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The German Political Foundations' Work between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv

A Kaleidoscope of Different Perspectives

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List of Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative for Germany (ger.: Alternative für Deutschland)
ASF	Action Reconciliation Service for Peace
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
BfG	Bank for social economcy (ger.: Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft AG)
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (ger.: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung)
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (ger.: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSU	Christian Social Union (ger.: Christlich-Soziale Union)
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service (ger.: Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst)
DGB	German Trade Union Confederation (ger.: Deutscher Gewerkschafts-bund)
DIG	German-Israeli Society (ger.: Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft e. V.)
DITIB	Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği)
DM	German Mark (ger.: Deutsche Mark)
DSD	German Language Diploma (ger.: Deutsches Sprachdiplom)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GIGA	German Institute of Global and Area Studies
EU	European Union
FCC	Federal Constitutional Court
FDP	Free Democratic Party (ger.: Freie Demokratische Partei)
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (ger.: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

FFP	Future for Palestine
FIFA	Federation Internationale de Football Association
FNS	Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation (ger.: Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung)
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
HBS	Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (ger.: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung)
HCGES	The Haifa Center for German and European Studies
HCJ	High Court of Justice
HSS	Hanns-Seidel-Foundation (ger.: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung)
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IEPN	Israeli European Policy Network
IP	Israeli Pounds
IPCC	International Peace and Cooperation Center
IR	International Relations
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (ger.: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung)
KfW	Reconstruction Credit Institute (ger.: Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	New Israeli Shekel
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany (ger.: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
OAS	Organization of American States
ÖDP	Ecological Democratic Party (ger.: Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei)
OPT	Occuied Palestinian Territories
PA	Palestinian Authority
PALAST	Palestinian Academy for Science and Technology
PASSIA	The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PM	Prime Minister
PNC	Palestinian National Council
RAF	Red Army Faction (ger.: Rote Armee Fraktion)
RATZ	Movement for Civil rights and Peace (רצ)
RLS	Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation (ger.: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung)
SED	Socialist Unity Party of Germany (ger.: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands)
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany (ger.: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)

SPNI	Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel
TED	Technology, Entertainment, Design
TICSF	The Turkish-Israeli Civil Society Forum
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union
ZFD	Civil Peace Service (ger.: Ziviler Friedensdienst)

Introduction: German Political Foundations Abroad as a New Field of Research: Opportunities and Challenges

Anna Abelmann and Katharina Konarek

The research field of political foundations in Germany and their international activities, networks and history is a relatively new addition to academic discourse on international relations. This leads to several crucial questions: What are the foundations' roles in the international arena and within German foreign policy itself? How do they influence bilateral relations between Germany and other countries? Do they have an impact on political development in their host countries, and if they do, what are the results, goals and motives? Are German foundations a real player or just a payer? What are the expectations of their partner organizations in host countries and what are their legal frameworks both abroad and at home?

This publication is the result of a bilateral research project between the Ruhr University of Bochum and the University of Haifa on German political foundations' work abroad with a special focus on Israel and the Palestinian Territories and was conducted by Anna Abelmann (Ruhr University of Bochum) and Katharina Konarek (University of Haifa) within the scope of their PhD theses. The entire project was sponsored by the research school of the Ruhr University of Bochum and the Haifa Center for German and European Studies (HCGES) at the University of Haifa. This volume gathers together the results of the workshop, "New Gatekeeper in a Globalized World? The Israeli Transparency Bill. Legal and Political Aspects of the Work of Israeli NGOs supported from Abroad",[1] which took place in Haifa in March 2016, and the conference "A Player and not just a Payer? The Work of German Political Foundations abroad",[2] which was organized in Bochum in July 2016.

[1]For further information please see http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/political-foundations/workshopHaifaProgramm

[2]For further information please see http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/political-foundations/

The book presents a kaleidoscope of perspectives on the work of German political foundations abroad. It collects papers written by current and former members of the foundations, local partners and different researchers who consider questions from legal, political, historical and anthropological perspectives and explicitly in due consideration of their personal experience and perception.

Before discussing the work of German political foundations abroad, an important remark on the terminology and the concept of 'foundation' must be made. The German term is 'Stiftung'. In this volume, the English term 'foundation' will be used. The concept of a 'Stiftung' dates back to the Greek philosopher Plato. Around 380 BC, he purchased land surrounding his house in the northwest of Athens and began to teach his philosophy there. The land was purchased not in order to make profit, but for Plato to share his theories with others. With his 'Academia' he established the first 'Stiftung', which went on to exist for nearly 300 years.[3] 'Stiftungen' are purely not-for-profit organizations. They are usually administrated by a board of trustees. Nowadays they are civil law entities that, with aid of property, pursue a purpose that is defined by the founder.

Nevertheless, the German political 'Stiftungen' today are actually not such organizations in the traditional meaning of this concept, but registered associations that use the term 'Stiftung' as a name component. Compared to regular 'Stiftungen', they do not own large properties, and are not bound to the goals of any founder. They can organize their agenda and programme flexibly, whilst at the same time benefiting from the positive associations of the term 'Stiftungen'. However, as classical foundations, German political foundations are non-profit organizations whose purpose is to promote political education, and strengthen democracy and civil society.

Today there are six German political foundations: the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS), the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation (HSS), the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation (FNS), the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (HBS) and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation (RLS). They are treated legally as non-governmental-organizations (NGOs) even though they are almost entirely financed by the German taxpayer. These foundations are unique institutions on an international scale. Each can be related to one political party in the German parliament: the FES is related to the German Social Democrats (SPD); the KAS to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); the HSS to the Bavarian Christian Social

[3]For a further discussion on Plato's idea of the good, read Rubert Graf Strachwitz. 1996. 'Stiftungen in Deutschland. Geschichte und Gegenwart. Die Idee des Guten – eines der obersten Ziele Platons', in: ebds.: Stiftungen, Aachen: Grünenthal GmbH, p. 90.

Union (CSU); the FNS to the liberal party of Germany (FDP); the HBS to the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen); and the RLS to the left-wing party (DIE LINKE).

Their dual function as both independent, non-governmental organizations and close relatives of the parties represented in the German Bundestag and subsidized by the state makes them an interesting and highly relevant research topic, but also raises criticism and distrust both abroad and at home. However, German political foundations have been for most of the time a widely neglected group of actors in academic research on German foreign policy. While aiming to close this research gap, this volume also focuses on a geographical region that traditionally takes a special place in German foreign policy.

The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the special relationship between Germany and Israel as a consequence of the Holocaust are a combination that does not offer an easy working environment for political foundations. The specific challenges and consequences that result from this background are one of the central focuses of this volume, which discuss the foundations' role between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv from various perspectives.

The first part reflects the development of the work of German political foundations historically in Israel and the Palestinian Territories as well as in a more general approach.

As a longtime representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, **Ernst Kerbusch** begins by presenting his professional historical perspective. He analyses the FES' international work from its inception, reflects on the emergence of the foundation and the beginning of its international work in 1963 in cooperation with the German Ministry of Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and also emphasizes the importance of trade unions at the beginning of this work. Furthermore, the article reflects on the foundation's development until today against the international backdrop. Nowadays the FES maintains more than 100 offices in Europe, Africa, Asia, America and the Middle East, where works in the field of the European integration process, Transatlantic relationships, overcoming conflicts in the Balkans and Central Africa, and also contributes to international trade union solidarity by focusing on trade unions in emerging countries such as Brazil, South Africa and South Korea.

Following this overview of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation's work abroad, **Anna Abelmann** describes the establishment of the Israeli Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation as one of the first partner organizations of the FES in Israel during the 1960s. Her case study also considers the historical background in terms of the official German-Israeli relations of that time and shows the unique situation of the foundation in Israel and the obstacles and challenges it had to face before the

official establishment of its office in Tel Aviv in 1978. However, the story of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation also proves that already the first initiatives of the FES in Israel were by no means a one-way street, but were supported by high-ranking officials from the trade union *Histadrut* and the ruling Israeli Labour Party. Additionally, the study pictures the specific scope of action among the political foundations during difficult bilateral relations between Germany and the host country or in crisis situations.

In order to understand the last 60 years of German-Palestinian relations, **Katharina Konarek** is reflecting afterwards two periods: The first spans the founding of the State of Israel and the Cold War considering the division of Germany. The second covers the aftermath of the German Reunification and the Oslo process. Also, the current German activities in the Palestinian Territories will be reflected in this article.

Finally, **Omer Hakim** and **Oz Aruch** reflect on the foundations' work in Israel by using the history of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation as a case study. Their paper focuses especially on the close relationship between the foundation and its related political party by showing reciprocal influence and different perceptions and reflects the foundation's and party's relationship to the Israeli civil society by following the ongoing discussion from the early 1982 up to today.

The second part of this volume focuses on the political, legal and anthropological aspects of the foundations' work abroad.

Dani Kranz adopts an anthropological approach looking at the role, work and influence of foreign NGOs – German political foundations and others – in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Her observations include of all three major groups – Israelis, Palestinians as well as "internationals" – and their different perspectives and motivations as well as her personal background. The paper focus on the extensively discussed Israeli perspective on Foreign NGOs in order to present its conflictual and multifaceted positions, which were and are discussed at length both in Israel and in Europe.

Katharina Konarek discusses the role of the German political foundations in German Foreign policy both on a theoretical and a practical level. It introduces the academic approach of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and describes the character of the foundations' international by also giving examples of their work in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The question discussed is whether the foundations a just payers funding projects abroad just financially or if they are real players with influence on both – German politicians and local partners.

Eli M. Salzberger describes three ingredients. These were the almost universal recent phenomenon of the increasing role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in collective decision-making and in the actual conduct

of civil societies; the unique structure and operation, especially in foreign countries, of German political foundations; and the recent Israeli legislation popularly termed the "transparency law" (official title: Law on Disclosure Requirements for Recipients of Support of a Foreign Political Entity (Amendment) (Increased Transparency of Those Primarily Financed by Donations from Foreign Political Entities), 5776-2016). This is of special interest in Germany due to the operation of its political foundations in Israel and their interrelationship with various Israeli NGOs. In order to analyse and evaluate this recent law the prime task of his article is a short background to set the context is useful.

In response and with regard to other articles that touch upon the question of the legal aspects of the foundations' work abroad, **Anna Abelmann** reflects on the foundations' legal framework from the German point of view, and the current debate regarding this topic. The paper gives an overview over the past Federal Constitutional Court's judgements on issues related to the foundations, and stresses the different perception of the foundations in Germany and abroad.

The third part of the volume reflects the political foundations' work in articles written by foundation representatives from Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv.

Marc Frings, head of the office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) in the Palestinian Territories in Ramallah, analyses the work of the foundation by focusing on recent developments. He describes a shift in the approach of foundations, which makes them play a more important role today than in the past. Frings describes them as facilitators of German and European networks for Palestinian partners and partner institutions and emphasizes the importance of building long-term structures. The uniqueness and specific challenge of the work in Ramallah arises from the interconnectivity of every relevant topic with the military occupation and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination.

Kerstin Müller, head of the office of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (HBS) in Israel, analyses the work of the German Green Foundation in Israel. The foundation functions as a catalyst for green visions and projects and is active in initiating public debates on political, environmental, and social issues that focus on the environment, sustainability, gender and Israel as part of the German-Israeli dialogue. After the Israeli government adopted the so-called transparency bill in June 2016, all six German political foundations wrote a joint letter of protest. While the government argues that it merely wants to ensure the transparency of the influence that foreign governments allegedly try to wield on Israeli politics, the HBS claims that this rationale is a cover for efforts to further curtail the work of NGOs that are critical of the government.

Walter Klitz discusses the work of the liberal Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation (FNS) in Israel and the Palestinian Territories during the last 30 years. Compared

to the other foundations and NGOs active in this region, the FNS has a unique Israeli-Palestinian team supervising projects on both sides in a shared office in East Jerusalem. They work with partners sharing liberal values and introduce them to public discourse. Focusing on the liberal value of individual freedom, the FNS pays special attention to the problematic relationship between state and religion. Interreligious dialogue, religious paternalism and religious education are the focal point of the work of the FNS and their partner organizations. The high density of NGOs is challenging, and restrictions against foreign NGOs by the Israeli government and also by the Palestinian Authority makes the work of the FNS difficult.

The final part of this volume focuses on the outside perspective by presenting a collection of different personal points of view from different partners and researchers, who reflect on and discuss their experiences.

Shlomo Shpiro reflects on the foundations' activities in Israel from both a personal and professional academic point of view. He himself received a scholarship from the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation to conduct a post-doctoral fellowship in Germany. He also participated in group meetings and discussions on the Holocaust together with Israelis, Palestinians and Germans, which were organized by the KAS office in Ramallah and also took part in conferences and meetings of the Israeli-European Policy Network (IEPN) funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Israel. Based on his long-term experience, he emphasizes the important role of the foundations in bringing together politicans and economic decision-makers from the two countries. He sees future challenges for German political foundations in Israel in helping to develop further common understanding and building and enhancing a future base for German-Israeli relations.

Amaal Abu Ghoush, a Palestinian architect and urban planner, reflects on her experiences as a long-term partner of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. Being an architect and urban planner in East Jerusalem, she works for the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC). The IPCC as a Palestinian non-profit and non-governmental organization, seeks to promote political, social and economic transformation within Palestinian civil society without depending on foreign aid. Therefore, the partnership with the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), which is not purely financial but based on mutual goals and visions, allows for long-term support and led to 14 years of cooperation. While the IPCC is profiting from the FES global networks, the IPCC contributes to the FES work by providing its staff and visitors from Germany with political tours and background information.

Another partner's perspective comes from **Deniz Altayli,** Program Director of PASSIA, one of the first Palestinian partner organizations of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. Altayli describes the beginning of the cooperation in 1987 through a founding grant from the FES, which helped to organize a workshop

on German-Palestinian relations, and its development until today. This long-term partnership built mutual trust and respect. The core of joint efforts today is dialogue, research and the PASSIA Desk Diary. In this partnership, the FES takes responsibility for providing the funds and PASSIA implements activities and initiatives.

Based on her experience as a diplomat at the Israeli embassy in Berlin and as a long-term employee at the "Shimon Peres Center for Peace", **Idit Seltenreich** presents 10 points which reflects the diplomats', foundation-partners' and outsider's perspective on the foundations activities in Israel. Her article considers the international and networking aspect of the foundations' projects and their ability to become active even in tense conflict regions such as the Middle East, but also notices that foundations could either support a positive development or create even more tension in their host countries.

Tobias Pietsch from the political newsblog "Alsharq" reflects on the foundations' work in Israel and the Palestinian Territories by raising the question regarding the benefit of having ten German political foundations being active in such a small region. His article discusses advantages and disadvantages of this situation and considers possibilities how the foundations could avoid an overlap which would make their work widely ineffective.

Ayelet Banai refers to the discussion regarding the Israeli NGO law that took place during a workshop in Haifa 2016 and to the article of Kerstin Müller in this volume. She outlines that "singling out" of public funds – as it is featured by the NGO law – is not just a matter of political expediency, but a part of a broader ideology that depicts public power as a danger to freedom, while private money as an expression of human flourishing. The call for transparency is highly pertinent from a democratic perspective. Therefore, advocates of progressive politics should endorse it and support the struggle to also expand it to private funds.

After nearly 20 years of different cooperation projects in the field of intercultural and interreligious dialogue, **Benjamin Mollov** reflects on the development of this journey from a personal point of view. As a long-term partner of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, he describes different cooperation projects, goals and success. Additionally, he refers to the chances and challenges of this partnership and gives an outlook on future cooperation with the foundation.

This volume presents a kaleidoscope of different perspectives on the work of German political foundations abroad based on various personal and professional experiences and perceptions. By focusing on different guiding questions, the contributors provide a highly comprehensive pictures of the foundations' international work and the chances and challenges involved.

Part I
Preamble

Preface

Fania Oz-Salzberger

More than any other time after the Second World War, the 1960s launched the complex triangular relationship explored in this volume. A new era of Israeli awareness of the intricate horrors of the Holocaust began with the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. A new epoch of German-Israeli relations dawned with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's visit to Israel in 1966, his meeting with Ben Gurion and the exchange of ambassadors. A new chapter in the long-winding Israeli-Palestinian conflict started with the Six-Day War of 1967 and the occupation of territories densely populated by Palestinians. No one could foresee how lasting, painful and insoluble this struggle would become.

All three of these tectonic historical shifts are still affecting our lives today. The German-Israeli tension field that emerged from the Nazi calamity evolved, over five decades, into a highly creative—though ceaselessly strained—space of dialog, cooperation and creative engagement. But the political psychology of Israel's governments and part of the Israeli public, are still marked by the collective trauma of Nazi genocide. It is a recognizable building block of the recent rise of Israeli nationalism.

For a while it seemed as though German-Israeli relations, burdened and inspired by a long common past, are developing without heeding the Israeli-Palestinian storyline. So deeply were Israel and Germany steeped in their horrific challenge, so enthralled were they by the hesitant and heroic trudge toward an understanding between Israel and the 'Other Germany', and perhaps so ephemeral

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seemed the Palestinian tragedy by comparison, that for a long-time Germans and Israelis refrained from including Palestine in their ongoing conversations.

When German governments, most notably that of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the early 1980s, attempted an open discussion of the occupation of West Bank and Gaza with its Israeli counterpart, the results were often counter-productive: the Schmidt-Begin confrontation of 1981−1982 is a case in point. The rhetoric on both sides, Schmidt's and especially Menachem Begin's, was far too crude to enable an honest and deep-plowing exchange of ideas; the shadow of the holocaust was dragged into the discussion with detrimental force. Schmidt's Germany was unable to play a fruitful diplomatic role, at least from the Israeli perspective, in either the First Lebanon War of 1982 or the build-up to the First Intifada in 1987. It was a lose-lose showdown, and the very opposite of soft power.

But, even as political leaders clashed and fumed, civil society's voice became stronger, first in Israel and later, on a smaller scale, in parts of Palestinian society. This rising voice of the public sphere and flourishing of non-governmental organizations was both a partial product and a future ground for the work of the German political foundations in the region.

We should not, of course, play down the subsequent positive role of German governments, especially after reunification, in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and in Israeli-Arab peacekeeping missions. The very fact that Israel—both government and public opinion—accepted German military peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon and in Egypt's Sinai desert is a significant testimony to the degree of trust Israelis came to feel toward official Germany, even in uniform. At the same time, some Palestinian organizations and Arab states could count on German involvement as honest brokers in a series of peace efforts as from the Madrid meetings and Oslo Accords.

It was, however, mostly the sphere targeted by the German political foundations, the civil-society intersection of academia, arts, social activism and pluralistic conversation, that made a headway during the 1980s and 1990s. Several chapters in this volume describe the foundations' impact on the founding and upkeep of Palestinian academic and social institutes, changing the lives and prospects, perhaps also the worldview, of numerous individuals. It may well be too early to assess the actual impact of these projects on political decision-making, economic development and social-cultural dynamics in the present-day Palestinian Authority, let alone the Gaza Strip. By contrast, in Israel we can make a persuasive case for the hands-on effect of the foundations' work on arts, culture, research, and more generally on the personal acquaintance of many Israelis with Germany. To a lesser degree, but still tangibly, the foundations also enabled thousands of Germans to meet Israel up close.

The growing Israeli public trust in Germany and in Germans was not manufactured by governments. It was the work of gentler agents of change. The Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel may have begun their relations on a strictly official basis back in the 1960s, but this accomplishment was far outweighed by the currents of social history that brought Germans and Israelis together. Unlike Palestinians, Israeli Jews were historically linked with Germany and with Europe as migrants therefrom, and always had a cultural affinity with Germany through the Jewish-German cultural lineage. Nazi Germany and the holocaust acted as two-directional vectors in this pained intimacy of Germans and Jews; even when everything 'Made in Germany' was a taboo for Israelis, my generation grew up on the books of Erich Kästner and Karl May. As a student, my peers and I witnessed at first hand the shift that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s, when the small Goethe-Institute in Tel Aviv shifted from relative emptiness to waiting-lists of would-be students of German. Hebrew literature needed no financial support in order to rediscover and reclaim the German dimension of Israeli identity. Cinema needed support, and received it. Both arts, alongside theatre, dance and others, became a staple of the new Tel Aviv-Berlin two-way street.

It seems that for a long-time Israelis felt that Palestinians have nothing to do with this story. Even peace-seeking Israelis saw no reason or rhyme in inserting Palestinian woes into the binary Jewish-German conversation, complex enough as it is, throbbing and raw as it is. Here, many of us felt, was a diptych, not a triptych. Jerusalem and Ramallah need not, must not, converse via Bonn or Berlin. Worse, Germany's shadow tended to Nazify extremist rhetoric on all sides, ensuing in a series of extremist and counterproductive statements from German, Palestinian and even Israeli actors, to the effect that Israel's occupation of Gaza and the West Bank was in some way comparable to Hitler's atrocities. Despite its benign contribution to Palestinian wellbeing and relative regional stability, the German-Israeli-Palestinian triptych brought new shades of darkness into the public debate.

A strange double-act ensued from this dilemma, and I think it is still at work today. A significant part of the Israeli public is benefitting from the work of the German foundations directly or indirectly, knowingly or unawares: the proponents and consumers of science and technology, arts and culture, educational initiatives and social NGOs. Both political and apolitical input, from German official and civil-society sources, has helped significantly—if by no means exclusively—in turning the tide of Israeli fascination with Germany. One of the questions this volume aims to answer is whether the German foundations, more specifically the political parties' foundations, are a player and not merely a payer in the recipient countries. I would like to offer a definite answer for Israel, though I am in no position to make any assertion about Palestine: yes, the foundations

have certainly been a player in Israel's social and cultural scene. Insofar as they supported human rights and civil rights organizations, they have also had a certain political impact. Their perceived effectiveness is the reason for the recent Knesset backlash, enacting a law that demands 'transparency' from—and reflecting, in spirit if not in actual phrasing, a suspicious hostility toward—NGOs funded by foreign governments. This new legislation, deeply divisive within Israel, is discussed and debated in the present book.

But the Israeli government possibly misreads the situation, "shooting the messenger" instead. The German political foundations, and others, are indeed players in the Israeli scene, but not constitutive players. They could have created, out of nowhere, the flux of Israeli students to German-language courses, or the famous Israeli diaspora in Berlin, or the renaissance of cultural exchange between the two societies. Nor could they invent and promote single-handedly the numerous social and legal organizations that have mushroomed in Israel in the last three decades, following a humble beginning in the 1970s. Israeli society itself awoke, in its own good time, to its multiple German perspectives and affinities. Belles-lettres, relatively free of financial burdens, is good proof for this internal transformation. AB Yehoshua, Haim Be'er and Yoram Kaniuk did not shift their literary gaze to Berlin because they were paid by anyone, but because Berlin was, and is, a constituent part of Israeli culture.

Similarly, German political foundations helped the rise of human rights discourse and litigation in Israel but its origins, scope and accomplishments go well beyond their impact. The same goes for the environmental issues promoted by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation. The German contributions were only effective when they met an existing and authentic Israeli process. Players, yes; architects, no.

I cannot make the same assertion on Palestinian civil society, primarily because German foundations, mainly the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, began working in the Palestinian territories a decade or more later than in Israel. Hence, the jury may still be out on their direct and measurable impact. Perhaps the role of payers is, yet, far more important than that of players. But such is the nature of education and social activism, that the answer is likely to change over time. Historical patience, a long breath, is requisite for the change of minds and hearts. Arguably, the German political foundations are uniquely placed to understand, practice and teach historical patience.

As an Israeli, I am curious to know whether the foundations speak the same language in Israel and in Palestine. Are messages adjusted to audiences, and to what degree? Is the relative freedom of Israelis to expose and critique their country's political and moral shortcomings reflected in human-rights discussions in Palestinian NGOs? How different are the respective measuring rods, the demands

made to each civil society? And, perhaps most painfully: can universal values be promoted in an occupied territory? Should be occupied be invited to self-reflection and self-criticism matching those afforded by the occupier?

These are not 'left' or 'right' questions, but existential ones for all involved. How universal are the universal values promoted by the foundations, and how strong the true color of their political creeds? Can the proverbial line between my terrorist and your freedom fighter be calmly handled by the German foundations, benign "neutrals" from a powerful country whose own history is far from neutral? Are they honest workers in the fields of humanity and hope, or latter-day moral colonialists, pretending to even-handedness?

Israel's recent governments have been nurtured by right-wing opinion marked by an ascending nationalist tone, tinged by populist enmity that translates universal or humanist values into pro-Palestinian bias. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu plays his own double act by deeming the Federal Republic of Germany a close friend of Israel, and hailing Chancellor Merkel as the epitome of this friendship, while covertly targeting the German political foundations as moral hypocrites, or worse. The present volume appears in a time of unprecedented hostility between Israel's political right and left. One feature of this hostility is the widespread right-wing tendency to identify Human Rights activism, indeed all aspects of civil rule-of-law liberalism, with a left-wing political stance. In a near parallel, the left-wing political stance is accused of anti-patriotism, perhaps all-out treason.

In this crucial point, Netanyahu's leadership is diametrically opposed to Menachem Begin's. Whereas the latter respected individual rights and liberties and cherished Israel's independent judiciary, Israel's current prime minister and Knesset coalition are aiming to weaken both the supreme court and the civil NGOs, claiming that their purported neutrality and universal values are a pro-Palestinian bias in disguise. Let us step back and watch this development in a broader perspective: today, not only in Israel, the emblems of soft power, cultural diplomacy and humanitarian aid face more suspicion than ever.

Facing an unfriendly official climate in Israel, a weakening Palestinian regime, an imploding Middle East and a dramatically transforming global political theater, what are the chances of the German political foundations to stay anchored and effective?

We must now compound these tough questions with a new and disconcerting dimension: with the *Alternative für Deutschland* party gaining a significant parliamentary presence and eligible to its own political foundation, how can the existing foundations retain their claim to fairness and universal values, the groundwork of their integrity? How can they stick to the role of a fair player, a pluralistic player, a hope-inspiring player?

This book will provide some feasible answers, but also sharpen the questions' bite. The very fact that it is a German-Israeli-Palestinian opus, its analyses and judgments crossing lines of national belonging, may allow us—while never compromising our facts and our scholarship—to err on the side of hope.

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Part II

The German Political Foundations Abroad: A Collection of Historical Case Studies

The International Work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation: A Professional's Perspective

Ernst Kerbusch

1 Introduction

Having started as a minor institution with a small number of staff members back in the mid-1950s, the international work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and other political foundations has become a substantial part of German foreign policy and a genuine contribution to the culture of international relations. The foundations' networks today have become an additional opportunity to establish socio-political foreign relations and since the 1980s, numerous attempts have been made to copy the German concept of political foundations. Founded in 1925 as a political legacy of Germany's first democratically elected president, Friedrich Ebert, the Foundation became a role model for other political foundations that were established in the 1950s and later.

The political circumstances in which the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and other political foundations were re-established were affected by several international changes and challenges. The ratification of the Bonn-Paris Convention in 1955 put an end to the Allied occupation of Western Germany, and the government of chancellor Konrad Adenauer obtained the full authority of a sovereign state. The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and the WEU, and was firmly integrated into the West. Foreign policy became dominated by the Hallstein Doctrine that claimed the exclusive mandate to represent the whole of Germany and tried

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to weaken the international standing of the GDR and the global influence of the Soviet Union.

The rapid reconstruction of Western Germany and the so-called 'economic miracle' enabled the government in Bonn not only to integrate millions of German displaced persons who had had to leave the Eastern territories, but also to invest substantial financial funds to promote Western values abroad and to return to the international arena. This development was strengthened by the Western Allies who requested a substantial German commitment to the struggle against communism. After all, West Germany had received comprehensive support in the course of the European Recovery Program, which played a crucial role in German reconstruction after 1945 and led to a period of prosperity, social peace and justice.

It was therefore only natural for West Germany to begin a debate about how to support the new states that arose out of the decolonization process and whose rapprochement with the Soviet Union as a potential partner should be prevented. This context opened the floor for the international work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and was facilitated by two main factors: 1) Since Germany had already lost its colonies after World War One, it now appeared in Africa and Asia as a widely unencumbered player; and 2) the German labour movement had already started to build an international network in 1920 and continued after World War Two. The SPD and the members of the DGB trade union immediately re-established their international contacts and returned to international forums, as the 'Socialist International' and the 'International Confederation of Free Trade Unions', that now enabled the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation to expand its focus to the global arena.

Additionally, many of the executives who helped to rebuild the foundation from 1945 had survived the Third Reich either in exile or as a member of the resistance. In this way, they had established an international network of their own, including links to other social-democratic players around the world that then became a valuable tool to start the foundations' activities abroad. Meanwhile, the USA and the Soviet Union turned their attention to the former colonial states of Africa and Asia, which in 1955 merged into the Non-Aligned Movement. This advocated a middle course for new states in the developing world between the Eastern and Western Bloc. The 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 paved the way for building closer ties between the former colonial countries, their liberation movements and the government in Moscow. Finally, the revolution in Cuba in 1959 proved that communism was not geographically limited to Eastern Europe.

The Western Allies' and West Germany's fear of an expanding influence of Soviet communism played a major role in the prioritization of foreign and

development aid policy. In the late 1950s, the German government extensively supported organizations that could build trustworthy networks with key players in the new countries of Africa and Asia. These were church organizations that mainly worked in the field of humanitarian aid, and political foundations as a new player to promote democracy through educational and training courses. The founding of the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation (BMZ) in late 1961 constituted a vital prerequisite for a structured German development aid policy and laid the cornerstone for a long-term planned international work programme for the political foundations. The new ministry meant an immense improvement of the foundations' finances and extended their scope of action.

In addition, the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation reached an agreement that transferred the mandate for international trade union work to the foundation. Still today, the international trade union's support in the Third World is one of the central pillars of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation's activities abroad.

Additional subsidies enabled the foundation to expand its work and establish a new scholarship programme for young students and researchers from totalitarian regimes. This helped them not only to continue their life in another environment, but it also did the groundwork for close ties between young elites and the foundation which, in many cases, have lasted a lifetime. Consequently, the German public realized that formally independent organizations such as political foundations could support the official foreign policy agenda without the government being directly involved or responsible for potentially undesirable developments.

2 The International Work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation

Following the founding of the BMZ, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation was able to direct its international programme into better-structured and coordinated channels, and widen its international network. In 1963, the first staff members were posted to several developing countries to open permanent offices and to promote the same values that the foundation already supported within its national work: adult education, democracy and social justice. From the very beginning, trade union members proved to be an important factor for the international work of the foundation. During the decolonization processes, they had already taken an important role and were now in close contact with the new elites. By 1965, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation had sent 20 young trade union advisers abroad to support the establishment of trade union infrastructures in the new states. Nearly

all those advisers had their roots in the German Federal Trade Union (DGB). They soon realized that their previous experience differed from the economic and social circumstances in the host countries, so they mainly facilitated organizational matters and leadership training.

Apart from trade union cooperation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation strove for closer contacts with the new political elites in the developing countries. When the SPD became part of the German government in 1966 and Willy Brandt German chancellor, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation was seen by many partners as a direct broker for the German government. Meanwhile, West Germany had turned into one of the largest donors of development aid. The foundation's programme was based on its German experience and included educational training for public officials and for citizens who acted to disseminate democratic values e.g., journalists, teachers, researchers and students.

Since many former colonies had a lack of national cohesion due to the arbitrary drawing of new border demarcation lines, the field of nation building was of paramount concern for international work and was not always successful. In the 1970s, the foundation suffered several setbacks when totalitarian regimes came to power e.g., in Argentina, Chile and Ghana, and forced the foundation to stop its work and leave those countries.

The presence of Willy Brandt as head of the SPD, foreign minister, chancellor and president of Socialist International, had a major impact on the development of the foundation's international work. Brandt supported and encouraged the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in many ways whilst the foundation accompanied and strengthened his policy.

Based on the model of its adult education centres in Germany, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation set up several similar institutions in different host countries, including Madagascar, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Costa Rica after the members of the foundation's board had met with the governing elites of each country. The selection of partner countries showed the shift in the foundation's international policy: it concentrated not only on promoting democratic values, but also cooperated with military-based dictatorial regimes such as Indonesia to achieve one central objective: to oppose the influence of Soviet communism in the developing countries.

Setbacks such as the collaboration with single-party states or regimes with enforced conformity had to be accepted and could only be understood in the context of the Cold War. The foundation's international work no longer focused on exporting Germany's experiences of democratic values, but on opposing the growing influence of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states.

Consequently, this development also influenced the choice of partners: Chilean socialists and communists did not appear as potential partners due to their alleged contacts with the Soviet Union and the GDR, while the foundation now supported minor social-democratic actors and left-wing-oriented members of the Christian democrats in Chile. In Tanzania, it collaborated with members of the unified party, in Peru and Ecuador the left-wing military government became partners and so did the authoritarian regime of Indonesia's dictator Suharto.

Viewed in a long term, there were good reasons for this strategy. The changes that a political foundation can bring about require long-term planning e.g., by focusing on young activists who will later hold a leadership position within the government or economic structures of a state. In consideration of this long-term perspective, by cooperating with non-democratic players, the foundation was encouraging future democratic developments.

During the 1970s, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation extended its scope of action abroad and strengthened its international network, which was partly because of growing financial support. Now it was able to establish large-scale projects like media promotion, economic development and the installation of research institutes. Henceforth the foundation had a chance to cooperate with highly qualified researchers and activists independently from an equivalent form of governance in the host countries. Within the framework of large-scale projects in cooperation with research institutes, the foundation was even able to initiate activities in several non-democratic countries in which a direct political involvement, e. g. By collaborating with the trade union and other political activists, had not been possible before.

