


# THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN US STATECRAFT

Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition

Caitlin E. Schindler



Palgrave Macmillan Series in  
**GLOBAL PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY**



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# The Origins of Public Diplomacy in US Statecraft

Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition

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*To Mom, Dad, Meredith, Keith, Claire, and Max.  
And to all public diplomats, past and present.*

## PREFACE

*Very few Americans have an adequate idea of the historical role America has played [sic]...The penetration of American missionaries in the Balkans during the early part of the nineteenth century will some day be considered the brightest pages in the annals of the peninsula...The significance of their activities in the Near East...is much greater than it seems to many...*  
—*American Influences in Bulgaria*, Prof. Constantine Stephanov<sup>1</sup>

On September 5, 1810, a coalition of churches, ministers, and parishioners in Farmington, Connecticut, formed the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). The formation of the organization was spurred by the ideas and religious fervor of the Second Great Awakening, a spiritual revival in the USA which called upon Christians to not only work toward their own salvation, but also the salvation of others.<sup>2</sup> In line with millennial religious ideas about the impending return of Jesus Christ, bringing peace on earth, the ABCFM believed there was an immediate need to return people to Christianity, ensuring their salvation. Eight years after forming, the ABCFM decided to send missionaries to the Ottoman Empire to restore the Jews to Palestine.<sup>3</sup> Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons volunteered to be the first missionaries to travel to the Ottoman Empire, arriving in Smyrna (Izmir) in 1819. For the first year or so, they were instructed to travel throughout the Empire, gathering information about the people and the environment and to learn languages before beginning any specific mission work.<sup>4</sup>

Upon arriving in Smyrna, the first task for Fisk and Parsons was to ascertain what was most needed in the region. “Our time has been occupied thus far, and will principally occupied for months, perhaps years, in studying languages, and in collecting information about the country, and in distributing Bibles and Tracts.”<sup>5</sup> Both Fisk and Parsons learned Greek, Italian, Arabic, French, and Turkish within the first few years of living in the Empire. They wrote to family and friends about the people they encountered, conversations with locals, the food, how people dressed, customs, and the government. Reports were also sent to the ABCFM corresponding secretary. These reports were then published in the ABCFM monthly publication *The Missionary Herald*. Missionaries helped to provide knowledge of countries and people overseas. Pamphlets, newsletters, and public talks about missionaries’ encounters with different cultures overseas expanded the USA’s understanding of people overseas.<sup>6</sup>

Shortly after commencing their explorations of the Empire, Fisk and Parsons received word from ABCFM that they were sending a printing press along with two more missionaries, Reverends Daniel Temple and Jonas King. The arrival of the first print press heralded one of the more significant contributions American missionaries made to the region, an impact which reverberates through the present day. Though the missionaries saw the press as a tool to print religious materials, not all of the publications were religious. As one American touring a Turkish school noted, “[it] was gratifying to perceive that to America this and almost every other great school in Turkey and Greece is indebted for its elementary books of instruction.”<sup>7</sup> The missionaries took American textbooks, translated them into Greek, Turkish, Armenian, and Arabic to use with students. By 1850, the missionaries used their presses to print periodicals in five languages, dictionaries, volumes of history and literature, and one magazine, which was credited as having the largest circulation in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>8</sup>

Beyond just providing texts in local languages, the American missionaries in some instances helped to establish print versions of local languages.<sup>9</sup> US missionaries ensured languages, which the Turks, Greeks, or Russians were trying to eliminate, thrived. Not only was a standard removable Arabic type created, but the missionary press at Malta revived Armenian and Bulgarian languages. When missionary Cyrus Hamlin opened Bebek Seminary in 1840, he



...found a great many Turkish words mixed in, I resolved not to use them, but so far as possible speak a pure Armenian. Bebek Seminary had no small influence in the introduction of a purer style of speaking and writing the modern Armenian...Our mission saw clearly that, as the language of the Armenian race, we must adopt it and make the best of it. The idea of translating the Bible into such a language was ridiculed...The history of missions proves, by many examples, that no language is so degraded that the simple truths of salvation cannot be expressed in it...The modern Armenian is now wholly transformed; it has become a beautiful and cultivated language.<sup>10</sup>

The Bulgarian language also faced eradication under Greek authorities. "The Greek church, with the sanction of the Turkish government, had introduced the Greek liturgy into all the Bulgarian churches...To throw off the Greek language and the Greek bishops, was the vow of every Bulgarian heart. To have schools, newspapers, a literature of their own, were among their strongest aspirations."<sup>11</sup> Through the work of another ABCFM missionary, Elias Riggs, the Bulgarians soon had texts in their own language.

US missionaries were also responsible for setting up hundreds of schools throughout the Ottoman Empire, many of which still exist today. Between 1820 and 1860, American missionaries established thirty-three schools. In establishing schools throughout the region, American missionaries unwittingly shared American ideas and culture, despite efforts on the part of the missionaries limit their cultural influence.<sup>12</sup> Unlike European missionary schools in the region, the ABCFM missionaries insisted on ensuring the curriculum was in local languages and as much as possible taught by natives.<sup>13</sup> Two schools were established around 1860: Robert College in Constantinople and the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut. Both colleges remain today. Robert College was a scheme devised by another missionary and Christopher Robert of New York who happened to be visiting Constantinople following the Crimean War. The Christian college in Constantinople was to be an experiment.

The probabilities of failure consisted in the division of Eastern populations. Religion has divided them...The spirit of race was also strong...These it was said will never unite in one institution of learning. To suppose it possible is absurd. But, on the other hand, it was urged, the East has made great progress in enlightenment...A Christian college, that shall offer the best intellectual training, as broad a culture as our best New England colleges, will meet the wants of this class, of whatever race or faith.<sup>14</sup>

The Syrian Protestant College, now the American University of Beirut, was also created with the same mentality. Of the first sixteen students to enroll at the Syrian Protestant College, only five were in the graduating class of 1870. One of them returned to teach Arabic at the College and also founded an Arabic newspaper and a journal, *Al Mukattam* and *Al Muktataf*. *Al Muktataf* became a leading scientific magazine in the region until 1909. Three more students went on to medical school.<sup>15</sup>

The missionaries' role in the region circa 1820–1830 is significant to the story and origins of American public diplomacy. Not only were those initial efforts by the missionaries to engage with the Greeks, Syrians, Bulgarians, Armenians, Arabs, Palestinians, and Turks the same methods that other private organizations would employ to engage the people of the Middle East and Eastern Europe later in the century, but they are also the same methods used by the US government during World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) and later throughout the Cold War. “American education in the Near East not only instructed residents there but anticipated the United States government’s Fulbright program and the work of the United States Information Agency (USIA). These formal efforts by the American government were part of its new cultural diplomacy after the Second World War.”<sup>16</sup> The Fulbright program would create partnerships with both Robert College and the American University of Beirut as well as the American University of Cairo, another former American missionary school.

While US missionaries were not very successful converting the Ottomans to Protestantism, they were exceedingly successful in sharing American culture and ideas. Even more importantly, they shared the culture of the people they ministered to with Americans at home through speaking tours, missionary publications, and the many memoirs written by missionaries about their experiences among the Greeks, Arabs, Turks, Bulgarians, and Armenians. Though they were concerned and cautious about usurping local cultures, the American missionaries did not understand that the individualism, piety, and optimism of the Second Great Awakening influenced Protestantism and threatened the political status quo in the region. “The original wise advice from Board leaders not to offend local mores was almost impossible for the missionaries to follow. Puritanism, by its eager commitment to a *city built on a hill* for all to see, required conflict with competing ideas.”<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, as those who have studied American missionaries’ work in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the missionaries had

more influence in the Ottoman Empire and Persia than American public officials; and with the help of philanthropists obtained “mandates” over most of Turkey, something many European nations never obtained except through force and occupation.<sup>18</sup>

Following the success of the American Revolution, the people of the US and their leaders desired to shrink away from Old World entanglements and to enjoy independence. Yet this was a luxury the US could not afford. For at least the next forty years, the USA’s relationship with the rest of the world would be of utmost importance to the nation’s survival. Beset by pirate attacks emanating from the North African Barbary States<sup>19</sup> since declaring independence and surrounded by European powers: Britain, France, and Spain; the US could not isolate itself from the world. Despite these dangers, America’s foreign ministry, the Department of State (DoS), remained a tiny government institution with very few ministers or consular officers posted overseas. Thus, much of America’s interactions overseas were not initiated or maintained by the US government, but rather by private citizens, primarily merchants and missionaries up until the late nineteenth century.<sup>20</sup>

For at least a century, the US unwittingly conducted public diplomacy throughout the Ottoman Empire. Missionaries, private citizens, and merchants set up libraries, schools, translated books, and arranged for students to study in the US, sometimes at great personal risk. The first Americans entered into the region as the Empire became known as the “sick man of Europe.” As the Bulgarian professor, Constantine Stephanove, would later note in 1930, few Americans are aware of the historical role their nation played in the region or the world. This is especially true about America’s experience with public diplomacy.

Washington, USA

Caitlin E. Schindler

## NOTES

1. Attached to Despatch No. 1616, Sofia, March 16, 1930, Record Group (RG) 59, Central Decimal File (CDF) 1930–1939, Box 5065, 811.42774/1.
2. James Morone, 2003. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (Yale University Press: New Haven); Michael B. Oren, 2007. *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776, to the Present* (W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, NY).

3. Hans-Lucas Kieser, 2010. *Nearest East: American Millennialism and Mission to the Middle East* (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, PA); Oren 2007.
4. Joseph L. Grabill, 1971. *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810–1927* (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, Minnesota).
5. Fisk in Alvan Bond, 1828. *Memoir of the Rev. Pliny Fisk, A.M., Late Missionary to Palestine* (Crocker & Brewster: Boston), p. 117.
6. Grabill 1971, p. 4.
7. An American. 1833. *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832* (J & J Harper: New York, NY), p. 286.
8. Grabill 1971; One newspaper, “Rays of Light,” carried a full-text translation of the Emancipation Proclamation in Arabic. The newsprint is among Abraham Lincoln Papers held by the Library of Congress (May 13, 1863, Library of Congress (LoC): Abraham Lincoln Papers (ALP), Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833–1916).
9. In 1820, there was no movable type in Arabic, but in the 1830s, two missionary printers created movable type to produce “American Arabic,” which earned the approval of Arab scholars (Daniel, Robert L. 1964. “American Influences in the Near East before 1861,” *American Quarterly*, Vol. 16: 72–84; Grabill 1971). “Arab classical literature, long in decline, was revived as the mission schools created an expanding audience for it and through the press, the means of reaching a still greater group. Two native collaborators with [Eli] Smith and [Cornelius] Van Dyck became prime movers in kindling the Arab literary renaissance, compiling the Arabic-English dictionary and beginning an Arabic Encyclopedia” (Daniel 1964, p. 81).
10. Cyrus Hamlin, 1893. *My Life and Times* (Congregational Sunday School and Publishing Society: Boston), p. 210–211.
11. Cyrus Hamlin, 1877. *Among the Turks* (American Tract Society: New York), p. 268.
12. Daniel 1964, p. 78–79.
13. Bliss (ed.). 1920. *The Reminiscences of Daniel Bliss, edited and supplemented by his eldest son* (Revell: New York); Stephen B.L. Penrose, Jr. 1941. *That They May Have Life: The Story of the American University of Beirut, 1866–1941* (Trustees of the American University of Beirut: New York).
14. Hamlin 1877, p. 285.
15. Penrose 1941.
16. Grabill 1971, p. 299.
17. Grabill 1971, p. 7, emphasis added.

18. Robert L. Daniel, 1970. *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820–1960* (Ohio University Press: Athens, OH); Grabill 1971.
19. The Barbary States were vassal states under the Ottomans and included what is present-day Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya. The Americans referred to them as the Barbary States due to their barbaric behavior as reported by sailors, merchants, and former hostages (Oren 2007).
20. Daniel 1964.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ABCFM	American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
ALP	Abraham Lincoln Papers
ANRC	American National Red Cross
ARC	American Red Cross
BFP	Benjamin Franklin Papers
CBP	Clara Barton Papers
CCRC	Central Cuban Relief Committee
CEIP	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CDF	Central Decimal File
CIAA	Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs
COI	Coordinator of Information
CPI	Committee on Public Information
CSC	Committee of Secret Correspondence
DCR	Division of Cultural Relations
DoS	Department of State
EO	Executive Order
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
IIE	Institute of International Education
JCC	Journals of the Continental Congress
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LSRMF	Laura Spelman-Rockefeller Memorial Foundation
LoC	Library of Congress
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
ND	No Date

OCCCAR	Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
OFF	Office of Facts and Figures
OGR	Office of Government Reports
OIC	Office of Information and Cultural Affairs
OIE	Office of Information and Exchange
OSS	Office of Strategic Service
OWI	Office of War Information
PAU	Pan American Union
RG	Record Group
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association



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## Reconnecting the Past and Present

*We ought not to look back, unless it is to derive useful lessons from past errors, and for the purpose of profiting by dear bought experience. To inveigh against things that are past and irremediable, is displeasing; but to steer clear of the shelves and rocks we have struck upon is the part of wisdom...*

George Washington to John Armstrong, March 26, 1781<sup>1</sup>

Over two hundred years ago, as British–American colonial relations began to deteriorate, colonial leaders recognized the importance of informing and connecting with the public, both domestically and overseas.<sup>2</sup> Only a month after convening as a congress to represent the colonies of then British America, the representatives of the First Continental Congress deemed addressing the British public a prudent initial step toward resolving the ever-widening breach between the colonies and the British government. The gathered congress “resolved, unanimously” on October 11, 1774, to compose an address to the people of Britain, to explain the British–American colonists’ view of Parliament’s actions toward the colonies.<sup>3</sup> More open letters would be written to the people of Quebec and Jamaica in order to explain the colonies’ reasons for opposing England’s legal measures against the colonies.

Today, US leaders still note the importance of engaging with people abroad, evidenced not only by *The 9/11 Commission Report*, but also subsequent reports and public statements made by political and

military leaders.<sup>4</sup> More recently, comments by US leaders advocate bolstering public diplomacy to counter the effects of terrorist propaganda and Russian propaganda.<sup>5</sup> Despite continued interest and repeated calls to strengthen US public diplomacy, more than a decade after 9/11, America's national communication efforts with foreign publics are inadequate; the "...public information campaign is a confused mess,"<sup>6</sup> despite considerable reforms since 2013.<sup>7</sup> When the nation was most vulnerable immediately following the 9/11 attacks and when America most needed to engage with publics abroad, the country was unable and remains unable to use public diplomacy effectively in US statecraft. Since the onset of the Cold War, "...the American people and their government struggled to define the appropriate role for overseas information. There has always been a broad consensus on the need to more effectively communicate U.S. messages and values. However, when it came to the specific nature of such communication, opinions diverged."<sup>8</sup>

For over a decade, American political leaders, public diplomacy practitioners, and academics have raised the issue of how America practices and incorporates public diplomacy in its statecraft, especially in the last three years.<sup>9</sup> Much of the debate focuses on the issues which continue to inhibit effective practice and bureaucratic questions as to public diplomacy's place in American statecraft, as well as defining the concept.

So why look back at the past when the problems facing US public diplomacy are in the present? As George Washington observes, looking at the past affords the opportunity to see where the "shelves and rocks" are so that they may be avoided. This is the intent of this book, to look back in order to learn from past experiences of US public diplomacy. More than this, this book seeks to provide context for today's problems facing US public diplomacy. As the following chapters will demonstrate, some of the problems plaguing US public diplomacy are deeply embedded in past experience, US political culture, foreign policy traditions, and ideas about how the US should engage the world. Unfortunately, the US cannot escape its past, and the nation is unlikely to surmount obstacles tied to national identity, traditions, and experience which inhibit the strategic integration of public diplomacy in US statecraft. Then, why bother at all with examining over 170 years of US history to "fix" public diplomacy if it cannot be fixed? The reason is just as Washington said: to know where hazards are so that we may avoid them as much as possible. This manuscript will draw upon the history of US public diplomacy in

order to suggest ways to navigate the problems currently impeding US public diplomacy, to provide context.

Before delving into early examples of US public diplomacy, the proceeding pages identify three general categories of problems facing US public diplomacy based on assessments and observations made by former practitioners, policymakers, scholars, Congressional reports and testimony, Inspector General and Government Accountability reports, and assessments of the US Public Diplomacy Advisory Commission. These problem categories provide a framework for observing connections between public diplomacy of the past and the present, demonstrating how these issues are tied to the nation's past experience, traditions, and political culture, as will become apparent in the proceeding chapters. As the cases of early US public diplomacy will show, some factors such as national experience, tradition, and national political culture act as catalysts, stimulating and shaping US public diplomacy as we know it today. On the other hand, those same forces also act as inhibitors of public diplomacy, contributing to the problems seen today. The proceeding pages identify and describe the three broad problems of public diplomacy based on scholars' and practitioners' assessments and government reports: conceptual, organizational, and ideological. In examining each problem category, connections will be made between how the issue affects public diplomacy and the historical roots of the problem. The final section of this chapter will outline how each historical case was selected and evaluated.

## PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

In the last thirty years, public diplomacy has become the subject of inquiry among academics, current and former practitioners, government research bodies, and independent think tanks. The ever-growing body of research on US public diplomacy acknowledges its importance and that its significance in international relations is increasing, rather than diminishing.<sup>10</sup> The body of research furthers understanding of public diplomacy either from a historical angle, a practical perspective, or by looking at the impact of public diplomacy. This study traces the origins of US public diplomacy to better understand the roots of the problems regularly cited by scholars, practitioners, and government audits, to provide context for practical ways to overcome these issues.


There is general agreement regarding the problems confronting US public diplomacy. These problems or impediments often highlighted by

scholars and practitioners can be grouped into three categories: conceptual, organizational, and ideological (Fig. 1.1).

Organizational problems refer to issues related to the agencies' or departments' responsible for administering US public diplomacy as well as the role or non-role public diplomacy plays in policymaking or carrying out foreign policy. Conceptual problems are issues tied to what public diplomacy actually is, what public diplomacy is used for, and what it should or should not do. Ideological problems are derived from deep-rooted beliefs and interpretations about America's relationship with the world, what is appropriate or not. Ideological issues are also connected to an ingrained view that American values and principles are universally acceptable. Many of these issues plague other elements of US statecraft (diplomacy, intelligence, defense), but for US public diplomacy, each of these areas can be connected to all of the often cited problems confronting US public diplomacy both in the past and in the present.<sup>11</sup> The case studies featured in this book demonstrate how these problems manifest themselves in early US public diplomacy and often become recurring issues.

Whether looking at scholarly, practitioner, or government literature regarding the practice and use of public diplomacy; the problems cited fall into these three categories. For example, Nancy Snow and Philip Taylor noted that while "scores of reports and white papers" are

**Fig. 1.1** Problems of US public diplomacy.  
*Source* Created by the author



produced on the need for reform and new public diplomacy initiatives, there is little done to clarify and solidify the *conceptual* understanding of public diplomacy itself.<sup>12</sup> Cull's comprehensive historical work on the United States Information Agency (USIA) from 1945 through its eventual dissolution recounts the repetitive structural and organizational problems which plagued the institution.<sup>13</sup> Many of these same issues are noted by Richard Arndt, Wilson Dizard, and Hans Tuch: the disconnect between public diplomacy and policymaking; overlap between USIA and other government agencies' work; and problems clearly defining USIA's mission, to name a few. Even after the USIA's absorption into the Department of State in 1999, structural and organizational problems continue to undermine the practice of public diplomacy.<sup>14</sup> US political ideology is not often cited as a specific issue confronting American public diplomacy, but some scholars and practitioners have made passing references to this issue.<sup>15</sup> For example, Hans Tuch refers to an observation made by a public diplomat and how Americans *assume* the world is sympathetic to American ideas and by extension the nation's policies.<sup>16</sup> The cases featured in the proceeding chapters will show how the USA's political orthodoxy sometimes impeded or spurred the use of public diplomacy in statecraft, as well as questions about the United States' role in the world and how relations with the rest of the world should be conducted.

## CONCEPTUAL

Why is defining public diplomacy so difficult? For those scholars and practitioners well immersed in the area of public diplomacy, the question raises discussions about the term's affiliation with *propaganda* and discussions about whether public diplomacy *is* or *is not* propaganda. In the context of the United States, the association with propaganda is a source of great discomfort and anxiety for any policymaker or member of the US public. Due to negative connotations associated with the term, many believe the US should not use propaganda or must not because propaganda violates liberal, democratic principles. However, if public diplomacy in the US context is not propaganda, what is it?

### *What Is Public Diplomacy*

The term *public diplomacy* is a modern concept, coined by Edmund Guillion in 1965, the then dean of the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy at Tufts University.<sup>17</sup> According to Guillion, “[by] public diplomacy we understand the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions.”<sup>18</sup> A more specific and often cited definition, pulled from a brochure of the Murrow Center, defines public diplomacy as:

...the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.<sup>19</sup>

More broadly, academics and practitioners tend to distinguish traditional diplomacy from public diplomacy as government-to-government communication whereas public diplomacy is described as being government or private communication with the wider public of another nation.<sup>20</sup>

However, as J. Michael Waller notes, outside this very general definition, perspectives about public diplomacy vary. Academics, practitioners, and policymakers differ on whether public diplomacy is simply a euphemism for other mechanisms of communication or statecraft, such as propaganda, psychological warfare, political warfare, public affairs, or public relations,<sup>21</sup> as well as the degree of government involvement with communication with foreign publics<sup>22</sup> and the function public diplomacy should play in statecraft.<sup>23</sup>

More recently, the idea that public diplomacy is related to public affairs and public relations has gained currency among academics looking to conceptualize public diplomacy generally.<sup>24</sup> However, former practitioners and other scholars object to connecting public diplomacy to public affairs or public relations.<sup>25</sup> Though much of American “public diplomacy’s roots are in the persuasion industries of PR, marketing, and advertising as well as in the minds of Edward Bernays, Walter Lippmann, Harold Lasswell, and Edward Filene,”<sup>26</sup> practitioners argue that to associate public diplomacy with PR and marketing practices reduces public diplomacy to a tactic.<sup>27</sup> Eytan Gilboa argues

...PR, advertising, political campaigns, and movies are related to public diplomacy as much as baseball is related to cricket. Advertising and branding of products are specific and self-defining; movie-makers want to entertain, political strategies work in familiar domestic settings, and PR rarely goes beyond clichés. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, has to deal with complex and multifaceted issues, must provide appropriate context to foreign policy decisions, and cope with social and political impetus not easily understood abroad. In short, public diplomacy cannot be reduced to slogans and images.<sup>28</sup>

According to Rhonda Zaharna, after the attacks on 9/11, using a PR approach to US public diplomacy only exacerbated the tensions and anger toward the USA. The US government determined that the United States suffered from an image problem and merely had to communicate better to erase misconceptions. As Zaharna demonstrates, this approach is an oversimplification of much deeper problems relating to America's relationship with the rest of the world.<sup>29</sup>

The lack of consensus regarding the practice of public diplomacy as well as defining its role or usefulness to the function of state inhibits effective practical use of public diplomacy. In addition, the absence of general agreement about what public diplomacy *is* and what the mechanism *does* complicates the systematic study of public diplomacy. Recent academic contributions now distinguish public diplomacy of the Cold War era from public diplomacy of the Information Age, now referred to as *new* public diplomacy or public diplomacy 2.0.<sup>30</sup> The advent of the Internet, publically accessible communication platforms, and the transition into a multipolar world undoubtedly have implications for the practice and role of public diplomacy. However, as James Pamment notes, theories and definitions of *new public diplomacy* tend to be normative, rather than attempting to define public diplomacy within the set of existing conditions.<sup>31</sup> Before moving forward with new conceptions of public diplomacy, there needs to be further discussion and consensus about what public diplomacy is and what it should do within both past and current contexts in order to reach a practical framework for its effective use in statecraft. This research looks at past archetypes or manifestations of public diplomacy in order to understand how it evolved into a pronounced tool of statecraft, in order to come to a more general understanding of public diplomacy in the context of America's former experience and political culture.



Interestingly, despite the novelty of the term *public diplomacy*, most academics and practitioners agree that the general practice of governments communicating with publics of other nations to be an ancient practice.<sup>32</sup> However, beyond general references to past practice, there are not many specific studies which examine how early forms of public diplomacy or how such activities were used as a component of statecraft.<sup>33</sup>

### *What is Diplomacy?*

Much of the existing discussions on the concept of *public diplomacy* often relegate it to a function of communication, marketing, public relations, public affairs, or propaganda, as discussed in the previous section. Edward Guillion's coining of the term and definition does seem to lend credence to those who argue the term is just another word for propaganda. And yet, to suggest that *public diplomacy* as a euphemism of propaganda raises the ire of some academics and practitioners. What is perhaps more surprising is how little the concept is ever discussed as an element of diplomacy, though the word is in the concept. The historic cases of US public diplomacy in the following chapters reveal public diplomacy to be more concerned with *diplomacy* than *communication*, or of conveying a message.

Given the historical ties of *public diplomacy* to WWI, WWII, and propaganda, it is understandable that *public diplomacy* as a concept is tied to communication, rather than diplomacy. Compounding this is the contemporary tendency to distinguish and label certain activities with the term *public diplomacy* and others as *diplomacy*. What would be readily labeled as public diplomacy today would not be identified as such a hundred years ago. Based on the works of Francois de Calières<sup>34</sup> and Abraham de Wicquefort,<sup>35</sup> the practice of diplomacy by professional diplomats encompassed many activities, including spying, which are not typically considered to be within the sphere of a modern diplomat's practice. *Diplomacy* was a broad term used to describe many activities undertaken by an official representing another state or leader in another country, and even in the late eighteenth century still an evolving practice among states, varying in style and practice even among different nations.<sup>36</sup> Though *public diplomacy* is a twentieth-century concept; *diplomacy* as generally understood today is also a product of twentieth-century interpretation. This being said, much of the existing literature on diplomacy tends to evaluate past diplomacy using a modern

understanding of the practice, where diplomacy and diplomats only include interactions among state leaders.

The practice of diplomacy remains ambiguous even today, as much study and attention is given to how nations interact in the realm of international relations and foreign policy.<sup>37</sup> Looking at the evolution of diplomacy from Thucydides to present day, the argument could be made that *both* the practice and mechanism of diplomacy remain a subject of debate. Despite this, there is some consensus about the role or functions of a diplomat. First and foremost, diplomats are representatives and are present in a host nation to not only represent their nation's leader, but also the policies of their nation.<sup>38</sup> Second, diplomats and those who serve in embassies are also listening posts, identifying issues emerging from patterns in domestic or external events and sending this information back to its own government.<sup>39</sup> A third function, and perhaps most obviously, diplomats also work to avoid conflicts, assuage tensions, and are generally responsible for managing the relationship between the nation represented and the host nation.<sup>40</sup> Finally, diplomats may also work diplomatic initiatives with a host nation in order to contribute to the international system.<sup>41</sup>

Each of these functions or tasks of the diplomat parallels the public diplomacy cases featured in this book. The diplomatic function of representation, not only of a nation, but its policies, is particularly relevant to the efforts of Benjamin Franklin in France where he was required to define from whole cloth the character of a new nation and represent a new republic. One of the trends, identified in the public diplomacy cases examined in this book, is the concern about how the USA is represented to the public of other nations or how US policies are explained or misunderstood and how any negative representation of the United States to the public of another nation undermines US international relations. The second task of a diplomat or embassy as listening post is equally analogous to the public diplomacy cases in this study. The idea of using public diplomacy to not only understand and know public sentiment in another country, but to use this to inform policymaking in the same way diplomatic information or intelligence informs policymaking, is of crucial importance for the mechanism as a tool of statecraft. Many of the cases of early US public diplomacy center around conflict and how public diplomacy was used to mitigate conflict or alleviate tensions, and in some cases, public diplomacy was used to manage relations with another nation as the Union managed its relations with Britain during the Civil War. At the turn of the century,

private entities and the Department of State presented a new diplomatic initiative to the Pan American Union to develop student exchanges to further relations and friendship between members of the Pan American Union. Through the study of the evolution of public diplomacy in the United States, these parallels between public diplomacy and diplomacy appear more substantive than those drawn between public diplomacy and propaganda, which are predicated on the means of engagement or communication and the intent to influence others.

These conceptual issues and novelty of *public diplomacy* coupled with the changing practices of traditional diplomacy make a historical investigation into previous uses of public diplomacy more difficult to trace. In an effort to avoid analyzing the past using anachronistic concepts and to facilitate archival research, this research uses a general term to identify past examples of public diplomacy. For this reason, the study uses a broad, general term, *foreign public engagement*, to not only signify activities which share similarities with present-day public diplomacy, but also help identify these activities within archival records. *Foreign public engagement*, for this study, is any conscious effort by either the US government or private entities to interact or communicate with people of foreign nations, beyond superficial relationships such as trade and administrative correspondences, for geopolitical reasons.

### *What is Propaganda?*

As briefly discussed, a frequent criticism and concern for American public diplomacy consistently throughout the Cold War up to the present day is the concept's relationship to propaganda, perhaps the most difficult conceptual issue confronting US public diplomacy. Propaganda became something of an enigma after America's experience with propaganda from World War I (WWI) to the end of World War II (WWII). Upon the conclusion of WWI, Americans were incensed by revelations of propaganda used by foreign governments and the US government to encourage support for the war. The fallout of WWI propaganda spurred intellectuals and journalists to publish exposés, to engage in experimental studies, and to investigate the use of propaganda by foreign and domestic entities.<sup>42</sup> Ironically, looking at the period from the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 to the creation of the USIA in 1953 and the popularization of the term *public diplomacy*, the term *propaganda* is

used regularly to describe American activities which would eventually be labeled as public diplomacy under the USIA.<sup>43</sup>

As David Welch notes, *propaganda* has come to mean different things at different times, though the use of propaganda saw a dramatic increase in the twentieth century.<sup>44</sup> Propaganda in the twentieth and now twenty-first century presents a conundrum for academics, political leaders, and citizens. While the term itself connotes something different from its origins, providing an exact definition remains elusive and determining the ethics of using propaganda even more contested. As with the literature on public diplomacy, the literature on propaganda remains largely historical, with a few dated texts exploring the mechanics and epistemological aspects of propaganda.<sup>45</sup>

With the post-WWI revelations of foreign and domestic propaganda targeting the general population, Americans were appalled by not only how easily the public were manipulated, but also discomforted by the fact that the US government also used propaganda to persuade citizens to support the war through the CPI.<sup>46</sup> The use of propaganda infringed on Americans' sense of fair play and independence, creating permanent fear and suspicion toward any government information. Compounding this fear, American political leaders and academics never adequately defined what propaganda meant in relation to American liberal political values in the intervening years between WWI and WWII.<sup>47</sup> As WWII began, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created several agencies which used similar techniques and practices to those used by the CPI, without any consensus or resolution regarding the use of propaganda let alone how to define the practice. Many of these agencies, including the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), were later absorbed by the State Department, becoming the forerunners of US public diplomacy.

America's twentieth-century exposure to and the use of propaganda from 1914 to 1945 contributed to how American institutional public diplomacy developed. Based on the opposition aroused by propaganda among both policymakers and the American public, coupled with present-day suspicions that public diplomacy is simply a euphemism for propaganda,<sup>48</sup> a logical conclusion can be made that the development of American public diplomacy is affected by the latent issues surrounding the definition of *propaganda*, propaganda's role in American democracy, and the development of America's own propaganda strategy.

Perhaps the most significant impact of America's encounter with propaganda was the complete loss of faith in the ability of the American citizen to differentiate propaganda from true information.<sup>49</sup> A central tenet of American liberalism—the rationality of man and his ability to discern the truth—was diminished by America's experience with propaganda in WWI. As Philip Taylor notes in the introduction to *Munitions of the Mind*, propaganda was believed to force people to think and do things they might not have conceived of doing if left alone. Propaganda, according to the “liberal minded,” usurped key liberal tenets of independent thought, the free flow of information and ideas, and the search for peace and truth, and as such democracies should not use propaganda.<sup>50</sup> Two of the cases featured in this book look specifically at America's “propaganda” agencies during WWI and WWII. This is because they are not only a key piece to the story of American public diplomacy, but also because of the similar methods used by the CPI, OWI, CIAA, and the Division of Cultural Relations in relation to the methods used throughout the Cold War and in present-day American public diplomacy, connecting past experience and techniques with the present.

The term *propaganda* excites a great deal of anxiety within the USA today due to national experience in the twentieth century. Yet, America's fear of foreign influence throughout the Revolutionary War and even in the early, formative years is an often overlooked element comprising national attitudes. Even before the negative connotations associated with *propaganda* in the twentieth century, the United States' fears about foreign influence pervaded discussions about relations with other nations from the late eighteenth century and following the ratification of the US Constitution. Fears about the possibility of American commissioners “going native” or being subject to foreign influence while representing the United Colonies overseas spurred the Continental Congress to pass a resolution limiting commissioners' length of representation overseas to three years.<sup>51</sup> Discussions throughout the Constitutional Convention often raised concerns about how to protect a republic from foreign influence, while balancing the need for security with preserving individual citizens' liberty. The same issue was frequently discussed in *The Federalist Papers*, explaining how the different branches of the government were accorded various powers and checks on power in order to protect the virtue of the republic from foreign interference and internal discord.<sup>52</sup> Upon leaving office, George Washington reiterated concerns about the

threat of foreign influence in his *Farewell Address*, warning against particular attachments to any foreign nation and against party factions, as factionalism opened the door to foreign manipulation.<sup>53</sup> The fear about potential foreign influence was of particular concern regarding the organization of the USA's diplomatic institutions and the level of diplomatic representation overseas, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Propaganda raises some important issues for understanding public diplomacy. First, just as public diplomacy lacks clarity, propaganda remains a relatively ambiguous term. Due to the organic nature of language and the vast period of study, the cases look at how people engaging with foreign publics viewed what they were doing and when able, contrast this with what foreign publics thought they were doing. Second, there is a tendency in public diplomacy literature to use techniques to distinguish between the terms. Thus, much attention will also be given to the methods used to engage people abroad and the *intent* behind the engagement, as "propaganda cannot be defined by the nature of the material propagated. The definition must rest on the intent underlying the dissemination or, as in the case of censorship, the suppression of the material in question."<sup>54</sup>

## IDEOLOGICAL

The issues effecting US public diplomacy which fall into the ideological category are not as clearly distinguishable as the conceptual and organizational issues, likely because those issues are most identifiable and easier to address. The ideological issues touch on sensitive debates in the United States which have percolated since the nation gained its independence. Additionally, the ideological problems represent two issues. First, defining the USA's role in the world, how the nation should engage, and what nation the USA engages. This changes with time and circumstance, and as such, it is a question of persistent debate. The second aspect of the ideological problem plaguing US public diplomacy is more subtle. There is a tendency with US public diplomacy to advocate and rely upon national ideals to justify and explain US foreign policy. This works, as long as US foreign policy embodies and represents the same national ideals represented through public diplomacy. When the two are out of sync, the damage done to international relations is significant.

### *US Diplomacy & Foreign Relations*

In an address to the US Public Diplomacy Council, Donald Bishop outlined three challenges facing public diplomacy. One of the challenges Bishop noted impacting US public diplomacy derived “from division among the American people over our nation’s purposes in the world.”<sup>55</sup> If the goal of public diplomacy is to assist with a nation’s foreign relations, how can public diplomacy be effective without consensus about the nature of the country’s relationship to the rest of the world? The USA not only struggles to clearly define what its role should be, but also premises much of its public diplomacy on ingrained principles which date back to before the US became an independent nation.<sup>56</sup> These principles and ideas, such as freedom and the sovereignty of the public, are assumed to be universally acceptable and desired. America’s evolving view of its relationship with the world and the principles which define American political culture impact the development and role of public diplomacy.

Contradictions in the United States’ political culture have long affected how the US sees and defines its relationship with the rest of the world. “What is more, confusion and discord have been the norm in American foreign relations not because we lack principles to guide us, but because we have canonized so many diplomatic principles since 1776 that we are pulled every which way at once.”<sup>57</sup> Examining US history, particularly looking at how American ideals, diplomatic practice, and pillars of foreign policy developed reveals the paradoxes present in the political culture of the nation. Scholars have noted the conflicting traditions and political philosophies which compose American political culture.<sup>58</sup> “American political thought... is a veritable maze of polar contradictions, winding in and out of each other hopelessly: pragmatism and absolutism, historicism and rationalism, optimism and pessimism, materialism and idealism, individualism and conformism.”<sup>59</sup> To this broad list, other political philosophies may be added, including republicanism, federalism, conservatism, Protestantism, and liberalism.<sup>60</sup> The question then is how these many doctrines influenced the development and practice of foreign public engagement throughout the course of American history and subsequently public diplomacy.

Through much of USA’s existence, the nation’s relationship with the world remained passive. However, as America grew geographically and economically; as the outside world changed; and as technological

advances diminished physical boundaries, the United States altered its view of the world and the role of the nation in the world. By the end of the nineteenth century, the USA prepared for a much more active relationship with other nations. This altered stance toward the world and the paradoxes ingrained in US political culture both facilitated and hindered the development of public diplomacy throughout the course of American history.

America established much of the country's diplomatic practice and attitudes toward foreign affairs through colonial experience, European influence, and British legal tradition. Keynote diplomatic traditions such as isolationism and the separation of the New World from the Old World originated in colonial experience and remain important frames guiding US relations with the rest of the world through WWII. Colonial and later American ideas toward foreign relations can be traced back to classical and European philosophies, while American diplomatic practice originates from not only British and European influences, but also from the use of colonial agents going back to the seventeenth century. Looking at how American diplomacy developed reveals how much the colonial years helped to determine and fix American foreign policy principles and diplomatic practice which then plays a role in the development of public diplomacy.

Firstly, the colonies developed in such a way that made each colony take on "international" responsibilities equivalent to a sovereign state. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the American colonies shared borders with colonies which were under Dutch, French, and Spanish administration, and by virtue of the colonies' geographic separation from England, many of the colonies formed policies based both on the framework of the home government's laws and based on practical need. Edmund Burke coined the term "salutary neglect" to describe the relationship formed between the British American colonies and England,<sup>61</sup> a relationship which was, generally, mutually beneficial for both: The colonial settlers escaped the political chaos of Europe and the European home governments benefitted from the raw materials and eventually agricultural products of the colonies. Thus, "American freedom and order grew 'organically' in colonial times, out of practical social experience of the colonial people, who adapted British political institutions to their American circumstances."<sup>62</sup> The physical distance between America and Britain as well as the need for a strong government to handle



colonial policy toward neighboring colonies obligated the American colonies to take on an executive role early in their existence.

American ideas of isolationism or separation from the Old World were well ingrained in the colonial mind as the proper course of relations with other nations prior to the seventeenth century. Interestingly, the idea of separate spheres, Old World and New World, originates from European efforts to manage international relations dating back to the fifteenth century. The idea behind the separate spheres had two purposes. On the one hand, two spheres helped to minimize the effect of conflicts transferring from one sphere to the other. European nations agreed that hostilities in one sphere did not transfer to another. On the other hand, the separate spheres were used to set boundaries for spheres of influence and European colonial interests. Eventually, the two spheres concept evolved, and the idea that the colonial world was a sphere distinct from Europe with its own international laws, conventions, and institutions took the place of the original concept. This distinctiveness, between the Old World and New World, contributed to the USA's understanding of its role in the world, shaped diplomatic institutions, and foreign policy.<sup>63</sup> The concept was built upon over the course of the seventeenth century as more and more settlers came to the New World.<sup>64</sup> At the time, not all the colonies in North America were British. The colonies did not want to become entangled in the frequent conflicts which emanated out of Europe, in part because they left to escape the violence, but also as a matter of survival. The colonies developed inter-colonial trade relations which would have been disrupted by any involvement in Europe's disagreements. America maintained no interest in becoming involved in European power politics for more than a hundred years after the Declaration of Independence.<sup>65</sup>

The origins of American diplomatic thought and practice impacted the way the United States viewed the world and how the nation saw its role in the world. And as the American colonial experience influenced USA's ideas about interstate relations, the historical origins of America's diplomatic institution reflect the political debate throughout the nation's history about the role of the USA in the world, whether to retreat completely from the world or whether to maintain some form of contact.<sup>66</sup> The Department of State's development was shaped by tensions within the branches of government over the handling of American foreign relations and how both the Executive and Legislative branches each use Constitutional powers to maintain some authority over the form of

the country's foreign relations along with concerns about the possibility of foreign influence.<sup>67</sup> These tensions over the character of American diplomacy as well as control over foreign policy profoundly impacted the bureaucratic organization and function of the State Department. Understanding the debates surrounding the institution responsible for American diplomacy is important to understanding not only the origins of American public diplomacy, but also some of the recurring discussions about whether public diplomacy should be performed by a separate government agency. The stagnated development of the Department of State in some cases forced American leaders to use non-traditional diplomacy to attain foreign policy objectives, such as engaging with foreign publics.

The present-day modern organization of the Department of State has only been in place for about seventy years.<sup>68</sup> The largest growth the Department experienced was in the middle of WWI, and again throughout WWII.<sup>69</sup> America's first "foreign ministry" was formed on September 18, 1775.<sup>70</sup> The Committee of Secret Correspondence (CSC) acted as both a diplomatic and intelligence organization by corresponding with agents abroad to garner support for the colonies as well as to ascertain which European governments might recognize American independence and join their fight against the British.<sup>71</sup> The committee membership tended to be rather fluid because frequently members were asked to serve as agents overseas. Additionally, the committee lacked any authority and primarily performed secretarial duties for the foreign affairs of the colonies. The issue of authority would plague the Committee and future early diplomatic organizations of America until the ratification of the Constitution.

One of the main causes for the stunted growth of American diplomacy was the general opinion of Congress and the public regarding foreign relations with other nations; many feared close, continual contact with other nations and others did not see a need for any foreign relations. American political leaders throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries actively sought to avoid political ties with the outside world, particularly with Europe, fearing the Old World power politics would poison the new government which answered to the will of the people, who desired most to maintain peace with the outside world.<sup>72</sup> "[To] the generation that founded the United States, designed its government, and laid down its policies, the exceptional calling of the American people was not to do anything special in foreign affairs, but to be a light to lighten the world."<sup>73</sup> Throughout the period from

1779 to 1888, the idea that diplomacy had a perverting effect or that it was contradictory to republican government and American liberal principles persisted among political leaders.<sup>74</sup>

Consequently, American diplomacy as an institution and practice was fluid and lacked political and public support throughout much of the nation's existence. Around the end of the nineteenth century, private citizens, missionaries, and merchants began to actively urge reform and professionalization of American diplomatic institutions.<sup>75</sup> The stunted growth of the Department of State reflects the fear of political entanglement and foreign influence within American political culture.

### *The City on the Hill*

The image of America as a model nation is embedded in American culture and character and impacts America's approach to foreign relations throughout the nation's history. The assumption of America as an exemplar model is apparent in the use of the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny in American foreign policy and by the end of the nineteenth century becomes the impetus to project America more actively. Interestingly, this belief in America as a model for other nations is not actively promoted by the government throughout much of the country's existence, but with the Second Great Awakening private entities became motivated by religious and moralistic beliefs to travel abroad to solve social problems, and in doing so, unwittingly and wittingly spread American political ideals abroad.

While simultaneously advocating for isolation or at least separation from the world politically, US leaders and the American public did hope to spread the American model around the world. The belief that America was not only an exemplar nation for others to emulate, but also American ideals would certainly spread remained a consistent and strong belief throughout the late eighteenth century up through the twentieth century.<sup>76</sup> This belief in America as the "city on the hill" influenced American statecraft even prior to gaining independence.

One element of the concept of the "city on the hill" is the belief that America, the land and people, was chosen by God to establish a nation built on sound principles founded upon the Law of Nations and Natural Law and that America was destined to change the old ways of the world by serving as a model to other nations.<sup>77</sup> Part of this belief in the exceptional nature of America is further influenced by a sense of national

destiny and religious duty which go on to shape American political culture, diplomacy, and foreign policy.

According to Sacvan Bercovitch, early Puritan settlers saw the American colony as a present-day Canaan.<sup>78</sup> He details how Puritan typology, the exegetic practice of taking present-day occurrences and equating them with Biblical events, was used to not only justify the Puritan's departure from England, but also encourage Puritan settlers to live in accordance with God's wishes to ensure the development of a model society. John Winthrop's sermon, "A Model of Christian Charity," carries this belief by admonishing his parishioners to live as devout Christians and in turn to develop a Christian society, so that their new community could become a model for others to observe and emulate. The sermon raises key themes which influence American exceptionalism: a chosen people on a divine errand to create a model society in a chosen land.

The influences of Puritan exceptionalism combined with the ideas of John Locke and Montesquieu to create a colonial ideology among American colonists which expected the government to respect and protect the rights of the individual. Rights were granted by God, not the government. The government served the people by ensuring these rights were protected. The "mission" of the New World to create an Eden on earth became tied with eighteenth-century Enlightenment ideas of representative government, egalitarianism, free trade, and the rights of the individual. All of which were to be protected, not diminished by the government. As Deborah Madsen explains, US founders, such as Benjamin Franklin, reformulated the religious conception of American exceptionalism. "Franklin represents the American errand as the creation of a secular state that is purified of the corruption of European politics and a social structure based on inherited title. It is the secular America that will be a model of democratic government and the envy of all the nations of the earth."<sup>79</sup>

This "city on the hill" motif serves as one of the key catalysts of American public diplomacy throughout the course of US history, as many of the cases the preceding chapters demonstrate. In addition to acting as a catalyst for US foreign public engagement, the idea of the USA as an exemplar for others to follow is also connected to the assumption US principles and ideas are *universally* appealing and compatible with other nations and cultures and that US foreign policies are predicated and compatible with national principles and ideas.

[Edmund Burke]...recognized in these colonists a whole new breed of man that deserved to be let alone...His warning...was prescient: the conviction that America was an example to every man because any man could hope to pursue his dreams there, at least in principle, *led imperceptibly to an inability to comprehend how anyone would fail to acknowledge the universal validity of this system of government. Specifically, it meant that democracy's appeal was assumed as 'self-evident'*...It meant that, in the US, strategic diplomacy and global communication have generally been an afterthought. Unlike Crusaders from other times and cultures, Americans assumed that their democratic system and their motives required no rhetorical defense. The *pride* which, as Burke astutely perceived, fatefully accompanied the otherwise commendable American religion of freedom, would eventually prove to be a handicap: The result has been a sorry chronicle of dimly ineffective public diplomacy.<sup>80</sup>

A similar assessment is made by Rhonda Zaharna regarding US public diplomacy following 9/11. The *Shared Values* initiative attempted to promote American values and Muslim values, but rather than demonstrating connections between the two, the *Shared Values* campaign seemed to contradict US foreign policy when the commercials aired in the Middle East. "The [Bush] administration argued that if international audiences could understand and appreciate the values upon which U.S. policy was based, they would be more accepting of the policy."<sup>81</sup> This idea that US ideas are universally acceptable and representative of US policies underlines much of US public diplomacy throughout WWII, the Cold War, and after 9/11. Consequently, this mentality raises ethical concerns regarding the line between *representing* an ideal and *imposing* an ideal. US public diplomacy tends to shift from representing the "city on the hill" to imposing American ideas and values on the world, which undermines the entire purpose of public diplomacy.

## ORGANIZATIONAL

### *Public Diplomacy as a Mechanism of Statecraft*

Three years after the conclusion of WWII, the United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, more commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act, was passed. In comparison with the bills setting up the Fulbright program and the Central Intelligence Agency, the effort to incorporate public engagement formally into American statecraft

was a hard fought battle, consuming the full 3 years after the war just to draft an acceptable bill and get the act through both the House and the Senate. The 1948 Act is recognized as being the watershed moment, which signaled the inclusion of public diplomacy into American statecraft. Five years later, President Dwight D. Eisenhower would create the USIA, which assumed the responsibility for administering US public diplomacy. The USIA remained the primary agency for US public diplomacy until 1999, when the agency was dissolved and public diplomacy was reabsorbed by the US Department of State.

Since the demise of the USIA, practitioners, government think tanks, and some scholars attribute some of the problems facing US public diplomacy today to the fact that there is not an independent agency dedicated to engaging with people overseas.<sup>82</sup> However, even when the USIA existed, US public diplomacy was still inhibited by structural problems.<sup>83</sup> From 1948 through 1999, US public diplomacy went through several bureaucratic shifts, never finding a satisfactory position within the US government structure.<sup>84</sup> As proceeding chapters will demonstrate, the bureaucratic issue is rooted in a much deeper issues relating to US political culture and the organization of the US federal government itself, which existed long before Smith-Mundt. Factors related to US political culture, historical experience, and state infrastructure often act as inhibitors to the full integration of public diplomacy in American statecraft. An independent agency might help to define the role or place for an element of statecraft, but as many practitioners have noted, US public diplomacy never really had a place among the other tools of American statecraft. “Perhaps one of the most important lessons of the 9/11 period—is that public diplomacy, as a political and communication activity, needs to be strategically aligned to the political and communication dynamics of the international arena in order to be effective. This alignment needs to occur on the higher level of grand strategy as well as the lower levels of strategy and tactics.”<sup>85</sup> The lesson about the need to incorporate public diplomacy more strategically into statecraft is not a new lesson. Incorporating public diplomacy into the policymaking process was an issue fought over by the CIAA, OWI, and the State Department. It was also a constant problem for the USIA and remains a problem today.<sup>86</sup>

Modern public diplomacy is recognized by political leaders and practitioners as a distinct tool of American statecraft, a mechanism wielded by the state or its leaders to maintain peace, order, stability of a state or

to achieve particular objectives of a state.<sup>87</sup> A former member of the US National Security Council, Carnes Lord remarks that "...those responsible for U.S. policy tended to conceive of public diplomacy as part of an arsenal of capabilities that could and ought be used...Public diplomacy programs thus emerged as an independent dimension of national strategy fully comparable to diplomacy, military force, and economic power."<sup>88</sup>

In general, the term *statecraft* is a rather broadly defined word. As Carnes Lord ruminates, the term "is rarely analyzed carefully...Even its basic meaning is not especially clear. The term is now used almost exclusively to refer to diplomacy or the conduct of foreign policy in a broad sense."<sup>89</sup> Lord goes on to add that such a narrow view of statecraft does not take into account the cultural, domestic, and ideological influences and elements which are every bit apart of statecraft and the practice of statecraft. As Lord notes, to see statecraft as only the external function of a state limits the understanding and function of diplomacy. A state maintains foreign relations to maintain peace and to inform policy. This function is not limited to just the external activities of a state. Therefore, *statecraft* can be said to be all the activities required for a state to function, to interact with other states and to fulfill the duties a state has to its own citizens.

Like strategy in war, statecraft is an art of coping with an adversarial environment in which actions generate reactions in unpredictable ways...Like strategy, too, statecraft is also an art of relating means to ends...statecraft is an art of using wars and other instruments available to political leaders to attain national goals...Effective statecraft requires an understanding of the various instruments actually or potentially available to statesmen and an ability to use them in coordinated fashion in differing circumstances to achieve the objectives of state policy.<sup>90</sup>

Various tools of statecraft have been identified by practitioners and academics in recent years to evaluate state policies and the effectiveness of particular mechanisms of statecraft as well as looking for best practices for future use.

Ostensibly, American public diplomacy as a government-led institution began in WWI and the Committee on Public Information's (CPI) Foreign Section. The Foreign Section carried on operating through the Paris Peace Conference. US government-run public diplomacy ceased until 1936 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt became concerned

with the deteriorating situation in Europe, leading to the eventual creation of the Division of Cultural Relations (DCR), and later included the OWI and the CIAA.<sup>91</sup> Following WWII, the responsibility within the government for American foreign public engagement rested primarily with the Department of State, but other components were scattered among other parts of the US government (i.e., the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency).<sup>92</sup> With the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, American foreign public engagement became a legally recognized function of the Department of State (DoS).

After the creation of the USIA in 1953, the agency managed American public diplomacy throughout the Cold War, but practitioners and political leaders remained divided on what the nature of public diplomacy should be (advocacy versus mutuality) and what role it should play in statecraft.<sup>93</sup> These key issues would continue to plague American public diplomacy throughout the USIA's existence, as described in histories of the agency<sup>94</sup> as well as regular government reports done by an independent advisory council, the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (formerly the US Advisory Commission on Information).<sup>95</sup>

Almost a decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union, President Bill Clinton and Congress began to re-evaluate the purpose and use of public diplomacy in American statecraft.<sup>96</sup> This culminated in the decision to move the USIA under the Department of State. Unfortunately, though the plan to consolidate the USIA into the DoS was intended to better integrate public diplomacy in American statecraft, the assessment 6 years later was that in the "era of the 1990s, public diplomacy was viewed as a low priority, and was often seen by lawmakers as a source of funds to tap for other programs."<sup>97</sup>

Following the terror attacks of September 11th, US political leaders renewed focus and attention on American public diplomacy.<sup>98</sup> Since 9/11, efforts to improve and hone public diplomacy in American statecraft have yielded mixed results as evidenced by Government Accountability Office reports,<sup>99</sup> the Congressional Research Service reports,<sup>100</sup> and Congressional hearings,<sup>101</sup> in addition to studies by private think tanks.<sup>102</sup> These reports and hearings repeat the same problems noted in 2001: an absence of strategy, what public diplomacy should do and how, as well as clearly defining the role of public diplomacy in American statecraft, and uneven and ineffective implementation.<sup>103</sup> All of these problems suggest American public diplomacy is yet to be fully incorporated in American statecraft.



## ANALYZING THE PAST FOR ANSWERS

Between the public diplomacy of the American Revolution and the US missionaries in the Middle East and Asia, the United States has a rich history of engaging with the people of other nations, prompting the question of how a nation, which entered the realm of international diplomacy by readily engaging with the publics of other nations consistently throughout the American Revolution, continues to struggle to find a place for public diplomacy in American statecraft. This book examines why the USA struggles to integrate public diplomacy into statecraft based on various factors to include the nation's historical experience, political culture, national infrastructure, and foreign policy traditions which have either inhibited or spurred the use of public diplomacy. This study not only draws connections between eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century US public diplomacy and present-day practice, but also explores early attempts to incorporate public diplomacy into statecraft and the problems effecting early US public diplomacy.

As the previous sections outlined, much like nations conduct diplomacy in their own distinct way, they also practice and use public diplomacy in a way which fits their nation's political system and culture. Therefore, this research provides context for the practice of public diplomacy and its incorporation into statecraft today by reconstructing and examining specific episodes of American public diplomacy spanning from 1776 through 1948 and the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act which legally incorporated public diplomacy in US statecraft.<sup>104</sup> By looking at how public diplomacy evolves into a distinct tool of statecraft, the study tracks not only how the practice of engaging with people of other nations develops, but also looks to define the role public diplomacy comes to play in US statecraft. Subsequently, the study also provides a new way to conceptualize public diplomacy in the American context, addressing the conceptual issue of public diplomacy. Additionally, the research identifies common factors which either impeded or facilitated the development of public diplomacy as well as determining the point of origin for many of the systemic problems confronting public diplomacy today.

Accordingly, the project is concerned with both the mechanical operations of the state as well as the intellectual motivations underlying the diplomatic functions of the American state. Thus, the research will provide a narrative of the mechanical development of American public

diplomacy while also considering how America's own political culture and national values helped to shape the evolution of public diplomacy. These two angles of analysis will run throughout this study. On the one hand, the research will examine the practical experience of American foreign public engagement, while on the other hand, evaluate how political principles of American culture have figured in the progression of American public diplomacy.

As Savelle and other historians of American diplomacy<sup>105</sup> observe, American diplomacy and foreign policy is based on past experience, both in relation to other nations' colonies and the colonies' own relationship with Britain, coupled with observations of European international relations and both European and Classical political philosophies. American diplomacy is a compilation of traditions, collected and canonized throughout the nation's existence.<sup>106</sup> These basic principles held firm not only through the seventeenth century, but remain the basis for much of American foreign policy and diplomatic behavior over the nation's history, though the policies and actions taken to ensure tenets, such as freedom of the seas and economic attachments over political connections, manifest in different ways throughout American diplomatic history, and have been re-interpreted over time to suit national needs.

The consistent nature of American foreign relations and enduring diplomatic traditions are reflections of American political culture. This is a political culture composed of both past experience and long-held political values which determine the motivations and functions of American diplomacy. Political culture "refers to the specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system."<sup>107</sup> The foundations of American diplomacy, identified by many diplomatic historians,<sup>108</sup> suggest the American framework for foreign policy and diplomatic practice is deeply ingrained in American political culture. Thus, it stands to reason that US political culture along with the long-standing US diplomatic and foreign policy traditions played a role in the use and development of public diplomacy in statecraft as well as defining where public diplomacy fits into US statecraft.

As a nation made up of so many traditions which influence foreign policy and statecraft, this research will seek to understand how the use of public diplomacy evolved and what role public diplomacy played in American statecraft throughout the nation's history. Using primary and secondary sources, the study analyzes how public diplomacy fits into

American statecraft in the context of its historic traditions and political culture by examining how foreign public engagement, from 1776 through 1948, shaped the role of modern public diplomacy in American statecraft; how foreign public engagement and modern public diplomacy fit into American statecraft; and how American political culture impacted the development of American public diplomacy.

In answering these questions, this study has four goals: to identify patterns in American public diplomacy throughout the research period; to identify connections between past use of public diplomacy and present-day public diplomacy; to analyze how trends and past experience influence present-day public diplomacy; and to determine how public diplomacy fits in American statecraft.

The book is not written as a narrative history, and the cases are not structured to retell events. Instead, the research aims to provide general knowledge about the practice and role of public diplomacy in US statecraft throughout US history. In doing so, the method combines historical analysis and case studies to examine the development of public diplomacy as a tool of the state, as each of the selected cases presented look at the process of statecraft within the historical episode. The historical case studies help to develop general knowledge of a phenomenon, public diplomacy, and then convert historical explanation into a limited generalization about the practice of public diplomacy.<sup>109</sup>

This research merges techniques from at least three areas of social science: history, political science, and international relations. In the last 40 or 50 years, academics and practitioners in the field of political science and international relations have sought to combine expertise in order to conduct research which advances knowledge in the fields of political science and international relations while contributing practical knowledge for practitioners.<sup>110</sup>

Using the *structured, focused comparison* developed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, cases examined in this book were selected to analyze specific elements of each case and use the data collected to compare each case. George and Bennett define a case as a class of events. A class of events refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest such as types of governments, revolutions, or economic systems with the goal of developing general knowledge about the causes or differences among the class of events. A case study is a clearly defined aspect of a historical episode that the researcher chooses for analysis, rather than the historic event itself.<sup>111</sup>

By employing this approach, the goal is to provide a “middle-range theory.” Middle-range theories “are deliberately limited in their scope; they attempt to explain different subclasses of general phenomena. Middle-range theories attempt to formulate well-specified conditional generalizations of more limited scope. These features make them more useful for policymaking.”<sup>112</sup> This does not suggest the history of this study can or should be used in any one-to-one comparison for present-day US public diplomacy. Policymakers require much more specific information for situations they are required to address. However, policymakers do need a *general conceptual model* of strategies and policy instruments which provide a basic rationale for the effective use of a policy tool.<sup>113</sup> Consequently, this study endeavors to formulate a general conceptual model for US public diplomacy.

Cases for this study were identified based on three factors predicated on the research questions this study seeks to answer. First, each case required conscious engagement of the public in another country either by the government or a private entity. Second, each case required that public diplomacy either become incorporated into American statecraft or already apart of the country’s statecraft. Since this study examines how public diplomacy became a tool of statecraft, this second criterion for case selection is important. Finally, case selection is also based on the availability of records and information in relation to the questions posed.

Based on these selection criteria, six cases were identified for analysis. The first case in Chap. 2 looks at Benjamin Franklin and his use of foreign public engagement to not only define and represent the US to France and Europe, but to use this engagement to obtain much-needed supplies for the United States. The second case examines the Union’s attempts to employ foreign public engagement in Britain to counter the Confederate’s mission to obtain support and formal recognition. The third case uses two examples where foreign public engagement became a mutual endeavor between both state and private entities. The first episode looks at the year leading up the Spanish-American War, and President William McKinley’s decision to form an ad hoc committee of business leaders, religious leaders, and elements of the American National Red Cross (ANRC) to organize and administer humanitarian relief to the *reconcentrados* in Cuba, the Central Cuban Relief Committee (CCRC). The second episode within Chap. 4 looks at the Fourth International Conference of American States. In 1910, the body resolved to exchange professors and students from American universities

with professors and students in Latin American institutions. The case focuses on the growing trend in US foreign public engagement where private entities and the US government developed partnerships to facilitate foreign public engagement. The fourth case selected and featured in Chap. 5 looks at the Foreign Section of the Committee on Public Information (CPI). Chapter 6 examines interwar foreign public engagement. And the sixth case in Chap. 7 compares and contrasts the many agencies created between 1938 and 1942 to engage with people abroad to include the Department of State's Division of Cultural Relations (DCR), the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), and the Office of War Information (OWI).

There are other examples of American foreign public engagement; however, the lack of records discussing how and why engagement was used and the relationship between the use of public diplomacy and American statecraft made such examples ineligible for the purposes of this study. Despite this, six historic episodes fitting the requisite requirements are featured in this book spanning from 1776 through 1948, in order to study the use of public diplomacy in US statecraft.

Additionally, to facilitate evaluating how public diplomacy develops and identify practices used to engage with people abroad, this study uses core approaches to public diplomacy as described by Nicholas J. Cull.<sup>114</sup> Cull identifies these core practices as *listening*, *advocacy*, *cultural diplomacy*, *exchange diplomacy*, *international broadcasting*, and *psychological warfare*. *Listening* is defined as the administration of the international environment by gathering information about foreign publics and their opinion, where an actor looks for a foreign audience to listen, not to speak. Intelligence collection can sometimes be considered an actor's attempt to listen. *Advocacy* is when an actor promotes a specific policy or policies to people of another nation. *Cultural diplomacy* ensures a nation's cultural resources and achievements are highlighted overseas to transmit a nation's culture abroad. *Exchange diplomacy* is where citizens from a nation travel overseas or a nation hosts a citizen from abroad to study and learn of another nation's culture. *International broadcasting* uses communication technology such as radio, television, and the Internet to engage with people from other nations. *Psychological warfare* is where an actor communicates directly to the public of the enemy to achieve war objectives.<sup>115</sup> In this study, psychological warfare is applied in the most literal sense, communicating with the people of a designated enemy nation during war. The final case will touch on the confusion

surrounding the term *psychological warfare*, and in the concluding chapter, there will be some discussion regarding the relationship between psychological warfare, propaganda, and public diplomacy.

Most of these generalized practices can be found within the text of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which effectively legalized public diplomacy, formally incorporating public diplomacy into US statecraft.<sup>116</sup> The only practices not enumerated within the text of the 1948 law are *listening* and *psychological warfare*.

To further critical analysis of each case and to permit cross-case evaluation, the structured, focused comparison method requires general case questions to be generated based on the research objectives and the posed research question. The case questions are applied to each case, to facilitate comparison between cases and to identify patterns between the cases. "The method is 'focused' in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined...The method was devised to study historical experience in ways that would yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems."<sup>117</sup> Thus, once each case was identified and prior to beginning archival research, case questions were created based on the aims of the study and the research questions. For each of the cases included in the study, the following questions were posed:

*Who initiates engagement?*

*What is the intent of the engagement?*

*What do the initiators of engagement believe they are doing?*

*What are the initiators' beliefs about the people they are engaging with?*

*What is the message behind the engagement?*

*What methods are used to engage the public?*

*How is the engagement connected to American statecraft?*

*What is the impact of the engagement on American statecraft?*

This study focuses on understanding how foreign public engagement becomes a tool of American statecraft and in turn how this is related to the development and practice of modern American public diplomacy. Hence, the archival research used in this work is primarily official records of the US government. In some cases where private entities initiated

foreign public engagement or became involved in government initiated foreign public engagement, private archival records are used to supplement official records and secondary sources. Each case puts foreign public engagement in the context of the historical period, providing background about American foreign relations at the time, and when relevant, information about other nations' relations with the USA.

The final chapter summarizes the major findings of each of the cases. One of the key findings besides understanding the origins of the problems facing public diplomacy today, the cases also revealed five patterns or trends which recur in several of the cases. These patterns expose the underlying reasons for US public diplomacy based on perspectives of the past, outline how the practice of US public diplomacy evolved, identify who shaped the practice of US public diplomacy, and suggest what role US public diplomacy should play in US statecraft. Chapter 8 will strive to answer the primary research question of how foreign public engagement shaped the role of public diplomacy in American statecraft, using the past as a context for American public diplomacy today. In addition, this chapter will use lessons from America's past practice of foreign public engagement to offer possible solutions to the problems facing American public diplomacy today.

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116. "The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this Act are to enable the Government of the United States to promote better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase the mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. Among the means to be used in achieving these objectives are—(1) *an information service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State, and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs*; (2) *an educational exchange service to cooperate with other nations in—(a) the interchange of persons, knowledge, and skill; (b) the rendering of technical and other services; (c) the interchange of developments in the field of education, the arts, and sciences...*" (United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, January 27, 1948, Public Law 402, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, emphasis added).
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## America's First Public Diplomat

*One Thing that he recommends to be done before we push our Points in Parliament, viz. removing the Prejudices that Art and Accident have spread among the People of this Country [England] against us, and obtaining for us the good Opinion of the Bulk of Mankind without Doors; I hope we have in our Power to do, by Means of a Work now near ready for the Press, calculated to engage the Attention of many Readers, and at the same time efface the bad Impressions receiv'd of us: But it is thought best not to publish it till a little before the next Session of Parliament.*

Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Leech and Assembly Committee of  
Correspondence, London, June 10, 1758<sup>1</sup>

This chapter explores how foreign public engagement was used by Benjamin Franklin during the American Revolution to not only obtain foreign aid and support, but also explain to the world who and what America was as a nation. Over the objections of the other commissioners and the Continental Congress, Franklin engaged with the French public perhaps more than the French government, especially in his first year as commissioner.<sup>2</sup> In light of the geopolitical positions of America and France between the end of 1776–1778, Franklin's efforts to engage the French public were crucial to the success of the American Revolution. As American commissioner to France, Franklin engaged with the public to secure private support and aid, to counter British misinformation and

anti-Americanism, to entice European businesses to invest in American trade, and to convince the French public that the American colonies were a separate, sovereign, independent nation.

In examining the correspondences of Benjamin Franklin, along with the accounts of his fellow commissioners and other members of the Continental Congress,<sup>3</sup> several patterns emerge which are significant to understanding Franklin's efforts to engage the public of France. Firstly, the American commissioners and the Continental Congress regularly sought current, truthful information in order to counter British misinformation, to give the public accurate information about America. Secondly, Franklin and even Arthur Lee were keenly aware of America's image in the eyes of Europeans. Franklin was attentive to the exigencies of explaining America's character to a world which previously identified the people living in the colonies as English. Thirdly, Franklin consistently distinguished between the opinion of the French government and the French public in his reports to personal acquaintances and to the CSC. All this not only suggests an awareness of the importance of foreign public opinion, but also points to the crucial role the foreign public would play in America's search for foreign assistance.

