelings which were expressed in sporadic violence against the Hindus" (Das 1991, 170). Or, as another writer comments, "with each victory, a communal wedge was driven deeper into Calcutta football if not into Calcutta society" (Nandy 1991, 318). This transition of Indian football from being nationalist force to promoter of separatist, communal identities can be situated in the wider context of nationalist movement and the rise of communal politics leading ultimately to the Partition of 1947. However, the same communal overtone made the game more popular in India.

The year 1946–1947 witnessed worst communal riots across India following the call for "direct action" by the Muslim League in August 1946 in Calcutta. Because of the riots, there were no competitions for the Shield in 1946 and the Calcutta League in 1947. Unfortunately, the advantages of building a successful club entirely on the patronage of rich businessmen and political leaders from a particular community were offset with associated problems. Immediately after the Partition of August 1947, many of the patrons of Mohammedan Sporting Club left for Pakistan. The club retained its fame as representative of Muslim identity throughout the twentieth

century with intermittent successes, only to become an insignificant football force in the twenty-first century.

3   Historical Club Rivalries: Indian Football's *Battle Royale*

The turnover from colonialism to independence added a further fragmentary dimension to Indian football. In the aftermath of the Partition of Bengal that accompanied independence, large-scale Hindu immigration from East Bengal/Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to West Bengal created a new socio-demographic tension whereby a distinct sociocultural conflict ensued in Bengali society. The sub-regional identity of the East Bengali Hindus clashed with that of the established Hindu settlers of West Bengal. To the West Bengali Hindus who used to call the former derisively as *Bangals*, the new immigrants caused upset in their local life. Hence, they strongly disapproved of according them any worthy place in local society, culture, economy and polity. The *Bangals*, with their common memory of a homeland and everyday culture and a shared experience of suffering and migration, fought hard to earn their living, economic strength, social position and cultural recognition to ensure survival in a hostile environment. They, too, in their turn, returned the compliment by calling the locals as *Ghotis* (Bandyopadhyay 2011).

The *Ghoti-Bangal* conflict sent ripples across the football field. While the rivalry between Mohun Bagan, the club of the *Ghotis*, and East Bengal, the club of the *Bangals*, was most pronounced after Partition, it began when the East Bengal Club was formed in 1920 by East Bengalis keen to ameliorate the continuous discrimination waged against them by Calcutta's Bengali clubs (Bandyopadhyay 2011). While the club lost its exclusive sub-regional character by the 1930s, the name and banner of the club continued to inspire among the East Bengali population in West Bengal an emotional attachment to the club. This particular emotional set-up, hardened more by the West Bengalis' discriminatory remark and attitude, was an extension of the sociocultural conflict between the *Ghoti* and the *Bangal*. And it lay, along with the communal tinge in Bengal football, at the root of fragmentation of Indian sporting nationalism from the 1940s onwards. Even at the height of communal tension in Bengal on the eve of Partition, IFA was alarmed at the increasing spectator violence on the occasion of every Mohun Bagan–East Bengal match.

The trend of derisive attitude aside, the differences between *Ghoti*s and *Bangal*s were clearly discernible in terms of dialect, manner, dress, food

habits, rites and rituals and even appearance, transcending wider similarities of religion, language and a common cultural past. These mostly *cultural* differences, though not rigid, had the potential to create sharply distinctive *social* identities in times of heightened sociopolitical tension. The Partition of Bengal in 1947, followed by a massive influx of East Bengali Hindu refugees into West Bengal, created the occasion for a sub-regional social conflict to flourish. As Hindu refugees started to arrive in droves in West Bengal from East Bengal/Pakistan after 1947 and as they sought to preserve their cultural identity and integrity in a new society, they searched for avenues to assert themselves. It was the Indian football field that provided them this opportunity. Under the stress of great plight in everyday life during their resettlement and rehabilitation in West Bengal (Nandy 1991–1992, 249–250; Kudaisya 1998, 118), the Hindu refugees discovered the East Bengal Club, which was waging their battle on the sports field and surprisingly enough, winning! "For these ravaged and embittered masses", remarks Nandy, "the one source of hope, pride and victory lay in the triumphs of the Club named after their abandoned homeland" (Nandy 1990, 319). In fact, in a spell of five years (1949–1953) in the immediate aftermath of Partition, the club achieved a series of successes in local and national level tournaments. These victories, for the uprooted *Bangal* migrants, soon became a cultural weapon to fight discrimination. Naturally, they found in East Bengal a club of their "own", representing their cultural "self" to fight and win against the "other", i.e. the West Bengali Hindus. Interestingly, as Moti Nandy writes: "These two communities even divided the aquatic population in a symbolic manner—the prawn for the *Ghotis* and the hilsa for the *Bangals*. In the evening after a football derby, the prices of prawn and hilsa used to rise or fall depending on the result of the match" (Nandy 1991–1992, 249).

It has been argued that if "Mohammedan Sporting Club had brought with it hatred through its aggressive communalism born of a minority's natural instinct for self-preservation, East Bengal brought anger through regional, cultural and language differences in the backdrop of a hostile social, economic and political environment" (Nandy 1991–1992, 250). Press reports of matches between the two clubs in the 1950s and 1960s anywhere in India confirm the presence of massive crowds, with crowd disturbances becoming the order of the day. The rivalry came to acquire a political dimension as well. While the refugees, backed strongly by the Communists, waged a pitched battle against the Congress-led West Bengal Government on the political plane,[15] East Bengal led the onslaught on the cultural plane, i.e. on the football field. The situation became so alarming in the late

1950s that Dr. B.C. Roy, then chief minister of West Bengal, suggested a change in club names which carried religious, regional or ethnic overtones (*Amrita Bazar Patrika* [Kolkata], 17, 18, and 24 July 1957). Further, football's politicisation in the context of increasing spectator violence in the 1950s was a major source of discord between the IFA on the one hand and clubs like East Bengal, Mohammedan Sporting or Aryan on the other. The *Ghoti-Bangal* war on the football field and the political war on the streets of Calcutta merged in the 1950–1960s to produce a strong identification of sport with politics.

The fresh spate of Hindu immigration of the early 1970s from East Pakistan following the Bangladesh Liberation War (1971) coincided with a period of intensive social tension and political turmoil in West Bengal in the wake of the anti-establishment Naxalite movement that used violence and terror as means to achieve its end. While East Bengal's fan base became more consolidated, the Indian football field failed to isolate itself from this violence. As a result, spectator behaviour began to undergo qualitative changes. Emotional bonding with a club rapidly acquired a violent temper; aggression became more pronounced, and win or loss produced spontaneous euphoria or retaliation with instances of fans committing suicides in dejection (Bandyopadhyay 2011). Spectators used to stand in queues for days on end to obtain their cherished tickets to watch matches. Skirmishes and feuds were common during long waits for tickets. People also got injured or fell ill at times. Instances of the crowd going overboard are galore in contemporary press reports (ibid.). What these trends of crowd behaviour brought to light was that, with time the sub-regional and social *Ghoti-Bangal* football conflict merged into a more virulent club rivalry between Mohun Bagan and East Bengal based on intense team loyalty. In the late 1970s, however, the transformation in the character of spectator behaviour was sudden and unprecedented (*Khelar Asar* [Kolkata], 3 July 1979, 38). The matter came to a head in 1980 when, during a rather unimportant League match between the two teams at the Eden Gardens in Calcutta, clashes between fan groups led to widespread violence in the stadium resulting in a stampede that cost sixteen diehard fans their lives (Bandyopadhyay 2011, 193–195).[16]

Since 1980, fan rivalry on sub-regional lines began to fade away, as memories of Partition and the old homeland itself grew weaker (Dimeo 2001, 106). More importantly, there were radical changes in the Indian sporting map in the 1980s—organisation of the Asian Games in Delhi (1982), India's World Cup victory in cricket (1983) followed by the Mini World Cup triumph two years later (1985), live telecast of World Cup football since 1982 and of European and Latin American League and Cup matches

(since 1987), organisational laxity of AIFF, and most important of all, utter failure of the national and regional football bodies as well as the three great Calcutta clubs to adapt to the challenge of globalisation, commercialism and professionalism till the mid-1990s. Yet the intensity of rivalry between Mohun Bagan and East Bengal showed no signs of abatement. The rivalry faced a challenge in 1997 when both the clubs came to be sponsored and marginally controlled by the same company, viz. the United Breweries Group. After this sponsorship deal, there arose a large apprehension among the supporters of the clubs that their age-old enmity would come to an end. Yet, 20 year after, what still continues to dominate Indian football is a desperate rivalry between the two Bengali outfits. The tradition of a long-term rivalry, consolidation of an oppositional identity, convention of fan cultures and intensification of club loyalty—all this have contributed to sustain the excitement of "battle royale" of Indian football in a most critical age when Indian football experienced recurrent fluctuations in terms of standard, popularity and professionalism. What still differentiates this rivalry from other Indian club rivalries is an intense emotional attachment of fans towards *their* club and vehement opposition to the *others*' club. This oppositional perception of *self* and *other* continues to shape the future of the most fascinating club rivalry in Indian football.

4   The Changing Horizon of Indian Football

So long as India was a colony, her true potential as a football power remained undetermined. After its Independence, however, India emerged as a formidable Asian force on the international stage. The story of India's tryst with international football offers an interesting repertoire of stunning performances including modest success, appalling defeat and long absence, ranging from India's modest start in the London Olympics of 1948 and her missed opportunity to play in the 1950 Brazil World Cup through a huge defeat in the Helsinki Olympics of 1952 to a stirring performance in 1956 Melbourne Olympics and her startling victory in the Jakarta Asian Games (Bandyopadhyay 2009a; Basu 2003). The momentum of Indian football was lost from the 1970s. The decline set in and the giant had fallen asleep. Since 1960 Indian football team never qualified for the Olympics, neither did it cross the pre-qualifier stage in the World Cup.

As a sequel to the unfortunate fragmentation of sporting nationalism since the 1930s, club loyalties became both more prominent and all-embracing assuming an importance transcending the *national* significance of

the football team in post-colonial India. It seems that Indian football could not cope with the requirements of a post-colonial nation state. Football's changing role in post-colonial India produced a gradual but sharp dichotomy between the club and the nation. In the peculiar amateur (semi-professional since the mid-1990s!) set-up of Indian football, the increasing clash of interests between India's leading clubs and the national team had been a bane for the standard of the game resulting in India's dismal show at the international circuit during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The support for the national team which gained some momentum in the 1950s and 1960s due to India's success in international tournaments deteriorated with India's steady decline since the 1970s.

The governments—both Central and state—never realised football's importance as a national emblem in independent India. Nor did they understand the game's potential as a commercial force. Hence, the AIFF remained an amateur organisation throughout the twentieth century. Corruption and lack of professionalism went hand in hand in Indian football. The anomalies of the AIFF have ranged from pecuniary inconsistency (Majumdar and Bandyopadhyay 2006, 172–174) to administrative highhandedness (Bandyopadhyay 2009a). It took eleven long years to get affiliated with the world apex body, FIFA. It played its flawed part in India's failure to participate in the 1950 World Cup. The unresolved dichotomy of national and club football has been, to a great extent, a result of its failure and amateurish duplicity. Moreover, factionalism, favouritism and infighting within the Federation continued unabated. With politicians like Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi or Praful Patel at the helm of affairs since the late 1980s, the AIFF failed to cope up with the changing parameters of the global game in the wake of globalisation, commercialism and mediatisation. Although a semi-professional National League (present I-League) was started in 1996, it could never become a success in terms of organisation, commerce and popularity. The transition towards commercialism and professionalism seemed to have begun in the twenty-first century with the AIFF undertaking the *Vision Asia* project offered by the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) to raise the standard of Asian football. Indian states like Manipur, Delhi or Tamil Nadu were initially taken under the *Vision India* project, an ambitious project under the aegis of the grand *Vision Asia* project of the AFC, envisaging the fulfilment of AFC's latest motto *The Future is Asia*—a holistic approach towards the development of Asian soccer.

The intensive support base of the three Bengali clubs sustained the mass craze around the game all over India until the 1980s when club teams from Punjab, Maharashtra, Kerala, and Goa began to challenge Bengal's supremacy

in domestic tournaments. This new challenge also signalled the beginning of a novel representational rivalry between club-based regional communities in Indian football. With the launch of the National League in 1996, this rivalry got a perfect stage for articulation. In the present decade, this rivalry got a new fillip thanks to the onset of the Indian Super League (ISL) in 2014 on the model of the Indian Premier League using city or regional affiliation as the basis of club formation, fandom and commercial promotion. Added to this, Indians are well known for their fanatic support for two leading Latin American teams in the World Cup—Brazil and Argentina, and during every World Cup, Indians become divided into two warring camps on the basis of fan loyalty. Similarly one can find transnational fan communities in twenty-first century India with active fan groups of European club teams like Manchester United, Chelsea, Barcelona or Real Madrid.

With the slow but steady commercialisation of football in twenty-first century India, clubs are on their way to becoming as strong as their European counterparts: introduction of theme songs and websites, merchandising of club jerseys, flags and symbols, formation of fan clubs and satellite communities. All these constitute attempts aimed at strengthening and widening the nationwide, as well as transnational fan base of the clubs. Similarly, the global challenge of club–nation binary has also influenced Indian football since the 1980s. It is the responsibility of the AIFF and its affiliated state units to ensure that the interest of the national team must not clash with that of these club communities, a reality that plagues Indian football for quite some time. The successful organisation of the 2017 Under-17 FIFA World Cup by India and her participation in it has certainly made a silver line in the direction of India's future engagement with the global game. This is an opportunity India cannot afford to miss.

Notes

1. The present ranking of India is 105 with an average ranking of 133 since the introduction of the ranking system.
2. Most important works in this regard are: Mitra (1988, 1991, 2006), Nandy (1991–92), Mason (1992), Dimeo (2001, 2002a, b, 2003), Mangan (2002), Mills (2002), Dimeo and Mills (2002), Basu (2002), Mukherjee (2002), Majumdar (2002), Majumdar and Bandyopadhyay (2006), Bandyopadhyay (2003, 2008a, b, 2009a, b, 2010, 2011), Gooptu (2005), Sen (2007), Nath (2011), Majumder (2012), and Kapadia (2017).
3. The oldest football tournament—the Durand Cup—was held at Simla in 1888. It was followed by the Trades Cup in Calcutta in 1889.

4. In 1905, a popular movement engulfed Bengal and parts of India against Lord Curzon's decision to Partition Bengal. The best work on the anti-Partition movement till date is Sarkar (1973).