Over the following years, the research institutes that served as a basis for socio-political consultation measures and were based in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, became highly relevant.

A question that is regularly raised about the political foundation is how independent it was and is from the German state and its institutions. To what extent does the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation depend on the SPD and the DGB, with which it shares the same political and ideological values, and on the German parliament and ministries, which are responsible for the foundations' finances? Despite—or perhaps even because of—this complex mesh of relationships, the independence of the political foundations and their decision-making process and programme planning was never seriously questioned. Everyone who helped to engineer the concept of the political foundations was aware that their independence was a precondition for the additional benefits that encouraged German development aid and foreign policy up to today. In return, the ministries that controlled the foundations' international work allowed them a maximum level of freedom. Neither the BMZ nor the foreign ministry oppose project applications,

unless they have a strong reason to believe that the intended measure will damage the bilateral relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the host country.

The relationship between a foundation and its respective political party was clarified by the German Federal Court of Justice in 1986. According to the court's judgement, foundations align their activities and agendas to suit their political ideology, but do not depend on their respective party. Due to the commitment of former members of the SPD and the DGB, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation is strongly embedded in the network of the German labour movement. Employees of the foundation regularly appear as advisers in parliamentary committees or informal meetings.

The process of coordination correlates with a continuous development of international work due to a comprehensive quality management system that starts by defining the target of each project, then processes and evaluates it.

Altogether, in the past few decades, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation has been able to achieve several successes abroad that have drawn the focus of the international community towards the concept of German political foundations e.g., in the course of its advisory activities during the democratization process in Spain and Portugal during the 1970s.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain meant a radical change within the foundation's international work programme. New access to the former GDR and other Eastern European countries required a restructuring of the foundation's priorities and the establishment of new approaches for democratic educational training in states that underwent a process of transformation. Simultaneously, the long-term strategy of the foundation's work abroad paid off. In recent years, increasing ties with young multipliers from different Eastern European countries have developed through workshops, meetings during delegation visits, and providing support within the foundation's scholarship programme. Many of those supported were to go on to occupy leading positions which were to widen the foundation's international network immensely.

3 Conclusion

Since its re-establishment after World War Two, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation turned from an organization with a focus on adult education and promoting democracy and social justice in Germany into a global player. It has proven its capability to react flexibly to constantly changing circumstances and tasks, and to re-invent itself if necessary.

Today, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation maintains about 100 offices in Europe, Africa, Asia, America and the Middle East and is engaged in numerous projects in the fields of socio-political development as well as economic and social support. Having established contact with liberation movements during the process of decolonization, the foundation has become a collaboration partner with the young nations of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, the United Nations and many industrial countries. It became an important guarantor for Western interests during the Cold War, but also appeared as a pioneer for chancellor Willy Brandt's new Eastern policy towards Eastern Europe, and particularly the GDR, after 1969. The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation reflected the approach of the young West German republic towards a new development policy that was based on a conscious socio-political commitment and understanding of the new countries. Aware that the Federal Republic would not be involved in any military engagement, the foundation followed the idea that the new foreign and development aid policy would be based on civil and financial support.

At the same time, it was obvious that the successful German model of rapid economic and democratic recovery could not simply be exported to other countries. Instead, programmes based on long-term experience and profound analysis offered the best chance for positive changes towards stable democratic infrastructures.

Additionally, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation helped to find solutions for conflicts and to prevent crisis situations. As an external player, it offered neutral meeting platforms for opposing parties and supported democratic actors during apartheid in South Africa and the dictatorship in Chile and Brazil. In Israel, it supported the Labour Party to recover from its political breakdown in the course of the elections in 1977, and also helped to overcome totalitarian regimes in Spain and in Portugal.

The foundation has encouraged unification processes worldwide. It supports the process of European integration, and played a supportive role during the transformation processes in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. As the first NGO, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation implemented cooperative measures in Afghanistan after the end of the Taliban regime. It contributes to the international dialogue to strengthen the instrument of global governance, supports the cross-linking of trade union movements, and helps to promote minimum labour standards.

Since the beginning of its international activities, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation has accompanied and promoted the foreign policy path of the Federal Republic of Germany and supported German interests in the world, starting from cautious first steps in the 1950s during the Cold War, and progressing through Brandt's New Eastern Policy to the German reunification process. Also, the foundation has

influenced a number of other international developments: the European integration process, the Transatlantic relationship, and the overcoming of the conflicts in the Balkans and Central America.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation shares especially close relations with Israel and is involved in many initiatives to overcome the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab conflict. Another significant field of its international activities is its contribution to international trade union solidarity, especially by focusing on trade unions in emerging countries as Brazil, South Africa and South Korea.

In conclusion, it should be stated that the pluralistic structure of all German political foundations as an original German instrument of international dialogue, and against the backdrop of the challenges of the globalization process, are especially suitable to contributing to the realization of foreign policy interests and aims of the Federal Republic of Germany. Throughout their ongoing engagement in democracy, social justice and crisis management, the foundations have also contributed to Germany's reputation. Their worldwide networks give them the chance to shift topics to a supra-national level, to link elites while crossing cultural and national borders, to benefit from others' experiences, to recognize crises at an early stage, and to react in a constructive and flexible way. While doing so, the foundations contribute to the transfer of ideas and balance of interests. Local representatives do much more than organize meetings, seminars and informative workshops and programmes. They provide up-to-date analysis and act as advisers, moderators, mediators, networkers, brokers, and they support political developments and decision-making processes. Through the eyes of foreign observers, German political foundations are a highly efficient and complementary instrument to German foreign policy.

About the Author

Dr. Ernst Kerbusch served as International Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation from 1976 to 2008 and is today a Senior Expert on International Politics. He began his career as the FES representative to Peru. Afterwards he was the Deputy Director of the International Division of the FES from 1972 to 1976. Before joining the FES, he was Assistant Professor at the University of Cologne's School for Electoral Research. He has also been member of the Commission for International Relations of Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) since 1990. Dr. Kerbusch is holding a degree in Economics, Political Science and Sociology from the University of Cologne, Berlin and London.

The Story of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation: A German-Israeli Co-Production

Anna Abelmann

1 Introduction

On October 29, 1967, a large ceremony was held on the campus of Tel Aviv University with more than 200 high-ranking representatives from politics, science, culture and industry. Among them were Golda Meir, at that time the general secretary of the governing party *Mapai*,[1] several members of the *Knesset*, a large delegation of the Israeli trade union *Histadrut* headed up by its General Secretary Zev Hering, the Mayor of Tel Aviv, and members of the Israeli Kibbutz movement. Additionally, about 100 invited guests from the Federal Republic of Germany attended the event, including Erwin Schöttle (SPD), Vice-President of the German *Bundestag*, a delegation from the Federation of German Unions (DGB) headed by its President Ludwig Rosenberg, several emissaries from German-Israeli Society (DIG), a delegation of the "German Friends of the Hebrew University", and finally

[1]The centre-left party *Mapai* (lit. "Workers' Party of the Land of Israel") was founded in 1930 and became the dominant political power after the establishment of the state in 1948. In 1968 *Mapai* merged with two minor left-wing parties *Ahdut HaAvoda* and *Rafi* into the new Israeli Labor Party (IAP). Both *Mapai* and IAP were closely affiliated with the international labour movement. Until 1977, all Israeli Prime Ministers derived either from *Mapai* or IAP.

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Walter Hesselbach, Director of the German *Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft* (BfG)[2] and president of the board of trustees of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. He was one of the most influential members of the political foundation, which was closely linked to Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). Furthermore, a handful of representatives from Swiss and Austrian trade unions had also travelled to Israel to attend the event.[3]

In the presence of this top-ranking audience, Dr. George S. Wise, President of Tel Aviv University, inaugurated the Peretz Naftali Social Science Building as the new main building for the faculty of social science. It was named after the German-born economist, social democrat and publicist Fritz Naphtali (1888–1961), who played a major role both in the German and Israeli labour movement. After he emigrated from Berlin to the British Mandate of Palestine in 1933, he changed his first name to Peretz and became Director General of the *Histadrut*-owned finance institute *Bank HaPoalim*. He joined the Knesset in 1949 as a member of Ben Gurion's *Mapai*. During the 1950s, he was appointed to several ministerial positions and was among those cabinet members who supported a cautious rapprochement between West Germany and Israel at an early stage (Reiff 1988, pp. 7–9).

The inauguration ceremony also included a premiere in German-Israeli relations: Erwin Schöttle, Ludwig Rosenberg and Walter Hesselbach became the first speakers ever to address an audience at the university's campus in German. It was during his speech that Walter Hesselbach announced the establishment of the Fritz-Naphtali Foundation, which would become one of the major financiers of the Peretz-Naphtali building.[4]

The history of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation is a unique and widely unknown chapter in German-Israeli relations and is still shrouded in mystery. While it became embroiled in German bribery scandals in the 1980s, it also played a major role in strengthening the link between the German and Israeli labour movements during the 1970s, and opened up new possibilities for cooperation and communication.

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[2]The German "Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft" (BfG) was a union-owned bank for the social economy founded in 1958 in Frankfurt/Main in West Germany.

[3]German Embassy to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn, October 21, 1967, on the establishment of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Tel Aviv, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1148.

[4]German Embassy to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn, October 21, 1967, on the establishment of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Tel Aviv, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1148.

Formally, the new foundation was a cooperative initiative between members of the German, Israeli, Swiss and Austrian labour unions, but in reality, the driving force behind the entire development came from Walter Hesselbach.

Pursuant to its charter, the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation was established in accordance with the Ottoman law for corporations. Its main purpose was to support social, cultural and research institutions, associations and research projects with a focus on social or sociological questions, and to promote young students and researchers along with international cooperation in the spirit of democracy and social movements.[5] The German Embassy in Tel Aviv quickly recognized some similarities with another foundation back home, and sent an information notice to the foreign office in Bonn indicating that the newly established Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Israel should complete the same tasks as the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Germany: supporting research and science.[6]

A German political foundation as a role model for an Israeli institution did not fit into the general picture of the German-Israeli relations in the late 1960s, and posed numerous questions that will be explored below. The unique concept of German political foundations within German foreign policy has been described in other articles in this volume as well as the founding history of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation itself.[7]

This article, which reflects a small part of a larger research project, will focus on an exceptional chapter in German-Israeli relations that shows the unique path bilateral relations can take between two states under unique circumstances. This uniqueness was caused by the special character of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the *Shoah*. By 1967, both countries had already established diplomatic relations, but were still struggling with finding a suitable way to communicate and interact. With this in mind, this paper first gives a short overview of the state of bilateral relations between the two states and also briefly addresses the role of the German Social Democrats in this context before touching on the history of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation and its influence on German-Israeli relations.

[5]Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) to the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development in Bonn, October 31, 1970, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B66 679.

[6]German Embassy, Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn September 27, 1967, on the establishment of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Tel Aviv, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1148.

[7]See for instance the articles written by Ernst Kerbusch and Katharina Konarek.

2 Historical Context: German-Israeli Relations in the 1960s

The birth of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation took place at a time when historically strained German-Israeli relations had just slightly improved with the establishment of diplomatic relations, but were still very fragile. Memory of the *Shoah* was still fresh in May 1965 when Bonn and Jerusalem decided to exchange ambassadors, but there was more immediate turmoil after the secret came out about German armaments going to Israel in October 1964. This led to strong protest notes of the Arab embassies in Bonn.[8] This revelation provided Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leading voice of the Arab World at that time, with a reason to call the German *Hallstein* Doctrine into question by inviting Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany, for an official visit to Egypt (Blasius 1998). Since the mid-1950s the Federal government had feared how the Arab states would respond to any kind of convergence between Bonn and Jerusalem. In fact, after the Suez Crisis in 1956, Israel had changed its previous position and expressed its willingness to establish official relations with the West German state, though the situation in Bonn had changed as well. In light of the Luxemburg Agreement, chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU) would have preferred to install diplomatic relations at the same time, but the Israeli delegation had refused this proposal. In the mid 1950s the government in Jerusalem slowly changed its mind. Not only was the Federal Republic about to become one of the strongest economic powers in Europe and a fully accepted member of the western community of states, but it was also proving to be a reliable partner to Israel by completing reparation payments punctually even during crisis situations. Against this backdrop, Israel was now ready to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn. But Germany's regaining of its foreign sovereignty, the Cold War and German partition made this step much less attractive to the federal government, and even put its key foreign policy goals in jeopardy, which were to be accepted as the sole representative of the German people and the achievement of German reunification. The Arab states had made their position

[8]A detailed description on German-Israeli arms shipments up to 1965 can be found in: Niels Hansen 2002. *Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe. Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Konrad Adenauer und David Ben Gurion*. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag GmbH, pp. 479–501; 618–636 and in: Otfried Nassauer, Christopher Steinmetz. 2004. *Rüstungskooperation zwischen Deutschland und Israel*, Berlin: Berliner Informationszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit.

clear: a German-Israeli rapprochement would be followed by the political recognition of the GDR by the members of the Arab League and the retreat of the German reunification into the far distance. When Walter Ulbricht arrived in Cairo in February 1965, the government in Bonn did not have many options for a response without losing face. As a reaction, instead of breaking off diplomatic relations with Cairo, the government of Ludwig Erhard froze economic aid to Egypt. To Israel, he offered to convert outstanding armament shipments into financial aid, which did not meet the expectation of the Israeli government. While Erhard's special envoy Kurt Birrenbach performed shuttle diplomacy between Bonn, Jerusalem and Washington D.C., chancellor Erhard made a statement on German Middle East policy on March 7, 1965, declaring (1) that his government was aiming to establish diplomatic relations with Israel; and (2) that Germany would stop sending weapons to crisis regions such as the Middle East. The Israeli negotiators had no choice but to accept this offer, which was facilitated by a promise from the US government to provide Israel with generous arms shipments a few weeks later. Diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel were established on May 8, 1965 and followed by the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Germany and ten members of the Arab league. Thus, the feeling of loss prevailed both in Bonn and Jerusalem.[9]

Even so, the CDU-led German government had achieved some milestones for German-Israeli relations, such as the implementation of the Luxemburg Agreement and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Israeli governmental party *Mapai* was in much closer contact with the opposition Social Democrats who had sought early contact with members of the Israeli labour movement and pleaded for diplomatic relations at an early stage. During the SPD party congress in Nuremberg in 1947, party chairman Kurt Schumacher took a straightforward position on the future relationship between the Germans and the Jewish people. According to Schumacher, the Germans were bound to make amends to the Jewish people and the Social Democrats should become the lawyers of the victims of the *Shoah*.[10] The antifascist reputation of the German labour movement, whose

[9]A detailed description of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany can be found in: Yeshayahu A. Jelinek 2004. *Deutschland und Israel 1945–1965. Ein neurotisches Verhältnis*. München: R. Oldenburg Verlag, pp. 431–468; George Lavy 2006. *Germany and Israel. Moral Debts and National Interest*. London: Frank Cass & Co, pp. 90–129.

[10]Kurt Schumacher during the SPD Party Congress in Nurenberg, June 29-July 2, (1947), pp. 50–51.

members had partly suffered from persecution themselves during the Third Reich, and the common ideological roots which reached back to the 1920s, paved the way for the gradual rapprochement between the German SPD and Israeli *Mapai* as well as between the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB) and its Israeli counterpart *Histadrut*. This was especially the case after the votes of the SPD parliamentary group became decisive for the ratification of the Luxemburg Agreement (Vogel 1967, pp. 96–97). While representatives from both sides only initially met within the scope of international platforms like the Socialist International (SI) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), they established numerous bilateral contacts during the 1950s. Within the parliamentary discussion, SPD politicians usually strongly supported Israeli positions. Their votes were decisive for the ratification of the Luxemburg Agreement at the German Bundestag. In 1957, SPD chairman Erich Ollenhauer became the first high-ranking German politician to visit the young state of Israel. Around the same time, the DGB also sent its first delegation to Israel. Both the SPD and the DGB regularly requested the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Jerusalem in spite of the feared reaction of the Arab League.[11] Their efforts paid off: In 1962, Esther Herlitz, head of the international department of *Mapai*, gave an interview in which she spoke about good party relations between the SPD and *Mapai*, and furthermore commended the Social Democrats for their support during the negotiation of the Luxemburg Agreement.[12]

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Jerusalem, a range of initiatives came into being to strengthen political, cultural, economic and civic ties between Germans and Israelis. The German-Israeli Society (DIG) appeared as one of the most active groups, whose members were high-ranking representatives from the *Bundestag*, both the Catholic and Protestant churches, trade unions, and finance. Another association was the German Friends of the Hebrew University, which supported academic institutions in Jerusalem. The German-Israeli Chamber of Commerce based in Frankfurt sought to strengthen economic ties and facilitate Israel's access to the European market.

[11]A detailed description of relations between German Social Democrats and Israel until 1965 can be found in: Sabine Hepperle 2000. *Die SPD und Israel. Von der Großen Koalition 1966 bis zur Wende 1982*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, pp. 26–60.

[12]Interview with Esther Herlitz on German-Israeli relations in: SPD- P/XVII/113, May 29, (1962).

Simultaneously, the grand coalition of chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) strived to regularize bilateral relations with Israel. The informal "Operation Business Associate" (dt.: Aktion Geschäftsfreunde)—a result of the meeting between chancellor Adenauer and prime minister Ben Gurion in New York in 1960 to support Israeli infrastructural projects with several hundred million DM between 1961 and 1965 (Jelinek 2004, pp. 313–317)—was stopped and replaced by an official economic assistance agreement, a programme that the Federal Republic had also initiated in cooperation with other countries.

The Six-Day War aroused a huge wave of sympathy for Israel within the German population, who strongly supported the Israeli state in this David-versus-Goliath-scenario. While the government tried to maintain its neutral position towards the Middle East, both the SPD and DGB clearly took Israel's side. The Israeli embassy was flooded by solidarity letters, funds to support Israel were raised, and many Germans applied to become volunteers in the Israeli Army (Lavy 2006, pp. 153–155). This situation did not continue for long. Increased attention on the Palestinian movement followed by a wave of solidarity of the Western German left wing as well as the 1973 Yom-Kippur-War, the oil crisis and the joint declarations of the European foreign ministers with regard to the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis in the 1970s, led to a more nuanced Middle Eastern policy from the West German government and a gradual dissociation of West German society from Israel (Weingardt 2002, pp. 228–233).

3 The Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation

When the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation sent its second official delegation to Israel in March 1966, the Six-Day War conflict and its aftermath were still to come. A first group of leading representatives had already visited the country in December 1961 and set the basis for cooperation projects with the Afro-Asian Institute, the international educational department of the *Histadrut* which provided training courses for unionists from Africa and Asia, and the *Beit Berl* College, the elite school of the *Mapai*. Considering the political context, this had already been a remarkable success. But five years later the delegates obviously hoped to widen their contacts and project networks.

There was no attempt to conceal the foundation's high expectations, evident by the names of the second delegation's participants. In addition to the foundation's executive director Günter Grunwald and Alfred Nau, deputy chairman of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and treasurer of the SPD, Walter Hesselbach, Otto

Brenner, Rudolf Sperner and Fritz Schreiber, all of them top-tier representatives of the federal labour unions, also made the journey to Israel.[13]

Walter Hesselbach was not a stranger to Israel. As the director of the German *Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft* (BfG), he had visited the country several times since 1960 and met with representatives of the *Histadrut* and the board of the Israeli workers' bank *HaPoalim*. The BfG was highly regarded in Israel. Established after 1945 by the German trade unions, it was not linked to the Third Reich and its personnel were not suspected of being former Nazis, which was certainly one of the reasons why the BfG became the first German bank to enter Israel's banking industry (George 1964, NN).

Hesselbach was also driven by personal reasons. As a teenager in the 1920s he had already attended Zionist youth groups meetings with a Jewish friend and later witnessed the persecution of the Jews in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s. This experience accompanied him throughout his entire life and gave him the credibility to become one of the central figures in German-Israeli relations during the 1960s and 1970s. Besides his position at the BfG and within the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, he was a board member or chairman of most German-Israeli associations during that time and served as an external consultant to the SPD governments of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt on Israel, where he also enjoyed high respect.[14]

The schedule of the visiting delegation in Israel was tight and impressive. Among others, they met with representatives of the Weizmann-Institute, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the Afro-Asian Institute of the *Histadrut*, several banking institutes and members of *Mapai*.[15] The delegation did not arrive empty-handed either, but with a long list of potential cooperation projects and investment plans that were meant to extend and strengthen its network in Israel.

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[13]Kristian Müller-Osten, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Bonn, to Eliahu Speiser, International Secretary Mapai, on February 25, 1966, Moshe Sharett Labour Party Archive 2-914-1964-71; German Embassy Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn on April 22, 1966, on the visit of the FES delegation to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1094.

German Embassy Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn on March 2, 1966, onthe visit of the BfG to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1094.

[14]A detailed description of Walter Hesselbach's biography can be found in: Michael Schneider 1995. Walter Hesselbach: Bankier und Unternehmer. Bonn: Dietz.

[15]Günter Grunwald, Executive Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Bonn, to the German Embassy in Tel Aviv on March 3, 1966, on the visit of the FES-delegation to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1094.

Among others, the BfG offered an investment in the *Histadrut's* production facilities amounting to up to DM10 million, and about DM8 million for its housing programme. Another offer included the acquisition by the BfG of Israeli independence and development bonds amounting to about DM10 million per year. Finally, a joint organization project for trade union banking institutes in Third World countries was discussed.[16]

Even though all those projects were proposed on behalf of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, they bore the clear and distinctive signature of Walter Hesselbach and his BfG. Most of the media and public reaction to the German delegation in Israel was neutral. The "Jerusalem Post" even published an article by Hesselbach on German economic ties with Israel.[17]

But nevertheless, the actual result of the visit was somehow disappointing. Despite the large number of different proposals for cooperation and the obvious willingness to make comprehensive investments in the Israeli economy, none of the projects was finally implemented due to a small but influential opposition within the *Histadrut* that refused to cooperate in any way with Germans or German institutions.[18]

This experience provided the impetus for what 18 months later became known as the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation. This was an artificial platform to enable the groups that refused to cooperate with German organizations to overcome psychological-emotional obstacles thanks to the non-German character of the new foundation. The driving force behind this project was clearly Walter Hesselbach, who, together with Akiva Lewinsky, the head of the Israeli workers' bank *HaPoalim*, laid the financial basis for the new foundation.

The financing concept of the Naphtali-Foundation was exceptional and mainly based on Hesselbach's personal initiative and network. In October 1966 he returned to Tel Aviv for the inaugural meeting of the new Industrial Services Limited (ISL), a factoring company, founded as a cooperation between his Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft and the Israeli *Koor* industries, a *Histadrut*-owned enterprise,

[16]German Embassy Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn on April 4, 1966, on the visit of FES-delegation to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1094.

[17]German Embassy Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn on April 23, 1966, on the visit of the FES-delegation to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1094.

[18]German Embassy Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn on April 23, 1966, on the visit of the FES-delegation to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1094.

even though in fact the BfG held a 95% shareholder majority in the new company.[19] Unsurprisingly, Walter Hesselbach became the deputy chairman of the ISL. The Industrial Services Limited was meant to support economic exchange and financial transfer between German and Israeli investors and companies. But more importantly it ensured the financing of the future Naphtali-Foundation thanks to a unique agreement. The Israeli Government agreed to repatriate the income taxes of the ISL directly to the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation, which guaranteed a steady financial basis for this project.[20] This arrangement was remarkable and proved the level to which the Israeli government played a direct and active role during the establishment of the new foundation, whose emergence was obviously directly supported by the prime minister's office. Furthermore, the repatriated taxes from the government were not sent directly to the new Israeli foundation but to a bank account belonging to the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation.[21] One can only speculate about the actual reasons for this design, but maybe the explanation is surprisingly simple. During its first years, the Naphtali Foundation lacked basic institutional infrastructure, and was mainly run by people who also represented other organizations. The foundation did not have its own office or full-time executive director, and nor perhaps even its own bank account since most of its financial resources came from Europe.

By the official inauguration ceremony in October 1967, the financial resources of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation had expanded. The German *Volkswagen-Stiftung* contributed about DM250,000 to endow exchange programmes between German and Israeli students and researchers and which were to be jointly managed by both the Naphtali and the Ebert Foundations.[22] The contribution of the *Volkswagen-Stiftung* was not a surprise: both Günter Grunwald and DGB-president Ludwig Rosenberg were members of the board (Globig 2002, pp. 44–46), and the

[19]Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau to the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in Bonn on January 20, 1970, on capital assistance to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B66 679.

[20]German Embassy, Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn September 27, 1967, on the establishment of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Tel Aviv, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1148.

[21]Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau to the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in Bonn on January 20, 1970, on capital assistance to Israel, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B66 679.

[22]German Embassy, Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn February 25, 1969, on the activities of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Tel Aviv, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1148.

Volkswagen-Stiftung had shown a high affinity for Israel since its establishment in the early 1960s (Precht 2002, pp. 487-489). Additionally, the Swiss and Austrian trade unions subsidized this new foundation, and the Israeli ministry for agriculture donated several scholarships for further educational training in the field of forestry and water management.[23]

During the first few years, the money was mainly used to support infrastructural projects of the Israeli labour movement e.g., to support the *Mapai* elite school *Beit Ber*l, the University of Tel Aviv, the Kibbutz *Givat Haim* and Kibbutz *Gesher* and the building of a *Histadrut* guesthouse (Naphtali 1969, p. NN).

Even though contributions were also made from Switzerland and Austria, the core of the new foundation was meant to be German-Israeli. In a report to the foreign office in Bonn, the German embassy described the character of the new foundation quite accurately. Besides representatives from the German and Israeli labour movements, members from other trade union organizations such as those in Switzerland and Austria were also represented on the board of the new foundation and soon representatives from other European countries were expected to join the board. This compilation gave the Naphtali-Foundation an international character, which also enabled those Israelis who were not interested in direct cooperation between Israel and Germany to join the foundation.[24]

The determination of the Embassy was reflected both in the composition of the executive board and the board of trustees of the Naphtali-Foundation. Besides Germans and Israelis, the executive board also included one Swiss representative, Anton Benya, and the Austrian trade union representative Hermann Leuenberger. Aharon Becker, head of *Histadrut*, became the Chairman and Ludwig Rosenberg, the president of the DGB, his deputy. Besides Reuven Barkatt, Avraham Harman, Zev Hering and Akiva Lewinsky, Günter Grunwald and Walter Hesselbach from the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation also joined the board (Naphtali 1969, NN). Records from later years do not show any signs that the board members tried to win over members from other nations, and even Benya and Leuenberger only participated sporadically in meetings of the Naphtali-Foundation.

[23]German Embassy, Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn February 25, 1969, on the activities of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Tel Aviv, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1148.

[24]German Embassy, Tel Aviv to the Federal Foreign Office in Bonn September 27, 1967, on the establishment of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation in Tel Aviv, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, B96 1148.

The board of trustees did not even try to present an international picture. All of its members were political, economic, labour and cultural representatives from Israel or the Federal Republic, such as Golda Meir, the ambassadors Asher Ben Natan and Rolf Pauls, prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia Heinz Kühn (SPD), Jerusalem's mayor Teddy Kollek, Israel's foreign minister Abba Eban, the Federal minister for transportation Georg Leber (SPD), deputy president of the *Bundestag* Erwin Schoettle (SPD) and Hesse's prime minister Georg August Zinn (SPD) (Naphtali 1969, NN).

After a few years, in the early 1970s the foundation's work was structured in a better way. Regular board meetings with representatives from the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, *Histadrut* and DGB, IAP (formerly: *Mapai*) and SPD took place twice a year. The financial endowment also expended. With the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation as its guarantor, the Naphtali-Foundation received several amounts of credit from the German *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau* (KfW), which enabled it to finance huge infrastructural projects including the Levy-Eshkol-Tower as the main building of the university of Haifa, the Martin-Buber-Centre for Adult Education at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the main building of the Ben-Gurion University in Beer Sheva, a high school named after Fritz Naphtali, and two cultural funds for the cities Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Reiff 1988, p. 6).

Against this backdrop, the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation expanded continuously. In close cooperation with the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation it supported not only infrastructural projects at Israeli universities but also promoted German-Israel dialogue, especially between members of the labour movements. Soon, their cooperative activities included countries abroad.

Board meetings were regularly held where representatives of both foundations as well as the *Histadrut* updated each other on their current international activities and discussed cooperation on projects abroad. This aspect became especially important after the October war in 1973, when most of the African countries broke off their diplomatic ties with Israel.

Development aid projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America had always played an important role in the cooperation between the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and its Israeli partners, so it naturally also became a point in the cooperation within the Naphtali-Foundation.

The 1970s presented a challenge for Israeli Foreign Policy. While in the 1960s it managed to establish diplomatic ties with nearly all non-Muslim countries in Africa, which helped it to overcome its international isolation, these relationships became tenser after the Six-Day War in 1967, followed by a widespread breaking-off after

the Yom-Kippur-War in 1973.[25] Meanwhile, the political importance of diplomatic relations with Latin American countries increased.

In this context, the representatives from *Histadrut* and Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation used the regular meetings of the Naphtali-Foundation to exchange information about their international work, new contacts, and developments and prospective plans.

One project was the support of the establishment of workers' bank institutions in Latin America, which were to be built based on the model of the Israeli *Bank HaPoalim* or the German *Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft*. When the Naphtali Foundation came into being the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation did not have much experience of international work in Latin America.[26] The contact person was Akiva Lewinsky, not only executive director of the Naphtali Foundation and director of the Bank *HaPoalim*, but also advisor to the Organization of American States (OAS) for the development of workers' banking institutes in Latin America and the Caribbean.[27]

By 1968 the Naphtali-Foundation had invested IP35,000 in this project (Naphtali 1969, p. NN), and had come to an agreement between the Naphtali-Foundation and the OAS for technical support of the workers' bank in that region. Following that, an expert from *HaPoalim* was sent to Venezuela to support projects in Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras and Argentina (Naphtali 1969, p. NN). The help was greatly appreciated: during the third inter-American conference of the ministers for employment in October 1969, the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation was the only non-Latin-American institute whose help received particular mention in the final report.[28] This programme continued until the 1980s (Reiff 1988, p. 10).

[25]A detailed description in Israel's Foreign Policy in Africa can be found in: Peter Joel 1992. *Israel and Africa. The Problematic Friendship*. London: The British Academic Press.

[26]A detailed description in the Friedrich-Foundation's work in Central America can be found in: von Hofman, Norbert, V. Vinnai, H. Benzing. 2010. *Die Arbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Indonesien, Tansania und Zentralamerika seit den 1960er Jahren*. Bonn: Dietz, pp. 203–315.

[27]Jewish Agency for Israel. NN. *Akiva Lewinsky* (1918–2000), http://www1.jafi.org.il/treasurer/bios/akiva.htm. Accessed on August 20, 2017.

[28]Akiva Lewinsky, Executive Director Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation, to Günter Grunwald, Executive Director Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, on December 29, 1969, Archive of Social Democracy/Archive DGB, International Department, 5/DGAJ000670.

4 Conclusion

Though the Naphtali-Foundation was formally one of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation's partner organizations in Israel, it was not just an ordinary organization but one created under unique circumstances and influenced by several protagonists with unique agendas. The central figure was certainly Walter Hesselbach, who had access to all players and institutions involved and who did not hesitate to use his influence as the director of the BfG and his role in the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and the German labour movement.

The Naphtali-Foundation was established at a time when the future development of German-Israeli relations was still unclear. But even so, central players on both sides showed a strong interest in expanding these contacts.

It was created as an Israeli institution but designed, financed and supported in large part by members of the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. In return, the Naphtali-Foundation opened many doors for the Germans and enabled Israelis who refused to cooperate with them to join the foundation and its projects.

During the 1970s, this cooperation between both foundations benefited strongly from political alignment in Bonn and Jerusalem where the governments were run by the SPD and the Israeli Labour Party (IAP). This enabled the foundation to establish communication channels leading to the prime minister's or the chancellor's office. This promoted mutual relations and blurred the boundaries between governmental and party relations.

The cooperation contract between *Histadrut* and the DGB was widely prepared in the Naphtali -Foundation's board meetings, during which time the crisis between the SPD and IAP youth organizations was also discussed. From the early 1970s until the Israeli change of government in 1977, the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation went through a "golden age" with access to the highest-ranking politicians in both countries.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation benefited in two respects from the new partner organization in Israel. Officially, the foundation only started its project work in Israel in 1978 along with the "Association for Labour Education". But in cooperation with the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation it had already built a comprehensive network of local contacts more than a decade before. The Naphtali-Foundation opened the doors even to those partners who were unable or unwilling to cooperate with German institutions. Secondly, a seamless and smooth cooperation with the Naphtali-Foundation did hardly attracted the attention of the media or other players in the international arena and therefore enabled the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation to cooperate with Arab partners in other Middle Eastern countries. Even though both Israelis and Arab cooperation partners were always informed about

the foundation's activitites on either sides, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation preferred not to make a big fuss about its acitivites in Israel in order to prevent any kind of interference.

This unique constellation clearly supported the development of bilateral relations between the two countries and societies on many levels and shaped new communication channels that later became especially important when official relations deteriorated.