To Franklin, countries were people—not a government, people to be understood, befriended, and wooed,<sup>4</sup> and this was reflected in his practice of diplomacy, especially when contrasted with his fellow commissioners' *diplomatic manner*. Franklin immersed himself in French society by interacting with the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie in various Parisian salons and through his continuing interest in natural science. Much to John Adams's dismay, Franklin spent more time at dinner, at the theater, and at the Paris Academy than he did managing the mission books or engendering himself to the French government.<sup>5</sup>

One of Franklin's most pressing duties upon arriving in France was to explain the nature and character of America as a nation separate from England, convincing the French public of America's strength and resilience in the face of repeated military defeats. While at the same time, Franklin tried to finagle French support through the government without making America seem too weak or too strong, patiently waiting for the moment when the French government would be willing and able to sign a treaty with America and join the fight against Britain.

To illustrate the role foreign public engagement played during the American Revolution, this chapter will examine with some detail how

Franklin employed four core elements of public diplomacy to engage the French public: *listening*, *exchange diplomacy*, *international broadcasting*, and *advocacy*, using the framework outlined in Chap. 1. Before considering this, Franklin's engagement with the French public will be put into the context of the period, with a summary of the Continental Congress's foreign policy as Franklin left for France and France's policy toward the American colonies in 1776.

## INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION OF BRITISH AMERICA AND THE NEW WORLD

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, negative perceptions of the American colonies and the land itself were widespread in Europe. The early hopes of a prosperous new land had dissipated by the mid-seventeenth century.<sup>6</sup> Disappointed hopes fed prejudiced and flawed perceptions about the colonists and the land of the American colonies. The citizens of American colonies were likely aware of European distaste for the New World and its inhabitants: a savage, inhospitable land full of convicts, indentured servants, and uncivilized people.<sup>7</sup> Prior to the Revolutionary War, Americans did not concern themselves too much with countering these sentiments. Benjamin Franklin did make some early efforts to counter misperceptions about the land, flora and fauna, and the people of America, which can be found in his correspondences between various scientists of the day, who in turn published their conversations for a wider audience.<sup>8</sup>

A more concerted effort to counter the negative perceptions toward America developed when the American colonies considered independence from Britain and sought French aid. The Continental Congress hoped to arrange a trade treaty with France and other nations, but given the European and British public opinion at the time, colonial leaders needed to counter many misperceptions before they would be able to entice anyone to trade with the fledgling nation. "In order to obtain assistance and credits for the United States, the American envoys had to prove that America was a 'good risk'..."<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the external impressions of the New World, the late seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century brought many changes to European societies which are relevant to understanding American foreign public engagement in the context of the period. Ever since the

Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, establishing the legal concept of the sovereign nation-state, the theory and practice of diplomacy was still evolving by the mid-eighteenth century.<sup>10</sup> Before the end of the seventeenth century, several tracts on the theory of diplomacy or the laws governing nations were published, read, and debated among political leaders and jurists. At the time of the American Revolution, Emer de Vattel's *Law of Nations* was the latest publication on the subject and the most popular.<sup>11</sup> Relevant to the understanding of American perspectives toward diplomacy, it is important and significant to consider not only the still evolving practice of diplomacy, but also that these seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century diplomatic and international law theorists wrote a great deal about the responsibilities of the state to the people. As previously mentioned in Chap. 1, these ideas coincided well with America's own liberal, democratic ideas regarding the relationship between nations as well as a nation and the people.

Around the same time that geopolitical relationships were changing, the introduction of the print press caused changes in the public's relationship to the state. The print press combined with the legal relaxation of printing and censorship laws in England and parts of Continental Europe marked the advent of newspapers. The popularity and demand of newspapers ostensibly led to a more literate and informed public which in turn gave rise to political parties and the importance of public opinion to government leaders.<sup>12</sup> The public indirectly and directly asserted more influence over the government, giving rise in the mid-seventeenth century to the expression "politics without doors," among the English. According to Benjamin Carp, the term referred to extra-parliamentary activity occurring outside the closed doors of Parliament, since up through the end of the seventeenth century most of Parliament's business remained secret—"indoors." Subsequently, as people felt more freedom to discuss political opinions publicly, the idea grew that the politics of the people without doors could counter the fixed, secretive politics of Parliament.<sup>13</sup> As the opening quote of this chapter demonstrates, before attempting to persuade those in government, Franklin was given council by an unnamed lawyer to first persuade the people "without doors"—referring to the general public. America needed to attend to the world's opinions of their nation and citizens if they were to get any foreign aid or investment.

## DIPLOMACY & FOREIGN RELATIONS OF REVOLUTION

America's move toward independence and foreign assistance occurred with starts and stops, and moves and countermoves. When the Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia in 1774, the main objective was to present the colonies' complaints about England's policies toward America as a united voice. The Congress eventually agreed to pursue a policy combining economic warfare and long-distance diplomacy. Petitions were drafted to King George III and Parliament enumerating colonial grievances relating to taxes levied on imported British manufactures (paper, tea, etc.); the stationing and quartering of troops within certain colonies; as well as the disbandment of colonial assemblies. On September 27, 1774, the Continental Congress passed a measure to stop the importation and consumption of British manufactured goods as well as to stop exportation of American goods to Britain.<sup>14</sup> The representatives believed the loss of American trade would drastically cripple the British economy and force Parliament to negotiate. The closure of American ports did not impact the British economy enough to force Parliament to negotiate with the colonists, though the lack of trade did hurt the colonies' economy and access to much-needed manufactured goods.<sup>15</sup>

In October of 1774, petitions were drafted and published in the papers addressing the publics of Canada and Great Britain.<sup>16</sup> The petitions attempted to explain the colonies' position to people of Britain and Canada. Previous petitions to the Parliament<sup>17</sup> and King George were ignored.<sup>18</sup> Further angering the colonies and the representatives of the Congress, King George issued a "rebellion proclamation" on August 23, 1775. The proclamation not only cut off communications between the colonies and the British, but also accused the colonies of performing sovereign activities of the state such as obstructing commerce, preparing and making war, as well as refusing to uphold the laws of England.

In need of supplies for the Continental Army as well as money, the Continental Congress formed the Secret Committee on September 18, 1775.<sup>19</sup> The committee was to arrange covert contracts with merchants willing to risk shipping and selling guns, ammunition, and other supplies to the colonies. More than 2 months later, the Congress formed another committee on November 29, 1775, the Committee of Secret Correspondence (CSC), to contact America's "friends" in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the world.<sup>20</sup> Most of the foreign contacts the

committee corresponded with were Franklin's contacts from his time in England and Europe serving as a colonial agent.<sup>21</sup> Upon creating the CSC, Franklin contacted an old friend, Charles Guillame Frédéric Dumas, who worked as an editor and publisher in The Hague. Dumas met Franklin when he visited Europe in 1766, and both shared an affinity for the printing business. Franklin immediately engaged Dumas to sound out who might be willing to assist the American colonies against the British:

But we wish to know whether any one of them [European countries], from principles of humanity, is disposed magnanimously to step in for the relief of an oppressed people, or whether if, as it seems likely to happen, we should be obliged to break off all connection with Britain, and declare ourselves an independent people, there is any state or power in Europe, who would be willing to enter into an alliance with us for the benefit of our commerce, which amounted, before the war, to near seven millions sterling per annum, and must continually increase, as our people increase most rapidly. Confiding, my dear friend, in your good will to us and our cause, and in your sagacity and abilities for business, the committee of congress, appointed for the purpose of establishing and conducting a correspondence with our friends in Europe, of which committee I have the honour to be a member, have directed me to request of you, that as you are situated at the Hague, where ambassadors from all the courts reside, you would make use of the opportunity that situation affords you, of discovering, if possible, the disposition of the several courts with respect to such assistance or alliance, if we should apply for the one, or propose the other.<sup>22</sup>

Dumas would act as an agent for the Continental Congress throughout the duration of the war, performing various duties, primarily disseminating news and information about the US colonies and the war throughout Europe as will be discussed further in this chapter.

The functions of these two committees, the Secret Committee and the Committee of Secret Correspondence, were rather different: the Secret Committee essentially administered what would today be considered to be a covert action program between America and France; and the CSC acted as a diplomatic and an intelligence organization.<sup>23</sup> Benjamin Franklin served on both committees prior to being nominated as a commissioner to France.<sup>24</sup>

Early in 1776, some members of the Congress recognized the need for foreign assistance. Based on Britain's relations with other European nations, the only country which might consider assisting the colonies in their fight against England was France. However, tied to the issue of acquiring foreign support, the Congress faced the decision to officially declare the colonies independent from Britain. Both independence and entering into a formal agreement with a foreign nation for assistance were seriously contentious ideas within the Continental Congress.<sup>25</sup> "There was, however, still a majority of members who were either determined against all measure preparatory to independence, or yet too timorous and wavering to venture on any decisive steps."<sup>26</sup> The debate of whether to open ports to all nations as well as the issue of declaring independence from Britain went on from February through June finally concluding with the formation of committees to prepare a plan of treaties for use with foreign nations as well as a draft declaration of independence.<sup>27</sup>

On July 18, 1776, the committee chosen to draft a model treaty presented their report to the Congress.<sup>28</sup> The committee and the treaty emphasized that any formal agreement with another nation would be non-political, and non-military. The treaty would simply facilitate equal, free trade between America and another nation. The treaty and instructions to the elected commissioners to France were not finalized until September 24, 1776.<sup>29</sup> As Stacy Schiff notes, Congress's instructions simply asked "...that the Treaty should be concluded and... instructed *to use every means in your Power* for concluding it conformable to the plan you have received"<sup>30</sup>; how this was to be achieved was left to commissioners.

## FRENCH POSITION TOWARD BRITISH COLONIES

In 1764, just a year after the Treaty of Paris, the then French foreign minister, Étienne François de Choiseul, sent observers to the American colonies to determine whether a rebellion against the British stirred.<sup>31</sup> Clearly, the French wished for an opportunity to reverse the damage of their defeat in the Seven Years' War. However, when the American colonies did eventually begin to buck against British rule, France was not prepared—financially or militarily.<sup>32</sup> The arrival of American agents in 1775 and 1776 to France forced French foreign minister, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, to tread very carefully. The country

could not risk open war with Britain. In addition, due to the family alliance between France and Spain, any support to the American colonies would need to be discussed with and agreed to by the Spanish court.<sup>33</sup>

In 1775, Vergennes sent his own agent to the American colonies to observe as well as to indicate to the colonies France's own position of support for the colonies' independence from Britain. After hearing from his own agent, along with the persistence of Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais,<sup>34</sup> a French dramatist, Vergennes drafted a report suggesting a course for French policy in 1776 which recommended military preparations be undertaken by both France and Spain against any potential British attack; provide friendly assurances to the British, deceiving the government as to France's intentions toward the American colonies; and providing secret support to the American colonies *without any treaty until their independence is firmly established*.<sup>35</sup> Vergennes's plan was adopted by the King's Council, leading to a royal command in April 1776 to rebuild the French navy. To the third point, another report was drafted outlining Beaumarchais's 1775 proposal to encourage the American Revolution through covert assistance masked as private commercial contracts.<sup>36</sup>

France's policy stance toward the American colonies was eventually communicated to the members of the CSC. On October 1, 1776, Thomas Story, an American agent working in England, sent an intelligence report to the committee which was received by Robert Morris and Franklin, being the only committee members present. The report relayed information about Arthur Lee's private conversation with the French ambassador in London who communicated that France was in no position to enter into a war with England and would not be in a position to do so in the near future. The most France could do for America was to provide a secret lump sum of cash which would be transferred from a bank in Holland to St. Eustatius under the name Hortalez. Robert Morris and Franklin made two important decisions based on this report. First, the information would not be reported to the whole Congress out of concerns of secrecy.<sup>37</sup> Second, aware that "altho [*sic*] disposed to support us in our Contest with them, *we therefore think it our duty to Cultivate their favourable disposition toward us, draw from them all the support we can and in the end their private Aid*



*must assist us to establish Peace or inevitably draw them in as Parties to the War.”*<sup>38</sup>

This foreshadows the approach which Franklin would adopt in order to get French support. In light of France’s diplomatic, military, and financial limitations at the time, the only way America could hope to get supplies and support would be with private aid by members of the French public in business and trade willing to risk a possible confrontation with the British navy with an unknown trading partner.

Based on reports sent to the CSC from Franklin, he was acutely aware of the French government’s inability and unwillingness to engage in any diplomatic arrangement: “The Cry of this Nation is for us; but the Court it is thought views an approaching War with Reluctance.”<sup>39</sup> France already took a great risk by allowing the American commissioners to remain in France. The British Ambassador Lord Stormont complained regularly to Vergennes about the Americans’ presence and demanded to know what business they had in Paris.<sup>40</sup> Vergennes stalled and feigned ignorance regarding the American commissioners’ mission, despite already arranging a secret meeting between the commissioners and his undersecretary, Conrad-Alexandre Gérard.<sup>41</sup>

In the meantime, Franklin and the other commissioners worked to get support and supplies where they could. King Louis XVI and Vergennes allowed American merchant ships to use French ports, as long as all treaty agreements relating to war contraband were honored.<sup>42</sup> Franklin and his grandnephew, Jonathan Williams, not only arranged for contracts with French and European merchants for weapons, arming of ships, and material for uniforms, but also directed American privateering operations in accordance with the Secret Committee. These contracts were made through Franklin’s own personal contacts which he developed throughout the spring of 1777.

Thus began what would be a tense year of waiting: waiting for France’s naval forces to be readied for war; waiting for possible British attack; waiting for a definitive sign of resolve from America; and waiting for a firm commitment from Spain. All these factors made the possibility of a formal treaty between America and France in 1776 seem very unlikely to ever occur, hence obtaining private aid and access to supplies was essential to the United States’ ability to continue their fight for independence.

## BENJAMIN FRANKLIN LISTENS

In light of the situation in the America colonies faced at the end of 1776, when Benjamin Franklin left for France, the only logical course of American diplomacy was to include foreign public engagement alongside more formal and even secretive diplomacy with the French government. Furthermore, in consideration of the American character at the time, the fact that American leaders engaged the public of other nations is unsurprising. Previous attempts to engage with British leaders were ignored, leaving no other option than appealing to the public. America was in many respects already a democratic nation, where the government structures served the public's interests and answered to the public, extending this practice of the state's relationship with the people beyond domestic boundaries was not incongruous. The Continental Congress published much of their proceedings in the papers to guarantee transparency. Franklin would later ensure these proceedings were also published in European papers to bolster the legitimacy of America in the eyes of Europe.

As already noted, Franklin's diplomatic approach differed from the other American commissioners; many of Franklin's characteristics or methods as a diplomat are noted by his French acquaintances and fellow commissioners which included listening. "In prattling Paris,... Franklin did something extraordinary. He listened."<sup>43</sup> John Adams and Franklin's friends in France all remarked on his capacity to listen, and how his ability to listen garnered him further respect and popularity among the French.<sup>44</sup> Franklin consistently demonstrated his desire to listen, made an effort to listen, and then used what he heard to achieve the objectives of his mission in France.

The last time he visited France as a colonial agent, he dressed as an Englishman; however, when Franklin landed in France in December of 1776, he dressed simply in what the French presumed was either the garb of a Quaker or an American frontiersman.<sup>45</sup> He wrote several letters noting the simplicity of his attire and his reluctance to assume a public character to Silas Deane, John Hancock, the CSC, and Mary Hewson. He acquainted "no one here [France] with this Commission, continuing incog. [*sic*] as to my publick [*sic*] Character; because not being sufficiently acquainted with the Disposition and the present Circumstances of this Court, relative to our Contest with GB [*sic*]. I cannot Judge whether it would be agreeable [*sic*] to her at this time to receive publicly

[*sic*] Ministers from the Congress as such, and I think we should not embarrass [*sic*] her...on the one hand, nor subject ourselves to the Hazard of a disgraceful Refusal on the other.”<sup>46</sup> This demonstrates Franklin’s intent to listen before attempting to attain any of the official objectives he was charged with by the Continental Congress. He was aware that his very presence could embarrass the French government and that a refusal to recognize him in his official capacity by the French court would humiliate America in the eyes of the world.

As many historians have noted,<sup>47</sup> “Franklin had a flair for feeling public opinion, and for approaching it.”<sup>48</sup> Franklin was not just aware of the importance of public opinion in relation to his mission, but also made time to gather the opinion of the public and tried to listen. Much to the consternation of Adams, Franklin’s first concern seemed to be engaging the French public rather than keeping the mission books straight and making daily trips to Versailles to interact with other diplomats. In Adams’s autobiography, he gave a detailed account of Franklin’s usual schedule as an American commissioner:

It was late when he breakfasted, and as soon as Breakfast was over, a crowd of Carriges [*sic*] came to his Levee or if you like the term better to his Lodgings, with all Sorts of People; some Phylosophers [*sic*], Accademicsians [*sic*] and Economists; some of his small tribe of humble friends in the literary [*sic*] Way whom he employed to translate some of his ancient Compositions, such as his Bonhomme Richard ...; but by far the greater part were Women and Children, come to have the honour to see the great Franklin, and to have the pleasure of telling Stories about his Simplicity, his bald head and scattering strait [*sic*] hairs, among their Acquaintances. These Visitors occupied all the time, commonly, till it was time to dress to go to Dinner. He was invited to dine abroad every day and never declined unless when We had invited Company to dine with Us. I was always invited with him, till I found it necessary to send Apologies, that I might have some time to study the french [*sic*] Language and do the Business of the mission.<sup>49</sup>

This description by Adams of Franklin’s activities as America’s commissioner indicates that Franklin spent a great deal of his time listening to the French public. Franklin made time for everyone, including reading and responding to hundreds of letters he received seeking advice or favors.<sup>50</sup>

In addition to making time for callers at Hotel de Valentinois where Franklin resided in Passy, Benjamin Franklin also made time to visit various salons. In eighteenth-century France, the best place to listen to the people was in the cafes and salons.<sup>51</sup> Franklin was such a celebrity among the French and well-known among the Republic of Letters in France, that he gained access to several influential salons, including Marie-Louise-Nicole-Elisabeth de La Rochefoucauld Duchesse de Enville,<sup>52</sup> Madame Anne-Catherine de Ligniville d’Autricourt Helvétius,<sup>53</sup> and Anne Louise Boivin d’Hardancourt Brillon de Jouy<sup>54,55</sup>. In these salons, he was introduced to Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat Marquis de Condorcet and Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, among other notable French intelligentsia and people with connections to the court.

In contrast, Adams noted that Arthur Lee made himself repulsive to the French “...by indiscreet speeches before servants and others, concerning the French nation and government—despising and cursing them.”<sup>56</sup> Adams too, struggled to make peace not only with Franklin’s preference for socializing with the people of France rather than handling mission business, but also Franklin’s widespread popularity among the French: “On Dr. Franklin the eyes of all Europe are fixed, as the most important character in American affairs, in Europe: neither Lee nor myself are looked upon of much consequence.”<sup>57</sup> Adams records little about French perceptions toward Silas Deane, but does say that he “seems to have made himself agreeable [*sic*] here to Persons of Importance and Influence, and has gone home in such Splendor [*sic*]...” suggesting that Deane engaged only with those who benefitted him personally.<sup>58</sup> In comparison with the other American commissioners, Franklin appears to be the only one who prioritized engaging with the French public, specifically listening to them.

Using what he heard, Franklin provided general indications regarding French public opinion to the Continental Congress. His reports to the Continental Congress regularly distinguished court opinion from the general public of France<sup>59</sup>; even reporting to John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, that America’s French supporters were disheartened by the reports in a French Gazette of British victories in the United States:

Our Friends in France have been a good deal dejected with the Gazette Accounts of Advantages obtain’d [*sic*] against us by the British Troops. I have help’d [*sic*] them here to recover their Spirits a little, by assuring them that we shall face the Enemy...<sup>60</sup>

In addition to providing intelligence to the Congress about how negative press reports about the Revolution impacted French public opinion, Franklin also used public opinion to gauge his advocacy needs. Benjamin Franklin provided material to Continental papers to counter negative reports in the British and Continental press, in some cases, in response to concerns raised by American supporters in France and in Holland. Thus, Franklin used what he heard to manage the French environment to guide American policy and gauge further public engagement needs.

### THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS & EXCHANGE DIPLOMACY

In the years leading up to and throughout the American Revolution, another ongoing revolution persisted quietly in the background: the science revolution. Of note to the discussion of public diplomacy and exchange diplomacy particularly is the use of scientists, artists, and men of letters by European monarchs to further their nation's standing and influence abroad.

Monarchs and state bureaucracies were, in fact, interested in the possible gains associated with the development of science and technology as well as in the prestige of scholarship. Through the academies, they tried to organize the management of scientific research, which was considered a source of personal glory and national wealth.<sup>61</sup>

The connection various governments made between the use of science and the arts as a tool for improving prestige manifested itself in European cities where royal academies were established by state governments where "scientific activity assumed a stately character and was financed by administrations with practical goals in mind."<sup>62</sup> A nation could project power and prestige through the Republic of Letters and national academies, drawing eminent artists, philosophers, and scientists of the period.

As a self-educated and self-trained scientist Franklin became a part of the eighteenth-century "republic of letters" and the network of scientists, philosophers, writers, and artists from all over Europe.

Networks of correspondence among men of science were also an essential tool for the emergence and social definition of a community of scholars devoted to the study of nature. They were the concrete side of the imaginary "Republic of Science," which can be seen as a system of person

relations, and in particular correspondence (*commerce de lettres*), between scholars who shared an interest in the study of nature.<sup>63</sup>

Thus, the most significant and meaningful foreign public engagement occurred through Benjamin Franklin's work as a scientist and philosopher. Franklin's own curiosity coupled with the eventual acceptance of his electrical experiments garnered him many prestigious and influential contacts within the Republic of Letters. As Stacy Schiff notes, "Franklin's scientific career...played a vast role in his diplomatic one..."<sup>64</sup>

Upon his retirement in 1748 from the printing business, Franklin put more time into his intellectual pursuits. In the past, he corresponded with members of the Royal Society in England to request publications of the latest experiments and discoveries in natural science. Franklin corresponded regularly with Royal Society members Joseph Priestley and Peter Collinson. These relationships Franklin fostered between members of the Royal Society spurred him to create the American Philosophical Society in 1743.

In the mid-eighteenth century, experiments with electricity were in vogue and peaked Franklin's interest; however, Franklin's knowledge and interest in electricity started when he made his first trip to England in 1725–1726.<sup>65</sup> Eventually, Franklin conducted his own experiments and wrote about the results. He passed his work onto his contacts in the Royal Society as well as others in Europe. Initially, his experiments did not receive much attention and were written off by some members of the Royal Society, but after the experiments were performed successfully in front of King Louis XV, Franklin's reputation rose throughout Europe.<sup>66</sup> Jean-Baptiste le Roy, a French scientist and member of the Paris Academy of Sciences, arranged to have Franklin's writings on his electrical experiments translated into Latin, Italian, and German, which furthered his fame as an international scientist.<sup>67</sup>

With use of the Leyden Jar<sup>68</sup> for electrical experimentation, electricity experiments became a public form of entertainment in England and Europe. It is possible that even Franklin's own experiments were used to entertain crowds. Due to Franklin's experiments and the invention of the lightning rod, "he was the world-renowned tamer of lightning, the man who had disarmed the heavens, who had vanquished superstition with reason...He was America's first international celebrity."<sup>69</sup>

Within the Republic of Letters, Franklin maintained correspondence with many men of science or men of letters from all over the world

with varying connections to national leaders. Initially, this collaboration served no other purpose for Franklin other than a genuine interest in the latest experiments, advances, and philosophies of the day. He enjoyed the intellectual exchange he shared with many of his correspondents in France and England as well as other parts of Europe. Later, these relationships between leading scientists and intellectuals from all over Europe would serve as a network of connections to obtain access to political leaders, to people with access to intelligence, and to people willing to provide aid to America.

Thus, Franklin's involvement in both the Royal Society and the Academy of Sciences is an example of exchange diplomacy—a core element of public diplomacy as understood today. Though Franklin's active involvement in the European scientific community did not initially have any political objective, when he became the commissioner to France his science did become politicized.<sup>70</sup>

In many of his letters between other scientists and intellectuals, he exchanged not only his thoughts on various scientific ideas of the day, but also political information about the colonies and Britain. The correspondence between the Jan Ingenhousz<sup>71</sup> and Franklin illustrates how exchange diplomacy allowed Franklin to explain America's relations with England and the future of the country. The two were connected through John Pringle, a Member of Parliament and the Royal Society. Ingenhousz wrote to Franklin frequently throughout 1776 and 1777. Writing to Franklin on November 15, 1776, Ingenhousz expressed confusion by the revolt as "You made me consider them as one nation... You told me more than once that no more distinction should be made between a man residing in England and one residing in North America, than between the inhabitants [*sic*] of London and cheffield [*sic*]." <sup>72</sup> Franklin explained in his reply on February 12, 1777, the reasons for the breach between the colonies and Britain, even adding the purpose of his mission to France.

I long laboured in England with great Zeal and Sincerity to prevent the Breach that has happened, and which is now so wide that no Endeavours of mine can possibly heal it... It would therefore be deceiving you, if I suffer'd [*sic*] you to remain in the Supposition you have taken up, that I am come hither to make Peace. I am in fact ordered hither by the Congress for a very different Purpose, viz. [*sic*] to procure such Aids from European Powers for enabling us to defend our Freedom and

Independence, as it is certainly their Interest to grant, as by that means the great and rapidly growing Trade of America will be open to them all, and not a Monopoly to Britain as heretofore; a Monopoly, that if she is suffer'd [*sic*] again to possess, will be such an Increase of her Strength by Sea, and if she can reduce us again to Submission, she will have thereby so great an Addition to her Strength by Sea and Land, as will together make her the most formidable Power the World has yet seen, and, from her natural Pride and Insolence in Prosperity, of all others the most intolerable.

You will excuse my writing Politicks [*sic*] to you, as your Letter has given me the Occasion. Much more pleasing would it be to me to discuss with you some Point of Philosophy...<sup>73</sup>

The letter continues to further discuss Franklin's role in France as well as Ingenhousz's query about the dispute between which lightening rod, blunt or pointed should be used to protect gunpowder magazines. Two months later, Franklin writes again to Ingenhousz, further explaining the breach between America and Britain and noting in the same letter that "nothing new in the philosophical Way, or I should have a Pleasure in communicating it to you."<sup>74</sup>

Ingenhousz was not the only man of science with whom Franklin readily provided information to regarding America's position and the nation's plans for the future. Franklin met regularly with French scientists and scholars, such as Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, and Jean Baptiste le Roy,<sup>75</sup> to collaborate and perform the experiments of other scientists and discuss politics.<sup>76</sup> In addition, many of Franklin's British men of science continued to correspond with him using trusted couriers. This allowed for continued exchange on subjects relating to not only science and philosophy, but also politics. With Franklin's contacts in Britain, he tried to secure an exchange of prisoners and kept communications open for peace negotiations.

Hence, Franklin's exchange diplomacy afforded many opportunities which helped to further facilitate the most urgent needs of America—a sympathetic ear and people willing to offer assistance. Some of Franklin's contacts simply told him who might be willing to provide aid to America, others introduced him to people who wanted to help, and some became actively involved in providing aid to America, such as his friendship with Lavoisier. Lavoisier was the *inspecteur général des poudres et salpêtres* for the French government as well as a member of the *ferme*



*générale*.<sup>77</sup> His father-in-law, Jacques Paulze, was the Director of the Tobacco Department, a component of the *ferme générale*. Through these connections, Franklin opened negotiations with Paulze for a two million livre advance on American tobacco shipments to France as well as access to much-needed gunpowder supplies.<sup>78</sup> Franklin's exchange within the Republic of Letters also gave him the opportunity to represent America, dispelling rumors, and providing a truer portrait of America.

## 18TH CENTURY ADVOCACY

Once Franklin and the other commissioners arrived in France, they quickly learned that the British used the European press to downplay the war with the colonies, play-up their inevitable defeat, circulate rumors of reconciliation, accusing Americans of war atrocities, and to ridicule America's complaints against the British government.

When we reflect on the Character and Views of the Court of London, it ceases to be a Wonder, that the British Ambassador [*sic*], and all other British Agents, should employ every means, that tended to prevent European Powers, but France more especially, from giving America Aid in this War. Prospects of Accommodation, it is well known, would effectually prevent foreign Interference, and therefore, without one serious Design of accommodating on any other Principles, but the absolute Submission of America, *the delusive Idea of Conciliation hath been industriously suggested on both Sides the Water*, that, under colour of this dividing and aid-withholding Prospect, the vast British Force, sent to America, might have the fairest Chance of succeeding; *And this Policy hath in fact done considerable Injury to the United States...*<sup>79</sup>

Aware of the impact such reports had on the French public as well as the French and European governments, Franklin and his colleagues regularly requested information from the CSC about the latest news from America in order to counter the information spread by the British:

We have had no Information of what passes in America but thro' [*sic*] England, and the Advices are for the most part such only as the Ministry chuse [*sic*] to publish. Our total Ignorance of the truth or Falsehood of Facts, when Questions are asked of us concerning them, *makes us appear small in the Eyes of the People here*, and is prejudicial to our Negotiations.<sup>80</sup>

In this February 6, 1777, report to the CSC, the American commissioners requested current information regarding the course of the war. The repeated pleas for news about the progress of the war demonstrate the importance of providing accurate information to the European public.<sup>81</sup> The commissioners did not resort to conjecturing about the current situation in America. In her book, *The Great Improvisation*, Stacy Schiff suggests Franklin overstated America's success to the French; however, based on the letters written by Franklin, there is nothing to suggest that he ever claimed American military success. He did tend to obscure the precariousness of America's situation in terms of money and military supplies, but he optimistically spoke of the inevitable success of America.

In addition, this report, as well as subsequent reports to the CSC, specifically highlight the negative effect such news had on not just the French government, but also the French public—the people who would invest in trade with America:

The want of intelligence from America, and the Impossibility of contradicting by that means *the false news spread here and all over Europe by the Enemy, has a bad Effect on the minds of many who would adventure in Trade to our Ports*, as well as on the Conduct of the several Governments of Europe.<sup>82</sup>

Letters between both the commissioners in Paris and the Continental Congress repeatedly express concerns about how negative news would impact public perspectives toward the colonies and hurt commercial prospects, a major foreign policy objective for the young nation. On his way to Spain, Arthur Lee observed "...by the Papers, that Agents of the [British] Ministry are endeavoring to cover their cruelties on Long Island, by charging us with having wantonly hangd [*sic*] some hessian Prisoners previous to that transaction. This they are constantly repeating both in the foreign and domestic Gazettes, in order to establish it as historical fact."<sup>83</sup> He suggests to Franklin and Silas Deane that Congress should publish something to contradict this report. Lee hoped the nation's "name will be unblemished."<sup>84</sup>

As Franklin indicated to the CSC in his reports, he needed facts to help counter British "false news" and to reverse the effect of such unfavorable news. Perhaps the most crucial tasks for the American commissioners were to establish United States' identity as a nation, distinct from England, and to bolster the nation's legitimacy in the eyes of potential

investors. To accomplish these objectives, Franklin *advocated* for the US by arranging for the Declaration of Independence, state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and articles from the American press to be translated. With the help of Charles Dumas in The Hague and Duchesse de Enville's son, Louis-Alexandre, duc de La Rochefoucauld, Franklin was able to translate US founding documents, publish them, and circulate them around France and Europe.<sup>85</sup>

All Europe is for us. *Our Articles of Confederation being by our means translated and published here have given an Appearance of Consistence and Firmness to the American States and Government, that begins to make them considerable.*

The separate Constitutions of the several States are also translating and publishing here, *which afford abundance of Speculation to the Politicians of Europe.* And it is a very general Opinion that if we succeed in establishing our Liberties, we shall as soon as Peace is restored receive an immense Addition of Numbers and Wealth from Europe, by the Families who will come over to participate our Privileges and bring their Estates with them. Tyranny is so generally established in the rest of the World that the Prospect of an Asylum in America for those who love Liberty gives general Joy, and our Cause is esteem'd [*sic*] the Cause of all Mankind.<sup>86</sup>

The objective was to not only counter the perception that the United States was weak, but also to demonstrate that a democratic republic was a solid government and unlikely to collapse into anarchy.

Furthermore, the translation of these documents served to illustrate America's identity as separate from England. Approximately 10 years before the start of the American Revolution, the American colonies stood loyally with Britain, fought, and professed their solidarity with their "mother country" in the Seven Years' War or French and Indian War. A war which put the American colonies in opposition to most of the world, the very same nations which America now sought trade and friendship. The commissioners also had to prove the steadfastness and unity of the colonies to continue to fight until Britain recognized their independence. The negative perceptions of America and Americans, coupled with the lack of information from home, made the commissioners' task to entice the French government to recognize the United States or to obtain private aid from French investors and businessmen all the more difficult.

Prior to Franklin's arrival, Vergennes set up a newsprint to counter British propaganda. The publication was entitled the *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique* and ran from 1776 through 1779. The *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique* is an early example of *international broadcasting*, though unusual. In this case, the paper was created by another foreign government, but Americans and French citizens put materials together for the paper. The newsprint had three primary objectives: to provide a narrative of events; to reprint information from other newspapers and pamphlets of particular interest; and to give inside political history and parliamentary proceedings of Great Britain.<sup>87</sup>

Upon Franklin's arrival in France, he worked with the editors, Edemé-Jacques Genêt, Antoine Court de Gébelin, Jean Baptiste René Robinet, and others to provide material, and later, John Adams would also provide material.<sup>88</sup>

Edited to a certain extent in a partisan manner, it was clearly intended to neutralize the accounts published by the ordinary French journals, who drew their news from the English press, and by giving the French people *accurate information* concerning the causes and progress of the war, *encourage them in their sympathy with the American cause*, and so add another lever to the forces that were action on the French government to make it recognize...[America's] independence.<sup>89</sup>

The 1776 draft of the Articles of Confederation appeared in *Affaires* along with the Pennsylvania state constitution, Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, and later five state constitutions would also appear in 1777 and the Declaration of Independence.<sup>90</sup> "...[The] *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique* did constitute the most important publications of American political documents in France...and their number and variety indicate the breadth of the French audience they reached."<sup>91</sup>

Franklin also contributed original essays, usually under a pseudonym as he used to do when he worked as a printer.<sup>92</sup> One contribution, of note, was an essay published on October 18, 1777, entitled "Comparison of Great Britain and America as to Credit" under the byline "Bankers Letter."<sup>93</sup> The essay outlines seven factors contributing to good credit and goes on to compare America's credit to Britain's, making a case for people to invest in America. The autumn of 1777 was a particularly tense period for both France and the American colonies with funds nearly depleted and Franklin's hesitancy to request additional

funds, "Franklin may have been trying to inject new enthusiasm in an old refrain" to support the colonies.<sup>94</sup>

In addition to using the *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique* to advocate America as a stable nation and attractive trade partner, Franklin also used other popular European newsprints to reach audiences beyond France. As mentioned earlier, Dumas acted as an intelligence agent of sorts for the Continental Congress. He also helped to disseminate propaganda and other information about the colonies throughout Continental Europe. He wrote to Franklin that he was "...very connected for some time with the *Gazetteur françois Leiden*, that promotes long as he can [Americans]..." and "...has already ...inserted in its leaves several small items that I [Dumas] have provided, and who will insert others if I can provide [them]..."<sup>95</sup> This Dutch agent was well connected to the editor of the *Nouvelles extraordinaires de divers endroits*, popularly known as the *Gazette de Leyde*, Jean Luzac. Through Franklin's contacts in the Republic of Letters, Louis-Alexandre de La Rochefoucauld, helped to translate material for print in both the *Gazette de Leyde* and the *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique*.

In March of 1777, Dumas wrote to the commissioners in Paris and mentioned a connection to the editor of a French gazette published in Leiden. Dumas apparently already passed materials for the editor to publish, but the editor offered to publish more. "I strongly advise you, gentlemen, to take advantage of his good will by *giving me something ... (but more facts than political arguments)*, because [the] gazette is widespread, both in this country throughout Europe, is estimated as one of the most impartial."<sup>96</sup> The *Gazette de Leyde* was a highly influential French paper during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The paper, though printed in Amsterdam, had a wide circulation in France (over 2000 subscribers in July 1778), despite government censorship and control over imported printed materials. Also of note, the Leiden paper was free from any government control or influence as opposed to its competitors (*la Gazette d'Amsterdam* or *la Gazette de France*), making it a fairly reliable news source throughout Europe.<sup>97</sup>

Based on another letter from Dumas on May 23, 1777, Franklin apparently provided an article which compared George Washington's treatment of Hessian and British prisoners of war to British treatment of American prisoners of war, an effort to counter the claims made in the British press as reported by Arthur Lee.<sup>98</sup> The same piece was also featured in a Dutch newsprint, *Rotterdamshe Courant*. The editor, Reinier

Arrenberg, was a fervent supporter of American independence.<sup>99</sup> Another supporter of America living in Holland, Benjamin Sowden, reported back to Franklin regarding public reception of news items from America as well as acting as a courier for Franklin, delivering materials to Arrenberg from Franklin and newspapers from the American colonies.<sup>100</sup> This demonstrates the vital importance information played throughout the American Revolution, not just from an intelligence perspective. Information was needed to engage the French public to counter rumors or misinformation. The commissioners were without means to refute these reports. Some of Franklin's contacts, eager to support the American cause, begged him to provide information to dispel the negative reports coming from the British.<sup>101</sup> Many of these contacts were long-time correspondents and friends of Franklin through the Republic of Letters. In place of current news, Franklin provided founding documents of the colonies and the United States to demonstrate the character and reliability of the fledgling nation.

### THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This chapter presents several interesting points with regard to not only the use of foreign public engagement preceding and during the American Revolution, but also the role of foreign public engagement as a mechanism of statecraft. First, as stated in the opening of the chapter, Benjamin Franklin was keenly aware of the importance of America's image in connection to what the representatives of the Continental Congress hoped to achieve in severing ties with England.<sup>102</sup> The importance of the US image was twofold: commercial enticement and to *represent* the character of the nation. Both were crucial to the success of the Revolution and also tied to the future success of the nation. Franklin knew this and worked diligently, and sometimes at odds with the other commissioners and the Continental Congress, to attempt to minimize damage to the US colonies' image as well as build up confidence in the nation as a stable, secure investment.

Second and also connected with the importance of America's image, was the need for accurate, current information about the war and the progress of the Revolution. This is also an important point in connection with the general development of American foreign public engagement, as will be discussed further in Chaps. 5 and 7. The need to present the *truth* about America is a recurring strategy in American public diplomacy

throughout the Cold War. Countering inaccurate information disseminated by the British government was also connected to the importance of maintaining the image of the US. Later, this need for using truth to counter misinformation about America is used to differentiate between American foreign public engagement and enemy propaganda. In the eighteenth century, the use of lies to counter British inaccuracies about the colonies and the war was seen as being beneath the dignity of the colonies.

...therefore we conceive that the english [*sic*] papers are calculated to deter the french [*sic*] Merchants from beginning to taste the Sweets of our Trade. Their falshoods [*sic*] rightly understood are the Barometers of their fears, and in Proportion as the Political Atmosphere presses downward the Spirit of Fiction is obliged to rise. We wish it to be understood that we pay too much respect to the wisdom of the French Cabinet to suppose they can be influenced by such efforts of visible despair, and *that we have too much reverence for the Honor of the American Congress to prostitute its authority by filling our own News papers [*sic*], with the same kind of invented Tales which characterize the London Gazette.*<sup>103</sup>

The desire for accurate, current information was often inhibited by the limitations of communication technology at the time. The American colonies suffered from the lack of a navy or even a merchant fleet robust enough to carry messages between France and America. Ironically, despite advances in communication technology, the requirement for access to truthful information in a timely manner does not dissipate over the course of this study. This remains a recurring problem. Yet, the emphasis on truth and the strong desire to *represent* the US to foreign publics is a recurring idea as American foreign public engagement evolves and ties in with the issue of conceptualizing public diplomacy. The nation's political values, influenced by eighteenth-century liberal ideas, dictated only the truth should be used to represent and explain the new nation.

Another remarkable finding in this case is the attention and value placed on public opinion, particularly by Benjamin Franklin, but also by the other commissioners and the Continental Congress. All the more so, given the sociopolitical environment of eighteenth-century France. Despite the French government's control over the press, a robust domestic police (pseudo-intelligence) service, and professed faith in

absolute monarchy, Benjamin Franklin and the Continental Congress did not seem to be deterred by these considerations. Engaging with foreign publics was taken as a pragmatic, natural course. The Congress was not only eager to know political developments in Europe, but also desired to know what the people of Europe thought about the United States.

We have Nothing further to add at present, but to request, that you will omit no good Opportunity of informing us, how you succeed in your Mission, what Events take place in Europe, by which these States may be affected, and that you contrive us in regular Succession some of the best London, French, and Dutch Newspapers, with any valuable political Publications, that may concern North America.<sup>104</sup>

Franklin was careful to differentiate between public opinion and government opinion in each of his letters to either the Continental Congress or even in personal letters. This was important, as the Congress continually pressured the commissioners to get France to recognize the American colonies as an independent nation, to enter into a trade treaty, and to provide the colonies substantial loans. As Franklin was well aware, this was impossible for the French government to do. Such actions would have meant war with England, for which France was neither militarily nor monetarily prepared to engage, as Franklin wrote to another member of the Royal Society in May 1777: “*The People of this Country* are almost unanimously in our favour. *The Government* has its reasons for postponing a War, but is making daily the most diligent Preparations; wherein Spain goes hand in hand.”<sup>105</sup> The distinction between public opinion and government sentiment as well as the concern and care for public opinion is reflective of the liberal, democratic values expressed by the founders of the United States, and also foreshadows future calls for a democratic diplomacy, a diplomacy between the US government and the people of other nations, rather than other governments. The correlation between American political values and foreign public engagement helps to conceptualize public diplomacy, an idea developed further in the course of this study. Unfortunately, as the proceeding case demonstrates, the US government adopted a more “traditional” diplomatic practice. However, private American entities continued to engage with the people of other nations, as this study will reveal.



In addition to these key findings, this case sets out methods of engagement, which will be used again in forthcoming cases. The need to listen, to collect information about the people was more important to Franklin than interacting with the French government regularly. *Educational exchanges* played a vast role in not only telling people about the character of the US, but the contacts Franklin made through the Republic of Letters were instrumental to the American Revolution's success. Philosophers, artists, poets, musicians, and printers throughout Europe offered their assistance to Franklin in varying ways. Often these contacts acted as couriers for letters and news from the colonies; sometimes these contacts offered access to people in government or much-needed supplies. For Franklin, engaging the French public was the only means of obtaining what the United States needed: ready money and supplies. Most of the contacts who Franklin regularly interacted and corresponded with during his time in France provided some conduit for him to obtain these items. Lavoisier, Le Roy, Dumas, Jacques-Donatien Le Ray de Chaumont (Franklin's landlord), and others were all connected to Franklin's work as an eminent scientist and respected philosopher as well as having connections to the *ferme générale* and the French government. Chaumont and Le Roy helped Franklin establish connections with European merchants willing to ship uniforms and weapons to French ports and onward to America.<sup>106</sup>

These same contacts were also instrumental to US *advocacy* and *international broadcasting*. With the help of Dumas, Arrenberg, and La Rochefoucauld, Franklin was able to take founding documents of the United States and use them to supplement current news from the colonies. This technique of using official documents and officials' words to advocate the US position, in place of or alongside current news, is utilized in the course of American foreign public engagement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The foreign public engagement of Benjamin Franklin sets the foundation for the future development of American public diplomacy as a tool of statecraft.

Proceeding cases will build upon and echo some of the issues highlighted in this chapter. Patterns emerge in this case and continue to run through the following five chapters. One major theme, communication, manifests in three different ways in this study: First, communication problems impacting the correspondence between US representatives abroad and policymakers in the US due to limited communication technology; second, the unwillingness of US leaders to heed reports

from those serving abroad; and third, the awareness by US leaders and private citizens of the need to communicate with people abroad to preserve the reputation of America around the world. In this instance, both communication technology and neglect by the Continental Congress to consider Franklin's reports impacted engagement in France. Additionally, this case demonstrates recognition by American representatives of the need to communicate with the public of another nation as a way to represent itself, the nation's policies, and to maintain its image. Another theme is the consistency of the methods used by Franklin to engage the French public. Future cases will feature similar methods of engagement.

And finally, the case exposed the roots of one of the three interconnected issues impacting US public diplomacy today. Benjamin Franklin believed the liberal ideals upon which the United States was founded would serve to attract people around the world to settle in the US. He advocated for the United States using these values when current information from the Continental Congress was unavailable. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, US leaders and citizens believed nothing further was required to advocate America because the nation's liberal, democratic values were enough to secure peace and friendship with the world. As the US matures and grows as a nation and the world changes, this passive attitude toward America's relationship with the world dissipates.

The following chapter will build upon some of the themes identified in this case, particularly problems caused by advances in communication capabilities as well as communication issues between Washington and US representatives abroad. Tied to this theme, the next case will look at the integration of engagement into statecraft as a means to inform policy. Another pattern will also be introduced in the next case with the first attempts at a public-private partnership to conduct engagement with people abroad.

## NOTES

1. *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 1965. Leonard W. Labaree, et al. (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 8, p. 87.
2. Claude-Anne Lopez, 1990. *Mon Cher Papa: Franklin and the Ladies of Paris* (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT); Stacy Schiff, 2005. *A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America* (Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC: New York, NY).

3. A group of representatives sent to Philadelphia by each of the British American colonies between September 5 and October 26, 1774, initially to discuss a united response to the so-called Intolerable Acts or Coercive Acts. The Congress reconvened a second time in May 1775 and remained a de facto governing body of the colonies throughout the American Revolution.
4. Lopez 1990, p. 7.
5. John Adams autobiography, part 2, "Travels, and Negotiations," 1777–1778, sheet 26 of 37 [electronic edition]. Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive. Massachusetts Historical Society. <http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/>.
6. Gilbert Chinard, 1947. "Eighteenth Century Theories on America as a Human Habitat," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 91, pp. 27–57.
7. Several historians recount various perceptions of America which depict the land and the inhabitants of the American colonies as uncivilized, unintelligent, uninhabitable, and depraved (see James W. Ceaser, 2003. "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *The Public Interest*, No 152; Sophie Meunier, March 2005. "Anti-Americanisms in France," Princeton University, Accessed April 25, 2013. <http://ducis.jhfc.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/archive/documents/Meunier.pdf>; and Chinard (1947). Muenier's work focuses on the evolution of French anti-American perceptions up through the present, while Ceaser outlines five periods which recount the origins, changes, and the movement of anti-American ideas throughout time and across the world. Chinard explains that by the mid-seventeenth century much of the hopes that the New World inspired in Europe faded with the realities of the difficult climates and failures of the colonies to be a valuable investment for raw materials.
8. Examples of Franklin explaining about life in the American colonies can be found in the BFP collection. The collection includes second-hand accounts of conversations with Franklin which were later printed in Europe. Swedish botanist, Peter Kalm, spent several years traveling in North America, interviewing notable Americans of the period to include Franklin. Another example of this type of exchange is in a series of articles published in the spring of 1767 in the *Hannoverisches Magazin*. The series recounts an oral interview of Franklin on varying subjects including weather in the regions of the colonies, Native Americans, population growth, and general lifestyle of American colonists (BFP).
9. Chinard 1947, p. 28.
10. José Calvet de Magalhães, 1988. *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy* (Greenwood Press: New York); Harold Nicholson, 1963. *Diplomacy* (Oxford University Press: London).

11. J.S. Reeves, 1909. 'The Influence of the Law of Nations upon International Law in the United States', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 3, p. 549.
12. T. Bickman, 2009. *Making Headlines: The American Revolution as Seen through the British Press* (Northern Illinois University Press: Dekalb, Illinois); Jon Cowans, 2001. *To Speak for the People: Public Opinion and the Problem of Legitimacy in the French Revolution* (Routledge: New York).
13. 2007, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution* (Oxford University Press: USA), p. 173.
14. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford et al. (Washington, D.C., 1904–1937), Vol. 1, p. 43.
15. Lawrence S. Kaplan, 1975. *Colonies into Nation: American Diplomacy 1763–1801* (MacMillan Company: New York); Paul A. Varg, 1963. *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers* (Michigan State University Press: Michigan).
16. *JCC*, 1:50; *JCC* 2:79–80, 110; Smith, Paul H., et al., eds. *Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789*, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976–2000), Vol 1: pp. 175–179.
17. *BFP* 1978, William Wilcox, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 21:155 and 214.
18. *BFP* 21:495–497.
19. *JCC*, 2:253–254.
20. *JCC*, 3:392.
21. Jonathan R. Dull, 1982. 'Franklin the Diplomat: the French Mission', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 72.
22. *BFP* 1982, William Wilcox, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 22:287.
23. Ed Crews, 2004. "Spies and Scouts, Secret Writing, and Sympathetic Citizens." In *Colonial Williamsburg Journal*. <http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/summer04/spies.cfm>: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation.
24. *JCC*, 6:1061–1068.
25. Charles Francis Adams (ed.), 1856. *The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: with a Life of the Author* (Little, Brown and Co.: Boston). Vol. 3.
26. *Ibid*, Vol. 3, p. 31.
27. *JCC* 5:431.
28. *JCC* 5:575–589.
29. *JCC* 5:813–817.
30. *BFP* 1982, William Wilcox, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 22:624, emphasis added.
31. Samuel Flagg Bemis, 1957. *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (Indiana University Press: Indiana, USA).
32. Dull 1982.

33. Bemis 1957; Schiff 2005.
34. Beaumarchais sent many letters to Vergennes describing different schemes and providing reasons to support the American colonies. Whether out of annoyance or due to his own persistence, Beaumarchais did manage to get Vergennes to take his idea to King Louis XVI to provide covert funds and supplies to the American colonies. Against the guidance of Turgot, the *contrôleur-général des finances*, and Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, Count of Maurepas, the minister of state, King Louis agreed to grant secret funds and send supplies to the Americans using Beaumarchais as a cutout agent (Bemis 1957; Schiff 2005).
35. Bemis 1957, p. 24.
36. Bemis 1957.
37. Franklin and Robert Morris's reason for keeping Thomas Story's information secret from even the Continental Congress was their concern that the agreement by the French government to provide monetary assistance might be made public. "As the Court of France have taken Measures to Negotiate this loan and succour in the most cautious and Secret Manner, shou'd [*sic*] we divulge it immediately, we may not only loose the present benefit, but also render that Court Cautious of any further Connection with such unguarded People and prevent their granting other Loans and assistance that we stand in need of..." (*BFP* 22:636).
38. *BFP* 22:636, emphasis added.
39. *BFP* 1983, William Wilcox, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 23:113.
40. Schiff 2005.
41. *BFP* 23:82 and 124; Schiff 2005.
42. *BFP* 23:164.
43. Schiff 2005, p. 48.
44. Adams 1856, Vols. 1–3; Schiff 2005.
45. Lopez 1990.
46. *BFP* 23:28.
47. Historians looking at Franklin's time as a printer and newspaperman note his acute awareness of public opinion (F.B. Adams, April 1956. "Franklin and His Press at Passy," *The Yale University Library Gazette*, Vol. 30; Bemis 1957; J.A. Leo Lemay, 2006. *The Life of Benjamin Franklin: Volume I, Journalist, 1706–1730* (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia)). Franklin himself makes many observations and remarks regarding public opinion and his ability to both gauge public opinion as well as alter it in his Autobiography (1904. *The Works of Benjamin Franklin Including the Private as well as the Official and Scientific Correspondence Together with the*

- Unmutilated and Correct Version of the Autobiography* In, edited by John Bigelow. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.).
48. Bemis 1957, p. 49.
  49. John Adams autobiography, part 2, "Travels, and Negotiations," 1777–1778, sheet 26 of 37 [electronic edition]. *Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive*. Massachusetts Historical Society. <http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/>.
  50. Upon arriving in France, Franklin received an anonymous memorandum from a French person explaining the current dynamics in France. The anonymous writer observed that governments in Europe almost always cede to the general interest and that America's cause of liberty has the general interest of the people of France. Franklin marked the memorandum in his own hand "Good advice" (*BFP*, 23:104). In the fall of 1777, Franklin writes to Dr. Dubourg to vent about the hundreds of commission requests he continued to receive (*BFP*, 1986, William Wilcox, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 25:20).
  51. Jack R. Censor and Jeremy D. Popkin (ed.), 1987. *Press and Politics in Pre-Revolutionary France* (University of California Press: Berkley); Cowans 2001; Robert Darnton, 1982. *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); Schiff 2005.
  52. A fervent supporter of the American colonies. Her salon hosted Adam Smith, Turgot, and Franklin. She introduced her son, Louis-Alexandre, duc de La Rochefoucauld, and de la Roche-Guyon, to Franklin who would play an important role in American advocacy and international broadcasting.
  53. Widow of French philosopher, Claude Adrien Helvétius, and patron of arts and sciences. Diderot, Condorcet, Raynal, and Turgot frequented her salon.
  54. An accomplished musician and composer and neighbor of Franklin while he stayed at Passy. She helped edit Franklin's *Bagatelles* and composed a song, *Marche des Insurgents*, in honour of the American victory at Saratoga.
  55. Lopez 1990; Schiff 2005.
  56. Adams 1856, 3:139.
  57. Adams 1856, 3:189.
  58. Adams 1856, 3:138.
  59. *BFP* 23:113; 23:194; 23:466; 24:514.
  60. *BFP* 23:31.
  61. René Sigrist, 2009. "Scientific Networks and Frontiers in the Golden Age of Academics (1700–1830)." in Jürgen Barkhoff and Helmut Eberhart (eds.), *Networking across Borders and Frontiers, Demarcation and Connectedness in European Culture and Society* (Peter Lang: Frankfurt), p. 40.
  62. Sigrist 2009, p. 57.
  63. Sigrist, 2009, p. 45.

64. 2005, p. 369.
65. J.A. Leo Lemay, 2008. *The Life of Benjamin Franklin: Volume III, Soldier, Scientists, & Politician, 1748–1757* (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia).
66. J.L. Heilbron, 2007. “Benjamin Franklin in Europe: Electrician, Academician, Politician,” *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London*, Vol. 61.
67. B.R. Gossick June–September 1964. “Benjamin Franklin, Scientist,” *Education, IEEE Transactions on*, Vol. 7.
68. A glass jar device used to study static electricity in the eighteenth century.
69. Schiff 2005, pp. 2–3.
70. While Franklin served as a commissioner in France, King George III and the Privy Council commissioned the Royal Society to determine whether blunted or pointed lightning rods were better at protecting structures from lightning strikes. The investigation divided scientists within the Royal Society along political lines—those who sympathized with America and those who did not (Heilbron 2007). Franklin refused to become involved in the debate, but stuck by his own conclusion that a pointed rod was better than a blunted rod. “The connection between politics and science...had an immediate parallel in real life in England in fight between royalists and Franklinists over the shape of lightening rods” (Heilbron 2007; pp. 364–365). Franklin was aware of how his position as both an American and serving American commissioner created divisions between himself and his colleagues in the Royal Society. In some of his letters to David Hartley, British scientist and a member of Parliament, he explains how he avoided writing him simply because he did not wish to cause trouble for his friend (*BFP*, 25:64).
71. Jan Ingenhousz worked as the personal physician to Joseph II and Maria Theresa of Austria.
72. *BFP* 23:7.
73. *BFP* 23:310.
74. *BFP* 23:613.
75. Le Roy was also a well-regarded scientist interested in hygiene and ventilation in hospitals, and shared an interest in electricity with Franklin. He was the director of the royal laboratory in Passy near where Franklin resided while serving as an American minister. Turgot was the former *controleur general* of King Louis XVI’s council.
76. *BFP* 1986, William Wilcox, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 24:142; 24:210.
77. French 1979; The ferme générale was a syndicate of tax “farmers” who were contracted by the French government to collect taxes by leasing

- the land. The syndicate paid the government a fixed rent or share of revenue for the bail or the lease of the right to collect taxes (Eugene N. White, 2004. "From privatised to government-administered tax collection: tax farming in eighteenth-century France," *Economic History Review*, Vol. 57, p. 640).
78. *BFP*, 23:328; 23:388; *BFP* 1997, Barbara B. Oberg, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 33:486.
  79. *BFP* 23:50, emphasis added.
  80. *BFP* 23:466, emphasis added.
  81. A letter from CSC to American Commissioners, Feb 2, 1777, explains that the heavy presence of British cruisers prohibits more frequent communication, but also complains about the lack of information and supplies from Europe. The American Commissioners write to the CSC on February 6, 1777, to complain about having no way to refute "*the false news*" spread by the British all over Europe (*BFP* 23:285). On March 4 and 12, 1777, the commissioners write again to the CSC asking for current information from America. Several months after the commissioners established a packet service, the commissioners write to the Committee for Foreign Affairs (previously the CSC) on September 8, 1777, again asking for current information and saying they had received no correspondence from the committee for some months, though the committee had written several letters between March and August. In one of the letters from the committee dated May 30, 1777, they indicated they did not receive the dispatches sent via the packet ship.
  82. *BFP*, 23:285, emphasis added.
  83. *BFP* 23:339; General George Washington attempted to push the British out of New York by launching attacks at Trenton (December 26, 1776) and Princeton (January 3, 1777). In both the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, most of the casualties were Hessian soldiers under British command.
  84. *BFP* 23:339.
  85. *BFP* 23:522;25: 327.
  86. *BFP* 24:6.
  87. Paul Leicester Ford, 1889. 'Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique', *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 13; Given France's policy stance in late 1776, Vergennes's actions seem to contradict policy. However, Vergennes was influenced more by his own feelings, decidedly anti-British and eager to right the wrongs of the Seven Years' War. Vergennes also saw the American Revolution as an opportunity to raise France's world power status. Though official French support of the USA was not possible, he hoped that by galvanizing the public's opinion he might persuade the other members of the King's



- Council to favor more direct involvement (Bemis 1957 p. 43, 45, 50; John Hardman, 1995. *French Politics 1774–1789: From the accession of Louis XVI to the fall of the Bastille* (Longman: London), p. 168).
88. Ford 1889; Durand Echevarria, 1953. “French Publications of the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitutions, 1776–1783,” *The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, Vol. 47: 313–338.
  89. Ford 1889, p. 222, emphasis added.
  90. Laura Anne Bédard, 1986. “Les Affaires de l’Angleterre et de l’Amérique”: A French Journal Covering the American Revolution from France,” University of Maryland; Echevarria 1953; Ford 1889.
  91. Echevarria 1953 p. 316.
  92. Bédard 1986; Lemay 2006.
  93. Bédard 1986.
  94. Bédard 1986, p. 81.
  95. *BFP* 23:459.
  96. *BFP* 23:459, emphasis added.
  97. Anne Marie Mercier-Faivre, 2012. “Presentation of the Leiden Gazette,” *European newspapers of 18th century*, Accessed October 10, 2013. <http://www.gazettes18e.fr/gazette-leyde>.
  98. *BFP* 24:68; 23:339.
  99. *BFP* 24:71.
  100. *BFP* 24:134, 25:317, *BFP* 1987, William Wilcox, et. al (eds.). (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT). Vol. 26:568.
  101. For example, Franklin received a letter from Thomas Walpole, dated February 1, 1777, where he complains about the lack of engagement from America to explain their position to the British. “All those who are friends to both Countrys [*sic*] think they have much reason to complain of the neglect with which they have been treated by America, in not having been made acquainted in some authentick [*sic*] manner with her real views and circumstances at the opening of this unhappy rupture, nor with a true representation of the events which have followed. The want of which advices it is thought has not been less prejudicial to the reputation of America in the eyes of the rest of Europe than in the public opinion here, as the friends of both Countrys [*sic*] have thus been deprived of all means of refuting the tales which have been imposed on the world by the artifice of Administration and which have principally contributed to the delusion of the people of England” (*BFP* 23:264). Also, Georges Grand, writes from Amsterdam on February 27, 1777, “...it is important that [for] your Interests You sent me all the good news you would receive to insert for [the] paper in Dutch and French

[to] support for Your Credit, and maintain the will of spirits in this country...” (*BFP 23:393*).

102. In one report to the CSC, Franklin reported on the unprofessional behavior of Mr. Merkle, a commercial contracts agent working for the CC at Bourdeaux. Franklin wrote “...his Character is marked for low Debauchery incompatible with the Gentleman or the Man of Business. Persons of such a Character giving themselves out for Agents of Congress and producing Contracts in support of their Pretensions, hurt the Commercial reputation of the United States, and can be of no service in any shape whatever” (*BFP 23:421*).
103. CSC to American Commissioners, *BFP 24:12*, emphasis added.
104. CSC to American Commissioners, *BFP 23:50*.
105. *BFP 24:8*, emphasis added.
106. Lopez 1964; Schiff 2005.

## Public Diplomacy of the Union

*The secessionists have colored a glass for England – and all England looks through it.  
Some body [sic] should break the glass!*  
United States Consul Zebina Eastman in Bristol to Abraham Lincoln, December  
10, 1861<sup>1</sup>

Unlike the fame and accolades which Benjamin Franklin received upon arriving in France, the newly appointed US minister to St. James Court, Charles Francis Adams, arrived in Liverpool to a crowd of anxious merchants, keen to know what President Abraham Lincoln's blockade meant for their businesses.<sup>2</sup> Adams was so concerned with the local sentiments in Liverpool that he delayed his journey to London by 1 day. He remained in Liverpool to *listen* to merchant concerns and assure them the USA would do everything to maintain trading relations despite the secession of the South. He told Secretary of State William Seward he would have remained longer, but after hearing of the Queen's Neutrality Proclamation, he hurried on to London.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout the American Civil War, the battle for the hearts and minds of the British raged in the papers, in Parliament, and across British society. The case demonstrates parallels between two of the major problem categories from Chap. 1, including conceptualizing foreign public engagement and understanding what role it should play in President Abraham Lincoln's administration. Though both Lincoln and Seward recognized the need to engage the public in Britain, there were

questions about the appropriateness of such activities, who should be charged with engaging the public, and what place foreign public opinion should hold relative to the Union's policies and plans for the war. During the Civil War, the Union struggled to balance domestic politics and war aims with foreign relations. By prioritizing retention of the Border States and emphasizing reunification over the abolition of slavery, the Union not only caused political strife in the Union, but also alienated much of the British public. Furthermore, there was a tendency for the Union government to give precedence to traditional diplomacy (state-to-state) and employ bellicose diplomatic tactics over foreign public engagement, missing opportunities to foster friendly relations and eliminate the potential for foreign intervention in the Civil War.

Though the Union did use listening and advocacy to garner British sympathy, efforts to engage the public were not as extensive or consistent as Benjamin Franklin employed in France. What makes the case relevant to understanding the role and origins of public diplomacy is the *recognition* by the Union of the need to engage with publics abroad to facilitate *both* foreign and domestic policy objectives and to manage foreign relations. This case highlights questions about the role of foreign public engagement and the methods used to engage people abroad as well as how much consideration should be given to foreign public opinion in the formation of national policy; who should be responsible for carrying out foreign public engagement (public or private entities); and whether foreign public engagement is an appropriate mechanism for the state. These debates parallel some of the issues confronting US public diplomacy today, specifically in terms of conceptualizing the practice and determining what public diplomacy's role is in US statecraft. The case also builds on some of the patterns identified in the previous case.

The chapter focuses primarily on Union efforts to engage the British to garner the public's support. This is for continuity, to examine the United States' efforts to engage foreign publics in the context and structure of the US government as it is in the present day. The first few pages of the chapter will provide some context regarding why British public opinion took precedence over other European nations, looking at both Confederate and Union foreign policies and war aims with regard to foreign relations as well as how advances in communication technology and British politics in 1861 all impacted Union foreign public engagement.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION

Both the Union and Confederacy gave considerable attention to engaging the British government. The reasons for this were based primarily on economic considerations for either side, but in some ways, their focus on Britain was in response to what the other side did in turn. The first nine months of the war solidified Britain as a primary figure in the fight between the North and South, as both the Confederate and the Union identified Britain as key to determining the outcome.

In the first few months of the war, the Confederacy was confident that Britain would recognize it as an independent nation based on their incorrect interpretations of British public opinion and Britain's reliance on Southern cotton exports. The Confederates were convinced that British dependence on Southern cotton would lead them to recognize them as an independent nation; however, British investments were also heavily tied to US railroads, telegraphs, and other industrial sectors based throughout the Union, not just the South.<sup>4</sup> The Confederacy focused its efforts to obtain recognition and European support on Britain because while France also relied heavily on Southern cotton exports, 85% of Britain's cotton imports came from the South, with 20% of Britain's population dependent on the textile industry for their livelihood.<sup>5</sup> Though the Confederacy did spend considerable effort attempting to garner recognition from Britain, the South's efforts at diplomacy were undermined not only by their government's reliance on slavery, but also by their own diplomats. As much as the Union frequently offended and irritated the British throughout the Civil War, the Confederate envoys selected to garner British support repulsed even those who supported the South's separation from the Union, specifically with their use of threats cut off cotton exports or putting a tariff on cotton exports. The British did not appreciate the Confederates' attempts to blackmail Britain into recognition.<sup>6</sup>

Aside from sending formal commissioners to advocate for recognition of the Confederacy, a former Swedish journalist, Henry Hotze, and a Liverpool merchant, James Spence, worked vigorously to generate support for the Confederacy using the British press, pamphlets, public meetings, and petitions, though neither men were officially connected with the Confederacy.<sup>7</sup> With their success, the Confederates later provided support for their efforts.

Conversely, the Union also believed Britain would recognize the Confederacy in part due to its heavy reliance on Southern cotton, but also to see the democratic republic and perceived competitor divided.<sup>8</sup> Union victory promised higher tariffs whereas a Confederate victory would mean a large free-trade market, from the perspective of some, particularly the British aristocracy and business elite. British manufacturers hoped to benefit from the North's defeat and put their competitors at a disadvantage. The British aristocracy and government leaders saw the unified America as a hegemonic threat to their way of life. This sentiment is captured in an article featured in *The Liverpool Mercury*, February 25, 1862, reporting on Union attempts to gain British sympathy and speeches made by various Americans at a celebration in honor of George Washington's birthday. *The Liverpool Mercury* reported

[the] keynote of the meeting was Union, Empire, Conquest...We cannot say that it is particularly suited to win the sympathies of a *free* people. The extension of the American "empire" from ocean to ocean is an object the value of which will be differently estimated by different minds. American patriots may naturally think that the interests of the human race coincide with the territorial aggrandisement of their Imperial Republic, but impartial observers may be permitted to regard the point as open to controversy...It is remarkable that even when Americans are specially anxious to interest the feelings of Englishmen in their favour, they should be so devoid of prudence and self-control as to suggest the precise topics which a more judicious advocacy would suppress. Mexican wars, projects of Cuban annexation, 'manifest destiny,' and the rest of it, are reminiscences which it is alike unnecessary and inexpedient to recall. If there is one thing more than another which reconciles the moral sense of mankind to the disruption of the American Union, it is the recollection of that insolent and profligate foreign policy which North and South jointly pursued, but which in future will perhaps be effectually checked by their mutual vigilance.<sup>9</sup>

The Union's policies both economic and domestic were often sources of tension and frustration for the British, even among those who were inclined to support the Union. Secretary Seward's hard-lined, threatening approach to managing the possibility of European recognition only made Britain more resistant to supporting the Union, leading Britain to favor neutrality over backing either side. The Union's inconsistent stance toward slavery, the Morrill Tariff, Seward's bellicose rhetoric and policies, as well as

the Union blockade all had a negative impact on public opinion and influenced the perceptions of British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston's cabinet.