5. *Maidan* refers to the vast open playing fields of Calcutta opposite to the Eden Gardens at the Eastern banks of the river Hoogly.

6. These tournaments included Trades Cup, Cooch Behar Cup and Lakshibilas Cup.

7. I have taken this term from Partha Chatterjee's celebrated work *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, 54–84. Chatterjee (1986), however, used the term in an entirely different context.

8. For nationalist fan behaviour in colonial Bengal, see Gupta (1913), Sengupta (1950, 66–72).

9. For alternative views on cultural imperialism in the sporting arena, see Guttmann (1994), Stoddart (1988).

10. *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 20 September 1936.

11. Letter of Colonel Majendi, president of ASCB, to the Maharaja of Santosh, 29 May 1937, *Maharaja of Santosh Private Papers*, New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, File 4-II, 1–3.

12. In 1887 was established the Jubilee Club, a sporting organisation for the Muslims in Calcutta. The club changed its name twice in the next few years, first to the Crescent Club and then to the Hamidia Club. Finally, in 1891, the latter culminated into the Mohammedan Sporting Club. While its growth and status as a football outfit in the first three decades of its existence had been dismal, it emerged as a powerful team in Indian football in the 1930s.

13. Comments of Muhammad Nasiruddin, the editor of *Saugat*, a periodical published from Dacca, quoted in Ritan (1985, 21).

14. Led by Abdul Kasem Fazlul Haq, the Krishak Praja Party drew its strength from the mass following it enjoyed among Bengal's Muslim peasantry and intermediate shareholders.

15. For a useful study of the relationship between Communist political ascendancy in West Bengal and refugee politics, see Chakrabarty (1990).

16. The pre-match press reports suggested possibilities of chaos and violence on the match day. In fact, the Federation Cup final between the two teams on 8 May 1980 witnessed extremely unruly behaviour of not only fans but also players and club officials. See *Khelar Asar*, 16 May 1980; *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, 15 August 1980.

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Indonesia

Andy Fuller

Football—or, *sepakbola* in Indonesian—is virtually entirely absent from research on Indonesia. This is despite the deeply imbedded nature of football in the everyday life of the Indonesian nation. Football is important to the political infrastructure of Indonesia and holds a major grip on the imagination of writers, essayists and filmmakers. Not only this, watching football on TV, playing football, going to football games at local stadiums, and playing football video games on PlayStation are popular activities of the leisure times of millions and millions of youth. In this sense, Indonesia is no different from other countries: football is a major part of the nation's popular culture. Analysing, representing and engaging with football is a means to articulating the everyday concerns of the Indonesian nation. Football in Indonesia holds much scope to be incorporated into studies of popular culture, urban studies, practices of fandom, globalisation, and regional identities. Few studies, regrettably, have explored the complexity of meanings that are invested in Indonesian football.

The thorough infiltration of football in the national life of Indonesia is not reflected in the research on the country. Football, a sport, a game, a leisure activity is trivialised for being 'low-brow', 'popular', 'peripheral', and 'unimportant'. The ongoing absence of Indonesia from major football tournaments also adds to this perception that Indonesia occupies only a marginal

A. Fuller (✉)
The Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

position to football. If one looks at the catalogues of esteemed libraries, one could easily conclude that 'football doesn't matter' in Indonesia. And that would indeed be one's conclusion until one is in Indonesia: the sheer proliferation of replica shirts being worn by the rich and the poor, being perhaps the first indicator that, 'Indonesia is a football nation' (Barboy 2011, 11). Football, however, is intricately linked to the rise of nationalism in the 1920–1930s Indonesia. The founder of the PSSI (Indonesian Football Association), Soeratin Sosrosoegondo, being a respected nationalist, who founded the association with the intention of resisting Dutch authority (Elison 2014). In my library search, I found no histories of any single club. Perhaps they do exist, but probably they are not easily available except through supporter networks. I have no doubt in the presence of respected figures affiliated with clubs who know their club's history.

The purpose of this chapter is explore some of the main trends in Indonesia's footballing culture and trajectory. Authors such as Dorsey and Sebastian (2014) and Colombijn (2000) have provided details on the emergence of the national leagues as well as the game's problematic cross-over with party politics. This chapter explores more recent developments in fan culture; rivalries and the relation to urban space and city-based identity formation.

1 Football Everywhere: Absence and Underachievement

Football is inseparable from everyday life in Indonesia. And, it plays a vital role in international, national and domestic politics. Politicians use football clubs as a means to access a mass audience. Some football supporter groups willingly take part in the political campaigns of presidential candidates. While, others adopt a hostile attitude towards 'politics' and 'politicians'— while not acknowledging that their club's survival depends on a range of investments facilitated by such politicians.

There are very few scholars working on football in Indonesia and even fewer outside of Indonesia. The scholarship that exists is fragmentary and partial at best—despite the articles of Junaedi (e.g. Fuller and Junaedi 2017), Colombijn (2000), Brown (2008), Fuller (2015, 2016; Fuller and Maulana 2014) and others. There is much miscellanea in which writers and researchers explore the minutiae of footballing culture in Indonesia. Much work needs to be done; much work can be done and much work can significantly strengthen research on the cross-overs with tendencies of globalisation (and its rejection) or the strengthening of regional identities. Fan cultures, football

politics, the intersection of football with the urban are just some of the areas of possible research. Barboy's rather unconvincing statement that 'Indonesia is a football nation' is indeed correct. Despite the contributions of emerging scholars and those of established essayists and literary authors, *how* it is a football nation remains largely unexplored.

The official history of football in Indonesia is articulated in Tulis and Saputra's *Sepakbola Indonesia: Alat Perjuangan Bangsa* (Soccer in Indonesia: A Tool of National Struggle, 2010). The history is divided neatly into the eras of the independence struggle and subsequent political administration: from 'the national uprising', through the Japanese era, liberal democracy until the reformasi era and the era of 'modern football', which is only given as beginning in 2004. The author draws on the quotations of national leaders who endorse the role of sport, football and the PSSI articulating the dreams, shape and identity of Indonesia.

As with *Semangat Membatu*, *Sepakbola Indonesia* also presents an idealized reading of Indonesia's footballing history. The narrative is one of a unified effort in which all players and stakeholders contribute to the furthering of Indonesia's footballing performance in spite of the (difficult) circumstances. The number of Chinese-Indonesians in the team that participated in the 1956 Melbourne Olympics is not commented upon. This narrative is a continuation of New Order narratives that ignored the large role played by Chinese-Indonesians in the sporting and cultural life of the nation. *Reformasi*—a student-led and successful protest movement against the Suharto-led dictatorial government—may have taken place some 12 years prior to the book's writing, but a persistent New Orderly imaginary remains.

Sepakbola Indonesia provides a linear narrative on the history of Indonesian football. The book gives examples of the universality of football throughout history, while also arguing that football has antecedents in Indonesia in the form of '*Kanuragan*' and *sepaktakraw*. The former being used as a means to develop one's 'inner strength' (*tenaga dalam*); and was considered as a branch of knowledge (*keilmuan*) rather than a sport or game. It is perhaps, however, the sections on the founding of the *Persatuan Sepakbola Seluruh Indonesia* (Indonesian Football Association) and the early processes in establishing a national League and competition that provide the most useful information for an articulation on what football is and means in Indonesia. Tulis and Saputra (2010) provide an outline on the founding of the PSSI by Soeratin, the congresses held by the various football associations (*voetbal bond*) throughout the then Netherlands Indies. At the time of the founding of the PSSI, Yogyakarta's Bintang Mataram proudly declared that 'sport is one means through achieving a great nation' (Tulis and Saputra 2010).

Indonesia's greatest moment in its football history—appearing in the 1938 World Cup in France is also shown to be an ambivalent moment. This was a team, that although consisting of 'nine natives', was made up of players from the *Nederlandsche Indische Voetbal Unie* (NIVU) League—i.e. that which was under the control of the Dutch. Although a Dutch team also appeared at the 1938 World Cup, the team from the Indies also played under a Dutch flag. The founders of the PSSI came from the elite strata of Indonesian society—for example, Soeratin was trained as an engineer in Germany, while others were doctors. Tulis and Saputra (2010) write, 'these intellectuals chose to organise football in a professional rather than amateur manner. They then had to use their spare time to support their families'.

This is a bureaucratic text that tells the history of football in Indonesia in an unproblematic manner. The sections on the emergence of the PSSI, nonetheless, are valuable. The book also provides a thorough list of results, dates and organizations. There are some useful images. However, with an ever increasingly complex and polyvocal media that covers football, the sections covering 1998–2010 prove to be very thin on the ground. One gains very little impression of what football is like, only an understanding of the idealized progress of the Indonesian national teams and competitions. This is a story that excludes the broader context of what football means in Indonesia. And thus, it is works such as Junaedi's, as discussed next, or the short stories of Seno Gumira Ajidarma, that provide a more culturally located reading of Indonesian football.

2   Spaces of Football: The Demolition of Persija's Stadion Menteng

The stadium, on the characterful Jl. HOS Cokroaminoto, with its damaged wooden grandstand (*tribune*), its faint lighting and poorly maintained pitch was hardly worthy of a field for a junior tournament in 2000, let alone the fully-professional and much loved iconic team Persija. It was a stadium with a groundsman of some 45 years of service, who lived at the stadium and brought up his seven children there (Trinugroho 2005). Coaches and assistants claimed that it was not '*standar internasional*'—but in truth, it was barely of regional standard or national standard. The stadium had been valued and variously restored and improved by previous governors Ali Sadikin, Tjokropranolo, Wiyogo Atmodarminto and Suryadi Sudirja, who had also protected the stadium from being turned into yet another mall (*Kompas*, 28

February 2005). For Persija the destruction of their historical stadium was further evidence that 'every centimetre of Jakarta had to be used to satisfy investors' and that the 'right of the public for cheap entertainment is not important' (Trinugroho 2005).

Prior to its demolition, it was in a neglected state, dirty and messy—ironic given its location in the heart of the elite suburb of Menteng. Indonesia, so consistently underperforming, couldn't even get its footballing federation, the PSSI, to produce an adequate pitch for the only professional team of the nation's capital city. That Jakarta, a sprawling megacity, could boast only two proper stadiums is an indictment on the city's urban planning. By comparison, the far smaller cities of Surabaya, Bandung, Malang, Solo and Yogyakarta all have at least two adequate, functioning football stadiums. The city lacks the 'lungs' (green space, *ruang terbuka hijau*) through which its residents can enjoy their leisure time. In 1999, the city had only half the ideal amount of green space, and of this space, only 10% was fully-functional (Joga 2002).

The stadium was demolished for the building of a 3.4 hectare park, under the camouflage of being transformed into a city park (*taman kota*) (Joga 2004). Rather than being destroyed the stadium should be revitalised and enhanced, partly because of its heritage value and also because of what it could add to its surrounding community (Joga 2004). The city-park argument made for its destruction contrasts significantly with the overwhelming *mall-ification* of Jakarta throughout the 1990s and 2000s (van Leeuwen 2011).

The green grass has been removed; the smoothness of the pitch has been turned into coarse and rough light brown sand and dirt. A couple of smart SUVs occupy the centre of the pitch—where the ball was once criss-crossed and chased down. Where the crowd once stood, there is now, only rubble. On one wing there still remains a tribune: roofless, unstable and unsafe. There is no shouting, choreographed Jakmania. The camera upon the drone spins to show the surrounding landscape: outer suburban Jakarta replete with low-rise houses, thick with traffic, and occasional pockets of trees. The light towers, appearing as skeletons, are the most evocative articulation of the stadium's death and its being-turned-into something else. Their lights have been removed and only their steel bones remain. The coverage given to its ruins contrasts the indifference to the stadium during its use. Even here, some 10 km from the relative urban centres of Jakarta, a football stadium takes up too much space and becomes the scapegoat for causing traffic congestion.

The ruined stadium reveals its typical outer urban surrounds: a large mosque, a three-storey shopping complex, a line of *ruko* (house-shops). What an oasis this stadium might have been; the intense expression of pleasure and disappointment that football mediates in contrast to the humdrum and half-hearted 'planning' in which it was a contentious part. The drone moves silently and follows the stadium's straight lines. The making of the short news feature becomes an excuse to engage with its aesthetic qualities. The camera's silent and still gliding, is a stronger reminder of the absence of a crowd angry with footballing injustices being played out before them. The ruins of the stadium provide a metaphor for the problematic state of the domestic leagues and the failed ambitions to articulate a strong national or city-based identity through football. The decline of a beloved stadium is a potent source of nostalgia for fans and players alike:

Feri, a leading figure in in the Jakmania 'ultra' support group remembers: "When the players came out to warm up, we would already be there. Singing and chanting. The opposition players would already be nervous. We can't create the same atmosphere at Stadion Senayan, because it is too big and the crowd is too far from the pitch." (Sport Satu TV 2015).

The peripatetic tendency of clubs, in part due to their financial precarity as well as that of the domestic leagues, is also reflected through the disappointment of fans. Feri continues:

> This is the second time we have experienced the loss of a stadium. Stadion Menteng was demolished based on the reason of *blah blah blah*. We protested, of course, and Sutiyoso replied, 'it will be replaced with Lebak Bulus', so, I replied, 'but Lebak Bulus already exists.' Lebak Bulus was built in 1987. We went to Ragunan for a little while, but then we had to leave. But now, after so many great experiences both for Persija and Jakmania, it is hard to leave Lebak Bulus. This stadium has had to become a victim for development. We don't really have a problem with leaving the stadium, as long as there is a replacement. And, up until now, there is no real vision of the replacement stadium. What we only have is promises. All of the governors of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, Fauzi Bowo, Jokowi, Ahok, have promised us a new stadium, but it has never been realised. (Sport Satu TV 2015)

The stadium is a vital piece of footballing infrastructure, which not only provides the primary facility for the playing of the game; its quality also shapes the kind and practice of fandom. The Lebak Bulus stadium, a purpose-built football stadium, facilitated the emergence of a highly-focused and well-co-ordinated fan group which provided the previously nebulous Persija

football club with a strong identity and a strong sense of 'home' through its raucous and partisan home crowd who 'performed' in their home stadium.

"Maybe it is possible to say that Persija is from Menteng. But, Jakmania is from Lebak Bulus. Everything has its origins here. How we learned to sing and chant. How we learned to engage with other fans. How we learned to accept defeats, the bitterness of defeat. So, for Stadium Lebak Bulus, all that I can say is, 'thank you' because it has been the site of history, it helped take Jakmania from being a small community, to a very large community. Moreover, Persija had been neglected by its fans. But, it is now a team that represents the pride of all Jakartans. And thus, I give my thanks to Lebak Bulus." (Sport Satu TV 2015).

