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THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Edited by
Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba and Toyin Falola



The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics,
Governance and Development

Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba • Toyin Falola
Editors

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*To Professor Mahmood Mamdani for his intellectual vision
and
To President Thabo Mbeki for his political vision*

PREFACE

There is an inextricable link between politics, governance and development. This is because the nature of politics affects the quality of governance, which inevitably determines development outcomes. In almost six decades of moves towards political independence, politics, governance and development in Africa have evolved and morphed into their contemporary position. Politics in Africa has been defined by the antinomies of liberal and radical thoughts, with the former having the upper hand. In the 1960s, discourse on politics was largely determined by the theory of political development, which emanated from the modernization school. In this context, liberal theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Sidney Verba, Jason Finkle and Richard Gamble considered newly independent countries in Africa as arenas for contestation over political power in ways that made conflicts inevitable. In the perspectives of these scholars, lack of hegemony among the elites undermined the capacity for forming legitimate political authority. Consequently, the military was considered the most cohesive, disciplined and modernized institution capable of presiding over the affairs of the newly independent countries. Thus, political infighting among the nationalists who led African countries to independence provided a convenient excuse for the military to strike and take over power. From the first military coup in Egypt in 1952 to the Togo coup of 1963, African countries became a hotbed of coups and countercoups for the next four decades.

The Cold War also shaped the politics of Africa in the first two decades of independence in ways that saw the two main rival powers contesting for space and relevance in Africa. To a great extent, politics in Africa during this time was shaped by the two competing ideologies of Socialism and Capitalism, with the former having footholds in countries that pledged allegiance to the former Soviet Union and the latter being countries that had the West, represented by the United States of America and Britain, as their base of support.

From the 1980s, discourses on African politics have centered around state formation, the state's capacity to deliver public good, the development and entrenchment of institutions, the role of the state in the economy, as well as the

nature and the character of political elites. Even in the post-independence era, the state still functions essentially as an instrument of extraction for the political elites. Following on the heels of the key arguments of the dependence theory that the Third World should delink from the core capitalist countries, African countries formed various alignments with other countries in the global South from the 1950s. In the light of the Bandung conference of 1955, African countries joined other countries in the South to take a non-aligned position on the raging Cold War of the time. However, the reality of the search for development aid and the politics of raw material extraction compelled many of the countries to be aligned one way or the other.

Notwithstanding the relative success of the postcolonial state in establishing state-owned enterprises to generate revenue and employ millions of citizens, the commodity crisis of the 1970s and the early 1980s led to the collapse of these companies. The resulting debt crisis necessitated the intervention of the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Founded on the neoliberal principle of market efficiency, these organizations identified the state as the main culprit in the socio-economic problems that faced African countries. Consequently, they recommended the rolling back of the state and the primacy of the market in the management of the economy. It was in this context that the idea of good governance came to dominate discourses on politics and development in Africa. From this perspective, the need to protect the market necessitated the observance of certain principles to which the state must adhere. These included observance of rule of law, protection of property rights, an efficient court system and independence of the Central Bank, among others. Beyond mere policy advice, acceptance and adoption of these prescriptions were made contingent to qualification to receive external aid from both bilateral and multilateral agencies. It was also in this context that the third wave of democracy swept across the continent. Despite the tone of finality that underpinned these policy prescriptions, the scorecard in terms of nation-building, democratic consolidation and inclusive development in Africa has fallen below average as the continent continues to dominate the league of least developed countries in all indexes of human development.

As the search for the most appropriate political arrangement which is capable of fostering socio-economic development in Africa continues, this handbook is a modest contribution to the debates on how the past encounter with the West in forms of colonialism, neocolonialism and coloniality as well as the internal contradictions of the political milieu on the continent have stifled the realization of the massive potential for accelerated development.

Contributors to this volume went beyond the niceties of political, economic and social theories and sophisticated methodologies to engage with history and how it has continued to impact on the contemporary experiences of African countries and its peoples. They also went beyond fixation with the past and the present and look to what the future holds for socio-economic and political development on the continent. The uniqueness of this volume lies in its multidisciplinary nature as contributors include scholars from various disciplines such as

political science, history, economics, international relations, philosophy, education, sociology and political economy. Although they share different views and perspectives, their contributions have further stimulated our minds and enhanced our understanding of the challenges that the continent continues to face with regard to politics, governance and development. While the analyses of these scholars will no doubt help in shaping knowledge in these areas of study, their recommendations will assist policymakers in making informed and high-quality policy choices that can help to ameliorate the current and future challenges confronting the continent and its peoples.

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Introduction: Contextualizing the Debates on Politics, Governance and Development

Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba and Toyin Falola

Debates on African politics, governance and development have been located within the search for socio-economic and political transformation of the continent, especially since the wave of independence that started in the late 1950s. In attempts to contextualize the challenges faced by African countries, scholars have established a link between the nature of politics, economy and governance from pre-colonial through colonial to the postcolonial periods (Herbst, 2000; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mamdani, 1996; Ake, 1981; Rodney, 1981).

Mamdani (1996) shows how the pre-colonial institutions of governance were rearranged, altered and recreated to serve the immediate needs of the colonialists. In a bid to institute and establish their authority over their subjects, the colonialists changed the structure of power by deposing chiefs and traditional rulers and arbitrarily appointing compliant natives who were inclined to do their bidding. The constitution of these new levels of power had implications for the exercise of power, the legitimacy of political authority as well as for peace, harmony and cohesion of the colonized societies. Over the course of time, African politics have evolved with varied experiences across different parts of the continent.

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Discourses on African politics have centered around state formation, its capacity to deliver public good, the development and entrenchment of institutions, the role of the state in the economy as well as the nature and the character of political elites (Joseph, 2016; Englebert, 2009; Herbst, 2000; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Herbst (2000) compares Africa with Europe and concludes that the processes of state formation in Africa have not followed those in Europe due in part to the failure to develop bureaucratic capacity and institutions for tax collection. He notes that the state in Africa never had to make political concessions to its citizens. This leads to a situation where there is no functioning political institutions such as parliament. Even in the post-independence era, the state still functions essentially as an instrument of extraction by the political elites. This simplistic explanation of Herbst on political power and the state in Africa was challenged by Robinson (2002) who convincingly argues that external factors such as long years of trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonialism contributed to the weak capacity of the state in Africa. Fukuyama (2010) identifies three important categories of political institutions that are necessary for the delivery of public good in any society. These include the state, the rule of law and accountable government. These three institutions have not been obviously present in many African countries post-independence and their absence has created room for the preponderance of patrimonialism, in which government officials use the state as a means of personal accumulation. Bratton and van de Walle (1994: 61) put this in contextual perspective thus:

In patrimonial political systems, an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power; ordinary folk are treated as extensions of the ‘big man’s’ household, with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler. Authority is entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler’s preferences rather than any codified system of laws. The ruler ensures the political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain environment and by selectively distributing favors and material benefits to loyal followers who are not citizens of the polity so much as the ruler’s clients.

Fukuyama (2010) amplifies this position when he notes that impersonal modern states are difficult institutions to both establish and maintain, since patrimonialism—recruitment based on kinship or personal reciprocity—is the natural form of social relationship to which human beings will revert in the absence of other norms and incentives and that the most universal form of human political interaction is a patron–client relationship in which a leader exchanges favors in return for support from a group of followers. With the particular case of Africa, Fukuyama notes that, although most people would prefer to live in a society where government is both effective and accountable, only few governments are able to provide these qualities because of weak, corrupt, incapacitated or absent institutions. Scholars such as Young (1994) and Joseph (2013, 1987) argue that the prebendalizing of the public realm created a state that was incapable of effective macroeconomic management. This is because patrimonialism has a self-destructive nature with strong

debilitating consequences for the capacity of the state. Despite the popularity of this concept among Africanist scholars in the West and the influence that their position has had on the donor community in their assessment of the socio-economic situation in Africa, recent scholarship has queried the utilitarian benefit of the concept to the African economic condition. For instance, Pitcher et al. (2009) argue that the current usages of the term *patrimonial* in the context of Africa are conceptually problematic and amount to a serious misreading of Weber. They argue that, contrary to the broad-brush usage of the concept to describe economic performance in Africa, Weber's usage of *patrimonialism* indicates a legitimate type of authority, not a type of regime. It also included notions of reciprocity and voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled. Given this relationship, the reciprocities enabled subjects to check the actions of rulers, which most analyses of neopatrimonialism overlook. Mkandawire (2015: 4) takes this argument forward when he notes that:

While *patrimonialism* can be used to describe different styles of exercising authority, idiosyncratic mannerism of certain individual leaders and social practices within states, the concept offers little analytical content and has no predictive value with respect to economic policy and performance.

The location of the economic challenges of the 1980s within the purview of the marriage of traditional practices and modernity in Africa is only one side of the argument, which serves the interests of the World Bank and its neoliberal apologists. The idea of developmental *patrimonialism* has also been used to describe outliers such as post-genocide Rwanda and, increasingly, Ethiopia.

Apart from the *patrimonialism* school and its variant, neopatrimonialism, scholars argue that the state in Africa is also weak because of corruption. In an attempt to describe the nature of the state in Africa, especially in relations to its dysfunctionality, various epithets have been used: "sovereignty and sorrow," "politics of the belly," "prebendal," "leviathan," "kleptocratic," "predatory," "disorder as political instrument," and "patrimonial," among others (Englebert, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993; Joseph, 2013, 1987).

While these descriptions may be apt, many of the inventors of these epithets fail to take into consideration the role of external forces in the shaping of the state in Africa. Adebani and Obadare (2010: 387) put this counter-argument this way:

The disorder-as-a-system-of-order thesis that governs many approaches to African realities often misses the historical nature of the order that the positive Other—that is, the social forces committed to the transformation, or, at least, reformation has been attempting, before and since independence, to impose on the African state. Yet, that the result of the struggle has been less than satisfactory or even visible must be conceded.

While the struggle has been less than satisfactory as these authors argue, other scholars have established the fact that, in the first decades of independence, the

state in Africa performed relatively creditably, even as it became involved in established enterprises, expanded the bureaucracy, thereby generating employment for the teeming population (Olukoshi, 2004; Soludo and Ogbu, 2004).

One of the most visible expressions of the disconnect between external actors' policy prognosis and the reality of African conditions was the Berg Report of 1981, which the World Bank adopted as its policy framework for Africa. The report had identified the state as the main hindrance to economic development and recommended that African countries (that were already in throes of economic problems) should be compelled to adopt various measures, which include the Washington Consensus prescriptions such as market liberalization, inflationary macroeconomic stabilization and other market-based and private-sector driven policies. As Augustine Fosu (this volume) notes, other recommendations of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) include:

strict debt management; effective control of budget deficits; massive privatization of state-owned enterprises; and curtailment of government spending, including severely limiting government subsidies for consumption goods and social services. Particularly salient among the proposed policies were currency devaluation and trade liberalization intended to achieve an economically healthy and stable external balance. These proposed reforms refer to 'economic governance'.

These policy prescriptions were made conditional for receiving development assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The package of intervention was designed as a structural adjustment program (SAP) geared toward restoring macroeconomic stability and helping to diversify the economic base of the affected countries. Suffice it to note that, with few exceptions, these policies were accepted without any form of consultation with local populations. This was essentially because most of the countries were under one form of autocratic rule or the other. Even in Nigeria, where the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida consulted with certain civil society groups on whether or not to follow the path dictated by the IMF, the consultation turned out to be a façade as the government rejected the overall majority opinion of and implemented the program nonetheless. As several scholars have argued, the Structural Adjustment Program was not only ill-timed but it was grossly inappropriate for addressing the challenges facing the continent (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Onimode, 1988).

Rather than helping to correct the macroeconomic problems, SAPs worsened conditions as poverty and inequality increased. Devaluation of currencies led to the change in the social structure of society as the middle class more or less disappeared. Paradoxically, corruption became more endemic as the scramble for state resources became more intense after the adoption of SAPs. Over the same period, debt accumulation increased and dependence on foreign aid became one of the few ways in which African countries could survive.

Although the BWIs would claim that SAPs are no longer tenable in Africa, the reality is that the policy package of the Washington Consensus continues today in various guises such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Enhanced

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the World Bank's new transformation agenda Bank. Moreover, even though the state was considered an obstacle to economic development, it was used as the agent for imposing the bitter pill of massive cuts in social spending, mostly applied in a violent manner. One upside of the SAPs was that it contributed to a series of actions that led to the third wave of democracy on the continent as people demanded the liberalization of the political space. As Olukoshi (1997) argues, the contradictions of SAPs paved the way for the constellation of social forces in countries such as Nigeria to demand political liberalization.

Following the seminal success of the East Asian countries in the 1980s, the prospect of building a democratic developmental state in Africa was also mooted. Scholars such as Edigheji (2010) and Mkandawire (2001) note that building bureaucratic, administrative and political capacity are necessary features of a developmental state. Mkandawire (2001: 289) argues that "one remarkable feature of the discourse of the state and development in Africa is the disjuncture between an analytical tradition that insists on the impossibility of developmental states in Africa and a prescriptive literature that presupposes the possibility of their existence." Having said this, he went further to argue that even though the dominant literature forecloses the possibility of a developmental state in Africa due in part to the comparison of African states with other states, "neither Africa's postcolonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful 'developmental states' rule out the possibility of African developmental states capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto." Examples from post-war Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana and, Ethiopia are increasingly confirming Mkandawire position that a developmental state is possible in Africa. But when development is prefixed by democracy, at least in its neoliberal version, many of the high performing developmental states may fail to meet the requirements to qualify for developmental status. Although states such as Ethiopia and Rwanda have made significant strides in economic performance, the democratic credentials of these countries leave much to be desired. Reservations about such democratic credentials among high performing economies in Africa feeds in to the current debates on the limits of liberal democracy and its capacity for fostering economic development. As Joseph (2016) and Fukuyama (2013) separately argue, it is a matter of concern that countries that are recording higher levels of economic growth today both in Africa and elsewhere are those that are not strictly practicing liberal democracy. The capacity of these countries to deliver public goods to their citizens has put a big question mark around the high expectation of liberal democracy and its supposed triumph over other forms of government.

The challenge with liberal democracy and its link to the search for inclusive development brings us to the second focus of this Handbook: governance. Despite its embeddedness in politics, governance has assumed a life of its own since the World Bank's adoption of the concept in the 1990s. Rather than seeing it as a constitutive aspect of politics, it became instrumentalized as an ideological tool for describing or measuring the compliance of government

with certain standards. Hence the term good governance became another buzzword, taken primarily as an end result rather than the process of development. Development itself became a big industry in which aid and official development to Africa eventually became known as the white man's burden.

The idea of good governance as a necessary condition for fostering socio-economic development in Africa was part of the reform packages of the BWIs and the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s. Crafted within the general neoliberal economic doctrine of a limited government, good governance relates to the observance of the rule of law, protection of property rights and the primacy of institutions. It was premised on the reduction of the redistributive role of the state and maximizing the play of market forces (Englebert and Portelance 2015). The works of Joseph (2012) provide a contextual debate for further discussion on the growth-governance nexus in Africa. Joseph's view is that this nexus provides contrasting puzzles and outcomes both in the past, where the involvement of the state in economic activities led to economic decline, and in recent times where there have been some positive development outcomes with state involvement. In more than three decades after the adoption of the good governance in Africa, there have only been a few outliers where impressive levels of economic growth have been achieved. For the majority of people, the adoption of good governance in theory has not translated into more transparency in governance in practice, nor has it led to the expected economic growth.

One of the development economists who have challenged the good governance mantra and its overtly optimistic expectation to bring about economic development is Mushtaq Khan. Drawing on the works of scholars such as North (1990, 1984) and Acemoglu and colleagues (2004), Khan argues that the good governance agenda is based on the theoretical framework of the New Institutional Economics (NIE). The NIE links economic stagnation to high transactional costs of markets, contested and weak property rights and welfare, reducing interventions, rent seeking and corruption, unaccountable government and economic stagnation. While recognizing that that it is imperative for states to have governance capabilities, Khan made a distinction between the dominant liberal approach to governance, which he calls 'market-enhancing' governance (and which is generally referred to as good governance), and an alternative view of governance appropriate for developing countries which draws on the historical evidence of catching up, described as 'growth-enhancing' governance (Khan 2009, 2008). He argues that

Many of the dominant views on governance reform priorities for developing countries implicitly draw on a particular view of the role of the state that is based on a view of markets as largely able on their own to allocate resources and draw forth entrepreneurial capabilities that are necessary for sustaining economic development. This view argues that the appropriate governance capabilities to ensure growth and development should be market-supporting governance capabilities to maintain a rule of law, stable property rights, control corruption and operate political institutions that ensure accountability through democratic processes. (p. 1)

This view is based on a comparison of state capabilities in developing countries with those of the developed capitalist countries. Given the divergence in the history of state formation and experiences, it is problematic to transpose what obtains in the developed capitalist countries to the developing countries. It is even more so as history shows that the developed countries of today did not develop because of good governance structures but in spite of them. It was with this in mind that Khan proposed another perspective to governance, which he calls “growth-enhancing governance.” He argues that

the alternative approaches to social understanding start from historical readings of processes of change and transformation in different countries and then attempt to build plausible theoretical models of historical change ... Thus, these alternative approaches to governance not only take a different position on theoretical aspects of how markets and states work, but often derive this analysis from different methods of reading the processes of economic transformation in developing countries.

Khan contends that

instead of the broad public goods describing good governance we find that successful countries instead had a more limited and specific set of capabilities and political arrangements that allowed their states to push accumulation, technology acquisition, resource allocation and political stabilization in very difficult contexts using an array of pragmatic strategies that differed from country to country. (p. 3)

Lin and Monga (2012) provide a critique of the broad-brush and universalistic tendencies of the good governance agenda of the World Bank and the IMF. They argue that by focusing on the search for the determinants of some global governance standards that often reflect particular political, ideological and philosophical conceptions of power, the traditional literature on governance has so far failed offer a set of actionable policies that poor countries could implement to foster inclusive growth in a pragmatic and incentives-compatible way. This point is very significant as it points out one of the main defects of the interventions of the BWIs in Africa: a universal application of rules and standards, with scant regard for the historical differences and institutional capacities of the developing countries. Lin and Monga conclude that, instead of posing “good governance” as the main prescription and a prerequisite for sustained growth development, economists should design policy frameworks that offer the maximum likelihood of success because they are consistent with comparative advantage, while providing minimum opportunities for rent-seeking and state capture. Beyond this is the need to develop institutions that are consistent with the historical realities of the countries concerned and ensure that governance delivers on inclusive development.

The last major sub-theme of this Handbook is development in Africa. The search for development, broadly conceived as improvement in people’s living conditions, has been central to discourses on postcolonial Africa. Although

the meaning of what constitutes development itself has been a subject of much debate (see Mkandawire 2010), Africanist scholars, described by Olukoshi (2005) as “high priests” on African issues as well as policy makers, have not shied away from prescribing different theories and policies on how Africa can develop. Thus, starting from the modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s through the dependency theories, import substitution industrialization strategies, the New International Economic Order (NIEO) of the 1960s and 1970s to the nascent neoliberal order (see Nasong’o, this volume), there have been plethora of suggestions and recommendations on how Africa countries can catch up with the rest of the world, using the developed countries as a standard and yardstick to measure what constitutes development. As Mkandawire (2010) argues, the idea of development as catching up has been driven by the emancipatory aspirations of developing countries themselves, and that catch-up goes as far back as the humiliating encounter with the West. In this regard, modernisation theorists like those of W.W. Rostow see the attainment of development in terms of unilineal stages that countries must follow just as developed countries, especially in Europe, had done (see Rostow 1960). Modernization theory also informed and shaped the policy orientation of the leaders of the West in the early late 1950s and early 1990s. In order to make up for the shortage of domestic capital, which was considered necessary for the development of the newly independent countries, developed countries poured billions of dollars into overseas development assistance to African countries. In what Easterly (2006) calls the white man’s burden in a book of the same title, these resources have failed dismally to bring about development due in part to the fact that the recipients were never consulted on what their needs and priorities were.

On the other hand, the aid industry became a political economy instrument of accumulation and control in what Adedeji (2002) calls the development merchant system where a sizeable portion of the resources are spent as consultancy fees to nationals of the giving countries. The failure of development aid did not teach its architects and key actors the lesson of seeking to understand the ineluctable processes of the history of social change and the peculiarity of the each country before imposing policies. Rather, acting in concert with the BWIs, developed countries, led by the United States of America, designed new packages of reforms, which they considered to be appropriate for fostering development on the continent. As mentioned above, SAPs and their variants were imposed on Africa for many years. The result of such external imposition, as Escobar observed (1995, cited in Mkandawire 2010: 9), was that development has been a disaster:

instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression. The debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence are only the most pathetic signs of the failure of forty years of development.

The elusive search for development in Africa has been complicated by the nature of politics, the structure of the domestic economies and the location of Africa in the global political economy. At the political level, scholars have argued that, despite all pretensions to the contrary, the political elites in Africa lack hegemony, are disconnected from society and lack autonomy for capital mobilization (see Taylor 2014; Ake 1996; Shivji 1980). In the first decades after independence, the political elites moved from the struggle for decolonization to the project of nation-building and in the process moved from a consultative process that defined the nationalist struggle for independence to an authoritarian and despotic rule. Preoccupied with an urgent sense of achieving development, most leaders preferred a state of silent cooperation among their contemporaries under what Ki-Zerbo (2005) calls “silence: development in process.” Thus politics became a zero-sum game in which the winners take all and the loser loses all, sometimes, his or her own life. Following in the footsteps of its progenitor, the postcolonial state became violent, statist and exploitative (see Ake 1996). The result of the intolerance of the political elites was a prolonged period of political instability, in the form of coup and counter-coups, wars and ethnic conflicts. From Nigeria to Ethiopia, Uganda to Somalia, Mali, Sudan and Zimbabwe, there has been one form of challenge or the other.

The structure of the domestic economy in Africa has been such that export of raw materials constitutes the bulk of economic activities. Dependence on resources has engendered resource curse (see Obi, this volume) and worsened the crisis of governance (Collier 2007). Lack of diversification in the economies of African states has consistently made the economies susceptible to the vagaries of the international commodity markets. Although manufacturing constituted a sizeable part of the key economies such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire in the first decades after independence, this soon fizzled out under the weight of an unfavorable international political economy, where the rules favor the developed countries. Despite a lull in the momentum of pan-Africanism, on which many countries on the continent rode to independence, the 2000s witnessed some Pan-continental development strategies for achieving development. Leaders such as Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal led a series of processes that culminated in the formation of the New Partnership for African Development as well as the African Peer Review Mechanism. The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union (AU) (Fagbayibo, this volume) was part of the initiative geared toward boosting developmental governance and realizing an African renaissance.

Since the early 2000s, Africa has occupied the spotlight as a rising continent. According to reports from the World Bank and the IMF, many of the high performing countries in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) are in Africa. For several years, countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Rwanda grew at more than 7 percent. However, as Olorunfoba (2014) and Taylor (this volume) have argued, these growth figures did not result from any fundamental change in the structure of the African economies, neither

were they high or long enough to bring about the development needed. Rather, they were externally determined and contingent on what happened in newly emerging countries, especially China, India and Brazil.

Contributors to this volume examine the various dimensions of African politics, governance and development from historical, contemporary and future perspectives. The contributions cover theoretical, empirical and policy aspects of these three interrelated concepts. As politics is embedded in both the economy and society, Africa has witnessed changes in politics, economics, demography and its relations with the world in ways that requires a large volume of the type that this Handbook promises to be.

Research on the interconnections between politics, governance and development in Africa has found expression in various publications that seek to understand the primacy of politics as a necessary condition for development. Among such books are Robert Bates, *Markets and States in Africa*, 1981 and *Centralization of African Societies*, 1983; Patrick Chabal and Jean Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, 1999; Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspectives*, 1997; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, 1996; and Jeffery Herbst, *State and Power in Africa: Contemporary Lessons in Authority and Control*, 2000. These earlier works were succeeded by new endeavors that situate Africa in the narrative of weak state, state failure, conflict, poverty and the good governance discourses. Examples are Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, 2007; Pierre Englebert, *Africa Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow*, 2009; April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon, *Understanding the Contemporary Africa*, 2013; Peyi Soyinka Airewele and Rita Edozie, *Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, Economics and Culture in the Global Era*, 2010; Akbar Noman and Kwesi Botchwey, *Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategy*, 2012; and David Booth and Diana Cammack, *Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems*, 2013.

Our current endeavor complements these arrays of scholarly output. However, we have gone beyond them by adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the issue of politics, governance and development in Africa. Contributors to this volume span several disciplines including History, Political Science, International Relations, Sociology, Anthropology, Economics and Education. This interdisciplinary approach enhances cross-fertilization of ideas and fecundity of thought that combines to provide readers with a masterly understanding of the issues covered in the Handbook.

ORGANIZATION OF THE HANDBOOK AND THEMATIC FOCUS

The book is divided into ten parts, which include, following the Introduction, Theories and Concepts (Part I); History and Contexts of Politics, Governance and Development (Part II); the Military in Politics (Part III); Identity Politics, Conflict and Development (Part IV); Progressive Forces, Governance and

Development (Part V); Democracy, Governance and Development (Part VI); The Political Economy of Development (Part VII); Africa in Global Politics (Part VIII); and the Future of African Governance, Politics and Development (Part IX). A Conclusion summarizes the Handbook's (Part X). Authors of the theories and concepts of African politics and governance examine various aspects of the theories that have underpinned the search for development in Africa since independence. These include the theories of the state, postcolonialism, decoloniality, social change and nation-building.

In Chap. 2, Wanjala S. Nasong'o interrogates the competing theories and concepts of politics, governance and development in Africa. He argues that multiple theories and concepts of governance, politics, and development have been employed in the study of African politics, with varying degrees of analytical potency and competing implications for African governance and development. Nasong'o notes that some of these theoretical and conceptual frameworks are rooted in the liberal perspective while others proceed from a critical paradigm; some are holistic while others are individualistic; some are dyadic while others are atomistic; some are unilinear in orientation while others are dialectical. The author notes that the theories that have shaped the three interrelated concept include liberal theories of modernization, political order and political stability, public policy critical theories such as the dependency world systems approach, Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories, new liberal approaches such as public choice and institutionalism, political economy, neo and post-imperialism, social movements and the nationalist school. In a thorough analysis of these theories in terms of their strengths, weaknesses and relevance for politics, governance and development in Africa, African peoples and social systems of the neoliberal models of development imposed by the dominant social classes realities of the Global North. Although the liberal theories described may appear to seek for solutions to the multifarious challenges facing Africa, they have done so using the West as the standard. It was in the context of such limiting assumptions that the critical theories, though often too prescriptive, were more appropriate for advancing understanding of the processes of development in Africa.

The most important institution in the study of politics, governance and development in Africa is the state. Even though the authority and the legitimacy of this institution has been challenged on several occasions, analysis of it remains critical to the understanding of how the development process in Africa has floundered since the 1970s. In Chap. 3 Ogenga Otunnu interrogates the theoretical basis of the state. He argues that the diverse descriptions of the crises of the state and the competing and/or complementary possible remedies to the crises in Africa imply an important conclusion, which shows that the most significant factor accounting for the origins, persistence and harrowing effects of the crises are directly related to the profound legitimation deficits of the state, its institutions and the political incumbents, and the interplay of both local and international factors, past and present. The author also notes that discussions about the African state have produced more confusion than clarity. This lack of consensus manifests itself in various ways and is compounded by

the usage of important but problematic concepts and/or “theories” in the study of the African state: “weak state,” “soft state,” “hard state,” “failed state,” “failing state,” “collapsed state,” “shadow state,” “criminal state,” “predatory state,” “warlord state,” “over-extended state,” “juridical state,” “empirical state,” “crisis state,” “authoritarian state,” “semi-authoritarian state,” “democratic state,” and “developmental state.” Otunnu interrogates the historical foundation of the state in Africa, its origin and character, from colonial to post-colonial times. He concludes that the persistence and the unprecedented scale of the crises of the African state require innovative, flexible, dynamic, outward-looking and comprehensive practical strategies and policies that address the underlying structural conditions that sustain the crises. Such practical strategies and policies, he argues, should address human rights abuses, dictatorship, corruption, underdevelopment, poverty and inequality caused and sustained by both internal and external factors, political and religious repression, profound legitimization deficits of the state, domination and exploitation and environmental degradation.

In Chap. 4 Godwin Onuoha examines postcolonialism as a theoretical framework for understanding the state in Africa. Despite the popularity of postcolonialism, Onuoha argues that its usefulness for understanding the socio-economic and political phenomenon in Africa is limited because of its conceptual ambiguity. He notes that the concept of postcolonialism articulates a philosophy that seeks to propose fundamental alterations to politics and popular struggles, which encompasses the history of colonialism and the perpetuation of imperialist policies. According to Onuoha, postcolonial theory, at least as deployed in academia, is perceived as elitist, but with obvious relevance to issues of gender, race, migration, diaspora, nation and identity. Postcolonial studies are largely predicated on cultural studies and are yet to incarnate most of the political and economic debates subsumed within post-colonialism. He adds that what appears to be one of the main critiques of postcolonial studies is the fact that it fails to mediate debates around “real” politics but focuses extensively on modes of textual interpretations as taught in English departments of universities. The author also argues that the present necessities and realities, particularly in the economic and political realm on the continent, reinforce the need to revisit the transcendence of colonial imprints on contemporary African societies. It appears that postcolonial African political thought and practice is intrinsically tied to Western ideas, theories and concepts. Consequently, Onuoha concludes that in order to make democracy work for development in Africa there is a need to rethink the postcolonial agenda in a manner that makes actual meaning and impacts positively on the quality of lives of African peoples and strengthens the critical constituencies in African communities. The limitation of post colonialism to African studies to decoloniality as an explanatory framework of the relations of Africa to the Eurocentric global order of the last 500 years. Perhaps as a

reaction to postcolonialism, decolonial thinkers argue that there is nothing “post” in the pattern and order or relations between the Global North and the rest. With roots in Latin America, this approach argues that there is a continuity of colonial structures which is revealed in areas of knowledge, power and being (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a). Consequently, in order to have true freedom, decolonial thinkers call for a complete change in the patterns of relations with the West. William Jethro Mpfu in Chap. 5 interrogates this within the context of development conundrum in Africa. Mpfu argues that African liberatory and critical thought on development would not be so occupied with decoloniality if coloniality had not negated politics and development on the continent. He contends that a decolonial imagination of development in Africa necessarily has to pay attention to the historical and political injuries that Africa has encountered in slavery, colonialism and enduring coloniality. For that reason, a decolonial development paradigm in Africa cannot but be a liberatory and a repair operation at the level of power, knowledge and the sense of being African as subjects rather than objects of history. The author agrees with those decolonial thinkers who argue that decoloniality is a continuing search for a new world order after slavery and colonialism impoverished Africa, and coloniality continues to extract rent from Africa. Mpfu contends that decolonisation contains in itself certain contradictions which make postcolonial world a myth. He argues that decolonial thinking and practice in Africa have to be a combative ontology in reaction to the colonial paradigm that has presented development as underdevelopment, violence and domination. Using the late anthropologist Archie Mafeje as a source of interlocution, Mpfu argues that decoloniality emerged as a negation of negation in order to introduce liberation where domination has been normalized to challenge coloniality in which development in Africa has been presented as a negation. He concludes that decoloniality has to emerge where both socialism and capitalism are appearing increasingly impoverished, fatigued and entrapped in crisis.

Development is a process of social change at the socio-economic and political levels. Social change itself has been the subject of various theoretical contestations as the process and outcome invite varying historical and empirical interpretations. The theory of social change is the topic of Chap. 6 by Augustine Okechukwu Agugua, who argues that social change may refer to the notion of social progress or socio-cultural evolution—the philosophical idea that society moves forward by dialectical or evolutionary means. It may also refer to a paradigmatic change in the socio-economic structure, for instance a shift away from feudalism and towards capitalism. Accordingly, it may also refer to social revolution, such as women’s suffrage or the Civil Rights movement. Social change may be driven by cultural, religious, economic, scientific or technological forces. With particular regard to Africa, the author argues that colonialism and its deleterious effects on the continent necessitates social change both as a

reaction against and a response to the demands for such changes. Agugua identifies two broad of theories through which scholars have understood social change:

1. Theories relating to the direction of social change including various types of evolutionary and cyclical theory.
2. Theories relating to causation of change:
 - (a) Those explaining change in terms of endogamous factors or processes, and
 - (b) Those emphasizing exogamous factors such as economic, cultural or historical aspects.

Under these broad groupings are evolutionary and cyclical, liberal, dependency and Marxist theories, world systems, globalization and postmodernism. Agugua concludes that, in talking about social change as having informed the development of sociology, major sociological theorists posit that change does not affect one country or one way of life. They underscore the necessity to take a global approach and to understand how social groups fit into the context of the global social system. Principally, the postmodern approach is deemed to be very important in understanding social change in Africa.

Chapter 7, the last chapter of Part I, examines nation-building Africa. This chapter is important because one of the main challenges of post-independence political elites in Africa has been how to forge nation-states out of the mosaic of nationalities that the Europeans wedged together as single political entities during colonialism. The challenge of nation-building was even more complex as people that previously shared a similar culture, language and identity were forcefully transferred to new entities with people with dissimilar cultures and languages. This is very common in West Africa where, for instance, Yoruba people of southwest Nigeria were divided among the English-controlled Nigeria and French-controlled Benin Republic (see Ki-Zerbo 2005). Lawrence Ugwuanyi adopted a philosophical approach to interrogate the dilemma of nation-building in Africa. He argues notes that by nation-building is meant the effort to contribute to an institution that can be called a nation; that is, a situation whereby an entity or a people can be said to have a relationship that can be held to be national. He notes that the idea of nation-building may involve practical measures such as physical labor, personal adjustment and development, creation and recreation, cultural advancement, institutional re-adjustment and collective self-appraisal or re-appraisal and so on. The author tailors the work to nationalism as it relates to the modern form of the state that came into existence on the African continent as a result of the project of colonialism and how or whether there are indigenous ethics of nation-building in Africa that can promote this trend. In relation to the theory of nation-building, Ugwuanyi argues that, in order to provide theoretical views that support or explain how

it can be held that nation-building has some ground or basis in an African setting, it is imperative to note that this effort would be located within what can be held to be African theorizing or Afro-theorism. By Afro-theorism is meant advancing ideas through concepts which are believed to be rooted in the worldview of African people. The unique value of this chapter to the volume is the suggestion that, rather than focus on establishing nation-building at the national level, a pan-African nation that reflects the divergence of the peoples in terms of cultures, languages and other forms of identity construction should be pursued.

Part II focuses on the historical contexts of politics, governance and development in Africa. Contributors examine pre-colonial institutions in Africa, assess the origin, philosophy and influence of colonialism (both settler and non-settler), and nationalism and the role it played in developing political independence on the continent. In Chap. 8, the first chapter in Part II, Elizabeth A. Eldredge examines pre-colonial political institutions and their relevance for contemporary Africa. With empirical case studies, she argues that chiefdoms were ubiquitous throughout precolonial Africa for over a millennium before the modern era and that the primary institutions of governance across the continent were the chieftaincy and support offices of councils, counsellors and advisors, governors, subordinate chiefs and commanders. As chiefs consolidated their control over productive resources and trade and accumulated wealth, they increased their authority and power to control the political and economic functions of their polity, and their positions and the roles of other governing and administrative officials became institutionalized. These institutions of governance became more complex and structured over time. Contrary to the Hegelian argument that Africa was not part of human history, Eldredge argues that by 1500 CE, there were large and thriving chiefdoms and kingdoms across the continent. She concludes that only a careful analysis on a case-by-case basis can determine whether modern renditions of pre-colonial institutions have retained their original pre-colonial functions and have gained legitimacy by honoring restraints and restrictions on positions and persons of authority that were imposed by popular expectations and by the multiple separations of authority and power that had been present in the era of pre-colonial independent African rule.

The stronger pre-colonial African institutions were the first victims of colonial imposition and intrusion as they were not only violently destroyed by the colonialists but replaced by institutions that distorted the traditional structure of power and authority. Following this line of argument, Alina Segobye's Chap. 9 engages with the nature of politics and its interactions with society in precolonial Africa. Segobye bases her argument on anthropological studies that show how societies lived in the past, building social theory on how complex institutions such as kingship were founded, were used and eventually collapsed. Using historical evidence, she contends that there is a better way of understanding and appreciating how political and governance institutions developed,

including systems of trade, food production, culture and social life. In the same way, the author notes that from the material culture evident across the continent, we have been able to infer substantial and significant amounts of knowledge about the way in which governance and political institutions developed. A core argument of this chapter is that precolonial political institutions were not always expressed in terms of material culture. Rather, politics was infused across many other institutions of social and economic life. In the same vein, politics was infused in religious practice, societal norms and values and in arts and culture. This chapter, like the preceding one, challenges the core basis of racist anthropological studies, which denied the existence of history and any form of political arrangement in pre-colonial Africa. It also strikes at the core of the central argument of Christian missionaries, colonialists and theorists of modernization, with their unsubstantiated claims to civilizing Africa. Given the failure of the imposed Western models of governance to translate into inclusive development in Africa, this chapter provides lessons in institutional development for contemporary African countries.

Apart from the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism had the most significant impact of any external intervention on the socio-economic and political organization of African societies. There are divergent school of thoughts on the implications of colonialism on the continent. While liberal scholars, missionaries societies and racists anthropologists see colonialism as benign and beneficial to Africa, radical scholars argue that colonialism effectively destroyed the pre-colonial socio-economic and political organization of African societies (Acemoglu et al. 2002; Collier 2007; Falola 1984; Rodney 1981; Ake 1981). In his contribution to this volume, in Chap. 10, Adelaja Odutola Odukoya examines the philosophical and ideological foundations of colonialism and its effects on Africa. He notes that, despite the fact that Africa has celebrated five decades of independence, the continent is neither free nor developed. Some scholars, Odukoya notes, argue that contemporary crises and the contradictions of underdevelopment in Africa reflect the path dependency of the continent's colonial legacies. Others question the propriety of blaming colonialism for Africa's contemporary woes given that the colonial experience was not exclusive to Africa and the differences in the nature of colonialism within the continent.

Odukoya interrogates the nature, character and dynamic of colonialism in Africa in his chapter. He shows that though settler and non-settler colonial architectures appear seemingly heterogeneous; their divergent manifestations were but a result of strategic and tactical considerations. The illusion of difference aside, the author opines that colonialism across Africa was informed by the imperative to resolve the crises and contradictions of capitalism in Europe. Consequently, both settler and non-settler colonialism made Africa serve the interests of imperial political economies through rapacious appropriation and exploitation of resources and hegemonic subordination to the imperative of the unequal international capitalist system. Both colonial forms propagated a civilizing ideology rooted in cultural supremacy. He identifies forced labor,

violation of human rights, despotic rule, cultural disorientation and subordination, racism, divide and rule, inferior and irrelevant education, disarticulation and systematic deindustrialization as strategies of both settler and non-settler colonialism in Africa. The author concludes that the development of underdevelopment in Africa, irrespective of the nature and character of colonial rule, bears testimony to the fact that the difference between settler and non-settler colonialism in Africa was only in form and not in essence.

The last two chapters in Part II deal with nationalism both in its conceptual meaning and its role in triggering the decolonization process in Africa. It will be recalled that following the end of the Second World War, domestic and external forces in Europe, but in particular the weakening capacity of European countries to efficiently manage their overseas territories, led to an increased tempo in the campaign for decolonization. In Chap. 11, Maurice N. Amutabi argues that the history of African nationalism goes back centuries to the time when African states resisted foreign invaders and occupation. The earliest manifestation of nationalism in Africa is found in the Ethiopian state which resisted invaders from the north and east before the Christian era. The author demonstrates that Africa has gone through many phases in the history of its nationalism. Various parts of the continent experienced violent nationalist expressions in which millions of people lost their lives. In some countries, including Algeria, Angola, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, it took armed struggle to dislodge minority white rule. While acknowledging the important role of great pan-African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and the significance of the pan-Africanist movement in the decolonization of the continent, Amutabi concludes that, despite making some progress, African leaders have tended to focus on the nation-state and thus leave boundary disputes and conflicts between African states that are yet to be resolved. Moreover, the AU or African leaderships collectively have been able to do little about the horrific problems of oppressive African regimes, where leaders are changing constitutions to extend their terms in office. This calls for a new pan-Africanist movement, perhaps from below to seek for a shift in the paradigm of leadership and governance on the continent. James Olusenun Adeyeri's contribution in Chap. 12 specifically focuses on the role of the nationalist movements and individuals in resistance to formal colonialism and decolonization. He argues that the ideological underpinnings of African nationalism and quest for political independence had political, economic and social ramifications. Colonial actions and inactions provided African nationalists with the impetus and ingredients to formulate an ideology for the struggle for freedom. In the political sphere, the focus of African nationalists was the pursuit of equality and freedom to replace segregation, discrimination and subjection. This was predicated upon the strong conviction that in their condition of subjugation under alien governments and rulers, African states and peoples urgently needed to embrace self-help and mutual support for survival because only Africans themselves can best understand their own needs and can adequately satisfy such needs. The author shows the various dimension of the struggle for independence across the four

main geopolitical zones of Africa namely, West, East, North and South Africa. Despite the fact that the structures of the colonialists differ across the region, Adeyeri establishes the agency of peoples' resistance to colonialism. He concludes that in the post-independence period, however, nearly all African states, perhaps with the sole exception of South Africa, are yet to substantially reap the socio-economic and political benefits of independence. This has led to incessant national and occasional international crises, which sometimes degenerate into violent conflicts of monumental proportions. This conclusion underpins the necessity of economic decolonization as a necessary component of true freedom. As Mazrui (1999) argues, the high optimism that underlines Nkrumah's aphorism of "seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things will be added" was betrayed because, without economic freedom, political freedom is limited in its ability to foster genuine independence.

The advent of the military in politics has affected the level of political development in Africa. Starting from the first military coup, which took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952, the continent became a theater of coups and counter-coups. What contributed to these series of coups and counter-coups and how have they contributed to undermine political development on the continent? These are the issues that are analyzed by the contributors to the third part of this handbook. In Chap. 13, Godwin Okeke examines the theories of military rule in Africa. He argues that virtually all modern African militaries are a creation of colonialism, of which their character, culture and environment differ markedly from African culture, attitudes, historical experiences and environment. With this background, Okeke notes that there are several theoretical spectrums of the military in African politics, including colonial legacy, weak political institution and culture, lack of socio-economic development, ethnic plurality, foreign influence and contagion. The author revisits the dominant theoretical orientations and interrogates their continued relevance or otherwise in the explanation of the military in African politics. Following this chapter, in Chap. 14 Richard Obinna chronicles the history of coups and counter-coups on the continent. He argues that while coups and counter-coups are global phenomena, they are especially common in postcolonial African states. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s military coups and counter-coups were more rampant in African politics than in the 1990s and 2000s. Ironaya investigates why the African state remains prone to military coups and counter-coups despite an appreciable desire to establish sustainable democracy. He argues that an analysis of the phenomena of coups and counter-coups entails a theoretical discussion of the internal and external factors—social, economic, political and historical conditions—which render the postcolonial African state susceptible to incessant military incursions into politics. He also highlights the effects of military coups and counter-coups and offers suggestions on how this challenge can be addressed at national and regional levels. The author concludes that preventing coups and counter-coups should entail a reconsideration of the concept of leadership. Leadership should not be personified by those holding public offices but entrusted to political institutions. Institutional leadership

should therefore be emphasized over charismatic or personalized leadership. Institutional leadership will enhance political pluralism, accountability, transparency, integrity and the rule of law as well as assist in the reorientation of the military toward professionalism and deference to civilian control. Beyond this is the need to ensure people's social and economic security, while ensuring the subordination of the military to civilian control.

In countries where the military has intervened in politics a program of transition to civilian rule is generally put in place. This is the subject of Chap. 15 by Rotimi Ajayi and Yusuf Ibrahim. The authors argue that, after decades of military interregnum in Africa, there seems to be a new order sweeping across the continent. They note that the men in "Khaki," as the military is often referred to, are shifting base back to their original enclave, the barracks. This has been necessitated by popular outcry and widespread demonstration by pluralists, professional and civil society groups, religious organizations, among others, against the brutal and oppressive nature of military regimes; the unpopular nature of military rule globally; and the pressure from the global community on military rulers to democratize the political space. This has led to the different variants of transitional politics across the globe aimed at restoring and consolidating the democratic process, as the experiences of Burundi, Niger, Nigeria, Lesotho, Mozambique, Togo and Central African Republic (CAR) have clearly demonstrated. However, one fundamental problem with the military-led transitions in Africa is that former military leaders, overtly or covertly, still hold sway, especially in the distribution of power, privileges and positions in the society, and in some cases leading to fear of further military interventions in the polity. The authors conclude that the degree of democratic consolidation in Africa depends largely on the pattern of intervention and mode of withdrawal by the military in countries where they had once exercised political suzerainty.

Apart from ensuring that the military returns to the barracks, another major challenge of managing military incursions into politics is how to ensure civilian control over the military. This is particularly important because of the penchant of the military to take over power, even after handing over to civilian governments. For instance, even though the military government of General Olusegun Obasanjo handed over to a civilian government in 1979, the military struck again barely four years into that democratic experiment. The same pattern played out in Ghana and other parts of the continent. Browne Onuoha examines this issue in Chap. 16. He argues that "objective" civilian control of the military may not be achieved now in Africa because there is no political socialization guiding the social formation of the African citizen. Onuoha further contends that the "subjective" civil-military relations in greater part of Africa conform with the unstable social and political history of the region. He concludes that in order to ensure civil-military control, there is need for a socialization process, which will help to build a person's spirit of nationalism before they are admitted into a military school.

While much attention has been focused on the economic problems confronting the continent of Africa, less attention has been given to the crisis of identity, which has engendered conflict, wars and xenophobia. These issues are taken up in Part IV of the Handbook. Contributors examine various identity issues, which include the politics of identity and the crisis of nation-building, migration and xenophobia and wars of secession, ethnic identity and conflict, resource control and conflict as well as conflict and peacebuilding. Chapter 17 by Ikenna Mike Alumona and Stephen Nnaemeka Azom examines identity politics and the crisis of nation-building in Africa. The authors argue that Africa as a continent has been characterized by different crises that are principally responsible for her underdevelopment. They contend that, among the various problems in Africa that have attracted attention, the identity crisis and its attendant impact on the process of nation-building appear the most protracted and challenging. They conclude that colonialism in Africa intruded into the integration process of nation formation in Africa and in the process created a kind of identity politics that has remained the bane of nation-building on the continent. Although the post independent elites have not succeeded in forging nation-states out of the multiplicities of nations on the continent, this is imperative for political stability and development.

One of the ways in which the crisis of identity has manifested itself on the continent is xenophobia or what is generally known as Afrophobia, in which African nationals are attacked and sometimes killed in other African countries. In Chap. 18 Lanre Ikuteyijo and Peter Olayiwola examine the links between migration and xenophobia in Africa. The authors trace the history of migration and xenophobia in Africa, discuss inter-regional migration dynamics and examine the remote and immediate causes and consequences of some of the cases of xenophobic attacks. The chapter also highlights the influence of irregular migration on xenophobia and policy issues emanating from past xenophobic incidences. They conclude with recommendations on ways of reducing xenophobia and creating a more enabling environment for sustainable development and innovative governance in Africa.

Following this chapter, Nicasius Achu Check in Chap. 19 examines identity politics and wars of secession in Africa. Check argues that because the colonial state has reproduced itself into the postcolonial dispensation, the challenges of the colonial state became those of the post-colony. He argues that the challenges of the post-colony became more exhilarating as the people who inherited the state structures after 1960 were of the same ethnic and religious groups they were called upon to fight. As a result, new forms of identity politics began to play out in the post-colony. The author also notes that because the postcolonial political elites were seen more and more as part of the problem rather than part of the solution, many postcolonial grievances with an ethnic or religious flavor rapidly tilted toward agitation for autonomy and in some cases outright separation and independence. The author cites various examples of

countries such as Nigeria and Rwanda, where the search for political relevance has led to ethnic war and conflict in Africa.

Ferdinand O. Ottoh's Chap. 20 focuses on ethnic identity and conflict in Africa. Ottoh finds that certain world events, specifically the disintegration of Soviet Union and the inevitable end of the Cold War, contributed to the increasing rise of ethnic identity conflict in Africa. He also notes that the rise of religious extremism in the Arab world has increased the tendency to ethnic identity conflict in some states in Africa. Ottoh concludes that the deep-seated animosity among ethnic groups arises from deliberate state policy which marginalizes, segregates and alienates minority groups in the state. Therefore, as long as this social, political and economic injustice remains in the body politic of these states, identity conflict will continue to arise.

Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso's Chap. 21 looks at conflict and refugee crises in Africa. The author correctly locates the problem of refugee in Africa in the context of ethnic and tribal conflict that has been raging on the continent since independence. Given the pan-African mandate of the AU, it is saddled with the responsibility of managing conflict and building peace on the continent. Beyond the military activities of defeating irredentist groups is the challenge of demobilization of militia groups and caring for refugees from conflict-ridden states. The author addresses the challenge of putting in place structures of justice in such a way that will prevent another outbreak of conflict or wars.

In Chap. 22 Victor Ojatorotu concludes this part of the book by touching on a very important aspect of the causes of identity conflict in Africa. Using the Niger Delta as a point of departure, the author shows how contestation over resources has led to conflict in Nigeria. He argues that Africa is naturally endowed with valuable resources that includes oil, diamonds, gold and cobalt, but the tremendous wealth from the extraction of these resources has served as a source of conflict rather than the dramatic development needed in the host communities. The marginalization and deprivation of the host communities that bear the negative impact of resources extraction have informed the series of conflicts in Africa in recent years. Prudent management of resources and adequate compensation and resource control by the host communities are some of the ways in which resource conflicts can be minimized, if not totally avoided, on the continent.

The role of progressive forces such as civil society groups, trade union bodies, peasants and militia groups in politics, governance and development is the focus of Part V. The contributions in this part range from a focus on trade unions and the struggle for democracy, the peasantry and politics in Africa, to civil society and politics, uncivil society as well as ethnic militias. The central argument of the various contributions to this section is that the failure of the political elites to incorporate the subaltern part of the population has led to the rise of progressive forces in Africa. Although many of the social forces participated in the processes that led to political independence, they were marginalized and neglected after independence. While some of them, such as trade unions,

student bodies and professional associations, adopt fair methods in securing the attention of political leaders to meet their demands, some are not so patient as they resort to taking arms or engaging in arson and destruction of public properties to drive home their grievances. Kolawole E. Omomowo sets the tone to this discourse in Chap. 23 on trade unions and the struggle for democracy in Africa. He argues that, as a constitutive part of the emergent progressive forces in postcolonial Africa, trade unions have contributed to the struggle for political independence, the restoration of democratic governance and its consolidation in different parts of the continent. Their relevance according to the author is solely determined by the context and history of the countries concerned. Linnet Hamazi, in Chap. 24 on the peasantry and politics in Africa, engaged with a very important aspect of social forces in Africa. The peasantry, or what is popularly called the subaltern forces, have resisted all forms of domination and authoritarianism since colonial times. Contrary to the dominant narrative that the peasants are not organized, Hamazi argues that they are very coherent and organized. He concludes that they have played a crucial economic and political role both before and after independence in Africa. Dele Seteolu and James Okuneye's contribution, Chap. 25, locates civil society in Africa within the struggle to open up political space and foster democratization in Africa. They contend that, despite the prevailing military authoritarianism that pervaded many of the countries in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, civil society organizations contributed to political liberalization under the third wave of democracy on the continent.

These critical segments of society remains crucial to fostering accountable governance in Africa today. Beyond the space occupied by civil society organizations are uncivil society and ethnic militia groups which operate outside the realm of the state to hold the state accountable, usually through violent means. Mumo Nzau, in Chap. 26, traces the emergence of uncivil society and militia groups to the authoritarian nature of the state, the misuse of natural resources as well as the politics of ethnicity in different parts of the continent. Given the adoption of participatory democracy or a semblance of it in many African states, social forces should be incorporated into the process of nation-building and development. John Lekan Oyefara's Chap. 27 examines the increasing incidences of urbanization and what this portends for development in Africa. He argues that in Africa as in most other developing countries, the process of urbanization is mostly rural to urban migration. Thus, rapid urbanization witnessed across the continent has been a result of the "push" of rural inhabitants to urban areas.

Part VI of the Handbook focuses on democracy, governance and development. Contributors examine the following issues: democracy and political development, political parties and their relevance for democracy, institutions, big man politics and democratic consolidation, gender and governance, political citizenship and political participation, media and politics, and public procurement and development in Africa. The main thrust of this part is the important role of democracy and its institutions such as political parties and

the media in fostering socio-economic development. Contributors employ case studies to analyze how the practice of democracy feeds into governance and development on the continent.

The agency of citizens in serving as watchdogs in the goal of democratic consolidation and development is also highlighted. Adeolu Durotoye's Chap. 28 examines democracy and political development in Africa. He notes that while there has been an upsurge in electoral democracy in different parts of the continent, this has not translated into a deepening of democratic values in most of the countries. Rather, there have been cases of democratic reversals, hybrid democracy and authoritarian regimes. This chapter is followed by Jo-Ansie van Wyk, who examines the relevance of political parties to democracy in Africa. She argues in Chap. 29 that the relevance of political parties in deepening democracy is largely informed by the strategies that they adopt. In the case of Africa, political parties have operated under difficult circumstances as political authoritarianism has tended to undermine their contributions to democratic consolidation. In Chap. 30 Emmanuel Remi Aiyede and A. Afeaye Igbafe focus on the role of institutions on democratic consolidation in Africa. They argue that the subversion of the critical institutions of democracy has fostered the emergence of the politics of the big man on the continent. Their chapter focuses on executive and party politics, the accountability and role of parliament and the role of the judiciary in African politics. Damilola Agbalajobi's contribution in Chap. 31 investigates the relationship between gender and governance in Africa. Agbalajobi locates her argument with the patriarchal structure of power in Africa, which has led to the exclusion of women from holding political powers or contesting political offices. While this politics of exclusion is culturally and religiously deterministic, she argues that they have limited the possibilities that women folk can add to the quality of governance in Africa. Nonetheless, she explains that countries such as Rwanda, South Africa and Uganda among others have made significant progress in mainstreaming women into political processes. In Chap. 32 Oluyemi O. Fayomi and Taiwo Adebayo examine political citizenship and political participation in Africa. They argue that the level of political consciousness and socialization determine how citizens participate in politics. Sharon Adetutu Omotoso's Chap. 33 engages with the media and politics in Africa. She argues that to a very large extent the media shape political outcomes in different parts of the continent. As the fourth estate of the realm, the media is critical to deepening democracy and communicating political agendas to citizens.

The last chapter of this section, Chap. 34 by Vincent Efebeh, examines public procurement and development in Africa. Efebeh argues that the lack of strong institutions capable of checking the excesses of public officers has made the abuse of public procurement processes inevitable, with its attendant negative impact on development in all spheres of life. He recommends that institutions of governance should be strengthened beyond the manipulative abilities of public office holders.

Part VII focuses on the political economy of development in Africa. Chapters in this part cover economic development in the first decades of independence in Africa, resource governance, illicit financial flows and African development, the political economy of corruption and the crisis of service delivery, regional integration and development, resilient/informal economy. Apart from engaging in critical analyses of the state of development and the factors that have hindered development in Africa, contributors to this part also suggest various ways through which African countries can move from a state of dependency to autonomous development. In other words, despite the challenges that have confronted the continent, there are encouraging prospects which a determined, imaginative and visionary political elite can realize, with the overall aim of fostering inclusive development. Adewale Aderemi and Faeren Agaigbe's Chap. 35 examines the debates that have shaped development experiences of African countries since independence. They analyze programs such as Import Substitution Industrialization Strategies, SAPs, New Partnership for African Development, among others. They conclude that strategies for economic development in Africa have conspicuously overlooked autochthonous solutions and the rich African diaspora. In Chap. 36 Cyril Obi engages with the vexed issue of resource governance and development in Africa. The chapter is premised on the argument that although the continent is rich in abundance resources such as mineral and metals, oil and gas, it remains trapped under the resource curse thesis, in which contestation over these resources have fueled conflict and wars, rather than fostering development. The author also links the challenges of using natural resources to foster development in Africa within the politics of globalization and the attendant trans-nationalization of capital. In his contribution in Chap. 37, Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba locates the challenges of capital mobilization in Africa within the scourge of illicit financial flows, which have led to the export of trillions of dollars from Africa to other parts of the world since the mid-1960s. Oloruntoba argues that the globalization processes and the entrenched interest of the members of the transitional capital class have reinforced the practice of illicit financial flows. This constitutes a continuous impediment to the search for development in Africa. Olugbenga Olatunji, in Chap. 38, locates the challenges of public service delivery within the political economy of corruption in Africa. He argues rather poignantly that the high level of corruption in various African countries has led to the failure of service delivery. This is due mainly to the criminal diversion of the resources that are meant for provision of service delivery. Given such scenarios and the attendant costs to the development potentials of African countries, it has become pertinent to stop corrupt practices in the public sector. Due to the limited capacity of the state in Africa to foster socio-economic development, regional integration has been touted as a complementary arrangement for ensuring transformation and meeting the needs of the people in Africa. The historical experiences of the various countries and their continued marginalization in the global capitalist system make the case for regional integration as a matter of urgency. Christopher C. Nshimbi, in Chap. 39,

examines the challenges of integration as well as the domestic and external factors that have constrained the potential for development in Africa. In the last chapter of this part, Chap. 40, the trio of Oluyemi O. Fayomi, Grace Adebayo and Uchechukwu Okorie examine the informal sector in Africa. They argue that unemployment, governance and a low level of education have significantly contributed to the proliferation of informal economic settings among African economies while at the same time retarding formal economic development. This study, therefore, posits that considerable government attention should be given to the transformation and development of informal economic operations through socially inclusive policy strategies; they argue that this will facilitate the rapid development of the African economies.

Part VIII of the Handbook explores Africa in global politics. In locating Africa within global politics, contributors examine Africa's relations with international financial institutions, Africa in the global trading system, Africa and foreign direct investment, Africa in the BRICS countries, Africa's growth narrative, the politics of foreign aids, supranational governance in Africa, and pan-Africanism and development in Africa. This part is particularly important as it shows how external forces continue to shape the fortunes of African countries today. Whereas Part VII of the Handbook shows how colonialism affected the development potentials of the continent, Part VIII shows some continuity and discontinuity in the processes of how exogenous factors affect the development potentials of Africa and how best the continent can respond to maximize its potential. Akinola Adeoye, in Chap. 41, examines Africa relations with the international financial institutions (IFIs). He argues that the state's inability to manage the socio-economic challenges confronting the various countries necessitated the intervention of the IFIs. He also notes that the forces of globalization have compounded the challenges of underdevelopment and that the intervention of IFIs has not succeeded in addressing these challenges. Adeoye provides some recommendations on how African countries can derive benefits from the IFIs. While these recommendations may seem plausible, the neoliberal ideological roots of these institutions and their antecedents in Africa and other parts of the developing world does not give room for such optimism. For instance, while the IFIs claimed that the SAPs were designed to foster development in Africa and Latin America, the results was disastrous as the programs effectively truncated the development potential of the countries that adopted them. The imposition of development programs by the IFIs without due consultation with the people that will be affected continues under various guises today. One of the ways in which the continent has been short-changed in the global capitalist system is the unequal rule of trade under the World Trade Organization. This is the subject of Chap. 42 by Lere Amusan, which deals with Africa in the global trading system. Amusan argues that, despite the potential that a multilateral trading system could provide as a basis for boosting global prosperity, the developed countries of the world have stacked the rule against developing countries in a manner that undermines the ability of the latter to derive maximum benefits from the system.

Scott D. Taylor's Chap. 43 focuses on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Taylor argues that even though Africa has attracted a relatively high level of FDI in recent times, the continent still represents a tiny fraction of the global flows of FDIs. The author then states the obvious fact that FDI flow to Africa has been concentrated in the extractive sector, thus limiting the potential of African countries to diversify their economies. However, he goes beyond this narrative to show that FDIs have stimulated domestic responses, which are critical to the desire to diversify economies on the continent. A new direction in FDIs in Africa is the increasing penetration of other parts of Africa by domestic investors. For instance, the Dangote Group of Industries owned by the Nigerian-born billionaire Aliko Dangote has established cement plants in many African countries, outside Nigeria. In the same vein, South African companies have invested in banks, telecommunication and retail shops in other African countries. This new trend in African capitalism presents new dynamics in FDIs, which augurs well for regional integration and development on the continent. This chapter is followed by Ian Taylor's contribution in Chap. 44, which argues that the much-trumpeted African rising narrative was not a reflection of any fundamental shift in economic structure of the continent. Rather, it was a result of massive exploitation of raw materials, including mineral and metals, to meet the demands for growth and expansion in countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and to some extent white capital in South Africa. He also argues that the growth in GDP did not translate into improvement in the living conditions of the majority of the people. Consequently, he recommends a radical restructuring of the economies in Africa from raw materials export to manufacturing and industrialization. The limitations that are inherent in GDP as a means of measuring economic performance is the subject of Lorenzo Fioramonti's contribution to the Handbook, Chap. 45. The author argues that GDP obscures other areas of economic activity such as domestic work and negative impacts on the environment. Like Taylor, Fioramonti argues that the African growth narrative is cosmetic since poverty and inequality continue apace on the continent.

Foreign aid is another aspect of Africa's involvement with the other parts of world. This is the subject of Dikeledi A. Mokoena's Chap. 46. Mokoena argues that foreign aid is not benign but has served as a means of neocolonial control over the continent. Using China as a point of interrogation, she contends that dependence on foreign aid stifles local initiatives for achieving development. In Chap. 47 Babatunde Fagbayibo examines supranational governance in Africa within the context of two continental organizations which have served as the umbrella for interaction since independence. In this regard, he interrogated the transition from the Organisation of African Unity to the AU. Basing his argument on the legal aspects of these two organizations, he interrogated the extent to which these organizations can foster regional integration in Africa. Chapter 48 by Rita Kiki Edozie explores pan-Africanism and its relevance for contemporary Africa. The author traces the historical trajectories of pan-Africanism as an ideological and political force, which culminated in securing

political independence for virtually all African countries. In what she terms the third way for Africa, Edozie examines how African companies from South Africa and Nigeria are redefining pan-Africanism through investment flows into different parts of the continent. In an age where FDI from the West is shrinking due to the recent global economic recession, this new initiative in Afro-capitalism is fundamental to the much needed socio-economic transformation of the continent.

Part IX examines the future of Africa's governance, politics and development within the context of various interrelated forces and issues. Consequently, it contains contributions on demography and the future of Africa, security architecture, innovation, education and development, energy security, climate change, food security and sustainable development and the political economy of corruption. The importance of this section lies in its prognostic value. For too long, analysis of socio-economic and governance issues in Africa has focused on what has happened in the past and to some extent what is happening in the present. However, contributors to this part look at Africa beyond our own time. They locate the continent in a future where the environment, climate, education and technology, energy security as well as food and human security matter for development.

Timothy A. Atoyebi and O. Anuodo's Chap. 49 explores demography and population growth in Africa. The authors situate their argument in the context of the dynamics of population growth at the global level, especially as it relates to developed countries such as Germany, France, Britain and Japan, where decline in the number of working population has put pressures on the economy. They argue that in order to minimize the negative effects of the population explosion, African countries need to put in place measures to control the population in the future. Against the backdrop of the rise of terrorist organizations and the huge investment in military hardware in Africa, Owolabi Sunday Adewale in Chap. 50 looks at human security as an alternative perspective to managing security in Africa. The core of the argument is that investment in human development will reduce the tensions and conflicts that necessitated the need for high cost of managing hard security in Africa. Chika A. Ezeanya's Chap. 51 on research, innovation and higher education in sub-Saharan Africa challenges the current paradigm in which African educational systems continue to follow colonial designs while neglecting indigenous educational systems. This chapter is particularly important as the challenges facing Africa require a system of education and innovation that are cognisant of the cultural specificities of the continent. While it is appropriate to borrow knowledge systems from other parts of the world, there is no substitute to developing indigenous knowledge systems for driving development in Africa. In Chap. 52 Lucky E. Asulieme and Blessing Simura examine energy security and the future of development in Africa. They argue that, in view of the huge energy challenges facing the continent, it is pertinent to diversify the sources of energy by making use of various opportunities that are available in solar, wind and coal in order to maximize the potential inherent in these sources. Jennifer

Turyatamba Tumushabe, in Chap. 53, locates the problem of food security in Africa to the epiphenomenon of climate change. Given the reality of climate change, Tumushabe argues that it is imperative for African countries to develop strategies that minimize its negative effects on food security and sustainable development. Samuel Zalanga's contribution, Chap. 54, examines the political economy of corruption in Africa and shows how the continent's development potential has been stifled through the misappropriation of national resources by a tiny elite. Zalanga argues that, in order to understand corruption as a social problem, it is pertinent to study it through the lens of political economy. The Handbook's final chapter, by Augustine Kwasi Fosu, re-contextualizes governance and development in Africa. While noting that economic and political governance have both improved in Africa since the mid-1980s, the author flags the challenge of the likely disequilibrium between the economic and political equilibria under multiparty democracy, with adverse implications for fiscal allocation. In other words, in order to ensure fiscal produce and macroeconomic stability, both economic and political governance have to continue to improve not only to satisfy the market but also to foster inclusive development.

This Handbook complements other scholarly endeavors through which the interrelated issues of politics, governance and development in Africa have been discussed. Its uniqueness lies in the link between the past, the present and the future. It is also unique in its interdisciplinary engagement with three of the cardinal themes that define the relevance of a country or a continent in an integrated global system. Readers will find that this book represents a compendium for research that relates to the varied and differentiated experiences of politics, governance and development in Africa.

CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE OF POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

This book has examined the three interrelated and interconnected issues of politics, governance and development in Africa. From the historical and contemporary analysis that the various contributors have presented, there is no doubt that macro and micro aspects of lives as well as the relations of Africa with other parts of the world will continue to be shaped by these issues in the foreseeable future. Despite the fact that some progress have been made in the political, governance and development spheres in Africa, the faulty foundation of the state in Africa, as a colonial entity created for exploitation and expropriation of the resources in the interest of the metropolises, has continued to shape its capacity to foster nation-building, effectively manage the centrifugal and centripetal forces that have continued to undermine the legitimacy of political institutions, mobilize capital required for infrastructure, social services and enhanced standard of living for the citizens. Entrapped under the global matrix of power (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b), the postcolonial state has continued to operate as the satellite of the advanced capitalist countries both in its nature and character as well as its function of forceful implementation of the agenda

for accumulation on behalf of the members of the international capitalist class (Robinson 2010, 2004). The neglect of pre-colonial political institutions and the resultant preference for the Western-induced idea of political participation under the rubric of liberal democracy has undermined political development on the continent. As in other parts of the world, Africans are increasingly expressing their distrust of liberal democracy as a system of government that can grant them more voice and enhance their standard of living (Oloruntoba and Gumede 2016; Joseph 2016; Fukuyama 2013). Governance itself has been instrumentalized to serve the interest of the market. In the same vein, development remains an illusion lacking in empirical precision of what it means for an average person. While political elites continue to rehearse the slogan of pursuing development, they have not adequately deciphered what it entails and how to achieve it (see Ake 1996).

What has emerged from the scholarly analysis of the African condition by the various contributors to this handbook is the need to set a research agenda on redefining politics, governance and development on the continent. In this respect, we need to understand how to establish a link between pre-colonial political institutions and modern institutions in such a way that will enhance accountable governance at local, sub-national and national levels. Given the contradictions that are inherent in the debate on governance and its implications for participation and enhanced living standards, research is also needed on the relations between governance and governmental authority. This is particularly important as it seems that emphasis on governmental authority, as expressed in the capacity of the state to provide public good, has come under serious threat from the forces of globalization over the past three decades. Moreover, while much attention has been given to analysis of governance at the national level, complementary research is needed on governance at the sub-national and supra-national levels. Lastly, development itself should be reconceptualized to transcend the current preoccupation with growth in GDP or inflow of FDI (see Fioramonti 2013). The aforementioned areas of research on politics, governance and development will further enrich our understanding of these issues in Africa.

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PART I

Theories and Concepts

Competing Theories and Concepts on Politics, Governance, and Development

Wanjala S. Nasong'o

INTRODUCTION

Multiple theories and concepts of governance, politics, and development have been employed in the study of African politics, with varying degrees of analytical potency and competing implications for African governance and development. Some of these theoretical and conceptual frameworks are rooted in the liberal perspective while others proceed from a critical paradigm; some are holistic while others are individualistic; some are dyadic while others are atomistic; some are unilinear in orientation while others are dialectical. The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine these theories and concepts with a view to evaluating their analytical rigor vis-à-vis African politics, as well as their practical implications for Africa's governance and development. In doing this, the chapter pays particular attention to the strengths and limitations of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks in terms of their descriptive, explanatory, and predictive potency.

LIBERAL THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Available literature demonstrates that the study of Africa's governance, politics, and development has largely been dominated by liberal approaches which envisaged the development of free market democracies reminiscent of the Western world. The assumption of these liberal theories was that African countries would advance along the same path of political and economic development

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that was traveled by their Western counterparts. Three of the most prominent liberal approaches are modernization theory, political order approaches, and public policy analysis perspective.

*In Search of Socio-Economic and Political
Development: Modernization Theory*

Modernization theory draws from Walt Rostow's exposition of stages of economic growth.¹ According to Rostow, all political systems develop through the same stages of economic growth as leaders strive to transform "backward" agricultural societies into "modern" industrial economies.² Emerging in the 1960s, the theory assumed that at the time of independence, Africa was at the beginning point of a process of development that would enhance education and literacy, mechanize agriculture, industrialize urban centers, and facilitate economic growth measured in gross national product (GNP) terms. The social trajectory of modernization theory borrowed heavily from the ideas of Max Weber,³ and also Talcott Parsons,⁴ in the fields of psychology and sociology. The main concern here was with the social dynamics by which individuals shifted from "traditional" to "modern" worldviews. Modernization theory viewed ethnic divisions in Africa as obstacles to development and assumed that these would fade away as modernizing societies became "melting pots" in the image of the Western world.⁵ At the political level, modernization theory borrowed from theories of democratic pluralism in political science. Herein, the key to political development was a rapidly growing electorate both willing and able to participate in the political process. As political participation grew, it was expected to generate corresponding growth and specialization of government agencies as leaders responded to the legitimate demands of citizens. It was envisaged that the economic, social, and political trajectories of modernization would culminate in the establishment of modern industrial democracies in Africa.

As argued elsewhere,⁶ however, modernization theory was based on shaky assumptions. First is the a priori assumption that ethnic identity is, in and of itself, a hindrance to development, however defined, whilst industrialization is the ideal end of a modern political economy.⁷ Second is the assumption that modernization is a unilinear process in which traditional attributes such as ethnic affiliations would ultimately erode to be replaced by modern forms of affiliation to civic and professional associations. The reality, however, is that ethnicity and other forms of ordering societies, including clan and caste systems, are often revitalized and strengthened by the modernization process. Third is the assumption that the modernization process is a zero-sum game in which certain social and political advances along the path of modernity inevitably result in an equal decline in traditional culture and values. On the contrary, it is apparent that traditional institutions often adapt to and coexist with modern institutions. Sylvester Whitaker Jr. demonstrated this with particular clarity in the case of northern Nigeria,⁸ where the creation and expansion of

modern political institutions was accompanied by the strengthening of the political roles played by traditional Muslim leaders (emirs). “Far from modern institutions having simply driven out traditional ones, elements of the institutions of each type or origin coalesced to form a workable system of power and authority.”⁹

Fourth and finally, modernization theory assumed that traditional attitudes and institutions are inherently irrational and thus a hindrance to modernization or development. On the contrary, modernization revisionists such as Whitaker Jr. emphasized the importance of building on traditional cultures and values to promote development in Africa.¹⁰ Disregarding the significance of such traditional attributes as ethnic affiliations and beliefs, they argued, is to court failure. Indeed, historically, ethnicity provided the basis for organization of resistance against colonial rule; it was a basis for adaptation to the uncertainties and insecurities caused by the rapid changes introduced by colonialism and for mobilization of the nationalist struggle for political independence. In more contemporary terms, ethnicity functions to cushion the individual against the deleterious effects of alienation inherent in the rapidly modernizing societies of Africa by providing a sense of belonging and appreciation of one’s social roots in a community. Even more importantly, ethnic movements demand justice and equity in the political and resource dispensation of the moment, and thus effectively contribute to democratic practice.¹¹

Prioritizing Socio-Political Stability: Political Order Approaches

A number of developments in Africa and the USA beginning in the mid-1960s led to a shift from the optimistic assumptions of modernization theorists to a pessimistic view of African politics and governance. First was the rise of secessionist movements, guerrilla insurgencies, and frequent military coups, with an average of four successful coups annually between 1965 and 1969 compared with only two successful ones before 1963. This violent trend debunked the belief in democratic power transfer associated with modernization theorists.¹² Second was the intensification of the Cold War and the commitment of the USA to contain the spread of Communism into Africa via means that were anathema to the optimistic assumptions of modernization theory. “When the normative goal of modernization theory, the creation of democratic political systems, clashed with anticommunist national security interests, U.S. leaders often supported national security efforts even when it meant creating unsavory, undemocratic leaders in Africa and other portions of the developing world.”¹³ Third was the politics of the civil rights movement in the USA and its potential for violence as well as the protests against US involvement in Vietnam, which resulted in the mantra of “law and order” as the political slogan for presidential campaigns in the USA between 1964 and 1968.

The impacts of these three political developments resulted in a shift away from modernization theory and its belief in benign political development to a pessimistic expectation of “political decay” in Africa manifested in

“conflict and chaos.” The foremost exponent of this perspective was Samuel Huntington,¹⁴ according to whom the modernization process, instead of contributing to democracy and stability, engendered political instability that endangered US foreign policy interests. It was now contended that democracy is not necessarily a natural or direct end product of modernization; that modernizing states face six major crises, which if not dealt with threaten regime collapse and political decay. The crises were identified as:

1. *The crisis of identity* embodied in the challenge of crafting a common sense of nationality among ethnically, linguistically, and religiously disparate peoples.
2. *The crisis of legitimacy* encapsulated in the challenge of creating a broad-based national consensus on the legitimate exercise of political authority.
3. *The crisis of participation* represented by the challenging quest to guide rising public demands for effective inclusion in the decision-making process.
4. *The crisis of penetration* symbolized by the difficulty in creating an effective government presence throughout the national territory.
5. *The crisis of distribution* hinged on the quest for balancing public demands for goods and services with the government's responsibility and capacity to provide public goods.
6. *The crisis of integration* embodied by the onerous task of nurturing harmonious relationships among a society's multiple groups and interests vying for access to and control of the political process.¹⁵

Faced with criticism about their overly internalist approach and lack of attention to external forces that African political systems faced, political order theorists added two more crises to the above: *the crisis of national survival*; that is, the challenge of maintaining the territorial integrity of the country as constituted at independence; and *the crisis of foreign control*; that is, the challenge of securing and protecting political, social, and economic freedom from external control.¹⁶

Political order theorists prescribed political institutionalization as the remedy to these crises. By this they meant the creation of strong governmental structures capable of maintaining political order and stability. Such institutionalization had to be the top priority of African leaders. Paradoxically, this perspective was the antithesis of the modernizationist approach. Instead of the rising levels of popular political participation envisaged by the latter, the former gave African leaders the license to curtail popular participation in the name of securing stability and order. Huntington,¹⁷ for instance, argued that the most critical political difference among countries is not their *form* of government but their *degree* of government. He admired the Leninist vanguard single party, arguing that though such single parties may not provide liberty, they provide authority and create governments that actually govern. Aristide Zolberg went so far as to argue, in the case of West Africa, that the single-party system provides political order, the prerequisite for successful modernization

of African societies.¹⁸ This political order perspective provided African leaders with a sound intellectual rationalization for the establishment of authoritarian single-party states, which were viewed as the most viable political rubric for the onerous task of nation-building and economic development.¹⁹

*From Grand Theorizing to the Nitty Gritty:
Public Policy Process Perspectives*

Critiques emerged in the mid-1970s to the effect that much of the scholarship on African governance, politics, and development was so abstract as to be of little practical value in addressing the day-to-day policy problems faced by Africans. Scholars were urged to descend from their lofty grand theorizing and make their research more policy relevant. The result was the emergence of two trajectories of public policy research that drew from political science and economics. First is the political economy approach, whose main assumption is that politics and economics are so mutually interrelated that previous attempts to study each in isolation from the other offered solutions that did not capture real world conditions.²⁰ This approach appropriated rational choice models from economics, whose essential thesis is that individuals are rational actors who make decisions on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of the trade-offs between a variety of options. As rational actors, they seek to maximize utility and minimize cost.²¹ Schraeder notes that the political component of this approach emphasizes the importance of understanding the variety of policy alternatives available to policymakers and other interests in society as they bargain for an outcome that they perceive to be in their best interests.²² Robert Bates applied this approach to explain why food production declined in Africa in the first decades of independence, contributing to vicious cycles of famine and starvation.²³ In other words, why should reasonable leaders adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for the societies they govern? The answer, according to Bates, lies in the political calculations of African policymakers.

The second trajectory of the public policy process perspective focuses on public policy analysis. This entails evaluation of the outputs of government policies and programs. The approach probes and explores the strategies available to policymakers for addressing the social, economic, and political problems that characterize the quest for development, broadly defined. The approach is action oriented and aims at problem-solving. Its main concern is to analyze policy options available to policymakers and evaluate which one of them is most germane to the development process. Taking this problem-solving approach with a view to assisting African leaders in tackling the constraints presented by inherited colonial institutions, resource scarcity, and environmental degradation, Rothchild and Curry Jr. contend that African leaders are capable of adopting policy options from a variety of strategies, each of which encompasses different trade-offs depending on the nature of the policy goals desired by the political leaders.²⁴

Schraeder points out that the impetus for the shift toward public policy perspectives beginning in the late 1970s and through to the 1980s was an increasing emphasis on the role of the state in Africa.²⁵ Scholars began to effectively interrogate the relationship between the state and its domestic constituencies, including ethno-regional groups, social movements, and classes; as well as the relationship between the state and external forces such as transnational corporations, international organizations, and agents of bilateral and multilateral interests. Hence by the end of the 1980s, the state had become the focal analytical point for African and Africanist scholars, seeking to understand and explain the “lost decades” of Africa’s political independence.²⁶

CRITICAL THEORIES OF POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT

Inspired by the historical experiences of the Western world, liberal approaches to the study of governance, politics, and development in Africa assumed that African countries could replicate the governance and development models of the Western capitalist world. These approaches were overly internalist in outlook, tending to assume that African politics, governance, and development were essentially a function of factors internal to African states. Conversely, critical theories were inspired by the socialist experiments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. Critical perspectives emphasize external forces in African politics and contend that genuine development will be achieved in Africa only through revolutionary struggles and the inauguration of socialist and people-centered modes of governance throughout Africa. Among critical perspectives are dependency theory, world systems theory, and Marxism.

External Forces in Africa’s Governance and Development: Dependency Theory

In spite of the optimistic projections of modernization theorists, Africa experienced authoritarian rule (both military and civilian), economic stagnation, and socio-political strife through the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond. Modernization theorists explained these problems in terms of factors internal to Africa, especially poor governance and corruption; dependency theorists focused on external factors and argued that the problem of underdevelopment in Africa was a product of the continent’s incorporation into the global capitalist system from an unequal footing. This resulted in the extraction of resources from Africa and their transshipment to Europe, hence the progressive underdevelopment of Africa.

According to Walter Rodney,²⁷ for instance, before the sixteenth century African countries were developing both economically and politically. However, the spread of international capitalism by the end of the sixteenth century culminated in colonialism and the incorporation of Africa into the global capitalist system. This marked the end of all forms of autonomous development in Africa. European domination, Rodney argues, resulted in the development of

underdevelopment; that is, the gradual impoverishment of the African continent as previous development was halted, blunted, and reversed.²⁸ Instead, under the colonial economy, surplus value was extracted from the colonies and shipped to the colonial metropolises. Substandard wages were paid to African workers while no profits were reinvested in the colonies in the form of social services to benefit Africans. Profits were instead expatriated to the metropolises where they contributed to the material wellbeing of Europeans, a process that led to the simultaneous development of Europe and underdevelopment of Africa.²⁹

From this perspective, governance in postcolonial Africa has less to do with the management of public affairs for the benefit of Africans, but more to do with the maintenance of the unequal relations between the postcolony and the former colonial metropolises. Those in charge of African governance constitute a comprador class that advertently or inadvertently serve as the political, economic, and cultural agents of global capitalist forces. According to Dani Nabudere,³⁰ transnational corporations constitute the neocolonial form of this form of imperialism. The local comprador class, who manage subsidiaries of these corporations or sit on their boards benefit from the survival and success of these businesses, and thus influence domestic policymaking to protect these foreign interests. Such policies benefit only the foreigners and their local allies.³¹ Hence African governments preside over the impoverishment of local majorities and, as Nyong'o argues,³² have to be strong enough to master the tensions and conflicts generated among the masses by this process of underdevelopment. Inevitably, therefore, authoritarianism becomes the established mode of governance in this scheme of things, the process of democratization notwithstanding.

The Need for Governance Transformation: The World Systems Approach

Immanuel Wallerstein is the chief exponent of the world systems approach, which emerged in the mid-1970s, focusing on the exploitative nature of the relations between the Global North and Global South.³³ Wallerstein analyzed the emergence of the capitalist world system, which he saw as an exploitative global capitalist system controlled by the major powers of the West. This system is characterized by alternating periods of economic boom and bust in which the metropolises progress and the periphery gets impoverished. According to this perspective, European overseas imperialism epitomized by the scramble for Africa was a consequence of contraction in the capitalist world economy between 1873 and 1897.³⁴ In place of the center-periphery dyadic approach of the traditional dependency theorists such as Andre Frank,³⁵ and Fernando Cardoso,³⁶ Wallerstein conceptualized an intermediate class between the two, the semiperiphery. Countries in the semiperiphery are neither very powerful nor are they overly impoverished. These are states that wield economic and political power within their immediate regions, such as Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and South Africa in the Southern African region.

According to the world systems approach, genuine socio-economic development in Africa can only occur with a shift from the capitalist ethos of the moment to a people-centered socialist form of governance. Otherwise attempts by any given country to attain socio-economic transformation within the capitalist world system are doomed to fail. However, the possibility for the overthrow of the capitalist world economy is complicated by the existence of the semiperiphery. The revolution is supposed to be occasioned by extreme polarization between a small core of the richest countries and the vast majority of the poorest ones. However, semiperiphery countries delay the process of polarization by undermining the creation of a unified front against the center countries. Semiperipheral states see themselves as better off in economic and political terms than the countries of the periphery, and thus wittingly or unwittingly serve as agents of the metropolises by seeking to strengthen their position in an otherwise exploitative global system.³⁷

Class as the Bane of Governance: Marxist and Neo-Marxist Approaches

According to Karl Marx,³⁸ all societies are divided into two basic classes bound together in a relationship of exploitation. The dominant classes in a capitalist society are the bourgeoisie (owners of the means of production) and the proletariat (the working class who sell their labor for subsistence). As more and more profits accrue to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat becomes more and more alienated from the products of their labor and they increasingly become revolutionized. The revolutionary situation is accelerated by advances in the forces of production (technological, scientific, etc.), which outgrow the relations of production (the system of property ownership among classes), resulting in increasing difficulty for the dominant class to maintain control over society via its traditional means. Since no dominant class is willing to peacefully cede its position of dominance, the growing contradiction between forces of production and relations of production results in intensified struggle that culminates in the revolutionary overthrow of the ruling class. According to Marx, this is the essence of dialectical materialism that has characterized the development of human society from the ancient through the feudal to the contemporary capitalist system, which will eventually transition into socialist and communist systems as the end product of social development. In this Marxian conception, the established order is the thesis, the contradictions it generates constitute the antithesis, and the revolutionary outcome is the synthesis.³⁹

Drawing from the principles of classical Marxism, neo-Marxism emerged in the late 1970s and affected critical theory on Africa. First, whereas neo-Marxism concurred with dependency theorists that capitalism is inherently exploitative, neo-Marxists contended that individual African countries could achieve “dependent development” within the capitalist world economy by pursuing autocentric (self-reliant) development.⁴⁰ Neo-Marxists rejected dependency theory’s contention that only one mode of production, capitalism, characterized the international political economy. They posited that the

fundamental socio-economic differences that exist both between and within African economies point to the simultaneous existence of both capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production at international, regional, national, and even sub-national levels.⁴¹ Neo-Marxists thus preferred a more nuanced approach that took into account myriad developmental processes and results globally, regionally, and nationally. Second, neo-Marxists argued that it was wrong to assume that the spread of capitalism across the globe has had a permanent pernicious effect on Africa. On the contrary, they contended, in line with their classical Marxist precursors, that the spread of capitalism to Africa marked a major developmental stage in the inexorable march toward socialism, the ultimate end of socio-political development. In line with Wallerstein's postulation,⁴² neo-Marxists posited that semiperiphery countries have witnessed rising levels of literacy, urbanization, agricultural mechanization, and industrial output; all of which constitute the requisite conditions for the crystallization of a proletariat, the class charged with leading the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and the realization of a classless society characterized by the equality of all.

In matters of governance and development in Africa, the key issue between Marxists and neo-Marxists was whether the African state merely mirrored the interests of the dominant class in each African country (the viewpoint of classical Marxism) or whether African governing classes could be independent and implement policies that ran counter to the interests of the dominant national economic class (the standpoint of neo-Marxists). According to Schraeder,⁴³ the most notable contribution to this debate, at least in Africanist circles, was made by Richard Sklar,⁴⁴ who contended that fundamentally class relations are determined by relations of power, not relations of production as classical Marxists presumed. Central to Sklar's thesis is the argument that the African state is not a mere reflection of the society's economic system, nor should it be viewed as a sheer instrument of its dominant classes. Instead, Sklar posited a perception of African politics in terms of class competition with varying degrees of class competition and conflict. In certain circumstances, the economic elite may control the activities of the ruling elite; while in other circumstances the reverse may be the case. The point, according to this approach, is to eschew the notion that one particular class or combination of classes will always be dominant, nationally and internationally, and to focus on the reality of different class configurations and relationships in each African country and across time even within each country.

POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: NEW THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

In the twenty-first century, following the disintegration of the socialist experiments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally, a shift has occurred both within the liberal and critical traditions in theorizing about politics, governance, and development in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world.

New conceptual and theoretical approaches have emerged in the study and practice of African politics, governance, and development. The liberal tradition is now marked by a new theoretical and conceptual eclecticism; while the critical approach has largely shifted away from prescriptions for inauguration of socialist modes of governance to devolution of power to ensure a people-centered mode of governance and politics.

The New Liberal Theoretical Eclecticism

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a number of liberal approaches now undergird the study of African politics, governance, and development. The first is the study of democratization, inspired by the so-called second liberation of Africa. Scholars such as Staffan Lindberg, Godwin Murunga and Shadrack Nasong'o, John Mbaku and Julius Ihonybere, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja and Margaret Lee, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, as well as Peter Nyong'o share the optimism of democratic consolidation in Africa with modernization theorists.⁴⁵ However, they do not assume a priori that such consolidation will be easy or even assured.

The second trend in the liberal tradition, which is a corollary to the first one, focuses on the centrality of civil society in the politics of democratization in Africa. The first crop of scholars who took this approach such as Harbeson et al. and Kleinberg and Clark, heralded civil society, defined in terms of social formations such as trade unions, professional associations, community organizations, women's organizations, and religious groups among others, as the hitherto missing key to sustained political reform and insurance of political renewal on the continent. Subsequent scholars in this trajectory took a more critical position, arguing that in spite of civil society's critical role in pushing authoritarian regimes to open up political space to competition, its democratic pre-disposition cannot be taken for granted as organizations within the realm of civil society exhibit contradictory possibilities.⁴⁶

A focus on the role of ethnicity in African politics constitutes the third trend in the liberal tradition, with some scholars contending that the resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Africa was inevitable after the end of the Cold War and that these conflicts constitute the bane of African political development. Other scholars posit that the ethnicization of politics is inherently positive as it both engenders and calls for decentralization of authority from the contested national center to local levels, hence promoting the democratic ethos.⁴⁷ Fourth is the gender approach to the study of African politics. Scholars who take this approach argue that the classic themes on African politics need to be enriched by focusing on the hitherto marginalized women, whose empowerment has yielded more of their numbers in the political arena with serious implications for the nature of political discourse and policy formulation in Africa.⁴⁸

The fifth new trend in the liberal study of Africa adopts an individualistic methodology and focuses on the actions of individual African leaders as the critical variable in seeking to understand the continent's socio-economic

problems. This approach tends to be extreme in its pessimism about the nature of African politics. The basic logic is that African political classes manipulate the state to pursue illegal activities with the sole purpose of self-aggrandizement. Scholars such as Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou,⁴⁹ for instance, argue that African political elites deliberately perpetrate political disorder and even instigate state collapse in pursuit of political advantage and personal enrichment. Chabal and Daloz go so far as to posit that African political systems embody an inbuilt bias in favor of greater disorder.⁵⁰ Whereas van de Walle falls into this trend in his explanation of Africa's socio-economic malaise in terms of the patrimonial logic of governance that he views as incompatible with economic growth and development, he is more guarded in his analysis.⁵¹ Unlike Chabal and Daloz, van de Walle contends that the African crisis of governance is neither static nor permanent; nor is it part of the natural landscape of African politics and society as Bayart et al. suggest. It is, rather, subject to both internal and external forces of change, including the forces of democratization.

The sixth and final trend is one that focuses on "worst-case scenarios" of state collapse in Africa. With Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo-Kinshasa as its analytical focus, this approach analyzes the ability of warlords to use their control of valuable resources; including diamonds and gold, as a source of income to fund illicit activities, especially guerrilla wars against centralized state authority; Taking this approach, William Reno notes that historically, external actors, particularly transnational corporations, have shown themselves to be more than willing to enter into financial arrangements with warlords as long as the said warlords control access to a valued resource or territory.⁵² Schraeder points out, however,⁵³ that critics have cautioned that one must be wary of attempts to generalize from Reno's worst-scenario case studies to the broader universe of the continent's states because for every extreme case of state collapse such as Somalia, there exists other cases of effective conflict resolution and state-building such as Mozambique as illustrated by Carrie Manning.⁵⁴ The state of the liberal tradition in the social study of Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century is thus characterized by lack of unanimity on the specifics of which liberal theories are most apposite for the analysis of African politics and society, As the above six trends amply illustrate, the liberal approach entails myriad competing ideas, theories, and policy prescriptions. These differences notwithstanding, scholars in the liberal tradition are bound together by their common belief in the Western liberal democratic tradition as the model to be emulated by African leaders.⁵⁵

End of an Era and Theoretical Revisionism: New Critical Trends

Africanist critical thought underwent revision following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The latter had served as an ideological beacon of hope for African Marxists, who saw a path to development that was independent of capitalism. Its demise ushered in a period of extreme pessimism among critical scholars.⁵⁶ The revisionism within critical

circles that this pessimism engendered led to the emergence of a number of new research trends and perspectives.⁵⁷ The first of these is a critical review of the process of democratization. Focusing on the role of external powers in promoting multiparty democracy in Africa, critical scholars contend that this is a form of neocolonialism that is contributing to the recolonization of the continent. Claude Ake,⁵⁸ for instance, argues that for the most part, the adoption of multiparty politics in Africa has contributed to the “democratization of disempowerment,” in which the essence of electoral contests is the rotation of self-interested elites of different political parties in power while the majority of the citizens remain disempowered from the political system. Ake argues that the true essence of democracy is social democracy wherein popular masses are guaranteed concrete social and economic rights beyond the abstract civil and political rights that are the hallmark of liberal democracy.⁵⁹ To achieve this form of democracy, according to Sklar,⁶⁰ requires the nurturing of “developmental democracy” in which collective group interests as opposed to individual self-interest are protected and promoted; and the pursuit of social justice, economic, and political rights is prioritized as the characteristic norm. Sklar posits that such developmental democracy constitutes the best political option to the prevailing cruel choice between laissez-faire liberalism without social justice on the one hand, and authoritarian modes of statist developmentalism on the other.

The second new major trend in the critical social research on Africa is embodied in the political economy approach that critiques the increasing power and authority of international financial institutions, especially the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), over the economic decision-making of African countries. During the Cold War era, African states enjoyed bargaining leverage in sourcing foreign economic assistance from the West and the East. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union this leverage disappeared and IMF/World Bank loans increasingly became tied to the conditionalities of economic liberalization in the name of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which were not only rammed down the throats of African leaders, but were required to be implemented with the use of force. In essence, SAPs ran counter to the legitimate interests of the masses and, insofar as they were negotiated in closed-door boardrooms and needed force to implement, were inimical to genuine efforts at creating responsive and accountable governance in Africa. Scholars in this research orientation, including Fantu Cheru, Thandika Mkandawire et al., and Godwin Murunga,⁶¹ among others, argued the case for Africans to retake the initiative in the SAP debate, otherwise the processes of political democratization, economic liberalization, and the simultaneous determination of Africa’s economic policies by international financial institutions would amount to shifting from political dictatorship to authoritarian economism.⁶²

The third critical trend is rooted in the dependency perspective and has two main trajectories, neoimperialism and post-imperialism. The first perspective proceeds from the premise that the granting of political independence to

African countries did not alter the exploitative military, economic, political, and cultural relations between the continent and the capitalist Global North in any meaningful way. Taking this view, Lumumba-Kasongo argues that, indeed, the exploitation of Africa has increased and intensified in the post-Cold War period.⁶³ The post-imperialism perspective, on the other hand, posits that as agents of Global North imperialism, transnational corporations can play both negative and positive roles depending on the nature of the relationship between the international wing of the corporations' managerial bourgeoisie headquartered in Global North countries and the local indigenous wing of the same managerial bourgeoisie in African countries. Sklar and Becker concur that such relations are not ideologically neutral as they transmit the capitalist values of the Global North to African countries.⁶⁴ They argue, nonetheless, that such transmission of ideas, attitudes, and values is not a unilinear process but a two-way traffic: "Members of the corporate international bourgeoisie are just as likely to be sensitized to the developmental values of their host country partners as the other way around."⁶⁵

The fourth new trend in the critical tradition focuses on the idea of gendering the social sciences, by which is meant making gender an integral element in the analytical approach to various themes in African politics and society.⁶⁶ Parpart and Staudt,⁶⁷ and Nasong'o and Ayot,⁶⁸ for instance, argue that gender is critical to political development in Africa and to all scholarly efforts to conceptualize and theorize the modern African state whether in its historical origins, current composition, or the management of the extraction and distribution of resources. Some scholars in this realm focus on the collaboration between patriarchy and capitalism and the constraining impact of this on the role of women in socio-economic development. In this regard, April Gordon argues that although patriarchy and capitalism once collaborated to control and exploit women, their interests no longer coincide in contemporary Africa and, accordingly, women have the capacity to design new creative strategies to reform existing patriarchal structures and capitalist development to enhance their own status and improve their opportunities.⁶⁹ This eventuality, according to Nasong'o and Ayot,⁷⁰ is contingent upon facilitation of a critical mass of women representation in key policymaking state institutions.

The study of social movements and their contribution to the struggles for more inclusive governance in Africa constitute the fifth research trend in the critical tradition. The work of Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba is emblematic of this genre.⁷¹ The authors in their volume adopt a broad definition of social movements to encompass all group activity independent of the state; a perspective that enables them to examine such varied social formations as national liberation movements, religious revivalist movements, ethno-nationalist movements, and community-based organizations of self-empowerment among others. The thread linking the myriad movements examined in this work is said to be a shared experience of past oppression and the perpetual struggle for survival and inclusion in the political process. The potential for the success of these social movements in achieving their objectives, the argument

goes, is dependent upon the types of objectives they set for themselves, and the strategies they devise for achieving them; the quality of their leaderships and followers; and the nature of their ideologies or organizing principles.⁷²

Finally, Schraeder identifies the African nationalist school of thought as the sixth new trend in the critical tradition.⁷³ This school of thought, according to Schraeder, is also known as the Dar School because it originally grew out of a small cohort of African scholars based at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which founded the African Association of Political Science in 1973. The principal premise of this school of thought is that the traditional focus of the critical tradition on the negative impacts of the global capitalist system and national economic classes must be supplemented if not supplanted by a growing cognizance of the immense political power and autonomy enjoyed by African states. "Specifically, scholarship must reflect the indigenous power of African political institutions and actors in their relationship with domestic and international economic actors."⁷⁴ A critical aspect of this scholarship is the promotion of Africa-specific scholarship that builds on African research networks and the interests of African scholars. Accordingly, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research (CODESRIA) headquartered in Dakar, Senegal, has emerged, in the twenty-first century as the flagship, premier institution, and principal outlet for critical scholarship on Africa by African scholars such as Paulin Hountondji, Ibrahim, Mamdani, Wamba-dia-Wamba, Mkandawire, Olukoshi, Murunga, and Nasong'o.⁷⁵

Just like their liberal counterparts, critical scholars are not agreed on any one single theoretical framework as possessing the requisite descriptive, explanatory, and predictive potency to serve as the main guiding frame of reference for scholars in this research tradition. Nevertheless, they are united by their common resolve to confront the deleterious effects on African peoples and social systems of the neoliberal models of development imposed by the dominant social classes working in cahoots with foreign capitalist interests; as well as their commitment to generating knowledge and policy prescriptions that reflect the lived experience and daily realities of Africans as opposed to those which merely caricature the experience and realities of the Global North.⁷⁶

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Theory of the Crises of the State

Ogenga Otunnu

Images of millions of exhausted, dehumanized, destitute yet resilient Africans fleeing political violence, political repression, civil wars, ecological violence, organized terrorism and harrowing economic dislocations are indelibly etched in our collective global memory, forming the sensibility and the prisms through which we view African states. In different epochs and featuring different actors, the destitution and the inhumanity remain unchanged across time. These crises have raised serious questions about the definitions, origins, the nature, the functions, the capability, the capacity and the effects of African states. Efforts to describe the crises have led scholars, practitioners, policymakers and activists to refer to African states as a “juridical state,” “weak state,” “failed state,” “collapsed state,” “shadow state,” “belly-state,” “warlord state,” “predatory state,” “criminal state,” and “genocidal state” (Young 1994; Mazrui 1995; Jackson and Rosberg 1986).

This chapter argues that the diverse descriptions of the crises of the state and the competing and/or complementary possible remedies to the crises imply an important conclusion: that the most significant factor accounting for the origins, persistence and harrowing effects of the crises are directly related to the states’ profound legitimation deficits, their institutions and political incumbents, and the interplay of both local and international factors, past and present.

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DEFINITIONS OF THE STATE

Discussions about the African state have produced more confusion than clarity. For one thing, there is little agreement on the meaning of “state,” the phenomenon this word is meant to describe, how to study it, how and when it emerged, what its proper functions are, the relationship between it and civil society, the relationship between it and the regime, the relationship between it and socio-economic development, what constitutes its domestic and international legitimacy and/or what constitutes its legitimacy deficit, what constitutes state failure or state crisis, how to measure state failure or state crisis, how to improve its capacity and capability, what is African about it, how it affects societies, how people respond to it, and whether to destroy or reform or transform it. Differences of opinion mirror diverse assumptions about the nature, histories, legitimacy and functions of the state; the nature, functions and legitimacy of its institutions, regimes and political incumbents; and the nature and functions of civil society, as well as the conceptual frameworks and methodologies employed to unravel the phenomenon. This lack of consensus is compounded by the use of important but problematic concepts and/or “theories” in the study of the African state: “weak state,” “soft state,” “hard state,” “failed state,” “failing state,” “collapsed state,” “shadow state,” “criminal state,” “predatory state,” “warlord state,” “over-extended state,” “juridical state,” “empirical state,” “crisis state,” “authoritarian state,” “semi-authoritarian state,” “democratic state,” and “developmental state.” This terminological confusion is hopelessly complicated by the competing political beliefs of scholars, whose side these scholars take in the crises they study, and the conceptual frameworks and methodologies that are employed to unravel the phenomenon (Young 1994; Ake 1985, 105–114; Mkandawire 2001; Reno 1995a, 1997).

Given the dominance of a particularly European hegemonic political formation—dating from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648—over the “intellectual images of the state,” its unrivaled “strategic position at the core of the contemporary world system of states, and its virtually exclusive place in the fold of vision of moral philosophers and contemporary theorists” (Young 1994, 16), this chapter will adopt Max Weber’s definition of the state. Weber defines it as “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory” (Mitropoliski 2011; Anter 2014). Here, the key elements of the state are monopoly, legitimacy, force, community (civil society, population) and territory. Monopoly, for example, represents the concentration of political power within a particular community. Legitimacy, which mediates the power contest between the state and civil society and is the cornerstone upon which the stability, unity, continuity, sovereignty and purposes of the state rests, represents reciprocal responsibilities and obligations within a community. Here, physical force represents the technique of control and governance within a community and a geographical territory. Territory, in this instance, represents spatial domain with precise boundaries.

The state, therefore, is a legitimate, sovereign and collective legal organization that exercises control over the population in an independent territory. Thus, Young, for example, noted, before the most recent reunification of Germany, that “all the main theoretical trails led to the same handful of contemporary polities—Britain, the United States, France, West Germany, Sweden—as the empirical source for conceptual reflection on the state in its exemplary form” (Young 1994, 17).

DEFINITIONS OF LEGITIMACY AND CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

Diverse and competing definitions of legitimacy emphasize the following criteria: (1) power which is derived from a morally and/or legally valid source of authority; (2) power in the hands of institutions and/or those with appropriate qualities to obtain and exercise them; (3) power whose exercise conforms to recognizably shared interests, values, beliefs and expectations of the subordinates; and (4) power that wins reciprocal cooperation, responsibility and obligations from the “contracting” parties. In a multiethnic, multireligious, multinational, multiclass and multiracial African state, membership into these groups is also an important criterion of legitimacy. The criteria of legitimacy highlighted incorporate socio-economic, cultural and political expectations and obligations into the definition of legitimacy (Schaar 1981, 17–30; Moulakis 1986; Foti and Kittrie 1996). With regards to the international legitimacy of the state, for example, two competing and somewhat ambiguous criteria are often emphasized: power whose exercise conforms to international norms, customs, principles, practices, conventions, obligations and rules by which relations between states and other international persons are governed; and power in the hands of those who control internationally recognized political jurisdictions or sovereign states (Otunnu 2016; 2017).

The definition adopted in this chapter suggests that legitimacy is divisible. That is, while some segments of society may perceive the state, its institutions and the political incumbents as legitimate, other segments may perceive them as lacking the right to exist and/or rule. Similarly, while some states and international persons may perceive a particular state, its institutions and political incumbents as legitimate, others may perceive them as having a legitimation deficit. The definition also acknowledges that legitimacy is transient or time specific—that is, it may decline or increase, according to how stakeholders perceive the prevailing socio-economic, cultural and political systems. It also depends on how political players order their vital values, interests and obligations (Otunnu 2016; 2017).

Since the criteria of legitimacy are interpreted and ordered differently from time to time by the stakeholders, a crisis of legitimacy is a common characteristic of politics. What constitutes a crisis, however, is a subject for extended debate. In fact, scholars and practitioners are also divided over an important definitional criterion of a crisis: its duration. According to some economists, sociologists, social workers and psychiatrists, one of the essential features of a

crisis is that it is acute rather than chronic and takes place over days or weeks to a few weeks or a few months, depending on its particular subject matter. What this view suggests is that a crisis cannot drag on for an “indefinite” period without resolution one way or the other (Turner 1985, 179–183).

Other scholars and practitioners, especially those of contemporary political economy, refugee and forced migration studies and environmental degradation, maintain on the other hand that a crisis is a chronic phenomenon, which is more persistent and has a lower rate of resolution. Accordingly, this group often talks about crises of imperialism, crises of periphery capitalism, debt crises, crises of structural adjustment policies, environmental crises, crises of the state and refugee crises as chronic phenomena (Otunnu 1992, 18–26; Price 1991).

Despite differences of opinion, most definitions of crisis emphasize one or more of the following notions: (1) a breakdown in and/or a significant disturbance of the equilibrium; (2) a breakdown of strategic institutions; (3) a state of impasse or imbalance in relations or in the structure, one that has repercussions for the system; and (4) a critical period or an event that is perceived as a danger to and/or a strain on important habits, values, customs, capacity and life goals of the stakeholders. The foregoing, especially the structural–functional perspective, suggests that a crisis is often associated with increased tension, conflict, turmoil, violence, instability, insecurity, frustration, alienation, confusion and disorganization.

In this chapter, the broader concept of crisis, as espoused in contemporary political economy, is adopted. Here, a crisis of legitimacy means perceived legitimation deficit or perceived breakdown of legitimacy or perceived imbalance in the desired socio-economic, cultural and political equilibrium. A severe crisis of legitimacy, therefore, means perceived fundamental and prolonged legitimation deficit or perceived fundamental and prolonged breakdown of legitimacy or perceived fundamental imbalance in desired socio-economic, cultural and political equilibrium (Habermas 1975, 68–75).

What these definitions of legitimacy and crisis of legitimacy suggest is that states, their institutions, regimes and political incumbents experience crises of legitimacy at particular points in history. These crises have been closely associated with increased tensions, conflicts, alienation, instability, uncertainty, socio-economic dislocations and violence.

PRE-COLONIAL AFRICAN STATE

Imperial and colonial historiographies of Africa, based on European expansionist racial supremacy, intentionally and consistently denied African agency, innovation, initiatives and creativity, and declared, using a carefully invented Hamitic theory, that Africans were incapable of creating any complex socio-economic and political formation. However, scholars are now agreed that pre-colonial African societies, which would later be forcibly grouped into the

colonial states, developed their values, customs, laws, rules, institutions, stability and legitimacy from the extensive library of lived African experiences and African traditional religions, which in some parts of the continent were augmented by Islam. The participation of these societies in profitable trade, increased production and utilization of abundant items of consumption and trade, expansion of elaborate security institutions for stability and protection of trade routes and territorial enlargement and/or integrity, and technological innovations led to the development of two broadly defined types of state system: centralized and decentralized systems. In both political systems, religions, myths, fictions, customs, political culture and histories determined who could legitimately hold political power, how and why that power was to be exercised, the obligations and rights of the rulers and the ruled, and what institutions were appropriate for the states (Otunnu 2016; 2017).

Central to these political systems was the idea that the states and their institutions were constructed through social “contracts” between the rulers and the ruled. These contracts, which were, in some instances, sanctioned by divine authority and customs, provided the states and their institutions with legitimacy, identity, continuity, cohesion, and relative peace and stability. The contracts also provided the incumbents with legitimacy. Whenever they were violated, this idea further posited, a crisis of political legitimacy claimed the political landscape. Often, existing institutions, customs, political culture and religions prevented the crisis from becoming a common feature of the political landscape or from leading to a prolonged socio-economic and political dislocations (Otunnu 2016; 2017).

Centralized Pre-colonial African States

There were many types of centralized pre-colonial African state, including Bunyoro-Kitara, Buganda, Mali, Songhai, Asante, Dahomey, Benin, Ndebele, Lozi, Hausa, Zulu, Abyssinia, Egypt and Nubia. In these polities, which were often built on pre-existing states, the process of state centralization led to the gradual concentration of political power in the hands of the rulers, who, through careful negotiations with the “clans,” took advantage of opportunities presented by local and long-distance trade and successful territorial conquests to gradually reinvent and manipulate customs, existing institutions, histories and traditional religions and/or Islam to legitimize the “new states” and their power. The legitimization ideology that emerged also presented the new rulers, the states, the institutions and the laws as morally appropriate for the subjects. Additionally, it represented the state as a representative of the interests of its members and as a competent and just conflict manager (Otunnu 2016; 2017).

Through socialization, invented and shared historical experiences and negotiations, the rulers and the subjects “agreed” on the criteria of political legitimacy. The social contract, among other considerations, demanded that the rulers were constituted by custom and guided by divine presence and representative institutions to rule over the people, “shepherd” their “flock” and defend

them from oppression, despotism, violence and other forms of human insecurity. At least in theory, this meant that the ruled could withdraw legitimacy from rulers who violated their obligations to protect the population from violence, injustices and avoidable human insecurity. The ruled could then proceed to choose new rulers from acknowledged royal families. Thus, Gluckman noted that withholding legitimacy from or rebelling against rulers who did not honor their political obligations and/or abused their divine offices was common throughout Africa: “[W]hen subordinates turn against a leader ... they may only turn against him personally, without necessarily revolting against the authority of the office he occupies” (Gluckman 1956, 28). Put differently, the sovereign role remained intact, even if a particular ruler proved incapable of meeting the obligations of the office.

Decentralized Pre-colonial African States

The overwhelming majority of pre-colonial African states were decentralized states. They included the Igbo, Fulani, Nyamwezi, Luo, Acholi, Dinka and Nuer. Although it is impossible to make generalizations which apply without qualifications because these states were by no means uniform in size or degree of decentralization and democratic practice, they had some common characteristics: traditional concepts and practice of legitimacy were based on consensus alongside popular and inclusive democracy; government apparatus was not captured or held by a family or a ruling house; executive and judicial powers were decentralized; the regime did not rely on violence, coercion and intimidation to maintain itself in power; the incumbents did not use state capabilities and resources for personal enrichment; and customs and traditional religions did not sanction the use of political violence in domestic politics. In some cases, the low level of democratic practice and weak democratic political culture made them unable to significantly penetrate and control the states. This meant that such states were both despotically and infrastructurally weak. The majority of the decentralized states, however, were despotically weak and infrastructurally strong. The infrastructural strength of the states resulted from the long history and practice of popular and inclusive democracy, and the fact that the democratic society and state were very closely wedded. The democratic and horizontal relations between state and society also meant that the latter carried out those binding decisions that the former made. The nature of decision-making, therefore, made it easy for the state to implement those decisions. The ability of the state to implement decisions that were agreed upon by the society also accorded it strong infrastructure to penetrate and control the society (Otunnu 2016; 2017).

THE COLONIAL STATE

The overriding motives for European expansionist violence and the subsequent imposition of both its control and the colonial state in Africa were economic exploitation, oppression, dehumanization and dislocation of African socio-economic and political societies and control of the territory. In order to

plunder societies' resources, including those societies where the treasure house was somewhat mythical, European colonial powers enacted economic and administrative policies—using political violence, genocidal violence, terror, intimidation, coercion, manipulation, cooption, policies of divide and rule, policies of “indirect rule,” policies of direct rule and colonial laws—that fractured and underdeveloped the emergent and dependent state and created and/or elevated ethnic and religious tensions.

One of the first tasks the imperial presence embarked on was to determine the territorial boundaries of the colonial state. This process began in European capitals among the imperial diplomats and bureaucrats. The official minds of European imperialists who knew nothing about the topographical, pre-colonial socio-economic and political formations, the cultural and demographic characteristics of the territories, signed treaties and multilateral agreements that determined the boundaries of the colonial state. Since the architects of the boundaries lacked reliable topographical information, they shifted the frontiers of the state whenever new and better information accumulated. The boundaries also shifted many times during the colonial period owing to economic and political rivalries among European imperial powers. Occasionally, administrative imperative also determined the pace and nature of the shifting frontiers and population exchange among the imperial powers. Thus, Jackson and Rosberg noted that:

African states are direct successors of the European colonies that were alien entities to most Africans. Their legitimacy derived not from internal African consent, but from international agreements—primarily among European states—beginning with the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. Their borders were usually defined not by African political facts or geography, but rather by international rules of continental partition and occupation established for that purpose. (Jackson and Rosberg 1986, 5–6)

Young added: “Three crucial elements of the state were missing: sovereignty was emphatically denied; ultimate power was vested in the colonizing state. The doctrine of nation; and the colonial state was not an actor in the international scene” (Young 1994, 43).

The colonial power structure operated on what Smith, whose work on British colonial power generally applies to other European colonial powers in Africa, referred to as the gubernatorial principle: the colonial governor, appointed by the colonial power, was vested with authoritarian and supreme powers. He acted on behalf and with the advice of the British Government. He was assisted by provincial commissioners and sub-commissioners who were, in turn, assisted by district commissioners and assistant district commissioners. They were joined at the top of this pyramid of power by European Christian missionaries, European settlers, expatriates and European scholars. Together, the Europeans created a watertight caste-like structure which masked internal differences within the “superior” caste. This caste-like structure created an appearance of unity and invincibility (Smith 1983, 25–35).

What this suggested in the larger context of the colonial state in Africa was that socio-economic and political power was captured by one racial group or one clan. This power was captured for the primary purpose of enriching the clan, the colonial power. This clan ran the country as a no-party or one-party state. The bureaucracy and other institutions also operated primarily through patron–client relations, with systematic discrimination against non-members of the clan and those who disagreed with the hegemonic ideology. It also meant that the state was not rooted in the society; and the purposes and ends of governance were vigorously contested. The systematic exclusion of the ruled from positions of power in the state, and the patron–client relations that characterized relations within the state, also suggested to the ruled that the control of the overbearing state or access to it was vital for survival. Additionally, the despotic nature of the state promoted a political culture of absolute despotism in the colonial state. Equally importantly, it transformed every struggle in society into a political struggle. Another important characteristic feature of the colonial state was that it was so intimately wedded to the regime that created it that the distinction between state and government ceased to exist.

Several other observations should be made about the nature of the colonial state and the crises of legitimacy it generated. To begin with, by and large the colonial state was despotically strong but infrastructurally weak during the period of colonial penetration. However, once colonial rule had been effectively established through political violence, competent coercion, exploitation and the colonial policies of divide and rule, the colonial state became despotically strong and infrastructurally strong. This despotically strong and infrastructurally strong state, the existence of which resulted largely from European expansionist political violence and imperial concept of legitimacy, began to lose some of its strengths during the period of decolonization, however. This resulted from the erosion of the infrastructure of violence, repression and control during the terminal phase of colonial rule. This prepared the ground for a transition of state powers: from despotically strong and infrastructurally strong to despotically strong but infrastructurally weak. This guaranteed the persistence of the state as an important site for a severe crisis of legitimacy and political violence. Unlike the despotically strong and infrastructurally strong state, the despotically strong but infrastructurally weak state became an important site of political instability. The colonial state also created and maintained various forms of conflicts: religious, racial, regional, ethnic, over land, economic and over leadership, as well as rebellions of the suppressed and disenfranchised, and conflicts generated by the forced transition from “traditionalism” to “modernity.” These outlived the era of formal colonialism, and have remained important features of the political landscape of the post-colonial state (Otunnu 2016; 2017).

THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE

Cabral concluded that the origins, purposes, functions, persistence and consequences of the colonial state that survived into the postcolonial state were so diametrically opposed to the objectives of liberation struggles and the true

meanings of independence in Africa that the postcolonial state had to be destroyed and replaced with an organic, contractual, inclusive, legitimate, productive, functional, efficient and people-centered sovereign state:

We are not interested in the preservation of any of the structures of the colonial state. It is our opinion that it is necessary to totally destroy it, to break it, to reduce to ash all aspects of the colonial state in our country to make everything possible for our people ... The problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of the failure of African independence. (Young 1994, 1)

However, the new rulers of the postcolonial state attempted to defy Cabral's prophetic demand by trying to address the profound legitimation deficits of the state and its institutions through embracing democratic experiments under various labels, building more schools and healthcare centers more quickly than during the colonial period, encouraging economic growth within the dependent and parasitic international economic systems, and engaging in national integration. However, by the end of the first decade, by and large, the zero sum democratic experiment had been replaced by one-party dictatorship and military coups. The Congo crisis, for example, which saw the active, determined and violent involvement of rival superpowers in suffocating sovereign and progressive democratic impulses in Africa, became the crisis of the African state, alongside the Biafran crisis. The gains of the first decade of independence and the respectable economic growth of the 1960s, which attracted many predatory international loans in the early 1970s, were wiped out by the international economic crisis later in that decade. By the 1980s, Cabral's observation had gained more currency, as the fragmentation, decline and decay of the African state, intensified by the international economic crisis of the 1980s, invited and popularized the term "crisis state" (Young 1994, 2–4).

Following the end of the Cold War and the demise of Soviet socialism and self-described African socialism at the end of the 1980s, international capitalism and neoliberalism, through their institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, claimed unrivaled hegemony. This period, extending to 2016, also witnessed both a rise and a decline in democratization and people-centered economic development, and a decline in the capacity, integrity and sovereignty of the postcolonial African state. Together with increasing violent conflicts, mass population displacements and severe economic dislocations on the continent, these developments renewed the debates about the nature, functions and consequences of postcolonial states. Reflecting the growing crises, images of the "collapsed state," "warlord state," "predatory state," "shadow state," "criminal state," and "disorder state," for example, were popularized in efforts to identify and address the crises (Young 1994; Ake 1985, 105–114; Mkandawire 2001; Reno 1995a, 1997; Nyang'o 1989; Zartman 1995).

Under multiple and problematic descriptions and theories of the African state, scholars have concluded that the postcolonial state is by and large in economic, social and political disarray, decay and crisis. The crisis is explained in varied and competing terms, including the incapacity of the state “to foster accumulation through the state, to find domestic private substitutes for state, or to secure external finance other than to facilitate reimbursement of its gigantic debt” (Ake 1985, 40). Some scholars have identified the crisis as emanating from the pervasive neopatrimonial regimes that maintain autocratic power through personal patronage. Those who refer to the postcolonial state as a “weak state,” with the extreme forms being such phrases as “failed state” and “collapsed state,” for example, contend that the state has failed to perform some or all of its basic functions, such as procuring domestic legitimacy, providing human security and security within the state and, in some instances, providing security in the international systems. In the extreme case of a “failed state” or a “collapsed state,” protracted political violence, civil war, loss of the central authority’s monopoly of coercion, mass population displacement, control of territories by warlords, and/or the growth of terrorist organizations are the hallmarks. More often than not, pervasive corruption and authoritarianism or semiauthoritarianism are also identified as important markers of “weak” and/or “failed” state. Libya, Somalia and Mali are some of the most contemporary examples of “failed states” or “collapsed state” (Di John 2011, 1–4).

In a similar vein, some scholars have identified the crisis of the postcolonial “weak state” in terms of systematic corruption and the pervasive politics of the underbelly, as deliberate predatory and criminal pursuit and control of national resources as a mode of governance. In such a state, the political incumbents generate and or sustain instability and disorder as a political instrument, in order to maximize the predatory plunder of national resources, some of which may be used to purchase legitimacy from a segment of the population. According to Reno, whose work sheds light on how the rulers of the disordered state emerge and become important actors in the “shadow state,” the destabilization caused by post-Cold War economic and political liberalization eroded the traditional patronage systems which the autocratic rulers had used to maintain power and generate some limited economic growth. However, as warlords seized the disordered state, the rulers, like the warlords, used violence to extract, accumulate and siphon off state resources for personal enrichment, manipulated and controlled informal markets, which they shared with external companies, and established personal patronage systems, instead of providing economic security and public goods to the state (Reno 1995b).

Since the 1970s, the debates about the nature, functions and consequences of the postcolonial state have also focused more closely on the roles of international financial institutions and African governments. Significant parts of the debates make a number of assumptions about the desired functions of the state in economic development: ensuring high rates of equitable human-centered economic development by facilitating the creation, accumulation and distribution of investment and industrialization; developing and achieving capacity to

develop and implement economic policies efficiently and effectively; and using its power and autonomy to prevent and/or reduce predation in society. The debates also attempt to explain the postcolonial state, which played a central role in the development process in the 1960s, as the main problem in the quest for development, because of its weakness, its disruptive interference in the functioning of the free market, its overextension, its dependence on foreign and international actors, and its repressive and corrupt character. However, Mkandawire observed that “The most important case against developmental states in Africa is not faith in flawless markets, but rather that whatever the degree and extent of ‘market failure’ African states cannot correct them in ways that do not make things worse” (Mkandawire 2001, 292).

On the question of the harrowing effects of structural adjustments on the states and economies of Africa and how to replicate the central roles that the states played in the economic success stories of the East Asian “Four Tigers,” Mkandawire noted that:

In the African case, the failure of structural adjustment programs has compelled the Bretton Woods institutions to recognize the positive role the state can play in the process of development, beyond acting as a “night watchman.” In practice, the World Bank maintains that the African state must stay away from the development process because it is too weak and too prone to capture by vested interests. Also that the World Trade Organization insists on industrial policy that makes what was done in East Asia or what the state can do in Africa no longer acceptable or highly restricted. (Mkandawire 2001, 292–293)

What these observations indicate is that international financial institutions and vertical international economic systems play important roles in reproducing and intensifying the crisis of the post-colonial state.

Several observations may be made about the post-colonial state. Generally, having sustained the colonial state it inherited, it has not only been an important site of a severe crisis in legitimacy and intense and prolonged socio-economic and political dislocations, but has also experienced wide variations in despotic and infrastructural power in any particular historical epoch. Indeed, this despotic and infrastructural power has oscillated from time to time, depending on the state’s political heritage, culture and institutions, contested identities and aspirations, economic history and base, social complexity and interaction with both internal and external environments. The post-colonial state has exhibited many of the following characteristics: (1) it is a recent creation of European expansionist political violence, and lacked strong roots in civil society; (2) since the colonial period, by and large, there has been little distinction between the regime, the ruling party and the political incumbent, for the three, since the colonial period, have been closely fused, and the state is a vehicle for the benefit and self-interests of the political incumbent and his domestic and international allies; (3) it has dominated society and suffocated the limited and shrinking autonomous space of the utterly fragmented civil society; (4) by and large, the regime has been “captured” by one person or one group, with the systematic

exclusion of a section of the population, so that the regime is run almost exclusively on the basis of patronage and clientelism, and the institutions of the state operate essentially through patron–client relations; (5) if it has a strong infrastructure, then it penetrates the emergent civil society through coercion, overt violence and cooption; (6) it is a major source of insecurity and deprivation, and accordingly is incapable of providing security and other basic services to a sizable segment of the population; (7) the regime relies heavily on violence, coercion and intimidation to maintain itself in power; (8) in some instances, such as in “failed states” or “collapsed states” or “shadow states,” the regime is not despotically strong enough to control the territorial state; (9) its territorial integrity rests largely on international law, not on the popular will of the population; (10) it is generally a tragic fiction because it lacks nationhood and is predatory; (11) it is chronically dependent on other states and international institutions and organizations for economic, military, political and social assistance, this common feature of many postcolonial African states since the economic crises of the 1970s making the state vulnerable to manipulation by external actors and institutions; (12) it is a supplier of low-priced raw materials and is a purchaser of high-priced manufactured goods; (13) it is in search of hegemony; (14) more often than not, the political incumbent does not assume power as a result of winning a freely and fairly contested election, and possibly becoming an imperial president, also cannot be recalled by the ruled, and (15) major state institutions, including the military and the judiciary, are controlled by those in power and serve their interests.

Observers of the African state have suggested a number of possible solutions to the crises, including the destruction of the state and reconstitution of an entirely new socio-economic and political formation anchored on inclusive and accountable African culture and values; promoting popular, inclusive, effective and accountable people-centered democratic projects that protect and promote human security and deliver economic development and infrastructure for healthcare, education and food; building a social compact based on decentralized, consensual and inclusive democracy and federalism; building regional and continental formations that are better equipped to meet the realities of contemporary world systems; reconstructing weak and failed states by creating credible central authority, controlling national boundaries and national territory, developing the capacity to extract, accumulate, invest and distribute resources, and controlling the actions of state agents; and reforming humanitarian intervention to prevent bloodshed, save lives, and provide protection and space for humanitarian assistance, peace negotiation and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation of failed states (Nyong’o 1992; Nyang’o 1999; Richard 1987).

The persistence and the unprecedented scale of the crises in African states therefore require innovative, flexible, dynamic, outward-looking and comprehensive practical strategies and policies that address the underlying structural conditions that sustain the crises. Such practical strategies and policies should

address human rights abuses, dictatorship, corruption, underdevelopment, poverty and inequality caused and sustained by both internal and external factors, political and religious repression, profound legitimacy deficits of the state, domination and exploitation, and environmental degradation. Equally importantly, such policies and strategies will require the sustained political and financial commitment and coordination of domestic and international civil society groups, governments, public and private institutions and sectors, humanitarian actors and other stakeholders. What is required, therefore, is to turn high-sounding agreements and statements of intentions that address the root causes of the crises into immediate, sustainable and practical human rights-based and human needs-based solutions.

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Post-colonialism: Theoretical Foundations and Relevance to African Politics

Godwin Onuoha

INTRODUCTION

The term postcolonialism was first used in the 1960s to explain different aspects of society in the Global South, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The term, as utilized at the time, captured the treachery of imperialism and the perpetuation of colonial tendencies up to the present. This expansive deployment tacitly perceived colonialism as a continuous experience with definite beginnings in the nineteenth century but with no end, despite the termination of the colonial experience in Africa over five decades ago. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s several publications have appeared linking postcolonialism to contemporary developments, but the term still lacks real clarity and it is still eclectically deployed as “postcolonial theory” or “postcolonial studies.” This terminological crisis is replete among advocates of the term who have little or no agreement on its referents and meanings. Its deployment in a broad range of cultural and literary contexts renders it heterogeneous and diffuse, and at the same time raises the question of where to situate it, whether in discursive practices and original texts; in the making of identities and subjectivities; or in broad historical and societal processes.

The terms “postcolonialism,” “postcolonial theory,” “postcolonial studies,” “postcoloniality” and “decoloniality” are sometimes deployed interchangeably. It is pertinent to state that the idea of “decoloniality” has received little or no attention owing to its association with the underside of modernity and a perception of inferiority by Eurocentric forms and centers of knowledge.

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Although post-colonialism and decoloniality are similar in the sense that they both offer a critique and stand in opposition to Eurocentric narratives, the decolonial has been subsumed within the postcolonial in a problematic manner, and sometimes decolonial and post-colonial scholars are interchangeably substituted for one another. However, the major differences stem from their reference to colonialism, which has many theoretical, conceptual and epistemological implications for both projects. Essentially, while post-colonialism focuses on culture and leaves out the political economy, the decolonial takes both together in order to understand the cartography of power involved. An analytical elaboration is necessary in order not to render them as substitutes or to encourage random usage. Postcolonialism articulates a philosophy that seeks to propose fundamental alterations to politics and popular struggles, which encompasses the history of colonialism and the perpetuation of imperialist policies (Sethi 2011, 26). As Young (1998, 4) rightly contends, “postcolonialism has come to name a certain kind of interdisciplinary political, theoretical and historical academic work that sets out to serve as a transnational forum of studies grounded in the historical context of colonialism, as well as in the political context of contemporary problems of globalization.” Postcolonial theory, at least as deployed in academia, is perceived as elitist, but with obvious relevance to issues of gender, race, migration, diaspora, nation and identity (Sethi 2011, 27). Postcolonial studies are largely predicated on cultural studies, and are yet to incarnate most of the political and economic debates subsumed within post-colonialism (Loomba 1998, 40). What appears to be one of the main critiques of postcolonial studies is the fact that it fails to mediate debates around “real” politics but focuses extensively on modes of textual interpretations as taught in universities’ English departments (Sethi 2011, 27). Sometimes the concept is heterogeneously deployed in its complex relationship with the humanities and social sciences, where its disciplinary tendencies interrogate the cultural aspects of issues of race, gender, class formation and nation-making, while its theoretical underpinnings expatiate concrete instances of economic and social manipulation.

Postcolonialism in this context refers to “a condition of living, a practice, a political belief or set of political beliefs that come into effect in a situation of oppression or marginalization, that can help counter that oppression through protests, resistance and activism” (Sethi 2011, 6). This encompasses enduring, profound and qualitative social changes; the introduction of massive and widespread social formations and consolidated social structures; reinvented indigenous political and social systems; and different strategies deployed by former colonies in mediating and negotiating the consequences of imperialism and neocolonialism.

A convenient point of departure in this chapter is to undertake a systematic critique of the term with specific reference to Africa, and to interrogate the following questions. Has Africa really gone beyond the colonial into the postcolonial? Is Africa actually caught between a postcolonial and neocolonial moment? Are we grappling with several Africa(s) in a time-space

progression that eludes simple delineation or understanding? Or are we presently experiencing multiple postcolonialisms? Against this backdrop, which of these propositions is more relevant to the understanding of African politics? By focusing on these questions, this chapter aims to interrogate the term postcolonialism by examining its historical evolution and specific deployments. Secondly, it seeks to understand Africa's uncertain postcolonialism, particularly against the backdrop of developments in Africa that are externally articulated. Thirdly, an attempt will be made to understand politics in Africa, especially in terms of the postcolonial democratic experience on the continent.

MAPPING THE CONCEPTUAL TERRAIN

Postcolonialism articulates "Third World" struggles that took place as critical structures of nationhood were dismantled by the forces of Western imperialism. As Shohat (1992, 99) argues, the multiplicity or variants of "posts" has not enabled an interrogation of the politics of location, its ahistorical and universalizing deployments that are at the very heart of postcolonialism. The crisis associated with the term emerged almost immediately, and reflected, as it were, a wide variety of complex economic, political and social developments globally. While debating its proper usage, it is pertinent to note that postcolonialism can be situated historically, geographically and institutionally. A critical question in this regard concerns the frames of reference that postcolonialism promotes. And what are the political implications of these frames? This necessitates a limited, theoretically and historically specific deployment of the term, one which advances its utility in understanding African societies.

Shohat's (1992, 100) observation underscores the emergence of postcolonialism and its evolutions during the late 1980s as coinciding and dependent on the waning of an older model, the "Third World." The latter gained global currency in political and academic cycles as a result of its widespread deployment in the decolonization struggles, and later in the dependency and world systems theories, with reference to Andre Gunder Frank/Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein respectively. Though there was a consensus that poor states were impoverished and that rich states benefit from the manner in which poor states are integrated into the global system, it suffices to note that power relations were also fluid, and sometimes hegemonic, even in the Third World.

The waning of the Third World concept and the advent of the term postcolonial took place hand in glove at a time when issues emanating from colonial relations and interactions were at the forefront in many parts of the Global South. Wittingly or unwittingly, in the course of engaging in critical discourses and themes related to the postcolonial, Shohat (1992, 101) argues that "dropping the suffix 'ism' from 'postcolonialism', the adjective postcolonial is frequently attached to the nouns, 'theory', 'space', 'condition', 'intellectual', while it often substitutes for the adjective 'Third World' in relation to the noun 'intellectual'. The qualifier 'Third World', by contrast, more frequently accompanies the nouns, 'nations', 'countries' and 'peoples'." The prefix "post" does not just

denote a transcendence of the colonial but associates postcolonialism with a string of similar terms, such as post-structuralism, postmodernism, post-Marxism and post-feminism, among others. According to Shohat (1992, 101), while this string of similar terms demonstrates the transcendence of obsolete political and philosophical theories, the postcolonial indirectly suggests transcending anticolonial nationalist theory as well as a movement beyond a particular point in history, comprising colonialism and Third World nationalist struggles. For Shohat, the prefix “post” parallels similar categories of post such as post-war, post-Cold War, post-independence, post-revolution, all of which suggest a transition into a new era and the foreclosure of certain historical epochs or episodes. As Shohat (1992, 102) points out, it is instructive to note that the “post” in postcolonial implies “after” the termination of the colonial project, one infused with uncertainty in relation to both space and time.

Spivak (1990) points to an expanded use of the term postcolonialism, one that appears to serve as a model or pattern in Third World discourses. While Spivak (1990) posits a radical and resistant formulation of the term, Shohat (1992, 103) addresses how the term gives rise to unusual couplings of “post” in different contexts and regions in a manner that dims a proper usage. Following this logic, it then means that the eradication of the last vestiges of colonialism uniformly from virtually every part of the world has ushered us into a postcolonial era where the term becomes a model or standard representing everything else that exists in the postcolonial era despite significant geographical and conceptual differences. The deployment of the postcolonial glosses over diverse chronologies and elides historical specificities and different beginnings, which makes useful articulations impossible. Contemporary deployments of postcolonialism or the “postcolonial condition” is based on the elimination of space and time, as well as feasible linkages between postcolonialism and present constructions of the anticolonial, or anticolonial discourses and movements in the Global South. Shohat (1992, 106) opines that the postcolonial suggests continuities and discontinuities, emphasizing new modes and forms of prior colonial practices, but not beyond it. This much can be gleaned from the ambiguities that have characterized the deployment of the term, whether as a phenomenon representing the passage of a period or as something perpetuating itself into the future.

POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE AFRICAN CONDITION

A necessary starting point in considering the place of postcolonialism in understanding the African condition is ask whether postcolonialism implies the act or process of passing, of movement from one point to another, or the repetition of something or regeneration of something through other means. How then do these positions help in understanding the African condition? The intellectual outburst generated by these perspectives still elicits a “live” debate in contemporary Africa. There is a view that postcolonialism invokes a condition or a “fulfilled” period of resistance, or a breaking away from colonial relationships. This popular

Africanist view was championed by Dike, Ade-Ajayi and Ogot, and other pioneer Africanist historians who dominated the Ibadan School of Social History in the late colonial period and early years of independence in Africa. Emerging as the first generation of African historians on the continent and against the backdrop of the institutional support provided by the Ibadan School of African History, this generation of African historians sought to defend the glorious view of pre-colonial Africa. They defended and represented African history, and in the process stressed Africa's glorious past in complete contradiction to a Eurocentric view of the continent (Dike 1956; Ogot 1967; Ade-Ajayi 1968).

Prior to this time, the African continent has had to contend with a largely Eurocentric depiction of the continent, both as the "White Man's Burden" and the "Dark Continent." These views flowed mainly from a perspective that the continent was dominated by a barbaric, unknown and inferior race in urgent need of civilization, and by extension colonization. The dominant argument of the period was that until the advent of the Europeans Africa had no history, was non-literate and that any worthy mention of Africa was in relation to Europe. Hegel's seminal work, titled *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Wiley, 1944), delivered as part of the Jena Lectures Series in 1830/1831, succinctly advanced this notion in intellectual and academic circles, when he stated, among other things, that Africa was an irrelevant part of the world and not a historical part of the world. This view was further developed by Hugh Trevor-Roper, Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford, in a series of lectures he delivered at the University of Sussex in October 1963, where he stated that "perhaps, in the future, there will be some African history to teach. But at present there is none, or very little: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa." Subsequent perceptions of Africa drew heavily on these views, as colonial anthropologists, colonial civil servants, merchants, cartographers and missionaries based their perceptions of the continent on these and other related sets of assumptions. Since colonialism needed a justification, it had to project a distorted view of African history replete with Eurocentric biases, one that characterized the study of history in the late colonial period and in the period immediately after independence.

The predisposition of the Ibadan School of History to postcolonialism or a postcolonial moment was borne out of a predilection for "dates" and "periodization" as core elements of historiography. On this basis, they argue that the Berlin Conference which settled the partition of Africa in 1885 and the great decade of African independence beginning in 1960 should be seen as a seventy-five-year colonial period, and that the era of independence which began in 1960 should be seen as one that ushered in a postcolonial period in Africa's long history. Apart from the periodic considerations, the Ibadan School of History agrees that during the colonial period the colonial state had arbitrary powers, and could not and was not willing to engender any form of legitimacy as a situation was perpetuated that led to the loss of African sovereignty in virtually every sense of the word. But colonial domination did not go unchallenged as Africans retained the initiative and entrenched their struggle for independence, which ultimately led to independence in the 1960s.

On the other hand, the view advocated by Peter Ekeh, a Nigerian sociologist, has leveled several criticisms against the “Ibadan School of History,” arguing that postcolonialism represents the repetition of something or regeneration of something through other means. Ekeh (1983, 10) argues that major colonial developments cannot be neatly captured in the period between 1885 and 1960, and to stick to these dates in a strict sense is to subvert the fundamental impact of earlier Euro–African relations, some of which led to the emergence of new power configurations and equations in pre-colonial African societies. Against this backdrop, Afigbo (1977, 11) opines that it would appear the dominant preoccupation of African historiography was to defend Africa’s image at all cost, while shying away from the need to contribute something substantial to the explanation and understanding of the African question, a situation which has imposed a severe limitation on the potential for understanding and articulating contemporary events (Ekeh 1983, 13).

For Ekeh (1983, 23–24), the impact of colonialism transcends the demise of the colonial system, and perpetuates into the postcolonial period with significant and enduring social, political and economic formations. This means that the articulation of the colonial has implications for how we understand the postcolonial moment, as the colonial is seen as an epoch, not an episode. In contemporary Africa, most colonial structures have outlasted the end of colonialism and have been perpetuated into the postcolonial era. Substantively, Africa has been integrated into the global capitalist system in very contradictory terms, through various monetary and trade policies, capitalist intrusions, exploitation of raw materials, and global institutions and structures. These transformations have ensured that the postcolonial period still carries with it the baggage of colonialism, which constitutes the reality of the African condition. Ekeh (1983, 12–21) points to the changes in indigenous social structures, which already existed before the advent of colonialism but went through a remarkable transformation and still exist today. Second, he points to the wholesale migration of Western social structures such as democracy, rule of law, bureaucratic systems and forms of knowledge production into Africa without due regard to context and history. Third, he comments on the emergence of social structures within the colonies themselves to meet the needs of colonization, while at the same time they blurred the lines between tradition and modernity, reiterating the view that colonialism was not an episodic but an epochal event.

On this basis, what we now consider to be a postcolonial situation is shaped and defined by colonialism. Some have advanced the thought that as Africans began to define themselves as one against the Europeans, the idea of “Africa” was harnessed, fostered and created by such developments (Nyerere 1964, 149). Pursuant to this conclusion, Mazrui (1963, 90) contends that “it took colonialism to inform Africans that they were Africans,” as the different ethnic constituencies in Africa were offered a rallying point to mobilize and unify; or as Otiye (1978, 11–12) puts it, colonialism provided the basis of “reactive anti-colonial thought.” This buttresses the fact that pan-African unity as presently constituted in postcolonial societies took root largely as a result of the colonial encounter and

the mutually contrived efforts of the peoples and leadership of the continent to end it. As Osaghae (1991, 29) opines, when one considers the existence of the colonial imprints on the continent which transcend the end of colonialism, it is reasonable to argue that colonialism goes beyond the episodic to the epochal as it provides insights into the understanding of the postcolonial moment in Africa.

IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

From the foregoing, it is imperative to examine closely the implications of colonial imprint on contemporary political thought and practice on the continent. Undoubtedly, colonialism played a major role in shaping the structure and context for political thought and practice in independent Africa. Most of the ideas and practices of politics were inherent in the colonial structure, and there has been a tendency to replace colonial ideas with “authentic” African ideas, in what Osaghae (1991, 32) refers to as a “replacement syndrome.” This forms the basis of African political thought and practice today. This has led to the reinvention of Eurocentric and Western theories, concepts and themes in order to make them relevant to the African milieu in a postcolonial context. Sklar (1985, 22) observes that the “historic framework of colonial and anti-colonial theorizing has become an impediment that exerts negative pressures on the process of creative thought” in African politics, arguing that it is “largely irrelevant to issues and problems of the postcolonial world,” hence the need for “a conceptual breakthrough” or “breakaway from the colonial/neo-colonial fixation.” As a result of the flux and constantly changing nature of theory and form, a yawning gap exists between thought and practice and between form and reality in African politics (Otite 1978, 3). In the immediate postcolonial period, these incongruities were emphasized by the realities of the postcolonial period, which was remarkably different from that of the colonial era, as leaders of the nationalist and independent movements began to realize that the challenge of nation-building, economic development, political order and national unity had to be rooted in concrete realities. In the face of these realities, it was not surprising that some of the respected nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere began to tilt towards authoritarian rule and one-party states, respectively. Hence, these leaders began to make the argument for authoritarianism and one-party state in developmental terms, and as a necessary component of national consensus and nation-building.

Notably, the immediate needs of the nationalist leaders and ruling class was brought to bear on postcolonial politics. In a bid to reject both the capitalist and socialist models of politics and development, postcolonial African leaders sought to embrace a certain kind of neutrality, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provided the basis to further this standpoint in the context of a struggle between two dominant global ideologies. Yet despite their commitment to neutrality, most African leaders in reality promoted, tacitly or openly, one of

the dominant ideologies of the era as manifested in their economic, political and social programs to the detriment of a pan-African ideal. Remarkably, the pan-African position as presently articulated is either a “core political project” or a “philosophical ideal.” This stems from the weaknesses inherent in the divergent, irreconcilable and often contradictory positions pursued by most African states. The paucity of a coherent pan-Africanist theory is reflected in M’buyinga’s (1982, 34) argument, that the ideal was only meant to “provide a set of political and philosophical ideas for the guidance of African peoples in their struggle for liberation, independence, and unity, a struggle for independence within the unity of Africa.” Having been rendered motionless, both in thought and in practice, references to pan-Africanism and non-alignment by African leaders has gradually waned in the face of the harsh realities of post-colonial nation-building. This, in Osaghae’s (1991, 35) view, has partly to do with the inauthentic nature of these ideas, and their apparent failure to confront, let alone address, the postcolonial situation.

Democracy and democratization remain central to the postcolonial condition in Africa. There appears to be little or no faith in the viability of democratic trends, and the need to rethink current democratic practices and projects has become more urgent. Postcolonial democratic projects and practices have been imposed wholesale on Africa, without due regard to theory, time and chronology, nor attention to the patterns, characteristics and problems inherent in such projects. This raises critical questions about postcolonial democratic projects. Whose democracy is in place? Is it a popular and inclusive democracy? Was it imposed on the people? What limitations are inherent in the ideological framework of this type of democracy? What possibilities exist for building viable and sustainable democratic projects in postcolonial Africa?

By far, the most enduring struggle in Africa, irrespective of the various waves of democratic transitions, has been about the whole notion of “states without citizens.” The experiences of most postcolonial African states raises questions of citizenship deficit, and at the same time calls into question the universal value of democracy. This reiterates the need to contextualize, modify and particularize democracy to address the local conditions and realities on the African continent, one that reiterates citizenship, perceived as emancipation, empowerment, participation and autonomy as a necessary condition for democratization and democracy in postcolonial Africa. The adoption, propagation and implementation of Western democracy hardly take into account the peculiarities and uncertainties of postcolonial Africa.

The point has to be made that postcolonial democratic projects were welcomed in Africa without due regard to the context within which they were unfolding. These democratic projects ignored the interconnectedness of the processes to a broader historical flow, and perceived them as episodic events to be treated in isolation. Osaghae (2005, 2) points out that the analysis of the democratization project in Africa was seen as part of the hegemonic third wave of liberal democracy into which the African experience must fit into. Little or no attention was paid to the specific historical challenges that democracy

and democratization is confronted with in postcolonial Africa, and the role democracy was expected to play as a result. Ekeh (1997, 83) described this as an unprofitable mimicry of Western theory and concepts, without a grounding in the discourse of democracy in African political thought, while Olukoshi (1999, 464) refers to it as an analytical subordination of African experiences to the experiences of others. It is precisely for this reason that Africa's democratization process, by taking as its standard the global liberal democratic framework, is perceived to have ignored the long-standing historical need to resolve the social contract and citizenship deficit that has plagued postcolonial Africa since independence. The seeming decoupling of democracy and democratization from socio-economic issues of citizenship robs the democratic project in postcolonial Africa of content and meaning, and limits democracy primarily to the "political", without due regard being given to its "social" and "economic" imperatives.

Contemporary democratic projects in Africa has been evaluated on the extent to which African states conform to liberalism (or liberal democracy) and power-sharing arrangements (Osaghae 2005, 14). Democracy is examined in relation to "good governance" and "market reforms" typically in the form of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), rather than in the form of a transfer of power to the people (Olukoshi 1998). Several indicators for the measurement of this type of democratic performance have emerged in the international community, ranging from Joseph's Quality of Democracy Index, Carter Centre's Africa Demos, World Bank Governance Indicators, Brookings Institution Index of Failed States, Freedom House Index and Democracy Web to the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, among others. "Good governance" has now become the criterion for evaluating democratic transitions, and this has morphed into a model known as the Washington Consensus. "Good (political) governance" has become part and parcel of the cross/conditionality clauses of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors (Olukoshi 2002, 23). The emphasis on "good governance" focused extensively on political democracy, rather than other aspects of democratic reforms which has been lacking in postcolonial Africa. This framework has become too narrow, functional, technocratic and managerial, and tends to subordinate politics to a neoliberal framework in contemporary Africa.

What postcolonial Africa actually needs, as Osaghae (2005, 15) argues, is the liberationist approach to democracy which discerns the peculiarities of the continent's democratic challenges, and seeks to instrumentalize democracy and democratization for the public good and for broader emancipation and empowerment. The goal of the liberationist approach is to engage civil society in "real" terms to play a determinate role in the reconstruction of the state and binding the state to responsiveness, transparency and accountability, one that transcends the rituals of periodic elections, voting and being voted for, and seeks to elicit a new social contract that puts citizens at the center of democracy and democratization processes (Osaghae 2005, 15). It emphasizes how the state can be strengthened in a social bargain that connects all political

actors and guarantees popular participation in the democratization agenda. The central tenet of the liberationist agenda is the appropriation of the state based on domestic political consensus reached by progressive social/popular forces, and ultimately, repositioning it as a developmental instrument that is in real terms democratic and caters for the needs of the people.

As Osaghae (2005, 15) points out, the latter advocate a revolutionary-type transformation that is not elite-driven, but based on a groundswell of the alliance of progressive forces and social movements intent on defending the autonomy of the political space. By challenging the exclusive monopoly of democracy, this process is elite-challenging and not elite-driven and pushes for a democracy that has popular anchorage. Its authenticity has to be measured by its local anchorage, a strong degree of local value added that is linked to local specificities and circumstances and not just an imposition from the external environment. Most of the transitions recorded in Africa witnessed the propping up of indigenous technocratic elites by the IMF and World Bank who had no anchorage in domestic political processes and structures. This has made postcolonial African democracy an almost entirely external imposition. Hence, the various responses to this top-down approach to democracy have emerged in most countries in Africa in response to the search for an enduring alternative.

CONCLUSION

From the realm of economic development, characterized by a situation where the economies of postcolonial African states are still externally articulated and tied to former colonial metropolises; to social and political thought, characterized by the erosion of post-independence social contracts and imposition of liberal democracy, there is abundant evidence to suggest that even in the postcolonial moment Africa is still saddled with the perpetuation of the colonial phenomenon. Present necessities and realities, particularly in the economic and political realms, reiterate the need to revisit the transcendence of colonial imprints on contemporary African societies. It appears that postcolonial African political thought and practice is intrinsically tied to Western ideas, theories and concepts. Whether we refer to actual political thought, theory, concept or practice in postcolonial Africa, the underlying conclusion seems to be that Africa is engaged in an unprofitable imitation of a universalizing Western model, which is far from being original.

Though democracy may be intrinsically universal and appropriate for all, it must be realized that its anchorage in local conditions and realities is crucial in the bid to “modifying and particularizing the universal” (Obi 2008, 24). Central to this objective is a rethink of the postcolonial agenda in a manner that makes actual meaning and impacts positively on the quality of the lives of African peoples and strengthens the critical constituencies in African communities. This is not an attempt to tropicalize democracy, but one geared towards making democracy relevant for postcolonial Africa. Until this penchant for

mimicry is discarded, postcolonial developments in Africa will remain largely dependent and subordinate to Western experiences. While this holds true, it continues to make the theory and practice of postcolonial developments in Africa contradictory and irrelevant.

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Decoloniality as a Combative Ontology in African Development

William Mpofu

INTRODUCTION

African liberatory and critical thought on development would not be so occupied with decoloniality if coloniality had not negated politics and development in the continent. A decolonial imagination of development in Africa necessarily has to pay attention to the historical and political injuries that Africa has encountered through slavery, colonialism and enduring coloniality. For that reason, a decolonial development paradigm in Africa, which this chapter explores, cannot be but a liberatory and a repair operation at the level of power, knowledge and the being of Africans, this time as subjects rather than objects of history. In his important articulations about Africanity as a combative ontology, Mafeje (2011) noted that imagining freedom, Afrocentricism, Africanity and the African renaissance had to be a rebellious negation of the colonial negations that have been imposed on Africa. Enunciating on the negation of Africa in slavery and colonialism, Rodney (1972) describes “how Europe underdeveloped Africa” by interrupting, with imperialism and capitalism, the natural development that Africa was going through at her own time and pace. In the observation of Ake (1996), Africa exists in the politics, economics and culture of the present modern and colonial world system as a marginality. The marginality and peripherization of Africa and Latin America in the modern colonial world system is understood by Dussel and Ibarra-Colado (2006) as the negation in which globalization has been discharged to organize the world into a powerful Euro-American centre and a weak global South, in which Africa and other peripheries are found. Economically, politically

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and ontologically the world, under the care of the Euro-American Empire, has been globalized into conquerors and the conquered. In escalation of the understanding of the world as a space of conquerors and the conquered, Escobar (2004) notes that the projects of modernity and modernization, development and democratization, have been experienced in the global south as “violence” and “displacement” in physical, epistemic, cultural and socio-political terms. In recognition of that physical and cultural negation of Africa in form of dispossessions and displacements of people, Wa Thiongo (2009) describes Africa as having been dismembered and needing re-membering to bring it together as a space of power and life for Africans. Proposing the decolonial epistemic perspective and decoloniality as a combative intervention into the historical, political and cultural negations of Africa, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015a) notes that decoloniality as a combative ontology is necessitated by a crisis of imagination where socialism has collapsed and capitalism is in crisis, and dominant social theories such as structuralism, post-structuralism and post colonialism have been caught up in poverty and exhausted. In the view of Ndlovu-Gatsheni, decoloniality is a continuing search for a new world order after slavery and colonialism impoverished Africa, and coloniality continues to extract rent from Africa. Decoloniality is a way of making sense of the trauma of slavery and colonialism that is reproduced through coloniality today. Many decades after formal slavery was abolished and after juridical and administrative colonialism was dethroned, coloniality as an enduring imperial and colonial power structure, which is manifest in the exercise of power, production and distribution of knowledge, and the experience of life and being of peoples in the global South, remains intact. Even the imagination of development in Africa is still sadly enmeshed in the slavish and colonial imaginary. This stubborn endurance of coloniality after slavery and colonialism have been dethroned is viewed by Mignolo (2000) as happening through the presence of domineering global designs—economic, political and cultural—that still impinge upon local histories in the global South. In light of the colonial wounding and negation of Africa, decoloniality seeks to erect new concepts and fresh ways of imagining development as liberation in Africa. Before this chapter fleshes out decoloniality as a combative ontology in African development, an explication of coloniality as a negation of African development is necessary. After that the decolonial epistemic perspective that is deployed in unmasking coloniality in Africa is treated. Finally, the chapter delineates decoloniality as a liberatory and combative current that seeks to set afoot a new humanity and world order that is an alternative to the present modern and colonial world system.

COLONIALITY AS A NEGATION OF DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

In his revealing book *Cry Havoc*, Simon Mann (2011, 1), a self-declared British mercenary and “dog of war,” discloses how in 2004 he, together with accomplices, was hired to carry out a coup to dethrone the sitting government of Equatorial Guinea with the pretext of pursuing human rights and democracy. The actual purpose of the *coup d'état* was to install a puppet leader who

would open avenues for the exploitation of oil by European and Asian business tycoons. “This was about oil” and other natural resources that the country held, Mann declares. An unnamed British former Prime Minister was involved in the planning and financing of the operation. Illuminated in the story that Mann narrates is exactly how Africa remains for Europe, America and other powerful political and economic business actors in the world a site of political, economic and intellectual exploration, experimentation and exploitation apparently for development and democratization but in actuality for cheap labor, natural resources and possibly political enjoyment. In the planned invasion of Equatorial Guinea, Mann, a former British Special Air Services operative, was accompanied by highly trained soldiers who carried sophisticated weapons and had advantage of special and advanced knowledge about the country that they were targeting for invasion and opening up for exploitation and the siphoning of resources. In the argument put forward in this chapter, it is shown that Africa is exactly that in the present world order, an object to be overpowered, to be overcome and invaded and to be known, simplified into manageable details and controlled. Africa, politically, economically and developmentally, is open and easy for outside adventures, rich in resources and available. That vulnerability to being overpowered by force of arms, the knowability and also exploitability that Africa, and the entire Global South suffers, is described by Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (2000b) as a coloniality of power that is residual from slavery and colonialism. Nkrumah (1965) observed this ability of the former colonizers and enslavers of Africa to invade, influence and control the politics and economies of Africa as neo-colonialism which is the highest stage of imperialism, even more punitive and extractive because it operates indirectly and stealthily. Coloniality harvests for Empire all the economic and political benefits of slavery and colonialism without the financially and morally expensive presence of juridical and administrative structures. Coloniality, in the elaboration of Anibal Quijano operates through “control of the economy” of the former colonized and former enslaved by Empire. Empire also has a firm hold on “authority” and power in the peripheral and marginal polity and economy. Aspects of gender and sexuality are not spared as Empire prescribes ways of being and what family should mean in terms of sex, gender and reproductivity. Knowledge production and dissemination, research and ways of knowing, the academy and the media are also owned and controlled after the interests of capital and Empire. Lastly, there is military and technological might to consolidate and validate the victory and reign of the Euro-American Empire over the entire planet. For that reason, Maldonado-Torres (2007) notes that coloniality is therefore different from colonialism in that after colonialism has been dethroned and exhausted coloniality achieves, economically, politically, epistemically, psychologically and otherwise, all the purposes and ends that colonialism intended in the first place.

Coloniality, therefore, as it expresses and represents itself in Africa, is the stubborn corpse that wakes up after each and every one of its final funerals. Coloniality becomes the enhanced and resurrected emergence of slavery and

colonialism. For this ability to be killed through political decolonization that is followed by independence celebrations and still to become effective in the economic and political benefit of Empire, colonialism appears as more than an event that passed but a reality that fits the definition of a process and a social movement of epochal and epic proportions:

Colonialism may be considered as a social movement of epochal dimensions whose enduring significance, beyond the lifespan of the colonial situation, lies in the social formations of supra-individual formations developed from the volcano-sized social changes provoked into existence by the confrontations, contradictions and incompatibilities in the colonial situation. (Ekeh 1983, 4)

Coloniality, therefore, is the unholy ghost of colonialism itself. In coloniality everything that colonialism and even slavery ever was is represented and reproduced in a more virulent and perfected sense. In that ability of itself to be killed or to publicly commit suicide in the decolonization and political independence of colonies, and only to wake up the following day to perform itself and its functions in the colony on behalf of Empire, coloniality makes postcoloniality and the postcolonial world a myth. Grosfoguel has emphasized how the imperial and colonial power structure that was built over 450 years cannot evaporate with the administrative exhaustion of juridical colonialism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni has also described how in Africa “myths of decolonization” carried and sold themselves for genuine decolonization, causing ill-fated euphoria and celebrations as Empire continued its extractive projects and imperial exploitation of the conquered spaces and peoples.

Escobar, in fleshing out coloniality, believes that “development” has been caught up by “violence” and the “new imperial order” of the world. To the peoples and places of the periphery and former enslaved and colonized places, modernity and modernization arrive as violence and dispossession. It is Escobar’s belief that modernity has become incapable of solving the problems that it creates for itself and the world, hence the ecological crisis that threatens the planet and the inability, developmentally, of the modern world to offer minimum well-being for the majority of people:

I will argue that this violence is not only endemic but constitutive of development. I also believe that this level of violence is closely tied to a feature of modernity that has become so naturalised that it is no longer remarked upon and at times even celebrated: Displacement. My argument is that modernity is essentially about displacement—conquering territories, uprooting peoples from place, restructuring places, such as creating plantations and urban sprawl or ghettos and so forth—and displacement, to put it bluntly has gone out of hand. (Escobar 2004, 1)

The modernity and modernization that emerged from Europe as furniture of enlightenment and civilization were received and experienced in the Global South, of which Africa is part, as violence and a darkening of life.

Development in Europe became in Africa exactly that which Rodney has registered as “underdevelopment” and which Ake has recorded as “the marginalisation of Africa.” What modernity and modernization present to Africa, here a dream of civilization and there a fantasy of development, appear and emerge as a nightmare of the reproduction of slavery, colonialism and imperialism collapsed together in coloniality, and perhaps the most lethal form of domination.

Enduring coloniality, which survives colonialism, in Africa is not, contrary to popular speculation, a passing event but a process of cataclysmic proportions. Realizing the staying power of colonialism, Mazrui (1986) defined its six long-lasting effects in Africa, for which Africa still pays rent to Empire in economic and socio-political terms. In his view, Africa was frog-marched, unwilling and unprepared, into the world economy. Through slavery and colonialism, cheapened African labor was mobilized into the service of Empire. In 1648, European countries and powers sat in Westphalia to erect and respect the sovereignty of each other to the exclusion and in ignorance of Africa. In 1884–1885 European countries partitioned and divided Africa amongst themselves as a resource. In 1945, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) adds that African countries joined the United Nations as weak and disjointed entities with no influence. Mazrui also notes how Africa was engulfed by the Euro-North American culture and languages, and enveloped against her agency by the Euro-North American international law system, the Christian order, and the modern technological regime, knowledge production and information dissemination systems. In all these developments, Africa is acted upon rather than acting itself upon any of the initiatives. In all these processes of modernization Africa is changed, but it does not participate in changing anything.

The world system can afford in political and economic terms to reorient the world with or without concern with or input from Africa, according to the argument of Nimako (2011). Europeans and North Americans on their own have the power, in the absence of Africa or the larger Global South, to turn the world towards their interests and values:

Four times in the modern age men have sat down to reorder the world—at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the Thirty Years War, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars, in Paris in 1919 after World War I, and San Francisco in 1945 after World War II. (Keegan 2002, 3)

These are all historical moments at which Europeans and North Americans, from their provincial positions, managed to make epic and epochal decisions that affected all the peoples of the world, including those from the Global South who were not represented in the agenda. In the world, then, Africa is that presence which is also an absence. When world power is exercised Africa appears only as an object and not a meaningful subject. The objectification and inconsequentialization of Africa in world affairs and history is the working of the coloniality of power that peripherizes and marginalizes Africa and its peoples.

In the Peace of Westphalia the powerful countries of the Global North sat alone to agree to respect each other's sovereignty and to ensure peace amongst themselves in their national and regional interests. But in the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 the powerful countries of the Global North literally sliced up Africa amongst themselves, and in the process caused violence and powerlessness in Africa. The unity and peace that the Global North reserved for itself was not afforded to Africa:

It is one of the ironies of the great German leader Otto von Bismarck that he helped to unify Germany in the nineteenth century and initiated the division of Africa soon after. The unification of Germany led to the emergence of one of the most powerful Western countries in the twentieth century. The partition of Africa, on the other hand, resulted in some of the most vulnerable societies in world history. (Mazrui 2010, xi)

Therefore the unity and peace that European leadership valued and treasured for Europe was not seen fit for Africa, and it was in Wa Thiongo's view dismembered. Africa was fragmented and its people were subjected to political and economic vulnerability. The Africans were "dismembered from the land, from labour, from power and from memory, the result is destruction of the base from which people launch themselves into the world" (Wa Thiongo 2009, 28). In a way Africans were uprooted and alienated from their life base. Progressively, "the geographic expansion of Europe and the expansion of its civilisation subjected the world to European memory" (Mudimbe 1994, xii). European memory and knowledge were imposed on Africa, and Africa's own memory and history suffered erasure, distortion and silencing.

What turns colonialism into coloniality or what allows coloniality to remain intact after colonialism is the imperial invasion of the imagination of the colonized, and the replacing of the memory of the colonized with that of the colonizer, changing the mental universe of the colonized. Fanon (1968, 210) put it eloquently: "colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content." In reality, "by a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts and disfigures, and destroys it." This process, where colonialism invades and dominates the mental and cultural world of the colonized, is referred to by Wa Thiongo as the colonization of the mind, which works like a cultural bomb that breaks the cultural and intellectual resistance of the colonized:

The biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effects of the cultural bomb are to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and actually themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from the wasteland ... Imperialism presents itself as the cure. (Wa Thiongo 1986, 3)

In erasing the memory of the past from the mindsets and cultural universe of the colonized, colonialism presents itself as the reality of life and the only future for the colonized. Progressively, the colonized begin to fail to imagine any life and future without coloniality. The imperialism and the colonialism that are the problems paradoxically present themselves and are represented by the colonizer as the overarching solution. The cultural and psychological purchase and strength of coloniality lies in its projection of itself as fundamentally good for the colonized. In development, democratization and in politics at large, Africa suffers exactly this tragedy, tending to take the very problems as solutions and looking to Europe and America for salvation.

As a result of coloniality, the invasion of the African mindset and cultural universe, violence and physical dispossession and displacement, and the control of economies, Africans are produced and reproduced as victims. Africans become the vulnerable people that Ali Mazrui describes and the wretched of the earth that Frantz Fanon theorized on. Walter D. Mignolo observes coloniality to be the name of the experience of damned people:

Coloniality names the experience and views of the world and history of those whom Fanon called *les damnés de la terre*, (the wretched of the earth). Those who have been, and continue to be subjected to the standard of modernity. The wretched of the earth are defined by the colonial wound, and the colonial wound physical/or psychological, is a consequence of racism, the hegemonic discourse that questions the humanity of all those who do not belong to the locus of enunciation and the geopolitics of knowledge of those who assign the standard of classification and assign to themselves the right to classify. (Mignolo 2005, 3)

In a strong way, in the present modern and colonial world system, Africans and by extension the peoples of the Global South are made into condemned and classified peoples who are at the bottom of the hierarchy of humanity. The bar is lowered and reduced and the exploitation, abuse and dehumanization of the Africans therefore does not appear to be such a crime. The racism that looks at Africans and blacks in animal terms becomes the moral excuse for exploiting and dehumanizing them. For that reason, Euro-American power and knowledge has investment in defending the myth that blacks and Africans in particular are not complete human beings. Mbembe (2015) observes that “the African human experience constantly appears in the discourse of our times as an experience that can only be understood through a negative interpretation” and “lesser value, little importance and poor quality ... that is incomplete, mutilated, and unfinished.” The Africans are negated by reduction, by being seen as the unfinished business of God which colonialism tries to complete.

For the reason that Africans could not, with a clear conscience, be colonized and exploited without being devalued and portrayed as lesser beings, Eurocentricism as a knowledge and rationality had to invent a view of Africa as another space and Africans as other people who deserve less or no recognition. Perhaps Hegel spoke for all Eurocentricists when he noted that Africa was negligible in the world and human scheme of things:

At this point we leave Africa not to mention it again. For it is not a historical part of the world: It has no movement or development to exhibit ... What we properly understand by Africa is the unhistorical, underdeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the world's history. (Hegel 1944, 99)

Interestingly, from his imperial and Eurocentric point of view, Hegel views Africa as already underdeveloped and existing in a state of nature. On the other hand, from his decolonial standpoint as seen above, Walter Rodney thought that it was actually Europe that underdeveloped Africa, which before slavery and colonization was progressing well in its own time and at its own pace. What Europe counted as a civilizing mission, and the development of Africa from a state of nature to modernity, became violence: this caused the colonial wound, whose scar of coloniality this chapter explores.

In its composition and effect, coloniality is a phenomenon that defines the modern colonial world order. Coloniality punctuates the relations between the centre and the periphery and the Global North and the Global South. As Dussel and Colado-Ibarra argued above, the world has been organized and globalized into an entity that is manageable to the world order as shaped by the hegemonic Euro-North American economic and political Empire. Quijano adds that:

What is termed globalisation is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world's population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentricism. (Quijano 2000, 533)

The constitution of America in the so-called discovery of the New World in 1492 by Christopher Columbus initiated modernity and a coloniality that expresses itself even more emphatically today. Power that classifies human beings according to race is accompanied by a rationality of Eurocentricism that privileges Europe as the beginning and the center of the world. This power and its accompanying knowledge and rationality is the coloniality that has positioned development in Africa in terms of what Walter Rodney has tellingly described as exactly "how Europe underdeveloped Africa." Rodney's underdevelopment of Africa thesis is a radical way of overturning the hegemonic view that the European enslavement and colonization of Africa brought God, salvation and civilization to the primitive peoples of Africa. From here, this chapter proceeds to explore colonial understanding of development and the development process as a negation of Africa. The decolonial epistemic perspective as the antithesis of coloniality is described and used to observe coloniality as a negation of Africa in developmental terms.

THE DECOLONIAL EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVE AGAINST COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

The previous section of this chapter delved into the idea of coloniality and how Africa has been arrested and enveloped in the hegemonic global power structure at the level of power, knowledge and the being of African peoples, who have been reduced to the wretched of the earth. This section seeks to explore the idea of development in Africa as a combative ontology that gestures towards an alternative episteme and regime for development in Africa. To start with, decoloniality emerges in the world knowledge economy and power landscape at a time when many theories and world views, schools of thought and concepts of imagining the future have become tired. These ways of thinking cannot account for what is happening in the world, where it is coming from and the direction it should go in pursuit of liberation for humanity. Especially at a loss are the peoples of Africa and indeed the entire Global South, for whom modernity and development have come as violence.

For Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015), such ways of seeing the world and imagining the future as socialism and capitalism have been entangled in exhaustion and crisis. Even such theories as postcoloniality and postmodernism have been found to be criticisms of Eurocentricism that are still hostage to its limits and suffer its poverty. Writing from Europe before his death, Patrick Chabal admitted that “those instruments, that is—the social sciences we employ to explain what is happening domestically and overseas—are both historically and conceptually out of date.” Further to Chabal, Wallerstein notes that scholars in the world have to “unthink nineteenth-century social science, because many of its presumptions” that it has relied on “are now misleading and constrictive.” Wallerstein (1999) and Chabal (2012) write long after Ake (1979) in Africa had concluded that the conventional social sciences are nothing but imperialism itself, because as tools of seeing and knowing the world they tend to sustain rather than challenge Eurocentric assumptions about the world and humanity.

Decoloniality and the decolonial epistemic perspective bring a critical mood that assumes it can no longer be business as usual; the world has to be reimagined anew. This is a critical posture that is projected by Hardt (2011) as “the militancy of theory.” Also writing from Africa, Nabudere (2011) notes that in light of the crisis of development in Africa that is linked to the hegemonic world order and the system a “great deal of acrimony and uncertainty” exists “in the way we understand the world, as well as the way human beings understand each other in different environments and cultural contexts, scientific knowledge is unable to explain” life and the world. The world and its different provinces and regions have become too wide and too big for a singular hegemonic and Eurocentric explanation. In his emphatic defense for cognitive justice and the need for epistemologies of the Global South also to be privileged, De Sousa Santos puts it aptly that:

The understanding of the world by far exceeds the Western understanding of the world. Second, there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice. Third, the emancipatory transformations in the world may follow grammars and scripts other than those developed by westerncentric critical theory, and such diversity should be valorised. (De Sousa Santos 2014, viii)

De Sousa Santos states that development cannot be understood only in the terms that Europe has spelt out. The Global South and indigenous cultures and traditions also have to make their contribution in spelling out visions and aspirations of development. Cognitive justice demands that Africans, for instance, should have their say regarding how Africa should be developed and how their lives can be changed for the better, as opposed to the colonial and imperial civilizing mission that imposes rather than proposes development. When it comes to development, the decolonial epistemic perspective spells out that the former enslaver and former colonizer may no longer hold a monopoly of the truth. In spite of its pretence of understanding the world and its condition, Zizek (2010) argues that the present capitalist hegemonic system has thrown the world into a worldwide ecological crisis, the biogenetic revolution threatens to overtake humanity, imbalances and social inequalities are reaching disturbing heights and the accompanying social divisions threaten an implosion. True to what De Sousa Santos and Escobar have argued, modernity seems to be short of modern solutions for the problems that it has created.

The promises of the modern world that once held hegemonic sway, thanks to decoloniality and its critical projects, are beginning to be revealed for what they are: rhetorical promises that are not fulfilled in the lives of the people of Africa and the entire Global South. The critical and analytical stamina of the decolonial epistemic perspective allows the unmasking and undressing of the logic of coloniality that lies curtained behind the rhetoric of modernity and its vaunted civilizing mission:

Decoloniality seeks to unmask, unveil and reveal coloniality as an underside of modernity that co-existed with its rhetoric of progress, equality, fraternity and liberty. It is a particular kind of critical intellectual theory as well as political project which seeks to disentangle ex-colonised parts of the world from coloniality. What distinguishes Decoloniality from other existing critical social theories is its locus of enunciations and its genealogy-which is outside Europe. Decoloniality can be best understood as a pluriversal epistemology of the future, a redemptive and liberatory epistemology that seeks to delink from the tyranny of abstract universals. Decoloniality informs the ongoing struggles against inhumanity of the Cartesian subject. (Mignolo 2011, 93)

Emerging from the Global South and from the critical thinking of the victims of global coloniality and colonial globality, decoloniality is located in the experiences of the underdeveloped and the liberatory aspirations of the dehumanized. With decoloniality and the decolonial epistemic perspective, the modern colonial world is stripped of its pretences and presented in its reality as a civilization

that promises but does not deliver, that creates modern problems for which it cannot supply modern solutions. Journalist and public intellectual John Pilger describes how the modern world, behind its articulations of such furniture as development, democracy, governance and freedom, tends to conceal rather than reveal the reality of oppression and exploitation for those peoples of the world who exist in the underside of modernity, such as the people of Africa:

Democracy is now the free market—a concept bereft of freedom. Reform is now the denial of freedom. Economics in the relegation of most human endeavour to material value, a bottom line. Alternative models that relate to the needs of the majority end up in the memory hole. And Governance—so fashionable these days, means an economic approval in Washington, Brussels and Davos. Foreign policy is service to dominant power. Conquest is “humanitarian intervention.” Invasion is nation building. Every day we breathe the hot air of these pseudo ideas with their pseudo truths and pseudo experts. (Pilger 2008, 4)

The modern colonial world system presents itself through a grammar and register that spells out a fantastic utopia. The discourses of democracy economics, reform, freedom, governance and humanitarian invention have all assumed a darker underside that continues to punish societies of the Global South while rewarding peoples of the Global North who largely remain the beneficiaries of modernity and its accompaniments of slavery, colonialism and the all-enduring project of imperialism. Development in Africa, which semantically refers to progress, actually happens as violence and hegemonic domination:

The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crime have been the steady companion of development and they tell a common story: It did not work. So much development talk and planning has not managed to reduce poverty and inequality. (Sachs 1992, 1)

Beside happening as violence and domination, and materializing as underdevelopment, development in Africa in the view of the decolonial epistemic perspective remains a tragically broken promise. As a critical facility, the decolonial epistemic perspective diagnoses development in Africa to be an absence that is represented by its opposites: underdevelopment, marginalization and a giant step backward in time and in place. All the efforts and initiatives that are made to uplift the lives and betterment of the people seem to end in tragic dead ends and disappointment, because African local histories are entangled in colonial and imperial global designs that are prohibitive to development as liberation and not as domination.

Instead of Africans and the entire peoples of the Global South being understood for what they are, the victims of the modern colonial world system and its world orders, a specific propaganda is purveyed to portray them as authors of their own misery. The victims of the modern colonial world system are forced to understand the situation that they are in as their own failure, lack of initiative, bad luck and backwardness. Generation after generation of Africans have

been portrayed as failures and a people characterized with tragic insufficiencies. Thinking of the entire Global South, Grosfoguel describes the imperial blame game thus:

We went from the sixteenth century characterisation of ‘people without writing’ to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterisation of ‘people without history’ to the twentieth century characterisation of ‘people without history’ to the twentieth century characterisation of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty first century ‘people without democracy’. (Grosfoguel 2007, 214)

What the modern global colonial system has stolen from the periphery of the world and the Global South, the victim is blamed for lacking. The underdevelopment that slavery and colonialism inflicted on Africa, and which Rodney emphasizes, the hegemonic epistemic and political system of the world absolves itself of complicity and blames the victim of its crimes that it caused, leading to victims of coloniality in the world being seen as people who are a problem instead of people who have a problem. Memmi (1974) correctly observes that necessarily, just as the bourgeoisie invents a convenient image of its victims, the proletariat, the colonizer invents a suitable image of the colonized as a failure who need the cruel correction of the civilization mission. Coloniality is persuasively presented as the painful but necessary remedy for the condition of the peoples of the Global South, in this case Africa.

As a result of the portrait of Africa as a failure that lags behind Europe and America in development and civilization, some well-meaning African scholars and thinkers have been beguiled into internalizing the belief that Africa must hasten to catch up with the modern and advanced world. After correctly observing that development in Africa is being pursued as a foreign idea and that the knowledge of African is being ignored, Mkandawire (2009) recommends that to catch up Africa must run while others, meaning Europe and America, are walking. Further, in terms of developmental knowledge production, Mkandawire recommends that the African university has to sprint while the Western university walks. The insinuation that Africa must run to catch up with the West ignores the fact that the West and the Global North at large have advanced and moved ahead in economic and developmental terms because of the exploitation of the free labor of slaves and the siphoning of cheap natural resources from the colonies during colonialism. Fanon (2001) and Williams (1964) are two of the scholars in the academy who have emphatically noted how the wealth of Europe and America, and their prosperity and advancement, are owed to the plunder of the Global South. The idea of Africa running to catch up with Europe and America in developmental terms unfortunately seeks to suggest that Africa must imitate and mimic Europe, which decolonially speaking is a wrong model and not a role model for development as liberation.

In the study and observations of otherwise well-meaning but critically limited theorists on economics and development, Grosfoguel observes how they

critique the developmentalism of the modernization paradigm of development but still remain hostage to it and its limits. In a way, such critics of the modernization paradigm of development such as Frank (1969) tend to be Eurocentric critics of Eurocentricism. The Dependencia School understands that development and underdevelopment are produced by the centre–periphery relationship of the modern capitalist world system and that each country is not an autonomous entity as the modernization paradigm pretends. In other words, underdevelopment is systemic and a globally structured phenomenon. The modern and traditional dichotomy that modernization believes in is abstract and ahistorical in the view of the Dependencia School. The imagined penetration, diffusion and acculturation of modern ideas from the centre to the periphery does not constitute development but subordination. Dependencia dismisses with contempt the view that there are fixed stages of development from backward and traditional to modernity that each country must follow before it arrives at the advanced level of Europe and America. For all its biting critique of the modernization paradigm of development, Grosfoguel finds it to be well meaning but insufficient in thinking outside the frames that the modern colonial world system has set. Added to the critique by Grosfoguel, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012, 1), in defense of the decolonial epistemic perspective, notes with disappointment that “development studies have remained deeply interpellated by its Euro-American modernist and ‘civilising mission’ genealogy.” He observes that sadly “development as a concept, process, discourse and practice, remains caught up in coloniality of power, which hampers the formulation of possibilities for decolonised, democratic and inclusive development in Africa.” For that reason, he believes that the decolonial epistemic perspective illuminates how development studies remains enmeshed in colonial and imperial designs, and points to the need for decolonizing development studies.

The section that follows seeks to describe how decoloniality is a combative ontology that negates the negation of coloniality in African development and the thinking about development in Africa. A combative ontology points to a theory and a body of knowledge that by nature engages in militant and aggressive combat against coloniality. For this reason, it is important to describe how coloniality itself has been what decolonial thinkers have called a “metaphysical catastrophe” and an all-enveloping power structure that has sought to change its victims’ world forever and for the worst. Césaire describes this multi-pronged catastrophe as a sweeping violence that encompassed the political, social, physical and spiritual universe of the peoples of the Global South and the periphery of the world, which exists, because of coloniality, on the darker side of modernity. Coloniality has left no aspect of the world or the life of its victims uninvaded; it has taken over the physical and metaphysical universe of colonial subjects and turned them into objects rather than subjects of life and history. In talking about the victims of coloniality Césaire said:

I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out. I am talking about millions of men torn apart from their gods, their lands, their habits, their life, from dance, from wisdom. I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to tremble, to kneel, despair, and behave like flunkies ... I am talking about natural economies that have been destroyed-harmonious and viable economies—adapted to indigenous population—about food crops destroyed, malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development oriented solely towards the benefit of the metropolitan countries, about the looting of products, the looting of raw materials. (Cesaire 2000, 43)

Coloniality in African development has not only caused the underdevelopment of Africa that Rodney has so described, but it has had the effect of changing the world of Africans in political, cultural and spiritual terms. Coloniality has been a radical negation that can only be negated by an equally if not more radical theoretical and practical force. For that reason, decoloniality is called for in what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 181) calls an attempt at “creating African futures” where they have been made impossible by global colonial matrices and machinations. As a combative ontology in African development that is called to negate the cataclysmic negations that coloniality has erected in the African life world, decoloniality has no choice but to become what Dastile and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) have called “Decoloniality as a combative discourse” that is a “survival kit for Pan Africanists in the twenty-first century.” African futures and the very survival of Africa and its political and economic visions might be, without decoloniality, impossible to imagine. In a word, development studies and development practice in Africa need a combative decolonial turn.

DECOLONIALITY AS COMBATIVE ONTOLOGY IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

What Hardt (2011, 1) has called the “militancy of theory” is the gravitas with which revolutionary knowledge reacts to domination. Owing to the gravity of the negation of coloniality in African development, decoloniality has to assume a combative posture and a militancy of theory and philosophy. Coloniality, in development and politics, reduces the lives of people to what Maldonado-Torres has described as the equivalent of a people who are vanquished captives of a war and have no rights or justice to appeal to. Even free trade, which is supposed to symbolize progress and advancement in economics and commerce, has been twisted into trade as a European war upon the peoples of the world, in the observation of Tandon (2015). In development in the African context, coloniality has turned commerce and economics to a site of war, where the poor emerge as vanquished losers and victims of a globalized negation to life. Coloniality as a global power structure that manifests through coloniality

of power, knowledge and being in the Global South turns peoples and societies into victims and losers.

Because of the gravity of the totality of negation that coloniality is in politics and development, Fanon proposes a radical break with the European-led modern world system. The Global South must set in train a new world and a new humanity that is removed from the example that Europe has so far hegemonized:

We must leave our dreams and abandon our old beliefs and friendships of the time before life began. Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their streets, in all the corners of the globe ... So, my brothers, how is it that we do not understand that we have better things to do than follow that same Europe? Come, then, comrades, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. (Fanon 1986, 251)

Life and work, in the scheme of decoloniality as a combative negation of the negations of coloniality cannot be allowed to be business as usual. Decolonial thinking and activism demand a radical delinking from the example of the modernity, civilization and development that Europe has set afoot in the world. Decoloniality proposes a new modernity that takes into account the histories, experiences and knowledges of those peoples of the Global South such as Africans who have so far been the vanquished and wretched of the earth. To imitate Europe would be to repeat the crime against humanity that Europe has perpetuated:

Humanity is waiting for something from us than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature. If we want turn Africa into a new Europe, and America into a new Europe then lets us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us. (Fanon 1986, 251)

The combative gesture of decoloniality is that those who have lived under the shadow of death and have been the victims of coloniality have something new to offer humanity. Decoloniality will not participate in the imitation and caricature of Europe but seeks to invent a new paradigm of life and development that liberates humanity, which includes both the oppressor and the oppressed. Because of this liberatory quality that seeks to free both the oppressor and the oppressed, decoloniality “is not essentialist, fundamentalist,” or is it an “anti-European critique (Grosfoguel 2000). It is a perspective that is critical of both Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalisms, colonialism and nationalism.” Grosfoguel (2007) observes that “what all fundamentalisms share including the Eurocentric one is the premise that there is only one sole epistemic tradition from which to achieve truth and universality.” In other words decoloniality gestures for the inclusion of those knowledges of development from the periphery

that have been excluded from mainstream thinking, which Eurocentric modernity has privileged. In development and the politics of Africa, decoloniality advances the argument that the people and the knowledges that have been excluded from what is considered the wisdom of the times should be considered, and their experiences and view of the world should be factored in. In defense of decoloniality in development, Casas (2013, 30) calls for “transcending coloniality of development and moving beyond hierarchies” of power, knowledge and being that Western modernity has erected over a long period of time.

Importantly, contrary to the colonial paradigm of development that centers profit and gain ahead of the life and the dignity of human beings, the decolonial paradigm privileges life and the human being as the center. The human being is given agency and power to determine development and progress in a manner that preserves rather than endangers life and happiness. Decolonial development centers the human being and life:

At the heart of that development are Africans. These are the Human Factor. They are the ones who should be developed. They are the ones who should bring about that development. That is to say they are the ones who should develop themselves. (Fanon 2001, 254)

The decoloniality paradigm of development is the human factor approach to development that puts Africans as complete human beings at the center of its priorities. Decolonial development does not act upon the people, it is not an imposition, but the people enact their own development themselves. In his articulation of Afrikology as a decolonial and liberatory epistemology, Nabudere (2011) argues that respecting human agency and privileging the human factor brings wholeness to the world and to life. Decoloniality in African development combatively attempts to bring back wholeness where the coloniality paradigm of development has established incompleteness and emptiness. In life and in development in Africa, decoloniality as a combative ontology becomes that which Cesaire (1959, 1) says “turns the colonised consumer into a creator and gives the historical initiative back to those whom the colonial regime has made its mission to rob all such initiative.” The defeated, colonized and emptied human being who consumes the culture and the world that the colonial regime produces is turned by the decoloniality paradigm of life and development into a powerful producer of development, knowledge and history. On a worldwide scale, decoloniality asserts itself, “acknowledging that globalisation means something else when it is seen from different points of view, such as those of the invaded territories and the victims” (Dussel and Ibarra-Colado 2006). The understanding of life and the world of the peoples of the periphery is taken seriously; views and knowledge of the hegemonic world order are not given abstract universality but are considered to be views and knowledge amongst many others in all the different parts of the world.

Thinking about life and development in terms of decoloniality is thinking in terms of “turning the world over” and instituting a total revolution. Asante puts it well when he argues that Afrocentricity as a combative gesture must be “about turning the world over so that we see all the possibilities of a world where Africa, for example is subject and not object. Such a posture is necessary and rewarding for both Africans and Europeans.” Centering Africa in a world where coloniality has over centuries decentered it is to create a totally new world, for that reason. Asante continues:

The Afrocentric critic’s chief problem is finding a place to stand—so to speak—in relation to the Western standards that are imposed as interpretive measures on other cultures. I have familiarised myself with the leading proponents of the logic of scientific discovery, only to find their reductionist views of the world incapable of adequately dealing with African cultural data. (Asante 1998, 14)

In other words the thinker who espouses Afrocentricity in development is a decolonial thinker who prefers to question and challenge the enduring Western way of thinking about life and development. The decolonial thinker on African centered development stands strong to negate the negations of coloniality in thinking of and practicing development in Africa as part of the Global South. Decoloniality in development and politics in Africa is disobedient thinking and practice that insists on a new standard of life that is good for both the West and Africa in a world where Western scientific logic has proven not to be adequate in accounting for the experiences of the whole world. The Western paradigm of development and thinking about development has provided only a view and not the whole picture. Decoloniality, as a combative ontology in African development, seeks to complete the picture. In his explication of the relationship of the colonizer and the colonized, Memmi (1974) notes that for a new life and a new human era to be set afoot the colonizer and the colonized as political identities should come to an end. In a way, the combat of decoloniality is to end colonial power and knowledge relations that have produced underdevelopment instead of development in Africa, for a new humanity and history to be unleashed, for development to happen as liberation and not violence and domination. Decoloniality seeks to overturn both the world of the colonizer and that of the colonized to usher in a decolonial and liberatory paradigm of development and life.

CONCLUSION

In the view of this chapter, decolonial thinking and practice in Africa have to be a combative ontology in reaction to the colonial paradigm that has presented development as underdevelopment, violence and domination. For the reason that coloniality in Africa has presented development as a negation, decoloniality has to emerge as a negation of a negation, to introduce liberation where domination has been normalized. Decoloniality has to emerge where

both socialism and capitalism are appearing increasingly impoverished, fatigued and entrapped in crisis. Established thinking on development as advanced by the social sciences have become problematic and remain hostage to the modern and colonial paradigm of thinking and practicing development. This chapter has fleshed out the manner in which coloniality has negated development in Africa. After that, the decolonial epistemic perspective of thinking about and practicing development is enunciated. Finally, the gestures of decoloniality as a negation of the negation of coloniality and a combative ontology in African development is delineated. The decolonial paradigm of development which negates the colonial paradigm understands development as liberation and the humanization of those who have been dehumanized.

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Theories of Social Change and Development in Africa

Augustine Okechukwu Agugua

INTRODUCTION

Feigelman conceptualized social change as any transformations in the social structure, normative order and to behavior patterns that are typical of any given society.¹ These transformations cover such issues as change in knowledge, belief and values, in technology and material culture in various institutions, such as the economy, government, the family, education and religion; in the system of stratification and other patterns of intergroup relations; and in the conception that members of society have of themselves.

For Jangam,² social change is said to be any modification whatsoever with regard to any aspect, feature or dimension of society. Any increase, decrease, reduction, diminution, growth, decay, envelopment, development, progress, regress, revolution or evolution can be seen as social change.

In this understanding, social change was conceptualized as a sociological concept that has been conceptualized from several different theoretical perspectives linking from the evolutionists, the functionalists and Marxist perspectives through to modernization viewpoints. By way of definition Jangam therefore posited that social change, from both evolutionary and modernization perspectives, refers to changes in individuals' values in society that have produced new patterns of behavior and structures in the social, psychological, religious, economic, political and other spheres of a society's history. Change is evident only by referring to various points of time in a society's history.³

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In line with the foregoing, Agugua posited that issues of social change in recent times address a variety of cross-cultural and transhistorical metamorphoses including the move to global capitalism, transformation in gender systems, demographic transition and development in the contemporary world.⁴ Sequentially then, the study of specific social change involves the location of cause and effect chains in time. Cause and effect relations sometimes recur in a wide range of conditions, which we study in different circumstances to learn how valid and general they are. Thus Friedenfels observes that sociologists who specialize in the study of major social changes usually concentrate on cause and effect historical chains that:⁵

1. Cover a considerable time span
2. Have a definable direction
3. Touch many people at the same time
4. Make a significant difference to those people's lives.

Developing this viewpoint, C. Wright Mills endeavored to locate sociological analyses of social change at the intersection of biography and history in social structure.⁶ That formulation is seen to have nicely captured the major reasons for studying social change:

1. For self-knowledge; to figure out what in the world is going on around us, and how it intervenes in our lives
2. For empathy; to understand what is happening to fellow humans elsewhere in their individual lives. Self-knowledge and empathy complement each other and the study of social change is seen to enlarge both of them.

FACTORS THAT FACILITATE CHANGE

On the inevitable and universal nature of change, certain factors have been identified as being capable of facilitating social change. These have included movement through the lifecycle, differing physiological potentials and socialization experiences, variations in fertility and mortality rates, the changing physical and social environment, the ubiquity of non-conformity and the failure to achieve ideal values.⁷

The foregoing includes the fact that the complex nature or complexity of social change has been anchored on some major causes, such as technological, economic, ideological or religious factors.

Principally, though, the technological factor has been identified as a major pervasive factor in the cause of social change and its effect has also been seen to be quite pervasive. In this sense, the technological effect in institutional settings has been identified in such issues as the introduction of power-driven machinery, which has had monumental effects on economy and society, affecting factories and towns. These same developments and the associated spread of household technology have affected the family: sex roles have changed and middle-class wives go out to work in increasing numbers.