While both the Union and Confederacy singled out Britain in their foreign relations during the Civil War, neither side seemed aware of the influence public opinion held in Victorian England. In 1859, Lord Palmerston became Prime Minister after a decade of instability in British parliamentary politics. "...[The] Palmerston Ministry was made up of an unsteady coalition and was therefore peculiarly tied to public opinion. And in the country at large, Adams realized, sentiment had not yet fully crystallized."<sup>10</sup> Adams noted the tenuous position of the British government and its reliance on the public support in a dispatch to Seward in October 1861.<sup>11</sup>

The popular feeling varies according to the character of the intelligence from America. It has now reverted almost to the state prior to the action at Bull Run...The Ministry feeling as it does [*sic*] very insecure as to its hold on power is not anxious to stir up any cause of internal discord...Besides which the aspect of things all over Europe is so threatening as to inspire caution in every quarter.<sup>12</sup>

He observed that the ministers made fewer distinctions between themselves and their more radical supporters. "As a consequence they have nothing left to stand upon but their personal popularity, a very unsteady prop in the direction of so many and so difficult public questions as must be perpetually presenting themselves for the decision of a leading power like Great Britain."<sup>13</sup> Major changes in opinion sometimes occurred month to month or even week to week, depending on the news from America, news of the hardships facing cotton factory workers, America's own domestic policies, and the speeches or motions made in Parliament as well as speeches made by US leaders. The situation was so tense throughout the four years of the Civil War that Adams only leased accommodations in London on a monthly basis, fearing that at any point, Anglo-American relations would break.

Contributing to the fickleness of British public opinion was the advent of the telegraph, which not only sped up communications between the United States and Europe, it provided the British public closer insight into the Civil War and American politics. Newspapers were able to obtain reports more quickly and consistently from all over the world using foreign correspondents, changing the audience dynamics for nations.<sup>14</sup> American news was reported

more regularly throughout Europe, and many foreign correspondents followed both the Confederate and Union armies as embedded reporters.<sup>15</sup> When US officials spoke to their American audience, they were also heard by Europeans, as Ambassador Adams reported to his son Henry Adams:

The impression is general that Mr. Seward is resolved to insult England until she makes a war. He is the *bête noir*, that frightens them out of all their proprieties. It is of no use to deny it and appeal to the facts. They quote what he said to the Duke of Newcastle about insulting England as the only sure passport to popular favor in America,<sup>16</sup> and a part of a speech in which he talked of annexing Canada as an offset to the loss of the slave states. This is the evidence that Mr. Seward is an ogre fully resolved to eat all Englishmen raw. Pitiful as is all this nonsense, it is of no trifling consequence in its political effect...And if war finally happens, it will trace to this source one of its most prominent causes.<sup>17</sup>

Seward's own anti-British rhetoric, whether sincere or a mere tactic to curry favor with public at home, frightened and irritated the British. The belligerent and anti-British rhetoric often used by Secretary of State Seward as well as anti-British sentiment in the the American press alienated the British public and soured the British public's opinion toward the US government.<sup>18</sup> Based on various remarks by Americans both in the US and in Europe, Union leaders often overlooked or seemed to disregard how their own press undermined their diplomatic efforts abroad. US officials and private citizens reported to Secretary Seward that the wire services were being used to color how the Union was portrayed and the success of the efforts against the South. Dr. Reverend John M'Clintock, residing in Paris, wrote to Seward noting how

...every European government takes pains to correct, officially, through its diplomatic agents, and through the press, all injurious statements that may get currency with regard to its affairs. So far as I can see, our government has given little or no heed to this matter. Even the telegraph from New York appears not to be used in our interest. The consequence is that all the public men of Europe live in an atmosphere of falsehood as to our war. This might have been prevented at first. It is not too late to remedy it now.<sup>19</sup>

Union leaders, Secretary of State Seward in particular, seemed oblivious to how his words directed at Union audiences were not limited to just



Union audiences. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Ambassador Adams elder son, complained of how the Union press undermined any attempts at improving British public opinion toward the Union. On October 6, 1861, he wrote to his brother Henry: "...I must confess I think the government's cards, *so far as the public sees them*, are played badly enough both here and in England. While the agents of the Confederates are abroad working the whole time at public opinion and at the foreign mind, influencing papers and thinkers and undermining us the whole time, *our press at home does but furnish them the materials they need and our agents abroad apparently confine their efforts to cabinets and officials and leave public opinion and the press to take care of themselves.*"<sup>20</sup>

### CONFLICTING UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE CIVIL WAR

Historical memory and the divided opinions of those involved in the war have shaped the real reasons for the Civil War.<sup>21</sup> For some historians and for those who lived through the war, the battle was about state's rights, for others it was about the survival of democracy and republicanism; and yet popular belief attributes the reason for the Civil War to ending slavery. However, part of the confusion for the British public and the government was that neither was entirely certain of what the war was really about because there were many conflicting explanations.<sup>22</sup> The inability to clearly explain the Union's reasons for continuing the war undermined any efforts undertaken to engage with the British public.

From the Union's perspective, the seceded states began the war when they attacked Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. To many Unionists, like Secretary of State William Seward and Charles Adams, the seceded states violated the Constitution and *stole* land and property from the American people by separating from the Union. As Adams also explained in his first meeting with the British foreign minister, Lord John Russell, the Confederacy

...had undertaken to withdraw certain states from the Government by an *arbitrary act* which they called secession, not known to the Constitution, the validity of which had at no time been acknowledged by the people of the United States, and which was now emphatically denied. But not content with this, they had gone on to substitute another system among themselves avowedly based upon the recognition of this right States to withdraw or secede at pleasure.<sup>23</sup>

There was no provision in the Constitution which allowed states to leave the Union. From the North's perspective, the states which held referendums for secession contravened American republicanism and democracy. For conservatives in the North, the war was about saving the ideals America was built upon, not about slavery. On the other hand, "radical" Republicans and abolitionists in the North believed the war was to end slavery and competed with other Northern leaders to make their views heard.

While the historical interpretations about the underlying reasons for the Civil War are not particularly relevant for this study, the perspectives of the Union, the British people, and the government at the time are important. Union perspectives shaped not only their domestic policy and their war objectives, but also framed their foreign policy and the way the Union engaged with the British public and the government. Firmly believing that the secessionists were rebels and traitors, the Union adamantly opposed any foreign interference in the conflict, particularly if some sort of foreign recognition was given to the Confederacy. Members of the British public and government viewed the reasons for the conflict in varying ways. These views conflicted not only with the Union's perspectives, but also caused the British public and the government to be critical of the Union's pursuit of their war objective to reunify the United States. This accounts for the gulf of misunderstanding between the British public and the Union so frequently noted in the correspondences to Lincoln and Seward by US representatives and private citizens residing in England as well as other parts of Europe.

### THE UNION'S VIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION

Though the Union recognized the role of foreign public opinion in relation to the Civil War, Union leaders tended to value domestic opinion and policies over the importance of foreign public opinion and foreign relations. Secretary Seward did not see the need to engage with foreign publics while the United States was fighting for its survival, as he wrote to the US ambassador to Spain.

But, on the other hand, it is never to be forgotten that *although the sympathy of other nations is eminently desirable, yet foreign sympathy or even foreign favour never did and never can create or maintain any state*; while in every state that has the capacity to live, the love of national life is and always

must be the most energetic principle which can be invoked to preserve it from suicidal indulgence of fear of faction as well as from destruction by foreign violence.<sup>24</sup>

Only when Britain or France threatened to intervene or recognize the Confederacy did Seward give foreign public opinion any consideration. Part of Seward's attitude toward foreign public opinion may also be due to his and other Union leaders' perspective toward the war itself. As explained earlier, the Union firmly believed the conflict to be nothing more than a rebellion, easily reconciled in a few months.

This erratic approach to foreign public opinion is demonstrated repeatedly throughout the war when attempts were made to engage the British public, while pursuing policies which made the British unsympathetic to the Union or when events in America or Britain riled British public opinion. Union war aims and policies as well as international events which touched both America and England tended to have an adverse impact on any engagement with the British public. In particular, the Union's ambiguous stance toward slavery, trade policies, and Secretary Seward's antagonistic foreign policy all tended to detract British public support from the Union. Added to this were various incidents which further alienated the British public from the Union. First, there were public revelations of Union ongoing espionage operation in England in the fall of 1861,<sup>25</sup> and shortly after, the Trent affair.

Looking at the Union efforts to engage the British public during the Civil War, each can be summarized into three categories: official, private, and semi-official. These categories are defined by who initiated foreign public engagement. In the official category, Secretary Seward and President Lincoln sent three men to England and France just before news of the *Trent* affair reached Britain in 1861 and then sent two more men to address the English public in 1863. Then, there were unofficial efforts to engage the British by private US citizens. These efforts were more persistent throughout the war. Finally, there was a semi-official engagement to alleviate the suffering of those who were out of work due to the Cotton Famine. Though private citizens organized donations and arranged for goods to be shipped to England, Congress considered legislation to provide US naval escort for the ships; in addition, there were connections between the Lincoln administration and those who traveled to England with the donated supplies to explain the Union's reasons for fighting the Confederacy. The development of semi-official

or public-private partnerships in the use and practice of foreign public engagement initiatives is an important trend in the development of US public diplomacy, as proceeding cases will demonstrate.

### THE WEED MISSION AND THE *TRENT* CRISIS

In the late fall of 1861, a group of three men were sent to Europe to garner public support for the Union and explain the reasons for the war. The men included Thurlow Weed,<sup>26</sup> Bishop Charles McIlvaine,<sup>27</sup> and Archbishop John Hughes.<sup>28</sup> The idea to send a special mission to Europe was likely precipitated by General Winfield Scott's decision to retire in late October 1861. Upon resigning as commander of the Union armies, General Winfield Scott wrote to Seward to tell him he intended to travel to Europe for his health. While in Europe, General Scott said he hoped to counter the influence of Confederate commissioners, John Slidell and James Mason.<sup>29</sup>

The inevitable arrival of Slidell and Mason in Europe clearly caused President Lincoln and Seward concern as Secretary Seward wrote to Adams explaining why the delegation of Weed, Hughes, and McIlvaine was sent to Europe. Seward intimated concerns about the influence of the Confederate commissioners:

*When in November, we thought we had reason to apprehend new and very serious dangers in Europe, the subject was taken into consideration that the insurgents were represented abroad by a number of active, unscrupulous, and plausible men, who manifestly were acquiring influence in society, and in the press, and employing it with dangerous effect, and it was thought that such efforts could be profitably counteracted by the presence in London and Paris of some loyal, high-spirited, and intellectual men of social position and character. We considered that the presence of such persons there, unless they should act with more discretion than we could confidently expect, would annoy and possibly embarrass our ministers abroad. It was decided that hazard must be incurred in view of dangers which seemed so imminent. All our individual sensibilities must give way in time of public peril. The persons selected were thought to be among the most prudent and considerate in the country. When all our agents and friends abroad, consular as well as diplomatic, official and unofficial persons, united in warning us of a serious danger...*<sup>30</sup>

Seward also raised concerns about the dangers of sending the delegation, a concern that was not only voiced among Lincoln's cabinet, but

also those people initially selected: Edward Everett and Archbishop Hughes, as well as Weed were concerned about the appropriateness of the mission.<sup>31</sup>

When Weed and his fellow delegates arrived in France, the news of the *Trent* affair just reached Europe. The mission changed from an engagement initiative into crisis control. Upon arriving in England, Weed and the other delegates saw for themselves what had been reported by Adams, Cassius Clay, and others that British public opinion was opposed to the Union in most respects.

But much of the abuse of the Press here might have been prevented if our Government had looked to it. I am already in communication with prominent men, some connected with the Government and some with the Press, to have changed the whole tone of popular sentiment. But to do this able writers, here...must be paid. The Secessionists understood this – have paid what was necessary, and we are suffering the consequences. I am working as hard as I can, on my own hook, tho' distinguished People here believe, and trust me, as in some way connected with the Government.<sup>32</sup>

In late November 1861, Weed, Hughes, McIlvaine, Reverend Dr. John M'Clintock,<sup>33</sup> US consul John Bigelow, US Minister to Paris William Dayton, General Winfield Scott, and US Minister to Belgium Henry Sanford met at the café in the Palais Royale for a “council of war” to devise how to handle the Trent crisis as well as explaining the Union’s views about the war.<sup>34</sup> The men determined that Thurlow Weed and Bishop McIlvaine should travel to England with a public letter outlined and signed by General Scott, but written by Bigelow. Archbishop John Hughes would remain in Paris and meet with the French emperor.

Before Weed left for England, M'Clintock wrote a letter of introduction to Reverend William Arthur. With this letter, Weed was immediately introduced to several members of Parliament and editors of the London press.<sup>35</sup> Weed ensured General Scott’s letter to the British public was published and began writing responses to pro-Confederate editorials in the London press such as one article written by a Confederate Lieutenant, Mathew Maury. Maury wrote an article in the *Athenaeum* accusing Federal Union troops of looting and destroying civilian property. Weed declared that “the Federal army, wherever it goes, spares towns and respects household property. Not so with the rebel army. In retreating from Gosport, Harper’s Ferry and Hampton, they kindled

incendiary fires, leaving the old, infirm and poor homeless and destitute.”<sup>36</sup> He also countered Maury’s accusation that the Union mistreats prisoners. “Our treatment of prisoners, and our respect for non-combatants, is a distinguishing feature in our favor. Indeed, it has been hard for our Northern troops to engage in this war ‘with a will.’ While our enemies lie in ambush to shoot sentinels, and in battle aim systematically at officers, we have failed to retaliate in either respect.”<sup>37</sup> Weed accused Maury of “impugning history” to garner English sympathy. However, Weed’s reply backfired. He compared the conduct of Federal forces with that of British forces in the War of 1812, where he claims the British burned Alexandria, Havre de Grace, Frenchtown, and Buffalo. In a letter to the editor, signed “One Who Was Present,” explains why the British burned the towns. He claimed the inhabitants of the town refused to surrender weapons stores and some instances used the weapons against British troops. Burning the weapons stores in the towns was done to protect British soldiers.<sup>38</sup>

Another article featured in *The Standard* further undermined Weed’s attempts to explain the causes for the Civil War, by assailing the Union’s position on slavery. The article accuses Weed of glossing over key facts, such as when he admits that all states were originally slave-owning, “but he omits to say under the constitution of the United States property is recognised in slaves...Mr. Weed also omits to say that upon each state joining the Federal government...it pledges itself to return all slaves that should escape...”<sup>39</sup> The writer, pseudonym Fair Play, argued that the Fugitive Slave Law was not a compromise, but a police agreement to enforce what was already in the Constitution. Unfortunately, for Weed, the article demonstrated that either Weed did not have a full understanding of the facts and dates or that he deliberately omitted facts to make the case for the Union.

Bishop McIlvaine was perhaps more successful in his efforts to reach the British public. McIlvaine restricted most of his engagement to personal, face-to-face engagement. He traveled around England as a guest preacher and was often invited or asked to speak on the Civil War. Former Liberal MP, Arthur Kinnaird and his wife, hosted the Bishop and Thurlow Weed “to give information on the present war in the United States...Mr. Kinnaird explained, that his object in calling his friends together was to aid in removing the misapprehensions which prevailed in the unhappy conflict now raging in America.”<sup>40</sup> Bishop McIlvaine denied “the assumption...that there was an inherent and

irreconcilable incompatibility of union and association between the people of the North and South respectively. The close intercommunication in all matters—educational, ecclesiastical, and social—which prevailed between the two parts of the country, prior to the disruption, entirely negated [*sic*] the allegation.”<sup>41</sup> Thurlow Weed provided information on the US government as well as explaining the policies of the Whig and Republican Parties.

McIlvaine also wrote articles for the British press. In one article, he wrote to correct the misprinting of President Lincoln’s annual message to Congress. He observed that the way the message was printed in “certain London journals...seemed so at variance with my reading of the message, that I [McIlvaine] was lead to compare the extract which one journal gave as ‘the text’ on which its censure was based, with the true text as given in American papers.” McIlvaine found in one British journal “important clauses were omitted (not to speak of changes in punctuation) which did great injustice to the President’s true meaning.”<sup>42</sup> According to McIlvaine, an English paper quoted the President’s message as:

The insurgents have seemed to assume that foreign nations in this case (discarding all moral, social and treaty obligations) would act solely and selfishly for the most speedy restoration of commerce...

And McIlvaine corrects the passage in the President’s message to read:

*If it were just to suppose*, as the insurgents seemed to assume, that foreign nations in this case discarding all moral, social, and treaty obligations, would act solely and selfishly, for the most speedy restoration of commerce...

The first passage, as printed, suggests that President Lincoln *did* believe that Europe’s motives for intervening in the Civil War were guided by commercial desires, rather than higher motives. If President Lincoln’s message was in fact misprinted as McIlvaine claims, the statement would have only engendered further animosity among the British toward the Union. McIlvaine sought to counter the potential impact of such a misstatement.

In looking at the Weed mission, there are several issues which make the success of the mission questionable, despite the claims made by both

Adams and Bishop McIlvaine.<sup>43</sup> The first issue being the arrival of the delegates just as the Trent affair news came to Europe. The Trent crisis altered the mission perceptibly from an engagement mission to interact with the British public to a crisis control operation. The next couple of months, Weed and the other delegates spent much of their time meeting with British leaders assuring them the Union did not intend to start a war with England, as Weed wrote in an editorial to *The Times*:

...I confess to a very strong “yearning” that the English Government, its press, and its people, may be disabused of an impression which has so generally obtained, that our Government seeks occasions for disagreement, or cherishes other than such feelings as belong to the relations of interest and amity that blend and bind us together...I quite concur...in the opinion that these rebel emissaries are not worth a war, and, individually, would not hesitate to make large concessions, in feeling, for peace.<sup>44</sup>

More consideration was given to the Union’s perspective toward the questions raised by the *Trent* affair, than other concerns such as the Union’s stance toward slavery or dispelling the idea that the Union pursued the war merely for self-aggrandizement.

In these efforts to defend Captain Wilkes actions against the *Trent*, the unofficial Union representatives often did more harm than good in explaining why the US public cheered Captain Wilkes’s actions. For example, General Scott’s public letter attempts to argue legal precedence justifying Wilkes’s action

Her [Britain’s] statesmen will not question the legal right of an American vessel of war to search any commercial vessel justly suspected of transporting contraband of war. It was even guaranteed to her by the Treaty of Paris; and British guns frowning down upon nearly every strait and inland sea upon the globe are conclusive evidence that she regards this right as one the efficacy of which may be not yet entirely exhausted. Of course there is much that is irritating and vexation in the exercise of this right under the most favourable circumstances, and it is to be hoped the day is not far distant when the maritime States of the world will agree in placing neutral commerce beyond the reach of such vexations. The United States Government has been striving to this end for more than fifty years.<sup>45</sup>

Here, General Scott points out that the British searched neutral ships and confiscated items or whole ships in the past, and goes on to suggest that in



light of the British outrage at the Trent imbroglio, perhaps the British government will consider adopting the United States's long-held foreign policy objective of neutral rights on the seas. Not only does this sound patronizing, it also does nothing to engage the public on the issues facing both nations in relation to the Civil War. For those who had resided in Britain since the onset of the Civil War, the British public's antipathy toward the Union went beyond their irritation over the *Trent*. Thus, begging the question of whether the Weed mission could have more adequately addressed British concerns about the war if either Captain Wilkes had not stopped the *Trent* or if the Union had done more earlier in the war to address the British public as urged by M'Clintock, Cassius Clay, and Charles Adams.

Another concern raised by the Weed mission is how the Union's use of "traditional" diplomacy (state-to-state) to guard against foreign intervention actually undermined the Union's relations with Britain. With the secession and the Queen's Neutrality Proclamation, Seward used threats to ensure no European nation would consider recognizing the Confederacy. Some historians argued Seward used belligerent rhetoric as a deterrence mechanism, hoping that no European nation would want to go to war with the USA on behalf of the Confederacy.<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, the tactic only made the British believe Seward wanted to start a war with Europe as a means of reuniting the Union.<sup>47</sup> With the *Trent* crisis, the British tended to believe Seward *wanted* to provoke a war with England as part of his own war strategy. After being in England for a few weeks, Weed was alerted to "[the] great cause of insecurity is that neither this Government or People [British] are our Friends. The Morrill Tariff and the belief that you [Seward] are unfriendly to England prepared the Country [Britain] to go first, for Secession, and next for War."<sup>48</sup> Seward could have created an alternative policy to fend off the threat of foreign intervention in the Civil War. However, in order to devise a policy, taking into account the peculiar position of the Palmerston ministry and British sentiments would have required the US government to incorporate information provided by Ambassador Adams, Henry Adams, Cassius Clay, and John M'Clintock regarding public opinion in Britain. The reports on public opinion were largely ignored by Secretary Seward; he paid more attention to the British government's actions and intentions, in spite of repeated warnings. Only 8 months after assuming responsibility for US diplomacy and foreign policy did Lincoln or Seward attempt to approach relations with Britain differently by sending unofficial representatives to engage the public.

Notably absent from all the planning and efforts of Weed and his cohorts is US minister Charles Adams. Interestingly, Seward did not forewarn Adams about the special delegation before Weed arrived at the legation in late November, nor was he forthcoming with any information regarding the Administration's response to the *Trent* affair, based on surviving official State Department records. Adams dispatches indicate he was left in the dark regarding the government's position. He discovered the US answer to the British regarding the release of Slidell and Mason in the British press and not from Seward: "Though not yet favored with any information from the Department respecting the course of the proceedings between the two Governments in regard to the case of the Trent, at Washington, I am bound to believe from what I see in the newspapers that the difference has been settled by the release of the captives."<sup>49</sup> Weed arrived at the US legation in London in December 1861 and provided Adams with a letter Seward wrote to introduce him and explain his mission.

Dear Sir,

It is deemed important to the public interest that citizens of well-known high standing should visit Europe for the purpose of assisting to counteract the machinations of the agents of treason against the United States in that quarter.

This opinion having become known to Thurlow Weed, Esq., of Albany, N.Y., the bearer of this communication, he has kindly offered his services, which, as he has the full confidence of both the President and myself, have been promptly and cheerfully accepted. *It is not intended that he shall take part in or interfere with your official proceedings. His unofficial character,* however, as well as his great knowledge and experience in public affairs may enable him to be of usefulness to us in a way and to a degree which we could not reasonably expect from you...

I am sir,

Your obedient servant, William H. Seward<sup>50</sup>

Seward did not provide Adams with additional information about Weed's mission until March 7, more than four months after Weed arrived. There were clearly concerns about the appropriateness of the mission, and it is possible that Seward avoided mentioning anything to Adams to give

him distance from any controversy should one arise. None of those who expressed concerns specified what objections Congress or the US public might have against such a mission. If Seward and others in Lincoln's cabinet were not concerned about the constitutionality of the mission, perhaps it was the nature of the mission itself: to counter the influence of the Confederates. The irony is that the British press was aware of Weed's arrival "...in pursuance of the resolution...to send unofficial ambassadors or representatives to England and France to counteract the effects of Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell's mission and to *make explanations...as well as to sound the depths of public feeling, and ascertain the views of leading men in the political world.*"<sup>51</sup>

At the end of Weed's mission, Adams did offer his assessment of the initiative, raising other significant issues regarding the use of foreign public engagement and its relationship to traditional diplomatic practices. Adams seemingly admits his skepticism toward using unofficial representatives to counter the Confederates influence and goes on to make other suggestions.

Neither has it been in the least in my disposition to call into question the policy adopted by the Government...of sending out some loyal, high spirited and intellectual men of social position and character, to counteract the supposed influence acquired in London and Paris, of the intriguing emissaries of the Confederates. On the contrary though placing a much lower estimate than many did of the degree of influence attained by these persons, it was with great pleasure that I heard of the intention of the Government to counteract it and that I welcomed the gentlemen who actually came to London on that errand...I have borne free testimony to their effective service whilst here...At the same time that I gladly express these views, it is due to my sense of the public interest to add that *my remark is confined to persons who come in their apparently private position.* There is a difficulty in regard to employing recognized official representatives to other Governments in the same way which will not fail to be injuriously felt whenever the experiment is attempted. They necessarily occupy a false position in the face of the regularly accredited agent, or they force him into one. They must be wholly admitted into his confidence in which case they can not [*sic*] fail to take his responsibility out of his hands; or they must be kept out of it when there is perpetual danger of running into contradictions which neutralize the influence of both. Added to which, the inference of strangers is almost unavoidable that the Government sends a second person because it fears the ability of the first one to be equal to his work...I would

respectfully submit to your judgment the expediency of keeping perfectly distinct the responsibility of the respective Diplomatic Agents.<sup>52</sup>

This issue of who should initiate foreign public engagement and the relationship of such engagement with politics is one that becomes more and more complex with each of the succeeding cases. As future cases will demonstrate, public-private cooperation for foreign public engagement initiatives becomes a dominant feature. Adams observations regarding how “private” people who are sent as unofficial representatives can potentially cause serious problems if they contradict the policy of the official representative or are seen in the public and government’s eyes as being more representative of the US government’s position.

Looking ahead to the fall of 1862, as Lincoln considered his plans for an emancipation order, other unofficial delegates were sent back to England. This time Edward Everett agreed to go to England unofficially. The correspondence between Lincoln and Everett suggests Adams’s suggestions were incorporated in subsequent engagement missions:

September 22, 1862

My dear Sir,

Mr. Blair urged me to seek an opportunity of conversing with you, on a subject he has mentioned to you. I should be greatly obliged to you, if you would be pleased to name a time, when you will allow me to wait upon you for that purpose...

Edward Everett

September 24, 1862

Whom it may concern

Hon. Edward Everett goes to Europe shortly. His reputation and the present condition of our Country are such, that his visit is sure to attract notice and may be misconstrued. I therefore think fit to say, that he bears no mission from this government, and *yet no gentleman is better able to correct misunderstandings in the minds of foreigners, in regard to American affairs...*

Abraham Lincoln<sup>53</sup>

In addition to Edward Everett, a minister, Julian Sturtevant, was also sent to England to engage the public, as well as Charles W. Denison, a former chaplain.<sup>54</sup> These efforts to engage the British and other parts of Europe tended to rely on advocacy as a method of engagement. Union representatives engaged the British public through the press, writing editorials, and responding to Confederate misinformation; using pamphlets; attending public meetings; and giving speeches. The intent of the engagement efforts was to *explain* the reasons for the war, from the Union's point of view, and to garner sympathy from the British public. Despite these efforts, the Union's slavery policy tended to undermine any show of sympathy or friendship from the British public.

### BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SLAVERY QUESTION

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the Union's policies in the eyes of the British public and the government was the vacillation on the slavery question. Charles Schurz, US ambassador to Spain, wrote to Secretary Seward imploring the government to make the war about slavery. He argued

... public opinion will be so strongly, so overwhelmingly in our favour... Our enemies know that well, and we may learn from them. While their agents carefully conceal from the eyes of Europeans their only weak point, their attachment to slavery, ought we, to aid them in hiding with equal care our only strong point, our opposition to slavery? While they, well knowing how repugnant slavery is to the European way of feeling, do all to make Europeans forget that they fight for it, ought we, who are equally well acquainted with European sentiment, abstain from making Europeans remember that we fight against it? In not availing ourselves of our advantages, we relieve the enemy of the odium attached to his cause. It is, therefore, my opinion that every step done by the Government towards the abolition of slavery is, as to our standing in Europe, equal to a victory in the field. I do not know how this advice may agree with the home-policy of the Government. But however bold it may seem, I am so sincerely convinced of its correctness, as far as our foreign policy is concerned...<sup>55</sup>

Despite receiving repeated encouragement from other US representatives abroad to make the war about slavery, both Lincoln and Seward's

unwillingness to attack the institution of slavery and announce it as the Union's cause for war undermined the Union's moral superiority and denied the United States the opportunity to exploit anti-slavery sympathies of the European public.

However, Lincoln and Seward had legitimate reasons to deny slavery as the main cause of the war. "Every demonstration against slavery puts our assured positions in Maryland Kentucky Missouri and Virginia at hazard, and tends to combine the revolting states in mass."<sup>56</sup> On the one hand, Union leaders were concerned about losing the Border States to the Confederacy, as Seward explained to Adams, which they deemed to be catastrophic to the Union's cause. On the other hand, they were also concerned that Northerners would be unwilling to fight a war to end slavery. At issue was how much foreign relations should influence or guide domestic policy. The Civil War provides an extreme example of this problem, a problem often debated by political leaders even today. There were some critics of the Lincoln administration, including among the British public, who believed if the Union declared the war to bring about the end of the slavery in America, the war would have concluded much sooner.<sup>57</sup> Much of these assessments at the time of the war were likely influenced by the view of situation from abroad versus in the United States as well as political predispositions, as many of Union representatives overseas were abolitionists including Carl Schurz and Cassius Clay. From Seward and Lincoln's perspective, maintaining the Border States and troop levels was a matter of national survival.

Once the Border States were sufficiently secured in the summer of 1862, Lincoln began to consider issuing a military order to free slaves in the Confederate States.<sup>58</sup> Interestingly, Seward asked Lincoln to wait before publically announcing anything about emancipation. First, Seward believed Lincoln should wait for a decisive Union victory to announce emancipation. Seward thought that emancipation might look like a desperate act to the world, an attempt to initiate slave riots in the South to keep the Confederates from fighting. After the battle of Antietam in September 1862, Lincoln wanted to go through with emancipation, but Seward delayed again out of the expressed concern that emancipation would cause Europe to declare war on the Union because slavery would mean the end of the cotton supply.<sup>59</sup> In light of the many letters and dispatches from private citizens and US representatives who strongly encouraged the Union to abolish slavery, Seward's explanation for delay

is surprising. Especially since, just six months prior to the discussion of emancipation, Adams wrote to Seward explaining how the real reasons for the war were becoming more apparent to the British public.

The progress of affairs in America is daily more and more exposing its real character. Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may be disposed to view the [Morrill] tariff as the source of all our ills, and as much as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make democracy responsible for them, the inexorable logic of events is contradicting each and every assertion based on these notions, and proving that the American struggle is after all the ever recurring one in human affairs between right and wrong, between labor and capital, between liberty and absolutism. When such an issue comes to be presented to the people of Great Britain, stripped of all the disguises which have been thrown over it, it is not difficult to predict at least which side it will not consent to take.<sup>60</sup>

To which Seward hastily replied that demonstrations against slavery endangered the Union's war objectives.<sup>61</sup> Apparently, Adams's declaration that Britain would not stand against the Union if the nation ended slavery, was forgotten by Seward when Lincoln brought up emancipation in July of 1862. He wrote to various ministers in Europe, casually asking what reaction might be expected, all of the ministers he contacted responded similarly: Public and official opinion would wholeheartedly support emancipation.<sup>62</sup>

Although, when the Emancipation Proclamation became public in September of 1862, reactions in England were mixed. As Seward initially predicted, some believed the proclamation to be a desperate military tactic and was not brought about by any moral conviction. Furthermore, the British public was confused as to why the Proclamation only extended to the Confederate States and did not include the Border States as well as why the Proclamation would not go into effect until January 1, 1863. This lack of understanding reflected the limited impact of the Weed mission, and the subsequent attempts by the Union to explain war aims. The Union's use of foreign public engagement also demonstrates the disconnect between engagement initiatives and policy-making. Though many of the official and unofficial representatives of the Union did *listen* to the British public, providing detailed reports depicting the varying viewpoints of both the government and different segments of British society, these reports were often overlooked by Seward

or elicited a fiery response from the Secretary of State. President Lincoln was more concerned by the reports; concerned enough to send Thurlow Weed and others to “correct misunderstandings in the minds of foreigners.” But correcting foreign public opinions and connecting such initiatives to national policies had not developed and would remain elusive in future as well.

The impact of the Emancipation Proclamation on British public opinion would not be apparent until the end of 1862 through the beginning of 1863, when Adams became inundated with requests to attend public meetings in support of the proclamation as well as resolutions and letters of support addressed to President Lincoln.<sup>63</sup> These expressions of sympathy and friendship were passed onto to the State Department and eventually President Lincoln. Adams requested an approved official response to distribute as needed; however, Lincoln responded to some personally, including the Workingmen of Manchester and the Workingmen of London, which was printed in *The Leeds Mercury*, February 14, 1863.<sup>64</sup>

Though there are historians who question the actual impact of the Emancipation Proclamation on British public opinion,<sup>65</sup> the importance of the Proclamation is that it shifted the reason for the war from national survival to a moral reason, thus making an intervention in the conflict nearly untenable to European leaders, especially the Palmerston ministry. The strong anti-slavery sentiment among the British public as well as members of the cabinet made it difficult for the government to intervene. At the very least, the Proclamation quieted demands for intervention till the fall of 1863.

#### AID AS FOREIGN PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

After advertng war with Britain at the end of 1861, the next major concern for diplomatic relations between Britain and the USA was the so-called “cotton famine.” In Lancashire, England, some 400,000 textile workers were left without work due the Union’s blockade against Southern cotton exports. British leaders and the press often cited the Union blockade as the cause of the cotton famine; however, the Confederate government issued orders to burn cotton throughout the war as part of their King Cotton diplomatic strategy.<sup>66</sup> At the beginning of the year, members of Parliament and Palmerston’s ministry grew concerned by the number of textile mills either shut down or operating



only part-time. Liberal MP, Richard Cobden, voiced his serious concerns to Adams about what the British government or other European governments, such as France, might do if large swaths of their populations continued unemployed.<sup>67</sup> He suggested that the US government acknowledge the suffering endured by the textile workers and to provide “some rather careful friendly exposition of the whole question as bearing upon the policy of other countries might be of use to check the direction of popular opinion against us in Europe.”<sup>68</sup>

Seward’s response to the suggestion that the US government express sympathy for the textile workers was indignant and accusing. He referenced the Queen’s Neutrality Proclamation, granting belligerency rights to the Confederacy, and necessarily prolonging the rebellion.

All our efforts are measurably counteracted by the attitude of those governments who recognize our internal enemy as a lawful public belligerent, and thereby are understood as encouraging it to hope for recognition and intervention...And still more are they counteracted by the now conceded political sympathies of European masses and classes, who improve the civil war in this country and the distresses it works to the manufacturing and commercial interests of their own country to raise against us there a prejudice which has the moral effect of sustaining and prolonging that civil war.<sup>69</sup>

In Seward’s eyes, the policies of the Union were not the reason for the distress of British textile workers, but rather the British government’s policies. He even blamed the European public’s lack of sympathy toward the Union’s plight for undermining US policy. Though Cobden’s observations and advice were considered “with much interest” by President Lincoln, there was no immediate action taken by the US government to acknowledge the impact of the blockade on British textile workers.

On the other hand, when private US citizens heard of the British textile workers’ situation in the American press, they began to organize a relief operation in mid-November of 1862. On November 28, 1862, the New York Chamber of Commerce circulated an invitation to the merchants of New York to attend a meeting on December 1st to discuss what could be done to assist the textile workers in England.<sup>70</sup> A series of resolutions were passed at the meeting whereby a committee was formed, the International Relief Committee, to organize the collection of food and money to send to England. Shipping magnates, Nathaniel and George Griswold, agreed to donate a ship to carry the collected supplies to

England. The members of the committee and those donating goods or services contacted merchants in Manchester and Liverpool, asking them to help supervise the distribution of supplies. By January 9, 1863, the *George Griswold* was ready to depart for England, arriving on January 14, 1863. The very same Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, which awaited Adams arrival in 1861, now eagerly thanked the captain of the *George Griswold* and the American people "...to convey to the donors its sense of the liberal and *friendly spirit* in which your merchants and agriculturalists have united to send forward to our distressed cotton operatives, so acceptable a message of good-will and sympathy."<sup>71</sup>

What makes this an example of foreign public engagement are the methods of engagement which are used in order to engage with the British public in multiple strata of society: textile workers, merchants and the middle class, and the British aristocracy and governing officials. First, the American public *listened* to the fact that their own government's war policies were having an adverse effect on the citizens of Britain, damaging the good feelings of the public there toward the United States.<sup>72</sup> Second, the American representatives traveling with the supplies *advocated* the Union's causes for fighting the Confederacy and the need for the blockade. There was also some two-way exchange, where British textile workers expressed gratitude and desire to emigrate; and British merchants expressed their attitude toward the ongoing war:

...[It] is well known, great differences of opinion prevail as to the causes and objects of the contest now unhappily raging among you, it would be evidently unbecoming in us to put forward any statement that would create dissension and mar the general harmony of the occasion; but we think we are warranted in saying, that men of all shades of opinion would rejoice to see this war terminated in any way that would not be inconsistent with your honor as a people, and with the great and responsible position which you occupy among the nations.<sup>73</sup>

Even more importantly in terms of the overall study of the development of American public diplomacy, is how humanitarian aid was used to build relations with the British public as well as the Union's involvement with the private operation to help cotton textile workers. As future cases in this study will explore, a trend developed in the second half of the nineteenth century where private entities and the government increasingly worked together in their efforts to engage foreign publics. In this

particular instance, the government considered providing a US naval escort for the *George Griswold*.<sup>74</sup>

*Some members thought that perhaps by inaugurating this movement, some national vanity and enmity to England might be attributed to the Chamber.* The majority of the speakers deprecated conducting the movement in a way to obtain favour with one class in England, but urged that it should be based exclusively on the grounds of Christian charity. England was a great customer of America for grain, and it was a plain case that it was America's duty to feed a brother nation in distress.<sup>75</sup>

Congress's reluctance to provide assistance out of concern that it might be looked upon as a ploy by the government to curry favor with working class is significant in light of later debates regarding the role of public diplomacy and whether public diplomacy should be used to achieve foreign policy objectives. The Congress desired the act of providing relief to be untainted by the government, and so both resolutions in the House and Senate went no further. However, there is a curious letter sent by the chaplain of the *George Griswold* to Abraham Lincoln, almost a month after arriving in Liverpool. The letter reports on the results of the humanitarian operation.

February 11, 1863

Sir;

I have the honor to inform you that this ship of mercy for the suffering operatives of England, Scotland and Ireland, has been received at Liverpool with many demonstrations of public favor. –

The Mayor, the Chamber of Commerce, the newspapers, the citizens of Lancashire, of Manchester, Kent, and other parts of England have vied with each other in recognizing and doing honor to this act of kindness in America. –

As you are aware of my humble share in the mission of the *George Griswold*, I avail myself of the opportunity to state that I shall being at once my labors among the labouring classes, especially those of the Baptist denomination, with a view to laying before them the facts of our great struggle for constitutional government and the rights of mankind...

Chas. W. Denison<sup>76</sup>

The last part of the letter would seem to indicate Denison was another special representative sent by Lincoln or Seward to engage with the British public.

## UNION STATECRAFT AND FOREIGN PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

Union foreign public engagement is not an ideal model, but the case does demonstrate US leaders' awareness about the need to engage foreign publics as a part of statecraft as well as raising questions about foreign public engagement's role in statecraft. These questions include how much consideration foreign public opinion should be given and should influence national policies; whether foreign public engagement should be used to attain national policy objectives; who should be responsible for foreign public engagement; and the appropriateness of foreign public engagement as a tool of the state. In addition, the case also highlights obstacles or concerns for using foreign public engagement such as how advances in communication technology changed national audience dynamics; the importance of clearly explaining and representing national positions and policies; and the prioritization of government opinion over public opinion.

Unlike the American Revolution, the Civil War demonstrates how both US representatives serving abroad and leaders in Washington recognized the connection between engaging with the public of another nation and foreign relations generally as well as with foreign policy. Though Benjamin Franklin's letters to members of the Continental Congress demonstrate Franklin's understanding of the need for engagement with the French public, the Continental Congress did not. Nor did many of the other commissioners in France. Though slow to respond to reports from Charles Francis Adams, Cassius Clay, Zebina Eastman, and others, once President Lincoln understood the need to address British public, he sent commissioners to both France and England in an attempt to salvage US foreign relations and to counter Confederate influence.

However, recognizing this need to explain and correct misunderstandings about national policies led to other questions and issues which the Union was never able to adequately resolve. For instance, Secretary Seward frequently denied that foreign public opinion should be considered in the formation of national plans, as he wrote Carl Schurz, despite regular warnings about how US policies negatively impacted foreign public opinion and by extension the opinion of foreign governments. Yet US

citizens residing abroad or representing the United States in an official capacity understood how public opinion could be used to *inform* policy. As Henry Adams observed “...England was perfectly welcome to think what she liked. Her opinions were of no consequence to us, *except as they indicated her actions.*”<sup>77</sup> Henry Adams’s father, Charles Francis Adams, reported on the apparent connection between popular opinion and the Palmerston government and suggested that public opinion should be considered in the formation of US policy toward Great Britain:

Whilst the struggle between the two parties (Liberals and Conservatives) seems to be carried on upon faint and shadowy lines of divisions...*After the organization of the last ministry (Palmerston’s) upon what seemed a tolerably wide basis, of popular support, the policy naturally adapted itself so far as was practicable to the elements constituting its strength, and indicated sympathy with liberal ideas all over the globe. But not being provided with any imposing amount of personal abilities, the friction of disputed domestic measures, and the inevitable fluctuations of public opinion, have had their natural effect on lowering their moral strength to the least possible standing point...*In view of this State of things it becomes important to consider how the interests of the United States are likely to be affected as a result. *To judge correctly, it becomes necessary to examine the form which opinion takes here and the distribution made of it between contending parties...*<sup>78</sup>

The Civil War presented an extreme situation where President Lincoln had to balance domestic policies with foreign policy, at the risk of possible of foreign intervention either in the form of an outright war or mediation. In a real sense, Britain’s entrance as a second combatant in the Civil War, whether on the side of the Confederacy or simply as an independent belligerent, threatened US national security as much as the loss of the Border States. Seward attempted to temper this threat with aggressiveness, asserting that the Union would readily fight any European nation who interfered. Unfortunately, this tactic not only hurts Anglo-American relations, but also exacerbated the potential for British intervention. The British public did not appreciate Seward’s bullying and tended to support mediation and permanent division of the United States.

This ties into one of the themes or trends uncovered in this study regarding communication. Beyond recognizing the need to communicate and listen, the Union had to consider how much weight to give British public opinion in relation to its influence on the British government. In the case of Great Britain, the precariousness of the Palmerston

government and its reliance on public opinion should have raised the importance of British public opinion in the eyes of American leaders in the formation of not only national policy, but also war objectives and the use of foreign public engagement, especially in light of Union's concerns about the potential for Britain to decide the outcome of the war before the Union could defeat the Confederacy.

Though there was a great deal of listening done by private and public US representatives, many failed to use the information to *inform* US policy, to clarify the reasons for the war and the Union's position toward the Confederacy, and to utilize engagement much sooner. Even the Union's advocacy failed to take into consideration the opinion of the British public, only exacerbating public irritation, as with Thurlow Weed's articles in the press and General Scott's open letter. In addition to the policy issues and considerations of whether to engage the British public, the Union committed several blunders which frequently hurt engagement efforts: the revelations of the Union's extensive espionage operation in London and Liverpool to track Confederate movements; the Union's avoidance of the slavery issue; and the first publication of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS). Seward arranged for diplomatic correspondences to be published, mostly to quiet criticism and questions from the US Senate. He published the correspondences without warning Adams, who discovered his dispatches printed in the British press, also around the same time as the Trent crisis. Though the British officials were not seriously put off by the publication, Adams recognized that the publication undermined public perception of him as a fair representative of the US. Aaron Marr assesses the first edition of the *FRUS* was edited with both the American and foreign public in mind.<sup>79</sup> This may be true based on Seward's hard-lined approach to Europe and Britain in particular; however, the publication of the *FRUS* containing recent correspondences between Seward and Adams only serves to further demonstrate Seward's unwillingness to acknowledge the impact of foreign public perceptions of his tactics on the British government as well as his unwillingness to *listen* to those representing the US.

While recognizing the connection between engaging the foreign public, maintaining foreign relations, and implementing foreign policy, this case also raises questions about the appropriateness of using foreign public engagement. The question of appropriateness was considered in terms of whether the government should engage with foreign publics as well as *who* should be engaging foreign publics, whether they should

be done by private entities unaffiliated with the government or private individuals or even whether the government and private entities should jointly work to engage with people abroad. The Weed mission stirred these questions among those asked to go as “unofficial ambassadors” as well as for Union leaders. Seward’s letter of introduction for Weed to Minister Adams emphasized Weed and the other commissioners as representatives in an “unofficial character.” According to Weed, Seward initially refused to provide the commissioners with diplomatic credentials until pressured by another politician.<sup>80</sup> Even those first asked to travel to Europe were uncomfortable with the mission. Edward Everett was asked initially, but declined the request, believing that it was inappropriate for him to take up such a mission as a former Secretary of State.<sup>81</sup> Bishop McIlvaine also felt uncomfortable with the mission, but later found the British supportive of his mission there:

Some thought I was coming on a semi-diplomatic mission – the rest that I was at least on a mission of peace. They [the British] instinctively interpreted my coming at such a time, as meaning that I had some good, kind object for the two countries. They therefore neither asked, nor needed any explanation, and I needed no concealment...It requires a readiness and courage, a quickness of answer, and a fertility of resources, which I was afraid I should fail in; but I am satisfied as yet.<sup>82</sup>

McIlvaine’s characterization of the British understanding of the Weed mission is reflected in the British press reporting the appointment and arrival of a special delegation to England and France. Weed, Archbishop Hughes, and Bishop McIlvaine were referred to as “unofficial ambassadors.” The British press also recognized that the mission was to specifically address the British public vice the government.

Nevertheless, Adams felt that representatives despite being declared “unofficial” undermined and potentially caused problems for those who were official representatives of the United States. He supported the object of the Weed mission, but felt that any future mission should be confined to *private persons* unaffiliated with the US government. Adams’ views must have been taken into consideration, as later “unofficial representatives” traveled to Great Britain quietly and without mention in the press. Edward Everett, Julian Sturtevant, and Charles Denison all traveled to Great Britain to engage the British public, but did so without any overt connections to the Lincoln administration.

In addition to raising questions about the appropriateness of foreign public engagement generally and who should be responsible for such engagement, another question was raised about the propriety of joint public-private foreign public engagement. Though the House and Senate determined that providing a military escort for the *George Grissold* might be interpreted by the British as the government attempting to curry favor and let both motions die, the idea of combining or coordinating private and public engagement initiatives abroad does not disappear. Moving forward in time, the lines between private and government foreign public engagement initiatives becomes further blurred; the distinctions between public and private engagement become even more indistinct. Even in the case of the *George Grissold*, the letter from chaplain Charles Denison suggests that President Lincoln did not balk at conjoining government engagement efforts with private ones.

During the Civil War, communication technology impacted foreign public engagement. The Union struggled with the new communication environment which permitted broader and faster dissemination of political speeches and remarks made by Union leaders. Additionally, engagement was effected by the problem of synchronizing Washington's expectations of the field and what representatives in the field reported to Washington. As explained, Seward tended to overlook reports from the field which did not align with his conception of what was important. Despite being told repeatedly by multiple sources to pay attention to foreign public opinion, Seward disregarded it.

## NOTES

1. *Abraham Lincoln Papers (ALP)*: Series 1, General Correspondence, in the Library of Congress (LoC).
2. Adams to Seward, May 17, 1861, NARA, M30, R74; *The Liverpool Mercury*, May 14, 1861.
3. Adams to Seward, May 17, 1861, NARA, M30, R74.
4. Blumenthal (1966), Foreman (2010) and George C. Herring, (2008). *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford University Press: New York, NY).
5. Howard Jones, 2010. *Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill), p. 12; Jay Sexton, 2014. *Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era 1837–1873* (Oxford University Press: Oxford).



6. Jones (2010).
7. James Spence, a British merchant, authored a book, *The American Union*. The book explained the causes for the war, countering Union arguments on the unlawfulness of the secession. Spence argued England was a natural ally of the South. The book was widely read in England [John Bennett, 2008. *The London Confederates: The Officials, Clergy, Businessmen and Journalists who Backed the American South During the Civil War* (McFarland & Co., Inc: North Carolina)].
8. Sexton (2014).
9. “American Appeals to English Sympathy,” Issue 4381.
10. Martin Duberman, 1960, Charles Francis Adams, 1807–1886 (Stanford University Press: Stanford), p. 265.
11. No. 58, October 11, 1861, NARA, M30, R73.
12. Dispatch No. 58, October 11, 1861, NARA, M30, R73.
13. No. 61, NARA, M30, R73.
14. Jeremy Black, 2001. *The English Press, 1621–1861* (Sutton Publishing: Gloucestershire, UK); Brian Winston, 2012. *Media Technology and Society* (Routledge: online).
15. Amanda Foreman 2010. *World on Fire: An Epic History of Two Nations Divided* (Penguin Books: London, England).
16. While visiting in England in 1859, William Seward remarked to the Duke of Newcastle that the best way to garner political favour from the American public was to threaten war with England. The British press reported the exchange as well as other remarks made by Seward where he suggested annexing Canada.
17. December 20, 1861, Worthington C. Ford, (ed.) 1920. *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861–1865* (Houghton Mifflin & Co.: Boston), pp. 88–89.
18. *The New York Herald* in particular was known in the USA and by the British as being vehemently anti-British and initially supported the secession. The editor, Scotsman James Gordon Bennett, believed Northern abolitionists were to blame for the secession. *The Herald* had a large circulation in Europe which influenced public sentiment overseas. American representatives in England, France, and Belgium were apprehensive about the impact on public sentiment caused by *The Herald*. President Lincoln raised the issue of *The Herald's* influence before the cabinet, where it was decided that Thurlow Weed would approach Mr. Bennett to alter the tone of the paper [Thurlow Weed, 1883. *Life of Thurlow Weed including His Autobiography and a Memoir* (Houghton, Mifflin, and Company: Boston, MA)]. Though Weed was able to alter his stance toward the secession, *The Herald* continued to produce caustic articles about England which were reprinted in and often remarked upon by the British press (see “Anti-English Feeling in America,” December 28, 1861, *The Morning Post*, p. 6, Issue 27466).

19. Reverend Dr. John M'Clintock to Secretary of State William Seward, November 18, 1863, in Joseph O. Baylen, 1959. "Dr. John M'Clintock: Union Propagandist, 1860–1864," *Civil War History*, Vol. 5, pp. 143–144.
20. In Ford (1920, p. 52), emphasis added.
21. Kinley J Brauer, 1977. "The Slavery Problem in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 46.
22. Some of Charles Francis Adams's despatches also describe the varied explanations which swirled around England: Despatch Nos. 1, 9, and 61 (NARA, M30, R73). See also R.J.M. Blackett, 2001. *Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War* (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, LA); Duberman 1960; Foreman 2010.
23. Dispatch No. 2, May 21, 1861, NARA, M30, R73, emphasis added.
24. Seward to Schurz October 10, 1861, in Schurz (1913, p. 192), emphasis added.
25. American Henry S. Sanford was appointed to serve as the US ambassador to Belgium; however, through much of the Civil War, he remained in England and France. In England, he established a network of spies to track the movements of Confederate agents and contractors. He gained access the English mail and cable services to read Confederate messages sent to and from the Confederate government. The network was discovered and its activities were made public in the British press in the fall of 1861, just before the *Trent* crisis. Ambassador Adams was unaware of Sanford's activities until he read about them in the press. According to correspondence between Secretary of State Seward and Sanford, Seward specifically tasked Sanford to collect intelligence on Confederate activities throughout Europe and provided secret funds for these activities (Adams to Seward November 1, 1861, M30, R73; LOC: ALP, Series 1, Sanford to Seward July 4, 1861).
26. Thurlow Weed was a nineteenth century campaign manager and political lobbyist for the Republican Party.
27. Episcopalian Bishop of Ohio.
28. Irish-born Archbishop of New York.
29. Stahr (2012).
30. No. 201 Seward to Adams, March 7, 1862, NARA, M77, R77, emphasis added.
31. Weed (1883).
32. Weed to Seward, 11 December 1861, LoC: ALP; General Correspondence, Series 1; No archival evidence was found to suggest that Weed ever paid journalists to write stories favoring the Union. Henry Sanford did pay French journalists to write favorable stories for the Union, but this did not last long. Once Sanford's espionage activities were revealed in England in the British papers, Seward ordered Sanford

- to take up his post in Belgium. Sanford no longer had the funds to either run spies nor to pay journalists (Owsley 1961).
33. M'Clintock had already been very active in England, giving public addresses, publishing pamphlets, and attending public meetings, to explain the North's views about the ongoing war in America. M'Clintock realized the seriousness of the situation in the USA and decided that though he was not officially empowered, he would do his best to represent his country as a private citizen (Crooks 1876). Since his arrival in France, he had made many contacts in England who remained sympathetic to the Union and were willing to help.
  34. Baylen 1959; Thurlow Barnes Weeds, 1884. *Memoir of Thurlow Weed* (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company).
  35. Weed (1883,1884).
  36. "Thurlow Weed in Reply to Liet. Maury," *The Globe*, reprinted in *The New York Times*, January 21, 1862.
  37. Ibid.
  38. "An Answer for Mr. Thurlow Weed," *The Standard*, January 3, 1862, p. 5, Issue 11669.
  39. "Mr. Thurlow Weed on the American Question," *The Standard*, February 10, 1862, p. 6, Issue 11700.
  40. "The Causes and Probable Results of the American Civil War," *The Lady's Newspaper*, February 8, 1862, p. 87, Issue 789.
  41. Ibid.
  42. "The American President on Foreign Relations," *The Morning Post*, December 31, 1861, p. 2, Issue 27468; No newsprint examined in this study carried the misprinted version of President Lincoln's message. Even papers which tended to favor the South, such *The Times* and *The Liverpool Mercury*, both had accurate prints of the President's message.
  43. Adams wrote to Seward in Dispatch No. 95 on December 27, 1861, "I am happy to say that I have seen and conferred repeatedly both with Bishop McIlvaine and Mr. Weed. I think their services have already been of material use, and that they will be of still more hereafter, if peaceful relations should be preserved" (M30, R73). Later, Bishop McIlvaine also wrote to Seward, reporting "[w]hatever the cause, every body [*sic*] sees the change in public opinion, or expression of it, recently..." (February 21, 1862, LoC: ALP; General Correspondence, Series 1).
  44. Thurlow Weed, "To the Editor of the Times," December 14, 1861, *The Times*, p. 7, Issue 24116.
  45. Winfield Scott, in *The Morning Chronicle*, December 5, 1861.
  46. Herring (2008); Stahr (2012).
  47. "Mr. Seward," December 3, 1861, *Daily News*, Issue 4856.
  48. Thurlow Weed to Seward, December 4, 1861, LoC: ALP, Series 1.

49. No. 84–99, January 10, 1862, NARA, M30, R73.
50. Weed (1884, p. 351), emphasis added.
51. *The Times*, November 26, 1861, p. 9, emphasis added.
52. No. 136, Adams to Seward, NARA, M30, R75; emphasis added.
53. LoC: ALP; General Correspondence, Series 1.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Carl Schurz to Seward, in Schurz (1913, pp. 190–191).
56. No. 163 Seward to Adams, January 11, 1862, NARA, M77, R77.
57. Schurz (1913); Weed (1883) and Weed (1884).
58. No. 303, Seward to Adams, July 18, 1862, NARA, M77, R77; Stahr 2012.
59. No. 303, NARA, M77, R77.
60. No. 95, Adams to Seward, December 27, 1861, NARA, M30, R73.
61. No. 163, January 11, 1862, NARA, M77, R77.
62. Brauer (1977).
63. NARA, M30, R77 & R78.
64. NARA, M30, R77; LoC: ALP, General Correspondence, Series 1.
65. Campbell (2003); Hernon (1967).
66. Blumenthal (1966).
67. No. 182, July 3, 1862, NARA, M30, R76.
68. *Ibid.*
69. No. 303, July 18, 1862, NARA, M77, R77.
70. American International Relief Committee for the Suffering Operatives of Great Britain. 1864. *Report of the American international relief committee, for the suffering operatives of Great Britain: 1862–'63* (C.A. Alvord: New York).
71. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
72. Weed (1884).
73. Address of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to the Commander of the “George Griswold,” American International Relief Committee 1864, p. 41.
74. *US House Journal*. 37th Congress, 3rd Sess. 15 Dec; *US Senate Journal*. 37th Congress, 3rd Sess. 15 December.
75. “Reuter’s Telegrams,” *The Times*, December 16, 1862, p. 8.
76. LoC: ALP, General Correspondence, Series 1.
77. “An American in Manchester,” *The Times*, January 9, 1862, p. 6, Issue 24138.
78. No. 9, Adams to Seward, June 21, 1861, NARA, M30, R73.
79. Aaron Marrs, 2015. “The Civil War Origins of the FRUS Series, 1861–1868.” in William B. McAllister, Joshua Botts, Peter Cozzens and Aaron W. Marrs (eds.), *A History of the Foreign Relations of the United States*

(U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs: Washington, D.C.), p. 17.

80. Weed (1884, p. 638).
81. Weed (1883, 1884).
82. Bishop McIlvaine to Bishop Bedell, December 1861, in William Carus, (ed.) 1886. *Memorials of the Right Reverend Charles Pettit McIlvaine, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D., late bishop of Ohio, in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States* (Elliot Stock: London), p. 225.

## Early Public-Private Partnerships for Public Diplomacy

*The political and civil institutions of the countries of this continent having been consolidated, it is proper for them to develop, in conformity with their kind and the national aspirations, the resources wherewith nature has so richly endowed them. In this work of progress, there devolves upon universities the noble task of assisting the State as also to form and direct public opinion which exercises such a decisive influence over modern democracy.*

“Report of the Tenth Committee on Interchange of University Professors and Students,” July/August 1910<sup>1</sup>

The end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century marks the start of public and private cooperation with foreign public engagement initiatives. Unlike earlier chapters where either the government or private entities clearly initiated engagement with people abroad, this chapter looks specifically at how the US government *consciously* worked with private groups to engage publics overseas for specific political objectives. Though private foreign public engagement sometimes overlapped with government engagement or helped to achieve national policy objectives, there was not much coordination of these efforts between private entities and the US government. By the end of the nineteenth century, government and private entities worked together to engage with people abroad.

Not only does this case tell the story of the early relationship between private entities and the US government with foreign engagement efforts, but also the deliberate use of engagement in US statecraft to achieve foreign policy goals, moving closer toward institutionalizing the practice of foreign public engagement as a mechanism of statecraft. The previous case highlighted how the government recognized the need to engage with people abroad to correct misperceptions and explain policies. This case looks at how the US government employed foreign public engagement to attain policy objectives. A significant development, the use of foreign public engagement for political ends becomes a contentious debate, as later cases will show.

Furthermore, the organizations and key figures of this case play significant roles in developing more consistent and organized efforts to engage foreign publics in the following three cases of this research. The organizations and individuals in this case make recurrent appearances as American public diplomacy develops. This is also essential to answering the primary research question of how foreign public engagement shaped the role of modern public diplomacy in American statecraft, as these organizations and individuals undoubtedly contributed to this.

Rather than focusing on a singular event, this case uses two examples of public-private foreign public engagement as part of a period trend which began around 1890 up through WWI. The last decade of the nineteenth century is frequently noted by scholars of American history as a significant turning point for America, especially in the area of foreign politics.<sup>2</sup> At the turn of the century, American diplomacy became more active; American leaders and the public saw the USA as playing a decisive and powerful role in the world.<sup>3</sup>

Several factors contributed to this new activism. Perhaps the most significant factor was America's transition from a raw materials exporter to an industrial goods exporter. Emily Rosenberg notes this trend in America for foreign expansion was brought on largely by American industrialization.<sup>4</sup> American businesses of industry wanted to broaden their market base and sought overseas markets. As they did so, businesses noted the inadequacy of the American diplomatic service, criticizing the Department of State for not doing more to facilitate access to foreign markets or protect American investments and goods overseas. This private dissatisfaction with American diplomacy coincided with the onset of American Progressivism<sup>5</sup> and a drawn out effort to reform the American diplomatic and consular services.<sup>6</sup>

American public opinion about the nation's role in the world also changed from the passive "City on the Hill" to one of the active reformer.<sup>7</sup> Private citizens urged the US government to be more proactive in facilitating trade relationships between American business and foreign nations as well as expecting the government to protect American trade and economic interests overseas.

Private impulses, more than government policies, laid the basis for America's enormous global influence in the twentieth century, an influence based on advanced technology, surplus capital, and mass culture... Operating on the assumption that the growing influence of private groups abroad would enhance the nation's strategic and economic position, the government gradually erected a promotional state; it developed techniques to assist citizens who operated abroad and mechanisms to reduce foreign restrictions against American penetration.<sup>8</sup>

Coupled with America's economic expansion, private humanitarian organizations, managing education initiatives and technical training, also grew in importance in American statecraft.

American citizens and their government imagined a new position for the United States in the world. Through the provision of overseas assistance, they characterized the United States as a new breed of world power, strong, benevolent nation committed to guiding the world in peaceful cooperation and modernization. In the process, they made international assistance a new American civic obligation and a central component of American statecraft.<sup>9</sup>

This attitude toward foreign expansion allowed the United States to distinguish between European imperialism and America's own foreign acquisitions. "With outright colonialism out of fashion, the expansionist debate revolved around other means of control: tutelage under theoretically independent protectorates, or more important, governmental encouragement of private connections, especially economic ones."<sup>10</sup> In an effort to augment access to foreign markets and spread American ideas, culture, and influence, the US government worked with private entities.

To demonstrate the development of both the public-private relationships and the use of foreign public engagement as a tool of statecraft,



two rudimentary instances of public diplomacy within the period are explored. The first portion of the chapter examines how President William McKinley decided to use the American National Red Cross (ANRC) in Cuba in the winter of 1897 to ameliorate both American and Cuban public opinion. The second episode investigates how the US government started what would prove to be a long-term relationship with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) to support and administer student and academic exchanges between the USA and Latin America following the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910.

### CLARA BARTON AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

After a chance encounter with Dr. Louis Appia, a committee member of the International Red Cross (IRC), in Switzerland in 1870, Clara Barton began to organize efforts to establish an American Red Cross which would eventually lead to America joining the Geneva Convention.<sup>11</sup> Upon returning to the US, Barton wrote a pamphlet in 1878, *The Red Cross of the Geneva Convention: What It Is*. The most important part of the pamphlet was that it created public support for adherence and participation in the convention based on her descriptions of peacetime programs.<sup>12</sup> Barton made eight attempts between 1887 and 1900 to obtain Congressional approval for the United States to sign the treaty.

In addition to lobbying the government, Barton and her associates decided that having a Red Cross society already established might help to encourage Congress. The American Association of the Red Cross established in May 1881 provided for an Executive Board and a Board of Consultation, which included the President, his cabinet, the General of the Army, the Surgeon General, the Adjutant General, and the Judge Advocate General.<sup>13</sup> Congress did not grant a federal charter to the newly named American National Red Cross until 1900, and even then, did not recognize the organization as the sole manager of voluntary services in wartime.<sup>14</sup>

The story of Clara Barton's efforts to ensure America's participation in the IRC is connected to the ANRC's partnership with the US government to provide aid to Cubans in 1897 and 1898. The ANRC had a parallel objective in their assistance to Cuba which becomes apparent in some of the exchanges between Clara Barton, her nephew, Stephen Barton, and auxiliary organizations under the name of the Red Cross. Conflicts between the American National Red Cross and similar

organizations claiming affiliation with the IRC arose during the Central Cuban Relief Committee's (CCRC) operations. The ANRC was protective of its image and the relationship it shared with the US government. Throughout the spring of 1898, the ANRC lobbied for legislation to be passed, naming the ANRC as the sole organization to use the Red Cross insignia and IRC affiliation.<sup>15</sup> While Clara Barton and the other members of the ANRC were motivated to alleviate the human suffering of the Cubans, there were ulterior motivations for the ANRC to ensure they obtained US government support prior to organizing any aid for distribution.

### THE CUBA QUESTION

In 1868, Cuba began to rebel against Spanish rule. Due in part to economic and humanitarian interests, American presidents from General Ulysses S. Grant to William McKinley offered to mediate between both the insurrectionists and Spain. Spain remained confident they would be able to quell the insurrection and bring peace to the island; however, fighting continued until a truce was agreed to by both sides in 1878.<sup>16</sup> The truce broke in 1895 with renewed violence and determination on both sides to obtain victory. The fighting between 1895 and 1898 destroyed the island agriculturally, economically, and socially. Insurgents destroyed the country's infrastructure (railroads and telegraphs) as well as destroying cane fields and mills which processed sugarcane. The goal was to decrease Cuba's economic worth to the Spanish and force the Spanish to relinquish control. In February 1896, Governor General Valeriano Weyler implemented a policy whereby Cuban peasants in rural regions were forced by the Spanish military to relocate to Spanish-controlled military garrisons and cities.<sup>17</sup> When the local Cubans left their homes, the Spanish burned the villages, farms, and killed livestock to cut off rebel food supply. Essentially, both sides were using economic warfare to get the other to surrender. This caused a humanitarian crisis to develop inside Cuba, with civilians dying of disease or starvation due to poor sanitation and food shortages.<sup>18</sup> Reports from both private US citizens and politicians on the conditions inside Cuba were publicized in America, stirring public opinion in favor of some type of intervention.

In addition to creating a humanitarian crisis, the Spanish-Cuban war created economic consequences for the United States. Much of the situation between America, Spain, and Cuba was exacerbated by the

inconsistent trade policies of the US. In 1890, America signed a reciprocity treaty with Spain which caused a boom in sugar exports from Cuba.<sup>19</sup> Thus, in 1894 when Congress passed the Wilson-Gorman tariff, Cuban sugar exports fell dramatically and subsequently led to increased civil unrest and fighting on the island. By 1895, America was going through a depression which caused industrial and agricultural prices to drop and led to strikes and rioting.<sup>20</sup> With the onset of the Cuban revolution, trade between the US and Cuba dropped by two-thirds which caused importers and exporters to lobby the American government to pressure Spain to make peace.

