THE EU'S POWER IN INTER-ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS

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The EU's Power in Inter-Organisational Relations

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FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I belong to those who greatly enjoy wide views. Like a view from a hill or a mountain: to be able to see far, so far that I cannot really say how far it is I see, nor what it actually is I am seeing. Seeing becomes blended with knowing, supposing, imagining. It is both calming and inspiring to see things connect to each other, and how they do that, in reality or perhaps just seemingly: far away from one another, they are brought together because of my vantage point, to form together a landscape.

When planning a book on the relations between the European Union, NATO and the United Nations, I felt I just did not manage to see much of a landscape. It was difficult to get them into the same picture. The vantage points I came across appeared insufficient: in particular, looking at the organisations and their relations with each other from the point of view of member states seemed rather to hide the view, however warmly that perspective was proposed to me.

At some point during the actual writing, I realised I was arguing that power is an essential part of the relations between international organisations and that, indeed, it was an excellent vantage point from which to analyse them. This seemed a bit controversial at first. I noticed how powerless these organisations appeared in much of the literature and was left wondering how much the theoretical canons, the habitual varieties of analysis, actually hamper us from seeing that they can have power. Were we to acknowledge this hampering effect and just climb over hindrances, what would we gain? The view that organisations indeed have power might not only help understand what happens in their relations. It might also restore confidence in the functioning of the international system.

To see the power, it seemed to me, one had to climb a bit, become a bit more abstract.

Not having the gift of painting, I search to write this kind of a landscape. The landscape I write is composed of international organisations and their environment. The hill I am writing from is the notion of power. This book is not about power as such, as landscapes are not about the hill on which they have been painted. But likewise, this book could not have been written without the concept of power, without the feeling of standing solidly on something when observing the surroundings. To get a grasp of such a phenomenon, one needs to have a vantage point that is quite remote, high or abstract. The concept of power is what is needed here, to help collocate what can be observed near to oneself in relation to other, more distant things that were not visible from the foot of hill.

I hope the book conveys to its reader not only a landscape but also the insight of how concepts that are seen as impossible to define and use, arch-difficult and mastodontic such as "power" can be of much help in research. The vast amount of study on them and their omnipresence in all kinds of literature does not render them useless. It is exactly their size that makes them so precious: the view from the top of such a notion is decidedly wide.

Throughout, I have been motivated by the great interest in the topic I have noticed every time I have mentioned what I work on. How the EU relates to NATO and the UN seems to be something many really want to and need to know more about. There is a practical need there to know more about what happens to the organisations, and how their interrelations might affect them. People working in the organisations do have a clear view of the forms these relations take in practice, as well as of their problems and possibilities, but may not have been able to look at the larger picture.

Many people saw where I wanted to arrive and helped me to devise a strategy, to build the ladders with which to reach the top of the hill in the first place. In the course of the writing, I have had the chance to lean on the support of a number of great people. The book's roots are in Florence at the European University Institute of the 1990s, in discussions with late Professor Susan Strange, my supervisor, and in seminars by Professor Steven Lukes. It was in these discussions power came into the picture. The ideas have then travelled with me in both Sweden and Finland, growing a bit on every move as new environments have brought me in contact with new ideas and new colleagues.

The book has even had a godfather and a godmother, Kirsti and Raimo Lintonen. This great idea to look for godparents was not mine. It was Kirsi Hämäläinen who suggested to me that I should have someone accompanying the writing, and better godparents could hardly be found. For inspiration when it comes to language and literature, I would like to thank Vivi Säll in particular.

The work has been carried out in several places. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is a great community of colleagues and friends that all deserve a warmest thank you. Barbara Zanchetta's advice on how to make a proper book plan, Katri Pynnöniemi's company in our "book laboratory" and the excellent help by the then librarian Jouko Rajakiili, always held up one corner of the project for me. Colleagues at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs were great companions in their drive and keen interest in research on the EU and on institutional design. Gunnar Sjöstedt was there to encourage with his open mind and his warm laugh. In Stockholm, I also came into contact with Bo Ekman who challenged me and Malin Häggqvist actually to count, map and assess the overall system of international treaties and organisations in an effort to look at the phenomenon of sovereignty—a task that might appear hopeless but that indeed can be done when accompanied with Bo's and Tällberg Foundation's inspiration and vision. Spending some time writing at Sigtunastiftelsen has been another important part of the process, and I am very grateful for the existence of such a place.

The scholarly community working on inter-organisational relations has, needless to say, been an essential company to which I have been able to present my thoughts in their early shapes. Rafael Biermann, Joachim Koops, Thomas Gehring, David Galbreath, Katie Verlin Laatikainen, Richard Gowan, Nina Græger and many others have been crucially important for my thinking and research. Two important, very kind, knowledgeable and always so helpful persons, Alyson Bailes and Clive Archer, passed away before the book was finished.

In summer 2013, at the start of the writing process, I had the chance to make some 20 interviews in Brussels and New York with people who have been observing and analysing EU-NATO-UN relations in practice or whose work in these organisations and in their environment related to these relations in some way or another. Needless to say, their views were extremely interesting—as interesting as it was to see how these interviews confirmed the assumption that inter-organisational relations matter in practice and that they have tangible consequences for the organisations

and have impact on the daily work of those employed by them. I would like to thank all these people for their time and insight and for their willingness to reflect on the phenomenon.

In the end, the bulk of the work was carried out while working at the University of Tampere, in its community of thoughtful and insightful students and colleagues that helped me in the return to the world of theories from the world of policy analysis. Some last hurdles were cleared thanks to the energetic and bright writing company of Elina Kestilä-Kekkonen. Particular thanks for very able research assistance go to Jari Marjelund, Annina Peltonen and Tiia Hytönen.

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Understanding Inter-organisational Relations: Substance and Toolbox

1.1 The Changing Substance of Inter-organisational Relations

In the study of international relations, conflicts, wars and threats often dominate the scene. International organisations usually represent what is positive in the picture, the brighter side, meagre perhaps, but nevertheless there.

The organisations represent cooperation and problem-solving, even progress. Even when we do not have precise knowledge of what they do or how they work, let alone of why they work as they do or what might impact on their performance, we expect something from them. At times, we would wish they were better in what they do or what they are supposed to do. Take the United Nations, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: how much have not the member states invested in them over the decades, how much expected, but also obtained from them?

When looking at what these organisations do in today's world, one particular aspect catches attention: the way they cooperate with each other, refer to each other and share the same tasks. Be it the EU looking for a UN mandate for a new mission or NATO Secretary General referring in his speech to the EU as a strategic partner of NATO, all these organisations operate in a shared environment and are quite close to one another.

How international organisations relate to each other and interact is, nevertheless, one of the less well-known aspects of international organisations. This very much applies to these three organisations today. We know them one by one, but our understanding of them together is limited. At the same time, inter-organisational relations are essential to understand if one wants to have a full picture of the condition of international organisations and the prospects of their functioning.

Understanding the relations between international organisations is increasingly important as these relations themselves keep gaining scale and significance. The sheer number of international organisations has grown. Many of them have a growing membership. Most of them have an expanding amount of tasks to perform, and expectations on them tend to grow, often because of the difficulties of other actors, such as states, to handle these tasks.

This leads to more overlap between the organisations, both when it comes to membership, geographical coverage and functions. The overlap, in turn, means that the organisations are more and more connected to each other. Organisations that might not have had any particular relations with each other before may now need these relations. As more and more is assigned to the organisations because more and more needs to be done, cooperative relations with other organisations might be of help in coping with the tasks. They may be pushed closer together by their member states that hope to see synergy and efficient use of resources.

If these are among the reasons for increasing inter-organisational relations, what would their consequences look like? Where do they lead? Such interaction may strengthen the organisations: it can be a way to gaining resources, skilfulness and competence. But the organisations may also end up competing with each other, wasting resources. What seems crucial to understand is that relations between international organisations are truly consequential. They do not only have an impact on what these organisations do but also for how they do what they do, how they work. In a more existential sense, they also have an impact on what their organisational identities are, what their place is in the entire landscape of international relations.

This can be illustrated by a short look at the field of security and defence in Europe where the development of the relations between the European Union, NATO and the United Nations has come to highlight the relevance of inter-organisational studies. The early 2000s opened in this sense a new chapter for research on European security. Central to this was the

way in which the EU was becoming more pronounced as an actor in this field. The development of the EU towards actorness in the fields of crisis management, security and defence brought it to domains where other organisations used to work.

As an earlier example, the end of the Cold War also affected the constellations of organisations. Western European Union, the European defence union from the late 1940s, first got redefined as a mediator or bridge between NATO and the EU. Later on, it was to leave this role and the organisational scene altogether. This contributed to the need to define what the relations between the EU and NATO are and formulate the contents and principles of these relations in declarations and agreements.

Meanwhile, neither the EU nor NATO was happy with a regionally limited role: both showed signs of a global imperative. Their search for a role in security, and the globalising nature of security, led them to perceive a need for action beyond their area or territory. The times were relatively calm in Europe; security threats were seen to originate elsewhere. This brought the two organisations to define anew their relations with the one global organisation in charge of security, the United Nations.

A number of interesting debates, episodes and incidents show that relations between these organisations have not been straightforward. In EU-NATO relations, there have been clashes of interpretation such as on NATO's right of first refusal when it comes to the decision to start a crisis management operation and signs of competition in, for instance, the creation of rapid and ever more rapid reaction forces to be used in the growing field of crisis management, or in the definition of threats. In the relations between these two and the UN, negotiations on their format and nature have been surprisingly complicated.

There is a growing understanding that inter-organisational relations are a consequential phenomenon. Organisations do relate to each other and influence each other. Moreover, there are forces within the organisations and outside that want them to relate to each other. But while inter-organisational relations have consequences on what the organisations do and how they perform, the consequences are not necessarily those intended or wished for. The story of inter-organisational relations can certainly be told in a rational way, but it is not devoid of irrational features or unintended consequences.

Indeed, the organisations themselves chose to characterise these relations in a certain way, reassuringly, as it were. In their official phraseology, the organisations increasingly refer to each other, stressing the positive

sides of cooperation. Similarly, politicians from the member states, caught up in this new reality, have stressed the absence of rivalry between organisations even at the face of it and tend to stress their own role, their authority, in deciding on and guiding these relations.

Here, the need to know more and to understand better becomes manifest. What can the consequences of inter-organisational relations be in practice? What do inter-organisational relations consist of actually, what happens between the organisations? What makes organisations cooperate, what makes them not cooperate? If organisational interaction has negative consequences, how to prevent them? How can the consequences be made more positive? When and why can we expect positive consequences, and when negative? Exactly for whom or why would negative consequences be negative?

What are our tools to find the answers to these questions? What do we know, and how can we know? The domain is difficult to tackle in research. Not only is it not clear what the consequences of interaction are: it is also not easy to define what actually is meant by interaction between organisations, or what their relations consist of in practice. In the face of it, we barely have an agreement on what "international organisation" means.

When reading carefully prepared overviews on literature on inter-organisational relations in this field, one is struck by how often the lack of theory is mentioned. Lack of theoretical insights or proper theoretical oversight is often deplored (Koops 2013; Græger and Haugevik 2013). This book, however, grows from the insight that there is perhaps too much theory there. In order to develop fresh understandings, we need first to be better aware of the theories that bind us to repeating certain views—or have kept us unaware of these questions before.

The starting point for this analysis is the insight that inter-organisational relations change organisations. This is the first and most important consequence they have. Looking at the EU in particular, we can see that through interaction with other organisations, it both impacts on others and is impacted by them. None of them remains quite what they were.

We speak about impact and influence; thus, we speak about power. We need something more than their own understanding and something more than most of our theories would say on inter-organisational relations. The concept of power helps us understand these relations. Building a way of analysing inter-organisational relations as manifestations of power relations, or from the vantage point of power, helps us understand the nature and consequences of inter-organisational relations. This, in turn, helps us

understand the state of international relations—and perhaps even increase our understanding of what power can be in this field today.

Indeed, the position of international organisations in the broader framework of international relations might be changing, too. Some authors suggest that, overall, literature has not kept in pace with the changes as security matters are increasingly managed, regulated or implemented by and through multilateral security institutions—and that this has been a development that even the most influential of member states, the United States, shaped only to a limited extent (Jones and Forman 2010: 8–9). "Institutional pluralism" might be something typical for European governments, shown very clearly in the EU Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS 2003) that was "remarkably generous to the efforts of other organisations," perhaps motivated by a desire to show the viability of pluralistic forms (Gowan and Batmanglich 2010: 81, 94).

Does this growing role and growing interrelatedness of organisations mean that a new level of international relations is taking shape above that of the level of states? What would that mean in terms of shifts of power within the system? With the help of this analysis, the goal is to be better able to assess the importance of organisational agency in today's world. Is its growing (Erskine 2004) or radically diminishing (Naïm 2013)? What would be the reasons for this? What or who would challenge it?

This book aims at shedding light on relations between international organisations with the help of theoretical tools and concepts aiming, in the end, at a better understanding of this part of the empirical reality of international relations. It aims at letting the tools we have do their job, craft different constructions out of the substance at hand and, in the end, bring to the reader not only a freshened way of looking at inter-organisational relations but also an improved understanding of how the tools we use impact on the results of our analyses.

1.2   The Toolbox

When it comes to the substance of inter-organisational relations, there is, indeed, a multitude of research fields that look at it. Each comes with their own insights and idiosyncrasies. In organisational theory, relations between organisations are richly studied, including from the perspective of power, but international organisations are often left out. Typical objects of study are instead enterprises, bureaucracies and associations. In international relations research, international organisations are, quite

obviously so, an object of research. Yet, they have for a long time been seen as derivatives, not as subjects. They are understood in a way that does not allow for such a research agenda: if they are not autonomous actors, they cannot have relations with each other, either. If the organisations do not have their own intentions or autonomy in terms of means, relations between organisations cannot be intentional either and cannot involve conscious aims or policies. Finally, in European studies, the EU is at the very centre of research—but it is often seen as *sui generis* instead of as an international organisation. This makes comparison with other organisations particularly demanding, if not impossible, and renders theory formation complicated.

There are, in other words, tools that fit each some particular purpose, as of screwdrivers for the EU only, not of the EU as an international organisation, or for the study of power, but not the study of the power of international organisations. Because of these idiosyncrasies, we have plenty of non-answers, or, to put it differently, we have a lack of knowledge. We do not know the answers as we do not pose the right questions in the first place. Our theoretical tools each reduce the substance to statements that may be logical and understandable but unsatisfactory. Still, while using the tools we have may seem to lead us to an impasse, the impasse may actually be an invitation to take another path and gradually get where we aimed at getting.

Therefore, this book operates several of these tools and comes to try several different paths. Indeed, to get a grasp of the relations between the EU, NATO and the UN, a number of insights from different theoretical traditions are needed. This book undertakes the analysis in the following way: from the research of inter-organisational relations, it gets the basic starting point that organisations in actual fact are related to one another and that these relations are consequential and have an impact on them and on their environment. From this same field, it further gets the insight that relations can be of various kinds, as are the needs of organisations for such relations. Indeed, what do organisations need to fulfil their purposes? These insights are then complemented by considerations about the specificity of international organisations among organisations in general: there might be some crucial differences there that have to be taken into account, particularly concerning legitimacy and power.

Exemplifying all this with the European Union may be unsatisfactory from several viewpoints as one could say it is not a normal international organisation at all. Yet, because of its special nature, concentrating on it

does help to bring the analysis forward. What exactly is special in it? The analysis of the EU's power helps answer this. Indeed, international organisation or not, the EU is an entity that is seen to have power, and the rich literature on this helps us overcome the impasse of "powerless" organisations. But it also leads to another impasse, that of a debate on the EU's power being specific and unique. This is a hindrance that we leave aside by looking at the question of why the EU needs power in the first place. This leads us to looking at power in inter-organisational relations.

In other words, the book builds a framework for analysing power in inter-organisational relations by combining theoretical insights from the study of inter-organisational relations and that of the power of the EU as well as empirical research on interaction between the EU, NATO and the UN. A reading based on power connects these separate research traditions in this book, leading to a novel way of answering the question of what kind of power the EU has and uses in its relations with international organisations. This opens up for a specific, new research question: what power the EU has vis-à-vis international organisations. This is an essential question for understanding the development of the EU in the global system and the current dynamics of international relations.

Put shortly, the main claim of this book is that international organisations need power, that they have power and exert power and that their relations with other organisations are both a factor that affects this power, reducing, increasing or transforming it, and a venue where they exercise it. The book is organised in a way that successively spells out each of these claims. The study of international organisations may not have given much space to considerations of power, but it is clear that international organisations need power to fulfil their tasks and exert that power in various ways. The study of the European Union illustrates in widest possible sense the variety of forms and types of power an organisation can have. Looking then at the EU's relations with NATO and the UN in particular, it is easy to find examples of how these relations affect the power of the organisations. How the organisations exert power over each other is finally exemplified by a series of cases and phenomena from the past decade or so.

Power in this book is a vantage point. The vantage point here is not the member states' interests; it is not the acting bureaucrats', either. We are not speaking about their power. In order to understand inter-organisational relations, we need a vantage point, and power is suitable as it is abstract enough to make us see this complexity from a sufficiently great distance.

What this book does not do is to offer any comprehensive treatise on the concept of power. It does strongly underline the usability of superconcepts such as "power," the ones over which, as Baldwin (2002) points out, there is troublesome disagreement, but that are still necessary. Writing the book is based on the use of the notion of power—it is put into use as the necessary vantage point for this analysis: "what if this was about power?"

The hill on which the reader is now invited to stand to see the scenery is composed of an abounding theoretical debate on what power is. It is many-faced. The classic definition of power is a definition concerning the relationship between two actors, A and B, where power is the ability of A to get B to do something B would not otherwise have done. This view, stemming from Dahl (1957), would usually be labelled as the "first face" of power. The actors that are meant here are often individuals, persons with the capacity to produce intended and foreseen effects on others (Wrong 1979: 2). The second face of power, usually identified with Bachrach and Baratz (1962), adds the dimension of A being able to prevent B from doing something. A third face, then, as introduced by Lukes (1974), would be about the ability to control the agenda, or to change what B actually wants. In this sense, power is something that can be used to prevent conflict by shaping peoples' perceptions, cognitions and preferences to the extent that they accept their role in the existing order of things (Lukes 1974: 24). It can also be seen as a process of legitimisation that prevents opposition from arising (Hardy and Clegg 2006: 761).

A fourth face, sometimes called Foucaultian, essentially concerns the linkage between power and knowledge: the two are inseparable. Power would be the ability to influence, and even control, not only what B does, does not, wants or does not want, but, rather fundamentally, who B is. Foucault's "productive power" would be about the constitution of social subjects through discursive practices (see, e.g., Merlingen 2011). This final form of power would take us away from the seeing power as a resource that can be possessed or manipulated, and instead paint for us a web of power relations, or a structure of dominancy, that one cannot escape, independently of whether one was in role of the dominant or in that of the subordinate (Hardy and Clegg 2006: 762–765).

It is perhaps illustrative of the complexity of the phenomenon of power that researchers would not easily agree on how many faces there actually are. Is power Janus-faced, would we recognise it when we see it? What is relevant for us is to take a starting point in the variety of layers in approaching power: the layer of having the upper hand, or winning a conflict, the

layer of being able indirectly to limit alternatives and set agendas and the layer of being able to shape what is considered normal, shaping other's interests (cf. Berenskoetter 2007).

Such richness in the conception of power helps us look at inter-organisational relations from several viewpoints and with the necessary level of abstraction. In the first part of the book, the lack of power analysis becomes manifest as the various theoretical tools are used in turn. Building an understanding of where power is and what kind of power we are dealing with, the book then presents in its latter part readings, "paintings" as it were, based on power, of three sets of empirical cases or examples of interaction between the three organisations: how the organisations exert power over one another in shaping the other organisations' relevance, tasks and image. These cases reflect different power sources the EU may or may not have over the UN and NATO and show the ways they shape one another.

In conclusion, in addition of offering a fresh way of analysing the vast substance of inter-organisational relations, the book invites the reader also finally to turn around and see back to where this was painted from. Using power as a tool of analysis helps us gain an increased knowledge of what power is in current international relations and, finally, of power itself.

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Analysing Inter-organisational Relations

2.1 Inter-organisational Theory and International Organisations

Inter-organisational relations can be seen as a part of organisation theory. It encompasses studies on relations between two or more organisations. Put simply, research in this field starts from the basic consideration that organisations relate to one another and that these relations, or interaction between them, matters. Given the great variety of what the term "organisation" can be thought to include, the field extends from private companies to public administration.

International organisations, in turn, are an integral part of international relations, and they, too, are related to one another—increasingly so, as will be shown in what follows. At the outset, then, the study of inter-organisational relations sounds appealing to a student of international relations that wants to gain a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of current international relations and their dynamics. Yet, the application of inter-organisational theory to international organisations is only gaining ground. In particular, relations between organisations in the field of security and defence have hardly been studied using such an approach. This chapter looks at factors that may have hindered its spreading and finds them both in the theoretical inheritance and in the empirical reality.

This chapter then passes through the changing landscape of inter-organisational relations in practice, concentrating on how the relations between the EU, NATO and the UN have developed over the past 10–15 years. It also looks at existing literature on these relations and concludes that, while research is constantly growing and aptly dissects the different forms and types of interaction between the organisations, it does not necessarily help to understand them. Why are the relations there in the first place, and what consequences do they have? A way to answer these questions is to insert power into the investigation. As inter-organisational theory helps understand inter-organisational relations as something consequential, the concept of power helps understand both the causes of or motives for such relations and what their consequences actually are.

Surprisingly enough, while the study of international relations is, after all, about power, the study of inter-organisational relations is not. This is why there is need for first clearing away some theoretical impediments related to the understanding of the character of international organisations and the locus and type of power in international relations.

Inter-organisational theory typically explains how and why organisations relate to one another and how these relations can be of different types, competitive, cooperative, sometimes short term and tactical, sometimes vital relations of interdependence. It also explains how these relations affect the functioning of the organisation and its success. Concrete examples could include alliances and mergers (as in Cook 1977).

Organisations exist and function in a certain environment, and as Mizruchi and Yoo (2002: 599) put it, organisations must respond to the concerns of environmental constituents. These would be customers or other organisations that all are part of that environment. This is why other organisations need to be taken into account; they can be essential for the attainment of the goals of the organisation.

One could find it natural to apply this approach also to international organisations. There are many of them, they form part of each other's environment, and they might compete or cooperate. Would it not be logical to include in the analysis of any international organisation the other organisations that exist in its environment? Their role could be an important explanatory factor when examining, for instance, the conditions under which the organisations succeed in reaching their goals.

Still, inter-organisational theory has been rather slow to extend to international relations. Some fields were reached more quickly than others,

however, including notably trade and environment policy, foreign aid and aviation. An example of early theoretical research is Jönsson's article (1986) on IATA in the transnational aviation network where the author looks at the role of linking-pin organisations and personnel in boundary roles within the organisations. In part, these studies build on organisation theory, sociology of organisations and related fields such as regime interaction (see Oberthür and Gehring 2011 for a useful overview of scholarly development on institutional interaction).

Why political, general purpose or security-political international organisations have been less studied from this perspective can be explained by two different reasons, empirical and theoretical.

The empirical reason is relatively simple: there were no such relations to be studied. Put somewhat simplified, the system of international organisations was originally one where either the same states established different organisations for different purposes or different groups of states established a similar organisation for each group. The late nineteenth-century functional organisations as well as the growing number of organisations from the late 1940s onwards made up a constellation where there was one organisation for one task or function, often also one per geographical region. Different organisations had different tasks and different membership, with the exception of the universal UN that, however, works through and with specialised agencies, in practice autonomous organisations, such as WHO or FAO. There was no need or reason for these organisations actually to interact.

As the number of international organisations then grows, as their tasks expand and their membership grows, there is more and more overlap between them: they come to cover more of the same area, tasks and members. Overlap is often seen as the most immediate reason for inter-organisational relations to form because it implies a need to define and clarify relations between organisations. Another reason may simply be the new opportunities of these organisations to work together.

The European Union (EU) is an international organisation in a category of its own. Its tasks, membership and also working methods have been broadening in a way that has step by step brought it into contact with other organisations. Early examples of inter-organisational questions would appear in the 1950s and 1960s through the European Coal and Steel Community's links with ILO, while the development of European Political Cooperation led to gaining an observer status in the UN General Assembly and a role in the Conference for Security and Co-operation in

Europe in the 1970s (cf. Koops 2013: 73–75). Other examples could be found in the fields of trade and environment (see also Gehring et al. 2013).

In foreign, security and defence policy, however, such development of overlap only started to accelerate in the 1990s. An important trigger was the expansion of tasks of the EU in the 1990s to cover more security-related functions. This expansion led the EU to occupy itself with similar tasks as NATO. NATO was itself changing focus. Moreover, both organisations enlarged in parallel towards having close to identical membership. Both organisations were also testing the ground for broader than regional scope in their action, which led them into a new position with the UN. To a considerable degree, the EU's development functioned as a trigger for relations with other organisations.

How we see the empirical reality is also affected by what we are supposed to look at. The theoretical and conceptual luggage of international relations often comprises a certain view on international organisations. They are not independent actors but tools; as such, they are not capable of having autonomous relations with other organisations. As we move towards international organisations in the field of security, this tendency is strengthened: these are intergovernmental organisations, and in these fields, states are understood to be particularly wary of their autonomy and freedom of action.

Views and analyses on international relations have overall been very state centred. In this tradition, intergovernmental organisations are just what they are: established by the states, for specific reasons. They are derivatives, seen as instruments or tools of the states, sometimes as arenas for or facilitators of the interaction of states; much more seldom are they seen as actors by themselves. The classic textbook on international organisations by Archer (1992) discusses these roles—instrument, arena and actor—and notes that the roles are not mutually exclusive. Even when considered as actors, the independence or autonomy of organisations as actors can be contested (Mayer and Vogt 2006): they would act on behalf of the states. Thus, should the organisations effectively be inter-related, these relations would not be anything that could be seen as their own policy or independent action, but instead part of how the states want them to operate. Inter-organisational relations can in fact be studied from the perspective of the member states: they may pursue their strategic goals through, for instance, empowering one organisation over another (see, e.g., Simón 2010). Similarly, Schleich (2014) would see that the importance of member states on the development of cooperation between

NATO and the EU has been greater than that of the leaders of the organisations or their bureaucracy.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or Amnesty International, that otherwise might be seen as relatively less important than, for instance, the UN or NATO, may appear as having a clearer identity as actors. Archer describes it as strong corporate identity (Archer 1992: 148).

The study of relations between international organisations would thus somewhat surprisingly tend to leave the organisations themselves out of the picture and look elsewhere. The organisations, not being autonomous, would lack the rationality of an actor, and they would not have own interests to defend in interaction with other organisations. The state then becomes the object of study: it is the member states that are studied when one wants to analyse inter-organisational relations.

Even when the organisation itself is in focus, scholars put effort at locating the "real" actor within them and find it complicated. The organisation as such does not seem to act; but who then would be the actor? Such a methodological impediment is discussed by Jönsson (1986) who argues that organisations have to be disaggregated to discuss agency. Interaction can be studied when it is restricted to individuals within the organisations, looking at their roles and identities, locating the so-called boundary-spanning personnel, those placed at what is seen as the interface between two organisations. And quickly, the object—the organisation—disappears again: instead, we look at people, the persons in charge.

Such conceptual and methodological difficulties need not, however, hinder the study of relations between intergovernmental organisations. After all, similar questions arise elsewhere, too. If organisations need disaggregation, then the state needs it, too; looking at states as rational and unified actors is equally contested similarly and in a matter of advanced theoretical simplification. Likewise, all other organisations can be understood as actually a mere reflection of something or someone else. Mizruchi and Yoo (2002: 606) discuss the view that organisation is not the appropriate unit of analysis for understanding corporate power and that corporations are most appropriately viewed as tools—of individuals, groups, classes.

These parameters explain why a perspective that builds on the state is prevalent in the study of inter-organisational relations. What strikes as the most common focus is that of state-organisation relationship. Central to

this focus is the argument that the organisations have been created for a reason. As Kapur (2002) puts it, from the point of view of members, the rationale and purpose of international organisations is to lower transaction costs, produce information, provide for more stable expectations, a durable negotiation forum but also, for instance, different consultative and supportive services. How well they perform thus becomes a research question.

One may also straightforwardly see states using organisations as a tool. The hegemonic stability theory as framed by Keohane (1984) is a classic example of this: the hegemon not only uses but in actual fact creates organisations in order to control other states and to pursue its own goals. The instrumental use of organisations by the states is also captured in the concept of forum shopping, a situation in which states have a choice of multiple international organisations that they can turn to depending on which one they see as being of best value in pursuing their goals. These goals might differ from the goals of the organisations.

Then again, the states might not always succeed in using the organisations in such an instrumental way. The organisations might just be malfunctioning, or they might be immune to a single state's efforts at using them. The principal-agent theories would look at situations where the agent, the organisation, actually does something different from what the principal, the state, has intended (see, e.g., Hawkins et al. 2006 on delegation and the autonomy of international organisations).

In addition to being analysed in relation to states, international organisations can also be seen to play a role in the international system. As Archer (1992) puts it, they serve the system by enabling its functioning in an effective, regular and equitable way. Their ways to do this would include articulation and aggregation, norms, recruitment, socialisation, rulemaking, rule application and rule adjudication as well as information, communication and operations of different kinds (Archer 1992). Such a perspective widens the way of looking at the organisations from serving the states (or some of them) to serving, if not even forming, the international system. While the perspective here widens, it also changes the perception as it renders the organisations less susceptible and more generally legitimate.

Susceptibility and legitimacy lead us to an important question about the attitudes towards international organisations. There might be a considerable difference between organisations such as firms and international organisations: while the former are supposed to perform, the latter are

often seen as representing certain important values, even more so than as actually doing something.

International relations are often analysed from the realist, anarchy-inspired assumption that cooperation in this realm is particularly hard. In such difficult conditions, managing to establish an international organisation is already an achievement as such; the mere existence of such an entity is something positive for international relations. Therefore, the organisations are looked upon with a degree of benevolence. In such adverse environment, it would also be fully understandable that their actual achievements be scarce (cf. Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 701, 703).

A possibility of bias may follow. Menon, speaking of institutions—in which we here count also the organisations—says that institutions are often assumed to exercise a positive impact and scholars would not necessarily pay attention to potentially negative consequences of the institutions. The possible roles of institutions are manifold: they are supposedly able to lend legitimacy (e.g., to military interventions) or provide an alibi, when member states use organisations as a means of replacing costly policies at the national level with cheaper multilateral alternatives (Menon 2011: 92–95).

International organisations seem to enjoy considerable legitimacy even when not necessarily functioning too effectively. Legitimacy, in a general sense, means popular acceptance, consent, a belief in that the institutions and actions of the entity are appropriate. International organisations are as a rule perceived as such. But where does this legitimacy stem from? One possibility is that it stems from the authority and legitimacy of states. After all, if the organisation is established based on a treaty between states that themselves are legitimate (democratic, performing), then there is hardly a reason to see the organisation as illegitimate. Still, the question of the legitimacy of international organisations seems more complicated than that. To a considerable extent, it seems to be based, on the contrary, on the organisations being different from the states. The international organisations are free from the suspicion often associated with the states of simply trying to further their own, narrow interests. The goals of the organisations would be general, impartial and therefore legitimate.

What is also interesting with international organisations, when compared with many other forms of organisation, is that the often-used measures of legitimacy based on "output" and "input" seem more difficult to apply and possibly even of less relevance. There are no clear criteria either

for evaluating output, or what the organisations achieve, or for evaluating input, or the way in which they function and reach decisions. It does not necessarily matter if the output is scarce. In some cases, as Lipson (2010) points out, a poorly performing institution may even be desirable for key stakeholders and thus conducive to organisational survival (cf. also Gutner and Thompson 2013: 59). Kapur (2002) notes that the formation of international institutions has implied high transaction costs, and this means that suboptimal outcomes are tolerated. It may also mean that institutional change is slow, even "glacial," and that the institutions have something of a "stickiness" in them.

If performance does not matter, it may not affect behaviour, either. Overall, performance is often seen as a reason for organisations to interact or cooperate. But here, too, international organisations differ from organisations at large. Their performance matters relatively less, also the incentive to cooperate because of the need to perform better is less.

Moreover, the measurement of the performance of international organisations is highly complicated. As Gutner and Thompson (2013) point out, the assessment of performance is based on both the process and the outcome, on whether and how goals have been achieved. This, however, cannot be meaningfully done without a clear understanding of the goals. And for international organisations, particularly for such multipurpose general ones than the EU or the UN, the goals are often unclear, conflicting, political and ambiguous (Gutner and Thompson 2013: 58–59). In addition, eventual problems with performance are often linked to views on the state-organisation relationship. As this is another moving target and one that is open to different interpretations (idem: 63–65), the measurement is complicated further.

The measurement of input is equally difficult. Chapman (2009) is an example of attempt to measure legitimacy with a link to public opinion. Pursuing the line of thought that non-state entities would have a certain legitimacy gain, one could think that NGOs would be even more an "alternative" to the state than IGOs. Yet, they may suffer from lack of democracy and accountability, more so than the IGOs.

Overall, performance and legitimacy stand out as features that seem crucial to set international organisations aside from organisations in general or organisations as usually dealt with in organisational theory. This is a challenge—and an opportunity—to theorising that this book will return to in the chapters to follow.

2.2 The Rise and Development of Inter-organisational Relations in the Field of Security

International organisations active in such fields as trade and environment were connected to each other earlier on than those in security policy. For the latter, the end of the Cold War was a major landmark that eventually led to intensifying relations between them. All organisations active in the field of European security went through an important change. Except for the Warsaw Pact that was dissolved, the organisations went through a period of activation and expansion. For NATO but also for the OSCE, it was a question of redefining their role in the absence of East-West division. WEU was activating itself. The EU that perhaps changed the most took steps into the field of security as a newcomer, as part of its becoming a political union.

For NATO, WEU and the EU alike, a very consequential phase of enlargement started. Enlargement was a concrete manifestation of the end of the Cold War: the Central and Eastern European countries now expressed their wish to join the EU and NATO. For the organisations, this was undoubtedly a sign of their attractiveness: the organisations had something to offer to states wanting to join. Enlargement also came to be a motor of internal change in these organisations, or a reason to change, in particular for the EU. How very consequential enlargement actually has been seems still to be discovered, also in theoretical terms (see Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015, 2016).

Arguably, a new period of institutionalisation of security started (see also Gowan and Batmanglich 2010). In this, the organisations developed differently, but in interaction with each other.

Interaction between the EU and NATO was only to start. Somewhat curiously, it first developed through a third party mediating, as it were, the relations. This third party was Western European Union (WEU), the organisation where the impact of interaction in the end was most dramatic, as it led to its disappearance.

WEU originated in the Brussels Treaty signed in March 1948 between Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, on Economic, Social and Cultural collaboration and collective self-defence. The treaty was modified in 1954 to include the former enemy states Italy and Germany and creating WEU in 1955. WEU was a classic defence alliance as Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty states:

> If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

WEU was largely dormant until its "reactivation" in the 1990s. New tasks were included, notably the crisis management tasks entitled the Petersberg tasks, declared by the WEU in 1992; new organs were added, the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies as well as the Western Union Satellite Centre. WEU even conducted operations. In the Gulf War in 1987 and 1988, WEU member states reacted together to the threat to freedom of navigation: the minesweepers dispatched by WEU countries in the "Operation Cleansweep" were the first instance of a concerted action in WEU.[1]

WEU was also active in the Balkans. In July 1992, the WEU Ministerial Council decided that WEU naval forces would participate in monitoring the embargo against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. On 8 June 1993, the WEU and NATO Councils met to approve a combined concept for a joint operation in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 820. The agreement established a unified command for "Operation Sharp Guard," which was to begin on 15 June 1993. In May 1995, the Permanent Council accepted the offer of contributions to the WEU police force element in Mostar (Bosnia). In Kosovo, in response to a request from the EU based on Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, the WEU Satellite Centre in November 1998 embarked on a mission of "general security surveillance" of the Kosovo region. The Parliamentary Assembly later on, when looking for raison d'être, also saw itself as the only parliamentary assembly in the field of defence.

WEU pre-dated NATO and the EU, having been established to enhance the collective security commitment between Western European countries. The founding of NATO and of the European Communities shifted the concrete activities foreseen for WEU effectively to these other two. Still, it had a character distinct from both NATO and the EC/EU and was to remain so. In comparison with NATO, it represented a theoretical but as such relevant European alternative to transatlantic defence. In comparison with the EC/EU, it represented a defence alliance, a commitment to collective self-defence that was a field where the EC/EU member countries were not to enter.

In literature, we see that different organisations are usually treated one at a time, leaving out the organisational landscape. Such isolationism was grounded in empirical reality but also in political praxis. The organisations did not have relations to speak about. Moreover, relations between them were not necessarily seen as something positive at all. It is, indeed, possible to think that relations between the different organisations might have developed earlier, had they not been actually seen as unwelcome. The EU and NATO officials in Brussels were instructed not to be in contact with each other[2]—something that shows that such contacts were understood to have an effect, and, in this case, an undesired one. In other words, and this is important to note, the impact of inter-organisational relations was not ignored or denied but rather recognised as potentially considerable.

Such isolationism was also motivated by reasoning in terms of division of labour. There was a point in not doing the same or becoming the same. In some kind of post hoc reasoning, one could say that it was good for the EC/EU to be able to develop without the burden of taking care of security and defence that belonged to other organisations.

What then happens at the end of the Cold War is that isolation ends. Both NATO and the EU, two organisations in a period of important change, see in WEU something that is of interest for them. For NATO, WEU seems to embody the European defence commitment that could be fundamentally important to drag into NATO as a counterweight to the splitting effects of a changing security landscape and the formation of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). For the EU, WEU embodied both commitment and capacity, although the latter was to come from NATO, something that the EU now needed as it embarked on a road to become a security actor.

The launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1991) included linking WEU to the Union. The EU would "avail itself" of WEU to implement decisions which have defence implications. As WEU was also linked to NATO through the Berlin and Brussels agreements of 1996, it became a link between the EU and NATO.

The EU seemed to be the one that draw WEU with more force. There was also the question of the WEU treaty expiring 1998: what should be done? The EU countries considered defence issues in the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 and step by step achieved a merger of WEU with the EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 took the Petersberg tasks from WEU. In 2000 WEU was practically ended; the draft EU Constitutional

Treaty of 2003 already included even the mutual defence clause (albeit in slightly modified form). WEU came to an end in 2011.

Now that WEU no longer was there, the EU and NATO needed to find an agreement about their relations. In 2003, the two agreed on principles of cooperation and signed the "Berlin Plus" agreements with the following contents:

1. The NATO-EU Security Agreement, which covers the exchange of classified information under security reciprocal protection rules.
2. Assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations (CMO).
3. Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMOS, such as communication units and headquarters.
4. Procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities.
5. Terms of reference for DSACEUR and European command options for NATO.
6. Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, in particular the incorporation within NATO's defence planning of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations.
7. The EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities.

The EU subsequently inherited some operations from NATO in the Balkans (Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo). The two organisations were now envisaging similar operations, and both were developing capabilities for rapid action. Discussions followed on how the two organisations would relate to each other when it comes to command and planning capacities. Common defence or mutual assistance was now another shared domain, and there the constellation between the two was put into the wording of the Lisbon Treaty that would state that the EU's mutual defence clause does not adversely affect the obligations of NATO whose members see their defence obligations as primarily linked to NATO. Formal highest-level political cooperation between the two came to be blocked as Cyprus and Turkey both opposed to deals allowing the other party's full involvement (Cyprus not being a Partnership for Peace member, Turkey being outside the EU and less related to the EU's foreign and security policy than what it had been in its relations with WEU).

Expansion and development of European security organisations also affected their relations with the United Nations. A lot had indeed changed. WEU, NATO and the EU all embarked upon developing crisis management capabilities. While crisis management was a new task, the new profile also implied a potentially important geographical change. It was seen that crises took place not in the territory of the member states, but elsewhere, and that the organisations would then plan for operating even in faraway regions. This meant that the organisations were envisaging an international role, and indeed, they started speaking of global responsibility (e.g., ESS 2003).

Out-of-area operations and global reach brought NATO and the EU closer to the UN. In fact, they attributed their new crisis management capacities rather clearly as something that could be used to assist the UN. At the same time, however, NATO and the EU did not want the UN to decide on their behalf but wanted to retain their autonomy. Referring to situations where a UN mandate for their operations could stay blocked by a veto of permanent Security Council members, they brought forward the view that a UN mandate was not a formal requirement for their operations.

The EU acquired a legal personality with the Lisbon Treaty. The continuing development of common foreign, security and defence policy started to form of the EU an actor of an unforeseen type. Being a multi-purpose organisation, the EU's international role and its involvement with the UN have much longer roots. The EU is party to more than 50 multilateral agreements as the only non-state entity. In many major conferences, such as on sustainable development, it is a full participant. It has a variety of different relations with UN specialised agencies, including full membership with voting rights in FAO (since 1991) (on the variety, see even Gehring et al. 2013). In the UN General Assembly, the EU (EC) gained the status of a permanent observer in 1974. The development of the CFSP and the legal personality were factors conducive to rethinking the adequacy of such a status. In 2011, an enhanced observer status was agreed upon.[3]

Alongside these issues of representation within the UN, the development of the EU in the field of foreign and security policy has also impacted on how the EU is seen by the UN as a partner. The EU contributes a lot to the UN's action. This is very tangible when it comes to the budget. The EU is the UN's largest single donor; the contributions of the member states amount to 30.38% of the UN regular budget and 33.17% of the UN

peacekeeping budget.[4] In addition to the EU's crisis management capacity that has been created emphasising its usefulness for the UN, the EU stresses the importance of the UN system of norms. The European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS 2003) put this very clearly: speaking of effective multilateralism, it says "We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken."

At the same time, the UN is for the EU an important arena where to enact the common policy and use the common voice. Already in the times of European Political Cooperation, from the 1970s, it was seen that a common voice at the UN is a major goal of the common policy. The UN has been an important arena for the influence of the EU as an opinion leader. Importantly, it is also a source of legitimacy, in particular when it comes to the EU's action outside of its own territory.

Compared with the EU, NATO has had a thinner contact with the UN, one that has evolved with the new role of NATO in crisis management and peace support operations mandated by the UN. The backbone for these relations, from the point of view of the UN Charter, is Chap. 8 on Regional Arrangements that would apply to both NATO and the EU, yet both of them refuse seeing themselves in this category. Indeed, the UN was at the time of its own establishment in 1945 already thinking of its relation with regional organisations or "arrangements" in terms of utilisation and authorisation. NATO, established after the UN, duly mentions the UN in the Washington Treaty. From the 1990s onwards, as the two organisations have come into more contact with each other, NATO's capacities have been of use for the UN. But the relationship has not involved merely resource questions: also legitimacy and autonomy play an important role. In 2008, a joint declaration was signed on UN-NATO Secretariat Cooperation (UN/NATO Joint Declaration 2008) that is a framework for consultation and dialogue and cooperation and includes regular exchanges and dialogue on political and operational issues as well as the idea of further developing the cooperation between the organisations on issues of common interest, taking into account each organisation's specific mandate, expertise, procedures and capabilities.

NATO's strategic concept from November 2010 (NATO 2010) speaks of cooperation and is particularly telling on the inter-organisational relations. Under the title "Partnerships," it devotes considerable space to the EU, which it characterises as "a unique and essential partner for NATO."

NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which is seen to provide a framework for further strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. There emerges a "strategic partnership" between NATO and the EU that NATO would like to be strengthened in many tangible ways to get help in overcoming its own internal divisions. ESDP has also clearly inspired NATO when it comes to civilian crisis management and the new consultative way in which the 2010 Strategic Concept was prepared. On the UN, the concept says that cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world (NATO 2010).

In all, the past two decades have made inter-organisational relations an empirical reality even in the field of European security. New steps forward, such as the agreements achieved on how these relations would look like, the practices of mandating operations of other organisations, joint declarations, or programmatic points—like the intriguing concept of "effective multilateralism" of the EU's security strategy of 2003 (ESS 2003)—have also triggered studies of inter-organisational relations (cf. Koops 2013: 74). In the following, this chapter looks closer at the nature of these studies.

2.3   EU-NATO-UN Relations in Research

Understandably, a lot of research on the relations between the EU, NATO and the UN has been descriptive in nature, particularly so in the first years. A relatively new phenomenon needs to be described. Thus, many analyses provide a chronology of how the relations have unfolded, going through documents as well as main events along the road. They often look at concrete manifestations of these relations, be it in the form of systematic contacts between the bureaucracies or between the leadership of the organisations and accounts of cooperation in, for example, crisis management operations, moving then on to evolving practices of linking them together.

The accounts often relate to the evolution of the EU as a security actor or as an actor in multilateral institutions. It is the change in the EU that triggers research. Such analyses on EU-NATO relations would include Croft (2000), Reichard (2006), Ojanen (2006, 2010), Howorth (2007), Varwick and Koops (2009) as well as Græger and Haugevik (2011, 2013)

and on EU-UN relations Larrabee (2004), Ortega (2005), Laatikainen and Smith (2006), Sperling (2011), Tardy (2012), Novosseloff (2012) and Panke (2014). The study of NATO-UN relations, as well as NATO's relations with other organisations, would, in the same period of time, comprise, for example, Yost (2007), Harsch and Varwick (2009), Ojanen (2011), Smith-Windsor (2011) and a bit later on Biermann (2014).

Second, a growing field in the literature is composed of studies looking at cooperation and division of labour between them in crisis management operations, starting with, for instance, Missiroli (2002), Whitman (2004), Major (2008), Scheuermann (2012) and Harsch (2015). The EU's relations with other organisations are similarly analysed when it comes to, for instance, WTO (Zimmermann 2007; Ladefoged Mortensen 2009; Young 2012), the Council of Europe (Schumacher 2012; Kolb 2013), ILO (Riddervold 2010) or the OSCE (Brosig 2010; van Ham 2009). This would be researched usually without any pronounced inter-organisational starting point or an inter-organisational approach.

This research has been developing alongside research on the EU as an actor and its external action capacity. Here, the question would be the EU's capacity to have one voice or act as a unit, and one strand of such analysis looks at whether and how the EU acts as a unit within another organisation. This other organisation would typically appear as an arena for the formation and realisation of the EU's common foreign policy. While Gehring et al. (2013) study the EU in international organisations, Bouchard and Drieskens (2013) look at "the EU in UN politics," particularly the new research momentum built by the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. They point out that the EU's representation and functioning in New York has attracted scholarly attention since the early 1970s but see a tendency to focus on the rules and outcome of decision-making rather than on the process. Typical topics include the level of cohesion between the EU member states in UNGA voting (Bouchard and Drieskens 2013: 118–119).

Inter-organisational theory starts to enter into the study of the relations between the EU, NATO and the UN with the application of classifications of mechanisms of interaction. Cooperation would be one of these, but many other mechanisms exist. Examples of classifications would include Kubicek (2003), Oberthür and Gehring (2011), Heupel (2013), and Koops (2012). In such classifications, attention is first drawn to the basic nature of relations: they can be cooperative or competitive and can take the form of convergence or dependence, particularly resource dependence

(for this theory, see Biermann 2011: 182). Second, there are different types of interaction, including adaptation, learning, diffusion, contagion, imitation or emulation, networking, coercion, control, conditionality, convergence contract and enabling. Different authors would define and group these differently.[5]

Organisations can be studied in pairs but also in larger groups, looking at several organisations that are all interlocked. As mentioned above, networks of organisations and nodes in these networks had been studied by, for example, Jönsson (1986). Organisations can be seen to form a network in which the organisations position themselves, striving for a central location. Diffusion, or emulation, between organisations takes place in such networks. What is diffused can be norms, ideas, knowledge, products, services or strategies. Democratisation, to take an example, could be diffused, emulated or learned (Kubicek 2003). Biermann (2008) sees that such emulation and positioning are two causal mechanisms that affect the behaviour and profile of international organisations. They are, in other words, consequential, important for how the organisations act.

If these, then, are some of the ways in which the organisations interact, and if we think that interaction is consequential, would we not also aim at looking why certain forms of interaction emerge rather than others? And, to pose an even more fundamental question, why do they interact to start with? The explanation of interaction, as in the general literature on inter-organisational relations, starts even in this field from overlap. Overlap—of tasks, of members—is often seen as a basic prerequisite for relations. Galbreath and Gebhard (2010) identify several reasons for the increasing overlap between security organisations in Europe: on the one hand, the EU's functional expansion and increasing overlap and, on the other, structural changes in the international system, changes in member states, or changes in elites and thus internal dynamics in the organisations.

How would one then know in what direction the interaction will develop? When would organisations cooperate rather than compete? One way of answering is that they need cooperation: they need interaction or cooperation in order to gain something. They find cooperation fruitful or necessary for their own functioning and achievement of their goals. It might also be the member states that want them to cooperate. Biermann (2011: 174) would add the impact of norms on good governance that makes them cooperate. Such norms would include transparency, information sharing and policy coordination.

A notable part of research on inter-organisational relations in the field of security and defence policy has been problem driven and concerned by impact, identifying challenges to efficient cooperation and partnerships and how to improve them (Koops 2013: 75–76). Cooperation can thus be linked to performance. Above, we already hinted at differences between organisations at large and international organisations: international organisations would by their innate legitimacy be exempted from demanding requirements to perform. This difference might now be diminishing, and this would change the situation quite remarkably for these organisations. Indeed, international organisations seem to be increasingly under loop: more efficiency is required of them. This, in turn, may force them to find new ways of working, including, perhaps, cooperation with other organisations.

Still, organisations do not always cooperate. A number of impediments have been identified in research: little knowledge about what the others are doing or of their organisational cultures, thus miscommunications and misperceptions, but also the organisations' tendency to protect their own authority, autonomy, visibility and relevance and, finally, their quest for primacy and control (Biermann 2011: 176, 183).

Kolb (2013) and Brosig (2010) look at the conditions under which an inter-organisational relation is likely to be cooperative, and when it is likely to be conflictual. For Brosig, overlap leads to cooperation particularly if it is outside the core fields of competence of the organisations. If the core fields overlap, then a division of competences would be a more likely outcome. Competition, finally, would ensue if there is significant overlap in core or if there is a threat of dominance in peripheral area. In all, it would be a question of interests and capabilities, of calculating the cost and profit of cooperation.

If these are causes of interaction and reasons for the specific forms that they take, what can we say about the consequences of interaction? For David Law (2007) (quoted in Koops 2013: 79), there are three outcomes of inter-organisational relations: defensive, enhancive and transformative. On such a general level, one might assume that some of the features of the organisations are changed, others not and that there can be resistance to change.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) note in their classic article that organisational theory is often about explaining the variety of organisations, of their forms and behaviour. What they want to explain, however, is similarity and homogeneity that is in a sense paradoxical. They argue that once a set of

organisations emerges as a "field," rational actors make their organisations increasingly similar as they try to change them. Constraints emerge on the ability of the organisations to change. This happens through three isomorphic processes, coercive, mimetic and normative. Examples of coercive isomorphism include common legal environment. Mimetic isomorphism happens particularly when the goals are ambiguous and uncertain or there is uncertainty of relations between means and ends, but also in conditions of dependency. Particularly the organisations that are perceived as more legitimate or more successful are imitated. Normative isomorphism, finally, may stem, for instance, from professionalisation, similar types of personnel employed (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150–155).

Where all this takes place is an "organisational field" that forms through factors such as increasing interaction, structures of domination and patterns of coalition, as well as of mutual awareness between the organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148).

Why DiMaggio and Powell emphasise inter-organisational processes and interaction between organisations is that in their view, the major facts that organisations must take into account are, indeed, other organisations. Organisations compete for resources, customers, political power and institutional legitimacy, social and economic fitness (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). The inter-organisational perspective is needed to understand the political struggle for organisational power and survival—but also in order to potentially (re)gain diversity and pluralism.

Turning again to look at the analysis of relations between the EU, NATO and the UN, we can easily see that they have come to operate in an organisational field forming through awareness of each other and increasing interaction. What else can we see? Are the conditions right for isomorphism? From the outset, one could assume that international organisations often have goals that are ambiguous. Research on relations between international organisations seems thus far to diverge. Conclusions drawn on the analysis of the consequences of overlap and interaction are mixed.

Gehring and Faude (2010), when studying organisations in the fields of trade and environment, saw overlap leading to rivalry. Rivalry, then, led to specialisation—contrary to the expectation of growing similarity. Oberthür and Gehring (2011: 32) would say that in the majority of cases, institutional interaction leads to synergy; as an unintended but not negligible side effect, disruption occurred, too. Other consequences have been envisaged, too, for instance, autonomisation (Koch 2009), mutual irrelevance (Duke 2008) or inefficiency (Hofmann 2011).

The performance of the organisations could be affected, but also their identity and functions (Galbreath and Gebhard 2010). Interaction with the environment can be seen to shape the organisations' roles and identities (Biermann 2011: 173). Positing that other organisations are part of an organisation's environment, one can see interaction as change in identities, interests, behaviour or socialisation. The agenda and functions of an organisation can be shaped by interaction with this environment. For instance, when studying international organisations' role as norm promoters or norm diffusers, the analyses on where these norms come from often look at the environment of these organisations, including at the socialisation of the organisations by other actors (e.g., Park 2006). Overall, relations with other organisations are an important factor driving change in international organisations (Kapur 2002).

Bringing in such elements into the research on relations between the EU, NATO and the UN already brings us a good way forward. When Græger and Haugevik (2013) in their overview on the literature on EU-NATO relations point out a lack of theory in research on the topic, they actually open up for this kind of theorising on inter-organisational relations. They argue that NATO is often seen as an explanatory factor, if not "the key organisational other," for the development of European foreign, security and defence policy, or for the lack of it. NATO is typically dealt with as a constraining factor for the EU, one that complicates or even prevents the development (Græger and Haugevik 2013: 260–261). Koops (2012), for his part, looks at NATO influencing the EU as a model, enabler and competitor, and Kfir (2015) follows on the theme of competition seeing that the EU's development into a global actor renders NATO redundant.

The EU-NATO relationship is indeed a rich case to analyse. They can easily be seen as two organisations of a very different type that are complementary to each other and cooperate. Would cooperation then lead to similarity? Or does cooperation require certain similarity, such as comparable structures and processes, and at least mutual understanding of how the organisations function? It is often pointed out that in its development towards a military actor, the EU has used NATO military structures as a model. NATO seemed (NATO 2010) in turn, increasingly to stress civilian crisis management where the model would be the EU as the methods and thinking would stem from there. Would this modelling or imitation essentially help cooperation? Many facts seem to speak about competition, too. The fact that the two organisations are involved in similar activities with

similar means and in same geographic areas could speak of competition rather than cooperation. Finally, cooperation and division of labour are usually seen as based on the respective strengths of the organisations and, thus, the differences between them, one being civilian, the other military, one supranational and the other intergovernmental. Would all this not also be a sign of isomorphism, a sign of the two, originally so different from each other, becoming more and more similar to one another? And would this not reduce the possible value added of specialisation for cooperation?

If isomorphism thrives in conditions of dependency, we might want to look at the EU-UN relations. Would they not be about dependence or interdependence between two organisations that need each other? The UN needs the financial resources, the watchdog function and the multiplier role of the EU. The EU, in turn, needs legitimacy for its action outside of Europe. And it needs an arena where to gather support for goals such as the Kyoto agreement. Would these two organisations not shape each other and try to influence one another? After all, the UN contributed to the development of the EU's crisis management capacities by asking for help in what became the Artemis operation in 2003.

Research on the EU's interaction with international organisations seems to be growing in this direction: bringing up the notions of influence but also the idea of an organisation using other organisations for its purposes. It also brings in what seems as an important element that of development in time. Jørgensen (2009) looks at how the EU's relations with international organisations have changed. This research starts from the EU's support for multilateralism and proceeds to looking at the EU "using" international organisations, or influencing them, as well as at how these influence the EU. In my own typology, I add a chronological aspect to how EU-NATO and EU-UN relations have evolved, from the EU "in" the UN, the EU "with" the UN, to the EU "with" NATO and the EU "in" NATO (Ojanen 2011).

Costa and Jørgensen's (2012) framework for analysis moves from looking at the influence of the EU on international institutions to looking at international institutions' influence on the EU. The authors look specifically at other organisations or institutions' influence on the EU. Understanding influence as change, they analyse the conditions under which an international institution is likely to influence the EU and define four categories of impact: inertia, absorption, transformation and retrenchment.

Costa (2017) elaborates on these categories and combines them with what an organisation can influence in another organisation. While inertia

equals no influence, and retrenchment likewise—because of active resistance against being influenced—the categories of absorption and transformation differ as to the outcome. Absorption is shallow in nature and comprises adjustments in the parameters of policy. Transformation amounts to deeper changes, and these could comprise redefined mandates, changes in policy-making, structures, alliances, and paradigms. While examples of such influence can be found when examining organisations such as the EU, NATO and the UN, overall, he argues, the question of the magnitude of such inter-organisational influence is a question without answer (Costa 2017: 390, 402).

2.4   WHERE IS POWER?

Recent research on relations between the EU, NATO and the UN offers interesting insights into how they can be analysed and helps to see that these relations are indeed consequential for the functioning, perhaps even form and structure of these organisations. At the same time, the picture remains ambiguous. Both conflict and cooperation, efficiency and ineffectiveness can result from increasing interaction. Can the influence be measured somehow, and what is it based on? In order to understand which consequences are likely, or why certain consequences manifest themselves, one needs an additional component, that of power analysis. Thus far, it has been conspicuously absent from the analysis of inter-organisational relations.

Power does not equal influence, to start with. Yet, there are several ways of seeing the relation between power and influence. Costa analyses influence as an effect of power or "power as felt at the receiving end of the power relationship." Building on seeing power as a capacity and influence as a consequence of that capacity, Costa makes an important observation: also the capacity to fence oneself off from influence from others is an effect of power (Costa 2017: 391). Naïm (2013: 27) sees influence as a subset of power: something that seeks to change the perception of the situation rather than situation itself.

If there is influence, then there is power, too. But where is it? Where to look for power? While Gutner and Thompson (2013: 56–57) critique Barnett and Finnemore (1999) for ignoring in their analysis of the external side of the organisations, power politics and state interests, they seem to locate power questions as being external to the organisations. This is indeed what happens in much of the literature.

Yet, even when power would seem to be internal to the organisations, it is not necessarily treated as such. The growing literature on Europeanisation (to be continued in Chap. 3) is an evidence of the influence of the EU or processes therein. Europeanisation can be seen as a process whereby national policies change into more European (downloading), national interests are injected into European policy-making (uploading) or both change in the process (cross-loading) (see Wong and Hill 2011). The literature on Europeanisation is, however, quite "power-less" in the sense that power is not explicitly studied, even though related elements are visible—as in the case above on the EU "using" international organisations, and the very discussion of the impact of interaction on the organisations. Some of the above-mentioned mechanisms of interaction, such as coercion, seem clearly linkable to power or influence, and can be understood from that point of view.

Again, we need to consider some of the basic assumptions that govern the research settings. When studying international organisations, one such fundamental assumption is that they are not entities capable of possessing or exerting power. Power is located elsewhere. Usually, it is located within states. From this follows as an obvious first research question the member states' power over the organisations and their functioning, typically the power of member states over the decision-making procedures, the secretariats or other central organs.

Research also looks at the extent to which the organisations actually have power over the member states. Here, the partially supranational EU is an obvious case to be analysed, both in the sense of why states comply and how conditionality works—particularly the functioning of conditionality in the case of EU membership (e.g., on rhetorical action in NATO and EU enlargement, Schimmelfennig 2003; on compliance, Tallberg 2003; also Hasenclever and Mayer 2007). But this influence is not limited to the EU. Overall, the often-neglected independence of international bureaucracies increases in salience as a research object—the role of the OECD or the IMF are cases in point, as is that of international courts of justice. Still, power relationship, where detected, tends to be detected only in the relation between organisations and states. So also for Baldwin (2002: 186–187) who underlines the need in future research to pay more attention to who has power with respect to which other actors, including the question of institutions and power: he limits the latter to looking at the power relationship between organisations and states.

That the study of relations between international organisations comes without power is a surprise for several reasons. First, as international relations as a discipline otherwise is all about power—and as all relations, in the end, can be analysed as power relations. Second, it is a surprise because in organisation theory, many classics would actually start from here, from power.

Thompson (1967) is one of these. He studies organisations such as private firms, hospitals or universities and argues that each organisation has (and must establish) its domain and a certain task environment from which its operational goals are derived. Power, then, has to do with independence; dependence is the obverse of power. An organisation has power, relative to an element of its task environment, to the extent that the organisation has capacity to satisfy the needs of that element and to the extent that the organisation monopolises that capacity. An organisation can also be relatively powerless, having to "cater to whatever fleeting interests of an unstable population it could activate at a particular time" (Thompson 1967: 30–31).

In this logic, organisations need to acquire power, and there are different strategies to that. Organisations may cooperate (reducing uncertainty, making commitments)—also coalitions may rest on possible increase of net power in increasing interdependence. They may defend their domain (something that is part of the management of inter-organisational relations), and thirdly, they may enlarge or extend their task environment. The cheapest way of acquiring power, argues Thompson, is, however, acquiring prestige (Thompson 1967: 33–36).

Central to Thompson's analysis is to look at how organisations are assessed and evaluated. He notes that they are put to different tests— efficiency tests, instrumental tests, social tests (Thompson 1967: 83). They need to "demonstrate fitness." How do organisations do that? They demonstrate fitness by, for example, showing historical improvement; growth of an organisation is often considered a sign of health. And, they seek to score favourably in relation to comparable organisations (idem: 89).

Now, all this would seem to be increasingly relevant for international organisations, including those in the field of security policy. There is more competition; there is more evaluation, but also a growing contestation.

Another impediment to analysing power in inter-organisational relations might relate to the ways power is understood. Power can be seen as something measurable, or as something non-measurable. Classic

international relations realist takes would look at the measurable or quantifiable side of the means, power resources such as wealth, money, weapons, geographic area or population (for a deeper analysis, see Guzzini 1993 and later). These bring us further to the division between hard and soft power (see notably Nye 2004, 2006; Hurrell 2005). While hard power would be exerted through tangible means such as weapons or money, soft power is exerted through attraction, and as such is a good example of power that is hard if not impossible to measure. Agenda-setting (Barnett and Finnemore 2005) and the setting of norms (Manners 2002) appear as important forms of power and will be turned to later on in more detail. Finally, structures of different kind may play a central role for power: one can distinguish between different structures of power (Strange 1988) or see structures as a means of using power.

International organisations might not seem to possess much of such resources in the first place, particularly not when compared with states, and particularly not if their resources are seen to be delegated by their member states. Could they be part of power structures? Inter-organisational power should be looked at, as Koops (2013: 81) also says. But it appears that in order to insert power in the study of inter-organisational relations, we need a deeper analysis of the types of power an organisation can have.

In the following chapters, we therefore try to redress two shortcomings. The first shortcoming detected is that research on inter-organisational relations in this specific field lacks a perspective of power, the insight that there is power in the relations or that the relations may be about power. Thus far, analysing inter-organisational relations from the point of view of power has been hindered by several impediments. The main impediment to tackling power-related questions, or assuming that an organisation can exert power over another organisation, is that power has been linked with actors other than organisations. Notably, power in international relations has been linked with states, as a corollary of them being the only independent actors in the system. Power-related studies of international organisations thus far have therefore mostly been about the (member) states' power over organisations (and subsequently also on inter-organisational relations) and about the organisations' power over the (member) states.

This book does not look at power in the state-organisation relationship like, for example, Simón (2010) who sees that it is the member states and their calculations, their national strategy considerations, that crucially

mould the EU-NATO relations, or the "EU-NATO conundrum." Where the state comes in, though, is in the analysis of the nature of the EU where the state-like elements of the Union do play a role (see notably in EU-UN relations).

Quite often still, international organisations are not assumed to have power of their own, only delegated power. Their agent/actor/relation capacity is questioned, as is their capacity to be intentional actors with goals and interests. This book comes closer to those who bestow international organisations with leeway and autonomy of their own, as well as with intentional capacity, goals and interests. In order to make better sense of how these relate to power, the book proceeds first to the analysis of the power of the EU.

The field of focus of this book, international security and defence, is a field where inter-organisational relations have been pushed by the widening of the EU's tasks. As the EU took on tasks in crisis management, a role in international security, and defence, it has entered the domain of organisations that were already actively working with these. It is therefore easily understandable that inter-organisational relations have grown in importance. As shown by the overview of research in this chapter, these relations represent a great variety of different types of interaction.

But what is the impact of interaction? What consequences can it have? And, what is the EU's role; can it influence this interaction and steer its impact? Can it profit from interaction or minimise eventual harm caused by it? In order to find this out, we need to know more about the EU's capacities and abilities, in a word, its power. This is the topic of the next chapter. The analysis of the EU will also help in understanding the differences between different organisations. Would they simply have different amounts of resources or different types of resources? Or would they differ in their ability to manage and gain resources? As Haas and Haas (1995) point out, there are important differences between international organisations as to their capacities, and an important capacity for them is the capacity to learn. Some—but few—are able to learn, most organisations merely adapt. All organisations need to adapt to their changing environments, but they could be differently equipped to do that.

The second shortcoming in the literature is its rather narrow view on interaction. What this book adds to this literature, indeed, is looking for interaction in a wider sense. In addition to visible interaction, one also needs to look at the non-visible side, and similarly, at the non-voluntary, spontaneous, unplanned side of interaction (cf. Oberthür and Gehring

2011: 47; Baldwin 2002). As pointed out above, organisations form part of each other's environment. Mere coexistence may therefore already be a shaping factor: the awareness of the other organisations' existence, perceptions on them, attitudes towards them, including aspects such as reputation, need to be included. Also mutual ignorance may be a form of relation or interaction.

The analysis of the EU's power will then facilitate the construction of an improved framework for analysis on inter-organisational power in Chap. 4, to be consequently applied to the relations between the EU, NATO and the UN.

Notes

1. See, for example, Rees (1998), Bloed and Wessel (1994), Deighton (1997), Bailes and Messervy-Whiting (2011).
2. Bailes and Messervy-Whiting (2011:34) and further information by private correspondence with Bailes.
3. UN (2011) General Assembly Resolution A/65/276; comparable to Palestine and the Holy See. Thus, the EU's representatives are allowed to present a common position. The resolution gives the EU the ability to speak early among other major groups, when speaking on behalf of the 27 EU states, and invites the EU to intervene in the general debate at the opening of the General Assembly. In addition, the EU has obtained the right to orally present proposals and amendments, a possibility that no other observer has at its disposal, and the right to reply once to a speech regarding EU positions. The EU representative cannot vote or propose candidates for the vote.
4. European Union Delegation to the United Nations (2017). Information from http://eu-un.europa.eu/about-the-eu-at-the-un/. Accessed 11 August 2017.
5. For instance, for Kubicek (2003), there are four main categories of interaction: control, contagion, convergence and conditionality.

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Analysing the Power of the EU

3.1 The EU: An Organisation that Does Have Power

From the notion that international organisations do interact and that this interaction does matter, this book goes on to arguing that organisations even have power and that the power of the EU is a particularly interesting case to study. International organisations are not always seen as possessing power, or being powerful; at least they would not have power of their own, autonomous power. This might be a common view in literature and true for many organisations. But not for the EU. The EU is different: it is an organisation to which the member states have delegated more power than to any other organisation. It is also seen as having autonomous power aside of and on top of that stemming from its member states. In comparison with other organisations, it stands out as the most autonomous one (Hasenclever and Mayer 2007).

A sign of power is the continuous debate on it. The EU's power seems endlessly debated: is the EU already too powerful in some questions, why does it seem helpless in others? Should it have more or less power? The debate is not limited to the EU's inside. We also see from the reactions that the outside world has had to its power that the EU undoubtedly is an entity in international relations that is seen to possess power. The outsiders,

too, at times worry over its power diminishing, at times criticise its power being out of proportion.

Quite clearly, the EU is not a typical international organisation. To the contrary, one might say it is not an international organisation at all, but a political union, a political entity of different kind altogether: partly intergovernmental, partly supranational. It has come increasingly to resemble the state and has strong federative characteristics (Rosas 2014). Its competences, some exclusive, some shared with member states, some of supportive, coordinative or complementary kind, reach out to practically all fields of state competences. Its basic treaties are constitution-like, it empowers actors other than its member states, giving access to businesses, regions, associations, but above all to the citizens of the Union who in that capacity vote the members of the European Parliament but can also directly propose legislation through the European Citizens' Initiative.

In view of all this, one could argue that it is not helpful to analyse the EU if the aim is to draw conclusions about the power of international organisations. It is not seldom that the EU is defined as a *sui generis* entity, not really comparable with others. This view, even though accurate in many ways, often leads to isolating the EU as an object of study. This chapter breaks this isolation for the benefit of our general understanding of international organisations and, ultimately, of their power. It is, indeed, through the study of the unique position of the EU somewhere in between the state—the traditional power base of international relations—and international organisations of various kinds that one can say more about the nature of power and power dynamics.

This theoretical centrality corresponds to an empirical centrality the EU has in inter-organisational relations. If the EU is central to how we can conceptually and theoretically analyse these questions, it is also central empirically in that its expansion and development has accelerated and intensified the interaction between international organisations.

What do we know about the power of the EU? Before looking at how this question has been approached in the literature, and what kinds of findings research has to offer, this chapter takes a short detour to look at the panorama of attitudes towards the EU's power. Power rarely leaves one completely indifferent: it can be longed at, admired, envied, suspected and feared. The power the EU has, or is seen to have, is no exemption to this. Indeed, the EU is often seen to have too much power, while at the same time lacking the power it would need to be of use, to fulfil its tasks.

It seems important to consider the attitudes separately. The power of the EU is an empirical question of power that the EU has to do what it is supposed to do, the capacities it has in relation to its tasks or the attributes it has as a process of political unification—and about the power that is not there, that the EU lacks, the forms of power or the capacities it does not have but that others possess. But it is also a normative question, a question about the power that should be there and the power that should not be there.

The look at attitudes serves then to help understand the scholarly analyses of the EU's power: it sheds light on their background assumptions. From the attitudes, this chapter then moves on to give the reader an understanding on research conducted on the power of the EU. The chapter analyses research on the types of power of the EU, what power relations are discovered, what power bases are considered and what relation to theoretical discussions on power this research displays. It shows how a large part of the academic discussion on the EU's power actually is about the specificity of that power and, concomitantly, about the specificity of the EU as an actor in international relations. This discussion also involves questions about eventual changes in that respect and picks up signs of that specificity possibly diminishing.

It is important to understand what may be specific for the EU, including in terms of its power. It seems, however, even more important to understand why we see it as specific in the first place and what that way of seeing it means for our analyses. In this book, the emphasis is more on the general than on the specific. This chapter therefore proceeds from the discussion on the specificity of the EU's power, and the discussion on different types of power, to looking at some fundamental questions about the purposes to which power is needed, and the question of over whom power is being used. It is through these questions that we can recognise the dynamics of power and power relations. It is also through these that we can approach the question of the EU's power over international organisations and appreciate its importance.

3.2   Attitudes Towards EU Power

Power seldom leaves one indifferent, and the power of the EU seems to provoke and disturb to a particular extent. But while worries about its power may be particularly acute, so are also the hopes often very high, hopes about it being able to act, influence and wield power.

There is a tendency to see what ever power the EU has, or how ever little that actually amounts to, as being too much. This tendency is visible in public opinion in many EU member countries, captured by Eurosceptic political parties and fed in recent years by the severe economic crisis and the rapidly changing migration. The EU, according to these critics, has too much power in the sense of being intrusive, expansionist, interfering with affairs that should not be of concern for it, be it the internal affairs of a member state, issues that should be regulated on a national level, or be it the private life of a person that finds the EU rules obstructing. Its recipes of austerity for the member countries severely hit by the economic and financial crisis are furthermore seen to lead to only more misery, weakening public service and worsening living conditions.

Similar criticism can also be found at the international level. Equally there, the EU would be seen as interfering with national sovereignty, through posing tough conditions for economic assistance or for achieving membership. It can be seen as profiting from different kinds of cooperation arrangements to further its own interests. It can also be seen as distorting the principle of equal representation of states, as carrying too much weight—through the number of seats or its share of finances—in international fora such as the UN, especially the United Nations Security Council (see, e.g., Gowan and Brantner 2008). It can also be seen to represent the self-interest of certain states, all EU members as a group, or some of them, and thus being a mere tool of national interest.

This criticism coexists with concerns for the EU having too little power and wishes to render it more powerful. The EU is found to have no power at all or not as much power as it should have had, or was supposed to have, for instance, in its relations with other actors; an example could be Haukkala (2009) writing on the EU's failure to influence Russia. Still others regret the EU have lost power that it used to have, particularly so in the case of power of attraction, of which more below.

Views on the EU's power are intertwined with the expectations on the EU. These, too, are widely different, as are the views on the EU's tasks and roles. Add to this the considerable pace of development that has effectively expanded the Union throughout its history, simultaneously in terms of membership and in terms of tasks, but even in terms of depth with which these tasks are undertaken, or the exclusivity of competence of the Union, and we see that different perceptions do have a good growing ground.

There is a link between tasks and expectations, as there is between tasks and capacities. Early on, Christopher Hill pointed out the risks of a gap between what is expected of the EU or what it promises to do, and what it can deliver, its capacities (Hill 1993). In fact, there is also a link between tasks and power. The more tasks the Union gets, or the more it claims to be doing, the more power it needs. Starting from simple tasks given to it by the member states, accompanied by the related competences and thus power that they delegate to it for the fulfilment of such tasks, we end up at tasks that are more assumed than delegated but that nevertheless require some kind of new power forms or resources. The EU's responsibility for global security is a good example of the latter, one that lies in the background for much of the inter-organisational relations, too.

When discussing what the tasks and roles of the EU should be, we also engage in a comparison between the EU and other entities, notably the state, but also international organisations. It may be hard to locate the EU in such categories, as it certainly is quite different from other international organisations, much more state-like, yet still quite different from the states, too. Where this comparison matters most, however, is again in the realm of attitudes. There is a strong undercurrent that colours the views on the EU and its tasks that actually stems from how the state is perceived and what the process of integration, or the EU, is seen to do to the state. Seen in a very classic yet also timely way, the EU is to remedy the harms caused by the state, a political entity that is not up to its tasks or is not the right answer to how politics and international relations should be organised.

An important starting point here is to look at the broader idea of international organisation as an improvement of the international system, as a sign of progress and as a growing ground of better forms of international interaction and a more peaceful world. International organisations, from early on, helped the states—that established them—to solve functional problems and to make cooperation between states easier. Much of international relations theory has viewed cooperation between states as inherently difficult if not close to impossible. Thus structures that make this cooperation easier may indeed be warmly welcomed. The inherent nature of the organisations is seen in a positive light—much because of the negative view on the state, or its capacities. In the case of the process of European integration, the stakes are even higher as the transformation is more dramatic: integration could amount to dissolving the state altogether.

Many classic integration theories base on a negative view on the state. While for Haas (1964: 9–10), the modern state has a distorting role with respect to the possibilities of human fulfilment and is something unnatural and depersonalised, Hoffmann (1966: 160) sees the nation state as "often inchoate, economically absurd, administratively ramshackle, and impotent yet dangerous in international politics."

