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Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies

Edited by António Costa Pinto, Maurizio Cotta, Pedro Tavares de Almeida

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CHAPTER 1

Beyond Party Government? Technocratic Trends in Society and in the Executive

António Costa Pinto, Maurizio Cotta, and Pedro Tavares de Almeida

The election in 2017 to the politically prestigious position of president of the French Republic of Emmanuel Macron, a young man with the typical profile of a French technocrat and no partisan background is just another episode which revives the old question: Who governs in democratic regimes? Or, to be more specific, who are the men and women who occupy the positions of head of government or minister, and from these positions bear the responsibility of driving national policymaking and steering the state machine? A couple of decades ago the answer to these questions would have been straightforward, at least for European democracies: party men and (fewer) party women. The ranks of cabinets were predominantly

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filled by people who not only had an explicit party label but who had moved to this position after a generally long political career spent in the local and national offices of party organizations and in parliament (Blondel and Thiébault 1991). This fact was commonly seen as one of the best established consequences of 'party government' (Katz 1986; Blondel and Cotta 1996 and 2000). Today we are much less sure about the dominance of the party mode of governance. In fact, while a prominent 'parliamentary-*cum*-party' route to ministerial positions persists in some countries—e.g. Britain (Yong and Hazel 2011; Yong and Bennister 2011), Germany (Kaiser and Fischer 2009; Fleischer and Seyfried 2015) or Belgium (Dumont et al. 2009)—there are also numerous recent examples of non-political ministers (and even, in a few cases, non-political prime ministers), without prior party/parliamentary background.

With few exceptions (a sprinkle of celebrities, sports and entertainment personalities), non-political ministers are characterized by what we may call, in a broad sense, 'expertise'. Their educational and professional qualifications and their background in high-ranking positions in state administration, international organizations, private enterprises or the academic world are what differentiate them from party professionals, whose main credentials are to have spent their time rising to the top of the governmental ladder from within the ranks of party organizations and parliamentary life (Best and Cotta 2000).

These experts or specialists hold in general, but not always, ministerial portfolios that correspond to their specialized skills and professional training. They are sometimes chosen for their technical and managerial capacities, regardless of the specific policy areas of government, and to some extent precisely because they do not have a 'party stigma'.

This phenomenon requires, firstly, to be more carefully documented: What is its diffusion? What are the variations across countries and over time? It must then be explained: Which are the factors that affect its diffusion and development? Finally, it should be interpreted: What is its meaning for democratic governance? Is it compatible with, or is it a dangerous challenge to, this form of government?

While a more analytical interest in this topic, supported by empirical studies, is relatively recent, some of the underlying themes are very old. With the concept of technocracy, the discussion about the role of qualified experts in modern social and political life has a long tradition. It was probably with two early French sociologists, Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, that the theme was put forcefully on the agenda for the first time.

With a mix of analytical interest and strong normative accent, the two French authors not only highlighted the growing importance of scientific and 'engineering' skills in modern society, they also developed a philosophical and political project that asked for the recognition of a guiding role for technocrats in society. This role was, in their view, justified by the greater legitimacy, based upon the higher competence, of this new social group when compared to traditional aristocracies as well as to parliamentary politicians (Saint Simon 1821; Comte 1851–1854; Fisichella 1965).

Different versions of this theme have resurfaced in twentieth-century America (Akin 1977). Veblen (1921), Galbraith (1967) and Bell (1973) are just some of the authors who have debated in global terms the rise in contemporary society of technocrats and technocracy and have discussed the strengths and problems of this phenomenon. On a more specific level, we must also mention the discussion about 'planning' as a crucial instrument of governance which started with the Great Depression and continued after the Second World War, on both sides of the Atlantic. Planning, which obviously required the skills of experts, was seen as a response to the needs of economic reconstruction, to the expanded role of the state in the economy and to a significant extent also as a democratic alternative to the soviet model of economic 5-year plans (Fourquet 1980; Margairaz 1989; Schick 1966; DonVito 1969).

The discussion about the ascendance of technocracy has often gone hand in hand with doubts about the solidity of democracy and its ability to face the problems of the day. Depending on the point of view, technocracy has been alternatively seen as a positive or negative response to a frail democracy (Engelen et al. 2012). The power of technocracy has been many times contrasted to that of elected politicians and its mode of decision considered symptomatic of a pernicious decline in the quality of democracy (Fischer 1990). As J. Habermas underlined, technocratic strategies offer an element of expert-scientific legitimation, not as a complement but as an alternative to open and public political deliberation (1975). An interpretation challenged by Pettit (2004) and Rosanvallon (2008), who on the contrary stress the complementarity and sometimes positive role of technocracy for democratic legitimation. Overall, however, technocracy and democracy have been for many an almost zero-sum game (Bertsou and Pastorella 2015).

Progressively, with the consolidation of democratic regimes and the rise (and scientific 'discovery') of party government in most European countries and elsewhere (Katz 1986), political scientists had predominantly

sidelined the topic when discussing the central mechanisms of governance. From time to time, however, particularly when analysing some of the shortcomings of democratic processes, for instance, the 'short-termism' of elected politicians, the role of experts and technocrats in policymaking was posited as a potential antidote (Alesina and Tabellini 2008).

In two more specialized fields of research, however, greater attention has been paid to the role of experts in contemporary politics. Policy studies have long recognized the importance of experts, working side by side with politicians, in the decision-making process. With metaphors such as 'iron triangles', 'policy (or epistemic) communities', 'issue networks', scholars of this field have developed the conceptual tools for incorporating this type of actors in their analyses. In a similar way, the study of independent authorities, a growing phenomenon which has spread from the United States to Europe towards the end of the twentieth century, has recognized the crucial role of expertise (Majone 1994). When important policy sectors are delegated to independent authorities, such as central banks or regulatory bodies, it is more or less explicitly acknowledged that experts are better suited to administer certain domains than representative politicians.

More recently the discussion has also focused on the recruitment of ministers and has paid increasing attention to the proliferation of non-partisan ministers. This has happened in connection, on the one hand, with a broader debate about the presumed weakening of the party government model and, on the other hand, with the discussion about ongoing changes in the parliamentary form of government and with an emerging interest in non-parliamentary forms of government such as presidentialism and semi-presidentialism and their consequences. It must be added that the two themes have often been seen as interdependent.

The weakening of party organizations and of their social roots has been extensively documented and analysed (Whiteley 2011; Van Biezen et al. 2012). In fact both the old proliferation of paid employment and appointed party functionaries, and the professionalization of party activists and officials are declining (Pakulski and Tranter 2015). Additionally, a number of recent studies have focused their attention on the changing role of the heads of government, suggesting a trend of increased authority of prime ministers over other ministers and the party organization (Foley 1993;

Helms 1996 and 2005; Poguntke and Webb 2005). The phenomenon, christened 'presidentialization'—a term strongly rejected by others who would prefer 'prime-ministerialization' or personalization (Dowding 2013)—is by some authors considered relevant also to the themes discussed here, particularly in the selection of ministers. At the same time, the strong diffusion among recent democracies of the constitutional form generally defined as 'semi-presidentialism' (Duverger 1980; Elgie 1999 and 2011), has stimulated a new wave of studies devoted to analysing the differences between parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential forms of government as well as within each of them. These studies have also raised questions about the consequences of the different forms of government upon the recruitment of ministers and the relations between the head of the executive and the members of the cabinet.

Recently two other themes have been suggested as being connected with the role of experts in politics: the occurrence of deep economic crises and the growing constraints originating from forms of multi-level governance, as is noted in the EU. Both phenomena have been proposed as potential factors favouring the rise of expert ministers in cabinets, to respond to the special challenges of these situations.

This book proposes to analyse, in a sample of European countries, the weight of non-partisan, technocratic recruitment in governments with the ambition of providing, in the first place, an accurate mapping of the phenomenon and, secondly, to explore some of the potential explanatory factors. Our study concentrates its attention on Europe for three main reasons: First, this is the region of the world where party government has found its fullest development, but also where the party systems generated by the recent waves of democratization have been considered as substantially weaker (Blondel and Muller-Rommel 1993; Blondel, Muller-Rommel and Malóva 2007). Secondly, Europe is the region where the parliamentary form of government is the most diffuse, but also where, in recent times, semi-presidential forms of governments have proliferated. Thirdly, Europe has seen with the EU, the development of a particularly strong form of multi-level governance. There are thus good reasons for an in-depth exploration of cabinet recruiting patterns in this area of the world.

In the next section, we will provide a more systematic overview of the existing literature, before, in the final section, describing our research strategy, the selection of cases and the operationalization of the variables.

Patterns of Recruitment and Career Paths of Ministerial Elites: The Ongoing Debate

Parliamentarism and party government have long been seen as the defining features of post-1945 European democracies. With political parties virtually monopolizing elections, parliamentary assemblies and government formation, a partisan and a representative background were the indispensable pre-requisites in the career paths of ministerial aspirants. This predominant recruitment pattern was congruent with the higher systemic professionalization of modern polities (Borchert and Zeiss 2003) and with the rise of party-based professionalism among MPs (Allum 1995; Best and Cotta 2000; Tavares de Almeida et al. 2003; Cotta and Best 2007).

With a few significant exceptions, the presence of individuals appointed as mere experts, and without effective political experience, was seen as a rare occurrence in most executives. Country studies provided abundant empirical evidence in this direction (Dogan 1979; Headey 1974; King 1981; Calise and Mannheimer 1982). A seminal comparative work analysing 13 European countries between 1945 and 1984 (Blondel and Thiébault 1991) could establish that 'outsiders'—defined as ministers without a parliamentary career and also without previously holding a leading party position (a definition quite similar to the one adopted in this book)—comprised, on average, fewer than 12.3% of all ministers (De Winter 1991). Variations of some significance were indeed to be found (the Netherlands with 36% and Luxembourg with 33% of outsiders were the outliers of that sample of countries, showing that in some cases the relationship between parliament and government could not be equally tight), but overall the model of party/parliamentary government was rather clearly confirmed. Moreover, when comparing earlier years with the period after 1964, a slight increase in the dominance of this model could even be seen (Cotta 1991).

This does not mean, however, that post-war European ministers were only chosen from among pure-politicians, the so-called generalists, regardless of their technical competence in any particular policy field. The conceptual distinction between 'politicians' and 'experts', or 'insiders' and 'outsiders', is undoubtedly useful but should not be applied as a rigid dichotomy, since these categories are not always mutually exclusive. Indeed, a significant number of ministers do combine both skills, and while qualifying as professional politicians they may also add expert

knowledge acquired through their education and former occupational training, or through experience in parliamentary and governmental committees (Baturo 2016; Alexiadou 2016). The Blondel and Thiébault study in fact found that a significant proportion of the political ministers exhibited previous service in public bureaucracies or in private professional positions. Their representative background was in fact complemented by some form of non-political expertise (Cotta 1991).

In recent decades, however, in a number of European countries and also in other parts of the world, the career paths of members of government show, in varying degrees, the recruitment of a greater proportion of people coming from outside the realm of politics and selected mostly on the basis of their technical knowledge and specialized expertise (Strøm 2000a; Yong and Hazel 2011). Some of them may have a loose partisan affiliation or connection (they are not pure 'independents'), but they lack experience as national representatives or locally elected officers and never served in party executive committees. This tendency seems more pronounced in the 'third wave' democracies, but also occurs in a few older parliamentary democracies. Also significant is the fact that these experts, very frequently labelled 'technocrats' whenever they are trained in the 'applied sciences', namely, as engineers and economists (Meynaud 1964; Putnam 1977; Hira 2007), have increasingly occupied key executive positions (e.g. as finance ministers) and emerged as powerful actors in the decision-making process, sometimes challenging the prominent role of full-time politicians. A similar trend has also been observed in Latin America since the 1990s (Centeno and Silva 1998; Williams 2006; Dargent 2015). Moreover, fully technocratic governments—'composed of all non-partisan, expert ministers and headed by a non-partisan prime minister' (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Pastorella 2015; Brunclik 2015)—have been appointed more frequently, mainly as an alternative solution for crisis resolution.

If this phenomenon is more than an exception, what can explain it? Why is the presence of non-political ministers so significant? Why has it increased with time? We must also ask why the dimensions of this phenomenon vary across countries. In recent years a growing number of contributions have started to address these questions and have proposed a variety of explanatory hypotheses.

The most general assessments consider it as an indicator and evidence of the increasing complexity and sophisticated nature of modern-day governance, a major factor conducive to technocratic solutions and the assignment of sensitive policy issues to experts (Meynaud 1964 and 1967;

Putnam 1976; Fischer 2009). Other explanations focus on more specific institutional and political variables, which are supposedly correlated with the changing pattern of ministerial selection. These variables include: the constitutional framework of government, namely, the implications of the widespread diffusion of semi-presidential systems; the cabinet format (coalition vs. single party; majority vs. minority) (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Protsyk 2005a, 2006 and 2011; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010); the so-called presidentialization of politics and the growing empowerment and autonomy of national chief executives (Poguntke and Webb 2005; McAllister 2007), a trend that some believe to be reinforced by Europeanization (Johansson and Raunio 2010; Johansson and Tallberg 2010) and the (declining) organizational strength and perceived reputation of mainstream parties, closely related with falling public trust in politicians (Blondel and Cotta 2000; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Krouwel 2012).

The constitutional and political framework of government is one of the most accredited explanations for the presence of non-partisan ministers in democratic governments (Strøm 2000b). Using game theoretical (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006) or principal-agent (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009) approaches, two recent studies focusing specifically on this variable have hypothesized the existence of a significant difference between parliamentary forms of government, where government portfolios should be more frequently controlled by parties, and semi-presidential ones, where a greater proportion of ministerial positions would escape party control. The new wave of democratizations in central and eastern Europe, which has brought a new diffusion of semi-presidential governments should, accordingly, have strengthened the presence of technocratic ministers (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013). Another study hypothesizes that presidential governments should be the most inclined to recruit non-partisan ministers (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010).

Why should forms of government matter? The basic idea behind this hypothesis is that an elected president (a common feature of the pure presidential form and of the 'mixed' semi-presidential form), who enjoys a direct popular legitimation and is not dependent in his office from parliament, enjoys greater freedom than a parliamentary prime minister in the choice of ministers. The lesser need to pay attention to the parliamentary/party base should reduce the incentives to fill the cabinet with partisans (otherwise needed to gain and maintain support in parliament) and leave

the president freer to pick ministers from other backgrounds. In the past, agency risks in presidential cabinets and in the relations between presidents and their own parties had not been sufficiently discussed by the literature. More focused research indicates that party-affiliated ministers are not always reliable agents for presidents, 'and presidents appoint non-partisan ministers to limit agency loss', as a study on partisanship of single-party cabinets in 12 Latin American countries convincingly claims (Martinez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015). Expertise and personal loyalty will therefore have greater weight in the selection. The situation is obviously more complex in semi-presidential than in presidential systems, as in the former the cabinet is constitutionally subservient to a double principal—the president as well as the parliamentary majority, which has the power of confidence over the government.

The decline of parties in older democracies or the weaker development of parties in more recent democracies should produce a structural and long-term reduction of their ability (and in particular that of parties in parliament) to supply a sufficient pool of qualified candidates for positions of ministerial responsibility. The supply by parties of 'ministrables' could be affected also by more short-term and conjunctural effects such as a long period in office leading to a certain exhaustion of internal resources and to the need to look outside of party ranks.

Leaving aside for the time being some of the problems related to the quality of data and the conceptual categories employed, what are the main results obtained so far? Based on a sample of 134 European cabinets representing 12 semi-presidential and 12 purely parliamentary (republican) regimes in the 1990s, Amorim Neto and Strøm show that semi-presidentialism increases the probability of having non-political ministers (2006, pp. 636–637). 'Owing to their direct ties to voters and more extensive constitutional powers, popularly elected presidents are more prone to try to influence cabinet formation than their parliament-selected counterparts' (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006, p. 673). Using a somewhat larger set of data, covering 57 countries and including presidential, semi-presidential and both monarchical and republican parliamentary systems, over the period 1980–2000, Amorim Neto and Samuels affirm that the greatest difference is to be found between presidentialism and the two other forms of government. 'The institutional leap from semi-presidentialism to pure presidentialism appears to have the largest effect on the relative degree of partisan composition of the cabinet' (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010, p. 14). Differences between parliamentary system

and semi-presidentialism in the recruitment of ministers exist but are definitely smaller (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010, pp. 14–15). Placing the three forms of government—parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism and pure presidential system—on a continuum defined in terms of the influence (from weakest to strongest) of the head of state over cabinet appointments, Amorim Neto and Samuels find that, ceteris paribus, the stronger the executive and the more direct the role of electors in the executive's investiture, the higher the proportion of non-partisans in the cabinet.

Since, especially among semi-presidential systems, the variability of presidential powers is remarkable, most studies also introduce a measure of these powers as one of the crucial explanatory variables (Siaroff 2003). Using measures derived from established works such as those of Shugart and Carey (1992) and Metcalf (2000), a number of contributions have tried to establish a more precise relationship between the proportion of non-partisan ministers and the variable powers of the head of state. The hypothesis put forward is that, independently from the specific constitutional form of government, the stronger the powers of the head of state, the greater will be his or her ability to resist the influence of parliamentary parties in the selection of ministers and thus a greater space will be opened for the recruitment of non-partisans. The empirical evidence provides mixed support for this hypothesis: This variable is found to have a positive impact in the study of European parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006), but is not significant in a more temporally extended study also covering presidential regimes (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010).

Other political and institutional factors have also been evoked, sometimes in conjunction with the form of government, to explain our phenomenon. It has been suggested, for instance, that in parliamentary systems, high-party system fragmentation tends to lead to stalemated legislatures, which then favour the formation of occasional caretaker cabinets who will be relatively more likely to have non-partisan ministers (Linz and Shain 1994). In semi-presidential regimes, when the parliament's ability to bargain is inhibited by party fragmentation, presidential influence rises, and party control over portfolios declines (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009). Let us not forget also that semi-presidential regimes (and sometimes even parliamentary ones with strong parliamentary elected presidents) have more caretakers or interim governments than pure parliamentary ones. Technocratic cabinets, defined as cabinets with a non-partisan prime minister and a majority of non-partisan ministers, similarly

to minority cabinets, have been found to be associated with fragmented parliaments in central and eastern European democracies (Protsyk 2005b). More broadly, the proportion of non-partisan ministers in the cabinet is found to increase as legislative fragmentation increases in all systems (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010) (yet this relationship did not hold in another, more restricted, study) (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). The incidence of non-partisan appointments was also found to rise with electoral volatility and to be higher with minority than with majority governments (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006).

The impact of electoral systems has also been examined as a potential factor. Based on a cross-country analysis of post-communist experiences where, in comparison to the broader European context, the share of non-partisan ministers looks very high, Protsyk has explored the combination of a version of semi-presidentialism that includes a constitutionally powerful president with single-member district/mixed electoral system. His conclusion is that this situation favours the ability of presidents to enhance their control over parliament and the cabinet (and thus to have less party-dominated governments). In countries with 'little tradition of multi-party politics, such a combination will further deter structuration of politics along party lines and will affect patterns of executive accountability and responsiveness' (Protsyk 2011, pp. 107–110).

The 'presidentialization of politics' is another factor which has been often discussed in this context. For some scholars several interrelated processes have led to a political process increasingly moulded by the inherent logic of presidentialism implying stronger leadership power and autonomy of the prime minister within the executive (Poguntke and Webb 2005). The presidentialization hypothesis highlights the augmented centralization in the cabinet and an electoral process increasingly focused on the personality of prime ministers, who more and more approximate the chief executives of presidential systems and who select ministers from outside parliament to bolster their cabinets' effectiveness (Bäck et al. 2009).

It has been strongly debated whether presidentialization is the best term to designate such phenomena (Dowding 2013; Webb and Poguntke 2013). Critics affirm that if there has been an increase in the powers of prime ministers this has made them *less similar* rather than more similar to (American) presidents at least with regard to legislative activities, as US presidents have a much tougher job than prime ministers in obtaining success for their policies. Prime-ministerialization or personalization would be better words to designate this trend (Dowding 2013). Leaving

aside the general discussion about this phenomenon, a number of country studies suggest that, thanks to an enhanced role (more presidentialized or more prime-ministerialized) prime ministers in parliamentary and sometimes in semi-presidential countries, have gained a greater autonomy (from parties and parliamentary groups) in the selection of ministers and this can be conducive to a larger selection of non-partisan ministers. Spain and Portugal, two countries with different forms of government (fully parliamentary Spain and semi-presidential Portugal), are major examples of one-party cabinets with highly presidentialized features, increasing cabinet dominance over the party and with (some) prime ministers using executive leadership as an instrument to control the party (Pinto and Tavares de Almeida 2009). A specific study of Spanish cabinets indicates, however, a significant degree of variation in this respect as some cabinets have been formed only by party ministers, while other cabinets have had a majority of non-partisan ministers; personal loyalty to the prime minister is perhaps the crucial factor in this (Rodriguez Teruel 2010). Studies of Scandinavian cabinets have also provided some evidence in the same direction (Beckman 2006; Bäck et al. 2009)

For Member States of the European Union, the phenomenon of presidentialization (or, if we prefer, prime-ministerialization) of government, with all its consequences, has been ascribed at least in part to the effects of the advances of European integration and in particular to the role of summitry in decision-making (Johansson and Tallberg 2010). The role played by prime ministers in the European Council and the needs of intergovernmental bargaining should have contributed to increase their autonomy, also with implications in the selection of cabinet ministers. In particular, European integration, as it strengthens the need for technocrats able to master the coordination of national and EU policies, would discourage the presence of MPs in cabinets (Bäck et al. 2009).

Finally, we should not forget the impact (possibly accrued in European countries by EU related constraints) of critical junctures, namely, political and/or financial crises. The technocratic elements of European integration (independent agencies and binding rules on economic affairs) have expanded dramatically in scope (Sánchez-Cuenca 2017), and many scholars have suggested that economic conditions and the need to pursue efficiency affect the likelihood of technocrats entering the ministry. In a global sample, negative economic conditions seem to increase the likelihood of non-partisan technocrats entering the cabinet and some studies illustrate that executives have greater incentives to appoint non-partisans

when the economy is in crisis (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010). Counterintuitively, however, in a previous study, a negative relationship between the two factors was suggested (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). In the context of the implementation of structural reforms during the 1990s, Latin American scholars have developed an important number of studies on the performance and impact of powerful non-partisan ministers within presidential cabinets (Centeno and Silva 1998; Silva 2009). Signals to the electorate, the business community and international investors, as well as the position of the country in the business cycle, are powerful elements of explanation for partisan shifts in technocratic appointments in the region (Kaplan 2016).

Since we can assume that technocratic cabinets will have a higher than normal number of non-political ministers, the question as to whether there is a close relationship between critical junctures and 'technocratic cabinets' is also relevant to our topic. While in some cases it is quite clear that such cabinets can be associated with the impact of the Eurozone crisis developing after 2008, a more systematic exploration of the diffusion of technocratic governments shows that they are not just a recent (if extraordinary) political phenomenon: From the end of the Second World War until June 2013, there have been 24 technocrat-led governments in 27 European Union democracies (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). The relevance of factors like scandals, economic crisis and the fragmentation of the party system illustrates that the appointment of technocratic cabinets happens more frequently 'when the political system is unstable, deadlocked or unable to face a situation of crisis (be it economic or political)' (Pastorella 2015). It is interesting as well to stress that in these junctures the few studies we have on citizens' attitudes in Europe indicate a preference for technocrats over party politicians (Bertsou and Pastorella 2015). This is not so surprising as the trust on parties has generally reached a very low level.

Last but not least, it can be observed that in critical junctures associated with unpopular reforms, involving cuts in social welfare, labour market liberalization and other hard decisions, politicians may be induced to invite technocratic or non-partisan ministers to the relevant portfolios in order to avoid high political costs to their political careers. A recent study of 13 west European democracies pointed out convincingly that in this type of crisis juncture, the primary motivation of prime ministers for the ministerial recruitment of technocrats is more related to their independence from electoral politics than to their expertise (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2015).

We cannot conclude this discussion of the literature without highlighting the fact that an important (but difficult) aspect is still almost unexplored: the consequences of the presence of technocratic elements in the government of democratic countries. Do non-partisan ministers (and even more non-partisan cabinets) perform differently in terms of policymaking? A recent study of Italian lawmaking which provides some preliminary evidence about this suggests this as a promising line of research (Pedrazzani 2017). Do they deliver what is expected from them or do they fail to deliver? And, on a higher level, do they mean a significant limitation of democracy by weakening the electoral delegation chain or can they be considered a useful remedy to protect democracy from some of its defects (short-termism, electoralism, demagoguery)? These are questions which at some point will have to be taken seriously.

This Book and Its Aims

This synthetic discussion of the recent literature suggests a number of observations concerning the themes debated and the results obtained. The first is that on the relevance of the phenomenon, there is a sufficient agreement in the literature. The presence of gaps in the 'old normal', that is, the model of party government, is a phenomenon, which clearly deserves to be more carefully analysed and which can also possibly help us to understand better, 'by opposition', the working of party government and its mechanisms of political delegation. The phenomenon can take either the extreme form of a fully technocratic cabinet, where both prime minister and ministers have non-political qualifications, or else entail the presence of a variable proportion of ministers with a technocratic background side by side with partisan ministers.

The second point concerns the size of the phenomenon, whether it is equally distributed across countries or not and whether it shows a growing trend over time. Variations across countries have been repeatedly documented (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010), but variations over time in a comparative perspective have received less systematic and specific attention (Strøm 2000a), except perhaps for the more limited phenomenon of fully technocratic cabinets (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). With regard to comparative analyses of this phenomenon, which use an extensive research strategy, some caveats can be raised about the quality of the data used. In most of the cases, data come from already existing data collections (Woldendorp et al. 2000; Strøm 2000a) not specifically designed for analysing this phenomenon. While

there are no doubts about the general quality of these data collections, the criteria used for defining partisan and non-partisan ministers are not always as clearly operationalized and standardized as it would be required when zooming in on our topic.

The third point concerns the explanations offered for this phenomenon. Highly different factors have been proposed. To remind them we can provide a list of the most frequently discussed factors:

1. Forms of government
2. Powers of the head of state
3. Government fragmentation
4. Legislative fragmentation
5. Cabinet status (majority vs. minority; single party vs. coalition)
6. Electoral system
7. Decline of parties
8. Presidentialization of government
9. European integration
10. Economic crises
11. Age of democracy

To organize this rich field of hypothetical factors we can read them from the point of view of their potentially negative impact upon the party government model and the 'voters-parliament-cabinet' delegation model associated with it. All these factors are hypothesized to be relevant, at least in principle, because they in some way contradict the operating mechanisms of party government (which entails that a collective body with some sort of programmatic identity/platform plays the role of intermediary between voters and the government and that this intermediary role is predominantly implemented through the parliamentary assembly). The ability to mobilize electoral (and then parliamentary) support, to provide collective loyalty in decision-making and to groom a personnel suited for these purposes, are the classic resources which parties in their best shape can offer (or, one could say, impose) to the government thanks to their organization and programmatic/ideological identity. The impact of these resources can be weakened either because of factors internal to the working of party government itself which reduce their supply and effectiveness or because of external factors which reduce their demand. Moreover, the control of the parties upon ministerial selection can be diminished structurally, and with long-term effects, or conjuncturally and thus with short-term effects (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Factors explaining technocratic government

	Internal	*External*
Short term	Cabinet status (majority vs. minority and single party vs. coalition) Government fragmentation	Economic crises
Long term	Party decline (and exhaustion of internal resources) Legislative fragmentation Presidentialization of government	Age of democracy EU integration Form of government Presidential powers Electoral system

Internal factors suggest effects from the side of supply and external factors from the side of demand. The distinction between long-term and short-term factors should be highlighted as the first will produce stable (and possibly growing) levels of non-partisan ministers while the second will produce more variable and reversible patterns.

In Table 1.2, we summarize the different factors, their theoretical background, the typical operationalization and also some of the problems arising at both the theoretical and empirical level.

How does this book innovate in comparison to previous studies and what are its limitations? Our strategy is a bit different from the strategies followed so far: There have been either in-depth case studies (data collecting and hypotheses generating) or extensive comparative analyses exploiting existing databases and testing different hypotheses with multivariate statistics. We acknowledge the merits of these strategies but we try to improve in respect to some of their problems. With respect to case studies, we add a comparative perspective which is better able to test the soundness of hypotheses; with respect to existing extensive comparative analyses, we provide a series of national ad hoc in-depth collections of data based on carefully standardized criteria. The confidence in the quality of data is thus enhanced. Admittedly our strategy will not enable us to provide robust tests of the influence of all the factors mentioned. It should however permit a more qualitatively articulated exploration of the relationship between some of the hypothesized explanatory factors and the mechanisms of ministerial recruitment and of their variations across countries and across time.

In this book we are able to provide detailed empirical evidence concerning the phenomenon of non-partisan, expert ministers in 14 European countries. The national cases selected include the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Table 1.2 Explanatory factors

Factors	*Theoretical bases*	*Operationalization*	*Problems*
Form of government	Different forms of government influence the degree of autonomy of the head of the executive in the choice of ministers vis-à-vis the parliament	Classification of forms of government	The semi-presidential form of government (if formally defined) covers very different political arrangements affecting the powers of the president
Powers of the President	The constitutional powers attributed to the head of state influence the degree of autonomy of the head of the executive in the choice of ministers vis-à-vis the parliament	Different scales	Not all the powers listed in the scales are relevant for the phenomenon of non-political ministers. Beside formal powers also political situations which affect the relationship between president, prime minister and parliament should be considered
Government fragmentation	The fragmentation of the cabinet and the difficulties in the bargaining process should give more space to the head of the executive to assert its influence vis-à-vis parties	Effective number of parties in the cabinet	The opposite view would seem equally plausible: With many parties in government to accommodate the space for non-partisan ministers would be reduced
Legislative fragmentation	By making the formation of cabinets more difficult, and increasing the probability of caretaker governments it should increase the probability of full or mixed technocratic cabinets	Effective number of parties in parliament	The opposite view would seem equally plausible: With many parties in parliament to reward the space for non-partisan ministers would be reduced

(*continued*)

Table 1.2 (continued)

Factors	*Theoretical bases*	*Operationalization*	*Problems*
Cabinet status	Minority governments will be more probably open to technocratic components	Type of parliamentary support	Minority governments are more probably single-party governments and this would run against the government fragmentation hypothesis
Electoral system	Single-member district (SMD) electoral systems should reduce the control of parties upon recruitment	SMD electoral systems vs. PR systems	The effects of electoral systems are strongly dependent from configurations of political actors (and their effects could change significantly)
Decline of parties	The organizational and ideological weakening of parties should reduce their supply of qualified personnel and increase the legitimacy of experts	Measures of party membership, measures of party identification	Risk of tautology: The decline of partisan ministers is in itself a measure of party decline
Presidentialization of government	The transformation of the role of the prime ministers should increase their ability to choose autonomously the ministers	Strengthening of the PM Office, enhanced electoral role of PM candidate	Ambiguities in the concept: presidentialization, or personalization or prime-ministerialization?
Economic crises	The policy solutions to a crisis require greater competence and their unpopularity incentivizes the shifting of the burden on non-elected ministers	GDP growth level, unemployment level	How strong must be a crisis to activate technocratic solutions?

(*continued*)

Table 1.2 (continued)

Factors	*Theoretical bases*	*Operationalization*	*Problems*
European integration	The growing importance of European level decisions taken by the European Council should enhance the independence of heads of governments in national politics	Stages and levels of EU integration	Difficulties in defining precisely when the effects of European integration impact upon the role of national executives
Age of democracy	More recent democracies are supposed to have less consolidated party systems and thus leave a greater autonomy to heads of governments	Time from democratic instauration	The assumption linking age of democracy and party system consolidation is debatable

France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey (a country which, depending on the point of view, can be considered European or non-European), thus covering a rich variety of democratic polities, with different institutional settings and divergent political paths. We have thus countries from Western and from Central-Eastern Europe, old democracies and new ones, pure parliamentary systems and semi-presidential ones (and with a significant variation in the role of the elected president), countries that have deeply suffered from the economic crisis of recent years and countries that have managed fairly well during the same period. The degree of fragmentation of their party systems and the degree of persistence or decay of the traditional party government also differ significantly. Although the period of time examined in each country varies according to the age of democracy, the data series collected enables us to scrutinize medium or even long-term trends—more than 20 years for the CEE countries and an even longer period for Western Europe and Turkey.

For the sake of cross-national comparisons, a common operational definition of 'non-partisan minister' is applied: people without a relevant

political background—they never held local office (e.g. mayor) and had no parliamentary experience (at regional, national or European level) nor a previous record in leading positions in a political party. In other words, people who have come to be members of the cabinet from outside the world of party politics and, presumably, on the basis of different qualifications (typically but not exclusively a specialized expertise in some domain). We distinguish them, therefore, from the ministers who have had a structured political background and have acquired their qualification to be minister through the channels of representative politics (having occupied party and parliamentary positions and/or local offices). As already mentioned, a simple affiliation to a party, without a formal role, is not considered as a sufficient element to qualify a minister as a party politician. As concerns parliamentary experience, we also include among non-political ministers those who, without a party career, were appointed to the cabinet shortly after being elected for a first mandate as deputies and had no time to occupy their seat in the legislature.

The country chapters cover six single case studies (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey), a binary comparison (Hungary and Romania) and one six-country comparison (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and the three Baltic countries). The individual chapters follow a common format. They measure the extent and variations over time of the ministerial recruitment of non-partisan experts; they describe their background profile, the type of portfolio allocation and length of tenure (risk of dismissal) and, whenever possible, the post-ministerial career; and finally they discuss the range of potential driving factors which promote or inhibit the rise of this particular subset of ministerial appointees. The concluding chapter summarizes the main lines of inquiry presented in each chapter, pointing out similarities and convergences, as well as divergences related to historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies, and revisits the key explanatory factors underlying the role played by non-partisan experts in various European cabinets.

Bringing together a group of scholars with a sound record of publications in the field of elite studies, and relying on rich and unique empirical evidence for a large number of countries, harmonized and standardized for cross-national comparisons, this book hopefully offers a firm grounding and new insights into the current public and scholarly debates on the introduction of technocrats into politics, an expanding phenomenon with significant potential implications for the very fabric of democracy.

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CHAPTER 2

Non-partisan Ministers Under the French Fifth Republic (1959–2014)

Marie-Hélène Bruère and Daniel Gaxie

Introduction

The most distinctive formal criterion of a parliamentary regime is governmental responsibility before the parliament. Ministers owe explanations about their activities to MPs at every moment. They must be able to take the floor to answer questions and defend their choices. They are usually members of the parliament, and they remain MPs when they are appointed to the government.[1]

Conversely, in a presidential regime, branches of government are separated. It means that the Parliament cannot dismiss the government or the president, and the executive branch cannot dissolve the parliament. A more political feature is that members of the government do not belong to the parliament and are often recruited outside the legislative branch. The government is a form of advisory staff to the president. The president personally chooses the members of his cabinet, not necessarily from among parliamentarians or political parties that support him.

The French Fifth Republic is a semi-presidential regime.[2] It shares some attributes of a parliamentary regime. The main one being that government

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is responsible before the National Assembly. But, unlike most parliamentary regimes, the head of state is elected by direct universal suffrage. A supplementary distinctive feature is that the president of the Republic has also been given many important formal powers by the constitution. He or she may dissolve the National Assembly. They appoint the highest civil servants, who occupy positions on the borders of the administrative and political sectors of the state. They are commander in chief of the national armies. They may exercise exceptional powers in the event of a crisis. The president also appoints the prime minister. On the request of the prime minister, the president appoints the other ministers and terminates their functions.

Some heads of state in genuine parliamentary regimes, of course, also have significant formal constitutional powers, but they are not always able to implement all of them. French presidents, on the contrary, as long as they have a majority in the National Assembly, do exercise their constitutional powers. They also enjoy political powers that may conflict with the letter of the constitution. In practice, the president holds a significant part of the constitutional powers of the government or of the prime minister. For instance, according to the constitution, the government sets national policy and carries it out. In fact, presidents are the true head of the executive branch. They are the main decision-makers when it comes to the appointment of ministers. They retain the power to demand the prime minister's resignation.

One explanation for such an unusual concentration of power is that the presidential election has become the only first-order election. MPs who belong to the political parties associated in the presidential coalition depend more and more on the president for their election and re-election. Many of their voters support them because they are perceived as the local representatives of their party and, increasingly, of the president-elect. In many cases, their election depends more on the collective political capital of the presidential coalition than on their own personal one. The same is true for members of opposition parties whose results rely, to a growing extent, on the popularity of their main leader, who, in most cases, is also a presidential candidate. A consequence is that most MPs would be in trouble if their party decided not to appoint them as their official candidate at the next parliamentary elections. This is one of the reasons why they are inclined to obey injunctions and demands of the president and of the government and, for instance, to vote in favour of the bills transmitted by the executive branch in the name of the president.

The authors of the 1958 Constitution wanted to break with the parliamentary tradition of the Third and Fourth Republics, which, from their viewpoint, led to governmental instability. They introduced a set of constitutional provisions aimed at preventing such instability, an important provision being the incompatibility of parliamentary and governmental functions. When members of Parliament are appointed to the government, they must resign, and they are replaced by a substitute, elected on the same ticket. Since 2008, these former representatives automatically return to the Parliament when they leave the government, whereas before they had to regain their seat through a by-election.

It is interesting to examine to what extent the semi-presidential character of the Fifth Republic has consequences for government recruitment. Due to the semi-parliamentary aspect of the regime and the weight of political parties that support the president and/or the government, most ministers are professional politicians that have been elected to the parliament. The proportion of non-politician, non-parliamentarian, and non-partisan ministers is an indicator of the mixed nature of the institutional regime[3] that, in the French case, has not been widely studied.[4] It has, however, been noted that Charles de Gaulle appointed many high-ranking civil servants, some of them with little or no partisan and parliamentary background, at the beginning of his first presidency in 1959.[5] Such a choice, alien to French parliamentary tradition, also raised questions about an emerging 'technocracy', able to deal with issues of an increasingly complex society. Later, political commentators analysed appointments of a few non-politician ministers as an increase in the weight of the 'civil society', in a context of distrust towards politicians, politics and political parties. These questions and hypotheses need to be discussed through a closer examination of the number, the characteristics, the selection, the role and the destiny of so-called expert and non-partisan ministers, in the particular case of the French Fifth Republic, since its inception in 1959 until 2014.

Morphology of Non-partisan Governmental Recruitment Under the Fifth Republic

From the beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1959–2014, 602 persons have been appointed to the government, and, among them, 98 were without previous parliamentary or political leadership experience. They may be considered as 'non-partisan' ministers. Their proportion amounts to 16.3% of all members of government. More than two thirds of these have

belonged to right-wing governments (67 versus 31), but conservative parties have led governments for 38 years since 1959, compared to 17 years of socialist leadership. The proportion of 'non-partisan' members is quite similar in right-wing (17.2%) and left-wing (14.0%) governments (Table 2.2). No increasing or decreasing trend can be observed since 1959 (Table 2.1). Despite the semi-presidential regime, the weight of non-partisan ministers is weaker in France than in many countries, especially those from southern,[6] and eastern[7] Europe. However, even though the proportion of non-partisan ministers is weaker in France than in other countries, it is unusually high by the yardstick of the French parliamentary tradition. It thus appears as a characteristic of the new regime established in 1959 and especially of its presidential component.

Table 2.1 French governments and the number and share of ministers[a] without political background, 1959–2014

Government (PM and his party, begin date)	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers[a]*	*Ministers without political background[b]*	
				N	*%*
De Gaulle first presidency					
Debré UNR 01-1959	Right	Majority	38	10	26
Pompidou 1 UNR 1962	Right	Majority	30	4	13
Pompidou 2 UNR 1962	Right	Majority	27	5	19
De Gaulle second presidency					
Pompidou 3 UNR 1966	Right	Majority	27	4	15
Pompidou 4 UNR 1967	Right	Majority	38	4	11
Couve de Murville UNR 1968	Right	Majority	30	0	0
Pompidou presidency					
Chaban Delmas UDR 1969	Right	Majority	44	0	0
Messmer 1 UDR 1972	Right	Majority	29	0	0
Messmer 2 UDR 1973	Right	Majority	37	3	8
Messmer 3 UDR 1974	Right	Majority	28	2	7
Giscard d'Estaing presidency					
Chirac UDR1974	Right	Majority	52	12	23
Barre 1 UDF 1976	Right	Majority	36	9	25

(*continued*)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Government (PM and his party, begin date)	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
				N	*%*
Barre 2 UDF 1977	Right	Majority	43	9	21
Barre 3 UDF 1978	Right	Majority	47	9	19
Mitterrand first presidency					
Mauroy 1 PS 1981	Left	Majority	45	3	7
Mauroy 2 PS 1983	Left	Majority	45	2	4
Fabius PS 1984	Left	Majority	45	5	11
Chirac UDR 1986	Right	Majority	43	4	9
Cohabitation					
Mitterrand second presidency					
Rocard PS 1988	Left	Majority	54	17	31
Cresson PS 1991	Left	Majority	45	8	18
Bérégovoy PS 1992	Left	Majority	46	9	20
Balladur RPR 1993	Right	Majority	31	0	0
Cohabitation					
Chirac first presidency					
Juppé 1 RPR 1995	Right	Majority	42	5	12
Juppé 2 RPR 1995	Right	Majority	32	3	9
Jospin PS 1997	Left	Majority	43	3	7
Cohabitation					
Chirac second presidency					
Raffarin 1 UMP 2002	Right	Majority	39	7	18
Raffarin 2 UMP 2004	Right	Majority	45	5	11
Villepin UMP 2005	Right	Majority	32	7	22
Sarkozy presidency					
Fillon 1 UMP 2007	Right	Majority	52	11	21
Fillon 2 UMP 2010	Right	Majority	31	6	19
Hollande presidency					
Ayrault PS 2012	Left	Majority	38	1	3
Valls 1 PS 2014	Left		32	1	3
Valls 2 PS 2014	Left		35	2	6

[a]Including the prime minister

[b]Ministers without parliamentary experience or a local/regional political background, as well as a previous record of leading positions in political parties at any time before their appointment

Table 2.2 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different types of governments, 1959–2014

Cabinet type	*Political orientation*	*Appointed*		*Dismissed*[a]	
		N	*%*[b]	*N*	*%*[c]
Grand coalition	C		–		–
Coalition	L	31	14.0	6	16
	R	67	17.2	17	17
	C				
Single party majority	L				
	R				
	C				
Single party minority	L				
	R				
	C				
		98	100.0	23	100.0
	Left				
	Right				
	Centre				

L Left, *R* Right, *C* Centre
[a]Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate
[b]Percentages refer to all ministers appointed
[c]Percentages refer to all ministers dismissed

A Presidential Prerogative and a Feature of a Semi-presidential Regime

As confirmation of this hypothesis, the number and the percentage of the non-parliamentarian ministers are higher at the beginning, or shortly after the beginning, of a new presidency (Charles de Gaulle in 1959, Valery Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, François Mitterrand in 1981, and, even more so after 1988, Jacques Chirac in 1995 and 2002, Sarkozy in 2007) (Table 2.1). In some cases, appeals to non-partisan personalities are at their highest levels at the moment of a 're-launch' of a presidential mandate (Valery Giscard d'Estaing in 1976 after the resignation of Jacques Chirac as prime minister, François Mitterrand in 1984, when he decided a more moderate policy direction for his government, Jacques Chirac in 2005, with the appointment of a new prime minister). The only exceptions to this are the presidencies of Georges Pompidou in 1969, with a limited 'restart' in 1973 after parliamentary elections, and more clearly, François Hollande in

2012. The percentage of non-politicians is particularly high when the prime minister also appoints former advisers, faithful followers or friends, who do not belong to the parliamentary *milieu*, as was the case in 1988 with Michel Rocard. A new presidency and a 'new departure' during a presidential mandate are windows of opportunity for change, particularly for change in the governmental team. A way to highlight such changes is to co-opt persons who have little or no political experience, but who are close to the prime minister and, even more so, to the president. Table 2.1 shows that the number and proportion of non-partisan ministers are higher in governments formed immediately after presidential elections than in subsequent ones, with some exceptions for 'new governments', whose composition is meant to symbolize a political revival of presidential activities. Despite the exception in 2012, it seems that the habit of choosing a significant number of new ministers outside the political field, at the beginning of a new presidential term, is more firmly established after 1974 than it was at the beginning of the Fifth Republic.

Such cycles of renewal of governmental personnel suggest that the appointment of non-politicians to government is mainly a presidential prerogative. Its significance is therefore linked to the semi-presidential character of the regime. The president and the prime minister have to nominate the main leaders of the political parties who support them. They also need to recruit loyal seconds. The choice of promoting new governmental actors without personally independent political capital seems, at least partly, the consequence of a strategy that aims to secure political and personal loyalty to the president (and also, to a lesser extent, to the prime minister). Once the new presidential team is put together after the election or the re-election of a president, changes in governmental personnel are more limited.

A Precarious Position

The appointment of politically inexperienced newcomers to the government is also a risk that helps to explain the unequal length of the governmental career of non-partisan ministers. The shortest experience lasted 1 month, the longest 158 months, with an average duration of 32 months and a high standard deviation (28 months). About a third of non-politician ministers remained in office for less than 2 years, a third between 2 and 3 years and a third over 3 years. There are generally three or four distinct governments in the course of a presidency. A majority of non-partisan

ministers (56[8] out of 98 or 58%, compared to 39% for members of all governments since 1959) have belonged to only one government, and less than a third (27 out of 98 or 28%, compared to 35% of members of all governments since 1959) have been able to last for three or more governments. Only a minority are thus able to last a whole presidency. A governmental chair is a precarious position for non-partisan ministers. This suggests that many political amateurs that are called to the government are unable to face the difficulties and to comply with the rules of the position. They disappear relatively quickly while those who manage to cope with these difficulties are re-appointed and pursue a governmental career that often leads them later to a political career. However, the proportion of 'non-partisan' ministers who were dismissed or who resigned before the end of the government in which they were appointed (respectively, 25% for right-wing and 17% for left-wing governments) is not significantly higher than the percentage for all members of government of the Fifth Republic (23%).

Unequal governmental destinies of non-partisan ministers also suggest that these actors have different roles and status.