Although players are primary agents of the game, they are rarely given a voice or any degree of credibility when discussing the game's qualities and broader culture. One of Indonesia's all-time greatest players and former-Persija star, Bambang Pamungkas, remembers as follows: "our keeper used to tell the crowd to be quiet because his voice couldn't be heard and he couldn't give his instructions to the other defenders." "We need another stadium. Make it bigger than Lebak Bulus, but not as big as GBK. The atmosphere is lost as soon as the crowd isn't big enough. Persija just needs a stadium that can hold around 30–40,000 spectators." "Lebak Bulus: maybe your form will disappear for ever very soon. But, you'll always remain in our memories, for ever." (Sport Satu TV 2015)

The rapid developments in Jakarta's urbanisation over the past fifty years, shaped thoroughly by its governors and the national politics of the New Order era, witnessed the marginalisation of spaces for domestic football games. Fans of Persija would clash with rivals from Bandung and elsewhere throughout the city's streets and along train lines and toll ways. The proliferation of homogenous malls and luxury hotels has also contributed to the demise of spaces of play and recreation for the city's poorer inhabitants. The consecutive demolition of Persija's two stadia (Menteng and Lebak Bulus) is evidence of an, at best, ambivalent attitude towards the football club of the nation's capital.

3   Jakmania: Fandom, Persija and City Identity

Jakmania, aka The Jak, was founded out of a reaction towards the frequency with which supporters of Persija would be outnumbered by supporters of visiting teams in their own stadium—*whichever one it may be*. This aspect

of football fandom reflects the broadly characterised quality of Jakarta: it is only a new home to its residents, occupants and that 'home' is generally somewhere else for most Jakartans. Witness the city's emptiness during Lebaran, when half of the city *pulang kampung* (return to one's hometown) and overwhelm the nation's public transport infrastructure. Living in Jakarta for dozens of years, as Seno Gumira Ajidarma writes, doesn't make one simply an *orang Jakarta* (Jakartan); one always requires the epithet of where one originates from—for example, being *asli Yogya*, or *asli Surabaya* (from Yogyakarta; from Surabaya) (Ajidarma 2008, 167).

In the documentary, *Jakarta Is Mine*—by Andibachtiar Yusuf—one member of Jakmania articulates his fandom in the following manner:

> As Jakartans, we don't have much to be proud of. The only thing we're proud of is that we come from the Capital City. It is only the 'high class' people who can enjoy Jakarta. And us, the people down below, we just have love for a football team. And, in the end, we can, go beyond the province of Jakarta, we can show off our pride. It is not just a matter of us saying, we've got better roads; lots of fly-overs going all over the place. We're not proud of that because we've never really experienced it. What we feel pride in is this: the football field and Persija. This team is respected throughout Indonesia. And perhaps it will be respected throughout Asia, or throughout the world. That's what we are proud of. (Yusuf 2007)

The *placeness* of a stadium is highly valued by ground hoppers and fans alike, and, in the case of Jakarta, the Jakmania are willing both to protest the destruction of their stadia (Stadion Menteng and Stadion Lebak Bulus) while also express their flexibility as fans and following their team to wherever they play. The Jakmania are capable of creating a home for their team, Persija, whether in the city of Jakarta itself (in Menteng, Lebak Bulus or Senayan), in the nearby city of Bogor, or, at the "home" venue of Stadion Manahan, 571 km away in the city of Solo. Their fandom of Persija is not defined by their topophilia for their local, characterful stadia. The lack of stadia in Jakarta has forced the Jakmania into a particularly itinerant fandom which has caused friction and lead to deaths between rival football fans, while at the same time creating new alliances with previously hostile enemies. The politics of urban regeneration have been a camouflage for the removal of spaces which provide occasions for carnivalesque footballing occasions in which Jakmania are mobilised and intervene in the ideally-smooth and uniform modern Jakartan cityscape.

4   Football Fandom Post-New Order

The post-New Order era saw a great opening up of political and cultural freedoms. There were many new developments in the fields of literature and film and the visual arts. Censorship and ideological conformism had been the dominant mood of the 30-year New Order era and its decline saw an often-euphoric embracing of youth subcultures, often mashed together in curious ways. The 2000s saw a great rise in punk and hip-hop culture and new artistic modes of production. The 2000s also saw an increasing awareness of the importance of 'history' and archives, just as much of Indonesia's recent history was being deliberately forgotten. Pasoepati fans—and particularly those in the B7 group—have been active in researching the football history of Solo: football, for these fans, becomes not only a means for accessing, interacting with and borrowing from global subcultures, but is also a means into the history of one's own city as a part of strengthening the sense of one's local identity.

Although the rise of ultras in Indonesia is specifically a post-New Order phenomena, the live-broadcasting of Italian Serie A in the 1990s laid the foundations for an introduction into ultra-fan culture. The main reference point being the supporters of AC Milan and Juventus—incidentally—both clubs continue to have strong support in Indonesia; with Juventus having an official Indonesian language website. The increasingly ease of access to the Internet in the 2000s and the popularity of YouTube gave football fans opportunities to learn the rituals, styles and performances of ultras from Italy and elsewhere. Learning the art of ultra-support was mediated, rather than from fans witnessing directly the presence of foreign ultras. Nonetheless, through the travelling of fans for domestic games is an opportunity for learning and imitating styles. The Pasoepati ultras were among the first ultras in Indonesia to heavily use the large flags, flares (and smoke bombs) and choreographies so ubiquitous in global football culture.

The first Solo-based ultras positioned themselves behind the southern goals at Manahan Stadium; this was a replication of ultra-practice elsewhere. This group named themselves as the Ultras 1923, referencing the year of Persis Solo's birth, and simultaneously indicating the independence from the Pasoepati supporter group. Their imagery relying heavily on the incorporation of the *totenkopf* (borrowed from Nazi symbolism), an appropriation of the Fred Perry-logo, and the primary use of red, white and black. Their initial use of flares and smoke bombs were protested against by other fans, but, after the increasing coverage of their displays on the Pasoepati.Net website,

the Ultras 1923 gained credibility and more members. The difficulty in accessing flares and smoke bombs led to the Ultras 1923 to start making their own flares or smoke bombs; often resulting in rather toxic products. The ability to make such essential equipment for ultra-fandom is a means for establishing one's credibility within the group, which relies very much upon the amateur skills of its members who create artefacts in the name of supporting their team. There is a strong-quality of 'home-made', 'collaboration', 'working-together' within the ultras: learning much from YouTube. Although this is a strongly macho culture, the male-youth work conscientiously in the otherwise female-gendered activities of craftsmanship—such as sewing (flags), designing, dancing (choreography) and singing (chanting).

The success of the Ultras 1923 led to tension with the Central Leadership Committee of Pasoepati. The tension was in part caused by the Ultras 1923's decision to travel to away games by themselves as well as their reluctance to use the name 'Pasoepati' as part of their designation. They relented however and became a sub-section of the Pasoepati Pasar Kliwon Kota Solo. Nonetheless, the Ultras 1923, or, officially the Pasoepati Ultras 1923, were more strident in the promotion of the club, Persis Solo, rather than the supporter group, Pasoepati. The ultras style of the Ultras 1923, was subsequently taken up by the Pasoepati supporters in the northern terrace, as well as those in the B7, Eastern tribune.

The Brajamusti of Yogyakarta: Loyalis Mataram

The Brajamusti supporter group emerged in the early 2000s after the disbanding of an earlier incarnation, the PTLM (*Paguyuban Tresno Laskar Mataram*, Team Mataram Supporter Group). The Brajamusti was founded as a means to modernising PSIM's supporter base and providing a structured organisation in order to more professionally support the football club. Although PSIM is not—and has never been particularly successful—the Club is well-loved within the city of Yogyakarta and its stadium is in (relatively) Central Yogyakarta. The Club's identity is inextricably linked with the city of Yogyakarta; the Club's emblem, that of the Tugu, is borrowed from one of the city's landmarks. The Sultan of Yogyakarta, however, has not always taken a favourable position to the club. During the periods of relative success in the early 1990s, the Sultan was closely linked to the Club's management. Over the last decade, however, the Sultan has increasingly distanced himself from PSIM. Brajamusti members claim that this is because

there are three teams from the province of Yogyakarta in the Divisi Utama and that the Sultan doesn't want to offend any particular fans. Others have said that it is because the fans of PSIM (primarily the Brajamusti and The Maident supporter groups) have a reputation for causing trouble.

Rivalries are a key aspect of supporter groups and ultras in particular. Rivalries not only maintain antagonisms which perpetuate the sense of a distinctive group but are used to shape alliances with other groups of ultras. The Brajamusti supporter group is characterised by two main rivalries; first, the internal rivalry with The Maident, and secondly, the external rivalry with Pasoepati—the supporter group to be discussed in the next section. Although relations between Brajamusti and The Maident have been officially smoothed over, tensions remain between the broad masses of supporters. The split between Brajamusti and The Maident is evident in the occupation of the grandstands at Mandala Krida Stadium as well the cultural geography of the city of Yogyakarta. The streets of Yogyakarta are marked with flags indicating affiliation with one of the supporter groups. The blue and white flags indicate Brajamusti, while the black and blue (and occasionally other colours) indicate affiliation to The Maident. The various *laskars* (smaller sub-groups) of Brajamusti or The Maident adorn the flags or murals. As such, the supporter groups remain active throughout the year, regardless of whether or not there is any football taking place.

The split between the Brajamusti and The Maident emerged in the wake of the 2004 election for the president of Brajamusti. During the tense ballot, which saw many police deployed to prevent any serious violence from breaking out, Eko Satrio Pringgodani emerged victorious after making several emotive speeches and accepting his supporters' requests to remain as a candidate. The result was tight, and the losing candidate refused to accept the legitimacy of the outcome. As a result, he and several close confidantes soon formed a new group—The Maident, an abbreviation for Mataram Independent. The Maident and Brajamusti subsequently became engaged in an intense and violent rivalry. Members of both groups would abuse each other and throw rocks at each other while games were taking place inside Mandala Krida. This resulted in games being stopped and security forces being deployed to, apparently, contain the fighting. But, the most intense fighting took place on the streets of Yogyakarta; resulting not only in street battles and sweeping, but, also the death of a member of The Maident, seventeen-year-old Nurul Huda. It is his unsolved killing that has remained as one of the main sources of the continual tensions between the two groups.

External Rivalries

Brajamusti and soccer supporters are generally considered 'violent', 'trouble-makers' and disturbers of civil, public order. Violence, *tawuran* (street battles) amongst soccer supporters has become so normalised, that it is rarely covered in the local and national press. This is not simply a crisis affecting semi-professional teams: supporters attending high-school futsal competitions are also required to be chaperoned by a police convoy. Brajamusti reject the condemnation that they are simply a group of supporters who like to fight with other supporters—particularly Pasoepati but also those from Malang and its team, Arema. Yet, upon being asked 'what were the great games that you remember watching, being a part of' one respondent Adnan D. Kusuma mentioned only games which involved violent street battles and riots at the stadium. He said, 'it is these moments that make me love PSIM even more. I can't stop being involved with PSIM because of these events.' (interviewed by author). This respondent is required as relatively neutral and on the periphery of Brajamusti, yet, he is well-respected amongst Brajamusti and is close with its affiliates.

Three days after the Brajamusti futsal competition, buses and cars transporting Pasoepati to Ciamis, West Java were attacked in Yogyakarta and at the city's Eastern and Western periphery. Ari and Unyil recounted the night of stone-throwing with relish. They stated that it was unorganised, spontaneous and done out of their love for PSIM. They knew of Pasoepati's trajectory through following their statements sent out through Twitter. Pasoepati, apparently, sent tweets saying that they were in Yogyakarta. For these two members of Brajamusti, such statements were too provocative and broke the ethics of supporter conduct. Buses and cars with Solo number plates (indicated by the letters AD) were attacked from Sleman in the North and inner East to Kulon Progo in the West. Ari and Unyil recounted gleefully, humorously, that Brajamusti had come out of their houses in the middle of the night to join in the stone throwing without *any co-ordination*. They stated that they were already 'ready to great Pasoepati' as they arrived in Yogyakarta. Pasoepati's tweeting of their journey was a step too far for the Brajamusti to tolerate. Ari and Unyil, instead, gave the counter example of their methods of travelling through Solo on their 'away days'. That is, to take a general bus, rather than a hired bus, or to use fake number plates to disguise where the vehicle is travelling from.

Ramdhon of *Universitas Sebelas Maret* (the 11th March University in Solo) argued that Pasoepati's brazen movement through Yogyakarta was not a sign of the supporter group's arrogance, but, instead a sign of their

unity. He stated that Brajamusti and PSIM fans more generally are not brave enough to travel through Solo as they are a fragmented supporter group. This sense of fragmentation is also emphasised by Fajar Junaedi who argues that PSIM fans' loyalty is split between political faction, laskar and affiliation (Brajamusti or The Maident). Ari and Unyil, however, argue that they are able to travel through Solo undetected because of their superior methods at remaining incognito. Brajamusti have a severe trauma of being attacked in Solo in 2003. This incident became known as Kandang Menjangan after the Brajamusti were locked up in one of Solo's army barracks as a means to protect them and to prevent further rioting. Brajamusti condemn the degree of organisation of the violence, rather than the violence itself. They claim that the Solo branch of *Radio Republik Indonesia* was announcing their arrival into Solo and thus residents were ready to pelt them with stones as they made their way into town. This indicates that although soccer violence can be articulated and directed at specific supporter groups, it can also easily spread to residents who may have little direct involvement with soccer itself.

Tensions within football fandom in Yogyakarta (the city and the province) have intensified over the past decade with the emergence of the northern-Yogyakarta team, PSS Sleman. The emergence of the team as a powerful club within the Divisi Utama (second division) occurred in the wake of the reformasi movement and the implementation of decentralisation policies. Suddenly, the resource-rich *kabupaten* of Sleman was able to use its income for itself, without the money being syphoned off to the Central government of the province of Yogyakarta. Moreover, PSS Sleman had a new stadium built for it, by the *pupate* (regional head) of Sleman. Despite the bupati being eventually coming under suspicion for corruption (hardly uncommon), the PSS Sleman supporter groups of Slemania and BCS (Brigade Curva Sud) have been able to enjoy a stadium designed as a mini-San Siro. The BCS and Slemania fans quickly established themselves as some of the most co-ordinated, active and fashionable ultras in Indonesian football. Their choreographies and chanting achieving huge numbers of views on YouTube and most games being as good-as-sold out. Their rise, however, was less-appreciated by PSIM supporters, both Brajamusti and The Maident, who not only saw their own fans switch alliances, but, also faced the overwhelming support for PSS Sleman in their own stadium.