Much of American opinion was divided on the right course to take. Even American businessmen were divided on the right approach.<sup>21</sup> Some favored strong diplomacy to get Spain to settle the conflict and others preferred cooperation. While many Americans sympathized with the Cuban rebels, they did not advocate for annexing Cuba to the United States. The very idea of US intervention divided Americans. Some felt any intervention would be a violation of Spain's sovereignty while others believed that the Cubans were unprepared to self-govern.<sup>22</sup>

Exacerbating the situation, the American press led by Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst as proprietors of the two leading papers, *New York World* and *New York Journal* respectively, played on American sympathies in favor of the Cubans. In addition, the Cuban Junta headquartered in New York circulated propaganda favoring the Cuban rebels in the American press. The Spanish were not able to counter either propaganda effectively.<sup>23</sup> Despite the mounting domestic pressure, McKinley delayed war and intervention of any kind in Cuba for over a year, hoping that the Spanish would alter their policies in Cuba.<sup>24</sup>

As the fighting continued, McKinley and his cabinet explored different options to try to end the violence, including recognizing the Cuban rebels and offering to purchase Cuba from Spain. These ideas were floated, but never seriously pursued. McKinley supported Cuban independence, but also worried about any approach which would hurt US economic recovery.<sup>25</sup> According to John L. Offner, McKinley desired to keep American policy options in Cuba open following Spain's departure from the island.<sup>26</sup> In this respect, he was forced to balance political and public pressure at home as well as the public sentiment within Cuba, but at the expense of Spanish public opinion both in Spain and in Cuba.

## USING FOREIGN PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT TO MANAGE CRISIS

In the midst of President McKinley attempting to alleviate tensions between the USA and Spain as well as between the Cubans and Spain, Clara Barton made multiple appeals to the US government, including President Grover Cleveland, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy.<sup>27</sup> “She realized that the situation was explosive, involving the three-cornered relationship of the United States, Spain and the Cuban *insurrectos*, and that no move could be made without the full approval and authorization of the governments concerned.”<sup>28</sup> Thus, Barton wrote to then President Grover Cleveland and the Spanish minister in Washington, Dupuy de Lome. Barton was first able to get permission from the Spanish government to provide aid to Cuba, receiving a response from de Lome on February 11th, graciously accepting the ANRC’s offer of aid to Cuba.<sup>29</sup> The US government’s reply to Barton’s offer was more lukewarm. Secretary of State Richard Olney responded on February 13th asking “What do you now propose doing in view of the consent given by the Spanish Government to allow the distribution of alms to destitute and suffering people in Cuba? ... Inasmuch as the Government as well as yourself has taken considerable pains to procure from Spain the permission she now accords it would be rather mortifying, would it not, if there was no other practical issue to the matter?”<sup>30</sup> This suggests skepticism on the part of the Secretary of State, at least, that any aid given to the Cubans was unlikely to alleviate the bigger issues at play between Cuba, Spain, and the United States.

Interestingly, Barton did not begin any relief operations for the Cubans, despite having received permission from the Spanish government and no specific objections from the US government; adding weight to the earlier suggestion that Barton’s offer of ANRC aid to Cuba was in part motivated by a desire to maneuver the government into joining the IRC. Instead, she persisted to obtain official US blessing to begin aid to the Cubans. She contacted President McKinley at the beginning of June 1897.<sup>31</sup> This time she was granted a meeting with the President, in July of 1897, but Barton still did not receive the official support she sought. Barton tried to contact the Secretary of War, Russell Alger, on August 3, 1897, who forwarded her letter to the Department of State. The Second Assistant to the Secretary of State was confused by Barton’s correspondence and referred her to the Congressional resolution passed

on May 24th to appropriate fifty thousand dollars for aid to *US citizens* residing in Cuba.<sup>32</sup>

While Barton pursued official approval for the ANRC to distribute aid in Cuba, the President attempted to use traditional diplomacy to reverse Spain's reconcentration policy in Cuba. Secretary of State John Sherman wrote to Minister Dupuy de Lome to protest General Weyler's policies in June 1897.<sup>33</sup> Later in July of 1897, Secretary Sherman instructed the US minister in Madrid, Stewart L. Woodford, that the United States stood ready to mediate between the Cuban rebels and Spain. Spain refused to alter Weyler's policies in Cuba and felt confident his methods would end the rebellion, forgoing any need for mediation. Then in August, the Spanish Prime Minister, Canovas del Castillo, was assassinated by an anarchist, resulting in a new, liberal government under Praxedes Sagasta.<sup>34</sup> Sagasta changed Spanish policies in Cuba by changing military leadership, cutting back on troop levels, ending the reconcentration policy by recalling General Weyler, and increased food and public works for those in need.<sup>35</sup> With these promises of reform, McKinley refrained from recognizing Cuba.

Despite the reversal of Weyler's harsh policies and the promise for a more liberal colonial policy in Cuba, conditions in Cuba continued to deteriorate. General Fitzhugh Lee was the Consul-General for America in Havana. Lee reported in a despatch to the Department of State (DoS) on June 8, 1897:

...that neither the Spanish, or the Cubans, or the Spanish army, or the forces of the insurgents seem to take the slightest interest in said reforms, and their presence in Habana [*sic*] has not produced a ripple upon the surface of affairs. No one who is well acquainted with the existing conditions now has any hope Spain can grant reforms approximating, even, to Canadian autonomy, such as is so often mentioned.<sup>36</sup>

A few months later, on November 27, 1897, Lee sent another despatch detailing the conditions of the *reconcentrados* within Havana, which depicted overwhelmed hospitals, extreme unsanitary conditions, and people dying of starvation in the streets. This coupled with reports of rioting in Havana, plans to destroy American property and target American citizens in other parts of Cuba, may have pushed President McKinley to seriously consider Clara Barton's offer.<sup>37</sup>

On November 30, 1897, Assistant Secretary of State, William R. Day,<sup>38</sup> contacted Barton to meet with President McKinley and himself.<sup>39</sup>

Subsequent correspondences between Secretary Day and Barton suggest there were several meetings between the President, Secretary Day, and Barton to discuss plans for Cuban relief from the end of November through the end of December 1897.<sup>40</sup> What is most interesting about these letters is the way Day talks around Cuban relief and the arrangements made between Barton and the government.

Dear Miss Barton:

I have your favor [*sic*] of the 18th instant. When Mr. Carsen of Philadelphia called at my house sometime ago, in the interest, as he stated, of the Red Cross Association of Philadelphia,<sup>41</sup> I advised him that I had had some conversation with you and preferred to continue communication on that matter with you. I therefore suggested that he come to the Department when you could be present...I then stated to you the position of the President and the Department upon the matters to which you referred, all of which was practically in confirmation of the conversation with the President...*The Department has not taken any further or different action in the matter, and is quite content to leave it in your hands as I stated to you when you were here. I think you fully and properly appreciate the position of this Government in the matter, and as you know, full confidence is reposed in your discretion and judgment...*<sup>42</sup>

The President and the Department of State arranged for a committee to be created to manage the call for donations and ensure the donations were transported to Cuba where US consuls would be responsible for distribution to those in need. The committee, The Central Cuban Relief Committee (CCRC), was composed of three people: Stephen Barton, Chair; Dr. Louis Klopsch, Secretary; and Charles Schieren, Treasurer. Stephen Barton served as the Vice President to the ANRC, and Louis Klopsch owned *The Christian Herald*. Charles Schieren was a member of the New York Chamber of Commerce and owned a leather factory. Secretary Day assigned a State Department despatch agent to the committee, I.P. Roosa, to handle transactions between the government and the committee as well as correspondence and logistics for aid. However, there were issues with this arrangement, and the ANRC became more directly involved with the humanitarian effort in Cuba.

As the committee began to collect donations from American businesses and private citizens, there were obstacles which cropped up along the way in the relationship between the CCRC, the US government, and the ANRC. First, there was the matter of distributing funds which came

into the US treasury. The DoS chief of accounts and disbursements, Frank Branagan, had to purchase drafts instead of cutting checks for payments of goods.<sup>43</sup> This was overcome when Stephen Barton proposed to Secretary Day that the CCRC treasurer, Schieren, should keep all accounts and provide regular reports to the DoS on donations received and purchases made by the committee. Second, General Lee needed assistance with the actual distribution of the large shipments of flour, cornmeal, and clothes coming into Havana.<sup>44</sup>

On January 11, 1898, General Lee cabled the CCRC with a list of needed items, including a request for nurses. Then on January 31, 1898, Louis Klopsch wrote to Clara Barton to ask her to go to Cuba and provide reports of her activities for *The Christian Herald* to publish in exchange for a monthly donation of \$10,000. He briefly mentioned that General Lee had requested nurses and that Barton would be well qualified. Finally, on February 3, 1898, Assistant Secretary Day wrote to Stephen Barton to let him know that Clara Barton intended to travel to Havana to assist General Lee with aid distribution.<sup>45</sup> Within weeks of settling the roles between the government and the CCRC (and the ANRC), the arrangement essentially dissolved. Upon Barton's arrival with Mr. John Elwell, General Lee turned over all elements of aid and aid distribution to them. Elwell and Barton were appointed as special agents to Cuba by the President and the Department of State, but shortly after taking responsibility for aid distribution, Barton requested additional members of the ANRC be permitted to come to Cuba to assist with setting up hospitals and orphanages as well as training the locals in basic care of the sick.<sup>46</sup> Clara asked J.A. McDowell, then working for the Department of Treasury, to help manage the warehouse where all the donations were stored. Thus, less than a month after beginning humanitarian relief for Cuba, the lines between public and private engagement became decidedly blurred.

### HUMANITARIAN AID AS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Humanitarian aid can be considered a form of public diplomacy because the act of giving such aid and engaging with those receiving it involves two core elements: listening and cultural diplomacy, as seen in the previous case.<sup>47</sup> Both practices are used in delivering humanitarian aid. The actor delivering aid needs to listen to know what type of aid to give,

and when giving aid, the actor tends to administer aid according to cultural practice. As described in Preface, the Christian missionaries in the Ottoman Empire passed on the American style of teaching and technical know-how, thus transferring elements of American culture.

American international assistance was not simply propaganda, however, nor was it just a tool of American statecraft and national expansion. For many Americans, participation in overseas humanitarian endeavors represented a way to act upon and extend their domestic social commitments ... These physicians, nurses, social workers, and public intellectuals recognized relief and assistance activities as a way to disseminate their reform ideas to the rest of the world ... reformers relied on ideas about social improvement, public health and democratic governance that they had adopted in Progressive Era America...guided by the conviction that acquiescence to American biomedical and social welfare ideas was key to fostering a peaceful, democratic, and healthy world.<sup>48</sup>

As the ANRC arranged for distribution of food and clothing as well as restoring basic sanitary conditions, orphanages, and hospital facilities, the ANRC transferred the latest practices in American health and sanitation as developed during the course of the Civil War.

In order to deliver the aid that was needed, the CCRC needed to know what items were most needed in Cuba. Here again the relationship between the private entity and the government caused some issues as to who should be doing the listening and then taking action based on the information. Also, listening was not always done, especially initially. On January 11, 1898, General Lee sent a list of needed items to the CCRC which included flour.<sup>49</sup> As was later discovered when Clara Barton and Elwell arrived in Cuba, Cubans did not use flour in their cooking. They also found that Cubans use a great deal of lard to cook, which was different from American style cooking.<sup>50</sup> Elwell wrote to Stephen Barton to tell him that the flour sent from the USA had been sitting for weeks in storage, so they arranged for a local man in Havana who ran a cracker factory to use the flour to make hard biscuits by mixing the flour with cornmeal. Just five days later, Elwell asks the CCRC to send large quantities of corn meal to Cuba instead of flour.<sup>51</sup> Though this seems rather trivial, it does demonstrate listening, an effort to engage with the locals, and respect for cultural practice in Cuba.



Other communications from General Lee, Clara Barton, Elwell, and Consul Pulaski Hyatt specified things such as the type of clothing most needed and medicines. However, there was confusion about who should tell whom about what supplies to purchase. The CCRC seemed to defer to the DoS on what should be purchased, and the DoS tended to defer to the CCRC on what to purchase. For example, on January 19, 1898, the CCRC treasurer, Charles Schieren asked I.P. Roosa to let the committee know what was most needed.<sup>52</sup> Yet on January 11th, Roosa received a telegraph from Secretary Day telling him to defer to the committee on what to purchase or to use his own discretion.<sup>53</sup> After Clara Barton and Elwell arrived in Havana, the committee shipped items based on the reports from Elwell and Barton.

As Clara Barton and Elwell were able to survey the regions outside of Havana, they requested permission from the DoS and the CCRC to send ANRC doctors and nurses to Cuba to help establish hospitals and orphanages. Dr. A. Monae Lesser, a physician at the Red Cross Hospital in New York, and his wife, Bettina Lesser; Dr. Julian B. Hubbell; Dr. E. Wingfield Egan; and Mr. J.A. McDowell were all specifically requested by Clara Barton to assist with setting up hospitals around Cuba. Mr. McDowell was the only person to actually represent the CCRC; the others were all representatives of ANRC.

The team of Barton's physicians and nurses went from town to town, selecting appropriate buildings for hospitals or orphanages as needed. The spread of disease was a major problem for many of the places visited, so there was an emphasis on restoring sanitary conditions as well as teaching sanitation practices to prevent the spread of malaria, yellow fever, and tuberculosis:

...we went from place to place founding nineteen asylums and taking in one thousand poor Reconcentrados leaving them in the care of the best people of the place and when we could get time, we visited them to find how they were getting along and we were more than pleased with the good work the people did with a little help.<sup>54</sup>

Many of the sanitation practices used by the Red Cross in Cuba were practices developed and learned by the Sanitary Commission's work during the Civil War.

After the Spanish-American War, several representatives of the ANRC remained in Cuba to continue aid and reconstruction of various public

services. In a letter to Clara Barton, dated February 25, 1901, Miss Trotsig mentioned how she showed the Cubans to establish smaller orphan asylums within the areas where orphans are found rather than creating a large asylum and taking the children away from friends or possible relatives.

With the large asylums started by the government this work of breaking them up was much harder, for their relatives and friends were so scattered it was almost impossible to find them. I have made everybody see the difference and have had them say to me that the Red Cross Relief work down here was very fine and very successful, for it had taken care of the people when they needed help and stopped just at the right time. So I am satisfied.<sup>55</sup>

In addition to organizing public institutions according to American practices, strains of American Progressivism also influenced how the institutions functioned. Reform was done with the objective of making the recipients of aid self-sufficient through training and providing means for self-support. In a report by Dr. Hubbell to Clara Barton, he described how at an orphanage in Guinis the ANRC team arranged for children and staff to have farm land to not only provide a food source for themselves, but also as something they could sell.<sup>56</sup>

### US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, HUMANITARIAN AID, AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

The ANRC's involvement in Cuba prior to the United States going to war with Spain demonstrates the use of engagement to ameliorate international tensions by the US government, although imperfect. Though the CCRC was only able to run humanitarian relief operations for a few months before war ensued between the United States and Spain, the initial *intent* behind US support for ANRC's relief to the Cuban people was to avoid going to war with Spain due to both US public pressure and perceived pressure from the Cuban public. The engagement of CCRC ostensibly had a specific political objective. This is significant to later debates which arise in the development of public diplomacy. Prior to and following WWII, many objected to using foreign public engagement for political goals. As this study proceeds, the debate over using engagement for political ends becomes attached to the debate about

the use of propaganda. In this particular instance, using aid as opposed to armed conflict to alleviate the humanitarian crisis on the island raises the question of whether all engagement can and should be apolitical if engagement helps to avoid violence.

The formation of the CCRC to administer the humanitarian operation is representative of the period and another significant development in American foreign public engagement. In the previous case, the US government refrained from joining private aid efforts to English textile workers, again out of concern that such a move by the US government would input political motives into the aid. There are no existing records of the November 30th meeting between Clara Barton, President McKinley, and Secretary Day to understand why the CCRC was created or why the US government provided logistic and monetary support for the operation. Looking at previous US humanitarian operations, this was the first instance where the government and private entities coordinated and pooled resources. Just five years before, Congress fought over a Republican proposal to use government money to ship corn flour to Russia from Iowa. Iowan private citizens and Red Cross societies arranged for surplus corn crops to be donated to relieve the famine in Russia and Germany. The Democrats opposed the bill on the grounds that US citizens' taxes should not be used to help outsiders. The bill died.<sup>57</sup> The coordinated relief operations between the ANRC and the US government set an important precedent not only for future humanitarian operations, but also for US foreign public engagement. Henceforth, US engagement would inevitably involve both private and public aspects, whether one side initiated engagement and another merely provided support.

As explained earlier, this period in American history marks a transition from distinct private and government initiatives in foreign public engagement, a trend that extends to other aspects of American diplomacy and government generally. Historians have attributed this merge between the public and private to a number of social influences in American society including Progressivism and social Darwinism.<sup>58</sup> This, coupled with Americans' new vision of their role in the world, led to more expansive and active involvement overseas. Yet as the State Department remained a small institution, the Department often relied on private entities to supplement American diplomacy. Partnering with ANRC in Cuba was one of many organizations which the US government would work with to engage with people abroad. The next episode of American foreign public

engagement provides another illustration of this developing interconnection between private engagement initiatives and US foreign relations.

### ORIGINS OF THE PAN AMERICAN UNION

The present-day Organization of American States has undergone significant transformations since the idea of uniting the American republics was first proposed in 1824 by Simon Bolívar.<sup>59</sup> The first Inter-American Congress took place in Panama in 1826, but a successful union between the American republics did not develop until the end of the century after several attempts. The International Union of American Republics formed following an inter-American conference arranged by US Secretary of State James Blaine. Secretary Blaine's idea for a conference arose from frustrations in trying to stave off wars erupting between several Latin American nations during his time as Secretary of State from March to December of 1881 under President James A. Garfield.<sup>60</sup>

In 1881, Latin America was a mess of boundary disputes and diplomatic frays. Aside from creating a diplomatic headache for the US Secretary of State, the tensions and fighting among the South American states posed problems for American trade and investments in the region as well as heightened America's fear of European intervention. The fighting among the South American nations resurrected the Monroe Doctrine and in effect re-interpreted how America put it into practice. The doctrine, outlined by President James Monroe in his 1823 annual address to Congress, stated the USA's belief that any American nation securing its independence from colonial rule should not be subject to re-colonization by another power. Now American political leaders sought to keep Europe out of the American hemisphere altogether.<sup>61</sup>

Regrettably, Blaine's first attempt to organize a Pan American conference failed. President Garfield was shot in July and later died in September of 1881. With Chester Arthur's arrival in office, Blaine was replaced with Arthur's own choice for Secretary of State, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen. Just as Blaine issued invitations for the conference to the Latin American states, Frelinghuysen canceled the conference. Additionally, Congress launched an investigation of Blaine's diplomacy during the War of the Pacific.<sup>62</sup>

Despite this, the idea to gather all independent American states to discuss the future interests of all states did eventually come to fruition. President Benjamin Harrison selected Blaine to be his Secretary of State

in 1889 after taking office. By this point, the American public supported Blaine's idea of holding a conference to discuss the possibility of an arbitration system among the American states.<sup>63</sup>

### INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES

The first conference was held in Washington, D.C. from October 2, 1889, to April 19, 1890. The conference was divided into fifteen committees. One of the committees discussed the issue of customs regulations and recommended the creation of a commercial bureau. The rest of the representatives at the conference supported the idea of creating a commercial bureau which would collect and distribute among participating states commercial information for the benefit of merchants and investors. The Bureau would be managed by the International Union of American Republics. The regular publication of the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, *The Bulletin*, was to distribute information most relevant to merchants and shipping agencies from countries participating in the union.<sup>64</sup> To some, the Bureau stood to circulate "a wealth of potentially valuable commercial and economic information, gradually broadened to encompass cultural and scientific matters"; while others argued the Bureau was simply a tool for the United States to develop hegemony over the region and to dominate overseas markets.<sup>65</sup>

Interestingly, though the participants at the first conference agreed to continue the Union for a period of 10 years, no plans were made for the next conference. Indeed, over the years, no plan or effort was made to meet at regular intervals; rather members of the Union could call for a conference.<sup>66</sup> The Second Inter-American Conference was called by Ecuador and held in Mexico City from October 22, 1901, through January 31, 1902. The conference took measures to strengthen the International Bureau of the American Republics. The executive committee of five was replaced with a Governing Board made of the twenty representatives of the Latin American Republics in Washington with the US Secretary of State as chair. The Governing Board would be responsible for composing the program for future conferences and collecting details on each topic for conference agendas.<sup>67</sup> The third conference was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906. Of the various outcomes from the third conference, two are relevant to this case. First, Andrew Carnegie pledged to donate funds to erect a building to house the Bureau in Washington, D.C.<sup>68</sup> Second, the representatives at the conference resolved to return

to their respective governments and establish within their foreign ministries, Pan American Union Committees for the purpose of interacting with the Bureau's Governing Board.<sup>69</sup>

In February of 1908, then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, formed the US Pan American Committee to work with the Department of State and the Bureau's Governing Board regarding the work of the Union. The Committee was composed of academics, businessmen, and politicians to include Andrew Carnegie.<sup>70</sup> By the time planning for the Fourth Inter-American Conference was underway in the spring of 1910, Philander Knox was the serving Secretary of State, and Elihu Root, now a private citizen, served as the honorary president of the Committee as well as the Chairman of the newly created Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

#### ANDREW CARNEGIE AND THE PAN AMERICAN UNION

On December 14, 1910, Andrew Carnegie announced to a distinguished grouping of scholars, diplomats, and business leaders his establishment of an endowment to end all war.<sup>71</sup> More than ten years prior to the creation of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), Andrew Carnegie was asked by President Benjamin Harrison to serve as a representative for the Inter-American Conference in Washington, D.C.<sup>72</sup> In the years to come, Carnegie would not only be an active participant in the International Union of American Republics, but he would attend future conferences as an observer as well as later serving on the US Pan American Committee, providing input for conference agendas.<sup>73</sup> Much of Carnegie's support for the Pan American Union (PAU) was motivated by his own active interest in the peace movement and eagerness to establish arbitration as an international norm. Carnegie's interests in arbitration coincided with Blaine's hopes for the First Inter-American Conference to arrange a multilateral arbitration agreement among the American state participants.<sup>74</sup> Since 1888, Carnegie had been active in attempting to arrange various arbitration agreements between the USA, Britain, and France.

Coinciding with Carnegie's interest in arbitration, the peace movement within the USA transitioned under the influence of Progressivism and the desire to achieve real peace.<sup>75</sup> Many members of the peace movement became disgusted with the "sentimental pacifism" of the older elements of the movement and sought to find practical, scientific

means to abolish war.<sup>76</sup> Among those practical peace advocates included two former Secretaries of State, Elihu Root and John W. Foster; the President of Colombia University, Nicholas Murray Butler; editor of *The Independent*, Hamilton Holt, and international law scholar and former DoS lawyer, James Brown Scott. All would be integral in persuading Carnegie to establish the Endowment.<sup>77</sup> The idea for the CEIP ultimately came from Hamilton Holt who raised the concept with Nicholas Murray Butler. After a few proposals and input from Foster and Root, Carnegie agreed to set up the Endowment.

This interconnection between private citizens, civil servants, and philanthropy members influenced not only the future of American foreign public engagement and its role in American statecraft, but also further demonstrates the entanglement between private entities and the US government. The US Pan American Committee of 1910 is an excellent early example of the developing cooperative relationship between private entities and the US government. There were four members who also served on the Board of the CEIP, not including Carnegie himself, who determined never to interfere with the CEIP board.<sup>78</sup> The four included Congressmen James L. Slayden; former Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Bacon; Professor Paul S. Reinsch; and Elihu Root. Reinsch would later be asked to serve as a delegate to the Fourth Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires. These Pan American Committee members become key advocates and architects of American foreign public engagement over the next 40 years including Elihu Root, John Barrett, Leo S. Rowe, and Paul Reinsch. Their ideas of how to engage people abroad, the relationship between the United States and the people of other nations are instrumental in the formation of American public diplomacy.

### INTRODUCING A DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE: EDUCATION EXCHANGES

Planning for the Fourth Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina began early in 1908, following the Argentinian government's announcement that they would host the conference. The US Pan American Committee met throughout 1908 up until the actual conference discussing the proposed agenda items. The suggestion to add to the agenda student and academic exchanges did not appear until the

spring of 1909. James Brown Scott was serving as the Department of State's solicitor, when he sent the recently appointed Secretary of State, Philander Knox, a note and accompanying memos. The note referred to an earlier conversation between Knox and himself about adding professorship exchanges to the conference program:

In a recent interview you approved the suggestion of broaching the subject of exchange professorships with Latin America, and suggested that it be presented to Pan-America by mean of the Bureau of American Republics.<sup>79</sup>

Attached to Scott's note were memos from Jerome D. Greene, Secretary of Harvard University, an excerpt from Nicholas Murray Butler's Report on exchanges between Columbia University and Germany, and a pamphlet written by another professor, L.S. Rowe, "The Possibilities of Intellectual Co-operation between North and South America."<sup>80</sup>

In these attached documents, various attitudes about the purpose of exchanges are discussed by each of the document authors. Scott's remarks regarding possible exchanges with Latin America tend to emphasize one-way exchanges and undervalue the contribution of Latin American scholars to America.

But while the present memorandum recognizes the importance of commerce and industry as a means of bringing the nations closer together, it seeks to accentuate the great benefit which would accrue to Pan-America by the establishment of exchange professorships by virtue of which *competent professors in our various universities would familiarize Latin-America with American scholarship, expound the aims and purposes of our institutions, the means by which they have been created, maintained and their influence extended, and, in addition, carry to them a message of sympathy and encouragement with the efforts they are making toward a common goal.*

The presence of Latin-America professors at our universities would enable us to understand as never before, not merely the difficulties of Latin-America but the progress made in spite of those difficulties, and *even if the contributions of the visiting professors were not, in all cases, of value to our universities or to our people...we should not forget that the various professors would inform themselves upon our methods of instruction, our political aims, purposes and ideals, and, on returning to their various homes, would form a center of American influence.*<sup>81</sup>



Here, Scott emphasizes the contribution of the United States over the contribution of South American nations. He also recognizes how education exchanges would provide opportunities to expose people from South America to US institutions, ideas, and ways of life as well as explaining US policies, creating “a center of American influence.”

In comparison, Jerome Greene tended to emphasize reciprocity of the exchanges, despite acknowledging the political agenda attached to exchanges by the German government: “Our object has been to effect a fruitful exchange of inspiring teachers, each of whom had contributed something to his subject, and whose presence as a colleague in our teaching staff, with an outsider’s point of view, would be helpful and stimulating to our community.”<sup>82</sup> There is little mention of the larger international impact of exchanges, beyond a brief observation “that ultimately more can be done to promote international sympathy and goodwill through the success of the exchange Professors in their strictly academic work, and the mutual respect thus engendered.”<sup>83</sup> This view of exchange diplomacy remains relatively apolitical. The purpose of exchange diplomacy is intended to establish and maintain foreign relations, not necessarily achieve policy objectives in the view of Greene.

Finally, Nicholas Murray Butler’s remarks are more balanced in terms of the political advantages of exchanges and the importance of reciprocity. Like Gerome, he highlights the benefit to an academic scholarship provided by professor exchanges while also connecting exchanges to improving understanding among the people of different countries. “The effect of this interchange of professors upon productive scholarship, upon the movement to bring about a better understanding between the people of different countries, and upon the influences that are making for the peace of the world, it would be difficult to overestimate.”<sup>84</sup> He outlined the “systematic” nature of the exchange between Columbia University and the German government, ensuring American professors selected to teach would teach in German to maximize understanding and devised a program which would offer lectures on the history and institutions of America and the nation’s people. The exchanges described by Butler are intended to educate people in both countries about each other.

All three see the exchanges as positive and beneficial to the United States in one way or another, but the differences between them are more important. The varying viewpoints point to the tensions which develop as foreign public engagement becomes a tool of the state, raising again

the question of whether engagement should be apolitical or not. Both Scott and Butler saw exchanges as a way to *explain* America to people of other nations; however, Scott took this a step further, suggesting that this could facilitate American influence. Greene objected to using such exchanges for either social or political gains, instead emphasizing the potential of creating international sympathy and mutuality. These ideas about the purpose of engagement and its role in relation to the state foreshadow future debates, as later cases will discuss.

Just a month and a half after Scott's letter and accompanying documents were given to Philander Knox, he himself wrote a memo to the US Pan American Committee suggesting exchanges be added to the conference agenda for consideration by the Governing Board.

Turning from the subjects broached in the tentative program, I would add that, in the view of the United States, it would be very desirable to add as a subject for consideration, the question of arranging for an exchange of professors between universities of the various American Republics; and also for an exchange of students between the different countries. *Such a scheme, if practicable, would seem to hold great possibilities to facilitate and foster mutual understanding and sympathy, and, consequently, still better relations in thought, civilization and commerce.* A discussion of the subject might touch, also, upon the possibility of establishing foundations or scholarships for this purpose.<sup>85</sup>

With this, student and academic exchanges were added to the agenda of the Fourth Inter-American Conference. However, these brief pages scattered among the Department of State records remain the only discussion of the exchanges until after the conference was concluded, with only a single sentence on the topic included in the directions to the delegates from Secretary Knox: "An interchange of professors and students among the universities and academies of the American Republics will undoubtedly promote mutual intellectual and social understanding and sympathy, and you will give your hearty support to any practical plan tending to this end which may be devised."<sup>86</sup>

As with the previous conferences, each agenda item was discussed in committees where propositions were made regarding each topic. The Tenth Committee took up item XII of the agenda, the interchange between universities of the American republics of professors and students. US delegate Bernard Moses, a University of California professor

of Latin American studies, served on the committee with six other delegates from the conference.<sup>87</sup> The Tenth Committee supported the plan for exchanges between the American republics and submitted a revised resolution for the rest of the delegation to consider. The resolution only asked governments of the Union to *recommend* to universities in their respective countries to establish exchanges for students and professors, the creation of a congress among American universities for intellectual exchange, and to establish scholarships to enable student exchanges.<sup>88</sup>

In the United States, the resolution did not garner much support from the government. First, the resolution was simply a resolution, not a convention or treaty with legal weight. Therefore, the US Senate would not consider the measure nor appropriate any funding toward fulfilling the resolution. Second, the education infrastructure within the United States prohibited federal interference in determining curriculum, especially within higher education where many colleges were either private- or state-funded institutions. However, this does not mean there were not people within the US government and outside the government who did not see the value of such exchanges.

### IMPLEMENTING EXCHANGE DIPLOMACY

Leading up to the conference in the summer of 1910, the Department of State received dispatches from consular officers and US ministers noting the rising number of European education institutions and offers for student exchanges. In addition, after the conference, Latin American nations became eager for the United States to establish exchanges between their countries. Nonetheless, American exchange programs were slow to develop and met with a lukewarm response from the Department of State.

On December 15, 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler wrote to Secretary Knox on behalf of the CEIP to announce the Board of Trustees had agreed to establish funds for two scholars from Latin America to study in the USA and two US scholars to study in a Latin American country for one year.<sup>89</sup> Murray asked for the Department's advice and assistance as well as asking whether the Department would pass the news of the scholarships to US legations in Latin America. From the correspondences between CEIP, the Department of State, and American legations in Latin America, CEIP developed as a *de facto* subdivision of the Department of State, responding to queries relating to exchanges passed on by the

Department from serving US ministers and consul officers. The State Department served as a clearinghouse. This foreshadows the role the Department would continue to play in relation to various private foreign public engagement initiatives until WWII.

On August 14, 1913, John Bassett Moore,<sup>90</sup> then Assistant Secretary of State, wrote to Nicholas Murray Butler of the CEIP to ask for any information relating to exchanges for a report he was preparing for the Fifth Pan American Conference in Santiago, Chile.<sup>91</sup> Responding to Moore, CEIP's A.H. Jones wrote "up to the present time no formal interchange of Professors and students of the American Republics has been established."<sup>92</sup> More than two years after CEIP decided to fund education exchanges between the USA and Latin America, and no exchanges had been arranged. To which, Alvey Adee, Second Assistant Secretary of State, asked the CEIP to report "... any steps that your institution may take in regard to this proposed inter-American interchange of professors and students ..."<sup>93</sup> This correspondence highlights the reliance of the DoS on private entities such as CEIP, to carry out foreign public engagement activities, where due to political and funding obstacles, the DoS was unable to administer directly. CEIP, like the American Red Cross, became a chosen instrument. The government increasingly relied on private entities to carry out various policies or operations, especially abroad.

Another example of CEIP's relationship to the US government is evident in a separate series of correspondence. One month after Moore contacted the CEIP regarding academic exchanges, an American consul in Tampico, Mexico, wrote to the Secretary of State on September 23, 1913, suggesting that education exchanges should be created between the US and Mexico to counter anti-American feelings among the Mexicans.<sup>94</sup> The consul's suggestion was passed by the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Interior, "as of possible interest to the Bureau of Education" as well as to the CEIP.<sup>95</sup> This not only demonstrates the way the DoS *used* CEIP, but also highlights the general lack of interest within the DoS for exchange diplomacy or any foreign public engagement. As later cases will demonstrate, US representatives abroad urged the Department to do more to engage with the people of other nations.

Despite receiving information from representatives in country reporting on the interest of the local public to study in the USA, the increased presence of European nations in Latin America looking to establish academic exchanges, and repeated suggestions by ministers and consuls

to arrange exchanges; the Department of State assumed a passive role. This could be construed as a failure to *listen*, disconnect between those in the field and those working at headquarters. However, the tone of State Department replies to such suggestions of public engagement demonstrates a lack of interest at best and extreme irritation at worst. Mostly, the DoS either forwarded these suggestions to the Bureau of Education or to CEIP. CEIP came to be viewed by the State Department as being responsible for carrying out the resolution made at the Fourth Inter-American Conference. The Department of State was not prepared to take on educational exchanges without a mandate from the President or Congress. As explained in Chap. 1, the Department of State remained a relatively tiny department until after WWI, and usually under serious scrutiny by Congress. Realistically, the Department was only able to ensure posts kept up with America's basic needs internationally. It would not be until after WWI that the Department would be able to consider expanding its activities. Thus, the US government's intent for educational exchanges was nothing more than to encourage inter-American relations, specifically to benefit economic and trade relations. For the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there was an optimistic hope that such exchanges would foster improved, deeper relations between the people of North and South America.

### PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

This transition period presents American public diplomacy in an embryonic stage from which present-day public diplomacy develops. Practices such as using technical education and humanitarian aid as engagement, employing engagement to secure foreign policy objectives, the coordination and cooperation between government and private entities in engagement activities, as well as the figures and organizations themselves mark this period as a turning point in the story of the origins of American public diplomacy. Although both instances of foreign public engagement during this period may not be viewed as great examples of American public diplomacy, they do demonstrate the growing realization within the US government about the connection between engagement and the potential benefits it holds as a mechanism of statecraft. McKinley used engagement in Cuba to alleviate foreign and domestic concerns. Whereas, Philander Knox, American ministers and consuls saw

how engagement could not only provide benefits domestically, but also abroad.

The ANRC came to be a major figure in American international aid. While the organization was privately funded, it was distinguished by Congressional charters as the “official voluntary” aid organization of the United States. Business owners, the US government, and professionals in the emerging fields of public health, social work, and publicity helped to support ANRC and make international aid not only a patriotic duty but also an important part of American statecraft. This semi-official status of the ANRC allowed the organization to receive government support for fundraising, and as Barton hoped, a monopoly over other aid agencies. “The federal government benefited from this arrangement because *the ANRC carried out American cultural diplomacy on its behalf*, obviating the need to commit state funds or personnel.”<sup>96</sup> The ANRC became the US government’s chosen instrument for international aid and technical education.

On the other hand, the government’s relationship with CEIP was more complicated. As the planning for the Fourth Inter-American Conference was underway in 1909, Carnegie had not yet created the Endowment. Incidentally, James Brown Scott, Jerome Greene, John Barrett, Elihu Root, and Nicholas Murray Butler belonged to a group of lawyers, businessmen, and scholars who, like Andrew Carnegie, sought *real* peace and to bring about international understanding. All of these men were involved in the planning of the conference directly or indirectly, and just eight months prior to the start of the conference the Endowment was created, with Elihu Root, James Brown Scott, and Nicholas Murray Butler serving as members of the board. Even before CEIP decided to fund exchanges between the USA and Latin America, the relationship between CEIP and the government was nebulous. As this study proceeds, the connection becomes more murky, as more civil employees become affiliated with CEIP or CEIP members return to government. Also, the interactions between CEIP and the government are interesting. In this case, the government expected CEIP to administer student exchanges in accordance with the resolution passed at the conference in Buenos Aires; however, in future, the government does not task CEIP. Rather CEIP will rely more and more on the government to facilitate their international engagement activities abroad, even when these programs contradict government policies.

The government's new relationship with private organizations is not the only consequential development. As mentioned above, there are individuals who play recurring roles in not only defining American foreign public engagement practice, but also shaping the role engagement should play in American statecraft. Figure 4.1 depicts not only the connections between private organizations, individuals, civil servants, and the US governments, but also denotes key people who will continue to play a role in the development of American public diplomacy. The development of a cooperative public-private relationship is another important theme or pattern of this study. The previous two cases reflect how US political culture and infrastructure tended to restrict government




Fig. 4.1 Public-Private network and US public diplomacy, 1897–1912. *Source* Created by the author

foreign public engagement as well as US diplomacy generally. These factors meant private entities played a larger, more consistent role in engagement and the development of public diplomacy in the United States. Proceeding cases will include similar charts, continuing to document the growing public-private relationship in foreign public engagement as well as featuring those individuals who maintain leading roles in ensuring foreign public engagement becomes a part of American statecraft. This cooperative relationship between the government and private citizens and organizations is not the only significant development. Key groups and individuals reappear in later chapters, either initiating engagement, facilitating government engagement, or providing guidance for engagement policy development. This is another relevant pattern in the advancement of public diplomacy. In this case, Greene, Butler, and Scott all saw general benefits to using engagement, although only Butler and Scott imputed political benefits to such engagement. This is important given their later roles in CEIP. Nicholas Murray Butler becomes the Director for the Division of Intercourse and Education, and James Brown Scott becomes the Director of the Division of International Law.

Figure 4.1 This figure depicts the relationship between the US government and private entities which facilitated engagement overseas. The chart also highlights certain private entities who in proceeding cases play an important role in the evolution of US public diplomacy.

This period also raises contentious issues relating to the use of foreign public engagement as a tool of statecraft, especially the use of engagement to obtain political objectives. This ties in with the issues impacting public diplomacy today as described in Chap. 1: conceptual and organizational. This case raises questions about the appropriateness of engagement as a mechanism to attain foreign policy objectives as well as questions about what role engagement should play in statecraft. Prior to WWI, engagement with people abroad was not connected to propaganda. In the next case, the fear of propaganda generated not only by the war, but also by muckraking journalists prior to the war, causes those who support the use of engagement to become suspicious of using it for political gain. The ethical question of whether engagement should be used for political purposes is not as clear cut as this case illustrates. Desperate to avoid war, but pressed by Congress, the American public, and by the Cuban public; McKinley recognized the action of some sort was needed. Barton's meeting with McKinley and the Secretary of State was rather fortuitous for McKinley. Barton offered a compromise



which avoided military action. Though no concrete exchanges developed immediately following the Fourth Inter-American Conference, the idea that such exchanges could provide the US opportunities to *explain* policies, spread American ideas, and “pacific penetration” of Latin America culturally and economically were raised by Secretary Knox, US consuls in Latin America, and future leaders in CEIP. These ideas seemed innocuous at the time; the PAU was intended to link the USA with Latin America socially, culturally, and economically. But the idea of using such engagement to *influence* people politically became circumspect once the war started in Europe. Propaganda and anything that might seem like propaganda was viewed with extreme suspicion and fear.

The following case continues to build upon the themes and issues already identified thus far, while also adding new concerns regarding the use of engagement as a mechanism of statecraft. Even prior to the start of WWI and America’s entrance into the war, propaganda had already been deemed a threat to American liberal ideas. The next chapter will explore how the Committee on Public Information tried to distinguish their work from other nations, particularly Germany. The Committee’s interpretation of their work and the materials they used to engage with people around the world add to the problem of conceptualizing public diplomacy, while also establishing patterns of practice for engaging foreign publics.

## NOTES

1. NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File, hereafter, CDF 1910–1920, (Unnumbered document), 710.D/212 thru 710.D/291, Box 6462.
2. Beisner (1986) *From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865–1900* (Harlan Davidson, Inc.: Wheeling, IL); Dulles (1965) *Prelude to World Power: American Diplomatic History, 1860–1900* (Collier Books: New York, NY); Herring (2008) *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford University Press: New York, NY).
3. Beisner (1986); McDougall (1997).
4. Rosenberg (1982).
5. American Progressivism was a reform movement. Most American Progressives sought practical reforms for social institutions, this included both foreign and domestic institutions.
6. Ilchman 1961.
7. As explained in chapter 1, America’s sense of mission is sometimes used to explain American relations with the world, which is connected to the

- old belief of America as a “City upon a Hill.” In the early nineteenth century, this idea was more passive, America stood as an example for others to follow. By the late nineteenth century, the idea merged with Social Darwinism and the “white man’s burden” to turn America’s sense of mission into a more active force (Steven G. Calabresi, 2006 “‘A Shining City on a Hill’: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law,” in *Boston University Law Review*; Ilchman 1961; McDougall 1997; Rosenberg 1982;).
8. Rosenberg 1982, p. 38.
  9. Irwin 2009, ‘Humanitarian Occupations: Foreign Relief and Assistance in the Formation of American International Identities, 1898–1928’, Yale University, p. 2.
  10. Rosenberg 1982, p. 47.
  11. Before the IRC formed, the USA was invited to participate in the second conference in Geneva in August 1864. The US minister to Switzerland attended only as an unofficial observer to the proceedings along with Charles Bowles of the US Sanitary Commission (Dulles 1950, *The American Red Cross: A History* (Harper & Brothers: New York)). The USA declined repeatedly to sign the Geneva Convention and join the IRC, due to American isolationist concerns, the then Secretary of State Seward disapproved completely. The Geneva Convention required the US government to agree to cooperate with the society, accept their services in the event of war, and permit centralization under its administration of all wartime relief to sick and wounded (Hutchinson 1996, *Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross* (Westview Press: Boulder, CO)). This was perceived by various American leaders and Congress through the end of the nineteenth century to compromise American national interest and sovereignty. Ironically, it was the work of the US Sanitary Commission throughout the Civil War that inspired IRC co-founder, Jean Henri Dunant, with idea for the Red Cross.
  12. Dulles 1950.
  13. Dulles 1950.
  14. Hutchinson 1996.
  15. Letter to Alvey Adee, Assistant Secretary of State, from Stephen Barton, Chairman of the CCRC, dated March 22, 1898: “It is only another emphatic demonstration of the imperative need of Congressional legislation [sic] which would enable the National Red Cross to restrain the ambitious desires of members of other Red Cross organizations, who feel they can with safety, and without injury to the Red Cross, pursue their own methods independently.” Letter to Stephen Barton from Charles H. Howell, President of the Red Cross Society of Philadelphia: “We beg to submit that we are not, in any sense responsible for that which you

- are pleased to call ‘independent action’ since there has been no apparent desire upon the part of your body to have us act in any other manner” (*Clara Barton Papers (CBP): Red Cross File, 1863–1957; American National Red Cross, 1878–1957; Relief operations; Spanish-American War; Correspondence; General; 1897, Jan.-1898, Mar. 1897.* Box 129, Microfilm Reel 98 (M98), Manuscript/Mixed Material. Retrieved from the Library of Congress (LoC), <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730674/>).
16. McKinley, William. Dec 5, 1899. “Message of the President,” in *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States*, (Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.), p. xi–xxi.
  17. Dobson 1988 *Reticent Expansionism: The Foreign Policy of William McKinley* (Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, PA); Offner 2004 ‘McKinley and the Spanish-American War’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34: 50–61.
  18. Offner 2004.
  19. Herring 2008.
  20. Offner 2004.
  21. Dobson 1988; Herring 2008; Hilton 1994 ‘The Spanish-American War of 1898: Queries into the Relationship between the Press, Public Opinion and Politics’, *Reden*, Vol. 7.
  22. Dobson 1988; Offner 2004.
  23. Herring 2008; Peifer 2016 *Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents* (Oxford University Press: New York).
  24. Dobson 1988; Herring 2008; Offner 2004.
  25. Herring 2008.
  26. Offner 2004.
  27. *Clara Barton Papers: Red Cross File, 1863–1957; American National Red Cross, 1878–1957; Relief operations; Spanish-American War; Correspondence; General; 1897, Jan.-1898, Mar. 1897.*, Box 129, Microfilm Reel 98, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730674/>; *Clara Barton Papers: Red Cross File, 1863–1957; American National Red Cross, 1878–1957; Relief operations; Spanish-American War; U.S. Government; State Department, 1897–1899*, undated. 1897., Box 148, M104, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730768/>.
  28. Dulles 1950, p. 43.
  29. *CBP*, LoC, Box 129, M98, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730674/>.
  30. *Ibid.*
  31. *Ibid.*
  32. *CBP*, LoC, Box 148, M104, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730768/>; US citizens residing in Cuba added another

complication for the McKinley administration as well as previous administrations. Spanish authorities often arrested and imprisoned US citizens, then refused to allow US consul officials access to prisoners. Much of the correspondence between the consuls stationed throughout Cuba focused on determining who were American citizens and getting the Spanish authorities on the island to cooperate (see NARA, M899, roll 130, Consular Despatches from Havana; *FRUS* 1896, pp 582–842; *FRUS* 1897, pp. 483–548).

33. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President and the Annual Report of the Secretary of State (FRUS)*. 1897. (Government Printing Office: Washington), p. 506.
34. *FRUS* 1897, p. 525–526.
35. Offner 2004.
36. NARA, Consular Despatches from Havana 1897–1898, M899, R130.
37. On December 1, 1897, General Lee reported on the Matanzas conspiracy to retaliate against Americans if the USA attempted to intervene in favour of Cuban independence. In another despatch dated December 3, 1897, Lee reported “that the rumors have been more or less frequent regarding riotous intentions of some of the dissatisfied elements towards citizens of the United States dwelling here ... Any riotous demonstration here must come from the Spanish non-combatants or from volunteer forces” (NARA, M899, Roll 131). President McKinley seemed to prioritize the humanitarian, economic, and domestic impact of the Cuban rebellion without considering how either the Spanish public in Spain or the Spanish citizens residing in Cuba might view American intervention, even on humanitarian grounds.
38. President McKinley appointed John Sherman as Secretary of State at the age of 74 despite failing health and forgetfulness. McKinley was aware of Sherman’s shortcomings and to compensate, nominated William R. Day as Assistant Secretary of State. Day ran the Department of State and served as a link between the President. Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee also helped to bolster the weak Secretary of State appointment (Dobson 1988).
39. Dulles 1950.
40. None of these correspondences are held in the National Archives Department of State records or the Red Cross files. There are some letters between Secretary Day, Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey Adee, and Barton in the Red Cross files within the Clara Barton Papers collection in Library of Congress.
41. A Red Cross society unaffiliated with the American National Red Cross founded by Clara Barton.

42. From William R. Day, December 21, 1897, *CBP*, LoC, Box 129, M98, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730674/>, emphasis added.
43. Branagan to Roosa, January 5, 1898, NARA, RG 59, Entry 362, Box 3.
44. January 28, 1898, NARA, M899, R131.
45. *CBP*, LoC, Box 129, M98, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730674/>.
46. *CBP*, LoC, Box 129, M98, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730674/>; Box 148, M104, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730768/>.
47. Emily Rosenberg mentions in her book, *Spreading the American Dream*, how women from Iowa travelled to Russia in 1892 to set up kitchens to teach Russians how to cook corn which was donated by the USA to alleviate the ongoing famine (1982). Culture is not restricted to just art and music; and in the case of American foreign public engagement, cultural exchange often involved technical training using American methods and ideas.
48. Irwin (2009, p. 3–4).
49. *CBP*, LoC, Box 129, M98, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730674/>.
50. J.K. Elwell to Phil Armour, February 16, 1898, NARA, RG 200, 900.26–900.3, Box 65.
51. J.K. Elwell to S.E. Barton, February 15, 1898, NARA, RG 200, 900.26–900.3, Box 65.
52. NARA, RG 59, Entry 362, Box 3.
53. *Ibid.*
54. “Cuban Work,” n.d. in *CBP: Red Cross File, 1863–1957; American National Red Cross, 1878–1957; Relief operations; Spanish-American War; Orphan asylums, 1900–1901, undated. 1900*. Retrieved from the LoC, Box 143, M102, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730739/>.
55. *CBP: Red Cross File, 1863–1957; American National Red Cross, 1878–1957; Relief operations; Spanish-American War; Orphan asylums, 1900–1901, undated. 1900*. Retrieved from the LoC, Box 143, M102, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mss119730739/>.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Bloodworth (2011) ‘A Complicated Kindness: The Iowa Famine Relief Movement and the Myth of Midwestern (and American) Isolationism’, *The Historian*, Vol. 73.
58. Beisner (1986); Ilchman (1961); Rosenberg (1982).
59. Inman (1965).
60. Bastert (1959) ‘A New Approach to the Origins of Blaine’s Pan American Policy’, *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 39; Healy (2001) *James G. Blaine and Latin America* (University of Missouri Press: Columbia, MO).
61. *Ibid.*

62. Chile tried to claim nitrate rich land in Bolivia and Peru in 1879, sending troops to occupy the land. The war went on until 1880, but tensions between the countries remained through the turn of the century. Europe relied heavily on the nitrate from the region, with the war, European intervention posed a threat to the USA's new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine (Bastert 1959; Healy 2001).
63. Bastert 1959; Healy 2001.
64. Casey 1933 'The Creation and Development of the Pan American Union', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 13.
65. Vivian 1974, 'The Commercial Bureau of American Republics, 1894–1902: The Advertising Policy, the State Department, and the Governance of the International Union', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 118, p. 556.
66. Inman 1965 *Inter-American Conferences 1826–954: History and Problems* (The University Press of Washington, D.C. and the Community College Press Washington, D.C.
67. Ibid.
68. Barrett 1911, *The Pan American Union, Peace, Friendship, Commerce* (Pan American Union: Washington, D.C.); Kunz 1945, 'The Pan American Union in the Field of International Administration', *Iowa Law Review*, Vol. 31; Inman 1965.
69. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910–1929, 710.D/107.
70. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910–1929, 710.D/220a.
71. Patterson 1970, 'Andrew Carnegie's Quest for World Peace', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 114.
72. Ibid.
73. Inman 1965; M862, R766.
74. US ideas for Pan Americanism differed significantly from Latin American ideas. Simon Bolivar and other Latin American advocates of Pan Americanism hoped to establish a collective security arrangement between American nations. For this reason, the USA avoided earlier inter-American conferences. US plans for Pan Americanism emphasized establishing formal arbitration mechanisms, standardization of trade issues (port declarations, manifests, taxes and fees for shipping goods across borders), transportation infrastructure improvement, communication improvement, and sanitation. The objective for the USA was to create ideal economic conditions to facilitate trade among the American nations. These issues tended to dominate future conferences.
75. Nurnberger 1987, "Bridling the Passions", *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 11.
76. Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the peace movement in Europe and the USA was dominated by religious organization. These religious groups wanted to end all war, but did not offer

any solutions to stave off conflict. American Progressives of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries became irritated with the pious nature of religious peace activists and sought practical solutions to resolve political conflicts in effort to avoid war.

77. Dubin 1979, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Advocacy of a League of Nations, 1914–1918’, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 123; Patterson 1970.
78. *CEIP 1915*; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910–1929, 710.D/158; Paterson 1970.
79. Brown to Knox, 8 May 1909, NARA, RG59, CDF 1910–1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/38.
80. This pamphlet was not found among the rest of the pages of document 810.42711/38, see NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910–1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/38.
81. NARA, RG 59, 1910–1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/38, emphasis added.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, 810.42711/38.
84. *Ibid.*, 810.42711/38.
85. Philander Knox to John Barrett, Director of the International Bureau of the American Republics, July 24, 1909, NARA, RG 59, CDF, M862, R766, 11302/35–36, emphasis added.
86. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910–1929, Box 6462, 710D/233A.
87. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910–1929, Box 6463, 710D/291.
88. NARA, RG 43, Entry 57, Box 1.
89. NARA, RG 59, 1910–1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/48.
90. Moore was a delegate at the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910 and later joined the board of the IIE.
91. NARA, RG 59, 1910–1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/79a.
92. NARA, RG 59, 1910–1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/80.
93. 810.42711/80.
94. NARA, RG 59, 1910–1929, Box 7299, 810.42711/83.
95. 810.42711/83.
96. Irwin 2009, p. 8, emphasis added.

## America's First Public Diplomacy Agency?

*“Remember that the coming year is to see more ‘people’s diplomacy’ and more propaganda of all kinds than any year so far in the war.”*  
Ernest Poole to George Creel, 27 December, 1917<sup>1</sup>

The story of the Committee on Public Information's (CPI) activities overseas is essential to understanding the pathologies of present-day public diplomacy as well as the established practices of public diplomacy. For all the criticism lodged at the CPI following World War I, the CPI was in essence America's first public diplomacy agency. As discussed in the last chapter, many key people continued to facilitate America's engagement with the people of other nations and this did not stop with the onset of WWI. In addition to serving as an archetype for future American public diplomacy, the existence of the CPI, though brief, builds upon some of the points raised in earlier cases. Particularly, the methods used to engage people abroad remain the same though altered by technological advances and public-private partnerships which were instrumental to CPI operations. Also, the recognized need to correct misperceptions and counter misinformation resurfaces as well as the connection between engagement and foreign policy.

Perhaps most significantly, at this point in the story of American public diplomacy, US foreign public engagement becomes associated with propaganda. Until now, none of America's efforts to engage with people abroad was ever referred to as propaganda, by either the United States or by the



people of other nations. The CPI's propaganda legacy makes a lasting impression, following the future development of American foreign public engagement. However, whether the CPI did or did not use propaganda is not as important as understanding *why* those working for the CPI did not believe they were using propaganda. Nor is it as important as understanding why America objected so much to propaganda. Interestingly, the inability of the US to answer these questions influences the future of American public diplomacy.

This case examines the CPI's mission and what CPI personnel thought they were doing, exposing how the distinctions between German propaganda and American "publicity" and "democratic diplomacy" often blurred or faded altogether. The lack of clear distinctions and repeated comparisons contribute to the confusion of the word propaganda as well as creating problems for the future of American public diplomacy. As the methods used by the CPI to engage people abroad are similar to earlier cases, the practices of the CPI are not what distinguishes CPI's operations as propaganda. The question must be then, *what* made CPI's operations propagandistic? In light of this, much attention is given not only to what the CPI officers thought they were doing, but what their stated *intent* was as well as how people from other nations viewed the CPI's work.

There were two key components to the function of the CPI. First, the CPI was established to *educate* the US public about not just the government's policies and operations in support of the war, but also about the country's role in the world, as perceived and determined by the government.<sup>2</sup> Second, the CPI was to *publicize* or *advertise* the United States and the country's war aims to the rest of the world. For Wilson and others within the CPI, the overseas operations of the CPI prioritized *advertising* American ideals around the world, to *sell* those principles to the rest of the world in order to remake the world in America's image. The CPI was the active advocacy of America as the City on the Hill for others to imitate. Instead of a vision in the distance for others to admire, now America was actively "selling" the idea that other nations should become like the United States.<sup>3</sup>

Just as James Brown Scott, Jerome Greene, and Nicholas Murray Butler all had differing ideas about the relationship between education exchanges and US foreign policy objectives, this case explores the differences within the CPI and on the fringes who expressed different views about the advantages of engaging with publics abroad and what engagement was precisely. There were those who believed there were

commercial and economic advantages to *publicizing* America abroad: “For the interests of these ideals and for the future of American trade, this news propaganda should in some way be continued.”<sup>4</sup> Others viewed such engagement as a return to America’s democratic roots, bucking Old World diplomacy in favor of New World diplomacy: “It is an anomaly, a denial of our own democratic faith, that our Republics should accredit its ambassadors to the kings and not to the peoples of Europe.”<sup>5</sup> Some also saw foreign public engagement as necessary for the security of the nation.

You may be sure that other nations will continue and increase the work of this kind which they are already undertaking in a much larger way than we have done. An [*sic*] when such nations develop policies hostile to our own, they will campaign in this way against us, and their points will have to be met unless we are willing to suffer defeat in each big national purpose.<sup>6</sup>

These similar, but varying perspectives about the appropriateness and necessity of foreign public engagement for security, for diplomacy, or for economic interest are themes which carry on through to the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act legally establishing American public diplomacy as a function of the state. Though Americans did view engagement abroad as appropriate, ethical, and in some ways a part of the American diplomatic tradition, that did not extend to propaganda which was viewed as antithetical to the liberal, democratic values of America.<sup>7</sup>

As with the previous chapters, the first few pages will provide some context for America’s use of foreign public engagement during WWI. The following section will build on some of the issues highlighted in Chap. 1 regarding propaganda and the stigma associated with the term. An overview of how and why the CPI was created following the US declaration of war, as well as some background on the United States’ decision to enter WWI is also included, as much of the CPI’s messaging was predicated on President Woodrow Wilson’s plans for “peace without victory” and reshaping the international order.

## AVOIDING THE “P” WORD

As discussed in Chap. 1, American fear of propaganda and its use by governments predates WWI and is rooted to alarming assumptions about American society and democracy. Americans became aware of the power of mass persuasion at the beginning of the twentieth century with the

exposés written by so-called muckraker journalists<sup>8</sup> on how the railroad companies used publicity to garner public support for the railroad industry and how the newspaper industry manipulated public opinion. In many respects, Americans reacted to the quick advancement of communication technology and the onset of modern mass communication. Information could be produced and disseminated in large quantities and at fast rates.

Several other factors existed prior to the war which further compounded the impact of the CPI and the use of propaganda throughout WWI on the American psyche. More and more American leaders and those involved in the CPI began to lose faith in the rationality of the American public even before the war began.<sup>9</sup> “Antirationalistic views of the public mind and of public communication began to emerge in the decades before the Great War.”<sup>10</sup> This loss of faith in the power of an informed democratic public can be attributed to the development of mass media, the legitimization of the fields of psychology and sociology, and the publication of Le Bon’s *The Crowd*.<sup>11</sup> Adding to this loss of faith in the people themselves was the confusion which existed regarding the actual definition of propaganda. The many definitions for the concept of propaganda made the goal of exposing propaganda or finding methods to defend the general public against the influence of propaganda difficult.

Consequently, even before the Germans and other belligerent nations began their propaganda campaign around the world, America already viewed propaganda as a pernicious mechanism which undermined the democratic process by circulating false information or by intentionally withholding information required by a citizen to participate in the democratic debate. In light of America’s perception of propaganda as antithetical to the democratic process, it is not altogether surprising that the CPI adopted an informational or news approach during the war.

The American propaganda *should enforce [sic] the truth* about America’s intentions...It should be an *information propaganda*, a *news propaganda*. The work...of the Committee on Public Information is criticized as having been too much *political propaganda*, the object of which is to spread democratic ideas in Germany; *what is wanted is a war propaganda revealing the exact present situation, propaganda dealing with facts rather than with ideas*”.<sup>12</sup>

Despite a sincere aversion to propaganda, the US did not have a standard definition of the word. And regardless Creel’s declaration that the

CPI "...did not call it 'propaganda,' for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions,"<sup>13</sup> many of the official documents and memos all use the word to identify the activities and material of the CPI. As the memo quoted above suggests, there are different types of propaganda which were acceptable depending on the *intent* of the material, information that was *truthful* and *informative* to facilitate public discourse, a type of propaganda which reflected the values of the nation.

Not only was the word *propaganda* used to describe CPI activities, but the term was also used interchangeably with other words such as *educate*, *advertise*, *publicize*, *journalism*, and *news* to identify the CPI's work.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, CPI personnel did not always distinguish between what the CPI was doing from what the Germans and other nations were doing. As the Director of the Foreign Section, Will Irwin, explains "...we Americans invented *modern advertising* and worked out effective advertising method; and now the Germans had taken up our methods and using them against us."<sup>15</sup> In another memo, propaganda is defined as "only a matter of *higher advertising method*—a thing which we [America] invented."<sup>16</sup> Besides equating propaganda with advertising, some also described the CPI's activities as *educational* in nature:

...he said that your Committee is particularly interested in urging upon American Manufacturers the importance of conducting *educational advertising campaigns* in all foreign countries; that you feel that a wide expansion of this sort of effort will have a favorable affect in the contest for world markets at the close of war.<sup>17</sup>

Or as journalistic news:

The underlying purpose of this division is to help in the dissemination of *news* regarding America with special references to *making clear the reasons why this country entered the war, its purposes*, military preparations and efforts. America is appealing to the good sense and democratic instincts of the world. Such an appeal lacks reality unless it reaches the newspaper readers of the world.<sup>18</sup>

The main point is that for Americans in 1917, or even today, to attempt to distinguish propaganda from other forms of foreign public engagement is made difficult by America's own experience and non-specific understanding of what the CPI did in WWI. It also another example

where US public diplomacy is influenced by both national experience and national political culture or values. Increasingly, as the United States continues to recognize the importance of engaging with the people of other nations in the course of US diplomacy and foreign relations, it is often stymied by questions of how such engagement corresponds with US liberal sensitivities regarding free and fair public discourse and United State's own sensitivities regarding foreign influence. This confusion over the necessity and appropriateness of engaging with publics overseas and the disapproval of propaganda remained unresolved after the CPI ceased operations abroad in the spring of 1919.

### FROM NEUTRAL TO BELLIGERENT

According to some historians, Wilson's eventual decision to go to war rested on an idealistic vision to recreate the world order according to American liberal ideals.<sup>19</sup> In the context of President Wilson's own beliefs and background, the decision to go to war and to create the CPI to facilitate international reform makes sense.<sup>20</sup> Wilson "projected American nationalism onto the Old World as the basis of his foreign policy...He wanted to redeem the Old World from its outmoded system of alliances that depended upon a discredited balance of power."<sup>21</sup> This is reflected in President Wilson's plans for peace and the reasons for America's intervention in the war would be the basis of much of the CPI's messages directed at home and abroad.

When the war began in August of 1914, President Wilson firmly declared neutrality and asked the American public to remain neutral in thought and deed. As the war continued, this became more and more difficult not only for the President, but also for the country more generally. As the USA tried to remain neutral, reacting to belligerent efforts to cut trade and communication, the government's own policies tended to favor the Allies over Germany. A combination of short-sighted decisions on the part of the USA and belligerent actions on the part of both Germany and Britain eventually moved the USA farther and farther from neutrality. First the British cut the Atlantic cable and complained about German use of US radio stations to communicate with their war ships. The first, act cuts communications between the US and Germany, hindering diplomatic communications. In response to Britain's complaint, Counselor of the DoS Robert Lansing arranged for the Navy to take over two high-powered radio stations. Regulations were drawn

up to allow all belligerents to use the radio stations by giving the Navy Department a copy of their messages. As the British and French could still use cables, they did not need to pass messages to the US government. The decision inadvertently favored the Allies.<sup>22</sup>

Not long after, in August 1914, the British government announced they would arm merchant vessels for self-defense. This led the German government to begin their policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in early 1915. In May 1915, a German U-boat sank the British passenger liner, the *Lusitania*, killing 128 Americans. Though there was general outrage at the disaster, many Americans still did not feel they had any reason to become involved in what was perceived as Europe's war.<sup>23</sup>

With the Germans' use of unrestricted submarine warfare against both Allied and neutral shipping, President Wilson began to change his stance toward neutrality and to advocate for "armed neutrality." At the same time, Wilson urged the Germans to stop targeting passenger and merchant ships. Germany eventually agreed in the spring of 1916. Removal of this immediate threat and the election of 1916 seemed to move the war in Europe into the background, at least through much of the summer and fall of 1916 until after the election.<sup>24</sup> When Wilson won the election, he renewed attempts to end the war. First, President Wilson threatened to cut off financial support to Britain. He also sent an open letter to all belligerents asking them to state their peace terms, offered mediation, and promised American participation in a league of nations. In January of 1917, he unveiled his plan for world peace, asking for a non-punitive settlement of the war—peace without victory.<sup>25</sup>

While Wilson attempted to bring the war to an end without American military involvement, the situation for America further deteriorated over the next three months. First, the Germans decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, determining that they could achieve victory before America ever entered the war. Second, British intelligence intercepted a telegram on January 19, 1917, and on 24 February passed the telegram to President Wilson. The telegram was sent by German foreign minister, Arthur Zimmerman, to the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt. Zimmerman suggested that Eckardt approach the Mexican government with a proposal of a military alliance whereby Mexico would invade the United States with German assistance (funding and supplies), promising that Mexico could take Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The telegram was published in the American press on March 1, 1917.<sup>26</sup>

On March 20, 1917, Wilson held a cabinet meeting to discuss military intervention in the war. Most of his cabinet supported intervention, but no firm decision was made that day. According to biographers and historians, Wilson's reason for asking Congress for a declaration of war against Germany on April 2, 1917, was motivated by his desire to sit at the peace table rather than view it as a spectator.<sup>27</sup> Wilson believed that as a neutral he would have little say over the plans for peace, and "Wilson had long since concluded that the United States must play a central role in the peacemaking."<sup>28</sup> Yet, even before the end of the Paris Peace Conference, he was unable to convince the European powers who had suffered so much throughout the years of fighting to accept his ideas of "peace without victory," leading to disillusionment not only among Americans, but also the people around the world who had been stirred by Wilsonian ideals.

### FORMING AMERICA'S FIRST INFORMATION AGENCY

After Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany, "... perhaps the greatest single task facing President Wilson was to achieve a complete national solidarity in support of the 'Peoples' War' as he called it."<sup>29</sup> Wilson knew he would need to obtain the support and cooperation of the American press in order to achieve public unity.<sup>30</sup> At the time, the US public was composed of approximately 14.5 million immigrants; 8 million of which considered Germany their home. There were also strong pacifist sentiments in the United States in 1917. In addition to the ethnic diversity and pacifist inclinations, many Americans in rural regions remained relatively cut off from the world and subsequently tended to be uninterested in the war.<sup>31</sup>

On April 13, 1917, just after Congress voted to declare war against Germany, the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy addressed a joint letter to President Wilson suggesting that a government committee be created to oversee information about the war. The "Committee on Public Information" would encourage a partnership between the public and the government in the business of government. The Committee's primary functions would be censorship and publicity.<sup>32</sup> The task was to create an organization that would "make the fight for loyalty and unity at home, and friendship and understanding of the neutral nations of the world."<sup>33</sup>

President Wilson did not just receive input about preparing the public for war from his cabinet, but also from various other acquaintances and supporters. Walter Lippmann, a journalist, wrote often to Wilson

regarding the dangers of mobilizing public opinion.<sup>34</sup> He was particularly worried about how raising an army might cause hatred to be manufactured in the press, as it was in Britain, and he raised concerns about military censorship. Lippmann also stressed that it was important to control misinformation and lies, but not to suppress the truth. A former student of Wilson's urged him to announce that America's quarrel was with the German government, but not with the German people.<sup>35</sup> He also emphasized the need to publicize US war aims abroad. Arthur Bullard, a muckraker and future CPI representative in Russia, wrote to Wilson as well, stressing the importance of publicity and the risks associated with censorship. According to Stephen Vaughn, many of Bullard's ideas for mobilizing public opinion influenced the main functions of the CPI: to *educate* the US public and to *inform* the foreign public about America.<sup>36</sup>

Just before the CPI was created, Bullard wrote an essay, "Democracy and Diplomacy," in which he criticized the American governments' adoption of Old World style of diplomacy, secret diplomacy; therefore, violating the ideals of American democracy and untrue to the New World style of diplomacy, open diplomacy. "In order to democratize our diplomacy...we must consciously work at the education of our public opinion."<sup>37</sup> Beyond just educating the American public about foreign relations, Bullard also advocated breaking "through the traditional barriers and to establish more direct contact with the popular forces of other countries."<sup>38</sup> He believed "democratic diplomacy," a theme of Bullard's work from 1916 through 1917, would bring international relations into agreement with the objectives of domestic politics.