Developments in science have also affected religious beliefs. In the same vein, industrialization has affected government, in that it has been required to organize the protection of the sick, the unemployed, the old and so on. Values and attitudes have also changed, as identified in the Marxist theme of alienation. Social inventions such as the trade union have also had a marked influence on wages and working hours, which in turn have affected leisure industries: in other words, people have more money to spend and time.⁸

SOCIAL CHANGE CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

Increasingly complex neoliberal globalization, changes in intercultural relations at the global level, climate change, poverty, rapid urbanization, advances in science, the ICT revolution, the emergence of knowledge societies, the evolution of gender and intergenerational relations, the evolution of spirituality and of the status and role of religion in modern societies, the emergence of a multipolar world and the phenomenon of emerging powers in the South are some of the realities of our world today that are widely and extensively discussed by both academics and policymakers. Some of these have been identified in the 2010 edition of the International Social Sciences Council's World Social Sciences Report as major challenges of the twenty-first century.⁹

The challenge that Africa is facing is not only that of understanding how new scientific discoveries may have an impact on our societies, but also how to become a "continent of science" itself. The rapidity of the pace of change in virtually all spheres of social life at local, national, continental and global levels make it difficult to identify the challenges that Africa will be facing in the coming century beyond a few decades. The ability of science to anticipate, read and interpret the processes of change has increased over the years. Similarly, the ability of humanity to follow developments taking place in nature, and to capture the major trends taking place within society, is likely to increase as science itself develops. Therefore, the list of questions that can be considered as major challenges for the twenty-first century is likely to change over time.¹⁰

Africa has entered the twenty-first century with huge unresolved issues, such as poverty, rapid urbanization, the question of nationality, regional integration, gender inequality, food insecurity, violent conflicts, political fragmentation and the fact that it occupies a subaltern position in the global community and in global governance. The weight of the past is a major handicap for Africa. The effects of the slave trade, colonization and neocolonialism that Africa has suffered from are still being felt, as they have individually and together resulted in the suppression of freedoms, the violation of human rights and dignity of the continent's peoples, as well as the looting of human, natural and intellectual resources, which have led to what the Pan-Africanist historian Walter Rodney called the "underdevelopment" of Africa.¹¹ Among the major disadvantages of the continent at the dawn of the twenty-first century are also the low level of education of many Africans, the lack of modern techniques of production, transport and so on, a fragmented political space and the extrovert structure of the economies. The institutions of higher education and cultures of the elites

are strongly marked, not by a philosophy and development strategies that are guided by the interests of African peoples, but by influences that come from the North, influences that are more alienating than liberating.¹²

Nevertheless, the Africa of the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century is not the same as the Africa of the early 1960s, which had just gained freedom from colonial rule. The challenges that the continent faces today are not exactly the same as those of the 1960s. There have been many achievements made in economic, education and health. Moreover, some countries have managed to establish democratic governance systems, especially after the wave of national conferences (in West and Central Africa) at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s. Yet even with the recent political transformations, governance issues are still part of the great challenges facing the continent. Poverty is still massive and deeply rooted, and the processes that lead to exclusion and marginalization of large segments of African societies are still ongoing. By all indications, with the exception of a few, the countries of Africa are still at the level of receivers/consumers in the overall relationship that is behind these processes, or at best “passengers” rather than “drivers” of the process of globalization.

Other issues include the high mobility of African people, both within and outside the continent; the issues of climate change, natural resource management and food security; the recurrent problem of African integration with a focus on the issue of a common currency and common borders; and yet again the governance of African cities, since a number of prospective studies have identified urbanization as a major trend in the evolution of the continent. Closely related to the foregoing is the issue of sustainable development challenges in Africa,¹³ which is discussed next.

Africa's Sustainable Development Challenges

The overriding sustainable development challenge in Africa is noted to be poverty eradication. Indeed, the African Ministerial Statement to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) identified poverty eradication as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. Africa is the only region in the world where poverty has increased both in absolute and relative terms. Apart from being the poorest region in the world, it remains the least developed, the most technologically backward, the most indebted, the most food-insecure and the most marginalized. Furthermore, malnutrition, disease, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, poor and inadequate infrastructure, unemployment and weak institutional capacities continue to pose serious development challenges for Africa.

It is striking that Africa is the only continent that was not on track to meet most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Sustainable development thrives best in an environment of good governance, peace and security, but armed conflict remains a major obstacle to development in several parts of the continent. In spite of the long-standing commitments and the

emphasis placed by African leaders on the process of regional integration, this has been slow and therefore remains a major challenge.¹⁴ At this point, a reference to Africa's colonial experience might be useful.

Colonialism and Its Implications for Africa

“Liberation is the task imposed upon us by our conquest and colonization.”¹⁵

Colonialism is the practice of invading other lands and territories for the purpose of settlement and/or resource exploitation. When nations and territories were conquered, in some cases the survivors were enslaved and forced to provide resources, including human labor, food, metals, wood and spices. The invaders then imposed their own forms of governance, laws, religion and education. Over time, these populations became assimilated into the culture and society of their conquerors.

Cecil Rhodes, the British colonial official after whom Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was named, articulated the motives and goals of European colonialism in the nineteenth century: “We must find new lands from which we can easily obtain raw materials and at the same time exploit the cheap slave labor that is available from the natives of the colonies. The colonies would also provide a dumping ground for the surplus goods produced in our factories.” Owing to its history and culture, European colonialism is characterized by genocidal practices, including wars of extermination, massacres of non-combatants, biological warfare and scorched earth policies (destroying food and shelter). These acts are fueled by racist and patriarchal ideology (i.e., Christianity and white supremacy), greed and a psychopathic desire to kill and inflict violence and “suffering on others.”¹⁶

It is often erroneously held that economic development occurs in a succession of capitalist stages and that today's underdeveloped countries are still in a stage, sometimes depicted as an original stage of history, through which the now developed countries passed long ago. Yet historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. This point makes imperative the need to establish a link between colonization and decolonization in the study of social change in Africa.

Theories of Social Change

Theories of social change can be divided into two groups:

1. Theories relating to the direction of social change which include various types of evolutionary theories and cyclical theory.
2. Theories relating to causation of change:

- (a) Those explaining change in terms of endogamous factors or processes;
- (b) Those emphasizing exogamous factors such as economic, cultural or historical.

Evolutionary Theory

Though there are various strands of social change theories, they share an important conclusion: that the course of man's history is marked by an upward trend through time.

The notion of evolution came into social sciences from the theories of biological evolution as noted in the work of Charles Darwin. It was conceived that society and culture were subject to the same general laws of biological and organism growth. Some thinkers even identified evolution with progress and proceeded to project into the future more and more perfect and better-adapted social and cultural forms.

Herbert Spencer, who is known to be the forerunner of this evolutionary thought in sociology, took the position that sociology is "the study of evolution in its most complex form." For him, evolution is a process of differentiation and integration.¹⁷

Basic Assumptions and Distinctive Features of the Evolutionary Change

The basic assumption of this theory is that change is the characteristic feature of human society. The present observed condition of society is presumed to be the result of change in the past. Another assumption is that change is inevitable or that it is "natural." It was assumed that change is basically the result of operation of forces within society or culture. Underlying all theories of evolution, there exists a belief of infinite improvement in the next stage over the preceding one. All thinking of early sociologists was dominated by a conception of man and society as progressing up definite steps of evolution, leading through every greater complexity to some final stage of perfection.¹⁸

The general evolutionary model of society is represented by a large number of detailed theories. For example, C.H. Saint-Simon, one of the earliest founders of sociology, along with August Comte, put forward an evolutionary idea of social development as a sequential progression of organic societies representing increasing levels of advancement. These stages were later elaborated in Comte's evolutionary scheme. He linked developments in human knowledge, culture and society and delineated the following three great stages through which all societies must go—those of conquest, defense and industry. Societies passed through three stages—the primitive, the intermediary and the scientific, which corresponded to the forms of human knowledge (thought). He conceived these stages as progressing from the theological through the metaphysical to arrive ultimately at the perfection of positive reasoning. He argued that all mankind inevitably passed through these stages as it developed, suggesting both unilinear direction and progress. Spencer also displayed a linear concept of evolutionary stages. He argued that the trend of human societies was from

simple, undifferentiated wholes to complex and heterogeneous ones, where the parts of the whole become more specialized but remained integrated.¹⁹

William Graham Sumner, who has been labeled as a “Social Darwinist,” also used the idea of evolution, as had Spencer, to block efforts at reform and social change, arguing that social evolution must follow its own course, dictated by nature. He said: “It is the greatest folly of which a man can be capable, to sit down with a slate and pencil to plan out a new social world.”²⁰

The evolutionary approach to social development was also followed by radical thinkers, such as Marx and Engels, who were greatly influenced by the work of the anthropologist L.H. Morgan. He sought to prove that all societies went through fixed stages of development, each succeeding the other, from savagery through barbarism to civilization. Marx and Engels maintained that each stage of civilization, such as feudalism, prepared the ground for the next. It contained within itself “the seeds of its own destruction,” and would inevitably be succeeded by the next stage, “higher” on the scale of evolution.²¹

Durkheim’s view of the progressive division of labor in society and German sociologist Ferdinand Toennies’ view of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* types of society to some extent also represent the evolutionary perspective, but their schemes of classifying societies are less sweeping and less explicit, and are, therefore referred to as quasi-evolutionary theories. For Durkheim the most important dimension of society was the—degree of specialization, as he called it, “the division of labor.” He believed that there was a historical trend, or evolution, from a low to a high degree of specialization. Durkheim distinguished two main types of society on the basis of this division of labor—the first based on mechanical solidarity and the second on organic solidarity. He believed that this second type always evolved from and succeeded the first as the degree of specialization, the division of labor, increased. Toennies’ *gemeinschaft* type of society corresponded quite well to Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity and *gesellschaft* type to organic solidarity. Numerous other scholars put forth similar ideas. The scheme of the American anthropologist Robert Redfield, who elaborated on the contrast between “folk” and “urban” society, reiterates the same basic dichotomy of social types that was suggested by Durkheim and Toennies. Modernization theorist Talcott Parsons also viewed social change as a process of “social evolution” from a simple to a more complex form of society. He regards changes in adaptation as a major driving force of social evolution. The history of human society from simple hunting and gathering to the complex nation-state represents an increase in the general adaptive capacity of society.²²

Criticism of Evolutionary Theory

Evolutionary schemes (gradual and continuous development in stages) of any kind fell under both theoretical and empirical attack in the later part of the twentieth century. They were criticized heavily on many grounds but mainly for their over-generalization of historical sequences, uniform stages of development and evolutionary rate of change. Biological evolution, from which the main ideas of social evolution were borrowed, provided somewhat

clumsy and unsatisfactory answers, and there was also a lack of evidence for this approach. Evolutionary scales were also questioned from a somewhat different but more empirical source. The easy assumption that societies evolved from simple to complex forms was mainly based on a scale of predominant productive technology, which turned out to be unwarranted. Because of the above shortcomings, the evolutionary theory is less popular today.

Cyclical Theory of Change

Cyclical change is a variation of unilinear theory which was developed by Oswald Spengler and the world-renowned British historian Arnold J. Toynbee. They argued that societies and civilizations change according to cycles of rise, decline and fall just as individual persons are born, mature, grow old and die. According to the German thinker Spengler, every society has a predetermined lifecycle—birth, growth, maturity and decline. Society, after passing through all these stages, returns to its original state and thus the cycle begins again.²³ On the basis of his analysis of Egyptian, Greek, Roman and many other civilizations, he concluded that Western civilization is now in decline. Toynbee also upheld this theory. He studied the history of various civilizations and found that every civilization has its rise, development and fall, an example being the civilization of Egypt. They have all come and gone, repeating a recurrent cycle of birth, growth, breakdown and decay. He propounded the theory of “challenge and response,” which means that those who can cope with a changing environment survive and those who cannot die.²⁴ Thus, a society can grow and survive if it can constructively respond to challenges. The cyclical theory of change, sometimes called “rise and fall” theory, presumes that social phenomena of whatever sort recur again and again, exactly as before, in a cyclical fashion.

A variant of the cyclical process is the theory of the well-known American sociologist P.A. Sorokin (put forward in his book *Social and Cultural Dynamics*), which is known as “pendular theory of social change.” He considers the course of history to be continuous, though irregular, fluctuating between two basic kinds of cultures: the “sensate” and the “ideational” through the “idealistic.” According to him, culture oscillates like the pendulum of a clock between two points. A pendulum swings with the passage of time, but ultimately it comes to its original position and continues its previous journey. Therefore, it is just like a cyclical process but oscillating in character. A sensate culture is one that appeals to the senses and to sensual desires. It is hedonistic in its ethics and stresses science and empiricism. On the other hand, the ideational culture is one in which expressions of art, literature, religion and ethics do not appeal to the senses but to the mind or the spirit. It is more abstract and symbolic than the sensate culture. The pendulum of culture swings from the sensate pole to the ideational pole through the middle pole, called “idealistic” culture, which is a mixed form of sensate and ideational culture—a somewhat stable mixture of faith, reason and senses as the source of truth. Sorokin places contemporary European and American cultures in the

last stage of the disintegration of sensate culture, and argues that the only way out of the “crisis” is a new synthesis of faith and sensation. There is no other possibility.²⁵

In Sorokin’s analysis of cultures, we find the seeds of both theories—cyclical and linear change. In his view, culture may proceed in a given direction for a time and thus appear to conform to a linear formula. But eventually, as a result of forces that are inherent in the culture itself, there will be a shift in direction and a new period of development will be ushered in. This new trend may be linear, perhaps it is oscillating or it may conform to some particular type of curve. Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of Circulation of Elites is also essentially of this variety. According to this theory, major social change in society occurs when one elite replaces another. This can be used to explain the nature and pattern of political and leadership changes in Africa today.²⁶

Functionalism and Social Change

Functionalism, as a new approach to the study of society, developed mainly as a reaction to evolutionism in the early years of the twentieth century. Critics of evolutionism advocated that there was no reason to know about the first appearance of any item of culture and social behavior. They called it the “fruitless quest for origin. One of the most significant assumptions of functionalists is that society (or culture) comprises functionally interdependent parts or a unified system. These theorists believed that society, like the human body, is a balanced system of institutions, each of which serves a function in maintaining society. When events outside or inside society disrupts the equilibrium, social institutions make adjustments to restore stability. This fundamental assumption became the main basis of the charge made by critics of functionalism—that if the system is in equilibrium with its various parts contributing towards order and stability, it is difficult to see how it changes. Critics (mostly conflict theorists) argued that functionalists have no adequate explanation of change. They cannot account for change, in that there appears to be no mechanism which will disturb existing functional relationships.²⁷ Thus, functionalists have nothing or very little to offer to the study of social change, as this approach is concerned only with the maintenance of the system; that is, how social order is maintained in society. The dominant characteristic in the model is an inherent tendency towards stability. Society may change, but it remains stable through new forms of integration.

The functionalists responded to this charge by employing concepts such as equilibrium and differentiation. For instance, a leading proponent of functionalist approach, Talcott Parsons, approaches the problem in the following way: He maintained that no system is in a perfect state of equilibrium although a certain degree of equilibrium is essential for the survival of societies. For changes to occur in one part of society there must be adjustments in other parts. If this does not occur, the society’s equilibrium will be disturbed and strain will occur. The process of social change can therefore be thought

of as a “moving equilibrium.”²⁸ Van den Berghe stated that change may come from three main sources:

1. Adjustment to external disturbances such as a recession in world trade
2. Structural differentiation in response to problems within the system, for example, electoral reforms in response to political unrest
3. Creative innovations within the system, for example, scientific discoveries or technological advances.²⁹

Economic (Mandan)/Marxist Theory of Change

The economic theory of change is also known as the Marxian theory of change, though there are other variants.

The Marxian theory rests on the fundamental assumption that changes in the economic “infrastructures” of society are the prime movers of social change. For Marx, society consists of two structures—“infrastructure” and “superstructure.” The infrastructure consists of the forces of production and relations of production. The superstructure consists of those features of the social system, such as legal, ideological, political and religious institutions, which serve to maintain the infrastructure, and which are molded by it. To be clearer, according to Marx productive forces constitute the “means of production” (natural resources, land, labor, raw material, machines, tools and other instruments of production) and the “mode of production” (techniques of production, mental and moral habits of human beings). Both and their level of development determines the social relations of production, in other words production relations.

These production relations (class relations) constitute the economic structure of society—the totality of production relations. Thus, the socio-economic structure of society is basically determined by the state of productive forces. For Marx, the contradiction between the constantly changing and developing productive forces and the stable production relations are the determinants of all social development or social change.³⁰

Basic Postulates of the Theory

According to Marx, the world, by its very nature is material.³¹ Everything which exists comes into being on the basis of materials, and arises and develops in accordance with the laws of motion of matter. Marx’s whole philosophy of social change is summarized thus:

At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing, relations of production or with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution with the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.³²

Marx viewed the course of history (social change) in terms of the philosophy of “dialectic” (an idea borrowed from Hegel and referred to by Marx as materialistic; according to Hegel, evolution proceeds according to a system of three stages—thesis, antithesis and synthesis). Accordingly, change, development and progress take place by way of contradiction and conflict and the resulting change leads to a higher unity.³³ In particular, Marx viewed the class struggle and the transition from one social system to another as a dialectical process in which the ruling class viewed as “thesis” evoked its “negation” (or “antithesis”), and thus a “synthesis” took place through revolutionary transformation, resulting in a higher organization of elements from the old order. Marx believed that class struggle was the driving force of social change. For him it was the “motor of history.” He states that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”³⁴

Critique

Marx is often criticized for his deterministic attitude towards society and its changes, as he held the position that the economic situation is the foundation of the social order. Few deny that economic factors influence social conditions, but they cannot be regarded as the sole factor that affects social change. There are other causes which are equally as important. The link between social change and the economic process is far less direct, simple and sufficient than Marxist philosophy admits, especially in explaining social change in Africa.

Moreover, Marx oversimplified the class structure of society and its dynamics of social change in the form of class struggle. Dorothy Thomas argued that “it is not difficult to establish correlation between social changes and economic changes, though it is harder to interpret them.”³⁵ Thus economic determinism, it was argued, does not solve the major problem of social causation.

Conflict Theories of Change

The label “conflict theorists” is generally applied to those sociologists who opposed the dominance of structural functionalism. These theorists contend that in functionalism there is no place for change and as such it cannot explain change. In contrast to the functionalist approach, conflict theorists contend that institutions and practices continue because powerful groups have the ability to maintain the status quo. Change has a crucial significance, since it is needed to correct social injustices and inequalities. Conflict theorists do not believe that societies smoothly evolve to a higher level. Instead, they believe that conflicting groups struggle to ensure progress. They assert that conflict is a necessary condition for change. It must be the cause of change. There is no society, changing or unchanging, which does not have conflict of some kind. Thus conflict is associated with all types of social change in some way or another.³⁶

Modern conflict theory is heavily influenced by the ideas of Karl Marx. It may be regarded as the offshoot of his economic theory of social change, which states that economic change only occurs and produces other changes

through the mechanism of intensified conflict between social groups and between different parts of the social system. Conflict ultimately transforms society. While Marx emphasized economic conflict, Max Weber based his arguments on conflict about power. Ralf Dahrendorf (cited by Smelser), although critical of Marxist notions of class, tried to reconcile the contrast between the functionalist and conflict approaches to society. He contended that these approaches are ultimately compatible despite their many areas of disagreement. He not only disagreed with Marx on the notions of class but also on many other points. Marx viewed social change as a resolution of conflict over scarce economic resources, whereas Dahrendorf viewed social change as a resolution of conflict over power. Marx believed a grand conflict would occur between those who had economic resources and those who did not, whereas Dahrendorf believed that there is constant and simultaneous conflict among many segments of society.³⁷

Modernization Theory

Modernization theory was developed out of the assumptions of the structural functionalist school. It was developed to explain the change from traditional, pre-industrial society to industrialized modern society, which was first experienced in the West, hence the “First World” tag given to the West. The philosophy which informed the conceptualization of the First World led to the observation that non-existent or slow change in undeveloped countries, the Third World, can be explained by a difference in values in those countries which have developed. In this sense, Talcott Parsons argued that whereas in traditional societies there is a system of ascription whereby individuals obtain their roles by who they are, in modern industrial societies achievement is valued; in other words, individuals have to compete for positions on the basis of merit.³⁸ In the views of Parsons, pre-industrial societies will become modernized as they adopt and internalize the values held in developed countries. In this sense, the process of modernization is seen as being universal and a *sine qua non* for development.³⁹

Modernization Theory and Its Relevance to Effecting Change in Africa

According to Alvin So, there are three main historical elements which were favorable to the inception of the modernization theory of development after the Second World War. First, there was the rise of the United States as a super-power. While other Western nations, such as Great Britain, France and Germany, were weakened by the war, the United States emerged from it strengthened, and became a world leader through the implementation of the Marshall Plan to reconstruct war-torn Western Europe. Second, there was the spread of a united world communist movement. The former Soviet Union extended its influence not only to Eastern Europe, but also to China and

Korea. Third, there was the disintegration of European colonial empires in Asia, Africa and Latin America, giving birth to many new nation-states in the Third World. These nascent nation-states were in search of a model of development to promote their economies and to enhance their political independence. According to the modernization theory, modern societies are more productive, children are better educated and the needy receive more welfare. In a political sense, Coleman stresses three main features of modern societies: (1) differentiation of political structure; (2) secularization of political culture; and (3) the ethos of equality, which enhances the capacity of a society's political system.⁴⁰

Modernization is a phased process; for example, Rostow has five phases in his theory of economic development for a particular society. In summary, these five stages are: traditional society, precondition for take-off, the take-off process, the drive to maturity and high mass consumption society. Modernization is a homogenizing process; in this sense, we can say that modernization produces tendencies toward convergence among societies. For example, in 1967 Levy posited that as time goes on societies will increasingly resemble one another because the patterns of modernization are such that the more highly modernized societies become the more they resemble one another. Modernization is a Europeanization or Americanization process. In the modernization literature, there is an attitude of complacency towards Western Europe and the United States,⁴¹ and also Japan.⁴² These nations are viewed as having unmatched economic prosperity and democratic stability. In addition, modernization was taken as an irreversible process, which cannot be stopped once it has started. In other words, once Third World countries come into contact with the West, they will not be able to resist the impetus towards modernization.

The application of modernization in Africa, therefore, provides a strong indication of a new scramble for Africa which departs from the old imperialism (colonialism) only in form. The new imperialism does not seek political control of economies. Its main interest is to devise ways in which to assume direct control of a territory's natural resources and thereby accomplish the objectives achieved by colonialism.

Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory

Dependency theory as an approach to the explication of social change came about out of criticism of modernization theories. The central argument is that the explanation given why some countries have not developed because of their traditional values and institutions is wrong. The theorist primarily associated with the dependency theory is Andre Gunder Frank, who argued that it is the perpetuation of an exploitative relationship between the developed and developing countries that keeps developing societies such as Africa and Latin America dependent on the developed nations. Frank used the phrase "the development of underdevelopment" to explain how the exploitation of the capitalist system in industrialized nations has not only prevented countries from developing but also has reduced the overall level of development in

the world.⁴³ This form of negative influence of the integration of developing societies into developed nations was to metamorphose into an unholy alliance which Immanuel Wallerstein described as the world systems theory. The theory showed how the world, through the aforementioned global integration, has been partitioned into three compartments of unequal relationships:

1. Core: developed nations or the First World
2. Semiperiphery: developing nations or the Second World such as the Asian Tigers
3. Periphery: underdeveloped nations or the Third World such as sub-Saharan African, Latin American,⁴⁴ and South Asian countries .⁴⁵

Social change is explained from this perspective as a consequence of social relations between different groups, which is a strand of the conflict theory.

The world systems theory is an approach to world history and social change that suggests there is a world economic system in which some countries benefit while others are exploited. The core countries dominate and exploit the peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. Core countries own most of the world's capital and technologies and have great control over world trade and economic agreements. They are also cultural centers which attract artists and intellectuals. The peripheral countries are dependent on the core countries for survival. They focus on low-skill, labor-intensive production and extraction of raw materials; they have weak states. The semiperipheral countries share the characteristics of both, but have less diversified economies. This theory emphasizes the global structure of inequality, and holds that the international division of labor was at the root of the Third World's developmental problems. This is because it has bequeathed to the Third World the position of subordinate incorporation in the global economy, polarized into a core and periphery,⁴⁶ and metropole and satellites.⁴⁷

Theory of Globalization

Globalization can be defined as the process of increased harmonization of national economies with the rest of the world to create a global coherent economy. The theory of globalization emerges from the global mechanisms of greater integration with particular emphasis on the sphere of economic transactions. In this sense, this perspective is similar to the world systems approach. However, one of the most important characteristics of this theory is its focus and emphasis on cultural aspects and their communication worldwide. Rather than the financial and political ties, globalization scholars argue that the main modern elements for development interpretation are the cultural links among nations. In this cultural communication, one of the most important factors is the increasing flexibility of technology to connect people around the world.⁴⁸

The main assumptions of the theory of globalization can be summarized in three principal points. First, cultural factors are the determinant aspects in

every society. Second, it is not important, under current world conditions, to use the nation-state as the unit of analysis, since global communications and international ties are making this category less useful. Third, with more standardization in technological advances, more and more social sectors will be able to connect themselves with other groups around the world. This situation will involve the dominant and non-dominant groups from each nation.⁴⁹

POSTMODERNISM

In discussing social change, it becomes quite instructive for us to note that sociology as a discipline evolved during a time of great social change. It was a time when social systems, institutions and values were noted to be in great flux. In the same vein, postmodernism as a theoretical construct developed when those changes and the significance given to rationality and science, originally in the Enlightenment era, started to be questioned as never before. Importantly, the very concept of “truth” is questioned by postmodernists because it is seen to be relative, and dependent on what have been called paradigms of knowledge by Thomas Kuhn.⁵⁰ Principally, a paradigm explains a phenomenon “scientifically” but is derived from created facts, which are only possible because the “experts” shared a language of concepts and methods. Another point to note is that other facts might be created and so the progress of knowledge is seen to be a continual replacement of one paradigm with another, none of which need be “true.” This is almost akin to what Lyotard referred to as meta-narratives. The implication of the foregoing for sociology, as well as for understanding social change, is the development of a theory which rejects notions of a single truth and of history as “progress” in the sense of it being a grand narrative heading in a particular direction. It is in this sense that postmodern theorists such as Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard rejected rationality and scientific certainty. Rather, they see society as in continual change and stress the importance of cultural activity as the center of social life.⁵¹ This is why when talking about social change as having informed the development of sociology, major sociological theorists posit that it is not about one country or one way of life. They reason that there is a necessity to take a global approach and to understand how social groups fit into the context of the global social system. This is the nexus linking sociology, social change and globalization.

CONCLUSION

Our discourses on social change in Africa, and the attendant theories used to explain it, show how much the dynamics of colonialism in such issues as social, cultural, political, economic and technological has foisted the unmitigated attachment to the Western world on Africans. The expositions also show how ephemeral political independence of African nations has effected social change, bringing to the fore the need to interrogate the theme of genuine decolonization. Indeed, the foregoing also shows that the issue of social

change in Africa should be equated with true decolonization, as shown earlier. This is a revolutionary struggle aimed at transforming the entire social system and reestablishing the sovereignty of ethnic nationalities. In political terms, this means a radical decentralization of national power (i.e., the dismantling of the nation-state) and the establishment of local autonomy (community and region, traditionally the village and ethnic nationalities). Any discussion of social change in Africa that does not take into consideration the destruction of the colonial system and the liberation of land and people can only lead to greater assimilation and control. The primary focus in the first phase of decolonization is on disengaging from the colonial system and relearning one's history, culture and so on, and embracing all that is indigenous as good and positive. Some common steps in this phase include returning to one's community, reestablishing family relations, relearning culture (including art, language, songs, ceremonies, hunting, fishing, etc.). In many ways it is a struggle for identity and purpose. This should not be done in a manner that is totally oblivious of the rapid change engulfing the whole world. Here, the need to infuse the sentiments associated with "glocalisation" becomes necessary—people must learn to think globally, but also to act locally. This is in accord with the strategy of disengagement and immersion in regard to personal decolonization, and adaptation to larger change at the macro-level, both nationally and internationally.

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Theoretical Foundations of Nation-Building

Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses a specific question: on what grounds can it be held that nation-building is desirable in an African context or falls within the worldview of the African? To frame the question in another way, what explanations are available to support the view that nation-building is a desirable project in an African context? To address this question, the chapter provides positions through which it can be held that the idea of nation-building finds enough justification within the African worldview and the assumptions held by Africans, and that it is implied in the African thought pattern. It will then proceed to articulate the implications of these for nation-building in modern Africa. To achieve these objectives, the chapter (1) provides some conceptual clarification and justification for the project by way of articulating the idea of Africa implied and the idea of nationalism applied. Thereafter the chapter (2) demonstrates the notion of theory applied; that is, theory as one that favors positions that find their origins in the African worldview, that can be held to have scientific potential when subjected to a process of rational and critical justification. Building on (1) and (2), the work then (3) articulates the theoretical foundations of state nationalism in Africa; that is, how it can be said that the idea of nation is founded or rooted in the concepts and values that are inspired by or rooted in the worldview of Africans. Finally, the chapter (4) articulates the socio-political imperatives of the

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ideas canvassed and the practical implications of the positions advanced for a worthier nation-state formation in Africa. The chapter applies intuitive deduction and conceptual analysis to achieve its purpose.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND THEORETICAL ASSUMPTION

To undertake a discourse on nation-building in Africa, it is necessary to start with certain basic assumptions. These can be found in conceptual clarifications of the key terms employed in the work as I map out the positions on which the work is anchored and which provide the conceptual foundations on which this chapter is built.

Let us begin with (1) the three basic concepts applied in this work: theoretical foundations; nation-building; and Africa. By theoretical foundations is meant certain verifiable positions that can be applied to explain issues and can be held to be formative or at the root of positions, and can be held to capture some wide assumptions. By this is meant those positions that explain certain beliefs, habits, positions and attitudes, and norms that induce or explain the positions. A theory may be held to be a rational account that explains and streamlines wide assumptions about an idea and how it can be held to be what it is. Theories may be informal or ordinary, formal or scientific. Theories are informal when they are held to be true, not because they arise from any objective enquiry but because they are accepted within the regime of truths and values that is based on the attitudes and beliefs of a people. Such theories become formal when through the selectivity of formal special processes they are institutionalized through a regime of thinking. They become acceptable accounts for how a thing is what it is held to be, thereby stipulating what is desirable through that explanation.

Many human assumptions are held to arise from customs, habitual beliefs and traditions. While some of these assumptions are cogent and reliable, some are not. But they are all limited in one way or another because none of them takes account of all possible implications or has the capacity to satisfy all possible implications and the demands of their applications in all cultures, customs and institutions, and by extension in all histories. A theory provides a formal basis through which explanations are made by locating the limits of the desirable assumptions that can be made. Theories, especially in the scientific sense, provide the marked space of relevance for the ideas and concepts supported by the available knowledge through which assumptions can be held to be true and valid, and be so applied.

Formal or scientific theories add value to a position in that they center issues within the domain of thought as cogent or valid explanations of an item or issue. For instance, the theory that it is wrong to tell lies may be informal, but when it is subjected to rational scrutiny to try to validate this position, we have a legitimate account or justification of why telling lies is often held to be wrong. Therefore it becomes more forceful and compelling not to tell lies. So theories can be both justificatory and purificatory.

By nation-building is meant the effort to contribute to an institution that can be called a nation; that is, a situation whereby an entity or a people can be said to have a relationship that can be held to be national. The idea of nation-building may involve practical measures such as physical labor, personal adjustments and developments, creations and recreations, cultural advancements, institutional readjustments and collective self-appraisal or reappraisal. But what underlies all these is the attempt to achieve certain status through values and ideals by and through which a people can consider itself to be different or distinct from others and to have more reasons to be more deeply committed to others than ordinarily would be the case.

Thus, the idea of nation applied here amounts basically to a mega-association of human beings. By this I mean that ideas of nationality are basically “conscious creations of bodies of people, who have elaborated and revised them in order to make sense of their social and political surroundings” (Miller 1995, 6). In view of this, then, nationalism must be seen in the practical character of its members and in the direction in which this operates. This is because nationalism is multidimensional and nationalism in one sense may mean antinationalism in another sense, and one may belong to several nations at the same time. For example, while Christian nationalism may bind an Iranian and an Israeli together (if both are Christians), as belonging to the chosen people of Israel originally meant to occupy the kingdom of God, this would not be in tandem with the idea of Iranian state nationalism or Israeli state nationalism. In a similar manner, Islamic nationalism may bind an American to sympathize with members of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which cannot in any way tally with the ideals of American nationalism with its secular orientation and ethics. This work is tailored to nationalism as it relates to the modern form of the state that came into existence on the African continent as a result of the project of colonialism, and how or whether there are indigenous ethics of nation-building in Africa that can promote this trend.

By Africa is meant sub-Saharan Africa, or what is usually known as black Africa. It should be noted that those states brought about by modern political arrangements, such as the Nigerian state, the Togolese state and the Ghanaian state, which replaced traditional state structures in Africa, are purely colonial creations; and that state projects hitherto existed under kingdoms and empires such as the Ghana empire, the Dahomey empire, the Songhai empire, before the colonial period. It should also be noted that these states were all organized differently from the nation-state project that is currently in vogue in Africa.

INTERPRETING NATIONALISM

A central aim of this chapter is to suggest that the idea of nationalism is implied in the African worldview. The key to achieving this lies in the effort to break up the idea of nationalism or nationality into its constituent demands. Nationhood in all its meanings always involves a sense of collectivity directed by a number of beliefs, ideals, principles, practices, signs and symbols. These articles are often

reinforced through one form of action or another and serve to locate and direct its ideals and principles. There might be no nation anywhere without some practices and actions or without what can be called *actionable beliefs*. As can be glimpsed in several works on nationalism—Engin (2013), James (1996, 2006), Hodge (2011) and Marx (2005)—nationalism has to do with a certain manner and measure of self-conception as a social group. Thus, it is expected that actions should always be directed to promote the cause of nationhood for those who believe in it, either by deliberately carrying out acts that reinforce national ideas or by refraining from acts that demote national ideals. In a sense then it can be said that nationalism is a form of traditionalism in the sense that promoting the cause of a nation involves a constant renewal of belief in the nation itself through practices that are seen to belong uniquely to that nation. Nationalism would ordinarily include rites, signs and symbols which are observed from time to time and which people are made to believe in and to apply without question. These are largely the same ethics which define tradition, in the sense that to make an item traditional is to enable it to acquire a social force, either from without or from the repetitive principle through which it becomes imbued with a valued social import and relevance.

Nationalism often manifests itself as an expression of emotions, ideas, ideals, values, abstraction, rites, rituals and symbols through which it garners and sustains its life and force. The view implied here is that there is what can be called a personal commitment implied in what is called a nation, and for this reason a nation has both physical and spiritual features and characteristics. The natural foundations of nationalism and the social impulse for nation-building can be located in the emotions, passions, will and drive through which it is expressed; in other words, that people are national to the extent to which the drive and will to be national burns and remains in them. Here I borrow from the important view of Renan (1939, 22–23) who has called it “a daily plebiscite,” by which he means that nationalization is a continuous exercise and depends on the desire of people to remain and share life in common.

An effort to articulate the actionable beliefs on which nation-building operates yields such ultra-principles and components of nationalism as unity or union of will, purposefulness and identity. Seen in this way, nationalism could be interpreted in terms of humanism and vitalism. In sum, nationalism could be interpreted to mean actionable humanism or vitalist humanism (interpreted to mean a form of humanism which is defined by the will for action), and it is for this reason that we do not have mental nationalism. Rather, what is common is practical result-oriented nationalism.

THEORIZING NATION BUILDING IN AFRICA: A CASE FOR AFRO-THEORISM

To provide theoretical views that support or explain how it can be held that nation-building has some grounds or basis in an African setting, it is imperative to note that this effort would be located within what can be held to be African theorizing or Afro-theorism. By Afro-theorism is meant advancing

ideas through concepts which are believed to be rooted in the worldview of African people. This option for advancing a theory of nation-building in Africa is considered more cogent because of the failure of theory-building in the African context and the need to provide a supplement. Hountondji (1992, cited in Marcelo Rosa 2016, 5) highlights the poverty or weakness of theories in Africa and finds a correlation between the absence of factories or laboratories in Africa and the absence of acknowledged theories from the continent. Owing to this absence, those who live in this region are often relegated to being producers or exporters of raw materials (either natural resources or research data) and importers of manufactured goods and grand theories, the result of which is dependency (technological or intellectual, or in some cases both) that characterizes what Alatas (2003) has referred to as the “captive mind.”

This situation which amounts to what the Indian scholar Siddharth Mallavarapu (2015) called “provincialism” of the knowledge world today, and its “universal pretense” or the epistemological colonialism of the South, has led to a situation where “provincial experiences are passed off as universal experiences,” which in turn obstructs a proper interpretation of the experience. This is harmful because it hinders a proper interpretation and understanding of issues. Thus it becomes urgent to address this state of affairs through Afro-theorizing. Several other scholars, Comaroff and Comaroff (2012), Hofmeyr (2014), Wa Thiong’o (2012) and Baturi (1990), have addressed this concern by providing positions that highlight the weakness or poverty of this point of view.

This has moderated the pervading effect of Western ethics of reason, which has been shown to advertise a form of “mechanistic, materialistic, reductionist, ... decontextualized, mathematically idealized ... ideological, masculine, elitist, competitive, exploitative and violent” character (Aikenhead 1997, cited in Enslin and Horsthemke 2014, 1), and has led to a “dominating knowledge” (Maglin 1990) paradigm.

Afro-theorism implies the attempt to theorize and make African beliefs and cultural assumptions rationally more compelling through a scientific disposition to a rational evaluation of their meaning and import. It is, as it were, rethinking Africa through the rigors of scientifically verifiable claims and rethinking the world through Africa.

THEORIZING NATION-BUILDING IN AFRICA

In line with the Afro-theoretical approach, the effort to locate the foundations of nation-building in the African context would yield results by looking at what can be called the micro-principles or ultra-principles that direct African thought. By micro-principles or ultra-principles of nationalism is implied some values and ideals that stand behind what is held to be nationalism or nationalist sentiments in Africa and in the African worldview. In doing this, my focus is basically on state nationalism or the kind of nationalism that leads to the conception of a group within the parameters of what is called a state.

This position is again anchored on the view that the highest ideals of the nation can be found in the state idea, in the sense that it is at state level that a people manifests the highest ideals of communal commitment and belonging, such as the readiness to lay down one's life for the sake of another. Now when this state ethic is rooted in some form of nationalism—a form of higher value that sees the state as a mechanism that reinforces nationalist ethics—the strongest form of nationalism has been achieved; that is when the state itself exists to serve the cause of the nation. No philosopher appears to have captured the primacy of state nationalism better than the German philosopher Hegel, for whom the state is the divine idea on earth.

The work will proceed by (1) mapping out the substance of the African worldview to locate the extent to which it favors nationalism and nationalist sentiments; (2) locating some cultural items that define traditions in Africa to see the extent to which they favor nation-building; and (3) itemizing and interpreting some proverbs which provide some insights into the idea of the state and nation in the African context, to see the extent to which they disclose the ethics of nation-building. In doing this, I note that I will draw most of my views from the Igbo worldview of Nigeria. I feel justified in doing this because of what has been called “the cultural unity of black Africa,” by which is meant that although different components of sub-Saharan Africa offer different variations in their cultures and traditions, they are basically or fundamentally the same at the level of ontological or metaphysical assumption.

To begin with, (1) when an attempt is made to capture the nature of the African worldview, it will be seen that man is at the centre of this universe. It will further be seen that man does not exist alone and that to be human demands a form of connectivity such that “only in terms of other people does the individual become conscious of his own being” (Mbiti 1970, 108). This connectivity is such that reality is cooperative. Hence Momoh (1989, 174) submits that:

In African worldview elements or constituents co-operate in a communal-ity and “connectives” are dynamic not static, spiritual not material, moral not imperialistic....

The anthropocentric nature of the African worldview is such that literally everything in the ladder of being is connected to man as its source; everything strengthens and draws its vitalism through an exercise of some willingness or disposition to be relevant to human nature. This, to a large extent, justifies the view of Placide Tempels, the Belgian scholar, who in an attempt to interpret the worldview of the Baluba people of Congo held that “each being has been endowed by God with a certain force, capable of strengthening the vital energy of the strongest being of all creation: man.” As Tempels put it further:

Bantu hold that created beings preserve a bond with another, an intimate ontological relationship comparable with the causal tie which binds creature and creator. For the Bantu there is an interaction of being with being, that is to say, of force with force.

Tempels' position finds a correlation in the Igbo worldview where as Nwala (2010, 45) puts it, "There is belief in the unity of beings; in the original cosmic (universal) harmony and order ..." Apart from the human principle that animates the African world and the principle of connectivity by which all beings are linked to each other, there is also the principle of "constant interaction and communication" (Nwala 2010, 47). Hence the Igbos say "*ife kwulw ife akwudobe ya*" (something stands beside another). The principle of connectivity is not a mere loose relationship or a reluctant union in African thought. It is one that functions in favor of life.

In addition to the anthropocentric principle of the Igbo worldview, by which man is at the center and is the principle of connectivity, there is the principle of vitalism or what can be called the principle of action and effect, according to which all beings influence each other and cause an increased quality of being or decrease in quality of their being. The principle which leads to what can be called the principle of cooperative vitalism is what Buto (1998, 16) calls "a kind of interaction" that leads to "the increase of vitality within the clan." Similarly, Polycarp Ikuenobe (2006, 63) interprets it as a "harmonious composite of various elements and forces" that directs the African communal world.

In Africa, the idea of existence at which man is at the center functions through the principle of force popularly referred to as vital force. Indeed a particular idea of life in Africa holds that the principle of being is vital force, and that whatever the African does or does not do is geared towards acquiring or achieving this force or power, something akin to vitalism or a vitalist ontology. This theory holds that the principle of vital force is desirable both for the social group and for the individual because they reinforce each other. Tempels (1959) formulated this claim in his influential work *Bantu Philosophy*, in which he inferred from the ethics of the Bantu people of southern Africa that Bantu people speak, act and live as if, for them, being were force. He averred that for them "force is even more than a necessary attribute of beings: force is the nature of being, force is being, and being is force," and concluded that "[t]heir purpose is to acquire life, strength or vital force ... Each being has been endowed by God with a certain force, capable of strengthening the vital energy of the strongest being of all creation ..." The theory of vital force has had other names in African philosophy. In addition to these principles, there are also other vital principles that explain the provisions of the African worldview. They include such values as "sense of human value" (Onwubiko 1991; Onah cited in Metz 2007), "sense of hospitality," "sense of the sacred," "the sacredness of life," "sense of community," "sense of good human relations" and "sense of identity" (Onwubiko 1991).

After outlining the principles that explain the substance of the African worldview, the next challenge is to illustrate how they can be applied to substantiate the idea of nation-building in an African context. To address this, it is important to interpret nationalism in terms of what can be called the ultra-principles or micro-principles of nationalism. By this is meant the fundamental values on which the idea of nationalism is rooted. Here, it is important to define nationalism in terms of unity and action, as a form of action-oriented

unity, an actionable unity or *unitive vitalism*; that is, an energizing sense of unity where people are led to see themselves as one and to act in defense of this principle. In this sense nationalism would amount to unity and action, unity that sustains a course of action and a course of action that supports unity.

But unity itself suggests or at least encourages commonality and corporateness, just as action demands performance, activity, practical exertion of energy or dispensation of energy and a measurable outcome of energy and work, all of which are implied in the principles and values that define the African worldview as outlined. In the light of these, it can be safely held that nationalism is heavily suggested by or inscribed in the substance of the African worldview, because the major principles and norms that define this worldview for physical and metaphysical beings and for both animate and inanimate beings have a tendency to promote a form of unitive ethos, which is a major feature of nationalism. Seen in this way it can then be held that the tendency to be national or to function from the point of view of the group has strong foundations in the African worldview.

After this attempt to locate the foundations of nation-building in Africa through the substance of the African worldview, my next desire is (2) to locate how or whether this is implicated in the traditions that animate the African worldview. This aspect of the work is urgent because traditions animate worldviews in the sense that they are socio-cultural items that mark or advertise the social belief of a people. Traditions are often physical and measurable and for this reason serve as visible items that illustrate the inner forces around which a worldview operates. Traditions are dependable accidents around which a worldview functions.

If an effort is made to outline the traditions that are associated with Africans, it will be seen that these traditions are very wide, varying from place to place and from one part of Africa to another. For instance, the traditions that obtain in the western part of Africa are not those that obtain in South Africa. These variations may, however, depend on the material demands of the tradition. For instance, whereas what is called African traditional religion is practiced in nearly all parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the items and materials for worship vary substantially from one place to the other. While some worshippers practice their religion around rivers and seas, others do so on hills and mountains, depending on the myth of their origin and the assumptions of their belief system. In spite of such discrepancies as these, there are some traditions that can be held to be valid in major parts of Africa. These include, for example, the presentation of kola nuts or gifts to visitors, respect for elders, greetings, hospitality to strangers, marriage, naming ceremonies, eating from a common dish and with bare hands, elaborate burial and funeral rites, especially for the aged, and the spirit of brotherhood. These traditions are given symbolic expression such that certain rites and rituals define and advertise them. For instance, the Igbo of Nigeria offer kola nuts to visitors. "As a sign of goodwill, it is always the first thing one has to present to a visitor" (Opata 1998, 100). Similarly, the "presentation of kola nut is not only a sign of goodwill; it is also an indication of respect from a younger person to a more elderly one" (Opata 1998, 101). In the same vein, effort is made to ensure the comfort of a stranger, such that in many cases one could be ready to vacate

one's house to allow a stranger to pass a night there if the situation so demands. The tradition of marriage in Africa is also emphasized, such that marriage usually goes through a lot of processes before it is consummated. These include, but are not limited to, formal presentation to the parents of both the bride and the groom; formal declaration of intent; payment of the bride price; formal involvement of the extended families and clans; and the traditional marriage, all of which involve the presentation of drinks and items of entertainment. These traditions, as can be seen, emphasize an ethos that reenacts the oneness of the human family and a corporate responsibility to the clan. These traditions and rituals recreate the family and reestablish a cherished union around which African life and thought gravitates. How do these traditions of the African worldview reveal the values that support the idea and cause of nation-building? These can be located in the quality of sociality implied by these values and how it advertises a strong predisposition to conviviality which is suggested and implied by the idea of nation. These traditions, which project the spirit of African communalism, are such that they make Africans feel bound and bonded to each other. Nze summarized the components of African communalism as "extended family systems, belief in corporate guilt and choosing the path of the community" (Nze 1989). The corporate ethics that underlie African tradition is such that a man outside the clan is like a fish out of water while wisdom lies in the opinion of the majority. It is also as a result of the corporate underpinning of this philosophy that the community, which institutes and determines traditions, defines the individual, and in Africa the cardinal social philosophy is "I am because we are, and since we are therefore I am" (Mbiti 1970, 141). Indeed, the humanist quality of African thought and tradition spans a number of writings on African philosophy, thought and culture. For example Armah made this the overall theme of his creative essay *Two Thousand Seasons* (1973) while Soyinka discussed this extensively in his essay *The Credos of Being and Nothingness* (1991). Ugwuanyi has also reflected this position in the essay entitled "Authentic Existence in the African Understanding" (1993). These humanist values suggest that Africans have a worldview that defines the world as a human nation or a world in which human beings have strong reasons to find value in a corporate project such as a nation.

Another aspect of tradition that provides a strong basis for nation-building is the land ethic as it obtains in the African world. Africans generally profess a strong attachment to the land as a sacred place of union. This land ethic is such that it is always the desire of people to be buried in their land of origin because of the need to secure and promote the cause of their lineage. Indeed an important value is attached to being buried in the land of one's birth, such that dead bodies are often transported back, irrespective of the distance involved, to the land of their birth or origin with the belief that even at death one's remains should be close to those of kith and kin. Often in traditional African societies land is owned in common, and there is a common belief in land as a common heritage which should be held sacred. The implication of this is that there is a need to protect the sanctity of the land and to act for the sake of the land. In Igbo society land is seen as a goddess, and it is common to find people who swear by invoking the land. All these show a source for a common belief ethic

that provides the basis for a common weal that supports the cause of nationhood, a strong basis for social mobilization.

A number of maxims and proverbs that support the idea of nation-building in African thought can also be found in the spoken and written languages of Africa. For example, the Igbo say “*Anyuko mamiri onu ogba ufufu*” (if people urinate together into a common hole it foams) just as another proverb from the Mbu/Nkanu dialectical version of the Igbo language says that “*Unu oha ka ika enya obumanonye*” (the foolishness of the majority amounts to more than the wisdom of one person). These proverbs are strong indications of a worldview in which people are ready to subordinate their private beliefs and interests to the larger interest of a bigger social will symbolized by the idea of a nation. It explains how the African world could pre-dispose its members and citizens to be national, rather than personal or individual. Along with the other points articulated, this illustrates how the idea of nationalism can be located within African thought.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has tried to provide positions to show that the idea of nation-building finds justification within the African worldview. To do this, it has provided some conceptual clarification and justification by way of articulating the idea of Africa and the idea of nationalism implied and applied here. The chapter has also demonstrated the notion of theory applied—one that goes beyond mere assumptions, can be held to have scientific potential and can be subjected to rational and critical justification. Building on these, the chapter has articulated the theoretical foundations of state nationalism in Africa; that is, the idea of nation that is founded or rooted in the concept of state formation with all its modern demands, is inspired by this and is also theoretically rooted in the worldview of Africans by intuiting from the substance of the African worldview, cultural traditions, land ethic and a number of proverbs. All this has served to illustrate the grounds on which it can be held that the idea of nationalism is rooted in the worldview of the African people. Perhaps the next stage is to articulate the socio-political imperatives of the ideas that have been canvassed and the practical implications of the positions advanced for modern African state nationalism. It is hoped that scholars who find the ideas put forward here compelling will proceed to apply them to further study.

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PART II

History and Contexts of Politics,
Governance, Politics, and Development

Pre-colonial Political Institutions: Relevance for Contemporary Africa

Elizabeth A. Eldredge

INTRODUCTION

The institutionalization of political offices and processes occurred historically across the continent at different times in different places. Transformations, growth, and increasing complexity of political institutions were catalyzed by internal and external political conflicts. Political consolidation through processes of conquest and subordination or voluntary submission propelled the institutionalization of political roles, offices, and processes of governance.

Pre-colonial political institutions in Africa were not constant and unchanging but evolved and remained in flux even as offices and practices of governance became institutionalized. Changes sometimes occurred as the result of external influences—trade, religion, and military conquest. Islamic influences spread early into North Africa and were carried by land and by ocean-based trade into West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and East Africa. Sometimes changes in political institutions were propelled by internal and local or regional struggles over control of resources, trade, and political authority. Political office and authority was often undergirded by religious or sacred authority attributed to rulers and ruling lines of descent. Conversely, however, there were strong similarities in the structure and functions of political institutions across regions even as political boundaries changed and configurations of polities changed.

Pre-colonial Africa denotes the era of independent political rule of Africans by Africans prior to the imposition of formal European colonial rule in Africa. The imposition of European colonial rule occurred at different times in different places and the length of the period of colonial rule varied greatly, therefore the

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time gap between pre-colonial independent African rule and the postcolonial era of independence also varied greatly. In some places where the era of formal colonial rule was relatively short, the pre-colonial era was within living memory in the early postcolonial era so that knowledge about pre-colonial political institutions was received directly or through oral transmission in the postcolonial era. The length of the period of colonial rule affected the extent to which pre-colonial political institutions and practices directly influenced those of the post-colonial era.

Western misconceptions have persisted to the present regarding pre-colonial African polities. Early Westerners who travelled to Africa described African political rulers as kings and chiefs, and their record is clear that the basis for the identity of chiefdoms and kingdoms was political and did not correspond with cultural differences such as language. Pre-colonial African polities comprised peoples of multiple languages and cultures, and people of the same language and cultural practices were dispersed over multiple political units. Political units were designated by Europeans as “tribes,” a European Western concept of a socio-political unit pre-supposed to comprise only a single and entire linguistic and cultural population. The Western Eurocentric perception of African political organization as being defined by “tribes” mistakenly presumes the boundaries of polity, language, and culture including religion and sacred beliefs all coincide. Socio-political units in Africa were not as simple as kin groups based on lines of descent, “clans,” and “lineages,” but comprised people from multiple descent lines who fell under the political authority of the dominant line of descent and its head, the chief or king. Socially recognized groups identified by their genealogical origins, that is, the members by birth of “lineages” or “clans,” did not remain living under a single political authority in a discrete territorial unit but were dispersed over the generations and came to comprise parts of the populations of various political units. Corporate socio-political units were defined by their political authority, the chief, and the allegiance of those who recognized his authority and owed him—or a woman regent during a chief’s minority—allegiance and tribute in labor and in kind, in exchange for settlement and land rights. Political offices in pre-colonial Africa can be aptly designated with Western terminology. For purposes of generalization, the term “chief” is applicable in most pre-colonial political contexts. Political units that emerged through the consolidation of several smaller polities are appropriately conceived of as chiefdoms, defined as the adherents to a political leader or chief. However, the person holding political authority also commonly held social seniority in the dominant ruling line of descent. The increasing size and complexity of the political system determines the appropriate Western terminology for the polity, and the conquest or voluntary incorporation by a strong chiefdom of multiple smaller chiefdoms in a subordinate status—marked by symbolic submission and the payment of tribute and taxes and contribution to military functions—has commonly been perceived in Western terms as the creation of a kingdom by virtue of its greater size and multiple layers of authority.

Within the geographic boundaries of a polity, the primary functions of government were to exercise control over access to natural resources, especially land and water, and provide for the allocation of land rights and resource rights equitably; and to uphold and enforce laws that protected rights to land and property, governed trade, and punished criminals. Government officials adjudicated disputes, made judicial determinations, and executed punishments for the violation of laws. Sometimes these functions were performed at different levels of authority than main government officials, such as when the head of a clan or lineage retained rights to perform these functions for members of the family line of descent of which he was the senior male member.

The other central functions of political authorities were linked to the provision of security against external threats, whether from small-scale cattle raiders, full-scale military operations launched by other chiefdoms or kingdoms, or Europeans engaged in colonial conquest. This required the development of larger militaries and more complex military institutions with appointed military authorities, and military conquest often resulted in the institutionalization of slavery and a slave trade, which in some places became central to the economic and political functioning of the polity. Diplomacy was a central function of governing officials.

Political offices and practices were linked to and overlapped with social, economic, and religious institutions. Religious authorities sometimes held political office, or wielded authority over them, limiting the powers of governing officials. Governance and politics were codified and institutionalized through laws that were enforced by chiefs, kings, administrative officials, and courts. Governance was accomplished through intermediate levels of political authority and governance: counselors, councils, and subordinate chiefs. Political authority overlapped with the power and functions of social, military, and religious leadership and authorities. Political institutions reflected, reinforced, created, and were a means of defining and reinforcing boundaries of popular allegiance, loyalty, service obligations, tribute obligations and taxation, perquisites, entitlements, and identity.

Popular expectations of the functions and character of political institutions embraced the connection of government to the social foundations of the polity, including familial and ancestral links, and to religious and sacred beliefs and practices. Political officials were expected to be linked to and responsive to the community, and to exercise correctness with regard to inherited practices, concepts, and the machinery of politics. Political office and authority was reflected in and reinforced by symbols, insignia, and ceremony. Women were individually and collectively important in governance and sometimes held political office individually, and often held sway as royal women entrusted with governing authority, or by virtue of a leadership role in women's social or sacred societies.¹

Many famous kingdoms and empires had risen and fallen across the continent of Africa prior to 1500 CE, such as the early West African *sahel* empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, the ancient Nubian civilizations of the Nile River valley, and

the Great Zimbabwe empire of southern Africa. The ancient civilization of Nubia on the Nile River, after the decline of its successive complex city-state settlements at Kerma, Napata, and Meroe, saw a period of renewed state development and the emergence of Christian kingdoms from the sixth to fourteenth centuries, followed by a second period of decline by the fifteenth century CE.² Following the disintegration of Christian kingdoms along the Nile, small peasant-based Muslim sheikhdoms emerged and created confederations along the Nile, such as a Fung sheikhdom based at Sennar, and another at Qasr Ibrim.³ The Darfur Sultanate in the western districts of the modern Republic of the Sudan reflected a long process of Islamization in the region that blurred linguistic and ethnographic distinctions over time, and by the sixteenth century Muslim dynasties had replaced older kingdoms in the region which introduced Shari'a law and furthered the Islamization of state institutions.⁴ The Abyssinian dynastic rulers of northern Ethiopia, successors to the Axumite civilization, claimed Christian Solomonic roots as early as the seventh century CE, and remained predominantly Christian through periods of decline and revival over centuries. The revived empire enjoyed a golden age into the sixteenth century CE before the destruction of its churches and monasteries by Muslim attackers in 1505 CE. The reunification of Ethiopia in the mid-nineteenth century and its conquest of Oromo lands and peoples to the south rested on an ideological claim to legitimacy based on old dynastic links. Emperor Menelik, crowned in 1889, led his empire into the twentieth century, when it experienced only a brief period of Italian rule from 1936 to 1941, carrying its pre-colonial traditions of rule into the modern era after only a brief five-year interruption.⁵

WEST AFRICA

Chiefdoms and kingdoms proliferated across the savanna and forest regions of West Africa long before the arrival of European explorers and traders at the end of the fifteenth century CE. Early politics ruled by dominant lines of descent of ruling families that had come to rule over subordinated lineages emerged in the forest belt at the same time ancient Ghana arose between about 400 and 900 CE in the area between the Niger, Senegal, and Gambia Rivers as the first Western Sudanic empire in the Sahel south of the Sahara desert. The successive rise and fall of the empires of Ghana (c. 400–1100), Mali (c. 1050–1480), and Songhai (c. 1464–1593) followed the shifting north–south Trans-Saharan trade routes that moved east over time, and were the means by which Islamic influences and Islamic rule were introduced into West Africa. The institutionalization of offices of governance, in small-scale polities best denoted as chiefdoms, began very early and then the process of formalization and institutionalization of political offices was catalyzed by the arrival of Islamic influences through commerce and conversion of rulers. Political systems and offices and governance practices were Islamized, culminating centuries later in dramatic renewals of earlier Islamic conversions of political systems with new Islamic movements and the creation of new caliphates in the early nineteenth century.

Hausa city-states emerged among a people with a shared Habe language and culture in the area of what is now northern Nigeria and vicinity, dating back at least to 1000 CE, which in times of wars with outsiders banded together for mutual defense. Some Hausa states fell under a tributary relationship under the Songhai empire, and all had become Islamized by the sixteenth century following the dissemination of Muslim scholarship by the famous scholar Al-Maghili who came to the Hausa city-state of Kano in 1492. Between 1500 and 1800 many Muslim scholars moved into the area; some were Fulani (Fulbe) scholars whose ancestors had moved into the region from the upper Senegal River region over the previous five centuries. Distinguishable by their physical characteristics and language, the “cattle Fulani” tended to be non-Muslims who remained herders and lived separately from their neighbors, while the “settled” or “town” Fulani were Muslim farmers and traders who lived in towns alongside the local Hausa population. The town Fulani won influential positions in the courts of Hausa kings (*sarki*) and brought Islamic knowledge to the kings. By the mid-eighteenth century the Hausa states were nominally Muslim, but many people remained unconverted and many kings did not strictly follow Islamic laws and practices. In about 1754 Usuman Dan Fodio, a Fulani Muslim scholar born in a northern Hausa state of Gobir, became leader of a large Muslim community and, after he was brought into the court of Gobir to teach the *sarki*'s son, became very influential. When a new Sarkhin of Gobir tried to suppress the practice of Islam in 1802 and conspired to assassinate Usuman, Usuman established an Islamic community about 50 miles to the north from which he launched a military jihad to overthrow the Sarkhin and establish an Islamic caliphate. By 1808 all the Hausa kings had been defeated and Fulani Muslim emirs had been installed in their places in each of the Hausa states, which now fell under the overrule of the Sokoto Caliphate. Islamic law was adopted but there were few changes in the structure of government. Each of the emirates was relatively independent, but sent regular tribute and taxes to the capital to show loyalty, and had to provide armies when needed.⁶

The renewal of Islam and introduction of Islamic rule and Islamic law was also accomplished by means of jihads elsewhere in West Africa, including in Futa Jallon in 1725–1728 culminating in the formation of the *almaamate* of Futa Jallon in 1747; in Futa Toro in the 1760s–1770s under Sulayman Bal and Abdul Qadir; in Masina led by Fulani scholar Seku Ahmadu in 1818; and in the Tukolor Islamic empire forged by al-Hajj Umar in 1851–1862.⁷ Islamic rule emerged without a jihad in Bundu, a small Islamic state founded in the upper Senegal River region by a Fulbe (Fulani) Muslim scholar from the Sissibe clan, Malik Sy, at the end of the seventeenth century. These Islamic rulers held both religious and secular authority and implemented Islamic law. The authority of the *Almaami*, or ruler, of Bundu increased over time, but he was expected to consult with a council of clerics and notables. The *Almaami*'s court included an advisor, royal historians and praise-singers or *griots*, and royal family members, while the administration of villages remained in the hands of lineage heads and village imams.⁸

The consolidation of wealth and power and emergence of larger kingdoms in the forest region was accelerated by the Atlantic Ocean-based trade with Europeans beginning in the sixteenth century that drew trade routes southwards. The Yoruba kingdom of Old Oyo, well established at Ife by 1400 CE, gave rise to other city-based kingdoms across the region whose kings were putatively linked to the first Oyo dynastic family.⁹ After an initial period of expansion the Oyo rulers were defeated by their Nupe neighbors to the north and rebuilt their capital further south, only to return to its first capital by about 1610. The expansion of Oyo rule in the surrounding savanna and forest regions brought the empire to its height in about 1750 CE.¹⁰ The Oyo ruler, the *Alaafin*, in theory held absolute power as well as supreme judicial authority but was subject to the authority of a council of seven members who headed their own non-royal subordinate lineages, and was denoted the Oyo Mesi.¹¹ The leader of the Oyo Mesi, the *basorun*, was the chief minister of state and supreme military commander and served as regent during periods of interregnum. The other members of the Oyo Mesi were ranked by seniority and each had a designated title and functions, such as the official responsible for religious observance, the *Egungun* cult head and minister of religion, the envoy and minister of foreign relations, the special adviser to the *Alaafin*, the minister of (military) reconnaissance, and the official in charge of distribution of gifts and domestic affairs errands.¹² The *Alaafin* was chosen through election by the Oyo Mesi, and he had to receive their approval to declare war or make peace. The Oyo Mesi commanded the army, controlled the main religious cults, and could force the *Alaafin* to commit suicide along with one of their members, the *samu*. The Eso was a body of seventy subordinate war chiefs who served as army commanders. Ancestral kings were believed to have become, after death, lesser gods or *orisa*, under a supreme God Olorun, who was conceived of as a Lord of Heaven. A cult was devoted to each of the most important *orisa*, and each cult had a perceived or assigned role in the political-religious function of the empire. For example, “[t]he members of the Sango cult were sent out to the vassal states as political agents, since, being members of the cult they were regarded as equals of the kings.”¹³ The cult of Ogun, the god of iron and the god of war, was a royal cult.¹⁴ A secret body of political and religious leaders, the Ogboni, which were probably created at the founding of the Oyo dynasty, wielded wide influence over political officials including the *Alaafin*. Feared by the public, its members were scrutinized for their own integrity, and they could inflict sanctions on anyone, including the highest public officials who committed any acts that were a threat to the honest governance and welfare of the kingdom.¹⁵

The *Alaafin* kept a large staff of palace officials who performed various critical functions and who, in their service to the *Alaafin*, provided a counterbalance to the power of the Oyo Mesi. The functions of palace officials included trying court cases for the *Alaafin*, overseeing religious cults and their political functions, overseeing administrative duties, collecting revenues and taxes, and serving as messengers and bodyguards.¹⁶ After the Oyo kingdom had subordinated

other kingdoms into a tributary status, a system of imperial administration was created in which an official, an *Ajele*, was sent to every major town and city-state to represent the *Alaafin* and collect revenues. Each of the elements and institutions of governance were replicated at each subordinate level, so that each subordinate Yoruba kingdom that had been incorporated into the Oyo empire had its own political structure with a king subject to a king's council and processes that allowed for popular participation in decision-making at every level from the lineage compound to each higher level of governance.¹⁷ Thus,

the typical system of government of a Yoruba kingdom had a considerably democratic character, and the Yoruba people in general were strongly established in the tradition of participation in the making of the decisions that affected their lives in the community. At every level, (even on the occasions when ordinary citizens gathered for meetings with the chiefs in the palace), the system enshrined freedom of speech; in fact, at certain levels (such as in the lineage), it was regarded as a sacred duty of the leader to ensure that every component section of the lineage and every individual had a say before a decision was concluded—because every member was regarded as a chip of the ancestors. As for the women of the lineage (called *obirin-ile*—women married into the compound), no compound would take an important decision without involving and hearing its women. In fact, in certain matters (like weddings and some aspects of some festivals), leadership in the compound sometimes belonged more to the women than to the men.¹⁸

This respect for the roles of women in governance extended to all levels, and “many Yoruba kingdoms had women rulers in their history,” including the kingdoms of Ila, Ilesa, and Ado. Within Yoruba kingdoms, women held positions in special chieftaincies where they held authority over designated functions in the marketplace or in the palace. The most senior woman in the kingdom sat on the high council of chiefs, and the king's senior wife held a title and was entitled to speak on occasion in the high council.¹⁹

The kingdom of Benin, located in the region of modern Nigeria southeast of the Oyo Empire, emerged among the Edo people of the forest region not far from the coast sometime before 1000 CE, during which time the institution of the kingship and its attributes and supporting governing processes evolved. After the rule of the first Ogiso dynasty fell into decline, a second dynasty of rulers emerged, reputedly after a son of the founding Oyo Alaafin (Oduduwa), upon request from Benin, sent his son to marry the daughter of a chief of Benin. Their son Eweka became the first ruler of the Eweka dynasty under which the kingdom emerged, and it reached its height in about 1600. The *Oba* or king of Benin had divine and religious attributes, but was subject to the Uzama, a body of five elders (later increased to seven) which was an institution believed to have survived from the earlier Ogiso dynasty. Comprising hereditary nobles, this body saw its authority over the *Oba* decline over time but it continued to form part of the highest state council, along with the palace chiefs (*Eghaevbo n'Ogbe*) and town chiefs (*Eghaevbo n'Ore*), which the *Oba* was obligated to consult for declaring war or passing legislation.²⁰ These nobles, and subordinate chiefs

throughout the kingdom, continued to have judicial powers within their own territories. The palace chiefs received their titles from the *Oba* and served as administrative officials and advisors to the *Oba*, and oversaw city guilds. The town chiefs, also appointed by the *Oba*, controlled their own lands from which they provided tribute, labor, and military troops to the *Oba*. The *Oba* sent officials to represent him at major towns and collect tribute, and the governing institutions of subordinate tributary chiefdoms were loosely modeled on those of the central Benin kingdom.²¹

The Asante kingdom emerged from the Akan clan-based chiefdoms that had emerged around Kumasi by the mid-seventeenth century and it consolidated its control over the region of modern Ghana and beyond under the senior Kumasi lineage of the Oyoko clan. The kingdom was unusual for its recognition and practice of matrilineal descent in the inheritance of office. The highest political authority was the *Asantehene* and the first to hold this office was the second ruler of Kumasi, Osei Tutu. The kingdom reached its height during the reigns of Osei Tutu (d. 1717) and Opoku Ward (d. 1750), and incorporated into its governance the kings of the other states that had joined into a union as a defense against the threat of Denkyira domination. The member states retained sovereignty in their own territories, with the exception that they recognized the supremacy of the *Asantehene* and of the Supreme Court at Kumasi, paid tribute, gave an oath of allegiance to the *Asantehene*, and attended the annual festival at which disputes were settled and rites and rituals of the union were performed.²² The *Asantehene* was an equal to the *Amanhene* when they met in council, and moral authority was represented by the symbolic Golden Stool that was in the possession of the *Asantehene* at Kumasi. The highest council, the *Asantemankhyiamu*, consisted of the *Amanhene* and provincial rulers as territorial representatives, and the Kumase chiefs. The *Asantemankhyiamu* and a smaller inner council later denoted the Council of Kumase had both legislative decision-making powers and judicial authority.²³ Kings of the union's member states each held the position of the military wing commander, and the military enabled the expansion of Asante territorial control. As provincial territories and chiefdoms outside the union kingdoms were conquered and incorporated into the emerging Asante empire, administrative officers were sent to oversee a multitiered hierarchical administration of the provinces.²⁴ An office with responsibility for the Treasury, the *Fotosanfohene*, was an appointed position, as was a position of counselor or *akyeame* to the *Fotosanfohene*. The *Asantehene* appointed those who served him in many capacities, and the *asomfo*, including everyone from palace household servants to revenue collectors, traders, healers or physicians, and public servants, collectively "constituted the central administration."²⁵

The kingdom of Dahomey was founded in the region of modern Benin by Dukodonu, the son of an immigrant Fon Aja chief, who amalgamated local chiefs under his rule after the death of his father in about 1620. By the mid-eighteenth century the kingdom had consolidated its control across a wide region and it reached its peak of power under King Agaja and his successor

King Tegbesu IV. The king, who was believed to have divine attributes, held absolute power. Dukoduno and his successors replaced the royal family rulers of conquered and incorporated chiefdoms with their own appointed provincial chiefs and, under them, governors, who instituted Dahomean policies and rule directly in place of deposed and suppressed local rulers and laws.²⁶ New government offices were created and institutionalized under Tegbesu IV, whose appointed officials included an advisor and prime minister (*migan*), finance minister (*meu*), viceroy of Whydah (*yovogan*), minister in charge of protocol (*to-no-num*), minister of agriculture (*tokpo*), minister of the palace, minister of religion, and police chief (*ajaho*). The army general (*agan*) exercised supreme military control over the standing army, which included both men and women in its ranks.²⁷ The *sogun* or “master of the horse” was a high-ranking official who not only controlled the royal stables of horses, which were still rare, but also was responsible for the king’s plantation and for war captives and criminals. The king’s wives, the *ahosi*, and women born to the royal line, the *ahovi*, took on important roles such as serving as attendants to and armed guards of the king. The Kpojito, the queen mother, was not the biological mother of the new king (the *agasunon*) but was selected from the wives of the deceased king to serve in a parallel role with the new king. She had her own court, estate, villages, and slaves, interceded with the king on behalf of their subjects, and adjudicated religious cases on appeal from the court of the minister of religion. The king’s great wives, the most senior women in the kingdom, were the *kposi* who supervised the other women and may have performed religious cult functions. Female officials served as female duplicates of their male counterparts, so that, for example, the male prime minister *migan* had a female counterpart, the *miganon*, and the male finance minister *meu* had a female counterpart, the *meunon*, and so on; the female counterpart was expected to be present with her male counterpart in court.²⁸

Governance among most of the Igbo (Ibo) of Nigeria never reached the complexity of multi-layered kingdoms and chiefdoms, but they emerged in some places by as early as the thirteenth century CE, superimposed over systems of governance through village-based and age-grade-based institutions that also encouraged popular participation in decision-making. Common across Igbo institutions of governance were kinship-based structures at the levels of a compound with an extended family, a cluster of related lineage-based segments, and a village of multiple lineages, and within which governing functions were also performed by age grades, associations, cults, and priests. At the height of the Nri kingship in the seventeenth century the king imposed authority through village title ceremonies, and used Nri high priests of religious deities and institutions to act as his agents and collect tribute through his kingdom. The Aro kingdom allowed for outlying provinces to retain considerable autonomy with the exception of external or foreign relations, and was governed by the king and his court. Igbo kings were believed to be sacred, but they shared secular power with officials who comprised a governing cabinet of chiefs, *ndi ichies*. In Aro, clan chiefs or *Mazi* were members

of the king's council and constituted an institution of clan chieftaincy, the *Aro Mazi*, which had legislative functions. A body of seven clan chiefs and seven other clan representatives adjudicated civil cases between clans, and other civil cases involving marriage, social issues, and problems related to health or harvests, were adjudicated by a council of oracle priests, the *Ibinukpabi*. In Nri the state council of all men with the *ozo* title was the *Ndi Nze*, and senior men holding the *ozo* title from each lineage group and appointed by the king or *Eze Nri* served in a council of his highest advisors, the Nzemabua council. The Nzemabua council heard court cases related to internal and external affairs of state, breaking or abrogating taboos, murder, kidnapping, lineage disputes and land disputes, and cases involving the treatment of slaves. In Onitsha, the king (*obi*) appointed the heads of the village or district councils (*ebo*), which comprised all titled chiefs and all untitled adult males whose rights to participation were therefore institutionalized through the council meetings.²⁹ Women also had limited but also institutionalized rights to participation in some governing functions. Female chieftainship, *omu*, was present in some Igbo areas and towns, and was a female counterpart to the parallel office of the *obi* or male chief. She held authority over women's affairs that were nevertheless still subject to the ultimate authority of the *obi*.³⁰ The most senior woman of a lineage, the *ada*, also held high status comparable to titled men, and was respected as holding an honorary public office. Women's associations, which governed women's behavior and activities, were organized on the basis of the lineage or village, or a select group of these women eligible on a more select basis such as marital status. Collectively the members of a woman's association could make demands or inflict the punishment of social humiliation when men transgressed spheres of women's authority, such as in marriage or in the marketplace.³¹

EAST AFRICA

Along the coast of East Africa, the Indian Ocean trade of Arab and Persian traders introduced foreign cultural influences and Islam to create the Swahili coastal culture and language and bring the introduction of Islamic Shari'a law and customs of governance under Muslim sultans. By 1500 the Swahili coast was ruled by Muslim sheikhs in a series of strong Islamic city-states from Somalia to northern Mozambique. Mogadishu was the first prominent Swahili town, but by 1500 CE Kilwa further south dominated the entire coast. The Swahili city-states favored island and coastal locations for settlements, but they were dependent on trade with inland peoples for their basic subsistence needs, including food, and for trade goods such as ivory and gold. Following earlier Arab influences, Persian influences had been introduced through Shirazi royal dynasties, so that it was sheikhs and people of mixed Arab-Persian-African heritage and culture who lived in thriving coastal city-states at the time of the Portuguese arrival in 1498. At that time the Shirazi-ruled states of Mombasa, Malindi, Kilwa (the largest), and Pate (ruled by an Arab Omani dynasty) were

the strongest, while the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba were sometimes divided under multiple rulers.³² Kilwa paid tribute to the Portuguese from 1502 but was sacked by the Portuguese in 1505 and went into a rapid decline, while Malindi forged an alliance with the Portuguese and gave them a base. Mombasa and Pate resisted the Portuguese until an attack by a Turkish expedition, followed by a Portuguese attack and an attack from inland (Zimba) invaders, weakened it. Mombasa was defeated in an attack against Malindi two years later, enabling the Sheikh of Malindi along with an inland immigrant Segeju chief to occupy Mombasa and turn control over to their Portuguese allies. The coastal city-states then paid tribute to the Portuguese based at Mombasa; the decline of the Shirazi dynasties, however, gave way to renewed Arab interest and intervention. Migrant chiefdoms from inland, the Galla and the Nyika (Miji Kenda or Nine Tribes), shifted the balance of power during a period of extensive migrations in the seventeenth century, and gained power when the Malindi sheikhs relocated to Mombasa. The Twelve Tribes of Mombasa's modern population arrived in the seventeenth century, and became one of two "Swahili federations" at Mombasa. Swahili resistance to Portuguese dominance became effective only after they received Omani assistance, driving the Portuguese from Mombasa in 1698 and soon after from Zanzibar. The Omani presence reinvigorated Arab influences along the coast during the eighteenth century, and the Mazrui clan of Omani installed themselves at Mombasa; under Mazrui rule, the Mombasa sheikhdom reached its greatest geographic extent by the mid-eighteenth century. The Swahili sheikhs acquiesced because their own divisions prevented them from mounting a united resistance; most retained virtual autonomy under nominal Omani rule, exercised through their governors (*liwalis*), and the smaller island sheikhdoms were able to control mainland chieftaincies that were located in close proximity to them. Also on the mainland the larger non-Swahili (and non-Muslim) chiefdoms including those of the Segeju, the Nyika (nine chiefdoms who were allied with the Mazrui rulers at Mombasa), the Vumba (who acknowledged Mombasa suzerainty), and the Galla retained autonomy in their own town-based city-states. The Mazrui dynasty rejected Arab Omani overrule, only to be ultimately defeated by Omani Sheikh Sayyid Said in 1837 just after Said had relocated the Omani capital to Zanzibar in 1832.³³

In western modern Uganda the Bito royal line of descent ruled the Bunyoro–Kitara empire which reached its peak of influence in the seventeenth century but began to suffer a regional decline in the eighteenth century when the kingdom of Buganda expanded its territorial control dramatically over neighboring chiefdoms that became tributary to it.³⁴ In Bunyoro, the *Mukama* or king, chosen from among numerous eligible sons of the former king, was assisted in governing by the *Olewiri*, a brother of the former king who exercised authority over the Bito royal clan in lieu of the king who now served all subjects of the kingdom, Bito and non-Bito alike.³⁵ The *Kalyota* was an "official sister" and a sister of the reigning king by another mother. She held authority over the Bito royal family women or "princesses," who were not

permitted to marry but, like the royal family princes, ruled over an allotted territory as chiefs. The *Kalyoto* herself had estates and controlled the revenues from them, adjudicated cases, and held decision-making power regarding precedence among the royal women. The king's mother also had her own estates, court, and authority within her designated territory. Palace officials, advisers, retainers, important chiefs, and honored "crown-wearers" selected by the king performed governing functions under the king's authority.³⁶

The Buganda kingdom's ruling dynasty was also Bito and related to that of Bunyoro, and also had a complex system of governing institutions. The *Kabaka* or king appointed chiefs, *batongole*, as governing officials, and suppressed the authority of subordinated clan chiefs and their chiefly families, which had the effect of centralizing political and military power in his office.³⁷ The highest governing body was the council or *Lukiko* which shared responsibility with the *Kabaka* for the appointment of subchiefs. Two senior chiefs, with estates in every district like the *Kabaka*, were senior to the ten appointed district chiefs (*Basaza*). The most senior was the *Katikiro* who served as prime minister and chief justice; all state matters and cases were brought to him and were only referred to the *Kabaka* if the *Katikiro*'s decision was challenged.³⁸ The *Kimbugwe*, entrusted with the *Kabaka*'s umbilical cord, oversaw religious and cult matters related to the royal family. The district chiefs collected tribute and adjudicated cases, and wielded authority in their own districts over sub-chiefs who were also appointed by the *Kabaka*; some district chiefs served as governors over tributary chiefdoms such as Busoga.³⁹ The appointed chiefs or *bakungu* came to hold authority over land and labor resources and the collection of tribute, functions that had previously been under the authority of the heads of clans that had been incorporated into the kingdom.⁴⁰ The king's mother, *Namasole*, had her own estates in each district, and her own court. The *Lubuga* or "queen" was the sister of the king by another mother and, in addition to having her own estates, adjudicated disputes and was empowered to appoint chiefs.⁴¹ Princes (*balangira*) and princesses (*bambejja*) born into the family held titles; both princes and princesses were given their own estates in several districts where they administered the affairs of governance themselves and through titled chiefs appointed to supervise the estates.⁴² The elevation of royal family daughters to the status of royal men required the princesses to abstain from marriage and child-bearing, rendering them virtually genderless, as a means to restrict the number of potential heirs in the royal line of descent. The *Kabaka* was provided with wives from all of the subordinate clans which derived influence from a marital relationship to him. Elite wives of the *Kabaka*, *bakembuga*, were titled, and a senior wife, *mukyala* or *kaddulubale*, was appointed to control and administer the affairs and wives in each section within the wives' enclosure.⁴³

CENTRAL AFRICA

The ancient Rwanda kingdom was consolidated in the region of modern Rwanda during the reign of Oyilima in the mid-eighteenth century in the face of external threats from Burundi, Gisaka, and Ndorwa. In the new state

administration, reflecting a fusion of cultures, the king or *Rujigira* appointed government officials, especially army leaders, and had a sacred role in mediating “between the essential values of culture, society, and ecology,” that is, nature, fertility, and crops. He was assisted in governance by corporate groups, *umuheto*, which performed military and administrative functions, and by ritual authorities who assured that seventeen rituals and codes governing the king’s roles and prerogatives were upheld. Army leaders oversaw armies that were permanently posted in conquered areas, where they created administrative structures and integrated the regions into the state administrative structure. Increasing differentiation in access to state structures became rigid over time, changing from more fluid groups into distinct socio-cultural categories of “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” and those categorized as “Hutu” were “increasingly excluded from positions of effective power.”⁴⁴

The Nyiginya kingdom, which emerged in the region of modern Rwanda during the reign of Mazimpaka in about 1735, was governed by a king who held both judicial and ritual functions, and exercised control through the appointment of his clients to court positions, and of army commanders. Elite family members and the great chiefs were required to live most of the time at the court, where the queen mother managed court economic activities and supervised the women, slaves, and pages at the court. Ritualist specialists not only supervised rituals, but also controlled their own large domains themselves, while over time army commanders also gained increasing administration functions linked to a standing army.⁴⁵

In West Central Africa, the Kongo Kingdom had been consolidated by the mid-fifteenth century after, according to oral traditions, the chiefdom of Bungeni migrated from near modern Boma to south of the Congo River and there incorporated the Mpangu and Mbata kingdoms. Members of the aristocracy held the title of *mani*, so that the first king or *Ntinu*, King Wene, was known as the *manikongo* to indicate his office as paramount over the entire Kongo kingdom. Through his marriage to the daughter of an earth priest Wene gained spiritual recognition of his supreme political authority over the whole area through religious rituals performed by the ritualists from the region. The early arrival of Portuguese influences to West Central Africa introduced Christian elements into the offices of the king of the Kongo kingdom and his subordinates, even as pre-European contact religious beliefs and institutions perpetuated the dependence of the nominally Christian Congo king’s governing powers on non-Christian religious authorities, who used non-Christian sacred powers to protect and govern the land and its inhabitants. Appointed governors and heads performed administrative and judicial functions at village, district, and provincial levels, and palace officials included a Portuguese advisor to the king after 1512.⁴⁶ Only descendants from Wene were eligible to inherit as king, and later only descendants from a later king, Affonso I, were eligible. Since any descendent was eligible, the pool of possible claimants became large over time and an electoral “college” or council of nine to twelve people was created to choose the new king. The kingdom experienced structural changes over the

centuries, and after the kingdom was restored by Pedro IV in the late seventeenth century, authority gradually devolved to the provinces.⁴⁷ Earlier socioeconomic patterns of stratification were magnified with the institutionalization of slavery; nevertheless, a continuity in governing structures and institutions remained evident following political transformations.⁴⁸

The Luba kingdom of West Central Africa had emerged by about 1500, and according to oral traditions achieved its political structure during the reign of Kalala Ilungu who overthrew his uncle, the purported founding king Kongolo. The Luba king held absolute authority over subordinate chiefs and titleholders. The basic administrative structure of the kingdom was hierarchical and rested on lineage-based homesteads, villages under headmen, chiefdoms each under a territorial chief (*kilolo*), and provinces. The central government comprised the king and titleholders; territorial and provincial chiefs had titles, as did counselors and officials at the capital, such as the war leader, the head of the officer corps, and the keeper of the sacred emblems. Usually titleholders were relatives of the king, and when the king died they were replaced by relatives of the new king. The only legitimate claimants to the kingship were those who were believed to have a sacred quality, *bulopwe*, believed to be vested in the blood and transmissible only through males. *Bulopwe* gave kings the right and the supernatural means to rule; all *bulopwe* stemmed from Kongolo or Kalala Ilunga, hence the king ruled by divine right and had supernatural powers, and challenges to the king could only come from other descendants from these two rulers. The organization of the kingdom was perpetuated by two devices: perpetual succession and positional kinship. Each successor to any given office took the title and name of the original holder of the office, hence all rulers had the same name even though they were not necessarily father and son; anyone who took over a position also took the earlier titleholder's name, even if they were unrelated. If the original titleholder was a relative of another titleholder, then that relationship between the two positions became permanent in a fictitious relationship. The relations between different offices were made permanent based on fictional, positional kinship. Earth priests were usually the head of the original family lineage which founded their village, and because of this connection with the ancestral founders they had highly respected religious powers. The priests had the authority to regulate land use and they allocated land for settlement indirectly by supervising lineage heads, who regulated access to hunting land, fishing streams, and fruit trees in the forest. Sometimes the priests took on direct political roles of leadership; usually, however, they worked with a chief who needed the earth priest's approval in order to have legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The chief would recognize the powers of the earth priest through gifts and tribute, and political rituals such as the investiture of a new chief involved sacred symbols and the participation of the priest.⁴⁹

The Lunda kingdom derived much of its political culture from the Luba, an influence which in oral traditions is attributed to the role of the Luba king in marrying a Lunda queen and fathering the subsequent Lunda ruling line of

descent. The Lunda queen's son by the Luba king was called Mwaant Yaav, hence this name became the perpetual title for the king. *Mwaant Yaav* became the royal name for the ruler of the Lunda empire in which perpetual succession and positional kinship was recognized, under a matrilineal kinship organization. The Lunda empire spread east, and prompted the emergence of imitative states such as Kasanje, which had Lunda rulers but remained independent from the central Lunda empire.⁵⁰

SOUTHERN AFRICA

In south central Africa, the Mwene Mutapa or Munhumutapa empire had emerged by 1500 in the region of northeastern modern Zimbabwe in the wake of the disintegration of the Great Zimbabwe empire to its southwest. After an initial period of expansion, when the empire reached its peak of geographic control, the polity experienced a steady loss of territory over the next three centuries, so that "while it may well be correct to refer to the Mutapa state as an 'empire' during much of the fifteenth century it is perhaps more accurate to call it a 'paramountcy' or even a 'chiefdom' by the late nineteenth century."⁵¹ Therefore any description of the structural organization of the state is not valid for every period, and political institutions changed in accordance with the gradual loss of political dominance in the region. The lowest level of political authority lay within the village (*musba*) and the village head was assisted by the collective consultation of all adult men at the village meeting place, the *dare*. Above the village authority rested at the ward level of multiple villages, the *dunbu*, under a ward chief, the *sadunbu*, headquartered at a town or *nzanga* where a more formal and restricted body of men met at the ward *dare*. The *sadunbus* were selected by their ward, sometimes through succession, and confirmed at the next level of authority, that of the chiefs or *madzisho*.⁵² The paramount chiefs or kings reserved for themselves the title of *mambo*, and the title of *madzimambo* was restricted to the emperor. Each of the *madzisho* was headquartered at a *muzinda*, the capital of their chiefdom or *nyika*. Their council or *dare* included only selected men either from the ruling family or commoners known for their exceptional wisdom or talents, and the *dare* served as the highest court of appeal for the chiefdom. The emperor, the *mutapa* or *mambo*, also ruled with a council composed of the governor of the provinces (*Nengomasha*), the chief minister (*Nevinga*) the captain of the armies (*Mukomobasha*), and other appointed officials. The wives of the *mutapa*, drawn from within the royal family and from the daughters of influential subordinate or vassal chiefs, enjoyed considerable prestige and performed various administrative duties and kept their own estates.⁵³ The power and decisions of the ruling *mutapa* were subject to the ritual authority of spiritual leaders of the *mbondoro* cult, who were spirit mediums. Each *mbondoro* was believed to be the medium for communications with a specific deceased *mutapa*, and each came to be associated with a spiritual geographic realm of influence and spiritual authority, although they were also responsible for the welfare of the entire empire.⁵⁴

Large and small chiefdoms had proliferated across the region of southern Africa long before the first Portuguese contact with the region in 1488, and eventually, by the second half of the eighteenth century, gave rise to the consolidation of kingdoms.⁵⁵ Perhaps the longest ruling descent, that of the AmaSwazi, consolidated a kingdom around its AmaNcwane core chiefdom through a process of conquest between about 1815 and 1820 under their 38th ruler Sobhuza. The king, *Inkosi*, shared authority with his mother, the queen mother (*Indlovukati*), and was subject to the influence of the princes of the royal family, counselors, and the collective body of male subjects in a general council or *Libandla* as well as a smaller inner council, the *Ligoqo*.⁵⁶ Two men were chosen to become ritual brothers or *tinsila* for the king when he inherited the kingship. These men were always selected from the same two important clans, and they advised the new king, participated in national rituals, and assisted in the selection of an heir upon the death of the king.⁵⁷ While the king was the highest judicial authority and commander of the armed forces, the queen mother had her own royal village, presided in the second highest court, had her own counselors, and had her own regiments commanded by royal princes.⁵⁸ With the exception of the Lovedu, known for the investiture of a rain-queen as the highest political authority, the high position and authority of the queen mother in the Swazi kingdom was unique in southern Africa.⁵⁹ The chiefdoms of the SeSotho- and SeTswana speaking peoples in the interior of the region and the Nguni-speaking peoples along the coast recognized that the authority of their chiefs was subject to popular support, and a popular assembly (*pitso*, *imbizo*) of all adult males, was common throughout the region.⁶⁰ Women commonly served as regents during the minority of the heir following the death of a chief, and in the Zulu Kingdom that emerged under Shaka in the 1820s royal women were appointed over their own territories with similar authority to that held by royal men, although the overall authority of even royal women was severely constricted by the superior authority of their male kin.⁶¹

CONCLUSION

This overview of a small selection of the pre-colonial political institutions of a variety of representative Africa chiefdoms and kingdoms serves to illustrate the complexity of institutions of governance across the continent before the imposition of colonial European rule. The size and complexity of polities, and the durability of their institutional structures, varied widely across regions and over time. Colonial rule disrupted indigenous political authority and practices, but many institutions persisted if in modified form and substance. Pre-colonial political institutions remain relevant to contemporary Africa as past models of indigenous legitimate governance. Where the colonial era was of long duration or colonial rule was harsh, pre-colonial institutions did not always survive, or they were transformed so that fundamental differences were introduced in institutions that had origins in the pre-colonial period. The strength and resilience of pre-colonial political institutions—their breadth and depth in terms of their

governing functions—determined the degree of their resilience in the colonial era. However, similar institutions found in contemporary Africa that evolved from pre-colonial political institutions are always different from their pre-colonial predecessors in significant ways; similarities may be superficial and they may be intrinsically different in ways that are not apparent. Under colonial rule the functions and prerogatives of any pre-colonial governing institutions that were allowed to continue were severely restricted if necessary to meet the colonizers' goals. Criteria for the legitimacy of pre-colonial regimes included popular consultation in the process of governance and in judicial proceedings. Even rulers who held almost absolute authority were still restrained by alternative authorities, often councils and religious authorities. The institutions of governance were undergirded by the rule of law and religious beliefs which bound the ruler as well as his subjects. Colonial regimes did not meet these criteria for legitimacy. By definition, European colonial regimes were foreign and were forcibly imposed by means of conquest or threats of violence to enforce compliance. Not until the anticolonial movements gained traction during and after the Second World War did colonial regimes begin to seek popular legitimization by creating new consultative channels and councils, attempts which were superficial and implicitly contradictory to underlying colonial goals to maintain control and rule. Only a careful analysis on a case-by-case basis can determine whether modern renditions of pre-colonial institutions have retained their original pre-colonial functions and have gained legitimacy by honoring restraints and restrictions on positions and persons of authority that were imposed by popular expectations and by the multiple separations of authority and power that had been present in the era of pre-colonial independent African rule.

NOTES

1. See for example John K. Thornton, *The Kongolese Saint Anthony: Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita and the Antonian Movement, 1684–1706* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Lynda Day, *Gender and Power in Sierra Leone: Women Chiefs of the Last Two Centuries* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
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15. Ibid., 64–5, 126.
16. Boahen, *Topics*, 66.
17. Akintoye, *History*, 252–3, 121–126.
18. Ibid., 128.
19. Ibid., *History*, 126.
20. Boahen, *Topics*, 74–78.
21. Boahen, *Topics*, 79; Osarhiem B. Osadolor and Leo E. Otoide, “State Formation in Precolonial Nigeria: A Historiographic Assessment,” in Ogundiran, ed., *Precolonial Nigeria*, 168.
22. Boahen, *Topics*, 57–8.
23. Ivor Wilks, *Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, second edition 1989), 388–98.
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28. Bay, *Wives of the Leopard*, 115–16, 51–4, 67–8, 142–53, 71–2, 78, 231–3, 239–40.
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39. *Ibid.*, 234–7.
40. Nakanyike B. Musisi, "Women, 'Elite Polygyny,' and Buganda State Formation," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 16 no. 4 (1991), 768–71.
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48. Thornton, *Kingdom of Kongo*, 117–18; David Birmingham, *Central Africa to 1870: Zambezia, Zaire and the South Atlantic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 26–36, 52–67.
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53. *Ibid.*, 84–110.
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Politics and Society in Pre-colonial Africa: Implications for Governance in Contemporary Times

Alinah K. Segoby

INTRODUCTION

Africa's long record of human occupation has provided researchers, particularly archaeologists, with a wealth of information on the study of human development. With a variety of sources to use, researchers have been able to develop detailed and evidence-based accounts of the story of humanity in Africa. Drawing on written, oral and other textual evidence, archaeologists have been able to generate deep time knowledge of how societies lived in the past, including building social theory on how complex institutions such as kingship were founded, used and eventually collapsed. In the last forty years we have developed a better understanding and appreciation of how political and governance institutions developed, including systems of trade, food production, culture and social life. From the material culture evidence across the continent, we have been able to infer substantial and significant amounts of knowledge about the way in which governance and political institutions developed. We have come to appreciate the power of material culture in shaping social life, political thought and ideas and culture more generally. Religion and its role in influence on politics has been well documented (Insoll 2003), as has been the role of trade (Ilfiffe 2007).

Pre-colonial political institutions were not always expressed in material culture. In the main, politics was infused across many other institutions of social and economic life. Similarly, politics was infused in religious practice, societal norms and values and in arts and culture. Reid argues that

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Aesthetics endeavors often provide vital clues to African political as well as cultural life. Art was a mediation between the living and the dead, and often underpinned political power. (Reid 2012, 3)

The richness of Africa's intangible cultural heritage also provides insights into pre-colonial politics. Oral traditions from across the continent provide accounts of leaders, their leadership styles, wars and conquests which shaped the political landscape of the region. Although many societies did not have written records until the advent of colonial encounters, some cultures where literacy was developed or introduced early, before the eighteenth century, have documented accounts of their political institutions and how they changed over time. Other records of encounters are found in media such as rock art, which document the early encounters between foraging, pastoralist and farming societies. In the main, it is through the study of spatial systems and architecture that we have been able to reconstruct pre-colonial political institutions (Huffman 1996; Insoll 2003; Bisson et al. 2000). African landscapes as texts provide insights into how early societies interacted and in some cases provide detailed accounts of how people managed their interactions. Among many clues is the presence across time and space of "refuge" settlements which were used during times of conflict. Other markers such as ostentatious monumental architecture, including boundary walls, also tell stories of how encounters were managed within and between social groups. In the main, architecture was used to express and project the authority of leaders in the landscape. The built environment also spoke to the powers of rulers to command authority through the ability to mobilize and deploy labor for construction exercises. Ancient Egypt, Meroe and Axum provide early examples of the projection of power in the landscape (Phillipson 2005).

In this chapter, I review the development of institutions which in the long term shaped the political landscape of the continent. The themes addressed highlight the interconnectedness of institutions of social, political and economic life in Africa's pasts and the interlinkages between material culture and intangible cultural heritage. The chapter also highlights the interconnections between Africa and the world through time, which is significant for Africa's current engagement with the world and may have a bearing on the continent's future in terms of how it shapes its development agenda. Significantly, the development of urbanism from its earliest expressions on the landscape has brought with it recurring challenges of governance of resources and people, stability and security, and often undermined the very nature of the state, leading to collapse. The collapse of complex state systems in pre-colonial Africa is an interesting phenomenon both in its causality factors and in how people responded to it. Clearly, Africa's current experience with fragile and failed states can draw reflections from past experiences of state-building across the continent.

Human beings have organized themselves into units for purposes of securing food, shelter and adapting to their environments since time immemorial. On the African continent, foraging, hunting and gathering communities left their imprint

on landscapes through rock art and habitation sites, some of which highlight the beginning of social differentiation even for egalitarian societies. These ways of life were succeeded by herders and farmers, who are credited with developing more complex socio-political institutions that included networks of trade and exchange and immense architectural monuments. The advent of farming along major river systems like the Nile influenced the development of kingdoms with highly sophisticated institutions of governance. The spatial expressions of these kingdoms across the continent left legacies which today form part of Africa's rich cultural heritage, including the Nile river civilizations, the Mali empire along the upper Niger delta and Great Zimbabwe in southern Africa. The development of social institutions and systems of leadership from egalitarian communities to highly differentiated systems of leadership in places such as ancient Egypt forms part of a long term record of human–environment interactions across the continent which was also marked by innovations in areas of technology, use of space, food production and trade systems. The evidence for deliberate burial of the dead, art and aesthetics expressed on implements and tools, and the vast rock art heritage of the continent point to sustained efforts of human creativity and innovation.

By 3000 BC, ancient Egypt had sophisticated institutions of politics, religion and the management of food production and other resources. The development of systems of writing and social institutions celebrating culture and the arts led to transformations of societies across vast regions both within and outside the continent (Iliffe 2007, 24). Along the Maghreb and the east African coast local developments were interwoven with external influences, leading to the development of complex settlement systems with monumental architecture and the formalization of religion as part of political life (Reid 2011; Insoll 2003).

The African continent is diverse in terms of people and geography. It is also vastly endowed with resources, including minerals, fertile land and other resources which were central to the local, regional and international trade networks that developed across the continent and beyond. The continent's diversity is informed by both internal movement of people and the later in-migration of other populations, which informed the complex tapestry and diversity that is Africa today. The movement of people, whether through small- or large-scale migrations, created opportunities for political change inasmuch as they were a response to change (Reid 2011, 15). Some movements, such as the Bantu migration, had a lasting influence on the peopling of the southern part of the continent, leading to the establishment of settled agriculture societies such as Broederstroom and later urban centers such as Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe (Huffman 1996, 2007). On the east African coast in-migration by Omani Arabs resulted in the establishment of independent caliphates, which transformed the Swahili coastal settlements and the interior in terms of politics, society and culture. In the north, the people of the Sahel traversed the Sahara, which though often perceived as a barrier between the Sahara, Sahel and savanna regions has ample evidence of people navigating it for purposes of trade and other reasons. The Islamization of the Maghreb and Sahelian regions

through to the central Africa regions is well documented as a process which used pre-existing trade routes (Insoll 2003). The political and cultural tensions of contemporary African societies, including intense conflicts associated with cultural and religious difference, can be traced to these earlier movements.

POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA

From the simple egalitarian societies of early foragers to clan-based communities of pastoralists, African societies gradually aggregated into settled food-producing groups which utilized the fertile soils and waters of the Nile to expand their way of life and population. Diversification of food production and the introduction of craft specialization are some of the early developments which influenced the consolidation of settlements and eventual development of political institutions and lineages of leaders, who took control of processes of state-building. Specialization of production and intensification of food production are believed to be the foundations on which the production of surplus and exchange systems developed. These would lead to the formation of local and long-distance trade networks which enabled people to exchange goods. The addition of luxury goods, including ornamental and decorative objects, reinforced the differentiation of social groups in societies such as ancient Egypt, with those at the top enjoying privileged access to and benefit from such goods.

The early rulers of Egypt were able to appropriate luxury goods to enhance their power and status and to further manipulate their leadership into all areas of social life by positioning themselves as immortal. Through complex rituals of life and death the rulers of Egypt were able to fuse their earthly existence with supernatural powers which were played out via elaborate burial rituals at death. The use of elaborate material culture as burial goods together with an opulent and ritualized life gave Pharaonic leaders an authority which enabled them to exercise power in many ways (Meskell 1999). This fabrication of immortal being was used by leaders elsewhere in pre-colonial African states in ways which legitimated their rule. At Great Zimbabwe the use of ritual power by Munhumutapa rulers enabled them to control a vast empire via a political system built on allegiances of a hierarchy of leaders who paid tribute to the state and provided oversight over production of minerals such as gold and salt as well as other resources (Chirikure 2007). West African kingdoms of Mali and the Akan are noted for the gold possessions of their leaders, whose conspicuous consumption of wealth is emulated by many modern political leaders today.

Farming societies which aggregated into kingdoms and empires relied on elaborate social institutions and rituals as part of their governance systems. In the main, most of these societies relied on patrilineal clan systems to organize production and reproduction. The elaboration of leadership systems from family level ensured the maintenance of social order, in particular the regulation of labor. Some scholars have argued that even as early as the seventh century AD evidence for the exchange of cattle for females could be inferred. Huffman (2007, 155) argues that “the exchange of cattle for wives underpinned kinship

relations and political power.” Whatever the antiquity of systems of bride-wealth, what is clear from the literature is that the institutionalization of exchange of women through systems of marriage ensured male authority over female labor and reproductive resources. The practice of polygyny also reinforced male control over female labor and reproduction (Ilfiffe 2007). In the context of labor-intensive agricultural systems such competition for female labor was often mediated through elaborate social and religious rituals which were infused into the new religions such as Islam and Christianity. From the viewpoint of governance, the social organization of labor through family and kinship systems ensured that ruling lineages were able to maintain relative stability. In many regards this practice continues to underpin the subordination of female labor and women in contemporary African societies.

MILITARISM AND POWER IN AFRICA’S GOVERNANCE TRAJECTORIES

Conflicts over the use of resources have characterized interactions of people across the continent, particularly conflicts between different food production systems. To this end, farming societies that were able to consolidate themselves into large socio-political institutions wielded power over access to resources, often at the disadvantage of their pastoralist or forager neighbors. Tensions were managed through negotiations, alliance building and/or conquest where agreements could not be reached. These tensions were, as Reid argues, played on or arrested by colonial powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries only to resurface at independence. The volatility of intergroup interactions and control of resources and land influenced the political and social terrains across the continent prior to, during and after the colonial era (Reid 2011, 297–299).

Other movements in response to conflict such as the nineteenth-century *Difaqane* in southern Africa triggered new conflicts which altered the demographic, socio-political and cultural landscapes of the interior up to modern Tanzania. The conflicts were triggered by intense warfare on the eastern seaboard associated with the rise of Shaka Zulu. Shaka’s military innovations led to regional instability and war across a vast area at a time when incoming Afrikaner migrations were also expanding their colonization of the interior. These encounters are well documented in the annals of South African history and suffice to say their impact on the history and contemporary experience of South Africa and the region continue to date particularly with respect to the politics of land and the construction of the grand narrative of an empty land in the justification of land alienation from the majority Black population of South Africa from the late nineteenth century (Marks 1980; Bonner 2007).

Early state development in Africa relied on the military and authoritarian power of rulers. These leaders were crucial in sustaining the political economy and ensuring they stayed in power with control of resources including trade routes and goods. Large kingdoms such as the Kongo, Oyo and Yoruba exploited rivalries within and between their territories to survive. Rulers relied heavily on

complex social and economic networks for their political survival. By invoking competition as a means of building their power base, the ruling elite remained vulnerable to challenge, and many did indeed face challenges from competing claimants to power. This vulnerability or fragility which was built into the political systems of many of the pre-colonial states was exploited by incoming colonizing groups, including Arab and European newcomers in later times.

Historians note that densities until the twentieth century the continent had fairly low population (Iliffe 2007, 1). As a result, leaders had to keep tight control over people. Militarism became the de facto system of governance to consolidate power and authority over others. It is also likely that demographics influenced the consolidation of patriarchy and patrimony as systems of social control. Reid observes that leaders had to resort to controlling labor either through slavery or the use of marriage as an institution for building alliances, of labor pooling and ownership. The constant challenge of fission by those on the fringes meant that ruling elites had to buy the loyalty and support of those in the periphery through marriage and/or trade institutions. “State-building in the savanna, then and now, was a search for devices to counteract localism and segmentation” (Iliffe 2007, 72). One of the recurring themes in the politics of pre-colonial state-building in Africa is the importance of “Big Men” who not only controlled resources but could also mobilize technology and ideas to their benefit. This was the case in ancient Egypt, West African kingdoms, the savanna kingdoms and in eastern and southern Africa (Iliffe 2007; Holl 2000). These elites controlled the production of resources including food, metals and fertility through rituals and religion whilst using military might and warfare to expand their spheres of influence.

Militarism was also central to the spread of external religions, particularly Islam. The military was the means through which ruling elites could exercise control and hold on to power. Islamic jihads ensured the rapid conversion of African societies, with Islam becoming the dominant religion before European colonial penetration (Insoll 2003). Islamization brought with it new political, socio-cultural and economic institutions, which are still influential in Africa today. The east African caliphates developed sophisticated trade networks, which at their height linked the interior of southern Africa with Asia and China. The diversity of Islam in Africa is often overlooked in discussions of Islam in contemporary Africa, particularly post 9/11, and in discourses about Islam in the context of global geopolitics. Militarism was as much a part of Islamization through its emphasis on jihad as were other forms of statecraft in Africa’s early states. Similarly, the emphasis on patriarchal leadership systems entrenched social class and gender differentiation, which continue to be sources of conflict and development discourses in Africa today.

The role of the military in pre-colonial African states suggests that the continuing fragility and susceptibility of Africa’s governance institutions to military take-over is indicative of the inbuilt propensity to use violence as a governance tool. The violence of the colonial period has been ably written about, and what can be highlighted is the appetite for warfare and military technologies by all

forms of leaders in pre-colonial African states. Firearms were sought after in all trade relations, and Europeans were quick to tap into this appetite by supplying firearms to local leaders and groups. This no doubt contributed heavily to the nature and scale of conflicts on the continent. Military aggression was also a contributory factor to the slave trade, when at its height militias could use force to capture and enslave for sale people from within and beyond their regions. In this respect governance was not always premised on values of negotiation and dialogue and/or pursuit of peace. This can be seen to have had significant influence in contemporary politics where conflict resolution and peace-building are often elusive compared with the propensity towards violence. These fractures and fissures of the past undermine current efforts to bring stability and peace both within countries and between countries. The next section highlights how the political economies were gradually entangled in international trade systems, which led to the underdevelopment of Africa's economies—a phenomenon which continues to shape African politics today.

TRADE, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT

Trade was in many ways a game-changer in the development of pre-colonial states in Africa. As noted, the intensification of production resulted in an accumulation of surplus which ruling elites could exert control over for purposes of trade and/or securing allegiances and allies. As noted by Holl, metal production generated wealth and prestige for elites who, through ritualization of production, could enhance their political power and serve as mediators between their societies and external trade partners. Metals such as copper, iron and gold, which became currencies for procurement of external goods, bestowed authority over leaders who used them to entrench their power. Metallurgy became central to political transformation (Holl 2000, 78), and this is borne out by the use of material culture in burials, which extended the aura of enduring leadership stature for rulers. The growth of commerce across the continent relied on the production of surplus, which in turn needed labor. With the population dynamics noted above, leaders resorted to using forced labor, including enslaving others, to increase production. Slave labor was probably used in other spheres, including construction, military service and most likely in transportation of goods. The arrival of Europeans and the commencement of the transatlantic slave trade in the sixteenth century fed into the existing trade routes and networks of the different African societies. The long-term impacts of the slave trade in Africa and the transatlantic slave trade are still being felt to date. One of the key impacts was to lock African societies into long-term and unequal relations of trade, leading to the underdevelopment of the continent and dependence on extractive resources. The problem of an imbalance in Africa's export of raw materials, including the dominance of trade relations by ruling elites who benefit from such trade, continues in modern African states, causing instability and conflict both in countries and across regions. The political economy of Africa's pre-colonial states in many ways laid the roots of the state in Africa today. Concerning the slave trade, Iliffe notes that

The chief political consequence was to shape the character of states in a mercantilist direction, meaning that politics and commercial power fused, either by rules controlling trade or by traders acquiring political power.” (Iliffe 2007, 143)

Because of the interwoven nature of production, politics and trade, the strength and/or vulnerability of pre-colonial states were heavily dependent on access to and control of trade routes. With the abolition of the slave trade in the nineteenth century those states which had invested heavily in slave trading collapsed, while new states which could diversify their production systems thrived. The Akan states of West Africa are an example of states which were able to transition from the human slave trade culture to the commodity trade culture. The rulers were able to develop a sophisticated trade system in gold through which they were able to enhance and ritualize their power and aura of office. They embraced political transformation, including the introduction of literacy, which further served the ruling class’s ability to maintain power (Iliffe 2007, 147–149). Along the east African coast the rise of urban centers such as Zanzibar and Kilwa was facilitated by the diversification of trade goods. Archaeological research in the interior of southern Africa suggests that ivory and gold, which were sourced from the interior Kalahari, helped to build states such as Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe (Reid and Segobye 2000a). That leaders could command control over vast areas stretching across the continent suggests they mobilized a number of resources to reinforce their power base. For the Great Zimbabwe state, recourse to ritual power helped in this regard.

The example of Great Zimbabwe state provides good insights into the functioning of the pre-colonial states in Africa. At its height, the empire extended from the east African coast cities of Sofala and Chibuene to the Kalahari sandveld in central Botswana. In the interior, the largest known salt production site in sub-Saharan Africa was located in the Makgadikgadi pans (Reid and Segobye 2000b). The monumental footprint of the empire is expressed through stone-built settlements (*madzimbabwe*) which suggest a ritualized spatial settlement pattern and land use systems (Pikirayi 2000; Ndoro 2001). The leaders of Great Zimbabwe and its precursor state Mapungubwe also used ritual power to appropriate mineral production and technological expertise in ways that de Barros observes for other parts of the continent (de Barros 2000, 158). He notes, with respect to iron production, that

an expansionist polity must directly control either iron production or access to that production if it is going to continue to expand and/or maintain its superiority ...

Those larger, often expansionist polities that did not fully control their own iron production often sought to do so by guile or force. (de Barros 2000, 158–159)

The control of other resources, including rain and the fertility of the land, was also claimed by ruling elites, as was the case for the Munhumutapa. The control of rainmaking is well documented in southern African archaeology (Schoeman 2006) and further highlights the manner in which political

power was elaborately crafted by ruling elites to legitimate their stay in power and transfer of authority through their lineages. What is interesting and common across the continent is the association of exotic foreign goods with rituals of power. Exotic beads and other paraphernalia were often used in the construction of elaborate ritual sites for rainmaking. These were also used in burial rites which reinforced the power and authority of the office holders (Bisson 2000, 129–131). Overt ceremonies for controlling fertility (of land and women) were reinforced with performative activities such as initiation ceremonies, regulated cycles of agricultural and other production activities, including hunting and foraging. With the arrival of new religions ruling elites were quick to use them as sources of power by either converting or using religion to augment their powers or by resisting conversion and using their traditional religious authority to resist colonial overtures. In sum, the need for control of people and resources by ruling elites was a critical element of governing in many pre-colonial states. Omnipotent leaders could rule long and wide, while all the time conscious of their precarious claims to power which were forever challenged by contenders. Clearly the arrival of colonial powers highlighted this as the fragmentation and/or ultimate collapse of powerful kingdoms and empires was facilitated by the divide and rule policies of European rulers.

Given the linguistic and cultural diversity of the continent, an equally diverse array of legal systems evolved among the different kingdoms and states of the continent. Of these, Islamic law (sharia) was imposed where Islam had been successfully established. In other countries, different legal systems of colonial power were imposed. As a result, at independence many African countries found themselves with multiple legal systems, which rendered the rule of law very complex. This complexity persists to modern times, and the use of multiple legal systems renders the administration of justice difficult, creating sources of conflict and violence in some instances. An area where this multiplicity has had repercussions is in the area of land administration. Colonial authorities were more often than not likely to leave traditional institutions alone and/or changed them in their favor where indirect rule was the governing model. To this end, elite rulers, chiefs and kings were left to administer resources such as land, leading to extensive manipulation of resources and access to them. This has been a source of conflict and in some instance violence where resistance has been waged by communities. Land distribution still remains a contentious problem for many African states today. The issue of access to land for majority citizenry who lost their land in pre-colonial to more recent times has been at the heart of disputes both intrastate and interstate. Conflicts over shared boundaries and borders have also informed disputes, some of which have been referred to international courts. These conflicts have undermined the development of the continent, as exemplified by the long and complex conflict in the Sudan. This resulted in the separation of South Sudan, but peace and stability have still not been brought to the region.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to outline some of the key factors which informed the development of political institutions in pre-colonial Africa. As noted, early efforts at state-building were centered on the transformation of society and the food production system. Increased specialization in production systems informed the gradual concentration of power in the hands of lineages who consolidated their power into political institutions. These leaders were able to use their office to concentrate even more power around themselves, some ultimately gaining Pharaonic status and divine kingship. The interplay between politics, economy and culture meant that many, if not all, institutions of everyday life were harnessed to the support of political office. Leaders were even able to use their office to manipulate opportunities brought by external players, but unfortunately these were not always good, as was shown in the long-term payout of the colonial experience.

The demise of colonial and imperial rule left behind a vacuum of political authority in many ways. Many African countries mobilized liberation movements to become new rulers of the newly created nation states. However as noted by Reid, the political volatility of past crept back into modern political statecraft. Old fault lines across territorial, ethnic, racial, religious and other divides resurfaced and old conflicts reemerged, causing instability and insecurity for ordinary citizens. Population dynamics shifted from the challenges of “too few” to “too many” and undermined the capacity of states to deliver on their mandate. Good governance has been an elusive project, particularly with the inability to ensure equitable distribution of resources such as land and food. As a result, popular uprising against ruling elites continue to plague the continent as Africa’s poor demand better governance and especially an end to hunger. Reid (2011, 303) notes that

it remains broadly true that poverty and under-development feed the fires of civil unrest, contribute ineffectually to the failure of democratic politics and civil society, and exacerbate ethnic tensions.

Contemporary African states grapple with the challenges of building coherent nation states and advancing human development. This task has proven difficult given the unresolved legacies of colonial era governance and repression. Many African societies continue to rely on their traditional knowledge systems with respect to the management of resources such as land. Clearly, public health, land resources and the environment call on governance systems which can facilitate intra- and intergroup coexistence and social cohesion. Addressing issues of food security and adaptation to increasingly adverse climatic and environmental conditions needs leadership skills and expertise which resonate with the lived experience of Africa’s diverse populations. There is no doubt that contemporary development challenges, including lack of human security, could be mitigated by the invocation of an array of leadership strategies and solutions drawn from the milieu of African experiences past and present.

The relevance of Africa’s past to Africa’s current political landscape can be summarized in the following points:

1. Politicians use the state as a means to personal aggrandizement. Many African leaders have tried, some successfully, to extend their rule and/or keep their lineages or protégés in power so that they can benefit from the largesse of the state.
2. Ruling elites will form alliances and allegiances which ensure they maintain their positions of power. The phenomenon of elite collusion is still part and parcel of modern politics. This includes ties with local and external partners, including foreign corporations and states, to create legitimacy of office where popular support is diminished.
3. Religion and culture have been used to support leaders' claims to power and this continues to inform and influence politics in Africa. Research suggests politicians exploit religious opportunities to bolster their positions. Recent movements which have involved radical and/or fundamental religious views have been in some cases shown to have carried political favor and/or tolerance.
4. Political leaders thrive on control systems, and to this end military rule remains a *de facto* tool of governance, despite claims towards greater freedom of political participation and democracy.
5. Politics exploits the ambiguities created by multiple legal systems and traditions of governance. Many countries which maintain multiple legal and governance institutions do so not because these provide effective instruments of good governance but because they enable leaders to manipulate the powers of their office to their advantage. This has been the case in so-called monarchical states and in countries where elected leaders also enjoy traditional authority. In this regard, civic society advocacy towards a human rights culture in politics is often trumped by the idea of culture and heritage.
6. The ideal of nationalism still holds an allure for many Africans, and leaders exploit this to their advantage. Although pre-colonial societies were not organized in nation states, the post-colonial state has used the rhetoric of nation-building to create hegemonic rule often at the detriment of diversity and pluralism within and between African societies.

In conclusion, it can be surmised that Africa's rich and diverse experiences in politics in the past does have relevance for contemporary and future Africa. One point to be highlighted is the need for the genuine and committed demilitarization of Africa's political institutions and culture. Cultivating a democratic and inclusive development agenda for Africa requires a genuine acknowledgement of the problems wrought by strong patriarchal and militaristic cultures. The African Union has begun the process of developing continental institutions to facilitate this process of enhancing democratic governance and peace-building. A second and perhaps more important point is the need for a paradigm shift in the shaping of African masculinities and gender relations in African societies. From Cape to Cairo Africa remains by and large patriarchal with scant regard for gender justice. This is played out in various ways, especially in social

institutions which perpetuate the violation of the rights of girls and women. Despite progressive legislation to advance women's rights being enacted in some countries, processes of implementation remain weak and at best non-existent. As a result, high levels of violence against women persist even in zones without conflict. Recurrent reports of the violent capture and enslavement of women and girls into forced sexual and/or marital relationships persist for Africa's militia such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Boko Haram and others. These are reminiscent of Shaka and Mzilikazi's *impis*, which were infamous for these tactics.

Africa remains resource rich even after many centuries of plunder. However, many of these are finite resources. Whether they are minerals, water or plant resources they should be serving Africa's populace better in terms of delivering much-needed services. However, it is clear that ruling elites still conspire to enrich themselves through the exploitation of resources meant for national development. The continent could learn lessons from the past that extractive industries will not benefit African citizenry but instead leave them with a burden of impoverishment, particularly where unregulated extraction leaves local communities with scarred or contaminated landscapes. The escalation of "land grabs" on the continent undermines the capacity of communities to reaffirm their identity and dignity, particularly in countries where land resources were appropriated by colonial powers and have by and large not been restored to their traditional owners. The asymmetries of power between elites and ordinary citizens suggest traditional and contemporary inequalities will persist in the future. To this end Africa's development agenda should be aiming for greater inclusivity to avert future conflicts. The triple burden of poverty, inequality and unemployment plaguing many of Africa's populations, especially youth, will remain a threat to stability and accentuate the fragility of African states some of which are already fragile and/or weak. As has been noted elsewhere (Sall and Segoby 2013), greater accountability towards citizenry by leaders can yield better development dividends, including securing them greater popularity and support in office. Leaders who remain great in the annals of African history are remembered for their magnanimity and capacity to provide for their people.

Finally, contemporary African leaders could exercise greater leadership as champions and custodians of the continent's natural resources. Pre-colonial leaders who were champions of safeguarding their environments and resources have enjoyed a richer legacy. Given the challenges of contemporary resource management and climate change, political leaders also need to demonstrate a greater capacity to manage resources and to negotiate at local and global levels for the protection, preservation and safeguarding of Africa's natural and cultural resources. This governance of resources will call for more democratized systems of consultation, participation and action. The political leader of today and the future will therefore need qualities other than charisma and force to be able to lead with conscience.

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Settler and Non-settler Colonialism in Africa

Adelaja Odutola Odukoya

INTRODUCTION

Colonialism in Africa started with the Portuguese incursion in the fifteenth century. As an oppressive governance form, colonialism became institutionalized with the scramble for and partition of the continent in Berlin 1884–1885 by European powers, aptly described as “European robber statesmen” (Rodney 1972, 161). This marked European transition from an age of “discovery” to one in which “effective occupation” was proof of claim and control over African territorial space (Schraeder 2004).

The Berlin assembly led to an exponential expansion of European territorial control over Africa, with the transition from foreign companies’ domination to control by foreign state powers. Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Germany assumed formal control, became colonial authorities and exercised brutal and exploitative imperial dominions over different parts of Africa. After 1945, of these imperial powers Britain and France had about 75% of Africa under their colonial control. Of these two dominant colonial powers, France had dominance (Khapoya, 2010).

Finesse, civility, democracy and diplomacy had no place in the colonial order. Marx and Engels (1973, 324 cited in Rashid, 2014: 4) succinctly argued in this regard that “Colonialism presented capitalism in naked form, stripped of decorous clothing of European bourgeois society.” Colonialism was never for nor about Africans. As a regime of criminal dispossession and domination, everywhere on the continent, it ignored the desires of African people and was most unconscionably brutal and arbitrary in form and essence. For Thomson (2010, 14),

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“They are ‘arbitrary’. Not arbitrary in the sense of random, but arbitrary because they reflected the short-term strategic and economic interests of the powers, and not the interests of the Africans they housed.”

The colonialists following the successful allocation of the continent amongst themselves settled for prolonged occupation. Colonialism had a long-term existential agenda of continued domination and exploitation of the continent and its people. However, the crises and dynamic transformation in the interstate system from the 1930s resulted in a change of fortunes for colonial empires in Africa.

The depression of the 1930s, the Second World War, the formation of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Charter and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man collectively dealt a deadly blow to colonialism in Africa. These provoked radical movements for justice, freedom and independence, which developed amongst Africans and other oppressed and subjected peoples globally. African nationalists latched on to these positive developments and demanded freedom and independence from their oppressors. As Nkrumah (1963, x) notes, “The realization was breaking upon the vast world of subject peoples that freedom is as much their inalienable right as it is of those who had set themselves over them on the pretext of bringing them Christian light and civilization.” As a consequence, the fury of agitations and struggles for independence rose to unprecedented levels, resulting in thirty-nine African nations achieving independence from colonial rule between 1945 and 1970.

The narratives of the mass mobilization for independence by the nationalist leaders were instrumentalist in nature. For nationalist leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, political independence was a *sine qua non* for development and progress on the continent. Freedom, justice, life more abundance and development were the expected outcomes of independence. Political independence was seen by Africans as a means to an end, to be measured in terms of material benefits and progress, better life and popular empowerment. After fifty years of nationhood, these expectations had receded, with the continent at the bottom of global development and the poverty scale, with human conditions largely moving backwards. The puzzle has been how to explain the crisis of development on the continent.

There is no consensus about where the blame for the African tragedy should lie. Opinions are therefore divided whether independence was a misadventure and if Africa would not have been better governed and would have fared better under continued colonial rule. Bratton and Van de Wall (1994), Joseph (1995), Ayittey (1998), Bond (2006), Calderisi (2006) and Easterly and Easterly (2006) have placed the African crisis squarely at the doorsteps of Africans, particularly in terms of governance deficit, corruption, maladministration, bad policy decisions and policy somersaults by African leaders. A more nuanced view opines that the legacies of colonialism on the continent are intricately linked with its contemporary crises. For Walter Rodney (1972), and Ake (1981), colonial imperialism both laid the foundations and is responsible for the contemporary crisis of development in Africa.

The search for explanations about Africa's problematic development is compounded given that colonialism ended over five decades ago. Furthermore, African countries experienced heterogeneous colonial forms. There were not just different colonial powers with different administrative styles in different colonial outposts, but part of the continent experienced settler colonialism while other parts had non-settler colonialism. The implications of these divergent experiences cannot be overemphasized.

Scholars such as Horvath (1972) argue that different types of colonialism produced dissimilar outcomes in Africa. These colonial forms were not haphazard. Similarly, different colonial forms had their unique pathologies and conditioned divergent socio-economic and political realities, thereby provoking different reactions, organization forms, strategic and tactical struggles to confront and liquidate colonialism. The nature and patterns of decolonization were largely shaped by the colonial forms in these countries. For instance, according to Keller (1995), while decolonization processes were peaceful in non-settler colonies, they met strong resistance and violence in countries with settler colonialism.

This chapter examines the two variants of colonialism on the continent. It argues that the logic which produced settler colonialism was also at the root of non-settler colonialism in Africa. It further opines that situational socio-economic and political exigencies informed similar practice by colonial powers through different colonial forms in different countries, as well as dissimilar practices by the same powers within the same or different territories, as was the case with Britain in South Africa and Botswana. The outward difference between the two colonial forms in Africa, this chapter notes, was in form and not essence. This was because colonialism was in practice dynamic and oriented to what worked best for the maximum accumulation at the lowest cost and greatest convenience. This resonates with Nkrumah's (1963, xii) declaration that "Whatever the means used by the colonialists, the objective was the same."

The chapter reveals the common practices, operations and strategies of both settler and non-settler colonialism on the continent. It argues that these were characterized by flexibility in means and methods, but rigidity of governance principles and goals. The chapter concludes that given the common logic that informed them, while the colonial forms were outwardly heterogeneous they largely produced homogeneous outcomes. These outcomes, which find expression in the crises of underdevelopment on the continent, were influenced primarily by the interests and the socio-political conditions of the home country, and those of the migrant settlers in the settler colonies. The rest of the chapter is structured into four sections: conceptual issues; the logic of colonialism in Africa; the colonial theatre in Africa and outcomes; summary and conclusion.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Colonialism is a regime of brutal and arbitrary power by an external political power over another political formation. Colonialism is essentially a direct or indirect socio-economic order rooted in the political subjugation, conquest,

control, exploitation and plunder of a nation by an outside power. For Kohn (1958, 4), “A colonial relationship is created when one nation establishes and maintains political domination over a geographically external political unit inhabited by people of any race and at any stage of cultural development.”

Jurgen Osterhammel (cited in Wolfe, 2006: 10) widely accepted conceptualization of colonialism is:

... a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in the pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to Rule.

Important to an understanding of colonialism therefore are issues of foreign subjugation through the instrument of violence, control and domination of a domestic population. As a consequence, the colonized lost their power of self-governance and independence to an off-shore political power who exercises sovereign authority arbitrarily, without responsibility and accountability to those over which authority is exercised. Raw power is primarily deployed for the appropriation, exploitation and expropriation of the colony’s resources for the development of a homeland. Essentially, therefore, forceful occupation is a desideratum of colonialism, just as economic gain through accumulation remains its motive force. Colonialism promotes an asymmetric power relationship and the subjugation of a weak nation by a powerful one. This imbalance of power is exploited to the advantage of the powerful nation for the regulation, governance and control of the affairs of the weak nation. This power structure reflects in the organization of the colonial society and the socio-political hierarchies of the colonizer and the colonized.

Built on brutish force and the logic of might is right, colonialism abhors consensus and is antidemocracy. It is authoritarian, undemocratic and arbitrary. This could be no different since the state was imposed upon by an occupying power with no direct and organic pact with the people. The people were irrelevant to the state, beyond their utility as tools for accumulation, and different types of citizenship relationships founded on injustice and inequality coexisted within the colonial state.

As noted by Mamdani (2001, 654), “The colonial state divided the population into two: races and ethnicities. Each lived in a different legal universe.” While those who owned the land lived in earthly hell, the invaders lived in paradise on earth at the former’s expense. While those from the home countries were deemed to be civil civic citizens with rights and deserving of respect and dignity, the natives were subjects, subhumans and barbarians, undeserving of respect and a dignified existence (Mamdani 2001). Citizens and subjects, that is, the non-indigenous and indigenous respectively, in colonial Africa existed under different legal orders constructed with regard to the architecture of civic and primordial publics (Ekeh 1975) or civil civic society and

custom (Mamdani 2001). This division, which also finds expression in spatial and locational geography in the colonies, approximates to wealth and poverty for the colonizers and colonized respectively.

Given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity occasioned in discourses on settler and non-settler colonialism, distinguishing analytically between settler and non-settler colonialism entails a perceptive understanding of what a colony was in theory and practice. This is important given scholarly arguments about whether settler colonialism qualifies as colonialism. A number of reasons account for this confusion. First, there is the general conception of colonialism as foreign domination; hence, it seems on the surface illogical to talk about settler colonialism, given its onshore nature.

Second, there is the transformation of foreign invaders into citizens of the colony. Therefore, unlike in non-settler colonialism where we have the colonialists and the colonized, we are confronted with another influential force: the citizens/migrants/settlers from the home countries in existential spatial relocation to the colonies, where they become citizens.

Third, whereas colonialists in non-settler colonialism are primarily interested in exploitation of surplus from the colony, settlers given their permanent stay have interests beyond mere exploitation. Hence, settler colonialism unlike non-settler colonialism entails a struggle for power with the local people, institutionalization of a new political order to replace the indigenous political order with settler hegemony and violent contestation for space and resources, particularly land. This informs Wolfe's (2006, 388) position that "Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element." While settler and non-settler colonialism are both rooted in occupation, the nature of occupation favorable for settler colonialism is of a different kind. This, however, does not make it any less colonialism. For the act of and continued exercise of a stolen sovereignty, which is used to confer superior citizenship and privileges, does not make the domination, oppression and exploitation any the less. Internal colonialism may be seen as acts of domination over one native population by another, with the settler always deemed to be better, different and superior to the native. This calls for an understanding of what a colonial is.

Khapoya (2010) argues that "A colony is both a political body that is dominated by an exogenous agency, and an exogenous entity that reproduces itself in a given environment (in both cases, even if they refer to very different situations, 'colony' implies the localized ascendancy of external element—this is what brings the two meaning together." Johnston and Lawson (2000) in defining "settler" approximate the ambivalent connotations of colony expressed above. According to them, "settler" uneasily occupies a place caught between two First Worlds, two origins of authority and authenticity. One of these is the originating world of Europe, the imperium—the source of its principal cultural authority. Its "other" First World is that of the First Nations whose authority they not only replaced and effaced but also desire. This definition of colonial is elastic and accommodates the two spectrums of colonialism.

Lawson and Johnson advance conditions for settler colonialism. They argue that "For the settler, [as for the explorer], the land had to be empty. Empty

land can be settled, but occupied land can only be invaded. So the land must be emptied so that it can be filled with both words and herds.” Since Africa settler colonies were fully occupied, what was the mechanism used by settlers to take over and entrench themselves in the colonial states in Africa? Stated differently, since settler colonies in Africa were not virgin lands for easy occupation, what did they do to institute their hegemony? In answer, Saito (2014, 24) notes that “This state of affairs is achieved not only-or even primarily-by brute force, but by what Kenyan scholar Ngtigi wa Thiong’o calls the ‘cultural bomb’ that ‘annihilate [s] a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves,’ thus ‘mak[ing] them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves’.”

What cannot be overemphasized is that the particular form of colonial rule is never expressed. Instead it is a product of several situational factors. Geographical conditions more than anything else played a significant role in which type of colonialism the colonial powers established in Africa. Favorable geographical conditions which allowed for the migration of people from the home country were important in deciding whether indirect or direct rule be adopted, which affected the nature of colonialism; that is, settler or non-settler.

More fundamental to colonial state formation was the resolution of the native question. As Mamdani (1996, 16) opines, “The colonial state was in every instance a historical formation. Yet its structure everywhere came to share certain fundamental features ... this was so because everywhere the organization and reorganization of the colonial state was a response to a central and overriding dilemma: the native question. Briefly put, how can a tiny and foreign minority rule over an indigenous majority?” The native question therefore entails the challenge of institutionalization of colonial hegemony over an unwilling population.

Settler colonialism was a condition whereby there was extensive migration of people from the home country to assume permanent settlement and eke out their livelihoods in the colonies. In this way, citizens from the home countries translocated to become the colonies’ citizens. However, these emigrants were not equal with their hosts, who were deemed inferior. Both the power of the state and control over economic resources, particularly land and other means of production, were directly in the hands of the settlers, who controlled and used state power discriminatively against the natives to their own advantage. As Mamdani (2001, 657) succinctly writes, “The notion of ‘settler’ distinguished conquerors from migrants. It was an identity undergirded by a conquest state, a colonial state.” The creation of an effective and efficient administrative mechanism for law and order, revenue mobilization, conflict management and governance issues as well as relations with the colonial power are indispensable for colonialism (Brett, 1973).

Some other perceptive observations by Saito (2014, 25–26) are germane to our understanding of the logic of settler colonialism:

The first is that settler societies, including the United States, cannot continue to function as such without continuously enforcing their jurisdiction, political and military, over their claimed territories and doing everything in their power to ensure that their assertion of sovereignty is accepted as legitimate within the larger global order, notwithstanding any illegalities involved in the acquisition of the lands at issue. The second point is that settler colonial states cannot be decolonized unless their underlying territorial claims are challenged. Reforming settler societies to be kinder, gentler, more environmentally sustainable, or more inclusive legitimizes and, therefore, entrenches the underlying colonial relationships; such reforms do not deconstruct settler hierarchies of power and privilege ... Thus settler colonialism thrived on opportunism of colonial domination and exploitation of a conquered population. In a sense, the settler were migrant conquerors. (Saito 2014, 25–26)

Settler colonialism evinced accumulation by the combined forces of dispossession and disempowerment of a political society and its people by a foreign power and its citizens who chose to take up permanent residency in the colony, leveraging a forced occupation. For this reason, unlike non-settler colonialism, as Wolfe (2006, 388) argues, “settler colonialism destroys to replace,” making the phenomenon of settler colonialism “a structure not an event” (Wolfe 2006, 388). Settler colonialism entails permanent colonial occupation.

Describing settler colonialism, Mamdani (1996, 14) notes that it is when and where “the colonizing community remain behind after the end of empire, to capitalize on the unequal social relations with the colonial population, governing itself and others independently from the imperial metropole.” Unlike non-settler colonialism, where the colonial concern was to ensure favorable conditions for the accumulation of capital for the home country, in settler colonialism the state took up the additional task of promoting conditions for the establishment, promotion, protection and securing of hegemonic control of the settler over the land’s original owners.

Under settler colonialism, imperialism established permanent physical settlements in the dominated countries through relocation of its citizens. This type of colonialism involved more brutal struggles between white settlers and natives over scarce resources, particularly land, these being skewed in favor of the former. The situation led to the creation of racial social and power hierarchies with the native at the bottom. South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Kenya and Uganda are examples of settler colonialism in Africa: east and southern Africa were the bastions of settler colonialism. Settler colonialism and non-settler colonialism both ensure the continuity of imperialist exploitation even after formal independence is granted.

Non-settler colonialism exemplifies offshore imperialist control without the necessity of translocating nationals from the home countries. This was an administrative and extractive colonial imperialism under which the colonies were governed directly from the home countries through their bureaucratic appointees. Another variant of non-settler colonialism was the indirect rule system, under which bureaucrats appointed by the home countries administered

the colonies with the help of local chiefs, who derived their authority from and owed allegiance to the imperial powers. This was done either through the instruments of the native authorities or created where none existed.

The foreign bureaucrats who ran the colonial administrations were merely on a tour of duty rather than permanent settlers or colony citizens. Beyond accumulating the resources of the colonies for the development of their home countries, individual bureaucrats, agents of the colonial powers, had no personal interest in capital accumulation through land-grabbing and permanently skewing social hierarchies, in a way that institutionalized oppression of the colonial people after independence. This was because they were mere “birds of passage,” with no physical attachment to the colonies.

Non-settler colonialism is aptly described by Horvath (1972, 47) as “imperialized—dominated but not settled.” In other words, non-settler colonialism practiced oppression and exploitation through political and administrative control as long as colonial hegemony and exploitation were sustained. Conquerors were engaged in offshore administration, rather than being settlers, citizens, administrators, politicians, entrepreneurs and business managers all rolled into one. Furthermore, while non-settler colonialism involved accommodative exploitation either through assimilation/association or indirect rule, settler colonialism entailed displacement and/or the liquidation of the indigenous people and the institutionalization of a permanent foreign power, as was the case in America and Canada. The colonial experience in Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Togo were examples of non-settler colonialism in Africa. Racism, being psychological warfare related to political contestations and the domination of territorial space and power, where citizens of home countries took on local citizenship of colonies, was more pronounced under settler colonialism as opposed to non-settler colonialism.

THE LOGIC OF COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA

Colonialism was the ugly handmaiden of imperialism. Though colonialism is seen mostly in its political form, it is a hegemonic project for the fulfillment of economic objectives by a colonizing power. This privileges the exploitative orientation of all colonial forms. In this context, Onimode (1982, 31) puts it succinctly: “The imperialist violence unleashed in the creation of the colonial economy was associated with the pressing economic demands of the Industrial Revolution.”

This position differs from the mountainous edifices of falsification that were erected to rationalize and defend colonialism as a civilizing mission in Africa. This paternalistic justification posits that colonialism was a burden which European undertook with Christian fortitude, forbearance and love. Aime Cesaire (1972, 35) exposes the lie of this argument. Contrary to the claim of civilizing the colonized, Cesaire argues that “colonialism works to *decivilize* the colonizer, to *brutalize* him in the true sense of the word, to degrade him, to awaken him to buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism.” He concludes that colonialism fundamentally negates civilization (Cesaire 1972).

On his part, Crocker (1970, 113–116; Beidelman 2012) notes that the dual mandate was “an anthill of cover up for a failed system of domination.”

Europeans looked down on Africa in a condescending manner. Essentially, they were caught in their own contradictions by the act of colonialism, which was rooted in greed and exemplifies man’s inhumanity to man. Given its claim to civilization, a crisis of legitimacy confronted Europeans similar to the one it faced during the slave trade against a backdrop of Christian evangelism. This reversed the theological logic of colonialism. Within this context, whether undertaking settler or non-settler colonialism, Europeans sought to humanize the inhumanity and exploitation of colonialism by clothing it in the garment of benevolence through a declared objective of “civilizing mission.”

This implies that Africans were less human; that they were uncivilized, barbaric and savage people who needed to be rescued from themselves in case they visited self-destruction on humanity. Ekeh (1975, 97) observes that “backward ahistorical Africans, according to this view, should be ashamed of their past; the only important thing is the present. Indeed, Africans were virtually told that the colonizers and missionaries came to save them, sometimes in spite of themselves, from their past.”

For these reasons, African customs and culture were condemned and forcefully rejected, while European ways of lives and civilization were foisted on Africans. Khapayo (2010, 106) thus notes that “It was their “manifest destiny” to take over Africa; not to respond to this special calling would have been a betrayal of that special, unique quality that had made them great.” He further notes that “Europe justified its colonization of Africa on grounds that it was its moral duty to ‘uplift’ Africans from their primitive state. Ample evidence suggests that all European powers did not think much of Africans or African culture and history” (Khapayo 2010, 106).

For Africans, who are the direct victims of colonialism, there was an imperialist and political economy logic at the root of African colonialism. Granted that there were political and strategic reasons behind it, colonialism was not informed by power qua power, neither was it solely a result of strategic imperatives. Power for what? Power in the colonial context was instrumentalist in nature. Rather than power for the sake of power, it was power for economic advantage. In other words, colonialism was “an imperium of commerce” (Nairn 2002, 361 cited in Beidelman 2012).

It is also instructive to note the proximity between the dates of the Industrial Revolution and the scramble for and partition of Africa. Industrial capitalism, given its technological revolution and mass production, engendered differential development, wealth and poverty between and within nations. Competition between business concerns for technological advantage and profitability was heightened in the aftermath of industrial breakthroughs, with mercantilist imperialism becoming the economic orthodoxy. This had the consequence of triggering the expansionist nature of capitalism. Forays abroad for new markets helped to resolve the crisis of overproduction and underconsumption, supply of cheap raw materials and labor in the context of the struggles amongst capitalists to accumulate capital. This was the motive force for European colonialism and

the underdevelopment of Africa, which found expression both in settler and non-settler colonialism.

As Rodney (1972, 163) succinctly notes, “Indeed, after the scope of expansion became limited inside of their national economies, their main attention was turned to those countries whose economies were less developed and who would therefore offer little or no opposition to the penetration of foreign capitalism. That penetration of foreign capitalism on a world scale from the late nineteenth century onwards is what we call imperialism.”

THE COLONIAL THEATRES IN AFRICA: MAKING SENSE OF OUTCOMES

Despite the appearance of differences, the organization of the state under settler and non-settler colonialism was remarkably similar. As previously noted, the colonial states were not products of social contracts but of force. The governance system was not rooted in consensus building, human rights, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, but in arbitrariness, discrimination, inequalities, inhuman treatment, racism and injustice.

Power was monopolized by the colonialists and exercised to the exclusion and disadvantage of the colonized. While racial discrimination was a common feature of both colonial forms, it assumed a special dimension in settler colonies—as typified by the color bar in Southern Africa. Politically, the executive and legislative positions as well as the top bureaucratic jobs were mainly for whites, while Africans were relegated to clerical and menial jobs. This resonated in the poor quality of education given to Africans.

In the settler colonies, there were hierarchies that defined rights and privileges. Atop the socio-political hierarchy were white colonialists, followed by the Indians, with Africans trampled upon at the base in their own countries. There was also locational segregation, exemplified by spatial inequalities and injustices. This found expression in government-reserved areas and white only areas, schools, social amenities, seating in buses and public spaces, in distinction to ghettos, suburbs and backstreets for Africans. The laws and justice system worked in favor of the whites and against the colonized, who were subjects and hence had no rights. As Ginio (2000, 4) notes, “Most Africans were considered subjects (*sujets*) and had no political rights whatsoever.” This confirms that whether settler or non-settler, colonialism is by definition rooted in domination, subordination and oppression.

Oriented to ensuring the extraction of resources from the colonial political economy for the development of the home countries, settler and non-settler colonialism in Africa were anti-people and anti-development. It was therefore not surprising, as Meredith (2011, 5) argues, that “Administration was thus kept to a minimum, education was placed in the hands of Christian missionaries; economic activity was left to commercial companies. The main functions of government were limited to maintaining law and order, raising taxation and providing an infrastructure of roads and railways. There seemed to be no need for more rapid development.”

Where there was some semblance of development there was spatial inequality. As Beidelman (2011, 6) notes, “Finally, colonialists rarely exploited or developed all parts of a colony but instead only favored some areas, thus setting regions and people against one another.” Administratively, the British colonial power in Nigeria used this sort of divide and rule system to the maximum in Nigeria, with the Northern and Southern Protectorates. Missionaries and Western education were prevented from spreading to the North, with serious implications for the nationalist struggle, political and economic development of the people of the North as well as creating separatist feelings amongst Nigerians. Accompanying these deliberate policies under settler and non-settler colonialism relating to the enforced socio-economic disarticulation of the African political economy (Ake 1981) were systematic deindustrialization (Rodney 1972) and underdevelopment of Africa’s capitalist productive forces (Ake 1981; Akeredolu-Ale 1975; Rodney 1972; Williams 1980).

Nothing was spared under settler and non-settler colonialism to ensure maximum capital accumulation by the colonialist. A major instrument used in this regard was forced labor. Writing on French colonialism in West Africa during the Vichy years, Ginio (2006, 4) notes that “The rest of the vast population was under harsh colonial rule and subjected to forced labor and to the *indigénat*, a legal system that enabled any French official to inflict limited punishments on Africans without trying them.”

It was because of this that Young (1988, 37 cited in Thomson 2010, 16) submits that the African state was “alien to the core.” Under the two colonial forms, as Thomson (2010, 16) argues, “Coercion acted as a substitute for legitimacy. The state, in this sense, never rested on a social contract between government and the people. Indeed, colonial administrators were not even accountable to the Africans they ruled. Instead, they obeyed orders emanating from their superiors back in the capitals of Europe. Government was therefore about maintaining order, balancing budgets and overseeing the extracting of raw materials for export.” Africans were of no significance to those who governed them.

All colonial forms engendered ethnicity and state-building crises in Africa. The primary reason for this was the artificiality of African states, which were partitioned without reference to socio-cultural, linguistic and historical associations. There was also the fallout from the systemic fragmentation of the colonies in order to prevent a united nationalist front against colonialism. The vehicle for this under British colonialism in Africa was the divide and rule system. Not the least was the colonial division of the public sphere into civic and primordial publics (Ekeh 1975), which was coupled with the social and developmental irresponsibility of the colonial state. This left the African public organized in terms of welfare and development under the umbrellas of community and ethnic associations.

These platforms were opportunistically hijacked for political advantage by competing political gladiators from different elite groups as the nations approached independence, and afterwards. Not only were the independence struggles compromised, but independence brought the incubation of civil strife, political instability and civil wars all over the continent. Nigeria, Congo,

Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Sudan and several African nations have not been spared the virus of ethnicity in one form or another. Additionally, the colonial powers fostered these divisions by playing ethnic groups against each other in order to maintain their hegemony.

We have already alluded to the civilizing mission and dual mandate by colonialists as the colonialists own *raison d'être* for colonialism on the continent. Clearly, all colonial forms operated from a higher platform of racial superiority, which conferred authority for the hegemonic domination of Africa. Thus, and paradoxically, Africans are to be humanized by the very process of colonial dehumanization, and civilized through criminal acts of incivility, exploitation and oppression. Several mechanisms such as the Church, school and the force of the state were deployed to ensure that Africans accepted their subordinate and inferior position, and were amenable to exploitation and incapable of reasoning against the orthodox hegemony conditioning. Manzo (1992, 12) captures this succinctly:

In colonial societies, the key knowledge-producing apparatuses were the schools and churches affiliated with various European missionary societies. Through discourse, they effectively normalized certain practices and ways of thinking about the world, thereby delimiting the range of possibilities for both dominant and subordinate alike.

This edifice of cultural imperialism under both settler and non-settler colonialism was to ensure unquestionable obedience and compliance by Africans. This as Mwaura (2005, 168) notes, “conditioned the oppressed Africans into accepting their place. This was aimed at creating a docile rural labor force.”

CONCLUSION

There is no gainsaying that African political elites have in several ways contributed to the criminal underdevelopment of Africa since taking over power in the 1960s. However, the negative effects of colonialism are still a lived reality all over Africa. This was because colonialism in Africa was rooted in the imperative to resolve the crisis and contradictions of capitalism in Europe through the acquisition of cheap raw materials and labor as well as new markets in Africa.

Therefore, both settler and non-settler colonialism in Africa were essentially and primarily political castration of the colonized. Settler and non-settler colonialism in different ways foisted an alien and contemptuous political order upon the African people. They enforced and promoted the economic exploitation, disempowerment and underdevelopment of Africa and its people. This was coupled with the spiritual, cultural and psychological disorientation of Africans such that their self-image, self-respect and self-worth were gravely battered and devalued. Both settler and non-settler colonialism, with different intensities, by denying the colonized subjects civil rights, deeming them to be subhuman and robbing them of the power of self-government, transformed the colonized to outsiders in their own land.

Above all, although colonialism has political manifestations, all its forms are primarily governed by imperialist economic logic for capital accumulation. To achieve its economic objectives, it is essentially exploitative. As Fanon (1967, 88) succinctly argues, “Colonialism is synonymous with exploitation and all forms of exploitation resemble one another.”

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Nationalism in Africa: Concepts, Types and Phases

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines nationalism in Africa, looking at concepts, types and phases from the earliest times to the present. Some scholars have wondered if there is a history of nationalism in Africa, arguing that Africa has never had one nation. To argue this is to miss the point, because Africa has had a unique identity of blackness and Africans have resided on the same continent for centuries, enjoying a consciousness through similar experiences that are separate from “outsiders” and invaders from other continents. Africans have shared hopes, aspirations and identity, and shared past. The history of African nationalism goes back centuries to when African states resisted foreign invaders and occupation. The earliest manifestation of nationalism in Africa is found in the Ethiopian state, which resisted invaders from the north and east before the Christian era. Abyssinia, as the Ethiopian state was known under the Negus, served as a refuge for refugees from the early Christian and Islamic states. This chapter will demonstrate that there have been many phases in the history of African nationalism. Africa has experienced some of the most violent nationalist expressions, in which millions of people lost their lives. In some countries such as Algeria, Angola, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, it took armed struggle to dislodge minority white rule. There are many concepts, types and phases of nationalism in Africa, and they stretch back hundreds of years.

Concepts relating to African nationalism include ethnic nationalism or the earliest phase of consciousness among African chiefdoms and kingdoms, which were first organized under single ethnic groups, speaking the same language.

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These ethnic entities later developed into empires that sought to conquer or incorporate members from other ethnic groups. There are also concepts that describe multinationalist movements that incorporated members from many ethnic groups; and this is where the majority of nationalist movements in Africa belong. There were also many cases of unification movements led by Africa's founding presidents who worked hard to create a cohesive and integrated society through nationalist agenda and projects. Many of these nationalist projects sought to create national culture, identity, symbols, aspirations and interests, such as those of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. In the 1960s, Africans started to move to cities in large numbers, and what we saw was an emergence of new identifies that were cut off from rural villages, them, being hybrids of different ethnic groups, called in the Kenyan urban milieu *Pointis*, meaning that they have mixed blood as a result of intermarriage.

There are many types of nationalisms that have emerged in Africa. They include local nationalism, regional nationalism, nation-state nationalism, continental African nationalism, Black nationalism or pan-Africanism. Local nationalism often takes ethnic dimensions and is responsible for many of the ethnic tensions and civil wars on the continent. There is also regional nationalism in which people from one region, north or south, feel they have similar interests and aspirations to those from other regions. This thinking affects many countries in Africa today. There is also state nationalism, expressed by members of a nation-state. This type of nationalism emerged in modern states in Africa and brought together members of many ethnic groups. This was the type of nationalism supported by Africa's founding presidents, such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, among others. This state nationalism based on the nation-state is constantly being fought by local nationalism in African countries.

There is also what is known as continental African nationalism, or Black Nationalism or pan-Africanism, which has been expressed as a reaction against foreigners or invaders from other parts of the world who were non-Africans, and included Arabs and Europeans. It incorporated people on the continent as well as those in the Black diaspora, and was a response to imperial incursions into the African continent.¹ It was a reaction to colonial overtures and oppression by European powers; a response to the racism and prejudice which gripped most of Europe and the Americas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, affecting Black people who were increasingly excluded and discriminated against in Europe and Americas, looked down upon and denigrated.² Black nationalism or pan-Africanism was an attempt to find an alternative. On the African continent, continental nationalism was championed by Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, among others. In the diaspora, continental or Black nationalism or pan-Africanism was articulated by, for example, Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Dubois.

This chapter provides a synopsis of various concepts, types and phases of nationalism in Africa using case studies from the continent. The understanding is that although these case studies are not necessarily representative of all strands of nationalism, they represent relevant strands. The African continent

has faced many challenges in the past, many of which revolve around negative ethnicity, especially the separatist and secessionist movements that fueled civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the Katanga crisis and Nigeria during the Biafran war. The Katanga crisis and Biafra conflicts were caused by internal nationalist feelings that were basically ethnic as well as external factors (Were and Amutabi 2000). The Africa that produced model nationalists and pan-Africanists such as Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah also produced buffoons and nincompoops such as Jean Baptiste Bokassa and Idi Amin. Why has African nationalism not produced a United States of Africa? Why are there xenophobic feelings in southern Africa against fellow Africans, even though southern Africa was liberated by efforts of other Africans? Is it a lapse of memory or are humans selfish and egocentric through and through? These are the issues that this chapter addresses.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE CHANGING PHASES OF NATIONALISM IN AFRICA

Many definitions of nationalism have been based on the European trajectory of unifications in Germany, Italy and such like, where they talk of shared histories, language, similar past, hopes and aspirations. We need to go beyond these traditional definitions and look at nationalism in terms of emerging trends, where nations are still creating what one call national representative cultures. This is because globalization is creating new identities that are defying boundaries of traditional nationalism.³ In his book *In My Father's House*, Kwame Antony Appiah suggests a new form of hybridity in Africa, in which new identities are forged.⁴ He goes further, suggesting the possibilities of people who regard themselves as global citizens, not belonging to any nationality and being disconnected from their roots owing to disconnections created by the new world order that is dominated by the media and other influences. Congolese scholar V.Y. Mudimbe also seems to suggest that some nations in Africa have been invented by the colonial project, whose agenda is imperial divide and conquer and in which some individuals are coopted and function as appendages of the former imperial powers.⁵ These new postcolonial and postmodern forms of looking at the state of nationalism in Africa pre-suppose a lack of a pure ethnic group, in which intermarriage and interaction of groups on the African continent allows us to look at a varied conglomeration of people who are as diverse as they come.

If one looks at Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, the village of Umuofia, Okonkwo and the environment are insulated from the outside world, which is suddenly disrupted by the arrival of white people.⁶ The same can be said about Ngugi wa Thiong'o's *The River Between*, in which the tranquility of the Kameno village is disrupted by the arrival of missionaries at Siriana.⁷ The reaction of the people to strangers is different in Umuofia and Kameno, but what makes the experiences similar is that both Igbo and Kikuyu are aware that they are different from the strangers and seek solutions collectively. The collective reaction in

African villages is different from the indifferent and ambivalent response one sees in urban areas in Kenya today, where people create bonds that are transethnic in their neighborhoods, interspersing these with burial associations formed by people from various rural locales. We start to see dual and even triple allegiances to ethnic groups, work associations and neighborhood societies.

In many writings on African nationalism, the tendency is to look at it as a top down idea, passing from leaders to the peasants or hoi polloi below. The hoi polloi have no agency other than providing audiences in political rallies and demonstrations. But beneath the separation of the elite and mass conceptualization is allegiance to a charismatic leader who reminds the people where they belong and who their friends and enemies are. There is trust that the leader is speaking the truth and the intention is to assist the masses to be liberated from oppression. The message is that unity is strength, and it is only through this that the oppressor can be defeated. It is this type of conceptualization that creates possibilities for a United States of Africa, in which Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Haile Selassie saw and envisioned an Africa where ethnic groups can be united to form one nation. In Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe forged a union with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, until 1966 when this was undermined by a military coup. In Uganda, Milton Obote and the Kabaka Sir Edward Mutesa brought the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the Kabaka Yekka Party together (Salim 1984). In Angola, Holden Roberto and Agostinho Neto united to forge a strong national agenda in which they incorporated a reluctant Jonas Savimbi. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) created a formidable opposition against the minority colonial rule. Although still a top down examination of nationalism, there is a strong popular appeal in the brand of nationalisms that they pursued which helped them to be elected by the majority after independence.

There are many possibilities when we look at African nationalism fifty years later. Many narratives have embellished some of the nationalist activities more than others. There is also valorization of some accounts, such as the Mau narrative in Kenya, and the discussion whether ZAPU did more than ZANU or vice versa. In the nationalist narratives, some groups have been left out and remain silenced, while at the same time some accounts are privileged. Is it possible to have accounts of nationalism that are holistic and representative of all groups?

LOCAL NATIONALISM, PROTO-NATIONALISM AND THE BIRTH OF NATIONALISM IN AFRICA

There were various manifestations of local nationalisms in Africa, best illustrated by what took place in Uganda—which allowed the Buganda kingdom to create strategies of self-preservation, fairly successfully, against the competing interests of rival kingdoms such as Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro. Gideon S. Were's book *East Africa Through a Thousand Years* pays great tribute to a group of Africa's

pre-colonial rulers who resisted colonial penetration.⁸ The book creates a duality between the manner and nature of encounter in which some African leaders either resisted or collaborated with Europeans. In this oppositional duality, Were's notion is predicated on the belief that only these two possibilities existed, and yet we are finding evidence to suggest that there are those who wanted to be neutral: they did not want to welcome white people, yet neither did they want to fight them. Terms such as acquiescence or accommodation suggest forms of welcoming and inviting of the colonial project, which is far from the reality. No African state was comfortable with the presence of European imperialists in their territories. Experiences from Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana and South Africa illustrate the complexity of the encounter between Africans and Europeans, and how it produced different scenarios that created diverse dynamics.⁹ Uganda had more than half a dozen competing kingdoms that were by and large connected by a long history of relations and linkages. These states included Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro, Karagwe, Busoga, Haya States and Wanga kingdom.

Buganda kingdom was trapped in the vortex of encounter largely because of its location at the headwaters of the Nile: many European travelers ended up in Uganda in pursuit of the source of the Nile. Activities of explorers such as Samuel Baker, John Speke and James Grant created a unique exposure for the kingdoms of Uganda but also allowed for the shaping of new narratives around the classification of hostile and non-hostile kingdoms.¹⁰ Some scholars have questioned whether indeed Buganda was accommodating and cooperating with the British imperial project, and ask if they had any choice.¹¹ Did the Baganda have agency and voice? Did they have an alternative? White intrusion was invasive and condescending; it was not a situation that any state would have loved to find itself in. White intrusion took away many of the African kingdoms' privileges and what emerged were strategies of survival. The British found Buganda a remarkably fascinating case to do business with.¹² They found there remarkable tranquility and an aristocratic order that resembled hierarchical British society in many ways.¹³ The Baganda on the other hand saw the possibility of taking advantage of friendship with allies who had the power of the Maxim gun, which they could use to their benefit in dealing with their bigger and stronger rivals in the north, the Banyoro of Bunyoro kingdom. So, was this nationalism on the part of the Baganda, as they were protecting their interests against the Banyoro and welcoming the British so they would assist them in defending their terrain?

Activities in Uganda before the arrival of the Europeans present the Baganda as opportunists rather than nationalists, operating sometimes like a mercenary or a predator state that allowed itself to seize any advantage that came within its borders. This argument is lent credence by the behavior of Buganda kingdom, which moved quickly to set up business deals with Arab and Persian traders from the coast, and exchanged many goods such as ivory and rhinoceros horns for the musket.¹⁴ The Baganda were quick to identify the benefits of trade and welcomed Swahili traders from the Islamic towns on the Indian

Ocean coast such as Mombasa, Malindi and Kilwa. As a result, Islam arrived, and some Baganda converted: they were regarded as allies by Arab and Persian traders and accorded all manner of privileges as a result, as brothers and not infidels or kaffirs. Opportunism and the survival of the Buganda kingdom may have played a role in the conversion of Kabaka Mwanga to Islam. There was a realization that Islam came alongside rewarding trade deals, strong allies and muskets. When Europeans arrived with the more powerful Maxim gun, Kabaka Mwanga renounced Islam in favor of Christianity.

Can one classify the actions of the Buganda state and Kabaka Mwanga as nationalistic or just acts in self-preservation? Isn't self-preservation part of nationalism? The Baganda helped the British in the execution of the colonial project. They acted as subimperialists in annexing other parts of Uganda, using sons of Buganda such as Semei Kakungulu and Sir Apollo Kagwa.¹⁵ The Catholic and Protestant presence in Buganda created tensions that culminated in a civil war, leading to a very intricate domestic political situation in which Muslims, Catholics and Protestants were all making converts, which in addition to the traditional religion made four political groupings, all struggling to control Baganda society.¹⁶ Nationalism was not strong in these times, as it was overtaken by religious interests. Later, the privileging of the Baganda would lead to reactions against their hegemony, to which other ethnic groups reacted strongly in the post-colonial state. Therefore, proto-nationalism and local nationalism became precursors of nationalism in Africa. The case of Buganda demonstrates that the colonial occupation created a new form of nationalism in which the local forces coalesced and united to resist white rule. At this point there was true nationalism. Nationalism emerges from a certain consciousness of difference and a need to seek unity in order to win or to feel at home.

Identify plays an important role in this conceptualization of nationalism. Blackness becomes a major marker of unity in African nationalist consciousness, similar to experiences in the diaspora. The Baganda realized that they were more similar to the Banyoro and Banyankole than to white rulers, and they united in forming political parties to champion the interests of Africans. The formation of the Uganda People's Congress by Milton Obote and its coalition with the Kabaka Yekka Party was a manifestation of this realization. Similarly, when Kwame Nkrumah was in the United States of America, he preached in an African American Baptist church in Philadelphia where the people were Black like him, giving him a sense of belonging. He led a pan-African student movement at the University of Pennsylvania, the African Students Association (ASA), which was also guided by blackness but was rooted in and originated in Africa.¹⁷ But even if identify becomes an important aspect in explaining nationalism, how do we explain circumstances in which African states conquered each other and assimilated the conquered? How do we explain cases where two or more groups lived under one kingdom but never merged into a single entity? Take the case of the Shona and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe, who lived under Mzilikazi and Lobengua but exhibited differences after independence. What is interesting is that in Chumurenga I and II Africans rose up

against the whites jointly; the differences only came after independence after the common enemy departed.

In Zimbabwe, the Ndebele have felt marginalized and targeted by the majority Shona in Robert Mugabe's regime, where the Shona are increasingly privileged. Against such tensions, is there such a thing as Zimbabwean nationalism? We see a similar situation in Nigeria where Igbo feelings were expressed by breakaway Biafra, which was thwarted by a Federal army supported by a government that enjoyed support from the majority ethnic groups who saw themselves as Nigerians. The same tension obtained in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through secession attempts by Katanga Province. Can we observe Congolese nationalism? In all these cases, I think we can talk about Zimbabwean nationalism, Nigerian nationalism and Congolese nationalism because there are many times when they are expressed as such.¹⁸ We have seen Shona and Ndebele, Igbo and the rest of Nigerians and majority Congolese shed tears when their national teams lose in international competitions. They may have local differences but they are in solidarity with each other when dealing with external adversaries. They all proudly sing their national anthems together and share in the narrative of how they defeated colonialism.

MODERN AFRICAN NATIONALISM FROM THE 1940S

In a number of ways, modern African nationalism started in the 1940s.¹⁹ This is the time when many African students were returning from studies abroad. This is also the time when Second World War veterans were beginning to assert themselves as able soldiers, and realized they could fight for the liberation of their countries as they had done for European colonial powers. Many of the causes of nationalism in Africa revolved around land grievances. Africans in settler colonies such as Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Algeria and Mozambique bitterly resented being squeezed into "native reserves," where congestion and land scarcity became major problems.²⁰ The causes of nationalism revolved around land, poor education for Africans, discriminatory labor policies, over-taxation and religious oppression.

Africans formed nationalist movements to demand back their land. In Kenya, huge tracts of lands were grabbed and set aside as "White Highlands," where only whites were allowed to own land. In Mozambique, Prazos were run by whites as small chiefdoms along the Zambezi River and other fertile areas, from which Africans were excluded. Given the poor colonial land policies that favored Europeans at the expense of Africans, it is not surprising that the primary reason Africans fought for their independence was because of land, the source of their livelihood as well as the sacred home of their ancestors. In Kenya, the Kenya Land Freedom Army or Mau Mau movement engaged in all manner of sabotage and targeted isolated white farms for attack, and it worked. In Zimbabwe, the various nationalist parties such as ZAPU and ZANU created armed liberation wings. The same obtained in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia

and South Africa, where the respective national parties MPLA, FRELIMO and SWAPO also took up arms.

Poor education for Africans was another grievance for nationalists. In many colonies from Nigeria and Ghana in the west, through Kenya and Tanzania in the east and Zimbabwe and South Africa in the south, indigenous populations complained about poor education which marginalized Africans. The situation was worse in settler colonies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa, where Africans were excluded from good schools and colleges. Some schools were branded as whites only and enjoyed the best facilities and teachers, while schools meant for Africans had mediocre facilities. In Kenya, national schools such as Duke of York (Nairobi School) and Prince of Wales (Lenana School) were for whites only and prepared learners for university education, while mission schools taught humility and obedience and promoted service for the colony. There were also technical schools that taught manual labor and minor artisan trades.

Africans also protested against poor labor policies and poor working conditions.²¹ Labor policies were discriminatory, whites being called officers and Africans called laborers. Whites earned salaries while Africans earned wages. African wages were kept low and trade unions were prohibited in domestic service, in which many Africans were employed. In Ghana, African youth, who were increasingly coming from missionary schools and other institutions such as Achimota, were not getting the type of elite jobs that the pioneers had received. They were made to work under white superiors with far less education. Many of them joined the Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party (CPP), as they saw hope in independence. On January 6, 1950, the Gold Coast Trade Unions Council declared a general strike, with many grievances related to the CPP's platform. The government arrested all union and CPP leaders on January 21, 1950.²² The strike failed and Nkrumah served a year in jail, but the CPP dominated local elections two months later and led Ghana to independence in 1957.

In settler colonies, trade unions were prohibited from tourism, mining and agriculture, the three largest sectors of African employment in Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Many Kenyan trade unionists such as Dennis Akumu and Tom Mboya came face to face with ruthless colonial officials who threatened them with detention. There were sympathetic whites who created some welfare associations for Africans such as the Kavirondo Tax Payers Association, which was assisted by Cannon Owen.²³ In South Africa, Clements Kedralie was confronted with a white regime that was prepared to perpetuate oppression of the Blacks. Discontent first emerged in the African press, especially in the *Mugwithania* in Kenya and the *Daily News* and the *Catholic Moto* in Zimbabwe and in *Sowetan* in South Africa. In Zimbabwe, the African National Congress (ANC), led by Abel Muzorewa, was often the mouthpiece through which labor unions and individuals voiced their grievances. Although the colonial government, through censorship and the banning of undesirable organizations, firmly suppressed any militant actions, it helped to create grounds for nationalism in Zimbabwe.

There was a lot of physical and psychological violence in the colonies as Frantz Fanon has ably documented in his book *The Wretched of the Earth*. In settler colonies, Africans protested against mistreatment in offices and white farms and mines.²⁴ There were cases of forced labor coupled with complicated rules and regulations of movement. In Kenya and South Africa, the colonial state used *kipande* (identity card) and passbook to control the movement of Africans. The white settlers had been demanding this as a means of keeping track of their workers and cutting down crime. It was also meant to restrict all Africans' movement, especially the so-called vagrants or vagabonds. Africans were restricted to certain spaces and could only move out with the authorization of the state. This became one of the grievances against white rule in Kenya and South Africa and was on the agenda of nationalist movements and parties.

African independent churches were part of African nationalism and the search for African identity. The main reason for their creation was to ensure that Africans could be masters of their own lives. The church was a site of the African search for empowerment. In many urban areas, the churches became mechanisms for transition, rural to urban, as well as relating to social capital and social mobility. They were mainly products of syncretism; movements that took what they believed were the best from Christianity and African cultural practices.²⁵ Africans were dissatisfied with the way Christian missionaries condemned African culture (Ogot and Welbourn 1966). The causes for breaking away included resistance to the restrictions on indigenous customs and traditions.²⁶ Three prominent issues that stood on the agenda were *intonjane* (girls' initiation, or female circumcision/genital mutilation), *lobola* (dowry or bride price) and polygamy. Many missionaries did not understand the cultural implications and meaning of *lobola* and opposed it, seeing it as trade in human beings. Similarly, female circumcision was opposed by missionaries for many reasons. In 1928 in Kenya, the Church of Scotland mission tried to prohibit this custom among its Kikuyu members. The result was an explosion of anger and outrage among the Kikuyu. There were massive secessions and two separatist Churches emerged. The entire episode had an important influence on the nationalist, independence movement, which was already underway. In South Africa, an outbreak among the Zulu in 1905–1906, called the Bambaha Rebellion, was blamed on religious separatism. Changing ideology also affected churches, leading to breakaway or secession in South Africa. This introduced elements of Pentecostalism—baptism by immersion, faith healing, speaking in tongues. In his book *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* Bengt Sundkler identified two categories: Ethiopian churches and Zionist churches.

There was an indirect connection between religious independence and political independence. This was certainly true in Kenya where the independent churches became centers for rebels where people sought refuge and organized “subversive” or “clandestine” activities. In Kenya's nationalist movement, independent church leaders such as Bildad Kaggia played an important role in national politics.²⁷ Also in Kenya, Elijah Masinde founded his Dini ya Musambwa religious sect and became a political activist, organizing boycotts and protests.²⁸ The two most frequently cited examples in South Africa are the

events leading to the Bulhoek massacre in Queenstown in 1921 and Wellington Buthelezi's Garveyite (after Marcus Garvey) movement in the Transkei in the 1920s. In Malawi, the actions of John Chilembwe were unquestionably political (rather than accidental as some scholars have alleged). Chilembwe had running battles with the British colonial authorities, and was very vocal in defending the interests of Africans. His actions are often regarded as part of nationalism in Malawi.

We should point out that no one grievance can be said to have been responsible for the rise of nationalism in Africa. At the same time, we should note that African groups did not always unite for one cause. There were multiple grievances, over land, employment opportunities, discrimination in promotion and general lack of respect for Africans by Europeans. It was not unusual to find many groups emerging to fight whites. In Angola, Holden Roberto formed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in Kinshasa to liberate Angola from Portuguese rule. Agostinho Neto formed the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) in the 1950s. These two movements united at independence, but the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi broke away and retreated to his Ovimbundu backyard, from which he mounted rebel activities.

PAN-AFRICANISM AS PART OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Is it right to discuss pan-Africanism as part of African nationalism? Yes, it is, because there was a consciousness that united people of African descent to speak with one voice owing to their shared heritage. There has also been a belief that blackness united Africans in ways that other identities did not.²⁹ Colonial oppression at home and racism abroad that targeted Africans made them have similar feelings and aspirations, and a desire for freedom. Scholars such as Bethuel Allan Ogot and Adu Boehen have identified two traditions, whereas others such as Maurice Amutabi have identified three.³⁰ The two common traditions saw pan-Africanism as that originating from the continent or the strand emanating from outside, from the Black diaspora, where it was regarded as Black racism. The three traditions that I would like to use in understanding pan-Africanism include the "Africanist" stream that represents pan-Africanism through the actions of Africans residing on the continent such as Haile Selassie, while the second is regarded as the "racist response" or "search for equality" stream that sees pan-Africanism as reactionary to racial and colonial oppression, whether by ways of coded communication as seen in Ebonics or through rebellion, while the third is a muted and neutral stream that sees pan-Africanism as an expression of identity and not necessarily a form of contestation. We have not documented the actions of the Zulu *impis* at the battle of Isandlwana under pan-Africanism, but there is a need to see this as a strong motivation for many African-based reactions to foreign invaders, replicated in many places such as the reaction by Menelik II at the battle of Adwa in Ethiopia of 1877 by the Zulu *impis* who massacred the British column of 800 red jackets. So that we can

say that although Africans from the African continent attended pan African congresses and were certainly aware of the ideas of pan-Africanism as they evolved in the twentieth century, the “Africanist” tradition did not have a major impact and influence on African nationalism in Africa until the 1940s.

Europe did not develop a collective nationalist appeal against foreigners because it did not come under colonial occupation such as that witnessed in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The collective continental consciousness in Africa was triggered by the people in the diaspora who looked to Africa for identity and collective self. Africa became a rallying cry against slavery and oppression, showing that the people had a continent they could call home and which was once the greatest, with mighty kingdoms and empires which had been invaded.³¹ They planned a return, similar to the biblical Moses, who led the Israelites from exile in Egypt through the desert. There have been many explanations of pan-Africanism, many of which acknowledge that as an idea it remained largely at elite level and rarely permeated the masses.

The diaspora strand of pan-Africanism was better documented and enjoyed much scholarly attention compared with the pan-Africanist strand erupting from the African continent that was represented by a celebration of the African past and Ethiopianism. Members of the African diaspora, primarily from the Western hemisphere, have therefore been credited with developing pan-Africanism, and Edward Blyden has been cited as the founder of the movement. However, I would like to contest that claim and assert that the origins of pan-Africanism were multipronged and cannot be linked to one person. There are well-documented efforts of African empires such as Ethiopia trying hard to stop Europeans from taking over fellow Blacks and freeing Blacks from slave caravans.³² The explanation of pan-Africanism as arising through the diaspora became popular and found its way into many textbooks, and it has been hard to correct this mistake.³³ Thus pan-Africanism was seen by some as not African in its origins. True, leadership and ownership of documented pan-Africanism did not appear to incorporate Africans on the continent until 1945, but we are aware of many efforts made by leaders such as Menelik II to lock whites out of the African continent as early as 1896, during the battle of Adwa.

Diasporic pan-Africanism represented by people such as Edward Blyden, Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Dubois and George Padmore differed in many remarkable ways from pan-Africanism on the continent represented by people such as Haile Selassie, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. Diasporic pan-Africanists wanted Black agency back; they advocated for equality and voice and accepted the concept of “race” and its dualities as normal, whereas pan-Africanists at home saw pan-Africanism as rising against white imperialism, colonial occupation and oppression, which were hegemonic and needed to end. Diasporic pan-Africanism was articulated in many writings.³⁴ These carried the idea that Blacks as people of color had a great deal in common (i.e., that many traits, even cultural ones, were genetic). Thus, it has been called a Black racism. In 1888 Edward Blyden wrote: “I would rather be a member of

the African race now than a Greek in the time of Alexander, a Roman in the Augustan period, or an Anglo-Saxon in the nineteenth century.” This was Black pride at its best, and one can detect overtones of racial pride which may have rubbed whites up the wrong way. There was a sense of a nostalgia for a great African past, and a valorization of this. In 1902, Edward Blyden was the first person to use the term “African personality.” He said: “Every race has a soul, and the soul of a race finds expression in its institutions.” There is a clear indication that the diasporic pan-Africanism was more assertive and articulate.

There is no doubt that diasporic leaders such as Dubois inspired many young Africans studying in the West such as Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah and Hastings Kamuzu Banda, among others. Diasporic pan-Africanists defended the rights of Blacks and assertion of pride in being Black (later popularized under notions of Black beauty), which found great illumination in the Harlem Renaissance and other cultural revivalisms. Like Blyden, Dubois had to confront the problem of white racism, and wrote early in the twentieth century: “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.” He was the first African American to receive a Ph.D. from Harvard, in 1902, and was able to articulate his feelings and thoughts more succinctly on paper, through many essays and books. The ideas of diasporic pan-Africanists were further magnified by the “Black is beautiful” movement in the 1960s and 1970s, Léopold Sédar Senghor’s concept of Negritude, expressed in *Présence Africaine*, and other forms of Black consciousness.

The 1940s saw the birth of modern nationalism, and this coincided with pan-African congresses organized by W.E.B. Dubois (Okonkwo 1980). There are many scholars who see Emperor Haile Selassie as a major figure in pan-Africanism and African nationalism, and he was looked upon as Africa’s elder statesman. He called the first meeting that saw the creation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the precursor of the African Union (AU), and the AU’s headquarters are located in Addis Ababa to this day. Pan-Africanism was also carried to Africa by returning students. Of more significance were African students studying in the USA, such Kwame Nkrumah. Ghana’s independence, the first in sub-Saharan Africa, inspired Africans throughout the continent. Most scholars give Kwame Nkrumah a lot of prominence in the promotion of the ideals of pan-Africanism on the African continent. He was a great believer in unity and the need for cooperation among Africans, and he set out to build pan-Africanism in Africa. In 1958, Nkrumah organized and held the first conference of independent African states where representatives of eight states, mostly from North Africa, attended. In 1960, the second gathering was held in Addis Ababa, with the number of states represented increasing to fifteen. At the third conference, also in Addis Ababa, twenty-eight states and governments formed the OAU. In the early days of the OAU,

the focus was on assisting all Africa to become independent; this was also the aspect which brought most unanimity. In Ghana, Nkrumah felt the need to build a sense of national identity in a national state that had been created artificially by colonial conquest and contained different ethnic and religious groups. At the same time he tried very energetically to go beyond nationalism in pan-Africanism, before he was overthrown in one of the earliest military coups in Africa, on March 13, 1966.

CONCLUSION

African nationalism was successful because by 1994 all African states were totally liberated from colonial control. Whether diasporic in origin or originating from the African continent, pan-Africanism affirmed the worth of Black people and therefore rejected the inferiority ascribed by racist thought in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also helped to launch the struggle for rights and equality for Black people in the diaspora. Although there were advocates of a return migration to Africa, eventually and especially after 1945, Black people in the diaspora focused on rights and justice where they lived. In Africa, it asserted the right of independence for Africans—"Africa for Africans." It held out a lofty ideal for the future of independent Africa. Nkrumah granted free citizenship to all African Americans, and in the 1960s there were many immigrants who arrived in Ghana and were granted citizenship. One of these was W.E.B. Dubois, who moved to the country, and died and was buried there. The W.E.B. Dubois burial site in Accra is a national monument, visited by thousands of tourists annually.

The legacy of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Haile Selassie is the AU, which remains one of the greatest manifestations of a pan-African spirit that started in the diaspora and today is embedded in many African states. Nyerere was the embodiment of the twentieth-century African liberation struggle and continental solidarity. He provided support and shelter for many African freedom fighters who were persecuted in their home countries, transforming Tanzania into a safe haven for many people. A strong advocate of the importance in recognizing the wisdom inherent in local culture and in decolonizing people's minds, he advanced policies that promoted cohesion and integration, such as the establishment of Kiswahili as the national language and the implementation of a more African-centered curriculum in schools. His greatest legacy was resigning from the presidency voluntarily in 1985. Despite making some progress, African leaders have tended to focus on the nation state, and thus there have been boundary disputes and conflicts between African states that are yet to be resolved. In addition, the AU and African leaderships collectively have been able to do little about the horrific problems of oppressive African regimes, where leaders are changing constitutions in order to extend their terms in office.

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Nationalism and Political Independence in Africa

James Olusegun Adeyeri

INTRODUCTION

The ideological underpinnings of African nationalism and the quest for political independence had political, economic and social ramifications. Colonial actions and inactions provided African nationalists with the impetus and ingredients to formulate an ideology for the struggle for freedom. In the political sphere, the main focus of African nationalists was the pursuit of equality and freedom to replace segregation, discrimination and subjection. This was predicated upon the strong conviction that, in their condition of subjugation under alien governments and rulers, African states and peoples urgently needed to embrace self-help and mutual support for survival because only they themselves could understand their own needs and adequately satisfy such needs. Among the economic considerations, Africans desired equal opportunity and greater participation in large-scale trading, banking and other business enterprises. They also had aspirations for industrialization, diversified economies, free choice of world markets and improved standards of living. The social considerations included a desire for free adult and primary education, health and sanitation projects, increased employment opportunities, freedom of association/trade unionism and improved welfare policies in general.¹ This chapter, therefore, is a contemporary reflection upon the nature and travails of colonialism, nationalism and independence in Africa, with particular reference to their impact on nation-building and national development in the postcolonial period.

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PATTERNS OF INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE IN AFRICA

West Africa

Nationalism in pre-colonial West Africa was championed by politicians, journalists, critics and other elements, who were essentially cultural nationalists who advocated Black emancipation and defense of the African personality. Edward Wilmot Blyden, an erudite writer, held a strong conviction that the key to African freedom and salvation resided in Africa and Africans. He debunked the Eurocentric views of such scholars as R.F. Burton, James Hunt, and T.J. Hutchinson, who sought to explain the status of racial inferiority in biological terms. Blyden charged Africans to adopt the policy of cultural identity and disregard European culture. He urged the educated elites to reject mental slavery because satisfaction of the African's integrity and identity was the best defense against the negative manifestation of European cultural infiltration.² Although Blyden's pan-Africanist and nationalist posture has been challenged by some critics, he undoubtedly had an extraordinary influence on fellow West Africans. Indeed, the nationalistic stance of James Johnson was akin to that of Blyden, who no doubt influenced the former. Johnson, like Blyden, also opposed the Eurocentric anthropological theory of race inequality. Despite his devotion to Christianity, he criticized foreign Christians and advocated the complete integration of Christianity through African rites. As part of his struggle for African identity, Johnson baptized babies with African names. He condemned the European dress modes of young African men and women. Johnson's nationalism also paid attention to the issue of education for Blacks. In 1896, he led the demand by some African intellectuals for the establishment of a university at Ebute Metta, Lagos, Nigeria. In the envisaged institution, traditional African values were to partly constitute the guiding norms, free from the eroding effects of European civilization. Though, Johnson did not oppose West Africa's contact with Europe, he advocated a combination of cultures, in such a way that the indigenous moral, social and cultural values of the people would be preserved. As a testimony to his commitment to an Africanized approach to education, Johnson reportedly carried out anti-European activities in Sierra Leone.³ Subsequently, several other members of the West African elite, such as Samuel Ajayi Crowther, J.A. Horton and Leopold Sedar Senghor, embraced his policy and zeal, in order to defend African indigenous institutions against Western infiltration.

Despite the staunch cultural nationalism by West Africans during the pre-colonial era, the entire West African region except Liberia had fallen under European imperial rule by 1900. From this time, the nature of West African nationalism shifted from cultural nationalism to political protest. In British West Africa, the emergence of the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) in 1920 marked a watershed in the political history of the territory. The organization brought together delegates from the four British West African colonies, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Gold Coast, and consolidated independently expressed grievances into one single petition.

The NCBWA also advocated the notion of a single West African nationality (an English-speaking one) to be facilitated via the establishment of a West African university. The movement also envisaged the creation of a West African Dominion which would act as the mouthpiece of the region—as Canada, India and Australia had earlier envisaged during the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. Essentially, early modern nationalism in West Africa comprised a variety of organizations, ideas and demands. The NCBWA resolutions synergized the grievances and pleas of numerous groups, organizations and individuals. This collective nationalist project encompassed thinkers such as Edward Blyden and J.E. Casely-Hayford and political protest movements such as the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) of the Gold Coast and the People's Union of Lagos. It also included newspapers such as the *Lagos Weekly Record*, *Gold Coast Leader* and *Sierra Leone Weekly News*. Other components of the collaboration included independent church movements, grievances of chiefs and subjects over land, economic grievances of West African merchants who had been pushed out of the market by European and Lebanese competitors, and lawyers who had been prohibited from practicing in the hinterland courts.⁴

Owing to the draconian nature of the French colonial policy of *indigenat*, press and liberty of association laws, early modern nationalism in French West Africa did not take the form of formal political organizations, but manifested itself through protest movements, voluntary associations and the elite. The protest movements undertook a wide range of activities. At one level, the Tuareg and Mauritians repeatedly asserted independence from French rule. In 1924 and 1927, Mauritians yet to fall under French protection stormed Port Etienne. Much of the protest during the interwar years were targeted at the nature of French administration. In Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, now Cote D'Ivoire and Burkina Faso respectively, people in their thousands deserted their homes and villages in order to avert *curvee* (forced labor). A resistance movement, the Nana Vo, emerged against the arbitrary requisition of food and animals by the chiefs, who had the approval of the colonial government. In 1923, the people of Porto Novo, Dahomey, rioted in protest against the hike in head tax payable by men, women and children. Again in Dahomey, riots were staged in 1933 and 1934, this time against tax collection through coercion, while there were protests in Lome in 1933 against tax increases in an atmosphere of dwindling individual income occasioned by the post-war economic depression.⁵

Workers also adopted illegal industrial actions in Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey and Sudan to express their grievances against an unfair economic system that prohibited them from negotiating their conditions of service. Religious movements such as the Hamallists and Mourides in Senegal also operated as platforms for protests and assertion of independence. In Ivory Coast the Harrisite Movement served as a religious platform for the assertion of West African independence. It is worth noting that in Senegal the French administration later adjusted its policy of oppression to that of collaboration with the Mourides, because of the realization that the movements had a huge religious, economic and political power and importance.⁶

In both British West Africa and French West Africa, the post-Second World War period ushered in full fledged anticolonial nationalism. Thousands of West Africans had participated actively in the Allied armies' military campaigns for the sake of liberty and self-determination. They were able to see that Britain and France needed and sought African and Indian soldiers, which therefore exposed the contradictions between the Allies' proclaimed reasons for fighting the war and the continuous colonial subjugation of West Africa. Reformist proto-nationalism was thus replaced by anticolonial nationalism, which was more political and territorial. Fiercely anticolonial movements emerged to demand not just liberation, independence, self-determination and autonomy, but also liberal democracy, majority rule, immediate freedom and human rights. Finally, these movements also pursued socio-economic objectives such as modernization, industrialization and education.⁷

East Africa

Early modern nationalism in East Africa was shaped by an emphasis upon education, economic development and modernization that was championed by village schoolteachers, shopkeepers, clerks and cotton-growers. The mid-1920s ushered in the era of proto-nationalism in Kenya with the formation of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), which took up the leadership of the resistance against the missionary assault on Kikuyu tradition and culture, particularly the female circumcision and initiation rites. The KCA activities provided the Kikuyu, hitherto split into numerous autonomous groups, a sense of cultural homogeneity. In protest against the missionary demands, many Kikuyu abandoned the mission churches or gave up their teaching jobs in mission schools, and proceeded to establish their own churches and schools.⁸

Unlike the interwar period, during which protests in East Africa were mainly local in nature, the early 1950s marked the birth of mass nationalism targeted directly at the core structures of colonial rule. In 1954, the Tanganyikan African Association (TAA), established in 1929, metamorphosed into the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which elected Julius Nyerere, one of Tanganyika's few graduates, as its president. The party exploited peasant discontent to further its nationalist struggle. Nyerere also took the demand for independence to the United Nations (UN). After the colonial administration failed in its bid to suppress TANU, elections were conducted for thirty Legislative Council seats of which TANU won an overwhelming majority. Through a combination of extraordinary membership expansion across the country and Nyerere's popularity for his moderate and non-racial disposition to the minority groups, in December 1961 Tanganyika gained independence, being the first country in East Africa to achieve that feat.

Kenya's journey to independence was characterized by violent upheavals, unlike Tanganyika's process which was relatively smooth. The violent struggles, however, helped to build a public opinion that promoted a swift and ultimately peaceful political transition from British colonial officials to Kenyan politicians.

But in the meantime, owing to the colonial government's continued reluctance towards Kenya's independence, the Kikuyu, which predominated in Kenya's nationalist struggle, increasingly embraced the idea of violence. Leaders of the Kenya African Union (KAU), which succeeded the KCA in 1944, and many other Kikuyu nationalists engaged in widespread oath-taking, which was meant to ensure abiding and irreversible commitment to the independence struggle. A group of radical militants, who favored a much more brutal approach than the constitutionally inclined members of KAU, also emerged in Nairobi. Arson and maiming of cattle heightened and in October 1951 a major Kikuyu supporter of the colonial government was murdered, leading to a declaration of a state of emergency. Instead of achieving peace and stability, emergency rule inspired an escalation in violence following the retreat of the militants to the Mount Kenya forests and their subsequent resort to guerilla warfare. In 1956, the colonial administration succeeded in returning law and order to the Kikuyu territory after introducing an aggressive agrarian policy reform and stepping up political reforms in the country. In the late 1950s, the Luo ethnic group under the leadership of Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga took over the leadership of Kenya's independence movement following the government's disbandment of KAU and incarceration of its president, Jomo Kenyatta, and several other frontline Kikuyu politicians. A constitutional conference was eventually convened in 1960 which made provision for elective African majority seats in the Legislative Council, thereby paving the way for Kenya's independence. After initial polarization within the nationalist movement caused by disagreements between the two rival parties, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and Kenya African National Union (KANU), the latter achieved electoral victory in 1963, and formed the government that won independence for Kenya at the end of that year.⁹

In contrast to Kenya, the Ugandan nationalist movement undertook very little protracted and bitter political struggle. Rather, several political parties and their activities shaped and predominated in the fight for independence in Uganda. The origin of Uganda's national independence struggle is traceable to the establishment of the Uganda National Congress (UNC), the country's first political party, on March 2, 1952. The UNC under its first president, Ignatius Musazi, pulled its larger support from Buganda in addition to militants from other regions.¹⁰ The party clamored for immediate self-government, sought to exploit local issues on a district by district basis and made intense demands for the return of Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda from exile by the British colonial authorities. However, from 1956 onwards the UNC consistently became weakened and unpopular owing to serious internal divisions and membership withdrawals. In 1954, the Democratic Party (DP) was founded under the leadership of Matayo Mugwanya, its first president general. At inception, the party had an exclusive Roman Catholic membership and inspiration, and was opposed to protestant hegemony in Ugandan politics. Afterwards, the party advanced concrete proposals for constitutionalism and independence. The Progressive Party (PP) was established in 1955, with the bulk of its membership from the ranks

of Baganda schoolmasters, successful farmers, and businessmen. It presented strong constitutional proposals for independence from the colonial administration, but by 1961 it had become weak because of internal leadership tussles.