Non-partisan Ministers with Different Roles and Status

A first difference lies in the position in the governmental hierarchy: 43 non-partisans have been nominated as junior ministers (*Secretaires d'État*), 12 as mid-level ministers (*Ministres délégués*), 42 as senior ministers, and one directly as prime minister (Georges Pompidou). Seven junior ministers have become senior ministers during the same or, more often, in a subsequent government. Four senior ministers later became prime minister (Maurice Couve de Murville, Pierre Messmer, Raymond Barre, Dominique de Villepin), all in conservative governments.

A second major difference is linked to areas of competence of the governmental portfolio. Around 30% of the non-partisan ministers have been in charge of 'technical' departments (industry, agriculture, housing, transport, major public infrastructures). An almost identical number have been at the head of 'social' departments (social affairs, health, elderly people, youth, disabled persons, solidarity, precariousness, social integration). A quarter of non-partisan ministers dealt with international affairs (foreign affairs, defence, European affairs, cooperation, *Francophonie* (association of French-speaking countries)). The same percentage (around 16%[9]) worked with economic affairs (economy, finance, budget, external trade,

privatization), state affairs (home office, justice, overseas departments, human rights) or education, culture or communication. If we take into account precise and stable departments rather than general policy areas, non-partisan ministers appear to be especially numerous at the head of the ministry of foreign affairs, since 10 of the 22 holders of this prestigious position were non-partisan ministers, at least when they were first nominated (Table 2.3). Under the Fifth Republic, foreign affairs are considered as part of the *domaine réservé* (presidential protected domain) *par excellence* of the president of the Republic. Almost all presidents have appointed, at least once, a non-partisan minister, often a professional diplomat, as their foreign minister. The first exception was Nicolas Sarkozy, who first appointed Bernard Kouchner, a former non-partisan minister in socialist governments in the 1990s, who had pursued a political career afterwards, and cannot be considered as a non-partisan actor in 2007. At that time, Nicolas Sarkozy explained in private that this nomination was to highlight his concern for openness and pluralism but that he would keep full control of foreign affairs. A second exception is François Hollande, who asked Laurent Fabius, a former prime minister of François Mitterrand, a socialist leader and a leading politician for decades, to become his foreign minister in 2012. This high number of politically inexperienced international

Table 2.3 Weight of ministers without political background according to government departments (1959–2013)

Ministries	*All ministers*	*Ministers without political background*	
	N	*N*	*%*
Foreign affairs	22	10	45%
Justice	28	7	25%
Economy, finance[a]	32	8	25%
Education, science and culture	55	13	24%
Health	31	5	16%
Agriculture, industry, and trade	85	13	15%
European affairs	21	3	14%
Defence	22	3	14%
Internal affairs	27	3	11%
Public works(+housing and transportations)	58	3	5%

[a]In France ministers of finance are generally also in charge of economy. They are therefore counted together

relations experts, at the head of a ministry especially important to the president, confirms that the semi-presidential nature of the political regime is one important explanation of the recruitment of non-partisan ministers under the Fifth Republic. Presidents intend to retain their grip on foreign affairs and the appointment of non-partisan expert ministers is a way to recruit competent and loyal advisers with a reasonable assurance that they will not attempt to pursue their own policy.

The same analysis seems relevant for the justice ministers, whose official title is *Garde des sceaux* (Keeper of the Seals). They occupy a prestigious and sensitive position in the French tradition that may lead a president to choose a person of confidence, often a lawyer, outside the political *milieu*. The sizable proportion of non-partisan actors at the head of ministries such as culture, education and finance/economy seems more related to considerations around expertise and fame. Almost all have been appointed to right-wing governments, which may also mean that right-wing political parties do not always have enough traditional politicians to propose for these *portfolios*. It is known that many members of educational and cultural sectors display left-wing political leanings, which could explain why right-wing parties face difficulties to recruit politicians coming from these sectors. However, right-wing parties are well connected to economic sectors. Many of their professional politicians were employers or private sector executives before beginning a political career, and yet, their leaders also resort to practicing managers and heads of firms when they need to find a minister of economy and finance. Recruitment of non-partisan ministers seems, therefore, more frequent when government is controlled by weaker parties or parties of weaker significance—in the French scale—which is more likely with right-wing coalitions. Correspondingly, presidents and prime ministers from the left seem, on average, but with differences between them, more attached to partisan organizations and/or are more obliged to take them into account. They would, therefore, be less willing or able to appoint non-partisan ministers except to more technical positions.

Table 2.4 also shows that positions in governmental hierarchy and domains of competence are correlated. Non-partisan actors at the head of social or technical departments are more likely to be junior ministers, whereas those in charge of more prestigious activities, such as economy, international or state affairs, are more often senior ministers.

Table 2.5 confirms that right-wing governments are more likely to appoint non-partisan members to departments in charge of economy and education whereas left-wing governments recruit them more often for technical matters.

Table 2.4 Position in governmental hierarchy and domain of competence

	International affairs	*Economic affairs*	*Sovereign affairs*	*Technical departments*	*Education and culture*	*Social ministries*
Junior ministers	4 (18%)	5 (29%)	3 (19%)	10 (34%)	3 (19%)	15 (54%)
Mid-level ministers	4 (18%)	1 (6%)	1 (6%)	3 (10%)	0	4 (14%)
Full ministers	14 (64%)	11 (65%)	12 (75%)	16 (55%)	13 (81%)	9 (32%)
Total	22 (100%)	17 (100%)	16 (100%)	29 (100%)	16 (100%)	28 (100%)

See above, page 36, detail about the composition of these 'domains' of competence

Origins of Non-partisan Ministers

'Non-partisan' ministers are not without political experience or resources. A few have been elected to local office without executive responsibility (8 out of 98), have held second rank national partisan positions (3 out of 98) or have been members or leaders of a think tank (5 out of 98), before joining government. About half (48) have belonged to the entourage of a political personality, often as a member of a ministerial advisory staff, 58 have occupied high politico-administrative positions (such as director of a ministry, head of the treasury directorate, prefect, ambassador, chief regional education officer, president of a council devoted to the reform of the school programmes, president of a 'mission' in charge of the organization of the bicentenary of the Revolution of 1789, president of a public radio station, president of a state body in charge of the management of major public works, such as the renovation of the Louvre museum, director of the European Space Agency, European commissioner and so on) and 25 have been leaders of a non-partisan collective organization (such as trade-unions, business and farmer organizations, mutual companies, art festivals, sports federation, freemasonry, associations in charge of veterans, environmental issues, defence of migrants, humanitarian rescue) prior to their appointment to a government. Only a few (10 out of 98) non-partisan ministers are without previous political experience of any sort. Individuals who have no political or collective resources that could help their recruitment seem to owe their appointment to a kind of public fame, resulting from appearances in the media, sport, journalism, cinema, belonging to a migrant community, top management of a well-known company, court lawyer in famous trials or even participation in space flights.

Table 2.5 Governments' political orientations and domains of competence of their non-partisan members

	International affairs	*Economic affairs*	*State affairs*	*Technical departments*	*Education and culture*	*Social ministries*	*Total*
Right-wing governments	15 (22%)	13 (19%)	12 (18%)	17 (25%)	13 (19%)	20 (30%)	67 >100% (multiple coding)
Left-wing governments	7 (23%)	4 (13%)	4 (13%)	12 (39%)	3 (10%)	8 (26%)	31 >100% (multiple coding)
All governments	22 (22%)	17 (17%)	16 (16%)	29 (30%)	16 (16%)	28 (29%)	98 >100% (multiple coding)

The kind of political experience that helps recruitment differs according to the type of political parties that control government. Recruitment of non-partisan members to right-wing governments seems more often related to individual political resources, resulting from personal links (35 or 52%, against 13 or 42% in left-wing governments) or occupation of a politico-administrative position (44 or 66%, against 14 or 45%), whereas left-wing governments more often resort to individuals with collective capital due to their involvement in various kinds of organizations (10 or 32%, against 15 or 22% in right-wing governments).

Factors That Favour Appointments

There is a link between the field of responsibility and competence of the governmental position to which non-partisan ministers have been appointed and their activities and kind of expertise prior to their appointment, in 77 cases out of 98. This is one of the reasons why more than half of the ministers (54 out of 98) were higher civil servants before their appointment. Civil servants are proportionally even more numerous among non-partisan ministers than among other government members.[10] Non-partisan ministers also display a high level of education: 87 out of 98 have received tertiary education, and 28 have a PhD (Table 2.6). On average their level of education is slightly higher than other ministers.[11]

There is also a link between academic specialization and domain of competence within the government. Ministers who have received an education in economics and public administration are proportionally more numerous at the head of departments in charge of economic affairs. The same is true for lawyers with regard to state affairs, scientists and engineers with technical departments and for holders of degrees in humanities and social sciences with education and culture.

However, when it comes to governmental recruitment, considerations about expertise seem intertwined with concern about symbolic representation. Chief executive officers are appointed as ministers of the economy because they are knowledgeable but also because their nomination shows that economic affairs are entrusted to the care of those who know about the economy and are interested in it. Their choice is a message that the right people have been placed in the right places and, therefore, that the economy will be managed properly. The same is true when former champions are appointed at the head of sport departments,

Table 2.6 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without political background, 1959–2013

Variables	*Ministers without political background*		*All ministers*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*
Male	74	76%	499	83%
Female	24	24%	104	17%
Mean age	51.8			
University graduates	87	89%		
—with a PhD degree	28	29%		
Academic field (multiple coding)				
Law	44	45%		
Engineering/architecture	12	12%		
Economics/business/finance	44	45%		
Social sciences	26	26.5%		
Others (medicine, sciences)	13	14%		
Higher education abroad[a]				
Occupation				
Business, industry, finance	9	9%		
Higher civil servant	54	56%		
International organization	0			
Lawyer	8	8%		
University professor	8	8%		
Others	19	20%		

[a]Graduate and/or post-graduate studies

when a former president of *Doctors Without Borders* becomes junior minister in charge of humanitarian rescue, a well-known professor of medicine becomes a health minister, a former banker becomes a minister of economy and so on.

The appointment of non-partisan ministers, therefore, appears as a way to improve the symbolic representation of governments and this preoccupation may prevail over others. It is known, for instance, that French right-wing political parties face difficulties in promoting women, whether in their parliamentary groups or in the governments they control. We may thus understand why women are proportionally more numerous among non-partisan ministers in right-wing (21 out of 67, or 31%) than among left-wing governments (3 out of 31, or 10%).

Post-governmental Future of Non-partisan Ministers

Not all 'non-partisan' ministers are 'non-political' ministers. As previously mentioned, a majority of them had diverse links to political milieus before they became members of the government. There are few exceptions, and we may hypothesize that political connections are one of the many factors that influence the recruitment of those who are often presented as representative of 'civil society', called to the government to counterbalance the weight of political parties and professional politicians. In many cases, these connections with the political field are reinforced through a governmental career. For many non-partisan ministers, access to government is a first step in a political career.

Non-partisan ministers are more likely to pursue political activity as a politician (50%) and at the head of a high politico-administrative position in the State (36%), than to quit the political *milieu*. Only 36 out of 96 returned to non-political activities, or stopped any occupational activity, after leaving the government (Table 2.7). Several factors seem to favour the pursuit of a political career (stricto sensu, i.e. not including appointments to a high politico-administrative position) after leaving the government (Table 2.8). The longer their presence in government, the more likely non-partisan ministers are to pursue a political career afterwards. Those who have been appointed to more prestigious departments

Table 2.7 Activities of non-partisan ministers after they left the government

	Number of non-partisan ministers	*Percentage of non-partisan ministers*
Pursue a political career after leaving the government	48/96[a]	50%
Elected to the Parliament after leaving the government	29/96	30%
Elected at a local level after leaving the government	41/96	43%
Appointed to a politico-administrative position after leaving the government	35/96	36%
No political activity after leaving the government	36/96	38%

[a]One 'non-partisan' minister has been appointed in 2012, and another one in 2014. They are still members of the present (2014) French government. It is too early to say if they will enter a political career after their governmental experience

Table 2.8 Factors for the continuation of a political career after leaving government

	Political career (stricto sensu) after government	*No political career*	*Total*
All non-partisan ministers	50% (48)	50%	*N* = 96
Less than 23 months in government	44% (12)	56%	27
Between 23 and 32.5 months in government	57% (12)	43%	21
Between 33 and 49 months in government	38% (9)	62%	24
More than 47 months in government	63% (15)	37%	24
Members of one government	44% (24)	56%	55
Members of two governments	20% (3)	80%	15
Members of three governments	69% (9)	31%	13
Members of four and more governments	92% (12)	8%	13
Women	57% (13)	43%	23
Men	48% (35)	52%	73
First appointed as junior or intermediate minister	46% (25)	54%	54
First appointed as senior ministers	55% (23)	45%	42
Appointed to dep. in charge of foreign affairs	59% (13)	41%	22
Appointed to dep. in charge of economic affairs	63% (10)	37%	16
Appointed to dep. in charge of state affairs	63% (10)	37%	16
Appointed to dep. in charge of technical affairs	29% (8)	71%	28
Appointed to dep. in charge of education and culture	56% (9)	44%	16
Appointed to dep. in charge of social issues	46% (13)	54%	28
Had been in the entourage of a politician before their appointment to government	53% (24)	47%	45
Leaders of collective non-partisan organizations before their appointment	48% (12)	52%	25
Holders of a politico-administrative position before their appointment	44% (25)	56%	57
No political or collective resource before their appointment	30% (3)	70%	10
Member of right-wing governments	54% (36)	46%	67
Member of left-wing governments	41% (12)	59%	29

(*continued*)

Table 2.8 (continued)

	Political career (stricto sensu) after government	*No political career*	*Total*
Prior experience in relation to governmental position	44% (33)	56%	75
Former top civil servants	50% (23)	50%	46
Former students of highest elite institutes	45% (15)	55%	33

(international, economic or state affairs), and also women, mostly in right-wing movements, more often become politicians. Conversely, persons without political resources prior to their time in government, who have been placed at the head of technical departments, especially in left-wing governments, are more likely to quit the political field after leaving the government.

Conclusion

In the French case, no increasing governmental selection outside the realm of politics can be observed. This result leads us to discard the hypothesis that an increasing complexity of governmental activities would favour the appointment of experts to deal with them. Similarly, there is a growing distrust towards political parties and politicians,[12] although citizens' attitudes are more ambivalent than opinion polls suggest,[13] but no correlation with the composition of governments can be observed. Better than a new pattern of governmental recruitment, is the hypothesis of the maintenance of an old cyclical sequence[14] that dates back to the beginning of the Fifth Republic and the first presidency of General de Gaulle.

French presidents are powerful heads of the executive branch, for at least as long as they are able to rely on a majority in the National Assembly. They have broad constitutional powers and they are elected by direct universal suffrage. Their electoral legitimacy helps them to fully exercise their constitutional powers. The presidential election has become the main French election and presidential candidates are first-order politicians. There are strong links between the election of a presidential candidate and the results of the candidates of the same political camp at the next parliamentary elections. The presidential term was reduced from 7 to 5 years in

2000. In 2001, it was decided that parliamentary elections would be held after the presidential election, every 5 years. Parliamentary elections have become a form of confirmation for the presidential election. Many MPs are thus dependent on the political authority of the president for their election and re-election. Presidents are the true leaders of the governing coalitions. Their effective political powers are wider than their constitutional powers. For instance, according to the constitution, the president appoints the prime minister and also other ministers at the request of the prime minister. In fact, presidents impose their preferences and choices, even though the prime minister may have some leeway to promote a few of his or her followers. When it comes to the composition of governments, presidents have to reward the leaders and parties of their presidential coalition, especially as political parties are stronger and more relevant in the eyes of the selectors. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the weight of non-partisan ministers is weaker in France than in countries with less established parties and party system. On average, French political parties are weaker than their western European counterparts, but stronger than central and eastern European parties. As with most political parties, French movements face a growing lack of trust among citizens. However, they have maintained, and even strengthened, their control over the recruitment of members of the National Parliament and of the representative bodies at the subnational level. As powerful as they are, French presidents must deal with the parties that support them, especially with their leaders, when they choose the members of their government. These leaders may be loyal allies, but they also have their own independent political capital and authority. They may, therefore, one day compete with the president. The latter may be tempted to increase the weight of his or her faithfulness within the government. The recruitment of ministers without political background, that is to say, without personal political capital and authority, is a way for presidents to surround themselves with devoted and reliable ministers. They must be able to work with presidents on issues within the presidential domain, especially on foreign affairs, or to take charge of sensitive questions, for instance those related to the justice ministry.

In the French case, the recruitment of 'non-partisan' ministers is a consequence of the semi-presidential nature of the political regime in a context of relatively established political parties. It is also a result of the presidentialization of politics, that is to say the growing autonomy and concentration of power in the hands of the head of the executive branch, either the chief of government in a parliamentary regime[15] or the president

in a presidential or semi-presidential system. When they consider the composition of a government, French presidents are also more inclined to look outside political circles when they pay less attention to political parties, or when the parties of their presidential coalitions are weaker. In the French case, both factors are slightly more likely on the right side of the political spectrum than on the left one. It also depends on the political resources of the president. Even though they both come from the socialist party, François Hollande owes more of his career to the party than François Mitterrand, which could help to explain the differences in the number of non-partisan ministers they have appointed to their governments. In the French case, non-partisan recruitment is only slightly more frequent under liberal conservative heads of the executive branch than under socialist ones. However, those who join right-wing governments are more likely to be appointed as senior ministers to prestigious departments, such as economy and finance, whereas their left-wing counterparts are more often junior ministers in technical departments. The relative weakness of political parties and, even more so, of their political relevance at the national level, seem therefore supplementary factors in 'non-partisan' governmental recruitment. They may help to explain differences in the weight of non-partisan ministers both across and within countries.

In spite of a few isolated cases and of political commentaries that stress the presence of non-politicians presented as representatives of civil society, most non-partisan ministers were close to political circles before their appointment to government and many remain close to them after leaving it. Their appointment is also subject to political considerations. They are often sought after because of their expertise but also to improve the symbolic representation of the government. As long as they give satisfaction to their mentor, these newcomers can enter the political field and embark on a political career. This specific pathway for entry in the political profession is slightly more common on the right than on the left side of the political field, but, on both side, many non-partisans gradually become ordinary partisan ministers.

Notes

1. See, for example, Juan Rodriguez Teruel, *Recruiting from Parliament and Beyond. The Selection of Ministers in Multilevel Spain (1977–2009)*, paper presented to the 21st IPSA World Congress, Santiago, Chile, 12–16 July 2009.

2. Maurice Duverger, *Échec au roi*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1978; Maurice Duverger, (1980) ‘A New Political-System Model: Semi-Presidential Government’, *European Journal of Political Research* 8(2):165–87; Robert Elgie, (ed.) (1999) *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Robert Elgie (2004)‘Semi-presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations’, Working Papers, *International Studies*, Centre for International Studies, Dublin City University; David J. Samuels, Matthew Shugart (2010) ‘La nomination et la révocation du Premier ministre en régime semi-présidentiel: l’impact de la présidentialisation des partis’, *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, 17(1): 67–91.
3. Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Antonio Costa Pinto, ‘Expert and Non-partisan Ministers in Portuguese Democracy 1976–2012’, *Presentation to the IPSA XXII World Congress*, Madrid, 8–12 July 2012.
4. With the exception of a few remarks in Jean-Louis Thiébault (1998) ‘France: Cabinet Decision Making under the Fifth Republic’, in Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds), *Cabinets in Western Europe*, London: Macmillan; Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright (2006) *The Government and Politics of France*, London: Routledge; Christopher Kam and Indridi Indridason (2008) ‘Cabinet Dynamics and Ministerial Career in the French Fifth Republic’, in Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont (eds) *The selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing*, London: Routledge; Olivier Costa and Eric Kerrouche (2009) ‘MPs under the Fifth Republic: Professionnalisation within a Weak Institution’, *West European Politics*, 32: 327–344.
5. Daniel Gaxie (1983) ‘Les facteurs sociaux de la carrière gouvernementale sous la Ve République 1959–1981’, *Revue française de sociologie*, 24(3): 441–465.
6. Pedro Tavares de Almeida, António Costa Pinto and Nancy Bermeo (eds) (2003) *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000*, London: Frank Cass.
7. See, for example, Elena Semenova (2011) ‘Ministerial and Parliamentary Elites in an Executive-Dominated System: Post-Soviet Russia 1991–2009’, *Comparative Sociology*, 10: 908–927.
8. Including one member of the government established in 2014 and two members of the last conservative government nominated in 2010, who cannot belong to more than one government.
9. The sum exceeds 100% because several ministers were appointed to positions in different policy areas.
10. Daniel Gaxie (1986) ‘Immuables et changeants: les ministres de la Ve République, *Pouvoirs*, 36, 1986: 61–78; Daniel Gaxie (1985) ‘Les facteurs sociaux de la carrière gouvernementale sous la Ve République 1959–1981’, *art. cit.*; Brigitte Gaïti (1985), ‘Politique d’abord: le chemin de la réussite

ministérielle dans la France contemporaine', in Pierre Birnbaum, (ed.), *Les élites socialistes au pouvoir*, Paris: PUF, pp. 53–85; Valentin Behr, Sébastien Michon (2012), 'De qui (ou de quoi) le gouvernement est.-il représentatif sous la Ve République?', *unpublished presentation*.

11. Daniel Gaxie, 'Immuables et changeants ...', *art. cit.*, p. 71; Valentin Behr, Sébastien Michon, *art. cit.*, p. 5.
12. According to an opinion poll published by *Le Monde on* 14th January 2014, respondents who believe that democracy does not work very well in France numbered 48% in 2009, 60% in 2011 and 69% in December 2013. According to another opinion poll published by the same newspaper on 22nd January 2014, only 8% of the respondents said that they trust political parties, 23% for MPs and 28% for the National Assembly.
13. Daniel Gaxie (2001) 'Les critiques profanes de la politique. Enchantements, désenchantements, réenchantements', in Jean-Louis Briquet and Philippe Garraud, (eds.), *Juger la politique*, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, pp. 217–240.
14. Jean-Claude Colliard, (1978) *Les régimes parlementaires contemporains*, Paris: Presses de la FNSP, p. 190 ff.
15. Ben Yong, Robert Hazell, (2010) *Putting Goats amongst the Wolves Appointing Ministers From Outside Parliament*, University College London, The Constitution Unit, Department of Political Science, p. 102.

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CHAPTER 3

No More Political Insiders? Ministerial Selection in Sweden During the Post-WWII Period

Hanna Bäck and Thomas Persson

Introduction

The hiring and firing of cabinet ministers is a natural part of all parliamentary democracies. Until recently, however, there has not been much research dedicated to the mechanisms for selection and deselection of cabinet ministers. A growing literature on appointment and turnover of ministers has appeared in recent years (see, for instance, Dowding and Kang 1998; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Dewan and Dowding 2005; Berlinski et al. 2010, 2012; Kam and Indriðason 2005; Bäck et al. 2009, 2012; Dowding and Dumont 2008; Hansen et al. 2013). Several explanations have been advanced in the literature for cabinet reshuffles more generally. Prime ministers (PMs) may use ministerial dismissals and reshuffles for strategic purposes, for example, by blaming policy failures or scandals on individual ministers (Dewan and Dowding 2005), to boost

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government popularity among voters (Dewan and Dowding 2005; Kam and Indriðason 2005) and to increase competence among cabinet members (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Kam and Indriðason 2005).

However, while PMs may have good reasons for selecting certain ministers and for cabinet reshuffles, their ability and incentives to do so vary across contexts. One of the major conclusions from this literature is that constitutional, party and strategic considerations affect hiring and firing decisions of the PM (Dowding and Dumont 2008). Except for formal and informal constraints on ministerial selection and turnover, also the individual and collective performance of ministers and cabinets may affect staffing decisions taken by the PM. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to our understanding of why specific politicians become ministers, focusing on the Swedish case.

We follow the existing literature on ministerial selection and turnover (Dowding and Dumont 2008), which relies heavily on principal-agent (PA) theory and takes its starting point in the so-called parliamentary chain of delegation (Strøm 2000). Our focus here lies on the third step in this chain, where the PM is often seen as the principal delegating power to the individual line ministers. One way of minimizing agency problems, specifically that line ministers act in a way that does not coincide with the wishes of the principal, is to try to appoint ministers whose interests do not clash with the principal's interests (see Kam et al. 2010; Bäck et al. 2016). One of the main results in the comparative empirical literature on ministerial selection is that a parliamentary background is the main career path for becoming a minister (De Winter 1991). Selecting ministers with such a background could minimize agency loss since ministers who have a background within political parties and the parliament are likely to have been heavily 'screened'.

In this chapter we focus on investigating various background features of individual ministers in post-WWII Sweden, specifically on whether ministers have a 'political insider' background or whether they are better characterized as being 'outsiders' or 'experts'. There are several reasons for analysing the background of ministers, such as their previous political appointments and their education and 'expertise'. For example, some scholars suggest that ministers with an 'outsider', or non-political background, are more likely to be appointed as European integration increases (Poguntke and Webb 2005), whereas other scholars focus on the effects of economic conditions, suggesting that 'technocrats' are more likely to be appointed during economic crises. Hallerberg and Wehner (2013, p. 8)

suggest that 'technically competent economic policy makers' will be more likely among ministers appointed during times of economic crisis, in order for governments to gain the confidence of both investors in markets and of voters.

This chapter is structured as follows. We start out by briefly reviewing the previous literature applying principal-agent theory to ministerial selection, where selection is characterized as a delegation problem. We then briefly review the literature on the 'presidentialization' of parliamentary democracies, and the literature on the selection of 'technocrat' ministers. We then describe the Swedish institutional setting which we concentrate on in this chapter. Then follow the main empirical analyses, focusing on describing the background of all appointed ministers in Sweden during the post-WWII period, in terms of the ministers' political, educational and occupational background. We end the chapter with some concluding remarks.

Ministerial Selection as a Delegation Problem

The literature on ministerial selection and turnover or cabinet reshuffles (Dowding and Dumont 2008) relies heavily on principal-agent theory and takes its starting point in the so-called parliamentary chain of delegation (Strøm 2000). As mentioned above, the focus when looking at ministerial selection lies on the third step in this chain, where the PM is often seen as the principal delegating power to the individual line ministers.

Principal-agent theory identifies two main threats to the principal's ability to control agents: 'Adverse selection' and 'moral hazard' (Strøm 2000). As described by Bäck, Debus and Muller (2016), applied to ministerial selection, the PM faces a problem of adverse selection because at the time of appointment, the PM does not have complete information about a minister's abilities and preferences to run a department effectively and in accordance with the wishes of the PM. Moral hazard problems can arise because, as described by Indriðason and Kam, 'all ministers have motive and opportunity to use their portfolios in a manner that runs against the PM's interests'. One reason for this is if ministers become too aligned with their portfolio and the sectoral interests associated with it. While ministers can 'go native' in any system, one reason specific to coalition systems is that ministers adhere to individual parties and their interests rather than to the collective goals of the coalition (Martin and Vanberg 2005; Müller and Meyer 2010).

Parliamentary democracies often lack ex post mechanisms providing credible oversight, while the ex ante control mechanism of screening and selecting candidates plays a central role for aligning the preferences of the candidates for key political offices. This extensive screening of prospective parliamentarians as well as potential cabinet members is performed by centralized, cohesive, policy-oriented political parties (cf. Müller 2000; Strøm 2003). Accordingly, the best way for parliament to mitigate agency loss is to place a subset of its own members in the cabinet since members of parliament (MPs) are likely to be better informed about ministerial candidates taken from the parliament, and the latter's preferences are also in all likelihood more similar to those of the MPs, thereby also reducing the risk of moral hazard. For these reasons, as described by Bäck et al. (2009), ministers in a stylised parliamentary system are political insiders, that is, members of parliament with some party background (Verney 1959/1992; De Winter 1991).

While the selection of MPs helps mitigate the delegation problem for the parliament as principal of the PM and the cabinet, the PM might have different preferences for the composition of the cabinet, faced with the problem of appointing competent, dependable and loyal ministers. Therefore, a more powerful PM might continue to recruit ministers from parliament because of extensive screening during their political career. However, a more powerful PM is not forced to rely exclusively on ex ante control to align cabinet members with his wishes but can also rely on cabinet reshuffles to sanction ministerial drift. Therefore, a less constrained PM might, nonetheless, choose to appoint outsiders because their lack of political power resources makes it easier for the PM to deal with agency problems ex post facto, that is, outsiders are simply easier to dismiss if there is evidence of ministerial drift (cf. Bäck et al. 2008, 2009).

The 'Presidentialization' of Parliamentary Democracies

According to recent debates, executive-legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes, where some scholars have detected a trend towards 'presidentialization' within contemporary parliamentary politics, in which more power resources are concentrated to PMs and their autonomy vis-à-vis parliamentary groups is increasing (Poguntke and Webb 2005). In a similar manner, 'Europeanization'

researchers assume that one important consequence of Europe's impact on domestic political systems is that national parliaments lose influence over national executives.

We have, in our previous work (Bäck et al. 2009), assessed the validity of claims of an increase of executive autonomy by studying the development of a quantitative indicator on Swedish executive-legislative relations (ministerial selection) over the years 1952 through 2006 and by statistically analysing whether any changes in this indicator can be attributed to increased economic and political integration of Sweden into the European Union (Bäck et al. 2009). Our findings suggest that there is some evidence in favour of an ongoing shift in executive politics in terms of a decrease in the appointment of political insiders and an increase in expert ministers. It appears that today's PMs, to a somewhat higher extent, reward expertise, rather than parliamentary experience, when filling cabinet positions. In our multivariate analyses, we assess to what extent the over-time variation can be explained by European integration. The results indicate that as European integration increases, there is a decrease of ministers hired with a pure party or parliamentary background. Moreover, some of our findings support the claim that with increased European integration the ministers that are appointed are more likely to have an expert background, either as pure experts or in combination with a political background.

European integration is, however, not the only feature expected to influence trends in ministerial selection according to the literature on the 'presidentialization' of parliamentary democracies. While the president-like domination of the political executive by individual leaders is often explained by short-term contingent or idiosyncratic factors, Poguntke and Webb (2005) affirm that there is some—although not statistical—support for the claim that 'presidentialization' can be explained by four factors. In addition to the 'internationalization' of politics, they contend that macro-societal factors such as the erosion of cleavage politics, the changing structure of mass communications and the growth of the state all account for 'presidentialization', which could result in changes in executive-legislative relations (Bäck et al. 2009).

The Selection of 'Technocrat' Ministers

As a response to the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, elected PMs in countries like Italy and Greece were replaced by 'technocrats' such as Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos. With a background as experts in

economics instead of being career politicians, their mandates were to implement fiscal austerity packages that their predecessors had not been able to push through. This type of leadership turnover is meant to bring more 'competent' people into government in times of deep economic crises. As interesting and illustrative as these cases may be, they raise a number of important questions that should be pursued in research, specifically, how common is it that elected politicians are replaced by technocrats in times of economic crisis?

As mentioned above, several scholars have focused on the role of 'technocrats' as ministers, for example, Hallerberg and Wehner (2013) argue that certain backgrounds will be more likely among ministers appointed during times of economic crisis. Governments in an economic crisis need to gain the confidence of both investors and of voters. 'The appointment of a technically competent economic policy-maker may help the government gain credibility with both groups' (Hallerberg and Wehner 2013, p. 8). In a similar fashion, Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) discuss how appointments of non-partisan ministers—often associated with skilled technocrats or experts—signal that 'efficiency concerns' trump 'redistributive ambitions'. Both of these arguments suggest that governments are more likely to appoint economically competent ministers or ministers with a 'technocrat' background are more likely to be appointed during times of crisis.

In a recent paper, Alexiadou and Gunaydin (2015) look at the conditions under which PMs or party leaders select technocrat ministers. They argue that technocrat ministers are selected for two main reasons: to reduce problems of agency within their party and government and, in turn, to send a signal to markets and voters about their pro-reform intentions. Alexiadou and Gunaydin (2015) suggest that, as non-elected experts, technocrats have policy expertise and, crucially, the commitment and willingness to adopt tough economic policies irrespective of their short-term effects on the electorate. Using a data set on finance and employment ministers in 13 advanced parliamentary democracies over 40 years, they show that critical economic events and party ideology predict technocratic appointments.

There are, therefore, several reasons to expect that the background of ministers changes over time, either due to long-term trends, like an 'internationalization' of politics, or due to a variation over time in the economic conditions of a polity. Also, the institutional setting should matter as to whether such factors influence executive-legislative relations and ministerial

selection. In the following section we describe the Swedish institutional setting.

Rules Surrounding Ministerial Selection

Sweden is a constitutional monarchy, the King lost his political powers when parliamentarism was introduced in 1917. The Instrument of Government of 1974 transferred the monarch's role in cabinet formation to the speaker of the parliament, the unicameral (since 1971) Riksdag. According to the constitution, bargaining over cabinet formation begins with the speaker holding bilateral consultations with the leaders of all parties that are represented in the parliament. Based on these consultations, he or she then proposes a prime ministerial candidate. Four days after the candidate is nominated, at the latest, the parliament votes on the speaker's proposal. If more than half of the parliament's members vote against the proposal, it is turned down. Thus, it suffices that the candidate is tolerated by the parliament, a constitutional feature termed negative, as opposed to positive parliamentarism (Bergman 1995, 2000; Bäck and Bergman 2016).

As described by Bäck et al. (2008), the prime ministerial candidate—if tolerated by parliament—is then free to staff the cabinet pretty much as he or she sees fit, after which the government is formally installed. There are, indeed, very few formal restrictions on who is 'selectable' as a minister, basically only requiring that a minister must have been a Swedish citizen for at least 10 years and must give up any employment before entering government office. When appointed, ministers who are MPs are required to leave parliament temporarily, and their seat is filled by a replacement, allowing a minister to return to parliament after being dismissed if she/he so wishes.

Historically, the number, the professional background, and the tasks of members of government were specified in the constitution. Over time, however, the trend has been to award the PM and his government more and more power over their own organization, in order to improve flexibility. This was the explicit motivation behind the elimination of most details concerning ministers in the 1974 instrument of government (Bäck et al. 2008). Constitutionally, all ministers, including the PM, have the same weight in cabinet decision-making. However, there is a distinction between ministers who are heads of departments and those who are not, or 'without portfolio'.

Constitutionally, there are two main routes to cabinet dissolution. Either the PM voluntary resigns or a majority of the members of parliament support a vote of no confidence directed against the PM. In both cases, the speaker dismisses the remaining cabinet ministers. Since WWII, there have been four unsuccessful attempts to remove the PM and his cabinet through a vote of no confidence. The individual cabinet minister is subject to the same rules of resignation as the PM, with two exceptions: First, the PM may dismiss an individual minister, irrespectively of whether the latter wishes to be separated from his or her position or not. Second, when a minister other than the PM chooses to step down, or is subjected to a successful vote of no confidence, he or she does not bring down any of the other cabinet ministers (Bäck et al. 2008).

The Cabinets Formed in Sweden During the Post-WWII Period

In Table 3.1, we describe the governments that have formed during the post-war period. Here, we illustrate the fact that Swedish cabinets have, to a large extent, been minority single-party governments. Another important feature is that cabinets, at least since the 1960s, have followed a 'bloc' political pattern, either the Social Democrats have governed by themselves with the support of one or more of the 'socialist' parties (Greens or Left party) or the 'non-socialist' parties (Centre party, Liberals, Christian Democrats, Moderates) have coalesced. It was only in the early and mid-1950s that we saw cooperation across the 'blocs' when the Social Democrats governed with the Centre party (Agrarian party) under the lead of PM Tage Erlander (Bäck and Bergman 2016). The most immediate reason for the Social Democrats having governed for more than 80 percent of the period since World War II is the fact that they collected an average of 44 percent of the ballot in this period. The regular occurrence of minority governments is attributed by Bergman (1995) to the aforementioned principle of negative parliamentarism.

The size of Swedish cabinets during the post-war era ranges from 16 ministers (Hansson 1945–1946) to 22 (Reinfeldt 2006–2014), with an average size of 19 cabinet members; however, the number of ministers appointed during the whole government term varies more. For instance, during Persson III (2002–2006), 36 individuals were appointed as cabinet ministers while only 15 were appointed during Erlander VI (1957–1958).

Table 3.1 Swedish governments, and the number and share of ministers without political background, 1945–2014

	PM's party	*Begin date*	*Left-right predominance*	*Minority/majority, single party/coalition*	*Number of ministers*[b]	*Number without political background*[c]	*Share without political background*
Hansson	Social Democrat	31.07.1945	Left	Minority, single party	16	4	25.0%
Erlander I	Social Democrat	11.10.1946	Left	Minority, single party	17	5	29.4%
Erlander II	Social Democrat	19.09.1948	Left	Minority, single party	20	7	35.0%
Erlander III	Social Democrat	01.10.1951	Left + centre	Majority, coalition	18	7	38.9%
Erlander IV	Social Democrat	21.09.1952	Left + centre	Majority, coalition	19	5	26.3%
Erlander V	Social Democrat	26.09.1956	Left + centre	Majority, coalition	22	4	18.2%
Erlander VI	Social Democrat	31.10.1957	Left	Minority, single party	15	3	20.0%
Erlander VII	Social Democrat	01.06.1958	Left	Minority, single party	18	5	27.8%
Erlander VIII	Social Democrat	18.09.1960	Left	Minority, single party	20	5	25.0%
Erlander IX	Social Democrat	20.09.1964	Left	Minority, single party	23	5	21.7%

(*continued*)

Table 3.1 (continued)

	PM's party	*Begin date*	*Left-right predominance*	*Minority/majority, single party/coalition*	*Number of min-isters*[b]	*Number without political background*[c]	*Share without political background*
Erlander X	Social Democrat	15.09.1968	Left	Majority, single party	21	4	19.0%
Palme I	Social Democrat	14.10.1969	Left	Majority, single party	19	5	26.3%
Palme II	Social Democrat	20.09.1970	Left	Minority, single party	25	7	28.0%
Palme III	Social Democrat	16.09.1973	Left	Minority, single party	21	2	9.5%
Fälldin I	Centre party	07.10.1976	Centre-right	Majority, coalition	21	1	4.8%
Ullsten	Liberal party	13.10.1978	Centre (liberal)	Minority, single party	20	3	15.0%
Fälldin II	Centre party	11.10.1979	Centre-right	Majority, coalition	21	1	4.8%
Fälldin III	Centre party	19.05.1981	Centre (centre + liberal)	Minority, coalition	18	1	5.6%
Palme IV	Social Democrat	07.10.1982	Left	Minority, single party	22	5	22.7%
Palme V	Social Democrat	15.09.1985	Left	Minority, single party	22	3	13.6%
Carlsson I	Social Democrat	12.03.1986	Left	Minority, single party	22	3	13.6%
Carlsson II[a]	Social Democrat	18.09.1988	Left	Minority, single party	27	7	25.9%
Bildt	Moderates	03.10.1991	Centre-right	Minority, coalition	21	2	9.5%

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

	PM's party	*Begin date*	*Left-right predominance*	*Minority/majority, single party/coalition*	*Number of ministers*[b]	*Number without political background*[c]	*Share without political background*
Carlsson III	Social Democrat	06.10.1994	Left	Minority, single party	22	6	27.3%
Persson I	Social Democrat	21.03.1996	Left	Minority, single party	23	5	21.7%
Persson II	Social Democrat	20.09.1998	Left	Minority, single party	31	5	16.1%
Persson III	Social Democrat	15.09.2002	Left	Minority, single party	36	13	36.1%
Reinfeldt I	Moderates	05.10.2006	Centre Right	Majority; coalition	27	2	7.4%
Reinfeldt II	Moderates	19.09.2010	Centre Right	Minority; coalition	29	1	3.4%
Total					636	126	19.8%

[a]PM Carlsson II resigned in February 1990 but returned to power shortly thereafter. This reshuffle has not been included in the list of governments

[b]A minister is only included once in each government, regardless of how many portfolios he/she holds in that government

[c]A minister without political background has no parliamentary experience (at local, regional, national or European level) prior to his/her appointment, and no previous record of leading positions in a political party

The number of consultative ministers varies across governments. Most PMs appoint about half as many consultative ministers as department heads. Some later cabinets (Persson III and Reinfeldt I and II), however, deviate from this pattern, appointing more consultative ministers than department heads (see Table 3.1).

The Selection and Deselection of Political 'Outsiders' in Sweden

As mentioned, we have previously reported a trend towards the appointment of more political outsiders in Sweden (Bäck et al. 2009). Does this development persist? As illustrated in Table 3.1, the selection of ministers without political experience was common in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, before it became less prevalent in the 1970s and early 1980s when centre-right governments took office. In the mid-1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, it once again became more common to appoint non-partisan ministers during Social Democratic governments, with a peak in Persson III (2002–2006) when 36 percent of the ministers did not have any prior political experience. The only exception during this period was the centre-right government under PM Bildt who appointed only 9.5 percent ministers without a political background. Furthermore, the most recent centre-right governments under PM Reinfeldt (2006–2014) appointed only 2 out of 27 (about 7 percent) and 1 out of 29 ministers (about 3 percent) with no political background (see Table 3.1).

Over the entire post-WWII era, 20 percent of all individuals appointed to cabinet office did not have a political background, that is, had no parliamentary experience (at local, regional, national or European level) prior to their appointment, and no previous record of senior positions in a political party. Most ministers either have party experience before taking office (on average 53 percent), or parliamentary experience (on average 79 percent), and in many cases they have both. However, there are big variations in the background of ministers between governments. As illustrated by Fig. 3.1, the parliamentary background among ministers was particularly high in the centre-right governments led by PM Fälldin in the 1970s and early 1980s and by Reinfeldt in the 2000s and 2010s (90 percent or above), while only about 58 percent of ministers had a parliamentary background in the last government led by PM Persson in the 2000s. Similarly, the party background among ministers was particularly low in



Fig. 3.1 Parliamentary, party and political background of ministers in Swedish cabinets, 1945–2016

the Persson III government (about 30 percent), while it was much higher in the Fälldin and Reinfeldt governments (70 percent or above).

Since Sweden has been dominated by the Social Democrats, left-wing governments have appointed more ministers without a political background (about 91 percent) than the centre-right parties (about 9 percent). The most common type of government that appoint non-partisan ministers is a single-party minority government (about 74 percent of all expert minister appointments have occurred in such cabinets), which is also the most frequent type of government in Sweden (see Table 3.2). The second most common type of government that appoints expert ministers (about 13 percent) is minimal winning coalitions dominated by left-wing parties, which formed only in the 1950s (i.e. coalitions between the Social Democrats and the Centre party). Similarly, parties to the left dominate dismissals of expert ministers. Governments dominated by the Social Democrats have carried out 94 percent of all dismissals while centre-right governments have executed only 6 percent.

Table 3.2 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different type of Swedish governments, 1945–2014

Cabinet type	*Political orientation*	*Appointed*	*Appointed*	*Dismissed*	*Dismissed*
		N[a]	*%*[b]	*N*[c]	*%*[d]
Minimal winning coalition	L	16	12.7	7	20.6
	C				
	R	5	4.0	2	5.9
Minority coalition	L				
	C	1	0.8	0	0
	R	2	1.6	0	0
Single-party majority	L	9	7.0	0	0
	C				
	R				
Single-party minority	L	90	71.4	25	73.5
	C	3	2.4	0	0
	R				
	Total	126	100.0	34	100.0
	Left	115	91.3	32	94.1
	Centre	4	3.2	0	0
	Right	7	5.6	2	5.9

Note: *L* Left, *R* Right, *C* Centre; refer to the political orientation of the cabinet
[a]A minister is only included once in each government, regardless of how many portfolios he/she holds in that government
[b]Percentages refer to all ministers appointed without a political background
[c]Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate
[d]Percentages refer to all ministers dismissed without a political background

The pattern of selection and deselection of ministers without a political background is thus explained to a large extent by the type of governments that have been formed. There is a correlation between left vs. centre-right governments and the share of ministers without a political background, indicating that left-wing governments tend to appoint a significantly higher share of outsiders (Pearson's r is 0.32). Accordingly, the trend from the 1970s until the mid-2000s towards fewer ministers in Sweden without any prior political experience can be partly explained by the more frequent shifts in power between the Social Democrats and the centre-right parties. Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that governments dominated by the Social Democrats have chosen to appoint non-partisan ministers to such a great extent.

The Political Background of Swedish First-Time Ministers

First-time ministers in Sweden tend to have a fairly solid political background. A majority of ministers appointed for the first time have a background as members of the Swedish Riksdag (62 percent), and almost half of them have been members of a local parliament (46 percent). Fewer first-time ministers have a background as a member of a regional parliament (17 percent), and only three individuals have been members of the European parliament (1 percent), which is partly explained by the fact that Sweden joined the European Union as late as 1995, and the parties have tended to nominate MEPs who are late rather than early in their careers (see Table 3.3). Furthermore, a few ministers also have experience from a local executive (18 percent) or a regional executive (2 percent).

On average, about 45 percent of all freshman ministers in Sweden have experience from a leading position in a political party. Thus, only about 25 percent of all first-time ministers have neither experience of senior positions in political parties nor any representative experience, that is, can be considered as 'outsiders'. In other words, three out of four first-time ministers in Sweden can be considered as political 'insiders'. Furthermore, there is some variation over time in the new ministers' background. For instance, having executive experience from local and regional levels of government has become more common over time. Similarly, having experience of senior positions in political parties has become more important in the last two decades than ever before.