Similar deep mistrust can be seen in Deutsch (1968). He sees that the foreign policy of every country deals first with the preservation of independence and security and, second, with the pursuit and protection of its economic interests, particularly those of the most influential interest groups. This makes the countries act in a special way. In particular, they aim at resisting penetration and manipulation by foreign countries and ideologies while simultaneously accomplishing active penetration and manipulation of their own, spreading their national and ideological propaganda, for example, through economic aid or the support of cultural and scientific exchange missions (Deutsch 1968: 87–88).

The process of European integration offers a way out of this impasse. It is a process where a new political entity is formed, where interests change, where loyalties shift and where common good gains ground. In addition, the more practical, concrete side of integration contributes to easier movement, more trade, growth and new dynamism, which makes it easier for a very positive picture of the European Union as the embodiment of all this to emerge. This is a picture that has been held dear not only by the promoters of European integration but also by its admirers outside of the Union. For many, the EU would be a model, a leader, also an alternative actor in international relations whose goals are not those of pure national self-interest but that is capable of locating and furthering the common goals and one that does not act alone but through seeking support of international structures, multilaterally. Its special character was noticed early on—as by Hart (1976) who sees the European Communities as powerful because of its supranational character, and growing in importance, together with other non-state actors.

At the same time, as the process of European integration has advanced and as the European Union has assumed more tasks and also more signs earlier attributed to states, it has compromised its positive outlook in many eyes. The more power it gets from the states, the more it takes their role, the more it resembles them, the less it has of such positive "anti-state" features. Common currency, Union citizenship, directly elected parliament, external border regime, diplomatic representations—all these mean

that the EU is no longer like an organisation but more like a state. And thus, it can be assumed to, or feared to, return to the old logic of state interest, becoming less and less of an improvement of the general situation in international relations.

The growth of a monstrous superstate was indeed the fear of some of the early theorists already, such as Mitrany (1943). For him, a union or federation of states would not solve the problem of war. It would exacerbate it, by reproducing the logic of political exclusion and the system of national states, and be a threat to security in changing the rivalry of powers and alliances to the rivalry of whole continents. Such thoughts have been revived in different forms in, for instance, peace research (Galtung 1973). To a large extent, they are based on a view of the state that is dominated by a stress on coercion and monopoly of the use of legitimate violence. A typical way of understanding the functions of the state today would be to start with the preservation of internal order, maintenance of national boundaries and defence of national territory and continue then to provision of legitimate government, services and welfare and promotion of national prosperity (e.g., Wallace 1994: 64). The EU, while increasingly implied in all this, would still be expected to be "different," not part of the normal, somehow unpleasant "power game," but instead placed above "power politics."

3.3   On the Specificity of the EU's Power

At the outset, the EU is an entity that has a lot to do with power: it deals with power and it exerts power. The EU is seen as powerful inasmuch as it impacts on, or exerts power on, its own member states, its neighbourhood, actors further away or international norms and standards. It seems also to have an ability to renew itself: its ability to carry out reforms of its own policies can appear as a form of power the EU has, particularly when seen from the outside and in comparison with other organisations.

The EU induces change. Internally, the change the EU induces may be geared towards its own working and institutions. The importance of such potential and actual development may have been too much neglected in research.[1] The changes the EU induces in its member states are aimed at increasing internal cohesion, pulling them closer together or keeping them together (the "integrative power" of Boulding 1989). Inducing change in the neighbourhood, then, typically takes place in the context of EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Its "transformative" (Börzel

and Risse 2009a, Grabbe 2006, 2014) power there could denote changes prompted in the internal workings of a state, its governance, the economic and political principles. Democratisation is one example of such transformation. It can result from the use of conditionality, a mechanism by which the EU makes other actors—notably candidate states—change in exchange of benefits of different kind, such as membership. But such transformations may take place through a variety of means and through different kinds of interaction. The previous chapter referred to Kubicek's (2003) way of seeing democratisation also happen through control, contagion or convergence and take different forms such as emulation or learning. Many of these would apply also to the EU's exercise of power vis-à-vis actors further away and to other more recently established qualities or goals, such as resilience (EU Global Strategy 2016).

But what kind of power does the EU have? Do different entities possess different forms of power? This is what one could deduce from research on the EU's power where the *sui generis* nature of the EU seems to mean its power is *sui generis*, too, different from the power of other entities.

In fact, the EU's power always seems to come with an epithet. A variety of concepts has been used to describe it. The EU's power is called soft (Nye 2004, 2006), civilian (Duchêne 1972, 1973) or normative (Manners 2002); it is qualified as transformative (Börzel and Risse 2009a; Grabbe 2006, 2014), ethical (Smith 2002; Aggestam 2008), pragmatic (Wood 2011), integrative (Koops 2011; following Boulding 1989)—indeed, it seems always qualified in one way or another. These qualifications highlight the difference between the EU and other actors: they stem from defining the EU as something that is not what the other actors are, or does not have the types of power other actors might have, but could have, instead, something else. These forms of power are in particular juxtaposed to other forms of power such as hard or military power that are identified with other kinds of actors, the states or military alliances.

Another central facet in the literature on the EU's power is the emphasis on how much the nature of the EU counts in here. The EU may not have all the power of other actors, but it may not necessarily need that either. It can be seen as an entity that does not need to act, to do something, to be powerful: it may also influence others simply by being what it is, a model, not necessarily actively searching to influence or using power. It may have power of attraction.

Sometimes the enticement of novelty may lead to a light overlook of basic concepts and background assumptions. Some of the notions of the

EU's power, in particular the normative, the civilian and the soft power ones, have had considerable success both in the academic community and among policy-makers. That the EU is special and particularly attractive is an idea that has in the past ten years quite eagerly been embraced by politicians who propel the self-image of the EU as a "force for good" (as in the ESS 2003). These notions have no doubt been felt to convey something not only new but also fitting and useful about the EU. A lot of research has been done using these concepts, and sometimes taking them as starting points rather than examining them critically. While the concept of "normative power Europe" has become "immensely popular" in EU studies (Forsberg 2011: 1186), the definition of the very term "power" in the original version of the notion (Manners 2002) has been found unclear (Larsen 2014: 897–898).

Research on the EU's normative, civilian and soft power would be worth a closer look already because of such popularity. There is, however, also a rich theoretical debate that has accumulated about these notions as the academic community has dedicated quite some time and energy to examining the idea further, to refining, criticising and dismissing it.[2] Above all, however, looking at these notions serves the fundamental purpose of understanding what the assumption of specificity implies for research on the EU's power.

Starting with "normative power," a first distinction to be made is that "normative" power may relate to setting, spreading or appealing to norms or to changing the understanding of what normal is. As coined by Manners (2002), "normative power Europe" would in essence mean that the EU's international identity or role has ideational impact that can be seen as normative power, power of example or power as ability to shape conceptions of "normal." The EU would represent something, being an example, but it would also characteristically act to promote norms, such as the norm of abolishing capital punishment. While there are several ways norms can spread, the EU would typically use specific means to reach its goals: persuasion, activation of international norms (referring to previous treaties, agreements) and shaping the discourse,[3] in addition to setting an example for others. From the start, therefore, we see quite a wide spectrum of how the notion may be understood.

One of the strands in the discussion on the EU's normative power has been the requirements that an actor needs to fulfil in order to be qualified as normative. While in a narrow view, it might be sufficient that the actor stresses the importance of norms, but in a broader interpretation, being

truly normative is seen to require not only something of the quality and kind of the norms in question, but also of the means used, and the ultimate goals that the actor pursues. Many see that not all "norms" would do. The norms should be "good" ones and "legitimate"; the goals should be universal, oriented towards common good, not particularistic and pursuing the actor's own interests; and the means, finally, should be generally accepted, legitimate, perhaps ethical. Ideational in character, normative power cannot be wielded by all kinds of means: coercive means would be excluded, but perhaps even economic ones. What would be suitable means could be what Manners[4] includes in "normative performance": persuasion, argumentation, invoking norms (activating commitments), shaping the discourse, showing example and conferring prestige or shame.

Judged by such standards, the EU's overall justification and legitimacy would lie, as Aggestam (2013) sees it, in the universal character of its values: they also protect the EU against accusations of imperialism. Nevertheless, the higher the requirements, the less the chances are that the EU or any other actor qualifies as a normative actor.

Another strand in the discussion has been whether the EU actually has been normative, and whether one can see a real impact. The views are mixed as whether there is empirical backing to claims about the EU being a normative power. Some impact is detected, but the picture is not uniform. Examples of success of the EU's use of normative power usually include the abolition of capital punishment, Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal Court and human rights issues at the UN. It is also often pointed out that the EU has been successful in shaping the discourse when it comes to regions and regional integration: it has been a successful model for others, rendering the idea of close regional integration attractive or something that is perceived as a "normal" state of affairs (see, e.g., Pace 2007; Börzel and Risse 2009b). While the process of enlargement would be an example of real impact on the candidate states (Grabbe 2006), the EU would face difficulties in achieving normative ends in relations with Russia and China (Forsberg 2011: 1194).

While some would qualify the EU as a transformative superpower (Leonard 2005; McCormick 2007), others would see it is small at best (Hyde-Price 2008; Hyde-Price 2006; Toje 2010). Instead of "normative," its actions would be characterised as "ethical"—the use of military power in an ethical way would be part of this for Aggestam (2008) but also as "soft imperialism" (Zielonka 2008).

In the end, thus, the "normative" specificity of the EU appears unclear. It may indeed have impact, but the reason might be what it can offer by way of material incentives rather than ideational reasons. Aggestam (2013) concludes that the EU does demonstrate normative performance, but this tends to be inconsistent and mixed with more strategic material considerations. This, again, makes the EU appear less special or exceptional in its action (cf. Johansson-Nogues 2007; Tocci 2008).

The impact of the EU also varies according to who is impacted, something that brings up the intersubjective, relational dimension of European power (Wendt 1999). This leads us to a third strand in the discussion: debates on how the EU is perceived. Here, scholars would point out that the perception by others of what the EU is, and why it does what it does, does not necessarily depend on what the EU itself aims at doing, or of what it actually does.

Larsen (2014: 898–899) argues that in order for the EU to have the status of a normative power, the international actors have to find that it plays a special role: it needs some kind of acknowledgement or recognition. He sees that Manners (2002) lacks consideration of the broader structural context that leads the outside world to adopt the norms promoted by the EU. Still, one of Manners' mechanisms of diffusion, the "cultural filter," does suggest an interest in why other actors might or might not adopt them. Not all norms would pass such a filter. An example of cultural filter at work can be the United States' refusal to ratify protocols and conventions on biosafety, biological diversity and climate change—that is, local knowledge and identity construction regarding the environment. Similarly, sovereignty could act as a strong cultural filter when it comes to norms regarding, for instance, landmines, responsibility to protect or the ICC (Manners 2013: 218–219).

Here, we see how crucial it is for the understanding of power that it is something relational. Power becomes manifest through the actions of the object of the use of power (cf. even Latour 1986), but what is more, the actions of that object can be seen as determining its success. So also for the diffusion of norms: it is not only the actor diffusing them, but also the actor at the receiving end that matters. As Forsberg (2011: 1198) sums it up, the norms that the EU advocates typically appeal most to those who already share them. Similarly Larsen (2014: 899) notes that the EU is more likely to be able to influence if its norms are part of a dominant discourse. Thus, a central explanation of the success of the big EU enlarge-

ment in 2004 would be that officials and politicians shared the EU's agenda of empowering reformers (Grabbe 2014).

Larsen (2014) questions the justification of designating the EU as a normative power because the perceptions related to this are thin and geographically varied. On the basis of his analysis of the literature on external perceptions of the EU, he notes both geographical and functional variation. In the Western world, the EU is seldom seen as a normative power, except for countries or regions that hope to obtain closer links with the EU: the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood might see the normative power aspect more clearly. In some places, the EU would even appear as a negative normative power. It would be criticised for neo-colonialism and double standards. Chinese and Russian elites in particular appear negatively disposed towards the EU's critical approach to human rights issues and democracy, seeing it as interference in internal affairs.[5] Aggestam (2013) sees a considerable gap between perceptions of the EU and its self-image as a normative power—the EU is more frequently seen as pursuing its own interests. Particularly Russia and China question the EU definitions of global norms and principles. Larsen (2014) adds that in some countries and contexts, the normative arguments are not accepted *because* they are put forward by the EU (Larsen 2014: 907).

Lucarelli concludes on the basis of a wide review of literature that knowledge of the EU in non-European countries is not very high (Lucarelli 2013: 435). The images most frequently associated with the EU are those of an economic giant, multilateral actor and an area, even a model of economic integration. It is rarely seen as a norm promoter, with some exceptions such as democracy and climate change. Neo-colonial features would come up as well (Lucarelli 2013: 436–438).

Actors can indeed be perceived as "normative"—but this might apply to other actors than the EU: the United States would appear as a normative power in international perception, for norms such as democracy in particular (Larsen 2014: 904–907). Normative power cannot be considered, in Larsen's conclusion, as the primary way in which the EU exerts international influence. The EU is seen to have a leading role in fields where it pursues its own interests, such as in economy and trade, being a "trade power" (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006, quoted in Forsberg 2011) rather than a powerful normative actor.

"Normative power" may thus not appear as a distinctive feature of the EU. Still, it may be useful as an ideal type (Forsberg 2011). And while it may not increase our understanding of the EU, it does increase that of power.

The same goes for another notion often associated with the EU, "civilian power." "Civilian power" originally highlighted what was special in the European construction compared to other actors in international relations, those having and using military power.[6] The basic idea behind the thinking about civilian power is that there are different means that can be used in international relations to reach one's goals, and while military means have traditionally been the ultimate tools a state, or a group of states, uses, they are not for that reason necessarily the only effective ones. Duchêne (1972, 1973) argues that the EC is a civilian power. Not only does he see that an international actor can achieve its goals through civilian means; he also sees that there is a trend towards increasing use of such means. Power politics is in decline; the future international relations, he argues, will be increasingly civilised through the strengthening of the rule of law.

Duchêne's conceptualisation of Europe's international role is a pluralist one, based on notions such as low politics, non-state actors, ideational influences and interdependence. As Orbie (2006: 124) points out, other conceptualisations existed alongside and would yield different interpretations—for instance, Galtung's structuralist (capitalist superpower) and Bull's realist, or Gaullist one (Europe puissance).

Duchêne is also normative in his writings. He sees that civilian means and ends are the core characteristics of Europe, and Europe should also remain true to these, trying to be a force for the diffusion of civilian and democratic standards, and act as a model or example of a new kind of interstate relationship that could overcome war, intimidation and violence. Building out of Europe a traditional superpower did not make much sense for him, as such a superpower would need to be a nuclear, centralised state with a strong sense of collective nationalism. Military power should not be ignored, but Europe should avoid trying to achieve military dominance. The lack of military power could actually be an advantage because it removed suspicions about Europe's intentions and allowed it to act as an unbiased moderator. What mattered most to Europe's ability to succeed was cohesion and purpose.[7]

Civilian power, as normative power, has had quite some appeal among politicians. In 2000, the former Commission President Romano Prodi suggested that Europe should become a "global civil power" (McCormick 2007). This has become part of the image the Union wants to spread of itself (at least for some time; cf. chapter 7.2). Even with the development to a military actor and the articulation of military means as part of the

EU's range, civilian means continue to occupy a central position (Larsen 2002, cited by Smith 2005).

As in the case of normative power, the idea of civilian power also includes the elements of basic character or identity that make the EU inclined towards such action, and the normative or prescriptive notion that it also should persist in acting in that particular way. Even the criticism, theoretical and empirical, of this concept is similar to that on normative power (See Maull 1990 on civilian power).

On the empirical side, we see a clear change in the nature of the EU as an international actor as it started to consider the acquisition of own military capabilities in the late 1990s, needed for its new tasks in civilian and military crisis management. The gap between how a civilian power was described and how the EU looked like started to widen: researchers noted that the EU was not so civilian after all (Giegerich and Wallace 2004). The new capabilities and instruments have given rise to new types of analyses, too: Aggestam (2013) sees a shift in the academic studies of European power towards a more strategic discourse, often based on the reasoning that being a civilian actor might not be an adequate way to address the challenges of international relations, or that it would be better for the EU's legitimacy to gain a broader spectrum of tools. Others would contest this: use of military force may undo the potential magnetic force effect of the civilian power Europe (K. E. Smith 2000), distracting it from its "comparative advantage" (Smith 2000; Orbie 2006: 125).[8]

The specificity of the EU is brought to the centre of attention. Is specificity its major asset? But the specificity of the EU being "civilian" is contested, too. Even other actors can be civilian, while no actor is likely to be fully civilian, or fully military, for that matter (Smith 2005).

Smith (2005) in fact dismisses the "civilian power Europe" altogether, as well as the idea that the EU would be a specific kind of international actor. She ponders on the theoretical problems linked with the concept that either appears as inadequate or, when more precisely defined, becomes close to an ideal type making the target disappear beyond reach. For her, four features would be important for the definition of a civilian power: the means that the actor uses, civilian means; the ends that it pursues, cooperation, rule of law and the like; the way it uses those means, persuasion rather than coercion; but also the process by which foreign policy is made—democratic control over foreign policy-making is an important element.

A third variation of the theme of the EU's specificity is that of the EU as a soft power. From the onset, it differs from the others in that while the

EU may have been inspiring such a notion, it has not been developed with a view of the EU only, not even prevalently so. What is in common between all these three, however, is the prescriptive dimension. Joseph S. Nye Jr.'s notion of "soft power" indeed comes out in a context of a self-help book for international actors: this is what one should do to cope in current international relations. The subtitle of Nye's 2004 book is indeed "the means to success in world politics." Soft power is a useful form of power, and some actors have more of it than others. While the book is mainly about the United States, Nye sees that the EU and the UN as actors that have soft power—but not NATO, even though his definitions would actually allow this.

Soft power logically contrasts with hard power. What these entail is not always clear-cut. For Nye, however, the definition is clear. Nye's starting point is the importance of understanding the changing nature of power, how, for instance, information is power. Nye speaks about the second face of power, the indirect way of using power, in agenda-setting, as attraction. Soft power is the ability to get others to want the outcomes that you want (Nye 2004: 5). The means used are intangible; they do not include money or force. Co-opting is more important than coercing (idem: 7). One important source of attraction and power is the ability to share information and to be believed (idem: 31). The resources used include values, culture, policies and institutions (idem: 8–11). Institutions can enhance soft power, thus, for instance, the United Kingdom and the United States would have promoted free trade and the gold standard or other goals through the IMF, the WTO, the UN. The effect is often diffuse (idem: 16). Nye also says liberal and pluralistic countries are likely to gain soft power.

What the growing literature on Chinese, Russian, Turkish, Korean, Brazilian and Japanese soft power shows is that this does not seem to be the case.[9] Other criticisms include that soft power is difficult to measure, that it is ineffective as form of power, as it is, for instance, impossible to control information.

In response to critics and growing discussion, Nye (2006) specifies that the three resources of soft power for a country include culture, where attractive; political values, when it lives up to them; and foreign policies, when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority. Economic means are not soft, and soft power is not necessarily more humane than hard power: it can be wielded for ill, too. Military resources, on the other hand, are not necessarily exclusively hard: they can produce also soft

power. Military prowess and competence can create soft power, by way of admiration, but also when, for instance, military-to-military cooperation and training programmes establish transnational networks that enhance a country's soft power. Finally, soft power can be measured, too, even though many say it cannot: for instance, diplomatic resources can be measured. Nye also adds that a combination of hard and soft is what is needed—and calls the use of both as "smart power."

Nye (2011: 123–125) even ponders on the notion of cyber power that he defines as creation, control and communication of electronic and computer-based information. He notes how cyber security is quickly becoming a question of power, a domain with low barriers to entry and high vulnerabilities.

What limits the applicability of Nye's analysis is that he does not seriously address the question of institutions or organisations having power. Nye (2011: 91) says attraction and institutions are means to shape preferences or make "B" see the agenda as legitimate (second and third faces of power), but he does not elaborate on "institutions." Organisations, then, are not in the focus. For Nye (2011: 215), "global government" is not there yet; only some degrees exist. In his view, institutions are rarely self-sufficient. They benefit from the leadership of great powers if these are willing to lead them. He would also question the EU leaders' claim that other countries' desire to join the EU is a sign of soft power: this can be the result of economic inducement of market access, too (Nye 2011: 85).

The link between soft power and capabilities or performance is, however, interesting.[10] Particularly insightful for the analysis of the soft power of organisations could be Lukes' addendum to what Nye writes on soft power. Lukes (2007) sees that Nye's soft power might be a cousin of his own "third dimension of power," that is, power to shape, influence or determine others' beliefs. But there is an important distinction that needs to be added. Shaping the preferences of others can take place in two ways that are very different from each other in nature: by limiting the others' capacity to judge for themselves or by requiring and facilitating such capacities (empowering) (Lukes 2007: 95–97).

Taken together, the debates on the EU as normative, civilian or soft power all look at a similar setting of means, particularly those of persuasion, shaping the discourse and setting an example for others. Related to these, still other labels are used, such as "discursive power" (Merlingen 2011).

What may unite all these is a certain idealism but also the effort of making virtue out of necessity: the EU, when not capable of acquiring or using

other forms of power, needs to use what it has—and what it has can be seen in a positive light as actually being good and suitable. When the EU evolves, and acquires new kinds of means, the discussion evolves, too.

Understandably, a great deal of debate has been on the manifest change in the nature of the EU. After the launch of a common security and defence policy, the Battle Groups, the European Defence Agency and the insertion of a defence clause in the treaty, the nature of the EU does not seem to be so civilian any longer. It appears less normative, too, in the sense that it seems to have, in some contexts, wielded more power before: in the field of human rights, for instance (Brantner and Gowan 2009).

The same goes for the power of attraction that also is diminishing—if by the power of attraction we mean a certain kind of power of the EU that consists in drawing states towards it, to seek for membership or to bandwagon, to vote similarly at the UNGA and the like. The power of attraction can be questioned from the outset: has it not always been more about economic benefits than about intangible attraction? As Forsberg (2011: 1188) notes, the EU is actually using other forms of power and appearing as other kind of power in the eyes of outsiders: transformative, not because of normative nature but through economic clout, fear of exclusion from its markets, promise of membership (Forsberg 2011: 1188). We can in any case see less interests towards the EU by Turkey, a candidate state, stating, for instance, that it would only accept EU norms if universal, not because they are EU norms. We also see Iceland taking back its membership application (though still considering).

This can also be seen as the EU losing the monopoly of transformative power, as Grabbe (2014) puts it—a quarter-century of largely unrivalled gravitational pull—shown to have come to an end by Russia's employing soft and hard power to prevent Armenia and Ukraine from signing association agreements (Grabbe 2014: "1"). The EU had by far the deepest impact on domestic policies, but there were clear limits to its influence on political culture. Now it appears as a "conflicted, uncertain and reluctant power in its own region." Since 2013, it is overtly rivalled by Russia for influence (Grabbe 2014 "14"). [11]

The EU also acts in its own interest, or in that of its member states. The picture thus gets more mixed. As Forsberg (2011: 1194) summarises it, the EU sometimes has normative interests, sometimes not; it behaves according to international norms most of the time, but not always (for instance, WTO sees that the EU has violated international trade rules), and it stresses both the importance of a "full toolbox" and may act

unilaterally, too. The EU's Global Strategy of 2016 would underline interests more clearly than before.

But is this change for the good or for the bad? On the one hand, losing specificity may also be bad if this was the very edge of the EU, if its attraction and model functions were actually based on its being civilian and normative. On the other hand, the change of the EU towards a military power, or a mixed power, can be seen as improving its standing in the system where such form of power is in use and deemed efficient. The EU would become a traditional power, perhaps a traditional great power. The pronounced particularity might also be a burden when the EU was seen as too normative, too intrusive or too demanding.

The analyses of normative, civilian and soft power all also lead to fruitful comparison of the EU with other actors, both states and international organisations. On a closer look, none of these forms of power is specific to the EU alone, nor specific to any other type of actor. We can and do see some differences: for instance, the EU's soft power resources may be a bit different from those of a monocultural state (think of the lack of unified foreign policy, the variety of languages and cultures each with their radiation but not contributing to pushing forward "Europe," surpassing nations). Its specific internal construction may also lead to certain constraints and thus specific power forms (like "pragmatic power" of Wood 2011).

Manners (2002) also posits a difference in power types or resources between different actors or organisations. In many analyses, the power resources and the instruments with which the EU exerts power are compared to those of states or are seen increasingly to resemble those of the states (e.g., Tiilikainen 2011). Tiilikainen also hints at certain volatility (or hybrid nature): different instruments or types of power might be useful in different relations but also lead to problems.

The analyses of the power of the EU are coloured by normative stands on the entity itself, as well as coloured by the understanding of its nature, compared to other entities, the state on the one hand and international organisations on the other. The hybrid nature of the EU and assumptions on the state and on international organisations are essential components in understanding the EU's power.

A considerable part of the analysis of the EU's power seems indeed to be about the kind of power it has, in comparison, explicit or implicit, with the power of other entities. But it seems important to note at the outset how the analysis of the power of the EU is not only about the power it has

but it is also about the power it does not have, about the power it should not have, about the power it should have and about the power it would need to have.

The analyses about hard or military power that the EU either should have or should not have are illustratively related to the nature and characteristic ways of action of the EU. The discussion on whether the EU has such powers needs to be complemented by a closer look at the attitudes behind. Debates on civilian power are not complete without the dimension of normativity—whether it is good or bad for the EU to be a civilian power. Power dynamics enter here, too: the power of attraction is a good example of power that is seen to have diminished lately, giving thus reason to look at the power resources and perceptions of power.

3.4   Or Is the EU's Power so Specific in the End?

A still richer view on the EU's power can, it is argued here, be painted by looking at it from another angle, questioning the specificity of its power. Is the power the EU has really that specific? What if it is rather common to other actors in the same fields and in the same situations?

If the EU actually is partially normative, partially something else, then the others are even more likely to be just like the EU. As Forsberg (2011: 1187, 1191–1195) notes, all states support some kinds of norms (and those of the EU might not be any better). After all, the hybrid polity and treaty-based legal order (that were for Manners the basis that leads to normative identity) might also be shared by other actors.[12]

What is needed is, in fact, a look at a further aspect of the claimed specificity: whether the types of power it is seen to have correspond to types of power that international organisations are seen to have in theoretical research on the topic. To what extent are they actually all the same?

A deeper analysis of the EU's power includes not only the question of type of power but needs to start from the question of "what for"—first, what the EU needs power for, and second, where it comes from. There is a reason for it to have power, for it to have been given or delegated power. And it needs power for certain purposes: internal and external. Finally, the analysis also needs to include the aspect of power relations: over whom does the EU have or exercise power?

In the case of the EU, it is convenient to start to draw the picture from the creation of the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community as

part of the general post-World War II trend to establish new international organisations to help the states recover and develop their economies. The goal of assuring peaceful relations between them accompanied these practical goals. So did the idea of supranational authority: a traditional intergovernmental organisation would not necessarily be sufficient to induce change or to ensure that cooperation continues and develops further. If, instead, there was an authority at least partially above the member states, the results would be better guaranteed. Such a supranational authority would be the European Commission in the first place, while the European Court of Justice would ensure the primacy of common legislation in relation to national laws.

From delegation of power from member states to the communities, there was a development towards a division of competences between the states on the one hand and the union on the other whereby some of the competences would be shared, others belong exclusively to the Union, while one part of the competences of the states would remain theirs. Another way of characterising the special mixture of authority is to call it pooled or shared sovereignty. The sovereign states would share their sovereignty, or their ultimate decision-making right, with each other, following certain rules.

The Union thus needs power to fulfil its tasks, one of which is to assure the member states' compliance. The Union would thus have power over its member states: even if the states can be seen as being involved in practically all use of EU power, the power is not that of any one of them, often not even of all the member states together. For this, the Union would have various power resources: the use of economic instruments, ultimately even suspension of certain membership rights.[13]

The question of the organisations' power over their member states is particularly interesting in the case of the EU. There would seem to be something special to it. As Ringmar puts it, the EU—that looks managerial and has an unglamorous administration—has next to no "power over" anything at all; yet evidently it does possess a considerable amount of "power to," close to social engineering (Ringmar 2007: 202).

The process of European integration was a regional project aiming at creating of the participating states a close community characterised by free movement and common norms. While some of the internal policies quickly came to have external implications, such as the common agricultural policy, other policy fields were from the outset external, such as the common trade policy. The communities were given certain competences

for certain tasks in these fields, extending to common representation of the member states, first in trade, later in foreign policy.

The goal of peaceful relations between the states was first internal, too. The idea that the communities would be an actor promoting peace also internationally developed together with its outside reach and the actual growth of its competences. From the idea of a common voice in international relations from the times of European Political Cooperation starting in the 1970s, the EU developed in the 1990s towards an actor with tasks in international crisis management, and in the 2000s also in defence.

Here, we see the EU's power from another angle. It gets tasks for which it needs power over external actors, not only actors within the Union itself. The tasks include much more than an eventual shaping of candidate states; they also extend globally. The EU needs recognition as an entity, as a powerful one. The Union also enters a field characterised with different forms of power and ways of speaking of power here, particularly notable in the field of security and defence. And it enters a field in which there already are several other actors of different kind. This development of the Union towards an actor in security policy forms the ground for the analysis of this book of the EU's power in inter-organisational relations.

A general question obviously is: what is specific to the power of international organisations in international relations? Can they be seen to exercise, for example, soft power? How would organisations rank on different soft power indexes? Here, we also come to important distinctions between states and organisations, as well as between organisations at large and international organisations in particular. Do we see clear differences as to their power resources?

There are important benchmarks in the literature on the power of international organisations that help compare the EU with other organisations, notably when it comes to the questions of what sources of power they have, and how they exercise that power, or what they achieve with it.

According to Barnett and Finnemore (1999), international organisations exercise power as they constitute and construct the social world, as they, for instance, define tasks, define interests, fix meanings or articulate norms. More specifically, they can exert three types of power: compulsory power, getting states and non-state actors to comply, sometimes with material resources, more often with normative resources; they have institutional power in that they guide behaviour, indirectly or directly, by agenda-setting and classificatory practices (and this includes definitions:

like the UNHCR categorising people as migrants or refugees); and finally, they have productive power, visible in how organisations fix meanings, define the problems or identify and help solve them, assign responsibilities for action (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 174–178).

Their power stems from at least two sources: the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody and control over technical expertise and information (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 707). International organisations are powerful as bureaucracies, but also because they pursue goals that are seen as legitimate (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 162).

Barnett and Finnemore further find three categories of authority: delegation, morality and expertise. Delegated authority is authority on loan, from the member states. Moral authority is involved when international organisations serve or protect important principles, or inasmuch as they represent the "international community" against self-seekers, self-serving states. Finally, expert authority, what international organisations possess by way of their specific knowledge of the issues at hand, similarly works to create an appearance of depoliticisation (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 171–174).

As will be shown later on, this framework is useful for the purposes of this book. The EU can certainly be seen able to exert these kinds of power. Would it not be able to do even more, using aspects of state power? At the outset, there does not seem to be any reason for excluding, as Barnett and Finnemore (2005) do, the fourth category of power by Barnett and Duval (2005), namely, structural power. It does seem that international organisations also exercise structural power, in instances such as admission of a new member state and how that constitutes social capacities and interests. Susan Strange's (1988) concept of structural power is particularly useful here as she speaks about areas through which to exercise power in international relations: production, security, finance and knowledge. Security and knowledge are particularly interesting for this book. One could see several structures of international relations where the EU has had an impact: the structures of diplomacy challenged by the European External Action Service; the EU's status within the UN (of which more later) is a challenge to the principles of intergovernmental organisations.

The particular nature of the EU also means that it has, and needs, integrative power—as defined by Boulding (1989) who, speaking of consequences of the use of power, distinguishes between destructive, productive and integrative power. Here, integrative power would be about creating

relationships, bringing together: according to Boulding, social groups use integrative power to gain members and maintain their loyalty.

We thus certainly see use of normative and institutional power of different kind. The norm of prohibiting death penalty (Manners 2002 example), the ways of framing modalities for trade between the EU and other countries or groups of countries (Stocchetti 2013 on EU-ACP trade), the interpretation of the situation on the ground and of measures needed (Merlingen 2011) would be typical examples. Stocchetti analyses the EU's power in development and global governance and sees that it is normative in nature and works through institutional, discursive and even, albeit to a lesser extent, through compulsory power. Merlingen notes how, in the EU's civilian crisis management missions, there is quite some discursive power at play, exercised in particular by experts and by mentors. The European Defence Agency (EDA) in its field has a significant network-builder role, establishing itself as the "spokes-person" for actors in its network.[14]

Again, the particularity of the EU deserves more attention. From the above, we can see how the EU indeed may qualify as a normative power—but would this not be typical of all international organisations? And what would be the impact of the apparent depoliticisation that Barnett and Finnemore (2005) take up? While it could be an important component part of the power of the organisations, the particular development of the EU is again a matter that takes it apart from the others. The important changes of increasing politicisation in the EU (see notably Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015, 2016) may need to be looked at.

3.5   The Less Explored Dimension of Power: Power in Inter-organisational Relations

The EU, in all, has power. Looking at the power of the EU helps us understand the power of the state and that of the international organisations, mirroring what their power is understood to be about. The theoretical debate on the nature of the EU's power serves as an excellent tool for further analysis. Indeed, instead of stopping at this debate and trying to find out whether or not the EU is, for instance, a civilian power, or a more civilian power than some other actor, we can take the categories of normative, civilian and soft power as one type of power that international actors can and do use. It is neither exclusive to the EU nor to any other actor or type of actor. We need to go further. What is it that makes an actor

use this kind of power, when and why? What is it in the environment and in the interaction with others that make this kind of power useful and right?

The EU's power is usually analysed as power over states. Assuming, on the basis of what emerged from this and the previous chapter, that international organisations need power to cope with their tasks and that their interaction with other organisations may influence that capacity, we can also assume that power over other organisations might also be sought at and needed. Therefore, we need to look at whether the EU has power over international organisations and what kind of power it could be. In other words, we need a power-based view at how organisations shape each other—how and when they have the power to shape each other and how they in fact influence each other's power, making the others invest in a certain kind of power or discourage other kinds.

In existing literature, we find notions about the EU's power in such relations. Development policy is a field where the EU aims to exercise influence in international organisations such as WTO, the UN and OECD/DAC. In this interaction, the EU legitimises and reproduces its own choices and agency, Stocchetti (2013: 273) argues. Zimmermann (2007) speaks about the EU's negotiation power in its relations with other organisations such as the WTO. Manners (2002) finds examples of the use of normative power or various mechanisms of diffusion of norms in the EU's relations with several organisations, including contagion in EU-Mercosur and procedural diffusion in the EU's relations with SADEK and WTO.

What could then be the EU's specificities in such relations? Kolb (2013), while studying the relations between the EU and the Council of Europe, sees that in these relations, power is based on resources, authority over member states—here, one would need to think in particular of supranationalism—and political weight. This invites for a closer look at each of these elements: what would they actually consist of? Gehring et al. (2013: 860) point out that the EU's hybrid nature may set it apart from other international organisations. It can be on an equal footing both with an international organisation, as with NATO, or with that organisation's member states (as in WTO). This might give the EU additional power resources.

Would the EU then be able to outpower the others? Peters (2004) discusses an example where he finds an outright fear of marginalisation and encroachment. This would be the EU-OSCE relations. However,

existing research also points out that it is not always the one who has most power that actually is powerful. The weaker ones can have an important enabling role. Schumacher (2012) sees that the Council of Europe helps the EU with information and expertise; in return, it has its own standards and conventions strengthened by the EU. There would be a "discrete charm" and influence that an organisation perceived as weak, like the Council of Europe, could have; it may both enable and constrain the policies of the EU through advice and expertise.[15]

Costa and Jørgensen (2012: 11–12) bring forward four categories of impact identified in literature on Europeanisation (inertia, absorption, transformation and retrenchment) that cover different magnitudes, directions and sorts of change and apply them to the study of how other organisations affect the EU. Their fourth category, retrenchment, or the active and explicit action against an institution, to counteract its influence, or simply a negative attitude, is a valuable element for the analysis in this book. Their conclusions are equally interesting. They find little evidence of the explanatory power of the independent variables chosen to account for the variance of influence, namely, the strength of international institutions (stringency of constrains, robustness of organisation) or the conditions of the domestic setting. Instead, they underline the key role of facilitating factors: an international institution is more likely to influence the EU if it deals with issues that are prone to be grasped at the meso-level of the EU (such as transgovernmental networks, social networks and agencies and typically on issues that are not politicised) and if the influence can be linked to an increase in the EU competences or its international actorness or leadership potential—typically, issues that are new to the EU (Costa and Jørgensen 2012: 251–255).

The EU's particular character helps us understand the differences, and so does the EU's development trajectory from a civilian-normative-soft actor to an actor in security and defence policy. New areas of action open up for new channels of interaction.

Differences are not to be overestimated either. The EU is not totally different from other international organisations but shaped by the same trends and external environment as them. There is an overall expansion of tasks or expectations towards international organisations, not only towards the EU; there is an overall positive attitude towards international organisations as helping towards solving problems and towards a more trustful and peaceful international environment—not only towards the EU. They are all seen as legitimate in this particular way. And the same goes for the

criticism of their inability to perform—and so even the more extreme case of being criticised for wielding too much power. Power may thus come in variable quantities and variable forms, in forms that are needed or that are good to have, but also in forms that will be criticised and protested against.

The impact of inter-organisational relations on the specificity of the EU would also seem to require a more thorough analysis. Supposing the EU does shape the conception of "normal," it would make other organisations become more like it. What happens when the EU no longer is different? Something no doubt happens with its (power of) attraction: why should similar attract similar? Thus, we see a possible contradiction: the EU is powerful in being different from other actors, or as it is perceived or presented as being different. If others become like it, it loses this advantage. The same goes obviously for the case that it is the EU itself that changes, be it for the fact that others exert attraction on it.