The supporter base of PSIM has also come under threat from the South with the relative success of Persiba Bantul. Despite being unsuccessful during the amateur era, Persiba became champions of the Divisi Utama (Second Division) in 2009, leading to their participation in the ISL. They would be relegated back to the Divisi Utama at the end of the 2014 season, after

finishing last. The presence of these two younger and more recently successful teams intensified fan-rivalry at local derbies and clearly threatened PSIM's status as the primary football club in Yogyakarta. The Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengkubuwono X, also gave the reason of the presence of rival clubs in the same League as the reason for his withdrawal of support (financial and symbolic) for PSIM.

A journey through the streets of Yogyakarta quickly reveals the scope and range of the three teams' supporter groups. The main streets of the city, and many of the smaller back-streets, are decorated with football murals or simple gratified statements of supporter-group affiliation. Yogyakarta's inner South, for example, is home to numerous laskars (sub-groups within a larger supporter group) from Brajamusti. The different laskars, generally consisting of a minimum of 50 male youth, set up a base at a street-side road-stall or relatively open public green space, such as Lapangan Minggiran football field. The murals are a means not only to claim space and thus territory for the larger supporter group (it seems that Brajamusti are far more active than The Maident in the production of murals), but, also for establishing their own reputation amongst the different laskars. The murals are often complemented by the placement of massive flags which hangover the roads. These flags, usually a combination of blue and white (for Brajamusti) and blue, black and white (for The Maident) also feature writing indicating their affiliation. The flags indicate which supporter group controls the informal economy, covering costs such as motor-cycle and car-parking fees, as well as rent that is paid for use of footpath or road-side space. Members of laskars patrol these streets, collecting funds which are then given to the leaders of the relevant supporter group.

5   Conclusion

Football in Indonesia is violent, corrupt and precarious. There is poor footballing infrastructure and young players lack the sufficient coaching and training regimes to fulfil their potential. Potential stars such as Evan Dimas or Andik Vermansyah, instead, have to seek opportunities beyond Indonesia itself. Politicians have long sought to utilise the massive supporter groups as a means of gaining more beneficial political positions, contrasting with the earlier efforts of politicians to solidify the national imaginary through establishing football clubs and a League. The nefarious interventions of politicians and FIFA bureaucrats is stridently and violently opposed by supporter groups such as the Bonek 1927 of Surabaya (Fuller 2017). While Indonesia

achieves sporting success through badminton, the national sporting obsession is the World Game of football. The dire state of the domestic leagues and the continually disappointing national team has fostered the emergence of huge audiences for the European leagues and England's Premier League. Indonesian football still awaits its moment for 'reformasi', which will involve investment in the game from politicians through long-term planning and building of adequate infrastructure, as well as the implementation of transparent, corruption-free administration. Indonesia's football fans are decades away from receiving the level of football they crave.

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Japan

John Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter

Football (known popularly as "soccer" in Japan) emerged in Japan roughly around the same time as baseball at the end of the nineteenth century, yet it did not acquire a strong following until the formation of the Japan Professional Football League (hereafter, the J.League) in 1992 (Horne and Bleakley 2002). The semi-professional Japan Soccer League (JSL), the precursor to the J.League, was established in 1965 (Watts 1998). Yet, when the prospect of a professional football League in Japan transpired in the late 1980s as part of an attempt to rebuild the football infrastructure, it received only a lukewarm response. Until 1993, football in Japan was widely considered to be an inferior product by a range of interest groups (Watts 1998). For example, Japan's largest advertising agency, Dentsu—which helped to devise strategies for clients such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) in Japan—predicted that the sport would not take off. Dentsu subsequently declined the contract to devise the original marketing conception

J. Horne (✉)
The School of Sport and Wellbeing, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
e-mail: JDHorne@uclan.ac.uk

W. Manzenreiter
The Department of East Asian Studies—East Asian Economy and Society, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: wolfram.manzenreiter@univie.ac.at

of the J.League. The formation of the J.League in 1991 and its initial success proved Dentsu wrong. However, by the late 1990s, the rapid overexpansion of teams and Japan's weakening economy saw the deflation of the football "bubble", and average attendance and viewing figures declined (Manzenreiter 2004). However, as a result of Japan's co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup (with South Korea), and the success of the men's national team in the 2006 and 2010 World Cups, attendance numbers increased and peaked at an all-time high of 11 million in 2010 (Wong et al. 2014).

Despite these recent gains, though, football still falls far behind the popularity and media coverage of baseball (Kelly 2011). However, while ratings for J.League matches are regularly below those of professional baseball, World Cup Football matches featuring the national team are much more competitive, pointing to the continued appeal of televised international matches (Watanabe 2011). It was mainly during a period of rapid economic growth in Japan in the 1960s that televised sport began to attract huge audience numbers, rating 50% or more. However, with the exception of the 1972 Summer Olympics, only football matches featuring the national team after the 1998 FIFA World Cup have achieved higher ratings. This viewing pattern arguably implies that purely "local" sports programs are no longer "killer content" for television in Japan, but also that football is breaking into the mediascape in Japan. It has been observed that football is becoming the sport of choice among Japanese youth for both playing and watching while baseball audiences are "greying" every year (Kelly 2011). Yet, it has also been suggested that viewer interest in football broadcasts has waivered (Kelly 2011). From our interviews with the executives of Sky PerfecTV, one of Japan's largest pay-TV satellite broadcasters that secured an exclusive five-year contract with the J.League in 2007, we know that subscription rates at the end of the contract period were a far cry from bringing in the investment. Very few League matches have been available to watch on free-to-air TV. Not unlike baseball, J.League observers have also noted the ageing of spectators at live matches. While the cause is not clear, the following inference may be plausible: on free-to-air TV anyone beyond football fans had the opportunity to be exposed to football, while pay-TV simply cannot stimulate the interest of latent football fans. Consequently, only those fans who originally like football subscribe to pay-TV. Thus, as a relatively new sport in the Japanese sportscape, football cannot increase the number of fans by exclusively broadcasting on pay-TV.

In reflecting on the politics of football in Japan, we might explore both *politics in football* as well as the role of *football in politics*. The former often focuses on the internal politics of sports organising and governing bodies at

the global level (e.g. on FIFA and World Cup politics, see Tomlinson 2014), or at the regional level (e.g. on the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) see Horne and Manzenreiter 2017). Here we will not consider the internal politics of the Japan Football Association (JFA) and the J.League in detail, but primarily focus on the external politics of Japanese football. Hence here our general interest will be in key political actors, such as the JFA, the J.League, local and Central government, and their objectives and strategies. Although football has not routinely been used as a political resource by political elites in Japan, as its historical significance is thin, it has increasingly been used for diplomatic purposes by the Japanese government in garnering positive foreign policy relationships as we will discuss below. Due to the shifting geopolitics of power in the background of global football history, football in East Asia has always been situated at the periphery, largely disconnected from dynamics and developments within the European and South American centres of the people's game (Manzenreiter and Horne 2002, 6).

1   Political Origins of Football

The history of the development of all sports is full of stories featuring people, places, dates and ironies, which naturally derive from real events, yet nonetheless can be criticised for sustaining individualistic origin myths. The development of sports, like all historical events, involves wider social influences and political and economic processes. In particular, we examine the way in which the development of football in Japan is a product of different social, economic and political interests, which dominate society at specific moments. This section considers how Japan adapted a historically English game to the specificities of its local culture and considers the role that football played in the construction of the nation.

Like many "Western" sports, members of the military forces and commercial communities that safeguarded, administered and financed the British Empire first introduced football to the East Asian region in the late nineteenth century. However, despite its early introduction and institutionalisation, football remained a minority sport for the first hundred years of its history in Japan. Since the introduction of football coincided with the final chapter of European colonialism and a growing US American influence in the North Pacific, football remained in the shadows of the overwhelming popular support for baseball for the greater part of the twentieth century.

At the first football match held in Japan after the Great Kantô Earthquake in September 1923 a brief memorial service was held in honour of William

Haigh (Horne with Bleakley 2002; see also JFA n.d.). Haigh had encouraged the British Ambassador to request a gift from the English Football Association (FA) in the form of a trophy that could be presented to the equivalent organisation in Japan. In an early example of "soft power", the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, was of the opinion that the 'encouragement of the sport' through the provision of a trophy would "contribute to the cordiality of unofficial Anglo-Japanese relations" (cited in Horne with Bleakley 2002). In September 1921, when the Football Association of Japan (JFA) was finally established, the trophy found its intended home. The JFA had 65 member clubs when it was inaugurated. Later that year the British Ambassador, Elliot, presented the trophy to the captain of the Tokyo Football Team, the first winners of the All-Japan Football Tournament, or Japanese FA Cup. This tournament marked the start of competitive domestic football for adults in Japan.

Progress in absorbing the modern game of football was slow. The transition from traditional Japanese garb to Western dress was a gradual one and there were many other priorities during modernisation. The game was however played regularly by members of the foreign communities that had settled in Japan, especially around the ports. Kobe Regatta and Athletic Club (KRAC) and Yokohama Country and Athletic Club (YCAC) are thought to have staged the first of many "inter-port" football matches in 1888.

In 1886 the Japanese Ministry of Education created a number of selective high schools to serve as preparatory institutions for entry into the Imperial universities. Many of the head-teachers of these institutions that were inspired by the example of the English public schools (Eton, Harrow, Rugby, etc.) believed that games should be a Central part of the educational experience of their students. Football was not Central to this extra-curricula sporting diet, while it formed a part of primary school physical education lessons (*taisō*) from the 1870s (see Guttmann and Thompson 2001, 92). It was not until 1896 that football was formally introduced at the Tokyo Higher Teacher Training Institute. From 1900 students at Tokyo Imperial University and a few other institutes of higher education also began to play it. Graduates began to teach football all over Japan in middle and high schools. In 1911 the Japanese Amateur Sports Association (JASA) was established as an umbrella organisation for all sports in Japan, and the JFA affiliated to it in 1925.

During the 1920s physical education teachers were advised that *a-shiki shūkyū* (the pre-World War Two literal translation of association football), also known as *sokkā* (English pronunciation) or *sakkā* (American pronunciation), was too rough for young children. One manual, *Jidō supōtsu*

(Children's Sports) warned that the game should be restricted to those over the age of 15 as it could harm children's health (Ishikawa 1928, 166). In this way, the sport remained confined to older middle and high school pupils and students. The city of Kobe became renowned as a dynamic football region during this period—two of its schools winning the tournament 16 times between 1918 and 1940.

By the mid-1930s, as university teams began to dominate domestic football, political developments were exerting a strong influence on sport in general. In 1935 a new tournament, The All-Japan All-Comers Tournament, was introduced and a new trophy, The Football Association of Japan Cup (FAJC), was presented to the winners. The trophy sent from London in 1919 was now destined for the winners of a less important tournament. The new tournament, as the title suggested, could include teams from annexed countries in "Greater Japan", including Korea. In 1935 Hansŏng (present-day Seoul), but known as "All-Keijō" by the Japanese, became the first Korean football team to take part in the tournament and proceeded to win it. All-Keijo's victory prompted a heated debate in Japan about the inclusion of Korean players in the Japanese football team for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. Japan had qualified without having to play a game and hence became the first Asian team to take part in the Olympic football championships. The Japanese squad entered for the Olympic championship included two Korean players. On 4 August the team, including one of the Koreans, sensationally defeated Sweden 3-2 after trailing 0-2 at half time. The Japanese media hailed it as "the miracle of Berlin".

After the war football was reintroduced into the school curriculum during the US Occupation, while other traditional Japanese sports and physical activities—perceived as too martial in spirit—remained proscribed. An All-Japan football tournament was organised from 1946 but conditions in the country were such that it was not until 1950 that it was organised on a nation-wide basis. The attendance of the Emperor at the All-Star game at the Meiji Jingu Stadium in April 1947—the first football match he had attended since the final of the All-Japan Tournament in 1929—was followed by the presentation to the JFA by the Imperial Household Agency of a Cup, which from 1951 onwards was presented to the winners of the All-Japan Tournament, or Emperor's Cup.

For nearly the next forty years, football in Japan remained essentially amateur. As Japanese companies came to act as the main source of support for organised sport in this period it might better be described as "corporate-amateur". After a decade of isolation from the football world, links had to be re-established and the development of the game at the grassroots attended

to. Initially, in the 1950s the Emperor's Cup was dominated by university teams, but towards the end of the decade football had began to take root in company sports teams. In 1954, Tōkyō Kōgyō and, in both 1956 and 1958, Yawata Steel, became the first two company teams to reach the final of the Emperor's Cup. In 1960 Furukawa Electric became the first company team to actually lift the trophy.

In June 1965 the "JSL Japan Soccer League" JSL, featuring company teams, was launched. The original intention was a national championship involving both university and company teams. Because of a conflict between the proposed spring to autumn football season and the summer to winter Japanese academic year, leading university teams declined to take part. The JSL was therefore composed entirely of company teams, regarded by their owners as either a welfare facility or a publicity tool (Horne with Bleakley 2002).

Despite early successes—the League drew an average of 7491 fans per game in 1968, the year Japan won the bronze medal at the Mexico Olympics—the interest of the Japanese media in the JSL and the sport of football in general was lukewarm. By 1973 the League was struggling and drew an average of 2897 spectators per game. In fact, overall during its 27 seasons, the JSL attracted only 9,739,110 spectators, an average of 3972 per match (JFA 1996, 236, 244). It was the mid-1980s before more noteworthy developments in Japanese football occurred.

In 1985 the AFC reinstated the Asian Club Competition that had started in 1967 but then been abandoned between 1972 and 1984. Japanese attitudes to this initiative had been cautious, as problems had been encountered reconciling the demands placed on Japanese clubs by the Asian competitions with their domestic commitments and essentially amateur status. In 1986 Furukawa Electric (later to be renamed JEF Ichihara in the J.League) made history by becoming the first Japanese club to win the Asian Club Championship. Also significant for domestic football was the 26 October 1985. This is a key date in the history of Japanese football despite the fact that it marked yet another defeat at the hands of Korea in a World Cup qualifying match. This time the first leg was played before a capacity crowd at the National Stadium in Tokyo. Despite having failed to qualify for the World Cup Finals to be played in Mexico, spurred on by a sense of popular interest in the sport, a committee of the JFA was established to consider the development, for the first time, of professional football in Japan. The JFA recognised that it had to adopt an increasingly professional approach to the game.