The Uganda People's Union (UPU), created between late 1958 and early 1959, drew its leadership and membership from different regions and social groups, in contrast to other parties which were dominated by the Baganda. Largely owing to the ideas and personalities of its leaders, the party won majority seats in the Legislative Council in the first direct elections, barely two months after its establishment. On March 9, 1960, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) was founded through the merger of W. Rwatsiba's UPU and Milton Obote's faction of UNC in order to consolidate party politics and push forward a common Ugandan agenda for total independence. In line with this, the UPC advocated strong central government in order to unite the different groups in the country. Consequently, in 1962 an alliance between the Kabaka Yekka (KY), a newly formed movement by the Baganda leadership to defeat the DP, put the UPC in power under the leadership of Obote, whose government led Uganda to independence later that year.¹¹

North Africa

The maiden nationalist groupings in Egypt emerged in 1879 as a result of local disaffection with Khedive Ismail and European interference in Egyptian affairs. In 1882, Ahmad Urabi, a prominent figure in the emergent nationalist movement, became the head of a nationalist-dominated ministry determined to achieve democratic reforms such as legislative control of the national budget. Britain and France, in order to avert possible reduction in their imperial control, launched a military bombardment against Alexandria, crushed the Egyptian army at the battle of Tel el-Kebir and subsequently reinstated Ismail's son, Tawfiq Ismail, as a stooge of a de facto British protectorate. Egypt's nationalist movement received a boost in 1906 following the Dinshaway incident, which swayed many hitherto neutral Egyptians to join the movement. After the First World War, Saad Zaghlul and the Wafd Party led the Egyptian nationalist movement to a majority at the local Legislative Assembly. Egypt launched its first modern revolution when Britain exiled Zaghlul and his associates to Malta on March 8, 1919. Significantly, the revolt prompted the British government to issue a unilateral declaration of independence for Egypt on February 22, 1922. The new administration introduced a parliamentary constitution and system in 1923 under which Zaghlul was elected as Egypt's prime minister in 1924. Although, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was concluded in 1936, instability persisted because of remaining British influence and increasing political interference by the king. This eventually brought about the dissolution of the parliament in 1952 via a military putsch popularly called the 1952 Revolution. The Free Officers Movement, vanguard of the revolution, forced King Farouk I to abdicate the throne for his son, Fuad II. However, British military presence in Egypt remained until 1954.¹²

Algeria's nationalist struggle commenced effectively after the First World War through the activities of various nationalist movements, mostly established by Muslims. In 1926, the Star of North Africa was created by Messali Hadji and demanded the withdrawal of French soldiers from Algeria, creation of a national army and the nationalization of large estates. In 1930, the Federation of Elected Muslims was established by Ferhat Abass. Under its assimilationist agenda, the group demanded Algeria's representation in the French parliament, suppression of legislators that discriminated against Muslims and equal rights for all Muslims without renouncing their religion. The Association of Muslim Ulama, formed by Ben Badai in 1931, was largely committed to religious reforms. Although, the movement opposed assimilation, it stressed the crucial importance of Islam as part of the Algerian national identity.

Besides the aforementioned Islamic movements, numerous other organizations were established overtime in the quest for Algeria's independence. For example, after the Second World War, in 1937, Hadji abandoned the Star of North Africa to establish the Algerian People's Party (APP), Algeria's first political party, to serve as an umbrella body for political activity locally and internationally. It is worth noting that the worsening standard of living in Algeria, particularly during the interwar years, gave additional fillip to the independence struggles by the various Algerian movements. In fact, several socio-economic and political issues caused political upheavals in Algeria between 1933 and 1936, while the invasion of North Africa by Anglo-American forces in 1943 and some American interests in Algerian nationalism fueled nationalist agitations. In spite of limited political concessions offered by France, for example, in an attempt to stem the tide of political dissent in Algeria, Algerian nationalists including Ben Bella soon realized that the French government would not grant independence to Algeria on a gold platter. Consequently, the Organization Secret (OS), an agglomeration of youthful leaders of different independent Algerian movements, including Ben Bella, which was created in 1948, commenced armed attacks against French interests in Algeria in 1949, when Ben Bella led a raid against the Central Post Office in Oran. The organization acquired about three million French francs from the operation, but a second plot to hit Bona was foiled by the French government, leading to the arrest and imprisonment of Ben Bella, who later escaped to Egypt in 1952.

Despite the government's crackdown on the OS, its members intensified their armed struggle, which ultimately culminated in the commencement of the Algerian revolution/war of independence under the aegis of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) on November 1, 1954. After a successful referendum in favor of Algeria's political autonomy was conducted in 1961, France withdrew from Algeria in June 1962, thereby setting the stage for the declaration of the country's independence on July 5, 1962 under the presidency of Ben Bella.¹³

Tunisian nationalism initially took the form of boycotts, strikes, protests and sometimes open confrontation with the French colonial administration. In 1911, students of the Zaytuni University sparked civil disturbances, while disenchanted Muslims staged protests over the Jallaz Muslim Cemetery, with

both incidents resulting in the death of dozens of Tunisians and some Europeans. Indeed, the period 1906–1960 marked the crystallization of independence movements in Tunisia. In 1907, the Young Tunisians was established, followed by the Destour Party few years after. The New Destour Party was formed in 1934 by Habib Bourguiba, a former leader of the Destour Party following its collapse that year. The Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) was created by Farhat Hached in 1946, and subsequently became the foremost trade union in the struggle for Tunisia's independence. The colonial administration however, exploited the internal crisis, eventual breakdown of the New Destour Party and the subsequent riots to ban the party and incarcerate Bourguiba for about twenty-eight years within and outside Tunisia, until his release in 1943.

The independence movement adopted terrorism as part of its *modus operandi* owing to the intensification of French control over Tunisia. The nationalists deployed bombs against colonial facilities. Terrorist and guerrilla organizations such as the Fellaga increasingly emerged and launched attacks from their mountain operational bases against French citizens in Tunisia. The urgent need to reduce the spate of violent confrontations and attacks between Tunisian nationalists and the French settlers (who had also formed a secret organization known as the Red Hand) prompted Pierre Mende, the new French prime minister in 1954 to initiate France's withdrawal from Tunisia, although France still held on to important portfolios such as foreign policy. After the collapse of Mende's government in 1955, fresh negotiations led to the signing of an agreement between Bourguiba and the French administration on March 2, 1956, which proclaimed Tunisia's independence.¹⁴

Nationalist struggle in Morocco prior to the 1930s revolved around agitations over social services, infrastructure such as electricity and roads, and the disparities in the remunerations of Moroccan workers and their French counterparts in the country. The entry of the Allied forces into North Africa in 1943 marked a turning point in Moroccan nationalism as it rekindled the desire for independence and rejuvenation of the Nationalist Party. In that year, Ahmed Balafleg, the Party's secretary general who had just returned from exile, renamed the party *Istiqlal* (independence) and in the following year declared a manifesto calling for Moroccan independence. Owing to the strong relationship between Moroccan nationalists and the traditional leadership of Morocco, from 1947 Sultan Mawlay Mohammed V became the guiding light of Morocco's independence struggle. Despite a number of minor political concessions granted to the Moroccan people, French colonial control remained in Morocco. Thus, in March 1947, the sultan, via a letter to the President of France, demanded independence for Morocco, a demand that France rejected and which partly necessitated the sultan's deposition and exile to Corsica and Madagascar in 1953. As a result of heated demand by Moroccans for his reinstatement, Mohammed V returned to power in 1955 and resumed negotiations for independence with the French foreign minister, Pinney. Subsequently, a communiqué instituted on March 2, 1956 announced Morocco's independence.¹⁵

Libya's independence struggle commenced effectively during the Second World War and crystallized in the post-war years. During the early post-war years, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania remained under British rule while Fezzan was under French control. In line with the 1947 peace treaty with the Allied Powers, Italy and France dropped their claims to Tripolitania and Fezzan respectively, thereby allowing Libya to be united. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution on November 21, 1949 scheduling Libya's independence for December 31, 1951 at the latest. In the subsequent UN negotiations, Libya was represented by Idris as-Senussi, the Emir of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and the leader of the Senussi Muslim Sufi order. Following the transition program supervised by UN Commissioner Adriaan Pelt on December 24, 1951, Libya proclaimed its independence under an arrangement in which the representatives of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan declared a union and a constitutional, hereditary monarchy, the United Kingdom of Libya under King Idris as-Senussi. Libya thus became the first country to attain independence through the UN.¹⁶

Southern Africa

The year 1912 was a seminal date in the historical evolution of modern African nationalism in South Africa, following the establishment of the South African Native National Congress, later called African National Congress (ANC), for the chief purpose of fighting for the redress of African grievances, particularly the abolition of racial discrimination in administration, parliament, education and industry, through constitutional means.¹⁷ From inception, the ANC arguably played the dominant role in the struggle for South Africa's independence from apartheid rule. Up to the early 1940s, the ANC adopted a moderate approach comprising speeches and resolutions. Owing to the lukewarm attitude of the apartheid regime towards the ANC's demands, from 1945 the latter embarked upon a more militant approach in engaging the government. In June 1952, the ANC launched the Defiance Campaign against unjust apartheid laws, and the campaign resulted in the arrest of 8000 Africans. Despite the litany of repressive legislations, arrests, fines and imprisonments by the apartheid government, the ANC alongside organizations such as the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), South African Coloured Peoples (SACP) and Congress of Democrats converged under Albert Luthuli in Natal and declared the Charter of Freedom in 1955. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), formed by a splinter group of the ANC, launched a protest against the reckless and degrading pass laws in March 1960, which resulted in the Sharpeville Massacre during which sixty-nine Africans were killed and many others injured by the South African Police. In the wake of the resultant nationwide demonstrations and riots, the apartheid regime intensified its crackdown on African nationalists and eventually banned the ANC and PAC on April 8, 1961.¹⁸

The ANC consequently decided to adopt an underground armed struggle with the creation of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the armed wing of the Congress Movement that comprised the ANC, the South African

Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), under the leadership of the ANC. Umkhonto, which embarked upon sabotage, guerrilla warfare and other measures to pursue its objectives, soon became one of the pillars of the South African revolution, which was anchored upon united mass action and the international isolation of the apartheid regime. The evolution of the People's Army, and the political and economic crises faced by the racist government owing to its loosening power and authority encouraged the ANC consistently to ask the masses to make the country ungovernable and apartheid unworkable.¹⁹ In 1994, a combination of the ANC-led relentless armed struggle and the international community's imposition of economic and other sanctions against the racist government brought apartheid rule to an end, following the victory of the ANC under Nelson Mandela in the country's first multiracial democratic elections.

Elsewhere in the region, after the seeming consolidation of white power between 1945 and about 1958, decolonization emerged in three key stages. By 1968, there had occurred the relatively peaceful achievement of independence by territories under direct British control: the High Commission territories transformed into Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, while Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became Zambia and Malawi respectively. This was followed by the far bloodier independence struggle in the Portuguese colonies and Southern Rhodesia, which eventually attained independence in 1980, and the denouement in South West Africa, which gained independence as Namibia in 1990.²⁰

CONCLUSION: AFRICAN NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD

By the 1960s, most African states had achieved political independence from their erstwhile colonial masters, while others joined a few decades later. A majority of the states attained independence through constitutional and relatively peaceful political processes, with North Africa and southern Africa showing a prevalence of the strategy of sustained bitter and violent struggle.

In the post-independence period, however, nearly all African states, perhaps with the sole exception of South Africa, are yet to substantially reap the socio-economic and political benefits of independence. This has led to incessant national and occasional international crises sometimes degenerating into violent conflicts of monumental proportions. In the immediate post-independence era, many states, including Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, experienced disruptions in their political evolution via military coups d'état, while some grappled with civil wars and interstate boundary conflicts. In the 1990s, Rwanda even experienced genocide.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, despondency over increasingly deteriorating socio-economic conditions, including heightening unemployment, acute poverty and lack of access to basic needs, particularly among the masses, has ignited new forms of militant nationalism of ethnic and sub-national character.

Rather than focusing on the crucial and urgent tasks of nation-building and national development, various groups and movements have emerged to forcefully and violently pursue socio-economic and political change in many states, with the possibility of the scenario being replicated in others. In North Africa, the Arab Spring, a sobriquet for the revolutionary uprisings that arose independently across the Arab world beginning in Tunisia in December 2010, shook a number of states to their foundations. In several other parts of the continent, numerous militant separatist organizations emerged. In Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), an umbrella body of a large number of Niger Delta militant groups fighting the Federal Government over resource control and revenue allocation, fought a separatist armed struggle against the Nigerian state until 2009.²¹ At present, Boko Haram, a Hausa-Fulani Islamist militant group, is prosecuting a bloody insurgency in order to form a sharia state out of the Nigerian federation, with spill-over effects in neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad. In Mali since 2012, the crises generated by the insurgency staged by Tuareg and hardline Islamist groups is yet to be fully resolved. Since December 2013, a bloody political conflict between armed groups divided between South Sudan's two main ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer, has continuously threatened state power and caused severe socio-economic and humanitarian hardship for the populace.²² These and similar expressions of proto-nationalism are products of the failure of political independence to transform into the sort of socio-economic and political benefits desired by many citizens of the various African states. Above all, the best guarantee for national and continental stability and progress in Africa resides in broad-based, liberal, constructive and patriotic consultations and negotiations, rather than sectional and sectarian violent contestations for power.

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PART III

The Military in Politics

Theories of Military in African Politics

G.S. Mmaduabuchi Okeke

INTRODUCTION

Usurpation of political power or the supplanting of civilian rule by the military in African politics largely characterizes the nature of military intervention in the democratic process. Until recently, military rule was a major defining feature of African politics. Although conventionally military intervention in politics is regarded as an aberration, in Africa from the 1960s to the late 1980s military rule was not only fashionable, but also tolerable. During this era, regional and subregional heads of state meetings were more or less congregations of military generals which every military leader on the continent looked forward to, and used as an opportunity to brandish their various unique military regalia and security entourage. In most African countries, then, *coups d'état* were popular, and military rule was welcomed with optimism by the people, who hoped it would bring an end to post-independence corruption and bad governance among the political class. In Nigeria, for instance, the first military coup on January 15, 1966, was celebrated by many Nigerians, who hoped it would address the various challenges confronting the country, particularly electoral corruption.¹

During this period, various theories emerged to attempt to explain not only the causes of military incursions into African politics but also why such incursions were inevitable and necessary in the first place. Theories such as colonial legacy, contagion influence, weak socio-economic institutions and political culture, military structure, corruption and politicization of the military and so on were deployed by different theoreticians. Some even argued that military rule

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was a necessary evil that was needed to effect change and accelerate Africa's development. But when several decades of military forays into African politics failed to yield the expected positive results but rather deepened corruption and underdevelopment, there was a series of agitations for civil democratic rule. The high degree of oppression, corruption and bad governance as well as the "sit-tight-in-power syndrome" that characterized military regimes on the continent not only caused them to lack legitimacy, but also changed the people's initial optimism and replaced it with hatred for and pessimism about military rule. It was therefore a huge relief when in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century there was the so-called third wave of democracy, in which most African countries experienced a transition from military rule to a democracy. Although this was achieved peacefully in some countries, it was fought for and achieved with weapons and revolts in others.² Since the emergence of the new wave of democracy in Africa, one of the major issues that has dominated political debates is how to strike a balance between the armed forces and the civilian political leadership so as to subject the former to civilian control and supremacy and permanently keep them away from politics. In other words, at the core of the civil-military relations debate in Africa since the return to democracy in the 1990s and early 2000s has been how to build a military that is professional, non-partisan and loyal to civil authority. However, after about two decades of the new wave of democratic experimentation in Africa, the military has begun to rear its ugly head again in politics notwithstanding the fact that the unconstitutional change of government particularly via *coup d'état* has been outlawed by the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).³

Although the resurgence of military incursions into African politics is no longer popular and tolerated by the international community, it has continued to occur in recent times as experiences in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Guinea Bissau attest. Under the amended AU Constitutive Act and the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, forceful and unconstitutional change of government in Africa is no longer acceptable, but despite this injunction military coups still occur in the continent's emerging democracies. This raises some fundamental questions as to what is causing the new wave of military intervention in African politics and whether the previous theories of military intervention are still tenable in explaining these evolving events.

This chapter analyzes the theories about the military in African politics so as to determine whether they are still relevant in understanding the recent resurgence of military incursions into the politics of emerging democracies. It also explores new variables that seem to be partly responsible for the recent resurgence of military *coups d'état* in Africa. These include the quest for tenure elongation and the attendant abuse of electoral democracy, the rise of terrorism and the search for national security, and lack of severe consequences for coup plotters in Africa.

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN POLITICS: THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

There are a lot of theoretical explanations about the causes for military intervention in the politics of countries around the world, particularly those in Africa and the Third World in general. These theories are contained in various classic works about the impact of the military on society in general and politics in particular. They include *The Soldier and the State* (Huntington 1957), *The Man on the Horse-back* (Finer 1962), *The Coup d'Etat in Theory and Practice* (Wells 1974), *Internal Defense and the Less Developed Countries* (Gorman 1967), *Soldiers in Mufti, The Nigerian Military* (Luckham 1971) and *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Ake 1996), to mention but a few.

Although some scholars are of the view that military incursions into politics are random events which are unrelated to the structures of societies and external influences, there is no doubt that a mix of historical, political, economic and social factors account for military interventions in various countries across the globe.⁴ Various scholars have provided different theoretical underpinnings about why the military intervenes in politics around the world particularly in Africa. These include colonial legacy, weak political institution and culture, lack of socio-economic development, internal structure of the military, ethnic plurality, foreign influence and contagion effects. We shall discuss them sequentially.

Colonial Legacy

Classical works by Coleman and Brice,⁵ as well as Luckham,⁶ attribute incessant military intervention in Africa to the colonial legacy. They argue that the ex-colonial powers such as France, Britain and Portugal left behind incongruent and in some cases disintegrating political systems in their colonies. To them, there is a high propensity for military incursion in polities that inherited the French unitary and centralized system of government, because this gives little or no room for popular participation and expression of diversities. This is unlike countries that inherited British institutions and the parliamentary system which allows popular participation and expression of diverse views, thereby being less prone to military intervention, which could be caused by unexpressed and unresolved internal grievances.

However, a historical examination of military coup trends in post-colonial Africa shows that there is no strong correlation between colonial heritage and *coup d'état*. The cases of Liberia and Ethiopia, which were never colonized but have had military coups, discredit the colonial legacy thesis.⁷ Even the two West African countries that have witnessed the most military coups, Nigeria and Niger, have varying colonial experiences and different post-colonial systems of government, having been colonized by Britain and France respectively.⁸ Moreover, the available evidence does not support the colonial legacy theory because military intervention has been a recurring event in both French and British ex-colonies as well as Portuguese ex-colonies, such as Guinea-Bissau.⁹

Weak Political Institutions and Culture

Weak political development has also been blamed for military intervention in politics. The central argument of this theory is that there is a tendency towards it if countries have weak political institutions and political culture. The reason is that a lack of institutionalization of political organization, electoral participation and processes results in political decay, participation crisis and instability which compels the military to intervene.¹⁰ While participant political culture ensures high and active participation in electoral processes and decision-making, strong political institutions guarantee articulation and aggregation of interests as well as effective regulation of political participation and peaceful resolution of conflicts that arise. But the lack of a well-developed political culture and strong political institutions that can regulate political processes and actions is a recipe for social instability and military coup. Accordingly, Finer postulates that the level of military incursion in a given society is negatively related to the level of political culture and the degree of public trust and attachment to civil institutions. A society with low political culture and little trust in civil institutions is likely to witness a high degree of internal conflict over basic societal values, and when such social dissent occurs it ushers in the military as a rallying point or the arbiter, because of its strategic position in society.¹¹ Structures are weak in countries of low or minimal political culture, and boundaries are so poorly maintained that military organizations themselves are shaped and permeated by the political environment; caught up in uncontrollable social processes, they are unable to maintain either their structural integrity or their capacity for independent actions.¹² The exponents of political development theory blame incessant military intervention in the politics of post-independence Africa on the continent's weak political institutions and parochial political culture, which could not sustain the post-independence upward social mobility and modernization.

Lack of Socio-Economic Development

One other major theory about military intervention in politics is weak socio-economic development. Its exponents argue that military incursions into politics usually take place in nations with lower income status and where there is sometimes unhealthy internal competition for the available limited resources.¹³ That is to say, nations that have unstable and low socio-economic development are more likely to experience military intervention than nations that have stable and high socio-economic development.¹⁴ This is because strong economic development increases interest and awareness in political issues and the capacity to act accordingly. Furthermore, a high literacy level, urbanization, industrialization and high living standards, all of which often characterize societies that have strong economic development, do not create an atmosphere of corruption and its attendant economic exploitation and hardship thanks to a sense of hopelessness among the populace, which encourages military intervention.¹⁵

That is to say, high economic development diminishes the likelihood of a military coup, whereas poverty and lack of economic prosperity increases the likelihood. This theory appears to be tenable in explaining and understanding military rule in Africa, given that most military coups there occurred in the poorest countries with the highest rates of corruption and low economic development indicators. Moreover, most African military coups take place during periods of economic instability, when there are development crises and high poverty rates, and thus, more often than not the coup plotters usually cite corruption and poor economic conditions as the reasons for their intervention.

Foreign Influence

Apart from socio-economic and political factors, foreign influence is also one of the causes of military intervention in Africa politics. This occurs when external interests sponsor a coup by providing funding and military tactical support. Foreign military aid and the power it brings can also encourage the military elites in a given country to succumb to external pressure and oust a civilian regime that has fallen out of favor with foreign powers.¹⁶ For instance, the bloody coup of 1976 in Nigeria in which General Murtala Mohammed was killed is believed to have been influenced by the government of the United States, which was not comfortable with the regime's radical and assertive foreign policy posture in Africa particularly in the southern Africa subregion.¹⁷

Ethnic Plurality

Ethnic plurality is another variable often blamed for military intervention in politics. Ethnic heterogeneity is usually associated with unhealthy interethnic rivalry and antagonism as various ethnic groups compete for the political space so as to have the upper hand in sharing scarce resources. Sometimes this competition leads to internal conflict which could degenerate into instability. And the greater the number of ethnic cleavages in a society the more there is a likelihood of inter-elite conflicts and its attendant social instability, which could lead to military intervention.¹⁸ In a study carried out by Jackman to ascertain the internal determinants of military coups in sub-Saharan Africa's new states from 1960 to 1975, it was found that the presence of a dominant ethnic group and multiparty system were having a destabilizing impact on the new states.¹⁹ Similarly, a survey of thirty-three sub-Saharan African states between 1957 and 1984 by Jenkins and Kposowa found a strong correlation between ethnic diversity, ethnic antagonism and military coup.²⁰ However, another study by Johnson et al. covering about thirty-five sub-Saharan African states from 1960 to 1982 found that military coup occurred less in ethnically heterogeneous societies that lacked social mobilization before independence but maintained a significant degree of political pluralism and political participation after independence.²¹ Although ethnic plurality is usually associated with unhealthy interethnic conflict, ethnic dominance could be a stabilizing force that weakens opposition while creating social integration in the polity.

Military Structure

Another theory examines the internal structure of the military itself and the level of its central role and relevance in the society. The state's claim on legitimate violence is expressed and guarded through the military, which is also saddled with the important responsibility of defending the nation against external aggression and maintaining its territorial integrity. With this centrality of role and relevance, the military is tempted to dominate politically by grabbing political power, particularly if the extant institutions of civil society are weak.²²

Another strand of the theory submits that the high level of discipline, centralized chain of command and effective communication inherent in military institutions usually create the cohesion needed for executing a coup. Moreover, the larger the army and the greater its access to state resources, the more a society is prone to military intervention.²³ Military incursions into politics could also be triggered by professionalism or lack of it in the military institution. A military that is well trained and professional will submit itself to civilian supremacy, unlike a military that has not been ingrained in the core of military tradition and values. In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington argues that civilian supremacy over the military could be guaranteed in one of the following ways: subjective control in which the military is permeated by civilian values and interests; or by objective control in which discipline is ensured through professionalism and corporate commitment to service to society by managing violence and protecting it against external attacks. Professionalism separates the military from politics, and also allows the military to focus solely on developing expertise in the profession of arms, which entails the "management of violence."²⁴ In other words, professionalism in the military diminishes coup tendencies. But this is not always the case in Africa. For example, "in Nigeria, the majors who effected the coup of January 15, 1966 clearly belonged to the professional elite in the officer corps, most of them having alternated between training and staff appointments."²⁵

Contagion Effect

Contagion effect theory has also been used to explain military incursions into African politics. The exponents of this theory assert that there is a tendency for military coups to spread from a country to its close neighbors with which it shares physical features or boundaries. That is to say, if a successful military coup takes place in a West African country, there is a likelihood that the military in other countries in West Africa will also be influenced to execute a coup. The incessant coups in many countries in West Africa, which in some instances have occurred within the same time frame, are sometimes blamed on contagion effect factors.

In a cross-national comparison of what accounts for military intervention in politics generally, Murat Onder notes that *coups d'état* are less likely to occur in countries that have stable and high socio-economic development and a mature

political culture with well-developed institutions, whereas they are more likely to occur in countries with weak economy and political institutions and political culture as well as multiple ethnicity and interethnic antagonism, and where military institution plays a central role.²⁶

The military is essential in every society because of its strategic role as guardian and protector against both internal and external aggression. Thus, for any country to be able to protect its citizens and interests military security is required. Part of the solution to Africa's problem of constant conflicts and insecurity may sometimes require the force of arms.²⁷ Is it any wonder that Machiavelli asserted that "the chief foundations of all states, whether new, old or mixed are good arms." Because of its importance in the maintenance of law and order and its superior capacity in the use of force and violence, the military is always respected and at the same time feared in most democratic African administrations.²⁸ The military is also the guardian of the elite, and an agent that acts to defend it from the risk of civil war, hence the governing elite is often tempted to increase the size of the army for protection and to checkmate any likely aggression from the public, especially when a lack of economic development has created public disenchantment and strong opposition.²⁹ But the danger in enlarging the army is that the army may not only protect the elite, but also oust it from power and take over the machinery of government.³⁰ This has been the fate of post-independence Africa, though an interplay of other factors already discussed above has also contributed to military incursions over the years.

MILITARY INCURSIONS IN POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICAN POLITICS

The first military coup in Africa took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952. The monarchy of King Farouk, who was criticized for corruption and failures in the Arab-Israeli war, was forced to abdicate and relinquish power to General Muhammed Naguib. It was a revolutionary coup by the society of free officers. They tried the politicians for corruption and abolished the monarchy in 1953. By 1954, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the coup, had removed General Muhammed from power and installed himself as the Prime Minister of Egypt. He promulgated a constitution that made Egypt a socialist Arab state. In 1956 he was elected unopposed to the new office of president. He died in office in 1970.

By and large, military foray was the defining feature of African politics in the 1960s and 1980s, given that the continent was plagued with a plethora of coups during this period. It is on record that many countries started to experience military coups just a few years after independence. Although the trend has been on the decline since 1990s, it is still an intermittent fact of life. In fact, no year has passed by since 1960 to date without one or more military coups occurring in Africa (see Table 13.1 for a list of military coups in Africa,

Table 13.1 Military coups in African countries, 1960–2015

<i>Year</i>	<i>No. of successful coups and country</i>	<i>No. of failed/attempt coups and country</i>
1960	1 (Democratic Republic of Congo: DRC)	1 (Ethiopia)
1961		1 (Somalia)
1962		1 (Senegal)
1963	3 (Togo, Congo, Benin)	1 (DRC)
1964		4 (Ghana, Tanzania, Gabon, DRC)
1965	5 (Benin, Algeria, DRC, Benin, Benin)	1 (Burundi)
1966	8 (Central Africa Republic: CAR, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Nigeria, Burundi)	2 (Togo, Sudan)
1967	3 (Togo, Sierra Leone, Benin)	1 (Ghana)
1968	3 (Sierra Leone, Congo, Mali)	
1969	4 (Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Benin)	
1970		3 (Congo, Togo, Guinea)
1971	1 (Uganda)	4 (Sierra Leone, Uganda, Sudan, Chad)
1972	3 (Ghana, Madagascar, Benin)	2 (Congo, Benin)
1974	3 (Burkina Faso, Niger, Ethiopia)	5 (Uganda, Uganda, Angola, CAR, Madagascar)
1975	2 (Chad, Nigeria)	3 (Benin, Sudan, Mozambique)
1976	1 (Burundi)	6 (CAR, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Mali, Sudan)
1977	1 (Seychelles)	6 (Benin, Sudan, Congo, Chad, Angola, Uganda)
1978	3 (Comoros, Ghana, Mauritania)	3 (Mali, Somalia, Sudan)
1979	3 (Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, CAR)	2 (Chad, Ghana)
1980	5 (Mauritania, Liberia, Uganda, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso)	1 (Zambia)
1981	2 (CAR, Ghana)	4 (Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Gambia)
1982	1 (Burkina Faso)	5 (Mauritania, CAR, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana)
1983	2 (Burkina Faso, Nigeria)	5 (Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Niger)
1984	2 (Guinea, Mauritania)	2 (Ghana, Cameroon)
1985	3 (Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria)	3 (Liberia, Guinea, Liberia)
1987	2 (Burundi, Burkina Faso)	2 (Sierra Leone, Comoros)
1988		1 (Uganda)
1989	2 (Sudan, Comoros)	1 (Ethiopia)
1990	1 (Chad)	2 (Nigeria, Zambia)
1991	2 (Mali, Lesotho)	4 (Djibouti, Togo, Chad, Togo)
1992	2 (Sierra Leone, Algeria)	3 (Burundi, Benin, Comoros)
1993	1 (Nigeria)	2 (Guinea Bissau, Burundi)
1994	1 (Gambia)	2 (Burundi, Liberia)
1995		3 (Sao Tome and Principe, Comoros, Sierra Leone)
1996	3 (Sierra Leone, Niger, Burundi)	3 (Guinea, CAR, Sierra Leone)

(continued)

Table 13.1 (continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>No. of successful coups and country</i>	<i>No. of failed/attempt coups and country</i>
1997	1 (Sierra Leone)	1 (Zambia)
1998		1 (Guinea Bissau)
1999	3 (Niger, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire)	
2000		3 (Comoros, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire)
2001	1 (DRC)	5 (Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, CAR, Burundi, Comoros)
2002	1 (Cote d'Ivoire)	
2003	3 (CAR, Sao Tome & Principe, Guinea-Bissau)	1 (Mauritania)
2004		4 (DRC, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea)
2005	1 (Mauritania)	
2006	1 (Chad)	2 (Madagascar, Cote d'Ivoire)
2008	2 (Mauritania, Guinea)	
2009		1 (Madagascar)
2010	1 (Niger)	2 (Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar)
2011	3 (DRC, Niger, Guinea-Bissau)	
2012	2 (Mali, Guinea-Bissau)	
2013	1 (Egypt)	
2014		1 (Lesotho)
2015	1 (Burkina Faso)	1 (Burundi)

Source: Adapted from Barka and Ncube (2012),³¹ Smith (2014),³² Ibrahim (2015),³³ Oropo (2015)³⁴

1960–2015). Even though the colonial masters did not hand over power to the military during the independence of most African countries, the military intervened in the politics of some of the newly independent states just a few years after independence.³⁵ Incessant military forays into African politics accounts for the numerous Peace Support Missions (PSM) in Africa by multilateral institutions such as the UN, the AU and ECOWAS over the years.³⁶

Arguably, military coup is not peculiar to Africa alone. Since the Second World War, more than three-quarters of states in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East have experienced one form of military foray or another into their bodies politic.³⁷ Within this period too, more than half of the states in Africa have witnessed at least one military coup.³⁸ In the last five and a half decades Africa has witnessed over 200 military coups, including successful and failed coup attempts.³⁹ In West Africa, for instance, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Mali all experienced one or more successful coups between 1960 and 1970 alone.⁴⁰ This trend continued across Africa until the emergence of third wave democracy blew away most of the military regimes and replaced them with at least an elected government. But what made African countries descend into military rule just a few years after independence? The post-independence military coups were caused by a mix of factors such as colonial legacy, unhealthy interethnic rivalry for political power, weak political culture, an underdeveloped economic base, foreign influence and so on. These

factors and the degree of their manifestation varied from one country to another, depending on ethnic configuration and the politico-economic conditions of a given country.⁴¹ Most countries in Africa arrived at independence with these unfortunate characteristics coupled with the arbitrary and absolute character of the state which they inherited from their colonial experience. The first set of military coups in Africa between the 1960s and the 1970s was mainly caused by the crises generated by ethnic competition for political power at the centre, which were aggravated by the dearth of strong political culture and the reliance on and deployment of violence, which were part of the arbitrary power of the state inherited from the colonial experience in order to manage conflicts. The January 15, 1966 coup in Nigeria and the countercoup in July 29 of the same year were mainly driven by the interplay of these factors. The post-independence politics in Nigeria assumed a character of warfare, thus creating the condition that encouraged military incursion. It is against this background that Ake rightly observes that in post-independence Africa:

Coercion was also used to impose 'political unity' in the midst of considered social pluralism, which had become very divisive for being politicized and exploited by competing elites ... The dominant faction of the political elite found itself utterly isolated, increasingly relying on violence, at war with the rest of society and with rival factions among its own ranks. Political competition now assumed the character of warfare and paved the way for the ascendancy of the later essentially formalized a reality that was already firmly established. It was not the military that caused military rule in Africa by intervening in politics, rather, it was the character of politics that engender military rule by degenerating into warfare, inevitably propelling the specialists of warfare to the lead role.⁴²

Moreover, in most ethnically segmented societies, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, military organization usually has an ethnic basis, and this partly contributes to the occurrence of coups and countercoups on the continent.⁴³

External Western influence also played a major role in the post-independence coups in Africa. Some of them were somehow linked to external Western interests in Africa's resources. Being a continent rich in many natural resources, such as oil, gold and diamonds, Africa has always attracted economic interest from the industrialized world, particularly the USA and Europe. The quest to exploit these resources has, at various times, encouraged the USA and other Western countries to induce military coups in various African countries so as to change regimes that were deemed anti-West and replace them with regimes that were pro-West. For instance, the 1960 coup in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which later led to the assassination of a great nationalist, Patrice Lumumba, in 1961, was influenced by the US and Belgian governments which had interests in the resource-rich country.⁴⁴ Similarly, military coups have been used by the West to pursue other foreign policy interests in Africa. For instance, the US government was fingered in the bloody 1975 coup in Nigeria, in which General Murtala Mohammed was assassinated—mainly because of his assertive

foreign policy posture in Africa, which was aimed at ending colonialism and undue Western influence in Africa. This was at variance with US foreign policy in Africa at that time.⁴⁵

But apart from these factors, military forays into African politics have also been caused by a lack of economic development. The nationalists who championed the independence of countries in Africa had promised economic prosperity and a better life for their citizens once colonialism was eradicated and independence achieved. But after about two decades of independence, poverty had increased and economic underdevelopment become prevalent, causing public disenchantment. This was partly caused by corruption and the use of the state power as an instrument for wealth accumulation rather than for development.

The use of state power for accumulation, associated as it is with statism, monopoly power, and the interposition of coercion in the labour process raised to new heights the premium on the capture of state power ... political intensity received additional impetus from the alienation of the leaders from the followers in the postcolonial era ... coercion was used to constrain the political expression of the masses, now disillusioned with the performance their leaders ... State power remained essentially the same: immense, arbitrary, often violent, always threatening. Except for a few countries such as Botswana, politics remained a zero-sum game; power was sought by all means and maintained by all means.⁴⁶

Of course, the military capitalized on the disenchantment of the people regarding the failure of the civilian political leadership to engender economic development and improve living standards, and seized power while citing corruption and rising poverty as the reasons for their intervention. Sadly enough, the military also fell into the corruption and bad governance trap. Thus, in Africa:

military regimes performances were not in any way better than those of the civilian regimes they overthrew. With benefit of hindsight it has come to be realized that the military regimes in Africa were as well guilty of those crimes they highlighted as necessitating their intervention. Military dictators are themselves corrupt; their regimes were repressive and marked by primordial practices of the highest order. There were testimonies to the plundering and mis-governance by the military regimes across states on the continent.⁴⁷

This was partly why both civilian and military regimes experienced various kinds of coups from the 1980s onwards in Africa.

The crass corruption and the attendant economic underdevelopment and poverty were so high in countries ruled by the military that:

By the early 1990s, African states and their dictatorial leaders have lost legitimacy to rule. Economies of most states on the continent were in shambles as a result of corruption and mismanagement. As the socio-economic and political situations in many states worsen, the various segment of their polity became enraged, public anger grew and opposition to military dictatorship increased across the continent.

The rising popular opposition coupled with external pressure from the international community forced many military dictators on the continent to accede to holding multi-party elections and open up the democratic space.⁴⁸

This led to what later became known in academic literature as third wave democracy. Transitions to democracy became fashionable for many countries of sub-Saharan Africa during this era.⁴⁹ Regrettably, these fledgling democracies have come under serious threat in recent times following the resurgence of military intervention in the politics of some African states.

THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA AND THE NEW WAVE OF MILITARY INCURSION IN AFRICAN POLITICS

Intermittent military coups in Africa and the attendant reemergence of military rule though briefly, in some countries on the continent in recent times has provoked many political debates and raised some fundamental questions. What makes Africa so volatile a region that it seems it cannot do without military coups? Are the conventional military theories that explained the causes of military intervention in African politics in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s still tenable for understanding the current resurgence of military incursions? How should civil–military relations be conducted to guarantee total loyalty of the military to civilian control and supremacy? Perhaps the frequency of military forays into African politics has also raised questions about whether the military is becoming less institutional in nature, hence abandoning its tradition and patriotic values while becoming primarily driven by economic values and guided by “business and economic principles.” The general belief among scholars is that the military in the Third World in particular is becoming more oriented toward economic principles, though still retaining some institutional features.⁵⁰ It is on record that after several decades of military rule failed to yield the expected economic development and political stability as well as failing to mitigate corruption, many African countries began to jettison military incursions into politics and embraced democracy in the 1990s and early 2000s, in what later became known as the third wave democracy. The abuse of human rights and war crimes committed by some of the military heads of state also attracted the prying eye of the international community, such as the UN, and other influential global actors, such as the USA.⁵¹

The struggle for “democratization and demilitarization” of politics in Africa was championed by different interest groups, among which were the pro-democracy civil societies, students’ unions, religious leaders, professional bodies and the international community. Various strategies were deployed in the struggle, including demonstrations, industrial strikes, civil disobedience, advocacy campaigns, opposition politics and lobbying for foreign support.⁵² Factors such as external pressure, the degree of cohesion of the opposition and popular demand for democracy determined the type and speed of response from the various military regimes across Africa.⁵³ While some responded with force and

repression before handing over political power to a civilian or democratically elected government, others exited power peacefully. In those countries where military and autocratic regimes were pressurized to conduct multiparty elections to usher in democracy, the electoral processes were manipulated such that the democratization efforts were a sham.⁵⁴ In fact, some of the military heads of state only removed their military uniforms and put on civilian mufti and still retained their position in power by manipulating the electoral processes. For instance, in Ghana, Jerry Rawlings “civilianized himself” and remained in power. The story was similar across the continent. In Guinea and Gambia, Lamizana Conteh and Yahya Jameh, respectively, removed their uniforms and contested national elections which they manipulated and retained political power. During the 1991 presidential elections in Kenya, President Arap Moi manipulated the electoral process in order to remain in office.⁵⁵ In Nigeria, General Sanni Abacha was transforming himself into a civilian president when death overtook him in 1998. His successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, later returned the nation to democracy in 1999,⁵⁶ but the electoral process was manipulated in favor of the military establishment’s anointed candidate, an ex-military general who was once a dictator—General Olusegun Obasanjo.

Although during the emergence of the so-called third wave democracy the dominant practice among military dictators was to retain power by manipulating the electoral process, there were instances where dictators were forced out of power, some through elections and others through popular rebellion. For example, in Benin President Kerekou was defeated in the 1991 presidential elections. The same fate visited President Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, who after thirty years of tyrannical rule was ousted through election.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the autocratic regimes of Siad Barre of Somalia and Mengistu Hiale Mariam of Ethiopia fell through popular armed revolt.⁵⁸ It is worth noting that some of the electoral imperfections that emerged during the early stage of the third wave democracy in Africa were overlooked because democracy was desperately needed and there was hope that those electoral challenges would be addressed in subsequent elections as democracy consolidated. Unfortunately, this never came to pass, as subsequent elections were also characterized by series of electoral malpractices. In this context, Saka and Omede note that democratization in Africa has been “greatly flawed” and remains in a bad state.⁵⁹ With this flawed and weak democratic foundation, it is not surprising that democracy has not thrived in Africa in the past two and a half decades. Since democracy was restored to African countries by abusing and manipulating the very basic principle of democracy, which is free, fair and credible elections, it is not surprising that after a few years of democratic experiment, many African countries have continued to experience military intervention and most have returned to dictatorship, if not military dictatorship then civilian tyranny. The political leaders who came to power through these flawed electoral processes simply imbibed the wrong culture of democracy. They institutionalized election rigging and other forms of undemocratic practices, such as tenure elongation and alteration of national constitutions at will, so as to remain in

power. To this crop of leaders, democracy is just periodic elections and nothing more. Whether elections are free, fair and credible is secondary. This is partly why political leaders in Africa abuse the electoral processes, not minding the implications, because the processes that brought them to power in the first place were also manipulated. In fact, manipulation of the electoral processes by political leaders who want to be president for life has become a ritual for elections in Africa. The crisis and social instability that often arise from such actions (alteration of the constitution and electoral processes so as to remain in power) usually create conditions that are conducive for military coup. For example, the ousting of President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso in 2015 through popular protest and the subsequent take-over of government by the military was caused by the president's attempt to elongate his tenure after being in power for twenty-seven years, and his attempt in 2014 to change the constitution so that he could be president for life. His further attempt in 2015 to remain in power by altering Article 37 of the constitution, which limits presidential tenure to two terms, led to popular protests that forced him out of office. He ran away to Ivory Coast, thus creating a power vacuum which the military capitalized on, seizing power immediately under the leadership of General Honore Traore.⁶⁰

Similarly, the failed coup attempt in Burundi in 2015 was provoked by the attempt by President Pierre Nkurunziza to remain in power by seeking a third term. This triggered nationwide protests that led to the death of many people.⁶¹ Although the president later succeeded in extending his tenure and conducting elections which he manipulated to remain in power, the crisis that his manipulation of the electoral processes created shows how the abuse of electoral democracy and the constitution can lead to social instability and military incursion. In this regard, President Barack Obama during his state visit to Ethiopia in July 2015 rightly observed that "when a leader tries to change the rules in the middle of the game just to stay in office, it risks instability and strife, as we have seen in Burundi ... And this is often just a first step down a perilous path."⁶²

Even the political leaders who ascended to power through guerrilla rebellion and later legitimized their claim to power through elections are also partners in this crime against electoral democracy. From Zimbabwe to Uganda, Congo to Rwanda, it is the same story of sit-tight-in-power syndrome and tenure elongation perpetrated and reinforced through the manipulation of electoral processes and national constitutions. For instance, the ninety-one-year-old President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has finally institutionalized sit-tight-in-power politics since assuming power in 1980 after the country's independence. The same applies to the seventy-one-year-old president Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo, who has ruled the oil-producing country for thirty-one years and recently succeeded in removing term limits in the country's constitution which had banned him from seeking another term.⁶³ President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who has been in power for thirty years and who in 1996 introduced a term limit in the constitution for the post of president,

scrapped it in 2005 so that he could contest as many times as he wants and remain in power. President Paul Kagame of Rwanda is also planning at the time of writing (2015) to remove term limits from the constitution so that he can contest in the next presidential election even when he has exhausted his constitutionally allowed terms.⁶⁴ Apart from South Africa, where the transition from repressive apartheid regime to a multiracial and multiparty democracy has been a huge success,⁶⁵ as well as Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and a few others, the vast majority of other countries in Africa have been gravitating towards dictatorship and military rule.⁶⁶ The danger of this manipulation of the electoral process by all these incumbents who want to remain power is usually the creation of social instability, which in turn creates a condition that encourages military intervention.

Moreover, the institutionalization of electoral manipulation took place alongside the institutionalization of corruption and bad governance, which undermined the African states' ability to fulfill their primary purpose—which is the security and welfare of the people. The implication of this is that most African states, including institutions such as the military, are ill equipped and lack the capacity to protect their citizens against internal and external aggression. Thus, when terrorism emerged in Africa and become a major threat to national and regional security, most countries on the continent lacked the capacity to contain it. As different terrorist groups invaded national territories, maiming and killing people, the quest for national security increased, and this encouraged the military to seize political power in some countries. For example, the March 21, 2012 coup d'état in Mali which ousted President Amadou Toumani Toure was motivated by national insecurity created by the terrorist organizations operating in the north of the country. The coup leaders accused the civilian administration of poorly equipping the military and claimed that inadequate resources to fight and contain the invading Tuareg insurgents in the north of the country was the main reason for their action. Of course, the coup occurred when the Tuareg rebels and their terrorist allies, such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), attacked and chased away the Malian army from the northern territory and proceeded to raid and take over other territories in the southern part.⁶⁷ In other words, the coup was a manifestation of “soldiers’ grievances over the government’s weak handling of the Tuareg-led rebellion in the northern part of the country.”⁶⁸

Perhaps another cogent factor responsible for the recent reemergence of military incursions in African politics is the apparent lack of severe consequences for coup plotters or former military dictators. Apart from the fact that severe punishment has not been meted out to coup leaders in Africa, the post-third wave democracy on the continent has been characterized by the emergence of ex-military heads of state or their cronies as civilian presidents. This is what Onuoha describes as the ruling “coalition of ex-military” personnel and their partners in crime.⁶⁹ The African experience is to some extent similar to what is happening in Latin America, where, according to Eynde, “the civil-military institutions that historically governed civil military relations simultaneously

encouraged and discouraged coups.”⁷⁰ Citing Stepan (1971) and Shifter (2004), he further reveals that fourteen countries in Latin America in 1970 had constitutional provisions which allowed military forays into politics, and that in recent years the punishments for coup plotters were and are still low. For example, in Ecuador, the leader of the failed coup in 2000, Lucio Gutierrez, was allowed to contest the presidential elections only three years later.⁷¹ This practice of treating leaders of both successful and failed coups is common in Africa, and this partly accounts for the indiscriminate military coups by some members of the military who know that whether they succeed or fail there will be few or no consequences. In fact, some members of the military in Africa use a coup as a platform to launch themselves into prominence and political relevance and thus become members of the political elite. The situation is so bad that a significant percentage of the political and governing class in most African countries, Nigeria being an example, is made of ex-soldiers, many of whom have carried out or attempted a coup while in military service. On many occasions their influence in politics is not a result of their meritorious military service to their countries (as in countries such as the USA) but because of the *coup d'état* they carried out, through which they seized political power in order to accumulate and dispense state resources using a system of prebendalism and patronage. This enabled them to build a strong political power base that allows them to remain politically relevant even when their regimes are over.

The worsening economic condition across countries in Africa are also another variable. Although this variable is not recent, it is still germane to understanding the reemergence of military coups in Africa. For instance, the recent coups in Sao Tome and Principe in 2003, Niger in 2010 and the attempted coup in Lesotho in 2014 were caused by the high prevalence of poverty and lack of economic development in these countries. Africans have seen poverty levels increase in both civilian and military administrations. They have also witnessed repression and abuse of human rights in both military and civilian regimes. Hence, to most Africans, it does not matter whether civilians or military are in power since neither civilian administration nor military regimes have been able to change their economic conditions positively. This partly explains why the recent resurgence of military incursions into African politics has aroused little or no public resentment. In fact, it seems that attempts by civilian presidents in recent times to elongate their tenures and remain in power by manipulating the constitution and electoral processes have aroused more public resentment and protests than military coups.

From this analysis, it could be extrapolated that there are four major factors triggering the resurgence of military intervention in African politics in recent times:

1. Tenure elongation and the abuse of electoral democracy.
2. The rise of terrorism and the quest for national security.
3. Lack of severe consequence for leaders of military coups in Africa.
4. The persistence of weak socio-economic development.

While three of the factors are new, one is old. The first among the three new factors is tenure elongation quest and the manipulation of the constitution cum electoral processes by the sit-tight-in-power presidents. While the sit-tight-in-power mentality of some African presidents has made them alter the constitution and manipulate electoral processes so as to extend their stay in office, the governed have opposed such attempts and reacted through demonstrations and riots which sometimes turned violent, thus, leading to crises and social instability which have encouraged the military to intervene and seize power.⁷² No wonder Adetiloye and Duruji submit that “the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa is a reflection of [much] deeper problem,” and that what is common to recent military coups in Africa is “the issue of spill over from election dispute” as well as bad governance, which is usually cited by the coup leaders as the excuse for their intervention.⁷³

Moreover, the increasing threat to national security in some African countries caused by terrorist insurgents has prompted the quest for a strong political leadership that has the will and capability to deal decisively with terrorists and contain their acts of terror. In this context, the military has intervened in politics, claiming monopoly of such will and capability while accusing the civilian government of lacking the capacity and courage needed to wage a successful war against terrorist organizations that threaten national security.

Moreover, the culture of little or no consequences for military coups in Africa, which serves as an incentive for some military men who want to gain political relevance or fame, as they know full well that if their actions fail they will receive little or no punishment. But if they carry out a successful coup they will receive huge benefits, such as political power and entry into the political class.

Another factor which is not new but is still very relevant is weak economic development in Africa. In recent times, the poverty rate has doubled across the continent and the standard of living has fallen drastically. The military has intervened in politics in some instances with the aim of remedying the situation by eliminating corruption, which is believed to be the major cause of economic underdevelopment and abject poverty in Africa. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, these military interventions have worsened the continent’s bad economic conditions.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the final analysis, available evidence for most countries in Africa has shown that though some of the conventional theories about military intervention are still relevant today, they are perhaps no longer adequate to fully explain and understand the increasing resurgence of military incursions into African politics in recent times. New theories have emerged. While the old theory of weak socio-economic development is still very tenable, the character and nature of military coups in post-third wave democracy Africa point to new factors. These include the quest for tenure elongation and the attendant abuse of electoral

democracy, terrorism and the quest for national security, and lack of severe consequences for coup plotters. Based on these facts, the chapter concludes that the recent resurgence in military incursions into African politics is caused by a combination of variables. While some are new, others are those that pushed the military into politics in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. These include a lack of socio-economic development, the quest by incumbents to remain in power, which has led to the subverting of the electoral processes and social crisis, the rising threat to national security, which has led to a search for a strong political leadership that has the will and capacity to guarantee security, and the lack of severe political punishments for military coups.

Since these variables are at play to various degrees in most African countries, more of them would have experienced military coups or military rule in recent times if not for the severe rejection and sanctions that an unconstitutional change of government attracts from the international community, particularly from the AU and ECOWAS. It is therefore recommended that the best way to subject the military to civilian control and supremacy as well as to contain the increasing resurgence of military intervention is to tackle those variables which create the conditions that increase poverty and insecurity and to subvert those democratic processes that trigger crises and social instability, in turn encouraging military coups. In other words, there should be an end to the sit-tight syndrome and tenure elongation as well as to prejudiced and premeditated alteration of the constitution that is aimed at increasing or removing office terms to favor the incumbent. There should also be a rapid revival of the economy coupled with strengthening of state institutions, including the military, the police and paramilitary agencies, so they can address the rising threats to national security posed by terrorism. Finally, leaders of successful or attempted coups should face the maximum penalty as enshrined in the country's constitution, or be banned from contesting in elections and holding elected political positions. This is because a democratic constitution does not envisage or contemplate its subversion. All this would serve as deterrents to military men who want to use *coups d'état* to launch themselves into political relevance.

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Coups and Countercoups in Africa

Richard Obinna Iroanya

INTRODUCTION

Instability has remained a major feature of African politics since the dawn of independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. While instability manifests itself at three main levels, social, political and economic, in the African context emphasis is often placed on political instability mainly as a result of coups and countercoups. The singling out of political instability for analysis does not suggest a detachment or unrelatedness of social and economic instabilities to the political. These three forms of instabilities are intricately connected and mutually reinforcing. However, the overriding assumption appears to be that political instability characterized by the incessant overthrow of governments in Africa seriously impacts on the democratic governance, social and economic development of African states. While it is generally assumed that coups and countercoups produce adverse effects on all aspects of a country's life, some schools of thought still hold that the phenomena do have some positive effects on democracy (Collier 2009; Varol 2012; Thyne and Powell 2016, 192–213).

While coups and countercoups are relatively global phenomena, they are common in post-colonial African states. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s military coups and countercoups were more rampant in African politics. In the 1990s, however, African states witnessed fewer military incursions into politics (Miller 2011; Barka and Ncube 2012). The unprecedented rate of democratization in the 1990s led many to assume, rightly or wrongly, that Africa's march towards democratic governance was irreversible and that coups and

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countercoups had become things of the past. Credence was given to this assumption by democratizations, as well as a sustained campaign by energized African civil society, the end of the Cold War and global condemnation of military intervention in politics. Political instability in several African states as a result of military coups in recent times appears to suggest that believing the era of military incursions into African politics was over was a premature conclusion. Thus, coups and countercoups in Burkina Faso (September 2015), Mali (March 2012) and Guinea-Bissau (April 2012), as well as those that occurred in the Niger Republic (February 2010), Mauritania (August 2008), Guinea-Conakry (December 2008) and Guinea-Bissau (December 2008) tend to suggest a reversal of Africa's march towards enduring democracy and a tilt towards return to the praetorian era.

Consequently, an investigation into why the African state remains prone to military coups and countercoups despite an appreciable desire to establish sustainable democracy is the focus of this chapter. An analysis of the associated phenomena of coups and countercoups will entail a theoretical discussion of the internal and external factors, social, economic, political and historical conditions, which render the post-colonial African state susceptible to incessant military incursions into politics. The effects of military coups and countercoups are also highlighted and discussed, as are suggestions about how this challenge can be addressed at national and regional levels.

THE AFRICAN REGION AND MILITARY *COUPS D'ÉTAT*

As previously noted, African politics is characterized by military coups and countercoups. A *coup d'état* can be carried out by armed forces as well as civilian political actors. The focus in this chapter is on military coups and countercoups, however. Conceptually, a *coup d'état* refers to a sudden overthrow of a constitutional or in some cases unconstitutional state government (Sampford 1991; Miller 2011; Marinov and Goemans 2014). Such actions in all cases predominantly target the leader of the state (Thyne and Powell 2016) and the seizure of state security apparatuses. They usually result in the suspension of all democratic institutions, such as the constitution, legislature, executive, judiciary, political parties, the political system, electoral system and all government paraphernalia. They are usually perpetrated or sponsored by top officials of the armed forces and their internal and sometimes external supporters. This does not imply that there are no coups staged by junior military officers. Evidence shows that in the context of Africa they have a low success rate (Barka and Ncube 2012). Countercoups are those carried out against leaders who came to power through *coups d'état*. Contextually, constitutional governments are those legitimately elected by the electorate of a state. By contrast, unconstitutional governments refer to those regimes which came to power through the barrel of the gun or other forceful means. Generally, coups and countercoups are regarded as violent in nature. However, evidence exists to suggest that they can also be non-violent. The bloodless coup in Nigeria in which General

Ibrahim Babaginda overthrew the regime of General Muhammed Buhari in 1985 is a classic example of a non-violent coup. Studies have shown that since the era of political or “juridical independence” (Jackson and Rosberg 1986) in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the African region has experienced over 200 coups and countercoups (Barka and Ncube 2012). This figure is inclusive of successful and failed or attempted coups.

Extant literature on coups and countercoups is enormous, with competing theoretical frameworks for a systematic study of the phenomena. Earlier theories claimed that ineffective social mobilization, in the presence of a dominant ethnic group and multiple political parties, was accountable for political instabilities and military incursions into politics in the post-colonial African state (Jackson 1978). The fact of ineffective social mobilization in African states is incontestable. However, the presence of a dominant ethnic group in a multiethnic society is not sufficient to cause political instability or military *coups d'état*. This is because multiple ethnicity becomes destructive when deployed or exploited for political and economic ends by political actors. A multiparty system allows for equal participation and representativeness in a political system in the presence of strong public institutions such as the constitution and the rule of law. The multiethnic argument, however, provides a deeper insight into the understanding of coups and countercoups when adapted to accommodate other mutually reinforcing factors. In this regard, it is argued that multiple ethnicity produces destabilizing effects in the presence of ineffective constitutional arrangements, personalized rulership, economic lopsidedness and resistance to structural changes. These conditions are compounded by exclusionary politics, disrespect for the rule of law; harassment, prosecution and imprisonment of the opposition, as well as the existence of ethnicized, largely politicized and “heavily funded armed forces” (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, 4–5; Harkness 2016).

In this regard, Johnson, Slater and McGowan (1983) in their proposition place emphasis on the economy rather than on multiple ethnicity and social mobilization as a major cause of coups and countercoups. They argue that less social mobilization, political participation and pluralism, diversified commodity exports and sustained economic growth help to reduce the risks of military coups and countercoups. O’Kane (1993) agrees with the prescriptive economic argument of Johnson, Slater and McGowan (1983), but with a slight modification. The main argument is that economic activities such as world trade result in domestic uncertainties over which the African state lacks firm political control. World trade, according to O’Kane, encourages specialization and dependency on primary goods for export and revenue generation. However, primary goods are susceptible to global price fluctuations, which often incapacitate governments’ efforts to provide efficient service delivery and pursue development programs. Poor revenue generation and service delivery worsen the problem of poverty in the African state. Poverty exacerbation “renders even the most responsible governments open to accusations of incompetence and corruption, so inviting coup d’état” (O’Kane 1993, 622–639). The extent to which these conditions motivate military coups and countercoups is dependent, however,

on the absence or presence of “factors which hinder coups,” namely historical antecedents of coups and the presence of foreign military troops (O’Kane 1993).

Socio-economic formulations provide an insight into understanding the phenomenon of *coups d’état* because they recognize the role of external forces in Africa’s political instability. Economic arguments are also significant because they show how economic factors can result in social unrest and how social unrest can bring about military coups. Evidence from coup-prone African states supports this. However, the socio-economic reasoning is still limited. For example, if poverty exacerbation results in social unrest and provides motivation for coups and countercoups, what explanations can be provided for why coups and countercoups occurred in Africa during periods of relative economic prosperity? For example, Nigeria experienced relative economic prosperity during the oil boom of the 1970s, yet experienced coups and countercoups during this period. A predominantly economic argument appears to expunge from analysis the inordinate political ambitions of military officers consequent upon politicization of military institutions and covert foreign involvement. Similarly, economic arguments lessen the role of ethno-religious ramifications, weak public institutions and poor nation-building projects as causal factors of coups and countercoups (Adekanye 1992; Falola et al. 1994).

A dynamic economy alone cannot guarantee ethnic harmony, religious tolerance, strong public institutions and inclusive nation-building projects. These require skills in politico-social engineering. Specifically, the economic argument of O’Kane (1993) is flawed to the extent that it recognizes the presence of foreign military troops as a check against coups and countercoups in Africa. Differently stated, military coups occur in Africa when there is no foreign power providing security for the state and its leaders. The absence of military coups and countercoups in Botswana since independence ruptures O’Kane’s argument. Botswana has never hosted foreign military troops or bases. Similarly, both successful and failed military coups, in Gabon in the 1960s and in Côte d’Ivoire in the 1980s and the 1990s as well as in the new millennium, despite the presence of the French military, further weakens O’Kane’s argument. In addition, the presence of French military troops in Chad, Djibouti and the Central African Republic has prevented neither attempted nor successful military coups in these African states. Based on this, it may be argued that the presence of foreign troops does not necessarily prevent *coups d’état*. Foreign troops only intervene to foil coups when the interests of their governments are served by incumbent African governments or perceived to be at risk from the new regimes in power. The experience of Côte d’Ivoire and others suggests that rather than being a hindrance to coups and political instability, foreign military troops actually exacerbate coups and political instabilities.

The economic argument of O’Kane and others is influenced by Cold War thinking when geopolitical, military and economic considerations prompted the extensive involvement of foreign powers in African politics. Cold War interests rather than the stability of African states hosting foreign military troops

accounted for the extensive involvement and support of dictatorships during this epoch. Wang (1998) makes perhaps what could be regarded as a crucial observation with respect to foreign involvement in coups and countercoups in Africa. He links arms transfer to Africa by foreign powers to their increase.

Competing theoretical propositions differentially focus on the complex interaction of internal and external structural imperatives. In this regard, personal political ambitions; intra- and interelite squabbles or clash of interests are commonly cited as major causal factors of military coups and countercoups in Africa (Decalo 1976; Amuwo 1995). This argument holds that the African state is generally weak and as such is incapable of effectively implementing desired policies. A weak state is characterized by extreme fragmentation along ethnic, regional and religious lines, inefficient public institutions, divergent politico-economic interests and patrimonial networks. In such a state decision-making authorities are often blinded by patrimonialism (Van de Walle 1989, 580) and are relatively resistant to citizens' demands for improved living conditions and equitable access to state resources. Open resistance to citizens' demands is reinforced by a state monopoly on coercive power and the willingness to deploy such against opposition, civil society groups and citizens at large. A monopoly on coercive power ensures the perpetuation of exclusionary politics and creates an exaggerated confidence in public support of and obedience to the ruling elite. Hence, there is an unwillingness to relinquish political power without a struggle. Resistance to structural changes and the instability it brings motivates military officers who are intent on realizing personal political goals rather than salvaging the collapsed or collapsing political systems to attempt a coup or countercoup (Amuwo 1995).

Weak political institutions, patrimonial networks, limited political space, a monopoly of coercive power and mutually beneficial relationships between the political and military elites all engender a steady politicization of the military and a decline in professionalism. Amuwo (1993) argues that the military, by interfering "allegedly to halt a dangerous slide towards national catastrophe, has lost, in the process, its apolitical posture of noninvolvement in politics." Furthermore, he posits that the consequences of interference have been "military divisive politics and a multiplicity of conspiratorial groups" to the extent that the military has become "a big political talking shop where politics, politricks and politicking have free rein" (Amuwo 1993). With specific reference to Nigeria, Amuwo (1995) explains that:

rapid politicization gradually led to the abandonment of professionalism in favour of struggles, often bitter, for power and the wealth and fame this brings in its trail. Deep fissures and cleavages ensued so that today, the Nigerian military is little more than assorted array of conspiratorial groups, with multiple *chefs de file* each willing, whenever balance of forces is favorable, to attempt a seizure of power.

It is further argued that politicized and largely unprofessional African military institutions are characterized by three identifiable ideological strands: the

supremacist school, or what Amuwo (1995) classifies as right-wing ideology, the correctivist (centric) school and the reformist (revolutionary) school. Military supremacists are the most politicized elements of the African military. In addition to pointing out the constitutional functions of territorial protection, this school perceives the military as the custodian of the African state and its institutions and as being best positioned by virtue of discipline, organization and effective command system to provide effective leadership (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985; Ajayi 1999). As a result of this notion, continuous military involvement in politics is seen as necessary for sustained development of the African state. Contrary to the supremacist school, the correctivist school or what Amuwo (1995) classifies as “centrist” military thinkers, perceive the military as unfit for democratic governance by nature of their training and authoritarian command systems. Military correctivists, prime professionalism and swift return to civilian governance in cases where coups have occurred to correct misgovernance and prevent state disintegration. Military reformists, also referred to as the “left-wing thinkers” (Amuwo 1995), are mainly revolutionaries within the military. They tend to pursue speedy expulsion of the corrupt politico-military elite, the liberation of the African state and the establishment of a more inclusive and egalitarian state in which the military plays an active role. Specifically, these thinkers are concerned about remote foreign control of the African military. This school supports shared or joint leadership of the state between civilian political actors and military actors. The existence of these ideological strands among African military institutions sits behind the conclusions that coups produce contagious effects. A successful coup by one ideological strand in one country motivates coup attempts in other countries by similar ideologues.

Obviously, each strand of military ideology reserves some roles in politics for the military, thereby providing the basis for a fusion of state power and military power in the context of the African state. This perception is influenced, however, by Samuel Huntington’s theory regarding military preparedness for political leadership. Huntington (1981) theorized that professional discipline and status of the military pre-dispose them to rule well in societies with low political culture. In contrast, however, Finer (1962) stressed that an efficient democratic government can checkmate or reduce chances of military intervention in politics.

Often, a clash of interests between those who hold state power and those who hold military power results in a *coup d’état* to the approval of the citizens. The reason, as Amuwo (1995) observes, is that the sacking of “a government is seen, rightly or wrongly as a decisive opportunity for a new beginning towards nation-building and development.” This perception, as well as covert foreign support, remains a latent motivation for coups and countercoups in the African context. Continued political instability and an economic and social quagmire demonstrate that neither military regimes nor civilian governments have provided required leadership or addressed national questions affecting African states (Adekanye 1992; Falola et al. 1994). For both military and civilian leaderships,

the main political objective is always the same. Hutchful (1991, 185) observes that for both military and civilian governance in Africa it has never been about liberalization of national politics and the accommodation of differing interests or the provision of equal access to state resources.

From the foregoing, no single or unified theoretical construct of coups and countercoups in the African context exists. The absence of a single or unified theory partially explains the difficulty in predicting how, why and when coups and countercoups can occur. Different reasons for the difficulty in prediction include, among other things, their uniqueness in terms of originality, causality and socio-economic implications for states (Barka and Ncube 2012). Besides, coups and countercoups are products of complex interactions of socio-cultural, ethno-religious, historical, political, international, personal and economic imperatives in a given state. As political events, coups and countercoups constitute major obstacles to realizing more enduring democracy in Africa.

COUPS D'ÉTAT AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Coups and countercoups significantly affect democratic governance in the African context. Contextually, democratic governance is considered as a system in which leaders are answerable for their actions in the public domain by those who are led, who also indirectly participate in the governance process through their elected representatives (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Sen 1999b). Democratic governance in the economic sense engenders a sense of freedom and belonging among a state's citizens (Sen 1999b, 31–34). In the political sense, it is characterized, at a minimum, by supremacy of the constitution, rule of law, an independent judiciary, periodic elections and an independent electoral system, equal participation in politics through political parties and mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. The effects of coups and countercoups on democratic governance are evident at two levels: democratization and democratic consolidation (Miller 2011; Onwumechili 1998; Kieh and Agbese 2004; Harkness 2016; Thyne and Powell 2016).

EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION

Generally, democratization is a process of political change from repressive to democratic governance. It is characterized by a transition program, the adoption of a new constitution, the formation of political parties and the holding of general elections for public offices. Despite the observable negative effects of coups and countercoups on democracy, some strongly argue that they stimulate the process of democratization (N'Diaye 2009; Varol 2012). In this regard, Thyne and Powell (2016) consider coups and countercoups as shocks that push “staunchly authoritarian regimes off their continued path of repression.” Through robust statistical analysis they attempt to establish claims that coups act as catalysts for democratization. They hypothesize that both successful and failed coups within authoritarian regimes increase the likelihood of democratization.

Several instances of dictators forced out of power owing to their reluctance to introduce democracy and those who were forced to initiate a transition to democracy after failed coups are cited to support their claim.

While Thyne and Powell's (2016) as well as Varol's (2012) arguments regarding *coups d'état* are insightful, there are not sufficient grounds to accept their findings as complete. There is also no sufficient ground to accept the supporting evidence provided by their statistical analysis, especially in the African context because their cases were selected from different regions of the world. Rather it is argued that internal and external pressures brought on dictatorial regimes, and that an energized African civil society, democracy movements, civil rights groups, militant oppositions and the international community played a more significant role in ending military rule than a fear of coups and the willingness of authoritarian regimes to relinquish state power. The end of the Cold War and a consequent decrease in the importance of the African region in the geo-political/strategic calculations of the West resulted in the loss of military support and protection for dictatorial regimes in Africa and the consequent exposure, in some cases, to militant opposition (Miller 2011).

Democratization effected by military regimes in various African states laid a weak foundation for democracy to thrive. The reversal of the path away from military dictatorship supports this claim. Mali returned to military dictatorship after twenty years of democratic governance, for example. A solid political foundation relates to the adoption of a democratic constitution which addresses structural problems in a country. Writing and adopting a new constitution provides opportunities for open debate on difficult national questions; reaching agreements on terms of existence as a nation state and agreement on a system of governance. In many democracies constitutions are approved in an unrigged referendum. Consultation and active participation of the citizenry are necessary for the approval of new constitutions or constitutional amendments. In countries in Africa where a transition to democracy had occurred, dictatorial regimes had handed over power to elected leaders on the basis of constitutions written by authoritarian regimes without public participation. Such constitutions have been found to be defective in many cases because they failed to address serious structural problems responsible for political instability. For example, the 1999 constitution in Nigeria delivered by General Abdulasallami Abubakar's regime was made without public participation and scarcely addressed structural problems at the root of political instability in the country. In these imposed constitutions, national questions are brutally suppressed and disguised as resolved or simply overlooked as insignificant. Frequent military interference and guided democratization prevent the evolution of the stable democratic political culture that is necessary for strong political institutions. The lack of democratic political culture and the suppression of national questions continue to harm efforts that are made to achieve true democratization and democratic consolidation.

In many cases, what is regarded as democratization is a transformation from military dictatorship to civilian despotism. N'Diaye (2009) confirms that African military leaders have "the proclivity to manipulate transitions to

fulfil suddenly awakened self-seeking political ambitions.” A few examples will suffice. In Ghana, Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings took over power in 1979, conducting an election and handing over power to a civilian administration the same year. However, in 1981 he ousted the elected government of President Hilla Limann in a second military coup. This time he installed himself in power and later transformed himself from a military dictator to an elected autocrat in 1992. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni came to power through a *coup d'état* in 1986. Uganda democratized under him in 1996. Part of the democratization program was the adoption of a new constitution. The 1995 Ugandan constitution provided for a presidential term limit of two on a five-year tenure. This constitutional provision was important considering Uganda's history of dictatorial rule and the need to preclude the personalization of political power. Museveni won elections in 1996 and 2001. Constitutionally, his presidency should have ended in 2006. However, in 2005 he disregarded this important constitutional provision by calling for constitutional amendment to remove presidential term limit. This has enabled him to remain in power for thirty years. Despite the adoption of a multiparty system, Uganda remains a predominantly one-party autocratic state. In 2016 Museveni won another election that will keep him in office for another five years. On the campaign trail in 2016, he gave the reason why he cannot retire from politics in Uganda by stating: “This old man who has saved the country, how do you want him to go ... How can I go out of a banana plantation I have planted that has started bearing fruits?” (BBC 2016).

Major Pierre Buyoya terminated Burundi's democracy in 1987 when he ousted President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza in a *coup d'état*. After six years in power the military junta democratized Burundi in 1993. But the democracy did not last more than four months. The new president was killed and Burundi was plunged into a civil war. Pierre Buyoya staged another coup in 1996 and remained in power until 2003. Coups and democratizations have never resulted in democratic consolidation in the country. This is evident from President Paul Nkuruziza's disregard for constitutional provisions limiting him to a second term in office. Although he has survived a coup attempt, Burundi remains on the brink of another civil war as a result of suppressed and unresolved national questions.

In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré came to power in the palace coup of 1987, during which he killed his friend and confidant President Thomas Sankara. He democratized Burkina Faso in 1991 and in the process transformed himself from a military dictator to a civilian autocrat. He ruled Burkina Faso for twenty-seven years by winning elections that were widely regarded as fraudulent in 1998, 2005 and 2010. In 2014 Compaoré followed the example of Yoweri Museveni by attempting to amend Burkina Faso's constitution to extend his year despotic rule. This attempt drew Burkina Faso into a political turmoil in which Compaoré was forced out of power. Another instance can also be drawn from Liberia. Liberia moved from military tyranny and oppression under Samuel Doe to civilian despotism. This transformation did not translate

to fundamental changes in governance style, hence the descent of Liberia into a bitter civil war, in which Doe was killed.

Ideally, democracy provides a level playing field for electoral competition. However, most elections conducted by departing or democratizing military leaderships have been fraudulent and violent. The Nigerian general election in 1999, for example, was not only fraudulent but largely characterized by unprecedented electoral violence in which lives and property were lost. Departing Nigerian military leaders deliberately created an unequal political playing field in which retired military officers and civilian candidates with close military connections were heavily favored in the elections over their civilian opponents without military connections. The point being emphasized here is that what some scholars regard as democratization or democratic governance in Africa is in actual fact dictatorships in disguise. The Burkinabe, Liberian and Ugandan experiences demonstrate that imposed democratization results in defective democracy. It does not lead to democratic consolidation.

EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

As already pointed out, coups and countercoups negatively impact on democratic consolidation. Continuous democratic governance over a sustainable period of time is what is generally referred to as democratic consolidation (Thyne and Powell 2016). This does not come with a mere transition from dictatorship to civilian governance. It comes through stability and adaptability of public institutions which coups and countercoups do not guarantee. The first of such institutions is the constitution. This is the highest law in any state and usually stipulates the scope and limits of the powers of various organs of government at both national and regional levels. The continuous existence of a constitution and its adaptability to changing circumstances enhances democracy, while coups and countercoups resulting in suspension and replacement of constitutions during democratization hinder democratic consolidation.

Democratically, the making of a new constitution involves extensive consultations and debates that take into consideration people's history, traditions, political beliefs and practices. This is what Ekeh (2010) refers to as the spirit of constitution making. The military imposition of new constitutions during democratization dampens the spirit of constitution making. As Ekeh (2010) argues, constitution making takes into account "historical antecedents, traditional practices, sentiments and attitudes of the people towards governance." Therefore any constitution which "disrespects the constitutional history and practices of the people it is meant to serve is inherently defective." The defectiveness of the constitution is the reason why it is grudgingly accepted by the citizenry.

The Nigerian experience best illustrates the problem of operating under a defective constitutional framework imposed by the military. Nigeria's Second Republic (1979–1983) constitution and the truncated transition constitutions

of General Ibrahim Babangida (1988), General Sanni Abacha (1995) and General Abdul Salam Abubakar (1999) were all imposed on Nigerians.

The 1979 democratization process radically shifted Nigeria away from parliamentary democracy to an executive presidential system modeled on that of the United States. While the Nigerian state was still struggling to learn about and consolidate its executive presidential system, the military intervened again in 1983. It is also important to point out that between 1966 and 1978 the military promulgated decrees and counterdecrees that altered not only the governance structure of the Nigerian federation but also the ownership of and access to the country's economic resources. Instead of fiscal federalism and a decentralized administrative system inherited from colonial rule, a highly centralized or unitary form of administration was introduced. Interestingly, subsequent Nigerian constitutions have been used to endorse those undemocratic promulgations. The overall aims of both military decrees and constitutional arrangements appear to be the continuous existence of the Nigerian state and the deepening of centralization of power, access to and ownership of Nigerian economic resources. The constitutional arrangements hardly reflect the historical experiences, traditional practices, sentiments and attitudes of diverse ethnic Nigerian groups towards governance (Eke 2010). Their emphasis on centralization of power in the presence of the commodification of public office remains at the root of electoral violence, deepening corruption, factional fighting within political parties and the reason for military take-overs.

Inconsistent constitutional frameworks do not augur well for democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is a process which implies, among other things, full acceptance, continuous practice, mastery, improvement and adaptability of democratic governance to changing circumstances. Democratic consolidation eventually results in institutionalization. As Huntington (1968) opines, institutionalization is characterized by adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence in organization and procedure. Differently expressed, the continuous existence of political institutions over a long period of time and in the midst of serious socio-political challenges defines their integrity, resilience and institutional characterization (Huntington 1968, 12). Huntington's argument implies that political institutions require more than legislation to become institutionalized. In addition, institutional integrity and credibility, rules of conduct, goals, visions, policies and strategic plans must be accepted as a norm; independent, trusted and respected over a sustainable period of time. Attaining this level of consolidation has been difficult for political institutions in "democratized" Africa owing to frequent military interference and democratization.

African experience has shown that military-imposed democracy does not stand the test of time. Ghana's first attempt at democratization in 1979 after the first military coup ended in 1981, merely two years later. Sierra Leone's democratization in 1968 ended in a civil war in 1991 (twenty-three years); Liberia's democratization in 1985 ended in a civil war in 1990 (five years) and Mali's democratization in 1992 ended in 2013 (twenty-one years).

What may be seen from the African democratization experience is that the military lack the capacity to address structural problems that cause political instability. It is also deducible that frequent termination of democratic governance by the military does not allow for a maturing democratic political culture. More so, the transformation of military dictators to civilian despots does not alter dictatorial patterns of governance but rather gives it a democratic name. Constitutional manipulations prolong the autocracy of leaders in “democratized” Africa but remain largely unhealthy for democratic consolidation.

Defective constitutional frameworks affect political institutions requiring stability and adaptability for democratic consolidation such as political party, electoral, judiciary and legislative systems. For example, the instability and weakness of public institutions such as electoral management boards partially explains why several African governments have suffered a legitimacy crisis (Ogundiya 2009; Bamgbose 2011). This can be deduced from the fact that electoral frauds and violence are common features of African politics. It is necessary however, to point out that the existence of electoral frauds and violence does not suggest the absence of electoral laws. In principle, these forbid all forms of electoral frauds and violence. To forestall violence, political actors are often made to sign undertakings which commit them to free, fair, credible and transparent elections (Nwolise 2007). Specifically, in Nigeria party leaders and candidates are strictly obliged by law not to use violence, rigging and different forms of electoral malpractices to undermine the integrity and credibility of elections. Both politicians and electoral management boards are required to consistently educate and remind the electorate and party members of the need to refrain from certain actions that are capable of undermining the electoral process.

Despite these, with the exception of the 2015 elections, elections in Nigeria since 1999 have been marred by fraud and unprecedented violence. Forms of electoral violence witnessed have been physical, psychological and structural (Ochoche 1997; Woolies 2007; Ogundiya 2009). Thus, political assassinations, bombings, killings, burnings and the destruction of lives and property create an atmosphere of insecurity and also result in the loss of confidence in democratic processes. This implies a loss of faith in political leadership, institutions, laws and capabilities (Wig and Rød 2014). In such circumstances, the continued existence of the state is seriously threatened. The Ivorian experience under General Robert Guei in 2001 supports this assertion. For democratic consolidation to happen, governments must earn legitimacy through victory in a free and fair popular election. Militarily imposed democratization does not preclude electoral violence and fraud.

CONCLUSION

The focus of this chapter has been on the susceptibility of African states to military coups and countercoups despite the observable desire to establish sustainable democratic governance. Analysis has showed that democracy is a political

culture that evolves over time through sustained practice and adaptability to changing circumstances. Democracy can neither be imposed nor practiced without faults. Therefore, coups and countercoups that are often presented as necessary and corrective are illegal and obstructive to sustainable democracy. Theoretical explanations have demonstrated that internal and external factors of a social, economic, political and historical nature render the African state susceptible to incessant military incursions into politics. In this regard weak political institutions, patrimonial networks, limited political space and a monopoly of coercive power have been highlighted and discussed as possible causes of military intervention. Equally implicated have been factors such as the mutually beneficial relationship between political and military elites, which engenders a steady politicization of the military and a decline in military professionalism.

Poor economic performance and a consequent increase in social problems such as unemployment, ethnicity and religiosity have also been identified as contributory factors. However, considering that military cadres of diverse ethno-religious and regional identities straddle identified ideological schools within the military, it has been suggested that social problems such as ethnicity and religion may be unjustifiably projected as contributory factors in coups and countercoups. This does not suggest the absence of ethnicity, regional divisions and religiosity in African politics, but is a counterargument that they obscure “structural and vertical divisions,” which pose serious challenges to African states (Amuwo 1995).

Military coups and countercoups have been shown to produce serious negative effects on democratic governance in different ways. They obstruct evolutionary democratization through the sustained practice of democracy and the prevention of stability and adaptability of public institutions. Characteristically, successful military coups result in the suspension of a country’s constitution, the dissolution of legislative assemblies, the suspension of political activities and the imprisonment of political leaders. The replacement of the constitution by military decrees has been shown to be antithetical to democracy. Over time, the arbitrary exercise of power which military decrees engender becomes “normal” political practice. Similarly, the imposition of constitutions during democratization betrays the spirit of constitution making. This is because little or no effort is made to debate national questions, stimulate national consciousness or to legitimate the constitution through a referendum.

Democratic consolidation in the context of imposed democracy has been shown to be difficult owing to frequent military interference (Harkness 2016). Democratization, it has been suggested, goes beyond conducting elections and inaugurating civilian leaders. Democratization connotes the transformation from military dictatorship to civilian despotism, and also must of necessity alter dictatorial patterns of governance and enhance the stability, adaptability and development of political institutions. Democratization characterized by electoral frauds and violence prevent “democratized” African governments from enjoying the legitimacy that is needed for enduring democracy.

Overcoming frequent military interference and consolidating democracy in Africa would require a concerted effort in addressing fundamental governance challenges confronting democratized Africa. Such efforts must ensure that democratization does not end in the imposition of new constitutions and the conducting of general elections. It should entail continuous application of the principles of democracy in all public institutions.

Preventing coups and countercoups should also entail a reconsideration of the concept of leadership. This should not be personified in those holding public offices but be entrusted to political institutions. Institutional leadership should therefore be emphasized over charismatic or personalized leadership. This will enhance political pluralism, accountability, transparency, integrity and the rule of law, as well as assisting in the reorientation of the military towards professionalism and deference to civilian control.

For democratic consolidation to take place, democratic governments must of necessity be anchored on the socio-economic empowerment of the citizenry. This entails the initiation and implementation of policies which ensure poverty reduction and equal economic opportunities for all citizens. Democracy cannot be firmly established and sustained in the presence of poor economic performance, high unemployment and social disorder. Sustainable levels of economic development through the diversification of African economies and encouraging results in productive capacities is necessary. Significant improvement in the economy should be reflected in the living standards of the citizenry. This will entail, among other things, alleviating through social security measures the effects of social problems such as unemployment. This is necessary in order to preclude or reduce the chances of social violence, which provides the premise for military incursion into politics. Sustained international and regional pressure is necessary in order to forestall military coups and countercoups. It sends a strong signal to would-be coup plotters. While the African Union's policy of suspending and sanctioning coup leaders needs to be sustained, strong condemnation of despotic and repressive leaderships masquerading as democracies is also important. Sham elections in which military dictators transform themselves into civilian autocrats should be discouraged because evidence shows they are used to legitimate the illegitimate.

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Military and Transition Politics

Rotimi Ajayi and Yusuf Ibrahim

INTRODUCTION

One challenge that Africa has faced for decades is the legacy of military dictatorship and authoritarianism, and the attendant negative effects on the continent's political economy. At different times in all parts of Africa, constitutional governments have given way to military-imposed laws, total disregard for the rule of law and flagrant violation of fundamental human rights (Hutchful and Baily 1998, 10). The history of military intervention in African politics dates to 1952 when the military in Egypt overthrew the monarchy and instituted significant institutional and structural reforms, leading to a new phase in the politics of the country. Between this period and 1990, Africa witnessed over seventy-one military coups (Thomson 2000). The figures stood at 200 as at 2012 (Barka and Ncube 2012), most of these interventions being products of debilitating socio-economic and political conditions and the neglect of the complex, multicultural and ethnically polarized social structure of African societies by the various civilian regimes across the continent. However, the failure of the military in addressing these conditions in the countries where they intervened, coupled with other internal and external dynamics, led to the inevitability of military withdrawal from politics and the different forms of transitional arrangements across Africa. This chapter addresses the nature of military transition politics in Africa with an emphasis on Nigeria, Ghana, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Niger Republic. The discussion is phased along three developmental stages in Africa, namely the pan-Africanist, nationalist and global merchants eras.

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The first generation of military leaders in Africa, particularly from the 1960s, could arguably be described as pan-Africanists, given their commitment to a reversal of the misfortunes that characterized most post-colonial African societies. The most noticeable military interventions in Africa in the 1960s were those in the republic of Togo in 1963 by Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema, who toppled the first president of the country, Sylvanus Olympio; in Congo Kinshasa (now Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), which witnessed its first coup by Colonel Joseph D. Mobutu in November 1965; the military intervention in Algeria the same year by Colonel Houari Boumedienne; the military strike in Nigeria in 1966 by Major Nzeogwu Chukwuma Kaduna, paving the way for a succession of military rulers for the next thirteen years; a month later in Ghana, when the military staged a coup led by Colonel Akwasi Amankwaah Afrifa; in 1968 in Mali by Lieutenant Moussa Traore; and in 1969 in Libya, when it was the turn of Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi.

One common feature of these putsches was that the civilian authorities were displaced by young military officers ingrained with radical, nationalist and pan-African ideology on one hand and a strong aversion to foreign interference, especially by the former colonial masters, in the affairs of these newly independent states on the other. Though there were varied internal contradictions and vagaries of the external environment that triggered these interventions, it appeared that most of the new military rulers were opposed to the subservience of their states to the dominant foreign interests of the capitalist West (Adetiloye and Duruji 2013, 7). Coinciding with the Cold War era, and its East–West rivalry, most of these new rulers adopted a socialist ideology in running their states, and this was reflected in their anti-West policies and posture.

The period 1970–1980 could be described as the nationalist era. Torn between the exigencies of “under the tree” rule and the pressure of Cold War politics, the leadership opened avenues for soldiers to step in as power-brokers or nationalist states. Prominent among the military coups in the 1970s were the experiences in Uganda in 1971 by Idi Amin Dada; in Ethiopia in 1974 by General Haile Selassie, in Nigeria by General Murtala Muhammed, and in Ghana in 1979 by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. These groups of soldiers emerged with a nationalist posture that was intended to build the true African state by uprooting all colonial heritages and restoring the dignity of Africa through service delivery to the people. Of all the military interventions within this period, General Murtala Mohammed of Nigeria appears the most benevolent, as his six months in power was widely accepted by Nigerians.

There was also a military intervention in Liberia in April 1980 that led to the overthrow of Williams Tolbert by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe. Another coup took place in Ghana in 1981, once again by Rawlings. During this period, Nigeria witnessed two military coups, one by Major General Muhammadu Buhari in 1983 and the other by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1985. Similarly, Captain Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) staged a coup

in 1983. Colonel Lansana Conte of Guinea staged his coup in 1984, while Yoweri Museveni of Uganda's National Resistant Army (NRA) took over in 1986. Thomas Sankara's military rule seems to have been the most spectacular, as he instituted a national reform where all citizens were active participants in his regime.

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of global merchants, as military rulers were not only economically parasitic but also plunged their nations into debilitating structural, economic and financial crises. For example, General Ibrahim Babangida's regime in Nigeria virtually surrendered the country to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in a most controversial Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), with its attendant economic and political distortions and dislocations.

To be sure, despite interventions of African nations acting under the auspices of the African Union (AU), aimed at stemming the tide of militarism, the wave of military take-over has continued in the twenty-first century: thus, the recent military take-overs in Côte d'Ivoire by Guillaume Soro and in CAR by François Bozizé. In Guinea Bissau, the military through General Verissimo Conneia Seabra overthrew the civilian government, and in Mauritania the military struck through Ould Ahmed Taya to complete the list within this period.

THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

Apart from toppling elected governments across the continent, there are few instances where the military have also frustrated attempts at democratization. Chege (1995) gives us a vivid account of how military units scuttled the chances of democratic consolidation in Rwanda when the presidential guards, predominantly Hutu, suspicious of late President Juvenal Habyarimana signing a treaty with the Tutsi rebels group (Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front) and possible integration into the army staged a military coup. Most importantly, the intervention was informed by the fear of losing relevance and patronage in the incoming government.

In Burundi, the October 1993 anti-government massacre was carried out by Tutsi militarist hardliners of the Melchor Ndadaye government (Mothibe 1999; Chege 1995). Moreover, a section of Lesotho's army revolted against the government of Ntsu Mokhele twice in 1993. And in the events leading to the April elections in 1994, a splinter group of the South African Armed Forces (defense force and police) openly supported the right-wing efforts to scuttle the advance to majority rule. The military have equally used their guns against democratic forces in the DRC, Congo Brazzaville, Nigeria and the Republic of Togo in West Africa. Similarly, the military in Niger and Congo joined forces, albeit unsuccessfully, with antidemocratic forces to scuttle democratic consolidation (Nnoli n.d.).

The dominant interest of these political soldiers led to the termination of the transition programs in Nigeria and Algeria at their very end, when the political

parties and the candidates that were not supported by the military leaders had virtually won the elections. Since the military was not able to control civilian succession to its rule, the only option left was to reimpose military rule and heighten repression. More unabashedly, in Zaire (now DRC) and Togo, undemocratic forces used the military to block any progress to elected regimes, preferring to foist the military leaders on the countries as constitutional rulers through sham elections (University of Central Arkansas 2015, 16).

MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT FROM POLITICS

The reasons for military disengagement from politics generally have been explained by scholars from different perspectives. Some of these reasons, as we shall see, differ from country to country based on their peculiarities, but in general they consist of a multiplicity of factors and forces within and/or outside the political environment (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 12). For instance, the voluntary disengagement of the General Obasanjo and Jerry Rawlings juntas in Nigeria and Ghana respectively in the 1970s was not necessarily an acceptance by the military of established democratic values, but rather could be seen as products of existing socio-economic and political conditions which exerted serious pressure on the military to hand over to civilians. The factors that triggered the disengagement in those countries include, among others, the fear of the military's increasingly violent disposition, the fear of counter coup, and pressure from different civil society groups such as organized labor, students, journalists, trade unions, professional groups, sections of the political class and the international community. These reasons could also be applied generally in those countries that have witnessed various forms of transitional arrangements.

For the purpose of this chapter, three main types of political disengagement or transition are discussed. These are revolutionary transition, sovereign national conference transition and evolutionary top to bottom transition. The revolutionary transition is mostly sudden and violent. It is often carried out by very radical minds and can either be by a military, paramilitary or organized militia/rebel group(s) with sweeping reforms. Examples of revolutionary transition are the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Ugandan Revolution under Yoweri Museveni and the Zairean (DRC) Revolution under Kabila. The sovereign national conference (SNC) is above all a consensus transition with a national outlook and acceptance. This can also be described as people-centered, as the will of the people appears dominant unlike in the top-down model. A classic example of how the SNC transition worked is in the Republic of Benin in West Africa. A top to bottom transition is usually initiated by those at the top without any significant contribution from the people (Ibrahim 2003, 9). The military has prescribed the evolutionary top to bottom type for Nigeria. They alone decided the conditions of their exit without any input from the people. Subsequent sections examine case studies of military transition models across Africa.

THE MILITARY AND TRANSITION POLITICS IN AFRICA

Africa military regimes have organized different forms of transition programs, ranging from the obviously insincere and parochial to the genuine. In this chapter, we shall limit the discourse to Nigeria, Ghana, Niger and CAR respectively.

Nigeria

Nigeria is well known for elaborate transition programs undertaken by its numerous military rulers, beginning with the first, spearheaded by the General Murtala Mohammed regime in 1975, and concluded in 1979 by General Olusegun Obasanjo. The transition which followed the toppling of General Yakubu Gowon could best be described as an integument for legitimacy, as the failure of Gowon to fashion out a process of return of power to civilians not only alienated him from the political class but also served as one of the bases of Murtala Mohammed's seizure of power. Even the assassination of Mohammed in a failed coup attempt in 1976 could not stop the transitional arrangement as Obasanjo, his successor, showed a total commitment to its actualization.

Hence, with the foundation clearly laid with the inauguration of an electoral commission, creation of local governments, the setting up of a Constitution Drafting Committee and a Constituent Assembly and the completion of their assignment of drafting a new constitution for the country, the stage was set for the lifting of the military ban on political activities in September 1978. Consequently, five political parties were registered to contest the elections. These were the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigeria People's Party (NPP), People's Redemption Party (PRP) and Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP). It is to the credit of the military administration and electoral body that the elections were peacefully conducted at local and state levels until the anomaly surrounding the constitutional interpretation of the requirement of two-thirds of the nineteen states to vote for a winner of the presidential election came into play. The Supreme Court later adjudicated on the issue and declared Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN the winner of the presidential election. General Obasanjo immediately handed over the reins of government to the new civilian government on October 1, 1979, marking the beginning of another chapter in the politics of Nigeria. The Murtala/Obasanjo transition program could be described as an evolutionary top to bottom in which only the military decided the conditions of their withdrawal.

This was at variance with the General Babangida transition program that came thirteen years later. For instance, while the four-year Murtala/Obasanjo program was regulated by two basic laws, General Babangida promulgated fifty-seven decrees containing a total of 1174 sections to execute his six-year transition program between 1986 and 1992. Consequently, in the latter, implementing these laws (and their numerous amendments) was enmeshed in controversies and allegations of government insincerity in implementing

the transition agenda. Adebisi (1998, 5) describes the situation this way: “under General Babangida Nigeria became more or less a laboratory for all sort of political experiments from the seemingly genuine to the absurd.” General Babangida came up with several experiments in his political engineering, among which is the famous “option A-4.” This required that a candidate competing for an office emerged from the electoral district called a ward to local government council level and the state to federal level in the case of presidential candidates. Realistically, this political strategy achieved significant success by ensuring that only the candidate with the widest political support was elected at all levels. Odinkalu (n.d.) describes it this way:

General Babangida’s political programme was promulgated in Decree no. 19 of 1987. This decree originally outlined a programme of transition, scheduled to begin in the third quarter of 1987, with the establishment of a Directorate of Social Mobilisation, a National Electoral Commission (NEC) and a Constitution Drafting Committee (later established as the Constitution Review Committee, CRC) in the third quarter of 1987. In addition, the programme listed in six schedules, an itemized timetable of 19 other activities and measures to be implemented during the transition period. These included local government elections on a zero-party basis in the last quarter of 1987, the termination of the Structural Adjustment Programme(SAP) and the consolidation of its gains in 1988, the lifting of the ban on politics and the registration of two political parties in 1989, the inauguration of elected state governments in 1990, the conduct of a national census in 1991 and the inauguration of a new president in 1992.

But as beautiful and laudable as this program appeared to be, Nigerians did not see it materialize. Babangida had envisioned a two-party state, and for this reason he had decreed two political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) (Edeh 1999). At the primaries leading to the presidential elections, Chief M.K.O. Abiola and Bashir Tofa emerged as the flag bearers of SDP and NRC respectively. But following a successful election, attested to by both local and foreign observers, and on the verge of Moshood Abiola of the SDP being declared the winner, a bewildered nation woke up to the rude shock of an announcement by the ruling junta, which was canceling the outcome of the elections. Following pressures from within and outside the country, General Babangida was forced to hand over power to an interim national government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan in 1993.

As the debate over the legality or otherwise of the ING raged, especially when a Lagos High Court declared it “illegal,” General Abacha again took over the reins of government in another military coup on November 17, 1993. In line with previous traditions, he again halted the transitional arrangement and put in abeyance all existing democratic structures at local, state and federal levels, and consequently returned the country to a full-blown military dictatorship.

As a ploy to buy both time and legitimacy as well as placating Nigerians, the Abacha regime instituted the National Constitutional Conference (NCC), instead of the much-anticipated Sovereign National Conference (SNC). Eventually, the NCC was opposed by a large section of the pro-democracy movement, which among other actions mobilized the populace to boycott the selection of delegates. This resulted in a low voter turnout. Adebisi (1998) argued that the aftermath of Babangida's failed transitional agenda, especially the military rulers' skeptical disposition towards the hand-over of power, instilled fear and an apathetic culture within the Nigerian political class when General Abacha lifted the ban on political activities in 1998. Subsequent events, beginning with the flawed local government elections on a non-party basis in March 1996, later justified this position. Not only were aspirants who were considered "anti-military" disqualified, but the regime imposed its preferred candidates on the councils. Remarkably, some of the candidates who were cleared to contest the elections had their candidature withdrawn on the day of the election to pave the way for the emergence of the junta's stooges, in a clear demonstration of an outright disregard for democratic principles and tenets. For instance, in the Abuja municipal election where election to the council was deadlocked, the choice of candidate was decided by tossing a coin rather than resorting to the law court or a rerun of the election.

The political drama continued in the second quarter of 1996, when the Abacha regime created six additional states ostensibly as a means of placating sections of a weary and bewildered nation. Within the same period, the process of registering political parties commenced and was completed in the third quarter, with the delineation of electoral constituencies and the production of an authentic voters' register. Unlike his military predecessor, General Abacha opted for a multiparty democracy following the registration of five political parties, namely United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), Congress for National Consensus (CNC), National Conscience Party of Nigeria (NCPN), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN) and Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM). But in terms of a commitment and sincerity to a successful transition, both military juntas were of the same disposition, with Abacha perhaps exhibiting a more draconian and violent approach to his ambition to transmute into a civilian ruler, using the platforms of the five political parties. In pursuit of this agenda, Abacha was definitely in league with other African leaders who embarked on tailor-made transition programs in which they were the ultimate beneficiaries and inheritors of power. They include Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.

Consequently, it was obvious that every stage of the transition process was stage managed in furtherance of the interest of the military emperor. For instance, elections of state governors were put on hold apparently to forestall a possible clash of civil and military laws. Moreover, federal parliamentarians who were elected into the two National Assembly chambers were not allowed to perform the responsibilities of their office. The most absurd was the general's adoption by the five political parties as their sole presidential candidate in

an election that was meant to produce a civilian successor to the military administration, this taking place in collaboration with sections of traditional institutions, youth organizations and the business class who were apparently mobilized to propagate an Abacha presidency (Edeh 1999; Ojo 2014), prompting the description of these parties by Bola Ige (a former governor and top politician) as “the five fingers of a leprous hand.” The mobilization for Abacha reached a climax in March 1998 with the organization of the march of a purported 2 million men in Abuja by the National Council of Youth Associations of Nigeria (NACYAN) to “persuade” the military head of state towards making a presidential declaration. But General Abacha spared no opposition as the nation degenerated into the worst form of terror, culminating in the arrest and imprisonment of labor leaders, human rights and civil society activists and military officers, and the outright murder of prominent political figures, including the wife of Moshood Abiola, Kudirat.

However, this was terminated following Abacha’s death in 1998 and his successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, commenced a completely new political agenda that would culminate in the transfer of power to elected civilians on May 29, 1999. Under the transition arrangement, the new junta announced the dissolution of all existing political parties established by the Abacha regime, the scrapping of the National Electoral Commission (NECON) and cancellation of all elections held by the previous administration. In addition, General Abubakar announced the release of all political detainees, while those in exile were invited to return home to help build a strong democracy for Nigeria. To affirm his determination for a genuine transition program, the new ruler established a new electoral body called the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

INEC subsequently registered three political parties after a screening of several political associations that emerged in response to calls by the military rulers for expression of interest. The political parties were the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the All Peoples Party (APP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). General Abubakar had earlier inaugurated a committee headed by Justice Niki Tobi of the country’s Court of Appeal to coordinate debates on what is today the 1999 Constitution. The transitional arrangements culminated in the election of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP as the new president, signaling the advent of the fourth republic and the end of military sixteen-year authoritarianism and the top to bottom process of democratization (Vaughan and Ihonvbere 1999, 7).

All the transition programs discussed here have some basic similarities. The most obvious is that the military authorities drew the guidelines for all the transition arrangements, supervised the process and played a significant role in who emerged as their successors. For instance, the 1979 hand-over exercise was greeted with widespread criticism following the feared manipulation of the judicial process to tilt victory towards Alhaji Shehu Shagari, who eventually became president, in the determination of what constituted two-thirds of the nineteen-state structure, a provision that candidates were to fulfill in order to be elected into that office. Similarly, in 1993, General Babangida refused

to hand over power to Moshood Abiola by annulling an election in which he was already coasting to victory. The atrocities of General Abacha have already been documented, and they were the high point of official manipulation and desecration of the electoral process to suit the whims and caprices of a single individual. Even the seemingly benevolent Abubakar transition program was not bereft of military class interest, as Olusegun Obasanjo, the beneficiary of the entire process, was widely seen as the preferred candidate of the military constituency where he had once held sway as Commander-in-Chief. Obasanjo's presidency was meant to secure military corporate and personal interests, and it was therefore less surprising that the PDP, founded by top military brass and their civilian counterparts, was at the forefront of that crusade.

Ghana

The first military coup in Ghana was staged by Lieutenant General Ankrah, who overthrew the government of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 and immediately set up the National Liberation Council (NLC). The NLC's transition to civil rule program took the familiar Nigerian route, commencing with the setting up of a Constitution Commission (CC), a constituent assembly, lifting the ban on politics, electioneering campaigns, elections and the final handing over of power to civilians.

To ensure that the old guard, especially those of the former regime were prevented from participating in the electoral process, a controversial Election and Public Offices Disqualification Decree was published on January 29, 1968, which barred certain members of the CPP from holding office for ten years (Esew 2002). There was a comprehensive ban initially on CPP activists and employees by Decree No. 223, even though those affected could appeal to the Exemption Commission. The decree was eventually replaced with a new one following public reactions and outcry. Hutchful (1973, 402) opines that:

the NLC was not consistent on the banning of former CPP activists and even though some of them appealed to the Exemption's Commission, while the case was still pending, the NLC came out with yet another decree disqualifying 152 CPP officials for a ten-year period.

Among the measures taken immediately after the successful displacement of Dr. Nkrumah's CPP government was the abrogation of the Republican Constitution (Austin 1964, 106). As a result, before the advent of a new civilian government a new constitution would have to be drawn for the nation. This was exactly what the NLC did as a new Constitutional Commission was established, comprising eighteen outstanding Ghanaian citizens (Austin 1964, 9). Chief Justice Akuffo Addo (Austin 1964, 108) was appointed its chairman. The draft document was a combination of the Whitehall and Washington models, with a different viewpoint in favor of fundamental freedoms and civil rights (Esew 2002).

The report of the Constitutional Commission was completed and presented to the NLC, which forwarded it to a Constituent Assembly (CA) to deliberate upon it before final approval. The main features of the draft constitution as recommended included a ceremonial head of state, a 140-member National Assembly and the office of ombudsman. The transition time was actually very brief, since the ban on political activities was lifted on May 1, 1969. Elections were scheduled to be held on August 29, 1969 and the NLC was to hand over power finally on September 30, 1969. Even though the NLC made it categorically clear right from the beginning that it was not interested in holding on to power and as a result set up modalities for the transfer of power to civilians, the ban on political activities still remained in force. Intrinsically, there was no way politicians, particularly; those in opposition to the CPP, could openly assemble.

In view of the abridged nature of the transition timetable from May to September 1969, all the same elaborate and sophisticated background planning had been undertaken by various civilian advisory committees. Political parties were formed immediately the military lifted the ban on political activities and organized themselves, mobilizing their supporters in readiness for the elections in September.

The process to pick a civilian government under the new Ghanaian constitution began with an extensive electioneering campaign that lasted for four months from August 29, 1969 and by September 1 voting was completed. A total of 479 candidates filled nomination papers and there were 2.5 million registered voters (Price 1977, 135).

This brought to an end the first military rule in Ghana on September 30, 1969 and Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia was sworn in as the prime minister. Dr. Busia had to wait almost a month after winning the elections before he was sworn in, a situation that afforded him sufficient time to select and name his cabinet. It is sad to state here that in spite of the military efforts in transferring power to civilians, there were still traces of military rule under the guise of the three-man Presidential Commission which appointed the members of the Council of State. This Council of State was appointed to assist the prime minister in discharging his duties. It must be pointed out that Dr. Busia did not feel comfortable with this arrangement. A way of doing away entirely with military rule had to be sought through Parliament, in which he controlled 75% of the seats.

Characteristic of African politics, the Progress Party (PP) became oppressive and clamped down on opposition. The government outlawed the Ghana People's Party (GPP), which it thought was the reincarnation of the CPP in August 1971, and subsequently passed a law banning the restoration of Nkrumah or the CPP. The bitter politics between the CPP and the UP before independence was resuscitated.

The military felt disparaged by Dr. Busia's government's economic policies, which affected the officers in a personal way as car maintenance allowances were abolished, rents for officers' houses were doubled and officers were asked to pay part of their electricity and water bill, these services previously having been supplied free of charge by the government. There were also forced

retirement or semiretirements of some eleven senior officers). Despite its majority seats in Parliament, with 105 of the 140 seats and the overwhelming support enjoyed from Ghanaians, Dr. Busia lost control over his government, which failed to implement the constitutional provision for the declaration of assets by MPs; and the military saw this as good grounds to intervene again.

Lieutenant Colonel I.K. Acheampong, the Acting Commander of I Brigade, led a successful and bloodless military coup d'état and overthrew Dr. Busia on January 13, 1972 (Price 1977, 138). Like Dr. Nkrumah, who was toppled while on an official visit to Hanoi, Dr. Busia too was thrown out of office while on his way to London for a medical checkup. Shortly after Dr. Busia was overthrown, Lieutenant Colonel I.K. Acheampong sacked the prime minister, suspended the Constitution, dissolved Parliament and banned all political parties, announcing the establishment of the National Redemption Council (NRC) with some civilians as members to bring to an end to the malpractice, economic mismanagement and arbitrary dismissals which had been characteristic of the regimes of Dr. Busia and Dr. Nkrumah (Esew 2002).

Colonel I.K. Acheampong justified this intervention and promised that power would soon return to civilians, as the measures taken were temporary—as is customary with all military juntas (Price 1977, 139). But the popular protests triggered by Colonel Acheampong's reluctance to hand over power to a civilian government led to his forced resignation on July 5, 1978, and the emergence of General F.W.K. Akuffo, the Chief of Defense Staff, as the new head of state. Citing massive corruption and maladministration, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged his first coup in 1979, for which he was arrested and tried publicly. But while the trial was on, his collaborators, led by Captain Boakye Djan, staged the second coup, which led to the establishment of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the chairmanship of Jerry Rawlings.

The AFRC embarked on a house-cleaning exercise which claimed the lives of three former heads of state, Generals A.A. Afrifa, I. K. Acheampong and F.W.K. Akuffo. In addition, five military officers were also tied to the stake and executed. A senior army chief, Odarthey Wellington, then Chief of Defense Staff, died in action while attempting to suppress the rebellion. Rawlings subsequently supervised a transition program that brought Dr. Hilla Liman to power as president in 1979 (Hutchful 1998, 8).

The revolutionary approach of Rawlings' transition agenda showed him clearly as a Pretorian guardian different from the Pretorian ruler regime type of Generals Babangida and Abacha's dispensations. It was apparent that Rawlings' emergence on the political scene was to cleanse the Augean stable left by the civilian political class, institute a new political culture founded on transparency and accountability, and thereafter hand over to a civilian regime. Thus his was a transitional arrangement devoid of the superfluous and widening social, economic and political programs characteristic of sit-tight rulers. But whether Rawlings succeeded in that task is a different issue.

Niger Republic

Just like Nigeria and Ghana, the military took over power in Niger in 1987 through General Ali Seibou, but as a result of international pressure mounted against him by pro-democracy demonstrators, a new constitution was adopted by popular referendum in 1992. Mahamane Ousmane was elected president under the platform of the Alliance of Forces for Change in 1993, but his government was overthrown in January 1996 by Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, who eventually became president in fraudulent polls (Freedom House 2012). President Baré Maïnassara was assassinated in April 1999 by members of the presidential guard, and to avoid a power vacuum, the guard commander spearheaded a transition government that began with the conduct of a referendum in July and subsequently ended with competitive elections in November. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Mamadou Tandja, who was massively supported by the National Movement for Developing Society (MNSD) and the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) parties, won the presidential election in a poll that was adjudged to be free and fair by local and international observers. At the same time, the MNSD and the CDS won the majority of seats in the National Assembly. Again, Tandja contested in the 2004 elections and was reelected, and in concurrent legislative elections four political parties joined the MNSD and CDS to further secure majority seats. Following cracks within the MNSD, Prime Minister Hama Amadou's government in 2007 lost the confidence of parliament consequent upon charges relating to financial malfeasance. The National Assembly was dissolved by Tandja following the lawmakers' refusal to approve a constitutional referendum that would delay the 2012 presidential election, increase executive powers and remove executive term restrictions in May 2009. He thereafter announced that he would rule by decree under emergency powers (Freedom House 2012). His desperation to stay in power saw him score a political point as the controversial constitutional changes were adopted by referendum in August amidst wide spread protest across the country, but observers rejected the result as fraudulent. Tandja's political maneuverings continued as emergency rule was lifted later in the month and legislative elections were announced to replace the dissolved National Assembly in October 2009. In a swift reaction, key opposition leaders boycotted the poll, giving room to Tandja's MNSD to capture a majority of seats. The international community denounced the elections, while the sub-regional organization Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Niger.

The military struck in February 2010, through Major Salou Djibo, and immediately set up the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), placed Tandja under house arrest, suspended the constitution and dissolved all governmental institutions. But in an effort to return power back to civilians, the junta appointed a transitional government which created the National Consultative Council, a 131-member body saddled with the responsibility of drafting a new constitution and electoral code, and a transition

Constitutional Council to replace the Constitutional Court. As lofty as these institutional reforms were, as was the designation of a prime minister, Major Salou Djibo remained the de facto head of state without any genuine checks on his powers. In a referendum conducted in October 2010, 90% of participating voters massively voted in favor of a new constitution with a turnout of approximately 52%.

On January 31, 2011, presidential, legislative and municipal elections were conducted in a free atmosphere. The representatives of the transitional government and the members of the junta were banned from contesting for offices. Out of the total 113-seat National Assembly, the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNSD) led by a long-time opposition leader Mohammadou Issoufou, won the highest number of seats, thirty-seven. The MNSD Seini Oumarou, former prime minister, came second with twenty-six seats, while Hama Amadou's Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation (MDN) won twenty-five seats.

Since there was no winner in the first round of the presidential elections, Issoufou and Oumarou emerged as the top two candidates winning 36% and 23% respectively. Amadou, who came third with 20%, later declared his support for Issoufou. With this development, Issoufou claimed victory with 58% of the votes in a runoff election in March. International observers and the media adjudged the presidential and legislative elections to be free, fair and credible despite minor administrative glitches.

Central African Republic (CAR)

Since its independence from France in 1960, CAR is one of the countries that have endured several military coups and apolitical notoriety particularly under the dictator and self-appointed emperor Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa. David Dacko of the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (Mouvement pour l'évolution sociale de l'Afrique Noire, MESAN) was elected president by the National Assembly on August 14, 1960 at independence. President Dacko's popularity led to his reelection in 1964 and his party, MESAN, won all the seats in the National Assembly elections. However, the military struck with a coup led by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, and toppled Dacko's government on December 31, 1965, leaving eight people dead (BBC 2015). As is customary with every military regime, the revolutionary council under the leadership of Colonel Bokassa abolished the constitution and dissolved parliament in 1966. Like other African leaders, Colonel Bokassa declared himself life president and the commander in chief of the Armed Forces. This development led to serious unrest: French troops were deployed to suppress the rebellion led by Lieutenant Colonel Banza, who was executed following a successful campaign against him in 1969. On September 5, 1976, President Bokassa dissolved the government and constituted a thirty-one-man Council of the Central African Revolution (CCAR). Jean-Bedel Bokassa later proclaimed himself emperor of the Central African Empire on December 7, 1976 and dissolved

the CCAR. Emperor Bokassa I was later replaced in a rebellion that brought former president David Dacko back to power on September 20, 1979.

To pave the way for a transition program to return power to the civilians, a referendum was conducted by the David Dacko Central African Democratic Union (L'Union démocratique centrafricaine, UDC). He was elected President with 51% of the total votes cast in 1981 and was subsequently inaugurated on April 3, 1981. But in a dramatic turn of events, President Dacko was overthrown in another military coup led by General André Kolingba in 1981. The Military Committee for National Recovery, CMRN (Le Comité militaire pour le redressement national), headed by General Kolingba who took control of the government, suspended the constitution and banned all political activities.

The Central African Democratic Assembly (Le Rassemblement démocratique centrafricaine, RDC) was formed as the country's sole political party in a new constitution that was approved in a referendum as efforts were intensified to return CAR to civilian government. As the only legal political party constitutionally allowed to participate in the legislative election conducted on July 31, 1987, RDC eventually won all the fifty-two seats in the National Assembly. Despite the boycott of the election by opposition groups, General Kolingba went ahead and appointed a prime minister, Edouard Franck. As a response to the protest by opposition groups, a National Commission was set up by the Kolingba government to review the constitution in June 1991. The constitution was amended to pave the way for multiparty democracy on August 30, 1992 and legislative elections were conducted on October 25, 1992, but the Supreme Court cancelled the election on October 28, 1992.

In a dubious attempt to hold on to power, Timothée Malendoma was appointed by General Kolingba as prime minister on December 4, 1992. On February 26, 1993 Prime Minister Malendoma was fired by Kolingba and Enoch Derant Lakoue of the Social Democratic Party, PSD (Parti social-démocrate) was hired as prime minister. General Kolingba's political maneuvers continued in the fashion of General Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria until legislative elections were held on August 22, 1993, and MLPC took thirty-four seats out of eighty-four contested for in the National Assembly. The RDC won thirteen seats in the National Assembly and Ange Ange-Félix Patassé of the Central African People's Liberation Movement (Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafricaine, MLPC) was elected president with 53% of the vote in the second round of presidential elections conducted on September 19, 1993 and was sworn in on October 22, 1993 as president of CAR (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed., 2015).

Political instability erupted again in CAR as some 400 rebel soldiers mutinied in Bangui, the capital, in April 1996 against the government of Ange-Félix Patassé. To strengthen his government, President Patassé sacked Prime Minister Koyambounou in June and appointed Jean Paul Ngoupande as his replacement in 1996. The mutiny continued as rebel soldiers commanded by Captain Anicet Saulet revolted against the government of President Patassé in Kasai in November 1996. After serious mediative efforts by francophone countries by providing troops to restore peace, subsequent legislative elections

were organized between November 22 and December 13, 1998. President Patassé's MLPC won forty-seven seats in the National Assembly and was reelected with 52% of the vote on September 19, 1999, while Adre Kolingbia, the opposition candidate, came second with 19%.

In a new twist, President Ange-Félix Patassé dismissed his Chief of Army Staff General François Bozizé in 2001 on allegation of plotting to overthrow his government. General Bozizé fled to Chad, where he formed a rebel group on a revenge mission to overthrow the government of Patassé on March 15, 2003 (BBC 2015). General François Bozizé thereafter suspended the constitution and dissolved the parliament signaling another chapter of military despotism in CAR. The overthrow of Ange-Félix Patassé by Bozizé and his rebels was widely condemned by the AU, the United Nations and the European Union, with sanctions imposed by the international community. But in an attempt to win global legitimacy for his illegitimate government, a new constitution was approved in a referendum with 91% of the vote in 2004. Legislative elections were scheduled between March 13 and May 8, 2005, and at the end of the election the National Convergence "Kwa Na Kwa" (NC-KNK) won 42 out of 105 seats in the National Assembly while MLPC took eleven seats. François Bozizé was elected president with 65% of vote and was therefore sworn in as president on June 11, 2005. Celestine Leroy Gaombalet announced his resignation as prime minister. Bozizé won reelection in 2011 but was forced out of office following the resumption of hostilities by the Seleka rebels against his government on March 20, 2013, bringing to an end his beleaguered regime.

CONCLUSION

The history of military-led transitions in Africa has engendered more puzzles than solutions for the challenges besetting the country's democratic space. In the case studies examined in this chapter, such transitions have not translated to deepening the democratic culture in terms of establishing the necessary political institutions and values, and entrenching an orderly pattern of leadership succession. On the contrary, what has persisted is an entrenchment of a culture of impunity by military rulers, whose whims and caprices account for who takes over the reins of government in any transition program. In some other instances, as the chapter has demonstrated, such transitions are merely tailored to perpetuate the legacies of particular military regimes or to transmute particular military dictators into civilian rulers. Except in Ghana, under Jerry Rawlings, and Abdulsalami Abubakar's administration in Nigeria, where the military intervened under a nationalist garb to correct specific societal ills and thereafter handed over power to a civilian ruler under a guided transition program, experiences show military rulers who were desperate to perpetuate themselves or their cronies in power. Such political manipulations are done under a perverse, deceptive and elongated so-called transitional arrangements, or in some other instances military regimes that are compelled by popular forces and internal rebellion to tread the path of civilianization.

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Civil–Military Relations in Africa

Browne Onuoha

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the character of civil–military relations in Africa. It begins with some questions. Is there any identifiable unique African character of civil–military relations? If there is, what may be held responsible for this character and what may explain it? How does this character compare with civil–military relations in states that may be said to be of the older democracies? If there are identifiable African civil–military relations, what are the implications of this character for democratic consolidation and national stability? How can civil–military relations in Africa and all their social determinants be explained by the existing models of civil–military relations, especially by the work of scholars such as Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960) and Finer (1962).

At this juncture, it may be important to emphasize that the role the military played in African government and politics from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s underscores the importance of the study of civil–military relations in the region, especially as they shaped the process of nation-building and politics in Africa; they impacted current developments in Africa including missed opportunities. Indeed, the impact of military rule, especially in shaping politics in Africa, may only be compared to the impact of colonialism on the continent. Thus civil–military relations are critical in the understanding of contemporary African politics, economy and society, and in advancing methods of using the lessons for national development.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first examines African society, its relationship with the military and tries to understand the relationship from the

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perspective of existing models of civil–military relations. It also explains civil–military relations. The second part classifies African states into four according to their relationship with military coups and military governments. The third part introduces the critical need for a proper socialization process in order to raise young people as citizens imbued with a budding nationalist spirit before they enlist into military school. The conclusion suggests that according to the extant models, existing forms of enquiry into civil–military relations will not assist knowledge production in Africa because comparing African civil–military relations with those of the developed world, when there are fundamental contradictions in military formations under serious social division in Africa, will not enable us to ask meaningful and verifiable questions.

CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

Civil–military relations is an area of study that examines the relationship between civil society and military organization. It focuses in particular on the relationship between the civil authority and the military authority of the state. It is a large area that involves the study of civilian control of the military or military allegiance to civil authority, professionalism in the military, military institutions, spending/budgeting especially under democratic politics; it also includes study of military participation in politics.

According to Huntington,

The principal focus of civil–military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state. Here the conflict between functional and societal pressures comes to a head. The officer corps is the active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for military security of society.

A point of departure for our analysis of the subject matter, and the perspective to be adopted, is Huntington’s definition of civil–military relations, especially his emphasis on “officer corps” (“state” and “society”). In this case we relate “society” to the individual prospective military officer: how was the individual citizen socialized before he was enrolled in the military school? Thus the emphasis goes beyond the officer corps. It goes further by asking what type of “society” brought up or socialized the individual citizen prior to his enlistment into the military school? In an attempt to answer this question we may begin by isolating Huntington’s three key concepts (1957, 3): the officer corps (who are they?); the state (what is the nature of the state, the African state?) and what is the form of the society (African society) that socialized the individual citizen before he was admitted into the military school and became a military officer?

An examination of these three elements of Huntington’s study will assist in explaining civil–military relations in Africa. We will later include “ideology,” which Huntington also isolated as important in building civil–military relations (Huntington 1957, 90). Following on from the above, the chapter argues

that an understanding of civil–military relations in Africa should rest more on “society,” “state” and “ideology” than on officer corps. Among the four, “society” is the most critical. The weak states in Africa will come a distant second.

Thus, what has been the nature of civil–military relations in Africa, and in what ways might they have affected African government and politics. Put differently, what is the nature of civil–military relations in Africa? To what extent does Huntington’s “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy of civil–military relations explain civil–military relations in Africa? That is the next focus of this chapter.

Theorizing Military Intervention and Civil–Military Relations in Africa

Early works on military in politics and civil–military relations were led by scholars such as Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), Finer (1962) and Welch and Smith (1974). Their contributions are still eminently relevant. Huntington, of the environmental school of thought, emphasized the need for institutionalized political culture to discourage military intervention in politics. He is also credited with advocating a professional military in order to ensure civilian control. The control could be either “objective” or “subjective” control (Huntington 1957, 80–86). Objective civilian control acknowledges military professionalism and discourages military participation in politics; military autonomy must not be subjected to any group or class or institution of the state. On the other hand, subjective civilian control is the situation where the military is under the control of one institution or another, one arm of government or another, one ethnic group or another, or an authoritarian leader (Huntington 1957, 83–84).

Furthermore, Huntington identified the relevance of political ideology in civil–military relations. According to him, ideology is an issue in this area, in particular to the extent that ideology may be compatible with or hostile to the military ethic (Huntington 1957, 143–162). The ideologies he identified were the well-known ones: liberalism, fascism, Marxism and Conservatism (Huntington 1957, 143–162). This issue of ideology is important. According to our analysis, along with society, ideology sustains civil–military relations, as well as being a platform on which to examine the status of civil–military relations in Africa. Both in their individual and general contributions, Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), Finer (1962) and Welch and Smith (1974) have developed models which it is hoped will assist our understanding of civil–military relations, including those in Africa. But actually how explanatory are these models in understanding contemporary civil–military relations in sub-Saharan Africa?

Here, we want to argue that the first place to begin when examining civil–military relations in Africa is understanding African society, and also understanding citizens’ socialization process and the socialization content. How are citizens socialized, and what is the content (ideology) of the socialization?

Therefore theoretically, it is first and foremost society and secondly the state that reproduces civil–military relations, and not the officer corps. But in the particular case of socialization, the state in Africa is weak and poorly organized, as will be argued shortly (Ake 1981, 1985). This leaves society as the first-line agent to form the individual citizen before the state enlists that citizen into military school. African society is fragile, still emerging, but must perform certain primary functions if it is not to become extinct. One of these primary functions is socialization; how it inducts new members into its system.

The African Military Society and State in sub-Saharan Africa

In Africa, the 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s were known as the “age of generals,” a period during which virtually all sub-Saharan African states were under military rule. This created an age bracket of African youth referred to as a “lost generation,” during which time a great majority of the youth did not experience any meaningful development in their lives. Instead they were overwhelmed by poverty and decay, especially during the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s (Onuoha 2002, 242–259).

This socio-economic and political trajectory of Africa would certainly be part of what in future would shape civil–military relations. In that future, the state would be confronted by disenchanted, disappointed and disillusioned citizens, some of whom would attempt to join the military. And while in the military, the loyalty of such disillusioned citizens could be compromised and suspect, particularly in the weaker states of sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition, the misrule by the military when they were in control of most of the governments in Africa brought wars and conflicts, and gruesome social consequences especially for African youth. Even after the democratic transition of the 1990s, the youth who grew up under military rule were not socialized into recognizing military loyalty to civilian rule. There was no known program in any African country during democratic transition in the 1990s that demilitarized the people, state or society, or civilianized the military after over thirty years of controlling political power (Adekanye 2005). Demilitarization could have prepared prospective officers to be socially and politically conscious and accept civil control of the military as a constitutional demand before being enlisted in the military. Therefore, civilian control of the military, then or now, should not be assumed to be a given. The state has never prepared for this in any known form. Thus, the socio-political condition in Africa could not have encouraged loyal submission of the military to civilian control, particularly after the authoritarian control of government by that same military for thirty years in most countries.

In a further analysis of the conditions that impede objective civil–military relations, we may need to isolate individual African states since the conditions were not uniform. In that respect we can raise several questions. What are the ethnic, religious, sectional or other interests making up the military? And to

what extent might these interests have affected civil–military relations? These questions become necessary because in most cases in sub-Saharan Africa one dominant ethnic/tribal/racial/religious grouping in the military staged a particular *coup d'état* (Adekanye 2008). There was a plethora of coups in Africa between the 1960s and the 1980s, and a “band wagon” effect.

The scope of military intervention, and the depth and length of military rule, certainly brought to the fore concern about the effect of military intervention in Africa on civil–military relations, and on government and politics.

We may examine this below in four groups:

1. successful military coups, remotely/proximately leading to civil wars/serious bloody insurrection: Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Uganda, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Burundi, Rwanda, etc.
2. Those afflicted with coups and military rule without descending into civil war: Ghana, Togo, Benin, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Congo Brazzaville, Mali, Lesotho, Niger, etc.
3. Those that had no military coups or military rule, but were dictatorships/authoritarian/single party states: Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal, Guinea, Côte de Ivoire.
4. Those that fought liberation wars (moving from war to peace): Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Guinea Bissau, South Sudan.

The classification adopts no particular order. It is purely for analytic purposes, hoping that some meaningful implications will be deduced and that some lessons may be learnt about what the nature of civil–military relations could be under the different classifications.

1. Successful military coups, remotely/proximately leading to civil war

In most countries in the first group, a military coup led to civil war/unrest. On most occasions the coups were interpreted nationally and internationally to have been led by a section of the military; and when a section of the military is emphasized the implication is some doubt about the existence of a national military. By design or default, the section that carried out the coup corresponded with a certain ethnic, ethno-religious or tribal group. This was evident in many coups in Africa from the 1960s to the 1980s. The lack of national military negatively affects cohesion in the military and the problem of loyalty. We shall examine how these affected the first classification by further developing three typologies of that classification.

Central to the problem of civil–military relations in Africa is the doubt about the existence of a national military, and the complexity and dilemma of unresolved citizenship contests in the continent, especially:

- (a) the Tutsi in the Great Lakes of East Central Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda);
- (b) the Mandingo of the Mano River Basin of West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire); and
- (c) the Zaghawa ethnic group of Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Central African Republic (Onah 2006, 2008; Onuoha 2012).

The Tutsi were very central in most of the military coups and attendant civil wars in the Great Lakes Region of East Central Africa, including “Africa’s world war” of 2005, which involved nine countries of the Great Lakes region of East Central Africa (Prunier 2009). The military in the three sub-regions of Africa isolated above belong, not to their national military but to their various major ethnic groups. The various military units have been used, and have remained at the centre of most atrocities of civil wars and in the struggle for citizenship in those subregions since the 1960s.

The wounds have not healed in any of these countries. It is difficult in these regions to build objective civil–military relations even after the secession of hostilities. In other words, the issue of civilian control of the military has more meaning where there is social order. Thus, in most cases, with a divided military and even with claims of disarmament and reintegration, no attempt is made at truth and reconciliation; and therefore military loyalty to civil authority still remains suspect. Animosity and faultlines still remain after the wars. Perhaps the only known exception is Rwanda, where some effort is being made to adopt a new educational curriculum to socialize the citizens towards nationalism and national integration, different from their colonial divisive educational system (Mwambari and Schaeffer 2011). In such cases of war and unresolved animosity, struggle for citizenship and claims of neglect and injustice, harmony in civil–military relations and civilian control of the military may not be achievable. In the cases immediately isolated there is hardly any national military, but instead “ethnic/tribal” military. It is difficult to build objective civil–military relations where there is sectional, ethnic military and no national military with inbuilt national ideology. And none of these subregions is blessed with such leadership that will build their nations from the ashes after several years of civil war.

2. Those afflicted with coups/military rule without descent to civil war

This group has stayed stable at least since the 1990s—with transition to democratic rule. The contests of civil society against the military and authoritarian rule in Togo and Benin during the transition to democracy of the 1990s (Bratton and Van De Walle 1997) appear to have contributed to the stabilization of the polity and equally stable civil–military relations. Thus, Ghana, Togo and Benin have remained stable in terms of civilian control of the military. There is apparent constitutional civilian control of the military moving gradually from subjective to objective control. The basis for threat from the military

against civilian rule has remained minimal since the 1990s. Gambia and Guinea have not been as stable, but threat to civil–military disharmony is low, though there are cases of power struggle among the power blocs, more than direct civilian military disagreement on civilian control.

3. Authoritarian/one-party states

Civil–military relations in those countries where there were no military coups and no civil wars are more harmonious and tend towards more civilian control of the military: Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea (up to the death of President Sekou Toure in 1985). Their military forces are smaller in number and less exposed to meddling in civilian matters/politics. They have remained more professional than those contaminated by greater participation in civil politics.

4. Those who fought liberation wars (moving from war to peace)

These include Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Guinea Bissau. The experiences which these states gained in revolutionary wars (against imperialism) have no doubt assisted them in shaping civil–military relations in their countries. Civilians and the military collaborated in fighting nationalist wars against imperialism. Most of the current civilian rulers were freedom fighters. Therefore, the spirit of freedom and nationalism was equally shared and produced an ideology of nationalism. This is the foundation of and basis for current civil–military relations in those countries that fought wars of liberation. Their military is part of government; and because they understand the task of post-colonial and post-liberation war, there is collaboration between military and civilian rulers, and there is ease in civil control of the military and military subordination to civil rule. The case of Guinea Bissau with five coups may be viewed more as an ideological struggle than purely a problem of civil–military relations. South Sudan is a slightly different case: it is yet to settle the power struggle and power distribution mechanism between the two major ethnic groups (the Dinka and the Nuer).

Putting the four classifications together, a question may be asked about the cohesiveness of the military in sub-Saharan Africa. And what is the relationship between that military and the larger society? What manner of civil–military relations can be constructed in these states and societies where there was no national military, instead an ethnic or ethno-religious military (Adekanye 1993, 2008)? As earlier argued, it is the society, through socialization, and not the officer corps, that builds civil–military relations; and the society does this through political socialization. However, the effectiveness and success of the socialization process is a function of the cohesiveness of the society or how unfractured the society is; divided societies may not produce objective civil–military relations. Successful socialization will also be a function of a purposeful and nationalist leadership, along with a strong and relatively autonomous state.

Political Socialization and National Military

There is need to emphasize that the understanding of civil–military relations in Africa is to be found within the region’s social formations: from the socio-political history of the continent, including struggle for citizenship and self-determination. These have fundamentally contributed to shaping civil-military relations in sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, in sub-Saharan Africa the current nature of civil–military relations is to be traced to colonial history and the early years of independence, and whether or not there was a systematic, organized socialization process designed to inculcate the spirit of nationalism into the youth, or the citizens at large. Such spirit of nationalism will prepare citizens who may want to join the military to readily accept the value of civilian control of the military.

Experience in Africa shows that even where these values are expressed in military curricula, the socialization given at the primary level to those aged five to ten obstructs the effectiveness of the military nationalist curriculum. The average citizen, including the officer corps in training, thinks about a primordial group before a nebulous and poorly defined or poorly nurtured national mindset (Adekanye 1993, 2008). From the foregoing, the study of civil–military relations in sub-Saharan Africa should be pursued slightly differently. Questions to be asked about those relationships should be different.

Thus, according to our study, rather than the “officer corps,” which Huntington, and other scholars identified, the type of society (“divided societies” in Africa) should be the most significant factor to be associated with the type of civil–military relations in the region. Put differently, it is the type of society instead of the officer corps that will define and shape civil–military relations. The officer corps in sub-Saharan Africa has his root in the African society; he is a member of a society before military school: what did the officer corps, before military school, pick from his society (his roots)? This is the critical question for Africa (Luckham 1971).

Experience about agents of socialization in sub-Saharan African, and indeed of socialization elsewhere, shows that the values inculcated into the child between the ages of five and ten live with him all the days of his life (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Dowse and Hughes 1972). This inculcation is achieved through socialization processes carried out by the agents of socialization: the family, school (education; the state intervenes here), churches, mosques, peer groups, the media and so on; and also importantly by the state itself (as an agent of socialization), which it does through what it includes in school curriculums and how it influences or controls what is taught in churches and mosques, as is being done presently in Rwanda (Mwambari and Schaeffer 2011).

The content of the curriculum which the state provides will be specific in inculcating nationalist ideology from the primary school; designed to create nationalists out of schoolchildren/citizens. The values include duty for duty’s sake, thrift/frugality, honesty, sacrifice and love for the nation, readiness and commitment to die for one’s country, noble spirit, the “protestant ethic,”

which it is suggested produced the values which developed the modern capitalist system in Britain (Weber 1971). When properly and adequately disseminated, and equally imbibed by the citizen, the result of socialization, which is the value outcome, transforms to become an ideology which will represent the view, spirit and attitude with which the citizen views the world outside him. The same values, though under different social conditions, assisted immensely in building modern China, Korea and the so-called Asian Tigers (The East Asian Miracle 1995; Hill 1997; Nyaw and Chan 1982). Nkrumah's Young Pioneers founded by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1964 was designed to achieve this purpose, to inculcate in the children of Ghana a feeling of pride for their country (Addo 1997, 142–146; Onuoha 2012, 594–595).

As mentioned above, Rwanda is currently embarking on the resocialization of its citizens through a program designed to inculcate national values different from the divisive socialization process it had from colonial education (Mwambari and Schaeffer 2011). In the end, a spirit of nationalism will have been built and constitutionalism learnt to a great deal. The values learnt from the socialization will enhance the chances of citizens' acceptance of civilian control of the military. In addition, those enlisted in the military will accept civilian control of the military.

It is also important to observe that the officer corps is not conscious of the state qua state; that is, his relationship with the state; that he stands for the state; that he is symbol of the state, until some time after his training. Indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa, the individual military officer sees himself through the lens (ethnic lens) with which his primordial group sees and relates with others, and through which he thinks others see him (the ethnic lens). What is being formulated here is that civil–military relations is more a social enterprise, and above all a social construct before it is a relationship with the state.

CONCLUSION: THE STATE IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL MILITARY IN AFRICA

Are civil–military relations in sub-Saharan Africa the making of society, a socio-political subject or a state/political construct? While the border between these categories may be blurred, it is important to clarify so that we may know from where to initiate intervention in a state or political remedy, if there are to be problems with civil–military relations. In other words, the question about civil–military relations in Africa should be redirected: what do we do to build objective civil–military relations when there are fragile and fragmented state/society relations, as there are in Africa? This answer will help to suggest methods of building new military in Africa that may bring about constitutional civil–military relations.

If we view the study more critically, it may not be misleading to argue that there may not be objective civil–military relations without building a professional national military (the emphasis is on “national”). In other words, an objective

civilian control of the military in Africa is an outcome of the existence of a professional national military (a national military as opposed to an ethnic, ethno-religious military). If this is correct, then it follows logically that there may not be a national military without a nationalistic ideology. Furthermore, there may be no nationalist ideology without the political socialization which will imbue in the citizen a nationalist ideology; and to sustain nationalist ideology there must be a hegemonic leadership as the custodian of those nationalist values (Gramsci 1971, 245–246). In other words, the existence of objective civilian control of the military is rooted in the social history of the people of no less than half a century.

In most of sub-Saharan Africa, this social history did not confer advantage in nation-building. Most of the military in Africa do not have that critical connection to history; they do not carry the image or have the thirst of nationalism which derives from hegemonic order. Instead, the military is mostly in the hands of a dominant group (ethnic, ethno-religious, tribal or economic group). What exists, at best is subjective civilian control of the military in most states of sub-Saharan Africa.

African states do not seem to be seriously concerned about civil–military relations or civilian control of the military. This is because since the transition to democracy in Africa in the 1990s, literature has been replete with calls to demilitarize the countries that suffered years of military rule in order for democratic consolidation to be meaningful. But this has not been seriously implemented in any country. For instance, accusations of impunity leveled against agents of state in some Africa countries have occurred because of a hangover of military culture which resulted from many years of military rule. It requires a sustained socialization process to demilitarize as well as to civilianize the entire society as well as the military.

Professionalism may have increased in some of those countries that experienced many years of military rule. But this may not have translated into objective civilian control of the military. Moreover, because Africa does not have a “military industrial complex,” it is not easy at this point to state clearly how much or to what extent the military influences military budget or its administration.

Therefore, in sub-Saharan Africa civilian control of the military is subjective: control associated with major ethnic groups, and some cases authoritarian subjective control.

This subjective civilian control of the military is well known. But this needs to be explained, and this is what this chapter has attempted to do. The explanation lies with the nature of African society, and in distant second place the fact that African states are weak. Until and unless the states initiate political socialization processes, the societies and politics in sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to constitutionally build objective civilian control of the military, whether professional military or not. Proper and adequate political socialization will prepare all citizens, not only the officer corps, to know why civilian control of the military will build more stability and better society, democratic consolidation and overall development of Africa.

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PART IV

Identity Politics, Conflict, and
Development

Politics of Identity and the Crisis of Nation-Building in Africa

Ikenna Mike Alumona and Stephen Nnaemeka Azom

INTRODUCTION

Historically, Africa as a continent has been characterized by various crises that are principally responsible for her underdevelopment. Among the problems in Africa that have attracted attention, the identity crisis and its attendant impact on the process of nation-building appears the most protracted and challenging. The primary concern of this chapter is to interrogate the nexus between the nature and character of identity politics and the crisis of nation-building in Africa.

The rest of the chapter is organized in three main sections with a conclusion. The first section explores the context of identity in Africa. The second outlines the nature and character of identity politics. The impact of the crisis of identity politics on the process of nation-building in Africa is examined in the third section. The conclusion sums up the chapter. The basic argument is that colonialism intruded in the integration process of nation formation in Africa, and in the process created a kind of identity politics that has remained the bane of nation-building in the continent.

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WHY IDENTITY MATTERS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Identity is a known phenomenon all over the world. People define themselves in one way or another. Yet the concept of identity is replete with superfluous meanings. Despite the contestations and ambiguity around the concept of identity,¹ and several attacks on identity politics from all angles,² the concept has continued to define human relations in different ways. Identity is defined as “the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture.”³ Identity politics is derived from the activities of individuals or groups who try to whip up identity sentiments in the struggle for the authoritative allocation and distribution of the scarce resources of the state. In the opinion of Nwanegbo, identity politics as a political phenomenon is closely tied to the freedom associated with liberal democratic politics and it has to do with the political activities of various ethnic, religious, and cultural groupings that make demands for greater economic, social, and political rights in the political system.⁴

It is common knowledge that the African people who are divided largely along different identity lines attach so much importance to these identities. In most parts of Africa such as South Africa, Nigeria, Liberia, and Somalia people have been caught up in, and excluded by, the powerful currents of identity politics. It has, however, been observed that the problem in Africa is not identity per se but that these identities, which for so long have come to dominate interpersonal and group relations, have transcended to affect not only state-society relations but the entire process of development. Hence, in different parts of Africa the fallout of identity politics has led to ugly developments such as genocide in Rwanda, civil war in Nigeria, Liberia, and Somalia, apartheid in South Africa, and frequent ethnic violence in Kenya. In another vein, the fallout of identity politics in Africa has also been responsible for several secessionist attempts as found in the following cases: Belgian Congo 1960, Uganda 1966, Nigeria 1967, Djibouti 1991, and Senegal 1991. Presently, the resurgence of separatist movements in Nigeria has to do with identity politics. Identity matters in Africa are due to the following reasons:

1. The Ascriptive Nature of African Culture

The centrality of identities such as birth, kinship, gender, age, and class in African culture cannot be ignored. In different communities in Africa, there is so much attachment to pre-determined factors such as age, sex, kinship, or birth which largely determine status and in the process create a discriminatory notion of “us” and “them.” This self-perception stems from a shared sense of in-group adhesion based on trust, custom, familiarity, and belonging, and an assumption of collective identity derived from common descent, territorial affiliation, or both.

2. Colonial Legacy

Most of the African nations we see today were products of colonialism. The pre-colonial African communities appreciated and respected their

different identities but it was through the instruments of colonialism that the foundation of the crisis of identity was laid. And the state which, according to Nwabueze, is a central legacy bequeathed to Africa by colonialism was at the centre of it all.⁵ First, with the imposition of arbitrary boundaries, the colonial forces did not only separate kith and kin and unite strangers, but also highlighted their different identities through their obnoxious, discriminatory, and divide and rule policies. To this end, the colonial state created a feeling of them against us among the different indigenous communities in many African states. In Nigeria, for instance, the colonial authorities had different educational policies for the northern and southern parts of the country. This has affected educational development in the country until today. In Rwanda, the story was the same: the Belgians classified the population into Batutsi, Bahutu, and Batwa and removed the relative flexibility in political distinction that existed among the people in the pre-colonial times.⁶ As Mamdani clearly puts it, “colonial rule strengthened and polarized an apparent physical difference into an antagonistic political relation.”⁷

3. Communal Nature of Africa

Communalism in Africa is a system that is both very sensible and material in its terms of reference. Both are found in a society that is believed by the Africans to be originally “god-made” because it transcends the people who live in it now, and it is “man-made” because it cannot be culturally understood independent of those who live in it now.⁸ The community offers Africans psychological and ultimate security as it gives its members both physical and ideological identity. Therefore, the Africans emphasize community life and communalism as a living principle, of which the basic ideology is community identity.

4. Socio-Economic Inequality

Socio-economic equality reduces ethnic rivalries in the long run because it eliminates class and its antagonistic nature. This is unlike the uneven growth which intensifies existing tribal cleavages. Unequal access to resources of the state has been a primary basis for ethnic mobilization in states such as Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, and Somalia. This explains why Katanga, for instance, tried to break away from the Congo (which became Zaire, and is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Biafra from Nigeria. Southern Sudan struggled protractedly to break away from the North. It was issues bordering on socio-economic inequality that led to the fighting that resumed in Sudan in 1983, and today Southern Sudan is a separate country.

5. Bad Leadership

The leadership question has become a serious problem in most African countries. Following the plural nature of most African countries, the desired leadership that is needed to foster peace, unity, and development

appears to have eluded the continent. Rather bad leadership characterized with corruption has taken over. Most of the African leaders, by their policies, highlighted differences instead of relationships in their states. In this regard, Wangari believes the reason to be a threat to a more open political system and a strong civil society.⁹ He argues that this has disquieted enough African leaders and has forced them to encourage the brewing of tribal tensions, the worst of which was the violence which ravaged Rwanda and Somalia. It is important to emphasize that it is not the tribes who want to fight; rather, it is the threatened elitist leaders who are using tribes to arouse ethnic nationalism as the only way they can continue to cling to political and economic power and the privileges which come with that power.

The Nature and Character of Identity Politics in Africa

The nature and character of identity politics in Africa can be situated for clarity in three historical epochs, namely the era before the advent of colonialism, the colonial era, and the era after colonialism. Before the advent of colonialism, African people recognized their different identities. But even then relations among the different nations were often characterized by intergroup and tribal wars. The nature of identity politics during the colonial era was merely not of one Africa group making political demands on another African group. Rather, it was Africans against the colonialists and the motive was the achievement of self-rule. The motive of self-rule manifested in the spate of nationalism that occurred in Africa beginning in the early 1930s and continuing until the late 1960s.

The history of contemporary identity politics in Africa could therefore be traced to colonialism. The fact that no serious attempt was made to make these people see themselves as one, especially in British colonies where the indirect and “divide and rule” policy held sway, exacerbated the identity problem in Africa. The nature and character of identity politics took a different dimension in the post-colonial era as ethnic bigotry stalled the anticipated socio-political development. The greatest challenge faced by almost all the post-colonial governments in the continent is how to keep these different ethnic and tribal groups together as one state. From Ghana to Nigeria to Uganda and Angola, the African continent was bedeviled by ethnic and intertribal conflicts, as different groups tried to outwit others in the scramble for political control of the emergent states.

The nature and character of identity politics in Africa is denoted by the factors listed below.

Ethnicity

Any attempt to understand the nature, character, and dynamics of identity politics in Africa will surely amount to a study of ethnic politics in the continent. No other phenomenon has been as contentious or has generated so much conflict in the continent: in the distribution of state resources, every ethnic group

sees the other(s) not just as a rival, but as an enemy. It is in line with this that Nnoli defines ethnicity as “a social phenomenon associated with the identity of members of the largest possible competing communal groups (ethnic groups) seeking to protect and advance their interest in a political system.”¹⁰

The history of ethnicity in Africa and its attendant impact on African politics and governance has also been traced to colonialism.¹¹ Colonialism helped to create artificial states in Africa, where people of different ethnic nationalities were forcibly bound into one state without any serious effort to build a single nation out of those nations. What was therefore bequeathed to African states during independence was merely a conglomerate of antagonistic entities that never saw themselves as one. Politics was therefore perceived by these groups as a zero sum game, where every group’s interest was to accumulate as much as it could, if not all that was available to be accumulated. Even today, little or nothing has changed in the nature and character of political identity in Africa; rather, politics of ethnic identity has increasingly graduated to ethnic nationalism, which “seeks for attainment of sovereignty or statehood for an ethnic group.”¹² In Nigeria for instance, one of the greatest challenges facing the country has been how to build a nation out of the mosaic of nations that make up the Nigerian state. It is this obvious fact of “we are not one” that saw the country implode immediately after independence in 1960. By 1967, the country was already fighting a civil war, in which the Biafran secessionists were massacred by the Gowon-led military government. Fifty-five years after independence, the country is still enmeshed in the struggle for ethno-political recognition. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) are fighting for the economic and political liberation of the Niger Delta, which is dominated by the Ijaw and Itshekiri. In the eastern part of the country, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) are still fighting for the emancipation and political freedom of the area called Biafra, dominated by the Igbo ethnic group.

Ethnic identity also influences electoral contests in Africa. Still using Nigeria as an example, elections in the First Republic were marred by ethnic politics when electorates voted almost exclusively for candidates from their ethnic groups. The 2015 presidential election was not different, as the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group voted massively for General Muhammadu Buhari (retired), a Muslim and a northerner, while the then incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and a southerner, had a landslide in the South South region. In Angola, ethnicity has equally been central in the understanding of political identity in the country. The Mbundu ethnic group, the Ovimbundu people of Central Angola and the Kikongo ethnic group of Northern Angola form the major identity lines in political contestations.

Religion

Here, we align our definition of religion to that espoused by Durkheim, who sees it as a “unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say to things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into

a single moral community all those who adhere to them.”¹³ It is on this ground that religious identity has come to play a significant role in the political lives of the people. As a term, “religious identity” was first used by Hans Mol in 1976 and later in 1979.¹⁴ He used it to refer to the identification of an individual with a religious tradition. It was later expounded by Seul, who argues that religion provides the strongest kind of identity for individuals and groups.¹⁵ Specifically, they both argue that because religions rest on metaphysical and ethical beliefs drawn from a shared religious tradition, they form a key influence on an individual’s perspectives of himself and the world. Religious identity begins with the inculcation and communication of religious norms and values to individuals through texts and practices; and because of their appeal to the transcendent, they have a greater influence on people than other kinds of influences.¹⁶

Political contestations in Africa are usually built around religious beliefs. People tend to choose political option based on religious affinity. While religion best serves as a means through which people commune with the supernatural, Familusi argues that it could be used politically, either to canvass support for a candidate or dissuade the electorate from voting for the candidate.¹⁷ In Egypt, though mainly a Muslim country, electoral contests have always been overshadowed by questions of secularism or Sharia law. This notwithstanding, the use of religion for political identity is made manifest in a more plural than in a mono-religious society. The import of this in African societies is that politicians and the people incline to religious subjectivism in power politics. Little wonder that Sampson argues that “the elite have always used religion as a tool of exploitation to achieve selfish socio-economic ends, while politically deploying religious fanaticism and favouritism to polarize the people and sustain unhealthy tension in the country.”¹⁸

Demonstrating how religion influences political identity in Nigeria, Kukah draws our attention to the electioneering campaign of 1983 in the North, during which Alhaji Dankwaro composed a song enjoining Muslims to vote for Shagari and the NPN.¹⁹ The song was intended to permeate the minds of the Muslims North to ensure that they voted for NPN.

Another important thing to understand about religious identity in Africa, especially when political allocations and decisions are being made, is the tendency for religion and ethnicity to coalesce. Sometimes it is difficult to isolate one from the other in determining the nature and character of identity politics. This is because most members of a particular ethnic group in Africa also share the same religious beliefs; hence, the difficulty in separating religion from politics while determining which factor influences political identity amongst the people.

Racial Dimension

Although ethno-religious identity has dominated the nature and character of identity politics in Africa, racial identity has equally played a significant role in political decisions in some African states. Racially based politics dominated political discussions in South Africa until recently. The notorious apartheid

regime which supported the rulership of a white minority in the country was vehemently opposed by activists for many years, until 1994 when Nelson Mandela and his group conquered the policy. At the end of apartheid, the Zulus also held to their legendary identity and the tacit power that goes with it, and this is responsible for the black on black violence in the country.²⁰ Other examples include Zambia and Zimbabwe (formerly known as Northern and Southern Rhodesia respectively), Angola, and Rwanda, where racial discrimination was formalized as early as the 1930s when the Belgian colonizers conducted a census, classifying Rwandans as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, and thereafter issued ethnic identity cards to all Rwandans noting their racial identity.²¹ Since then, identity for any political reason has always taken a racial inclination.

Political Party Affiliation

As organized groups of men and women with a common interest whose aim is to seize, use, and control state power, political parties are the primary unit of analysis in every democratic state. In advanced democracies, political parties form the fulcrum for identity politics. This is basically because of their ideological differences. Members of political parties hold tenaciously to parties' tenets, hence their perpetual loyalty. Political parties therefore serve as institutions and structures for identity politics. In Africa, political parties serve this purpose, but more often than not members exhibit the tendency to dump their political parties for others. The propelling force behind this high level of political nomadism in Africa falls under money politics, selfish ambition, and lack of internal party democracy and ideology.²² In cases where people identify with political parties in Africa, there is a tendency that such other factors such as ethnicity, religion, and even race serve as contributory factors to such decisions, since most political parties in the continent are ethnic or religious based: as an example, Nigeria during the First and Second Republics, when political parties were ethnic and regional based, and people merely supported political parties on the basis of ethnic affiliations. Another example is Egypt, where proponents of Sharia law identify with the Muslim Brotherhood, while proponents of secularism support other political parties.

Other factors which have come to define the nature and character of identity politics in the continent include class, gender, minority and majority groups. By class, we are referring to the unending struggle between the rich and the poor, the ruling class and the masses, the bourgeois and the proletariat. Although class distinctions exist across the continent, political decisions are always the affairs of the ruling class. During elections, the ruling class is expected to present candidates while the masses are expected to vote for these candidates. This dimension of identity politics is made manifest under political parties, a dimension which has been explained above. The discrepancy which exists between the minority and majority groups is a creation of colonialism. It is important, however, to note that the problem of identifying or being identified with the majority or minority group can be better appreciated under ethnicity, where an ethnic group with a larger population and/or landmass is considered a majority group

while the other is considered or considers itself as a minority group. Hence, issues of politics and allocation of values are discussed on the basis of minority against the majority.

IDENTITY POLITICS AND CHALLENGES OF NATION-BUILDING IN AFRICA

The nation-state, at present, is the primary mode of political organization in the international system. However, whereas the nation-state is said to be successful in Europe and America,²³ one of the most critical political challenges facing post-colonial African states is the task of nation-building.²⁴ Post-colonial African leaders have, therefore, made efforts to culturally integrate and erect nations from the states bequeathed to them at the dawn of political independence. Referred to as the dynamic socio-historical process by which a state seeks to forge and/or mainstream national consciousness, solidarity, identity, unity, integration, and nationhood,²⁵ the essence of nation-building is to form a nation-state from an existing state system. The imperative of nation-building in Africa has been dictated by the fact that most states of the continent are multinational in composition, largely comprising many identity groups with diverse socio-cultural, linguistic differences, and heritage.²⁶ These socio-cultural categories were incidentally yoked together into uneasy political union by reason of colonial overlordship without a conscientious effort to integrate them into a functional political entity.

Consequently, no sooner had most African states achieved political independence than they were plunged into the morass of political instability, principally occasioned by the dialectics of identity politics. Social identities are used as platforms for political consciousness-raising, advocacy, activism, or mobilization. As Onwubiko succinctly avers:

As soon as the unifying influence of the colonial power was withdrawn, the divisive forces of ethnic particularism or tribalism reared their ugly heads and began to plague the body politic in form of inter-tribal rivalry for political power, public offices and public wealth. The divisive forces of tribalism or religious differences are even intensified by ambitious and unscrupulous politicians who appeal to the tribal or religious sentiment of their people in order to win their votes at elections or to score a point against an opponent.²⁷

In this respect, politics is conditioned by aspects of social identity through loosely correlated social formations and/or constructions, such as ethnicity, class, religion, nationality, sexuality, age, profession, among others.²⁸ The problem with identity politics in Africa is the inherent tendency of politicization of primordial ties in such a manner that engender antagonistic outcomes. This is the case in most African states where ethnic, religious, and sectional identities have often been mobilized and manipulated by the political elite in pursuit of their self-regarding motives.²⁹ The phenomenon has negated the prospect of national

unity and integration in many African states by propagating ethno-communal “consciousness with its disintegrating tendencies instead of national consciousness which welds the various sections into a unified indivisible nation.”³⁰ For instance, religious differences between the Christian South and Muslim North in Nigeria ignited a gruesome conflict that overlapped into ethnic, regional, and economic divides to result in thirty-month civil war. In Sudan, the introduction of Sharia law in the Christian South sparked ethnic conflict that led to the loss of life.³¹

The fragile post-colonial African states are, therefore, not only implicated in the rising tide of identity politics anchored on diverse social groupings, but also appear incapable of effectively mediating the challenges this poses to nation-building. Historically, the state in Africa has served as an instrument for aggressive accumulation and projection of political power and wealth.³² This, coupled with lack of visionary priorities and genuine commitment by political leaders to address the issues of structural imbalance, economic backwardness, and social decay, has created and intensified socio-economic and political divisions along ethno-religious and class lines with attendant squabbles, mistrust, and conflicts. In effect, various social groups tend to position themselves with the sole determination to push for political power for the benefit of their members. The quest for political power is therefore prone to all sorts of lawlessness and violence as political succession is based on dangerous twists of primordial ties.³³ This has led to untoward complications that threaten African nation-building. For instance, the experience of the Republic of Sudan regarding ethnic conflict was a result of the dynamics of ethno-racial cleavages. The conflict was principally between the northward Arabs who are predominantly Muslim and the southward “native Africans,” who are largely Christians.³⁴ The situation degenerated into intense armed conflict wherein organized rebels and mercenary fighters (some of whom acted at the behest of the state) confronted one another, leading to massive humanitarian consequences. More often than not, ethnic divisions tend to coincide with religious cleavages such that interethnic squabbles often ignite religious conflicts. In northern Nigeria and some parts of central and northern Africa known for such Islamic outbursts, the human casualties are enormous.

In the same vein, the ethnic composition in South Africa is skewed in favor of the Blacks who constitute over 70% of the population.³⁵ The rest of the ethnic/racial groups are whites, the coloreds, and the Asians (mainly Indians). Among the Black, the Zulu ethnicity constitutes the dominant stock. The nationalist struggle for independence in that country saw the birth of the Inkatha Freedom party, which represented the ethnic Zulus. The more dominant Black party, the African National Congress (ANC), maintained a clear lead, however. A clash occurred between these two Black parties in 1991, leading to intercommunal conflict; a confrontation that followed party lines. This was a case of intra-ethnic conflict occasioned by the dialectics of elite competition wherein identity manipulation was salient.³⁶

In Nigeria, the character of the Nigerian political class is such that makes ethnic manipulation by the elites inevitable. Nigerian elites are polarized alongside ethnic, religious, sectional, and communal lines. In the context of party politics, therefore, the elites resort to whipping up primordial sentiments to make good their politico-partisan ambitions.³⁷ In this regard, such variables as religion, clan, ethnicity, and other modes of identity are instrumentalized as a veritable political strategy for the production of political leaders. It is in this circumstance that politicization of identity and the mobilization of this becomes a political necessity. Manifestation of identity politics in Nigerian party politics was vividly demonstrated in the First Republic by the emergence of political parties that drew the majority of their supporters from the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria. Hence, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG) drew the bulk of their members from the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Igbos in the southeast, and the Yorubas in the southwest respectively. There were also clear evidences of the proliferation of ethnic-based political parties. Table 17.1 is indicative of this fact.

This situation reinforced ethnic cleavages. It also stiffened tension and conflict between the majority ethnic groups as well as between each of the majority groups and minorities in the regions of their dominance.³⁸ In their struggle to capture state power, thuggery and electoral violence became normative. This precipitated the military intervention of January 1966, the countercoup of June 1966, and the civil war that threatened the existence of Nigeria as an indivisible political entity. Subsequent alignments of political parties and party politics in Nigeria have continued to reflect ethno-religious loyalties and their deployment in interethnic struggles.

The desperate advancement of ethno-religious solutions to economic and political challenges in multiethnic African states such as Nigeria, Togo, and Kenya among others, which do not have a unifying political entity, has heightened the feeling of marginalization in accessing the benefits that political power confers, and also intensified the struggle for regional autonomy. Such perceptions of marginalization underlie the insurgency of ethnic minorities in Nigeria's oil-rich Nigeria Delta, and to some extent, the crisis in Darfur.³⁹ In extreme instances, some ethnic groups have attempted secession. The Igbos

Table 17.1 List of ethnic parties in Nigeria's first republic

ACRONYM	FULL NAME
BYM	Borno Youth Movement
IU	Igala Union
ITU	Igbira Tribal Union
MDF	Mid-Western Democratic Forum
NDC	Niger Delta Congress
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
ZCP	Zamfara Commoners Party

Source: Compiled by the authors from diverse sources

of southeastern Nigeria who attempted to break away from the federation between 1967 and 1970 on account of their perceived marginalization readily comes to mind. In recent times, separatist movements that have stepped up a struggle for the actualization of the sovereign state of Biafra used the same ideology to widen their membership base.

The point being made is that identity and its politics are cardinal to the nation-building question in Africa because they form the bases of contestations for inclusion or exclusion. A troubling dimension to these contestations is the rising incidence of hostilities arising from the contradictions between indigeneity and citizenship.⁴⁰ Being that the former is the basis for citizenship rights, entitlements, and access to opportunities, such hostilities are characterized by organized attempts to single out non-indigenes for attack and liquidation. No doubt, the collective nature of such attacks is serving to strengthen ethnic solidarity.

In the Nigerian experience, for instance, the contradictions between indigeneity and citizenship, are complex, and the contestations for inclusion or exclusion are horrendous because “being an indigene or a settler is a permanent identity, as there is no provision for the latter to convert to the former.”⁴¹ In their dealings, therefore, Nigerians are daily confronted with deliberate cases of denial of job opportunities, political appointments, and admission into schools, among others. This ugly dimension in identity politics is often reinforced by state or regional policy, such as the northernization policy adopted by the northern regional government in the First Republic which aimed to exclude the southerners and have “Northerners gain control of everything in the country.”⁴² The exclusions and denial of rights and opportunities on the basis of identity have resulted in many ethnic conflicts: for instance, between Zango and Kataf in 1992 over claims by the indigenous Kataf against the immigrant Hausa community; between the indigenous Jukun and immigrant Tiv communities in Wukari and its environs between 1990 and 1992; between the Bassa and Igbirra ethnic communities in Nasarawa state between 1986 and 1997; between the Bachama (Western Bwatiye) and Hausa immigrants in 1988.⁴³

The contradictions between indigeneity and citizenship have also played out in Côte d’Ivoire, where ethnic groups organized in terms of the north and south have been divided over the issue of Ivorian citizenship since the death in 1993 of the country’s founding president, Houphouët-Boigny. Based on the “concept of *Ivorité* or ‘true Ivoriness,’ political elites from the south have sought to exclude their northern counterparts from power, while members of the northern elite, with the backing of some neighbouring countries, have insisted on their rights as Ivorian citizens.”⁴⁴ These differences eventually culminated in civil war between 2002 and 2007, ending with the signing of a power-sharing agreement between Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, who became the prime minister. This notwithstanding, the contestation over citizenship was a major issue in the November 2010 presidential elections between Gbagbo and Allasane Quattara. The refusal of the former to concede defeat after electoral loss to the latter led to the resumption of hostilities early in 2011.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it is evident that identity politics is inimical to nation-building in Africa. The saliency of identity politics is to be appreciated with reference to elite desperation in the context of competitive party politics. In this context, primordial structures of belonging and identification readily become instrumentalized as avenues of political advantage. Populist concerns and sentiments of ethnicity, religion, and sectionalism are thus mobilized and manipulated by political elites to secure cheap political advantage at the expense of sustainable nation-building. This tendency has often precipitated volatile and recalcitrant intergroup political relations that negate national unity, integration, and stability in Africa. The pitiable condition of Africa in the comity of nations is vividly captured by a joke that God once called together the “peoples of the world to give account of the talents He endowed them with. It was reported that after other peoples had given a good account of their stewardship, Africa came lumbering with assorted baggages sweating profusely at the same time. Then when God asked her to give account of her talents, she looked up pointed to the baggages, pointed to other nations that had given good account of themselves, and said: “I have been carrying their bags.”⁴⁵ The deduction is that Africa has not fared well in nation-building and sustainable development, and this may likely continue in the foreseeable future owing to the daunting challenges posed by identity politics to the national democratic project.

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Migration and Xenophobia in Africa

Lanre Ikuteyijo and Peter Olayiwola

INTRODUCTION

Human mobility is going through unprecedented change. A body of evidence shows that the volume of migration has been increasingly rapidly over the years. Currently, it is reported that more than 200 million people are residing outside their places of birth (Nationerna 2013). This revolution has been enhanced by globalization. Technological advancement in diverse forms including information technology; global systems for mobile communication; the Global Positioning System; and breakthroughs in modern means of transportation have all greatly affected global relationships. The impact of migration is evidenced across the world with desirable and undesirable consequences. One of the darker responses to migration (Crush 2001) is xenophobia.

Xenophobia is a topical issue in migration discourse as xenophobic behaviour can be seen in many parts of the world. Often, migrants are at the receiving end of blame when countries experience economic recession or political tumult (Adepoju and van der Wiel 2010). Across the world, various episodes of tension and imbroglios are recorded among traditional settlers and migrants, herdsmen and farmers, indigenes and non-indigenes and other categories of people brought together by migration. In some countries, the indigeneity versus citizenship debate rages on, with severe implications for human security and development.

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Across Africa, xenophobia has resulted in loss of life and property as well as a perpetual loss of trust and comradeship between different ethnic and racial groups. From the south (South Africa) to the west (Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast) and from the east (Kenya) to the Maghreb (Libya), African migrants have had to deal with xenophobia at some point or another. This chapter traces the history of migration and xenophobia in Africa, discusses inter-regional migration dynamics and examines the remote and immediate causes and consequences of a number of xenophobic attacks. The chapter also discusses the theory underpinning xenophobia and highlights the influence of irregular migration on xenophobia and the policy issues emanating from past xenophobic incidents. The chapter concludes with recommendations on how to reduce xenophobia and create a more enabling environment for sustainable development and innovative governance in Africa.

XENOPHOBIA AND INTER-REGIONAL MIGRATION DYNAMICS

The connection between migration and xenophobia in Africa today cannot be fully analysed without an understanding how migration has evolved over time. This history can be broadly classified as pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial (Adepoju 1995; Amin 1974). Migration in pre-colonial Africa was influenced by natural disasters, pastoralism, warfare and commerce among other things. But to a large extent, people moved freely and did not follow a specific or singular pattern or direction (Adepoju 1995).

In colonial times—characterized by relative peace and political stability, the development of an urban sector and the neglect of rural areas, increasing labour requirements for plantations and administrative purposes and so on—migration was increasingly driven by economic need (Amin 1974; Adepoju 1995), with the relative prosperity of many coastal areas, plantations and mines being the main attraction in West, East and South Africa respectively. Thus, colonialism altered “the patterns, volume, intensity and direction” of movements in Africa (Adepoju 1995).

Post-independence, migration followed a similar pattern, with the selective development of resource-rich areas and capital cities (Adepoju 1995). Buoyed up by poorly policed boundaries, which often lacked physical features, complementarity of economies of neighbouring countries and the cultural affinity between ethnic groups in different countries, internal migration became an extension of external migration (Conde 1984) and drawing a distinction between the two is generally problematic because of the aforementioned reasons (Adepoju 1995). Coupled with frequent environmental disasters, political uprisings and the promotion of free movement through regional collaborative efforts—such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), SADC (Southern Africa Development Community) and EAEC (East African Economic Community)—these are the major reasons why undocumented and seasonal migration is common in all regions of Africa (Adepoju 1983; Oucho 1994).

Migrants (both from neighbouring and distant countries) are attracted to and often welcome in the relatively prosperous countries of the continent. However, the volatility of many African economies also means that in periods of economic recession and instability, migrants are often blamed and targeted for economic “restructuring”. This is the context in which xenophobia in Africa became an important topic. In 1969, Ghana—that had until the 1960s welcomed migrants from neighbouring West African states—expelled aliens from the country; Nigeria attracted African migrants from the mid-1970s, but by 1983 some 2 million of them had been expelled; Gabon also welcomed migrants from other countries when the economy was booming, however, when economic hardship set in, government policy required foreigners to register and pay residence fees or face being expelled—only 15,000 paid the fees with some 55,000 being expelled (Adepoju 2008).

This trend has continued today in relatively prosperous Southern Africa (notably Botswana and South Africa) and the Maghreb. In the case of the Maghreb, its proximity to Western Europe—the “dreamland” for many African migrants—and the increasingly stiff migration policies of European countries, have made the region a source, transit and destination centre (Adepoju 2008). Xenophobic attacks, particularly in Libya, have been associated with the increasing frustration of locals with foreigners who have become stranded in the country on their way to Western Europe (BBC 2016).

MIGRATION AND XENOPHOBIA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (INCIDENTS, HISTORICAL FACTS ABOUT CAUSES)

Xenophobia can be defined as an irrational, deep-rooted fear of or antipathy towards foreigners. It is the direct opposite of “philoxenia” which means love for strangers.

Xenophobic tendencies predate modern civilization. Records show that in biblical times Jews were under threat. Likewise, there are records of Jews displaying xenophobic tendencies to other tribes such as the Amorites, Jebusites and Hittites among others. In the modern era, xenophobia also has a long history. After the influx of people from different nations into America in the early 1920s, a rise in the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, or KKK was observed. As a racist movement in America in the early 1900s, the KKK was known for lynching and murdering entire families and leaders from the African-American community as well as any sympathizers. The Klan was an essentially pro-white Protestant group preaching anti-Catholicism, among other things, and could be identified by their use of white hoods and flowing white robes (Cao 2014; Thomas 2010). In Eastern Europe, the main targets of xenophobia are likely to be members of minority groups. In many Western countries the targets tend to be immigrants and refugees, including those coming from Eastern European countries. Between 1991 and 1995 a civil war broke out in Yugoslavia caused by pre-existing ethnic conflicts among Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks and Slovenes who

were fighting for political domination (Wood 2001). This led to the death of more than 200,000 people. In Australia there are records of racially motivated attacks against Indian students in 2009, which reportedly began with a late-night attack on an Indian taxi driver that led to further attacks (Mason 2009). In all xenophobic incidents there is a deep-seated suspicion of the foreigner, which often stems from the belief that the presence of “aliens” is responsible for social and economic deterioration.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF XENOPHOBIA

To explicate the phenomena of xenophobia, a number of theories will be used: action theories used in sociology and political economy theory drawn from political science. Action theories see human action as the major object of sociological investigation. Some of the theories in this category include phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions, ethno-methodology, symbolic interactionism, structuration theory and Weberian sociology. A common characteristic of the theories in this category is they are concerned not only with the nature of action but also with the meaning and interpretation of social action. Action therefore carries a subjective meaning for the actor. In any inter-group relationship there is the inevitable demarcation between the dominant group and the minority group. Racial prejudice, which is the root cause of xenophobia, is defined as the attitude of aversion and hostility towards members of a group on the singular ground that they belong to that group and are therefore presumed to have the objectionable features ascribed to it. Herbert Blumer (an interactionist par excellence) observed four feelings characterizing the dominant group members.

1. The dominant group usually has a sense of superiority over the minority group.
2. The dominant group feels that the minority group is different and alien by nature.
3. The dominant group feels that it has a proprietary claim to privilege, power and prestige.
4. There is a fear and suspicion that the minority group has designs on dominant group benefits.

Racial prejudice therefore represents a sense of group position and this opinion shapes the interaction between the dominant group and minority group over time.

In sociology, the interactionist perspective provides an explanation of prejudicial tendencies in inter-group relations. This school of thought believes that racial prejudice is a state of mind, a feeling or disposition. This feeling is shared by members of the dominant group and is usually displayed during episodes of xenophobic attacks. Xenophobia is an unreasonable fear or hatred of foreigners

or strangers, or of that which is foreign or strange. This unreasonable fear can lead to stereotyping and when the fear boils over the perceived foreigner or stranger can be the target of violence, murder and destruction (Kiprono 2015). It should be noted that not all members of the dominant group hold ill feelings against foreigners.

Another theory that explains the phenomenon of xenophobia and other forms of migration violence is political economy theory. Political economy theory originated in the fields of economics and political science, but it has been employed across various disciplines. In the context of migration and violence, political economy theory describes the relationship between migrants and host communities in terms of access to resources. Without doubt, most xenophobic attacks against migrants have been perpetrated on the baseless allegation that the presence of migrants often leads to unemployment (Goldin et al. 2012). Hence, an attack on migrants is often aimed at sending them back to their countries of origin. On the other hand, the political aspect involves the reaction of most governments to the issue of migration, in particular irregular migration. Overtly or otherwise, many state policies actually encourage xenophobia. Consider situations whereby some states criminalize irregular migration and punish it with the same force as more heinous crimes and infractions. The state gives the impression, wrongly, that irregular migration is synonymous with crime and other social vices.

In essence, perpetrators of migration violence rationalize their actions by claiming that the presence of “aliens” in their country boosts criminal activities, that the aliens are responsible for many social vices and are the cause of an economic downturn resulting in poverty and unemployment. Unfortunately, many migration policies have been influenced by this unfounded prejudice. This is exemplified in the criminalization of irregular migration, treating it as a criminal act rather than an administrative infraction. Thus, migrants are exposed to double trouble as they face discrimination from host communities with the backing of governments. It is also noteworthy that several pieces of research have disproved the hypothesis that migrants are more involved in criminal activities than indigenes and that the presence of migrants fosters crime (Goldin et al. 2012).

XENOPHOBIA IN AFRICA

There have been several reports of xenophobic attacks across Africa. From the north to the south, east and west, the continent has had its fair share of attacks aimed at non-citizens. These attacks have always been met with widespread condemnation but the phenomenon appears to be a hard nut to crack for most migration destination countries. Although xenophobic attacks are common in many African countries, we examine the incidence of xenophobia against foreigners in just a few of them.

XENOPHOBIA IN KENYA

Kenya is a country that has often been described as a tourist haven. However, the country is not immune to attacks on non-indigenes. Xenophobic attacks in Kenya can be traced to both ethno-political and security-related crises. For instance, after the release of the results of the country's presidential elections in 2008, supporters of Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement took to the streets and began a series of protests that led to loss of life and destruction of property (Landau and Misago 2009). The violence had an ethnic dimension as the Kikuyus (the tribe of the declared winner Mwai Kibaki) were attacked by other tribes, in particular the Luos and the Kalenjjs. Xenophobic attacks in Kenya also occurred in the aftermath of terrorist attacks by the Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab groups. Somalia's proximity to Kenya as well as its political situation has made Somalia a stronghold and breeding ground for the Al Qaeda network. Somalia serves as an operations base as well as a convenient hideout for Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab terrorists (Otiso 2009). In separate incidents, the terrorist groups launched attacks at Westgate in 2013, Mpeketoni in 2014 and Garissa University College in 2015. Since Al Shabaab is a Somali-based terrorist group, Somali migrants in Kenya were targeted in reprisal attacks. This development has unfortunately led to a direct attack on Somali migrants, especially Muslims, in what has been termed "islamophobia" (Otiso 2009).

XENOPHOBIA IN IVORY COAST

Ivory Coast is a multi-ethnic country and there are often crises generated among the various ethnic groups over access to scarce resources. The influx of migrants has caused more conflict. For instance, tensions are common in the western cocoa belt between indigenous groups and northern and foreign-born workers. "For decades, migrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Guinea have provided cheap labour for local landowners, which helped turn Côte d'Ivoire into the world's leading cocoa producer" (HRW 2005). However, in the face of economic decline, competition over land rights and a military coup the country has become increasingly characterized by intolerance, xenophobia and suspicion (HRW 2005). Indeed, political and local leaders have reportedly exploited these differences with many media outfits being used to campaign that foreigners are dangerous to the Ivorian economy and therefore the country must be "defended against foreigners". The concept of "Ivorite" was first used by then President Henri Bédié to distinguish "original citizens" from "the rest". Since that time there have been several attacks against people of foreign descent and looting of their properties (HRW 2001; News 24 2011). Xenophobic attacks are common in Ivory Coast and recent episodes include attacks on Senegalese migrants in the 1990s and targeting Senegalese migrants in the wake of the Ivorian 2002 civil war (Ikuteyijo 2014).

XENOPHOBIA IN LIBYA

Many migrants from different parts of Africa who hope to be smuggled into Europe see Libya as the gateway to their desired haven. However, the intricacies and uncertainties of smuggling across the Mediterranean Sea have left many with “dashed hopes” and kept them in Libya hoping for “a breakthrough” rather than going back home (The Guardian 2015). As a result, many migrants have been subjected to the worst forms of treatment by smugglers, locals and even the authorities (Amnesty International 2012).

The violence in 2000 was traced to the growing resentment of Libyan youths towards migrants (legal and illegal) from many West African countries who had migrated to the oil-rich country for work. The then Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi, blamed the violence which led to many deaths on “hidden hostile hands” who ‘exploited the situation’. In the wake of the violence, thousands of immigrants were either deported by the Libyan government, or evacuated by their own governments (Bald 2000). While there has not been a major outbreak in recent years, the recent turmoil in the country has not helped the cause of migrants. Rather, “the chaos and lawlessness in Libya feeds the xenophobia” (BBC 2016). After the political uprising and uncertainties in the economy, the country has become particularly dangerous for black people (BBC 2016). Refugees and migrants not only suffer at the hands of smugglers and citizens, but also in government detention centres with regular stories of murder, exploitation, robbery and so on.

XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

The African continent has witnessed a shift in migration trends as a result of the political and economic crises in many West African countries. The new destination is South Africa, especially since the fall of the apartheid regime in 1994. Consequently, many migrants from across Africa perceive South Africa as a desirable destination country. This explains why migrants from other African countries such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Uganda have moved to South Africa for employment opportunities. Any discussion on xenophobia would be incomplete without a mention of South Africa. Indeed, given the well-publicized incidents in 2008 and 2015 and several less-publicized incidents, one would be forgiven for limiting a discussion on the topic to South Africa alone. The problems are mainly due to the apartheid legacy in a country believed to be richest one in Africa, but with the highest level of inequality in the world (World Bank 2015). This inequality is still widespread along ethnic lines with white South Africans generally thought to be better off than black South Africans.

There have been an increasing number of cases of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa—though much of the discrimination and violence against (African) migrants in South Africa prior to 1994 can be explained by

apartheid (Neocosmos 2010). Some of these cases have been documented as early as 1994 (Crush 2008; Harris 2001; Landau and Misago 2009), but the most prominent ones are the 2008 and 2015 attacks. Explanations of the causes of attacks on foreign citizens by South Africans usually revolve round perceived unhealthy rivalry for opportunities, mostly among black South Africans and black African migrants. This has led some to refer to the xenophobia in South Africa as “Afrophobia”. This is because while non-blacks—particularly from America and Europe—are seen as “tourists” or “expats”, blacks are almost always synonymous with such terms as “irregular migrants”, “foreigners”, “aliens” or in more derogatory local language “*Makwerekwere*” particularly in areas around major cities where there is large concentration of black migrants (Nyamnjoh 2006; Morapedi 2007). The popular perception is that foreigners are the cause of it all—even the spread of disease, including HIV/AIDS, has been blamed on *Makwerekwere* (Nyamnjoh 2006).

After the 2008 violence that left more than 50 people dead, the Human Sciences Research Council carried out a study on the underlying causes of the attacks and found that they were mainly against African migrants and occurred predominantly within informal settlements in urban centres. The findings showed deprivation and the perceived corruption of government officials were the main grievances of the local population. The report warned that unless these were tackled, attempts at reintegrating foreign nationals would fail. The subsequent attack in 2015 suggests that these underlying causes are still very much present in South Africa.

In April 2015, violence started in the coastal city of Durban and later spread to other parts of the country including Johannesburg. Attacks were reported to leave some people dead with several others injured and many homes and properties destroyed (The Guardian 2015). Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, Ethiopians and Nigerians among others were attacked, which led to repatriation of citizens by some African governments and demonstrations against South African interests and businesses across the continent. The attacks were believed to have been influenced by comments made by the Zulu king (Zwelithini) about foreigners in the region. Even if he had been misquoted as he claimed, there are other reports of South African elites, members of parliament, media and government officials who mirror such sentiments and resentments against “foreigners”. For example, in the same year, the Small Business Development Minister Lindiwe Zulu explained that foreign business owners had undue advantage over their South African counterparts because of the apartheid legacy and they should “reveal their trade secrets” to the locals if they are expected to live peacefully in the country.

Cases of abuse and exploitation of undocumented migrants by local citizens, employers and officials are well-documented by Human Rights Watch. Equally, anecdotal sources revealed that apart from large-scale deportation, people have been accosted on the basis of their names, accents and physical features such as skin colour, facial marks, patterns of dressing and even mode of walking (there was a case of a person arrested for “walking like a Mozambican”). As one might

expect, such unprofessional and crude practices result in confusion, with many South Africans also ending up as victims (HRW 1998).

In all, xenophobic attacks across Africa have revealed that political and traditional leaders have a role to play in the integration of migration and stemming the tide of xenophobic incidents.

POLICY ISSUES FROM PAST XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS

African heads of state have formed collaborations in a bid to promote economic cooperation and regional development. Some of these collaborative efforts include the ECOWAS borderless pact and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Treaty. However, before regional migration policies came into being, African states have used different means, most notably dialogue and deportation, to manage migration. This was often borne out of labelling and scape-goating of specific nationals as “folk devils” in the face of socio-economic and political challenges. This was exemplified by the expulsions of migrants by the Ghanaian and Nigerian governments in 1969 and the mid-1980s respectively (Adepoju 2005; Ikuteyijo 2015). However, mass deportation remains a tool for managing migration in Africa. For example, more than 300,000 people were deported from South Africa in 2007/2008 alone (Singh 2015) and about 1.5 million people between 1994 and 2008 (Singh 2015). Many South Africans would support the use of an electric border fence—used previously during apartheid—to control the influx of migrants into the country (Singh 2015).

Data on migration are often unavailable or inaccurate in many African states that are characterized by porous borders, inadequately skilled personnel, inefficient policies and weak enforcement. The result of this is misleading information from politicians, public officers and the media. In the case of South Africa, the belief that there are too many foreigners is widespread even though the immigration figure (including documented and undocumented) was estimated in 2010 to be between 3 and 4% of the total population—lower than that of many countries in and outside Africa (Polzer 2010).

PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS

Migrants are humans irrespective of their status (either regular or irregular) and require that their fundamental human rights, especially the right to life, be respected by all. There are two main ways in which migrants are protected. The first is diplomatic protection, which is the type of protection that migrants enjoy from their countries of origin. Different countries have embassies in different parts of the world and one vital role performed by such embassies or high commissions is to protect the interests of their citizens. The second type of protection is more universal, the Fundamental Human Rights as guaranteed by the United Nations General Assembly’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. These rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law in the forms of

treaties, customary international law, general principles and other sources of international law. International human rights laws lay down obligations for governments to act in certain ways, to refrain from certain acts and to promote and protect human rights and the fundamental freedoms of individuals and groups. These rights protect migrants since their host countries are also signatories to these treaties. There are also other international instruments aimed at the protection of migrants' rights. These include the Convention Against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; and other numerous conventions and treaties.

Besides these universal instruments aimed at protecting migrants' rights, some countries (especially xenophobia-prone countries like South Africa) have responded with certain policies to curtail the problem. Although South Africa is a signatory to various international conventions relating to forced migration and refugee protection, the South African Parliament unanimously passed the first-ever Refugee Act to give effect to the principles enshrined in the conventions in 1998 (De la Hunt 1998; Handmaker 2001; Crush 2001). South Africa also has a strong state-funded Human Rights Commission, which has identified the protection of foreign citizens as a major part of its activity. Despite these laudable attempts at policing migration and xenophobia, it is sad to note that South Africa is still prone to xenophobic attacks.

GAPS IN EXISTING POLICIES

Despite the availability of a plethora of policies aimed at protecting the wellbeing of migrants, several gaps still exist. In most cases, the policies that are borne out of xenophobic incidents are usually reactive and, more often than not, lead to a lacunae between policies on paper and their actual implementation (implementation gap) (Czaika and De Haas 2013). The need for policies to be informed by research is therefore essential to bridge this gap. Second, when policies are made there is an urgent need to establish mechanisms for enforcement. In the past, the police and other law enforcement agencies have been accused of complicity in xenophobic incidents, taking sides with citizens against migrants. There is a need for transparency in the enforcement of these policies to enhance public trust and to help allay the fears often held by migrants. The policies should also be communicated effectively to everyone through proper orientation and advocacy programmes. In terms of adjudication, the criminal justice system should be enhanced such that perpetrators of xenophobic attacks are tried in competent courts of law and due punishment meted out to convicted offenders. Moreover, there is need for efficient cooperation among the regional blocks in terms of migration management. What happens currently is more a pursuit of sectional sentiments and interests. Hence the continent has been divided into such blocks as COMESA (the Common

Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), ECOWAS and SADC. Even within regional blocks there are challenges in efficiently managing migration-related challenges that are caused mainly by irregular and other forms of clandestine migration, with attendant economic and security implications (Ikuteyijo 2015).

TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE WORLD (POLICY IMPLICATIONS)

The fact that xenophobic attacks are calculated violence aimed at people from certain political, religious and racial backgrounds has implications for global migration management. Historical references as well as contemporary events have necessitated the need for migration managers to address racially motivated violence, which is now manifesting itself in various ways. There is a growing need for clear and constructive migration policies at both regional and national levels. Since migration is a crucial component of the development process, migration policies should explicitly respond to the expressed need to incorporate international cooperation and integration into policy goals, objectives and programmes. Furthermore, giving the important roles migrants play in both the social and economic development of any host nation, the interests of migrants must be protected and the training of the police and other law enforcement agents must be addressed to ensure a swift and rapid response to migrants' call for help when there is an outbreak of xenophobic attacks.

There is a need for appropriate mechanisms to control the activities of politicians and public office holders that often use migration and xenophobia as campaign issues and who sponsor messages of divisions and hatred among Africans. The media is a powerful tool for the education and re-education of citizens of host countries on the benefits of a well-managed migration system. This can help to address some of the existing stereotypes and potential fears of host citizens (particularly about their welfare and the economy) about fellow Africans. One major factor that can help in achieving this is to have accurate migration data. That way there will be less room for fictitious figures and claims about migrants—a breeding ground for xenophobic attacks. Migration holds lots of potential for the development of both destination and countries of origin. An effective management of xenophobic tendencies will therefore go a long way in bringing about this much desired human security and development.

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Identity Politics and Wars of Secession in Africa

Nicasius Achu Check

INTRODUCTION

A prominent feature of post-colonial Africa is the emergence of armed conflict with increasing undertones of ethnicity and identity. The development of these forms of armed conflict has been attributed to the fluidity and artificiality of post-colonial nation-building trajectories. There is no gainsaying that the post-colonial state in Africa is foreign in character and make-up. In many parts of the continent, single ethnic groups have found themselves on both sides of an international boundary. This has led to competing loyalties to different countries in a single ethnic group. The challenge of managing such an aphorism is complicated and in most cases has even led to conflict between countries. However, the focus of this chapter is an analysis of how to manage identity politics within states that have suffered conflict. Attention is paid to micronations that have advocated separation as a result of alienation or as an attempt to project their identity within a state.

Identity politics, Eisenberg & Kymlicka note,¹ is a process whereby an array of identity groups have become politicised and mobilised on the basis of gender, race, language, ethnicity, indigeneity, religion and sexuality. Any attempt to distinguish what type of politics are gender, race, language or even ethnicity runs the risk of imposing an oversimplified categorisation on groups with a mixed colouration and outlook.² Thus, particular attention should be paid to politics with a specific identity undertone to differentiate it from other forms of conflict situations. From this standpoint identity politics is not new, especially in Africa where inter-ethnic and racial wars were a common feature of the

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decolonialisation process. This process had a spill-over effect and affects the manner in which politics is played out in the post-colonial state. The critical question is how can politics in a diversified political environment be devoid of confrontation and even outright secession? To understand this dilemma and the manner in which identity politics has played out in the post-colonial state, it is important to understand how power is acquired and distributed in the post-colonial state. In this instance, Mamdani's understanding of how power is acquired is indispensable. He notes that the colonial enterprise was built around the concept of ethnicity or religious belonging.³ This explains why all colonial era uprisings have been related to either ethnicity or religion. Thus, the colonial authorities acquire power by relying on the support of the majority ethnic or religious entities to sustain their power. In return, the representatives of these groups are given some form of power to exercise at the periphery of state authority. This form of power acquisition has also been the hallmark of post-colonial governments. This is important, as it has been argued elsewhere that what happened in 1960 was just a change of personnel and the colonial state structures remained intact.

Because the colonial state reproduced itself in the post-colonial dispensation, the challenges of the colonial state became those of the post-colonial state. The challenges of the post-colonial state became more exhilarating as the people who inherited the state structures after 1960 were of the same ethnic and religious groups they were called upon to fight. As a result, new forms of identity politics began to play out, with regional, language and cultural affinities. Because the post-colonial political elites were seen more and more as part of the problem rather than part of the solution, many post-colonial grievances with an ethnic or religious flavour rapidly pushed towards agitation for autonomy and in some cases outright separation and independence.

CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF IDENTITY POLITICS

Identity politics can be defined as a process whereby a diverse array of identity groups have become politicised and mobilised on the basis of gender, race, language, ethnicity, religion and sexuality.⁴ Also referred to as identitarian politics, identity politics usually involves political arguments that focus upon the interest and perspectives of groups with which people identify. This includes the manner in which politics can be shaped by aspects of belonging and social organisations. Thus, identity politics relates directly towards a tendency for people of a particular ethnic group, religion or social background to form exclusive political alliances moving away from mainstream political and broad-based political party politics. Recently, identity politics has come to signify a wide range of political activity in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Be it religious, race, ethnicity or language, proponents of identity politics congregate around belief systems or political manifestos or political party affiliations and rally around political formations typically aimed at securing the political freedom of a specific constituency usually marginalised within its larger context.⁵

Alcoff and Mohanty on the other hand contend that identity-based groups generally have an agenda that they intend to pursue within a larger public sphere.⁶ They note that these 'special interest groups' and their leadership are opportunists and uninterested in the common public good. With an intrinsic activist and academic undertone, identity politics has over the years had activist leanings with an understanding that identities are resources necessary for social change and that oppressed groups need to be at the centre of their own liberation.⁷ Though identity politics gained traction soon after the Second World War, it was only in the 1960s that identity-based scholarly programmes were developed in universities across the globe. This renewed interest in identity politics should not be divorced from the civil rights movements in the United States and the increasing demand for self-determination and independence in many parts of the world. The decolonisation debate in Africa took a more identity-based, belonging posture with an increased demand for self-determination. Though self-determination was granted to some, the question of identity-based politics became the new normal in post-colonial political debate.

Critical to this new normal is the assumption that some groups within the Westphalia post-colonial state structure are oppressed and therefore need an avenue to express their feelings. The genesis of identity politics can be attributed to stigmatisation, oppression and disenfranchisement. Instead of wallowing in self-pity, groups are known to have re-asserted their own culture and transformed their sense of self and community through consciousness and for some through armed struggle. Eisenberg & Kymlicka note that there are two broad literature trajectories on the manner in which identity politics is researched.⁸ First is the ethics of identity claims, which recognises and accommodates identity related to the broader principles of justice, freedom, human rights and democratic citizenship. This form of identity paradigm aims to advance core values of freedom and justice from those identity claims that threaten or jeopardise these values. The second paradigmatic direction of identity politics is related, but leans largely towards disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and political science. This trajectory attempts to explore the social and political processes that underpin the politicisation of identity groups.⁹ The focus here is on the role of elites in organising and mobilising identity-based political movements to achieve political goals.

There are, however, a few negative effects associated with the political mobilisation of identity groups. The most common is that when identity politics pervades the public space, existing hierarchies within groups are highlighted, and when the demands of an identity group is accented, group elites may feel emboldened and encouraged to exert pressure on the central authority with more, sometimes untenable, demands. This usually leads to conflict and in some cases outright hostilities. Lloyd notes that identity-based politics, especially those within the realm of feminist discourse tends to alienate far right movements within a polity.¹⁰ This motivates women to call for political intervention to safeguard women folk as an entity because they have suffered from discrimination.