Bullard's essay raises intriguing ideas about American diplomatic tradition, particularly in light of how Benjamin Franklin practiced diplomacy in France, emphasizing engagement with the people over the government of France. Bullard explained how as a democratic nation, the diplomacy should also be democratic whereby the people are informed about America's relations with other nations and representatives of America speak directly to the people of another nation. He recognized President Lincoln for his use of democratic diplomacy during the Civil War, explaining how "Lincoln went over the heads of the Court of Saint James, directly to the common people he loved and understood and trusted."<sup>39</sup> He blamed the deteriorated relations between the United States and France on how the State Department did not make any effort to engage with the people of France directly. Just as Benjamin Franklin had been advised over a hundred and fifty years ago to speak to the



“people without doors,” Arthur Bullard was reminding American leaders to remember to engage with the citizens of nations vice the government.

Following the input from Lippmann, Bullard, as well as the Secretaries of the Navy, War, and State, the CPI was created through an Executive Order (EO) on April 13, 1917. There was some discussion of drafting legislation to make the committee a legal part of the US government, but the idea never came to fruition.<sup>40</sup> The Committee was funded through the President’s Discretionary Fund<sup>41</sup> initially, with Congress providing war appropriations funds to the CPI between 1918 and 1919.<sup>42</sup> Parts of the CPI’s operations were subsidized and supported not only by individual volunteers, but also other US government agencies and private organizations as well as earnings made from exhibitions and movie sales.<sup>43</sup> After the creation of the committee, the organization grew in a haphazard fashion.<sup>44</sup> As ideas or new needs were identified, new offices, bureaus, or divisions were created or dissolved.

### LISTENING IN WARTIME

The overseas operations of the CPI began in September 1917 with the establishment of the Wireless and Cable Service, known by the cable code address COMPUB, but the Foreign Section of the CPI was not formed until October 1917 at the behest of President Wilson.<sup>45</sup> More robust activities began in November and December of 1917 with the CPI sending representatives to posts overseas, in some cases inside US legations and other times in separate offices. The work of the Foreign Section was divided into three divisions: Cable, Mail, and Film.<sup>46</sup> Much like the Domestic Section, the Foreign Section of the CPI used the (foreign) press, wireless service for spot news, window displays, posters, pamphlets, speakers, and films to engage with the public overseas. Using these media platforms, the CPI explained American war aims, demonstrated America’s mobilization for war, and attempted to provide some understanding about America, the land and its people.

Of those who were responsible for the CPI’s operations overseas, all of them had very clear ideas about what was required to engage with the people of various nations, and most of them emphasized the importance of knowing the people and the environment where the information would be sent. The first chief of the Foreign Section, Will Irwin, suggested a body of scouts should be deployed, and make it their “duty to go out constantly among the people in order to find the opinions which

we must combat, and to let us know in general what the people are thinking". "This job requires reliable people of the newspaper reporter type, thoroughly conversant with the language. If they had some other apparent job to lull suspicion so much, the better."<sup>47</sup> As such, the Foreign Section of the CPI did a great deal of listening. From military intelligence reports which detailed a country's political structure and background, culture and psychology, as well as leading newspapers and their political leanings, the military and the CPI identified country-specific objectives for American engagement.<sup>48</sup> These objectives were determined based on not only what America wanted to convey to the people of another nation, but also based on the situation of the country, internally and externally. Just as Harold Lasswell observes in his study of WWI propaganda, the CPI, like other nations, emphasized different messages for each country based largely on whether the country was neutral, an ally, or an enemy.<sup>49</sup> In a military assessment for Sweden, a neutral during the war, the objectives for American engagement were as follows:

1. To counteract and dissipate Sweden's fear of Germany.
2. To combat German peace propaganda and German falsehoods directed against the Allied [*sic*].
3. To block Germany efforts, already markedly successful to obtain complete control of the conservative party.
4. To show why America is in the war and prove that she is going to stay put.
5. To prove that in America Sweden has a friend who will see that the Swedish problems will be given a fair solution when peace conditions are imposed on Germany.<sup>50</sup>

While in Mexico the CPI's:

primary objective...is to convince that country that the successful solution of her political difficulties and her economic prosperity depend upon friendly relations and cooperation with the United States...German propaganda is making every effort to foment anti-American feeling, which is now extraordinarily bitter. Its ultimate object is to force American intervention. The secondary objective is therefore to combat this propaganda.<sup>51</sup>

Though both Mexico and Sweden were neutral throughout the war, the CPI did not define the same objectives for both countries. The goals for

American engagement in both countries reflect concerns about America's relations with the nation as well as Sweden's and Mexico's individual situation.<sup>52</sup> Techniques for engagement were essentially the same for both nations, but in Sweden, the CPI ensured that the Swedish press received regular cable news service from the CPI office in New York and arranged for Swedish-American papers and magazines to be distributed in the country. In Mexico, the CPI used films to show American agriculture, culture, and industry. The CPI also arranged for a group of Mexican editors to tour the USA as a way of generating goodwill.

This was not the only method of *listening* employed by the CPI. The officers in Washington crafting and pulling together resources to disseminate overseas were constantly urging the officers posted in the country to provide feedback on how the material was received by the public. In one report, the Foreign Section complained about the lack of feedback received from CPI agents, reporting "...we sent a cable asking for criticism from all foreign agents, but as yet have had no replies."<sup>53</sup> As a result, the Section started to include a questionnaire in each package they sent overseas which asked a series of questions about the content, style, and type of materials sent:

1. Is the material sent in convenient form? Specify exactly what change, if any, desired.
2. What of our material has been used and not used.
6. What particulars of the situation in country where you are stationed should be kept in mind in preparation of material?
7. What are people talking about? What seems to be their opinion of the US? What do they want to read from the U.S.<sup>54</sup>

The documents and letters exchanged between the CPI officers in Washington and New York and the representatives abroad emphasize how crucial *listening* was to the work of the CPI. However, this *listening* was only used to inform CPI engagement efforts; there is no indication in the archives that any of the information collected by the CPI was used to inform US policy. When the demobilization order for the CPI's foreign operations was sent, many CPI agents, US ministers, and consular officers attempted to convey how halting American engagement with people abroad would hurt relations with their nation in future. Some suggested trying to hand-off operations to the DoS, but the decision to withdraw American engagement prevailed.

## WAR AIMS, PLANS FOR PEACE, AND ADVOCACY

Perhaps the next important method of engagement for the CPI was *advocacy*. Though the objective of the Foreign Section was to *inform* the foreign public of America's reasons for entering the war and the nation's plans for peace, a great deal of the materials and information sent abroad *advocated* American values and objectives for peace. As discussed earlier, Wilson and many working for the CPI hoped to remake the world when the war ended:

The following notes are for a change of policy—not to be adopted now but prepared for and put in action immediately when military activities cease...building up in all possible ways the international exchange service which you have begun—as it relates especially to the peace aims and reconstruction purposes of our government for *a new international order*.<sup>55</sup>

One of the most effective ways for the CPI to advocate America's peace program was through the publication of Wilson's speeches, in particular his "Fourteen Points Speech." The speech was given to a joint session of Congress in January 1918, but the CPI went to tremendous lengths to ensure all of Wilson's speeches were quickly disseminated, translated, and given to the foreign press for publication. "Such a publication has gone a long way towards making clear to the world the American attitude and purpose."<sup>56</sup> The famous speech reiterated the desire for peace without victory, the establishment of the League of Nations, *open diplomacy*, freedom of the seas, and emphasized the right of each nation to self-determination without outside interference.

In addition to advocating Wilson's ideas for peace, the CPI recognized how engagement could be used to generate support for American policies more generally: "...for to gain agreement abroad with our foreign policies we must gain the good will of the world and arouse a friendly interest in all the aspects of life and work in the US."<sup>57</sup> This was done by ensuring news and information about the American government and policies were made available to the foreign press.

In September, 1918, there began at the Helsingfors American Consulate the receipt of news telegrams from the Committee on Public Information. They were translated into Swedish and Finnish and given to the press. In many instances they were not taken. But quiet persistency together with news that really interested the reading public, and especially because of

the non-political matter, they gained headway...As was explained by the Consulate to many of the papers: "This news is not anti-German or pro-German or anti-French, or pro-French or anti or pro anything, except pro-truth. It simply tells you what is happening in America and what Finns and Americans are not only thinking and saying but what they are doing—it is a narration of current human events"...The work done by the Committee of Public Information...has contributed wonderfully toward saving the situation...*It has been done so as to create no irritation, and yet quietly demonstrated its force in supplanting William by Wilson and militarism by America.* While of course the turning of battle on the western front was the immediate cause of the turning of public opinion in Finland toward the Entente, the work done by the Committee has most effectively cleared the way and prepared a suitable soil wherein the unwillingly-changed public opinion can reasonably and conscientiously grow.<sup>58</sup>

The aims of America were also advocated using film.

American moving pictures are extremely popular in Scandinavia...It is through moving pictures that America's immense preparations for war can be put most convincingly before Swedish people, who are in the main ignorant of what we are doing and are not thoroughly convinced that our country intends to use all its resources and strength to beat Germany.<sup>59</sup>

These efforts to advocate American plans for peace and different policies raises again the issue of what propaganda *is* and what propaganda *is not*. According to the report on the Compub's operations in Finland, initially the Finns did not want anything distributed by the CPI because they viewed the material as propaganda, and they had already been inundated with propaganda from the Germans, French, and British.<sup>60</sup> Apparently what made the American material more acceptable was the fact that the news did not appear to have a slant. While the Domestic Section of the CPI operated in an environment where laws and social pressure often eliminated negative or dissenting views in the press, the Foreign Section had to work with foreign news outlets and compete with other governments' propaganda.

The underlying purpose of this [Foreign Press] Division is to help in the dissemination of news regarding America with special reference to making clear the reasons why this country entered the war, its purposes, military preparations and efforts. America is appealing to the good sense and

democratic instincts of the world...*Speaking generally, it is fair to say that America has largely been misunderstood throughout the world and developments in this country have been badly or inadequately presented in the foreign press...*With some notable exceptions, it can be stated that brief items, often sensational in character and never with background or proportion, have constituted the news sent from this country. Many important news distributing centers have received no direct news from here.<sup>61</sup>

The report further explains how the division familiarized itself with all news channels around the world, looking specifically at those channels which carried news from America. The Division *engaged* with foreign press correspondents and press agencies to encourage them to expand their coverage of America, emphasizing that the CPI does not wish to compete with established news agencies. Given that the CPI did not have full control and had no way to control all media sources and channels in country, this suggests that if locals demonstrated a preference for American news information over other nations' that there was in fact a difference in style and content. According to reports provided by US military intelligence, US ministers, and consular officers, each noted how local publics viewed American reporting and why local publics liked or disliked American "propaganda" or "news."<sup>62</sup>

### WARTIME EXCHANGES

In addition to three separate tours of the USA for journalists from Mexico, Italy, and Sweden, there were both private and public efforts to facilitate academic exchanges, trading educational periodicals between the US and other nations, and arranging pen pals between American students and students of other nations.<sup>63</sup> The first *exchange* of journalists occurred in June 1918 with a group of Mexican newspaper editors invited to tour America. Mexican–American relations were seriously damaged after several US military incursions into Mexico starting in 1914. The relationship did not improve with the publication of the Zimmerman Telegram, though Mexico refused Germany's proposal and remained neutral.

A group of private businessmen organized a commission for the purpose of countering German misinformation, based on concerns about the continued efforts by Germany to foment anti-American sentiment in Mexico. However, some of their efforts only exacerbated the mistrust

and anger felt by many Mexicans toward the USA. The American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico printed a pamphlet “which purported to convince the Mexicans how desirable friendly relations were between the United States and Mexico. The chief argument used was the vast undeveloped wealth of Mexico and the great advantage which close trade relations would be to the United States. This merely gave anti-American newspapers a chance to raise the old cry of ‘Yankee commercialism’.”<sup>64</sup>

Further undermining the development of friendly relations, the CPI appointed Robert H. Murray, who became “the most hated and unpopular man in the American colony in Mexico City...” while serving as a correspondent for the *New York World*.<sup>65</sup> The CPI’s efforts were also hampered by virtual monopoly the Germans held over the Mexican press. In June 1915, a consortium of German citizens and government officials formed a league to financially support ten major news outlets in Mexico, thus limiting the CPI’s access and effectiveness to compete with German control of the Mexican press. The solution to this impasse was to invite the editors of the leading papers in Mexico to the United States in an effort to counter the misinformation disseminated by the Germans and to improve relations with Mexico more generally.

Though the tours were financed by the government, many private citizens and businesses supported the tour by acting as hosts and guides, providing entertainment and dinners in honor of the guests.<sup>66</sup> The US Navy and Army granted the groups access to shipyards and munitions factories. President Wilson met with each of the groups. Companies such as Bethlehem Steel, General Electric, and Ford Motor Company offered tours of their factories.<sup>67</sup>

During both the Mexican and Italian visits, similar issues threatened to undermine the purpose of the tours. With both tours, the CPI representative accompanying the groups reported that the tour was repetitive and overscheduled. Much of the tours consisted of visiting American factories from coast to coast: “A great many of the factories we show them all along the line are duplications of the larger and better factories, which they saw earlier on the trip. We have seen so many of them that they dream of riveting machines, and can see pile drivers and ditch diggers on every corner of the street.”<sup>68</sup> There was an overemphasis on demonstrating American military preparation and economic power on these tours, with little time for visiting cultural sites throughout the US. The reason for the emphasis on military preparation and the American economy was linked to the CPI’s objectives for both countries, as well as more long-term strategic national objectives. German

propaganda in both Mexico and Italy claimed America was unprepared for war and would not be prepared in time to win the war for the Allies. CPI representatives believed the best way to show the world that America was ready for war was for people to actually see the preparations for themselves, through pictures and films, but also through the eyes of their fellow countrymen. With the Mexican and Italian visits, the plan was for the journalists to send stories back to their newspapers in Mexico and Italy reporting on what they had seen of American preparations. In the case of the Italians, demonstrating American mobilization and seriousness about winning the war was intended to improve Italian morale.<sup>69</sup>

On the other hand, the emphasis on America's economy was also connected to various ideas about what foreign public engagement meant for both America and the rest of the world. In many ways, the emphasis on developing trade relations typifies America's diplomatic tradition of favoring economic ties over political ones.<sup>70</sup> Many Americans, both inside and outside the government, believed the best way to maintain friendly relations was through commerce: "The idea of cooperation properly developed between countries should greatly help our foreign commerce, and may not only improve international relations but may prevent disagreements and even wars."<sup>71</sup> American ideas about improving trade relations as a means of ensuring peaceful relations can be traced to not only American experience, but also seventeenth-century liberal thought emphasizing free trade as a means of ensuring peace and avoiding economic competition.<sup>72</sup> These ideas were emphasized by those working for the CPI and the private entities that assisted the CPI.<sup>73</sup>

Both the Mexican and Italian journalists complained about feeling rushed through the United States and not having enough time to relax, socialize, and write articles for their readers at home.<sup>74</sup>

May I also say that these Mexicans need more time to themselves than similar groups of Anglo-Saxons would need or desire. It irritates them to be rushed too much, and they need for their own good and ours frequent opportunities of being by themselves, with possibly a few Spanish-speaking and 'simpatico' Americans. A constant succession of formal entertainments and a never-ceasing program will weary them and dissipate some of the ideas they are absorbing. They should also certainly have time to write their papers frequently, giving daily and weekly impressions, rather than await their return.<sup>75</sup>

With the third visit of Swiss journalists in September 1918, the CPI changed the schedule to include more cultural places of interest.<sup>76</sup> The



Swiss were escorted to George Washington's home at Mount Vernon, the Metropolitan Opera, as well as Charles M. Schwab's<sup>77</sup> steel factory.

Other exchanges were encouraged by the CPI, but facilitated by private entities. Columbia University, Yale University, and Harvard University professors agreed to work together to create schemes for exchanges between students and scholars.<sup>78</sup> Dr. Huber William Hurt ran the Education Division of the CPI which worked with both the Foreign and Domestic Sections of the CPI. In the summer of 1918, Dr. Hurt's division started on education projects overseas. He reached out to educators across the US to assist him with some of the exchange projects the division developed, including arranging for over a hundred French women to study in the USA on scholarship.<sup>79</sup> Of significance to this study is how the activities of the Education Division were started and continued though the CPI eventually ceased operations. By December 1918, the Division was attempting to end all operations. However, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, many of the people who initiated exchanges at the behest of the CPI, continued to arrange academic exchanges. Organizations such as CEIP, the American Library Association, the Pan American Union, and the National Educators Association along with university professors such as Guy Stanton Ford,<sup>80</sup> James Shotwell,<sup>81</sup> Paul Reinsch,<sup>82</sup> and Nicholas Murray Butler<sup>83</sup> launched programs for exchanges just after WWI concluded, thus perpetuating the relationship between public and private entities in undertaking foreign public engagement initiatives.

### PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND THE GERMAN PUBLIC

From the start, President Wilson wanted to distinguish between the German government and the German people, believing that the way to conclude the war quickly was to ensure the German public knew that America was not at war with them, but with their government, as suggested by Wilson's former student. With the loss of the Atlantic cable, America's contact with Germany was severed when the war began in 1914, so the CPI with the US military worked together to find ways to reach the German people directly as well as indirectly. The CPI used *psychological warfare* by attempting to speak directly to the people of Germany rather than the German government in order to secure peace more quickly.<sup>84</sup> This was done in two ways. First, the CPI made a

concerted effort to engage the people of Scandinavia and Switzerland<sup>85</sup> as a way to indirectly reach the German public.

By “the indirect way” I mean the influencing and instructing of the German people through contiguous neutral countries, and let me state at once that I consider it by far the most effective which can be used...If it is desired to make known to the German people the extent and the spirit of American participation in the war, it can be laid down with reasonable certainty that ten days after such a conviction has passed into the minds of the German-Swiss it will be shared by the Germans themselves. Obviously... it is necessary to work upon the German-Swiss people, and this is best done by means of their newspapers, which are printed in German, which have been severely critical of all things American, and which circulate to an extent in Germany...<sup>86</sup>

In addition to targeting the press of neutral countries such as Switzerland, the CPI also used films and exchanges as a way to get their message to the German people indirectly.

...I await Mrs. Whitehouse's<sup>87</sup> instructions to begin shipping to her both moving pictures and “stills.” I have already shipped her copy of our big film...[The] Committee's representative in Holland, recently came to France with two Dutch journalists...and this office did all it could to make their visit to the American front a success....Representatives of papers hitherto doubtful of the efficiency of the American military effort, from Switzerland, Holland and Spain, should be invited to see what we have done in France and elsewhere...Mrs. Whitehouse, I know, intends to arrange for a delegation of Swiss journalists, the General Staff of the American Army here has already invited Swiss officers to come...Needless to say, I am doing all in my power to encourage this form of propaganda, and this office is at all times ready to facilitate trips of such as reach France.<sup>88</sup>

The CPI believed that if people abroad could see what America was doing to prepare for war and their commitment to win the war, then they would pass along what they saw and heard to their countrymen. The CPI considered this personal form of engagement to be more effective at getting their message across to the people, since the information was not coming directly from the US government. This belief in personal contact contradicts the propagandistic characterization of the CPI.

Officers of the CPI recognized that personal exchanges between people were more likely to have a positive impact than mass propaganda.

Another way in which the CPI, along with the US military, tried to engage the German public was directly, using mechanical methods to disperse pamphlets and fliers.

The military authorities (French, British, and our own) place chief dependence on rifle grenade and the paper balloon. The grenade, fired from a rifle, and exploding in such a manner as to send a shower of tracts or pamphlets fluttering down into the trenches...The effect of this form of sending has been closely watched...As the distance to be covered grows, the use of the balloon becomes imperative...<sup>89</sup>

The US military used two different types of balloons depending on their target. When targeting the German citizens behind German lines, they used a fabric balloon which carried twenty pounds of material, could travel for eighteen hours, and reach major cities like Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Trieste. For reaching German troops, the US military used a paper balloon which only carried four pounds of materials. Similar methods would be used during WWII. The CPI knew carrying materials distributed by the Allies was forbidden, but military intelligence observed Germans collecting the materials and hiding them to read later.<sup>90</sup>

The material used to drop into Germany was excerpted from the German press, in keeping with the CPI's emphasis on using facts to achieve their primary objectives.

...[I]t is proved beyond a doubt that extracts from German papers tending to weaken the German spirit have the greatest value. If, for example, the Arbeiter-Zeitung is found printing an article expressing war-weariness, or even so much as hinting at the possibility of German defeat, this is at once seized on, and is sent back with no further comment than that is an article from such-and-such a German paper, printed on such a date.

It has been found that today the German is little, if at all, to be moved by anything coming from foreign sources—that is to say, from enemy sources. Only that which comes from within Germany, or perhaps from German Switzerland, will make an impression. Thus, if it is desired to send over a general and impressive statement as to the extent of the American effort in France and at home, it would emphatically be best to secure publication in a German-Swiss paper of a story setting forth the facts. Then, when this is

to be sent into enemy trenches, it could be quoted as the statement of a paper known to be pro-German, and would stand a thousand times better chance of being believed than if it was obviously from enemy sources.<sup>91</sup>

These same observations are echoed by another CPI officer, Carl Ackerman, though in reference to the Swiss. He advocated for the Associated Press and United Press to establish news bureaus in Switzerland, to ensure news items passed from American press outlets would go to the Swiss and German press without the label "American government propaganda."<sup>92</sup> The CPI thought that if the German people could be given the truth, both indirectly and directly, they could be convinced to stop fighting. This meant convincing the Germans that their submarine offense would not be enough for them to win the war and that America was already prepared to fight and currently fighting. To achieve this, the CPI again used the press as the primary means, making sure these messages filtered into Germany, taking groups of journalists from neutral countries to the French and American fronts and ensuring news of America's war efforts were reported in their press as well.

## US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE LEGACY OF WWI PROPAGANDA

Long after the Domestic Section of the CPI ceased operations, the Foreign Section ended their operations in the spring of 1919. Ernest Poole cabled all overseas offices on February 4th to demobilize no later than March 15.<sup>93</sup> As rumors that the CPI would cease operations began to circulate, followed closely by the order to demobilize, various CPI representatives, US consuls, and ministers began to protest that the CPI overseas operations should continue to operate. Though there was support among the consular officers, ministers, and CPI representatives, they each voiced their own ideas of why engagement with the people of other nations should continue. The consul of Finland noted the economic advantages, saying "[if] the Government could not lend a hand in carrying on this work, *it would be financially beneficial if the interests of American trade could be influenced to carry on such propaganda...*"<sup>94</sup> To others, the work of the CPI helped other people of the world to understand America:

When you get this letter I wish you would cable your candid opinion as to how long this work is going to last. This information is more important through the fact that most of Bullard's men engaged in this work for the duration of the war and it seems rather difficult to convince them that the Compub end of the work is now more important than ever...Incidentally if the Compub should withdraw from all other parts of the World, this Division should continue. *Russia does not understand America and our work here has only begun.*<sup>95</sup>

And others recognized not just the advantage to the US government, but also perceived the impact of retreating after establishing relations with people of other nations:

ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE IS CONVINCING DEMOBILIZATION MISTAKE REACTION FROM WHICH WILL BRING REVULSION FEELING AGAINST AMERICA WITH PECULLAR EFFECT AT THIS CRITICAL TIME STOP BULLARDS ORGANIZATION WORK INTIMATELY KNOWN TO ALL RUSSIANS IN SIBERIA AS DIRECT CONNECTION WITH AMERICAN PEOPLE THEREFORE THEY NOW SEE IN SUSPENSION ACTIVITIES ABSOLUTE ABANDONMENT STOP...YEARS OF BELATED EFFORT MAY NOT ERASE IMPRESSION BURNED INTO PEOPLE DURING THEIR DARKEST HOUR STOP...AMBASSADOR IS CABLING STATE DEPARTMENT ASKING RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER UNTIL BULLARD ARRIVES AT WASHINGTON STOP...JAPANS PUBLICITY GROUP ARRIVED TODAY HEADED BY ZUMOTO STOP BRITISH HAVE PURCHASED AND COMMENCE NEXT WEEK PUBLICATION RUSSIAN ENGLISH NEWSPAPER STOP AMERICAN QUILTS END.<sup>96</sup>

The protests against ceasing CPI's overseas operations did not alter the fate of the CPI.<sup>97</sup>

These objections against the closure of the CPI raises some important points regarding American foreign public engagement generally and its future specifically. As highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, many people whether within the CPI or outside saw different benefits to engaging with people abroad. The consul in Finland saw economic benefits to future engagement, while officers stationed throughout Russia believed US security and diplomatic relations were imperiled should the US break direct relations with the people of Russia. Philip Norton's report to Harry Rickey from Russia noted how the Russian people did not understand the USA, a problem noted in two of the previous cases. Then, Norton's cable sent one month later emphasized how the relationships established between the USA and the people of Russia would

be damaged by breaking off all future engagement. He emphasized the *diplomatic* benefit of engagement. Norton's communiques contrast with the consuls in terms of what the *intent* of engagement should be. This debate about the purpose of engagement reflects the overlap of issues (conceptual, organizational, and ideological) as identified in Chap. 1. These different views about the role of engagement, what it should or should not do, create problems for conceptualizing what the CPI was doing. Furthermore, the varying perspectives also demonstrate different ideas about the role of engagement in statecraft whether to benefit US economic relations, security, or foreign relations generally.

In addition, this leads to the question asked at the start of this chapter: *what* made the operations of the CPI propagandistic? As the methods to engage people abroad resemble earlier efforts by Benjamin Franklin, Thurlow Weed, John M'Clintock, Nicholas Murray Butler, and others to engage with people abroad, the techniques of engagement themselves do not signal CPI operations as propaganda. Rather, the CPI frequently slipped from merely *representing* America, American ideas and foreign policy to trying to *convert* people to accept American ideas and model themselves on the USA.

With the creation of the CPI, President Wilson, George Creel, and others working for the CPI strove to create a "democratic diplomacy" based largely on Arthur Bullard's own ideas. Often, whether through eagerness and absentmindedness, the genuine *intent* to engage with the *people* both at home and abroad tended to veer toward more negative intentions to *control* domestic opinion and *sell* American ideals and products abroad in hopes that people around the world would adopt these same principles. The CPI was created with the idea of preventing the uninformed citizen by *educating* and *informing*. But as with the arranged tours for the Mexican and Italian journalists, the CPI tended to overemphasize American economic power rather than providing a sample of America as a nation and a people. In essence, President Woodrow Wilson hoped to *sell* American principles to the world using the CPI. Unfortunately, Wilson's own compromises at the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles undermined all the CPI had gained in publicizing American ideals of self-determination, peace without victory, and the League of Nations. Wilson assumed that the other powers, in particular France and England, would accept his vision of peace, but he was gravely mistaken. Wilson and the CPI's ideas and conceptualization of the purpose behind the Committee's foreign engagement tie again to the issue of ideology raised in Chap. 1.

On the basis of America's duty to uplift the world Wilson was convinced that the United States could no longer live isolated from the rest of mankind. Instead, she was bound to assume the new obligations for neighbourliness imposed by the increasing interdependence of the world and by her ascendance to world power. *However, he was always careful to point out that the realization of America's mission did not imply an extension of her physical power, for he believed that it was American character and ideals, not American wealth or military might, that the world so keenly needed.*<sup>98</sup>

The CPI advocated American ideas not only to improve the image of the USA, but also in conformity with Wilson's foreign policy which envisioned a new role for America internationally as well as for the future of the world, one where other nations would adopt US principles.

In many Americans' eyes in the first decade of the twentieth century, the advances in mass communication and crowd psychology meant the traditional processes of the democratic society were being corroded. Compounding this loss of faith in the democratic process was the fear of organizations, people, and nations who might intentionally use mass communications and advertising methods to misinform the public or withhold information needed for informed debate. The CPI was intended to be the solution to this threat, but as many scholars have observed, the CPI did withhold information and to a certain degree misinformed the public by framing the information to ensure positive support for the war. Even the CPI's activities abroad tended to portray America in positive terms and advocated for international political reform according to American principles.

Analyzing the different views of the CPI's mission abroad raises some of the difficult issues which develop along with American foreign public engagement. Often, due to the CPI's and America's leaders' own desire to validate their intervention in the war and achieve Wilson's idealist goal of reshaping the world in the image of the United States, the efforts of the CPI became propagandistic in nature. The CPI pushed American ideals and idealism as the solution to the violence of the world war, seeking acceptance of America's vision for the future, rather than simply letting "American events tell their story."<sup>99</sup> As some serving American ministers or consular officers observed, the CPI's efforts became political in tone, rather than honestly attempting to provide a broad understanding of America as a nation and a people.<sup>100</sup> For example, the CPI in Russia often ran into problems with both the Russian government


and the Department of State for their attempt to support certain factions during the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1917.<sup>101</sup>

Not only does this case bring to the surface some of the problems in distinguishing between American propaganda and public diplomacy, the CPI's efforts to engage foreign publics in many ways is an extension of some of the forces already set in motion at the turn of the century. Much of the foreign work undertaken by the CPI was supported by private organizations, including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the American Red Cross, furthering the cooperative relationship between private entities and the US government in foreign public engagement efforts. The CEIP gave the CPI use of their offices, rent free, for the duration of the war.<sup>102</sup> CEIP also funded various efforts to establish libraries and American reading rooms abroad, an activity which continued after the war. The ARC, along with the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), were instrumental in ensuring CPI materials were distributed abroad, including operating mobile theaters. These foundations were not alone in facilitating the CPI's efforts abroad, private businesses volunteered office spaces for CPI window displays in foreign countries, they offered to distribute pamphlets and other materials, and hosted foreign visitors. Without private support, CPI would not have been able to carry out many of their overseas operations, nor reach people in more remote regions. Fig. 5.1 highlights key figures and organizations which played significant roles in supplementing the operations of the CPI, either providing logistical or monetary support and in some cases carrying out actual engagement on behalf of the CPI.<sup>103</sup> The chart also shows how public-private partnerships became a main feature of US public diplomacy, a key theme in this study.

Figure 5.1 shows how the public-private relationship deepened throughout WWI, as well as highlighting key figures which continued to influence the development of US public diplomacy.

Additionally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the people who worked for the CPI or private organizations supporting the CPI, spearheading efforts to engage people abroad, act as key figures in continuing foreign public engagement, even when the government shows no interest. Their efforts to keep foreign public engagement going and their perspectives toward what foreign public engagement means and its relationship to American statecraft impact the development of American public diplomacy. This is an important pattern in this study: key figures





**Fig. 5.1** Public-Private network and US public diplomacy, 1917–1919. *Source* Created by the author

and organizations which helped to develop and perpetuate US foreign public engagement.

The CPI's foreign operations are important to not only understanding the origins of American public diplomacy, but also some of the issues which continue to plague American public diplomacy today. As will be demonstrated in the next two chapters, the same people, organizations, and methods of engagement will be used in the interwar period and throughout WWII. Though the CPI no longer existed, many of the activities of foreign public engagement continued, managed by private organizations, along with official support. This semi-official foreign public engagement continues in the interim between the two world wars.

Thus, when the United States entered WWII, the people, organizations, and mechanism of foreign public engagement were in place when the US government again reorganized government agencies charged with engaging with people all over the world, to tell the truth and to tell America's story.

Following the demise of the CPI, US foreign public engagement shifted from government managed programs to private-run initiatives. In the interwar period, there was tremendous growth in the number of private organizations interested in engaging with people around the world. The war coupled with the internationalist movement spurred private citizens to seek international engagement as a means of engendering understanding and ensuring peace. The following chapter explores some of the key American organizations which maintained foreign public engagement throughout the interwar period. The case will continue to build on the patterns and issues already explored in the last four chapters including the public-private relationship, communication, methods of engagement, people and organizations as well as the continued and increasingly important role of the public in international relations.

## NOTES

1. NARA, RG 63, Entry 1, Box 19.
2. This is the point of contention which both Gary and Sproule critique in their monographs on the domestic functions of the CPI in conjunction with the activities of the Postmaster General and the Department of Justice. Though Creel's report and *How We Advertised America* emphasizes fair and transparent distribution of government information [George Creel (1920a). "Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information." In, edited by Executive Department, 290. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; George Creel (1920b). *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe* (Harper & Brothers Publishers: New York)]; Brett Gary (1999). *The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War* (Columbia University Press: New York) and J. Michael Sproule (1997). *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge University Press: New York) note that Wilson's administration framed much of the information to suit predetermined policies.

3. Emily S. Rosenberg (1982). *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (Hill and Wang: New York).
4. NARA, “Compub Service in Finland,” written by US Consul Thornwell Haynes, no date (n.d.), RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13.
5. Arthur Bullard (1917). “Democracy and Diplomacy.” In *The Atlantic Monthly*, pp. 491–499. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Company, p. 492.
6. Ernest Poole from George Creel, November 15, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 2.
7. Sproule (1997) and P.M. Taylor (2003). *Munitions of the Mind: A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present era* (Manchester University Press: Manchester, UK).
8. Many of the people who worked for the CPI were muckraker journalists prior to the war, including Will Irwin, George Creel, and Walter Lippmann.
9. Gary (1999) and Sproule (1997).
10. Sproule (1997, p. 30).
11. Gary (1999); Sproule (1997); Le Bon argued that the individual becomes anonymous in a crowd or within masses of a society losing sense of responsibility and an increased sense of invincibility. The individual within a crowd tends to be unreasoning and emotional; susceptible to the power of suggestion [1896. *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (MacMillan & Co.: New York)].
12. “Memo for Committee on Public Information, Subj: American Propaganda in Switzerland,” RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13, emphasis added.
13. George Creel (1920). *Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information*, p. 1.
14. NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Boxes 3, 4, 10, and 16.
15. “Report on Foreign Propaganda,” NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10, emphasis added.
16. Untitled memo, n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10.
17. Memo to George Creel (forwarded to Edward Bernays) from Mark Kellogg, Burroughs Adding Machine Company, September, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 4, emphasis added).
18. “Report of the Division of Foreign Press,” February 1, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16, emphasis added.
19. Jason C. Flanagan (2004). “Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Rhetorical Restructuring’: The Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the Germany Enemy,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, Vol. 7; Richard F. Hamilton, and Holger H. Herwig (2004). *Decisions for War, 1914–1917* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge); James R. Mock, and Cedric Larson

- (1939a). *Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917–1919* (Princeton University Press: Princeton).
20. George C. Herring (2008). *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford University Press: New York, NY); Henry A. Turner, 1957. “Woodrow Wilson and Public Opinion,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 21; Stephen Vaughn (1980). *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, North Carolina).
  21. Lloyd E. Ambrosius (1991). *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I* (Scholarly Resources, Inc: Wilmington, DE), p. 3.
  22. Kendrick A. Clements (2004). “Woodrow Wilson and World War I,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34.
  23. Hamilton and Herwig (2004); Douglas Carl Peifer (2016). *Choosing War: Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents* (Oxford University Press: New York).
  24. Flanagan (2004).
  25. Flanagan (2004); Hamilton and Herwig (2004).
  26. Hamilton and Herwig (2004).
  27. Ibid.
  28. Herring (2008, p. 409).
  29. America was not entirely unified in the decision to go to war, but this does not mean that the American public was completely opposed to war or as uninformed as presumed by many of America’s leaders at the time or implied by Gary (1999) and Sproule (1997). Mock and Larson both recount how different portions of the American public became zealous in their belief that war was necessary to preserve US national security and to root out the thousands of German spies many believed already resided in America (“The Lost Files of the Creel Committee of 1917-19,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 3). Aside from infringing on American civil rights, the CPI egregiously enflamed many groups to become even more intolerant of dissent and bent on persecution of their fellow Americans simply because they held different political views or objected to the war.
  30. Mock and Larson (1939b).
  31. Vaughn (1980).
  32. Mock and Larson (1939b); Stephen Vaughn (1979). “First Amendment Liberties and the Committee on Public Information,” *The American Journal of Legal History*, Vol. 23.
  33. Creel (1920a, p. 1).
  34. Vaughn (1980).

35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 7.
37. Bullard (1917, p. 497).
38. Ibid., p. 499.
39. Ibid., p. 497.
40. Vaughn (1979).
41. A fund established in the first few years after the Constitution was ratified and typically used by US Presidents for foreign policy emergencies. Special agents appointed by the President were often paid with money from the President's Discretionary Fund. The use of the fund allowed the President to bypass Congress. As will be explained in Chapter 7, President Franklin D. Roosevelt also used his discretionary fund to establish several information agencies prior to America's entrance into WWII. Funding for these agencies would eventually come from war emergency funds appropriated by Congress.
42. Congress only appropriated \$1.25 million dollars as opposed to the \$5.6 million used from the President's fund (Creel 1920a).
43. Ibid.
44. Mock and Larson (1939a); Vaughn (1980).
45. Unsigned, untitled document, n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 2.
46. Ibid.
47. Report on Foreign Propaganda, Will Irwin, n.d. [circa winter 1917/early 1918], NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10.
48. NARA, RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5.
49. [1927] 1971 Propaganda Technique in World War I (MIT Press: Cambridge).
50. "Sweden Military Intelligence Psychological Estimate," May 13, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5.
51. "Propaganda Manual: Mexico," n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5.
52. According to the Sweden psychological assessment, the country had been subject to intensive German influence and subversion. On the other hand, Mexico suffered a great deal of internal political instability, some of which had been exacerbated by American interventions in 1914–1917. Sweden's population tended to be more literate and educated, whereas many Mexicans were not. These and other factors are noted in each of the country assessments, impacting the CPI's approach to both nations. It should also be noted that in the case of both assessments, emphasis was placed on how each nation's history was connected to national psyche ("Sweden Military Intelligence Psychological Estimate," May 13, 1918 & "Propaganda Manual: Mexico, n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5).
53. Division of Foreign Press—Mail Report, March 30, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 11.

54. NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 11.
55. "Notes for Proposed New Policy—Hurt, n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 1, Box 19, emphasis added.
56. Report of the Division of Foreign Press up to February 1918, 1, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16.
57. Ernest Poole to George Creel, November 15, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 2.
58. "Compub Service in Finland," n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 104, Box 13, emphasis added.
59. "Sweden Military Intelligence Psychological Estimate," May 13, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5.
60. NARA, RG 63, Entry 104, Box 13.
61. "Report of the Division of the Foreign Press (cable) up to February 1, 1918," NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16, emphasis added.
62. Memo from Foreign Section to Paul Kennaday, Aug 16, 1918, passed information received by Military Intelligence from a confidential source in Paris regarding the impact of American propaganda abroad, specifically in France. "Publicity in newspapers and magazines, and the talks in universities, in munitions works, and in industrial establishments, have a good result also...Propaganda by word of mouth is difficult to carry on and seems to have great effect" (NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10). Philip Patchlin (DoS) to George Creel passed along a request from the American minister posted in The Hague. Dutch journalists complained about the lack of reliable American news and requested that the US establish a telegraphic news service for neutral countries (February 2, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 111, Box 1). Memo addressed to American Chargé de Affaires in Zurich, Hugh Wilson, from CPI officer, Carl Ackerman, explained how information passed directly from the CPI was viewed as being official propaganda and was rejected outright by the Swiss. He suggested that the Associated Press and United Press (both American news outlets) be asked to open a news bureau in Switzerland to receive American news from the USA to provide to the Swiss press (NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910-29, Box 0736).
63. Paul Kennaday reported to Ernest Poole that Guy Stanton Ford, Dean of the University of Minnesota, had proposed arranging academic exchanges. James Shotwell, John Dewey, and other university professors agreed to work with Herbert Carpenter to finance the exchanges (March 28, 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16). Ernest Poole provided George Creel with the Education Division's list of planned projects which included exchanging academic articles and journals between nations, international academic conferences, and organizing pen pals between school children in the USA and abroad (July 1, 1918, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 2).

64. "Propaganda Manual: Mexico, n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 133, Box 5.
65. "Propaganda Manual: Mexico, n.d., NARA, RG63, Entry 133, Box 5.
66. The New Orleans Association of Commerce hosted the Mexican journalists when they visited and the mayor of the city hosted a luncheon in their honour (Walter Parker to Will Irwin, June 5, 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13). The Italians were shadowed on their tour of the USA by the Roman Legion, a US civic organization of Italian heritage. The CPI representative traveling with the Italian journalists reported that the journalists found the Roman Legion offensive and irritating (Robert Whiting to Carl Byoir, August 22, 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10).
67. NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13.
68. Lieutenant Reis to Will Irwin, June 22, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13.
69. Merriam (1919).
70. Max Savelle explains how seventeenth century North American colonies prioritized trade relations over politics as a matter of survival, given the long distance between their colonial overseers in Europe (M. Sep. 1934. 'Colonial Origins of American Diplomatic Principles', *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 3). George Washington's Farewell Address also emphasized "extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible," what he referred to as the Great Rule ([1796] 2008. "Farewell Address," Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, Accessed March 20, 2012]. [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th\\_century/washing.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp)).
71. Harrison C. Lewis [General Manager, National Paper & Type Company] to Irwin, July 21, 1918 (a), NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 12.
72. M. Howard (1978). *War and the Liberal Conscience* (Hurst & Company: London); Savelle (1934).
73. Mark Kellogg of the Burroughs Adding Machine Company wrote to George Creel to volunteer advertising space for the CPI based on the CPI's belief "that a wide expansion of this sort of effort [foreign educational advertising] will have a favourable effect in the contest for world markets at the close of the war" (September 4, 1918, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 4). James Carson and Harrison Lewis of the National Paper and Type Company spearheaded creating an advisory committee of American businesses with ties to Latin America for the purpose of improving relations between the USA and Latin America and as a result improve trade relations. "The idea of cooperation between this recognized Giant of the North and the slowly developing but potentially important countries to the South, properly presented to the Latins and to the people of our own country, may create a bond of great political importance and develop a belief in the ultimate commercial supremacy

- of our country which the Latins will be quick to realize and eager to take advantage of" (Harrison Lewis to Will Irwin, June 21, 1918: RG 63, Entry 105, Box 12).
74. Will Irwin to Walter Rogers, June 13, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13; Robert R. Whiting to Carl Byoir, August 22, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 10.
  75. Harrison Lewis, General Manager of National Paper & Type Company, to Will Irwin, June 15, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 12.
  76. "The Visit to Washington of the Delegation of Swiss Journalists," October 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 132, Box 3.
  77. Schwab was the owner of Bethlehem Steel and the son of German immigrants.
  78. Paul Kennaday to Ernest Poole, March 28, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16.
  79. "September Report: Education," September 28, 1918, NARA, RG 63, Entry 13, Box 2.
  80. Guy Ford Stanton was the Dean at the University of Minnesota. Dean Ford provided support for the Education Division of the CPI.
  81. James Shotwell was a professor at Columbia University. He also served as a Director of Research for the CEIP alongside Nicholas Murray Butler.
  82. Professor Paul Reinsch was a representative at the Fourth Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires. He went on to serve as on the Committee of Research for CEIP in 1919 as the American Minister to China.
  83. Nicholas Murray Butler was also a Colombia professor, who worked with the German government before the war to establish academic exchanges between Colombia and Germany. Nicholas Murray Butler served on the Board of Trustees for CEIP.
  84. "Enemy Propaganda," n.d., NARA, RG63, Entry 1, Box 16.
  85. The CPI targeted these neutral countries because of their shared heritage with the Germans.
  86. "Enemy Propaganda," n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 1, Box 16.
  87. Mrs. Vera Whitehouse was an American advocate for woman's right to vote and the CPI representative in Switzerland. Her initial arrival in Switzerland started badly when she and the US ambassador Pleasant Stovall got into an argument over her position in the country. The disagreement caused her to leave the country. Eventually, President Wilson interceded on her behalf, writing to both Secretary of State Lansing and ambassador Stovall personally, demanding that they both cooperate with Mrs. Whitehouse (103.9302/64; 103.9302/71 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910-29, Box 0736).
  88. "Enemy Propaganda," n.d., NARA, RG 63, Entry 1, Box 16.
  89. Ibid.



90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910-29, Box 0736, 103.9302/48.
93. Telegram to Norton from Rickey, February 4, 1919, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 14.
94. "Compub Service in Finland," N.D. written by US Consul Thornwell Haynes, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 13, emphasis added.
95. Report from Philip Norton, Russian Div. CPI, to H.N. Rickey, Jan 9, 1919, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 14, emphasis added.
96. Cable from Philip Norton to Harry N. Rickey, Feb 15, 1919, NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 14, emphasis added.
97. By the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson was facing a partisan political battle in the USA which focused not just on the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, but also the CPI. Congress, specifically Republican Congressmen, became suspicious of the CPI's activities and how such an organization might be used for political campaigning. The CPI was also facing accusations that the organization misused funds and that Creel did use the CPI to censor information.
98. Osgood (1953, p. 177), emphasis added.
99. "Report of the Division of Foreign Press up to 1 February 1918," NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16.
100. There was frequent concern expressed in particular countries, such as England, France, and Switzerland, warning the CPI not to attempt any sort of propaganda because the people had become desensitized due to other nations' propaganda efforts: "Memo for Committee on Public Information, Subj: American Propaganda in Switzerland" warns CPI materials are too political in nature and reminiscent of German propaganda, the memo suggests the CPI stick to providing straight news (NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 16). "Memo from John Balderston (Compub London) to Edgar Sisson 9 August 1918" warns Sisson that the CPI cannot just hand out spot news to British journalists, as they see it as government propaganda (NARA, RG 63, Entry 105, Box 3).
101. Claude Fike argues that the CPI, the ARC, and the American YMCA usurped the State Department reporting directly to President Wilson and Colonel regarding the political situation in Russia (1959, "The Influence of the Creel Committee and the American Red Cross on Russian-American Relations, 1917-1919," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 31). However, based on the records of the CPI, Arthur Bullard reported to George Creel why Edgar Sisson avoided sending reports through the American legation. According Bullard, the American Ambassador, David Francis, was having an affair with a woman who was suspected by

British Security Services to be a spy. Bullard reported that Francis allowed the woman to file and encrypt State messages back to Washington. As a result, none of the Allied governments trusted the US legation, and Sisson and Bullard started sending their reports through US military channels (Bullard to Creel, December 20, 1917, NARA, RG 63, Entry 1, Box 3).

102. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1910–29, Box 0736, 103.93/1562A–103.9302/118H, [document unnumbered].
103. This graphic only highlights private entities, public figures, and organizations which play recurring roles in the development of US foreign public engagement. There were many private businesses, US labor unions, and civic organizations which aided in some part of the CPI's operations throughout the war.

## InterWar Public Diplomacy

*“The so-called isolation of the United States exists only in the brains of a few politicians, not in the American intellectual and academic world...The abandonment of this purely political isolation is only a matter of time.”*

Neue Zuercher Zeitung, No. 1502, November 17, 1922<sup>1</sup>

As the world’s leaders worked on arrangements for the Peace Conference in Paris, the US minister in Berne, Pleasant Stovall, received a proposal from Dr. Herbert Haveland Field, an American zoologist, for establishing an American Institute in Zurich. Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips forwarded Stovall and Field’s memoranda for informational purposes only to the Bureau of Education within the Department of Interior. No further action was taken by the US government, until August of 1920 when the new minister in Berne reported that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) presented the Zurich Central Library with a collection of two thousand books, “carefully selected, treating on people, history, law, policy, economic policy, literature...of the United States.”<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Hampson Gary presented the accompanying framed deed of the gift to the library, as requested in the instructions CEIP sent in a diplomatic pouch. Gary asked that this information along with acknowledgment of the receipt of the collection in Zurich be conveyed to CEIP.<sup>3</sup>

Many private organizations and citizens, who supported the CPI’s work during the war, continued to engage people around the world

throughout the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. Private entities carried on arranging academic exchanges, founding libraries and international schools, as well as distributing American books and periodicals around the world, largely due to the widespread influence of internationalism. The exchange described in the paragraph above is representative of American foreign public engagement practices in the ensuing interwar period. This case highlights how the internationalist impulse perpetuated foreign public engagement and influenced the development of foreign public engagement despite the national inclination to remain politically “un-entangled” during the interwar period.

American foreign relations during the interwar period can be characterized as involvement without commitment.<sup>4</sup> The United States remained involved in world affairs, by relying on private entities as “chosen instruments” to achieve foreign policy objectives without direct political commitment.<sup>5</sup> This type of public-private relationship is also reflected in American foreign public engagement of the period. Although the US government showed little interest in foreign public engagement throughout much of the 1920s, the government was aware of private efforts to engage publics abroad and occasionally used the connections provided through such engagement to support American foreign relations and foreign policy.

Much of these foreign public engagement programs were initiated or supported by large corporate foundations, such as the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), the Laura Spelman-Rockefeller Memorial Fund (LSRMF), and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP).

Under the leadership of American corporate philanthropy, there evolved by the end of the 1920s a private institutional system for the conduct of cultural relations. This network was characterized by a comfortable correspondence between idealist ends and nonpolitical organizational means... This private national policy structure also struck a balance between domestic tradition and the complex demands of international involvement, making possible full participation in an increasingly coordinated and interdependent, yet informal, transnational system.<sup>6</sup>

However, this chapter will also demonstrate that corporate foundations were not the only groups administering foreign public engagement. Private American citizens and, to a certain extent, members of the US

government all played roles in American foreign public engagement during the interwar period.

The US government utilized private foundations as ad hoc agencies or chosen instruments. When requests or queries regarding student exchanges, international pen pals, exchanging American literature and academic materials, and touring musical groups, the State Department would defer such requests to CEIP, RF, the Institute of International Education (IIE), and the American Red Cross (ARC), officially recognizing these organizations, in effect, as the primary institution for a particular form of engagement. Furthermore, "...throughout the nineteen-twenties and thirties, the philanthropic elite of the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations retained a certain closeness to officials in the State Department, and in the American embassies abroad. There was no direction of foundation policies but there were certainly informal consultations without directions."<sup>7</sup> Frequently, these organizations acted as pseudo-representatives at the League of Nations, going as far as to provide reports on the proceedings of the League to the Department of State, or bolstering the League through various engagement activities, often to serve the organization's own interests in shaping the League of Nations.

The interwar period serves to demonstrate not only the continuity of foreign public engagement, but also the significant forces which impact the development of foreign public engagement into public diplomacy as a mechanism of American statecraft. As such, the focus of American foreign public engagement, both private and government initiated, focuses on Europe and America's relationship with the League of Nations as well as Latin America. American foreign public engagement was not limited to Latin America and Europe during the interwar period. This chapter simply focuses on the two major regions where foreign public engagement became the focus of American statecraft. Despite maintaining a strict non-affiliation, non-contact policy with the League of Nations, many private American foundations and organizations maintained regular contact and supported the League through foreign public engagement programs. As stated earlier, these same organizations provided reports and analysis to the Department of State and Congress regarding the activities of the League.<sup>8</sup>

In looking at the relationship between private foreign public engagement activities and the government's role throughout the interwar period, there is a subtle transition, whereby the government becomes

more involved and interested in supporting and facilitating foreign public engagement. As will be explored later, the transition from private foreign public engagement to a more cooperative relationship between public and private actors was precipitated by several factors: the Great Depression, the implementation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, and the developing threat of war in Europe coupled with the perceived threat of Nazi influence in Latin America.

## US INTERNATIONALISM AND FOREIGN PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

Internationalism was a significant force in America beginning in the late nineteenth century and garnered strength just prior to the start of WWI. The internationalist perspective and proponents of internationalism played a vital role in the continued development and use of foreign public engagement throughout the interwar period. It is the influence of internationalist ideas, the relationship between internationalists and the US government, and the practices and use of foreign public engagement in pursuit of internationalism which unites the two decades of the of the interwar period.

According to some scholars, internationalism existed for centuries, but grew in strength around the mid- to late nineteenth century.<sup>9</sup> A surge of American proponents of internationalism came at the end of the nineteenth century with the reorganization of the peace movement. American internationalism advocated for international cooperation based on liberal principles such as the free exchange of ideas, cultural exchange and understanding, free trade, and the development of international relations based on international law.<sup>10</sup> These liberal precepts are based on the same ideals advocated by American leaders and liberals of the late eighteenth century. Internationalists believed that world peace could achieve through cooperation and education. Collaboration was the only way people could hope to achieve a peaceful, stable world; the interdependence of the world had to be embraced. They also believed national leaders had to give up the balance of power politics in favor of a system of cooperation.<sup>11</sup> In many ways, the internationalism of the twentieth century is the active projection and belief that Western liberal principles should be used to create an international framework for interstate relations. This has serious ramifications for American foreign public engagement. Though American internationalists presented a lofty ideal, they

advocated for an ideal which was based on American ideas and political culture with little consideration for competing concepts for maintaining peaceful relations. An excellent example of this is presented by Nicholas Murray Butler in an interview printed in *International Conciliation*. He characterized the socialist concept of a league of nations as “a colloidal or jelly-like internationalism without real nations...The achievement of this ideal would bring civilization to an end, make order impossible, destroy liberty and put mankind back at the foot of the ladder from which it began...”<sup>12</sup> Butler went on to say that “[t]rue internationalism must be built on the union of strong and self-respecting nations...”<sup>13</sup> In other words, American internationalists were seeking to apply a US model to the rest of the world. With the start of WWII, this desire becomes more apparent in the rhetoric used by US officials and private advisors.

Among American internationalists, there was little agreement as to how to achieve international cooperation and by extension international peace and stability. This was made apparent with the fight over America’s participation in the League of Nations, even after President Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected. Internationalists sought to change how nations interacted using cultural exchange and understanding, inter-dependent economies, and an accepted international legal framework.<sup>14</sup> However, American internationalists all tended to emphasize one aspect of internationalism. This is especially evident with the operations of CEIP throughout the 1920s, and their support for the League of Nations. Some internationalists advocated the issue of free international trade; others stressed the need for the development of international law and a legal infrastructure to maintain international relations. There were also internationalists who believed that an international legal framework could not be achieved until cultural barriers and international misunderstandings were overcome through education of the public and greater intellectual and cultural exchange. In general, most internationalists advocated for some kind of greater intellectual and cultural understanding among the people of different nations in order to achieve greater economic inter-dependence and an international justice system. Internationalism was not only a strong influence on American foreign public engagement in the interwar period, but many of the leading internationalists of the period were also trustees of CEIP, RF, IIE, and LSRMF. Thus, they tended to advocate dual objectives: the development of international law and the establishment of cultural exchange networks.

Influential internationalists such as Elihu Root, Nicholas Murray Butler, James Brown Scott, Raymond Fosdick, James Shotwell, and Stephen Duggan were on the boards of the philanthropic organizations of CEIP, RF, and IIE. Prior to WWI, these same individuals advocated and supported efforts to develop international law, the international court at The Hague, and encouraged international exchanges through international congresses and academic exchanges. The rhetoric of internationalism as well as proponents of the internationalist movement was integral to the continued practice and development of foreign public engagement. Both acted as a catalyst, providing reasoning, justification, and standardization for American engagement with people of other nations.

### LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND US POLICY

The interwar period is often categorized as the height of American isolationism, in part due to the United States continued refusal to join the League of Nations. Though there were significant isolationist impulses throughout the 1920s and 1930s, American foreign relations in the intervening decades between the First World War and the Second World War were more complicated than just a desire to remain detached from the world. America's refusal to join the League of Nations in 1920 was not solely due to isolationism. On the contrary, many Senators who voted against League membership in March 1920 supported some type of international association, as did much of the American public. Republican Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Philander Knox both supported the idea of an international association. Polls conducted by various newspapers at the time indicated general support in favor of joining the League of Nations.<sup>15</sup> This was primarily due to widespread support for internationalism. Many Americans also saw international cooperation and unification as a way to stave off future wars, to ensure peace. The debates about American participation in the League were also based on partisanship, isolationism, a concern for national sovereignty, and competing internationalist perspectives.<sup>16</sup>

When the articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations were published on February 15, 1920, many who had advocated for so long for an international union were disappointed and concerned. The Covenant did not reflect mainstream internationalist ideas of the day.<sup>17</sup> First, many internationalists as well as isolationists were alarmed by



Articles X and XI, which to them seemed to ensure the continuance of war as a means to settle disputes. Article X called members of the League to respect and preserve territorial integrity and sovereignty of all member nations against external aggression. In the event of any external aggression, the League's Executive Council would determine what course of action to take. Article XI allowed League members to take any action deemed necessary to ensure peace when threatened by a non-League member. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was concerned the article might lead to an international army, while future Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes believed such a measure limited a nation's flexibility in responding to a crisis.<sup>18</sup> Second, the Covenant blatantly ignored the established international court at The Hague and remained vague regarding justiciable and non-justiciable cases.<sup>19,20</sup> Third, the Covenant failed to create any infrastructure for the study and development of international law. Finally, the League of Nations, as outlined, only made vague assurances as to the freedom of the seas. Between Wilson's unwillingness to alter the Covenant and the inability of internationalists to unify on a course to correct the Covenant, both parties ensured the US would never become a member of the League of Nations.

As the League morphed into a political pariah in the United States, the Department of State initially maintained a strict policy of non-interference and non-contact. During the Harding administration, the Department of State initially ignored all correspondences from the League of Nations. Raymond Fosdick and Hamilton Holt exposed this in the US press which caused a great deal of outrage among the American public. The Harding administration was forced to rethink how to manage relations with the League despite the extreme political views at home. In the end, the administration did begin to provide replies to League correspondence, but the US ambassador in Geneva was instructed to never enter the League building.<sup>21</sup>

As the League became an established political entity, with most nations participating in the League, America was unable to ignore the organization entirely. Advocates for American membership still hoped that the United States might still join the League and to this end, supported the League through various programs, as well as encouraging US involvement through summer programs in Geneva. Many of these advocates, such as Elihu Root, James Brown Scott, Raymond Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller Jr., Stephen Duggan, and Nicholas Murray Butler, were also trustees of philanthropic foundations and private organizations which initiated

these programs to further internationalism both in the United States and abroad as well as to bolster the League itself. With the US government's uncomfortable position between politics at home and the League of Nations, the US government increasingly relied upon private foundations to communicate with the League as well as supplement American foreign relations, becoming chosen instruments for US diplomacy.

### THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY AND FOREIGN PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

Almost five years prior to his inaugural address, Roosevelt articulated his Good Neighbor Policy in an article for *Foreign Affairs* magazine.<sup>22</sup> Roosevelt used the article to demonstrate his affiliation and support of internationalism.<sup>23</sup> Roosevelt was a converted internationalist. Previously, he had advocated a more militant approach to American foreign affairs, modeled on his cousin's, Theodore Roosevelt, ideas. Roosevelt's adherence to internationalism was perhaps more politically calculated than other internationalists of the period. He began to support the ideas of international cooperation following a conversation with President Woodrow Wilson, returning from the Paris Peace Conference. What convinced Roosevelt of internationalism was not so much the principles of the movement themselves, but the wild reception Wilson received upon arriving in Boston as well as his own observations of broad American support for international cooperation. Roosevelt was "persuaded...that an aspiring politician with internationalist commitments could not now make his way with the kind of martial deeds and rhetoric T.R. [Theodore Roosevelt] had used."<sup>24</sup> The ideas espoused in the article not only urged the United States to adopt a more internationalist approach to the nation's foreign relations, but also foreshadowed the Good Neighbor Policy to be implemented when Roosevelt became president.

Though many Americans were not as eager for international cooperation as they had been before the 1929 Crash and ensuing Depression, the internationalist sentiment remained relatively strong; enough to influence President Roosevelt's handling of domestic and foreign policy. FDR ran on the campaign promise of the New Deal, a deal to bring the country out of the Depression through a series of legislated measures. He wanted nothing to hinder his relations with Congress which might prohibit the New Deal passing through the legislative process.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, the singular reference to foreign relations in his inaugural address, a brief reference to his “Good Neighbor Policy,” reflected not only FDR’s awareness of national priorities in 1933, but also the mood of the American public.

Thus, for the first few years of FDR’s presidency, foreign public engagement remained in private hands. The only noticeable difference being that between 1930 and 1935, Department of State representatives abroad began providing extensive reports on the activities of these private actors’ efforts overseas, particularly in connection with the League of Nations.<sup>26</sup> These reports were received with greater interest. Additionally, Secretary of State Hull set up the Information Service within the Department of State in 1934 as well as requesting officers overseas to conduct a survey in 1936 on how the foreign press reported on America.

The 1930s brought about a slight transition as the Depression inhibited many foundations’ ability to fund overseas programs.<sup>27</sup> Conversely, the US government took more interest in what private citizens and foundations were doing abroad to engage with citizens of foreign nations. To some degree, the threat of another large-scale war spurred many internationalists to renew their efforts for dialogue, cooperation, and exchange, including President Roosevelt.<sup>28</sup> Corresponding with the rising tensions in Asia and Europe, private entities and the government sought ways to diffuse the situation, including using foreign public engagement. In the same month, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was inaugurated into office, Japan left the League of Nations, and by the fall of 1933, Germany also left. As the situation abroad deteriorated further,

[three] leaders...believed that unless the Washington government threw its influence on the side of freedom and international organization, civilization would suffer a severe defeat. This trio was composed of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Under-Secretary of State Sumner Wells. They believed that salvation lay in closer cooperation with the rest of the American Continent.<sup>29</sup>

FDR hoped to bolster Pan Americanism through his Good Neighbor Policy as a counter force to the rising totalitarianism and militancy in Europe and Asia.<sup>30</sup>

## PRIVATE FOREIGN PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT AND US INTERESTS

One of the more significant aspects of American foreign public engagement in the interwar period is the relationship between private entities and the US government. As the exchange described in the opening of the chapter demonstrates, private entities initiated engagement activities both during and immediately following WWI. Throughout much of the 1920s, the US government paid little attention to these initiatives, at least in Washington, D.C. Most reports coming from consuls and ambassadors regarding private American engagement activities abroad went unanswered. Regardless of the ambivalence expressed on the part of the US government, the relationship between private actors and the US government was a symbiotic relationship in the context of foreign public engagement. Private entities served as chosen instruments, intermediaries between the US government and the League of Nations as well as fulfilling other roles for consuls and ambassadors. On the other hand, private foundations utilized the US government to facilitate their engagement efforts, either by using diplomatic pouching services or requesting ambassadors and consuls to gather information for foundation publications on international affairs.

For ambassadors and consuls serving overseas, these private engagement efforts were viewed with more interest and garnered more support. Official US representatives saw how private initiatives to engage with the foreign public not only relieved them of such duties, but also benefited American relations. One consular officer, Hugh Ramsay, wrote "there [were] certain ways in which efficient American organizations functioning at a consular post may lighten the burdens of the consular officer, without in any way encroaching upon his duties or prerogatives."<sup>31</sup> Ramsay described how two such societies did much for Swiss-American relations and diminished some of the responsibilities of his post. Two societies were created in the 1920s: Swiss Friends of the USA and the American Women's Club. Both organizations sought "...to bring about a better understanding between the two countries" through various activities including publishing a monthly newsletter on American and Swiss topics of interest and celebrating both Swiss and American holidays. "...[Through] the efforts of ...two societies definite aid has been... given to the Consulate General in maintaining the prestige of the United States and meting the obligations which the presence of even a small number of resident Americans creates."<sup>32</sup>

Ramsay was not the only official to notice the role of the foreign engagement efforts in relation to American diplomacy. Prentiss Gilbert wrote a series of detailed reports on the various societies, committees, institutions, and schools supported or operated by private American donors and foundations. Gilbert served as the American consul in Geneva, affording him the opportunity to observe how private American engagement efforts operated in conjunction with the League of Nations. He noted how “[t]hese organizations...are so closely associated in their management, that to gain a clear understanding of their nature they should be considered conjointly.”<sup>33</sup> Gilbert described the League of Nations Association, the Geneva Research Center, the American Committee, the American Council on Disarmament, the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales (Geneva Institute of International Studies),<sup>34</sup> and the Bureau d’Études Internationales (Geneva School of International Studies).<sup>35</sup> Each of these organizations received financial support from CEIP, RF, LSRMF, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. as well as being staffed by many of the foundations’ board members. From Gilbert’s observations, he saw how the private organizations working with the League of Nations or alongside the League “they have frequently performed services which might otherwise have devolved on the Consulate or on American members of the League or International Labor Office Secretariat.”<sup>36</sup>

This is in keeping with the policy established by the Harding administration with regard to how America would interact with the League.<sup>37</sup> Over time, American policymakers realized the value of these private actors as a way of still maintaining relations with the large international political organization without sparking public criticism at home. Private American citizens and organizations based in Paris and Geneva became chosen instruments or de facto intermediaries whereby the US government was able to keep informed about League activities and maintain some American representation within the League itself.

In particular, the American Committee in Geneva worked as both a pseudo-think tank and public-private diplomacy agency. The “avowed purpose is to supply means of informing American visitors as to the work of the League of Nations and the International Labor Office and to assist them in making contacts with officials in these two organizations.”<sup>38</sup> With support from CEIP, the committee was mainly staffed by college graduates and teachers with an interest in international cooperation. But in addition to facilitating American connections to the League

and reporting on League activities to the US public, the American Committee also prepared reports on international issues of interest to the US, including a study on international arms trade in 1934 for a Senate investigation and another report on the Chaco Arms Embargo.<sup>39</sup>

The foundations who supported organizations and institutions affiliated with the League of Nations did so with two main objectives. First, to ensure the survival of the very organization many internationalists strove to create since the turn of the century. Though the League did not meet many internationalists' expectations, internationalists, such as Elihu Root, considered the League as an important step toward international cooperation and a permanent end to war. American internationalists believed US membership was crucial to the future success of the League.<sup>40</sup> In order to guarantee the survival of the League, the RF, CEIP, and LSRMF sought to support the League.