A decision in 1989 by the JFA committee, which by this time included Naganuma Ken, Murata Tadao, Okano Shunichirō and Kawabuchi Saburō, was made to establish a Japanese Professional Football League, or "J.League", which laid the basis for a regular, fully professional, club competition. To ensure a more durable foundation for the sport, the J.League was to be one of three football-related projects launched simultaneously. Alongside the establishment of a professional League the aim was to strengthen the national team and to secure the rights to host the 2002 World Cup finals (Butler 2002). Essentially the continuous defeats at the hands—or feet—of the Koreans were at the root of the decision to install a fully professionalised football League in the early 1990s (Hirose 2004). The JFA wanted to see Japanese football advancing to a level worthy of Japan's economic power and overall achievements from forty years of post-war peace and prosperity. The concomitant end of the Cold War heralded a new global world order arising on the premises of economic rather than military power. Only after the inauguration of a professional football League has football gradually acquired the symbolic significance and crucial mass following needed for the sport to enter into the politics of everyday life, including community building and collective representation.

2   Historical Club Rivalries

As we have shown in the previous section, football in twentieth-century Japan did not receive sufficient attention to cause serious forms of rivalry between specific clubs and their followers. Teams competing in amateur football tournaments or in the semi-professional JSL usually represented an educational institution or a business corporation, and any possible rivalry between their mother organisations would have found a more suitable and visible outlet in university rankings, market share or shareholder values, rather than on the football pitch. In terms of popular culture and mass entertainment, football remained in the shadows of baseball, which traditionally had been Japan's only major sport capable of drawing dedicated and faithful allegiances. In contrast to baseball, which was professionalised already in the 1930s, football was hardly taken seriously enough to spark the amount of positive and negative affection needed to identify with 'our team' and to get in a rage when confronted with a detested "their team". After a quarter of a century in operation, however, there are some indicators of change in the J.League and it is possible that over time, rivalries similar to

the famous European and South American club rivalries and city derbies will emerge.

The major reason for this development lies first of all in the gradual expansion of the J-League from an original ten fully professionalised teams, to about fifty playing in three divisions 25 years later. All but nine of Japan's 46 prefectures had at least one professional football team in 2017. Within the densely populated region stretching between Osaka in the West, and Greater Tokyo in the East, some of the newly emerged clubs share home grounds and catchment areas with slightly more established teams. Famous examples include the rivalry in Osaka between Gamba Osaka and Cerezo Osaka or the City of Yokohama, home to the Marinos that had swallowed local rival Flugels in 1998 and saw itself re-challenged by newly founded Yokohama FC (the first supporter-owned professional sports team in Japan). In cases of municipal mergers, clubs from different areas unexpectedly found themselves placed within the same administrative unit, such as Urawa Reds and Ardija Omiya in Saitama City. Marketing pundits and media commentators have come forward with historical references or fancy names to stir the excitement such local derbies generate. For example, the "Tamagawa Classico", for example, relates to the match between FC Tokyo and Kawasaki Frontale, two of the more recently established clubs that are located along the Tama river separating Tokyo and Kawasaki. Even though the clubs belong to two different municipalities and prefectures, their home stadiums are very close to each other, being barely 15 km apart. Equally, the "Kawanakajima Derby" refers to the location of the epic battle between the warlords of Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin, whose domains largely correspond to the hometown areas of Ventforet Kofu and Albirex Niigata, respectively.

The attention the teams receive is skewed towards the more successful clubs of the higher J1 division that attracts average audiences of 20,000 per match, in contrast to roughly 7000 spectators at the J2 level and up to 3000 visitors at the J3 level. The particular significance of local and historical rivalries is revealed by a comparison of spectator numbers that are significantly higher in the case of derbies and matches against the J.League powerhouses Kashima Antlers, Jubilo Iwata and Urawa Reds. Teams face each other frequently in regular League matches, and tensions increase during encounters in Cup tournaments or end-of-the-season games facing the prospect of promotion or the danger of relegation. So nothing is better qualified than time to prepare the ground for lasting club rivalries. The continuous dominance of the League by teams like the Kashima Antlers or Urawa Reds, for example, has increased and seemingly naturalised the commonly shared

wish that everyone wants to beat these teams; these desires get occasionally amplified by the experience of bad luck to the disadvantage of one's own team, or by the subjectively perceived injustice and mischief that robbed one's own team of match points, promotion or League titles.

The politics of football rivalries are more evidently played out at the national level. Football never acquired the kind of over-deterministic meaning needed for representational purposes as in Europe. But it became of special significance for the symbolic representation of the relations between Japan and her former colonies. Under colonial rule, football enjoyed a special position as a sport at which Koreans regularly sustained some national prestige by defeating Japan. After the restoration of Korean independence, football continued to serve this prominent function. Playing the game against the former oppressor offered the nations of the Korean peninsula a highly visible opportunity to disprove the claims of cultural superiority or political supremacy through which imperial rule and military expansion had been rationalised (Lee 2002).

The first-ever (and still so far only) co-hosted World Cup in 2002 brought together the unlikely partnership of Japan and South Korea. Japan's government saw the chance of "re-orienting Japan's relations with South Korea toward the future without having to make the apologies and compensation that South Korea demanded as a prerequisite to such a development" (Butler 2002, 52). Both sides were keen to diminish/inhibit any dispute, separating politics from the hosting of the football event. But both parties understood well that there was an opportunity to make effective use of the World Cup as moral leverage in diplomatic relations. While the World Cup facilitated the effective exchange between the states, any positive effect of years of collaboration, however, was soon overshadowed by new and old crises and scandals (Manzenreiter 2008).

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

Although, for most of the outside world, the J.League started in May 1993 amidst much publicity (and a capital injection estimated at £20 billion by some observers), the tenth anniversary of the Japan Professional Football League, the J.League's governing body, was actually celebrated at a Tokyo hotel on 1 November 2001. The year following its foundation in 1991 the J.League staged the Nabisco Cup tournament for the ten J.League founder members, including the former Mitsubishi Motors, Furukawa Electric and Toyota Jidosha. Reborn as Urawa Red Diamonds, JEF United Ichihara and

Nagoya Grampus Eight, respectively, each club was equipped with an official slogan, mascot, and team song. Along with seven others teams, they were expected to attract between 15,000 and 30,000 fans twice a week from May 1993 onwards.

In 1993 the J.League chairman, Kawabuchi revealed that the original plan was to begin the J.League with just six teams, as in his estimation there were only about 100 players in Japan capable of playing at a professional level at the end of the 1980s. This plan also took into account the allowance of three professionals from abroad for each team (as is the case in Japanese Major League Baseball). Seven conditions were imposed on clubs applying to join. The first was that the club had to be a registered corporation specialising in football, a stipulation designed to force the professionalisation of club management, as well as players and coaches. Teams were also requested not to have the names of their owner(s) as the team name. J.League football, unlike the JSL and professional baseball, would not be used simply as an advertising tool. J.League teams were to have a balanced ownership, representing "home-towns" (or cities) and regional prefectures as well as sponsors. Nor at the outset was any team allowed to be based in Central Tokyo. The J.League was seen as a major tool of urban redevelopment and relocation away from the capital and hence a second condition was the cultivation of a home town environment, and each club was expected to forge strong links with its local community. The third condition was to secure the regular use of a 15,000 capacity stadium equipped with floodlights. The fourth condition imposed was that each club should operate a reserve team and teams at the U-18, U-15 and U-12 levels. The fifth condition imposed was that each club should include professional contracts with at least eighteen players, and that coaches employed at all levels should hold the appropriate licence. The other two conditions were disciplinary in nature: a $1 million membership fee was required from each club, as was an agreement to comply with the rulings of the J.League and the JFA. The J.League method of distributing media revenues from broadcasting rights equally to all J.League teams irrespective of performance also challenged the prevailing practice in professional baseball that permitted the Giants to amass a dominant financial position (Horne 1996).

From the start, it was projected to expand the J.League gradually over ten years and eventually to allow relegation and promotion between the J.League and the semi-professional/amateur JFL. Teams in the JFL that wished to be considered for J.League status not only had to finish in the top two positions of the JFL but also had to pass basic stadium requirements, and other criteria, such as potential level of spectator interest and local community support (Manzenreiter 2004). One example of this rule in operation

was when Honda Hamamatsu won the JFL championship in 1996 but was not allowed to join the J.League. There was some suggestion that additional pressure by motor company rivals Nissan (Marinos), Toyota (Grampus Eight) and Yamaha (Jubilo) might also have proven conclusive in the decision, although other considerations were the readiness of Honda to sponsor a football team as well as the Honda team's location close to other existing teams in the same prefecture.

From the end of 1998, two divisions (J1 and J2) were created out of the then existing J.League and semi-professional teams in the JFL. Those clubs left out of these divisions comprised a "new JFL"–a de facto "Third Division". With the qualification for the 1998 FIFA World Cup (in France) by the national team, as well as the prospect of co-hosting the 2002 World Cup with South Korea, it was clearly possible that football would be back in fashion if the changes brought in after the 1998 season created an exciting spectacle. Clearly, interest in football in Japan picked up as the 2002 World Cup approached. The key factors that have been influencing this upward movement in football attendances and the general growth of a stronger football culture in Japan include the success of the national team in the run up to 2002 and the higher profile given to Japanese football players playing outside of Japan in the Japanese and world sports media.

In 1991 football was ranked 22nd in terms of sports participation by the overall population, however, came in second among the 15–19 year olds, right behind baseball (Horne 1996). Football enjoyed greater involvement and more popularity than baseball in high schools at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. A survey conducted in December 1992 found 31.4% of respondents wanting to attend a J.League game at a stadium, compared with 33.5% for baseball (Horne 1996). Football found the most interest among children and young adults. The seeds of Japanese interest in it had clearly become greater in the 1980s and early 1990s. The corporate sponsorship and staging of international football competitions such as the World Football Club Championship (Toyota Cup) from 1981, the FIFA World Youth Championships, and the winning of the Asian Cup in 1992 had encouraged them. In addition the J.League had been packaged and sold as a new, trendy, leisure pursuit. It was marketed as *shinhatsubai*, as a "new, improved product, now on sale", which is a well-known marketing principle to Japanese consumers (Watts 1998). Central to this was the role of Hakuhōdō, Japan's second biggest advertising company, who portrayed football as international, casual, fast and lively, in contrast to the more slowly paced and traditional game of baseball. As a commercial sport, it was deliberately targeted at a younger audience than for baseball in Japan.

One of the medium-term football aims of the launch of the J.League was to broaden the pool of Japanese football players and thus assist in the creation of a stronger national side. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a handful of good players, but a large supporting cast was lacking. In the 1980s, however, more Japanese boys and girls began to play football rather than baseball at school and in university. Rather than sending players abroad, it was hoped that by attracting leading players from Europe and South America to Japan, Japanese players would learn from them. Eventually, Ramon Diaz, Guido Buchwald, Leonardo, Jorginho, Salvatore Schillaci, Sampaio, Zinho, Alexander Torres, Patrick Mboma, Hugo Maradona, Carlos Caetano Bledorn Verri (Dunga), Hristo Stoichkov and Dragan Stojkovic have all played in Japan since 1993.

Football, and other sports in Japan, have always been manipulated by different interest groups to accommodate new demands and initiate new ways of thinking. For much of the post-1945 period, sport—except for professional baseball and "television-friendly" sports like professional wrestling—was organised and facilitated on an amateur basis or by companies. Football at this time thus became a part of popular culture through corporate sponsorship. Since the early 1990s however, football in Japan has been actively marketed as something to be consumed differently than other sports, especially baseball. In contrast to baseball that was conceived of as inward looking, traditional and local, football was marketed as outward looking, (post-)modern and global. Essentially because financial success is crucial for any new sport that tries to break into an established popular culture, football in Japan has deliberately utilised different marketing strategies and targeted different clients (or a different spectator base) than the main professional sport of baseball.

An emphasis on place of residence, increasingly replacing an emphasis on the place of work or the company, which predominated after 1945, has also been a feature of the professional football League. Additionally, an emphasis on consumption, especially through the marketing of "new improved products", in contrast with an emphasis on production, which had existed for most of the post-1945 period, has been a key feature of the football culture developed in Japan since the launch of the J.League. Football in Japan is itself at the centre of a contradictory pull between the enthusiastic amateurs keen to generate football as a popular cultural "practice", and those with an interest in the exploitation of the commercial opportunities that football as a 'spectacle' provides.

Media coverage for football, the second most popular team sport in Japan, falls behind that of baseball. Because of the historical development

of close relations between the media and baseball, baseball continued to comprise about a quarter of all media sport in Japan over the last decades (Manzenreiter 2004). While there is no "blackout rule" for baseball and all games are broadcast in every city in Japan (McDonald et al. 2001), a "scarcity value" is applied by the J League, limiting the live broadcasting of football matches (Manzenreiter 2004). As noted above, football has gradually become the sport of choice among young people, both as a game for playing and spectating, especially as baseball audiences have aged (Kelly 2011). Yet like baseball, football also faces the double-edged sword of a 'foreign invasion.' In the same manner as baseball, the launch of digital television and satellite broadcasting in the 1990s helped to bring the wider world of football to Japan. Developments in mass communication technologies also promised a selection of channels offering live matches and delayed telecasts from major European football leagues such as the Bundesliga, Italian Serie A and English Premier League (EPL). The proliferation of coverage of the best European leagues has enticed young talents and star players to the top leagues in Europe. For instance, Hidetoshi Nakata's migration to the A.S. Roma in the 1990s resulted in the introduction of the Italian Serie A to the Japanese, going on to become one of the most popular foreign football leagues in Japan. However, by 2017, only seven Japanese footballers have ever played in the EPL—Junichi Inamoto, Kazuyuki Toda, Hidetoshi Nakata, Ryo Miyaichi, Shinji Kagawa, Maya Yoshida and Shinji Okazaki. Given the numbers involved, the threat to football is less severe when compared with baseball (Kelly 2011). Although interest in foreign football leagues has generally grown since the 1998 World Cup (Horne and Manzenreiter 2002), there have been several dips in ratings following the lack of success of the men's national team in past FIFA World Cups and other regional tournaments. Japan's first World Cup victory on foreign soil at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, however, sparked a resurgence of interest in football, which improved the place of the sport in Japan. Symptomatic of this fervent interest was the steep growth in attendance numbers for the J.League, which reached an all-time annual high of 11 million in 2010.