The story of the Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation is an impeccable example of the possible scope of action of German political foundations in crisis situations or when facing complex bilateral relations between two states.

The Fritz-Naphtali-Foundation was a unique German-Israeli co-operation project that not only marks a highly specific chapter in the history of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Israel but is also evidence of the reciprocal interest at the respective Israeli and German governmental levels in the 1960s in strengthening these relations.

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Germany and the Palestinian Territories: A Short Overview of a Troubled, Special Relationship

Katharina Konarek

1 Period 1: After 1948 and During the Cold War

German-Palestinian relations developed after the Second World War against a highly sensitive and complex background. On the one hand, the Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust had imposed a responsibility on the Germans towards the new state of Israel. On the other hand, there were millions of Palestinian refugees whose fate had been exploited in the context of the Cold War by groups of countries throughout the world (Schwanitz 2005). The divided Germany conducted two different policies towards the Palestinians. While West Germany focused on reconciliation with the Jewish people and turned towards Israel, East Germany established full relations with the PLO. As a member of the "Warsaw Pact", the GDR's leadership declared the PLO as a peaceful movement, fighting against imperialism and for the right of people to self-determination, and acting in the interest of regional security and international peace (Koester 2015). The SED regime acknowledged the right of the Israeli state, but emphasized that this right did not include the Palestinian Territories. This kind of restricted anti-Zionism stemmed from the efforts of the GDR's leadership to cope with the past in its own way. In their own understanding of the GDR as the "better" Germany, they renounced taking over any moral or material responsibility for the Nazi regime. On the contrary, they saw the GDR as a prolongation of the communist struggle against Hitler (Koester 2015)—a common narrative in the Eastern Bloc countries.

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Yassir Arafat was treated by the SED regime as a statesman. The GDR also became one of the most important weapons suppliers for the Arab nations. Honecker hosted several "military delegations" of the PLO, probably fighters that received army training in the GDR (Voigt 2008). The PLO also maintained a representative office in East Berlin. In 1982, it was upgraded to and provided with all possible rights. In West Germany, the PLO was presumed illegal- and was represented from 1979 in Bonn just by an "Informationsstelle Palästina"—a mere information desk (Jaeger 2002).

2 Period 2: Diplomatic Relations After German Reunification

As a result of good contacts between the two sides, the reunification provided Germany with a new role—namely becoming a platform for exchange, a mediator on the road to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Reunited Germany was the first to build diplomatic missions[1] in Gaza and Jericho in 1994 in the aftermath of the Oslo process (Schwanitz 2005).

German political foundations followed this example and opened offices in the Palestinian Territories. The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) was the first, and—after already fostering several local projects and partnerships[2]—opened its own office in East Jerusalem. This has included a branch in Gaza since 2001. The location was chosen on purpose in order claim the status of Jerusalem as a divided city. The FES was followed by the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS), which opened its office in Ramallah in 1996. The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (HBS) founded a regional office in Ramallah in 1999 that also covers Jordan. The Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation has been conducting project work since 2000, and established its Palestine regional office in 2008 in Ramallah. The Hanns-Seidel-Foundation (HSS) has been organizing projects in the Palestinian Territories through its Israel office in Jerusalem since 1994. The same counts for the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation (FNS), which has been conducting projects since 1994 through its Jerusalem office.

With its bilateral contributions and those made in conjunction with the EU, Germany became the largest donor country within the EU to support building

[1]The German term is "Ständige Vertretung".

[2]See also the article on the relation between the FES and PASSIA by Deniz Altayli.

infrastructure in the Palestinian Territories. Political contact has become significantly more intense since the beginning of the Oslo process. Furthermore, Germany played a decisive diplomatic role during its EU presidency in the first half of 1999. The leadership of the PLO was dissuaded from its intention of proclaiming a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999, which was shortly before the elections in Israel. At the same time, the Council of Europe passed the so-called "Berlin Declaration" at its summit meeting in March 1999, in which the right of the Palestinians to a viable state was expressly supported by the EU for the first time (Sterzing and Boehme 2002, p. 37). In this context, the diplomatic mission was also relocated from Jericho to Ramallah, where it is still operating today.

In 1993, the Informationsstelle Palästina in Bonn was transformed into the Palestinian Mission in Berlin—as a means of representation of Palestinians in Germany. Since 2013, Dr. Kholoud Daibes has served as the mission's leader. She is a former DAAD scholarship holder.[3] Before this posting, she served in the Palestinian Ministry of Tourism. In this position she was closely connected to the FES, which hosted German politicians such as Sigmar Gabriel (Ross 2013).

3 German-Palestinian Relations Today

Today most Palestinans express a very favourable view of the European Union and Germany (Borchard and Heyn 2015). According to the German foreign ministry, political bilateral relations have intensified during the past few years. Core areas are political dialogue and substantive cooperation in institution building and infrastructure, especially in the water sector, as well as culture and education (Auswärtiges Amt 2017). One of the most influential networks shaping this bilateral cooperation is the German-Palestinian Steering Committee. It met for the third time on March 29, 2014 in Berlin. Cabinet ministers from both sides meet every two years. Chaired on the German side by the then Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier, and by Prime Minister Hamdallah on the Palestinian side, the committee has provided a forum for discussion, networking and exchange (Auswärtiges Amt 2017) since 2010.

In addition to the federal government, various German federal states are engaged in activities of their own in the Palestinian Territories. There are four

[3]Daibes received a scholarship from 1983 until 1990 in order to study architecture in Hanover, Germany. She is married to Suleiman Abu-Dayyeh, project manager at the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation in the Palestinian Territories.

German-Palestinian city partnerships at the municipal level: Bethlehem/Cologne, Beit Jala/Bergisch Gladbach, Beit Jala/Jena and Beit Sahour/Xanten. The cities of Hebron and Mannheim and Bonn and Ramallah are also working on joint projects.

Development cooperation is a major element of German engagement in the Palestinian Territories. Improving the living conditions of the Palestinian population and further strengthening Palestinian institutions at the national and local level are important prerequisites for reaching a lasting solution to the Middle East conflict. Only if people have the prospect of a better future, peace can be achieved, and a viable Palestinian state be built. The focus is on swift and effective measures to stabilize economic and social conditions on the ground. German-Palestinian cooperation is also seeking to have a long-term impact, which is why Germany is helping to build infrastructure and state institutions at the local and national level. Supporting civil society is also a major element of state-building efforts (Hajjaj 2004).

With annual commitments running to approximately 100 million euros, official bilateral development cooperation focuses on three areas that are in line with the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan: a) water, sanitation and waste disposal; b) sustainable economic development and employment, including education and vocational training; c) establishing statehood and promoting civil society.

Germany's role in the reconstruction and provision of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip is acknowledged by both the Palestinian and the Israeli side, as well as by the international donor community. Additional funding pledged by Germany—totalling €108 million (€61 million in 2014 and €47 million in 2015)—is being deployed swiftly and effectively (Auswärtiges Amt 2017).

In addition, Germany is assisting the Palestinian Territories with transitional aid to promote development and build state infrastructure. Further activities include civilian crisis prevention, Civil Peace Service (ZFD) measures, and projects conducted by churches and foundations. The German Government is working with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as part of a strategic partnership.

Germany also has cultural intermediaries active in the Palestinian Territories. The Goethe Institute, in close cooperation with the Institut Français, runs the Franco-German Cultural Centre in Ramallah, which is an important part of local cultural life. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) regularly supports exchanges between students and researchers from Palestinian universities, and is currently establishing a study programme in German as a foreign language at Birzeit University in Ramallah. Private foundations and projects are engaged in cultural work as a bridge between Germans and Palestinians. Since the German

Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education signed a memorandum of understanding in 2014, research cooperation between Germany and Palestine has gained new momentum. This includes the Palestinian-German Science Bridge (PGSB), a pilot project implemented jointly by the Research Centre Jülich and the Palestinian Academy for Science and Technology (PALAST).

Germany also supports a variety of cultural projects through its representative office in Ramallah. These include providing funding (through the Cultural Preservation Programme) for the restoration of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, helping cultural institutions to stage exhibitions and concerts, and supporting a drama school in Ramallah (Shikaki 2014).

German church-affiliated organizations operate two large German schools abroad: Schmidt's Girls College in East Jerusalem and the Talitha Kumi Evangelical Lutheran School in Beit Jala near Bethlehem. The schools prepare pupils for the German higher education entrance qualification (Abitur) and the Palestinian school-leaving certificate. In addition, a total of seven private and public Palestinian schools offer German lessons and German Language Certificate (DSD) examinations. Representatives of the German Catholic and Evangelical Churches also play an important role in the Holy Land—by running the two German schools abroad via their German-speaking congregations, by funding cultural projects, and by supporting research through study programmes in Protestant or Catholic theology and archaeological research.

4 Conclusion

The current relationship between Germany and the Palestinian Territories, influenced by the division of Germany and antagonistic policies towards the Palestinians, has turned out to be a fruitful ground for cooperation. Germany is maintaining long-standing relations with the Palestinian political leadership. Through various educational, social and political programmes, Germany has also reached the Palestinian people at a grassroots level within just 60 years. German political foundations take an active part in this lively relationship. Both the sustained work of the German government and the German political foundations have the potential to be a major pillar of a future Palestinian state and an important factor on the way to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

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The German Greens, the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation and Israel

An Example for a Reciprocal Relationship Between the Party at Home and a Foundation Abroad

Oz Aruch and Omer Hakim

1 Introduction

The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation launched its operations in Israel in 1992, at the culmination of a transformative decade in the German Green Party's approach towards the State of Israel.

Since its election to the Bundestag for the first time in 1983, and over the next decade, the German Green Party, which constitutes the Foundation's political home, has gradually become more open to dialogue with Israeli government officials. It has shifted its focus from engaging with Israeli individuals identified with the 'radical left' of the Israeli political map to more moderate counterparts that are identified with the 'Zionist Left'.

In the years between the election of the Green Party to the German parliament, and the first projects pursued by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation with its Israeli partners in the early 1990s, the Greens have engaged in turbulent internal discussions in an attempt to form a consistent policy towards the State of Israel.

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As this paper shows, these negotiations ultimately dealt with the continuous and at times irreconcilable tensions between two competing ideologies within the party, both of which served as fundamental building blocks of the Greens' political identity.

As such, the formation of the Greens' approach towards the State of Israel constitutes a significant milestone that has contributed to the formation of the Greens' political identity as a whole.

2 The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation in Israel

The post-World War II German left was generally supportive of the State of Israel. This approach, however, started to shift in June of 1967, a date that marked both the radicalization of the German student movement and the Six-Day War. When the War ended, waves of criticism towards Israel from within the German left started to surge, primarily concerning Israel's status as a military occupier.

The aforementioned shift in the German left introduced a dilemma for the Bundestag representatives of the Green Party whenever they had to take a position on Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. They were torn between their inclination for supporting the Palestinians as a victimized "Third World" population on the one hand, and their desire to express solidarity with the state of Israel as a clear anti-fascist statement. The motives here were Germany's Nazi history, and assuming historic responsibility for the country's dark past.

Although the Greens were divided in their support of two competing camps—"Fundis" and "Realos"—during their early days in the Bundestag, Israel was not an issue that could typically be associated with one or the other stance. Rather, a relative consensus prevailed. The Green Party called for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories back to the 1967 borders. They supported initiatives for an international conference to reach a peace agreement, where secure borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state could be arranged. They opposed any act of terrorism. Despite the relatively clear standing of the party with regard to Israel, within less than a year, the Israeli issue had proved to constitute a source for friction and internal struggle among the Greens. One way to illustrate this development would be to consider the story behind some of the Party's delegations that set out to visit Israel between the years 1983 and 1992.

The first of these visits to Israel, headed by the Bundestag member Otto Schily, took place in the summer of 1984, at the invitation of Uri Avnery.[1] During

[1]Uri Avnery (born 1923) is a Germany born an Israeli publicist a left-wing activist.

their visit, Schily and the other delegates publicly endorsed the Progressive List for Peace,[2] a joint Arab-Jewish left-wing party, as part of their campaign for the 11th Knesset that took place that summer. That act of public endorsement of an Israeli political party by members of a foreign parliament was somewhat criticized in Israel. An editorial piece published in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Israel's most popular daily newspaper by circulation, called to expel the delegation from the country, referring to the endorsement of the Progressive List for Peace as "another and most crude step in the wave of foreign intervention in our own internal affairs". The writer further accused the Greens of anti-Semitism, concluding that this act of intervention in the Israeli election campaign was nothing but "typical German *chutzpah*".[3]

The next visit of the Green Party delegation to the Middle East and Israel was set for December 16 to December 30, 1984. The two Bundestag members selected to head the delegation were Jürgen Reents and Gaby Gottwald. The visit led to scandal before it even began. A working paper drafted by Uli Tilgner, a Green Party official, was discovered by journalists and reflected an extremely harsh stance towards the state of Israel. It stated among other things that, "*As long as the Israeli Government does not recognize the PLO, we should minimize contacts with official representatives of the state of Israel as far as possible*," and that Israel "*bears full responsibility for the impending blood bath in the Middle East if it does not decisively change its policies*".[4] In response to this publication, the Israeli Ambassador in Germany, H.E. Yitzhak Ben Ari, issued an official condemnation of the Green Party delegation.[5]

The uproar surrounding the much-anticipated visit of the Greens also reached the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. On December 24, 1984, a motion for the agenda was discussed on the visit of the Green delegation to Israel, which was expected to enter the country the following day. The centrist and right-wing parties vehemently criticized the statements of the delegation.

The leader of the extreme right-wing party Kach, rabbi Meir Kahane, claimed that the lesson that ought to be learned from the German Greens is that "*Israel's primary enemy in the world is the left*," and Yehoshua Matza of Likud accused

[2]In Hebrew—"HaReshima HaMitkademet LeShalom".

[3]"Dvar HaRosenblum", Yedioth Achronoth, 19.07.1984, Page 2.

[4]Ulrich Tilgner,"Nahost" (30.11.1984), AGG (Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis), B.II.1, 1987, p-3. Translation to English was taken from the New York Times article by James M. Markham on 18.12.1984—"Israel Bars a Member of German Green Party".

[5]Jerusalem Post, 13.12.1984.

the Greens of "*not making a sound when Arabs kill dozens of their brethren, but when the Jews can be blamed, they jump at the opportunity to ease their conscience*." Deputy foreign minister Roni Milo of Likud stated that the Greens' real intention was to conduct a "*systematic anti-Israeli campaign*" and added that "*there is another color that gives this tour its character—and this is the brown color, a color familiar to us all from the dark years of Nazi rule in Germany*". On the other hand, the leftward side of the political map in Israel showed acceptance of the Greens. Yossi Sarid (Ratz) noted that the Greens were a rising power among young people in Europe who would play a central role in politics in the future. He said he did not know of any other German political party that had dealt in such a "*decisive and clear way*" with Germany's Nazi past. Matti Peled from the Progressive List for Peace said that he rejected, "*the accusation of anti-Semitism being sounded automatically at any moment when international actors criticize Israeli policy*"[6].

Two days after this emotional debate in the Knesset, the Green delegation visited the Israeli Parliament (26.12.1984). While the members of the delegation viewed the plenary session, MKs Geula Cohen and Rafael (Raful) Eitan from the right-wing party "Tehiya-Tzomet" waved a banner with the words "*Grüne-Braune-Raus*!" in German.[7]

Most of the delegation's meetings in Israel took place with non-Zionist left-wing parties (Hadash, the Black Panthers, the Progressive List for Peace). Even when the delegation met with representatives of parties from the Zionist left, such as *Mapam* or the Labor Party, they had a clear preference that Arab members of these parties be present. Furthermore, the majority of the organizations the delegation met in Israel were on the left of the political map and mostly outside the Israeli consensus (for example, the Bir Zeit University Solidarity Committee and Yesh Gvul).[8]

The multitude of scandals caused by the delegation's visit and extensive media coverage in Israel and Germany led the Greens to hold a special meeting on February 5, 1985, on the subject of the Party's visit. Critical voices within the Green Party (which proved to overshadow the supportive voices) concentrated mainly

[6]From Hebrew: "Divrei HaKnesset", first seat of the 11th Knesset, booklet 14, meeting 35, pages 884–877.

[7]"Green-Brown Out". The brown color was related to Nazi Germany. The phrase was related to the infamous Nazi board game "Juden Raus!" ("Jews Out!").

[8]AGG—Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1990, "Vorläufige Dokumentation der Nahost-Reise der Fraktions- und Parteidelegation die Grünen" (1985, Pol 815–22).

on the absence of the historical German context, on ignoring the majority of the Zionist left, the Israeli peace camp, and on the inappropriate statements by representatives of the delegation towards official bodies of the State of Israel.

Jörn Böhme, who at the time worked at the Action Reconciliation Service for Peace (ASF), and who would later serve as the representative of the Böll-Foundation in Israel (2006–2011), prepared a detailed and critical report of the delegation's visit to Israel, and lamented the fact that the delegation had not met with more members of Knesset whose views represented the greater public in Israel.[9]

Joschka Fischer, who would later serve as Germany's foreign minister, noted during the meeting that there was no dispute over the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and when one refers to the Palestinians, one is necessarily referring to the PLO. In Fischer's view, the main problem with the delegation's visit to Israel was the absence of the German-Jewish context and the disregard of the sensitivities of German-Israeli relations. Since, according to Fischer, this aspect of relations between the countries was not properly considered, he concluded the delegation's visit had been a "*fiasco*".[10]

During the second part of the first term of the Green Party in the Bundestag, the faction supported most of the decisions of the German government on Israel. It was also emphasized that, in pro-Palestinian demonstrations, Israel's right to exist should be observed.

Following the federal elections in January 1987, the new Green faction placed less emphasis on its support for the Palestinian cause and its attitude towards Israel became more balanced. Jürgen Reents, who headed the controversial Green-Party delegation to Israel in 1984, stated in a position paper from February 1987 that, "*The fear of sounding too harsh in criticism of Israeli policy had led the Greens to stop pressing for the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, a cause that constituted a pivotal pillar of the Green party's foreign policy agenda*."[11]

During the party's convention in May 1987, it was decided to adopt a formal line calling for a commitment to Israel's security and right to exist within its 1967 borders alongside support for an independent Palestinian state.

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[9]AGG-Bestand B.2.1, Akte nr. 3260—"Kritik, Fragen und Anmerkungen zur Nahostreise der "Grünen" vom 16. bis 30.12.1984" (Jörn Böhme).

[10]Die Grünen im Bundestag-Sitzungsprotokolle 1983–1987, Bearbeitet von Josef Boyer und Helge Heidmeyer (Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 2008), pp. 712–721.

[11]Jürgen Reents, "Selbstbestimmungsrecht—nicht für das palästinensische Volk?", (18.02.1987), AGG, B.II.1, 1986.

A further official visit by the Israeli Greens took place in October 1987 at the invitation of the Israeli foreign ministry and President Herzog. The delegation was led by members of parliament Otto Schily and Waltraud Schoppe. In his biography of Otto Schily, Stefan Reinecke describes the visit as one that sought to undo the negative impression left by the Greens' visit to Israel in 1984; to overturn the Greens' foreign policy by incorporating Realpolitik elements; and to restore relatively good relations between the German left and Israel that had deteriorated since 1967 (Reinicke 2003, p. 279).

On October 23, 1987, Otto Schily held a press conference in Tel Aviv to summarize the delegation's visit. Schily's opening remarks acknowledged the warm reception and hospitality the delegation received by their Israeli hosts. He noted that the visit strengthened the positive impression of Israel and praised the construction and development the country had achieved. It was important for him to emphasize that the delegation had met with a wide spectrum of actors, "from Elyakim Haetzni to Matti Peled".[12]

When asked about the big difference between the green delegations of 1984 and 1987, Schily replied: "*Das müssen Sie so verstehen, dass die Partei gereift ist*."[13] Schily's statements in Israel drew much criticism from the Greens back in Germany, this time from the opposite political side to those of 1984. At a meeting of the Green Party on November 10, 1987, a large part of the debate was devoted to the "*Nahost-Debatte*".

Many of the speakers were critical of the delegation. Ideological criticism concerned the disregard of human rights violations committed by Israel, the absence of a clear statement concerning the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and the colonialist terminology that Schily used toward the Palestinians. Professional criticism spoke of poor preparations by the delegation, of creating an unbalanced timetable, of unprofessional statements, and of faulty internal party conduct.

It seems that the relatively moderate and non-critical nature of the Green delegation surprised their partners from the extreme left of the Israeli political map. Yeshaayahu Toma Ŝik, who headed the Israeli office of the International Movement for War Refuseniks at the time, wrote to the party's member Gina Maier-Dülmann on October 28, 1987: "*Then c a delegation of the pacifist Grünen comes*

[12]Elyakim Haetzni (born 1926), is a German-born Israeli lawyer and was one of the leaders of settlements movement. Schily met with Haetzni at his home, in the Kiryat Arba settlement. Mattityahu "Matti" Peled (1923–1995) was the leader of the radical left-wing party, "The Progressive List for Peace".

[13]Otto Schily, press conference transcript, Tel Aviv (23.10.1987) in AGG, A—Kelly, Petra, 1416.

and gives a final slap to the Left, reinforcing the misinformation system of the Israeli establishment..! How could you?!" Gideon Spiro, who was in contact with the Greens from their inception, wrote on October 29, 1987, on behalf of the "Committee for an Open Trial for Mordechai Vanunu," to Dülmann. He said that he had unfortunately had no contact with the Green delegation that had visited Israel a few days earlier. In addition, in a letter sent to the Greens on November 1, 1987 by the Council for Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue, it was stated that the delegation had not contacted the organization during their visit to Israel ("*da Eure Delegation leider keinen Kontakt aufnahm*").[14]

3 Conclusion

The Jordanian Kingdom's announcement in 1988 that it was relinquishing its claim to the West Bank and supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state in this area, was pioneering. This, alongside the growing support of the Israeli left for direct negotiations with the PLO, reduced tensions among the Greens over Israel.

Around this time, the ideas of the Zionist left gradually gained ground within the Green party. Ludger Volmer notes that one of the reasons for the Zionist-left agenda's growing influence was that the political criticism of Israel had become entangled in the Historikerstreit (the historians' quarrel), which was taking place during that time in West Germany. The Greens were looking to shake off the impression that their criticism towards Israel resembled the historical revisionism of the German right. In Volmer's opinion, a further reason for the weakening of the Greens' criticism of Israel was the fact that empirical research conducted at the time by the Center for Research on Anti-Semitism in Berlin showed that Green voters tended to hold more favourable views of the State of Israel than voters of other parties (Volmer 1998, pp. 324–325).

Alexandra Senft, who was heading the Middle East desk for the Green party at the end of the 1980s, reached the conclusion that the Greens' policy towards the Middle East was not productive and that a more conventional approach was needed. Senft's conclusion was that instead of engaging in "big politics" (Große Politik), the Greens should rather focus on human rights projects and humanitarian aid.

[14]AGG, A—Kelly, Petra, Bestand 1416.

At a political level, Senft composed a report in October 1989, stating that one of the goals for the next year of activity should focus on fostering close cooperation with the RATZ party in various political areas.[15] Consequently, an official delegation of the Greens visited Israel between June 26 and July 1, 1990, at the invitation of RATZ Party. The party's Middle East coordinator at the time, Jörn Böhme, wrote the following: "*Mit der RATZ haben wir einen Partner im offiziellen Parteienspektrum, der für den Ausgleich mit der PLO steht und der der Friedensbewegung nahe steht.*"[16]

A comparison of this visit with the official visit of the party in 1984 provides a perspective on the change that the Greens had undergone during that period. While the visit in 1984 was at the invitation of The Progressive List for Peace, which was part of the non-Zionist left, the 1990 visit was held at the invitation of the Ratz Party of the Zionist left. Most of the meetings took place with prominent institutions and personalities from Israeli politics.

The failure of the Greens in the 1990 federal elections led to major reforms and changes. The Greens abandoned the unique "anti-party" model, which was accompanied by an almost complete departure of the party members who associated themselves as "Fundis" throughout the 1980s and the beginning of the 1980s.

The resignation of the party's spokesman, Hans Christian Ströbele, following a controversial, critical statement towards Israel during the Gulf War in 1991, alongside Joschka Fischer's increasing role in representing the party's foreign policy, marked a process that had led the Greens to adopt a more moderate approach towards Israel in the early and mid-1990s. It was also during this period that the HBS launched its first partnerships with Israeli civil-society organizations, which ultimately led to the opening of the Foundation's office in Tel Aviv in 1998. In future research, it may be worthwhile looking at the way in which the development of the Greens' stance on Israel was reflected in the work of the Israeli office of the HBS, which will celebrate its 20th anniversary in 2018.

[15]AGG—Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1990, Akte 1658, "Rechenschaftsbericht Naher und Mittlerer Osten sowie Nordafrika (ausgenommen Kurden, Türkei, Afganistan)".

[16]AGG—Die Grünen im Bundestag 1983–1990, Akte 6030, "Vorbereitung einer Israel-Delegation 23.4.1990".

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Part III

The German Political Foundations from an Anthropological, Political Science and Law Perspective

Foreign NGOs in Israel: An Anthropological Perspective

Dani Kranz

1 Introduction

Hotly debated in Israel, considerations regarding the NGO[1] transparency law extended beyond national borders. Central to the debate is the principle that NGOs that receive a specific share of their funding from foreign sources should be subjected to what some see as undue scrutiny, and others as a matter of transparency. I do not specifically use the term German NGO as German, or German-funded NGOs are subject to the same legalese as any other foreign or foreign-funded NGO.[2] The key lies in the 'Israeli' vs. 'foreign' dynamic. Paradoxically, the opposing sides of the debate in Israel both argue that NGOs contribute to Israeli civil society, even though these sides differ in their conceptualizations of civil society. They disagree on where support for their core causes should be sought, what funding is acceptable, what counts as the "right" and "wrong" causes, and how far foreign actors should be players in Israeli domestic affairs. In essence, Israelis across all ethno-religious, political and social groups are struggling to define what constitutes Israeli civil society and its boundaries,

[1]In order to make this text more readable I will use NGO for NGOs and foundations.

[2]It needs to be noted that the right-wing AfD is still in the set up process (personal email, October 3, 2017).

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and minority viewpoints collide with hegemonic opinions. This leads to the scenario that those who represent a minority viewpoint seek support abroad as their support in Israel itself is too weak (Kranz and Zubida forthcoming publication). Problematically, and by way of the historiography not just of Israel but also that of the Palestinian territories and the wider Middle East, the two largest groups in Israel and the Palestinian territories are often central to NGOs. These are (Israeli) Jews, and Arabic speaking non-Jews (Palestinians who are Israeli citizens, those who are permanent residents of Israel, and those who live outside of the Green Line). Both span global diasporas of people who want 'their' say in 'their country'. This is to say that the debate that concerns Israelis and Palestinians has become global, that narratives seek support on a transnational level, and that a whole array of players, foundations, charities, NGOs, diasporas along with those with no kin, but a personal relationship to the locality 'contribute'.

Consequently, this paper draws on participant observations of all three major groups: Israelis, Palestinians, and "internationals".[3] These groups should not be seen as holistic categories. Conflicts between individuals who fall within either category are rife, and the struggle between different factions of Israelis concerning the NGO *Breaking the Silence*, or *B'Tselem*, can serve as an example. I will focus specifically on the Israeli perspective. The reason for doing so lies in the attempt to present the conflicted and multifaceted Israeli perspective; to offer some comparative aspects, and thus examine why and how Israel is still seen as unique; and use my own ethnographic self as a smoke screen. Through this I aim both to gain access to these different positions, and the potential sense of belonging and alleged allegiances that were addressed during fieldwork. In a nutshell, it is not my intent to condone legalese, or my research participants, but rather to identify areas and bases of conflicts, outline where these are unique, and distinguish them from where they seem unique but are not.

2 Domestic Affairs

Like any other country, Israel has a vested interest in regulating its domestic affairs. However, this specific issue is complicated by several factors:

[3]The definition of international in this paper is a non-Israeli, or non-Palestinian national or citizen, but a foreigner in the strictest legal sense.

- Israel, as well as the Palestinian Territories, is tied to foreign funding. Many Israelis and Palestinians choose to ignore the point that underpins the *de jure* sovereignty of Israel, but de facto constitutes economic dependence.
- Both the Jewish/Israeli and Palestinian diasporas are active players in domestic politics, leading to the de-territorialization of domestic affairs (Yiftachel 2006).
- The Jewish diaspora, as well as Israel-friendly individuals, are approached to support NGOs of all sorts, leading to the mismatch of the domestic Judaization process of the country (Ghanen 2011; Kranz 2016a; Olesker 2014) with the issue that 'foreign' NGOs, or NGOs that support issues that are mainly supported by foreigners but not by local Israelis, might support. The same issue applies to Palestinian-friendly charities and individuals, which might support different causes from those championed by local Palestinian players.
- At the same time, domestic and foreign/foreign-funded NGOs might compromise—from a hegemonic Israeli perspective—the wellbeing of Israel as they might support minority opinions. These NGOs span the whole spectrum from Israel-based but mainly foreign-funded NGOs to organizations that support BDS. For similar reasons, these are perceived as highly problematic by the Israeli public and political mainstream, not to mention more extreme factions of society and politics.[4]
- Israel defines itself as a Jewish state. Consequently, the argument goes, the focus of any kind of foreign funding should be on Jewish issues and contributing to Jewish wellbeing. However, major donors for established Jewish NGOs include non-Jews in Germany, in particular Germans who support Jewish Israel on the basis of Christian-influenced Zionist values.
- Israel has occupied the Palestinian territory of the West Bank for 50 years. While Gaza is not occupied, the actual status of Gaza and its governance by Hamas remains a contentious issue, given that Israel controls its borders. Hence, any support for what may be construed as "Palestinian issues" is viewed with suspicion.

This scenario leads to two main problems, which I will address in the next section: national laws and rights vs. general human rights that are unevenly distributed between human groups; and the core issue of Israel as a democratic and Jewish state as its declaration of independence outlines vs. a democracy for Jews, or more bluntly an ethnocracy (Yiftachel 2006).

[4]Breaking the Silences does not support BDS, but has been slandered with this allegation. The allegation puts it right in the 'annihilation discourse' outlined by Ian S. Lustick (2016).

3 Israel from the Outside

Israel is the only Jewish state, but at the same time it defines itself as a democratic state. For the sake of polemic, one can add that there is also only one Armenia and one Switzerland, both also ethno-nationalistically based sovereign states. In terms of Israel, the notion of being Jewish and democratic has caused legal and social problems since the foundation of the state in 1948. Israel caters to Jews first. According to a Pew survey published in March 2016, the majority of all Jewish Israelis agree with this approach (Pew Research Center 2016). This notion in turn challenges the idea of the equal citizenship of all Israelis (Kranz and Zubida forthcoming publication; Masri 2013). As a word of caution, citizenship is always stratified, and citizens tend only to be equal on the most abstract legal level. Even so, it is the social sphere, with its various unwritten laws and customs, which creates inequalities in everyday life (Smith 2015 for a theoretical overview; Kranz and Zubida, forthcoming publication, for a comparative case study of Germany and Israel). In Israel, the issue of the social inequality of citizenry is pronounced by Jewish history, which feeds a specific mainstream historiography and various identity investments in the notion of Israel as the only Jewish country and as a country that emerged after the genocide against Jews to guarantee Jews a safe haven. This basis leads to a specific hegemonic filter displayed in Israeli Jewish society that affects the interpretation of laws and directives. For example, the extremely powerful Ministry of the Interior is partially run through directives that are interpreted in an ad hoc fashion by caseworkers who are part of the social and societal texture of Israel (Kranz forthcoming publication). The legal sphere, as Ronnie Olesker (2014) and I (Kranz 2016) have shown through the analysis of verdicts, directives, injunctions and laws over time, is Judaizing, which means that the legal and social spheres (Ghanem 2011) are flip sides of the same coin. These spheres constitute, I would argue, a convergence of hegemonically held values that have a specific Israeli-Jewish inflection, and magnify contentious areas of Israeliness.

This affects the perception of Israel abroad. The total majority of all individuals abroad are not Jews (however, Jews are not a monolithic group, and they do disagree on who is a Jew, or what constitutes Jewishness). Their relationship to intricacies of Jewish identities, or the vast differences between different Jews and their considerably different identity needs differ from the relationship and needs of the heterogeneous Jewish in-group. These differences between in- and out-groups are reflected in the heated debate about NGOs. Israel is generally seen from abroad as turning ‘rightwards’, and becoming ever more Jewish, and at the

same time less democratic.[5] The country appears to be moving away from the West.[6] Growing factions in Israeli society might agree with these developments if the elections are anything to go by. Others do not, and quotes ranging from, "This place is turning into *Medinat HaHalacha* (state of the Jewish law)" to, "If I get to choose between a non-religious fascist or the rabbis I'll take the secular version", "Civil society? We've been losing it" and, "It is shit, but it is our shit" stand as evidence of the divide. In other words, Israelis—to be precise Israeli Jews—did not mince their words around me. They were all aware that I was an anthropologist, on fieldwork, and that anthropologists are data opportunists. For our profession, everything is data and interesting (Anderson 2013). They also knew that I was an Israeli Jew. At the same time, these local critics were often cautious around foreigners and when abroad. On the one hand, they understood that once reported abroad, their criticism would not be part of an internal Israeli discourse any longer. One wondered, "And then I feed into all the anti-Israeli resentment abroad? There are enough people who hate us already."[7] The person in question reflects precisely the issue that many Israelis grapple with: while being brash domestically, they are very careful about the context. "The issue is that it doesn't really matter what we do. We are perceived negatively anyways" was a rather fatalistic notion I came across repeatedly.[8]

This context relates to how Israel is being perceived abroad. Steffen Hagemann and Robby Nathanson (2015) report that Israelis perceive Germany and Germans much more favourably than vice versa. The rightward-swing and Judaization of Israel, exemplified by the electoral popularity of politicians from Likud and parties further right or religious of Likud such as Beitanu, HaBeit HaYehudi, United Thora Judaism, or Shas, feed into the perception of a radicalising country. It is not

[5]While it is beyond the scope of this paper, 'right' and 'Jewish' are concepts that would need to be unravelled carefully, as one can also be 'left' and 'Jewish.' Neither the extreme right, nor left, are known for their investments in plurality of opinion of democracy.