CHALLENGES OF IDENTITY POLITICS IN AFRICA

Identity politics is the by-product of the varied nature and interpretation of our existence as a human race. As D'Cruz notes, identity politics cannot function without the underlying assumption that it very much matters who I am, who you are and what possibilities are open or closed for us to form a 'we'.¹¹ This analytical narrative falls in line with the challenges that most post-independence African countries were called upon to address in the 1960s. In Rwanda, for example, the fundamental question was the place of the Tutsis and Twas in a Hutu-dominated political system. This was further compounded by the fact that for centuries, the Tutsis had held leadership positions in the country. However, historians and, to a large extent, anthropologists disagree on the origins of the perceived ethnic divisions in Rwanda. Many agree that the notion that the Hutu and Tutsi are distinct groups is an anomaly and maintain that the distinction is more of class or caste.¹² The first German administrator, Count Von Gotzen, recognised the supposedly hierarchical structure of the Rwandan polity and insisted that German policy must support the chiefs in such a manner that they would be convinced that their salvation and that of their supporters depended on their faithfulness to the Germans.¹³ The German policy was therefore not based on any empirical research to determine the real nature of the differences between the groups but rather on the physical characteristics of the Tutsi, which points to a somewhat European ancestry.

Of particular importance to ethnicity in the Great Lakes is the fact that primary identities such as blood ties, race, language and religion are acquired by accident of birth and as a result of primary socialisation. During the colonial and post-colonial years in Rwanda, secondary processes of socialisation did not create a unique Rwandan identity. Instead individuals remain attached to the cultural traditions of their primary communities, to their social institutions and to their accustomed political authorities. These primary solidarities constitute the essential bonds of potentially autonomous political communities. In the context of the Rwandan situation these solidarities were based on cultural traditions and geographic settlements, which in all their vicissitude constitute alternative definitions of political identity to membership in a national political community.¹⁴ Political maturity and evolution in the Rwandan polity followed these marked ethnic lines and in the late 1950s when the first political parties were created, they were done so along ethnic lines. The *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu* (Parmehutu) was a largely Hutu-supported party and called for an end to Tutsi colonisation before independence from the Belgians. By the same token, the *Union National Rwandaise* (UNAR), was a mainly Tutsi party that was pro-monarchy and anti-Belgian.¹⁵ A UN pre-independence mission visiting Rwanda in 1957 observed that there was little hope for a rapprochement between the races and called on Belgium to accelerate efforts to emancipate the Hutu.

The efforts at emancipation of the Hutu initiated by the Belgian colonial administration did not bode well with the Tutsi. Political myths relating to

the death of the Mwami in 1959 and that of the leader of the Parmehutu, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, led to targeted violence directed by the Hutu towards the Tutsi. The outcome was a massive exodus of Tutsi to neighbouring countries. Viewing the escalating political fallout of the violence, the UN advised the Belgian colonial administration to fast-track the decolonisation process. The outcome of the communal elections of 1960 showed massive support for the Parmehutu. The new leader of Parmehutu, Gregoire Kayibanda, was called upon to form a government in 1962. In order to destroy any vestiges of Tutsi power, he abolished the monarchy and declares Rwanda a republic on the 1 July 1962.¹⁶

Several attempts at creating a unique Rwandese identity failed and the Hutu governments after independence failed to create a conducive atmosphere for the return of the several thousand Tutsi who had fled Rwanda in 1959. The failed attempts at reconciling the Rwandan ethnic entities manifested itself during the 1994 genocide where there was a perceived attempt to eliminate the Tutsi and moderate Hutu from the political life of the country. Why have the various social groups in Rwanda maintained distinct cultural and social artefacts? The point of departure for this analysis would be Furnivall's model of the plural society. Furnivall indicated that the plural society comprises two or more social orders that live side by side, yet without mingling in one political unit.¹⁷ He further opined that there is no consensus except that which may be imposed by the external authority in regulating the interactions of the various segments of society. The only shared interest is economic profit. As such, in the absence of a common set of behavioural norms segmentary interests are mobilised and this division enhances the need for such divided society to be held together by some force exerted from the outside.¹⁸ Furnivall's model of a plural society suggests that though colonialism destroys the social life of local communities by introducing individualisation of interests in a common economic sphere, it also helps in reinforcing cultural identities. The norm is that once the colonial authority is removed, the political integration of plural society cannot be based on the social and economic integration of its cultural segments, instead political integration is a pre-condition for social and economic integration. The fact that post-colonial Rwanda cannot in any way be considered as a political integration project renders the social and economic integration endeavours by the various post-colonial governments a futile exercise. Salem argues that to depluralise society, two separate yet related processes need to occur.¹⁹ The first one is the increasing dissociation of the demographic and cultural traits identifying communal segments. The second is the fragmentation of political identities according to interests acquired in discontinuous phases of primary and secondary socialisation, where primary socialisation deals specifically with kinship and secondary socialisation cuts across ethnic and regional spheres.

On the whole, the notion of social mobilisation within the Rwandan context entails the erosion of major clusters of old social, economic and political commitments and a push for individuals to acquire new patterns of socialisation and behaviour.²⁰ Ironically, this did not happen in colonial and post-colonial

Rwanda where cultural and political ties still bind individuals to their primary communities. The Tutsi still very much regarded themselves as the aristocratic elites and the Hutu were increasingly seen as trying to break the ethnic inferiority shackle which had been hanging round its neck for decades. The process of the Hutu acquiring an inferior status is a well-known traditional practise. However, it is safe to argue that in culturally plural societies such as that seen in Rwanda the process of social mobilisation predates the attainment of political independence. The presence of colonisers only exacerbated the situation by inscribing cleavages that ended up dividing instead of uniting the various sections of the society.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the emphasis on the universality of citizenship created serious sub-nations within the cosmopolitanism of the economic development policies as ethnic groups strive to maintain their identity. As pointed out by Mustapha, but often ignored by the state-centred approach, there are processes of identity formation in the pre-colonial period that are of continued relevance to nation-building in the post-colonial era.²¹ Within the realm of nation-building in post-colonial Cote d'Ivoire, Houphouet-Boigny (the first president of Côte d'Ivoire) emphasised the concept of national unity, relegating old patterns of exclusion. In the process of crafting a national unity agenda for the country, new patterns of exclusion and domination were invented. The outcome was that some ethnic groups consolidated their grip on state institutions to the disadvantage and exclusion of others.²² In unpacking this dichotomous phenomenon after the death of Houphouet-Boigny and the ensuing bitter power struggle between Bedie and Ouattara, three distinctive schools of thought emerged relating to identity in Côte d'Ivoire. There were those who advocated for a pure Ivoirian identity, those who claimed there is a mixed Ivoirian identity and those who reasoned that there is a unique Ivoirian identity.

The concept of pure identity in Côte d'Ivoire assumes an essence of being that can only be achieved through birth.²³ Pure identity, or better still Ivoirite, can be seen as a set of socio-historical, geographical and linguistic data that enables one to be called an Ivoirian. Someone who claims to have a pure Ivoirian identity is supposed to have Côte d'Ivoire as his country and be born of Ivoirian parents belonging to one of the ethnic groups of Côte d'Ivoire.²⁴ Pure identity recognises the sanctity of acquiring nationality by birth. Preference was given to the individual rather than the citizen. Overall, the notion of a pure Ivoirian identity and culture as articulated by Bedie and other proponents of the Ivoirianness concept is untenable because the country has had decades of a locally settled colonial administration. Besides, the country has also developed and implemented an open door policy on immigration since the colonial era and during the three decades of Houphouet-Boigny's administration. In this regard, pure identity is anachronistic of Houphouetism, which essentially adopted a pragmatic approach to resolving Ivoirian human capital inadequacies in the sprawling agricultural and industrial projects of the colonial and post-colonial era by encouraging labour migration from neighbouring states. Thus, a pure Ivoirian identity has no historical foundation and

was conceived to capture and protect political office. Ruiters argues that this form of identity arises when groups perceive a loss or gain of power and need to protect their position in relation to the state.²⁵

Mixed identity on the other hand assumes an essence of being that can also be achieved through birth. This is possible when either one of your parents is not Ivoirian. Burkinabe, Malians and Guineans (among others) who settled with their Ivoirian spouses or partners in Côte d'Ivoire during the pre-colonial and colonial eras consider their offspring to be of mixed heritage. Several millions African migrants and their offspring who settled in Côte d'Ivoire and still maintain family bonds with their country of origin are considered as Ivoirians of mixed heritage. Remittance was therefore a determinant framework through which an individual is of mixed heritage. This framework was determinant because remittance still plays an important role in the economic wellbeing of migrant families in their countries of origins. The Ivoirite concept assumed that remitters were not true or pure Ivoirians and could therefore not participate or present themselves as candidates for elections in Côte d'Ivoire.

This form of identity gained momentum in the 1990s as Ivoirians of Burkinabe and Mali background and their Muslims counterparts from the northern part of the country backed Alassane Ouattara in the power struggle that pitted him against Bedie after the death of Houphouët-Boigny. Of particular importance to the concept of mixed identity was the fact that Ivoirians of mixed parentage have maintained a distinct cultural and social outlook despite decades of cohabitation and acculturation with 'pure' Ivoirians. With regard to the religion of immigrants, more than 80% of the immigrant population are followers of Islam and a report from the Ivoirian Economic and Social Council had expressed concern that the inflow of Muslim immigrants had considerably modified the pre-existing religious balance in the country and could lead some people to exploit religious affiliation for political ends.²⁶ Religion was therefore an important instrument to exclude Ivoirians of mixed identity from the lever of political power.

Depending on which side of the pendulum you lie, the pure and mixed-identity concepts as a definition of Ivoirian citizenship are contested issues and need to be interrogated further. However, many analysts have argued that colonial intrigues and post-colonial Houphouëtian policies precipitated the emergence of a cultural mosaic that was unique and peculiar to Côte d'Ivoire. It was a form of social and cultural mobilisation that strove to put at the forefront the supremacy of Ivoirian institutions and ethos across West Africa. Many have called this new method of nation-building as Houphouëtism, but for the purpose of this chapter we will call it Ivoirian nationalism. Akindes argues that this form of nationalism tends towards development, instrumentalising external resources in the process of constructing the nation by means of functional openness to the outside world.²⁷ This type of nationalism was quite innovative in a newly independent country and, more importantly, it was achievable through the equitable distribution of the country's natural resources and a fair balance in the representativeness of political office bearers. The permanency of

this form of nationalism was premised on the assumption that Côte d'Ivoire belongs to all those who call it home irrespective of social, religious or political background. Several million West African migrants called it home and by extension disputed the social and politically constructed concept of the 'pure' Ivoirian.

The administrations following the Houphouet-Boigny era have indicated their intention to preserve the Houphouet-Boigny legacy and to try to perfect his policies of nation-building. There is great exception taken to the Houphouet-Boigny legacy preservation project and grandstanding as these administrations have all questioned the Ivoirian nationality of Alassane Ouattara, a US-trained economist whom Houphouet-Boigny appointed as prime minister in 1990, though he holds a Burkina Faso diplomatic passport. The contentious Ivoirite concept was a direct result of the political elites questioning the nationality of Ouattara. In all fairness, Houphouetism is all about inclusiveness and equitable distribution of the resources of the country. If he could be prime minister, he could equally become president. The notion of an Ivoirian nationalism encapsulates the concept of a broader inclusion of people from all the regions of the country without recourse to religious and social background. The inability of the various post-Houphouet-Boigny administrations to uphold this principle is partly to blame for the political and security imbroglio in the country. The logical outcome was the mushrooming of patriotic movements, which later amalgamated to form the New Forces.

IDENTITY POLITICS AND WARS OF SECESSION IN AFRICA

Mamdani²⁸ notes that the form of state that emerged in Africa after 1960 could be divided into two distinct categories: the conservative and the radical. States within the conservative realm maintained the diverse structure of the colonial state while the radical state discarded a series of customary and tribal laws that characterised pre-colonial and colonial state structures. The radical approach undertaken by some states destroys the unique identity of some post-colonial states. Ethnic and clan structures were undermined, customary and tribal laws were discarded as a single common law transcending tribal boundaries was codified.²⁹ The codification of these laws was accompanied by measures to strengthen the state. These measures involved the centralisation of power into the hands of the political elites. The security forces were deployed to ensure that state laws were respected and in most cases political parties were banned or merged into one big political movement. As a result, several components of the state lost their identities in the process. Some were only co-opted at the periphery with little room to manoeuvre in asserting their power, independence and respecting their identity. The only means left available was to rebel against the central state authorities. Some of these rebellions have led to permanent separation. Here we examine some of these rebellions and propose what could have been done to arrest them. Our focus will be on two successful secession movements, namely the EPLF and the SPLA.

One of the most prominent identity conflicts, which eventually led to the unbundling of Ethiopia and the subsequent independence of Eritrea, was the Eritrean People's Liberation Front rebellion against the government of Ethiopia. The centre of the Eritrean struggle was based on the need to maintain the historical identity of the Eritrean people and the Eritrean region, which was administered by Italy between 1889 and 1941 and as part of the federation of Ethiopia in 1952 by the British. The territory was further annexed by Ethiopia in 1962.³⁰ This further eroded whatever identity the Eritrean people and the region as a whole had. As a result, Ethiopian students of Eritrean background studying in Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s decided to form pressure groups in maintaining and preserving the Eritrean identity. While opinion in Eritrea itself was divided on whether Eritrea should secede from Ethiopia, student bodies that included Christian and Muslim supporters forged ahead for a secular movement.³¹ The formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front and subsequently the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) concretise the idea that the people of Eritrea would prefer to preserve their identity. Since the 1960s, the EPLF has proved to be one of the most durable and successful liberation movements in the global South. It achieved its independence from Ethiopia in 1991 with little outside support.

The peculiarity of the EPLF and its successes can be viewed from two angles. First, it defeated a well-equipped and outside supported Ethiopian army. The Ethiopian army was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, which put in the necessary logistical support to defeat the EPLF. The second peculiarity was the fact that the independence of Eritrea broke all conventional legislation as the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) had made it very clear in its charter that colonial African boundaries are inviolable. These two peculiarities made the Eritrean fight for the protection of its identity special.

The Sudan also experienced a good dose of identity crisis soon after the country achieved independence in 1956. Though the Sudan People's Liberation Army's (SPLA's) armed struggle in Sudan was not necessarily looked upon as an identity preservation struggle, it nonetheless had all the hallmarks of a people trying to preserve its ethnic and religious identity.³² The fact that the civil war was fought principally in the three old provinces of the Southern Sudan, which was an area dominated by people of a particular ethnic group and practising a particular religion, suggests that the conflict was generally about preserving the cultural identity of the people of the Southern Sudan. Besides, the Southern Sudanese states had been administered separately by the British since the 1890s and only became part of a larger Sudan during the decolonialisation process after the Second World War. Johnson³³ notes that the Southern Sudan, with its huge linguistic and cultural diversity, is also an area where there has been little educational and economic development. Its marginalisation from mainstream Sudanese society, he notes, has created grievances leading to two periods of civil war in the post-colonial era.

Critical to this marginalisation is the sense that a majority of the Southern Sudanese states were stateless and in firm opposition to the main Nile Valley.

Within the Southern States, the majority of the population belongs to the Nilotic speaking pastoralist Dinka and Nuer peoples who are also segmented and belong to numerous clans.³⁴ Thus, the people in the south do not only share similar clan features, they were segmented and only accommodated within the periphery of the larger Sudanese state. Conscious therefore of their racial and religious exclusion from mainstream national politics, the southern states tried but failed to form alliances to forge a strong federated Sudan where each federated state should manage its resources. The *coup d'état* of 1958 aborted whatever political alliances the politicians were trying to put together. The Arabisation of Sudanese society under the military junta further alienated the southern states' political elites who saw in this move an attempt to wipe out the cultural identity of the southern states.

The political and economic alienation of the southern states continued under the military. The southern elites, conscious of this alienation, began to question critical government policies relating to nation-building. Mutineers and guerrillas soon emerged in the south to demand a separate state in the south. Without clear leadership, southern armed groups were easily defeated. It was only in the early 1980s that the SPLA emerged as a strong united force under the leadership of Colonel John Garang.³⁵ Its resistance to the northern onslaught lasted till 2005 when a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed. The CPA paved the way for southern states to vote in a referendum in 2011. The result of the referendum showed overwhelming support for secession from the north. Another marginalised people on the continent have defied the international community and the OAU/AU in realigning Africa's international boundaries.

MANAGING DIVERSITY IN AFRICA: THE MISSING LINK

To avoid other regions and people from other parts of the continent from renegotiating post-colonial boundaries, measures have to be taken—both at the national and continental levels—to ensure that minority rights and identities are protected. At the continental level, the African peace and security architecture needs to wake from its slumber. An effective early warning system needs to be put in place with logistical and technical support to ensure that critical conflict precipitants are detected early and appropriate measures taken to address them. Though the AU and sub-regional economic communities do have early warning platforms, their effectiveness has been questioned. Critical to this is the need to promote inter-country trade on the continent. With as little as 5% of trade being intra-Africa, measures need to be put in place to ensure that the people of the continent trade with one another. Central to this is the understanding that people can only manage diversity when they trade and interact with one another. Priority in this respect should be given to infrastructure projects that facilitate movement of people between countries. This will further help to facilitate cultural exchanges, which will go a long way to ensuring that people of different cultural backgrounds get to know and understand each other.

At a country level, emphasis should be on legislation that promotes cultural diversity. This should be done in such a way that minority rights are protected and participatory democracy encouraged. Participatory democracy in this regard should focus on ensuring that the least represented people are co-opted at the national level to positions of responsibility. This will ensure that minorities have a stake equal to that of the majority cultural group in the smooth functioning of the country. The absence of the state and the pervasiveness of poverty in many parts of Africa have made many on the continent start questioning their place in the cultural make-up of a country. Until such time—while preventable diseases are killing millions on the continent and the political elites lack the political will to address it—minority grumblings will continue to be a common feature in most African countries.

CONCLUSION

Identity differences that lead to secession have generally been interpreted in terms of the contested nature of statehood in post-colonial Africa. While those related to racial differences in some African countries have been praised, those against indigenous African regimes have been condemned as threats to the African nation-building project—the Casamance rebellion in Senegal and the Biafra question in Nigeria come to mind. Some of these identity-induced secessionist activities have even been termed neo-colonial in outlook. This makes it sound as if the departing colonial administrations did not trust African political elites to manage the affairs of the newly independent states. Thus, each case of secessionist activity (disguised in the form of identity protection) should be studied within its specificities and provide adequate context for people to make an informed judgement.

Clapham notes that wars of secession have resulted in some of the most appalling scenes of human suffering in Africa.³⁶ He further contends that, at times, this suffering is often attributed to the secessionists or to the government against which they are fighting. It is therefore important that measures are taken to ensure people feel accommodated within the confines of a particular country. Measures need to be taken that ensure a collective responsibility for the good and for the bad, which any country may endure from time to time. But the question remains, should Africa revisit the structural framework of states on the continent or should it stick to the artificiality in which the post-colonial states are constituted?

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Ethnic Identity and Conflicts in Africa

Ferdinand O. Ottob

INTRODUCTION

There has been an increasing scale, intensity and frequency of identity conflicts among groups in different parts of Africa. Africa's political process is characterized by the endless protests of ethnic minorities over domination, structural imbalance, power sharing, autonomy, identity, marginalization, resource distribution, questions of citizenship, among other things. Countries in West Africa, Central Africa, the Great Lake region and East Africa have been faced with ethnic identity conflict. These conflicts were over recognition and identification in political and economic activities. Civil wars in countries such as Nigeria in the 1960s, Congo (Zaire) now Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.) in the 1960s and 1990s, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and ethnic agitations in Sudan in the 1960s to 1980s were due to identity crises as majority ethnic groups supervised over the affairs of all groups.

During the colonial era, ethnic groups were the focal point of resistance and a medium of self-affirmation against the colonizer's aggressive deculturing or devalorizing of the 'natives'. In the main, the colonial state adopted the strategy of deculturing and acculturating Africans to undermine Africans' sense of purpose. For instance, in Southern Africa and South Africa in particular, the apartheid system reached its apogee with its attendant problems of racism and segregation. This led to a struggle for cultural and ethnic identity by the black majority in South Africa. The consequences were that ethnic groups displaced

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the state, delegitimized it and deprived it of its autonomy and civic public because groups fragmented along ethnic lines, pursuing their primordial interests thereby competing with the state for autonomy and recognition.

The arbitrary lumping of different ethnic groups together by the ingenious Europeans in the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 led to the interminable conflicts among ethnic groups. The Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) founding fathers decided to maintain the inherited colonial boundaries. This decision by African leaders was borne out of the desire to maintain political stability. In addition, post-independence African states were unable to establish political structures that reflected the diversity of the society. In Nigeria, the secessionist war over Biafra (1967–1970) was rooted in the failure to grapple with the challenge of state-building. Today, Nigeria has not been able to overcome the challenges of ethnic identity, constitutional and governance issues that underpinned the civil war.

Conflicts became more widespread in the 1990s in Africa after the end of the Cold War. By 2000, more than half of the countries in Africa and 20% of the population were affected by conflict. There were 11 major conflicts with more than 1000 war-related deaths a year.¹ The Global Burden of Disease study established that in 1990, 6% of all deaths in the world were caused by physical violence. In sub-Saharan Africa the figure was 13% with one in six males dying from violent causes. Almost one in every 20 of all deaths in Africa is clearly attributable to war. It was projected that by 2020, injuries caused by war will have become the eight most important factors.²

Conflicts often occur from the narrow pursuit of an ethnic agenda by elites who use ethnicity to conceal exploitation by deliberately building solidarity across class lines when it suits them. In other words, conflicts arise when political leaders appeal for ethnic support in the face of vanishing political legitimacy and manipulate the ethnic agenda to divide colonized people. Initially no ethnic problem was seen but after independence it became a problem because it was given ethnic coloration by the elites. In this regard, solutions to ethnic problems must be seen through the prism of the political dynamics in question, not from the narrow conception of ethnicity.³ The simple reason for loyalty to an ethnic group is because it is a major source of development in rural Africa and remains the door to the provision of social welfare services. These kinds of services provided by ethnic groups shows the absence of government in terms of development in rural Africa. Thus, ethnicity is transformed positively due to the fact that the state has abdicated its responsibility to rural people.

The post-colonial leaders that inherited power in Africa from the colonial rulers could not transform the state in accordance with the democratic aspirations of the people, rather they ruled in the same manner that colonial rulers ruled. This has contributed to the increasing intensity of ethnic identity conflict in different areas. It is against this background that we can agree that the construction of ethnicity and ethnic identity is both cultural and political. It has become a survival strategy of people struggling to affirm their humanity.⁴ The political elites from majority and minority ethnic groups could not resist fanning

the embers of ethnic ideology to consolidate political power in their respective bases.⁵ The danger of this was over-politicization of ethnicity as ethnic groups tangentially became the basis of political formations and pursued their interests in the political system. The elites of various groups more often than not manufacture and manipulate ethnicity to serve their self-interests. Understandably, some Africans are ready to fight to protect and preserve their cultural symbols at the expense of their national symbols. This is why most states in Africa are battling with the problem of national identity. Since there is no national culture in some if not all the states, ethnic culture is subsumed in the nation-states that have diverse culture.

The general assumption is that 'ethnicity' in Africa is where: (1) Africans define themselves primarily in terms of distinct ethnic or tribal affiliation; (2) kinship ideologies are principles to which 'primitive' peoples are inflexibly devoted; (3) affiliations are basically immutable and are serious obstacles to 'nation-building' and political stability; and (4) ethnic affinity means territorial control.⁶ Ethnicity is commonly blamed for political instability, weak national identity, outmoded values and regressive consciousness, fostering corruption and destructive conflict.⁷ This is traceable to the history of the decolonization of Africa and the nationalist movements that gave the moral impetus for groups to be formed and mobilized along ethnic lines, thereby contributing to the politicization of ethnicity from the onset. Politicized ethnicity implies the mobilization of ethnic identity, culture, territory and other symbols into a platform for making demands for cultural autonomy and outright independence.⁸

There are fundamental questions that continue to resonate in our discourse on ethnicity as Africans. (1) Are the components of national identity fixed or malleable? (2) Can a multi-ethnic society be constructed on the basis of one ethnic group? (3) Is the option of self-determination or outright secession acceptable? It is against this background that more attention should be paid to the process of state reconstitution to think first on how to deal or confront the 'gods' of ethnicity. This chapter identifies the features of African identity crises and conflicts. Without necessarily studying a particular country, the focus is to analyse the various theoretical arguments of ethnic identity to elicit more explanations. The study attempts to identify the root causes of ethnic identity conflict, which are to be found in the historical pattern of state-formation processes; ethnic marginalization; economic, uneven distribution of resources; and political mobilization of ethnicity. The chapter concludes with recommendations for managing ethnic identity and conflict.

CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Scholars in diverse disciplines in social sciences attempt to give an explanation of the concept of ethnic identity. In 1985, the celebrated writer Donald Horowitz published one of the most popular works on ethnic groups in conflict.⁹ He explains that 'ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually, carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription,

however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.¹⁰ Similarly, 'Ethnicity is a social and psychological process whereby individuals come to identify and affiliate with a group and some aspect(s) of its culture.'¹¹ In the European tradition ethnicity is understood not as a synonym for minority groups, but as a synonym for 'nationhood' or 'people-hood'. In this tradition everyone, not just minorities, belongs to an 'ethnic group'.¹²

Ethnicity and identity have something in common in terms of religion, language, and national origin. Indeed, what they have in common is that they have all become an effective means of group mobilization for concrete political ends.¹³ The criteria for group identity in a multi-ethnic society are based on varying racial, linguistic and religious characteristics. This has fundamentally affected the power relationships among groups in African multi-ethnic and multiracial societies that have resulted in dominant groups wielding disproportionate political and economic power. In these societies, the marginalization of the group has intensified political, economic and cultural power largely in the hands of the major ethnic groups.

Ethnic identity is an attitude that people deliberately shape and reshape.¹⁴ In that sense, elites and leaders restructure ethnic identity for instrumental reasons, which is to enhance their own power and mobilize the people to achieve their political aims, while 'identity' explains the personal psychological mechanisms for mobilization of groups in a socially segregated society. In effect, ethnic identity is the instrumentality for an ethnic group to mobilize itself in the contestation of political power. Furthermore, ethnic identity is an inescapable phenomenon because of the material base on which ethnic affiliations are formed.

Max Weber defines 'ethnic groups as those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration, this belief is important for the propagation of group formation. Conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationships exists.'¹⁵ Accordingly, an ethnic group is 'a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity'.¹⁶ Fearon and Laitin define an ethnic group as 'a group larger than a family for which membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous, and has a conventionally recognized "natural history as a group"'.¹⁷ In these definitions, 'descent' is a common element, which is an important defining characteristic of an ethnic group.

Arguably, a common ancestry may not be a defining characteristic of an ethnic group as is the case in Africa and Nigeria in particular, where ethnic groups have identifiable characteristics but do not have a common ancestry. It is true that the Yoruba ethnic group in Nigeria (Yorubaland) can trace its roots to the mythical ancestor Oduduwa (who was the progenitor of the Yoruba race). The Yoruba people in different 'ancestral cities' trace their descent even more specifically to particular sons of Oduduwa.¹⁸ Zulus in South Africa claim direct

descent from the patriarch Zulu who was born to Nguni Chief in the Congo basin area. Kikuyus in Kenya claim descent from the single ancestor Gikuyu.¹⁹ Those classified as 'Yoruba' because of their shared culture, a common myth of origin, the worship of a common set of deities and a common language still have many aspects of Yoruba culture that they do not share. For instance, within Yorubaland there are variations in dialect, they have localized festivals and distinct myths of origin, institutions and rituals, yet they are categorized as Yoruba.

In this regard, we can try to define ethnic identities in a conventional way that can capture all elements of the variables ascribed as 'ethnic'. Kanchan Chandra defines 'ethnic identities as subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with descent (descent-based attributes)'.²⁰ Ethnic identity is treated as a conceptualization of membership of an ethnic group. In this sense, the ethnic group is subsumed to an analytical category that shares a common identity and affinity based on a common language and culture, myth of common origin and territorial homeland, and this forms the basis of differentiating 'us' from 'them' and upon which people act.²¹ By the transformation of social identities into ethnic self-esteem one can understand the proper concept of identity. Social identity is in-group identification, co-existence of 'we' and 'they' or 'sameness' and 'distinctiveness', which vary in individual groups. In summary, ethnic identity is rooted in a historical past and as a form of social interaction upon which the structure, nature and character of the state in Africa can be understood.

Ethnic identity in the final analysis remains a psychological state of self-hood that gives meaning to life for groups desirous of liberating themselves from oppression, marginalization, domination and bondage. In its broader interpretation, it is a state of physical, psychological, social, cultural and spiritual being of an individual or group of individuals. Thus, the crisis of ethnic identity in Africa arises from the realization that an individual is distinct from others.

There are contending theoretical perspectives that help to explain the reasons or causes of ethnic identity conflicts in Africa. These theories emerge from anthropological and sociological writings on ethnicity. They are primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist theories. Primordialist theories describe ethnicity as fixed at birth. It is in this regard that ethnic identification is based on deep, 'primordial' attachments to a group or culture. In other words, ethnicity is something given, ascribed at birth, deriving from the kind-and-clan structure of human society, and hence something more or less fixed and permanent.²² Primordialists argue that human society is a conglomeration of distinct social groups. At birth a person becomes a member of a particular group. This explains why ethnic identification is based on deep 'primordial' attachments to the group that a person is born into, which is established by kinship and descent. This is what makes ethnicity a 'fixed' and unchangeable part of one's identity.

Contemporary primordialists hold the view that a primordial tie to a group is a biological phenomenon (socio-biological primordialism) and that it is a product of culture, history and/or foundational myths, symbols and memories (ethno-symbolism).²³ In the writings of Anthony Smith, ethno-symbolism is the defining element of ethnic identification—which is psychological and emotional—emerging from a person’s historical and cultural background.²⁴ This underscores the extraordinary persistence and resilience of ethnic ties and sentiments that characterize primordialism through the process of ethnic socialization.²⁵

In his 1969 article *Ethnic groups and Boundaries*, Fredrick Barth, a Norwegian anthropologist, questions the belief that ‘the social world was made up of distinct named groups’. According to him, ‘the identity of the group was not a “quality of the container”, (that is, an “essence” or a fixed objective reality belonging to a cultural or ethnic group) but what emerges when a given social group interacts with other social groups’.²⁶ He further writes that ‘a group maintains its identity when members interact with others...is based on one’s perception of “us” and “them” and not on objective reality that actually exists “out there” in the real world’.²⁷

Instrumental perspective holds that ethnicity is rooted in ‘historical’ and ‘symbolic’ memory created, used and exploited by leaders and others in the pragmatic pursuit of their own interests. According to the proponents of instrumentalist theories ‘ethnicity is something that can be changed, constructed or even manipulated to gain specific political and/or economic ends’.²⁸ Constructivists, conversely, see ethnicity not as a matter of nature, but as a matter of ‘nurture’.²⁹ Thus, common ancestry and myths are socially and culturally constructed, not given. In this regard, constructivism is based on the idea that ethnicity is ‘the social construction of descent and culture, the social mobilization of descent and culture, and the meanings and implications of classification systems built around them’.³⁰ Constructivists argue that ethnic identity is not something people ‘possess’ but something they ‘construct’ in specific and historical contexts to further their own interests. It is therefore seen to be fluid and subjective. There are circumstances that make people see their place of origin, their ancestry and aspects of custom and culture as fundamental to their being. This is what makes people attach primordial meaning to attributes that are seen to be fundamental, even biological, and certainly grounded in place (of birth) and similar in nature to ties of kinship.³¹ The constructivist view of ethnic identities explains the phenomenon of ethnic conflict. This is because societal, cultural and political influences are fundamental in shaping relations between ethnicities and thus in explaining conflict between them and ethnic mobilization.³² The exploitation of ethnicity by elites in certain circumstances reinforces the idea of diversity to the point that it becomes a source of conflict.

From these three theoretical perspectives, the primordial perspective provides an appropriate framework for analysing ethnic identity and conflict. The conflict between the in-group and the out-group and more specifically the aggression towards the out-group is justified because it is a ‘natural’ urge or

instinct of survival. The strength of the primordialist model is that it focuses on factors that easily explain human solidarity, most of which are superficial, for example, skin, pigmentation, language or common enemies. However, primordialists failed to explain the nature of group solidarity and methods of solving the problems of collective actions within the group.³³

CONFLICT AND ITS CAUSES IN AFRICA

Conflict no doubt, is inherent in all human societies and it manifests itself in different ways—these include conflicts between religions, races and ethnic groups. Conflict is a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have or think they have incompatible goals. Conflicts occur when people pursue goals that clash. Conflict is also defined as a ‘struggle over values, and claims to scarce resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals’.³⁴ There are non-violent and violent conflicts. Non-violent conflicts include articulation of charges of discrimination, neglect or domination, demands for redress through the press, ethnic leaders, political parties, law courts and other civil methods of articulating demands. Violent ethnic conflicts usually erupt in places where the government is an instrument of group domination and where the channels for articulating demands are closed. These forms of violence are common in Africa.

The most popular theoretical explanation of conflict in recent times is the Collier and Hoeffler ‘greed’ and ‘grievances’ model. According to them, grievances are the cause of most rebellions.³⁵ Grievances form the basis for mobilization of groups disenchanted with the political system. In other words, grievances are based on the drive for redress or justice around issues. Collier and Sambanis³⁶ are of the view that the availability of lootable resources or ‘extort-able economic rents’ is an opportunity that makes rebellion profitable. There is a relationship between natural resources and violent conflicts and civil wars, with resources providing opportunities and convenient sources of support for rebels.³⁷ The ‘greed’ aspect predicates incentives for conflicts and rebellion or struggles over resource appropriation and control opportunities, specifically the struggle for lootable resources. Grievance and greed tend to have a symbiotic relationship with rebellion. According to Ikelegbe and Okumu, rebellion is motivated by grievance while greed helps to sustain it.³⁸ It is against this backdrop that we can understand the causes of conflicts in Africa.

Colonial Legacy

Conflicts in modern African history are traceable to inherited boundaries created by the colonialist. At the famous Berlin conference of 1884/1885, the colonial powers partitioned Africa into various kingdoms, states and communities arbitrarily without recourse to the natural boundaries of Africa. The colonial administration left weak structures and institutions that posed problems for the post-colonial African government in counter-balancing the

economic and social disequilibrium. People had expectations on independence, but these were dashed leading to frustration with consequences of political unrest and exploitation of ethnicity as a potent force for mass mobilization against the state.

The colonial policy of divide and rule—by default or design—pitted ethnic groups against each other and created disunity. This divide-and-rule policy affected the process of nation-building and amalgamation of the various component units. In a subtle manner, the colonial system legitimized violence and exploitation in an attempt to have total control of the colonial people. This method of governance was maintained by the post-colonial elites who inherited power. Colonial administrations as a matter of deliberate policy created elites for the consolidation of their rule, especially elites that were tutored in Cambridge and Oxford Universities whom they felt were not ready to depart from the colonial ideological path and style of governance. Part of the inherited problem from the colonial administration was the operation of a large bureaucracy that sowed the seeds of corruption and political patronage. Corruption remains the bane of African development. It hampered efficiency in service delivery as the states had to maintain large expenditures that weakened the economy. The leaders that were corrupt ran their economies aground and created an environment for a power struggle for resources among ethnic groups.

Ethnicity and Identity Crisis

D.R.C., Rwanda and Burundi—where an artificial state model was created—legitimized ethnicity for the maintenance of state power. There was gross abuse of ethnicity and incitement of ethnic hatred by political leaders and belligerent warlords in these countries. For instance, some radical elements in Kivus in D.R.C. openly provoked ethnic tensions with the intention of destabilizing areas under Rwandan influence.³⁹ Similarly, some reactionary elements of the Ugandan armed forces have exploited ethnic differences for their own economic benefit. In other conflict spots in Africa it has been identified that lack of cohesion among the governing elites has led to the projection of colonial interest.

Scholars such as Gurr and Harff⁴⁰ and Horowitz⁴¹ have identified ethnicity or ethnic primordialism as the main causes of conflicts. Obviously, ethnicity is an important factor in explaining conflicts and wars in Africa. This is because most of the warring factions belong to different ethnic, tribal, religious or other identity groups.⁴² This explains why the killing or suffering of groups is based on group affiliations. Steve Fenton's⁴³ 'state-sponsored ethnicity' explains why the state allocates resources based on ethnic categories. The state creates or confirms ethnic categories and makes ethnicity a politically instrumental principle in the allocation of values and resources. He argues that 'when it is mobilized ethnic identity may be an apparently powerful source of action. In this case it is used by individuals or communities who may be seeking recognition, identity, security (jobs, education and, legal status)?

An opposing view was shared by Claude Ake, who argues that ethnicity is not the cause of conflict in Africa. In fact, there is nothing wrong in one preferring one's kinsfolk or one's own community without being antagonistic to others. To him, ethnicity is manufactured and manipulated to serve a number of selfish purposes.⁴⁴ Lake and Rothchild argue that 'ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, "ancient hatreds" and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy...rather ethnic conflict is caused by collective fears of the future...'.⁴⁵ To illustrate this fact, the old north-south divide between Tuaregs/Arabs and black Africans has rekindled memories of the old slave trade in Mali and the conflict between the Arabs in Sudan and South Sudan before the separation of South Sudan in 2011.

Identity and identity-based divisions and mobilizations along ethnic lines were for survival. Groups that considered themselves as minority, marginalized or excluded struggle for their identity in countries such as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, among others. For instance, the people of the Casamance region continued their armed secessionist struggle against the Senegalese state, while there are conflicts in the relations of the Anglophone minority elements in south-western Cameroon with the rest of what they regard as a Francophile-dominated state.⁴⁶ In Burundi, rebels from the majority ethnic Hutu fought exclusion and marginalization by the Tutsis, who constitute about 15% of the population. In northern Mali, Tuareg rebellion was driven by ethnic and insurgents whose region was perceived to be marginalized and undeveloped politically, socially and economically. The issues of marginalization and discrimination against ethnic, religious and regional groups are found in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Sudan.⁴⁷ In the last 30 years the people of the Niger Delta region in Nigeria have been battling with the Government of Nigeria over marginalization and exclusion in the development of the country. Militia groups such as Egbesus Boys in the Niger Delta have grievances that hinge on an ethnic minority status associated with marginalization, negative externalities of oil exploitation, developmental neglect, economic deprivation, inequitable resource distribution, unjust laws and repression.⁴⁸ In all these cases, the grievances expressed are genuine and serve to mobilize groups in order to actualize identity goals.

Natural Resource Wealth Struggle

Most African conflicts are also rooted in the struggle for resources, governance, management and distribution. There are resource-based conflict, conflict of scarcity of resources and wars of abundance.⁴⁹ The most common conflict is resource scarcity, which relates to control of land and water rights. In Central African Republic, the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas manifests clearly. Countries whose economies are dependent on natural resources such as oil and solid minerals face a high risk of conflict. Paradoxically, mixed in with abundant resources there is internecine war over control of the resources, which become the 'prize' for controlling the state,

as illustrated in Sierra Leone and the D.R.C. In Nigeria, communities living where oil is extracted often complain of government neglect and do not adequately reap the benefits of such resources. They suffer excessively from the degradation of the natural environment and this has generated armed conflict between communities and the Nigerian state. Moreover, ethnic conflicts exist as communities clash over ownership of oil fields, farmlands and waterways.⁵⁰

According to Raeymakers 'in a vicious circle, resource exploitation fuels war and war facilitates continued exploitation of the resources...groups making money from war have a vested interest in perpetuating conflict, thus these wars (in Africa) are more or less about one side winning, also about the ability to engage in crime under the cover of warfare'.⁵¹ It is therefore quite evident that in regions of booming mineral extraction and lumbering business—as in the Great Lake regions with its diamonds, gold and coltan—Burundi, Rwanda and D.R.C. were locked in intractable resource conflict, while the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts were largely due to the plunder and looting of diamonds and logged timber.⁵²

Governance Crises

Over the years, African states have suffered from bad governance occasioned by inherited large bureaucratic apparatuses and fragile and weak political and economic institutions. Most African states have been characterized by the inability or unwillingness of the elites in power to deliver effective and efficient services to the people. This has resulted in civil disorder, violence and corruption in all strata of society. Arguably, post-colonial African states have been unfortunate in being ruled by incompetent, corrupt leaders. The leaders lack vision on how to direct the affairs of the state. As one writer described them: 'some of the leaders have been victims of political myopia, narrow-mindedness, lack of creativity and imagination'.⁵³ In Nigeria, the leadership has shown itself to be selfish and self-serving, uncommitted, exploitative, corrupt and oppressive. The inherited bloated bureaucracy and appointment of political cronies and supporters to positions of authority has continued unabated. The state is used by leaders as an instrument of domination, exploitation, subordination and exclusion. The apparent lack of capacity, legitimacy, accountability and transparency in the management of public institutions renders the state ineffective, irrelevant and susceptible to challenge by groups who consider themselves marginalized. The leadership politicizes ethnic identity for its selfish political and economic gains, which often degenerates into conflict between the leadership and the people.

Neo-patrimonial and personal rule give further credence to the continuous manipulation of ethnic identity by leaders. Personal rule is a feature of the African political process as the state is seen by leaders as their personal property and therefore demand loyalty from the people without any corresponding obligation or service delivery. The leaders extract resources and redistribute rewards privately to their clients, who are mostly ethnic supporters. This is succinctly put: '...the independent states created a specific patrimonial path of

redistribution which divided the indigenous majority along regional, religious, ethnic and at times familial lines'.⁵⁴ This is a major source of social inequality, resentment and violence.⁵⁵ The failure of governance further orchestrates primordial enclaves in the form of communal, ethnic, religious and regional groups as platforms for social protest and conflict.

Economic Decline and Poverty

The majority of independent states in Africa inherited weak economic structures, especially in the 1960s. The focus of independent leaders at that time was on building those institutions that allowed for exploitation and management of resources. African states are experiencing economic shock as a result of mismanagement of resources in past decades. This has been responsible for the inability of governments to fulfil their promises of more jobs, better wages and improved public services. The consequences of this are general disillusionment and feelings of marginalization and frustration among the young population. Large numbers of young people are vulnerable because they are unemployed and therefore become a ready instrument for political violence. They are often recruited to join rebel groups or even a government sponsored rebellion. Logically, slow economic growth and rapid population growth contribute to the increase in conflict. Conversely, where there are few job opportunities, few schooling opportunities and where many young people are unemployed, rebel organizations see a ready reservoir of rebel recruits.

In addition, most of the countries in Africa fall into the category of low income earners. Countries in this category, namely Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, Ethiopia, among others, have gone through war and the citizens live on less than one US dollar a day. This may be caused by poor revenue earnings by the government, which reduces the capacity of governments to spend on education, infrastructure and defence, making rebel predation easier. In countries where there is disparity in income distribution you can expect conflict. The inequality in the distribution of income inadvertently leads to severe poverty among the populace. The uneven distribution of economic and other opportunities generates group tensions and conflicts. It is also observed in most states in Africa that ethnic groups with good education dominate in government positions. They are found in urban centres and are envied by those on lower rungs in society. The scarcity of resources exacerbates the uneven distribution of economic and other opportunities and hence, generates group tensions and conflicts.⁵⁶

Over-Centralization of Political and Economic Power

The over-centralization of political and economic power undermines the decentralized nature of African societies and polities. In a highly centralized system of administration and distribution, minority ethnic groups are marginalized and experience attendant problems of socio-economic and political domination by

the majority ethnic groups. Over-centralization has tended to breed predatory, personalized rule and a repressive approach in responding to the challenges of state-building.⁵⁷ Amos Sawyer⁵⁸ asserts that ‘the understanding of the nature of state predation and repression is critical to comprehending the deeper issues that under-grid conflict’. Certainly, concentration of political power makes the control of state power highly competitive and attractive to many groups and individuals. The state power provides individuals an avenue to enrich themselves. This competition or fight for state power and the politics of exclusion remains the source of Africa’s civil wars and conflicts and its attendant political instability. It is the centralization of political and economic power in Africa that has turned the state into a huge patronage machine as lucrative state jobs are parcelled out to ‘cronies’ and government largess shown to loyal supporters.⁵⁹

Lack of Institutional Capacity to Manage Political and Social Conflict

The authoritarian nature of most African states weakens them to the extent that they lack the capacity to manage internal conflict. In Western democracies there are institutional frameworks for the management of conflict. The weakness of state institutions in Africa accounts for the use of coercion by governments in dealing with issues. Ted Gurr asserts that ‘ethnic minority groups in western democracies, express their grievances in protest, rarely in rebellion’,⁶⁰ which is not the case in Africa. The security sector, which is critical for internal security operation, falls to the level of the militia or rebel groups, whose fire power is greater than that possessed by state security forces. In weak states, the process of holding elections can easily become a vehicle not for democratization but for the consolidation of personal abusive rule as in the case of Liberia under Charles Taylor and D.R.C. under Laurent Kabila.

Paradox of Democratic Election

Elections constitute an essential component of democratic governance in that they fulfil the functions of popular participation and a means to change government in a peaceful way. Elections have become a source of conflict in Africa. In new democracies in Africa, the crisis of political participation has resulted in a bitter zero-sum game (win or lose) struggles among the political elites. A change of regime always entails increased conflict arising from poorly organized elections or ‘selection’ processes. In the view of Amoo⁶¹ ‘the expectation of the possibility of change must be reasonable for popular participation to be meaningful and enhance stability’. The winner-takes-all electoral system is a recipe for conflict, especially in a situation whereby a group has been ruling since independence. Any change in the status quo through democratic, free and fair elections often results in conflict in the end.

There are instances where democratic elections have generated conflict. The election in Ethiopia in 1992 was marred by the inability of the government to assuage ethnic conflict that ensued between the Tigrean People’s Liberation

Front (TPLF) as the dominant party and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The annulment of the presidential election in Nigeria in 1993 led to the emergence of anti-democratic forces under the aegis of pro-democracy movements. There is always the problem of achieving peaceful political succession. This is why a strong commitment to democratic principles is required to discourage groups clamouring for self-determination.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

An attempt has been made in this chapter to provide a new perspective in analysing the problem of ethnic identity and conflict in Africa. The theoretical perspectives explored help to elucidate the reasons for an ethnic identity problem. It establishes concretely that ethnicity is primordial, constructed and instrumental to group mobilization and violent conflict. The nature of ethnic mobilization explains the role that ethnicity plays in African conflicts. The argument that can be sustained is that ethnicity is merely used by elites to perpetuate them in office and not the major cause of conflict in Africa. Conflicts arise from dysfunctional governance and a socio-political system that denies or suppresses the satisfaction of a group's ontological needs, such as the universal need for identity, recognition, security, dignity and participation. A denial of these ontological needs generates conflict that can only be resolved through alterations in norms, structures, institutions and policies.⁶²

Invariably, it is the deep-seated animosity among ethnic groups arising from deliberate state policy that marginalizes, segregates and alienates minority groups in the state that generates conflict. As long as this social, political and economic injustice remains in the body politic of these states, identity conflict will continue to manifest. The prevention and resolution of ethnic identity conflict must be linked to the underlying causes of those conflicts. Any attempt to neglect the root causes of conflict will amount to entrenching more violence in the society. The recommendations herein cannot be seen as a blueprint for the management of ethnic identity, rather each case has to be treated according to its own peculiarities.

1. The management of ethnic identity crises depends on the capacity of a government to deal with a myriad of demands, such as popular participation in politics, decision-making and inclusive national identity. African states need to seek inclusive, participatory and democratic polities compatible with their ethnic diversity. In addition, building effective national governance institutions that are founded on genuinely competitive democracy and rule of law is necessary.
2. Address the centrifugal forces—the issues that are likely to dismember the union—through a well articulated policy that will foster unity and cohesion among ethnic groups. It would be nonsense to wish ethnic identity struggle away through government legislation. One way of managing it is to recognize the reality of the problem and to ensure that ethnic agitation does not degenerate to irredentism.

3. The ingenious approach of consociationalism needs to be reinvigorated as a way of tackling the problem of ethnic identity crises. This is done by accommodating all the diverse elements and allaying the fears of the minorities. The minorities should be allowed to aspire to any political office. The desirability of democratic rule is a model for conflict management without allowing democracy to degenerate to majoritarian tyranny. This is why consociationalism becomes one of the options for conflict management as it allows for mutual veto of the groups in taking critical decisions that affect them.
4. Political parties should be repositioned to act as a vanguard for ethnic tolerance and accommodation. In this vein, political parties should adopt a rotation or power-sharing system in political offices. The establishment of a two-party system will discourage proliferation of ethnic political parties and engender national unity.
5. In view of the structural deformity associated with plural societies, it is compelling to adopt a federal system. This federal arrangement will be re-organized in way to serve as development centres, without suggesting adoption of a unitary system of government.
6. The problem of marginalization, alienation and domination by the majority over the minority can be handled by the application of social justice in the form of unimpeded access to education, primary healthcare, social insurance for the aged, affordable shelter and food assured to all ethnic groups.
7. Target a poverty reduction strategy and group inequalities. In this regard, a commitment to inclusive government and strong institutions help to legitimize the state. Strengthen the institutions of governance and civil society organizations that will engage local communities and national governments in framing policies that are aimed at addressing the problem of poverty, youth unemployment and conflict prevention.

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Identities, Conflicts, and Africa's Refugee Crises

Olajumoke Yacob-Haliso

INTRODUCTION

There is a “refugee” crisis in virtually every part of the world today. From Syria to Western Sahara, and from Guatemala to Afghanistan, people flee their homes in order to save their lives and those of their families, creating a challenge for the countries and cities that they flee to, as well as for the global society. Displacement of persons is one of the most predictable consequences of conflict and other kinds of instability. The instinct to flee is a time-tested reaction of human beings to threats to their lives, livelihoods, and well-being. Refugees have become synonymous with pathology, dysfunction, instability, insecurity and indeed, discrimination, xenophobia, and racism. It is however possible to forget that refugees are not really the cause of these negative conditions; most certainly, refugees are instead a symptom of, and a product of various problems in society—problems so large in proportion that human beings who should be masters of their environment are forced to abandon their places of habitual residence and flee for safety.

There are three distinct categories of people commonly referred to collectively as “refugees”, especially by the media—local and international. Refugees, specifically and strictly defined, are a category of persons recognised and protected by the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and its 1967 Protocol. By these international legal instruments, refugees are people who are forced to flee from their places of habitual residence, crossing an international border to seek recognition, asylum, and international protection and assistance. They may be fleeing wars, internal armed conflicts, and

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other forms of political instability, human rights abuses, and individual persecution based on their race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and so on (UN 1951). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has primary responsibility for implementing protection for refugees. The second type of refugee is persons who experience the same kinds of social and political problems listed above, but who do not cross an international border, remaining within the territorial jurisdiction of their country of origin or of habitual residence. These persons flee, but they remain within their own country. These are referred to as internally displaced persons (IDPs), and they were previously thought to be the sole responsibility of their home country, but have recently come under international attention and protection (see Asplet and Bradley 2013). As a matter of fact, IDPs worldwide outnumber Convention refugees (UNHCR 2016). In an international climate of hostility towards strangers, refugees, and other forcibly displaced persons are often conflated with other kinds of migrants, usually people who voluntarily leave their homes seeking better education, employment opportunities, and economic conditions or to move closer to family, friends or other kin. This chapter is not concerned with this third category of persons.

The current number of displaced people worldwide is the highest since the end of the Second World War: 65.3 million people were forcibly displaced as of the end of 2015, according to the UNHCR's annual Global Trends report (2016, 5). The number of displaced people had been steadily increasing in recent years with an almost 50% overall increase in numbers over five years, 2011–2015. Of this number, 21.3 million are refugees (16.1 million) and asylum seekers, and 40.8 million are IDPs. In 1975, an estimated 2.4 million refugees existed around the world, which increased to 10.5 million by 1985 at the height of the Cold War and to 14.9 million by the end of the Cold War (Betts 2009, 5–6; Loescher et al. 2008). The numbers began to drop thereafter, with about 9.9 million refugees by 2006. However, the number of IDPs had outstripped that of refugees, numbering about 26 million at this time (Betts 2009, 6). The proliferation of intractable conflicts such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have ensured that the number of forcibly displaced people keeps rising. The “Arab Spring” of 2010–2012 that swept several North African and Middle Eastern states such as Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria have contributed in no small measure to the record numbers of refugees and IDPs currently hosted in various countries today. Figure 21.1 shows this trend of rising numbers of refugees over the last two decades. The UNHCR (2016, 3) informs us that more than half (54%) of all refugees worldwide in 2015 came from just three countries: Syria (4.9 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), and Somalia (1.1 million); while the top host countries were Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, and Jordan. The dramatic rise in arrivals of refugees to Europe in 2015, more than 1 million arrived by sea—more than four times that of the previous year—has been the subject of much media coverage, but the current refugee crisis in the world embraces every region, including South America and the United States itself (UNHCR 2016).




Fig. 21.1 Trend of global displacement and proportion of displaced/1996–2015 (end-year)

Source: UNHCR 2016. *Global trends: forced displacement in 2015*, 6. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>

Sub-Saharan Africa has always borne a disproportionate refugee burden since the independence of Africa, as neighbouring states in the 1960s received refugees from liberation wars and other upheavals in solidarity with one another. In 2015, the region hosted the largest number of refugees—4.4 million (see Fig. 21.2). Refugees from five countries—Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Central African Republic—accounted for 80% of this number. African countries that received the largest numbers of refugees in 2015 included Tanzania, Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cameroon, the DRC, and Uganda (UNHCR 2016, 13–14).

Afolayan (2003, 68) classifies the various factors producing refugees in Africa into five areas. These are: colonialism and violent decolonisation; ethnic and other types of communal conflicts; repressive regimes and severe human rights violations; political rebellion and threats to governments; and profound economic depression. It is important to assert here that none of these refugee-producing factors is mutually exclusive and in many parts of Africa, several of these factors co-exist forcing people to flee. To illustrate this point, as decolonisation proceeded across the continent, ethnic identity politics simultaneously solidified to create regimes that appropriated the state in the name of their ethnic and other kin and maintained their power by suppressing and oppressing other ethnic groups. In reaction to this political repression, oppressed groups took up arms to fight the state, leading to economic collapse, wars, massive population movements, and de-development. These realities are exemplified by Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Zimbabwe, among others. Although Liberia and Ethiopia did not experience early twentieth-century European colonialism, they certainly did not escape similar dynamics.

UNHCR regions	Start-2015			End-2015			Change (total)	
	Refugees	People in refugee-like situations	Total refugees	Refugees	People in refugee-like situations	Total refugees	Absolute	%
-Central Africa and Great Lakes	625,000	37,600	662,600	1,173,400	15,900	1,189,300	526,700	79
-East and Horn of Africa	2,568,000	33,400	2,601,400	2,739,400	-	2,739,400	138,000	5
-Southern Africa	177,700	-	177,700	189,800	-	189,800	12,100	7
-West Africa	243,300	-	243,300	295,000	-	295,000	51,700	21
Total Africa*	3,614,000	71,000	3,685,000	4,397,600	15,900	4,413,500	728,500	20
Americas	509,300	259,700	769,000	496,400	250,400	746,800	-22,200	-3
Asia and Pacific	3,615,200	280,100	3,895,300	3,551,900	278,300	3,830,200	-65,100	-2
Europe	3,057,000	18,200	3,075,200	4,362,600	28,800	4,391,400	1,316,200	43
Middle East and North Africa	2,898,500	65,400	2,963,900	2,675,400	64,100	2,739,500	-224,400	-8
Total	13,694,000	694,400	14,388,400	15,483,900	637,500	16,121,400	1,733,000	12

*Excluding North Africa.

Fig. 21.2 Refugee populations by UNHCR regions/2015

Source: UNHCR 2016. *Global trends: forced displacement in 2015*, 14. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>

DE/CONSTRUCTING ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN AFRICA

Social cleavages are universal features of human societies, and no state is socially homogenous—be it European, Asian or African. There are multiple cleavages that rent modern society and create political problems. These might include ideology, nationalism, race, class, ethnicity, religion, and gender. It is the specific political context that determines which of these will become rallying points for political mobilisation. In the constructivist view of Young (1994, 234), he asserts that “in the ultimate sense, all identities are doubtless socially constructed”. Since identities are socially and historically constructed, we must examine the environment and the circumstances under which they are constructed and politically mobilised (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2001). Ethnicity has emerged as perhaps the most salient political identity on the African continent, defying the expectations and predictions of modernisation theorists of the 1950s and 1960s who expected the process of modernisation to engender the withering away of “primitive” features of newly independent African states and societies (Schraeder 2004, 102). This was not to be.

Indeed, colonialism had been the womb that formed and fed the ethnic identities that were to percolate into conflict and its many consequences including displacement. Beyond the focus on colonisation and the colonial situation, we find relevant here Ekeh's (1983, 3–4) conception of colonialism as “a social movement of epochal dimensions whose enduring significance, beyond the life span of the colonial situation, lies in the social formations of supra-individual entities and constructs”. It must be well noted that it is the design of colonialism as an ideological formation (Osterhammel 1997; Said 1993) that made it potent for bequeathing long legacies, including those of ethnic groups and ethnicity. It is now well established that “‘ethnicization’ or ‘tribalisation’ emerged concurrently with the era of colonial rule in Africa... Ethnicity was not a cultural characteristic that was rooted in the African past. Rather, it was a consciously crafted ideological tradition that was introduced during the colonial presence” (Yacob-Haliso et al. 2010, 116). These “fictional tribes” (Owolabi 2003) were arbitrarily lumped together within the same political territory by the colonisers and made to become aware of one another, thereby creating ethnic group consciousness by which these groups mobilised and struggled for control of a state's resources (Otite 1990). Thus began the creation, multiplication, and ossification of ethnic identities on the African continent.

Three caveats are necessary here to moderate the exposition above on the manifestation of ethnic identities on the African continent. Certainly, the so-called African “tribes” are modern social constructions (Thomson 2000) as the colonial state acquired “a compulsion to classify” (Young 1994, 232) for administrative reasons, leading to a freezing of these identities into a form that was alien to much of Africa before that time. For example, the Kikuyu and the Maasai in Kenya shared a social life and language before the British considered them sworn enemies (Reader 1997, 609), and in Ruanda-Urundi,

the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa has co-existed relatively peacefully until Belgian rule issued identity cards formalising differences among them. The important point however is that the colonialists were not alone in the ethnic enterprise: Africans themselves were active collaborators in consolidating the process (Thomson 2000, 59–62; Young 1994, 234). Ethnic solidarity got organised and led, and “political entrepreneurs”, “cultural brokers”, and “missionaries of identity” emerged to further consolidate the process (Young 1994, 235; Yacob-Haliso et al. 2010, 117). When, after independence, individuals purporting to represent their groups seized power in several African states they then refused to relinquish this power, creating the conditions for the proliferation of ethnic conflicts and its many consequences. The instrumentalisation of ethnic identity was thus perfected across the continent.

The second caveat derives from the constructivist view expressed above that ethnic identities are socially constructed identities emerging from an “amazing web of interactions between individual actors, groups and the colonial state” (Yacob-Haliso et al. 2010, 118). The converse implication of this process of creation then is that it is never a finished process: ethnicity can be undone, unravelled, and re-defined. Thus we agree with Oxford historian Terrence Ranger that “tribal identity is not inevitable, unchanging, given, but a product of human creativity which can be re-invented and re-defined to become once again open, constructive and flexible, subordinate to other loyalties and associations” (Ranger 1999, 23).

Third, an examination of current conflicts and challenges in Africa drives us to concur with Osaghae (1998) that ethnicity rarely exists in a pure form, being usually combined with other conflict generating cleavages such as religion, race, ideology, and class. As when studying conflicts anywhere else in the world, one must not join misinformed western media and political analysts to rush to ascribe a “tribal” explanation where there may be competing explanations available. It becomes difficult then to reduce every so-called “ethnic conflict” to an epiphenomenon, a manifestation of ethnicity alone. Therefore, even theoretical frames that emphasize this or that conflict-generating identity or cleavage runs the risk of being reductionist and of missing the complexity as well as specificity of social life in Africa’s varied contexts.

REFUGEES AND IDENTITY CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA

The conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa was one of the very first to produce refugees in post-independence Africa. Analysing that complex conflict requires one to remember the third caveat above, that ethnicity is rarely a lone explanation for conflict in Africa.

Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees during the combustible 1990s, informs us that from UNHCR’s experience, the effusion of Rwandan refugees into the Great Lakes region of Africa from about 1959 were “the first [refugee] group linked with the decolonisation process south of the

Sahara” (Ogata 2005, 172). Beyond the often re-hashed analysis of the historic ethnic divisions in Rwandan society, Thomson (2010, 63) urges us to “look towards overpopulation, land competition, falling coffee prices, economic malaise, French Neo-colonialism and Tutsi domination of the state rather than resorting to racist primordial explanations”. Indeed, Michel Chossudovsky (1995/2005) has provided a painstakingly in-depth analysis of the economic and social causes of the Rwandan genocide, particularly how the structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank contributed to the implosion. Mahmood Mamdani (2001) also demonstrates how an “ethnic” lens does not adequately explain the decades-old stresses in Rwandan society, and how *racial* political identity more accurately describes that context. Said Adejumobi (2006, 253) refers to Rwanda as “an ethnic republic in all ramifications except name”, and categorically theorises that “what happened in Rwanda transcends the issue of elite manipulation of ethnicity. It is also not simply a case of shared material deprivation. It is a destructive phenomenon of social identity competition grounded in historical trappings of the construction of citizenship and rights in Rwanda,” (255).

While the Tutsi had enjoyed authority and a higher status in Rwandan society long before colonialism, the Hutu population eventually reverted the system in the revolution of 1959. The consequence of this was the massive expulsion of Tutsi to neighbouring countries. Between 600,000 and 700,000 Tutsi left Rwanda as refugees between 1959 and 1973 (Prunier 1995, 61–67) when Habyarimana’s government took power.

The regional dimension of the crisis is extremely pertinent to this chapter, and parallels may be drawn for future analysis with the refugee crisis in the Mano River Union, also in the 1990s, involving Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Rwandan Tutsis who fled in the late 1950s and 1960s found a ready home in Uganda, many of them joining the National Resistance Army (NRA), which was then waging a guerrilla war under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni. When the NRA triumphed, they re-defined Ugandan citizenship on the basis of residency, thereby granting their Rwandan cohorts the rights to Ugandan citizenship. However, strong opposition to this within Ugandan society over time eventually led to a reversal to citizenship by ancestry. The Rwandan refugees were then treated as aliens, provoking their return to the bush from where they launched an insurgency against the government in Kigali from 1990 with the support, logistics, and arms of the Ugandan government.

Given their identical ethnic composition, geography, and politics, events in Rwanda provoked actions in neighbouring Burundi where the Tutsi held on to power until 1993. Elections ushered in Ndadaye’s Hutu government, which did not enjoy the support of the Tutsi-dominated armed forces. A coup in October of the same year led to widespread violence and the deaths of over 50,000 Hutus. More than 700,000 Burundian refugees fled into Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire, while at least another 250,000 were internally displaced (Ogata 2005, 174). UNHCR considers this refugee exodus the beginning of the major humanitarian crisis that engulfed the entire Great Lakes region in the 1990s (*ibid*).

The Burundian exodus was to be closely followed by a more staggering Rwandan exodus. Following the assassination of the presidents of both countries (Burundi and Rwanda) when their plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, Hutu extremists in Rwanda proceeded to implement a pre-conceived plan to exterminate all Tutsis. So for three months, about 100 days, with carefully organised and popularly orchestrated fervour, between 800,000 and 1 million Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in the most brutal manner possible. The genocide coincided with a civil war that was at the peace table with the Arusha Accords, which the incumbent Rwandan government had been reluctant to implement. With the onset of the genocidal killings, the Arusha Accords became impossible to implement as the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) returned to the battlefield, eventually successfully overtaking the army and seizing power in Kigali.

The result was the massive displacement of Rwandan Hutus, of a scale and a dimension never before seen as the population fled before the RPF, in anticipation of reprisals for the killing of Tutsis. According to Sadako Ogata, the first group of Rwandan refugees arrived in Tanzania at the end of April 1994, estimated at about 250,000 persons. By mid-July, UNHCR officials flying over the country reported seeing columns of Rwandans moving west, out of the country. By July 14, 1994, UNHCR field staff in eastern Zaire reported that “in no time the streets in Goma were filled with new refugees. Soon the movement became a ‘solid human river 25 kilometres long’”, and by July 17, the number of refugees were estimated to be between 800,000 and 1 million (Ogata 2005, 180).

The presence of this number of refugees, all from the same ethnic group, fleeing a perceived common enemy continued to have reverberating implications. The efflux from Rwanda was a mixture of citizens, militia, and political leaders. In fact, the hundreds of thousands of Hutu fled Rwanda *because* their leaders told them to flee. These political, ethnic, and militia leaders were mixed in with the population that arrived at the camps in the North and South Kivu region in eastern Zaire—a region consisting mainly of ethnic Hutus too. These leaders maintained tight control of the refugee population. Humanitarian actors in the camps are agreed that the single greatest challenge for them as humanitarians in this period was not the inadequacy of funds or the lightning epidemics that killed tens of thousands in a matter of days, but the security situation in the camps. The camps had become a locale for the regrouping and retraining of militia that had the intent of returning to Rwanda to attack the government and people there. Many of the men and women who had orchestrated the genocide and were known to the people and the humanitarian workers walked freely in the camps. Arms flowed in and out of the camps unchecked. As a matter of fact, the Zairean government of Mobutu Sese Seko had supported the deposed Hutu government in Kigali and so it was tolerant of the use of its territory by these ethnic militiamen for military purposes against the RPF government. Therefore, the Zairean government was not very

helpful in enforcing the principle of the primarily civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps as a basic standard of humanitarian assistance and protection. Thus we see here a combination of ethnic affinity and external politics combining to determine both the internal politics of Rwanda and the conditions of the displaced.

When the Hutu refugees began incessant and sustained cross-border attacks into Rwanda, the government in Kigali began to pressure the UNHCR to repatriate the refugees as they had become a threat to the lives of ordinary Rwandans, as well as to the stability of the government itself. The Rwandan government also deeply resented the meddling of Zaire in its politics and sought to attenuate this by demanding repatriation. The Hutu leaders in the camps virtually held the refugee population hostage, dissuading them from returning to Rwanda through a combination of intimidation, threats, and propaganda. The Kigali government then attacked the camps and oversaw the forced repatriation of the Rwandan refugees from Zaire back to Rwanda. It went a step further and co-sponsored with Uganda the armed insurgency of Laurent Kabila, which successfully deposed Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire. When the Kigali government fell out with Kabila, it again sponsored other rebels to attempt to overthrow the government in the DRC.

Thus, the entire region in the 1990s was enmeshed in a complex web of conflictual relations, producing millions of refugees and even greater numbers of IDPs. Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania bore the brunt of these and paid the heavy costs of producing and hosting refugees. Undeniably, the touchstone for the conflicts was the politics of identity, the seeds of which were sown in the distant colonial past, which became complicated by other existential fears and conditions, and continued to reverberate decades later.

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY/AFRICAN UNION AND AFRICA'S REFUGEE CRISES

Beyond the incendiary roles played by many of the regional actors in the above analysis, what has been the role of others in managing the displacement consequences of these conflicts? When people become refugees and IDPs, they must depend on one state or the other—a second state, or their own—first, for their protection, and eventually to access durable solutions (Betts 2009; Yacob-Haliso 2016). Protection here includes physical protection, provision of assistance for the maintenance of life and health, and the search for durable solutions (Yacob-Haliso 2009, 2012).

As early as 1963, African governments under the auspices of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) saw the need for a refugee treaty to address the peculiarities of the refugee situation in Africa. Work began in 1964 with the setting up of what became known as the Commission of Ten on Refugee Problems in Africa, an ad-hoc commission set up by the Council of Ministers' Second Ordinary Session in Lagos that year. Its task was to examine "(1) the refugee

problem in Africa and make recommendations to the Council of Ministers on how it can be solved; [and] (2) ways and means of maintaining refugees in their country of asylum” (OAU 1964).

The report of the Commission was a landmark. It provided the following “guiding principles” for the treatment of refugees by the OAU:

1. Refugees who wish to return to their countries of origin must be helped to do so under the most peaceful and normal of conditions with a view to their complete integration.
2. In the countries of refuge, refugees must be settled, as far as possible, a long way from the frontiers of their countries of origin, for obvious security reasons, as much for the sake of the refugees themselves as for the countries of origin and of refuge.
3. The term ‘refugee’ will be limited to citizens of countries, the political, social, racial, or religious conditions of which have brought about a need for expatriation through fear or oppression, imprisonment or other similar difficulties.
4. Countries of refuge must in no case allow refugees to attack their country of origin. In the same way the countries of origin must not consider the harbouring of refugees as an unfriendly gesture, and must desist from any attack on the countries of refuge through the media of press or radio or by resorting to arms.
5. Countries which have a refugee problem must begin or continue bilateral negotiations, with a view to solving all the difficulties likely to arise by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles and objectives of the Organization of African Unity [including] the principle of the settlement of refugees away from the border.

In addition, the Commission’s report recommended that the OAU “draft a special convention on the status of African refugees.” (Sharpe 2013, 59; cf. Holborn 1975, 851–852, 185).

After several years of high level meetings and the disposal of several initial drafts, finally on September 10, 1969, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa was adopted, and came into force five years later on June 10, 1974. While adopting the definition of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol, the OAU 1969 Convention in its Article 1 (2) broadened the definition of a “refugee” to include: “every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”.

The 1969 OAU Convention was very well received on the continent and beyond, going on to garner 45 ratifications, and even provoked a similar regional refugee instrument in Central America in 1984. However, the failure

of the OAU to translate the good intentions of the instrument into practical actions and policy, and its failure to create a vibrant and influential African refugee regime—norms and institutions—around the Convention, greatly attenuated the potential influence of the Convention. In the matter of the refugees from the Great Lakes crisis, the OAU had little if any impact on their situation as states in the region repeatedly and blatantly violated the core principles of the Convention in many ways: by compromising the non-political and civilian nature of refugee camps; allowing the refugees to attack their countries of origin from their place of asylum; situating refugees close to the borders; pursuing political objectives in other states' territories; by forcibly repatriating refugees to countries where they still harboured the fear of persecution; and by generally instrumentalising the tragedy in the region for their own ends.

One of the positive developments to have been born of the African Union with respect to the treatment of displaced persons is the 2012 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (known as the Kampala Convention). This is the first and only regional instrument in the world to comprehensively address issues on the protection of IDPs. The Kampala Convention builds on the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and other regional and international human rights instruments while at the same time it “advances the normative standard on internal displacement in a number of important areas, including in terms of the prohibition on arbitrary displacement; the responsibilities of international and regional organizations; internal displacement linked to the effects of climate change; and remedies for those affected by displacement” (Asplet and Bradley 2013). The extent to which the Convention moderates the actions of states with regard to IDPs on their territory remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION

Africa is a vast and varied continent. African countries have different histories and geographical conditions, different stages of economic development, different sets of public policies and different patterns of internal and international interaction. The sources of conflict in Africa reflect this diversity and complexity. (Kofi Annan 1998)

Refugee movements are all too often seen only as a by-product of conflict, with limited attention paid to the various ways [refugees] may cause conflict, prolong conflict, or frustrate efforts to resolve conflicts. (Morris and Stedman 2008, 82)

In the above scrutiny of the confluence of history, identity politics, economics, social unrest, regional interference, and human flight and displacement, we see the truism of Kofi Annan's words above. It may be concluded from the discussion of the Great Lakes crisis that the linkages among identities, conflict, and displacement are multi-directional. It is clear that the failure of the international community to deal with the issues of the Rwandan refugees of

1959–1962 eventually led to the series of events outlined above (UNHCR 2000, 49; Milner 2011, 270); thus refugees are not simply the casualties of conflict, but the cause and catalyst too in this case. The unfortunate implication of this is that “refugee populations are increasingly being viewed by host states, not as victims of persecution and conflict, but as a potential source of regional instability” (Milner 2011, 270). On the positive side though, having ethnic kin across the border can translate to better reception by the refugee-hosting communities (ibid., 270–272), and an influx of refugees of a particular ethnic or linguistic-cultural group can tip the political balance of power in favour of certain ethnic groups in the host country (Loescher 1992).

In Africa’s contemporary conflict-affected states and regions that are grappling with historical legacies, contemporary leadership failures, and massive internal and outward displacement of persons, the lessons of the Great Lakes experience cannot be overemphasized: social identities are combustible if mismanaged; conflict is usually a theatre of complex competing interests; and refugees are not flat characters, they are active players in underlining or rewriting the conflicts in their societies.

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Resource Control and Conflict in Africa

Victor Ojakorotu

INTRODUCTION

It is worrisome how countries with few or no natural resources tend to achieve sustainable development and those with abundant natural resources do not. It has been observed for decades that having natural mineral resources in abundance does not confer economic success on a country. Frankel (2010) termed this unfortunate phenomenon as the Natural Resource Curse. Several African countries today, including Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Congo, and Angola, are well known for their super endowment with vital natural mineral resources such as oil, diamonds, gold, platinum, and so on. Unfortunately, however, their citizens continue to suffer abject poverty and there is persistent violence against the state or mining companies over ownership and control of these minerals. This is exemplified by the results of the various challenges that accompany the natural resource endowment identifiable from resource-control agitations and their attendant armed conflicts in Africa.

There is no doubt that the continent of Africa has experienced avoidable socio-political unrest and civil strife/wars over the years. Most of these crises are the result of a struggle or fight for control over resources and the deprivation or restricted access to wealth associated with them.

With few exceptions, all resource-rich countries in Africa are presently suffering under the natural resources curse. This chapter examines various theoretical constructs as explanations for natural resources (mis)management in Africa. Issues raised in the chapter are contextualised within the ambit of relevant resource-control theories that have accounted for the relationship

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between resource-driven conflicts and the expected humanitarian crises beyond the simple illuminating dynamics. Therefore, this chapter provides an insight into the factors that place resources control at the core of Africa's perennial conflicts and details how natural resources have held back Africa with regards to development. The chapter proceeds from introduction to conceptual clarification, critical exploration and assessment of resource control and conflict in Africa. It covers theoretical constructs on resource conflict and presents a range of recommendations to address resource-control conflict in resource-rich countries in Africa.

NATURAL RESOURCES, RESOURCE CONTROL AND ARMED CONFLICTS: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND LINKAGES

In simple terms, natural resources represent all that exists outside of the actions and activities of humankind. In other words, they typify all that exists in their natural forms devoid of any kind of human influence. Natural resources comprise all the components of the environment that are visible and invisible to the eye. Arguably, by extension, natural resources are present in various forms within our environment. Common sense and some elements of primary knowledge provide us with the understanding that the soil/earth, rivers and natural vegetation are some of the visible formative components of natural resources. On the one hand, while the air that we breathe is not visible to the eye—though it can be felt— other large quantities of mineral resources such as oil, platinum, diamond, and gold, to mention but a few, are not also seen but are buried beneath the soil/earth.

Apart from what may be classified as a “general natural resource” such as the air and the Sun, it must be noted that other mineral resources are naturally present in varying volumes and quantities according to the medium of measurement, across the globe. In South Africa there are natural resources such as platinum, gold and diamond. In Nigeria, Congo, Sudan, and Angola, oil, is present in abundance. Research findings (Ojajorotu and Morake 2010; Omotola 2010; Mukoro 2010; Clayton 2016; Maystadt et al. 2014) have proved that the economic sustainability of these countries is directly linked to the wealth from exploitation and expropriation of these natural resources.

RESOURCE CONTROL

The concept of resource control is multifaceted in nature. It encompasses an extensive variety of issues. In most developing countries, including Nigeria, the structure of the federal system is often faced with challenges that stem from the resource-endowed regions' continuous agitation for a special revenue allocation formula (Olaopa 2012). Rather than making genuine efforts to resolve the problems, governments have resorted to legal sophistry on the issue of

revenue allocation and the attendant struggle for resource control, which in the real sense of it requires political solutions (Bello-Imam and Agba 2004). This often pushes people to resort to armed conflict, as in the case of the Cabinda (Angola) and Niger Delta region in Nigeria.

NATURAL RESOURCES, RESOURCE CONTROL AND ARMED CONFLICT: THE LINK

Natural resources have featured predominantly as a fundamental concern linked to the history of causes of wars and armed struggle across the globe. Not that the abundance of natural resources translates to arm conflict *per se*, rather what causes the eruption of armed conflict is the dynamics premised on the exploitation and exploration of natural resources (Carter 2007). Research findings have consistently linked domestic violence and armed conflict to natural resources (Welsch 2008). Countries with critical economic dependence on resource wealth have a correlation with strife, violence, armed conflict, and civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys 2005). The prevalence of conflict in Nigeria, South Africa, Congo, Sudan, and Angola is no less attributed to natural resources. Often, these conflicts are the overt expressions of accumulated grievance resulting from extreme frustration suffered by the citizens of resource-abundant countries.

Specifically, empirical evidence has shown that despite the huge potential economic benefits of natural resources, the economic growth and development of most natural-resource-abundant African economies tends to be relatively slow (Gylfason 2001; Sachs and Warner 2001; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2008). This has been attributed to bad government policies and some obnoxious characteristics of government officials, which broadly include corruption and mismanagement of natural-resource wealth. The inference emphasised here is that the existence of natural wealth does not categorically translate into problems but rather the inability of public authorities to consciously avert the dangers that accompany natural resources (Gylfason 2001). An anonymous opinion report in *The New York Times* of July 31, 2000, supported this claim when it was argued that:

If (natural resources) is managed well, it can educate, heal and provide jobs for the people. But (it) bring risks as well as benefits. Rarely have developing countries used (resource wealth) to improve the lives of the majority of citizens or bring steady economic growth. More often, (resource wealth) have caused crippling economic distortions and been spent on showy projects, weapons and Paris shopping trips for government officials. (New York Times 2000)

Unfortunately, across these African economies, poverty, frustration, and general aggressive dispositions are some of the fallout from having numerous natural resources. In Nigeria for instance, oil wealth is the mainstay of the economy. In fact, it would not be wrong to assert that Nigeria's economy subsists

on oil wealth. Oil revenue contributes a strategic percentage to Nigeria's foreign earnings to the tune of USD 300 billion since the discovery of oil in the Delta in 1957–2000 (Alapiki and Allen 2010; Omotola 2010). Ironically, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2008) emphasise that the unimaginably sharp increase in the number of poor in Nigeria between 1970 and 2000 clearly reveals a gory picture of disastrous economic development in the country over this period. Their research findings show that within this period the number of poor people (those subsisting below the globally accepted poverty line set at USD 1 per day) sharply increased from 36% in 1970 to a staggering 70% in 2000. Avoiding conflict in this kind of environment becomes increasingly difficult.

Nigeria's Niger Delta, located in the southern part of the country, is the bedrock of oil production in Nigeria. It has an oil and gas reserve put at approximately 25 billion barrels of oil and 130 cubic feet of gas, which account for about 90% of Nigeria's crude oil production (Oboreh 2010) and about 80% of Nigeria's wealth (Ojakorotu and Morake 2010). The consequences of oil extraction and exploitation have left this region environmentally devastated, ecologically destroyed, and the indigenes economically exploited, neglected, and desolate (Umukoro 2010). Because the people of Niger Delta are predominantly farmers and fishermen, environmental degradation has negatively influenced their livelihoods. The level of poverty is indescribable. A gross level of inequality is easily assessable from the living conditions of the people of this region. It sadly shows the level of developmental neglect suffered by the region since 1957—when oil was first discovered in the area—to date (Eboreime and Omotor 2010). The region is the least developed in Nigeria with its inhabitants living below the national per capita income level of USD 280. Consequently, it has been engulfed with various dimensions of armed resistance in response to these ills.

In South Africa, the prevalent protests and progression of strike action within its mining sector has resulted in the untimely death of many of the protesting workers. The most recent is the malevolent massacre of 34 mine workers and the injure of another 78 at a platinum mine, Lonmin Marikana, in the platinum belt in the north west of the country on August 16, 2012, by members of the South African Police Services (SAPS). Their crime was to demand better working and living conditions. Lonmin is the largest producer of platinum in the world as well as one of the largest foreign income contributors to the South African economy.

Clayton (2016) observes that between 1955 and 2005 the central Sudanese government and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) fought two wars that lasted for more than 40 years. The research findings linked the root causes of both Sudanese wars to the control of natural resources. Greater control of the oil-abundant region was at the centre of secessionist SLA aspirations.

Sadly, this implies that the explicit impact of natural-resources wealth does not translate to any serious economic development across the board and does

not reflect better living conditions for the ordinary citizens of resource-abundant countries. This causes a build up of unbearable frustration in the majority of the population of these countries.

RESOURCE CONTROL AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL EXPLORATORY AND EVALUATORY ASSESSMENT

In recent times, due to the presence of abundant natural resources, some countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Congo, Sudan, and Angola have witnessed civil war, chaos, anarchy, bloodshed, horror, barbarism, and devastation of their political economy (Ojaborotu 2011a, b; Ojaborotu and Akinbobola 2012). However, Africa's crises can be explained historically within the purview of economics, ethnic nationalism, and the political struggle for national stakes among the constituent units of states. In most cases, especially among the oil-rich nations, the main concern is resource endowment, which has resulted in armed conflict and protracted civil strife.

King and Lawrence (2005) buttress the argument for the link between resources and conflict when they assert that environmental resources, specifically mineral resources, have been an essential source of conflict and insecurity in many parts of the continent including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, and Angola. In some cases these conflicts have degenerated into uncontrollable and persistent violence with a disregard for human rights. With respect to community rights, most communities have suffered gory and fratricidal attacks from government and mining companies as witnessed in Odi town in southern Nigeria.

Environmental and mineral resource-triggered conflicts are countless and varied. This notwithstanding, they can be categorised simply into three, related sources of conflict. These are: scarcity, group identity, and right determination conflicts (King and Lawrence 2005). As explained by King and Lawrence (2005):

the fear and or reality of scarcity of sources of livelihood have been a major source of extractive activity conflicts. At the community level, scarcity conflicts arise over three major types of resources: water, productive agricultural lands, and forestry/non-forest products. These renewable resources spark conflict between local communities and transnational corporations because although they are the bed-rock for livelihood and survival they rapidly become scarce in mining affected areas. The scarcity of these resources interferes with the social, economic and political arrangement of the population and thus sparks off agitations leading to conflicts sometimes violently.

In regard to Africa, experience has shown that several factors are responsible for environmental and mineral resource-triggered conflict. The factors that aggravate the outbreak of such conflict include external policy prescription, especially those dictated by the World Bank and the International Monetary

Fund (IMF). The implementation of these programmes by African states without due consideration to their internal environment has often generated tension and increased the spate of civil strife across the African continent.

Theoretical Constructs on Conflict and Resource Conflict in Africa

Having discussed the links between natural resources, resource control, and armed conflict as well as giving an exploratory assessment of conflict in Africa, the section below examines the major theories that help to explain the conflict in the oil-rich states of Africa.

Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative deprivation theory is used to describe feelings or measures of economic, political, and social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute. Walker and Smith (2002) described it as the experience of being deprived of something to which that person or a group thinks it has entitlement. In the opinion of Wardlaw (1989), relative deprivation is defined as actors' perceptions of a discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities, while Gurr (1970) saw value expectations as the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled, and value capabilities as the goods they think they are capable of getting and keeping. This expectation, as opined by Eriksen (1993), reflects a perception by a people that the circumstances of their lives are not providing benefits to which they are justly entitled. According to this scholar, when an ethnic group experiences relative deprivation, the potential for impulsive outbreaks of violence directed at rival groups intensifies. This view explains better the reality of the situation in all areas of Africa where decades of economic and social deprivations have forced people, in particular the youth, into rebellion, militancy, and violence. The anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression irrespective of its instrumentalities (Madubuko 2015). This is in line with Dollard et al. (1939) who argued that frustration is the primary source of aggression. It forces the groups who feel aggrieved or disenchanting with the system to take up arms or use violence to express their grievances. This also ties in with the argument of Ross (2004) who states that the emphasis of the relative deprivation theory is that 'social movements' (including ethnic militias) arise when people feel deprived of what they perceive as their 'fair share' and when this occurs the result is violence. This happens as a result of the gap between the expected outcomes and the final outcomes and/or the prevalence of outcomes that are regarded as unjust and unsatisfactory. This notwithstanding, the theory has been criticised for failing to explain the reason why some people who feel aggrieved fail to act and join social movements (Madubuko 2015). Specifically, Ekpang (2005) believed there is no link between economic decline and violence, noting that individuals living in poverty are vulnerable to manipulation. He stressed from this standpoint that when government is unable to ensure that

the needs of the population are met, individuals are compelled to rely on their ethnic group for assistance and protection while opportunist politicians simply exploit this frustration to incite the people against the government based on the perceived lack of consideration on the part of government (Najibo and Nwiline 2009; Madubuko 2015).

Theory of Greed and Grievance

The theories of greed and grievance are opposing arguments. Greed theory proposes an economic factor in the motivation for conflict. Scholars of this school of thought, including Collier and Hoeffler (2004), argue that armed conflicts are most often caused by combatants' desire for self-enrichment. Motivation, in their view, is provided by economic gains through the control of goods and resources and increased power within a state (Madubuko 2015). In the same argumentative plane, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) contend that conflict entrepreneurs are profit seekers that use war to enrich themselves and see waging wars as comparable to running businesses. They argue that civil wars often stem from the greedy behaviour of a rebel group in organising an insurgency against the government. Moreover, they contend that rebels act in pursuit of self-interested material gains while oil, diamonds, timber, and other valuable primary commodities form the basis for contestable resources over which rebels fight their governments (Collier and Hoeffler 2004 as cited in Madubuko 2015). Thus, their research suggests that the presence of oil and gas resources creates violent competition and serious conflict over access to resource wealth. In the feasibility hypothesis, Collier et al. (2006 cited in Madubuko 2015) argue that, "where rebellion is materially feasible it will occur" and the motivations behind violent rebellion are "incidental to the explanation of civil war". They strongly suggest that economic greed (the desire to gain inroads to resource wealth in addition to clientelist rent-seeking) drives rebellion (Madubuko 2015). A good example of this is evidenced in the predatory economic activities seen among various rebels and militants with their professed grievances of economic and political marginalisation in most of the resource-rich countries, such as Nigeria, Burundi, Sudan, Congo, and Angola.

However, proponents of the grievance paradigm reject the claims of the greed theorists. They believe that insurgencies emerge from opposition to perceived injustices and that people fight because of oppression, inequality, lack of social justice and discrimination. For instance, Ballentine and Sherman (2003) argue that economic factors alone as claimed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) are not sufficient to explain militancy. In the same vein, Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) argue that the gap between expectations and achievements would contribute to the willingness of people to rebel. Keen (2008) in his "Complex Emergencies" argues that although many conflict eruptions centred on some concept of greed or grievance, this can never solely explain a conflict and demonstrated that the aims in a war or insurgencies are "complex". Keen (2000, 2012 cited in Madubuko 2015) presented a critique of Collier's economic war

paradigm by emphasising that Collier became too comfortable with “numbers” rather than relying on the “opinion” of a people involved in conflict. Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) also argue that empirical data can disprove many of the proponents of greed theory and make the idea “irrelevant”. Their conclusion was that too many factors come into play in conflict situations, which cannot be confined simply to greed or grievance alone.

All the criticisms notwithstanding, the greed theory still forms a foundation for explaining and analysing civil insurgencies and wars. This is against the fact that most scholars who have presented critiques of the theory did not argue that it is deeply wrong, but rather that it requires some modifications and additional theories for it to be explanatorily sufficient.

Collective Action Theory

This theory is applied to explain human phenomena in which the provision of public goods are at stake. According to, collective action rests on two tenets: that individuals confront discrete decisions about free riding, and that formal organisation is central to locating and contacting potential participants in collective action, motivating them, and coordinating their actions. Collective actions in pursuit of the same collective goods are typically framed as resulting in some shared outcome or public goods (Marwell and Oliver 1993). According to Tilly (2003), collective action is seen as a group acting together on shared interests. These interests are said to be paramount in the social behaviour of the group and shapes thoughts and actions, propelling the group to act on what it believes and targeting its action on those it sees as causing its problems (Madubuko 2015).

Olson (2002) presented two factors that predispose a group into action against perceived targets that are deemed responsible for the group’s problems. According to him, (a) if everyone in a group (of any size) has interests in common, then they will act collectively to achieve them; and (b) in a democracy the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannise and exploit the minority. These two hypotheses are present in most, if not all, of the countries where civil disobedience, war and ethnic militia are seen.

Frustration–Aggression Theory

According to Madubuko (2015) frustration–aggression theory provides a common explanation for violent behaviour, resulting from the inability to fulfil wants. I deploy the theory of psychological expressions of motivation and behaviour, as well as frustration–aggression theory to explain a conflict situation (Anifowose 1982). In explaining what predisposes people to aggression, scholars such as Burton (1979), Davies (1962), and Watts (2007) point to differences between what people feel they want or deserve against what they actually get—the “want-get-ratio” and differences between “expected need satisfactions”. The scholars further stress that where expectation does not meet

attainment, the tendency is for people to confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their ambitions. Agreeing with the above contention, Gurr (1970) argues that the greater the gap between what is needed and what seems attainable, the greater are the chances that anger and violence result.

The theory of frustration–aggression suggests that aggression is not undertaken as just a natural reaction or instinct, as realists and biological theorists assume, but that it is the outcome of frustration. In a situation where the legitimate desires of individuals are denied either directly or by the indirect consequence of the way the society is structured, the feeling of disappointment may lead such persons to express their anger through violence directed at those they hold accountable (Madubuko 2015).

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION OF RESOURCE CONFLICT

Legal Explanation of Resource Conflict

The proponents of the legal explanation of resource conflict (Peters 2001; Foss 2000 cited in Madubuko 2015) base their arguments on issues of ownership of natural and hydrocarbon resources and how regimes often lay claim to ownership of these resources. According to Luong and Weinthal (2006), the ownership of natural-resource-endowed regions is often claimed and controlled by the state with the exclusive rights to extraction and management. They say the legal instruments tying natural resources to government ownership in developing countries are sources of resource conflict. In their thesis, legal ownership and control regimes, as in the case of Nigeria and revealed by Madubuko (2015), determine the strength or otherwise of institutions, which decides, either positively or negatively, political and economic outcomes. It is their argument that resource wealth prevents state rulers from building state institutions, particularly institutions that would promote transparency and accountability in the management of resource wealth. This is so, and remains to be so, because leaders always manipulate the policy-making process and distribution of export rents. They even further weaken the existing institutions that posed “restrictions on the use of windfall” (Auty 2001a; Karl 1997). This ownership structure, control, and management of the natural-resource sector then results in serious disenchantment among affected citizens. This view is supported by Ascher (1999). They argue that poor economic performance, emergent authoritarian rulers, and corrupt regimes in the resource-rich developing countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, and other African countries with natural-resource endowments results mainly from ownership and management.

Luong and Weinthal (2006) identified four types of natural-resource ownership.

1. *State ownership with control* is where the state possesses the right to own, develop and manage natural resources by holding the highest share (51%

and above) in extraction, refining and export facilities, with limited foreign involvement. The state (represented by the government) does everything required to turn the crude resources into finished products (Madubuko 2015). Examples of this abound. These existed in the countries of the Western world in the late 1940s and 1950s, particularly Finland and Sweden, and France in the 1980s (World Bank 2011) and in recent times Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are typical examples (Luong and Weinthal 2006; Haysom and Kane 2009). With regards to tax, there is a weak tax regime based principally on indirect taxes from the natural-resource sector, which is subject to recurrent changes and indiscriminate enforcements (Luong and Weinthal 2006).

2. *State ownership without control* is where the state also owns and controls the majority of shares (51% +) in extraction, refining and export facilities, but allows some participation by foreign multinationals through contracts that grant them operational and major managerial control of the oil industry (Madubuko 2015). Most developing countries with natural-resource endowments belong to this category. Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and Angola are good examples (Luong and Weinthal 2006). Here, the tax regime is a hybrid, relying on both direct and indirect taxes, but only in the natural-resource sector. Tax collection here is unstable with its attendant arbitrary enforcement (Madubuko 2015).
3. *Domestic private ownership* is where domestic companies have the right to own and develop natural-resource deposits and hold the majority of shares (51% +) in production, refining, and/or export facilities (Madubuko 2015). Most African states also belong to this group because neither the state nor the private domestic sector has the required human and physical capital to exploit natural resources, such as oil, on their own (Madubuko 2015). Another country in this group is the Russian Federation (Luong and Weinthal 2006). The tax regime here is very strong because the economy is reliant on a combination of various direct sources of tax income such as personal income tax, corporate profits tax, and also indirect taxes within other sectors of the economy (Madubuko 2015).
4. *Foreign private ownership* grants private foreign companies ownership rights to develop mineral deposits and hold the majority of shares (51% +) in production, refining, and export facilities (Luong and Weinthal 2006). Examples of countries in this category include Cameroon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, South Sudan, and Kazakhstan (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). Tax collection here is unstable with its attendant arbitrary enforcements (Madubuko 2015).

It can be deduced from this that if resource-endowed countries are seriously desirous of breaking the jinx of their resource conflicts in their political economy, they should embrace private domestic ownership of the management of their natural resources. This, according to Luong and Weinthal (2006), would assist them in judiciously investing in building institutions that would enable

their countries to obtain more income from private industrial operators, regulate the private sector, and maximise revenues from other sources of income outside the natural-resource sector. This would mark the beginning of responsible, responsive and accountable government, reduce corrupt practices and enhance sustainable development. Private domestic ownership would offer an alternative route out of the resource curse because it motivates all stakeholders to bargain and establish the mutual rules of the game (Madubuko 2015).

Political Economy Explanation

Political economy theory has been advanced by some theorists including Bates (1990), Eggertsson (1997), and Grindle (1991) to explain the role of government and politics in economic growth and resource mismanagement, and particularly to explain why conflict occurs in resource-rich countries and regions. In doing this, Ross (1999 cited in Madubuko 2015) grouped the political economy explanation of conflict into three theories.

1. The cognitive theory, which blames conflict on policy failures and the non-performance of state actors and policymakers.
2. The societal theory, which explains the roles of the privileged individuals, actors, organisations, interest groups, and stakeholders in conflict eruption.
3. The statist theory, which condemns the powers of a state to extract and distribute resources unevenly and resists the clamour of interest groups for change.

According to Robinson et al. (2006), the reason for resource conflicts and wars in developing economies is the political incentives that these endowments generate. He argued further that in a situation where the presence of resources leaves much wealth in the hands of politicians and political leaders, it encourages them hang on to power perpetually. This will become easy because the resources will provide them with the opportunity to have even more resources, which they can use to influence the outcomes of political elections. With regard to countries experiencing both resource curse and resource conflict, the presence of resources, especially in the hand of a few elites, results in corruption, fraudulent elections, vote buying, capital flight, money laundering and rent-seeking (Mako 2010; Osaghae 2015).

Political Corruption Explanation

Related to the political economy theory is the political corruption theory. It argues that resource-abundant regions of developing states engender corruption typified by rent-seeking behaviour. Leite and Weidmann (1999) found that the presence of natural resources induces corruption and reduces economic growth and development. According to them, “empirically, the growth

regressions unanimously corroborate the negative growth effect of corruption". Other studies that supported these findings include Bulte and Damania (2008) who emphasised that in the absence of political competition, governments accept bribes from actors and interest groups who lobby for the granting of licences for extraction of natural resources. In the same vein, Shleifer and Vishny's study (1993) suggests that corruption retards economic growth and makes citizens hate the state, which exploits public goods for private gains. This is enhanced by the state's weakness, which permits state agents to collect bribes from those seeking permits and licences to operate in the natural-resource sector and when this happens, it hinders growth and development because the rent-seeking licensees have paid their way through the natural-resource sector and then behave in a manner that contradicts the licences obtained (Madubuko 2015).

Other scholars' work has found that resource abundance in Third World regions is associated with negative developments, such as corruption and a nonresponsive government that adversely affects the political system and leads to rent-seeking behaviour, accumulation of wealth, and general underdevelopment of the region (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Ross 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Sachs 2005; Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010; Auty 2001b; Isham et al. 2005; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Aslaksen 2004; among others). Transparency International (2004) noted in their Corruption Perception Index that oil-rich Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela, and Yemen all have extremely low scores. In these countries, revenues vanishing into the pockets of Western oil executives, middlemen and local officials, plague the oil sector.

Institutional Explanation

A plethora of studies have pointed to institutional causes and explanations for resource conflict in most oil-rich regions of Africa. According to the proponents of this school of thought, the nature of institutions in resource-endowed African states encourages corruption and rent-seeking activities. Robinson et al. (2006), for example, argues that the impact of a resource boom on any economy relies solely on the type of institution, in that the type of institution determines how resources are utilised to benefit society or otherwise. By implication, it means that good political institutions promote accountability and prevent corruption through well-established institutional procedures and vice versa. This remains so, in that bad institutions promote political patronage and rent-seeking, and everyone heads towards corrupt practices (Madubuko 2015). Institutional explanations of the resource curse are grouped into grabber-friendly-producer-friendly and point-source theory explanations.

Grabber-Friendly-Producer-Friendly Theory

According to Mehlum et al. (2006a, b), institutions can be classified into two types: "grabber-friendly" and "producer-friendly". A grabber-friendly institution

according to Mehlum et al. is a bad institution characterised by: (a) dysfunctional democracy, which uses rent appropriation as a political bazaar; (b) no transparency and accountability, which ends up in bureaucratic and political corruption; (c) weak rights to the ownership of property, which find expression in shady deals, unfair appropriation and takeover by force; (d) trampling on citizens' rights based on fraudulent manoeuvres and venal practices; (e) no freedom of speech, weak rule of law characterised by criminal activities, extortion and mafia-like activities; and (f) the presence of ethnic and regional warlords, which can be found in Nigeria, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, among others. A “producer-friendly” institution is characterised by good governance and respect for the rule of law. Nations in this category eliminate rent-seeking activities and have superlative bureaucratic systems and encourage transparency at all levels of governance (Mehlum et al. 2006a, b).

The Point-Source Theory

Woolcock et al. (2001) argues that of all natural resources, only hydrocarbon and minerals affect the quality of institutions. Murshed (2004) supported this view when he argued that revenues flowing from oil, gas, and mineral resources are “concentrated” compared to “diffused” revenues flowing from agricultural commodities. He further explained that because revenues from oil, gas and minerals are concentrated, they lead to rent-seeking behaviour and negative activities retarding economic growth compared to diffuse agricultural revenue resources. Therefore, in weak institutions—which lack institutional restraints on corrupt practices—greed and corruption combine to cause the resource curse, leading to the emergence of warlords who prey on resources (Madubuko 2015). This could be the reason why Boschini et al. (2005 cited in Madubuko 2015) contend that, although mineral resources are vital for economic growth, they possess the capacity to act as debilitating agents for nations with weak institutions.

RESOURCES CONTROL AND CONFLICT: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

A cursory look at various countries on the African continent shows that some are middle-income, emerging markets with an abundant supply of natural resources with well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors. However, growth has not been strong enough to lower the high unemployment rate and daunting economic problems remain. From the period of either colonialism and/or apartheid up to independence, state contradictions and underdevelopment indexes have been on the increase especially in Nigeria and South Africa. Some states in Africa with high oil endowment have witnessed persistent civil war, which has been the bane of development. This trend has ruined economies and is connected to resources control between the indigenous people/host communities and the state or oil multinationals.

The same situation was, and is still, prevalent in oil-rich Nigeria where protracted civil war, ethnic militia, political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic management is a daunting challenge. The state's political economy has been brought to its knees over the years by the combination of a fall in oil revenue; continuous agitation for resource control; the demand for environmental responsibilities from oil multinationals by the oil-rich host communities; and protests and militarisation of the region.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING RESOURCE CONTROL'S CONFLICTS IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES OF AFRICA

This chapter has examined the nexus of resource control, resource conflict and underdevelopment. This is situated within the explanation of some theoretical constructs. The review has identified that most civil conflicts in Africa are caused by groups who feel angry and unjustifiably alienated by the catastrophic failure of oil development by the oil industry. They are either fighting among themselves, the security operatives or the system for equitable share of the oil money. The work has also identified complex factors that fan the conflict on resource endowment in Africa. What remains is to devise an effective means of either reducing or resolving an outbreak of this type of conflict to enable enhanced sustainable development in Africa.

There are many strategies that can be implemented to address the dominant resource conflicts that have been ravaging the continent for more than 50 years. From the analyses above, the inability of most African governments to resist pressure from multinational institutions and transnational corporations in the form of conditionalities and advice has often led to the formulation and implementation of anti-poor or anti-public policies. To resolve this, African governments must strictly implement rule of law to minimise abuses of power.

Second, African states must reposition themselves and come up with a united front to place the continent within the global economic order as a measure to curb the frequent occurrence of mineral-resource conflicts in different parts of the continent. The need to transpose the states requires that governments should embrace and implement policies and programmes that address the progressive necessities and priorities of their people while ensuring environmental diversity for inter and intra-generation. For this to be realistic, according to King and Lawrence (2005) "any plans to increase mineral resource exploitation whether through foreign or domestic investment must be guided by a national vision to maximising net benefits, minimising environmental cost, and ensuring a rights-based approach to mineral extraction".

In policymaking, both regulatory and democratic structures, such as parliaments, should be able to sincerely and critically examine any agreement between states and oil multinationals to enhance confidence among citizens. This will go a long way to minimise resource-capture conflicts in Africa.

African leaders and governments must focus on policies to tackle poverty and environmental degradation. This will reduce the likelihood of war and ensure sustainable development. Reducing inequalities and ensuring fairness and equity in the distribution of socio-economic and political benefits and most essentially proceeds from natural resources are critically important in eliminating major sources of conflict. In doing this, policies towards investment, employment, wealth creation, education, and other social services should aim to reduce imbalances and inequalities. As observed by King and Lawrence (2005) such policies need to be introduced cautiously, since action to correct horizontal inequalities has occasionally provoked conflict from the group whose privileged position is being weakened, notably in Sri Lanka.

Related to this is the need for formulation and implementation of policies that diminish private incentives to fight. In this regard, ensuring and securing inclusive government where all major groups and most individuals participate and gain will enhance and promote a sense of nationalism and cooperation.

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PART V

Social Forces, Governance,
and Development

Trade Unions and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa

Kolawole E. Omomowo

INTRODUCTION

The discourse of trade unions and the struggle for democracy in Africa can be viewed as a level of the social relation between citizens and states (Somerville 2000) or the “state/society relationship” (Adesina 1994) on the continent. The existence of a state implies the existence of citizens with certain levels of expectations from the state. Marshall’s (1950) idea of rights (civil, political and social) dwells, conceptually, in part on the nature of the state–citizen relationship. Taking trade unions as key organizations in civil society, it speaks to the relationship between civil society and the colonial state, political liberation and the post-colonial state. Without dwelling on the elements of democratic practices in pre-colonial African societies (Brown and Kaiser 2007; Mamdani 1996), it is imperative to consider the nature of governance in colonial African societies, the role of civil societies (trade unions in this case) in colonial liberation and the fostering of contemporary post-colonial African democratic dispensation.

The emphasis on the trade union as an organization within broader civil society leaves space for the workplace and political struggles of trade unions and the forging of alliances with other progressive organizations within the African polity (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010). African trade unions are prominent in liberation struggles against authoritarian colonial states and play a crucial role in protests against authoritarian regimes (Oyelere 2014; Freund 1988, cited in Beckman and Sachikonye 2010, 5; Buhlungu 2010; Kraus 2007; Adesina 1994). How this plays out is shaped by each country’s particular historical trajectory and experience with regards to different social actors and

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power relations. The colonial states in Africa were authoritarian, despotic and imperial bureaucratic systems of control, focused on the extraction of wealth from natural resources. They were not institutions of democratic governance and learning for prospective independent African states, as self-governance and independence were not imagined due to their assumed view that Africa(ns) were incapable of such, or that Africa(ns) lacked the competence for democratic rationality (Brown and Kaiser 2007; Williams 2003; Friedman 1999; Sandbrook 1996).

However, preceding the process of decolonization, some form of democratic institutionalization was attempted when independence agreements were made (Brown and Kaiser 2007). There is no indication of whether these efforts were adequate or not, as nationalist independence movements were not necessarily democratic. The broad objective was to take over the state power. Some of the political leaders used their initial mass popularity, fostered by anti-colonial liberation victory, to drive the newly independent African countries toward authoritarianism (Brown and Kaiser 2007).

Carew (1993) argues that the failure of initial attempts at democratization in post-colonial Africa was informed by the false presumption of nationhood, and the inability to create a nation-state in the first instance. Also, the adopted conceptual framework was inadequate to understand Africa's political processes. He proposed the reconceptualization of democratic conditionalities applicable to a culturally and ethnically diverse African context. Ottaway (1997) and Carew (1993) highlight the limits of development and modernization theory as the basis for fostering post-colonial Africa's democratic transition in particular, and development broadly. For Ottaway (1997), the seeming presentation of the western countries as models of democracy and development degrades the traditions and histories of African societies, in clear disregard of the feasibility of alternative paths to governance and development. This creates gaps for the new African leaders to gravitate towards authoritarianism, in view of their initial overwhelming popular support prompted by political liberation.

Of course, what followed was that post-colonial regimes, apart from a few exceptions such as South Africa, became authoritarian and largely promoted single-party political systems. Some of these leaders were soon overthrown through military coups. Early post-colonial African state governance systems can broadly be described to have gone through democratically elected government, authoritarianism, one-party statehood, military regimes, kleptocracy and brutal dictatorship (Brown and Kaiser 2007; Riley 1992). Different African countries have had varied experiences within this spectrum. However, the 1990s witnessed a wave of new democratic transitions across Africa that has been attributed to various causes both internally and externally. Reasons such as increased popular protests, external pressure from foreign aid donor countries, divisions among government leaders and democratic experiments in other African countries, among others, have been adduced for this democratization wave (Sandbrook 1996; Riley 1992).

As was implied earlier, there is a close association between trade unions and the nature of political administration. The European experience has witnessed labour movements that are politically active through the formation of political parties, while also representing workers in industrial relations. However, there is a delicate balance between the conflicting governing interest and workers' representation in collective bargaining (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010). African trade unions, in a similar vein, have always been involved in politics, but in a different way. Trade unions' engagement with colonial states was often subordinated to broader national liberation and development struggles; hence, alliances were formed with other progressive liberation organizations, such as the United Democratic Front in South Africa (Oyelere 2014; Beckman and Sachikonye 2010; Buhlungu 2010; Southall and Webster 2010; Adesina 1994).

The post-colonial trade unions' relations to the state were more of a struggle to control the unions. Buhlungu (2010, citing Cohen 1974) identified four modes of union relations in post-colonial Africa—integration, participation, independent (opposition-allied) and independent (non-allied) models. The integration and independent (non-allied) models represent two opposing extreme ends of a continuum of the highest levels of subordination and autonomy of the state–union relationship. Buhlungu (2010) argues that national liberation praxis and discourses are imperative for the different forms of unionism that are being experienced on the African continent. Trade union objectives, strategies, organization and mobilization are, in essence, shaped by the prevailing forms of national politics. Oyelere (2014), focusing on the Nigerian case, sees it symbiotically with regard to how state and trade unions' political and economic activities affect each other.

The role of trade unions in the struggle for democracy in Africa can therefore be understood from the perspective of how national liberation struggles in different African countries have shaped their response on the one hand, and how they have responded to the post-colonial politics on the other hand. What kind of countervailing power force that trade unions provide in the various African polities is one of the important criteria in triggering democratic transition and probable consolidation. It can therefore be argued that the level of trade unions' autonomy or subordination to the state in different African countries speaks to the degree of union involvement in democratic transition and consolidation. However, it is the view here that that democratic transition and consolidation in Africa cannot be solely credited to the activities of trade unions. Trade unions are viewed as a constituent of civil society, albeit an important one. This is evident in the different forms of alliances they have forged during the struggle for liberation and in post-colonial political regimes.

The layout of this chapter is as follows. I will look at the notion of democracy: what does it suggest and what implications does it have for social well-being? It is pertinent to interrogate democratic transitions in Africa, in order to lay bare their driving forces and implications for development. This section will be followed by a discussion of the role of trade unions in democratic transition and consolidation in Africa. The chapter will be concluded by arguing

that trade unions are not enough in democratic transition, although they have played and continue to play a significant role as core civil society organizations. Notable here is how the changing nature of work has tended to reduce union density and organization, which forms their core power base. Also considered is the contention that trade unions in Africa are more reactive to the prevailing politics of a time, rather than being pro-active. This means that it is the politics of a time that shapes the nature of trade union organization and activities in Africa (Buhlungu 2010), rather than the other way around.

THE CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE—A BRIEF LOOK

It is very tempting to take the concept of democracy as given due to its wide usage in everyday conversation, in the national and international media and in academic writings. However, its conception is not as simplistic as it sounds. Consideration of its origins, praxis, variance, changes over time and impact on the quality of life or social well-being of different societies at different historical and contemporary times immediately conveys its inherent complexity. Is democracy a good thing? What ethics does it convey? How is democracy related to social justice? These are some of the questions that come to mind in its discourse. The Freedom House (<https://freedomhouse.org>) broadly measures democracy with two broad proxy variables of political rights and civil liberties (Tilly 2007). Each of these two variables is composed of various elements, which suggests that democracy is a doubled-layered composite social phenomenon, idea or praxis (Williams 2003). It does not become easier if we consider democracy as an idea and process. How does the idea of democracy inform its processes in different polities across the globe?

Williams (2003) emphasizes that democracy is conceptually contested. It has been associated with concepts such as power, liberty, rights and state. Its conception has traversed the notions of constitutional democracy, liberal democracy and social democracy—suggesting the necessary conditions for democratic dispensation to subsist. For him, the process of democracy involves “representation, accountability, and deliberation” (Williams 2003, 341). It seems that deliberation could be viewed as the basis for representation and accountability. It is what Sen (2009, 321–337) and Rawls (1971, 1993, 1999) severally referred to as “public reasoning”. At the core of democracy, in their view, is public reasoning—“government by discussion”. This idea is a broader conception of democracy, which transcends the limitation of reducing it to formal elections and voting.

Dahl (1966, cited in Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1983) notes that the two broad conditions for democratic transition and consolidation are “liberalization or contestation” and participation or inclusiveness. Institutionalized peaceful contestation by opposing groups/interests is imperative, as is popular participation for democracy to subsist in any polity. Tilly (2004) also emphasizes the contention element of democracy in his exploration of European democratic

transition history. Tilly (2007) is of the view that the determinants of whether a country is democratic are constituted by political standing, quality of life and how democracy is explained. Political standing in relation to the other countries of the world is an important indicator of a democratic regime. Democracy is viewed as intrinsically good because it delivers better social well-being, since power resides with the collective population to determine their own fate. How do we define, identify and explain democracy because of its profound effects on people's lives? However, explaining democracy with regards to its development, consolidation and possible reversal is important.

The definition of democracy can be classified into four approaches—substantive, constitutional, procedural and process-oriented (Tilly 2007). The substantive approach to the conception of democracy speaks to politics and the type of quality of life a prevailing regime fosters. When these coincide with political rights and civil liberties, such a regime can be viewed as substantively democratic. The constitutional approach focuses on the laws guiding politics. It is differences in legal provisions that distinguish the different types of government, such as monarchies and democratic regimes. The procedural definition places emphasis on governance procedures such as the holding of regular free and fair elections with universal suffrage. The process-oriented conception of democracy highlights a set of standard processes, such as effective participation, equality of votes and broad-based adult participation, as necessary for democracy.

Tilly (2004), in tracing the history of contentions in the development of democracy in Europe, identifies four contemporary conceptions of democratization and de-democratization. These include the necessary (as distinct from sufficient) conditions, variables, sequence and cluster explanations. The necessary conditions explanation speaks to the prevailing conditions within a polity to facilitate democratization. Conditions such as the learning of democratic ideas and activities from other polities; an autonomous state; a degree of national integration; economic growth; and a clear development of a capitalist and working class, with mobilization of the latter in demand for political participation to guarantee their collective rights. Michael Mann's notions of despotic and infrastructural powers are imperative to state autonomy (Soifer and vom Hau 2008; Weiss 2005; Mann 1984) in relation to the civil society as we consider trade unions in this chapter. So also is the conflict between dominant and subordinate classes.

The combination of different variables has also been used to explain democratization. For example, Huntington (1991, cited in Tilly 2004) identified delegitimizing authoritarian regimes; international economic growth and demand for democracy; and the changing policies of prominent countries as some of the variables that might combine in different ways to foster or hinder democratization. The sequence argument posits that democracy is a stage in the linear development of societies. Four stages, "development of preconditions, exit from authoritarianism, transition to democracy, and democratic consolidation" (Tilly 2004, 11), are identified as stages in the development of democracy. These stages are not treated as organic development, but rather as resulting from the

choices of, and the nature of relations (contestations) between, prominent political actors. This thrust in the literature has been referred to as the evolutionary conception of democracy (Williams 2003). The cluster explanation of democracy emphasizes a unique combination of conditions, causal variables and sequences during different polities, time periods and political regimes.

Tilly (2004) favours the conditions conception of democratization, drawing on Dahl's (1998, cited in Tilly 2004) conception of necessary conditions. He diverges, however, from the contemporary conception of democratization by arguing that there are many paths to democracy against a linear sequential conception development of democracy from undemocratic regimes. He contends that while there might be some necessary conditions, there are no sufficient conditions for democratic transition. For him, democratic transition cannot be limited to the characteristics of the political regime immediately preceding it. Attention must be focused on processes that may foster or hinder democratization. Finally, he is of the view that democracy is not an irreversible political dispensation with unshakable stability (except through crisis); rather, de-democratization is a possibility.

Diamond et al. (1988, xxvi) define democracy as "a political regime that possesses three conditions: free and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups in regular elections for the holding of governmental office at all levels; high levels of political participation among citizens in the selection of leaders and policies, by means of regular elections, with no social group excluded; and a full enjoyment of political and civil liberties (speech, press, association) in order to ensure that political participation and competition are open to all". The flourishing of democracy will require that organizational, socio-economic and political power are dispersed and civil liberties are guaranteed (Kraus 2007; Williams 2003). The protection of civil liberties enables political representation and popular influence on governance and decisions that affect them. Democracy is therefore the creation, protection and consolidation of the institutions that will facilitate the achievement of these objectives, particularly the fostering of public reasoning (Sen 2009; Williams 2003).

Various theoretical positions address the sources of democracy. Some theories focus on elites versus masses, while others emphasize contingent against structural positions. Some have suggested the interlinkages between capitalism and democracy, dwelling on the class antagonism in capitalist production as creating the conditions for democratic transition (Mainwaring et al. 1992, cited in Kraus 2007). The connection to capitalism has a close affinity with the consideration of the role of trade unions in democratic transition in Africa. The nature of the power constellation (class, state and transnational) could affect the rise and demise of democracy (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). This immediately suggests that alternative or counteracting power blocs are imperative for democratic transition and consolidation. It is within this thinking that trade unions in Africa, and broader civil society, can be viewed as an opposing power base to the authoritarian colonial and post-colonial states.

To conclude this section on democracy, different conceptions can be broadly grouped into cultural and economic theories of the origin of democracy. Against these positions, Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1983) argue for a historical and political conception of democratization, using the Chilean experience. They demonstrate, drawing on the work of Dahl, that Chile was high on all democratic indices before the 1973 military coup, though it deviates from the cultural and socio-economic preconditions conception of democratization. The argument that certain cultural values (such as Protestantism versus Catholicism) are more predisposed to fostering democratization did not stand up in the Chilean historical experience. Also, the argument that socio-economic development is imperative for democratization was not supported in the Chilean case. Concisely speaking, these theoretical positions suggest that democratization is the end-point in the process of modernization and that Protestant values are more disposed to democratization. The modernization thinking is best conveyed by Fukuyama's "End of History" publication (Fukuyama 1992; Ottaway 1997).

Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1983, 23) contend that cultural and economic conceptions of democratization are excessively deterministic. For them, critical historical moments and changing political power structures are imperative to democratization. They write: "Democratic institutions owe their development or consolidation to critical historical moments in which the balance of political forces tilts in favour of elites and social forces often of very different ideologies, who press for the consolidation of democratic institutions in the expectation that they will be advantageous for consolidating or increasing their power, safeguarding their interests, and or resolving in the least costly manner a political crisis." This could be a perspective on the African democratic transition, with regard to how different historical moments have prompted a power shift between political elites and civil societies. This is a less prescriptive view, While African countries might have similar colonial experiences, the dynamics of power shift at different periods varies.

DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA—THE ROLE OF TRADE UNIONS

How are we to understand democratization or democratic transitions in Africa? Did democratization develop organically as a logical response to socio-economic transformation and the achievement of other necessary conditions for democratization after decolonization? Or is it a product of political pressure on the nascent independent African countries? Fatton (1990) and Ottaway (1997) seem to think that the latter is the case in most African countries, though their justifications differ. Fatton (1990) maintained that African transition to liberal democracy from colonial despotism was rushed without attention to the lack of significant changes in the cultural, economic and bureaucratic spheres. For him, the immaturity of African capitalism with regard to the creation of a dominant bourgeoisie and powerful proletariat misses out on important conditions for the creation of a liberal democracy. The conflict between these two classes is necessary for the political

agreement that is imperative for a liberal democracy founded on “individual rights, civil liberties, and freedom of association”. What resulted from this gap in the development of an African bourgeoisie and democratic requirement was a politics of the patron–client relationship, which eventually led to personal rule, a dearth of institutional coherence, corruption and authoritarianism (Fatton 1990, 457).

Ottaway (1997), in like manner, argues that democratization in Africa is not an organic process that emerges out of improving socio-economic conditions, but has arisen out of political pressure from the western colonial masters. They thought that although the underlying conditions were not conducive, external pressure, expertise and assistance could create the necessary conditions, such as political parties and civil society. Africa must be socialized democratically through civic education, once formal democratic institutions and processes have been set up, even with the dearth of enabling underlying conditions. For her therefore, the fragility of democratic transition in Africa is because often, formally established democratic institutions are not complemented by adequate social transformation (Ottaway 1997).

One of the key underlying conditions for democratic consolidation is the existence of powerful countervailing forces (Ottaway 1997; Fatton 1990; Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1983). This can be viewed with regard to multi-party democracy where various differing political interests are represented within the political spectrum by different political parties. Also, it can be considered as meaning the countervailing forces between the governing political party/elites and the broader civil society. Ottaway (1997) indicated that the countervailing forces that emerged in the post-independence African political system were political parties and trade unions that are seemingly internally authoritarian. In view of this she suggests that in order to foster democracy in Africa, the apparently contradictory requirements are to prevent the collapse of the ‘soft’ state (because it is better than anarchy) and reduce the authoritarianism of the prevailing regime.

Friedman (1999, 840) seems to bring Ottaway and Fatton’s views together when he notes that the preconditions for democratic progress are an organized “robust civil society” with adequate autonomy to challenge state power, a “usable state” (that can “command, regulate, and extract”) and a working market economy. However, he noted a seeming paradox that democracy itself might be a necessary precondition for state-building, liberty, economic development and stability. This raises the problem of teleology when it comes to the preconditions conception of democracy. It seems that if we take a derivative approach to democracy (as important for the achievement of social well-being or inclusive development), the state (seen as institutions of governance in this case) is at the heart of everything. Democracy therefore becomes arguably the best way to constitute the state in the first instance, and also the best way to get the state to work for inclusive development that will benefit majority of the population. It means that beyond electioneering, democratic dispensation includes structures, processes and procedures to get the state to take inclusive decisions and be accountable to the people (Williams 2003).

Post-colonial African countries have therefore passed through several systems of governance, which can be broadly described as nascent fragile democracies shaped variously by the differing realities and experiences of different African countries. The majority of African countries, coming from the despotic colonial regime, were bequeathed with multi-party democracy at independence, though there was little or no experience to draw from (Sandbrook 1996). These initial experiences were, in a significant number of cases, interrupted by military coups and subsequent military rule. Some countries experienced civil war as the lowest ebb of military governance. The return to democratic governance, after the interruption of military rule, was characterized by quick gravitation towards a one-party state in significant numbers of African countries. Some countries have managed to transcend the one-party state to achieve multi-party democracy, though this is still fragile (Brown and Kaiser 2007).

Friedman (1999, 825) argues therefore that the first surge in democratic transition in post-colonial Africa failed because of the inability to build “substantive and sustainable democratic institutions”. He further maintained that what we experienced was a “fallacy of electoralism” (Schmitter and Karl 1991)—a supposition of election fetishism as an adequate indication of a democratic regime. He contends that African democratization could at best be described as “illusory” due to apparent subtle autocracy, because decision-making is centralized and elected officials are less accountable to the people. Hence, an election becomes a tool to give legitimacy to a not-so-democratic regime. A wider conception of democracy as a system of institutions that facilitate popular participation in decision-making, institutionalized conflict resolution through peaceful political systems and civil liberties will reveal the weakness of the African democratic dispensation.

After the collapse of the initial post-independence democratic governance, and interruptions by military regimes, the return to democracy seems remote to most African countries. However, the democratization wave of the 1990s happened against expectations, if we are to think in terms of the necessary conditions for democratization (Sandbrook 1996). Multi-party elections were held in various African countries. While some were choreographed by the ruling party to hold on to power, in others power was ceded to opposition leaders through the ballot peacefully. From the beginning of the 1990s to the late 2000s multi-party elections were held in about 45 sub-Saharan African countries (Brown and Kaiser 2007). The democratic transition happened in spite of unfavourable socio-economic structural obstacles, limited multi-party experience, pronounced clientelism, personalism and corruption and the effects of the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Sandbrook 1996).

Democratic transition was credited to internal and international countervailing forces that put pressure on autocratic regimes/leaders to succumb to democratic reform. Crucial among the factors that created this democratic space are persistent protests/demonstrations by civil society organizations. Other factors include division among governing elites, the effect of democratization elsewhere on the continent and international pressure, especially from

financial aid donor countries (Sandbrook 1996; Riley 1992). Popular protests and the role of the trade unions speak to the objective of this study. The nature of capitalist production brings workers together, and makes it easy for them to organize as a collective (Adesina 1994; Marx 1976). This means that among all the civil society organizations, the trade unions have the best platform to organize. While the other democratization enabling factors are important, I will only discuss the impact/influence of the trade union on democratic transition and consolidation in Africa subsequently.

It is important to note that Africa's democratization process has been different in character in different African countries, depending on the local conditions and how the idea is adapted in practical processes. However, the role of the democratic movement, especially the trade unions, was first undermined by the rise in neoliberalism across Africa. Popular movements were seen as a political hindrance to economic development, which provides the basis for their repression at times (Adesina 1994; Riley 1992). Sandbrook (1996) argued that an election is a first step in the process of democratization. The consolidation of democracy in Africa requires the institutionalization of the political party system to facilitate contestation, and an independent mass media to facilitate transparency and accountability. For him these two institutions will lead another array of institutions and procedures to facilitate "accountability, transparency in decision making, responsiveness of government and legal process"—all necessary characteristics of democratic consolidation (Sandbrook 1996).

However, the independent mass media remains partially institutionalized and press freedom remains partial. What Sandbrook (1996) failed to pay attention to are the driving forces behind the formation of the multi-party system and the press freedom he emphasized. The power of active civil society protests could be considered in this regard. They can represent countervailing interest and resist autocratic regimes. Further, they can hold a democratic regime to account. Brown and Kaiser (2007), drawing on the democratic experiences of Benin, Botswana, Burundi and Kenya, show the divergence between four broad categories of democratic experience in Africa. Though Botswana's democracy has an authoritarian foundation, it is stable. It has been ruled by a single dominant party for decades since the adoption of multi-party democracy. What is unique about the country is the mixture of the liberal democracy prescription of the West with traditional structures (House of Chief and village council or Kgotla) in their governance system. This connection between modern state institutions and traditional society has been credited with the endurance of its democracy (Brown and Kaiser 2007).

The Benin democratization process was built on a national conference, a practical demonstration of "public reasoning" (Sen 2009; Rawls 1971, 1993, 1999). Before then, its polity was defined by an ethnic defined government and military rule. Against an economic down-turn, a national conference was convened, and a democratic regime was installed. Benin has since passed the "two-turnover" test of democratic consolidation. Brown and Kaiser (2007) described the Kenyan democratic experience as reluctant, after about three

decades of one-party state governance. Although a multi-party system was allowed in the early 1990s due to local and international pressure, the ruling party unpopularity held on to power for another decade, through often violent electoral manipulation. It was not until 2002 that the party that had ruled since independence was replaced through the ballot for the first time (Brown and Kaiser 2007). Democratization in Burundi was marred by ethno-regional violence, which led to the loss of over 800,000 lives. This happened within the context of the assassination of the prime minister-elect, military coups and civil war. Pierre Nkurunziza was indirectly elected as president in 2005 (Brown and Kaiser 2007). The most recent development is that he has used the constitutional court to gain an unconstitutional third term in office, marred by a violent clamp-down on protesters.

The above four cases, it could be argued, capture the experiences of democratic governance in Africa. Military disruption to the post-colonial democratic regime was so rampant in Nigeria that its political development is characterized by the first, second and third republics (Oyelere 2014). Between independence in 1960 and 1999, Nigeria experienced eight military leadership/regimes. The current democratic transition has endured since 1999, and has passed the “two-turnover” test (Oyelere 2014; Brown and Kaiser 2007). As earlier indicated, there are competing explanations (structural, historical, the selected actor’s agency, culture and the economy, among others) of the cause of the democratic transition witnessed in Africa in the 1990s against obvious contextual disabling conditions. Even certain elements of civil society have been accused of covertly and overtly supporting different regimes. A good example of this is one million-man march that took place on 3 and 4 March 1998 in support of Abacha, a military head of state in Nigeria, to become the next civilian president (Idachaba 2001). Brown and Kaiser (2007, 1142) hence argue that a “complex interplay of conditions and actors” are accountable for the 1990s wave of democratic transitions in Africa. However, it is argued here that civil society organizations could be singled out as crucial to democratic transition and consolidation in Africa. It is from this perspective that I look at trade unions.

TRADE UNIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA

Trade unions have always kept the state on its toes in Africa ever since the colonial period. Hence they were significant participants in the struggle for liberation. What started as a demand for better working conditions from employers broadened to include the national liberation struggle (Oyelere 2014; Beckman and Sachikonye 2010; Buhlungu 2010; Adesina 1994). Unions are politically involved in order to affect the employment conditions of their members. This becomes imperative, especially with the expansion of neoliberalism, the promoters of which see trade unions as a hindrance to privatization and free trade (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010). African trade unions have been involved in protest and resistance against authoritarian regimes and forcing the democratization and liberalization of political life (Kraus 2007).

Friedman (1999) noted that the preconditions for democratic transition are a robust civil society and a reliable market economy. Trade unions are a significant social actor within the civil society community and the industrial relations system. They have the ability to organize both as a civil society organization and an important stakeholder in the industrial relations system, and their membership is the source of their power. The nature of capitalist production brings workers together, hence giving them the opportunity to organize easily, unlike other civil society organizations (Adesina 1994; Marx 1976). While unions' interest is focused on improving the working (and by implication living) conditions of their members, both the colonial and post-colonial states (in their various forms) are intent on labour control. Kraus (2007) identified corporatism and market strategy as two strategies for labour control deployed by different governing regimes in Africa. Corporatism involves integrating or co-opting the unions by granting them some benefits in order to contain their behaviour. A good example was when the Nigerian government was providing funding for the Nigeria Labour Congress (Adesina 1994). The state could use this space to pass union-limiting laws. Market strategy, on the other hand, is the exposure of the union to the vagaries of the market through deregulation, for example (Kraus 2007).

While persistent protests and strikes could compel the state into the negotiation and implementation of democratization, the unions have to battle with the challenge of resisting government control and at times the arrest of union leaders by authoritarian regimes, like the case of military regimes in Nigeria (Adesina 1994). There has been some argument that unions are more likely to push for democratic transition if they have internal democracy (Kraus 2007). It could also foster the success of union actions (Oyelere 2014). Beckman and Jega (1995, cited in Kraus 2007) have argued that there is a lack of internal union democracy in Africa. The union movement has the propensity to compromise and protest. The sizes of unions has no correlation with how influential they could be; rather their level of influence is determined by the kind of alliances they form with other democratic forces such as social movements and political parties (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, cited in Kraus 2007).

For Oyelere (2014) the challenge for trade unions to influence democratic transition is rooted in the exercise of their economic and political activities. These are in relation to state political and economic actions, which must be located within the context of the global decline of trade union membership since the 1970s (Verma et al. 2002, cited in Oyelere 2014). Liberalization has led to the changing nature of work such as its subcontracting, casualization and informalisation, all crafted in the notion of labour flexibility (Appiah-Mfodwa et al. 2000). There is a continuous decline in permanent employment (the Standard Employment Relationship), and replacement with atypical work. The loss of permanent work means the loss of union membership, with implications for trade union power (Omomowo 2010, 2011; Webster 2006; Von Holdt and Webster 2005; Webster and Omar 2003).

Different countries experience the global decline in union membership and how it affects union power differently. In the Nigerian context, unions have to deal with the challenges of economic conditions, lack of democratic governance with several military coups and regimes, and use of military decrees as well as legal edicts to prevent trade union activities (Oyelere 2014; Adesina 1994). The effects of economic policies in different African countries have been more devastating to union membership/density than political policies. Significant numbers of African countries have experienced neoliberal macro-economic policies, which peaked at the adoption of the failed SAP. The response of unions to the African political and economic context was the practice of “social movement unionism” (Oyelere 2014).

Adesina (1994), speaking to the Nigerian case, argues that the divide between industrial relations and political relations has been blurred since the colonial period: “What is industrial is immediately political” (82). Union and other civil society groups’ protests in the post-colonial period were triggered by increasing social inequality, corruption and authoritarian rule by military regimes. Contrary to his initial proposition, Oyelere (2014) found that civilian regimes are more despotic to trade unions in Nigeria. In essence, protests are informed by demand for “minimal livelihood” and contracting “socio-political space”, and are targeted at democratic governance (Adesina 1994, 88–89). Trade unions across Africa have been a leading civil society and class organization in resistance to and protests against authoritarianism (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010; Kraus 2007).

Williams (2003) noted that many governments incorporate unions into the ruling party and fund their programmes in order to control them and reduce industrial strikes. The failure of unions to deliver on preventing strikes led to breaking them down to undermine their demand. However, trade unions and their activities continue to set the pace in popular protest against corrupt authoritarian regimes, leading to democratic transition. It is important to note that popular protests are first economic before they are political in Africa (Riley 1992). Therefore, most protests are triggered by deteriorating living conditions. Buhlungu (2010, 198) describes African unions as “economic and political creatures”; it is limiting to treat them as either class or nationalist organizations. Therefore in post-independence Africa the unions maintain an unwavering interest in national development, and hence have sought to influence the state in diverse ways (Buhlungu 2010).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Without a doubt trade unions in Africa have been involved and continue to be involved in democratic struggle. Beyond viewing trade unions as class organizations, treating them as a significant stakeholder within the civil society spectrum immediately lays bare the economic and political activities of trade unions. Unions have to remain relevant in the face of the challenge of membership decline due to globalization and neoliberalism. They have to be able to withstand the two-pronged economic and political approaches to controlling

them that are deployed by both civilian and military regimes in Africa. Beyond workplace or industrial relations struggles, unions have been seen on the continent forming alliances with other progressive organizations, in order to dispatch their economic and political activities. Industrial relations cannot be clearly separated from political relations. The contribution of African trade unions to the liberation struggles of different countries on the continent is documented, though nationalist movements that are not always democratic have claimed leadership of the liberation struggle (Adesina 1994).

The post-independence African unions were quick to resist emerging authoritarian regimes across the continent. They championed various protests to force democratic transition, even against military regimes. They can also be credited with the level of democratic consolidation that has been achieved in different African countries because they force the state to be accountable to the people. I argue here that though the unions played and continues to play a significant role in African democratization, these achievements are only meaningful and significant partly due to the alliance of the unions to other progressive civil society organizations. I therefore did not treat the unions as class organizations alone, but as civil society organizations whose economic and political activities benefit the society at large. Their contribution is the struggle for democratic transition and consolidation in Africa.

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The Peasantry and Politics in Africa

Linnet Hamasi

INTRODUCTION

Peasant studies became popular in academia from the 1950s because of the successful peasant-led revolutions in India and Pakistan in 1947, China in 1949 and Ghana in 1957. These revolutions eventually led to the political independence of these former colonies. Göran Hydén defines peasants as people who have lived from hand to mouth with minimal access to strategic resources.¹ In his analysis, the peasantry lacks coherence, mobilization and leadership or a capacity to regroup. Peasants are largely uneducated, marginal and exist outside the formal structures of the state. It is therefore not easy to capture them within the superstructure. He recognizes, however, that peasants are a structural anomaly of rural Africa that allows the small to be powerful.²

In discussing the limits to *Ujamaa* (the concept that formed the basis of Julius Nyerere's social and economic development policies in Tanzania after it gained independence from Britain in 1961), Hydén argued that the state in Africa was in fact a bureaucratic structure incapable of dominating the countryside. According to him, the robustness of peasant communities actually prevented African governments from successfully penetrating the countryside. The peasantry owed its resilience to the persistence of honored customary practices and harmonious social relations, what Hydén termed the "economy of affection," and also to the overall weakness of the state bureaucracy.

Many scholars have looked at African peasantry as a vulnerable group that survives thanks to the sympathies of the formal structure and almost in parallel. In this chapter, I argue that the African peasantry make up an important

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and unique segment of any society. This is because peasants are a creation of colonization, and although they are essentially based in rural areas, they have their own mode of production which has sustained them.

Apollo Njonjo does not see the peasantry as helpless in the manner that is described by Hydén. He believes that peasantry is a coherent, conscious, articulate grouping that is responsible for Africa's liberation and has held the continent's economy together through the payment of taxes. Peasants were responsible for mobilizing forces of resistance against colonial rule. To an outsider, they may appear disorganized, but this is not the case.³ Njonjo faults both N'gan'ga and Nyong'o for leaving out very important theoretical and historical issues in their discussions about peasantry, especially Kenya's. To him, peasantry is found in the social formation in which it is formed. He insists that the peasantry further occupies a critical position in the transition to capitalism. According to Njonjo, fair distribution of resources has not trickled down to the peasants, thereby forming a middle-class peasantry as many scholars claim. There is still a differentiation of the peasantry as a group owing to capitalist development in agriculture, with the majority of the peasantry being reduced to owners of patches of land.

In his analysis, Ng'ang'a wonders whether peasants accumulate or are impoverished, and what happens when the capacity to accumulate is undermined.⁴ The rural poor are organized through ethnic networks, religious institutions and local councils concerned with cultural and religious issues rather than politics or policy. That view is supported by this chapter, in the sense that peasants are political because they are uneducated and divided by ethnicity.⁵ Peasants in early twentieth-century Europe were similarly challenged, but they were not an inert political force. Amanor argues that the rural poor in many African countries may be divided by clan, but the European population was fiercely divided by ethnicity and religion through the early part of the twentieth century and yet on many occasions they managed to revolt as one group.

Nyongo talks about middle peasants who engage in household production in Kenya to support household producers. In the case of Nyanza, he argues that the intrusion of international capital into Nyanzan social formation has led to the stagnation of middle peasant agriculture.⁶ Where this middle peasantry is still being formed, it is experiencing very painful birth pangs. In his essay, he inquires into the forces that have made it difficult for a middle peasantry to establish itself and flourish in Nyanza.

Peasants have been seen as the uncorrupted custodians of national consciousness and the rock upon which the revolutionary energies of national regeneration rest. Peasants in modern agrarian societies are a social force that can only be ignored at the peril of both the rulers and the revolutionaries.⁷ Other studies reveal that peasants consist of small agricultural producers who with the help of simple equipment and the labor of their families produce mainly for their own consumption and to fulfill their obligations to the holders of political and economic power.⁸

This chapter defines the peasantry as those who work on the land, relying on family labor; they are embedded in their local communities and take care of the landscape. All indigenous people working on the land and the landless are referred to as peasants. This is supported by Colin Bundy,⁹ who indicates that an African peasant was a rural cultivator who was dominated economically and culturally by outsiders in a wider society involved in relations of coercion and obedience. However, under colonialism, the extent to which the state or its representatives could enforce these relations differed sharply from time to time and from place to place, thus prompting peasants to exercise resistance in order to make political meaning.

The Peasantry Resistance in Africa

Peasants were marginalized and oppressed by other social sectors, such as landlords and urbanites. At the same time they were dismissed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as lacking revolutionary consciousness; but as we examine the activities of peasants in Africa we will come to the realization that they have periodically asserted themselves politically throughout history either single-handedly as a class or in alliance with other deprived groups such as workers.¹⁰ The argument in this chapter is that peasants have played a crucial role in resisting colonialism and its prescriptions, and that this is evident in many African countries.

In 1905 there was the Maji Maji (sacred water) uprising in Tanganyika (present Tanzania), where German conquest and colonization between 1895 and 1900 provoked a massive rebellion when African peasants objected to taxes, forced labor and harsh working conditions, the peasants being forced to work on cotton farms and build roads for the European occupiers.¹¹ This chapter agrees with most scholars that although this resistance failed to dislodge German colonialism, it forced the authorities to reform their administration and practices.¹² A spiritual leader named Kinjikitile Ngwale used “sacred water” to mobilize twenty-two ethnic groups against German rule.¹³ Although a total of 75,000 people were killed by the Germans, this became an inspiration for the later twentieth-century freedom fighters who called for interethnic unity against European rule.

Another example of armed peasant resistance is the 1896–1897 Chimurenga (peasant resistance) uprising in Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia) where, following British occupation in 1890, African peasants lost their land and cattle to colonial settlers and were subjected to forced labor and an array of taxes that were designed to force them into the labor market. Peasants in this country combined organization, mobilization and ideology during the revolution. The “everyday” peasants’ resistance underpinned their more dramatic revolutionary input during the guerrilla war.¹⁴

Ranger sees peasant participation in the war as sharing important continuities with a history of “everyday” peasant resistance. After the defeat of the Chimurenga in 1896–1898, the next forty years marked the development of

capitalism through a process of “primitive accumulation”. The natives were politically disenfranchised and brutally dispossessed of independent means of production (cattle and land), and they were turned into wage slaves who were forced to pay taxes.¹⁵ The people resisted this obnoxious practice until they eventually gained political independence. What this implies is that the future liberation of the country still lies in the hands and minds of peasants.

Spiritual leaders played a key role in mobilizing the first two Chimurengas. They included Nehanda Nyakasikana, often referred to as the mother of present-day Zimbabwe, from central and northern Mashonaland, Kagubi from western Mashonaland and Mukwati from Matebeleland.¹⁶ As was seen in Tanzania, resistance was led by a spiritual leader (Kinjikitile Ngwale) and was organized by mobilizing ethnic communities. The same took place in Zimbabwe and in other African countries, with mobilization being based on regions, ethnic groups and even clans.

Similarly, in Namibia, German colonial rule provoked armed resistance from the Herero and the Nama speaking groups between 1904 and 1907. Here, too, colonialism brought with it massive land alienation, loss of sovereignty, loss of cattle to incoming German settlers, numerous taxes, openly racist policies and practices that marginalized Africans, corporal punishment and other ills associated with European colonialism in Africa. In January 1904, the Herero rose up against German rule, led by Jacob Morenga, who took advantage of his ability to speak many languages. In late 1904, the Nama began a three-year guerrilla campaign against German rule, which was only crushed by German forces in 1907.¹⁷

An account is given on how the Nama and Herero peasants as well as Xhosa-speaking and other workers from Namaqualand made the revolt one of the major events in the politics of Namibia. This is because of the overall political significance which the events of those fateful years had for the country and its people. Alexander is quoted as saying:

The war was fought because of systematic dispossession of the Herero and Nama, lack of rights and equality of the people and the settlers. The land and cattle question was central especially with the building of the Otavi railway line which was due to the Otavi mining Company. The Herero womenfolk spurred their men folk to resist by shouting “to whom does our land belong? Herero belongs to us, the people!”¹⁸

The inclusion of women’s voices in the Herero–Nama resistance supports Bradford, who accused Bundy of gender blindness while analyzing peasant resistance in Africa.¹⁹ Bradford argues that access to land and hence control of labor during colonial rule were gendered processes. This is because male immigrants were given land but not female, and this meant that most female peasants were separated from the key means of production.²⁰ This chapter recommends the need for a gendered approach to an analysis of peasantry in Africa, since both men and women have played a major role in politics. According to other scholars, after the first wave of resistance, peasant protest

continued throughout the interwar years and thereafter flowered into militant mass nationalism, which finally led to the demise of colonialism.²¹

In Kenya colonial resistance was by and large led by sons of peasants, such as Bildad Kaggia, Achieng Oneko and Jomo Kenyatta, who were seen as the catalyst behind the Mau Mau movement. This started in the Nairobi slums among sons of poor men, the majority of whom had participated in the Second World War.²² The movement was dominated by Kikuyus, but other ethnic groups later joined in order to help eliminate colonial rule. The main reason for the revolt was increased discrimination through the payment of taxes together with the introduction after the First World War of the *Kipande* (identity card and passbook), which limited the movement of Africans—especially to urban areas; without it, no African could leave his home to look for work.

The colonialists took over the White Highlands and introduced the growing of cash crops such as coffee, tea and pyrethrum. These plantations pushed Africans to the peripheries, while demanding that they provide labor. Most of the Africans especially in Central Kenya were rendered landless, and this facilitated their disappearance to the forest to fight the white man. The land that the Mau Mau fought to recover from the colonialists was not well redistributed, and this led to the emergence of squatters.²³

The overwhelming connection between nationalism and Kenyan contemporary politics was best expressed in the 2007 post-election violence. Anderson suggests that Kenya would not have attained independence were it not for the Mau Mau freedom fighters. He argues that Kenya's freedom was created largely as a result of their activities. Many nationalist writers indicate that they were instrumental in the formation of political parties that led to Kenya's independence. However, the Mau Mau movement was hijacked by conservative forces, who attempted to take over state power to their advantage as a result of education. The peasants' revolution was hijacked by educated elites.

Many records from Kenyan national archives reveal that the so-called Home Guards recruited by the British used oppressive violence as a means of controlling the population. They helped to put the Mau Mau fighters in camps and subjected them to severe torture, malnutrition and beatings. Even though they also informed the colonialists on the activities of some Africans, this did not undermine the mobilization of the peasantry. There is a clear link between the success of Kenyan nationalism and the emergence of Mau Mau resistance. The consequence of all this was escalation of tensions between whites and Africans that led to the declaration of the emergency.²⁴

Over the three decades that led up to the Mau Mau rebellion, Africans voiced political concerns despite the obstructions set in their way by an unsympathetic colonial state. Until the mid-1930s there were two major issues: low wages and the abolition of the *Kipande*. From the 1930s two other issues grew in importance: the need to secure effective African representation and the land question, which became a major political grievance.

In Egypt the 1952 *coup d'état* that removed King Farouk from power was led by sons of peasants, the Felahin, whose power reached its apex during the

rule of Gemal Abdel Nasser and later on Hosni Mubarak. Egypt's successful peasant revolt was mainly thanks to revolution in urban areas, such as Cairo and Alexandria. This was made possible because almost 80% of the Egyptian population were peasants.²⁵ They worked in the fields and in homes as servants. During the flooding season they worked on large building projects for the government. There is a lot of evidence that indicates the pyramids were erected by peasants.²⁶

In Algeria the National Liberation Front (FNL) was started among the Tuaregs and Berbers and was the culmination of peasant activities in Algeria. The conflict was protracted, and led to one of the worst rebellions that the French faced in Africa. Peasant anger in Algeria was at the root of many historical and contemporary outbursts of populist or agrarian unrest. Most nationalists had been exposed to Mao Tse Tung's ideas about peasantry in China, and these were applied to other emerging nations, such as Algeria.²⁷ The Algerian peasantry was overwhelmed by the war, by concentration camps and by mass deportation. The questions of sameness or difference were important aspects of the identity debate during the French–Algerian war. There was a lot of “othering” in Algeria during French rule, while at the same time the French attempted to represent Algerian identity, something that was highly contested by the peasantry.

In Nigeria the role played by Usman dan Fodio and the mobilization of the Ulama created pockets of strong resistance against European encroachment on peasants' lands. Nigerian rulers in the north, especially the Emirs of Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, and Maiduguri, helped in the creation of political consciousness in the north to the point that they became an active force in the coalition created by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who became the first Prime Minister of Nigeria at independence in 1960. The manner in which political recruitment and mobilization took place in Nigeria has created a national consciousness which responded collectively against the Biafran war between 1967 and 1972. The main aim of the peasant struggle was to fight the “Kulaks,” and to eliminate middlemen and moneylenders. Thus the nationalists saw the need to mobilize peasants politically for the national democratic cause around issues that united them.

From these illustrations we can see that peasantry all over Africa revolted when they perceived their traditional moral order or moral economy as being violated. The examples show that peasants have not been merely passive victims of other classes' machinations but have asserted and defended their rights and ways of life when they felt that these were threatened.

This chapter has attempted to show that peasants' involvement in various resistances has disproved theorists of the 1960s who saw peasantry as backward and lacking the social organization to defend their class interests. The In most African countries, such as Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Algeria and Kenya, peasants participated in the armed struggle that brought about independence. Their contribution to the struggle for independence

notwithstanding, most peasants benefited little from political independence, as postcolonial political and economic systems were dominated by the urban elite, who promoted their interests at the expense of the peasant majority.

Peasantry and the Formation of Political Parties

This chapter contends that many political movements were largely led by people who can be regarded as peasants not elites. The popularity of peasant studies was occasioned by mass mobilization in the 1950s during the clamor for independence in Africa. The political parties that were created started as farmers' associations and welfare groups.

The rise of political parties in Kenya can best be understood in the wider context of the reaction by Kenyans to colonial rule. From the very earliest colonial times, peasants organized themselves to counter political and economic exclusion. This led to mobilization and later on to trade unions and then political party formation. The East African Association (EAA) was formed in 1919 to protest against hut tax, forced labor and the *kipande*. Next was the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), which was formed by Harry Thuku in 1922, leading to riots and the deportation of Thuku as well as Waiganjo Ndotoni and George Mugekenya. Other movements such as the Kavirondo Tax Payers Association in Western Kenya, the Abaluhya Political Union led by Musa Amalembe, the Luo Thrift led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, the Kalenjin Political Alliance under Daniel Moi and the Maasai Political Association led by John Konchella were the foundations of political movements such as Kenya African Union (KAU), and they enjoyed mass backing from the peasantry.²⁸

Many other regional parties came into existence, among them the Taita Hills Association, the Kikuyu Provincial Association and the Ukamba Members' Association. Moderate nationalists who emerged from the ranks of educated "mission boys," epitomized by Kenyatta and Koinange in the 1930s, spearheaded the formation of these movements.²⁹ They inclined towards national politics in the 1940s with the building of pan-ethnic political alliances as a means of fostering greater credibility in the struggle for representation. Chief Koinange was active on behalf of the KCA, an organization that he had earlier opposed. He formed the KAU in 1944, after the KCA had been banned in 1940.

KAU played a major role in militarizing nationalists whose politics would shape the Mau Mau in the early 1950s. Sons of peasants such as Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia and James Beuttah were typical of the new breed of militant nationalists who had emerged to challenge the KCA by the end of the 1930s.³⁰ They championed the landless and the dispossessed, and this made them unpopular among the Kikuyu landowners who wished to retain the right to evict tenants or develop their lands. This is the group that became increasingly hardbitten and determined as their exclusion from the political circles favored by the Kikuyu elders became apparent. These were the people who would take the lead in the Mau Mau movement.

As the resistance to colonialism deepened and grew more sophisticated, and as more and more Africans moved to towns and cities and mixed with those other ethnic backgrounds, the first cross-ethnic political movements developed. Though at the beginning the KAU had a mainly Kikuyu following, it reflected a national outlook and was out to stem the colonial evils. The harassment of the group's members gave birth to the Mau Mau resistance. This was a strong message to the colonialists about the need for a more inclusive government. In March 1960, a Leaders' Conference in Kiambu founded the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which fronted for a centralized unitary state. In reaction to this, at a meeting in Ngong in the same year, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was formed, with a demand for independence and a federal and less centralized government. KADU's aim was to ensure the inclusion of minority ethnic groups in the government, as well as to limit government interference in the running of federal states.

The formation of KANU and KADU led the ban against African political parties being lifted, thereby allowing the two parties to operate. The dissolution of KADU in 1964 allowed KANU to dominate Kenyan politics for a long time, but with the uniting of peasants in 1992, KANU was dislodged from power, giving way to the National Africa Rainbow Coalition (NARC). From then on, Kenya's political landscape has been unstable, as there are many political parties that are supported by both the elites and peasants for different reasons.

The political parties that brought independence to Zimbabwe were spearheaded by sons of peasants, such as Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Chimulenga was by and large a peasant uprising. There is an argument that the role of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe among other nationalists was a major catalyst for the independence of Zimbabwe.³¹ Joshua Nkomo was elected leader of the local African National Congress (ANC) after which he formed the National Democratic Party (NDP), which Mugabe joined immediately.³² When NDP was banned, Nkomo formed Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), being joined by Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole.

Rupiya and Chitiyo indicate that ZAPU split on regional and ethnic lines in 1963 and that a splinter group called Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed by Mugabe in the same year.³³ Tanganyika became a home to Mugabe, Nkomo and Kenneth Kaunda, who fled Zimbabwe as they feared imprisonment. While in Tanganyika they mobilized support for their ethnic groups and military groups that were forming in Zambia and Tanganyika. The two parties evolved into armies, with ZANU becoming the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU the Zimbabwe Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Moyo indicates that each of the two developed military structures to manage the liberation struggle that was fronted by peasants.

This chapter observes that the political landscape in Zimbabwe would not have been the way it is were it not for efforts by such people as Joshua Nkomo. The current tensions between Mugabe and the opposition stem from disagreements on the national development agenda. Many of his former

colleagues in the guerrilla struggle believe that Mugabe has lost the vision of the pre-independence struggle. Many writers on Zimbabwe nationalism argue that Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa among other moderates played an equally important role in raising political consciousness in Zimbabwe. They created a strong feeling that Africans were not ready to play second fiddle.³⁴ Zimbabwe's land redistribution to veterans of the struggle was fueled by Mugabe's sense of betrayal of his fellow comrades, and this has left the country where it was fifty years ago, with more peasants feeling the need to reclaim their economic mainstay (land and cattle).

Histories of political parties have revolved around peasants' consciousness. The formation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) by Nyerere in 1956 largely began among farmers and their grievances around taxation and low wages. Grassroots mobilization started in Tanga and Msoma, where cells of revolution similar to those of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 were created. Both leadership and members were illiterate and from poor backgrounds. Ujamaa was a peasant engagement where Nyerere, a son of a peasant, was the central force. Nyerere had substantial backing and TANU grew into a popular party. Owing to its popularity, Nyerere became the spokesperson of the peasants and the first president of Tanzania.

PEASANTRY AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

After independence peasants were not liberated fully because the ruling class which took power from the colonialists also took over land and other resources. Many post-independence governments created policies, structures and institutions to empower the peasants, but this did not achieve much since they remained marginalized.³⁵ Peasants continue to pay taxes and to exist on the fringes of society. Many began to react against the post-colonial state owing to a lack of engagement. There was a realization among them that the Europeans' place has been taken by fellow Africans who are experienced and educated. This has led them to create resistance movements, which among other things question the distribution of state resources.

Bernstein says that ignoring peasants in many African countries has culminated in resistance movements.³⁶ All the political parties demonstrated the amalgamation of peasants, yet the African political landscape after independence has been checked by peasants. This has led to regime changes in eighteen countries, all led by rebel movements that are fueled by the peasantry.

In Uganda, for instance, alternative centers began to emerge against Mutesa and Obote, and the voices of discontent led to the coup that removed Obote in 1971. This brought in Idi Amin, while the peasants supported Yoweri Museveni (president since 1986) by feeding his soldiers until he took power.³⁷ In Ghana the peasantry colluded with soldiers, and Nkurumah was overthrown in 1966 in a coup that was seen to be responding to the peasants' needs. In Nigeria, there was a military coup on January 15, 1966, in which the civilian government under the leadership of Tafawa Balewa was overthrown and General Ironsi became head of state.

In Kenya, the unsettled grievances of the peasantry emerged in government: President Jomo Kenyatta was protecting land grabbers but Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga and Members of Parliament such as Bildad Kagia and J.M. Kariuki were interested in the redistribution of a million acres of land. This culminated in the falling apart of KANU/KPU.

From the illustrations given here, it appears that limited capitalist development has meant that some social classes in independent Africa are comparatively weak and the peasant farmers are the weakest of all. Peasant farmers are at the mercy of those in power. They are economically exploited by the state and by dominant classes through low prices for agricultural goods coupled with high prices for manufactured goods and a relatively high preference for urban over rural investment.

To counter this, peasants in Kenya have resorted to a self-help initiative oriented towards state policy. Self-help is a contested terrain, however, and embraces all the contradictions of the Kenyan political economy. Even so, it has been a useful development strategy, and peasant farmers have been able to unite, form coalitions and manipulate state structures to their advantage via self-help groups.

In other countries, we have seen coups, countercoups and rebel activity after independence. The postcolonial state in Africa has many challenges—political, economic, social and even cultural. Although most writers tend to blame globalization, this author is of the view that ignoring peasantry in most African countries has complicated the situation.

In South Africa the peasantry has begun to cause xenophobia responding to delayed benefits from the state, and they have begun to kill *Makwerekwere* (foreigners) so as to enjoy the benefits of independence. This is a reaction against the state by the peasantry movement. The Africans referred to as *Makwerekwere* have made South Africa their home, and yet they face a lot of well-articulated racism launched on them by peasants who feel they have taken their land, jobs and the like. A lack of mainstream peasant involvement may plunge the country into the second stage of apartheid, which will be difficult to deal with.

In many postcolonial African countries peasant rallies have emerged. In the 1990s peasants began to support opposition, thus removing the sitting presidents. Leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda and Hastings Kamuzu Banda who have ignored peasants were kicked out, which led to the emergence of “New Leadership,” under Jerry Rawlings, John Kufuor and John Atta Mills from Ghana, for example.

In most postcolonial states, the peasants united and removed the one-party system, paving way for democracy in their respective countries. In Mozambique Samora Machel of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was removed as peasants followed the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) led by Alfonso Dhlakama. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Mobutu Sese Seko was removed in 1997, paving the way for Laurent Kabila—who was basically sustained by peasants until his assassination.

The peasantry were ignored in many postcolonial African countries. Just a few freedom fighters were rewarded. For instance, Kenya has continued to disregard most of the peasants who fought for independence. This has led

to the rise of the *Ngorokos* (children of freedom fighters) and then the *Mungikis* (grandchildren of freedom fighters), who wanted to have their stakes in the national patrimony. The agitation by these peasants created problems for the government of Jomo Kenyatta as the elites monopolized the gains of freedom. In 2017, there is still contestation between the state and the peasantry, who are raising the same grievances they raised against taxes.

This led to the removal of Daniel Moi by the peasantry in 1992. The post-election violence of 2007/2008 was a major demonstration of the anger of the peasantry against postcolonial Kenya, especially with regard to historical injustices such as the land question. Most scholars have indicated that this was a reaction of the masses to historical injustices.

After independence in 1990, in Zimbabwe the peasants began to demand land, and they began to evict Europeans. Zimbabwe is one country in which peasants were considered to be “economic creatures.” This led to their exploitation and the peasants’ participation in guerrilla war. Although it was ranked among the most diversified economies in Africa in the 1980s, with a thriving agricultural sector, Zimbabwe was driven into structural adjustment programs (SAPS) because of the level of international debt, which compounded the country’s economic problems. This has threatened the stability of the ruling party, since most citizens are living in poverty.

Attempts by President Mugabe to divert people’s attention away from this by demonizing the white settlers for monopolizing land ownership since colonialism has only increased tensions. According to Mugabe the peasantry is once again mobilizing to fight the third Chimurenga.

CONCLUSION

Peasantry and the politics of independence in Africa are bedmates. The colonial state shaped the peasantry and it is alive and well. This chapter argues that the peasantry should be brought into the mainstream through empowerment programs and education. Farmers’ and workers’ protests metamorphosed into political rallies. In central Kenya Europeans such as Michael Bladel supported the movement through the Devonshire White Paper, Lyttleton Constitution, which allowed Africans to grow cash crops. This is a move that should be adopted by the postcolonial states in Africa, to bring the peasantry onto the mainstream economic and political agenda, thus reducing the ever-rising tensions.

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Civil Society Organizations and Democratic Governance in Africa

Dele Seteolu and James Okuneye

INTRODUCTION

The domination and constriction of the political space through military dictatorship meant that some states in Africa assumed authoritarian status. Similarly, the implementation of the World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs (SAPs) reinforced and sustained the politics of exclusion to the advantage of elements of the political class.

The third wave of democratization in the early 1990s catapulted civil society organizations into African politics as competing structures to the state system in the allocation of resources to the working class; and as pivotal actors within the theatre of democratic struggle.¹ The new status of civil society organizations arose against the backdrop of the democratization drive, which popularized Western ideology as the global paradigm for development. These post-Cold War political realities coincided with the propagation of political liberalization and economic capitalism in Africa, in contradistinction to political authoritarianism. The neo-patrimonial politics and the authoritarian status of many African states began to wane amidst intense opposition and the campaigns of diverse organizations to construct democratic states.

Civil society organizations in Africa under political authoritarianism fought to achieve political pluralism and multi-party politics to dislodge autocratic regimes and secure the transition to democracy. The proliferation of civil society groups, voluntary associations, trade unions, and so on was informed by the

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determination of the populace to participate in decision-making. The drive for the policy domain gave momentum to organized voluntary and associational groups as counterbalances to the overbearing power of the state. Sponsorship from foreign donors in a sense encouraged civil society actors to deepen their efforts against repressive regimes with a view to actualizing democracy in Africa.

Meanwhile, the democratic project has been stifled through the disposition of corrupt and dictatorial state officials to clamp down on political opposition, rig elections, resort to violence and violate the rule of law as bases to retain power.² The institutionalization of democratic practices became a mirage in several states in Africa as a result of the authoritarian regimes that crept into nascent African democratic politics.³ However, the co-optation of non-state groups in some instances into power politics, the imposition of regulatory frameworks to define limits and *modi operandi*, and the internal contradictions of civil society organizations limit their capacity for democratic battles.

The interpenetrating nature of the state in Africa and civil society actors impinge on the ability of non-state groups to influence policy outcome and foster democracy. The discourse on civil society groups and democracy in Africa amid democratic rollback is imperative, therefore, to strengthen the political space and moderate anti-democratic tendencies.

This chapter interrogates the role of civil society organizations in the restoration and sustenance of democracy; and the challenges posed as agents of democratic consolidation. The next section discusses the conceptual frameworks of civil society actors as the bases for a thorough understanding of their nature, character and politics.

CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of civil society has been variously interpreted; these interpretations reflect different intellectual orientations and ideological bents. This concept has been concretely engaged with by John Locke in his perception of the private legal realm as the civil state, civility, or civilization emanating from the state of nature.⁴ The nineteenth-century German scholar Georg W Hegel differentiated between civil society and the state. He averred that civil society is a parallel and separate realm from the state; an intermediate domain of public space between the family and the state that protects the interests of private individuals.⁵

Hegel's view was opposed by one of his protégés, Karl Marx, whose concept hinges on the subordination of the state to civil society as an instrument of the bourgeoisie (capitalist class) to exploit and sustain its interest in a capitalist state. Civil society to Marx is a delusion that needs to be unmasked, since the freedom of action it seeks to grant to individuals serves in reality to disguise the relations of class exploitation.⁶ He agrees that civil society is a non-political organization, but differs on its autonomy. Civil society, he insists, is a critical instrument of state managers to oppress and repress the non-propertied social groups.

Antonio Gramsci argues that civil society is a separate arena from the state and market. He contends that the state is not subordinated to civil society as Marx submits.⁷ To Gramsci, state and civil society co-exist; civil society, he affirms, consists of the educational, religious and associated institutions deployed by the ruling class to sustain its hegemony, ideologically.⁸

The liberal conception of civil society is predicated on the individual's maximization of their own interests within it. The pursuit of the individual's rights, freedoms and obligations within a market economy on the basis of the rule of law and private property is highly valued in the liberal tradition.⁹ Alexis de Tocqueville is the foremost normative-liberal scholar to present civil society as an autonomous, voluntary and non-political organization that influences state actions in the interest of the populace.¹⁰ He emphasizes the significance of autonomous associations based on the principle of the tyranny of the majority to prevent the state from arrogating more powers against popular will. To de Tocqueville, civil society is a self-governing association that plays a key role in civic education; it inspects state policies and actions, and advocates for the equal participation of citizens in public affairs.¹¹

To Antony McGrew, civil society consists of agencies, institutions, movements, cultural forces and social relationships that are privately and voluntarily organized without the direct control of the state.¹² These agencies, forces and movements are tied to the private realm, unlike those linked to the public realm. To Gordon Wright, civil society implies power relations between the state and society in a sense that defines the limitations of the capacity of the state to pervade and control society. To Wright, it includes the power of members of the society to protect themselves from, and exert influence on, the state. Philippe Schmitter sees civil society as a set or system of self-organized intermediary groups that are relatively independent of public authorities and private units of production and reproduction.¹³ To Schmitter, it is capable of deliberating and reaching collective actions in the defense or promotion of group interests or passions, and seeks to replace either state agents or private (re)producers, or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole, and agree to act within pre-established rules of a civil nature.¹⁴

To Philip Oxhorn, civil society is the social fabric consisting of a multiplicity of self-constituted, territorially and functionally based units (excluding families and business firms) that co-exist peacefully and collectively resist subordination to the state, simultaneously exerting demands on national political structures.¹⁵ This approach gives credence to collectivism, which fosters a more encompassing inclusion process as opposed to election-based inclusion and the possession of political rights.

While most definitions of the liberal school emphasize individualism, the individual bias that limits civil society to varying social and historical contexts is avoided. The critical appreciation of broader social networks in the public realm to which individuals possess membership provides a different perspective on civil society. This approach reflects the practice of civil society in Latin America, where the individual is less reckoned with in the policy space except through the domain of a larger community that aggregates the interests of individuals.

The Eurocentric perspective on civil society is the dominant approach in the literature; civil society in this sense is posed as an essential desideratum of democracy. The application of the dominant Western perspective to explain African politics will not likely reflect the region's reality. The character of civil society organization in Africa has largely been defined by the turbulent socio-economic, political, cultural and colonial histories of the region. The civil society actor in Africa equally derives meaning from the nature and character of the region's political systems.¹⁶

Larry Diamond conceives civil society as 'the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules'.¹⁷ Diamond shares the position of de Tocqueville that civil society is an intermediary between the private sphere and the state, which excludes individual and family life, the profit-making enterprise of individual business firms and the political fight to assume control of state power. Civil society organization gives scrutiny to the exercise of state power and legitimates state authority when the state actors conform to the rule of law.¹⁸

Civil society actors often exhibit specific features. These are: (a) that civil society comprises a wide range of organizations that are concerned with public issues; and it is one of the three spheres (including the state and economy) that condition the development and democratic consolidation of a society; and (b) that it counterweighs the autocratic and repressive tendencies of the state and its institutions.¹⁹ The civil society group fosters the participation of the populace in decision-making processes through its deliberation with state officials on policies and executive actions. It exercises essential functions in the pursuit of democracy through the aggregation of citizens' demands and the mobilization of the citizens to hold state officials accountable.²⁰

RE-DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEEPENING OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE RELEVANCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS

The politics of alienation, the institutionalization of the one-party system, political corruption and neo-patrimonial politics aided the perversion of democratic practice in Africa. The incursion of military regimes in the region as an alternative to the political class strengthened dictatorship and constricted the political space. Military rule emboldened state actors to repress opposition, disregard democratic practice and repudiate associational life.

The failure of some states in Africa to discharge their social provisioning role on the implementation of the SAPs of the IMF and World Bank stifled public spending in Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria and other adjusting states. The declining role of the state eroded its legitimacy, which was transferred by the populace to non-state actors in relation to their social and economic needs. These non-state organizations emerged as alternative platforms to the state system to foster political participation and economic equality. In a related sense, the loss of confidence in the state and its actors partly explains

the decline of donor assistance to authoritarian leaders and the redirection to organized groups as alternative communities offering a welfare role to the people.²¹

The campaign to displace autocratic regimes and enhance the political space gained ascendancy through the increased capacity of civil society actors to exert pressure on the state to democratize. These groups have been historically relevant in the effort to re-democratize and deepen democratic practice. Civil society actors proliferated in the region as a counterforce to authoritarian regimes; and these groups posed questions and organized political actions to deepen democratic practice. The relevance of civil society organizations in Africa's political and social space is discussed within the following sections. These sections should be understood and interrogated in interrelated sense.

POLITICAL EDUCATION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

Civil society actors offer political education on civic culture as a basis for socializing the populace toward democratic behaviors.²² Meanwhile, the one-party system became the dominant party system in Africa in the post-independence period. Post-independence nationalists and political leaders sought accelerated political development and economic growth; the single-party regime was considered the strategic option. The single-party systems assumed the character of developmental regimes, but the expected gains were torpedoed through the subversion of political opposition, the control of the media and human rights violations. The negative fallouts of such single-party regimes engendered the organization of pro-democracy forces that organized on the question of democracy, development and inclusion. Similarly, the media deconstructed the political space to expose non-democratic regimes. The weekly news magazines in Tanzania were translated into Swahili and English to reach the population amid thorough scrutiny of state policies. The civil society actors in Malawi included exiled opposition figures from Zambia; these groups relied on media channels including fax messages to reach the populace.²³ The political altercations in Senegal in 2000 occurred within the context of the improved political awareness of the mass of people through the radio, the press and the global satellite mobile network.²⁴

Civil society organizations in post-authoritarian Africa have been less critical of the state and its actors. The co-optation of some civil society actors into the state domain has reduced their capacity to challenge the autocratic dispositions of state managers. Civil society in Nigeria, for instance, has shifted from the barricades to the conference room, seminar and workshop to engage the state and its actors. The Committee for Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) and the Campaign for Democracy (CD) led popular struggles against military rule in the 1980s. The emergence of civilian rule in 1999, however, thawed collective anger and disgust for military dictatorship. The civil society actors unconsciously left the battlefields, and in some instances became co-opted as allies of the state. The post-military phase, nonetheless, led to new approaches

to engaging with the state and democracy question. The emergence of the Centre for Constitutional Governance, the Campaign against Corrupt Leaders, One Voice, the Justice Development and Peace Commission, the Federation of Muslim Women, the Centre for Human Rights, the Electoral Reform Network, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), and so on, signposts a new phase of civil society activism. The new approaches are rather subtle, perhaps, in line with the somewhat soft nature of civilian rule. The instruments of the seminar, public lecture, political education class and ideological class have replaced, to a large extent, mass protests, popular rallies, mass strikes, trenches and barricades.

The Social, Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) focuses on social and economic questions. It sued the Babangida administration for its inability to account for the \$12.5bn oil windfall that accrued to the country in the Gulf War of the early 1990s. SERAP lost the suit on *locus standi*, but it gained enough mileage to place the oil windfall question into public consciousness. The Centre for Democratic Development, the Electoral Reform Network, the TMG, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), The Electoral Institute and political parties work on election issues such as the doctrine of free and fair elections without political violence.²⁵

OPENING OF CONSTRICTED POLITICAL SPACE

The governing class in some African states restricted social groups such as working people, the urban poor, rural peasants, students' organizations and professional groups, and constrained their presence in the public domain. The political space, however, became liberalized for the urban poor, women and minority groups through the persistent character of civil society actors.²⁶ These groups worked relentlessly to bridge the gap occasioned by the politics of alienation and resisted the predatory behavior of the political class through organized protests and mass strikes. Civil society actors exerted pressure on state officials, which led to the liberalization of the political space occasioned by the abandonment of the one-party system and release of political prisoners.²⁷

The 1948 apartheid policy in South Africa restricted the political space against the majority black population.²⁸ The all-white government discriminated against black people. The Land Act of 1913 denied black citizens their inalienable rights to land. The political space virtually excluded black people, but white people were involved in the policy space. The apartheid government denied black communities social services as part of the politics of exclusion.²⁹ This state dislodged opposition groups and imprisoned notable black personalities. The drive for social justice and inclusive politics involved the United Democratic Front, (UDF), the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress, church-based organizations, voluntary associations and organized trade unions. The UDF exerted pressure on the apartheid regime to lift the ban on the ANC and settle for a political negotiation of new South Africa on the basis of black majority rule. The groups mentioned earlier

negotiated the release of political prisoners and secured the entrenchment of the socio-economic rights of the black populace in the constitution.³⁰

The Daniel arap Moi government in Kenya was an exclusively elite affair.³¹ Moi perpetrated injustice against the Kenyan people through alienating policies and the privileges of the state were restricted to party officials. However, the unrelenting criticisms of the Centre for Democracy and Governance, the Human Rights Commission and the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change against state policies led its officials to include alienated social groups in constitutional review and liberalize the political space with a view to restoring the confidence of the populace and fostering their inclusion in political change and development if they wished.³²

CREATING POLITICAL AWARENESS IN THE LIGHT OF PREVALENT ECONOMIC POLICIES

The implementation of the SAP in Nigeria and its social backlash elicited critical reactions from civil society actors. The Babangida administration introduced neo-liberalism-based economic reforms to foster private sector-led growth, correct the balance of payment disequilibrium, and restore economic stability and growth. The policy was a conditionality to guarantee external debt repayment, but it emphasized financial stability to the detriment of structural and developmental issues. This economic approach resulted in harsh conditions for workers, the urban poor and rural peasants amidst severe social consequences. The perception of an alienated state gained currency among vulnerable social groups as a result of its pursuit of anti-people social and economic policies. The defects in SAP policy became a rallying point for organized trade unions, academics, student organizations, the urban poor and rural peasants who were traumatized and impoverished by its implementation.³³

Meanwhile, civil society actors in Nigeria posed questions on the philosophical premises, origins, relevance and social implications of neo-liberal economic policies. Civil society actors converged on the National Theatre in 1989 to examine the IMF and World Bank adjustment reforms. The dialogue, led by the late barrister Alao Aka-Bashorun, was meant to raise fundamental issues on the state, society and economy; and canvass an alternative economic agenda on the basis of the country's historical realities. The scheduled conference was aborted, however, by the Babangida administration.

The Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities (ASUU), the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) exposed the defects in neo-liberal adjustment reforms and insisted on alternative economic programs. The 1987, 1988 and 1989 anti-SAP protests occurred within the context of popular campaigns for endogenous economic policies. The ASUU critiqued the country's adjustment reforms, the neo-imperialist agenda behind reforms and the consequences for Nigeria's political economy. It averred that privatization signaled the transfer of public wealth to

interests that had exploited and deprived Nigerians over the years, and meant handing over Nigeria's independence to the same forces that had colonized and plundered its people for centuries; that it would increase mass poverty for Nigeria's people, making access to basic facilities and resources impossible and unaffordable for over 90% of its population; and that it would reward some Nigerians including politicians, public office holders, military generals and others in private business for their closeness to power.³⁴ The academic staff union insisted that the floating of state-funded enterprises in a developing economy was not an accident; it reflected the need of a backward, 'third world', under-developed country to respond to the challenge of fostering the well-being of its people.³⁵ The ASUU situates the privatization question in context:

The ostensible reason being brandished for privatization is that public enterprises are not efficient. This is false. The fact of the matter is that the public enterprises are deliberately made inefficient in order to sell them. Today, the privatization programme is part and parcel of the same process of recolonising Nigeria through the World Bank and IMF-packaged programmes of economic stabilization, structural adjustment and liberalization.³⁶

The (NLC), led by Hassan Sunmonu and Ali Ciroma, offered articulate and informed critique of the economic reform policy in Nigeria. The Sunmonu-led NLC relied on workers' education, shop floor mobilization, popular rallies, protests, media campaigns and strikes to exert pressure on state officials. The NLC canvassed the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program (AAF-SAP) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to highlight the human basis for an Africa-based development agenda.

The NANS assumed ideology-based struggles in the 1980s against the Nigerian state and its foreign partners. The students' movement did not conform to the liberal and positivist notion of schooling and education as being politically neutral. The student body reflected the Marxian position that schooling and education are not politically neutral enterprises. To Marxists, the education system creates consciousness meant to create and recreate the condition of domination of the propertied class without necessarily exerting the overt structures of domination.³⁷ To Amilcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon, the student body became involved in the arena of political and ideological contestation with a view to achieving social change.³⁸ These efforts were predicated on cells or political organizations that offered ideological and organizational rubrics for popular actions. The Patriotic Youth Movement (PYM), Socialist League and others built cell organizations that strengthened the popular struggles of the student movement. The students' battles were pursued in consonance with trade union centers, civil society actors and academics in response to the deepening crises in society, the economy and polity under SAP.³⁹

To Adejumobi, the regime of neo-liberal economic policies impacted on many sectors of the economy, including education. He argued that education became a major victim of downsizing, cost recovery and rationalization under

adjustment reforms. Consequently, academia metamorphosed from a 'citadels of learning to battlegrounds' amidst socio-economic policies that impoverished and alienated students and the larger populace.⁴⁰

Adejumobi captures the role of the student movement in the anti-SAP efforts thus:

From 1981, with the onset of the economic crisis, the students' movement launched not only a consistent and sustained campaign for educational reforms, but also sought to forge alliances with democratic groups, trade unions, and professional organizations in order to have a common and broader platform for the struggle against political misrule and challenge the unpopular policies and programmes of the state... Increasingly, the popular identity of Nigerian students, as represented by their association, the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) lies in their culture of popular struggle and resistance. Thus, the students' movement in Nigeria has been variously described as the 'barometer of public opinion', 'the vector of social change', 'the conscience of the society' and 'voice of the voiceless'. In other words, NANS is viewed as the vanguard of the interest of the masses or dominated groups and classes in Nigeria.⁴¹

Civil society actors in broad terms played a critical role in exposing the anti-populace nature of state policies.⁴² Such struggles for public space are not restricted to Nigeria. The Freedom of Information Act in South Africa, which specifies transparent declaration of assets, derived from the activist role of civil society actors. The popular effort in the Republic of Benin to review the constitution to avert the perversion of state power, stem political corruption and ensure the impeachment of an indicted incumbent president was led by civil society activists.⁴³

MONITORING AND OBSERVATION OF ELECTIONS

The task of monitoring elections to promote transparency and accountability has engaged civil society organizations. The conduct of national elections in about 22 African states over the past decade has been largely a function of the pressures exerted by a single organized civil group.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the conduct of elections in Africa has been contentious as a result of the nature of the state and the character of the political class. The political class is a non-producing class and it relies on the control of political power to access economic power. The lack of autonomy exposes the state to the manipulation politics of parts of the political class. This results in an unrestrained fight for power amid the distrust of the political class for electoral agencies to organize impartial elections.

The national elections in Africa regularly attract civil society actors as observers to discourage the manipulations of electoral processes, and guarantee credible elections and legitimacy for state actors.⁴⁵ Civil society groups in Nigeria and Ghana, for instance, have been involved in the training of election observers that are deployed to polling centers. These groups observe the electorate's predisposition before, during and post-election in pursuance of electoral purity.

The Coalition of Domestic Election Observers in Ghana had 28 civil society actors that monitored the 2004 general elections. The TMG in Nigeria is a coalition of civil society organizations that have been committed to electoral integrity since 1998.⁴⁶

The national conferences that ushered in democratic regimes in Africa were partly the results of the efforts of civil society actors. The overthrow of Mali's dictatorial government of Moussa Traoré by Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré in 1991 engendered a collaboration between civil society groups and the Transition Committee for the Welfare of the People to foster an interim administration of the country. Mali later had a national conference and a new constitution to guide the 1992 general elections. The elections created a platform for the first democratically elected president of Mali.⁴⁷ Civil society actors in the Republic of Benin were involved in the progressive build up to the first multiparty elections in the country. Academic and faith-based organizations intervened in the country's political crisis occasioned by the 20-year despotic reign of President Mathieu Kérékou. The national conference that emerged within the context of Benin's political crisis produced a new constitution that guided the election of President Nicéphore Soglo.⁴⁸

CHALLENGES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA

The increased financing of civil society groups by Western donors led to the groups' proliferation in the embrace of capitalist ideology. It is noteworthy that 90% of the income accruing to the Institute for Democracy in South Africa comes from foreign sources; the differentials are raised through internal financiers and the state.⁴⁹ The heavy financial dependence of activists on foreign donor agencies has somewhat altered their language of discourse and agenda. Foreign donor-driven civil society organizations have adopted the language of capitalism and replicated the material values of capitalist ideology. The prevalence of externally funded civil society groups has aided the decline of left-wing social movements. The adoption of neo-liberal ideology in adjusting states has further entrenched liberal democratic traditions. Civil society actors in Egypt, however, are denied access to foreign donor assistance by the state.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, there has been an increasing trend towards regulating and repressing non-state civil society actors in many states in the region; state officials restrict their practice and critique the modicum of freedom the groups have to canvass. The 2004 Zimbabwean bill on non-government organizations constrained the sphere of activities of non-state organizations.⁵¹ The Zimbabwean state dictated registration procedures and imposed sanctions on organizations that failed to adhere to extant legal frameworks. The 2009 Zambian non-government organization bill specified the compulsory registration of civil society organizations; this trend threatened the autonomy of activists groups and obstructed their functionality in society.⁵²

The politics of patronage and violation of the rule of law by state managers have equally assumed disturbing proportions.⁵³ The Babangida administration

in Nigeria sponsored elements of civil society organizations to support the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections presumed to have been won by the late Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola. The annulment of the June 12 presidential elections drew the anger of the Nigerian people, especially in the South West, and of civil society actors such as the CD, United Action for Democracy, the CDHR and civil liberties organizations.

The Babangida administration, however, thrived on the politics of co-optation and institutionalized settlement as state policy. This regime co-opted the Association for Better Nigeria to support the annulment of the presumed freest and fairest elections in the country's political history. The Maendeleo Ya Wanawake was co-opted into the ruling party after the 2002 Kenyan general elections.⁵⁴

The 'appearing' and 'disappearing' feature of some civil society organizations questions their credibility and ability to sustain democracy.⁵⁵ To Mojibayo Fadakinte, civil society actors in Nigeria seasonally mobilized the mass of people for rallies and protests when the state managers increased the prices of petroleum products. Critics contend that the activists have been less critical of political actors amidst increasing political corruption, official malfeasance, misappropriation and mismanagement of state resources. The shift in tactics from the barricade to the more subtle engagement of state managers under civil rule has attracted criticism.

The intricate nature of social structures in Africa, including cultural heterogeneity and ethnicity, reduces the assertiveness of civil society organizations in the political space. The activists' efforts are sometimes tainted by ethnic and regional perceptions. The popular agitation of the CDHR, CD, Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), and other radical groups on the June 12 presidential election question was perceived as an ethnic struggle by the Babangida and Abacha administrations. The ethnicization of the June 12 battle eventually narrowed the protests and civil disobedience to the South West; and the South East, South and core North (North West and North East) virtually abandoned the movement that had begun as pan-Nigerian.

CONCLUSION

Civil society actors played a pivotal role in dislodging authoritarian regimes in Africa and exercised a watchdog function to limit the extent of state power. The state restriction on activists, however, poses a threat to their capacity to assist in entrenching democracy in the region.

The discourse on civil society actors and democratic governance derives from the interventionist role of civil society organizations in defining the agenda for democratic renewal, the building of democratic institutions, the expansion of the political space and the democratization of economic resources. The adoption of neo-liberal policies in adjusting states in the 1980s constricted the economic and political space and fostered authoritarianism. Civil society actors, however, did not sit on the fence in the battle against despotic and authoritarian regimes.

The collapse of repressive regimes in several states in Africa was linked, partly, to the assertive nature of civil society organizations. Political activists, however, should be more involved in the deepening of democracy amidst the threats that exist in the political space.

The Gambia and Democratic Republic of Congo typify the threat to democratic development in the region. The President of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, assumed political power in 1994 after a coup that ousted President Dawda Jawara. Jammeh was in office for 22 years amidst alleged political killings, repression of opposition personalities, control of the media and divisive politics. The elections organized by President Jammeh before the 2016 general elections were caricatures of freely and fairly contested electoral contests. The Gambia during Jammeh's tenure was a police state amidst divisions along caste, ethnic, regional and class lines. The newest elections, however, will likely redeem the Gambian people from the authoritarian grips of the civilian dictator. The loss of the election by President Jammeh and the emergence of Adama Barrow through a coalition of parties represents the commitment of parts of the political class and the people of Gambia to transcend authoritarian rule and foster multi-party democracy. President Jammeh conceded defeat initially, but he later recanted on his position. Consequent to the posturing of President Jammeh, civil society actors in the Gambia resorted to protests and insisted on the mandate conferred on Adama Barrow. The behavior and comments of President Jammeh are a serious threat to peace in Gambia; the issue will likely escalate into ethnic and regional conflict unless sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and the United Nations embark on urgent and concrete measures including military action to avert this.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has been engulfed in mass protests and agitations occasioned by the authoritarian rule of Joseph Kabila. The protests are indicative of the growing resentment against the perceived repressive and corrupt regime in Kinshasa. The Congo, regrettably, continues to recede into poverty, political crisis and underdevelopment in a state that is potentially rich, especially in solid minerals. The failure of Kabila to conduct general elections has created lacunae in the political space and led to demand from opposition parties for an interim government. The opposition has alleged that Kabila deliberately failed to conduct elections and that he is conniving with the constitutional court to 'concoct' an interim government under his leadership.

The political situations in the Gambia and Congo suggest that civil society groups should not relent in the struggle for democracy in the region. The gains of democracy realized since the post-Cold War period and the third wave of democratization are not irreversible. Civil society actors should continuously identify threats to democracy and nip in the bud potential and real threats when these ensue.

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Uncivil Society and Ethnic Militia in African Politics

Mumo Nzau

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War in Africa was marked by an upsurge in intra-state conflicts. These, together with the concomitant civil strife, amounted to a new theater of civil war, characterized by mass deaths, wanton destruction and displacement of populations, as witnessed in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, later, Western Darfur among others.¹ A key feature that tempered these conflicts was the presence of bands of crude and very brutal, armed non-state groups and ethnic militia. Today, the ubiquitous presence of ethnic militia remains a central feature on the African political landscape.

Using a historical-descriptive analytical approach, this chapter sheds light on this intriguing set of actors. Their nature, origins and evolution are important, as well as accounting for their sustained presence. Furthermore, the role of ethnic militia in shaping the African sociopolitical and economic spheres of influence is critically analyzed, before pertinent academic and policy-relevant recommendations are proffered herein.

The discussion begins with a general theoretical examination of the militia phenomenon; followed by a retrospective account of ethnic militia, tracing their nature and dynamics as far back as the precolonial past; before delving into an assessment of the same in the context of Africa's post-independence experience. The chapter then makes a critical analysis of the place of ethnic militia in Africa during the post-Cold War era, before tying it together with a set of policy-oriented recommendations in the conclusion.

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SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Theories are models that enable us to account for and predict the behavior and/or patterns of change in various phenomena. They present a fairly good representation of the issue under analysis; and they need not be purely deterministic, especially in the context of social phenomena. The laboratory of human life is a complex domain and, for the most part, there can be no exact predictions.² That said, theories pertaining to the state may be loosely classified into two broad categories. The first is about theories that regard the control and management of the state as a pluralistic affair, while the second generally contends that the state is controlled by the few, mostly political and economic elites.

If civil society is about actors that are not part of the governmental realm, generally those that do not act on behalf of the state, then pluralist theories find application here, as they describe one of the many actors in the political system.³ Ideally, civil society is meant to play an oversight role in the management of state affairs. Nonetheless, civil society works best in an environment of democratic governance where fundamental freedoms are guaranteed, and where open and fair participation in public affairs is the norm. Hyden contends that one of the three empirical dimensions of governance is “citizen oversight,” others being “responsive and responsible leadership” and “social reciprocity.”⁴ The oversight function bestowed on civil society works best within an atmosphere of civility and social order—and when informed by a constitutionally anchored tradition where civil society actors can objectively criticize the work of government, and shape the flow of public policy.⁵

In fact, in functional democratic settings state–civil society relations need not be confrontational. However, the situation can be different in the harsh sociopolitical environments that characterize most authoritarian regimes. Here, state–civil society relations are often confrontational and potentially violent.⁶ In some cases, the state may outright suppress civil society. This sometimes breeds dissent, which in many cases translates into armed rebellions accentuated by theaters of political instability and state collapse. In cases where an authoritarian system is too powerful to bear, the civil society machinery may not disappear but rather remain dormant, perhaps awaiting a favorable moment to overtly project its agenda into the political mainstream.⁷

As such, what would ordinarily be civil begins to become potentially uncivil, especially when narrow elitist and ethnic interests find confluence and manifest in the form of various ethnic militias. A militia may be defined as an irregular outfit of the armed, non-state kind;⁸ it may represent different interests—private, tribal, ethnic, pro-state and even anti-state.⁹ However, for the most part, these outfits are a manifestation of certain narrow elite interests, particularly where the state actors, structures and processes exhibit poor institutional value. In this sense, the elitist theoretical argument may be invoked here. In other words, ethnic militias can be seen to be manifestations and conduits of the criminalization and/or unorthodox militarization of the state in the hands of narrow elitist interests.¹⁰

As the ‘greed versus grievance theorists’ contend, some militia groups may start off as genuine components of a suppressed civil society, only to be used for purposes of attaining narrow elitist gains.¹¹ Many years of marginalization and political exclusion may lead a given ethnic constituency to defend itself and protect its interests from a dictatorial regime by employing the services of some form of armed non-state entity, most likely an ethnic militia.¹² Yet, as Skocpol insinuated, “no bourgeois, no revolution,”¹³ meaning that ordinary ethnic militia (who in this case would be equated to Skocpol’s peasants) can easily be “captured” by elitist interests and be utilized to commit all manner of transgressions in order to maintain a sitting government in power—hence the tag “*uncivil society*.” Sitting governments do in fact use such ethnic militia, with the aim of unleashing sheer brutality and disorder so as to remain in power. At times, however, total civil war situations may persist, giving way to regime collapse and greater disorder. For the most part, within such anarchical settings, these militia become laws unto themselves as they unleash untold terror, death and destruction on populations which, ironically, they purport to protect and/or represent.¹⁴

THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE CONTEXT OF MILITIA IN AFRICA

Although there were centralized forms of authority, most precolonial African sociopolitical systems were not centralized. Many places were not governed by any form of central authority. But this did not mean that there was no order. An elders’ council, mostly a group of clan patriarchs or revered spiritual figures, would provide leadership.¹⁵ These precolonial African sociopolitical systems had communal defense outfits to protect the community from aggressive neighbors, while at times conducting raids elsewhere to acquire communal wealth, mainly cattle.¹⁶

The Maasai of East Africa, for instance, had organized regiments of young warriors, the Morans, who staged cattle raids on neighboring communities such as the Agikuyu and the Akamba.¹⁷ These neighbors also had communal defense systems. The Akamba defense outfit was known as Ita, in addition to a communal police outfit called Kin’gole. Kin’gole had the disposition of what would be regarded as an ethnic militia in the modern sense. It was an ad hoc arrangement in which clan elders would mobilize and fortify several dozen youths through rituals, before tasking them with a specific law enforcement undertaking. For instance, they would pursue and arrest murderers, rapists or those who had committed violent robbery; and, with the permission of elders, Kin’gole members would execute the suspects if they were found to be guilty of these heinous crimes. Once the task was complete, that particular Kin’gole assignment would be dissolved.¹⁸

One cannot discuss militias in the precolonial context without examining their presence in the centralized sociopolitical systems of those days—in the African kingdoms of old that were found in parts of eastern, central and southern Africa, as well as parts of western and northern Africa. Kingdoms such

as the Zulu in today's South Africa; the Umwami, in modern Rwanda and Burundi; the Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga and Nyankole in today's Uganda; the Wanga of western Kenya and the Yoruba and Ashanti kingdoms in modern-day Nigeria and Ghana, among many others, all had some form of standing army. These defense establishments were quite organized and disciplined. Some had regiments and divisions with horse-mounted cavalry units. Many of them, such as those within the Abyssinia Kingdom (modern-day Ethiopia) and the Songhai Kingdom in West Africa, had acquired firearms as early as the nineteenth century.¹⁹

Many of these kingdoms collaborated with Arab and European slave merchants. Their military were used to capture slaves from weaker communities and to transport them to the coast, from where they would be shipped off to other parts of the world.²⁰ The aggrieved communities developed their own defense mechanisms in order to ward off and/or escape the slavers' snare. They had bands of strong young men who would scout the land and alert the rest of the community whenever slave hunters were spotted.²¹ These defensive tribal outfits were ethnic militias, specifically constituted to fight the slave traders.