When comparing the political background of different ministers, the minister of justice stands out as the clearest example of a non-partisan minister in Sweden. Out of eight first-time ministers appointed as minister of justice, six ministers have no prior political background (75 percent). Illustrative examples are Laila Freivalds, who served as Minister for Justice from 1988 to 1991 and again from 1994 to 2000 and later as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2003 to 2006, and Thomas Bodström, who served as Minister for Justice from 2000 to 2006. Freivalds was a lawyer who had held senior posts in the public administration but had no prior political experience before taking office in 1988. She has become well known for having resigned twice because of scandals, first in 2000 over a controversy due to a private housing affair and then in 2006 due to her involvement in the closing of a website belonging to the Sweden

Table 3.3 Political background of first-time ministers in Sweden, 1945–2014

	1940–1950s		*1960–1970s*		*1980–1990s*		*2000–2010s*		*Entire period*	
	N	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]
Local deputy	14	31.8	29	45.3	35	44.9	33	62.3	111	46.4
Regional deputy	8	18.2	15	23.4	8	10.3	9	17.0	40	16.7
National deputy	29	65.9	39	60.9	46	59.0	34	64.2	148	61.9
European deputy	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5.7	3	1.3
Party leading positions	17	38.6	30	46.9	32	41.0	28	52.8	107	44.8
Minister in local executive	0	0	5	7.8	19	20.4	18	34.0	42	17.6
Minister in regional executive	0	0	0	0	2	2.6	2	3.8	4	1.7
Junior minister	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
No prior political experience	13	29.5	13	20.3	20	25.6	13	24.5	59	24.7
Total[b]	44	100.0	64	100.0	78	100.0	53	100.0	239	100

Note: The categories are not mutually exclusive
[a]Percentages refer to the total number of first-time ministers appointed in each period
[b]Total number of individuals appointed

Democrats. Bodström is the son of a former Minister of Foreign Affairs but had no private political experience before being appointed in 2006. Instead he was working as a lawyer prior to his appointment and applied for membership in the Social Democratic Party on the day his cabinet appointment was announced.

Similarly, about one-third of all newly appointed ministers of finance and ministers of foreign affairs are political outsiders. Again there is some variation over time, for instance, more experts are appointed as minister of finance in the later periods, and particularly in the 2000s and 2010s (see Table 3.4). This can be illustrated by the fact that dur-

Table 3.4 Selected ministries and the weight of first-time ministers without political background, 1945–2014

	1940–1950s		*1960–1970s*		*1980–1990s*		*2000–2010s*		*Entire period*	
Ministries	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]
Defence	0 (1)	0	0 (2)	0	1 (4)	25.0	0 (3)	0	1 (10)	10.0
Education, science and culture	0 (4)	0	1 (7)	14.3	1 (7)	14.3	1 (7)	14.3	3 (25)	12.0
Economy, agriculture, industry and trade	0 (5)	0	0 (7)	0	2 (8)	25.0	1 (4)	25.0	3 (24)	12.5
Finance	0 (2)	0	0 (1)	0	1 (3)	33.3	2 (3)	66.6	3 (9)	33.3
Foreign affairs	1 (3)	33.3	2 (8)	25.0	2 (8)	25.0	4 (7)	57.1	9 (26)	34.6
Internal affairs	0 (4)	0	0 (1)	0	1 (4)	25.0	0 (0)	0	1 (9)	11.1
Justice	1 (1)	100.0	1 (2)	50.0	3 (4)	75.0	1 (1)	50.0	6 (8)	75.0
Health	0 (2)	0	1 (6)	16.7	1 (8)	12.5	0 (8)	0	2 (24)	8.3
Public works	0 (0)	0	0 (3)	0	0 (4)	0	1 (5)	20.0	1 (12)	8.3
Others	11 (22)	50.0	8 (27)	29.6	8 (28)	28.6	3 (15)	20.0	30 (92)	32.6
Total[b]	13 (44)	29.5	13 (64)	20.3	20 (78)	25.6	13 (53)	24.5	59 (239)	24.7

[a]Percentages refer to the total number of first-time ministers appointed in each period (indicated in parenthesis)
[b]Total number of individuals appointed

ing the European economic and financial crisis, PM Reinfeldt appointed Anders Borg as Minister of Finance to implement significant budgetary cuts and Peter Norman as his deputy with responsibility for the financial markets. Both Borg and Norman were economists with a background in the financial sector and had no prior political experience. Borg, for instance, served as an Adviser on monetary policy issues to the Executive Board of the Swedish National Bank before he entered politics.

Among Sweden's foreign ministers who, before his appointment, was considered as a political 'outsider', we find Dag Hammarskjöld. Although

he was the youngest son of a former Swedish Prime Minister, he was not himself involved in politics. Hammarskjöld is most known for having served as the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, from 1953 until his death in a plane crash in 1961. Prior to his international career, however, he developed a successful academic career and served as a Swedish civil servant. Although he was never appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was deputy minister at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Tage Erlander's government 1951–1953.

The Educational and Occupational Background of Swedish Ministers

Of all first-time ministers appointed in Sweden in the post-WWII era, 69 percent were men and 31 percent women. Among non-partisan ministers, male dominance was even stronger (75 percent men and only 25 percent women). The average age of newly appointed ministers is 47.5 years, while ministers who have no political background are slightly older at their first appointment, 49.0 years. The general level of education is also higher among non-partisan ministers; seventy-six percent have a university education (to be contrasted with 65 percent among all newly appointed ministers), and 14 percent have postgraduate education (10 percent among all new ministers). The academic fields that dominate the educational background of expert ministers are social science (46 percent) and law (24 percent). Economics, business and finance account for only 4 percent of the educational background among non-partisan ministers.

Many freshman ministers without prior political experience have a background as lawyers or in other professions (27 percent); however, most of them come from other occupations (51 percent), and only a minority have a background as senior civil servants (9 percent), university professors (7 percent) or in business, industry and finance (5 percent). Taken together, the socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without political background suggest that they comprise a highly educated male elite with experience from professions that give them legitimacy in the mandate given to them by the prime minister (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without political background, 1945–2016

Variables	*All ministers (N)*	*All ministers (%)*[a]	*Ministers without political background (N)*	*Ministers without political background (%)*[b]
Male	165	69.0	44	74.6
Female	74	31.0	15	25.4
Mean age	47.5 years	NA	49.0 years	NA
University graduates	155	64.9	45	76.3
With a PhD degree	24	10.0	8	13.6
Academic field				
Law	41	24.4	24	48.0
Engineering/architecture	0	0	0	0
Economics/business/finance	8	4.8	1	2.0
Social sciences	77	45.8	21	42.0
Others	42	25.0	4	8.0
Higher education abroad	NA	NA	NA	NA
Occupation				
Business, industry, finance	12	5.2	1	1.9
Higher civil servant	20	8.7	10	18.5
International organization	0	0	0	0
Lawyer and other professions	63	27.4	27	50.0
University professor	16	7.0	3	5.6
Others	119	51.7	13	24.1

[a]Percentages refer to the total number of first-time ministers appointed
[b]Percentages refer to first-time ministers appointed without a political background

Concluding Remarks

The aim of this chapter has been to increase our understanding of why specific politicians become ministers. We have investigated various background features of individual ministers in post-WWII Sweden, specifically whether ministers have a 'political insider' background or whether they are better characterized as being non-partisan 'outsiders' or 'experts'. We have previously reported a trend towards the appointment of more political outsiders in Sweden (Bäck et al. 2009). The question is whether this development has continued, especially during the European economic and financial crisis.

On average, freshman ministers in Sweden tend to have a fairly solid political background. A majority of ministers appointed for the first time have a background as members of the Swedish Riksdag (62 percent) and almost half of them have been members of a local parliament (46 percent). As we have illustrated, the selection of ministers without political experience was common in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, before it became less prevalent in the 1970s and early 1980s during centre-right governments. In the mid-1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, it once again became commonplace to appoint ministers without a political background.

So why did PMs at this time start appointing non-partisan outsiders to a higher degree than their predecessors, considering the fact that Sweden generally has been regarded as a political system with strong parties and partisan control? One contributing factor is that the strong parties have weakened considerably since the mid-1980s with declining party membership figures and a stronger role for the party leadership (Erlingsson et al. 2016). Similarly, the national parliament has lost out due to the transfer of legislative powers to the EU level, and the balance of power has tilted decisively away from the parliament in favour of the executive branch (Persson and Wiberg 2011). Taken together, this entails a strengthened role for the PM whose autonomy vis-à-vis parties and parliamentary party groups has been significantly strengthened (Bäck et al. 2009). For PMs who want to reduce problems of agency loss, it has therefore become easier to appoint ministers with less political experience, which they can more easily control and 'get rid of' if necessary.

However, with the new centre-right government that took office in 2006, the trend was broken. Fewer political outsiders were hired in the last Reinfeldt government (2010–2014) than ever before. Hence, our previously reported shift in executive politics, in terms of a decrease in the appointment of political insiders and an increase in non-partisan 'expert' ministers, seems to be broken. Our data thus indicate that there is much variation between different PMs and type of cabinets. Centre-right coalition governments are more inclined to appoint ministers with a solid political background whereas governments led by Social Democratic PMs have been more open to political outsiders. It may be seen as somewhat surprising that governments dominated by the Social Democrats have chosen to appoint non-partisan ministers to such a great extent; however, this finding is in line with what has been found by others (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2015). This may indicate the willingness of the Social Democratic party

leadership to strengthen its control, while the centre-right parties have had less opportunity to act in the same way. We have suggested elsewhere, and found support for the argument that coalition governments systematically include a higher proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience because each party has fewer executive positions to fill than in a single-party cabinet and may, therefore, tend to select its parliamentary heavyweights (Bäck et al. 2009). Accordingly, the pattern of selection and deselection of ministers without a political background in Sweden is explained to a large extent by the type of governments that have been formed.

Taken together, evidence from Sweden suggests a continued strong role for politically experienced ministers. The Swedish parliamentary system allows for the appointment of political outsiders to cabinet, not least during the European economic and financial crisis, but the main pattern, that persons appointed as ministers have a solid political background before taking office, persists.

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CHAPTER 4

Shades of Technocracy: The Variable Use of Non-partisan Ministers in Italy

Luca Verzichelli and Maurizio Cotta

Technical Skills, Technical Ministers and Technical Governments: What Is the Difference?

The Italian political system has been recurrently portrayed as a pervasive example of party government, with a stable but underperforming governing elite: The coalitions supporting the 50 governments formed between 1946 and 1994 were all dominated by a centrist party (Christian democracy), while the two parties at the extremes of the Italian *polarised pluripartitism* (Sartori 1976)—the large communist party and the small but persisting neo-fascist party—were confined to an opposition role. After the crisis of the early 1990s, a difficult transition to a more efficient democratic regime was attempted. In the unprecedented context of full political alternation between two opposing coalitions, catchy terms like 'executive strengthening', 'responsive leadership' and 'policy-making effectiveness' gained wide circulation among political actors and in the media. Soon, however, the system revealed the persistence of old problems. Among them the questions of government stability (*governabilità*, in the Italian

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jargon) and of the poor performance of the ruling elite were particularly salient. Throughout this period, the myth of technocracy has often been advocated and, in turn, supported by many observers and sometimes even by the politicians themselves. Technocrats, or 'policy experts', were expected to do what 'ordinary politicians' could not: promote new ideas, monitor effective policies, establish new institutional rules and ensure the credibility of the country abroad.

The formation of a *governo tecnico*—the second to be entirely composed of non-partisan ministers—by Mario Monti at the end of 2011 has reopened the debate about the role of technocracy after the failures of party-based governments. Comparing this experience to the technocratic government formed by Lamberto Dini in 1995 and to the technocratic-led cabinet formed by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi in 1993, we can say that in 2011 the most extreme case of 'party abdication' has happened, demonstrating once again the dramatic bad health of the Italian party government. Indeed, if we consider an ideal space defined by two dimensions—the amount of non-party personnel and the scope of delegation conferred to the government—we must underline the high potential of policy autonomy granted to Monti and to his ministers, in comparison to the Ciampi and Dini cases.[1] In the middle of an unprecedented economic crisis and with no more than 15 months to the next elections, the Monti cabinet was clearly expected to see out the final part of the legislative term. At the same time, the situation of financial emergency pushed the new executive to take a broad range of legislative and political initiatives, all of them connected to the management of the crisis, but inevitably concerning several policy sectors. This palpable sign of weakness of the political system says a lot about the difficult state of Italian parties, 20 years after the crisis of the 1990s.

It is not the aim of this chapter to analyse in detail the differences between one technocratic experience and another, a puzzle which would require a different set of hypotheses and analyses focusing also on institutional and law making data (Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2012; Marangoni and Verzichelli 2015). We can, in any case, suggest that the quantity and quality of non-partisan ministers should be plausibly linked to the type of delegation received by the chief executive and, more generally, by all the ministers.

We have also to remember that the claim for limits to party-government practices is not completely new. Although very limited in number, non-partisan (or even semi-partisan) expert ministers had been recruited in the past. Most of them crossed into the political scene just for a single and specific 'occasion'. Others remained politically active, and a minority of

them actually evolved into a new form of partisan politician. Once again, we have to admit that the nature of non-partisan ministers and the salience of their delegation can be very different from one case to the other. Granted that all of them represent a proof of the difficulties of the party government paradigm and a challenge for the ambitions of career politicians, they can be at the same time very different things. Some of them count more, being more autonomous in their activity, others have a more dependent and marginal role. Some can stay in office for a long time and, in the end, they can try to 'occupy' a position which was supposed to belong to long-standing professional politicians. Others are just passing meteors.

Hence, when we look to non-partisan ministers from the perspective of the analysis of political elites, we can refer to a common object, but we have to bear in mind that the uses of such alternative human resources within the ruling elite can be very different. They depend on the nature of each individual delegation and on the reputation of the political leadership in that moment. In this respect, the presence of technocratic figures in the government can be conceived as a phenomenon with many different shades, all of them marking a different moment in the broader context of the evolution (or involution) of the party government paradigm.

Moving from these caveats, we analyse first the institutional constraints regulating government formation and ministerial selection in Italy, then the trend of growing opportunities for the selection of non-partisan ministers, a phenomenon consistent with what can be observed in other European democracies. In accordance with the framework of this volume, we assume a manifold set of interrelated factors which should contribute to explain a phenomenon particularly relevant during the past three decades:

1. The nature of the political system and the evolution of macro-institutional variables, including the role of the head of the state, which can influence the processes of government formation and elite selection (Rose 1991; Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009). This aspect is particularly relevant in a country where political crises have recurrently determined the conditions for an active role of the President of the Republic in the choice of some key ministerial candidates.
2. The organisational and reputational decline of political parties and the consequent recourse to civil society personalities in order to avoid further manifestations of mistrust.

3. The concentration of power in the hands of a restricted number of ministers representing the 'core executive' and the process of 'presidentialisation' of government (Poguntke and Webb 2005) which would also imply the possibility for the chief executives to recruit a number of 'personal agents' within the cabinet.
4. The growing impact of supranational arenas and institutions (particularly significant, in the context of the European Union) over the structure of national political institutions, with a consequent demand for specific competencies in order to deal more effectively with the inputs coming from supranational authorities (Johansson and Tallberg 2010).
5. The complex nature of the problems which contemporary democratic governance has to deal with in some more technical policy fields such as infrastructures, health, research and technology and so on. A peculiar case of increased complexity of policy-making is obviously that of economic and financial policies in times of crisis, which require policy-makers with an enhanced profile of competence. This theme, already addressed in the past (Blondel 1991), has acquired today an even stronger weight across many Western democracies (Hallerberg and Wehner 2013).

In the central section of this chapter, we present quantitative data combined with some anecdotal description about the long-term transformations of the Italian ministerial personnel, moving from the recent remarkable intensification of non-partisan ministerial appointments and the increase in their complexity. In the following section, we analyse further features of the non-partisan members of the Italian ministerial elite, like the uniformity of their qualities, their career potential and their exposition to reshuffles and career breakdowns. A final section will draw together the main implications from this study.

Ministerial Recruitment and Italian Parliamentary Democracy

After the enactment of the 1948 constitution, Italian parliamentary democracy has been without doubt an archetypal example of party government. The rules of 'positive parliamentarism', and particularly the need of an explicit double confidence vote for the inauguration of cabinets (Russo 2015), as well as the penetrating presence of political parties within

the social system (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007), have been, during the first republican decades, the main pillars of strong partisan and parliamentary control over the recruitment of ministerial personnel. The process of ministerial recruitment was, in particular, one of the most relevant concerns for the partisan elites who have ruled the country since the end of World War II. As is well known, the victory of a pro-Western alliance of parties centred on the Christian Democratic party, in the elections for the first republican legislature in 1948, paved the way for a long era characterised by a remarkable continuity of the political class, despite a very low degree of governmental stability (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000).

As a consequence, the process of governmental formation was, until 1994, essentially a 'post-electoral business': Although the general governmental guidelines could be largely predictable, given that a *conventio ad excludendum* kept the main opposition player, the Italian Communist Party, out of parliamentary majorities, pre-electoral coalition agreements were non-existent. After the elections the actors involved in a process of negotiation which could last for weeks, with a first phase of consultations conducted by the President of the Republic and then one or more rounds of negotiations with the *formateur* appointed by the president himself, have been always 'delegations of parliamentary groups'. In fact, the leaders of the external party organisations (usually called 'secretaries') have typically overshadowed the leaders of the parliamentary-party groups and guided the delegations. In the meantime, meetings among the top party leaders of the prospective coalitions would be held in order to define both the policy guidelines of the future government and the main criteria for portfolio allocation (and possibly some vetoes on a number of partisan representatives).

The choice among the 'ministrables' and the exact definition of the size of the next government have been, therefore, a complicated game of bargaining rounds in the hands of a limited number of party leaders. The same group of actors usually preferred, during the so-called First Republic, to select the executive from outside: Instead of entering the cabinet, party leaders (especially those of the Christian Democratic Party) tended to keep the top party offices, leaving ministerial positions to other politicians. This lack of overlap between top partisan leadership and ministerial appointments induced the former to organise occasional majority summits (*vertici*) in order to verify the consistency of the governmental action with the party line (Criscitiello 1993). This practice of party summits was, therefore, an emblematic feature of the Italian governments of the First

Republic. The practice declined during the Second Republic as the party leaders were now fully integrated into the government, but it has reappeared more recently, with the advent of technical governments, whenever they have had the need to reinvigorate the 'external support' of the parties providing the cabinet with a parliamentary majority.

The dominant role of top party leaders during the process of government formation and portfolio allocation in the experience of the Italian First Republic was absolutely clear. Following a general election or, much more often, after the formal commencement of a governmental crisis between elections, the bargaining game among party leaders (and within parties, among faction leaders), was the crucial step for determining who would get a ministerial position and which position. A cumbersome constitutional procedure, asking both parliamentary chambers to discuss the programmatic speech of the prime minister designate and to vote two separate confidence motions within ten days of the nomination of the new executive, provided some additional time to define the policy delegation among ministers and to 'fine tune' the distribution of spoils by appointing other junior ministers (normally a few days after the ministers had taken their oath).

Evidence confirming the remarkable degree of ministerial partisanship has been extensively presented in various works. A book by Calise and Mannheimer (1983) explored the peculiarities of the system of recruitment and circulation of Christian Democratic ministers (representing, at that time, roughly two-thirds of the whole ministerial elite). The most relevant features of this system were: (a) a balanced geographical distribution of ministers, (b) a significant correlation between electoral success (measured by preference votes) and competitiveness within the ministerial super elite and (c) a necessary phase of 'training' as a senior parliamentarian and, usually, as a junior minister, in order to reach the most important cabinet positions. Similar views about the features of the Christian Democratic elite were expressed by Mattei Dogan (1989), while more recent studies (Cotta and Verzichelli 2003; Verzichelli 2009) have analysed the long-term evolution of the republican ministerial elite and the sequence of different ministerial cohorts (also within the leading group of Christian Democratic ministers) with their particular backgrounds. However, the partisan nature of the large majority of ministers and the persistence of the established mechanisms of selection and circulation were never really challenged until the early 1990s.

Here we will not deal with the details of this diachronic reconstruction. We simply recall that all the studies and even the most comprehensive chronicles of government formation during the First Republic converge over the idea of a set of unwritten rules,[2] which maximised the bargaining power of parties, the presence of partisan elites in government and the 'post-electoral' nature of the process of government formation. Both the policy guidelines and the structure of the cabinet team used to be shaped after the elections or after the formal termination of the previous government. Within this context, the internal allocation of ministerial delegations, which could also be enriched by a relevant number of ministers without portfolios, who continuously changed in number and in the definition of their policy scope, was the object of intense competition among parties and within parties. This made Italian government crises particularly time-consuming, even when the general political outcomes (party composition of the coalition, name of prime minister, main policy objectives) were largely predictable.

Things have changed significantly with the Second Republic, when a process of presidentialisation of the executive, albeit an 'Italian-style' presidentialisation (Calise 2005) has been evident. Two 'presidents' (the president of the council of ministers and the head of state) are the protagonists of such a shift, which has reduced the room for factional compromises and strengthened the direct influence of the chief executive in the choice of his delegates. When political conditions do not allow the installation of a strong prime minister, the President of the Republic can gain a stronger say in the definition of the list of 'ministrables'.

Moving from these consolidated insights, we can now provide a general picture of the profile of the ministerial personnel in Italy, looking to the degree of partyness of such a crucial elite group in a long-term perspective.

Ministerial Recruitment and the Role of Non-partisan Actors in Italy: A Diachronic Picture

The traditional interpretation of a party-dominated process of ministerial selection and circulation in republican Italy has been challenged, at least partially, by some empirical evidence contradicting the rigid application of the ideal party government model. The most important element is the changing status (and role) of the Italian prime minister during the first

40 years of the Republic. As argued by many authors, for a long time the Italian chief executive could be considered only a *primus inter pares* in terms of effective powers.[3] Most of the time, the candidates for the role of *Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri* were important Christian Democratic leaders who did not occupy, during their cabinet mandate, the office of party leader. This circumstance, due mainly to the factionalised nature of that party, determined a reduced prime ministerial autonomy. However, the nature (or rather the state) of coalitions could produce some degree of variability in the room for manoeuvre of the PM, as well as in the autonomy of the governmental coalition itself. We can therefore distinguish, with regard to the cabinets of the First Republic, between 'organic party-government cabinets', with expectations of a longer duration and of a more vigorous policy-making, cabinets with a 'limited delegation', 'transitional cabinets' (very often minority governments formed only by the Christian Democrats) and even purely 'caretaker cabinets'. Typically, in the organic coalition governments, the space for 'party sentinels' was broader, while caretaker and minority governments could display a wider range of political and expert profiles.

Secondly, to argue that ministerial recruitment was dominated by partisan and parliamentary paths to power does not mean that experiences and experiments of technocratic presence in government were totally excluded from the practice of the First Republic. According to our data, 28 (11%) among the 260 ministers serving between the first and the tenth legislature (May 1948 to April 1992) had no previous parliamentary experience. The average duration of their ministerial career was remarkably lower (2.2 years) in comparison to the duration of the entire population of ministers (3.7 years). Moreover, none of them occupied core offices such as those of *Presidente del Consiglio*, minister of interiors, foreign affairs or 'social ministries' such as labour; the most notable exceptions were the cases of finance/treasury, since a few ministers with a technical background were recruited after the crisis of the 1970s (see below).

The overall distribution of ministers without a political background—we are using now the strictest definition used in this volume, which requires not just the absence of parliamentary experience or of a local/regional political background, but even the absence of any previous record of leading positions in a political party at any time before the ministerial appointment—is described in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

Table 4.1 Italian governments and the number and share of ministers without political background, 1948–2014

Government (PM and his party)	*Date in office*	*Political formula*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b] *(%)*
De Gasperi V (DC)	23/05/1948	Centrism	Surplus coalition	18/21	2 (9.5)
De Gasperi VI (DC)	21/01/1950	Centrism	Surplus coalition	18	0 (–)
De Gasperi VII (DC)	26/07/1951	Centrism	Surplus coalition	17	0 (–)
De Gasperi VIII (DC)	16/07/1953	Centrism (crisis)	Single-party minority[c]	17	0 (–)
Pella (DC)	17/08/1953	Centrism (caretaker)	Single-party minority	17	2 (11.8)
Fanfani (DC)	18/01/1954	Centrism	Single-party minority[c]	19	0 (–)
Scelba (DC)	10/02/1954	Centrism	Minority coalition	20/22	0 (–)
Segni (DC)	06/07/1955	Centrism	Minority coalition	21/24	0 (–)
Zoli (DC)	19/05/1957	Centrism (crisis)	Single-party minority	21	0 (–)
Fanfani II (DC)	01/07/1958	Centrism (crisis)	Minority coalition	23	0 (–)
Segni II (DC)	15/02/1959	Centrism (crisis)	Single-party minority	23	0 (–)
Tambroni (DC)	25/03/1960	Centrism (crisis)	Single-party minority	22	0 (–)
Fanfani III (DC)	26/07/1960	Centre-left (preparation)	Single-party minority	24	0 (–)
Fanfani IV (DC)	21/02/1962	Centre-left (preparation)	Minority coalition	25	0 (–)
Leone (DC)	21/06/1963	Centre-left (caretaker)	Single-party minority	23	1 (4.3)
Moro (DC)	04/12/1963	Centre-left	Surplus coalition	26/28	0 (–)
Moro II (DC)	22/07/1964	Centre-left	Surplus coalition	26	0 (–)
Moro III (DC)	23/02/1966	Centre-left	Surplus coalition	23/26	0 (–)

(*continued*)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Government (PM and his party)	*Date in office*	*Political formula*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b] *(%)*
Leone II (DC)	24/06/1968	Centre-left (caretaker)	Single-party minority	22	0 (–)
Rumor (DC)	12/12/1968	Centre-left	Surplus coalition	27/28	0 (–)
Rumor II (DC)	05/08/1969	Centre-left	Single-party minority	25	0 (–)
Rumor III (DC)	27/03/1970	Centre-left	Surplus coalition	26/28	0 (–)
Colombo (DC)	06/08/1970	Centre-left	Surplus coalition	27/28	0 (–)
Andreotti (DC)	17/02/1972	Centre-left (first crisis)	Single-party minority[c]	25	0 (–)
Andreotti II (DC)	26/06/1972	Centre-left (transition)	Minimum winning coalition	26	0 (–)
Rumor IV (DC)	07/07/1973	Centre-left	Surplus coalition	28	0 (–)
Rumor V (DC)	14/03/1974	Centre-left	Minimum winning coalition	26	0 (–)
Moro IV (DC)	23/11/1974	Centre-left (final crisis)	Minority coalition	25	0 (–)
Moro V (DC)	12/02/1976	Centre-left (final crisis)	Single-party minority	22	1 (4.5)
Andreotti III (DC)	29/07/1976	National Solidarity	Single-party minority	21	2 (9.5)
Andreotti IV (DC)	11/03/1978	National Solidarity	Single-party minority	21/23	3 (13.0)
Andreotti V (DC)	20/03/1979	National Solidarity (crisis)	Single-party minority[c]	21/22	1 (4.5)
Cossiga (DC)	04/08/1979	*Pentapartito*	Minority coalition	25/27	4 (14.8)
Cossiga II (DC)	04/04/1980	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	28	3 (10.7)
Forlani (DC)	18/10/1980	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	27/28	1 (3.6)
Spadolini (PRI)	28/06/1981	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	27	0 (–)

(*continued*)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Government (PM and his party)	*Date in office*	*Political formula*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b] *(%)*
Spadolini II (PRI)	23/08/1982	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	27	0 (–)
Fanfani V (DC)	01/12/1982	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	26	0 (–)
Craxi (PSI)	04/08/1983	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	31/34	0 (–)
Craxi II (PSI)	01/08/1986	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	30	0 (–)
Fanfani VI (DC)	17/04/1987	*Pentapartito* (first crisis)	Single-party minority[c]	26	6 (24.0)
Goria (DC)	28/07/1987	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	30	2 (6.7)
De Mita (DC)	13/04/1988	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	32	2 (6.3)
Andreotti VI (DC)	23/07/1989	*Pentapartito*	Surplus coalition	32/39	2 (5.1)
Andreotti VII (DC)	13/04/1991	*Pentapartito* (crisis)	Surplus coalition	33	0 (–)
Amato (PSI)	28/06/1992	*Pentapartito* (crisis)	Minimum winning coalition	30/32	5 (15.6)
Ciampi (non-partisan)	29/04/1993	Technocratic-led coalition	Surplus coalition	25/29	9 (31.0)
Berlusconi (FI)	11/05/1994	Right	Minimum winning coalition	26	3 (11.5)
Dini (non-partisan)	17/01/1995	Technocratic government	Surplus coalition	19/21	21 (100)
Prodi (Ulivo)	17/05/1996	Left	Minority coalition	22/23	5 (21.7)
D'Alema (PDS)	21/10/1998	Left	Surplus coalition	28/29	3 (10.3)
D'Alema II (PDS)	22/12/1999	Left	Minimum winning coalition	26	2 (7.7)
Amato II (independent left)	26/04/2000	Left	Minimum winning coalition	24	4 (16.7)

(*continued*)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Government (PM and his party)	*Date in office*	*Political formula*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b] *(%)*
Berlusconi II (FI)	11/06/2001	Right	Surplus coalition	25/30	6 (20.7)
Berlusconi III (FI)	23/04/2005	Right	Surplus coalition	26	4 (15.4)
Prodi II (*Unione*)	17/05/2006	Left	Minimum winning coalition	26/27	6 (22.2)
Berlusconi IV (PDL)	08/05/2008	Right	Minimum winning coalition	24/30	2 (6.7)
Monti (non-partisan)	16/11/2011	Technocratic government	Surplus coalition	18	17 (94.4)
Letta (PD)	28/04/2013	Grand coalition	Surplus coalition	22	5 (22.7)
Renzi (PD)	22/02/2014	Centre-left coalition	Minimum winning coalition	17	2 (12.5)

[a]The first figure refers to the number of members of the cabinet at the beginning of the mandate. The second figure is the total number of minister appointed. Both figures include the prime minister

[b]Ministers without parliamentary experience or a local/regional political background, as well as a previous record of leading positions in political parties at any time before their appointment. The percentage is calculated from the total number of ministers appointed

[c]These governments failed the initial confidence vote of investiture in one of the parliamentary branches and therefore were forced to an immediate act of resignation

Exploring the effective dynamics of the processes of ministerial selection, these data allow us to better understand the very nature of the presence of non-partisan ministers. According to this perspective, a clear distinction has to be stressed between the profiles of ministers of the so-called First Republic and those of the period following the 1992 and 1994 elections, when the non-partisan component of the ministerial elite has clearly increased, even within the 'political' executives (Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli 2017).

For a breakdown of government types, we adopt for the First Republic a classification of governing coalitions, all of them centred on the Christian-Democratic pivotal role, which reflects the different political phases of this

Table 4.2 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different types of party government, 1948–1994 and 1994–2014

Cabinet type (N)	*Political orientation*	*Appointed*	*Dismissed*[a]
		N (%)[b]	*N (%)*[c]
1948–1994			
Oversized coalitions (21)	Centrism, centre-left, *pentapartito*	12 (2.1)	0 (–)
Minimum winning coalitions (2)	Centre-left, *pentapartito*	5 (5.9)	0 (–)
Minority governments (22)	Centrism, centre-left, National Solidarity, *pentapartito*,	20 (4.0)	0 (–)
	All governments, *centrismo* (12)	4 (1.6)	0 (–)
	All governments, centre-left (17)	2 (0.5)	0 (–)
	All governments, National Solidarity (3)	6 (9.1)	0 (–)
	All governments, *pentapartito* (14)	25 (6)	0 (–)
All cabinets 1948–1994		74 (3.2)	0 (–)
1994–2014			
Post 2013 coalitions (2)[d]	Grand coalition (Letta)	7 (17.9)	0 (–)
Oversized coalitions (4)	Left or right governments	30 (29.1)	4 (3.9)
Minimum winning coalitions (5)	Left or right governments	17 (12.8)	5 (62.5)
Minority governments (1)	Left (Prodi I)	5 (21.7)	1 (100)
	All governments left (5)	20 (15.5)	1 (20)
	All governments right (4)	15 (13.4)	9 (81.8)
All cabinets 1994–2014		94 (17.2)	22 (33.4)
All cabinets 1948–2014		168 (5.9)	22 (20.2)

Note: The technocratic (or technocratic-led) governments of Ciampi, Dini and Monti have not been included in this table

[a]Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate

[b]Percentages refer to all ministers appointed

[c]Percentages refer to all ministers dismissed

[d]This category includes the Letta Government (a grand coalition including centre-right and centre-left parties) and the Renzi government (a minimum winning coalition including PD and some centrist and centre-right little parties)

period (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000). During the Second Republic, in contrast, a 'left-right alternation' was finally introduced, interrupted by short phases of technocratic government and (more recently) by attempts at a grand coalition. The results of the aggregate analyses (Table 4.2) illuminate a couple of points. The first one is that the ministerial recruitment of the First Republic can be defined as an almost pure application of the party

government paradigm, with the partial exception of the 'National Solidarity', a phase of minority governments supported by the whole front of the democratic parties. A limited use of non-partisan ministers emerged in that period to respond to a typical example of lack of party delegation (or to a partial party abdication). The only party in government (DC) did not want the whole responsibility of delicate reforms—to be taken on the contrary with a large parliamentary consensus—in policy fields such as public finance, welfare reduction and public administration.

The second point to be stressed lies in the differences in the non-partisan quota between cabinet types (and political orientations) in the post-1994 governments. The proportion of non-partisan ministers seems to increase in the case of oversized coalitions and, to some extent, of a minority government with a fragmented coalition (Prodi I). This evidence is consistent with the expectations of coalition theories, since it reflects difficult bargaining set situations: More technocrats will be recruited in order to solve disputes among the parties forming the cabinet or supporting it. At the same time, some differences emerge in the presence of non-partisan ministers between the right-wing cabinets (Berlusconi I/IV) and the left-wing ones. The former tend to appoint a slightly smaller quota of non-partisan ministers, but they tend to sack them much more easily. This has to do with the structure of the centre-right coalitions built by Berlusconi, and also the nature of delegation between himself (as PM) and some of his technical delegates (see below).

The diachronic evolution of the technocratic presence in the republican age can be described by other indicators, less 'radical' than the percentage of pure technocrats included in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. In particular, we can look at the rate of ministerial and governmental office holders without parliamentary experience (just one of the components of the strict definition mentioned above) and the rate of ministers with no previous relevant experience in an executive position (i.e. experience as a junior minister or vice minister). These indicators, summarised in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, show a similarly increasing trend starting with the demise of the First Republic and a more marked increase during the transition, after 1992.

The share of ministers not recruited from parliamentary ranks is clear: Even excluding the two cases of full technocratic governments (Dini and Monti), the increasing trend of this indicator over the last 25 years is evident. During the Second Republic, about a quarter of all ministers had no parliamentary background. *Prima facie*, this could be linked to two simple explanations: The 'crisis' and the increased policy-making complexity.



Fig. 4.1 Italian ministers and junior ministers with no parliamentary experience (before first full ministerial appointment) (%)

During the late 1980s, some non-parliamentary ministers were recruited to fit new delicate policy-making roles like those of minister for the environment (introduced in 1986) and minister for research and technology (1988). Over the following decade, the crisis and then the challenge of EMU pushed even the leaders of 'political cabinets' to include a significant number of non-parliamentary ministers, and a similar trend seems to have marked the cabinets of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The curve representing the rate of ministerial personnel with previous experience as a junior minister (Fig. 4.2) is also unambiguous: The classic 'track' from a lower to a higher position, emerging in the first decades of the republican age, started to decline during the 1980s, to become a largely minoritarian practice in recent executives. This dynamic has to be connected both to the increasing presence of 'policy experts', arriving directly from external careers (in some cases pure technocrats, in other cases party representatives with marked policy expertise) to the ministerial circle, and also to the decline of parliamentary seniority, challenged by other forms of 'integrated' and 'bi-directional' patterns of political career (Borchert 2012; Pilet et al. 2014). In particular, a number of regional

Fig. 4.2 Italian ministers with junior ministerial experience (before first full ministerial appointment) (%)

leaders and executive politicians from important cities[4] have been able to 'jump' directly into the ministerial circle, without spending years accumulating parliamentary seniority or experience as junior ministers.[5]

Finally, we have to bear in mind that a number of ministerial appointments, especially during the transitional governments of the 1990s were somehow influenced by the head of state, which constituted another possible 'interruption' in the natural chain of delegation of parliamentary democracies.

These data clearly describe the progressive deviation from the ideal party government model. Ministerial recruitment has not only experienced a clear turn away from a 'party and parliamentary pathway', which was traditionally dominant in the Italian case (De Winter 1991), but also a decline of the normal sequence from a junior ministership to a post within the inner cabinet, and the emergence of new modes of selection. The evidence from Table 4.3, analysing some usual indicators of political background of ministerial elites, helps to understand what are these new modes balancing the decrease of the classic parliamentary/junior ministerial seniority. More space is now available to non-partisan ministers and

Table 4.3 Political background of first-time ministers, 1948–1994 and 1994–2014

	1948–1994		*1994–2014*		*1948–2014*	
	N[b]	*%*[a]	*N*[b]	*%*[a]	*N*[b]	*%*[a]
Mayor or local councillor	138	48.9	75	36.1	210	43.0
Regional deputy or member of regional executive	31	11.0	29	14.0	59	12.5
National MP (deputy or senator)	253	86.1	130	62.5	373	76.5
National MP with more than 2 years parliamentary experience	212	71.6	92	44.2	294	60.1
European parliamentarian (included pre-1979 European Cultural Convention)	19	6.7	11	5.3	30	6.1
Party leading positions	200	67.6	104	50.0	297	60.7
Junior minister	126	43.2	33	15.9	158	32.3
Non-partisan (no prior political or parliamentary experience)	34	11.5	62	29.8	91	18.6
Total number of individuals appointed	296		208		489	

Note: The categories are not mutually exclusive
[a]Percentages refer to the total number of individuals appointed
[b]Total number of individuals appointed

significant opportunities are also open to politicians coming from subnational levels, and particularly from the regional institutions, without the passage through the national parliamentary election. Even the presence of ministers directly selected from local politics remained noticeable: The absolute rate of ministers with this background has decreased, but considering the increasing recruitment of non-partisan ministers, the importance of some experiences (for instance, that of mayor of a big city) seems to be rather relevant.

In other words, an enlargement of the 'pool of ministrables' happened from the late 1980s onwards, thus confirming the hypothesis of a declining role of the typical career politicians described in the past decades (King 1981). The presence of pure technocrats represents perhaps the strongest challenge to the party government model. However, such a presence tends to be limited to specific government experiences (e.g. caretaker governments), specific ministerial positions (e.g. finance minister, Justice Minister, etc.) or specific junctures during which expertise is particularly in demand, and it is required to revise the traditional model of selection and circulation of the ruling class.

Table 4.4 Selected ministries and weight of the ministers without political background, 1948–1994 and 1994–2014

Ministries	*1949–1994*		*1994–2014*		*1948–2014*	
	All ministers	*Non-partisan ministers*	*All ministers*	*Non-partisan ministers*	*All ministers*	*Non-partisan ministers*
	N	*N (%)*	*N*	*N (%)*	*N*	*N (%)*
Defence	21	0 (–)	10	2 (20.0)	30	2 (6.7)
Treasury/finance, economy[a]	34	5 (14.7)	14	6 (42.9)	45	12 (26.7)
Foreign affairs	23	0 (–)	12	4 (33.3)	33	4 (12.1)
Internal affairs	20	0 (–)	11	2 (18.2)	28	2 (7.1)
Justice	20	2 (10.0)	15	7 (46.6)	34	9 (26.5)

[a]This category includes the holders of two portfolios which were autonomous until 2001—Budget (*Bilancio*) and Treasury (*Tesoro*)—and all the ministers of Economy appointed after 2001

The distribution of pure technocrats by different portfolios (Table 4.4) confirms that within the narrow core of the executive circle, even during the First Republic, positions concerning economic policies had been sometimes reserved for non-partisan figures. This sector became heavily controlled by ‘non-party ministers’ during the 1990s, together with, although more rarely, justice and even foreign affairs. The ministries of interior and defence remain, by contrast, exclusive domains for political appointment, since the only two cases contained in Table 4.4 refer to fully technocratic cabinets.

Social and occupational backgrounds of ministers (Table 4.5) make this dynamic picture even more understandable. The long-term trend of the First Republic had followed the typical patterns of transformation of parliamentary elites (Cotta and Best 2007). The declining role of lawyers and other ‘notable’ politicians had been balanced by the increase of full-time politicians and public sector functionaries (mainly judges, state councillors and other senior civil servants). The transition of the 1990s did not dramatically change the occupational profile of the Italian minister. Quite to the contrary, after a modest reduction of political professionals and public functionaries during the transitional years, these categories again began to grow. In short, over the past two decades (with some exceptions for the technocratic cabinets we will discuss later in the chapter), the ministerial elite has been formed from two clearly distinctive categories: the

Table 4.5 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without political background, 1948–1994 and 1994–2014

Variables	*1948–1994*		*1994–2014*	
	Ministers without political background	*All ministers*	*Ministers without political background*	*All ministers*
	N (%)	*N (%)*	*N (%)*	*N*
Female	1 (3.7)	7 (2.4)	4 (6.6)	35 (16.8)
Mean age at first appointment	58.4 years	54.3 years	60.2 years	54.2 years
University graduates[a]	26 (100)	268 (92.2)	60 (98.4)	183 (88.0)
PhD	0	0	12 (19.7)	17 (8.2)
Academic field[b]: Law	13 (50.0)	169 (62.6)	22 (36.7)	82 (39.4)
Academic field[b]: Engineering/ architecture	2 (7.7)	12 (4.4)	5 (8.4)	11 (5.3)
Academic field[b]: Economics/ business/finance	7 (26.9)	32 (11.5)	19 (31.7)	28 (13.5)
Academic field[b]: Social sciences	0	4 (1.5)	2 (3.3)	17 (8.2)
Academic field[b]: Humanities	0	27 (10.0)	2 (3.3)	19 (9.1)
Academic field[b]: Others	4 (15.4)	26 (9.6)	11 (18.4)	23 (12.7)
Occupation: Business, industry, finance	4 (15.4)	29 (15.3)	7 (11.5)	15 (7.2)
Occupation: Higher civil servant	7 (26.9)	25 (13.2)	24 (39.3)	32 (15.4)
Occupation: Lawyer	1 (3.8)	70 (36.8)	0	17 (8.2)
Occupation: University professor	11 (42.3)	73 (38.4)	23 (37.7)	60 (28.8)
Occupation[b]: Full-time politician/ trade unionist	0	37 (19.5)	0	36 (17.3)
Occupation: Others	3 (11.5)	59 (31.3)	6 (9.8)	48 (23.1)

[a]Graduate and/or post-graduate studies
[b]Figures are calculated from the total graduates

'experts' (academics, technocrats, businessmen, sometimes media opinion-leaders) nominated with some degree of autonomy by the cabinet leaders, and the 'generalist politicians' who have decreased in absolute numbers but have maintained a relevant role as prospective long-term ministers. Many of these generalist politicians have come from full-paid professional positions within parties or unions, while the representation of other aggregate categories depends on the political colour of the cabinets. Within legislatures dominated by centre-right governments, the category which is more clearly evident is 'business, industry, finance', while the

ministers of centre-left governments tend to be civil servants (of all types) and academics.

Technocracy in Power: Tales from the Italian Republic

What about the little group of forerunner technocrats who entered the scene of the First Republic during the decades of Christian Democratic Party government? Among them we can find a few distinguished economists coming from prestigious but 'peripheral' offices concerned with reconstruction policy plans (Costantino Bresciani Turroni, Giordano Dell'Amore) or a lawyer involved in justice reforms (Francesco Paolo Bonifacio). Another isolated case of a policy expert who joined the ministerial core is that of a young independent academic (although close to the Christian Democratic left), Romano Prodi, who was appointed minister of industry in November 1978 (Andreotti IV cabinet) and later had a distinguished political career. As already mentioned, during the crisis years following the first oil shock, the demand for competent and relatively autonomous policy-makers rose, especially in the sectors of public administration reform and public finance. This explains the appointment of important university professors and high-ranking civil servants. Among them, we should mention Massimo Severo Giannini, an eminent administrative law scholar, who was recruited to the position of minister without portfolio for public administration reform in the Cossiga cabinet of 1979. His attempt, however, to translate his knowledge of the Italian public administration into systematic reform soon failed, and in a few months, he chose to return to his job as a university professor.

With the nomination of Rinaldo Ossola as minister of foreign trade, in 1976, a long practice of ministerial selection of the most brilliant officers of the Italian central bank (*Banca d'Italia*) began. A decade later, during the complicated phase of negotiations over the treaty for European Monetary Union (EMU), it was the turn of the governor of the Italian central bank, Guido Carli,[6] to become minister and to pave the way for a whole procession of national bankers in the core executive.

The Fanfani VI government, a caretaker cabinet formed to govern during the electoral campaign after a strong conflict between the two largest parties of the *Pentapartito* coalition, was the first example of the widespread selection of non-partisan experts. In this short-lived cabinet, we find 8 (out of 26) ministers belonging to the category of pure technocrats.

We can argue that the first (limited) examples of technocrats in government during the golden age of the Italian 'particracy' reflected occasional demands for expertise, in crucial but narrow policy areas and, above all, for a limited period. The limits to the autonomy of these ministers were relatively predictable: Their expectations of ministerial tenure and their political subordination to the (collective) decisions taken by the ministerial selectorates (the top elites of governmental parties) were clear. However, at the end of the 1980s, a relevant innovation in ministerial selection was already evident, with the percentage of ministers without a parliamentary experience approaching the threshold of 20% (Fig. 4.1). This suggests that already before the crisis of the party system of the First Republic and the launching of the first technocratic governments, different forms of deviation from the linear model of partisan-parliamentary ministerial recruitment had occurred.

During the four transition years (1992–1996), the percentage of ministers with no previous parliamentary career went up to 38% (34 out of the 90 ministers serving during the XII and the XIII legislature). Of course, this was mainly due to the formation of a semi-technical (Ciampi) and a fully technical government (Dini) during this short period of time. However, the nomination of different experts and non-partisan ministers was not exclusively limited to these two cabinets. Amato, who served as prime minister between June 1992 and April 1993, appointed a few ministers who did not hold a parliamentary office, and some of them, for instance, the professor and banker Piero Barucci (at the treasury) and the *Corriere della sera* editorialist Alberto Ronchey (Ministry of Culture), had a clear expert profile.