[6]The West is as much of a concept as the East, and these concepts would need as much unravelling as 'right', 'left' etc.

[7]This phenomenon can be observed concerning the debate between Israeli emigrants in Berlin, and Israelis who remained in Israel (Kranz 2016b).

[8]From my own experiences as an Israeli citizen abroad this notion holds regularly. To a fair amount of individuals it doesn't matter what I say or do, I am judged by my categorical belonging. The same, ironically, holds for me being a German citizen. This to say while resentments towards Israelis are voiced candidly, any other categorical citizenship can be judged with as many prejudices; 'Israeli' and 'German' are by their mere history particularly charged.

only an occupier, but one which by various means challenges the rights of minorities and strengthens those of the majority. In terms of its actual definition as a Jewish state this is hardly surprising, as Jews are the privileged group of citizens. Yet this definition goes against the grain of the self-perception of some democratically biased Europeans, and Germans (I will restrict myself here to Europeans, and mainly to Germans)[9], while others are supportive of Israel no matter what. Israel—to be precise the issue of Israel/Palestine—is a smoke screen for German identity issues (Kranz forthcoming b). My point is not to condone German ethnonationalism, or to apologize for Israeli actions, policies, justify the occupation, or support the use of the Shoah for political reasons and fear-mongering. Rather, it is to open a comparative perspective. Europeans, including Germans, have been voting in increasing numbers for the political right, and religion—the religion of the "Muslim other"—has become a focal point of the process, underpinned the creation of neat categories of "authentic" Europeans and "aliens" (Kranz and Zubida forthcoming publication). Fear of all sorts—whether it has a material quality to it in the shape of refugees or rockets, or an immaterial quality such as trauma or transmitted trauma—often leads to a focus on your own in-group, a re-centring of the rights of the in-group, and increased marginalization, exclusion, or racism.[10] Depressing as this is, the mechanisms of fear generally lead to similar outcomes amongst the social groups of human beings.

[9]This is not to say that Europeans do not engage in similar strategies of keeping 'their' countries German, British, French, or Austrian, to name just a few examples. At the height of the so-called refugee crisis in the summer of 2015, chancellor Angela Merkel who had opened the German borders to refugees and announced "Wir schaffen das!" (We will succeed) in the Bundespressekonferenz (federal press conference) August 31, 2015. Under mounting political pressure, and in the light of an unprecedented rightward swing of the German electorate, she exclaimed September 7, 2016 "Deutschland wird Deutschland bleiben" (Germany will stay Germany). Nearly 13% of the German electorate felt she did not live up to his promise and voted for the AfD, which built its election campaign around migration and anti-Muslim/anti-Islam rhetoric. Aside from Merkel's lines, in practical terms dual citizenship has become a very contentious issue, again underlining the desire for categorical clarity, and presumably allegiance. Historically this clarity went against Jews, at present it goes against Jews when citizenship restitution is rejected, but in most cases against Muslim immigrants and their descendants.

[10]The representative survey *Generation Mitte* (Generation Middle) depicts that the emotional state of Germans is not congruent with the actual state of the country (Allensbach 2016).

4 Being Torn

Foreign NGOs, or NGOs that receive a specific amount of foreign funding and that are central to the NGO law discussion, tap precisely into this contentious debate in Israel. From their own perspective, the NGOs support baseline democratic values and the equality of all citizens, they further the rights of non-Jewish immigrants in a country that does not see itself as a country for non-Jewish immigrants (Nathans 2012), and they stand against the occupation and maintain *ha'matzav* (the situation) in the Israeli consciousness. Ian S. Lustick has consistently outlined how the trauma of the Shoah, and Nazis as symbolic representations of it, have been transported into the current discourse of the anxieties of annihilation in Israel; how 'Arabs' (of any kind) are moved into discursive and cognitive proximity to Nazis in terms of evoking the basic fear of annihilation; and how anything that threatens Israeli (Jewish) wellbeing fits into the same pattern (Lustick 2016). I would call this an 'Israeli state of mind'. By their very presence in the Israeli social sphere, NGOs have challenged the hegemonic discourse of the Israeli state of mind, and prised open the Pandora's box of Israeli-Jewish fears. The Israelis who support them are out of sync with the majority discourse, they question or reject the hegemonic discourse. Foreigners or internationals who work there were neither acculturated nor socialised into an Israeli Jewish identity narrative, resulting in perceptions of minority issues and injustices that do not go through an Israeli-Jewish hegemonic filter,[11] nor do they engage with societal mechanisms through this filter or connect to it emotionally by way of acculturation, socialisation, and nativity. This does not mean that the internationals are incapable of learning, understanding or acquiring this 'filter', if this was the case than any anthropological work would be a vein effort. They do, however, perceive issues similarly to anthropologists on the ground by recording and broaching inconvenient topics as they have not been socialised/acculturated into local taboos either. The issues foreign NGO workers perceive do not necessarily form part of their emotive, 'socio-cultural DNA', and the values they bring with them are viewed with increasing suspicion in Israel. This input, welcome by some Israelis, but resented by many, is a reminder of foreign meddling in Israeli internal affairs,

[11]I cannot over-emphasize the point that not all Israeli Jews or Jews abroad peer uncritically through this filter, that they are unaware of it, or subject to any kind of hegemonic discourses uncritically (Kranz forthcoming a). At the same time those foreigners who work in NGOs are specific as other foreigners might well feel in sync with the Israeli Jewish mainstream.

and of Jewish diasporic history. It is not Israeli but *galuti*, diasporic, colonial, and not seen as Jewish (even though the NGO might be run or co-run by Israeli Jews). Above all, it serves as a reminder of how Israel cannot sustain itself, and therefore relates immediately to the basic fear of annihilation. The issue of the NGOs and foundations is not only legal but also psycho-historical.

The NGO transparency law bears witness to this trend. Similar legal structures exist in other countries, most notably Egypt and Russia, two countries with rather problematic "democratic" structures and which Israel usually does not like to be compared to. However, Germany, in essence also a democracy, does not welcome the meddling of other countries or foreign donors in its affairs if the donors oppose German custom (whatever this may be), or German law. The King Fahd Academy might serve as an example, as might on-going discussions about Salafists, DITIB, or burkinis. I am aware that I am not comparing like with like. However, this comparison serves the purpose of highlighting the idea of challenging hegemonic values, and of foreign ideas and values that might not be welcomed by the majority of one or the other country. What is welcome is impacted upon by historically biased inter-group relationships. It also serves my side point that we bear witness to global liberalization and renationalization.[12] A new definition of what is "authentic" and what is "foreign" is evolving. It spans the cultural, religious and bio-genetic spheres, as well as interstate relationships and supranational relationships. Recently, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union (EU). A small majority felt that the EU meddled too much in the UK's domestic affairs. In this sense, Israel—which is often depicted as an odd one out, as the ONLY Jewish state—is not unique in its developments at all.

5 "Please Don't Tell Anybody You Are an Israeli!" Limits, Boundaries, Challenges

Unlike the Israelis who didn't mince their words around me, some foreign NGOs and foundation workers were more circumspect, others less so. Some worried that their good relationship with Palestinians would be compromised if it were disclosed that I held Israeli citizenship. Others were concerned for my wellbeing,

[12]The success of populist movements across Europe underlines this trend. Many of those dwell explicitly in Christianity as a marker of distinction between authentic Europeans and alien others (Kranz and Zubida forthcoming), singling out both Jews and Muslims (Yurdakul 2016).

an issue some of "my" Israelis agree with, even if I do not. They'd never been to Ramallah, and reacted with a mix of excitement and incredulity to fieldwork reports. Some wanted to visit 'the other' in Ramallah, which is actually not that different from Israel at all. That I have personal relationships with Palestinians in my daily life seemed odd to those who lacked contact with Palestinians. They had imagined a kind of binary "What do you mean they (Palestinians) drink (alcohol)? But they are Muslims." Palestinians who had not met me previously reacted differently to my citizenship, but the fear of various Israelis and internationals has so far remained unfounded. The presumed binary perspective is often the result of ignorance, although this is not to say that extremism does not exist.[13] "Use your German passport please. And tell everybody you're a German tourist" is the advice given by one of my Palestinian contacts, who fears for my—and his—safety. His unease skyrockets whenever the issue of checkpoints is brought up. He describes being "black" next to me, and us becoming binaries given that his ID card is green, and mine is blue.[14]

Needless to say, those of my colleagues and friends who speak Arabic, engage in similar lines of work, or who are Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, were less fearful. The same can be said for NGO and foundation workers familiar with both sides. Due to the tense situation between Israelis and Palestinians, NGO work is far from easy in these two entwined yet separate entities. For example, we were obliged to advertise scholarships three times: once in Hebrew in Tel Aviv, once in Arabic and Hebrew in Jerusalem, and once in Arabic in Ramallah. The same educational and cultural institution felt unable to advertise differently, or to tag the different offices in a single Facebook post. "We can't do that. The situation is too tense we cannot even really cooperate between our offices." That the situation can indeed be tense can also be inferred in the snippet of a conversation with an NGO worker about the world Maccabi sports games in Berlin in the summer of 2015:

International: "Do you Jews always have to rub it in, that you are so special, that only Jews can take part?"

Dani: "I don't see it as special, and it doesn't bother me as any social group will set boundaries. If the Palestinians run their own games, surely they'd want Palestinians only, like the Germans only have German citizens in their national team."

International: "But you have to rub it in. Maybe I am tainted by what I see."

[13]There are several places where my Palestinian friends and colleagues refuse to take me with them for safety reasons.

[14]ID cards in Israel and the Palestinians territories have distinct colours. Those of Israeli citizens and permanent residents are blue, residents of the West Bank have green ID cards.

This brings me to my final point: this NGO worker indicated her position, and put it into binary opposition to my categorical belonging and presumably my allegiances too. She deals with Palestinians exclusively, and assumed "their" perspective, a perspective that is problematic and certainly doesn't reflect Palestinians as such (not that I represent Israeli Jews, or German non-Christians, for that matter). The issue is that her opinion raises suspicions within the Israeli mainstream and more so the Israeli right, which is growing in strength. This is the notion that "the world is against us", a tendency that is reflected in empirical data as Israel gradually becomes less popular (Hagemann and Nathanson 2015).[15] From the perspective of the Israeli political right, the NGO worker supports the 'wrong' side, sympathizes with the 'wrong' side, and in any case comes from abroad. This wrong side—however disagreeable to many who find it problematic—challenges the hegemonic Israeli mainstream and the right in general. It must also be remembered that any foreign influence on Israel is an unwelcome reminder of Jewish and Israeli history, and of the geopolitics of dependence in the country, as this quote indicates: "The current politicians don't come from ghettos." These words indicate the desire to develop a Jewish state, free from the shackles of the suppression of the past, and—problematically—in-line with the general, hegemonic trend towards nationalization, liberalization, and apparent authenticity. This sentiment is echoed in the quote from other fieldwork conversations. As a last comparative measure, this ties in with seemingly trite discussions about the 'alien' burkinis in the summer of 2016 in Europe; the discussion concerning Jewish and Muslim circumcision in Germany in the summer of 2012; and the rise of the AfD particularly in areas with very few foreign residents, and its success in the national election in 2017. One tries to block off the entrance of aliens with their different customs and values, at the same time this scenario leads to another pertinent question, which cannot be answered yet. The AfD initiated a foundation too, which now, with the party being in the parliament will also benefit from funding. While some of its politicians voice anti-Semitic opinions, other AfD politicians are favourable to their version of Israel—which includes membership in the pro-settlement lobbying group 'Friends of Samaria and Judaea in the European Parliament.' How will an outright right foundation fare in a country that is also increasingly leaning to the right?

[15]This notion directly relates to the unsettling issue of anti-Semitism existing regardless of what Jews or the State of Israel do. While both can and should be critically examined, it needs to be noted that anti-Semitism, like any other form of racism or hatred specific to social categories of human beings, exists regardless of deeds or facts about the object of resentment or hatred.

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About the Author

Dr. Dani Kranz is a senior researcher and director of the Israelproject at the Bergische Universität Wuppertal. Her research focus falls within the areas of migration, ethnic processes, community formation, cultural and intergenerational transmissions. For several years she has explored notions of home and belonging, and overarchingly the nexus to regional specific effects of ethnic dynamics, globalisation, and mobility. These research interests have led her to the area of legal sociology and anthropology, with a concomitant engagement with social justice, the stratification of rights, and with new forms of mobilities which reflect in citizenship, labour and migration policy. She explores these issues in Europe and the Middle East, specialising in Germany and Israel/Palestine.

Looking Ahead: German Political Foundations in a Globalized World

Katharina Konarek

1 Introduction

Before one can look ahead, the emergence of German political foundations must be considered. The six German political foundations—the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS), the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation (HSS), the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation (FNS), the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (HBS) and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation (RLS)—are treated legally as non-governmental organizations (NGO). However, this neglects the fact that they are almost entirely financed by the German taxpayer. Thus, these foundations are unique institutions on an international scale. Each foundation is related to a political party present in the German Bundestag. According to this relationship, the foundations receive their funding for their international work from both the German ministry of foreign affairs and the German ministry for economic cooperation and development.[1]

With the exception of the FES, all the other German political foundations arose after the Second World War.[2] In order to overcome the Nazi era, these

[1]For detailed information please read the opening chapter of this publication.

[2]The FES was founded in 1925 as an inheritance of Friedrich Ebert, the first president of Germany in the Weimarer Republic, who wanted a foundation in order to foster the education of people from the working class.

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foundations promoted democratic education and supported the transformation of the German public to a democratic, tolerant and multicultural society. As Germany was not allowed to conduct its own foreign policy, the foundations also provided international political contacts and networks for German politicians, trade unions and parties on an international level. The FES for example established contacts between the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and other social democratic parties in Europe as part of Socialist International.[3] Due to this national and international work, the foundations became an essential part of German political culture (Muehlen 2007).

This article describes first the main characteristics of the foundations' international work (1); presents a theoretical approach for foreign policy analysis (FPA) in order to describe the international role of the foundations (2); discusses their potential future role as agents and providers of legitimacy through knowledge in a globalized world (3, 4); presents a short case study on international work with examples from Israel and the Palestinian Territories (5); and then offers a conclusion (6).

2 The Character of the Foundations' International Work

According to their mandate, the main goal of the international work of German political foundations is "to foster democratic political structures and to prevent conflicts" (BMZ Report 1973). Fostering democracy in this context means:

> Promoting a democratic change in a state and in a society where the political system is not yet a representative democracy (…). This change is an inner process based on the society itself, but external actors can influence it as well, through foreign policy (BMZ Report 1973).

Foundations have been sending German employees to other countries since the 70s, establishing local branches and offices, running a wide range of projects together with local partners, and hosting German politicians. In this sense, the foundations are the first international institutions to work in the field of political

[3]The Socialist International (SI) is a worldwide association of social democratic political parties formed in 1951. Initially dominated by parties from Western Europe, it has grown to include 153 member parties from over 100 countries (Lamb and Docherty 2015).

party development, but their party assistance has been neglected in political-party research for a long time (Weissenbach 2010).

Due to their legal construction, they are well connected to policy decision makers—both in Germany and abroad. They share the same political values and aims and are closely connected to German policy decision makers. Therefore, they have significant influence on and access to key political actors e.g., members of the German Bundestag or high-ranking members of German political parties. Through informing and advising they also strengthen relationships with their local partners in other countries, and gain influence on the political landscape there. And they are well connected. It is not unusual for employees of the foundation to hold a party membership or run for office within the party (Hillebrand and Optenhoegel 2001).

The character of the international work of the foundations differs slightly depending on the target country. The engagement of the foundations in industrialized countries is generally conducive to the development of international relations and political contacts. In contrast, the focus in developing countries is more on promoting and consolidating social and democratic structures.

Even though the character of this international work differs, three phases of cooperation can be named (Von Klaedan 2009): (a) *Building networks and engaging in dialogue.* After 1945 it was one of the main tasks of international work to build new networks and friendships with politically like-minded people outside of Germany. The aim was to rebuild trust, to open new channels for political communication, and to integrate them into the Western world. This phase lasted until the 80s. (b) *Bridging and mediating conflicts.* The German reunification marked the beginning of a new phase in German foreign policy. The Federal Republic of Germany was able to define its own, independent foreign policy priorities without the constraints of the Cold War. Germany was pushing towards further European integration. The foundations were consulted as mediators to bridge internal social conflicts in the project countries, and focused on Eastern Europe. (c) *Providing ideas for global problems.* Since 2000, work has focused on concrete projects with local partners. Together they organize seminars, workshops, conferences and visiting programmes for German politicians or foreign politicians to Germany. They aim to raise awareness, initiate political debates on social and cultural issues, and enhance dialogue on global topics like the welfare state or a common European foreign policy between different stakeholders on the national and international level (Von Klaedan 2009).

Today one of their main tasks is to promote channels for foreign policy. The foundations often work in the background behind the political stage. Especially in regions of conflict with high political tension, this “soft-power” approach is a huge advantage. The second main characteristic of the foundations’ international

work is providing knowledge. They offer the information required in a complex world. But in contrast to academic-driven think tanks that develop ideas in ivory towers, the foundations collect data together with their local partners and provide realistic solutions, brief analyses and surveys that serve German politicians as well as the German public. Through their project work they are actually involved in the political process and therefore equipped with channels and contacts that are relevant to German politicians.

3 Methodology: The 'World Polity' Approach in the Field of International Relations (IR)

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) is a central topic of the discipline of international relations (IR). It examines how foreign policy decisions are made (Hellmann 2007). According to Niklas Luhmann, 'foreign policy' can be defined as all the actions of state actors with the aim of establishing collective mandatory decisions in international relations (Luhmann 1975).

In recent years, FPA has undergone important changes that have linked to the question of key analytical categories. What does external policy mean in terms of more and more blurred internal and external borders in a globalized world? How do FPA concepts adapt to the new globalized word in contexts of increasingly linked and dependent policy areas? Who is shaping them in the light of proliferation of actors in the world of politics?

According to this new 'post-national constellation' (Habermas 1998), the basic constants of FPA have to be adjusted. It is no longer just nation states, but also non-governmental actors, and actors from within civil society, on which the analysis must focus. And not just because they influence foreign policy, but also because they shape and generate new foreign-policy knowledge. German political foundations present a way to examine these new social actors in foreign policy.

Due to the distinctiveness of German foreign policy, the foundations illustrate a prototype of such non-governmental actors. For comprehensive understanding of German foreign policy, the importance of the foundations is crucial. Political foundations enable the political apparatus—both the governing parties as well as the opposition—to have an analysis focused on global issues and political developments in other countries, which cannot be achieved through classical diplomacy alone.

In contrast to the German embassies, German political foundations are not bound to strict diplomatic and political guidelines from Berlin. They are able to

maintain their own independent contacts and channels. They provide new, grassroots-oriented sources and enable unique networks. Financially well equipped, they also conduct their own projects. This is why they are usually very well connected in their respective countries.

This new access to foreign-policy knowledge is becoming more important in a globalized world. Modern states rely on these 'others', these advisory actors who provide them with models of legitimate action. The nation state and advisory actors determine each other. By consulting and being consulted, both gain legitimacy—the states by claiming additional knowledge and counselling, and the advisors by providing information and being consulted. The core of this mutual gain of legitimacy is the factor 'knowledge'. With the current tools and categories in political analysis, this process of gaining legitimacy cannot be described adequately.

The world-polity approach as defined by the sociologist John W. Meyer offers a new way to fill this gap. This concept, which derives from sociology, connects legitimacy with knowledge by incorporating factors that have been neglected before (Meyer et al. 1979, Meyer and Jepperson 2000). This helps to explain the emergence of new actors and their legitimacy in foreign policy.

4 Legitimation in the Modern World: Actors Need Agents

The world-polity approach is based on the bureaucracy model of Max Weber. It assumes rationalized processes embedded in a basic value and analysis system:

> The development of formal rational structures is driven not by the pursuit of efficiency but rather by the pursuit for legitimacy from the environment in which organizations are embedded (Meyer 1987, p. 8).

It is therefore important for the legitimacy of modern actors to convey to the outside that they are acting rationally. Only this external ascription provides an actor with legitimacy (Meyer 2000, p. 238 ff.). The world-polity approach examines how legitimacy requirements evolve and why Western paradigms such as 'the nation state', 'individuality', 'welfare' and 'human rights' are currently the dominant norms around the globe. Meyer uses his concept of 'world culture' and 'world society' in order to describe these phenomena: "Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local actions" (Meyer et al. 1979, p. 145). A central part of our world society is the so-called 'rationalized other' (Meyer et al. 1979, p. 162):

> Scientists and professionals have become central (…) participants in the world society. Their authority derives not from strength as actors (…) but from their authority to assimilate and develop the rational (Meyer et al. 1979, p. 165).

Science and expertise are therefore the appropriate and recognized means of solving problems. With regard to states and their external foreign policy, Meyer applies this concept as follows:

> World Society models shape nation-state identities and behaviour via worldwide cultural and associational processes. Carried by rationalized others whose scientific and professional authorities often exceed their power and resources, world culture celebrates, expands and standardizes strong but culturally somewhat tamed national actors (Meyer et al. 1979, p. 173).

The modern state needs agents—'rationalized others'—who provide models for legitimate action. Despite this central role of providing legitimacy, the concept of political agents has been neglected in FPA. The 'world polity' approach offers a new analytical category in order to describe foreign policy processes more precisely.

5 The Potential of German Political Foundation as Agents

Who are these knowledge-providing agents and to what extent can the German political foundations be described as such? German political foundations provide political knowledge in the field of German foreign policy. Therefore they play an important role in the process of decision-making and influencing decision-makers. As they are not directly involved in governmental work, their work is less influenced by short-term political interests. It is more globally shared norms such as democracy or human rights that shape the activities of the foundations. This commitment to 'world culture' increases their own level of legitimacy. Actors consulting the foundations or arguing on the basis of their analyses will receive high legitimation in the modern world. Therefore political foundations can be described as agents—at least to a certain extent (Harnisch 2003).

In order to analyse the real extent of their impact on the policy process, one must discuss the following three factors: (a) whether their influence is direct or

indirect; (b) the source of influence; (c) areas where they exhibit impact (Stone and Ullrich 2003).[4]

According to German political foundations, the influence that might be said to exist must be indirect (a). In the context of the work of the foundations one cannot say that x caused y. There could be multiple reasons. E.g., what promoted a change in civil society? All one can do to determine influence is to check previous papers and analyses written by the foundations and examine whether any of the proposed ideas made their way into the political process. An example is one of the three main goals of the work of the FES abroad, which is to promote

> a free society based on the values of solidarity, which offers all its citizens the same opportunities to participate on political, economic, social and cultural levels, regardless of their origin, sex or religion (FES Flyer 2016).

Obviously, the project work of the FES is not the only factor establishing such a free society, but a contributor to it.

The influence on the political process derives mainly from three interrelated sources: expertise, promotion of an independent and balanced view, and legitimacy through recognizing authority (b) (Stone and Ullrich 2003). Foundations gain influence through their work with local partners such as e.g., local researchers and independent think tanks, by writing balanced, expert analyses, and by being consulted by German politicians and also by German and European media.

The foundations also have an impact on civil society and political dialog (c). They serve as a forum and catalyst for debate through proposing policy ideas and concepts. They generate ideas primarily in the agenda-setting stage and are therefore able to present proposals for long-term strategic and sustainable planning.

Therefore, German political foundations can serve as state external agents providing legitimacy. They can contribute to the development of new discourses. When integrated in different policy networks, they can become effective ideological apparatus and feed their contributions into the public debate. These networks can be relatively stable over time and more or less exclusive in terms of memberships. They facilitate decision-making and policy implementation by channelling

[4]The three factors were developed by Diane Stone and Heidi Ullrich in order to describe the current trends and perspectives of policy research institutes and think tanks in Western Europe. They also apply—at least partially -to the international work of the German political foundations (Stone and Ullrich 2003).

access to decision-making processes, facilitating consultation or exchange of information, and negotiating coordination of independent action and cooperation in policy formation (Stone and Ullrich 2003, p. 36).

6 A Changing Role in the Project Countries: Three Examples of the Foundations' Work in Israel and the Palestinian Territories

In the following, the work of German political foundations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories should be viewed as a sample. Today, all six foundations are active in the region, and run their own offices with local and German staff conducting multiple projects on both sides. Three factors—the bilateral relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel (a); the German political approach towards the Palestinian Authority (PA) (b); and the large number of projects conducted in a geographically small area (c)—offer a great opportunity to describe this international work more closely. Furthermore, the case of Israel and the Palestinian Territories could serve as a blueprint for the challenges of strengthening democratic structures against the backdrop of on-going conflict. Approaches towards Israel and the PA are also cornerstones of German foreign policy (Asseburg and Busse 2011). This is why the case is ideal for showing the foundations' capacity to act as pioneers in complicated and non-existent bilateral relationships between states. These are ideal for monitoring the influence of German foreign policy and the political landscape of a project country.

Within the German-Jewish reconciliation process and the Israeli-Arab conflict the foundations took on an engaging role. Their engagement can be described in three phases:[5] (a) *Building trust and showing solidarity (1945–1987).* The project work in Israel during this time aimed to build trust and overcome the horror of the Nazi era. The Israeli side understood the work of the German political foundations as a sign of friendship and a step towards a new relationship, especially at civic society level. The FES for example has been working with the Israeli trade union 'Histadrut' since the 80s, and has established connections with German trade unions. Back then the support was mainly financial.[6] During the 70s and 80s

[5]The phases are similar to the general historical phases of the international work described in point 1 of this article.

[6]See also the article of Dr. Ernst Kerbusch on the international work of the FES in this volume.

the foundations also started to open own offices in Israel. (b) *Bridging and mediating (1990–2000)* In the aftermath of the Oslo Process, the foundations focused on engaging in bilateral dialogue between German and Israeli politicians or German and Palestinian politicians in order to flank the peace process. The FES was the first foundation to open an office in East Jerusalem in 1993, followed by KAS in 1996 with an office in Ramallah. (c) *Providing ideas for global problems (from 2000 on)* nowadays all six foundations focus on trilateral and multilateral talks on global challenges like the welfare state, and European Policy towards the Middle East. They are also in dialogue with each other and e.g., coordinate the visits of German politicians with the German embassy in Tel Aviv and the German consulate in Ramallah (Shikaki 2012).

The work of foundations these days is also quite challenging. In Israel, the foundations are accused of paternalism and of interfering in Israeli internal political affairs.[7] The Israeli public often presumes them to be gatekeepers to German politicians and public opinion makers. Here, on the Israeli side, the question arises as to what extent German political foundations are acting as foreign agents interfering in the sovereignty of the state.[8] In the Palestinian Territories, the foundations face a high density of NGOs.[9] The foundations normally just fund up to 50% of the projects they foster. The other half has to be funded by the partner organization. Most of the other NGOs active in the Palestinian Territories offer full funding. This leads often to misunderstandings regarding the role of the foundations as partners.

The HBS is the third largest German political foundation. It has one office in Tel Aviv in Israel, and one in Ramallah in the Palestinian Territories. The HBS describes itself as 'part of the Green political movement' (Heinrich-Böll-Foundation 2014). In 2016 the HBS had 40 offices outside of Germany, and funded projects in about 60 countries. Represented by Kerstin Müller, former Member of the German Bundestag, the HBS office in Tel Aviv supports the online platform '+972' with money. '+972' is a subcultural left-wing digital magazine criticized by the Israeli public for being anti-Semitic and pursuing an apartheid strategy towards Israel. Critics range from nationalist hardliners to Israeli left intellectuals.

[7]See also the article of Kerstin Müller on the work of the political foundations against the backdrop of shrinking spaces of civil society in Israel in this volume.

[8]See also the article of Prof. Eli M. Salzberger on the new Israeli NGO law in this volume.

[9]See also the article of Tobias Pietsch on the overload of NGOs in Israel and the Palestinian Territories in this volume.

The HBS regional office in Ramallah represents both the Palestinian Territories and Jordan. It was opened in 1999 working together with about 20 local organizations in Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Jordan. Bettina Marx, a former German journalist covering the Middle East, has run the office since 2016. Describing its core activities, the HBS includes: "Environmental justice, democracy, human rights and policy analysis" (HBS Report 2012). In this framework the HBS developed a guide book for "Ethical Consumerism in Palestine" (Dajani and Ismali 2015). The office is also very active in its own field of democracy and human rights. In this context they are working together with Addameer, a Palestinian NGO supporting political prisoners and human rights. The current Israeli government criticizes this support, claiming that the HBS is interfering in internal political affairs by supporting people convicted by Israeli military law.

The FES is the oldest German political foundations. Nowadays it is maintaining about 120 offices all over the globe. Since 1978 the FES is maintaining an office in Tel Aviv in Israel. This office provided first contacts between the Israeli Trade Union "Histadrut" and its German counterpart. Today the FES Israel is directed by Dr. Werner Puschra who worked before for the foundation in South America, Korea and Egypt. Since 1995 the FES is also maintaining an office in East Jerusalem. Currently it is run by Dr. Beyan Sentuerk, who studied in Birzeit, Ramallah and was working at the FES Headquarter in Berlin before. As the only one among the other foundations the FES is also holding a branch office in Gaza. Dr. Usama Antar is serving as project manager since the opening of the branch in 2005, holding conferences and meetings on political topics in the whole Gaza strip. One of the key project of the foundation is to foster young people and journalists in order debate the concept to freedom of expression. After the Hamas takeover in 2007 the work became more complex and risky. Still the FES decided to keep the branch open and to conduct projects in order to strengthen the civil society in Gaza.

7 Conclusion

During recent decades, the international work of German political foundations has changed. Their power in the international political arena has increased due to the shift from a bipolar, nation-state system to a multipolar, post-nation state system. In this globalized world the foundations—in their shape as hybrids between non-governmental think tanks and a state-financed do-tanks—became purveyors of soft skills in foreign policy. They bridged governmental actors and agents that just supplied knowledge. It has been made clear that the think tanks

have an explanatory role for an organization with discernible historical roots and which has continued to exist through political and societal changes, often thriving in situations of political instability. Think tanks, in their different organizational expressions, will continue to play a role in the cooperative networks of societies with an increasing need for professionalized expertise. It has also been stated that the concept of FPA has to be extended to take consideration of knowledge as a new source of legitimization. Due to their research abroad and their ability to provide detailed analysis, German foundations are well placed in this respect. But while they have the power to legitimize political actors and therefore take on the role of agents, one question remains unclear: What legitimizes the international work of the foundations themselves? Are they a 'First World tool' of colonialization, implementing a Western value system in other countries' civil societies? Are they interfering in the sovereignty of other countries? As illustrated by means of the foundations' work in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, they are equipped with a huge budget that allows them to conduct projects within the civil society of other countries.

Therefore, they are leaning towards Do-tanks and are less think tanks. They present the soft side of German Foreign Policy. But overall, they just catalyse debates. They do not invent them. Still, in a globalized, complex world, their power is increasing. They do not act independently. They conduct German foreign policy and carry it out on a socio-political level. In a globalized world they have become key players. But there is still a huge gap between (a) self-reflection and (b) reflection by partners and politicians.

While local partners and German politicians refer to the foundations as an influential part of German Foreign policy, the foundations themselves define their role as very limited. They work within the guidelines of the BMZ to "foster democracy and prevent conflicts". Still, this is an approach of a player and not just a payer.

Especially in the case of Israel, the international networking of the foundations lead to a normalization between Germany and Israel. Global networking has great potential. A huge advantage of the German political foundations is their long-term planning and sustainability due to (a) financial security and (b) shelter from the impact of daily politics. They are a good example of the fact that foreign policy is not just carried out by governments but also highly influenced by non-governmental organizations. If this is legally acceptable, especially due to the fact that the foundations are not elected democratically, is another question.

Regarding the question "Are the foundations just a payer or a real player?" one must answer: it depends where they are active. In Israel, they are more acting as payers, financing e.g. well established local think tanks and fostering debates.

In the Palestinian Territories, they are more an operating player due to the instable political situation.

But in both cases, they help through their provided knowledge to legitimize political decision. Therefore, they are therefore powerful analytical think tanks, agents and providers of knowledge for actors shaping German foreign policy not just in the Middle East, but all over the world.

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The New "Transparency Law" and the Operation of German Political Foundations in Israel

Eli M. Salzberger

1 The Increasing Role of NGOs—Global and Israeli Perspectives

Since the 1980s there has been sharp rise in the operation of NGOs in domestic as well as international arenas. This represents the emergence of the third sector, which is neither public nor private. The phenomenon was highlighted by the UN Millennium Declaration made in 2000 that acknowledged the importance of non-governmental organizations.[1] A non-governmental organization (NGO) is any non-profit or voluntary citizens' group organized on a local, national or international level. NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring citizens' concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies, and encourage political participation through provision of information. Some are organized around a specific issue, such as human rights, poverty, the environment or health. They provide analysis and expertise, at times in contrast to government positions, serve as an early warning mechanism, and conduct activities on the ground (indeed sometimes assuming the role of the official authorities).