This book, dealing as it does with security (and defence), benefits from these insights regarding the nature of the subject matters and the temporary dimension of the development of the EU's external role. To complete the view in existing literature on the power of the EU, the book next moves to the analysis of power in inter-organisational relations, its power over other organisations or other organisations' power over the EU. This encounter of the EU with other actors in international security also adds to our understanding of the debates on civilian power, normative power, and the power of attraction or soft power, and to our understanding of whether and how interaction renders the organisations more similar to each other.

Notes

1. Cf. Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015, 2016).
2. For an overall summary of a decade of scholarship, see Manners (2013) (and the whole *Cooperation and Conflict* theme number). On the notion and its criticism, see also, for instance, Hyde-Price (2006), Sjursen (2006) and Nunes (2011).
3. Both persuasion and shaping the discourse are related to credibility that in turn is related to expertise or knowledge. This will be looked at in the next chapter.
4. Manners (2009a, b, c) quoted in Forsberg (2011).
5. Larsen quotes Morini et al. (2010).
6. Manners (2002) actually wanted to overcome the civilian-military debate with the notion of normative power.

7. Duchêne's ideas are summarised also in Zielonka (1998).
8. Cf. even the Special Issue of Journal of European Public Policy 2/2006, edited by Helene Sjursen.
9. Cf. Manners (2013) for extensive literature on normative power originating outside of Europe, including particularly Chinese scholarship.
10. Cf. Nielsen (2013) on soft power and the capability-expectations gap.
11. When answering how the EU could get the transformative power back, she interestingly comes to list power resources of a kind: vision, patience, consistency and credibility (Grabbe 2014).
12. Duchêne (1973) presents a similar thought: there are certain "inner characteristics" of the EC that it needs to remain true to in order to make the most of its opportunities (cited in Smith 2005).
13. But the strongest conditionality is attached to membership; once in, the EU starts to lose its power (Grabbe 2014).
14. This resembles also Boulding's (1989) integrative power. Other agencies may have similar power in their fields.
15. Schumacher (2012: 189, 192, 203) sees knowledge and expertise as the most frequently exchanged resource between institutions and looks at two mechanisms of influence between the EU and the Council of Europe: one enabling, resource exchange, and one constraining, domain restriction. His analysis shows that the CoE has essential interest in supplying information on monitoring results, expertise and norms for the EU, to enhance the implementation of its own standards and conventions through the EU. But it also influences the contents and scope of EU policy, as exemplified by restriction as it protested against the mandate of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (perceived as invasion into its core competence) and got its point through so that the agency does not systematically monitor the human rights situation in general.

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Analysing Power in Inter-organisational Relations

4.1 Why Power Matters in Inter-organisational Relations

The previous chapters on inter-organisational relations and on the EU's power described two fields of study in continuous development. Inter-organisational relations as an approach gain ground in research on the EU, now also on the EU's relations with NATO and the UN. These relations themselves have grown in importance; there is more and more interaction, and at the same time, their impact on these organisations is more clearly seen. The relations do matter if they can significantly shape the organisations. The need to study and understand inter-organisational relations is therefore motivated by the consequences they have on the organisations, their functioning, tasks and goals.

Researchers have approached inter-organisational relations through mapping several different mechanisms of interaction. Already this opens up new ways of perceiving the significance of this interaction: an organisation can imitate another, learn from it; there can be cooperation and conflict between them. This helps us see that what and how the organisations do is to some, if not even large, extent influenced by other organisations.

More seldom, however, has an explicit power perspective been used, even though one might think that all relations are power relations, and thus also inter-organisational relations. The reason seems simple, yet

somewhat curious: international organisations are not always seen to, or supposed to, have any power. This applies even to the EU. While one could say that the EU, as a partially supranational political union to which the member states have delegated a considerable share of what used to be their competence, or power, actually is much more powerful than any other organisation, research has been slow to develop further. A logic of uniqueness seems to prevail. Some see the EU as an entity the very being of which is antithetic to the prevailing power logic of the international system: it does not enter the power game and should not do that. The form and the use of power would stem from the identity of the organisation. Others see that the EU indeed has power, but of a special type, different from that of the others. The evidence again challenges this latter strand, growing fast in the past ten years. The EU may have been an actor with considerable power of its own kind, but this power is diminishing, or losing its value in the international relations, as the EU's attraction weakens and its weight goes down as political contestation grows both inside and outside the Union.

This chapter builds further on how to analyse power in inter-organisational relations and, more specifically, how to approach this question in the case of the EU's relations with the UN and NATO. The following assumption leads the way: if inter-organisational relations are consequential for the organisations, and the organisations are also aware of this, would they not have interest in looking for interaction—or perhaps avoiding it—and, to the extent possible, influencing the outcome of interaction? The organisations may try to control this impact, minimise eventual negative consequences and rather try and turn it into their favour. They may need to have an impact on another organisation in order to achieve this goal. This, then, is exercise of power in inter-organisational relations, using power vis-à-vis each other.

Moving on to looking closer at power in the relations between international organisations, we get to important empirical questions. What do the organisations need power for, if anything? International organisations need power to fulfil their tasks. This power may mean authority, decision-making right, concrete capacity to act; it is often called as "power to." Just how much of these they need and how much they are granted may be a question of controversy. International organisations are expected to reach their goals, or called to exercise power, and may be criticised for being ineffective. Their performance can be assessed from different perspectives.

They also need another kind of power, "power over," starting within the relationship between the organisations and their member states. However, given that other organisations may affect their performance, they may also need power over the others. We thus need to understand over whom the organisations need to be powerful. But we also need to look at what makes an organisation powerful or powerless. What does an organisation's power over another organisation consist of in practice? If and when organisations need power, or more power, where and how do they get it?

In this chapter, we look closer at the forms and sources of power manifest in relations between the EU, NATO and the UN. This is done by bringing in some elements of the literature on power in inter-organisational relations that help to deepen the study of power relations between organisations. In this way, this chapter prepares the way to analyse some empirical cases of interaction, presented next, from a power perspective, thus building up a more comprehensive understanding of the EU's power in inter-organisational relations. At the same time, it also sheds light on the distinctive features of international organisations, or of the disciplines that study them.

To ground this analysis, we return shortly to power as a relational concept and its "four faces." Dahl's (1957) classic definition of power as the ability of A to get B to do something B would not otherwise have done and seeing power also as the ability to prevent B from doing something (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz 1962) are the first two faces.

At the outset, it may appear strange to ask whether, for instance, the UN would get the EU to do something that it would not otherwise have done. But this might well be the case. Would it not at least try to do so? What the organisations do seem to be a central issue in their ever closer relations: who does what, how are the tasks divided, is there a division of labour?

The third face of power, as introduced by Lukes, is about the ability to control the agenda or to change what B actually wants. Lukes' notion of power is essentially relational and asymmetrical; it is "power over" and means the ability to constrain the other's choices (Lukes 2005: 39, 83, 73). Put differently, Lukes (1974: 24) maintains that power can be used to prevent conflict by shaping peoples' perceptions, cognitions and preferences to the extent that they accept their role in the existing order of things (quoted in Hardy and Clegg 2006: 759). This third face or dimension of power can also be seen as a process of legitimisation that prevents opposition from arising (Hardy and Clegg 2006: 761).

From here, we see how the exercise of power can be not only about agenda-setting or division of labour, or about a certain kind of "conflict prevention" when it comes to their relations, but also about the entities' proper role, and the proper, acceptable way of doing. Thus, it can be about legitimacy.

Finally, the fourth face, sometimes called Foucaultian, is about the ability of those in power of influencing, and even controlling, not only what B does want or does not want, nor about placing B firmly in an order of some kind, but also controlling who B actually is. Foucault's "productive power" refers to the constitution of social subjects through discursive practices (see, e.g., Merlingen 2011) and is often identified as being about the linkage between power and knowledge, inseparable for Foucault. A crucial difference here would be that power is not a deterministic resource that can be possessed or manipulated; instead, all actors operate within a structure of dominancy or a web of power relations from which both the dominant and the subordinate hardly can escape (Hardy and Clegg 2006: 762–765).

Could thus power in inter-organisational relations also be about the constitution or construction of social subjects? Would the EU, NATO and the UN be in a process of mutual construction? The fourth face of power certainly does lead us to think of power relations as linked to identity. The identity of an organisation can be about what the organisation does, but perhaps also about how it does what it does. Again, we see the link to legitimacy. As Hurrell (2005: 49) puts it, power has an important social dimension: understanding power in international relations necessitates, in his view, placing it side by side with notions such as prestige, authority and legitimacy.

Furthermore, the fourth face also opens up for a view of power that is not necessarily about the capacity to produce intended and foreseen effects on others (as power often is seen, e.g., Wrong 1979: 2) but to situations in which power is unintentional and unforeseen. This helps us avoid the traps of being too resource bound or too exercise bound in our analysis of power.

Lukes speaks about "exercise fallacy" in cases when power is only understood in the sense of causing an observable sequence of events where no intentionality can be seen (Lukes 2007: 84). For him, the crucial distinction between power and influence is about the presence of intention: power needs to be meaningful, intentional (Lukes 2005: 30–31), and thus, the agency in question needs to be capable of intentions. This does

not mean that power needs to be an actuality: it is a potentiality. Power is a dispositional concept that identifies an ability or capacity (Lukes 2005: 69, 169).

Yet, Lukes seems indeed to make way for some kind of lack of intention, too. There is not only "exercise of power"; power also comprises non-actions or inaction, unconscious action, he says. This includes, for him, actors such as groups or institutions (Lukes 2005: 41, 77). Power can be observed in acts of deference, of subordination (Lukes 2007: 86)—but would often be at its most effective when least accessible to observation (Lukes 2005: 64).

The method of going beyond appearances, to some unintended consequences and cases without active intervention, would seem to suit well the study of international organisations. It might be that the power exercised by institutions such as international organisations is somehow less visible than that of the states. This was, after all, the case with their power over their member states: it was not necessarily to their advantage to be perceived as powerful, as this could question their position as impartial, explicitly apolitical servants. Certainly, power relations between organisations may not be easy to detect. But how to go "beyond appearances"? Next, we turn to what literature on power in inter-organisational relations might add to this discussion and whether it helps in discerning the least observable sides of exercise of power.

4.2   Research on Inter-organisational Power

In organisational theory, inter-organisational relations are often approached through the prism of power: power is a central concept, an inescapable, actually natural, part of inter-organisational relations. For instance, organisations such as businesses would merge to gain more power. Interestingly, however, a distinction seems to appear between general literature on inter-organisational relations and literature on relations between international organisations: the latter would be perceived prevalently as conflictual, while the general literature seems rather to emphasise cooperation.[1]

One central argument in the literature is that organisations are first and foremost concerned with survival. For survival, they need resources from their environment, and often from other organisations. Therefore, survival is based on the organisation's capacity to manage its relations with other organisations (Mizruchi and Yoo 2002: 602). Research on inter-organisational relations can be about alliances, mergers and similar

arrangements (see Cook 1977), or about problems related to coordination and the increasing need of organisations such as private enterprises to cooperate with each other (Whetten 1981).

When dealing with power, inter-organisational theory would not only look at it as a characteristic or attribute of an organisation but also as a goal that organisations share. Thus, while it may be interested in, for instance, comparing the power of one organisation to that of another, it also encompasses studies of how power considerations affect these relations, such as by bringing the organisations to cooperate with each other. Power could be their shared goal that they attain best by cooperating.

Need for resources that another organisation has may also lead to dependency, sometimes mutual dependency or interdependency. Mizruchi and Yoo (2002) mention specialised knowledge as an example of such resource. Awareness of this dependency is an important part in guiding the actions of the organisation, and resource dependence theories therefore constitute an important part of inter-organisational theory.

Dependency can be seen as a power relation, a situation of one organisation's power over another. The different forms of power, "power to," the ability to affect outcomes (Hart 1976), and "power over"—power exerted in a relationship between actors—can thus be intertwined. But "power to" can also be relational: it can be seen as an ability to influence, control or resist the activities of others (Huxham and Beech 2008).

Inter-organisational theory brings forward a further form still: "power for," a form of power that can be seen as the ability to influence the amount of power of others and, in particular, increase it (empowerment) rather than limiting it (something that "power over," or "power to" in the sense of control, actually implies). A related notion would be that of "power with," developed by Follett in 1918 and 1924. Concerned for how to democratise power, she saw that organisations organise and create power and that there is a difference between power over and power with, or coercive and coactive power (quoted in Hardy and Clegg 2006: 761). "Power for" can also be linked to the fourth face of power as it implies a definition of or change in someone's actorness.

Inter-organisational relations are not limited to resource procurement and allocation, but also extend to, for instance, political advocacy and inter-organisational legitimation (Galaskiewicz 1985). Legitimacy, for an organisation, may come through performance (Gutner and Thompson 2013), but also through conforming to dominant conceptions of appropriate behaviour in response to actual or anticipated pressures (Mizruchi

and Yoo 2002: 604). This, in turn, may be linked to tendencies to isomorphism, mentioned earlier on.

Mizruchi and Yoo (2002) do argue that power relations are understudied in organisational studies. They also point out that the question of unit poses problems: some critics of resource dependence approach, for instance, would note that organisation is not the appropriate unit of analysis for understanding corporate power as it is rather a tool for the dominant social class (Mizruchi and Yoo 2002: 606). Mizruchi and Yoo (2002: 614) further conclude that "we have little knowledge of the means by which organisations actually use the dependence of others to exercise power over them." In addition, they go further to affirm that "it is alarming that the interest in how organisations are coerced, cajoled, or otherwise influenced to behave in certain ways by other organisations has not received more attention" (idem: 617).

This observation does but underlines the centrality of inter-organisational relations as a field of study. Theories on inter-organisational relations, even when justifiably criticised, have a lot to offer for the study of relations between international organisations. And, first, the question of sources of inter-organisational power, particularly of knowledge as one of them, is worth looking closer at.

What exactly are the sources of inter-organisational power is understandably a complicated question, as is the question of how to use them. In the earlier chapters, we saw ways of dealing with power resources that did not lead us far in understanding inter-organisational relations. Organisational theory offers some insights that help us nuance the analysis. A first such insight is that it might be helpful not to determine power resources ex ante or in any general sense but to open up for the possibility that in different situations, different resources and different tools are used.

Indeed, Hardy and Clegg (2006) suggest the sources of power are infinite. They include information, uncertainty, expertise, credibility, position, access and contacts with higher echelon members, as well as the control of money, rewards, sanctions and the like. Different phenomena become resources in different contexts. One is also to note that possessing scarce resources is not enough in itself to confer power. Actors have to be aware of their contextual pertinence and be able to control and use them accordingly (Hardy and Clegg 2006: 757; cf. Mizruchi and Yoo 2002: 608–609 on infiltration, control, information and control of capital).

Information and expertise can also be synonymous to knowledge. Knowledge is seen as key to the performance of organisations, and as a

competitive advantage. This is why ways to gain knowledge get a lot of attention. Learning is a way to gain knowledge, and for an organisation, knowledge often comes from other organisations. Inter-organisational theory is therefore particularly interested in what is labelled "inter-organisational learning." Ingram (2002: 642) defines it this way: "interorganisational learning occurs when one organisation causes a change in the capacities of another, either through experience sharing, or by somehow stimulating innovation." Learning can be intentional or unintentional. But even learning itself can be an asset in that it is a capacity that not all have to the same degree: Haas (1990) would see learning as a skill that different organisations may possess to different extents. In addition to gaining knowledge, one may also aim at controlling it, as Strange (1988) points out, and we return to this later.

At its best, inter-organisational learning can imply the benefit of accumulating knowledge without the cost of accumulating experience (Ingram 2002: 660). It is, however, also risky: the results can be negative. Knowledge that transfers to a competitor can harm, and sometimes practices are adopted without full consideration of their appropriateness (idem: 652, 655).

Learning itself is a complicated process that is affected by the quality of the relationship between the "receiver" and the "sender," as well as by the qualities of the receiver and the status of the sender. Ingram argues that it is not only the quality of knowledge that determines whether others are interested in it and will take and apply it but also the characteristics of the knowledge sender (Ingram 2002: 647). He exemplifies this by a feature linked to the spread of innovations: as it is difficult to determine the importance of an innovation when it is new, the public initially takes its decision based on the status of the innovator rather than of the innovation. Status is something that makes others willing to imitate; it may be linked to size or profitability as well as success (idem: 648).

While Ingram somewhat surprisingly says a central question unanswered in the literature is just how inter-organisational learning happens (Ingram 2002: 655), he still lists features that increase or facilitate learning. These include, first, characteristics of the receiver: absorptive capacity matters, as does prior knowledge and so-called boundary-spanning members that are able to understand that knowledge and direct it to an appropriate part of the organisation. Receptivity creates the capacity to learn but is not enough: also intent is needed in that it establishes the desire to learn (idem: 649–650; cf. Haas and Haas (1995) on the ability to learn, below).

Regular communication—personal acquaintances, meetings—increases the opportunity to share knowledge, and similarity between organisations increases the opportunity for at least some types of inter-organisational learning. Yet, similarity also makes the organisations more intense competitors (Ingram 2002: 650, 652).

Indeed, as knowledge is a precious and sought-after resource, it is understandable that it is not necessarily always so gladly shared. It may rather be in the organisation's interest to keep the knowledge to it and control that of the others. Sillince (2006) writes on knowledge as competitive advantage and points out the relevance of knowledge and how to establish it. For him, knowledge is a source of competitive advantage, and the organisation can itself influence its strategic value. As for all resources or capabilities, according to resource-based theory, a firm's competitive advantage is determined by the value, rarity, non-imitability and non-substitutability of its resources. This is also true for knowledge. Still, each of these has a substantial side and a rhetorical side and can thus be increased by careful rhetoric (Sillince 2006: 800–801).

Sillince speaks about "the rhetorical construction of the value of knowledge" (Sillince 2006: 800). Rhetoric establishes the relevance of knowledge to the (client's) problem. Rhetoric can be used to claim legitimacy through expertise and collaboration in social networks. This may be particularly relevant for a firm whose products are very visible and thus also easily imitable. In such a situation, the firm needs to amplify uniqueness or unique expertise. In other words, it rhetorically constructs the rarity of knowledge, or the non-imitability of knowledge. A firm can protect itself from imitation through using rhetoric to amplify certain features of its knowledge, such as tacitness, social complexity or causal ambiguity. It may, for instance, stress that there are rare personal qualities involved that are difficult to learn and cannot benefit others (Sillince 2006: 801–803). He then interestingly extends the discussion to organisational identity. For him, organisational identity is a resource which is difficult to imitate and which therefore provides competitive advantage (idem: 807).

While knowledge thus appears as a noteworthy resource that the organisations may trade with, there is another similar resource that also can transfer from one organisation to another, and this is legitimacy. Legitimacy is the assumption, or perception, that the actions of an entity are desirable, appropriate or proper in the context of the social system in question and also a collective rationale for what it does, and why (cf. Suchman 1995: 574–575). It is a central resource if not altogether a question of survival

and relevance: a loss of legitimacy would lead to a loss of resources and mandates, or calls for reforms (Biermann 2017: 344), sometimes rather straightforwardly to a loss of members—as has happened in the case of the ICC, for instance.

Legitimacy is socially constructed, dynamic by nature and open to contestation (Biermann 2017: 339). International organisations are usually legitimised by the states, but also, and increasingly so, by NGO's, media and the public, usually based on some criteria related to their action, their input, output or throughput (Biermann 2017: 342). Importantly, international organisations can resort to self-legitimisation and also "other-legitimation" that can be both positive and negative, attributing or degrading the legitimacy of others (idem: 340).

Legitimacy can be seen as something that can be managed and that indeed needs to be managed, by any organisation. Managing legitimacy, that is, gaining, maintaining and repairing it, can be done by using different strategies according to the situation and according to the type of legitimacy. Suchman distinguishes between three such types: pragmatic legitimacy based on self-interest, moral legitimacy based on the evaluation of whether the entity is doing the right thing and cognitive legitimacy, based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness. All legitimacy management, Suchman argues, rests heavily on communication (Suchman 1995: 586).

The important point Suchman makes is that being legitimate makes the life of an organisation considerably easier than the life it leads once problems surface concerning its legitimacy. As Suchman puts it, belief in the organisation's good character may dampen the delegitimising effects of its failures (Suchman 1995: 597). Making sense might be the only thing that an organisation needs in order to continue its routine workings, or avoid questioning, while in the case it needs to mobilise more commitment, it needs to have value (Suchman 1995: 575). Thus, gaining legitimacy for new activities or repairing legitimacy after a crisis of some kind may be more demanding than maintaining legitimacy. Still, maintaining legitimacy can also be challenging. Long-term stability of an organisation may entail a rigidity that makes it less responsive and thus less able to respond to sudden challenges and protect its past accomplishments in the case of, for instance, an external shock that threatens its legitimacy (Suchman 1995: 593).

It is difficult to assess to what extent actors are in control of legitimacy, their own or that of others; therefore an organisation might rather cooper-

ate with one that is perceived as legitimate (Biermann 2017: 346). As Riddervold (2014) points out, the fact that the EU was considered more legitimate than NATO may be an explanation for why member states preferred its piracy operations over those of NATO. Legitimacy is therefore a factor that can help explain inter-organisational relations.

4.3   Inter-organisational Power and Relations Between International Organisations

The concern for legitimacy and knowledge is a particularly valuable aspect of inter-organisational theory for the analysis of international organisations. These two are, after all, generally identified as central attributes of international organisations. The organisations are perceived as legitimate because of their tasks and ways of operation, at least by those that have established them in the first place, but also often in a more general sense in that they represent the goal of cooperation that might seem difficult to attain were there no such venues as the organisations are. Knowledge, then, may be part and parcel of this legitimacy: as international bureaucracies, the organisations may possess more knowledge of their field than other actors, and the knowledge they possess may also appear more objective and therefore valuable than the knowledge of, for instance, a single state. As also Alasuutari and Qadir (2014: 74) point out, knowledge production that takes place in an institution that is independent from direct government or other political control is considered more credible than other knowledge claims—something that makes organisations such as the OECD pay much attention to show that their knowledge production is unbiased.

Inter-organisational theory stresses the importance of legitimacy and of knowledge for organisations. These may be sources of power, but also something that the organisations construct together, in cooperation: they share knowledge learning from each other, and they can also legitimise each other. Were the international organisations in a situation where their existence is put in question, or survival threatened, this would also mean their legitimacy is in doubt. What about their knowledge, then? Could knowledge be a power source they would try to invest in to regain legitimacy? In sum, inter-organisational theory usefully opens up for the growing importance of knowledge and legitimacy, or how these may become something that an organisation has and tries to benefit from, but also something that another organisation may have an interest in, and the

capacity to, influence. By extension, the same might apply even to identity, if identity is seen as the ultimate competitive advantage of an organisation.

It is, however, in the context of increasing need for legitimacy that the whole utility of this perspective is revealed. Again, to borrow notions from inter-organisational theory, we can relate this need to the discussion on the quest for survival.

The quest for survival might even appear as a first bridge between inter-organisational theory and the study of international organisations. Is not survival a basic concern in much of international relations theory? After all, the simplistic but as such classically appealing realist way of explaining state behaviour is built on this quest. Yet, the connection is not evident. Survival might be a customary notion of much international relations literature, but it is not an issue in research on international organisations. Once again, we come to the specificities of international organisations, or their assumed specificities. International organisations are not taken to be endangered species, other actors do not threaten them, be it states or organisations. Understandably, then, their first concern is not survival, and their survival is not a concern in international relations theory.

That the connection between survival and international organisations is not evident does not mean it is not important to look at. On a closer look, the survival perspective seems actually to gain salience. A simple consideration of increasing overlap between organisations may give rise to questions about the need for several organisations doing the same, and thus the question of whether some of them might no longer be needed. An increasing concern for the performance of international organisations might be an indication of a change in international relations whereby their legitimacy is no longer simply taken as granted. How would the organisations react? Would this increase competition between them?

Barnett and Finnemore (2005: 181–184) note that the basic claim that international organisations are by definition be good or do good is questioned. They see challenges to the international organisations' substantive legitimacy, their output. In addition, they see that even the procedural—input-related—legitimacy is challenged: more transparency, democracy and local participation are expected of them than before.

For Barnett and Finnemore, authority is a source of legitimacy for the organisations and a resource that the organisations use to exercise power. Authority requires consent and recognition (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 170–175). They see that international organisations command vari-

ous types of authority: rational-legal (being impartial and technocratic civil servants, not exercising power), delegated (faithful servants of the states), moral (being above state interests, representing those of the international community as a whole), and expert authority (based on their detailed, specialised knowledge).[2] Indeed, organisations such as the International Telegraphic Union (ITU) and the General Postal Union were a response to technological advances and need to coordinate national developments: the idea was to have a group of experts and administrators to perform particular functions on behalf of the states. One of their roles was that of providing statistical information (World Health Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organisation) (Archer 1992: 13, 176–177).

Legitimacy might indeed be changing from taken for granted to merit based, of something that needs to be earned. Why such a change? The simple increase in the number of international organisations is one factor: there are now many more that work in the same field, represent the same member states and draw on the same resources. There is more interaction between the organisations, including overt and covert competition over these resources. However, we might also observe an increase if not in the assets and power of the organisations, at least in the expectations directed to them. Member states may indeed expect more of the organisations by way of solving problems that they cannot manage alone. In such a situation, legitimacy would be something earned by trying to meet the expectations. This, again, could be called legitimacy management.

When it comes to expectations and stress on performance, the EU stands out in comparison with other organisations. As a political union, the EU's powers and capacities are far beyond those of normal international organisations, but so are the expectations to deliver also higher, and criticism louder.

Another interesting link between understandings of inter-organisational power and the relations between international organisations appears to be the notion of conflict. For Lukes (1974), power can be used to prevent conflict by shaping peoples' perceptions, cognitions and preferences to the extent that they accept their role in the existing order of things (see above). In the context of inter-organisational relations, could we see the organisations functioning in such a way, perhaps keeping up an order or structure?

Conflict can be linked with other conceptions or "faces" of power as well. Bilgin and Berivan (2008) present the four faces of power in a way where the presence or not of conflict matters for what kind of power is

used. For them, the first face of power is about A getting B to do what it wants in the event of a visible conflict, the second face about A getting B to do what it wants in the absence of a visible articulation of grievances during a visible conflict and the third face about A getting B to do what it wants by shaping B's wants and needs so that a visible conflict does not occur. The fourth face, for them, would be about A getting B to do what it wants by constituting the field of knowledge through which B realises its subjectivity (Bilgin and Berivan 2008: 16).

Again, is there conflict between international organisations? In the past, such a conflict was hardly a significant phenomenon. Organisations with different tasks and different membership were not drawn into conflicts with each other. But intensifying relations and increasing overlap mean that there can also be conflict. Conflict between international organisations, should it exist, would be an important phenomenon to study.

At the same time, it is an attractive way to approach inter-organisational relations in this field, as conflict, like survival, is one of the basic notions of the study of international relations. There might even be a propensity in research on relations between international organisations for such a conflict perspective: because of the central role of conflict in most other matters in the field, conflict may take the foreground even here and overshadow other aspects that are equally important for the understanding of power in these relations. What we saw from the general literature was that if the study of power in inter-organisational relations was limited to situations of conflict, important aspects would remain unnoticed. This is because power is not dependent on conflict: it is also linked to cooperation and can be a joint goal of the organisations.

What seems to happen, in fact, is that in the literature on relations between international organisations, conflict is taken up as one of the mechanisms or forms of inter-organisational relations, and power is primarily introduced through two different perspectives: performance and rivalry—not through cooperation. As Ringmar (2007: 190–192) points out, international relations theory tends to focus on resources as a shorthand or a proxy for power, because of lack of alternatives, when it is problematic to demonstrate causation or intention; this is also why structural aspects of power tend to get overlooked.

Literature on performance assessment can be about the evaluation of the organisations' capacity and capability; performance can be seen to consist, for instance, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and financial viability (Jørgensen 2013). This literature thus brings up the issue of the (power)

resources of the organisation and how well it manages to use them. It introduces the questions linked to growing expectations on the organisations and their ensuing need to meet these somehow. The shortcoming is that it does not necessarily see the importance of inter-organisational relations for the organisations' performance. As seen above, however, performance is in reality very much a matter of interaction between organisations. The resources the organisation needs are often to be found in other organisations, or organisations develop their functioning by learning from each other. Interaction with other organisations can be increasingly important or consequential as it has an impact on this power, increases or reduces it.

Literature on rivalry between the organisations, then, helps to identify possible sources of power. Rivalry is competition over something the organisations need, and this something is power, or a resource that can empower. We need therefore to understand what exactly the organisations compete over: money, experts, information, rapidity of action, leadership, members? Organisations may also compete for a certain position vis-à-vis each other, for centrality or focal position in networks of organisations (Biermann 2008). Moreover, Biermann argues that this "positioning" stimulates constant rivalry (Biermann 2008: 169; Schulze and Ries 2016). We also need to understand what the consequences of this rivalry are. Rivalry—as interaction more broadly—shapes the organisations.

Rivalry, thus, can be about resources, but also about mandates and position. All these matter for the organisations. Who controls their task description? How are their achievements evaluated? Who supplies the resources they need? These are crucial questions of power. And this power does not necessarily reside where traditional analysis would look for it, that is, within states: it may reside in other organisations.

The need to perform and acquire resources and power can also lead to cooperation among the organisations. From the above, we saw how in much of inter-organisational theory the questions about power are about how to improve cooperation between the organisations. Cooperation can be of temporary nature, but organisations can also be linked to each other through some kinds of patterns of dependency. The resource dependence theory would look at such asymmetric relations between organisations that involve some kind of dependence (Biermann and Harsch 2017).

Performance could be seen as having mostly to do with "power to" and rivalry with "power over." It could be argued, however, that since "power to" is to such an extent influenced by inter-organisational relations, this distinction is not necessarily helpful. Both forms of power can be seen as relational.

Returning to the different "faces" of power, we can see that international organisations' power in their interrelations may indeed be of any or all of these types: power to make another organisation do something, to prevent it from doing something, to control its agenda, or to impact on and even condition the role or identity of that organisation in the international system. The various mechanisms of interaction, mentioned earlier, include different types of power exercise and can be roughly divided in these categories as well. In that of the first face, one could place imitation, model and also division of labour. Division of labour can also be part of the second face together with competition and control. The third would be about agenda-setting and tasks, and the fourth about identity, image and role. What is important is to note how fundamental this kind of power can be. For an organisation, it does matter who is in control of its task description, or of how its achievements are viewed and evaluated, and who coordinates eventual cooperation. What makes this fundamental to understand is that this kind of power does not necessarily reside only where traditional analysis would locate it, that is, in states or in certain individuals. It may also reside in other organisations.

Accordingly, even Barnett and Finnemore's (1999) types of power an international organisation can have—compulsory, institutional and productive power—could be seen as forms representing the first, second and third faces of power, potentially also the fourth. Importantly, these seem to apply well to inter-organisational relations, even though the authors do not themselves concentrate on that aspect. What Barnett and Finnemore do not see as belonging to the types of power of an international organisation, namely, structural power, would seem most relevant in practice. Barnett and Duval (2005: 3–4) indeed distinguish between four types of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive.[3] How structural power is understood depends naturally on the understanding of structures. Astley and Sachdeva (1984) identify hierarchical authority, resource centrality and network centrality as structural sources of power. Strange (1988/1994: 23–32) sees that force, wealth and ideas are the sources of power and sees that structural power is more important than relational power as it is less visible and as it is about changing the range of options open to others. Knowledge structure, or control of knowledge, is one of her four power structures, the others being control of security, of production, and of finance or credit.

The question of structural power of the organisations, or indeed any power, seemed not to be relevant for Strange as she did not really see organisations as actors. They, or "international bureaucracies," are for her

a category of its own only under specific conditions (Strange 1988: 231). This choice may reflect the situation in time, not only the theoretical assumptions. Other authors, including Naïm (2013), are at ease studying states and organisations together when looking at the more general question of what has happened to power in international affairs.

Of Naïm's four means of power (Naïm 2013: 23–25, 72), reward and muscle (two means with which one can change the situation for the other) and pitch and code (the means with which one can change the other's perception of the situation),[4] all can in fact belong to organisations as well as states. Classic means of coercion may be seldom associated with international organisations, yet many possess some—even the EU, in addition to classic defence alliances such as NATO. Even the UN was to have its own troops even though this did not materialise. Material rewards and sanctions are the more usual, as many organisations dispose of considerable resources in this sense. What is essential to note here, however, is that coercion does not seem to be a feature of power relations between organisations, but rather between organisations and other actors. Still, in cases of clear asymmetry, "muscle" and "reward" might be found even in inter-organisational relations.

Naïm's (2013) "pitch" and "code," then, could be found in the repertoire of inter-organisational relations in cases where they use persuasion and refer to or create moral obligations, where they impact on other organisations' perception of the situation through framing it for them in a certain way. In such cases, information or knowledge appears to be a prime power resource. Naïm points out that many international organisations gather and possess invaluable amounts of information that is appreciated for its unbiased and reliable nature.

Once again, knowledge thus surfaces as a central piece in inter-organisational relations. It can be a factor of crucial importance for the success of concrete operations (and, that is, as basis for the EU's influence), as exemplified by Merlingen (2011) on fact-finding and mentoring linked with EU crisis management operations. It can also form an essential part of the organisation's legitimacy.

4.4   A Closer Look at Knowledge and Legitimacy

Both legitimacy and knowledge could be seen as power resources. But they also seem to be more than that. One could argue that all organisations need legitimacy and they need knowledge as necessary ingredients

for their survival. In an organisation perceived as legitimate, it is in a safe and unchallenged position. As we saw in the above, international organisations have often been treated as legitimate "by birth." But are they, still?

In the above, we already introduced the general idea that the legitimacy of international organisations is no longer simply taken for granted. Some authors speak of crises of legitimacy, others of a constant need for legitimisation. For Reus-Smit (2007), crises of legitimacy are so frequent that he sees "international crisis of legitimacy" as a central concept in the field. What makes such crises particularly relevant in his view is that legitimacy crises are crises in an actor's power: failing legitimacy is corrosive of power, while robust legitimacy is constitutive of power (Reus-Smit 2007: 161).

Menon and Welsh (2011: 85) argue that international organisations are actually in a constant process of legitimisation vis-à-vis both their own members and external audiences. If this is the case, how do they legitimise themselves? How to ensure legitimacy or even increase it? Different ways can be thought of, depending, again, on how legitimacy is understood.

For Menon and Welsh, both "input" and "output" legitimacy matter. In other words, an organisation's legitimacy depends both on the organisation's inner working, the decision-making processes and on the results it achieves. Output legitimacy relates to evaluation of performance, how efficient the organisation is. But legitimacy also links to the choice of the tasks to perform. By taking on tasks that are perceived as legitimate, and by doing that in a way that is perceived as legitimate, enhances legitimacy. To a considerable degree, legitimacy is a matter of gaining and keeping constituency or supporters and a matter of enhancing image and reputation.

Legitimacy can also be seen as based on the rightfulness, on being about norms, rules and principles that warrant respect and compliance for more than self-interested reasons (Reus-Smit 2007: 158–159). When seen in this way, it is not so clearly linked with ways of functioning, but more a matter of perception (cf. Biermann 2017).

Do some organisations experience such crises more than others? Most of them do seem to face problems, including NATO, the EU and the UN. The withdrawal of one member country from the EU makes the problem all the more acute.

Once legitimacy is seen as a power resource, ways of influencing legitimacy become central. In fact, connecting to what we noticed above, legitimacy is something that needs to be managed. International organisations may, for instance, want to try to strengthen their position through public diplomacy or the creation of constituencies around them. These might be

elite coalitions composed of national public officials, experts and media. The organisations may want to influence their own image and need for more visibility and presence.[5]

They might also want actively to legitimise tasks, old or new, arguing for their importance. Would they also compete with each other over tasks that are perceived as particularly legitimate? In addition, would they even try to impact not only their own image but also that of other organisations?

Knowledge as such may be a central component of the organisation's perceived legitimacy; it can be seen as expertise and knowhow that relates to performance. But knowledge is also a central ingredient in the ability to choose tasks, as well as in how to succeed in performing them. And gaining more knowledge, keeping up with others, perhaps surpassing them, may again be a central goal. As seen in the above, many of the ways of gaining more knowledge have to do with relations to other organisations: cooperation, sharing, learning. The ability to process information into knowledge, collect and analyse it, matters ever more. For Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 699–700, 710), the exercise of power by international organisations through definitions of concepts of or tasks is all about structuring knowledge.

The capacity of the organisations to acquire knowledge, to learn, but also to teach or, alternatively, "hide" or monopolise knowledge, may vary from one organisation to another. Many of the more conventional and quantifiable power resources such as materiel, various types of tools (civilian, military), size (as number of member states) or geographical reach (regional, global) that the organisations possess can also be linked to their capacity to increase their knowledge. Haas and Haas (1995: 271), when comparing different organisations' ability to learn, link this ability to certain characteristics of the organisations, such as their decision-making style. Significant differences can be found in the style, as also in the degree to which their decisions bind their members—compare supranationalism to intergovernmentalism, for instance. Also features characterising the organisation's relations with the environment matter. Here, Park (2006) divides international organisations in groups as to the degree of openness to the influence of their external environment, while Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 699–700) see organisational insulation as pathology breed by bureaucratic culture.

Interaction between the organisations may indeed be a necessity for gaining knowledge, but also for their legitimacy. In the inter-organisational

context, an important part of knowledge is knowledge about and understanding of other organisations. Knowledge of each other and capacity to interact are, thus, central elements of inter-organisational relations. Interaction might also be explained by these needs. As Brosig (2010) puts it, interaction between international organisations may be attractive because of increased effectiveness and because of positive impact on legitimacy. However, he argues that in the end, legitimacy and credibility are not sufficient in explaining interaction: rational interests and capacities explain more (Brosig 2010: 36, 54). But what if legitimacy is a rational interest?