The specific roles covered by several ministers during the subsequent period of 'left cabinets' between 1996 and 2001 clearly indicate that the nature of non-partisan appointments was about to change, determining new relevant and autonomous tasks and, overall, depicting a different pattern of executive delegation. Three features in particular should be highlighted: (1) the drastic reduction of the number of ministers coming from the classic parliamentary-party pathway (see below); (2) the demand of new policy competencies specially 'tailored' for a specific ministerial delegation and oriented toward the formulation of specific policy actions and (3) a more pronounced ministerial accountability, although limited to a few office holders of the 'core executive'. We can also add that, ministers without portfolio were reduced in number and increasingly assigned to non-partisan or non-parliamentary figures, somehow directly connected to the figure of the chief executive. In fact, it was the Berlusconi I cabinet

(1994) which inaugurated such an interesting development, appointing non-parliamentary figures such as Giuliano Ferrara (a well-known journalist) and Sergio Berlinguer (a distinguished diplomat). And again after his return to Palazzo Chigi, in 2001, Berlusconi appointed other technocrats (personally linked to him) in governmental roles: among others, the minister of health (Sirchia) and the minister for innovation (the former top IBM manager Stanca).

The propensity to achieve a diverse mix of ministerial personnel is even more evident in the growing percentage of non-parliamentary actors among the junior ministers (see above). This is an indicator of the reduction of two traditional elements of government formation in Italy: the centrality of the parliamentary pathway and the 'defensive' strategy of 'keeping tabs' on coalition partners, through the appointment of watchdog junior ministers (Verzichelli 2009). In the Second Republic, both Berlusconi (1994, 2001 and 2008) and Prodi (1996 and 2006) decided to fill key junior ministerships (in particular those attached to the PM office and to economic ministries) with trusted figures from their own entourage, from 'civil society'[7] and a number of experts and academics. A similar phenomenon can be found with the introduction of the new figure of vice minister—a sort of hybrid between a minister without portfolio and a junior minister.[8]

The two technical executives of 1995 (Dini) and 2011 (Monti) brought further examples of changes in the nature of ministerial selection. Using the lens of the principal-agent theory, the choice of a non-affiliated and purely technical actor as prime minister means the renunciation by the parliamentary majority to select a political representative as its agent. This is also applicable to the experience of the Ciampi government (1993) which had been the first case of 'party abdication' from the natural role of political parties within the chain of delegation. However, given the semi-technical nature of the Ciampi ministerial team (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014), we will concentrate our attention on the two other cases of 'fully technocratic governments'.

To start with, both cabinets, as already mentioned, were born from the crisis of a centre-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi, and they both had to cope with a dramatic financial crisis and address the difficult task for a caretaker cabinet to define immediate strategies. In the case of the Monti cabinet, which deliberately oriented its policy platform to avoid a financial default, considered very likely at the beginning of 2012, the seriousness of the economic recession was particularly relevant.[9]

Another evident similarity has to do with the profiles of the ministers of the two executives. The Dini cabinet had two capitalists/entrepreneurs (Agnelli, Lombardi), six university professors (Arcelli, Fantozzi, Gambino, Clò, Salvini, Treu) who also had good careers as government experts, eight state *grand commis* and high-ranking bureaucrats (Dini, Masera, Corcione, Paolucci, Luchetti, Caravale, Guzzanti, Baratta) with experience in ministerial offices or public banks and three judges (Mancuso, Brancaccio, Caianiello). In the Monti cabinet, we find: two top managers from large private or semi-private enterprises (Gnudi, Passera), eight university professors (Balduzzi, Fornero, Giarda, Monti, Profumo, Ornaghi, Riccardi, Severino), eight public *grand commis* (Barca, Catania, Moavero Milanesi, Patroni Griffi, Catricalà, Cancellieri, Terzi, Clini), plus another high-ranking civil servant from the military hierarchy (Di Paola). Moreover, both governments had a limited number of female ministers (just one in the case of Dini, three in the case of Monti), a good number of postgraduates and a relatively high mean age. The analysis of the junior ministerial level does not change that picture: 41 junior ministers for Dini and 27 for Monti, none of them with a major political experience, and most of them connected to an area of expertise defined by significant academic and high civil service backgrounds and experience in international organisations. If we exclude a handful of cases of junior ministers without a parliamentary career, but with some other kind of political background (we should call them non-parliamentary political figures), a mix of university professors (generally with a strong professional profile), *grand commis d'état* and other high-ranking bureaucrats (including judges and, occasionally, military officials) is the core of the whole technocratic governmental elite.

The profiles of the two cabinets look, therefore, rather similar, showing a peculiar distribution of features at odds with the profile of the typical 'political executives'. In general, the decision of the party elites to stay out of the cabinet, in a situation of urgent need for reforms, has produced a close correspondence of policy expertise and portfolios allocation (a general to defence, an ambassador to foreign affairs, a medical doctor to health, etc.). But the main peculiarity of these governments—the predominance of public or semi-public managerial skills—highlights the influence of actors who, given the political stalemate and the abdication of the party leaders, were put in the position to play a subsidiary role. This was the case first of all for the head of state, but also for the top ranks of different administrative branches.

The limited number of private entrepreneurs or managers may have to do with economic considerations (a ministerial position entails for them significant economic losses compared to private sector salaries), but also with a weak propensity of Italian businessmen to take a public role. Professors and *grand commis* have greater job security, as well as in general, previous experience in advisory positions to ministers or parliamentary offices. They have also more to gain, in terms of future professional advantages, from their ministerial job.

Ministerial Life After Selection: Trajectories and Fortunes of Non-partisan Ministers in Italy

We must now look for a more comprehensive explanation of the decline of partisan recruitment within ministerial circles in Italy. In this perspective, we explore the 'classic' indicators of the political background of ministers, summarising the descriptive data in order to simplify our dependent variable. More exactly, we propose a typology of political pathways to the ministerial circle (Table 4.6), built on a classification proposed by De Winter (1991). The typical 'outsider' path has been divided into two types: ministers having no national parliamentary or political experience at all (thus corresponding to the non-partisan ministers analysed above) and ministers who have had no parliamentary experience but held some party office. Ministers having both parliamentary and partisan experience before their first appointment are also split between 'pure insiders' (national party background and significant parliamentary seniority) and other combinations of political appointments. The time frame is the same adopted above and consistently with previous works on ministerial selection and circulation (Cotta and Verzichelli 2003; Verzichelli 2009). We use the 1994 election as the crucial turning point.

The data confirm the decline of the purely partisan pathway to government. Even when we weigh the data by number of ministerial appointments or by the duration of ministerial career in years, the rate of insider party ministers declines by about 15%, from roughly an absolute majority of careers to little more than a third of the ministerial population. The path which seems to be most advantaged in the passage to the Second Republic is that of 'pure technocrats'. However, given that many of these technocrats have been included in short caretaker governments and had very low expectations of becoming 'long termers', the percentages of the intermediate

Table 4.6 Types of parliamentary/party experiences before ministerial appointment

	% of ministers		*% of ministers weighted by number of appointments*		*% of ministers weighted by duration of ministerial career*	
	1948–1994	*1994–2014*	*1948–1994*	*1994–2014*	*1948–1994*	*1994–2014*
Insider party ministers	50.3	37.5	53.2	38.8	52.1	42.3
Other political combinations	23.6	19.7	31.4	20.5	32.4	20.9
Outsider ministers	14.5	13.0	9.7	14.4	9.4	13.0
Pure technocrats (non-partisan ministers)	11.5	29.8	5.8	26.3	6.2	23.8
N	296	208	296	208	296	208

Note: *Insider party minister* means a combination of significant parliamentary experience (5 years at least) and an experience as a national party office holder. *Other political combinations* means the sum of a parliamentary experience and a party office at any level. *Outsider minister* means local elective offices or party affiliation not combined with parliamentary background. *Pure technocrat minister* means no political activism and no parliamentary or local other office before becoming minister

categories, representing alternative paths of partisan/political selection, show that the demand of 'technical expertise' remains just one aspect of the renewal of the profile of the ministerial elite. A deeper analysis is, therefore, needed in order to better disentangle the contextual presence of different forms of not strictly insider profiles within the Italian ministerial elite.

In order to reach this goal, we can inspect the data concerning the career of the two groups of ministers recruited in the First and Second Republic (Table 4.7). A good deal of change seems to characterise this aspect of political life. In the second period, ministers tend to be more closely connected to their 'specific' role: the ratio between the number of appointments and number of different jobs tends to the minimum value of 1. On the other hand, ministers show a higher probability of being

Table 4.7 Duration and ministerial career of Italian ministers during First and Second Republic

	Ministers in First Republic (1948–1994)		*Ministers in Second Republic (1994–2014)*		*Ministers (1948–2014)*	
	Non-partisan ministers	*All ministers*	*Non-partisan ministers*	*All ministers*	*Non-partisan ministers*	*All ministers*
Ministers directly recruited to 'core executive' (%)	4 (11.8)	31 (10.5)	18 (29.0)	43 (20.7)	21 (23.1)	72 (14.7)
Ministers with only one experience (%)	14 (42.4)	73 (24.8)	47 (75.8)	135 (64.9)	61 (67.8)	208 (42.7)
Mean ratio number appointments/ number different portfolios[a]	1.5	1.9	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.6
Mean duration of ministerial career (years)[a]	1.9	3.5	1.9	2.9	1.8	3.1
N	34	296	62	208	91	489

Note: the core executive includes the offices of Prime minister, Deputy Prime minister, Minister of Economy and Finance (as well as the office of Treasury Minister until 1999), Justice, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior

[a]Ministers from the current government (Renzi government) excluded

recruited directly within the 'inner circle'. Not only leaders such as Berlusconi, Prodi, D'Alema and Monti, other important 'policy' ministers also (some of them with a clear technical profile like Ciampi, Tremonti, Padoa Schioppa, Dini) were directly recruited to a top government office during the Second Republic.

The average duration of ministerial careers becomes shorter and deviations from the mean decrease. Even the category of 'pure technocrats' shows an average duration not far from the overall mean.

More than a polarisation between pure technocrats and traditional politicians, these data indicate that the shift from a pure party-government recruitment to a more complex and open structure of opportunities for ministerial recruitment implies diffuse expectations about a different pattern of ministerial careers. According to the presidentialisation hypothesis, ministers are expected to be more 'loyal' to their principal or to their policy mission than the old 'climber' politicians who had as their first goal to maximise their share of governmental power.

A qualitative look into the personal histories of the Second Republic ministers reveals that some recent ministerial careers are actually the result of a sort of hybridisation between old and new profiles. Some ministers recruited for their specific expertise (Tremonti, Treu, Frattini or even Ciampi) have continued their experience in a specific policy-related office, while others have been 'paid back' from politics, being subsequently promoted to the parliament (Stanca, Lunardi, Micheli, De Castro). The new career models seem, therefore, to evolve both from the traditional example of the partisan minister but also from the different figures of experts: Some of the latter have been able to 'climb' into the political elite and to rebrand themselves as political leaders (Dini and Monti).

However, ministers with a more evident technocratic profile seem, in general, less inclined to accept compensation through different ministerial jobs and they are much more exposed to reshuffles promoted by the prime minister. We can indeed recognise in the recent history of the Second Republic a few cases of ministers fired by the PM—a practice which was almost impossible in the complicated coalition system of the First Republic. Ruggiero, Tremonti and Siniscalco, for instance, lost their important ministerial offices after disagreements with the government leader, while another demotion imposed by the PM was that of minister Mazzella in 2004. It is not the case that all these dismissals took place under a Berlusconi government, the only one to which we can fully apply the label of 'presidentialisation'.

Illusions and Consequences of a Long Technocratic Era

Many changes notwithstanding, the Italian parliamentary system remains a difficult democracy, and the outcomes of the processes of elite recruitment and government formation remain critically unstable. The difficulties of the grand coalition (subsequently downsized to a minimum winning coalition) supporting the Letta cabinet in 2013–2014 is further evidence of this extremely fluctuating situation.

However, the significant increase in the number of technocratic experts emerging at the end of First Republic is clear and, more generally, the changing patterns of ministerial selection suggest a remarkable evolution in the formation and circulation of the ruling elite in Italy. Changes have concerned both the quantitative number of outsiders not following the traditional partisan-parliamentary pathway to ministerial power and the qualitative profiles of the ministerial elite. Together with the significant quota of governmental spoils assigned to non-partisan actors, we have highlighted interesting evidence of the hybridisation between expert, technocratic and 'ordinary politician' profiles. Moreover, we do not simply observe 'new patterns of selection' but also new modes of circulation, survival, transformation and adaptation of the Italian ministerial elites.

This is important information, since, in the years to come, we will not only have to explain the reasons for this change, but also its effects. A relevant question is to what extent such a new, more diversified, rapidly evolving governing elite will be able to change the difficult relationship between political elites and public opinion and, more generally, to lead the political system away from the current deadlock. We leave these questions unanswered for the moment, and we try to summarise the empirical findings of this chapter.

Virtually all the factors indicated in the introductory section seem to have been at work in this complicated phase of change. It is indeed clear that the unstable Italian situation is influenced by different degrees of party abdication. Sometimes it is a temporary but broad abdication, driving technocratic or semi-technocratic solutions which correspond to a full suspension of the partisan role during the phase of government formation. This seems the case when the weakness of political parties is more evident but also when exogenous variables are at work, such as during the formation of the Monti cabinet, resulting from internal and supranational pressures.

In other cases, we have a more blurred situation in which the decline of party delegation combines with the enhanced role played by other institutions (the head of state in particular), the pressures from Europe and to some extent from the media. This determines a broader (but still relevant) claim for new ministerial candidatures coming from 'civil society'.

Moving to the more established 'political cabinets' of the last two decades, the signs of the phenomenon usually defined as the presidentialisation of the executive and of the need to increase the technical competence (especially in the European context) of some core ministers have been evident, and they can be interpreted as a fundamental factor of the ministerial elite transformation. It is clear that several ministers were directly delegated by the chief executive (and a few by the President of the Republic) without being influenced by any kind of 'party mediation'. On the other hand, most of the non-partisan ministers we have analysed can be described as '*saviours*', recruited to bring Italian policy-making out of the morass of recurrent crises.

The existence of two or three examples of technocratic government can be conceived as evidence of the extreme circumstances in which all these factors of party abdication worked contextually. On a case by case analysis, we can detect when one factor seems to be more influential than another: For instance, the profile of the prime minister and the narrative of the government formation in the case of the Monti cabinet seem to stress the international pressures (coming especially from Europe), while in the case of Dini as well as of another central banker like Ciampi called to lead a semi-partisan cabinet, the role of internal factors and the need to protect policy-making from the conflicts and failures of party politics were more visible.

Hence, 'policy experts', 'fixers' and 'saviours' are the typical forms of non-partisan delegation which have all appeared in the context of ministerial selection in Italy, with the last category of saviours being very much connected to the peculiar cases of a full technocratic or technocratic-led government. Overall, these different forms of individual and collective delegation to non-partisan ministers indicate a long-term perspective of structural change but also some peaks of exceptionality suggested by the total absence of party mediation.

The events of the XVII legislature and the appearance of the new strong leadership of Matteo Renzi allow us to think that some of the expectations arising from the era of technocratic government have not been fulfilled and the myth of the efficiency of technocrats has proven illusory. Some

recent personal scandals involving some of the technocratic personalities recruited after the economic crisis have perhaps reinforced the idea that technocrats are not much better than politicians.[10] However, we have learned that there is not just one clear alternative model to party mediation but rather a variety of different shades of technocratic influence that cannot fully change the nature of a parliamentary democracy, but can make its facade significantly different from what it used to be. Some of these shades will probably remain evident for years while others will probably soon be replaced by a new model of ministerial selection according to some new type of party interest.

Notes

1. We follow a slightly different perspective from that indicated by McDonnell and Valbruzzi (2014). Focusing on the number of partisan ministers, besides the type of delegation, they correctly classify the Ciampi government (April 1993–April 1994) as a technocrat-led partisan government, while the governments of Dini and Monti fall in the same class of the full technocratic government. We confirm here the different nature of the Ciampi government that has been usually described as a 'government of the president' (i.e. a government guided by the President of the Republic both with regard to the selection of the PM and to the definition of its main programmatic points). However, we note the difference between the type of delegation provided to Monti in 2011 and that provided to the Dini government (January 1995–May 1996). The latter was surely an authentically non-political team of ministers and junior ministers, formed during a phase of political impasse after the failure of the first Berlusconi cabinet in 1994. As in the case of Ciampi, the limits to governmental autonomy were evident from the short list of actions pledged during the inauguration speech. Dini was indeed asking the support of the parliament for a limited period, in order to assure a number of necessary reforms already announced and to some extent discussed, but it was clear to any political actor that early elections were to be called in about a year. However, as we will see later, the characteristics of the technocratic figures involved in these two executives are rather similar.
2. The expression is from Mattei Dogan (1989) who enumerated ten unwritten rules in the process of ministerial recruitment. Here we refer more generally to the broader process of government formation including the different institutional roles (from the head of state to the parliamentary leaders and obviously the *formateur*), the logic of the portfolio allocation game (Verzichelli 2008) and even the development of a series of policy pledges.

3. One should remember that a law regulating the office, the powers and the resources directly controlled by the PM, as requested by article 96 of the 1948 Constitution, was enacted only in 1988.
4. One should remember here that the chief executives at the local level, especially the mayors from big towns, became much stronger after the introduction of the direct election of mayors and provincial presidents in 1993 and of regional presidents in 1999.
5. Some of the first examples of pure politicians not recruited from the parliamentary ranks, like the influent regional Christian Democratic leaders Gianni Prandini and Giorgio Bernini, emerged during the 1980s. A more recent example of such a career trajectory is the past leader of the Democratic Party, Pierluigi Bersani, who left the office of president of the region Emilia Romagna (1996) to serve as minister of economic development in the Prodi cabinet. Similar examples are provided by two important politicians from the Lega Nord (Luca Zaia) and the People of Freedom (Giancarlo Galan). back and forth between the top position of the *Regione Veneto* and ministerial offices without serving in parliament.
6. Guido Carli had already served as minister of foreign trade in 1957 (Zoli Government).
7. Gianni Letta was junior minister three times with Berlusconi, Enrico Micheli and Ricardo Levi were recruited by Prodi.
8. A vice minister can indeed take part to the meeting of the cabinet when his/her delegation is somehow involved in the discussion, but cannot vote on any item.
9. More precisely, the Dini cabinet had to keep the line of financial and economic convergence in order to respect the timing of entrance to the EMU, while the Monti government, at work during the peak of the economic crisis, was tasked with avoiding the breakdown of the Italian public finance which probably would have been fatal for the whole Eurozone.
10. We refer to the scandals involving minister Cancellieri (Interior, Letta cabinet) and minister Guidi (Economic development, Renzi cabinet). The latter resigned, notwithstanding no formal accusation had been moved against her.

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CHAPTER 5

The Primacy of Experts? Non-partisan Ministers in Portuguese Democracy

António Costa Pinto and Pedro Tavares de Almeida

Introduction

Executive functions in modern democracies have been traditionally entrusted to elected representatives with a party membership and the most important appointments political parties can make are for ministerial positions (Blondel and Cotta 2000; Strom 2000). As to the predominant pattern of ministerial selection, a clearly structured career ladder emerged in European democracies in which a party and a parliamentary background were the standard paths for entering cabinet (Blondel and Thiébault 1991). With a few significant exceptions, expert ministers (often labelled 'technocrats'), without a background of active party membership and effective legislative experience, were a minority or played an ephemeral role in caretaker cabinets. This does not mean that cabinet ministers were chosen from among 'pure' politicians, regardless of their technical competence in a

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particular policy field. Indeed, there is a larger number of ministers, a hybrid type, who combine political skills developed in parties and legislatures with expert knowledge acquired through academic training and experience in parliamentary and governmental committees.

In Europe, party governments are still the norm, but the linkages between ministerial and parliamentary careers have been weakening in several countries over recent decades, with an increased number of appointees in party governments being recruited from outside the realm of politics. Simultaneously, the number of expert and non-partisan ministers has increased, although in an uneven way. In other words, there is a tendency towards the formation of 'party governments with fewer partisans' (P. Mair). Also, some critical junctures, like the sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013, favoured the formation of technocratic cabinets that, by definition, introduce an important number of non-partisans ministers in the cabinet (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Brunclik 2015).

In this context, Portuguese democracy is a relevant case for comparison, because expert and non-partisan ministers (usually described as 'the independents') are to be found in large numbers. This chapter investigates the determinants of this pattern of ministerial recruitment and, in assessing the main hypothesis postulated in the literature, operationalizes the analytical distinction between politicians and experts, establishing their number and evolution over time, and sketches a tentative profile of both ministerial types, highlighting and contrasting a few significant differences.

Explaining the Rise of Expert and Non-partisan Ministers in Democratic Cabinets

The most common reasons invoked for the increase in the number of expert/technocrat and non-partisan ministers in cabinets have been the increasing complexity of governance, answering to the 'power without competence' dilemma (Aberbach et al. 1981), as well as the response of political elites to economic crises and the distrust (or disaffection) of the electorate, in an attempt to move closer to civil society. The explanations put forward, however, in recent political science literature are based mainly on four other factors: The system of government, the type of cabinet, the 'presidentialization' of politics and, in the case of European democracies, the impact of European Union (EU) membership on national polities. We

will explore these below, paying particular attention to the first, since Portugal is a semi-presidential democracy and the third wave of democratization altered the hegemonic balance of parliamentarism in Europe in favour of semi-presidentialism, leading some scholars to argue this is now the predominant political regime on the European continent (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006).

The regime type seems to be a key factor in determining variations of non-partisan ministers in democratic governments. In parliamentary regimes, government portfolios are controlled by parties, whereas in semi-presidential regimes, almost one quarter of ministers might escape party control (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009). The explanatory power of this variable was already clear when comparing parliamentary and presidential systems, but the increase in the number of semi-presidential systems with the third wave of democratization provides an even clearer, albeit more nuanced, picture.

The number of non-partisan ministers increases as the power of the president becomes stronger compared to that of the prime minister and 'to the extent of the players' concern with policy efficiency rather than partisan redistribution' (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006, p. 643). However, we should note that the relationship between regime type and the percentage of non-partisan ministers appears to be non-linear, in that the average percentage of non-partisan ministers increases only slightly from parliamentary monarchies to semi-presidential systems (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010, p. 14).

A sub-field of this literature did extend the scope of analysis with a focus on a combination of electoral rules and regime type to account for the basic distinction between partisan and technocratic cabinets. Based on a cross-country analysis of post-communist experiences, where the share of non-partisan ministers even in the European context seems very high, Oleg Protsyk explores the combination of a version of semi-presidentialism that includes a constitutionally powerful president with a Single Member District (SMD)/mixed electoral system and concludes this will result in an increase in the number of technocratic cabinets (Protsyk 2005a). Intra-executive conflict is a recurring phenomenon within semi-presidential regimes, which does not mean semi-presidentialism can explain the type of conflict, since the party or non-party nature of the governments and the type of party system are determinants (Protsyk 2005b, 2006, p. 239). Furthermore, there is no basis for some of the more common conceptions about the seemingly inherent instability of semi-presidential regimes, of which the fall of government could be

characteristic. The most complete study of the fall of governments in democracies detected no significant difference between parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009).

The type of cabinet (coalition-majority-minority) and its relationship with parliament has a long tradition in explanatory models of patterns of ministerial recruitment. Minority and technocratic cabinets are largely a product of fragmented parliaments, and in central and eastern European democracies, six out of eight minority cabinets and five out of six technocratic cabinets were formed in parliaments with a high degree of fragmentation (Protsyk 2005b). In fact, in all systems of government the proportion of non-partisan ministers in cabinet tends to rise as legislative fragmentation increases (Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010). In parliamentary systems, high fragmentation rates tend to lead to stalemated legislatures, which favour the formation of occasional caretaker cabinets that are more likely to have non-partisan ministers (Linz and Shain 1994, p. 11).

In semi-presidential regimes, when parliament's ability to bargain is inhibited by party fragmentation, presidential influence increases and party control over portfolios declines (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009). Let us not forget, nevertheless, that semi-presidential regimes (and even parliamentary ones with strong parliamentary elected presidents) have more caretakers or interim governments than pure parliamentary ones. In European democracies, the incidence of non-partisan appointments also increases with electoral volatility and is higher under minority than majority governments (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006).

The 'presidentialization' of politics is another factor requiring evaluation. For some scholars several inter-related processes have resulted in a political process that is increasingly moulded by the inherent logic of presidentialism, with greater leadership authority and autonomy within the political executive (Poguntke and Webb 2005). The concept of 'presidentialization' underlines an electoral process increasingly focused on the person of the prime minister, who is increasingly like a chief executive in presidential systems and who selects their ministers from outside parliament in order to bolster the effectiveness of the cabinet (Bäck et al. 2009). At the same time, ministerial recruitment is an instrument through which the prime minister can control the party from within government (Blondel and Cotta 1996; Cotta 2008). Spain and Portugal, which have two different systems of government, are important examples of one-party cabinets with high degrees of 'presidentialization' and in which there is increasing cabinet dominance over the party—prime ministers have used executive

leadership as an instrument to subordinate the party and to appoint personally loyal 'outsiders' to ministerial posts (Pinto and Tavares de Almeida 2009; Rodríguez Teruel 2011). For EU democracies the effects of 'presidentialization' and European integration contribute to increasing both the autonomy of prime ministers and prime ministerial latitude in the choice of cabinet ministers, while European integration discourages the presence of professional politicians in cabinets by increasing the need for experts better able to master EU policies and to coordinate national and European policies (Bäck et al. 2009).

Finally, we will test the impact of critical junctures, such as financial crises and EU-related constraints, in the Portuguese case. Some scholars have suggested that negative economic conditions and the implementation of structural reforms increase the likelihood of 'outsiders' entering government and playing an important role (Centeno and Silva 1998; Silva 2009). At the same time, in Europe, at least before the 2008 financial crisis, some authors found empirical evidence that the heightened efficiency concerns that may accompany an economic crisis have a surprisingly weak impact on the incidence of expert and non-partisan appointees (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006).

Portuguese Democracy: Institutional Configuration and Political Dynamics

Portugal is a third wave semi-presidential democracy, which was consolidated after a transition by rupture and a short period of active military intervention in political life. The first democratic elections, which took place in 1975 and which were based on the D'Hondt system of proportional representation (Tavares de Almeida 2010), gave seats in parliament to the four principal founding parties of Portuguese democracy. On the left, the Communist Party (PCP, Partido Comunista Português), which had a long history of clandestine organization within the country, and the Socialist Party (PS, Partido Socialista) founded by Mário Soares in West Germany in 1973 and heir to the republican and socialist elements of the electoral opposition to Salazarism. On the right and centre-right, the Popular Democratic Party (PPD, Partido Popular Democrático) and the Social Democratic Centre (CDS, Centro Democrático Social),[1] which were formed soon after the breakdown of the authoritarian regime on 25 April 1974. Despite periodic challenges, these parties have provided a

stable structure for Portuguese democracy (Jalali 2007; Lisi 2015).[2] The only novelty, from the 1990s onwards, was the emergence of the Left Bloc (BE, Bloco de Esquerda), a left-libertarian party, electorally challenging both the Socialists and the Communist Party (Lisi 2013). The eruption of personalized populist parties and movements, despite occasional impact in the European and presidential elections, did not translate into a parliamentary presence.

In the 1976 Constitution, a directly elected president had the power to appoint the prime minister following national elections. If no majority could be found in parliament, the president could seek to engineer a majority himself—as the first elected president, Ramalho Eanes, did in 1978–1979. Moreover, the responsibility of the government towards both the president and parliament meant the president could withdraw confidence in the government, forcing it to resign, whether or not it enjoyed the support of parliament. In fact, at least until the constitutional revision of 1982, the government stood at the intersection between two legitimacies laid down in the constitution, represented by the president on the one hand and parliament on the other.

The government's difficulty in asserting its authority grew and was a reflection of the struggle between these two tendencies inherent in the Constitution, especially when there was no majority in parliament (Freire and Pinto 2010; Lobo et al. 2011).

Moreover, the president was granted veto powers over both parliamentary and government legislation. A presidential veto could not be overturned if the legislation originated from within the executive, however, when the legislation originated from the legislature then it could be overridden by an absolute or a two-thirds majority of deputies, depending on the nature of the law. The president could also request that the constitutionality of both parliamentary or government legislation be verified, either *ex ante* or *ex post*. Despite these powers, the 1976 Constitution placed the government at the centre of policy-making and of public administration (Lobo et al. 2011).

In the 1976 Constitution, there were also some important provisions designed to protect the government from a fragmented parliament. A new government did not need to present a motion of confidence to parliament once it was sworn in, thus facilitating minority or presidential governments. To dismiss the government, two motions of censure had to be approved by an absolute majority of deputies within a 30-day period. Although the government had to resign if its programme was rejected by

a simple majority in parliament, or a motion of confidence was not approved, the assembly itself would be dissolved by the president if it passed a motion of censure or rejected a government programme for three consecutive times.

In 1982, the Constitution was revised with the support of the right-wing parties and the PS. The goal of this revision was twofold: To circumscribe the powers of the president and to subordinate the military to civilian control. The revision limited the president's powers to dismiss the government in order—only under exceptional circumstances, when it is necessary 'to ensure the regular functioning of democratic institutions'. Nevertheless, the president's power to dissolve parliament was preserved. The second important change, concerning the relationship between cabinet and the president, was that while the cabinet was still accountable to both parliament and the president, it was now responsible politically only to the former. This meant the president could no longer dismiss the cabinet by calling a vote of no confidence. However, 'the vagueness of this article' suggests that under certain conditions (e.g. in times of political instability) the president retains the authority to dismiss the government (Amorim Neto and Lobo 2009). Indeed, this is what happened in November 2004, following the resignation of the prime minister, José Manuel Barroso, after he had been invited to take office as president of the European Commission. The socialist president, Jorge Sampaio, dismissed the centre-right coalition cabinet led by Barroso's successor, Santana Lopes, which enjoyed a stable parliamentary majority (Tavares de Almeida and Freire 2005).

The reduction of presidential powers was accompanied by an increase in parliament's power vis-à-vis the cabinet. There was also a simplification of the procedures for unseating a government. Presently a single motion of censure is enough to bring the cabinet down. The 1982 constitutional revision meant that the Portuguese was relatively less powerful than presidents in other semi-presidential regimes (Elgie 1999; Siaroff 2003). Shugart and Carey (1992, pp. 63–65) pointed out that with this revision the Portuguese system of government passed from being president-parliamentary to premier-presidential. In both systems the president is elected by popular vote and parliament has the authority to form a government. However, in the president-parliamentary system, the president has primacy over the prime minister in terms of authority over the cabinet and has the power to appoint and dismiss the government. In the case of a premier-presidential regime, the prime minister has more authority over the cabinet, and while the president can intervene in the appointment of

the government (of the prime minister and of other ministers), his power to dismiss the government is very limited, which effectively means the survival of the government depends almost entirely on parliament. This shift to a premier-presidential system also resulted in greater cabinet stability (Elgie 2011, p. 140).

From the democratic transition of the 1970s until the mid-1980s, Portugal had a proportional electoral system, exhibited a fragmented multi-party system with a sizeable Communist Party and was characterized by endemic cabinet instability. During the first decade of democracy, governments proved quite vulnerable, with none surviving a full term in office. In contrast, since 1987 and the first single-party majority (PSD), the two centre parties (PSD and PS) have alternated in government, and the duration of government mandates has increased. This was not achieved, however, under similar conditions. PS won both the 1995 and the 1999 elections, but fell short of obtaining an absolute majority, which it only managed to obtain in 2005 before losing it again in 2009 (Tavares de Almeida 2010). Both in 2002 and 2011, the PSD returned to government, but in coalition with the CDS/PP, in order to ensure an absolute parliamentary majority. Government stability was also enhanced by the centralized nature of the two main parties and the subordinate position of parliamentary groups within their parties' internal balance of power. A comparative study of party statutes and of the composition of national executive bodies across Portuguese parties in the 1990s has revealed a relatively small margin of autonomy of parliamentary groups and their under-representation among the party's national bodies (Van Biezen 1998).

The increase in government stability after 1987 is impressive. Some aspects of this change have been described as a 'majoritarian turn', with the concentration of votes in the two major parties, cabinet stability substantially increased and policy-making power increasingly concentrated in the executive. More importantly, this transformation cannot be attributed to changes in the institutional framework of politics. Instead, the institutional rules regulating both elections and legislative-executive relations have largely remained intact, albeit with an important constitutional revision (Magalhães 2011). Among the factors that have contributed towards this change, the lack of anchoring political parties have within Portuguese society—as evidenced by the high levels of electoral volatility—might have favoured the concentration of votes (Gunther and Montero 2001). But this pattern started changing again at the beginning of this century showing a drop in votes for the two major parties, particularly evident in the

2009 and 2011 legislative elections. There was also an increase in the effective number of parliamentary parties from two to three, particularly visible in the 2009 elections (Raimundo and Pinto 2014). The decline of this "majoritarian turn" did not translate into cabinet instability even in crisis junctures. Following the 2011 legislative election, the centre-right coalition government of Passos Coelho (PSD-CDS) survived the introduction of a punitive adjustment programme, following a bailout, facing strong social movements and important vetoes of some structural reforms by the Constitutional Court. In 2015, however, when this centre-right coalition fell short of an absolute majority in the legislative election, its minority cabinet was overthrown in parliament, and for the first time in the history of Portuguese democracy, the Socialist Party formed a single-party cabinet with the parliamentary support of the BE and the Communists. This new parliamentary alliance of the left, while breaking a 40-year-old barrier, appears to have reinforced the resilience of the current Portuguese party system.

Despite the strong social cleavages in Portugal, they are not important predictors of the vote, and once democracy was consolidated, a centrist electorate that is quite sensitive to short-term political factors became decisive. Finally, successive presidential elections, in which supporters of smaller parties tend to vote strategically, may have also facilitated vote switching to the larger centre parties during the legislative elections. 'Thus, constitutional, party system and organisational changes have contributed to a strengthening of the government and the prime minister as the locus of executive power in the Portuguese political system' (Lobo et al. 2011, p. 37).

Over the same period, Portugal has also exhibited growing levels of electoral abstention. Since the 1970s, abstention rates—which were already above the average of countries without compulsory voting—have experienced the largest increase of any Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country (Freire and Magalhães 2002; Magalhães 2011). Public support for democracy as a regime has slightly declined, but there are few signs of an incomplete allegiance to basic democratic values and freedoms. However, also fuelled by dwindling economic performance since the late 1990s, political discontent—as measured by such indicators as satisfaction with democracy—has clearly been on the rise since the 1990s. Levels of confidence in political institutions are not only low, but they are also strongly dependent upon perceptions of economic performance, suggesting that a more detached and cynical

view of political officeholders is replacing previous attachments and loyalties (Magalhães 2004). Nevertheless, the speed and intensity with which they have manifested themselves in Portugal in the last 15 years has given rise to growing concerns among observers and politicians alike about the quality of Portuguese democracy, leading to calls for institutional reform (Magalhães 2011; Pinto et al. 2013).

Expert and Non-partisan Ministers in Portuguese Cabinets, 1976–2015

Since the beginning of democratic consolidation, an important feature of Portuguese governments has been the presence of a sizeable number of ministers with no political background, whether as parliamentarians or as party members.[3] This group includes both independents and individuals with a loose party affiliation who have not been active members of, and have not held positions in, the ruling bodies of the party organization prior to their ministerial appointment. They are selected to cabinet as 'experts' with managerial skills or specialized knowledge in a particular policy field. Some of them have a technocratic profile, due to their academic background and professional training, and do not necessarily have direct experience related to their ministerial post.

Our data set comprises all the 241 individuals appointed to cabinet between 23 July 1976 and 30 October 2015. As Tables 5.1 and 5.2 illustrates, at the time of their first appointment, 149 ministers (61.8 percent) never had previous parliamentary experience, and 124 (51.5 percent) had not held a position of authority and responsibility in a political party. Overall, if we combine both criteria, the non-politician 'expert' type consists of 113 ministers (46.9 percent), an unusually large proportion in a comparative perspective. The size of this group varied over time. The pinnacle was reached in the late 1970s, due to the formation of the 'cabinets of presidential initiative', and the most dramatic decline took place during the mid-1980s at the time of the 'grand coalition' government forged by the two largest parties (PS and PSD) and headed by Mário Soares during a period marked by a financial crisis and IMF intervention. From 1987 onwards, except for the striking increase during the period 2005–2011, the proportions have remained fairly stable (see Table 5.1).

The semi-presidential regime clearly accounts for the extent of this pattern of ministerial recruitment, particularly during the period before the

Table 5.1 Portuguese governments and the number and share of ministers without political background, 1976–2015

Government (PM and party of affiliation, begin date)	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
				N	*%*
Soares (PS) 23.07.1976	Socialist	Minority	21	8	38.1
Soares (PS) 23.01.1978	Socialist/Conservative	Majority (Coalition)	17	5	29.4
Nobre da Costa 28.08.1978	Non-partisan	Minority	15	14	93.3
Mota Pinto 21.11.1978	Non-partisan	Minority	16	12	75.0
Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo 31.07.1979	Non-partisan	Minority	17	13	76.4
Sá Carneiro (PSD) 03.01.1980	Conservative	Majority (Coalition)	15	5	33.3
Balsemão (PSD) 09.01.1981	Conservative	Majority (Coalition)	20	4	20.0
Balsemão (PSD) 04.09.1981	Conservative	Majority (Coalition)	19	5	26.3
Soares (PS) 09.06.1983	Socialist/Conservative	Majority (Coalition)	22	4	18.2
Cavaco Silva (PSD) 06.11.1985	Conservative	Minority	14	6	42.9
Cavaco Silva (PSD) 17.08.1987	Conservative	Majority (Single party)	26	8	30.8
Cavaco Silva (PSD) 31.10.1991	Conservative	Majority (Single party)	26	8	30.8
Guterres (PS) 28.10.1995	Socialist	Minority	25	9	36.0

(*continued*)

Table 5.1 (continued)

Government (PM and party of affiliation, begin date)	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
				N	*%*
Guterres (PS) 25.10.1999	Socialist	Minority	29	8	27.6
Durão Barroso (PSD) 06.04.2002	Conservative	Majority (Coalition)	22	8	36.4
Santana Lopes (PSD) 17.07.2004	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	20	7	35.0
Sócrates (PS) 12.03.2005	Socialist	Majority (Single party)	22	11	50.0
Sócrates (PS) 26.10.2009	Socialist	Minority	17	9	52.9
Passos Coelho (PSD) 21.06.2011	Conservative	Majority (Coalition)	18	7	38.9
Total (23 July 1976–30 October 2015)	–	–	241	113	46.9

[a]Includes the prime minister

[b]Ministers without parliamentary experience or a local/regional political background as well as a previous record of leading positions in political parties at any time before their appointment

1982 constitutional revision, when presidential powers were stronger and the head of the state played an interventionist role in the formation of the executive. In the years 1978–1979, while the prospects for a partisan cabinet with stable majority support were uncertain, three short-lived non-partisan cabinets were appointed by President Eanes, without any negotiation with the parties represented in parliament. The overwhelming majority (almost 90 percent) of ministers of those cabinets were recruited from outside parliament and had no previous parliamentary experience. This not only inflated the weight of non-partisan ministers in cabinets at the initial stage of democratic consolidation, but also probably had a lasting impact on

Table 5.2 Prior political experience of first-time ministers, 1976–2015

	1976–1980		*1981–1990*		*1991–2000*		*2001–2011*		*1976–2015*	
	N	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]
Mayor or local councillor	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.3	1	1.56	2	0.9
Regional deputy or councillor	1	1.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	3.13	3	1.3
National deputy	28	37.3	30	57.7	24	54.6	23	35.94	108	44.8
With parliamentary experience	27	36.0	22	42.3	18	40.9	22	34.38	92	38.2
Appointed to cabinet soon after the election	1	1.3	8	15.4	6	13.6	1	1.56	16	6.8
European deputy	–	–	1	1.9	4	9.1	5	7.81	11	4.6
Party leading positions	30	40.0	31	59.6	25	56.8	28	43.75	117	48.5
Minister in a regional executive	1	1.3	0	0.0	3	6.8	2	3.13	6	2.6
Junior minister	26	34.7	31	59.6	24	54.6	17	26.56	100	41.5
Total[b]	75		52		44		64		241	

Note: The categories are not mutually exclusive. Multiple coding is applied when an individual have held different political offices. Therefore, percentages do not total 100

[a]Percentages refer to the total number of individuals appointed

[b]Total number of individuals appointed

the formation of later governments, in particular in enhancing the role of experts and independents as symbols of competence and openness to civil society. In fact, this trend continued well beyond 1982, when the parliamentary component of the semi-presidential regime was strengthened.

A second factor to be accounted for, at least until 1982, is related to the conflicts between the president and the heads of the parties, whose position was internally threatened on several occasions by pro-president factions (Lobo 2001 and 2005). A consequence of this was the increasing centralization of decision-making in the hands of the party leaders.

Even if under certain circumstances presidents could (and did) use both informal powers and tactics of 'going-public' to occasionally wear down individual ministers, the weakness of Portuguese presidents and the tight grip of prime ministers over cabinet members became the rule (Bucur 2013). This trend, combined with the restriction of the president's powers, led to the aforementioned 'presidentialization' of the role of the prime

minister, expressed in the increase of his authority as well as in his growing autonomy in the selection of ministers vis-à-vis his party.

We can even speak of the 'governmentalization' of the ruling party, particularly clear in the 10 years during which Cavaco Silva was prime minister (1985–1995). It is evident that personal trust and loyalty became as important as party membership in the selection of cabinet members. The subordinate position of the parliamentary group within the party's internal balance of power further contributed to this pattern. We must also highlight a more 'technocratic' style of Cavaco Silva, a professor of Economics with a PhD from the UK and former minister of finance of the founder of PSD. Cavaco Silva was not a professional politician when he was elected leader of PSD in 1985 and he always exhibited a 'technical' discourse. He was probably not exaggerating when he stated that the party gave him 'absolute freedom to select ministers for the cabinet, which became the rule during the time I was prime-minister', for three cabinets over more than 10 years (Silva 2009, p. 101). As he did not find 'the required political and technical qualities' in the leading group of PSD, he went elsewhere to find them (*ibid.*). With some nuances, successors could write the same in their memoirs. Prime ministers in Portugal do have a large degree of autonomy in the selection of ministers, a process that is marked by the parties' weak and subordinated role.

The strong distrust of parties and political leaders, associated with the above mentioned dilemma of 'power without competence' might be also another factor explaining the attempts to promote 'openness towards civil society', through a variety of initiatives which seek to bring together independents who are experts in various policy areas. The Socialists were the first to initiate this process in Portugal with the 1993 launch of the so-called *Estados Gerais* (General Estates)—an all-encompassing platform bringing together socialists and independents—which played an active role in the establishment of the party's 1995 electoral manifesto and government programme. Following the elections, this became an important springboard for cabinet recruitment (Ferreira-Pereira 2008). António Guterres, when appointed prime minister, decided to form a cabinet, half of which should be 'independents'.[4] It is in this context that a pool of 'non-partisan' fellow travellers, mainly comprising university professors and managers, became common actors in electoral campaigns, with a special ticket to cabinet office. They are mobilized by the parties in order to contribute, in their areas of expertise, to electoral and policy reform manifestos and programmes for governments (Pinto and Tavares de Almeida 2009). This 'recipe' would be regularly replicated in the following decades

and the two major parties (PS and PSD) began the practice of organizing debating forums, from which would emerge, once the election was won, a significant number of ministers without any previous political career.

This process has also been established as a regular element of electoral campaigns, which now include actions designed to attract the elite, the media and opinion makers who are more open to giving value to technical competence. The two main parties have tended to ritualize these forums in which they seek to attract experts from universities and business, so much so that they have now become familiar in electoral campaigns. 'General Estates' entered the political vocabulary, although the names of the forums may be different (e.g. 'New Frontiers' of PS in 2005 or the 'More Society' of PSD in 2011). However, perhaps the most important novelty is that both parties have consolidated this pattern of recruitment of 'non-partisan' ministers and junior ministers, although not exclusively through these forums. During the past 20 years, a few experts have even served in different cabinets led by different prime ministers and, with different portfolios, consolidating a specific non-party path to cabinet. There is an example of a non-partisan minister who served as minister of interior in one PS government, before being appointed as minister of defence in another PS government, headed by a different prime minister. Another example is a minister of research in two Socialist cabinets (1995–2002) who returned to the government with a different prime minister, in 2005, when the PS again won the election. In both cases they were active members of these forums and contributed to the electoral programme of the party.

Portfolio expertise may not be a necessary requirement for this pool of ministerial candidates who are, for different reasons, close to the main parties. Political priorities and bargaining between party and non-party candidates may be important as well. For instance, a 'fellow traveller' of the Socialists with foreign affairs and defence expertise was given the interior ministry. A minister of health in a centre-right coalition cabinet (2011–2015), whose primary task was to reduce excessive spending in the sector, did not have portfolio expertise either: He was a senior executive officer in a private bank and the former head of the tax collection department at the ministry of Finance.

As has been highlighted in the literature, the type of party government seemingly entails variations in the number of expert and non-partisan ministers. On the whole, due to inter-party bargaining and trade-offs in the allocation of portfolios, coalition cabinets are less inclined to include such ministers than single-party cabinets. In the Portuguese case, the figures provided in Table 5.3 confirm this hypothesis, although the differences are

Table 5.3 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different types of party government, 1976–2015

Cabinet type	*Party composition*	*Ministers appointed*	*Ministers dismissed*[a]	
		N	*N*	*%*
Grand coalition	PS + PSD	4	0	0.0
Coalition	PS + CDS	8	0	0.0
	PSD + CDS/PP	22	4	18.2
Single-party majority	PSD	10	5	50.0
	PS	9	2	22.2
Single-party minority	PSD	6	0	0.0
	PS	28	8	28.6
Presidential		27	0	0.0

[a]Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate

not very pronounced. In single-party executives, particularly with a minority government, PS tends to have more non-partisan ministers than PSD, but further research is needed to confirm this proposition.

With a sizeable and recurrent number of non-partisan ministers, the balance did not shift towards more technocrats in the cabinet in conjunctures of financial crises, even with severe IMF and ECB adjustment programmes (1978, 1983 and 2011). As for the effects of Europeanization, a factor that increases governance complexity, it is difficult to measure its direct consequences on the pattern of ministerial recruitment. During the last two decades, its impact has, however, been discernible in some traits of the academic and professional profiles of the ministers appointed to specific policy areas. Holding degrees from foreign universities or having served as officials or advisers in international or European organizations (the European Commission, the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund) have become more common features of non-partisan ministers.