Today, 25 years after the establishment of the J.League, after improved international success, and despite the growing number of teams, men's football in Japan remains a relatively niche sport. There is no denying that it has been utilised by political agents during this period. For example, following the 11 March earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku in 2011 (also known in Japan as "3/11") football was invoked as part of the discourse of community development and involvement. A large number of football stadiums

were damaged, the most serious being in Sendai, Kashima and J2 side Mito Hollyhock. The J.League suspended its regular season for six weeks after the earthquake and the League and clubs throughout the nation assisted in various ways through the holding of charity matches and other fundraising events. J.League players also volunteered to help distribute emergency supplies and to organise soccer schools for orphaned children and those left homeless. Fan clubs became engaged in raising donations and other volunteer work; all-star teams played against a side named "Team as One", staffed with J.League greats and players from abroad. When the J.League resumed operations in late April, stadiums all over the country were decorated with banners expressing compassion and commitment to rebuild Japan. Kashima Antlers players raised a banner after their AFC Champions League match at Suwon in South Korea which read "With Hope We Can Cope". According to the *J.League Newsletter* (2011, 8), messages "of sympathy and support for Japan had been flooding in from the global football community ever since the disaster struck". Former J.League players showed their support for the victims of the earthquake in various ways and former Japan head coach Zico played in a charity football match in Curitiba in Brazil. Before the UEFA Champions League match between Real Madrid and Olympique Lyonnais, a banner was unfurled with a statement (in Japanese) that read "We are together with everyone in Japan". Another Spanish club, Valencia, wore shirts with their names written in katakana script for one match.

These developments prompted Mike Plastow, Japan's correspondent of the magazine *World Soccer* to write:

> The J.League was always intended to be about community. It has always been about supporting each other through sport; about engaging the whole community so that every member can grow individually and together. This was the original vision. This year, when Japan needed it most, the football community coped. It provided a wonderful focus for hope. (J.League 2011, 8)

This community spirit, linking football via the national team with the entire nation was exemplified by the collective joy regarding the success of the women's football team later in 2011, when they won the world championship title. Despite professional women's football having a longer history in Japan than in almost any other country, when the Japanese national women's football team became world champions at the FIFA World Cup in Germany in July 2011 it came as some surprise. Although the Japan Women's Soccer League started in 1989, and enjoyed a fair amount of popularity in the early 1990s before the emergence of the professional men's J.League, in

the next decade media attention and resources for the sport had dwindled. Becoming the first Asian team to have won a world football tournament at any level was explained by some sections of the media with a feel-good narrative about the Japanese players' courage and resilience, which sprang from their desire to offer brief respite from the aftermath of 3/11. Accordingly, the national women's team that won in 2011 was referred to as "Nadeshiko Japan". Nadeshiko is the name of a flower, which also represents a certain ideal of Japanese femininity that is demure, quiet and accommodating to men (see Kietlinski 2011).

However, the ultimate Cinderella story was provided by the team from Sendai, the J.League hometown closest to the epicentre of the 9.0 earthquake. Prior to 2011, Vegalta Sendai had played only three seasons in the first division and hardly qualified as a contender for the J.League title. Yet in April 2011, with reconstruction work still going on in the badly hit home stadium, fans unfurled a giant banner during an away match that boldly promised "No defeat until we regain our hometown" (*furusato o torimodosu made oretachi ga makenai*). This was the start to a remarkable series of wins and draws that ultimately earned Sendai the fourth rank and in the following year even the runner's up position.

4   Contemporary Political Issues and Geopolitical Interests

In this section, we discuss the geopolitical interests of Japanese football actors in the East Asian region. In the new millennium, the Japanese government has used football and popular culture as tools of public diplomacy. *Captain Tsubasa*, a football manga and TV cartoon series was translated and aired in many places around the world. Focusing on the adventures of a Japanese youth football team and its captain named Ōzora Tsubasa, the story line reveals a highly idealised image of football and the way core values of Japanese society (cooperation, collective orientation, determination and persistence) are linked to the world of football (Horne with Bleakley 2002, 103). The Japanese government expected that the Arabic-language dubbed version of *Captain Majed* would strengthen goodwill towards Japan in Iraq, where about 1200 Japanese Ground Forces were stationed in the Southern town of Samawah. Stickers depicting the football star were also placed on water supply trucks provided by Japan to the waterworks in Iraq from the time the troops had been dispatched (MOFA 2005). In this instance, the

virtual football player was used as a globally recognisable proxy for Japan in order to make its assistance activities widely known among Iraqi people.

Parliamentarians met foreign diplomats or visiting Diet members from abroad for a friendly football match and used the opportunity for informal opinion exchanges. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) backed international friendship matches, inviting team players from war-torn Iraq to fly into Japan and offering live television coverage of the friendly match from Tokyo to Baghdad. It also dispatched former national team midfielder Kitazawa Tsuyoshi on behalf of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to places in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Kitazawa, who became the first JFA ambassador after ending his playing career in 2002, officially supported the objectives of Japan's official development assistance including sports and physical education issues (Manzenreiter 2008).

Territorial disputes between divided nations provided another field for the Ministry's attempts to gain clout in foreign diplomacy. In May 2004, Japan's MOFA hosted the Ministerial Conference on Peace Consolidation and Economic Development of the Western Balkans, which closed with the signing of a "peace ball" by Japan's prime minister and other heads of state of the five Western Balkan States to express their commitment to peace. As part of its attempts to bridge gaps, MOFA also frequently invited Israeli and Palestinian youth players to participate in training camps in Japan and to meet each other in direct competition. The Blue Book of Diplomacy from 2003 and later shows a steady increase in the number of football-related events sponsored by the government and often executed by the JFA, for example during the Japan–ASEAN Exchange Year 2003 or the Japan–Korea Friendship Year in 2005. These initiatives came to a sudden stop when territorial disputes or relicts from the conflict-ridden past of colonialism cooled off diplomatic relations at the state level (Manzenreiter 2008). However, it must be stated that South Korean players (and occasionally also North Koreans) continued to be a highly welcome resource of football talent for most professional football clubs in Japan.

In recent year, the politics of football in Japan have shown a remarkable turnaround from its previous focus on Europe towards South East Asia and Central Asia. The expedition of Japanese footballers to Europe failed to bring the desired midterm impact on raising playing skills and the level of the game in general. Japan is currently a greater importer than exporter of football talent (CIES 2015). While Europe still is considered to be the ultimate goal of highly talented individuals, it has lost in significance as leverage for promoting the entire game within Japan. Instead, the JFA has decided to pursue a regional growth strategy: By scouting and educating footballers, coaches and

referees in the neighbouring regions, it is hoped that gradually Japan's professional footballers will also raise their abilities when playing against better-skilled opponents at club and national team tournaments sponsored by the AFC. Already in 2002, the JFA embarked on a mission to organise youth competitions in Asia. Some Japanese clubs have set up satellite teams to compete within South East Asian leagues. Coaches are dispatched to train with youth teams or national teams abroad; foreign players, coaches and referees are invited to study at one of the JFA's four football academies or to gain international experience; entire teams are encouraged to use the National Football Training Centre facilities during training camps in Japan, and referees organise workshops camps for their colleagues from the region at large.

In official terms, most of these international exchange programs are labelled as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This is perhaps because the JFA in its endeavour to promote football in the region is completely separated from the AFC. As we heard from football officials in Japan, the JFA bypasses the official channels directed by the Confederation that these officials deem to be too difficult to navigate, if not helplessly corrupted by the money and influence of Middle Eastern oil powers. Japan's football developmental aid of the twenty-first century therefore is bilateral, it is crafted case-by-case, albeit following a master plan and conducted in close cooperation with the public body of the football association, the semi-public J.League, and private corporations, including media broadcasting companies. The J.League changed its regulations in 2009, granting clubs an additional fourth foreign player if at least one is coming from an AFC member country. The J.League also dispatches instructors to management workshops within the target countries in order to professionalise football and increase independency from FIFA or AFC donations. The broadcaster Sky PerfecTV banked on the media interest in the sending countries where huge audiences wanted to see how their best players are faring in one of Asia's strongest League. The arrival of players from Thailand, Vietnam or Cambodia, to name but a few of these new junior partners and recipients of Japan's football developmental aid, is closely monitored by domestic and foreign media alike. "This is J.League", the official video channel managed by the J.League's media partner viewers, provides video clips and mini documentaries that can be watched with English, Thai, Indonesian, and Vietnamese subtitles. Among the recipients of Japanese football developmental aid have been football associations in Singapore, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Guam, East Timor, Northern Marina Islands, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic, gradually expanding the network and Japan's football's political clout in the region.

5   Conclusion

The market value of Japanese professional football has always been suppressed by the dominance of professional baseball in the media and the comparatively higher interest in football competitions at the national level. As noted earlier Japan is currently a greater importer than exporter of football talent: with only 5 Japanese players in other Asian League teams and over 50 foreign players in the J.League in the first half of 2015 (CIES 2015, 25–26). At the same time Rakuten and Yokohama Rubber are sponsoring team shirts of Barcelona and Chelsea respectively (Ahmed et al. 2016; Mabley 2015) whil Yokohama Marinos are part owned by City Football Group (MacInnes 2017). Professional football has grown in the past quarter of a century in Japan, and with it football fandom at national and club level. Additionally, the political potential of the sport has not gone unnoticed by the organisers of the sport, local municipalities that sponsor J.League clubs, and the national government seeking geopolitical influence in the region.

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Turkey

Dağhan Irak and Jean-François Polo

Football is the most popular sport in Turkey through its success, its excesses, its prestigious victories in the 2000s (Galatasaray's victory at the 2000 UEFA Cup and the third place in the 2002 World Cup). Imported by European foreigners at the end of the nineteenth century, practiced secretly by Muslim elites, it became in a few decades the symbol of the nation fighting against the external enemies, against a threatening Europe.

Turkish football is also known for the passion of its supporters for the national team or club teams. The matches between the "Big Threes", the three most successful football clubs in Turkey, all based in Istanbul (Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş) are considered among the most spectacular derbies in the world that sometimes trigger violent clashes between fans.

The place of football in Turkey is such that it constitutes an area particularly invested by politicians and thus reflects the major debates of Turkish society. Thus, President Recep Tayiip Erdoğan, who has ruled the country since 2002 has regularly staged his (mythicized) past as a semi-professional footballer and does not hesitate to put on his shoes and kick a ball, in front of the cameras, for the pleasure of his followers. The football stadium is also a place of nationalist and partisan political expressions. In May 2013, football

D. Irak (✉)
Faculty of Sport Sciences, Strasbourg University, Strasbourg, France

J.-F. Polo
The Institute of Political Sciences of Rennes, Rennes, France
e-mail: jean-francois.polo@sciencespo-rennes.fr

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fans (and particularly the supporters groups of Beşiktaş) were very active during the largest protests against the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality project to destruct the Gezi Park in Istanbul.

Finally, Turkey has been a candidate on several occasions to host major sports events such as the Olympic Games and especially the Football European Championships (Euro). It has already hosted a final of the Champions' League and the Europa League but its aim is to host an event such as the Euro for which it was twice beaten little (for the Euro 2008 and the Euro 2016). Hosting this kind of event is a way to strengthen its domestic and international image.

1   The Political Origins of Football

Turkish football has a history that goes hand-in-hand with the history of faltering Ottoman Empire and the rising of modern Turkey. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was entering in a period of rapid modernisation. The Sultan Abdulhamid II initiated "a rapid move towards 'westernisation' in an array of fields that ranged from administration to law, education and health…" (Okay 2002) But he also imposed a strong control on the society. "The old structure and traditions were not abandoned completely, which resulted in a duality in political culture and social structure where both the traditional, and the Western/modern styles were experienced simultaneously" (Okay 2002). In this context, football was regarded as a representation, or expression of a foreign, Western European and unwanted culture and was therefore discouraged by the Abdulhamid regime for the Muslim Ottomans. As the capital Istanbul was under the continuous surveillance of the sultan police, cities such as Salonika and Izmir enjoyed considerably less pressure. In the faltering Ottoman Empire, the expansion of association football had a similar process as those of the vast majority of other nations. The empire's port cities, such as Thessaloniki or Izmir had commercial connections with the British. It was not a surprise that the first known football game in Ottoman territories was played in Thessaloniki in 1875 by some British residents of the city (Gökaçtı 2008). Even though the date of the first-ever football match in Anatolia remains unknown, it can be said that football was being played in Western Anatolia, notably in Izmir, starting from the 1870s. English residents of the city were the pioneers of the game, and Anatolian Greeks were the first indigenous community to play football by founding clubs. At the time, the Greek community of Western Anatolia, inspired by the Hellenic Kingdom founded in Greece in 1826,

were in the process of discovering their national identity. The main axes of the Hellenic enlightenment project were linguistics and antique Hellenic culture. In this context, cultural clubs for Greek community were founded in various cities of Anatolia, especially in Izmir. The Orpheus, founded a music-oriented association in 1890, gave birth to two sports clubs that would shape the entire athletic scene in the region, Apollon and Gymnasio (later Panionios). Among these clubs, the first one, Apollon[1] is particularly important since this club was founded in 1891, by Smyrnean Archbishop Chrysostomos and businessman Emmanuel Samios, therefore connecting the clergy and the bourgeoisie. Bearing in mind the ever-present tension between religious and secular Greeks that practically shaped the political axes in Greece, this cooperation for national unity in Izmir is extremely striking. This may show that both parties, disregarding their conflict, agreed on the necessity of a sports club for gathering the masses at a popular event. Izmir, pioneering the sports activities—including football—in Anatolia, also influenced Istanbul in the last years of the nineteenth century.

In Istanbul, association football started much later than in Izmir and Thessaloniki; however, it evolved more rapidly in terms of organisation. This can be explained by the fact that before football appeared, Izmir and Thessaloniki had strong sports communities. Hence, when football came to these cities, it was included in local sports organisations (such as Panionian and Apollonian clubs) and it was governed in the way the other sports branches were. This meant that although the British were the ones to bring football to those cities, they were unable to establish the system under which the football was played under in the British Isles. The local sports organisation perception was competition based, possibly carried over from very early Greek traditions, and the League concept was unknown. The conditions in Istanbul were more suitable for the British to set up a brand-new tournament scheme; thus, the first Constantinople Football League was begun just one year after the foundation of the first Istanbul football club Cadi-Keu (Kadıköy) on the Asian side of the city, whereas it took almost two decades for a League to start in Izmir. Cadi-Keu was founded by English residents of Kadıköy with the participation of the local Greek youth; it was followed by teams called Moda, Elpis, Imogene and others.[2] The Constantinople Football League started in 1903, with the participation of these four teams. The winner of the first League was Imogene, the team of the British Embassy's boat.