Some of these militias later served as porters and expedition guides for the early explorers and missionaries, while others served as carrier corps and soldiers in the various colonial establishments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Still others spearheaded resistance to colonial occupation over this period. As Mazrui later argued, these forbears of "Africa's warrior tradition"²² vehemently resisted colonial conquest under the leadership of great warriors, such as Chief Mkwawa who led the Hehe Rebellion against German colonialism between 1891 and 1899, in today's Tanzania, Ethiopia's Emperor Menelik, who defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adowa in 1896, Samori Toure of the Songhai Kingdom, who resisted French colonialism for over two decades, and Koitalel Arap Samoei who led the Nandi Revolt in Kenya; and not forgetting the Herero Rebellion that took place in today's Namibia.²³ There were many more. All in all, colonialism had a phenomenal political impact on the African continent. It superimposed the western state system onto the African sociopolitical landscape, by and large destroying the early indigenous forms of military organization. These precolonial military arrangements and traditional communal militia were therefore variously transformed by the political structures, processes and realities that came with colonialism.

It is noteworthy, however, that there were different colonial policies, outlooks and/or strategies. While the Portuguese, Belgian and German (at least before 1919), colonial policies were mostly harsh, brutally callous and aimed at destroying all forms of African sociopolitical organization, the French and, more so, British policies were somewhat benevolent.²⁴ The British particularly adopted a policy of indirect rule, leaving many precolonial sociopolitical systems intact (especially those that collaborated with them), instead using them to administer their African subjects. German, and later, Belgian colonial rule in Rwanda-Urundi (now Rwanda and Burundi) are a case in point too.

These colonial powers exploited a genuine traditional Hutu-Tutsi social structure in a manner that rather unduly elevated the minority Tutsi kingship within the colonial setup—a state of affairs that incrementally bred intra-ethnic hatred and bloodshed in the two nations.²⁵

Elsewhere, African conscripts, such as those of Senegalese and Nubian fame, served in the First World War as members of carrier corps. Two decades later, they served as regular military personnel in colonial establishments such as the King's African Rifles (KAR) in British East Africa. Many died in battle during the Allied campaign that took them to far-off lands, including Burma, Ethiopia, Northern Africa, Europe and the Far East. After the war, in 1945, many returned home, back to the indignity of being colonial subjects. They soon spearheaded armed struggles for independence, as was the case in Kenya and (later) Algeria, among other places.²⁶ Today's ethnic militia, the Mungiki in Kenya for instance, can be traced back to the Mau Mau freedom movement—an ethnic rebellion mainly by the Kikuyu community of central Kenya, who took to arms for purposes of getting back their ancestral lands, which had been forcefully annexed by the British Crown and settlers.²⁷

It may be argued at this juncture that the early roots of ethnic militias in Africa can therefore be traced back to these precolonial and colonial experiences. While many had started off as genuine military formations for the purposes of protecting the communal interests of the precolonial traditional sociopolitical systems, a large number were transformed or had to adapt to the forces of change occasioned by the advent of the slave trade, early European exploration expeditions and, more importantly, colonial conquest and the initial African reaction to it. This is the background that bequeathed post-independence Africa with the militia phenomenon.

ETHNIC MILITIAS AND THE AFRICAN POST-INDEPENDENCE EXPERIENCE: 1960s–1980s

As the first generation of African presidents sought to consolidate power and placate the support of the masses, many began to do so by maintaining close patron–client ties with ethnic chiefs, while excluding others, for the purposes of regime sustenance.²⁸ Just like the colonizers before them, they employed divide-and-rule tactics to ensure political support and survival. Subsequently, they began to experience resistance, especially from excluded ethnic groups. During this period, Africa faced several challenges that had a bearing (directly or indirectly) on the nature and dynamics of the militia phenomenon for the rest of the post-independence period.

The first set of challenges had to do with the decolonization of several countries in Southern Africa, where political independence was late in coming—the likes of Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Second, there were the challenges of state formation; and third, the political intrigues associated with the Cold War phenomenon at the time, in which

proxy superpower tensions and/or conflicts played out on the continent.²⁹ Problems of state formation, for instance, began to haunt African countries immediately after independence. The struggle for power among African elites involved use (and abuse) of various ethnic militias. Many African leaders looked to their ethnic communities for the purposes of whipping up emotions and placating the support of their tribesmen in order to gain power or to retain it.³⁰

Ethnically oriented political outfits such as the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (Parmehutu) in Rwanda or the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) in Burundi had emerged as early as 1959. These parties had youth wings and/or youth leagues, and these party youths were actually ethnic militia. For example, in the conflict that started in Rwanda in 1959, also known as the Hutu Revolt, ethnic militias were active. Similarly, Moise Tshombe, with the help of some of the divided foreign powers of the Cold War, utilized the services of ethnic militia in his bid to have the mineral-rich Katanga Province secede from the rest of the Congo. Ethnic militias were also involved in the Biafran War in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970.³¹ During the late 1970s, there was talk in Kenyan public circles that the ethnic communities that supported the Kenyatta regime (popularly known as Gikuyu Embu Meru Association [GEMA]) had allegedly formed an ethnic militia known as Ngoroko in order to shore up the regime by armed means if the need arose.³²

As such, during the 1960s and 1970s, localized power struggles informed by Cold War ideological differences attracted numerous dissident groups and rebellious movements. Many of these rebellious outfits bore an ethnic character. In Angola, for instance, Jonas Savimbi, who led the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) from 1966 until his death in 2002, drew immense political support from his *Bieno* ethnic group, which also served as a recruitment pool for ethnic militias in his Ovimbundu region. In Ethiopia, armed movements such as the Oromo Liberation Movement (OLM), Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Movement (EPLF), that sought either secession or to oust Mengistu Haile Mariam from power, relied heavily on militia from the different ethnic outfits they represented. In Senegal, the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance also bore an ethnic character, drawing its military strength from militias from the *Diola* ethnic group. In the Uganda Bush War of the early 1980s, Alice Lakwena led a militia that mostly consisted of members of the *Acholi* ethnic group in Northern Uganda.³³ This group later reconstituted itself to Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) under the leadership of the dreaded Joseph Kony.³⁴

One outstanding characteristic of ethnic militias during the decades of the 1960s through to the 1980s was that they mainly operated and/or were subsumed within the umbrella of the major ruling political parties, armed liberation movements and/or rebel factions. They were used for what would pass for being noble purposes, such as fighting the apartheid regime in South Africa or to resist its destabilizing effects in the rest of the Southern Africa region.

Such militias, too, were instrumental in the liberation of Southern Rhodesia from the shackles of racist domination, similar to that in South Africa. For example, they were important actors in movements such as South Western Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia and the armed wing of the African National Congress, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in South Africa.³⁵

ETHNIC MILITIAS AND THE AFRICAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The post-Cold War period ushered in a somewhat new phenomenon onto the African sociopolitical landscape. More bloody and brutal theaters of intra-state conflict broke out around the continent. Regimes that had clung to power for decades suddenly began to collapse. The Cold War's strategic chessboard, which had earlier afforded many African regimes the privilege of trading one power against another, suddenly disappeared; and Africa appeared to be somewhat neglected, as violent civil war episodes broke out in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Western Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone, among others.³⁶ A common undercurrent of these civil wars was not only the degree of brutal violence and extremely inhumane acts that defied the logic and rules of conventional warfare but also the blatant involvement of mostly civilian entities that waged them—assorted kinds of militia.

The total regime collapse, state failure and sheer anarchy that characterized these theaters of civil war left a governance vacuum, and militias occupied it.³⁷ In some cases, they literally played the role of government by default. In parts of central and southern Somalia, clan militia manned toll stations and collected taxes.³⁸ Like the olden-time militias that guarded their communities against the slave trade, these militia claimed to protect their communities. As a matter of necessity, someone had to make the law, execute it and adjudicate it; and so, militia became the law where there was none. Yet some, such as Somalia's Al-Shabaab militia, have turned from being supposed 'protectors' to total oppressors of the very communities they purport to safeguard.

Nonetheless, the challenges of governance in this period were not merely those occasioned by civil war and regime collapse but also those caused by the pull-and-push factors associated with the political change dynamics of the 1990s. The advent of multiparty politics is a case in point. In those years, political pluralism was sought, amidst much resistance from incumbent single-party dictatorships that had monopolized power for close to three decades. State-supported militia was mobilized for purposes of maintaining the status quo. It is crucial to note that many of the ethnic militia did not overtly identify themselves as such. Instead, they bear tags such as "ruling party youth wingers" or "community vigilantes" and, in some cases, simply as "area boys."³⁹

This was a common trend in Malawi under Kamuzu Banda, Nigeria under Sani Abacha, Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi, and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda in the early to mid-1990s, before most of these regimes finally gave

in to multiparty politics.⁴⁰ In Kenya, for instance, militia-like elements such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), Mungiki, Kaya Bombo Boys, Chinkororo, Jeshi la Mzee, Kingole, Kamjesh, Kalenjin Warriors and the Taliban emerged, along with many others. Many were responsible for violent ethnic or tribal clashes in 1992, 1997 and again in 2007, all election years.⁴¹

The political character of these militias need not be consistent. They can oscillate from being criminal gangs to instruments of political violence and, at the worst, war machines. It all depends on the political 'season' and the ability of the pay master and/or the political standing of the given tribal lords or elites who mostly bankroll them.⁴² Just like the Bakasi Boys in Nigeria, the Sungusungu from the Kisii community in Kenya's Nyanza region started off as genuine tribal vigilantes informed by the need to stem runaway crime on their turf—only to turn into a criminal gang that was responsible for violent robbery, extortion, rape and murder, among other ills. Similarly, the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) was a militia group started off as a typical ethnic militia that emerged as a result of clan differences among members the Sabaot ethnic community of western Kenya. However, this outfit turned to brutal criminal acts, unleashing terror on ordinary people as it acted in cahoots with unscrupulous political interests.⁴³

Some militias die out once they outlive their political usefulness, while others can persist, especially if they represent genuine sociopolitical grievances. In Nigeria, the Niger Delta Vigilante and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) fall into this category. Militia belonging to the Ogoni and the Ijaw communities in Nigeria's Delta Region told a story of grievance, with their communities having borne the brunt of exclusion, marginalization, environmental destruction and poverty, with a backdrop of immense wealth concentrated elsewhere. These militias began to abduct oil company workers and expatriates in exchange for hefty ransoms. At times, they killed their captives and destroyed oil transport infrastructure, along with other assets. As state authorities unleashed the counter-offensive, trails of destruction and suffering among local populations became all too common.⁴⁴

All in all, the ethnic militia phenomenon is associated with many wrongdoings that dot the post-Cold War African political landscape. More often than not, their modus operandi is one that bears the mark of anarchy. Like the Janjaweed in Western Darfur region in Sudan,⁴⁵ the atrocities committed by militia under the watch of rebel chiefs and tribal lords—the likes of Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson in Liberia,⁴⁶ Fodey Sankoh in Sierra Leone,⁴⁷ Farah Aideed in Somalia, Joseph Kony in Uganda, the Interahamwe commanders such as Theoneste Bagasora in the Rwanda Genocide and Samuel Hinga Norman, who led the Kamajors in Sierra Leone⁴⁸—were utterly inhumane and extreme, to the point that many of them were charged by International Criminal Tribunals and courts, and are now serving heavy sentences.

Take, for instance, the case of the DRC, where there are several dozen ethnic militia groups. They range from former Interahamwe remnants roaming Eastern Congo, to regional variants of the indigenous Hema or Tutsi

groups. Indigenous ethnic Congolese also have militias commonly known as Mai Mai. These militias have been associated with mass atrocities and gross human rights violations in Eastern DRC.⁴⁹ In North Africa (and by extension, parts of Western Africa), the Arab Spring phenomenon of 2011 and its ramifications throughout the region saw the emergence of militia groups in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mali, some of which have since morphed into serious regional security threats, especially due to their relationship with international terror organizations,⁵⁰ including Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, Macina Liberation Front (MLF), the Movement of Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and Ansar Dine, among others.⁵¹ These groups are responsible for gross atrocities including acts of terror and abduction. They too are part of the uncivil society.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to trace the evolution, nature and dynamics of ethnic militia in the African political landscape and to account for their phenomenal proliferation and growing significance in the post-Cold War period. From this discussion, several pertinent issues came to the fore. Militias are not new to Africa. Indeed, they have been a ubiquitous feature on the African sociopolitical landscape, dating as far back as the precolonial past. The contention here is not about whether or not they exist but rather how they operate and how best to account for the factors that have facilitated their continued existence, their behavior and the change dynamics within them. At times, these groups have played the worthwhile role of guarding communal interests in periods of danger, as they did in the days of the slave trade and colonial conquest. Yet, the phenomenal changes that came with the colonial era saw these groups turn into instruments of colonial rule in some cases, while in others they were used to resist it in the decolonization struggles. Nonetheless, for most of the post-independence period, they have belonged to the uncivil society, and represent the byproduct of political decay and poor governance in the early part of Africa's post-independence experience, as well as a manifestation of state failure in the post-Cold War period.

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Migration and Urbanization in Africa

John Lekan Oyefara

INTRODUCTION

The signs of rapid urbanization in Africa are ubiquitous, such that the continent has been reported to have experienced the highest rate of urban growth during the last two decades at 3.5% per year compared with other continents of the world (UN-Habitat 2014). Indeed, the 2014 revision and highlights of the United Nations' World Urbanization Prospects report showed that the fastest-growing agglomerations in the world are in Africa and Asia, as the two continents are urbanizing faster than other regions. Projected to become 56% and 64% urban, respectively, by 2050, the rate of urbanization, measured as the average annual rate of change of the percentage urban population, is affirmed to be highest in Africa and Asia, where the proportion of urban areas is increasing correspondingly by 1.1 and 1.5% per annum. Specifically, the same document has also estimated that the coming decades will further underscore this scenario, as the continuing urbanization and overall growth of the population will add 2.25 billion people to the urban population of Africa and Asia by 2050 (United Nations 2014), with Africa, currently urbanizing more rapidly than it was in the late 1990s, becoming the fastest urbanizing region, adding over 1.2 billion people to the urban population from 2020 to 2050 (United Nations 2013).

Despite this, shades of opinion are beginning to emerge that challenge the position that urbanization is occurring faster in Africa. Potts (2012) has contended that the fast growth pace of a typical capital city should not be equated with rapid urbanization, and that rapid population growth in most of the towns and cities of Africa should not be misconstrued as indicating rapid increases in

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urbanization levels. The author suggests that rather than an emphasis on urban population growth rates alone, a focus on the broader structural aspects of urbanization reveals a variable urban experience across Africa. With the aid of the latest census data, rather than the projections employed by the relevant United Nations agencies, Potts (2012) argues that Africa has experienced periods of rather slow urbanization in recent years, and that some of the cities or towns in a few African countries were seen to be losing population share, or counter-urbanizing, in the 1980s and 1990s.

These dissenting viewpoints must emanate from an inadequate understanding of the concept of urbanization and urban growth, which lays the foundation for the need for a proper explication of both. The meanings of “urbanization” and “urban growth” have been inconsistent over time, as the literature is replete with different conceptions of what the phenomena are, essentially owing to differences in paradigm across the disciplines interested in them. As such, their meanings have usually been colored by the inherent values in the assumptions upon which their different definitions have been based. Urbanization and urban growth have had an enormously varied scope, such that some authors (Tacoli et al. 2015) have suggested that there has often been confusion between urbanization and urban growth. They explain that urbanization is the proportion of the total national population living in areas classified as urban, while urban growth is the absolute number of people living in areas classed as urban. It would appear from the foregoing that barring semantics, urbanization and urban growth are concerned with people living in urban spaces. As such, going forward both terms will be used interchangeably.

The meaning of urbanization has been considered from both the paradigms of the developed and developing world. Gleaned from the viewpoint of the developed world, urbanization is considered in terms of its meeting certain conditions like modernization, physical and economic growth, and heterogeneity in occupation (Wirth 1938; Krüger, 1998; Smit, 1998; Bah et al. 2003; Von Braw 2004; Harvey 2004). It has also been pondered from the standpoint of the developing world, in which its connotation is more the sense of an increase in the average density of human settlement (Lowry 1990), or an agglomeration of people in relatively large numbers living in settlements (Agbola 2004; Olotuah and Adesiji 2005) known as urban centers. According to Drescher and Laquinta (2002), the process of urbanization occurs in five distinct ways—namely, by the natural increase of urban dwellers, by international immigration to cities, by internal rural-to-urban migration, by reclassification, and by metropolitanization.

However, in Africa as in most other developing countries, where the index of urbanization is mainly by population growth, the place of migration as a major factor in the urbanization process cannot be discountenanced, as it is an important component of urban population growth and the urbanization process in Africa. Migration is a specific aspect of human mobility (Du Toit and Safa 1975) that is not only important in human life but is also an essential feature of the natural balance, as people, animals (Ejiogu 2009), and plants (Southwood 1962; Denno et al. 1991) have, at different times, been known

to move from their natural abodes to new ones. According to Ramamurthy (2003), migration is an integral part of human existence, since virtually all the endeavors of man are predicated upon his necessity to move from one point to another. The world that man inhabits is dynamic, hence the need for him to be constantly mobile. Humans move from one place to another in the pursuit of specific needs and wants, which may be social, psychological, physiological, or economic. Indeed, it was reported that about 3% of the entire world's population were domiciled outside their countries of birth in 2010.

In this context, migration within countries constitutes a greater part of the mobility in Africa. This kind of migration is most exemplified by the rapid movement of persons from the rustic, less developed, and less populated areas characterized by farms, hamlets, and villages, where human activities are largely oriented toward primary production, to places where the orientation changes from agricultural endeavors to such other more rewarding pursuits as trade, manufacturing, industry, and management. Generally, this unique type of movement has been known to play a significant role in the process of the urbanization of several countries, so much so that today, more people live in urban spaces than in rural areas all over the world.

This chapter offers an analysis of the nexus between migration and urbanization, proposing that migration and urbanization are both part of the same process within the population dynamics of Africa and are therefore constantly interacting. It focuses on the various factors that predispose people to migrate from rural areas to urban centers, as it highlights the consequences of urbanization in Africa. Following this introductory section, the chapter proceeds to trace the historical trajectory of urbanization. It also delves into a brief outline of seminal literature on migration and urbanization. It then discusses the theoretical framework of urbanization migration before drawing final conclusions.

HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF URBANIZATION IN AFRICA

To locate the origin and trajectory of urbanization in Africa today, it is pertinent to look back through its history, from the pre-colonial to the colonial and post-colonial eras, and identify the forms of urban life that have evolved over time.

Pre-Colonial Era

The precincts of the Nile Valley were home to the earliest known urban spaces in Africa, such as Alexandria in Egypt, which dates back to 331 BC. The city was believed to have grown from a small port town to become the grandest and most important metropolis in ancient Egypt, further becoming the largest and most prosperous city in the world at the time (Oppenheim 1977). Other urban spaces are also known to have sprung up, such as Meroë, traceable to present-day Sudan. This is said to have been one of the major cities in the Kush kingdom, known for its advancement in iron technology, building construction and agriculture (Emberling 2009; Burstein 2009; Welsby 1998). There was

also Axum, the capital of the then Ethiopian kingdom, which endured from the first century AD through to around the tenth century AD, and was believed to have traded in ivory, precious metals, clothing, and spices with the Romans, Arabs, and Asians (Mokhtar 1990).

The trans-Saharan trade between 700 and 1600 AD saw the emergence of more urban places in the West African savanna, the more prominent of which included Koumbi Saleh, Timbuktu, Djenné, and Gao, where an elaborate economic system including taxation is known to have developed (Garrard 1982). Further into the deep forest of the West African region, other urban centers did develop among the Yoruba, Fulani, and Hausa people, as well as in the Ashanti Empire and Benin Kingdom. As these urban places developed across Africa during pre-colonial times, others were appearing in the central African equatorial region, in the areas around what are today Congo, DR Congo, Angola, Zambia, Rwanda and Burundi (Pritchett 1989).

Colonial Era

At the Berlin conference of 1884–1885, Africa was Balkanized and apportioned between European countries. Consequently, most of the continent, with the exceptions only of Ethiopia and Liberia, was coerced under British, French, Portuguese, German, Belgian, Italian, or Spanish control (Ajala 1983). The resultant economic activities were to have a significant impact on the urbanization of Africa at the time, as essential export products, mainly cash crops comprising cotton, maize, tobacco, sugar, coffee, tea, palm oil, and groundnuts, as well other raw minerals, had to be transported to the harbor towns for export by the colonial administrators. This imposed the necessity for the establishment of railway links between the places involved, following which the populations around these spaces began to swell. The political and administrative activities of the colonial administration were also to exert a huge impact on the urbanization of Africa. The personnel required to govern the protectorates were often stationed in the same harbor towns that also served as economic hubs (Rakodi 1997), leading to a gradual upsurge in the number of people concentrated in these spaces, which led to new cities arising in the existing settlements or in completely new spaces.

The growth of administrative and economic activities in the colonies further caused the development of the cities, as the colonial authorities began to pursue and execute development agendas regarding the provision of vital infrastructure such as harbors, electricity grids, and roads, in addition to the provision of social services, including primary, secondary, and a few tertiary institutions at the end of the colonial period.

Post-Colonial Era

The post-colonial era was one of high hopes and expectations for most of today's African countries that gained their formal independence in the 1960s.

The vision across the new nations was essentially that of building an economically prosperous and developed country. The focus was thus more on building infrastructure, developing social services, expanding industry, and creating employment. In effect, these establishments had to be sited in areas in close proximity to the available infrastructure and amenities, thereby leading to a huge concentration of investment in urban areas, and an upsurge of rural–urban migration in the newly independent nations (Rakodi 1997).

CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS IN AFRICA

Migration, whether internal or international, is a selective process (De Haas 2005, 2010; Adepoju 2006; Castles and Wise 2008; Bakewell 2009), and migrants are believed to have unique demographic, social, and economic characteristics (Simmons et al. 1977; Afolayan, 1991; Afolayan et al. 2008). It has been established that migrants in Africa are largely male, mostly young adults (Caldwell 1969; Rempel 1971), usually in good health (Papademetriou 1985), with some level of education (Caldwell 1968, 1969; Rempel 1971; Rastogi 1985), from comfortable family backgrounds, and from regions of higher population density (Forde and Harvey 1969; Hance 1973). In general, African migrants have been known to match some or all of the following profiles.

Age

Among African migrants, age is a major factor that exerts a selective influence on migration propensity (Champion and Fotheringham 1998 as cited in Etzo 2008). Adolescents and young adults are the typical migrants in Africa (Todaro 1980). Studies by Caldwell (1969), Rempel (1971), and Callaway (1963) fully established this assertion. While Caldwell observed a concentration of migrants in the 15–19 age-groups in Ghana, Rempel noted that the age range of the vast majority of rural–urban migrants in Kenya is 20–25 years, and Callaway found that more than half of migrants in Nigeria were between 15 and 25 years of age.

The factors that predispose young people to migrate more than the rest of the population have been explained. One of these is that most young people who migrate have no immediate family responsibilities as they have not started their own families yet, and they do not have occupational obligations (Byerlee 1974). Another key factor that encourages the out-migration of the young has been attributed to generational conflicts. As evidenced in the work of Banton (1957), young people who resent the authority of chiefs and traditional elders may believe that the city will provide a place of “freedom.” Young migrants in Freetown were reported to have remarked “Make I go Freetown—make I go free” when they were asked why they migrated to Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone (Banton 1957, 57). Other factors that promote migration among the young have been found to include lack of money to pay tax, or to perform a rite of passage—an initiation into

adulthood. Some young males also migrate to earn enough money for their bride prices through paid employment in the city, as well as for the prestige accorded them for their experience in the big town (Byerlee 1974).

Gender

Another major factor that exerts a selective influence on the migration propensity of Africans is gender (Champion and Fotheringham 1998 as cited in Etzo 2008). It has been established through several studies of migrant characteristics that adult males form a high proportion of migrants (Caldwell 1968, 1969; Forde and Harvey 1969; De Haan 1999, 2000). Other notable works have also affirmed the male-dominated dynamics of migration in Africa and these include, among others, Falola (1989), Mabogunje (1985), and Oyeniyi (2010), all of whom note that since the colonial period, young and able-bodied males, more than their female counterparts, have migrated. Adepoju (2006) and Oyeniyi (2010) adduced this gender bias to the very nature of colonial employment, especially regarding track, railway, and road construction, which required strength and many days of service outside the homestead.

A number of factors may be responsible for this. Men in Africa may assume more responsibilities and be more ambitious, which makes them determined to travel to find ways to make ends meet. It has also been suggested through other studies that factors such as the patrimonial administration, which favors the first-born male, make it imperative for males in the family to migrate in search of economic capital with which to start their lives (Findley 2005; Babatunde and Martinetti 2010). Another determinant, according to Boserup (2005) and Boserup and Kanji (2007), is the role of women in agricultural production, particularly in societies where women are the main agriculturalists, a factor which may preclude their migration tendencies.

Education and Skill Levels

Education has been observed to be positively correlated to migration (Caldwell 1968, 1969; Rempel 1971; Rastogi 1985). It has been established that there are indications of a greater propensity for educated youths in rural areas to migrate to urban centers, either for the purpose of furthering their education or to seek employment related to their skills set.

Economic Background

Economic background is also an important element of the profile of rural-urban migrants in Africa, as research has indicated that most migrants are from somewhat well-to-do backgrounds. Indeed, the process of migration is costly and economic weakness is an impediment to migration because a low-income migrant from a depressed economic area may have great difficulty affording reasonable housing in a major city. The poorest usually cannot migrate because

they do not have the skills or the resources required for start-up investment in tools and other assets, or for transport, food, and shelter. The move often involves bribes that have to be paid (Deshingkar and Grimm 2005). If friends or relatives previously provided transportation or babysitting services, then having to pay for these in a new place represents an additional financial barrier to a potential migrant. Therefore, people with higher incomes are more likely to migrate. However, other literatures on migration have insinuated that people from poorer communities, with limited access to land and other economic assets, tend to migrate more (Zhao 2004; Dev and Evenson 2004; Kundu 2003).

Health

It is improbable that people who are of ill health or not physically mobile would be able to migrate. For them, moving to a distant place where they do not have the support of family members or other relatives and friends poses a high risk. These physical barriers to migration can be very difficult to overcome (Afolayan 1985). As such, the process of migration can only be undertaken by those in a good condition of health.

MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA: CONSTANTLY INTERACTING

Migration and urbanization are parts of the same process within the population dynamics in Africa and are therefore constantly interacting. As noted earlier, the process of urbanization occurs in five distinct ways—namely, by the natural increase in the number of urban dwellers, by international immigration to cities, by internal rural-to-urban migration, by reclassification, and by metropolitanization (Drescher and Laquinta 2002). However, in Africa as in most other developing countries the process of urbanization is mostly a result of the growing population in rural areas (Kassahun 2000), a factor that ultimately provokes rural-to-urban migration. It has been submitted that, in Africa, urbanization has largely taken place as a result of the “push” of rural inhabitants to urban areas (International Labor Organization 1998).

Indeed, Todaro (1976) submits that the major source of the growth of the urban population in developing countries is the continuous in-migration of rural people, stating that over 50% of the urban growth in many developing countries is due to the accelerated pace of rural–urban migration. Historically, rural-to-urban migration has been known to significantly impact on the urbanization process of several countries and continues to be significant (Lall et al. 2006). It has also been observed that around two-fifths of the total urban growth in the Third World has occurred as a result of rural-to-urban migration (Gugler 1988), such that it has made up over half of all urban growth in Africa since the 1960s and 1970s and about a quarter of the urban growth from the 1980s onward (Brockerhoff 1995).

According to Williamson (1988), this peculiar growth pattern of urban spaces in developing countries, Africa included, has been contemplated primarily through two major postulates. One is that landless laborers are pushed into the cities by atypically rapid rates of population growth, which exert enormous population pressure on the inadequate farmland available in densely populated agrarian economies. In addition to this is an exacerbation of the problem of rural unemployment and underemployment, caused by the paucity of reproducible tangible capital relative to labor in the face of a high population density, which all adds up to encourage rural–urban population movement. The other postulate is that such favorable economic forces as technology, large-scale manufacturing industries, and foreign capital flows, as well as such urban infrastructure as housing, power, and transportation, pull migrants into the cities.

Analogous to these postulations is the push–pull factor, a model that is fundamental to an understanding of rural–urban migration (Braunvan 2004; Ali 2005; Etzo 2008), and has been used extensively to explain this pattern flow (Adegbola 1972; Afolayan 1985; Udo 1975, 1993; Awaritefe 2000). The push–pull model hinges on the idea that certain adverse factors like poverty, lack of employment, paucity of basic social amenities, and a complete absence of economic opportunities in the origin community of migrants serve as a “push” for them to move to a destination where there is an abundance of social and economic opportunities. It is believed that the existence of these beneficial opportunities, which are absent in the migrant’s community but which he or she desires, lures (or “pulls”) the migrant to other destinations with such prospects (Braunvan 2004). Indeed, the model is an original variation on the world systems model (Lee 1966), which postulates that centrifugal, or push, factors at the place of habitual residence, such as unemployment, drive out migrants, while centripetal, or pull, factors at the place of destination, such as higher job prospects, serve as magnets that draw people to these areas (Dike 1982; Mabogunje 1970).

Flowing from these ideas is the fact that migration is considered as a strategy adopted by individuals (Mazumdar 1987) and households (Bardhan and Udry 1999; Lucas 1997) to better their economic and non-economic well-being. Thus, the factors that “push” individuals from rural areas into urban spaces also include the expectation that pressure in rural areas has nearly exhausted all margins of cultivation, thus pushing hopeless people toward a new life in the cities, while the attractiveness of urban life and the rural–urban wage gap are the major factors that pull people into cities. Along the same lines, Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970) developed probabilistic models, with which they describe migrants as being attracted to cities by the expectation of a higher wage than they receive in agriculture, and being willing to accept the probability of urban unemployment, or lower wages and “underemployment” in the urban informal sector. Indeed Todaro (1969) states that the migrant is willing to accept urban unemployment or lower wages in the urban informal sector if he or she has the prospect of moving up to the urban modern sector in the future.

Other relevant seminal works have also identified that large differences in income and living standards between places, as well as the general perception that migrant households are better off than non-migrant households, act as incentives for people to migrate (Clemens and Pritchett 2008; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2008). With respect to migration in Africa, the key pull factors have been shown to include income, employment, and other opportunities for personal success and development in the more developed urban centers, all of which are lacking in rural areas (Black et al. 2006; Kwankye 2009). Perhaps this explains why cities offer more opportunities in their huge informal labor markets even in the face of declining formal employment (Songsore 2003).

In rural areas, sluggish agricultural growth and limited development of the rural non-farm sector raises the incidence of rural poverty, unemployment, and underemployment. Given the fact that most high-productivity activities are located in urban areas, the rural–urban income differentials, particularly for the poor and unemployed, are enormous. Thus, many of them migrate to urban areas in search of jobs. Even when jobs in high-productivity activities are limited in number relative to supply, and are often not accessible, people still migrate to urban areas in search of opportunities in the informal sector. Migration to urban centers supplements rural income not only through direct wages and remittances but also by increasing labor productivity through increased per capita land size at the rural origins of migration.

Corroborating these viewpoints, Kinuthia (2003) states that the classic “push factors” from rural areas, such as lack of jobs, famine, especially in pastoralist areas, drought, and various kinds of poverty and landlessness, have been known to “push” people out of their rural homes in search of better opportunities in urban areas. The “pull” factors in urban areas include the prospects of finding a job, increased income earning capacities, increased access to educational opportunities, access to social amenities, and general improvements in economic welfare.

URBANIZATION IN AFRICA: TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS

It is on record that Africa is undergoing significant population growth, as more than half of the global population growth between now and 2050 is expected to occur in Africa (United Nations 2015). Consequently, it is projected that about 1.3 billion people will be added to Africa’s population between 2015 and 2050, and this figure may well reach 4 billion by 2100. Indeed, it has been revealed that Africa has the highest rate of population growth among major areas, growing at a pace of 2.55% annually in 2010–2015. According to the 2013 edition of the United Nations (2013) report, this growth is occurring simultaneously with Africa’s urban transition, as almost all of the country is seeing a rapid pace of urbanization and the accumulated relative growth rate of African cities is now among the highest in the world.

It is remarkable to note in these circumstances that Africa’s urban population was less than 8% about a century ago. However, as of the end of the

twentieth century, Africa was 35% urban, and that figure had reached 40% in 2009, and 41% in 2012. It has been found that between 1950 and 2005, the number of urban inhabitants in Africa grew by an average annual rate of 4.3% from about 33 million to 353 million people. Even though the annual growth rate declined to 3.36% per year from 2005 to 2010, African urban areas grew 1.7 times faster than the urban growth rate of the world in the same years. The high growth rate means that some cities will double their population in 15 years, and some others in an even shorter period.

The United Nations projections suggest that Africa will become fully urban by 2035 when over 50% of the population will live in urban areas. African cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants are now absorbing about two-thirds of all urban population growth. But larger African cities continue to grow fast as well. In 2005, Africa had 43 cities with more than one million inhabitants, up from 28 a decade earlier. Traditional city-based urbanization is moving toward regional urbanization patterns, including the emergence of city regions, urban corridors, and mega-urban regions. The changing landscape of Africa's increasingly urban future is often cited as constituting a mega-trend resulting from a combination of rural-urban migration, natural population growth, and the spatial reclassification of urban areas. Moreover, conflicts, drought and rural poverty have driven millions of people out of their homes to live in slums and in the vicinity of the cities and towns as refugees and internally displaced persons (United Nations 2015).

IMPLICATIONS OF URBANIZATION IN AFRICA

In most developing economies, urbanization has been closely correlated with rapid population growth caused by rural-to-urban migration, and it has had some significant consequences. Of these, the economic consequences of urbanization have been the top investigative focus of many works. It is believed that urbanization has had a close association with economic transformation caused by the declining share of agricultural employment, a shift in economic activity from rural to urban areas, and the rise of the modern industrial and service economy, as well as a demographic transition to lower rates of births and deaths, a function of better health standards in urban areas. Indeed, according to the records of the African Development Bank (2011), Africa's centers of economic activity have shifted markedly from the agrarian countryside to urban areas, accounting for not less than 55% of GDP over the past half century. African cities can become an important driver of domestic demand-led growth, regional integration, and technological innovation. However, the inadequacy of their infrastructure and services for meeting social development and economic growth needs is undermining the economic performance of almost every African town or city. It is estimated that the demand for investment in basic urban infrastructure on the continent is in the range of USD 15–20 billion per year, while demand for urban housing investment is in the range of USD 20–25 billion (African Development Bank 2011).

In part, economic transformation is directly tied to the creation of jobs in urban centers. Indeed, Rondinelli and Kasarda (1990) have suggested that job creation has become an overriding focus, considering that the labor force in developing countries, mostly in the urban centers, has been on the rise. Another corollary of urbanization is the boost in the provision of alternative paths to job creation and social mobility, as much of the massive pool of labor will end up in informal sectors (Todaro 1980), which in terms of labor absorption, subsidy-free human capital formation, low-cost provision of goods and services to the urban poor, and the retention of scarce capital, is very productive (De Soto 1989; Richardson 1987). The informal sector also helps keep unemployment rates low and provides a viable path for moving a huge amount of transactions and recycling of goods within the economy, just as it helps sustain highly complex and established social and cultural networks (Castillo 2007; Anarfi and Kwankye, 2011).

There is some evidence on the impact of urbanization on education. Havighurst (1967) pointed out that the urbanization process increases the average size of schools; witness the number of enrolments in schools, as well as the quality of public schools, which has become the greatest single factor in the decisions of middle-income people to live in urban areas (Jayasuriya and Wodon 2003; Kirjavainen and Loikkanen 1998). It has also been found that urbanization is a formidable factor in the efficiency of countries in improving education outcomes and that there is cheaper access to education in urban than in rural areas (Hardoy et al. 2001).

In contrast with the foregoing, however, the urban trajectory in Africa has not generated significant formal economic development, nor has urbanization in Africa derived from economic development. UN-Habitat's data show that 63% of Africa's urban population still lives in slum areas defined by the four dimensions of overcrowding, inadequate housing, insecure tenure, and lack of access to water and sanitation (UN-Habitat 2012). Indeed, the reality is that exceptionally rapid urban population growth has outpaced economic growth over the past 30 years, contributing to the "urbanization of poverty" in most African countries. There is thus a proliferation of unplanned, under-serviced settlements, where diseases associated with poor water and sanitation, are rife. Access to adequate health and education facilities is often limited; insecurity is dominant; organized policing is ad-hoc at best; and employment is mostly informal, insecure, and poorly paid. Most African cities are characterized by severe backlogs in the provision of basic urban services, despite commitments made by African governments over the last 50 years to improve basic service delivery.

The issue of urban slum proliferation is perhaps both the greatest existing challenge and the most pressing future challenge for those secondary towns and cities that are just now developing. There is also the major issue of lack of formal employment, which is a significant factor contributing to urban poverty and the growth of slums. Africa's rapid urbanization is also characterized by a sharp increase in inequality within African societies. The dominant type of development being promoted in African cities is detrimental to their built heritage and contributes to the generation of further exclusion and segregation.

As a result of long years of military rule and gross mismanagement of the post-colonial political economy, many inherited colonial cities in Africa have either been abandoned or marginalized in the development process. Indeed, informal employment and distressed youth are also becoming the new features of most African cities. In the majority of African countries, urban unemployment among young people is higher in urban areas compared to rural areas.

In terms of the environment in the African urban space, formal and unregulated urban settlements and haphazard disposal of waste and industrial products contribute to the degradation of the environment in African cities. The urban poor live in life-threatening conditions with limited access to clean water, adequate drainage, and sanitation. They are also affected by high levels of pollution due to toxic materials, traffic and industrial emissions, residential congestion, and absence of green spaces. The result is environmental degradation, increased natural and manmade disasters, scarcity of drinking water, and increased risks to public health. In addition, the adverse impact of climate change can only accelerate the rural-to-urban migration of environmental refugees, while at the same time putting urban infrastructure at greater risk due to extreme weather events. It is important to note that urban areas account for about 60% of the continent's population who live in low-lying coastal zones that could be severely affected by rising sea levels, as well as frequent floods. Climate change could lead to excessive strain on traditional infrastructure; increased shortages and hazards; increased epidemics; and breakdowns in security due to increased conflict over resources. Rapid urbanization implies rapid increased demand for energy, land, and natural resources. Traffic congestion, due to a growing dependence on motor vehicles and intensive use of expensive fossil fuels, is a new feature of most African cities.

CONCLUSION

In order to discourage excessive rural-urban migration, an integrated rural development strategy needs to be formulated by African governments, such that will provide the necessary incentives to increase rural labor productivity through improved farm technology; greater farm inputs such as fertilizers, high-yielding varieties of seeds, and insecticides; adequate agricultural extension services; price incentives; improved access to financial credit and zero-interest loans to farmers; low-cost agricultural tools; good markets for agricultural produce; and increased market facilities, all of which would work in concert to enhance agricultural production. Besides that, the formulation and adoption of policies that would improve the access of rural dwellers to qualitative education and healthcare should be made a priority, while provision of various elements of modernization in rural localities such as better access to medical facilities, education, infrastructure, water, and electricity would reduce the amount of flow of the population to urban centers. The adoption of a transformative urban policy that emphasizes the positive and transformative qualities of urbanization, in terms of its ability to propel and guide national economic growth and reduce poverty, needs be encouraged in all African governments.

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PART VI

Democracy, Governance,
and Development

Democracy and Political Development in Africa

Adeolu Durotoye

INTRODUCTION

Making a sweeping generalisation about the prospects of democracy and political development in Africa would be misleading in light of Africa's diversity. However, there are common trends and fault-lines that are discernible in the study of political developments across the continent. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's annual democracy index for 2008–2015, the disorganised nature of the development of democracy in Africa has led to outcomes ranging from “full” or “flawed” democracy to “hybrid” or “authoritarian” regimes (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2008–2015).

While electoral contests and term limits are increasingly accepted as rules rather than exceptions, they are being flouted and manipulated in some cases, but not without consequences. Africa is experiencing a concoction of democratic consolidation and democratic backsliding.

Some sceptics have interpreted Africa's wave of democracy as almost a “historical accident”—the product of wily rulers' responses to an external reform agenda, and lacking structural foundations in African societies. They contend that just as African leaders managed to sidestep economic conditionality in the 1980s, they are now dodging the substance of political conditionality. By staging periodic elections, they have created a facade of democratic legitimacy and kept donor funds flowing, but no genuine developmental benefits of democracy seem likely to materialise. Democracy in Africa is falling victim to arrogant

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but calculating “born again” democrats in the garb of politicians, they argue. Signs of a return to authoritarianism thus mark the political landscape of Africa (Bates et al. 2012).

The other side of the argument is that Africa has progressed steadily in its democratic journey. This school of thought argues that political reforms have elicited political restraint and a higher quality of governance. Democracy in Africa has been accompanied by changes in public policies and political practices that generate benefits for the people. The only worry, according to this argument, is whether Africa can keep the momentum towards democratic consolidation (Bates 2010).

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index for 2015 shows uneven progress in sub-Saharan Africa, but notes a dramatic drop in successful “coups from within” since 2000, and says that holding regular elections is now largely commonplace. Even so, the index only awards full democracy status to Mauritius, a quiet achiever with a strong rule of law.

In its 2016 Freedom in the World report, Freedom House named Nigeria, Liberia and Ivory Coast among the countries that have made the biggest improvements in political rights and civil liberties. In Nigeria, 2015 was the first year in which an opposition party gained power through elections. Botswana, Ghana, Cape Verde and Benin have also been lauded as democratic examples.

In 2016 alone, 16 African nations held presidential elections. Although elections do not automatically lead to representative governments, competitive, multi-party elections constitute a *sine qua non* for democracy, and regular ballots indicate progress towards ensuring that citizens are able to choose their leaders.

However, Ake (1996, cited in Adetule 2011, 15) has retorted that “this type of democracy is not in the least emancipatory especially in African conditions because it offers the people rights they cannot exercise, voting that never amounts to choosing, freedom which is patently spurious, and political equality which distinguishes highly unequal power relations”.

Adetule (2011, 15) amplifies this position thus: “The version of liberal democracy introduced through the democratisation processes in Africa has been indifferent to the nature and character of the state. Experimentation with the liberal model has been primarily about how democratic elections will help determine who will be chosen by the people to exercise the power of the state. The consequence has been the survival of a state that lacks autonomy yet dominates and supervises the political process. This has serious implications for democratic development, as substituting ‘democrats’ for dictators through multiparty elections has not brought about democratic progress in several African countries.”

The overall purpose of this chapter is to assess the quality of democracy in Africa in its present state, and to ascertain whether democracy is growing or receding.

To accomplish this research, we relied on several reports and data from Afrobarometer, Freedom House, and the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, coupled with content analysis and a review of extant

literatures. Consequently, we employ numerous variables to assess democratic trends and political development in Africa. Is Africa experiencing democratic consolidation or democratic backsliding? What is responsible and how will Africa consolidate its democracies? Is the test of political development the capacity of a country to equip itself with political parties, civil administrations and legislative bodies? This chapter focuses on the reality of political life in African society.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Democracy

Democracy is a concept of Greek origin derived from two words, namely “*demos*” which means “the people” and “*kratien*” which means “to rule”. Put together, they form the single word “*demokratia*” which means “rule by the people”. Democracy means that power is in the hands not of the few but the many. Abraham Lincoln’s definition of democracy as “the government of the people, by the people and for the people” has stood the test of time. While Schumpeter (1950) defines democracy as synonymous with open competition among rival political parties, Dahl (1971) argued that to be democratic, political competition must take place within a setting infused with attendant rights and freedoms including the right to association and free speech, and such rights must be equally shared. Huntington (1991) insists that even when a polity exhibits the attributes highlighted by Dahl, it is not democratic until one party had surrendered power to another upon losing an election. Bates added that democracy is “a form of government in which power is employed to serve the interests of the public rather than of those who govern” (Bates 2010, 1133). According to the different treatises above, the fundamental principles of democracy therefore include equality of men, individual rights, free elections, the existence of political parties, majority rule, separation of power, checks and balances, the rule of law, freedom of the press and judicial autonomy. A sound democracy is expected to possess these features.

Put differently but succinctly, democracy is about popular control and political equity. “Democracy is a political concept, concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and policies of a group, association or society. Such decision making can be said to be democratic to the extent that it is subject to the controlling influence of all members of the collectivity considered as equals. The key democratic principles are those of *popular control and political equality* (emphasis mine). These principles define what democrats at all times and in all places have struggled for—to make popular control over public decision making both more effective and more inclusive; to remove an elite monopoly over decision making and its benefits; and to overcome obstacles such as those of gender, ethnicity, religion, language, class, wealth and so on to the equal exercise of citizenship rights” (Beetham et al. 2008, 20).

Democracy is not necessarily realised in the form of direct popular control over public decision-making, but in the form of control over the decision-makers (representatives) who act in the place of the people.

Democracy is not an event but a process. A government can therefore assume power through a democratic means of election but act in contradistinction of democratic ideals. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it this way: “Democracy is not just about one day every four or five years when elections are held, but a system of government that respects the separation of powers, fundamental freedoms like the freedom of thought, religion, expression, association and assembly and the rule of law ... Any regime that rides roughshod on these principles loses its democratic legitimacy, regardless of whether it initially won an election” (cited in the Guardian 2016).

Political Development

In defining political development, this chapter takes a cue from Lucian Pye’s seminal 1965 work titled “The Concept of Political Development”.

Pye analysed different definitions of political development and presented three of its broadly shared characteristics, which are: concern with equality, with the capacity of the political system, and with the differentiation or specialisation of governmental organisations. He opined that the problems of political development revolve around the relationship between political culture (the informal), the authoritative structure (the formal), and the general political process.

Pye’s definitions of political development are as follows:

- **Political development as the political prerequisite of economic development**

World Bank economists who posit that political and social conditions play a decisive role in ensuring economic growth facilitate this conception. Hence, political development is conceived as the “state of the polity which might facilitate economic growth” (Pye 1965, 5). This view of political development led to the introduction and pressure of political conditionality in the late 1980s. However, despite the introduction of political reforms in almost all African countries since the 1990s, economic development has been largely elusive.

- **Political development as the politics typical of industrial societies**

Political development is believed to be typical of industrial societies characterised by “an avoidance of reckless actions which threaten the vested interests of significant segments of the society, some sense of limitations to the sovereignty of politics, an appreciation of the values of orderly administrative and legal procedures, an acknowledgement that politics is rightfully a mechanism for solving problems and ... finally an acceptance of some form of mass participation” (Pye 1965, 6).

- **Political development as political modernisation**

Political development is also defined as political modernisation fashioned by the West, but defenders of cultural relativism have questioned the

assumption that Western practices are contemporary and universal standards for all political systems. The truth is that many of the standards traceable to the emergence of industrial society such as mass participation, rule of law, concepts of justice and human rights now belong to the universal standards of modern political life.

- **Political development as the operations of a nation state**

Communities that are nation states only in form and by international courtesy become nation states in reality by developing a capacity to maintain certain kinds of public order, to mobilise resources for a specific range of collective enterprises and to make and effectively uphold certain types of international commitments.

- **Political development as administrative and legal development**

Political development is believed to rest upon the existence of an orderly legal process based on an orderly administrative system and bureaucratic structures. Some have even contended that the strengthening of bureaucracies is the first task in political development. Much foreign aid and technical assistance is now focused on programmes in public administration.

- **Political development as the building of democracy**

Political development is defined as being synonymous with the establishment of democratic institutions and practices. Hence, political development has meaning only in terms of the strengthening of democratic values.

- **Political development as stability and orderly change**

Political development is defined here as being synonymous with political stability based on a capacity for purposeful and orderly change. It means there is an environment in which uncertainty has been reduced and planning based on reasonably safe predictions is possible. However, stability based on arbitrary support of the status quo is not development.

- **Political development as mobilisation and power**

Political development revolves around the capacity to mobilise and allocate resources. Democratic systems can often mobilise resources more efficiently than repressive authoritarian ones.

- **Political development as one aspect of a multi-dimensional process of social change**

Political development is intimately associated with other aspects of social and economic change and it is unnecessary to try to isolate it completely from other forms of development because change in the different aspects of a society, be it the economy, the polity or social order, all impinge on one another.

The nexus between democracy and political development therefore, for the purpose of this chapter, revolves around the maturation of democracy in African countries from its evolution to its present form, the capabilities of democratic

and administrative institutions, the level of involvement of the citizens, the impact of democracy on economic growth and social change, and the differentiation and specialisation of each arm and agency of the government as well as the nature of political culture.

The United Nations Secretary-General's 1995 Agenda for Development stated *inter alia* that: "Democracy and development are linked in fundamental ways ... because democracy is a fundamental human right, the advancement of which is itself an important measure of development" (The United Nations Secretary General's Agenda for Development 1995, p. 44).

Democracy in Africa: A Score Card

Different conclusions have been reached about the performance of democracy in Africa since the 1990s. While some scholars have hailed the democratic trends witnessed in many countries, some others have lamented "a steady, creeping deterioration of the quality of democracy in Africa" (Mentan 2007, 15). Some other scholars (Bates 2010) have been more balanced in their assessments. According to Mentan, democracy in any clime is bedevilled when power is concentrated in the executive, the rule of law is undermined, and basic rights and freedoms are violated. He identified six major factors that have "laid siege" to liberal democracy in Africa as the centralisation of executive power, the emergence of the military as a political actor, the lack of the rule of law, weak representative institutions, social exclusion and corporate imperialism (Mentan 2007, 20). He wrote about "anocratisation" of democracy connoting a situation in which the state combines the features of autocracy and procedural democracy, leading to increasing corruption and a deepening legitimacy crisis.

The resurgence of the military as a crucial political actor, as witnessed in Egypt and Mali, the perennial crisis of constitutionalism as witnessed in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the patrimonial state, corruption, the politicisation of violence and rising conflicts as witnessed in almost all African states, lend credence to Mentan's thesis.

Linda Beck wrote about "clientelist democracy in Senegal" connoting democratic regimes "infused with clientelist relationships that serve as the basis for political mobilisation and accountability" (2008, p. 4). According to her, political clientelism is not based only on vote buying (which is typical of most African democracies), but also the trust and reciprocity between patrons and clients. The degree of social authority and political autonomy determines the extent to which clientelism curtails political competition and participation, two key components of democracy.

In Bates' rather balanced argument, democracy in Africa "has been accompanied by changes in public policies and political practices that generate benefits for the people" but political dangers remain because "incumbent parties strive to suborn the electoral process and incumbent executives seek to prolong their terms of office" (2010, pp. 1133–1134). Even though political reforms in Africa have elicited political restraint and a higher quality of governance, "the question is, of course, whether the reformist impulse will endure or erode" (2010, p. 1146).

Freedom House's annual reports reveal a mixed bag of the state of political development in Africa. In its 2016 report, 49% of Africa's 989,179,000 population were adjudged to be partly free, 39% were not free, while 12% were free.

Burkina Faso received an upward trend arrow due to the holding of its most successful presidential and legislative elections ever and the subsequent installation of a civilian government, after the ousting of long-time president Blaise Compaoré in 2014 and a brief and ultimately unsuccessful military coup in September 2015.

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and largest economy, also received an upward trend arrow due to the improvements in quality of the executive and legislative elections held in 2015, which featured the first-ever opposition victory at the national level and a peaceful rotation of power, as well as the new government's efforts to combat corruption. Voters fed up with rampant corruption and insecurity rejected the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan, and elected Muhammadu Buhari to replace him, the first time ever that the opposition had gained executive power through elections in Nigeria.

The most positive political development among Africa's democracies was recorded in Ghana, which has passed Huntington's two-turnover test. In the December 2008 presidential election, the opposition party's candidate, John Atta-Mills, won a run-off over Nana Akufo-Addo by a razor-thin margin of 30,000 votes, out of over 9 million cast. Akufo-Addo conceded and Atta-Mills was inaugurated, marking the second time power had changed hands constitutionally since the country's 1992 democratic transition. Ghana thus became the largest African country ever to pass the "two-turnover test" of democratic consolidation.

Besides these examples, Africa can boast of a growing number of leaders passing power peacefully after elections as the cases of Nigeria and Ghana exemplified. Public backlashes against leaders who have tried to prolong their tenures, such as Burkina Faso's Blaise Compaoré, Zambia's Frederick Chiluba and Malawi's Bakili Muluzi, are also positive trends.

Women presidents have equally emerged in Africa, a feat deemed unimaginable prior to the 1990s. In 2006, Liberia's Ellen Johnson Sirleaf became Africa's first-ever democratically elected female president, followed by Joyce Banda in Malawi and Ameenah Gurib-Fakim in Mauritius.

According to Afrobarometer's 2014 report (Bratton and Houessou 2014), even though demand for democracy is rising in Africa, most political leaders fail to deliver democratic dividends to the citizens. In the report, Africans express growing attachment to democracy, according to citizen attitude surveys conducted by the Afrobarometer in 34 countries. Seven out of ten Africans preferred democracy to other political regimes. The paper points to the gap in many countries between the popular demand for democracy and the supply of democracy actually delivered to the people by ruling elites. "While ordinary Africans clamour for high-quality elections and leadership accountability, too many political leaders continue to manipulate the polls, challenge term limits, and even seize power by coup. In the most common pattern across African countries, popular demand for democracy exceeds the

available supply, producing a deficit of democracy”. However, “in ... countries across the sub-Saharan sub-continent—like Ghana in West Africa, Mauritius in East Africa, and Zambia in Southern Africa—an institutionalized form of electoral democracy is gradually taking root” (p. 2) (Guardian 2016).

Victoria Graham’s study titled “Assessing the quality of democracy in South Africa, 1999–2012” is also very instructive to our analysis. In assessing the quality of democracy in South Africa, she concluded that consistently free and fair elections; a strong rule of law and independent judiciary; significantly improved participation of women in political life; a dynamic civil society; comprehensive civil and political rights; and a vigilant media actively engaged in its watchdog role are all evident in South Africa’s growing democracy. The areas in which South Africa has performed the worst thus far are with regard to poor levels of individual security; high levels of corruption; the negative effects of cadre deployment; the continued existence of discrimination, spreading poverty and inequality; and the lack of efficient governance at local level. This discovery is evident in many African countries.

While the salient infrastructures of democracy which include the legislature, the judiciary, the rule of law, mass participation, elections and electoral systems, political parties and the party system, civil society, political transparency and accountability have become the norm in Africa, most African leaders are still paying lip service to democracy in their respective countries and only allow democratic rule to the extent that it does not put their personal interests in jeopardy (Durotoye 2016a).

ANXIETIES ABOUT DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

There have been many anxieties about the quality and sustainability of Africa’s democracy as listed below:

- **Lack of quality elections:** The Economic Commission for Africa’s (ECA’s) African Governance Report (AGR) II stated that since the foundational elections of the 1980s there have been numerous elections in Africa but many countries have not had quality elections. Overall there has been notable progress on political governance in some countries, while improvements have been blunted or reversed in others. On balance the progress on political governance has been marginal (ECA 2009, 17 cited in Adetule 2011, 11).
- **Political immaturity:** In many African countries, a “single-party mentality” persists in a multi-party system. Almost everyone tries to belong to the ruling party in a context where economic opportunities are limited. The best opportunities are reserved for those in the ruling party, thereby strengthening the politics of “winner takes all”.
- **Vote buying:** This has equally been a common menace of democracy in Africa. Impoverished citizens are ready to sell their votes on or before election day to the highest bidder, preferring to solve their immediate problem of hunger and thinking that the political elite may not reckon

with them upon assuming office. State funds are usually deployed by the ruling party for this purpose. A good example is the case of Nigeria, where the ruling party under Goodluck Jonathan diverted funds meant to procure arms to fight the Boko Haram insurgents to prosecute the 2015 elections, which the ruling party eventually lost. Even though vote buying is prevalent in Africa, people may still vote for their preferred parties rather than the party that “paid” for their votes.

- **Third termism:** The greatest bane of democracy in Africa at the moment is the trend by African leaders to tinker with the constitution in order to extend their terms (Durotoye 2016b; Freedom House 2016). African leaders in several countries manoeuvred to extend their terms in office during 2015. Burundian president Pierre Nkurunziza’s decided to run for a third term, and organised a phoney election which he won amid an opposition boycott in July 2016 leading to large-scale political violence, while the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Rwanda have all moved towards extending their term by tinkering with their constitutions through a dubious series of referendums. President Paul Kagame has equally secured a “successful national referendum” to potentially remain in office until 2034, thereby closing the political space against the opposition. In October 2015, long-time Republic of Congo president Denis Sassou-Nguesso also secured a constitutional referendum that allowed him to forego term limits and run to extend his rule in 2016, triggering the largest anti-government demonstration since 1992.
- **Military coup:** The re-emergence of military coups in Guinea Bissau, Egypt, Burkina Faso and Mali highlighted the political fragility of some African countries. The African Development Bank’s January 2013 report titled “Political Elections and Democratic Fragility in Africa” stated, “These events turn back the continent’s efforts towards strengthening democracy. The erosion of well-established democratic standards in countries such as Mali is a major threat to the ongoing political, economic and social development on the African continent”.
- **Dominance of “big men”:** The Guardian in its 2016 report titled “Democracy in African countries: five myths explored” stated that Africa is still dominated by “big men”, many of whom have been in power for over two decades. “In Africa, nine leaders have wielded power for more than 20 years; three of them have been at the helm for more than 30 years. Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo seized power from his uncle in 1979, the same year that Angola’s José Eduardo dos Santos rose to power. Yoweri Museveni won this month’s election in Uganda to continue his rule after a vote marred by a lack of transparency”.
- **Lack of democratic dividends:** Democratic “experiments” in several African countries recorded unimpressive results despite the introduction of constitutions, legislatures and electoral systems. The transition did not result in better and improved living conditions for the citizenry because

“...the perspectives and propositions made by western scholars and analysts on democracy in Africa fail to consider a number of critical issues, including the nature and role of the state in the struggle for democracy, the relationship between the state and democracy, the relationship between democracy and development, and the role of domestic and international social forces in promoting or inhibiting democracy. There are also other considerations, such as the level of social conflict in the country, the nature and orientation of the dominant class, the direction of class struggles, and the alignment and realignment of social forces at the domestic, regional and global levels. All these are key variables determining the direction of the processes and outcomes of democratisation in Africa” (Adetule 2011, 14).

- **Post-coup elections/legalising illegality:** The government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, following the 2013 coup, formalised in 2014 its hold on power through an election marred by large-scale rigging, criminalisation of and boycotts by opposition parties, and a tight grip on the media, thereby setting a dangerous precedent for how to get power in Africa.
- **Assaults on the state:** Many African states from Mali to Kenya continue to grapple with threats from Islamist militants. The deadly Boko Haram insurgents have penetrated from north-eastern Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, although the group has been largely curtailed by the present government of President Buhari.
- **Violations of civil liberties and the rule of law:** According to Amnesty International, human rights violations continue in the fight against Boko Haram. In the wake of an attack by Somalia’s Al-Shabaab militant group which killed nearly 150 people at Garissa University College in north-eastern Kenya, the Kenyan government continued its ham-fisted domestic counterterrorism campaign which includes alleged extrajudicial killings and disappearances, as well as a crackdown on nongovernmental organisations and critical media. Ethiopia also used the war on terrorism to justify a deadly crackdown on protests against forced displacement in the Oromia region, as well as repression of political opponents, journalists, bloggers and activists.

WHY DEMOCRACY IS FAILING IN AFRICA

The Freedom House report titled “Freedom in the World 2016” lists some reasons why democracy seems to be failing in different parts of the world, including Africa.

- **China’s role as a model:** China presents a model in the developing world and beyond for combining political repression with economic growth, at the cost of human rights.

- **Russia's challenge to liberal values:** Russia has defied liberal values increasingly aggressively under Vladimir Putin—domestically, among its neighbours and in international organisations.
- **New, sophisticated methods of censorship:** Techniques for censorship, information control and propaganda messaging have been developed in countries such as China and Russia, and by the Islamic State militant group. There has been increased use of draconian laws to suppress dissent in settings including Thailand, Ethiopia and Turkey.
- **Rampant corruption:** Corruption has affected troubled or aspiring democracies such as Nigeria, Brazil and Moldova, as well as entrenched authoritarian regimes.
- **Division and doubts:** There has been uncertainty surrounding global leadership among democratic powers around the world, resulting in wavering support for democracy beyond their borders.
- **Authoritarian hangover:** According to the 2009 African Governance Report (ECA 2009) put together by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, it seems that many of the democracies in Africa are suffering from an authoritarian hangover. Many African countries adopted the system of democracy because it enjoys global endorsement as the best form of government and a panacea for development. But it is a truism that development in Africa remains impeded. This is because many African leaders are ignorant and negligent of the philosophical principles upon which democracy was formed.
- **African leaders' lack of moral courage:** Democracy has failed in Africa simply because African leaderships lack the moral courage to live up to its expectations. Characterised by greed, ignorance and negligence, many African leaders do not practice democracy in the light of the foundational principles upon which democracy was formed. They easily drift from the path of democracy to satisfy their own whims and caprices, ending up practicing pseudo-democracy.
- **Lack of structural basis:** A major menace to Africa's democracy is the lack of structural "requisites" like industrialisation, mass education, the ascendancy of a large middle class, and at least the clear sense of national identity observed in established democracies. Many African countries remain at low levels of socioeconomic development and are highly ethnically fragmented, raising concerns about the structural basis for stable democracy (Alence 2009).
- **Confused agenda:** Squeezed between the policy demands of international financial institutions and the domestic imperatives of political survival, governments have typically responded with varying degrees of "partial reform"—delivering enough policy change to keep external donors at bay, while dragging their feet on the most politically sensitive items (Durotoye 2000).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has looked at the state of democracy and political development in Africa. While the infrastructures of democracy, like elections and electoral systems, political parties and the party system, the legislature, the judiciary, and civil society have been established, the commitment of the political elite to democracy has been largely superficial in some cases. As the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) notes, “democratic ideals are easier to endorse in principle than to realise in practice. There is no such thing as a perfect democracy. Democracy is not an all-or-nothing affair, but rather a shifting continuum. Countries are more or less democratic overall, and more or less democratic in the various aspects of their political and social life” (Beetham et al. 2008).

Our observations and recommendations are as follows:

- Signs of a return to authoritarianism mark the political landscape of Africa.
- Leaders of revolutionary movements that captured power after a protracted revolution, like Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Paul Kagame (Rwanda), Isaias Afewerki (Eritrea) and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), are finding it difficult to relinquish power voluntarily.
- International factors will continue to play an important role in supporting African democracy as the global climate will continue to be uncomfortable for nondemocratic governments.
- The African Union will need to do more to discourage autocratic rule in Africa by punishing “third termists” who are manipulating their constitutions to extend their terms.
- Agencies of restraint should further be empowered to curb the excesses of the political elites in Africa.
- Power should be devolved to the regions in Africa to discourage the excessive battle for the centre due to its monopoly over resource distribution.
- The cost of governance must be reduced as many African countries can no longer sustain the high cost of governance.
- The call for a “home-grown” democracy that takes cognizance of African culture should be seriously considered.

Our conclusion is that political development is a continuum and not a destination. Hence, scholars should not be in haste to pass judgement on Africa’s political development.

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Political Parties and Democracy in Africa

Jo-Ansie van Wyk

INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment of the continent's first political party, the True Whig Party, in Liberia in 1860, African political parties have undergone various mutations throughout the late colonial, independence and post-independence periods.¹ The rise of African nationalism, decolonisation and post-independent statehood, amongst others, were some of the earliest influences shaping historical and contemporary political parties and party systems in African states. By 2017, four generations of political parties and party systems had developed in Africa.² The first generation of these originated during the colonial period, whereas the second generation originated during the subsequent multi-party period. Third generation political parties are defined as liberation movements that were pulled into new constitutional frameworks in order to stabilise a country. Finally, fourth generation parties are fragmentations of the political parties of the first and second generation parties.

Contemporary Africa's experience of political parties is diverse, with the legacies of each generation remaining: from no political parties in Ghana and later in Uganda (1986–2005), to Swaziland, the continent's only absolute monarchy, which allows parties to register but bans competitive elections, to 445 political parties registered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to the ruling coalition in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), winning all 547 seats in Parliament in 2015. Moreover, since 2000, ruling parties were voted out in Benin, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Lesotho, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, São Tomé and

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Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Zambia.³ Furthermore, political parties such as the African National Congress (ANC) (South Africa, since 1994); the SWAPO stands for the Southwest African People's Organisation Party (Namibia, since 1990); the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) (Botswana, since 1966), the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) (Mozambique, since 1975); the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (Angola, since 1975); and ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe, since 1980) have governed for some time. Whereas ethnic divisions have long been regarded as an enduring feature of political parties in some parts in Africa, the salience of ethnicity seems to be decreasing.⁴ Finally, political trust in the ruling, rather than opposition, parties remains exceptionally high in Africa.⁵

This chapter does not present an analysis of the so-called third wave of democratisation processes on the continent. Instead, the aim is to focus on what is here termed the fourth wave of democratisation. Whereas the third wave of the 1990s saw the continent's democratic dividend increasing, the fourth wave proposed here refers to the third wave's fall-out, or wave roll-back, which may be defined by some democratic gains in a constrained environment under electoral (or competitive) authoritarianism. Under the latter, the routinisation of elections occurs; some semblance of political contestation appears, but the incumbent leader and party enjoy considerable advantage and little accountability on an uneven electoral and political playing field.⁶

The chapter is structured into four sections. The first section addresses African exceptionalism vis-à-vis political parties, while the second section focuses on the external environment affecting parties, such as the prevailing party systems on the continent, party endurance and regime durability. The third section addresses internal party dynamics such as history, party strength, organisation and management, party cohesion, regulation and funding. The final section focuses on the practice of party constellations.

Before I proceed, some caveats. As a continent, Africa defies generalisations due to its history and diversity. It has, for example, 2110 living languages and around 3315 ethnic groups.⁷ Conceptually, the contribution is limited to political parties as official institutions in terms of constitutions and national legislation, and thus excludes rebel groups and militias, although some suggest that these groups act as proto-political parties that perform functions similar to most other parties.⁸ For analytical purposes, a political party is defined as an interlocutor between state and society that articulates interests, enables representation and participation, and secures accountability and government responsiveness.⁹ Chronologically, the chapter is limited to the period since 2000 with, where appropriate, historical references to contextualise contemporary political parties. Finally, spatially, the chapter focuses on sub-Saharan Africa only but refers to examples elsewhere.

AFRICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND SIMILARITIES

Political parties in Africa are both similar to and different from political parties elsewhere. The origin, type, role and functions of political parties are determined by the context of the political regime (a 'set of rules that identifies: who has

access to power; who is allowed to select the government; and under what conditions and limitations authority is exercised') from which it emerged.¹⁰ Despite its unique historical and contemporary context, political parties in Africa perform functions similar to those of their counterparts elsewhere.¹¹ These functions include, *inter alia*, candidate nomination; electoral mobilisation; issue structuring; societal and parliamentary representation; interest aggregation; forming and sustaining governments; and social integration.¹² Political parties also perform an election oversight function through their obligatory membership of national election management bodies (EMBs) (Angola, Madagascar and Mozambique), as well as an oversight function at voting stations, and during the counting of votes (DRC, South Africa, Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia).¹³ South Africa's EMB, the Independent Election Commission (IEC), for example, has also instituted so-called party liaison committees to consult with the IEC during and between elections.

Notwithstanding these similar functions and the recognised significance of political parties, the African historical and contemporary context remains exceptional in some instances. Historically, and in some contemporary settings, movements rather than political parties have played a significant role, as in the case of liberation movements which are not political parties *per se*. Political parties differ from movements in respect of their origins and focus, level of cooperation with government, method (persuasion and/or mobilisation) and main area (parliament or society) of operation, and claims to resources (no formal links or links constrained by law).¹⁴ In Uganda, for example, political party competition was banned from 1986 until 2005 with the National Resistance Movement (NRM) the only political actor, and thus no political opposition. Other notable examples of movements, and thus so-called movement democracy, include the Rwanda Patriotic Front (PPF) in Rwanda, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front in northern Ethiopia, and Kenya's Green Belt Movement.¹⁵

PARTY SYSTEMS, PARTY ENDURANCE AND REGIME DURABILITY

African political parties form part of both formal and informal institutions. One such institution is the party system, which refers to parties' relation to and competition with other political parties in a specific constitutional and electoral context. Five types of party systems are associated with Africa: no-party, one/single-party, two-party, multi-party, and dominant-party systems. The idea of no political parties was introduced by Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and, more recently, Yoweri Museveni's Uganda. Giovanni Satori defined the one-party dominance system as a political party system where one party wins with an absolute majority in at least three consecutive elections.¹⁶

One-party systems, predominantly associated with the first generation referred to earlier, are divided between two sub-types. A *de jure* one-party system occurs when it is a constitutional and legal requirement for only one party to exist, whereas a *de facto* one-party system refers to situations where no such

legal requirements exist, but where the political arena is constrained, enabling only one party to exist.¹⁷

In contrast, in a two-party system such as in Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)), two main parties have an equal chance to win an election to govern. Indicative of the highly polarised ideological differences between the main parties, this system often undermines the potential of smaller parties to develop or to be sustained.¹⁸

The emergence of multi-party systems in Africa is associated with the continent's third wave of democratisation. More than two parties compete in these systems, thereby reducing the dominance of a single party, resulting in more accountability, and often producing coalitions and/or the constellations referred to in this chapter.¹⁹

Although a dominant-party system (Angola, MPLA; Botswana, BDP; Mozambique, Frelimo) may look similar to a two-party system, it differs in that while a dominant-party system is competitive, since more than two parties compete for power, this competition is dominated by a single major party enjoying prolonged periods of incumbency.²⁰ A dominant-party system often causes, or is a consequence of, electoral authoritarian regimes, that is to say regimes that are competitive and democratic *and* authoritarian due to the incumbent and/or the ruling party's use of state institutions and violence to undermine free elections, human rights and the political arena; all tenets of democracy. Thus, competition in electoral authoritarian regimes is 'real but unfair' due to an uneven playing field between the incumbent, the incumbent party and the opposition.²¹ Further, a 'hyper-incumbency advantage' improves and maintains an incumbent's organisational power to use coercive structures to repeatedly and regularly violate opposition groups, and democratic rules and norms.²² This means that the regime 'fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy'.²³ Therefore, the political playing field is uneven, intolerant of political opposition, and elections a mere façade of democratic practice.²⁴ Party—and thus regime—endurance succeeds due to the history (such as a liberation struggle) of the dominant party; its ability to supersede social divides such as ethnicity and class, and to entrench itself into society; a country's specific electoral architecture; the particular political culture of a society; and state-party relations (enabling incumbency advantages through organisational power and employing state intelligence and security structures).²⁵ Moreover, regimes led by these parties consolidate their power via broad-based incorporation of social and economic authorities at the local level, and state substitution (i.e. neutralising local power brokers and political entrepreneurs).²⁶

POLITICAL PARTIES IN AFRICA

Political parties on the continent share some common features such as a lack of party institutionalisation; limited internal democracy of an unrepresentative nature; limited financial resources; dominant ruling parties; a lack of issue-based politics; floor crossings or defections (or van de Walle's 'tipping game')

with leaders and/or parties switching allegiances); and established patterns of ethnic voting.²⁷ Political party institutionalisation depends on four enabling conditions, including regular party competition, society-based parties, party legitimisation of the electoral system, and significant party organisation, which are not subordinate to the interests of party leaders.²⁸

Against the aforesaid, this section outlines some of the key features—history, party strength, organisation and management, party cohesion, regulation and funding—of African political parties.

Party Origin

Party origin and formation are some of the key elements in understanding political parties. In conflict-ridden Africa, it is clear that parties that emerged from violent conflict as erstwhile rebel groups, liberation movements or militias (here collectively referred to as post-rebel parties) differ from parties that, for example, emerged from dominant-party fragmentation or labour movements. History as an explanatory variable sheds light on the character of political parties.²⁹ Successful post-rebel parties maintain some of their military character, centralised structures and decision-making, solidarity, and military veterans (such as those of the ANC's armed wing UmKhonto we Sizwe) once they have transformed into conventional political parties; more so when they become the ruling authoritarian party, such as in the case of Uganda's NRM, Ethiopia's EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) and Rwanda's RPF.³⁰

Post-rebel parties do not often shed their violent pasts. In some instances, political contestation between parties has escalated to violence and armed conflict between political parties, as the following examples illustrate. So-called war veterans and state security groups linked to ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe committed violence against opposition parties during the country's elections in 2000 and 2008. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, state- and ruling party-linked militias were associated with post-election violence in 2010 and 2011.³¹

Party Strength

Party strength, here defined as the ability of a party to 'effectively organise and represent societal needs', distinguishes a weak from a strong (opposition or ruling) party. In short, strong parties have three main characteristics: resources, organisation and outcomes.³² Resources may include financial resources; permanent, skilled, organised staff; a party newspaper and other means to communicate with the electorate; numerous local branches and a strong grassroots presence; a large dues-paying membership; an ability to penetrate society; and the ability to achieve success at the polls.³³ A second key characteristic of a strong political party is its organisational strength. This includes communication and coherence across different levels of party organisation; internal democracy and the means to resolve intra-party conflict; penetration of the national party to national level; societal 'rootedness'; organisational complexity

and links between the party and societal socio-economic networks; autonomy from other organisations, party penetration of civil society and labour; authority residing in the party rather than in the leader; and ideological coherence and stability.³⁴ A third characteristic of strong parties relates to its achievements or outcomes. This includes, amongst others, mass membership; electoral success; the development of ‘diffuse organisational loyalty’ and party loyalty; high levels of partisanship in the electorate; a lack of anti-party sentiment in the electorate; adaptability and survival over time; and an ability to prevent protest by associated groups.³⁵

Generally, opposition parties in Africa are weak and often consist of ‘recycled elites’.³⁶ Effective political party opposition requires organisational cohesion, competitiveness, distinctiveness and identifiability, and decisiveness in the arenas where contestation occurs.³⁷

Strong parties endure due to their ability to relate to their members and citizens, and due to their internal organisational ability and management, thus enabling a party to exist and operate between elections.³⁸ Relating to citizens between and during elections has taken many forms on the continent, where constituency-based structures such as *harambees* (a community self-help event) (Kenya African National Union (KANU), Kenya) and *imbizos* (government-community meetings) (ANC, South Africa) were established to interact with members and citizens.

Internal Democracy

Despite efforts to engage with members and citizens, political parties on the continent have centralised, and hence undemocratic, party structures. In Burundi, the ruling CNDD-FDD includes the so-called Committee of the Wise, an informal and secret party structure composed of selected party officials. In October 2014, the Committee decided in favour of President Nkurunziza’s third presidential term despite a constitutional provision limiting the number of presidential terms to two.³⁹ In South Africa, Luthuli House, the ruling party’s headquarters in Johannesburg, symbolises the party despite an extensive branch system. Luthuli House manages the party and has been accused of lacking internal party democracy. A similar view has been expressed elsewhere on the continent, with parties in Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi and Nigeria, amongst others, perceived to be the least democratic in electing party officials and election candidates.⁴⁰

Party Cohesion and Volatility

Party cohesion is an important contributor to party strength and success. However, in a number of African countries, a lack of internal democracy, clientelism, personal ambitions and divergent views have often resulted in party volatility, which refers to the emergence, fragmentation, factions, integration, disappearance, and/or re-emergence of some political parties. The case of Benin is illustrative of party volatility.

The president-elect, Patrice Talon, fell out with the former ruling party, Forces cauris pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE), in 2012 and was elected as an independent, with support from a large number of opposition parties; the FCBE, created in January 2007 to support the outgoing president, Boni Yayi, holds 41 seats in the National Assembly. The Renaissance du Bénin previously supported Yayi and the FCBE but is now divided; Union fait la Nation (UN), formerly the main opposition alliance, is dominated by the Parti du renouveau démocratique, and includes the Parti social démocrate and the Mouvement africain pour la démocratie et le progrès. The Forces démocratiques unies was formed by four smaller parties (UPD, INVR, PPD and PDS) in 2015; other small parties include Alliance cauris 2 and Alliance force dans l'unité (AFU).⁴¹

Further, party volatility is evident in Burundi where the Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) is one of the parties with parliamentary representation. However, UPRONA is divided into a 'small official or legal branch', recognised by the government (hence all UPRONA government members belong to the official branch), and a 'mainstream legitimate branch' not recognised by the Burundi government.⁴²

In the Central African Republic, the 2015 president-elect, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, was a prime minister and a member of the former ruling party, the Kwa Na Kwa (KNK), under former president François Bozizé. After the new Central African Republic president-elect had distanced himself from the KNK due to Bozizé's ousting in 2013, he was elected in 2016 as an independent. In addition to the KNK's fragmentation, the Mouvement pour la libération du peuple centrafricain, one of the main political parties in Parliament, also fragmented and split into two factions; one faction regrouping former supporters of the late Ange-Félix Patassé (CAR president from 1993 to 2003), and another faction supporting Patassé's former prime minister, Martin Ziguélé.⁴³

In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the former ruling party, Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), is not represented in Parliament following its boycott of the 2011 elections but maintains considerable influence and support. Recently, a senior member of the FPI, Mamadou Koulibaly, broke away and established an independent party, Liberté et démocratie pour la République (LIDER).⁴⁴

Another example of party volatility is Gabon, where the Union nationale (UN) currently enjoys parliamentary representation; a party comeback so to speak. The UN dissolved in 2011, but re-emerged in February 2015 to successfully contest elections and gain a parliamentary presence.⁴⁵

The emergence of factions (defined as 'any relatively organised group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is part'), defections (becoming a member of another party, or taking up a parliamentary seat on behalf of another party) and the formation of new political parties by disaffected party officials and members is a regular occurrence.⁴⁶ Ruling and strong opposition parties have often suffered this fate. Dominant parties' hold on power and dominant-party systems have been diminished through their fragmentation, with Senegal (2002), Zambia (2011), Lesotho (2012) and

Nigeria (2015) the most striking examples.⁴⁷ A further example of dominant-party fragmentation occurred in January 2014 in the final days of Burkinabé president Blaise Compaoré's tenure, when senior party officials of the ruling Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP), Simon Compaoré, Salif Diallo and Roch Kaboré, left the CDP and established the Mouvement du peuple pour le progrès (MPP), taking around 100 senior party members and National Assembly deputies with them. The MPP's formation followed an earlier split in the CDP with the departure of Zéphirin Diabré in 2010 to establish his own political party.⁴⁸ In South Africa, dominant-party fragmentation resulted in the establishment of the Economic Freedom Fighters by a former ANC youth leader, Julius Malema, whereas in Kenya, KANU's reign ended in 2002. Dominant-party fragmentation of KANU occurred prior to 2002 when it resulted in the establishment of the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a confederation of four parties. NARC itself evolved from an earlier KANU fragmentation, the KANU-NDP (National Development Party) coalition.⁴⁹

While these examples refer to so-called bottom-up party volatility, initiatives to restore party cohesion and loyalty through top-down purges have also occurred in the ANC in South Africa with the removal of President Thabo Mbeki from office in September 2008, as well as that of Cabinet Minister Mosiuoa Lekota (who later broke away and established his own political party, the Congress of the People (COPE)) and Hidipo Hamutenya, a presidential hopeful, by SWAPO leader and Namibian president Sam Nujoma.⁵⁰

Party Regulation

With the onset of democratisation on the continent, party regulation, specifically bans on parties formed on the basis of ethnicity, religion or race, has increased. In Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, for example, constitutional provisions ban ethnicity-based parties.⁵¹ Apart from eroding political opposition, these bans also aim to reduce conflict. Between 1990 and 2010, most bans were enforced in Angola, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. *In toto* 12 African states banned 138 particularistic parties; denied 112 parties from registering; dissolved 25 parties; and suspended one party.⁵²

In the wake of Burkinabé president Blaise Compaoré's fall in October 2014, he was succeeded, in November 2014, by the deputy of the Presidential Security Regiment, Lt-Col Isaac Yacouba Zida. In an attempt to stabilise the country and prevent the incumbent elite from opposing him, he temporarily suspended various political parties, including Compaoré's CDP; the Alliance pour la démocratie et la fédération–Rassemblement démocratique africain (ADF-RDA); and the Fédération associative pour la paix et le progrès avec Blaise Compaoré (FEDAP-BC) for 'activities incompatible with the law'.⁵³

Most often, party regulation is a conflict-prevention and resolution instrument. Today, 43 African states provide reasons for the banning of political parties, varying from prohibitions to prescriptions including an undemocratic

character, intolerance or practicing fanaticism; use of violence; employ the name of an already existing party; irregular funding and sources of funding; and promoting unlawful acts and undermining peace and social welfare.⁵⁴ Religion and ethnic identity are outlined as a mobilisation base for political parties in at least 33 African states.⁵⁵ Regulation ranges from funding to registration requirements, electoral and campaigning codes, party legislation and even party bans.

Party Funding

Like elsewhere, party finance and funding is crucial to power as money is the 'mother's milk of politics'. Typically, opposition parties suffer financially more than incumbent parties that have been guilty of abusing state funds to finance election campaigns and party organisation. Apart from unequal access to funding, political parties are often guilty of clientelism or patrimonialism, where a patron (a party or a politician) builds and maintains a relationship in exchange for votes, thus giving and granting favours.⁵⁶ Furthermore, some parties turn to vote buying, foreign funding, and/or illicit sources for funding.⁵⁷ Further sources of funding include corporate, state, public or private funding (including from party members through monthly salary deductions, from individuals and even from the party leader), party commercial investments (such as the ANC's investment company, Chancellor House, and party-owned radio stations in Sierra Leone), and illicit practices such as narcotics and resource smuggling.⁵⁸ Some parties do not take, or limit, contributions from corporations. In South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe, for example, parties receive direct or indirect funding from public entities such as the Electoral Commission or the state broadcaster (but not government institutions) proportionate to their representation in Parliament, thus possibly entrenching the parliamentary representation of some parties and excluding parties officially registered but with no parliamentary representation. In some instances (Gabon, for example) parties have been established to access public funding and then simply disappeared without contesting elections.⁵⁹

State funding to political parties in Africa falls into three categories.⁶⁰ First, funding for general party operations. This is provided in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.⁶¹ Second, there is funding for election campaigns, which is provided in Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tunisia and Uganda.⁶² Finally, some countries provide no funding for party operations or election campaigns. This is the case in Botswana, Central African Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Zambia.⁶³

Policies

Party election manifestos are an important source for determining party positions and policies, especially on a continent where electioneering is predominantly done through mass rallies and leaflets, and not heavy manifestos. Research suggests that party manifestos are rare in Africa, and are predominantly issued by the ruling and largest opposition parties outlining programmatic ideas. However, research in Ghana, Namibia and Kenya suggests that the ruling and opposition parties have produced manifestos containing parties' ideological orientation and programmes for elections since 1992.⁶⁴

PARTY CONSTELLATIONS

Political parties compete and relate to other parties in at least three arenas (society, parliament and government).⁶⁵ Unlike their Western counterparts, political parties in Africa are not regarded 'as societal forces driven by the main social cleavages' in their countries. Moreover, African political parties also 'do not manifest themselves in the parliamentary arena' due to the general weakness of parliaments in Africa. Instead, political parties are typically instruments for the election and selection of political leaders. Furthermore, due to the dominance of some parties, most political parties rarely compete in the government arena.⁶⁶

Whereas parliaments are peculiar to states in the West, assemblies are peculiar to African pre-colonial state societies such as the Zulu Kingdom (South Africa), Buganda (Uganda), Ashante (Ghana), Nupe (Nigeria) and Zande (Sudan). Apart from these institutions, some African chiefdoms such as the Bemba (Zambia), the Lou (Kenya), the Anuak (Sudan), the Tiv (Nigeria) and the Oromo (Ethiopia) also had councils for deliberations.⁶⁷ Today, the combined heritage of these assemblies, councils and colonial parliaments are evident in the continent's parliaments. Whereas African parliaments provided a platform for political parties in the wake of independence in the 1960s and 1970s, the power and influence of these parties and parliaments, and *vice versa*, has decreased since the 1980s, with the onset of one-party rule and electoral authoritarianism.

Increasingly, political parties on the continent are superseding, amongst others, ethnic and class divisions, establishing a multitude of what are here termed party constellations, typically consisting of various types of coalitions, party-to-party cooperation agreements, and post-conflict power-sharing governments such as Governments of National Unity. These constellations, which can either escalate or minimise conflict, are instrumental in power accumulation and distribution, and are characterised by various mutations. Despite this, the amorphous nature of these constellations does not necessarily contribute to the deepening of democracy.

Opposition party coalitions. In Kenya, for example, the Coalition for Reform and Democracy consists of parties led by Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka,

and forms the official opposition in Parliament.⁶⁸ In Tanzania, Ukawa is a coalition of opposition parties that emerged during the elections in 2015.⁶⁹

Election coalitions. The Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) in Botswana, for example, was established in late 2012 and contested the October 2014 general elections in Botswana on a joint platform. The UDC consists of three opposition parties, namely the Botswana Movement for Democracy, the Botswana National Front and the Botswana People's Party.⁷⁰

Ruling (party) coalitions. Ethiopia's ruling coalition, the EPRDF, emerged from several armed groups that took power in May 1991: the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic Movement and the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation.⁷¹ Another example is Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta's Jubilee Coalition, which consists of parties led by President Kenyatta and the deputy president in the Kenyan Parliament.⁷² The DRC offers another example of a ruling (party) coalition. When DRC president Joseph Kabila reshuffled his Cabinet in September 2015, he formed a Cabinet comprising the pro-Joseph Kabila alliance, the Majorité présidentielle, as well as a number of opposition parties. Apart from this Cabinet coalition, more than 12 other political parties are included in Kabila's government led by his party, the Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie.⁷³

Government (ruling party)–opposition party cooperation. After the 2010 presidential elections, Burkinabé president Blaise Compaoré attempted to secure a third term but his party, the CDP, did not have a clear parliamentary majority to effect a constitutional change. Several attempts to gain support from the Senate and elsewhere failed, but in October 2014 secret negotiations with an opposition party, the ADF-RDA of Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo, provided him with the necessary seats and votes to secure a vote in the National Assembly (Parliament) and change Article 37 of the constitution.⁷⁴

Post-conflict power-sharing arrangements. Power-sharing here refers to 'the creation of an inclusive government in which Cabinet posts, and hence executive power, are shared by the major parties (although not always all of the parties) in a given conflict'.⁷⁵ South Africa's Government of National Unity consisted of the ANC and the National Party and governed from 1994 until 1996. Other recent examples of power-sharing agreements between political parties include, for example, Burundi, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. For brevity's sake, the case of Burundi only is illustrated. Burundi held its first post-war parliamentary elections after protracted negotiations in July 2005. Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), won the election but two other parties, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) and the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) also won a significant number of the votes. Nkurunziza was indirectly elected as president and subsequently formed a coalition government including UPRONA and FRODEBU.⁷⁶

National interest and consensus bodies. Whereas the previous examples of party constellations referred to voluntary efforts, some (constitutionally-prescribed) constellations for the common good exist. Both Zambia and Rwanda

provide examples of this. The Zambian Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue is a platform for political parties to ‘forge cross-party consensus on national issues’, whereas Article 56 of the Rwandese Constitution provides that ‘The political will consistently recognizes the Rwanda Consultative Forum ... to enable political parties to discuss the major political issues of national interest, consolidate national unity [and offer] advisory opinion on national politics, serving as mediators in cases of conflict within a political party, at the request of the latter’.⁷⁷

CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed African political parties’ exceptionalism but also indicated that political parties on the continent share some commonalities and functions with their counterparts elsewhere. Despite the accusation that African political parties are weak, political party dynamics on the continent are robust in respect of the prevailing party systems, party endurance and regime durability. Parties’ internal dynamics such as history, party strength, organisation and management, party cohesion, regulation and funding are addressed.

Several major aspects stand out. Political parties are constrained or enabled by specific party systems. Dominant-party endurance is typically high in electoral authoritarian regimes, and *vice versa*. High incidences of party volatility occur due to dominant-party fragmentation, as well as fragmentation in opposition parties.

Apart from these findings, the chapter makes three contributions, the first of which is providing a broad canvas of the dynamics of political parties in Africa and their relevance for democracy and democratisation. The chapter’s second contribution is conceptual innovation, namely the introduction of Africa’s fourth wave and party constellations as unique political party practices. Finally, the chapter indicates that political parties in Africa have elaborated on the typical functions of political parties. As indicated, in some African states, political parties have a unique oversight role in elections and matters of national interest and consensus.

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Institutions, Neopatrimonial Politics and Democratic Development

E. Remi Aiyede and A. Afeaye Igbafe

INTRODUCTION

At independence, many states in Africa held great promise. Coming out of the post-Second World War nationalist struggles, African states entered the post-independence phase with western democratic institutions and structures inherited as instruments of colonial rule. They took the form of the modern state in Europe as it evolved from its origin in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. They were largely democratic institutions, characterised by the separation of powers and checks and balances. Systems of government varied from state to state. Some were presidential, while others were parliamentary, semi-presidential or a hybrid, depending on the relative influence of the colonisers. Even the basic laws of these countries mirror the texts of the constitutions in operation in the metropolises.

In the 1960s, the decade of African independence, according to Göran Hydén (2013), Africa attracted a great deal of research interest because of the ascendancy of system analysis, structural functionalism and comparative politics in political science in the United States. Africa promised a great deal of empirical information for these methodological approaches of political science. Carbone (2007) noted that political scientists were primarily concerned about gathering new information about sub-Saharan Africa's political systems. Indeed, the concept of political development which was in currency then led

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to a focus on the changes that were occurring in African societies in terms of the differentiation of political structures, the construction of state capacities that would make authority more effective and the institutionalisation of organisations and procedures.

However, a few years after independence, rather than the consolidation and stabilisation of these inherited democratic political structures, many African states witnessed a series of changes in such structures. Several countries began to move from parliamentary to presidential rule, and from a multi-party to a one-party system. Marxist-style constitutions, African socialism and so on were introduced. Scholars studied these developments as innovations and experiments in the process of political development in Africa (Le Vine 1997). In Francophone Africa, this process was described as Africanisation or the acculturation of constitutions (see Elgie 2012). Even elements of neopatrimonialism were viewed as a way of exercising power in a manner that combined Weberian forms of traditional and rational authority, and were viewed as a type of social capital appropriate for certain stages of development (Mkandawire 2015; Eisenstadt 1973; Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger 1984). Soon, military coups became a major source of regime change as pluralism gave way to dictatorship and authoritarian rule. These were attended by violent conflicts, including civil wars and fiscal crises.

By the 1980s, the economic performance of African states had fallen below that of their Asian counterparts. The expected improvement in welfare that heralded decolonisation did not materialise and several economies fell into crisis, characterised by huge debt overhang. Several countries suffered a decline in their gross domestic products. Many countries became poorer than they were in the 1970s. African countries had to adopt structural adjustment programmes that produced their own dynamics in the economy, society and politics. A very important outcome of the experience of economic and political reforms is the significance of informality in development outcomes. The rolling back of the state meant that an increasing range of governance activities were being carried out by community or non-governmental organisations, such as hometown associations, patronage networks, religious organisations, vigilante groups and traditional rulers, in a context in which public officials are known to govern in ways that contravene formal rules and regulations (Meagher 2007).

Studies of African politics began to re-focus on and emphasise the informal dimensions of politics as an explanation for development failures and the pathologies of politics. Indeed, formal institutions of governance seem to have been overwhelmed by informal processes as the mainstay of life in Africa. In studies of African politics, ideas of personal rule or neopatrimonialism which were earlier broached by such scholars as Price (1974, 1975), Le Vine (1980), Jackson and Roseberg (1982) and Médard (1982), attracted the renewed attention of scholars as they tried to make sense of the crisis of the economy, politics and governance in Africa. In the event, neopatrimonialism, personal rule or “big man” politics gained traction as a theoretical explanation for the crisis of governance in Africa.

INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS AND POLICY IN AFRICA: A THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL DISCOURSE

Political science has often proceeded with some basic assumptions about the exercise of political power in the management of public affairs. The most basic of these is that those who exercise power do so within a framework of institutions. Institutions not only define who can exercise political power; they also provide a basis upon which the decisions of those who occupy public office are determined. Indeed, it is often assumed that rulers make choices within more or less institutionalised polities. In these polities formal political institutions, such as the constitution, the structure of the legislature or electoral rules, and government systems place constraints on the behaviour of politicians and political elites, and directly influence political outcomes.

Early studies of politics and development in post-colonial Africa were very optimistic about the direction and possibilities of development on the continent. The consolidation of the western political institutions left behind by the colonialists, which was expected to happen in due course, was regarded as progress, as modernisation. Post-colonial states were viewed as evolving in a unidirectional and teleological way to become like the advanced western democracies. Modernisation was presented as multi-dimensional, involving a trend towards competitive democracy, stability and integration by means of institutional rationalisation and differentiation (Carbone 2007).

The entrance of the dependency school of thought fundamentally underscored the flaws in a linear conception of development. Later, this linear view of development was reversed in light of criticisms, experience and competing paradigms, especially from dependency theory and other Marxism-influenced models. Further, political development in the reformulation of the institutionalist approach to politics was conceived as reversible; hence the need to deal with the problem of political decay came to be emphasised. Indeed, modernisation theory and dependency theory came to focus on change and the difference in development paths across time and space. The emphasis was on the interaction between cultural traditions and the forces of modernisation, which often led to varying development outcomes. Eventually, both traditions began to focus on the state as the locus of political analysis. Thus, the culturalist's assumption that political life is grounded in the realm of ideas and values and the structuralist's idea that economic conditions determine political life meshed in a general focus on the state, only to be supplanted by a focus on politics and its associated outcomes.

By the 1980s, the new political economy with its emphasis on rational actors and the primacy of individual self-interest, and its bias against the "predatory state", politics and rent-seeking behaviour became dominant. One important aspect of the new political economy is its attempt to resolve puzzles related to cross-national variations in economic policy and performance, especially key questions over cross-regional differences in development patterns between the East Asian states relative to African and Latin American nations.

The studies attempted to explain the disparities in economic performance of states that were in a similar condition in the 1960s over time. These studies have over the years drawn on neo-Marxist, rational choice and pluralist understandings of institutional forces such as class conflict and the organisation of economic interests, the legality of public institutions to give substance to public interests, the self-interest of politicians, policy currents in relation to cohesion, autonomy and administrative capacity, and the societal linkages of state actors and political institutions within and outside the state sector. The emphasis was on the impact of the complex interplay of preferences, interests and institutions on policy outcomes.

The important point arising from these studies of institutions is the effort to derive a set of institutional characteristics that accounts for successes and failures across countries. Nowhere is this more evident and relevant to Africa than in the discourse on the “developmental state”. Successful countries’ features are distilled into elements that account for success while the features of unsuccessful ones are distilled to account for their failure. Then follows the attempt to explain why unsuccessful countries have not been able to develop the characteristics that would lead to success. This approach is sometimes not helpful as it assumes a sharp divide between successful states and unsuccessful ones. This point is emphasised by Mkandawire (2001, 290–291).

As formulated, the definition of the “developmental state” runs the risk of being tautological since evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance of the economy. This produces a definition of a state as developmental if the economy is developing, and equates economic success to state strength while measuring the latter by the presumed outcomes of its policies. It has led to myopic concentration of analysis around success to the neglect of the “trial and error” nature of policy-making even in the most successful cases.

With regards to Africa, two strands of the argument can be distilled. The first emphasises the consequences of institutions received from colonial rule, which are alien and arbitrary and therefore implicated in a post-colonial crisis of state and development. Modern institutions in Africa emerged as the foundations of colonial rule and are therefore not designed to achieve development. Such legacies of colonialism are more attuned to exploitation and control, it is often argued. Davidson (1992), for instance, argued that the “curse of the nation” in Africa is the disregard for cultural community and ethnic group, which led to a failure to take account of Africa’s real traditions in drawing state boundaries. These state boundaries cut across ethnic boundaries and are therefore not natural. Hence the series of violent conflicts and instability that have arisen out of the failure to achieve integration and accommodation among the diverse ethnicities that constitute states in Africa. As Mamdani (2001, 653) has objected, all boundaries are artificial and shifting power relations often translate into shifting boundaries. War and conquest have been integral to state-building.

A more nuanced analysis emphasises the interaction between the colonial structure and African responses, and the resultant amorality of the civic public as responsible for the crisis of legitimacy and institutional failures in Africa. This perspective, which is epitomised by Peter Ekeh's theory of two publics, emphasises the epochal character of the colonial experience and its consequences for politics and governance. It focuses on structure with little regard for agency and how to change the situation. It more or less presents the colonial experience as fundamentally structuring post-colonial politics and its attendant pathologies (Ekeh 1975, Osaghae 2006).

On the other hand, another set of analytical perspectives became dominant in the study of African politics in the 1980s and 1990s, when African states fell into a severe crisis that saw the reversal of some of the developmental achievements made in the early post-independence period. This set of views emphasises the agency of post-colonial leadership but reaches out to pre-colonial Africa's cultural repositories for an explanation for the pathologies of politics or the failures of formal institutions where their existence is admitted. The most fundamental expression of this perspective is neopatrimonial theory.

Neopatrimonialism became established as the essential characteristic of the state in Africa once the dependency theory, which focused on external factors, began to lose currency with the relatively better developmental performance of Asia and Latin America. According to Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 459), "although neopatrimonial practices can be found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in Africa and a small number of other states". Neopatrimonialism is the distinctive hallmark of governance in Africa: in such systems the chief executive maintains authority through patronage rather than through ideology or law (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Thus, Africa became the exceptional region, and the great challenge of development and progress in Africa is to break out of neopatrimonialism.

Neopatrimonialism argues that formal institutions are not significant in politics because they are either patrimonialised (Callaghy 1984) or informalised (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Neopatrimonialism, in dealing with the weakness of the post-colonial state by returning agency to post-colonial politics, draws on what are perceived as pre-colonial legacies of rule. In general, it assumes that post-colonial institutions did not upturn pre-colonial norms and practices, such as patronage, tribute, kinship and other relationships. Rather, Africa's post-colonial leaders have been able to subvert modern institutions by clientelism, the use of state resources for political legitimation and personal rule. Africa is "a place where formal institutional rules are largely irrelevant" (see Posner and Young 2007, 126).

Göran Hydén (1983, 1990) argues that the unofficial economy is generally predominant in Africa. Appropriation is more informal and circulates in a network specified by relations of affection. This type of relation, based on informal and historical bonds rather than exchange, corresponds to the predominant peasant mode of production in Africa. The peasant mode is predominant because of the limited capitalist penetration into society, and the low level

of commodification. In Africa, economic activities revolve around personalistic ties, involving the immediate or extended family, lineage relations, village or community bonds and religious obligations. These social relations, which Hydén describes as the “economy of affection”, are dominant in the peasant mode of production and in traditional societies. The post-colonial state as a capitalist state is not an organic outcome of this peasant mode of production. There is no capitalist mode of production to anchor the state. It is therefore suspended in mid-air above society like a balloon with no structural or functional links with the system of production (Hydén 1983, 7). Because it rests on the personalised relations between people rather than the relations arising from the productive system, it is difficult to enforce the performance of obligations in contract relations. The crisis of the state results from the contradiction between the logic of a modern state based on economic contract/exchange relations and that of African society based on covenant/affectionate relations. The ruling class is simply not able to “exercise systematic power”, creating a problem of incompetence and inefficiency.

Similarly, Sandbrook (1985, 38) argue that while the state elsewhere has facilitated capitalist development, African states are overwhelmed by their own incoherence, indiscipline and shrinking fiscal base. This state of affairs, they maintain, results from the absence of a capitalist hegemonic class that is capable of enforcing discipline and coherence on the state. In the absence of such a class, personal rule holds sway. Personal rule in turn leads to the privatisation of governance as personalised relations based on personal and communal ties penetrate the state. The state becomes a tool for the fulfilment of personal and communal aspirations, reduced, as it is, to an instrument for the distribution of patronage. Because the state rather than entrepreneurial activity is the chief source of surplus, bureaucracy is carried further away from the Weberian model, lacking the essential characteristics of hierarchy, technical competence, discipline and neutrality. It gives way to a self-reinforcing spiral of political decay and economic decline. It is a fictitious state of armed men (which) detaches itself from society and preys upon a dying economy.

Ake on his part argues that the state in Africa has limited autonomy and is immersed in class struggle. For him, the restricted autonomisation of the state is the result of the limited development of productive forces, and the limited capitalist penetration of the economy and society. The duality of society makes the state merely a coercive force unable to transform power into authority, and domination into hegemony (1994, 7). The development of productive forces has not attained a level that allows for the realisation of the law of value, hence the preponderance of primitive accumulation typified by the privatisation of the state for economic gain. Because of the high level of development of the state and the absence of a strong indigenous capitalist class, the state had to spearhead development. The development effort of the state expands its reach and resources. The state appears to intervene everywhere and to own virtually everything, including access to status and wealth. The struggle to win state power becomes “a matter of life and death”. Politics becomes warfare.

The unmediated contradictions within fractions of the dominant class, and the intense struggle for power and resources, divert attention from economics to politics. This leads to a tenuous relationship between the ruling class and the economy. The ruling class is therefore unable to live up to its historical role as an agent of development. What is more, “power is often over-concentrated and fused in the presidency, political competition is notoriously intense and Hobbesian, replicating the form and content of the colonial state in personal rule, the single party state, and military rule, not amenable to the service of democracy” (1994, 13).

The rest of this chapter provides a critical examination of neopatrimonial theory as a significant theoretical moment in the effort to understand politics and institutions in Africa. It explores the concept of neopatrimonialism as applied to Africa, teasing out the essential elements of the theory. It then proceeds to examine the values and weaknesses of neopatrimonialism as a theoretical explanation of the governance crisis in Africa. In the context of democratic change at the turn of the twenty-first century, it argues that neopatrimonialism is bound to give way to approaches that address institutions in a broader sense, recognising that formal and informal institutions are two sides of the same coin of democratic politics.

WHAT IS NEOPATRIMONIALISM?

As noted by Mkandawire (2015), neopatrimonialism as a concept is not original to the study of African politics. Its application there can be traced to the 1970s, when attempts were made to explain why the independent charismatic leaders had failed to fulfil the promise of development. It sought to address the questions around African leaders’ refusal to implement obviously “good policies”, which had been fruitfully adopted by other parts of the world, or adopt policies that impoverished their citizens by providing “a useful theoretical connection between micro- and macro-level or state-centered analyses and theories of development”. Its central assumption is that leadership style and the form of rule or the character of politics is responsible for policy failures in Africa.

There are a variety of concepts and definitions offered by those who have used the theory to explain development outcomes in Africa. Zolberg (1966) used the concept to describe the one-party state in Ivory Coast. The concept was first used by Shmuel Eisenstadt to remove any ambiguity with respect to the distinction between “traditional” and “post-traditional” modern patrimonial regimes (Eisenstadt 1973). Médard (1979) later applied it in his study of Cameroon in the late 1970s. Neopatrimonialism “best expresses the logic of political and administrative behaviour in Africa” (Médard 1982, 185). It is characterised by a constant interpenetration between private and public interests, but also by the management of official mandates for private purposes, the imprint of nepotism in the recruitment of civil servants and the selection of the entourage of officials. In the process, personal loyalties prevail

over institutionalised relations, with the result of a correlative weakness of institutions and legal frameworks, since they lack the capacity to shape the behaviour of actors. There is consequently low accountability of the leadership and a lack of incentive or commitment to adopt developmental policies. Neopatrimonialism refers to configurations where the state, while claiming to be modern, combines public and private norms, unlike the Weberian bureaucratic state that relies upon impersonal rules. These rules are “partially interiorized” by actors who are in an intermediary position.

Neopatrimonialism refers less to the absence of legal norms or the pre-eminence of tradition, than to the co-existence of conflicting norms. The concept is derived from Max Weber, who was concerned with political domination in relation to the three sources of legitimacy: legal-rational, charismatic and traditional. Legal-rational authority is exercised on the basis of law and is appropriate for the modern state. Charismatic authority is based on the charisma of an individual with the grace and character to command obedience. Charismatic authority is unstable. Traditional authority commands obedience on the basis of the immemorial traditions of society. Traditional authority is patrimonial and therefore obsolete in relation to the modern state. The combination of elements of patrimonialism with modern legal-rational bureaucracy is described as neopatrimonial. Hence Clapham (1985, 48), drawing on the experience of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) defines it as “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers ... as a form of private property.” Under neopatrimonialism “the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction ... but [it is] not always observed in practice...” and a patrimonial element “penetrates [the] legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions and effects”. Informal practices invade formal institutions and are ultimately linked to each other in various ways and by varying degrees, and this mixture becomes institutionalised (Erdmann and Engel 2006, 18).

Richard Joseph (1983, 1987) popularised the concept of “prebendalism” in reference to personal rule or big man politics. Joseph adopted the concept of prebendalism, like neopatrimonialism, from Weber’s notion of decentralised patrimonial authority to capture the pattern and character of politics in Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979–1983), which, he believed, were inadequately theorised by the then popular frameworks of patron–client relations, class analysis and ethnicity. His focus was on how state power is treated. Prebendalism describes the “normative expectation shared by bourgeois, petit bourgeois, and plebeian alike, that the struggle for a share of public goods will be conducted and assessed along ethnic and other sectional lines” (Joseph 1983). According to him, a prebendal system is “one in which the offices of the state are allocated and then exploited as benefices by the office holders, but also as one where such a practice is legitimated by a set of political norms according to which the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of individual greed or ambition but concurrently the satisfaction of the short term objectives of a subset of the

general population” (Joseph 1987, 67). It therefore perceives a moral dilemma as underlying the failures of development in Africa.

Bayart (1997) goes beyond neopatrimonialism as applicable to a form of rule to characterise a society. For him, a patrimonial society is one with no sense of the public good, one that condones corruption and is inhabited by individuals who focus on their own bellies. Bayart (1999, 38) emphasises the persistence of irrational belief systems on power, the role of witchcraft, and the recourse to the invisible as a means of ensuring wealth and worldly success as a cultural element that supports corruption. Hydén (2013) also suggests the idea of a patrimonial society. He maintains that on the one hand, leaders seeking support distribute the resources of the state to which they have access to followers and loyalists. On the other hand, individuals seeking intermediaries to provide protection and advancement attach themselves to big men. The whole society is governed by an economy of affection rather than contract.

THE LOGIC AND ELEMENTS OF NEOPATRIMONIALISM IN THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICS IN AFRICA

There are certain basic assumptions about and features of politics that are emphasised by the neopatrimonial theory. They include a dichotomy between formal and informal institutions, a conflict of institutions, a moral or ethical crisis, the patron–client strategy of power and kinship relations.

Formal and Informal Dichotomy

Writers on neopatrimonialism often make a distinction between formal and informal institutions. Hydén (2013) provides a very clear distinction between formal and informal institutions in terms of six variables.

The assumption is that formal institutions of the state are modern and informal institutions are traditional or patrimonial. The claim of informal institutions overwhelming formal institutions, which is the hallmark of the neopatrimonial theory, is hinged on this distinction. The informal rules or mores are always linked to the pre-modern mode of interaction/production. It is typically declared that in neopatrimonial systems, the formal is a façade for the informal. At other times, it is claimed that the informal has overwhelmed or invaded the formal such that the formal is illusory.

From the neopatrimonial perspective, the state is simultaneously illusory and substantial. It is illusory because its *modus operandi* is essentially informal ... It is substantial because its control is the ultimate prize for all political elites: indeed it is the chief instrument of patrimonialism. (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 9)

Several reasons are adduced for the claim that pre-modern values, norms and institutions continue to dominate the social life of Africans. One is that pre-colonial values have been very resilient. Contrary to the modernisation

theory, which assumes that traditional ways of life would decay in social life as modernisation proceeds, African pre-colonial social mores, values, norms and ways of organising have remained resilient. One of the elements of modernisation is the separation of religion (church) and the state and the rise of a secular, legal-rational bureaucratic state. This would occur as industrialisation, urbanisation and mass education transformed the mind-set of traditional peoples (Bruce 2002). This has not happened in Africa. Thus, in Africa there is a contradiction between the requirements of the modern state and the mores, customs and values of a traditional society. The second reason is that the process of transformation that began with colonial rule was never consolidated. Hydén argues that capitalist penetration was limited in Africa such that contractual social relations did not completely surmount the affectionate relations of peasant societies in Africa. Furthermore, the process of transforming this social relation has been halted by the persistence of poverty and developmental failures in many African states. It is further argued that such traditional ways of life deepened in the 1980s and 1990s following the development failures on the continent. Pragmatic strategies that individuals adopted to cope with the resultant dislocation and survival challenges from these failures led to a “re-traditionalisation of society” and the informalisation of economic life associated with them (Bangura 1994; Meagher 2007).

A Conflict of Institutions

Also, there is an assumption that there is always a contradiction or incongruence between formal and informal institutions in Africa that results in institutional weakness. Indeed, some argue that formal political institutions exist only in name. In reality informal institutions are the basis of politics and public policy-making. The question that arises here is whether there is always a contradiction between formal and informal institutions. The answer for Hydén (2013) would be yes. This is the case because Hydén makes the aforementioned erroneous assumption.

A Moral or Ethical Crisis

Another assumption of neopatrimonialism is that there is a moral crisis regarding proper and acceptable behaviour by public office holders. This sometimes involves a blurring of the distinction between the legal and illegal, leading to the ineffectiveness of formal rules and institutions. Writing about Nigeria, Richard Joseph emphasised not just the resilience of traditional values and institutions in a modern state, but that they have created a moral crisis that “results from the gap between the self-interested activities of individuals, classes and social groups and the formal institutions and laws of the republic” (Joseph 1987, 188). Thus, while certain practices go against the formal rules and laws of the state they may replicate norms of pre-colonial society that seem quite acceptable to the groups in society. Hence, the “pervasive normative expectations shared

by bourgeois, petit bourgeois, and plebeian alike that the struggle for a share of public goods will be conducted and accessed along ethnic and other sectional lines” (Joseph 1983, 29). Hydén on his part argues that

Formal institutions, although limited in their longevity, reflect culture as much as informal institutions do. Informal institutions challenge their legitimacy when a discrepancy occurs between the cultural norms guiding formal and informal institutions, as the case is when legal and moral norms may be at loggerheads. This is nowhere more apparent than in African countries. (2013, 7)

For Chabal and Daloz (1999) corruption is a cultural repository that supports the workings of an inefficient system by an elite that finds an improperly institutionalised state more useful for its purpose than a properly institutionalised one. Hence the criminalisation of the state, and the development of an “economy of plunder” as politics becomes interwoven with crime (Leguil-Bayart et al. 1999).

A Patron–Client Strategy of Power

The third assumption common among writers on neopatrimonialism in Africa is that it involves a patron–client framework for achieving legitimacy. Patron–client practices pervade neopatrimonial regimes. Van de Walle (2007), citing Schmidt et al. (1997) and Eisenstadt and Lemarchand (1981), argues that patron–client relations is an exchange relationship between unequals, which provides a political advantage to the more powerful agent and a material advantage to the less powerful agent. In such relations, patrons, mostly those who occupy public office, use the resources of the state to reward clients (citizens) or lower-level patrons who are connected to groups of citizens or ethnic communities in exchange for political support, loyalty or votes during elections. They constitute networks consciously set up by individuals or big men seeking to enhance their political fortunes or social status in society (Hydén 2013, 57). This informal relationship supplants formal institutions in the enforcement of social action, attending to local specific pressures and demands arising from local interests and communities.

Van de Walle argues that clientelism is a feature of modern states but distinguishes three type of clientelism: tribute, elite and mass clientelism. Tribute clientelism relates to the practice of gift giving that is common in peasant societies and kingdoms. Elite clientelism is defined as the strategic allocation of public offices to a narrow political elite, granting personal access to state resources. Mass clientelism is the political distribution of public jobs and services to gain electoral support, often dispensed through institutionalised political parties. He then argues that it is elite clientelism that is common in Africa, where access to state resources is used not just for patronage but also as prebend. The latter involves the use of such resources for personal enrichment. African states have neither the resources nor the capacity to carry out mass clientelism, hence clientelism is limited to the distribution of elite offices.

Prebendalism weakens the state because state agents subvert the rule of law for personal gain, confining participation to politicians who are only minimally accountable to the citizens, and the practice is largely restricted to the executive branch. The president and his inner circle of followers dominates politics in the effort to sustain the regime. In such circumstances neopatrimonialism becomes personal rule, a situation associated with “absolute power in the hands of one man, surrounded by a loyal group of sycophants telling the dictator what he wants to hear and all the excesses, narcissism and paranoia that go with it” (van den Bosch 2015, 12).

A Divide and Rule Strategy

At the heart of neopatrimonial theory is the preoccupation with the survival of the regime and its legitimacy. Arising from the alien character of the state is the need to use patronage to buy loyalty and the use of force to quell opposition. But these are not considered sufficient to achieve stability, let alone guarantee the survival of the regime. Thus, a divide and rule strategy is central to personal rule or neopatrimonial rule, especially in the face of shrinking resources. Jackson and Rosberg, when describing the strategy of personal rule as seamanship rather than navigation, alluded to this strategy (see Acemoglu et al. 2004).

Kinship Relations/Community Incorporation as the Micro-Foundation of Policy Failures

One very important feature of neopatrimonialism in relation to Africa is the place of kinship relations and the community in practices of clientelism. Erdmann and Engel (2006, 18) make a distinction between clientelism and patronage to drive the point home. According to them, clientelism involves a dyadic personal relationship between patron and client, while patronage refers to the relationship between an individual and a bigger group. Patronage is the “politically motivated distribution of favours not to individuals but essentially to groups” which in the African context would be mainly ethnic or sub-ethnic groups. Clientelism is the exchange of the brokerage of specific services and resources for political support in the form of votes involving unequal exchange. Médard (1982) argues that neopatrimonialism enables the study of African politics to incorporate clientelism, nepotism, ethnicity and corruption as constitutive elements of underdevelopment in Africa.

According to Mkandawire (2015) there is an attempt to build some kind of “methodological communalism where the community serves as the foundational unit of analysis and from whence macro level phenomena are derived”. Hydén (2013), for instance, argues that African rulers are rational actors but their rationality is political rather than economic. They are not concerned about transaction costs but rather with transgression costs, being constrained by the limits of their personal authority and power, not by formal rules.

AN EVALUATION OF THE NEOPATRIMONIAL THEORY OF POLITICS IN AFRICA

One of the factors that account for the popularity of neopatrimonial theory is that it draws our attention to power, and the means through which it is acquired and exercised, as an important aspect of political stability and policy performance. Indeed, it draws attention to the importance of governance and politics as central to policy performance.

Secondly, it points to the persistence of traditional forms of authority alongside modern or western political orders and the need to be mindful of these in the analysis of politics in Africa. The idea of hybrid systems owes a great deal to the work of the neopatrimonialists. It is indeed an offshoot of the effort to make sense of the so-called persistence of neopatrimonialism in Africa and elsewhere.

Third, neopatrimonial theory emphasises the importance of paying attention to contextual dynamics of power, authority and institutions (both formal and informal) in policy-making.

Lastly, as an empirical theory it appeals to common sense and purports to make recommendations on how to improve governance and the policy process in Africa. Reference is often made to such leaders as presidents Senghor of Senegal, Mobutu of Zaire, Moi of Kenya, Idi-Amin of Uganda, Banda of Malawi and so on.

On the other hand, there are many criticisms and challenges concerning the usefulness of neopatrimonialism as a theory of African politics. These criticisms question the empirical foundations and theoretical usefulness of neopatrimonialism for capturing the African reality and for predicting political behaviour. These criticisms have begun to erode its grip on the study of politics in Africa.

Some of these criticisms include the following:

- It attributes the reasons for the failure of development planning/policy solely to internal factors
- It privileges theory over empiricism, and does not recognise the varying policy performance of various African countries and across sectors
- The attendant reductionism and over-generalisations make its analysis inadequate
- It has no predictive value with regard to policy performance
- It robs non-elite groups of political agency
- It does not give us a handle on differences in time and geography
- It reduces the issue of policy-making to ethnic politics and tribalism
- The explanation for the failure of the development project goes beyond neopatrimonialism (see Walle 2012; Pitcher et al. 2009; Mkandawire 2015; Kelsall 2013, 2011a, b; Cammack and Kelsall 2011; Erdman and Engel 2006; Olukoshi 1999).

Mkandawire (2015) argues that neopatrimonialism can be used to describe different styles of exercising political authority but offers little analytical

content and has no predictive value drawing on empirical literature that is contrary to the claims of the neopatrimonial theory.

Wai (2012) argues that neopatrimonialism involves a vulgar universalism that tends to disregard specific historical experiences. It denies the specificity of the continent's historical experience while upholding the experience of the western liberal state as an expression of the universal. Its conceptual and analytical landscape of the Weberian ideal-typical conception of state rationality is mechanistic and denies the independent conceptual existence of the African state while vulgarising its social and political formations and realities, dismissing them as aberrant, deviant, deformed and of lesser quality.

Pitcher et al. (2009) remarked that the usage of the terms *patrimonial* and *neopatrimonial* in the context of Africa amount to a serious misreading of Weber. Weber uses the term *patrimonial* to delineate a legitimate type of authority, not a type of regime, and included notions of reciprocity and voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled. Those reciprocities enabled subjects to check the actions of rulers, which most analyses of (neo) patrimonialism overlook.

It is extremely pessimistic about the possibility of progress in Africa. Current donor orthodoxy is that neopatrimonialism is irredeemably bad for economic development, but evidence from other regions, together with a re-examination of the African record itself, suggests that this may not be true.

The case studies of Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi and Rwanda performed by Kelsall and others show that provided that mechanisms can be found to centralise economic rents and manage them with a view to the long term, neopatrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental ends. In other words, neopatrimonialism can achieve a "virtuous circle" of developmental rent management provided that clientelism is organised; rents are used centrally to finance politics; anti-corruption is at least partly entrenched; key public goods are provided, including venture capital; and there is strong economic performance. Indeed, these studies have coined the concept of developmental neopatrimonialism. Developmental neopatrimonialism contains the following features:

- a strong, visionary leader (often an independence or war-time hero)
- a single- or dominant-party system
- a competent and confident economic technocracy
- a strategy to include, at least partially, the most important political groups in some of the benefits of growth
- a sound policy framework, defined here as having a broadly pro-capitalist, pro-rural bias.

Such developmental patrimonial states have shown that

- in some circumstances, neopatrimonialism does not harm
- it has sometimes helped the climate for business and investment
- it is therefore not incompatible with rapid, pro-poor, economic growth
- donors and policy-makers need to recognise developmental neopatrimonialism where it exists, and understand their impact on it (Kelsall 2011b).

The assumption by neopatrimonialism that there is a clear demarcation between formal and informal institutions, and that informal institutions are pre-modern, is problematic. Bratton (2007) argues that neither the “stable, valued and recurrent patterns of political behaviour”, nor the patterns of patron–client relations or their interactions, are understood as they exist in Africa.

A broad conception views institutions as “formal organisations, systems of law and social organization and identity roles” (March and Olson 1995, 27). North defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction ... both formal rules and informal codes” (North 1990, 3). Informal institutions sometimes complement formal ones and may serve to reduce transaction costs. Helmke and Lecitsky (2007) observe (as cited by van de Walle 2007) that “a panoply of well-established informal institutions support the democratic order and shape the expectations and behaviours of political actors”.

In general, the idea of neopatrimonialism is useful as an organising concept but much less so as an analytical guide, wrote Le Vine (1980) several decades ago. Similarly, some scholars have emphasised its status as a blanket concept in danger of losing its analytical utility (Theobald 1990, 555; Erdmann and Engel 2006, 13). Recently, it has been declared that the neopatrimonial “literature on Africa is full of vibrant metaphors and characterized by unbridled use of anecdotes, pejorative vocabulary (what Michael Chege refers to as ‘brazen name calling’), and vivid vignettes of the all-too-frequent cases of egregious abuse of state resources and power” (Mkandawire 2015, 2). It has become more or less a term for pejorative reference to Africa (see Table 30.1).

Table 30.1 Elements and alternative substitute concepts for neopatrimonialism

Elements of neopatrimonialism	Alternative terms for Neopatrimonialism
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Despotism ■ Clannish behaviour ■ ‘tribalism’ ■ Patronage ■ ‘cronyism’ ■ corruption ■ predation ■ Factionalism ■ Superstition ■ premordialism ■ kinship relations ■ No separation between public and private ■ ritual ■ Irrational belief ■ Transgression cost 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Clientelism ■ Patron-client relations ■ patrimonialism ■ Prebendalism ■ Economy of Affection ■ informal networks ■ Politics of the belly ■ Criminalization of the state ■ Predatory Rule ■ Big man Politics ■ Kleptocracy ■ Sultanism ■ Personal rule

Source: Created by the author

CONCLUSIONS

Neopatrimonialism was first used to describe politics in Africa in the late 1970s. By the 1990s it had emerged as the dominant theoretical explanation for the pathologies of politics in Africa. It became a catch-all phrase not only to explain why Africa has lagged behind in development and service delivery, but to explain why an improvement in governance performance is likely to be hard to achieve on the continent. The theory has a logic that appeals to common sense. There are also sufficient anecdotes from both living and dead African leaders whose behaviour approximates the main variables that interact within the theory. It draws from several traditions of political analysis, such as state-centric, Marxian, modernisation and rational choice analysis. However, it is susceptible to a number of debilitating criticisms.

Not all discussions of neopatrimonialism in Africa are overtly pessimistic. Bach (2012 Chap. 2) argues that the problem with neopatrimonial theory in Africa is its assimilation with the teleology of the post-colonial state's decline, and its equation with the patrimonialisation of the *entire* state. This offers a sharp contrast with the notion's use outside the continent, where patrimonialism has not been treated as "structurally" incompatible with the production of public policies. As stated earlier, van de Walle (2007) and Kelsall (2011b) have argued that a state can be both neopatrimonial and developmental, hence the notion of developmental neopatrimonialism. Van de Walle (2007) argues that elements of neopatrimonialism may be found more or less in all polities around the world, since political clientelism is constitutive of all political systems. He in fact hypothesises that when African states had built fiscal capacities neopatrimonialism would recede and a transformation of the forms and functions of corruption would occur, in parallel with the emergence of the more redistributive forms of mass clientelism that are omnipresent in all democracies.

In the event, there have been several attempts at reformulations. Alternative proposals, such as the political settlement approach (Gray and Whitfield 2014), have been made on the study of politics in Africa. Furthermore, many states in Africa remarkably advanced the process of political institutionalisation in the 1990s as part of the third wave of democratisation. This reality has made the relative neglect of formal institutions of the study of African politics visible enough to be acknowledged; hence the need to bring formal institutions back in (Orvis 2006). In the words of Posner and Young (2007, 138), "The formal rules of the game are beginning to matter in ways that they previously have not ... African politics needs to be viewed through a lens that recognises the formal constraints on executives and rejects the assumption that African leaders simply get what they want."

The limited life of democratic practice in the immediate post-independence period and the subsequent failures of development initiatives by the 1980s led to a very limited focus on the character of democratic institutions, their mode of operation, the relationship between formal and informal institutions and their implications for governance and the prospects of democratic consolidation. It was essential to the rise of neopatrimonial theory as a viable explanation for the pathologies of politics and economy in Africa.

Given present realities, the study of African politics can now focus on its institutions in a broad sense, acknowledging its formal and informal components as two sides of the same political coin. Indeed, several issues immediately come to the fore concerning institutions which scholars must endeavour to address in Africa. These include the design and functioning of institutions in terms of accountability, institutionalising party politics, non-violent resolution of political competition, controlling corruption and abuse of power, entrenching the rule of law, and advances in regional frameworks and the principles of democratic governance within the continent. These studies will occur in a context in which Africans desire their governments to acquire the virtues of “political accountability, transparency, rule of law and restraint of power” (Diamond 2015, 153). They will also occur in a context in which the African Union and the various regional commissions are providing the principles of democratic governance to guide the behaviour of leaders within the continent.

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Gender and Governance

Damilola Agbalajobi

INTRODUCTION

Gender issues cut across all areas of governance from governance institutions, public and private sector management and accountability, local governance and decentralization to civil society organization. They also shape the lives of people in every society, thereby influencing all aspects of our lives (Agbalajobi 2008, 1533). Governance, as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is the “exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels” (UNDP 2000, iii). Governance, according to UNDP (2000), comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups express their interests, exercise their rights, fulfill their obligations and manage their differences. It is therefore imperative to examine how men and women in Africa work together to articulate their rights and obligations within this process. This is imperative given the fact that gender disparity is embedded in the most fundamental aspects of society (Agbalajobi 2008, 1534).

It is important to note, though, that women have been marginalized over time in political processes and governance in general, leading to inequitable representation and participation in institutional structures in almost all sectors. This has generated a call for women’s participation in governance on an equal footing with men (Hamadeh-Banerjee and Oquist 2000).

Yet the issue of gender inequality is not peculiar to Africa; it is a global phenomenon that has given birth to theories such as feminism. Gender inequality

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touches on every facet of human life and endeavor. Gender inequality manifests itself in many areas including the area of job opportunities. Women (more than men) have been victims of sexual advances and harassment from (male) employers who insist on trading job vacancies in their organization or institution for sex. Many women have fallen foul of this because of several factors. Socially, women are made to play second fiddle to their male counterparts. This type of sexism is pronounced in the ethos of traditional culture that is spread across various ethnic groups in Africa.

In many cultures, women are relegated to the background, to the extent that cultural norms dictate every aspect of their lives, ranging from their level of participation in societal affairs to their level of engagement with their male counterparts. Culture also defines the rights of women relative to the men. While many traditional cultures give men the unfettered freedom to do whatever they like, women do not enjoy this luxury. The traditional ethos and cultural norms successfully put the women under the authority of their menfolk.

Religion has also exacerbated gender disparity. Islam tends to “quiet” women. The role a woman plays is dictated by her husband or by male-dominated authorities (the government being primarily made up of males). The Christian Bible exhorts women to “submit” to their husbands. This has been widely interpreted by Christian practitioners to imply the supremacy of the male gender over the female. Traditional or indigenous religions are no different. The impact of culture and religion in tandem has affected the presence of women in key decision-making governance positions. Culturally, the key role that society assigns for a married woman is played on the family front, and for the unmarried in the home of their parents or guardians home, pending their marriage—when they assume at most a “managerial position” in their husband’s house, with their highest office being in the kitchen.

It is important to note, however, that there is a changing trend in the orientation of gender roles in society. Women are increasingly seen occupying positions of authority in contemporary times, with many of them becoming presidents of their countries, prime ministers or heads of state. As at October 10, 2016, there are 28 women occupying such positions, with the majority having been elected to their offices (Current Woman Leader 2016).

Going further back into history, we will discover that

there are several examples of matrilineal societies where women ruled or had leadership roles in governance structures. Women were regents, co-regents, city founders, army commanders, officers and soldiers, and bodyguards. For example, in West Africa in the 15th century, Queen Amina ruled the Kingdom of Songhai in midNiger. Oral traditions note that Queen Amina was a warrior who waged successful campaigns against neighboring territories. (Njogu and Orchardson-Mazrui 2013, 4)

Women in traditional Yoruba states, for example, held high office, such as the positions of Iyalode, Iyaloja, Iyalaje and even Oba, just as in contemporary times. But colonialism made gender discrimination more pronounced

(Agbalajobi 2010, 77). This was done by replacing the traditional political system where women's organizations were recognized with one that violated their democratic rights. Hence, the need arose for women to question the inequalities, which became more pronounced as colonialism emerged.

When women sought to question inequalities in their lives they turned to history to understand the roots of their oppression and to see what they could learn from challenges that had been made in the past (UNDP 2013a). According to Rampton (2008), "the study of gender inequality has always been closely linked with contemporary feminist politics. The root of feminism is traceable to ancient Greece with Sappho (d.c 570BCE) or the medieval world with Hildegard of Bingen (d. 1179) or Christine de Pisan (d. 1434). Olympe's de Gouge (d. 1797) and Jane Austen (d. 1817) are fore mothers of the modern women's movement. Organized feminism didn't really kickoff until the first Women's Conference held in Seneca Falls, America in 1848."

According to Salami (2013b), African feminism was launched in the early twentieth century by women such as Adelaide Casely-Hayford and Charlotte Maxeke, who in 1918 founded the Bantu Women's League in South Africa, and Huda Sharawi, who in 1923 established the Egyptian Feminist Union. Modern African feminism was solidified during the landmark United Nations (UN) Decade for Women 1975–1985 which resulted in feminist activism and scholarship. Today, African feminists, scholars, activists, artists and politicians such as Leymah Gbowee, Joyce Banda, Dana and Chimanda Ngozi Adichie as well as feminist organizations such as the African Feminist Forum and the African Gender Institute are at the forefront of using activism, knowledge and creativity to change situations that affect women negatively.

It is against this background that this chapter seeks to look at the role of African women in governance and what can be done to give women equal representation in the continent's governance structure.

GENDER INEQUALITY: MEANING AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Gender inequality presupposes gender consciousness in relation to distribution and access to rights and opportunities. These rights include the right to education and equal rights in marriage. Opportunities include securing jobs on a level playing field without prejudice to gender or sex. Gender inequality refers to unequal treatment or perception of individuals based on their gender. In another conceptualization of this subject, gender equality denotes that women have the same opportunities in life as men, including the ability to participate in the public sphere (Reeves and Baden 2000, 2).

Gender is viewed as a social construct that asserts the expectations, capabilities and responsibilities of men and women are not always biologically determined (Njogu and Orchardson-Mazrui 2013, 2). Gender inequality therefore assigns gender roles to men and women which are significantly defined—structurally and culturally—in ways which create, reinforce and perpetuate relationships of male dominance and female subordination (Njogu and Orchardson 2013, 2).

According to Coleman, Antonucca and Adelman (1987), the gender gulf remains pervasive in many dimensions of life worldwide. Men on average are better positioned in social, economic and political hierarchies (Jacobsen 2011, 1). This is despite considerable advances in gender equality in recent decades. The nature and extent of the discrimination vary considerably across countries and regions, but the patterns are striking. Coleman et al. further asserted that there was no region of the developing world where women are on a par with their male counterparts, whether in legal, social or economic terms, and that gender gaps are widespread in access to and control of resources in economic opportunities, power and political voice. Gender inequality is not perpetuated exclusively through differential access to and control over material resources (United Nations Development Programme 2013c, 161), but gender norms and stereotype reinforce gendered identities and constrain the behavior of women and men in ways that lead to inequality (UNDP 2013c, 161). This has dealt a deadly blow to development.

Having conceptualized what gender inequality means based on personal input and as advanced by various scholars, we must specify what it means in relation to Africa. How do we reconcile gender inequality based on the African experience and emerging realities?

In relation to gender as it pertains to women's stake in the governance of their countries, it should be pointed out that though Article 4 of the African Union Charter unambiguously recognizes legal gender equality for all Africans, the application of this article has varied from one country to another. As vividly captured by Salami (2013a) in the *Guardian* of September 23, 2013,

what would have once sounded like a far-fetched feminist fantasy—namely women forming the majority of a Parliament—is a reality in one country in the world, Rwanda. Early reports from the Parliamentary elections as of year 2013 showed that women now hold nearly 64% of the seats in Rwanda's Parliament.

Out of 54 countries in Africa, some have made significant progress in reducing this gulf, with the aim of totally eliminating the gap and inequality that the female gender has suffered in the hands of their male counterparts as regards key positions of decision-making. Some ten African countries have blazed the trail in addressing the dearth of women in governance positions and, by extension, other aspects of gender discrimination. Remarkably, some of these ten African countries are ahead of developed Western countries such as France and the United States in respect of the development towards gender equality in all sectors of life. The World Gender Gap rankings published in the 2015 World Economic Forum as cited by Anita Patrick (2016) on answersafrica.com captured the top African countries on the list. They are Zimbabwe, Botswana, Cape Verde, Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Burundi, South Africa, Namibia and Rwanda from tenth to first respectively. Shockingly, Nigeria, which prides itself as the giant of Africa, didn't make the top ten. Interestingly, these statistics show that in the global ranking the world powers of United States, France, Spain and Germany ranked 28th, 15th, 25th and 26th respectively, behind Rwanda, which is sixth worldwide in the promotion of gender equality.

According to a UNDP (2016) report cited by Lisa Schelin in Voice of America (online), economic and social discrimination against women is costing Africa more than US\$100 billion a year. The report found that African women across the board are denied the same kind of economic, social and political opportunities that men enjoy. It says that women lose out when it comes to education, work and health.

Another key imperative for gender equality is that it is a human right, or a natural right. As cited by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), a fundamental principle of the UN Charter adopted by world leaders in 1945 to which many African countries became signatories (after they gained independence) is “equal rights of men and women, and protecting and promoting women’s human right is the responsibility of all States (United Nation High Commissioner for Human Right 2016).”

African women have proved to be active producers and entrepreneurs. They constitute a large percentage of the agricultural labor force across Africa. By the same token, women run the majority of businesses in the informal sector. However, they are mainly occupied with subsistence farming. It is necessary, therefore, to help them boost their productive capacity so that they can generate more income for themselves and their households, and by achieving this for themselves and their families they are directly contributing to national integration (which starts with the family) and growth in gross domestic product (GDP).

In all, Verloo (2011) has argued that to place the elimination of gender inequality at the core of our concerns is to place attention on the intersections of gender with other inequalities in order to achieve full equality for all. Hence, there is a need to advance gender equality, in which, according to UN Women (2014), it is important to involve all stakeholders through collective action and engagement in decision-making.

KEY DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY WOMEN IN AFRICA

Before taking a critical look at key decision-making positions occupied by women within the governance structures of their respective countries in Africa, it is instructive to observe the roles that society and culture define as the responsibilities of men and women in each individual society. Henry (n.d.) considers the appropriate role of women in any society when he says that “the woman was made of a rib out of the side of Adam; not made out of his head to rule over him, nor out of his feet to be trampled upon him, but out of his side to be equal with him.” Hillary Clinton, as cited by Hallie Gould (2014), asserts that “it is past time for women to take their rightful place, side by side with men, in the rooms where the fates of peoples, where their children’s and grandchildren’s fates, are divided.”

Facing squarely the issue of how many key decision positions are occupied by women in Africa, it is of interest to note that the most fascinating development in African politics has been the increase in women’s political participation since the mid-1990s. Women are becoming more engaged in a variety

of institutions from local government to legislatures, and even the executive. According to Tripp (2013), as cited on democracyinafrica.org, Africa is a global leader in women's parliamentary representation. Additionally, African countries have some of the world's highest rates of representation.

The ranking from the aforementioned report (2015) has revealed that women still have the majority of seats in parliament. Based on the 2014 rankings of countries with the most women in parliament, Seychelles, Senegal and South Africa represent 43.8%, 42.7% and 41.9% respectively in the world. In Senegal, Seychelles and South Africa, more than 40% of the parliamentary seats are held by women, while in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Uganda over 35% of seats are occupied by women. By contrast, statistics collected from the Center for American Women and Politics (2015), women in the United States hold 19.3% of the seats in the House and 20% in the Senate. These parliamentary patterns are evident in other areas as well. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf became the first elected female president in Africa in 2005. There have been no fewer than nine female prime ministers in Africa since 1993. Since 1975 there have been 12 female vice-presidents, just one example being Wandira Speciosa Kazibwe in Uganda.

In East Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda are doing relatively well as regards women's participation at the highest level of governance. For instance, in Uganda, Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe was the first woman both in Uganda and in Africa to hold the exalted position of vice-president (from 1994 to 2003). It is imperative to note that this is the second highest executive office after president. In the same vein, the 2016 presidential elections, which were held on February 18, had a prominent female candidate in the person of Maureen Kyalya Waluube. Although she didn't win, a brighter future for women in the corridors of power is assured in this East African country. In Tanzania, some parliamentary positions are held by women and Tanzania is listed in the top ten countries in Africa promoting gender equality. It is also important to note that Tanzania's incumbent vice-president is a woman, Ms. Samia Suluhu, who was inaugurated on November 5, 2015. Rwanda tops the list of African countries promoting gender equality. As has been stated elsewhere, the two chambers of Rwanda's parliament have a majority of female parliamentarians.

Elsewhere, in Central Africa region, the Central African Republic (CAR) stands out as having produced a female president (although in an acting capacity), who stabilized the wartorn country between 2014 and 2016, before she handed over to Catherine Samba-Panza. The number of women in government, as cited by Women in Parliament Forum, stands at a little over 12%, which is still very low.

In Northern Africa, as cited in UNDP's publication, Algerian women occupied 31% of parliamentary seats, placing the country 26th worldwide and first in the Arab world. Although UNDP helped to establish a 30% quota for women in elected assemblies, the rate is only currently 18%.

In the southern part of Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia are frontline states with regard to gender parity, with Namibia leading

the pack. Out of 104 seats in the Parliament, 43 are occupied by women. This number is an improvement on previous figures in the country (New Era, Newspaper, 2015). In South Africa, the role of women in politics has increased since the end of apartheid through policy changes and organizations that have been set up to enable women's rights. Data from United Nations Women as cited by Oriya Pitamber have shown that the country is doing well in enabling women to play an active role in governance. As regards to key positions in governance, South African women are doing relatively well for themselves. This is evident in the fact that before the arrival of democracy in South Africa in 1994, there was just a 2.7% representation of women in parliament, but since then there has been a paradigm shift from this low percentage (Pitamber, 2016).

In West Africa, countries that have taken significant steps towards bridging the gender gulf between men and women include Senegal, Liberia, Mauritania and Cape Verde. Liberia is the first African country to produce a female president, in the person of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. While this is a plus for women in terms of holding key national decision-making positions, the point needs to be made that Liberia has scored low as regards representation of women in other key governing structures.

A 2011 report cited by Nana Kalandadze in an article posted to International IDEA's online platform asserts that women remain significantly underrepresented in government structures and in leadership positions across the public sector. According to the report, Liberia has yet to achieve the 30% minimum representation of women in positions of power and decision-making at all levels including the bicameral parliament. Statistics from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016) show that the current fixed levels of representation of women in the Liberian parliament is 11%–10% for the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively. Senegal has produced two female prime ministers. Ms. Mame Madior Boye held sway between 2001 and 2002 and Ms. Aminata Toure between 2013 and 2014. It is noteworthy that the office of prime minister is the second most exalted office in Senegal. In the parliament, women make up 42.7% of the members. Cape Verde ranks as the eighth African country in terms of promoting gender equality: 23.6% of the total parliamentarians are women. Mauritania has 25.2% and 14.3% female representation in its parliament's lower and upper houses respectively.

Unfortunately, in comparison with other African countries, Nigeria has not fared well in women's participation in politics. Women have remained political underdogs as far as occupying key decision-making positions is concerned since 1960. The closest a woman has come to occupying a key role at federal level was between June and October 2007, when Patricia Etteh was the Speaker of the House of Representatives, making her the fourth citizen of Nigeria. Federal positions in the presidency which women have held have been essentially made by appointment. Nigeria, which has three levels of government, has never produced an elected female governor at state level. Representation in the federal parliament and the House of Representatives stands at 5.6% and 6.5% respectively.

A comparison of the five subregions as regards to the number of key governance roles that women hold shows that while some of them, especially East Africa, are doing tremendously well in bringing about gender parity in their governance structures, a lot more needs to be done to make gender equality a dream come true for Africa. However, all statistics indicate that Africa remains a pacesetter for developed countries in bringing about gender parity in governance.

WHY WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE MATTERS

It is imperative to make the point that gender is a human right, as has been cited in OHCHR (2016) and other works. Therefore, it is only fair for women to compete and participate in the governance of their country in the same way as their male counterparts. It is in the light of this truth that it should be pointed out that the participation of women and men in formal and even informal decision-making structures depends on the country in question. Generally speaking, on an aggregate calculation the statistics are in favor of men. Religious, cultural and economic barriers, as well as the absence of female support for their own and apathy, among others, all impede women's opportunities and abilities to participate in decision-making, as will be explained later. As stated in Inter-Parliamentary Union (2016) statistics, women have in aggregate remained underrepresented in governance structures in Africa. Apart from Rwanda, where more than half of the parliamentarians are women, no other African country can boast 50–50 representation. Women's representation and leadership is often defined by societal stereotypes about the role of women. Their representation in informal sectors of decision-making is higher than their representation in the formal sector, which includes governance structures. In Africa the societal stereotype is that a woman's traditional role is in her family, and that the highest decision-making position she may hold is within her family. On the other hand, public affairs are traditionally regarded as the exclusive preserve of men. In Africa, it is the notion that when men are talking, women keep quiet.

One of the reasons why women's participation should be taken seriously and promoted is the fact that those women who have been privileged to govern have promoted security in their various countries. In government and politics, it is said that there cannot be meaningful development in a state if there is an absence of security for life and property. Liberia, which used to be a war zone, has been making progress steadily under the leadership of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who came to power in 2006 and has since maintained socio-political and economic stability. Since the 1994 genocide Rwanda has moved on as a nation. It has enjoyed relative peace, which may not be unconnected with the fact that women make up far more than half of her parliamentarians.

CAR, which used to be a theater of war, has been politically stable since Ms. Catherine Samba-Panza was acting president in 2014 to 2015, when she peacefully handed over power to a democratically elected president.

It is interesting but disturbing to note that the population of Africa stands at 1.2 billion and is projected to reach between 3 billion and 6.1 billion by 2100 if birth rates remain high. This will affect available resources in Africa and around the world. The major way in which this unpalatable projection can be reversed is for Africa and its governments, as well as its patriarchal authorities and people, to pursue gender equality educationally, economically, socially and especially politically. Women's participation in governance structures is imperative in this area.

In respect of education, gender inequality in this area is a function of a broader form of gender inequality, in which low representation of women in governance has been identified as a broader factor. It may be opined that the equal representation of women in the state will encourage girls' education, as women in positions of authority will serve as role models for them. Formal education will in turn reduce child marriage, forced marriage and so on, which take place on account of a lack of education and the perpetuation of social stereotypes, which are occasioned by repressive traditions, customs and convention.

There is a saying that changes are not made from outside but from within. That means you have to have a say before you can have your way. Given the fact that in democracy minorities have their say while the majority have their way, the equal representation of women in national parliament will put them in a stronger position to sponsor bills that give women equal economic opportunities, whether in wages or in entrepreneurship, and have these bills survive criticism or outright rejection from their male counterparts. For instance, the Nigerian Senate in March 2016, as cited by Timothy Oshi in the *Premium Times* newspaper, blocked a bill seeking equal marital rights for women. The bill was defeated when the Senate President, Dr. Bukola Saraki put it to the vote. This development is not unexpected given the fact that women are grossly underrepresented in the Upper Chamber of the National Assembly. Gender parity in representation will therefore give women the opportunity to push through bills that promote the economic wellbeing of women in their respective countries.

Gender inequality in governance has the capacity to impede the health status and access to healthcare for women. In some countries in Africa, cultural norms prevent women from travelling alone to the clinic. This means that they cannot receive healthcare. In some other traditions and customs, men's promiscuity is encouraged, while women are simultaneously prevented from insisting on condom use; this has led many married women to contract HIV from their husbands. All these undesirable occurrences can be reduced when gender parity in governance is attained. This puts women in a strong position to make laws that expunge a cultural ethos that endangers women's health.

NEED FOR GENDER MAINSTREAMING

Mainstreaming, as defined by International Labor Organization (2013), is a gender perspective that presupposes

the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is the strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes in every sphere, so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.

It is important to note that mainstreaming includes affirmative action and gender-specific interventions, in the sense that whenever men or women are in a disadvantaged position, policies or legislation known as Acts of Parliament may be made to enable the disadvantaged gender to participate in and benefit equally from development efforts. To deepen our understanding of mainstreaming, it is necessary to know what it is not. According to ILO (2013),

mainstreaming is not about adding a ‘woman’s component’ or even a gender activity, it goes beyond increasing women’s participation, it means bringing the experience, knowledge and interests of women and men to bear on the development agenda. It may entail identifying the need for changes in that agenda. It may require changes in goals, strategies and actions so that both women and men can influence, participate in and benefit from development processes. The goal of mainstreaming, gender equality is thus, the transformation of unequal social and institutional structures, into equal and just structures for both men and women.

Some basic principles of mainstreaming as cited by ILO (2013) include:

adequate accountability mechanism for monitoring progress need to be established, the initial identification of issues and problems across all areas of activity and disparities can be diagnosed, assumptions that issues or problems are neutral from a gender-equality perspective should never be made, gender analysis should always be carried out, clear political will and allocation of adequate resources for mainstreaming including additional financial and human resources if necessary, are important for translation of the concept into practice, gender mainstreaming requires that efforts be made to broaden women’s equitable participation at all levels of decision making, and mainstreaming doesn’t replace the need for targeted, women-specific policies and programmes, and positive legislation; nor does it do away with the need for gender units or focal points.

The importance of gender mainstreaming is crucial for bringing about gender parity over a consistent period of practice. One important reason for gender mainstreaming in Africa is to reinforce the truth that women are no less human than their male counterparts. This position has been corroborated by the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979) when it asserts that “women’s rights, are human rights.” To this end, gender mainstreaming as a gender-specific intervention will promote legislation that insulate women and girls from treatment that subjugates them under men.

Another imperative for gender mainstreaming is that it ultimately delivers gender parity. In governance structure for instance, mainstreaming promotes affirmative action, which allows for a percentage of public offices to go to women by default. It goes without saying that the rest of public offices, which are open to competition by both sexes, may in part be won by women. In Rwanda 20% of the national parliamentary seats are allocated to women. Consequently, the aggregate number of female parliamentarians has surpassed 64%.

Equality means more than just parity in numbers. It means justice, equal opportunities, acceptance and tolerance. This should be supported by policies that promote a general acceptance that women have a pivotal role to play in the development of the nation.

BARRIERS; ENABLING FACTORS TO BOOST WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE

The challenges that women face in attaining parity with their male counterparts in controlling the levers of power in a state are multifaceted and at the same time interwoven. In fact they are so interwoven that the problem of gender inequality in governance cannot be solved by addressing just one or two of the problems. Everything needs to be addressed simultaneously in order to see results.

Religious sermons sometimes create a gender gulf, either overtly or covertly. While religious beliefs can be a source of sustenance, "religious expectations" can stand in the way of the empowerment of women and girls. Religious expectations may be defined as what a particular religion designates as the role of men and women. An example in the Christian faith is the prevalent belief among many women that they have a three-fold ministry, namely being mother, wife and homemaker. This position is usually defended with scriptural references. Although it is not bad in itself, it strongly suggests that a woman's destiny starts and ends at home, and that at most she is "home manager," with her office in the kitchen. This belief holds that a woman has no major role to play in public or as a "leader" in society at large. Therefore, interpreting religious doctrines to pre-suppose that women have only minor roles to play in society has given rise to patriarchal systems, which continue to impede women's participation in governance.

Cultural institutions perpetuate discrimination against women through the beliefs that give males undue leverage or the upper hand over their female counterparts. For example, when the father dies in many African societies, the eldest son is the one who takes charge. Whenever there is a need for a family representative, for a function such as propitiation, the eldest son will go ahead of other family members, including his mother. This system gives natural leverage to men, and they end up abusing that power by sidelining the women, treating them as inferior or lesser humans. Traditional belief systems have had a terrible effect on gender parity, as men are believed to be heads of their families and women are expected to submit themselves to their husbands. Cultural

maxims in Africa exhort women to respect and not to challenge their husbands whether they are wrong or not, all in the name of preserving the marriage. All such practices subjugate women, relegating them to the background and not giving them the opportunity to participate in state governance.

Democracy derives from and thrives on the principle that power belongs to the people. The people exercise power through their elected representatives, whose mandates must be subject to periodic renewal on terms dictated by the laws of the land in tandem with conventional democratic principles and practice. Representatives in governance structures, especially in democracies, are elected. And for them to be elected, the participation of eligible people is essential. It is in view of this that it is crucial to understand why women in general distance themselves from participating in governance. One key factor that cannot be relegated to the background is cultural restraint. The whole responsibility of taking care of the home, which customs and traditions (especially in Africa) have apportioned to women leave little or no time for embarking on getting accredited, standing in long queues to vote or even participating as a candidate. Another factor is religion, as is electoral violence—and this is rampant in Africa.

Absence of female support for female candidates for public positions is another problem. For example, in Nigeria, eligible women voters preferred to cast their votes for either Goodluck Jonathan or Muhammadu Buhari at the last presidential elections, which was held on March 25, 2015. Interviews which I conducted among a few women showed that some of them hold the notion that if eligible women vote for female candidates the country will be turned upside down. Reasons such as these could not be rationalized. According to Newman (1996), in a study entitled “Do Women Vote For Women?”:

the extent of support a woman candidate receives from women voters will depend on the candidate, her campaign and mode of the electorate, and the political climate. Women are more likely to vote for a woman candidate but not as a bloc; like men voters, they make their decisions based on a wide variety of factors.

It has been suggested elsewhere that women voters want a father figure, and also that any woman who doesn't fit the leadership model of “manliness” does not garner the votes of fellow women. Women are unrepentantly harsh towards other women, especially in the professional sense. According to a recent study by the Workplace Bullying Institute as cited by Drexler (2013) on the Huffington Post website, “women bully other women at work—verbal abuse, job sabotage, misuse of authority and destroying of relationships—more than 70 percent of the time.” Another study by Business Environment found that 72% judged female coworkers based on what they wore to the office. A 2006 study from the University of Helsinki looked at the rate of beauty in politics and found that the better looking the candidate, the more competent, trustworthy and likeable he or she was perceived to be.

CONCLUSION

Engaging with religious leaders can help to address women's inequality borne out of religious doctrines. It is also important to put gender mainstreaming in place. This will help to address specific gender inequality in governance structures and elsewhere. Women, on their part, should embark on a massive reorientation campaign, starting from the grassroots, with the aim of inspiring women to see the women who stand for public office as up to the task, and the equal of their male counterparts. Sharing the positive impact that having women at the helm of affairs has had in Liberia, Rwanda and CAR will also go a long way in making female electorates less pessimistic about female candidates for public positions.

Therefore, it is projected that, thanks to the encouraging performance of current efforts to promote gender equality in Africa that are identified here, women in leadership positions will no longer be seen as an aberration, a fluke or rarity that have to be examined and analyzed.

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Political Participation and Political Citizenship

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INTRODUCTION

Political participation is an important part of our society as it directly affects how we live in a globalizing world. Political participation affords citizens in a democratic setting an opportunity to communicate information to government officials about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to respond (Eremenko 2014). Despite its importance to democracy, the right to participate is not exercised by all who possess it. The number of non-participants varies with time, place and circumstance, and also with the type of participation. More people discuss politics than vote, and many more vote than join parties or work in campaigns (Gale 2008). Individuals who engage in participation likely expect or at least hope that their actions will have some impact on the content of government policies. However, the effects of political participation might not be limited to outcomes. Political participation might also affect individual life satisfaction and happiness (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2008).

Political citizenship—the right to vote and hold office—is a cornerstone of democratic theory and practice (Cohen 1996 as cited in McDonagh 2002). Citizenship is grounded in the guarantee of legal and political protection from raw coercive power, whether that power comes in the form of a soldier’s sword or gun, the fists of an abusing spouse or parent, or an employer’s shout of “you’re fired,” which leads to a loss of work, income, status and possibly even food (Janoski and Gran 2011). Citizenship addresses issues relating to social justice, human rights, community cohesion and global independence, and encourages the challenging of injustice, inequality and discrimination. It helps

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young people to develop their critical skills, consider a wide range of political, social, ethical and moral problems, and explore opinions and ideas other than their own. They evaluate information, make informed judgments and reflect on the consequences of their actions now and in the future. They learn to argue a case on behalf of others as well as themselves and speak out on issues of concern (UK Curriculum Authority 2007). The concept of citizenship dates back to the nineteenth century, as it was then that the concept of nation-states was created. Before then, and especially up to the medieval period in Europe, citizenship was restricted to a privileged few: only those who owned property or came from important families were citizens; those who were considered as being socially or economically dependent on others were regarded as non-citizens, even though they were members of the polity. Such individuals included women, children and all those who failed to satisfy age and property qualifications; in other words, only the elite could enjoy the privileges of citizenship (Oyediran et al. 1990).

The issue of political participation has received a great deal of attention in recent years from academics, journalists and politicians across most liberal democracies. To a large extent, this reflects concerns about the decline in voting, party membership and other mainstream political activity (Li and Marsh 2008).

According to Leftwich, as cited in Bambra et al. (2003), the definition of politics is in itself a political act. Alfred de Grazia on the other hand, as cited in Anifowose (1999), argues that “politics” or the “political” includes those events that take place around the decision-making centers of government. Therefore, amidst various scholarly definitions of politics, the Eastonian definition of politics as the “authoritative allocations of values for a society” is considered to be useful by political scientists, even though there is no best definition of politics. However, most political scientists agree that politics has something to do with power, influence and authority, which are the central organizing concepts of the study of politics (Anifowose 1999) Therefore, this chapter raises the question of an apparent decline in political participation and the consequences of changing norms of citizenship for political engagement in a globalizing world. It should be noted that norms of citizenship are swinging from a pattern of duty-based citizenship to engaged citizenship.

CONCEPTUALIZING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND CITIZENSHIP

According to Eve Bevan, as cited in Wilson and Andersson (2005), participation is defined as genuinely feeling part of something. It is the principal means by which consent is granted or withdrawn in a democracy and rulers are made accountable to the ruled (Gale 2008). To be more specific, participation is the efforts that people make in order to influence public policy decisions; it is the organized effort to increase control over resources and regulative institutions on the parts of groups and movements who were hitherto excluded from such control (Gerry Stoker; United Nations Research Institute for Social

Development (UNRISD), as cited in Wilson and Andersson (2005). From the works of Wilson and Andersson (2005), it is discovered that there are precisely seven levels of participation: manipulation, education, information, consultation, involvement, partnership, delegated power and citizen control.

Political participation is the voluntary activities shared by members of a society in selecting their rulers and directly or indirectly involving themselves in the formation of public policies (Weiner as cited in Awofeso and Odeyemi 2014). From the works of Awofeso and Odeyemi (2014), political participation appears to be those actions (e.g., voting at elections, campaigning, contesting an election) must voluntarily or willingly come from the individuals before they can be described as active political participants. Any attempt to coerce people to get involved in these activities is a contradiction. This is in line with the argument of George-Genyi (2015), who argues that political participation describes the voluntary or non-coercive involvement of citizens in the political affairs of their country. This definition points to the fact that political participation does not entail the use of force. Furthermore, Maclosky (1968), as cited in Awofeso and Odeyemi (2014), defines political participation as voluntary activities shared by members of a society in the selection of their rulers and directly or indirectly involving the formation of public policies. It is a voluntary activity and one may participate directly or indirectly (Falade 2014). From these definitions, it may be seen to be well established that political participation must be voluntary and is either direct or indirect.

Akamare, as cited in Falade (2014), describes political participation as an aspect of political behavior that focuses on the way in which individuals take part in politics. Political behavior refers to a particular approach, a set of methods for the study of politics and the study of human behavior in politics (Anifowose 1999). This political behavior approach is distinguished by its attempt to describe government as a process made up of the actions and interactions of people and groups of people; it is also concerned with the activities of governments, political parties, interest groups and voters (ibid.). George-Genyi (2015) notes that the concepts of political participation, election and voting behavior are closely interrelated as they are mutually reinforcing: they all revolve around the concept of democracy which upholds citizens' engagement in public affairs. Without political participation, the need for elections and voting will not arise. Political participation is one of the fundamental requirements of democratic governance. It is the involvement of the citizens in the political system, a means of exercising one's civic responsibility in political systems and the overall development of the nation (Falade 2014).

In the words of Falade (2014), therefore, there are various ways in which people can be involved in the political system. These include the selection or election of political leaders, formulation of policies, community activities and other civic engagements. Falade (2008), cited in Falade (2014), identified six types of political participants:

- The inactive.
- Voting specialists.
- Parochial participants.
- The communalist.
- The campaigners.
- Complete activists.

Each of these will be explained as stated in his work. The inactive are those who take no part in any political activity. Voting specialists are those who are eagerly engaged only in voting, but outside voting are not concerned about other political activities. Parochial participants are those who participate in politics occasionally; they vote or get involved in political activity only when it affects their personal interests. The communalists are those who are engaged in voting regularly; they are also involved in community affairs but not in political campaign activities. The campaigners are actively involved in political campaigns but inactive in other community affairs. The complete activists are highly involved in all political activities, actively participating in voting, political campaigns, community activities and making contact with public officials. Some of the factors that determine political participation, as seen in the work of Falade (2014), are the cultural, economic, political, religious and educational backgrounds of individuals. Moreover, the level of political awareness as well as the measure of confidence in the political process determines the extent to which citizens participate in the political system. In Nigeria, for instance, politics is influenced by money, ethnic and religious factors.

While writing on the forms of political participation in the United States of America, Eremenko (2014) identifies the following types:

- Voting.
- Working in and contributing to electoral campaigns and organizations.
- Contacting government officials.
- Attending protests, marches or demonstrations.
- Working informally with others to solve community problems.
- Serving without pay on local elected and appointed boards.
- Being active politically through the intermediation of voluntary associations.
- Contributing money to political causes in response to mail solicitations.

Political participation itself is not, per se, a democratic activity, as it is also possible to participate in non-democratic activities or events (Pausch 2012). Furthermore, Pausch (2012) identified two major types of political participation: direct political participation and indirect political participation. Direct political participation is defined by the expression of political interests and a political aim. A citizen who participates directly is politically motivated, either with the aim of helping his/her favorite political party or personality win in elections, or with the aim of promoting his/her own political convictions or

interests within a certain field. Indirect political participation is voluntary engagement in social activities or networks with political implications but without clearly defined political interests or political aims. Pausch explained that direct political participation is usually categorized into conventional and unconventional participation. In his explanation, voting in elections or referendums, party memberships, trade union affinities or activities in other political organizations as well as interest groups and non-governmental organizations presents conventional forms of participation, while demonstrating and striking represent activities which are usually considered as unconventional, although they could equally be qualified as conventional if they are organized by conventional interest groups. In a study conducted by Umezurike and Danfulani (2015), political participation refers to the direct or indirect involvement of the citizens of a country in the governance of their country. In addition, political participation was divided into two: conventional and unconventional political participation. According to them, conventional political participation is concerned with one's involvement in political campaigns, public hearings, recalls, referendums, running for public office and voting in elections, while unconventional political participation has to do with one's involvement in public protests, civil disobedience, political debates, community development and strike action.

As seen in the study conducted by Boerboom (2015), making reference to Marien et al. (2010), labeling political participation as either conventional or unconventional is misleading. In his explanation, many political activities that were previously classified as "unconventional" have become more generally accepted and performed in society. As seen in his work, therefore, it is more accurate to classify political activities as being "institutionalized" or "non-institutionalized." One of the socializing agents that provides much of the raw material that make up social and political beliefs and attitudes is the media. It plays a central role in affecting political participatory behavior; while the rise of new media with fast developing communication technology has increased the availability of political information tremendously. New communication technologies have changed the way in which people gather news and participate in politics (Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Bakker and de Vreese 2011; and Carpini 2004 as cited in Boerboom 2015). For example, during the Arab Spring, social media played a central role in shaping political debates. It was used comprehensively to conduct a political tête-à-tête by a key demographic group in the revolution—young, urban, relatively well educated individuals, many of whom were women. Hence, before and during the revolutions these individuals used Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to put pressure on their governments.

Boerboom (2015) opines that at the heart of most definitions of political participation are four basic elements: activities or actions, politics, ordinary citizens and influence. As seen in his work, there are also other ways in which citizens can attempt to influence governmental action. Political protesting, signing petitions, participating in demonstrations or even violent actions can be considered to be political participation as well. The levels of education, social class,

age and gender of citizens have often found to be correlated to their likelihood to participate in politics (Brady et al. 1995; Marien et al. 2010; Stolle and Hooghe 2011 as cited in Boerboom 2015).

WHO PARTICIPATES?

In a study conducted by Tessler, Jamal and de Miguel (2008), the higher one's socio-economic status (defined in terms of education, income, social class, employment) the more likely one is to participate in the political process. Several studies also show that a citizen's age could be a determining factor in political participation: the older an individual, the more likely he or she is to participate (citing Inglehart 1991 and Dalton 1988). Furthermore, in their opinion, participation is costly, therefore only those who have sufficient resources (money, time, knowledge and social connections) will participate. These resources in their words are highly correlated with socio-economic status. On the other hand, those who are mobilized by elites will participate, but elites mobilize those who are likely to have more time, money, knowledge and social connections anyway. Therefore, more proximate explanations of participation are levels of individual political knowledge and political interest, whether individuals are part of a social network (church, soccer club, etc.) and whether they have a sense of political efficacy and a sense of duty (Tessler et al. 2008).

OF WHAT USE IS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?

There are principally two mechanisms by which individuals and groups seek to effect social and political change in democratic societies. One is through formal political participation and the other, as they seek to bridge the growing gap between them and their political processes and institutions, is through substantive political participation that goes beyond voting and engaging with political parties. In South Africa the struggle against apartheid and the struggle for democracy have both provided the impetus for sustaining a viable progressive politics (Pahad 2005). Political participation at its most passive stage, such as the act of voting for elected representatives, has a clear and expected link to policy outcomes, where voters' preferences differ systematically across groups. Those who vote affect the type of policies that the government implements, including those policies that fundamentally shape the nature of society. In the aggregate, then, political participation likely has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. In addition to the effects of participation on policy outcomes, however, political participation may matter in a very different way, by providing an individual with direct utility and thereby increasing happiness and satisfaction with life in general (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2008).

WHAT INFORMS POLITICAL APATHY?

Political apathy is the deficiency of love and devotion to a state. It is the indifference on the part of citizens of any state as regards their attitudes towards political activities, such as elections, public opinions and civic responsibilities. Political apathy is therefore an absence of interest in, or concern about, socio-political life. Thus, an apathetic person lacks interest in the social and political affairs of his country. Political apathy has manifested itself in Nigeria in the following forms: declining to register as a voter; the refusal to vote; failure to protest against rigging; and failure to assist security agents with useful information (Yakubu 2012 as cited in Idike 2014). The emasculation of public participation in Nigeria could be attributed to processes of state formation in the colonial and the post-colonial era. The colonial state was, in many ways, a template upon which the post-colonial state was built; it has played a significant role in the process of ethnic identity formation, and in post-colonial Nigeria identity has been politicized (Muse and Narsiah 2015). In consequence, the present Nigerian state is inherently a crisis-prone and a violence-generating mechanism. This militates against the rule of fairness in public participation. Perhaps this is to be expected, since the historical legacy of colonialism has not been fully resolved; moreover, the development of a democratic order was not actually the concern of the colonial masters. After all, the political entity today known as Nigeria is a product of the forceful amalgamation of the two halves of the protectorate in 1914 by Lord Fredrick Lugard (*ibid.*) The high rate of political apathy is also a function of the failure of the political elites to effectively deliver public good, or what is now generally regarded as the dividend of democracy. Political apathy is a growing worldwide phenomenon, whose unintended consequence is the rise of populist regimes in advanced countries in Europe, as well as in the United States of America.

Pakistan is among the countries where a lack of interest in political participation is apparent. There are many socio-political reasons behind this. One of these is the continuous exploitation of the common people's political rights (Mahmood et al. 2014).

Citizenship can carry significantly different meanings; it has no "essential" or universally true meaning. But one can attempt to understand the main usages of the term in our society and the great moral force behind what has come down to us historically, and we can offer a working definition that will include the main contested usages. Even if no one can agree on an identical list of the virtues that might be thought either to constitute citizenship or to be preconditions to it, the activity is not obscure; its activity or practice can be universal: it had its origins in ancient Greece and is a key part of our civilization (*ibid.*).

A "citizen" is a member of a political community, which is defined by a set of rights and obligations. "Citizenship, therefore, represents a relationship between the individual and the state, in which the two are bound together by reciprocal rights and obligations" (Heywood 1994, 155 as cited in Delapaz

2004). Citizenship may be defined as the passive or active membership of individuals in nation-states with universal rights and obligations at a specified level of equality (Janoski and Gran 2011). Excerpting from Janoski and Gran (2011), there are four main points for this definition. First, citizenship begins with determining membership in a nation-state, which means establishing “personhood” or who, out of the totality of denizens, natives and subjects of a territory, is recognized as being citizens with specific rights. Personhood began with a restricted group of elite citizens (e.g., the elites of Athens or the aristocrats of England), and non-citizens within a state (e.g., stigmatized ethnic, racial, gender, class or disabled groups) have slowly gained rights and achieved membership. Second, citizenship involves active capacities to influence politics and passive rights of existence under a legal system. With passive rights alone, a benevolent dictator could rule with limited legal rights and extensive social rights in a redistributive system. Active rights bring citizens in a democracy to the foreground in politics, and even in the economy. When citizens become active in citizenship rights, social scientists will be concerned with measuring the levels, causes and consequences of their participation. Third, citizenship rights are universal rights enacted into law and implemented for all citizens, and not informal, unenacted or special rights. Private organizations or groups can advance claims or proposals for citizenship rights, but claims often derive from norms within subcultures and are enforced by social pressures or group rules, often conflicting with norms in other subcultures. The process of enacting citizenship rights is an attempt to make these rights as complementary as possible. Fourth, citizenship is a statement of equality, with rights and obligations being balanced within certain limits. The equality is not complete; it must often entail an increase in subordinate rights vis-à-vis social elites. This equality is mainly procedural—the ability to enter public courts, legislatures and bureaucracies—but it may also include guaranteed payments and services that have a direct impact upon substantive equality. The extent of rights actually used by citizens may also vary considerably with class and status group power. Citizenship rights and obligations exist at individual, organizational or societal levels. At the societal level, they refer to the development of citizenship rights and obligations in countries. At the organizational level, they concern the rights and obligations of groups to form and act in public arenas. At the individual level, citizenship focuses on how each person sees the relationship of rights and obligations within a framework of balance or exchange (Janoski and Gran 2011). A major highlight of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the gradual extension of citizenship to all members of the emergent nation-states. By the second half of the twentieth century (with exceptions such as Southern Africa, where blacks had been denied certain rights on racial grounds) all citizens had come to be considered as individuals possessing equal rights and having equal status and interests in performing duties in their nation-states (Oyediran et al. 1990).

The manner of this gradual extension has, however, affected the meaning of citizenship in contemporary times. In pre-nineteenth-century Europe, for

instance, the underprivileged had been fully involved in the performance of duties to the states, even though they were denied rights granted to the privileged classes. The struggle for citizenship therefore revolved around the struggle for the extension of rights to all members of the community. In other words, duties were taken for granted while rights were contested (*ibid.*). Citizenship can therefore be defined both as political and legal concepts: as a political concept, its origin dated back to the Greek civilization. In the Greek city states, its enjoyment was limited to very few, and even at that period those endowed with citizenship status were granted the privileges and obligations of self-government. The Athenians enjoyed a number of rights such as the right to participate in political assembly in terms of deliberation and voting; similarly, Roman citizens enjoyed such rights as property rights, public rights such as voting and contesting elective offices. In the same way, both the English Revolution and the French Revolution greatly enhanced the citizenship status of individuals in Europe (Agagu 2005).

For the purpose of understanding the significance of citizenship in intellectual discourse, a distinction must be made between a subject and a citizen. A subject is usually subservient to the state where the right to rule is reserved for a privileged class, while on the other hand citizens themselves constitute a state (Dunmoye 2008). Historically, there has been a fundamental difference between the concept of a citizen and the concept of a subject: a subject obeys the laws and a citizen plays a part in making and changing them. To the Greeks and the Romans, citizenship was both a legal term and a social status: citizens were those who had a legal right to have a say in the affairs of city or state, either by speaking in public or by voting, usually both; women were not citizens, they were slaves, and often a larger number of subject inhabitants might have had some personal and property rights in law or custom but no civic rights—that is, to vote and participate in public affairs, active citizenship was believed to be a prime moral virtue (Crick 2000). Citizenship is a bundle of rights, and the citizen is expected to enjoy those rights within and even outside the territory of his country (Ejembi 2008). Citizenship connotes the status of an individual as a full and responsible member of a political community (Dunmoye 2008). Citing Marshall (1950), citizenship has three major components:

- Civil rights.
- Political rights.
- Social rights.

The explanation of the above components is excerpted from Dunmoye (2008):

- Civil Rights constitutes civil citizenship which includes: equality before the law, liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and conclude contracts.

- Political Rights constitutes political citizenship which includes: the right to take part in elections, the right to serve in bodies invested with political authority whether national legislatures, state assemblies or local government councils.
- Social Rights constitutes social citizenship which includes: the right to certain standard of economic and social welfare, and the right to share to the full in the social heritage.

Four categories of public institutions are formally and in some cases constitutionally equipped to take care of these rights. They are the courts, representative political bodies, the social services and schools (*ibid.*).

POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

Models of democratization focus on two key features critical for expanding political citizenship: governmental institutions and state policies. At the most basic level, the institutional shift from inherited monarchical structures to political rule to electoral structures expands the base of those eligible to participate in formal political power (McDonagh 2002). Orren (1991) and Smith (1997), as cited in McDonagh (2002), argue that an ideological shift from the use of ascription of group characteristics—such as race, class, and gender—to liberal principles of individual equality as the basis of state policies expands the political citizenship of subordinate groups. At the founding of the American state, for example, the structural substitution of an electoral democracy for an inherited monarchy, while increasing the political citizenship of some men, decreased the political citizenship of all women. By 1807 all states explicitly excluded women from the franchise, giving no women the right to vote (as cited in McDonagh 2002). Similarly, in the nineteenth century, institutionalization of cultural commitments to liberal principles of individual equality, while expanding the voting rights of white and African American men, failed to secure the same franchise for any woman—whatever her class or race. Women did not obtain a federal guarantee of the right to vote until 1920, with the addition of the Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution. More significant than this protracted period of time is the way reformers achieved this goal: they retained liberal, individual equality claims that women should have the right to vote in spite of the group difference from men (*ibid.*).

POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP IN NIGERIA

In medieval Europe, citizenship conferred economic advantage such as protection from the claims of feudal landlords. It was the American and French revolutions, however, that gave impetus to the concept of national citizenship which extends across society and serves as an instrument for the promotion of popular government, individual liberties and political equality (Golwa 2008). Nigeria is typical of such states, and is open to the problems of a multiethnic or

multicultural society which challenges the value of formal membership of the civic community. This, by way of practice, devalues citizenship of the nation-state (Nwosu 2008). All Nigerians are overprotecting their indigeneity because of the attraction it offers; what is noticeable is that indigeneity is placed before national citizenship despite constitutional provisions that emphasize the importance and relevance of citizenship, particularly as regards the rights and obligations associated with it. Indigeneity has consistently thwarted citizenship (Omotoso 2008).

Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999 after a long period of military dictatorship and tortuous democratic transition programs. One distinguishing characteristic of this return to civil rule is frequent civil wars and conflicts. They mostly pit ethnic and religious groups against one another, and identity politics and attendant violence have assumed unprecedented dimensions (as cited in Alubo 2009). Nigeria is a greatly divided country. This division is accompanied with serious suspicion, distrust and antagonism among its diverse people. These problems have had grave consequences for the good health, orderly growth, development, stable democratic government, unity and survival of the nation. The different measures and approaches designed and employed by successive Nigerian governments to unite and preserve the country and generally keep it afloat cannot be said to have been really effective, as the polity is faced daily with an increasingly monumental crisis of insecurity, sectarian violence, ethnic strife, political instability and threats of disintegration. A united country and people are in a better position to confront the crises of development, nationhood and stability. The desire and consciousness of the political leaders and the generality of the people to do this, with the appropriate frame of mind and instrumentalities, is crucial for a successful and lasting result (Enaruna 2014).

There are three dimensions to the major source of the problem with Nigerian citizenship: political, economic and socio-cultural. These are linked directly with deep-rooted cultural practices and the failure of successive political leaders and elites to transcend central and primordial allegiances (Ojiji and Kim 2008).

A major source of the problem with Nigerian citizenship is viewed from the economic dimension, where there is competition for scarce and limited opportunities and resources. This competition creates and encourages a situation whereby members of a community who consider themselves “natives” and are hosting migrant “settlers” in their community will begin to organize themselves along ethnic and communal lines; this situation may actually result in building hostilities among the people (*ibid.*).

Most scholars and observers of the Nigerian political scene will not deny the reality that contestations over citizenship issues are at the basis of what has euphemistically become known as the national question. Colonial Nigeria experienced two forms of citizenship: British Citizens and subjects of the United Kingdom, and colony. At independence, the Nigerian Citizenship Act 1960 was promulgated and subsequently amended as it is now contained in Chapter iii, Section 22.29 and Part iii, Section 268 of the 1959 Constitution

(Golwa 2008). The 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria emphasize the fundamental responsibilities of all organs of government, authorities and persons. They include the following: the need to respect and uphold the provisions of the constitution and the people to whom sovereignty belongs; to ensure democracy and social justice; to ensure primarily the security and welfare of people; to ensure participation of the people in their government; to provide adequate facilities; to encourage free mobility of people, goods and services; to ensure that citizens enjoy equality of rights, obligations and opportunities before the law; and to protect, preserve and promote the Nigerian culture, which enhances human dignity (Omolayo 2008). Many scholars have described the Nigerian state as a historical accident which did not evolve naturally (as did other civilized states in the Western world), but was imposed on the people living within the geographical entity now called Nigeria by the colonialists, who obviously had little knowledge, or no concern, for the principle of compatibility as a necessary pre-requisite for the formation of any state (ibid.).

CONCLUSION

Political participation is assumed as one of the determinants of empowerment because it provides a space for exercising strength and opportunities for choosing those leaders who have the ability to solve problems and are committed to reducing disparity (Mahmood et al. 2014). Defined as indifference towards politics, political apathy is an unrecognized threat that plagues all countries of the world (Tan 2012 as cited in Idike 2014). Very often it is the strength of civic organizations and their connectedness to community that provide citizens with the opportunity for civic engagement. The incentives and disincentives to participation are not monetary; rather they include considerations of solidarity, personal satisfaction and making a difference to the community as a whole (Pahad 2005).

The political apathy in Nigeria, for instance, is based on the twin problems of ignorance and indifference or nonchalance towards political activities by the citizens. Political apathy is also a lack of enthusiasm or concern for politics and political activities by the people and deliberate deception by some politicians, this being exacerbated by the struggle for daily survival by the already traumatized masses. The consequence of this is the inability of the masses to perceive a link between their state of underdevelopment and their non-participation in the electoral process (Fabiya 2010 as cited in Falade 2014). Political participation, being an important yet paradoxical and delicate political theory, obliges individuals to form and support a given government or the implementation of a given policy based on certain grounds. It also obliges the same people to dissolve any government or oppose the implementation of any policy, also based on certain grounds (Umezurike and Danfulani 2015).

Sen, as cited in Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2008), views participation in making decisions that affect one's life and the lives of others as fundamental to human wellbeing.

Globally, communal crisis, religious, ethnic, inter- and intrastate conflicts appear to have remained the most destabilizing feature of politics in Third World countries, especially in Africa. In Nigeria, for instance, since the return to civil rule in 1999, domestic instability arising from ethno-religious, inter- and intracommunal conflicts of varying degrees and dimensions have been recorded (Nwanegbo and Ochanja 2014). Nigerians are concerned about their indigenous status and are ready to guard it jealously. This dual identity has many implications for Nigerian citizenship as it creates discriminatory practices (Omotoso 2008). In essence, for the development and the sustainability of the Nigerian state to be in view, the issue of citizenship must be seriously addressed. The government of Nigeria needs to rise to the occasion and create an environment that will make everyone a happy Nigerian. Until the issue of citizenship is addressed, the ethnic crisis will continue.

One can hardly get something done at a distance; therefore there is so much need to get involved, realizing above all that citizens' participation is paramount in influencing governmental policies.

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Media and Politics in Africa

Sharon Adetutu Omotoso

INTRODUCTION

A good number of African states have celebrated their fifty years of flag independence, during which time so much has been discovered, written and read from media/political perspectives. While the media in Africa has been discussed largely within the ambit of its service to society through print, electronic and more recently new media, politics in Africa has been discussed within the purview of leadership, governance and more prominently democracy. Remarkably, media and politics have had consistent and continual interactions such that neither can subsist without the other, and they have been widely discussed within a variety of contexts. It is necessary to briefly summarize the prominent perspectives relating to the discourse on media and politics.

The term “media,” though seemingly straightforward, encapsulates a number of concepts, ideas, objects, postulations and technologies. Etymologically drawn from the Latin word *medium*, its plural form being *media*, it can be defined in general terms as all means through which things can be done, and more specifically as any technology or equipment that extends or stretches the powers of man beyond his purely natural ability¹; means, materials and techniques through which messages are sent to certain groups within a given geographical location²; apparatuses that come in between or mediate between two or more parties during information dissemination.³ It is vital to note that through media, primarily print and electronic, information, views, opinions and standpoints are made known using tools such as news, entertainment

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programs, musicals, documentaries, texts and advertisements among others, and disseminated to target audiences. “New media” is a more recent approach in contemporary media discourse, which presents emerging internet-based technologies and platforms for communication, including content communities (e.g., YouTube); blogs and microblogs (e.g., Twitter); collaborative projects (e.g., Wikipedia); virtual game worlds (e.g., World of Warcraft); virtual social worlds (e.g., Second Life); and social networking sites (e.g., Facebook).⁴ The media is saddled with roles such as extending people’s ability to communicate, to speak to others far away, to hear messages and to see images that would otherwise be unavailable without it⁵; advancing public goals by cultivating perceptions and setting agendas⁶; cohesion and integration roles.⁷

Drawn from the Greek word *Polis*, meaning city, society, community and more familiarly state, politics is understood to involve debating matters concerning the *polis* and acting in order to achieve the common good. It has been described as “a social process characterized by activities involving rivalry and cooperation in the exercise of power and culminating in the making of decisions for a group,”⁸ making and executing governmental decisions or policies.⁹ More popular is Lasswell’s definition of politics as “who gets what, when and how.”¹⁰ Dahl explains further that a “political system is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves to a significant extent, power, rule or authority.”¹¹ Terms used more often in connection with politics include state, governance, leadership and democracy.

The state has been variously conceived as a power system, a legal construction, a welfare system and the basic political unit. The state is the nation, legally organized and assuming the aspect of a single legal association¹²; a grouping of individuals who are organized in a definite territory for the pursuit of secular common welfare, the maintenance of law and order and the carrying out of external relations with other groups similarly organized.¹³ A state provides the basic needs and interests of its people; it achieves its legitimacy by ensuring social harmony and defending its citizens from external aggression¹⁴; hence, the real status of any state depends on the degrees of the inadequacies in its governance system as reflected by social, economic and political indicators.¹⁵ Referring to all processes of governing, governance is brought to the fore whenever people come together to accomplish an end. Resting on three dimensions, authority, decision-making and accountability, governance determines who has power, who makes decisions, how other players make their voice heard and how account is rendered, thus marking an intriguing transformation in focus from micro- to macro-issues.¹⁶

By describing leadership as one of the most important elements for order and progress in any human society, Omotoso and Fayemi note that leadership is “very vital and in fact, central to the control, motivation and direction of every human society towards development, progress and meaningful achievement in all spheres of human existence”.¹⁷ Also prominently discussed in connection with politics is “Democracy,” a system of government, which “as a social project means social progress in terms of better standard of living and

full participation in the process of governance by the people.”¹⁸ In the words of Schattscheider,

Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organisations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.¹⁹

From the foregoing, we may deduce that state, leadership, governance and democracy are interlinked constituents which have been widely associated with politics across the globe.

If “leadership is concerned with setting and not just reacting to agendas, identifying problems, and initiating change that makes for substantial improvement rather than managing change,”²⁰ governance is connected with power, decision-making, communication and accountability; democracy is a system of government of the people, for the people, by the people; and the state is the geographical entity within which all these constituents and others operate, it follows that they are all integral parts of politics. Seeing that these qualities are equally shared by the media, we may then logically argue that media and politics are symbiotically connected.²¹ A similar argument holds if leadership is to inspire confidence, to set the agenda for development and to define a moral tone for society based on a regime of sanctions and rewards²²; and the various forms of media are saddled with such roles in no less measure.²³

It is widely believed that media and politics are closely connected in a symbiotic manner; as Omotoso notes that “the power to influence (political power) is embedded in the power to communicate,”²⁴ implying that the necessity for survival of the *polis* raised the need for media; this tallies with Ocitti’s idea that media’s role includes taking the body temperature of democracy.²⁵ Several studies have addressed the relationship between media and politics and, by extension, media and leadership, media and governance, as well as media and democratization.²⁶ It is in the same spirit that the media is named the watchdog for democracy; the central nervous system of society and the culture industry among others.²⁷ It is expected that media–politics interrelations should breed a healthy polity, one which is led by responsible leaders who appreciate the part that mass participation plays in good governance. Sadly, while a large number of Africa’s political actors have plagued the continent with irresponsible leadership, the media has not lived up to expectations. In this chapter, the media (local and global) will be examined vis-à-vis politics in Africa, drawing inferences mainly from Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, which are states with large and vibrant media industries as well as fascinating and highly complex political landscapes.

AFRICAN POLITICS AND AFRICAN MEDIA

African politics may simply be described as who gets what in the African political space, when and by what means. Connected with power, decision-making, communication and accountability, African politics is identified with the natural

and nurtural constitutive elements of the African experience and thoughts on statism, leadership and governance. It involves an attempt to dig into the root of Africa's problems by seeking a commitment to formulation and reformulation of political thoughts considered relevant to Africa. In discussions of African politics, Leopold Sedar Senghor's *Negritude*, Kwame Nkrumah's *Consciencism*, Obafemi Awolowo's *Democratic Socialism* and Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa* among others come to mind. A fundamental essence of African politics begins with recognition of the uniqueness of African political landscape, the need to question Africa's colonial heritages and a search for African solutions to African problems.

The media, owing to their close link with the state, and their roles in state organization, has been seen as an integral part of the state. While a number of scholars have worked extensively on media and politics in traditional or pre-colonial Africa, this section pays particular attention to media and political issues since colonial incursions into Africa.²⁸ Historical evidences validate the argument that in Africa the state gave birth to the press.²⁹ Colonial governments initiated both print and broadcast media in Africa to serve colonialist expansion, African nationalism, palliative treatment for the natives, colonialist federalism, capitalist expansion and missionary activity.³⁰ From the establishment of the press in its various forms, mission-sponsored, anti-slavery, anti-colonialist; ethnic and indigenous (1822 in Sierra Leone, 1826 in Liberia, 1859 in Nigeria, 1895 in Malawi); radio in South Africa (1919),³¹ history has shown that African politics was never without the media, whose roles were primarily to publicize activities of governments and political actors (parties and activists). Since the struggle for independence between the early 1920s and the 1960s, to the period of "second liberation" characterized by a clamor for political change (1980s and 1990s) the media has played vital roles in African politics. The native resistance to colonialism brought about the establishment of locally owned media, which Hatchen describes as "African press for Africans" and "black press for black men."³² Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Tom Mboya, Harry Thuku and Obafemi Awolowo among other nationalist leaders established various publications aimed at reaching out to citizens and sensitizing them about political, social and economic developments within their localities. Grieving over the patchy nature of African media history, Banda attributes it to the hugeness of the continent and its checkered history of colonial, cultural and political experiences.³³

There are national, regional and continental levels of analysis when discussing African politics and African media. In national discourses, media is seen as an interface between government and its people; communication and information platforms within the state are explored in the pursuit of political objectives. Here, both politics and media are more inward looking, with a strong commitment to state patriotism and internal affairs. At regional level, states with shared socio-cultural and geographical links find common ground to deal with their political, economic and communication challenges and prospects.³⁴ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with membership from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia,

Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which draws members from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa are examples of regional bodies fostering political and economic discourses among member states.

Continental analysis presents a Pan-African disposition for development issues that is anchored by bodies including the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) among others. By extension, media attempts towards continental integration is presented by organizations such as the Pan African News Agency (PANA) and the Union of African National Radio and TV Organizations (URTNA), among other prominent bodies working on media homogenization in this regard. Here it is believed that African integration will be a success story if it can strengthen its regional institutions with a view to benefiting from the gains of globalization, as obtained in other continents.³⁵

At each level of analysis, political issues more often culminate in media issues, which are recycled, thus turning media issues into political issues for the masses to deal with in their various capacities. Ewumbue-Monono points out that “unlike national media integration schemes whose main concern is nation-building, regional media integration is an aspect of international politics and diplomacy.”³⁶ This conception is in several ways extended to continental media and politics. Unfortunately, stakeholders in African politics and African media fail to delineate between private and public spheres, between national and regional spheres, and between continental and global spheres, often displaying internal issues to global audiences, thus increasing chaos on the continent. On a national note, I have (as a privileged teacher of Nigerian politics) been faced with muted, yet fierce resistance from my students who come into the first class of the semester filled with pessimistic premonitions about the nature of the course, thus displaying all sorts of frustration and antipathy for any meaningful or result-oriented study of Nigeria.³⁷ This is largely because of the media constructions with which Nigerian students grow up. Similarly, from a national perspective, when writing on the place of natural law in Kenya, Gadaffi observes presuppositions such as a prevalence of universal morality above national morality, which has aided the spread of ideologies such as homosexuality to Africa; this mindset is also not without some media hype.³⁸ At a regional level, scholars observe how leaders of states question the essence of any integration and note the massive deficit in terms of political will for an integration agenda amongst states in each region.³⁹ A continental discussion of African media and politics embeds the media within societal (continental) pathologies, within which the vision of a United States of Africa is pursued such that the continent begins to speak with one voice to the world.⁴⁰ At this point, mention must be made of global media, which is primarily constituted by Western media and committed to shaping global politics. The global media

presents itself as most viable in telling the whole story owing to its human and technological access to global events. Powered by technology, owned or controlled by certain privileged global actors, the operations of transnational media corporations such as CNN and BBC are such that their unseen hands continue to define global perceptions of Africa. The constructions and distortions become yardsticks by which others are measured. Thus, global media are more harmful than helpful in shaping African politics, and, in the same vein, in shaping African media tenets, whims and caprices.