Here, it is argued that legitimacy and knowledge are power resources, and as such objects of rivalry, factors in dependency, cooperation and conflict but ultimately necessary for the relevance of an international organisation. And as such, they have become scarcer and less self-evident than what they perhaps were before.

4.5   Power Relations Between the EU, NATO and the UN: Towards the Question of Relevance

What could a research agenda on power in relations between the EU, NATO and the UN thus look like? The answer proposed in this book is to turn the analysis of their power over one another—when, why and how it is exercised and what potential there is—into a study of their relevance.

The emerging literature on relations between these three organisations provides elements of power analysis to start with, even though they might not always be labelled so. One possible research agenda could focus on visible examples of use of power, concentrating on these organisations' relations in the field of security policy, which is a shared task environment. In such a field with increasing overlap, one might see isomorphism in the sense that the new tasks the organisations assume tend to be shared by the others, too—as the cases of emergency response or piracy would show.

What would matter in such an analysis are the differences between the three organisations. One could posit, to start with, that their authority stems from different sources: that of the EU is delegated by the member states, partly not only delegated but actually conferred to it (exclusive competence); that of the UN is based on morality, and that of NATO on expertise. But could all now actually be experiencing problems with these same sources? The EU does face criticism, overall rise of Euroscepticism and specific claims to reconsider the question of delegation (revision of

competencies). NATO, when moving in realms that are not purely military, gets its expertise questioned and regains when moving back towards territorial defence, as from 2014 onwards.

Hypothetically, then, one might draw a picture where the power of the EU over the UN would be based on resources (material), voice (discipline induced by supranationalism, hybrid character) and the general doctrine of legitimacy of regional organisations (indeed, even the UN itself has been encouraging EU unity at the UN; Adriaenssens 2008). The power of the EU over the UN would, then, be manifest in the EU's autonomy (e.g., to act in crisis management) and status (upgrading towards state-like features). Conversely, the power of the UN over the EU could be manifest in the subordination of the EU to the authority of the UNSC as a regional organisation, the principle of division of labour, and limiting its rights in the General Assembly.[6]

The power of the EU over NATO could equally be based on supranationality (and certain resources such as those connected with soft power) and manifest itself in a takeover of NATO structures by the EU, while NATO's power over the EU, based on knowledge or knowhow (and US membership), would be seen in an effective limitation of the EU's development in the field of defence, for instance, functions such as common planning. NATO-UN relations would show similar features.

In essence, thus, understanding the distinctive features of the EU, NATO and the UN helps understand what power resources, potential or real, each of these have. These may be different, and not all resources necessarily count—as power resources are not to be equalled with power (Baldwin 2002: 179). As we saw in the above, unforeseen resources may count, too.

From the literature, we see that the relations have contradictory features. It appears each has elements both of cooperation and of conflict: as, for instance, Koops (2012) notes on EU-NATO relations, NATO can be seen to influence the EU as a model, as an enabler and as a competitor. Instead of a clear power relationship, there might be different situations of use of power between them.

Signs of management of conflict through hierarchy can also be detected. This is visible, for instance, in the UN perspective of working with regional organisations based on Chap. 8 of the UN Charter on regional arrangements and, on the other hand, the EU and NATO perspectives of autonomy and their active attempts at "renegotiating" this relationship. The EU is keen on stressing that it is not a regional organisation in this sense, and

so is NATO. Bouchard and Drieskens (2013: 121), for instance, note that the EU has been a loyal participant in the meetings organised under this umbrella, but it does not want to attend as a regional arrangement or agency, but only as one of the "other international organisations."

In the end, an analysis based on power resources and exercise of power faces its limits. We still lack the discussion on invisible power and on power as potentiality (Lukes 2005). Structural power could be a form of power that easily escapes observation. We would need to study even the impact of mere coexistence of different organisations and their awareness of each other. Awareness of what they do, and where they appear successful, appears quite consequential for task definition. This, again, links us to the "fourth face" of power: the power to alter the environment (social environment) through, for instance, knowledge and image production.

The perceptional nature of power deserves more attention. If we reframe the analysis somewhat, we could start from how the organisations alter the conditions for each other's agency, other organisations' "doing" and "being" by influencing their working culture and their goals, but also how they are perceived. Huxham and Beech (2008: 568–569, 570) argue that even though perceived power is not strong in extant inter-organisational relations research, it seems likely to be an important variable. Larsen argues that image, reception and recognition of an actor are fundamental for the success of its exercise of power (Larsen 2014: 898–899). The importance of perception and image for the EU's power has been demonstrated in recent literature (Lucarelli 2013 and others). This applies even in relations between the international organisations.

What we also need to highlight is what the organisations have in common. It is not only that they share a field where they are active, or share member states or share some basic features. They also share the same concern for relevance.

Increasing inter-organisational rivalry, as pointed out above, may also be a result of an increasing need to prove relevance as both expectations and the habit of assessment of performance grow. Not only do the organisations need to prove or retain relevance—they may also need to gain or show prevalence over other organisations in case they are performing the same functions for the same stakeholders. Indeed, what could be the case in EU-UN-NATO relations is that the organisations compete with each other over the best coverage of and reply to the current security needs (or serving the member states better than the others).

The notion that the organisations' legitimacy would be based in part on their appearing to serve the states and not exercising power of their own (Barnett and Finnemore 2005: 175) is challenged, but so is the notion that the organisations would not be rivals. Rivalry, seen in terms of organisational theory, is but a normal feature of inter-organisational life, as is power and the use of power.

We might indeed turn this discussion into one about relevance and see knowledge and legitimacy as a scarce commodity that is crucial for the continued relevance of the organisations. If we frame the research problem as a question of relevance, even the less visible forms of power use may become approachable. Equally well, we may start seeing less likely power relations, cases where an organisation with less resources has power over one with more, as when Schumacher (2012) points out how an organisation perceived to be weak, the Council of Europe, actually has "discrete charm" and influences the EU both enabling and constraining its policies, and this through advice and expertise.

Remaining relevant can be seen as a fundamental goal for an organisation. The organisation needs power for this purpose. Continued relevance could perhaps be what Menon and Welsh (2011) mean when speaking about the "sustainability" of an organisation.[7] Sustainable organisations are better able to fulfil their mandates. Ultimately, sustainability depends on the organisation's ability to satisfy its member states. For sustainability, they say, the capacity for adaptation and incremental change are centrally important (Menon and Welsh 2011: 81–82). At the same time, ability to adapt can mean a diminished potential for effectiveness and long-term sustainability, and adaptation can also give rise to conflict between member states (idem: 85, 90).

Berdal and Ucko (2010) see that NATO is assuring relevance through transformation. In this transformation, they detect one interesting element directly relevant for inter-organisational relations. They underline how NATO sees its future as a "service agency," complement to other organisations, in concrete areas of action where it can make a difference (such as strategic lift capacity). The support role they envisage is grounded on the thought that NATO cannot provide solutions to specific security challenges on its own: military solutions are not enough, and it lacks widespread international legitimacy of the kind commanded by the UN (Berdal and Ucko 2010: 120).

Relevance is also a concept that practitioners clearly recognise. In the interviews, it was easy to see that the perspective of relevance is well known

and thought about; in the UN, it was said that relevance is now a question only for NATO, while it was a question for the UN ten years ago (Head 2013), or for the EU that struggles with lack of relevance and compensates that with visibility (with flags everywhere) (Senior Policy Advisor 2013).

What is important to note is that relevance is a relational concept: one needs to be relevant for something or someone. As such, it is to a large degree a matter of recognition, perception and image. An organisation needs to be perceived as relevant. As Jørgensen (2013: 90, 94) puts it, relevance is the degree to which key stakeholders consider the EU a relevant performing organisation.

Gehring et al. (2013) define a relevant actor as one that has acquired action capacity in the relevant governance area. It is an actor if it can pursue its own interests and if it matters for third parties and the activities of international institutions. It has to be recognised as relevant. When they examine the question of why the EU is recognised as an actor in some international institutions, but not in others, or why the EU in some cases participates as an additional actor alongside of its member states, but not in others. They see in the background a cost-benefit calculation by the member states of that institution: the EU's participation is attractive only if the EU can significantly contribute to cooperation separately from its member states. This, then, necessitates that the EU has both autonomy in goal formation and control over a significant amount of governance resources (financial assets and legislative power transferred by EU member states to the EU and not controlled by them anymore). Resources and autonomy, in other words, create action capability that is a prerequisite of recognition. This action capability differs greatly from one policy sphere to another, thus yielding very different statuses in different organisations: the EU is a fully recognised actor within the WTO, selectively recognised with formal membership in FAO, non-recognised in IMF and so on (Gehring et al. 2013: 849–852).

Can the organisations then impact on their autonomy and action capability, if they want to become more relevant, or ensure relevance? These may be important parts of relevance, but it is argued here that relevance needs to be understood in a broader sense, taking into account tasks and image. These organisations can indeed influence; they even need to try to influence their own tasks and image.

Legitimacy and knowledge can be used to affect the agenda, notably to define the problem the organisations are to solve (Haas 1990), for instance, to define threats to security. Organisations certainly get security threats

defined for them by the member states, but they may also actively themselves define what security and security threats are. What might matter is being the one that first identifies a new threat and finds a convincing response to it.

But organisations can also influence the tasks and image of other organisations. The cases studied in the chapters below indicate that while relevance for "stakeholders" indeed is central, these stakeholders may need to be understood more broadly than only comprising member states. Indeed, organisations may need to prove relevance also vis-à-vis each other.

Trying to impact relevance through image, or creating the perception of relevance, can be exemplified by the question of how the EU is perceived by others. The quality or status of its knowledge would be an important factor affecting whether others are inclined to learn from it or adapt its norms or practices. When the EU's power is analysed from the "receiver's" end, asking whether the EU is perceived to have power, or the power it claims to have—such as normative power—the conclusions often point out that the perception may be very different from the self-perception or the theory-grounded understanding of the specificities of the EU's nature as an actor in international relations. For instance, Lucarelli (2013: 440) speaks about the "image of legitimacy and effectiveness" as something that has direct policy relevance as they impact on negotiations and thus foreign policy results.

The study of power thus brings us to questions of self-image and identity. These seem to affect all organisations. For NATO, for instance, Menon and Welsh (2011: 91) find a narrative about itself in which it claims to have the knowledge and resources to be an effective peace builder. Interestingly, they argue that "the link between interests and identity within NATO is stronger than in many other international organisations, given that the alliance is concerned with the high politics of security, which forms a core element of self-identification. The implication is that the problems involved in reconciling conflicting member state demands might actually be higher here than elsewhere" (idem: 88). Would, thus, organisational identity even here be a comparative advantage, as assumed in the literature above?

In the following, we will look at some concrete cases of interaction between the EU, NATO and the UN. To see how power is present and used in this interaction, we need to study how the organisations manage potential conflict through hierarchy and organise their relations. This includes negotiating tasks. Power relations are not only about conflict but

also about enabling; tasks are part of relevance and legitimacy, but these are also a matter of image, constructed by oneself and others.

At the same time, these insights bring in new research questions. As knowledge and legitimacy are related to the openness of an organisation to its environment, we need to ponder whether openness is increasing, perhaps becoming a new norm, and whether isolation is bad for performance. Further, what is the impact of greater openness for the image and identity of an organisation? How aware are the organisations of each other; how much do they know and understand? How much do they actually attempt at portraying themselves—and the others—in certain ways?

These considerations lead us to build on the insight that legitimacy and knowledge are traditional means of power of international organisations and also something used in inter-organisational relations. Taking into account, furthermore, the assumption that both are resources that are now more in demand or more difficult to gain and retain, because of crises hitting legitimacy and because of various structural changes affecting the production, retention and use of knowledge, we can suggest that relevance is becoming an increasingly pressing issue for international organisations. This, in turn, changes their conditions. Assuring continued relevance means that they need to fulfil their tasks in increasingly demanding environments and thus get the needed resources somewhere; they need to be sure of the relevance of their tasks and roles, and they may need to excel in comparison with other similar entities.

This changes the dynamics of inter-organisational relations and makes it important to analyse these relations from a power perspective. What become central for the organisations is what happens in their task description, what happens to their image and what happens to their relations with one another. Minding their tasks, image and hierarchies, they are led to definition, distribution and interpretation. The following chapters look at cases of interaction between the EU, NATO and the UN and show how they can be seen as cases of exercise of power—and how that perspective helps us see that power in their relations is not only about resource-inducted cooperation and conflict. Fundamentally, they link power to relevance.

The chapters are structured in the following way. Chapter 5 looks at relevance in the particular field of security, drawing attention to the centrality of two questions: what the relevant tasks are for organisations in this field, and, linked to this, what are the relevant threats. It also takes up the question of allocation or division of tasks. Chapter 6 looks at hierarchies,

taking up examples about position and status but also of division of labour. Chapter 7, finally, looks at image, the importance of image in inter-organisational relations, both the image of oneself and the image of another organisation, and how these connect with knowledge about each other. It also exemplifies the need to manage legitimacy: that the organisations now need to show legitimacy and need to change from powerless to powerful.

NOTES

1. See Berenskoetter (2007) and the link between the first dimension of power and winning conflicts: there is a power analogy and a security analogy.
2. Or three categories of authority: delegation, moral and expertise, as in Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 21–29).
3. Compulsory power means direct control over another; institutional means indirect control such as when states design international organisations; structural means the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors; productive is the production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification, for instance, defining "development" in a certain way.
4. Note that, for instance, for Wrong (1979), these would be forms of power rather than means of power (he finds four of these forms: force, manipulation, persuasion and authority, the latter further divided into different categories).
5. In the subsequent chapters, these will be linked to what is said about the EU's goals at the UN; PR activities of NATO; general recipes for success in international relations (while Nye 2004 is a guide to success for states from 10 years ago, the paper by Kenna (2011) on organisations and social media could be seen as one for today's needs a current one).
6. Cf. Bouchard and Drieskens (2013: 115): the EU's representation and functioning within the UNSC as well as within the UNGA is shaped by UN rules and realities.
7. Note also Wallander (2000) on "persistence".

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Power at Work: Relevance and Tasks

5.1 On the Importance of "Relevance" for an International Organisation

The following three chapters will look at cases of interaction between the EU, NATO and the UN from the perspective of power. They examine power at work: where and how power is manifest, what it is, how it is used and for what purposes. There is a common theme that runs through the chapters: relevance. Relevance summarises what the organisations essentially strive at and what they therefore use their power for. Relevance is increasingly important, but it is not a static feature. It is increasingly volatile. It is as if there was a new quotation for it every day, as in stock exchange: its value may go up and down and it has to be managed in some way or another. It is this management of relevance that the following examples from the empirical world of inter-organisational relations tell about. The organisations manage relevance through interventions concerning their tasks, their image and their position vis-à-vis other organisations. In this management, knowledge and legitimacy are key ingredients.

Before going into details of these examples, we need a wider perspective on relevance. As the previous chapters showed, we can speak of an old and a new type of relevance of international organisations. In the old conception, international organisations are relevant by nature, as they are legitimate by nature, too: they have been established for a reason, and this

is their relevance for those that established them, or, if we want to think in broader terms, for the international system as such. This traditional form of relevance is not necessarily closely tied to the actual performance of these organisations. This is not to say they would not be able to deliver. Their very existence is an achievement; they are a reminder of cooperative relations and cooperative intentions between international actors (the states), and they are, in a sense, *potentially* relevant.

The function of international organisations can also be understood more broadly, related to the functioning of the international system as a whole, if not even the very existence of such a system—organisations and treaties being the tangible material that makes the parts become, parts of a larger whole, a system. The organisations are there to make cooperation between states easier and help solve problems that they could not solve themselves. They increase durability, stability of expectations and trust; they facilitate, produce and diffuse information, create and uphold norms.

Indeed, that the organisations have such an essential role to play may even exempt them of some scrutiny of what they actually do and how they actually perform. Particularly if it is seen that cooperation between states is inherently so difficult that the establishment of an organisation is already as such quite an achievement, the very existence of the organisation goes a long way to justifying it. They might not need to be very efficient; their relevance is of a principled character. Moreover, when the role of the international organisation is defined in such a timeless way, it applies in most circumstances: when, in fact, would there *not* be need for such services?

There is, however, a new type of relevance that stems from growing expectations and needs but also from increasing number of actors. As states face increasing problems in fulfilling their tasks and in influencing international relations, they may increase the workload of the organisations, giving them more tasks. The general opinion might be supporting a stronger role for international organisations in a situation in which they see problems with state actors. The opinion might also turn against the organisations, as can be clearly seen in how the EU is contested.

At the same time, there are a growing number of organisations. In the field of European security, that we concentrate on, we see the increase in concrete terms as the EU has developed into an actor in a field that previously was populated by specialised organisations, NATO and WEU. In such a situation, all need to demonstrate relevance, one way or another. Can they all be relevant at once? They definitively need to be seen as relevant, because this is what their existence hinges on.

Relevance is a sine qua non for an international organisation. Now, it is no longer enough just to "be there." What the organisation does has to be linked to what is currently going on in international relations, the organisation needs to be pertinent and have bearing upon events. What it does needs to be relevant at that particular point in time. If it is not relevant, it faces the risk of losing funding, attention, interest—at one extreme, it faces the risk of being shut down. In other words, there has to be a need for what the organisation does.

The risk of being shut down might not be the main problem the organisations have to deal with. Such cases are not frequent. In the field of European security, there is a case, however, of an organisation being shut down, honourably so as having fulfilled its tasks. Western European Union (WEU) was originally established for a duration of 50 years, and as the deadline approached, discussions on how to find a continuation for the functions of WEU that were found important. Eventually, all of them were transferred to the EU, including a satellite centre, an institute for security studies and an article on mutual defence in the treaty (see Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011). In this discussion, it was interesting to observe how WEU defended its relevance by pointing at something it considered unique, that no other organisation had. The parliamentary assembly of WEU was such a unique element: it was lifted up as the only professional parliamentary assembly in Europe that was discussing defence issues. In so doing, the organisation was not only showing it was needed but also appealing to the public and the awareness of the importance of parliamentary influence, if not control, over such issues (Cf. Ojanen 2010: 183–184).

What usually protects the international organisations, in addition to their inherent general relevance or their raison d'être, is their specificity. They have been created in the first place because of a clear need for them, and for purposes that are relevant. There is a strong sense of instrumentality and reason in their establishment. The member states decide to establish an organisation because they see a need for it. The organisation is given tasks that are considered useful, even necessary, and that the states themselves cannot or prefer not to perform. These can be single functions, such as facilitating the postal service or other forms of communication or helping to struggle against pandemics. The tasks change in time: ITU, for example, worked in its early years to facilitate the use of telegraph and telephone between countries and would now work on satellite orbits and aim at bridging the digital divide.

Every now and then, changes in international relations make some specific functions less relevant. Fears of irrelevance do surface among the international organisations—all of them, one might argue. The Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have been seen in particular distress as the European Union has expanded its tasks to cover domains of their own core competence. Their fear of the EU, the "organisativore" that already "swallowed" WEU, would be motivated by their relative weakness. But nor are the UN, NATO, the EU itself exempted from fears of relevance.

The irrelevance of the UN, particularly acute in the early 2000s, often comes with discussions on the composition of the Security Council and the extent to which it reflects the world as it is. The irrelevance of NATO was discussed particularly after the end of the Cold War as the enemy disappeared, and with it, much of the rationale behind the organisation. As to the EU, one could argue that it has reached a low point in relevance in recent years in the joint impact of lengthy economic and financial crisis and downturn and growing contestation from within by populist parties and also some member state governments. Its power of attraction has diminished, perhaps also its power of international initiative and organisational innovation. The seriousness of the situation is well reflected in its external affairs strategy of 2016 (EU Global Strategy 2016) that speaks of "existential crisis" and where the foreword opens with the sentence "The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned."

What increases running the risk of irrelevance? Undoubtedly, the organisation's capacity to be in touch with what is happening and with its stakeholders, and undoubtedly also its capacity to renew itself. These capacities vary from organisation to organisation. But even competition from others matters: keeping relevant can become more cumbersome if there are several others that look relevant in the same field. Interestingly for our focus, relations between organisations matter in all these aspects. While one could foresee inter-organisational relations that increase relevance by strengthening the organisations in one of these aspects, there are also those who see that institutional interaction leads to mutual irrelevance (Duke 2008).

A central question when it comes to relevance is who adjudicates. For whom do the organisations need to be relevant? The primary stakeholders, masters, are the member states that have established them or joined them. It is in their eyes that the organisations need to keep up their relevance. The ebbs and tides of scrutiny from the part of the member states vary with economic conjunctures. In times of scarcity and need to reduce

public spending, international organisations may come under the loop in a particular way. States may want to invest less in them, they may want to ascertain that the organisations actually deliver—thus increasing performance reviews of different kinds—but they may also increase their expectations on them, hoping that they would do more, as the states themselves can do less. The position of the member states may thus vary from situation to situation. Typically, not all member states would be in the same situation; when some step up criticism, others may posit themselves as spokespersons, thus helping the organisations endure.

A "just in case" argument also appears in the discussion. Organisations might be perceived as "good to have." In the particular geopolitical context of the Baltic and Barents region, voices often raise to question the need for such a plethora of regional or sub-regional organisations. And still, the debate stills every time with the point made that they are different in nature, that at least one of them may be able to act in any given situation, that they all have their relevance.

It would, however, be to miss a central point if the question of relevance was looked at only in the context of the state-organisation relationship. As per the general theme of this book, state-organisation relationships do not reveal a complete picture of the condition of an international organisation. Here, too, inter-organisational relations matter. They matter, first, in the sense noted above: increasing overlap leads to fear of irrelevance or redundancy. And second, they matter in that international organisations may have relevance for each other, too, not only for their member states.

Based on the premise of the importance of relevance, this chapter sets out to look at what the organisations can do to maintain and even increase relevance, or ascertain the relevance of what they do. It focuses on how they find the relevant tasks and shows that task-finding indeed is a central part of the agenda of the three organisations' work in the field of security. Power is related to relevance: perceived relevance may increase resources, thus one kind of power, while power also manifests itself as the ability to be relevant and in the last instance as the ability to define what relevance is. There are two aspects of this phenomenon that are looked at in this chapter: first, how organisations deal with allocation of tasks and how they try to get to choose their own tasks, and second, how they attempt at defining what the relevant tasks are by influencing their order of importance or by suggesting new tasks, in this case localising new security threats and showing how they can be helpful in countering such threats.

5.2   Right of First Refusal: Task Allocation and Possibility to Choose First

Task allocation is fundamental both as a matter of principle and in practice. In a situation where two or more organisations are capable and willing to take care of similar tasks, it can be a problem if there is no clear principles or guidelines for decision-making on which organisation is to act. If the EU and NATO were to rush forward in crisis management without coordination, perhaps starting two similar operations at the same time, they would cause confusion not the least in the host country. A disorderly process would lead to wasting resources. Coordination is needed, but perhaps also more than that. The question of how tasks are allocated to organisations can in a longer term be crucial for their relations: a division of labour may appear that is more or less permanent and that shapes the organisations' characters, but may also lead to hierarchies emerging between the organisations. Such structural aspects will be looked closer at in the next chapter. In this chapter, the emphasis is on the possibility of an organisation to choose its tasks. Is it possible for an organisation to get tasks of its own choice? How would it proceed to get them? And how would these tasks be? One could well assume that an organisation aims at tasks that are perceived as relevant and therefore good for the perceived relevance of the organisation: those on which it can deliver and that do not involve too many risks.

Looking at a concrete example, we find the so-called right of first refusal issue in the EU-NATO relations that were formalised in the "Berlin Plus" agreements[1] in early 2003. Put simply, it means that in a situation where a crisis management task could be performed by NATO or by the EU, NATO would have the right to decide first whether it wants to take the task. In other words, it would be about NATO's right to choose, a right that the EU would not have—and about an asymmetrical power relation between the two.

When we look closer at the issue, we find complications that show how sensitive the issue is. To start with the background, the Berlin Plus agreements allow the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations. As the European External Affairs Service (EEAS 2016) would put it, it was the creation in 1999 of what would later become the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that reinforced the need to establish a formal agreement between the EU and NATO. Overlapping memberships and concerns over the duplication

of assets and capabilities required both partners to agree on modalities for crisis management operations. In other words, the increasing crisis management capacity of the EU made it necessary for NATO and the EU to work out a more systematic division of labour (Larrabee 2004: 60–61).

The framework for EU-NATO permanent relations was concluded in March 2003, building on the previous arrangements between WEU and NATO that were inaugurated in Berlin in 1996. It also built notably on the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 16 December 2002 that enumerates the principles on which the relationship will be founded on, including mutually reinforcing crisis management activities as well as equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the two organisations (NATO 2002.)

The formal elements of the Berlin Plus agreement include, among others, an agreement on the exchange of classified information, assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led operations and availability of NATO assets and capabilities for them and consultation arrangements between the organisations.

Why these agreements are interesting for us is because of the different views concerning the respective rights of the two organisations. Seen from the United States, a central element in them was that NATO would get the right to choose first. A Senate resolution of 1999 identifies the Alliance as the "primary institution through which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern" and adds in another paragraph that on such issues "the European Union should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through its European Security and Defense Identity only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action" (United States Senate 1999). As Missiroli (2002: 14) points out, this idea, that was soon labelled as "right of first refusal," was not well received on the other side of the Atlantic and fuelled the claim of full "decision-making autonomy" for the Union's ESDP.

The Helsinki summit in December 1999 established the principle that the EU would get involved in managing crises only "when NATO as a whole is not involved." This was widely interpreted as meaning that the EU would only take the lead in a crisis if NATO did not want to get involved. However, France and several other members of the EU were never really comfortable with this interpretation, which they felt constricted the EU's freedom of action (Larrabee 2004: 60–61).

Once achieved, the Berlin Plus agreements were duly celebrated. The EU High Representative Javier Solana defined on 16 December 2002 the agreement as a "clear milestone" and said: "we launch a strategic partnership that will bring our organisations closer together" (Solana 2002). The European Council in December 2003 described the agreements in the following way:

> In accordance with the EU/NATO permanent arrangements adopted in Nice, in a crisis contacts and meetings will be intensified so that EU and NATO can discuss their assessments of the crisis and clarify their intentions regarding possible engagements. The experience of 2003 shows that these arrangements are fundamentally sound, providing for intensified consultation, while respecting fully the decision-making autonomy of both organisations. (European Council 2003)

In practice, the conclusion of the Berlin Plus agreement facilitated the launch of the EU's first-ever military operation, Operation Concordia, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in December 2003. EUFOR Althea, the military operation launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, was the second military CSDP operation carried out within the wider framework of Berlin Plus. It has not been evoked since, mainly for reasons of disagreements between some member states.

Indeed, complications appeared quite soon. As Peterson (2003) noted, "this approach [right of first refusal]" dominated discussions on, for example, the EU's aspirations to undertake missions in the Balkans (Peterson 2003). The right of first refusal was a "controversial issue," as the rapporteur calls it in a report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2005 (Minniti 2005). Amidst the analysts, views as to what it really meant varied. For some, it all appeared very clear. As Marsh (2006) put it, "There was much talk of NATO's 'right of first refusal', by which was very explicitly meant restrictions on what the EU could undertake and decide until the issue had first been debated within NATO." A reason for this was seen in the fear that the EU would grow to challenge NATO. In the words of Burwell et al. (2006: 24), "Because some in the U.S. policy community worry that a stronger, more independent EU will undercut NATO, they have resisted the idea of autonomous EU operations, asserting that NATO should have the right of first refusal, i.e. a presumptive priority."

Most analysts have been looking at the issue through the prism of member states and their differences in views on the two organisations. While the United States has traditionally regarded NATO as the

organisation of choice, France and some other EU members have opposed this on the grounds that it subordinated the EU to NATO (Larrabee 2004: 60–61). While the British considered it normal for NATO to enjoy such a right, the French found the very notion preposterous (Howorth 2003: 179). The differences in view also regard the relations between the two organisations. While France would insists on complete independence of each other of NATO and the CSDP institutions, the UK and Germany would often mention "strategic partnership" between the two (Hofmann 2011: 112).

These disagreements were visible in practice in the case of the first EU deployment outside of Europe in 2003. France was very active and provided the bulk of the troops for the operation Artemis in Bunia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was conducted without recourse to NATO assets and without consultation with NATO. While it was unlikely that the United States would have wanted to involve NATO in the crisis, the lack of consultation annoyed, as Larrabee puts it, some US and NATO officials and "set a bad precedent" (Larrabee 2004: 60–61). For Keohane (2009: 130), sending an autonomous EU force to Bunia soured further the Bush administration's attitude to ESDP: having assumed that NATO had the "right of first refusal" on all potential EU peacekeeping missions, they were surprised when EU governments dispatched soldiers to the DRC without discussing their plans at NATO first.[2]

Such incidents prompted analysts to recommend a different approach in the future. Larrabee (2004: 60–61), for instance, emphasises the need for closer consultation between NATO and the EU on crisis management so that the decision regarding which organisation takes the lead in managing a crisis should be the result of close consultation between NATO and the EU rather than the product of fait accompli by one or the other organisation.[3]

Over time, practice has been seen to confirm NATO's right to be consulted on EU plans for autonomous operations (Mace 2004: 485). The "right of first refusal" is not explicitly expressed but it is "an often found view on the US side, and a corresponding concern on the European side, that NATO enjoys a 'right of first refusal'" (Biscop 2006: 4).

Reichard's (2006: 169–170) in-depth analysis of official EU and NATO documents and public statements concludes:

> The question of NATO's right of first refusal cannot be answered directly from the founding treaties or other related acts of the EU or NATO. What does transpire, however, is that NATO has never in fact claimed it, and that

the EU has never assented to it, be it as a matter of law or only one of policy. Instead, the EU has claimed for itself the principle of the Union's 'decision-making autonomy' in its relationship with NATO which the latter has undoubtedly accepted. In conclusion, NATO does not seem to have a right of first refusal vis-à-vis the EU in crisis management, even if this runs counter to the majority of media opinion on the subject.

The right of first refusal would thus actually not exist; what exists by way of commonly agreed principles is the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and thus equality and not asymmetry. But the efforts at claiming such a right are a concrete example of how a hierarchical relationship can be constructed between two organisations. The reasons may have to do with the member country perceptions, but the outcome matters arguably more for the organisations than for the member states. Why would it be so important to be able to choose first? It is a sign of hierarchy, a permanent subordination, even when only symbolic; the importance of hierarchies and the importance of avoiding them will be discussed in the following chapter. Here, it is important to note that the right to choose first is important for another reason, too: the one who does not get to choose risks getting tasks that are not "good," that are risky, difficult, with not much likelihood to succeed. Such tasks are a risk for the credibility and overall relevance of the organisation.

Crisis management was to start with a question of relevance. For both the EU and NATO, crisis management activities were in the late 1990s a new field that looked like highly relevant. With the East-West confrontation over, territorial defence and military aggression were less relevant. Conflicts and crises further away called the attention. Starting in this field was new for both, and thus a way of enlarging their scope, but also a way of ensuring their continued, for NATO, and increasing—for the EU—relevance in the field of security.

An organisation that aims at succeeding in this field would presumably take on realistic and meaningful operations. To do this, it needs to consider the cases from its own perspective. In this case of "right of first refusal," however, what we see is the power of an organisation to decide on the relevance of a task, a crisis management task, for another organisation. More precisely, NATO would affect the calculations within the EU: by choosing an operation in front of the EU would mean that the operation is relevant for NATO, thus probably also for the EU but beyond the EU's reach. By not choosing it, it signals to the contrary that the EU is

free to tackle "left-overs"—with no doubt something problematic or suspicious about them.

The problem would not be big if the organisations were very different and look at the tasks in different ways, unlikely to choose the same ones. In my background interviews, what emerged quite clearly was that in many cases, the organisations would actually assess the case and the potential operation similarly. Particularly in cases where the challenges are big, no organisation wants to go and take the operation. For the "easier" ones, however, there could be rivalry. In addition, if one organisation was very interested, then it would also be less flexible.

Later on, as the whole setting of crisis management changed, the question of organisations trying to pick the cherries lost some of its significance. Three important changes took place. As one interviewee argued, the whole Berlin Plus idea was meant for different times: it was agreed in a situation where the EU was going up. It became less interesting when both the EU and NATO started to look at other activities instead: typically training and similar projects instead of operations (Counsellor 2013a). It was also thought for situations where one of the two organisations would act alone, not the two together: as later on it appeared that when the two were together in all places, it would not work. What is more, the logic of who is helping whom has been partly reversed: NATO could be helping the EU on the ground (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013).

5.3   Finding the New Relevant: Defining Security Threats a New

When it comes to relevance, the most fundamental ability is to be able to decide and define for others what is relevant. When it comes to the organisations active in security and defence, this ability takes the form of defining security threats. Defining a threat is to decide on what to work against. Discerning a new threat is a possibility to show new relevance, and if the organisation in question also is able to show that it is capable of addressing that new threat, it is an excellent opportunity to ensure and increase relevance.

In the field of security policy, organisations can have many different kinds of tasks. Confidence-building, mediation, conflict prevention, crisis management, monitoring, training, early warning, collective defence are but some. As has been discussed in previous chapters, different organisations

may specialise in some of these—but only to some extent. They also tend to share the same tasks. One reason for this is that they are reluctant to accept and agree to a formal division of tasks. Another reason is that some tasks are more relevant than others in a given time period. Relevant tasks are something more than legitimate tasks: they are more important in time, for the stakeholders; they indicate priorities and often also include some sense of urgency.

In a sense, discerning new threats can be seen as a natural part of following what is going on in the environment and adapting the activities accordingly. Haas (1990) would say that this is the fundamental way in which organisations change. He defines change in international organisations as change in the definition of the problem they are to solve. For security organisations, this problem is the problem of insecurity, or the problems that come in the form of security threats.

It is easy to see why organisations would tend to develop in a similar way when it comes to defining the problems. They exist in the same environment where the problems surge; they are, to some extent, composed of the same member states, and it would therefore be rather curious if they were to disagree on what the security threats are.

In the development of the EU and NATO—but also of WEU—one such joint move towards new areas was the rise of crisis management in the 1990s. Traditional security threats in the sense of ideological enemies à la Cold War had disappeared, and the states saw security in a different way. Defending one's territory was no longer the primacy concern. Instead, it appeared wise and useful to work out of area, to tackle crises elsewhere—often marking how managing such crises would impede them from spreading closer to the members. The EU came to adopt WEU crisis management tasks (the so-called Petersberg tasks) and adding subsequently more to them. Conflict prevention also appeared high on the EU's agenda around the year 2000.

When NATO and the EU started crisis management operations, both needed to develop new tools. The EU had nothing by way of military capacity, but even NATO had to start working on a new concept of forces and capabilities. For similar tasks, similar tools were developed. Moreover, even similar institutional structures were followed—something that could be seen as an example of isomorphism in the EU-NATO relations. While the EU looked at NATO structures as an example for setting up its own Military Staff and Military Committee, later on NATO looked at the EU for civilian capacity-building (see, e.g., Koops 2012: 16; Haftendorn 2005 on reverse imitation).

Crisis management would not be the only match between the two organisations. Terrorism had been a threat that NATO had paid attention to since the end of the Cold War. After the terrorist strikes against the United States in 2001, the EU put terrorism first on its list of threats in the first Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS 2003). Among more recent fields of overlap and similarity, one could list disaster management, early warning and hybrid warfare.[4]

Piracy is a good example of a new security threat, an innovation as it were that can spread from one organisation to another. Once piracy is successfully defined as a priority security concern, perhaps defining it as a threat to the security interests of EU and NATO members, the organisations need to show that they take this threat seriously and credibility in addressing it. If one organisation starts fighting pirates, it almost compels equivalent organisations to follow suit. Not doing anything may render an organisation irrelevant.

The counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden have involved several organisations. Both NATO and the EU started their operations there in the late 2008. NATO provided escorts to the UN World Food Programme (WFP) on the request of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The EU launched a naval force operation (EU NAVFOR) as part of its comprehensive approach to Somalia and in accordance with relevant UNSR resolutions. At a first glance, these operations are motivated by and solicited by the UN and constitute important responses to its appeal for helping it to carry out its tasks. Another way of motivating the activities has been the need to secure commercial interests of the member countries. We might also see this joint sailing to Aden as imitation or as a sign of difficulties of division of tasks. Even more fundamentally, though, we can see here the impact organisations have on each other's agendas.

Again, organisations working in the field of security are supposed to work with what challenges security, with security threats. They are, thus, supposed to know what these are. They need to be able to concentrate on threats that are relevant. One might still argue that it is not necessarily the organisations that define the threats: there are no doubt initiatives taken by member states that lift up threats or dispute their relevance. But this kind of power of definition has been seen as a crucial part of the power the organisations have. It could be seen as an instance of what Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 711–712) call institutional power that the organisations wield by providing definitions for concepts. Combined with the authority and legitimacy of an organisation, this definitional power shows

its full importance: the new threat definition becomes generally recognised and authorised when it has been taken up by an organisation.

While the power of defining threats is here posed as a central form of power an organisation can have, threat definition is also a central domain of competition. In essence, it is about relevance. Instead of simply assuming that change in security threats reflects changes in the environment, the world, this chapter looks at this change as part of competition and interaction between organisations. The hypothesis is that an organisation that presents a new threat that it has been able to identify, which can in a convincing way show how serious this threat is, and also shows its own preparedness and its possibilities to help counter that threat, takes a clear lead from its competitors. It shows relevance to its member states, threatens the organisations that are unprepared with the spectre of irrelevance and eventually influences the distribution of resources. Soon, however, the other organisations will catch up: they need to be seen as active in this new field, too, lest they lose their credibility or their relevance. As a result, all organisations within the field will start looking at the same questions. The possibility of division of labour or of roles based on their specific features and capabilities, and thus of cooperation, comes up and meets with difficulties: rather than finding their niches, the organisations are inclined to do overlapping work.