[1] http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm, Sect. 30.

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The global rise of NGOs coincided in Israel with the relaxation of the 'standing' requirements at the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice (HCJ) in the mid-1980s. Until then, based on English precedents and doctrine, applicants against a decision or the conduct of a public authority had to show that they themselves were affected by this decision or action. The 1986 Supreme Court decision, acknowledging the standing of Mr. Ressler who petitioned against the exemption from army service of ultra-orthodox students, opened the doors of the HCJ to any petitioner, including associations and public-cause organizations.[2] This decision, in turn, empowered existing NGOs and prompted the establishment of many new NGOs for which the potentially very effective litigation avenue was now open. This significantly increased their influence on public policy.[3] The number of NGOs in Israel rose from less than 10,000 in the mid-1980s to more than 55,000 organizations today. Most of them are registered as non-profit organizations under the *Association Law 1980*, while a small minority are registered as public-benefit companies according to the *Companies Law 1999*. The number of Israeli NGOs indicates a very vibrant civil society.

2 Increasing Concerns and Actions Against NGOs

The global rise in the operation of NGOs also brought a backlash. Many NGOs promote ideologies and indeed actions that can be seen to act against governmental ideologies and policies. Promoting 'Western' concepts of liberal democracy and human rights in non liberal-democratic countries might be the pivotal example, but the counter-example of promoting fanatical religious beliefs in liberal countries should be also acknowledged (and might become instrumental in new future attitudes towards NGOs in liberal democracies). Following the 9/11 terror attacks, US President George W. Bush accused NGOs of assisting the terrorists, saying: "Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they oftentimes use nice-sounding, non-governmental organizations as fronts for their activities… We intend to deal with them, just like we intend to deal with others who aid and abet terrorist organizations."[4] This declaration paradoxically coincided with increasing

[2]FH 2/82 *Ressler v Minister of Defence* [1982] IsrSC 36(1) 708.

[3]The Israeli Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice is one of the more effective and activist courts worldwide and hence opening its door to any petitioner was instrumental. See Salzberger (2007).

[4]http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2001/5041.htm.

American funding of organizations operating towards democratization in other countries, and prompted similar criticism of America by the regimes targeted by this NGO activity. Vladimir Putin accused the West of bringing about, through NGO conduct, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Rutzen 2015).

This backlash was reflected by increasing attempts to limit the freedom of NGOs to operate, and especially of those NGOs funded by foreign sources. Thus, between 2004 and 2014, laws restricting NGOs were enacted in more than 70 countries, ranging from an almost total prohibition of civil-society associations (e.g., in Zimbabwe and Belarus) to various restrictions on foreign funding. Within the latter group, some countries require prior government approval to receive international funding (e.g., Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Bahrain, Belarus, Eritrea, Nepal, India, Pakistan). Some countries restrict the activities that can be undertaken with international funding (e.g., Sudan, Venezuela, Bolivia, Indonesia), and some countries prohibit receiving international funding from specific donors (e.g. Russia, Tunisia). Other methods include special taxes or tedious reporting requirements imposed on the receipts of international funding, and the restrictions on NGOs are also enhanced indirectly in the framework of counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering measures, defamation and treason laws, and the stigmatization or shaming of foreign-funded NGOs (Rutzen 2015).[5] The latter measure, which is employed in the US and Russia, also characterizes the new transparency law in Israel.

As mentioned above, there are more than 50,000 NGOs in Israel. Although many of the NGOs take different views on official governmental policy or conduct, only very few of them really irritate incumbent politicians. The Netanyahu right-wing governments ruling Israel since 2009 have been particularly concerned with NGOs who engage with protection of Palestinian rights, the conduct of the IDF and settlers in the Occupied Territories, and the Israeli policy towards the Arab-Israeli population. Two of these organizations—Breaking the Silence and *B'tselem*—received broad exposure recently (2017). Following a meeting of Sigmar Gabriel with their representatives during his first visit to Israel as the newly appointed foreign minister, PM Netanyahu cancelled a scheduled meeting with him.

[5]See also the website of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) at http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/foreignfund/index.html.

Israeli law provides very broad protection to the right of individuals to associate and operate. An unentrenched constitutional right of freedom of association was recognized by the supreme court in 1960.[6] It is also specified by the association and companies laws.[7] Denial of registration of an association can be made only if the goals of the association negate the existence of the state of Israel or of its democratic nature, or there is reasonable evidence that the association will serve as a front for illegal activities (art. 3 of the associations law). The supreme court narrowed down even further the possibilities to refuse registration (or declare the illegality of an association), applying the constitutional test of the limitation clause (proportionality) and the 'near certainty test', which is employed to examine freedom of speech limitations.

The tight judicial protection of the right to associate, and derivative rights (such as the right to raise funds) left the government with indirect and minor tools to wrangle with the NGOs that it perceives to aggravate its policies. In 2008, Article 36A was added to the associations law, requiring an association to report in its annual financial report on any donation from a foreign entity larger than 20,000 shekels. In 2011, the Knesset enacted the 'Law on Disclosure Requirements for Recipients of Support of a Foreign Political Entity', which requires any organization that receives donations from a foreign entity to inform the associations registrar about the donation, its value, and its source and conditions or agreements attached to the contribution. The law requires the registrar to publish these details every three months.

But the more controversial move came in 2016 with the enactment of the transparency law, an initiative of the minister of justice, Ayelet Shaked (Habayit Hayehudi party), together with Robert Ilatov (Yisrael Beitenu party) and Yariv Levin (Likud party).[8] The law requires any association where more than 50% of funding comes from a foreign political entity to mention that fact in every publication, application to a public official, and formal discussions at which minutes are written. The original bill also included a duty to wear a badge indicating the

[6]HC 241/60 Kardosh vs The Companies Registrar 15 PD 1151 and in the association context HC 253/64 Geris vs. The Haifa District Commissioner 18(4) PD 683.

[7]Article 1 of the Association Law 1980 specifies that any two or more individuals can establish an association and register it.

[8]Law of Disclosure Requirements for Recipients of Support of a Foreign Political Entity (Amendment) (Increased Transparency of those Primarily Financed by Donations from Foreign Political Entities), 5776-2015.

foreign contribution in any official meeting, but PM Netanyahu decided to delete this article due to the Holocaust yellow-badge connotation.

In comparison to laws in other countries (see above) the Israeli law is a soft restriction on NGOs sponsored by foreign entities—it does not prohibit such a donation, or require consent to receive it. Nor does it restrict the operation of the association supported by foreign donation, but it does require that such a donation is made public and is constantly visible. Since reporting requirements already exist, the prime function of the new law can be classified as shaming or stigmatizing. Although the actual effect of the law on NGOs operation is negligible, it was directly targeted at left-leaning human rights organizations. It applies only to 27 associations, of which 25 are human rights organizations identified with the left, and it was probably the prime intention of the legislators to shame these organizations.[9] Although the law raised sharp criticism (as can be seen in other contributions to this volume) from within Israel and from abroad, including many European governments and the US,[10] PM Netanyahu indicated in a recent statement (June 2017) that the law was not sufficient and a total ban on foreign contributions should be considered.

3 German Political Foundations and Their Operation in Israel

German political foundations are a unique phenomenon. Each of the political parties in Germany is entitled to establish a political foundation funded by the federal budget in accordance with the shifting proportional power of the respective party in parliament. These foundations are independent of the respective party and they operate not only in Germany itself, but also have branches in various other countries (The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, the oldest party foundation attached to the SPD, has branches in more than 100 countries), in which they engage with politicians, civil society and academia. Their public impact therefore affects collective decision making. The foundations also supply important information to various institutions and individuals in Germany, which influences German foreign policy, and they facilitate the visits of politicians and other German

[9] www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.592754.

[10] On the meeting of the US Ambassador with Ayelet Shaked on the matter see http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.696709 (11.01.2016).

public-office holders in the country in which they operate. This gives German officials an advantage over visiting officials from other countries.

All German party foundations (six in total) operate in Israel, and some have branches in the Palestinian Territories as well. They conduct various activities, many in cooperation with various organizations as well as with universities and other institutions for higher education. These activities are not focused just on German issues, but primarily on Israeli issues, where each foundation aligns itself and focuses on topics and positions reflecting the ideology of the foundation and the party it is attached to in Germany. There is no homogenized approach to operation for the foundations in Israel vis-à-vis the law. Some are registered as a foreign company (FNS, FES) and some are registered as companies for the public benefit (HSS, KAS, HBS, RLS) according to the companies law. Consequently, the transparency law may affect the German political foundations operating in Israel in different ways.

In general, one should examine two different hats that the foundations wear when operating in Israel and may be relevant to the transparency law. First, some of the foundations are supposed to be captured by the law as NGOs (i.e., direct affect), as they are companies for the public benefit whose entire (or nearly entire) funding comes from the German federal government. However, when the Israeli ministry of justice, upon requests in the Knesset during debates on the law, published the list of NGOs whose funding from foreign entities exceeded 50% and thus were subject to the law, the list provided comprised 27 NGOs not including the German political foundations. The list covered only associations registered according to the association law, while the law applies to companies working for the public benefit registered according to the companies law (to which some of the foundations belong), so the direct applicability of the law to the foundations is unclear at this stage.

Second, the foundations may be regarded as foreign entities themselves for calculating whether more than 50% of a registered NGO's budget originates from a foreign government (indirect effect). Some of the foundations state explicitly that they do not contribute or donate funds, but engage in common projects. Such formulations may raise an argument that the foundations do not contribute to the budgets of NGOs and shared projects are outside the scope of the 50% calculation. As far as I know neither question–the direct applicability of the law to the German foundations and indirect applicability of the law to them as funders—has so far been tested by the Israeli authorities or courts.

All the German political foundations voiced opposition to the transparency law. Even if it does not affect them directly or indirectly, it is seen to be opposed to liberal democratic values. In the final section of this short essay, I will examine this argument.

4 Some Normative Thoughts

In a democracy, collective decisions (legislation, regulation and policy) should reflect the citizens' preferences. Democracy is not just about majority rule, as majority decisions do not necessarily embody collective wellbeing or collective preferences. Many political philosophers have contributed to extensive debates on what materializing or maximizing the preferences of individuals actually means (consensus, collective utilities maximization, welfare maximization, etc.) and on what the structural and procedural elements that can best yield such preferences maximization (elected representatives, majority rule, constitutional constrains on the majority, judicial review etc.) are based.

In this shorts piece I cannot elaborate on these varied theories, but suffice to say, according to contemporary democratic thinkers, a vivid civil society, which enables serious debates and deliberation, is an essential element of democracy. Such an environment can expose and engage with the intensity of preferences, enhancing the utility frontiers of collective decision-making (e.g., Fishkin 2009). The related literature about interest groups and lobbies examining how collective organizations can impact on the final decision is well known, giving greater weight to the interests of the few who are well organized at the expense of the general public.[11] NGOs can be perceived as counterweight interest groups. They usually represent broad interests and, through their institutional organization and activities, they enhance the positions they represent in legislative and policy outcomes. Although interest groups and NGOs are structured legally in different ways, both can be perceived as fulfilling similar functions of expressing intensity of preferences in the context of formal decision-making procedures, such as the majority election of representatives, which do not take into account the intensity of preferences.

Hence, on the one hand, the operation of interest groups and NGOs in the political market advances the manifestation of the intensity of preferences in public decision-making and thus should be welcomed as promoting the collective good. On the other hand, well-organized and well-funded interest groups and NGOs can capture politicians and decision-makers that contribute to public decisions by reflecting the total good of society. This can justify some regulation of their operation. Indeed, many democracies regulate lobbying activities, and put various legal restrictions on the funding of politicians. The optimal or desirable

[11]The classical text is of Olson (1965).

level of regulation might be a tricky question, because collective organization also promotes democratic outcomes, one can generally observe that the absence of any intervention in the political market is problematic, and so of course is any regulation that does not maintain impartiality, equality and neutrality vis-à-vis the substantive issues on the political agenda.

This very general theoretical framework should be sufficient to assess the operation of the German political foundations as well as the Israeli Transparency Law. I think it can be argued convincingly that if a country has 'perfect' democratic decision-making procedures and institutions (by 'perfect' I mean procedures and institutions that attempt to yield decisions reflecting the society's aggregate interests, and that these procedures and institutions are inscribed not only in the laws but also reflect reality) then attempts by foreigners to affect domestic decisions and policy making, either directly or through sponsoring activities of local organizations, pose similar if not more acute concerns than well-organized internal interest groups. In fact, while internal interest groups and NGOs may contribute to the real reflection of society's preferences, foreign intervention may not.

This insight is of course not valid for non-democratic countries in which attempts at intervention by foreign entities might be legitimate and promote the interest of society (for example FES activities in Portugal under Salazar). Paradoxically, the positive analysis of the actual restrictions on foreign intervention will be in inversely related to normative analysis i.e., we can expect more limitations on NGOs in general, and on their foreign sponsorship in particular, in non-democratic countries (where such activity is more justified) than in democracies.

It is of course very difficult to assess whether decision-making processes in a country are fully democratic, and it is even possible that such an ideal or 'perfect' democracy does not exist, and this can always legitimize some sort of foreign input. In addition, international and supranational law and norms (e.g., the EU) may independently justify foreign intervention even in a 'perfect' democracy, but the legitimacy of such intervention will be contingent on its content. Intervention in line with international norms (e.g., promotion of equality or human rights) will be legitimate while intervention contravening those norms (e.g., promotion of racism, inequality, non-democratic policies etc.) will not be legitimate.

As far as the German political foundations operating abroad inform civil society and officials on German issues and interests, including opinions on matters related to the foreign country in which they operate, there is no normative problem with their operation vis-à-vis the normative framework offered above. This is also true for actual activities and assistance in making collective decisions. But their

involvement in internal political issues under debate is more problematic, and if the theoretical conjectures presented here are accepted, then the justifiable degree of intervention should depend on the level of democratic deficit in the target county (constrained by the actual capacity for intervention, which as stated above is in negative correlation with the desirable level). I think that all German political foundations operating in Israel generally acknowledge the country's democratic nature and vibrant civil society, and usually act sensibly and sensitively, keeping away from direct intervention in collective decision-making processes.

The same rationale applies to local NGOs sponsored by foreigners. Again, it is difficult to prescribe exact rules, but I would say that while an initiation of an Israeli NGO by a foreign entity or indeed by a foreigner, in order to promote the interest of the latter, is problematic, foreign contributions to an NGO initiated by locals is less problematic, especially if that NGO's goals are in line with international norms. However, it might still justifiably be under some regulation. Prohibiting foreign contributions or the operation of NGOs supported by foreign funds (as some countries do) altogether cannot be justified even in a perfect democracy. By contrast, transparency requirements can be justified under certain conditions. This brings me to the Israeli transparency law.

The initiators of the transparency law write in the bill's explanatory notes that, "There are dozens of organizations active in Israel that receive funding from foreign government entities in exchange for the organization's promise to promote the interests of these entities, or of those who are not Israeli citizens… Up till today, these organizations have had no obligation of proper disclosure, in which they have to present themselves as clearly representing foreign interests that do not accord with Israeli interests." This justification is clearly factually inaccurate, normatively unfounded, and I would even say that it is manipulative.

First, it is not true that, "As of today, these organizations have no obligation of proper disclosure." All NGOs have to submit their financial reports to the registrar and have a specific additional duty to report any foreign donation. The registrar even has a duty to publicize these contributions and the financial reports of NGOs. This means that the new law is not made for disclosure but that its main purpose is shaming or stigmatizing.

Second, foreign governments or other foreign public entities do not initiate NGOs in Israel in order to promote their interests, but rather decide to support activities and organizations initiated by Israeli citizens. In fact, in the course of the debate about the law, no evidence was found to substantiate the claim that Israeli NGOs "receive funding from foreign government entities in exchange for the organization's promise to promote the interests of these entities." If this

description by the bill proposers has some truth it is with regard to some NGOs who are sponsored (and sometimes indeed initiated) by private (rather than governmental) foreign donors, to which the law does not apply.

Requiring transparency in the financial resources of NGOs is a legitimate democratic regulation and meets the international law standards set by Article 22(2) to the ICCPR.[12] However, for such a law to be legitimate it has to apply equally to all organizations whose funding comes from any foreign source, including from non-governmental entities such as private organizations as well as individuals. It is no secret that the Israeli transparency law is relevant to left-leaning NGOs, while many right-wing organizations are heavily supported by foreign individuals or private foundations. Within the normative analysis of foreign donations there is no philosophical justification to distinguish between foreign intervention of public and private bodies. As such, the law is discriminatory and its real motivation is to impede left-wing opposition voices, rather than to promote transparency.

5 Conclusion

The topic of foreign participation in a domestic political market has unfortunately not attracted enough attention from political philosophers. Only on the bases of a solid theory can one assess various laws and policies towards such participation. I have tried to sketch some considerations on the issue, which might form a skeleton of a normative model. They suggest that allowing unrestricted foreign participation is problematic, but so is the total prohibition of such activity.

Transparency obligations regarding foreign intervention may be well justified, including with regard to financial contribution to NGOs. However, the new Israeli transparency law fails to pass as a justified real transparency requirement and its actual function is shaming and damaging Israeli left-leaning and political opposition NGOs. This law should not be part of the legal codex of a liberal democracy.

[12]It specifies: "No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

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The Six "Outlaws"? German Political Foundations and their International Work within the German Legal and Political Framework

An Attempted Classification

Anna Abelmann

1 Introduction

As shown in other articles in this volume, the political foundations' legal framework has been and still is an extensively discussed subject both in Germany as well as abroad due to the lack of sufficient anchoring within German legislation. Though the federal constitutional court (FCC) has dealt with questions regarding the financing of political foundations more than once, a comprehensive change has not yet been implemented. This in turn paves the way for assigning fanciful attributes to the foundations as shown above.[1]

Taking into consideration the fact that more than 90% of the political foundations' finances derive from state subsidies and that the largest amount is used to fund international activities, this shortcoming is particularly surprising.

[1]The title "The six outlaws?" is inspired by the article of Prof. Hans Herbert von Arnim "Parteifinanzen: Die gesetzlosen Fünf", published in: Der Spiegel 52/1994 on December 26, 1994, pp. 26–28.

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Economically, the foundations' budget development from the 1960s up to today has turned out to be a massive success story. While in 1967 the total budget added up to about € 13 million (Mohr 2010, p. 62), it had increased by 2014 up to around € 500 million, of which € 466 million came from governmental subsidies. Further grants were given from the German federal states and the European Union (Lutz and Müller 5 October 2014). The constant growth of these state subsidies gives a hint of the importance of the foundations' work for the federal government, but it is also one of the main causes for growing criticism and distrust towards their activities both abroad and at home.

The foundations' dual function – being formally independent from governmental influence combined with proximity to the government – is not always transparent and sometimes even leads to the suspicion of close ties between the foundations and German intelligence agencies.[2]

During the last decade, the political foundations have been facing growing pressure abroad and have even had to close several offices, as for example in Egypt, Saudi-Arabia and Ethiopia.[3] In other states such as Turkey and Russia, the foundations have experienced a part restriction of their scope of action (Weiland 2013), and even in democratic states with close ties to the Federal Republic of Germany such as Israel, the foundations are facing increasing distrust and allegations that their partner organizations support anti-Israel campaigns (Abé and Schult 2016).

At the same time, there is also a lively debate inside Germany regarding the legitimacy of state subsidies to the political foundations, whose programmes also support their affiliated parties. However, because not all parties are entitled to establish a political foundation with access to this kind of funding, the legitimacy

[2]In 2002, several members of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, The Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation and the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation in Turkey were accused of espionage and secret arrangements against the security of the Turkish state. The trial ended in 2003 in acquittal, but the basic attitudes of governmental officials did not change over the following years. For more information see: FAZ: Prozess gegen deutsche Stiftungen geht Ende Januar weiter, 26.12.2002, Der Spiegel: German Foundations in Crosshairs Abroad, 07.02.2012.

[3]During the last decade, the KAS withdrew its representatives from Kairo and Abu Dhabi after local authorities accused them of illegal activities. Also, the HBS closed its office in Abbis Abeba after political developments in Ethiopia limited its scope of action to a minimum.

of this practice is repeatedly questioned by smaller or new party organizations that are not represented in the *Bundestag*.[4]

Therefore, this paper seeks to give a review on the federal constitutional court's judgements regarding the political foundations up to today, followed by a contextualization of this debate in the foundations' role within German foreign policy. This is of particular importance due to current international developments, but also because of the recent entry of the *AfD* into the German *Bundestag.* This will certainly heat up the debate if predictions are correct.[5]

2 The Legal Framework of German Political Foundations

Indeed, a legal basis for the political foundations' work and financing model does not exist, and nor are the foundations' activities subject to the regulations of party law. Nevertheless, the federal constitutional law has delivered several judgments concerning state subsidies to the foundations and their activities, which give at least a vague guideline regarding the division of tasks between the foundations and their affiliated parties, and the practice of state subsidies.

In 1966, the federal constitutional court (FCC) prohibited the state funding of political parties that did not just support election campaigns and complete administrative work, but also offered political educational programmes. Instead, since 1967, the party-affiliated political foundations have received "global subsidies". These are annual, non-project-bound funds from the federal ministry of the interior to promote socio-political and democratic education. The global subsidies mark the key difference between the political foundations and other state-funded organizations that only receive project-bound grants (Pogorelskaja 2009b, p. 11).

[4]Since the 1990s, several parties not represented in the Bundestag have demanded their right to establish an affiliated political foundation with access to state subsidies e.g., the right-wing parties "Die Republikaner" and NPD, but also the ÖDP. A detailed discussion can be found in: Heike Mertens 1999. Parteinahe Stiftungen im Parteienrecht. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

[5]This article was written around the 2017 Federal election in Germany. Already during 2015 and 2016, the AfD established two foundations – the Desiderius-Erasmus-Foundation and the Kant-Foundation – as a potential political foundation. One day after the Federal election, the party's chairman Alice Weidel announced that the AfD will create an affiliated political foundation with access to state subsidies.

The court decisions of 1966 enlarged the foundations' independence from their affiliated parties and formed the basis of their specific scope of action.

In the 1980s the FCC judgement from 1966 inspired the main reason for the Green Party to file a lawsuit against this practice at the FCC, because it defined the global subsidies to the foundations as a violation of German financial legislation (Mohr 2010, p. 62). In its judgement of July 14, 1986 (BVerfGE 73,1), the FCC ruled that the institutional subsidies were constitutional because the foundations act in accordance with the model provided by the constitution and that they are legally and materially independent institutions that address their tasks autonomously, responsibly and in the spirit of intellectual receptiveness. However, the court emphasized the need to maintain a proper distance from the foundations' respective political parties in their practical work (BVerfGE 73,1). The Green Party drew its own conclusion from that decision: In 1987, it established its own political foundation, the "Stiftungsverband Regenbogen e. V." which later became the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (Fülle 1992).

In 1992, federal president Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU) appointed an independent commission on the issue of party finances, which also included the aspect of state subsidies for German political foundations. On February 17, 1993, the commission affirmed that political foundations constituted an essential element in the political culture of the Federal Republic of Germany, and that their work was useful to the democratic polity, but this judgement was not followed by the implementation of a legal framework for the foundations. Against this backdrop and to show their willingness for more transparency, the political foundations implemented some of the commission's recommendations independently by formulating their perception of themselves and their socio-political and democratic position and duties. As a result, in 1998 they signed a joint declaration that pledged to inform the public.[6] Nevertheless, the FCC backed the concept of the political foundations and their relations with their respective parties. A comprehensive legal framework is still missing and this continues to raise questions regarding the transparency and public control of the foundations as well the legitimacy of their financing. Therefore, the Ecological Democratic Party (ÖDP) filed another lawsuit against this concept that the FCC rejected in 2015, in which it describes the current financing practice as disguised support of the parties represented in the

[6]Gemeinsame Erklärung "Zum Selbstverständnis der politischen Stiftungen" der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS), Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS), Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) 1999, Bonn/ St. Augustin/ Königswinter/München/Berlin.

Bundestag (Hug 2017, p. 37). The AfD, which entered the Bundestag in September 2017, already announced its plan to establish an affiliated political foundation with access to comprehensive state subsidies and certainly will take legal action if other parliamentary parties should try to prevent this move.[7] The establishment of such an institution which could be turned into such a foundation has already taken place (Steffen 2017).

But what do the financing practices of the political foundations mean for their work abroad? The FCC has stated that there are no fundamental reservations regarding the constitutionality of state subsidies, and the lack of a concrete legal framework for the concept of political foundations is still missing and causes a lack of transparency and public control. The close ties between the foundations and their affiliated parties cause particular confusion and criticism.

All foundations are established by representatives from their associated parties with which they share the same values, ideological beliefs, and political goals. It is not uncommon that formerly high-ranking party representatives later assume leading positions within a foundation, as for example Johannes Gerster, state chairman of the CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz and afterwards director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in Jerusalem, and Kerstin Müller, formally minister of state at the foreign office and member of the Green Party and nowadays director of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation in Tel Aviv. Career paths like this are not necessarily bad. Party representatives like Gerster and Müller usually share the same values as the affiliated foundation and are highly qualified in the field of international relations. Nevertheless, it is important for the foundations not to appear as a depository for formerly high-ranking party representatives (Renvert 2014, p. 94).

Despite the obvious proximity, the foundations claim that they are not an extension of German foreign policy. Indeed, they do not receive direct instructions from the government and governmental officials can hardly influence the foundations' decisions, though the foreign ministry treats them as an important element of German foreign policy. The absence of on-going conflicts between the foundations and official German policy can be explained with the difficulty of measuring the proximity between the foundations and the parties in the Bundestag or even the government. Close ties, shared ideological values and close, often informal communication ensures most of the time that there is a fundamental consensus between all players. Even when the foundations oppose the political

[7]This prognosis was already stated by Dr. Heike Merten, University of Düsseldorf, during the conference at the Ruhr University in Bochum in July 2016 which preceded this publication.

agenda of their affiliate parties, they need not be afraid of consequences.[8] The apparent distance between state institutions and the foundations that describe themselves abroad as non-governmental organizations, prevents the emergence of diplomatic crisis. On the other hand, the foundations are even able to build ties to oppositional players that after a regime change might pave the way for bilateral relations between the host country and Germany.[9]

The specific scope of action suggests that governmental players are not even interested in influencing the foundations' work abroad since they benefit greatly from it:

1. The foundations can compensate for foreign policy when working in countries with under-developed official diplomacy e.g., due to dictatorship, revolutionary regimes or a past burden as in the case of Germany and Israel. Through their work, they can mediate in crisis situations within one country or in conflicts between two or several states, such as Israel and Palestine. Through their active participation in UN summits, the foundations influence a global peace policy (Ronge and Pascher 1999, pp. 192–194). Since the early 2000s, conflict management and prevention can be identified as a growing trend in the foundations' international activities (Pogorelskaja 2009a).
2. Due to their specific network and their access to the highest political level and central decision-makers, the foundations are "early warning systems" allowing the harmonization of political tensions and identification of ways to cooperate (Renvert 2014, p. 15).
3. Additionally, their specific scope of action enables the foundations to enter political "grey zones", which cannot be accessed by official representatives of the state. Unlike embassies, the foundations can even maintain contact with opposition groups (or even terror groups), whereas foreign policy dictates that diplomats keep their distance from such groups.[10]

[8]While the Green Party supported the government decision regarding the deployment of the German Federal Armed Forces in Kosovo in 1999, the HBS launched a campaign against this decision, which was fully accepted by the party (Bartsch 2007, p. 282).

[9]During the apartheid regime in South Africa the Federal government was not in contact with members of the ANC, while the political foundations established first contacts that later helped to build closer ties with the new decision-makers after the regime change.

[10]While German diplomats do not communicate with organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which are seen as terrorist organizations, representatives of the foundations kept and keep contact with members of both organizations.

However, the foundations still prefer to describe themselves as non-governmental organizations, and the host countries perceive them by no means as charitable organizations that merely provide unbiased political-development assistance. Their affiliation with a certain party from the *Bundestag* is usually not a secret. Furthermore, all foundation agendas include as a central point the promotion of democracy and human rights. Subsequently, authoritarian regimes in particular come to suspect the foundation of working against them.

But in democratic states, the foundations are facing a growing mistrust, which derives partly from their unusual structure of acting as a non-governmental organization while being subsidized by the government and promoting certain political goals. In Israel, the foundations are nowadays often accused of intervening in internal affairs because of their cooperation with controversial partner organizations from the far left of society such as "Breaking the Silence" and *B'Tsele*m. Critics as the organization NGO Monitor blame the foundations for contributing to the growing demonization of Israel in the world and to manipulating Israeli democracy by using German tax money (NGO-Monitor 2014, pp. 1, 6).

3 Conclusions

Accusations like this are by no means linked to reality, but revive the question regarding the missing legal framework of the political foundations. Indeed, this constitutional gap makes the foundations' work abroad and at home vulnerable to critics and mistrust and might lead to a restriction of their current scope of action.

The accusation of a lack of transparency could be levelled by the implementation of a legal framework that clearly defined the role of the political foundations within German polity and the necessary preconditions of receiving state subsidies. The latter is especially important in terms of the initiatives of those parties that do not necessarily promote liberal, democratic values, as for example the NPD or 'Die Republikaner'. The expected establishment of a foundation affiliated to the right-wing populist AfD will certainly heat up this debate again.

Also, the foundations' work abroad would certainly benefit from such a step. Especially in non-democratic countries they tend to act in "grey zones" and cooperate with opposition groups, grassroots organizations and representatives of civil society that easily raise the mistrust of their host countries. A legal framework would help to strengthen a climate of confidence, which is necessary for the foundations' international work.

By looking at the worldwide network of the foundations today, it becomes obvious that this cannot be maintained without state subsidies. The political foun-

dations rely on this concept. This financing practice makes it difficult for their host countries to perceive the foundations as independent players but strengthens their image of being diplomatic auxiliary forces (Nuscheler 1993, p. 231) or a party cover organization (Langguth 1993, p. 40).

Nevertheless, besides all the criticism they receive, the political foundations are by no means "outlaws" as some authors suggest (von Arnim 1994), but an integral part of the German political system. Their lack of integration in legislation jeopardizes this concept. Since their establishment in the 1950s, the foundations have gone through a massive development before finally reaching their current status, which can clearly be called a success story. This indeed should grant the self-confidence among Bundestag political parties to devise a legal framework for the concept of the political foundation. Not only is there nothing to lose but this might even be the only way to sustain today's concept of German political foundations.

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Part IV

The German Political Foundations between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv: Reflections from within

A Case Study: Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in the Palestinian Territories

Marc Frings

1 Introduction

An actor of external democracy promotion? A tool of Germany's foreign policy approach? Or even an additional intelligence service? These examples of (mis) understanding Germany's political *Stiftungen* (foundations) reflect, to a certain degree, the challenge political observers and scholars may face when asked to describe the mission and vision of the six party-affiliated institutions that receive funds from the German government today. Their budgets are mainly channelled through the federal ministry for economic cooperation and development and are dedicated to promoting democracy, political freedom, and the rule of law.[1] Given the foundations' presence abroad for almost 60 years and their growing financial support through different federal ministries, it is striking that scientific literature, and thus academic interest, remains rather limited.

In one of the rare exceptions, Stefan Mair examined the work of the foundations in 2000 and referred to the difficult working environment and likelihood of critical questions from German taxpayers as reasons that trigger the foundations' low profile (and thus false assumptions about their work) (Mair 2000). But is a

[1]Gemeinsame Erklärung zur staatlichen Finanzierung der Politischen Stiftungen, Berlin 1999, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/71.5035/.

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low profile still a desirable yet feasible approach today? And is this assumption correct after all? One can doubt it, given the ranking of the German foundations in the *Global Go To Think Tank Index* presented on an annual basis by the University of Pennsylvania. All foundations receive outstanding marks for their performance, with the *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* (KAS) being ranked best in two charts (Best Think Tank Network, Best Think Tank with a Political Party Affiliation) in the latest edition (McGann 2016). The worldwide perception might echo the shift of the foundations' reluctance, as described by Mair, and today's willingness to apply the tools of public diplomacy.

The unique feature of all foundations is the refusal of 'one-size-fits-all' approaches. In order to better understand the single-case feature that is more in line with the foundations' work, this article sheds light on the work of the KAS in the Palestinian Territories. It is, for a variety of reasons, a special case, as the following pages will illustrate. The article will review KAS' activities in the early stages of its presence in Ramallah and compare them with today's agenda. It will also give an introduction to the political environment and explain the role of KAS as both an interlocutor for and facilitator to German and European networks for Palestinian partners and partner institutions.

2 What, How, Why Do We Work in the Palestinian Territories?

The KAS established its country office in Ramallah in 1996. Prior to the opening, the foundation implemented activities in the Palestinian Territories mainly through its neighbouring offices. Opening a country office reflects the strong desire of the KAS to build long-term structures and institutional partnerships in order to contribute to overall goals that are always developed in cooperation with local partners from the ranks of politics, civil society, the media and academia. In other words: the opening of an office abroad comes with the promise that our foundation is there to stay. This is a political message per se to our political and non-state partners worldwide. The usual prerequisite, however, is the existence of a nation state, led by a government that defines the rules and regulations under which a political foundation can unfold its structures (i.e., opening an office infrastructure) and activities (i.e., conferences, workshops, training, research). The Palestinians still lack both a state and a government with full authority over a people living within defined borders.