It is evident that the majority of these international bodies have been established in Geneva or set up their headquarters here because of the presence in Geneva of the two large organizations<sup>41</sup>... There is a formal relationship existing, particularly in technical and humanitarian matters, between certain of these organizations and the League and the Labor Office. While such formal relations do not exist in those engaged in the strictly educational field, these educational institutions nevertheless base the majority of their studies on international questions, in particular those having to do with the League or with its activities. *It might be said that, as educational institutions often do, they advance a political philosophy in such matters which becomes a part of the atmosphere of Geneva, which is not without its influence on the progress of League affairs. Thus no picture of the complex situation which goes to make up Geneva is complete without some understanding of these organizations.*<sup>42</sup>

The secondary objective of American foundations was to mold the League to both suit their objectives and to form a League into something acceptable to American policymakers and the US public, as the quote from Prentiss Gilbert's report suggests. Foundations typically supported organizations and institutions which studied or developed international law specifically or international relations more generally. CEIP tended to place an emphasis on international law, while LSRFM sought to promote the study of social sciences more generally.<sup>43</sup> The Rockefeller Foundation focused more on natural sciences and the medical sciences in particular.<sup>44</sup> This is not to say that American foundations were not also

interested in developing international friendship and exchange through their engagement programs; it simply explains how internationalists such as James Brown Scott, Nicholas Murray Butler, Elihu Root, and James Shotwell helped to initiate programs attached to the very League of Nations they previously hesitated to support in 1919.

Connected to many of the American foundations' endeavors to push the US toward League membership was the promulgation of internationalism, international cooperation, and international affairs through foundation published books, journals, and periodicals. For this, foundations relied on the government to gather information needed for some of these publications. On April 25, 1930, James Brown Scott, the then Secretary for CEIP, wrote to Wilbur Carr at the Department of State (DoS) to request assistance gathering information on municipal legal decisions concerning international law around the world as well as information on arbitration tribunals. He asked Carr "*to instruct diplomatic agents, or...the consular officers of the United States, to request the Minister of Justice or other appropriate official of each of the countries to secure two or three copies of each of the municipal decisions involving international law, and likewise request the Minister of Foreign Affairs for two or three copies of the decisions of arbitral tribunals or mixed commissions functioning within his country...*" Scott further requested that these documents be sent with English translations of them, so CEIP "would be able to prepare the special supplements and place these important and indispensable texts at the disposition of professors of international law and of international relations and also at the disposition of the Department of State and its officials, texts of the utmost importance but which had never before been brought together and published."<sup>45</sup>

What is most striking about this exchange is that on May 5, 1930, a Department worldwide circular was issued to all US consular and diplomatic posts to compile the materials requested by Scott. Nor was this the only time where a private entity directed the US government to supplement its activities. Previously, the Council on Foreign Relations, a US think tank founded with the help of Elihu Root, requested information about major newspapers around the world in 1929 for the publication of the Council on Foreign Relations' *Political Handbook of the World*.<sup>46</sup> Also, as the exchange in the opening of the chapter described, CEIP used the DoS's diplomatic pouching services to send donation materials and instructions to the ambassador in Switzerland.<sup>47</sup> In spite of the

government's general disinterest in the foreign public engagement activities of these private foundations, the Department of State did assist with some foundation activities, creating a relationship of mutual dependence which continued up through WWII.

### PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LISTENING

Both private and public entities listened to people around the world during the interwar period, but for different reasons. Private foundations tended to use listening as a way to ensure grants and foundation monies were being used effectively, a reflection of the Progressive attitudes which dominated private foundations throughout the 1920s and 1930s. CEIP, IIE, LSRMF, and RF used the information they gathered overseas to inform their program policies at home and abroad. Both RF and CEIP conducted regular studies all over the world in preparation for new initiatives. In 1923 and 1924, representatives from both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment traveled to Europe to gather information regarding the status of European universities, the study of social sciences, and the resources available to students and academics.<sup>48</sup> James T. Shotwell and Guy Stanton Ford met with academics, university administrators, and state education officials to gather information about what was most needed to help rebuild academic institutions and communities following the war. The results of this information gathering trip are evident in the subsequent donations and grants established to rebuild libraries, foster academic exchanges between nations, and schemes to ensure access to scholarly publications.

In addition to carrying out regular surveys and collecting information regarding foundation foreign programs, the Division of Intercourse and Education within CEIP maintained Special Correspondents positioned in different places around the world. These correspondents tended to be local individuals. There were five correspondents in 1920 based in London, Rome, Geneva, Tokyo, and Berne. The correspondent in Italy covered the Balkans and Greece, and the correspondent in Geneva covered the League of Nations as well as Europe. By 1925, the Division had seven Special Correspondents, including one in Berlin. Then in 1930, the Division employed eight Special Correspondents, including two covering Germany and one covering Russia. The Special Correspondents reported on existing conditions, changes in public opinion, and economic and political policy changes.<sup>49</sup>



Before Stephen Duggan launched the IIE in 1920, he traveled to Great Britain, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Yugoslavia to meet with state education civil servants, university officials, journalists, and academics.<sup>50</sup> He also sent out questionnaires to US universities and colleges to understand what exchange programs already existed and what funds were available for international exchanges. By listening to university officials and academics in Europe, he discovered that many universities lost professors in the war and were not enthusiastic about sending professors to America. “Nevertheless they are anxious to have American teachers at their institutions.”<sup>51</sup> A member of IIE’s Administrative Board suggested American professors might volunteer to travel overseas during sabbatical leave. Using this scheme, American professors would still receive a salary, leaving only travel expenses to be offset by a donor or scholarship, thus alleviating the financial burden for host universities abroad. Dr. Duggan applied to CEIP for a stipend to cover travel expenses for American professors. Prior to even implementing any plans for academic exchanges, the IIE made listening a first step to formulating its exchange programs. This helped to ensure the success of the programs and avoided embarrassment for either US universities or universities overseas.

On the other hand, both private citizens and US representatives abroad noted when people overseas expressed negative attitudes toward the United States or when the US was somehow misrepresented abroad. Citizens and DoS officers attempted to cajole Washington to address negative attitudes and misrepresentation of the US, but were frequently met with disinterest and even hostility.<sup>52</sup> The US minister in Berne, Hugh Gibson, reported on how the press in Switzerland had become increasingly anti-American, largely in war debts, US–Mexico relations, US interventions in Haiti and Santo Domingo, and America’s policy toward the League of Nations. The only positive articles or editorials were published by the legation “through the influence of” the Consul-General in Zurich and the Consul at Basel.<sup>53</sup>

The attitude of the Swiss press is important not only because of its effect in this country but perhaps even more because of the influence it exerts in other countries...The Legation has endeavored to learn the reason for this attitude of the Swiss press in the hope that it might be found possible to contribute in some effective way to improving the situation.<sup>54</sup>

Gibson found after discussions with local news editors that they were not ill-disposed toward America. They were primarily interested in finding good stories to publish.

Some other countries have been quick to sense this situation and profit from it. They have made a point of furnishing material to the Swiss press setting forth their point of view on various questions. Some of them have assigned officials to their diplomatic missions in Berne to specialize in this work. It frequently happens that an article which is prepared or inspired in this way has a far greater effect if printed in Switzerland than if it appeared in the country of the author.<sup>55</sup>

Other nations with a vested interest in America's stance on certain policies, in particular France, saw the advantage of ensuring their view on certain issues, such as war debts, were circulated in the Swiss press.

*The only remedy that I can suggest is for us to resort to the same method of presenting our point of view. The Legation has succeeded in establishing friendly relations with the owners and responsible editors of the principal papers throughout Switzerland and as has been reported on several occasions these gentlemen are disposed to publish anything we desire and to give friendly treatment to matters in which we are interested. All this is, however, subject to one condition, - that we furnish original material in a form suitable for publication.*<sup>56</sup>

Gibson said the news needed to be received in a timely manner. He pointed to recent statements made by the Secretary of State and how such statements sent in advance to the Legation would have been extremely useful, but by the time, the Legation received it a week later, the statements lost their news value. Intermixed with Gibson's listening are plans to advocate America's position. He used the information he gathered from listening to people to reshape and *inform* America's relations with Switzerland.

Gibson's report and ideas caused an interesting reaction within the Department of State. The Department's response, written September 24, 1925, "recognizes the importance of the Swiss press in cultured and liberal thought in Europe, and has decided to authorise the procedure suggested by you."<sup>57</sup> The reply included three articles pertaining to the League of Nations, the Caribbean countries, and Mexico. As "...the preparation of such articles is a task which makes serious calls on the time

of the officers of the Department. [Gibson was] therefore instructed to observe carefully the results of [the] experiment; ascertain whether the articles are followed by discussion and editorial comment, and report [on]...whether or not the result justifies the labor involved.”<sup>58</sup> Gibson was thus instructed to *listen* to determine whether the articles had any impact on public opinion in Switzerland. But this reply and the articles were never sent to Gibson. According to the note handwritten on the document, dated December 3, 1925, “[this] instruction was carefully considered by C’s, A.H. and I.L. and it was decided not to send it. Mr. Hugh Wilson wrote Mr. Gibson a personal letter about the matter. – R.S.”<sup>59</sup> There were no textual records of any discussions related to this particular correspondence to ascertain why the response had been delayed for so long and eventually never sent.

Another interesting example of listening was actually initiated by the Department of State in 1936, six months after FDR suggested holding a special Pan American conference. On June 25, 1936, a worldwide circular was issued to all consulates, legations, and embassies to conduct a survey of the local press, looking specifically at the coverage of American news in the last five years. The Department wanted to know what subjects were covered more frequently and in detail.<sup>60</sup> The Chargé d’Affaires in Istanbul, G. Howland Shaw, caused a great deal of consternation with his reply. He noted that the little news printed in the Turkish press is generally sensational in nature. Shaw said that America seemed very remote to most Turkish, especially in comparison with Europe.

And, finally, with the development of *étatisme* in Turkey in recent years the discrepancy between traditional American and modern Turkish ideals has become marked, and the natural tendency has been and is to turn more towards those countries in which the totalitarian point of view obtains and away from the countries of democratic and liberal background.<sup>61</sup>

Shaw observed the Turkish regime was at the time “highly resistant to anything suggestive of foreign propaganda, but...observed that nevertheless the individual is eager to get hold of foreign books and foreign articles having to do with subjects which he is interested.”<sup>62</sup> Referring to a standing agreement between the United States and Turkey, whereby both nations agree to exchange official publications, Shaw said the Turkish officials do not make US official publications readily available to the public.

To secure results I suggest the following procedure and I am not making the suggestion with respect to Turkey alone, but as applicable to many, if not all, countries in which the United States maintains a diplomatic mission. *Let the mission be instructed to make careful study to determine in what particular field cultural relations with America might be developed...* Having through careful investigation determined in detail the field in which cultural relations may be developed, the next step would be to find out just what material on these subjects is available in America. *Both Government and private organizations must be approached and it has been my experience that both are willing and anxious to respond generously to any appeals for help from abroad.* When the material has been assembled, it is essential that it be placed in the hands of the person or persons who will make the most of it. It does little good to send a bundle of literature to a government department and forget all about it. It should be the duty of the diplomatic mission to know just who the individuals are who can use the material and it should also be the duty of the mission to follow up the matter and discover when and how the material can be supplemented.<sup>63</sup>

Shaw's report and suggestion initiated a flurry of exchanges within the Department of State. The first assessment was that Shaw used the "News Survey" circular "as a take-off for the writing of this despatch on educational and social propaganda as a function of the Foreign Service as a means of enhancing American prestige abroad...It seems clear, therefore, that Mr. Shaw's suggestion may be regarded as entirely original and its merits examined without reference to other matters," thus initiating a debate about the merits of Shaw's suggestion.<sup>64</sup> Mr. Alling in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs observed that "[if] Howland's plan were to be adopted it would require careful handling in the field for we should want to be careful to avoid giving the impression that we were consciously endeavoring to propagandize American ideas abroad."<sup>65</sup> As with the CPI, the issue for American efforts to engage with the public was also linked to the concern that any such engagement might be perceived as propaganda. To avoid this impression, Alling suggested that materials could be required from foundations like Rockefeller and Carnegie:

...we should have to have funds to purchase the necessary books. I doubt whether such funds could be obtained from Congress, for it would smack too much of the French Foreign Office appropriation 'Oeuvres Françaises à l'étranger' which is used to support French missionary, educations, and similar institutions in foreign countries.<sup>66</sup>

Another DoS officer in the Division of Research and Publication suggested that rather than creating new programs to distribute and exchange published materials abroad that Shaw and other consuls and ambassadors conduct a survey on the exchange already taking place. The officer suggested that the US embassy discuss with Turkish officials the types of documents they are most interested in and for what purpose they are needed. In familiarizing themselves with what publications were sent by the United States, what publications the Turkish officials need and how they are used, the author believed there would be a side benefit of familiarizing the Turkish officials of where to look for accurate information about America. The author used the example of the British and their British Library of Information office in New York, where the press frequently calls to get facts about Britain.

The Director of the Library has stated that they are constantly called upon to give information and render assistance to representatives of the press, and he believes that a little guidance offered to the press will prevent a great deal of misrepresentation, misstatement, et cetera. As this Government has no 'office of information' in Europe, it might be advisable for our representatives at Istanbul (and elsewhere) to familiarize themselves thoroughly with the very generous shipments of our official publications...so that foreign newspaper men, officials and others may be promptly directed to such publications when they are in want of information.<sup>67</sup>

Cyril Wynne in the Division of Research and Publication raised additional concerns about Shaw's suggestion and the obstacles to implementing such a scheme. The biggest obstacle, one well-known to the Department of State, was funding.

I have been attending and taking part in hearings before the Bureau of the Budget and Appropriations Committees of Congress for quite a few years now and I think it can be said that a request for funds to be used for the purpose mentioned would not only be turned down but the State Department official who submitted it would be the recipient of some very unkind remarks.<sup>68</sup>

Mr. Wynne went on to offer his thoughts on approaching the RF and CEIP for assistance.

These institutions might be willing to send publications or literature of the nature desired but, I am frank to say, that I doubt it unless Mr. Shaw could make a Bostonian appeal to members of their respective Boards of Trustees who know him...it may be pointed out that institutions like the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations generally proceed in their own way in distributing publications in foreign lands...As a general rule, these agencies act according to a settled procedure and it takes some powerful arguments from headquarters to change or vary the procedure in question. The reason for this is not because such institutions as Carnegie and Rockefeller are set in their ways, but because they have a definite and specific objective.<sup>69</sup>

Wynne agreed with the earlier suggestion to survey how American publications were used in Turkey and what types of materials are needed.

This exchange is significant for several reasons. First, the fact that a suggestion made by one Chargé d’Affaires caused such internal debate within the Department of State is worth noting, especially in the context of the role of public diplomacy in statecraft. At this point, many DoS officers did not see cultural relations as part of their declared duties, an issue which resurfaces again and again through the rest of this study. Furthermore, while this debate between the Near East Division and the Division of Research and Publication continued other State Department officials were preparing for the upcoming Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires with plans for treaties to encourage cultural relations between the USA and the rest of Latin America. Finally, the discussion is also noteworthy for the suggestion and consideration by some of the officers to approach CEIP or RF to handle Shaw’s suggestion, to avoid any accusations of using propaganda. But this also shows how CEIP and RF were viewed as almost *de facto* government agencies. Furthermore, the DoS seemed to be aware that CEIP’s and RF’s operations were guided by clear goals.

Much of the information obtained by private and public entities regarding foreign public opinion was gathered by reading the national and local press, not unlike Charles Francis Adams throughout the Civil War, and through regular interactions with members of the press, students, and academics. American foundations such as CEIP, RF, LSRMF, and IIE utilized intellectual networks, long established before WWI, to not only create new connections when setting up new initiatives, but also to ensure the smooth running of ongoing projects as well as creating

an easy way to gather information about the effectiveness of their programs.<sup>70</sup>

### PRIVATE ADVOCACY AND PUBLIC ADVOCACY

Private entities conducting engagement activities abroad not only advocated internationalist ideas or international cooperation, they were also advocating American ideas and culture. The foundations' support was in effect a form of advocacy; advocating the particular objectives and ideals which the boards of the foundations thought to be worthy of support and in keeping with the eventual development of a conflict-free world society.<sup>71</sup> As Nicholas Murray Butler noted

[appeals] are constantly...received...for financial support, and these must be given careful and kindly consideration and a decision must be reached as to whether they fall within the scope of the work of the Division [of Intercourse and Education], the object of which is...neither personal nor philanthropic, but the forming of an enlightened public opinion in matters of international concern.<sup>72</sup>

For CEIP, advocacy was an integral part of the foundations' internationalist mission. Each of the divisions within CEIP sponsored and published books, journals, pamphlets, and magazines relating to international cooperation, arbitration, international law, and trade and economics. Some publications were intended strictly for foreign audiences and others solely for domestic audiences. The European Bureau of CEIP published an international law journal, *La Paix par le Droit*, for European audiences, while publications such as *International Conciliation* and *Advocate of Peace* tended to be for domestic audiences, though not strictly so.<sup>73</sup> *International Conciliation* featured printings of treaties, speeches given to the Assembly at the League of Nations, key decisions of the international court at The Hague, as well as critical articles by prominent academics, statesmen, and international lawyers, including board members and trustees of CEIP, IIE, and RF. The *Advocate of Peace* was published by the American Peace Society, with financial support from CEIP which subsidized both the Society and the publication. *Advocate of Peace* was a magazine featuring shorter articles mostly on arbitration and international law. There were also some publications

which were disseminated all over the world, translated into English and several other languages, including manuscripts by foreign writers.

CEIP's interest also extended to ensuring America was understood abroad. In 1920, CEIP's Division of Intercourse and Education reviewed and collected official statements by past US presidents and Secretaries of State "...which have been formally or tacitly accepted by the American people and ....therefore constitute the foundation of *American Foreign Policy*..."<sup>74</sup> This publication was also circulated around the world. The Division also published a book, *Soldiers and Sailors of France in the American War for Independence*, which was circulated in France and the USA "as...more evidence of how much the two countries have in common."<sup>75</sup>

The Rockefeller Foundation's grant giving also reflected the organization's interest in promoting worldwide health and knowledge exchange. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the foundation used grants and fellowships to advocate for the development of state and local health boards as well as the implementation of health education in schools and industry internationally.<sup>76</sup> The RF also encouraged free exchange of knowledge, particularly in the areas of natural science and medicine. In this work, the RF worked with the League of Nations to support exchanges between public health personnel, physicians, and scientists. The objective was to break down national barriers to allow scientists and physicians opportunities to collaborate and find solutions for the betterment of international society. Following WWI, the RF received reports from their representatives in Europe of the great need for laboratory equipment and access to medical and scientific journals. European medical schools could not afford to subscribe to journals and purchase other publications as they had prior to the war. The Rockefeller Foundation's Division of Medical Education (DME) began an initiative to provide British and American journals to countries in need. Under the terms of the program, the DME would not allow requests for French journals or any publications not directly related to medical science.<sup>77</sup>

Private foundations, societies, and citizens tended to support programs which championed their policies and ideas, so peace societies advocated for peace generally and arbitration more specifically. CEIP encouraged the development and solidification of an international order premised on international law. RF advocated for world health initiatives "for the benefit of humanity"<sup>78</sup> as identified by the board of trustees and advisors. The IIE encouraged academic exchanges as a way to ensure



international understanding and education about world affairs. The ideas advocated tended to promote American ideas of internationalism and culture.

The US government did develop a form of advocacy in 1934 with the establishment of the Information Service. On July 27, 1934, Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a circular announcing the formation of the Information Service within the Department of State. The information provided by the service would fall into three categories: Confidential, Background, and Attribution. Background information was to be used to freely, but not attributed to the DoS, the Secretary of State, or any officer of the government. Information categorized for Attribution was any information attributed to the President, the Secretary of State, DoS, or some specific named individual. This heralded the start of what is better known as the Wireless File or Washington File, which would be an integral part of US informational public diplomacy under the US Information Service (USIS).

Secretary Hull asked for constructive suggestions on how to improve the service as operations began. Hull was "...convinced that there exists a need in the field for more comprehensive data concerning both [US] domestic affairs and [US] foreign relations."<sup>79</sup> Most US foreign service officers expressed appreciation for the new service, declaring the need to explain American policies abroad, not just to foreign government officials, but also the local press and to the people of the host nation.

*There have been many times during even my short period of service in the Field when accurate information concerning the policies of our Government would have been extremely helpful to myself and fellow officers in shaping opinion in various circles abroad concerning the activities of the American Government, and in adequately answering the ever recurrent criticism of our Government and people, much of which arises through lack of understanding due to the absence of accurate information. The absence of such information has not infrequently been a source of embarrassment, since people abroad seemed to think that the representatives of the American Government were certainly informed of the policies and background of the actions of that Government at home. This has often not been the case...The ability to give publicity abroad to certain types of information emanating from high officials of the American Government...should be very helpful, it is believed, not only in creating a better understanding of America in foreign countries, but in demonstrating a cooperative attitude on the part of American Foreign Service officers in their contacts with Government officials, the press and*

influential organizations, and as a result of such demonstration may open up in turn to such officers new avenues of approach to a variety of subjects of interest to our Government.<sup>80</sup>

Vice Consul Perry Jester was intimating that by sharing information more openly with the press and local public, mutuality and trust could develop between the US legation and the host nation. He also went on to make two suggestions. He asked whether the Information Service would be amenable to providing specific information on varied subjects at the request of the mission. Jester said US representatives are often asked “to speak intelligently on matters they are unfamiliar” with the host government. He also asked whether the Information Service would be able to provide publications and data on specific subjects as needed.

Here again is an example where US representatives in the field recognize the importance of interacting with the public of a nation in addition to the traditional role of engaging with the host government, just as the G. Howland Shaw noted in Istanbul. However, only certain individuals within the Department of State began to acknowledge this need and develop mechanisms to facilitate the needs of US representatives in the field to enable and facilitate foreign public engagement.

## PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXCHANGES

International exchange was perhaps the most overt and predominate feature of US foundations and private organizations engaging with people abroad. Many internationalists believed that with widespread international exchanges, people could get to know one another culturally, exchange knowledge, and diminish misunderstanding which could lead to conflict. Foundation programs were often designed to foster an international outlook, an awareness of international issues and different cultures. To this end, foundations emphasized cross-cultural exchanges.

From the beginning, CEIP had volunteered to support and arrange academic exchanges in response to the resolution passed at the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910. The RF also created fellowships and scholarships for students, scientists, teachers, and physicians the opportunity to work and study in the USA and other nations. The exchanges arranged by CEIP were not limited to students and academics either, they also set up exchanges between professionals such as lawyers, jurists, and journalists.<sup>81</sup> In the spring of 1929, European journalists from Italy,

Latvia, Spain, Yugoslavia, Belgium, France, Greece, and Poland were invited by the Division of Intercourse and Education to tour the United States and meet with their professional American counterparts, not unlike the tours arranged by the CPI during WWI.

All seem to feel that not only wider acquaintance with America and Americans has been attained, but that the association with each other has contributed to a clearer conception of the problems of the various European countries represented in the group. Each of the visitors has given publicity to happenings and impressions of his experiences through his own and through foreign newspapers. It seems apparent that advantages have been gained through this visit that could not have been gained in any other way.<sup>82</sup>

The trip resulted in a similar invitation issued to the United States for American journalists to tour Europe. American journalists were also invited to tour Japan, occupied Manchuria, and China, which CEIP also supported.

The Guggenheim Foundation also sponsored grants for fellowships to study in Latin America. The foundation was created in 1925 to provide grants to US citizens to conduct research in Latin America, but in 1929, the Guggenheims expanded the program to include grants to students and artists in Mexico desiring to study in the USA. In the fall of 1930, the Foundation announced additional grants for students and artists in Argentina and Chile. Cuba would be added soon to the list of countries eligible for grants. Arrangements for the grants were made through consultations with academics and business leaders in the recipient countries. As with each foundation, the grants and scholarships were guided by the Guggenheim Foundation's own objectives and policies.

The plan upon which these Fellowships are based embodies in my opinion fundamental considerations which are important for any intellectual exchange. Only individuals of superior ability should go abroad to pursue their studies. It is only the best which each of our several countries has to offer that should be passed on to others and only the best minds will be able to master the complicated conditions of study in another country and to profit by such study. It is inevitably upon such minds that we are dependent for better international understanding. To them we must look for the greatest improvements in social and economic conditions and upon them we are dependent for that progress in the intellectual and spiritual

realms which alone would make truly worthwhile so vast an enterprise as we are undertaking.<sup>83</sup>

The Guggenheim Foundation used academics and businessmen from both the US and Latin America to help set up and supervise student exchanges.

On the other hand, the IIE did not fund academic exchanges *per se*. The organization provided administrative assistance to facilitate exchanges and collected large amounts of information regarding academic institutions as well as any opportunities for studying or teaching abroad. IIE did help to manage many foundation gifts for students and teachers to study in the USA or overseas, including scholarships offered by CEIP, the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, and the RF.<sup>84</sup>

In addition to private US organizations, many foreign governments and foreign organizations were also eager to arrange exchanges. Foreign governments often elicited the US government's assistance in either establishing formal exchanges or requesting the American government select academic advisors to review their education system. These requests were frequently deferred to organizations such as the IIE, CEIP, and RF.<sup>85</sup>

## INTERWAR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND US STATECRAFT

The interwar period is an important epoch in the development of American public diplomacy. The most significant driver of foreign public engagement at the time was private foundations and organizations. Private entities were driven by internationalist ideas; they saw foreign public engagement as a way to foster internationalism more broadly as well as facilitating international cooperation through mutual exchange and understanding. The interwar period is also significant to understanding the issues and concerns expressed by government officials regarding the prospect of engaging with publics abroad. Some officials did not believe ambassadors and consuls were responsible for engaging with foreign publics, including Secretary of State Hull. Hull believed cultural activities should remain distinct from consular duties.<sup>86</sup> Others were concerned about obtaining funds for engagement programs or about the possibility of being accused of propagandizing. These issues relate to both organizational and conceptual problems identified in Chap. 1.

While private entities and the US government increasingly recognized the need for foreign engagement in American statecraft, integrating the practice and defining it became more and more difficult.

Additionally, the symbiotic relationship between private entities and the US government, which developed during the interwar period, presaged the framework for American public diplomacy eventually established after WWII. This case demonstrated how private entities and foundations helped with American foreign relations and foreign policy. As many of CEIP-, LSRMF-, and RF-supported groups and institutions backed the League of Nations, the foundations provided an indirect way for the US government to maintain relations unofficially. The US government provided foundations logistic support and in some cases, official backing. This symbiotic relationship deepens as the US government moves to establish foreign public engagement as a permanent part of American statecraft.

Much of the practices used by private entities to engage with people abroad throughout the 1920s and 1930s become standard practices for American public diplomacy. Frank Ninkovich noted how CEIP "... established what was to become the standard repertory of cultural relations: exchanges of professors and students, exchanges of publications, stimulation of translations and the book trade, the teaching of English, exchanges of leaders from every walk of life - all of these were to become the stock-in-trade of future governmental programs."<sup>87</sup> However, CEIP was not the only entity funding libraries, arranging international exchanges, and advocating the US in print. This chapter only highlights the activities of some of the larger foundations, though State Department records show that smaller civic groups were equally active in engaging with people all over the world.<sup>88</sup> These same individuals and groups will be called upon to advise and carry out what is thought of today as the start of American public diplomacy. Figure 6.1 details some of the many connections between not only the US government and private foundations, but also key people who remain integral to the development of American public diplomacy. Both the public-private relationship and the leading private entities which continued foreign public engagement throughout the interwar period are significant motifs of this study.

Figure 6.1 Compared with the two previous diagrams, this chart depicts how the public-private cooperative relationship became more complex and enlarged in the interwar period. There are also individuals




Fig. 6.1 Public-Private network and US public diplomacy, 1919–1938. *Source* Created by the author

and organizations which continue to facilitate the evolution of public diplomacy.

With the commencement of WWII in Europe the US government become more involved in American foreign public engagement. However, government officials recognized from the beginning that private entities will still be needed to engage with publics abroad. Therefore, the public-private relationship is solidified throughout WWII.

The culmination of foreign public engagement in the interwar period is the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Like the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910, members of the Pan American Union again gathered in Buenos Aires, and again, academic

exchanges were added to the agenda. This time, rather than simply passing a resolution for academic exchanges, the Department of State drafted a treaty for cultural exchanges. This formalization of cultural exchanges between the USA and Latin America was touted as another aspect of President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The effort was also viewed by both the US and other Latin American nations as a way to hold onto peace as Europe and Asia moved closer toward war.<sup>89</sup>

The treaty received Senate support shortly after the conference concluded and only required Congressional appropriation to fund the administration of the treaty.<sup>90</sup> Hence, discussions ensued as to which government department would be responsible for ensuring the treaty was administered and make the request to Congress for funding. Interestingly, there were several key figures within the Department of State who did not believe the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations should be administered by the State Department.

In the fall of 1937, about eight or nine months before the Division of Cultural Relations was established within the Department of State, a series of letters were exchanged between the Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, various State Department officers, and the Commissioner of the Office of Education in the Department of Interior. Donald Heath in the Division of American Republics wrote to Sumner Welles apprising him of a conversation he had with Dr. John W. Studebaker, Commissioner of the Office of Education. Dr. Studebaker informed Mr. Heath that his office requested Congressional funding to carry out the work required for the new Convention, and he expressed concerns that the Bureau of the Budget<sup>91</sup> might reject the request on the grounds that the work should be done by the Department of State.<sup>92</sup> Five days later, G.A. Butler of the Department of State replied to Heath and indicated that the State Department's Chief of the Budget Bureau, Charles Hosmer, knew nothing of the arrangement with the Office of Education. "[Heath] told [Hosmer] that all [he] knew was that Mr. [Laurence] Duggan had mentioned to [him] that an office to take charge of carrying out provisions of the Convention for the Promotion of Cultural Relations was to be set up in the Office of Education."<sup>93</sup> The following day, Under Secretary Sumner Welles wrote to Hosmer saying no agreement existed between the Office of Education or the Department of State with regard to the Convention. "In former conversations...with Dr. Studebaker during the past summer, [Welles]

expressed to him [his] own belief that the Office of Education was the appropriate office in the Government at the present time to handle the exchange of teachers and students with the other American Republics..."<sup>94</sup> Hosmer responded to Donald Heath the same day:

Subject to changing my views when I know more about the subject, they are as follow: (1) If the Office of Education is to handle exclusively the activities contemplated by the Convention and in a manner satisfactory to this Department and we require no funds to finance State Department activities in this connection, I believe we should support the Department of the Interior in obtaining an appropriation; although there is always a chance the Budget Bureau will not approve this arrangement even if we recommend it.

(2) If the State Department requires any funds to finance any activities of its own under the Convention, I think it would be preferable that the appropriation be under the administration of this Department.<sup>95</sup>

What makes this exchange interesting is not only that many within the DoS believed the implementation of the treaty should be managed by the Office of Education, but the fact that two of the leading champions of cultural relations within the DoS also believed the Office of Education should administer the treaty: Laurence Duggan and Sumner Welles. Furthermore, the exchange also demonstrates a rather narrow interpretation of the treaty. Heath, Hosmer, Welles, Duggan, Butler, and Studebaker all believed the sole purpose of the treaty was to ensure academic exchanges between the American republics. Based on this interpretation, the Office of Education was perhaps the best government department to manage the administration of the treaty. As the following chapter will discuss, while plans got underway to develop a government office to carry out the new Convention, the plan for simply ensuring academic exchanges expanded into a full program of foreign public engagement which included cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting alongside exchange diplomacy.

The next chapter looks at three US agencies which were created to engage with people abroad. Though President Roosevelt and those working in the Division of Cultural Relations, the Office of War Information, and the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs believed their missions were different, the agencies' operations often overlapped. This further complicates conceptualization of foreign



public engagement, as well as determining its role in American statecraft. Moreover, the underlying intent behind the engagement becomes tangled with US concerns about national security and economic priorities, and less interested in developing friendly relations. While highlighting these issues, the last case continues to build on the themes of communication, the public-private relationship, and methods of engagement.

## NOTES

1. Translation attached to Despatch No. 700: NARA, M1457, R10, 854.42711/1.
2. No. 183, August 16, 1920, NARA, M1457, R10, 854.428/1.
3. Ibid.
4. George C. Herring, 2008. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford University Press: New York, NY).
5. Emily S. Rosenberg, 1982. *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (Hill and Wang: New York).
6. F.A. Ninkovich, 1981. *The diplomacy of ideas: U.S. foreign policy and cultural relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge University Press: New York, NY), pp. 22–23.
7. Katharina Rietzler, February 2011. “Before the Cultural Cold War: American philanthropy and cultural diplomacy in the interwar years,” *Historical Research*, vol. 84, p. 154.
8. Rietzler (2011); NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5069, 811.43/68.
9. Akira Iriye, 1997. *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Maryland); Sondra Herman, 1969. *Eleven Against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898–1921* (Hoover Institution Press: Stanford, California).
10. Iriye (1997); Warren F. Kuehl, 1969. *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Vanderbilt University Press: Nashville).
11. Warren F. Kuehl, and Lynne K. Dunn. 1997. *Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920–1939* (Kent State University Press: Kent, Ohio).
12. *International Conciliation*, 1919, p. 167.
13. Ibid.
14. Iriye (1997); Katharina Rietzler, 2009. “American Foundations and the ‘Scientific Study’ of International Relations in Europe, 1910–1940,” University College of London.
15. Kuehl (1969, pp. 299–300).

16. Herring (2008); Kuehl (1969); Kuehl and Dunn (1997).
17. Kuehl (1969).
18. President Wilson is credited with adding Article X, a modern version of collective security (Kuehl 1969).
19. According to Warren Kuehl, the commissioners involved in drafting the Covenant intentionally made no reference to The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration created in 1899 at The Hague Peace Conference because they deemed it to be a failure (1969). This sentiment may be due to the widespread and terrible violations of international law which occurred throughout WWI. There were many who believed international law was unsalvageable (Rietzler 2009).
20. Justiciable refers to a case which can be determined by a court. A non-justiciable case would not be referred to a court. These issues were important to many internationalists, especially those who favoured legal internationalism. An accepted understanding of what qualified as a justiciable case and what did not was crucial for differentiating matters which were the domestic prerogative of a state versus those which were truly a matter for international evaluation.
21. Kuehl and Dunn (1997).
22. In his 1928 article, Roosevelt argued that “since the war our [America’s] attitude is that we do not need friends and that the public opinion of the world is of no importance” (p. 582). He raised the issue of America’s repeated interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the most recent intervention in Nicaragua. He noted that the USA is “... exceedingly jealous of our own sovereignty and it is only right that we should respect a similar feeling among other nations” (1928, p. 584). While applauding Presidents Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge to end US occupation of several Latin American and Caribbean nations, more was needed to restore faith and friendship between the USA and Latin America (Roosevelt 1928).
23. Robert Dallek 1995. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945*, (Oxford University Press: USA).
24. Dallek (1995, p. 11).
25. Dallek (1995); Elliot A. Rosen, 1966. “Intranationalism vs. Internationalism: The Interregnum Struggle for the Sanctity of the New Deal,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 81.
26. There are a series of reports scattered throughout the State Department archives at NARA: M1457, R23, 854/4; 854.43 Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales/1; 854.43 Geneva School of International Studies/1; RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5069, 811.43/66; Box 5069, 811.43/68. These will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.

27. US Ambassador in Paris, Jesse Isidor Strauss reported having several meetings with Mariano H. Cornejo, former Peruvian minister in Paris and ex-member of the Council of the League Nations. Cornejo wrote a book, *La Lutte pour la Paix*, which he wanted CEIP to buy from him and publish in English and Spanish. Ambassador Strauss forwarded a copy of Cornejo's book to Nicholas Murray Butler, President of CEIP. Butler replied to Strauss and explained that due the decreased value of the dollar, CEIP has been prohibited in making their usual expenditures abroad (NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 5070, 811.43 C 21/10).
28. Iriye (1997).
29. Samuel Guy Inman, 1965. *Inter-American Conferences 1826-1954: History and Problems* (The University Press of Washington, D.C. and the Community College Press Washington, D.C.), p. 160.
30. Dallek 1995; Inman 1965.
31. "Voluntary Report: Swiss-American Societies in Zurich," March 26, 1931, NARA, M1457, R23, 854.43/4.
32. NARA, M1457, R23, 854.43/4.
33. No. 526, February 27, 1933, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 5069, 811.43/66.
34. The Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales was established in Geneva in 1927. The project for setting up the Institute was pitched to the Laura Spelman-Rockefeller Memorial Fund. The Fund promised financial support for 10 years starting January 1930, initially \$85,000 and rising to \$114,000. Many of the faculty at the Institut were also connected to the League of Nations. Elihu Root and James Brown Scott both served on the Honorary Committee for the Institut as well (No. 983, Geneva, August 28, 1934, M1457, R23, 854.43 Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales/1; "Institut des Hautes Études Internationales Programme," 1924, NARA, M560, R50, 851.42711/29).
35. The school was organized by Dr. Alfred Zimmern, a professor of International Relations at Oxford University, in 1924. John D. Rockefeller donated \$2,500 to the school in 1934. In addition, serving American ambassadors also made generous donations. US officials also either attended the Bureau d'Études Internationales or served as advisors. Laurence Duggan was a student and DoS historical advisor David Hunter Miller served on the school's Advisory Council (No. 995 Geneva, September 4, 1934, "The Geneva School of International Studies," NARA, M1457, R23, 854.43 Geneva School of International Studies/1).
36. No. 1421, October 2, 1935, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 5069, 811.43/68.

37. The four part policy developed slowly overtime and was continued throughout the interwar period. First, the USA would never become a member. Second, private citizens could participate in League work as long as they acted in an unofficial capacity and made no claim to represent the US government. Third, official government participation would take place where a special interest was at stake or when it was to the advantage of the USA to cooperate. Fourth, any contact would be evaluated based on their merit. Representation would never be automatically assumed (Kuehl and Dunn 1997).
38. No. 1421, October 2, 1935, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5069, 811.43/68.
39. 811.43/68; The League of Nations placed an embargo on munitions to Paraguay and Bolivia in an attempt to diffuse their ongoing dispute over the Chaco Boreal territory.
40. Kuehl and Dunn (1997).
41. Referring to the League of Nations and the International Labor Office.
42. No. 983, August 28, 1934, NARA, M1457, R23, 854.43 Institut Universitaire de Hautes Internationales/1, emphasis added.
43. Rietzler 2009.
44. Up until 1928, the RF's focus remained entirely on science. In 1928, the LSRFM was subsumed into the RF. The RF continued to support the same programs LSRFM had previously (Rietzler 2009; *The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1929*).
45. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 4527/4528, 800.04418/6.
46. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5070, 811.43 Council on Foreign Relations/34; Ironically, Consul J.V.A. MacMurray wrote to DoS to complain about the 1929 Political Handbook of the World. He noted that “little use seems to have been made by the Council [on Foreign Relations] of the outline submitted by the Legation in 1928. James Orr Denby, consul in Peiping, also complained about the handbook. “I venture to inform you that I felt a great disappointment, on receiving a copy of the 1929 issue of the ‘Political Handbook of the World’, to note that the editors have apparently endeavored to force the structure of the Chinese Government into a general mold with the result that the Handbook’s section on China is almost without meaning” (Denby to Howland September 13, 1929, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5070, 811.43 Council on Foreign Relations/34).
47. No. 183, August 16, 1920, NARA, M1457, R10, 854.428/1.
48. The Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Medical Education conducted regular surveys of ongoing foundation supported programs overseas as well as conducting surveys prior to initiating new programs (RF *Annual*

- Report 1923*; see also CEIP *Year Book 1921*; Rietzler 2009; RF *Annual Report 1925*).
49. CEIP *Year Book 1921*; CEIP *Year Book 1925*; CEIP *Year Book 1930*.
  50. IIE *First Annual Report 1920*.
  51. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
  52. An American living in Paris, Eleu Foster Cohu, complained to President Franklin Roosevelt about the attitude of the American ambassador in France and his attitude toward cultural relations with the French when he refused to attend a concert of American music performed by French musicians. According to Cohu, the third secretary of the Embassy said “Yes of course we know that the French government backs its artists in foreign countries—but that didn’t keep Austria from fighting France, did it?” The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs in the DoS sent a reply, assuring Cohu that the USA always seeks to encourage American artists both domestically and abroad (February 19, 1936, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5062, 811.42751/34).
  53. No. 478, August 4, 1925, NARA, M1457, R19, 854.911/10.
  54. 854.911/10.
  55. *Ibid.*
  56. *Ibid.*, emphasis added.
  57. *Ibid.*
  58. *Ibid.*
  59. Unfortunately, the personal letter written to Mr. Gibson was not included in any of the archival records consulted for this research.
  60. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 4656, 800.911/33A.
  61. 800.911/33A.
  62. *Ibid.*
  63. *Ibid.*, emphasis added.
  64. Unsigned, n.d., NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5064, 811.42767/78.
  65. September 24, 1936, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5064, 811.42767/78.
  66. 811.42767/78.
  67. Unsigned, September 29, 1936, 811.42767/78.
  68. October 2, 1936, 811.42767/79.
  69. October 2, 1936, 811.42767/79.
  70. Inderjeet Parmar, 2012. *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (Columbia University Press: New York, NY); Rietzler (2009); Rietzler (2011).
  71. Parmar (2012).
  72. CEIP *Year Book 1921*.

73. Publications such as *International Conciliation* and *Advocate of Peace* were distributed to libraries and institutions around the world which requested materials from CEIP. The *Year Book 1925* includes expressions of gratitude for *International Conciliation* from a New Zealand MP and an Australian Premier (pp. 68–69).
74. CEIP *Year Book 1921*, p. 47.
75. Ibid.
76. RF *Annual Report 1923*; RF *Annual Report 1929*.
77. Susan Gross Solomon, 2003. “The Power of Dichotomies’: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Medical Education, Medical Literature, and Russia, 1921–1925.’ in Giuliana Gemelli and Roy MacLeod (eds.), *American Foundations in Europe: Grant Giving Policies, Cultural Diplomacy, and Trans-Atlantic Relations, 1920–1980* (P.I.E. - Peter Lang: Brussels, Belgium).
78. The Rockefeller Foundation motto.
79. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 232, 111.33 Information Service/7.
80. No 269, American Vice Consul Barbados, July 28, 1934, NARA, RG 59 CDF 1930–1939, Box 232, 111.33 Information Service/19, emphasis added.
81. CEIP *Year Book 1930*.
82. CEIP *Year Book 1930*, p. 47.
83. President of Swarthmore College, Dr. Frank Aydelotee, Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Guggenheim Foundation, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5048, 811.42710 Guggenheim Foundation/3.
84. Liping Bu 1999. “Cultural Understanding and World Peace: The Roles of Private Institutions in the Interwar Years,” *Peace and Change*, vol. 24.
85. In May 1934, Dr. Moses Bensabat Amzalak, Director of the Institute of Economic Studies at the Technical University of Lisbon, and Dr. Francisco Antonio Correia from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Portugal met with US Ambassador R.G. Caldwell to create an American reading room in the university library as well as invite American professors to teach. Caldwell explained that such a scheme would be hard to arrange “on account of the organization of the American higher education, it would not be easy to establish such relations with the United States directly through any government agency.” Caldwell suggested the men contact Dr. Stephen Duggan of the IIE to make such arrangements (NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5062, 811.42753/3). Also, in November 1932, the Siamese government requested the DoS help to recommend American professors in civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and mathematics to help the government improve education in their country. The DoS replied that the Siamese

- minister in the USA was asked to contact Dr. Stephen Duggan of the IIE to find instructors needed by Siam (NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5065, 811.42792/52).
86. Telegram #73, April 9, 1935, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 5064, 811.426765/45.
  87. Ninkovich 1981, p. 12.
  88. There were many organizations in the USA and around the world which were eager to establish international engagement among people of different nations. Some of the US organizations included the Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students, the ARC, the National League of Women Voters, the National Peabody Foundation for International Education Correspondence, the National Federation of Music Clubs, and the Foreign Policy Association (NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Boxes 5062–5073, 811.42741/21–811.43).
  89. The conference was actually called in response to the growing tensions in Europe and Asia, hence, the conference name: the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Inman 1965).
  90. Michael Francis Doyle, 1937. “Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, *The Document No. 328*,” *International Conciliation*, Vol. 18: pp. 197–289.
  91. The Bureau of Budget was part of the Department of Treasury and was responsible creating fiscal budgets based on each government departments’ funding requirements.
  92. NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 235, 111.46/3<sup>1/2</sup>
  93. Butler to Heath, November 8, 1937, NARA, RG 59, Box 235, 111.46/3<sup>1/2</sup>
  94. Welles to Hosmer, November 9, 1937, NARA, RG 59, Box 235, 111.46/3<sup>1/2</sup>
  95. Hosmer to Heath, November 9, 1937, NARA, RG 59, Box 235, 111.46/3<sup>1/2</sup>

## Public Diplomacy in Chaos and Ambiguity

*...a decision must be made as to the role of government in the international information programs and where the foreign office fits into the governmental program... 'Cultural Cooperation' and long range information are part of a whole single texture and should be treated as such.*

Archibald MacLeish, Information Service Committee Meeting Minutes,  
Department of State, January 4, 1945<sup>1</sup>

By the end of World War II, US leaders came to accept foreign public engagement as a tool of statecraft, though it remained unclear what role engagement should play. Now, with the war's end within sight, these individuals raised concerns about the future of American foreign public engagement. Though most agreed the practice should continue after the war's conclusion, each organization and individual involved all had their own ideas of what American foreign public engagement should and should not be. As Frank Ninkovich illustrates in his book *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, the conflicting ideas about the nature of cultural and information relations programs were not adequately resolved, even with the passage of Smith-Mundt in 1948. This case will outline the complicated history of how several pre-wartime and wartime agencies came to be consolidated into the Department of State by 1945, and how these different organizations helped to shape the future of American public diplomacy, highlighting some of the endemic problems which still plague American public diplomacy today as well as connecting to past cases.



On the eve of WWII, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) created offices and agencies to engage with foreign publics, marking the start of foreign public engagement as a distinct and permanent part of American statecraft. In many instances, these offices and agencies were created out of concern for US national security, not to improve US foreign relations. This becomes significant as more agencies are tasked to engage with people abroad and, in attempting to coordinate operations with other agencies also engaging with foreign publics, different views about the purpose and role such engagement should play in statecraft come to the fore.

The origins and work of Division of Cultural Relations (DCR), the Office of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), and the Office of War Information (OWI) illustrate how each agency was created to implement specific foreign policies and attain more general foreign policy objectives without determining any policy for the use of foreign public engagement, resulting in confusion and ambiguity regarding what role foreign public engagement should play in American statecraft. This is also made apparent in the opposing perspectives about how foreign public engagement should be used in American statecraft, whether as a more diplomatic tool or weapon of war, control, and influence, and how these differing views were left unresolved and became ingrained into American public diplomacy. This chapter will analyze the creation and demise of these agencies in the context of the previous cases, highlighting recurring issues and patterns where appropriate, bringing to light new perspectives toward not only this particular epoch in American foreign public engagement, but also toward American public diplomacy in the present day.

The history of these agencies has been recounted previously by both scholars and the officers who worked in the agencies.<sup>2</sup> What is interesting about each of these historical accounts is the discussion of the relationship and distinction between foreign relations, foreign policy, diplomacy, and foreign public engagement.<sup>3</sup> This is key to understanding the role of foreign public engagement in American statecraft. Over the course of the decade from 1938 to 1948, this question and the relationship between foreign public engagement and foreign policy and foreign relations becomes more and more indistinct, compounded both by the multiple agencies handling foreign public engagement, WWII, and the onset of the Cold War.

In Justin Hart's analysis, he differentiates between foreign relations, foreign policy, and diplomacy, by distinguishing diplomacy as being contacts between officially designated representatives of nations. Foreign policy is a government's "formal" approach to the world, and foreign relations is the sum total of a nation's contact with governments and people of other nations.<sup>4</sup> Cull's own analysis coincides with Hart's observing that "[what] would eventually be known as US public diplomacy would always tend to be seen as a tool for the enactment of foreign policy rather than a dimension of foreign-policy-making as a whole."<sup>5</sup> Thomson does not seem to make a distinction between either foreign relations or foreign policy, as he describes information to be an instrument of both.<sup>6</sup> Yet he makes a clearer distinction in his declaration that the US government "*must* decide clearly what the main objectives of its information work shall be ... a program designed to spread information, understanding, and culture for their own sake; or ... a program designed to use information and cultural relations for national objectives."<sup>7</sup> In this statement, Thomson is making the distinction between information work as either a tool of foreign relations generally or a tool to attain foreign policy objectives without direct reference to either term. Ninkovich makes a similar observation, noting the subtle change in how the US government handled cultural relations around the middle of 1941:

...the need to expand the program and the new short-term orientation toward immediate results placed inexorable pressures upon the informal system of policy and administration to give way to a greater degree of governmental control. The result was that the traditional conceptions of the legitimate role of governmental cultural activities—*whether of the national interest or the liberal universalist variety*, both of which emphasized reciprocity and the primacy of the private sector in policy and administration—were challenged in nearly every one of the United States' overseas cultural activities.<sup>8</sup>

Now Hart argues that this change was spurred by "policymakers recognition that US foreign relations had entered a new era in which the US government could no longer remain indifferent to perceptions of the United States abroad."<sup>9</sup> As a result of this view, US leaders now saw a requirement to project America's image abroad. However, as the previous cases have already demonstrated, US leaders were interested in the image America projected abroad, but within the confines of American

political tradition left the projection of America's image largely in private hands, preferring not become involved. Though there were indeed *some* officials within the US government who did see the need to pay more attention to America's image overseas, the reasons behind creating the Division of Cultural Relations, the CIAA, and the OWI were not due to concerns about America's perceived image abroad. Rather, the CIAA and OWI were both created to obviate national security concerns, and although the Division of Cultural Relations was arguably a manifestation of the Good Neighbor Policy, the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance for Peace was primarily called in response to the growing tensions in Europe and the fighting in Asia. As all these agencies were created with specific intent and objectives in mind, this forced each organization, the Division of Cultural Relations, CIAA, and OWI, to interpret their own connection to either foreign policy or foreign relations. With some agencies, this connection was still disputed when all of them were consolidated into the DoS in 1945.

Using methods of engagement to compare and contrast the Division of Cultural Relations, the CIAA, and the OWI, this case will reveal the tensions and analogous operations between each of the agencies.<sup>10</sup> As will become increasingly apparent, all three agencies used news, film, books, libraries, music, cultural centers, and exchanges to achieve their objectives. Thus, the discussion of this chapter will focus more on what each agencies objectives were as well as what the agencies believed they were doing and how using news, films, books, and libraries helped to attain these objectives. The different attitudes in each agency become increasingly relevant when all three agencies are consolidated into the Department of State in 1945 and impact the tortuous journey to the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 with implications for the future of US public diplomacy.

## FINDING A PLACE FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS IN THE US GOVERNMENT

By December 1937, key figures within the DoS still planned to give the Office of Education the responsibility of managing educational exchanges as prescribed by the recently ratified treaty for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. In fact, the DoS suggested creating a bureau within the Office of Education which would answer to

the DoS vice the Department of Interior, guided by DoS policies and by a Directive Council comprised of both government and private representatives.<sup>11</sup> However, 2 months later, the DoS reconsidered plans to create an interdepartmental bureau, as “experience has indicated that where control over an office is lodged in two or more departments or agencies the administration of that office usually suffers.”<sup>12</sup> Furthermore and perhaps most significant, the DoS noted “the necessity for final policy decisions in all matters directly affecting the conduct of international relations to rest with the Secretary of State...*the Bureau of Inter-American Cultural Relations...will be active in a field which, while not classically associated with foreign affairs, under modern conditions is very directly related to foreign affairs.*”<sup>13</sup> Whether the Office of Education or another agency handled the exchanges with Latin America, the DoS wanted to maintain full control over US foreign relations and foreign policy. The primacy of the Department with regard to foreign relations and foreign policy would continue to be a source of contention once the CIAA and OWI were created. Since experience showed the inefficacy of inter-agency office, the only solution was to create an office within the Department of State.

Only at this point did Laurence Duggan voice his agreement that the proper place for an office to manage US education exchanges should be in the State Department, though he did warn that such an agency would be viewed by some as a propaganda agency.

The establishment of an independent office for the promotion of cultural activities may be greeted in certain quarters with disapproval on the ground that the new office is to engage in propaganda. It seems to me that if information with regard to the establishment of this office is properly presented to the press this type of criticism could be minimized. Moreover, what little [criticism] there may be I feel confident will in time disappear when the press and the public become aware of the real activities of the division. *It has always been my idea that such a division would not engage in competition [sic] propaganda* but would endeavor solely, carefully and meticulously to construct solid foundations for cultural interchange.<sup>14</sup>

Duggan also envisioned a division which merely established the infrastructure and mechanism for exchange. In discussions among key officers of DoS, including Duggan, Sumner Welles, and George Messersmith, the new division and its primary objectives would be

mainly administrative. There was no connection to national policy, nor any idealistic internationalism expressing the aspiration for greater international cooperation. As plans moved forward to create a division within the Department of State to administer the Buenos Aires treaty<sup>15</sup> on educational exchanges, the scope of the office broadened to include not only student exchanges, but cultural relations more broadly.

Once the Department of State determined the office should be created within the Department rather than Department of Interior, the DoS hosted a conference “to consider the activities of private organizations and Government agencies with a view to formulating some coordinated program for the promotion of cultural relations between the United States and the other American Republics.”<sup>16</sup> According to Ninkovich the DoS intended that the policies of cultural relations should remain in private hands: citizens and organizations. The State Department envisioned a role as both administrator and coordinator, leaving the actual operations of cultural engagement to private entities.

While creation of the Division indicates recognition by Government that it has a contribution to make in this field [of cultural relations], *the function of the new Division will not be to supplant in any degree the significant activities toward international understanding now carried on by colleges, universities, foundations, institutes, and other private agencies*, but rather to render those activities more effective by the provision of an official agency *erving as a clearing house for exchange of information and a center of coordination and cooperation.*<sup>17</sup>

The DoS assured private entities would remain the primary agents for US cultural relations; however, by mid-1941 private organizations were fading into the background with regard to cultural policymaking and funding.<sup>18</sup>

## A PROFUSION OF INFORMATION AGENCIES

The motivation to create the forerunners to the OWI and CIAA did not originate with FDR. “Roosevelt’s reservations ensured that the first attempts to establish any propaganda network would be halting and hesitant ...”<sup>19</sup> Hence, the ideas for Office for the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (OCCCAR), Coordinator of Information (COI), the Office of Facts

and Figures (OFF), the Office of Government Reports (OGR), and the Foreign Information Service (FIS) were generally the ideas of individuals close to FDR. The other reason for the creation of some these agencies stemmed from growing concerns about the war in Europe and Asia, as well as a way for FDR to bolster American defenses without raising criticism from isolationists and Republicans.<sup>20</sup>

Just five days after Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand declared war on Germany in September 1939, FDR signed an Executive Order (EO) establishing the Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The office was to act as a clearinghouse and public liaison regarding defense matters. Also created with OEM was the OGR which was to provide the public with information about government activities as well as keeping the government informed about public reactions to their activities.<sup>21</sup>

Meanwhile, as the Nazis made advances across Europe from September 1939 up through the spring of 1940, the US government sought to bolster American hemispheric security with the creation OCCCAR in August 1940.<sup>22</sup> “As the character and probable outcome of the European war changed in the spring and summer of 1940, the President, recognizing the acute character of both the immediate and long run aspect of our trade relations with Latin American countries, created a Cabinet Committee on Inter-American Economic Affairs ...”<sup>23</sup> US policymakers believed that approximately 55% of Latin American exports were purchased by Europeans. With the onset of war in Europe, American leaders anticipated the reduced purchasing power and priorities for Latin American exports would destabilize not just Latin America’s economy, but also America’s economy. This concern about the stability of Latin America’s economy in light of the ongoing war in Europe was in part predicated on past experience with WWI.<sup>24</sup> These apprehensions coincided with FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. Now, in 1940 the policy became more concerned with US national and economic security as a bulwark against Nazi influence and potential invasion; whereas in 1933 the policy emphasized diplomacy and creating goodwill between the peoples of Latin America and the USA.

The events of the last few months have brought the peoples of this hemisphere face to face with a new and a very different kind of world. Our answer in the Americas has been to choose preparedness as the road to peace. We are going to become strong enough to protect ourselves against any emergency that may arise... Within this hemisphere, we are convinced that the best way to prevent an aggressor nation from succeeding in its

policy of divide and conquer is to protect the American republics from the economic and political consequences of having to deal with that power on its own terms.<sup>25</sup>

The Council of National Defense created the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations under the authority of the Council on August 16, 1940. Though subordinate to the Council of National Defense, the Coordinator, Nelson Rockefeller, was to report directly to the President.<sup>26</sup> Almost exactly a year later, the Council of National Defense disestablished the Office for the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics, and President Roosevelt created the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) with an EO.<sup>27</sup> The EO did two things, first the CIAA was placed under the direct authority of the President. Second, the EO connected US commercial *and cultural relations* to national security and defense. According to the EO, the CIAA was to “[serve] as the center for coordination of the cultural and commercial relations of the Nation affecting Hemisphere defense.”<sup>28</sup>

Also of significance is the fact that CIAA was created alongside an already operational Division of Cultural Relations engaged in essentially the same task: cultural relations with Latin America. As the earlier quote from Frank Ninkovich observes, the perceived threat to national and economic security required more expedient results than the small and slow program created by the DCR.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, the CIAA maintained a direct line to the President, while the Chief of the DCR reported to an Undersecretary who reported to an Assistant Secretary of State before finally getting to the Secretary of State and the then President. Additionally, the CIAA was well-funded,<sup>30</sup> while the DCR was unable to do much beyond encourage private entities in their ongoing operations.<sup>31</sup> And finally, under the language of the EO, the CIAA seemed to hold policymaking authority when it came to both commercial and cultural relations:

...[It] shall be the policy of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs to collaborate with and to utilize the facilities of existing departments and agencies which perform functions and activities affecting the cultural and commercial aspects of Hemisphere defense. *Such departments and agencies are requested to cooperate with the Coordinator in arranging appropriate clearance of proposed policies and measures involving the commercial and cultural aspects of Inter-American affairs.*<sup>32</sup>

This would prove to be a point of contention never adequately resolved between the Department of State and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller.

As the CIAA transformed from the OCCCAR, another office was created in July 1941: Coordinator of Information. After a fact-finding mission to Europe in 1940, Colonel Bill Donovan returned to report to the President that America needed a central intelligence agency which could carry out special operations and counter Axis propaganda.<sup>33</sup> When the COI was created, the organization's primary functions were to "collect and analyse all information and data, which may bear upon national security," and ensure the intelligence and analysis was disseminated to the President and any government agency as determined by the president.<sup>34</sup> Shortly after FDR created the COI, the President granted the COI the authority to conduct psychological warfare through the Foreign Information Service (FIS). The idea for the FIS had come from Robert Sherwood, who had persuaded FDR that an organization like the FIS could tell the rest of the world about the aims and objectives of the American government and the American people.<sup>35</sup> The FIS was to collect all news from around the world, particularly in the theaters of war, and "to disseminate to the people of all nations intimate information currently and promptly of what the United States and Western Hemisphere were doing to overthrow the Axis."<sup>36</sup> Sherwood and his colleagues at FIS were soon at odds with Donovan. Donovan wanted to use information as a weapon of war, using rumor and misinformation to create disunity and confusion. Sherwood wanted to use only truthful information as he feared using lies would impair US credibility. Sherwood also insisted on civilian rather than military control, and he argued that foreign information should not be in the same organization which carried out secret espionage.<sup>37</sup>

In addition to the OGR, CIAA, COI, FIS, and the Division of Cultural Relations, the OFF was created. The OFF was established by Executive Order on October 24, 1941, "to facilitate a widespread and accurate understanding of the national war effort, and of the war policies and activities of the Government."<sup>38</sup> The Librarian of Congress, Archibald MacLeish,<sup>39</sup> was named as the director of OFF. Prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the OFF ensured facts and figures relating to national defense were made available to the public while also withholding any information which was deemed to aid the enemy. However, the OFF was not responsible for dissemination of information. The



organization conducted extensive research on public knowledge and compiled factual reports for distribution, but government agencies still maintained the responsibility and authority to distribute its own information. The OFF simply offered guidance on subject matter and materials.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, FDR faced demands from the press and the leaders of the multiple “information” agencies to centralize US information operations.<sup>40</sup> Milton Eisenhower was tasked to survey US information agencies and outline a plan for centralization, but he was cautioned to avoid the type of centralization of authority held by the Committee on Public Information.<sup>41</sup> As plans moved forward for a central agency, Rockefeller insisted that the CIAA remain outside of the OWI with the explanation that information was part of his total program, combining culture and commercial relations. Sumner Welles supported Rockefeller’s argument, while Harry Hopkins, and others in FDR’s administration opposed CIAA’s exclusion, but FDR eventually sided with Rockefeller. Colonel Donovan also objected to incorporating the COI into any central organization, arguing that propaganda was a weapon of war.<sup>42</sup> Initially, Donovan got his way. The COI was dissolved effectively with the creation of the OWI and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The FIS of COI, OGR, and OFF were all consolidated into the OWI. The remaining parts of the COI were incorporated into the OSS. Figure 7.1 depicts both the evolution of the many organizations and the hierarchy of each agency within the US government.

Figure 7.1 The figure illustrates the organization hierarchy for US foreign public engagement agencies from 1937 through 1948, while also depicting the changes these organizations underwent during the period.

By 1942, the USA had at least three organizations engaging with foreign publics. These agencies are important to the development of public diplomacy as a tool of American statecraft. By the end of WWII, these three organizations become consolidated into the DoS, as policymakers debated about whether to keep foreign public engagement as a permanent function of the state. Once the Smith-Mundt Bill of 1948 was passed by Congress, the former OWI, CIAA, and Division of Cultural Relations remain as a permanent part of America’s public diplomacy apparatus.




Fig. 7.1 Information agencies' organization within the US government, 1938–1948. *Source* Created by the Author

### LISTENING WITH THE OWI, CIAA, AND THE DIVISION OF CULTURAL RELATIONS

Unlike the CPI, the three agencies did not consistently connect listening to inform long-term policy.<sup>43</sup> The CIAA and OWI did use information gathered in the field to help shape their operations overseas, but they did not use it for longer term strategic objectives, such as US policy after the war. The DCR's circumscribed mission and budget also inhibited any significant control or contribution to policymaking. This is not say that the OWI and CIAA did not intend to or did not try, but rather they were prohibited from influencing or informing higher policy, from participating in the policymaking process.<sup>44</sup> From 1941 through 1943, this was often a point of contention between the CIAA, the DoS, and the OWI.

The DCR relied heavily on private organizations already conducting a foreign public engagement in Latin America, especially in the first few years of the Division's existence, to gather information on public sentiment. For example, Dr. Carl Milam of the American Library Association (ALA) traveled to Mexico to establish an American library.<sup>45</sup> Dr. Milam interviewed local Mexicans and Americans regarding how the advisory board for the library should be arranged. He "found a divergence of opinion as to the proper composition of the directing Board."<sup>46</sup> Dr. Milam also asked locals about what types of books should be included in the new library. Mexicans wanted books about the US translated into Spanish. In a similar example, the Director of the Hispanic Foundation, Dr. Lewis Hanke, went on a 3-month tour of Latin America to survey the book market in Latin America.<sup>47</sup> In the course of his survey, Dr. Hanke spoke with local publishers and government officials about US books, discussed agreements with Latin American publishers to obtain rights to translate and publish certain US books, and arranged for Latin American books to be sold in the USA.<sup>48</sup>

Due to the initial interpretation of the government's role in the realm of foreign public engagement as assumed by the Division of Cultural Relations, the DCR did not prioritize nor initiate listening.

There are numerous private agencies for international intellectual cooperation in this country, many of them doing a splendid work. There is a lack, however, of adequate coordination, toward the working out of a clearcut [sic] and long-range policy.<sup>49</sup>

Listening remained in private hands, as the DCR conceived of its role as a coordinator. However, the DCR's program did emphasize reciprocity. In ensuring cultural and educational exchanges remained reciprocal, the DCR relied on Latin American governments and private organizations to tell them what types of exchanges they wanted to start. With books and book translations, the DCR with the ALA compiled bibliographies of available books, allowing libraries and institutions in Latin America to choose what books they would like to purchase or borrow. Furthermore, the DCR received information from US embassies, consuls, and legations throughout Latin America regarding different aspects of their program and plans.<sup>50</sup>

The CIAA gathered information regarding local sentiments in two ways. First, the CIAA's Communications Division created a "public

opinion reporting service” throughout Latin America. This service was facilitated by the American Association of Advertising Agencies using American businesses Export Information Bureau in each country.<sup>51</sup>

These offices will conduct research for the purpose of improving our knowledge of markets and advertising media in these countries...This reporting service will employ the techniques of public opinion interviewing long used in this country in commercial marketing research...[The service] will constantly supply us with more accurate reports than are now available of the stats of public opinion in each country...[and] it will furnish a measurement of the attitudes in Latin American countries regarding our own points of view...It will furnish us with more accurate information than is now available about the channels of communication through the press, radio, and motion picture facilities in these countries.<sup>52</sup>

The reporting service conducted weekly public opinion measurements using the leading press in each country and operated listening posts for totalitarian radio propaganda. The Communication Division also surveyed Argentina and Brazil to determine how many people had radio sets; how many people listened to European and/or American broadcasts; what types of programs they preferred; and what hours people typically listened to help shape CIAA’s own broadcasting programs.

Prior to beginning a series of short films for CIAA, Walt Disney and Orson Welles both spent several months traveling throughout Latin America around 1941 as part of a CIAA-sponsored goodwill tour.<sup>53</sup> Orson Welles was invited by the Brazilian government to produce a film, *It’s All True*, in Rio de Janeiro with the support of CIAA.<sup>54</sup> Walt Disney proposed twelve pictures based on his travels throughout Latin America.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, the CIAA employed special advisers from Latin America. These advisers were Latin American specialists in economics, politics, and culture and advised Rockefeller and other division chiefs on policy and operations. The advisers were not representatives or affiliated with their native government, nor were they American citizens, which was especially important for advising the CIAA on opposition groups and ensure no material offended various segments of Latin America.<sup>56</sup>

The second way the CIAA gathered information on local populations throughout Latin America was by using coordinating committees. The committees were composed of private US citizens, and in some cases, the

committees predated the CIAA.<sup>57</sup> The committees worked with locals and occasionally local government officials to either initiate or run CIAA programs. The committees suggested programs for CIAA to fund based on their assessments of local needs in relation to CIAA's operating directive.<sup>58</sup> These coordinating committees functioned much like the OWI's own outpost offices.

OWI outposts were tasked with compiling reports and analysis for operational and planning purposes of the Overseas Branch as well as disseminating information and propaganda in their posted region. In describing the information gathering function of the outpost branch, the OWI likened their operations to those of an international business which must: "Do a competent job of market analysis as to the products of competitors (the enemy), analyze the likes and dislikes of the customers (the local population), and determine the sales appeal of its own product (radio, publications, movies, pictures, etc.)."<sup>59</sup>

The various outposts worked with the OWI's Central Intelligence Panel based in Washington, D.C. The Panel was responsible for "gathering, classifying and assaying all intelligence material in the waging of psychological warfare...[and] developing constantly all outposts as sources of intelligence material."<sup>60</sup> The Panel also liaised with other US agencies to obtain further information to guide OWI's operation and policy planning. Information gathering was not only used to formulate new campaigns, but also to determine the effectiveness of the OWI's materials.