Looking at the ministerial careers of 'politicians' and 'experts', the available data reveal two aspects. First, as Table 5.4 shows, the latter are predominant in the main economic policy areas and in the fields of education and science. The large proportion in the pivotal portfolio of finance suggests the influential role played by this type of minister in the decision-making process within governments, especially in times of severe financial

Table 5.4 Selected ministries and the weight of the ministers without political background, 1976–2015

Ministries	*1976–1980*		*1981–1990*		*1991–2000*		*2001–2011*		*1976–2015*	
	N	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]
Defence	2 [3]	66.7	0 [8]	0.0	0 [6]	0.0	1 [6]	16.7	3 [22]	13.6
Education, science and culture	3 [6]	50.0	1 [5]	20.0	3 [5]	60.0	7 [10]	70.0	14 [25]	56.0
Economics, finance	5 [8]	62.5	3 [4]	75.0	5 [7]	71.4	7 [11]	63.6	21 [32]	65.6
Industry, commerce	8 [13]	61.5	4 [9]	44.4	0 [2]	0.0	–	–	12 [18]	66.7
Agriculture, environment	3 [6]	50.0	1 [7]	14.3	4 [8]	50.0	6 [12]	50.0	14 [32]	43.8
Foreign affairs	2 [5]	40.0	1 [5]	20.0	0 [3]	0.0	2 [7]	28.6	5 [17]	29.4
Internal affairs	2 [5]	40.0	1 [6]	16.7	1 [5]	20.0	2 [5]	40.0	7 [21]	33.3
Justice	5 [5]	100.0	1 [5]	20.0	0 [3]	0.0	0 [5]	0.0	6 [16]	37.5
Health	–	–	0 [3]	0.0	2 [4]	50.0	3 [4]	75.0	5 [10]	50.0
Public works, transports and communications	8 [11]	72.7	1 [6]	16.7	1 [6]	16.7	3 [4]	75.0	13 [26]	50.0
Pensions, employment	2 [5]	40.0	3 [6]	50.0	1 [5]	20.0	0 [6]	0.0	6 [21]	28.6
Others	4 [9]	44.4	1 [18]	5.6	2 [14]	14.3	3 [7]	42.9	11 [51]	21.6

[a]Percentages refer to the total number (indicated between square brackets) of individuals appointed to each ministerial portfolio

crisis, economic turbulence and uncertainty Castillo 2011). Indeed, some of these are key actors, because they hold strategic positions and control critical resources or are the protagonists of crucial and sensitive reforms—such as the ministers of finance in the centre-right coalition cabinet of 2011 (Vítor Gaspar, 2011–2013) and in the previous PS cabinets (Fernando Teixeira dos Santos, 2005–2011).

Vítor Gaspar has professional experience stereotypical of this career pattern. A former high-ranking European (and Portuguese) Central Bank

official, Gaspar was recruited to the Cabinet in the most difficult period following the bailout of 2011 to manage a very severe adjustment programme. During his term in office, he was proud of his 'non-political' credentials and was occasionally criticised for his too distant approach towards the 'politicians' of PSD, the senior party of government (Avilez 2014). He left the centre-right coalition government in 2013, following a conflict with the leader of CDS, the junior coalition partner, and went to work at the IMF.

The minister of education of the same centre-right coalition government of Passos Coelho (2011–2015) is another example of a fellow traveller who combines expertise in education with conservative values close to the electoral programme of PSD. A university professor of mathematics, he became well known in the public sphere and the mass media as a critic of the educational policies of past Socialist governments and also contributed to the 'More Society' forum during the electoral campaign of 2011.

Another indicator of the importance of non-partisan ministers lies in the fact that they are, overall, less affected by cabinet reshuffles than those with a political background—who constitute more than two-thirds of all ministers who stepped down between 1976 and 2012. The figures in Table 5.3 show, however, that the risk of sanction (dismissal) against non-political ministers is greater in single-party than coalition cabinets, regardless of their ideological orientation. The preservation of the power balance negotiated by coalition partners probably makes it more difficult to dismiss outsiders.

The analysis of selected socio-demographic characteristics of 'political' and 'expert' ministers shows meaningful differences and contrasts (Table 5.5). Female ministers are a small minority (22 out of 241), but most of them (about 64 percent) fit into the category 'experts', whereas the majority of their male counterparts (about 55 percent) have a political background. There is, however, no clear evidence of a gendered nature of portfolio allocation. The average age at the time of first ministerial assignment is higher for experts (48.6 years) than politicians (45.7 years). The relative seniority of the former is due to the greater length of their academic career (time to complete doctoral degrees) and their higher professional status. With very rare exceptions (three or four out of 241), cabinet ministers share a high level of education, holding university degrees or equivalent qualifications. The expert and non-partisan ministers, however, have a more exclusive educational background: 70 percent of the

Table 5.5 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers, 1976–2015

Variables	*Politicians*		*Experts*	
	N	*%*[a]	*N*	*%*[a]
Male	120	93.8	99	87.6
Female	8	6.3	14	12.4
Mean age	45.7 years		48.6 years	
University graduates	126	98.4	112	99.1
With a PhD degree	16	12.5	40	35.4
Academic field[b]				
Law	63	49.2	23	20.4
Engineering/Architecture	21	16.4	34	30.1
Economics/Business/Finance	24	18.8	41	36.3
Social Sciences	9	7.0	5	4.4
Others	16	12.5	14	12.4
Higher education abroad[c]	21	16.4	34	30.1
Occupation[b]				
Business, industry, finance	26	20.3	39	35.5
Higher civil servant	17	13.3	16	14.2
International organization	2	1.6	5	4.4
Lawyer	37	28.9	9	8.0
University professor	39	30.5	48	42.5
Others	23	18.0	17	15.0
Total[d]	128		113	

[a]Percentages refer to the total number of individuals appointed in each 'category'
[b]Multiple coding has been applied as some ministers held degrees in two or more academic fields and had a plurality of occupations. Therefore, percentages do not total 100
[c]Graduate and/or post-graduate studies
[d]Total number of individuals classified as 'politicians' and 'experts'

ministers with a doctorate, often associated with an academic position, belong to this group. Another distinguishing feature is related to the main fields of academic specialization. The largest proportion of the experts (around two-thirds) studied economics or engineering, and a significant number attended foreign universities,[5] whereas politicians are predominantly drawn from law faculties.[6] Finally, in respect of the main occupational background of first-time ministers, the most important recruitment pools for experts are the universities and the business or corporate sector; in contrast, lawyers and jurists have been prominent among politicians.

There are two features to be noted when observing the post-ministerial political and professional careers (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) of politician and expert ministers. The first is the ability of parties to attract a sizeable minority of former expert ministers into a political career. Around 23 percent of them are first elected to parliament after they have served as ministers. The second, which is both more complex and more common, is the use of the political and lobbying capital of former ministers by public and private sector enterprises and the corresponding process that results in the upward social mobility of former ministers.

The mobility of former politician ministers into the public sector and private companies, especially the banking sector, which, at certain times has been particularly common, has often given rise to hostile debates in the media about conflict of interests, clientelism and political corruption. What is most striking though is the tendency of the financial and business sectors to 'invest' in the recruitment of several former 'political' ministers (Table 5.7). It became a common pattern of the post-ministerial careers of politicians to become advisors or members of the board of banks and corporate groups. With the financial crisis of 2008, and the bankruptcy of some economic groups and banks, such careers were negatively exposed by the media as symbols of the opaque relations between politics and private interests.

Table 5.6 Political positions held after a ministerial career[a]

	Politicians[b]		*Experts*[c]		*Total*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Party leader	94	73.4	20	17.7	114	47.3
National MP	92	71.9	26	23.0	118	48.9
European MP or European Commissioner	16	12.5	3	2.7	19	7.9
Council of State member	26	20.3	5	4.4	31	12.9

[a]Includes all ministers who were officeholders from 23 July 1976 to 30 October 2015

[b]Ministers with political background (parliamentary and/or party leadership experience at first appointment). Percentages are calculated referring to the total number of Politicians

[c]Ministers without political background (parliamentary and/or party leadership experience). Percentages are calculated referring to the total number of Experts

Table 5.7 Politics and business: Politicians and experts working in companies and banks[a] before and after a ministerial experience

	Pre-ministerial career						*Post-ministerial career*					
	Politicians[b]		*Experts*[c]		*Total*		*Politicians*[b]		*Experts*[c]		*Total*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Public companies	15	11.7	26	23.0	41	17.0	25	19.5	33	29.2	58	24.1
Private companies	23	17.9	20	17.7	43	17.9	38	29.7	34	30.0	70	29.0
Public banks	4	3.1	6	5.3	10	4.1	6	5.9	4	3.5	10	4.1
Private banks	2	1.6	9	7.9	11	4.6	14	10.9	15	13.3	29	12.0

[a]Consultative positions (supervisory board, general meeting board, advisory board) were not counted
[b]Ministers with political background (parliamentary and/or party leadership experience at first appointment). Percentages are calculated referring to the total number of 'politicians'
[c]Ministers without political background (parliamentary and/or party leadership experience). Percentages are calculated referring to the total number of 'experts'

Conclusions

The significant role played by experts and non-partisan ministers in democratic (and authoritarian) regimes is not unknown, but in the case of Portugal, it has been a fairly persistent feature since the early days of democratic consolidation.

The composition of Portuguese democratic cabinets confirms the hypothesis that the semi-presidential regime and the prominence attributed to expert and non-partisan ministers are positively correlated. Also, it should be emphasized that their number has remained very high even after the significant reduction of presidential power following the 1982 constitutional revision. Their widespread presence, although in varied proportions, in different types of party governments (single-party and coalition, majority and minority), both from centre-left and centre-right, clearly indicates that their contribution is highly valued as a means of increasing both technical competence and political legitimacy. This is an assumption that is corroborated by their greater rate of survival compared to politicians in cabinet reshuffles.

There is also the view that this pattern of ministerial selection is an expressive symptom of the decline of parties and of their capacity to attract

the best talent and that the value assigned to expertise and technical competence, at the expense of the logic of representation, poses critical dilemmas and challenges to democratic governance: In particular in relation to mechanisms of executive accountability and responsiveness. Nevertheless, the most impressive characteristic of ministerial recruitment in Portugal is the consolidation of a non-party route to ministerial office as a consequence of the initiative of the two main political parties. Since the 1990s, mainly by party initiative, a political discourse more open to civil society and the inclusion of experts in electoral campaigns became the norm in both main parties.

The subordinate position of parliamentary groups within their parties' leadership, and the centralization of the party structure both in PSD and PS are certainly elements of explanation for the autonomy of the prime minister in the ministerial selection of experts and non-partisan members of the professional elites, reinforcing his/her power over the cabinet. This might also mean that 'the party principal's influence over the government is not exercised through the usual channels of representation' (Bucur 2013, p. 156). However, the presence of senior party members in government and their inclusion in the inner circle formed around the prime minister should not be underestimated, confirming that party government remains the rule in democratic Portugal.

Finally, we should emphasise that the analytical distinction between politicians and experts should not be interpreted as a rigid dichotomy. There is often an implicit assumption that these categories are mutually exclusive, when they are not (Yong and Hazelt 2011). As some recent empirical studies on European cabinets illustrate, there is a growing number of ministers with both political and expert knowledge who are able to meet the technical demands of a particular policy area illustrating that 'political experience is also a source of expertise in particular policy fields' (Bakema and Secker 1988; Beckman 2006, p. 126). In fact, over the past 20 years in Portugal, some non-partisan ministers have served in more than one cabinet under different prime ministers, acquiring political experience and sometimes pursuing a post-ministerial career in parliament. Conversely we can find some politicians who have a strong academic background and technical skills and are able to pursue a post-ministerial career in the private sector.

Notes

1. The PPD was renamed the Social Democratic Party (PSD, Partido Social Democrata) in 1976, while the CDS was renamed the Popular Party (PP, Partido Popular) in 1995. In both cases, however, the former abbreviation is coupled with the new one (PPD/PSD and CDS/PP).
2. In the 1980s a short-lived party created by the first elected president, General Ramalho Eanes, the Party of Democratic Renewal (PRD—Partido Renovador Democratico) emerged, but its presence was ephemeral.
3. Although not developed here, this feature was already present in the past authoritarian regime (1933–1974) with almost 50% of non-partisan ministers (Tavares de Almeida and Pinto 2003; Pinto 2009). We also need to stress that, unlike other countries, multi-level politics is not a relevant feature in pre-ministerial careers. In fact, only very few ministers with a political background had experience as mayors or local councillors (Tavares de Almeida and Pinto 2003; Tavares de Almeida 2010), and no former member of the regional legislatures and executives of Madeira and Azores have been appointed to the national government.
4. Interview with José Lamego, Lisbon, 9 March 2013
5. According to our data set, 55 ministers attended universities abroad, mainly on doctoral programmes: 63 percent are classified as experts and the remaining 37 percent as politicians.
6. Taking into account only those ministers with a law degree, the figures for politicians and experts are 73 percent and 27 percent, respectively.

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CHAPTER 6

The Selection and Deselection of Technocratic Ministers in Democratic Spain

Juan Rodríguez Teruel and Miguel Jerez Mir

Introduction

One of the defining features of Spanish democracy, since its restoration in 1977, lies in the limits of party government. Despite the strong control political parties have over the representative institutions, executives have been the particular realm of powerful prime ministers leading political teams in which some of the most relevant cabinet ministers have displayed a relatively low partisan profile. One example demonstrates well this paradox: Pedro Solbes was a junior minister for 6 years under Felipe González, and cabinet minister under González (agriculture and finance) and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (finance and vice-president) for more than 10 years, before being appointed as member of the European Commission. At the end of his political career, he stated that, despite these high-profile

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executive offices (as well as two incomplete terms as an MP), he always felt more a technician than a politician (Solbes 2013, p. 17). Certainly, there are many relevant ministers whose political and ministerial careers differ greatly from Mr. Solbes' experience. Indeed, since 1977 political parties have become the main recruitment pool for entry into the cabinet and many other key institutions. Mr. Solbes, however, is not a rare exception. During the last 40 years, almost one out of three cabinet ministers in Spain may be labelled as a non-partisan politician.

Despite the predominance of party politics in Spanish executives, cabinets are formed with fewer MPs and more non-partisan ministers than in many other European parliamentary systems. While this does not mean a predominance of technical executives made up of non-partisan specialists, the existence of a constrained party government with some (or even many) ministers coming from outside the national parliament or the central party offices suggests that party control over ministerial recruitment may be weaker than parliamentary theory and traditional practice would predict. As previous studies have suggested, this sort of paradox must be explained by the pre-eminence of the Spanish prime minister within the institutional system and the impact of the decentralization of the state in the opportunity structure of the Spanish political class (Van Biezen and Hopkin 2005; Rodríguez-Teruel 2011a).

This chapter aims to explain the presence of non-political ministers in the Spanish cabinet. By analysing the selection and dismissal of these individuals, we will show the cabinet dynamics behind ministerial appointments and the differences between partisan ministers and those coming from outside politics. Following the criteria delivered in the introduction of this book, we will identify non-political ministers as those individuals without previous political experience. This definition includes any individual who did not hold a national party office in the past or who had not previously held an elected post at the regional, local or European level. We also include those who were appointed within 2 years of being elected to their first term as a national MP, since we assume that this very short parliamentary career suggests that the ministerial appointment was connected to the professional rather than the political background of the minister. In the case of Adolfo Suárez's ministers, a rigid use of the book's criteria might be problematic, since the *Union de Centro Democratico* (UCD) party-building was in progress and its leaders had not had yet the opportunity to spend much time in parliament. So, for these UCD cases, we will consider as political background any parliamentary or party office obtained simultaneously to the entry into

the cabinet, in order not to overestimate the number of non-politician ministers appointed to the Suárez cabinets. Conversely, we will not consider previous posts in the Francoist Cortes—the corporatist chamber—as political experience.

The Spanish case presentation will be delivered in three parts. First, we will introduce the Spanish institutional framework to show the predominance of the head of government and the role of the ruling parties in cabinet life. Then we will review the dynamics of Spanish cabinets over time, in order to understand when and why Spanish prime ministers have chosen between political and non-political ministers. Finally, we will analyse the selection and deselection of ministers to understand the reasons and consequences of the appointment of outsider ministers in Spanish governments.

The Spanish Political and Institutional Framework

Spain belongs to the third wave of democracies and since the approval of the 1978 constitution is characterized by a system of majoritarian government limited by counter-majoritarian institutions, with a strong prime minister, combining elements from the Westminster model and the German chancellor model (Bar 1983; Gunther et al. 2004, pp. 121–123; Helms 2005; Lijphart 2012). The process of cabinet formation after a general election—or a change of prime minister between elections[1]—shows the predominance of the Spanish prime minister: The lower chamber gives its confidence to the prime minister (a simple majority is enough in an hypothetical second round) and then he chooses the rest of the cabinet, establishing a relationship of subordination between him and the other cabinet members from the very beginning (Bar 1997). This position of superiority is reinforced by other institutional and political arrangements, which has led the current Spanish political system to be considered as a clear example of a regimen characterized by 'strongly *presidential* tendencies' (Van Biezen and Hopkin 2005, p. 124). It is understandable, therefore, that the Spanish prime minister is called '*Presidente del Gobierno*'.

The factors that strengthen the predominance of the Spanish prime minister come from his institutional and legal position, from his condition as the leader of the ruling party and from the high personalization of political competition and campaigning over the years.[2] This strengthening of the prime minister in his relationship with his ministerial team and the parliament has also been reproduced in the regional governments, so that

the regional prime ministers—also called 'presidentes'—have become key political figures in their respective region.

The superiority of the president rises from the formal powers given by the Constitution (Articles 98–100 CE), but it is also reflected in the almost absolute control of the cabinet decisions (Heywood and Molina 2000). Likewise, the Spanish prime minister is not significantly constrained by the powers of the head of state, the King of Spain, who is a symbolic figure, devoid of any substantial power in cabinet formation.[3] The type of governments formed so far has also contributed to strengthen the prime minister's position in the cabinet due to the absence of coalition governments. Ever since 1977, 'the national-level executive has consisted of a single-party governments, oscillating between governments enjoying the support of absolute majorities of parliamentary seats, and minority governments supported through agreements with regional parties' (Gunther and Montero 2009, pp. 44–45 and pp. 58–59).[4] Indeed, Spain is a unique example among Western usual coalition governments, as single-party minority cabinets have always been the rational outcome in the absence of parliamentary majorities (Reniu 2011). If we consider the 11 parliaments elected between 1977 and 2015, a parliamentary majority was obtained in five terms: three of them by the PSOE (1982–1986, 1986–1989, 1989–1993) and two by the PP (2000–2004 and 2011–2015).[5]

As a consequence, the practice of ministerial appointments and ministerial reshuffles has reaffirmed the prime minister's pre-eminence over other actors, and in particular within their own party. The decision on when to make a ministerial reshuffle and how many ministers and portfolios would be affected has depended essentially on the criteria set by, and political needs of, the prime minister (Real-Dato and Jerez 2009). They have employed four major criteria for choosing ministers: personal competence (according to the type of ministry), party balance and strategy (paying for services, promoting new leaders, representing party factions), direct messages to the electorate (promoting descriptive representation of ministers) and the maintenance of the parliamentary majority (through ministers representing broader political positions). Likewise, the characteristics of the political context have also influenced the selection of ministers, since the premier's power varies according to the intra-party balance of powers, to the parliamentary context and to the particular political moment. In sum, the strategies of the prime minister and the political context of each government will contribute to understanding the final outcome in the

ministerial recruitment and the ministerial career that has developed within the cabinet since July 1977.

In this situation, challenges to the prime minister's authority come mainly from intra-party and multi-level politics, which have occasionally influenced the selection and dismissal of ministers. On the one hand, Spanish prime ministers may deal, sooner or later, with a factional crisis within the party. In some cases, these party conflicts have impacted upon the cabinet or have even originated from cabinet/party disagreements. On the other hand, almost four decades of political decentralization has led to strong regional governments, which have often acted as counter-national governments, especially in cases of executive incongruence (Stefuriuc 2009). Multi-level politics affects how political parties are organized and compete in the Spanish party system, as it fosters internal decentralization in national parties and enlarges the structure of opportunities for regional-based political organizations (Rodríguez-Teruel and Barrio 2017). It also affects the outcomes and the functioning of national governments in Spain, particularly in case of minority cabinets. Indeed, this generates a political dynamics of multi-level exchanges: The national party at the government 'can make policy concessions to regional parties in the national parliament where regional parties are policy-seeking, and offer office concessions at the regional level where regional parties are office-seeking, in exchange for achieving its priority goal of governing Spain' (Field 2016, p. 3). Accordingly, multi-level politics influences ministerial selection as prime ministers may employ ministerial appointments as a tool to enhance the position of the party territorial leaders against the opposition, or to help them to resolve territorial conflicts, as it has been tested with the recruitment of non-parliamentary ministers (Rodríguez-Teruel 2011b, 2017).

However, these party constraints on ministerial selection must not be exaggerated. Ruling parties have tended to be weak regarding their capacity to influence the executive agenda and their subordination to the government needs has often been the norm. This is the result of the finite resources available to the parties in terms of policy expertise and the weakness of party think tanks to provide policy specialists in Spain. Consequently, governments have often resorted to non-partisan experts in technical portfolios, as we will see later. Likewise, the limits to representatives' professionalization in Spain have also affected the expertise among the members of the parliament, which has eroded its potential as a pool for ministerial recruitment. Turnover in committee membership in the low

chamber has been quite high, and increased over time, preventing MPs developing strong technical skills during their parliamentary experience (Maurer 2008, p. 100; Jerez et al. 2013; Oñate and Camacho 2013). Parliamentary rules also weaken the institution's power regarding the executive. While the control of the parliamentary party over the parliamentary process of prime ministerial selection is very strong (Gunther et al. 2004), due to the chamber's formal rules, it becomes weaker in the executive arena afterwards. Once the head of government has been elected through the investiture vote, he/she may benefit from formal rules that pave the way for strong executive dominance over the parliamentary agenda and the policymaking process (Ajenjo and Molina 2011).

Hence, the prime minister may even have some incentives to appoint non-party ministers, isolating the cabinet from intra-party factionalism, going beyond party lines and introducing a non-partisan tone within the cabinet. In this sense, to promote the image of a non-political executive might be an asset given the bad image that citizens have of political parties. Between 1997 and 2010, there was a steady decrease in citizens supporting the idea that 'democracy can no longer subsist without political parties' (from 74.6% to 60.9%).[6] Similarly, the financial crisis fuelled the perception of political parties as one of the main problems in Spain (30.7% in June 2013).[7] In this context, prime ministers have justified the appointment of some non-partisan individuals in the cabinet as a way of bringing people from outside political parties into the cabinet.

Non-political Ministers in Spanish Cabinets, 1977–2015

In this section, we will give an overview of the formation of cabinets in Spain since 1977, paying attention to the appointment of ministers without partisan or parliamentary experience, but rather with a technical and specialist background. The objective is to connect the political context with the evolution of this type of ministers in the cabinet.

Since 1977, one out of every five ministers did not belong to the ruling party at the time of their appointment, and one out of three can be considered as a non-political minister following this book's criteria (Table 6.1). Independent ministers have been present in most cabinets, with just three exceptions (1981–1982, 1986–1988 and 2003–2004), affecting successively to UCD, PSOE and PP cabinets. Interestingly, there is not a

Table 6.1 Spanish governments and the number and share of ministers without political background, 1977–2015

Government (PM and his party)	*Year*	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
					N	*%*
Suárez I (UCD)	1977	Centrist	Minority	26	10	40.0
Suárez II (UCD)	1979	Centrist	Minority	37	13	35.1
Calvo Sotelo (UCD)	1981	Centrist	Minority	25	10	40.0
González I (PSOE)	1982	Socialist	Majority	21	4	18.2
González II (PSOE)	1986	Socialist	Majority	22	7	30.4
González III (PSOE)	1989	Socialist	Majority	27	8	28.6
González IV (PSOE)	1993	Socialist	Minority	21	9	40.9
Aznar I (PP)	1996	Conservative	Minority	18	3	16.7
Aznar II (PP)	2000	Conservative	Majority	25	7	28.0
Zapatero I (PSOE)	2004	Socialist	Minority	23	9	37.5
Zapatero II (PSOE)	2008	Socialist	Minority	27	14	48.3
Rajoy I (PP)	2011	Conservative	Majority	17	4	23.5
Total[c]	–	–	–	188	68	36.4

[a]Including prime ministers
[b]Ministers without parliamentary experience or a local/regional/national/UE political background, as well as previous record of leading positions in political parties at any time before their appointment
[c]The total refers only to the first appointment since some of these individuals were nominated more than once

stable trend, positive or negative, in this group over time as the presence of outsiders in Spanish cabinets has fluctuated over time. In the constituent term (1977–1979), four out of ten ministers could be considered as outsiders. In Zapatero's second term (2008–2011), they represented almost half of them. By contrast, in González I (1982–1986), Aznar I (1996–2000) and in the Rajoy's first term (2011–2015), non-politicians

represented the smallest proportion of the cabinet, although its number increased significantly over time during each premier's mandate.

Other indicators of 'technopoliticians', such as non-parliamentary tenure or expert abilities, show an even greater proportion: Around 45% of all the ministers had never previously been in the national parliament, and a similar percentage can be considered specialists or to have managerial backgrounds. However, this coincidence among indicators does not mean they define a very clear type of minister. It is rather the opposite: A plurality of ministerial types emerges when we observe how they combine. If we combine partisanship, parliamentary incumbency and specialization, we may obtain up to eight different profiles of individuals, where the typical 'Westminster' model of 'pure politician' (a generalist parliamentary-cum-party minister) applies to only one out of three Spanish cabinet members. The opposite type, what we may call the 'pure technician' minister, represents 16% of all cabinet members. Almost a half of remaining ministers belong to several types of 'hybrid'. In sum, Spanish majoritarian political cabinets are not ruled, as one would expect, by traditional parliamentary-cum-party ministers, but by a diversified elite with fluctuating levels of partisanship.

The UCD Governments

The government of Adolfo Suárez of July 1977 was the first cabinet to emerge from a democratically elected parliament. Suárez had been appointed by King Juan Carlos I as head of the executive a year earlier, under the Francoist Organic Law of State (1967).[8] The context of the transition to democracy substantially conditioned the development of the whole period until 1982 and the internal dynamics of the cabinet. Suárez's first democratic term (1977–1979) was mainly devoted to the adoption of a democratic constitution that was negotiated among almost all the parties represented in the parliament. The lack of an absolute majority for the ruling party *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD) paved the way for a consensual approach from the executive during the whole term, not only in the making of the constitution but also in the main policies based upon important agreements among parties in economic and social fields. Finally, we should note that the UCD did not exist as a party in June 1977 but was an electoral coalition of very small parties that supported Suárez as a candidate for the Spanish executive. During the months after the general election, the parties of the coalition merged into a single organization and

created the UCD as a formal party. This party-building process was not free of tensions, which in some cases affected the cabinet. This also means that some of the more relevant party leaders could be technically labelled as 'independent' before the start of the democratic government (although we will consider them as actual party ministers in our analysis).

Throughout this period, one in four ministers appointed by Suarez did not belong to the UCD. In some cases, they were public university professors and professionals from the private sector, some of them had even participated in the UCD electoral lists, but without joining the party. In other cases, they were top bureaucrats coming from the administration replacing fired ministers and aiming to cope with the departmental affairs without any significant political projection beyond the ministry. The most prominent case of a non-political minister in this period was Enrique Fuentes Quintana, deputy prime minister for economy. Quintana was a well-respected professor of economics and one of the most prominent policymakers of the second half of Franco's Spain. He had also been the author of a very influential blueprint in 1973 advocating progressive taxation and a neo-Keynesian approach to economic policies (Ban 2016, p. 47). As a minister, Fuentes Quintana planned to build an economic policy beyond party lines, whose main achievement was the Pact of Moncloa (in the autumn of 1977), an agreement with the main parties of the opposition to implement a set of social and economic policies to resolve the deep economic crisis of the 1970s.[9]

The presence of several independent ministers was part of a strategy of Suarez to keep control over the cabinet at the expense of the party and to promote agreements on public policy with the opposition, with the aim of avoiding problems during the negotiation of the constitution. The cabinet also included some of the most relevant leaders representing the various factions of the UCD. This combination of the main party leaders and relevant non-partisan specialists led to a cabinet of celebrities—the so-called *barones*—which produced a pattern of conflict regulation based on a consensual strategy (Huneeus 1985, p. 197). This case seemed to reveal the subordination of the party to the president of the government and made the UCD 'the government's parliamentary tool' (Hopkin 2000, p. 114). However, the balance between party and government was hardly unproblematic. A few months after its formation, one of the leaders of the party—Ignacio Camuñas—quit the cabinet because of disagreements over the process of the creation of the UCD. This situation aroused conflicts within the cabinet among party leaders regarding decision-making, particularly in

economic policy. Indeed, in February 1978, less than a year after his appointment, Fuentes Quintana resigned due to the strong opposition to his policy from right-wing ministers of the cabinet (Rodríguez-Teruel 2011a, pp. 124–125). Suárez decided then to replace all the ministers in that area and placed economic policy under the control of Abril Martorell, the other deputy prime minister and his closest ally within the party and in the cabinet.

Once the constitution was approved by popular referendum, new general elections were held in April 1979 and the UCD again formed a new minority government, with occasional support from other parliamentary groups. The president appointed party members to most of the portfolios, but left some of the more outstanding party leaders out of the executive. He wanted, thus, to reaffirm his authority over the cabinet and strengthen the autonomy of the executive regarding the parliamentary group and the party (Powell 2001, p. 164). However, this combination of presidential and coalitional models of party management (Hopkin 2000, p. 71) failed to realise its objectives. First, the authority of the prime minister was gradually eroded, since, having taken upon himself the responsibility of the government's policies, he assumed also directly the risks linked to their implementation and was exposed to the attacks of his rivals within the party (Hopkin 2000, p. 169; Caciagli 1989, p. 413). Second, the system of party government without party leaders did not preserve the executive from party tensions as expected (Hopkin 2000, p. 169). In contrast, the exit of the *barones* gave them time and reasons to conspire against Suárez from outside the government, free from the loyalty and cabinet collegiality that would have been imposed upon them by their position in the cabinet (Powell 2001, p. 242). The internal fights in the UCD created enormous tensions and led to some resignations from dissenting ministers. Less than 2 years after the election, in January 1981, Suárez himself—who had survive to a motion of censorship and won a vote of confidence—unexpectedly resigned as head of government by reasons not fully clarified.

This leadership crisis did not result in new elections because UCD feared electoral defeat. Instead, the leaders of the party factions elected Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, second vice-president in the last Suárez cabinet, as a new candidate for prime minister. After his particularly agitated parliamentary election,[10] Calvo-Sotelo, who was already minister with Carlos Arias Navarro in the first cabinet of Juan Carlos (1975–1976), formed a new minority cabinet composed exclusively of party members, where the main leaders of the different factions joined the executive. During the

following months, the UCD internal crisis worsened and extended to the parliamentary group, producing a significant number of splits and some ministerial resignations. In this situation, Calvo-Sotelo appointed new ministers from outside the party (mainly top high officials from the administration) and steadily reduced the presence of UCD *barones* in the cabinet. Despite this he achieved neither stronger parliamentary support nor maintained internal cohesion. A year and a half later, Calvo-Sotelo resigned and called for early elections.

The González Governments

The 1982 general election resulted in a resounding victory for the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE), with an absolute majority of 58% of the seats (48.4% of the popular vote), commencing the longest tenure for a prime minister to date: Felipe González who keeps the position of prime minister until 1996. During the 1980s, González enjoyed unchallenged authority within his party, even though the party machinery remained in the hands of Alfonso Guerra (deputy prime minister and deputy leader of the party). The cabinet was composed mostly of partisan ministers, some of them also members of the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), the socialist union. Overall, during the first 10 years of the PSOE government, 11 of the 40 cabinet members were non-political ministers. In addition, by the year 1984, González attempted to separate party and government introducing general incompatibility between being a member of the party executive and holding a cabinet portfolio, with just two exceptions—the PM and the deputy prime ministers.

Nevertheless, internal dissent emerged during the third term (1989–1993) as a consequence of party dissatisfaction with the cabinet's policies (mainly in the area of economics) and, ultimately, of the party struggle around the succession of González. After years of almost entirely partisan cabinets, in the 1988 cabinet reshuffle, González appointed three non-political ministers in order to contain the influence of party politics over the executive. One of the new ministers was the well-known intellectual Jorge Semprún, as minister of culture. Semprún came from a high-class family and was the grandson of former prime minister Antonio Maura, a relevant leader of the conservative party at the beginning of the twentieth century. After 2 years of imprisonment in the Buchenwald concentration camp, Semprún became one of the intellectual leaders of

the Spanish Communist Party until he was expelled in 1964. His cultural production (novels, plays and screenplays) make him an outstanding intellectual in the European left during the 1970s and the 1980s without party attachments and attracted the attention of González. As Semprún himself acknowledged afterwards, the main reason for his appointment was his lack of party affiliation, which allowed him more freedom in his cabinet position and a personal connection to the prime minister outside party politics (Semprún 1996, pp. 30–31 and pp. 274–275). The clash between supporters of González, with a more liberal view and headed by the Minister of Finance Carlos Solchaga, and supporters of Guerra, claiming for a leftist turn in economic policy, erupted at the XXXII party congress held in November 1990, at which González stated that Spain 'is governed from The Moncloa (the prime minister's residence), not Ferraz (PSOE's headquarters)'.

Guerra's resignation as deputy prime minister, in January 1991, due to a political scandal affecting him personally, broke the balance between factions within the cabinet and weakened the link between party and government. González, from that point, increased the presence of independent ministers, mostly recruited from sub-ministerial positions, in order to avoid the spread of the internal party crisis in the cabinet. In April 1993, González was forced to call for early election, in part to prevent a rebellion of a section of the parliamentary group controlled by the *guerrista* faction.

The PSOE lost their absolute majority in the June 1993 general election, opening a new scenario. After achieving the parliamentary support of the Catalan nationalist *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), González formed a minority cabinet, almost half of which were independent ministers (three of them women), with the aim of fostering an image of renewal in order to balance the internal strife in the party. The weakening of the party presence in the cabinet helped to promote parliamentary agreements with CiU and other minor parties, but also fed increasing executive isolation from the own party. This fourth term, however, fuelled cabinet instability due to serious corruption scandals involving members of the government, within a context of severe economic downturn. Consequently, the PSOE began to lose elections in favour the PP, the main opposition party (the 1994 European election and the 1995 local and regional elections), and González decided to bring into the cabinet some leaders who had lost their positions in the regional elections. The rest of ministers appointed during this term were bureaucrats, coming mostly from the central

administration, and non-party members. Three of these non-political ministers were women without party affiliation. One of them, Cristina Alberdi, minister of social affairs between 1993 and 1996, explained her appointment (and the promotion of other women to junior minister posts by that time) as the result of the lobbying made by a group of activists during the previous years advocating for improving the female presence at executive positions in Spain (Alberdi 2001, pp. 80–89). Alberdi was a lawyer who became the first woman to be selected as member of the General Council of the Judiciary, the ruling body of the judiciary power in Spain. Despite her professional background, she was appointed in a minor portfolio as a sort of tokenism (Alberdi 2001, p. 92). In sum, the González years showed an evolution from strong to increasingly weak party government. As the party questioned the policy direction of the executive, and the parliamentary majority vanished after electoral setback, the prime minister opened his cabinet to non-political ministers in order to maintain government stability. When Gonzalez decided to call for early elections again, in January 1996, more than half of his ministers were not members of the PSOE, and the party was in political disarray.

The Aznar Governments

When the *Partido Popular* (PP) won the 1996 general election, even though they failed to secure the expected absolute majority, it built parliamentary agreements with other parties in parliament—mainly CiU and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)—to sustain a minority government. However, this did not hamper the new Prime Minister José María Aznar to form a cabinet composed mostly of party members, most of them party leaders, which had accompanied him during the years in opposition. Eighty per cent of the ministerial team of the first term held a position in the party executive committee—the highest figure of any party during the democratic period—and only six independent ministers, non-affiliated to the party, reached the cabinet under Aznar's period. The most outstanding case was Josep Piqué, who held three different portfolios during 6 years (Industry, Technology and Foreign Affairs). Piqué was an economist and entrepreneur and the president of the Cercle d'Economia, a powerful Catalan lobby representing the more relevant firms of the Catalan industry. Although he had some political activism in far-left organizations during his youth, his most relevant previous public experience was as general director of industry in the Catalan regional government in the 1980s.

Accordingly, he was originally considered a link to ease the support from CiU and other moderated nationalist parties and aimed to represent these regional interests in the cabinet (*La Vanguardia* March 7, 2007). His increasing popularity made him one of the more reputed cabinet members, and, when he decided to join the party—a decision that was widely publicized in the 1999 party conference as a sign of the party's movement to the centre ideological position—he became soon the regional party leader in Catalonia. In 2000 he helped to promote Anna Birulés, another non-political Catalan entrepreneur with experience in the bank system and the sector of telecommunication firms, in the portfolio of Industry and Technology. He finally left the cabinet in 2002 in order to run—unsuccessfully—for the regional election. Pique's political career exemplifies how Aznar managed cabinet appointments as a tool to keep a balance between internal party factions and to renew and promote party leadership in different regions. Likewise, the selection of non-political ministers opened the door to several women (6 of the 11 female ministers with Aznar). Among them, only Ana Pastor followed an ascending political career afterwards.

The PP's victory in the 2000 general election, with an absolute majority, reinforced Aznar's pre-eminence within the government and the party. Although he reduced the amount of party leaders in the cabinet during his second term, appointing some non-political ministers after the general election, by the end of the period, he had formed a government composed entirely of party members. Such control over both the party and the cabinet allowed Aznar to arrange his succession without major internal dissent, when he decided to select Mariano Rajoy as the candidate for prime minister in the 2004 general election.

The Zapatero Governments

PSOE won the 2004 general election, unexpectedly and under exceptional political conditions (3 days after the terrorist attack of 11 March 2004). The new Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, had been elected party leader 4 years before by a narrow margin in a contested ballot and had not yet consolidated his position within the party. However, the high polarization of Spanish politics fuelled by the political opposition of the PP, as a reaction to the unexpected defeat, allowed Zapatero to form a minority government with relatively stable parliamentary agreements. During his first term in the government, Zapatero ruled

mostly with the support from IU-ICV and the left regional parties of the chamber. As this first term approached its end, his parliamentary support weakened after the PSOE lost some of its allies and the internal situation of the party deteriorated because of the unpopularity of some policies.[11] Despite winning re-election in March 2008, the economic crisis fuelled political dissent within the party and led to the disintegration of the popularity of Zapatero, leading to the announcement that he would stand down at the next election.

In these adverse conditions, Zapatero preferred to form cabinets with a lower partisanship profile and weaker parliamentary background than those of the Aznar premiership. Overall, 17 ministers between 2004 and 2011, of a total of 40 cabinet members, did not have a pre-existing political background, the highest amount to date. In the first term, one third of cabinet ministers were independent, although some of them brought strong political experience from the previous PSOE governments of Felipe González, as was the case of Pedro Solbes as minister of economy, Maria Teresa Fernández de la Vega as a deputy prime minister and Elena Salgado as minister of health (she later also worked with the portfolios of Public Administration and Finance). Besides Solbes, Fernández de la Vega and Salgado were among the most influential cabinet members of this period and lasted until the end. Some ministers of this period were not total outsiders since they had been included in the electoral list or had been previously appointed to sub-ministerial positions. While Zapatero substantially reduced the number of party leaders in the cabinet in his first years, the presence of party members declined even further during the second term—in which he renounce to reach stable parliamentary agreements laying in the so-called *geometría variable*—amounting to half of the cabinet. Only at the end of his government did Zapatero try to address the crisis of confidence among socialist voters, appointing a mixture of relevant party leaders and independent ministers to the cabinet. This situation eroded the influence of the party over the cabinet substantially and increased the influence of high-ranking civil servants on the cabinet's policies throughout the period (Ramió 2012, p. 95).

The strategy of promoting ministers with low political profile aimed to moderate the partisan background of the cabinet in the context of a parliamentary minority and also to broaden demographic representation by appointing more women and outsiders with a professional background in arts, university or business. For instance, Zapatero appointed a relevant scientist as minister of health, Bernat Soria; an outstanding businesswoman

in the biotechnology sector, Cristina Garmendia; as minister of science and innovation and a film director, Angeles González Sinde, as minister of culture, replacing César Antonio Molina, a writer who had the portfolio for a year and a half.[12] All these ministers shared a strong non-political professional background before entering cabinet and represented successful private careers far from politics. However, only a few of them played a significant role under Zapatero's executive and their political careers ended shortly after leaving the cabinet.[13] In many cases they were not able to complete even an entire term as cabinet members: The lack of party support made it easy for Zapatero to replace them after a reshuffle, depending on contingent politics.

The Rajoy Government

Following the victory of the Popular Party in November 2011, Mariano Rajoy's cabinet formation occurred under serious political constraints due to the ongoing political economic crisis. The spectre of the technocratic cabinets formed in Italy and Greece hung over the Spanish political environment. Rajoy, however, maintained the composition of previous cabinets, reducing the size of the cabinet by less than had been expected (13 ministers plus the president). Around 30% of the new ministers were not parliamentarians and a fifth of them were not affiliated to PP. Forty per cent of ministers could be considered specialist or having an economic background. The most relevant non-political member of the cabinet was Luis de Guindos, the new minister of economy. He started his professional career as s high civil servant (in the high corps of Spanish state economists and trade experts) and held executive appointments during the Aznar's period, particularly as junior minister of economy between 2002 and 2004. As he explained, he left politics after Aznar's government and worked at the private finance sector, becoming director of Lehman Brothers' bank in Spain and Portugal until the collapse of the form in 2008. Despite not being formally enrolled as PP member, Guindos was contacted by members of the IMF months before the 2011 general election to know about his opinions on the Spanish economy (Guindos 2016, p. 18). He had been Rajoy's economist advisor in the months before the 2011 general election, although he did not participate in the making of the economic party platform.

However, Rajoy's cabinet was not a technocratic executive but a full political one, with strong prime ministerial pre-eminence, as usual in PP

governments. Almost 60% had been outstanding politicians at the local, regional or the European level, and only a minority were national leaders in the party at that time. From the very beginning, some differences within the economic core of the executive arose because of the different type of message delivered by the 'managerial' minister of economy, De Guindos, and the 'partisan' minister of finance, Cristóbal Montoro. In the second half of the period, Rajoy faced five political resignations, two of them (formally cabinet dismissals) being due to international promotions (to the European Commission and to the OECD, respectively) and the others necessitated by political controversies, the final one occurring during the period of caretaker government in 2016. Two of the new ministers were top civil servants without a political background but with long experience in the high ranks of the executive during the Aznar and Rajoy periods.

Overall, along the 11 legislative terms and 12 cabinets since 1977, the number of non-political ministers has fluctuated depending on the parliamentary context and prime ministerial preferences. In the next section, we are going to specify the main factors underlying the selection of this type of minister, paying attention to the parliamentary context, individual careers and social factors.

Explaining the Selection and Dismissal of Non-political Ministers

As the previous section has shown, non-political ministers are a significant minority of Spanish ministers compared to political members of the cabinet. Sixty-eight ministers of a total of 188 were identified as ministers without prior representative or national party experience. To explain the main factors behind the appointment of these ministers, we will carry out an empirical analysis from our data comprising a pool of 188 cabinet ministers—including the five PMs, of which only Calvo-Sotelo and Rajoy hold previously a portfolio in democracy[14]—from July 1977 to December 2015. Then we will turn to their ministerial career and patterns of duration and exit from the cabinet.

The Selection of Non-political Ministers

Generally speaking, Spanish ministerial selection follows the main pattern of a parliamentary government, even though parliamentary recruitment is

particularly weak (Bermeo 2003). As Table 6.2 shows, lightly more than a half (54%) of cabinet members between 1977 and 2015 had first served in parliament. However, some of them (15%) were appointed soon after theirs first election as deputies; and a few others were MPs who left the low chamber before being chosen for a cabinet position. On average, only four of the ten members of each cabinet had already spent time as an MP before being appointed as a minister. Noticeably, the proportion of MPs in cabinets has declined over each successive prime minister's office: González (1982–1996), Aznar (1996–2004) and Zapatero (2004–2011). This evolution reflects one of the main peculiarities of the Spanish ministerial elite: Weak parliamentary roots compared to the general rule in parliamentary systems and any previous constitutional Spanish regimes, at least since 1868 (Linz, Jerez and Corzo 2013).

This trait, however, does not necessarily mean a non-partisan or non-political ministerial elite, since there are other political pools from which Spanish ministers may be recruited. The most striking trend has been the proliferation of ministers with regional and local political backgrounds since the mid-1980s, once regionalization was completed, adding a total of 17 regional parliament to the national one. One out of every four min-

Table 6.2 Political background of first-time ministers, 1977–2015

	N	%[a]
Mayor or local councillor	33	17.6
Regional deputy or councillor	32	17.1
National MP (deputy and/or senator)		
With parliamentary experience	100	53.5
Appointed to cabinet soon after the election[c]	27	14.4
European MP	8	4.3
Leading party position	105	56.1
Minister in a regional executive	21	11.2
Junior minister	34	19.1
No prior political experience	66	35.3
Total[b]	188	100

Note: The categories are not mutually exclusive. Multiple coding was applied when an individual held different political offices

[a]Percentages refer to the total number of individuals appointed

[b]Total number of individuals appointed

[c]Appointed to cabinet some days or weeks after obtaining the seat

isters have held a local political office, a seat in a regional parliament and/or a regional cabinet post, including ten cabinet ministers who had previously been regional presidents. In comparison, the European Parliament—joined by Spanish politicians in 1987—has not served as a significant pathway to the national cabinet, only seven ministers having been MEPs prior to taking cabinet positions in Madrid. In sum, the local/regional pathway to cabinets has produced more diverse sets of ministers and extended the length of political careers (Rodríguez-Teruel 2011b).