In the early 1900s, despite the interdiction for Turkish Ottoman to play football, some Turks, notably the students of Izmir American College in the 1900s, attempted to play football for their school teams, but they were

suspended from their schools owing to pressure from local officials. In the Turkish military schools, the same interest for sport and football emerged. A Turkish student from the Naval Academy (and son of an Admiral) formed with his friends the first Turkish football team played by Muslims. To avoid the repression of Ottoman authorities, they took an English name "Black Stockings" and trained clandestinely. They played only one game against a local Greek team in October 1901 that they lost 5-1. After the game, most of the players were taken into custody.

Another attempt to form a Turkish football team came from the Galatasaray High School (Sultanî (Sultans' school) of Galatasaray), the prestigious institute which was founded in 1868 to give modern formation to the palace elite. The school itself was an attempt to reform the Ottoman administration, especially by training a well-educated (mostly Muslim) elite (Galatasaray High School Official Web Site., n.d.). For this, a secular school system was set up, mainly based on the French education system. The majority of the academic staff was also French. The students that Sultanî produced quickly learned about modern concepts, including liberty, nationalism and of course, sports. They took courses on modern sports and they were encouraged to practice them. One of these students, Ali Sami (Yen) was the first one to be influenced by football. Whereas his first attempts to form teams within the school failed, he eventually managed to gather a group that had enough enthusiasm to follow through the principles to found a football club. The team initially avoided using a name, so as to avoid the same difficulties the Black Stocking had had, but they were quickly nicknamed as "the Gentlemen of Galatasaray" (Gökaçtı 2008, 34). In 1905, they joined the League, as the first Muslim-Turkish team. Although Galatasaray's participation in the League happened in the Hamidian era (Sultan Abdulhamid II, 1878–1908) and much before the declaration of the Second Constitution, it should not be considered to have been a move against the Palace, or some attempt at civic resistance. The football team had no political agenda against the Ottoman administration at that time. It seems that the Ottoman regime ignored the Galatasaray team. In addition, nationalism was rising and Hamidian era was reaching its end. While the first Turkish team Black Stocking had to face persecution from the Ottoman palace, Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe (which was founded in 1907) took advantage of Sultan Abdulhamid's quasi-paranoid *Istibdat* (repression) regime losing its power and competed rather freely against non-Turkish/non-Muslim teams. It is without a doubt that the foundation of these two clubs was motivated by the rising Turkish nationalism, as stated in Galatasaray founder Ali Sami Yen

declared; "Our goal was to play together like Englishmen, to have a colour and a name, and to beat the other non-Turkish teams" (Yüce 2014, 147). As in Izmir, Greek and Armenian clubs joined in, followed by Galatasaray in 1905 and Fenerbahçe 1907, two Turkish clubs who aimed to challenge the predominant non-Turkish teams in Stambulite football leagues (Beşiktaş opened its football branch in 1910) (Yüce 2014, 147–148). The emergence of Turkish teams such as Beşiktaş, Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe in Istanbul, as well as Altay and Karşıyaka in Izmir depend on the "belated" Turkish nationalism and its almost obsessive desire to catch up with non-Muslim Ottoman communities. One cannot understand how Turkish nationalism is essential to these clubs and how their relationship with their fans resembles the nationalistic relationship between Turkey and its citizens without this context. Particularly regarding the "three giants" of Istanbul (which are supported by an estimated 80% of football fans in the entire country), the nationalism component is essential, because these clubs, since the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Forces (British, French and Italian) after the First World War (between 1918 and 1923), thus before the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey, have been of national character and represented the whole nation. They owe their popularity to being "national teams", a phenomenon maybe comparable to Al-Ahly[3] in Egypt, and Basque and Catalan clubs in Spain. They even constitute an important part of the Turkish identity among diaspora Turks.[4] Therefore, these clubs, their emergence, their existence and their entire modus operandi are always associated with Turkish nationalism.

2   Historical Club Rivalries: Beşiktaş, Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe

The rivalry between Beşiktaş, Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe is a rivalry with many layers, with different phases and narratives throughout the history. First of all, it should be underlined that these three clubs were founded in very emblematic neighbourhoods of Istanbul; Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu (Galatasaray) and Kadıköy (Fenerbahçe). These neighbourhoods have been the core of the Ottoman cosmopolitanism and the Turkish modernism. Favouring one of these neighbourhoods over the others is an important question for any Stambulite, which often triggers heated discussions. Therefore, three immensely successful clubs founded in these neighbourhoods would be inescapably in the rivalry.

Moreover, this rivalry was born as a rivalry of young Ottoman Turkish elites, in a period where Turkish nationalism emerged as "belated" compared to rival Ottoman nationalisms, and these clubs, from the beginning, competed against each other in better representing the Turkish nationalism. Their engagement to the national cause goes way back, almost two decades before the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, and it is always primordial to their existence. In a country hardwired to nationalism, this reason would alone constitute a fierce rivalry. The question of which team Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of Turkey, supported is still a matter of debate today, or which team has represented Turkey better abroad.

Through the years, as the football League expanded to all over the country and so did the popularity of these three successful teams, the meaning of this rivalry has obviously changed. Even though the nationalism component has always been present, it is not the same as in the years where Istanbul was occupied by the British, French and Italian allied forces and these clubs played against their teams, as well as against the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Stambulite teams. The nationalism now translates to beating European teams in UEFA competitions. Also, the inner-city nature of these derbies is now less relevant, since all three teams have millions of supporters in every Turkish city and abroad, among the diaspora. These core, tangible elements related to the early twentieth century Istanbul are more and more replaced by constructed narratives. For example, "being from the neighbourhood" (*semtin çocuğu olmak* in Turkish) is still important, but it is now a cultural component shared by millions of fans, including those who have never been to Kadıköy, Beşiktaş or Beyoğlu. Despite the wide expansion of these clubs' fan base, the fandom experience can only be decentralised to a certain extent. Those who live closer to the "neighbourhoods" will always be the ones who shape the way how the fandom and the rivalry are experienced. Going to the games from the neighbourhood is still a substantial ritual (and it will always be). Of course, there are other modalities of fandom, for long distance fans and those who cannot afford to attend the games. However, these fandom modes inevitably mimic the Istanbul-style fandom and its narratives. And this mimicking is astonishingly powerful in Turkey, as the fierce rivalry between the neighbourhoods and clubs are recreated in every part of the country, and even in the Turkish diaspora abroad. The fans share the same love and hate for their club and the others. Media evidently plays a huge part in recreating the intensity of the rivalry. The narrative of the rivalry is transmitted through the media. In the 1990s, when Fenerbahçe board member Ömer Çavuşoğlu tore down a Galatasaray flag, or the Galatasaray coach Graeme Souness planted a red and yellow flag to

the centre spot at Fenerbahçe stadium, the media had a field day in retransmitting these images over and over again, thus spreading the mutual hatred between two clubs to the fans everywhere. In the 2000s, the fans had their own forums, blogs and eventually the social media to pass along their own stories to other fans. The intensity of the rivalry grew much bigger in these recent periods, even compared to the times in the 1970s and 1980s when all clubs shared the same stadium (İnönü Stadium at Beşiktaş), and had to sit side-by-side in the derby games.

Yet, the reason that the Istanbul rivalry is unique is again political. The rivalry between Beşiktaş, Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe is not a rivalry between three sports clubs. It is a rivalry between three nation-like entities, founded in a setting where everything is based on the nationalism. As in most nationalisms, nationalism itself is the sufficient reason for rivalry. The other reasons may be, and mostly are, constructed to reinforce the narrative.

It is possible to call major Turkish clubs with millions of fans as "micro-nations" (Irak 2014, 116) for multiple reasons. First of all, the popularity of these clubs transcends every single distinctive category. Beşiktaş, Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe have fans in every corner of Turkey and in diaspora, from every walk of life, every social and ethnic background. Between these clubs' fan bases; there are no social differences as in Hamburg and St. Pauli, religious as in Rangers and Celtic, ethnic as in Barcelona and Real Madrid, or political as in Al Ahly and Zamalek. "Three Giants" of Istanbul were all founded by the young, well-educated, late Ottoman elite a century ago, in cosmopolitan neighbourhoods (namely Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu and Kadıköy) which are pillars of modern, secular, urban lifestyle in Istanbul. Therefore, the roots of fierce rivalries between Istanbul teams are predominantly results driven, and club identities that are usually given as a reason for rivalries are mostly imagined; as in nations, regardless of other differences. If there is a political rivalry between these clubs, it is mostly about which club is more nationalistic than others, or which club Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey actually supported,[5] even though the Kemalist regime and Atatürk himself had very little interest in football, and prioritised physical education-based sports policy over team sports.

The second reason for calling Stambulite football clubs as "micro-nations", is their power structure and democratic procedure within these clubs (or lack thereof). Even though, these clubs have millions of fans, their membership figure do not exceed a few thousands. For an ordinary fan, club membership is usually unaffordable or inaccessible in other ways.[6] Also, it is known that, even under more open membership policies, club presidents or presidential candidates tend to register bulk members to vote in club

elections; since the number of voting members is very limited, it is an easy method to manipulate ballots by recruiting new members ready to vote for any candidate. Fan representatives are not really a component of any democratic procedure, and fans are hardly represented in any agency within the whole football world, including clubs and the Turkish Football Federation. According to the Law No. 6222 regulating fan behaviours in sports, the fan representative is a board member at the club, who is not necessarily elected for these functions. As there is almost no official representation, informal relations between club boards and fans emerge from time to time. However, as fan groups are not usually formal associations, but loose organisations based on the comradeship; these relations are not contractual, and they very frequently serve the interests of the few in club boards and among fans. Inner-club nationalisms come handy in justifying these undemocratic structures; criticizing the board or the president would mostly mean criticizing the club, "criticizing us", therefore strengthening the rival's hand. The politically motivated match-fixing case in 2011 is a prime example of this type of chilling effect created by club nationalisms. After Fenerbahçe President Aziz Yıldırım was arrested with a police raid, all criticism against the president among the fans were silenced. Some sort of personality cult for Yıldırım was created (such as wearing his facemasks in the stands during games), which he used to silence all his critics in the club after he was released. Ironically, after Yıldırım was released, he stays on good terms with President Erdoğan, even though Erdoğan, as the Prime Minister of the 2011 period, helped the Gülenist clique[7] rise within the ranks of the justice system to launch many politically motivated court cases, including the one Yıldırım was arrested for.

Another consequence of inner-club nationalisms is the difficulty they create in fans' defending their own causes; such as the controversial e-ticket scheme implemented by government, or ticket and TV subscription prices. Purchasing powers of all countries taken into account, Turkish football is among the least affordable in Europe, and buying a season's ticket would require a bank card named Passolig (which belongs to Aktifbank, run by a group close to Erdoğan) that would collect personal information from its clients, in other words the fans. Whereas some fans' rights groups, who are not in majority in the stadiums, challenge the e-ticket scheme in court, major fan groups of the "Three Giants" are hardly a part of these efforts. Even though some groups boycott the games because of Passolig, a full-fledged movement for defending fans' rights is out of question in Turkey. The same thing goes for pushing club boards for better conditions for fans (such as more affordable ticket prices or right to stand on terraces). While the lack of such organisation is a complicated question that is also connected to the lack

of social and political engagement in Turkey in general; the requirement of cooperating with rival fans and challenging one's own club board certainly plays a huge role in not having a democratic football environment with fans' organised and collective participation. Nevertheless, the fans' expressions have a political value in a broader sense that can even sometimes reach an extent that would make an impact on the political agenda of the nation.

3   Football as a Sports Spectacle

The football field in Turkey is a place for political and social mobilisations (Polo 2016). Players, rulers, spectators and politicians constantly invest this space to express social and political demands, assert national, regional, local, political identities, to challenge or support government actions. Football arenas thus appear eminently political despite the assertions from sports leaders and politicians on the boundary between sport and politics which they nevertheless themselves cease to transgress. The football news crush sports information and occupies a very important place in the generalist media. The slightest adventure in and out of the field involving players, leaders, supporters give rise to endless discussions, debates in the print and audio–visual press, on social networks. These political expressions take several dimensions, ranging from nationalist assertion to more partisan expression and even social demands.

Football in Turkey is the preferred theatre for nationalist expressions from the 1930s to the present. Football has played an important role in the national cohesion and identity formation process (Bora 2000). The songs and slogans enable to spread the feeling of belonging to a group, a community united by collective emotion. At the beginning of the Republic, football allowed Turkey to meet European teams and assume its place in the Western camp (of the 36 international matches played between 1923 and 1949, only four opposed Turkey to non-European teams). After the Second World War, the first victories of Turkish teams against major European ones (Hungary in 1956 in a friendly match, the elimination of Manchester by Fenerbahçe in 1968 in the European Champion Clubs' Cup) were celebrated with passion by supporters and political leaders, as they served to exalt nationalist fervour (Kozanoğlu 1999).

Nationalism is even stronger after the bloody military coup of September 1980. The ruling military has sought to depoliticise Turkey, which was on the brink of civil war, by promoting the "Turkish-Islamist synthesis" which reconciles Turkishness and religion as the foundation upon which

the Turkish nation must rest. In this context, the stadium became a place of celebration of nationalism, a new state religion, while the national political debate was heavily controlled. The role of the media was fundamental in spreading this ideology, as football dominates the rest of the sporting news in Turkey (Sert 2000). Paradoxically, in the context of a public space controlled, sport arenas remained one of the only places where there could be antagonisms between supporters of rival teams in the national football championship. This has certainly reinforced the exacerbated and sometimes violent rivalry between supporters of Turkish teams, especially those of Istanbul (Bostancioğlu 1993).

But beyond the rivalry between supporters, politicisation took an even greater dimension in the 1990s, at the height of the armed struggle against the Kurdish separatist organisation (PKK), with an opportunistic exploitation of ultranationalist movements to spread its ideology among supporters (Irak 2010). During this period, international matches were charged with the mission of first "solacing the nation going though times" and "then avenging the treacherous and striking the ignoble" (Bora 2000, 378). There were very close links between right-wing activists and supporters organisations, with the complicity of the police and intelligence services to provoke and encourage an exacerbated nationalism. There are many expressions of this nationalism which ranges from the obligation, beginning in 1992, to play the Turkish national anthem before each match of a national championship to the deployments by the supporters of banners containing nationalist slogans, Turkish or ultranationalist flags. When the PKK leader was arrested in 1999, all teams entered the land with Turkish flags and sang nationalist and anti-separatist slogans.