Having established the connections and interrelations between African politics and African media, Africans' perceptions of politics and media remain disturbing. These may be viewed from two perspectives; *elite* and *masses*. Members of the African elite see politics basically as a class structuring tool which guarantees superiority and power, allowing them to influence policies in their favor. On this basis, elites align to manipulate major terrains of development in order to maintain classism. It is on these grounds that Ottoh notes that media can only influence foreign policy when there is a disagreement among elites over a particular policy choice.⁴¹ By this he means that the media are largely arm-twisted by elites, such that they are more restrained in serving both government and masses than they should be, considering their normative roles. This situation is an evident indication of the colonialists' legacy, which was transferred to Africa's ruling class at independence. A more recent trend which cuts across elites and masses is the transformation of politics into a career. While most if not all of the nationalists went through formal training in their chosen fields before entering politics, today's elite groom their children and wards for political office without considering the necessity for other professional training. In a similar vein, the masses have developed a mindset that politics is sufficient as a career to be pursued, since it is nothing more than a money-making venture, something that the ruling elites equally display. These views stand contrary to the whole essence of politics and, by extension, governance and leadership as service to the state.

What, then, is Africa's understanding of the media? The elite understand media power; they acknowledge the capacity of the media to coerce the masses and influence their thought patterns, so that they conform to government policies. However, the masses are transcending the gullible realms of the colonial and early post-independence periods. With an understanding that the media is itself a sphere of influence, African masses have challenged and continue to challenge the political class, rejecting unfriendly policies and calling for order. The Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya which began in 2010, the 2012 Occupy Nigeria protest and the very recent "Rhodes must fall" protest against colonial iconography in South Africa are instances of mass revolt against government. Despite the masses' renewed appreciation of the media and political awareness, there is a persistent view of the media as a manipulative device and propaganda machines used by elites and government; hence the masses maintain a high level of media distrust. Normatively, political environments should not affect the media environment,⁴² however, the reality is that a sneeze from political spheres makes the media catch cold, which necessarily infects the masses owing to their low immunity.

MEDIATIZED POLITICS AND POLITICIZED MEDIA IN AFRICA

Media and politics in Africa have assumed tremendous dynamism, within which mediatizing transcends mediating. To mediate is to act as a go-between, a referee, an umpire; roles characterized by fairness, disinterestedness and justice. These characteristics are normatively identified with media, but realities in Africa make it impossible to boast of media disinterestedness across the states. To mediatize is to annex an entity to another, so that the former retains its identity even though it has lost most of its power to the latter. It is vital to state here that mediatization is double edged: it can either be positively or negatively engaged. While in the negative sense, the totality of the annexed entity is taken, in its positive sense, the annexed entity expects a symbiosis which will draw it out of wherever it has been trapped. The possibility of positive mediatization lies within the willingness of the annexer to selflessly aid the annexed. It must also be noted that mediatization may be pre-determined or unconsciously developed.

The prevalent situation in Africa, which has existed for a long time, could be termed the negative mediatization of politics. Politics is being mediatized such that it retains its identity even though it has lost most of its power to the media.⁴³ The media is fast becoming the political class, by influencing to a great extent what and how the masses think, while the political class lies helplessly at the mercy of the media, such that rather than one who pays the piper dictating the tune, the piper play their own tune and allow the payer to listen and dance. This is an emerging trend, aided mainly by advertising and social media proliferation. Social media, with the use of meme pictures, antigovernment blogs and a focus on celebrity among other themes, provides spaces where the masses fiercely and fearlessly respond or react to government policies. Attesting to this, Vickers affirms that “*social media* are providing the fora wherein decisions on who should rule, and what issues should be give *priority*, are being established.”⁴⁴ The frame of mind of most African politicians is that no political ambition can be realized without media; as a result, they try to cultivate a smooth relationship with it. Unfortunately, since no political class can successfully monopolize all available media in their constituency without encountering pockets of media opposition, the political class often remains reactive, shielding itself from media arrows rather than being proactive in the political arena. Mediatization, in its negative sense, is a slow poison in the veins of politics. While government retains the confidence of being in charge and retaining control over the media, it fails to realize that the media is on a daily basis reinforcing itself in order to capture the masses and decide how the state is run. It is in recognition of this that Vickers further asserts the “possibility of comprehensive change being secured suddenly, swiftly and dramatically due to modernity’s powerful new instrument, the internet, world-wide, 24/7 communication and social media.”⁴⁵ What then would be left for the political class to hold onto if the tide turns? In response, Vickers says that “All that one can say for certain is that life is full of surprises. And at present, the likelihood of such surprises seems great.”⁴⁶

Mediatization notwithstanding, instances of media politicization have not been overshadowed. Nyabuga affirms that most of the media in Kenya are commercial in nature and their pursuit of profit is no secret. He further asserts that

what the media seem to favor is content that sells, and their obsession with personalities, celebrities, and other ‘soft’ issues that do not require much investment in terms of time, monetary and even specialized human resources that would offer deeper and meaningful coverage of issues.⁴⁷

While the media cannot completely carry the blame for these anomalies, its politicization may be traced first to histories of ownership across the continent and second to histories of repression aided by military and autocratic rules which pervaded the continent until recently. Repression and censorship were prevalent in early post-independence Africa. Scholars provide comprehensive accounts of how military government threatened media practitioners, particularly journalists, jailed some, maimed some and killed many. Several newspaper agencies were forcefully shut down, while those that managed to survive existed in utmost fear.⁴⁸

On media ownership, there is a prevalent naivety that the ownership structure can influence the media. When Oloyede suggested the democratization of media ownership to break media monopolies and to allow “everybody—individuals, groups and government to be free to own, establish and operate any of the media of communication,”⁴⁹ he did not foresee that elites could raise the stakes of media ownership above the masses. What is today called media democratization is in actuality media politicization. A good number of print and electronic media in Africa are owned by politicians across the spectrum.⁵⁰ In their examination of patterns of media ownership in ninety-seven countries, including over twenty African countries, Djankov et al. find that “government ownership of the media is greater in countries that are poorer, have greater overall state ownership in the economy, lower levels of school enrollments, and more autocratic regimes.”⁵¹ Not much has changed in this regard since their article was published in 2003.

The link between politics and media in Nigeria is illustrated by the careers of nationalist leaders who combined journalism with their political activism.⁵² In this country, media politicization takes place according to the rate at which private media owners are politicians or aspiring politicians. For instance, Raymond Dokpesi, founder of Daar Communication Plc and Africa Independent Television, was charged with money laundering in December 2015, following his links with politicians during the 2015 election campaign. Ben Murray Bruce, founder of Silverbird Group, owner of Silverbird Television, Silverbird Galleria and a number of radio stations, also recently delved into politics and is currently a Senate member. The former governor of Lagos state, Bola Tinubu, a major shareholder in the *News Magazine* as well as proprietor of the *Nation Newspaper*, the *Broadcasting Giant*, *Radio and Television Continental*, is a force in Nigeria’s current political dispensation. Dr. Orji Kalu, former Abia

state governor, owns *The Sun*, *New Telegraph*, and *The Spectator*, as well as the *Nigerian Compass* *The Westerner*, established by former Ogun state governor Gbenga Daniel, among others.

In Kenya, key players in the media industry include Kenya's Deputy Prime Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta, who is linked with Media Max Network, a group which took over *The People Daily*, a newspaper previously owned by veteran politician Kenneth Matiba. Samuel Kamau Macharia is chairman and owner of Royal Media Service, which owns the dominant TV station in Kenya, Citizen TV, and eleven radio stations. The Nation Media Group (NMG) owned by Aga Khan is the largest media network in East Africa, extending services to Uganda and Tanzania with interests in newspapers, magazines, TV, websites and radio. It operates *The Nation*, *Sunday Nation*, the *Nairobi Metro*, the *Business Daily* and the *East African* newspapers as well as *True Love*, *Drum*, *Tourist Guide* and the *Business Directory*, among other magazines.⁵³

On media ownership in Kenya, Simiyu observes an emerging trend for media concentration, where politicians are increasingly patronizing and gaining ownership of the media, perhaps with an eye towards future general elections.⁵⁴ The subjection of the media to constant harassment, torture, imprisonment and fines, just for expressing their views,⁵⁵ has resulted in media coverage described as "petty politics."⁵⁶

Despite highly complicated ownership histories in South Africa, there are a number of smaller and independently owned titles which have a disproportionately large influence on news and opinion. Four major groups dominate the South African media: Independence Group (owned by Sekunjalo Media, trade union investment vehicles and broad-based empowerment groups), Nasper/Media24 (owned by Public Investment Corporation and various institutions), SABC (owned by the government) and Times Group (owned by Public Investment Corporation, Caxton and others). Of the four, the Times Group, publishers of *Business Day*, *Sunday Times* and *Sowetan*, is considered the most antigovernment, being openly critical of some African National Congress (ANC) policies and reporting extensively on corruption and related scandals.⁵⁷ Consequently, while discussing twenty years of changes in South African media ownership, Rumney is of the view that media ownership now greatly influences media freedom. Yet he argues that:

More competition does not necessarily translate into diversity, but may even mean more homogeneity as almost all compete for the wealthier sector of the market. In any case, we have to guard against being too media-centric. In an economy where racial patterns of ownership overall have changed, but not changed radically, it is unrealistic to expect media ... to present ideal patterns of ownership.⁵⁸

The point to note here is that ownership influences and party affinities are largely pervasive in Africa; this rubs off on their credibility and popularity among the public.⁵⁹ Therefore, there is an unhealthy equilibrium, such that while politics is being highly mediatized, African media organizations have not been able to go over and above politics for holistic development.

MEDIA AND POLITICS: CONVERGENT YET DISJOINTED

Media, being an interlocutor for mass mobilization, the pillar of public opinion, a bearer of danger signals and a mirror of society is at the same time the most indispensable instrument of governance. Judging by these roles, media and politics are interdependent and should operate in their separate spaces to achieve pre-defined objectives. With each operating on separate platforms, the media ought not be political; neither should politics be negatively mediatized.

A critical look at the internal workings of the media shows how deep they have become enmeshed into politicking. With a few exceptions, recent trends in news reporting reveal how media practitioners and agencies act for political reasons directed towards acquiring influence and achieving personal goals. Thus, newsroom decisions, creative copy, public relations agendas and station management, among other things, has been laden with ethno-religious biases. Caution has been dispensed with, while favoritism, nepotism, partiality and bigotry have pervaded media workplaces. This may be called “mediascape politics,” which distinctly differs from what Zaller describes as “media politics.”⁶⁰ Zaller draws a line between party politics and media politics by describing the latter as a system in which individual politicians seek to gain office and to conduct politics while in office through communications that reach citizens through mass media. Zaller’s conception of media politics is no different from what is now known as political communication,⁶¹ since he presents journalists, politicians and citizens as actors in media politics just as they are in political communication, playing similar roles. I argue here that media politics is not political communication within which citizens and government act. Rather, it is most appropriately understood when described as “mediascape politics,” recognizing media practitioners as primary actors who play internal politics within the profession and as they construct and distort reality. Mediascape politics recognizes disjunctures within media practice and how these affect media services rendered to the masses. The nature of mediascape politics is best explained by framing and horse race reporting. Horse race reporting is usually focused on polling data, public perceptions and exclusive reporting of candidates’ differences instead of their policies. The press covers elections and candidates by comparison, ignoring salient issues that the masses could meaningfully study.⁶² Framing is based on the agenda-setting theory, noting that how issues are presented to the masses influences how they process and respond or react to issues. Spin, metaphor and slogan are popular techniques that are used.⁶³ Without ignoring the fact that colonialism has shaped every aspect of African politics, the media often link the continent’s challenges (economic, health, environmental, religious and so on) with dysfunctional government, ignoring societal dysfunction and most importantly its own (media) dysfunction. Corruption in the African media includes taking bribes (brown envelope syndrome), suppressing stories and bias. It raises a question about who will watch the watchdogs. Writing on media in Uganda, Tegulle blames the prevalence of media corruption in Africa on economic and political reasons. His explanation is as follows:

Political because keeping the Opposition out of the media is important for the continued good health of the ruling party. And economic because media that offer space to opposition politicians are often denied government advertising, something critical in a country where Government is the biggest spender since the private sector is still nascent and is in fact struggling.⁶⁴

Away from the economic excuse which largely favors media organizations, other scholars have attributed corruption in the African media to media workers' poor pay.⁶⁵ On this, Skjerdal notes that poor pay is the "overwhelmingly dominant" explanation for brown envelope syndrome.⁶⁶ He finds that most of the research in Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, Cameroon and other countries cites poor salaries for journalists as the cause of the phenomenon. Closely connected to this is the greed argument raised by Ristow,⁶⁷ who establishes that similar incidences exist in other parts of the world. Having espoused salient issues pertaining to media and politics in Africa, it becomes necessary to hypothesize the future.

A LEAP INTO THE FUTURE OF MEDIA AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

If the mediatization of politics continues at a similar pace to the politicization of the media, one may be tempted to speculate upon the future of governance in Africa as taken over by media personnel, who have communication and information gadgets under their ambit. This could be detrimental to the masses in several ways, as it hampers national development. What would prevail is "inverted media freedom." By this I mean freedom which does not need to be censored since every political group has its own medium through which it can present its views to the masses. Government-owned media either become irrelevant or remain as a mouthpiece for the ruling government, which also has access to its privately owned media. If this comes to pass, the masses will become greatly endangered, as there will be limited media for the masses to express their views on governance. The media will become largely elitist and beyond the reach of the masses; this implies a return to dictatorship instead of a ride into good and accountable governance chiefly propelled by the media.

Both regionally and continentally, there is a high tendency towards "switched off states,"⁶⁸ who are unable to catch up with the rat race in media and politics and continue to lag behind, thus slowing down the pace at which a regional or continental voice (as may be needed) is developed in order to face the rest of the world. Other areas to watch out for are the rate and manner with which the media are gendering politics, how media and politics are reacting to new media and the survival threats to conventional media in the light of the sweeping effects of new media. Perhaps this should begin with a ten-year future projection of media and politics in Africa, in order to find out if African politics will progress and African media will regress, or vice versa.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed African politics and African media at national, regional and continental levels. It recognizes the persistent recycling of political and media issues for mass consumption. Decrying the failure of African politics and African media to delineate between private and public spheres, national and regional spheres and continental and global spheres, the chapter has appraised the prevalent mediatization of politics and politicization of media, and how the media has been enmeshed in politicking within its work environments.

Suffice to say that the level of enlightenment and exposure of African peoples largely determine their disposition towards media and politics. Despite increased political awareness, the media literacy skills of a good number of Africans remain largely underdeveloped, with so-called political elites working towards selfish ends, the masses largely being manipulated to think as the media says—and the media growing wild in their survival games. The social media is not exonerated from this trend, particularly with the recent incidences of fake news, described by Christiana Ammanpour of CNN as signaling the age of post-truth.

Discussions of politics in Africa cannot be done in isolation; world politics must also be considered in the light of how well Africa currently fares or will fare in future. Hence, on one hand, there is an urgent need for a reorientation of media management skills, on the part of both media practitioners and politicians. On the other hand, there is an urgent need for the African people to sharpen their media literacy skills to enable them to decipher right from wrong. In all, media and politics in Africa call not only for content awareness but also for context awareness, which will enable both parties to situate information appropriately and for issues to be interpreted critically and sensibly.

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Public Procurement and Development in Africa

Vincent Efebeh

INTRODUCTION

The efficient running of every government is tied to the existence of a viable as well as a transparent public procurement system, one that is guided by rules and regulations. Failing to adhere to such guiding rules and principles may negatively impact on development. It can thus be argued that the cause of the lack of development in Africa, and particularly in Nigeria, can be linked to this trend. It follows that there is a close nexus between public procurement and development. Procurement in the public sector entails a streamlining process, reducing the prices and costs of raw materials and finding better supply sources. Public procurement covers all kinds of acquisitions of public goods and services, from military aircraft to vehicles, at all levels of government.¹ It therefore means procurement by a procuring entity using public funds.² Because of state activities in providing law and order, health, education and other public services, public procurement accounts for a considerable proportion of total national expenditure.³

Public procurement is alternatively defined as the purchase of commodities and contracting of construction works and services, such acquisition being influenced by resources available from the state budget, local authority budgets, state foundation funds, domestic loans or foreign loans guaranteed by the state. Procurement is applied to increase the profitability of a given organization. Profit in this context is not necessarily defined in monetary terms. This function of reducing the bottom line is the responsibility of senior executives in the public sector. Traditionally, public procurement has been perceived as

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belonging to the implementation phase of the budgeting process. However, as well as executing the approved procurement budget, public procurement professionals can be valuable sources of information for certain decisions, particularly relating to building and road construction projects. To improve procurement plans, they need to know the following before the procurement is approved:

- How many procurement projects will be conducted in the calendar year?
- How many procurement projects' budgets have to be spent in the fiscal year, and will expire by the end of the fiscal year if they are not spent?
- What projects are most critical for the agency's mission so that extra attention can be given to them?

Knowing how a procurement budget is planned, authorized and budgeted, public procurement professionals will be able to implement procurement projects effectively, efficiently and economically. In reality, they are involved in procurement only after agencies have obtained a procurement budget. As Brunetti and Weder argue,

the procurement process consists of many stages (1) procurement stages (2) preparing and processing of procurement requests (3) developing and reviewing requirement documents (4) planning for evaluation (5) contract award (6) preparation and signing of contract and (7) contract administration. Government procurement is not only business, that is the acquisition of goods and services on the best possible terms, but also has broader social, political and economic implications.⁴

The rationale behind public procurement activities/procedures is for the best and most suitable contractors to implement public policies in order to promote the social, industrial and environmental wellbeing of the citizens.

On the other hand, the concept of development is a multisided process. Our concern here is development as it has to do with the transformation of human society for the wellbeing of all citizens. Thus development, seen through this lens, is to actively promote the growth of society by raising the standard of infrastructure, and indeed any other sector of the societal economy that can add value to the standard of living, thus making life worth living. Development is a process in which a system or institution is transformed into a stronger, more organized, more efficient and more effective form and becomes more satisfying in terms of human wants and aspirations.⁵ These descriptions of development point to the fact that development entails a possible transition from one level to a higher one.

Therefore, in running an efficient economy it is important to ensure that the considerable sums involved are spent efficiently, and that the process of allocating government contracts is free from corruption. This is because a corrupted

public procurement process may inevitably lead to an inefficient system that will in turn have a negative impact on the country's development. This has been the bane of development in most African countries, particularly Nigeria, where public office holders have turned the public procurement processes into a means of enriching themselves, to the detriment of Nigeria's development.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The failure of public procurement to enhance development in Africa and particularly in Nigeria is premised on the fact that the process of procurements in the public sector, as allowed by law, are not duly followed or have been hijacked and mishandled by corrupt and self-serving public officials. In order to effectively articulate the possible causes of this, the Marxian theory of political economy is used. The Marxist political economy is anchored in dialectical materialism which, according to Agah,⁶ presupposes "the investigation of production relations in the process of their emergence and development, the consideration of this process as an objective reality and the revelation of the internal contradictions of development inherent in social production." Thus, the system of economic production is the foundation on which the institutional and ideological superstructure of society is built.

At the center of the Marxist view is the production (economic) relations between people. These include the forms of ownership of means of production, the position of the various classes and the social groups in production, and their interrelationships, and the forms of distribution of the national wealth. It thus follows that Marxism is based on a materialist understanding of societal development, taking as its starting point the necessary economic activities required by human society to provide for material needs. The form of economic organization, or mode of production, is understood to be the basis from which the majority of other social phenomena, including social relations, political and legal systems, morality and ideology, arise. These form the superstructure, the economic system the base. As forces of production (most notably technology) improve, existing forms of social organization become inefficient and stifle further progress; these inefficiencies manifest themselves as social contradictions in the form of class struggle,⁷ and societal conflict.⁸

Marxist theorists do not view the state as a product of the will of the people nor as an entity that stands for the benefit of all society; rather, they see it as an instrument devised by the dominant class for its own benefit. It follows that the state cannot be understood separately from the economic structure of society. As Marx and Engels posit, "the executive committee of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."⁹ They further argue that when the state came into existence, society became divided into two antagonistic classes—one owning the means of social and economic production, and the other constrained to live on its labor. The point here is that the ruling class in any capitalist system is the class that owns the means of production and uses its economic power as its instrument for the domination of

society. The state here encompasses bureaucracy, judiciary, legislature, coercive organs of the state, trade unions and party machinery. All these are designed to promote and protect national security in order to create the atmosphere for capital accumulation, and to maintain social control.¹⁰ Therefore, those owning the means of production acquire the power to dominate the other class, not only in the economic sphere but in all spheres of life. Marx argues further that the ruling class uses the state as its instrument to dominate society by virtue of the interpersonal and social ties between state officials and the economic class. This is in line with Aboribo's view, when he posits that

in Nigeria, as it also applies to most African countries, the ruling class uses the state power to accumulate wealth or rather, uses political power in their control to acquire economic power. This is so because politics has now become an enterprise, and thus, being in power means having access to economic resources, and being out of power means being deprived of economic resources.¹¹

Thus, politicians want to capture state power by all means and at any cost for their economic survival and the maintenance of the status quo. This creates an atmosphere of mutual suspicion between the political class on one hand and the people on the other. This suspicion brings about a heated polity that can be likened to a Hobbesian state of nature, in which there is a war of one against all, especially during periods of state or national elections, where life indeed becomes solitary, nasty, brutish and short. As Ihonvbere summarizes, the intense and normless struggle for power generates differences and insecurity, and fear of violence even among the powerful.¹² In the absence of an autonomous force to mediate these contradictions and bring things to a state of normality, confusion, conflict and political instability abound.¹³ Under this condition, a high premium is placed on political power as the means of welfare and security, so that political competition becomes exceptionally intense and tangentially normless.¹⁴ Thus, central to the Marxist historical materialist conception of the state is the adoption of the view that the state is an instrument of the ruling class, and further that all the structures and elements in society are related—but that the economic factor is the most decisive of them all.

The significance of this theory to the public procurement system in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular is that the ruling class has abused the entire public procurement process by turning it into a huge mechanism for siphoning off public funds using state instruments. Demands for bribes before contracts are awarded have increased from 10% to 25%, while on some occasions the entire budget for a particular project is shared out, this latter being exemplified by the arms procurement scandal involving former National Security Adviser Col. Sambo Dasuki (Rtd.), which involved over US\$2.1 billion in what has become known as Dasukigate. This amounts to using state instruments for the financial benefits of the ruling class, thereby denying wider society of the benefits of an all-important project, in this case (discussed in more detail below)

procuring arms and ammunition so that the armed forces could fight the Boko Haram insurgents in northeastern Nigeria. Thus, arising from the profitability of the state when it is used for primitive accumulation, the struggle for state power is reduced to warfare between factions of the ruling class; this is made possible because politics in Nigeria, as in most African countries, has become commercialized. In this struggle, Agah notes, “commitment to public service and ethics of governance becomes secondary.”¹⁵ Ake alludes to this view when he argues that political power does not only represent the license for wealth, but is also the means to security and the only guarantor of general wellbeing.¹⁶

The analysis above has revealed that the state can be seen as an instrument of oppression, exploitation and injustice, and does not rest on moral foundations. It is not necessarily a national institution that offers everyone an equitable and level playing field for access to values. As Ibodje posits, if the state maintains law and order, it is actually not because through this it is able to secure the willing obedience of the people, but because it can use its coercive force to secure compliance from the downtrodden masses who constitute the bulk of the population.¹⁷ It is apt to remark, therefore, that given the reality and nature of the Nigerian state, especially in terms of the social and economic divide between the ruling class and the mass of the people, the Marxist perspective provides the best theoretical explanation for understanding the politics of public procurement in its futile effort to enhance development in Africa and more specifically Nigeria.

THE CAUSES OF THE ABUSE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESS IN AFRICA

It has been observed that there is no single causative factor for the abuse or corruption of the public procurement process, particularly amongst the developing countries of the world. These factors can be internal to a particular country or alternatively external; they can be microeconomic or macroeconomic in nature. Therefore, one single factor cannot explain the phenomenon using a set of factors such as economic variables. However, in a comparative study of the economic and political determinants of public procurement corruption in Uganda; Basheka found that economic factors best explained corruption in the public procurement process. This may be because corruption adds to the unjust income distribution which discourages investment (foreign or local) and distorts economic growth and development at all levels.¹⁸ The abuse of office and corruption in public service and the private sector are attributable to the environment in which they operate, especially bureaucratic and inefficient public administration systems in the less-developed countries.¹⁹ This is because the developing countries have a number of complex systems with inadequate control mechanisms and thus possess an inherent circumstance that offers a fertile ground for corruption. Brunetti and Weder note that the higher the quality of bureaucracy, the lower the probability of corruption in a system.²⁰

The fear of job insecurity and the low salaries of public servants are among the variables that explain the rising trends in public procurement corruption. Public servants in most African countries are wary of their job security. In Nigeria, for instance, it is believed that the 1975 civil service purge was the cause of corruption in the public service. The purge was meant to rid the service of corrupt elements, but in the end civil servants realized that they could be thrown out by the government before their retirement, so they should help themselves to anything they could by any means possible. Public funds therefore began to be seen as a “national cake,” which could be shared or stolen without looking back, or bothering about who baked it or where it was baked. On the other hand, the low income of the average public servant in times of global recession implies that the take-home pay of civil servants could not really take them home. These workers, unfortunately, were also expected to financially support not only themselves and their extended families, but in some cases a whole village. Corrupt practices become inevitable because they have to meet their obligations to families and village kinsmen.

Moral thinking or moral living in an amoral society is usually regarded as abnormal. In most African societies, particularly Nigeria, it is acceptable to be amoral. Hence, it is fashionable for public officials who have corruptly enriched themselves with public funds to be celebrated and lionized by the very people they have shortchanged through their act of irresponsibility. The public officials even shamelessly flaunt their ill-gotten wealth, to the admiration of the citizens. The criminals are even rewarded with chieftaincy titles or honorary degrees by universities both in Nigeria and abroad. This is a way in which amoral acts are “moralized.” This has fueled the thinking of some scholars, such as Myrdal, to the extent that in less-developed countries a bribe to a person holding a public office is not clearly differentiated from the gifts that are sanctioned by tradition.²¹ Something that may be regarded as corrupt may in actual fact be a gift, and therefore acceptable. This may, however, be contrary to the moral expectations in other climes.

The lack of transparency and accountability systems in the conduct of organizational responsibilities is another major cause of procurement corruption. Public institutions in the developed world are strong and not easily manipulable because they are built around laws, rules and regulations²²; but institutions in most African countries are built around individuals, usually those in power, and as a result these institutions don't work effectively because they respect the man in power rather than the law. It is therefore the rule of man not the rule of law. This is the primary reason for the high rate of public procurement corruption in Nigeria.

THE NATURE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN AFRICA AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

Procurement in the public sector is meant to benefit a country developmentally. However, the prebendary nature of politics in Africa has created an avenue through which the privileged few accumulate public funds for their selfish use. As Igwe notes, the massive corruption in Africa officialdom continues to cause degenerative underdevelopment on the continent.²³ This has taken place at the same time as African countries have become the personal estates of criminal gangs, whose avowed aim is not the development of their countries, but rather the stashing away of national resources in foreign banks. The public procurement Acts of most African countries, such as Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda, have objectives of probity, transparency, accountability and value for resources/money. The ruling class, comprising exploitative capitalists and corrupt public servants, has in most cases undermined these principles for self-aggrandizement. Ayittey aptly notes that “corruption inevitably results as a people try to circumvent the controls and regulations, and take advantage of loopholes.”²⁴ It follows that public procurement among African countries is for the benefit of the highest briber and that the increasing level of corruption in this arena impedes economic development, while other market mechanisms create inefficiencies, thereby reducing competitiveness, trade and foreign direct investment.

Thus, the United Nations estimated that in 1991 alone more than US\$200 billion in capital was siphoned out of Africa by the ruling class; as Ayittey further notes, this was more than half of Africa’s foreign debt of US\$300 billion.²⁵ Elsewhere, Ayittey argues that “an estimated \$15 billion—more than what Africa receives in foreign aid—flees Africa annually.”²⁶ According to the recent Global Corruption Barometer, 12 of the 13 countries with the worst record of bribery are in Africa. The African Union estimates that 25% of the GDP of African states or some \$148 billion is lost to corruption every year. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that corruption costs Africa up to 50% in lost tax revenues and over \$30 billion in aid annually. In terms of comparison, Africa receives about \$22.5 billion in development aid from industrial countries.²⁷ This is usually thanks to the collaborative efforts of the foreign partners of the African ruling class, otherwise referred to as the international bourgeoisie. As Joseph Stiglitz (cited in Ogunmupe) aptly notes, “every bribe that is taken has a payer; and too often, the bribe payer is a corporation from an advanced industrial nation or someone acting on its behalf.”²⁸

In all, most of the stolen monies in Africa are originally meant to develop and/or procure infrastructural materials to enhance societal development, but African society is being denied the developmental benefits of such huge funds, no thanks to the stealing spree of the ruling class. Abuse of the public procurement system across the African continent takes different forms, as recent studies have shown. These include embezzlement, extortion, bribery, fraud, nepotism, favoritism,²⁹ and lately, particularly in Nigeria, budget padding. As Eigen argues,

all these forms of corruption have a very high cost for the public at large. The quality of goods and services are affected, as they are purchased from the contractor who bribes highest.³⁰ The increasing level of corruption in Africa can create a situation whereby collaborative firms begin to determine the policy process. The lack of a transparent and open bidding process is prevalent, so corrupt public officials are able to design tenders and provide confidential information in order to favor a particular company.³¹ Every year, huge sums of taxpayers' money are spent by governments on goods and services; from building airports and other infrastructure, to road construction, power generation and buying computers for schools and medicines for hospitals. These projects are of high value, complex and important. This area of procurement by public bodies alone amounts to between 15 and 30% of gross domestic products on average,³² and even more in some countries. With so much money changing hands, few governmental opportunities create greater temptations or offer more opportunities for corruption.

On average, 10–25% of a public contract's overall value may disappear into the pockets of the corrupt. The European Commission estimates that €120 billion (about US \$163 billion) is lost each year to corruption in its member states; almost the entire annual budget of the European Union. But corruption in public procurement doesn't just mean citizens' money is wasted, it means that the quality of works and service is undermined, which can damage the environment and even cost lives. As it stands, the abuse of the public procurement system has led to a massive infrastructural deficit the promotion of widespread poverty on the continent, making Africa the most resource-endowed continent in the world yet the poorest on all scales of development. It is therefore correct to say that corruption is the reason Africa is not developing, and this has been brought about by bad leadership.

THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESS IN NIGERIA AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

There have been numerous scandals concerning the abuse of the public procurement process in Nigeria. For instance, it is believed that the reason the Ajaokuta Steel Complex, worth billions of dollars, failed to start production to its full installed capacity was as a result of the theft of monies meant for its operation, together with the awarding of contracts for the procurement of items and materials required for operations to incompetent contractors who were relatives, friends, political associates and campaign officials of the then ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by Alhaji Shehu Usman Shagari between 1979 and 1983.³³ This has become a major drawback in the developmental quest of the Nigerian state, as the steel company has the capacity to meet more than half of Africa's steel demands and could enhance the development of Nigeria in all spheres.

In a failed procurement attempt, the South African security agency seized an airplane from Nigeria allegedly used to smuggle over US\$9.3 million cash for the purchase of arms in September 2014. The aircraft was said to belong

to the erstwhile Christian Association Nigeria (CAN) President Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, who was also a close confidant of the then President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. This caused diplomatic problems between Nigeria and South Africa. Also in November 2015, Dasukigate started, when the former National Security Adviser Col. Sambo Dasuki (Rtd.) was charged by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for sharing, amongst relatives, friends, political associates, party loyalists and campaign officials of the then ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), the sum of US\$2.1 billion, which had been meant for the procurement of arms with which to wage the war against Boko Haram insurgents. This was at a time when Nigeria was under intense attack from this terrorist group, and the country's very sovereignty was undergoing a major challenge. In the end, no new weapons were bought, but the taxpayers' money was gone and many lives were endangered or even lost.

Another public procurement activity that went bad involved an Immigration Service job scandal in 2014. Erstwhile Minister of Interior Abba Moro and a Deputy Director in the ministry, F.O. Alayebami, alongside the former permanent secretary in the ministry, Mrs. Anastasia Daniel-Nwobia, and Drexel Global Tech Nigeria Limited were all prosecuted, charged with obtaining money by false pretences, procurement and money laundering. They were accused of defrauding 675,675 graduate applicants of about ₦625,675,000, and the applicants were made to pay ₦1000 each as a processing fee for 5000 job openings. In addition, they were accused of breaching the Public Procurement Act No. 65 of 2007 in awarding the contract for the organization of the recruitment test to Drexel Global Tech Nigeria Limited. This led to the death of many Nigerian graduates, owing to the poor handling of the process and the awarding of the contract to an incompetent company. Abuse of the public procurement process and rules is the major cause of leakages of government funds in Nigeria, and blame for this may be laid at the door of the visionless and prodigal leadership class. Instead of building the nation's future, by responsibly planning, they irresponsibly choose to build and nurture an unprecedentedly corrupt industrial complex.³⁴

The ruling class in Nigeria has for decades spent most of its time perfecting the shameful act of betraying public trust by repeatedly engaging in massive looting of the common patrimony of the people. Stories abound of the rerouting of billions of dollars of monies meant for power rehabilitation, road construction, Niger Delta development, maintenance of refineries and even the building of new ones. In the public procurement process, public resources are often distributed where kickbacks are high and tenders are given to the company or individual who pays the highest bribe, not the company or contractor that can deliver the best quality products and/or services or make the best investment; this is a major distortion of the mechanisms such as fair competition that promote progress. The ruling class has been at the forefront of the undermining of the rule of law, to the extent that they can get away with any act of lawlessness. They have also been able to influence all institutions of governance, thereby making them too weak to effectively avoid the manipulative tendencies of the ruling class.

CONCLUSION

Corruption, underdevelopment and Africa are indubitably linked. In contemporary times, Africa has become synonymous with corruption and the manipulation of due process. Most leaders and public officials see the state and public office as their patrimony and their private estate, hence their proclivity to loot from the coffers of the state without taking into consideration the corresponding damage on the economies of African countries. Being a major interface between public and private sectors, public procurement now provides an avenue for corrupt officeholders and private officials to divert public funds for their own personal gain. Ultimately, corruption shatters the confidence of citizens, organizations and investors in government, as is happening presently in Nigeria. And when government loses the people's trust, it will find it difficult to enforce rules that are aimed at increasing productive capacity, economic growth and the overall wellbeing of its citizens. When the leadership of a country is known to be corrupt, private sector organizations and investors alike also try to shirk their duties; trying to avoid tax, moving income offshore or bribing officials to secure trading licenses. The result of this is that the government is deprived of income; and there is therefore a negative ripple effect across the entire economy.

The impact of corruption on an economy is enormous; it contributes to the unjust distribution of income, discourages investment and distorts economic growth and development. In the long run, it affects efficiency in the supply chain activities of many procured goods and services, and it undermines both free and fair trade. Corruption cannot be totally annihilated, as it is often said that the average man is corrupt by nature, but it can be reduced to its barest minimum. Important strategies towards this end include changes in the organization of public procurement, greater transparency and attending to the supply side of corruption. Thus, the development of infrastructure and public procurement cannot be separated. It is true, though, that an efficient public procurement system can determine the quality of infrastructure. It follows that public procurement is a means of organizing the spending of public funds and accounts for a high proportion of government spending and expenditure. A transparent and efficient procurement system will certainly help in generating savings that can be used for developmental purposes.

However, political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful.

- There is the need to strengthen institutions of governance beyond what an individual leader or government official can manipulate. This is important because when institutions of governance are strong and well positioned they can effectively and efficiently deliver on their mandate. This is particularly important in the case of anti-graft agencies.
- Independent procurement relating to the procedures and criteria for evaluating bids is critical to improve transparency. The rules need to be

clear and there should be a well-documented explanation of the contract award. A board of contract appeals should also be appointed.

- Competition does not necessarily reduce corruption. However, applying international prices as benchmarks for procurement negotiations and requesting standardized goods and services does reduce the potential for corruption.
- Only companies that certify they meet anti-corruption commitments should be eligible for contract award. In addition, the activities of agents and middlemen should be regulated.
- To limit the opportunities for corruption created by the internet, its use should be restricted to the pre-qualification stage of bidding.

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PART VII

The Political Economy of Development

Challenges of Economic Development in Africa: The Dichotomy of a Debate and the Africanist View

Adewale Aderemi and Faeren Agaigbe

INTRODUCTION

The prospects for economic development at the apogee of Africa's political emancipation were promising; it was widely expected that the spur for global economic reconfiguration, a New International Economic Order (NIEO), would come from the continent and that several of the countries would emerge as Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). Africa started well: with a commodity boom and sufficient goodwill, several of the economies blossomed and dominated global production and distribution of important primary produce, such as palm oil, cashew nuts, timber, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts among others; they were also notable producers of mineral resources such as gold, bauxite, diamond, crude oil and iron ore. Indeed, it was Africa's incredible natural endowments that were assumed would allow its transformation into economic prosperity and development. However, by the mid-1970s, Africa, along with other post-colonial societies, had slipped from economic prosperity to stagnation, which quickly resulted in retrogression as incomes declined, the debt burden increased, living standards plummeted and a revolution of rising frustrations spilled over into political instability and intractable conflict.

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Our chapter navigates the spectrum of divergent opinions and debates about Africa's recalcitrant development dilemma, its origins and the oscillation of stratagems that have been evolved to resolve it. It is discussed into two sections, the first, after a brief discussion of the crisis itself, addresses the intellectual traditions identifiable in the development discourse in Africa. We trace a rather vibrant debate from the dominant evolutionary theories of metropolitan social science to the dependency revolution, the counterrevolution and what has been labelled the 'counter-counterrevolution'. Subsequently, the chapter addresses the policy prescriptions that emanated directly from these intellectual perspectives, from the Import Substitution Industrialization strategies of the 1960s to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) initiative, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and prevailing Policy Support Instruments (PSI), such as the Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PRSPs).

ORIGINS OF AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CRISIS

Several explanations have been adduced for the crisis of development in Africa varying from socio-political to technical and economic factors. The first post-independence decade was generally speaking a prosperous one for Africa, but the crisis in agricultural production that resulted in rising food import bills, acute food shortages and increasing dependence on food aid precipitated the decline of the continent. The oil shocks of 1973/1974 and 1979/1980 and the resultant global economic depression then exacerbated the situation. What eventually brought Africa to the nadir of economic misery and hopelessness was the debt problem that ensued from initial borrowings of recycled petrodollars to finance African budgets, especially unrevised import bills. Onimode classifies Africa's development experience into two broad periods, the pre-crisis period of up to the mid-1970s and the crisis period of the late 1970s and the adjustment years of 1980 and beyond.¹

Why exactly did the African crisis ensue, and why did it deepen rather than abate? Some have cited the nature and character of the post-independent African elite and urban class as a major cause. This class was not only 'praetorian',² but was also predatory, lacked vision and was totally ideologically bankrupt. Its disjuncture and aloofness from the rest of the populace set Africa on the path of self-destruction from very early on (Fanon 1967; Onimode 1989; Ake 1996; Dudley 1973, 1982; Ahmadu 1989).

Whereas Onimode identified the 'ideological vacuum' of the emergent post-colonial hegemonic class, arising from what he called 'fears of revolutionary pressures', Ahmadu (1989) alludes to 'the wrong way the African power elite perceived independence and the resulting way in which they managed their economies and society'. Ake's vituperative indictment of the political elite is much bolder and more acidic, though:

The ideology of development was exploited as a means of reproducing political hegemony; it got limited attention and served hardly any purpose as a framework for economic transformation. (Ake 1996: 9)

As far as Ake was concerned, the immediate post-independence political class all over Africa paid only lip service to the cause of socio-economic emancipation of the continent; for them, development was only a charade.

However, the sociological–ideological roots of the African crisis are not often considered to be as salient as the economic dimensions. As damaging as the apparent elite–mass disconnect of most post-colonial African societies was, and in spite of the overbearing and repressive nature of political power, which engendered what Onimode refers to as a culture of ‘silence and passivity’ precluding the public debate of national issues, it is the strictly economic matters that dominate the discourse about the origins of the African crisis.

The substantive causes of the African crisis are best appropriated by an eclectic approach. Methodologies that simply trace a parabola of very polemical debate and attempt at impassioned pontification conclude with a jaundiced narrative and also fail to synthesise the arguments of the contending traditions. Furthermore, a non-multidisciplinary, non-cross-cultural approach according to Sutcliffe risks missing out ‘important aspects of their origins and also fail to understand their specific nature’ (Sutcliffe 1986: 20).

What follows is an analysis of the intellectual debate about the origins/causes of Africa’s development dilemma, the contrasting policy prescription arising from the different traditions and articulation of the valid aspects of the contending arguments.

CONTENDING INTELLECTUAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE AFRICAN CRISIS

Speculations about the developmental future of the ‘New States’, the newly decolonised, former colonial empires of Asia, Africa and Latin America were blazed by the evolutionary models propounded by American social scientists, especially the modernization school best epitomised by Walt Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. A rather distinguished array of American scholars subscribed to Rostow’s naively optimistic model³ that states of the Third World would progress in stages, from being fatalistic traditional societies to becoming modern states replicating the socio-economic and industrial standards of the developed North.⁴ All they had to do was replace their traditional socio-political and economic institutions with more Western ones, embrace market economies and democratic rule—in short capitalism, and they would live happily ever after, just like Alice in Wonderland!

Incremental adjustments were introduced to this earliest liberal model in the course of time to explicate the unfamiliar and rather negative trends emerging from the Third World—military coups, authoritarian one-party rule, ethnic conflicts and civil wars, rampant corruption and general disaffection. Variables, such as the institutional atrophy of these states,⁵ their invariably poly-ethnic structures,⁶ and their political culture,⁷ were cited as reasons why they became politically unstable and economically backward.

Explanations such as the lingering pace of growing capitalist institutions behind the demise of traditional ones, the revolution of rising expectations and frustration thesis as well as claims that political culture varied directly with plurality and that African societies especially had a 'low political culture' (Finer 1962) dominated the discourse.

The dependency theory represents the first articulate challenge to the assumptions and arguments of the neo-liberal approach. It was propounded mainly by Marxist oriented Latin American scholars—André Gunder Frank, F.H. Cardoso, Raul Prebisch, Paul Singer and Osvaldo, and notable African scholars such as Samir Amin.

By the argument of the dependency school, the greatest defect of metropolitan scholarship was its neglect of the impact of the world capitalist system on the plight of developing societies. Dependency theorists affirm that the underdevelopment of the new states was perpetrated by the feudal interactional structure of the international capitalist system, and that the incorporation of these new states into peripheral capitalism through the Western impact is the root of their socio-political and economic impasse.

The dependency school holds the international capitalist system culpable for the underdevelopment of new states in all its ramifications, and puts forward the thesis that no meaningful understanding of politics in these states is possible unless it is perceived within the frame of this harsh milieu.

Furthermore the *underdevelopmentalists*, as the dependency theorists are also called, allege a conspiracy thesis. They argue that there is a comprador class in charge of the institutions of new states who serve the interests of foreign capital in exchange for privileged positions that are safeguarded by foreign economic and military power within their own underdeveloped societies. Unless this comprador class is exterminated, and new states delink from the world capitalist order by embarking on elaborate anti-capitalist, socialist formations, there cannot be any development in the real sense of that word for new states.

The dependency argument was substantiated by the Marxist/political economic school which argued that the crisis in the Third World was compounded by the social relations of production and class formation in Third World states, and that the petty bourgeoisie and its penchant for reproducing itself was as culpable as the international capitalist regime.⁸

The political economy school held sway and was substantiated by the seeming success of the Soviet Autarkic model. The USSR was not only a validation of New Deal Keynesianism but also proof that non-orthodox, non-liberal economic paradigms were feasible and had the advantage of fostering growth at a relatively faster pace. This was the intellectual revolution that opposed the dominance of neo-liberal economic thought.

In the late 1980s, buoyed by the political and economic chaos that had ensued in Africa, the increasing gap between the continent and the rest of the world in almost every development index, the obvious moribundity of the Soviet model and tensions in the former communist block of Eastern Europe after Gorbachev's planned reforms, the ascendancy of reactionary conservatives

Reagan, Thatcher and Kohl in major centres of the North, and very importantly the emergence of the four Asian Tigers, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan as NICs, the New Political Economy (NPE) school emerged to relaunch the neo-liberal argument.⁹ For them, the dominant interpretation of the African crisis was the ‘propensity of the elites and ruling groups for bad policies and poor governance’.¹⁰ The post-colonial African state was then demonised by an avalanche of epithets: ‘rentier’, ‘predatory’, ‘overextended’, ‘prebendal’, ‘crony’, ‘kleptocratic’, among others.¹¹ The New Political Economists, then offered the first explanation for the East Asian miracle—that the Asian Tigers epitomised the impeachability of the neo-liberal paradigm. The Asian miracle was hailed as the result of sound economic policymaking, an unfettered private sector and open market which served to trigger efficiency and competitiveness. The African crisis was a result of the omni-competence of the African state in the economic sphere. It was particularly vilified for destroying agricultural producers’ incentives for production by diverting exports proceeds to ambitious industrial projects. Preposterous suggestions such as dismantling state power were made by some of the scholars of this genre.^{12,13}

This new intellectualism became the counterrevolution to the challenge of the dependency/political economy school and became the pivot of the World Bank’s policy towards Third World states. The World Bank document *Towards Accelerated Development In sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action* (1981), better known as the Berg Report, was thought to be especially obnoxious throughout Africa, but still became the pivot for the SAPs of the mid-1980s and early 1990s.

The ‘internalist’ and ‘state minimalist’ arguments of the NPE school was particularly salient to and suited the purposes of the World Bank. As Mkandawire observes:

The World Bank was almost congenitally tied to the core argument of the Berg Report with its faith in the market and a minimalist view of the State. The 1994 (*Adjustment in Africa*) report insisted on the dichotomy made in African policy-making between State and market in which these appeared as rival forms thus reviving Manichean discourse that had over the years vitiated ‘development planning’ in Africa. (Mkandawire 2001: 4)

Fukuyama’s 1992 intervention, *The End of History and The Last Man*, is possibly the most charismatic of the NPE’s writings, its core argument being that the collapse of communism mapped a full circle of ideological contestations against the neo-liberal paradigm, and that for the rest of history no new ideology would emerge to rival the ascendancy of neo-liberalism—which is the fundamental thrust of the NPE argument.

In Africa, leftist scholars continued to brilliantly refute the claims of the NPE. Several scholars bore the torch for a radical rebuttal of neo-liberalism, which African leaders tended to accept hook, line and sinker.

Possibly the single most germane catalyst for the emergence of the counter-counterrevolution was the release of the very suspect document *Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s* by the World Bank in 1989 and the alterations it sparked between the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the World Bank. The thrust of the document was aptly summarised by the remark in its foreword by the Vice-President for Africa, Edward Jaycox, that 'Recovery has begun'. The document was fraught with several blunders—arbitrary generation and interpretation of (to say the least) dubious data, reckless and unsubstantiated assumptions, especially those leading to the conclusions in the document that on balance sub-Saharan Africa suffered least from external shocks between the 1970s and 1980s, and that beginning in 1985 economic recovery had begun in Africa.¹⁴

The counter-counterrevolution, a term coined by Paul Krugman, soon emerged to resurrect New Deal Keynesianism; the argument was not for centrist economic planning but inveighs against the unbridled classical economic doctrine of leaving everything to 'market forces'. According to Krugman:

this survey of intellectual developments may serve as a caution against carrying a free-market orthodoxy too far. It makes considerable sense for the World Bank and other multilateral agencies to push very hard for liberal policies in developing countries, given the demonstrated tendencies of these clients to engage in economically irrational interventions. But at the back of our minds we should remember that *it is not true that economic theory 'proves' that free markets are always best: there is an intellectually solid case for some government promotion of industry- one that has often seemed empirically plausible to sophisticated observers*. In order words, don't get caught up too much in the orthodoxy of the moment ... The lesson here is that *both casual empiricism and intellectual narrow-mindedness will lead one badly astray*. (Krugman 1992: 31–32 Authors' emphases)

The counter-counterrevolution inspired another detour in the Bretton Woods and multilateral institutions' management of Africa's economic management, symbolising more than anything else their confusion of agenda and at least partial indictment for the ideological basis of the grossly incompetent SAPs of the 1980s/1990s. Adedeji remarks of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF):

After years of an unbridled onslaught against the State, it is slowly dawning on the Bretton Woods institutions ... that States do have certain virtues, especially in countries where private structures are weak. (Adedeji 1995: 129)

The extant methodology for implementing the World Bank and the IMF's programmes is anchored by the badly vilified state, the previously rejected stone. The wisdom of development partnerships instructs at least a regulatory role for the state, as in its hypocritical counterparts in the North.

The reversion to some form of Keynesianism in the mid-1990s was also accelerated by the second and third explanations of the Asian miracle and the

subsequent Asian economic crisis that followed in the late 1990s. The argument that the Asian Tigers developed by their faithful adherence to the principles of market economies had become savagely mangled and totally discredited by the 1990s. It is common knowledge that the South Korean state during the Park regime for instance was far more 'economically omniscient' than most African states. With other evidence of the grievous breaches of classical economic doctrine by the Asian Tigers, the final explanation became that the East Asian success took place because the Asian Tigers were 'developmental states'.¹⁵ This final explanation lent further credence to the counter-counterrevolution and provided some momentum for its spread.

AN EXCURSUS OF AFRICA'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND STRATAGEMS

The earliest economic strategy progeny of neo-liberal intellectualism that received the widest patronage from the new states, embraced at some point or the other by most developing countries, were Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and export promotion or export-led growth.

ISI was aimed at fostering a national economy fairly independent of the rest of the world. The growth of the national economy was to be sustained by the expansion of the domestic market, because in the initial stages industries would be adequately protected against external competition and production would initially be for the home market.

ISI was also supposed to engender the conservation of foreign exchange that would otherwise have been spent on banned imports, which are afterwards diverted to local investments. A component of the strategy was the imposition of a relatively high tariff wall or total restrictions on imported substitutes to domestic manufacture.

Krueger explains that a variety of factors induced the preference for this strategy in developing countries. According to her, the infant industry argument—that an economic activity with perceived external economies in the long run could be incubated from competition in the formative years—provided the developing world with 'a rationale for imposing high levels of protection for domestic manufacturing industries' irrespective of whether the case was valid or simply motivated by a desire to industrialise and be self-sufficient. The other conditions that in her opinion dictated the choice of ISI were the pessimism arising from the Great Depression about the inelasticity of the prices of commodity products and Arthur Lewis' theory of surplus labour.¹⁶ Lewis (1954) had opined that to develop, developing countries needed to raise their profits from national incomes, and that this was only possible through industrialisation. Industrialisation in these societies in turn could only survive through protection.

The Harrod–Domar model was also influential in the choice of these strategies. Roy Forbes Harrod, an Oxford economist, and his Swedish counterpart, E.D. Domar, had propounded a growth theory linking income, savings and

investment. The implication for African and developing countries in general was that their lack of growth was a result of poor incomes, which resulted in poor savings and poor investment. To grow, therefore, these states needed to boost their incomes, the levels of their savings and consequently investments.

Export promotion strategy was contrived to create for the developing country a specialised role in the global economy. The developing economy was encouraged to concentrate attention and resources in the area of the world economy where it had the greatest comparative advantage. If properly implemented the strategy was supposed to generate considerable inflow of foreign capital.

Both of these strategies failed to foster the economic growth envisaged by African governments, for many reasons. First, there was too much emphasis on capital-intensive activities, and basic industries such as chemical and especially agro-allied industries were neglected, the result being that there was often no backward and forward economic linkage. The strategies were very dependent on importation of equipment and spare parts in particular. In the case of ISI, success was limited by internal demand and the 'narrow domestic base' as ISI tended to focus on the urban centres, an additional detriment of this being the massive rural-urban drift affecting most African cities. Furthermore, there was a huge need of limited foreign exchange to drive the strategy.

In his assessment of ISI, Turok makes the following observations:

There has been relatively little utilisation of local materials in the total production process and therefore little saving in foreign exchange ... Perhaps the biggest failure of the policy has been the failure to develop linkages backwards and forwards between agriculture and the rest of the productive economy¹⁷

In the case of Nigeria, ISI was preferred above other strategies such as export promotion and basic needs, but in implementation the strategy achieved only ephemeral success and remarkably failed to transform the Nigerian economy into the fairly self-sufficient model that was imagined, even in food production. The major features of Nigeria's ISI, which is typical of most sub-Saharan African countries, include the Nigerianisation of labour in the final stages of production, setting up of local assembly plants to ostensibly erect substantially finished products, pack and license manufacture.¹⁸ Both ISI and export promotion were huge failures in Africa and probably everywhere else except South East Asia, where they were implemented with grievous syncretism to the classical theory and the principles of free international trade in general. For instance the infant industry rationale was exploited to the point of making the Asian Tiger economies totally closed to the rest of the world, in promoting export-led growth, local manufactures that were inferior in quality when compared with global standards and produced at non-competitive costs by inefficient labour and technology. In addition, products were hugely subsidised to below world market prices and exported as cheaper brands. This sort of sharp practice, anomalous as it was, was condoned and ignored by the North.

The successor policies to the failed ISI and export promotion strategies, in part dictated by Marxist scholarship, were the basic needs and 'redistribution with growth' models. Both were short lived and applied in subservience to the dominant neo-liberal paradigms.

The policy-based lending of the 1980s and early 1990s marked the next significant phase of policy prescriptions and adoption in Africa. There were two components; the IMF programme was known as Stabilisation Policies and the World Bank's as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the difference between them being that while the former was aimed at reducing short-term disequilibrium, especially budget deficits, balance of payments deficits and inflation, the latter were concerned with restructuring economies towards greater efficiency in the medium term.¹⁹ These sets of policies represent the comprehensive prescription of the North for development in the so-called Less Developed Countries (LDCs); a World Bank programme is hardly implemented without an IMF programme already in place.

The avowed objectives of World Bank Adjustment programmes include:

- Reduction in the size of and better financial performance of the public sector.
- Improving the efficiency of resource utilisation in the economy, promotion of domestic savings in both the public and private sectors.
- Trade liberalisation and dismantling of artificial tariff walls, and so on. This must be pursued in tandem with export promotion, institutional support and incentives for export/exporters.
- Institutional reforms and elimination of price distortions in various sectors of the economy²⁰

According to Gana, 'the main features of the Structural Adjustment Programme are well known'. They include:

- Adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy.
- Rationalisation and restructuring of tariffs.
- Strengthening of demand management policies.
- Adopting measures to stimulate domestic production and to broaden the supply base of the economy.
- Adoption of appropriate pricing policies.
- Commercialisation and/or privatisation of government parastatals.
- Deregulation of the economy through the reduction/elimination of complex administrative controls, with greater reliance on market forces.
- Increased trade and payments liberalisation.²¹

According to Adedeji, 'Because of their excruciating debt servicing obligations and the near-permanent need to have them rescheduled, they [African countries] ... abandoned their own developmental strategy in favour of SAPs, seeing these programmes as the price to be paid for a sympathetic hearing from their creditors' (Adedeji *ibid.* 138).

Stabilisation and SAPs have been variously denounced not only in Africa but the Third World as a whole. The greatest deficiency of these liberal prescriptions is their grievous neglect of the political context of Africa, where socio-economic problems especially thrive and have deep roots. A strictly economic recipe could only produce cosmetic and very short-term relief, which disguises the more fundamental structural problems; a temporary reprieve buys time and diverts attention while the structural dislocations and distortions get more complicated.

Harrigan, on Malawi, notes that 'a significant sustained macro-economic improvement failed to materialise because the SAL [Structural Adjustment Loan] programme neglected to tackle fundamental structural requirements'.²²

Generally, these programmes are regarded as destined to fail in a social context like Africa's, and the whole of the South or Third World for that matter. Firstly, the programmes do not identify with the aspirations and goals of Africa: emphasis was on short-term financial symmetry and the concern was for the stability of the international system. Onimode submits that 'even if these programmes had succeeded in meeting their own performance targets, we would still regard them as having failed, because they have not satisfied the objectives that African countries have set for themselves'.²³

The most popular critique of the SAPs was in its prescription by the 'mad doctor' as an elixir for all ailments and all peoples. The programme did not take into account the specificities in the experiences of sometimes vastly different economic formations: whether Argentina or Burundi, India or Togo, the prescription was the same.

Olukoshi observed the Bretton Woods duo continued to be impenitent even after it became obvious SAPs had failed woefully, 'blaming implementational slippages by African countries and less in questioning the validity of the assumptions that underpinned the adjustment package in the light of observed reality' (Olukoshi 2002: 3).

The linear policy successor to the SAPs is NEPAD's Development Framework, introduced in 2002 after significant political reconfiguration of the continent; the avowed objective of the initiative is basically to tackle poverty all over the continent by promoting economic growth. NEPAD is also committed to pursuing the MDGs. The initiative reckons that by achieving an average growth rate of 5% continent-wide, poverty levels would be stabilised for up to 2015 and that, by achieving an average growth rate of 7%, it would be halved by the same time. Analyses of the NEPAD strategy are already robust and still burgeoning, in less than four years of its launch; it must be the second most popular subject of African social science research in the past fifteen years or so after the SAPs. For our present purposes, a comprehensive assessment of NEPAD is not required, but suffice to say that:

Whilst the overall vision and goals of NEPAD are very commendable, copious aspects of the initiative and principally its philosophy and assumptions are severely flawed ... it needs be stated that the blueprint is unlikely to take Africa through the woods to the path of sustainable development.²⁴

Mbaye refers to NEPAD as 'repackaged SAP',²⁵ Olukoshi remarks on its uncanny resemblance to the 'political conditionalities and governance reforms of Western donors',²⁶ and Muammar Ghadaffi calls it 'a racist tool of neo-colonialists'.

THE AFROCENTRIC MODEL: WHAT IS IT?

Afrocentrism is quite dated in the annals of African development discourse but as Hugo observed as recently as 1998, 'Afrocentric ideology, both as an idea and in any accessible form remains elusive; at least on paper ant to outsiders'.²⁷ The Afrocentric model that African scholars have at various times and in various forms espoused is often presented as a preferred alternative to neo-liberal approaches in the resolution of the African crisis, but Afrocentrism is not an antonym for neo-liberalism, it is more.²⁸

Mazrui's definition of Afrocentricity is that it is 'the study of the human condition from an African perspective'; for him, 'Afrocentricity is a quest for a reconciliation of opposites, confronting Eurocentrism with its ultimate other – Africinity'.²⁹ Within the context of Africa's development experience, Mazrui's conceptualisation will be irreproachable since the dominant dogma is Eurocentric by content and origin, but technically speaking Afrocentricity could also confront Latinocentrism as well as Asianocentrism or any other dogma from any non-African civilisation.

In another work Mazrui indirectly espouses a fivefold thrust of Afrocentrism—indigenisation, domestication, cultural diversification, horizontal interpenetration and counterpenetration.³⁰

The pedestrian definition of Afrocentrism that will thread through the whole gamut of the conceptualisation of its different proponents can be simply put: Africa centredness. Afrocentrism is a concept that explicates the predominantly (not purely) African identity of a matter; in fact, the most crucial conditionality of Afrocentrism is that its root must be solidly planted in African culture, experience, conditions and vision, and first and foremost be beneficial to the continent. Afrocentrism is cultural relativism, rebellion against hegemonic cultural dogmatism, but not necessarily superimposition over or submergence of other cultures. Therefore, an Afrocentric model is teleological and tendentially driven towards a predetermined goal—the greater good of Africa.

Thus, if arising from some lessons learnt in his many wars, Shaka Zulu compels his impis to wear British suits and eat with chopsticks to enhance further victories and safeguard the Zulu kingdom, this would qualify as an Afrocentric strategy. Whereas if in order to supply the cotton needs of Yorkshire's textile industries at a net loss, Africa decides to adopt traditional African farming methods, this would not qualify as an Afrocentric approach.

What then confers Afrocentric identity? Is it the ebony skin, ethnic homogeneity, geographical fixation, common socio-cultural heritage or common historical ancestry? None of these variables is appropriate for qualifying Africanness. The dark skin as a yardstick will exclude the whole of Maghreb

Africa, the Sahel including the light-skinned Fulanis of Northern Nigeria, the whole of the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean countries. It will also alienate the coloured Africans of South Africa. Aside from this, the dark-skinned aborigines of Australia, and native tribes of Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Samoan Islands will be classified Africans. A further problematic will be the assumption that the lighter you are the less African you are, and vice versa. Of course Africa is not ethnically homogeneous but composed of dozens of nations with sometimes deep cultural differences: the Yorubas of Nigeria and Masais of Kenya are for instance as similar as the Berbers of the Sahel and Zulus of South Africa, and the Kikuyus are as close to the Tuaregs as they are to the Anglo-Saxons or Indians. What bestows Africanness primarily, though not exclusively, is the common experiences of the pre-slavery, slave trade, colonial and postcolonial epochs. The rich history of the trans-Saharan trade and cultural exchanges over many centuries. These, added to geography, neo-imperial exploitation and global marginalisation, are the most common denominators of Africanness in the twenty-first century.

The renewed call for a new developmental paradigm is sufficient indictment for the repeated failures or weakness of erstwhile paradigms, including NEPAD. Although NEPAD is widely touted as 'African owned' and 'African driven', it is clearly not an Afrocentric initiative:

NEPAD is constructed on the waste-places of western strategies that are renowned for their emphatic failures in Africa and seriously underpinned and driven by neo-liberal principles. (Aderemi 2002: 23)

The heart of the development debate in Africa has always been the applicability of the neo-liberal approach and lately the replicability of the East Asian model, almost all African and Africanist scholars have at one point or the other pointed out the inappropriateness of neo-liberalism on the bases of its assumptions, thrust and goals for Africa. Ake puts it succinctly:

To begin with we have pursued development with a confusion of purposes and interests and with policies full of ambiguities and contradictions. It is not that we could not find suitable notions of development or ways to apply them to our experience. The problem lies with major agents of development; our governments, the multinationals, the IMF, the World Bank, and the imperial powers. Each of them propagates an idea of development corresponding to its interests and images of the world. (Ake 1989: 49)

The South Commission and various other scholars and analysts have shown that the neo-liberal policies, especially the Bretton Woods institutions' policies, are defective for Africa:

The Bank's theoretical paradigm and its neo-classical theoretical underpinnings are at best valid only under extremely restrictive assumptions, that is, there is perfect competition and full employment of resources; that there are no externalities

of production and consumption; and that there are decreasing or constant returns to scale, among other things. However, in a world of increasing returns to scale both in the static and dynamic sense, of monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, and of incomplete markets, markets left to themselves may not yield full employment of society's resources, let alone further economic growth.³¹

What, then, must be the cogent cardinal policy thrust of an Afrocentric model? The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) remains arguably the most pragmatic Afrocentric model that has been enunciated in Africa, although it draws heavily on the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), which, though impeccable in terms of its afrocentric thrust, is too radical and less pragmatic. Beyond combining the well-known aspects of the AAF-SAP and Mazrui's sensible fivefold strategy above, a plausible model for Africa must:

- Prioritise agriculture. Agricultural production must be restructured with a new emphasis on production for domestic food sufficiency rather than export. Consequently, reversion must be made to the production of food rather than cash crops.
- Revise educational curricula to reverse the trend of what Mazrui has called 'education without training', transmitting Western values without transferring Western skills. And without necessarily romanticising African history, to inculcate its study as a core module in the educational system at appropriate levels. In addition efforts should be made to replace foreign languages of educational instruction with local dialects.
- Adapt borrowed but useful Western concepts and institutions to the African ecology, such as political parties, democracy and parliament.
- Address the negative values of neo-liberalism—aggressive individualism, winner takes all, zero-sum nature of political competition, morbid attachment to economic growth rather than economic development.
- Sustain pan-Africanism.

CONCLUSION: CAN ANYTHING GOOD COME OUT OF NAZARETH?

Suddenly Africa is on the threshold of global significance. '2015 will be a decisive year for the continent' is a sentiment that resonates in development debates but whether this is prophetic or a cliché remains to be seen.

The justifications for this are obvious: the increasing prevalence of Africa's crisis—the continent's worrisome conflicts, deepening poverty, debt crisis, trade and financial flows, all dilemmas on the agenda of multilateral summits at the behest of the North (not Africa), is the main reason for the upbeat thoughts about an African resurgence. However, this is still hollow and little more than lip service; no cogent action has yet resulted.

Since 2002 at Kananaskis, when Africa for the first time featured on the agenda of the world's richest nations' annual conference, African leaders have been invited to every G8 Summit. Presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki, Wade and Secretary General Anan have attended the G8 assembly at Evian-les-Bains (France), Sea Island (USA) and Gleneagles (Scotland) in 2005.

The MDGs progress report of 2010 unanimously concluded that the MDGs were largely elusive in Africa and the United Nations summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda which convened in New York in September 2015, enunciated a new development framework known as Special Development Goals. Will any good come out of this? Has any good come out of almost five decades of interaction with the North?

The Commission for Africa (CFA) report is superficially Africa friendly, pressing the African case even more ardently than the African owned NEPAD, It is gladdening that some marginal gains in tune with the CFA Report have been recorded, precisely the debt cancellations of 2006 and easing of some demand-side trade constraints such as stringent inspection regimes.

Can anything good come out Afrocentrism? Is it feasible in the sense of the extremely inexorable nature of the extant global order's attitude towards Africa? Do African leaders and policymakers have the capacity to implement and coordinate a harmonised Afrocentric agenda. Will Africa ever emerge from this present darkness?

The greatest damage that was wrought by the slave trade and colonialism is not the stupendous looting of the continent but the brutalisation, subjugation and near annihilation of the African psyche, a mentality that has carried on until the present. Davidson remarks:

Read or re-read any of these great schemes for adjustment and readjustment and you will be reminded that they all assume that useful or usable history in this continent starts from colonial take-over. Before that? A void, a tumult, a panoply of ornamental titles at best.³²

The Tokugawa dynasty and the Meiji restoration in Japan, Kamal Atatürk in Turkey and the managers of the state in East Asia have successfully modernised without Westernising, Africa can also do it.

NOTES

1. Bade Onimode, B. *A Future for Africa: Beyond Politics of Adjustment*. London: Earthscan, 1992.
2. A term first invented by Billy Dudley. See Dudley, B.J. (1982) *An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: Macmillan).
3. Including Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, Samuel Huntington, Talcott Parsons, Lucian Pye, Samuel E. Finer and Karl Deutsch.
4. The Third World in the throes of the Cold War referred to the emergence of a different ideological grouping, of non-aligned states as opposed to capitalism (First World) and communism (Second World). The term was not originally a socio-economic taxonomy.

5. The classic is Zolberg, A., "The Structure of Political Conflict in New States of Tropical Africa" in *American Political Science Review*, 62, 1 (March 1968).
6. Morrison, D.G., and Stevenson, H.M., "Cultural Pluralism, Modernisation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis of Sources of Political Instability in African Nations" in *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, March 1972.
7. Finer, S.E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of The Military in Politics* (New York: Frederick Praeger Inc., 1962) pp. 86–139, Almond, G., "Comparative Political System" in Eulam, H., Janowitz, M., and Eldersveld, S.J. (eds.), *Political Behaviour: A Reader in Theory and Research*.
8. See Cohen, Robin, (1972) "Class in Africa: Analytical Problems and Perspectives" in Miliband, R., and Seville, J. (eds.), *The Socialist Register* (London: The Merlin Press), Randall, V. and Theobald, R. (1985) *Political Change And Underdevelopment: A Critical Introduction to Third World Politics* (London: Macmillan).
9. See Toye, J. (1987), Lancaster, C. (1988), Lal, D. (1992), Bates (1981, 1988), Fukuyama, F. (1992), John Iliffe *The Emergence of African Capitalism 1984*, Paul Kennedy *African Capitalism: The Struggle for Ascendancy 1988*.
10. Arrighi, G. (2002) p. 6.
11. See Mkandawire, T. (2001).
12. See Bates 1981, the Berg Report 1981.
13. See Aina 1993, Arrighi 2002, Aderemi 2004.
14. See Mosley and Weeks (1993) for an excellent analysis.
15. For an excellent discourse of the developmental state, especially in reference to Africa, see Mkandawire (2001).
16. Krueger, A. *Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA, London: MIT Press, 1993).
17. Turok, B. *What Can Be Done?* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987) p. 15.
18. See Graf, W. *The Nigerian State: Political Economy, Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era.* (Portsmouth: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1988).
19. Stewart, F., Lall, S. and Wangwe, S. *Alternative Development Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1992) pp. 4–5.
20. Stewart et al., op cit., pp. 6–7, AAF-SAP p. 17.
21. Gana, A. *Reflections on the Structural Adjustment Programme* in Olaniyan, R.O. & Nwoke, C. (eds.) (1989).
22. Harrigan, J. *Malawi* in Moseley, P., Harrigan, J. and Toye, J. *Aid And Power*, Volume 2 (London, New York: Routledge, 1991) pp. 201–264.
23. Onimode, B. (ed.) *Alternative Development Strategies for Africa, Volume 1: Coalition for Change* (London: Institute For African Alternatives, 1990) p. 48.
24. Aderemi, A. (2004) *The Post-Bipolarity, Terrorism and Interpretations for Africa* (paper presented at the AISA-DPMF Conference on Africa & Global Governance in The Aftermath of 9/11, UN Conference Centre, Addis Ababa, December 6–7, 2004).
25. Mbaye, S. (2002) NEPAD: The Wrong Plan? In *West Africa Issue* 4333, July 8–14, pp. 29–31.
26. Olukoshi, A. (2002) *Governing the African Development Process: The Challenge of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)* Unpublished paper delivered at Nigeria Institute for International Affairs, July.

27. See Hugo, P. (1998) *Transformation: The Changing Context of Academia in Post-Apartheid South Africa* in *African Affairs* Vol. 97, #386 p. 5–27.
28. The long list of African scholars who studied the Afrocentric model would include Samir Amin, Paul Baran, Adele Jinadu, Mahmoud Mamdhani, Ben Magubane, Claude Ake, Eskor Toyo, Guy Mhone, Bade Onimode, Fantu Cheru, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Yash Tandon, Issa Shivji, Adebayo Adedeji, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja and Julius Ihonvbere.
29. Mazrui, A. (1993) p. 1.
30. Mazrui (2001) pp. 79–83.
31. See The South Centre, *Towards An Economic Platform for the South* (Geneva: The South Commission, 1998) p. 53.
32. See Basil Davidson (1993) *For A Politics of Restitution* in Adedeji, A. (ed.) *Africa Within the World*.

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Resource Governance and the Crisis of Development

Cyril Obi

INTRODUCTION

While there has been great interest in the linkages between natural resource governance, conflict and insecurity in Africa (Obi 2016; Ebiede 2016; Aall and Crocker 2016), critical attention is also being paid to the gap between natural resource abundance and development. Such interest has gained more traction in the wake of two conflicting narratives: that of a “rising” Africa based on global commodity boom (The Economist 2011; Saville and White 2015) and that of a post-boom burst characterized by falling global oil, mineral and agricultural commodity prices. The optimistic view of Africa prospects was buoyed by an impressive resource boom-fueled growth rate that placed it among the fastest growing regions of the world between 2001 and 2014 (African Economic Outlook 2016). However, more recent evidence suggests that in spite of the earlier euphoria linked to the natural resource boom and high gross domestic product (GDP) growth figures, the idea of a “rising” Africa is either “superficial” (Taylor 2016, 10; Cheru 2016, 1273) or problematic. In a recent study, Ian Taylor (2016, 9) makes the point that “beyond the growth figures, ongoing dynamics are actually deepening Africa’s dependent position in the global economy” (citing Sylla 2014).

This chapter goes a step further by exploring the possible linkages between the recent collapse in global commodity prices for Africa’s natural resource exports, particularly oil, minerals and cash crops, and the crises of development in some countries. Three aspects of the emerging crisis that come to mind

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include growth without development, shrinking national revenues, widening inequality, growing levels of poverty and unemployment, violence and intolerance. These have reignited the debates around the feasibility of and/or risks embedded in natural resource-based development and poverty reduction in Africa. These rage not only across the state–market divide, but also over the risks and uncertainties linked to economic reliance on a volatile global market (natural resource exports).

The foregoing challenge is aptly captured in a question recently raised by Ovadia (2016). He asks: “Can Africa realistically rely on natural resource-led development given that some are suggesting Africa’s boom is over?” It becomes relevant given the mono-cultural structure of Africa’s resource-dependent economies and their susceptibility to the boom and bust cycles of the global capitalist market. Given that Africa’s resource-endowed states, in spite of decades of high export earnings, have largely failed to achieve real economic transformation and remain largely stuck in the role of primary product producers, the struggle for development remains pertinent to the African project. Apart from the continued search for a more viable and sustainable path to Afro-centric development, it raises a more immediate question as to the place and role of resource governance in correcting some of the structural distortions in African economies and providing a radical response to the question, “whose development?” This also connects with another pertinent question: is “efficient” resource governance the panacea to Africa’s development crisis?

This chapter interrogates the natural resource development nexus not just in relation to whether “natural resource-based development (which has largely failed) is a realistic option for Africa,” but goes further to critically examine some of the emerging options embedded in “economic diversification and local content development” (Ovadia 2016), “economic integration” (Saville and White 2015, 1–21) and “inclusive green growth” (UN-ECA 2016), which are being proffered as possible ways out of the (resource-based) development conundrum. It also raises questions about the political economy of resource-rich African states, particularly the ways in which they have engaged with the forces and processes of globalization, including the attendant consequences (and complications). While broadly addressing the issue of natural resource-led growth and crisis in Africa, this chapter focuses more on petroleum—oil and gas—as a natural resource that has defined most of the debates in the literature, particularly as it relates to the “oil curse.”

In setting about the task of exploring the challenges and prospects of natural resource-based development and its linkages to the persisting crisis of underdevelopment, this chapter is divided into four broad parts. The introduction provides the background and objectives, including questions that define the scope of the chapter. It is followed by a conceptual section on the political economy of natural resource governance, including its linkages to globalization and the politics and economics of resource-based development in Africa. This is followed by a critical analysis of resource governance and the crisis of development, drawing on the case of Africa’s largest oil producer and exporter,

Nigeria. The fourth and concluding section sums up the points made in the preceding sections and examines the various options for Nigeria's sustainable resource governance and development.

A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

As noted earlier, the discourse around the natural resource development nexus has been largely framed by the debate over how resource abundance impacts growth. This has assumed greater resonance in a context marked by the “high dependence of African economies on natural resources”, and the challenge of addressing ‘the sustained and increased pressure on resources such as minerals, forests, land, water and marine resources’ (UN-ECA 2016, 1). Most of the emphasis in the debates, however, is placed on explaining the “correlation between resource endowment and negative developmental outcomes” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Shaxson 2005; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013). Resource abundance has been linked to resource-determinism, whereby resource endowment has been linked to a “resource curse” (on development) and violent conflict (Obi 2016, 93). So much has been written on the resource curse as a “tragedy of endowment” (Alao 2007) or a scourge on Africa's resource-rich economies. For example, several authors attribute the failure of oil- or mineral-rich African states such as Nigeria to develop, in spite of immense resource endowment, to the existence of an oil curse (Oyefusi 2008, 539–555; Le Billon 2010). While there are those that reject the existence of the resource curse (Koubi et al. 2014), some see it as a “political and economic construct—a product of a constellation of social forces, histories and hegemonic power relations built around the commoditization of particular resources for the global market” (Obi 2010, 445).

There is a view that “the three mechanisms” of the resource curse are “the Dutch Disease, Expansive Spending and the Rentier State” (Roll and Sperling 2011, 9–10). These culminate in a set of negative results ranging from inflation to corruption and the waste of resources, resulting in poverty (and underdevelopment) in the midst of plenty. Such analysis poses the problem in relation to how to reverse the resource curse. Economists and political scientists seem to have taken the lead in seeking to “exorcize” the continent of the so-called resource curse by applying market and liberal principles to the quest for transparency in the efficient management and allocation of resources. This raises questions as to how resource-rich states can best manage their natural resources, mediate competing claims to such resources and, ultimately, transform and channel the wealth accruing from such resources towards developmental ends. Will developmental states better govern resources or should they be left to the invisible forces of the market?

It is in this regard that the discourse has moved in the direction of resource or environmental governance. As noted elsewhere, “natural resource governance discourse has largely focused on issues of sustainable development, by either

creating institutions and policies aimed at ensuring accountability and transparency in resource management, and building capable watchdog institutions and a virile civil society to monitor the state and its agencies” and “stop the abuse and mismanagement of natural resources” (Obi 2016, 99). Alstine (2014, 22) offers a perspective that “resource governance means the hard and soft rules that shape how hydrocarbons contribute to sustainable and poverty alleviation within host countries.” While this may be taken to reflect more of the ends rather than the means of resource governance, it coheres with a dominant narrative that pushes for transparency (with civil society holding resource states accountable) and efficient allocation of resources. The point, however, is that much of the resource governance discourse/narrative is of limited analytical value and stops short of interrogating the power relations underpinning the access, extraction and commodification of resources.

This is where a radical political economy approach becomes pertinent in unraveling the value-laden nature of resource governance. This is partly because of its connections with economic globalization and its being “driven by NGO [non-governmental organization] advocacy, the reputational concerns of Western governments, international financial institutions, and transnational extractive firms” (Alstine 2014, 22). Examples of such resource governance initiatives include the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) among others (*ibid.*, 23). A radical approach enables us to go beyond the politics that underpin the (voluntary and non-threatening) international agenda of transparency and unravel its serious limitations, whilst recognizing the power relations that undergird the managerial approach of mainstream resource governance, particularly in relation to the extractive ethos of state and corporate actors. Far from being a neutral process of mediating competing demands/pressures on natural resources by state and non-state actors, a radical approach demonstrates that it is really a struggle for power/control over, access to and exploitation of natural resources for profit, and resistance by those whose livelihoods are threatened by large-scale extraction. At the global level, the struggle is structured by Africa’s position in the global political economy as a producer of primary commodities for the global market and an importer of finished goods. It is an international system in which Africa is structurally disadvantaged. In most cases, non-renewable natural resources are extracted for profit, which often ends up outside the continent.

As Taylor (2016, 10) notes, “most African economies are integrated into the global economy in ways that are generally unfavorable to the continent and ensure structural dependence.” He goes on to enumerate some of the natural resources that dominate Africa’s exports as “agricultural products: coffee, cocoa, cotton, peanuts, fruits, oil palm etc.; and oil and minerals such as copper, gold, rare metals, diamonds etc.” Noting that Africa has largely been stuck in the same disadvantaged position in the global political economy for a long time, Taylor contends that “there is a desperate need to translate growth into structural change, expressed as an increase in the share of industry or services in the economy” (2016, 11), as a way out of underdevelopment or what

is in reality a crisis of development—growth without development. In this way, a radical approach enables us to interrogate mainstream approaches to resource governance, as well as establish a basis for understanding the imperative to change the status quo and foster a participatory process in restructuring resource governance, as a catalyst for repositioning the continent in a globalizing world on the basis of sustainable and equitable Afrocentric development.

RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: NIGERIA, CAN OIL BECOME A CATALYST FOR CHANGE?

The case of Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer and exporter, offers a good basis for interrogating resource governance. For over five decades, the country earned billions of dollars from the production and export of crude oil and gas, but remains immersed in a crisis of development, further complicated by oil pollution, poverty and episodic attacks on oil assets and infrastructure by local militias in the oil-producing Niger Delta region. Recent trends suggest that the collapse of global oil prices (Nigeria's chief foreign exchange earner) has led to an estimated 35% shortfall in national revenues with a near-disastrous impact on the economy. Some have even argued that Nigeria's economic recession is partly the result of the knock-on effect of long years of the mismanagement of oil revenues and the activities of corrupt/predatory elites. Others have gone as far as blaming oil "as a curse" on the country's developmental efforts. In between, the fundamental or strategic question confronting resource governance remains: can oil be the key to Nigeria's development after decades of "failure"? If so, how and under what conditions?

In one of his observations on the cause of the recent Nigerian economic crisis, President Buhari noted as follows: "We made a terrible mistake by becoming a mono-product economy hinged on oil, and we are now in a volatile situation due to the crash in oil prices" (Cited in Wright 2016). Based on this logic, "economic diversification" is proposed as the panacea to dependence on oil. Will dependence on several or many (alternate/natural) resources resolve the crisis, or will the solution come from structural transformation rather than diversification?

As noted elsewhere, perceptions about the oil development nexus have been partly informed by the "resource curse" and "oil rentier state" discourses that seek to demonstrate that resource governance has largely fueled corruption and conflict and subverted national development (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013; Obi 2010, 445; 2014, 147–153). Such thinking appears to dominate state and civil society's responses to Nigeria's economic crisis.

This view is rather problematic. Resource governance in Nigeria has been highly politicized, leading to rather complex outcomes. The structural distortions embedded in Nigeria's economy during colonial rule have persisted five decades into the post-colonial era. What has happened is the replacement of earnings from the production of primary products/cash crops such as cocoa, rubber, groundnuts and hides and skin, and minerals such as tin, columbite and coal, since the end of the civil war in 1970, by revenues from oil and gas exports.

The structure of the economy is still extraverted, producing primary commodities for the global market, while importing semiprocessed and finished goods. Apart from the wholesale commodification of oil destined for the global market, there are very few linkages between domestic oil and gas production and other sectors of the economy. This feeds into a paradoxical situation in which the country exports oil and imports the byproducts of oil, such as gasoline, diesel and plastics. Worse still, the post-structural adjustment years witnessed the deindustrialization of the economy, as priority was given to exporting more oil to earn more foreign exchange.

In spite of being structurally integrated into the global economic system on clearly disadvantageous terms, most of the responses by state and civil society have remained focused on addressing a “resource curse.” Often overlooked is the politics of natural resource governance in relation to the international political economy, and the interests of dominant local and transnational elites in resource extraction and the accumulation of wealth. In spite of the ownership of oil by the Nigerian state, oil extraction/production is dominated by oil transnational corporations, which also control technology of extraction, implying considerable external leverage over Nigeria’s most strategic resource, reducing the state to a rent collector. Apart from showing that resource governance is not the exclusive preserve of the Nigerian state—although this very much appears to look like the case—it also enables us to understand the implications of approaching resource governance from a purely managerial or allocative perspective.

The politics of resource governance operates at several levels. In the Nigerian case, the struggle involves extractive social forces, represented by the petro-state and oil companies, seeking to maximize profits, and social groups and people excluded from access or whose livelihoods are threatened by oil exploration, production and pollution, seeking inclusion/compensation or an end to the destruction of their ecosystem(s). At another level, it takes the form of a struggle to address an “oil curse” by working towards better forms of resource governance, largely through advocacy and mobilizing people to demand more effective mechanisms and institutions for ensuring transparency and accountability (from the state and oil companies), national control, as well as ensuring equitable distribution of the benefits from resource endowments for the equal benefit of citizens and the society at large. Often, this struggle is led by reformists who advocate for the diversification of the economy, increased use of local content and the reallocation of oil revenues in a manner more likely to facilitate development and peace.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND STRUGGLE FOR SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

Efforts by some civil society groups have coalesced around sensitizing members of the public to the need to demand for accountability in the way (state) oil revenues are collected and spent by the various tiers of government or

their agencies. Such organizations rely on the use of campaigns, training and awareness programs, and public demonstrations to defend the rights of people to demand accountability from the government and regulatory institutions. From a historical perspective early attempts to demand accountability from the Nigerian state and oil companies were largely driven by oil workers and students unions, professional bodies and local oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta. Led by local elites or community/associations/town unions, the initial oil community-driven demands were framed in terms of protests against oil corruption, oil pollution, lack of compensation for destruction of farmlands, fishing ponds, economic trees, demands for development projects and so on. These evolved into larger non-violent protests, eventually connecting with international human and environmental rights discourses in the 1990s, before taking a turn to a mix of violent militancy/resistance in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

One of the fallouts of the internationalization of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People's (MOSOP) non-violent protest against the state and Shell for the exploitation and pollution of Ogoniland, including the execution of the "Ogoni Nine" in 1995, was the turn to other aspects of the discourse on international governance, including democracy, human rights and corporate social responsibility. It was within the discourse of what constituted governance that some activists, scholars and technocrats in the 1990s popularized terms such as accountability, transparency and democracy as key constituents of a neo-liberal approach to "development." It was within this discourse that some civil society groups after Nigeria's return to democratic return in 1999 adopted a "new" campaign for sustainable resource governance. It could be argued that following the successful campaign against military dictatorship, the stage was set to extend the campaign beyond the demand for environmental and ethnic minority rights, protection against human rights abuses and pollution, to the demand for transparency and accountability in the management of Nigeria's oil resource. It signaled a concerted effort by civil society to mobilize the public to put pressure on the newly elected government to reform the oil sector, which had a long-established reputation of being steeped in secrecy, high-level corruption and insensitivity to the plight of people living in oil-producing/host communities.

Partly owing to such pressures, and partly to shore up its credibility at home and abroad, the Nigerian federal government joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2003. The EITI is "a global coalition of governments, companies and civil society working together to improve openness and accountable management of revenues from natural resources" (EITI homepage). By 2007, the government had established the Nigerian Extractive Industries Initiative (NEITI), which has since undertaken and produced audit reports based on reviews of financial activities of the Nigerian oil and gas industry: 2004, 2005, 2006–2008, 2009–2011, 2012 and 2013. The establishment of the NEITI provided an institutional framework for monitoring the industry and providing information on the management of oil revenues. Civil society

has been able to use such information to raise public awareness to some extent, but has not been able to drive and sustain an agenda of transformation.

In spite of some of their shortcomings, it is apposite to identify some of the leading groups in the struggle for accountability and transparency in resource governance. They include national organizations such as Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Nigeria, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), Centre for Leadership, Strategy and Development (CLSD), Environmental Rights Action (ERA), Stakeholders Development Network (SDN), BudgIT and Oil Revenue Tracking Initiative (ORTI). Others include professional and labor unions affiliated to the oil and mineral sectors. Several civil society organizations work with or are supported by international NGOs such as the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NGRI), Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER), Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Oxfam Novib and the World Bank (Communications with Garuba 2014a).

Several commentators agree that although the audit reports provide information of the financial problems facing the management of oil revenues, and identified several technological and infrastructural deficiencies plaguing the Nigerian oil industry, the knowledge has fed neither corrective policies nor actions (Joab-Peterside 2013). Worse, many civil society organizations are hobbled by their own internal contradictions and capacity deficits (Abutudu et al. 2012). Oversight bodies in the federal and state legislative bodies hardly fare better. Like earlier NEITI reports, that of 2013 points to modest gains in terms of increased information on oil revenues and the operations of the oil and solid mineral sectors. Reports also note a particular case where \$3.8 billion was “either lost or unremitted by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and its sub-units” (Udo 2016, quoting Minister of Mines and Steel Development and Chair of the Board of the NEITI).

Elsewhere in the report, it is noted that about “\$5.96 billion was unrealized revenue in the federation account due to Offshore Processing Agreement, crude swap and crude theft during the year” (ibid). Such instances underscore the point that the demand for transparency and accountability may have led to revelations about the extent of losses in natural resource revenue, but such knowledge has not been backed by the capacity of civil society to take any concrete steps towards ensuring that perpetrators are punished, lost revenues recovered or the transformation of the structure and influence of extractive industries.

THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BILL (PIB): TRUE TEST FOR NIGERIAN CIVIL SOCIETY?

The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), aimed at restructuring and promoting local participation, transparency and national control of the oil industry, was partly the result of advocacy and demands by civil society groups, professional unions and oil technocrats. It was arguably influenced both by discourses around the “resource curse” and the drive towards professionalizing and diversifying the Nigerian oil industry. The PIB was sent to the Nigerian legislature by then

President Umaru Yar'Adua in July 2007. Ten years later, the Bill has yet to be passed into law. As a strategic initiative that is central to oil governance in Nigeria, the PIB is partly conceived as a response to the challenge of repositioning the Nigerian oil industry in the face of changing dynamics in the global energy market, the recognition of the need for compliance with international oil industry “best practices” and the demand for efficiency and accountability in ways that can help the country avoid the “resource curse” and reap more benefits from its oil endowment.

Either way, the delay in passing the PIB into law reflects the high stakes in the struggle, particularly those who stand to lose if Nigeria asserts more control over the technical operations and management of her oil industry. Many believe that the “battle line” pitches international oil companies, which are concerned that certain policies and laws embedded in the PIB pose threats to their dominance of the industry, and have lobbied hard to delay the bill until such a time that the clauses they consider hostile can be watered down or overturned, against oil labor unions, nationalistic oil professionals, sections of the media and oil-producing communities.

The agitation for a PIB aimed at leveraging national control and accountability has largely been led by trade unions in the oil sector. Of note are the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigerian (PENGASSAN) and the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), as well as the leading national trade unions, the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) and Trade Union Congress (TUC). Both unions have pooled efforts in pushing for the passing of the PIB into law. For example, a joint position paper made public in 2012 condemned the lack of accountability and transparency in the oil industry, called for removal of clauses that granted the oil minister and president “discretionary powers to award petroleum licenses and leases” and criticized gaps in fiscal terms as provided for by the Bill, pointing out that it “does not contain any royalty rates, or amounts for fees and rents leaving it to ministerial regulations” (NUPENG and PENGASSAN 2012).

Other demands made by the oil unions include revising the proposed Petroleum Host Community Fund to address Nigeria’s regional and ethnic diversities, reviving and protecting the downstream operations, including an end to the importation of 80% of refined petroleum products (*ibid*). A paper also proposes a set of performance-based objectives and demands for the inclusion of the oil unions on the boards of strategic oil and gas agencies and institutions.

So far, the struggle of some civil society groups for better natural resource governance in Nigeria has yielded modest victories, notably in terms of providing more information. However, as a Natural Resource Governance Institute Index (NRGI 2017) puts it, the country still has a relatively low Resource Governance Index (RDI). However, in political terms, it means that global and national forces of extraction still control Nigeria’s oil resources. It is one thing to generate information; it is another to have the capacity to act on it. As Garuba (2014b) aptly puts it, “transparency cannot be an end in itself, but rather must be the means to an end.”

CONCLUSION

Although public discourse recognizes the connection between the misuse, abuse and exploitation of the country's abundant resource endowment and the crisis of development, the response, largely framed by the "resource curse" perspective, has not led to any effective transformative or remedial actions by the state and civil society. As argued earlier, the problem is both conceptual and political. While the country may exhibit some symptoms associated with the "oil curse," these do not sufficiently explain the contradictions in the natural resource development nexus. Such explanations lie in the history of Nigeria's integration into the global economy as a producer of primary products, rendering its economic structure dependent on supplying commodified natural resources to the global market and the world's established and emerging powers. Secondly, the nature of the state also shapes the relations of power that in turn determine control, access to or exclusion of certain groups from revenues/profits or benefits accruing from the exploitation of natural resources. Resource governance is deeply politicized in ways that subvert a development ethos.

Resource governance is a hegemonic project of the Nigerian state and its partners—the international oil companies continue to be geared towards ensuring the conditions for the optimal extraction of natural resources (such as oil) destined for the global market. Efforts at reform, no doubt well intentioned, do not interrogate the power relations underpinning the extraction of resources or the inequities spawned by the state's skewed allocation of oil revenues, and stop short of addressing the root of Nigeria's development crisis. Whether oil can be a catalyst of development will depend on an agenda of transformation of resource governance and production at both domestic and international levels. The resolution of the crisis will have to recognize the need to go beyond the symbolic rituals of reforms, transparency and accountability, to building partnerships and a social movement capable of changing the relationship between state, society and nature, on more equitable, participatory and sustainable terms. A national project of equitable resource governance and development can only take root in the context of such a transformed social contract.

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Illicit Financial Flows and the African Development Conundrum

Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba

More than five decades after gaining political independence, Africa remains trapped in contradictions of poverty in the midst of abundant human and material resources. Despite earning trillions of dollars from the export of raw materials and receiving trillions of dollars more in overseas development assistance, the development process in Africa has been stalled or emasculated to the extent that today the continent is the poorest region in the world. Development indicators from international development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank indicate that Africa is home to the largest numbers of people who live in absolute poverty, have least access to quality health and education, go to bed hungry and lack access to safe drinking water (UNDP 2015; World Bank 2015).

Various theoretical and empirical studies have identified different factors as responsible for the challenge of underdevelopment in Africa. These include bad geographical location, lack of good governance (largely exemplified by a predatory elite), legacy of colonialism, weak governance, influence of colonialism, lack of capacity to mobilise capital and judicious use of the same, unequal integration of Africa into the global capitalist system, weak state, conflict and wars (Heldring and Robinson 2013; Collier 2007; Herbst 2000; Amin 2002; Joseph 2013). While the above factors may be important, perhaps the most significant is the general consensus that Africa lacks the needed financial base and capacity to foster development. In order to meet the shortfall in domestic capital, the majority of the countries on the continent had depended on external

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aid as a source of capital since gaining political independence. As Adeoye (2014, 2) argues, ‘fifty years plus of political independence and many African countries are still largely dependent on external resources for public finance and economic investment’. These resources come in form of debt, overseas development assistance and foreign direct investment. Despite the fact that the resources have contributed in one way or the other to the running of government institutions and other sectors of the economies, they are not without conditions and restrictions that combine to limit the capacity of the state in Africa to pursue autonomous path to development. As several scholars have argued (Blad et al. 2016; Moyo 2009; Adedeji 2002; Onimode 1988), debt constitutes serious burdens on the recipient countries either through debt service or through loss of freedom to formulate appropriate policies. Moreover, Moyo (2009) argues that aid has not worked for Africa as it reinforces dependency and stifles the creative potentials of Africans in addressing their developmental challenges. Besides, Adedeji (2002) contends that rather than fostering development in Africa, an aid industry has developed to become what he terms a development merchant system, in which so-called experts and consultants from aid-giving countries earn a substantial part of the aid money in the form of salaries and consultancy fees. Contrary to the dominant narrative and practice, which place Africa as a perpetual borrower and dependent on foreign assistance, recent literature shows that Africa is in fact a net creditor to the world, through illicit financial flows (IFFs) to other regions (Global Financial Integrity 2015). How IFFs undermine the development aspirations of African countries, how they happen and the actors behind them are the focus of this chapter. Besides, using critical political economy theories such as dependency, underdevelopment and world systems, I argue that the pervasiveness of IFFs is a logical outcome of the financialised global capitalist system, in which multinational companies and members of the transitional capitalist class operate to further the perpetuation of underdevelopment of the peripheral regions of the world through various unethical practices (Oloruntoba 2015; Boyce and Ndikumana 2011; African Union High Level Panel 2014). After this introduction, the next section examines the debate on capital mobilisation in Africa, within the context of the political economy of the continent, and how this affects the development potentials. Section three interrogates IFFs, in conceptual, theoretical, forms and dimensions as well as their implications for development in Africa. In section four, I address how the problems of IFFs can be tackled. Section five concludes with recommendations on various capital mobilisation routes to assist with Africa’s development.

THE DILEMMA OF CAPITAL MOBILISATION IN AFRICA

One of the main challenges to development in Africa has been the capacity for capital mobilisation. This can be located within the historical origin and philosophy of the state, its location within the international division of labour and the character of the postcolonial elites that have assumed the position of power

since gaining independence. As scholars have argued, the postcolonial state manifests all the characters of the colonial states in terms of its authoritarianism, overdevelopment, dependence, exploitation and disconnection from the society. The postcolonial state, like its predecessor, depends on the use of force and violence to extract rent from nature and the people. Although in many instances it has some semblances of institutions of accountability, such as the parliament and judiciary, it is really not accountable to anyone. This is because the elites, by their nature and character, superintend over a prebendal system, in which national resources are shared between them and their cronies, albeit at disproportionate levels (Taylor 2014; Ake 1981).

As Taylor (2014, 7) argues, 'although Africa's elites undoubtedly command the state apparatus, with varying levels of intensity, their own practices often undermine and subvert the state's institutions on a daily basis'. In relation to the implications for Africa's placement within the global economy and its capacity for mobilisation of capital, the continuity of the colonial structure of the organisation of an international division of labour has prevented African countries from breaking out of the fixation with exporting raw materials. This is due to several factors, not the least being the lack of access to technology, the comparative advantage of the industrialised nations in manufacturing, the constraints of the domestic market, the global governance of trade under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation and the policies imposed by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In other words, the structural deficiencies in the organisation of African economies vis-à-vis their relations with other parts of the world hamper any meaningful attempt at autonomous capacity for capital mobilisation. Although foreign exchange can be earned through international trade, the African economy has been organised in such a way that exports of raw materials and natural resources remain the dominant source of earning it. Given the volatility in the international commodity market, the African experience with economic growth has been defined by boom and bursts in a cycle that leaves policymakers with little or no opportunity to make long-term plans. Paradoxically, most of the money realised from exports of commodities and metals is stolen by members of the ruling elites, who see no difference between their private pockets and the resources of their respective countries (Joseph 1987).

The low and underdeveloped nature of the economy in Africa makes it difficult to maximise the potential of tax as a ready and reliable base for revenue generation and capital mobilisation. Although Mubiru (2010, 1) argues that the trend of tax revenues on the African continent is positive, with the average tax revenue as a share of GDP increasing since the early 1990s, this has not been sufficient to meet all the developmental needs of the continent. Mubiru also notes that there are large differences in the tax mix patterns (defined as the indicator of the particular purpose for which a tax is imposed as well as its welfare effects, measured in terms of the costs it imposes on consumers, workers and capital owners. In this regard, while a country such as South Africa

derives most of its tax revenues from direct taxation, countries such as Senegal and Uganda rely mostly on indirect taxation. Countries such as Nigeria, Libya, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Algeria more or less rely on a single type of tax. These countries have something in common: the export of oil and gas (Mubiru 2010, 2) Mubiru also identifies various challenges with maximising taxation for optimum resource mobilisation in African countries. These include taxing the informal economy, quality of tax policies and tax administration, tax administration capacity, unnecessary granting of tax preferences, (in a bid to drive in foreign direct investment), inefficient taxation of the extractive activities and inability to fight abuses of transfer pricing by multinational enterprises (ibid., 4). In virtually all countries in Africa, the informal sector is the largest employer of labour, especially after the ill-advised structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s led to the decimation of the manufacturing sectors. However, this sector has not been effectively captured in the tax net, in part because of their unstructured nature, lack of capacity on the part of the state to incorporate them and the lack of reasonable justification to do so. Owing to the infrastructural challenges that face many countries on the continent, people who operate in the informal sector see the state as an irritant and absent, thus necessitating the need to avoid it at all costs. In the absence of capacity or willingness to provide basic infrastructures such as energy, a good road transportation network and security, most operators in the informal sector resort to self help to meet these challenges. Consequently, there is little or no incentive to pay taxes to the state. Yet if the state must increase its level of capital mobilisation, it is imperative to forge a symbiotic relationship with this important and large sector, such that it can be interested in paying taxes.

Royalties from mineral rights constitute another means through which many companies in Africa earned capital. However, several factors, not least the complicity of multinational corporations and the ruling elites, have ensured that Africa gets the least payments of all regions of the world. Various efforts such as the Extractive Transparency Initiatives, Publish what you Pay and so on, both at governmental and intergovernmental levels, have not resulted in the much-needed transparency in the extractive sectors. As we shall demonstrate in the section on IFFs, multinational companies have over the years deliberately engaged in falsifying accounts, subverting processes and undercutting their host countries so that they do not pay the correct amount of royalties on extracted minerals (African Union High Level Panel 2014).

Overseas development assistance (ODA) constitutes another source of capital for African countries. When the majority of African countries gained independence in the 1960s, development policy was underpinned by the theoretical framework of modernisation. Modernisation theory situated the newly independent countries in Africa within the European experience of the stages of economic growth. Rostow (1960) identified five stages of growth that these countries must follow in order to achieve development. Following the New Deal programme of President Roosevelt of the USA for the rebuilding of Europe, and the Marshall Plan, it was believed that given the huge

financial requirement for infrastructures development, ODA was required for the newly independent countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to develop. Over the last five decades, trillions of dollars have been channelled into them in the form of development aid. Apart from the politics that underpin development aid (see Dikeledi Mokoena in this book), it is subject to the vagaries and the economic fortunes of the donor countries. Consequently, in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2007–2011, development aid has declined. Despite the commitments of the eight most industrialised countries in the world (the G8) to provide 0.7% of their gross national product as aid to help developing countries meet their Millennium Development Goals, this was not achieved (Oloruntoba 2017a). As Adeoye (2014) observes, ODA is falling well short of commitments and is largely unfulfilled. He notes further that in 2011 aid flows declined in real terms for the first time in many years.

However, in what Easterly (2006) has described as the White Man's Burden, this amount of money has done little to foster inclusive development in these regions, owing to many factors but primarily the imposition of development programmes from outside, without due consultation with the potential beneficiaries. The problem of reliance on foreign development assistance is the usurpation of the sovereign authority of the state as well as its limited capacity. Aid dependence undermines creative and independent thinking about solving the challenges of development in Africa. As Adeoye (2014, 2) rightly argues, 'fifty years plus of political independence and many African countries are still largely dependent on external resources for public finance and domestic investment. A fully sovereign Africa should exude self-reliance and value-drive partnership, not dependence.'

Remittances from Africans in the Diaspora has been a significant source of capital mobilisation for African countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. According to the World Bank (2011), remittance flows to developing countries have increased substantially during the last decade to reach \$325 billion in 2010. Mohapatra and Ratha (2011, 1) argue that 'remittances sent by 31 million international African migrants reached nearly \$40 billion in 2010, equivalent to 2.6 percent of Africa's gross domestic product (GDP). In the wake of the serious macroeconomic challenges of the 1980s and 1990s, many African professionals migrated to Europe and United States of America' (see Gopalkrishna and Oloruntoba 2012). These migrants have continued to send money home to millions of dependents both for meeting immediate family needs, investment in business and education and other uses. Even though a lack of reliable data and the patronage of informal channels for remitting money affect the accuracy of the figure, it has been estimated as the second source of foreign inflow of capital to African countries, after foreign direct investment. According to Mohapatra and Ratha (2011), 'cross country analysis and evidence from household surveys show that remittance receipts are associated with reductions in poverty, increased household resources devoted to investment, and improved health and education outcomes' (p. 2). They also note that as a share of GDP, the largest recipients of

remittances are Lesotho (28.5%), Togo (10.7%), Cape Verde (9.4%), Senegal (9.3%) and the Gambia (8.2%) (p. 5). Problems associated with remittances include the high transactional costs of sending money through agents such as Western Union or MoneyGram. Although new mobile technologies for transferring money have been developed in some countries, in Africa this has not substituted for sending money through banks and the agents.

ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES AND DIMENSIONS

Concerns over IFFs and their negative effects on the development aspirations of African countries has occupied policymakers, research centres, civil society and international organisations in recent times. In 2015, the African Union High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows (henceforth referred to as AU Panel) put in place by African finance ministers with support from the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa completed a study of the extent and dimension of IFFs in Africa. The panel, headed by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, reports that over the past five decades after gaining political independence, African countries have lost more than a trillion dollars in IFFs. It further adds that Africa loses about \$50 billion to IFFs on an annual basis (Africa Union High Level Panel 2014). According to Global Financial Integrity, a non-governmental organisation that specialises on the issue of IFFs, Africa has suffered the highest loss of illicit financial capital when compared to GDP, with the continent losing an average of US\$81.7 billion a year between 2004 and 2014 to IFFs. (GFI 2015).

While many of the funds that are stolen and stashed abroad are abstracted from aid and other forms of overseas development assistance, as well as being the proceeds from exports of minerals and metals, most of these funds are estimates from unpaid or underpaid royalties on mineral resources, trade misinvoicing (over- and underinvoicing), transfer pricing and tax evasion.

Conceptually, IFF refers to ‘cross border capital movements for the purposes of concealing illegal activities and evading taxes’ (Herkenrath 2014). The AU Panel (2014, p. 9) defines IFFs as ‘money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilized’. The panel adds that ‘these funds typically originate from three sources: commercial tax evasion, trade mis-invoicing and abusive transfer pricing; criminal activities, including the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal arms dealing, and smuggling of contraband; and bribery and theft by corrupt government officials’ (p. 9). The problem of IFFs is not limited to Africa. Even though members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are the main recipients of IFFs from developing countries, they are also affected in one way or the other by their presence. Global Financial Integrity is one of the leading think tanks which have done much work on IFF. It defines the concept as ‘cross border transfers of funds that are illegally earned, transferred, or utilised’ (GFI 2013a).

From the above definitions, we may define IFFs as *flagrant* concealment and *criminal* transfer of funds across the border in a way that flouts extant financial regulations both at national and international levels. This emphasis on flagrant and criminal deserves further elucidation. Companies and individuals flagrantly transfer funds because they do not care about the implications of such actions on society. Their motives are usually the satisfaction of personal and class interests. As the case of the Panama Papers has come to show, many of the people who are involved in IFF are high-profile government officials and top executives of multinational corporations who both try to evade taxes and divert public money to safe havens. The criminal intent of IFF is the extent to which the people involved disobey the laws of the respective countries from where the funds are transferred.

The AU Panel made some distinctions to the general terms that are commonly used in relation to IFF. A few of these, which are relevant to this research, are the following: tax avoidance, tax evasion, trade misinvoicing, transfer pricing, abusive transfer pricing, trade-based money laundering. These are defined in the report as follows:

Tax Avoidance: The legal practice of seeking to minimise a tax bill by taking advantage of a loophole or exception to tax regulations or adopting an unintended interpretation of the tax code. Although it is possible to prevent this practice through having a strong antiavoidance rule, if such rules are not available, tax avoidance inevitably constitute part of IFF.

Tax Evasion: This is deliberate action by tax payers to escape a tax liability by failing to disclose to the revenue authority the income from which the tax liability came about. This constitutes a major component of IFF as many companies take advantage of the weak capacity of the state to detect such evasion in many African countries.

Trade Misinvoicing: This is the act of misrepresenting the price or quality of imports or exports in order to hide or accumulate money in other tax jurisdictions. Trade misinvoicing is generally done to avoid payment of taxes, customs duties, transfer a kickback or launder money.

Transfer Pricing: This is the price of transactions occurring between related companies that are owned by a multinational group. The report notes quite correctly that much of the debate on tax-motivated IFFs revolves around the formulation and enforcement of transfer pricing regulations, their shortcomings and the way in which they are abused for tax evasion and tax avoidance purposes (African Union Commission 2014).

Abusive Transfer Pricing: This occurs where companies manipulate transfer prices with the aim of shifting profits from one jurisdiction to another. Such profits are usually shifted from a higher-tax to a lower-tax jurisdiction.

Trade-based Money Laundering: This occurs where trade mispricing is used to hide or disguise income generated from illegal activity.

The loss of money through IFFs has in turn led to lost opportunities for development at both macro- and micro-levels. In several parts of Africa, mining

communities have been particularly adversely affected by the effects of mining operations. As Bond (2016) argues, mining companies have failed to take care of the mining communities. Working in concert with authoritarian states and their predatory elites, these companies have often resorted to violence when dealing with genuine demands of the people that they should perform their social responsibility functions.

Although in the case of South Africa there are laws which seek to regulate tax payments in the mining industry, the state has not really done enough to implement those laws. The capacity of the state to correctly determine the royalties due from mining companies is also severely limited owing in part to the weaknesses of institutions and the companies' misdemeanours. The resurgent cases of IFFs are the result of the ease with which individuals and companies export capital out of Africa to both developed countries and tax havens across the world. The overall implications of these cases of limited capacity are a loss of revenue to the government and the deprivation that the mining communities suffer in the process.

There have been concerns about whether or not capital flight is an illegal or legal activity. In cases where the laws of a country permit repatriation of capital by multinational companies, this is considered a normal part of the package of incentives that governments provide to secure foreign direct investment. Besides, they are also part of the neoliberal agenda that the World Bank and the IMF have imposed on Africa and other developing regions of the world over the past three decades (see Oloruntoba 2015, 2016). UNECA (2013, 2) notes that 'generally, capital flight is understood as the movement of funds abroad in order to secure better returns, often in response to an unfavourable business climate in the country of origin'. However, this position has been countered by scholars who argue that there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that consideration of risk factors for investments are responsible for the increased rate of IFFs from Africa. In this respect, Ndikumana (2013, 71) argues that

Studies that use econometric analysis to uncover a relationship between capital flight and indicators of risk-adjusted returns to investment in the case of African countries find no conclusive evidence that for the portfolio choice motive ... This leads to suspect that to a large extent capital flight is driven by illicit motives. Therefore, it cannot be addressed solely by relying on policies aimed at raising the domestic return to investment in African countries

Indeed, some of the recipient countries for IFFs do have higher risk factors than the countries from where capital is exported. And by exporting money that should have been reinvested to facilitate socio-economic development, those who are involved in capital flight usually cause undue disruption to the investment climates of the exporting countries. The need to correctly interpret who bears the burden of responsibility for capital flight was responsible for the shift in the nomenclature of capital flight from developing countries. In this regard, Herkenrath (2014) argues that discourses on capital flight have tended

to shift the burden of responsibility onto developing countries which suffer from the effects of such financial flows, either through the sheer volume of money that is taken out of those countries or the suddenness with which it is removed. The concern over who bears the responsibility to control the movement of money underpins the change in the nomenclature. Baker (2008 cited in Herkenrath 2014, 1) puts it this way:

We particularly want to address the transition from the term illegal flight capital to the term ‘illicit financial flows’ ... Flight capital is an expression that places virtually the whole of the problem upon the developing countries out of which the money comes. It suggests, without quite saying so, that it is almost entirely their responsibility to address and resolve the concern. The expression illicit financial flows does a better job of clarifying that this phenomenon is a two-way street. The industrialised countries have for decades solicited, facilitated, transferred, and managed both licit and illicit financial flows out of poor countries. This reality is becoming increasingly understood, and the growing global use of the term illicit financial flows contributes toward this end.

Theoretically, IFF feeds into the philosophy and ideological orientations of the neoliberal global capitalist order under which the transnational capital class (TCC) design an international system that promotes what underdevelopment theorists call the ‘Mathew Effect’, where resources are taken from those who have not to those who already have, so that they can have more (Robinson 2010, 2004). More than any time in modern history, economic globalisation has furthered openness and facilitated the ease with which money is transferred across different geographical regions of the world. As Oloruntoba (2015) notes, financialisation of the global economy has ensured the primacy of capital over other factors of production. As a central part of the neoliberal economic doctrine, financialisation has been anchored on the logic of profit maximisation by corporations at both domestic and international levels. As Robinson shows, the state is part of the trinity of evil and part of the TCC, through which the interests of the members of this class are pursued.

Although the state has suffered from a series of assaults from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, it has been incorporated to facilitate economic policies that favour capital flight. The deliberate weakening of the state in Africa through the imposition of market fundamentalist ideas and policies has limited the extent to which this important institution can control IFFs. Being a part of the TCC, the state in advanced countries has only expressed a lukewarm interest in the very important task of exercising due control over capital (see Oloruntoba 2016; Stiglitz 2010). Consequently, money that is illegally taken from African countries through various means such as transfer pricing and trade misinvoicing is either kept in foreign accounts of developed countries or in hidden tax havens and islands scattered across the world. Nicolson (2016, 1–2) supports this view when he notes that ‘companies use offshore accounts to manipulate the price, quantity or quality of goods to

funnel through funds and pay lower taxes when they avoid paying taxes where they operate'. The exposure of the Panama Papers in early 2016 shows how wealthy people across the world exploit offshore tax regimes to their advantage. In this macabre dance of the greedy, major corporations in Africa as well as politically connected and exposed individuals were found to have stashed trillions of dollars in these tax havens. Despite the outcry that greeted the release of the Panama Papers, the forces that benefit from the current financialised global economy, most notably, the USA and Britain, are not in a hurry to fundamentally change the rules of the game in such a way that constrains the ability of rich individuals and corporate organisations to hide money, move it around or hide it in tax havens (see Mbeki 2016; Wade 2013).

IFFs have serious implications on the development potential of African countries. As Nicolson (2016, 1) succinctly puts it, 'African states need cash for development, but their tax revenues are lower, by the billions than they should be because of illicit financial flows.' In what Ngwenya (2016) refers to as the spillovers of IFFs, scholars such as Unger (2006) have identified the following as the consequences of money laundering, which is a constitutive part of IFFs: distortions in consumption, distortions in investment and savings, artificial increases in prices, unfair competition, changes in imports and exports, negative and positive effects on growth rates, effects on output, income and employment, lower revenues for the public sector, the compromise of privatisation, changes in the demand for money and exchange rates and interests, distortion of capital flows, risk to financial sector stability, distortion of economic statistics, increased crime such as corruption and bribery, and the compromising of political institutions. Similarly, Blakenburg and Khan (2012 cited in Ngwenya (2016, 4) identify both direct and indirect implications of IFFs. According to these authors, the direct consequences are the immediate impact that they have on a country's economic development through a reduction in revenue or a reduction in private domestic investment. The indirect consequences include effects on the social and political structures in the country in which the IFF takes place. Apart from the above, IFFs can also undermine democracy owing to their negative social impacts.

The magnitude of the costs of IFF to the African economies and to other regions of the world has led to various actions, such as the establishment of several institutions as well as the promulgation of relevant Acts of Parliament. For instance, Section 1504 of the US Dodd-Frank Act, requires companies in the extractive sector to disclose publicly all their payments to government in the separate jurisdictions in which they operate. Furthermore, the European Union's Accounting and Transparency Directives require transparency and disclosure by companies operating in the extractive sector. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was also aimed at improving transparency. However, it is voluntary, and reporting payments made to governments tends more to curb corruption than to tackle IFFs from commercial activities: this is because reporting payments to governments alone may not show the full extent of IFFs if there is no profit base with which they can be

compared. Moreover, its provisions do not cover undeclared quantities, which are a key source of IFFs (Africa Union High Level Panel 2014, 45).

Despite the efforts that have been made at national and regional levels to address IFFs in Africa, the AU Panel report notes that these efforts have been hampered by the following factors:

- The lack of adequate regulatory frameworks.
- Lack of information and telecommunication facilities, transportation and other relevant infrastructure.
- Lack of adequate funding and reliance on unpredictable foreign assistance.
- Shortage of technical and human capacity to deal with crime perpetrated by sophisticated companies and individuals.
- The involvement in corruption of top government officials operating at different levels of governance.
- The perception of citizens of resource-rich countries that resource rents are free for all to harvest if given the opportunity.

The report further notes that the magnitude of the challenges experienced by these institutions overwhelms their implementation capacities. Most of these institutions face problems such as inadequate capacity (including equipment, adequate and relevant skills), shortages of funding (requiring them to rely on unpredictable foreign assistance) and in some cases inadequate support from the judicial system (Africa Union High Level Panel 2014, 42).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the challenges of capital mobilisation in Africa and how IFFs have compounded an already fragile situation. I argue that in over five decades since gaining political independence, dependence on external aid in the form of overseas portfolio and foreign direct investments, loans and other forms of aids has not been able to help Africa in achieving its developmental goals. Rather, the dependence has fostered subjugation and subservience to the logic of neo-imperial interests. Although several efforts have been made at domestic, regional and international levels to address the challenges of IFFs, these have not been enough to stem the tide, essentially because of the transnationality of the class interests of key actors in the design of global financial systems.

The challenges that IFFs pose to countries around the world has stimulated global action involving both governmental and non-governmental organisations. In Africa, for instance, the constitution of the AU Panel is one such initiative, which has helped to raise the consciousness of key stakeholders about the problems of financing development on the continent. Despite their lacklustre attitude and the legal complexities around financial disclosures, developed countries such as the USA, Britain, Switzerland and France have increased the rate at which they forfeit funds stolen from Africa.

Given the imperative of self-reliance in capital mobilisation, it is time that African countries built more capacity to monitor outflows and inflows of capital to the continent. The various institutions that have been put in place to checkmate IFF must be strengthened, while new laws must be put in place to check the complicity of political elites and the multinational corporations, which are the main culprits of IFFs. National, regional and international civil society organisations must also continue to exert pressure on domestic authorities of both developed and developing countries to search, forfeit and repatriate stolen funds in the relevant countries. Accounting systems must be reformed in such a way that the manipulation of accounts that is so common among multinational companies will be reduced to the barest minimum.

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Public Good and the Crises of Service Delivery in Africa

Olugbenga Olatunji

THE CONCEPTS OF “PUBLIC GOOD” AND “SERVICE DELIVERY”

In extant literature, the concept “public” has several connotations, one of the most popular being an item or function of common interest, value, utility or significance that has the backing of government and its instruments of coercion as the supreme power within a defined geopolitical space. The term carries an aura of popular participation, the state’s sovereignty, and in democratic political systems the legitimacy of common (public) authorities represented by government. For Ayee (2008, 3), the term “is simply used to imply the invocation of the power of the state”. Thus, Heywood (2014, 24) defines as public whatever “stands for all members of a community, not merely the largest number or even overall majority ... It is that which benefits every member ...”

Aristotle explained the concept using his popular distinctions between the *polis* and the *oikos*. Arguing that the *polis* (meaning the formal body politic) was different from the *oikos* (the private, family or household realm), he emphasized that the state (*polis*) was the highest form of political union, an instrument for the individual’s self-perfection, providing a means for satisfying individuals’ wants, security and the realization of the good life (Aristotle 1979, 2). He agreed with Plato that the state and its laws are natural, reflecting individual needs and purposes, given human gregariousness and sociability (Mukherjee and Ramaswamy 1999, 105).

Benn and Gaus (1983, 7–11 cited in Irele 1999, 53) distinguished between “publicness” and “privateness” using the features of access, agency and interest. Access indicates “public information and social intercourse,” agency interrogates

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on whose behalf the action is taken while interest pinpoints who benefits from an action. Like the proverbial goldfish that has no hiding place, public actors and actions are characterized by high visibility whereas private actors and actions are not.

Plato, in the *Republic* and the *Laws* and Aristotle in his *Politics* argued that the state represents the highest form of political union and provides a major platform for the realization and security of the good life for its citizens, including the satisfaction of basic wants. Thus, the pursuit of the good life for citizens should be the basis of rule, while good governance that could meet the needs of the people was the best.

Public good describes the collective interest and welfare of members of the public. It includes but is not limited to safety and security, individual and collective rights, expression, development and utilization to the fullest of human talents and other endowments, potentials and capacities as well as the enjoyment of those privileges, utilities and infrastructure that make life worth living for human beings as members of society.

As an institution that sees to the smooth running of society, government exists not only to control and regulate the organization and proper functioning of human society, but also to deliver those services without which human beings may not be able to live the kinds of life they desire by giving maximum expression to their endowments and capabilities. Thus, government provides for public good partly by delivering public services (or utilities) to citizens. Indeed, Aristotle argued that it is in the public, not private domain that human beings strive for justice and live the good life (Heywood 2014, 69).

For our purposes, we define the concept of “public good” broadly as “common good,” which implies the good or welfare of members of the society. Often it is best pursued by or through the instrumentality of the state. Public goods are publicly provided or administered goods and services and are mostly provided by government. They include anything (either tangible goods or intangible services) with a capacity to improve the welfare of members of the society.

Societal welfare is often related to public good-related concerns such as national security and market failure. This is particularly true of market economies where the concerns and interests of private capital cannot comprehend and cope with the supra-value of the public interest in making comprehensive decisions and provisions for public good. These include but are not limited to the sluggish response of the market to issues of externalities or social costs, willingness of private capital to address genuine but capital intensive public needs with few returns in the short run, and the destruction of social values or occasional threats to political values that are germane to national unity and human solidarity.

The concept of public good should be a prime consideration for the state as an institution that is responsible for service delivery providing the welfare of all its citizens. As guardians and custodians of public good, the state has the responsibility of delivering to the citizenry those services they require to realize their potential, such as security, healthcare, education, waste disposal, road networks and electricity.

The above is applicable to the many African states whose citizens expected so much from their governments immediately after the attainment of political independence. This was particularly so after Kwame Nkrumah's assurance to the people that he would seek first the political kingdom, after which all other things should be given to them. Nkrumah affirmed that "the struggle for political power by colonial and subject peoples is the first step towards, and the prerequisite to complete social, economic, and political emancipation" (Nkrumah 1962, 38–45).

Decades after independence, however, many African states found that political independence was merely "flag impotence," which did not automatically translate into fulfillment of the promises of the "good life" which had been made by African nationalists at the climax of the decolonization struggle (Acemoglu et al. 2011).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Since the theory of the African state emerged in the 1980s, there have been many attempts to explain the history and condition of states as they grappled with the problems of state and nation-building, economic development and public service delivery, among others (see Kawabata 2006). Of particular relevance to this study are theories of the weak state (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Migdal 1988; Reno 1997, 2008), "irrelevant" state (Ihonvbere 1994), failed state (Helman and Ratner 1992–1993; Mazrui 1995) and collapsed state (Zartman 1995; Widner 1995; Gros 1996).

Assessing the strength of a state by its capacity and capability to penetrate its society, Migdal 1988 suggests that African states are weak because they are out of sync with society. For such states, extracting resources from society to meet citizens' expectations will be problematic. Jackson (2002) identifies weak states as lacking democracy or democratic consolidation, national identity and institutional capacity, and being vulnerable to external control and forces. Ahluwalia (2012) condemns both strong and weak states, arguing that while a strong state tends towards dictatorship, a weak state collapses into clientelism, both of which are extremes of statehood that cannot deliver services optimally.

Ihonvbere (1994) argues that African states are irrelevant to citizens' needs because they have failed to achieve the goals of nationhood, including state-building, economic development and public service delivery, among others. The "failed state" and "collapsed state" were thought to have emerged because the symptoms of the weak state were left unaddressed. Failed states can be grouped into four classes, namely weak states, failing states, failed states and collapsed states, and are deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions (Rotberg 2003, 2004). They are identified with deteriorating institutional performance (Widner 1995). Defining state collapse on the basis of the failure of three core state functions related to exercise of sovereign authority, establishment of required institutions and guarantee of security, Zartman (1995) argued that a failed state that has lost its basic functions is a collapsed state.

The ideas enunciated in these theories are descriptive of economics, state–society relations and public institutional performance in Africa. They are useful in describing the crises of service delivery in many states that are at different stages of weakness, irrelevance, failure and collapse, as was the case in Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda for different periods of time. They can also help to chart the path that extricates the African state from such entanglements.

APPROACHES TO PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN AFRICA

In their quest to meet the needs of their populations, African states have passed through several stages and experimented with several approaches to service delivery.

The first of these was the wholesale adoption of the European model of the 1950s, which newly independent African states inherited from their colonial overlords. This was an extremely centralized system in which a government ministry assumed monopoly power over core and non-core public services such as education, healthcare, electricity supply and public works, and took responsibility for everything from planning and evaluation to delivery. This model was also attractive to many new states, which found socialism attractive for the management of public resources in the era of the Cold War. But as Collier (2009) argues, in many respects the model was not the best for peacetime as it was only adopted for the austere post-First World War period in Europe with the virtues of patriotism that helped it deliver results at the least cost through an emphasis on information and planning. It was not necessarily the best for African countries where these virtues are lacking, and it led to resource leakage, low productivity and poor service delivery. It also led to donor bypass of the state in the provision of services.

The second approach to public service delivery in Africa was private sector participation (PSP) which involved contracting, privatization and “agentification” of public services (Ngowi 2008, 97–116). Built on the foundations of huge debt profiles and poor service delivery by public sectors in Africa, the approach was targeted at delivering services that met the criteria of customer satisfaction, value for money and relevance to the needs of the people. While contracting involved some non-core services such as sanitation and public transport, privatization increasingly included core public services such as electricity, airport services, road construction and maintenance through build, operate and transfer (BOT) and other arrangements.

“Agentification” refers to the delivery of public services by public sector executive agencies with semiautonomous (though not independent) status. In order to overcome the challenges of mainstream bureaucracy—inefficiency, ineffectiveness, corruption and a lack of incentives, creativity, dynamism and vibrancy—agencies operate using private sector values of customer orientation, flexibility, service excellence, rewards and sanctions for performance, private sector accounting methods, managerial independence and control over allocated resources (Ngowi 2008, 106).

In recent times, there has been an increase in the number of executive agencies with mandates to deliver core public services such as health and rural electrification in Africa. While the main problem of contracting and privatization is the keeping of performance contracts, those of agentification are the typical problems of principal–agent relationships, particularly asymmetric information.

These challenges justify the quest for ways in which service delivery can be provided and managed in order to ensure speed, effectiveness, resource and service efficiency, citizen participation and satisfaction in Africa.

IMPORTANCE AND STATE OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN AFRICA

Service delivery is a major signpost of state responsibility to citizens. It is a prime concern of human rights-based thinking and an approach to state–citizen relations that sees the state as a “duty-bearer” with obligations to fulfill to its citizens. Since the end of the “night-watchman state,” which limited itself to the maintenance of law and order, protection of citizens and regulation of commercial activities from the twentieth century the state has assumed new responsibilities to cater for the welfare of citizens.

Service delivery now constitutes a hallmark of state responsibility as they strive to provide quality social services such as health, education, water supply and sanitation services, urban development and renewal, predictable and affordable power supply, and efficient public transport. Furthermore, quality services are key to overall human development because they improve the capacity of people to participate fully in the development process of their countries (Kimenyi 2013, 11). For many Third World states, however, the delivery of quality social services has been a major challenge, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where many poor people are still excluded from accessing them. Even when citizens access such services, they are only of poor quality (Kimenyi 2013, 11–17) and often insufficient to serve entire populations.

The situation does not exist because African governments do not intend or plan to deliver sufficient and high-quality services to their citizens. They actually plan and budget for social services even though there are resource constraints. Unfortunately, notes Kimenyi (2013, 11), the huge investment in social services has not translated into effective service delivery. Available evidence indicates that this is true in several African countries such as South Africa and Senegal (Resnick 2014, 56), although there are political factors behind it in some other countries. It is appropriate, therefore, to interrogate more deeply the question of poor service delivery in Africa.

CAUSES OF POOR SERVICE DELIVERY IN AFRICA

Several reasons can be adduced for the poor state of service delivery. First is the inappropriateness of the colonial public service delivery model that many African countries inherited. As Collier (2009) argues, that system was only

good for the First World War period needs of those colonial powers, but less appropriate for other periods, and much more less for developing economies that lacked adequate information dissemination and incentive systems, which helped the model work in Europe.

Second, the inherited model was inappropriate for African public services owing to a weak sense of the national public interest in African public sector workers, together with heterogeneity and internal conflicts in public services. Scarcity of resources meant that workers could not be motivated by higher pay. There was also a low internalization of public service norms. The situation is worse in post-conflict states owing to mutual suspicion amongst public sector workers of different ethnic extractions. The result is often low productivity and poor service delivery.

Third are resource constraints. Kimenyi (2013, 11–12) reports the scarcity of resources to meet basic minimum needs for equipment, supplies and human resources training that impact negatively on service delivery. Moreover, Resnick (2014, 57) notes that “in Dakar, resources are sufficient for addressing only three out of nine mandated responsibilities, including health, education, youth and sports.” This challenge can be traced to the weak tax base of African governments, as well as their corruption and profligacy, with receipts from the natural endowments of many African countries such as oil and other solid minerals and forest resources. The tax bases of many countries are also weak because most rural dwellers have low incomes and many urban residents are engaged in the informal sector with low incomes, which yield low tax returns that are difficult to collect.

A fourth factor responsible for poor service delivery in Africa is the leakage of resources thanks to corruption and weak accountability. Poor delivery outcomes are evidenced in weak links between the volume of resources devoted to service delivery and the quality and quantity of services provided. This is attributed to the existence of leakages. It has been argued that:

... There is a weak link between resources and quality and quantity of services provided. This is because often resources flows are characterized by leakages so that resources reaching facilities are only a fraction of what is intended ... although teachers and nurses are recruited to provide services to clients, they may be absent from work often and even when present, they may not deliver the service as expected. These and many other outcomes lead to widespread service delivery failures. (Kimenyi 2013, 12)

Fifth, every innovative service delivery strategy comes with its own strengths and challenges, some of which may detract from the core or intrinsic values of public service delivery. For example, even though contracting, “agentification” and public–private partnerships may have advantages of improving service delivery, they may nevertheless have challenges related to equity, and physical and economic factors regarding access caused by market failures may prevent poor sections of the population from enjoying public services.

In addition, there are principal–agent problems of asymmetric information as well as incentive problems that may impact negatively on service delivery. Thus, Lane (2000, 125) argues that “to employ a principal-agent framework for the analysis of government action involves a clear rejection of the notion of the public interest as the motivational basis in the public sector.” Other principal–agent problems characteristically build around issues of monitoring, transaction costs and coordination problems, as well as incentives, all of which can impact negatively on public service delivery.

A sixth problem is the nature of service and accountability relationships involving governments as providers (as policymakers or politicians who set policy goals and bureaucrats who implement or execute policy); members of the public (either as “clients, customers, consumers or as citizens”) (Humphreys 1998, 16); and private sector provider institutions as street-level “bureaucrats,” who make direct contact with service beneficiaries.

Kimenyi (2013, 13) presents three dimensions of accountability relationships, namely voice, service compact and client power. Voice is the ability of service beneficiaries to hold government accountable, and hence to respond to their demands for service and punish them for failure to accede to service demands. Service beneficiaries as citizens and voters can hold service providers accountable when institutional arrangements favor such. This can happen, for instance, when votes count so that non-performing political executives can be voted out or when ombudsman institutions are strong and responsive to citizens’ complaints about service delivery.

Because public accountability is low in many parts of Africa, service beneficiaries have little voice. Indeed, as Friis-Hansen (2014) notes, voice as an accountability relationship is low in Africa because “it is a relatively new and still rare phenomenon in rural Africa that people demand services as rights rather than privileges.” In many African countries, citizens still see the state as a leviathan rather than a burden-bearer that must meet citizens’ legitimate demands and expectations. Even among Africa’s educated, propertied urban classes, complaints about service delivery are often ignored by relevant authorities. But members of this class are not bothered because many of them amassed their wealth by cheating on the state through patronage and they have private facilities to meet their needs for service delivery.

Compact (or service compact), argues Kimenyi (2013, 13), is a second accountability relationship that affects service delivery in Africa. This defines the mutual expectations of policymakers and service providers from each other in the service delivery network. Policymakers should define the legal framework for service provision and make resources available for providers to work. They are expected to monitor and motivate providers. In return, providers should work as expected and support the service delivery visions of policymakers.

The third element of the accountability framework identified by Kimenyi is client power, which is the ability of clients to hold providers directly accountable for services. It is low in Africa because governments are yet to imbibe the “burden bearer” philosophy while civil society has not developed to the extent

of holding governments responsible for service delivery beyond rhetoric. It is not part of Africa's culture to question the wisdom of public authorities, partly because in the past public offices were mostly filled by the elderly. This belief was transferred to the state and its functionaries. Therefore, service provision is seen as manna from heaven. In other cases, the public institutions saddled with responsibilities for service delivery are either incapacitated or corruptly disdainful of their responsibilities. In addition, long years of military and other forms of personal rule in many African countries suppressed citizen voice and client power, thus exacerbating the prevailing low accountability in service delivery in parts of the continent.

In many parts of Africa, there is a need to question the quality and motivation of modern-day policymakers who are not disinterested masters and makers of policy but allow ethnic, economic and political affiliations to affect the quality of their service delivery decisions. For example, high regime turnover in African democracies has left many abandoned projects dotting the face of many countries owing to a lack of policy and program continuity when power changes from one party to another. For example, Resnick (2014, S10–S12) documents how vertically divided political authority has affected government performance and service delivery in areas where opposition parties have held sway, in Uganda, Senegal and South Africa. The same was true of Lagos State, Nigeria under the People's Democratic Party (PDP)-led federal administration between 1999 and 2015.

In addition to political pressures, service delivery is often affected by what Lipsky (1976, 208–220) described as “street level bureaucracy,” the “place where government meets people.” He argues:

in significant respects street level bureaucracies ... may be inherently unable of responding favorably to contemporary demands for improved and more sympathetic service to some clients. Street-level bureaucrats respond to work-related pressures in ways that however understandable or well intentioned, may have invidious effects on citizen impressions of governmental responsiveness and equity in performance. (Lipsky 1976, 208–210)

For operators in the public sphere in Africa, such pressures may include inadequate resource inputs, temptations of bribery and political clannishness in fully public sector operators while, in public–private delivery arrangements, the profit drive and extortionist tendencies may be at work. Factors such as the above have a tendency to reduce the quantity and quality of services delivered.

Another cause of poor service delivery is the inefficient structure of many African states argue that inefficient state structures reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision in democracies by creating more rents for bureaucrats who support rich rulers in exchange. An inefficient state structure sets lower taxes for the rich to appropriate more profits, while the political class expands the size of the bureaucracy further in order to gain more votes so as to remain in power. This naturally leads to low collectible taxes and low investment in public service delivery.

In fact, existing research demonstrates that equilibrium with an inefficient state will likely arise when, as is the case in many African states, there is greater inequality between the rich and the poor, when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and individuals are forward looking.

However, when the poor come to power in a democracy, they reform state structures to reduce the rent accruable to bureaucrats, increase actual tax level and consequently raise the level of public service delivery. Although poverty and democracy are not the best of friends, as the former hinders the manifestation of the latter in its true sense (in many cases), the ascendancy of the poor (who are always in the majority) to power in democracies is in itself a natural expression of a human penchant for change, which is consistent with the law of historical and dialectical materialism. Although many African “democracies” are “guided” (by which they may incorporate factors and forces to slow down or hinder popular change), the increasing complexities of modern society and a growing emphasis on governance have continued to make popular, alternative means of collective decision-making with a capacity to affect electoral and other decision outcomes. These include ideas of community and associations, global markets, hierarchies and networks, policy communities and telecommunications which today constitute important aspects of globalization. To a large extent, modern democracies are affected by the forces of globalization, and it is a question of time before this catches up with the so-called “guided” democracies of Africa, Asia and many theocratic regimes of the Middle East.

At present, service delivery is in a parlous state in many African countries with poorly performing economies, some of which are single party-dominated “captured democracies.” Examples include Togo, which Gnassingbe Eyadema ruled for 38 years until his death in 2005, only to be succeeded by his son, Faure; Egypt, which President Hosni Mubarak ruled for over 30 years until his ousting from office by revolutionary forces of the Arab Spring; Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe has been in power for over three decades beginning in the 1980s; and Sudan, where General Omar-al-Bashir has been in power since 1989 (Meredith 2006). Nigeria’s PDP boasted it would remain in office for 60 years beginning at the return to democratic rule in 1999. However, the party’s hold on power was broken in the 2015 general elections by the All People’s Congress (APC), a coalition of parties of the Fourth Republic.

The above analysis suggests that public service delivery has been poor in many African countries partly because long years of misrule have bred weak, fragile, unresponsive and, sometimes, personalized state institutions that are ill equipped to deliver standard, up-to-date public services with equity.

TOWARDS IMPROVED SERVICE DELIVERY IN AFRICA

Reforming service delivery in Africa will require certain measures, some of which may be unpopular and others just plain difficult. This is because vested interests and long-standing unproductive practices such as corruption and unhealthy collaborations between interests in the public sector and local/foreign capital will need to be stopped.

First, to improve service delivery African governments will need to discard the inherited but inappropriate service delivery model and develop systems that will work in their ecological situations. As Sani (1999, 72) argues concerning Nigerian and, by extension, other African civil and public services, “Britain from whom Nigeria inherited her civil service system has since discarded these archaic practices ... sequel to the adoption of the Fulton Report ... in 1968–70.”

Second, African governments should develop a strong sense of state public interest and loyalty rather than ethnic or sectional interests in public sector workers. They can do so by incentivizing interest in and loyalty to the state while recipients are still alive, as a way of encouraging such behaviors amongst the citizenry.

Third, to be able to finance service delivery better, African governments must increase and enlarge their public sector resource bases from productive and commercial activities in the face of dwindling revenues from minerals and other natural resources, the prices of which they do not control. In addition, they must block resource leakages, fight corruption and strengthen accountability in service delivery by involving service beneficiaries as citizens rather than as clients, customers or consumers (Humphreys 1998, 16). Already, continuous auditing of public accounts to control financial leakages has been embraced by some African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, and should be encouraged in others.

Fourth, in addition to involving service beneficiaries as citizens, African public sectors must encourage co-production among them in order to improve the quality of services. As Friis-Hansen (2014, 4) argues, if services are offered to all citizens without involving them as contributors, coproduction will not take place and the quality of services may decline. Furthermore, involving them in different ways will not only help them to contribute as stakeholders in service delivery, it will also help to increase voice and client power over services, help providers take service compacts more seriously and institutionalize social accountability mechanisms deeper in order to improve and sustain service delivery outcomes.

Fifth, although they need to embrace dynamism, African public sectors must be careful in the adoption of new market-oriented delivery strategies. This is because African societies do not have highly differentiated structures while unemployment and poverty levels are still high. This increases the probability of market failures. In view of public sector objectives and their constraints, care should be taken to preserve the supra-value of public interest in the adoption of market strategies to public service delivery in Africa.

Finally, although it may take time, efforts must be made to restructure the African state by addressing its weaknesses and capitalizing on its strengths in order to make it more efficient. Without this, Africa’s strong societies will find it impossible to cope with their weak states in the long run. That would be a recipe for confusion and anarchy, and armed struggles that contend the political space with the state are already on the rise. To avoid this grim prospect,

African states must create invited political spaces for civil society and other legitimate groups to participate in governance through a process of further democratization.

CONCLUSION

Creating invited political spaces to advance service delivery in Africa will involve creating multiple avenues for meaningful dialogue and a willingness and readiness by all parties to address, through policy and action, issues that pitch the typical African state against society, and also prevent maximum exploitation, utilization and conversion of Africa's resources into acceptable service delivery outcomes. These include unemployment, youth restiveness, sit-tight rulership, ethnic chauvinism and the avoidance of an "only government and the ruling party know it" attitude. Finally, there should be conscious, policy and action-oriented collaborative efforts to institute governance reforms to provide more effective and efficient services in the critical sectors of Africa's economies. To improve governance in general and public service delivery in particular, African governments should heed Heywood's (2014, 73) warning that "the traditional image of government as a command and control system has ... been displaced by one which emphasizes instead bargaining, consultation and partnership." With the realities of a more educated, enlightened and expectant citizenry as well as the lessons of globalization, this is the least that may be expected if African countries are to move up the global ladder in terms of public service delivery in the twenty-first century.

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Rethinking Regional Integration for Development and Eradication of Poverty in Africa: The Missing Link

Christopher C. Nshimbi

INTRODUCTION

African leaders have long thought socio-economic integration essential to continental transformation and development. They considered continental unity decades before concretizing the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) into the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) (hereinafter, the Abuja Treaty). However, African states remain disparate and underdeveloped approximately six decades after they started gaining independence. Despite the “Africa rising” hype (Roxburgh et al. 2010; *The Economist* 2011; Perry 2012), Africa faces persistent development challenges and widespread poverty. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) (2016) classifies 34 out of Africa’s 54 countries as least developed. The 34 account for 71% of least developed countries (LDCs) globally; and 14 out of the 34 (or 30% globally) have been on the list since its creation by the United Nations (UN) in 1971. In other words, 63% of the countries in Africa are least developed and 26% of them have been like that since 1971.

Poverty and economic inequality in Africa is high too. Approximately 50% of Africa’s population is extremely poor (African Development Bank 2013). According to the African Development Bank (AfDB) (ibid. 2013), the number of extremely poor people in Africa has doubled since 1981. This is despite Africa hosting six of the ten fastest growing countries in the world, in the 2000s.

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Paradoxically, the AfDB reports that six of the ten most unequal countries in the world were also in sub-Saharan Africa in 2010. Inequality is also pronounced within respective countries, with Angola, Botswana, the Comoros, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland in Southern Africa making the list of the ten most unequal countries in Africa, according to the AfDB. These conditions challenge the multiple regional integration schemes designed to develop Africa, raising the question: why is Africa failing to integrate and subsequently (achieve development and) overcome poverty? Various interpretations of the development challenges facing Africa and how to overcome them exist. In this chapter, I outline three such interpretations and corresponding strategies to overcome the challenges and also highlight some of the inadequacies of the strategies.

METHODS AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

I deploy comparative-historical analysis (CHA) in order to highlight three leading perceptions of Africa's post-independence development challenges. The prescriptions based on these perceptions allow for comparative historical assessment. Three key defining features of CHA distinguish it from other analytical frames in socio-economic and political enquiry: it focuses on significantly long-term, extensive and complex outcomes; it is empirically grounded and engages in detailed case-based enquiry; and gives attention to temporal dimensions and processes of politics (Thelen and Mahoney 2015). I thus focus on global causal factors—specifically, the influence of global institutions—and use archival sources to highlight periods signified by the development approaches adopted to address poverty in Africa. The point of interest is the motives and actions of the institutions as actors in prescribing the said policies and strategies. An appreciation of the macro-structural environment in which the interests and actions of the key actors can be understood (Thelen and Mahoney 2015, 7) clearly exposes Africa's experimentation with ideological and development orientations, including (various forms of) socialism and capitalism and associated policies, such as import substitution and privatization, among others.

Further, I utilize the case-based approach by focusing on the “real-world puzzles” of poverty and inequality in Africa, which are escalating despite the models and strategies designed to reduce them by global institutions and African states. Thus the question why poverty (and increasing inequality) persist in Africa, despite the ideologies and initiatives for development applied to the continent since the end of colonialism. In other words, the ideas, strategies, development initiatives as well as aid and projects applied to Africa seem to yield results that do not conform to expectation—and poverty and inequality escalate.

The four stages to systematic and qualitative comparative historical studies discussed by Schutt (2006) characterize the approach deployed in this chapter. Firstly, the analysis starts from neo-classical economics theoretical premises. These posit that regional integration can help participating countries to pool resources, exploit economies of scale, establish larger markets and complementarities to enhance capacities. This then enables participating countries to

compete effectively in the global economy and, thereby, develop or overcome poverty. Based on this, I attempt to explain the failure of collective regional and continental efforts (since independence) to effectively integrate and develop or overcome poverty. I propose that the failure is essentially explained by ideological and development approaches and orientations based on inaccurate instruments (and, accordingly, targets) for measuring wellbeing in Africa. The failure is also explained by the neglect of a key African constituency in the subsequent development policies and efforts adopted.

Studies have shown that the informal economy comprises a significant and viable portion of most African countries, taking approximately 70% (Hart 1970, 1973; ILO 1972, 2002; Vanek et al. 2012), as discussed shortly. There is also mounting evidence that economic growth and associated measures such as the gross domestic product (GDP) do not accurately measure a nation's economic health (Costanza et al. 2016; Fioramonti 2013). While obsession with increasing the GDP bodes well for some actors (e.g., politicians and corporations), economic growth represented by such measures is environmentally unaffordable and not necessary for welfare (Fioramonti 2013). The GDP model is humanly and ecologically unsustainable.

Secondly, the analysis focuses on Africa in general and, particularly, on the eight regional economic communities (RECs) recognized by the African Union (AU) to eventually build the AEC (Abuja Treaty 1991).¹

Thirdly, the analysis outlines three key approaches and prescriptions that have dominated African development policies. This is done in order to highlight their respective features and some similarities and differences, as suggested by Skocpol's (1984) "interpretive historical sociology." This helps highlight a deficiency in all three approaches. Thereafter, the analysis, fourthly, attempts to explain why poverty persists (and inequality is rising) and development seems unattainable, despite the ideologies and strategies that have been suggested before.

REGIONALISM, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, FLAWED MEASURING INSTRUMENTS AND THE OVERLOOKED ELEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR AFRICA

Regionalism is fashionable in Africa, as demonstrated by the multiple and overlapping RECs. I conceptualize regionalism as the ideal in favor of establishing regional alliances between geographically proximate countries. Many conceptualize regionalism as state-led projects of cooperation between governments for reorganizing regional geoeconomic spaces to conform to economic and political goals (Gamble and Payne 1996; Schulz et al. 2001). Wyatt-Walter (1995, 77) adds the prefix "economic," defining regionalism as the "*conscious policy* of states" for coordinating a greater region's activities. Regional economic integration is synonymous with economic globalization insofar as both denote increased mobility of goods, services, capital, technology and labor across national borders (Nshimbi 2005).

However, the former pre-supposes integration of the economies of a territorial subsystem. This interpretation is commonly used in neo-classical economic theory, sometimes calling it *market* or *trade integration*. Accordingly, markets or the actions of corporations and economic actors drive regionalization (Nesadurai 2002).

The new regionalism (which I call *revived* regionalism) of the 1990s and early 2000s in Africa that coincided with a similar phenomenon in Southeast Asia—after the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis (see, e.g., Shee 2003)—differs from the new regionalism approach (NRA). For one, the so-called new regionalism resembles the linear model of regional economic integration. In this model, member countries envisage an economic and monetary union or fully integrated region that evolves from a free trade area (FTA), to a customs union and on to a common market. Though it did not aim for a full common market like the European Union's (EU), examples of such were given of the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean, among others. The CBI would promote economic and trade policy harmonization among members. Specifically, it aimed to create conditions to beneficially integrate Eastern and Southern African countries and those of the Indian Ocean into the world economy by dismantling barriers to flows of goods, capital and people across borders and between member countries (Fajgenbaum et al. 1999; Imani Development 1992). The revived regionalism, under the auspices of international financial institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank still represents top-down regional forms of market integration. It emphasizes exports as drivers of growth and an active private sector, coupled with a government that withdraws from participating in the economy.

Rather than confine itself to formal interstate organizations, the NRA on the other hand incorporates alternative, informal or micro forms of regionalism. It incorporates a range of formal and informal relations among countries, as well as non-state actors. According to Soderbaum (2003, 1–2), the new regionalism is characterized by its “multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions.” In this chapter, I focus on the informality incorporated in the conceptualization of the NRA. I do so in order to highlight actors and activities in the informal economy and the potential to alleviate poverty and level inequality in Africa. I highlight the key perspectives of the informal economy next.

THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: THE OVERLOOKED SECTOR IN DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS AND POLICIES IN AFRICAN

As far back as the 1930s, the informal economy was regarded as not only distinct from the formal but also backward, traditional and insignificant. However, some considered it important for employment creation, poverty reduction and national development (Furnivall 1939; Geertz 1963; Gërkhani 2004; Hart 1973;

ILO 1972; Williams 2010). Contrary to the *structuralist* perspective, the *dualistic* view depicted the informal economy as excluded from and unrelated to the formal. According to the structuralist view, however, the informal economy is intrinsically linked to the formal and comprises economic units and workers subordinated to large capitalist firms. In the structuralist view, the informal economy is a consequence of the informalization of the formal owing to economic crisis that forces labor into informality (through retrenchments). Still, structuralists see the informal economy as serving the interests of capitalist development. This is because informal actors help increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms by supplying cheap goods and services to the latter.

According to De Soto (1989), however, informality is caused by stringent regulation of economic activities in the formal sector. De Soto's *legalist* view of the informal economy asserts that mercantilist (or firm) interests set bureaucratic rules of the game in collusion with government. This creates a hostile legal system for the informal actors. Informality thus provides the self-employed an environment in which they avoid cumbersome requirements of formal registration, save time and avoid costs. Similarly, the *voluntarist* view suggests that informal entrepreneurs deliberately exit the stringently regulated formal economy, but primarily in order to avoid taxation and formal regulations.

I situate the informal economy in the conceptual framework of this chapter as a phenomenon wrapped in the wider economy. This is to highlight informal actors and the sector, which has long been neglected and often made illegal by competing development models and state authorities in Africa. This brief overview and the literature clearly show that the informal economy is significant in employment creation and sustaining livelihoods for many, and that it is also universal and global in character (Portes et al. 1989). A general flaw of past development models applied to Africa has, therefore, been a failure to incorporate this sector, despite its ubiquity and global character. Moreover, its contribution to livelihoods and wellbeing continues to be overlooked because of a persisting reliance on GDP and the quest for ideal levels of GDP growth as indicators and means of national and continental economic wellbeing. I elaborate on this below.

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: A NARROW MEASURE OF HOLISTIC DEVELOPMENT

Obsession with GDP has long belied the necessity of pursuing and measuring development in totality. International financial institutions classify countries as developed or not, based on gross national income (GNI). The GNI sums up the value added by all producers that live in a country, taxes on products (less subsidies) that are excluded from output, income from abroad and property income. Like GDP, GNI, measures the incomes from domestic and overseas sources or the output from the country's citizens and companies, whether based in that country or overseas. According to the World Bank,

therefore, a country is developing if it falls in one of two income categories: low or middle. In 2016, developing economies were defined as low-income if they had had a GNI per capita of \$1045 or less in 2014 and were middle-income if their GNI per capita had been more than \$1045 but less than \$12,736 (World Bank 2016).

Although it is the world's most powerful number (Fioramonti 2013), GDP is an unreliable indicator of wellbeing and the health of a nation's economy. This is because it focuses on output while disregarding inputs, non-renewable natural resources and the environment among others. Fioramonti (2013) details the origin of GDP as a favored statistic for measuring economic health and its pitfalls. In the interests of space and scope, I only highlight four of the pitfalls in this chapter.²

Firstly, GDP does not take environmental factors into account when it is being calculated. Each time a Zambian extracts copper ore from the earth, Zambia's GDP increases. The environmental degradation and loss that result from this process and the accompanying pollution are not factored in.

Secondly, GDP does not take the distribution of income within an economy into account. Because of this, the GDP-based "Africa rising" hype of the two decades leading to 2016 masks high and rising levels of inequality. Generally, the high levels of GDP seen in countries such as Angola hide the fact that the income generated from the oil economy is distributed among just a few people. Angola is among the fastest growing countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with an ideal GDP growth rate of approximately 8%. This growth rate had actually reached 22.6% before the 2008 global financial crisis. However, the statistic contrasts Angola's Gini coefficient of 58.6% (AfDB 2013), reflecting high inequality, and 148th position out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI).

Thirdly, GDP does not capture quality of life issues, making it difficult to use as a benchmark of welfare. A resident of South Africa, for example, would not trade the protection of one of the world's best constitutions, the enjoyment of a range of democratic freedoms and rights and good healthcare services, among others, for, say, Congo-Brazzaville's generally healthier GDP growth rates.

Fourthly, and relevant to this chapter, GDP excludes household work, along with the majority of other work conducted in the informal economy. It excludes not only valuable services such as parenting, but also the work of many self-employed in informal enterprises (small and or/unregistered) and those on wages who are employed in informal jobs (ILO 2002).

According to ILO, informal employment comprises 72% of non-agricultural employment in sub-Saharan Africa. Self-employment constitutes a greater share of this than waged employment, representing 70% and increasing to 81% if South Africa is excluded. The ILO (2002) further reports home-based workers and street vendors as the two largest subgroups of the informal workforce, with 84% of female non-agricultural workers being informally employed. Informal employment is, therefore, not only generally a larger source of work

for women than men but also indicates their importance in street vending and home-based work.

Informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), too, operate in the informal economy, as it is defined by all activities, workers and units as well as output from the informal sector and informal employment (ILO 2003). ICBTs comprise a significant portion of the SADC region's expanding informal economy, which occupies approximately 70% of the total economy in some African countries. The ICBTs in SADC provide employment, sustain livelihoods and generate approximately US\$17.5 billion a year in trade (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2013). The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) region, one of the eight RECs recognized to build the AEC (and some of whose members are also members of SADC), reported that informal cross-border trade accounted for approximately 30% of total intra-COMESA trade in 2013 (COMESA 2015).

In Africa, the four highlighted pitfalls of GDP are exacerbated by the sparse, sporadic and uneven availability of statistical data (Jerven 2013, 2016). This, according to Jerven (2016), should tell researchers and data users engaged in inferential or descriptive statistics that studying Africa by the numbers can be misleading. This, as I argue, explains the failure of some past strategies for development prescribed and implemented in Africa. I consider three such models in the next section.

PAST COMPETING INACCURATE DIAGNOSES OF AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and Organization of African Unity (OAU)—now the AU—have together historically held views different from the World Bank's on how best to arrest a perceived deepening economic crisis in Africa. These represent the first and second understandings of the development challenges experienced by Africa and, accordingly, approaches touted as most appropriate to overcoming poverty on the continent. The way in which they have respectively interpreted the causes of the crisis Africa is experiencing also differs. The UNECA/AU, for instance, considered Africa's colonial heritage, unfavorable terms of trade and high oil prices to be responsible. The World Bank attributed the crisis to government inefficiencies, poor exports and pricing.

The UNECA/OAU thus formulated the LPA as a solution. In it, they suggested developing priority sectors (e.g., agricultural), skills development and training, institutional development and the establishment of international relations. The UNECA/OAU also urged collective self-reliance and a shift from exports to the exploitation of Africa's natural resources for growth. UNECA's solution could, therefore, be summed up as internally driven, self-reliant development.

Between the formulation and consolidation of the LPA into the Abuja Treaty, the World Bank (1981) indicated government inefficiencies, poor exports and pricing as responsible for Africa's crisis. Accordingly, it proposed more agricultural exports to boost Africa and demanded that African states streamline governments, balance budgets, devalue currencies and markets and liberalize trade. In summary, the World Bank's solution included the development of agriculture-based exports and structural adjustment measures.

Despite admitting that African governments and some cultural practices hindered development (Browne 1992); UNECA (1989) opposed the World Bank's "inappropriate, uninformed structural adjustment programs" imposed on African countries for disregarding local conditions. Moreover, dependence on agricultural exports would only perpetuate dependency and poverty.

Extraordinarily, the World Bank's (1989) views later converged with some of UNECA's (Browne 1992, 78). For example, it prescribed agriculture-based transformation, human-centered development, citizens' participation in development and better governance. However, World Bank and UNECA views on trade liberalization, exports, currency devaluation and privatization remained different.

Further, UNECA considered regionalism essential to Africa's development. Consequently, the LPA sought structural transformation through "a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance" (OAU 1981, 5). The Abuja Treaty promotes economic integration to increase self-sufficiency and policy harmonization and coordination between Africa's RECs in order to eventually establish the AEC (Article 4.1). Adebayo Adedeji, an LPA architect, regards intra-African economic cooperation a prerequisite rather than an afterthought to development (Asante 1991, 85). The literature, though, generally considers intra-African trade, integration and cooperation a failure (see, e.g., Schoeman 2013).

The World Bank's strategy to integrate Africa into the global economy through agricultural exports resonates with the third understanding and approach to Africa's development challenges; the EU's. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states and the EU aims to eradicate poverty, promote sustainable development and gradually integrate ACP states into the global economy (African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States—European Community 2000, CPA 2000 Article 1). The CPA was built on four decades (since the 1975 Lomé Convention) of special relations, where the EU extended non-reciprocal trade preferences towards ACP-originating goods. These generally included primary and some processed goods such as bananas, coffee, tobacco, textiles, beef and sugar. Despite depending on export earnings generated by the trade preferences enjoyed by ACP countries, the preferences reportedly have had very minimal impact on export expansion, investment and diversification of economies (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2016). Cooperation under the ACP–EU framework has today extended to peace and security, migration, good governance and non-state actors, complementing traditional bilateral engagements.

PRESENT COMPETING MISPLACED SOLUTIONS TO AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

The parties could not renew the ACP–EU trade chapter when it expired in 2007, the reason being that it violated global trade rules through the EU's preferential treatment of ACP states. The ACP–EU arrangement essentially reflected trade distortion and discriminatory allocation of market access, despite the EU's non-negotiable obligations to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Consequently, economic partnership agreements (EPAs)—which also progressively remove ACP–EU trade barriers—define their new mode of trade cooperation. The EPAs reportedly establish a WTO-compatible framework of trade, prescribed by Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO 2016). Article XXIV encourages trade agreements providing they include all trade without discriminatory tariffs and barriers against third countries. The EPAs reconfigure the existing RECs among the 77 ACP countries, as explained shortly, into six regions negotiating the new EU trade policy towards them. Africa's regional configuration around the EPAs, for instance, includes Central Africa–EU, Eastern and Southern Africa–EU, SADC–EU and West Africa–EU EPAs. EPA negotiations had started over a decade before the scheduled end date of October 1, 2014. Critics say EPAs unfavorably increase European access to ACP markets.

Generally, defaulters on the October 2014 deadline would lose free access to EU markets. Varied regimes would, therefore, now define a region's trade with the EU. In the SADC, for example, three member states would trade under the SADC–EU EPA when it was initialed,³ two under the Everything but Arms (EBA),⁴ and one under a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU (Mwanza 2014).⁵ New regimes that attract higher tariffs are likely to disadvantage some regional states.

EPAs also reconfigure Africa's existing RECs, disrupting traditional schemes based on *inter alia* common history, language and geographical proximity. For example, two EPAs split the SADC region into two. Thus, seven SADC member states including Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland now constitute the SADC EPA group.⁶ Another group of six SADC states including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe are negotiating an EPA along with Central Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa groups. Clearly, the envisaged AEC built on the AU's eight African RECs seems inconsequential to the EU.

EPAs actually reinforce the multiple and overlapping membership and associated conflicting obligations of some countries in African regionalism. They also contradict the June 10, 2015 COMESA–East African Community (EAC)–SADC (COMESA–EAC–SADC) tripartite free trade area (TFTA) and agreement. The contradiction is in the fact that the TFTA potentially solves the problem of multiple membership of African countries in RECs and enhances

the goal of establishing the AEC. Negotiations for the AEC look to build on the TFTA, in a similar fashion to the TFTA negotiations conducted between the three RECs through the principle of *acquis*.

Before the AEC is realized, Africa has to first establish a continental free trade area (CFTA). This is in keeping with the theory of regional integration (Balassa 1961; Balassa and Toutjesdijk 1975; Viner 1950) and the Abuja Treaty as the AU's preferred approach to African integration. Africa thus seems resolved to establish the CFTA. This is evident in the AU's commitment to negotiating a CFTA that makes substantial trade liberalization commitments (Gathii 2016). The commitment was firmed up in Addis Ababa in November 2016, when ministers and negotiators from the 54 AU member states held their fourth round of negotiations for establishing the CFTA (Oloruntoba and Nshimbi 2017). According to the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, the CFTA is one of six sequential stages through which the AEC should eventually be established, over a transitional period not exceeding 34 years (Abuja Treaty Article 6). An AEC built on RECs as envisaged by the Abuja Treaty is compatible with the transfer of the responsibility for development to the RECs.

However, the RECs should also decentralize. SADC, for instance, missed the deadline for the operationalization of the customs union originally targeted for 2010 and subsequent milestones of its integration project outlined in the 2005–2020 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (SADC 2001). SADC is not alone among African RECs in this respect. Having established an FTA, however, SADC might slowly be progressing towards customs union. Nonetheless, the subsequent relative increase in official intra-SADC trade is insufficient to benefit the grassroots; similarly, the record growths in GDP that SADC states post, especially after 2000. Actually, these trends betray the reality in the countries experiencing growth; that GDP growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty eradication. All the parties discussed above rely on the misleading indicator in devising strategies to deal with Africa's development challenges.

Moreover, these agencies have long misdiagnosed Africa as facing an economic crisis and, consequently, prescribed strictly economic solutions, when the crisis could be political (Asante 1991) and social. Take the example of the mobility of skilled persons to where they are needed, as the Abuja Treaty urges (AU 1991. See, e.g., Articles 6 and 71). Despite endorsing continental migration policies that match AEC goals, SADC, for example, of all eight AEC-building RECs, has since 1993 shown apathy towards ratifying a protocol to facilitate regional movement of people. Africa and RECs excel in drafting grand plans but fail to follow through. Schoeman (2013, 125) aptly says, "Africa has been dreamed to death." The LPA/FAL-cum-Abuja Treaty represents the first African-bred initiative addressing development challenges that leaders have shelved, in practice, to implement imported policies instead.

A HEALTHIER VIEW OF AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES: PEOPLE-CENTERED SOLUTIONS INTO THE FUTURE

While reorienting development strategies from exclusively targeting GDP-based economic growth for structural transformation (Asante 1991), policymakers should also realize that pragmatic solutions to Africa's challenges rest with the grassroots. Transformation starts with the individual, and not just a statistic such as GDP. These basics are generally absent from strategies for assessing and planning development. The general populace and especially grassroots actors are rarely considered critical agents of development. This is generally evident in the exclusion of such actors from regional integration interactions between the state parties. For example, CUTS International (2010) attributes the dissolution of the EAC in 1977 to, among others, the lack of involvement of non-state actors. The top down, state-led model of regional integration driven by heads of state and state bureaucrats has thus been held responsible for the ineffectiveness of African integration initiatives. Even when negotiations between the state parties end in agreements, non-state actors are rarely informed of the deals reached as well as the rules and provisions of the agreements; not to mention being encouraged to make use of the agreements and the opportunities they create. Therefore, it is imperative where such agreements are enshrined in instruments, laws and policies, that state, regional and continental leaders make them available to non-state actors to raise awareness. Communication of information about and the benefits of integration to the people at the grassroots is very critical for its success.

It is also imperative for the parties to engage civil society in the efforts towards integration. Civil society organizations (CSOs) work with the grassroots and are familiar with conditions at that level. Involving CSOs would help avoid the repetition of past failed regional integration efforts (CUTS International 2010). CSOs can be effective communicators of issues concerning integration to the grassroots. Simultaneously, they can promote people-centered integration. The ability of CSOs to construct regionalization through the framing of issues (Godsäter 2013) in areas such as trade, health and agriculture make them important partners in regional integration processes and governance. In this regard, some CSOs participate in REC and continental integration institutions.

At continental level, the AU's commitment to popular participation and engagement with civil society is reflected in Articles 5 and 22 of the Constitutive Act of the AU (AU 2000). Here, provisions are made for an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) which draws in a wide group of African CSOs. The establishment of ECOSOCC in 2005 signified formal approval by African leaders of civil society's participation in continental integration.

At REC level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, partners with CSOs out of the recognition that they help mobilize critical human resource for development, as well as raise economic, social and

political awareness (ECOWAS 2016). The REC thus engages CSOs, through the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOFF), as partners, agents and clients to or through whom regional issues are communicated. In Southern Africa, the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), brings together umbrella NGOs from SADC member states, to facilitate engagement of the region's people with the SADC secretariat and member state governments (SADC-CNGO 2017). Engagement is based on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between SADC Secretariat and SADC-CNGO. The MoU outlines SADC-CNGO aims to facilitate the contribution of civil society to integration. CSOs operating under the auspices of such umbrella organizations also provide services to the RECs, such as advice on policy issues regarding trade.

Despite this, the general exclusion of informal sector actors, as highlighted in this chapter, suggests that the RECs and Africa have more issues to address to fully achieve popular participation in integration. Actually, that RECs such as the SADC have MoU with civil society mother bodies points to regulatory criteria for eligibility for formal engagement. The limitation of non-state actors to a few CSOs considered representatives of civil society presents regulatory obstacles for some non-state actors (Godsäter 2013) such as ICBTs. Therefore, excluded non-state actors cannot engage with the RECs on issues that are exclusively pertinent to them.

Leaders will confront poverty better by regarding long-standing grassroots realities of excluded non-state actors. Despite size and viability, governments have for long not paid attention to and obstructed actors in the informal economy. Ironically, the literature has plentiful accounts of Africa's lack of funds for development. States, regional organizations and the AU depend instead on international financial institutions and other external sources to finance development. This, and continued reliance on foreign technical assistance, suggests that beside the historical goals of mobilizing human resources (see, e.g., Abuja Treaty Articles 71 and 72), Africa and its RECs has failed to train, mobilize and effectively utilize its people to realize the ambitious internally driven, self-reliant development.

NOTES

1. The eight RECs that the AU recognizes for this purpose include the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). See, <http://www.au.int/en/recs/> (accessed November 26, 2012).
2. See, e.g., Fioramonti 2013, among others, who details the central problem of GDP (or Gross Domestic Problem, as the title of his book reads) as measure of the economic wellbeing of a country.
3. Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland.

4. Lesotho and Mozambique.
5. South Africa.
6. The SADC EPA group concluded negotiations in July 2014. Angola was not party to the negotiations, opting to join the SADC EPA in future. The SADC-EU EPA was signed on June 10, 2016.

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The Resilient Informal Economy in the Milieu of African Development

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INTRODUCTION

The informal sector is a topic which elicits diverging views, sometimes passionately held, about how to define, measure and classify, and especially about how to respond to it—there is even a debate about what to call it (Bangasser 2000). The concept of the informal sector was first popularized by the International Labour Organization (ILO) Employment Mission Report to Kenya in 1972; the Report begins by stating a fundamental problem with employment in Kenya, as well as in many other developing countries (Emmerij 2005). Informal employment plays an important role for job creation, income generation and poverty reduction in many countries, with special focus on developing and transition countries. They enhance the visibility of many workers in the informal economy and of their contributions to economic and social development (Budlender 2011). For instance, in Latin America the urban informal sector was the main creator of employment opportunities in the 1990s, and on average six out of ten new jobs were created by micro-enterprises, own-account workers and domestic services. In Africa, urban informal employment is estimated to absorb more than 60% of the urban labor force (Emmerij 2005). This sector generated more than 90% of all additional jobs in the region during the 1990s. In Asia, before

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the 1997 financial crisis, the informal sector typically absorbed between 40 and 50% of the urban labor force, with differences between the newly industrializing countries (less than 10%) and countries such as Bangladesh with two-thirds of employment in the informal sector (p. 95). It is important to note that the majority of informal sector workers are self-employed, without employees. It is unclear how labor regulations relate to own-account workers without employees. They have full control of their working hours and income. It is in accord with this wisdom that the Pension Act (Act 766) provides for self-employed persons on a voluntary basis (Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum 2011). Resilience was used in terms of disasters, mostly by the engineering community (especially when referring to physical infrastructure), in the 1980s, and was related to the concept of being able to absorb and recover from a hazardous event. Since that time, hybrid definitions have arisen that combine engineering with the ecological, or the ecological with the behavioral (CARRI Report 2013).

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF THE RESILIENT AND INFORMAL SECTOR

The term resilience was first used in the physical sciences to denote the behavior of a spring. In the 1970s and 1980s, resilience was adapted by the ecological and psychological communities to describe somewhat different phenomena (CARRI Report 2013). The word was coined at the beginning of the seventeenth century, taking its roots from Latin. *Resilientia* was defined as a “material’s resistance to shock and its ability to absorb kinetic energy without breaking apart.” When something or someone is referred to as resilient, it means that the person is jumping (Latin *salire*) back (Latin *re*). Therefore, the literal meaning is that he/she/it is bouncing back to the state he/she/it was in before the situation in question (Bourdon 2013).

In other words, resilience is the capacity of a system, be it an individual, a forest, a city or an economy, to deal with change and continue to develop. It is about the capacity to use shocks and disturbances such as a financial crisis or climate change to spur renewal and innovative thinking (Moberg et al. 2014).

Resilience is the ability of a local economy to withstand economic shocks and to keep on providing goods and services required by residents to achieve an acceptable quality of life (Chadwick-Parkes 2015). The informal sector is “typically composed of very small businesses that are not registered in any way. They are rarely run from business premises [but] instead ... from homes, [sidewalks] or other informal squatter-like arrangements” (Sundquist 2010 as cited in Chadwick-Parkes 2015).

The concept of the informal sector was introduced into international usage in 1972 by the ILO in its Kenya Mission Report, which defined informality as a “way of doing things characterized by (a) ease of entry; (b) reliance on indigenous resources; (c) family ownership; (d) small scale operations; (e) labor intensive and adaptive technology; (e) skills acquired outside of the formal sector;

(g) unregulated and competitive markets.” Since that time, many definitions have been introduced by different authors and the ILO itself (Sharma 2012).

The informal sector captures one type of activity in informal employment—work that takes place in unincorporated enterprises that are unregistered or small. However, there are additional types of informal employment outside informal enterprises: for example, persons working in formal enterprises who are not covered by social protection through their work, as well as domestic workers, casual day laborers and contributing family workers who are not covered by social protection through their work (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO 2016).

As cited in Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum (2011), stated that “currently there are two approaches to defining informal sector activity: the definitional and behavioural.” According to the definitional approach, “informal sector is economic activity unrecorded in the official statistics such as the gross domestic product and/or the national income accounts.” Behavioral approach on the other hand, maintains that the “informal sector is based on whether or not activity complies with the established judicial, regulatory, and institutional framework” (as cited in Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum 2011). The informal economy refers to a series of activities that, by occurring outside the arena of the normal, regulated economy, escape official record-keeping (Losby et al. 2002). Some people engage in legal but informal work in the United States in a system of cash-only exchanges. These individuals are operating unregistered businesses or engaging in under-the-table work. This type of economic activity is often called “informal work” or referred to as “the informal economy” (Losby et al. 2003).

THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

This chapter focuses on empirical validation of the factors that determine the proliferation of informal sector activities, which invariably results in a retarded effect on formal sector economy and African development. It should be noted that around the world about two-thirds of all employees work in the informal sector (World Bank 2009 as cited in Sparks and Barnett 2010).

Hence, to carry out an empirical study of this nature, some African countries comprising economies from the West African, Southern African, East African and Central African subregions were selected. The selections were made according to the authenticity and availability of data necessary for the study. A panel study approach comprising a cross section of the selected economies over a given period of time was employed for data analysis. This therefore necessitated the need for the study to apply the pooled regression, fixed and random effect estimation procedure. A Hausman specification test was further conducted to determine between the random and fixed effect result. The Hausman null hypothesis of no systematic difference between the two estimators was accepted by this study, leading to the preference of the efficient random effect estimates over the consistent fixed effect result.

Excerpting from the work of Losby et al. (2002), various labels have been used by scholars to refer to the “informal economy”: it has been called the irregular economy, the subterranean economy, the underground economy, the black economy, the shadow economy and the informal economy. The popular media uses terms such as invisible, hidden, submerged, shadow, irregular, non-official, unrecorded and clandestine. The common thread is that these activities are not recorded or are imperfectly reflected in official national accounting systems. It was anticipated that entrepreneurs operating in the informal economy in developing countries would eventually displace foreign-owned capital and entrepreneurs, setting the stage for these countries to develop full market economies. This has remained elusive for the vast majority of informal actors who are too small, undercapitalized and insufficiently connected to the formal economy to fulfill this promise.

In general, informal sector activities are characterized by small-scale, self-employed activities, with or without hired workers, typically at a low level of organization and technology, with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes (Misati 2007). The informal sector has not only persisted but has actually grown in many developing countries, particularly in Africa where it dominates the economy both in terms of output and employment (Verick 2006). The informal sector generates employment, reduces social setbacks and serves as a catalyst for economic growth (African Development Bank 2013).

The dynamism of the informal sector in creating employment and value addition is particularly strong, representing about 80% of the total labor force and contributing about 55% of sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, nine out of ten informal workers are women and youth, but the lack of social protection, skills’ upgrading and productive income often trap these groups in poverty and exclusion from economic growth and development, with only about 10% of operators benefiting from social protection Schemes (AU 2011 as cited in United Nations Economic and Social Council 2015).

The informal sector matters because of its sheer size (e.g., about half of national output, more than 80% of total employment and 90% of new jobs in African low income countries) and its implications for economic development, notably its effects on employment opportunities, productivity, fiscal revenues and growth (Mbaye 2014). According to the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), the proportion of informal employment in Kenya increased from 70% in 2000 to 83% in 2012. In 2012, around 10 million people were employed in the informal sector. Across informal economies in African cities, including Nairobi, Lagos and Dar es Salaam, traders and artisans are common professions, but they are often stigmatized as unskilled or illiterate groups of individuals, who do not keep records of their goods (Kinyanjui 2015). International business discourse also identifies such individuals as survivalists and non-inventors with little entrepreneurial culture,

working in informal urban markets. Nonetheless, business exchanges in these informal urban markets are an integral part of social and economic development in Africa. These markets have retained and continue to retain traditional African norms and values of community and individual agency, which date back to indigenous market concepts. More importantly, traders and artisans in these informal urban markets exhibit a distinct entrepreneurial behavior that is referred to as solidarity entrepreneurialism (*ibid.*).

According to Sparks and Barnett (2010), the informal sector represents the dominant share of many sectors across the continent, especially in manufacturing, commerce, finance and mining. Trade-related activities, including street vending, are the most common form of activity in Africa's informal sector. The informal sector provides between 50 and 75% of employment and 72% of non-agricultural employment, 78% if South Africa is excluded. The sector comprised an average of 42% of gross national income (GNI) in 2000, ranging from under 30% in South Africa to 60% in Tanzania and Nigeria. Chen estimated that 93% of new jobs created in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s were in the informal sector. Indeed, informal sector employment in Uganda and Kenya now exceeds employment in the formal sector and nearly 90% of the labor force in Ghana comes from the informal sector.

In the pre-colonial era the informal economy was the economy, but that does not mean there was uniformity across the continent. In West Africa, where centralized states and empires dominated, a more urban environment and regulatory systems for economic activity were well developed. In southern Africa, the complexity and density of regional trade networks and economic systems was much lower. The colonial period witnessed the first wave of informalization in the sense that all economic activity now operated outside newly created imposed states (Meagher 2016).

However, the findings from this study suggest that unemployment, governance and level of education have significantly contributed to an informal economic setting among African economies while retarding formal economic development. Further evidence from the study reveals that the degree of sensitivity of the formal economy to the variations in these factors is nevertheless inelastic. Consequently, it could be observed that financial market development and price stability as significant macro-economic stability measures revealed a significant support for the development of the formal economy within the African continent. Apparently, the detailed analysis of the estimates indicates that the degree of responsiveness of formal economic development to the variations in financial system and macro-economic stability is notably elastic within the African context. This implies that small variations in the soundness of the financial system and stability of the pricing system will have a disproportionate effect on the developmental stage of formal African economies.

RESILIENCE AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

Africa is the world's second largest and second most populous continent after Asia (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 2011). The current population is 1,231,994,377 as of Tuesday, January 10, 2017, based on the latest United Nations estimates. Africa's population is equivalent to 16.36% of the [total world population](#) (Worldometers 2017).

Africa has become the world's fastest-growing continent, and more than two-thirds of African countries have improved their quality of governance, leading to a better business climate, improved basic services and expanded economic opportunities (Kaberuka 2015). In particular, seven countries—Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda—have made relatively more progress in building resilience. These countries, two of which have benefited from a natural resource windfall, have been able to adopt more inclusive political arrangements, strengthen their institutions and foster investment. They have also been able to maintain macro-economic stability and increase domestic revenues to support higher levels of public investment and improved social services. However, several other countries have not been able to make similar transitions and some countries have even regressed, for example Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi and Zimbabwe (Gelbard et al. 2015).

More than 250 million people on the continent are affected by fragility, with significant spillovers into neighboring countries and regions. The development prospects of four major regions—Horn of Africa, Sahel, Mano River Union, and Great Lakes and Central Africa region—are at risk (Kaberuka 2015). Taking a cue from Kaberuka (2015), the drivers of fragility can be categorized into four dimensions:

- Economic
- Social
- Political
- Environmental

Usually these dimensions involve exclusion and inequality. At the core of social drivers of fragility is a demand by individuals or groups in a society for inclusion and access to services, resources, opportunities, rights or identity that lead to grievances, social tensions, rebellions and violence. Political drivers may include the limited—participation or voice of certain groups, or state capture by some elites that threaten to deprive other elites or segments of society, which can manifest itself in a loss of legitimacy of institutions or breakdown of political settlements. Environmental pressures and climate change may lead to humanitarian disasters and competition over scarce natural resources such as water or pasture; countries or communities affected by geographic insularity, such as island states and isolated areas within a state, are particularly vulnerable in this regard. Large and growing economic inequalities, economic capture of the state

by a small group or the inability of the society to provide jobs, particularly for youth, are prominent economic drivers. Although these drivers of fragility exist to varying degrees in almost all countries, it is the state's and society's capacity to address and mitigate the effects that also differentiates the levels of fragility (pp. 42–43).

METHODS

This study examined the economic and institutional factors that support the informal economic setting which conversely weakens formal economic operations within African economies. To carry out this research, a panel method of data analysis was employed. This comprises twelve selected African countries from the south region (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa) and West African region (Ghana and Nigeria) as well as the East and Middle East region (Congo, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia) based on availability and reliability of data. In the process of data estimation, a panel regression approach was adopted. In this approach three estimation techniques were utilized: pooled regression, fixed effect and random effect regression. The panel approach allows for the combination of time series and cross-sectional observation, thereby increasing the chances of having a large sample size within a specific time frame unlike a primary reliance on time series or cross-sectional study alone. The secondary data were mainly from the world development indicators, (WDI 2015).

To determine between the fixed effect and random effect, the Hausman test (Table 40.2) was conducted, which favors the random effect result. The result and interpretation of the result were based on the random effect estimates as presented in Table 40.1.

Table 40.1 Analysis of formal and informal business operations in the African economy

Variables	Pooled OLS			Random Effect		
	Coefficient	T. statistics	P>/t/	Coefficient	T. statistics	P>/t/
LFMDI	1.40156	13.45(0.1042)	0.000	1.40156	13.45(0.1042)	0.000
LUNEMP	-0.4137558	-3.80(0.1089)	0.000	-0.4137558	-3.80(0.1089)	0.000
LGOV	-0.7093044	-6.69(0.1060)	0.000	-0.7093044	-6.69(0.1060)	0.000
LSSE	-0.1599889	-2.22(0.0721)	0.029	-0.1599889	-2.22(0.0721)	0.026
LCPI	1.395082	3.55(0.3931)	0.001	1.395082	3.55(0.3931)	0.001
F(5, 77) = 53.47; Prob > F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.7764 Adj R-squared = 0.7619				Wald chi ² (5) = 267.35 Prob > chi ² = 0.0000		

Source: Created by the authors based on World Development Index

Table 40.2 Hausman test result

Variables	Fixed(b)	Random(B)	Difference (b-B)	Standard Error
LFMDI	-.4915867	1.40156	0.0955986	0.0489088
LUNEMP	0.4915867	-0.4137558	-0.0778309	0.0441607
LGOV	-0.6975345	-0.7093044	0.0117699	0.0208484
LSSE	-0.1790874	-0.1599889	-.0190985	0.0148551
LCPI	2.223673	1.395082	0.8285914	0.726015
<i>chi²(8) = 5.18; Prob>chi² = 0.3948</i>				

Source: Created by the authors based on World Development Index

SPECIFICATION OF STUDY MODEL

Based on an extensive review of literature about the factors that promote informal economic activities evidenced from official business registration records, the model for this study has been implicitly expressed as follows:

$$\text{NBR} = f(\text{FMDI}, \text{UNEMP}, \text{GOV}, \text{SSE}, \text{CPI}) \quad (40.1)$$

The above model is further explicitly expressed in functional form as:

$$\text{NBR} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{FMDI} + \beta_2 \text{UNEMP} + \beta_3 \text{GOV} + \beta_4 \text{SSE} + \beta_5 \text{CPI} + \varepsilon_t \quad (40.2)$$

where;

NBR: number of registered business enterprises

FMDI: financial market development index

UNEMP: unemployment rate

GOV: governance quality

SSE: secondary school enrollment

CPI: consumer price index

β_0 is the intercept

$\beta_1 \beta_2 \beta_3 \beta_4 \beta_5$ are the slope coefficients

ε_t is the stochastic term

DATA MEASUREMENT AND DESCRIPTIONS

NBR: is the number of newly and officially registered enterprises, representing the level of informal or formal economic operations taking place within an economy. The higher the number of newly registered enterprises the more the economy is driving towards formal economies, while the reverse is the case when there is a significant decline in the number of officially registered

economic activities. Hence, it is expected that a negative influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable NBR will enhance the proliferation of the informal economy within African economies.

FMDI: represents the financial market development index. This measures the degree of the development of the financial market and market capitalization that could provide a significant attraction of large-scale investment ventures. It therefore provides an insight into the greatness of the individual economic units and capacity for financing the real economy as the need arises. The more developed the financial markets, the higher the chances of having credit facilities to support investors and promote formal business establishments when compared with less developed financial markets. It consists of the average weight of the sum of market capitalization and foreign direct investment.

UNEMP: is the level of unemployment experienced among the African economies. A high level of unemployment drives individuals into informal business establishments, which do not require much capital to set up and are also free of government interference through taxation and regulation. Thus it is expected that unemployment will promote the informal economy in the quest for the slightest business opportunity in order to survive. Hence there would be an inverse relationship between unemployment and business formalization.

GOV: relates to the quality of governance, and in this study is equated with political stability and absence of violence and terrorism. Good governance is characterized by strong institutions that enforce regulations. There is peace, orderliness, respect for property rights and rule of law. On the contrary weak governance is characterized by weak institution and poor adherence to regulations and order. It could therefore be seen that the strength of governance could play a significant role in determining the level of informal economy within a geographical boundary. In the presence of good governance there is less social exclusion and more social protection of property rights and patents, which invariably encourages formal economic activities. Hence, a negative relationship is expected between weak institutions and the formal registration of businesses.

SSE: is the school enrollment rate, which measures the level of educational attainment and how it has influenced formal business registration. It is expected that the more educationally enlightened population would opt for a formal economy instead of informal economic activities. This is further buttressed by the fact that the informal economy is often characterized by the less educated, less empowered and less informed workers in unregulated business settings. Less government attention is given to them and they are not regarded as among the influential part of the society. They are not often the target of policy implementations and consists more of the poor and less privileged. Therefore higher education and literacy is expected to encourage a greater formalization of business activities, as obtained in the formal economy.

CPI: The consumer price index measures the basket of commodity prices at specific times within a particular location. The level of price stability over a

given period of time helps to promote large-scale investment through the official registration process. Stable prices enhance the return on investment since the value of currency is expected to remain stable over a considerable period of time. Therefore high price volatility will tend to discourage formal economic transaction, while high prices will promote informal business transactions. Thus an indirect relationship is expected between formal business registration and general price level.

In a priori expectations the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables could be further expressed as; $\beta_1 > 0$, $\beta_2 < 0$, $\beta_3 > 0$, $\beta_4 > 0$ and $\beta_5 < 0$.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

The R-squared result (0.7764) indicates that 77.64% of the total variations in the new business formalization are jointly and significantly explained by the included exogenous variables of the model. Furthermore, evidence from the F-statistics of the pooled (53.47; Prob. > F = 0.0000) result indicates that the model significantly explains the data at 1% level of significance and thus could be regarded to be of best fit to the data. This is further confirmed by the chi-square Wald statistic (267.35; Prob > $\chi^2 = 0.0000$) of the random effect estimate.

The Hausman test was employed to determine between the fixed effect consistent estimates and the random effect efficient result. The evidence from the test provides empirical support of significant differences across the countries with uncorrelated errors between the group-specific errors and the idiosyncratic errors terms. This makes it more appropriate to utilize the random effect result in the analysis and interpretation of result in this study, as shown in the result and discussion section below.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Evidence from this study shows that with the exception of financial market development and general price index, other factors such as political stability, level of unemployment, governance measure represented by political stability and literacy level proxy by secondary school enrollment all revealed a significant inverse relationship with formal business registration.

Specifically, a percentage change in financial market development leads to a 1.402 percentage change in formal registered enterprises. In line with economic expectation it could be further observed that there is a direct relationship between financial market development and the formalization of business registration within the African economies.

Consequently, the degree of the sensitivity of formal business registration with the level of financial market development is elastic. On the contrary, the rising level of unemployment and its resultant effect have significantly discouraged the formalization of economic activities to the detriment of African development. As evidenced from the empirical report, a percentage change in

unemployment retards official registration of enterprises by 0.414%, holding other variables at constant. Owing to the level of unemployment especially among the youth and female population, those who are ready to start up their own business enterprises are not willing to go through the official requirements for formal business operation, these being associated in some instances with delays and protocols that discourage the entrepreneurial drive for investment.

The strength of governance through political stability and absence of violence portrayed a significant retarded effect on the formalization of business. This implies that the political system to a large extent has a determinant role to play in encouraging the proliferation of informal economies within the African context. Detailed analysis of the estimated coefficient for political stability reveals that a percentage change in political stability and absence of violence and terrorism suggests a significant inverse relation with official business registration process at 0.71%. This is further explained by the fact that political instability rather promotes an informal economy because most business oriented individuals will not risk embarking on creating an officially registered business entity as required in the formal economy. These categories of investors would most often prefer to operate within an unregulated and unstructured informal economic setting if the political environment is highly unpredictable.

The analysis of the parameter estimate of school enrollment provides empirical support for the fact that the level of illiteracy and ignorance significantly promote the informal economy setting in African countries. This also portrays the point that the majority of the people who operate within the informal economy are not well informed academically, in most instances lack high skill and professional development, and are not particularly driven by a quest for global competitiveness. Hence, school enrollment indicates a significant inverse relationship with formal business registration, such that a percentage change in enrollment pattern significantly influences formal economic activities by 0.159%.

The above evidence is backed up by the United Nations economic commission for Africa (2015) which asserts:

country specificities exist in informal employment, although some common traits can be observed. On the supply side, the low quality of numeracy and literacy attained in educational systems, and inadequate skills development, are among the main factors leading to informality on the continent. The lack of technical and vocational training, limited investments in infrastructure, technology and innovation, as well as poor alignment of educational curricula to labour market demand, constitute other major hindrances for job seekers to enter the formal market. At the same time, large cities with little or no industrial bases exacerbate informal employment as a coping mechanism, particularly by young people.

Hence, the level of education, enlightenment and literacy could be seen to be a significant factor that could contribute towards determining the extent of informal economic activities under taken across the African economies. However, the degree of responsiveness of official business registration to the variations obtained by education is inelastic.

Evidently, the general commodity prices indicate significant support for formal enterprise establishment. In particular a 1% change in the consumer price index leads to a 1.396 percentage change in the legal business registration process. Economically there it is observed that there is a significant direct relationship between commodity prices and formal business registration. Further analysis of the result therefore suggests that price stability would significantly encourage and promote official enterprise registration, which will consequently foster the development of a formal economy within the African region. A highly volatile price of goods and services will tend to discourage investment in formal economic operations to the detriment of African development. Hence, this reveals the considerable effort of the monetary authorities in maintaining price stability as a necessary condition for creating real economic stability in Africa. The coefficient for the basket of commodity prices in the African economies indicates that the degree of the responsiveness of official business to price stability is elastic. Thus, a proportionate variation in commodity prices leads to a more than proportionate change in formal business registration when compared with an informal economic setting.

STYLIZED FACTS

The informal sector comprises economic activities in the form of commerce, manufacturing, finance, agriculture and mining which are carried out without official registration of the enterprise. These economic activities usually have no reliable statistical records and have not been adequately accounted for by the government agencies and institutions in terms of revenue generation and policy actions. This makes it difficult for the government to incorporate them into policy formulation and planning strategies. However, the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa and Africa in general plays a notable role in development. In most cases the larger proportion of GDP in many African countries is from the informal sector. This shows that the sector has the potential of facilitating economic growth and development, especially among the developing and less developed economies. The important role played by this sector in African development can be seen in the provision of employment opportunities especially among women and youth. The majority of these economic activities take place within informal settings. This could be explained by the unstructured nature of the sector, which allows for the creation of many enterprises and divergent business opportunities that have less stringent bureaucracy around business formation and registration, and therefore less exposure to government taxation and regulations.

Consequently, notwithstanding the fact the informal economy provides ample opportunity for the generation of income and employment for the majority of Africa's economically active population, it is observed that the people involved are highly vulnerable to unsecured sources of income, employment benefits and social protection, which further explains why informal sector

participants are often beset by low income, low job security, poor recognition and poor inclusiveness, as well as other associated poverty-driven factors, all of which hinder the maximization of the sector's potential for rapid economic transformation. This is because African entrepreneurs seek to minimize the costs associated with wages, social benefits and retirement entitlements. Most of them prefer to operate as small and medium-sized enterprises with few or no staff, and in many cases without the services of technical and professional business experts.