Beside political pathways to the cabinet, senior bureaucrats have also been frequently recruited into the Spanish ministerial elite (Baena 1999). Yet it is important to note that the governmental bureaucracy of the new Spanish democracy is highly politicized, as compared with most other European public administrations (Parrado 1996). Senior echelons of Spain's bureaucracies tend to be staffed with political appointees chosen by the respective minister. Some senior bureaucrats may be real administration mandarins but many others have previously held important political positions in local, regional or national governments (Real-Dato and Rodríguez-Teruel 2016).

Consequently, the relatively low share of ministers with a national parliamentary background has opened the door for other types of cabinet members: Politicians with multi-level careers and experts with only a bureaucratic background or even some outsiders (without any prior public office). Overall, one out of three ministers in Spain reaching a cabinet position for the first time had not any previous political experience.

In order to explain the significant proportion of non-political ministers, there are a number of different criteria employed by presidents to select their ministers depending on the political context, among which the parliamentary status of the executive has been shown to be a relevant influence on ministerial recruitment. While majority cabinets seem to favour more partisan recruitment, minority cabinets reinforce the preference for a less political background in the cabinet. According to Rodríguez-Teruel (2012), in minority cabinets prime ministers are politically more exposed to intraparty problems; so they prefer to appoint a greater number of outsiders to the cabinet. Conversely, in majority cabinets they employ ministerial positions as a tool to reward parliamentary and party members. Since 1982, all prime ministers have ruled at least one term with an absolute majority (González, 1982–1993; Aznar, 2000–2004; and Rajoy, 2011–2015). In these periods we find the highest number of ministers

with a party affiliation, ranging between 80% and 100% across different terms. On average, one out of four ministers did not have a political career before joining the cabinet in majority governments, as shown in Table 6.3.

A strong party profile, however, may also be found also during some minority governments, as with UCD's second term (1979–1982), both with Suárez and Calvo-Sotelo, and during Aznar's first term (1996–2000), in which the number of experts was also low (below 15%). In the case of UCD, this can be explained by the political conditions during the process of consolidation of the new democracy and the need to keep together the newly established ruling party. The failure of this second process led to a heavy electoral defeat and the collapse of the UCD, disappeared by 1986. The minority cabinet made up by Aznar in 1996 was the first PP's national government since its creation 7 years earlier as a re-foundation of the old Alianza Popular (AP). Accordingly, Prime Minister Aznar included in the cabinet most of the party leaders that had been in the opposition during the years of PSOE's government: Javier Arenas, Francisco Alvarez Cascos, Rodrigo Rato and Mariano Rajoy. This explains the low number of non-political ministers in these right minority cabinets compared to centre and left minority cabinets.

Since prime ministers of minority cabinets typically prefer to have a greater share of non-political ministers, in order to reinforce cabinet

Table 6.3 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different types of party government, 1977–2015

Cabinet type	*Political orientation*	*Appointed*		*Dismissed*[a]	
		N	*%*[b]	*N*	*%*[c]
Majority	L	11	27.5	8	38.1
	R	11	28.9	3	33.3
Minority	L	25	41.7	9	36.0
	C	21	40.4	12	46.2
	R	3	16.7	1	14.3
All	L	34	38.2	15	36.6
	C	21	40.4	12	46.2
	R	13	28.9	3	25.0

L Left, *R* Right, *C* Centre

[a]Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate

[b]Percentages refer to all ministers appointed

[c]Percentages refer to all ministers dismissed

stability, this type of minister is less vulnerable when political conflicts arise. In contrast, non-political ministers are weaker in majority cabinets, so they are much more exposed to being dismissed or to resigning. As Table 6.3 shows, the proportion of non-political ministers dismissed increases in majority cabinets compared to their proportion of appointments, while it decreases in minority ones. Indeed, party ministers seem to be more protected from cabinet instability when the parliamentary party controls the political scenario and reduces political uncertainty.

From an individual approach, non-political ministers tend to share some traits that help to explain why they are appointed. Since they have not followed a political or party path to the cabinet, we may assume that a larger pool of recruitment will produce a distinctive social and professional profile. One of the most relevant social factors is gender. As shown in Table 6.4, female ministers are more likely to have a non-political profile than men. This situation reflects the weakness of the parliamentary group as a source of female ministers. Despite of the huge increase of women in both the national parliament and the cabinet (Jerez and Delgado 2011; Linz et al. 2013, pp. 970–972), the chances of being promoted from the chamber to the executive are much lower. While Spain was one of the first European countries to reach gender parity in the executive—although only at the cabinet level—this result has been mainly achieved through regional or non-political channels of recruitment (especially in PSOE's cabinets): Almost half of the female ministers did not have previous political experience before entering the cabinet. This non-parliamentary mode of recruitment has helped to enhance the proportion of women in the cabinets, usually higher than in the parliament (Rodríguez-Teruel 2011a).

Another trait is much less surprising: All the ministers without a political background were university educated, almost half of them having postgraduate or PhD degrees. Given their appointment as experts or technocrats, these ministers have a stronger academic background than political ministers. Only Jorge Semprún, minister of culture under González, did not finish his university studies in philosophy, although this is a very peculiar case: He was studying at the University of Paris during the German invasion and was then deported to Buchenwald concentration camp. After the war he became a prominent intellectual in France and even had a short but intense political career in the Spanish Communist Party, as explained before.

We can also add that both graduates in law and lawyers are less common among non-political ministers as compared to other types of

Table 6.4 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without a political background, 1977–2015

Variables	*Ministers without a political background*		*All ministers*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*
Male	51	75.0	149	79.7
Female	17	25.0	38	20.3
Mean age (sd)	47.2 (7.5)	–	45.9[b] (6.9)	–
University graduates	65	95.6	179	95.7
Academic field				
Law	42	61.8	105	57.1
Engineering/architecture	5	7.4	17	9.1
Economics/business/finance	19	27.9	48	25.7
Social sciences	6	8.8	15	8.0
Higher education abroad[a]	21	30.9	57	30.5
Occupation				
Business, industry, finance	12	17.6	29	15.5
Higher civil servant	30	44.1	73	39.0
International organization	–	–	–	–
Lawyer	5	7.4	20	10.7
University professor	17	25.0	43	23.0

[a]Graduation and/or post-graduation studies
[b]Mean age of those ministers with political background

academic studies or to other professional backgrounds. Indeed, lawyers account twice the proportion of political cabinet members than that of non-political ones. This trait reinforces the idea of non-political ministers as expert members of the cabinet, while ministers with a more generalist profile are more often expected to have had a political career before entering the cabinet. However, this does not exclude the importance of a judiciary background as a pool of recruitment for non-political ministers[15]: Six ministers without political background were judges or public attorneys, all but one appointed in left cabinets.

The Ministerial Career

Once inside the cabinet, the ministerial careers of non-political ministers follow the same path as their political counterparts. A clear majority serve only in one department during their entire tenure (Table 6.5). Conversely,

Table 6.5 Ministerial career of ministers without a political background, 1977–2015

Ministries	*All ministers*		*Ministers without political background*[a]	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*
One post	136	72.7	50	73.5
Two posts	33	17.6	13	19.1
More than two posts	18	9.6	5	7.4
Interrupted careers	18	9.6	6	8.8
Tenure (years in cabinet) (sd)	3.4 (2.55)		3.0 (2.18)	
(*N*)	187		68	

[a]Percentages refer to the total of ministers without political background

only one out of four moves to a second post, and just three were appointed to more than two different posts.[16] Among those 'mobile' ministers, partisan ministers have more opportunities to move to a third post than those without a political background, although the differences are not statistically significant. The lack of difference in internal mobility suggests that the shape of a ministerial career does not differ depending on previous political profile but rather on the performance and success of each cabinet member. Once they have been appointed, Spanish ministers will not have the opportunity to develop a generalist internal career between different posts, except for those few who obtain the prime minister's confidence. The lack of previous political experience does not really prevent a minister from developing into a strong political figure.

Similarly, there are no significant differences in the chances of returning to the cabinet after having left it. Only 10% of all ministers are re-appointed after their first experience in the cabinet. There are no statistically significant differences between the two groups, but we do notice that most of the expert ministers coming back to the cabinet had occupied a party office or a parliamentary seat in between so they cannot be considered merely technicians or outsiders anymore. The best example of this evolution is again Pedro Solbes, minister under González until 1996 and newly a member of the cabinet after 2004 under Zapatero I. Between those years, he was elected as MP and later appointed as a member of the European Commission. From this office he continued to be an influent politician in the national arena as well as gaining credibility to become the minister of Economy again upon PSOE's return to government.

In contrast, there are some differences between partisan and non-partisan ministers in terms of tenure. Partisan ministers tend to stay 6 years longer in the cabinet than non-partisan ministers, who, on average, remain only 3 years (the difference is statistically non-significant). Non-partisan ministers are almost twice as likely to remain in office for 12 or less months than their partisan equivalents. Some of these are junior ministers, or other top executive posts, that were promoted to the ministerial rank at the end of the legislative term or prior to a major reshuffle. This was the case of ministers such as Félix Pérez Miyares (1980), José Luis García Ferrero (1982), Carlos Westendorp (1996), Julia García Valdecasas (2004) or Antonio Camacho (2011). Their period of tenure is among the shortest as they were the last ministerial appointments decided by the PM then in office.

The most distinctive feature of a ministerial career is perhaps the portfolio(s) assigned to the ministers appointed to a cabinet (Table 6.6). Ministers without a political background are over-represented in economic and social portfolios, along with defence. The defence department has the highest proportion of non-politicians, mainly because of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in centre-right cabinets.

Most economic portfolios (economy, agriculture, trade, industry) also show a majority of ministers without a political background (Luque 2014). In this case, however, there are very interesting fluctuations between

Table 6.6 Selected ministries and the weight of the ministers without political background, 1977–2015

Ministries	*All ministers*	*Ministers without political background*	
	N	*N*	*%*
Defence	13	8	61.5
Economy, agriculture, industry and trade	43	24	55.8
Education, science and culture	34	15	44.1
Health	17	7	41.2
Justice	16	7	43.8
Internal affairs	14	4	28.6
Foreign affairs	12	3	25.0
Public works	12	2	16.7
Finance	3	0	0

ministers with a strong technical profile and also ministers with a highly political profile. The choice depends on the prime minister's preferences on how to organize the economic area. Interestingly, many ministers of economy, in different governments, did not participate in the making of the economic party platform before the election. Moreover, in right-wing cabinets (UCD and PP), the portfolios of economy and finance have often been divided, with a stronger political profile for the second, as was the case with Rajoy's cabinets. The combination of different profiles in this strategic area has led to tensions and conflicts between the party—backing the political minister—and the non-political minister of economy. An example of this situation happened with the appointment of Fuentes Quintana, which forced a reshuffle in the area 1 year later, as we explained in the historical section. The same tensions aroused between Guindos and Montoro during the first Rajoy's period, although this did not prevent both ministers continued in their posts at the beginning of the second government.

Interestingly but hardly surprising, the department of public works is the most politicized within the cabinet. Due to the large amount of resources available to it, political parties are very interested in having an influence in the department. Education, health and justice are portfolios with a high degree of specialization; consequently the presence of non-politicians is higher here than in the more genuine political posts. Departments such as foreign affairs, home office, parliamentary affairs and the ministry of the presidency are mostly offered to ministers with political backgrounds, so the proportion of non-partisan ministers is substantively lower than average. The general result emerging from the analysis of portfolio allocation is that the minister profile makes a difference and that politicians are better placed for occupying political posts.

The Deselection of Non-political Ministers

The examination of the end of ministerial tenures shows both differences and similarities between politicians and non-politicians. On the one hand, they do not substantially differ in their broad expectation of survival as ministers. Figure 6.1 shows that their hazard function (measured by Kaplan-Meier estimates) follows the same path, although partisan ministers always enjoy slightly stronger chances of survival. This is consistent with previous findings that detected a negative effect of expertise on ministerial survival (Mata, Luque and Ortega 2010; Real-Dato 2011). This difference, however, is not



Fig. 6.1 Hazard function (K-M) of ministerial survival for ministers with and without a political background in the Spanish cabinets, 1977–2015

statistically significant, although after 3 years in government, the increase in the chance of leaving the cabinet remain higher for non-politicians compared to ministers with a political background. The existence of very similar survival expectations over time shows the absence of a strong effect of the expertise factor on the evolution of the ministerial career.

Nevertheless, a similar pattern of ministerial survival does not necessarily mean that the fate of the two types of ministers are similar. The way they leave the cabinet differs depending on their profile (Table 6.7). Ministers entering the cabinet without a political background are much more likely to leave the cabinet due to a general reshuffle or to an electoral defeat than to intra-cabinet conflicts or problems arising with parties. In contrast, politicians are more likely to be fired following a new victory at general elections or as a consequence of an individual resignation. There are also other reasons that affect only political ministers, such as unforced and voluntary resignations or promotions to a higher position. These differences show the nature of the appointment of a non-political minister: He/she is an expert whose cabinet survival depends on the prime minister, and he/she will probably only leave when the prime minister chooses so.

Table 6.7 Post-ministerial career: Type of exit

Type of exit	*All ministers*	*Ministers with a political background*		*Ministers without a political background*	
	N	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Forced resignation (general reshuffle)	58	32	29.4	26	41.3
End of term (a different party takes over)	56	32	29.4	24	38.1
End of term (but party remains in power)	27	20	18.3	7	11.1
Individual resignation	17	13	11.9	4	6.3
Other reasons	14	12	11.0	2	3.2
N	172	109	100	63	100

Conclusions

Spain is the very model of a country demonstrating the centralization of the executive power around the prime minister, an effect of what has been called the 'presidentialization' or 'personalization' of politics (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Blondel and Thiebault 2010). Both the institutional factors and the political process have positioned the national executive at the centre of political life. At the core of the executive, the prime minister employs all the cabinet and party resources to protect and enhance his authority. One of these instruments is the appointment of cabinet ministers in order to preserve the internal equilibrium of the cabinet and to reward loyalty from the parliamentary party, the party office and other political levels. Spanish prime ministers also select their cabinet ministers according to other criteria that favour individuals without a political background. The reasons underlying the appointment of these ministers may be strictly technical (expertise for economic or issue-specific portfolios) but also broadly political (descriptive representation of non-political, non-partisan profiles).

Overall 68 ministers without a political background were appointed to the cabinet between July 1977 and December 2015. During this period, six prime ministers coming from three different parties ruled over the national executive, with both majority and minority governments. The number of outsiders within the cabinet fluctuated over time. The type of government and the political context has fostered the increase or decrease

of non-political ministers. There were, in general, fewer outsiders at the beginning of each new premiership but political evolution opened the way for more individuals without a political background. In minority cabinets, politicians were less likely to be appointed than in majority cabinets. When the prime minister envisaged risks for the government and needed personal loyalty and technical abilities, they preferred to source ministers from outside the parliamentary party or the wider party group. This portrait does not differ substantially from the results of empirical models explaining the recruitment of non-parliamentary ministers in Spain, which is another way of approaching the phenomenon studied in this chapter (Rodríguez-Teruel 2017).

Indeed, ministers without a political background are valuable for their insulation from party or parliamentary politics. They bring expertise and also mean a broader recruitment pool. This explains why they deviate in some individual traits from the traditional demographic pattern in aspects such as gender and educational background. On the one hand, men and lawyers are under-represented, while women and other educational and professional careers are more broadly represented. Once they arrive into the cabinet, outsiders stay in office a lightly shorter time than insiders and have a much higher risk of being dismissed in times of party conflict or during cabinet reshuffles. Some exceptions show non-political ministers returning to the cabinet after a prior tenure and a temporal interruption. However, most of these ministers are one-post appointments, mostly in economic portfolios and in ministries with high social expenditure.

To what extent has this type of minister had consequences for the functioning of democracy? Non-political ministers have brought expertise and talent to the cabinet and have usually contributed to deliver a technical narrative of the executive performance. In most cases, they were already members of the same department and were simply promoted to substitute the minister. Here the functioning of the executive machine benefited from continuity and coherence in the policymaking. There have been other cases where a non-political background meant they were real outsiders from executive politics. Accordingly, ministers performed a genuine role of specialist or expert in their own field. In both cases, however, the lack of political experience could often be perceived as a weakness, especially when the views of the minister differed from the party line. Since junior ministers or other under-ministerial positions of the department might be selected by the party—and sometimes without the collaboration of the minister himself—there was always a potential for conflict between

the two sides. If the conflict arose in the face of public opinion, the risk of breaking the chain of delegation was a great argument in favour of the party against the non-political minister. The final decision in these cases was, sooner or later, the termination of the non-politician ministerial career. The non-political minister was, in the end, the weakest point of the chain.

Notes

1. That has happened only once until present: in February 1981, when Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo reached the presidency following the resignation of Adolfo Suárez.
2. Again, the only exception was Calvo-Sotelo. Although he became president of the party just after his nomination as a head of government, he lacked the control of the party machinery and was internally contested. Finally, he stepped down as a party leader only 7 months after his election, some weeks before being forced to call for early elections.
3. Nevertheless, some ministers of military portfolios have been considered close to King Juan Carlos, as was the case of Eduardo Serra (1996–2000) and Pedro Morenés (2011–2016).
4. During the VIII legislature (2004–2008), that support also came from another national party: Izquierda Unida (IU), which then had only five MPs (two of them from its Catalan allies ICV).
5. Although the PSOE only obtained 175 out of 350 parliamentary seats (50%) in the 1989–1993 term, it was considered a majority due to the refusal of the Basque nationalists from HB to attend parliamentary sessions during that term.
6. Data from the CIS data-bank, Surveys No 2270 (1997) and No 2849 (2010). Source: http://datosbd.cis.es/ciswebconsultas/serieFichaView.htm?idSerie=A401010010&from=serieList (Accessed: 1-06-2016).
7. Data from the CIS data-bank, Survey No 2990 (2013). Source: http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.html (Accessed: 1-06-2016).
8. According with the *Ley Orgánica del Estado* (LOE), the prime minister, 'will be designated by the chief of state after a proposal from the council of the Kingdom' (article 14.1). This law, still officially in force at the time of the first democratic elections, until it was abolished by the new constitution, did not consider the institution of the President investiture by the Cortes. Accordingly, Suárez did not submit himself to a vote of investiture in 1977.
9. Fuentes Quintana announced his economic policy view, based upon a consensual approach beyond party lines, 3 days after his appointment in a

famous ministerial speech on TV (video available in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2tINhRiMqs, last visit on 01/06/2016).

10. The first parliamentary voting session was interrupted by entrance of a significant number of members of the *Guardia Civil* into the chamber which was the beginning of the failed 23 February coup.
11. In particular, the reform of the Statute of Autonomy in Catalonia ended up in a controversial outcome that left the Catalan regional parties supporting the government unsatisfied, particularly ERC, the Catalan left independence party, and lead to the resignation of the Minister of Defence José Bono.
12. Some months after his departure, Cesar Antonio Molina reported that his resignation as minister of Culture was due to a lack of 'glamour', according to the prime minister, who told him that he would prefer a woman in the ministry (*Diario de Pontevedra* 2010).
13. His last minister of education, Ángel Gabilondo, professor of philosophy and former Vice Chancellor of the Universidad Autónoma de (UAM), was later elected PSOE's candidate to the regional government of the Community of Madrid.
14. A third, Adolfo Suárez, was appointed minister in the first cabinet of King Juan Carlos, before reaching the presidency of government in July 1976.
15. Members of the judiciary in Spain cannot be affiliated to a political party.
16. Alberto Oliart (UCD), Elena Salgado (PSOE) and Josep Piqué (PP). Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado (UCD) and Pedro Solbes (PSOE) were appointed also three times, but they hold the same portfolio.

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CHAPTER 7

Recruitment and Careers of Ministers in Central Eastern Europe and Baltic Countries

Elena Semenova

In most countries, cabinet ministers are the most visible politicians at the national level (Blondel 1985). Their position at the apex of power (Dogan 2003) is even delineated in national constitutions. Moreover, ministers are the core decision makers, who are capable of setting political agenda (Higley and Burton 2006). Because of their dominant position in the political system, the recruitment patterns and careers of ministers require scholarly attention (Müller-Rommel and Keman 2012, p. 220).

Ministerial research has focused on advanced democracies and highlighted the nature of party government (Woldendorp et al. 2000), the role of political parties in building coalitions (Strøm et al. 2008) and in the selection of candidates (Hazan and Rahat 2010). As Bagehot (1867, p. 12) points out, the cabinet is a link between the executive and legislative powers. In parliamentary democracies, the chain of delegation goes from the voters to the political parties. Following an electoral victory, the political parties form the government and select the prime minister.

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Through the nomination of party-affiliated ministers (Blondel and Thiébault 1991) and the 'shadowing' of ministers appointed by the coalition partners (Thies 2001; Carroll and Cox 2012), political parties ensure the realization of their policy preferences. The expectations of the party government approach have been largely fulfilled in the case of Western European countries, where ministers have usually been recruited from among parliamentary ranks and had often gained leading party experience at the local or regional level before being promoted to prominent national positions (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1997; Dowding and Dumont 2009). Ministers may also have professional expertise in addition to their political experience (Blondel et al. 2007).

In Western European countries, the logic of party government has been challenged by new developments affecting both governments and political parties. The prime minister has gained increased power with respect to the formation and function of governments, a process referred to as 'presidentialization' (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Europeanization and the delegation of certain competencies to Brussels have restricted the power of national parliaments and increased the power of party leaders (Raunio 2002). Public discontent with politicians and parties (Dalton and Weldon 2005) and the declining number of party members (van Biezen et al. 2012) have weakened the once powerful position of political parties in the national arena (Mair 2008). Moreover, new parties (e.g., the Greens, the left and regionalist parties) have become acceptable coalition partners, thereby weakening the dominant position of the established parties (Deschouwer 2008).

Possible Differences Between East European and West European Mechanisms of Ministerial Selection

During the transition to democracy, Western Europe was a point of reference for many politicians in post-communist countries. This transition was even referred to as a 'catching-up revolution' (Offe 1991), that is, one that entailed following Western developmental paths rather than creating innovative concepts for reorganizing state and society. By adopting Western European patterns of political and economic development, the post-communist countries should have theoretically fostered the adoption of Western European patterns of ministerial selection, characterized by the considerable influence of political parties.

Due to the circumstances surrounding the regime transition and the political features of the post-communist transformation, it is unlikely that these patterns were directly transferred. The collapse of communism opened a window of opportunity for societal groups that had been excluded from political power under the 'old' regime. However, the structures of opportunity, the supply of candidates and the political expectations of the population were anything but favourable for selecting experienced politicians to the cabinet. The political transformation of new democracies also presented serious challenges to the party government model.

First, the transition in post-communist countries involved substantial changes to the logic of recruiting political elites. With the breakdown of the communist rule, the recruitment patterns of the old regimes were invalidated. The usual requirements for high-ranking office (in politics, economy and administration), loyalty to the Communist Party (or its satellite parties) and acceptance of the predictable *nomenklatura* system became obsolete. In the new democracies, the recruitment pool for top political positions (including cabinet posts) expanded and included political dissidents and candidates with little, if any, affiliation with the Communist Party. At the same time, the access of former prominent communist officials to positions of power was largely restricted both through legal (e.g., lustration) and political measures.

Second, in contrast to Western European party systems, which had been historically structured along the major cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), the development of political parties in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries was hindered by the scant and even elusive societal cleavages (Casal Bertoa and Mair 2012, p. 86). Moreover, new parties struggled to build nationwide territorial party organizations (Bielasiak 1997, p. 37). The level of activism among the general population was rather low (Keman and Müller-Rommel 2012, pp. 7–8), thereby limiting the supply of candidates for party positions. The personalization of politics and the electoral success of the newly formed parties introduced an additional element of uncertainty for political careers in the former communist countries (Tavits 2008; Sikk 2005). Additionally, none of the CEE countries could rely on experience in party government. During the post-communist period, coalitions in CEE countries were less stable and experienced more substantial compositional changes (e.g., the entry of new parties) than the West European democracies (Keman and Müller-Rommel 2012, p. 4).

Third, the public acceptance of political parties as major agents of policy-making has weakened over time, similarly to Western Europe (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Across CEE countries, the level of confidence in political parties was the highest directly after the collapse of communism. For example, 48% of Czech respondents expressed strong or fair confidence in parties in 1990–1994 (World Values Survey 1994). However, the specific trust in parties has been declining ever since (the European Social Survey, Table 7.1).

Finally, four CEE and three Baltic countries became part of the European Union (EU) in 2004. Political elites in all these countries declared membership in the EU to be their primary political goal, and all of these countries made considerable progress in complying with the *acquis communautaire*. Membership of the EU widened the political arena to the supranational level, thereby creating new opportunities for national politicians to continue their careers (e.g., in the European Parliament or European Commission) (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005).

The demand side of cabinet recruitment changed slightly in terms of the market size (i.e., the number of ministerial positions) but considerably in terms of the qualifications and expertise required for a minister. I argue that during the transition period, the new regimes favoured the experience and qualifications of three groups: politically inexperienced 'politicians of morality' (i.e., political dissidents), the technical intelligentsia and

Table 7.1 The proportion of respondents with strong and fair confidence in political parties in CEE countries

Waves	*CZ*	*PL*	*SK*	*EE*	*LT*	*LA*
2002 (W 1)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2004 (W 2)	4.9	1.3	4.7	5.5	N/A	N/A
2006 (W 3)	N/A	2.3	8.6	8.3	N/A	N/A
2008 (W 4)	6.4	2.2	9.9	6.2	N/A	N/A
2010 (W 5)	6.4	3.3	4.7	8.2	3.6	N/A
2012 (W 6)	9.3	3.1	6.9	7.6	5.8	N/A
2014 (W 7)	10.6	2.7	N/A	8.0	7.2	N/A
Mean	7.5	2.5	7.0	7.3	5.5	N/A

Source: Authors' calculations based on the European Social Survey waves (http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/)

Note: The percentage is calculated from the responses from 7, fair confidence, to 10, full confidence, and weighted by the population size

N/A not asked

Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LT)

generalists. Political amateurs and dissidents enjoyed considerable public support during the early 1990s (Baylis 1994). Instead of being perceived as a shortcoming, 'amateurism' (non-affiliation with the previous communist regime) enhanced the political credibility of the candidates. The technical intelligentsia (predominantly those educated in the technical and natural sciences) was valued by the communist power because of its expertise. Following the collapse of communism, members of this group possessed qualifications relevant for government action. Finally, beyond the interest in technical qualifications, there was a strong demand for expertise in various societal spheres. The challenges associated with the simultaneous transition in politics and the economy (Offe 1991) increased the demand for experts-generalists who could resolve critical situations. Summarizing these considerations, I expect that in the CEE countries, it is attractive to recruit cabinet ministers with profiles different from those of ministers in Western Europe, particularly during the transition. Some of these expectations are partly supported by the existence of technocratic non-partisan governments (Protsyk 2006) and the recruitment of politically inexperienced ministers in CEE countries (Fettelschoß 2009; Semenova 2015).

Operationalization and Data

In this chapter, the recruitment and careers of ministers with respect to their political and occupational profiles, portfolios, and cabinet tenure are analysed. Using the definition proposed by Tavares de Almeida, Costa-Pinto and Cotta (see the introduction to this volume), I focus on two groups of ministers: Political outsiders (ministers who were neither members of the national parliament nor party leaders before or at the time of their first recruitment) and experts (ministers who managed a portfolio that matched their previous occupation).

The analysis is based on the biographical information of 836 ministers from 63 cabinets. The data set encompasses the years 1991–2009. It includes information from six post-communist EU member countries: Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LT). The selection of the sample follows a most similar cases design, including all new democracies that joined the EU in 2004, except for Hungary (which is covered in a separate chapter of this volume) and Slovenia (because of insufficient data). In all countries selected, the power of parliaments is strong (Fish and Kroenig 2009). In the sample,

two countries (Estonia and Latvia) have parliamentary systems, while the remainder can be classified as parliamentary-presidential countries, with limited presidential power to dismiss cabinets (Doyle and Elgie 2016). Finally, in all selected countries, cabinets are appointed by the winning political parties, often in the form of coalitions.

The data were collected within the framework of the EurElite project, which primarily aimed to investigate the patterns of parliamentary recruitment in Western and Eastern European countries (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007; Semenova et al. 2014b). The structure of data sets was identical for each country and is based on the common code book. Each data set includes variables covering the social and occupational profile, political experience, career paths and the major post-cabinet positions (e.g., position in the national parliament) of ministers.

Institutional Framework

In all six CEE countries analysed in this chapter, the parliament strongly influences cabinet formation in the political systems. This institutional arrangement suggests the crucial importance of parliamentary experience for political careers. Indeed, in all countries except for Slovakia and Estonia, national parliamentarians are allowed to combine their mandate with a position in cabinet. The Slovakian and Estonian constitutions stipulate the 'sleeping mandate'—the right to reassume a parliamentary mandate following the end of cabinet service (Table 7.2). Prime ministers, however, have sometimes forced their cabinet members to resign from the parliament in order to entirely focus on their cabinet activities, as was the case with Czech Prime Minister Stanislav Gross (2004–2005).

The constitutional rules for cabinet formation in all six countries define that the candidacy of the prime minister (PM) is formally proposed by the president of the country and requires the approval of the national parliament. In some countries, when the PM candidacy fails to receive parliamentary support (which has occurred at least twice in Estonia and the Czech Republic, once in Poland), the right to nominate a PM is transferred from the president to the parliament. If the parliamentary nominated PM fails to form the government, early parliamentary elections will be held. In addition to the appointment of the PM, some constitutions specify the approval of individual ministers. In Estonia and the Czech Republic, for instance, the PM candidate must first receive approval for the cabinet from the parliament and then from the president. In Lithuania,

Table 7.2 Constitutional provisions and political framework in CEE countries

	CZ	*EE*	*LT*	*LA*	*PL*	*SK*
Government[a]	P-Pr	P	P-Pr	P	P-Pr	P-Pr
Directly elected president	Yes[b]	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incompatibility	No	Restrictions	No	No	No	Restrictions
Individual no confidence vote for ministers	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PPI	0.81	0.75	0.78	0.78	0.75	0.72
NCP (mean)	2.6 (0.84)	2.4 (0.77)	2.2 (0.99)	3.4 (0.96)	2.9 (1.16)	3.5 (0.91)
Polarization of party system (mean)	5.2	4.0	3.9	5.1	3.8	3.4

Source: Author's own classification and calculations

Notes: [a]P (parliamentary system); P-Pr (parliamentary-presidential system, where president has certain powers but the cabinet is responsible to the parliament, based on Elgie and Moestrup 2008)

[b]Since 2013, the Czech Republic introduced a direct election of the president

PPI (Parliamentary Powers Index, 2007), from M. S. Fish and M. Kroenig (2009); NCP (number of parties participating in the winning coalition), the standard deviation is in brackets; Polarization of party system (0 if all parties occupy the same position on the left-right scale and 10 when all the parties are split between the two extremes), from Dalton (2008)

Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LT)

however, the PM must only present the cabinet to the parliament after presidential approval.

The PM usually has limited ability to alter the structure of the government, which can be done only by legislation, particularly in the Baltic countries. According to the Lithuanian constitution, if more than half of all cabinet ministers have been changed, the government must once again receive approval from the parliament. In some countries (e.g., Estonia), the PM can appoint ministers without portfolios at his or her discretion. In Lithuania, in contrast, a minister should lead a specific ministry, thereby preventing the PM from appointing ministers without portfolios.

The constitutional rules allow the dismissal of both the entire cabinet and individual ministers. Among these provisions, the rules regulating the vote of no confidence are the most prominent in the constitutions. In order to initiate a vote of no confidence, at least one-fifth of Estonian MPs, a simple majority of Lithuanian MPs or an absolute majority of Czech MP, must support this proposal. In Latvia, there is no official

threshold for initiating a vote of no confidence. In contrast, the Lithuanian and Polish constitutions stipulate the threshold for initiating a vote of no confidence to individual ministers (more than 50% of MPs in Lithuania or at least 69 Polish MPs). A vote of no confidence or the resignation of the PM can lead to the dismissal of the entire cabinet.

In all countries studied, the authority of the parliament is high, as signified by the average Parliamentary Powers Index of 0.77 (where 1 is most powerful parliaments) (Table 7.2). Based on the number of coalition parties, the Czech, Lithuanian and Estonian coalitions have usually consisted of two political parties. In contrast, the Slovak, Polish and Latvian governments have often consisted of three parties (Table 7.2). Finally, the polarization of party systems has been moderate, with Slovakia (3.4) and the Czech Republic and Latvia (approximately 5.0) as outliers. In general, these institutional analyses reveal that the national parliaments in all six countries have enjoyed considerable power in the political system. Moreover, the position of political parties has also been crucial because of the necessity to form coalition governments. But do these institutional frameworks lead to the cabinet recruitment of partisan politicians with parliamentary experience?

Patterns of Ministerial Recruitment in Central European and Baltic Cabinets

A general analysis of the ministerial recruitment of all democratically appointed cabinets in six CEE countries from 1991 until 2009 reveals that a relatively large proportion of cabinet members without any party or parliamentary experience (outsiders) were appointed to their positions (Table 7.3). The outliers were Latvian and Lithuanian cabinets, whose cabinets were comprised of 32% and 52% of outsider ministers, respectively.

To some extent, politically experienced ministers in new democracies followed career paths similar to those of Western European countries, in which parliaments are the major springboards and agents of socialization available to a cabinet career (De Winter 1991, p. 44). The link between cabinet and parliamentary positions reflects the chain of delegation in which parties that win parliamentary elections are responsible for forming the government (Strøm et al. 2008). The strong position of parliaments defined by CEE constitutions is partly reflected by the fact that, on average,

Table 7.3 Political background of all first-time ministers in democratic cabinets, 1991/1992/1993[a]–2009 (%)

	CZ	*EE*	*LT*	*LV*	*PL*	*SK*
Mayor or local councillor	20	31	20	26	10	16
Regional deputy or councillor	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8	3
National MP (deputy or senator)[b]						
• With parliamentary experience	43	39	35	56	45	39
• Appointed to cabinet during MP's first term	8	19	10	5	13	3
European deputy	0	0	0	0	2	0
Party leading positions (national level)	21	31	23	39	28	22
Minister in a regional executive	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	8	2
Junior minister	–	1	0	6	13	4
No prior political experience	41	39	52	32	40	41
N[c]	138	110	133	129	214	112

Source: Authors' own calculations

Notes: Multiple coding is possible, as one person may have gained various experiences

n.a. Not applicable

[a]Referred to the year of the first democratically formed government in each country

[b]The categories are mutually exclusive

[c]Total number of individuals appointed

Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LT)

more than 50% of ministers in CEE cabinets were recruited from the national parliament (Table 7.3).

The importance of parliamentary experience for a ministerial career is also signified by an implicit requirement of legislative tenure for ongoing ministers. Political tenure has also been used as an indicator of ministerial survival in advanced democracies (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008; Berlinski et al. 2007). Indeed, a candidate remains in parliament for one legislative term before being appointed to the Czech and Polish cabinet (the standard deviation is 3.5 years). Some politicians, however, occupy a parliamentary seat while aiming for higher political office. Approximately 10% of cabinet ministers have refused their first parliamentary mandate in order to become a cabinet member (Table 7.3). This strategy is evident both in countries with incompatibility rules (e.g., Estonia) and without them. In contrast to national parliaments, a parliamentary position at the supranational level (the European Union) did not give impetus to cabinet positions.

Political positions at the local level (e.g., a mayoral office) and party leadership are the second-most widespread experience (Table 7.3). This

pattern of political activity is possible because of institutional rules that allow the accumulation of political positions and thereby protect political careers from the volatile preferences of the voters. Despite being highly unstable, political parties have become an important career gatekeeper for political offices in CEE countries. This is reflected in the growing proportion of cabinet ministers with experience of leading a political party (at all territorial levels), which fluctuates between 27% (in Lithuania) and 38% (in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia). For all party organizations, however, holding a leading party position at the national level increases one's chances of becoming a cabinet minister (Table 7.3). This finding underlines that the involvement in national political networks is a crucial factor for being promoted to ministerial positions.

Finally, in the EU accession countries, experience in ministries only marginally increases one's chances of being appointed to a national cabinet. While ministerial experience in regional administrations may be curtailed because of the low importance or even absence of these power bodies in many CEE countries, the relatively low weighting of the junior ministerial position is rather unexpected. In contrast to former post-Soviet countries, where the position of junior minister is a crucial springboard to the national cabinet (Semenova 2015), in the new EU accession countries, junior ministerial and cabinet careers were largely separated.

Patterns of ministerial recruitment may change over time and often depend on the preferences of the prime minister. In Poland, for example, the highest number of ministers with junior ministerial and local political experience were recruited to the cabinets headed by Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski (2006–2007) and Prime Minister Donald Tusk (2007–2011). Certain political situations surrounding cabinet formation also influence cabinet recruitment. For example, under Prime Minister Jan Fischer (2009–2010), the Czech government, which usually consists of politically experienced ministers, was formed as a 'crisis management' cabinet and was completely devoid of politicians.

In summary, this trend reveals that since the early 1990s, active involvement in national politics (a parliamentary mandate or party activity) has been an important—but not a limiting—factor for appointment to CEE cabinets. The results from CEE countries largely support the observation made by Berlinski et al. (2012, p. 34) that '[b]eing an MP provides no training for the administrative tasks of ministers'. At the same time, in new democracies, administrative experience (particularly in the form of junior ministerial positions) was also not the ultimate springboard to the cabinet.

Politicization Over Time?

As mentioned above, in new democracies, many positions of power became vacant, either because of political or generational reasons, thereby providing opportunities for candidates with little if any political experience to enter national politics. One would therefore expect to find more outsiders (i.e., ministers who were neither MPs nor party office-holders before or at the time of their first recruitment) in cabinet positions after the regime change. This hypothesis was indeed confirmed; in the early 1990s, approximately 50% of all ministers were political outsiders.

However, this effect should have been temporary. Applying the concept of political professionalization (Best and Cotta 2000), one would expect the gradual institutionalization of national parliaments in post-communist CEE countries to promote the accumulation of political experience by candidates for top political offices. The growing professionalization of candidates, in turn, would foster the development of an autonomous political sphere, whereby political parties control the entry channels to political positions. Political experience should, therefore, be increasingly valued for cabinet recruitment.

In a comparative perspective, only Estonia and Lithuania followed the pattern of gradual professionalization of cabinet ministers by increasingly recruiting politically experienced ministers. Whereas party leaders had higher chances of entering the Lithuanian cabinet during the 1990s, the recruitment of national parliamentarians to the cabinet has continually increased. During the 1990s, the cabinet positions in Estonia were often occupied by national parliamentarians. In contrast, throughout the post-communist period, there has been a moderate yet stable number of party leaders in the Estonian governments.

Latvia and Slovakia also followed the pattern of increasing professionalization of cabinet ministers until the early 2000s, when increasing numbers of outsider ministers again began to be appointed. In both countries, the number of former parliamentarians among cabinet ministers was moderate yet stable. In Latvia, the value of party experience for cabinet appointments increased until the mid-2000s, while slightly declining in the late 2000s. In Slovakian cabinets, the representation of party leaders was 'U' shaped. Numbers were the highest in the early 1990s, continued to decrease until the mid-2000s and have been increasing ever since. In contrast, the number of outsiders among the Czech ministers has continually increased, particularly in the 2000s. Finally, in the Polish case, there has been no clear trend in appointing outsiders to cabinet positions.

The political professionalization hypothesis could therefore only be partly confirmed. More specifically, the political control of parties and parliaments over cabinet appointments increased during the 1990s and the early 2000s but has been decreasing ever since. In a long-term perspective, political experience has never been ultimately crucial for cabinet candidates in CEE countries. Strikingly, the selectorates attached even less value to the expertise of candidates than they did to the former political activity of candidates. With the exception of Estonia and the Czech Republic (with the sporadic recruitment of experts), all other CEE cabinets continually recruited a moderate number of experts (from 17% in Lithuania to approximately 27% in Slovakia)—ministers assigned to portfolios that matched their professional and educational expertise.

The Profiles of Political Outsiders and Experts

The continued and pronounced representation of political outsiders in CEE cabinets raises questions about the reasons for their recruitment. Theoretically, outsider ministers may be highly valued because of their qualifications. This assumption follows the meritocratic concept of elites. The merit-based selection of elite members should signify professional expertise and high cultural capital. I expect that these factors are the most important for selecting outsiders to CEE cabinets. As it was not possible to measure professional standing by conducting a reputational survey, educational degrees and occupational background were used as a proxy for the qualification of a minister.

Using Bourdieu's term (1986), the cultural capital of outsiders, which is signified by their academic qualification, is indeed high. As with most CEE parliamentarians (Semenova et al. 2014a, pp. 288–289), cabinet members from these countries are highly educated and predominantly hold degrees in the technical and natural sciences (Table 7.4). The proportion of ministers holding doctorates was also higher among outsider ministers compared to their politically experienced colleagues. These educational achievements are also reflected in the higher average age of political outsiders compared to that of politically experienced ministers (48 and 46 years, respectively; in both groups, the standard deviation is approximately 9 years).

In addition to their educational qualifications, most outsider ministers were drawn from positions of high social prestige, particularly from high-ranking civil service, management of large enterprises and universities

Table 7.4 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without political background, 1991/1992/1993–2009 (%)

Ministers without political background [N = 342]	*CZ*	*EE*	*LT*	*LV*	*PL*	*SK*
Female	16	12	4	22	17	11
Mean age (at first cabinet recruitment)	50	43	48	42	51	48
University graduates	96	100	100	100	100	100
…with a PhD degree	28[a]	12	42	22	57	42
Academic field[b]						
Law	18	24	13	18	19	11
Economics, social sciences	32	27	30	31	40	24
Natural sciences, engineering, architecture, medicine	31	37	58	53	32	52
Humanities	21	12	7	18	12	17
Occupation						
Business (managers)	20	25	16	17	16	26
Higher civil servant	40	17	49	30	30	4
Lawyer	2	8	3	5	6	2
Teacher, lecturer, professor	11	33	10	15	27	15
Others	27	17	22	33	21	53
N	57	43	69	41	86	46

Source: Authors' own calculations
Notes: [a]Plus 32% with an—'automatic'—doctoral title
[b]Percentages may add up to more than 100% as some ministers have two or more university degrees
Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LT)

(Table 7.4). This selection pattern partly corresponds to the general development of parliamentary representation in CEE countries, with increasing proportions of civil servants and managers among legislators (Semenova et al. 2014a, pp. 290–292).

The recruitment patterns of experts (ministers who were assigned the portfolio that matched their previous occupation) have differed from that of outsiders. Among CEE countries, the expertise of ministers was strongly valued in Slovakia and Estonia (approximately 27% experts), followed by Latvia and Poland (both recruited 22% experts). In the Czech Republic and Lithuania, ministers have been rarely assigned portfolios that match their expertise (14% and 17%, respectively). Occupationally, expert ministers have been predominantly drawn from business, education and law.

During communism, the only societally acceptable political path for women was a party career within the Communist Party (CP) apparatus, satellite parties and the CP youth organizations (Janova and Sineau 1992). The abolishment of quotas in the early 1990s resulted in declining female

representation in positions of power. Since the mid-1990s, women have increasingly found their way into national parliaments (Semenova et al. 2014a, pp. 288–289), although they are still rarely appointed as members of national cabinets in CEE countries. Recruitment to the cabinet as an outsider minister was a relatively important career path for women in the post-communist period (Table 7.4). The underrepresentation of women in high-ranking positions of power can be explained by the lower activity of women in party organizations as well as the barriers to parliamentary seats observed in the new democracies (Matland and Montgomery 2003).

Thus, the selection logic for political outsiders and experts to cabinet positions indeed confirmed our hypothesis about the importance of expertise and qualification. Outsider ministers are highly qualified and have enjoyed high social status (as rectors of universities, managers of large enterprises or well-known academics) before being appointed to cabinet.

The Portfolios of Political Outsiders and Experts

Another reason for the appointments of outsider ministers is that their professional expertise is valued by the selectorates when assigning portfolios. I propose two hypotheses with respect to the allocation of portfolios to outsider ministers. First, outsiders should be assigned portfolios, for which they can best fulfil their duties (performance-based portfolio allocation). Second, outsiders should be assigned portfolios involving the supervision of policies in socially conflictual areas (non-partisan portfolio allocation).

Research on coalitions reveals that cabinet portfolios differ with respect to their salience (Browne and Feste 1975; Müller and Strøm 2003; Warwick and Druckman 2001). Based on the re-distributive qualities, Bueno de Mesquita (1979) defines that the most salient and desirable portfolios are a prime ministerial position, defence, the interior, foreign affairs, finance and (in some countries) agriculture.

The pronounced and rather stable number of politically inexperienced ministers in CEE cabinets represents a breach in the chain of delegation (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006), thereby challenging the research on coalitions. From this background, the recruitment of outsider ministers should fulfil specific functions in cabinets. In order to assess the strategies of portfolio allocation, the recruitment of outsider ministers to ministerial positions with high salience as well as the mobility between portfolios will be analysed.

The data reveal that the mobility of outsiders was strongly restricted. They rarely changed portfolios within the same cabinet (in the case of reshuffling or restructuring of the cabinet) or in consecutive cabinets. Moreover, the assignment of portfolios to outsiders differed from that of their politically experienced colleagues. I expect that portfolios with high salience should not be assigned to outsiders because these are subject to party control. Indeed, the most prestigious cabinet portfolio (i.e., that of the PM) was rarely assigned to outsiders, except in interim governments. Similarly, outsiders rarely hold the portfolio of defence, which is one of the most prestigious in Western European countries (Druckman and Warwick 2005, p. 30). In CEE countries, the recruitment of outsiders as ministers for special affairs and ministers without portfolios also supports these expectations. The outsiders in CEE cabinets have often been assigned portfolios concerning education, justice, social affairs and finance (Table 7.5).