In October of 1944, the Cairo outpost analyzed the impact of a series of booklets produced by the OWI which included *The American Worker and His Family* and *Life in America*. The books were published by the outpost in Arabic and distributed to individuals on a mailing list compiled by the OWI. Cairo's outpost assessed the impact of these booklets based on letters sent to the post from Egyptian workingmen asking for more copies. Between August and September of 1944, the outpost received 941 requests for copies of either booklet or both.

Not one of the letters dealing with *The American Worker* contained a word of adverse criticism. In a way we were disappointed to find that this was so, since we feel criticism can often be of help to use in our endeavor to improve the quality of our publications, but on the other hand it was

encouraging to find that so many people approved of the way in which we are carrying out our program.<sup>61</sup>

Trade unions throughout Egypt also wrote letters of appreciation to the outpost.<sup>62</sup>

All three agencies used listening primarily to support the immediate needs of their individual programs. The DCR relied on private organizations to conduct surveys to determine what was required to open a library, support a cultural center, initiate books translations and book exchanges, and what types of exchanges were of interest to people in Latin America. The CIAA and OWI used listening to shape their programs, determining the social and political environment of the people they would be engaging. This information was used for the immediate objectives of the CIAA's and OWI's programs. Yet as the leaders of both the CIAA and the OWI often remarked, the information they gathered never went beyond their own individual programs.

*It is not up to us to make policy. Our task is to carry it out...But, since we are the agency through which the US Government speaks to the people of Europe, and since we are in a position to know from day to day what the reactions to what is said by the Voice of America, it is our duty to raise this question in the minds of those who are responsible for policy...under our present policy instructions, we are unable to do our full job of softening up Europe for invasion, or of preparing Europe for permanent peace.*<sup>63</sup>

Nelson Rockefeller also became frustrated with the CIAA's exclusion from policy making. In a letter to Secretary of State Hull, Rockefeller criticized the Department for not inviting "this Office to participate in the formulation of foreign policy, nor have we deemed it our province to do so...," but Rockefeller felt it was his duty make suggestions in light of the serious situation in Latin America.<sup>64</sup> Rockefeller was also irritated by the lack of responsiveness and clarity with regard to US foreign policy. Both CIAA and OWI recognized their programs were limited in terms of their effectiveness while both organizations remained outside the policy-making process.

To an extent, the OWI and the CIAA accepted the State Department and US military's lead in the formation of policy, but they recognized the need to use the information they gathered on foreign public opinion

to *inform* policy. The effective block against the OWI and CIAA participating in policymaking contributed to the confusion and ambiguity about these agencies' role in American statecraft.

### WAR, FOREIGN POLICY, AND ADVOCACY

The frustrations of the CIAA and OWI were perhaps most felt in their attempts to advocate American policies overseas. In shutting the CIAA and OWI out of the policymaking process, the agencies were forced to constantly check to see what US policy was on particular issues. Given the changing international situation due to the war, US policies toward different nations often changed or were unclear. The DoS was slow to respond to queries from the OWI and CIAA which impacted their efforts to counter Axis propaganda.<sup>65</sup> Sometimes neither agency had a clear understanding of what US policy was regarding particular issues.

Aside from ensuring their advocacy efforts corresponded with US policy generally, the OWI and CIAA also had to contend with the Division of Current Information (DCI), an information office within the State Department. The DCI was "charged with maintenance of liaison between the Department and domestic and foreign press, the radio, the newsreels, and all governmental agencies concerned with the collection and dissemination of information in which the Department has an interest..." including "dissemination of information regarding the activities and policies of the Department and of the Government generally to American representatives abroad..."<sup>66</sup> The Division of Current Information was charged with clearing information for use abroad and providing policy directives for the COI and later the OWI.

While the COI still existed, Robert Sherwood wrote to Colonel Donovan raising concerns about the coordination between the FIS and the DoS. An FIS broadcaster, Stanley Richardson, had personal contacts within the DoS which he often used to rewrite and edit various policy directives which pertained to news broadcasts. "Mr. Richardson acts as censor of these stories on his account. He exercises the right to reject a story in toto, or revise it, according to his own judgement."<sup>67</sup> The problem came to a head over US policy toward the Vichy government in France.

On the morning of November 19th, the F.I.S. was advised by Mr. Pell of sensational developments in Vichy resulting in the retirement of General Weygand. Since this produced a considerable change in the whole attitude of the US government toward Vichy France, it was felt by Mr. Pell and our own staff that this change should be reflected instantly in American short-wave broadcasts to France – before the Nazis had time to anaesthetise the French with their own propaganda. It was Mr. Pell's suggestion that broadcasting to France could now take the strong tone which has for long reflected American opinion toward the Vichy government but which previously we have soft-pedalled because of our obligation to reflect the foreign policy of our government. The strong directive we had received from Mr. Pell was delivered to Mr. Richardson. He then consulted with his own contacts in the State Department and weakened the directive appreciably.<sup>68</sup>

This highlights two issues which remained obstacles for the OWI throughout the war. First, the OWI was reliant on the DoS to inform them of US foreign policy which often developed quickly and required quick response given the objectives of the OWI.<sup>69</sup> Second, though processes for coordination existed, policy planning and response to policy changes were developed within the DoS, often leaving OWI and even the CIAA in the dark about US policy. Personal politics and the DoS's own organizational nature also got in the way of any rapid decision making.<sup>70</sup> In this particular case, the Chief of the Division of Current Information, Michael McDermott, was Stanley Richardson's contact in the Department who overruled the OWI and Robert Pell.<sup>71</sup> Robert Pell was an Assistant Chief within the Division of Current Information and a part of the Planning Section, specializing in European Affairs. Based on Sherwood's memo to Colonel Donovan, Robert Pell and Michael McDermott did not agree on what the US policy stance should be toward the Vichy government. However, as Winkler explains, President Roosevelt and State Department did not have a clear policy stance toward the Vichy regime nor toward the Free French National Committee through much of the war.<sup>72</sup>

While both the CIAA and the OWI endeavored to resolve bureaucratic problems, the imperatives of the war required them to make the best of the situation. Both were able to use general information about America to advocate support for Allied and American policies. In a long-range



directive from 1943, the OWI encouraged field outposts to develop a material which explained America's history both in terms of the nation's government and culture. The idea was to "establish the feeling that the past actions of the United States in peace and war, despite inevitable shortcomings, failings, and blunders, and occasional wrongdoing, have been basically decent...by implication we can convey the idea that the United States has aligned itself with good causes and stood firmly against evil ones."<sup>73</sup>

To implement this, the OWI developed different ways to engage with different audiences, those who are literate as well as those who were illiterate. For audiences who could read, the OWI suggested the idea of distributing books on US history. For illiterate audiences, the Bureau arranged for items such as tea, dried bouillon, chocolate bars, soap, sewing kits, and match books to carry messages. Also, just as the CPI did in WWI, the OWI felt the most effective way of advocating US war and peace aims was to use the words of the nation's leaders, such as President Roosevelt, Vice President Henry Wallace, Secretary of State Cordell Hull as well as US military leaders. "It must be remembered that the people of most parts of the world today attach far greater importance than we do to immediate personalities rather than to traditional institutions such as the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, etc."<sup>74</sup>

The broad objective of the Communications Division in CIAA was "to secure a more effective use of these channels [of mass communication]...to form and influence Central and South American public opinion in ways more favorable to our Hemispheric defense policy."<sup>75</sup> The Communications Division of the CIAA was also responsible for counter-propaganda; correcting and resolving misunderstandings and myths between the USA and Latin America; to improve knowledge and understanding between the USA and Latin America; and "to give greater expression to the forces of good will between the Americas, in line with the Good Neighbor Policy."<sup>76</sup> For this, the CIAA produced "informative and documentary pamphlets" intended to "acquaint the other Americas with the war program, the life and the peace aims of the United States..."<sup>77</sup> The pamphlets distributed in Latin America "highlight hemisphere cooperation in the war, outline the progress of the United States war effort, explain how the people in the United States live and what they think, and deal with hemisphere peace aims and problems of the future." Just as the OWI used information about America's culture and history in their advocacy of American policies, the CIAA did the same. The CIAA also printed different materials for both educated and

uneducated audiences. For illiterate audiences, pamphlets in the form of cartoon strips were distributed. The cartoons told stories about US war leaders, war heroes, and heroes of democracy.

The advocacy of American policies and ideas was not only spread through published pieces such as pamphlets, magazines, and leaflets, but also via the radio and film. Again, much like the CPI, both organizations emphasized current or spot news as the best way to inform foreign audiences about US policies and to counter Axis information.<sup>78</sup>

### EXCHANGE DIPLOMACY AND COMPETING PRIORITIES

Exchange diplomacy is perhaps where all three agencies converged and often clashed the most. The OWI, CIAA, and DCR all used exchange diplomacy to meet various objectives; the intent and purpose of those exchanges were different for each agency. The CIAA actually categorized exchanges as *psychological warfare*, along with other engagement programs.<sup>79</sup> CIAA's fellowship and exchange program was "designed to stimulate exchanges in three major groups: young and adult students, creative workers in the arts and sciences, technicians, and administrators."<sup>80</sup> In 1941, the CIAA established the Roosevelt Fellowship program, which created an annual exchange of students, in addition to the exchanges already managed by the DCR under the terms of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. Ten students from the United States and twenty students, one from each American republic, travelled to the US to study.<sup>81</sup> Eventually, the program was transferred to the DCR, who delegated administration of the fellowship to the IIE. CIAA also worked with the Department of State and the Office of Education to survey Latin American schools. CIAA used the information to guide funding for educational projects such as book translations and distribution, teaching materials, and films to schools in Latin America as well as the USA. In Latin America, the education program sought "to increase among the people of the other American republics a knowledge not only of the United States but also of one another."<sup>82</sup>

Additionally, the CIAA-sponsored tours for journalists from Latin America, just as the CPI did during WWI. As with the CPI in 1918, the tours of Latin American journalists were intended to demonstrate US war preparations and military strength. The CIAA arranged for the journalists to interview government leaders as well as meet with American journalists and editors. The visits were intended to have a two-way effect.

While the journalists toured the USA, the CIAA ensured the US local and national press reported on the tour and the reception of the journalists. At the same time, the journalists were encouraged to file stories regarding their time in USA and what they had seen. “Extensive accounts written by the visiting journalists for their papers both while in the United States and after their return to their countries have made a deep impression in the other republics.”<sup>83</sup> Alongside these exchanges, the CIAA also developed “information” and “technical” exchange programs as part of their health and sanitation and economic programs.<sup>84</sup>

Ostensibly, the OWI’s objective was to facilitate the end of the war using propaganda and information; however, the OWI used exchange diplomacy to engage the people of other nations. OWI representative in India, Ralph Block, suggested Indian psychiatrist, Dr. K.R. Masani, be invited to the USA to learn about American psychiatric teaching and training. US consul, Howard Donovan, vehemently disagreed with Block’s suggestion.

It is the Consulate’s understanding that the proper activities of the United States Office of War Information in India relate to the field of war publicity and not to that of cultural relations. In the present instance, however, the United States Office of War Information has seen fit to interject itself into a sphere in which in my opinion it has neither the necessary authorization nor competence.<sup>85</sup>

Donovan went on to say that Dr. Masani was not “the type of Indian to whom an official invitation to visit the United States should be extended. Officers of this Consulate who know him are inclined to the belief that he is a man of only average competence who would like to further his personal ambitions by receiving the publicity which would probably accompany an officially sponsored journey to the United States.”<sup>86</sup> In another letter to the US Ambassador in New Delhi, Clayton Lane, Donovan explained that though Dr. Masani “holds several important-sounding positions...His competence in his chosen field has been described...as only fair.”<sup>87</sup> This exchange exposes not only the overlap between the Department’s exchange program and OWI’s exchanges, but also the elitist attitudes of the DoS as well as a perceived distinction between what the State Department was doing and what the OWI was doing. OWI used these exchanges as part of their *propaganda* campaign, while the State Department’s DCR argued exchanges managed by them were part of American *diplomacy* and *foreign relations*.

However, this claim that the DCR's exchanges were only implemented and intended to improve US foreign relations is questionable. The DCR was in essence responsible for two different types of exchange: technical and educational exchanges. In May 1938, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Cooperation (IDC)<sup>88</sup> was created to "encourage *cooperation* between the various governmental agencies and the American Republics in considering cultural and economic problems of mutual interest."<sup>89</sup> The DCR participated and often chaired the committee, which was distinct from the CIAA-chaired Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs,<sup>90</sup> though many of the same agencies were represented on both committees. One of the primary programs initiated under the IDC was a technical and expert exchange program. The exchanges received Congressional sanction with the passage of Public Law 63.<sup>91</sup> US government officials and experts could serve in an official capacity in the service of a Latin American government and officials from Latin America could come to the USA to work in a US government agency.<sup>92</sup> Under Public Law 63, experts were sent "to give advisory services in highway engineering and road building, immigration procedure, taxation and monetary problems, custom administration, the development of statistical services, fishery and library organization."<sup>93</sup> These exchanges ran parallel to the exchanges under the auspices of the DCR. Both types of exchanges emphasized reciprocity; however, due to the underlying assumptions and organizational directive of the IDC, the exchanges became less about international cooperation and more about extending American influence and markets.<sup>94</sup>

The word *cooperation* often used by internationalists from the start of the twentieth century up through the 1930s was used in a very different context by US officials. Cooperation became synonymous with technical assistance and development, especially among the officials on the IDC. Though there were those who wanted to ensure that any assistance provided to Latin American nations was only given based on requests and not forced upon nations,<sup>95</sup> the rather dubious assertion that technical assistance and development was mutual and altruistic caused the distinctions between cultural relations and hegemonic aspirations to become blurred, thus undermining the very purpose of cultural relations.

The word 'cooperation' is the keynote to our activities...*Effective international cooperation cannot exist unless there is an appreciation and understanding in each country of those problems in other countries which arise from*

*national customs, traditions, achievements, and philosophies of life.* Since these attributes of the people in each country are the fountain sources from which spring national policies, we must give them a prominent place in our international relations... *We have the task of learning to appreciate and understand the viewpoints, traditions, and customs of our neighbors in the other American republics and of making it possible for them to see our problems and ways of life – not by propaganda or proselyting, but rather by the joint execution of useful undertakings and through the personal associations incident thereto...*for there is no more effective basis for lasting international accord than mutual appreciation and respect among men and national governments.<sup>96</sup>

The underlying assumption in this statement is that the United States has problems which can be understood and cooperatively resolved with the assistance of other Latin American nations, just as cooperative assistance from the US can resolve problems throughout Latin America. Yet this was not put into practice. The way the technical exchanges were structured, US problems were not the focus. Cultural relations areas of “cooperation” included economic development, scientific investigation, social welfare, and intellectual activities within Latin America rather than in the USA.<sup>97</sup>

From the time discussions began within the Department of State in 1937 up through 1942, the participants of the General Advisory Council and those within the DCR itself concerned themselves primarily with how to execute the Convention of 1936. Most of their discussions focused on implementing exchange activities. Very little discussion was had regarding what these exchanges meant, what messages they conveyed, if any. Various members of the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation, however, sought to implement “exchanges” for several reasons: as a component of the Good Neighbor Policy; to obtain appropriations for various projects; and to promote American economic, commercial, and cultural power. Their plans and projects for “exchange” were implemented for some strategic goal of economic power and national interest.

## CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AND WAR

Toward the end of the war, as various countries began to be liberated, the OWI shifted focus from strictly advocacy and international broadcasting forms of engagement to use more cultural diplomacy.<sup>98</sup> The reason

for the shift was due to the fact that many of the formerly occupied countries had been cut off from the world for over 5 years. "...[It] will be a proper activity of OWI to inform the people not only of America's war effort but of American progress in all fields since 1939."<sup>99</sup> According to the Operational Guidance for European Information Program issued on October 30, 1944, the OWI was to re-establish "as quickly as possible all of the normal channels of thought between Europe and America which have been disrupted during the war... This is to say that from now on the principal tasks of OWI in Europe are those of gradually decreasing its own production and increasingly becoming a transmission belt for contacts and materials of other public, semi-public, and private organizations."<sup>100</sup> OWI's role was only to facilitate restoring lost cultural contacts between private and semi-private entities. The objective was to "inspire and assist" cultural exchanges between private groups and events. "We shall not finance nor otherwise sponsor such exchanges and events in our own name unless it can be demonstrated that they have an immediate relevance to our assigned propaganda objectives."

Interestingly, the DoS did not ask the OWI to alter their engagement activities to include more cultural engagement until the formation of a joint committee in January 1945. In the spring of 1945, the DoS also recognized the need to transition to postwar operations in terms of both cultural and information relations. The DoS did not have the legal authority, personnel, experience, or funds to take over the activities of the OWI, so the two organizations agreed to run postwar foreign public engagement programs conjointly until legislation and funding made it possible for the DoS or another government agency to take charge.

In present operations OWI, on an emergency basis, is also devoting some effort to the re-establishment of scientific and professional contacts; has helped in the exchange of specialized periodicals; has arranged lectures, exhibitions, and the exchange of specialists. In the absence of an American cultural cooperation program in many countries, these OWI activities are considered essential to the success of the over-all information program... some of the Department's activities have been similar to those of the OWI – i.e., answering requests for books and periodicals, for exhibit materials and music, for lecturers...<sup>101</sup>

The DCR's reliance on OWI was not new. Through much of the war, the DCR relied on the CIAA as well as private organizations for funding

and executing cultural and educational exchanges in Latin America as the Division lacked the funding to maintain robust operations.<sup>102</sup> As mentioned earlier, the ALA facilitated the DCR's efforts to initiate book exchanges between Latin America and the USA. The ALA would also help to distribute books and academic periodicals in China when DCR expanded their program in 1940.<sup>103</sup> The ALA along with foundations such as the Guggenheim and Rockefeller Foundations provided funds and personnel to set up libraries in Latin America and China.<sup>104</sup> In addition to books and libraries, the DCR arranged for private funds to aid American schools in Latin America and China as well as establishing American cultural centers. The DCR also worked to distribute non-theatrical films in Latin America. The films tended to be produced by either private entities or by other government agencies with the DCR only screening the films.<sup>105</sup>

While the DCR received funding support from the CIAA, not all of CIAA's cultural diplomacy was carried out jointly with the DCR. The CIAA had to clear projects with the DoS and DCR, but the DCR and IDC had to request funds for many of their projects for Latin American "cooperation." Similar to the DoS, the CIAA had its own Cultural Relations Division. The Cultural Relations Division was further subdivided into committees for specific areas such as art, education, music, publications, and fellowships.<sup>106</sup> The Arts Committee arranged for traveling art exhibitions around the USA and Latin America as well as working with art museums in Latin America and the US to arrange exchanges between museums. The CIAA also sponsored artist exchanges where artists could work for a few months in another country. To increase awareness of different artists and techniques used, the CIAA promoted publications and translations of existing pieces on art. Music was another area the CIAA developed programs. The office established a Music Center in the PAU building in Washington, D.C. Another center was opened in Montevideo. The US music center offered a sheet music library, recordings, and books on Latin American musicians. The center was also used to conduct research on Latin American music. There were also tours arranged for US and Latin American performers. The Yale Glee Club and American Ballet Caravan toured Latin America, and Hugo Balzo, a pianist from Uruguay, toured the US. The CIAA helped to support cultural centers created by Latin Americans independently. Cooperating with DoS, CIAA hoped to strengthen the existing centers as well as help to set up new ones.<sup>107</sup>

In addition to art, music, and literature, the CIAA also encouraged the production and distribution of theatrical and non-theatrical films throughout Latin America. The Motion Picture Division<sup>108</sup> of CIAA was responsible for not only just cultural diplomacy, but also economic diplomacy and advocacy. The division “was organized to employ motion pictures as a media for the development and improvement of the cultural, commercial and political relations between the American republics.”<sup>109</sup> The underlying premise of the Motion Picture Division was that “[motion] pictures, particularly those originating in the United States, provide the most direct approach to the widest audience in the hemisphere...serving, as no other media can serve, to cause the people of the other American republics to like, trust, and respect the peoples of the United States, and to join with them in the development of a lasting policy of hemisphere solidarity, which is the basis for a permanent Good Neighbor Policy.”<sup>110</sup> The Division distributed short 16-mm films on matters relating to health, sanitation, medicine, and other educational subjects (non-theatrical films). Using portable 16-mm projectors, the Division was able to reach more remote areas in Latin America which did not have their own facilities. As with other aspects of CIAA’s initiatives, the film division’s program was also “reciprocal.” Short films were produced and distributed in US schools and colleges. Attendance at these films was recorded to gauge audience reach and impact.

For theatrical films, the Motion Picture Society acted as a liaison between the CIAA’s office and the movie industry, including guilds, organizations, and individuals. In addition, the society helped to find employment for Latin American artists in Hollywood productions. The Motion Picture Society also helped advise the Motion Picture Division and CIAA on the selection of writers, directors, and producers to visit Latin America as well as helping to arrange talent and technical exchanges with Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. In tangent with the Motion Picture Division, the Communication Division worked “to correct some of the unconscious practices which have made motion pictures a source of trouble to our public relations in these countries.”<sup>111</sup> The Communication Division wanted to prevent production of films which contained offensive characters or incidents to Latin Americans as well as forestall showing films which showed the United States in a bad light.<sup>112</sup> The Motion Picture Producers’ Association agreed to allow a CIAA representative to review scripts prior to production.



## INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING AND THE PURPOSE OF INFORMATION

The OWI, CIAA, and to a certain degree, the DCR all used or were involved in *international broadcasting*. Another point of contention between those working in the DCR as well as among others within the DoS and the OWI and CIAA was the use of information as a component of cultural relations. When the DCR first began considering what cultural relations encompassed, radio, films, and newsreels were all considered as possible ways of communicating culture between the US and Latin America. Secretary Hull, Laurence Duggan, and Senator Dennis Chavez discussed possible legislation to create a government-owned broadcasting facility in January 1938. The station “would effectively present to the peoples in other American countries the ideals and traditions of the United States.”<sup>113</sup> The Celler Bill, jointly proposed by Congressmen Emanuel Celler and Chavez, never made it through Congress, due to industry pressure and opposition to anything that might become a platform for American propaganda.<sup>114</sup> In the winter of 1939, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Cooperation explored setting up a one hundred kilowatt broadcasting station to use on international broadcasting frequency bands. The Committee reasoned the basis for establishing the station was twofold: to improve international relations and *for national defense*. “The station is to be devoted exclusively to international short-wave broadcasting; it [*short-wave international broadcasting*] is defined as ‘an implement for broad gauged international policy’.”<sup>115</sup> However, some questioned using international broadcasting in a cultural program.

I personally feel that the investigations which have been made during the *past few months prove that the role of international broadcasting in improving international relations and in orienting public opinion in favour of or against certain nations is at the present time a very small one, and often a negative one*. I also feel strongly that for our Government to establish an international broadcasting station, while at the same time leaving domestic broadcasting in private hands, would produce an unfortunate effect in other American republics. In Great Britain and in Germany all broadcasting is governmental and therefore the British and German Governments’ activities in the international field are merely a projection of domestic policy. *I believe that one reason for the high opinion in which the United States is held in the other American republics is that our Government has at no time*

*made any attempt to spread competitive cultural or political propaganda; an international broadcasting station under Government auspices might, even with the best intentions in the world, arouse suspicion and prejudice rather than improve our position.*<sup>116</sup>

The desire to distinguish and separate information from cultural relations remained strong within the DoS and DCR, which directly opposed Rockefeller's perspective toward information and cultural relations. Rockefeller, and by extension the CIAA he oversaw, believed information and cultural relations were mutually reinforcing and could not be separated.

The CIAA was responsible for creating and implementing "programs in the commercial and economic fields, which, by the effective use of governmental and private facilities, will further the commercial well-being of the Western Hemisphere." In addition, the CIAA was also expected to develop and administer initiatives "in such fields as the arts and sciences, education and travel, the radio, the press, and the cinema, [to] further the national defense and strengthen the bonds between the nations of the Western Hemisphere."<sup>117</sup> To the CIAA, these two responsibilities broke down into "two important fields of operation...economic and *psychological*."<sup>118</sup> Cultural relations planned and funded by the CIAA were psychological rather than diplomatic. The objective was to change the mentality of Latin Americans to back US policies rather than an objective to create a relationship with other American republics and *represent* US policies.<sup>119</sup>

Thus, despite opposition from the DoS, the CIAA went on to broaden American broadcasting into Latin America.<sup>120</sup> Rather than trying to establish a government-owned facility, the CIAA created contracts with private broadcasting companies including General Electric and Westinghouse.<sup>121</sup> The CIAA also established a semi-private corporation, Precinradio, Inc., to further US broadcasting into Latin America. In addition to broadening US radio presence in the American republics, the CIAA also bolstered newsreel coverage throughout the Americas by providing funds for permanent news crews in Latin America.<sup>122</sup>

Additionally, the CIAA produced a monthly illustrated magazine, *En Guardia*, published in both Spanish and Portuguese. "The purpose of this magazine is to give readers in the other Americas a full picture of the hemisphere war program and of facts and information in general about the United States."<sup>123</sup> The OWI used the magazine in both Spain and

Portugal for their own operations in addition to producing two other magazines which became quite popular: *Victory* and *USA*. The *Victory* magazine was printed in English, French, Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Afrikaans. "...the purpose of 'Victory' [was] to show the United States as it is—its industry, agriculture and war effort, its public works, its culture, its people and their leaders."<sup>124</sup> The *USA* publication included abridged versions of articles printed in American magazines as well as special articles. The digest was printed in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Norwegian.

The OWI was responsible for broadcasting to the rest of the world, to neutral, occupied, free, and newly liberated areas. By the end of the war, the OWI established a large network for worldwide broadcasting in 25 languages. Broadcasts focused on current news and entertainment. Programing included roundtable discussions with multiple voices, question and answer sessions where listeners' questions mailed to stations were answered on air, and programs on American politics and public opinion. Entertainment programing consisted of radio dramas, music, poetry readings, and discussions on non-political subjects. The OWI was able to get feedback from listeners regarding their broadcasts, despite the obstacles of occupation. John Elwood, Manager of the International Division of National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (NBC), received feedback regarding US broadcasts into Switzerland. A relative of one of the NBC broadcasters still residing in Lausanne wrote to tell him how people in Switzerland responded to the broadcasts.

The shortwaves play an increasingly important role around here; the owners of short wave sets become increasingly polite when they happen to talk to me; this is because of your programs. Even my shirtmaker, a woman from Brittany, who nearly threw herself in my arms as I was trying on a shirt, when she discovered that the voice she heard from America was that of my son. It is a fact that the American radio, which avoids the tiring phraseology of the English stations, is awaited here like the Messiah by a great number of our people badly informed on what happens in the world...But I am quite sure that your name has been for quite a while on the blacklist of the Gestapo...<sup>125</sup>

However, just as the CIAA conceived of its information and broadcasting operations with regard to their agency's mission, the OWI also developed its own sense of what function their broadcasting operations

served. As will be discussed in greater detail, the OWI often used *propaganda* and *psychological warfare* to describe their information operations. This overlap in terminology was especially problematic when it came to OWI and OSS operations. Furthermore, there is little to distinguish between the objectives of either the CIAA's or OWI's magazine publications which both conveyed American history and culture to readers around the world. The only distinction is in terms of each agency's operating environment. CIAA restricted its operations to Latin America, while the OWI was prohibited from conducting operations in Latin America.

### PROPAGANDA VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

One of the more contentious relations among the agencies throughout the war was the relationship between the OSS and OWI. Pertinent to the general observation of this period, differentiating between the two concepts was a matter of perspective; whether one defined the concept by the means used or the desired ends.<sup>126</sup> "Psychological warfare, which in time became so important, was neither defined nor discussed."<sup>127</sup> Compounding this issue was the residual confusion left by the concept of *propaganda* after WWI. There was never any consensus on what propaganda was, despite much public debate and a great deal of research on the subject.<sup>128</sup> Unlike those running CPI operations, the OWI and OSS used the term *propaganda* regularly to describe their operations, but they also used *psychological warfare* to describe operations as well.

As mentioned in the development of the OWI and OSS, Colonel Donovan held rather different opinions from key personnel within the OWI, in particular Robert Sherwood and Archibald MacLeish.<sup>129</sup> Colonel Donovan sought short-term objectives regardless of long-term consequences which included using misinformation, deception, and rumors. The conflicts of approach appeared in the first psychological warfare campaign initiated by COI in the summer of 1942, just as the OWI and OSS was being created. A *covert* letter writing campaign targeting both France and Germany was outlined by COI in late July 1942. Most of the letters were sent to specific correspondents, identified through refugee interviews. The letters were also "written in various hands or typed in a slipshod 'personal' manner on various kinds of stationery. They all carry fictitious return addresses, which [were] filed by a Watch List with the US censors for eventual delivery" to the COI.<sup>130</sup>

The COI also worked to use different postmarks to further avoid suspicion by French or German censors. For the German letter campaign, agents in Sweden and Switzerland posted letters to correspondents in Germany. For the French campaign, the “objectives [were] to alienate... officials from their Vichy affiliation so that they will allow more freedom to the already active revolutionary movements; also to win the officials themselves to outright espousal of our ideas, as useful leaders.”<sup>131</sup> The plan for France also demonstrated listening on the part of the COI by acknowledging varied beliefs the French and how the people were very knowledgeable about their own political beliefs as well as their opposition. Thus, for each political view, the COI developed general replies for each.

The fact that the US government was writing these letters to both members of the French and German public as well as each country’s government was to remain hidden in the original conception of the campaign. In the case of Germany, the letters would not be sent from the USA, but by agents in Italy and Switzerland.<sup>132</sup> However, once the OWI established their operations, the letter campaign became overt.<sup>133</sup> OWI outposts would be responsible for ensuring letters were sent to enemy and occupied countries. The letters would be sent using connections between families within enemy or occupied countries or through professional organizations. OWI also utilized private organizations affiliated with the Catholic church, scientific institutes funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, and international organizations such as the Rotary Club and the Alumni Association of the International House to write form letters to individuals around the world. Foreign-born Americans were also asked to write “Letters to the Editor” to their hometown newspaper.<sup>134</sup> The plan covered much of the world including places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Spain, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania.<sup>135</sup>

Though operations continued, confusion remained regarding the roles of the OSS and the OWI as well as the government’s understanding of *propaganda* and *psychological warfare*. In December 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) drafted a directive defining the functions of the OSS, which was broken into two primary functions.<sup>136</sup> These functions included “[the] planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military program for psychological warfare.” And “[the] compilation of such political, psychological, sociological, and economic information as may be required for military operations.” The directive also declared

“[propaganda] operations included within the military program for psychological warfare will be executed by the Office of War Information,” thus, implying a distinction between propaganda and psychological warfare. To this directive, the OWI Chairman of the Central Intelligence Panel, William Whitney, verbally stressed “the proposition that the Executive Order 9182 and the accompanying ‘military order’ which created the Office of Strategic Services was intended by the President to eliminate Colonel Donovan from the psychological warfare operation, and ...the proposal now before the Joint Chiefs...would reverse this position and actually put Colonel Donovan in charge of all psychological warfare, leaving to the Office of War Information merely the task of executing the ‘propaganda phase’ of such warfare...the conduct of psychological warfare is subordinate to the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but should not be subordinate to the Office of Strategic Services.”<sup>137</sup> FDR wrote to the JCS informing them of his disapproval of assigning the OSS the responsibility for psychological warfare.

Your Directive to the Office of Strategic Services satisfies me as conforming to the Executive and Military Orders of June 13, so far as it concerns research and analysis functions, and special secret operations as espionage, sabotage and the fomenting of guerrilla warfare. However, I do not feel that psychological warfare is an OSS function...it was intended to be established as a function of the Office of War Information.<sup>138</sup>

On December 23, 1942, the JCS issued a new directive with a more detailed breakdown of OSS’s responsibilities with regard to both propaganda and psychological warfare.<sup>139</sup> Of the three specified functions of the OSS in the directive, the OSS was still responsible for “planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military program for psychological warfare.” However, as the document specifies later, “[propaganda] operations included within the military program for psychological warfare will be planned and executed by the Office of War Information upon request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” In terms of psychological warfare, the OSS was not given the planning or operational authority for either propaganda or economic warfare. Special operations were the only activities which the OSS maintained any authority, though still under military command.

In March 1943, FDR signed an additional EO to clarify OWI’s activities with regard to foreign information:

The Office of War Information will plan, develop, and execute all phases of the federal program of radio, press, publication, and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information. The program for foreign propaganda in areas of actual or projected military operations will be coordinated with military plans...and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>140</sup>

However, in the fall of 1943, the functions of OSS were clarified again. The directive issued by the JCS this time made no mention of psychological warfare. Duties of the OSS were restricted to intelligence collection and analysis, counterintelligence, subversion and sabotage, as well as training and supplying weapons to guerrilla fighters and resistance movements.<sup>141</sup> In the area of intelligence collection, the OSS was restricted from collecting or running operations within the Western Hemisphere including in Latin America. However, in terms of intelligence analysis, there were no geographic restrictions placed on the OSS. Further attempts were made to distinguish between the activities of both the OWI and OSS in 1944. Eventually, it was generally agreed that “all ‘black’ propaganda activities behind enemy lines [belong] in the hands of OSS...[and] left all ‘white’ or official propaganda activities conducted from outside enemy territory in the hands of OWI.”<sup>142</sup>

This debate between the OSS and OWI and the attempt to distinguish between *propaganda* activities and *psychological warfare* activities is important to understanding the origins and inherent issues of American foreign public engagement because OWI’s propaganda or psychological warfare was unlikely to be acceptable in peacetime. Yet as the previous pages have demonstrated there is little to distinguish between what the OWI did in Europe, Asia, and Africa and what either the CIAA or DCR did in Latin America. Arguably, the only differences between each agency were the objectives or policies each agency sought to achieve through various methods of foreign public engagement.

### *Postwar and Incorporating Public Diplomacy into US Statecraft*

Three days after Japan surrendered, a group of OWI executives gathered to read over a draft memorandum for President Harry Truman. The group stayed late into the night redrafting the memo “to recommend its own termination.” “OWI did not want to perpetuate [*sic*] itself and it would be in a better position to make recommendations as to what

activity should be continued if it had planned out its own end before it was ordered. This was the effort made that night of Aug. 17.”<sup>143</sup> Two OWI officers “took the letter to the White House personally at 3 AM and there was a great to do at the gate about letting the letter through at that hour but finally it was delivered to one of [sic] the White House secretariat through a barred door and thus it was expected that the President’s breakfast would be made happier.”<sup>144</sup>

Just 2 weeks later, President Truman issued an Executive Order to abolish the OWI, though not all of the office. “Although it is now possible to curtail governmental information activities, some of our foreign information operations will continue to be necessary.”<sup>145</sup> Crucially, when President Truman dissolved the OWI and CIAA, he identified foreign public engagement as a mechanism of US statecraft: “The nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs.”<sup>146</sup> Though the President of the United States and many who worked with and in the OWI, the CIAA, and the DCR throughout WWII recognized the need and importance of foreign public engagement, it would take another three years before the foreign public engagement was legally accepted as a tool of statecraft. And the fight to include foreign public engagement into statecraft perpetuated, exacerbated, and ingrained many of the debates, questions, and concerns already confronting foreign public engagement to include questions about the appropriateness of foreign public engagement and concerns about the US conducting and using propaganda as part of statecraft.

As part of the US postwar drawdown, President Truman’s EO requested the Secretary of State to conduct a survey of US foreign information needs and to construct a program to administer US foreign public engagement, by the end of the year. In the meantime, elements of the OWI and CIAA were consolidated within the DoS under the Interim Information Service (IIS). Dr. Arthur Macmahon, a DoS consultant, conducted a survey of US international information requirements and the report along with Secretary of State Byrnes’ findings led to the creation of the Office of Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) in December 1945, which fully absorbed the remaining operations of the OWI and CIAA.<sup>147</sup> The OIC would continue American libraries overseas, to supply information and background material via wireless and mail to missions abroad, to translate and distribute documentary films, to publish a Russian-language magazine for the Soviet Union, and to maintain personnel in sixty-two



countries to manage US informational and cultural relations. These activities were formerly managed by the OWI and CIAA. In addition, the Department planned to continue shortwave radio broadcasting “on a reduced scale” until Congress could make a decision regarding the transmitters and frequencies under the government’s control.<sup>148</sup>

At the same time, the DoS began a campaign of sorts to get legislation passed to not only extend the legal mandate for Division of Cultural Cooperation,<sup>149</sup> but also to incorporate information functions of the OWI and CIAA.<sup>150</sup> In October 1945, Representative Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York) made the first attempt to present legislation to add foreign public engagement as a tool of the state.<sup>151</sup> Getting legislation passed was critical for government-administered foreign public engagement. Without legislation, the DoS could not justify to Congress the need for appropriations beyond what was required to comply with the treaty for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. Legislation was also needed to recruit staff both in the US and overseas.<sup>152</sup> While many within the DoS had been converted to the idea that postwar foreign relations would become more democratized,<sup>153</sup> Congress remained unmoved, in part because many did not trust the Department and also because with the war ending, many Representatives and Senators desired to shrink the government not enlarge it. Without the Bloom Bill, US information and cultural relations might have been halted completely, but the DoS was saved by the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1947. The bill gave temporary authority for the DoS to continue foreign public engagement worldwide and provided some funding for engagement through June 30, 1947.<sup>154</sup>

A year later, debates over the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Appropriation Bill for 1948 coincided with Representative Karl Mundt’s presentation of HR 3342, the Smith-Mundt Bill. From May through June of 1947, the House of Representatives debated the purpose, efficacy, and necessity of adding foreign public engagement to the duties and responsibilities of the Department of State. There were five arguments against providing any further funding to the OIC: International broadcasting was not the business of the government; the OIC should be abolished to save money; the OIC was inefficient; and private agencies should be used to conduct US international broadcasting if there was a need for such an activity.<sup>155</sup> When debating HR 3342, four arguments against the measure were made throughout the debates which

went beyond criticizing the OIC information program, including that government cooperation in international and educational exchange programs was unwelcome; there was no need for such activities; the DoS did not run the international information program well; and finally, bringing people from abroad into the USA would allow Communist influence agents and spies to manipulate American students and steal US secrets.<sup>156</sup>

After much debate, HR 3342 made it through the House to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The State Department gave testimony, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles both provided written statements in favor of maintaining US foreign public engagement. The Committee unanimously supported the measure; however, when reported in the full Senate, there were attempts to prevent the bill from ever coming to debate. Eventually, a resolution was passed to establish a joint investigating delegation to tour twenty-two European countries in September and October of 1947.<sup>157</sup> The delegation was composed of five Senators, seven Representatives, and staff. Prior to the delegation's arrival, Assistant Director of the OIC, William Tyler, traveled to Europe, "[to] confer with the Chief of Mission and his staff on preparations for the visit of the Smith-Mundt group."<sup>158</sup> Tyler provided the Chiefs of Mission with background on each of the delegates of the Smith-Mundt group. He also helped to refine the information gathered by the missions to present to the delegation.

In general, the material drafted by the Mission was too long and too detailed...In every case I went over the draft of the answers to the questions [posed by the delegation]...I emphasized that the impression which should be conveyed to the visiting group was fourfold: (1) *The need, in support of the objectives of our foreign policy, of the Information and Cultural program.* (2) The extent to which other countries carry on this type of activity in the country concerned, compared with the U.S. (3) The adverse effect on the general work of the Mission of the cuts in the USIS personnel and operations. (4) The extent to which OIE<sup>159</sup> complements, stimulates, and assists American private enterprise whenever possible, and as circumstances permit.<sup>160</sup>

Tyler's visit to Europe is significant for two reasons. One, his visit and preparation with each of the missions illustrates part of the lobbying effort made by the OIC to ensure HR 3342 passed.<sup>161</sup> Second, the missions were encouraged to explain US foreign public engagement as

supporting the objectives of foreign policy. In 1947, this involved engaging in a counter-propaganda battle against the Soviet Union. More importantly, this meant justifying foreign public engagement as a mechanism to *implement* US foreign policy, rather than a style of conducting foreign relations as previously advocated by the DoS in 1946.

Upon the return of the delegation, the bill was reconsidered in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and later debated in the full Senate on January 16, 1948. Justifications and support for the bill largely focused on the extreme need to combat Soviet propaganda. The delegation reported on the Soviet Union's efforts to discredit the Marshall Plan and the USA generally. Since the debates in the summer, various measures were included in HR 3342 to address concerns about the loyalty of State Department employees, the effective management of the engagement program, and competing with private entities.<sup>162</sup> The only new point of contention arose between cultural purists who did not want cultural relations and education exchanges in any way combined with US information programs.<sup>163</sup> Former director of the Division of Cultural Relations, Ben Cherrington, believed combining informational relations with cultural relations would taint culture by politicizing culture, making it *propaganda*. Others, such as Charles Thomson, objected to the separation. Thomson and Archibald MacLeish both saw information and culture as mutually reinforcing. "The failure of the multilateral system to take root following the war and the concomitant rise of nationalist approach to cultural relations as a competitor to liberal internationalist tenets set the stage for a showdown between once compatible foreign policy outlooks...America's active world role inflated the expectations of both the pragmatic and the idealistic advocates of cultural relations, a development further enhanced by the creation of competing bureaucracies eager to impress their version of cultural relations upon foreign policy."<sup>164</sup> Thus, to get the legislation passed, the OIC was divided into the Office of International Information and the Office of Educational Exchange. Both offices would remain under the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The bill, which passed without debate in the House on January 19, 1948, and the debates among the members of Congress did little to resolve the problems which developed throughout WWII: defining what foreign public engagement was and what its role was. The long fight from 1945 through January 27, 1948, when the bill was signed

by President Truman, only established that foreign public engagement *should* be an element of US statecraft.

### FOREIGN PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT: A CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Despite attempts to consolidate and centralize America's information activities both leading up to and following WWII, most of the organizations were denuded of any real authority over US foreign public engagement, especially overseas due to the State Department's grip on foreign policy. The Department of State continued to develop both informational and cultural policy, often without consultation with either CIAA or OWI.<sup>165</sup> The Department believed that both organizations would dissolve following the war and the responsibility of communicating with the world would fall to the DoS. As the agency designated for the formation and implementation of American foreign policy, many within the Department of State believed outlining the policy of American foreign public engagement was solely the duty of the Department. However, this attitude toward the OWI and CIAA created more problems than it resolved. In many respects, the Department of State was reinventing the wheel with regard to the problems raised when contemplating how the US government would communicate with the world. The DoS wanted to maintain control of US foreign policymaking, but did not want to become involved in the production of US information engagement overseas.<sup>166</sup> This wreaked havoc on both the effectiveness of American foreign public engagement and caused agencies such as the OWI and CIAA to view the DoS as an obstacle rather than a cooperative partner. Both the OWI and CIAA saw how international communication was connected to US foreign policy and foreign relations; they desired to at least be included in the foreign policymaking process. As Charles Thomson observed, part of the State Department's problem was that the organization lacked the administrative structure to address the policy requirements of international communications. Various issues were either overlooked or were viewed as irrelevant to US foreign policy. With the creation and expansion of both the CIAA's and OWI's foreign postings, the DoS was bombarded with queries from the field regarding matters not yet considered by the Department. The relationship the DoS maintained with information agencies both during and after WWII also had

far-reaching implications for US public diplomacy. Without experience in information policymaking and an understanding of the connection between American foreign policy, US foreign and domestic communication, and US relations with the people of other nations, the DoS was unprepared to take on international broadcasting or advocacy. The tendency of the DoS to view cultural relations distinct from international communications also impacted the future of US public diplomacy. Both the CIAA and the OWI did not make the distinction between culture and communications.

Related to the issue of multiple bureaucracies, a recurring problem often noted by OWI and sometimes CIAA was the need for them to participate in the policymaking process. Though both agencies were able to communicate and engage with people abroad without involvement in policymaking, the CIAA and OWI recognized the engagement was less effective and sometimes added to misperceptions about the USA. As James Warburg acknowledged, the OWI is able to successfully convey the inevitable Allied victory; however, the OWI is unable to communicate to all people that the only chance of a durable peace is through Allied victory, even those presently in occupied or enemy territory: "... we have so far failed to develop a clear political attitude toward a liberated Europe and toward the enemy peoples themselves".<sup>167</sup> While the OWI may have only desired "constant and intimate cooperation between the policy-makers and the actual propagandists",<sup>168</sup> Rockefeller felt the CIAA should be more intimately involved in policymaking. He felt the

*[determination] of policy shall be a joint function of the Department of State and the Office of the Coordinator working in close collaboration...Execution of policy shall be the joint function of the Department of State and the Office of the Coordinator. Activities in the foreign field shall be under the direction and control of the Department of State. Activities in the United States shall, for the emergency program, be under the supervision and control of the Coordinator's Office...Operations both in the field and in the United States shall be carried out by appropriate competent agencies both private and governmental.*<sup>169</sup>

This put both the OWI and CIAA in the position of representing US policy to people abroad and helping to attain US foreign policy

objectives without a role in forming the policies they represented abroad. Based on the operating directive for the CIAA, this confused their role in American statecraft. OWI was also left in an ambiguous position both with its relationship with OSS and with the DoS.

Aside from the bureaucratic issues and confusion regarding policy, WWII did help to permanently solidify the public-private partnership for US foreign public engagement. The creation of the DCR incorporated input from many private organizations and individuals who already managed various foreign public engagement initiatives. Even more significantly, as the DCR was being set up, the Chief of the new department, Ben Cherrington, met with key figures of the IIE, Rockefeller Foundation, CEIP, and the Guggenheim Foundation to get input about how the division might cooperate with existing private efforts and what policies should be developed regarding government engagement.<sup>170</sup> In addition, much of the CIAA's operations relied heavily on private entities. Rockefeller felt it was imperative that engagement with Latin America stems from private organizations and individuals, rather than the US government, as engagement initiated by the federal government could be viewed as propaganda. The CIAA established corporations to avoid government affiliation with engagement activities.<sup>171</sup> The decision to use corporations also came from the experience of the Rockefeller Foundation with health and sanitation initiatives in Latin America.<sup>172</sup> Using private citizens and pseudo-private organizations, the CIAA "...from the unofficial character of their organization, [would] be in a position to carry out a variety of tasks in the other American republics which the United States Government officially could not do".<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, as the war came to an end, the OWI worked to facilitate private initiatives to re-establish cultural and educational exchanges around the world. Figure 7.2 displays the connections between private entities and the various government organizations tasked with engaging with people abroad.

Figure 7.2 By WWII, the public-private relationship is a standard component of US foreign public engagement. Private individuals and organizations would continue to facilitate and initiate engagement abroad in cooperation with the US government throughout the Cold War.




Fig. 7.2 Public-Private networks and US public diplomacy, 1938–1945. *Source* Created by the Author

These connections are built upon ties forged at the turn of the century. Both private organizations and individuals helped to not only develop government foreign public engagement throughout WWII, but also shape the policies of engagement, as previous cases have shown.

Perhaps the most significant finding of this case is how the multiple agencies and subsequent multiple “coordinating” committees created not only different terminologies for foreign public engagement, but also different perspectives on how foreign public engagement as a tool of statecraft could and should be used to facilitate foreign policy objectives. In other words, between 1938 and 1945, the government outlined specific objectives and policies with regard to relations with Latin America

and winning the war, but failed to clearly define their policy of using the tool of foreign public engagement. Based on the archival evidence, this occurred because each organization believed they were doing something different. The focus of the different agencies was more on the foreign policy objectives they were created to achieve, rather than the policy of the mechanism the CIAA, DCR, and OWI employed to attain those objectives. Though key figures within the Division of Cultural Relations did work hard to standardize American cultural relations policy, these efforts were unsuccessful because of the DCR's circumscribed role and hierarchy in comparison with either the CIAA or the OWI which both resided in the Executive Branch with directors who maintained close personal ties to the President.

The people working for OWI, CIAA, and DCR were not the only ones to believe they were doing different things. In a memo to Bill Donovan, President Roosevelt expressed a similar view: "It appears some question has been raised as to the fields of responsibility of your work and that of Nelson Rockefeller's organization. I continue to believe that the requirements of our program in the Hemisphere are quite different from those of our programs to Europe and the Far East".<sup>174</sup> The emphasis was not on how to use foreign public engagement for policy or what mechanisms were appropriate to achieve policy goals; the emphasis was on the goals themselves. Furthermore, the goals tended to be related to defense and national security, not the more general purpose of improving foreign relations. This puts the path to Smith-Mundt in a different perspective from ones previously presented or understood, with implications for present-day American public diplomacy. The disputes over foreign public engagement being used to achieve policy ends, the debates over whether the projection of American culture should be used to achieve policy, as well as the ultimate debate over America's use of propaganda have their origins with the creation of the multiple agencies and committees tasked to engage foreign publics, creating confusion and ambiguity for the future.

The final chapter examines the patterns which developed across the six cases featured in this book. These patterns of foreign public engagement are compared with the practices and issues of US public diplomacy today as well as connecting issues of conceptualization, ideology, and organization to the cases in this study.



## NOTES

1. NARA, RG 353, Entry 401–403, Box 94.
2. Cull (2008); Hart (2013); Ninkovich (1981); Thomson, Charles A. H. 1948. *Overseas Information Service of the United States Government* (The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.); Winkler, Allan M. 1978. *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942–1945* (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT).
3. The general term of foreign public engagement is used here to cover all other terms used including propaganda, cultural relations, and public diplomacy.
4. Hart (2013), p. 12.
5. Cull (2008), p. 38.
6. Thomson (1948), p. 158 & p. 188.
7. *Ibid.* p. 291, emphasis added.
8. Ninkovich 1981, p. 43, emphasis added.
9. Hart (2013), p. 5.
10. The focus of the archival material remains largely at the headquarters level, as the research is mostly concerned with the role of foreign public engagement in America's general statecraft. However, where events occurred in the field and connect with issues emanating from headquarters there is some discussion. Compared with previous chapters, there is also limited discussion regarding the actual methods employed by each agency. This is also again due to the confines of space, but also to avoid repetition.
11. "Points to be Considered...for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations," RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2. Almost a full year after the Division of Cultural Relations was created under the Department of State, there was still unresolved tension about the division of responsibilities between the Division of Cultural Relations and the Office of Education. Essentially, the Division was both a policymaking and administrative office, responsible for ensuring all aspects of the Convention were implemented. "Under these circumstances the Division of Cultural Relations would be essentially a policy making group for these particular functions and as such should make regulations and determine procedures to govern them. The agency which would carry out any given aspect of the program delegated to it would be bound...by these policies and regulations" (NARA, Fred Kelly, Chief of Division of Higher Education, to Dr. Ben Cherrington, May 22, 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 236, 111.46/135).
12. NARA, Memo to Sumner Welles and George Messersmith, February 8, 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2.

13. Ibid, emphasis added.
14. NARA, Lawrence Duggan to Sumner Welles, March 9, 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2, emphasis added.
15. The actual Convention only required signatories to award two graduate students and two professors a fellowship for one school year annually. At the time, the DoS began to organize the Division of Cultural Relations, the USA and the Dominican Republic were the only signatories. Officers within the State Department noted that “that the exchange provided by the Convention is of a reciprocal nature, and it is doubtful whether there can be any interchange for the next few months.” (NARA, “Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations,” March 11, 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2).
16. NARA, “Conference to Consider Inter-American Cultural Relations,” February 23, 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2. The Division of Cultural Relations worked with an Advisory Committee which included Stephen Duggan of IIE; James Shotwell of the American National Committee on Intellectual Cooperation; John Studebaker of the Office of Education; and Carl Milam of the American Library Association. The Advisory Committee included leaders from private organizations already conducting foreign public engagement activities. Other private entities were asked to form subcommittees to advise the Division of Cultural Relations on student exchanges, educational films, radio, publications, and translations (NARA, “Summary of Activities of the Division of Cultural Relations,” November 23, 1938, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 235, 111.46/61 ½).
17. NARA, Address by Charles A Thomson, before the Institute of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia, July 3, 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 237, 111.46/211, emphasis added.
18. Ninkovich (1981).
19. Winkler (1978, p. 20). Both Richard Steele and Robert Dallek note FDR’s regard for US public opinion and attempted to steer policies with the support of public opinion. The general opposition to any foreign involvement plus extreme suspicion toward propaganda prevented FDR from making decisive and strategic policy decisions in both areas (Dallek, Robert. 1995. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945*, (Oxford University Press: USA); Steele, Richard W. 1970. “Preparing the Public for War: Efforts to Establish a National Propaganda Agency, 1940–1941,” *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 75: 1640–1653).
20. Steele 1970.
21. Winkler 1978.

22. In the spring of 1940, the Nazis began invading Denmark, Norway, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. By the summer of 1940, Holland, Belgium, and Norway had surrendered to the Nazis, and France signed an armistice with Nazi Germany. The Battle of Britain began in early July 1940.
23. NARA, "Plans or Programs for the Increase of Trade....," August 7, 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472.
24. An officer within CIAA noted that when the "[hostilities] ended in November, 1918...the period of wartime effect on commerce and finance lasted at least until 1924, or 10 years in all" (McQueen to Friele, June 24, 1941, "Functions of the Coordinator's Office with respect to future trade and economic developments," RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).
25. NARA, President Franklin D. Roosevelt Message to Congress, July 16, 1940, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 510.
26. NARA, "Order Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations," August 16, 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472. The USA was not the only nation concerned about the impact of the war on the Western Hemisphere's economies. The governments of the American republics were also concerned and called for a meeting of all foreign ministers of American republics in Havana on July 21, 1940 (NARA, "Statement of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics," June 17, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472).
27. NARA, "The Executive Order Creating the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," John Lockwood to Executive Staff of OCCCAR, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435.
28. NARA, "Executive Order—Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Executive Office of the President and Defining its Functions and Duties," July 18, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435.
29. Ninkovich 1981. *The History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs* asserts the creation of OCCCAR "was a definite implication that the Department of State was not functioning in such a way as to meet the emergencies of war in the Latin America areas..." (United States 1947, p. 181).
30. The CIAA received funds initially from the President's Discretionary Fund, and then later received emergency funding from Congress through a series of Deficiency Appropriation Acts. In CIAA's first year of operation, the organization had a budget of \$2.5 million, most of which came from the President's fund (NARA, FDR to Secretary of the Treasury, August 24, 1940, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 510). Through the

- course of the war, the CIAA expended a total of almost \$50 million dollars on foreign projects alone (United States 1947).
31. The Division of Cultural Relations received an initial appropriation of just \$75,000, solely for educational exchanges in 1939. For the Fiscal Year of 1941, Congress increased funding slightly, appropriating \$236,500, but still only funded half of what the DCR requested (Espinosa 1976; NARA, "Outline of Tentative Program for the Division of Cultural Relations," March 16, 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 236, 111.46/126<sup>1/2</sup>).
  32. NARA, "Executive Order—Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Executive Office of the President and Defining its Functions and Duties," July 18, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435.
  33. Winkler 1978.
  34. NARA, "Executive Order Designating a Coordinator of Information," July 11, 1941, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4.
  35. Winkler 1978.
  36. NARA, "History of Communications Operations," by G.E. Hughes, n.d., RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 2.
  37. Winkler 1978.
  38. NARA, "Description of the Organizational Breakdown and Function of the Units within the Office of Facts and Figures," March 11, 1942, RG208, Entry 6E, Box 12.
  39. Archibald MacLeish was a Pulitzer Prize winning poet and essayist. During WWI, MacLeish was an outspoken critic against the war. Through his experiences abroad in the 1920s and 1930s, he reversed his anti-war beliefs, and returned to the USA as a fervent supporter of US intervention in Europe. In his role as Librarian of Congress, he offered space for propaganda intelligence research, later named the Division of Special Information and absorbed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (Gary 1999).
  40. Steele 1970; Thomson 1948; Winkler 1979.
  41. Winkler 1978.
  42. Colonel Donovan's views regarding the use of information as a weapon of war would eventually put him at odds with FDR as will be discussed later.
  43. Much of CPI's messaging was tied to Wilson's plans for after the war and his 14 Points. Though FDR did have the Atlantic Charter, as Winkler explains, the primary objective of ending the war trumped any idealistic or long-term policy objectives (1978, p. 73).
  44. As discussed previously the EO creating the CIAA seemed to indicate the CIAA had policymaking authority. However, as Rockefeller

soon found out, this was not the case. On April 22, 1941, President Roosevelt wrote to Rockefeller asking him to ensure all aspects of the CIAA's program were discussed and fully approved by the Department of State. This meant that the DoS controlled not only policy, but also execution (Thomson 1948, pp. 143–144, 153). The matter was still unresolved. In May 1941, a meeting was held to discuss the division of labour between the two agencies with the Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations at DoS, Charles Thomson, and the CIAA counterpart, Edward Trueblood. In response to a memo drafted by Thomson, Rockefeller, who was not at the meeting, said he generally agreed with the working principles established between the CIAA and the Division of Cultural Relations. However, Rockefeller believed that the parameters for both agencies should “indicate a greater responsibility on the part of this Office [CIAA] for determination of policy...” as CIAA is “charged by the Congress and the President with full responsibility for all funds expended” (NARA, Rockefeller to Laurence Duggan, 31 May 1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 495).

45. A \$45,000 grant for the library was given by the CIAA (NARA, Meeting of the General Advisory Committee of the DCR,” September 17–18, 1941, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29).
46. NARA, Meeting of the General Advisory Committee of the DCR,” September 17–18, 1941, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29.
47. Dr. Hanke's tour and the subsidies arranged with Latin American publishers were all funded by the CIAA, a total of \$80,000 (NARA, Meeting of the General Advisory Committee of the DCR,” September 17–18, 1941, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29).
48. NARA, “Meeting of the General Advisory Committee of the DCR,” September 17–18, 1941, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29.
49. NARA, “The Importance of Intellectual and Cultural Cooperation Between Nations,” April 20, 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2.
50. The DCR did consider using film as part of its cultural program. Ambassador Fay Allen DesPortes cautioned the Division of Cultural Relations with regard to using films in Guatemala, as the people there were highly suspicious of any time of foreign propaganda. “...[It] must be emphasized that Guatemala suffers from an understandably well developed inferiority complex vis-à-vis the United States. This, however, in no way diminishes the interest of Guatemalans for American tourists, artists, and archeologists [sic]. At the same time it makes Guatemalans, on the one hand, suspicious of foreigners and foreign propaganda, and on the other almost childishly pleased at any distinction conferred on Guatemala or Guatemalan citizens by leading foreign nations. In handling cultural relations with Guatemala, this combination

- of sensitiveness and vanity must be given very careful consideration” (NARA, No. 945, Guatemala, 26 July 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 237, 111.46/183).
51. NARA, “Program of the Communications Division,” by Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235.
  52. Ibid.
  53. CIAA supported Disney’s tour for \$70,000 (NARA, “Organization of the Motion Picture Division, CIAA,” n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).
  54. CIAA paid to ship both crew and equipment to Brazil for the movie (NARA, “Organization of the Motion Picture Division, CIAA,” n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).
  55. NARA, “Organization of the Motion Picture Division,” CIAA, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235.
  56. Thomson 1948, p. 143.
  57. A group of 35 American businessmen organized in conjunction with the local Chamber of Commerce in Rio de Janeiro. The group worked with the embassy and local press a full 2 years before the existence of CIAA (Thomson 1948, p. 156).
  58. States, United. 1947. History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (U.S. Govt. Print. Office: Washington).
  59. NARA, “Outpost Bureau,” n.d., RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 1.
  60. NARA, “Central Intelligence Panel,” November 22, 1942, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 3.
  61. NARA, “Reception of the Booklet *The American Worker* by the Egyptian Public,” October 1, 1944.
  62. Some excerpts from Egyptian trade union’s letters: Commercial Stores, Belkas: “We would like to thank you for the effort you have made to encourage close relations between the American and Egyptian Laborers. With the help of the forward policy of the Americans among the workers there has been created a fine spirit among the workers in Egypt.”; Egyptian Oil & Cake Workers, Alexandria: “We have received *The American Worker* and extend our thanks. We want to ask a favor: if possible, send us some more copies of *The American Farmer*, as we need these badly. All members of the syndicate can read and write fairly well, and are very anxious to study this topic” (NARA, “Reception of the Booklet *The American Worker* by the Egyptian Public,” October 1, 1944).
  63. NARA, James Warburg to Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood, August 11, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4, emphasis added.
  64. Rockefeller to Hull, September 7, 1944, in United States 1947, p. 185.

65. NARA, "Elmer Davis to President Roosevelt," August 30, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 3; United States 1947. When President Roosevelt asked about the Rockefeller's efforts to coordinate with the DoS the activities of CIAA on March 3, 1941, Rockefeller explained how the Advisory Committee of the Division of Cultural Relations within the DoS only met once or twice a year, whereas CIAA's committees met once a week as they are "charged with the prompt execution of an emergency program..." (NARA, Rockefeller to President Roosevelt, March 7, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 510).
66. NARA, "Register of the Department of State, October 1, 1942." 1943. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
67. NARA, Robert Sherwood to Colonel Donovan, November 22, 1941, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 6.
68. Ibid.
69. The OWI attempted to garner the trust of the world public. Trust was crucial to OWI's own objectives in order to get people to listen and continue to listen as the war progressed. "If the peoples of foreign countries trust and like this America who comes to them across the oceans, they will listen to it sympathetically and be influenced by its suggestions. If they do not like, or at least trust America, they will not be influenced by what they read in the daily press or hear over the air. Since the first prerequisite of trust and friendliness is understanding, there is literally no aspect of American life which is not worth while presenting clearly and truthfully..." (NARA, "Long-Range Directive," January 15, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13).
70. Thomson 1948; Winkler 1978.
71. Robert Pell was not only the Assistant Chief of DCI, he also served in the Planning Section of the Liaison Branch for DCI, representing the Division of European Affairs for the DoS (*Register of the Department of State* 1942).
72. 1978.
73. NARA, "Long-Range Directive on the Projection of America," February 6, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13.
74. NARA, "Long-Range Directive," January 15, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13.
75. NARA, "Program of the Communications Division," by Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235, emphasis added.
76. Ibid.
77. "NARA, Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," August 16, 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447.
78. As will be discussed in greater detail later, the DCR, CIAA, and OWI distinguished between theatrical and non-theatrical films. Non-theatrical

films included newsreels and documentaries highlighting different aspects of American life. These films were produced using 16-mm film so they could be shown outside of theaters in town halls and schools and on mobile projection units to reach a wider audience. Theatrical films were produced using 35-mm film and were intended for movie theaters.