Most of the activities in this sector are carried out in remote areas and do not generally enjoy adequate publicity, advertisement or global competitiveness. The informal economy tends to dominate in places where there are weak institutional arrangements to coordinate revenue generation through taxation. This is because high taxation discourages young entrepreneurs from venturing into business owing to the increase in costs. Furthermore, poor regulation and poor protection of patent rights also encourage the non-formalization of informal economic activities.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Since institutional weaknesses lie at the root of fragility, a strategy to escape fragility must include the adoption or development of institutions that foster good governance and economic growth (Gelbard et al. 2015).

Fragility comes about when pressures become too great for countries to manage within the political process, creating the risk of conflict and the outbreak of violence—the most extreme manifestation of fragility—whether interstate or civil war, ethnic or tribal conflict, widespread criminality or violence within the family. Countries that lack robust institutions, diversified economies and inclusive political systems are the most vulnerable. In the most acute cases, violence has the effect both of magnifying the underlying pressures and eroding the institutions needed to manage them, creating a fragility trap from which it is very difficult to escape (Kaberuka 2015).

Therefore, this chapter posits that considerable government attention should be given to the transformation and development of informal economic operations through socially inclusive policy strategies; this will invariably yield a tremendous result in facilitating the rapid development of the African economy.

On a final note, there cannot be any meaningful development in any country if its cities are not resilient to disasters. The development of the continent is seriously challenged if this cannot be done, leaving many African countries struggling for development (Amusat 2016). In the same vein, investments in infrastructure—transport, irrigation, energy, information and communication technology—are crucial to achieving sustainable development and empowering communities in many countries. It has long been recognized that growth in productivity and incomes, and improvements in health and education outcomes all require investment in infrastructure (United Nations SDGs 2016).

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PART VIII

Africa in Global Politics

The Role of International Financial Institutions in Africa

Adeoye Akinola

INTRODUCTION

Africa remains the poorest continent in the world (Credit Suisse Research Institute 2015). The region continues to crack under the weight of poverty, epidemics, state failures, wars, insurgencies and terrorism, and other forms of social discontent. Despite its immeasurable natural resources, Africa continues to grapple with socio-economic crises that threaten the existence of most of its countries. From the 1970s, the failure of many states in Africa, and the associated incapacity of political institutions to instigate enduring development, began to necessitate urgent responses from IFIs towards redressing the institutional decay and public service ineffectiveness that characterized most of the African states (Uzodike 1996). These crises were aggravated by the engulfing waves of globalization that penetrated African state boundaries, thereby changing the existing political economy of the continent—an economy that was hitherto disarticulated by colonial powers (Akinola 2014b).

The IFIs became one of the main pillars of globalization, which was expected to bring the developing countries relatively closer to the developed world in terms of poverty alleviation and improved livelihoods. The urgency of instigating socio-economic development made it necessary for countries to seek financial redress and economic assistance from IFIs. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) attempted to ensure countries' fiscal discipline and budgetary performance, while the World Bank focused on investment in the capital and infrastructures necessary to drive the developmental agenda of African states.

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The nature and effect of global financial powers' intervention in Africa has been the core of intellectual discourse and passionate debate in Africa's post-colonial political economy. There has been much dispute about the role of IFIs in the economic recovery of the region, especially in the area of granting financial assistance in the form of loans. There has also been much debate about the impact of the "conditionality" attached to receiving financial assistance. It is thus necessary to examine the rationale behind the acceptance of neo-liberalism worldwide, and the conditionality clauses in the IFIs' dealings with Africa (Stone 2008; Stein and Nafziger 1991, 173).

Since the wind of democracy first began to blow across the world, from Southern Europe to Eastern Europe, from South Asia to Latin America, and lately down to Africa, advocates of globalization have continued to reiterate how globalization would instigate the drastic socio-economic and political development of Africa. IFIs see themselves as the most potent agent for providing financial stability and triggering rapid development in Africa (Dawson 2003); however, there is compelling evidence that holds IFIs responsible for deepening the socio-economic debasement of Africa (Ake 1981; Akinola 2014b).

Despite the recently proclaimed buoyancy of African economies, growth has been slowing, which means that sub-Saharan Africa could be the only developing region to fall short of global poverty reduction targets. World Bank chief economist Punam Chuhan-Pole believes that "much needs to be done to accelerate the pace at which poverty is being reduced" (Maswanganyi 2015). According to Chuhan-Pole, growth in the region was projected at 4.4% in 2016 and 4.8% in 2017. Africa requires much more growth for sustainable economic development. Therefore, this chapter assesses the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in the African development agenda.

THE ORIGIN OF IFIs' INTERVENTIONIST ROLE IN AFRICA

The IMF and the World Bank are products of a conference held at Bretton Woods, N.H., in July 1944, at which it was decided that the major goal of these twin financial powers would be to rebuild Europe immediately after World War II. The World Bank comprises two bodies: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD, the largest development bank in the world, is a global development cooperative funded by its 188 member states (The World Bank Group 2016). It has two main goals:

... to end extreme poverty by 2030 and to promote shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. It seeks to achieve these goals primarily by providing loans, guarantees, risk management products, and expertise on development-related disciplines, as well as by coordinating responses to regional and global challenges. (The World Bank Group 2016)

The IDA has also assumed the position of “the largest multilateral source of concessional financing and the main instrument for pursuing the bank’s goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner in the world’s poorest countries” (The World Bank Group 2016). The IDA focuses on increasing countries’ economic growth, poverty reduction, and improving the livelihood of the poor. The roles of the IBRD and IDA capture the responsibilities of the World Bank (WB). These roles sometimes overlap with that of the IMF, which also focuses on the provision of global financial stability and assistance in the global war on impoverishment.

Specifically, the three main activities of the IMF are: surveillance and provision of policy advice; lending; and technical assistance and research, especially in designing and implementing effective socio-economic policies (Dawson 2003). To slightly expand these functions, the IMF maintains a dialogue with and among its member countries on the national and international implications of their economic and financial policies. The IMF provides loans of foreign exchange to countries experiencing balance of payment problems, undertaking the necessary adjustments for growth.

The IMF was initially established to smoothen the balance of payment adjustment of fixed and adjustable exchange rates. However, the IMF later established a new identity as a “manager of financial crises in emerging markets, as a long-term lender to developing countries and the one-time communist countries in transition, as a source of advice and counsel to many nations and as collector of economic data”, while the World Bank, likewise, has transformed to become “so large and has taken so many different tasks that effectiveness has been sacrificed” (Economic and Political Weekly 2000). IFIs have become infamous in developing countries, not only because of their ineffectiveness but due to the complexity of their functions and stringent conditionality attached to granting assistance to needy countries.

African leadership and other antagonists castigate IFIs as agents of neo-imperialism, manipulating African economies for the benefit of the advanced capitalist countries. However, sparse reference is usually made to the “willing” invitation to IFIs from African leaders to salvage African economies from total socio-economic extinction (Uzodike 1996). Also, radical political economists often ignore the factors leading to their invitation. The literature is replete with the exploitative role of IFIs in the Third World’s political economy; however, there are sparse studies on the complicity of the African leaders who invited the institutions to facilitate the economic recovery of the continent. The leaders were ignorant of the manipulative and exploitative mechanisms used by IFIs to deepen neo-colonialism.

Post-colonial Africa experienced daunting socio-economic crises, which made it vulnerable to IFIs. Uzodike reinforces the failure of the leaders to instigate sound policies and submits that “no other region of the world has been as poorly led and governed by so many leaders for so long” (Uzodike 2009, 2). This explains the interventionist role of IFIs (Uzodike 2009). Many African countries, especially those states endowed with natural resources, generate a

contradiction whereby the resource boom generates a “resource curse”. Nigeria fits into this category. Countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have experienced budget deficits putting a strain on their economies (Rivlin 2011). Rivlin notes the non-diversification of their economies, from industry to agriculture, resulting in food insecurity and economic harshness; hence, they turned to IFIs for succour.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section sifts through the contending theories of development and underdevelopment to scrutinize the assumption that IFIs offer the most desirable path to Africa’s sustainable development, which is attainable through the liberalization of African economies. The chapter engages with the modernization–dependency theory divide, adopts a critical standpoint and explores radical political economy perspectives to unravel the inability of Africa to record significant development under the influence of IFIs.

Modernization theory explains the logic underpinning post-colonial Africa’s inability to develop, and provides a road-map to development: it takes a liberal approach to progress. The theory sees internal contradictions as a lens for understanding Third World underdevelopment. Deutsch (1961) identifies social mobilization as a condition for development and suggests two stages: breaking from the old (traditional) and forming stable new patterns (modern). The “modern” from this perspective is democratization (the political system) and capitalism driven by economic liberalization (the economic system).

The theory posits that there is one general process and that democratization constitutes the final stage. That is, there is a strong convergence between economic development and democracy. The theory justifies imperialism, colonialism and liberal democracy, and attempts to divert Africa’s attention from locating the cause of its underdevelopment in external manipulations. Rather, it suggests that internally generated impediments to development—corruption, bad leadership, cultural affinity, non-industrialization, dictatorship, economic centralization, low exportation—explain the economic despair on the continent. Radical political economists (Frank 2004; Ake 1981; Rodney 1972) have rejected this argument.

Before the emergence of dependency theory, the Annales school of thought as well as the *Longue Durée* analytical tool had dislodged the assumptions of the modernization school by emphasizing that phenomena do not repeat themselves (Tomich 2011). Therefore, the coercive advocacy to globalize the Western and European social, economic and political system is adjudged antithetical to the development of non-Western societies. This perspective notes that national socio-economic and political realities are different; hence, social scientists recognize the historical uniqueness of any social phenomena under study.

Dependency theorists vehemently criticize the theory for substituting European modernity with development, without considering the socio-political history of developing states, which is linked to imperialism and colonialism.

In other words, they argue that any attempt to study the political systems of the underdeveloped states must recognize the realities of Western intervention in these societies (Frank 2004; Ake 1981; Rodney 1972). The effect of colonialism and continued neo-colonialism, which the modernization schools ignored, relegated these societies to an impoverished status. Frank insists that the circumstances under which Western societies developed no longer exist and cannot be replicated. He concludes that “the now developed countries were never *underdeveloped*, though they might have been *undeveloped*” (Smith 2003, 89).

Dependency theory perceives a single global economy with unequal development in its constituent parts, while its basic argument is that development and underdevelopment are partial, interdependent structures of one global system. It holds that the integration of Africa’s economy into the advanced capitalist system and the nature of that integration, coupled with the resulting unequal trade and exchange, engender dependency and underdevelopment. Ake (1996) believes that the spate of global transformation is a re-colonization that democratizes disempowerment in Africa and facilitates further exploitation.

Exploitation of these societies is worsened by the international economic order, which promotes export-led growth in developing countries, which in turn increases the trade-flow between developing and developed countries under the free-market economy (World Bank 1993). But in the case of Nigeria, the strategy replaced food-crop agriculture with a cash-crop economy directed at the industrial needs of developed countries (Ake 1981). The advocates of export-led development and free trade argue that most developing states that have adopted inward-oriented policies, otherwise called the import substitution strategy, have recorded poor economic growth (Stiglitz 2002). Therefore, the socio-economic problems facing developing countries could not just be reduced to internal contradictions (despite acknowledging that there are internal challenges), but attributed to their dependence on the export of a limited range of primary commodities whose prices are liable to incessant fluctuation (Smith 2003, 2).

Apparently, the existing international economic order creates economies that are positively and actively underdeveloped by advanced capitalist economies. Nkrumah notes that “the essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (Cited in Smith 2003, 7). Therefore, external realities influence internal factors.

The position of states in the international division of labour facilitated the economic crisis on the periphery as well as political instability and authoritarianism (Smith 2003). States on the periphery are essential to the capitalist mode of production (Chase-Dunn 1998). Historically, these states act as a resource base for the core, strengthening labour relations along the core–periphery division. Global decision-making is undemocratic, permitting inequality of influence and access to funds. This fact is corroborated thus:

Unlike a democratic system in which each member country would have an equal vote, rich countries dominate decision-making in the IMF because voting power is determined by the amount of money that each country pays into the IMF's quota system. It's a system of one dollar, one vote. The US is the largest shareholder with a quota of 18 percent. Germany, Japan, France, Great Britain, and the US combined control about 38 percent. The disproportionate amount of power held by wealthy countries means that the interests of bankers, investors and corporations from industrialized countries are put above the needs of the world's poor majority. (Global Exchange 2011)

In a similar vein, IMF big-shot Horst Kohler reportedly showcased the central driving force of IMF policy when he noted that “there cannot be a good future for the rich if there isn't a better future for the poor” (Global Exchange 2011). This point validates the perspective of radical political economy, which accuses the IMF of enhancing the appropriation of a subservient economy like Africa by advanced capitalist countries. This is made possible through the diminishing sovereignty of African states to make informed policies without recourse to the approval of global powers (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016). IFIs have used the opportunity to crack African state borders through the liberalization policy.

The liberalization of African economies by the Bretton Woods agencies, although supported by the elites of advanced democracies, was destructive to African economies and strongly resisted through mass protests in developing countries as well as in Prague, Seattle and Washington, DC (Stiglitz 2002). Nabudere (2000) argues that liberalization engendered a new departure for a restructuring and down-sizing of the state and a redefinition of democracy in such new states. Ake (1981) was sceptical about the trans-nationalization of more economic activities and argued that as long as important decisions are made in distant places by IFIs, which are uncontrolled by Africans, democratic choices become vacuous.

The West promotes open and competitive economies in which the forces of the market determine the workings of key economic variables. Therefore, IFIs insist on a minimalist government in their Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) policy prescriptions in developing countries. This perspective—built on the ideas of Friedman, Adam Smith and David Ricardo—is at the core of prevailing neo-liberal policies, which now became the rationalizing principles of the neo-classical liberals advocating economic liberalization (Eme and Onwuka 2011). They contended that the best way to create political and economic prosperity was by freeing economic interchange from political restrictions (Eme and Onwuka 2011).

IFIs AND THE AFRICAN PROJECT

Upon invitation, IFIs responded to African economic crises by encouraging a re-focus on economic growth through a structural reversal of the state-imposed impediments to the efficient operation of markets: an intervention coined

under SAP (Stein and Nafziger 1991). State restrictions in economic and public enterprises did not gain wide circulation until the late 1970s and early 1980s, which coincided with the rise of conservative governments in the United Kingdom, the US and France (Cammack 1998). These countries influenced the interventionist strategies of IFIs in developing economies like Nigeria's.

IFIs, which had assumed the position of being the drivers of globalization, approached Africa's economic dilemma with a calculated dexterity, which liberalized African economies and resulted in the withering away of state sovereignty. This condemned African states to the position of acting as managers or mediators of the impact of globalization on their political economies (Clapham 2002). The intervention of IFIs subjected these subservient economies to the manipulation of the core countries.

IFIs pressurized governments to adopt market-oriented reforms by reducing fiscal expansion and cutting social spending. This continued to generate dissent against the government and hostility towards IFIs. There were public outcries against the government to increase workers' salaries in many countries like Botswana, while grave political instability was recorded in states like Nigeria. As noted by Azikiwe,

Much of the instability led to a further fracturing of the political landscape which found its expression in military coups and other forms of anti-democratic practice. These seizures of power by the armed forces and the police were often prompted by economic crises engineered by the financial institutions and multinational corporations whom were seeking to maximize their profits at the expense of the majority of workers, farmers and youth. (Azikiwe 2015)

Notwithstanding, the protagonists of globalization insist that liberalization remains the most assured road-map to economic and political development in Africa (Akinola and Ndawonde 2016; Adesoji 2006). IFIs' perception of political development is successful democratization, while economic development represents economic liberalization. However, Uzodike (1996, 5) emphasizes that democracy that aims to bring greater socio-economic justice and equality is impossible in the context of open or free markets. SAP was claimed to have not only structured the African economy to the requirements of global capitalism, but also to have established mass poverty (Eme and Onwuka 2011), which is antithetical to sustainable democracy.

Since the end of World War II, IFIs have "coerced" national economies to embark on policies that favour liberalization. Therefore, the major undercurrent of SAP is the unbridled development of market liberalization and state divestiture (Umezurike 2012, 57). Import licences and agricultural marketing boards were eliminated, price controls were lifted and liberalization of the financial system became an important instrument of the stabilization of the country's economic life. For instance, SAP mandated the Nigerian government

... to alter the system of determining the exchange rate of the domestic currency by replacing the previous fixed exchange rate system with an open bidding system ... The other key instruments that were adopted under the SAP included progressive trade and payments liberalisation, adoption of appropriate pricing policies for public enterprises and rationalisation (i.e., commercialisation/privatisation) of public sector enterprises; reduction of government deficit financing and pursuit of tight monetary and fiscal policies to counter the inherent inflationary pressures that accompany currency depreciation in the short term. (Umezurike 2012, 52)

The contradictions inherent in the liberalization of African economies provide a nuanced argument about the instrumental role played by SAP in ensuring democratization, as citizens opposed to the economic programme combined forces with civil society organizations to oppose it and demand direct participation and democratic rights (Umezurike 2012). Ironically, SAP had the unintended consequence of instigating democracy in developing countries (Uzodike 1996).

THE CONDITIONALITY QUESTION

IFIs exploited their intervention to impose the conditionality of democratization and stringent economic decentralization on Africa (Robert 2010). Although the conditionality was initially limited to economic liberalization, the realization of effecting changes in political institutions to ensure successful economic reform prompted the extension of conditionality to political development—democratization. Invariably, the conditionality later moved from specifying certain economic targets and acceptable policy tools to more direct involvement in the domestic politics of the borrower by insisting on the inculcation of democratization into the agenda of such states (Stone 2008).

According to Yahaya (2004), IFIs embarked on a policy drive in favour of private-sector-led growth in place of state-led development. The state in this situation becomes a catalyst and facilitator of economic prosperity as opposed to acting as an active player and driver of national economic development. Thus, its primary responsibility is limited to the provision of rules and regulations, the protection of individuals and investments, the regulation of economic transactions, and the enactment of policy frameworks to guarantee the smooth running of the economy.

The impact of economic reforms and the realization of meaningful transformation of the productive sectors were typically undermined by obstructionist political processes and systems (Robert 2010). As such, political systems should be altered to facilitate the operation of effective economic reforms by embedding key principles such as transparency and accountability into the management of the economy. But it was not until 1999 that Nigeria experienced a small degree of political reform, which expanded the political latitude that led to the adoption of democratic rule.

The response of the government to conditionality (whereby liberalization of the economy and the adoption of liberal democracy became the political

conditionality) was the implementation of austerity measures that resulted in further economic hardship on the continent. The inflation rate rose to 7.7% in 1982 and then skyrocketed to 23.2% by 1983, and further increased to 39.6% in 1984 (Robert 2010). By 1981, the fiscal deficit rose to N3902.1 m and hit N6104.1 m by 1982. The standard of living of the public was greatly diminished. The resulting dire economic crisis was manifested in the high prices of food and other essential items which then threatened democratic sustainability and social stability.

In Ghana, the national utility regulator, the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, announced a hike in prices in a bid to attract private investors due to the dwindling power crisis in the sector (Kpodo 2015). Accordingly, electricity prices rose by 59.2% and water prices by more than 69% and 89%, depending on the degree of consumption. The Bank of Ghana, the country's government bank, acknowledged the challenges in the power industry and projected the hike in its September 2014 report (Bank of Ghana 2014, 5). Ghanaians experienced significant economic stresses, which prompted dissent and threatened the government's legitimacy. The opposition considered it the highest level of insensitivity and economic hardship. The hikes were a directive from the IMF in fulfilment of Ghana's three-year aid deal with the Bretton Woods institution, which aimed to address the recurrent power crisis and ensure fiscal discipline (Kpodo 2015).

In Nigeria, the Goodluck Jonathan-led administration decided to implement the deregulation of the downstream sector with immediate effect from 12 January 2012 (Akinola 2014a). As was to be expected, Nigerians embarked on street protests, while civil servants declared indefinite strike action. The revelation that the managing director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, was in Nigeria around the time of the announcement, to persuade President Jonathan to commence deregulation, further energized Nigerians, under the aegis of the Nigerian Labour Congress–Civil Society Coalition, to resist the move *by all means* (NewsRescue 2012).

Robert (2010, 4) makes reference to Minsky's model, insisting that deregulated market economies are not dynamically stable systems that converge to full-employment equilibrium, but systems that are cyclical in nature, in which crises are not unusual events. Robert attributes the collapse of the East Asian economy in the mid-1990s to the IMF's implementation of pro-US policies. Despite this collapse, the failures of SAP and the apparent impoverishment of the majority of Nigerians, the IMF still publicly supported the Nigerian oil sector reform. In 2000, the Afrobarometer group carried out a national survey which revealed that 60% of respondents held that the economic reform programme had "hurt most people and only benefited a few", while 84% believed that "people close to the government" had benefited the most from these policies (Luqman and Lawal 2011, 72). Others argued that the purpose of the deregulation of the oil sector was to *deregulate the Nigerian oil wealth*, in the form of corruption, for new political elites (Akinola 2014a).

As laudable as these IMF-inclined policies may seem, the reality across Nigeria is impoverishment and a decline in the quality of life of the down-trodden, while

the wealth of the elites keeps increasing. Between late 1999 and the end of 2002, there was widespread dissent against the imposed economic policies all through the developing world (Jones and Hardstaff 2005). These authors made reference to 238 separate incidents of civil unrest involving millions of people across 34 countries, which demonstrates the extent of the hostility of people to IFI policies. They revealed that:

Many of these incidents ended with the deployment of riot police or the army, resulting in almost 100 documented fatalities, with arrests and injuries running into thousands. Since then, the civil unrest has persisted with people continuing to protest at policies imposed on their countries by the IFI. (Jones and Hardstaff 2005, 22)

The implementation of SAPs resulted in violence and economic hardship in Nigeria. The economic dilemma negatively affected domestic social forces in Nigeria and created political upheaval in the country, as was evident in the series of mass protests that ravaged Nigeria between 1988 and 1989. Other African countries also experienced similar upheavals. For instance, in October 2004, after a series of clashes over privatization, trade and investment policy, President Museveni of Uganda hit out at IFIs, claiming that their policies were not compatible with the needs of poor African countries (Jones and Hardstaff 2005). President Museveni submitted that “these people are forcing their policies on us that cannot work in poor African countries but for me I have reached a point where I can tell them off because they are misleading our country” (Jones and Hardstaff 2005, 29).

The failures of SAP in Africa were evident. By the end of the 1980s, SAP had collapsed in about 30 African countries. Globalists now advocated for a shift towards the private company as an agent of development (Stein and Nafziger 1991, 173). In Nigeria, the economic harshness of SAP was compounded by the devaluation of the naira. The sum of one US dollar could be exchanged for N0.6369 in 1981 and N0.9996 in 1985; reached N9.0001 in 1990; by 2000 was above N22.0000; and by 2014, stood between N160 and N163 (Robert 2010). It is untenable to continue to implement classical liberalism in Nigeria decades after the introduction of SAP. It is more surprising that Nigeria is implementing deregulation and privatization after the apparent global decline of economic liberalism, when advanced capitalist powers like the US, after the 2008/2009 economic downturn, directly intervened in the regulation of private business.

Developing countries should vehemently resist the attempt to frame universal operational rules and rather promote the principle of “subsidiarity” and the legitimacy of a diversity of regulatory frameworks that responds to differences in country preferences and in levels of development (Robert 2010). The spread of a single variety of capitalism through IFIs is harmful to developing states. One of the obvious criticisms of IFIs has been the replication and application

of the same policies that work in other territories to Africa, a continent with its own unique political economy.

Also, African states found themselves in a debt trap due to the higher rate of foreign loans and their inability to repay them. It is instructive to understand that the IMF, the World Bank and other global financial institutions are not responsible for the grave economic crisis that prompted African countries to opt for foreign loans, which accumulate as “debt”: inept leadership, corruption, mismanagement and a disarticulated economy explain Africa’s indebtedness. However, the fact remains that these institutions are responsible for the recurrent economic and debt crises experienced in Africa. IFIs, no doubt, have deepened the debt profile of African states and created unattainable repayment deals through aggravated interest paid on the loans, stringent and unprogressive repayment plans and ill-advised socio-economic policies imposed on the countries (Akinola 2012). Some of the major reasons for the African debt crisis are thoughtless and irresponsible overlending by foreign creditors, and the persistence of negative real interest rates during most of the 1970s in global financial markets (FONDAD 1992). Stiglitz correctly resolves the complexity of those culpable for Africa rising debt profile:

Does it make a difference if we say there is overlending rather than overborrowing? ... Is the problem more on the side of the lenders, that they are not exercising due diligence in judging who is creditworthy? Or on the borrower being profligate and irresponsible? ... But why have sophisticated, profit-maximizing lenders so often overlent? Lenders encourage indebtedness because it is profitable. (Stiglitz 2006, 216)

The reliance of many of the states in Africa on external savings, their unwillingness to increase domestic savings and drastically reduce domestic consumption, and the reality of the high, positive real interest rates that emerged in the 1980s, as well as protectionism in the global markets for agricultural resources and low-technology manufacturers, make it extremely tasking for African countries to diversify and increase their exports to hard currency markets; all these factors have aggravated the region’s debt servicing and debt accumulation problem, thereby consolidating the debt trap (FONDAD 1992, 11).

In 2015, the levels of Africa’s debt increased to 44% of gross domestic product (GDP), which represented a 10% rise from 2010 when Africa’s debt-to-GDP ratio was ascertained to be 34% (Azikiwe 2015). The US Congress-appointed International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission reported the imperativeness of the institutions to write off all “indebted poor countries which are willing to implement governance and economic management strategies” (Economic and Political Weekly 2000, 1233).

IFIs also acknowledged their high-handedness in handling the African project, as revealed by one of the IMF’s representatives in Africa. Dawson notes that:

Though the expansion of structural conditionality was a largely appropriate response to changing circumstances, there is a sense that we may have gone a bit too far. The conditions attached by the IMF to the loans made during the Asian crisis were criticized as being too extensive. They asked for ‘too much, too soon’ and ventured into areas far outside the Fund’s mandate and expertise. (Dawson 2003)

Despite all the opposition, pessimism and negativity associated with IFIs’ engagement in Africa, the Bretton Woods institution has succeeded in leaving a positive trail on the continent. For instance, in 2015, the IMF granted a \$918 million loan to Ghana to boost the country’s economic growth and job creation (Azikiwe 2015). IFIs have also supported regionalism, which is expected to drive Africa’s development stride. In the case of East Africa, the sub-regional community secretary general, Richard Sezibera, noted that the “removal of restrictions on capital flows should serve as a catalyst for capital market development and for the provision of long-term and risk capital most needed to spur economic development” (IMF 2012). The bank has positioned itself as the essential partner for both developing countries and potential investors, willing and ready to exercise its “comparative advantage” in partnerships, knowledge and financing (The Guardian 2010). However, the majority of Africans would not agree with the claim that IFIs are African partners for sustainable development.

In 2009, the IMF raised alarm at the possibility of the retrogression of economic growth in Africa due to the global downturn, and appealed to advanced countries to honour and increase their aid commitments to the region as well as revive stalled world trade dialogues (IMF 2009). Unfortunately, the IMF does not have the capacity to coerce the advanced economies to live up to their commitments for supporting the African development project. IFIs have become an instrument for accomplishing the interests of the capitalist powers. That explains why the pressure has mounted, from the powerful countries, on the IMF to reduce its huge investment in developing countries and refrain from its “war on poverty” (Dawson 2003); a pressure that has impeded its ability to deliver on its promise to partner with Africa. For example, the US Congress in 1998—through its Meltzer Commission—recommended that the IMF should refrain from lending to countries that seek long-term development assistance (Dawson 2003).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the role of IFIs in Africa. Apparently, they have become the progenitors of globalization and democratization across the world, and particularly in Africa. Through the operationalization of the theoretical framework of radical political economy, the chapter has tried to uncover the ideological underpinnings of the continued underdevelopment of Africa’s attempts at progress. The study engages in the ideological motivations of liberalism and how Africa became trapped in the orbit of the neo-liberal political economy.

The chapter notes that despite the huge promises that accompany the acceptance of these policies, Africa has not fared better. This is contrary to the arguments of the modernization theorists, but conforms to the position of the political economy school of thought, which maintains that the adoption of these neo-liberal policy frameworks would definitely worsen the plight of the continent. In other words, IFIs have failed to instigate the sustainable economic development of the African continent, and in such a way have generated many contradictions. Aside from the conditionality of democratization in seeking IFIs' financial assistance, economic hardship has generated much pressure on dictatorial governments to embark on democratization. So, in another way, the imposition of liberalization policies in Africa paved the way for the enthronement of the voting system in many African states.

Although the era of SAP and astute conditionality seems to be over, the IMF's reputation continues to be dented by the imposition of SAP and the conditionality clause. It is compounded by the rising debt crisis, which dwindles any positive contributions of the institution to the economic stability and growth of Africa. Conditionality was not just relegated to the background as a policy shift of IFIs, but was jettisoned due to the fact that many African countries had been swept away by the wind of IMF-inspired democratization and liberalization that started in the 1980s; hence, there seems to be no new ideological conquest on the continent. The last notable resistance to democracy, from Libya under the late Muammar Gaddafi, has been cracked by the "iron swords" of the advanced democracies led by the US and France.

It is instructive to recognize the waning influence of IFIs in Africa, which is due to expanding regionalism, the penetration of Africa by other major powers (China) and the proliferation of other international bodies like BRICS, an acronym for the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and MINT, representing the economies of Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. The global economic crisis of the late 2000s that cracked the ideological pillar of liberalism, the resurgence of protectionism even in the US, and the reversal of Thatcherism have contributed to the dwindling vibrancy of IFIs in Africa. For instance, World Bank spending in Africa slid from \$18.5 billion in 2000 to \$5.6 billion in 2011 (Herbst and Mills 2013). This is a manifestation of its "slowing" investment in Africa.

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Africa in the Global Trading System

Lere Amusan

INTRODUCTION

No state is an island in the complex, interdependent international system. There is a need to relate to other actors, state and non-state, for any country to successfully navigate the complexity of anti-autarky global international relations. In doing this, the state continues its social contract with its citizens. Many theories, from realist/neo-realist to Marxist/neo-Marxist, and from the English/International society to liberal/neo-liberal schools (Brown 2015; Burchill 2013; Donnelly 2013; Dunne 2007; Fierke 2015; Jackson and Sorensen 2013; Linklater 2013; Panke and Risse 2007), support this position. Neo-liberalism's complex, interdependent economic system promotes trading for economic and political stability. This poses challenges because of the unequal exchange between developed and underdeveloped states. As opined by Onimode (2000) and Bond (2003), what is in place now is more of a dependence relationship between Africa and the North in the areas of trade, investment and aid.

Before colonialism, Africa was in contact with developed states in the form of a trade relationship, when the Industrial Revolution forced European states to look for markets and raw materials for their newly developed technology. The Portuguese explorers paved the way for the rest of the European states to exploit the resources of Africa for their development (Rodney 1972).

A question worth asking is to what extent one can claim that Africa has benefitted, to the fullest, from the trading system as crafted by the Euro-American arrangement handed to the rest of the world? A global trading

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system that calls for ultra-*laissez-fairism* at the theoretical level demands for the forces of supply and demand to determine what, when, how and where to allocate factors of production through free movement. In reality there is no such free movement of capital and labour. The politics embedded in the movement of capital in the form of technology is too complex for Africa's comprehension. On the movement of labour, as pointed out by Collier (2013), Pearce (2011) and Priestland (2013), the politics inherent in this is more than the usual crises of identity, xenophobia and religious fundamentalism. The developed North fails to abide by the tenets of neo-liberalism through confusing imposed globalisation, regionalisation and regionalism capped with unsustainable international trade norms. From the absolute advantage thesis to endowment theory, Africa always serves as an industrial input supplier (raw material, cheap labour and a dumping ground for finished goods). At best, when there is an opening for the manufacturing industries, it is the multinational corporations (MNCs) that dominate the market with dirty investment in the age of climate change (Amusan and Odimegwu 2015).

This 'grandfathering' type of trading system by the North perpetuates underdevelopment in Africa. This is not only antithetical to the basic theories of liberalism, neo-liberalism and globalisation, it is also not in line with the dictate of the Bretton Woods institutions. It is the intention of this chapter to interrogate several options for Africa in ensuring equal exchange in an unequal trading system. Critical theory will be the starting point.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CRITICAL THEORY

Liberalism/neo-liberalism and realist/neo-realist approaches to understanding Africa in the global trading system are not only the traditional straitjacket that abides by what Max Horkheimer (1972) termed a traditional approach to the study of international relations. He sees these theories as static, problem-solving, environmentally neutral and conservative in orientation. He instead comes up with a critical/Frankfurt School/post-modernist/post-positivist theory. This theory 'belongs to a larger intellectual map, while at the same time representing a "journey without maps" in a global system that is dynamic' (Fierke 2015, 1). The theory 'is not only about politics, it also is itself political' (Hutchings 1999, 69). In trying to affirm this, opines that 'theory is always *for* someone and for some purpose', that is, it may be described as self-reflective and environmentally determined, which means it is subject to change. Scholars such as are noted for this position. The traditional approach/positive school as captured by François Bourguignon (2016), Hans Morgenthau (2012), Henry Kissinger (2015, 2012) and Kenneth N. Waltz (2000) maintains the existing status quo as sacrosanct in the global trading arrangement (Boas 2012, 23). This position is well captured by Richard Devetak (2013, 166) when he is of the view that while

... traditional theories would tend to see power and interests as *a posteriori* factors affecting outcomes in interactions between political actors in the sphere of international relations, critical international theorists insist that they are by no means absent in the formation and verification of knowledge claims. ... they are *a priori* factors affecting the production of knowledge.

Going by Devetak's observation, critical theory is sceptical of the traditional approach of seeing facts and values as distinct variables and the separation of subject and object is tantamount to objectivity, which is independent of human consciousness. This leads this study to the historical, social and political developments in the different environments from which the existing international trade norms imposed on Africa are crafted. Employing critical theory will address. Therefore, to address the problem under discussion, critical theory shall be our point of departure because

... it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about. ... [and] unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.

Africa's integration into the present international economic relations will be discussed in the next section, where critical theory will prove the need for an emancipatory approach to redress the issue of unequal exchange between developed states and the developing African continent.

AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: ANALYSIS FROM THE BEGINNING

Africa's political economy is traceable from the contemporary political economy of globalisation to the era of the Industrial Revolution, when finite resources (raw materials) from Europe could not cope with the rate at which finished goods were being produced (Ake 1981). It also signified the need to avert Karl Marx's excess production, but at the same time confirm V. I. Lenin's thesis on imperialism to dispose of excess commodities that might bring about a decrease in the price of goods and services produced by industrialists in Europe. When the Industrial Revolution came about as a result of technological development, slave trading as a lucrative business became a thing of the past. This was discouraged through legislative acts and Christianity. Missionaries were posted to Africa to globalise the West's culture and religion by introducing Christianity to the animist Africans, which altered the cultural ways and economic systems of Africa. To avert a clash of interests the Berlin Conference was organised between 1884 and 1885 by the European states to embark on boundary demarcation and delineation, without considering ethnicity, culture,

geography or other attributes of each area (Reader 1999, 569). This explains the political and economic crises that still litter the continent of Africa today, coupled with the principle of *uti possidetis* adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its Cairo Summit of 1964 (Ahmed 2015; Ratner 2002, 255–256).

It was not in European interests to embark on a *civilising mission*, as they made Africans believe. Their primary mission in Africa was to ensure unhindered access to the raw materials of the colonies and to dispose of their wares that would have attracted lower prices in Europe to the benefit of the working class (Davidson 2005, 7). Africa was tactically integrated into the global trading system in various ways. Firstly, by forcing African farmers to abandon the production of food crops in favour of cash crops introduced through carrot and stick diplomacy. Carrot diplomacy meant paying higher prices for cash crops against food crops; stick diplomacy meant physical assaults on farmers who refused to go cash cropping. This was experienced in the Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of the Congo (Ake 1981). Secondly, the system promoted a liberal, later neo-liberal, economic system. Through the controversial international trade of absolute advantage as described by Adam Smith (a theory that was later adjusted by David Ricardo to the concept of comparative advantage), the global trading system apportioned the production of industrial inputs to Africa rather than encouraging finished goods that would attract higher prices. Much later, the factor endowment theory of Samuelson and the Heckscher–Ohlin model came as a the starting points of the perpetuation of underdevelopment in Africa. These theories reduced Africa to monocultural states where one item is encouraged to be the major product instead of self-sufficiency in food production. Ghana, Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, which were encouraged to produce cocoa for the chocolate industry, are now being encouraged to focus on fossil fuel production despite the ‘resource curse’ and ‘Dutch disease’ implications for these countries (Clarke 2010, 290–2). European and North American states that should focus on manufactured goods have equally become major food producers from the twentieth century onward. These societies were known as agrarian enclaves before the Industrial Revolution. How then can one talk of international trade theory in practice? Thirdly, through the introduction of several international regimes, such as the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund, Africa was finally integrated into the trading system that is described as an unequal arrangement for the benefit of developed states. Lastly, in a bid to consolidate the existing status quo, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established through the Marrakech Agreement in 1994, and covers intellectual property, trade in services and agriculture previously not covered by the 1947 GATT (Stephan et al. 2006, 203). When the wind of change started blowing across the continent of Africa, the colonialists had no option other than to grant political independence to their colonies. 1960 was glorified as the Year of Africa, when the majority of dependent

states received flag independence under the neo-colonial system. Before this time, predatory social scientists were carefully selected in America to invade the universities of 'freed' states to teach neo-liberal theories of social science in a bid to further the imperialistic economic system in Africa. Some of these academics came up with static problem-solving theories, in contrast with the emancipatory dynamic theories that promote the socio-economic development of the new states in world politics (Ake 1982; Amusan 2016). Their mission was accomplished as they imposed a system of economic development on Africa that they hardly adhered to (McDonald 2014). Neo-liberalism accommodated Francophone African states to the European Economic Community to perpetuate underdevelopment in the guise of W. W. Rostow's incremental economic development (Taylor 2008, 521). During this time, the colonies that were released for political independence were prepared for an unperturbed supply of industrial inputs for the European market in the form of North-South relations through various systems like most favoured nation status, the price stability system and import substitution industrialisation. On import substitution, industrialisation boosted the MNCs' activities on the continent. The activities of MNCs asphyxiated whatever initiative was embarked on by post-colonial governments for their economic and trading systems. Manufacturing companies were killed off by the dumping and economy of scale that transnational companies brought to production (Dasgupta and Singh 2007). This opened the way for Lever Brothers (Unilever), Nestle, Cadbury, Societe Commerciale de l'Quest Africain (SCOA), Compagnie Française de l'Afrique (CFAO), Roche, Berger Paint and many automobile industries to gain total domination of the African market (Ake 1981, 93).

To consolidate this arrangement, the African Anglophone states were admitted to the controversial North-South Lomé Convention trading system in 1975. Despite the New International Economic Order that was mooted by developing states to seek redress from the economics of imperialism, the Lomé Convention was promoted by the European states to entrench unequal trading systems to the advantage of the North. Through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Africa was able to facilitate economic development, but without the blessing of the GATT. From Lomé 1 to IV, Africa could not experience any appreciable trading advantage in a relationship of unequal partners. In 2000, the Cotonou Agreement was mooted by the European Union to further the exploitation of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries through political means. The agreement turned out to have an agenda that was not captured by the Lomé Convention, which emphasised more the ultra-neo-liberalism of the first generation in terms of human rights, democratisation and the liberal economic system without considering the peculiarities of the African states. Also of concern regarding this agreement was the imposition of a certain economic system which discouraged small and medium industries. This attempt was to concretise the attributes of belt-tightening/Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) that perpetuated poverty in the continent (Lee 2009). The result of this led to the closing down of many industries in Africa and the wiping off of marketing

boards that stabilised the prices of primary products. These developments led to high rates of unemployment through the imposition of SAP that could not address the very foundation of state creation, the social contract between a government and its citizens. Basic rights have been eroded away from Africa. These include children's rights to free and compulsory education, health services and nutritious food for mental and physical development. The construction of dams and highways, radical cuts in public expenditure and increases in consumer taxes have perpetuated poverty and instability in some of the African states (Malloch-Brown 2011, 100–1). On the issue of employment and the provision of three basic needs shelter, food and clothing for human existence, the majority of Africans have no access to these. The political system continues to experience the instability that started in the 1980s. The imposition of an alien type of government from colonial times is not only facilitating underdevelopment, but is allowing property rights that were communal-based to be altered to suit individualism premised on the commodification of land to the advantage of foreign ownership through the WTO (Trebilcock and Prado 2011). Since the negotiation of the Uruguay Rounds that eventually led to the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement, which metamorphosed into the WTO, more powers have been arrogated to the MNCs. Other institutions such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs; relevant for technology), and Trade-Related Investment Measures (relevant for trade in services) are some of the institutions that have concretised the exploitation of Africa (Amin 2003, 92–120; Bayne and Woolcock 2011; Nwoke 2013, 89–91; Onimode 2004, 25–7). Despite the fact that generic drugs production or the importation of the same is allowed through TRIPs, American multinational pharmaceutical companies fought a battle with South Africa, for instance, on the production of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs for HIV/AIDS patients in the country (Amusan 2015). Patenting politics that has been introduced to international trade norms promotes Western trading capacity at the expense of developing states. As stated by Carol Thompson (2009, 299):

Plants and animals comprise the treasures of Africa and they helped to build overseas empires as much as yellow or black gold ... What is new in the twenty-first century is not the scramble for genetic resources, but changes in law and science that allow exclusive ownership over nature.

Elsewhere, this politics receives academic examination through the patenting of the Rooibos and Hoodia plants owned by the Khoi and San tribes in the present South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and part of Angola (Amusan 2014, 2017). These are plants that cure several ailments of those regarded as indigenous peoples based on the relevant international law. Not only does the West want to register this product for global use, but the initial owners, based on geographical indications, may not process the same and export it to the international market without paying royalties to those who have registered the product in America and Europe. Africa's response to these arrangements is the next issue to examine.

AFRICA'S RESPONSES TO THE EXISTING STATUS QUO

The alternative to the existing status quo is traceable to the political independence of Ghana when Kwame Nkrumah advocated African socialism as the only way to escape neo-colonialism. He organised a series of conferences on the continent to address this; the most important one was the 1958 All-Africa Conference that called for a United States of Africa. This was frustrated by the conservative African states through the establishment of the alternative grouping system of Monrovia, Lagos and Brazzaville with the aim of perpetuating the existing economic and political systems, as evidenced by the formation of the defunct OAU in 1963. Nkrumah's starting point was to address the colonial boundaries that fuelled instability and frustrated economic underdevelopment through the *uti possidetis* principle. Almost at the same time as the Lomé Convention was instituted, the continent realised the need for regional and sub-regional economic groupings as agents of development and political stability. This led to the formation of the Economic Community for the West African States (ECOWAS); and in 1980, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which though it was established to alleviate the frontline states overreliance on South Africa's apartheid government, at the same time aimed at promoting the economic development of the member states. These economic regimes that were formed as an alternative to the North-South relationship were not without their challenges, such as ideological incompatibility (e.g. the Uganda-Tanzania dispute that led to the temporary collapse of the East African Community) and hegemonic rivalry among the members, which hindered these organisations from functioning as an economic union (Akokpari 2008). This situation may not be too far from the rivalry between colonial and Cold War powers on the continent.

When Africa realised that a lord-servant relationship had been put in place from colonial times, the OAU came up with another blueprint, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), which was mooted in 1980 with the help of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). This laudable project became history. Ten years on from the formation of the LPA, the OAU came together, again in Nigeria, to form the African Economic Community (AEC) as an incremental approach to economic development and trading among the member states. The organisation faced the same fate as the previously inaugurated international economic regimes on the continent.

Towards the end of the 1990s, African states came together to fall in line with the dictate of the globalisation concept. In trying to do this as a means of establishing a new trading regime with the North, a New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was formed, this time with the blessing of the developed states and their financial institutions as an 'external guarantor's model' (Akokpari 2008, 91; Bunwaree 2008, 234). Since its inauguration, there has been no substantial trade development to its advantage, or to equal advantage for the North and the South. NEPAD was a misguided regime only satisfying the North's trading regime. Participation in this newly formed

regionalised organisation may not be in the best interests of Africa, but may lead to further exploitation of the continent as a dumping ground for manufactured goods and a source of industrial inputs for other members of the organisation (Bond 2015).

It is the same story when one tries to contextualise the African Growth and Opportunity Act, as displayed in 2016 when America tried to promote food security in Africa, but ran up against the imperialistic ambition of South Africa with the initial theory that the tropical climate was not suitable for agriculture (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 49; Taylor 2008). South Africa was forced to import chicken, which ordinarily should not be necessary because the country is capable of self-sufficiency in the production of chicken. Based on comparative and endowment theories in international trade, Africa, which is noted for its food production, should be left to continue this according to the neo-liberal thesis.

It is therefore evident that a tenet of globalisation is not only paying lip service to, but perpetuating an imbalanced trading system to the advantage of the North. This goes far beyond economic and financial domination. It creeps into the issues of culture, education, technology and history with all its negatives impact (Axford 2013). As observed by various scholars (Sachs 2008; Stiglitz 2013; Axford 2013; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; de Haan 2007; Birdsall 2007), globalisation has brought inequality, poverty, corruption, conflict and identity crisis to Africa. The determinant of prices for African goods is centred in the North while at the same time, the prices of manufactured goods are determined by the same centre. Despite Africa's identification as the basket of food for the next generation, the scramble for land on the continent is unabated, traceable to the pre-colonial era (Clarke 2010, 66–70). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the rate at which Asian emerging economies, America and Europe are involved in land grabbing for the production of food for their populations is a source of concern in the guise of conservative neo-liberal economic development. At the current rate at which land in Africa, which should be reserved for the living, the dead and the as yet unborn, is being commodified, the next generation may struggle to produce food for the teeming population of the continent, since foods produced by the MNCs find their way to the developed states either as raw materials, as animal feed or for human consumption.

Land grabbing also promotes genetically modified organisms (GMOs), both foods and animals; South Africa is said to be the tenth-largest country in the world to produce and consume such products. Farmers in Africa are indirectly forced to produce GMO foods and animals in the guise of achieving massive production, and while this encourages mammoth harvests for farmers it also furthers the profit ambitions of GMO producers such as Monsanto, Panner, Pioneer and Syngenta (Amusan and Odimegwu 2015, 132–3). In an attempt to further economic imperialism in Africa, America and Europe are now involving their citizens who, through questionable non-government

organisations (NGOs), come to Africa on the pretext of taking part in philanthropic activities or as non-partisan institutions wishing to better the lives of the poor on the continent (Sankore 2005, 12–15; Manji and O’Coill 2005, 16–20; Onyanyo 2005, 20–21). For instance, the Bill and Melinda Gates, Rockefeller and Warren Buffett foundations are active in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa in distributing GMO farm inputs such as seedlings and fertiliser to poor rural farmers. In the long run, the farmers, after some years, will be advised to purchase seedlings from Monsanto and other GM seed producers despite their human health and biodiversity challenges (Mansbach and Rafferty 2008, 529; Lymbery and Oakeshott 2015; Thompson 2009). This is only to further the trading ambition of the developed states. This power arrogated to MNCs through the WTO finds further strength in the 21 January 2010 judgement handed down by the US Supreme Court that the ‘government may not ban corporations from political spending on elections’ (Chomsky 2012, 189). Corporate personhood has shifted power from shareholders to managers who may decide, unilaterally, what is best for their corporations as against what is legally and humanly good for the environment, stakeholders and sustainability. As the same time, managers must maintain the ‘holy grail’ of always seeking shareholder value maximisation, which is the *zeitgeist* (primary aim) of MNCs (Chang 2010, 17). This could explain why the issue of patenting fails to consider the plight of the rightful owners of their resources. As much as MNCs are legally involved in political financing, governments in the developed states may not be able to question international trade, which is in the hands of a few corporations in the global system; taking into consideration their *leitmotif* as profit-oriented institutions deriving their satisfaction from perpetuating a raped, looted and pillaged periphery continent with an economy of disarticulation (Ake 1981; Chang 2010).

The economic crisis that started in October 2007 because of America’s reckless economic mismanagement did not only affect the United States, but equally had an impact on the rest of the developed states and Africa. Rather than adhering to the forces of the supply and demand dictum, various stimulus packages were devised to bail the ailing American economy out of the economic doldrums (Altman 2009, 8; Amusan 2016, 25). Surprisingly, the same was not prescribed for Africa in the 1980s when SAP was introduced to the continent. At a theoretical level, and based on the predatory, synthetic and unsustainable theory of liberalism that gained currency from the 1950s onward as discussed above, this should have been the solution to the crisis that America faced. Ironically, Fareed Zakaria (2013), Roger Altman (2013) and their followers were quick to come up with problem-solving explanations as to why America had to intervene through bail-out financial stimulus. As observed by Amusan and Oyewole (2012) and Malloch-Brown (2011), prescribing a limited state in an era of unlimited quest is antithetical to democratisation, and the second and third generations’ human rights.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As for the future, this chapter will proffer some unpopular recommendations that are antithetical to the traditional theories. It is time for Africa to look more inward for trade, as the existing status quo is to the benefit of a few states compared to the number of sovereign states in the international system. As observed by John Akokpari (2008, 90), a functional trading system for the benefit of Africa should be introverted, inward-looking and state-centred rather than being an externally dependent arrangement. There is a need to embark on a *new regionalism*, described as regionalism from below, that takes into account the concept of regionalisation, which is a broader concept of economic integration that goes beyond regionalism's elitist approach to trading systems (Adebajo 2012; Ivan 2012, 2). This is an approach that accommodates civil societies and informal businesses that cut across Eurocentric international African boundaries, but does not address the physical challenges of economic development.

Though Africa has not fully benefitted from regionalism and regionalisation as discussed above, there is a need to advance this option vigorously so as to ensure human security rather than the ideological incompatibility created by colonial boundary demarcation and delineation. This, as pointed out by Asiwaju (2004, 206), would enhance an economic and political stability from which 'transboundary natural resources ranging from land, water (surface and underground) and air to liquid and solid minerals, as well as the flora, fauna, the inherently indivisible environment and the ecosystem' could be jointly harnessed for the commonwealth of the continent. There is a need for a transparent trading system instead of grandfathering. In line with the traditional thesis, there is a need to discourage aid as it perpetuates underdevelopment; as Yoweri Museveni said, 'aid without trade is a lullaby' (Adedeji 2012, 83). Doing this would address the current religious fundamentalism, conflict and violence over resources; and the power of MNCs needs to be revisited. The Algerian civil war between 1992 and 1998, and the ongoing Somalian crisis, can be linked partly to the neo-liberal economic system introduced to the state that excluded 'the young urban poor, blighted by the bad economic prospects, embraced a populist Islamism; and the pious middle classes, both business and professional, who felt shut out by the "neo-liberal" crony capitalism' (Fergusson 2014; Priestland 2013, 236). There is a need for human or people-centred development rather than an elite regional arrangement of graft, crony capitalism, rent-seeking and social inequality that fails to address civil society's concerns (Mills and Herbst 2012). Adebayo Adedeji's anti-SAP mission came to fruition with the African Alternative Framework to SAP published by the ECA in 1989, which faults the one-size-fits-all approach of SAP as an imperialistic trading system. In doing this, the LPA and AEC, which advocated bottom-up development that could promote sustainable progress on the continent, should be a cornerstone of African trade relations with the rest of the global system.

To conclude, there is an urgent need to dust off South Africa's Reconstruction and Development programme as a blueprint for equal exchange in Africa's international trade with the North (Onimode 2004). Not too far from

this is the question of biopiracy: it is time for Africa to address the issue of patenting, which MNCs and the developed states have crafted in their favour. At this stage, the issue of geographical indications, as mentioned above, and the need to possibly violate Eurocentric patenting norms is long overdue (Carmody 2011). Going by an example from Botswana, there is a need to subscribe as a continent to SADC's 2014 Victoria Falls Declaration on value-added and beneficiation in the mining sector, which is presently dominated by mining giants and their cronies on the continent. Adhering to this would rejig and reboot trading and economic systems.

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Africa and Foreign Direct Investment

Scott D. Taylor

INTRODUCTION

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has grown markedly in the last two decades. Despite this growth, Africa still represents only a fraction of the world's FDI flows. Moreover, from colonialism to the present, the bulk of Africa's inward FDI has been concentrated in primary commodities, particularly in the extractive sectors. These dual problems, global marginality and lack of diversification, both highlight the limits to Africa's competitiveness and portend the continued dependence of African economies on primary commodities. Indeed, the decline of global commodity prices that began in 2015 following more than a decade of increases has raised fears in some policy and scholarly circles of a return to Africa's 1970s economic malaise, which would only serve to further exacerbate Africa's marginal place in the global economy.

Yet comparing the contemporary African experience to that of the previous generation can also obscure a number of changes on the continent. For example, although investment volumes leveled off after 2014, inward FDI has diversified, increasingly including manufacturing, retail, and financial services¹; importantly, a non-negligible portion of this FDI is horizontal, that is, geared toward *domestic* markets, suggesting an improved investment climate in many economies.² Another factor differentiates the current period from the past: the growth of intra-African investment. Although much of this FDI originates from South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria and Kenya, its emergence

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signals that some of the most bullish investors in Africa are other African firms, thereby compelling us to rethink the potential of FDI to reshape the African economic landscape.

Nonetheless, even if the positive FDI trajectories of the early years were to resume to their early 2000s levels in the near future, FDI still has a long way to go to be a significant driver of growth in SSA,³ or to affect domestic industrial development. The degree to which FDI has stimulated domestic investment responses—which are essential to the diversification and development of African economies—remains inconsistent across the continent.

This chapter examines these and other trends in FDI in Africa and seeks to explain the evolving patterns of investment. It proceeds by first outlining the arguments in favor of FDI, drawing on its historical global benefits. The chapter then turns to an examination of the historical experience of FDI in Africa, which has been, for the bulk of its colonial and post-colonial history, substantially negative. SSA's abundant primary commodities, especially hydrocarbons, have tended to attract the lion's share of FDI and, in general, this has had an adverse impact on economic development and diversification,⁴ as well as governance and democracy.⁵ But natural resource endowments need not be destiny. As Theodore Moran argues, "it is no longer possible to consider that a country's initial factor endowment consigns the economy to a given position within the international system..."⁶ Moran's observation reflects the potential advantages for Africa, as for the rest of the world, in increased FDI, particularly in conjunction with increased trade flows. Africa saw a surge in FDI beginning in 2000, and it is important to identify the numerous and impactful ways in which this recent investment departs from the historical experience. Finally, the chapter concludes with some thoughts about the prospects for FDI going forward.

THE BENEFITS OF FDI

A range of research demonstrates that FDI offers a host of benefits to a developing country. FDI can generate positive spillover effects for local economies. Moran, Graham, and Blomström (2005) conclude that under reasonably competitive conditions, FDI improves efficiency in host economies and attracts new kinds of activities and businesses to the country.⁷ Therefore, FDI does not merely generate financial flows, but also encourages research and development in the respective investment-receiving countries. In addition, argue Moran et al., foreign investors "continually upgrade the technologies, management techniques, and quality-control procedures of their affiliates to keep their sourcing networks at the competitive frontier in the international industry."⁸ Although many developing countries have availed themselves of this approach, history suggests that Africa has not generally conformed to this ideal type.

Indeed, in order for FDI to have the theorized beneficial spillover effects on the economy—especially in terms of promoting local small and medium enterprise (SME) development so that they can contribute to the supply chain—the domestic

environment must be attractive to prospective investors. In other words, fostering backward linkages with local SMEs in order to achieve the kind of virtuous circles Moran (2006) describes requires a policy environment that allows SMEs to develop in the first place: local industrialization, for example, lures more FDI, along with guided trade protection, political stability and a business-friendly, “enabling environment.”⁹ Achieving these milestones remains a challenge for SSA, but the 2015 Africa Attractiveness Survey indicates that a majority of respondents continue to consider SSA as a high-risk environment: “Political risk factors, such as instability and corruption, remain the main barriers that discourage investment in Africa.”¹⁰ In fact, for most countries political (in-) stability is the *sine qua non* of risk factors. Nearly 55% of respondents indicated that political instability is the biggest obstacle for companies doing business in Africa.¹¹

The more technical dimensions of the business environment, captured in the World Bank’s annual “Doing Business” report, are also important. Many countries have made great strides in such measures as the time it takes to open a business, the permitting process and dealing with labor (www.doingbusiness.org). Yet most SSA countries perform poorly along the 11 metrics included in the Doing Business indicators. Even relatively highly ranked states, however, such as Rwanda or Botswana, remain constrained by small domestic markets and a low industrial base, which combine to make such countries less appealing to foreign investors.¹²

Finally, so-called “South–South” investment—FDI originating from developing countries and targeting those in developing regions—may offer a partial corrective to more hesitant FDI from OECD countries, potentially yielding some unique benefits to both the receiving and sending countries. The World Bank (2014, 1) maintains that, for example, “South–South transfer of technology tends to be lower cost and more adaptable.” China, Brazil, and South Africa are among the countries that have been able to leverage these advantages in countries across the continent; however, whether in regard to commodities, construction, or consumer products, Southern investors have also found themselves at the center of controversies around labor, environmental issues, and displacement of domestic producers.¹³ These subjects are revisited in additional detail later in the chapter.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF FDI IN AFRICA

The historical levels of FDI in Africa can be best described as anemic, as indicated in Fig. 43.1. In post-colonial Africa, averages were in the range of just 1–3% of global flows for three decades, and the most significant volume was directed to investment in the extractive sectors.

Post-colonial regimes, regardless of ideology, substantially sought to pursue strategies of import substitution industrialization (ISI) as a means to development. The “Afro-capitalist” countries, namely Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Kenya, tended to have a more active encouragement of and engagement with foreign investors, and it was arguably more common to see an international




Fig. 43.1 FDI in Africa
 Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Foreign Direct Investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1980–2014," 10/2/15, UNCTAD STAT, Web.

corporate presence in those states across a range of sectors: retail, finance, mining, manufacturing, and so on. Nonetheless, most of what was produced was mainly for local market consumption; very little was exported. Even nominally Afro-socialist regimes such as Zambia, however, encouraged large foreign firms to locate inside their borders in order to produce for local markets. Hence, some investment occurred in ISI activities such as light manufacture of household products, automobile tires, chemicals, and other goods, and it was common to find multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Colgate-Palmolive, Goodyear, or Unilever operating even in putatively anti-capitalist economies.

As Moran notes, however, these post-colonial experimentations with ISI represented a “dark side” of FDI. Such “FDI oriented toward protected developing country markets typically resulted in plants too small to capture economies of scale in the industry, leading to inefficient operations and expensive output.”¹⁴ Not surprisingly, most of these monuments to ISI failed once exposed to liberalized trade regimes in the 1990s, since they could no longer compete even in domestic markets with a surge of new imports.¹⁵

Only in the extractive sectors—gas, oil, some mining activities—were foreign investors oriented toward exports and access to global markets, but these sectors were (and are today) poorly integrated with domestic economies and labor markets. Thus, they failed to have the stimulative developmental effects witnessed elsewhere. In other words, whereas FDI helped to stimulate export-led development throughout East and Southeast Asia, for example, in Africa it lacked such global connectedness.

Another dimension common to FDI in Africa that warrants mention is the intersection between FDI and the widespread African nationalism of the post-colonial era. Of course, Western corporate interests were the bedrock of colonial economies across the continent. Following independence, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many SSA countries experienced a backlash against this foreign presence, fueled by African economic (and political) nationalism. Africanization policies thus became the sociopolitical and ideological vehicle for asserting national control. Examples include Zambia’s Mulungushi Accords (1968) or Tanzania’s Ujamaa (1967), sweeping initiatives that nationalized much of the economy. In Zaire (today DRC), President Mobutu Sese Seko implemented a “Zaireanization” program in the late 1970s, which included the nationalization of the vital mining sector previously controlled by Belgian and other interests. Even in capitalist-leaning Nigeria, the 1970 “Nigerianization” campaign established significant state ownership rules in particular sectors.

Notwithstanding the ideological antipathy to Western capitalism in places like Tanzania, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, Western MNCs still enjoyed outsized privileges and protectionism for operating in local markets, though in some cases ownership stakes were reduced by law, or certain sectors were foreclosed to foreigners. Importantly, the only MNCs that thrived in this range of countries were those in the extractive sectors, which were able to export petroleum, minerals, metals, and (non-value added) agricultural products.¹⁶ Since export opportunities for non-extractive sector FDI were limited, and domestic markets

unattractive, the impact of widespread economic nationalism was the reduction of new FDI and some divestments, since prospective investors feared losing their capital.

In the former French colonies, where France steadfastly maintained its neo-colonial ties—through economic and corporate linkages, payoffs to political elites, and unabashed financial and military support for presidential clients—were multinationals like the then national French petroleum company, Elf Aquitaine, which were substantially insulated from these African nationalist currents. Gabon, under presidents Léon Mba and later Omar Bongo, arguably remains the quintessential example of this phenomenon.¹⁷

The deterioration of African economies from about the time of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis in 1973, and the sustained collapse of commodity prices beginning in 1975, firmly discouraged extant, and certainly new, FDI on the continent—extractive sectors included—as profitability fell.¹⁸ Indeed, due to the instability of the African political economy and the unpredictability of state policies toward property rights, there was no net FDI in the 1970s; in fact, some disinvestment occurred, a trend that continued into the 1980s and 1990s, particularly outside of the oil and gas sectors.¹⁹ In Kenya, for example, “the stock of foreign direct investment *declined* from US \$670 million in 1980 to less than \$400 million in 1990”.²⁰

Thus, by the third decade of independence, FDI in SSA looked grim indeed. African markets were burdened with restrictive policies, economic stagnation, highly rural, low-skilled populations, and scant consumer capacity, exacerbated by political risk. Besides the macro-political and economic unattractiveness of Africa as an investment destination, from at least the early 1970s, other justifications for low levels of FDI included deteriorated legal as well as physical infrastructure, weak financial services, low skills, high debt, and a shortage of foreign exchange; as well as continued restrictions, such as sector restrictions, domestic ownership requirements, and so on.²¹

The 1980s and 1990s saw the continent-wide adoption, with mixed results, of economic structural adjustment programs implemented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The privatization of state-owned enterprises and the promotion of private investment, especially from international sources, became essential components of the neoliberal prescription for Africa.

Although proponents saw great promise in its development potential,²² critics found it ironic that FDI could be regarded as a panacea for economic growth on the continent that its champions prescribed.²³ Multiple generations of scholars have highlighted the failures and exploitative nature of FDI in Africa.²⁴

But where MNCs have contributed to bad outcomes, for example, social disruption, environmental degradation, and economic exploitation, clearly such “bad FDI” did not operate in a vacuum. Indeed, considerable fault lies with unscrupulous national political elites. It was evident well before the advent of structural adjustment that state-driven economic models had failed, but elites steadfastly clung to those models until the 1990s. Yet African leaders’ views toward FDI since independence always had a Janus-faced quality to them.

Even during an era of ideological antipathy toward foreign capital, up to and even after the inauguration of structural adjustment, state elites had a deep interest in preserving the presence of Western multinationals in the extractive sector. Part of this was a more or less inevitable outcome borne partly of scant capacity within the domestic private sector; part of this, too, resulted from elite interest in corruption and rent-seeking. As Tangri argues, “The evidence suggests that ... [states] have permitted foreign capital considerable autonomy and advantages in conducting its operations while, oftentimes, conferring huge private fortunes and political support on many of Africa’s political leaders.”²⁵ Certainly, many leaders have conformed to the worst depictions of a self-interested, comprador elite, mortgaging their country’s future in an effort to curry favor, and accumulate rents from, foreign capital.²⁶

All in all, the historical failure of FDI to deliver “development” despite a century of activity has induced an understandable degree of skepticism, not solely among scholars, but among many African people and policymakers as well.²⁷ Yet in a 2004 analysis focusing chiefly on East Africa, Moss, Ramachandran, and Shah examined the bases for this skepticism and found them wanting. They showed that

... foreign firms are more productive, bring management skills, invest more heavily in infrastructure and in the training and health of their workers, and are more connected to global markets. At the same time, they do not appear to succeed by grabbing market share and crowding out local industry. These results suggest that many of the objections to foreign investment are exaggerated or false. Africa, by not attracting more FDI, is therefore failing to fully benefit from the potential of foreign capital to contribute to economic development and integration with the global economy.²⁸

FDI RESURGENT

At the time of the analysis by Moss et al., however, the situation already had begun to change. In 2000, global commodity prices began their longest sustained boom since World War I, partly as a result of increased demand from a rapidly growing and externalizing China.²⁹ Suddenly, prices for Africa’s resources began to rise, and with them so did economies. Trade volumes also expanded exponentially, and GDP rose sharply. Governments responded by trying to improve conditions for “doing business” and comply with the eponymous new ranking system launched by the World Bank in 2004. Certainly, FDI became bolder. To a measurable degree, “Africa” has become more attractive to potential investors. In Ernst and Young’s 2011 Africa Attractiveness Survey, 42% of respondents indicated that they would consider investing in SSA.³⁰ The attractiveness of Africa as a possible investment destination continued at a high level, though it has declined somewhat since 2011.³¹ Enthusiasm is also reflected in the burgeoning literature as well as the litany of new conferences and summits on business in Africa.³² Most importantly, this attractiveness is manifested in the tremendous increase in FDI volumes. In the first decade of

the twenty-first century, levels of FDI into Africa turned sharply upward, rising from US\$6. billion in 2000 to US\$35 billion in 2012. The changes that characterized the 2000s combined to create a new narrative for Africa that increasingly told of an “Africa Rising,” replete with opportunities for investors as well as for the continent’s people.³³

The partners have diversified as well, beyond the traditionally dominant former colonial powers and the US. France, the US and the UK still hold the largest FDI stocks in Africa as a whole (including North Africa), and a significant volume of FDI flows from 2001–2011 originated from OECD countries,³⁴ including France (US\$4.9 billion), the UK (US\$4.1 billion), the Netherlands (US\$2.7 billion), the US (US\$1.8 billion), and Germany (US\$1.3 billion).³⁵ However, five countries of the global South—Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Malaysia—each became an important source of FDI into Africa over the same period.

Thus, overall, the picture is far more robust and diversified than at any time in the past. Nonetheless, a number of problems persist that continue to present obstacles to SSA’s maximal benefit from FDI.

PERSISTENT RISKS; PERSISTENT PROBLEMS

The first problem actually is the obverse of a phenomenon noted above, and which many observers celebrate: South–South investment. Although many of these investors, South Africans and Chinese among them, may be less daunted by political risk factors than their OECD counterparts, investment from these countries is not a silver bullet. South African FDI, for example, which includes significant retail, mining, and services such as tourism and finance, has at times crowded out local investors. Moreover, South African companies are often connected to their own supply chains, thereby bypassing local upstream producers and depriving host countries of many of the ancillary benefits of FDI.³⁶

China has been a leading investor for a decade, in sectors such as construction, extractives, construction, and increasingly, agriculture. There is widespread disagreement about whether the impact of Chinese FDI is positive or negative.³⁷ Clashes have occurred, for example, between Chinese managers and workers in Zambia, and Chinese shopkeepers and their neighbors and customers in Senegal, but in general this investment has been a boon to SSA, bringing much-needed capital and infrastructure improvements. The slowdown in China’s domestic economy in 2015, however, and its corresponding reduced demand for raw materials had, by 2016, already led to a massive slowdown in production across Africa.³⁸

A second problem stems from the still small number of countries in Africa that actually have received measurable amounts of FDI. Among the targets, just 15 countries accounted for over 80% of total FDI flows into Africa in 2012, and this disparity was visible throughout the decade. “In 2012, Nigeria and Mozambique received the most FDI. They were followed by South Africa, Ghana, DRC, Congo and Sudan (all exceeding US\$2 billion). There are nine

countries in Africa that had FDI inflows (net) that were at least 5% of GDP between 2008 and 2012. FDI also constitutes a large share of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in several African countries. The share of FDI in GFCF was at least one-third in Congo, DRC, Ghana, Madagascar and Nigeria.”³⁹ Only South Africa has a diversified economy that could absorb investment in non-extractive sectors.

Thus, the third risk is Africa’s continued primary commodity dependence. Although recently the services sector has been a major destination for FDI, much of the increase in the 2001–2012 period was driven by extractions. High demand helped push FDI higher, including a robust US\$72bn in 2008. In 2009, however, after consistent growth for a decade, FDI dropped precipitously to US\$59bn, a decrease of 19%, as a result of the global recession. In fact, Africa was more resilient than other parts of the world (to which FDI flows declined by 37%). The 2009 fall in FDI was due to the drying up of international finance, but also to the contraction in global demand and falling prices for commodities. Although these effects proved short lived—in part because China continued to stockpile commodities—and FDI (and trade) growth resumed,⁴⁰ African economies did not, in general, see this as a wake-up call for diversification. Thus, little was done to diversify the kinds of investment Africa needs. Whether through negligence or lack of capacity, most failed to diversify economies, creating vicious circles: the ‘Dutch disease’ and other effects of primary commodity dependence have deepened investment in those sectors in which states have comparative advantage, but at the expense of other sectors. As a result, industrialization remains limited, consumer markets underdeveloped, and various other economic infrastructures underinvested.

While the upturn in FDI and the “Africa Rising” mantra that characterized the 2000s are noteworthy and impressive, SSA elites must guard against complacency, though this may be easier said than done.⁴¹ With commodity prices plummeting in 2015, SSA’s fiscal position affords far less flexibility.

A final problem or set of constraints over which SSA has scant control, however, is structural in nature. Indeed, the inability to marshal the ideal typical advantages of FDI consistently (and in some cases at all) is not simply a problem of malicious agents, whether African or corporate. Africa’s cartographic impediments have impeded FDI as well, hosting, as the continent does, the world’s greatest number of land-locked states; small inaccessible markets reduce the attractiveness of Africa in terms of export potential and as a destination for FDI. African countries also face unique structural challenges to foreign investment that other regions, by dint of geography, or colonial legacy, escape. In addition African countries suffer contagion effects disproportionately—a crisis in one tends to affect the perception of risk in others, often regardless of proximity.⁴² Finally, Africa’s appetite for FDI must compete with other markets, such as East and Southeast Asia—which has benefitted from US hegemony and, more recently, proximity to China—and elsewhere in the global South where factor endowments may be more favorable.

These factors, then, as well as policy shortcomings and political risk, explain why, despite Africa's impressive growth in FDI flows in recent decades, the amount remains at the margins of global FDI, at just 2.5% of total global flows.⁴³

CONCLUSION

Many scholars decried the increased demand for African resources, which, in addition to boosting trade volumes, has seen new investments in mines, ancillary industries, and construction, as a renewed "scramble" for Africa. Similar concerns were raised about other investors on the continent, whom critics accuse of neo-colonialism, land-grabbing and "stalking horses" for foreign corporations that will merely crowd out local producers and markets.⁴⁴ Yet this view is too reductionist.

Clearly much of Africa's FDI growth since 2000 is due to global, and particularly Chinese, demand for commodities, yet whereas the largest cumulative inflows are either in sectors in which the region has a comparative advantage (such as natural resources and agriculture) or where there is need for investment and returns are high, such as construction, not all FDI is in mining, hydrocarbons, or other natural resources. In fact, in 2013, for example, "the non-extractive sectors [were] expanding... with some 64 percent of investments going to tech, media, and telecoms; financial and business services; and consumer goods sectors."⁴⁵ The growth of FDI into non-traditional (i.e., non-extractive) sectors is essential, although the prevailing international price environment and economy makes it far more challenging. Yet to condemn FDI entirely would be to embrace the discarded ideological strictures of the past and would have the impact of cementing SSA's longstanding inequality in relation to other regions of the world.

NOTES

1. Steven Radelet, *Emerging Africa: How 17 Nations are Leading the Way* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2009); Jake Bright and Aubry Hruby, *The Next Africa: An Emerging Continent Becomes a Global Powerhouse* (NY: St. Martins, 2015).
2. Tidane Kinda, "Beyond Natural Resources: Horizontal and Vertical FDI Diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Applied Economics* 45 no. 25 (2013): 3587–3598.
3. Emmanuel George, Paul Ojeaga, Adetunji Adekola and Oluwatoyin Matthews, "What Does FDI Inflow Mean for Emerging African Economies?" Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper #62195. <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62195/>(date added 28 February 2015; accessed 9 March 2016).
4. Kinda, "Beyond Natural Resources."
5. Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*, 53 (2001): 325–361.
6. Theodore H. Moran, *Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Policies for Developed and Developing Countries* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006), 21.

7. Theodore H. Moran, Edward M. Graham and Magnus Blomström, "Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?" Washington, D.C.; May 2005, ISBN paper 0-88132-381-0, 375.
8. Moran, *Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment*, 21.
9. Njimantend Godfrey Forgha; "Foreign Direct investment and Economic Performance in Cameroon" International Review of Business Research Papers 5 No. 1 (January 2009), 55–69, accessed 9 March 2016, <http://irbrp.com/static/documents/January/2009/5.Forgha.pdf>.
10. Ernst and Young, "Africa Attractiveness Survey, 2015: Making Choices" (2015): 5, accessed 9 March 2016, [http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-africa-attractiveness-survey-2015-making-choices/\\$FILE/EY-africa-attractiveness-survey-2015-making-choices.pdf](http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-africa-attractiveness-survey-2015-making-choices/$FILE/EY-africa-attractiveness-survey-2015-making-choices.pdf).
11. Ernst and Young, *Africa Attractiveness Survey 2015*, 31.
12. Of course, the business environment and condition of local SMEs has little impact on FDI in extractive sectors, particularly in oil-rich economies such as Angola or Gabon.
13. Scott D. Taylor, "Region-Building in Southern Africa," in *Region Building in Africa* ed. Daniel Levine and Dawn Nagar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
14. Moran, *Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment*, 7.
15. Scott D. Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa: From Patrimonialism to Profit* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).
16. Among the most noteworthy and paradoxical examples was Angola. A self-proclaimed Marxist state from its independence until 1991, Angola long hosted the American oil company Gulf (later acquired by Chevron) as its leading investor.
17. Pierre Englebert and Kevin Dunn, *Inside African Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013); Al Jazeera (TV) "The French-African Connection" Special Series, 07 April 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/special-series/2013/08/201387113131914906.html> (accessed on 9 March 2016).
18. Taylor, *Globalization*.
19. Roger Tangri, *The Politics of Patronage in Africa: Parastatals, Privatization, and Private Enterprise* (London: James Currey, 2000), 116.
20. Tangri, *The Politics of Patronage*, 124, *emphasis added*.
21. Tangri, *The Politics of Patronage*, 118.
22. Moran, *Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment*; Kerf, Michel; Smith, Warrick. 1996. *Privatizing Africa's Infrastructure: Promise and Challenge*. World Bank technical paper no. WTP 337. Africa Region series. Washington, D.C: The World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/942071468741656732/Privatizing-Africas-infrastructure-promise-and-challenge> (accessed on 29 March 2016).
23. Tangri, *The Politics of Patronage*, 124.
24. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1972); Tangri, *The Politics of Patronage*; Padraig Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
25. Tangri, *The Politics of Patronage*, 125.
26. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*; David Korten, *When Corporations Rule the World, 3rd ed.* (Oakland: Berret-Koehler Publishers, 2015); Patrick Bond, *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation* (London: Zed Books, 2006).
27. Alastair Fraser and John Lungu, "For Whom the Windfalls: Winners and Losers in the Privatisation of Zambia's Copper Mines," 10 October, 2006, <http://www.sarpn>.

- org/documents/d0002403/Zambia_copper-mines_Lungu_Fraser.pdf (accessed 29 December 2016); Cyril Obi, "Enter the Dragon: Chinese Oil Companies and Resistance in the Niger Delta," *Review of African Political Economy*, 35 (2008): 417–434 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056240802411073>.
28. Todd Moss, Vijaya Ramachandran and Manu Kedia Shah, "Is Africa's Skepticism of Foreign Capital Justified? Evidence from East African Firm Survey Data," CGD Working Paper #41 (10 June 2004), <http://www.cgdev.org/publication/africa%E2%80%99s-skepticism-foreign-capital-justified-evidence-east-african-firm-survey-data>, accessed on March 9, 2016.
 29. This is largely commodities-based, but Ernst and Young's Africa Attractiveness Survey 2015 suggests it was more than FDI driving the 2014–15 results. Note, however, that the Ernst and Young study includes North Africa as well.
 30. Ernst and Young, "Africa Attractiveness Survey 2011: It's Time for Africa," 2011, (accessed 9 March 2016), [http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAs-sets/2011_Africa_Attractiveness_Survey/\\$FILE/11EDA187_attractiveness_africa_low_resolution_final.pdf](http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAs-sets/2011_Africa_Attractiveness_Survey/$FILE/11EDA187_attractiveness_africa_low_resolution_final.pdf)
 31. When asked how their perceptions of Africa's attractiveness as a place to do business had changed over the past year, 53% of respondents said they had improved in 2015, however, this number was 66% in 2011 (n = 501). Ernst and Young, "Africa Attractiveness Survey, 2015."
 32. Among the former: Ernst and Young's Africa Attractiveness Surveys, conducted annually since 2010; "Africa Open for Business," dir. Carol Pineau, 2006, <http://www.africaopenforbusiness.com/index.htm>; the Report of the McKinsey Global Institute: Charles Roxburgh, Norbert Dörr, Acha Leke, Amine Tazi-Riffi, Arend van Wamelen, Susan Lund, Mutsa Chironga, Tarik Alatovik, Charles Atkins, Nadia Terfous, and Till Zeino-Mahmalat, "Lions on the Move: The progress and potential of African Economies" (2010 (accessed 9 March 2016) <http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/middle-east-and-africa/lions-on-the-move>; Jonathan Berman, *Success in Africa: CEO Insights from a Continent on the Rise* (Brookline, MA: Bibliomotion, 2013); Vijay Mahajan, *Africa Rising: How 900 Million Consumers Matter More Than You Think* (Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2009); Jake Bright and Aubry Hruby, *The Next Africa: An Emerging Continent Becomes a Global Powerhouse* (New York: St. Martins, 2015); Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business*; Scott Taylor, "The Warming Business Climate in Africa" *Current History*, 114, 772 (2015): 163; *The Economist*, "Africa Rising," cover story, 3 December 2011. Among the latter are African annual business conferences at leading US business schools, such as Harvard University and Georgetown University; the US–Africa Business Summit, spearheaded by the White House in 2014; the quadrennial Chinese-led Forum for Chinese African Cooperation (FOCAC); the India–Africa Summit, and so on.
 33. Mahajan, *Africa Rising*.
 34. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), *World Investment Report 2012*.
 35. World Bank, "Foreign Direct Investment Flows," 2.
 36. Taylor, "Region-Building in Southern Africa."
 37. Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Deborah Brautigam, *Will Africa Feed China?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Carmody, *The New Scramble for Africa*; Human Rights Watch, 2011. "You'll be Fired if You Refuse: Labor

- Abuses in Zambia's Chinese State-Owned Copper Mines," accessed 9 March 2016, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zambia1111ForWebUpload.pdf>.
38. Patrick McGroarty and Joe Patterson, "Mining Collapse Cripples Africa's Dreams of Prosperity" *Wall Street Journal*, accessed 9 March 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/mining-collapse-cripples-africas-dreams-of-prosperity-1457104328>.
 39. World Bank, "Foreign Direct Investment Flows into Sub-Saharan Africa," March 2014. Science, Technology, and Skills for Africa's Development (serial), 2.
 40. <http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/outlook/external-financial-flows/direct-investment-flows/>
 41. It is incumbent upon leaders to extract more equitable deals from their MNC counterparts. Although this defies the structural inequalities in the relationship between a SSA country and a powerful corporation, it is worth noting that both Ellen Sirleaf in Liberia vis-à-vis Arcelor-Mittal and Paul Kagame in Rwanda were able to use their moral authority to extract additional concessions from large scale investors. Perhaps they can serve as models other leaders might emulate.
 42. Radelet, *Emerging Africa*.
 43. World Bank, "Foreign Direct Investment Flows into Sub-Saharan Africa," 1.
 44. Carmody, *Scramble*.
 45. Bright and Hruby, *The Next Africa*, 49.

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Africa and the BRICS: In Whose Interest?

Ian Taylor

The 2000s saw relatively high per capita growth figures across Africa. This trajectory was constructed on the back of a commodity price boom and was not autonomous, but was rather a form of classic dependent development. The commodity price hike in itself can be attributed to the robust growth of emerging economies, particularly China (Akyüz 2012). High growth rates and the increase in activities by emerging economies across Africa however was extrapolated to eulogise a supposed “Africa Rising”. Yet, beyond the growth figures, ongoing dynamics deepened the continent’s dependent position in the global economy, something which in itself was established by the colonial legacy. The present-day economies of the African countries continue to be characterised by a lop-sided dependence on the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods. There is no evidence thus far to suggest that Africa’s structural profile is improving: African economies continue to be integrated into the global economy in ways that are generally unfavourable to the continent and ensure structural dependence.

“AFRICA RISING”

The idea that Africa’s time had come and that the continent was embarking on a radically different (and better) stage in its history was largely connected to the growing interest in Africa from various emerging economies. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth was the central focus of such commentaries, and talk of the “the hopeless continent”, as *The Economist* called Africa in 2000, was dropped in favour of “a hopeful continent” (*The Economist*, March 2, 2013). This Africa Rising discourse, however, neglected a most fundamental aspect of

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the context: in “only nine of the forty three [Sub-Saharan] countries were growth rates during 1980–2008 high enough to double per capita income in less than thirty years, and only sixteen in less than one hundred years. Performance would have been considerably worse had it not been for the brief years of relatively rapid growth in the mid-2000s” (Weeks 2010, 3). Africa needs to grow by at least 7% a year for the next 20 or 30 years if any serious reduction in continental poverty is to be realised.

What GDP growth that did occur was overwhelmingly characterised by the deployment and inflow of capital-intensive investment for the extraction and exportation of natural resources. There was a conspicuous lack of value added on the African side and the interest in Africa from the emerging economies did very little to change this. Although not exclusively, the principal focus of the BRICS countries’ interest in Africa was on the extraction of primary commodities. Problematically, “while the hope of the development literature has been that higher rates of inflow of capital investment will have downstream effects on African employment (through increased government revenues and spending alongside an injection of consumer wealth into local economies), there is little evidence that this will take place on a substantial scale. The fundamental reason for this is that the [growth] rests heavily on the engagements of foreign governments and corporations with African elites” (Southall 2008, 148). In *most* neopatrimonial administrations, of which Africa has many, sustainable and broad-based development is unlikely to occur and this raises key questions about the nature and sustainability of the BRICS role in Africa.

With regard to the overt focus on exporting commodities, in late 2012 the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa noted that the relatively good economic growth performance over the previous ten years had been driven mostly by non-renewable natural resources and high commodity prices. Alongside this, he noted, deindustrialisation had been a key feature, with the share of manufacturing in Africa’s GDP falling from 15% in 1990 to 10% in 2008, going hand-in-hand with an increase in unemployment (*Addis Tribune*, December 8, 2012). In fact, since 1990, Africa has experienced a relative shift in the composition of employment towards sectors that create too few high-productivity jobs. Manufacturing growth has been near the bottom in 12 growth sectors—only public administration has lagged behind (McMillan and Rodrik 2011).

This of course is not to write off the recent growth as devoid of any value at all. Retail sectors have grown, with revenue increasing by around 4% per year, and there is growing investment in infrastructure (McKinsey Global Institute 2010). Given that there is a correlation between infrastructure and export diversification, and the current low levels and distorted composition of exports from sub-Saharan Africa are in part due to poor trade infrastructure, investment in infrastructure may have a *per se* positive impact on growth and trade capability. In social sectors, performance is varied but increases in the years of schooling are reported across the continent, albeit unevenly. Health outcomes, particularly life expectancy at birth, have also generally improved, in some countries substantially. These advancements are all obviously to be welcomed.

However, there is a desperate need to convert natural resources and high commodity prices into structural change, “defined as an increase in the share of industry or services in the economy, or as the diversification and sophistication of exports ... or as the shift of workers from sectors with low labour productivity to those with high labour productivity” (Sindzingre 2013, 26). This did not happen while the BRICS’ interest in Africa was at its height. Instead, with the arrival of emerging economies in Africa alongside traditional trade associates, the historical process of underdevelopment was further entrenched.

In addition, initially Africa’s debts fell at the start of the 2000s, partly thanks to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). The 1996 HIPC Initiative, supplemented by the 2005 MDRI, cancelled about \$100 billion of debt in 30 African countries in exchange for economic reforms. Although only half of African countries witnessed a temporary reduction of their annual debt service, the continent’s position generally improved (Petithomme 2013, 119). However, as commodity prices have collapsed, many African countries are now experiencing rising debt and widening budget deficits. During the boom years a number of African countries took on foreign debt, taking advantage of low global interest rates and high commodity prices to issue billions of dollars of debt as international investors hunted for yield. This coincided with investors in the North, following the 2008 financial crisis, looking for ways to diversify their investment portfolios. Africa appeared to be a healthy option. African governments started issuing Eurobonds, circa \$26.5 billion between 2006 and 2014, according to the African Development Bank. In 2014, African countries (excluding South Africa) issued a combined \$7 billion of dollar debt (in 2015 it was \$6.75 billion). The problems that this has generated will be discussed below.

Some proponents of the Africa Rising trope argued that improved governance and modes of doing business facilitated the upsurge in African GDP. In a detailed study, Scott Taylor argued that a “hospitable climate for business” has been spurred by institutional change and political and economic reform (Taylor 2012). This was one of the central arguments around which much of the newfound optimism about Africa has been built. For instance, the *Oxford Companion to the Economics of Africa* claimed that “improved macroeconomic frameworks and political governance in a majority of countries were key drivers for the improved economic performance” (Aryeety et al. 2012). However, “the empirical evidence on growth and policy related indicators is consistent with the null hypothesis that more than twenty years of so-called policy reform had limited impact on strengthening the potential for rapid and sustainable growth in the sub-Saharan region. The drivers of the brief recovery during the second half of the 2000s appear to have been a commodity price boom, debt relief and a decline in domestic conflicts” (Weeks 2010, 10). World Bank figures with regard to the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices, based on constant local currency (for all income levels, rounded up) and compared to the movement of the Commodity Price Index (CPI), revealed this intimate link. Indeed, the years when SSA’s growth figures surpassed 1996 levels (2004–2008)

can be demonstrably linked to the period when emerging economies began to hugely demand commodities, as reflected in the CPI. This reality is qualitatively different from the picture of Africa Rising, where “correct” policies alongside commodity prices drove growth.

In fact, despite the celebration of improved governance across the continent and the attempts to link this to Africa’s recent growth spurt, there is little evidence that the overall quality of Africa’s democracies is improving or that governance is dramatically on the up-and-up across the continent. The composite Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2013, 24) had a continental average of 47/100 in 2000, and by 2013 it had increased to 51.6/100—hardly seismic. In fact, fewer than half (43%) of people living in Africa live in a country that has shown overall governance improvement since 2010.

This makes a nonsense of strident claims that “What took the UK centuries can now be a matter of decades, even years ... Today Africa has the greatest room to boom on the back of two centuries of global progress ... In other words, Africa is ideally poised to leapfrog centuries of industrial development ... It has an added advantage in that it does not have to carry baggage from the past” (*African Business*, January 2013, 19). Thus (yet another) commodity-driven boom in Africa, this time in part propelled by emerging economies, wipes the historical slate clean, makes dependent relationships and unequal terms of trade vanish instantaneously, and positions the continent to reach OECD status virtually overnight!

NEW PARTNERS

Until the turn of the century, it would be fair to say that many African economies were dependent on the Northern-based international financial institutions and donors for establishing key ideas and approaches to their development models *and* for access to capital and policy advice. This has now changed somewhat. The emerging economies’ rise in material capabilities and their incorporation into the key global governance architecture has given rise to the notion that Africa’s international relations are in a process of change, perhaps away from the North and towards the South, with attendant debates over the possibility of alternative models of development. Certainly, the potential ability to access different methodologies and new ideas concerning developmental thinking could possibly lessen Africa’s dependence on the West and its conditionalities. Whilst such conditionalities can be seen as reflecting neocolonial impulses—and the policy advice has been rigidly doctrinaire in its application of neoliberal prescriptions—it is uncertain that shifting to *no* conditions is better, given the governance modalities of many African states. Equally, the environmental and social models upon which the emerging economies base their rise—intensified labour and environmental exploitation and a free rein to capital—is hardly a superior alternative. As Africa is routinely ranked as the most corrupt region of the world, a hands-off approach by the emerging economies over matters related to governance is not helpful.

Furthermore, a set of new relationships based on the intensification of natural resource extraction will be equally problematic. One of the key lessons for Africa from the financial crisis was that those countries that were more diversified generally tended to be more resilient than those that were highly dependent on a few primary commodities (Mutenyo 2011, 29). Re-inscribing African dependence on commodities thus hardly offers any novel framework for a new set of international relations for Africa. Of course, not all emerging economies in Africa revolve around commodities; that would be a crude caricature. But commodities certainly dominate Africa's trade with the BRICS countries (Table 44.1).

Such a situation further reinforces and helps underpin the overall structure of Africa's insertion into the global economy. The BRICS certainly did not create this milieu, but their current trade profile with the continent promotes the reification of existing and ongoing developments.

This brings us to the question as to whether emerging economies' increasing engagement with Africa has been exploitative or benign. Actors such as the BRICS have increased engagement with Africa as a means to achieve their own economic and political goals. Overall, Africa remains the weaker partner. This weakness is usually ascribed to the continent's dependent relationship in the international system and Africa's historic insertion into the global capitalist economy. However, dependence is "a historical process, a matrix of action"

Table 44.1 Key product composition of BRICS imports from Africa (percentage share, 2010)

	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
<i>Mineral fuels, oil, etc.</i>	85		71	65	76
<i>Ores, slag, ash</i>		3	2	14	
<i>Precious stones, metals</i>	1		13	4	6
<i>Copper</i>				6	3
<i>Fertilisers</i>	5		1		
<i>Edible Fruit and Nuts</i>		29	2		
<i>Cocoa</i>		16			
<i>Tobacco</i>		9			
<i>Inorganic Chemicals</i>	1	8	4	1	

Source: Compiled by author based on data from Fundira (2012)

that permits the prospect of alteration stemming from changes in the dynamics, processes and organisation of the international system and the fundamental tendencies within Africa's political economy (Bayart and Ellis 2000, 234).

Actors from both the global North and South have actively pursued closer engagement with Africa. This has provided the elites of the continent with many opportunities to extract leverage in return for access. This may or may not be a good thing, depending on the conjectural circumstances in each state formation and the nature of the external partners. It cannot be taken for granted, however, that actors from the emerging economies are genuinely interested in furthering Africa's developmental priorities. There does not seem to be much optimism within Africa that this will happen and distrust in the continent's leadership is profound. An Afrobarometer survey revealed that despite a decade of strong GDP growth and the Africa Rising narrative, there is "a wide gap in perceptions between ordinary Africans and the global economic community", where 53% "rate the current condition of their national economy as 'fairly' or 'very bad'" and only 31% think that "the condition of their national economies has improved in the past year" in comparison to 38% who claim conditions have declined (Hofmeyr 2013, 1).

THE ROLE OF THE EMERGING ECONOMIES

There is no doubt that the exponential growth of the emerging economies helped stimulate the global commodity booms of the past decade. This is important given that labour-intensive agricultural and manufactured goods do not feature significantly in the exports of African countries to these economies. This dependence is a double-edged sword. Countries with the highest economic integration with the BRICS have generally managed to sustain growth during the global downturn, compared to a contraction observed in countries with the fewest ties. Interestingly, the risk analysis company Maplecroft released in 2011 its *Emerging Powers Integration Index Series*, assessing the economic integration of 180 countries with each of the BRICS (Maplecroft 2011). According to Maplecroft, the countries most integrated with the BRICS are resource-rich developing economies, which provide the raw materials to fuel economic growth back in the BRICS domestic economies. Of these, many are located in Africa. Zimbabwe was ranked joint first, Liberia fifth, Guinea-Bissau sixth, Zambia seventh, Democratic Republic of the Congo tenth, Mozambique twelfth, Mauritania fifteenth, Congo eighteenth and Sudan twentieth. Whilst the data showed which countries stood to gain the most from the economic rise of the BRICS, they also revealed just how exposed some countries were to economic contagion should this growth weaken. As Alyson Warhurst, CEO of Maplecroft, noted, "should growth in the BRICs economies falter or lead to internal unrest and repression, we could see contagion spread to those countries that are most highly integrated with the emerging powers" (ibid.). Clearly,

[T]he positive effect of the world business cycle suggests that the economic performance of African countries is sensitive to world markets. Specifically, this result provides strong support for the hypothesis of the dependence of African countries' economic growth on the economic growth of industrialised nations. This implies that a relatively high degree of integration of African countries with the world economy carries some benefits in as far as the industrialised countries continue to grow. However, should industrialised countries suffer economic setbacks, this could have adverse impacts on the African economies. (Bangwayo-Skeete 2012, 312)

Exports from Africa to both traditional and non-traditional trading partners exhibited a very clear and continuous pattern in terms of commodity structure, which is consistent with Africa's Ricardian advantage in commodity production, with extractive commodities dominating. In short, such processes were simply the diversification of dependency, with Africa being further trapped into low value added production structures. This is hardly congruent with the idea of Africa Rising.

THE COMMODITY CRASH

Having noted all of the above, in 2014 commodity prices tumbled and this raised fresh concerns over the nature of the BRICS' role in Africa. The commodity boom came to an end due to slowing demand from consumers (much of this drawn from the emerging economies) and rapidly increasing supply which dampened prices. By 2012, growth rates in China and some of the other emerging economies began to decline. Concomitantly, growth in the demand for primary commodities slowed. With regard to China, its economic growth slowed to 7.8% year-on-year in 2012, the lowest since 1999, and remained at an average of 7.7% between 2012 and 2014 (World Bank 2015). Various factors alluded to above combined to bring about a sharp decline in the global prices of oil, iron and copper and other minerals. The CPI dramatically fell, causing severe problems for much of Africa. The table below traces the rise and then decline in commodity prices since 2000. The table reflects the all commodity prices composite index, with 2005 = 100 (Table 44.2).

The fall in commodity prices inflicted considerable economic hardship on many African countries, once again raising important anxieties over the implications of dependence on commodity exports for development. This is nothing new and the repetitive nature of African countries' experiences with commodity booms and busts is of concern. It has long been noted that African commodity exporters tended to continue boom spending even as commodity prices (and thus export revenues and government earnings) declined, thus incurring debt, and increasing budget deficits, monetary expansion and inflation. This seems to be once again occurring.

As noted above, during the period of high commodity prices, many African governments started issuing Eurobonds. These debt investments are usually denominated in dollars and this has proven of considerable concern as it has

Table 44.2 IMF Primary Commodity Prices 2016

December 2000	61.06
December 2001	49.39
December 2002	62.66
December 2003	69.10
December 2004	81.58
December 2005	105.97
December 2006	120.95
December 2007	156.74
December 2008	98.24
December 2009	140.81
December 2010	174.96
December 2011	184.15
December 2012	182.56
December 2013	184.21
December 2014	130.87
December 2015	90.73
October 2016	106.68

Source: Created by author based on data from IMF (2016)

left the issuing countries at the mercy of exchange rate fluctuations, which have been profound for primary commodity exporters.

Furthermore, the decline in commodity prices has reduced many African countries' foreign reserves, meaning that finding the capital to repay the monthly Eurobond interest payments has become problematic. The decline in commodity revenues has now resulted in a large increase of government debt as a percentage of GDP across Africa. In fact, the average government debt of sub-Saharan countries has risen from 39.5% of their GDP in 2012 to 45.5% in 2015. The IMF itself asserts that sovereign debts above 40% of the country's GDP in developing countries undermine sustainable development. What this has meant is that

The current high levels of government debt; the fact that most of the countries keep borrowing in the international markets; and the sudden loss of steam in the growth of most of sub-Saharan African economies, are a recipe for a possible economic crisis, in the not too-distant future. A continuously rising debt ratio is one of the first symptoms of unsustainable developments. (Veras 2016)

Whilst demand from the emerging economies for African commodities was high, Africa Rising was celebrated and the issue of commodity dependence was largely overlooked. Now that this demand has cooled, the issue returns. Commodity dependence is typically measured by the share of export earnings of the top single commodity (or top three export commodities) in GDP, total merchandise exports and total agriculture exports. The percentage of people occupied in commodity production or the share in government revenue accruing from commodities are also important measurements. From 1995 to 2009, trends in the share of primary commodities in total exports, which coincide with increasing Africa Rising claims, demonstrate “that despite a contraction between 1995 and 2000, the share of primary commodities in total exports rose rapidly between 2000 and 2009” (UNDP 2011, 60). This development had particular implications for the African continent: “The share of primary commodities in exports increased across all regions of the developing world ... Africa—the region most dependent on primary commodity exports throughout the period—became even more commodity-dependent (the share of primary commodity exports was 72 per cent in 1995 and rose to 81 per cent by 2009)” (ibid.). Put another way, “dependence on external markets, as measured by the export-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio ... doubled from 26 per cent in 1995 to 51 per cent in 2007” (Dembele and Mo 2012, 183). As noted, this super-cycle was largely—though not exclusively—driven by growth and industrial demand within the emerging economies.

What occurred was that Africa has more or less remained undiversified in its exports, remaining dependent on primary commodities. In some respects, this is history repeating itself, with commodity booms being initially held by some to be positive for Africa. Note that in 1974, off the back of the then-latest commodity boom, it was asserted that “trade prospects for the developing world [were] considerably better in 1973 than they were in 1951 or even in 1960” (Hone 1973, 1). We all know what eventually happened. Indeed, “several countries [in Africa] have the dubious distinction of having been among the fastest growers in one decade, then the slowest in another. For example, half the fastest ten growers in the 1960s were among the slowest in at least one of the subsequent decades” (Weeks 2010, 3).

Whilst the surge in commodities led to an increase in income for some African countries (or their elites), “By diverting resources from non-raw material sectors and contributing to real exchange-rate appreciation, a price boom runs the risk of locking developing country commodity exporters into what Edward Leamer (1987) called the “raw-material corner”, with little room for industrial progress or skill development. Leamer’s corner came from his illustration of both relative

factor endowments and relative factor intensities with three factors and any number of goods. Given that Africa's factor endowments are concentrated in commodities and the export profile and sector concentration are the same, the raw material corner has been the continent's broad fate:

During colonisation and the period immediately after, the structure of external trade of African countries were mainly determined by the needs of the colonial masters. African countries mainly exported natural resources such as timber and minerals and imported manufactured goods. About six decades later, this structure of trade has not been significantly altered. Invariably, African countries have continually and consistently not managed to diversify trade into manufactured products. (Afari-Gyan 2010, 63)

The result has been what Issa Shivji (2009, 59) terms “structural disarticulation”, where Africa exhibits a “disarticulation between the structure of production and the structure of consumption. What is produced is not consumed and what is consumed is not produced”.

CONCLUSION

Not only has the current model of growth promotion so far been unsuccessful in generating sustainable developmental outcomes, it has made things worse regarding issues such as equality, the environment and Africa's dependent status within the global political economy. As Morten Jerven notes, “The most recent period of economic growth did not entail the large improvements in human development that were the case from 1950–1975 ... Furthermore, the latest period of economic growth has not been associated with much industrial growth” (Jerven 2010, 146). Even the Africa Progress Panel, which is invariably Pollyanna-ish in its assessment of Africa, admits that,

After a decade of buoyant growth, almost half of Africans still live on less than \$1.25 a day. Wealth disparities are increasingly visible. The current pattern of trickle-down growth is leaving too many people in poverty, too many children hungry and too many young people without jobs. Governments are failing to convert the rising tide of wealth into opportunities for their most marginalised citizens. Unequal access to health, education, water and sanitation is reinforcing wider inequalities. Smallholder agriculture has not been part of the growth surge, leaving rural populations trapped in poverty and vulnerability. (Africa Progress Panel 2012, 8)

This has gone hand-in-hand with a lack of serious structural change in the continent's economies; indeed, they are linked. The share of Africa in global manufacturing value added (MVA) actually *fell* from 1.2% in 2000 to 1.1% in 2008, whilst there has been no substantial change in the region's share of global manufacturing exports in recent years (i.e., the years when the upsurge in Africa has been most pronounced). In 2000, manufacturing made up 12.8%

of GDP in Africa, but by 2008 it accounted for only 10.5%. It is apparent that with the exception of Eastern Africa, manufacturing is in decline across the continent. Note that the share of mining and utilities has hugely increased over the last few decades and that within the manufacturing sector, resource-based manufacturing accounted for about 49% of total MVA in Africa.

This fact of manufacturing underdevelopment in Africa is also apparent at the global level. Manufacturing exports represent a low percentage of total African exports and, more importantly, the share has declined over the years. Whilst the share of manufactures in Africa's exports was 43% in 2000, it fell to 39% in 2008. Problematically, what manufacturing that does take place is generally resource-based. However, it is in low-technology manufacturing that labour-intensive job-creating opportunities are found. A look at the figures where data are available reveals that this sector of manufacturing is relatively small (to very small) as the key contributor to the MVA in Africa (UNCTAD 2011, 27–28). In fact, “fewer than 10% of African workers are currently in manufacturing of any kind and only about 1% in modern companies with advanced technology” (*Africa Confidential* 2014, 1).

In short, the much-vaunted recent economic growth in Africa, upon which the Africa Rising narrative is fundamentally predicated, is based on trade in resources, not production. Such growth is problematic given that “production is the key to accumulation since the profits of all capital, even merchant capital that operates exclusively in the sphere of circulation, originate in the sphere of production” (Kay 1975, 71). The economic advantages of current trade accrue to the accumulation centres outside of Africa. The result is that Africa's role is reified as a source of cheap raw materials, exported to feed external economies and/or processed up the value chain into finished products. “Since the surpluses that could lead to industrial investments are not forthcoming, the peripheral nations seem condemned to be producers of raw materials in perpetuity. The economic landscape then is weak industrial development, chronic balance of payment problems all under the management of a neo-colonial comprador class” (Amaizo 2012, 127). This has been a habitual problem for Africa, given that building up capabilities in manufacturing and improving the productivity of agriculture are the levers to wealth creation, with suitable pro-poor policies aimed at equitable and sustainable development at the heart of long-term poverty reduction.

Problematically, “[s]ub-Saharan Africa's international competitiveness in individual industries, especially in manufacturing and agro-processing, has seen little improvement over the last two decades. Its exports remained undiversified and their growth was overwhelmingly accounted for by natural resources. Sub-Saharan Africa's world market share in processing industries is not only low but has remained virtually unchanged” (World Economic Forum 2011, 15). Indeed, as has been noted, there is evidence of *de-industrialisation*. Sub-Saharan Africa's overall share of light manufacturing world exports declined from 1.2% in 1980, to less than 0.9% in 2008. Meanwhile, heavy manufacturing saw an infinitesimal increase of 0.1% between 1995–97 and 2008, when it produced

0.3% of world exports. Agribusiness saw a similarly tiny development, from 1.5 to 1.7% between 1995–97 and 2006–08 (*ibid.* 15–19). In other words, all areas where value might be added and production relatively enhanced are either stagnant or in decline. Instead, mining alone represented 73% of Africa’s export growth between 1995 and 2008:

Africa’s current pattern of growth is that it has been accompanied by de-industrialisation as evidenced by the fact that the share of manufacturing in Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 15 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2008 ... The declining share of manufacturing in Africa’s output is of concern because historically manufacturing has been the main engine of high, rapid and sustained economic growth. (UNCTAD 2012, 2–3)

Notably, “Africa—the region most dependent on primary commodity exports” has become even more commodity-dependent during the period now dubbed Africa Rising. “The share of primary commodity exports was 72 per cent in 1995 but had risen to 81 per cent by 2009” (UNDP 2011, 60). Uncomfortably, “[t]he basis of recurring growth in African has always been strong external demand. Growth has not been triumphant and the end of growth periods has ended with a combination of predatory rent-seeking and depressed external markets. The recent boom was one-sided, based on external market demand for natural resources” (Jerven 2010, 136).

“Economic development usually refers to sustainable economic growth accompanied by significant structural change in production patterns and generalised improvement in living standards” (Whitfield 2012, 241). Relationships based on extraction have not historically worked as catalysts for this outcome. Unless an economy is engaged in activities that deliver increasing returns over time (as found in manufacturing production), then the economy is not developing—it is just growing. The problem is that mainstream economists argue that economies must integrate into the global economy using their notional comparative advantages. If this means focusing on primary commodity extraction, then so be it. In this reading, the simple existence of upward GDP growth and flourishing trade volumes (not the quality thereof) are seen as evidence of success. This is on what the discourse about Africa Rising is based. But growth and trade in commodities do not equate to development and in fact may simply be the manifestation of an intensification of dependency: industrialisation develops countries, extraction exploits them. The vast majority of Africa’s countries that are said to be on the rise are still locked into primary commodity sectors and evidence very little progress towards engaging in value added industrial production.

After over a decade of intense BRICS–African engagement, during which time the Africa Rising narrative became prominent, the continent risks being left where it started. China’s current economic slowdown and the significant drop in the international prices of commodities constitute profound challenges for African economies. When the BRICS were most active in Africa, a growth model

based on the exploitation of natural resources and exports to foreign markets was advanced; one that in particular was highly dependent on the Chinese market for demand. For a period, the massive Chinese economy emerged as one of the main consumers of commodities (especially iron ore, coal and soybeans) and African countries exporting such products (among others) saw their GDP grow. This was, however, based on an unsustainable intensification of resource extraction through diversifying partners and courting the BRICS, with no serious long-term development policies in place to reap what benefits might accrue. Rather, history repeated itself and whilst political elites benefitted (and often noisily celebrated the Africa Rising story), over half a billion Africans remained in poverty. With the drivers for this growth period now diminished, the fundamental task of economic diversification and industrialisation returns as absolutely central for Africa's future. This refrain has followed every other commodity boom and bust since the continent gained independence from the 1960s onwards and it is disappointing to have to return to such time-worn essentials.

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Africa's Development Narratives: From Growth to Wellbeing

Lorenzo Fioramonti

INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the millennium, conflicting descriptions have emerged to describe developments taking place in Africa. The narratives appear to describe at least two distinct versions of modern-day Africa. On the one hand, the region is portrayed as vibrant and dynamic, evolving from a troubled past. On the other hand, the continent appears strangled by boom and bust cycles and extractive practices, and is challenged by global structures that keep it in a position of subjugation.

The stories being told about Africa are crucial, for they contribute to shaping the discourses on Africa's development. A dominant discourse not only frames how one perceives the continent, but also shapes the range of decisions, policy choices and actions available to policymakers, government officials, businesses and international financial institutions. One dominant narrative is that Africa is "rising." This narrative has been embraced and widely reproduced by international institutions, regional organizations, governments and businesses, whilst others have met it with great skepticism. This chapter will examine the "Africa rising" discourse, its various facets and how it is challenged by alternative approaches to the continent's development trajectory.

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DOMINANT NARRATIVES

From Underdevelopment to “Africa Rising”

For most of the twentieth century, development accounts looking at Africa have focused on the impacts of colonialism and then postcolonialism. The Martinican poet and politician Aimé Césaire published his *Discours sur le Colonialisme* in the early 1950s, presenting the colonists’ project as a self-centered system of exploitation; it was a scathing attack on the Eurocentric apology of colonialism as a benevolent export of development policies. In an attempt to liberate Africa from the cultural subservience towards its colonizers, Cheikh Anta Diop’s *Nations Nègres et Culture* provided a fundamental account of the cultural and political evolution of African cultures and their profound links with the diaspora. Similarly, Frantz Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth* focused on the dehumanizing effects of colonization, from which he asserted the need to regain an understanding and appreciation of Africa’s languages and cultures as a first step towards the liberation of the continent and its political and economic emancipation. From the 1970s onwards, the focus of most writings shifted to the political economy of Africa in an increasingly global economic system. Samir Amin’s *Unequal Development* offered a critique of how the capitalist economy contributed to creating peripheral areas of exploitation, largely dependent on the core for survival. Similarly, Walter Rodney discussed at length how Africa was deliberately kept in a state of economic and social subjugation by colonial regimes in his groundbreaking *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. In the following decades, research focused on Africa’s attempts at social and economic emancipation and expanded the “development” angle to cover issues of institutionalized racism (Mama 2002) and language policy (Wa Thiong’o 1986), post-colonial despotism (Mamdani 1996) and the role of international financial institutions and multinational corporations (Onimode 1988), with a view to sketching alternatives emerging from bottom-up resistance movements and social organizations (Ake 2001).

This account of Africa’s development trajectory being marred by the hangovers of colonialism and apartheid, as well as the social, psychological, political and economic implications of external domination, was suddenly replaced by an overly optimistic and forward-looking narrative, roughly a decade after the turn of the millennium.

In late 2011, *The Economist* magazine (traditionally skeptical of Africa, which it routinely described as the “hopeless continent”) published a cover page that is probably jealously kept in most government offices from the Cape to Cairo: a young boy flying a rainbow-colored kite with the shape of the continent and the title “Africa Rising.” The British magazine pointed out what conventional statistics revealed: “Over the past decade six of the world’s ten fastest-growing countries were African. In eight of the past ten years, Africa has grown faster than East Asia” (*The Economist* 2011). The leading

article described the Onitsha market in southern Nigeria: shops “stacked six feet high with goods,” streets “jammed with customers and salespeople” sweating profusely under the onslaught, in what many consider the world’s biggest market. A year later, in December 2012, *Time* magazine also celebrated “Africa Rising” (Perry 2013). For the *Financial Times*, Africa was “calling” investors from all over the world eager to take advantage of a “flourishing market” (Wallis 2013). *The Economist*, *Time* and *FT* were preceded by a 2010 report on Africa aptly titled “Lions on the Move” (Roxburgh et al. 2010). In this publication, the McKinsey Global Institute, a leading global consulting firm, highlighted some of the major shifts taking place in Africa, dishing out data on trends in consumer markets, business opportunities and distinct growth trajectories among African countries; and promoting Africa as an investment and business destination. In a 2014 research report titled *Winning in Africa: From Trading Posts to Ecosystems*, the Boston Consulting Group also highlighted business and investment opportunities in what they saw as a new era in Africa’s social and economic development (Dupoux et al. 2014). A number of bestselling books also followed, with ambitious titles such as *Africa Rising: Why 900 Million Consumers Offer More Than You Think* (Mahajan 2009), *The Next Africa: An Emerging Continent Becomes a Global Powerhouse* (Bright and Hruby 2015), *Success in Africa: CEO Insights from a Continent on the Rise* (Berman 2013) and *Africa Is Open for Business* (Kgomoeswana 2014).

According to *The Economist*, Africa’s “rise” owed to a number of factors: the commodity boom, the changing demographic profile (characterized a growing middle class), the rise of the manufacturing and service sectors, and increased access to technology and improved governance. *Time* attributed the shift mainly to external factors, such as the provision of billions of dollars in foreign aid, debt cancellations, increasing demand for Africa’s natural resources from China and other emerging markets, the penetration of mobile technology across the continent and increased foreign investment. In this vein, some have argued that the factors contributing to the continent’s economic “take-off,” a classical concept associated with Rostow’s growth-based development theory (Rostow 1960), ranged from investment in manufacturing and production of consumer goods, as well as growth in the service sectors, from banking to retail and information, coupled with a dramatic increase in Africa’s trade with the rest of the world (Hårsmar 2014).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) officially endorsed the “Africa rising” narrative by hosting an international conference with the same name in Mozambique in May 2014. The then Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, vowed that her organization would become a “close partner in Africa’s journey,” reasserting the IMF’s intention to be actively involved in Africa’s development trajectory after the animosity and tensions generated by the structural adjustment policies introduced in the 1980s and 1990s (Lagarde 2014).

GDP Growth as the Key to Success

All approaches associated with the “Africa rising” narrative emphasize the high growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP) across the continent as a sign of success. It is true that Africa’s growth outpaced that of Asia during the 2000–2010 period, with most of the ten fastest-growing economies around the world being African. In addition to GDP, other related economic statistics are referred to as signs of Africa’s resurgence. Some, for instance, mentioned the decrease in poverty, the tripling of trade between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world, the quadrupling of Africa’s portion of global foreign direct investment (FDI) and the closing of infrastructure gaps (Rotberg 2013). Others include the significant amount of remittances sent back by migrant African workers to support their families on the continent as well as the comparatively higher levels of disposable income (Cohen 2013).

The continent’s mineral wealth is central to this narrative. As remarked by Lagarde, “We all know that Africa has tremendous potential—it is home to more than 30 percent of the world’s mineral reserves. Properly managed, these endowments offer unparalleled opportunity for economic growth” (Lagarde 2014). Similarly, *Time* mentioned growing interest in Africa’s natural resources as one of the drivers of Africa’s take-off, particularly from China, coupled with the trend of infrastructure-for-resource swaps, which have helped close the infrastructure gap. *The Economist* acknowledged that between 2000 and 2008, one quarter of economic growth in Africa was attributable to increased revenue gained from the sale of natural resources.

The first decade after the turn of the millennium, with the massive rise of production and consumption among emerging markets, particularly in the Far East, witnessed a boom in commodity prices. Yet, as we will discuss later, the trend came to an abrupt end in 2013, with decreasing prices ever since.

Consumerism and Demographic Shift

Time heralded “steel-and-glass skyscrapers,” vendors selling iPad chargers and commuters in suits as some of the numerous signs of Africa’s economic transformation, with much potential for free trade reforms and the movement of goods, services and people to further expand new markets and create opportunities for growth (Perry 2013).

In the “Africa rising” narrative, all these factors are viewed as benefiting from a fundamental demographic shift across Africa, the only continent in the world whose population is expected to grow exponentially for the foreseeable future, reaching over 1.5 billion people by 2030 (Mubila 2012). With expectations of the world’s leading workforce by 2050, Africa would reap a massive “demographic dividend,” thus generating enough income for massive investment in infrastructure development and further economic expansion (Mubila 2012; Hårsmar 2014; Swaniker 2013). As a note of caution, however, “Africa rising”

enthusiasts warn that the demographic shift requires careful management and appropriate policies to avoid turning into social unrest if economies are not able to provide employment and services (*The Economist* 2011; Swaniker 2013; Perry 2013; Drummond et al. 2014; Lagarde 2014).

Against the demographic evolution of the continent, the roles of urbanization and consumerism become central to support the growth trajectory. As reported by McKinsey, “the rise of the African urban consumer is serving as a new engine of domestic growth” (Roxburgh et al. 2010, 22). As people move to live in cities and acquire new levels of disposable income, companies will be able to increase productivity (thanks to a better connected workforce), thus supporting internal consumption and creating opportunities for investment, especially for foreign companies interested in higher returns than they can get in the conventional markets of North America and Europe, as well as the Far East. For the Boston Consulting Group, Africa will see a burgeoning market of consumers “with discretionary income to spend” (Dupoux et al. 2014, 3).

The “Africa rising” narrative also depicts urbanization and consumerism as key driving forces behind the formation of a growing middle class, which in turn will contribute to driving consumer spending, boosting information technology, facilitating ideological and cultural shifts, improving governance, and increasing accountability and transparency (Rotberg 2013; Ncube 2011). According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), approximately 350 million people could be identified in the middle-class category in 2010, representing a growth rate of 3.1% from the early 1980s (Ncube 2011). On the economic front, the middle class is supposed to lead the reduction in poverty and spur domestic demand, thereby leading to diversification in African economies. Politically, a growing middle class is associated with demands for greater accountability, service delivery and rule of law (Ncube 2011).

The New Scramble for Africa

The account of Africa’s emergence has often been framed in the context of a window of opportunity, which must be grabbed by both African policymakers and the global community: a “golden interlude” that may not present itself again (Rotberg 2013, 17). *Time* was very explicit about it: “it is in that second scramble for Africa that the continent’s best hopes lie, because if the first scramble for Africa ... was a European imperialist carve up, the second should leave Africa as the big winner” (Perry 2013, 7). Similarly, McKinsey advised its clients that “early entry into African economies provides opportunities to create markets, establish brands, shape industry structure, influence customer preferences, and establish long-term relationships” (Roxburgh et al. 2010, 8). In a similar vein, Boston Consulting Group maintains that Africa is the “final frontier—the last sizable area of untapped growth in the global economy” (Dupoux et al. 2014, 3).

THE COUNTER NARRATIVES

GDP Growth as a Myth

While the “Africa rising” narrative and its various streams focus almost exclusively on economic statistics (and, mostly, GDP), there are a growing number of analysts and scholars pointing out how such emphasis is largely misleading as a proxy of economic performance, let alone general social welfare (Taylor 2014; Fioramonti 2013; Bassey 2014; Rowden 2013; Obeng-Odoom 2014; Devarajan 2013; Beattie 2014; Akwagyiram 2013).

It is true that among world’s top countries in GDP growth rates, many are African. But most of these countries have grown because of continuous destruction and massive exploitation of non-renewable natural resources. Take Libya, for instance, which led the world with over 100% GDP growth in 2012, or other fast growing economies such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). GDP tells us nothing about the health of an economy, let alone its sustainability and the overall impact on human welfare. GDP is simply a measure of market consumption, which has been improperly adopted to assess economic performance (Fioramonti 2013). Rebuilding Libya after the civil war has been a blessing for its GDP. But does that mean that Libya was on an enviable growth path? Massive exploitation of fossil fuel resources in Angola and Nigeria as well as minerals in the DRC has certainly pushed up GDP growth. Yet it has also triggered conflict, violence, inequality and social instabilities. When there is only one brick left in a country devastated by war or other disasters, then just making another brick means doubling the economy (100% growth).

A growing body of research has also called into question the validity of utilizing GDP as a measure of development, contending that, despite claims of high economic growth rates, African economies are still suffering from significant challenges, most of which are deliberately caused by its economic growth. African countries are among the least diversified in the world and their economies are largely based on the exploitation of polluting non-renewable natural resources (Bush 2013; Taylor 2014). Moreover, the concept of GDP growth is also criticized for its failure to take into account the issue of sustainability (Bassey 2014; Taylor 2014). For instance, the World Bank sustainable development statistics, which deduct environmental damage and natural resources depletion for the countries overall economy, provide a rather different picture: African countries have been depleting their wealth at the tune of 1.2% a year (World Bank 2014). Rather than growing, the continent’s economies have been shrinking. Sierra Leone has experienced net losses of about 20%, Angola of 40%, Chad of 50% and the DRC of over 57%.

While acknowledging the variety of investment opportunities in the continent, one should beware of concluding that these are necessarily contributing

to the wellbeing of Africa. A joint report of Global Financial Integrity and the African Development Bank estimates that between 1980 and 2009 Africa lost \$1.4 trillion in illicit financial outflows and corrupted deals (Global Financial Integrity and African Development Bank 2013). That is more than three times the overall foreign aid received in the same period. The Africa Progress Panel, an organization chaired by former United Nations (UN) chief Kofi Annan, has also reported that African economies are plagued by the aggressive attitude of companies (local and foreign-owned) that exploit the continent's vast natural resources through overt and covert mining operations, underpriced deals and mismanagement (Africa Progress Panel 2013). The DRC, one of the fastest growing economies in GDP terms, is also the country with the lowest Human Development Index in the world. Its life expectancy and literacy rates are at the bottom of the global ranking. It lost over \$1.4 billion through underpriced deals in the mining sector.

There are also significant problems with the availability and quality of development statistics in Africa. Economic growth figures for most African countries are patchy and incomplete, thus undermining generalizations about overall economic performance in the continent (Jerven 2013b). Data is not completely reliable and requires ongoing imputations and change. There are significant variations and degrees of subjectivity in deciding which economic activities are included, further compounded by a lack of funding to gather economic data and substantial differences among countries in the models used for calculating GDP (Jerven 2013a). For instance, in 2013, a country like Liberia was Africa's second-poorest, seventh-poorest or twenty-second-poorest, depending on whether one took the international calculations published by the World Bank (through the World Development Indicators), the Penn World Table or the Maddison Project Database, which provide the data used by most development agencies to design their policies: "Angola, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria and Zambia all make leaps of more than ten places in the rankings from one source to the other" (Jerven 2013b, 19).

Beyond the statistical deficiencies, some analysts point out problems with the policy implications of the GDP model of economic growth, which can easily result in a negation of popular emancipation and citizen-based development, reducing people to the mere role of consumers while ignoring the significance of the informal economy and non-market economies, and discounting the ecological, environmental and human costs of conventional development policies (Fioramonti 2013). The GDP paradigm sacrifices nature, which must be commoditized to become productive. It also neglects important components of the real economy, such as the informal sector, because they are not part of the formal market system. Policies that are designed to support GDP growth thus replace the informal (e.g., street vendors, subsistence farming, flea markets, family businesses, household production) with the formal (e.g., shopping malls, commercial farming, large infrastructure). While some can take advantage of this concentration of wealth, many are left behind, thus

increasing inequality. It is no coincidence that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has confirmed the intimate link between rising inequality and GDP growth across the world (OECD 2011). This is further amplified in those countries where the informal economy provides a fundamental safety net to many poor households, as is the case throughout Africa.

The “Africa rising” promoters proudly highlight Africa’s growing middle class, but there are accounting problems here too (Ncube 2011). The methodology used divides the middle class into three sub-categories, including a so-called “floating class,” describing individuals with per capita consumption levels of between \$2 and \$4 per day. As the AfDB recognizes, these individuals are “only slightly above the developing-world poverty line of \$2 per person per day”; they are “vulnerable to slipping back into poverty in the event of some exogenous shocks” (Ncube 2011, 2). The floating middle class amounted to about 199 million individuals in 2010. Then there is a “lower-middle class,” with consumption levels of between \$4 and \$10 per day, amounting to 83 million individuals. Finally, the upper-middle income category (for which we have a per capita consumption of between \$10 and \$20 per day) reaches above 44 million. If the floating category is included, then 34% of the African population belongs to the middle class. If this category is eliminated, the middle class falls to 13%. The upper-middle income group, which is better aligned with the general expectations associated with the middle class, hovers around 4%.

Perhaps this is why many Africans do not seem to be impressed by official statistics. The Afrobarometer, Africa’s largest public opinion survey, released data showing widespread dissatisfaction with current economic conditions despite the popularity of the “Africa rising” narrative (Dulani et al. 2013). Across the thirty-four countries surveyed by the research, a majority of respondents (53%) rate the current condition of their national economy as “fairly” or “very bad,” while just 29% offer a positive assessment. Only one in three Africans think economic conditions have improved and most respondents (over 70%) believe governments have done a “fairly bad to very bad” job at improving living standards and narrowing income gaps. According to the team that conducted the study, “lived poverty” (as opposed to the nominal wealth indicated in GDP) remains pervasive across the continent. They suggest that if real growth is occurring, then “its effects are not trickling down to the poorest citizens” and “income inequality may be worsening.” Alternatively, actual growth rates may simply “not match up to those being reported.” With slightly more than one year before the 2015 Millennium Development Goals assessment, the data suggest that significant numbers of Africans still fail to meet their most basic needs. Most respondents report shortages in medicine and medical services (53%) and food (50%). Way too many still experience shortages of clean water (49%) and go without cooking fuel (42%). And for a significant percentage of people, these shortages are happening on a regular basis (repeated shortage of water for 22%; lack of medicines for 20%; and no food for 17%).

Structural Imbalances and Uprisings

Several scholars have continued to point out the profound imbalances characterizing Africa's development trajectory, in particular the export of raw materials and the limited value added by the industrial configuration of the continent (Cohen 2013; Taylor 2014). Some point out a number of dangers associated with overdependence on commodities for export, including the vulnerability to decreasing prices, less competitiveness in other sectors, limited internal regional trade and disincentives for governments to diversify economies in the face of short-term gains (Hårsmar 2014). Coupled with the problems of resource depletion, pollution and environmental as well as social devastation (Fioramonti 2014a; Taylor 2014; Obeng-Odoom 2014), the excitement about "Africa rising" was called into question in 2013 and then 2014–2015, when commodity prices began to plummet around the world, with a negative cascade effect on Africa's growth trajectory.

A number of analysts highlight that African economies are volatile, enjoying peaks and slumps at different periods depending on internal political dynamics, environmental factors and shifts taking place in the global economy (Sylla 2014; Kappel 2014). For some, Africa has continued to be "looted" by the West in the name of neoliberalism and by the new emerging powers, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the so-called BRICS), through a form of subimperialism. Amid the bonanza generated for many foreign investors, for whom Africa can provide comparatively higher returns in the short term, there has been limited opportunity for indigenous contributions.

What about political development? Has "Africa rising" contributed to political emancipation and more accountable governance? Critics of this dominant narrative believe that Africa's purported emergence has not resulted in greater sovereignty and capacity to govern its own affairs. In fact, its dependence on external actors to facilitate its own development may have increased (Sylla 2014). The diminishing state power over key aspects of the economy, such as capital controls, exchange rate regulation, fiscal policy and public spending, which began in the 1980s, has in part continued to hinder the capacity of African countries to set their own development pathway (Bush 2013).

There are many indications that African people are becoming increasingly frustrated with a development model that does not improve their quality of life, while impinging on their basic human and socio-economic rights. The so-called "Arab Spring," which began in 2011 and then sent shockwaves throughout the continent in the years that followed, was a clear indication of how economic and political emancipation were intimately connected. Triggered by rising costs of food, it soon became a movement for political emancipation. Since then, a number of countries have experienced political upheaval. Besides Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, popular protests erupted in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi, all the way down to South Africa. In 2012, the massacre of mineworkers in the platinum belt of South Africa's northwest province made headlines around the world, with the World Economic Forum

highlighting how African countries have some of the worst labor–employer relations in the world (WEF 2015). As in-depth analyses of the motives and strategies of protesters have highlighted, Africa’s youth are at the center of a radical transformation (Branch and Mampilly 2015). With two-thirds of its population under the age of twenty-four, the continent appears more and more divided between elites capable of enriching themselves through foreign investment and extractive practices and a vast majority of poor youngsters, mostly urbanized, with little hope of finding steady employment. Rather than “Africa rising,” the structural imbalances and political issues are triggering a continental wave of “Africa uprising.”

CONCLUSION: CONTENDING NARRATIVES AND THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA

In 2015, the African Union adopted Agenda 2063, a continental framework to ensure the sustainable development of the continent over the next decades. The document envisions that “Africa will take its rightful place in the political, security, economic, and social systems of global governance towards the realization of its Renaissance” (Nepad 2015, 10). It also points to using economic growth, improved peace and improved human development as a “springboard to ensure its transformation and renaissance to meet the people’s aspirations” (Nepad 2015, 12). Although referring to generic economic goals, Agenda 2063 seems to go beyond economic growth to highlight the importance of heritage, culture, peace, independence, sovereignty, shared values, human welfare and self-reliance. It expects the continent to become an “influential global player,” “a major social, political, security and economic force in the world,” “an active and equal participant in global affairs” and “fully capable and hav[ing] the means to finance her development” (Nepad 2015, 2–10). It also expects African states to “affirm the importance of African unity and solidarity in the face of continued external interference” and seek “mutually beneficial relations with other regions and continents” (Nepad 2015, 10–11). Interestingly, the document concludes with a reference to the “African values of family, community, hard work, merit, mutual respect and social cohesion” and a commitment that “African countries will be amongst the best performers in global quality of life measures” (Nepad 2015, 83).

The African continent is certainly a place of transformation. Economic statistics, although questionable in their uses and applications, do indicate that shifts are taking place on the continent. Economies are changing, societies are morphing and the perception of Africa is evolving. At the same time, the model of development being advocated by the “Africa rising” narrative is increasingly being questioned by researchers and activists interested in social justice, environmental sustainability and long-term stability. For most of the twentieth century, the continent was subjugated by external powers, which imposed their own approach to development on African people. In the past few decades, economic growth has been largely based on the same principles that underpinned

the colonial and postcolonial eras, with limited emancipation throughout the continent in terms of the freedom to decide what development is and how to pursue it.

The paternalistic relationship between Africa and the West has only been partly eroded by the rise of emerging powers, while the extractive structures of economic governance have remained the same. As commodity prices plummet, global growth shrinks and demands for ecological transformation challenge the world economy, Africa finds itself in the eye of the storm. Popular upheavals are on the rise, while governments are unable to deal with change. A new approach to progress is desperately needed; one that is able to marry human and ecological wellbeing.

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The Politics of Foreign Aid

Dikeledi A. Mokoena

INTRODUCTION

Aid flows into Africa have been subject to debate by journalists such as Tom Burgis (2016), scholars such as Patrick Bond (2015) and concerned citizens such as Dambisa Moyo (2009), all of whom hold the same judgement of foreign aid in Africa through their unique critical analysis of aid flows into the continent. The history of aid in Africa, particularly colonial Africa, informs us that aid is a locomotive of donor economies' growth. This chapter offers a critical discussion of Chinese aid through an analysis that utilizes aid data compiled by Austin Strange, Bradley Park, Michael Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher and Vijaya Ramachandran (2013). These authors devised a media-based methodology of Chinese aid in Africa. The outcome reveals a different narrative of the West about Chinese aid in the continent, one which elicits fears. However, the conclusive remarks in this chapter echo the call made by Moyo (2009) for Africa to close the aid tap because major aid flows are channelled into extractive sectors, thus facilitating neo-colonial extraction of minerals and oils. China's aid in Africa has largely become economic; however, relationships with certain countries such as Zimbabwe are founded on China's support of anticolonial movements. After a critical examination of Chinese foreign aid in Africa, I differ to some extent with Moyo's (2009) neoliberal recommendations by suggesting indigenous institutionalism as an alternative approach.

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Foreign aid is simply the inflow of external resources of goods, money and services. However, this conceptualization is subject to critique for being vague, as export credit, foreign direct investment and/or commercial loans from other economies are deemed as flows (Ali and Zeb 2016: 108). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined the official development assistance (ODA) as “the flow of official financing to the developing world that is concessional in character, namely grants and loans with at least a 25 percent grant component.” (Abuzeid 2009: 17). The commissioning of the 335 MV gas turbine in 2002 in Nigeria through the Chinese Export-Import Bank’s export credit of US\$114.9 million at 6% interest rate and a grace repayment period of six years is an example of a flow that did not constitute ODA (Strange et al. 2013). This flow only had an aid element of 21.9318%, rendering it non-ODA. In simple terms, aid is concessional finance explicitly designed for development purposes, which may include technical assistance or cooperation as encapsulated within the conceptualization of ODA. There is also Other Official Flows (OOF) that do not meet the criteria of ODA, as in the above-mentioned example. According to the OECD, OOF includes grants given to developing countries for commercial purposes. Although OECD was officially launched in 1961, the flows of aid precede the 1960s.

HISTORY OF COLONIAL AID, POLITICS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE REAL BENEFICIARIES

The history of foreign aid is largely traced to the formation of the United Nations (UN) Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in 1933, which offered assistance in terms of food, medicine and other commodities to Europe which had been ravaged by war. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1944 was also established to function as a locomotive for financial flows to Europe. The post-war economic recovery plan was characterized by state investments. To date, it forms part of the World Bank Group (WBG) and is interlinked with other WBG institutions. The above-mentioned institution was not the only source of finance at the time. The USA also offered aid through the Marshall Plan as a response to the post-war crisis. This was designed as an economic recovery programme worth \$13 billion that was channelled into industrial and agricultural production in Europe. It has been dubbed the most successful structural adjustment programme ever, and it ushered in what was declared to be an extraordinarily successful set of political and economic institutions (De Long and Eichengreen 1991). The programme played less of a role in the actual reconstruction; instead it significantly shaped the economic policy environment for a post-Socialist Western Europe. The Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan, framing it as a US imperialist project, and substituted it with the Molotov Plan.

This is a history tied to the Bretton Woods institutions and the US treasury. The history of bilateral foreign aid can be traced back to the ninth century but foreign aid in its modern form is traced to the period after second ‘world war’ (see Ali and Zeb, 2016). However this remains a Western epistemic analysis of history which excludes the history of the “pre-colonial” trans-Saharan bilateral

or multilateral relations amongst African nations that were characterized by cooperation and interdependence. Although there is limited mainstreamed documented knowledge of the explicit aid transactions within pre-colonial African states/empires, it is hard to fathom that a continent historically threaded together by the philosophy of Ubuntu/African humanism did not have assistance practices. For instance, consider the following ritual archive, “molomo o jang o rohaka o sa jeng”, meaning that a mouth that eats insults the one that does not eat, highlighting the principles of sharing, consideration of others and the imperative *modus operandi* of giving and assisting.

Ritual archives constitute “words as well as texts, ideas, symbols, shrines, images, performances, and indeed objects that document as well as speak to those religious experiences and practices that allow us to understand the African world through various bodies of philosophies, literatures, languages, histories and much more” (Falola 2016: 1). The archives produced, reproduced and shaped social relations and practices, be they political, economic or spiritual. Coloniality of knowledge explains the omission or disregard of these forms of histories within discursive arguments made by scholars such as Hjertholm and White (2000), who also highlighted the 1929 Colonial Development Act as pre-IBRD development finance. This becomes an invitation to excavate and/or mainstream the pre-colonial history of aid in Africa. The earlier noted European history of aid is but one side of the story. Some European countries, such as Britain, were also donors, although aid flows were disrupted by the Second World War.

The history of aid from Britain can be legislatively traced as far as the nineteenth century. The Colonial Stocks Act of 1877–1900 enabled colonies to borrow loans at lower interest rates. Moreover, the Colonial Development Act of 1929 was for “the purpose of aiding and developing agriculture and industry in the colony and territory, and thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom” (Overseas Development Institute 1964: 14). Prior to the enactment of the Colonial Development Act, there were debates contesting the financing of colonies, but thanks to an awareness of the economic benefits that the British government would gain if it aided the colonies, aside from the “moral” argument of “civilizing backward” people, the bill was passed and later a colonial development fund was established. This financed the development of infrastructure such as the building of roads and ports, which facilitated the exportation of exploited raw materials that were later imported back into Africa as secondary and tertiary goods. For instance, in 1927 there was a discussion of the recommendation to guarantee an East African Transport loan of £10 million in order to maximize transport facilities such as railways in facilitating economic development. There were other forms of grants offered by Britain such as technical assistance, but these were financed by the colonies.¹ The interests of the European empire in financing Africa’s “development” were coupled with welfare interventions (Hodge et al. 2016, Hopkins 2000). The use of inverted commas serves to highlight the contested nature of the concept of development, which scholars such as Walter Rodney have exposed as the underdevelopment of peripheral economies.

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reported that in the 1930s Malawi, then called Nyasaland, was granted £80,815 of which £66,205 was to be utilized for public health schemes. However, it was only in the 1940s that the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was enacted, providing up to £ 5 million per year for ten years towards development projects in the British colonies of Africa. The fund increased to £17.5 million per year in the 1950s (see Hodge et al. 2016). “The years following the Second World War ... the leading European powers embarked on extensive development plans in Africa and Southeast Asia. Such plans were designed both to raise purchasing power and standards of living in the overseas territories and to alleviate US dollar shortages by stimulating colonial exports that would help pay for the reconstruction of Europe” (Hodge et al. 2016: 2). Moreover, despite the welfare and social services programmes intended to improve African living conditions, the attempts were in tandem with the colonial system that stripped Africans of their humanity and forced labour in the modernizing project of maximizing profitability at the cost of decent working and living conditions.² “The symptoms of these poor working conditions included shortage of reasonable accommodation, poor diet, inadequate hospital facilities, very high accident and morbidity rates, non-payment of wages, brutalization and wanton abuse of workers and consistently low wages where these were paid” (Makambe 1994: 81).

The logic behind this treatment of workers was justified under the banner of the modernization project and the subjection of Africans as non-humans. Makambe’s (1994) work exposes the violence of Western modernity/coloniality.³ Western modernity came with policies that were geared towards development models in which industrialization was privileged. Without getting into a Marxist versus bourgeois economic development debate, one may emphasize that although they are “appropriately considered as contending theories of Western modernity, we should not lose sight of the fact they are both progenies of a larger European Enlightenment project whose overriding objective was and remains that of modernizing/enlightening Africa” (Lushaba 2009: 2), meaning that they are both projects constitutive of coloniality. Foreign aid was embedded within this modernizing project, in which Africa and other economies found themselves caught in a European war of contending views on achieving Euro–North American modernity. Pertaining to the violence meted against workers, decolonial scholars highlight the embedded violence of coloniality. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) deployed the following analytical tools to explain the logic of violence in African history. He listed coloniality as explained by Nelson Maldonado Torress and explained how violence played a role in African subjectivities; and secondly, Frantz Fanon’s *damnes* (meaning the wretched of the earth) whose humanity was denied and Slavoj Žižek’s subjective, objective and symbolic violence. “The colonized were defined as inferior and obstacles to modernity (in economic, religious and other terms), in many cases justifying the suspension of normal ethical conventions, and so use of violence, to ‘modernize’ colonized peoples and places” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 2).

Forced labour facilitated through violence was a mode of “transforming beasts into men”.⁴ Chinua Achebe, in his *Arrow of God* based in colonial Nigeria, captures this phenomenon, albeit with some level of coerced consent from the Igbo coupled with the exploitation of existing social structures in Africa for the benefit of European economic expansion. However, these structural violations were not met with passivity by the workers. A series of riots in the 1930s by the wretched of the earth in colonial Africa ensued. For instance there were workers’ struggles and protests “in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam in 1939, on the railway and mines in the Gold Coast in the late 1930s; on the Copper belt once again in 1940” (Cooper 2004: 15). During the Second World War the strikes continued in Kenya, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Rhodesia and South Africa, which presented challenges to European economic continuity and threatened colonial interests.⁵ It was later in the 1970s that “for the first time the focus of foreign aid was shifted from investment projects in power, transport and telecommunication towards agriculture, rural development and social services including housing, education and health. The ILO launched its World Employment Programme in 1969 to raise the living standards in the backward regions through increased employment opportunities” (Ali and Zeb 2016: 113).

Despite these interventions not being intended to address the fundamental question of normalized subjection of the other, it remains that aid is largely for the benefit of the donor rather than the recipient who, in the Cartesian sense, is perpetually subordinate. “The economic and social development of the third world, as such, was clearly not a policy objective of the colonial rulers before the Second World War. Such an objective would have been inconsistent with the underlying division of labour and trading patterns within and among colonial blocks” (Thorbecke 2000: 27). Milner and Tingley (2010) sought to explain the rationale behind donor countries’ legislative support of foreign economic aid as being mainly because aid has distributional consequences for donor countries’ constituents. “Some studies show that aid and trade are positively correlated, while others even indicate that both tied and untied aid has a positive effect on a donor’s exports to aid recipients” (Milner and Tingley 2010: 204). For instance in 1957 former French prime minister Francois Mitterrand said that “without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century” (Ilisha 2014), and in 2008 during the financial crisis, former French president Jacques Chirac was quoted as saying that “without Africa, France will slide down into the rank of a third [world]”.⁶ In 2013, French finance minister Pierre Moscovici stated that “we have to speak the language of truth: African growth pulls us along, its dynamism supports us and its vitality is stimulating for us ... We need Africa.”⁷ France is largely dependent on bilateral trade relations with its former colonies. For instance, in 2011 former French minister Jacques Godfrain said that “with a small amount of strength, [France] can move a planet because [of our] relations with 15 or 20 African countries”.⁸ Two years later, President Francois Hollande said: “France, along with Europe, would like to be even more involved in the destiny of [Africa] ... tomorrow’s

economy will heavily depend on the strength and vibrancy of African businesses ... The goal I have set is to double the level of trade between France and Africa ...”⁹ The Afrobarometer report authored by Lekorwe et al. (2016) revealed that 89% of survey respondents made up of a sample of 59,000 people in thirty-six African countries think France continues to have influence on its former colonies.

In the postcolonial era, which does not denote disruptions with the colonial system, meaning that coloniality persists (see Quijano 2000), aid dynamics altered especially when the USA came onto the scene and attempted to dismantle the exclusive bilateral trade relations between empires and their colonies.¹⁰ John Perkins (2016) confessed that his job was “[t]o encourage world leaders to become part of a vast network that promotes US commercial interests. In the end, those leaders become ensnared in a web of debt that ensures their loyalty ... In turn, [we] bolster their political positions by bringing industrial parks, power plants and airports to their people. The owners of US engineering/construction companies become fabulously wealthy” (Perkins 2016: xiii). This is facilitated through the use of loans and grants from aid organizations via aid conditionality, as evidenced in the 1980s. “Colonial and financial empires as practiced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by Europe and America were consciously designed to benefit their own people, not the colonised people” (Tandon 2015: 17). The same can be said about Chinese aid, which is critically discussed later in this chapter. The only difference is that Chinese aid differentially benefits Chinese transnational elites, including Chinese lowest classes made up of the marginalized and most exploitable sect of Chinese society. Although all imperial nations import their labour and skills, historically the most exploitable labour has been the indigenous population, unlike China, which often exports its least privileged as workers, the majority of whom come from the population of over 360 million people living below \$3.10 a day (Shapiro 2016). Shapiro (2016) shared that the Chinese population living below \$1.90 a day is over 150 million, which forces us to ask the following question. If there are that many Chinese people living in penury, why does the government give aid to Africa? The answer lies in the section that follows. Pertaining to the issue of Chinese labour, whenever it is imported and local labour is completely excluded, the consequence for aid recipient countries is the loss of capacitation and development of the recipient country’s human resource and employment. Before delving further into a discussion about Chinese aid, it is imperative to highlight the 1980s political economic landscape in terms of policies, because this will shed light on an understanding of the critique made pertaining to Chinese aid.

Aid and Neoliberal Strings Attached

Foreign aid programmes in the 1980s were geared towards stabilization and economic structural reforms. The concessional loans that many African countries received from the World Bank were marshalled with policy recommendations

that coerced African states to adopt structural adjustment programmes. The 1980s debt crisis coupled with the socio-economic crisis that many African countries experienced had an influence on the decision to adopt the neoliberal model. It was largely believed that political and economic environment was crucial in facilitating development. The fall of the USSR gave the USA and Bretton Woods institutions leverage to cajole economies into signing the Washington Consensus, which advocated for trade liberalization among other liberal reforms, thus opening up developing markets to compete with transnational corporations from developed economies. Trade liberalization is one of the major tenets of neoliberal economic ideology; its underlying principle of free markets had its heyday when England ruled the seas in the nineteenth century. However as soon as the USA was ready to industrialize it challenged the free market ideology of the British. As it went into full-blooded industrialization, the USA put in place protectionist barriers against 'free trade'.¹¹

Yet free trade liberalization has been universalized under the Washington Consensus, a scenario that Ha Joon Chang (2002) metaphorically described as kicking away the ladder, because developed economies reached their heights through protectionist policies that enabled domestic industries to thrive. Opening up infant industries to international trade systematically reproduces the hegemonic status of the ruling economies. It can be argued that it is in the best interest of donors to propagate Washington Consensus policy reforms that enable trade liberalization and promotion of private property rights, deregulation of the market, tax reforms, fiscal policy, currency devaluation and competitive interest rates. Washington Consensus proponents have largely been overt in determining domestic policies of aid recipient countries, while China has been described as a non-interference donor. However, China's lack of an overt imposition of its own demands from recipient countries does not render its development assistance purely altruistic. The same logic as Western aid applies to Chinese aid, the difference being that China does not have overt policy conditionality attached to its assistance, unlike aid from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The latter imposed reforms which included liberal democracy as a necessary political environment for economic prosperity. China, on the other hand, is riding on the wave of the globalized macro-economic conditioning that most economies are being modified into. China benefits from Western global imperial designs, even from the economies that have been subjected to systematic violence and sanctions for various reasons, such as dictatorship; hence imperial wars begun in the name of 'bringing democracy to...?'

Democratic countries have been proven to receive more foreign aid as opposed to authoritarian regimes (Alesina and Dollar 2000). It is crucial to highlight that liberal democracy is in actual fact corporatocracy.¹² Corporatocracy refers to the control and influence that corporations have over governments; it masquerades as democracy, fuelling the illusion that the people have political power and influence (Vanbergen 2016). Moreover on politics and aid, prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, communist regimes received less regard in the disbursement of aid

by the USA. On the other hand, communist China's foreign assistance, which began in 1950, extended its aid to non-communist countries in 1956. Trade relations became more imperative, a decision that one could argue may have also been influenced by the "white cat, black cat or good cat" metaphor.¹³ Moving back to US foreign aid conditions, aid from the USA does not exclude dictatorial regimes; foreign aid is largely allocated on the basis of furthering the political and economic interests of the donor country. For instance, Equatorial Guinea which has one of the longest serving presidents in Africa, who has been in office for thirty-seven years, has been one of the USA's aid recipients since 1979, the year in which the president, who has been described as the most brutal dictator, took office. "President Obiang, his sons, and his inner circle continue to dominate the economic landscape with absolute power. Worsening institutional weaknesses and the fragile rule of law impede emergence of firms without links to the regime" (Index of Economic Freedom 2016: no page).

The oil sector in Equatorial Guinea is dominated by the USA's oil firms, such as ExxonMobil, America Hess, Chevron Texaco and Marathon Oil, which collectively have the largest share of oil production in the country (Dare 2002). Equatorial Guinea primarily exports crude petroleum, petroleum gas, acyclic alcohol, rough wood, aeroplanes, helicopters and spacecraft. The top destinations for these exports are China, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Brazil and France; while most of its imports are from Spain, China, the USA, France and Côte d'Ivoire. Equatorial Guinea's domestic revenues are largely generated from oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the tune of 80%. Moreover, the US assistance to Equatorial Guinea involves financing grassroots activities, exchange programmes for the country's citizens and financing education institutions, which are needed but also function as sources of soft power and diplomacy. In 2001 China and Equatorial Guinea signed an agreement regarding agricultural cooperation. However, there was no clarity pertaining to the terms of the agreement. The issue of lack of clarity arose again in 2005, when Equatorial Guinea's president signed agreements on investment, economic and technological cooperation, finance and diplomacy with China.

According to Human Rights Watch, Equatorial Guinea is overwhelmed by corruption and repression, and poverty is rampant despite US and Chinese aid. Another criticism of China has been based on the undemocratic regimes that its ODA and its beyond official development aid flow (BOF) supports. "China's development assistance may strengthen existing authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, forestalling democratization in some contexts, and perhaps reverse this process in other jurisdictions" (Hasmath 2014: 10). The Washington Consensus expands to encapsulate liberal democracy as a prescription along with modernization, the logic being that under these conditions economic growth is guaranteed, especially when considering the protection of private property; while Chinese donors are largely presented as having no concern for political climates in aid-recipient countries. Dreher and Fuchs (2011) analysed data from various sources such as CIA reports for the period between 1975 and 1984. The 1987 OECD study including Bartke's (1989) study,

which focuses on China's economic aid between 1956 and 1987 as well as China's commerce yearbook covering the period of 1990 to 2005 revealed that political considerations are an important determinant in China's allocation of aid. However, based on the reports, there is relatively less focus placed on politics compared to the Washington Consensus recommendations. This contradicts the publication by Mambo (2015), who noted that the "diplomats who followed Mnangagwa to Beijing said the Chinese, *in their refusal to grant Zimbabwe another loan worth \$27 billion*, raised fears about Mugabe's age, Zanu PF leadership renewal, Zimbabwe's investment climate and ease of doing business, the country's relations with Western countries, political risk, government's failure to tackle corruption and bureaucratic red tape, among other issues" (Mambo 2015: para. 13). Mnangagwa is the vice-president of Zimbabwe and the fears raised are political concerns tied to Chinese loans and business. The imposition is not as overt as US interventions, the Chinese, in the Zimbabwean case, using refusal to grant another loan as a coercive tool to force the recipient country to address its institutional shortcomings in order to repay its existing loans. Amongst the concerns raised, repression does not seem to be a barrier to Chinese aid.

Interestingly, some repressive regimes have had impressive economic growth indicators. An example is Angola, which grew under Dos Santos to be the third largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa and Nigeria. In China, "[t]he 'illiberal' aspects of China's social market economy ... have not prevented China from achieving a high rate of economic growth and lifting the living standards of the Chinese people" (Zhao 2010: 422–423). It is evident that economic growth is not dependent on democracy, as witnessed in Angola: it was only in 2012 that Angolans cast their democratic votes. However, those who expressed dissent have been jailed and tortured (Burgis 2016). This further reinforces Moyo's (2009) assertion that democracy is not the determinant of economic growth. However, this logic is admissible in a context in which gross domestic product (GDP) matters more than human wellbeing and democracy. In its real sense, democracy is conceptualized as a system where the people have an influence in decision-making, assuming the decisions are geared to advance general wellbeing. South Africa is a democratic country, yet it remains the most unequal nation, in which precarious existence is worsening and violence is meted against those demanding improved means of affording decent livelihoods. An example is the unfortunate case of the Marikana massacre of 2012, in which mine workers demanded wage increases.

Moreover, South Africa has become the protest capital of the world. Although protests can signal democratic virility, they expose the socio-economic fissures that exist. China's authoritarianism subverts political freedoms: "civil and political rights are limited in the name of stability and economic growth..." (Zhao 2010: 422). Moreover, it is of interest to note that in 2016 South Africa voted with China and Russia against the UN resolution on "promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet" (*Mail & Guardian* 2016),¹⁴ which was aimed at securing freedom of expression and privacy. The China, Russia and South Africa

grouping ignites debate about the rise of the global South and its contentions with the global North. China rewards African countries that vote with it at the UN General Assembly, although data shows that China largely assists poor countries; “countries that support China do better” (*The Economist* 2016). Despite the negative criticisms against Chinese aid, particularly from the West, the Afrobarometer 2016 report shows that Africans view China as a positive source of investment, infrastructure and business development. China ranks second in terms of being the greatest external influence after the colonial powers, and its development model was praised by the same respondents in the study (Lekorwe et al. 2016).

THE BEIJING CONSENSUS AND WASHINGTON CONSENSUS VERSUS CHINA’S MODEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The rise of China in the twenty-first century in the critical areas of scientific and technological fields, amongst others, has weakened Western dominance globally and ushered in a Sinocentric system of state-led capitalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014). The Chinese model of development is characterized by imitation of successful elements of liberal economic policies, in which the Chinese market is opened to foreign and domestic investment, labour market flexibility, and state and private sector spending. The state has retained its control over the market through regulation, including control over the judiciary, the military and security apparatuses; and it has limited freedom of the press and the flow of information. The unique nature of China’s model has been the tailoring of policies and practices in accordance with specific contexts. An example is the one child policy, which was geared at addressing China’s population burden but had the consequence of affecting the size of the forecasted labour force, which resulted in reformation or elimination of the policy (Hasmath 2014). The Beijing consensus is a distinct approach that is guided by the philosophy of pragmatism. Moreover, its lack of coherent policy prescriptions makes it distinct from the Washington Consensus, which has spelled out a recipe for development. John Cooper Ramo (cited by Zhao 2010) stated that the Beijing Consensus has three features, namely a “commitment to innovation and constant experimentation in reforms; an emphasis on sustainability and equality instead of per capita GDP as the only measure of progress; and a commitment to self-determination” (Zhao 2010: 421). Hasmath criticized the conflation of the concept of the Beijing Consensus with the Chinese model of development. Development models provide a subset of policy prescriptions and often a fundamentalist approach to following specific political economy theories of development. China does not need to impose set policy prescriptions to its aid recipients; “the Beijing Consensus represents a philosophical movement towards an ultra-pragmatic view of conducting policy deliberation” (Hasmath 2014; 3). This pragmatic approach provides a framework that applies context-sensitive and context-specific solutions. Apart from this, China is already riding on the wave of the Washington Consensus’ prescription of free market capitalism as a necessary condition for economic growth.

Many African countries accepted Washington Consensus recommendations, although there was only partial implementation (Manuel 2003). Prior to the Washington Consensus imposition, most independent African governments promoted industrialization and the development of local production to substitute imports in order to maximize employment, increase standards of living and address trade patterns that yielded unfavourable terms, characterized by raw or primary commodity exportation by economies that import manufactured products. Moyo (2009) highlighted that development aid was geared towards financing industrialization. She also recommended neoliberalism as a tool for growth in Africa. These are recommendations that are universalized despite the distinct contexts of developing and developed countries. It is worth noting that market economies in Africa have yielded significant decreases in exporting manufactured goods. Exports decreased from 7.8% in 1980 to 1.1% in 1990. However, some economies, such as South Africa, have remained relatively strong in parts of their manufacturing sectors.

Manuel (2003) highlighted that the prescribed policies of the Washington Consensus were not wholly pursued by most African countries. It is generally accepted that macro-economic stability is important for economic growth, but privatization as a prerequisite of growth has been subject to scrutiny, debate and doubt, thus challenging Moyo's (2009) recommendations. Moreover, Manuel (2003) has highlighted that "a larger problem for African economies is that their growth potential is directly affected by their ability to export and use export revenue to diversify production. Their ability to do so is constrained by a global trade regime inimical to the full development of African countries' comparative advantage. Limited market access for low cost textiles, cotton and agricultural products and competition from heavily subsidized industrial economy exports effectively prevent growth" (Manuel 2003: 18). China's imports have been reported to have a negative impact on domestic industries. Nkabinde (2015) reported that the South African steel industry is on the brink of collapse as a result of Chinese dumping. This means that China's steel imports are sold at lower prices compared with South Africa's market price, consequently affecting local steel manufacturers.¹⁵ As previously argued, this arrangement results from China benefiting from trade liberalization as the largest steel-producing economy. In 2015 China produced 803.83 million tons of crude steel, accounting for 50.3% of global productive capacity (World Atlas 2016: no page). China has undoubtedly adopted the Washington Consensus liberal stance on Foreign Direct Investment and trade, making the distinction between the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus an exaggeration.

"The Chinese state has adopted most of the basic principles of the Washington Consensus, especially its emphasis on the role of the market, entrepreneurship, globalization and international trade, it rejected or modified the liberal aspects that would greatly reduce the role of the state. For example, while the state gradually opened the domestic economy to international competition, it has maintained protection to key sectors and infant industries" (Zhao 2010: 424). China continues to protect its industries and subsidizes

them, which partly accounts for the European Union and the USA's refusal to grant China official market economy status. Other economies, including some in Africa, have granted China market economy status in return for Chinese aid and investment. This includes infrastructural development projects characterized by a quasi-barter system and grants to poor economies, among much else. According to the Chinese government's white paper on foreign aid, until 2009 developing countries received US\$38.54 billion worth of aid of which 41.4% constituted grants, 29.9% was interest free loans and 28.7% was concessional loans (State council report quoted by Dreher and Fuchs 2011).

China Daily (cited by Afrobarometer 2016) reported that China's trade increased by \$210 billion in the period between 2000 and 2014. On 17 May 2001, the Angolan government received more than \$600,000 in aid from China, aimed to alleviate the suffering of the 115,000 people displaced by heavy floods in that year. The aid included 100 tons of rice, 24,000 tins of beef and luncheon meat, cooking utensils and other daily necessities, and was distributed in Bie Province (Strange et al. 2013). It is worth noting that Angola's rice imports have increased exponentially since 2001, from 93,769 tonnes to 362,209 tonnes in 2012, despite Angola being a rice-producing economy. The tide is turning, however, after political interventions by the Angolan government resulting in a significant decrease in imports of staples such as rice. According to National Shippers Council (CNC) data, rice imports dropped by 21.41% in the second quarter of the 2016 financial year and China remains Angola's main trade partner.¹⁶ According to Strange et al. (2013) aid data compilation for the years ranging from 2000 to 2001 shows that China committed, pledged or granted more loans to Angola than grants. For instance, in 2002 China's Export-Import (C-Exim) Bank funded the construction of energy infrastructure, and in 2004 gave Angola an oil-backed loan to repair transport infrastructure, thus fuelling the "aid for resources" narrative. The same pattern is replicated in other countries such as Zimbabwe.

TOWARDS A VERDICT ON FOREIGN AID IN AFRICA

Apart from benefits such as trade and infrastructural development, Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008), Booth (2012) and Moyo (2009) have all critiqued aid negatively, highlighting its negative consequences on poor countries' institutions. "The influx of massive amounts of foreign aid can have deleterious effects on the governments of the receiving countries, and can end up doing more harm than good in several circumstances" (Abuzeid 2009: 16). Moyo (2009) has firmly argued that grants contribute to institutional incompetence partly because aid replaces domestic revenue. According to Strange et al. (2013) China provides fewer concessional loans and more commercial loans to countries with weak institutions. The conditions of China's concessional loans involve the use of Chinese products, or services such as Chinese companies and labour. China's quasi-barter system is said to be characterized by tying aid flows to the flow of natural resources and the advancement of

Chinese national interests and international alliances. The commercial loans are given with the assumption that they will minimize the risk of financial misappropriation, thus promoting good governance. Based on the analysis of China's financial flows to Zimbabwe, there were more pledges made by China to offer commercial loans to Zimbabwe than official concessional loans. In 2005 the Zimbabwean government established an anticorruption commission (ZACC) in line with the state's anticorruption Commission Act, yet according to media reports corruption remains rampant and the ZACC lacks authority. A funding crisis has implications for its functions and its officials have been charged with defrauding the commission (Chitiyo and Kibble 2014).

Bracking (2009) proposed moving beyond the conventional economic definition of corruption for states such as Zimbabwe and proposed a framework that locates the concept within models of spoils of politics, in which politics becomes the locomotive for wealth generation especially in the context of global economic marginalization. This is coupled with predatory accumulation tactics in which political elites acquire stakes in foreign direct investments as a means of amassing wealth and/or reproducing the privileged status of the compradors (Bracking 2009; Burgis 2016). In terms of weak states, China's pledges to offer commercial loans rather than aid is in line with the idea that those commercial loans would maximize accountability and minimize risk. However, in the context of weakened states such as Zimbabwe, the risk is that there will be exploitation of minerals and a lack of institutional capacity to deal with compliance or to deter the contravening of local laws by Chinese investors (Mapaure 2014). Mapaure (2014) reported on the relationship between Zimbabwean labour and Chinese companies. Local workers have lamented the poor working conditions and exploitative income. The Labour Act of Zimbabwe is being violated by Chinese companies, which Chinese investors have argued have excessively high standards—much higher than in China (Mapaure 2014). Institutional weaknesses in poor states seemingly favour Chinese investors, not only in terms of getting away with labour law violations but in terms of a market for low quality and cheap Chinese products which force local competitors out of business. Moreover, Mapaure (2014) has highlighted that the thwarted consumer power of many Zimbabweans has led to their purchase of cheap Chinese products despite complaints about the products.

Out of the top three poorest economies in Africa in 2016, Zimbabwe received more aid from China than Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the period ranging from 2000 to 2012. China also pledged large sums of commercial loans to Zimbabwe as part of its commercial loans for minimizing risk through the use of mineral resources. However, these loans are often underwritten with concessions for mineral resources; for instance, in 2005 China pledged to finance the expansion of Zimbabwe's road infrastructure. The concessional loan was underwritten as a joint venture with the Chinese encompassing copper and iron ore mining projects (Strange et al. 2013). The same applied to a commercial loan servicing agreement in 2005 that gave China access to Zimbabwe's minerals in exchange for \$40 million

worth of export credit. Zimbabwe's governance issues and institutional challenges can be used to buttress the argument that China supports pariah regimes without regard for issues such as good governance; however, the commercial loans strategy could be viewed as encouraging good governance through the avoidance of mineral grabbing. China's "non-intervention" stance to foreign policy is captured by Ramo (2004), who contrasted the Beijing Consensus to the Washington Consensus, which he argued assumes the "knows-best" approach, undermining state sovereignties by dictating to them how to run their countries. Chinese foreign relations, on the other hand, are guided by Zhan Enlai's eight principles of foreign assistance which were formulated out of the visits the premier made to African countries.¹⁷ However, failure to comply with domestic laws of financial flow recipient countries is also a way of undermining the sovereignty of those states, thus forcing us to critically assess Chinese aid not from an ethnocentric view. This means that Chinese aid and its consequences ought not to be assessed in the same way as European and American aid.

Moreover, despite the massive contributions of aid in Africa, one cannot ignore the arguments made by Lauren McCauley, who in 2014 affirmatively argued that aid is used as a disguise for the perennial plundering of Africa's resources by domestic political elites and transnational capitalist elites. "Under the smokescreen of giving aid or charity, Western governments and multinational corporations are pillaging states in sub-Saharan Africa with losses nearing \$60 billion each year" (McCauley 2014: para. 2). The research of Sharples et al. (2014) revealed that Africa's net loss amounts to \$58 billion each year from foreign investment, aid and loans. On the other hand, if viewed in the long run and taking into account the agreements made, China's infrastructure investments in Africa could be utilized for Africa's benefit. For instance the facilitation of intra-Africa trade could be facilitated through infrastructure projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway project in Kenya, which is worth \$3.8 billion and is financed by China's Exim Bank which provided about 85% of the cost for which a Chinese company was contracted for the project (Strange et al. 2013). It is envisioned that the railway will connect cargo and passengers between Nairobi and Mombasa, and will also be part of a modern standard gauge railway that will connect Kenya to Uganda's Malaba and Kampala, further running to Kigali in Rwanda and branching out to Juba in South Sudan (Railway Technology, n.d.). The downside is that these progressive infrastructure projects are often underpinned by mining concessions, signing away the mineral wealth that should benefit Africans.

"Africa does not need AID; it simply needs an international legal system that can protect it from permanent pillage" Piketty (2016: 170). Moyo (2009) called for the aid tap to be closed, to allow for structural reforms that will enable economic growth and prosperity in Africa. However, this does not address the perennial global trade imbalances, which can only be changed through decolonizing the global order by allowing pluriversality and multiple power centres facilitated by context-specific and indigenous development

frameworks. In the interim, Africa should strengthen its active position on import substitution and industrialization, which according to Margaret McMillan and Kenneth Harttgen (2014) accounts for the continent's recent economic growth miracle. They found that "between 2000 and 2010, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of the labor force employed in agriculture declined by roughly 10 percentage points. The decline in the share of employment in agriculture has been matched by a 2 percentage point increase in the share of the labor force engaged in manufacturing and an 8 percentage point increase in services" (McMillan and Harttgen 2014: 1). On the other hand, Africa's rural population remains large, meaning organic agriculture, agro-processing and other knowledge economy activities that can bolster rural economies also ought to be centralized in development planning.

In order to succeed in industrialization, Africa may have to reconsider the state-led development approach.¹⁸ However, the state in Africa has to be reformulated and remoulded in accordance to African indigenous principles. It ought to prioritize the African populace over GDP growth. Once an African-centred state is birthed, guided by lessons from the ritual archives as highlighted by Falola (2016), Africa should look into strengthening the revolutionized state and its institutions while concurrently reformulating its principles of economics. This reformulation should stray away from the *homo economicus* model that renders human beings as intrinsically self-centred and individualist. This concept of economics is culturally specific to European and American cultural values, which are fundamentally Cartesian and contradict holistic humanism in the African context; thus returning to the economics of Ubuntu is imperative.¹⁹ This is a time for pursuing alternative indigenous modes of finance to fund uncompromising development projects. The inspiration for generating investment funds can be drawn from African indigenous methods of funding which resemble the *Osusu*.²⁰ Africa must also strengthen its institutions to curb illicit financial flows as well as addressing the consequences of licit financial flows through beneficiation. It must be made mandatory for multinational corporations to process primary commodities that are extracted in Africa. It is also pivotal to acknowledge that natural resources are finite, and that without them beneficiation would not be a factor because there would be nothing to benefitiate. Moreover, the threat of global commodity fluctuations to employment, especially of the majority of the unemployed African youth, calls for deep consideration of greater commitment to the inevitable fourth industrial revolution characterized by information and communications technology, nanotechnology, robotics, 4D printing and biotechnology by investing more in research and development for innovation.²¹ Africa's youthful population, which is techno-savvy, is in the best position to be integrated into technologically advancing African economies, whereby investment in economic growth tools such as robotics and artificial intelligence ought not to equate to threats to wellbeing—for example, through robots replacing human labour. Instead, robotized labour should force us to rethink our economic values and redistributive politics, which are centred more on Ubuntu. After all, the Basotho and Batswana people of

Southern Africa taught that “bana ba motho ba kgaolenana hloho ya tsie”,²² which speaks to the principles of sharing and cooperation even in the context of scarcity. “Hloho ya tsie” is a locust’s head, a metaphor for national, regional or global income that can be shared amongst everyone. Thus our political economic principles should be reconfigured to reflect African world views.

NOTES

1. See Overseas Development Institute 1964 report.
2. See research done by Makambe in colonial Zimbabwe between 1903 and 1930.
3. Coloniality is the darker side of modernity, and decolonial scholars argue that there could be no modernity without coloniality. Coloniality refers to the colonial matrices of power. See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013).
4. See Eric Allina, “Transforming ‘beasts into men’: colonialism, forced labour and racism in Africa.” OpenDemocracy. 2015.
5. Frederick Cooper. “Development, modernization, and the social sciences in the era of decolonization: the examples of British and French Africa.”
6. Illisha. “Bleeding Africa: A Half Century of the Françafrique.” Loonwatch.com.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. 1
9. Address by the President of French Republic on the opening of the Elysee Summit on Peace and Security in Africa, 7 December 2013.
10. Yash Tandon, *Trade is War: The West’s War Against the World*. OR Books, 2015.
11. Ibid. 21
12. Graham Vanbergen noted a study done in 2000 revealing the growth of corporatocracy characterized by merely 200 corporations in the world that have a global reach with wealth bigger than 182 countries combined and twice the economic influence than 80% of the global population.
13. The metaphor was used in Hasmath, Reza 2014 publication titled “White Cat, Black Cat or Good Cat: The Beijing consensus as an alternative philosophy for policy deliberation?” It refers to the utterances made that it matters not what the “cat” looks like, as long as it does its job in fulfilling a purpose and reaching a goal.
14. The article was published online on 4 July 2016. It was accessed from <http://mg.co.za/article/2016-07-04-sa-votes-against-internet-freedoms-in-un-resolution/>.
15. The article was published on Moneyweb on 20 July 2015.
16. “Angola: Imports drop steeply.” ANGOP.
17. The principles are that China will: (1) always base itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in its foreign relations, (2) never attach conditions or ask for privileges, (3) help lighten the burden on recipient countries, (4) assist recipient countries to gradually achieve self-reliance, (5) strive to develop aid projects that require less investment, (6) provide the best quality equipment and materials for its own manufacture, (7) provide technical assistance and ensure recipient country’s personnel are well trained, and (8) not allow its experts to make any special demands or enjoy special amenities.
18. It is pivotal to note that state-led development does not automatically yield wellbeing for all citizens of the nation-state and the integration of a nation-state within racist, sexist, ethnicist and ecologically catastrophic global capitalist system, suggests that state led capitalism is not a panacea for ills of existence.

19. Tandon (2015) in his article titled Development is Resistance argued that all economic theories are self serving Eurocentric ideologies. This invites us to consider that economics are not value free. Moreover, Harrison and Huntington (2000) in their book titled 'Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress' reminded us that culture matters while Ayyitey (2006), in his book titled 'Indigenous African Institutions' emphasized that ecology, culture, politics, law, and development are inextricably intertwined thus pivotal in development projects.
20. A Wolof concept used to describe an indigenous financial scheme common throughout Africa. It is made up of a group of people coming together to save money that they then make available to one group member at a given time. Businessmen and women in informal sectors use the method to start or expand their businesses. Households also use the method to invest for various ends.
21. See Tembe and Sehume. Investment into young people is crucial in this new economic era.
22. Transliterated to mean that siblings share a locust's head.

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From OAU to AU: Rethinking Supranational Governance in Africa

Babatunde Fagbayibo

INTRODUCTION

Having existed for over a decade, the imperative of understanding the place of the African Union (AU) in the matrix of regional integration cannot be understated. The transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the AU in 2000 was predicated on a number of factors, chief of which was the inability of the former to effectively drive a continental integration process. This major handicap necessitated the need to reform the institutional process of the continental organ in order to respond efficiently to global and regional politico-economic dynamics. In specific terms, the transformation sought to provide a more effective platform for addressing issues such as development, democratic governance, peace and security, and the overall socio-economic condition of the continent. In order to achieve these objectives, the Constitutive Act of the AU stipulated, amongst other principles, a number of normative principles such as the harmonization of the policies of the regional economic communities (RECs) under the AU umbrella, a common defense policy, the right of intervention, and the establishment of judicial and parliamentary organs (AU Constitutive Act 2002b).

The advancement of these objectives, especially in the context of the normative prescriptions in the Constitutive Act, implies the need to place regional mechanisms beyond a rigid state-centric framework. In other words, the underlining rationale behind the transformation of the OAU was the imperative

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of creating institutions that exercised binding powers and thus were able to assert far-reaching authority over member states. It is this understanding that placed the continental integration process within the theoretical context of supranationalism. The success of this experiment in Europe was not lost on African leaders, who pushed for the transformation of the OAU. In addition, it was a continuation of the ideological drive that started in the 1960s, spearheaded by Kwame Nkrumah, which hinged the development and relevance of Africa on the immediate establishment of a “United States of Africa” or a “Union Government for Africa” (Nkrumah 1963, 163–164). As Nkrumah (1963, 218) averred:

The basis for political action need not infringe the essential sovereignty of the African states. These states would continue to exercise independent authority, except in the fields defined and reserved for common action in the interest of the security and orderly development of the whole continent.

In line with this, Nkrumah ensured that the Ghanaian constitution stipulated the partial or wholesale surrendering of sovereignty as a contribution towards the attainment of continental unification (Nkrumah 1963, 221). In similar vein, Guinea, Mali, Tunisia and Egypt also provided for limitation of sovereignty in their constitutions (Legum 1962, 66).

On the other side of the spectrum of this federalist ideology were people such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria, who preferred an incremental approach that places an emphasis on the strengthening of subregional formations as the first step to achieving continental supranationalism. As Nyerere famously observed:

To rule out a step by step progress towards African unity is to hope that the Almighty will one day say, ‘Let there be unity in Africa’, and there shall be unity; or to pray for a conqueror. But even a conqueror will have to proceed step by step. (Nyerere 1966, 302)

Although the establishment of the OAU in 1963 was far from achieving Nkrumah’s federalist objective, largely settling for a rigid state-centric approach, the idea has evolved over the years and remains a referential point of discourse in fashioning the appropriate supranational path for continental integration.

This chapter aims to place the continental integration process within the discourse of supranationalism. It seeks to highlight some of the problems undercutting the effective realization of the supranational project at continental level. The overall objective is thus to provide some policy measures for counteracting the obstacles identified.

The chapter begins by situating the transformation of the OAU to AU within the supranational theoretical paradigm. It then discusses some of the major problems hindering the realization of effective supranational regionalism. It concludes with some policy prescriptions.

FROM OAU TO AU: A SUPRANATIONAL TRANSFORMATION?

In over five decades, the discourse on deepening the African regional integration drive has mainly existed within two ideological paradigms. Shaped by global and regional politico-economic dynamics, these ideological paradigms have provided some definitive methodologies on how to proceed with the quest of integrating Africa. The methods proffered have largely existed within the context of the theories underpinning regional integration. In specific terms, paradigms of engagement in terms of advancing integration in Africa can be classified under intergovernmental and supranational approaches.

The intergovernmental paradigm, which remains the dominant approach on the continent, affirms the primacy of member states in international law and relations. In this respect, international organizations are configured only to serve as a platform for engagement between and amongst member states. According to Schemers and Blokker (1995, 40), two features define an intergovernmental institution. The first is that decision-making resides solely with representatives of member states. The second is that decisions are arrived at through unanimity or consensus amongst member states, with regional institutions playing a markedly subsidiary role (Schemers and Blokker 1995, 40).

The OAU was an archetypal intergovernmental organization, as its Charter made no pretensions about the need to assert any authority over member states. In addition, the Charter made no explicit normative or institutional reference to deepening regional integration efforts on the continent. It was a generally held view that the primary functions of the organization were the eradication of colonialism, the ending of Apartheid in South Africa and upholding the independence of African states (Packer and Rukare 2002, 366). The Charter was very clear about the non-interference of the organization or member states in the affairs of other member states (OAU Charter 1963, art III). The General Secretariat was not granted any real decision-making powers, such powers residing in intergovernmental structures such as the Assembly of Heads of States and Government and the Council of Ministers (OAU Charter 1963, art. VII). The organization was thus unable to meaningfully address intra-African conflicts, curtail the deluge of gross human rights violations or confront contemporary challenges facing the continent.

It was in the context of the foregoing that the OAU was transformed into the AU in 2000. This transformation was seen as a significant turn of events in Africa's post-colonial history, especially as it relates to the move to deepen and enhance regional integration. Similar to the mood of the 1960s, which preceded the establishment of the OAU, the divide between "absolute and minimal integrationists" again emerged (Maluwa 2004). The "absolute integrationists," led by the late Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya, advocated for the creation of a federalist AU, with extensive executive, legislative and judicial powers (Maluwa 2004). On the other side were the "minimal integrationists," led by Thabo Mbeki (South Africa) and Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), who pushed for an intergovernmental approach that would incrementally evolve

into a supranational entity (Maluwa 2004; Landsberg 2008). Before discussing whether or not the term “supranational” can be ascribed to the AU, it is essential first to identify the elements of this concept.

Supranationalism has been defined as “the development of authoritative institutions and network of policy-making activity above the nation state” (Rosamond 2000, 204). Pescatore (1974, 51–52) identified three elements of supranationalism as: the recognition of common values and interests; the creation of an effective power and the autonomy of these powers. Similarly, Weiler (1981, 271) made a distinction between normative and decisional supranationalism. In terms of normative supranationalism, the central line of enquiry is the extent to which the laws of regional institutions supersede, and in some cases nullify, competing laws in member states (Weiler 1981, 273–280). Decisional supranationalism essentially deals with the procedural mechanism for arriving at decisions, particularly through a majority voting system rather than the rule of consensus (Weiler 1981, 271).

It is, however, important to note that no organization is completely supranational, as institutions exercise variations of supranational powers and in some cases a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational elements. For example, the United Nations (UN), which remains a typical intergovernmental institution, exercises some supranational powers in relation to voting and implementation of Security Council decisions (Weiler 1981, 305). The European Union (EU), which is often referred to as the best experiment in supranationalism, is still intergovernmental in its approach to matters such as foreign affairs, home affairs and justice (Dashwood 1998, 205–206). It is in this context that Schemer and Blokker (1995, 42) rightly suggested that the test should not so much be about the designation of an institution as supranational as the understanding that supranational elements prevail in such organizations.

The question then is whether, assessed against the factors explained above, the AU can be described as a supranational entity. Compared with the OAU, the AU has much broader and elaborate institutional architecture and objectives. Unlike the OAU, the AU has institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the AU Commission (with functions much broader than that of the OAU General Secretariat). The similarity between the institutional architectures of the AU and the EU is deliberate, and thus an indication of the supranational ambition of the former (Fagbayibo 2011, 217). These institutions are expected to exercise supranational tasks ranging from the binding interpretation of AU instruments, determining the modus of intervention in conflict zones, review of the standard of governance in member states and the policy initiation and implementation functions of the AU Commission (AU Constitutive Act 2002b; NEPAD 2003).

In terms of the objectives and principles of the AU, there exist a number of normative prescriptions that point to the intention to bestow the institution with supranational powers. These include the institutional mandate to coordinate and

harmonize the policies of the subregional organizations (AU Constitutive Act 2002b, art. 3(1)), the AU's right to intervene in member states (AU Constitutive Act 2002b, art. 4(h)) and the majority voting system rule in the PSC in relation to the decision on intervention (PSC Protocol 2002a, art. 8(13)).

Beyond the formal and theoretical enquiry, the next line of assessment is to determine whether in practice supranational elements are more prevalent in the AU institutional environment. The first line of engagement in this respect is the manner in which AU institutions exercise binding powers over member states. The AU Assembly, composed of heads of state and government, remains the dominant authority in the organization and exercises exclusive decision-making powers. It has not shown any keen interest in transferring requisite supranational powers to other organs of the AU (Fagbayibo 2013, 414). It has for example refused to cede full or partial legislative powers to the PAP, in spite of the normative stipulation that the legislative organ should start exercising supranational law-making functions from 2009 (Lulie 2012).

The AU Commission, although designated as the “engine room” of the organization, remains unable to make any real impact beyond the initiation of policies and strategic documents. The AU Assembly and the Executive Council (composed of national ministers) have largely ignored documents that have outlined measures of enhancing the implementation powers of the Commission. These include the AU Audit Report (2007) and the Commission-authored strategic plans (2004–2007; 2009–2012; 2014–2017), which all speak to the importance of refining and enhancing the internal administration of the Commission through the strengthening organizational processes, granting more autonomy to the Chair of the AU Commission and endowing the Commission with more functional powers to effectively monitor and evaluate the implementation of institutional objectives (AU 2004, 2007a, b, 2009, 2013). At the 2012 AU Summit, the Executive Council reversed the decision in 2009 to transform the Commission into the AU Authority (Fagbayibo 2013, 415). This reversal sealed any meaningful attempts to endow the Commission with supranational powers.

The mandate of the AU to coordinate the standards and activities of the various RECs is another element that is yet to be meaningfully achieved. In 2007, a Protocol on the Relations between the AU and RECs was drafted, which required the signing of at least three RECs before coming into force (Protocol on the Relations between the AU and RECs 2007, art. 33). The protocol provides for the establishment of two organs, the Committee on Coordination and the Committee of Secretariat Officials, to oversee the gradual harmonization of the various frameworks and standards of the eight AU-recognized RECs (Protocol on the Relations between the AU and RECs 2007, art. 6). However, this protocol is yet to come into force. What this then implies is that the RECs continue to implement policies at varying levels of development, without any move to measure how these correspond with continental objectives, and how the AU can be integrated into these plans. An implication of this is that the relatively developed supranational structures at subregional levels continue to exist

in silos with no articulate plan of action to use them as platforms for furthering continental objectives. RECs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and East African Community (EAC) have harmonized migration standards, with both having regional passports (ECA et al. 2012, 68). The EAC and the Southern Africa Customs Union both have functional customs unions, while the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) has initiated a customs union that is yet to become functional (EAC et al. 2012, 14). In addition, member states belonging to two or more RECs are often faced with the reality of having to adhere to conflicting or overlapping obligations, a situation that further impedes the realization of continental supranational goals (Draper et al. 2007).

The right of military intervention (AU Constitutive Act 2002b, art. 4(h)) in instances of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and, a 2003 amendment, serious threat to legitimate order, remain the strongest element of supranationalism in the organization. In principle, based on the decision of its PSC, the AU is enabled to, without request or authorization from the affected member state, intervene and stop atrocities. While a number of grounds have necessitated the invocation of this principle, the AU is yet to activate it. It has rather relied on the more diplomatic article 4(j), which restricts intervention to a request by the affected member state(s). The inability to effectively invoke article 4(h) is due to a number of complex factors. First is the conceptual factor. It has been argued that the lack of clarity on the definition of the thresholds of intervention is very problematic as it enhances the political motive behind the move to, or not to, intervene (Kuwali 2008; Powell 2005). Another issue is the vagueness of the relationship between the AU and the RECs in terms of conflict management. In 2008, the “Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities and Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa” was entered into (AU 2008). The problem, however, is that the MoU is phrased in generic terms as it fails to specify or clarify the roles, functions and powers of the AU and RECs in terms of intervention (Dersso 2010, 8). The final point is the absence of the envisaged African Standby Force (ASF), which is expected to be composed of five regional brigades, each composed of between 3500 and 5000 troops, to be deployed in conflict situations. Its establishment remains hampered by the lack of sustainable funding for military operations, little or no political will on the part of member states to finance and/or contribute troops, and the lack of effective administrative capacity of relevant institutions (Vines 2013, 101–108).

While the AU may differ from the AU in terms of form, the exposition above shows that very little has changed in terms of substance. The indicators of supranationalism within the AU are either too weak or non-existent. As noted above, the AU Assembly, composed of heads of state and government, is still the sole source of authority in the AU. The only other influential organ is the Executive Council, composed of designated national ministers, which is also an intergovernmental body. A recent study of the AU, which highlights the fundamental deficiencies of its implementation milieu, is worth quoting in full:

For the implementation of decisions taken by the AU Assembly, the AU has to primarily rely on member states. Depending on the policy area or sector, different AU organs come into play ... There are many formal institutions in place to encourage and facilitate implementation. However, the practices of reducing uncertainty, generating mutual trust, providing transparency on actions, offering a framework for dividing labour, interpreting mandates, and facilitating policy coordination remain problematic ... In fact, the formal institutions and mechanisms for monitoring, or for incentivising cooperative behavior or compliance and sanctioning deviance, and the informal institutions such as norms in support of respecting formal agreements may be lacking or insufficiently mutually reinforcing. While member states may be willing to cooperate through regional organisations, they are not prepared to give in on sovereignty. The relationship between the AU and member states remains strictly intergovernmental. (Vanheukelom et al. 2016, 8)

Assessed against the normative and institutional design of the organization, the picture painted above implies that the AU is not a supranational institution; it merely has the potential of becoming one. Such potential is, however, dependent on a number of variables, which will be discussed below. Suffice to note that the successful realization of continental supranationalism requires innovative thinking and approach, underlined by serious commitment from political elites (Table 47.1).

RETHINKING SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: SOME SUGGESTIONS

The issue of how to advance supranational governance in Africa is one that cannot be done outside the context of certain variables. These variables cumulatively speak to the nature of the milieu that currently determine the “ebb and flow” of regional integration on the continent. The first deals with the relational dynamics of regionalism. This implies the level of relations between and among critical governmental stakeholders such as AU organs *inter se*, AU and its member states, the AU and its RECs, and member states *inter se*. The second is the extent to which the AU is integrated into the structures of member states, through bureaucratic and other less formal means. The last point is the extent to which the epistemic community or civil society shapes the debate and action on the formulation and implementation of integration policies.

Against the backdrop of the points outlined above, it is imperative to begin to put in place measures that ensure the AU is well positioned as the fulcrum of the regional integration process. The AU Assembly, being the exclusive source of authority in the AU, will have to display the much-needed political will in this respect. In this respect, any discussion on the distribution or conferral of powers must begin with the extent to which the Assembly is able to take bold, pragmatic steps.

The question is no longer about why it should devolve powers to other organs but how this should be done. In this context, the Assembly should begin an incremental process of sharing and ultimately transferring its implementation powers to critical organs such as the AU Commission and the PAP (Fagbayibo 2013).

Table 47.1 Comparative table of the OAU and the AU

OAU	AU
Single source of authority: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government	Many sources of authority: the Assembly of the union, the Judiciary (Court of Justice) and Parliament (PAP)
Primacy of national sovereignty: Non-interference in internal affairs.	Respect for national authority but rights to intervention in grave circumstances and suspension of regimes coming to power by unconstitutional means.
No provisions on the possibility of future common sovereignty.	Provisions allowing for monitoring of compliance with decisions in the context of the CSSDCA.
Basic objective: Collective struggle for the liberation of African countries from colonialism and defence of national sovereignty.	Basic objective: To enable Africa to meet the challenges of the 21 st century and strengthen the continent's position within the global economy and the international community.
The OAU is distinct from the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty).	Integration of the African Economic Treaty (AEC) and its regional integration programme into the AU.
The OAU Secretariat: Headed by a Secretary-General, who initially had no powers to take initiatives.	The AU Commission is the executive arm of the Union, with specific powers in terms of initiatives.
Secretary General and Assistant Secretaries General elected.	Members of the Commission elected and endowed with fully recognised political power.
Purely intergovernmental approach	Community and intergovernmental approach possible. Guardian of Treaties.

Source: Created by author and adapted from the AU (2004) 23–24

Placing the AU Commission at the heart of an implementation matrix of organizational objectives is imperative. The Assembly could achieve this through the following options. First is the setting up of an “implementation committee,” to monitor and recommend punitive or deliberative measures, which includes representatives of the AU Commission, Assembly and any other relevant AU organ (Ayangafac and Mpyisi 2009, 4).

Another option is to establish formal structures through which the Commission can participate in deliberations surrounding monitoring and enforcement measures at REC level. The AU Commission’s role in this respect

will be to ensure that there is an alignment in terms of continental objectives, and to enhance the power of the Chair of the AU Commission to set policy agendas, to be involved in the assignment of portfolios to Commissioners and to be autonomous in engaging with member states when discussing how to implement organizational directives (Fagbayibo 2012). This level of engagement should be preceded by a policy guideline that allows for member states that are willing and able to comply with AU directives, on condition that they work closely with the Commission on achieving these objectives.

With regards to the PAP, the Assembly should put in place short- to medium-term measures of granting partial and full legislative powers to the organization (Fagbayibo 2013). An example is allowing the PAP to enter into strategic arrangements with member states and RECs that have shown the willingness to adopt laws made by the legislative organ. Another measure is the participation of PAP in the process of electing the Chair of the AU Commission (Fagbayibo 2012, 24). In this respect, the Assembly will retain the power to nominate candidates for the position, and the shortlisting of the best candidates. However, the names should then be forwarded to the PAP, who will then subject the shortlisted candidates to a thorough process of assessment and then elect the best candidate (Fagbayibo 2012, 24–25). The Assembly could also explore the possibility of direct elections into PAP by encouraging member states that are interested in following this path to proceed (Fagbayibo 2012, 24). Such elections should, however, be overseen by an AU-mandated electoral body.

The integration of the AU into national frameworks is another area that requires more than the enactment of formalistic legal rules. It should build on mutual trust and strategic relationships between the AU and the relevant member states. One area is the extent to which member states are prepared to include the AU in national processes such as the design of national development plans, law reforms and civil society engagements. In achieving these, member states should be encouraged to establish national focal points that deal specifically with coordinating regional integration-related activities, and are thus positioned to interface with the AU in assessing the levels and progress of implementation. The role of civil society is very fundamental here. Civil society organizations (CSOs) should be mainstreamed into the activities of the national focal points in terms of assessing the formulation and implementation of regional programs. CSOs should also be granted the opportunity of liaising directly with AU officials on the implementation of policies and programs.

Lastly, nothing should preclude member states that are willing and able to further integration objectives from doing so. In this regard, the AU should encourage member states, through bilateral or multilateral or inter-subregional formations, to pursue agendas such as peace and security, good governance, natural resources management and sustainable development. This should, however, be conditional on the involvement of the AU in the process as a means of ensuring that the engagement takes place in tandem with organizational objectives and regulations.

CONCLUSION

The move to deepen the regional integration agenda in Africa has gone through a number of phases in the past five decades. Although there seems to be a consensus on the importance of creating strong and assertive continental institutions, the modus of achieving this has differed. While the OAU was designed within the context of rigid state-centrism, the normative and institutional framework of the AU evinces the desire to create a supranational entity.

This desire is expressed through normative and institutional frameworks that speak to the power of the organization to exercise binding powers over member states. The principles of harmonization of the standards and policies of RECs, military intervention in member states, review of governance standards, and the establishment of legislative and judicial organs all point to this intention. Having existed for over a decade, the AU has shown very little difference in substance from its predecessor. Member states have been very reluctant to transfer requisite powers or provide necessary funding to the AU. The resultant effect is the existence of weak and non-assertive transnational institutions, incapable of either sanctioning errant member states or delivering the envisaged developmental agenda of regional integration.