Interesting research has been conducted on how certain ways of framing security threats and development of doctrine have travelled from one organisation to another. The "comprehensive approach" moved from the OSCE to NATO in 2006, while "integrated approach," originally of the UN, was later adopted by the EU (Biermann 2011: 175).[5] Faleg (2012) looks at security sector reform and focuses on the role of epistemic communities in advancing this agenda at the EU level while also shedding light on inter-organisational relations in the process.[6] While the rise of terrorism as the main security concern can be a good example of threat framing that "travels" from one organisation to another, so are other threats, too, for instance, the threat posed by failed or fragile states (Barnett and Duval 2005).[7] Potential next-generation security threats that will be taken up by one organisation after another might relate to water and food.

How this pattern could look like is here exemplified by the example of cyber security. Chronological aspects help to trace examples of "diffusion of innovations," tracks and trails with eventual examples of "retrenchment," efforts at counteracting such influences exerted by others.

While cyber security is comparable to other security threats that rise on the agenda as a political phenomenon, it has some distinctive features as well, notably being comprehensive, comprising societies at large, and, from the military point of view, being about capabilities that are difficult to assess.[8]

Cyber security has consolidated its position on the agenda of most if not all states in the past decade. Often, the cyber-attacks against Estonia (the Bronze Soldier dispute) in 2007 are given as a formative event in this case, one that brought cyber security into the agenda of both the EU and NATO. They certainly did have an impact, particularly as Estonia was active in promoting the issue in both organisations, but this was not the actual starting point for the focus on the issue.

Within the UN, the first UN General Assembly resolution (GA Res. 53/70) was issued in 1998, and further resolutions on cyber security affairs have since been issued annually. That year, Chinese hackers attacked Indonesian government websites to protest anti-Chinese riots. In 1999, a number of attacks were made against NATO during operation Allied Force in Kosovo.

A simple chronology of the early stages would look like this:

2002: The Prague Summit of NATO brought cyber security for the first time on NATO's political agenda—a Cyber Defence Programme was adopted.

2001: The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime was signed in Budapest and entered into force in 2004.

2004: The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) was created.

2008: Georgia experienced cyber-attacks in the war between Georgia and Russia. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) was established in Tallinn. The Stuxnet virus, most likely of state origin, was used against Iran's nuclear facilities.

2010: NATO strategic concept (NATO 2010) was approved, and the Emerging Security Challenges Division created. The European Commission presented a communication entitled "The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe" in which one of the objectives was to raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace, calling for the establishment of EU Cybercrime Centre by 2013, as well as CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams) for EU institutions and member states. Furthermore,

the Digital Agenda for Europe as part of the Commission's Europe 2020 strategy highlighted the importance of digital infrastructure and its security. Cyber Europe 2010, the first pan-European cyber security exercise, was organised by the Member States and ENISA.

2011: NATO policy on cyber defence was adopted with the Cyber Defence Management Board and the Computer Incident Response Capability was established.

2013: The EU publishes its Cyber Security Strategy (EU's Cyber Security Strategy 2013) and the European Cybercrime Centre EC3 was established in The Hague; the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had its first meeting on cyber security, and the UN Group of Governmental Experts issued a report with recommendations on the threats facing ICTs.

2014: The European Parliament voted through the Network & Information Security (NIS) directive; the EU was to develop a Cyber Defence Policy Framework;

2013: The Council conclusions in November 2013 called for "concrete steps" "to implement and take forward the CSDP related cyber defence aspects of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in line with the Council conclusions of June 2013, in full respect of the responsibility of Member States in particular regarding protection of critical infrastructure." The Council invited the High Representative, in cooperation with the EDA and the European Commission to present in 2014 an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework to promote the development of member states' cyber defence capabilities, research and technologies through the development and implementation of a comprehensive roadmap for strengthening cyber defence capabilities; the reinforced protection of communication networks supporting CSDP structures, missions and operations; the mainstreaming of cyber security into EU crisis management; raising awareness through improved training, education and exercise opportunities for the member states; synergies with wider EU cyber policies and all relevant other actors and agencies in Europe such as the EU Agency for Network and Information Security; and to cooperate with relevant international partners, notably with NATO, as appropriate (European Council Conclusions 2013).

2014: NATO Defence Ministers agreed (on June 3) a new cyber defence policy, recognising cyber as part of NATO's collective defence. This policy would help enhance information sharing and mutual assistance between allies, improve NATO's cyber defence training and exercises and boost cooperation with industry (NATO 2014).

What does this list of events tell us? The EU and NATO have made progress in tandem. Decisions and documents would not tell about the influence other organisations—or indeed any external actor—would have had on the outcome, but we see parallels and we may see one organisation taking the lead and the other following. Overall, NATO has had the lead at least until the late 2000s. The ESS of 2003 did not highlight new security threats to the same extent than NATO that had started earlier. The implementation report of the ESS (European Council 2008) made important updates and since 2010, the EU has caught up on the issue.

The interviewees recognised the interplay between NATO and the EU while linking cyber security to the interests of the member states ("organisations have to be responsive to states, and these want cyber security"). NATO was seen as faster than the EU, less complicated, more straightforward, with simpler decision-making. Still in 2006, the EU used to come to NATO on these issues. In other terms, what one could observe in this question is that NATO starts earlier and has a better technical base, but the EU eventually comes up with a doctrine that is more comprehensive—something that it is able to draft as it can reach to different ministries. The EU is slower than NATO but it makes more sense to the member states, and therefore attention in these matters shifts from NATO to the EU even if the Union might not yet have the capacity to implement the policies. An instance of such a move was seen in France shifting its focus in cyber issues from NATO to the EU, something that caused frustration in NATO (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013).

When it comes to the focus of cyber policies, the efforts of member states have concentrated on building national capabilities. The same goes for the international organisations that also have started from securing their own infrastructure first. Thus, the 2011 NATO policy of cyber defence states that "The main focus of the NATO Policy on Cyber Defence is on the protection of NATO networks and on cyber defence requirements related to national networks that NATO relies upon [...]."

For both organisations, cyber security is very much about their relevance in the twenty-first century. This aspect was visible in the discussions about NATO's mission and tasks already before 2007 but has been highlighted from that point of time onwards. For NATO, what has been at issue has been cyber defence and more specifically the question whether cyber-attacks can be considered an armed attack in the sense of article 5.[9] While the question about cyber defence still seems somewhat open, the discussion is moving even to cyber-attack

capabilities and related strategies. The EU's approach has overall been more comprehensive, covering not only attacks against national governments but also, for instance, cybercrime, extending thus the question to the domain of internal security.

For the EU, the measures taken are said to be about increasing security by countering cyber threats in different walks of life, but they are also about credibility and about European values. As Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital Agenda, noted in a speech entitled "Using cybersecurity to promote European values," "to be taken seriously by international partners, we must get our own house in order" and "protect European values" (Kroes 2013).

Looking closer at the EU Cyber Security Strategy (2013) one can find a particular way of speaking on the issue. Cyber security is placed in the broad context of society: the strategy first mentions the tremendous impact of cyberspace "on all parts of society." Even the basic goal of the strategy looks like the EU itself: "For cyberspace to remain open and free [...]." The strategy also lists the principles for cyber security noting that the EU's core values apply as much in the digital as in the physical world: protecting of fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy; access for all; democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance; a shared responsibility to ensure security (public, private, individual).

For the EU, the strategic priorities in the field are achieving cyber resilience, drastically reducing cybercrime, developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy; developing the industrial and technological resources for cyber security; establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promoting core EU values.

The issue of cooperation between the organisations is duly taken up. Under CSDP, the strategy says "to avoid duplications, the EU will explore possibilities on how the EU and NATO can complement their efforts to heighten the resilience of critical governmental, defence and other information infrastructures on which the members of both organisations depend." "To address global challenges in cyberspace, the EU will seek closer cooperation with organisations that are active in this field such as the Council of Europe, OECD, UN, OSCE, NATO, AU, ASEAN and OAS." The EU also aims at supporting the development of norms of behaviour and confidence-building measures in cyber security.

An interesting detail as such is the sheer number of organisations listed and their not being in alphabetical order, suggesting therefore some kind of order of importance. As the number of international organisations grows, and due to the nature of the question, there are obviously frequent calls for international cooperation, too. The EU Cyber Security Strategy (2013) lists the following: "The Commission, the High Representative and the Member States engage in policy dialogue with international partners and with international organisations such as Council of Europe, OECD, OSCE, NATO and UN." NATO, in turn, notes that "As cyber threats defy state borders or organisational boundaries, cooperation with partners and international organisations including the European Union (EU) on cyber defence is an important element of the revised NATO policy" and goes on to specify that "engagement with partners is tailored and based on shared values and common approaches, with an emphasis on complementarity and non-duplication" (NATO 2017).

Among the calls for cooperation, even the organisations' power to assign responsibilities or their attempt at hierarchy comes into play. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen mentioned cyber security as one of the relevant security issues when urging—in an already customary way—the EU to spend more on defence amid the financial crisis.

In the end, as a threat has been successfully identified, all react. No one can afford not taking this issue on board. This leads to a plethora of different frameworks and overlapping action. The process of definition of cyber security still ongoing, the organisations promise to tackle it and show their relevance. They need to find and create expertise and knowledge on the issue. Thus, they create centres of excellence and draft strategies. They participate in the process of definition of the concept and of the field of activity. They also want to be seen as understanding the issue strategically, within a larger context and as part of other activities, for instance, as part of mutual defence. Therefore, they include it in their strategies or devise new strategies explicitly for this domain. They want to show strategic thinking: forward looking or context savvy. To some extent, each organisation sees the cyberspace as a continuation of itself.

They also embark on cooperation with other actors. But is their cooperation serious? Are they tackling different sides of the issue, or all the same, together? The usual limitations apply: there should not be direct or harmful overlap but instead beneficial complementarity. All also need to work for themselves first. Another interesting aspect of cooperation between the organisations is the relation between regional and global

cooperation. Would regional solutions be the most efficient even though the topic undoubtedly is global in character?

Such considerations stem from the particular sensitivities of this field. Sofaer et al. (2010) discuss the potential utility of international cyber security agreements, in the light of the existence of other agreements in other fields, enhancing safety and efficiency of, for instance, air transport. They note that the field is different: such agreements are possible only if they take into account the existing substantial differences. Many states are unprepared to agree to limit their control of cyber activities they regard as essential for national security interests, and there are irreconcilable differences between them when it comes to views on political uses of internet, privacy and human rights. This is why they are carefully looking at what kinds of activities, which measures, forms, and what authority an eventual body in charge could undertake.

The UN's special role and potential obviously comes up, too. Within the UN framework, progress has been made towards universal acceptance of the legal framework as, for the first time, a group of governmental experts from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and ten leading cyber powers from all regions of the world agreed to a set of recommendations on norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour by states in cyberspace. They recognised that international law, including the principles of the law of state responsibility, fully applies to state behaviour in cyberspace (Wolter 2013).

The previous lack of clarity as to what rules apply in cyberspace was one of the factors contributing to instability and the risk of escalation. The explicit affirmation that international law, particularly the principles of the UN Charter, is applicable to state activities in cyberspace, including to activities of non-state actors attributable to states, and is presumed to allow the international community and affected states to react to violations more effectively. The idea would be that in cyberspace, states have to comply with the prohibition on the use of force, the requirement to respect territorial sovereignty and independence and the principle of settling disputes by peaceful means in the same way as in the physical world. The right, specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter, to self-defence including the use of force would apply if a cyber-attack reached the level of an "armed attack." The report, however, refrained from spelling out when this could be the case as the legal debate on this issue has only just begun (Wolter 2013).

These principles of universal law go beyond restricting the use of force in cyberspace. They also cover other areas such as sovereignty and territo-

rial integrity, which restrict the lawfulness of potentially harmful acts below the level of kinetic force. In particular, together with the customary international law principles of state responsibility, the principles of the UN Charter would limit the legitimacy of state actions purposely breaching the intellectual property of companies or the personal data of individuals. Nevertheless, legal experts need to do much more work to specify these principles and rules to cover more specifically a range of diverse actions in cyberspace. Attribution continues to be a key challenge, as legal and technical attribution are required in order to challenge a state, for example, in the Security Council, for wrongful acts in cyberspace. Concerning cyber-attacks that reach the threshold of an armed conflict, a lower threshold than armed attack, most of the 15 experts were willing to explicitly acknowledge the application of international humanitarian law to cyberspace (Wolter 2013).

In October and November 2013, the UN General Assembly First Committee adopted resolutions creating a new group of governmental experts to follow up on some of the most contentious issues of state behaviour in cyberspace (Farnsworth 2013).

5.4   Conclusions

Tasks are the essence of an international organisation: they are there to take care of certain tasks. Any change in the tasks is a major component of the overall change of an organisation. How can inter-organisational relations help explain these changes, their causes and consequences?

The examples presented in this chapter show how important the relevance of tasks is for the organisations. If possible, they would try to influence their own tasks—pick and choose—to ensure that they get tasks that are relevant and tasks that they can cope with, in order to show utility. But why not also take up tasks that are new and contribute to making them special and more relevant than others? There is an element of hierarchy there, too: an organisation may boost its importance if it can be the one to choose whether it takes on a given tasks or not, as in the case of the "right of first refusal." Legitimacy may set the limits to what tasks are possible: picking up the relevant tasks among the legitimate ones would be safest.

For organisations in the field of security policy, tasks are linked to threats, and these change. The example of cyber security shows the organisation's need to define the threat, as they go, for themselves but,

importantly, even for others. All three, the EU, NATO and the UN, put the question in their own context: the EU in that of freedom and safety of the citizens but also growth, NATO in the context of mutual defence and the UN in the context of international law. They also affect each other when doing this. They are positioning themselves vis-à-vis each other. But they are also positioning themselves vis-à-vis states, other types of actors and global structures. The same would go with the concept of hybrid warfare and hybrid threat.

While they sharpen their take on cyber security, they bolster their relevance with the special knowledge they have. This brings us to broader considerations of who decides what is relevant knowledge. It might also be a good example of the problems in sharing knowledge. Sjöstedt[10] recalls the need to balance between sharing information and one's own identity: sharing all information is detrimental to the specificity of one's identity. In organisational theory, the question is taken further still: to how the organisations actually boost the specificity of their own knowledge. One way towards this is defining the question in a particular way and finding special expertise to lean on. Another could be to get the member states to share more of their knowledge. Information (and intelligence) sharing is, still, one of the main problems that adds to the differences between the member states both when it comes to their capabilities and to their views on what the relevant threats are. Also in the interviews, it was pointed out that to start with, allied views on new threats are very different (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013).[11]

The example of a new security threat, or a new security domain such as cyber security, is also illustrative of another aspect of the legitimacy of the organisations and how the relations to other organisations come into play. It may be very positive for an organisation to take on a new task, and thereby show dynamism, but it may also be risky. Expansion of activities is a typical case where the question of legitimacy arises. As Suchman (1995) points out, gaining acceptance for a new line of activity is a case where an organisation needs to gain legitimacy. How does the organisation do that? It has various strategies at its disposal, from conforming to the dictates of pre-existing audiences in current environment to selecting among environments and to manipulation of the environmental structures and creation of new audiences (Suchman 1995: 586–587). Associations with respected entities in its environment and mimetic isomorphism, even hierarchical links, can be of help here (idem: 588–589). Here, the expert communities play a central role.

The ways in which the organisations handle legitimacy may also be problematic. They may recur to slightly different audiences in doing that. What emerges at the same time is how important the organisations are for the sustained definition of what is relevant. Once cyber security is inserted as a task, it is likely to stay; even organisational changes may occur institutionalising it further. But what also emerges is that the organisations may also depend on each other for relevance. This question of mutual relevance will be further elaborated in the next chapters.

Notes

1. The name stems from the Berlin agreements between NATO and WEU.
2. See also Cornish and Edwards (2002) referring to early discussions about the right to first refusal, and Brenner (2002).
3. Mace (2004: 485) explains that the compromise on operational planning negotiated by the UK, France and Germany in the autumn of 2003 and that formed the basis for the Presidency document "European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations," endorsed by the European Council on 12–13 December, identifies NATO as "the forum for discussion and the natural choice for an operation involving the European and American allies" and states that in a crisis "contacts and meetings will be intensified so that EU and NATO can discuss their assessments of the crisis and clarify their intentions regarding possible engagements." Mace argues that this wording is carefully balanced to accommodate the different views on EU-NATO relationship. It suggests the primacy of NATO without explicitly stating that the Alliance has a "right of first refusal" over operations.
4. See Stoltenberg (2015) on NATO-EU cooperation on hybrid warfare.
5. On agenda-setting in this context, see Limnéll 2009 on factors that work for the rise of a certain threat on the political agenda.
6. Further examples could include the EC warm-heartedly welcoming the notion of preventive diplomacy as expounded in Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An agenda for peace* (1992) (Adriaenssens 2008: 58).
7. Barnett and Finnemore (2005: 179–181) exemplify productive power by UN interventions to save failed states, and constituting the world in ways that reflect the values that constitute the organisations.
8. It is also a field where openness and cooperation seem hard to achieve; pooling and sharing are not really an issue; but situational awareness could be a field where cooperation is important.
9. The discussion is ongoing; in 2016, NATO recognised the cyberspace as "as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as

effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea." See NATO webpage on cyber defence http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm (NATO 2017).
10. Gunnar Sjöstedt in discussions at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).
11. "Paying for what exactly?"

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Power at Work: Relevance and Hierarchies

6.1 Hierarchies as Power Relations

This chapter looks at different situations in relations between the EU, NATO and the UN where we can see aspects of hierarchy. The relations seem to display a constant tension between attempts at forming a hierarchical order of some kind and attempts at resisting it, defending instead the autonomy of each organisation. These situations, in other words, are examples of power relations where the power that the one placed above in a hierarchy may have over those placed lower, or the power to enforce hierarchies, is perceived as problematic and is contested.

As we saw in the literature on inter-organisational relations, "positioning" is what seems to go on between organisations that share the same field of activity. It is important for an organisation to be placed centrally vis-à-vis the others. A central location in what could be characterised as an intangible network of organisations may help the organisation stay informed about what other organisations do or plan to do. It may even ensure continued relevance: an organisation that is needed by other organisations is less likely to be seen irrelevant than an organisation that is loosely connected to the others, situated as some kind of outpost in the periphery of the network.

Centrality is not a mere question of position and links but also of power. One of the reasons for aiming at a central position is to avoid being dependent of others. But why avoid dependency? Organisational theory

sometimes sees dependencies as mutually beneficial. In particular, resource dependency theory would point at the positive sides of organisations relying on each other: they would benefit from their different and complementary resources. But there are also less benign or less welcome forms of dependency.

If we look at dependency in the way Thompson (1967: 30–31) does, dependency becomes the obverse of power. For Thompson, power lies in the ability of the organisation to monopolise the capacity to satisfy the needs of an element in the task environment. A powerless organisation, then, is one that has to "cater to whatever fleeting interests of an unstable population it could activate at a particular time." This is the case when dependency entails loss of autonomy: for instance, decision-making autonomy on the tasks of the organisation, on what the organisation does and how it does what it does. If an organisation is dependent on another for decisions concerning its tasks, it loses independence. There would seem to be a fine line between a division of labour that is beneficial for all parties and dependency that takes the form of an assignment of roles and tasks. The latter would emanate from a hierarchical relation and limits the possibilities of action of the organisation that is positioned lower in that hierarchy.

When looking at inter-organisational relations, it is, however, important to move beyond dependence in terms of resources to dependence in wider terms—in a similar way to what was noted in the earlier chapters on the need not to fall in the resource trap when analysing power. For entities so often believed to have so little power and autonomy, international organisations are strikingly jealous about their decision-making autonomy. It is this autonomy or independence that this chapter will concentrate on.

The chapter examines three different situations in which one of the three organisations, the EU, NATO and the UN, faces the reality of being dependent—potentially or actually—on another organisation. The first case relates to the EU's development as a military actor and the question of developing an autonomous military capability, something that has direct implications for its relations with NATO. What would "autonomous" be if not independent, when need be, from NATO? The second case is the articulation of the relationship between the EU and the UN that recognises that the two organisations are important for one another but tries to avoid spelling out a hierarchical relationship in favour of any of the two. The third case, then, is about the relations between NATO and the UN where what is at stake is the need to seek legitimacy while still staying independent.

6.2   DIVISION OF LABOUR AND SPECIALISATION AS FORMS OF DEPENDENCY

In order to grasp the importance of decision-making autonomy in EU-NATO relations, one needs to look first at division of labour and specialisation that appear quite complex. The question of dividing labour between the organisations is in itself a rather divisive question.

Views on the appropriateness and possibility of a division of labour and on its consequences vary. Should it be aimed at, and if so, how could it be achieved? A fairly common, if not a commonplace, view underlines the rationality of dividing labour. Lack of division of labour, in other words duplication, is often deplored as waste of resources. It is reasonable to have different actors concentrate on different questions. Division of labour can be a sign of effective governance and enable cooperation. Fragmentation, the existence of several organisations each specialising on different topics, can be a strength when manageable and cooperative in nature.

Still, division of labour also has its flipside. What if organisations actually all work alone on their special tasks? At the outset, this can lead to less contact between them. It may also lead to less flexibility within each of them. According to the argument put forward by Howorth (2003: 234), specialisation in essence puts the organisations in a position of vulnerability. Their flexibility diminishes, and thus their performance is at risk. In a rapidly changing environment, flexibility would seem to be key to adaptation.

One might even see how division of labour shapes the identities of the organisations. For Ringmar (2007: 193–194), division of labour is a basic social mechanism that illustrates structural power: forcing people to specialise on their competitive advantage impacts on their position and identity. This may well apply to international organisations, too. Ringmar's point is well worth carrying on in particular when it comes to the way in which this specialisation is enacted. One can well imagine that a "forced" specialisation is not well received but would it at all be possible in inter-organisational relations? Who would force specialisation on them? The sensitivities of authority and of autonomy become apparent here.

Division of labour entails consequences for competition, too. Again, there are different views as to the relation between specialisation and competition. Competition may lead to specialisation, to finding the ultimate competitive advantage, but it can also lead to homogenisation. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) see homogenisation as a consequence of increased competition where everyone's goal is increased efficiency. It may thus be

that the dynamics of inter-organisational relations, here in particular mimetic processes or isomorphism, are by nature such as to lead to specialisation between the organisations without any special overarching authority or decision-maker settling the issue for them. Specialisation, then, should end competition between the organisations as there no longer is overlap. Whether or not this is a positive outcome depends on the interpretation. Competition can be good in preventing sclerosis and serving as a driver of overall progress, as Oberthür and Gehring (2011: 50) put it.

Essentially, division of labour is about hierarchy and therefore it is a power issue. This makes it so difficult to achieve in practice. A basic reason for this is the defence of the autonomy of the organisations vis-à-vis each other. The old cliché "everyone wants to coordinate, no-one wants to be coordinated" speaks to the same difficulties of division of labour, but also of specialisation among the organisations.

To make the case of the desirability of division of labour, one only needs to find a way to divide labour in practice. As also the case of cyber security in the previous chapter, concrete gains could be achieved if there was leadership and if all the actors had their own roles in the issue. The roles, then, would be based on the differences between the organisations.

Interviews with practitioners clearly brought forward that a lot of thinking had been put into locating the comparative strengths of the different organisations. Many interviewees spoke about "niches," areas of action where the organisations function in a particularly appropriate or suitable way. Some also pointed out ways in which one organisation may offer such special capabilities for use by another organisation.

Sometimes the niches were quite tangible. Examples mentioned included the EU providing training in operations (Minister Counsellor 2013), using its satellite centre for imagery support, or offering concrete capacities such as armoured vehicles (Counsellor 2013a; Deputy Secretary General 2013). NATO could help in training, too, while being particularly resourceful when it comes to implosive devices, situational awareness and ground surveillance (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013). The interviewees saw more fundamental differences, too. One would be between the global UN and the regional NATO and the EU. Being global is an asset as such, but regional organisations can be more efficient as and when they can effectively bind their member states (Ambassador 2013).

Likewise, comparative advantage depends on the definition of the situation. NATO is in advantage in situations of pure military threat, but if

such a threat was unclear or was to disappear, the advantage would disappear, too (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013)—something that highlights the importance of the discussion on threat perception as an instance of power.

Intelligence production emerged as a particularly interesting field of potential comparative advantage. Again, while tangible resources were one part of the question, intangible differences of approaches and method also came up. The interviewees would point out how different organisations have different access to the means of intelligence gathering or employ different methods, from ground presence to devices such as drones.

More fundamentally, the question of comparative advantage was about knowledge. Knowledge was approached by the interviewees both from the point of view of quantity and from that of quality, and it was linked to questions about knowledge production. Quantity-wise, UN appeared to have more expertise or knowledge than the EU (Director 2013). Indeed, in the EU, more specifically inside the Commission and the European Parliament, the UN—that is also represented locally in Brussels—is seen as a source of knowledge and therefore consulted (Senior Policy Advisor 2013). While perhaps the most imminent reason for this quantitative lead is the global nature of the UN, there is also a qualitative difference. The knowledge produced within and possessed by the UN was seen as more accurate because it stemmed directly from the sources. An interviewee pointed out that at the UN, the discussions are different from those at the EU: at the UN, the country in question is always present, as are its neighbours, whereas at the EU, it can well happen that no one in the room has not even been near to the place that is under discussion (Counsellor 2013a).

In the interviews, quality was also connected with context assessment and context sensitivity. If the EU was, for instance, collecting information somewhere through a three-week long mission, the outcome would be lacking when it comes to context sensitivity. Context sensitivity was attributed to people permanently based in the place in question (Senior Advisor 2013). From the EU's side, voices of self-defence could be heard, too. The existence of the 140 EU delegations under the EEAS was pointed out as a source of information that makes the EU truly knowledgeable—while this was not always sufficiently recognised (Member State Ambassador to the EU 2013; Counsellor 2013b).

Knowledge and information are a good example of the difficulties in division of labour. An organisation may possess special knowledge because

of certain characteristics that make it different from other organisations. This can be a good basis for division of labour and for cooperation. But how likely is an organisation to share this special knowledge with others? Is it not rather something fundamentally important for its own purposes, as well as for its identity and specificity? Shared with all, the knowledge and information would no longer be such a benefit.

Intelligence production and intelligence sharing is a case in point and grows in importance.[1] The organisations have different ways and means of gathering information; those with more means can afford satellites while others might use drones. The ways and degrees of sharing information vary, and not only between the organisations. There are also internal variations within the organisations. For instance within the EU, different member states and EU institutions can be differently informed—and there are differences in risk assessment, too. Between the organisations, then, a shared situational analysis would seem to be a prerequisite for cooperation.

The organisations do share, and what they share is analysis rather than raw information. Sharing takes place following the specific agreements that they have concluded with each other, and where the positions of certain member states matter, such as those of Cyprus and Turkey on EU-NATO issues. While EU-NATO exchange is at the level of secret, EU-UN exchange is at the level of restricted. The EU delivers to UN but also to NATO (Seconded National Expert 2013).

In all, having a "niche" can be an asset but also a liability: specialisation may lead to dependency. At times, however, dependency is the goal. A closer look at the EU-NATO relations from this point of view helps to understand such situations—as well as the overall importance of autonomy for the organisations.

Coming back to the basic documents on the EU-NATO relations that were discussed in the previous chapter, one can see how the EU-NATO Joint Declaration from 2002 (NATO 2002) includes equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the two organisations among the principles on which the relationship will be founded on. The Berlin Plus agreements, then, include, inter alia, an agreement on the exchange of classified information, assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led operations and availability of NATO assets and capabilities for such operations.

Seen from the point of view of division of labour, and thinking about the rationality of cooperation based of respective strengths, this would look not only like an understandable way of framing the relations between

the two but also as a particularly fortunate outcome, a generous support for the EU from NATO. In military operations, particularly those involving peace enforcement and combat operations, NATO would be likely to take the lead, being better equipped in assets, capabilities and infrastructure since it has the more capable assets and infrastructure for dealing with such crises (Larrabee 2004).

Still, Berlin Plus agreements were also seen as "highly intrusive, autonomy-restricting cooperation framework" (Biermann 2017: 352) with a de facto subordination of the EU under a NATO chain of command. That it was not an easy agreement was shown by the length of the negotiations that took whole three years (Biermann 2017: 349).

The recurrent theme in characterisations of EU-NATO relations is that one should avoid duplication—most often further specified as avoiding "unnecessary" duplication. This shows that there is an overall understanding that overlap cannot be completely avoided—but how then to find the right balance, and how to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary or harmful duplication?

Promising the EU access to NATO's planning and conduct capability carries with it an element of dependency and a limitation of what can be done. Recurring to NATO's capabilities might mean that the EU then conducts similar operations to those of NATO and that would be an auxiliary force rather than an autonomous actor.

The possibility and even necessity of autonomous action was clear in the Saint Malo Declaration of 1998. To what extent the 2002 Declaration was a reply to that, and an effort at setting limits to the development of such autonomy, may be difficult to assess. The possibility of the EU both planning and conducting its own military operations was in any case seen by many as potentially undermining NATO. What better way of controlling the EU than to offer it ready-made planning and conduct capability, thus making such development redundant?

What has happened in practice since then is that the EU has indeed kept on developing both planning and conduct capability, arriving in 2017 at putting together an embryo of joint headquarters in Brussels in the form of the Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), a joint command centre for EU military missions. The EU foreign and defence ministers, including from the UK, came to an agreement on this on 6 March 2017 (Euraktiv 2017). For the first time in its history, the EU is now able to assume the command responsibility for its own operations (instead of recurring to national headquarters). Emphasising that the

centre leads training missions (only) is a way to frame it in an inconspicuous way.

The development of the EU's autonomy as a military actor could be interpreted as a case of resistance or retrenchment as in Costa's (2017) example of resistance against being influenced. Here, the EU would not resist against the influence of NATO when it comes to models for the development of military capacity, but it would resist division of labour and hierarchies in order to retain its own autonomy and develop its capabilities further. If not quite resist, it would ignore the hints and advice on not continuing that development beyond a certain sensitive point. This point, in turn, would be the crucial tipping point where the EU breaks out of a relation of dependency from NATO (Cf. Larsen 2014 and his examples of normative arguments that were not accepted in some countries because they were put forward by the EU, in Chap. 3).

6.3   Hierarchy, Status and Rank Order

EU-UN relations are a case of inter-organisational relations in which hierarchy plays a role, but where we also see the wish to avoid spelling out the existence of a hierarchy. It is also a case in which change in one organisation demands an update of its relation with another organisation: the increasing idiosyncrasy of the EU demands a confirmation or recognition of the EU having a particular nature, and thus needing a particular status.

Here, the EU wants to step up on the invisible ladder of statuses that exist within the UN for international organisations. Its specificity is such that it is also about to cross the borderline between different types of actors, that between states and organisations.

This is understandably not straightforward. In its relations with the UN, the EU is not designing something new, as in its relations with NATO, where the two organisations draft principles together. In the UN, there is already a scheme in place. The UN has its own, established ways of relating to other international organisations, and to different types of international organisations separately. Principles and rules are in place, with the idea of placing organisations together, corresponding organisations in the same group. The EU falls under the group of regional organisations.

The status as a regional organisation as implied in Chap. 8 of the UN Charter is, however, not what the EU is aiming at. It cannot see itself as

an organisation that would be implementing UN policies or acting under its mandate.[2] It needs to be able to act autonomously. As Bouchard and Drieskens (2013: 121) note, the EU is keen on stressing that it is not a regional organisation in the sense of the Charter. The EU has been a loyal participant in the meetings organised under the umbrella of regional organisations, but it does not want to attend as a regional arrangement or agency only as one of the "other international organisations."

At the same time, the EU may be much more helpful for the UN than regional organisations on average. Several elements make the EU-UN relation a mutually beneficial one. The EU is a highly significant funder of the UN. It is also an organisation that works for the UN principles, for international law and multilateralism, as was particularly highlighted in the 2003 Security Strategy (ESS 2003). The UN, in turn, is fundamentally important for the EU as the only actor that can legitimate the EU's action outside its own territory (cf. Smith 2013). What is more, the UN actively pushed for the development of the EU's crisis management capacity as the mutual benefits were clearly foreseen.

Several such assets were highlighted in the interviews. The interviewees saw that the EU's assets within the UN consist of the infrastructure provided by the EEAS delegations, the multiplying effect through EU member states, the good behaviour of the Union, its economy and markets. It was also noted that the EU did not look at whether a country perceived it negatively or not when deciding on funding. Furthermore, the EU could also be quick in delivering, both when it comes to money and to missions. The capacity to cooperate with the UN system was an asset, too (First Counsellor 2013; Seconded National Expert 2013), as well as the ability to draw on both member states and EU resources together. In foreign policy, where supranationality does not apply, what was seen as an asset was the neutrality of the EU—something stemming from it having 28 very different members, the views of which it needs to balance (Member State Ambassador to the EU 2013; Counsellor 2013b).[3] Views diverged as to whether funds always were positive. It was pointed out that the UN is addressing security threats in a manner that is more genuine, and that the ultimate legitimacy lies with the General Assembly—while the EU "usually tackles problems by throwing money at them" (NGO UN Office Representative 2013).

Other aspects still make the EU stand out from the group of international organisations affiliated with the UN. The Union enjoys considerable possibilities of influence in that its member states are dispersed across

three electoral groupings in UNGA and are not demanding the reconfiguration of groupings, either, as "they have different pools to fish in" (Bouchard and Drieskens 2013: 120). The EU also has two permanent (one after Brexit) UNSC members out of five, and the total number of EU members in the Security Council can be quite high at any time.

With the Lisbon Treaty, this positive relationship needed to be put in partly new terms. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a single legal personality for the Union and strongly aimed at making the Union's external action more effective. The EU set as its goal to upgrade its observer status in the UNGA accordingly. Bouchard and Drieskens (2013: 117), referring to Emerson and Wouters (2010) and Gowan and Brantner (2010) summarise that the EU "wanted its post-Lisbon foreign policy architecture to be matched with an enhanced status within the UNGA." It failed to secure those privileges in September 2010 and only managed to secure its "wish list of representative rights in May 2011 after intensive outreach and textual compensations."

Defining the status of the EU within the UN was an example of how power is used in inter-organisational relations. The UN may have had structural power over the EU as it defines the role and identity of the EU in the UNGA. But the EU was not powerless either. For Laatikainen (2013: 482), the EU employed "rather muscular diplomacy" in pressing the UN community to accommodate its demands and did manage to achieve an upgrade.[4]

There are clear ways of signalling status in the UN context. The EU still speaks after all the others, including after other regional organisations. They speak before the EU because of the fact that they are represented by a member state, while the EU represents itself. Status is rooted in the system of states: not being a state, the EU ranks lower. Its efforts and success in climbing up does not leave the UN member states unaffected. This emerges clearly from the interviews. The interviewees pointed out that the EU has power through the crisis management operations; the UN wants to keep it at arm's length yet asks for help. Particularly small UN member countries would want a lot of money from it but have a strong view on its status (Director 2013). Many point out the Caribbean countries in particular having problems with an enhanced EU status.

Even for those usually very happy for the UN-EU relationship in practice, the question of membership or status opens question marks. In the UNSC, the EU was said to be like a cat among the stoats. But as it is not a member, the EU would not be a danger in the Security Council.

Moreover, even if it was a member, it might not be able to sit there as it is too slow. In the General Assembly, then, the EU cannot count on automatic support, but it must campaign: it encounters resistance, both on reasons of principle—it is not a state—and because of discontent, based in particular on history and memories of colonialism. Criticism of the EU is very common (First Counsellor 2013). Some perceive the EU machinery is deciding even far too autonomously (from its member states) (Head 2013). In general terms, it was seen that in the EU, it is easier to use the argument of national interest, while the UN is more about global responsibility (Head 2013).

As to the deal on observer status, the interviewees said that the EU's goal is to have more visibility, but the status of mere observer is not an impediment to that (Deputy Secretary General 2013); while seeking to upgrade its status, the EU was interpreted to be overly concerned for getting a global role when it does not have one—and that the deal was "huge" for the EU, yet the UN thought (and thinks) of it as a regional organisation (Senior Policy Advisor 2013).

An interviewee observed that in New York, one sees the opposition in the eye, something that might not be perceived in Brussels. The opposition was seen as a factor contributing to the EU now speaking "on behalf of the EU and the member states" rather than on behalf of the EU only. This would ensure a more benevolent reception as states are "harder currency" at the UN (First Counsellor 2013).

All in all, a case of tension very special to the EU is being played out here: the UN system would undermine the EU's power when it appears as something else than a state. State-like features or simply the choice of being represented by (member) states might help the EU, but also put it in an awkward position vis-à-vis those member states that dislike federalist features and also by those who dislike the member states continued relevance in the conduct of EU external affairs.

6.4   Hierarchy and Legitimacy

The case of the cooperation agreement between NATO and the UN (UN/NATO Joint Declaration (2008) and how it was arrived at is another variant on how questions of hierarchy and legitimacy play out in interorganisational relations. As in the case of EU-UN relations, here too, we see the UN if not highest in the hierarchy, then at least in the centre of a network of organisations. The other organisations seek for appropriate

links with it because of its unique possibility to lend them legitimacy. Nevertheless, the case is very different: it is another type of hierarchy issue, one of an organisation aiming at becoming "normal," of no longer being particular. For NATO, what seemed to matter was to follow the EU and other organisations in their efforts at relating with the UN. NATO thus strives for legitimacy or equality, and the background or the reason behind is that it has a handicap as it can be seen in a very negative way.