The opening of the office in Ramallah was guided by the serious hope for the creation of a Palestinian state next to Israel and according to the principle of a

two-state solution, as described in the Oslo accords of the early 1990s. The office started its operations only months after the first presidential and quasi-parliamentary elections that gave the late president of the PLO, Yasser Arafat and his Fatah-movement a strong mandate to implement the Palestinian list of work and duties as derived from Madrid and Oslo.

One of the early KAS documents on our work in Ramallah describes the peace process and the further progress of institution-building within the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the guiding principles of the Foundation's work in the Palestinian Territories (KAS 1999). Peace work, regional cooperation, rule of law, local governance, economic development, and women's politics were among our interventions in the late 1990s/early 2000s. The report furthermore states:

> As a German political Foundation, KAS works in Israel and the Palestinian Territories in order to strengthen the peace process and support a peaceful agreement between Israelis and Palestinians (…) The Foundation aims to contribute with its activities to economic prosperity, legal certainty, as well as political and social ownership (…) The ultimate goal is democracy promotion and strengthening of the social structure (KAS 1999).

The two-state solution and improved governance capacities remain the long-term aspirations to which KAS wants to contribute with its projects. However, the early hope for a near end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has meanwhile been replaced by the challenge of keeping the idea of two states for two peoples alive. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority (that was never designed to exist for more than five years) struggles to perform according to principles of good governance, and lacks a democratic mandate. Instead of deepening democratic values, international and many Palestinian observers witness the opposite these days: shrinking spaces for civil society, legal consequences for critical thinkers, notably journalists, and obstacles that hinder the development of a viable Palestinian state (i.e., settlements, lack of sovereignty) on a regional level.

3 Political Assumptions

Independent from, but in line with, the federal government

The privilege of a foundation is its independence. But in a critical—and very political—environment such as the Middle East, it is important to highlight that we are clearly operating in line with the official German position vis-à-vis the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. While much emphasis is given to

German-Israeli relations, it is worth mentioning that relations between Berlin and Ramallah are exceptional: German support to the Palestinians—in terms of development cooperation, police training, financial contribution to UNRWA and special support for the reconstruction of Gaza after the 2014-war—exceeded € 200 million in 2015. But bilateral ties are also manifested on the political track. The *ministerial steering committee* between Germany and the PA was inaugurated in 2009 to facilitate closer political cooperation and direct exchange on urgent matters. A survey, conducted by the KAS and the Ramallah-based think tank PSR, revealed in early 2016 that 69% of Palestinians have a very good or good impression of Germany. 59% are convinced that the German government advocates peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and 73% claim a 'special relationship' between Germany and the Palestinians based on the Holocaust (Borchard et al. 2016).

This gives Germany important credits from a Palestinian perspective, although Berlin is clearly perceived as one of the closest allies of Israel as well. Hence, it brings every decision of the German government under special scrutiny. When Palestine asked for the status as a non-member observer at the UN General Assembly in 2012, Germany abstained. A PLO-representative later told me that Germany's vote meant "more to the Palestinians than ten yes-votes from allied states".

4 Rule of Law and Delegations: Examples of Our Work

Projects—initiated, implemented and monitored, based on the "partnership-principle"—form the centre of our work in the Palestinian Territories (and worldwide). Two examples of our portfolio shall be presented here.

The Palestinian Territories, and especially those parts under PA control (approximately 40 % of the occupied West Bank), face a complex judicial system of contradictory and/or missing legal regulations. The KAS has partnered with the Institute of Law (IoL), a research department at Birzeit University, since the very beginning of the establishment of the PA and the opening of our branch in 1996. The rule of law is thus one of the pillars that has remained at the centre of our work ever since. While the set-up of a genuine Palestinian legal framework was the ambitious goal of KAS and the Institute of Law in the early stages, priorities shifted towards the necessity to react to up-to-date developments:

- The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), created as the legislative branch of the PA, is no longer holding meetings that match the required quota. This is the consequence of internal conflicts between the competing movements of Fatah and Hamas that led to a split between Gaza (Hamas-ruled) and West Bank (Fatah/PA-ruled) in 2007;
- The legislating power is mainly in the hands of President Abbas today (for the West Bank), while Hamas has introduced its own laws, norms and regulations for the two million Palestinians living under their rule in Gaza;
- General and democratic elections are overdue on all relevant levels. The mandate of President Abbas and the PLC ended in 2009 and 2010, respectively, with no scheduled elections on the horizon.

Hence, the partnership between the KAS and the IoL today focuses much more on the harmonization of laws. The legal system can be best characterized as an amalgam of foreign footprints, with roots from the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, as well as Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli rule. This was followed by the establishment of the PA and Hamas legislation, with the latter being inspired by Islamic law and political Islam.

Visiting delegation programmes have to be considered as an additional—and very crucial—pillar of the Foundation's activities. The KAS receives delegations from Germany and the EU to share knowledge and perspectives *from within*. These delegations are of great importance, as they allow us to update decision-makers on current developments in the region. Both offices of the KAS—in Ramallah and Jerusalem—complement each other with their respective networks, and therefore work in close cooperation in order to provide visiting groups with a deep understanding of current political trends. But it is not just Germans who are travelling. We also have the opportunity to bring national or mixed delegations to European capitals and discuss Palestinian and/or regional affairs. This happens through closed-door meetings with decision-makers, diplomats and think tanks, but also through public conferences in our premises in Brussels, Berlin, and elsewhere.

These events help us contribute to Germany's public diplomacy and to our self-understanding as an actor in international relations. As a matter of course, Germany today is committed to both Israel's security and the Palestinian aspiration for statehood. The latter is reflected in a general statement that summarizes the work of the KAS worldwide: "In our European and international cooperation efforts we work for people to be able to live self-determined lives in freedom

and dignity."[2] The chairman of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung recently used a public event on the situation in the Palestinian Territories to state:

> Freedom, justice, and solidarity are our guiding values. We want all people to benefit from these values. And hence, we [KAS] are not in favour of one side, and against the other side (…) our values are valued for both peoples, Israelis and Palestinians (Pöttering 2017).

The occasion for his remarks had been the visit of Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, to Germany in March 2017. President Abbas accepted an invitation by the KAS to speak publicly about the future of the two-state solution and domestic challenges of his people. The event took place on the eve of Abbas' official meetings with Chancellor Angela Merkel and further officials from the federal government and the German parliament. It gave the president a platform to address the German public and—at the same time—the Foundation the opportunity to demonstrate its valuable contribution to Germany's foreign policy.

Cross-linking our work abroad with trends and debates in Europe is definitely important for us. Foreign and security policies play a more important role today and the need for expertise is rising. More than 90 offices constantly report on developments and trends on a national, regional, and global level. The faltering belief in the feasibility of a two-state solution serves as a good example here. The past year saw only weak support for the two-state solution among Palestinians, mainly because of their loss of hope vis-à-vis any chance for statehood in the upcoming years. We provide this information not only via people-to-people exchanges, but also through publications, media appearances and social-media outreach.

Rule of law and delegations constitute only two examples of our work. However, we are also focusing on the reasons that are currently triggering the political impasse, and mapping realities of the political situation on the ground. Therefore, the KAS conducts public opinion polls with the above mentioned think tank PSR, cooperates with the *Palestine Strategy Group* on long-term strategies, and conducts research on law enforcement and security perception in areas B and C (thus areas that are not or only partly under PA control).

[2]Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, About Us, http://www.kas.de/palaestinensische-gebiete/en/about/.

5 Conclusion: Surprise Your Audience! Go Public! Create Momentum!

While a country office usually covers different areas of intervention and policy fields, the uniqueness of our work in Ramallah lies in the interconnectivity of each and every topic with the military occupation and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. This political burden limits both the work of any international actor and the messages that we can share with our networks in Europe through delegation programmes and publications. For that reason we are working in the Palestinian Territories on what can best be described as surprise messages. We want to turn the perspective and add some stories of hope and success to the predominant picture of an apparently 'irresolvable' conflict. Take the start-up-scene in Gaza. 2000 students graduate annually from universities in Gaza with a technical degree. Half of the entire Palestinian population is 19 years old or younger. Hence, the potential for a growing creative IT sector is huge. KAS is therefore partnering with the *Gaza Sky Geeks*, a start-up-accelerator and -incubator that hosts start-up-weekends, TED talks, and excels through a very committed group of staff. We are providing access to the German start-up-scene and support exchange programmes between Silicon Valley, Berlin-Neukölln and Gaza City. Another project targets Christians who form an almost neglected minority in a region that some call the *Holy Land*. We want to highlight that Christian life still goes on—and that Christians, despite the alarming migration trends, contribute to the public sphere and the economy.

Foreign security and development policies are no longer just taking place abroad. Germany and Europe are experiencing the consequences of global and regional crises. The right and appropriate tool to frame these developments is a public stance in accordance with our set of values. In many cases, it is prerequisite to appear in the media and in public events in order to defend these values and our approach in our partner countries. The KAS is present in all social media channels. The country office in Ramallah alone has more than 9000 Facebook followers that receive regular briefings and access to videos on current affairs in the Palestinian Territories.

The work, experience and knowledge of German political Foundations are more decisive today. Experts from political foundations and our networks can help explain and analyse events that happen in and around Europe. They can furthermore bring up new topics and refer to experiences of other regions and countries. This defines one of the big differences between our early work and today's priorities. Political development cooperation is no longer a one-way-street, but is better defined as a platform for reciprocal exchange.

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The Work of the Political Foundations Against the Backdrop of the "Shrinking Space" of Civil Society in Israel

Kerstin Müller

1 Introduction

The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (HBS) is an intellectually open, civic organization that promotes its values not only in Germany, but worldwide. It is the German Green foundation affiliated with the German Green Party (*Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*). All major political parties in Germany are connected to a foundation, which, though independent, is politically aligned to them. They are called political foundations, and are non-profit organizations that are funded by the German government.

The political foundations can be described by the way that they play a role in between political diplomacy and development aid. This means that they don't have to follow diplomatic common agreements in their work or the specific political line defined by the German foreign office—although they act within its framework. They are also not engaged in the field of development policy. But nevertheless, they play an important role in the preliminary political stages by working with local NGOs that try to influence politics from within their society. Very often they even influence agents of political change in their societies.

All foundations whose party is represented in the parliament are allocated money—regardless of whether this party is part of the governing coalition or not. The German Greens have been in opposition since 2005 and in their work, domestically and abroad, they often follow policies that are different from those

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of the German government. Even if they were part of the government, the foundation's legal basis, confirmed by the German Supreme Court, is absolutely independent from the Green party. As a consequence, Green members of the parliament cannot be on the foundation's board or work for the foundation at all. This is not only strictly forbidden, but also monitored by the Supreme Court.

2 The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation and its Partners—Strengthening Democracy and Civil Society

The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation is committed to certain values that it shares with the German Green party. The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation's headquarters are located in Berlin with a staff of about 180. The foundation sees itself as a catalyst for green visions and projects, a think tank for policy reform, and an international network. It promotes the development of democratic civil society at home and abroad, it defends equal rights and equal opportunities regardless of gender, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, or nationality, and it supports cultural projects as part of civic education programmes.

Internationally, the foundation has established 33 offices around the world, and funds projects in about 60 countries. In the Middle East and Northern Africa, the foundation has offices in Israel, located in Tel Aviv, in Ramallah, covering Palestine and Jordan, in Beirut, responsible for Lebanon and Syria, in Tunisia, and in Rabat, Morocco. It often operates at the interface between foreign and development policy, but it is more independent to the extent that it does not have to follow diplomatic constraints.

In cooperation with our local partners we organize and support workshops and conferences, training, publications, and research. We support advocacy, capacity and coalition building, and are active in initiating public debates on political, environmental, and social issues. Additional important activities of international cooperation include visitor programmes, which enhance the exchange of dialogue and political networking, as well as staff development for committed activists.

3 The Heinrich-Böll-Foundation's Four Project Components in Israel

The Israel office works mainly in four areas:

3.1 Environment and Sustainability

Environmental issues have always been of central importance to the Greens and to the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation. Equally important have been the connections and links made to social and economic issues, creating a holistic vision of society and sustainability. Our work in Israel therefore focuses on climate and energy policy, the green economy and smart growth, urban resilience and sustainable communities. Together with our partners we work with decision-makers at the local and national levels in the area of advocacy, policy development, capacity building, and environmental innovation. The foundation supports a variety of Israeli environmental and social organizations, which, over the last decade, have striven to increase their impact on policy and society.

3.2 Gender and Democracy

Our Gender and Democracy programme seeks to enhance a comprehensive democracy that provides an inclusive, participatory system that ensures full civil and human rights. Realizing that gender is a fundamental factor in shaping societies, we try to promote a political culture that prioritizes gender democratic values and practices on all levels.

3.3 Foreign and Security Policy

Our foreign and security policy programme aims to broaden the traditional security discourse to include a human security approach that considers human rights as well as gender aspects. We provide space for NGOs, experts, media, and government officials to debate on-going regional and security policy developments. In order also to have an impact on the political debates of the so-called Israeli mainstream, we support NGOs that are able to reach out to the mainstream media and debates, especially on topics like regional security and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the two-state-solution. By bringing Israeli peace and human rights NGOs together with Israeli decision-makers and international policy makers, we also encourage the development of alternative political strategies that may contribute to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolution process.

3.4 German-Israeli Dialogue

The German-Israeli dialogue programme contributes to a strong German-Israeli relationship that is based on a realistic perception and mutual understanding of the past as well as the present. It works for the benefit of shared democratic values in both countries, bringing together opinion leaders from Israel and Germany from the fields of politics, academia, the media, civil society, and art. As part of the programme, the HBS cooperates with the Israel Public Policy Institute and has established two fellowships. These provide young professionals from Germany with hands-on work experience while tackling common societal questions in Israel and Germany today in order to foster joint perspectives for the future. The two fellowships, 'Environmental Innovation—German-Israeli Perspectives' and 'Rethinking Security in the 21st Century—German-Israeli perspectives' allow the participants to gain exposure to the work of both the HBS and a partner institution in Israel while they also compose a policy paper on a common challenge to both Israel and Germany.

4 The Work of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Against the Backdrop of NGO Law

On July 11, 2016, the Knesset adopted a bill that includes various new obligations for NGOs that are predominantly funded by foreign entities. The government claims the bill to be a matter of 'transparency', based on the concern that foreign governments may try to influence political life in Israel. From our point of view, however, the bill serves as a legal justification to crack down on a selected group of organizations that are critical of the government's policies. It is true that the final wording of the law was somewhat softer than the original bill. This was due to pressure from people in Israel and abroad who stood up against the proposal and voiced their concerns for the violation of the democratic rights it entails. With the same goal in mind, the directors of all six political foundations that are directly affiliated with German parties wrote a joint letter to the Israeli government. Ultimately, however, the law fulfilled its objective, which is the de-legitimation and marginalization of NGOs critical of the government and especially those groups who oppose the occupation and still advocate the two-state-solution.

The adaption of the final law concluded months of heated debates in both Israeli civil society and the parliament. In short, the new law demands that all NGOs receiving more than half of their funds from foreign "state entities" must

specify details about the source of their funding in their publications and in communications with civil servants or elected officials. Hence, it obviously concerns foreign foundations that have a branch in Israel and provide funding to Israeli NGOs, such as the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation and other German foundations, because they receive the biggest part of their budget from German ministries. These are mainly the ministry of economic cooperation and development, and the foreign ministry. The organizations that are most affected, however, are the 27 Israeli NGOs that defend human rights and challenge the Israeli government's policies in the occupied Palestinian territories. Some of these are project partners of the HBS.

5 The Israeli NGO Law—to Achieve More Transparency?

As mentioned above, the new bill affects NGOs that defend the human rights of Arabs in Israel and Palestinians under Israeli occupation as well as those organizations addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general. In that sense it might be that, in the future, NGOs that are currently partners of the HBS in Israel could be affected by the law. The government argues that it merely wants to make transparent the influence that foreign governments allegedly try to wield on Israeli politics and opinions.

However, we argue that this reasoning is only a cover for a targeted effort to further curtail the work of those NGOs that are critical of the government. In its current state, the bill spares those NGOs from any new obligations that are on the government's side of the political spectrum and advocate the same agenda. We are convinced that a lively civil society is the cornerstone of a strong and democratic society. It is precisely for that reason that the NGOs that do not agree with the policy of the current government are indispensable. A strong opposition is a crucial element of democracy. If a democracy starts to suppress and destroy its opposition, it starts to destroy its own basis.

6 Israel's Civil Society Under Pressure

Officially, the 'Transparency Bill' currently stipulates the increase of transparency with regard to funds flowing from overseas actors to civil society actors in Israel. In fact, it serves to further promote the on-going de-legitimation process of progressive NGOs in the country through a public shaming process that depicts

the latter as minions of foreign governments. Special emphasis is placed on the organizations that actively seek to overturn the Israeli occupation of the Palestinians. The proposed bill hampers the activities of progressive civil society actors in Israel and has aggravated Jerusalem's closest international allies.

7 The NGO Law in Detail

Since the passing of the new law, NGOs, whose main funding (over 50%) stems from foreign public funds (including the EU and the UN), are required to include a list of their donors in any of their official publications. According to the original draft of the bill, the representatives of the aforementioned organizations would also have been required to wear a badge whenever they accessed a public institution, indicating their names and the identity of the entities funding their organizations. However, this clause was dropped from the final incarnation of the law.

The bill prides itself on increasing transparency regarding funding sources of Israeli civil society organizations, whereas in reality it only targets institutions whose funding sources are already fully accessible because they are closely monitored by the governments they get their funding from. Opponents of the law advocate leaving organizations whose financial channels are kept in secrecy alone. The reason for the partiality of the bill lies in the fact that it only applies to organizations whose activities rely on foreign public funds, and not to funding provided by private donors. Given the funding topography in the country, in which left-leaning organizations are mainly supported by the former, but right-leaning organizations by the latter, this differentiated approach leads de facto to only left-leaning organizations being covered by the legislation.

Given that the law aims to increase of transparency, and not single out government-critical organizations, one may rightfully ask about the obvious discrepancy between the law's declared purpose on the one hand, and its selective formulation that applies solely to funding sources that are already transparent on the other.

8 The Argument Behind the Bill

The rationale in favour of scrutinizing organizations supported by foreign public funding in the name of transparency while ignoring donations from private donors was clearly explained by the current chief promoter of the law, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked:

> A country that wants to defend its sovereignty needs to set clear limits on the intervention of foreign agents. The invasion into another country's public space, blatantly intervening in another country's internal affairs amounts to an infringement on the latter's sovereignty, most certainly when such an intervention is not transparent. (…) these are NGOs that presume themselves to represent the Israeli interest, but in fact are funded by foreign governments that are using them according to their world view.

According to this approach, the transparency bill does not attempt to promote transparency as a value in itself, but rather serves as a *tool* in order to safeguard Israel's sovereignty from external (governmental) interventions in its internal public sphere and protect the country's democracy from disproportionate representation of other countries' interests.

Breaking this argument down to its two fundamental premises is crucial in order to understand the motivation behind the proposed law:

1. NGOs that rely on foreign government funding do not represent a legitimate Israeli voice, but rather function as proxies/lobbyists that promote other governments' interests (and are therefore not to be trusted).
2. Only NGOs funded by foreign governments are to be suspected. In a world that is allegedly run by nation-states, only foreign governments can infringe on the sovereignty of a given state. Therefore, organizations funded by private donors, regardless of how influential they may be, do not call for inspection and are accordingly not included in the proposed bill.

Needless to say both aforementioned premises are fallacious and misleading:

9 Israeli Civil Society Organizations Backed by Foreign Public Funding are not Proxies or Lobbyists for Foreign Governments

The attempt to depict civil society organizations that receive public funding from abroad as proxies or agents of foreign governments is factually wrong and only seeks to de-legitimize them in order to marginalize their impact in the target country. The organizations in question apply for funding from a myriad of sources, among which are grants from foreign governments. Securing a government grant does not grant the foreign government with decision-making authority on the operations of the organization supported.

Hence, the organizations in question cannot be regarded as messengers, proxies or agents of foreign governments. Rather they consist of dedicated groups of Israeli citizens committed to a local agenda, be it focussed on the environment, women's rights, marginalized populations or, yes, the termination of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinians (a position that is consistently supported by well over 50% of the Israeli public). The donations pledged to these organizations by foreign governments do not render the Israeli NGOs any less patriotic or committed to promoting the interests of Israeli society.

The NGOs supported by foreign public funding are not lobbyists. Rather, they seek support from organizations, some of which are foreign governments, with which a convergence of interests and shared values is established. This constellation differs greatly from the framework in which a lobbyist is hired by an organization or a government in order to push forward the latter's agenda.

As shown before in Israel, the Foundation's work concentrates on supporting Israeli organizations dedicated to promoting environmental sustainability, equal gender representation in public institutions, and more besides. Claiming that an Israeli grassroots organization that is dedicated to the promotion of women's participation in the public sphere is nothing short of a proxy of the German government, only because it is supported by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, is absurd.

10 Distinction Between Public and Private Funding in the Legislation is Two-Faced

Suppose that one follows the rationale suggested by the proponents of the bill, who deny a deliberate crackdown on government-critical civil-society organizations. What other explanation is there for the selective nature of a law that calls for more transparency, yet deliberately leaves out private donors?

Is it only because public funding is directed towards political activities that create a disproportionate balance of foreign political interests in the country? This is clearly not the case. A significant amount of private funding flows to political organizations in the country, and unlike public funding, it is not transparent and not being monitored. Take the right-wing NGO *Im Tirzu*[1] for example. The organization, which recently launched a series of campaigns depicting left-leaning

[1]The Hebrew sentence "Im Tirzu" means, "If you want". It is part of a famous quote by Theodor Herzl, "Im Tirzu en zor agada" (If you want, it is not a legend) meaning nothing is impossible.

NGOs and Israeli culture figures as 'moles' of European governments and traitors, received NIS 6.83 million between the years 2006–2013 in private donations from 'foreign entities'. Despite its accusations of progressive NGOs acting secretly as agents of foreign interests, the organization itself conceals the sources of the majority of its funding. Only NIS 860,000 (12% of the organization's foreign funding) can be traced back to the donors, whereas the vast majority (88%) remains clandestine.

The Israeli NGO Peace Now examined the reports for 2006–2013 of nine other Israeli NGOs identified with the political right and found that the sources of nearly half a billion of shekel that have influenced policy and public opinion in Israel in recent years are not transparent, and that the public has no way of knowing where this funding originates.

Of the total contributions (NIS 495.44 million), 98.35% (NIS 487.29 million) are not fully transparent. The fully transparent contributions (NIS 8.15 million) equal 1.7% of the budget and ostensibly transparent contributions total about NIS 22.4 millon (4.5%).

Some of the right-wing organizations whose private donors remain unknown support the building of new settlements. It is worth mentioning the Ir David[2] foundation (Amutat EL-AD) or the Yesha Council that advocates the establishment of settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Perhaps the distinction is justified because of the degree of clout that the funding entities possess? One might think that a private person cannot be as influential or powerful as a foreign government. However, we learn that private donors can surpass the influence of states—eventually when it boils down to the size of the grant and not the overall financial capacity of the entity. Sheldon Adelson's proposal to US President Barack Obama to completely finance the *Iron Dome* system in Israel at the modest cost of US$ 1 billion drives this point home.

Is the distinction perhaps justified because the governments that support Israeli organizations are in a state of conflict with the Israeli state and seek to undermine it from within with the help of local proxies? Hardly. The foreign governments in question make for some of Israel's closest allies in the international arena. Moreover, it seems that the Israeli state itself has very few problems in receiving funding from these governments when it comes to cutting-edge weapons systems and scientific agreements etc.

[2]The Hebrew word "Ir" means "city". Ir David is the city of David, namely Jerusalem.

It seems that despite the generous attempt to follow the rationale of this discrepancy-ridden law, the only logical explanation for the exclusion of the privately funded organizations from legislation that prides itself on promoting transparency lies in the identity of the organizations in question. The mistrust instigated towards NGOs that receive funding from foreign governments by such legislation is therefore the primary effect and probably purpose of the initiators of the bill.

11 The Argument Behind the Bill is Misleading

In summary, the proposed legislation employs the term 'transparency' as a justification to crack down on a selected group of organizations that disagree with or oppose the government's policy. It serves as a further building block in the de-legitimation process against left-leaning Israeli NGOs that has been rapidly unfolding over the past five years. It depicts these groups as puppets of foreign agents and consequently as immediate suspects of treason. It employs a two-faced logic as it does not target organizations that receive funding from non-governmental sources based on the somewhat lazy argument that private donors are not foreign states and therefore do not infringe on a state's sovereignty (as if the latter could only be practised in a state-to-state relationship). It is furthermore two-faced because it treats Israel's closest allies as potential enemies.

The law constitutes yet another step in a series of attempts to diminish the activities of Israeli NGOs that are critical of certain policies of the government and whose ability to work freely in Israel constitutes an important pillar of the country's democracy.

The law stipulates increased transparency with regards to funds flowing from overseas to civil society actors in Israel. However, given the fact that all of the donations NGOs receive from foreign governments are already transparent and under high scrutiny, whereas private funding, which remains mostly uninspected, is not covered by the law, it becomes clear that transparency is not the real issue at hand.

The fact that private funding is not covered by the law makes it quite evident that organizations that are primarily targeted by the law are those that are critical of certain policies of the current government, especially NGOs that work for the promotion of human rights and to end the occupation.

About the Author

Kerstin Müller stepped in as director of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation's Israel Office, Tel Aviv in December 2013. At the end of the last legislative term, Kerstin Müller concluded her career of many years as a Member of the German Bundestag, serving as the Spokesperson on Foreign Policy for Alliance 90/The Greens. In the second term of the red-green government coalition from 2002–2005, Kerstin Müller was Deputy Foreign Minister of Germany. The Middle East, and especially Israel, have been the focus of her work over many years. In countless visits to the region, she built a broad network of personal and political contacts.

The Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation's Work in Israel and the Palestinian Territories

Walter Klitz

1 Introduction

The Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation für die Freiheit (FNS) provides liberal political education. We make it possible for individuals to participate in political events and with good background knowledge. We support young talented people with scholarships. Internationally, we stand up for human rights and democracy in more than 60 countries by supporting policy dialogue and policy consultation, requests and commitment.

The foundation works in Israel as well as in the Palestinian Territories. It enjoys great appreciation among its partners in political, academic and economic fields. Since 1984 in Israel, and since 1994 in the Palestinian Territories, we have promoted the reinforcement of liberal ideas and principles, the bridging of social disparities, the support of a desire for peace and the pursuit of a permanent and just peace agreement on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance. This was and is not always easy. The Second Intifada and recurring waves of terror have led to setbacks. If we take stock, we can proudly observe that the work of the political foundation has clearly left its mark on the German-Israeli relationship. We are working unerringly on a peaceful solution to the conflict and confidently cherish the notion of a peaceful coexistence within secured borders.

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2 Organization of Work

In our project office in East Jerusalem, the foundation's work is supervised by an Israeli-Palestinian team on both sides. In spite of all differences it has been working since 1994, also in times of crisis. The Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation therefore has a unique characteristic that can be traced back to the political atmosphere as a result of the Oslo I Accords in the mid-90s. In so doing, the work of the Foundation faces a particular challenge as it strives for a fair balance between conflicting interests without excluding the special historical responsibility of Germany.

The Foundation works on four levels of dialogue: the German-Israeli dialogue, the dialogue between the Jewish majority population and the Arab minority, Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and the Inner-Palestinian dialogue.

3 Choice of Partner and Content of the Work

We wish to reach people in the Palestinian Territories as well as in Israel that share our liberal outlook: the strengthening of democratic and constitutional institutions, a peaceful compromise between Israel and the Palestinians to form a two-state solution, a market-oriented framework, and an open society free from religious paternalism. A prerequisite for cooperation with local organizations is that they are willing to support and spread liberal values. Moreover, it is expected that partners are sufficiently organized and interconnected to introduce these values to public discourse and secure a lasting impact. The political conditions of such cooperation's are part of Germany's special historical responsibility:

- The recognition of Israel's right of existence within secured borders
- The recognition and compliance of previous agreements and obligations
- The renunciation of violence
- The active support of the two-state solution
- No direct or indirect collaboration with Hamas or associated organizations
- No cooperation with organizations that support the political, academic and economic boycotts of Israel

Bound to the liberal value of individual freedom, we place special attention on the problematic relationship between state and religion. Interreligious dialogue, religious paternalism, religious education and the military, and the social and political role of rabbis and imams as well as the separation of state and religion are at the heart of the work we do with our partner organizations. In the tradition

of the Enlightenment, the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation conveys liberal values that are conducive to democratic rule, especially human rights and a state framework that ensures the conditions for a self-determined life for its citizens. In our view, individual freedom is an essential prerequisite that legitimizes government action.

In the Palestinian Territories it is only possible to control public institutions and support economic innovation while letting society and culture flourish freely by means of a legal and social system that rests on liberal principles. Human rights, religious freedom, political legitimacy and transparency, private property and freedom of contract form common laws and they are non-negotiable basic rights. By strengthening private-sector, growth is being unleashed and the lack of perspectives for Palestinian young people is reaching its end.

4 Noteworthy Activities in 2016

- Discussion and lecture panels with selected topics about liberalism that aim to stimulate the political discourse.
- Measures for dialogue on the subject of relationships between state and religion. Public discussions and increasing awareness of the monopoly position of orthodoxy, religious paternalism, curtailment of individuals and the religious right of freedom, instruction to be a multiplicator and information sessions about existing informal alternatives to religious ceremonies.
- Majority/minority proportion, Israeli-Arab dialogue events and research projects. East Jerusalem project – research and working group for improvement of infrastructure and local services in East Jerusalem. Israeli-Arab working group under the heading, "Land and soil in the Jewish-Arab network of relations". Inheritance law for Muslim women in Israel.
- Trans-boundary dialogue. ME 2.0 – dialogue forum with Palestinian and Israeli young entrepreneurs with the goal of professional exchange and networking, promotion of economic cooperation, support of peace camps on both sides, exchange with experts and study trips, Turkish-Israeli dialogue on civil society (TICSF), contribution to the stabilization of fragile relationships, dialogue events and website for information exchange and networking for NGOs, European/German – Israeli/Jewish dialogue, conferences and study trips.
- Research and dialogue projects about alternatives to the two-state solution (Israeli-Palestinian confederation model). After extensive examination, the research group, made up of academics and policy makers, came to the conclusion that the confederation model has little chance of success.

- Position paper about history, the initiators and participants as well as the political goals of the BDS movement "Boykott des Friedens – die Boykottbewegung und der Westen" (trans. Boycot of Peace – the Boycott movement and the West).
- Major event with about 1000 participants in Jericho on occasion of Anti-Corruption Day.

5 Competitors

Israel and the Palestinian Territories have the highest NGO density on a global scale. Foreign organizations mainly work in the humanitarian, religious and political sector. They are financed predominantly by the home country's public money, or supranational institutions. Especially worth mentioning are the programmes of the European Union. Up to 200 Palestinian and Israeli organizations take part in their tenders e.g., the yearly EU tender for the EU Peacebuilding Initiative (before: EU Partnership for Peace Programme). In the Palestinian territories in particular there is a great financial dependency on donations from abroad due to the labour-market situation.

While there are regular coordination meetings with institutions of governmental development cooperation that mainly help with projects, politically non-legitimized organizations increasingly claim a political ideological mandate for themselves and support matters that go beyond their actual assignment. These are not in accordance with the diplomatic considerations of the Federal Republic of Germany.

6 Legal Basic Conditions for Work

The Foundation's initiatives support our partners' needs without exception. Through this, the repeated argument of interference in internal affairs, especially from a national religious camp in Israel and from opponents of normalization in the Palestinian Territories, should be counteracted. Moreover, the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation is registered as a foreign non-profit company in Israel. The Foundation is therefore subject to Israeli company law, must produce a balance sheet every year, and has to accept company audits by the tax authorities. Its work is therefore fully transparent to the Israeli authorities and has never caused reason for complaint.

The work of the foundation follows the proven German foreign policy goals of the last few decades. Even if the Foundation has met all necessary inner-state legal precautions in order to avoid political isolationists, there are still messianic religious decision makers who aim to restrict civic involvement and oppose pluralism.

Political foundations have to register in Israel as well as in the Palestinian Territories. In both cases there are two possibilities: firstly, registration as a foundation. Secondly, registration as a non-profit company.

Even though cooperation with political parties and members of parliament is not regulated in the Ethical Rules for the Members of Knesset, members of the Knesset are still expected in case of doubt to gain advice from the Knesset's Ethical Commission. This was the case on several occasions in the past. The commission decided in several cases that a direct cooperation with foreign organizations that are directed solely to members of one party is not valid and that events must be open to the general public.

7 Restrictions of the Foundation's Work

In May 2015, the governing parties Likud and HaBait HaYehudi agreed in their coalition agreement to change the so-called Amutot law (law on the registration of public associations and non-profit organizations, 1980) and to impose a tax on grants from public treasuries of foreign governments to Israeli NGOs in Israel. The goal of this legislative project was basically to cut the influence of left-oriented and government-critical NGOs, and simultaneously maintain the financing of right-wing NGOs, for which financing mostly comes from private sources. This is especially problematic from a democratic point of view. Even though the law was passed in a much more weakened form in the summer of 2016, caution is required. The genie is out of the bottle. This law is one of three central legislative projects of the national religious party HaBait HaYehudi. The other two central projects that will strike the Israeli constitutional state at its core are the nation-state bill, in which Israel's character as a 'Jewish state' shall be codified, and a law that wants to cut the rights of the supreme court over the government.