In making a case for the rethinking of the modus of supranational governance on the continent, this chapter has advanced a number of propositions. Beyond the proliferation of normative frameworks or institutions, these proposals speak to the extent to which what we currently have can be used to advance the supranational project. The chapter has proposed the need for the refinement of the interface between the AU and other critical stakeholders such as member states, RECs and civil society. It was argued that the AU Assembly, as the dominant source of authority and power, should engage in an incremental process of transferring competences to the AU Commission and other relevant AU organs. Suggestions were made regarding the need for the involvement of the AU Commission in the implementation of directives and norms, PAP's role in the election of the AU Commission Chair, direct election of PAP members, the establishment of national focal points charged with directly engaging with the AU, and cooperation between member states in terms of advancing regional integration.

Attaining effective supranationalism on the African continent ultimately depends on the extent to which political elites are able to merge rhetoric with concrete actions.

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Pan-Africanism is Africa's Third Way: The Cultural Relevance of African Political Economy

Rita Kiki Edozie

INTRODUCTION

While addressing East Africa's East African Community (EAC) in 2014, a former South African parliamentarian, M. Bhengu, rightly asked important questions about Africa's engagement with the global economy. Does neoliberalism fail in African settings because it is not embedded within African culture? Has the time not come for Africa to have her own economic philosophy? These questions smack of a pan-Africanist orientation little different from founding pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah's thesis about African unity being achieved through economics as its strategy and politics as its goal (Marah 2007). Already conscious of the way that colonial Balkanization would lead to the neocolonialism of Africa, given that most of Africa's new nations at the time were too small to avert economic dependency in a then emergent global economy, Nkrumah advocated African union through pan-Africanism with specific economic goals to break the pattern of economic exploitation established through colonialism. Too few accounts of the contemporary African international economy draw from Nkrumahist economics.

Pan-Africanist scholar George Padmore's classic 1955 book, *Pan-Africanism or Communism*, presented pan-Africanism as a "Third Way" political/economic development model for independent Africa in contrast to both communism and capitalism (1971). Today, the Third Way possibility is a choice between pan-Africanism or Neoliberal Africa Rising. And yet in the

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policy spaces on the ground since the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2001 at the helm of neoliberal global capitalism and again since 2009's Great Recession and ascendancy of a post-neoliberal era, African Renaissance discourses have led to the resurgence of pan-Africanist discourses that present a blueprint for a Third Way international political economy for Africa. These discourses and practices are increasingly Africentric, nationalistic, and pan-Africanist, and while engaging with more entrenched hegemonic International Political Economy (IPE) structures of neoliberalism, Africa Rising, and their post-structuralist discontents such as post-developmental-ism; as an alternative route to mainstream approaches—a Third Way—pan-Africanism presents greater African ownership, nuance, agency, alterity, and a distinctive cultural context for engaging the African international political economy.

Nevertheless, pan-Africanism's resurgence in the African twenty-first century global economy needs to be understood beyond the AU political elite expressions and initiatives of Agenda 2063. While it is good to see that Kwame Nkrumah's pan-Africanist ideal is alive and well in furthering the political/economic aspirations of contemporary Africa; there is a need to understand the pan-Africanist economic world view a little differently from Nkrumah's 1960s decolonizing arena. In a global era, pan-Africanist thrusts and orientations operate in "glocalized" (local-global spatial networks and interdependencies) African life-worlds. In determining the importance of national anchoring and national-level democracy to the success or failure of pan-Africanism, Thandika Mkandawire considers whether there are forces at the national level in African countries that are pushing for African integration, and whether it is worth national level groups expending efforts in pan-Africanist political mobilization. Mkandawire identifies African capitalist classes as prospects for taking such a role. With Africa's indigenous capitalists, Mkandawire acknowledges that there has been an ideological sea change whereby there is much greater acceptance of the private sector and markets than there was in the 1960s and 1970s. However, what is not yet clear are the interests of this emergent class in the pan-African project and its capacities to exploit the enlarged economic space.

To understand Mkandawire's righteous inquiries, one might consider African businesses in 2016 to see whether this new, national-level, globalized pan-Africanism has a chance. For example, in January 2016 the Tony Elumelu Entrepreneurship Program (TEEP) announced the selection of the first of 1000 African entrepreneurs to train, fund, mentor, and empower the next generation of entrepreneurs from Africa and the African diaspora. The program's longer-term, ten-year goal is to help grow 10,000 start-ups across the continent and create 1 million new jobs and \$10 billion in annual revenues for Africa's economy (Nsehe 2016). TEEP is a program set up by Nigerian millionaire Tony Elumelu. The non-profit organization characterizes itself as pan-African and premised on a concept coined by the billionaire entrepreneur as Africapitalism. In a related event, addressing an EAC forum, a South African parliamentarian, Mfuniselwa Bhengu, proposed Ubuntu economics to posi-

tively contribute to the socio-economic development of post-colonial Africa while also providing the continent with a competitive edge in world markets. To achieve such a feat, Bhengu recommended that the EAC would need to integrate the innovative African practices and processes anchored in the Ubuntu value system to achieve competitive parity as opposed to a competitive advantage for African economies in a global era (Moyo 2015).

Both of these examples are expressions of new and alternative ideas and practices that are representative of a pan-African economics that will engage the continent in the international political economy and are a “Third Way” for African global development. With Africapitalism, Tony Elumelu invokes his self-styled characterization of capitalist practice in Africa as one dimension to employ African business solutions to African economic challenges. Elumelu uses Africapitalism to target strategic sectors of Africa’s economies for investment in agriculture, power, healthcare, and finance to create broad-based capitalist development that will provide inclusive opportunities for the greatest number of Africans. The Nigerian-derived concept Africapitalism relies on African values—self-determination, collectivism, and social value—to distinguish Africapitalism from neoliberal global capitalism’s individualistic and competitive values. According to Elumelu, “No one can develop Africa better than Africans” (Wall Street Journal 2014). Similarly, according to Reuel Khoza, a South African CEO and entrepreneur, in Africa we say a person is a person because of other people, and nowhere is this more apt than in the relationship between leader and followers. Mutual dependence is the ethic of Ubuntu. Ubuntu business and economics is an African world view that also seeks African-centered solutions to Africa’s economic dilemmas. In its strongest formulation, Ubuntu business asserts that humans’ very beings derive from each other’s (Khoza 2012a, b).

Africapitalism and Ubuntu economic models are the new pan-Africanism. They are derived from non-state business actors in local and national African cultural, political, and economic contexts. In *Africentricity & African Nationalism: Philosophy & Ideology for Africa’s Complete Emancipation* (Dompere 1992), Ghanaian Diaspora scholar, K.K. Dompere once linked African nationalist and Africentric practices in local, community, and national domains to be part and parcel of the broader pan-Africanist rubric. None, he argued, would necessarily be radically antisystemic, antiglobalist, or anticapitalist per se, but rather these pan-Africanist philosophies would broaden the scope and demographics of political control while privileging homegrown economic solutions. Dompere’s theoretical framework applies to Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics. For example, Africapitalism self-defines itself as a vehicle that may rein in runaway globalization. It also claims to engage Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Creating Shared Value (CSV) as vehicles that direct the private sector to contribute to the societal benefits of the development of Africa. Ubuntu economic philosophies assert a value system based on an African philosophy that teaches the human race we are one moral universe, and shared moral sense makes humans recognize their duty to each other. Ubuntu presumes core elements that are

contrasted against Western capitalism, such as shared African values against Western individualism, cooperative systems as opposed to hierarchical institutions, and the underscoring of humanness in social interaction in distinction to humans as objects, being mere consumers, laborers, or owners.

Using Dompere and Mkandawire's conceptualizations of pan-Africanism for a theoretical framework, in this chapter I explore the roles that Nigerian and South African business sectors and classes play to enhance, contradict, undermine, or complicate the pan-African project. I consider the interests of this emergent class of African businesses in the pan-African project and its capacities to exploit the enlarged continental and global economic space. Furthermore, I examine the ideological trajectories of Africapitalist and Ubuntu business national business organizations in representing new expressions of pan-Africanism. Arguing in support of the relevance of pan-Africanism and its contemporary resurgence among a non-state business class in local and national arenas as a possible anti-thesis of neoliberalism, the chapter reveals ways in which Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics exhibit distinctive elements of pan-African economic philosophy and practice. Both are used as case studies to critically assess the practices of pan-African political economics from ethnographic locations and contexts in Nigeria and South Africa, where new expressions of African entrepreneurial identities are emergent and valuable, and thus relevant in fostering a more authentic African global development.

AFRICA IN THE NEOLIBERAL GLOBAL ECONOMY: AFRICA RISING?

The academic literature on the international political economy of Africa reveals a considerable amount of diversity in the way that it analyzes Africa's economic and development progress historically and contemporaneously. Over the centuries, however, in assessing the progress of African development in the millennium, one observes a disconnect between Western narratives of Africa's economic progress transfixed on celebratory economic growth on the one hand, or pessimist human and social development indicators on the other; and African continental narratives that tend to speak to structural global inequality issues, infrastructural underdevelopment, and the need for regional integration. Viewpoints commonly vary according to the diverse roles that African economy stakeholders hold. They also differ according to the ideological perspectives that underlie stakeholders' strategies for change vis-à-vis Africa's structuring in the global economy.

According to Mthuli Ncube and Charles Lekeya Lufumpa in *The Emerging Middle Class in Africa* (2015), there are two narratives that compete for the African international political economy in the current global era—one is Africa Rising, aligned to the development narrative, and the other is the poverty narrative or Afro pessimism. The Africa Rising narrative celebrates a decade or more of economic growth in the continent that has begun to yield benefits in reducing poverty and alleviating inequality, calling attention to a rapid increase

in foreign investment which is an indicator of growing international confidence in Africa's future (Ncube and Lufumpa 2015). The Africa Rising narrative represents a liberal optimist view for Africa's engagement in the international political economy. There is a Chinese Dragon, an Indian Tiger, and now an African Lion, which are symbols of newly emerging market competitors in an increasingly multipolar world. According to Ian Taylor, Africa Rising is about growth in Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) and opportunities for investors that falsely represent Africa as an emerging "bonanza" economy (Taylor 2014).

In suggesting that Africa is finally pushing aside postcolonialism, a 2013 *African Economic Report* that placed Africa in the "beginning to catch up with the affluent global economy camp" category embodies the luster of the Africa Rising social construct (2014). The report enthusiastically announced that the new millennium saw Africa's per capita incomes rise faster than high-income countries for the first time since the 1970s. The report noted that nineteen countries made it to emerging markets in the 2000s, compared with only two in the 1990s; and the report's authors boasted that this fact illustrated a dramatic change in Africa's average growth performance compared with the rest of the world. Mainstream scholars of Africa Rising have been equally celebratory of Africa's economic outlook. Steven Radelet's *Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way* (2010) captures what has become commonplace for the Africa Rising narrative: to categorically characterize much of the continent as an "emerging market" region in the millennium (2010). Using seventeen African countries, Radelet describes the positive economic outlook of Africa and attributes success to the rise of democracy, to strong economic management, to the end of the debt crisis, to the introduction of new technologies, and to the emergence of a new generation of African leaders.

Africa Rising narratives exist among counternarratives such as Afropessimism, which still project Africa in gloom and view Africa in pathological terms. The poverty narrative, for example, asserts that Africa's recent economic growth is largely the product of a commodities boom, whose sustainability and potential to transform society remain in question. This narrative points out that recent improvement in growth enjoyed by African countries must be attributed to soaring exports of high value primary commodities such as oil, natural gas, coal, and metal ores that are scarce in global markets. The concern is that the wealth generated by these exports has not been reinvested in sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture, which have a potential to generate employment opportunities and rising incomes (Ncube and Lufumpa 2015). As such, despite its economic growth, Africa remains by and large in a poverty trap.

Johannesburg scholar and Brenthurst Foundation founder Greg Mills maintains such a pessimistic economic outlook for the continent, claiming that African governments lack interest in how to realistically achieve growth in a global economy. Mills argues that Africa's progress on the human development index and the continent's performance in the United Nations' (UN's) Millennium Development Goals (MDG) goals provide a more comprehensive

picture of the continent's holistic development status. MDG Report 2013 revealed that while Africa has made the greatest effort in MDGs compared to other regions, the continent's low development requires more effort to make any real meaningful progress (United Nations 2013). The Afro-pessimists thus conclude that despite a decade of economic growth—aka Africa Rising—the continent's Human Development Index (HDI) and MDG statistics remain among the lowest in the world (Mills 2012).

And yet both optimistic (Africa Rising) and Afro-pessimistic narratives, poised between a liberal left and a liberal right view of African international political economy, fall short of centrally interjecting African-derived humanistic perspectives on the international political economy. Graham Harrison's liberal analysis of the continent's economic prospects is especially troubling. That is to say, in revealing the rich contours of Africa's status in the contemporary international political economy, Harrison's otherwise excellent book *Neoliberal Africa: the Impact of Global Social Engineering* (Harrison 2010) exemplifies the problem of representing Africa from an outwards-in perspective. In this regard, while his book represents an important corrective to the commonplace references to Africa as a “switched off” place in the global political economy (Harrison 2010, 1), at the same time he dismisses a pan-Africanist economic strategy. In rightly shaking off Afro-pessimism, Harrison argues that even in matters of global economy there is a need to shake off mainstream representations of Africa as remote, exceptional, lacking, and being bypassed by globalization (Harrison 2010, 3). He is also right to argue that Africa is at the forefront of globalization through the neoliberal agenda. The continent has after all undergone extensive and protracted neoliberal social engineering, whose practices in Africa are instructive for how we may understand neoliberal globalization more broadly. In effect, asserting African agency, Harrison maintains accurately that “Africa and globalization are co-produced” (Harrison 2010, 5).

Be that as it may, Harrison's revelation of this important truism does not go far enough. Instead, in maintaining that it is mass poverty, surplus population, state collapse, and Africa's development crisis that are at the heart of the neoliberal globalization project in Africa, without identifying on the one hand economic advances in the continent and on the other contextual responses to neoliberal globalization by Africans Harrison's perspective remains a thesis about globalization “upon” Africa. In this position, he consciously misses an opportunity to include African critical perspectives and agencies in his analysis of the African international economy, especially when he dismisses as a weak approach the framing of Africa as a coherent historical social entity convened by African unity because the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did not do much.

This position leads Harrison to favor what he refers to as a “stronger” approach to examine Africa as a unified category, which would be to concentrate on the continent's discursive deployment as a category. While acknowledging at one point that such an approach is closer to an Afro-centric approach, that is a politics and culture constructed to demonstrate and promote a belief in African ideas and sociability, ideationally and transnationally, at another

point, however, he criticizes such an approach, claiming that it is an essentialist rendering of the continent as a single entity. Curiously, Harrison wants to argue that Africa is extreme but not exceptional in that the continent manifests the most radical instance of contemporary globalization, which is neoliberal reform. Criticizing a culturalist approach to African political economy, Harrison concludes, “To research African culture would indeed be a complex and hazardous line of inquiry; to look at development policy and its impacts seems to me a more secure way to approach Africa as a whole” (Harrison 2010, 16–17).

Paradoxically, Harrison’s departure point in *Neoliberal Africa* offers a starting point for an anti-thesis for the Africa Rising thesis and an entry point for socio-economic and cultural pan-Africanism. Contrary to Harrison’s critique, Africans have a long-standing history of merging culture and economics to engage the continent’s development prospects for centuries. Through the ideology of pan-Africanism, political, economic, and cultural “African Unity” initiatives have been the sustained political/economic practices of Africans that are today represented as mainstream postcolonial genres of African national and international politics. As a collective entity, African nations—through the pioneering platform of the OAU, evolved into the AU—have increasingly and progressively put forth the notion of a “pan-African international political economy.” An example is the recently held 2013 Fiftieth Anniversary Solemn Declaration, whereby Africans collectively affirmed the continent’s commitment to a political, social, and economic integration agenda that involved both a continental free trade area, and political union in a common continental governance and democracy (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014). The founding chairperson of the AU, former South African president Thabo Mbeki, revealed the foremost rationale for the institution’s establishment to be the transformation and modernization of African economies that would end the unequal and exploitative economic relations between Africa and the West, as well as Africa’s economic marginalization and unequal access to the claimed benefits of globalization (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014).

We can turn to examine the ways in which Africans are reshaping pan-Africanism for some answers. The continent’s major regional organization, the AU, is also less convinced that African emerging markets represent a point of celebration at this time although for different reasons than Greg Mills. The AU’s economic outlook for Africa has been highly critical. Africa’s share in world trade is about 3% on average and only about 10–12% of African trade is with African nations, whilst 40% of North American trade is with other North American countries, and 63% of trade by countries in Western Europe is with other Western European nations. African unemployment rates are among the highest in the world. The continent’s infrastructure remains the least developed in the world. Only 30% of the African population has access to electricity, compared with 70 to 90% in other parts of the developing world. Only 18% of the continent’s irrigation potential is exploited, yet many countries on the continent are net food importers. Africa has a telecommunications penetration rate of a meager 6%, which compares to an average of 40% for other geographical zones.

There are alternatives to neoliberalism and externalist social constructions of African economic growth, and while sometimes invoking “Africa Rising” tropes to combat negative stereotypical and pathological representations of Africa as a non-viable location for investment, African narratives that embrace Africa’s global engagement are very different from the Western liberal narratives that celebrate the continent uncritically as an emerging market. This is seen in *Emerging Africa: How the Global Economy’s ‘Last Frontier’ Can Prosper and Matter*, in which a former Nigerian Central Bank deputy governor, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, while pivoting an Africa Rising thesis through the book’s title, also challenges the narrative. The notion that while the West lies battered by financial crisis, Africa offers limitless opportunities for wealth creation in the march of globalization, is seen as a false social construction of Africa’s economy for foreign investors. Instead, in an African-centered orientation, asking “Are its economies truly on the rise?” and “What is Africa to today’s Africans?”, Moghalu’s book asks important questions about African agency and self-definition in the global economy. (Moghalu 2014).

Despite neoliberal constructions of “Africa Rising” narratives about African economies, pan-Africanist economic narratives are also still very much alive in the African continent. However, while it should be a competing narrative to the neoliberal Africa Rising, pan-Africanism is in effect sometimes an appropriator of Africa Rising narratives itself. What is more, while the expression of pan-Africanism is rhetorically dominant among the elite actors of the continent’s AU, there is new expression of pan-Africanism’s presence within African nations and among non-state actors and business sectors in the continent.

PAN-AFRICAN ECONOMICS AND AFRICAN AGENCY

Pan-Africanist economics has a long history and impactful present in presenting a platform for African self-determined economic policy paths to African economic successes. At the height of the Cold War and African decolonization struggles, George Padmore posed the question, pan-Africanism or communism? Seething from his breakaway from the Communist International, where he accused the communists of not understanding Africans’ need to achieve “mental” liberation as well as materialist freedom, Padmore warned African nationalists struggling against colonialism that communism would be a grave danger to pan-Africanism. Later pan-Africanist scholars, such as Hakim Adi (2013), have revealed the links between pan-Africanism and communism, demonstrating how Padmore’s real thesis was to present the values of pan-Africanism for decolonizing African nations over an emergent capitalism. pan-Africanism, similar to Julius Nyerere’s affirmation that Ujaama was “neither capitalism nor socialism,” would be Africa’s own “Third Way.”

In 2016, pan-Africanist economic thought is still considered in formulating a road-map for Africa’s alternative engagement in the international political economy of African development and progress. Dr. Carlos Lopes, the Cape Verde economist who is also the secretary general of the UN institution

Economic Commission for Africa, based in Addis Ababa, which for fifty years has had African development as its primary objective, presented the role that pan-Africanism could play.

As we entered the twenty-first century, pan-Africanism reflected Africa's conscious need not only for political independence, regional integration, and improvement in its living standards, but also the throwing off of the shackles of economic bondage and democratic stagnation that had seen it reverse the short-lived prosperity of the independence era. This meant devising a new economic positioning and new forms of partnership in which Africa, as an equal partner, would negotiate with the rest of the world, with fierce defense of its own defined priorities. Without losing the key elements of unity, cultural heritage, and freedom, the reinterpretation of pan-Africanism in the form of an African Renaissance is very relevant. It is a new phase that requires popular participation and the mobilization of the African people behind the goals of structural transformation and improved governance. Indeed, Africa's Renaissance can only be complete when the African voice is heard and taken into account (Lopes 2013).

Lopes' call for a reinterpretation of the African international political economy to resuscitate and reconfigure pan-Africanism to affect radical change for the continent is an example of Africa's modern "Third Way."

Former South African president Thabo Mbeki has also recently employed the notion of political and economic pan-African Renaissance with an axis based on "Afro-modernity"—modernity combined with African heritage to expand the Ubuntu world view beyond politics and restorative justice to South African business, socio-economics, and corporate governance. Africapitalism is also promoted as a pan-African Afro-modernity, as it provides a template for developing national economies differently from the modern West, as well as achieving its best results when its principles are applied on a continental scale, with the promotion of inter-African trade as a means to stimulating manufacture, skills mobility, and the economic development of Africans.

Pan-Africanism is an Afro-modernity that deals with power and interest in the international arena, in international political forums, and in the international political economy (Lumumba-Kasongo 1994, 109). Kwame Nkrumah defined pan-African unity as a nationalist survival shield that protected Africans from the vulnerability of neo-colonialism. pan-Africanist economics was used to attain African command over all vital African economic decisions, which was essential for the achievement of economic reconstruction as opposed to underdevelopment for the continent (Green and Seidman 1968). In relation to development, therefore, pan-Africanism would find ways to exercise control over international economic forces that would foster the continued process of underdevelopment and alternatively redirect economic policy for Africans toward African goals and contexts (Cohen and Daniel 1981, 251).

As economic policy at the regional level, in Eddy Maloka's *A United States of Africa?* (Maloka 2002), we see how pan-Africanism and African perspectives on African development have historically been intertwined as a single ideology

since the 1960s by the OAU–AU. The pillars of the pan-Africanist political economy have been collective self-reliance and self-sustaining development, African-owned economic growth, and equitable redistribution (Maloka 2002); “delinking and auto-centricity”, intra-regionalism, and equitable globalism (Amin 1985). Newer more contemporary theories of pan-African IPE demonstrate the philosophy’s national and community orientation in a global era. Malawian economist Thandika Mkandawire has argued that there is a need for a continued democratizing of pan-Africanism if it is to be useful for reintegrating African regional economies. In light of the hostility of neoliberalism to regionalism and continued tensions between intra-continental economic objectives and extra-African economic objectives, Mkandawire suggests pan-Africanism’s contemporary utility is its ability to awaken African civil societies and capitalist classes in Africa for whom pan-Africanism can provide a vehicle for a new national growth agenda (Mkandawire 2011). In a 2004 book, Opoku Agyeman assessed pan-Africanism in terms of this genre of grassroots activism using the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) as a case study. While Agyeman’s findings concluded a failure of pan-Africanism in this regard and an indictment of its leaders, whose efforts he claimed were thwarted by neo-colonialist opportunists, given more than ten years after the publication of Agyeman’s book there may be alternative truths and realities on the ground by now (Agyeman 2004).

Pan-African economic epistemologies are transmodernities that are assessed for their prospects for bringing alternative routes to modernization in Africa. In considering whether Africa’s pan-African global political/economic agenda can reverse underdevelopmentalism by influencing a “decolonized” yet globally interconnected African political/economic future free of the paradoxical effects of dispossession and dependence. Pan-Africanism, which has a long history of putting forth epistemologies and practices that have resisted the underdevelopment processes of Africa, will need to be tested over time and in broader scope before concluding that it has failed, as Agyeman’s study does. Pan-Africanist theory approaches the African economic experience through the prism of struggle and agency. On the one hand, agency is used to present a critical review of existing paradigms, which have failed to capture an analytical framework that does justice to the processes of social change that are actually taking place in Africa today (Chabal 2009). On the other hand, presenting Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics as resuscitations of national-level business sector pan-Africanisms underscores the reality that select African economic activities are continuing struggles to present alternative political economies that transcend colonial legacies, infuse African histories, agencies, and identities, and foster modernity rooted in African contexts. Through agency, business classes may represent a link between democracy and the market to reveal ways in which African social forces are in effect empowered individuals endowed with social, political, and economic activism (Chabal 2009).

AFRICA'S NEW (PAN-AFRICANIST) CAPITALISTS IN PRACTICE

One may examine Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics as new instances of pan-Africanist politics; as manifestations of African economic epistemologies and practices that engage in and benefit from the international political economy in ways that transcend underdevelopmentalism and its attendant colonial structures that inhibit comprehensive and sustained African growth and development. Africapitalism and Ubuntu economic philosophies and practices currently have their most dynamic presences as progenitors that are providing societal engagement and impact as socio-economic and political organizations based in Lagos, Nigeria, and in Johannesburg, South Africa. Their pan-Africanist thrusts are manifest through three prisms: their inclination and capacity to refocus "Africa's" place in the global political economy; their directing of Africa's private and non-profit sector to contribute to societal benefits to African communities; and their cultivation of an Africonsciousness among African communities that guides Africa's renaissance.

We can see how Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics attempt to engage these new "pan-Africanist" thrusts from their global contexts in Nigeria and South Africa. On the one hand, Africapitalism is an economic philosophy that is being formulated, promoted, institutionalized, and globalized by the singular efforts of a successful Nigerian entrepreneur. The idea was first launched in a 2011 National Leadership Institute (NLI) White Paper Report, which was contributed by Tony Elumelu who is a product of a "new Nigerian entrepreneurial class."¹ He is a successful banker, who has transferred his own insights into an economic vision for Africa. He served as chief executive officer of the UBA Group for thirteen years, where he was responsible for using the bank to build a reputation for innovation and the democratization of banking services across Africa, and for providing services to more than 10 million customers across the continent and in London, Paris, and New York, before launching the Tony Elumelu Foundation. Elumelu has sought to prove that the African private sector (over the international capitalist sector) could itself be the primary generator of economic development. Local content generation is an important policy objective of the Africapitalist. Elumelu believes that local content policies promote the quantum of composite value added to Nigeria through utilization of Nigerian resources and services in Nigerian industry that will result in the development of Nigerian business capability and employment (Balouga 2012).

Likewise, in South Africa, Dr. Reuel Khoza is a successful entrepreneur who is a leading proponent of a new management culture based on inclusivity, Afrocentricity and Ubuntu, and is the author of several books on the topic. Khoza became famous in banking as Chairman of Eskom, Aka Capital Limited, and the Nedbank Group Limited, as well as several other companies. Khoza represented his own pan-Africanist visions as the founding Chairman of the Nepad Business Foundation (NBF) from 2001 to August 2011. During his tenure as Chairman, he initiated the establishment of the African Leadership

Development Program, and he was a Fellow and President of the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa. The key objective for Ubuntu economics is to become a business model platform to serve people, and not for people to serve the economy, and to create an African self-understanding in economic terms.

These business leaders can be seen as purveyors of “New Pan-African Economics.” They are Afro-modern, Afro-globalists who are impactful political/economic actors involved in engaging a national public–private sector dialogue within their respective economies. For example, Elumelu and Khoza’s business practices are at once strategically Africentric, pan-Africanist and globalist, seeking to recenter Africa in order to cultivate a more equitable globalization. Nigeria’s Tony Elumelu and South Africa’s Reuel Khoza represent an awakening of a burgeoning transnational capitalist class, middle class, and business sector in Africa. Both are distinctive members of a burgeoning African business class who have strategically cultivated discourses of Africonssciousness to engage national, regional, and international public–private sector dialogues on African political economies. One might define the business leadership that is representative of their discourses as strategically cultivating a rediscovering and interjecting of African visions, values, and philosophies into business practices and economic outcomes.

As the founder of the Tony Elumelu Foundation, an Africa-based and African-funded philanthropic organization, Elumelu promotes entrepreneurship in Africa, based on his championing of Africapitalism. Elumelu has prominently stated that Africapitalism sees Africans taking charge of the value-adding sectors and ensures that those processes happen in Africa, not through nationalization or government policies, but because there is a generation of private sector entrepreneurs who have the vision, the tools, and the opportunity to shape the destiny of the continent. Africapitalism is not capitalism with an African twist; instead, it is a rallying cry for empowering an “African” private sector to drive Africa’s economic and social growth, Elumelu has proclaimed. Showing the prowess of his entrepreneurial leadership, Elumelu has established several institutional platforms to cultivate the Africapitalist ideology. These institutions include a globally disseminated White Paper Report launching Africapitalism as a necessary world view, the establishment of a magazine with the same name, and more recently the establishment of the Africapitalist Institute.

Reuel Khoza has been much more conscious and deliberate about interjecting an Africonssciousness into South African business practices and engaging the national political/economic dialogue. Khoza is considered as one of the most prominent activists and beneficiaries of the black economic empowerment (BEE) movement. He was appointed to the Nedbank board in 2005 and was made chairperson in 2006. The appointment formed part of the rising BEE wave, which opened opportunities for Black people in the corporate sector. Khoza also participated in the Nedbank BEE deal, which saw the fourth largest banking group in the country promise to transfer about 10% of its shares to a broad-based BEE consortium. Khoza has authored several books and keynote speeches on the topic of Ubuntu management practices in South African

businesses, including “The Ubuntu Philosophy as A Conceptual Framework for Interpersonal Relationships and Leadership,” in which he argues that from an African perspective you cannot have proper management without ethical leadership (Khoza 2012a, b). The former is strictly subordinate to the latter because the ultimate responsibility of leadership is to ensure that the organization is permeated by humanity. Khoza is also the author of *Attuned Leadership* and *Let Africa Lead*, and he describes himself as an exponent of African-led, globally competitive economics and industry. He came to prominence through his membership of South Africa’s King Committee, with the King Code emerging as a response to the governance and leadership challenges of a changing South African economy in 1992. The King Reports and King Code addressed environmental, organic, and cultural elements of the South African political economy, and the relationship between Ubuntu and the King Code gained prominence in the King III Report.

Tony Elumelu and Reuel Khoza’s Afri-conscious, Afro-modern economic philosophies and business leadership practices serve as very rudimentary platforms from which to observe and assess new thrusts in the pan-African political economy. Both African economic philosophies converge as pan-African discourses and business practices despite their stylistic differences, whereby Africapitalism will have more impact as an Afro-liberal global engager and facilitative partner for African global development while Ubuntu economics will foster a more bottom up, grassroots, and possibly subregionalized Africentric African idiom in generating humanizing African values in continental political economies. The first point is evidenced by Tony Elumelu’s global penetrative profile in using Africapitalism as a platform to facilitate African global engagement at the 2015 World Economic Forum (WEF) titled “The New Global Context” (“World Economic Forum” 2015). Elumelu and other Nigerian Africapitalists represented Africa and used social media as a platform for further global reach. Elumelu was the third most tweeted person at Davos after Bill Gates and Kenneth Roth (Executive Director, Human Rights Watch).

Using the hash tag #AfricaAtDavos to drive the African agenda during the annual meeting, one of Elumelu’s top tweets included “#AfricaAtDavos #wef15.” The tweet noted that “1 million people in Africa share an average of 91-megawatts of electricity while in the US the same number of people consume an average of 3360-megawatts,” and that therefore powering Africa therefore was not merely a choice between coal, gas, hydro, wind, or solar, or between grid and off-grid (Gundan 2015). The common theme of the platform was to see to the improvement in the economic stance of Africans, as well as African-Americans, and to create advancement opportunities for all who interacted.² Here, Elumelu presents Africa’s Third Way—Africa’s distinction is not pro- or antienvironmentalism, but one of basic needs, attainment of power in the first place. In 2014, Elumelu, along with other prominent American and African business moguls, came together to form a summit in Washington DC that consisted of more than forty-five African and American business heads, along with fifty African business leaders.

Reuel Khoza has also been profiled at respective WEF meetings in 2003 and in 2006, and most recently in 2016. Khoza's greatest impact internationally has been his contribution to the ethnic challenges of globalization when in 2000 he with several world business leaders, such as Carlos Bresser Pereira, Martha Nussbaum, Mark Moody and Muhammed Yunus and James Wolfensohn, he discussed "Competition and Social Responsibility" and "Religious Resources for Business Ethics" in Africa, Europe, Japan, Latin and North America at the Second International Society of Business, Economics, and Ethics (ISBEE) World Congress on July 19—23, 2000 in Sao Paulo, Brazil. In 2005, the ISBEE World Congress was hosted by Africa (Team Africa) in Cape Town, South Africa, and its theme, "Global Fairness—Local Integrity," combined a focus on global economic fairness with one on business ethics in smaller local enterprises.

Reflected in Elumelu and Khoza, who are merely representative, Africa's new, burgeoning capitalist class, their organizations and institutions, and their leadership discourses are important expressions of Afro-modernities among an awakening and burgeoning capitalist civil society and new business sector elite in Africa. Each business sector's leadership in fostering an Africonsscious ideology and world view in business and economic practices serves to refocus Africa's political/economic practices in the world.

In Elumelu and Khoza's representations of these business models, we can see how Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics offer prospects for the examination of pan-African economic philosophies and political/economic practices, and their potential to positively transform Africa in a globalized world. Africapitalism speaks to the reality that Africans are both resilient and ingenious in the management of their circumstances, as many succeed in ways that are not obvious or that remain invisible to the unintended observer. As is the case with contemporary models of cultural capitalism and their emphasis on "business social responsibility" and other everyday habits and practices in economics, Africapitalism's value may also be in its promotion of capitalism in Africa as an Afro-modernity—a way of demonstrating how Africans can indeed be successful at capitalism.

Ubuntu economics, on the other hand, may speak more directly to the underside of capitalist failures in directly addressing the depth of suffering endured by the millions of desperately poor people in the continent who have no access to the emergent capitalistic benefits that are essential to life in Africa. Ubuntu economics may also be seen to belong to a genre of new economics once considered socialist, including new practices of resource-based economics, gift economies, and everyday livelihood issues. In this regard, one may consider Ubuntu economics in relation to classical African socialist practices such as Julius Nyerere's Ujaama. On the other hand, however, South Africa's Reuel Khoza argues that the challenge for Ubuntu economics is not to abolish capitalism, but to humanize it through the spirit of Ubuntu, which has the essential formula to change and improve capitalism given Ubuntu's emphasis on a common humanity that acts ethically towards others.

While both philosophies and practices may seem to be very different—one based in capitalism (Africapitalism) and the other in socialism (Ubuntu economics)—we see now that they converge as new and alternative “Third Way” expressions of pan-African economics in the African continent, which may further inform renewed bases for continental regional integration. It may be the case, nonetheless, that in accordance with the main ideological objective of pan-Africanism, both Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics’ goal to “Africanize” an economy that is currently still extraverted and externalized is a shared and thus requisite objective on its own terms. Given that this is the case, both Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics may not be mutually exclusive in the way that capitalism and socialism are usually understood in liberal and structuralist frameworks. In a cultural political economy framework, both may exist simultaneously or even reinforce each other in generating agency among Africans in their striving to control their own economic determination. Both reveal how in a global era the pan-Africanist renaissance is revived as a renewed ideology through Ubuntu economics and Africapitalism, both seen as “Africentric and African nationalist” political/economic ideas that are floated to varying degrees in local, regional, and national, as well as global arenas.

CONCLUSION

As evidenced by the AU Agenda 2063, whereby in 2015 African member states redeclared their commitment to use AU pan-Africanism to transform and modernize African economies and end the unequal and exploitative economic relations between Africa and the global political economy, as such a search for the relevance of pan-African economic philosophy is still very much present in Africa’s engagement with the world—at least rhetorically. This chapter has devoted its attention to a renewed and more distinctive manifestation of pan-Africanism practiced from below, whose ideas, discourses, and practices proliferate in national, continent-wide, and global arenas. Using the emergent discourses and practices among a new African business class in Nigeria and South Africa, the chapter has illustrated ways in which Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics importantly reveal the cultural dimensions (subjectivities, identities, agencies) of the African political economy. They have emerged in the historical context of the continent’s ongoing global marginalization, dependency, and underdevelopment in a global system that has been defined by a set of attitudes, norms, and ideas that have facilitated the continent’s peripheralization and marginal status.

Cultural dimensions of the political economy, including business culture, leadership subjectivity, and African identities in the analysis of the continent’s progress in global development help us to see the relevance of pan-Africanism. The examples of Africapitalism and Ubuntu economics embed within themselves the principles of self-determination, African agency, African knowledge, and an Africentric symbolic identity, revealing ways in which new and alternative African international political economies are emerging in localized, national

African life-worlds. When the tensions between Africa Rising and pan-African economics are reconciled, pan-African economics represents a viable “Third Way” route that engages the international political economy and also produces global development for Africans.

NOTES

1. Segun Aganga and Christopher Kolade, *The National Leadership Institute (NLI) White Papers*, Volume 1, 2011.
2. Michael Imhotep. “Entrepreneurship Wednesdays on The Michael Imhotep Show” at <http://tobtr.com/s/7999671> or www.AfricanHistoryNetwork.com.

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PART IX

The Future of African Governance,
Politics, and Development

Demography and the Future of Africa

Timothy A. Atoyebi and Oludare Anuodo

INTRODUCTION

More than at any other time in history, there has emerged a realization of the need to approach the issue of demography from a realistic perspective. Nowhere is this more relevant than in Africa, where growing population, urbanization, and the ratio of working age to non-working age and aging populations are creating pressures on food, energy, and water resources. According to the African Development Bank Group (2012), a good knowledge of demography, especially demographic trends, provides policymakers with the tools to design interventions that lead to development by, for example, targeting social sectors (health, education, and labor) and providing tailored infrastructure services. Adequate knowledge of demography, especially population, is therefore crucial for planning resource allocation and designing appropriate policies.

Across all continents population growth is pervasive, but it is particularly significant in African countries. In fact, in the last 100 years, Africa has seen an incredible increase in her population. However, recent developments have seen some countries, such as Germany, Japan, and Spain, experiencing a decrease in their population growth.

The continent of Africa, however, is not following this pattern: her population continues to increase at an alarming rate. The population is at least 1.2 billion people (from just 477 million in 1980), of which about 950 million live in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is currently growing by 30 million a year. It has been projected by the United Nations (UN) that by the year 2050 the annual

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increase will exceed 42 million people per year, and the total population of the world will increase to 2.4 billion. In other words, about 3.5 million people will be added every month, or 80 per minute.

No doubt, these population dynamics will have an unprecedented influence on global demography over the next 100 years. It is astonishing to note that out of the 2.4 billion increase in population expected worldwide by 2050, Africa alone will contribute 54%. In fact by 2100, Africa will contribute 82% of total growth: 3.2 billion of the overall increase of 3.8 billion.

HISTORY OF AFRICA'S POPULATION BEFORE 1900

The history of African population estimates started with that of Riccioli, an Italian Jesuit astronomer, who guessed 100 million in 1661, assuming that Africa contained as many people as Europe. This figure was not challenged for several centuries. In 1933, Willcox restated this figure for 1850. However, this view of a stable African population was criticized by Carr-Saunders (1936), who insisted that the slave trade had had a substantial negative impact. The debate on the effect of the slave trade still continues, and Diop-Maes (1991) has emphasized that slavery reduced 650 million Africans in 1500 to 150 million in 1900.

Recent analysis of the historical population of Africa is revealing new facets of Africa's past, the analysis adopting the city population method. It has been indicated in a historical context that city population, defined as top x cities' population (e.g., when $x = 10$, the total of top ten cities' population), can be a good indicator of total population (Hayashi 2007). For China, the ratio of top ten cities' population to the total population from AD 100 to 1900 was stable at around 2%, and similar stability was observed for Japan (from 1650 to 1898) and France (from 1750 to 1851). Assuming that the ratio of city population of Africa in 1900 was stable in the earlier period, the total population could then be calculated.

The new estimate shows that population was increasing throughout the period, and this supports the view of Durand, McEvedy and Jones (1978); they claimed that there was a notable decrease from 1600 to 1700. This decline was particularly noticeable in Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa; however, the degree of decrease is far more apparent in North Africa. The slave trade was most virulent in the eighteenth century. It was noted that during the seventeenth century the world was affected by the so-called Maunder Minimum, a colder climate, which could have been one of the causes of population decline. Using the historical city distribution, most cities in Sub-Sahara Africa were concentrated in fewer regions, such as West Africa (Mali, Niger, Nigeria) and Sudan and Ethiopia. However, this pattern of distribution changed after 1900.

AFRICAN POPULATION DYNAMICS

It is important to emphasize that the changes that are currently being experienced in Africa will influence global demography in the twenty-first century. The dynamics at play are straightforward. Since the middle of the last century, improvements in public health have led to an inspiring decrease in infant and child mortality rates. Overall life expectancy has also risen. The 12 million Africans born in 1955 were expected to live only until the age of 37; encouragingly, the 42 million Africans born in 2015 are expected to live up to the age of 60.

In addition to the above demographic variables, the African Total Fertility Rate (ATFR), which is defined as the number of children an average African woman is likely to have in her lifetime, is high compared to global rates—88% higher than the world standard. While ATFR per woman is 2.5 globally, in Africa it is 4.7.

Ironically, in Niger, where gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is less than \$1 per day, the average number of children a woman is likely to have in her life is more than seven. Accordingly, the country's current population of 20 million is projected to grow by 800,000 people in 2016. By mid-century, the population will have risen to 72 million people and will still be growing by 800,000 people every 18 weeks. By the year 2100, the country could have more than 209 million people, and this figure will still be expanding rapidly. This projection is based on the assumption that Niger's fertility will gradually fall to 2.5 children over the course of the century. If fertility does not fall at all, and it has not budged in the last 60 years, the country's population projection for 2100 will be near to 960 million people.

In 2004, the UN projection expected Africa to grow only to 2.2 billion people by 2100. This number appears to have been outdated. Demographers have been caught off guard as African fertility has not fallen as expected. Precipitous declines in fertility in Asia and Latin America, from five children per woman in the 1970s to around 2.5 today, led many to believe Africa would follow a similar course. Effective national family programs in various parts of the world have accelerated fertility. Furthermore, a decline in fertility has allowed more educational and other resources to be deployed per capita than otherwise would have been possible. In turn, relatively more educated girls and women have been able to increase their economic value and societal status, and this allows for even greater agency to access and use contraception.

Unfortunately, since the early 1990s family planning programs in Africa have not had the same attention, resulting in slow, sometimes negligible, fertility declines. In some countries, previous declines have stalled altogether and are reversing. Beyond unreliable supplies of contraceptives in many countries, the greatest obstacles to lower fertility are often male opposition to contraception, religious teachings, social norms, or misinformation about contraceptive options and their side effects. These dynamics create the opposite of a virtuous

circle. Rapid population growth overstrains educational systems and local economies, and can be a challenge to any government. In countries such as Australia and England, most people are contending with overcrowded schools, congested highways, and stratospheric housing costs.

Failure to do so results in per capita declines in living standards. In some economically strained nations, physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, water supplies, sewers, and electricity systems is crucial, but scaling up educational, public health, and security systems is also required. Unemployment, instability, and entrenched poverty follow if this is not done. Uneducated girls and women are less likely to overcome social barriers to contraceptive use, such as domineering paternalistic cultures or religious prohibition. Fertility remains high and human suffering increases. A few heroic efforts, such as Family Planning 2020, are attempting to stimulate family planning programs across the continent, and there are some rays of success. The 2015 figures from Kenya and Zambia show a substantial strengthening of contraceptive use among married women. In Kenya, 58% of married women now use modern contraceptives, and in Zambia this measure has risen from 33% to 45% between 2012 and 2015.

In both cases, the catalysts for improvement were government commitment and commensurate financing. The virtuous circle may not be completely out of reach, but many more African governments must make haste and provide substantial investment in contraceptive information and access for their people. Many factors are known to contribute to Africa's continued pace, these include but not limited to the following:

- **Lots of high fertility countries.** Globally, there are 21 countries that have high fertility, meaning than an average woman has five or more children in her lifetime. Of these countries, 19 are in Africa, while the other two are in Asia. The largest is Nigeria, which according to another report will have 10% of the world's births by 2050.
- **Major gains in life span.** Life expectancy in Africa rose by six years in the 2000s, double the global average. Africa's average life expectancy is expected to gain about 19 years by 2100, rising to age 78.
- **Major declines in child mortality.** In the past decade, the rate of children under age five who died fell from 142 per 1000 to 99 per 1000. This global fall was from 71 per 1000 in 2000–2005 to 50 per 1000 in 2010–2015.

THE FUTURE OF AFRICA'S POPULATION GROWTH

The future growth of Africa is not so different from that of Asia, particularly China. The urbanization of China represents the greatest demographic shift of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, and the urbanization of Africa will be one of the largest shifts for the rest of this century. According to the Globe, Africa had only eight people per square kilometer in 1950. By 2050,

this figure will go up to 80. The shift will be deeply felt in the continent's megacities. For example, Congo's Kinshasa is expected to grow to 20 million by 2030 and Lagos is expected to grow to 24 million by 2030, this being the population of present-day Shanghai, the largest city in the world.

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM AFRICA'S GROWING POPULATION

- Although the world population as at 2015 is currently growing at a slower rate than was experienced a decade ago, it is projected that by 2050 there will be 9.7 billion people in the world. It is astonishing to note that out of the 2.4 billion people who will be added to the world's population in that year, about 1.3 billion, or more than half, will come from Africa.
- The UN's new projections are based on what is called the medium projection variant, which assumes a decline in fertility in countries where large families are prevalent, and an increase in those countries where on average there are less than two children per woman. However, a rapid increase is still anticipated in Africa, as the continent is expected to witness substantial growth after 2050. The implication is that the continent will account for 39% of world population by 2100, while Asia's population will fall to 44%.
- Between 2015 and 2100, the populations of 33 countries have a high probability of tripling. Following this projection, the populations of some 28 African countries will double by 2050. Specifically, Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Niger, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia will witness a five times population increase by 2100.
- In the next 35 years, half of the world's total population growth will be concentrated in nine countries, and five will be in Africa: Nigeria, DRC, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Others are India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the USA.
- Statistically, by the year 2015, Nigeria occupies the seventh position and is the only African country among the ten most populous countries in the world. In 2050, it will become the world's third largest country, surpassing the USA. The populations of Ethiopia, Egypt, DRC, and South Africa will also increase at an alarming rate. According to this indication, by 2100 five out of the ten most populous countries will be in Africa.
- Globally, some 21 countries are classified as "high-fertility" nations, where an average woman has five or more children in her lifetime. These countries account for 9% of the world's population, and 19 of them are in Africa, of which the largest are Nigeria, DRC, Tanzania, and Uganda.
- Africa has witnessed a decline in fertility in the last ten years, from 4.9 children per woman in 2005 to 4.7 children in 2015. This trend is expected to continue in the continent for the next three decades. In contrast, Europe witnessed an increase in total fertility from 1.55 children per woman to 1.6 children over the same period.

- At 98 births per 1000 women who are between 15 and 19 years of age, Africa had the highest adolescent fertility in the world between 2010 and 2015. This, no doubt, had negative implications on the health and social life of the people.
- Globally, life expectancy has risen by three years since 2000, and is now 70 years. This increase was mostly noticeable in Africa. Interestingly, the life expectancy in Africa, which was 60 between 2010 and 2015, is still lagging behind that of Asia (72), Latin America (75), Europe (77), and Northern America (79).
- Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a noticeable decline in the numbers of children who die before their fifth birthday (from 142 to 99 deaths per 1000 live births by the year 2015). This decline is unconnected with the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.
- In recent times, populations in high net income countries have been shrinking as deaths exceed births. The UN projects that this will be countered by net migrant growth by 2050, as migration will account for 82% of population growth in developed countries, with Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean being the net senders. Presently, none of the countries in Africa have been included among the world's top five senders. In countries such as India, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, and Mexico, more than 100,000 emigrations are recorded annually.
- In Africa, six out of every ten people are below 24 years of age. The implication is that if the right policies are put in place, the continent could gain from this demographic dividend.
- In 1980, five out of the leading ten countries with the youngest populations were African. As at 2014, all the leading ten countries are African. This situation is projected to remain the same till 2100. In fact, Niger is presently topping the list, as she has the highest fertility of 7.63 children per woman.
- Africa also has the highest numbers of workers (20–64 years) per retiree (aged over 65), at 12.9 people. Japan, the country with the lowest Potential Support Ratio (PSR), has 2.1 workers per retiree, a trend consistent in the developed world, which heralds pressures on healthcare and old age social protection systems for them.
- Mauritius is the only country in Africa that will see its population decrease at any point before 2050, with its current 1.27 million shrinking to 1.25 million.
- African countries are often called out for marginalizing women, but in ten of them (Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia) the ratio of males to females is exactly 1:1. In another 27 countries, fewer males are born for every 100 females. Countries with significant Muslim or Arab populations tend to have more males than females.

AFRICAN POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Despite the challenges and revelations, most African scholars, such as, Ohadike and Adansi (1989), and Mosley and Branic (1989), believe that African problems are not primarily related to population growth but to other challenges, which if surmounted would transform Africa into a much-desired continent in terms of economic growth and development. Listed below are some of the arguments on about African population growth and the proffered solutions.

- Poverty is the real problem

Hans Rosling (2013) noted that Africa would become a very important part of the emerging consuming world.

The factors that are driving population growth in Africa are the same that are attributable to past population growth in Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Such instances exist when a society experiences a high and rising birth rate alongside a high infant mortality rate. Thereafter, the death rate goes south, followed consequently by the birth rate. According to Rosling, Africa would likely follow the path of Asia, where education reduces infant mortality and family size.

He further noted that Addis Ababa (the capital of Ethiopia) has an average of 1.6 children per woman. Generally in Africa, a woman has an average of 4.5 children. While most educated and enlightened African women have limited themselves to two children, most illiterate and poor women give birth to six or seven children. Although he noted that no future government in Africa may find a solution to the problem, he emphasized that if women from extremely poor areas continue to give birth to six children or more, the population will double in one generation, which will create a serious problem for Africa as a continent. The issue he was emphasizing is that poverty and not population growth is the fundamental problem confronting Africa.

- Investment in human resources is the key to unlock African population and economic problems

Isabella Aboderin, a senior research scientist at the African Population Health Research Centre in Nairobi, sees Africa as a young continent. However, the number of older people will grow more rapidly in Sub-Saharan Africa than in any other continent. In fact, after attaining the age of 60, the possibility of an individual living an additional 16–18 years is higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world. She noted that within the next three to five decades, most people who fall into the category of youth now will have reached old age. Those who fall within the working population must utilize their income and resources to take care of their children's education and also support older people.

There appears to be an assumption among the younger population that the older population is unproductive and has nothing more to offer. This author suggests that the capacity of older people should be enhanced to enable the younger people to tap their wealth of experience and as such contribute meaningfully to economic development.

- Improvements in infrastructure and creation of jobs

Obadiah Mailafiaa, former deputy governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria and former presidential adviser, believes that many African cities are much more crowded than ever. A lot of challenges are emanating from the population increase, and this is quite palpable. One can see this not just in the heavy traffic, but also in the way people put pressure on social services, water, electricity, schools and other infrastructures. He opined that “from an economist’s point of view, it’s often the case that increase in population is synonymous with increase in GDP, because there will be more labour force, more consumption, more spending.” He further noted that “it tends to be reflected in an overall rise in GDP” and that “in this day, age quantitative growth is not enough. It’s not the ultimate indicator of better conditions for citizens.” The fact is that in some of our airports there are pressures on space for parking private jets, while most Nigerian streets are filled with poor people, who have no opportunities and no hope for the future.

Mailafiaa emphasized that “my worry is the fact that we are not making arrangements to cater for this rising population. There’s no country in the world that I know of that has over 70 million people that does not have a good rail network. Our roads are cluttered up with heavy trucks. There are pressures on social service like health, education and the rest of it, hence the need to plan for population and families.” He further opined that “we must create jobs; expand opportunities for young people to be engaged and busy, otherwise the situation that occurred in Arab Spring could repeat itself in Nigeria.”

MEASURES TO CONTROL POPULATION GROWTH TRENDS IN AFRICA

One of the development issues that most developing countries in the world are facing is population growth. According to UN population statistics, the world population grew by 30% between 1990 and 2010. An excessive increase in population has various adverse effects, including undue pressure on natural resources. An increase in the number of people means more consumption and more exploitation of fixed and exhaustible resources. The problem that is associated with population growth is not a universal challenge, but it is limited to nations whose economies have not yet achieved full potential and development. In the past few decades, Africa has joined China and India to witness an extremely high population growth rate. Interestingly, China, which is the most populated nation, has devised a means of controlling her population, although this method cannot be replicated in other countries.

Below are the most effective measures which can be employed to control population growth:

- Delayed marriage

The problem of child marriage is prominent in certain countries with a high population, such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Marriage at a tender age leads to a long span for giving birth. Young age marriage also hinders people from acquiring necessary education and the awareness required to be informed on the negative consequences of early marriage and having too many children. A UN report has suggested that there would be a significant decline in world population if the legal age for marriage was set at 20 years.

- Medical facilities

One fundamental problem confronting most developing countries today is that of limited and highly centralized medical facilities. Because of the rural–urban dichotomy in most developing countries, good medical facilities, including hospitals and doctors, are limited to urban centers. The resultant effect is high infant mortality rate in rural areas. Rural people, in an attempt to ensure that at least some of their children survive, give birth to more children, thus contributing to population growth. If there are optimum medical facilities, the population rate will almost certainly decline.

- Legislative actions

It is important to state that little will be achieved if family planning and the use of contraceptives remains optional. Urgent action and strict legal steps are required to tackle the problem of child marriage, child labor, slavery, and beggary. Enforcement of laws related to these problems must be put in place.

- Providing incentives

Incentives have proved to be an efficient policy measure in combating most development issues, including population. Providing necessary health, educational, and financial incentives can be effective measures of controlling population, as can be certain incentive policies, such as payment of certain sums of money to people with one or no children or free or discounted education for those with a single child. These measures have been adopted in some developing countries facing population-related challenges and have proved to be useful.

- Create awareness

Necessary awareness must be created about the negative consequences of having too many children. Government and non-governmental institutions should be involved in necessary awareness campaigns regarding how people

can handle the issue of family planning and how they can provide good nutrition, education, and medical facilities for their sizable families. An increase in population can lead to an increase in levels of illiteracy, disease, and malnutrition, and the attendant effects all these must be communicated to the general public.

- Women empowerment

In most developing countries, women are not considered equivalent to men in terms of force and might. Such opinions are extremely common in Islamic countries, and even in India and Bangladesh. Gender discrimination is a major reason for population growth. People keep giving birth in order to have more sons than daughters. Empowering women with a say in matters concerning them, such as childbirth, and educating them to fight against discrimination will ensure a healthy and aware society.

- Eradicate poverty

Most poor countries have higher population growth than rich ones. Poverty has a direct relationship with population growth. In the developing countries of Asia and Africa, child labor, slave trading, and human trafficking are highly prevalent. African countries, for example, still have maximum reporting of slave trading, though trading of humans is legally banned everywhere in the world. People give birth to children, and then sell them to rich people, who in turn employ these children in various laborious and unethical tasks. Even if they don't sell their children, these parents force their kids to beg or work at a very tender age, so as to earn some extra money for the family. These people believe that more children mean more hands for begging and work, and thus more money. Without concrete measures for growth and poverty eradication, other methods of population control may prove to be ineffective.

- Education

Education forms the backbone of an individual and an economy. Once educated, people know and understand the harm which a high population growth rate possesses. Education, especially female education, can work wonders in controlling population. An educated man and woman can readily understand the benefits of a small family. Without sufficient education, most measures such as awareness campaigns and female empowerment will prove to be insufficient and pointless.

- Availability of cheap contraceptives

Ensuring that people have access to contraceptives will help reduce cases of unwanted pregnancies. Government-owned hospitals should be compelled to provide cheap and efficient birth control medicine. The use of condoms and

contraceptives must be advertised and promoted. It is important to note that contraceptives have not only proved to be an important population control measure, but have also prevented the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, such as AIDS.

- Development

Why the enormous population and the increasing rate of it is the biggest challenge faced by the developing nations of Africa and Asia, while the same is little or no threat in countries such as America, Europe, and Japan. Lack of development implies high poverty, high illiteracy, high discrimination, lack of awareness, lack of medical facilities, and thus in turn increased population growth. Any economy is termed developed if its population is not discriminated against and is justly treated. By reducing discrimination between gender and class, and ensuring development of the whole population instead of just a segment of society, would eliminate the challenge of population growth for once.

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From Hard to Human Security: Rethinking the Security Architecture in Africa

Adewale Sunday Owolabi

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have investigated the relationship between military spending and economic development, especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Some have argued that heavy military spending has a negative effect on economic growth and sometimes retards economic development (Yildirim and Öcal 2016). Others have observed that, since a state has a responsibility to protect its citizens from internal and external aggression, this justifies the heavy spending on military defence. (Walinsky 1963, cited in Dowdle 1992, 153). Indeed, the main purpose of the state is to guarantee protection of its citizens; thus, it is essential to give the military a higher priority in budgeting than other government endeavours. The implication of this is that there cannot be any real economic development in a society in which people's everyday activities are being threatened by violence and an organised force (Walinsky 1963, cited in Dowdle 1992, 153). This assumption is not only wrong but unrealistic for developmental purposes. As Black (2010) noted, the turn of the twenty-first century marked another era in development and securities studies, and there has been a paradigm shift from heavy spending on hard security to heavy spending on human security.

This chapter seeks to argue that heavy spending on the military cannot lead to any economic benefits for a state, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This is because investment in arms has no direct impact on people's empowerment, which is a basic ingredient of sustainable development. In addition, poverty and inequality are two major causes of violence in society and these issues

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cannot be solved by heavy spending on arms. Nigeria has been chosen as the case study for this paper. The link between poverty and conflict in the northern region of Nigeria (where there is a high rate of poverty) will be examined.

The main argument of this chapter is that, if people were adequately empowered, there would be little or no need to invest so much in military equipment. Lack of formal education, bad governance, and economic insecurity make people discontented about the government and make them more aggressive towards the state. Thus, investment in human security (defined as the effective steps taken by a government to reduce poverty and engender economic growth and development) could generate peace and internal stability, which is what is needed for political stability.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first focuses on an empirical review of relevant literature on the relationship between military spending and economic development. The second will deal with an analysis of human security. The third will make recommendations regarding human security, and the fourth will conclude the chapter.

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been a paradigm shift since the turn of the twenty-first century in development studies and its related disciplines (politics, securities studies, international relations, global governance, and many more) from the traditional focus on heavy spending on a military budget at the expense of other sectors, such as healthcare, education, social amenities, and welfare. Black (2010) noted that the imperative to safeguard human security received greater attention than military hardware acquisition in the twenty-first century, especially from the United Nations (UN). Black (2010, 106) emphasised the commitment of the then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, to freedom from fear and freedom from want as the tenets of human security. This implies that human security denotes an aspiration towards enhancing important aspects of human lives in such a way that leads to human freedom and human fulfilment and satisfaction (UNCHS 2003, cited in Black 2010, 107).

Heavy spending on the military has been said to be the cause of the debt burden in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Azam and Feng (2015) and Danso (1990) noted that there is a symbiotic relationship between the debt burden and military spending which has a negative effect on the economic growth of a country. This implies that most developing countries spend a high percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP) on military expenditure, which has a negative effect on economic development. This is because money that was borrowed from external sources is being used for procurement of military hardware from abroad instead of utilising it for industrialisation and human empowerment.

Ahmed (2012) noted that, despite the fact that many sub-Saharan African countries rely on foreign aid for development purposes, the money received from the donor countries' agencies has been misused owing to misplaced

priorities. Ahmed (2012) further noted that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa spend more on military expenditure than other important sectors, such as healthcare and education. Investment in healthcare and education, for example, would have a positive effect on the economy. Meanwhile, in the developed world, the reverse is the case. Governments of developed countries spend more of their GDP on healthcare, education, and social amenities than they spend on arms.

For example, Nigeria spent 1.1% of its GDP on military defence and 0.8% on healthcare and education. America spent 1.7% of its GDP on military defence and 4.1% on healthcare and education. Burundi spent 8.1% of its GDP on military defence and only 3.6% on healthcare. Meanwhile, Spain spent 1.25% of its GDP on military defence and more on healthcare and education.

Most African countries spent more on importing arms than their counterparts in the developed world. The implication of this is that, if less money is being spent on healthcare, education, social amenities, welfare, and other important aspects of human development than is being spent on the military, how can sustainable human development which is aligned with the concept of human security be achieved? Another implication is that there are losers and winners in terms of the import and export of military equipment around the world, in the sense that Africa imports most of its arms from advanced industrialised countries. Consequently, trade which benefits the arms-producing countries is created. For example, even though the USA is the top military spender (39% of global arms purchases), at the same time it is also the top exporter of arms at around 29%, followed by Russia at 27% (Azam and Feng 2015). This implies that an advanced industrialised country such as the USA benefits from the sales of weapons around the world, especially in Africa, where countries spend a huge amount of money on procuring military arms at the expense of other important institutions, such as education, healthcare, roads, and water services.

Nevertheless, the concept of human security can sometimes be confusing as it lacks precision (Paris 2001). For example, is it not the case that the protection of citizens from external aggression is an essential ingredient of human security? The response is clearly yes; however, in the contemporary world and as the evidence suggests, civil war within a country is more likely to happen than interstate war owing to a lack of government concern for disadvantaged groups of society. For instance, the current (2016) crisis in Syria is a result of the failure of the authoritarian government to make room for the political emancipation of the people and of harsh economic conditions; thus, the people staged a peaceful protest against the government. The government responded by using military force to suppress the protest, which then escalated to civil war. The same argument can be advanced in terms of the Boko Haram Islamic insurgents in Nigeria. Poverty and illiteracy are two of the reasons why the militant group was established in the first place. Additionally, most members joined it as a result of poverty and a lack of formal education (Weeraratne 2015, 17). Crucially, despite the huge

amount of money been spent on arms to combat Boko Haram, it is still operating. This implies that attention must be given to other aspects of security (such as human security) if peace is to be achieved.

In support of the above view, Kofi Annan noted that the concept of human security goes beyond the absence of violence. He explained:

Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. (UNCHS 2003, cited in Black 2010, 108)

The implication of this is that security has gone beyond traditional investment in arms and ammunitions and heavy investment in the military. Thus, human security is a systematic approach to security which aims to tackle the causes of social disorderliness and violence in the first place (which could include poverty and a feeling of relative deprivation) and to empower people through education and the provision of social amenities at a relatively low and affordable cost.

Indeed, the notion of human security could be viewed from two perspectives (Paris 2001): the first is safety from threats (such as hunger, disease, and repression) and the second is protection from disruptions to one's pattern of daily life (UNDP 1994, cited in Paris 2001, 89). The implication of this is that poverty must be alleviated in every society in order to safeguard national security; thus, governments should make considerable efforts to ensure that there is justice in the distribution and redistribution of resources. Additionally, ordinary people's basic essential needs must be provided if true national security is to be achieved. Conversely, investment in military spending may be useful in an ethnically diverse society, in the sense that the military can act as a unifying agent in the country and can prevent ethnic rivalry from disrupting the political system (Jackman 1978, cited in Dowdle 1992, 157). This means that there could be an attempt by an ethnic group which feels neglected to stage a coup and to take control of the state from the dominant ethnic group. For example, a crisis in Nigeria led to a military coup on 15 January 1966. The Hausa tribe felt that they had been maltreated and thus staged a countercoup in July 1966, through which a Hausa man became the military head of state. However, while the fact that the military should be well financed is not being disputed, professionalism and unity among military officers are more important in terms of developing national defences than the amount of money spent on arms and ammunitions.

In another empirical study, Dunne (2012) examined the effect of military spending on economic growth and development using a large cross-country panel dataset in the post-Cold War period. Dunne (2012) noted that, immediately after the Cold War, there was a reduction in military spending;

however, he also noted that, in recent years, military spending has increased, especially in low-income countries. Dunne (2012) emphasised that these resources should have been used for other purposes which would positively influence the welfare of the people. This is because heavy military spending for restoring peace does not have any significant positive effect on economic growth and development; on the contrary, it may have a negative effect thereon, especially in sub-Saharan African countries which use part of their borrowed money to import military hardware. This means that efforts should be made to reduce the resources that are being devoted to military hardware procurement, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Based on the above literature review, it is clear that investment in military hardware alone cannot provide stability or social and economic development, which would guarantee peaceful coexistence in a political system. Governments must invest in other sectors such as health, education, and social amenities, which would make life better for their people. When people feel content, they think less about violence. However, when they are disconnected from their government and are in severe poverty, they become disengaged from the state and therefore start to think about other means by which they may overcome their challenges. This means that the inability of the governments of African countries to take care of their citizens (by investing in education, healthcare, building good roads, creating jobs, developing a corruption-free society, justice and equity, etc.) causes violence in the political system and therefore leads to disequilibrium.

This position is supported by Marxian class analysis, which provides that a few privileged people enjoy the resources of the state at the expense of the majority. This leads to a class struggle between the rich and the poor. Marx and Engels (1848) noted that this class struggle is irreconcilable in the sense that the interests of the ruling classes are quite different from those of the poor. This can explain why the ruling classes in Africa invest so much in military arms in order to protect themselves from the poor, who could one day rise up to fight and take control of their own destiny as predicted by Marx and Engels (1848).

The next section will consider why it is necessary to invest in human security (defined as investment in education, healthcare, road, creating jobs, good governance, etc.), using Nigeria as a case study. The focus will be on the northern part of Nigeria, where the government has neglected human development for so long. The section will also consider how poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment have contributed to the development of the Boko Haram militant organisation, which has risen up to challenge the state.

RETHINKING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN AFRICA

Even though military defence is an important function of a government and does require a certain amount of the national budget, heavy spending on military defence at the expense of other sectors such as healthcare, education, and social amenities could weaken economic development and lead to an increase

in poverty, which might cause conflict and civil war if the poor feel that the ruling class is exploiting them. As shown in the literature review, there is a connection between poverty and insecurity. People must be adequately empowered if the real meaning of security (which is aligned with the concept of sustainable development and human security) is to be achieved. Thus, to have peace and stability in a political system, poverty must be eradicated, jobs must be created, and there must be equal opportunities for all (UNCHS 2003, cited in Black 2010, 108). This implies that development must resolve poverty, unemployment, and inequality among the people. When these three factors are improved, the relevant government does not need to invest much in military equipment as there will be little or no internal threat to citizens' security.

This section will examine Nigeria's poverty profile in order to explain the link between poverty and insecurity and why it is more important to invest in human security than military hardware in order to avoid internal aggression. This chapter mainly focuses on the northern part of Nigeria. Despite the fact that this area has a greater population than the south and west, it is the most undeveloped region in terms of education, healthcare, roads, and employment. The north is mostly populated by poor people, many of whom have no formal education, and those that do have access to education have not received the best possible as the classes are overcrowded for the most part. Consequently, the majority of northern Nigerians are desperate to accept any offer of money in exchange for their a better life. This makes it easy for Boko Haram to convince young people to join the sect (Weeraratne 2015, 10).

The Nigerian economy is monocultural and dominated by the oil sector. The country has a very young population (Cortez et al. 2016). More than half (63.3%) is below the age of 25 and 22.5% is in the age range 10–19 (Cortez et al. 2016, 1). However, despite the population's youth and the abundance of natural resources, the country has remained one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 152 out of the 188 countries on the Human Development Index (Nigeria Human Development Report 2015, 1). Crucially, the Nigerian government has failed to utilise its youthful population for developmental purposes. Indeed, the rate of child labour is high, especially in the northern part of Nigeria and for girls. According to the Nigeria UNICEF website (2015), child labour is 'the work that is mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children and deprives them of opportunities for schooling and development'.

Exploitative child labour in Nigeria as a result of poverty is endemic in the country, even though there is legislation in place which forbids child labour. The situation is similar to slavery, whereby parents take their children to work as house-helpers while they collect the money (Uzodike 1990, cited in Ball 1991, 416). The corollary is that there is a growing number of children whose rights are being abused on a daily basis.

This means that, owing to the mental stress that results from child labour, it is easy to manipulate children. This is why they get married at a very young age, thereby preventing themselves from developing fully. More importantly, terrorist groups such as Boko Haram exploit this opportunity and enlist children in their organisations (Weeraratne 2015).

Girls are usually found on the street during school hours selling items to support their parents. This is because if they do not do so there is nobody to cater for the family. Their parents are too old to sell on the streets any more. Unlike in Europe, there is no social security programme in place to support the elderly.

Interestingly, as of 2015, Nigeria is the 34th top spender on military hardware in the world and third in Africa (SIPRI 2016). This shows that Nigeria spent more of its resources on arms acquisition at the expense of education, which is the key to sustainable development and human security.

Unfortunately, despite this heavy spending, it has been very difficult for the country's military forces to defeat the Boko Haram insurgents. This implies that there is more to security than investment in military hardware.

However, there are more poor people in the north than in the west. Table 50.1 shows the geographical and regional distribution of poverty in the country using a multidimensional model of poverty. As a result of population growth, the actual number of people living in poverty remains high, around 58 million in 2010/2012 and 2012/2013 (World Bank 2014, cited in Cortez et al. 2016, 1). However, the poverty recorded in the states in the northern region is much higher than in the states in the western region. One possible explanation could be that most northern people do not go to school, especially those whose parents are poor.

The table indicates that there are more people who are in severe poverty in the north of Nigeria than in other regions of the country. Table 50.2 provides the head count poverty ratio at the regional level. Analysis of Table 50.2 shows that poverty is quite low in the west of Nigeria; however, as can be deduced from this, there are more poor and destitute people in the north of Nigeria than in the south. Indeed, Nigeria has been characterised as having a huge social economy disparity between the north and the south. More than 50% of Nigerian people are poor, with Zamfara and Yobe having the highest numbers. It is also noted that while there has been a significant decrease in poverty in the south, poverty is increasing in the north. It is much higher in north-west Nigeria (World Bank 2014, cited in Cortez et al. 2016, 1). The implication of this is that when people are considered to be in multidimensional poverty, there is a serious threat to the country's security, regardless of the resources devoted to military expenditure. One day, the people will revolt against their own government to take control of their situation. This is evident from the daily Boko Haram attacks.

Table 50.1 Geographical distribution of poverty in Nigeria

Nigeria

OPHI Country Briefing December 2015


J. Multidimensional Poverty across Sub-national Regions

Region	MPI (H x A)	Percentage of Population:						
		H (Incidence) k ≥ 33.3%	A (Intensity)	Vulnerable to Poverty k = 20%-33.3%	In Severe Poverty k ≥ 50%	Destitute	Inequality Among the MPI Poor	Population Share
Nigeria	0.303	53.3%	56.8%	17.5%	32.8%	34.6%	0.297	100%
Urban	0.132	28.1%	47.0%	22.2%	10.5%	-	-	39.9%
Rural	0.416	70.0%	59.5%	14.4%	47.7%	-	-	60.1%
Lagos	0.035	8.5%	41.1%	20.0%	1.1%	1.3%	0.045	4.6%
Osun	0.043	10.9%	39.7%	22.1%	1.5%	1.9%	0.051	1.9%
Anambra	0.050	11.2%	44.5%	19.1%	2.7%	3.1%	0.131	2.4%
Ekiti	0.051	12.9%	39.6%	27.0%	2.4%	2.8%	0.073	0.8%
Edo	0.080	19.2%	41.5%	23.9%	4.5%	6.5%	0.078	1.7%
Imo	0.083	19.8%	41.9%	24.0%	4.9%	6.2%	0.068	2.2%
Abia	0.088	21.0%	42.0%	25.3%	4.8%	7.7%	0.078	1.3%
Rivers	0.088	21.1%	41.6%	21.3%	4.7%	6.3%	0.073	2.8%
Akwa Ibom	0.099	23.8%	41.6%	22.8%	5.2%	7.2%	0.079	2.0%
Kwara	0.099	23.7%	41.9%	23.3%	6.2%	7.0%	0.096	1.5%
Delta	0.107	25.1%	42.5%	22.5%	6.6%	9.6%	0.106	2.1%
FCT (Abuja)	0.108	23.5%	45.7%	14.9%	9.5%	10.5%	0.142	0.8%
Ogun	0.112	26.4%	42.5%	30.5%	5.6%	9.3%	0.073	2.4%
Kogi	0.113	26.1%	43.2%	27.1%	6.4%	8.5%	0.076	1.8%
Bayelsa	0.120	29.0%	41.4%	26.8%	5.9%	8.6%	0.066	0.8%
Emugu	0.123	28.8%	42.6%	27.8%	6.9%	13.7%	0.093	2.1%
Ondo	0.127	27.9%	45.4%	26.6%	8.2%	11.0%	0.089	2.0%
Cross River	0.146	33.1%	44.2%	24.9%	9.0%	10.2%	0.106	1.8%
Oyo	0.155	29.4%	52.7%	24.7%	13.0%	14.8%	0.316	4.0%
Nasarawa	0.251	52.4%	48.0%	24.9%	23.2%	26.5%	0.127	1.7%
Ebonyi	0.265	56.0%	47.3%	25.1%	23.5%	26.6%	0.124	2.5%
Plateau	0.273	51.6%	52.9%	22.4%	25.9%	30.5%	0.238	1.8%
Benue	0.280	59.2%	47.3%	23.4%	24.8%	24.8%	0.131	3.5%
Adamawa	0.295	59.0%	49.9%	20.4%	27.7%	30.1%	0.203	2.1%
Kaduna	0.311	56.5%	55.1%	18.2%	34.1%	36.9%	0.267	5.2%
Niger	0.324	61.2%	52.9%	16.2%	33.2%	37.8%	0.223	4.5%
Borno	0.401	70.1%	57.2%	16.2%	49.3%	54.7%	0.201	3.5%
Kano	0.434	76.4%	56.8%	11.9%	48.2%	50.1%	0.265	8.9%
Taraba	0.448	77.7%	57.7%	13.4%	53.1%	51.2%	0.251	2.1%
Gombe	0.471	76.9%	61.2%	13.2%	56.1%	57.0%	0.300	1.6%
Katsina	0.520	82.2%	63.2%	10.8%	63.7%	60.8%	0.287	4.2%
Sokoto	0.548	85.3%	64.2%	8.2%	66.4%	66.8%	0.298	2.9%
Jigawa	0.552	88.4%	62.4%	6.5%	69.0%	70.2%	0.270	3.7%
Kebbi	0.553	86.0%	64.3%	8.7%	69.9%	71.3%	0.280	3.6%
Bauchi	0.583	86.6%	67.3%	6.4%	70.7%	66.3%	0.351	3.2%
Zamfara	0.605	91.9%	65.8%	5.8%	72.7%	74.1%	0.315	3.5%
Yobe	0.635	90.2%	70.4%	4.5%	77.6%	84.6%	0.292	2.6%

Source: OPHI Country Poverty Briefing (2015)

One of the challenges faced by Nigerians is the high cost of healthcare. Sambo et al. (2004) noted that the ‘pay as you go’ healthcare system, otherwise known as ‘out of pocket payment’, has denied healthcare to the poorest people in the country. Many children have died as a result of inaccessible and expensive healthcare and poverty. This is why Sen (2009, cited in Alkire et al. 2015, 6), argued that poverty ‘should be seen as capability deprivation’. This means that poverty cripples one’s ability to develop positively

Table 50.2 Head count poverty ratios of Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) poor and destitute at regional state level
L. Headcount Ratios of the MPI Poor and Destitute at the Sub-national Level



Source: OPHI Country Poverty Briefing (2015)

in society and to cater for others. The conditions are worse for those under the age of five. Male children are more affected than female. There are more cases of infant mortality in the north of Nigeria than in the south and west. This shows that life in northern Nigeria is a serious human security challenge which must be addressed. The region is the most problematic part of the country in terms of socio-economic development.

The implication of the above poverty analysis of Nigeria is that the failure of the government to render good governance which focuses on healthcare, education, social amenities, youth empowerment, and environmental protection as well as reducing the high level of corruption has a significantly negative impact on political stability. This is what gave rise to the Boko Haram insurgencies.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Following Kofi Annan, who was quoted earlier, every step towards human security is a link to poverty reduction, economic growth, and preventing conflict. In this way, Nigeria and other African governments must invest in the following sectors.

Education

‘Access to appropriate formal education is a universal pre-requisite for the enhancement of individual autonomy’ (Doyal and Gough 1991, 215). In their research conducted in Nigeria, Akerele et al. (2012) found that a high level of education reduces the likelihood of poverty. This implies that its attainment may have a significant impact on the reduction of poverty. Akerele et al. recommended that a basic universal education programme should be established and strengthened in order to tackle poverty. In the same vein, Doyal and Gough (1991) stated that, despite the differences in national educational systems worldwide, providing an appropriate education would strongly improve people’s wellbeing. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) identified the importance of universal primary education in combating poverty. Consequently, the World Bank has committed to invest an extra \$750 million in education, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa (Africa Research Bulletin 2010). Therefore, it is clear that education is crucial for human security purposes as it helps to empower people.

Food and Water

The eradication of poverty starts with the eradication of hunger. Every man, woman, and child has the right to adequate food (Social Watch 2008). Unfortunately, food insecurity has become a big challenge in the world today, especially in African states, where governments have failed to promote the growth of staple foods but instead rely on oil or cash crops to export abroad. On the one hand there is hunger and on the other there is poverty. For instance, the majority of people who work in agriculture in Ghana are women, and the

government has not promoted the growth of staple foods in rural areas. This has led to a rise in poverty across the country. Poverty is the greatest among farmers who grow basic foods, and the majority of them are women (Social Watch 2008).

In the same vein, safe water is critical for a person's health. Most poor people do not have access to safe pipe-borne water, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the Ghanaian government planned to privatise the urban water supply in March 2003, wanting profit without considering people's needs. The average Ghanaian could not afford to pay for the water which they were able to access prior to the government's decision (Social Watch 2003). About 78% of the urban poor do not have regular access to water, simply because it is typically sold for around \$0.34, or 54% of the minimum wage (Social Watch 2003).

In sum, good food and clean water are signs of good living conditions. They are also essential for measuring individual and household poverty levels, whether in developed or in developing countries.

Economic Security

Overpopulation and a lack of planning on the part of governments can result in economic insecurity. For instance, in Nigeria the absence of social amenities such as electricity and water has had a significant impact on economic growth. Another problem associated with economic insecurity is overreliance on a single source of revenue. For example, Nigeria is now facing food insecurity as a result of an overreliance on petroleum (Fasoyiro and Taiwo 2012, 340). While it was possible in the post-war years in Europe for governments to address the issue of economic insecurity through income maintenance (Doyal and Gough 1991, 210), the same cannot be said of most developing countries, especially in Africa. African leaders must develop an economic growth and development model which focuses on African distinctiveness. Jobs must be provided for the people. The rates of unemployment and underemployment in Nigeria are worsening every day, and are far higher than employment growth.

Healthcare

The importance of access to adequate healthcare cannot be overemphasized. It has been observed that access to primary healthcare provision can reduce the high rate of mortality and related diseases (Stewart 1985, 7; Cumper 1984, 3, cited in Doyal and Gough 1991, 204). However, most poor people do not have access to this, either because of its location or its cost (Doyal and Gough 1991, 204). For instance, while there is a National Health Service in Britain for its citizens, in Nigeria medical care is not free. This has been a huge challenge to poor people. Even in circumstances in which the local authorities introduced a free healthcare programme, staff members are not helpful. The 'out of pocket payment' system has denied basic healthcare to the poorest people in Nigeria for the past twenty-five years (Sambo et al. 2004).

Housing

Doyal and Gough (1991) observed that good housing is one of the prerequisites for good living conditions, whether in advanced countries or in developing countries.

There are some universal housing needs which are applicable throughout the world. Nevertheless, some scholars have commented that the concept of a slum is a product of the West (Drakakin 1979, cited in Doyal and Gough 1991, 196). Despite cultural differences, houses must always offer protection from extreme climatic conditions (e.g., the cold) and from pests and other diseases (Doyal and Gough 1991, 196). If houses are well protected in this way, they can protect a person from diseases that can lead to death. African governments must invest in housing schemes that protect less privileged people.

CONCLUSION

Having conducted a literature review on military spending and economic growth, this chapter has found that heavy investment in arms may have a negative effect on economic development, especially in Africa, where governments may use borrowed money to purchase arms. This chapter has also examined the link between poverty and insecurity by using Nigeria as a case study, where Islamic militants from the poorest region (the north) of the country cited corruption, bad leadership, inequality, and immorality as pretexts for rising against the government. As evidence from the geographical distribution of poverty in Nigeria shows (Table 50.2), the northern part of the country is poorer than other regions. It does not have a good educational system; and girls are more prone to be involved in child labour than boys. This level of poverty has helped the Boko Haram Islamic terrorist group to recruit young people who have no education and little or no awareness of what a good life entails. This chapter suggests, therefore, that if the Nigerian government prioritises improvements in the quality of its education, healthcare, employment provision, housing, food and water, and economic safety (all of which are attributes of human security), there would be no need to invest so much in military hardware.

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Research, Innovation and Higher Education in Sub-Saharan Africa

Chika A. Ezeanya-Esiobu

INTRODUCTION

Higher education has served as the coordinating platform for research, innovation and sustainable national advancement for many industrialized countries. Many industrializing countries, understanding the place of higher education, have placed emphasis on the creation of research hubs whose outputs are distilled in industry and among the general population towards the growth of a core innovation base. Owing to challenges ranging from lack of awareness to corruption, many African countries still struggle with building research centers of excellence across premier institutions of higher learning. The dearth of serious research in Africa's institutions of higher learning is noticeable in the low level of innovation output and in the absence of a strengthened base for coordinating creativity and innovation in the arts, social sciences, sciences and technology.

Historically speaking, the four walls of most first-generation African universities and institutions of higher learning were created to shut out research, creativity and innovation, these establishments having been created within an imperial culture. The inevitability of independence for the colonized territories after World War II forced colonial authorities such as Britain to seek to establish institutions of higher learning that would provide the "kind of indigenous leadership that had acquired Western skills and a 'modern' outlook" (Mazrui 2003, 64). The universities that emerged were designed to provide bureaucratic support to outgoing colonial administrators and not necessarily

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to “help Africa close the technological gap with the more advanced countries” (Abdi and Cleghorn 2005, 26). Curricula in African institutions of higher learning was Eurocentric in outlook from inception, and did not promote research but instead a continued dependence on Europe for intellectual stimulation and advancement. Eurocentric teaching and learning, especially in such fields as liberal arts and literary education, was promoted at the expense of research and investment in vocational and practical training or technological literacy within the African reality and/or the indigenous knowledge paradigm. The dependence on foreign curricula, agenda and even textbooks led Professor Ali Mazrui to note that African universities are more like “multinational corporations, with their headquarters outside Africa” (Mazrui 1978, 298). The resultant effect is a university model that in the twenty-first century is still struggling to shed itself of its rigidly foreign nature, and which has alienated rather than integrated Africa’s authentic need and societal realities in teaching, learning and research.

The disconnect between Africa’s reality and its research institutions exemplified by higher education goes beyond the churning out of generations of graduates whose mindsets are geared towards imitation rather than originality to the continued dependence on external aid for research funding and the setting of research agenda. Independent thinking, authentic generation of ideas from one’s experiences and environment, and the liberty to question one’s reality are foundational in building a culture that promotes creativity and innovation. The setting of research in Africa’s higher education system does not promote a culture that moves researchers towards creativity and innovation.

This chapter will look at contemporary history in order to explore the origins of the research inertia that plagues many African universities—outside just a few. The chapter will focus mostly on the influence of external factors such as development aid, although it acknowledges—but is constrained by space from exploring—internal factors such as corruption, military dictatorships and outmoded cultural influences.

BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH IN AFRICA’S HIGHER EDUCATION

Among the reasons advanced for delays in granting independence to African countries was that Africans, who had been given minimal access to education by the colonialists, would be unable to effectively manage their own affairs. Soon after independence, therefore, it became necessary for these countries to invest heavily in the education sector in order to train the necessary manpower for national development. Although emphasis was placed on primary and post-primary education, the need for institutions of higher learning was great, as many African countries had no universities at the time of independence. Although the primary rationale for the establishment of higher education in Africa was to produce highly trained personnel who were capable of replacing expatriates, it also became necessary that there was need for universities as research centers that would cater to the demands for economic, political and

social expansion, which independence was destined to generate. For most African countries, post-independence, therefore, the establishment of a national university became an obligatory sign of that independence, together with a national flag, currency and anthem. The smallest of the colonies in Africa, deemed too insignificant to be equipped with one university all to themselves, were lumped together and one regional university was established. An example was Makerere University in Kampala, Uganda (Mamdani 2008, 2). In the bigger countries such as Nigeria, an immediate post-independence Nigeria had only one university in 1961, with about 1000 students (Mamdani 2008, 3).

Most African governments could not afford the enormous funding needed to make higher education accessible to the majority of the population. Immediate post-colonial governments therefore demanded increased aid for education from the international community. The United Nations and the major world powers responded to this plea, not necessarily out of deep-seated feelings of empathy or humanitarian considerations, but more in response to unfolding global realities. The commencement of the Cold War, the resultant shifting of alliances and emerging realignment of interests presented the reality that unstable governments and a disillusioned citizenry in any part of the world could pose serious risks to the rest of the globe (Mazrui 1978). Through Western-style education and training of the majority, the United Nations and major world powers sought to mitigate instability in emerging African countries. In his last annual report, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld stated that education held “the key not only to material welfare of the newly independent countries, but also to the very stability of the new states” (Mazrui 1978, 44).

The funding of education in Africa attracted the attention of donors such as the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—whose director-general described the problem of education in Africa as “far and away the biggest single task facing UNESCO” (Mazrui 1978, 44). From the 1960s onwards, UNESCO’s yearly budget gave priority to funding the expansion of education in Africa. Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) was first in line, being allocated the “largest single amount ever devoted in a single year to a single country” (Mazrui 1978, 44). Former colonial powers such as Britain and France were also very much involved as donor nations in assisting their ex-colonies to build education systems. These agencies and bilateral relationships provided wider assistance for Africa’s deprived education sector, mostly through the provision of teachers, volunteers, shipping of textbooks and school materials and the granting of scholarships to African children.

By depending on external agencies and governments for the funding of Africa’s education, the continent denied itself the much-needed capacity to intervene and change the colonially bequeathed structure and, most importantly, to provide the program content for its education system. It was a case of “either you accept colonial tutelage or your educational progress will be retarded” (Mazrui 1978, 44). Part of the evidence for the heavy presence of external forces in Africa’s education is that as late as 1978, up to 50% of the teaching staff of an appreciable number of countries in both English- and

French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa were non-Africans. These foreigners, lacking an understanding of the local terrain, insisted on their own paradigm being reflected in the curricula. In 1969, almost a decade after Nigeria gained her independence from the British, 64% of the ex-officio professors and department heads represented in the Senate were expatriates (Berghe 1973). The foreign nature of the curricula did not go unnoticed in all cases. An instance of this was the student revolt against the Americanization of the law syllabus in the Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam. Although the new syllabus was presumably an improvement on the previously British colonially imposed one, the law students would not accept it, complaining that it was “an American intrusion into the academic process” (Mazrui 1978, 205).

CURRICULUM, RESEARCH AGENDA AND RELEVANCE

In addition to a lack of resources and available African manpower, the foreign-based agenda that undergirded teaching and research in Africa’s institutions of higher learning is one of the factors that has been upheld for the lack of a viable research culture throughout the continent. Many industrialized countries in their days of growth emphasized authenticity in teaching and research. Even in the numerous cases where it was necessary to borrow ideas from other already industrialized nations, aspiring countries were careful to ensure that local knowledge, culture and reality served as foundations. After the Meiji era, Japan consciously emphasized the assimilation of Western technology, rather than its own literary and verbal culture. The Japanese slogan was “Western technique, Japanese Spirit,” which implies the retention of Japanese systems, practices and processes. The new technological knowhow and scientific expertise so acquired were distilled through Japanese paradigms, analyzed within Japanese culture and used to produce the great era of innovation that launched Japan into the industrialized countries class.

In several of Africa’s higher education institutions, the study of such areas of life that are central to African societies continues to receive marginal attention. In the field of pharmacology, the established efficacy of numerous herbal remedies has not led to the mainstreaming of their study among Africa’s pharmacology students. The Eurocentric curricula being run across African universities, which guides the continent’s research agenda to a large extent, are not open to it. There is still a tendency to categorize African medical practice as, at best, some form of alternative medicine, and at worst, as superstitious and irrelevant. However, African herbs are, to an appreciable extent, mostly natural treatments that are derived from plants (Baronov 2008). In traditional bone-setting, numerous Africans would rather patronize indigenous bonesetters rather than orthopedic medical doctors, as quite a few of the former are renowned for their capacity to treat even the most difficult cases.

In other fields such as agriculture, not much attention has been given by Africa’s institutions of higher learning to teaching about and research into indigenous vegetables, the nutrition content of African foods, traditional planting

and cultivation mechanisms, traditional pesticides, manures and so on. Another area is in linguistics and languages, where African proverbs, idioms and sayings, for instance, have not received the in-depth study that they deserve, given that they often compress deep philosophical truths into a single sentence or statement. The unwritten nature of the African intellectual experience made the use of proverbs expedient in pre-colonial times, such that from one single proverb a whole textbook of philosophical musings could be written, were it to arise in a society where writing existed. Another area is that of African art, where not much attention has been paid to its intellectual expression, which forms part of the pre-colonial education structure on the continent. European curators have erroneously drawn from the aesthetic emphasis of European art to interpret African art, although the latter was fashioned mostly for its intellectual, philosophical and spiritual uses. As most education in pre-colonial Africa was based on oratory, Africans tended to express their “philosophic-religious ideas through art, through the timeless, immemorial, silent, and elemental power so characteristic of African traditional art” (Abraham 1969, 111).

African music or musicology is another case in point. Although “dance and song in African societies continue to play a more important sociological role than they now play in the western world, yet the decision as to which kind of subjects ought to be given priority in Africa is reached as a result of examining what is regarded as important in the western world” (Mazrui 1978, 299). Rather than the deeply philosophical, energy-infused and high octane African drama, dance and songs, ballroom dance, rock and roll, Western-styled renditions of poetry, Shakespeare and other European expressions became acceptable. For a long time, the African university championed this neocolonial aversion to any expression of art that was authentically African.

In the area of African mathematics, there is a need to study the numerous geometrical expressions found in African art such as textiles, wood carving and mural decorations. Moreover, African games have been linked to fractals, combinatorics, bifurcation, tiling and tessellation, and this can be traced back thousands of years, as evidenced by the discovery of some of the earliest mathematical objects in human history, the Lebombo and Ishango Bones (Bangura 2012). In the general field of science and technology, including engineering, there is the tendency to imitate Western models in teaching and research instead of placing emphasis on the research and development of easily accessible indigenous technologies. In all, the low level of creativity and innovation obtainable across Africa can be traced to the low involvement of the continent’s own knowledge in teaching and research at the higher level institutions.

EXTERNAL FACTORS AND THE ROLE OF AID

Dependence on external funding for education in Africa has come with a marginalization of higher education and research. The success of funded programs is usually measured by literacy levels before and after intervention, which encourages many funding agencies to focus on the promotion of primary and

post-primary education. For years, the World Bank, for instance, channeled much of its African educational funding to primary and post-primary levels and only allocated a tiny sum, if anything, to higher education. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund also advised governments, in their official budgets for education, to follow that trajectory.

In Malawi, the regime of Kamuzu Banda agreed to freeze all funding for research and to focus on the general expansion and improvement of primary and post-primary education. The World Bank policy instrument for this was designed almost entirely by expatriate technical expertise and focused on “developing new teacher training programs, building schools, and designing and creating new learning materials” (Mundy 2002, 45). In the 1990s USAID established an overlapping reform agenda in Malawi at about the same time as the World Bank was implementing its own reforms. This brings up the issue of a lack of coordination in education funding, which is a major challenge for donor-funded projects across sub-Saharan Africa. USAID’s project was targeted at improving girls’ education and was conducted with minimum consultation with locals, preferring instead to fly in expatriates from the United States (Mundy 2002, 46). In 1994, the government of Malawi attempted its own independent educational reform agenda. This focused exclusively on the expansion of access to primary schooling, with minimal attention being paid to funding for research and development in the higher institutions. Although the reform was initiated by the government of Malawi, it was soon made clear that it was funded primarily from external sources. Behind the scenes, the funding agencies insisted that their projects and policy instruments should be made the core of the policy document (Mundy 2002, 40). Between 1995 and 1998, the most comprehensive curricular review in the history of Malawi education was implemented. Funded exclusively by donors, the reforms took very little emphasis of local realities owing to the overwhelming number of expatriate consultants who handled the project.

One of the key education strategy papers employed by the World Bank with regard to the regulation of funding for African education was the Education Paper for Sub Saharan Africa (EPSSA). This emphasizes a reduction in funding for higher education, and expressly states that:

to meet minimally acceptable targets for coverage and quality of lower levels of education in most countries, as a general rule the tertiary sub sector’s share of stagnant real public education expenditures cannot expand further, and in some cases may have to contract. Some combination of efficiency improvements, increased private contribution to costs, constrained growth in some countries and fields, and outright cutback in production of graduates must be sought. (World Bank 1988, 95)

The World Bank based its submission on calculations regarding the Rate of Return on Education (RORE). The RORE represents an attempt to employ a market-based approach when analyzing state expenditure on higher education. Schugurensky summarizes this as “the commodification of knowledge,

the redefinition of the relationship between the university, the state and the market, and a drastic reduction in institutional autonomy” (Schugurensky 1999, 283). Based on this, the World Bank’s projections for the social RORE of primary, secondary and tertiary education are 24%, 18% and 11% respectively (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). The lower the RORE, the more unworthy of further investment. The major fields targeted were the arts and humanities, which were declared to be of little significance in Africa’s drive for technological advancement.

Brain drain in Africa can be directly traced to the implementation of the World Bank’s EPSSA. EPSSA included a clause that allowed for “technical assistance” from the West to support African universities. The result was an excessive inflow of expatriate staff from donor countries as technical experts, whose usually disproportionate salaries and emoluments were paid from the aid package extended to sub-Saharan Africa, which was to be repaid with interest. The intellectual nationals of these sub-Saharan African countries were sidelined, and in certain instances were made answerable to less qualified expatriates, resulting in massive brain drain across universities and colleges.

Dependence on external funding also led to an undue interference in African universities and other institutions of research and higher learning. Perhaps the first officially recorded attempt at subverting their independence was during the 1986 conference of vice-chancellors of African universities, convened by the World Bank in Harare. The conference was organized at a time most African countries—owing to economic frustration and excessive debt—were on the verge of signing the now discredited Structural Adjustment Program. At the conference the World Bank advised the gathered vice-chancellors that it would make economic sense for them to close all existing universities in sub-Saharan Africa and channel all the needed human resources trainings to Western universities. The vice-chancellors, uncomfortable perhaps at the prospect of being unemployed, kicked vehemently against the World Bank’s proposition, forcing it to change tactics. Instead, the granting of desperately needed economic assistance was tied to conditions that drastically curtailed the research orientation of most African universities (Mamdani 2007, 4).

RORE AND RESEARCH IN AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

World Bank’s RORE calculations ignore the social and long-term economic growth implications for wider African society of universities that are starved of funding. The continued dependency of Africa on the West for knowledge creation and national development is directly linked to the paucity of funds for African universities. Development theorists and practitioners have long presented the argument that universities act as major actors in ensuring a nation-state-led national development. Universities are looked upon to supply the knowledge and human capital that are needed to ensure industrialization and other processes through research and the training of students

(University World News 2013). In Africa, the lack of emphasis on higher education has robbed scholars of teaching and writing resources that are desperately needed to address societal problems, and would prevent a decline in all sectors of the African economy. Essentially, privatization and donor-financed reforms have shifted every focus to teaching as opposed to research.

The case of Makerere University in Rwanda under the RORE is remarkable and worthy of note. At independence, Makerere University was one of the few African institutions to embark on massive education reforms, aimed at decolonizing the school system. The university started with a decolonization of personnel, and this was immediately followed by a decolonization of curricula. The emphasis was on development from a standpoint of a “broader historical study of imperial expansion since the 15th century” (Mamdani 2007, 3). It was mandatory for the entire student intake to take a full year-equivalent course in Development Studies before graduation. In 1972, Edward Rugumayo, then Minister of Education, in a speech he made regarding the appropriate foundation of education curricula in a post-colonial Uganda, stated that it was expedient for the students to be inculcated with “an independent mind capable of judging and analyzing problems objectively; the ability to live in a collective society with the major aim of serving it; one’s loyalty to his motherland in a patriotic and nationalist way” (Mazrui 1978).

Makerere University was soon to be forced by the World Bank to adopt market-oriented reforms, through privatization and commercialization. Under privatization, privately sponsored fee-paying students became special targets of the university. Under commercialization, departments, faculties and institutes were mandated to source funding from different quarters and to generate the majority of their own budgets (Mamdani 2007, 5). As an incentive, departments that admitted fee-paying students were allowed to retain as much as 90% of these fees. The effect was that the university-wide emphasis on a development-based curriculum was ignored by individual faculties, which were creating more economically viable programs and courses that would attract private fee-paying students. Faculties began to bicker over who had a greater right to teach more marketable courses, such as secretarial studies, environmental management, conflict resolution and human rights. These were Western-oriented courses that were often introduced by the “technical aid” expatriates sent by international organizations to assist in remedying African universities’ dire economic situation. Within the faculties, financial considerations became the major determinant for the hiring and retention of staff, rather than academic considerations. Several professors were hired to replace those who had been asked to leave or who left to the West in search of greener pastures.

Within a decade of the introduction of market-based reforms in Makerere University, research and development took a nosedive; two universities existed side by side within the institution. One was the “official” university with tenured professors who had to be Ph.D. holders and were appointed by officially constituted authorities. The other was an informal university, run by auxiliary teachers who were recruited by unit administrators on “an informal and short-term basis” (Mamdani 2007, 6). They were poorly remunerated and ill

treated, some of them teaching for up to a decade without so much as a formal appointment letter. The World Bank market-based reforms produced at Makerere a university of very low quality, where the independent indigenously developed curriculum was sacrificed on the altar of capitalist preference for a lucrative education system that was based on a Western curriculum. At Makerere as well as several other affected universities across sub-Saharan Africa, fee-paying students became recipients of low-level irrelevant education in an expensive campus setting (Mamdani 2007, 6).

The result of the market-based reforms at Makerere was dramatic; student population increased from 3000 at the start of the reforms to 30,000 in the first decade. Academic staff were paid by the hour instead of as salary earners, with an average teaching load of about 20 hours per week. The quality of teaching declined sharply while research became almost extinct. The successful courses were those that were deemed lucrative enough to lead to jobs in the tourism industry or with the several aid agencies that had flooded Uganda. Such courses included BAs in Tourism, Secretarial Studies and the French and English languages. All of the development-based programs and courses were scrapped for lack of economic viability, and revenue generation took centre stage from research. To this extent, whatever little progress that had been recorded in breaking away from the colonial curriculum was lost. Mamdani captures it thus:

What happens when local universities focus on teaching to the exclusion of research? When knowledge production is seen as mainly an external process, to be imported? The result of a failure to develop local research capacity is that both problems, and solutions, come to resemble ideologically-defined, off-the-shelf offers. One result is that those interested in research or dissatisfied with an externally-driven process of knowledge production begin to move to overseas centers or simply out of the university. The tendency is to fill the university with mimic men and women. Research needs to be an integral component of higher education, particularly in countries with a recent colonial past, for the simple reason that without a capacity for research no one can be in a position to define meaningful choices. Even the imparting of a meaningful general education requires developing a curriculum that is responsive to local contexts and local needs, something that simply cannot be picked off the shelf. (Mamdani 2007, 6)

ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN AFRICA'S HIGHER EDUCATION

Understanding the role that history has played in the present state of research and innovation in Africa, with emphasis on institutions of higher learning, should lead to a rethinking of existing systems and practices that are being perpetuated as a result of historical exigencies. Research in African universities has suffered serious setbacks as a consequence of an emphasis on primary and post-primary education, and a reliance on external funding in the education sector, which brings with it the imposition of external agendas, insistence on certain policy frameworks and the marginalization of research into the continent's indigenous knowledge.

In more recent times, some external funding agencies are beginning to rethink funding for higher education and research in Africa. The World Bank, for example, is seeking to present its conviction that higher education—with the university at its core—has a crucial role to play in Africa’s development (World Bank 2010). The World Bank’s increased interest in Africa’s higher education, it should be noted, has not been preceded by an admission of the distortion that its earlier policy brought upon the continent. This emerging policy shift appears to have been replaced by a more market-oriented approach to higher education; Michael Khun notes that “more recent World Bank publications and pronouncements suggest a radical re-thinking of its former anti-university orientation, although the damage caused to the university system and its intended reconstruction on a market-instrumentalist key, require once again critical analysis” (Vessuri 2014).

Recently, external funding for higher education and research into science and technology has increasingly poured into Africa from several sources. While this is a development to be applauded, there seems to be a strong bias by African governments towards supporting teaching and research into science and technology and to abandon, even denigrate, the arts, humanities and social sciences. For President Museveni of Uganda, Arts students in Uganda “only think” and “have nothing to help us because they are offered useless courses” (Wandera 2014). The either/or stance on science and technology versus the humanities poses a great danger to the continent, with the abandonment of the crucial foundations of such courses as philosophy, political science and sociology. The growing disdain across Africa for aesthetics, intellectual and emotional depth, critical thinking, and ideas and debates, which the arts, humanities and social sciences offer a society, will result in retrogression rather than progress.

In conclusion, research within Africa’s higher education needs to be transformed. Starting from the paradigm of analysis or research agenda, perhaps even from the curricula of taught courses, there is need for a reappraisal about what is really of importance to Africa’s core developmental aspirations. In that regard, indigenous or local knowledge is critical for laying the foundations of an authentic research base that will most likely lead to the necessary advancement across fields and sectors. A balanced view of research in contemporary Africa is important. While the present emphasis on science and technology is a welcome development, the derogatory attitude increasingly displayed towards the arts, humanities and social sciences will prove detrimental and retrogressive when it comes to the continent’s drive towards overall growth. The role of external funding for research must be reexamined. While the links between grant-making agencies and other development partners with research and higher education do not need to be lost, there is a need for African governments and researchers to be more discretionary, assertive and original in requesting for and receiving funds. Funds should be channeled towards areas where Africans have established that research is needed, and not to the areas that donors want to emphasize, based on their home country experiences and convictions.

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Energy Security and the Future of Development in Africa

Lucky E. Asuelime and Blessing Simura

INTRODUCTION

The history of the use of energy goes back to the beginning of human history. Humans began adapting to their environments especially with regard to the need for heating and cooking, possibly realizing the importance of energy in their social and economic lives. Indeed, “Energy has always been crucial for the economic (and social) development of human societies” (Labandeira and Manzano 2012, 2). The development of civilization in its various forms increased the need for energy in various societies throughout the world. The need for energy was increased by rapid developments in the agricultural and industrial revolutions.

As other parts of the world, Africa is on an industrial growth path. Various countries on the continent are experiencing economic and population growth. While some are stalling in terms of economic growth, owing to energy insecurity, most countries are on a growth trajectory, which seeks to transform African countries into emerging economies and developed countries. “South Africa leads the rest of Africa in this direction but has focused fairly and narrowly on the development and use of uranium as source of energy” (Izuagie et al. 2016, 216). This is largely because in a period when it seemed that uranium deposits were an attraction, and the product was a currency for powerful states that were enmeshed in an international system dominated by the Cold War in the first half of the last

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century, attention turned to South Africa (Asuelime 2016). South Africa was the supplier of uranium products that were required to fuel the West's nuclear industry (Asuelime and Francis 2014; Asuelime and Adekoye 2016). This is because its uranium residue was a commodity needed for both peaceful and military purposes by the principal state actors (Asuelime 2013; Asuelime 2014).

African economies have faced social and economic challenges in their drive to achieve development. Economics and development scholars have attributed the continent's developmental woes either to internal factors related to governmental inefficiencies and corruption, or external factors related to neocolonialism, international markets and the price volatility of minerals and the other products that are Africa's dominant exports. While agreeing with this argument, we argue that there has been a transformation in international politics and economics which in some cases makes the old claims trite. The issue of energy security is a critical factor that African leaders need to address if their economies are to challenge other emerging economies in Asia and Latin America.

TRANSFORMATION IN THE MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

The definitions of development in Africa have come from different fronts both within and outside Africa. There have been scholarly debates which define Africa as the last frontier for economic development. Over the past decade, policymakers, consulting companies and leading media organizations in the West have identified Africa as the new destination for investment. Such praise has been seen as an important catalyst for African development, which is seen by some, especially from the field of economics, as an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). Human development paradigms can then conveniently argue that the development of the continent will be seen in how its people move out of poverty and become middle and high income earners.

While these two basic paradigms differ in their conceptualization of development, they agree on the notion that the human matrix is a central part of defining development. Dudley Seers, quoted in A. K. Sharma, defines development from a human development approach:

The questions to ask about a country's development are three: What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. (Sharma 1996, 149)

On the other hand, the nexus behind economic growth and human development is expressed in the trickle-down effect theory. In fact, "It is widely believed that the accumulation of wealth by the rich is good for the poor since some of the increased wealth of the rich trickles down to the poor" (Aghion and Bolton 1997, 151). Liberal thinkers such as Walter W. Rostow contend that for African economies to develop, the continent has to go through the

stages of development which European countries went through, which focused specifically on economic growth and took little consideration of the effects of that growth on the general population (Todaro and Smith 2012, 111).

Nowhere in the world is the concept of development and its relationship with the citizens more pertinent than in Africa. The euphoria of independence was quickly snuffed out by the harsh realities of failed development strategies in different African countries. This has been due to many reasons, mainly corrupt political leadership, international commodity prices' fluctuations and misguided economic prescriptions from the international financial institutions in the name of structural adjustment programs (SAPs).

While the issue of energy security is mostly related to economic growth, this chapter deliberately discusses development with a human-centered approach. Analyzing the concept only from an economic growth perspective may fail to capture issues of the repatriation of profits by multinational corporations and "slave" remunerations, which in some cases lead to the "trickle up effect," where the little income that the lower classes of the society earn ends up benefiting the rich while the poor get poorer (Todaro 1997).

African development must also be analyzed from a rural perspective because rural development or underdevelopment has a great bearing on national development owing to issues of rural to urban migration. The rural areas are increasingly growing in importance in terms of economic development through agricultural production and the transformation of rural centers, known in some countries as growth points, into industrial and rural centers for urban development. The authors take notice of the fact that the traditional definition of African development in terms of economic growth encapsulated only the colonial elites and those who benefited from the exclusionary system, while disadvantaging the majority of the citizens, who resided in the rural areas. Any current definition of development in Africa should take into account the considerable number of citizens in rural areas and the lower classes in urban areas as well.

ENERGY SECURITY IN AFRICA

Energy security has been a challenge for a number of countries in the world that wanted to embark on a take-off development trajectory. Different countries define energy security in different ways that suit their socio-economic and political status. For most net energy importing developed countries, the usual definition of energy security is "simply the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices" (Yergin 2006, 70–71). For major international players such as the United States of America (USA), Britain, France, Germany, China and Russia, the major thrust of energy security is protection of the state from energy-related political extortionism (Winzer 2012). This has seen a number of developed countries pursuing policies of energy independence. Benjamin K. Sovacool and Ishani Mukherjee are of the opinion that energy security ought to comprise five dimensions: availability, affordability, technology development, sustainability and regulation (Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011).

While energy security has been a prominent topic in developed countries since as early as the First World War, in Africa it has not been central to discussions. For instance, the British government started preparing for energy security in the early twentieth century when its navy switched from the use of coal for its vessels to oil, while successive American presidents have had clear energy policies (Cherp and Jewell 2011). However, African countries have found it difficult to come up with country, regional or continental specific definitions for energy security and to develop energy policies, except in a few countries. Many countries have continued to rely on the colonial energy infrastructure, with little improvement of the aging equipment.

There is a need to accept that energy security is a public good which African leaders have not properly valued. Apart from powering different industries, energy is important in private and public medical institutions for the well-being of citizens. Its importance stretches to the educational sector, where it has long been proven that energy for lighting and scientific lessons creates a difference between pupils and students who study in schools that have and those that do not have power. One can also argue that provision of affordable electricity to rural areas has the capacity to save vast African forests. The majority of rural people still use wood as the primary energy source for heating. This is not an easily renewable energy source and its destruction has negative effects on weather patterns, with the capacity to distort traditional seasons. Hence African governments must develop energy policies that take into account the importance of energy security as a social and public good.

Discussions about energy security have the unintended consequence, in that they drive the participants into thinking that energy security is all about petroleum (oil) (Jewel 2011). Even though oil, and by extension natural gas, is the most dominant feature in energy security discussions, the concept is much more extensive than that. Other important power sources that can be harnessed in Africa to improve its energy security include solar, hydroelectricity, coal, ethanol and wind. Paradoxically, discussions about energy security in Africa have been dominated by issues of electricity, focusing in most cases on clean energy development. There is a need to harmonize the different forms of energy and to take note of their importance in the African development process. While hydroelectricity is seen as the dominant source of energy owing to its domestic and industrial reach, changes in the price of oil are known to affect transport prices, as well as industry, hence having a bearing on prices of goods and services (Delsalle 2002). With the effects of climate change on some important electricity-producing bodies of water, some countries, such as Zimbabwe, are contemplating the construction of emergency diesel power stations to augment and cushion power supply in cases of low rainfall.

Africa is currently insecure in terms of energy. The continent has faced a power demand growth of 4% every year against the gross underinvestment that has been going on for years (Scott 2015). This is perhaps responsible for Codi Kozacek's remark that

in sub-Saharan Africa, the stage is set for a particular fierce collision between energy development and the new realities of the twenty first century. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most resource-rich and electricity-poor regions in the world, and both its population and its economic clout are mushrooming. (Kozacek 2015)

While Africa has the potential to fully supply itself with its energy requirements, thereby leading not just to energy security, but to energy sovereignty, this is inhibited by several factors. Military conflicts in energy-resourced regions, limited capital resources and non-cooperation or a lack of sincerity between African states means the dream of energy security has remained a mirage for the continent. This is noted by Daniel Yergin in his analysis of energy security in the world:

The major obstacle to the development of new supplies is not geology but what happens above ground: namely, international affairs, politics, decision-making by governments, and energy investment and new technological development. (Yergin 2006, 75)

Africa has faced challenges in ensuring energy security owing to a plethora of reasons, primarily conflicts in energy-resourced countries, a lack of capital to develop energy infrastructure, corruption, and a lack of political will from the African governments to pull resources together and develop shared energy infrastructures. While it has long been established that hydroelectricity provides vital energy for industry and social amenities, African leaders have not pursued the development of infrastructure to harness this energy resource. Zimbabwe and Zambia named the Batoka Gorge along the Zambezi River as a strategic site for a hydroelectric-producing dam in 1972 (Makichi 2015). However, the project has remained in the planning and feasibility study stage for years, even though the two countries involved are facing energy challenges that have reached unprecedented levels: water levels at the main hydroelectric-producing Kariba dam have fallen below 16% and the power plants are now producing less than 50% of their installed capacities (Mangundla 2015). In another example, countries in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region have noted that the Inga dam projects (Inga III and the Grand Inga dams) on the Congo River have the capacity to power the region through the production of more than 40,000 megawatts of electricity (Green et al. 2015). This has the capacity to change not only Southern Africa but also the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa into an industrial hub. Apart from the capital constraints in the development of the project, investors could fear for their investment because of the political instability that has afflicted the Great Lakes region since independence. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is home to the Inga power projects, has been rocked by coups and insurgencies since the attainment of independence in 1960.

The West Africa region, which is also an important energy-producing region owing to its vast oil deposits, has had its fair share of problems that have had a

negative impact on investment and stability. Nigeria, which for a long time was sub-Saharan Africa's leading oil producer, has been battling an insurgency in the oil-producing Niger Delta since the late 1980s. Coupled with this insurgency and a Boko Haram insurgency in the north, the country has also battled corruption among high-ranking officials that is related to oil politics (Katsouris and Sayne 2013). It is no surprise therefore that petroleum scarcity has been experienced in a major oil-producing state. Notwithstanding these examples, it is not all doom and gloom in respect to energy security. As already noted, a number of hydroelectric projects are under way, and the Inga dam projects have attracted the attention of countries in the region, such as Angola, Namibia and South Africa, in the process cushioning them from the current regional energy crisis (Tshombe et al. 2007). South Africa is also planning to construct nuclear plants in order to deal with its energy crisis (Reuters 2015).

The Ethiopian government is in the process of constructing the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is expected to start power generation in 2017 (Wuilbercq 2014). The project will have a hydropower generating capacity of 6000 megawatts (Tekle 2015). The ambitious nature of this project informed Emmeline Wuilbercq's observation, that the country is sending signals of its intention to become a byword for African development, given the fact that it is already the second most populous country in Africa (Tekle 2015; Refera 2005). These projects have the capacity to add considerable energy supplies to the continental grid and help to drive the African development trajectory, given that electricity is the major source of industrial and domestic energy on the continent.

On the petroleum front, new major players in sub-Saharan Africa have also emerged as major players in oil production. These countries include Angola and Ghana as well as the newly created state of South Sudan. It is partly because of the rise of these energy producers that China has challenged other major powers over market penetration into Africa. The discovery of oil saw Ghana and Angola become important powerhouses because of their capacity to influence energy security on the continent and also globally. However, oil production in Africa has not translated into direct energy trade within the continent. This failure of enhanced inter-African energy trade and the conflicts that characterize some areas that are energy hubs means that it may be a while before Africa can challenge other emerging markets in Latin America and Asia.

ENERGY SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE NEXUS

Energy is the fuel which powers any engine. Simply put, the African economies are engines that can only be put in motion for perpetuity if they are fueled enough for that motion to take place. The importance of energy in any economy is such that is "not just another commodity, but the precondition of all commodities, a basic factor equal with air, water and earth" (Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011, 5343). This is supported by Chola Mukanga who states that, "Electricity is the lifeblood of the economy" (Mukanga 2015).

Not many scholars have taken a keen interest in the role played by energy insecurity in Africa's failure to develop in the twentieth century, the only exceptions being some studies conducted by the World Bank and other development agencies that mainly looked at the development of clean and renewable energy with the intention of curbing climate change. However, it is hoped that this chapter brings to light the importance of energy in the development matrix in Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. As noted, energy is the fuel that powers the developmental engine. Among its most important functions it powers the whole industrial value chain from primary industry (mining and agriculture), manufacturing to the critical service sectors (health and education) and other social amenities.

The stiff competition for FDI in the twenty-first century means that investors now look at important enablers for their investment. One of the core enablers that they look for is the supply of sustainable and uninterrupted energy. It can be argued that the cost of energy is as important to an investor as labor costs. It is because of this that those countries that have erratic power supply and production capacities attract relatively less FDI than those with better power supply, if all other factors are equal.

Energy security, from the concept of uninterrupted and affordable supply, impacts directly on the competitiveness of an economy. In Southern Africa, lack of energy security has impacted negatively on manufacturers and farming in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The only ammonium nitrate producer in Zimbabwe, a strategic industry given the centrality of the product in farming and other chemical productions, was forced to cut production after the Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and Distribution Company (ZETDC) cut its dedicated supply of 40 megawatts (Murwira 2016). The power shortages led to the loss of more than 100 jobs at the company, and many more were lost in the country and region, while other potential jobs were not created as investors chose to invest where there was enough energy to power their investments.

In their submissions on why Zimbabwean products are expensive locally and regionally when compared with those produced by their regional counterparts in South Africa and Zambia, Zimbabwean industrialists and farmers pointed out that high energy costs pushed their production costs up (Zaba 2016). The reason for this relationship is simple. Energy, be it electricity, diesel or solar, powers the machines in the industries while on farms they are used for irrigating crops, powering tillage and accessory machines, curing and drying the produce, while also being used in the transportation of produce to market.

South Africa's mining and manufacturing sectors have also been affected by electricity and power shortages in the country. The effects were first felt in 2007 (van der Nest 2015). In an argument that related energy security to investment, economic growth and economic development, Gavin van der Nest stated that "The inability of South Africa to service its electricity needs has led to downward revisions of economic growth and investor confidence in the economy. These structural constraints were initially thought to be temporary but have become increasingly embedded into the fabric of the economy"

(van der Nest 2015). He goes on to state that the three levels of load shedding in South Africa have the potential to cost the country between 1 and 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP) per month (van der Nest 2015). These costs will be felt mostly in the mining and manufacturing sectors, and some are now looking at the feasibility of using solar to power their operations. All these shocks are felt more by ordinary citizens, who lose out on social benefits as the government is forced to revise its social development plans owing to depressed revenues. The effects of these cuts are felt most in health, education and infrastructure development, such as roads and bridges.

The impact of energy insecurity was felt in Zambia when the Zambian Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO) faced a crippling 560 megawatt deficit in 2015 against the annual demand growth of 200 megawatts. The most affected industries included poultry farmers, with their association indicating that development in the industry was hindered by long hours of load shedding and increased fuel prices (Mukanga 2015). Equally affected was the Zambian mining sector, specifically the copper industry which is a major income earner for the country. Commenting on the effects of power cuts on industries and economic growth, Chola Mukanga noted:

A reduction in output in these sectors inevitably means lower taxation revenues and economic growth. That in turn has real impacts on the fiscal position and Zambian debt levels. It is, much more than that. The real losers are the ordinary Zambians who not only face the indignity of more load shedding from ZESCO but also higher prices for some products, as business pass on some of the costs to maintain their profit levels. (Mukanga 2015)

The transformation of African economies can only be realized by transforming farming methods, a move that calls for an increased usage of energy. The increase in agricultural production through modernization could feed other industries with cheap raw materials that would boost industrial growth and create employment for millions of unemployed youths in Africa.

It is easy to classify the development levels of an economy by simply analyzing its energy consumption. Developing economies are seen because of the sustained increase in the energy they consume. In that regard, sustainable and affordable energy supply becomes imperative to keep a country on a development trajectory. This is not only important for industrial growth; it is also equally important in powering the needs of a middle class that rises with economic growth and development.

As previously noted, development does not end with industrial growth but should have the people as its primary focus. Africa can only be accepted as rising if the majority of its people have access to sustainable energy. Sustainable energy, specifically to rural and remote areas, will translate into social development in health, education and the modernization of farming methods. This latter has the potential to transform African economies and African peoples as well. Modernization will transform subsistence farmers into commercial producers,

bringing them profits and reducing the price of food products. Increased food production will reduce the food import bills and will free sizable funds for infrastructure development and increasing social responsibility by governments. This in turn will increase national energy consumption, creating a cycle of development and increased energy security demands.

CONCLUSION

Energy security is a cardinal pillar for development in any society. The importance of energy to human beings was realized the moment they desired the means to adapt to harsh natural climatic conditions as well as changing from a simple reliance on fruits to a range of economic activities. The importance of energy security grew during the agricultural and industrial revolutions in different parts of the world. The two world wars helped, as they showed the major countries the central importance of energy security for national security. Since then these countries, which include those in Europe and North America, as well as Japan, Russia and recently China, have placed unparalleled importance on national energy security.

Although energy security did not become important with the coming of colonialism to Africa, colonialism changed the natural development course that the continent was taking. All of a sudden, new energy sources such as coal became important, especially with the growth of the mining and farming sectors. These industries have continued to grow in importance as the population of the continent has grown in the post-colonial period, leading to increased demand for energy and the need for energy security policies.

Energy security in Africa is of imperative importance if individual countries are serious in their development rhetoric. As noted here, energy security is important as it drives the primary and secondary industries in the continent that will lead to economic growth and employment creation. Cheap energy also makes African products relatively cheaper on the international market. Specific industries that stand to benefit greatly are mining, manufacturing and agriculture. Service industries such as health and education will be greatly transformed with the provision of uninterrupted and affordable energy. Domestic use will also mean a transformation in Africans' social lives. All these changes will mean a holistic development, where industrial growth will be evident alongside social benefits such as the eradication of poverty and disease. As made clear in this chapter, energy security is a prime element for holistic African development.

African countries are not oblivious to this fact. While no overarching energy security policies have been developed on the continent, the leadership is currently working on increasing generating capacity in terms of hydro and thermal power. One need only mention South Africa's proposed investment in nuclear reactors, the Inga dam projects of DRC, the Batoka gorge dam on the Zambezi river and the GERD on the Nile River in Ethiopia to show that Africa is serious about energy production. Oil field exploration is still taking place, and this has

seen countries such as Angola and Ghana emerging as regional power houses in energy production. However, Africa still has a long way to go given that the continent has only developed an estimated 8% of its potential energy resources and the fact that development of the sector is lagging behind the yearly increase in demand. Other issues which need to be dealt with are internecine conflicts, corruption and red tape relating to investments in the energy sector, as well as the development of workable blueprints and implementable policies.

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Climate Change, Food Security and Sustainable Development in Africa

Jennifer Turyatembera Tumushabe

INTRODUCTION

This chapter scrutinizes strategies to alleviate food insecurity through sustainable agriculture, which provides a better livelihood for Africa's population. These strategies are mainly based on the reduction of severe and prolonged droughts, flooding and the loss of arable land owing to desertification and soil erosion, which reduce agricultural yields and cause crop failure and loss of livestock.¹ Such factors endanger rural populations; livestock losses have also plunged approximately 11 million people into crisis and have triggered mass migration of pastoralists out of drought-affected areas.² Adaptation and mitigation actions need to be planned, assessed and implemented at international, regional and national levels. Governments have already addressed the problem of climate change through mitigation and adaptation activities and programs based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This successful forward planning has not just responded to emergency situations, but has also ensured food security and development sustainability. A long-term focus on agricultural development in the context of the future of African governance and politics is necessary, hence sustainable development.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Climate change has seriously impacted food security in Africa. As the world's climate changes at an extraordinary rate, it is clear that this is having an impact and that there are risks related to these changes. Climate change is already influencing mankind, through changes in land and water resources, health and above all food security.

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Globally, about 923 million people are chronically hungry according to the Centre for International Governance Innovation.³ The MDG of halving the number of undernourished people by 2015 was becoming a more difficult target for Africa. Africa's food security situation is particularly worrying.⁴ Of the 36 countries worldwide currently facing food insecurity, 21 are African. More than 300 million Africans are chronically hungry, nearly a third of the continent's population. Of this number, at least 235 million are in Sub-Saharan Africa, the reason why African as a region has the highest proportion of chronically hungry people.⁵ The poorest families, the landless and female-headed households are among the hardest hit. Most urban and rural households in Africa rely on food purchases and stand to lose from high food prices. These high prices reduce real income and increase the prevalence of food insecurity and malnutrition among the poor.

Africa's ability to address sustainable development strategies starting in the year 2016 tests its capacity to manage the consequences of its own actions. The strategies that are being used confront and eliminate the threat, through the creation of a stable political climate and predictable governance for future generations. This area is a great challenge for sustainability of life, ecosystems, livelihoods and indeed the development of Africa as a whole. Accordingly, therefore, this chapter presents the need to adjust governance and politics issues that have impacted food security as well as the need to facilitate the development of techniques that will assist in increasing resilience to climate change impacts.

The chapter scrutinizes strategies for the alleviation of food insecurity through sustainable agriculture, which provides a livelihood for about three-quarters of Africa's population. This is mainly through the reduction of severe and prolonged droughts, flooding and loss of arable land owing to desertification, with soil erosion reducing agricultural yields and causing crop failure and loss of livestock. This has endangered rural populations, which have been hit by recurrent disasters, leading to crisis and mass migration of communities from drought-affected areas. In a way these are all brought about by climate change and human activities.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The MDG 2010–2015 strategy was put in place to eradicate hunger and promote environmental actions.⁶ The same strategies seem to appear in the SDGs. The challenge is how to overcome these unceasing challenges. To do this we have to look at ways of reducing hunger and food insecurity promoted by the action of climate change. The SDGs address these issues, but we need to ask why the MDGs that have been set have not accomplished their set targets. These problems are not being solved as far as the African collaborative efforts that have been put in place.

This chapter aims to identify gaps in the MDGs in order to make the forthcoming SGD strategy robust enough to mitigate climate change and its

impact on food security. Changes in weather patterns, including extreme weather events, are impacting on the livelihoods of different communities, and this impact is being felt most severely by the poor and vulnerable. Many solutions are available and being implemented, but on a small scale by individual African countries. Some countries have not yet attempted to put these strategies into place on a large scale or at the speed which is required in order to accomplish an orderly transition to a low-carbon, food-secure and climate-resilient economy; hence sustainable development.⁷

METHODOLOGY

As part of the research undertaken for this study I examined the current standing of and changes in food security and climate change in Africa based on the milestones measured by the MDGs. The underlying issues tackled are the challenges that hindered achieving MDG1, which was adapted in SDG2. The recommendation of a zero hunger strategy will assist in achieving food security, improved nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture in African countries. Similarly, this applies to MDG7 which is now partially under SDG13. Determining the obstacles in combating climate change and its impact on food security is also crucial. The information collected is identifying strategies that will strengthen Africa's agricultural sectors to enable a response to its challenges. A lot of information has been published in relation to the topic, and this is the basis of the desk review method.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual perspective explores the link between climate change and food security as far as sustainable development is concerned and also examines the conditions that intensify under development in Africa. It scrutinizes the different pathways through which climate change affects Africa's development, of which food security is among the most crucial. The major aspects considered are poverty, farming system, malnutrition, ill health and social exclusion. Similarly, climate change is promoted by environmental degradation, human activities and the applied mitigation and adaptation mechanisms. It is necessary to highlight the opportunity that the Copenhagen Agreement (2009) can create for Africa to adapt to new, more efficient patterns of development, which will reduce its vulnerability and improve its resilience through sustainable development (Fig. 53.1).⁸

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MDGs

There is evidence that the global goals were a success.⁹ They stimulated the entire global community to address the most pressing issues at the beginning of the millennium, centered on lifting people from extreme poverty and improving the lives of those most disadvantaged. Secretary-General




Fig. 53.1 Conceptual framework
 Source: Created by the Author (2016)

Ban Ki-moon comments that “the MDG experience provides compelling evidence that the international community can be mobilized to confront complex challenges.”¹⁰ This means that governments, civil society and a wide range of international bodies leading governance and politics had to make a combined effort to back the MDGs in a multifront battle against hunger and climate change.

These goals were adopted in September 2000, when world leaders from 189 countries including the 147 heads of state gathered at the United Nations General Assembly to consider the challenges faced by the new millennium.¹¹ The challenges addressed had much impact on communities’ livelihoods and the natural resource base. This study aims to discover the African challenges using the MDGs after the identification of the eight actual goals. The primary focus is on Goals 1 and 7, which will highlight food security, climate change and sustainable development.

Progress and Status of the MDGs

Strategy (MDG1): *Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger*

The targets for the goal were:

- Halving the proportion of people whose income is less than US\$1 a day.
- Achieving full and productive employment and decent work, including women and young people.
- Promoting food security through the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger.

Achievements

- Extreme poverty (US\$1.25 a day) has declined from 47% in 1990 to 40% in 2008. The rate of decline in Africa is extremely slow compared with South East Asia and Latin America.
- One in three people in Sub-Saharan Africa still lives in hunger and undernourishment.
- It is unlikely that Africa will achieve its regional target of reducing extreme poverty to 29% by 2015.
- About 70% of the jobs are informal, with low incomes, low productivity and poor working conditions.

Goal 7: Strategy: Climate change action through ensuring environmental sustainability

The targets for the goal were:

- Integrating the principles of sustainable development into country's policies and programs, and reversing the loss of natural resources.
- Reducing biodiversity loss and halving the percentage of the population without sustainable access to drinking water and basic sanitation.

Achievements

- Reduction in the continuous and rapid loss of forest land.
- Carbon emissions are low and largely unchanged despite the fact that 16 countries recorded declines.
- The proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources has increased from 56% to 66%, but the increase was not enough to hit the target of 78% by 2016.¹²

The progress and status presented above shows that food security is a core aspect in development.¹³ Whenever poverty or underdevelopment is identified in a community, it means it lacks the basic needs, and food is one of those basic needs; this is why poverty has been considered in food security aspects. Unemployment is also one of the challenges in the agriculture sector. Communal labor will lack alternative sources of income, which impacts on food security in the society, the consequences of this being the inaccessibility, non-availability and non-utilization of food. The nutritional status of the community is also affected.

The MDGs have shown the importance of data in monitoring development. Stefan Schweinfurt, Director of the Statistics Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), commented that “the MDGs have been incredibly important in statistics, launching tremendous efforts to build capacity worldwide for data collection and use in policy making, monitoring and evaluation. This work has been crucial to tackle the challenges yet to come for the monitoring of an even broader development agenda.”¹⁴

The post-2015 development agenda will benefit from the lessons learned from the experience of the MDGs. A new development period will focus on where we left off after 15 years of worldwide efforts and on the new challenges at the forefront of the global agenda. Without a doubt, the MDGs have shown that improvements and substantial gains can be made when the global community sets aspirational priorities. The last MDG report highlights the achievements made through this historic effort, culminating in the improvement of the lives of millions.¹⁵

The MDGs have served as a framework for local, national, regional and global monitoring of development progress, resulting in remarkable gains. In many parts of the world, especially in the poorest countries, the MDGs have helped to accelerate progress to improve the lives of millions. Their importance has been paramount for development. For 15 years, the global community and national governments have worked extensively in an effort to end hunger and to reduce environmental degradation. However, few gains have been made in the reduction of extreme hunger and the mitigation of climate change. This chapter endeavors to identify the gaps and the challenges that will guide us towards the management of the SDGs.

THE CHALLENGES TO THE ERADICATION OF EXTREME HUNGER BY ACHIEVING FOOD SECURITY

“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an activity.”¹⁶ More than 300 million Africans are chronically hungry; nearly a third of the continent’s population. Of this number, at least 235 million are in Sub-Saharan Africa, making it the region on the planet with the highest proportion of chronically hungry people. The poorest families, the landless and female-headed households are among the hardest hit.¹⁷ Most urban and rural households in Africa rely on food purchases and stand to lose from high prices. High food prices reduce real income and increase the prevalence of food insecurity and malnutrition among the poor.

The proportion of undernourished people in the developing regions has fallen by almost half since 1990, from 23.3% in 1990–1992 to 12.9% in 2014–2016, and healthy life has improved.¹⁸ Current estimates suggest that about 795 million people are undernourished globally. This means that nearly one in nine individuals does not have enough to eat. The vast majority of them (780 million people) live in the developing regions that are found in Sub-Saharan Africa. The targets were achieved or close to being met in Northern, Southern and Western Africa; but in Central Africa progress has been hampered by rapid population growth and environmental fragility as well as economic and political upheaval.

There are other challenges to the eradication of food insecurity in African countries.¹⁹ These are poverty, persistent and increasing inequality, and the availability, frequency and quality of data remain a challenge. This persistence

and increase in inequality negatively influences the multiplier effect of the region's economy. Current economic growth in Africa does not create jobs. Growth is not inclusive.

Agriculture and food security are connected because agriculture provides a livelihood for about three-quarters of Africa's population, which is mainly rain-fed. Severe and prolonged droughts, flooding and loss of arable land owing to desertification and soil erosion are reducing agricultural yields and causing crop failure and loss of livestock, which endangers rural and pastoralist populations. For example, the Horn of Africa's pastoralist areas (Ethiopia–Kenya–Somalia border) have been severely hit by recurrent droughts; livestock losses have plunged approximately 11 million people dependent on livestock for their livelihoods into a crisis and triggered mass migration of pastoralists out of drought-affected areas. Climate change is also contributing to oceanic acidification and an increase in surface water temperatures around the African continent. Urgent action is needed to combat climate change and its impacts on food security.²⁰

In some regions such as semi-arid and arid areas, climate change has contributed to the mismanagement of resources, through deforestation, wetland reclamation, burning of bushes and pollution, for example. This is why some of the aims of MDG1 and 7 have only been partially achieved. The factors causing these failures need to be addressed if a new strategy of sustainable development is to be achieved.

THE CHALLENGES TO COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACTS

Climate change presents insurmountable challenges to human society in the twenty-first century. Africa is largely considered to be one of the most vulnerable continents in relation to climate variability. Owing to global warming, Africa is expected to face a more variable climate and often frequent severe weather events, which result in disease outbreaks, hunger and displacement. This clearly spells out how climate change has had substantial impacts and created challenges for food security.²¹

The picture presented above shows specifically how climate change impedes the agricultural sector. These effects are mainly an increased severe average temperature, change in rainfall amount and patterns, increased intensity of events and increased severity of drought. There is reduced agricultural productivity and around three-quarters of the world's population living on less than US\$1 a day depends directly on agriculture. Climate change scenarios point to large loss in productivity for food staples linked to drought and rainfall variation in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.²² The projected revenue losses for dry land areas in Sub-Saharan Africa amount to 26% by 2016. This means a total revenue loss in excess of US\$20 billion. Through its impact on agriculture and food security, climate change could leave an additional 600 million people facing acute malnutrition by the 2080s over and above the level in a no-climate change scenario.²³

Another challenge to combating climate change is the political will that has been identified as one of the challenges to MDG7 attainment.²⁴ Climate change is usually not prioritized when designing, formulating and implementing policies, programs and procedures because its effects are indirect; this has created political negligence when allocating funds to different sectors. Environmental sector funds are usually diverted to urgent needs, forgetting that climate change has its effects too. MDG7 was not achieved because of these challenges.

The local governance institutions that protect natural resource use and management are weak.²⁵ Globally, greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise, and are now more than 50% higher than their 1990 level. A continual rise is projected to further warm the planet and to cause long-lasting changes in the climate system, threatening severe and irreversible consequences for people and ecosystems.

Further, policies to govern the degradation of natural resources challenges affect the marginalized groups, women, children and the youth. In their search for natural products, women end up exhausting the resource base—their sources of food, fuel and water. They are victims of climate change that the MDGs target were not able to help. The recent increase in global warming and climate change may put additional burdens on women in relation to natural resources, through increased distances in fetching water, wood for fuel, fodder for livestock and so on.²⁶

The adaptation and mitigation strategies are often used loosely and in some cases interchangeably. The whole strategy of embracing agriculture as a coping and adaptation measure has been neglected, leading to the assignment of fewer resources to run its programs. The resources that are assigned are sometimes misused or reduced owing to corruption, which has been highlighted as a major challenge.²⁷

In addition, the existing policies on adaptation mechanisms and resources under the Kyoto Protocol, designed to mitigate the effects of climate change on Africa, have been directed at limiting future carbon emissions, rather than addressing the region's vulnerability and its lack of resilience to the impacts of climate change on its economies and populations.²⁸

As late as April 2007, a report by the Intergovernmental Panel Climate Change (IPCC) warned that Africa was not acting quickly enough to stem the dire economic and environmental consequences of greenhouse gas emissions.²⁹ What this report seems to have missed or overlooked is that Africa's concern about the governance of climate change is not mainly in terms of projections of carbon emission and future environmental damage. It is more about the links between climate change and droughts, desertification, floods, coastal storms and soil erosion—contemporary disaster events that threaten lives and livelihoods—and less about the continent's developmental progress. Climate and environmentally related disasters threaten human security, induce forced migration and produce competition. Among communities and nations, the competition for water and basic resources has potentially negative consequences for political stability and conflict resolution.³⁰

As far as African governance is concerned, there is limited support for past and current global climate change agreements about Africa's climate and environmental problems. The hardest hit region has benefited least from the international climate change regime, which relates almost exclusively to funding and investment for green, low carbon growth. For example, Africa's participation to date in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and carbon trading arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol has been minimal. Africa's negligible role in previous international climate change negotiations could be remedied by concerted action on the part of African leaders in the Copenhagen round of negotiations.

African governance, politics and development have been challenged by issues to do with the implementation of policies. This has brought many challenges that will affect the SDG strategy, a case study being Uganda food security policies.³¹ Corruption, poor governance, poor procedures of monitoring and poverty are policy implementation challenges. This is not far from the failure to implement the SDG strategies. Unless these are tackled by individual countries, the overall strategy will be hard to attain. In addition, there are issues such as unskilled labor and lack of funding to run certain programs in less developed countries that are presented as failures of the MDG strategy and the future of the SDGs (Fig. 53.2).

Addressing this political dilemma in relation to the unabated rise in greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting likely impacts of climate change remains an urgent and critical challenge for the global community. At the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change conference in Paris in December 2015, participants had to forge an agreement on a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force that will apply to all parties to the Convention. Politically this will provide a framework for strengthening international action to mitigate climate change.




Fig. 53.2 Major causes of policy malfunction in Uganda

Source: Created by the Author (2016)

STRENGTHENING APPROACHES TO RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE INFLUENCE ON FOOD SECURITY

In Africa the strategy to ending hunger and food insecurity and improving nutrition is at the heart of the SDGs. Climate change has already impacted on agriculture and a lack of food security has consistently made hunger and malnutrition worse.³² The effects of climate change on our ecosystems are already severe and widespread, and ensuring food security in the face of climate change is among the most daunting challenges facing humankind. While some of the problems associated with climate change are emerging gradually, action is urgently needed in order to allow enough time to build resilience into agricultural production systems.

Checking the vulnerability, sustainability and coping mechanisms of development strategies is critical for Africa's development. The food security strategies identified by searching for a framework for institutional and social innovations shows that more than 1.2 billion people in the world are poor, and the primary indicator for this is that they do not have enough to eat.³³ The Sustainable Livelihood Approaches (SLA) put forward by Robert Chambers is concerned with earning a living.³⁴ Therefore, looking at the vulnerability aspects of shock, adverse trends, seasonalities, and economic, political and ecological stress, the sustainability of all innovations in food security need to be addressed in relation to creating resilience towards vulnerability, for now and the future. Coping mechanisms need to be developed at household level to address food security availability. This is according to the SLA long-term perspective on food security.³⁵

Incorporating women in the fight against hunger needs to be considered to achieve the SDGs. The indicators of change in women's status and empowerment show how they are decision-makers regarding farming activities and also implementing them: they play a central role in land preparation, weeding, harvesting and post-harvest management. Male-headed households play the primary role when it comes to decision-making regarding sales.³⁶ Gender strategies will neutralize the gender power gaps. Therefore, if the strategy is to increase food security, the role that women can play is substantial.

There has been limited governance of past and current global climate change agreements that affect Africa's climatic and environmental problems, the hardest hit region benefiting least from the international climate change regime, which relates almost exclusively to funding and investments in green, low carbon growth.³⁷ Examples are Africa's participation to date in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and carbon trading arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol. Africa's negligible role in previous international climate change negotiations can be remedied by concerted action on the part of African leaders in the Copenhagen round.³⁸

The issue of conflict and fragility in some African countries has remained challenging. Politically, this is notably in the regions and countries most lagging behind, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Less Developed

Countries (LDCs). There is need for improved performance in terms of governance and political guidance in developing countries to avoid situations such as war, strikes and terrorism. These contribute directly to the backwardness and hence to underdevelopment.

Global approaches have been essential, for example the December 2015 agreement where countries met in Paris to sign an agreement on climate change. This is different from previous agreements, in which the focus was on setting “top-down” targets that drove national action. Today, the emphasis has shifted. Individual countries are being asked to come forward with their own ambitions and plans for lowering carbon. Countries have pledged to play their part in global action, providing financial support for the low carbon transition, while ensuring transparency to enhance cooperation. A good agreement will provide an enabling framework, doing more than they could alone.³⁹

Countries like the USA and China have worked hard to ensure that they achieved a positive outcome by 2015; and the years since the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations have seen some significant breakthroughs. International negotiations remain vital for countries, allowing them to build on national approaches, providing reassurance that they are not acting alone and making it easier for nations to work together towards a low carbon future.⁴⁰ There are ambitious action plans for before and after 2020. This approach can be used to achieve the planned climate change strategies to mitigate food insecurity challenges. The agreement should include ambitious national action plans from 2020 onwards and a package of pre-2020 action, with more ambitious national mitigation pledges, better delivery of existing financial commitments and more action in key sectors, such as energy efficiency, renewable energy deployment and forest protection.⁴¹

Since 2002, a large number of member countries have demonstrated their commitment to achieving the MDGs by periodically preparing MDG country reports.⁴² By the end of 2010, 51 member countries out of a total of 139 worldwide had prepared at least one report in the past decade. In particular, in the run up to the 2010 MDG Review Summit, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sponsored several MDG country reports, resulting in 15 member countries out of 31, of which two-thirds were from the Sub-Saharan member countries, preparing their MDG reports. The data was presented in a form that is orientated towards the new governance strategy in the SDGs as well as in member countries.

If the above climate change and food security approaches are adopted, then the challenges around slow growth prospects that face member countries in their quest to attain sustainable developmental goals will be mitigated; such challenges include resource constraints, lack of institutional reforms, inadequate capacity development, uneven income distribution, global economic situation, lack of political will and commitment to specific goals, and a lack of an enabling environment to attract investment or to encourage private sector development.⁴³

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Climate change has affected agriculture and other development activities which ensure the availability of and accessibility to food in African communities. There is a need to incorporate the lessons learnt from the achievement of the MDGs to provide knowledge about good governance and to draft policy guidelines for the effectiveness of the SDGs strategy.

There is a need to ensure equity in climate action and a fair outcome when planning for SDG success. Equity must be fully integrated into the SDG 2016/2020 Agreement in order to reflect historical responsibilities and responsibilities to future generations, as well as current and future capabilities. To fight corruption in developing countries there must be transparency and accountability. Country-specific actions and support should be communicated effectively, addressing uncertainty and building confidence and trust amongst governments and their stakeholders.

Collective responsibility by all stakeholders is essential at a global level. The EU was firmly committed to support the achievement of the MDGs globally by 2015.⁴⁴ This is still possible with the SDGs, if all partners in the international community demonstrate strong political commitment, implement necessary policy changes and take concrete action on climate change.

A strong sustainable development deal will make a significant change in the ability of each individual country to tackle climate change. This can provide a clear signal to business and will guide towards investing in low carbon outcomes. It will reduce the competitiveness impact of national policies, and create a simpler, more predictable framework for companies operating in different countries.

Globally the food production sector needs to carry out research on the linkages between climate change and specific adaption measures that are key to managing the impact of climate change; more specifically in maintaining levels of food production and quality in spite of increasing temperatures and highly variable rainfall. This will promote climate change policies and tools important for the specific agriculture and food security sectors.

The other approach is to strengthen regional and international cooperation. With climate change much productions will have to move, in some cases from one country to another. This calls for strengthened regional and international cooperation to facilitate exchanges of knowledge, management of food stocks, exchange of genetic material for planting, and other practices. Policies and institutions dedicated to the prevention and management of specific risks and vulnerabilities that can be modified by climate change, such as plant pests, animal diseases, invasive species, wild fires, drought and floods, are mainly local and national, but they can be effectively supported by international cooperation and tools.

African countries should ensure that there is an integration of the agriculture sectors as well as food security and nutrition concerns into climate change policies and governance. Specific national climate-related instruments such as

national adaptation plans of action (NAPAs), prepared by LDCs, as well as the NAPAs already under preparation, aim to identify vulnerabilities to climate change and ways in which they can be addressed.

African countries should build upon the G8 and G20 food security initiatives to reexamine existing approach should be a condition of future agreements. In the case of livestock, farmers have adopted practices aimed at the more efficient use of water and to produce their own fodder and stock it for use during the long dry seasons when fodder is scarce. Farmers should also switch to more heat-tolerant breeds over the traditional ones, and changing the timing, duration and location of cropping and grazing.

There is need for global institutions and policies to support smallholders and small producers in the transition to more resilient situations through the adoption of new livelihoods. Farmers, herders, fishers and foresters need to transform the institutional environment that supports such change. At present this type of enabling policy and institutional environment is often lacking for smallholders. Institutional arrangements that support increased and stabilized returns from agricultural production are essential, for example rural credit and insurance programs, agricultural extension, land and water tenure arrangements and input subsidy programs.

As recommended by the Centre for International Governance, there is a greater need to explore the links between climate change, food security and sustainable development that intensify underdevelopment in Africa, and examine the different pathways through which climate change affects Africa's development.⁴⁵ There is a need to highlight the opportunity that Copenhagen created for Africa to adapt to new and more efficient planning procedures. These patterns of development reduce the continent's vulnerability and improve its resilience. It is essential to eliminate hunger by improving health and building security, outcomes that are linked to tackling climate change. This will bring huge benefits to the natural environment by helping to avoid biodiversity loss and the degradation of the ecosystems upon which we all depend.

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The Political Economy of Corruption

Samuel Zalanga

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the political economy of corruption in Africa from an international political economy perspective (Balaam and Veseth 2001). It begins with a discussion and analysis of the conceptual problems and challenges in the definition of corruption. The second section reflects that understanding corruption in society is important because of its consequences on various dimensions of what constitutes a healthy human society. In the third section, the political economy of corruption in Africa is examined. The last part analyzes the conditions and situations in the post-war era of state intervention in economic development, and the period following the end of the Cold War, which led to the hegemonic emergence of the regime of neoliberal reforms and globalization (Massey et al. 2006). The analysis makes specific reference to how this contributed to the flourishing of corruption in Africa. In the next section we ruminate on the conceptual challenges and problems associated with defining corruption.

DEFINING CORRUPTION: CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

At the basic level, corruption for some people implies moral failure. Indeed, the origin of the word in Latin means spoiling, polluting, abusing, or destroying something. Looking at the literature on corruption in general, it can fairly be observed that the meaning is dynamic and varies with time and space (Philip 1997). Corruption is also perceived as an aberration from societal norms and expecta-

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tions. It is a behavior that is inappropriate but related to the way someone uses his or her official status. The key issue that bedevils the discussion on the definition of corruption is explaining what constitutes an official position and what constitutes an abuse of such a position, status, or office. This definitional question is very important, because without a consensus and agreement on what exactly constitutes corruption it will be difficult to combat it. For instance, although the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) produced one of the most profound documents on corruption with universal application, it never provided a definition of what corruption is, because the group working on the document could not reach a consensus (Sandage 2014).

In a related case, Transparency International, one of the world's leading international anti-corruption non-governmental organizations, used to define the word in two ways, but recently it has avoided doing so because of the complexity of what constitutes corruption. For instance, one of the definitions it used until 2012 regards it as a situation where people who are holding public office abuse it for the purpose of personal gain. The World Bank uses this definition too. But in other respects, Transparency International uses a definition that is much broader, given that it characterizes corruption as a situation where someone abuses a position of power that he or she holds in trust (Hellman et al. 2000). The difference between the two definitions is that the first makes corruption a problem for state employees only, while the second is applicable to corporations and persons serving in corporate capacity, even when the person is not employed by the state.

Another conceptual issue that needs to be addressed with regard to the definition of corruption provided by Transparency International is whether abuse of office is simply conceptualized in pecuniary terms or whether it can include actions such as nepotism and cronyism. Furthermore, there are certain decisions made by state officials and political parties that may not involve money or embezzlement but that enhance and privilege their struggle for power at the expense of other social groups or political parties (Karklins 2005). In brief, corruption can take purely economic form or a social form and nature. Much depends on how a society decides to define it. In the next section the significance and social consequences of corruption are examined.

SIGNIFICANCE AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION

Corruption needs to be studied and addressed because it is significant in its effect of service delivery and provision of public good and has harmful social consequences. First, when there is corruption in a society, it reduces the amount and timeliness of and quality and access to public goods in a society. It also reduces the level of investment that ought to be made for the provision of public goods (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016). Since the availability of public goods empowers people in pursuit of their legitimate goals in life, and therefore increases productivity and economic growth, when corruption undermines the provision of public goods it has a major impact on societal wellbeing.

Corruption also has consequences because it can discourage foreign donors or business partners when they know that their contribution will be corruptly used and wasted (Moyo 2009). In such situations, foreign donors and business partners are not only hesitant to contribute or invest but they may also completely stop doing so. Such a development affects the life chances of many in society who would benefit from such aid or investment.

We also need to study corruption because when it is deep and widespread in society it promotes exclusive instead of inclusive development, thereby creating tension and resentment in society both horizontally and vertically. In a deeply corrupt society, there are winners and losers in the sense that corrupt officials engage in corruption to pursue their private interests at the expense of public interests. The only people who benefit from corruption are the perpetrators and their allies or associates. Other members of the public are short changed. Whether this corruption affects people vertically or horizontally, the fact and reality is that it causes resentment in society, which is not healthy for social and political stability, both of which are foundational to economic growth and prosperity. Corruption also impacts societal wellbeing because when and where it exists it increases the degree of inequality in society between the rich and the poor, as measured by the Gini Coefficient.

Furthermore, when inequality is not based on consensus on meritocratic criteria, those at the receiving end of such structured inequality will not see the legitimacy of the social structure that emerges and exists in the system of inequality. Indeed, even when inequality is based on meritocratic criteria, there are questions about if not a crisis of legitimacy. Those excluded, when informed and organized, will always contest the legitimacy of the unequal distribution of scarce resources, which can be a source of instability. In addition, a high level of inequality in society is greatly correlated with poverty. Social science research has documented the extensive and damaging consequences of poverty on the life chances of people and their social, physical, and mental health (Roland 2014). No society can make progress under such circumstances. Indeed, when economic growth is exclusive and unequal because of corruption, it has moral consequences in society. According to Friedman, when people feel materially and socially insecure, they are more resentful of public policies that will redistribute wealth to help very disadvantaged people (Friedman 2005). In brief, society and people become meaner.

Societies that have been known to be very corrupt are often characterized by state institutions that are either failing or are outright predatory. Moreover, distrust of the state, especially the police which represents it, can lead to people not relying on the state to maintain law and order because of police corruption. The people will instead develop extra-legal strategies for protecting themselves and solving their problems, these often resulting in violence. In a nutshell, this situation leads to a decline of trust and social capital. But as Robert Putnam argues, based on a comparative study of northern and southern Italy, modern institutions cannot effectively function in producing public

goods if there is no social capital and trust (Putnam et al. 1993). Social capital and trust are prerequisites for the effective functioning and legitimacy of modern state institutions in a diverse society. Without these ideals being realized, the level of insecurity in a society will increase.

The neoclassical theory of economics forms the bedrock and foundation of modern capitalism. A major argument of the theory is that for capitalism to be beneficial to the people business firms have to operate in a highly competitive environment. Unfortunately, corruption undermines this potential contribution of capitalism to society because corrupt officials can use their position of power and decision-making to favor corporations that are less competitive or efficient but highly connected politically. In this situation, the decision of corrupt officials leads to public plight while enhancing the private gain and pleasure of the corrupt officials. Similarly, a high level of corruption in a country can undermine the potential contribution of human resource and human capital to national development through the institutionalization of nepotism, cronyism and primordialism in employment and appointment decisions. Instead of acknowledging merit, personal effort, level of motivation, creativity and the ingenuity of potential employees, nepotism, cronyism and primordialism are in contrast used as selection criteria. This leads not only to incompetent public employees but also creates the huge problem of brain drain, when otherwise highly qualified and competent people migrate to other countries, especially in the West, where their human capital is highly valued and they are treated more justly and fairly (Todaro and Smith 2012). It is pertinent to note that African countries have suffered highly from the negative consequences of brain drain. Meanwhile, many who remain in the country but have their human capital ignored remain frustrated, demotivated and angry, which is not healthy for any effective and productive working environment. From the foregoing, it is obvious that corruption has terrible social consequences on the institutions and social fabric of a society. The next section uses a political economy perspective to trace the genealogy of corruption in postcolonial Africa.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POSTCOLONIAL CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

Corruption can best be understood in postcolonial Africa using a *longue durée* method of analysis. What this means in this case is to trace the social problem back to the colonial period. Colonial rule was a foreign imposition on Africa, and Europeans used unaccountable and illegitimate power to take whatever they wanted in the continent (Abernethy 2000). They imposed laws that primarily reflected and protected their interests instead of the interests and well-being of the indigenous or colonized population. What this means is that colonial rule in a subtle way institutionalized corruption in the African continent by leaving a legacy of might is right and using state power for personal benefit and gain at the expense of public interest.

The nationalist struggle for independence was led by Western-educated African elites who were nurtured in the womb of colonial society and government. In the great majority of cases these elites were fundamentally more interested and united in chasing the European colonizers out of power than having any fundamental commitment to and vision for promoting inclusive growth and development that was fair and just to all (Mamdani 1996). Consequently, the purported challenge of pursuing economic development and nation building in the postcolonial period became complicated and a haphazard adventure in many cases. The citizens were not really unified in their struggle for independence, given that colonial rule divided and ruled the people, and also that the people on their part had their own primordial identity, which was the main prism through which they perceived social reality and their future in the new political landscape and dispensation (Horowitz 1985). The various civil society groups that were formed during the era of anticolonial struggle had the goal of pursuing their unique social and material interests, which were regional, religious, generational, class, commercial and ethnic in nature. Few groups were committed to national interests above all else (Davidson 1992).

Given the ruthless competition for power among the different interest groups during the era of nationalist struggle, the coalitions of ruling elites that emerged in the postcolonial period were infused with a high sense of insecurity. They feared being removed from office and losing power. This sense of insecurity became among other factors a major explanation for the creation of an environment that was conducive to corruption and a lack of accountability. Here are several processes through which the insecurity of the ruling elites in postcolonial Africa contributed to this situation (Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh 2001). First, the ruling elites in power eliminated competing political parties or competing elites, which led to the emergence of a lack of accountability and corruption. The elimination was carried out by either co-opting the opposition, scaring or intimidating political opponents, or imprisoning or eliminating them, which all led to great centralization of power without accountability or checks and balances. To worsen matters, in many cases even the opposition parties did not have any viable alternative and coherent vision that was better (Arriola 2013).

Second, to keep themselves in power the ruling elites had to tamper with the conduct of the elections so that the results, irrespective of what the people wanted, would always return the ruling party to power. In practice this meant that the election results were rigged and bribery was used to purchase votes or the support of influential members of the opposition (Meredith 2005). Third, the political system was converted into a personal system of rule, as the president or dictator imposed many “constitutional” restrictions on the functioning of many public democratic institutions. The democratic system if it existed at all was present in name only or in the form of what some refer to as electoral or ambiguous democracies (Diamond 2002). Under the personal system of rule, recruitment into the state bureaucracy was not based on merit. Neither was there a genuine attempt to have proportionate representation of the diverse groups and people in the country. Rather the president or strong man

governed the country as a personal fiefdom and so only recruited people into important government bureaucratic positions based on a patron–client relationship (Sandbrook and Barker 1985). Those outside the loop of the patron–client circle were left to their own devices.

What this means in practice is that government bureaucracy, the military, and security agencies such as the police did not function in the interest of the general public but rather to protect the position of the dictator, who had a high sense of insecurity in office. Fourth, without a legal or rational system of governance, which would guide the efficient allocation of resources to facilitate inclusive development, the postcolonial ruling elites expanded social services and created public parastatals that performed poorly and therefore shortchanged the general public (Mbaku 1997). While the government parastatals were inefficient and shortchanged the general public, they were an appropriate conduit for corruptly enriching the bank accounts of the ruling elites and their associates. In this way, they could illegally accumulate wealth in order to continue to service the patron–client political machine and meet the expectations of ordinary citizens, who were deliberately kept poor so that they would forever beg from the elites and become personally dependent on them.

With the postcolonial African political economy turning into what looked like a winner takes all system of political contest, because of the emergence of one party rule (i.e., no accountability), politics became more ethnically politicized as postcolonial political movements were often at their core identified with certain primordial groups (Joseph 1987). They were in the great majority of cases not genuine civil associations representing all citizens. And where some groups started as genuine civic associations representing all citizens, they were gradually forced to adapt to the ethnically politicized political landscape, which meant treating other citizens as second-class people if they were not from one's primordial group. As personal rule deepened, the patron–client relationship became more established as a mechanism for distributing public goods and scarce resources. It resulted in the distortion of public policies to the extent that government issuance of import–export licenses, contracts, tax concessions to business, access to housing and car loans, and university scholarships ignored merit and citizenship status (Joseph 1987). Access was determined more by personal connections with those in power. Some who felt totally excluded from the government bonanza resorted to military rebellion or irredentism as a coping strategy.

To worsen things, the lack of the rule of law, or at least a lack of respect for the rule of law, meant that the ruling elites could get away with violating the civil rights of citizens without being held accountable by the judicial system (Fanon et al. 1965). By the late 1970s, the anticolonial nationalist fervor had disappeared in most African countries. The slow and uneven progress of economic development meant that poverty and inequality had increased in the continent since independence, which heightened the sense of resentment among different social groups. Such a situation is unhealthy for any society (Adelman and Morris 1973).

Most postcolonial African ruling elites, including the military establishment, were primarily concerned about improving their personal wellbeing and socio-economic status, which made them keen to be in power in order to privately accumulate wealth and enrich themselves (Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh 2001). The cumulative effect of the poor decisions made by such ruling elites led to a terrible situation in numerous ways. First, it led to the spending of public funds on political patronage rather than on education, infrastructural, and social development projects. Yet such neglected public goods projects empower people and have an enduring value in terms of laying the foundations of inclusive and sustained economic development (Piketty and Goldhammer 2014). Similarly, the predatory elites continued to fund inefficient and inequitable public projects and ineffective parastatals as conduits for their corrupt private accumulation. Third, they also paid less or no attention to rural underdevelopment and backwardness, neglecting rural people and the rural economy in spite of agriculture being the major source of living for the majority of the continent's population (Lipton 1977).

By the late 1970s, and leading into the 1980s, the growth rate of African economies not only slowed down but in some countries became stagnant, while in others it receded. African countries harbored decayed government and administrative institutions, which increased corruption. Meanwhile, the population of the continent was rapidly growing while the terms of trade for the continent's exports were declining in spite of increasing levels of production (Bayart 1993). With the high cost of oil in the 1970s because of the so-called "oil shock" in the Middle East, most African economies were in crisis. As a coping mechanism many citizens withdrew from the state to their primordial groups, which further created a conducive environment for corruption to thrive as declining state revenues gave government workers the incentive to be more aggressive in illegally extracting money from citizens. Fast forward to the middle of the 1980s, and the great majority of African countries were forced to borrow money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the Structural Adjustment Program, with conditionalities that penalized ordinary citizens by strategically mandating cuts in expenditure on social services (Mihevc 1995). Indeed, by 1989, of all African countries only five had not borrowed money from the IMF.

IMF reform programs reduced corruption in some respects by deregulating the price of agricultural and other commodities, including food, while eliminating subsidies that went to a small segment of the population who were close associates of the ruling elites. Under the IMF neoliberal reform programs, privatization of public assets was executed in haste (Stiglitz 2002). In some cases, government workers were either laid off or had their salaries unpaid, and the traditional patronage system of governance was undermined without an effective alternative being put in place to keep the political system stable. Given the long tradition of patronage politics in Africa, irrespective of the moral and economic problems associated with that, this was a major problem. Yet the privatization process of public services, the "cash and carry" approach to

accessing regular public services and government outsourcing of its services created great new opportunities for corruption. Indeed, trade liberalization meant that many foreign corporations could win contracts at the expense of local corporations because the former could afford to pay huge bribes or kick-backs to the African ruling elites who were offering contracts (Alden 2007). As the local African currency became devalued, many government officials found their salaries lower in value and they had to resort to corrupt practices in order to cover their living expenses. Some civil servants received salaries but did little in the office. They spent most of their time making additional money during their official duty time to augment their devalued income, while still remaining government employees.

As African countries embarked on a great effort at democratization in the early 1990s, in many respects the democracy that emerged was money-driven (Basedau et al. 2007). With many poor and uneducated people, and there being no long history or culture of citizen participation in public decision-making, the third wave of democratization created another opportunity for increased corruption in many countries (Alden 2007). What all the foregoing suggests is that one cannot understand the phenomenon of high- or low-level corruption in contemporary postcolonial Africa without deciphering how the genealogy of events and their cascading consequences from the colonial period unravel to date, and produce conditions that created a conducive environment for corruption. This is so especially because the postcolonial African ruling elites and bourgeoisie did not have the courage to shift the legacy of colonial rule from exclusive to inclusive development (Fanon et al. 1965). With a high level of poverty, inequality and a climate of rapid social change, African cultures and societies found themselves in an anomic situation, which is fertile soil and climate for corruption to thrive and flourish owing to the moral and ethical ambivalence that such situations promote. In the next section, we discuss several specific factors rooted in the institutional and social-cultural quagmire that African countries found themselves in which contributed to the flourishing of corruption.

POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA: THE CONTEXT AND CLIMATE FOR CORRUPTION

The literature is replete with numerous explanations and analyses accounting for economic and other socio-structural factors and processes responsible for creating a conducive atmosphere in which corruption can thrive and flourish. This section of the chapter, owing to space constraints, will limit itself to providing an overview of a few of such factors and processes, with particular reference to the post-war development period, followed by the end of the Cold War and the era of neoliberal reforms and globalization in Africa. First and foremost, scholars have noted that greater state intervention in the economy, as was the case in the immediate post-war development era, creates a conducive environment for

corruption (Tanzi 1995). Generally, it is argued that the more the state intervenes in the economy, the larger the bureaucracy in such a country will be. Such expansion in state bureaucracy as part of a broader strategy of state-led development creates wide-ranging and intensive opportunities for interaction between business elites and state bureaucrats. As was noted by Adam Smith, many business organizations are willing to rig the competitive processes in the market to their own advantage when they find it conducive to do so (1955). In this respect, when there is much interaction between state bureaucrats and business elites, rent-seeking culture develops where the business elites acquire favorable business opportunities by bribing state bureaucrats (Olson 1971). Alternatively, the state bureaucrats may sell extremely profitable business opportunities to businesses that need the services and are willing to pay for them in the form of bribes.

On a critical note, however, based on comparative studies, other scholars maintain that state intervention in development policy and implementation with a view to promoting economic development does not in and of itself promote corruption. Thus, state intervention per se is not a solid criterion for accounting for the possible flourishing of corruption. Rather, the nature of ruling elites in power and the kind of institutions that exist in society that are spearheading the state intervention process are the critical variables that need to be focused on (Wade 1990). If the coalition of ruling elites in power is lacking vision, is incompetent, and lacks a nationalist sense of commitment, corruption is more likely to thrive at high levels than when it is a developmental state run by transformational elites who are competently prepared and are genuinely nationalistic with an historic sense of mission for uplifting the lives of their people (Evans 1990). In this respect, even the World Bank has commended the role of East Asian states in spectacularly pioneering the development of their countries in the post-war period, in contrast to the situation in Africa and in contrast to the presumed orthodoxy in the neoclassical theory of economic development, which privileges the market over the state (World Bank 1995).

A second factor and explanation for situations and conditions that create a conducive atmosphere for corruption in Africa is the regime of neoliberal privatization (Burgis 2015). In theory this is aimed at eliminating corruption in government but in reality it creates situations that nurture it, because neoliberal reforms require the state to privatize its own corporations by selling them to any willing buyer. Opportunities for corruption are created in the process because either the business elites offer bribes to government officials or the government officials demand bribes in order to grant unfair advantage to the buyer. Often this happens by way of the state officials artificially undervaluing the government-owned corporation as they sell it, so that the buyer ends up paying a discounted price for public property. What this means is that since the neoliberal agenda of privatization took off in the late 1970s, later reinforced by the Washington Consensus agenda in the early 1990s, there have been boosts to opportunities for privatization. Indeed, such corrupt opportunities through privatization cannot be dismissed as merely a problem of institutional

failure in developing countries, given that there is evidence such privatization created corruption opportunities in developed nations such as East Germany, and in Britain under Margaret Thatcher (Bishop and Thompson 2003).

The third factor and explanation for corruption is also related to neoliberal reform policies. These created the need for the down-sizing or right-sizing of government bureaucracy. In this process, workers' employment positions were terminated and this process was agnostic in terms of past diligence, loyalty, hard work, and commitment of the workers to their organization (Stiglitz 2002). This situation heightened the sense of insecurity among employees and often this led to a decline in employee commitment, morale, and loyalty. When employees become insecure owing to the ruthless nature of implementation of neoliberal reform policies, they perceive the sense that they are being treated as objects or means to some other people's ends. This is because neoliberal reforms are ruthlessly concerned about numbers and results at all costs. Due process is often ignored in the process of firing employees, let alone any consideration about the consequences of the termination on workers' welfare or that of their families. This kind of situation promotes corruption, as when workers are insecure because they do not see any future in their employment or feel they will not be treated fairly by their employer, they are more predisposed to use corrupt practices as coping strategies in order to prepare for a future that looks like the "Wild West."

The fourth factor and process that contributes to the creation of a conducive environment for corruption has to do with the fact that neoliberal reform policies privilege the movement of capital and goods over the free movement of labor. Given that Western and advanced nations have more capital and capacity to produce tradable goods, they use their influence in the World Trade Organization and other multilateral trading blocs to promote free movement of goods and capital. These allow their capital and goods to penetrate the markets of developing countries, disrupting local economies and the means of livelihood that cater for many ordinary people. With such disruption, there is pressure for migration from developing countries to Western nations in search of greener pastures and better opportunities in life (Dickinson 2017). Unfortunately, just as this is taking place in the era of neoliberal globalization, the movement of people from developing nations to Western or developed nations has become extravagantly difficult. Some describe this situation as "Fortress Europe." This situation creates a conducive environment for corruption because desperate people who have become hopeless owing to free trade policies decide to migrate illegally, and in the process of doing so they pay huge amounts of money to human traffickers and smugglers, who in turn bribe immigration border officials.

Therefore, immigration border officials are bribed to ignore illegal border crossing, which is being made because of neoliberal trading policies that have disrupted and dislocated people's livelihoods without providing a viable substitute or alternative (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2012).

Some may legitimately argue that border crossing can never be illegal because the borders are colonial creations and have no validity. But applying this logic would entail not recognizing the current nation-states in Africa as legitimate because they were also colonial creations. It is unrealistic to extend this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion given the situation in the world today.

Fifth and lastly, a situation in many African countries especially after the end of the Cold War that has contributed to the flourishing of corruption has to do with the hangover and persistence of conflict-ridden institutions and processes. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Western nations abandoned many authoritarian and oppressive postcolonial African regimes that they had propped up because of the strategic interest of averting the spread of communism on the continent. When they lost the support and protection of Western nations, many irredentist groups emerged because of their dissatisfaction with the status quo political arrangement in Africa. As dictators and authoritarian African leaders responded with violent attack, civil wars started and these conflict-ridden societies were boycotted by legitimate business organizations (Burgis 2015). Indeed, in many cases, foreign governments avoided doing business with the governments of these violent societies. But because the governments needed to survive, their officials engaged in an unholy alliance with organized criminal groups in order to get a regular and reliable supply of ammunition and to be able to sell their precious export commodities in order to earn income (Arnold 2000). All this took place outside the legitimate mediums for international trade.

Gradually, a whole new business culture that was clandestine and corrupt emerged. Vested interests that benefited immensely from the illegitimate trade and corrupt business practices developed. Eventually, when civil war ended, even when the new peacetime democratic governments came to power and attempted to reform the corrupt and clandestine business practices that had developed during the civil war, the old ways of doing business persisted because of the entrenched corrupt and vested interests that had developed and became an integral part of the system. Consequently, in such postcolonial societies, corruption thrives as if it is business as usual.

CONCLUSION

This chapter uses the international political economy perspective to analyze corruption in postcolonial Africa, notwithstanding the fact that space has not allowed for substantive discussion from this perspective. It is valuable because it involves analyzing a research problem at different levels, including individual, state/national, and international or global. To understand corruption as a social problem, one needs to move between different levels of analyses while making an effort to synthesize the derived insights for the sake of comprehensive understanding. The international political economy perspective perceives the world as an interdependent community, where people are diverse and have different

interests, perspectives, and values that sometimes agree with each other and at other times clash. Social reality in this respect is a product of the compromises and negotiations that come out of the clashes, compromises, and consensus at which different groups arrive.

Similarly, corruption in the modern nation state in Africa, and in the global community, is a product of how different social groups and individuals, depending on their social location and context, attempt to pursue their self and group interests as individuals, social groups, and nations, as the case may be. At the center of explaining the problem of corruption in postcolonial Africa is the question of institutional design and failure, worsened by chronic poverty, which creates a vicious circle that plunges societies into an underdevelopment trap. Africans should expect no one from outside the continent to solve this problem for them. And they should not expect a religious miracle to get them out of this quagmire, as fifty years of successful expansion and penetration of Islam and Christianity into the continent does not seem to have halted the worsening problem of corruption in public institutions. While the ruling elites have a primary responsibility to address this problem given their institutional power, ultimately it is the responsibility of all social groups in Africa to unite and fight against corruption. Failure to do this will end up sooner or later with a phenomenon called the “tragedy of the commons,” if this has not already arrived in many African countries.

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Rethinking Governance and Development

Augustin Kwasi Fosu

INTRODUCTION

Governance has long been suspected as a major impediment to African economic development. This suspicion came to the fore in the late 1970s when African economies suffered major setbacks during the post-independence period. In the Berg Report (World Bank 1981), commissioned by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, poor governance was highlighted as a major contributor to Africa's poor state of economic health. The proposed solutions included market liberalization, anti-inflationary macro-economic stabilization, and other market-based and private sector-driven policies. The report additionally proposed the following reforms: strict debt management, effective control of budget deficits, massive privatization of state-owned enterprises, and curtailment of government spending, including severely limiting government subsidies for consumption goods and social services. Particularly salient among the proposed policies were currency devaluation and trade liberalization, which were intended to achieve an economically healthy and stable external balance. These proposed reforms refer to 'economic governance.'

Subsequently, a number of African countries undertook political reforms, partially in support of the above economic policies and partially in response to donors' demands for such reforms in exchange for external aid. These reforms refer to 'political governance.'

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The importance of governance has also been highlighted in a subsequent study by the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), ‘Explaining African Economic Growth’ (the Growth Project). This project put governance at the core of the growth record of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),¹ concluding that poor governance led to growth-inhibiting ‘policy syndromes’ while improved governance resulted in a greater prevalence of growth-enhancing ‘syndrome-free’ regimes (see Ndulu et al. 2008a, b). And, in a more recent study, ‘governance’ was highlighted as the most prominent basis for the achievement of economic successes in the developing world generally and in selected African countries, in particular Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, and South Africa (Fosu 2013c).

Have the above reforms improved both economic and political governance in Africa? What have been their development consequences? What is the nature of the governance challenges currently? And, what are the implications for the future? Following this introduction, the chapter attempts to answer these questions.

THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT RECORD

In order to put the implications of the evolution of governance for Africa’s development in proper perspective, I first sketch out the development record. Although there has been much disparity across African countries, both at given points in time and over time, I shall limit this sketch to the overall record for SSA as a whole.²

Growth

Economic growth is a critical element for development. It has been the main engine for poverty reduction globally (Dollar and Kraay 2002; Fosu 2011) and for SSA (Fosu 2015a). Furthermore, growth provides a major explanation for improvements in human development in African countries (Fosu 2002b, 2004). Thus there is a need to reemphasize economic growth in the African region, consistent with the general extant literature.

There has been economic growth resurgence in SSA since the mid- to late 1990s, following the dismal performance in the 1980s and early 1990s (Fig. 55.1).³ Moreover, Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth has over the last decade and a half exceeded the world’s, which must happen if the region is to catch up with the rest of the world.

On a per-capita basis, however, the recent growth resurgence is not as impressive (Fig. 55.2), suggesting the need to limit population growth and dependency. Africa could, of course, rely on a ‘natural’ demographic transition as incomes grow, but that process might take much too long. Furthermore, unless productivity continues to rise sustainably in the region, this transition may be quite distant, with any economic catchup likely to be considerably delayed.




Fig. 55.1 GDP annual growth (%), Africa vs. world (1961–2012)
 Source: World Bank (2013a)




Fig. 55.2 Per capita GDP annual growth, Africa vs. world (1961–2012)
 Source: World Bank (2013a)

As in the rest of the world, Africa’s growth declined substantially during the recent economic crisis of 2008–2009, with SSA’s GDP growth falling by more than 60% between 2007 and 2009. However, the region has recovered reasonably well, actually exhibiting considerable resilience during this crisis, relative to the rest of the world, and better than in any other economic crises since independence. Such resilience is attributed in considerable part to improvements in governance and institutions (Fosu 2013a).

Development Outcomes

Consistent with the above growth record, per capita GDP stagnated during the 1980s and early 1990s but has risen considerably since the late 1990s (Fig. 55.3). Indeed, the mean GDP per capita has increased substantially during the last decade and a half, from PPP\$1192 (2005 purchasing power parity-adjusted international dollars) in 1996 to PPP\$1885 in 2012, that is, by nearly 60%.

In addition, human development, as measured by the human development index (HDI), has accelerated in 2000–2010, compared to the performance in the previous decade (Fig. 55.4). Between 2000 and 2010, the HDI increased from 0.405 to 0.468. This rise is three and a half times its increase during the preceding decade.

Furthermore, poverty has been falling in SSA since the mid-1990s (Fig. 55.5), following its substantial rise in the 1980s. Extreme poverty (at the \$1.25 poverty line) fell by 10 percentage points between 1999 and 2010.⁴ Thus, the African growth resurgence has been generally inclusive. Decomposing poverty reduction into growth and inequality changes, Fosu (2015a) finds, as in the global case (Dollar and Kraay 2002), that income growth has been the primary driver of the progress on poverty. However, the responsiveness of poverty to growth or changes in inequality tends to be small in SSA compared to that of the world (Fosu 2010c, 2009). Hence, greater efforts are required for translating growth and improvements in income distribution into progress on poverty in SSA relative to the world. While the relatively high level of inequality in Africa tends to retard the continent's progress on poverty (Fosu 2008b, 2010a, b), the low level of income poses an even greater impediment (Fosu 2015a). Thus, once again, the importance of growth for development in the form of poverty reduction in Africa cannot be overstated.




Fig. 55.3 Africa's per capita GDP, PPP (constant 2005 US\$), 1960–2012

Source: World Bank (2013a)




Fig. 55.4 Africa’s human development index, 1980–2010
Source: UNDP (2013)




Fig. 55.5 Africa’s poverty picture (\$1.25), 1981–2010
Source: World Bank (2013b)

Moreover, Ravallion (2012) finds that *initial poverty* constitutes a major obstacle to progress on poverty. Success in reducing poverty should, therefore, help to facilitate further improvements in poverty. Accordingly, social protection programs that insure against the downside risk of undertaking economic activities could raise incomes for the poor while reducing inequality, and thus accelerate the progress on poverty (Thorbecke 2013).

EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OUTCOMES IN AFRICA

By ‘governance’ I mean the division of labor between markets and states (Bates 1981; Hayami 2001). Since this concept involves the ‘rules’ that define that division, it closely resembles the definition of institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ by North (1990, 1991). The latter, however, entails all aspects of societal activities; hence, it seems reasonable to conceive of ‘governance’ as a proper subset of institutions. In this chapter, however, I shall view these two concepts as synonymous, by limiting myself to that subset of institutions, namely the ‘rules’ governing the division of labor between markets and states. Those rules pertaining to economic and political activities are designated as ‘economic governance’ and ‘political governance’, respectively.

Economic Governance

Arguably the most important measure of economic governance is economic freedom (EF). EF is defined as the degree to which an economy is market liberalized. Considering the Fraser Index (Gwartney et al. 2012), the following five broad policy areas define EF:

- Size of government: expenditures, taxes, and enterprises (Area 1).
- Legal structure and security of property rights (Area 2).
- Access to sound money (Area 3).
- Freedom to exchange with foreigners (Area 4).
- Regulation of credit, labor, and business (Area 5).

The Fraser Index measures the degree of market liberalization and is a (simple) average of the scores for the above five areas. FE is larger as: (1) the size of government is lower, (2) the protection of property rights is stronger, (3) access to sound money is more open, (4) freedom of international exchange is higher, and (5) the regulation of the various sectors of the economy is less. Figure 55.6 presents the evolution of EF for SSA, versus the world, for 1975–2010. It shows that EF has increased appreciably, from a value of 4.5 in 1980 to 6.2 in 2010 (range: 0–10), though its trend closely follows that of the overall world average.

The increase in EF over time bodes well for growth in Africa, given the positive association of EF with economic growth (Haan and Sturm 2000). In addition, EF may provide direct utility to society as Sen suggests (Friedman 1962; Sen 1999). And, according to Friedman (1962), EF is a precursor to political freedom, which in turn provides further utility to individuals (Sen 1999). Thus, the upward trend of EF might be not only consistent with the African growth resurgence since the late 1990s, but it also might have contributed directly to social welfare.




Fig. 55.6 Economic freedom, SSA vs. world, 1975–2010 [0–10]

Source: Created by author based on data from Gwartney et al. (2012)

Political Governance

Consistent with the above definition, political governance is measured by the following indicators of democracy: electoral competitiveness, constraint on the government executive, and Polity II. Also employed as indicators of political governance are measures of political instability (PI). PI has been a major feature of the African political terrain since independence, whether as elite PI in the form of *coups d'état* or civil wars.

Electoral Competitiveness

As an indicator of political governance, the index of electoral competitiveness (IEC) has risen considerably (Fig. 55.7), from 3.3 in 1980 to 5.9 in 2010 (range: 1–7).⁵ Unlike EF, however, the IEC gap with the rest of the world has virtually closed.

The effect of IEC on growth in Africa has been found to be non-linear: at the early stages of democratization (‘intermediate level’) it is negative, but it is positive at the ‘advanced level’ (Fosu 2008a).⁶ This result holds for both the index of executive electoral competitiveness (EIEC) and index of legislative electoral competitiveness (LIEC).

Based on EIEC, Bates et al. (2013) provide causal evidence, consistent with the New Institutional Economics, that better political institutions have improved economic outcomes at both macro- and micro-levels in Africa. At the macro-level, the authors find that political reform causes per capita GDP growth. They observe additionally that at the micro-level, changes in national political institutions towards greater democracy have served to raise total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture. Furthermore, ‘that Africa’s electorate is largely rural further suggests that the movement to majoritarian institutions has served to attenuate the “Batesian” urban-bias policies of the past where governments pursued policies favoring (urban) consumers at the expense of the (rural) producers of agricultural products’ (Bates 1981 cited in Fosu 2013a, p. 492).




Fig. 55.7 Index of electoral competitiveness (IEC) (1–7). Notes: IEC is the first principal component of the legislative index of electoral competitiveness (LIEC) and executive index of electoral competitiveness (EIEC), with respective weights of 0.51 and 0.49 and explaining over 90% of the variance (Fosu 2008a). Data for LIEC and EIEC are from World Bank (2013c)

Source: Created by author based on data from Gwartney et al. (2012)

Executive Constraint

Similarly, the degree of constraint on the executive branch of government (XCONST) has increased steadily in recent years (Fig. 55.8).⁷ XCONST began to accelerate in SSA in about 1990, when the Cold War ended. The gap with the world had narrowed substantially by 2000, although it remained significant and little changed since then. Interestingly, the gap in 2012 was the same as that in 1975 when the data was first available. The widest gap occurred in 1989, which was double that in 1975 and 2012. Thus it seems appropriate to emphasize that Africa has made considerable progress on executive constraint since the late 1980s, though this progress represents a return to its relatively high levels in the 1970s.

But why is XCONST important as an institutional variable? Alence (2004) observes that democratic governance in Africa greatly improves ‘developmental governance’: ‘economic policy coherence (free-market policies), public-service effectiveness, and limited corruption.’ He finds additionally that while ‘restricted political contestation’ (with limited executive constraints) has little direct impact on developmental governance, executive restraints improve developmental governance even if there is little political contestation (Fosu 2010d, p. 68).

Moreover, XCONST can accentuate the likelihood of a ‘syndrome-free’ (SF) regime,⁸ independently or by mitigating the potentially pernicious effect of ethnicity (Fosu 2013b). At the same time, the prevalence of SF is a necessary condition for sustaining growth and constitutes ‘virtually a sufficient condition for avoiding short-run growth collapses’ (Fosu and O’Connell 2006, 31; see also




Fig. 55.8 Executive constraint (XCONST) [1–7]

Source: Created by author based on data from Polity IV Project (2013). XCONST is a measure of the constraint on the executive of government

Collier and O’Connell 2008). Further, growth collapses have historically reduced Africa’s annual per-capita GDP growth by about 1.0 percentage point (Arbache and Page 2007). This estimate is not paltry, given that the growth averaged 0.5% for African economies during 1960–2000 and the growth gap with the rest of the world was roughly 1.0 percentage point (Fosu 2010d). Avoiding growth collapses could, therefore, be quite consequential.

Thus, the role of XCONST in African growth and development is critical. It may promote developmental governance, accentuate the prevalence of SF regimes, and constitute an important antidote for preventing growth collapses. The growth-enhancing role of XCONST, therefore, cannot be overstated.

Polity

Another indicator of political governance is polity 2 as a measure of the degree of democracy, with a score of –10 representing complete autocracy and +10 indicating complete democracy. As shown in Fig. 55.9, the Polity II score fell below –5 in the 1970s and the latter part of the 1980s, but has risen steadily since 1990, reaching well above zero in the 2000s.

McMillan and Harttgen (2014) find that this measure of political governance has contributed to the promotion of structural change in Africa since 2000, by reducing the share of employment in the relatively low productivity agricultural sector. This outcome can occur directly, or interactively with price changes.

Political Instability

Political instability (PI)—including military *coups d’état* and civil wars—constitutes a reasonable measure of the quality of governance and may have important implications for economic and development outcomes in Africa. For




Fig. 55.9 Polity II score, average SSA, 1960–2013

Source: Created by author based on data from Polity IV Project (2013). Polity II score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic)

example, civil wars in Africa have been found to be growth-inhibiting (Collier 1999; Gyimah-Brempong and Corley 2005). In addition, the prevalence of elite PI, involving military coups, tends to be deleterious to growth in SSA (Fosu 1992, 2001, 2002a, 2003). PI could, moreover, reduce the rate at which growth might be transformed to human development (Fosu 2002b, 2004).

As Figs. 55.10 and 55.11 indicate, the incidence of PI in its various forms seems to be declining on the continent. For example, the frequency of civil wars fell from as high as 18 in 1991 to 8 in 2008 (Fig. 55.10). Similarly, the incidence of military coups shows a downward trend from the early 1990s, despite the apparent spike in 2008 (Fig. 55.11). Based on the extant literature, therefore, this state of affairs for PI might have contributed to the aforementioned improved African economic and development outcomes.

The Governance Challenge: What Next?

The above account shows that Africa appears to have turned the corner on its economic and development outcomes. This record is, furthermore, supportable by the accompanying improvements in governance. But are the current trends durable?

As more and more African countries have become relatively democratic within the multiparty framework, an important challenge has arisen: will the political outcome be consistent with the desired economic outcome? Interpreting Bates (2006), Fosu et al. (2006, p. 1) write:




Fig. 55.10 Frequency of armed conflicts in SSA, 1960–2008
 Source: Created by author based on data from Strauss (2012)




Fig. 55.11 Incidence of elite PI in SSA—*Coups d'état*, SSA, 1960–2013
 Source: Created by author based on data from Center for Systemic Peace (2014). Total coups equals the sum of the frequencies of ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ *coups d'état* that occurred in the year of record

First, while politically accountable governments can lead to improved economic outcomes, they are unlikely to adopt economically desirable policies that are unpopular with the populace. Unfortunately, such governments also tend to increase the risk of political disorder in Africa, which may in turn be growth-inhibiting. Thus, recent attempts by African countries to adopt more democratic governments may not lead to the expected improved growth and development outcomes unless successful attempts at minimising political disorder can be achieved.

Coupled with the additional argument, based on Kimenyi (2006), that ‘the existence of ethnically based interest groups is likely to result in sub-optimal provision of public goods’ (Fosu et al. 2006), the foregoing ‘Batesian’ proposition is a very powerful argument. It provides the basis for revisiting the issue of the desirability of multiparty democracy in an ethnically polarized society. Indeed, certain authors view ethnicity as a major culprit for the dismal growth performance in African countries (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997). Thus, the role of governance becomes critical. As Collier (2000) and Easterly (2001) argue, ‘good’ governance might be an appropriate mechanism for resolving ethnic conflicts. The key challenge then is how to attain such governance. For example, Easterly (2001) employs Knack and Keefer’s (1995) measure of institutional quality, which combines freedom from government repudiation of contracts, freedom from expropriation, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality. While this measure is comprehensive and is found to be effective in attenuating ethnic conflicts, attaining a regime that appropriately reflects all these components is indeed a tall order.

Perhaps, the recent finding that XCONST can mitigate the potential pernicious effect of ethnicity might be a good starting point (Fosu 2013b), as XCONST constitutes a better ‘policy’ variable for *implementation* purposes. But even here, there is the problem of finding the growth-enhancing optimal level of XCONST, which might actually deviate from that which minimizes the ethnicity-based adverse outcome. After all, attaining the upper limit of XCONST would be suboptimal, since it might imply complete impotence of the executive branch of government. But even if the optimal level of XCONST could be found, it is not clear how to achieve it in practice.

Nor is ethnicity the only challenge. In an environment with heterogeneous geographically based interest groups, ‘free’ local public goods are very attractive to local constituents and, therefore, to politicians who wish to win national elections. Given a government budget constraint, however, such local public goods (e.g., local-level schools, clinics, roads) might be provided at the expense of national ones (e.g., national-level schools, roads, railways), which could nonetheless be relatively productive.⁹

I conjecture that such a strategy maximizes the probability of a given political party winning the presidency nationally. Apparently, with strong local affiliation and affinity, voters tend to value local public goods relatively more than national ones. Cumulatively, however, there is the tendency for such local-based provision to lead to a suboptimal supply: a higher quantity but lower quality of the public good, while exacerbating the fiscal condition of the economy. Thus, in my view, such a politico-economic disequilibrium, as pointed out by Bates (2006, 2008a) and Humphreys and Bates (2005) in a more general context,¹⁰ is a key challenge that development stakeholders need to grapple with, as African countries continue their march toward improved growth and development. A critical risk is that the potential adverse implications, including likely mismanagement of the economy (Bates 2008a; Humphreys and Bates 2005) and political disorder (Bates 2008b) in such disequilibrium, might lead to

backtracking by African countries in the thrust toward democratic dispensation. Achieving ‘advanced-level’ democracy resulting from deeper democratic consolidation might help to resolve this challenge. But would it, and how?

NOTES

1. In the present chapter, ‘sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)’ is used synonymously with ‘Africa’.
2. Fosu (2015b) presents a similar discussion of the African growth and development record. For recent studies that discuss the disparity in performance among African countries see, for instance, Fosu (2010d, 2012).
3. Employing data on consumption rather than national income or GDP, Young (2012) finds that SSA’s growth has been miraculously faster. Rodrik (2014) however has a contrarian view, arguing that the ‘miracle’ may actually be a mirage.
4. The poverty data presented here are based on household surveys. Using national income data, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2014) find that Africa’s poverty rate has been falling even faster.
5. This index is the first principal component of the legislative index of electoral competitiveness (LIEC) and the executive index of electoral competitiveness (EIEC), with the respective weights of 0.49 and 0.51 (Fosu 2008a); the first principal component explains over 90% of the variance (Fosu 2008a).
6. Fosu (2008a) estimates the threshold for this regime as the level of the index of electoral competitiveness in excess of 4.4 (0.0–7.0 range).
7. XCONST measures the degree of constraint on the executive branch of government, and it takes on values of 0–7, where 7 is for ‘strict rules for governance’, 1 means ‘no one regulates the authority’, 0 signifies ‘perfect incoherence’, and so on (for details, see Fosu 2013b).
8. ‘Syndrome-free’ regime means a ‘combination of political stability with reasonably market-friendly policies’ (Fosu and O’Connell 2006, p. 54).
9. For example, in Ghana, the government is bent on building and operating *regional* universities, which are likely to duplicate programs in already existing national universities. Why?
10. Bates (2008a, p. 387) for instance argues that the recent political reforms in Africa may have actually resulted in macro-economic mismanagement, as ‘governments in competitive systems tend to spend more, to borrow more, to print money, and to postpone needed revaluations of their currencies than do those not facing political competition.’

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