The hypothesis advanced on this particular case is that in looking for an agreement with the UN, NATO was not looking at balanced cooperation but for a pronounced role for itself, as the primary military force. Yet, it was also trying to show its "other" sides (constructive or civil). This "other" side was primarily exemplified by the operation in Afghanistan that would underline the organisation's new, positive image. This case also reflects the negotiation power resources of the two organisations.

Where would NATO then start from? Arguably from far behind the EU in terms of image, but also from different background conditions. As Biermann (2017: 346) describes, the start of the NATO-UN cooperation in Bosnia in 1993–1994 actually led to a deep crisis of legitimacy. NATO perceived the UN as preventing it from stopping Bosnian Serb atrocities; the UN perceived that NATO was undermining its primacy with the unilateralism that followed. "Insult" and "idiots" were words that the secretary generals used about one another.

The interviewees, when asked about NATO-UN relations, reflected on NATO's goals and nature by saying, inter alia, that while the EU applied for membership [sic] of UNGA, "NATO wouldn't" (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013); while NATO would like to have observer status at the UN, this was impossible; one could see it as a long-term goal that would be "nice" as others have that too (Officer 2013). On a practical level, it was pointed out that NATO liaison officials at the UN were not much seen and were not invited to events (Director 2013).

Again, the process leading to a redefinition of NATO-UN relations in the form of a Declaration in 2008 was a long one. The issue of achieving a strategic understanding of cooperation between NATO and the UN instead of ad hocery came up in the latter half of 2005. Cooperation on the ground in Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Balkans was a reason to prompt a new definition. Early on, however, the problems were underestimated: it was thought at NATO that a couple of months would suffice to reach an agreement—but instead, it took three years. There was a common understanding among the 26 NATO members about the goals and textual basis;

these were achieved swiftly in a couple of months. At the UN, there was "enormous scepticism": the prejudices were deep and nourished by Russia and G77. Four such prejudices were that NATO was a remnant of the Cold War, with no role any more but irrelevance; that NATO was purely US-driven, and tool for US military power projection; that NATO was a tool for Western hegemony vis-à-vis Russia; and that NATO would always act without UNSC mandate. The NATO negotiator was kept at arms' length and basically spent 2–3 years fighting the prejudices, without getting help from any national delegation (Ambassador 2013).

What the NATO negotiator did was to describe what NATO was, its partnerships, and explain how NATO was doing good for the Muslim world. The negotiator noticed surprisingly little knowledge on NATO there, but also very little knowledge on the UN at NATO (Ambassador 2013).

Then came the war in Georgia in 2008. It was seen by some as inspired by the US or NATO and additionally complicated the situation.

Arriving close to the date set for signature, problems rose again. Two weeks before signature, the UN counterpart phoned to tell the signing was impossible. NATO Secretary General tried to call Ban Ki-Moon, or perhaps private office directors, and nations started to pressure the USA in the first place. Only hours before, Ban decided it was all right to sign, saying "Yes but no cameras," and not allowing for a press release either. What is more, small changes were introduced to the text. It was now called a declaration on cooperation "between secretariats"—a change was made in the very final minute between the negotiators without even calling the headquarters. The UN wanted to change the text as the Secretary General "cannot engage the nations" (Ambassador 2013).

What was there for the UN in the agreement? The Secretariat as a whole was against it: it saw that NATO only wanted to increase its legitimacy, or to have a rubber stamp of legitimacy from the UN. The UN Secretary General (Ban Ki-Moon)[5] said there was something there and saw that the UN is dependent on NATO as protection element in the operations, for information and for defence sector building in UN nations (Ambassador 2013).

In the end, the 2008 Declaration was a door-opener to UN secretariat and sub-organisations; it meant better cooperation in theatre, better cooperation on strategic level and staff talks. Permanent offices have since been opened. Cooperation has increased considerably; an interviewee even noted that "all prejudices have disappeared" (Ambassador 2013).

Another interviewee added that the declaration has helped to acknowledge, to open for cooperation and for sharing training methods—but that the issue is still sensitive. The drafting of the declaration was done at UN political department, and its contents were not particularly ambitious but mainly put on paper what there was already. A good dialogue was conducted on NATO strategic approach where the UN wanted NATO to be careful on its proposals. NATO was saying "we have a strategic approach" and referring somehow to the UN umbrella without, however, asking the UN; thus it was shoehorning the UN in their approach (Director 2013).

The UN wanted the content of the agreement to be quite general, not stating anything too specific. This, however, was not the case just because it was NATO; rather, it was the UN rule of thumb with regard to memoranda of understanding more in general. As things evolve and change, it was better to have a broader declaration so that the UN would not be tied into anything too specific—this was how the UN worked (Director 2013).

Furthermore, from the UN point of view, it was very important to underline that the organisations would work together in the field only when their mandates coincided, because some member states were especially wary of the UN cooperating with NATO. It was stressed that NATO and the UN had a lot of commonalities but were very different organisations. It was important for the UN to protect itself and the organisation's impartiality. This is also why a lot of emphasis was put on practical cooperation (Director 2013).[6]

In the words of Berdal and Ucko (2010: 121), the "UN secretariat hold out against a more substantive and meaningful agreement on practical cooperation than the anodyne and vague Joint Declaration." NATO's image with some of the UN membership as an instrument of US imperialist action or neo-colonial Western meddling or a militaristic approach resulted not only in postponements and a quiet signing of a low-key document. Similar agreements had to be signed beforehand with the EU, the AU and ASEAN, even with the CSTO later on (Biermann 2017: 337–338; Harsch and Varwick 2009). Such moves to cut the particularity of one organisation are an effective way of exerting power.

6.5   Towards Conclusions

Relations between organisations may serve the very important purpose of gaining legitimacy. Being dependent on the legitimacy of another organisation, however, would not be ideal; overall, autonomy is valued to the extent that relations that hint in any way to dependency are avoided.

Legitimacy is a means to power and to a good position in the hierarchy. As Biermann puts it, perceptions of legitimacy constrain and empower inter-organisational relations. Connecting to legitimate others or associating organisations with respected others are perhaps easy ways of gaining legitimacy, compared to other ways. While NATO seeks legitimacy from cooperation with the UN, it denies the same in relation to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). NATO is reluctant to lend legitimacy and standing to the CSTO by meeting with it as an equal for the reasons of the largely anti-democratic nature and expansive "near abroad" concept of CSTO (Biermann 2017: 337).

While the UN mandates and supports organisations it values, the EU supports the AU and legitimises it vis-à-vis other regional organisations in Africa (Brosig 2010), while probably shining away from lending the Eurasian Union too much legitimacy.

While an organisation seeks legitimacy for itself, it may also seek to legitimise others. Links to other organisations have a fundamental importance for the EU particularly since the 2003 Security Strategy (ESS 2003) and its strong emphasis on multilateralism. One part of this reliance consists of the EU's support for the UN and for international norms and rules. But there is also another side to multilateralism, namely, that of actively seeking to work with other organisations and also trying to support them. This can be seen as the EU empowering other organisations, as Koops (2011: 220–225) notes. Koops, however, argues that reality seems to be different: the EU has been empowering itself. Still, the aspects of power that have in the previous chapters been called "power for" or "power with" are visible here. The cases above can also be seen as examples of inter-legitimisation among the organisations.

If legitimacy and knowledge are among the primary means to power or power resources, then one way of empowering others may be to help them gain these. In fact, knowledge appears as another central asset here. Knowledge-sharing is admittedly important, yet it might be one of the most difficult points in cooperation, particularly when it comes to intelligence sharing. As Lukes (2005: 65) puts it, knowing the powers of the others and those of your own is to know what someone else can do for you—and also how you can diminish the power of another.

The world of knowledge undergoes big and profound changes. The knowledge structure, one of Strange's four structures of power (control of security, production, credit or finances and knowledge, beliefs and ideas), is the one that is in her view changing fastest. What knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, who communicates it, by what means and to whom,

and in what terms, is all changing. Writing in the late 1980s, Strange sees that power is increasingly important in interstate relations and that competition between states is becoming a competition for leadership in the knowledge structure (Strange 1988/1994: 136–138). What we would now see is that this applies to inter-organisational relations as well.

Finally, legitimacy can be seen as one of the attributes of an organisation, as one part of its image. As will be seen in the next chapter, there are other parts to image as well, and even they may become object of inter-organisational relations. Image matters: the case of the image of NATO as imperialist, neo-colonialist or militarist greatly impacts on possibilities to achieve an agreement with the UN. And as it matters, it is only natural that it becomes an issue in inter-organisational relations. But can it be affected, and how? How much can NATO really impact on its own image?

The questions of influencing one's own image, and that of the others, are taken up in the next chapter. They are linked to a phenomenon that could be called "casting": situations where different organisations are suggested or put to play different roles, according to their characteristics and capabilities, but also perhaps not according to these but for other, less rational reasons. Manifestations of such image moulding and casting can often be found in documents and speeches where one organisation expresses itself on the role and tasks of another organisation.

Notes

1. See Fägersten (2010) for an analysis of problems in this cooperation.
2. Or indeed, merely implementing the UN decisions. Article 34 TEU makes the intersection of the EU and UNSC visible, as the only provision in the European treaties that explicitly refers to the UNSC, but Article 215 of TFEU does so in practice as it shapes the implementation in the EU legal order of most of the sanctions imposed by the UNSC; Brussels is seen by many scholars as being "at the receiving end of what is decided upon in New York," reducing the Commission and the Council to implementing bodies (Bouchard and Drieskens 2013: 121–122).
3. A global network of security partnership was seen as something that only NATO has as its asset (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013).
4. Note how different a state-oriented explanation again is: the member states of the UN exerted their right to decide on the terms in which the EU can participate in the work of the UN. Cf. Ojanen (2017).
5. The personality of the UN Secretary General played an important role.

6. UN Secretariat holds yearly staff talks with various organisations. The UN-NATO staff talks actually predate the signing of the declaration. However, the staff talks had been on hiatus for a couple of years, and the declaration re-energised also the talks. Currently, the UN-NATO staff talks are held annually. NATO appears to be very organised with follow-up of the action points. NATO cooperates a lot with us to make sure that the agreed follow-up items are implemented. There is a civilian NATO liaison officer with the UN to enforce follow-up. As an example of good follow-up items are joint trainings with NATO (Director 2013).

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Power at Work: Relevance and Image

7.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGE IN INTER-ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS

Few organisations or institutions if any escape the need to think about their public image. This is true even for the ones lucky to enjoy an overall positive reception, such as international organisations. They are in general terms seen as useful and legitimate. They might even be seen as having prestige—the United Nations for one. Prestige, then, is something that for an organisational theorist like Thompson (1967: 33–36) is actually the cheapest way to power.

One part of this positive image stems from juxtaposition, from putting organisations forward as alternatives to something that does not work or that is problematic. International organisations have been contrasted with states that are incapable of solving their problems or indeed badly counterproductive for international relations because of their overriding self-interest and proneness to war. Even when the international organisations are criticised and belittled, the criticism does not amount to what the state has had to endure image-wise. The attack from early authors of theories of European integration was particularly hard: they represented the state in Europe as unnatural, ramshackle, dangerous and propaganda-spreading.[1] Against this background, the image of the new, promising alternative, a supranational organisation, necessarily grew positive.

With increasing competition between the international organisations, and with growing requirements on performance, image becomes important in a new way. Increased efforts at taking care of or improving one's image are needed. But this is not to say it would be an easy task. The very question of what is seen as positive may vary in time and according to the audience.

What may be the most contentious issue in the image of international organisations is their power. Is it good or bad to be seen as powerful? Power is an irritant, and one that irritates both when there is too little of it and when there is too much. As was pointed out in the earlier chapters, the international organisations have for quite some time thrived on appearing as powerless. This would be part of their legitimacy: they serve, they do not command. It has been important to show that they do not have or do not exert power of their own; what power they have has been given them by the member states.

Today, a powerless organisation may still be harmless, but powerlessness can also be turned against an organisation. The criticism of the EU and the UN often boils down to their lack of decision-making capacity or lack of enforcement capacity to ensure that the decisions are implemented. They might also publicly criticise one another.[2] Today, the organisations may need to appear as powerful—thus reversing the earlier image. In the same way, they also need to demonstrate or earn legitimacy instead of just being legitimate as by default. This makes them dependent on how others view them: legitimacy is a matter of perception and of recognition.[3]

Whose views matter, then? As Alasuutari and Qadir (2014: 72, 74–75) argue, the public view is central, as it creates resources or constraints for political actors. Organisations would want to work upon how people understand them and other organisations, and their understanding of what other actors there are. Alasuutari and Qadir speak about strategies of epistemic work through which actors convince each other about the best policies and practices, or attempt at affecting each other's views. Such work can be targeted at three different aspects of the social world: what the environment is, who the actors are and what is virtuous or acceptable. Alasuutari and Qadir also point out that such epistemic work does not need to be self-conscious.

How would the organisations proceed in practice? Do they have strategies? What means do they have to influence their image? Various efforts are being made. The organisations need visibility for what they do. Concretely on the ground, the EU flag would be placed on construction

sites funded by the Union, or to mark the EU's presence in operations abroad. International organisations are also working on their "constituencies," making efforts at establishing links to different communities or segments of general public, and on building or creating, keeping and enlarging such constituencies. Reaching out to audiences, constituencies, traditional and perhaps new ones, is a way to gain legitimacy. As Reus-Smit (2007: 171–172) puts it, one needs to reconstruct the social bases of power, which in turn requires reconciling between self-representation and expectations.

The enlargement of an organisation, growth of its membership, may be one part of reaching out to new audiences, or creating new constituencies. As Thompson (1967) sees it, growth of an organisation is often considered a sign of health. Organisations may want to grow to "demonstrate fitness." Indeed, the fact that more states want to join them is a clear sign of their utility. While the explanations of enlargement of the EU and NATO would not start from the organisations' self-interest,[4] the EU and NATO have been enlarging in parallel, and their growth has been seen as a sign of success—even though also a source of additional complications, such as increasing overlap and increasing variety of expectations placed on them.

As Abbott and Snidal (2010) point out, the organisations can actually link to a variety of different kinds of actors: they need not to limit their search for partners to states, current or future members or third states. The organisations can reach out to private actors and institutions, collaborate with them, being able to improve their performance through drawing on this kind of network, and also supporting them or shaping them.

In an effort that quite looks like that of building constituencies, they can also reach out to private persons in different roles, as experts or as citizens. One means to do this is their presence online. Being visible where people are—including social media—is important.[5] Here, the difference between the EU on the one hand and NATO and the UN on the other is obvious. It is only the EU that has its own citizens. The EU's possibility to reach out to its citizens, and its growing interest to do so, is as such interesting. Communication or outreach as such might give some kind of legitimacy: an organisation that communicates exists, is remembered and may therefore be seen as legitimate.

But such efforts might not be successful. Trying to influence one's own image may be difficult, even counterproductive. The efforts might annoy the audience. They might also never reach their targets—as in cases where

the organisation tries to reach out to people in a country where the government controls such outside efforts and the image that is transmitted. And even when successful, there might be a time lap between the effort and the impact so that it is difficult to say what or whose impact it actually was and whether impact is something that the organisation can control.

A central question is who the target, or the constituency, is. These may be states or individuals, but they may also be other organisations. An organisation may try to convey a certain image of itself to another organisation for various reasons: as part of constituency-making or to facilitate cooperation, for instance. This is why image is a central element in inter-organisational relations.

There is a good basic motivation there for an organisation to explain itself to another organisation: the organisations need to know and understand each other's goals and working if they are to cooperate successfully. Literature on the relations between the EU and NATO from some 10–15 years ago often took up the fact that the organisations did not know or understand each other; they lacked knowledge of how the other organisation works. For NATO, the supranational character of the EU and in particular the role of the Commission seemed to be difficult to grasp. This was an obstacle for cooperation.

Years into closer cooperation, similar problems seem to persist. In the interviews, lack of knowledge on how other organisations work, and the ensuing frustration, was apparent. It was pointed out that the UN does not quite know the EU (Minister Counsellor 2013) and that this still causes problems. Few understand how the EU works; there is a need to explain a lot, even daily, for the UN personnel about how the EU works—something that was felt both in EU member state representation in New York and in the UN organisations' office in Brussels (Senior Policy Advisor 2013, Director 2013). It was felt that the UN is more clear and easier to understand. Yet in NATO, an interviewee told "I don't know how the UN works, its internal dynamics; but there is no need fully to understand totally anyway; it has been a revelation to learn that the UN is not one organisation" (Officer 2013).

This is not to say that the efforts at explaining the functioning of the organisations were in vain. On the contrary: progress was visible. It was pointed out that actors within the UN system strive at a more systematic relationship with the EU, getting to know it better (Director 2013), and that the understanding at the UN of what the EU can bring has improved from what it was ten years ago (Deputy Secretary General 2013).

It transpired from the interviews that one question where there was lack of clarity was the relative independence of the organisation vis-à-vis its members: "I don't know to what extent the EU bureaucracy is independent" (Director 2013).[6] Transparency and bureaucratic nature appeared as differences between the organisations. They were also connected to legitimacy. One interviewee characterised the EU's Political and Security Committee as opaque and secretive, while the UN Security Council is a model of transparency, and NATO probably even worse than the EU. The EU would beat the UN in being highly bureaucratic, and also highly fragmented, something that is reflected by the presence of too many EU countries in the UNSC. NATO, then, was relatively more simple, a straightforward "animal," one that does not pretend to be other than military (Head 2013).

The characterisations, then, can be a way of saying "you are complicated, we are not" and help bring up the negative features of an organisation. Still, the most important observation, and one that this chapter builds on, is simply how much the organisations actually talk about each other.

This chapter concentrates on the ways in which the organisations do this, contrasting three different ways of conveying the image of an organisation. First, there is the case in which an organisation expresses itself, talks about itself, gives a certain image of itself. Second, there is the case where organisations give a certain image of another organisation. Third, we have cases in which organisations communicate jointly in a way that puts forward a certain shared image.

The attention of analysts might have tended to be more about the first and about the third than about the second. The efforts of the organisations at explaining themselves, be it in the form of a strategy document or a major speech, are a common object of analysis and arguably good material for research looking at narratives and rhetoric. Similarly, when studying cooperation between organisations, one would tend to look at the joint declarations and agreements to find how the organisations describe what they are and what they are to do together.

All this is important for understanding the organisations and how they relate to each other. It is, however, the second case that is enticing. In fact, we deal with two different kinds of activities. It is not only about one organisation trying to influence its image. It is also about an organisation influencing the image of another organisation. A further, important distinction to be made is that this takes place in different ways: it can be at times deliberate, at times unconscious, accidental.

The topic of this chapter is, thus, how organisations explain themselves and how they talk about each other, how they do "not understand" each other, and misperceive each other. It is about how they influence the others' images, spread and consolidate views on which organisation is good at what kinds of tasks, or less suited for others—and deal with potential vulnerabilities. In other words, this chapter presents the third case of exercising power over another organisation: through impacting its image.

The three organisations, while describing themselves and their goals in documents and official speeches of their representatives, also describe the environment in which the organisation finds itself. As part of this environment, other organisations are often mentioned—perhaps increasingly often, too. When mentioned, they are seldom just mentioned: they are described in a certain way, attributing certain roles and characteristics to them. An organisation may praise another organisation, its goals and values—such as the EU on the UN. There might be repeated references to important cooperation, as between the EU and NATO, but there can also be shades of disapproval and criticism. An organisation can reproach another for not doing enough—NATO on the EU—or for doing too much (Council of Europe on the EU). Still another way of telling something potentially consequential about another organisation may be acknowledging that it is difficult to understand—as in the case on NATO about the EU.

In looking at this form of exercise of power, public documents and speeches constitute the main source for drawing up these crucial (self-) definitions and descriptions. The informal interaction or lack of it, the way in which the organisation or their personnel thinks about the others and sees them, is not as easily seen. An attempt is made here to start approaching this through elements that the interviews brought up. After all, this is where one needs to consider Lukes' concept of power as not necessarily accessible to observation and as not implying active intervention either.

The chapter first gives a background of image-making by giving examples of how the EU and NATO currently do that in their strategies. Then, the focus moves to what they say about each other. What comes into view is that they say a lot; whether intentionally or not, is not always easy to tell. Finally, the attention is shortly turned into joint documents and how they convey an agreed overview of what the organisations are like.

7.2   Imaging Oneself

Organisations depict themselves in their own documents through describing what they do and what they aim at, sometimes also through describing how they work and why. If we look at some of the main elements of the self-portraits of NATO and the EU, we can find the following elements:

NATO's Warsaw Summit Communiqué of July 2016 (NATO 2016) depicts an organisation whose essential mission is unchanged, that is united in its ("our") commitment and that fulfils effectively all its core tasks, collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security (NATO 2016, point 2). It is an organisation that has taken steps and further action to reinforce defence and strengthen resilience (point 4). NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend its ("our") territory and populations against attack (6).[7] The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia but it ("we") cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which security rests (14). NATO ("we") remains committed to a continued coherent international approach, in particular between NATO and the EU (22). NATO is adapting (26), concerned and vigilant (27); its military posture is defensive in nature, and it has the full range of capabilities (32). NATO adopts a broad approach to deterrence and defence and tailors its response; its measures are defensive, proportionate, consistent with its ("our") international commitments and demonstrate its ("our") respect for the rule-based European security architecture (38). Further, NATO remains robust and agile (46) and enhances its situational awareness, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (47). NATO seeks a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons (64). It improves management of resources, skills and capabilities (70) and builds skills and enhances expertise (71). NATO also mentions enhancing civil preparedness (73). Furthermore, NATO says it is an alliance of values (129) and has a new policy (Building Integrity Policy) reaffirming its ("our") conviction that transparent and accountable defence institutions are fundamental to stability (130).

In sum, NATO emphasises continuity, success, action, determination, adaptation and agility. Skills and expertise come up, too. References to knowledge appear in particular in the form of "new" knowledge of new domains (such as cyber), knowledge that someone else has and where sharing becomes an issue; intelligence becomes increasingly central.

The EU, then, in its Global Strategy of 2016 (EU Global Strategy 2016) says it "must collectively invest in" being credible, responsive and joined-up. "We need a stronger Europe," the strategy delineates (p. 13). The EU's vital interests are peace and security, prosperity, democracy and rule-based global order (Director 2013). It has five broad priorities in its external action that are "the security of our Union," "state and societal resilience to our East and South," and integrated approach to conflicts and crises, cooperative regional orders and global governance for the twenty-first century. The strategy notices that the EU is the first contributor to UN humanitarian agencies and the world's largest economy (p. 40). It will lead by example in sustainable development and climate questions (p. 40). It notices the need for an investment in knowledge base underpinning its external action (46). It also says its ("our") diversity is a tremendous asset—"provided we stand united and work in a coordinated way" (pp. 46–47). Responsive external action must be underpinned by a strong knowledge base; situational awareness is needed (p. 48).

The EU would, in all, appear as self-critical, emphasising that more (work, effort, progress) is needed; it underlines cooperation, puts itself forward as the largest actor or more important than other, comparable actors, even as a leader that leads by example. The emphasis on the EU as a global civil power, however, is much less visible here than in the 2003 strategy (cf. Chap. 3). Diversity—that might appear as a weakness or a problem—comes out as an asset, at least if rightly managed. Knowledge is underlined.

Comparing the two, NATO would appear more self-confident, while the EU more conditional and pleading to its members. Both outline tasks that are of great importance not only for their members but to the international community as a whole. Both highlight knowledge, expertise and skills, but on a rather general level, without details as to the sources or kind of knowledge they have or need.

7.3   IMAGING THE OTHER

Sometimes the organisations use colourful language on each other, even such as to make the prospect of increasing cooperation and complementarity seem doubtful. Biermann's (2017) examples of the legacy of mutual stereotyping between the UN and NATO as a result of their cooperation in Bosnia that led to the use of strong negative expressions are telling in this respect. But he notes also the African Union branding the UN policy

side-lining the AU mediation efforts in Libya as "high-handed, arrogant and provocative." When a UN representative criticises the EU publicly on bad management of migration, the tool of imaging is clearly used, but even casting appears in the sense that the UN puts the EU in a given role in migration and expects it to play that part.

In the interviews conducted in the preparation of this book, strong views held within an organisation on another were stated, too. At the UN, while NATO was seen as a Western military actor, very political, mentally different, pursuing its own interests (the interests of a group of countries), even the EU may be kept at arm's length (Director 2013) and "degraded" (Ambassador 2013): it would be a mere wallet, while the UN is the one that decides (Minister Counsellor 2013). Compared to the EU, NATO would present more problems: it is not holistic, as a military alliance it takes sides—while the EU would be the better "value match" (Director 2013). Still, even the EU would be perceived as "tone deaf" in its approach (NGO UN Office Representative 2013).[8] The UN has a more nuanced look on the questions; misperceptions matter, also competition for visibility and space; the EU is "obsessed," and the UN is not good at giving the EU the visibility it wants (Senior Policy Advisor 2013). The importance of communication was recognised as fundamental to avoid misperceptions; the EU, too, was seen to become more context sensitive (Senior Advisor 2013).

The remarkable anti-NATO narrative within the UN was pointed out (Director 2013). NATO's negative image was said to be based on three issues: its attempts at becoming global, while it should stay at home,[9] on its potential to inspire or encourage (in a negative way) other military organisations and on the likelihood that there would be mistrust as to what it will do in the future [after Afghanistan]. The UN Security Council would keep NATO under very tight leash as NATO did affect its image negatively; the legacy of the use of force leaves a bitter taste (Senior Advisor 2013), it was observed. This negative image was confirmed inside NATO: the image of NATO at the UN "is not what we would like it to be yet" (Officer 2013). Indeed, NATO is working hard for its image in countries that "do not like it," for instance, in Latin America (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013).

It is interesting to note that there is awareness of the possibility that one organisation affects the image of another. To what extent would these attitudes transpire into something that can be interpreted as an effort at actually trying to influence the image of another organisation?

A peculiar example of such behaviour was the paid advertisement in an international relations magazine by NATO in 2011. Over a spread in *Europe's World* that appeared in spring 2011, there was an advertisement that asked the question "Which organization adopted a new vision of its geopolitical role in Lisbon?" It went on to giving a "Hint: It wasn't the European Union!"

The rest of the contents, printed in smaller font, outlines in few words the tasks identified in the Strategic Concept (NATO 2010a), engages the reader to think what this means for transatlantic security, for Europe and for her and gives information on how to find out more and give the answers to these questions.

The tone of the advertisement appears immediately depreciating or teasing as it seems to play with the fact that the EU's security strategy dated 2003 (ESS 2003) and efforts at updating it had not yet led to more than an implementation report in 2008 (European Council 2008). Mentioning Lisbon seemed to make the case against the EU not performing even heavier, as it would lead the thoughts to the Lisbon Treaty.[10]

Later on, this advertisement was removed from the online PDF version of *Europe's World* that only showed empty pages where it had been.[11]

This might be a just a mistake, failure of judgement or failure to capture the unintended impact the advertisement has. But it may also reveal tensions and intentions. In an interview (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013), this incident was classified as an error of the information department—while, at the same time, the interviewee noted that the period in question was indeed one that was tense and brought up all kinds of sensibilities, rough expressions ("EU-NATO relation is a frozen conflict") and no shows in meetings.

7.4   DEPICTING THE OTHER

All three organisations produce quite a lot of public written material about each other. Given the extension of their relations both in time and over different issue areas, they are bound to refer to each other constantly. In this chapter, a small sample of documents and speeches are analysed that can be seen to have central importance, such as a strategy document, or to represent an authoritative view expressed in an important venue. These delineate how the organisation officially sees another organisation, the role of that organisation and the nature of the relationship between the organisations.

Some of the documents are of a special character in that they are produced jointly and thus present a view that the organisations have agreed to jointly: the joint NATO-EU Declaration of 2002 and their Joint Declaration of 2016 (EU-NATO Joint Declaration 2016). These will be looked at separately.

The organisations' websites present such documents in different ways. While the NATO website presents a section on relations with other international organisations with documents on relations with the EU and the UN, the webpage of the European External Action Service does not include NATO in its section on international organisations and fora. The UN main webpage does not easily lead to finding relations with other organisations.

What is the purpose of these statements? They may have several: signalling awareness, giving recognition, showing shared understanding, contact and paving for cooperation or justifying it. They might also serve to dispel suspicions and redress misunderstandings.

Some analysts point out the discrepancies between the statements and the practical realities. Kamp (2013) notes, when writing on NATO and EU summits, that the participants will praise NATO-EU cooperation and will promise to work even more closely together to master future challenges. However, "Alas, the fly in the ointment is that there is no such cooperation, and there probably won't be any in the near future. Both institutions have been erecting Potemkin villages for years now—they even go so far as to call themselves 'strategic partners'. But real cooperation does not happen at all" (Kamp 2013).

Varwick (2006) notes that the official perceptions of the involved parties differ from what the unofficial ones would be. He notes how the North Atlantic Council's final communiqués routinely stress the common strategic interests between NATO and the EU; likewise, a declaration of the European Council states that "[T]he transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. The EU remains fully committed to a constructive, balanced and forward-looking partnership with our transatlantic partners." Nevertheless, even high-level officials criticise the current state of affairs between NATO and the EU. Varwick refers to the NATO Secretary General expressing "deep concern" regarding the evolution of formal relations between the organisations and complaining about still "too many" people "who misunderstand NATO and the EU as rival organizations and display a protectionism in some sort of zero-sum thinking to safeguard ESDP." Likewise, the German Military Representative to NATO

and the EU lamented: "We are far away from having finished solutions for the final design of a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, though this has been repeatedly asserted in summit declarations." Suspicions thrive, even to a degree of potentially laying ground for an open conflict: Washington would suspect, Varwick writes, the EU of attempting to become an independent actor in security policy under French and German leadership, while the US is supposed to reshape NATO into an instrument by which it can keep the EU's military ambitions under control (Varwick 2006).

Image and reality may differ, and even on purpose. In the following, some central documents are analysed for how the organisations depict each other: the EU on NATO and on the UN, and NATO on the UN and on the EU. The emphasis is on how the EU and NATO conduct a "dialogue" of a kind in the form of statements.

The European Security Strategy (ESS 2003) says the following on NATO: "One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship." And "The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century."

Of interest is the absence of the words "security" and "defence." EU-NATO arrangements are instrumentalised. NATO could be interpreted to be just one, even though important, expression of transatlantic relationship. As such, the strategy (ESS 2003) says: "The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence."

The ESS (2003) makes the UN seem much more central[12]:

"We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. We want international organisations, regimes

and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken."

Further, "The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations." The EU, then, supports the UN and encourages others to do so too.

The report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (European Council 2008) continues putting the UN in the centre. "The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives."

On NATO, the implementation report of 2008 says: "The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo."

Here, one might notice the language used: it is rather straightforward and in a sense self-critical when saying "even if formal relations have not advanced" and emphasising the need to do more. Implicitly, the strategy puts NATO on the same line with OSCE as it is placed in the same paragraph.

NATO's Strategic Concept of 2010 (NATO 2010a), in turn, says on the UN that "[C]ooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through: enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters, more regular political consultation and enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged" (point 31). Here, the Alliance signals that it is together with NATO that the UN contributes to security.

On the EU, the same document (NATO 2010a) says that

[A]n active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential

partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will: fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations; enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field; broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives; cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness. (NATO 2010a, point 32)

Here, the emphasis is on improvement in the future. At the same time, the concept (NATO 2010a) also points out the problems, also when in between the lines: notably those linked to the role of non-EU-NATO members, as well as that of duplication.

Similar points appear in NATO summit declarations. That of Riga (29 November 2006) (NATO 2006) says that NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests: "we will strive for improvements in the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and avoid unnecessary duplication, in a spirit of transparency and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. A stronger EU will further contribute to our common security." There is, thus, a vision of how these together could be or will be stronger.

The Bucharest Summit Declaration (NATO 2008) states: "We recognise the value that a stronger and more capable European defence brings, providing capabilities to address the common challenges both NATO and the EU face. We therefore support mutually reinforcing efforts to this end. Success in these and future cooperative endeavours calls for enhanced commitment to ensure effective methods of working together." The need to "ensure" means the methods are not necessarily effective for the time being.

The Chicago Summit Declaration (NATO 2012) then states: "The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity." NATO will work closely with the EU, "to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU's Pooling and Sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing."

NATO summit declarations also say something on NATO-UN relations. That of Lisbon (NATO 2010b) states

> "We are committed to strong and productive cooperation between NATO and the United Nations. We welcome the strengthened practical cooperation following the Joint Declaration on UN/NATO Secretariat Cooperation of September 2008. We aim to deepen this practical cooperation and further develop our political dialogue on issues of common interest, including through enhanced liaison, more regular political consultation, and enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged."

The Chicago Summit Declaration (NATO 2012) says "We will continue to enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN in line with the UN-NATO Declaration of September 2008. We welcome the strengthened cooperation and enhanced liaison between NATO and the UN that has been achieved since our last Summit meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, and which also contributed to the success of OUP." Here, we would see how progress is clearly written in the text as something "real."

The European Council Conclusions of 2013 are important to look at as this was a point in time when security and defence policy re-entered the EU agenda after some time's absence. The conclusions state:

> The EU and its Member States must exercise greater responsibilities in response to those challenges if they want to contribute to maintaining peace and security through CSDP together with key partners such as the United Nations and NATO. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will continue to develop in full complementarity with NATO in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each. This requires having the necessary means and maintaining a sufficient level of investment. (European Council 2013: 2)

> Cooperation should be facilitated by increased transparency and information sharing in defence planning, allowing national planners and decision-makers

to consider greater convergence of capability needs and timelines. To foster more systematic and long-term cooperation the European Council invites the High Representative and the European Defence Agency to put forward an appropriate policy framework by the end of 2014, in full coherence with existing NATO planning processes. (European Council 2013: 6)

NATO's *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*[13] (NATO 2016) says that "We remain committed to a continued coherent international approach, in particular between NATO and the European Union (EU). NATO's response is in support of this overall effort, which includes sanctions as decided by the EU, the G7 and others, to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict and to address Russia's actions" (NATO 2016, point 22). Here, the different tasks in which the two organisations cooperate are listed. The Communiqué would then list terrorist acts and the trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings across the Sahel-Sahara region where NATO welcomes the efforts of the UN and the EU and "underscore the importance of a strong commitment by the international community to address the complex security and political challenges in this region." Energy issues come up as well: NATO will "further enhance" its ("our") strategic awareness in this regard, "including through sharing intelligence and through expanding our links with other international organisations such as the International Energy Agency and the EU, as appropriate" (point 135).

Further, the Communiqué lists cyber defence ("of our national networks and infrastructures") "as a matter of priority" and one where "strong partnerships play a key role in effectively addressing cyber challenges. We will continue to deepen cooperation with the EU, as agreed, including through the on-going implementation of the Technical Arrangement that contributes to better prevention and response to cyber attacks. We will further enhance our partnerships with other international organisations and partner nations, as well as with industry and academia through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership" (NATO 2016).

Capability development, the Alliance's role in projecting stability as well as the task to "stem the flow of irregular migration," are further tasks where cooperation is important. The point on avoiding unnecessary duplication and maximising cost-effectiveness in capability development is repeated (NATO 2016).

Moreover,

In light of NATO's operational experiences and the evolving complex security environment, a comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach

is essential in crisis management and cooperative security. Furthermore, it contributes to the effectiveness of our common security and defence, without prejudice to Alliance collective defence commitments. NATO has developed a modest but appropriate civilian capability in line with Lisbon Summit decisions. We will continue to pursue coherence within NATO's own tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations. (NATO 2016, point 119)

In particular,

The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. Enhanced consultations at all levels and practical cooperation in operations and capability development have brought concrete results. The security challenges in our shared eastern and southern neighbourhoods make it more important than ever before to reinforce our strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, and complementarity, while respecting the organisations' different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations. (NATO 2016, point 121)

It continues:

We welcome the joint declaration issued here in Warsaw by the NATO Secretary General, the President of the European Council, and the President of the European Commission, which outlines a series of actions the two organisations intend to take together in concrete areas, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security, and exercises. (NATO 2016, point 122)

NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, which will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance the security of all Allies, and foster an equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, we welcome the strengthening of European defence and crisis management as we have seen over the past few years. (NATO 2016, point 124)

Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU's efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We encourage further mutual steps in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership. (NATO 2016, point 125)

In the fight against terrorism, NATO adds value and has a role to play, without prejudice to national legislation and responsibilities, in coherence with the EU, and in particular through our military cooperation with partners to build their capacity to face terrorist threats. NATO will continue to reach out to partners and other international organisations, as appropriate, to promote common understanding and practical cooperation in support of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. (NATO 2016, point 134)

In all, there is not much that the organisations say directly on each other but they do say the following: that they do important work and that will do even more and that the prospects for cooperation are good and actually cooperation has already improved; there is progress. Fundamental differences come up in a subtle way, as in the allusions to intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism.

The EU's Global Strategy of 2016 and the foreword by Federica Mogherini (Mogherini 2016) say the following: "This is no time for global policemen and lone warriors. Our foreign and security policy has to handle global pressures and local dynamics, it has to cope with super-powers as well as with increasingly fractured identities. Our Union will work to strengthen our partners: We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO, while we will also connect to new players and explore new formats" (Mogherini 2016, 4). The sentence "while we also…" and the hint at new players and new formats are interesting here as part of the need to adapt and follow changes in the environment.

Further, the strategy outlines that "[T]he EU will step up its contribution to Europe's collective security, working closely with its partners, beginning with NATO" (EU Global Strategy 2016, 9). "As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend its members—most of which are European—from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary" (EU Global Strategy 2016, 19).

Here, as a matter of fact, the EU says why NATO exists, or what its role is. It engages in casting.

When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional

framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States. (EU Global Strategy 2016, 20)

Here, NATO is "primary" in one field (even though not for all member states). The word "healthy" is interesting because of the vagueness and room for interpretation that it creates.