The topic will stay on the agenda. The activity of cultural and academic institutions is to be examined by 'ethical codes' more and more. In 2013, Ayelet Shaked (HaBait HaYehudi, current Israeli justice minister) and Robert Ilatov (Likud Beiteinu) had taken initiative against foreign funding of NGOs. This law change limited foreign financing to Israeli NGOs, and stipulated a tax rate of 45% was stipulated if they:

- demand prosecution of Israeli soldiers before international courts of justice
- support the boycott of Israeli products or institutions, their sanctioning or the withdrawal of investments from Israel
- deny Israel the right of existence as a Jewish and democratic state
- encourage racism
- call for armed battle against Israel

As these are quite indeterminate legal concepts, there is a big margin for judgement in any case of litigation. That is exactly where the danger lies. Even 'moderate' NGOs can be affected, which means that the original draft law could have been directed against critical parts of civil society in Israel as a whole. As a reason to impose a limitation on NGOs' work, Shaked and Ilatov list the activities of left-oriented NGOs that undermine Israel's democratic character and increase the influence of foreign governments in domestic politics.

Amongst the Palestinian liberation movement there have also been thoughts on passing an NGO law since the end of 2015. This involves the introduction of tax liability for:

a) Organizations that are registered as non-profit companies. Of around 2000 registered organizations, about 600 active organizations would currently be affected. The deliberations clearly take aim at organizations of politically ambitious personalities e.g., the organization of the former prime minister Salam Fayyad, Future for Palestine (FFP), which cannot receive any foreign grant without the explicit consent of the cabinet, even though he is currently only active in the sector of technical cooperation due to political repression.
b) International NGOs registered in the West Bank.
   This would also affect the German political foundations that are registered in the West Bank.
c) State organizations for development cooperation.

In a bilateral framework agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1998, the Palestinian Authority committed itself not to levy taxes on organizations for development cooperation. This agreement is explicitly valid for, "Companies that conduct support measures out of funds of the Federal Republic of Germany and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany." For political foundations, charitable organizations and church institutions that are registered in the Palestinian Territories, the extent of the validity of this development cooperation agreement would have to be ascertained. On the part of the Federal Republic of Germany there is no privilege agreement for NGOs within the Palestinian Authority.

There have already been some constraints for German organizations registered in Ramallah with payment transactions to partner organizations, because the banks were ordered to get authorization from the Palestinian authority before transactions to Palestinian organizations could be made.

About the Author

Walter Klitz directed the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation in Israel and the Palestinian Territories between 2012 and 2016. He joined the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation for Liberty in 1994. After the collapse of the Iron Curtain, became Director of the new Project Baltic States in Tallinn/Estonia. From 1996 to 2000 he was Executive Manager and Spokesman for the Department "Press, Public Relations and Communications" at the Foundation's head office in Königswinter (Bonn) and later in Potsdam (Berlin). From 2001 to 2005 he was Representative of the Foundation at the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions in Washington D.C./USA. After returning to Germany in 2005 he served as Head of the Central, South East and East European Desk. From 2007 to 2012 he was in charge of the project in South Korea and in North Korea.

Part V

The German Political Foundations between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv: Local Partners and Outsiders Perspectives

German Political Foundations in Israel: An Israeli Academic Perspective

Shlomo Shpiro

1 Introduction

The German political foundations have been active in Israel since the 1960s. Only two decades after the end of the Second World War and the Holocaust, German political decision-makers found it expedient, indeed necessary, to extend nascent and emotionally laden German-Israeli relations into the fields of political education by incorporating Israel into the global work of their main political foundations. The resulting five decades of cooperation have been very successful for both sides. From a small start at tiny offices in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the activities of these foundations has evolved into a wide range of cooperation programmes, events and partnerships. The foundations gained much respect and appreciation for their activities, traits not to be taken for granted in the Israel of the 1970s and 1980s, where anti-German sentiments were still quite strong. They also played an important role in bringing together politicians and economic decision-makers from both countries. Later, their work extended to issues relating to relations between Israel and the European Union. Today, the activities of the German political foundations play an important role in German-Israeli relations and in the development of democracy education in Israel and neighbouring countries.

Rather than adding to the wide overview of the activities of the German political foundations in Israel, this chapter aims to bring a narrower, personal point of view from an Israeli perspective. Having had close interaction with German

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political foundations, principally the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), for almost a quarter of a century, I feel qualified to provide some insights into their modes of operation and their impact within Israeli academia and society.

2 The German Political Foundations in Israel: An Academic Point of View

My own interaction with German political foundations began in the mid-1990s. Having graduated with a bachelor's degree in international relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and subsequently a master's degree in intelligence and international relations at Salford University in the United Kingdom, I began working on my PhD at the University of Birmingham. The topic of my research, prompted by a lifelong interest in the role of intelligence services in international affairs, was 'The roles of Intelligence Services in Foreign Policy'. The doctoral thesis analysed four decades of German-Israeli intelligence and security cooperation. For this research, I needed to spend an extended period in Germany. Not having the financial means to fund such a research stay myself, I had to search for a suitable scholarship.

Although my family history had a strong German element to it——indeed the name *'Shpiro'* comes from the town of Speyer in Rheinland Pfalz (until 1825 also spelled *'Speier'*)——I had not visited Germany before my university studies. Over 30 of my relatives were murdered by the Nazis in the Holocaust. But I grew up in a home where Germany was also spoken of in terms of the future, not only the past. My father, the historian Dr. David Shpiro, participated in one of the earliest German-Israeli student exchanges in the late 1960s. At that time, such contact with Germans were frowned upon, even ostracized in Israel. In the 1970s, our home in Jerusalem was a focal point for German guests. I vividly recall the visit of a young German military doctor to our home during the kidnapping of German industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer, who was later murdered by the RAF terrorists. By the time, I had begun my PhD studies, I was very familiar with Germany's history and political system.

In 1995 I visited the KAS office in Jerusalem, seeking a scholarship for my PhD research in Germany. The KAS representative at the time, Dr. Gerhard Wahlers, was very pleased about my interest in Germany, but after making some inquiries with the Foundation's office in Sankt Augustin explained that, due to the lack of applicants, the KAS did not hold scholarship selection committees in Israel. I could not be considered for scholarship without attending a selection committee.

After considerable administrative effort, Dr. Wahlers was able to get approval for me to attend a selection committee conducted for German students in Germany. I travelled to Bonn and was the only foreigner to attend that committee day. One of the committee members was the head of the KAS research department, one of Germany's leading experts in security policies, and we immediately found a common language. The outcome of that meeting was a year spent as a post-doctoral research fellow at the KAS headquarters in Sankt Augustin, conducting research on parliamentary control and the oversight of intelligence services in Germany and Britain. The results of this research were published by the KAS as a book under the title 'Guarding the Guards'. In the framework of my studies in Sankt Augustin, I became familiar with the work not only of the KAS, but of the other German political foundations as well.

After completing my post-doctorate in Germany I returned to Israel, where I was appointed to the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University, which has been my professional and intellectual home ever since. Over the years, I cooperated closely with the KAS on numerous projects and issues, ranging from international conferences, academic and political exchange visits and research projects, to facilitating informal contact and participating in joint Israeli-Palestinian-German initiatives. Perhaps one of the best moments of my cooperation with the KAS was sitting as a member of a scholarship selection committee in Jerusalem, awarding outstanding young Israeli students with fellowships for studying in Germany, fully two decades after I myself became the beneficiary of such a scholarship.

In 1999, I received a call from the KAS Representative in Ramallah, Dr. Henning Niederhoff. "Would you be interested in taking part in a visit to the Yad-Vashem Holocaust Museum together with a group of Palestinians?" was his question. At first I was dumbfounded, which in any other context would probably have been quite innocuous. But in Israel of the late 1990s, with waves of terrorism and political violence, relations between Israelis and Palestinians had deteriorated so much and precluded virtually any contact. I found it difficult to share the historical legacy of the Holocaust with Palestinians, when Palestinian propaganda gave such wide voice to Holocaust denial.

After struggling with myself for several days, I agreed to take part in the Yad Vashem visit. Dr Niederhoff assembled a small group of Israelis and Palestinians, which included journalists, scholars and young students. One participant was Ari Rath, Holocaust survivor and former editor of the Jerusalem Post, whose unique Viennese humour helped break the ice between Israelis and Palestinians and contributed much to the historical depth of the discussions. Another supporter was Noach Flug, President of the International Auschwitz Committee. Soon this one

visit became a series of activities involving deep discussions about the meaning and making of identities and history. These were not political meetings, and politics were not even discussed. On the contrary, discussions went way beyond 'ordinary' politics and into the very personal realm of identity, very seldom expressed before total strangers. A very vibrant group dynamic developed, and contacts among group members were maintained for many years, even during the difficult years of the Second Intifada. These Yad Vashem visits and the ensuing meetings and discussions were, without doubt, some of the most emotionally difficult dialogues I have ever participated in (Niederhoff 2011).

In the mid-2000s, I was invited to take part in a new FES project. Coordinated by Dr. Roby Nathanson at the Macro Center for Economic Development in Tel-Aviv, the Israel-Europe Policy Network——IEPN——aimed to make a substantial contribution to public discourse and political debates on European-Israeli relations. The project, which has been running for almost 15 years, conducted policy workshops, facilitated high-level meetings, and research on a wide range of Israeli-European topics. The results were published in a series of books presented to policy-makers in Europe, Israel and the US (Nathanson and Stetter 2007). The IEPN network brought together ministers, parliamentarians, government officials, academics and experts on discussions on political, social, economic and energy issues. These activities made a distinct contribution to a better understanding, both in the EU and inside Israel, to each side's needs, interests and expectations, as well as providing analysis, policy options and recommendations.

In 2009, I initiated an international conference on the role of intelligence services in conflict and peace together with the KAS representative in Jerusalem at the time, Dr. Lars Haensel. The conference, which was a joint initiative with the International Intelligence History Association, was attended by over a hundred experts from all over the world. Discussions focused not only on the traditional political and military roles of intelligence, but especially on their roles in identifying and directing opportunities for conflict resolution and peace-making.[1] The conference made a marked contribution towards a better understanding of the role of intelligence services in peace-making. Many papers of the conference were subsequently published in leading journals, including the Journal of Intelligence History, and received wide distribution among policymakers and statesmen. Since then, more highly successful conferences were organized together with the KAS at my university.

[1]See online: http://intelligence-history.org/?page_id=468.

In hindsight, the impact of the German political foundations' work in Israel can be analysed on four levels:

- German-Israeli relations
- European-Israeli relations
- Democracy and the Rule of Law
- Personal development and future interaction

While their contributions in the fields of German-Israeli and EU-Israeli relations received much praise among Israeli decision-makers and academics, it is the fourth level mentioned above——personal development and future interaction——which is no less important. By providing scholarships to young and very promising Israeli students, the foundations lay a basis for relations between both nations in the future. Every student who receives a scholarship from the KAS or FES for studies and research in Germany, or German students who come to Israel, becomes an 'ambassador of goodwill'. These scholarships make a very important contribution to the personal development and career of each recipient, but their social and political contributions are wider than that. Many of those scholarship holders, known as *Altstipendiaten*, rise to positions of influence and as multipliers make a wider positive impact on bilateral relations between both countries. Most remain in contact, both professionally and personally, with colleagues and former fellow scholarship holders throughout their life.[2]

3 Conclusion

Perhaps one element of success in the work of the German political foundations in Israel is in the personalities of their representatives. The requirements for such a job are more demanding than for most other countries. One must be not only a talented manager and initiator but also a careful diplomat and tactician. The potential for misunderstandings, offence or even scandals is high, as historical and political sensitivities must be carefully observed. Representatives of the foundations have a more flexible field of action than diplomats at the German embassy, but that wider field also brings more risks. The representatives of the

[2]Most foundations recognize the impact of alumni and organize activities that bring together German and foreign alumni. See, for example, www.altstipendiaten.de.

KAS and FES with whom I worked were all very sensitive to the particular needs of working in Israel and working with Israelis. Much of their work was conducted at the time of terror attacks, violence and even wars. Yet they were almost always able to maintain impartiality, a cool head and an open mind. This is highly appreciated by many Israelis, perhaps in more ways than are expressed publically, and especially at times when many EU officials expressed a markedly cool attitude towards Israel.

In the future, the work of the German political foundations in Israel will be more important than ever before. As Germany and the European Union change, so do the basic premises of German-Israeli relations. The historical legacy of the Holocaust in Germany, while not diminished, recedes into the background as an element of *Tagespolitik* decision-making. It is often replaced by policy considerations more emanating from Brussels than from Berlin. Germany and Israel must find new and solid bases for their future relations. Social changes in both countries mean on the one hand much more interaction between ordinary Germans and Israelis. On the other hand, these changes also inevitably mean a decline in Germany's historically based commitment to Israel. Beyond the Holocaust, both countries have much in common and share the values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. The future challenge for German political foundations in Israel is to help develop those common understandings and build and enhance the future bases for German-Israeli relations, as they did so well in the past.

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About the Author

Prof. Shlomo Shpiro holds the Paterson Chair in Security and Intelligence and was until recently Head of the Political Studies Department at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. Prof. Shpiro is a graduate of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (BA 1992), the University of Salford (MA 1994) and the University of Birmingham (PhD 1998). He specializes in the fields of intelligence, terrorism and security, with emphasis also on crisis management and crisis communication, counter terrorism, societal resilience and internal security issues.

Formerly Research Coordinator at the Israeli Parliament, Prof. Shpiro conducted research at leading universities in Europe and Israel and has published extensively on intelligence, terrorism and security. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, in the years 1999–2001, he led a NATO-funded project on improving intelligence cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean countries. In the years 2009–2012 he was Coordinator of the FP7 'SAFE-COMMS' project, developing the EU Terrorism Crisis Communication Strategy.

Supporting Civil Society: German Political Foundations from a Partner's Perspective

Amaal Abu Ghoush

1 Introduction

International support—mainly financial—has and still plays the most important role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and peace process. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is on the main list for aid in the world. Palestinians and Israelis are number one and two of the top beneficiaries of foreign aid. The international community provides aid to Palestinians through their government or their non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The European Union (EU) is among the major entities supporting the Palestinians, along with the Arab countries, the United States, Japan, international institutions such as UN agencies, European countries, and others. According to estimates made by the World Bank the Palestinian Authority received $525 million in international aid in the first half of 2010, $1.4 billion in 2009, and $1.8 billion in 2008. Foreign aid is the 'main driver' of economic growth in the Palestinian Territories (Palestine Human Development Report 2004).

Any aid usually has a political, cultural, social or ideological motive. In some cases, the aid is conditional and is neither coordinated nor in cooperation with the beneficiaries, the associations, or the government that represents them. Aid to Palestinians can't be considered on the local level alone. It will have a bigger effect and play a bigger role on the peace of the region. Most foreign aid supports one

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or more of the following three major aspects: development of human resources, implementing projects such as strategic planning, and cross-sector cooperation.

International support to the Palestinians represented by the PA in billions of Euros for aspects of infrastructure development, humanitarian aid, and the support of its ministry of finance was meant for institutional building. Instead this aid altered the socioeconomic conditions of Palestinian society and treated the PA like an NGO, dependent on foreign aid without an excess of employees or any self-supporting industries.

2 The International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC)

The IPCC was established as a non-profit, non-governmental organization in East Jerusalem in 1998. It specializes in developing proactive initiatives that support the social, political and economic processes essential to a prosperous society through an integrated approach of research, urbanism, community engagement, training and urban planning.

The general thrust of IPCC activities may be summarized as developing visions, options, policies, plans and priorities. The IPCC seeks to place concepts on the public agenda that support political, social and economic transformation processes, and by building capacities and empowerment. It seeks to move the Palestinian society away from conflict and towards peace and democracy.

The goals of the IPCC are to shape public agendas that support the urban transformation of Palestinian society and enhance its culture, and to function in a leadership and advisory role in urban planning, community development, and urban leadership training. The organization also seeks to support the urban rights of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank.[1]

The IPCC's principal projects have been focused on the development of community-led master plans in both East Jerusalem and Area C of the West Bank. These projects have sought to resolve the deadlock created by the Israeli planning systems applied in these areas by bringing together local and national stakeholders, and collectively preparing spatial zoning plans that conform to agreed planning principles and meet the needs and wishes of the existing communities.

[1]For a deeper understanding of the distribution of A-, B-, and C-Area of the West Bank read the report of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

In addition, the IPCC works to enable development on the ground. These initiatives stopped the demolition of thousands of houses. They also demonstrated to Palestinian communities the importance and effectiveness of community organization and participation in urban planning processes.

Since 2009, the IPCC has been supporting and training civil society, community activists, informal leaders and businesspeople at the local and the community level. Through a variety of programmes, the IPCC has offered workshops and courses on critical topics of urban development including planning concepts such as public space, planning processes, local development, community awareness, lobbying and pressure groups, integrity, and transparency.

A core component of the IPCC's work is spatial and strategic planning in the West Bank. The organization is working on community planning initiatives in 12 neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem and 63 villages in Area C. The IPCC is also engaged in capacity-building and youth leadership programmes throughout the West Bank. In addition to its practical activities, the IPCC undertakes extensive research on urban development with a particular focus on East Jerusalem and its hinterlands.

To date, the IPCC has trained over 500 community representatives from over 140 municipal, local and joint-service councils. Participants have included governmental officials and representatives, and leaders, members and engineers working for municipal and local councils. By the end of 2015, women constituted 40% of the total number of participants as opposed to only 12% in 2009, signifying an important achievement for the progress and success in involving women in planning and decision-making processes. These projects help the IPCC to explore the needs of women in these areas and what is needed to improve their situation.

3 Partnership with German Political Foundations

In executing projects, the IPCC typically partners with other stakeholders. These include NGOs, civil society, and community-based organizations in the Palestinian Territories. Additionally, the IPCC links with international organizations that are interested in fostering peace in the Middle East.

One of these partner institutions is the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), which has been supporting the IPCC since 2003. The mutual goals of both institutions are what brought them together. The FES supported the vision the IPCC had for Jerusalem within a two-state solution, and helped step by step to nurture and build 'Scenarios and a Shared Vision' for the IPCC and its Israeli partner for Jerusalem in the future. The FES was one of the foundations believing in the

importance of scenarios and visions for Jerusalem while other foreign foundations were afraid even to discuss the situation and the future status of Jerusalem.

Any partnership between two or more institutions is usually built upon mutual goals and visions, but also on the political orientation of these institutions. The case is not different in this long partnership between the IPCC and FES. The IPCC was established in the late 1990s after the closure of Orient House in Jerusalem by the Israeli authorities. Its aim was to support the social democracy of Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Area C, while the FES is a social democratic foundation.

Some of the disadvantages of international aid—when it is not based on partnerships—are that some aid focuses and contributes only to a small proportion of the investment needed by the community. Aid in general requires a long-term process and is very bureaucratic. It consumes resources and time. There is no guarantee that aid will not be wasted on unproductive or low-priority projects from the perspective of the beneficiaries. Maintenance and sustainability of projects supported is also a major disadvantage in most cases.

It is quite important for partner institutions to have the right basis for such partnerships, especially if they are to continue. In the case of the IPCC and the FES, the partnership has remained strong for 14 years. Despite the decrease in the size of their cooperation, both institutions still do their best to maintain and enrich this partnership. The IPCC informs the FES of its goals and projects to press the importance of Jerusalem and area C on the international agenda, and to benefit from the FES's vision and networks. It gains experience around the world, including knowledge about other conflicted societies.

The IPCC also supports the FES in Jerusalem and the West Bank, and provides its staff and visitors from Germany with political orientation tours of the situation from a Palestinian point of view.

4 Future Cooperation

Both institutions have many other partners in the region, depending on the projects and the faction of the society they both serve. But at the same time, they both believe in their long-term partnership and the benefit it has on their mutual aims. The partnership has developed over years and will continue to develop since both institutions work on creating projects that are sustainable in current society and in the future.

Most of the recent projects between the partners were to support study initiatives and development initiatives. It is expected that future cooperation will tend

to support more sustainable development and bridge the gap in the basic knowledge needed to develop the political and economic sector for a better future for Palestinians under occupation, and in preparation for a future Palestinian state.

The IPCC builds its projects on the needs of the community, but also based on the needs of a better and sustainable future for these communities. All projects are participatory. Community engagement is the core of all projects, and the IPCC seeks to engage all community sectors, especially women and young people.

In general, the community is contacted within the early stages of developing a project, and informed of the nature of the partner institution with the IPCC. This does not necessarily mean that the community participates in selecting such a partner. But it does give the community the right to approve or disapprove of this partnership.

5 The Effect of Political Changes in the Region—Shifting Allocations

The political situation strongly affects the partnerships between the different institutions. The international community usually comes with a specific agenda that its country, political party, or region identifies with, and which it believes will suit their intended beneficiaries best and is in line with their goals and visions. These agendas change and the political situation defiantly affects and is affected all the time.

From experience, some of the partnerships survive, but the size of the cooperation and type of projects may differ due to the political situation and the political agenda of the institutions. In Jerusalem, the pressure on international institutions is high, since Israel is increasing the pressure on the Palestinians living there and does not answer to international law. Pressure on international institutions distracts them from work on individual relief in favour of collective development, which the IPCC believes will eventually amount to individual relief.

6 Recommendations

Support for Palestinian NGOs should be in the shape of a partnership instead of donations. This is the only way to guarantee sustainable development and avoid future dependency on aid. Further support to local NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) is needed, as it can play the biggest role in sustainable community development. One way to do this is to ensure community engagement throughout

the whole process and to make the aid records open to the public for the sake of transparency and efficiency. Another complementary step is to develop strategies for sustainability and self-sufficiency for NGOs and CSOs. Here the German political foundations seem to be very supportive and differ from other NGOs or private foundations engaged in the Palestinian Territories.

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German Political Foundations in Israel and the Middle East: A Diplomatic Reflection in 10 Points

Idit Seltenreich

10 points

1. The very presence of the German political foundations (all six of them are represented in Israel) is not to be taken lightly or for granted. This is particularly important when one considers the first office was opened in the 1960s when Israel had to deal with the Arab boycott and its foreign policy was based on the Periphery Doctrine developed by David Ben-Gurion, designed for seeking allies in a hostile Middle East. The Periphery Doctrine was developed out of necessity as the Arab countries in the region were active enemies of the Zionist country. This led Israel to unexpected partnerships with non-Arab countries and entities such as Iran, the Kurds and African states. A German function in the country, which was fighting for its existence and sustainability, while also trying to do the right thing, was not to be underestimated, and that is before even considering the overriding burden of the Holocaust. The political foundations' presence was established shortly after the Eichmann trial and not too many years after Israel issued its passports with the statement, 'Valid for all countries except Germany'.
2. Even today, Israel is not a member of the EU or NATO. Naturally, Israel is not a member of the Arab League. It is also not a member of the Asian political 'clubs'. Israeli participation in the UN institutions is partial. That Israel takes part in the Eurovision Song Contest or FIFA games as part of Europe

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and not of Asia, is also due to an Iranian veto. (Some Israelis have made the point that if it were playing as part of Asia, Israel would have made it to the World Cup games by now.)

3. Israelis experience less multilateral diplomacy or cooperation than one accustomed to European diplomacy would tend to think. The way I see it, providing an opportunity to interact and cooperate with foreign partners remains the greatest element of added value that German political foundations offer in Israel.
4. But is this what the German political foundations aspire to when they say they want to be players? It's more likely that they mean they strive to be an influential player in regional geopolitical issues, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this context, multiple international players reduce the influence of each individual player, with German political foundations included—especially when considering that they are not allowed to join forces supporting the same project.
5. In this context one should also note that, in Israel, political views are determined mostly through the prism of the conflict and far less through a socio-economic one. So no liberal social democratic foundation, or any other worldview of a German political foundation, was criticized for working with unions or religious institutions or the private sector.
6. Considering the political circumstances, the foundations can of course play a role in the region. For example, when one of them launched an Israeli-Egyptian business delegation endeavour to promote the bilateral dialogue between the two countries. At the same time, Israeli-Palestinian partnerships that turn to German political foundations on their own initiative can find a supportive partner organization which offers a wide range of tools for further cooperation and rapprochement.

Is cooperation with the German foundations based on an equal footing? Does it echo, even if unintentionally, the 19th-century colonial tradition? How does it empower local partners?

7. Cross-border political ideas: bilateral work. At times, there is tension between the fact that German foundations work to promote cross-border political views (social democracy, liberalism etc.) and to establish cooperation bilaterally. Possible examples for such tensions are when the head office of a political foundation sent a delegation to Iran but did not find that the

issue of Holocaust denial represented a relevant point in such bilateral dialogue. Another example is when Christian interests are considered. Jerusalem would make an interesting case study in this regard. There are also cultural and political differences to bear in mind.

8. Vis-à-vis local partners: German foundations answer to local laws and make a point about only responding to calls from local players. They rarely initiate their own projects. They certainly do not coerce cooperation. They also make a point of their political views, about their long-term orientation, and very much about being substantial partners and not just funders, when it comes to setting or agreeing with the content of a programme and following it up. At the same time, when the foundations choose their local partners, administrative criteria do play a dominant and highly selective role. They are far-reaching, and far from being merely technical. Still, when presenting themselves to local partners, each would tend to stress a different image, which they may feel more comfortable with—one that would present it as a practically government-oriented institution. Another foundation would describe itself as more of a football club where political fans gather.
9. Vis-à-vis Berlin: Despite clear conceptual and organizational diversity, and even if obliged not to support the same local partner with the same project, German political foundations tend to realize they are still 'German' when located elsewhere. As one of the foundations' employees put it: "I have always thought of myself as not being a typical German but every time I am posted in a different country I realize how German I am the way I conduct myself and affairs." Over the years numerous Bundestag members have said how, when they visit a foreign country, they consider the review of any German political foundation about the foreign state to be politically 'colour-free' and highly professional.
10. The foreign offices of the political parties: The role of the political foundations in political Berlin and vis-à-vis German legislators is significantly more substantial and broader than reflected to local partners, who are usually only aware of the bilateral work of the foundation and not the scale of their work and the context of their work in Berlin. I tend to think of the political foundations as the foreign offices of the parties, while also considering their research work and geographical spread. Some of them are bigger in number and budget than the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs. When talking about transparency, it may be worthwhile to address this issue and not only financial and technical dimensions.

About the Author

Idit Seltenreich is the head of department for development and marketing at the Sam Spiegel Film and Television School in Jerusalem. As former diplomat, she was political adviser in Berlin from 2007 to 2011. Her portfolio focused on domestic politics including the political Foundations. She was posted to Berlin following completion of the diplomatic training course in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006). During the previous decade (1996–2006) Idit Seltenreich worked at the Shimon Peres Centre for Peace (NGO) where she was responsible for the Israeli-Palestinian youth and education program and during the following four years director of the Civil Society Unit at the Centre, focusing on cooperation with Palestinian as well as other partners, including Germans. Her academic education at Tel Aviv University was in the fields of Political Science and History (Middle East, Europe, South-East Asia).

Another Partner's Perspective: Reflections on 30 Years of FES-PASSIA Cooperation

Deniz Altayli

1 Introduction and Background

This article looks at the involvement and work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) in the occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) from the perspective of a long-term partner on the receiving end: the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). It will not elaborate on the sometimes-heard criticism that there are a lot of German political foundations active in the OPT doing broadly similar work, as this would be beyond the scope of this article. It will also not go into detail about the accusations that aid and development cooperation at large have been used as fig leaves to mitigate an international lack of action and 50 years of de facto complicity with the Israeli occupation and its international law violations. While this is a legitimate argument that at least needs to be mentioned, this is not the right place to explore it.

Rather, this paper will reflect on the nature of our cooperation, which has continued since PASSIA's foundation in 1987 when there was no FES representation in the West Bank, Jerusalem, or Gaza. It also looks at the benefits of an enduring partnership.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)

The FES is affiliated with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and, as with all German political foundations, is committed to contributing to the

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strengthening of democratic political structures and civil society as well as fostering information and debate in the countries and regions it works in. The FES works primarily in the fields of governmental and parliamentary consultation, party development, and support for research. The strengthening of civil society is an overarching concern, as the FES is considered crucial in building and consolidating a democratic system. The FES has been active in the region since the 1960s, and has maintained the same overriding objectives (promoting pluralism, democracy and socioeconomic development, including human and women's rights). Additionally, the FES hopes to contribute to finding a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[1]

The FES office in the OPT was established in the wake of the Oslo Accords in 1995, whereby it was explicitly ensured that it was based in East Jerusalem, not elsewhere in the West Bank. This was a move—and message for that matter—that was highly appreciated by the Palestinians. Prior to this, the FES had implemented activities with Palestinian partners through its office in Amman and via the headquarters in Berlin.

Ever since 1995, the Jerusalem office has been directed by a 'resident representative' i.e., a seconded German employee usually changing every three to four years, and a small, mainly Palestinian, staff. The aim of the work is to support the establishment of democratic structures and a socially just economic order in the Palestinian territories, to foster political participation, and to communicate Palestinian conflict-resolution strategies in the European and especially German discourse on the Middle Eastern conflict.

Accordingly, the main target groups, or 'obvious' partners, are government institutions, parliamentary members, political parties, and trade unions, as well as civil society organizations and research institutions (such as PASSIA[2]). Typical project activities are workshops, round-table discussions, conferences and publications, with a focus on four major areas: political transformation, economic and social policy, support for civil society, and international dialogue.[3]

[1]The FES Middle East and North Africa department currently includes 11 offices, with 6 of them representing the Middle Eastern region. Some work is implemented with project partners without their own offices (e.g., Iraq).

[2]Other Palestinian partners are: Institute for Public Policies (IPP), the International Peace Cooperation Center (IPCC), the Health Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP), the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), and the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU).

[3]See for details the FES-Palestine website at http://fespal.org/what-we-do/.

PASSIA

PASSIA was founded in 1987 as an independent institution to conduct research, promote political analysis and coverage of the situation in the region, provide a constructive forum for open discussion, and foster academic awareness of Palestinian issues.

PASSIA seeks to present the Palestinian question in its national, Arab and international contexts through academic research, dialogue, education and publication. As a think tank, it is dedicated to facilitating understanding of Palestinian positions as well as developing alternatives for the future of Jerusalem and constructive approaches to the peace process.

PASSIA endeavours that research undertaken under its auspices be specialized, scientific and objective, and that its symposia and workshops, whether international or intra-Palestinian, be open, self-critical and conducted in a spirit of harmony and cooperation.

2 PASSIA-FES Cooperation

The PASSIA-FES cooperation began back in 1987, the founding year of PASSIA, and it was a FES grant (in addition to the donation of a photocopier), then via its Amman office, that kicked off what was to become a long-term partnership. That first FES contribution helped to fund a workshop on Palestinian-German relations, held in October 1987, with local academics and German scholars from the Middle Eastern Studies Center of Berlin University, Germany, as panellists. This group's participation was facilitated by the FES grant. The proceedings were later published as 'Notes on Palestinian-German Seminar'—PASSIA's first ever publication—enriched with information on German history, population, its political landscape, media, etc. and a bibliography on Arab-German relations.

This first event was significant in many respects and a 'pioneer' for further cooperation with the FES. First, it brought together Palestinians and foreign counterparts motivated by the desire to learn from and gain knowledge about each other, and to discuss mutual relations and concerns about developments in the politically tense region. This was especially the case with the various facets of what is referred to as the Palestine question. Thus, the partnership developed an informed and meaningful dialogue, built on mutual respect, trust and cooperation.

Second, the seminar's proceedings were documented and published with additional related educational materials in book form. This encouraged not only the

conduct of research work but also aimed to provide a reference for researchers and academics, and enrich the Palestinian library—objectives that have remained a concern of PASSIA's activities ever since.

Over the years, the goals of raising awareness and knowledge as well as encouraging informal debate on relevant issues and engaging a wide array of stakeholders, including policymakers, civil society leaders and media representatives, have not changed. Key areas of interest and concern have changed, of course, and have varied in accordance with the respective political developments on the ground, both locally and abroad.

PASSIA's activities under the cooperation agreement with the FES have concentrated on three main areas that have been proven to be both in demand and successful and will, due to their significance, continue to be at the core of our joint efforts: dialogue (meetings, briefings and workshops/conferences); research/publication; and the PASSIA Desk Diary. Before presenting these in more detail, it should be noted that there have also been other special projects, such as training programmes on party development, workshops on strategy and security, training of young leaders, and international conferences,[4] and that a very essential aspect of the FES's on-going support has been funding the salary of one full-time member of staff at PASSIA.

This is important to mention since it is not something to be taken for granted in today's international aid world. It is all the more crucial to sustain an institution and help it survive and develop, especially in an environment like Jerusalem. Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem are not only constantly under threat of having their activities disturbed or being closed by Israeli authorities under any given pretext, but they also have to function under and according to Israeli law and regulations. This makes it very costly to run an office compared to the West Bank, where the legal framework of the PA applies. In Jerusalem, not only is rental space, including the *arnona* (property) tax, extraordinarily expensive (and an aspect donors hardly ever agree to cover), but so are personnel costs, as employers are obliged to pay the Israeli minimum wage and must register their staff with the relevant pension and compensation schemes. It is worth noting that these financial obstacles have been the major driving force behind the closure of numerous Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. They have moved to Ramallah or at least opened a branch there while keeping only a formal address in Jerusalem.