The analysis of portfolio allocation also involves identifying whether the probability of being appointed to a specific ministerial position differs between outsiders and politically experienced candidates. From all portfolios with low salience, outsiders have usually led ministries of social affairs and health (in Latvia and Lithuania) as well as those of transport and construction (in Estonia and Poland). This finding supports our hypothesis that outsider ministers are often assigned to policy areas with high conflict potential. Issues such as pensions, social benefits and infrastructure sometimes

Table 7.5 First-time ministers without political experience in different portfolios, 1991/1992/1993–2009 (%)[a]

Ministries	*CZ*	*EE*	*LT*	*LV*	*PL*	*SK*
Defence	56	13	0	33	30	25
Education, science and culture	56	60	53	40	50	27
Economy, agriculture, industry, trade	36	33	57	38	17	47
Finance	29	38	80	0	69	75
Foreign affairs	33	14	40	20	86	57
Internal affairs	43	58	50	13	39	63
Justice	57	40	29	33	33	43
Health and social affairs	33	29	56	62	39	54
Transport, construction/housing/planning[b]	33	(75)	46	(0)	54	(50)
Total ($N = 342$)	57	43	69	41	86	46

Source: Authors' own calculations

Notes: [a]Excluding prime ministers and ministers without portfolio

[b]Percentages in brackets: very few cases

Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LT)

led to the electoral defeat of the governing coalition and even to the dismissal of politically experienced ministers (e.g., the dismissal of the Czech minister for health Milada Emmerová in 2005 or the resignation of Estonian social affairs minister Maret Maripuu in 2009).

Strikingly, some portfolios with high salience were also predominantly occupied by outsider ministers. More specifically, in Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland, ministries of finance and economy were usually led by political outsiders. In Slovakia and Poland, political outsiders usually led ministries of foreign affairs, while in Estonia and Slovakia, outsiders usually led ministries of the interior.

One of the reasons for recruiting expert ministers to cabinets is the expectation of the selectorates that a candidate's professional background and expertise will increase ministerial performance. A cross-country comparison revealed that portfolios of justice (28%), education and culture (30%) were predominantly assigned to expert ministers. In addition, the portfolio of finance in Estonia and Lithuania was usually occupied by experts. To a large extent, the appointment of experts is highly plausible—ministers of education were usually drawn from the educational sphere, the ministry of justice was usually led by former lawyers and judges, and the ministry of defence was often led by former military officers. Moreover, personal success in business (either as a manager or an owner of a large enterprise) was valued by the selectorates as an excellent prerequisite for leading the ministries of finance, economy, agriculture and trade. The performance-based portfolio allocation indicated the pragmatic aspect of cabinet assignments in new democracies. However, the overall number of experts was quite small. As a result, their recruitment tended to be subject to the preferences of the prime minister as well as the political situation surrounding the formation of the cabinet.

Careers of Political Outsiders

After examining the recruitment of outsider ministers and the allocation of portfolios, the next important aspect is their careers. Do political outsiders experience higher chances of deselection? In advanced democracies, ministerial tenure is often used as a proxy for the performance of a minister in his or her office, that is, the better a minister fulfils duties related to the political office, the longer the cabinet tenure (Berlinski et al. 2010). In this chapter, I distinguish between the institutional and political factors that may influence the appointment and tenure of outsider cabinet members. With respect to the political factors that influence the appointment of

political outsiders, the career duration of outsider ministers is expected to vary between cabinets formed by a coalition and those formed by a single-party government. Specifically, outsiders will have a greater chance of being recruited into cabinets formed by a single party because such governments have a smaller pool of potential candidates for cabinet positions (ministrables). Moreover, the power of the PM in single-party governments is also higher than it is in coalitions. Indeed, in governments formed by a single party majority, outsider ministers outnumbered their politically experienced colleagues, although the number of such cabinets is extremely low. Moreover, outsiders were particularly often recruited into the few caretaker cabinets in CEE countries. Considering the temporary nature of such cabinets, political parties and selectorates did not stress the importance of political experience for such an appointment. However, with respect to appointing outsiders, there were no substantial differences between majority and minority coalition cabinets (Table 7.6). The recruitment of this group was also independent of the number of coalition partners participating in the government. In all CEE countries analysed, the cabinets formed by left-wing parties included more political outsiders than the cabinets formed by right-wing parties, although this relationship was statistically insignificant.

Table 7.6 First-time ministers WITHOUT political background appointed in different types of cabinets, 1991/1992/1993–2009 (%)

Cabinet type	*Political orientation*	*CZ*	*EE*	*LT*	*LV*	*PL*	*SK*	*All*
Grand coalition ($N = 3$)	Centre	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	30	30
	Non-partisan	100	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	100
Majority coalition ($N = 41$)	Left	40	n.a.	26	n.a.	45	55	43
	Right	21	32	43	36	38	28	40
	Centre	n.a.	40	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	40
Minority coalition ($N = 13$)	Left	n.a.	n.a.	22[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	22[a]
	Right	39	44[a]	n.a.	17	n.a.	74	42
	Centre	n.a.	67[a]	69	31	n.a.	n.a.	47
Single party majority ($N = 3$)	Left	n.a.	n.a.	73	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	73
	Right	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Centre	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Single party minority ($N = 3$)	Left	30	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	30
	Right	36	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	36
	Centre	n.a.	72[a]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	72[a]

Source: Authors' own calculations

Notes: *n.a.* Not applicable

[a] $N < 10$

Czech Republic (CZ), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK), Estonia (EE), Latvia (LA) and Lithuania (LT)



Fig. 7.1 Hazard rates of outsider ministers (=yes) compared to politically experienced politicians (=no) in CEE cabinets. Source: Authors' own calculations Note: The tenure of a ministerial career in each country was normalized in order to eliminate the effects of various cabinet durations

Compared to politically experienced ministers, outsiders had shorter tenures: Only about one-third served in more than one cabinet. Moreover, survival analysis (Fig. 7.1) reveals that the hazard rates for political insiders were approximately 30% lower than for outsider ministers ($p < 0.001$). This finding is interesting considering the moderate level of party and parliamentary experienced ministers in all six countries selected. The disadvantageous effect of the outsider status on cabinet tenures differed, however, among countries (Figs. 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7). The hazard rates for political outsiders were substantially higher in the Visegrád countries (i.e., in the Czech, Slovakian and Polish cabinets) as well as in Estonia. In Lithuania, in contrast, the chances of outsiders surviving in the cabinet were comparable to those of their politically experienced colleagues.

Among the factors that can influence the cabinet tenure in CEE countries, I also controlled for gender, various portfolios (with high and low salience) and type of the government (e.g., majority coalition), none of



Fig. 7.2 Hazard rates of outsider ministers (=yes) compared to politically experienced politicians (=no) in the Estonian cabinets. Source: Authors' own calculations. Note: The tenure of a ministerial career in each country was normalized in order to eliminate the effects of various cabinet durations

which had any predictive power for the variation between the hazard rates of outsiders and politically experienced ministers. However, a time-dependent factor was identified. In the early 1990s, the hazard rates for outsider ministers did not substantially differ from those of the political insiders. By the mid-1990s, the tenures of political outsiders had become substantially shorter. This divergence between the tenures of political insiders and outsiders then began to increase and reached its maximum in the late 2000s. By that period, the hazard rates of outsiders were approximately 2.65 times higher than those of politically experienced colleagues ($p < 0.001$).

Taking into account the factor of expertise in cabinet appointments, the survival models for expert ministers were also calculated. Interestingly, the hazard rates for experts were slightly, but insignificantly, higher than the ratios of the ministers whose portfolios did not match their expertise. None of the control variables such as gender, type of coalition and type of



Fig. 7.3 Hazard rates of outsider ministers (=yes) compared to politically experienced politicians (=no) in the Lithuanian cabinets. Source: Authors' own calculations. Note: The tenure of a ministerial career in each country was normalized in order to eliminate the effects of various cabinet durations

portfolio substantially influenced the hazard rates of experts. The country-specific and time-dependent effects on the hazard rates of experts were also marginal.

Outsiders did have shorter tenures; however, the reasons for ending their cabinet career require additional analysis. Although it is usually difficult to identify the reasons for dismissal or resignation of a minister (Berlinski et al. 2012), I identified that most cabinet careers in new democracies were terminated because of institutional (i.e., the regular election) and political factors (i.e., the change of governing coalition). In these respects, outsiders did not differ from politically experienced ministers. The reasons for termination specific to outsiders included early elections, dismissal by the PM and voluntary resignation. The dismissal and resignation of outsiders because of conflicts with the president, the PM or parliamentary parties were less frequent than may be expected. Outsiders often voluntary left the cabinet in order to assume a new position, for example, in business.



Fig. 7.4 Hazard rates of outsider ministers (=yes) compared to politically experienced politicians (=no) in the Czech cabinets. Source: Authors' own calculations. Note: The tenure of a ministerial career in each country was normalized in order to eliminate the effects of various cabinet durations

Finally, applying the political socialization theory (Rose 1971), I expect that outsiders would remain in politics following their cabinet career, thereby becoming political insiders. This idea is based on the meritocratic concept of elites, according to which good performance in cabinet may lead to acceptance by the political insiders and open the doors to party and parliamentary politics. In order to prove these hypotheses, the parliamentary experience that political outsiders gained following cabinet service was analysed. However, this hypothesis was proven to be incorrect: While approximately 77% of political insiders returned to the national parliament, only 22% of outsider ministers joined the national parliament after the end of their cabinet service. In the CEE countries with a upper chamber of the national parliament, almost 12% of political insiders joined the upper chamber after their cabinet career, whereas only 1.7% outsider ministers enjoyed the same opportunity.



Fig. 7.5 Hazard rates of outsider ministers (=yes) compared to politically experienced politicians (=no) in the Polish cabinets. Source: Authors' own calculations. Note: The tenure of a ministerial career in each country was normalized in order to eliminate the effects of various cabinet durations

Conclusion: Outsider Ministers in Central European and Baltic Cabinets—Easy Come, Easy Go

In order to explain why political outsiders have been (increasingly) appointed to CEE cabinets, I use the supply-demand model, which provides a suitable framework for the analysis of interests from both sides of the recruitment process (the selectorates and the candidates).

The demand side of the recruitment process highlights the incentives for the selectorates to appoint politically inexperienced ministers. The high number of outsider ministers can be seen as an indicator of the growing power of the PM (presidentialization), who intentionally increases the circle of ministrables by including candidates from outside the political sphere. These outsider candidates are often recruited because of their expertise in specific areas. Other reasons for recruiting political outsiders may include their personal ties to the PM (this will result in the appointment of associates



Fig. 7.6 Hazard rates of outsider ministers (=yes) compared to politically experienced politicians (=no) in the Slovakian cabinets. Source: Authors' own calculations. Note: The tenure of a ministerial career in each country was normalized in order to eliminate the effects of various cabinet durations

and supporters); however, in order to prove this thesis, we would need to conduct a network analysis of the power circles in each country.

According to the party government approach, the pronounced number of outsider ministers recruited to the CEE cabinets reveals that political parties in the new democracies have failed to establish substantial control over political appointments, including those to the cabinet. With unstable electoral supports, ideological orientations and organizational structures, parties have not managed to become the dominant career gatekeeper for political offices.

On the supply side of the recruitment process, the possible incentives for outsider ministers to enter the cabinet should be examined. One of the incentives is performance-oriented—outsider ministers want to use their expertise to influence certain policy areas. In the CEE countries, a small but stable proportion of ministers are assigned portfolios according to their expertise, which supports this hypothesis.



Fig. 7.7 Hazard rates of outsider ministers (=yes) compared to politically experienced politicians (=no) in the Latvian cabinets. Source: Authors' own calculations. Note: The tenure of a ministerial career in each country was normalized in order to eliminate the effects of various cabinet durations

Another motivation for outsider ministers to assume a cabinet position may be related to their subsequent careers, particularly in the political sphere. This incentive is not mutually exclusive with the performance motivation. If this career-oriented expectation was indeed held by the politically inexperienced candidate, it has not yet been fulfilled. Outsider ministers have often been unable to accumulate political capital during their cabinet career because they have been mostly assigned portfolios with low salience. The restricted mobility across portfolios does not allow outsiders to gain additional expertise. It also substantially limits the opportunities for retention of outsider ministers who were (for whatever reason) unsuccessful in their portfolios. The expertise and non-partisan status of outsider ministers have usually not protected them from a higher risk of deselection. Following their short cabinet service (usually one cabinet term), few outsider ministers have managed to assume a new political position in the national parliament. This pattern suggests that outsider

ministers are usually recruited to fulfil specific tasks and are often dismissed once the goals are achieved or the problems are no longer politically relevant.

Based on these results, I argue that the pronounced representation of outsider ministers in Central European and Baltic cabinets is primarily generated by the demand side (the PMs and parties) rather than by the supply side (outsider candidates). Few outsider ministers have managed to survive in cabinets, and even fewer have joined the political class after their cabinet service. The advantages for the PM are more influential in recruiting a political outsider: The PM appoints a professional minister who is entirely dependent on the PM's support. The PM can dismiss such an outsider as a form of performance-oriented punishment. This can also be done to provide an additional asset for coalition negotiations because dismissing an outsider seldom causes the coalition to break down. However, a position that used to be occupied by an outsider may be a crucial factor for drawing a new partner to the coalition and thereby increasing the PM's chances of survival.

The question about the generalizability of our results arises. In order to prove the negative effect of the candidate's outsider status on his or her cabinet tenure, a survival model with shared frailty (i.e., random effects by country) using pooled data from 13 Central and Eastern European countries was calculated (the 6 selected countries plus Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Croatia). The time frame of the analysis was from 1990 until 2012. The results reveal that the effect of outsider status on the survival of ministers is strongly negative: The risk of them being terminated is approximately 40% higher than for their politically experienced colleagues ($p < 0.001$). Empirically, the number of outsider ministers has been substantially higher in presidential-parliamentary countries (particularly in Russia and Ukraine) than in parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential ones. Excluding presidential-parliamentary countries (Russia and Ukraine) from the sample, the risk of outsider ministers being terminated is approximately 60% higher than for their politically experienced colleagues ($p < 0.001$). On average, however, outsider ministers in presidential-parliamentary countries remain in cabinets longer than their colleagues in parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential countries where PMs have appointed large numbers of such ministers and dismissed them rapidly. This shows both the power of presidents and the fact they are constrained by party considerations when forming cabinets.

Further research should focus on explaining system and path dependent factors, which may contribute to a better understanding of the cross-country differences in the number of politically inexperienced ministers, including those of other countries (particularly the 2007 wave of EU enlargement). The public perception of outsider ministers should also be examined with respect to the assessment of their performance and their roles in the cabinet. Finally, the analysis of post-cabinet careers should add a valuable aspect to the socialization thesis, especially whether the outsider ministers who joined the parliament systematically differ from those who were unsuccessful or unwilling to remain in the political sphere.

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CHAPTER 8

Variations in the Expert Ministerial Framework in Hungary and Romania: Personal and Institutional Explanations

Gabriella Ilonszki and Laurentiu Stefan

Introduction

One major question of our chapter is whether the theories explaining the emergence and function of expert ministers—which are most often based on the experiences of established democracies—can be applied in the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, more specifically in Hungary and Romania. Can we find expert ministers in these cases and if so do they appear in the same context, have the same features and perform the same functions as in the west? Interest in the presence and performance of expert ministers at the cabinet level is not new (Andeweg and Bakema 1994; Bakema and Secker 1988; Blondel 1985), but due to the economic

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crisis and the legitimacy deficit of the ruling parties in several countries, the analysis of ministerial expertise has recently emerged with even more vigour. Acknowledging the difficulty in identifying ministerial expertise, throughout the text we shall use 'expert minister' and non-political minister or minister without party background interchangeably: *per definitionem* expert ministers are not party members.

Theoretical justifications concerning expert ministers in established democracies mainly revolve around the parties' changing profile: Due to the increasing difficulty of being simultaneously representative and responsible (Bardi et al. 2014), a party's weakened position might, paradoxically, be strengthened by 'party independent' accountability patterns, for example, when government posts are occupied not by the parties but by experts. This problem area has become even more explicit due to the financial and economic crises of the past decade. Experts are under less pressure than regular party politicians as they are not politically accountable and thus the parties would not be blamed by the public for the austerity measures (Åslund 2012).

Distrust towards parties can clearly be observed in the new democracies but has a different dynamic to that seen in the west. We can rightly assume that after the collapse of communism, in the context of new parties' formation, public attitudes towards the parties have either been more uncertain and volatile from the start—as in the case of Romania—or became more rigid, like in Hungary, than in the west. In Romania fragmentation and volatility were the main characteristics of a slowly emerging new party system, while in Hungary a quick process of party formation was rooted in the strong adherence of voters to party leaders (Tóka 2006, p. 47). The left-right divide in Hungary has become explicit from early on while in Romania the parties' ideological identities have been more blurred.

The partyness of governments—when parties are primarily in charge of cabinet nominations (Andeweg 2000)—is largely acknowledged despite variations in the extent of the partyness (Cotta 2000, p. 73). While parties can entrust and nominate non-party experts to government posts under certain conditions, nominating party members remains the natural way to provide a party face to the government, including to its policy context (Müller 1994, p. 23). To achieve this, however, parties have to be well-established organizations. Thus, our first hypothesis is that to understand the presence and function of expert ministers in new democracies, party institutionalization has to be explored. We assume that the formation and stabilization of parties and the consolidation of the party system will have

an impact on the presence of expert ministers: The more established the parties are the more partisan the governments will become. Overall we argue that despite the contextual differences between old and new democracies the (changing) role of parties has a powerful explanatory force in understanding the (changing) presence of expert ministers in Hungary and Romania.

Faster party institutionalization and visible bipolarization (the case of Hungary) are less conducive to an environment where experts are welcome. In contrast, weak parties, a fragmented and volatile party system and blurred political frontlines (the case of Romania) should provide more opportunities for experts to get high-ranking cabinet posts. It remains to be seen whether our assumptions are matched by our findings. It is an additional point whether the recent crisis had an impact on this assumed developmental chain—although we must acknowledge that we see the past 25 years of these countries as an almost constant crisis environment where the legacies of the past and the enormous new problems have generated particularly difficult tasks to solve.

Our second assumption concerns the personal context—the role of those who have been the most influential in nominating the cabinet ministers: The chiefs of the executives, that is, the prime ministers in both countries, as well as the president in Romania. Can we identify particular 'nomination policies' on their side which favour expert ministers? Presidentialization of politics is visible in both countries, but its large impact originates in the constitutional setting in the first place (Fettelschoss and Nikolényi 2009, p. 204). In Romania a semi-presidential system was put in place after the regime change and a strong president—with prerogatives similar to the French case—was created. The frequent conflicts between president and prime minister in Romania have been highlighted (Protsyk 2005) and the power of the Romanian head of state has been diagnosed as particularly strong in ECE (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001). In Hungary, the original settlement created at the time of the democratic transition put in place a strong prime minister whose power seemed exceptional in comparison to other new democracies (Goetz and Margetts 1999). The prime minister enjoys full constitutional authority in the nomination and dismissal of ministers, the prime minister enjoys the advantages of administrative modernisation and separation between politics and administration that had begun in the late communist period (Müller 2008). The prime minister was strengthened by the mechanism of the constructive vote of no confidence which contributes to government stability. In

view of how the prime ministers have tended to use their rights, the notion of leader democracy was proposed for Hungary (Körösényi 2005) and also recent studies have highlighted the strong prime ministerial position (Lengyel and Ilonszki 2012). On these grounds, we hypothesize that the Romanian president and the Hungarian prime minister should have a great influence on the selection of ministers. The main question remains how the constitutional opportunities available for those at the top match the evolving party framework, is the political influence of the leaders a counter balance to the power of political parties? We hypothesize that whenever it is possible, that is, whenever political and power constellations allow, presidents and prime ministers will choose ministerial expertise because this will enable them to gain a more independent role.

In addition to party institutionalization patterns and personal nomination strategies, it remains an interesting question as to whether the pre-democratic tradition has an impact on the ministerial condition in these two countries. While Blondel (1985) generally claims that non-democratic regimes have the tendency to have more expert ministers because they do not have to consider representative demands, the difference between the two cases in this respect is obvious. Hungary went through several reform processes from the 1960s onwards—with several setback and restarts. Still, by and large, the soft post-totalitarian Kádár regime (Linz and Stepan 1996) was tolerant of, and occasionally even demanding of, expertise, and some 'reform economists', as they were called at that time, got positions in the non-democratic government. Provided the basic political rationale of the regime (the political monopoly of the Communist Party) was not challenged, experts were able to find their place in the highest echelons of the regime. In contrast, the communist period in Romania under Ceaușescu was over-politicized and dictatorial in nature and expert knowledge was pushed into the background. On this basis, it is justified to say that a pool of experts was more readily available in Hungary at the beginning of the transition than in Romania, but it needs further exploration as to whether it had an impact on ministerial nominations in the democratic period. In close connection with the nature of the communist period, systemic change was also different in the two countries: The hard-line communist regime in Romania ended with an internal coup-cum-revolution, while in Hungary a negotiated transition paved the way for continuity with the former regime—again with potentially beneficial, although controversial, implications for the presence of old-new experts in the post-1990 years.

In sum, we aim at identifying the most important sources of variation between the two selected countries concerning the presence and features

of expert ministers. The comparison of the two countries seems rewarding because within the group of post-communist democracies, they represent highly dissimilar cases—in terms of their legacies, constitutional setting and patterns of party institutionalization. The power and the impact of these explanatory variables might enrich our knowledge not only about ministerial expertise, but also about institutional development in general in the two countries. Since the emergence of expert ministers in East and Central Europe may be rooted in a different context than in the more established democracies, the expert ministers themselves are expected to have somewhat different features than their counterparts in the west. Thus, the chapter will also explore to what extent the category of expert minister has a different flavour in the new democracies than in the older ones and whether this serves the democratic potential of the given countries.

The Political Context Behind Expert Ministers in Hungarian and Romanian Cabinets: A Broad Overview

There have been 10 governments in Hungary and 14 governments in Romania between the first free elections (March 1990 in Hungary, May 1990 in Romania) and Spring 2014 (March for Romania, April for Hungary). In Hungary, the governments had altogether 200 ministerial positions that were occupied by 147 persons, while Romania had a larger pool: 313 ministerial positions filled by 280 persons. Romanian ministerial careers are not only more numerous but also more varied. Given a much more complex structure of opportunities, which includes various local offices and a bicameral Parliament, the career routes available to Romanian ministers are more diverse. The Hungarian scene is comparatively more horizontal: Local offices do not offer particular career routes for cabinet members and the Parliament is unicameral.

There have been 222 instances of ministerial recruitments (including reshuffles taking place inside the same cabinet after forced or voluntary resignations) in Hungary and an almost double that number (428) in Romania during the period under investigation. However, the numbers of instances where experts have been selected varies greatly in the two countries: 91 in Hungary and 58 in Romania (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). This implies that Hungary has provided a much more conducive environment

Table 8.1 Hungarian governments, and the number and share of ministers without political background, 1990–2014

Government (prime minister and his party; begin date)	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
				N	*%*
Antall (MDF)[c] 23.05.1990	Conservative	From oversized majority to minimal winning coalition (MWC)	30	14	46.7
Boross (MDF) 21.12.1993	Conservative	MWC	18	7	38.9
Horn (MSZP) 15.07.1994	Socialist	Supermajority coalition	26	6	23.1
Orbán I[c] (Fidesz) 06.07.1998	Conservative	From oversized majority to minority coalition	29	12	41.4
Medgyessy (MSZP) 27.05.2002	Socialist	MWC	25	10	40.0
Gyurcsány I (MSZP) 29.09.2004	Socialist	MWC	26	10	38.5
Gyurcsány II (MSZP) 09.06.2006	Socialist	MWC	19	11	57.9
Gyurcsány III (MSZP) 01.05.2008	Socialist	Minority one party	18	7	38.9
Bajnai (MSZP) 14.04.2009	Socialist	Minority one-party caretaker	18	9	50.0
Orbán II (Fidesz) 29.05.2010	Conservative	Super majority coalition	13	5	38.5
Total			222	91	41%

[a]Includes the prime minister

[b]Ministers without parliamentary experience or a local/regional political background, as well as a previous record of leading positions in political parties at any time before their appointment

[c]Although one party officially left the coalition government, we decided not to break the government into two periods because the ministers of the leaving party remained in the government

Table 8.2 Romanian governments and the number and share of ministers without political background, 1990–2014

Government (prime minister and his party, begin date)	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*	*Ministers without political background*	
				N	*%*
Roman (FSN) 28.06.1990	Left (social-democrats)	Supermajority (single party)	30	11	36.7
Stolojan (ind.) 17.10.1991	Left (social-democrats)	Supermajority (coalition)	21	4	19.0
Vacaroiu (ind.) 20.11.1992	Left (social-democrats)	Minority one party to minority coalition and back to minority one party	43	12	27.9
Ciorbea (PNTCD) 12.12.1996	Right (Christian-democrats)	Minimal winning coalition (MWC)	41	9	22.0
Vasile (PNTCD) 17.04.1998	Right (Christian-democrats)	MWC	28	6	21.4
Isarescu (ind.) 22.12.1999	Right (Christian-democrats)	MWC	22	6	27.3
Nastase (PSD) 28.12.2000	Left (social-democrats)	Minority coalition of two parties to minority one party	49	10	20.4
Tariceanu I (PNL) 29.12.2004	Right (liberals and democrats)	MWC	38	7	18.4
Tariceanu II (PNL) 05.04.2007	Right (liberals)	Minority coalition of two parties	25	2	8.0
Boc I (PDL) 22.12.2008	Grand coalition (democrats and social-democrats)	Supermajority	23	1	4.3
Boc II (PDL) 23.12.2009	Right (democrats)	MWC	29	6	20.7

(*continued*)

Table 8.2 (continued)

Government (prime minister and his party, begin date)	*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*	*Ministers without political background*	
				N	*%*
Ungureanu (ind.) 09.02.2012	Right (democrats)	MWC	19	2	10.5
Ponta I (PSD) 07.05.2012	Centre-left (social-democrats and liberals)	MWC	28	3	10.7
Ponta II (PSD) 21.12.2012	Centre-left (social-democrats and liberals)	Supermajority	32	1	3.1
Total			428	80	18.7

for expert ministers (41% of all ministerial appointments have brought experts into the cabinet). In Romania, on the other hand, in aggregate terms, party credentials and previous political experience seem to prevail in the selection of ministers (only 19% of all ministerial appointments are experts).

The comparison between the two cases is particularly telling in terms of government stability, left-right dynamics and type of government. Government stability was higher in the Hungarian case: Until 2004 each government was formed after regular parliamentary elections—with the exception of the 1993 government change, which was due to the death of the first democratically elected Prime Minister, József Antall. Governments were built on majorities—even oversized or occasionally supermajorities (this term is used when the governing forces have more than a two-third majority, enabling them to introduce constitutional changes or legislative changes of a constitutional nature). The 2004, 2008 and 2009 governments were due to intra-government crises which in the latter two cases have brought about minority governments. The left-right divide is also easily observable in the Hungarian case.

In Hungary, the first (Conservative) governments (Antall and Boross) included former anti-communist opposition parties; thus ministers in these cabinets did not have any former political, party or parliamentary

background, and therefore they were genuine experts according to our categorization. This is of course the case regarding the prime ministers of these first governments. Nevertheless, this statement immediately warns us about the limitations of our categories, particularly in the first years after systemic change. Indeed, J. Antall the first Prime Minister was a historian by profession and presided as the head of a museum as a career, still it is widely known that throughout his life he prepared to become a politician, if this intention did make any rational sense during the decades of communism. Still, being born in a 'political family' (his father was member of parliament, state secretary and minister in the colours of the Independent Smallholder Party in the post-1945 period before the communist takeover), J. Antall cherished that dream. One could rightly say that he was a politician per se even if according to our categories he is indeed an expert—not having any former party position or other political position.

The next, socialist-liberal (Horn, 1994–1998) supermajority coalition government had the lowest share of expert ministers (23%). The low share of expert ministers in this first left-wing government demonstrates that the socialists did what has been generally expected from parties under the conditions of party government: They nominated party members to the cabinet. A relatively well-organized party, as the socialists were the successor party of the previous regime, followed this regular pattern. Still a leadership crisis in the socialists escalated to the point, by 2004, that the head of the socialist government was not a party member. Although Prime Minister Medgyessy had been a member of the Communist Party central committee before the regime change, he was also an acknowledged expert. He had worked in the ministry of finance and for several years in the 1980s was the minister of finance. After systemic change, he served as minister of finance in the Horn government and occupied top positions in the private banking and economic sector. As his early resignation as Prime Minister demonstrates, he could not maintain his government leadership position against partisan challengers—both from the socialist and the junior coalition party liberals' benches. His career also reminds us about the delicate connection between expertise and political engagement in communist Hungary.

Gyurcsány II and Bajnai are the two governments with the highest proportion of experts: The former represents a conscious attempt to 'departicize' the government in face of the necessary reforms that the Socialist Prime Minister wanted to pursue, which proved to be a partial cause of his

early failure—together with the lingering global financial crisis and the increasing political conflicts between the two hostile political blocks, the socialists and the Conservative Fidesz. The Bajnai government assumed its mandate in 2009 under crisis conditions and is regarded as the only expert government although it was supported by the socialists and even by the former coalition partner, the liberals. Despite this party support, academic literature places this case in the 'full technocratic government' type together with only a handful of European governments, including the Dini and Monti governments—and in Romania the Vacaroiu government (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Pastorella 2016). McDonnell et al. do not directly target expert ministers; their focus is expert government and its potential types—with the obvious starting point that the 'status' of the head of government is a strong indication about whether the government can be regarded as an expert government—and, if so, of what type. Half of Bajnai's ministers were indeed experts but the government's fundamental party support makes it a 'borderline' case. In the observation period, two conservative governments with the same Prime Minister (V. Orbán, 1998–2002 and 2010–2014, respectively) do not show a particular pattern, they had the average (high) proportion of expert ministers. Overall, the main finding about the Hungarian case is that with regard to the share of experts we cannot see any substantial change over time or according to the left-right dynamics. The picture is very different in the Romanian case.

In Romania, as Table 8.2 clearly indicates, the 'golden age' of experts and non-partisan ministers was immediately after the collapse of communism until 1996. It is not a coincidence that this period overlaps entirely with the first two presidential terms of Ion Iliescu (a former Communist Party high-ranking *apparatchik* turned social-democrat). In fact, a third (33.8%) of all the appointments of experts in Romanian cabinets between 1990 and 2014 took place in this period.

In the early to mid-1990s, personalities coming from civil society or from the public administration and with weak connections to the emerging parties made inroads at the top of the Romanian political system. Ion Iliescu, the Romanian chief of state until 1996, although a personality with strong party and political credentials both before and after December 1989, was a promoter of 'technocratic cabinets', and of consensual politics, where major (and opposing) political blocks would support policy solutions identified by bureaucrats or scientific experts. He believed that party structures and the administration of the country should only minimally overlap. Iliescu self-proclaimed himself the leader of the Council of the National Salvation Front (CFSN), the revolutionary body that assumed

power after the down fall of the communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. With no (elected) parliament, CFSN assumed full authority of selecting and deselecting ministers between December 1989 and the first free elections of May 1990. This very first democratic cabinet, unsurprisingly, was overwhelmingly made up of experts, most of them former deputy ministers having served in the last communist cabinets with no or little background in the communist party. The first post-communist Prime Minister, Petre Roman, was a university professor and had no career in the communist party structures, but was personally known to Ion Iliescu, via Petre Roman's father, a former communist party leader who lost his arm in the Spanish Civil War. After being appointed Prime Minister in December 1989, Roman quickly assumed a full political role, becoming the president of the dominant political structure (the National Salvation Front—FSN) and later a real challenger to President Iliescu. His second cabinet (the first to be analysed in this chapter) that resulted from the first free elections of May 1990 continued to be dominated by experts and non-partisan ministers. Theodor Stolojan, who was called to run the Ministry of Finance, for example, used to work in the ministry since 1972, and rose through the ranks up to becoming Director and General Inspector in December 1989 and deputy minister of finance immediately after the revolution. In September 1991, miners' strikes and widespread social unrest forced Roman to resign from his prime ministerial position. This provided then President Iliescu another opportunity to turn the cabinet over to an 'expert' (he picked former Finance Minister, Theodor Stolojan, as the new prime minister) and to invite opposition parties into the cabinet (in an attempt to form a 'national unity' government). These parties brought their leaders into the cabinet, but the FSN continued to select ministers from its pool of experts, including Ludovic Spiess, a famous Romanian tenor, who became Minister of Culture.

The break between Iliescu and Roman became effective in the spring of 1992 and the FSN split several months before the presidential and legislative elections of 1992. Iliescu was re-elected for a second term. His new party (the FDSN, the precursor of the current PSD) won the elections and was called to lead the negotiations to form a cabinet. Iliescu pushed again for a 'national unity' cabinet, and was even open to a grand coalition, but negotiations with the block of opposition parties failed and the FDSN had to form a minority cabinet. Iliescu was however much more successful in imposing an 'outsider' as Prime Minister (Nicolae Vacaroiu, who worked before 1989 in the State Planning Committee and promoted to deputy

minister of economy after the revolution). More than a quarter of his cabinet was made up of 'outsiders'. The Vacaroiu cabinet (1992–1996) best embodied President Iliescu's vision of a consensual, non-political, 'national unity' politics where party and cabinet dynamics should not interfere with each other. Both the Prime Ministers Nicolae Vacaroiu and his predecessor Theodor Stolojan had no party affiliation before taking office.

Emil Constantinescu, a university professor of geology and rector of the Bucharest University, won the presidential elections of 1996. He was only loosely attached to the Christian-Democrat National Peasant's Party, the main governing party between 1996 and 2000, and therefore not compelled to favour party colleagues when he selected the prime ministers or when he endorsed candidates for various ministerial portfolios. Although he was generally perceived as a non-partisan politician, cabinets formed during his term were marked by a stronger influence of political parties on the process of selecting ministers and therefore by a stronger presence in the cabinet of party politicians. The percentage of expert and non-partisan ministers has collapsed in December 1996 from 28% in the Vacaroiu cabinet to 22% in the Ciorbea cabinet. It went up again to 27% in the cabinet of Mugur Isarescu. In that period, the pressure to appoint people with no party affiliation remained high, also as a consequence of the extremely limited pool of party people with the required profile and experience for a ministerial portfolio.

Ion Iliescu was back in the presidential palace in 2000, but this time his party (PSD, social-democrats) was run with an iron fist by Adrian Nastase who became, after the legislative elections of 2000, the chief of the government. The composition of the cabinet is largely a compromise between the two PSD leaders. While Iliescu insisted on former party colleagues, Nastase brought some people from outside the party to fill important positions such as finance or foreign affairs. They joined eventually the PSD and some even became its leaders. Mircea Geoana, who became PSD chairman in 2005 and party's presidential candidate in 2009, was Romania's Ambassador to Washington when he was appointed minister of foreign affairs in the cabinet led by Adrian Nastase.

The place of experts diminished again during the two right-wing cabinets led by Calin Popescu-Tariceanu (2004–2008). The new President of Romania, Traian Basescu, may be seen as the one forcing Prime Minister Tariceanu to accept some experts. One of the most visible and sensitive portfolios in that period was the portfolio of justice. Monica Macovei was a staunch non-governmental activist for human rights and the rule of law

when President Basescu asked her to take up this difficult portfolio. She held this portfolio until the major reshuffle of April 2007 that led to a new Tariceanu cabinet. At the height of the tensions between then President Traian Basescu and PM Tariceanu (2007–2008), with one exception, all the ministers that had to be revoked had been replaced with experts with no party affiliation. Three ministers belonging to the governing party (PNL) had to resign amidst controversies. President Basescu refused to accept other PNL politicians and suggested to the PM that the only acceptable solution, in all the three cases, would be a person from outside the political system but with undisputed professional credentials. Lazar Comanescu was Romania's Ambassador to the EU when he was called to take up the foreign affairs portfolio. Catalin Predoiu was a successful lawyer before becoming justice minister, while Dacian Ciolos served in the Delegation of the European Commission in Bucharest and then as a public servant in the ministry of agriculture before getting to its helm.

Since the grand-coalition cabinet led by Emil Boc (2008–2009), the number of expert ministers remained relatively low with the exception of Boc 2 cabinet (2009–2012). In this cabinet, for example, the Minister of Agriculture Mihail Dumitru came also from the structures of the European Commission; the Minister of Foreign Affairs was previously Ambassador in Paris, while at some point the Minister of Labour came straight from the Presidential Palace after serving as presidential advisor.

Taking the Broader View: Two Distinct Explanations About the Presence of Expert Ministers

Party Development

An important explanatory thread of the ministerial condition is the configuration of the party system and the degree to which it structures ministerial selection. There are obvious differences between the two countries in this respect.

In Romania the general hostility of the public towards political parties (as a reaction to the overbearing communist party) played a role in shaping the opportunity structures in the early nineties and in paving the way for more experts with no political background: 'Movements', 'forums' or 'fronts' took the stage in the early 1990s and collected most of the votes in the first free elections. The local political culture was not yet favourable to an enhanced role for political parties.

The pervasiveness of an anti-party political culture translated into two different processes visible when we analyse governing and opposition parties in the 'golden age' of experts in the cabinet (1990–1996). When it comes to the governing parties (the left-wing FSN, then PDSR), one may note the extent to which—even when parties have been given full entitlement to power by the voters—top party leaders were favourable to 'technocratic' solutions and to bringing in non-affiliated 'experts' to positions of responsibility in the cabinet. On the other hand, the opposition parties were, to a significant extent, in the shadow of influential non-governmental, 'civic' associations and organizations. The broad coalition of parties and civic associations (the Romanian Democratic Convention) which eventually came to power in 1996 was permeated by this political culture that gave prevalence to expertise and civic activism at the expense of party credentials.

In Hungary, by contrast, the grip of the parties on the public has been so strong since the transition to democracy that new civic initiatives could not develop. In the first years of the democratic period, anti-party sentiments were not explicit—after all, the (new) parties had brought about the change of system. While scepticism towards parties has increased over the years, at the same time a relatively strong partisanship has developed. This is a paradoxical phenomenon: Due to bipolarisation and the leadership effect, citizens remained devoted followers of their party-camp, volatility figures were low, so people were not anti-party—but 'anti the other party camp'. Thus, in the Hungarian case, the inclusion of experts in cabinets does not reflect a societal demand or mood. The political scene between 1990 and 2010 was virtually dominated by the same parties, but the conservative Fidesz was the only party involved in the regime change that went through full institutionalization and became organizationally strong. In this process Fidesz has developed into a highly centralized and leader-dominated party. The party system was marked by a clear left-right alignment and was defined by bipolarity from the very beginning of the regime change. By 2010 however the socialists lost much of their original organizational and political vigour and the emerging extreme right of Jobbik contributed to create a new, tri-polar party framework. This overview of the party setting would suggest the existence of favourable conditions for more partisan governments: Strong partisanship, well-outlined blocks and no overlap between governments should have encouraged this tendency. Despite these expectations, however, we have seen, thus far, a constant and high proportion of experts in the Hungarian governments.

The evolution of Romanian parties is different in several respects. In the aftermath of the Romanian revolution, political parties were in their infancy and—roughly speaking—not 'fashionable' with the public. At this particular historical moment, politicians or would be politicians had no clear party career behind them, other than in the communist party or in the so-called historical parties (parties established long before the communist takeover in the 1940s). This fact, combined with the hostility of the population to both the communist party and the 'historical' parties, left enough space in politics in general and in cabinets in particular for social activists or bureaucrats.

Political parties were barely established when some of them were called to take power. Less than 5 months after the December revolution, the National Salvation Front (FSN) had to fill more than two dozen ministerial slots after their landslide victory in the first free elections of May 1990. Only eight MPs would take up cabinet positions, most of the others were invited from outside the FSN, chosen for their administrative experience or expertise in their fields. There was simply not enough time for the parties to establish their own pool of experts who would also become active inside the party structures. For FSN and its successor parties (the Social Democratic Party, PSD, and the Democratic Party, PD), the eight experts co-opted in cabinet soon became a prime target in the process of recruiting new party members. We may also note that most of the experts recruited by the PSD when in power came from the public administration (in the early 1990s, many high-profile ministers, including two prime ministers, Theodor Stolojan and Nicolae Vacaroiu, had been in top positions in the communist administration).

There are indeed some parties (the social-democrats, the PSD; the liberals, the PNL; the liberal-democrats, the PDL) that were more resilient than most, but even these parties underwent many transformations, in their label, ideology, composition, membership and electoral scores. Volatility remains the key descriptor of the Romanian political system: The dominant right-wing party of the nineties (PNTCD) has failed, since 2000, to get elected to parliament.

Moreover, the two blocks defined by the communist-anti-communist cleavage of the 1990s, dissolved in the early 2000s, and some of the parties that seemed irremediably opposed to each other, such as the PSD and PNL, eventually formed (in 2011) a strong political alliance that won the local and parliamentary elections of 2012, just to collapse before the presidential elections of 2014. After 2004, the mainstream parties became

more and more reluctant to offer portfolios to outsiders. The size of the cabinet gradually shrank, which may provide an explanation of why the number of expert ministers fell.

Overall, our first hypothesis about the impact of party institutionalization is only partially confirmed. The Romanian case provides the prime example: After the troubled first years of democratization when party formation was in its infancy and experts were 'used' to strengthen the legitimacy of the new system, the stabilization of parties resulted in the diminishing number of experts, which only slightly increased during the crisis years. The Hungarian case is more controversial: Despite the seemingly well-cemented parties, expert ministers prevail in large proportions throughout the entire period. Indeed, the only exception in this regard was the first left-wing government after systemic change (Horn, 1994–1998) in which the 'classical' ex-communist party leader and prime minister, Gy. Horn, aimed to follow the classical line of party government. The personal component that will be presented in the next sections (the function of the nominator and the features of the ministers) might help understand the paradox.

The Role of Prime Ministers and Presidents in Nominating Experts

As presented in the introduction, the particularly strong Hungarian prime minister and the strong Romanian president might operate similarly—in the selection and dismissal of ministers, who should be non-partisan (if not apolitical) and expertise-based. To establish a pool of ministerial experts is a delicate issue, however, a relationship often develops over time between the expert and his or her political sponsor. A similar relationship develops between a politician and his or her advisors. This relationship is topical for our research, as in many cases the person who provides (unknown to the greater public) his or her expertise to the frontline politician is pushed in the spotlight when offered a ministerial position. A special category includes presidential advisors who have been recruited for their expertise but who develop political connections under the protection of the leadership and therefore increase the likelihood of a ministerial promotion. Many expert ministers have emerged from among the personal staff, advisers or even friends of these high-level officials. They may be non-partisan, with no parliamentary background or party position, but they are personally dependent. This personal dependence is visible in both

countries but the different time dimension of the two cases demonstrates the dynamism of personal versus party (i.e. more structural and institutional) selection.

Unsurprisingly in the semi-presidential Romanian case, the president plays an important role in the political dynamics in general and in the selection of ministers in particular. First of all, it is the president's constitutional prerogative to pick a candidate for prime minister (after formal consultations with the parliamentary parties) who will then put his or her cabinet and programme of government before the parliament for a vote of confidence. Being popularly elected, the president has the upper hand over the leaders of parliamentary parties and has the authority to impose a solution to his liking. The first Romanian president, Ion Iliescu, was determined in appointing the initially obscure Petre Roman as Prime Minister in the heydays of the Romanian revolution in December 1989 and then again in June 1990, and it was he again who insisted in having two experts, non-affiliated bureaucrats as prime ministers (Theodor Stolojan in 1991 and Nicolae Vacaroiu in 1992). He was equally influential in pushing the successive prime ministers to accept non-partisan experts, public personalities or experts with significant experience in the communist administration. On the other hand, the next president, Emil Constantinescu, was himself the epitome of an expert ready to assume power in a context where parties were seen as weak and unpopular. Constantinescu, the rector of Bucharest University, endorsed by his peers in academia and strongly supported by the Civic Alliance, largely disregarded the parties in selecting a prime minister, this is why two out of the three chiefs of cabinets nominated during his term had practically no connections to the established parties (Mugur Isarescu was a genuine expert, while Victor Ciorbea served in local politics before his prime ministerial tenure). Constantinescu equally used his influence in opening the cabinet to experts.

Iliescu returned to the presidential palace in 2000, but, as mentioned before, the popular tide had in the meantime turned in favour of political parties and the new custom would now be enforced: The leader of the senior governing party would become prime minister (with the exception of Ungureanu, all the other prime ministers of the period 2000–2014 have been also chairs of their parties). This political development, however, impacted also on the process of ministerial selection. A quasi-omnipotent president until 2000 was replaced by a president constantly challenged by his prime minister, even if they come from the same party, more so if they do not. Both fight now over the best (or most loyal)

candidates for various portfolios and, in most cases, the outcome has been a deal which gives the president full power over the nomination of certain ministers. One implication for our topic is that the presidents who have been in office between 2000 and 2014 (Ion Iliescu 2000–2004 and Traian Basescu 2004–2014) have sent experts previously serving as their presidential advisors to serve as ministers. The most difficult scenario was when the president and the prime minister openly and fiercely opposed each other (a situation close to the French 'cohabitation'). This situation has, however, led to a number of 'technocratic' appointments that would have not happened in normal political circumstances. During cabinet reshuffles in 2008, President Basescu opposed the nomination of controversial political appointees, forcing the prime minister to accept a compromise solution: The nomination of experts agreed by both (for justice and foreign affairs).

In Hungary, the continuously high proportion of expert ministers indicates that parties do not take up the governing responsibility wholeheartedly. This increased role of the prime minister in the selection process may be the main factor responsible for the high rate of experts in Hungarian governments. Although prime ministers in Hungary have displayed different leadership styles—and even diverse party positions, as two of them were not even party members (Medgyessy and Bajnai)—still they have applied very similar ministerial selection mechanisms. On the conservative side, authoritative and even charismatic prime ministers-cum-party leaders were in power, more particularly Antall, the head of the first government and Orbán, who began his third prime ministerial period after the 2014 election. Orbán's power position is demonstrated by the fact that he managed to remain the conservative Fidesz party leader after losing three elections (1994, 2002 and 2006) (Ilonszki and Várnagy 2014). Among the Socialist Prime Ministers, Horn was the only one who was able to manoeuvre well within his party and was also able to dominate the coalition (although it was relatively easy because in the supermajority coalition the junior partner, the Liberal party, was not numerically necessary). As a result—as we have seen above—he was able to rely on the party in terms of ministerial selection as well. All the other socialist prime ministers had hidden or open conflicts within their own party and had to balance the governing game with the coalition partner (the liberals) as well. Coalition politics has never been a problem for Fidesz because it managed first to neutralize and then to eliminate its coalition partners.