79. NARA, "Activities of the Coordination Committees," February 10, 1942, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 455.
80. NARA, "Cultural Relations Division, Programs & Plans," September 15, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435.
81. NARA, "Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," August 16, 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447.
82. NARA, "Cultural Relations Division, Programs & Plans," September 15, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435.
83. NARA, "Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," August 16, 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447.
84. The Basic Economy Program of CIAA was "directed toward the well-being of all the people and the Coordinator's Office is endeavoring realistically to relate its program to these objectives" of the "hemisphere policy." The program considered health and sanitation conditions, nutrition and food supply, and emergency rehabilitation. "The program is being advanced by *education* and *example*. Every encouragement is being given to make known to others methods and techniques which have been used in the United States with a full and objective evaluation of results which have been obtained" (NARA, "Basic Economy Program, Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," (Circa June 1942), RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).
85. NARA, No 1755, Bombay, India, 5 January 1945, RG 59, CDF 1940-1949, Box 307, 103.9166^1-545.
86. *Ibid.*
87. *Ibid.*
88. "Fearful of a German victory and domination of Latin American trade by Germany, with the threat which this may involve to the economic and political security of the United States..." numerous government committees and agencies were created between 1938 and 1940. The IDC was one of these agencies established by FDR under the chairmanship of Sumner Welles, and included representatives from several US government departments. The IDC made recommendations for funding initiatives within the different representative agencies in cooperation with Latin American nations with the specific purpose to bolster Latin American governments and economies against potential Nazi influence



- (NARA, "Plans or Programs for the Increase of Trade...", August 7, 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472).
89. NARA, "Order Establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations," August 16, 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472, emphasis added.
  90. The Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs was created along OCCCAR in August 1940 and continued its existence in the transition to CIAA in 1941. Nelson Rockefeller served as the chairman and included representatives from the Export-Import Bank, the Treasury, DoS, Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Commerce. According to Rockefeller, "...the President in issuing this order had in mind not just another duplicating Government agency but rather a reorientation of the whole American problem from the viewpoint of National Defense. [Rockefeller] therefore felt that in all of its activities *the Committee should keep the defense angle firmly in mind*" (NARA, "Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs," August 27, 1940, RG 229, Entry 10, Box 543, emphasis added).
  91. The law came out of discussions in the IDC. Secretary Cordell Hull asked FDR to request Congress pass a bill to improve cooperation between the USA and Latin America to offset European experts currently detailed to Latin American governments. Public Law 63 was passed by Congress on May 25, 1938. The IDC began recommending projects including economic development, transportation initiatives, public health and sanitation assistance, as well as cultural and informational projects under the administration of the DCR. For these projects, the IDC originally requested a budget of one million dollars, but only received \$370,500 from Congress for the 1940 fiscal year. The IDC's budget was eventually consolidated into the DCR's budget and the other government agencies represented on the committee (Espinosa 1976).
  92. The DoS and the Inter-Departmental Committee for Cooperation with American Republics often described various projects as being cultural interchange. In general, these initiatives were exchanges, but they tended to be between government officials rather than among the citizens of each nation. The Department of Interior planned to "loan" six employees from their offices (Office of Education, Indian Affairs, Mines, National Parks Service, Geological Survey, etc.) "to share with other American governments their knowledge and experience in their respective fields, for a period of 1 year." In "exchange," the Department of Interior would receive Latin American students for practical training within the Department (NARA, "Committee of Representatives

- of Executive Departments and Independent Agencies to Consider the Question of Cooperation with the American Republics—Meeting Minutes 17 August 1938,” RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29). Other plans included textbook revision of US textbooks, removing any unfriendly or prejudiced statements; conducting a survey of US curriculum and add emphasis on Latin American nations in history, geography, and economics; sponsoring and co-sponsoring cultural exhibits; and promoting educational radio programs.
93. NARA, “Plans or Programs for the Increase of Trade...,” August 7, 1940, RG 229, Entry 1.5, Box 472.
  94. Vice President Henry Wallace adamantly opposed making any distinctions between economic programs and cultural relations: “...I wish to emphasize the interrelationship that must exist between the economic action programs and the Cultural Relations Program. There is no sharp line of division between these two. One must supplement the other... However, it is also necessary that we establish *helpful relations* with the remaining 90 percent of the people, who are for the most part engaged in agriculture. Unless we help them to improve their economic lot, thus making it possible for health and education to develop, there will be no dependable basis for democracy...in a truly democratic system, cultural and economic cooperation are largely interdependent. The one cannot thrive long without the other. A Cultural Relations Program that is correlated with our various activities in the economic sphere is far more desirable than one which does not March in step with our efforts to meet the economic problems of the Hemisphere” (NARA, General Advisory Committee, September 17-18, 1941, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29).
  95. In reference to the IDC’s plans to initiate technical exchanges, members of the committee agreed that “the language should be carefully drawn, and the especial care should be taken to avoid any appearance of ‘forcing’ projects upon the other American republics” (NARA, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics on October 12, 1938,” RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2).
  96. NARA, Sumner Welles, Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics, Meeting Minutes, August 12, 1942, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29, emphasis added.
  97. NARA, Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics, Meeting Minutes, August 12, 1942, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29.
  98. NARA, “OWI’s Participation in Cultural Activities,” April 11, 1945, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13.
  99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.
101. NARA, "Memorandum to State Department Heads of Missions and OWI Outpost Chiefs," March 15, 1945, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 15.
102. Espinosa, J. Manuel. 1976. "Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948: Cultural Relations Programs of the U.S. Department of State." In, edited by Department of State. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; Fairbank, Wilma. 1976. "Cultural Relations Programs of the U.S. Department of State." In. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
103. Fairbank 1976.
104. NARA, "Outline of the Tentative Program for the Division of Cultural Relations," March 16, 1939, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 236, 111.46/126 ½; Fairbank 1976.
105. NARA, "Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics Meeting Minutes," October 28, 1938, RG 353, Entry 22, Box 29.
106. NARA, "Cultural Relations Division, Programs & Plans," September 15, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 435.
107. Ibid.
108. The Division was headquartered in Washington with offices in both New York and Hollywood. Policy and planning of the Division took place in Washington. Within the Division, there were two departments: theatrical and non-theatrical. Non-theatrical productions tended to be educational rather than for entertainment. The New York office coordinates its initiatives with the help of two committees from the motion picture industry. One committee was composed of the presidents of the leading companies and another of export managers (NARA, "Organization of the Motion Picture Division," n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).
109. NARA, "Motion Picture Division of the CIAA," circa July 30, 1943, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235.
110. Ibid.
111. NARA, "Program of the Communications Division," by Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235.
112. One example of a film which the Communication Division blocked from overseas distribution was *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* which was deemed to portray Congress and American democracy in a negative light. Another film, *Down Argentine Way*, was found to be objectionable because "[three] Argentine business men and one Argentine government official shown in it were comedy characters..." Further objections were raised about one of the main Argentine characters being a gigolo; the only Spanish-speaking Argentine character spoke with an obvious Mexican accent; and the plot of the movie focused on a corrupt race at the Buenos Aires Jockey Club, "...an institution of which Argentinians are proud." The producer agreed to reshoot the movie before releasing

- in Latin American countries. (NARA, "Program of the Communications Division," by Nelson Rockefeller, n.d., RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235).
113. NARA, "Conversation...in Secretary's Office," January 15, 1938, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2.
  114. Gilpin 1938.
  115. NARA, Philip Bonsal to Duggan, December 22, 1939, RG 353, Entry 14, Box 2, emphasis added.
  116. Ibid.
  117. NARA, "Summary of the Activities of the CIAA," March 1, 1942, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235.
  118. Ibid.
  119. Rockefeller said "the only concept we are trying to sell at the moment is 'Democracy' and that this has not been thought out from the point of view of Latin America...our emphasis on Democracy might even be a boomerang, as most of the governments of the Latin American republics are dictatorial in nature" (NARA, Policy Committee of Cultural Relations Division of Coordinator's Office, Meeting Minutes, September 27, 1940, RG 229, Entry 10, Box 543).
  120. According to the Executive Committee Meeting Minutes for OCCCAR, Sumner Welles did not approve of the Coordinator's cultural information program (NARA, Executive Committee of the Coordinator's Office, Meeting Minutes, September 25, 1940, RG 229, Entry 10, Box 543).
  121. The CIAA emphasized private over government sponsored or affiliated initiatives. To avoid directly sponsoring programs, the CIAA established corporations. Several corporations were set up during the course of CIAA's existence, including the Motion Picture Society for the Americas, Hemisphere Films, Incorporated, and Prencinradio, Incorporated (Thomson 1948; NARA, "Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," August 16, 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447).
  122. NARA, "Summary of the Activities of the CIAA," March 1, 1942, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235.
  123. NARA, "Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs," August 16, 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447.
  124. NARA, "Bureau of Overseas Publications," May 31, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4.
  125. NARA, Elwood to Robert Sherwood, August 15, 1941, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 6.
  126. "Definition is open game...There are three ways in which 'psychological warfare' and 'military propaganda' can be defined: first, by deciding what we are talking about in a given situation...second, by determining the responsibilities and authority involved in a given task; or third, by

- stating the results which are believed to be accomplishable by the designated means" (Linebarger 1948, p.37).
127. Winkler 1948, p. 31.
  128. Gary 1999; Sproule 1997.
  129. MacLeish was responsible for policy and planning within the OWI.
  130. NARA, "Letter Writing Plan...Unoccupied France," July 20, 1942, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4.
  131. Ibid.
  132. NARA, "Letter Writing Plan...Germany," July 30, 1942, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4.
  133. NARA, "Plan for an Overt Direct-Mail Department," n.d., RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4.
  134. Ibid.
  135. Ibid.
  136. NARA, J.C.S. 155/1.b, "Functions of the Office of Strategic Services," December 7, 1942, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 9.
  137. NARA, "OWI Board of War Information Minutes," December 21, 1942, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 9.
  138. NARA, "Draft of Memorandum from the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," n.d., RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 9.
  139. NARA, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive: Functions of the Office of Strategic Services, J.C.S." 155/4/b, December 23, 1942, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13.
  140. NARA, "Executive Order: Defining the Foreign Information Activities of the Office of War Information", March 9, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 7.
  141. The OSS did engage in what would today be considered black propaganda, with the generation of "false rumors, 'freedom stations,' false leaflets and false documents...all for the purpose of creating confusion, division and undermining the morale of the enemy" (NARA, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Corrigendum to J.C.S. 155/11/b Directive: Functions of the Office of Strategic Services, October 28, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13).
  142. NARA, Unsigned document, April 14, 1944, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 13.
  143. NARA, "Conference with Bracken," September 26, 1945, RG 208, Entry 6E, Box 7.
  144. Ibid.
  145. NARA, "Statement by the President for EO 9608," August 31, 1945, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4. President Truman's statement mentioned the consolidation of the CIAA as well. Much of the CIAA's activities

- were transferred to the Department of State as early as 1943 (Espinosa 1976; United States 1947).
146. NARA, "Statement by the President for EO 9608," August 31, 1945, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4.
  147. NARA, "Letter from Secretary Byrnes to the President," December 31, 1945, RG 208, Entry 6H, Box 4.
  148. Ibid.
  149. The Department of State reorganized in January 1944, creating the Office of Public Affairs and a position for Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs. The Office of Information and Educational Exchange combined the Division of Cultural Relations along with the Division of Current Information.
  150. Though the DoS had attempted throughout WWII to extend their mandate beyond managing cultural relations in Latin America under the 1936 treaty for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, the Department had not been successful. By 1944, the Department now sought to not only expand cultural relations worldwide, but to also include many of the information operations managed by the OWI and CIAA.
  151. Senate and House debates on the bill were delayed by controversy between the DoS and the Associated Press and the United Press over selling their news services to the US government. The Bloom Bill was further delayed by the DoS Appropriation Bill for 1947. When the bill was finally put before both the House and Senate, Senator Taft blocked the proposal to bring the bill to the floor and the bill died (Paulu, Burton. 1953. "The Smith-Mundt Act: A Legislative History," *Journalism Quarterly Summer*, Vol. 8).
  152. NARA, William Benton to Senator Karl Mundt, June 19, 1947, RG 59, Entry 1559, Box 73.
  153. John Begg, former Chief of the International Information Division within the DoS, sent a memo to Harley Notter in the Planning Division of DoS in 1943 regarding the democratization of international relations. "When we, as a country became independent, it was again the ruling groups that had the contacts, but during the last war, radio, motion pictures, newspapers, and fast communication had developed an interest in the people; they wanted to participate. This was democracy...in international relations...It was inevitable, in my mind, that we should have people involved in international relations" (NARA, Oral History Interview with John M. Begg [Transcript], in Harry S. Truman Library, 11 July 1975, pp. 18–19).
  154. *Congressional Record* 1946 Vol. 92 Part 4, pp. 4347–4351; *Congressional Record* 1946 Vol. 92 Part 6, pp. 8021–8023; Debate over the

- appropriation bill (HR 6056) centered primarily on funding for both the DoS information and broadcasting program. The primary argument against the measure was the legality of funding a program that Congress had not legislated. As Representative Halleck noted, “[authorizations] for agencies, the creation of agencies, and the changing of the powers and duties and functions of agencies are for the legislative committees of Congress. In recent years we have seen a practice develop under which the Appropriations Committee, by making appropriations for agencies and functions not authorized by law...usurps many of the responsibilities, duties, and powers of the legislative committees” (*Congressional Record* 1946 Vol. 92 Part 4, p. 4347).
155. Paulu (1953); *Congressional Record* 1946 Vol. 93, Pt 4, pp. 5282–5295.
  156. *Congressional Record* 1946 Vol 93, Pt. 5, pp. 6621–6626; pp. 6739–6745.
  157. *Congressional Record* 1946 Vol. 93 Pt 7, p. 8996.
  158. NARA, “Report on European Trip, August 25–September 30, 1947, RG 59, Entry 1559, Box 2.
  159. Successor to the OIC, the Office of Information and Exchange.
  160. NARA, “Report on European Trip, 25 August–September 30, 1947, RG 59, Entry 1559, Box 2, emphasis added.
  161. Within RG 59, Entry 1559, there are over 20 boxes containing correspondence and memorandums on members of Congress. William Benton, Director of OIC, spent most of his tenure lobbying Congress to draft and pass legislation in support of US international information and culture programs. Nelson Rockefeller maintained similar records and correspondences with Congress throughout the existence of CIAA (NARA, RG 229, Entry 1.4).
  162. The bill included a requirement for personnel involved in the State Department’s foreign public engagement program to undergo a security check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation before being hired. To monitor the effectiveness of the program, two independent commissions composed of private citizens appointed by the President would be asked to make annual reports on both the information and exchange programs. The language of the bill also emphasized that the State Department only fills the gaps where private companies or organizations are not able to or do not operate overseas (*Congressional Record* Vol. 94, Pt 1, 271–274).
  163. *Congressional Record* 1948 Vol. 94, Pt. 1, p. 247; Ninkovich 1981.
  164. Ninkovich (1981, pp. 125–126).
  165. In March 1944, the Department of State formed another committee to explore the problems regarding information dissemination to missions worldwide. The committee was comprised of all the geographic

- area divisions. According to the committee chair, Mr. Erhardt, “[it] was essential that the Committee should study and adopt all possible new techniques for the gathering, evaluation and dissemination of information” (NARA, “Minutes, Information Service Committee,” March 10, 1944, RG 353, Entry 401–403, Box 94).
166. In the fall of 1944, John Begg of DoS invited CIAA and OWI information officers and field representatives to discuss the future of US information policy after the war. He noted that “[several] people in the Department had been recommending the use of information as a part of diplomatic technique as far back as several years ago.” In summarizing the meeting, Charles Lee (CIAA) said that the “questions put by the field men and some of us from this Office [Communications Division/CIAA] soon made it clear that there was no provision at present for permanent information officers under the Department of State, nor had great thought been given to the operation in the field. They also brought out clearly that the field men were not in favour of a [sic] operation directed or controlled by information officers in the Embassies” (NARA, “Meeting in Mr. John Begg’s Office,” November 20, 1944, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 493).
  167. James Warburg to Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood, August 11, 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 4.
  168. Percy Winner to John Houseman, 12 April 1943, RG 208, Entry 6B, Box 6.
  169. Rockefeller to Laurence Duggan, 31 May 1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 495.
  170. RG 59, CDF 1930–1939, Box 236, 111.46/131; Box 237, 111.46/223.
  171. “Summary of Activities: Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,” August 16, 1944, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 447.
  172. A corporation could conform to local practices, unlike a government entity. Corporations also had executive power to determine policies and methods which also permitted more flexibility. Corporate bodies also allowed for negotiation and execution of cooperative agreements with foreign agencies, a crucial component of CIAA’s operations. If a US minister or consul wanted to negotiate an agreement with a local or national foreign government, there would be Constitutional obstacles to carrying out the agreement (Thomson 1948).
  173. Rockefeller to President Roosevelt, August 19, 1941, RG 229, Entry 1.4, Box 235.
  174. Roosevelt to Donovan, 15 October 1941, RG 229, Entry 1, Box 472.



## Foreign Public Engagement: An American Tradition in Context

*Modern international relations lie between people, not merely governments.*  
Dr. Arthur Macmahon, 1945<sup>1</sup>

Despite public diplomacy obtaining legal recognition as a mechanism of US statecraft with the passage of Smith-Mundt, its role in US statecraft was anything but clearly defined. As the cases in the previous chapters demonstrate, public diplomacy may have been recognized as a necessary and missing element of US statecraft, but none of the questions about what it was, its purpose, or role were ever fully resolved in 1948, nor were they resolved in the decades that followed. The goal of this research is to shed light on the role of US public diplomacy in statecraft, by examining the origins of the issues which effect the tool today in order to understand public diplomacy within the context of US historical experience and political culture. In the six cases, several patterns emerged which provide important connections between foreign public engagement and public diplomacy, revealing the role of public diplomacy in US statecraft. Five major patterns or themes surface in each of the cases. These patterns include communication; methods of engagement; people and organizations; public-private partnerships; and the role of the public in international relations (see Fig. 8.1).

The patterns uncovered not only reveal the origins and evolution of US public diplomacy, but also an American understanding about the



**Fig. 8.1** Patterns in the development of US public diplomacy. *Source* Created by the author

purpose, practice, and role of public diplomacy. As discussed in Chap. 1, the origins of some of the problems confronting US public diplomacy are well-known to scholars and practitioners, such as defining the concept and how to organize public diplomacy within the government. Yet, as the proceeding chapters illustrate, the obstacles and debates surrounding the practice and use of public diplomacy are complex and often intertwined with US political culture, foreign policy traditions, and historical experience.

This study reveals that in the context of historical experience, public diplomacy's role in US statecraft tends to be a last resort mechanism, used when the United States is at war. However, this study also reveals that despite the tendency to use public diplomacy as a last resort there is consistent agreement that public diplomacy should be a standard practice of diplomacy for a variety of reasons, to include concerns about US national image abroad; the use of exchange diplomacy to maintain peace

and increase international understanding; bolstering US trade internationally; national security concerns; and perhaps most significantly, because public diplomacy is seen as reflective of US democratic values and thus the “American” way of conducting foreign relations. The following pages will explore each of the patterns, examining how these trends of the past are connected to the development of public diplomacy and present-day public diplomacy generally.

### PATTERN ONE: COMMUNICATION

One of the recurring themes or patterns in each of the cases is *communication*. In this study, communication as a theme appears in three ways. First, there is consistent recognition in each case of this study from Benjamin Franklin to President Harry Truman of the *need* to communicate with the *people* of other nations, not just the governments. First, in several of the cases within this study, advances in communication technology helped or hindered engagement relationships between the US and the people of another nation as well as changed audience dynamics between the United States and the world. And finally, communication between those in the field and headquarters is often a concern, with those in the field feeling excluded from policy decisions made in Washington or overlooking information provided by the field.

The imperative to communicate with the people of other nations, to correct misperceptions and explain US policies and character is clearly demonstrated in the first two cases. Benjamin Franklin’s seemingly frantic reports back to the Continental Congress and the Committee of Secret Correspondence illustrate the importance of providing news about the colonies in order to counter what the British press circulated. Even being the last to know about events in the colonies impacted the public perception of the commissioners and by extension the United States. Franklin wrote four letters in succession from February 6th through April 1777, pleading for information to use with the *public*. Not only could the American commissioners in France not refute any of the information disseminated by the British, but the commissioners also noted how their “total Ignorance of the truth or Falsehood of Facts, when Questions are asked of us concerning them, makes us appear small in the Eyes of the People here, and is prejudicial to our Negotiations.”<sup>2</sup> While serving as the US minister during the American Civil War, Charles

Francis Adams noted how “[t]he industry of the Confederate emissaries are poisoning the sources of opinion, as well as in disseminating wholly erroneous notions of the nature of the struggle in America has been unwearied. And here the seed has fallen on favorable ground it has germinated strongly and fructified well.”<sup>3</sup> In both examples, the importance or need to communicate was based on a profound concern for the *image* of the US and how America’s image could be or is affected by misconceptions or misinformation about the United States and its policies. This same concern surfaces throughout WWI, the interwar period, WWII, and through today.

One month after the attacks of 9/11, the US State Department launched the *Shared Values Initiative* which was intended “to correct a mistaken image of American hostility to Islam that research showed was prevalent in the Arab and Muslim world.”<sup>4</sup> *The 9/11 Commission Report* also noted how after 2003, people in Muslim countries in the Middle East, Indonesia, and parts of Africa became increasingly negative toward the US. According to the report, “these views are at best uninformed about the United States and, at worst, informed by cartoonish stereotypes, the coarse expression of a fashionable ‘Occidentalism’ among intellectuals who caricature U.S. values and policies.”<sup>5</sup> In over 200 years of US history and experience, the importance of communicating with the people of other nations to correct misperceptions never really diminished in relation to US image, policies, and values. “Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values...If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.”<sup>6</sup> The importance or relevance of public diplomacy to the US government tended to alter based on US foreign policy or the international situation, as this study has demonstrated.

Historically, when foreign public opinion obstructed US foreign policy and posed a perceived threat to the United States itself, the government tended to value communicating with foreign publics more, as with both WWI and WWII and when President McKinley chose to send humanitarian aid to Cuba in 1897. Private citizens and organizations were more consistent in their recognition of this need to communicate with the public of other nations. Stuart Perry, Editor & Publisher of *The Adrian Telegram*, was so concerned about the misperceptions held by people overseas, he wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

Correspondents of foreign newspapers in Washington and New York have all the news there is, but they send only what they choose—which is the news they think their editors in Europe want. The editors, in turn, print what they please, or what they think their readers like to read. In short the problem seems to be one of converting the foreign press to a more sensible and ethical treatment of news from America...We can take an indifferent or contemptuous attitude...but the fact remains that we do care, if we are intelligent. In the aggregate the misrepresentation of America in the foreign press is very hurtful to the nation. It all tends to lower us in the estimation of foreigners, to diminish our prestige, to weaken our hand in whatever we are doing.<sup>7</sup>

This concern about a misunderstanding between the people of other nations also drove private foundations such as CEIP, RF, and the IIE to encourage mutual exchanges. A key component of internationalism argued that war and conflict were caused by misconceptions which existed among people from different cultures. Peace and stability were attainable if cross-cultural communication could take place.

Another aspect of communication reiterated throughout many of the cases in the study is how either limited means of communication or the advance of communication technologies impacted both the nature of engagement and the platform for engagement. Benjamin Franklin was woefully inhibited by the lack of communication capabilities, compounded by the fact that the US colonies at the time of the Revolution did not have naval vessels that could compete against the British navy. In many cases, Franklin and the Continental Congress relied on trusted couriers to send correspondences across the Atlantic.<sup>8</sup> Given the technological limitations, Franklin adapted the way he engaged with the people of France. Since the US desired to show France and the world that the United States was a stable, independent, and lucrative investment, Franklin used the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and state constitutions to demonstrate these qualities in the face of repeated military defeats.

Unfortunately, the advent of the telegraph caused a great deal of problems for the Union throughout the Civil War. Despite warnings from Reverend Dr. M'Clintock and Minister Adams regarding the bias of the telegraph services, Secretary Seward did little to alter or address the problem. Additionally, Seward and other US leaders did not seem to understand how the telegraph diminished the wall between the domestic

and foreign audience. The European public had access to whole speeches given by US leaders and other dignitaries only a few days after giving the speech. Charles Adams's son, Charles Francis Jr., saw the problem, writing to his brother, Henry

...I must confess I think the government's cards, so far as the public sees them, are played badly enough both here and in England. While the agents of the Confederates are abroad working the whole time at public opinion and at the foreign mind, influencing papers and thinkers and undermining us the whole time, our press at home does but furnish them the materials they need and our agents abroad apparently confine their efforts to cabinets and officials and leave public opinion and the press to take care of themselves.<sup>9</sup>

This is not only the time US engagement lagged behind the progress of communication technology. When WWI broke out in Europe, the US communications relied heavily on private European communications infrastructure.<sup>10</sup> In an effort to ensure the rapid broadcast and dissemination of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech the Committee on Public Information used a patchwork system, relaying the speech from US Navy wireless stations to cooperative European governments' wireless stations. A Japanese news service, Kokusai Agency, described how they received President Wilson's speeches.

It had travelled overland for nearly four thousand miles and then commenced its long under the sea trip from San Francisco to the Island of Guam. Here again the long message was taken down and 'relayed' once more for China and Japan where the Reuter agent in Shanghai and the general manager of Kokusai had been notified to accept it...During the afternoon...the first section of about one hundred words came in on the wire to the headquarters of the Kokusai Agency at Sojuro-cho. Here...translators, manifolders [*sic*] and messengers had all been organized to work. Experienced editors taking turns, received the telegrams as they came... Short "takes" were passed to translators and then to the chief translator in Japanese and English for reediting. The retouched and compared sheets were then re-written and passed to the manifolders [*sic*] for the machine work of reproduction of the copies necessary...Literally hundreds of telephones were commandeered and from one end of Japan to the other the contents of the message were distributed and made ready for publication.<sup>11</sup>

Even by WWII, the United States still had not developed a worldwide communications network. The US remained reluctant to develop a communication infrastructure to counter-propaganda and censorship, despite concerns about both. “Liberal traditions nurtured a deep distrust of direct governmental involvement in the dissemination of culture and information; Americans had always insisted that ‘freedom’ meant privately controlled mass media.”<sup>12</sup>

Today, technology continues to play a role in shaping US public diplomacy. The US no longer suffers from an inadequate communication infrastructure to engage with people abroad; however, the changes to the communication environment have presented both problems and opportunities for US public diplomacy. Perhaps the most recent and glaring problem is the same problem Secretary Seward suffered—a change in audience dynamics. Communications technology is not what it was in either 1865 or 1918 when the United States relied on foreign telegraph services or a cobbled cable relay system. Now, US leaders are heard and quoted in real-time between mobile networks and Twitter. An example of this disconnect was seen in the aftermath of the attacks on the US compound in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. Following the attacks, US Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, made several public appearances on American television attributing the attacks to an angry protest incited by a YouTube video ridiculing the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>13</sup> Two days after these public statements regarding the YouTube video, protests began at American diplomatic posts throughout the Middle East.<sup>14</sup> The DoS provided answers with only the US public and Congress in mind. By raising the profile of the YouTube video, the DoS caused anger and violence to spread throughout the Middle East. In some instances, US domestic affairs are also more public as a result of new communications technologies. The protests and violence in Ferguson, Missouri made international news and was featured on the front pages of leading international papers.<sup>15</sup> US domestic issues have been and continue to be of interest to the rest of the world, and in turn play a role in how the United States is perceived not only in connection to the nation’s foreign policy, but also the national values the USA represents and advocates.

On the other hand, advances in communications technology provide opportunities for US public diplomacy. The government funded and established a social media network in Afghanistan called Paywast, which

means “to connect” in Dari. One of the frustrations faced in Afghanistan is the resistance to central authority and the firm adherence to tribal, cultural, and linguistic affiliations. “But a social media network initially financed by the United States is finding a way around those barriers. It is connecting millions of Afghans equipped with cellphones and other mobile devices, allowing an exchange of ideas that has never been possible in Afghanistan outside Kabul, the capital.”<sup>16</sup> Despite the loss of US financial support for Paywast, the network continues to be used by Afghans.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, the need for communication between those in the field and headquarters or lack of communication between the field and headquarters is a recurring problem in many of the cases featured in this study. Frequently, individuals who lived and worked abroad saw the importance and need for communicating with people abroad and urged the Department of State to engage more with people of other nations. Unfortunately, either due to political or policy constraints or a genuine lack of interest, the DoS often left such requests either unanswered or refused to become involved. When Charles Francis Adams requested Secretary Seward to send him updates about the Civil War to use with the British public, Seward replied he “should be pleased if it more *prudent* to give you at all times our plans concerning military operations. It would at first sight seem that I might safely give you accounts of results, but *there would be so many hazards of misinterpretation at home and abroad of what I might write* upon such matters, that I deem it safest to have you obtain your knowledge as best you may from a feverish and confused press.”<sup>18</sup>

Following the Fourth Pan American Conference, Latin American nations were enthusiastic about starting inter-American academic exchanges. Guatemala was the first nation to announce their government would offer up to five scholarships for students in the USA to study in Guatemala. This announcement was printed throughout the US in the press and resulted in dozens of letters and postcards from across the United States addressed to the Secretary of State, asking for more particulars about the scholarships.<sup>19</sup> Applicants were told to contact the Guatemalan embassy. Meanwhile, the DoS in Washington did little after the conference to either encourage other nations to establish academic exchanges or to arrange US exchanges, despite repeated queries and requests from US officers serving in Latin America.



I have the honor to respectfully suggest to the Department that my experience of six years in this country has convinced me that a great part of misunderstanding between the people of the two countries and the feeling of anti-Americanism which always exists to more or less degree in this country is due to the fact that the individuals citizens [*sic*] are not very well acquainted with the people, customs, etc. of the other country. It has occurred to me that perhaps an extensive and systematic exchange of scholarships between American and Mexican Institutions might serve in the course of time to create a better understanding.<sup>20</sup>

The suggestion was forwarded to the Secretary of Interior “as of possible interest to the Bureau of Education” and to CEIP, then the request was filed 7 October by DoS.<sup>21</sup> Similar suggestions were sent throughout 1913 and 1914 with little impact on the Department of State.

This disconnect between those operating in the field and headquarters carried on through WWI and WWII. When Assistant Director of the Office of Information and Educational Exchange (OIE), William Tyler, traveled to Europe in 1947, he asked about the concerns and problems of the officers working in the field. Tyler found that United States Information Service (USIS)<sup>22</sup> officers did not have access to the same information about US foreign policy as Foreign Service officers within the same mission. “One of the symptoms and consequences of the USIS not yet being used to its fullest advantage as an instrument of the Mission’s work, is that our PAO’s [Public Affairs Officers] are often badly informed as to what is going on and what our policy is.”<sup>23</sup> As Benjamin Franklin, Thurlow Weed, Charles Francis Adams, officers of the CPI, CIAA, and OWI all found, without information from headquarters, they were unable to do the very thing they were asked: to correct misperceptions or explain US policies and culture. Conversely, foreign public engagement was inhibited when headquarters refused to listen or ignored what officers in the field reported. In the 2015 and 2016 reports on US public diplomacy, the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy recommended Washington-directed activities needed to be more responsive to field needs and local contexts in order to meet local needs and the goals of the mission.<sup>24</sup>

With advances in communication such as the Internet and mobile networks, the distance between one nation and another has faded into seeming insignificance. Foreign audiences sit right beside domestic audiences; therefore, US policymakers and leaders must now consider

not just the American public when communicating, but also the public abroad. There is a clear disconnect among US leadership in recognizing that the altered communication environment and the implications this has for every aspect of US statecraft, not just public diplomacy. Now the President, the Secretary of State, a Senator, or a state governor are not just speaking to a domestic audience they are simultaneously speaking to foreign audiences, as advances in communication make it possible for people everywhere to hear. In 2009, a Congressional research report noted this same issue that “with the rise and rapid evolution of Internet communications, the U.S. government must determine how to effectively communicate with foreign publics in an increasingly complex, accessible, and democratized global communications environment.”<sup>25</sup> As this study has shown, this is not a necessarily new development. The United States, in many ways, still acts as though the nation is still a separate sphere from the rest of the world.

## PATTERN TWO: METHODS OF ENGAGEMENT

While this research relied heavily on Nicholas Cull’s core approaches to public diplomacy, there are undeniable similarities between the methods used to engage the people of another nation. Even removing the framework used, with the five core elements of public diplomacy, the practices used from 1776 up through the present-day remain much the same. By the mid-nineteenth century, the ways in which to address or engage the public had become standardized.<sup>26</sup> The consistency of practice confirms not only Cull’s core elements of public diplomacy, but also that the basic act of engaging the people of another nation has been an element of international practice for centuries and is not a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Further research examining how other nations developed public diplomacy may demonstrate other methods of engagement or show how nations use similar methods engagement in different ways. Looking more closely at how and when the US used different forms of engagement to achieve specific objectives suggests the core practices of US public diplomacy reflect experience (what works) and US political culture, such as with US missionaries and the philanthropic organizations in the 1930s.

This study opened by describing how the missionaries sent to the Ottoman Empire were first tasked to gather information about the Empire and the people to report back to the American Board of

Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). The missionaries were also to report on the progress and problems they faced in the work, so the Board could alter the mission to fit the requirements of the people in the Empire. Benjamin Franklin's friends in France and his fellow commissioners particularly noted Franklin as a listener: "He was considered as a citizen of the world, a friend to all men and an enemy to none. His rigorous taciturnity was very favorable to this singular felicity. He conversed only with individuals, and freely only with confidential friends. In company he was totally silent."<sup>27</sup> Gathering information and listening to the people of other nations is a relatively consistent feature in each of the cases, performed with varying degrees of effectiveness. As described in the preceding section, understanding what people in other nations believed or perceived often spurred the United States to begin engagement or change the way in which the US engaged with people abroad.

However, there have been times, as noted throughout this study, when the United States failed to listen or understand the people of other nations, which made engagement ineffective and in some cases entirely counterproductive. During WWI, the US Chamber of Commerce in Mexico attempted to engage the Mexican public with a pamphlet. The primary argument for building US-Mexican relations, according to the pamphlet, was the yet undeveloped economic potential of Mexico. To Mexicans, this only confirmed their belief that the US was only interested in economic imperialism. In another instance where the United States failed to understand the people they wish to engage with, the CPI sent a representative to Mexico, who did more harm than good. Robert H. Murray's previous work as a journalist for *The New York World* in Mexico made him an extremely unpopular person to the Mexican public. Throughout the Civil War, William Seward failed to listen on numerous occasions regarding the importance of British public opinion in relation to the government's policies. In the case of the American National Red Cross and the Central Cuban Relief Committee, the organizations struggled initially to gather information from the Cubans as to what was required and relaying this to either the DoS or the CCRC.

This is a major issue confronting US public diplomacy today. Following 9/11, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Charlotte Beers designed the *Shared Values Initiative* (SVI). The SVI was a series of short vignette commercials featuring Muslims in the USA. Each vignette emphasized or highlighted a value which corresponded to personal or social values which were common

in the US, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, based international consumer research. According to Beers, the purpose of SVI was to start a conversation; however, when developing SVI, mechanisms were not put into place to absorb international responses and US posts were not made aware of the intent. The United States made an effort to engage, but there was no follow-through to listen.<sup>28</sup> As Rhonda Zaharna notes in the aftermath of 9/11, “U.S. public diplomacy was very much a Washington-driven, or source-driven, rather than audience-driven campaign.”<sup>29</sup> Similarly, a *Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World* also noted the USA has “failed to listen and failed to persuade. We have not taken the time to understand our audience, and have not bothered to help them understand us... Arabs and Muslims, it seems, support our values but believe that our policies do not live up to them. A major project for public diplomacy is to reconcile this contradiction through effective communications and intelligent listening.”<sup>30</sup> While the US often listened, as many of the cases featured in the previous chapters demonstrated, listening never goes beyond the tactical, rarely does the information inform higher levels of policymaking.

Understanding and information gathering about foreign publics is not the only constant feature of foreign engagement. US missionaries in the Ottoman Empire translated books into local languages, established newspapers and magazines, and arranged for students from the Empire to study in the USA. This study saw how CEIP, the CPI, the ALA, CIAA, DCR, and OWI translated US literature, textbooks, magazines, and newspapers as a means of engaging with people of other nations. Though Benjamin Franklin did not set up the *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique*, he was one of the primary editors for the newsprint. The purpose and content of *Affaires de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique* is not unlike the *L'Amérique en Guerre* magazine produced by the OWI during WWII, which contained news about the Allied war effort and other news and information about America.<sup>31</sup> CEIP produced and supported several magazines and journals on international law and peace initiatives, while the RF and LSRMF ensured institutions in Europe and other parts of the world received the latest medical and science journals. One of the many recommendations in *The 9/11 Commission Report* included translating textbooks and more of the world's knowledge into local languages as well as establishing libraries in the Middle East.<sup>32</sup>

Though not one of Cull's core practices of public diplomacy, several of the cases saw how the United States used humanitarian aid not

just as an act of human charity for those in need, but as a mechanism to engage people of other nations and to manage international relations. The Cotton Famine in France and Britain spurred private citizens outside of the Confederacy to pull resources in order to provide for the textile workers and their families. To be sure, the impetus for the aid was guided by concerns for those suffering, but there was also recognition by the leaders of the American International Relief Committee that doing nothing for those impacted by the Cotton Famine would hurt relations between the Union and the UK, forcing the UK to act in way which might favor the Confederacy in order to protect their own citizens. The same can be said for President McKinley's decision to not only provide permission for Clara Barton and the ANRC to provide humanitarian aid to Cuba, but also provide US government resources in support of such efforts. While not often considered a component of public diplomacy practice, the cases of US humanitarian assistance in the nineteenth century demonstrate there is a precedent for employing international aid as foreign public engagement in very meaningful way. And as noted at the beginning of the section how the United States employs the core practices reflects the nation's political culture and national experience, the US use of aid as public diplomacy manifests this. The desire to not only help others, but also the desire for social betterment can be tied to US religious, liberal, and progressive strains of political culture; the US missionary spirit. The use of humanitarian aid as a tool of the US in managing foreign relations became even more prominent in the twentieth century with the Progressive movement and the change in the United States' role in the world from a passive observer to active participant.

Student exchanges have also been a consistent method of engagement. Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons arranged for four Greek boys to travel to the US in 1824 to begin school. "We think these lads of much promise, and earnestly desire that they may enjoy all the best means our country affords, for securing a thorough education."<sup>33</sup> In addition to missionaries arranging for students to study in the US, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Chinese students came to the USA either with support from American missionaries, the Chinese government, or the Boxer Indemnity scholarship fund.<sup>34</sup> Following the Fourth Pan American Conference, CEIP agreed to establish scholarships for US scholars and students to study in Latin America and for Latin American students and academics to come to the USA. The creation of the Institute of International Education facilitated and encouraged

more exchanges. During WWI, the CPI with the help of US universities arranged for students to study in the USA. Educational exchanges are clearly a pillar of public diplomacy.

Not only does this lend credence to the core elements of public diplomacy, but it also validates the repeated attestations that public diplomacy is not a twentieth-century phenomenon. Numerous other scholars have made similar connections between private entities and government organizations and present-day public diplomacy practices. Duncan Campbell noted how there were established practices in the mid-nineteenth century to engage people of another nation, which both the Confederates and the Union employed to engage the British public. These techniques included the use of pamphlets, public meetings, speeches, and editorials,<sup>35</sup> which are not dissimilar to those used by Benjamin Franklin. Emily Rosenberg also observed how the CPI's methods of engagement resembled those used by American missionaries in the nineteenth century.<sup>36</sup> At the start of the twentieth century, foundations such as CEIP, RF, and IIE took over supporting schools, academic exchanges, and medical schools started by US missionaries while also initiating their own parallel programs.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, the parallels between the engagement techniques used from the eighteenth century through the twentieth raise questions about public diplomacy and its association with propaganda. Throughout each of the cases, the emphasis has been on both the techniques used and intent. The question is whether schools set up by missionaries, foundations, and the US government can be considered public diplomacy. Certainly, the missionaries wanted to convert people to Christianity, but this quickly became incidental to efforts to build relationships in the communities they served.

*At the present time, when through our community so much sympathy is manifested for the Greeks; when, in their behalf, meetings are held, addresses made, resolutions passed and funds procured; it is confidently expected, that these young sons of Greece, who have been sent to our shores for qualifications to exert, in future years, a strong regenerating influence upon the civil, literary and moral character of the interesting people to which they belong, will not fail of receiving sufficient support. It is pleasing to think of the mutual acquaintance and free intercourse, which may arise between this country, Palestine, and Greece.*<sup>38</sup>

The missionaries saw the people in the Ottoman Empire as people who could achieve a better life with more education and technical training. Foundations such as CEIP and RF viewed their educational and medical programs similarly, believing that with mutual exchange, cross-cultural relationships could be fostered. CEIP and RF also saw education as a way to establish real peace. US public diplomacy raises first the importance of using activities such as exchange and education initiatives to persuade and influence, but also observes that these programs serve to *build relationships* and to provide opportunities to people to better their lives through education and technical training.

Public diplomacy provides a foreign policy complement to traditional government-to-government diplomacy, which is dominated by official interaction carried out between professional diplomats. Unlike public affairs, which focus communication activities intended primarily to inform and influence domestic media and the American people, U.S. public diplomacy includes efforts to interact directly with the citizens, community and civil leaders, journalists, and other opinion leaders of another country. *PD seeks to influence that society's attitudes and actions in supporting U.S. policies and national interests.* Public diplomacy is viewed as often having a long-term perspective that requires working *through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting relationships and understanding of the United States and its culture, values, and policies.*<sup>39</sup>

Thus, for over 200 years, the United States continued to engage with people from other nations, to build relations, exchange information and ideas, as well as spreading American culture and values.

### PATTERN THREE: PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS

Another significant theme of this study is the recurring role of many private organizations and individuals in not only administering US foreign public engagement, but also shaping it. Private entities have been recognized as partners with the government and leaders of US public diplomacy since the Cold War. However, this research suggests further study should be done looking at how these private groups and citizens impacted the development and role of public diplomacy in the United States. The ideas and motivations behind these actors undoubtedly left indelible marks on American public diplomacy. Going back to

the ABCFM, to the American National Red Cross, to CEIP and its first board members, to the Advisory Committee for the DCR, there are connections between US foreign public engagement in the nineteenth century through the twentieth century. Figure 8.2 demonstrates this visually by showing the connections between all the individuals and organizations featured in this study which contributed to not only the continual effort to engage with people from other nations, but also helped define and formulate US public diplomacy. This figure clearly illustrates not only the cross-generational connections between different groups and individuals, but also the significant importance of private entities who contributed to the development of US public diplomacy.

Figure 8.2 This chart includes all private and public entities in the study which contributed to the development of US public diplomacy.




Fig. 8.2 Public-Private networks and US public diplomacy, 1819–1945. *Source* Created by the author



The chart is a visual demonstration of the relative continuity of US public diplomacy and also shows the importance of private individuals and organizations in maintaining and advancing public diplomacy.

Foreign public engagement continued throughout US history due primarily to private initiatives. As some of the cases in this study demonstrated, left in government hands, foreign public engagement would have withered away or never gone beyond Benjamin Franklin's efforts in France. Therefore, in terms of impact, without these private actors, public diplomacy in the United States might not exist today. It could be argued that the CPI may have acted as a catalyst to further US public diplomacy; however, much of the CPI would not have functioned or existed without the assistance of private organizations such as the American Red Cross, the American Library Association (ALA), the YMCA, CEIP, and even the ABCFM. Dr. Carl Milam helped the CPI and Library War Service while working for the ALA to establish libraries for US soldiers as well as for locals in Europe. Throughout the interwar period, the ALA worked with CEIP to establish libraries and exchange books between the US and other nations. Milam would later serve as an advisor to the Division of Cultural Relations in 1938. This is one of the many examples in this study where private entities played important roles in ensuring US foreign public engagement continued as well as shaping the policies and practices.

Not only are the private organizations and citizens integral to the continuity of American foreign public engagement, but there are key figures who helped to shape many of the ideas about what foreign public engagement is, what it should do, and what role it should play in relation to the state. In fact, many of the disagreements regarding public diplomacy today can be traced to the varying ideas about the practice as described in Chap. 4. Both James Brown Scott and Nicholas Murray Butler became crucial figures in American foreign public engagement, and both expressed rather different ideas about what foreign public engagement could do and what its role was in relation to US foreign relations and foreign policy. Scott's views of foreign public engagement saw it as a way to not only explain US institutions and ideas, but to spread American influence.<sup>40</sup> While Butler saw exchanges as a way of bringing about international understanding and achieving permanent peace.<sup>41</sup> Both men served on the board of CEIP; Butler as the Director of Intercourse and Education and Brown as the Director of International Law.

As noted earlier, these differing viewpoints about the role of foreign public engagement remain as foreign public engagement developed over the course of the twentieth century up through present day. The varying perspectives toward foreign public engagement were reflected in the way CEIP, RF, IIE, LSRMF, and other agencies conducted engagement; these ideas also shaped the policies, programs, and practices of their foreign public engagement.<sup>42</sup> These views and ideas were then used to develop US public diplomacy when the Department of State established the Division of Cultural Relations. The DCR invited leaders of organizations which already conducted foreign public engagement to advise the DCR on the administration and formation of the US government's own cultural relations. James Shotwell, Stephen Duggan, Carl Milan, Henry Allen Moe, Malcolm Davis, and Waldo Leland among others all served as advisors to the DCR.<sup>43</sup> This study only scratches the surface of how private organizations and citizens helped to shape US public diplomacy. Future research on the development of US public diplomacy should examine the individual views of some of these figures and organizations who played lasting and key roles in advising and cultivating US public diplomacy.

#### PATTERN FOUR: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

More recently, the United States began strengthening and increasing public-private partnerships as a way to augment US public diplomacy.<sup>44</sup> A major pattern in this study is the cooperative foreign public engagement which develops from public-private partnerships. Through much of this study, private entities have played a major role in initiating and conducting US foreign public engagement. When private foreign public engagement aligned with government foreign policy or foreign relations needs, the government facilitated private efforts to engage with people abroad. Even when the US government determined to use engagement as a component of statecraft, such as during WWI and WWII, the government relied heavily on private businesses and nonprofit organizations to perform the actual engagement. Much of the CPI's operations would not have been possible without the support of private business and organizations such as the Red Cross, YMCA, and CEIP, as noted in the previous section. Private entities were also crucial to US foreign relations in the interwar period, by providing de facto representation at the League of Nations.

The major role private entities played in maintaining and activating US foreign public engagement through much of the nation's history is unsurprising. As the United States lacked a professional foreign service and few US legations around the world throughout much of the nation's history, much of US diplomacy was carried out by private entities. As explained in Chap. 1, US institutions, particularly the State Department, were shaped by national experience and political culture. The supremacy of private foreign public engagement over government foreign public engagement is reflective of how US political culture and national experience came to shape US public diplomacy as a practice and what role it plays in US statecraft. The fear of a large federal government often made Americans favor private initiatives over government-administered ones. After the alarm of propaganda, fear of government-controlled communications further inhibited government-run foreign public engagement. Connected to this, and a frequent criticism for US public diplomacy throughout the Cold War, is the issue of allowing the government to decide *what* American culture is and how this is represented abroad. Representing a diverse culture composed from various immigrant backgrounds and shaped by regional differences throughout the USA makes any portrayal of United States' culture a thorny political subject. In many ways, allowing private entities to play the primary role of engagement avoids many of the concerns and problems which government engagement would have to negotiate. The government as coordinator and facilitator aids private initiatives by averting duplicated efforts. This was the model which developed from 1937 to 1938 with the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations. Unfortunately, this model never had the time or funding to develop properly with the onset of WWII.

Some of the cases not only highlighted the development of a cooperative relationship between the US government and private entities carrying out foreign public engagement, but also discussed whether it was more appropriate for private entities to conduct foreign public engagement and how much of a role the government should play in engagement generally. Charles Francis Adams thought appointing private entities to undertake engagement on behalf of the government, in a quasi-official stance, undermined the role of those officially appointed by the government. In Adams' case, sending four private citizens to Britain would suggest that the US government did indeed believe the appointed minister was not capable of handling the duties of the post. On the other hand, when private entities already initiated engagement, as with the

aid organized for the textile workers in Britain, the US government was afraid that by providing any assistance, the aid would become politicized.

This debate over the appropriateness of joint private-public foreign public engagement did not appear when the Central Cuban Relief Committee (CCRC) was formed. This is likely due to the fact that Congress was not consulted when President William McKinley and the Assistant Secretary of State decided to work with Clara Barton. Previous examples where Congress considered assisting private aid and engagement, such as with the Russian famine in 1893, never came to fruition. The debates over funding US foreign public engagement and passing the Smith-Mundt Act argued essentially the same thing: engagement and aid should remain in private hands.

Notably absent from many of the reports and audits published since public diplomacy became of renewed importance after 9/11 is the discussion of private entities' role in US public diplomacy. There is much discussion in these reports about the need to use private entities for technical support, providing access to the latest technology to enable faster and top-quality communication with people abroad. These reports also note how private entities, such as businesses and public relations firms, are consulted and hold contracts with the government to suggest the best public relations techniques, conduct audience research and impact evaluation.<sup>45</sup> This type of relationship differs markedly from the one which evolved from the end of the nineteenth century through the end of the Cold War. Despite the creation of the Office of Private Sector Outreach in 2006 within the Department of State's Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the quality and nature of the relationship between the federal government and private entities is not the same cooperative partnership which evolved in 1937.

This is reflected in the audits and reports on US public diplomacy since 9/11. According to an Inspector General audit of the Bureau of International Information Program (IIP), the 2011 reorganization within the IIP created an Office of Talent Management and Partnerships. The office was to recruit speakers and writers as well as develop partnerships with other government agencies and private organizations to administer public diplomacy activities. "No organic connection exists between the work of the speakers program and that of partnerships. IIP has actively sought partnerships with government and private-sector organizations.... In some cases, the bureau did not determine in advance the PD [public diplomacy] value of the proposed partnerships...did not devise a

strategic plan that included a buy-in from embassies, and did not commit sufficient bureau resources...”<sup>46</sup> The 2003 Djerejian report noted the strength and value of institutions such as the American University of Beirut and American University in Cairo.<sup>47</sup> The report suggested strengthening these institutions and along with the creation of intercultural centers for US-Arab/Muslim studies and dialogue, recommending private organizations could sponsor these centers. These ideas are not new. US private entities voluntarily created these types of centers, often without government assistance in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the first inter-cultural centers in Latin America were created by US businessmen.

One reason for this change in the relationship between the government and private organizations could be due to private businesses’ and foundations’ reluctance to be associated with the government, particularly in light of US foreign policy in last decade. US policies following 9/11 have contributed largely to the USA’s unpopularity in the world with revelations of water boarding, black prison sites, the invasion of Iraq, and US digital surveillance. Many of these policies directly contradict the values US public diplomacy espouses. On the other hand, redeveloping government partnerships with private entities could serve as a means for listening. Private entities are less likely to support or be associated with government policies which they know would alienate the public abroad, unless they benefit in some way. Furthermore, past experience would indicate public diplomacy is more effective with private entities in a primary engagement role and the government playing the coordinator and facilitator role.

#### PATTERN FIVE: THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The cases in this study have highlighted numerous reasons for the US to employ public diplomacy as a mechanism of statecraft. The first trend described how United States felt the need to use public diplomacy to correct negative or inaccurate perceptions about the US. Diplomats and US citizens argued a negative national image undermined US relations. Others believed public diplomacy could be used to bring about international peace through cultural exchange and educational understanding. Public diplomacy was also viewed as a way to increase and broaden US trade.

Not surprisingly, the United States tends to invoke public diplomacy during times of crisis and conflict. Rather than a strategic mechanism, public diplomacy seems to be a tool of last resort. This unfortunate trend is apparent through the debates and eventual Congressional support for the Smith-Mundt Act, and further demonstrated by the decline of the USIA following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and again following the events of 9/11. As many public diplomacy scholars and practitioners note, public diplomacy cannot be relied upon as a mechanism of last resort. The success and benefits of public diplomacy can only be reaped with consistent use in concert with other elements of statecraft.

However, perhaps the most significant reason to for the United States to use public diplomacy, as evidenced by the cases in this book is the belief that the US should conduct its diplomacy in a way that reflects its democratic values. This reasoning for public diplomacy is also tied to the recurrent recognition that the citizens of the world play as much of a role in international relations as the nation-states. As noted in Chap. 2, Benjamin Franklin saw nations, not as a government, but as people. Though eighteenth-century France was a monarchy, bordering on police state, Franklin still pursued and prioritized engagement with the French public. Arthur Bullard admonished President Wilson for conducting US foreign relations in the mode of the Old World, between governments, rather than the people, specifically highlighting the diplomacy of Franklin and Lincoln as how the United States should conduct its foreign relations. And by the end of WWII, postwar State Department policy planners foresaw a world where nationalist movements and decolonization would increase the number of democracies around the world, raising question about the need for the US to consider foreign publics when conducting foreign relations.

This recognition of the role of the public in international relations is more than just the “public dimension” of diplomacy, the growing trend that diplomacy occurs in public. Or to reference an eighteenth century turn of phrase, diplomacy now occurs among “the people without doors.” The idea that people are a factor or play a more significant role in international relations is the awareness of the power and place of the public vis-à-vis their own state and their individual relations with other states.

## CATALYSTS &amp; IMPEDIMENTS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

This study demonstrates how past experience with US foreign public engagement formed American public diplomacy today. In addition, the cases have highlighted various factors which have inhibited and facilitated the development of public diplomacy. Though many forces and events can be identified as playing some role in the development of public diplomacy, the main factors identified in the six cases of this study are *political culture*, *private foreign public engagement*, *historical experience*, *state infrastructure*, and *foreign policy traditions*. These forces contributed not only to how public diplomacy was used to engage with people overseas, but also acted as either catalysts or inhibitors to encourage continued engagement with people abroad or discourage this type of engagement. Some of these factors overlapped and combined to either aggravate obstacles to engagement or in some cases competed with one another.

In the case of political culture, some of the cases demonstrated how attitudes about US foreign relations and diplomacy served to both spur foreign public engagement and inhibit it. Identifying some of the elements which compose US political culture confirms how it has shaped public diplomacy. US republican and liberal ideas such as liberty, human rights, freedom of speech, and equality are typically featured in public diplomacy as the characteristic values of the United States and often encourage engagement based on the belief that these ideas are universally appealing. American federalism, the relationship between the federal government and the states, frequently throughout this study inhibited engagement. When the US government considered starting academic exchanges, state infrastructure posed as an obstacle. US education is under the purview of individual states, not the Federal government. This made implementing the resolution passed at the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910 impossible for the US government, leading private actors to fulfill the requirement. Hence, political culture facilitated other factors, such as the heightened importance of private foreign public engagement in the development of public diplomacy. Political culture overlaps with state infrastructure and foreign policy traditions, as it is the culture of the nation which has shaped both of these factors.

However, as explained Chap. 1, US political culture and foreign policy traditions are also a by-product of historical experience. US “isolationism,” or tendency to refrain from political involvement in the world,

is connected to historical experience. This tendency influenced both US attitudes toward diplomacy and impacted foreign policy as well as state infrastructure. The lack of political will to enlarge or professionalize the Department of State due to the circumscribed foreign policy of the eighteenth and nineteenth century served to inhibit state infrastructure. The limitations of the Department in terms of personnel and responsibilities frequently inhibited foreign public engagement, but again, only heightened the importance of private foreign public engagement.

US public diplomacy is defined and confined by these forces which should be taken into consideration when using public diplomacy. American political culture, infrastructure, and foreign policy traditions tend to limit what is feasible with public diplomacy, especially government public diplomacy. Based on the cases of foreign public engagement explored in previous chapters, historical experience and private foreign public engagement have done much to define public diplomacy, both in terms of *what* it is and *how* it is practiced. Given this, and the history of US foreign public engagement, the following sections will explore what this means for the key problems facing public diplomacy today as outlined in Chap. 1.

### PROBLEM: IDEOLOGICAL

As Juliana Pilon notes, the idea that American values are universally acceptable inhibited US public diplomacy (2008). Pilon focuses on how in the past, the belief that the world saw US principles as naturally decent served as justification for *not* engaging with people and communicating these ideas abroad. As John Quincy Adams told Congress, the United States “must forever stand alone, a beacon on the summit of the mountain, to which all the inhabitants of the earth may turn their eyes for a genial and saving light...”<sup>48</sup> In other words, the US stood as an exemplary model for others to follow, without the need to engage with the world further. However, as America became more involved in the world and American citizens and leaders found that there was a great deal of misunderstanding about the US overseas; US principles were used to correct misconceptions. American principles underlie Wilsonian ideals which the CPI disseminated around the world in WWI, thus US foreign public engagement came to connect US ideas with the formation and execution of foreign policy. In this, there is an assumption that if American values are generally agreeable, national policies which are guided by these values will be accepted.



This belief guided US foreign public engagement in WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and continues to frame public diplomacy today. The *Shared Values* campaign is an excellent illustration of this belief and how it impacts US public diplomacy. In American thinking, because people around the world share similar values with the United States, they will also understand and support US foreign policy. Such assumptions undermine the effectiveness of public diplomacy. Audience research conducted to inform SVI indicated that family, faith, and learning were common values between people in the Middle East and South East Asia and the USA. While the values highlighted in commercials of SVI did resonate among audiences, the content of the SVI was out of synch with the United States' policies and actions in the region the initiative was intended to engage, subsequently impairing the entire purpose of the *Shared Values* program and damaging US credibility. The US cannot base public diplomacy efforts solely on the syllogism that its principles are universally accepted and by extension the nation's foreign policies, especially when these policies contravene American values.


The second aspect of the ideological issue is one the US will constantly have to assess and reassess as the international situation changes and as the nation changes. The cases brought to the fore the tensions which exist between traditional desires to remain unencumbered by international commitments and to protect the nation from possible foreign manipulation alongside imperatives to represent the United States not only through traditional diplomacy, but also to the public other nations. Looking more broadly at United States' views regarding the nation's role in the world, the long period of study also shows how US public diplomacy was shaped in the first century of the nation's existence by the desire to remain isolated or removed from the rest of the world. By the 1890s, the mood of the US and its leaders shifted, seeing a more active role for the US in the world. With this shift, both private and government entities conducted foreign public engagement, with the government relying on private entities to establish and run engagement. Wilson's vision for US following WWI saw the government become more involved with foreign public engagement, as the government began to view engagement as beneficial to US foreign relations and instrumental for achieving US foreign policies.

As discussed in Chap. 1, understanding what the United States' role is in the world and the nature of that role is crucial for US public diplomacy. This vision of the nation's role is reflected in the use of other

mechanisms of statecraft and will be reflected in US public diplomacy. More than keeping the embassies or consuls apprised of US policies, the United States' character in the world whether as a light, a savior, a policeman, or a collaborator needs to be defined for public diplomacy or any mechanism of statecraft to work effectively.

### PROBLEM: ORGANIZATIONAL

Several cases in this study illustrated the importance of integrating foreign public engagement into statecraft and more importantly into the policymaking process. An issue frequently cited by public diplomacy scholars and practitioners as well as government reports.<sup>49</sup> The bureaucratic obstacles facing US public diplomacy are rooted in much deeper issues, as mentioned in Chap. 1 and earlier in this chapter. Some of these issues are tied to the development of the Department of State itself, while other problems stem from the dim view, long-held by Congress, of diplomacy generally. Based on these factors, the role of public diplomacy



**Fig. 8.3** Catalysts and inhibitors of US public diplomacy. *Source* Created by the author

in American statecraft is confined and defined by US political culture, state infrastructure, foreign policy traditions, and historical experience.

Figure 8.3 depicts how each of these factors contributed to the role public diplomacy plays in US statecraft today. These same factors also contributed in some way to the endemic problems which continue to plague US public diplomacy. The role of public diplomacy in American statecraft is tied to America's understanding of its role internationally and what relationship the nation should maintain with the rest of the world. Public diplomacy as a mechanism of the state inputs limitations on the tool itself, putting up parameters based on America's relationship with the world and what is deemed acceptable by the people and the nation's leaders.

There is general agreement that the Department of State should be the agency to administer US public diplomacy, given the Department's primary responsibility for US foreign relations and foreign policy after the President. Yet this study frequently highlighted institutional beliefs within the Department of State which does not believe engaging with the public of other nations is the responsibility of DoS. Throughout the twentieth century, whether in peace or during times of war, the Department showed indifference and in some cases irritation with the idea of foreign public engagement, preferring to pass such responsibilities off to another agency such as the Office of Education or to a private organization. This appears to be, from the cases examined in this study as well as literature on US public diplomacy throughout the Cold War, ingrained into the institutional culture of the Department. While adding another US agency or department to the federal government would be counterproductive for public diplomacy, redefining institutional culture within the Department of State would present many challenges.

If US public diplomacy is to remain within the Department of State, the internal priority would be to change the culture within the Department. The US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy issued several very detailed reports since 2015, emphasizing and reiterating the need for improving training for public diplomacy officers within the State Department, as well as, advocating for ensuring the public diplomacy track within the Foreign Service has equal chance of professional advancement alongside other traditional Foreign Service tracks (i.e., political, economic).<sup>50</sup> The Advisory Commission reports suggested that by ensuring more public diplomacy officers reach senior level positions within the State Department the more public diplomacy will have

a voice in policymaking. This will help change the organizational culture if the recommendations are implemented. Nevertheless, as the cases in revealed, with improved communication and the permanent and increasing importance of the public in international relations, all diplomats or representatives of the United States should have some awareness and training in public diplomacy. Not only to provide practical training, but to also illustrate how public diplomacy is connected to other aspects of diplomacy and statecraft.

Public diplomacy needs to be on an equal footing with political and economic relations and the responsibility of *every* individual within the Department. To truly alter the culture within the Department to integrate public diplomacy completely would likely take years and require consistent implementation, even when administrations change.

In addition to the organizational issues within State Department, many of the cases highlighted the consistent failure of the US to integrate public diplomacy into policymaking; to allow public diplomacy to *inform* policy. This issue was apparent during the American Civil War and throughout WWII. The core public diplomacy practice of listening only reached the tactical level, where listening was used to inform efforts to engage with people abroad. In order for public diplomacy to achieve policy objectives, the tool must have “a place at the table,” or role in informing policy. As former public diplomats and scholars note, this occurs when senior policymakers recognize the role and value of public diplomacy as a mechanism of statecraft, like as with intelligence collection, the military, or diplomacy.

#### PROBLEM: CONCEPTUAL

One of the great advantages this study affords is to see foreign public engagement in use without the stigma of propaganda attached. Many of the same techniques were used in all the cases to engage people abroad, thus eliminating the argument that methods themselves identify something as propaganda. The cases exploring foreign public engagement during WWI and WWII clarified not only why Americans oppose and fear propaganda, but also how propaganda and public diplomacy became intertwined, creating problems for its implementation into US statecraft. Most importantly, this study revealed another way to conceptualize public diplomacy within the context of US history and political culture: democratic diplomacy.

Though Arthur Bullard coined the phrase, the idea that a liberal, democratic nation, which believed in the sovereignty of people over the state, should conduct diplomacy reflecting these ideals made sense. This was the way Benjamin Franklin conducted diplomacy in France. He spent a great deal of his time engaging with the people, making only weekly appearances at Versailles.<sup>51</sup> Ernest Poole of the CPI recognized that the democratization of the world, meant “people’s diplomacy” would become increasingly important. Charles Francis Adams noted that British sentiment was of more diplomatic importance than the British ministry in his reports to William Seward, again highlighting the recognized role of the public in international relations. At the end of WWII, various people within the DoS believed that a world composed of more democracies required US foreign relations to include a public dimension to diplomacy. As Bruce Gregory observes, “[diplomacy’s] context ... changes with time and circumstance ... What changed was not a generic concept of diplomacy that included a public dimension. What changed was situational ... Public diplomacy has always been part of diplomacy.”<sup>52</sup>

One of the recurring observations in each of these cases is that *representing* the United States to the people of another nation is an integral part of diplomacy in general. As discussed in Chapter 1, public diplomacy is typically thought of in terms of communication, including public relations or public affairs. This is perhaps due to the fact that scholars typically associate the origins of public diplomacy with WWI and WWII, with the CPI and the marketing and PR techniques employed.<sup>53</sup> However, this study demonstrates how atypical this approach is. If public diplomacy is thought of less in terms of communication or information, and more in terms of the functions of a diplomat, the approach and expectations of public diplomacy significantly alter. The primary objective of public diplomacy becomes about representation rather than persuasion. When Benjamin Franklin went to France, he never set out to persuade the French as his first objective. His first objective was to represent the character of the United States, to define the British American colonies as an independent, unified nation. Chap. 1 also highlighted how diplomats act as listening posts, identifying issues of concern both within the country they are posted and in terms of the relationship between the country they represent and the host nation. Though Secretary Seward refused to listen to Charles Francis Adams, Zebina Eastman, and Charles Schurz about the trends in public opinion and the effect this had on

the British government's policies, the dispatches, specifically from Adams, highlight this function of the ambassador, observing and noting trends which have implications for their own nation. Public diplomats are specifically responsible for listening to the public, understanding the nuances within a nation's public in order to inform not only the US mission in country, but also policymakers at home. Several cases in this book also showed how public diplomacy was used to manage relations, to avoid conflicts or relieve tensions. Chaps. 4 and 6 also demonstrated examples where public diplomacy was used to develop diplomatic initiatives to include academic exchanges and the League of Nations. More recent scholarship on US cultural diplomacy during the Cold War also exposes how the nature of the programs and the work required negotiation and listening in order for the public diplomacy programs to be successful.

Furthermore, these case studies have demonstrated how when people set out to engage with people abroad, it was not about convincing foreign publics to *like* the US. Rather, the goal was simply to establish and build relations, provide a broader picture of the United States, and to correct misperceptions. The goal should be to build a relationship where the people of another nation are more inclined to engage with the US in a discussion rather than violence. Public diplomacy can instead be used to build trust, credibility, and dialogue, but only if the US sees public diplomacy as diplomacy and not solely as a communication tool or product being sold. There is a fine line between using public diplomacy to develop amicable relations and using public diplomacy to ensure a nation supports US policies. Adopting a marketing or PR model automatically discloses the intent behind the engagement, when the idea behind marketing and PR is to sell and induce acceptance of a statement, argument, or policy. The intent is *not to represent* the United States or its policies, but gain acceptance for national policies.

As a diplomatic tool, the tool is wielded differently and subsequently, the anticipated results should be different. Public diplomacy is not a marketing tool, to market or sell American policies either. Putting public diplomacy in those terms makes disassociating the practice from propaganda more difficult. According to David Welch, "[modern] political propaganda is consciously designed to serve the interests, either directly or indirectly, of the propagandists and their political masters. The aim of propaganda is to persuade its subject that there is only one valid point of

view and to eliminate all other options.”<sup>54</sup> Within this context, US public diplomacy is certainly used to serve American interests; however, the intent is what helps to distinguish between propaganda and public diplomacy. The kind of results the US should be looking for are real dialogue with other nations. The *intent* should not be solely to garner acceptance of US policies or even US principles; to *implement* US foreign policies unilaterally. US public diplomacy should ultimately intend to foster relationships and *represent* itself as a nation to the people of other nations. There are many nations which the United States no longer has diplomatic relations or nations which the US has rather tense relations. If there is a problem with these nations, US policy options are very limited in terms of how the government could respond to a threat. The goal of public diplomacy, properly used, should be to open discussion, to reach compromises where there is disagreement, to broaden policy options.

Based upon this study and preceding sections, some conditional generalizations about the practice and role of public diplomacy, may be specified. First, public diplomacy, in the US context, is best understood in the context of diplomacy, rather than as loudspeaker or marketing tool. This facilitates easier integration into the nation’s statecraft. In this frame, public diplomacy fits into US political culture and becomes disassociated with the historical experience of propaganda. Second, care should be taken when incorporating American principles with foreign policies and US public diplomacy. To avoid situations where public diplomacy initiatives appear to be out of synch with foreign policies, the United States needs mechanisms to facilitate good listening and to ensure this informs US policies. Listening should not be used solely as a feedback tool for public diplomacy programs or only reach the mission level in country. The information should be assessed and incorporated with other information provided to policymakers. This leads to a third condition, that for public diplomacy to be effective, the tool requires access and participation in the policymaking process. From the attacks on 9/11 to the Arab Spring beginning in the winter of 2010, recent world events continue to demonstrate the increasing importance of human intelligence or the psychological and informational aspects of state power.<sup>55</sup> Of the fifteen intelligence agencies in the US intelligence community, few if any report on public opinion and views toward the United States. Public diplomacy is a missing component of US policymaking *and* diplomacy.

## A LOST TRADITION?

Upon examining various episodes throughout US history where either private entities or the government sought to engage with the people of other nations as part of US foreign relations, some may question the title of this book. The very fact that the United States did not consistently incorporate public diplomacy into its statecraft until after WWII would seem to imply that it is *not* a traditional component of US statecraft.

However, recurring ideas which encouraged and shaped US public diplomacy show how the purpose, practice, and role of public diplomacy are strongly tied to the nation's political culture, national experience and traditions. Though cases in this book provided various reasons for the use of public diplomacy in US statecraft, the idea that as a democracy, the United States should practice diplomacy in a way which acknowledges the role of the citizen in international affairs, was a recurring impetus for public diplomacy. This, along with the recognition that as the world became more democratic, US foreign relations would have to change, suggests that public diplomacy is a tradition of the US. If anything, the historical experience of the United States foreign public engagement demonstrates that the problems and concerns, which impact public diplomacy today, are nothing new, and as George Washington advised, this history should be used to learn from past errors and to avoid the rocks which impede progress.

The last decade confirms that *people* make a nation, not governments. This study suggests America has overlooked what Benjamin Franklin knew to be true—nations are more than just governments. Thus, *American* diplomacy—public diplomacy—is a lost American tradition. The question is whether the nation can recover this old American tradition.

## NOTES

1. Memorandum on the Postwar International Information Program of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. xi.
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3. NARA, No. 95, December 27, 1861, M30, R73.



4. Edward P. Djerejian, 2003. "Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World." In. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 375.
6. "The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report)." In. 2004. edited by Executive Director; Philip Zelikow, Counsel; Bonnie D. Jenkins and Senior Advisor Ernest R. May, 568. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office., p. 377.
7. NARA, Perry to Hull, November 29, 1935, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, Box 4656, 800.911/33.
8. Unfortunately for Franklin, he was *surrounded* by spies, both French and British. He was warned repeatedly that his entire household was composed of spies. Franklin provided a seemingly unconcerned response to these warnings: "I have long observ'd one Rule which prevents any Inconvenience from such Practices. It is simply this, to be concern'd in no Affairs that I should blush to have made publick; and to do nothing but what Spies may see and welcome. When a Man's Actions are just and honourable, the more they are known, the more his Reputation is increas'd and establish'd" ("To Juliana Ritchie," January 19, 1777, *BFP*, Vol. 23, p. 211).
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  21. Ibid.
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