[4]E.g., **on** Turkey, the Middle East & the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (2005), and on '50 Years of Occupation Must End' (2017).

3 Activities

Dialogue

Under the dialogue component, PASSIA has held thousands of briefings, round-table meetings and workshops with the aim of providing a forum for the free expression and analysis of a plurality of Palestinian perspectives. It has also promoted both intra-Palestinian debates and discussions with external actors. These encounters have contributed, and still do, to a better understanding of Palestinian affairs and the Palestinians' struggle for independence and justice in all its local, regional and international dimensions.

This fusing of Palestinian intellectuals and foreign resources allows for open discussion of critical themes, and has resulted in numerous fruitful debates on vital issues confronting Palestine in its larger historical, cultural, religious and socio-economic contexts.

PASSIA and the FES intend to make European and other international decision-makers more familiar with the line of Palestinian arguments, and be more supportive of Palestinian strategies through such discussions and analysis of current policy issues. With regard to the domestic arena, the intention is to stir internal debates and assist Palestinian decision-makers in garnering public support for new approaches, for instance in reaction to the political stalemate.

For example, a 2015 meeting on 'The Palestinian National Agenda–What Lies Ahead?' discussed the current Palestinian situation and strategies in light of President Abbas' resignation as head of the PLO and the upcoming/pending PNC meeting. The meeting examined the different Palestinian viewpoints, interpretations and scenarios of what these moves meant for the Palestinian national agenda. Another recent meeting on 'EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the constitution of the new Israeli government' provided an insight into the current European discourse on how to deal with the Palestine-Israel conflict in the aftermath of the latest Israeli elections and the formation of a right-wing government. It also considered to what extent a change in EU policies can be expected, and what this could imply for the resumption of the negotiation process. All such meetings have an impact on policy formulation, as they trigger further discussions among stakeholders, including decision-makers.

Research & publication

To understand Palestinian historical and contemporary developments it is crucial to provide and make reliable information and analysis available to as wide an audience as possible—both in print and electronically. To meet this need, PASSIA has from its very beginning endeavoured to conduct high-quality, independent research

and publish studies and information papers. To date, this has resulted in over 200 publications (most of them achieved with support from the FES; some of them now out of print), dealing with a huge diversity of subjects relating to the Palestine question, and written by a number of commissioned local and foreign researchers. These publications include books, monographs, and bulletins, and are distributed both locally and internationally, prompting great feedback. PASSIA materials have often become a source of knowledge and tool of reference for academics, diplomats, professionals, libraries and others with an interest in Palestinian issues.

PASSIA Desk Diary

Another pillar of the FES-PASSIA cooperation has been the PASSIA Desk Diary, which is updated and published annually, soon in its 30th edition. It is PASSIA's 'flagship' publication. It contains a directory of organizations operating or active in the Palestinian territories (listing names, contact information, main activities), a calendar (day-to-day planner with important dates), and a comprehensive yearbook-style agenda with statistics, maps, and facts and figures related to Palestine and the Palestinians. The diary is a unique 'tool' for all those who work in or on Palestine or with an interest in the Palestine question.

4 Mode of Cooperation

Simply put, the 'division of labour' in the FES-PASSIA cooperation gives the FES responsibility for the provision and the flow of funds, and PASSIA responsibility for the implementation of the activities and outputs mentioned in its proposals, as well as for the administration of the funds and the submission of corresponding reports.

Usually PASSIA submits the objectives, methodology, outline, and budgets of its projects to the FES, which then inserts them into the annually renewed cooperation agreement. The agreement underlines that "PASSIA undertakes the project on its own behalf and not on behalf of FES, and that FES's cooperation shall in no way be construed as constituting PASSIA or any other institution or person involved in the project as the agent, representative or licensee of FES" (PASSIA-FES Cooperation Agreement 2017).[5]

[5]PASSIA, however, takes care of clear and complete visibility of the FES's contribution to the agreed-upon activities by using the FES's logo (regarding all contacts, published papers, signs and PASSIA's website), underlining the FES's role as a partner in the implementation of the project.

In practice, partnership and content coordination are at the center of the FES-PASSIA long-term cooperation, for example with regard to thematic approaches for meetings and publications, although the ultimate decision usually rests with PASSIA. This acknowledges that the local partner can better assess needs on the ground and secure local anchoring of project work.

Some activities are organized jointly e.g., most recently a conference entitled, '50 Years of Occupation Must End', but the majority of the activities and a large part of the content conception are carried out by PASSIA in accordance with the framework agreement as well as its own mission and goals. However, the FES reserves the right to have a look at the drafts of written material before they are published, or to reject a speaker. This could be seen as interference and cause major friction with the local partner, but due to the underlying partnership principle, there is a mutual understanding for the other side's needs and constraints. For example, the FES is permanently aware of the need to protect itself from attempts to denounce its involvement in Palestine by organizations like the pro-Israel NGO Monitor, which tends to suspect organizations working with Palestinians as working against Israel. In a political, conflict-laden environment such as Palestine/Israel, it is often a balancing act for the resident representatives to satisfy both the local partner (i.e., local sensitivities) and the positions of their own headquarters in Germany, which in turn are often hostage to domestic political debates.

The FES-PASSIA cooperation has encountered such misunderstandings and disagreements in the fine-tuning and implementation of activities as well, especially with regard to "controversial" terminology (e.g., using words that are common in the Palestinian narrative, such 'martyr', 'Apartheid', 'Judaization', and 'colonization') or the selection of a speaker, which was once the case with a Hamas-affiliated personality in the aftermath of the 2006 elections.

Based on our experience, however, such differences are easily solved due to mutual respect and understanding for each other's constraints, which is one of the advantages of a long-term commitment to a partner. Without this, the required transparency, trust, and reliance cannot be developed.

While projects based on unreliable, short-term funding may be well-meaning and established with good intentions, they are often doomed to fail and frequently a waste of resources. The continued and consistent funding of the FES, however, has certainly strengthened PASSIA (and others) as a trusted, respected and academic address in Jerusalem. It has been able to function, plan and develop even during the most difficult times. Our example and experience show that the provision of stable financial support is critical in building sustainable institutional capacity among independent institutions, and should be the prevailing aspect of all cooperation schemes.

In the future—and this applies not only to the FES or German foundations at large but to all actors on the donor side—more core funding for running costs in established and trusted partnerships would be desirable (salaries, rent, utilities) as well as cooperation agreements that are signed for a period of three to five years, rather than just one. This would help institutions—especially in Jerusalem—to preserve their presence in the city, plan for the long term, and maintain their vital role and functions as non-profit and independent civil-society actors. Also desirable would be a show of more third-party responsibility when it comes to the enforcement of international law i.e., more pressure on the Israeli government to allow Palestinians to advance and serve their people—within the development and human rights parameters set and agreed upon by the international community.

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10 German Foundations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories – an overload?

Tobias Pietsch

German political foundations and their international work are a quite unique phenomenon. Some countries, like Egypt or Russia, seem to fear their work and try to limit it with laws or other repressive means against foundation staff. Other countries like China or Turkey seem to be impressed by the German model and are trying to copy it. However, states all over the globe perceive this singular form of soft power, and the situation of the German foundations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, to be unique. In no other region in the world is the density of NGOs and media representatives as high as in Israel and Palestine. Therefore, it is not surprising that all of the six German political foundations are present there as well. But it is astonishing that besides the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation (FNS) and the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation (HSS), the other four foundations are represented in Israel as well as in the Palestinian Territories. The two foundations mentioned cover both sides from one office in Jerusalem, while the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES) runs its Israel office in Herzliya Pituach and its office for the Palestinian Territories in East Jerusalem. The Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) is located in Jerusalem and Ramallah, and the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation (HBS) and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation (RLS) cover Israel in an office in Tel Aviv and the Palestinian Territories in Ramallah. The FES also runs an office in Gaza, which is integrated into the office for the Palestinian Territories and therefore not counted separately. The HBS also has a representative in Jenin, but not an office. In total the six foundations run ten offices in the area between the

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Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, which covers 29,000 km^2. As a comparison: in the USA (9.8 million square kilometres) there are only five offices. The question is whether these ten offices overload an area of this size and population vis-à-vis the general density of NGOs in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. To answer this question, it is useful to ask about the roles and goals of the foundations. What's their mandate and how do they understand and fulfil it? What's the impact of the presence and the work of the political foundations? How do they interact and collaborate with each other? And finally, a factor that might seem trivial but is not self-evident: how come they are all present in both countries?

To start with the last question, it is not obvious that all of the six German political foundations are present in both countries. As the budget of the foundations depends on the electoral results of the parties they are affiliated with, it is logical that the FES and KAS have more resources than foundations belonging to the smaller parties. The more resources a foundation has, the more offices can be opened around the globe. While all six foundations are present in Russia and, since the Arab uprisings, in Tunisia as well, just two foundations (the KAS and the FNS) are present in Iraq, for example. Armenia and Belarus, both countries in transition, are just covered by the FNS.

To understand the presence of the foundations in Israel, it is of crucial importance to understand the idea behind the establishment of political foundations as tools of civil power after World War II. In order to return to the stage of global politics, Germany decided—or was forced to decide—to invent a new, non-military soft-power tool, enabling the state that started two wars and was responsible for the Holocaust to be accepted as a player on a global level. So it cannot be taken for granted that the foundations are present in Israel. It is part of the German-Israeli miracle that shortly after the *Shoah*, Israel issued passports with the statement, 'Valid to all countries except Germany', and the Eichmann trial (c. f., Seltenreich on this issue), German foundations established networks in Israel and began their project work there. What also started to support the new State of Israel—namely its political parties and unions—paved the way for today's Israeli-German relations and is until now part of the foundation's mission. All of them run projects to strengthen bilateral relations to deal with the common past and future. The foundations play an honourable role in the process of reparations and rapprochement.

Back in the 70s the activities of the foundations were in line with the foreign policy of Germany. As their international work developed and increased, understanding of the role of the foundations started to differ. Although independent in their work, Frings says about the activities of KAS in Palestine: "We are operating in clear line with the official German position vis-à-vis the conflict between

Israelis and Palestinians" (pp. 2017). At the same time Müller claims that the work of the HBS does not "have to follow the diplomatic common agreements in their work or the specific political line defined by the foreign office" (pp. 2017). These statements clearly show a totally different understanding and therefore also a contradiction in the self-conception of the role and mission of a foundation. This might be caused by the fact that the KAS is affiliated to the Christian Democratic Union, the ruling party of Germany, while the HBS-affiliated Green Party is in opposition. Feeling connected to the government explains why the KAS defines its work in line with the state's official policy. But this is not the only contradiction. While condemning Israel's new transparency law, Müller disagrees with the concern of the Israeli government, "that foreign governments may try to influence political life in Israel" (pp. 2017). At the same time the HBS and other foundations alike claim to, "have an impact on the political debates of the so-called Israeli mainstream" (ibid.). The foundations support processes of democratization and transformation as well as particular NGOs and partners. This might be perceived by state governments as foreign influence that lacks democratic legitimation.

The number of political foundations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories also has an impact on cooperation. Several foundations support and cooperate with the same partners. At least nine Israeli institutions receive support from two or even three foundations. The FES, HBS and RLS in Israel support the Adva Center, and the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute is in cooperation with FES, HBS and HSS. Some cooperation agreements might even be surprising. One would assume that the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI) would be supported by the HBS, but it in fact it is the conservative KAS and HSS that provide this backing. It should be discussed whether it makes sense to have local NGOs receiving support from several foundations. Furthermore, there is even competition among local partners. As the Israeli left is nowadays limited mainly to the Labor Party, Meretz and the Arab List, the foundations trying not to tie themself to just one partner. Although not officially or directly financing them, the Labor Party and Meretz are affiliated to the FES, as the Social Democratic Party of Germany is in the same international political family as the Labor Party and Meretz. But the HBS and the RLS are also inviting their representatives and activists and vice versa the parties seek for support from not only one foundation. This phenomenon should be seen in the broader framework of the high density of NGOs and foundations in Israel and the Palestinian Territories trying to have at least a small impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The result is competition for local partners, as the left is becoming more and more prominent and local NGOs and partners are able to cherry pick. As a result the ideological affiliations often get

blurred and the NGO business keeps the status-quo profitable for many people preventing it from being changed.

In order to change this status-quo and to have a positive impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would be necessary to establish closer collaboration between the offices of foundations working on the same topics within the 60 km zone described above. Although the offices are geographically so close, the staff of the foundations running these offices, both in Israel and Palestine, often fail to cooperate and exchange ideas and knowledge from their German headquarters. On the ground there are just a few points of cooperation e.g., the realities of living. The local staff, the partners and the social situations are so different that collaboration seems to be too burdensome or challenging. This is surprising as all the foundations strive to have a positive impact on the conflict. But for as long as they neglect to cooperate and to exchange ideas, how can they convince the conflicting parties to do the same?

Ten German political foundation offices within a 60 km range is an overload, especially in a region already packed with NGOs. Don't get me wrong: the foundations do important work in many different fields, especially as these days many are concerned the lack of criticism of society.

About the Author

Tobias Pietsch studied Social Sciences (M.A.) at Humboldt University Berlin with a focus on international relations, European Union and the Middle East. He received his Bachelor degree in Political and Social Studies from the University of Würzburg. He works for the media platform 'Al Sharq' as a journalist and analyst covering mainly Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Egypt. He has lived and worked for one and a half years in Jerusalem, whereby he completed his one year civil service at the Willy-Brandt-Center Jerusalem. He is a board member of Alsharq e. V. and of the support association of the Willy-Brandt-Center.

Supporting Democratic Politics from Abroad: Beyond the Israeli NGOs Law

Ayelet Banai

The much-contested amendment, known as the NGOs law, which was adopted by the Knesset in summer 2016, is designed, according to its proponents, to advance transparency, and subsequently help safeguard the integrity of the democratic process in Israel. Formally entitled "Transparency requirements for parties supported by foreign state entities bill", the legislation requires that associations in Israel that are funded primarily by foreign governments indicate their sources of funding clearly in designated publications and communications. An apparently innocuous demand, the recent legislation stirred a public controversy that even caught the attention of the international press.

As commentators noted, it is important to understand the legislation in the context of what is omitted from it and of the political discourse that accompanied the legislative process. The large sums of private money and donations from abroad that support local civil society associations and organizations in Israel are omitted, which has a strong impact on the political agenda and policy. Political discourse according to the legislation depicts international sources of funding from state entities as serving illegitimate interests. Noticeably, powerful private corporations that increasingly fulfil essential public functions are omitted from this discourse about "foreign-read-illegitimate" interests. Ayelet Shaked, Israel's minister of justice who promoted the NGOs law, also defended Israel's monopolistic gas sector from public opposition and legal review.

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Among the foundations affiliated with Germany's political parties that are active in Israel, the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, associated with the German Green Party, expresses strong opposition to the legislation. Speakers for the foundation describe the current bill and the possibility of future legislation to restrict funding of NGOs in Israel by public funds from abroad not only as a measure to put pressure on progressive politics, but as a potential danger to democracy itself in Israel.

Without understating the challenges and indeed pressures that democratic politics face today, we might still wish to pay attention to scepticism among the Israeli public with progressive leanings, where opposition to the government and its politics abounds about Europeans' perspectives on what 'truly progressive' politics in Israel should mean. Consider, for example, a salient and highly contentious issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is the status of Palestinian refugees and their descendants. The official position of most established politics and diplomatic efforts in Europe, including Germany's Greens, is support for a solution negotiated between the parties. In Israel, in contrast, the office of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation is supportive, as it were, of the view that Israel and its people should recognize the Palestinians' so-called right of return—namely, a right of the refugees and their descendants to establish residence in Israel, and in a constellation with an autonomous Palestinian state.[1]

The question, indeed doubt, raised here is not about the merits of the view itself, which is a matter for an entirely different discussion. The question is rather whether and why the politics of return should be considered progressive from European and German perspectives. Within the German context, with regard to German refugees and their descendants, the Greens express an adamant and persistent opposition to the politics of commiseration and return. In the German context, politics of this kind feature in the Green discourse as highly nationalistic, dangerous from a democratic perspective, and generally objectionable. What accounts for the change of meaning of progressiveness in the case of Israeli politics? Seeing that the overwhelming majority of Jewish Israelis oppose the right of return—do they fail the progressive politics test? While the contexts are evidently very different, the question nonetheless persists.

Raising questions about the political causes selected by international donors and actors that seek to support democracy in Israel is not to understate the pressures

[1]Supportive pertains to funding in the form of a modest annual grant to a media outlet that defends this cause. The point made here by no means criticizes the beneficiary media association, which indeed provides a unique and relevant platform for public debate in Israel. Nor does it condone the line of criticism advanced by the organization NGO-Monitor.

that democratic politics indeed face. We are witnessing a crisis of democratic capitalism, whereby wealth and political power are becoming increasingly concentrated and states use their repressive powers to reinforce and protect the interests of the rich. The "singling out" of public funds, as featured in the NGOs law in Israel, is not just a matter of political expediency, but part of a broader ideology that depicts public power as a danger to freedom. Private money on the other hand—no matter how highly concentrated and how focused on the political power it buys—is as an expression of success.[2] The call for transparency—the wish to expose where the money poured into our democratic process comes from and whose interests are being promoted thereby—is highly pertinent from a democratic perspective. Rather than dismissing the transparency agenda as a ploy, advocates for progressive politics would be right to endorse it wholeheartedly and support the fight to expand it to private funds too. International actors and donors that wish to support democratic politics in Israel might wish to consider causes that help bring fractured opposition forces together over causes that set increasingly demanding standards for 'progressiveness'.

About the Author

Ayelet Banai is Lecturer in Politics at the School of Political Sciences and the Haifa Center for German and European Studies (HCGES) at the University of Haifa. Before joining the School of Political Science, she was a research fellow in political theory at the University of Frankfurt. She holds a D.Phil. from the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University. Her research interests are in comparative politics, international political theory, the right of self-determination, identity politics, democracy and democratization.

[2]Israel's Minister of Justice, Ayelet Shaked lays out and endorse this worldview in a recent article: "mesilot el ha'meshilut", in *HaShiloach* no. 1 (2016), pp. 37–55 [in Hebrew] http://hashiloach.org.il/wp-content/themes/hashiloach_landing/dist/images/article-shaked.pdf.

Almost Two Decades of Cooperation: A Personal Reflection on the Partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in Israel

Benjamin Mollov

1 Introduction

My personal involvement with the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) representation in Israel began in 1999 in the context of a developing relationship with the University of Bethlehem. After several meetings at each other's university, an idea was proposed by a Bethlehem colleague to undertake a joint course with students from both universities. The theme was, "understanding each other's discourse". This idea came to the attention of the then KAS Israel Director, Dr. Johannes Gerster, and immediately he proposed a meeting between me, another colleague from Bar-Ilan University, and our two faculty partners from Bethlehem. In that meeting, he offered funding for such a project pending the preparation of a joint proposal. I was entrusted with the coordination and negotiation of content that would be acceptable to all parties. Developing a proposal became a challenge in itself as it entailed balancing all the most difficult narratives and seeking a way to present them. For instance, we planned a trip to *Yad Vashem* to expose the students to the Holocaust while also visiting a refugee camp to highlight the plight of Palestinian Arab refugees during the Israeli War of Independence. We avoided

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recognition of the Palestinian demand to assume the similarity between these events. We also planned a joint visit to the holy sites of Jerusalem, accompanied by experts both in Israel studies and Palestine studies from the two institutions.

2 Different Cooperation Projects and Initiatives

Dr. Gerster deemed our project to be extremely promising and ambitious. Unfortunately, we were only able to begin the course in September of 2000. The Intifada of 2000 made its continuation impossible.

However, this disappointment did not end my partnership with the Foundation, but in fact was only a first step in continuing it. Influenced by the new approach of an Israeli political scientist in both federalism and the Jewish political tradition encapsulated in the idea of covenant, I proposed an academic training course on conflict resolution in the graduate programme at Bar-Ilan University. Following its introduction in 2002, this special course entitled, "New Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Israeli Society" is now being offered in its 15th consecutive year. Several hundred graduates of the course, of whom many occupy senior positions in government, the military and social services, have been exposed to the federalist approach emphasizing intercultural diversity within unity and social partnership. The emphasis is on the narratives and characteristics of important subgroups within Israel including Haredim, people identified with the Shas party, and the Arab community. The intent was to promote "intercultural competency" within Israeli society among the graduates.

The course impact has been accentuated by important public-affairs activities, including dialogue with Knesset members on the themes of identity, and dialogue within Israeli society. Moreover there has been an on-going intercultural and inter-religious seminar in the mixed Jewish-Arab city of Akko, which has involved the chief rabbi and chief sheikh along with both Arab and Jewish leaders of the municipality and community.

The course has also spawned significant academic publications along with articles more accessible to the general public explaining its rationale and significance. In addition, several conference forums have also sought to highlight the concept of the course to a wider public, including one held in connection with the Rabin Memorial Day.

In 2002, the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation also ran a major international conference on religion and conflict resolution in partnership with Bar-Ilan University. As the academic organizer of the conference, this was especially rewarding given

my own area of expertise in inter-religious and intercultural dialogue strategies. This approach to conflict resolution needs to be more substantially encouraged, and it was most gratifying that the Adenauer-Foundation saw the importance of such an endeavour and helped to facilitate the proceedings' publications.

The 40th anniversary of German-Israeli diplomatic relations in 2005 was the basis of an international conference that was conducted by the Adenauer-Foundation and Bar-Ilan University under the title, "The German-Jewish Heritage: A Basis for German-Israeli Dialogue". The starting point of this effort was an intercultural approach to dialogue. Although not a specialist in German-Israeli relations, I explored important aspects of German-Jewish heritage and experience as part of my doctoral dissertation in political science entitled, "The Jewish Aspect of the Life and Work of Hans J. Morgenthau". This later appeared as a book, *Power and Transcendence: Hans J. Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience*. The conference focused on three essential themes: 1) What defined and characterized German Jewish heritage; 2) Reconciliation and its limits; and 3) The relevance of German-Jewish Heritage to conflict management and social transformation. Among others, the topics focused on questions regarding *Bildung* and German-Jewish moral heritage; the Holocaust and the possibilities and limits of forgiveness and reconciliation; and Martin Buber's philosophy as a basis for conflict management and social transformation.

The proceedings of the conference were also published in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation. Indeed the juxtaposition of Martin Buber's idealist thought and Hans Morgenthau's realist approach explored at the conference provided the inspiration for a publication in a special issue of *Die Friedens-Warte* (2007) entitled, "An Integrated Strategy for Peacebuilding: Judaic Approaches". Undertaken with two colleagues, this article sought to offer an integrated approach to conflict management, highlighting the "centrality of power" emanating from the cruel lessons of the Holocaust for the Jewish people. It also investigated the danger of helplessness according to Morgenthau, the "power of dialogue" according to Martin Buber, and the progressive belief in human cooperation that also represented a facet of German-Jewish heritage. The article also combined results and conclusions of an Israeli-Palestinian inter-religious dialogue undertaken by this writer along with two colleagues. This was an important test case for both the importance of power and promotion of dialogue in navigating this central conflict.

Based on the success of this overall effort, a follow-up conference was held at Bar-Ilan University in cooperation with the Adenauer-Foundation in 2009. This focused on the theme of "The German-Jewish Heritage: A Basis for Conflict

Management". Prominent guest lecturers from Germany, and Israeli academics and media personalities with an interest in German-Israeli relations and dialogue, participated in this event. They highlighted the contribution of German-Jewish heritage to Germany, Israel, and the dialogue between these countries. Furthermore, the ambassador of Germany to Israel at that time, H.E. Dr. Harald Kindermann, appeared as the final speaker at this conference.

In the effort to explore the dynamics of "intercivilizational conflict" as highlighted by Samuel Huntington, and possible means of bridging these schisms, the Bar-Ilan University held another conference in cooperation with the Adenauer Foundation in 2007 entitled: "Intercivilizational Conflict – Can it be Moderated?". This theme was also rooted in the inter-religious and intercultural approach to dialogue and conflict resolution. A wide range of other approaches to conflict management were addressed at this international conference. The conference was intended to have a public affairs impact, as speakers from the Islamic world including Turkey and Malaysia, Israeli academics and practitioners, and other speakers from countries such as England engaged in the theme from a variety of perspectives. Also important was the fact that the proceedings of the conference served as the basis for the first issues of *The Israel Journal of Conflict Resolution*, which the Adenauer Foundation helped to sponsor in cooperation with the graduate programme in conflict management.

In addition, as a development of the conference, a project for the study of religion, culture and peace was established at Bar-Ilan University with the encouragement of the Adenauer foundation. It has been in progress ever since alongside the graduate programme in conflict management and the interdisciplinary department of social sciences.

In an effort to explore this theme particularly against the backdrop of increasing political turmoil throughout the greater Middle East, the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, Bar-Ilan University and Western Galilee Academic College in Akko held a conference entitled, "Inter-religious and Intercultural Dialogue in a Changing Middle East - Challenges and Opportunities" in 2012, which provided an excellent venue for academics and religious leaders of the Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Druze and Bahai faiths to interact.

Finally, the most recent forum undertaken at Bar-Ilan University in cooperation with the KAS was held in January 2017 on the theme of Haredim and peace building. This topic reflects the Foundation's interest, and particularly that of its current Israel director, Dr. Michael Borchardt, in expanding contact with the ultra-orthodox community, which is considered to be an increasingly strong segment of Israeli society.

3 Conclusion

By looking back on nearly 20 years of on-going cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, a few conclusions and reflections can be offered.

The fact that the Foundation is linked to the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) of Germany was not a factor in motivating any desire to work with the Foundation. The impetus was rooted primarily in the general prestige of the Foundation, and its mission to promote democracy and peace-building. However, the general orientation of the Foundation as a reflection of its mother party's worldview proved to be significant in its interest and understanding of the importance of religion and culture in society and political life. I think this was a clear advantage for my own work in comparison to a Foundation with a more secular outlook.

Even before I became involved with the Foundation, it had already undertaken previous cooperation projects with Bar-Ilan University. This made it the most accessible option for our projects.

The opportunity to work with the Foundation was affected neither positively nor negatively by the fact that it is a German organization. However, I must indicate that I was raised in the Jewish community of the United States in which there was a strong tendency to avoid all things German given the bitter history of the Third Reich and its crimes against the Jewish people. However, in working with the Foundation over the years, which has included opportunities to visit Germany, I underwent something of a transformation in my view of Germany, and now see the country in a more positive light. I have also been impressed by the commitment to Israel's future and an in- depth understanding of Israel's dilemmas, achievements and potential shown by the directors with whom I have worked over the years. These include Dr. Johannes Gerster, Dr. Lars Haensel, Dr. Michael Mertes, and Dr. Michael Borchardt.

The financial aspect of the partnership has been indispensable for carrying out our activities, but the general prestige of the Foundation is also very important in making the profile of our activities stronger. I also very much appreciate the idea of partnership as opposed to merely funding, which implies on-going involvement, and encouragement for helping to develop concepts and ideas in a cooperative venture. Very laudable is the fact that the Foundation has sought over the years to help empower individuals to carry out their activities regardless of their existing public profile.

By looking at the years to come of this long-term relationship, I would like to see the existing foundations of our partnership strengthened and expanded in the areas of intercultural/inter-religious cooperation as an important and insufficiently appreciated approach to conflict resolution. This is particularly relevant to the partnership with Bar-Ilan University, which is founded on a commitment to Jewish tradition along with modern scholarship and societal improvement. This is a vital philosophy that Bar-Ilan represents not only for Israeli society, but also for the Middle East as a whole, parts of which are moving steadily into the throes of religious extremism.

In addition, I believe that the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation could serve a vital role in helping to expand the impact of grassroots and mid-level initiatives that it has already helped support from the micro to the macro level. For instance, the idea of federalism and social partnership based on the concept of the Covenant or "Brit" has been enthusiastically endorsed by many of the students who have participated over the years in our graduate course on conflict resolution. Our on-going interreligious/intercultural seminar in Akko has been perceived by our students as a very positive and notable example of Jewish-Arab cooperation, which much of Israel and beyond is unaware of. Students have considered that, if the example of Akko and its lessons could be elevated to higher levels of our political system, an important contribution to conflict resolution in Israeli society could be made.

Given the Foundation's work in supporting grassroots and mid-level initiatives in cooperation with academia along with its on-going dialogue with policy makers, it is in a unique position to link these various parties together.

I also believe that the current worldwide network and work of the Adenauer Foundation in many countries could help foster cooperative cross-fertilization of ideas developed in certain parts of the world to others where they might be relevant. I am suggesting that there could be more awareness between various partners in specific countries of their respective initiatives and activities.

Current developments such as the NGO law are unnecessary and even counterproductive. Foreign NGOs in Israel or in the immediate area do not serve as a cover to advance the agenda of delegitimizing Israel's existence.

About the Author

Dr. Benjamin Mollov is on the faculty of the Interdisciplinary Department of Social Sciences and the Graduate Program in Conflict Management at Bar-Ilan University, and runs the university's Project for the Study of Religion, Culture and Peace. He specializes in conflict management from an intercultural perspective and the Jewish political tradition, on which he has written widely. He has organized several international conferences at Bar-Ilan University in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation and appeared as the sole Israeli speaker at the Global Peace Forum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2005, and appeared again for another guest lecture in Malaysia in 2008.

Epilogue: What's Left to Say?

Anna Abelmann and Katharina Konarek

The present book is the result of a series of coincidences that started in April 2015 in Cologne. During a conference on German-Israeli relations, I came to speak with Prof. Amos Morris-Reich, Director of the Bucerius Institute for Research on Contemporary German History and Society at the University of Haifa, about our research projects. He suddenly suggested to get in touch with a PhD student from his department, who happened to work in the same field as me. This researcher was Katharina and indeed, our PhD topics had many similarities. We were both researching the history and development of German political foundations in Israel and Palestine, but from a historical and a political science approach respectively.

With the objective of promoting this research field, we decided to apply for a grant at the RUB research school of the Ruhr University of Bochum and were lucky. This financial support enabled us not only to organize a three-day conference but also to invite many highly experienced speakers from different political foundations and academia.

In preparation for that conference, we met in Haifa for a pre-workshop that had a special focus on the Israeli NGO bill, a piece of draft legislation that inspired a broad debate within Israeli civil society and among the German

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political foundations in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem at that time. The workshop was enriched by lively and fruitful discussions, and was attended by the director of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, Kerstin Müller, and Yariv Oppenheimer, director of Israeli NGO Peace Now, which was among those organizations that are highly influenced by the law.

The next step was a conference at the Ruhr University of Bochum, which aimed to give a broader view on the foundations' work, history and perception in this difficult and conflicted environment, as well as their legal framework and role within German foreign policy.

The topics ranged from a retrospective on the foundations' early days to current topics such as the ongoing debate in Israel, impacts of the Arab spring, and Germany's domestic discussion on the legal status of the foundations. A special accolade was that not only did researchers and partners attend the event, but so too did Ernst Kerbusch from the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Marc Frings, Director of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in Ramallah, Walter Klitz, Director of the Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation in Jerusalem, and Jörg Schultz, responsible for the Middle Eastern department at the Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation. Representatives from nearly all foundations enriched the conference with their personal experiences.

Publishing the workshop's and conference's results in one volume was an idea that was only born afterwards. Even so there were several good reasons not to pursue this target, e. g. the underestimation of the amount of work involved, there were and still are even more good reasons that support this decision. Some of these were the large number of requests and inquiries, especially after the conference.

Above all we are convinced that research on German political foundations, as a comparatively young field of studies, still has many gaps. The investigation of this group, its history, agenda and specific scope of action might even offer a complementary perspective of the entire concept of German foreign policy. Research challenges and opportunities are to be found in the unique and only vaguely defined concept of the German political foundations, which has no equivalent in other countries. Even organizations such as the "National Endowment for Democracy" in the USA, the "Dr.-Karl-Renner-Institute" in Austria, or the "Internationella Stiftelse" of the Swedish Centre Party, which all work in the field of political education and promotion of democracy, cannot be compared to the German concept. None of them possesses financial resources comparable to the German political foundations, and none of them maintains a global network to the same extent.

Their proximity to political partners and key decision makers while maintaining an enormous degree of independence is fundamental to the unique status of the foundations and their specific role within both German domestic and international policy.

Looking at the geographical focus of this book, German-Israeli relations cannot be compared to bilateral relations between the federal republic and other states. As a consequence of the Shoah, Germany and Israel today maintain a "special relationship" and will continue doing so in the future.

Additionally, the German-Israelis relations and the German Middle Eastern policy has to be seen against the background of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The historical circumstances and the duration of this conflict and its perception in the international arena makes the foundations' work in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Ramallah incomparable with their activities in any other place.

This complex political situation combined with incomplete research leads to different conclusions and points of view. For this reason, this volume presents a kaleidoscope of different perspectives on the foundations' work and history between Jerusalem, Ramallah and Tel Aviv, which is still an on-going project.

Finally, this volume cannot be concluded without expressing our sincere thanks to all of those who supported this project in so many different ways. Above all, we very much want to thank all the speakers who attended the workshop in Haifa and the conference in Bochum, and all the contributors who were willing to turn their papers into articles. There would be no volume without you!

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