In the 2000s, in the context of Turkey's accession negotiations with the European Union (EU), nationalist expressions took a different turn in meetings against European teams. While the Turks were at that time very much in favour of the EU membership, football matches between a Turkish team and one from a European state were the occasion for impressive nationalist demonstrations. Warlike words are sung or painted on the banners: "Europe, do you hear the footsteps of the advancing Turks?" "Tremble of fear Europe, we are coming". These demonstrations were particularly strong during the meetings against teams from countries formerly under Ottoman domination; the most extremist supporters recalled the Ottoman power drawing from the imagery of a master Empire of Europe. Football thus appears as a formidable telling of the frustrations, the unthought and the malaise in the country. For Turkish fans convicted of being despised by a Europe to which they want to belong to but which is reluctant to accept it, the sports

stage allows the expression of a symbolic revenge on the real world of social and political relations. The ambiguity of the relationship with Europe thus reveals a real social schizophrenia of a Turkey in the midst of a crisis of identity between the nationalist assertion and the desire of Europe (Kozanoğlu 1999, 118).

However, over the past ten years, according to Bora and Senyuva (2011), football fans in Turkey have altered their behaviour by becoming less nationalist and more Europeanised. These changes could be explained by the increasing exposure of Turkish fans to European football through the media and the Internet, the growing number of Turkish teams competing in European competitions, foreign players in Turkish teams and players from Turkish of European national teams. It would then encourage Turkish supporters to identify identification of national predominance in favour of more complex membership processes, blurring the boundaries between "them" and "us". Turkish football would thus come closer to the process of "post-nationalisation" of football in Europe in the 1990s, as a result of various factors: introduction of the Champions League, intensified marketing and professionalisation of the game, liberalisation of media landscapes, in the governance of football after the Bosman ruling, feminisation of supporters, etc. (Sandvoss 2003).

The politicisation of football fandom is not restricted to nationalistic expressions against the external enemy. Over the last fifteen years, several groups of supporters have demonstrated by drawing from the classical repertory of political action, addressing sometimes to the power, to the opposition, to internal or external enemies. These political expressions reflect, without surprise, the main subjects of political news: the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue, and even the social question. They are all as much supported by partisans of power as by their adversaries. The question of territorial identities is particularly strong in the politicisation of the football stadium, particularly around the Kurdish issue. If teams and their supporters have been able to claim and celebrate their Kurdish origins (sometimes even with references to the PKK's struggle), they have also been targeted with insults, provocations, even direct physical violence by supporters nationalists without necessarily having a specific claim from their part. On other occasions, clubs in the Turkish Kurdistan region have claimed their Kurdish origins and even took a Kurdish name when the court lifted the ban on using Kurdish names. It may also be pointed out that certain causes, such as the support to Egyptian President Morsi (from the Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood) expressed through the sign "Rabia" (hand extended with the thumb folded), have been used both by supporters, players and

opportunely by Prime Minister Erdoğan from 2014. In fact, to execute this gesture means as much support to the Muslim Brotherhood as to the Turkish government.

These political expressions which point to major issues on the political agenda are as much carried by the partisans of power as by their opponents. Erdoğan was shouted down at the inauguration of the new stadium of Galatasaray in 2011 or during a match at the stadium of Fenerbahçe in December 2013. The political expressions in the stadium closely follow the national news and can also address social issues. After the Soma mining disaster[8] in May 2014, supporters denouncing state failures in security checks expressed their support to the families of the victims.

However, at the beginning of the year 2010, several events reveals a strong takeover of the power, even an authoritarian drift of the leader of the AKP which tolerates less and less the criticisms and the protests against its policy. This evolution appears in a spectacular way with the demonstrations against the park of Gezi transformation project at the end of May 2013. This huge mobilisation and the occupation of the Gezi park during two weeks surprised by its plural message and its claim in favour of a social and political pluralism in Turkey. Football fans were particularly active during the early stages of the protest. Indeed, their experiences in confrontations with the police forces allowed them to participate effectively in the demonstrations to occupy the park of Gezi. The reconversion of the skills and resources of supporters, accustomed to rubbing against the forces of policing, in the service of a political cause has been patent. Supporters of the *Çarşi* group of the Beşiktaş club have been particularly prominent and have been joined by supporters of the other two major Istanbul clubs after the occupation of the square to celebrate a reconciliation of supporters against the power that fuelled a myth of a union of supporters gathered under the slogan "Istanbul United!" (Irak 2015).

4   The Turkish Sport Diplomacy

Sport in general and football, in particular, have been utilised by Turkish political authorities as a means of foreign policy to diffuse a positive image at home and abroad, and consolidate its role in the region. This strategy was particularly remarkable during under AKP's ruling between 2002 and 2012. During this decade, Turkish authorities have used the opportunity offered by sporting competitions between the teams of countries with historically difficult relations to display its benevolence towards reconciliation. However,

the question is raised as to the intended ends of these strategies. There are multiple possible explanations: national security concerns over its borders, a means of demonstrating its compliance with EU membership require-ments during the negotiations, or alternatively, an act made by a regional power demonstrating its commitment and generosity towards populations outside of its borders. Participation in international sports matches have provided opportune occasions for the implementation of Turkey's strategy of "zero-problem with neighbours policy", developed by the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu.

Turkey's strategic use of sport as a tool of diplomacy was observable in two football events: The friendly Aleppo match between Fenerbahçe of Turkey and Al-Ittihad of Syria in 2007; and secondly, the two football matches held between the Turkish and Armenian national football teams in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The matches represented an occasion for the demonstration of Turkey's goodwill towards establishing relations with its former enemies, a strategy that corresponded to its wider aim of strengthen-ing its role in the region.

On 3 April 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan joined Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Aleppo to watch a friendly match between Turkey's Fenerbahçe and Syria's Al-Ittihad to mark the opening of the new sta-dium. After receiving a personal request from Assad, Erdoğan convinced Fenerbahçe officials to hold the match. Occurring during a period of comparative stability in Turkish–Syrian relations, the match provided an advantageous occasion to publicly demonstrate the progress of reconcili-ation that had been achieved by the two countries which were previously on the brink of war. An official meeting was held at the presidential pal-ace in Aleppo to correspond with the match and facilitate discussion about regional geopolitical issues. Future possibilities for cooperation on natural gas, water and energy trade were explored. According to the mainstream Turkish media, the match was a friendly watched by 75,000 supporters inside the stadium and 150,000 outside in celebration of the two coun-tries and its leaders with slogans and flags. Therefore, it can be argued that the Aleppo match offers a useful example of the instrumentalisation of sport by political authorities for the benefit of its leaders. The event and its media coverage were utilised as platforms for the public affirmation of the political will behind the desire to overcome past tensions and build new forms of cooperation. With regard to Turkey, the visit coincided with a favourable political climate towards a Syrian rapprochement. The match served to endorse Davutoğlu's doctrine and strengthened Turkey's regional image.[9]

Another astonishing example can be drawn with the two football matches held between the Turkish and Armenian national football teams in 2008 and 2009, respectively. An intervention of fate resulted in the drawing of Turkey and Armenia in the same group for the qualifying rounds of the 2010 FIFA World Cup (European zone), the matches scheduled to be played in Armenia, 2008, and Turkey, 2009. However, since Armenia's establishment as an independent state following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two states had no official diplomatic relationships. In addition, Turkey's territorial border with Armenia had been unilaterally blocked since 1993, in reaction to international pressure for the recognition of the Armenian genocide, and in expression of Turkey's solidarity with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijan's territory. Although in all likelihood the matches would have continued irrespective of the diplomatic situation, Turkish–Armenian relations entered an unprecedented period of conciliation from 2008. In June 2008, the Armenian President Sargsyan surprised the international community with an invitation to his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, to attend the Turkey-Armenia World Cup qualifying match in Yerevan. The question of attendance provoked fierce debate in Turkey throughout the summer among political actors, intellectuals, and "civil society" (Polo 2015). The leaders of the main political opposition parties argued that this so-called invitation should be declined. However, Prime Minister Erdoğan, pro-government newspapers, and liberal intellectuals broadly supported the gesture. Thus, Gül, became the first-ever Turkish President to make an official visit in Armenia in 2008. The visit, comprising joint meetings in addition to the match, took care to avoid any potentially contentious political issues; the visit was to resolutely convey an image of mutual peace and cordial dialogue. The two Presidents exchanged signs of mutual friendship and benevolence. The pretext of the game opened an unprecedented dialogue in daylight, making almost forget that the contacts had never been completely suspended. Following the match, the symbolic significance of Gül's visit was perpetuated by the media and politicians. The political import of the event totally eclipsed the football event, including the national win achieved by the Turkish team. The matches between Turkey and Armenia had a real diplomatic impact, at least in the short term. The EU and the United States publicly supported Gül's visit to Armenia. Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, warmly welcomed the visit. International acknowledgment of the visit was marked in other ways. The Monaco-based Peace and Sport organisation distinguished Turkey and Armenia with the "Peace and Sport Image of the Year Award" in December 2008, for the photograph of the historic

handshake between Gül and Sargsyan taken at the Yerevan match as embodiment of the image of fraternisation through sport. In the following year, the FIFA Fair Play Award, 2008, was presented to the respective Football Associations of Armenia and Turkey in recognition of their part in facilitating dialogue between two countries with otherwise absent diplomatic relations. Notwithstanding the historic accomplishments of Yerevan, the most momentous outcomes were achieved in the political events that followed, without which the visit would have remained a simple meeting of state representatives and limited to a basic level of diplomatic exchange. Gül returned the invitation to President Sargsyan to attend the away match in Turkey in 2009. But the Armenian President exerts diplomatic pressure to ensure on Turkey by conditioning his presence at the return match to the signing of two diplomatic protocols. The protocols envisaged the establishment of diplomatic relations and the founding of an intergovernmental commission to address the political issues that existed between the two countries, including the institution of a subcommission on history. Of course, the negotiation process sparked a harsh backlash from the Armenian diaspora, the Armenian opposition, Azerbaijan, and nationalist circles in Turkey. The content of the protocols was passionately debated in both countries and negotiators had difficulty in reaching an acceptable compromise that would be agreeable to both parties. But finally, the protocols were signed in Zurich on 10 October 2009. Sargsyan attended the return match between Turkey and Armenia on 14 October 2009, alongside President Gül. However, the Parliaments never ratified the protocols which were eventually abandoned.

Turkish authorities have also used sports mega-events to promote the country abroad (Polo 2015). The last thirty years, Turkey host all the biggest sport competitions except the Olympic Games (but Istanbul was five times candidate), the Football World Cup and the European Football Championships (two applications for Euro 2008 and Euro 2016). It hosts the UEFA finals of the Champion's League (2005) and of the Europa League (2009).

Over the last twenty years, the political use of football and more broadly of sport in Turkey has been integrated into an influence-building diplomacy to foster a positive image abroad. From 2000, sports diplomacy, alongside other diplomatic instruments, have participated in a new AKP-driven foreign policy, such as the international cooperation policy, and an external cultural policy. In the aftermath of the Arab revolts in the early 2010s, Turkey paraded itself, and was correspondingly vaunted abroad, as a political model of the ideal modern state, which had succeeded in successfully combining

democracy with Islamic values. However, since 2013, Turkey faced with a series of domestic and international setbacks which tarnished its image and challenged this strategy of using sport as a diplomatic tool.[10]

Football in Turkey occupies a very important place in daily discussions, in the media and in the public space. This passion goes well beyond the sporting issue and appears as an indicator of the tensions and issues that work this society. Its complex relationship to the West, the persistence of strong nationalism, the investment of political actors in the world of football are all manifestations of the politicisation of football in Turkey.

Notes

1. After having migrated to Greece, Apollon and Panionios are still active in today's Athens.
2. *Türk Futbol Tarihi 1-2*, 11. For detailed records of Ottoman football, cricket, rugby and tennis games, see Yüce (2014).
3. For a detailed account of football supporters taking part in the Egyptian revolution, see Gibril (2016).
4. For a recent ethnography on football fandom in European Turkish diaspora, see Szogs (2017).
5. While Beşiktaş, Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe all present different arguments on why Atatürk was their supporter, there is absolutely no evidence on the famous Turkish statesman having the slightest interest in football. For the early Republican period sports policies which favoured physical education, see Akın (2003).
6. For example, in Galatasaray, not being a graduate of Galatasaray High School or a former athlete in the clubs dramatically reduces the chances of becoming a member, since it is completely in club board's initiative to open memberships to the general public.
7. Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish Muslim intellectual and the inspirational figure of the Gülen movement. He has set up a worldwide network of Turkish primary and secondary schools. Members of his movement cultivate secrecy, and they have infiltrated the Turkish administration, particularly the police and judiciary. Gülen went into exile in the USA in 1999. From 2002 to 2011 he was an important ally of Erdoğan's government. However, their relations became strained (he criticised Erdoğan's actions, in particular, the growing hostility towards Israel, the violent repression of Gezi Park and the negotiations with Kurdish rebels), and they were broken off in late 2013 in the wake of revelations about cases of corruption involving ministers, AKP officials and Erdoğan's family members. The Gülen movement was accused of being behind these revelations and of attempting to destabilise the

government. It was declared to be a terrorist organisation and the authorities embarked on the severe repression of its members, seizing their financial assets and demanding that Gülen be extradited from the USA. Gülen and his allies were said to be behind the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, justifying a new wave of arrests and dismissals of public-sector officials.

8. On 13 May 2014, an explosion at a coal mine in Soma, Manisa, Turkey, caused an underground mine fire. 301 people were killed in what was the worst mine disaster in Turkey's history. Soma miners' relatives and lawyers denounced the dangerous working conditions and inadequate infrastructure. The disaster trigged a large sympathy movement in Turkey.

9. However, although these benefits were the cumulative product of diplomatic overtures, the match failed to have a significant impact on Turkish–Syrian relations. The decline into civil war following the Syrian revolt in 2011 and Turkey's ensuing support of the opposition, considerably altered relations.

10. After the Gezi movements (June 2013), Erdoğan's close circles and collaborators were accused of corruptions which triggered in 2014 strong repressions against journalists, and lawyers, police officers. In 2015, in the framework of the Syrian drama, Erdoğan who lost its majority at the Turkish Parliament (June) relaunched during the military actions against the PKK. In July 2016, the failed state coup gave to Erdoğan the opportunity to implement the state security and to engage repression against those accused to be linked to the plotters (especially the Gülen movement). More than 50,000 people had been put in jail and 140,000 of the civil servant were dismissed (among them scholars, lawyers, police and military officers). In 2017, after a narrow victory in a referendum (with important fraud suspicion), Turkey adopted a controversial new Constitution that gives still more power to the President Erdoğan. In the context of a growing pressure on Turkish media, some European leaders have called to stop Turkey's EU accession talks.

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