On cooperation, the strategy states that

The EU will support political, operational and technical cyber cooperation between Member States, notably on analysis and consequence management, and foster shared assessments between EU structures and the relevant institutions in Member States. It will enhance its cyber security cooperation with core partners such as the US and NATO. (EU Global Strategy 2016, 21)

This includes neighbourhood policy, one of the prime policy fields.

The EU will pursue a multifaceted approach to resilience in its surrounding regions. While repressive states are inherently fragile in the long term, there are many ways to build inclusive, prosperous and secure societies. We will therefore pursue tailor-made policies to support inclusive and accountable governance, critical for the fight against terrorism, corruption and organised crime, and for the protection of human rights. Repression suffocates outlets for discontent and marginalises communities. The EU will therefore promote human rights through dialogue and support, including in the most difficult cases. Through long-term engagement, we will persistently seek to advance human rights protection. We will pursue locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors, and support fragile states in building capacities, including cyber. We will work through development, diplomacy, and CSDP, ensuring that our security sector reform efforts enable and enhance our partners' capacities to deliver security within the rule of law. We will cooperate with other international players, coordinating our work on capacity-building with the UN and NATO in particular. (EU Global Strategy 2016, 26.)

Under a subtitle "A Closer Atlantic," the strategy explains that the EU will invest further in strong bonds across the Atlantic, both north and south. "A solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts,

and contribute to effective global governance. NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world. The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security" (EU Global Strategy 2016, 36–37). This is particularly clear: what NATO is, and where cooperation will be developed, is stated, while there is also recognition of its leading position and roles.

Different partner organisations are thought of in different policy fields.

> The format to deliver effective global governance may vary from case to case. On cyber, global governance hinges on a progressive alliance between states, international organisations, industry, civil society and technical experts. On maritime multilateralism, the EU will work with the UN and its specialised agencies, NATO, our strategic partners, and ASEAN. On humanitarian action, sustainable development and climate change, the EU will partner with the UN and the G20, as well as new donors, civil society and the private sector. On counterterrorism, we will deepen dialogue with the UN, while building broad partnerships with states, regional organisations, civil society and the private sector on issues such as countering violent extremism and terrorist financing. (EU Global Strategy 2016, 43–44)

Finally, the Global Strategy tackles defence, where NATO is strongest, but where the need is clear for the EU to find new ways forward.

> "To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, nationally-oriented defence programmes are insufficient to address capability shortfalls. We remain far from achieving our collective benchmarks, including 35% of total equipment spending in collaborative procurement. The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. An annual coordinated review process at EU level to discuss Member States' military spending plans could instill greater coherence in defence planning and capability development. This should take place in full coherence with NATO's defence planning process. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has a key role to play by strengthening the Capability Development Plan, acting as an interface between Member States and the Commission, and assisting Member States to develop the capabilities stemming from the political goals set out in this Strategy."

(EU Global Strategy 2016, 45–46). This is the part where supranational elements appear.

Some statements by high-level officials of the organisations add interesting colour to the images that the organisations give on one another. The tone may change into a more direct one. Concern and question marks appear, as when Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen states in Warsaw (17 March 2011) on the "principle" of the transatlantic link:

> "History shows us that Europe is safer and more stable when it works together with North America. It is a relationship that has brought significant benefits not just for Europe, but for North America too. However, it is a relationship that must not be taken for granted. It must be nurtured. It requires investment in terms of time and political will, but also in financial terms. The current development is a matter of concern, because we are witnessing a widening gap between the United States and Europe."

"But in the current economic crisis, such institutional cooperation is not a question of 'nice to have'. It's 'need to have' /…/."

At the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs and Sub-committee on Security and Defence, 23 April 2012, Fogh Rasmussen would say: "That is why I believe, that even as it tackles its economic problems, Europe cannot afford to be inward-looking or self-absorbed." "/…/ European nations must look outwards, and stay ready and able to act for their own sake. /…/ Today's economic difficulties may tempt European nations to become introverted. But the need for a confident, compelling, outward-looking Europe has never been greater. This is why European nations must continue to invest in critical military capabilities /…/ and they must continue to show willingness to use them when needed." "NATO and the European Union can, and should, play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. To carry out this role, Europe must invest sufficiently in our common security. And Europe must continue to invest in the vital transatlantic bond—in political, economic, and military terms. I believe in Europe."

Congratulating the EU for the Nobel Peace Prize, 12 October 2012, the Secretary General says: "From the outset, NATO and the European Union have shared common values and helped shape the new Europe." It is not the EU alone that has shaped the new Europe, then.

At the European Parliament on 6 May 2013,[14] Fogh Rasmussen says "I am fully committed to a strong and open Europe. I firmly believe that Europe must have a strong common security and defence policy." "But let me also be frank. If European nations do not make a firm commitment to

invest in security and defence, then all talk about a strengthened European defence and security policy will just be hot air." The European Council in December "should encourage the European Union and NATO to do more together. To consult more. Coordinate more. And cooperate more."

Here, we see a different vocabulary: "European nations" would not be typical EU speak; defence and security policy also come in a reverse order.

At the European Council on 19 December 2013 (that the Secretary General attended), he says: "Actually, over the last five years, some European countries have cut their defence budgets by up to 40 per cent in real terms. /…/ But this is not just about what Europe pays in defence costs. It is also about the role Europe plays in the world. I speak as a committed European. But also as a concerned European." "But I am concerned that if Europe is unwilling, or unable, to play its full part in international crisis management, others will fill the vacuum. And we will reduce our ability to protect our values and defend our interests." This may almost sound like a threat.

For the EU's part, High Representative Catherine Ashton's remarks add something on how the UN and NATO are depicted. At the UN Security Council on 4 May 2010, she says: "The European Union attaches great importance to its partnership with the UN. A core objective of EU foreign policy is the development of an effective multilateral system with a strong UN at the centre." "The reasons behind the creation of the UN are similar to those that originally drove European integration: 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. Today, the UN and the EU need to promote the ideals that inspired earlier generations /…/" (Ashton 2010).

7.5   Joint Imagery

An efficient way of signalling a shared view or shared goals is a joint declaration as it would engage both at the same time and have a wording shared by both, or commonly sought and defined. The EU-NATO declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002 (NATO 2002), is an important document in this respect. It states the following:

The European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,

Welcome the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges

of the new Century; welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members; Welcome the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union's disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged; reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management; reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities.

Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be founded on the following principles:

- Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organisations are mutually reinforcing, while recognising that the European Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature;
- Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency;
- Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;
- Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;
- Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions;
- Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.

What makes this declaration particularly interesting is that even though it is a joint document, it represents a rather forceful attempt at "casting." There are signs of division of tasks, as well as instrumental use of the EU (but both organisations are instruments to some extent). Still, there is also a point on "knowledge": need to recognise their different nature. Finally,

a triangle relationship with the UN appears: UN Charter is mentioned here with a reference to "indispensable foundations."

The Joint Declaration of 2016, then, says:

> We believe that the time has come to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership.
>
> In consultation with the EU Member States and the NATO Allies, working with, and for the benefit of all, this partnership will take place in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members.
>
> All Allies and Member States, as well as the EU and NATO per se, are already making significant contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. The substantial cooperation between NATO and the EU, unique and essential partners, established more than 15 years ago, also contributes to this end.
>
> In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step-up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond.

Here, the situation is different from that of the previous declaration: something needs to be done, stepping up is encouraged; common challenges and mutually reinforcing impact become key to the relationship between the two organisations.

7.6   Conclusion

What did we see here? Some differences between the two organisations might be a first element to notice. NATO is able to "speak" about the EU in a consistent manner over the years; summit declarations use more or less the same vocabulary, stressing the importance of the "strategic partnership" between the two organisations and stronger European defence capabilities. The consistency also holds for the direct criticism pointed at the EU by NATO officials, as by Secretary General Rasmussen speaking about the importance of European nations spending enough on defence. The spokespersons of the organisations may be more outspoken or make the message come out more clear. It is more difficult to find out what the EU

"officially" says on NATO. Statements by the European Council or High Representative Ashton are more difficult to come by. In its relations both with the UN and with NATO, the EU has so many possible "voices" that finding consistent ways of speaking about these organisations—beyond the few catchphrases—is difficult. But here as well, the tone of the statements has remained more or less the same since the Joint Declaration in 2002. The most fundamental difference between the two, the EU's supranational character, does appear,[15] alongside its speaking about the citizens. Self-criticism appears to be another difference that is worth pondering on.

What tools (cf. Alasuutari and Qadir 2014) have been used? Do these organisations speak about the environment, the actors and the acceptability or virtuosity of certain action? Yes, they do. But is that a strategy? Is there any visible manifestation of them having had impact on each other's image? Do they reach their constituency, or that of the others?

The point is that irrespective of the intention or lack of it, what the organisations say about each other may be quite consequential. One might even posit that there could be added credibility for what they say about another organisation, compared to what they say about themselves: first, the audience might dismiss self-characterisations as purposeful; second, the home audience—those working for the organisation—might be inclined to share the view presented on another organisation.

Awareness of image is certainly there, and mutual awareness, be it positive or negative, of comfort or concern. Signs of active mutual ignorance, or of being quiet about another, do not appear that much. Rather, the organisations seem duly to mention each other, as well as a number of other international organisations, when speaking about their action on specific issue areas. Inter-organisational relations would seem predominantly to figure as something that increases the ability to act of the organisation in question. In terms of power analysis, cooperation would increase their "power to" do something. They would seem careful not to refer to "power over" in their relations to other organisations. The emphasis is on similarities and on working together. Still, occasional criticism and some "casting" appear, even signs of Lukes' (2007) deference and subordination signs.

How do the organisations depict the goals and their functioning? Efficiency seems key, particularly to NATO. As noted in the literature, effectiveness of institutions often depends not only on their own features but also on their interactions with other institutions (Oberthür and Gehring 2011: 25) who also say (p. 50) that large overlaps can create

added benefit if they employ complementary governance instruments, represent different memberships or provide for significantly different decision-making procedures. They argue that duplication of work or redundancy that policy-makers commonly deplore is in fact frequently a sign of effective governance. Complementarity may be positive, so also regulatory competition that may help avoid sclerosis and drive progress.

The two organisations' attitudes towards duplication are interesting in the light of theories. They do speak a lot about avoiding unnecessary duplication, without going too much in detail. There are different ways of looking at the issue. Haas (2001) mentions three of them. The redundancy theory predicts that efficiency in the attainment of some common objective is best attained by having several organisations attempt to achieve the same outcome; if one fails, the others will take up the slack. The theory of hierarchical nesting, then, says that the best result is achieved if organisations with related and overlapping mandates are arranged in a hierarchical order; the top organisation interprets the norms and this results in a single harmonious regime, without competing organisations. Finally, cognitive nesting theory would suggest that solutions are achieved if actors nest their beliefs in a consensual hierarchy of ideas. Of these, our organisations would seem to speak to the need of consensual hierarchy of ideas.

This would show in the similarity of tasks and in the awareness of shared concerns. As the EU's Implementation Report (European Council 2008) puts it, "The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions."

Here emerges also the idea that the organisations are aware of belonging to the same category, as it were, that of international organisations (cf. Ojanen 2005)—and thereby depend on each other. Legitimacy also comes up, and also the ways in which legitimacy can be increased. As Suchman (1995: 589) points out, being similar or becoming similar to another organisation—be it through mimetic isomorphism or something else—is a way to legitimacy in the specific sense that it increases comprehensibility—which is a central part of cognitive legitimacy.

Legitimacy can be actively affected by the organisations. As Biermann (2017) puts it, the ways or instruments to influence it include both

behavioural (action and non-action) and discursive ones (framing). Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) speak about the acceptability of certain action; showing that other organisations share the same way of acting or the same tasks may increase this acceptability.

Legitimacy and knowledge have been traditional means of power of international organisations, sources of authority, and they also strengthen each other. The organisations can use these power tools in relations with each other. An assumption behind the analysis of the power the organisations have vis-à-vis each other has been that knowledge would rank highly as a power resource. In the analyses above, knowledge about each other was found quite important. Interestingly, though, knowledge did not come up much as a power resource that the organisations would mention—before the self-imagery of 2016, when clearly knowledge, information and intelligence start appearing as increasingly central.

Changes in international relations, however, now seem to leave these organisations frequently in crises of legitimacy. They also see their positions in the knowledge structures as challenged by many other knowledge holders. Risking the loss of both legitimacy and knowledge as assets, the fight for relevance accentuates. This means a new urge in inter-organisational relations to assure continued relevance. Thus, they need to fulfil the tasks given—by new resources from where they can be fetched, for instance, from other organisations—to ensure the relevance of what they do, and of their roles; possibly excel in relation to other organisations. This is why tasks and conceptions (threat definitions) become so important, and this is why image and hierarchy matter. The question is not only what the organisations do, not even how they do it, but also why they do it.

The organisations seem to move towards shared relevance, and inter-legitimisation, perhaps in particular because of the times—being actively challenged by some states, or because of increasing misinformation circulating about them.

Would this lead them to build strategic alliances? Some interviewees seemed to see some kind of UN-NATO alliance being on NATO's mind, against the EU (Director 2013)—but also saw that if NATO is going to survive, a European element within it is necessary and that NATO needs the UN as exit strategy (Deputy Assistant Secretary General 2013). The 2016 Joint Declaration, however, and the ensuing lists of practical measures the two organisations could and will undertake might point to a strengthening EU-NATO alliance instead.

In conclusion, image is a power resource, and the organisations are aware of this. It is hard to evaluate the success of their intentional use of tools to change the image of themselves or of others, but they do possess some tools and also use them, even if perhaps sometimes inadvertently. In the end, it would seem that the organisations tend to pool the power of image rather than undermine that of the others.

Notes

1. See examples of both Haas, Deutsch and Hoffmann in Chap. 3.
2. Examples could include the UN criticism of the EU's response in migration issues. See, for example, "UN attacks 'woefully inadequate' Mediterranean migrant rescue operation," *The Guardian*, 12 February 2015, "UN criticises EU's anti-migrant rhetoric," *EUObserver*, 4 March 2016.
3. Auto-legitimisation is an oxymoron, says Reus-Smit (2007: 159).
4. Schimmelfennig's (2003) study of why the EU and NATO have enlarged considers different kinds of rationalist arguments and sociological accounts, ending up in arguing that rhetorical action was in the end decisive for the enlargement to happen. Those with interests seem however to be state representatives; the point of view of the organisations themselves is lacking.
5. See Kenna (2011) who argues that the EU would profit from increasing public diplomacy through social media, particularly if based on a strategic approach.
6. These observations may be quite interesting from a theoretical point of view: the independence of an organisation is a central feature and possibly a crucial difference between the organisations, and ultimately it is a major component of power.
7. The numbers in the brackets in this paragraph refer to the numbered points of this document.
8. For instance, in its way of using the word "fragility."
9. Particularly Libya: NATO wanted to show it is to reckon with, led to bad reputation, corrupting its mission, led to more polarisation of power resources and paralysis of the UN Security Council: thus, NATO damaged the UN.
10. The Strategic Concept was adopted in a summit held in Lisbon.
11. *Europe's World*, N. 17, 2011, originally pp. 44–45.
12. But see also the context in which the strategy was drafted in 2003 and its purposes.
13. URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
14. Fogh Rasmussen's speeches have been accessed through the NATO webpage.

15. What also transpired from the interviews was that in the UN, the EU was (sometimes) perceived as interfering with internal matters of states (Director 2013).

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Conclusions and Implications

8.1 Findings and Insights from a Power Perspective

This book has brought the perspective of power into the analysis of relations between the EU, NATO and the UN. It started from the observation that these organisations interact, this interaction has been intensifying and that it is increasingly important to understand the consequences of this interaction. For this, a power perspective is needed. Power is an attribute that is visible in relations between actors. So also in the relations between these organisations.

The perspective of power helps to understand inter-organisational relations in two major ways: it helps understand the motives or reasons for these relations, and also their consequences. An improved understanding of these relations, in turn, means an improved understanding of the organisations themselves, of how and why they change. This is essential knowledge in international relations.

While inter-organisational relations may be both cooperative and conflictual in nature, they are fundamentally power relations. The EU is being impacted and is having impact; so also NATO and the UN. What would the EU be without such relations? Its tasks and its organisation would differ; also the argumentation about its nature and goals would be different.

More specifically, the examples that the previous chapters brought forward highlight two sides of the consequentiality of inter-organisational relations for an organisation. On the one hand, organisations use power resources for a purpose, but these resources matter also in cases where power use is unintentional. The purpose is more often than not related to keeping or increasing their relevance. On the other hand, a major consequence of the increasing interaction and the strive for relevance is that instead of a situation of competition, the organisations find themselves on the same side: their legitimacy and their relevance seem increasingly bound together.

While such a choice of perspective may now, at this stage of the book, appear obvious, it was shown in the first chapter how many hindrances actually appear on the way to choosing it. Most analyses of these organisations' interaction have been "power-less" in character. This, one could argue, is because of certain traditions within the disciplines of international relations and European studies. In particular, the wary views on international organisations' actual actor capacity and capacity to possess and exert power have contributed to steering the attention of researchers elsewhere. But also other idiosyncrasies have played their role. The strong tendency to see the EU as a unique entity in international relations has discouraged comparison. Finally, the frequent emphasis on rivalry as a basic characteristic of international relations has come to colour even the early phases of research on inter-organisational relations.

Theoretical or conceptual choices do not solely count for the absence of power in these analyses. To some extent, power has indeed been absent itself, empirically speaking: international organisations, contrary to most organisations at large, have not always found it to be in their interests to manifest power. They have not necessarily felt the need to have power, or to gain more of it. This is because of the structure of the international system where organisations have been created by the states to serve their interests, a situation that creates the need for the organisations rather to stick to the role of "servants." While the system—or the states—would not seem easily to forgive any stepping on their authority by these entities they have created, they, at the same time, seem quite forgiving when it comes to the performance of these same organisations. Should they not achieve the admittedly difficult tasks they are pursuing, they would not be threatened by any immediate dismantlement. For this reason, the organisations have traditionally not focussed on the pursuit of more power, either.

One more empirical note needs to be repeated once again. The very relations between international organisations, particularly between the three, the EU, NATO and the UN, in the field of security policy, are rather new, and they have taken new forms and intensified over the past 15 years. This explains the fact that research is relatively limited in extent, too, but growing. Whether this growing research on inter-organisational relations actually contributes to a heightened awareness of the implications of such relations is an interesting question, as are the choices made in approaching the topic. As will be argued at the end of this chapter, we are speaking about a new level of international relations that perhaps needs to be explicitly pointed out before it can be seen, noticed and appreciated.

Pursuing here, however, the goal of looking at EU-NATO-UN relations from the perspective of power, believing that power crucially helps make sense of these relations and their consequences, the first chapters of this book built a way of approaching the question with building blocks from three different strands of analysis. From the study of inter-organisational relations, the following insights could be drawn: relations between organisations require a certain similarity—of goals, but also of operation—in order to function, but they may also in and of themselves contribute to such increasing similarity. In the cases looked at here, what surfaces is a tension between the need for similarity and the need for divergence. After all, it may be variance, the differences, that induce gains in cooperation by allowing for complementariness and making stronger teams. Differences can be seen as added value or competitive advantage or as ground for a meaningful division of tasks. What would happen to these, should the organisations come to resemble each other more and more?

The analyses of the power of the EU, then, led us to focus on comparison and perception when trying to find out more about the type of power and the ways of exercising it the Union would have. Thus far, research has established that the EU indeed has power, albeit of a special type, and started inquiring into the power dynamics, in the sense of looking at the possible decrease of that power and the reasons of such decrease. Comparison and outsiders' view are, however, necessary complements to such an analysis. It is through them that one is capable of saying more about the alleged speciality or specificity of the EU's power and its effects. What if other organisations share exactly the same types of power; what if the outsiders would not perceive much of such power at all?

Finally, research on power in inter-organisational relations yielded the insight that in the relations between these organisations, one can

distinguish several central elements related to power. We can look at the relations as power relations—as a question of formation of hierarchical relations, or of ongoing positioning within a hierarchical structure—but we can also go deeper in the analysis towards discerning the power needs of these organisations as well as the sources and types of power at their disposal. In this particular case, the closer analyses started from the assumption that the organisations use power to affect each other's relevance, tasks and image, also their position in a hierarchy, and that the power they use often consists of authority, legitimacy and knowledge.

In the case studies, examples were found where the organisations sought relevance through updating their task descriptions. They also sought relevance in relation to each other, be it in a hierarchical or a mutually supportive way and, furthermore, through perception, or image, trying to influence how they are seen—and also how the other organisations are seen by other actors in the international system. While an intention and a goal can be seen behind this activity, there was also an unintentional side to their use of power. What became increasingly clear, however, was that power was sought for in order to maintain or regain relevance: this is why power was a goal, and a goal that was shared by the different organisations.

8.2   Insights on the EU's Power

The case studies showed examples of interaction between the EU, NATO and the UN that, when looked at from the perspective of power, carry a special significance for these organisations. The EU's role has been fundamental in shaping much of this interaction, or causing it, as it has been the development of the EU—and notably the extension of its field of action—that has led to overlap with other organisations. The EU has stood model for others but also used others as a model for how it has decided to act and to build its structures. The examples are but a small set of issues where the EU has been shaped by these relations and where it has been keen on shaping the relations and also the other organisations.

In the examples analysed, the consequences of use of power can be seen in several ways. The EU's power appears in its way of resisting an allocation of tasks or limitation of specialisation that would be harmful for its autonomy or possibility to act, as in the field of defence. The EU appears constrained in its development into a hybrid kind of actor by the state-centred system of the UN. The EU challenges the UN in being not an

organisation and not a state; in a sense, the UN setting makes the EU become more of a state. In addition, the EU pushes the UN into action, also when it comes to regional organisations: for the EU to have a role, it needs backing. Finally, the EU is defined by others and defines others in various documents and statements—where we might see a tendency for the organisations to try to gather and issue common statements so as to make the point more clearly and better control their image.

On a more fundamental level, the examples shed light on the complications of power analysis. The first hindrance was detected in the overall resistance to seeing international organisations as actors that have power of their own. Looking at the EU, however, was illuminating in opening up a multifaceted discussion on the power an organisation indeed can have, or is expected to have, on the power the organisation needs, and where it can find such power. The very case of the EU also showed a further complication in the way the analysis of power gets intermingled with the identity of the entity. What the EU claimed to be or what it was found out to be in terms of type of actor also influenced the way its power was seen. Put somewhat simplified, a civilian actor had civilian power; an actor that wants to diffuse norms is seen as a normative power. Certainly the EU has had and has certain unique characteristics. Based on those, one could assume that it stands out as distinctive in comparison with the two other organisations. Their authority, for instance, could be assumed to be based on different sources. In the end, such power analysis was not found particularly promising for understanding inter-organisational relations.

Another complication generally found to trouble power analysis surfaced here as well. It was the easiness with which one ends up at a fixation either with resources or with the actual exercise of power. Resources are often a proxy for power, while exercise of power is seen as a proof of the existence of power. In the analysis of inter-organisational relations, looking at any particular kind of potential power resource would not yield much. In the actual fact, organisations would rather be deprived of most resources, while the most deprived of all might actually have the upper hand in its relations with others. Looking at exercise of power would not reveal much of the power relations, either. In inter-organisational relations, power seems actually rather seldom exerted in any visible way. But it does exist.

A final complication came up when the "international" was added to the analysis of inter-organisational relations. Peculiarly enough, when international organisations are studied from the point of view of power—

and already this might still be rare—certain assumptions about international relations tend to come in and colour the study. They can be summarised as the centrality of conflict and of rivalry. This colouring comes in on two levels. On a first level, international relations may in general terms be seen as conflict prone because of the lack of overarching mechanisms of control or authority. International organisations would compete with each other, too, particularly in a situation of overlap. On a second level, the introduction of "power" does but accentuate this tendency, when power is closely associated with conflict.

Breaking out of such assumptions was found crucial to understand what is going on in the relations between the EU, NATO and the UN. Power did not need conflict anywhere near to be present and to be consequential. Power was above all discovered as something that the organisations need to gain and maintain relevance and, on the way there, to manage issues of legitimacy and of image or identity. Interestingly enough, knowledge was found to link with identity and legitimacy for each of them. Each organisation values its own knowledge but increasingly perceives the need to share knowledge and information.

While at times the organisations would indeed attempt at gaining some of these at the expense of others, what in the end was more fundamental for their survival was that this need was mutual. The three organisations share relevance—they hang together.

8.3   Power Perspective and Implications for Third Actors

Looking at the relations between the EU, NATO and the UN from a power perspective helps us understand how and why these organisations shape each other, and thus understand certain consequences of this interaction such as increasing similarity. Power relations between these organisations are, however, also an aspect of the real world that has impact on third actors.

For states, member states and third states, being exposed to inter-organisational relations and the exercise of power in these may in practice mean strategic problems and declining influence. The traditional picture of state-organisation relations—be it a picture of the state controlling the organisation or the organisation having impact on the state—becomes essentially more complex when organisations are inter-related and even dependent on each other. States in such situation need a policy not just on

each of them separately but also a policy, an understanding and view on how they should be related to each other. This may be out of their control, however, and they may not fully grasp how these relations matter and change the conditions for the states themselves. Playing the "inter-organisation game" may not be easy.

Another type of third actor is the other organisations. What does the field look like for them? Organisations exist in an environment, and this environment is a basic conditioner of their functioning as they need to be able to function well and prosper in the environment—they cannot escape it. Other organisations are an important part of this environment. How important it is becomes visible when the power perspective is applied to the study of another organisation that works in the same functional and geographical field, such as the regional Nordic arrangement for closer cooperation in defence policy, NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation).[1] In essence, this approach helps us explain why there is still space for yet another organisation in this field and what kind of space it may be.

To shortly lay out what such a perspective would mean in studying NORDEFCO, we might start with more traditional ways of looking at new formations of international cooperation. A conventional way of looking at the establishment and development of this form of cooperation would start from the needs of the participating states. In this case, it would be the Nordic states that find it useful to develop forms of cooperation between themselves even though organisations already exist that could be used as a basis for such cooperation. This is where the other organisations' role comes into play: they are not seen to be sufficient. The Nordic states need something more or something different and refer to their wish and ability to proceed further or differently in the field of defence cooperation than what is the case in the EU or in NATO.

The creation of such an organised cooperation needs a motivation. Why would it be needed? Is it because of the problems of the performance of the two other organisations, perhaps their lack of progress, their slow motion or even their complicated inter-relations? Alternatively, could it complement the others? How to navigate this dense environment of extensive overlaps? Does NORDEFCO have a niche, tasks or purposes that are different from those of the others, thus ensuring there is no real competition? How is a niche carved in this environment?

Explanations relying on factors such as a long history of Nordic cooperation, or the unique bonds between the countries, often rely on the

(assumed) specificity of this cooperation as compared to other forms of cooperation and organisations the same states participate in. What happens, then, if in reality it is hard to find evidence for concrete usefulness, for instance, cost-effectiveness? How do the states legitimise the continuation of such cooperation?

What forms this cooperation takes and how it is spoken about look different when analysed from a power perspective, placing this organisation or form of cooperation in the environment composed of the EU and NATO in interaction. How does a newcomer actually enter such a dense field? How does it prosper? Will it impact the others? Indeed, to what extent is its form actually a consequence of inter-organisational relations?

NORDEFCO can indeed be fruitfully approached by using inter-organisational concepts such as positioning and by looking at power in its relations with the other organisations. Interestingly, it seems legitimised by the EU and NATO, exemplifying the idea of mutual relevance. Both the EU and NATO seem to be very positive about it (Ojanen 2014). The very fact that it is praised as an example illustrates in practice the interdependence of the international organisations. A power-based approach would thus help to make sense of NORDEFCO's relevance, tasks, image and knowledge. Its tasks would seem to be overlapping yet more far reaching; the image is domestically positive, in the hierarchy it positions itself as serving the others. When thinking of image and positioning, the Nordic politicians have been very careful to stress the compatibility of this cooperation with cooperation in the EU and in NATO. Moreover, there is a measure of humility in the way the cooperation is presented—being humble might be a strategy of positioning. In terms of knowledge, complementarity, local expertise but also practices of sharing might be assets. This setting seems to show how rivalry need not be the only and not even the main form of inter-organisational relation: here, too, it is the mutual relevance (interdependence) that seems to count more. Its relevance for the EU and NATO seems to be taken into account from the outset.

8.4   THE EU'S POWER IN INTER-ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM A POWER PERSPECTIVE TO PERSPECTIVES ON POWER IN FUTURE RESEARCH

Much has changed in international relations, and much has changed in terms of power. A power perspective gives us new insights to understanding inter-organisational relations. Not only that there is power that the

organisations may wield over another organisation but also that there is a profound need for power. It appears, indeed, that power now matters more than what it used to. If the organisations in the past needed to appear as powerless, or cared for an image of serving the states that have established them, they now need to appear as powerful. This is because they cannot take their legitimacy for granted in the way they could in the past. They need to perform; they need to be recognised as capable actors; they need continuously to show relevance. Moreover, this need for power is something the organisations share. Power is their shared goal.

We might also put this in the framework of Naïm's (2013) and agree that international organisations now compete for power in a way they perhaps did not need to do before. Nevertheless, we would not agree and say that they have lost power. They may have gained some—and this may contribute to them being more overtly contested than before.

Indeed, the political realities of the late 2010 seem particularly harsh for international organisations. The EU speaks about living through an existential crisis (EU Global Strategy 2016) and stands to lose a member state for the first time in its history. European integration is increasingly politicised (Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015, 2016), but the consequences of this are unclear. NATO has reverted to its original role that concentrates on territorial defence but is internally divided. The UN continues unreformed when it comes to the Security Council composition in a world that less and less resembles that of the late 1940s in terms of demography, flows and interlinkages. The Trump administration in the United States alarmed the Europeans with its questioning of NATO, but even more broadly with its policies on the funding of the UN.

This is not all. There are countries that seem to work to weaken international organisations: the case of Russia splitting the EU and NATO would be a case in point. Other organisations come under increasing strain, too. The International Criminal Court faces the problem of countries withdrawing. The UN Human Rights Council faces problems of legitimacy with member countries that are redefining human rights in their own liking.

What will follow? Would the three organisations survive with the power resources that Grabbe (2014) envisages, vision, patience, consistency and credibility, or do they crumble to leave a void of international governance? Will there be alternative models of international governance presented by countries such as Russia, China, Turkey or the Gulf countries? Is the increasing similarity of the three organisations here studied, and the fact

that they increasingly lean on each other for relevance, a factor that prompts this development?

Classic state-based analysis has its own way of explaining how alternative models come up. Abbott and Snidal (2001) speak about international governance as "the formal and informal bundles of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and non-state actors in international affairs." They argue that actors (states) look for the most desirable forms of governance in given circumstances. So, states might now prefer organisations that are less influential or have less transformatory power, at least on their members, and more malleable or easily instrumentalised. But what would be grounds for seeing something as desirable? Perhaps a broader look is needed. We need to look at the question of functionality or appropriateness or desirability not only in terms of functions and features such as democracy, fairness or representation but also in terms of perception.

The organisations might be perceived as "too functional" in the sense that they are too powerful and, moreover, they join forces as they all work for the same purposes within the same overall paradigm. An alternative, then, could be a type of governance that better "respects the sovereignty" of the participating states. But the organisations might also be perceived as too complicated, and slow, and too heterogeneous inside for the needs of some of the members. In this case, the popularity of cooperation in smaller groups within an organisation, or of preferring bilateral treaties to multilateral arrangements, might grow. There is evidence for this in the field of defence. Why this would be the case is an important question as such. The long-term, structured, and relatively transparent, even democratic modes of international organisations might be replaced by ad hoc arrangements but also to bilateral treaties if these were to present benefits such as speediness, effectiveness, clarity and predictability. In comparison to complex, compromise-prone organisations, bilateral deals are easily overseen and their outcome easier to control.

Naïm, we recall, sees the power as the ability to direct or prevent the current or future actions of other groups or individuals. He notes that as a commodity or force, power is hard to pin down or to quantify, but as a dynamic that shapes a specific situation, it can be evaluated (Naïm 2013: 16, 22–23).

Naïm argues that international organisations grew powerful in that they were bureaucracies, the international counterpart of a Weberian bureaucracy, civil service. For Weber, bureaucracy, or organisation, was key to

wielding power in modern society. On the international level, it took the form of international civil service with the Universal Postal Union (UPU, established in 1874). These large-scale systems were superior to others, an effective way of managing the resources, and thus they made the effective wielding of power possible (Naïm 2013: 40–43). Now, however, this model is challenged: large organisations were efficient because of low costs, but now costs of maintaining order and control are going up, while resources are more easily available and "micropowers" thrive (Naïm 2013: 51, 75).

It is particularly knowledge that dissipates, including the knowledge accumulated by all these structures or bureaucracies. Naïm speaks of de-skilling and loss of knowledge, of the accumulated experience, practices and knowledge of the different bureaucracies but also of an overall corrosion of moral authority and legitimacy (Naïm 2013: 18, 228). At some point, thus, the added value of large organisations is lost, and the size turns into a downside. In the case of NATO, Naïm would see an organisation characterised by an apparent supremacy yet mounting weaknesses reflecting the absence of existential threat and the dilution of power among its participants, also rivalled by parallel structures (idem: 142). The EU, in turn, would actually be contributing to the very change that diminishes its position as it is among the factors that bring barriers down (borders, regulations, euro) (idem: 172)—also barriers to power. Now the international organisations are, in his view, scrambling to keep pace with the booming demands and evolving threats in the areas they are supposed to oversee (idem: 227).

When organisations were more clearly specialised than now, they also had more specialised knowledge. Knowledge might still be a comparative advantage and a power resource, but it is now less specialised and more dispersed.

Indeed, the demands and threats are growing. But the organisations seem to be reacting, too. What we found out in the above was that it is bad for international relations theory and research to stick to thinking that power is where it is understood to be, without a closer look, without changing perspectives; in the end, power might not be there at all but instead, somewhere else. This is linked with the "exercise fallacy" and the "resource fallacy" often present in the analysis. Resources are a poor proxy for power, as Ringmar (2007) points out.

Thus, the questions of whether the EU has power over international organisations, or in what situations and what kind of power this is, or whether it is really very different from the UN and NATO as to its power

bases or resources, and if so, how, are to be complemented by questions on what it achieves with power, what it needs power for and whether it is worth achieving more power. Who does what, what is relevant, who is legitimate: these are the crucial questions where power is being played out. It is, in the end, not about mutual irrelevance but about mutual relevance that the examples in this book have been telling about.

One also needs to look at the implications as to international organisations at large. They seem to connect increasingly in a Lego-like way. Will the connections be further institutionalised? Are they becoming increasingly interdependent? Does this mean new ways working and increasing adaptation? Are they also becoming increasingly autonomous from states? If that was the case, adding the layer of inter-organisational relations to the study of international relations seems needed to make sense of what happens. A fourth layer, as it were, sufficiently independent from the other traditional layers of the individual, the state and the system helps capture the reality of international affairs.

In the end, the organisations might depend more on each other than they depend on their member states. "Power for" or "power with" seems to outweigh "power over." Shared prestige, authority and legitimacy mean interdependence between the organisations. The organisations are clearly aware of each other and aware of the importance of perception, of prestige, authority and legitimacy for how they are seen, and how the other organisations are seen.

Are the organisations thus empowering each other? For Lukes, this was one aspect of soft power of organisations (cf. Chap. 3, Lukes 2007). Lukes sees soft power as a cousin of the "third dimension of power," that is, power to shape, influence or determine others' beliefs. But there is an important distinction that needs to be added. Shaping the preferences of others can take place in two ways that are very different from each other in nature: by limiting the others' capacity to judge for themselves or by requiring and facilitating such capacities—in other words, empowering (Lukes 2007: 95–97). Empowering in the sense of "power for" can also be linked to the fourth face of power as it implies a definition of or change in someone's actorness (cf. Chap. 4).

This brings us back to the question of power at large and to the question of what happens to it. In the Naïmian sense, power would always be somewhere else, it would be volatile: it not only shifts but decays; those in power face more constraints and lose power more easily. We would come up with a picture where indeed the increasingly challenged position of the

international organisations makes them do something differently, to seek one another for relevance and mutual relevance.

Inter-organisational relations help the organisations resist but may also mean they share the same vulnerabilities. International organisations have power over one another, but using that power may be complicated as in the end what they possess is shared. They may gain in knowledge or legitimacy, but legitimacy and knowledge are ingredients of their relevance, and relevance is a goal or a need they share. For research, the implication is quite clear: more emphasis and attention to "power with" is needed to grasp the development of inter-organisational relations, and thus the development of international organisations, their role and function in the international system.

Notes

1. NORDEFCO and its structures, the Policy Steering Committee and the Military Coordination Committee, were established by a Memorandum of Understanding between the five Nordic states on 4 November 2009. The goal is to develop cooperation in five areas: strategic development, capabilities, human resources and education, training and exercises, and operations.

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Communications Assistant, Mission to NATO, Brussels, July 9, 2013.

Counsellor, Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, New York, June 11, 2013.

Counsellor, Political and Security Committee, Permanent Representation of a Member Country to the European Union, Brussels, July 10, 2013.

Deputy Assistant Secretary General, NATO, Brussels, July 9, 2013.

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———, United Nations, New York, June 12, 2013b.

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Member State Ambassador to the EU, Brussels, July 10, 2013.

Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of a Member State to the United Nations, New York, June 10, 2013.

NGO Representative, New York, June 10, 2013.

NGO UN Office Representative, New York, June 11, 2013.

Officer, NATO and Multilateral Affairs Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Brussels, July 9, 2013.

Researcher, New York, June 11, 2013.

Seconded National Expert, EU Military Staff, July 11, 2013.

Senior Advisor, NGO/Think Tank, New York, June 12, 2013.

Senior Policy Advisor, UNDP, Brussels, July 8, 2013.

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