Although for different reasons, both the conservative and the socialist prime ministers opted for expert ministers in large numbers: This was a self-evident expression of their exclusionary power and also paved the way for a personally determined policy agenda in the leader-oriented Fidesz government, while it was a possible way to create some extra legitimacy for the prime ministerial post in the socialist governments. Moreover, in the socialist-led coalitions, the nomination of experts was often the demand of the junior coalition partner, the liberals, who thought in this way to fight back socialist 'partisan expectations'. Thus, the weakness of the party, as opposed to the leader, in the conservative governments, and the relative weakness of the prime minister, as opposed to his own party and the coalition party, in the left-wing governments, provide the background for the nomination of expert ministers in Hungary. This finding contributes not only to the examination of the cabinets' profile but also to the understanding of party development in general. At this stage it should be mentioned however that the behaviour of junior parties of the different coalitions proved to be diverse. While the liberals (the all-time coalition partners of the socialists) as mentioned above mostly urged the nomination of expert ministers and they themselves often sent experts to the governments, the small coalition partners of Fidesz exclusively 'used' their politicians in the government benches to give face to their relatively weak parties and also to have access to spoils. These parties could do so as they did not have to be concerned about shortage of personnel (Laver and Shepsle 2000) being represented in governments by only one or two persons—politicians as they were.

We can conclude that our expectations about the impact of party institutionalization and personal nomination strategies on the expert composition of governments are fulfilled in a complex way. Presidents in Romania have had to face, and increasingly acknowledge, evolving party interests and prime ministerial ambitions to control ministerial nominations, although their conflicts have not been entirely eradicated from the political scene. In Hungary, although prime ministers are constitutionally strong, the socialist prime ministers as well as party leaders have had to manoeuvre within their own party and in relation to the coalition partners, while conservative prime ministers could openly neglect partisan opinions and pursue a personal leadership agenda. Whichever way, experts seem to be the solution in Hungary. On these grounds, we can rightly assume that expert ministers have different profiles in the two countries. In the following section, we shall present the main features of ministers.

The Profile of Expert Ministers

Tenure of Ministers

As Tables 8.1 and 8.2 showed, we could observe recurring attempts to involve expert personnel in Hungarian cabinets while Romanian cabinets featured a diminishing trend in the presence of expert ministers. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 add variations according to cabinet type and regarding ministerial appointments and dismissals. Romania shows more variations in cabinet types, while in Hungary coalitions prevailed in addition to two single-party minority governments. There is not much variation in the expert composition of Hungarian coalition governments, both the left and right coalitions appointed and dismissed virtually the same number and share of expert ministers. The single-party minority cabinet category is different: There was less than 10% early expert dismissal in these two cases (2 out of 16) while early dismissal is close to 50% in the coalitions. It should be kept in mind that these two were 'crisis governments' and one of them was regarded as a full technocratic government, as mentioned above. Also, these two single-party minority cabinets modify the overall left-right dynamics of appointments and early dismissals.

In Romania, left-wing cabinets seem more open to experts than right-wing cabinets (26% vs. 19%). At the same time, the duration of experts in left-wing cabinets seems to be shorter (see Table 8.4). Almost 20%

Table 8.3 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different types of party government, Hungary, 1990–2014

Cabinet type	*Political orientation*	*Appointed*		*Dismissed*[a]	
		N	*%*[b]	*N*	*%*[c]
Coalition	L	37	40.7	15	46.9
	R	38	41.8	15	46.9
Single-party minority	L	16	17.6	2	6.3
		91	100.0	32	100.0
	Left	53	58.2	17	53.1
	Right	38	41.8	15	46.9

L Left, *R* Right, *C* Centre
[a]Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate
[b]Percentages refer to all ministers appointed
[c]Percentages refer to all ministers dismissed

Table 8.4 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different types of party government, Romania, 1990–2014

Cabinet type	*Political orientation*	*Appointed*		*Dismissed*[a]	
		N	*%*[b]	*N*	*%*[c]
Coalition	L	4	19.0	0	0.0
	R	38	18.8	8	12.3
	C	5	6.0	1	3.03
Single-party majority	L	21	26.6	5	16.7
	R		0		0
	C		0		0
Single-party minority	L	12	27.9	5	23.8
	R		0		0
	C		0		0
		80	18.7	19	12.7
	Left	37	25.9	10	19.2
	Right	38	18.8	8	12.3
	Centre	5	6.0	1	3.0

L Left, *R* Right, *C* Centre
[a]Dismissal/resignation before the end of the ministerial mandate
[b]Percentages refer to all ministers appointed
[c]Percentages refer to all ministers dismissed

(19.23%) of experts appointed to left-wing cabinets were dismissed before the end of their term, while only 12% (eight out of 65) of those nominated in the right-wing cabinets had to quit their office before the end of the parliamentary term. Thus, we can find more variation in the Romanian case, but differences in early dismissal are the most striking between the two countries. This is particularly so if we leave out the Romanian outlier single-party majority left-wing cabinet, with its exceptionally high dismissal rate, and the Hungarian single-party minority crisis governments, with their exceptionally low dismissal rate. Having done so we find that close to 50% of expert ministers are prematurely dismissed in Hungary as opposed to just about 13% in Romania. The position of the experts is extremely unstable in Hungary irrespective of whether the government is left or right leaning. This phenomenon has already been more thoroughly explored (Ilonszki and Ványi 2011) and reflects the fact that experts are indeed more dependent. Most often they depend on the personal sponsorship of the prime minister and they cannot find security in institutional

support, specifically within a party. We should also note that experts often occupy 'difficult' portfolios, a point that Table 8.6 will explicitly cover.

Expertise with Different Faces

Table 8.5 provides an overview of all ministers—not only experts—at the time of their first nomination. Romanian first-time ministers are, on average, more experienced when they join the cabinet than their Hungarian counterparts. As expected, a significant share of ministers have already been in parliament (25% in Hungary, 38% in Romania), with only around 10% in both cases being appointed soon after their election to parliament. A relevant share also acquired experience in the most appropriate apprenticeship position as junior ministers and this experience was more common in Romania (22% in Hungary, 30% in Romania). A smaller share comes from local politics (11% in Hungary, 14% in Romania). It is no surprise that half of the ministers in the Romanian case and almost half in the Hungarian case have had leadership positions in their parties. Romania has a small share of ministers who have sat before in the European Parliament (3%). What is striking is the significant difference in the percentages of ministers with no prior political experience: 44% of all the first-time ministers are coming 'from nowhere' in Hungary and this correlates well with

Table 8.5 Political background of first-time ministers, Hungary and Romania

	Hungary	*Romania*
	Nr. (%)	*Nr. (%)*
Mayor or local councillor	1 (0.01%)	40 (14.3%)
Regional deputy or councillor	16 (10.9%)	0
National MP (deputy or senator)	49 (33.3%)	140 (50.0%)
• With parliamentary experience	37 (25.2%)	106 (37.9%)
• Appointed to cabinet soon after the election	12 (8.1%)	34 (12.1%)
European deputy	0	9 (3.2%)
Party leading positions	67 (45.6%)	142 (50.7%)
Minister in a regional executive	–	
Junior minister	33 (22.4%)	84 (30.0%)
No prior political experience	65 (44.2%)	58 (20.7%)
Total	147	280

Note: The political background categories are not mutually exclusive

a higher share of experts invited to sit in Hungarian cabinets than in the Romanian case, where only 21% have no prior political experience. This is in agreement with our previous findings: The presence of a constantly higher share of expert ministers in Hungarian governments.

Table 8.6 broadens this perspective by showing the portfolio allocation of all ministers and particularly of expert ministers in Hungary and Romania. Despite some similarities, portfolio allocation has again some distinct features in the two countries. In Romania, health, education, foreign affairs and public works are the areas where more experts are called to serve than in other areas. In Hungary, finance, economic portfolios, justice and foreign affairs are the most attractive areas for the specialists without a political background. However, not only the proportions but the numbers themselves are also important for a proper analysis. Table 8.6 depicts the

Table 8.6 Selected ministries and the weight of ministers without political background, 1990–2014, Hungary and Romania (first-time ministers)

Ministries	*Hungary*		*Romania*	
	All ministers N[a]	*Ministers without political background N (%)*[b]	*All ministers N*	*Ministers without political background N (%)*
Defence	6	0 (0.0%)	8	0 (0.0%)
Education, science and culture	13	5 (38.5%)	47	13 (27.7%)
Economy, agriculture, industry and trade	35	20 (57.1%)	49	9 (18.4%)
Finance	11	7 (63.6%)	13	1 (7.7%)
Foreign affairs	4	2 (50.0%)	8	2 (25.0%)
Internal affairs	8	2 (25.0%)	11	0 (0.0%)
Justice	9	5 (55.6%)	14	3 (21.4%)
Health	19	7 (36.8%)	20	6 (30.0%)
Public works	9	3 (33.3%)	16	4 (25.0%)
Ministers without portfolio	24	10 (41.7%)	11	3 (27.3%)
Others	6	2 (33.3%)	83	17 (20.5%)
Total	144	63 (43.8%)	280	58 (20.7%)

[a]Out of the seven Hungarian prime ministers, four served as ministers first; the other three prime ministers are not included in this column (147−3 = 144)

[b]Out of the seven Hungarian prime ministers, two are regarded as experts; they are not included here (65−2 = 63)

stability of certain ministries—and ministers. For example, during the ten governments in Hungary, only four ministers occupied the foreign affairs portfolio—and two of them can be regarded as experts. In contrast the healthcare portfolio has gone through 19 ministerial nominations—36.8% being experts. Larger ministerial numbers in Romania, as compared to Hungary, do not only originate from the higher number of governments but from the generally higher level of ministerial fluctuations, which is, however, not connected to expert minister fluctuation. In both countries the ministry of defence has been led exclusively by politicians, which draws attention to an interesting contextual factor: A conscious attempt to demilitarize the leadership of the military. As a result, this portfolio has always been occupied by party-affiliated people. The same is true in Romania for the internal affairs portfolio.

Finally, Table 8.7 summarizes the socio-demographic characteristics of first-time expert ministers. Among ministers, nominated for the first time in Hungary and Romania experts constitute 43.8% and 20.7%, respectively: The substantially higher proportion of experts in Hungary is also visible at this level.

In both countries the number of female expert ministers is low, but this comes as no surprise as the number of female ministers in general in these two countries is under 10%. Still, in Hungary close to half of the female ministers (5 out of 12) are in the expert group, while in Romania the share of female expert ministers is lower (5 out of 24). Female presence follows the expected patterns: For example, female ministers can be found with the health and public works (labour affairs) portfolios. In both countries, the average age of the ministers without political background is higher than the average age of all ministers. One striking difference, however, is that Hungarian ministers are on average more than 10 years younger that their Romanian counterparts. Ministers in both countries are highly educated, but relatively speaking there are more ministers with a background in engineering in Romania (43.9%) than in Hungary where people with legal expertise are dominant (29.2%), along with individuals with financial expertise (also 29.2%). These data reflect a more traditional versus a more professional educational profile. In the communist regime, engineering was in high demand and was the most frequent way to get elevated in the social hierarchy. This has slowly changed and the more open post-totalitarian regime in Hungary both required and acknowledged legal and business education. The age difference between the expert groups in the two countries strengthens this difference. It comes as no surprise that

Table 8.7 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without political background, Hungary and Romania

Variables	*Hungary*		*Romania*	
	Ministers without political background Nr. (%)	*All ministers Nr.*	*Ministers without political background Nr. (%)*	*All ministers Nr.*
Total	65 (100%)	147 (100%)	58 (100%)	280 (100%)
Male	60 (92.3%)	135 (91.8%)	53 (91.4%)	256 (93.8%)
Female	5 (7.7%)	12 (8.2%)	5 (8.6%)	24 (6.2%)
Mean age	50 years	49 years	66 years	62 years
University graduates	63 (96.9%)	145 (98.6%)	57 (98.3%)	277 (98.9%)
• With a PhD degree			31 (53.4%)	147 (52.5%)
Academic field				
Law	19 (29.2%)	44 (29.9%)	8 (14.0%)	54 (19.3%)
Engineering/architecture	9 (13.8%)	21 (14.3%)	25 (43.9%)	121 (43.2%)
Economics/business/finance	19 (29.2%)	40 (27.2%)	13 (22.8%)	67 (23.9%)
Social sciences	4 (6.2%)	20 (13.6%)	2 (3.5%)	5 (1.8%)
Others	12 (18.5%)	20 (13.6%)	9 (15.8%)	30 (10.7%)
Higher education abroad	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Occupation				
• Business, industry, finance	27 (41.5%)	53 (36.1%)	10 (17.2%)	58 (20.7%)
• Higher civil servants	12 (18.5%)	17 (11.6%)	18 (31.0%)	99 (35.4%)
• International organizations	–	–	–	–
• Lawyers	0	0	0	0
• University professors and other humanistic professions	3 (4.6%)	18 (12.2%)	3 (5.2%)	16 (5.7%)
• Others	15 (23.1%)	30 (20.4%)	18 (31.0%)	60 (21.4%)
	8 (12.3%)	29 (19.7%)	9 (15.5%)	47 (16.8%)

social science education is underrepresented among expert ministers—particularly in Romania. This is a different pattern from the parliamentary elites where social science degrees were more dominant particularly in the first decade after the regime change (Ilonszki and Schwarcz 2014).

Another interesting difference is the source of recruitment for politically non-affiliated ministers in the two countries. While close to half of experts in Hungary are brought directly from the business and finance fields (27 out of 53) in Romania this profile is underrepresented (10 out of 58). In contrast, a large number of ministers and expert ministers come from inside the public sector in Romania (31%), most of them being public servants before their cabinet tenure, while in Hungary this category represents only 18%. In both countries, significant shares of expert ministers come from university posts and from other professions with a humanistic flavour.

With the help of these tables the complexity and the interrelated features of expert ministers have emerged, also showing the differences between the two countries. An ideal typical expert minister in Romania is placed in varied portfolios, more often works in left-wing cabinets, is older and with a more profound academic foundation (as opposed to Hungary where PhD degrees, although in some cases exist, could not be identified) and has a strong civil service background, while in Hungary experts are more concentrated in particular portfolios, are younger and more often come from the private sector. A state-bureaucratic expertise in Romania and a more private business-oriented outsider expertise in Hungary seem to feature in the expertise of the two countries. It would require further research to examine how these two groups are able to fulfil their expert functions in the respective governments—until this point we only know that the Hungarian outsider and dependent experts have less secure careers: they leave, are sacked and dismissed more often than their colleagues.

Conclusion

This paper is only the beginning of an exploration of the ministerial condition of persons with no (or weak) party affiliation but with a track-record of expertise in specific areas of governance. This is the first exhaustive mapping of the presence of non-partisan experts in the cabinets of two countries in east and central Europe, Hungary and Romania. We wanted to contrast two countries that have relatively recently shed their communist regime by adopting modern western-type democratic institutions and that

also have gone through different institutionalization patterns in the democratic period. We wanted to test whether the common historical heritage may have had a similar impact in the favourable bias towards the presence of experts in cabinets over time. In addition, we assumed that party institutionalization and constitutionally strong executive leaders should have a significant impact on the nomination of expert ministers. While we expected to see fewer expert ministers in a country with a stable and bipolar party system (like in Hungary) than in a country where political volatility, both with regard to party stability and coalition politics, is higher (like in Romania), in fact, the reverse has happened.

The pervasiveness of the communist party in Romania before 1989 led to a strong anti-party reaction after 1989. The environment was conducive to more experts appointed to cabinets, at least in the first post-communist decade. This was also because the parties did not have enough time to convince professionals of various sorts to join their ranks. In Romania the emphasis on technocracy had gradually diminished towards the end of the first transitional decade and party experience and credentials came increasingly to the fore. Party structures have consolidated: This also means that all mainstream parties now have specialized departments run by party members that are ready to take over ministerial portfolios once the opportunity arises. Although voters have not become much more tolerant towards political parties, due to organizational consolidation, parties have gained the right to compete for political offices and to offer them to their members. Party consolidation has worked against the existence of expert ministers—and as a result the main source and dynamics of expert nomination has been challenged.

In Hungary, in contrast, parties became established and accepted political actors from the very first years of the transition but, at the same time, experts enjoyed a regular presence in all Hungarian cabinets regardless of the cabinet's political colour or moment in time.

Although, at first glance, it seems that we should step back from our first hypothesis concerning the impact of party institutionalization on cabinets' partisan versus expertise flavour we argue that a more thorough discussion of party institutionalization would confirm our assumptions. The stability of the Hungarian party framework before 2010 tended to hide parties' internal developments or the fact that parties did not reach their full potential for control (Panebianco 1988). Parties' vague internal institutionalization, which involves factors such as internal stabilization, leadership selection and governmentalization (Harmel and Svasand 1993;

Harmel et al. 1995), might explain why Hungarian parties did not establish party government more fully. This is particularly true about the small parties that vanished by (in) the 2010 parliamentary elections. On the surface parties and the party system seemed to be stable but parties' internal development stopped short of full institutionalization. The development of the two parties that represented the two poles until 2010, MSzP and Fidesz, is somewhat different but well explains the presence of experts in cabinets. After the first decade, the failing socialists began to lose their potential to establish a fully responsible government and continued to offer cabinet membership to non-partisan experts. On the conservative side, Fidesz has gradually developed into a leader-centred party, where the party chairman has an absolute say in the nomination of cabinet members, in addition to other posts in the political system.

This observation leads us to the second hypothesis regarding the elevated role of senior politicians in both countries (the prime minister in Hungary, the president in Romania) which has been clearly confirmed—although the different sources of their powers in this regard have been identified. In Romania the constitutional prerogatives particularly supported the presidents in their attempts to counterbalance the power of governing parties by forcing their proxies or people with a strong public reputation as diplomats, law practitioners, physicians or successful businesspersons into the cabinet. All Romanian presidents used their formal and informal powers to convince the governing parties, including other leaders of their own parties, to make room for people who have not spent a day working within the party structures. In Hungary we could identify more political—and particularly party political—reasons behind the prime ministers' nomination strategies, although they have also been supported by the constitutional opportunities in this regard. Fidesz is dominated by the party leader to a degree that the party cannot influence the government's 'party-face', and the Socialist Party leader-cum-prime minister, in the face of intra-party divisions, often opted for his own personal and non-partisan ministerial choice. The vulnerability of expert ministers (their shorter time span in office) is an indication of their personal dependence. Sheer number of expert ministers does not automatically imply their influence in policy making and with the possible exception of the Bajnai government remains unrelated to the concept of technocratic governments (Pastorella 2016, p. 4).

Finally, with respect to the potential impact of the pre-democratic legacies—which were indeed highly different in the two country cases—we

have found that the past matters not in the presence but in the features of the expert ministers. While the number and share of expert ministers depend on the institutional context and leaders' personal ambitions, as specified above, the general background and the career patterns of expert ministers is often connected to how things operated in the past in the educational system or in the state bureaucracy. Due to the reformist communist environment in Hungary, many expert ministers display continuity in the sense that they were active in the former regime.

Altogether we have found clear patterns in the expert composition of the two countries' governments as well as much variation between them. These two highly dissimilar cases—as we have formulated the comparative dimension in the introduction—have brought about dissimilar patterns in many respects, however not always in the expected dimension. This suggests that cabinet expertise requires deep analysis; it is a complex phenomenon that exists in conjunction with several features of the political system. Our examination leaves two fundamental questions open for further exploration. First, whether the selection of this type of minister brings more efficiency in the cabinet and more prosperity to the countries they are called to govern. Second, and even more importantly, whether the representative dimension of governing is being harmed when non-partisan experts who are embedded in a non-transparent accountability framework occupy large segments of cabinet posts. The answers to these questions are fundamental in the evaluation of our new democracies.

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CHAPTER 9

Turkey's Ministerial Elites: The Growing Importance of Technical Expertise

Sabri Sayarı and Hasret Dikici Bilgin

Introduction

Recent research on government formation in European democracies has underscored the increasing number of technocrats and experts with specialized training among the ranks of the ministerial elites. Many of these ministers with backgrounds in technical fields join the cabinet through the traditional recruitment channels of political parties and parliaments. However, the number of cabinet ministers who have little or no previous experience in political parties and who have not served in the parliaments prior to their first ministerial appointment has been on the rise. The changing patterns of ministerial recruitment raise a multiplicity of questions about the functioning of democratic political systems including political leadership and governance, chains of representation between voters and

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elected officials, accountability and transparency of policy-making and the quality of democracy. Although there is a growing body of impressive data and statistical analysis that highlight the transformation of the cabinets,[1] or the 'elites within an elite' (Frey 1965, p. 224), the implications and potential consequences of the new patterns of ministerial recruitment have yet to be fully uncovered through detailed case studies and comparative analyses.

Studies on Turkey's political elites have shown that technical training and specialization have been on the rise among both the parliamentarians (Sayarı and Hasanov 2008) and government ministers (Sayarı and Dikici Bilgin 2011). In particular, there has been a significant rise in the number of cabinet members with occupational backgrounds as university professors, engineers and economists or business managers. The fact that three former Turkish prime ministers, Süleyman Demirel, Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan, were all trained in the engineering sciences in the prestigious Istanbul Technical University, while the fourth one, Tansu Çiller, received her Ph.D. in economics in the United States, underscores the role that specialized training has played in advancing the political careers of some of Turkey's most prominent governments leaders. But when compared to the emerging trends in contemporary European democracies; the Turkish case displays two major differences. First, the majority of the ministers with technical skills are affiliated with political parties and they can be properly identified as partisans. Barring some exceptions, such as Kemal Derviş, a high-ranking World Bank official who was invited to join Prime Minister Ecevit's coalition government during the financial meltdown of the economy in 2001, there have been very few non-partisan technocratic ministers in Turkey's democratically elected governments in more recent years. Second, although almost all of the ministers who have educational and occupational backgrounds in technical fields are partisans, most of them have no legislative experience prior to their appointment to the *Bakanlar Kurulu* (Council of Ministers). In short, technical competence has increasingly become important in the allocation of the ministerial portfolios in both Turkey and Europe. But partisanship continues to be a major criterion for a government post in Turkey even if most of the expert ministers begin their tenure in the cabinet without extensive parliamentary background. Exploring these puzzling aspects of the Turkish case may contribute to building a more parsimonious theory of government formation and ministerial recruitment.

The Constitutional and Political Context

Following the establishment of the Republic from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, in 1923, Turkey was governed under an authoritarian single-party regime until the end of World War II. The first steps toward the liberalization of the regime took place in late 1945 when President İsmet İnönü announced that opposition parties could be established and compete freely in the elections. İnönü's critical decision set the stage for the end of authoritarian rule and the beginning of the transition to democracy. A group of parliamentarians split from the governing party of the authoritarian regime, Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and established the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) in 1946. The country's first free and fair elections in 1950 were conducted under the plurality system with multimember electoral districts. The DP's victory in the elections was followed by a peaceful transfer of political power and the formation of a single-party majority government headed by DP's leader Adnan Menderes. This critical juncture in recent Turkish political history paved the way for the entry of newcomers with little previous party or legislative experience into the cabinet. In the first government headed by Prime Minister Menderes, there were only six ministers who had worked in the DP's organization since the founding of the party. 'The rest were technocrats or bureaucrats who had joined the DP only recently' (Ahmad 1977, p. 79).

It is worth noting that Turkey was one of the first among the 'developing countries' to experience a regime change from authoritarianism to democracy in the post-World War II Era. Turkey's transition to democracy took place at a time when some Southern European countries such as Portugal and Spain remained under authoritarian rule while another one, Greece, was going through the painful experience of a civil war. Despite its relatively early and promising beginning, however, Turkish democracy encountered serious problems in the years ahead. There were three regime breakdowns through military interventions in politics in 1960, 1971 and 1980 (Sunar and Sayarı 1986). The military interregnums in politics were of relatively short duration and the officers returned power to elected civilian politicians after each intervention. However, direct (1960–1961, 1980–1983) or indirect (1971–1973) periods of military rule witnessed changes that had significant consequences for Turkish politics. They included the writing of new constitutions, the introduction of new

electoral laws, the banning of political parties and the provision of exit guarantees for the armed forces. Most importantly, they interrupted the natural evolution of party politics and undermined the consolidation of the party system. Although the military formally left the political stage after each intervention, it continued to be a key veto player in Turkish politics until the first decade of the twenty-first century. In comparison with the democratic transitions in Southern Europe during the 1970s or in post-communist Eastern Europe in the 1990s, where the consolidation of democracy took place within a relatively short period after the end of authoritarian rule, the consolidation of a fully democratic regime in Turkey has been a very protracted and lengthy process that has not yet reached its final phase (Sayarı 2014, p. 89).

The recruitment of cabinet ministers in Turkey during the period of this study (1950–2011) has taken place within the context of three different constitutions. The country's first constitution was written in 1924 and it remained in effect until 1960 despite the beginning of democratic politics a decade earlier. The 1924 constitution concentrated executive and legislative authority in the National Assembly (officially *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*). In actual practice, executive power under the authoritarian single-party rule rested exclusively in the presidency. Although the same constitution remained in effect, there was a notable change in the concentration of power after the beginning of the democratization process: The Prime Ministry rather than the Presidency of the Republic became the top political post in the Turkish government (Frey 1965, p. 239). As Turkey began to acquire the formal characteristics of a Western European style parliamentary system, the leader of the largest political party in the National Assembly emerged as the dominant figure of Turkish politics. Prime Minister Menderes, who formed five successive majority party governments between 1950 and 1960, established a precedent for the concentration and exercise of power in the Prime Ministry.

Turkey's second constitution in 1961 provided for the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of the government. The new constitution granted the president formal and mostly symbolic powers as the Head of State. Although the constitution only briefly defined the role of the prime minister as one of 'ensuring the co-ordination among the ministries and overseeing the implementation of governmental policies' (Article 104), the political influence and authority of the prime minister in the Turkish political system far exceeded that of the president. The 1961 constitution also included two new articles that were relevant for the

allocation of ministerial portfolios. First, individuals from outside the parliament could become cabinet ministers, provided that they met the requirements for election to the National Assembly. The inclusion of this provision reflected '…the need for highly qualified administrators, particularly in technical fields, sometimes not available in parliament' (Dodd 1969, pp. 119–120). Second, at the outset of the election campaigns, three 'independent persons' from within or outside the parliament had to be appointed to the cabinet as ministers of justice, internal affairs and transportation. The meaning of 'independent persons' was not clearly specified in the constitution. In practice, it has commonly involved the selection of individuals (mostly from the top-level bureaucrats of these ministries) without formal ties to political parties. This constitutional clause aimed at ensuring the fair conduct of elections and preventing the party (or parties) in power 'from exploiting its governmental power for party propaganda purposes' (Dodd 1969, p. 184).

Turkey's third constitution in 1982 reversed the distribution of power between the executive and the legislative branches and vested considerable authority in the presidency of the republic with the goal of creating a 'strong president' (Gönenç 2008, p. 497). The 1982 constitution (currently in use) retains the provisions of its predecessor regarding ministerial recruitment. They include the appointment of the prime minister by the president, the formal approval of the cabinet by the president upon the suggestion of the prime minister, the possibility of selecting cabinet ministers from outside the national legislature and the appointment of three independent ministers during the election campaigns. Although Turkey did not formally adopt either a presidential or a semi-presidential system, the 1982 constitution created a hybrid system in which the elements of parliamentarism and presidentialism remained in somewhat uneasy coexistence, especially during periods when the presidents and the prime ministers did not belong to the same party or share similar political worldviews. Turkey's constitution divides executive authority between a president, who is not politically responsible to the legislature, and a cabinet that is. Under the current constitution, the presidency has been transformed from a 'largely symbolic and ceremonial office, as it was under the 1961 constitution, into an active and powerful one, with important political and appointive functions' (Özbudun 2012, p. 198). While the constitution gives the president a stronger role than its predecessor, it also retains some of the important characteristics of parliamentary systems. For example, all acts of the president have to be countersigned by the prime minister and

the ministers concerned which means that presidential decisions must reflect the advice of the government. Moreover, it is the prime minister, and not the president, who chooses the cabinet members although the president has to formally approve the new ministers. While presidents have generally accepted the choices made by the prime ministers regarding the composition of the cabinets, they have occasionally refused to endorse the appointment of an individual to a ministerial post.

In 2007, Turkey amended its constitution through a referendum and adopted the use of direct presidential elections beginning in August 2014. This marked the first time when Turkey had a president who was popularly elected by the voters.[2] The change in the constitution is likely to further enhance the role and the influence of the president in the Turkish political system. The formal replacement of parliamentarism with either presidentialism or semi-presidentialism has been widely discussed in recent years among politicians, academics and journalists. Currently, the governing Islamist Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP) favours the change from parliamentarism to presidentialism through a new constitution. Since his election as president of Turkey in August 2014, the leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdoğan, has sought to further enhance the role of the presidency in the Turkish political system and he has made it clear that he intends to personally decide on a much larger range of issues than the other Turkish presidents have done in recent years. If Turkey formally adopts presidentialism, this is likely to have a major impact on various important aspects of politics, including the recruitment of cabinet ministers.

The Selection of Cabinet Members in Turkey

The selection of the cabinet ministers in Turkey follows the same procedures that are used in most other parliamentary systems. Normally, the leader of the party that has the largest representation in the legislature is appointed as the prime minister by the president. The newly designated prime minister, in turn, selects the cabinet members largely from the ranks of his/her party's parliamentary group. In Turkey's governmental system, there are no junior ministers. Unlike in France, the Netherlands or Norway, those individuals who are awarded ministerial posts do not have to resign their seats in the parliament when appointed to the cabinet. The degree of freedom that a Turkish prime minister enjoys in selecting the members of his/her cabinet depends on the type of government that is

formed following the elections. When the prime minister's party has a parliamentary majority, he or she personally controls the selection process and has the final say on the ministerial appointments. When the electoral outcome necessitates the formation of a coalition government, the final decisions regarding the composition of the cabinet involves extensive intra-party bargaining and negotiation over both the allocation of the portfolios to the parties in the coalition and the choice of the individuals who will occupy them. According to the constitution, the person designated as prime minister by the president has to present the new cabinet for a vote of confidence in the National Assembly within 45 days of the election. While single-party majority governments are normally formed shortly after the election, negotiations and bargaining between potential coalition partners usually take several weeks before the new cabinet can be presented for a parliamentary vote of confidence.

In selecting members of the cabinet, prime ministers usually consult only with a few close and trusted colleagues in the top ranks of the leadership of their political parties. The local party organizations or the parliamentary party groups have little say in the composition of the cabinet. Prime ministers generally use several criteria to select their cabinet colleagues. First, and foremost, personal loyalty counts more than any other factor. Such loyalty may be based on the close ties that were built after having worked in the same organization. For example, Prime Minister Özal selected a large number of his ministers from among his former colleagues at the State Planning Organization where he had worked during the 1970s. Similarly, Prime Minister Erdoğan's cabinets since 2003 have included several ministers who had formerly served under him when Erdoğan was Istanbul's mayor from 1994 to 1998. Turkish Prime Ministers generally refrain from including potential opponents in their cabinets to silence their criticisms. Since political parties in Turkey do not permit the existence of organized factions in their ranks, there is no tradition of including the leaders of different factions in the cabinets either. Second, electoral and regional criteria play an important role in the prime minister's decisions concerning the composition of the cabinets. Members of the party's parliamentary group who represent key electoral districts usually have a better chance of gaining entry into the cabinet than others. Prime ministers also seek to have a balance in the regional distribution of the cabinet seats and avoid the over-representation of some regions in the government at the expense of others. Third, the expectations of the prime ministers concerning competence also play a role: Prime ministers try to

find persons whom they believe have the competence to manage their ministerial tasks. In recent years, expertise in economic and social policy fields has assumed increasing importance in the appointment to cabinet posts. Fourth, ministerial appointments in Turkey are sometimes also used to reward defectors from rival parties. One of the most blatant and notorious cases of this practice took place in 1977 when the leader of the centre-left CHP, Bülent Ecevit, needed about a dozen additional votes in the parliament for a vote of confidence. In his bid for power, Ecevit included 11 former deputies of the centre-right Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*—AP) in his government who agreed to support him on the condition that they be awarded ministerial posts.

The size of the cabinets in Turkey has grown over the years (Table 9.1). The first cabinet that was formed by Prime Minister Menderes following the transition to democracy had 17 seats.[3] By the mid-1990s, the number of the ministerial portfolios had doubled. The expansion of the cabinet was particularly notable during the period between 1980 and 2002. Several developments contributed to the growing size of the Turkish cabinets (Sayarı and Dikici Bilgin 2011, pp. 748–749). First, the increasing number of tasks undertaken by the state in various economic and social issues necessitated the establishment of new ministries. Second, new ministries were also formed as a result of the growing functional specialization in the duties of the individual ministers. Third, coalition politics contributed to the growing size of the cabinets. The senior partners of the coalitions usually paid disproportionally high coalition payoffs to the minor parties in the form of ministerial seats in the cabinets. Since 2002, the trend has been toward the reduction in the number of ministers serving in the cabinet: While there were 39 ministerial posts in Prime Minister Ecevit's tripartite coalition government in 1999, the number of ministerial portfolios in Prime Minister Erdoğan's majority party governments since 2003 has averaged 26. Cabinet reshuffles have been common, more so in the coalition governments than when a single party controlled a parliamentary majority. With respect to their durability, Turkish cabinets have been quite similar to their counterparts elsewhere in Southern Europe.[4] Their average lifespan between 1950 and 2012 has been slightly less than 2 years. Some of the governments that came to power, such as those that were formed by Prime Ministers Demirel in 1965, Özal in 1983 and Erdoğan in 2003 have lasted more than twice this average. As it has been the case in the other European parliamentary systems, single-party majority governments in Turkey have enjoyed greater durability than coalition

Table 9.1 Turkish governments and the number and share of ministers without political background, 1950–2011

Government (PM and his party, begin date)		*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
					Nt.	*%*
Menderes (DP)	22.05.1950	Conservative	Majority (single party)	23	15	65.2
Menderes (DP)	09.03.1951	Conservative	Majority (single party)	36	21	58.3
Menderes (DP)	17.05.1954	Conservative	Majority (single party)	24	3	12.5
Menderes (DP)	09.12.1955	Conservative	Majority (single party)	28	9	32.1
Menderes (DP)	25.11.1957	Conservative	Majority (single party)	39	2	5.1
Gürsel (mil.)	30.05.1960	Non-partisan	Supra-party/ military	33	33	100.0
Gürsel (mil.)	05.01.1961	Non-partisan	Supra-party/ military	30	26	86.7
İnönü[c] (CHP)	20.11.1961	Social democrat	Majority (coalition)	24	12	50.0
İnönü (CHP)	25.06.1962	Social democrat	Majority (coalition)	35	9	25.7
İnönü (CHP)	25.12.1963	Social democrat	Minority (coalition) (CHP+indep)	27	13	48.1
Ürgüplü (AP)	20.02.1965	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	29	18	62.1
Demirel (AP)	27.10.1965	Conservative	Majority (single party)	43	15	34.9
Demirel (AP)	03.11.1969	Conservative	Majority (single party)	26	6	23.1
Demirel (AP)	06.03.1970	Conservative	Majority (single party)	27	6	22.2
Erim (mil.)	26.03.1971	Non-partisan	Supra-party/ military	34	21	61.8
Erim (mil.)	11.12.1971	Non-partisan	Supra-party/ military	25	17	68.0
Melen (mil.)	22.05.1972	Non-partisan	Supra-party/ military	25	14	56.0

(*continued*)

Table 9.1 (continued)

Government (PM and his party, begin date)		*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
					Nt.	*%*
Talu (mil.)	15.04.1973	Non-partisan	Supra-party/ military	25	11	44.0
Ecevit (CHP)	26.01.1974	Social democrat	Majority (coalition)	25	13	52.0
Irmak (military)	17.11.1974	Non-partisan	Minority	27	22	81.5
Demirel (AP)	31.03.1975	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	37	15	40.5
Ecevit (CHP)	21.06.1977	Social democrat	Minority	26	6	23.1
Demirel (AP)	21.07.1977	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	33	7	21.2
Ecevit (CHP)	05.01.1978	Social democrat	Majority (coalition)	45	13	28.9
Demirel (AP)	12.11.1979	Conservative	Minority	30	7	23.3
Ulusu (mil.)	21.09.1980	Non-partisan	Supra-party/ military	40	40	100.0
Özal (ANAP)	13.12.1983	Conservative	Majority (single party)	39	32	82.1
Özal (ANAP)	21.12.1987	Conservative	Majority (single party)	49	12	24.5
Akbulut (ANAP)	09.11.1989	Conservative	Majority (single party)	38	12	31.6
Yılmaz (ANAP)	23.06.1991	Conservative	Majority (single party)	37	13	35.1
Demirel (DYP)	20.11.1991	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	34	12	35.3
Çiller (DYP)	25.06.1993	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	78	29	37.2
Çiller (DYP)	05.10.1995	Conservative	Minority	30	13	43.3
Çiller (DYP)	30.10.1995	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	37	13	35.1
Yılmaz (ANAP)	06.03.1996	Conservative	Coalition (minority coalition)	33	8	24.2

(continued)

Table 9.1 (continued)

Government (PM and his party, begin date)		*Left-right predominance*	*Type of parliamentary support*	*Number of ministers*[a]	*Ministers without political background*[b]	
					Nt.	*%*
Erbakan (RP)	28.06.1996	Conservative (pro-Islamist)	Majority (coalition)	40	16	40.0
Yılmaz (ANAP)	30.06.1997	Conservative	Coalition (minority coalition)	42	12	28.6
Ecevit (DSP)	11.01.1999	Social democrat	Minority	26	20	76.9
Ecevit (DSP)	28.05.1999	Conservative	Majority (coalition)	66	20	30.3
Gül (AKP)	19.11.2002	Conservative (pro-Islamist)	Majority (single party)	25	12	48.0
Erdoğan (AKP)	12.03.2003	Conservative (pro-Islamist)	Majority (single party)	34	18	52.9
Erdoğan (AKP)	29.08.2007	Conservative (pro-Islamist)	Majority (single party)	45	7	15.6
Erdoğan (AKP)	06.07.2011	Conservative (pro-Islamist)	Majority (single party)	26	3	11.5

[a]Includes the Prime Minister

[b]Ministers without parliamentary experience or a local/regional political background, as well as a previous record of leading positions in political parties at any time before their appointment

[c]The CHP formally adopted a social democratic programme in 1965

or minority governments. Minority governments have been rare in Turkish political history and they had the shortest durability in comparison to single-party majority or coalition governments (Sayarı and Dikici Bilgin 2011, p. 746).

Experts and Technocrats in the Cabinets

What have been the major trends concerning the ministerial personnel in Turkey's cabinets since the early 1950s? To what extent have these trends followed the patterns that have come into existence in contemporary European democracies in recent years? Has Turkey experienced a similar increase in the number of technocrats and non-partisan experts serving in

the government? The starting point for the analysis of our data is definitional: We consider a minister 'non-partisan' when he/she was not a member of the parliament at the time of his/her appointment to the cabinet. While some define technocrats or experts in the cabinets very broadly as 'the highly-educated, professionally-trained policy-makers' (Williams 2006), others emphasize their technical training, non-partisanship, and as 'outsiders' who are recruited to the cabinet from outside the parliament (Blondel and Thiébault 1991; Yong and Hazell 2011; Amorim Neto and Strom 2006). We classify technocrats/experts as those cabinet members without a pre-parliamentary career who are appointed to the ministries in charge of economic and social issues such as finance, foreign economic relations, labour, social security, industry and technology, trade and transportation. Our classification also includes state ministers, who are tasked with overseeing agencies involved in economic and social policy-making. We refer to the cabinet members who have little or no political experience prior to their appointment as 'ministers without a political background'.

As noted earlier, Turkey's constitution does not require that cabinet members should be members of the parliament. On the contrary, Article 112 specifies the duties and responsibilities of the 'members of the Council of Ministers who are not parliamentary deputies'. Nevertheless, Turkey's ministerial elites have been predominantly drawn from the National Assembly. In this respect, the Turkish case is quite similar to Western European countries concerning the proportion of the outsiders among the ministerial elites in the post-World War II Era. According to Blondel and Thiébault (1991, p. 44), nearly 25 per cent of cabinet ministers in Western Europe between 1945 and 1985 had no parliamentary background. In Turkey, 1475 ministers served in 43 cabinets between 1950 and 2011. 420 of the ministers (28.4 per cent) had very little parliamentary experience: They joined the cabinet sometime during their first term in the National Assembly. The number of ministers without any pre-parliamentary career combined with those who had very limited experience as deputies was 626 (or 42.4 per cent of all ministers). One-third of these outsiders (nearly 18 per cent) were appointed to posts that required specialized technical training and expertise.

In most European democracies, prime ministers have traditionally reached the pinnacles of power after a long parliamentary career. Hence, it is rare to find outsiders serving as prime ministers in governments. Turkey represents a very different case: The prominence of outsiders in Turkish governments extends to those who served as prime ministers as well. Since

1950, Turkey has had 19 prime ministers. Among these two, Cemal Gürsel and Bülent Ulusu, were former military officers who became prime minister following the 1960 and 1980 coups. Several others had only very limited service in the National Assembly before they served as prime minister. Demirel rose to the top position in the government in 1965 only 1 year after he began his political career as the newly elected leader of the centre-right AP. Although at the time Demirel was not a parliamentary deputy, Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü nevertheless included him in his cabinet as deputy prime minister. Following the AP's victory in the 1965 elections, Demirel won a seat in the National Assembly and he was appointed prime minister without having previously served in the parliament. Özal, the leader of the centre-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*—ANAP), became prime minister after his party scored a decisive electoral victory in 1983. Although Özal was a candidate for the parliament in 1977 from the Islamist National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*—MSP), he failed to win a seat in the election. Consequently, he had no legislative experience when he formed his cabinet. Turkey's first (and so far, only) female prime minister Çiller's meteoric rise to the top post in the Turkish government came after only a very brief involvement in politics as well. When she was first elected to the National Assembly in 1991, she had no previous political experience. Prime Minister Demirel appointed Çiller as a state minister in his coalition government in 1991. Upon Demirel's election to the presidency of the republic 2 years later, Çiller replaced him as the leader of the centre-right True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*—DYP) and Turkey's new prime minister. Erdoğan had a longer political career than Demirel, Özal or Çiller before becoming prime minister in 2003. He had worked in the organization of the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*—RP) and also served as Istanbul's mayor during the 1990s. But at the time of his appointment as prime minister, he had not previously served in the National Assembly. It should be noted that, along with these 'outsiders', Turkey has also had its share of 'insider' prime ministers. The archetypical insider was İnönü whose extraordinary and long political career spanned nearly six decades of continuous parliamentary service. He was the first prime minister of the newly established republic in 1923 and headed seven different governments until 1935. After serving as the leader of the authoritarian single-party regime and president of Turkey from 1938 to 1950, he remained in the parliament as the leader of the main opposition CHP following the transition to democracy. During the early 1960s, Turkey's veteran statesman and politician

once again became Prime Minister and headed several successive coalition governments.

In recent years, the trend concerning the entry of non-partisan outsiders into cabinets seem to be diverging in Europe and Turkey. While the number of non-partisan ministers from outside the parliament has been on the rise in a number of European democracies, Turkey has witnessed a sharp drop in the presence of the outsiders in the cabinets during the past two decades (Fig. 9.1). During 1960s and 1970s, nearly the half of all ministerial posts were occupied by outsiders. Clearly, the governments that were formed during military rule were responsible for the high percentage of the non-partisan cabinet members (Table 9.1). The proportion of outsiders among all cabinet ministers from 1971 to 1979 was 37.6 per cent. During the 1980s, the representation of the outsiders holding ministerial portfolios again registered a sharp rise. But beginning with the 1991 parliamentary elections, the number of the outsider cabinet members declined steadily to the point where the last government formed by Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2011 was composed largely of partisan ministers from the ranks of the governing AKP's parliamentary group.

Our findings suggest that in addition to regime changes, the recruitment of ministers with little or no previous parliamentary experience has varied with the incumbency of the governments and the left-right party



Fig. 9.1 Ministers without political background in the Turkish cabinets, 1950–2011

composition of the cabinets. During their first term in office, governing parties have tended to award large number of ministerial seats to the newcomers in the parliament. However, the longer an incumbent party stays in power, the smaller is the proportion of the ministers without a political background. This is especially the case in the single-party majority governments when the same party scores successive victories at the polls (Table 9.1). Consequently, we observe a close relationship between the re-election (or the lack thereof) of the incumbent parties and the proportion of the outsiders in the cabinets. We also observe a close relationship between the left-right composition of the governments in power and the number of cabinet members without a parliamentary background. The electoral preferences of the Turkish voters have tended to favour parties on the ideological right of the political spectrum. Conservative parties have finished first in 12 of the 16 elections held since 1950 while the social democrats were victorious only four times. Consequently, nearly 80 per cent of all civilian governments during the past 60 years were either single-party or coalition governments led by a variety of conservative parties from the centre-right, far-right and pro-Islamist party families (Table 9.1). Out of the 35 civilian governments, only 7 had a social democrat as prime minister and none of them was a single-party majority government. Hence, the share of ministers without a political background has been considerably higher in governments in which the senior coalition partner is from the political left (Table 9.2). Since the pool of experienced social-democrat politicians to choose from is smaller, nearly half of these governments are composed of ministers with little political experience. Accordingly, the single-party minority and coalition governments formed by prime ministers from the social-democratic parties also have a higher share of ministers without a political background. However, when we aggregate the data, the difference between the coalition governments and single-party majority governments diminishes. One-third of the members of both cabinet types were selected among non-partisan and first-time ministers (36.7 per cent and 34.5 per cent respectively). This ratio rises to 42.4 per cent in the single-party minority governments since nearly two-third of these governments were led by left-wing parties.

Turkey differs from the current trends in Europe regarding the presence of technocrats in the cabinet. Technocrat ministers were prominent in the cabinets in an earlier era in Turkish politics, when party competition was interrupted by military interventions. The highest representation of expert ministers who were technocrats was in cabinets that were formed in

Table 9.2 Ministers without political background appointed and dismissed in different types of party government, 1950–2011

Cabinet type	*Political orientation*	*Appointed*	
		Nr.	*%*[a]
Grand coalition	C	75	36.1
Coalition	L	13	48.1
	R	57	41.0
	C	58	32.6
Single-party majority	L	0	0.0
	R	186	34.5
	C	0	0.0
Single-party minority	L	39	49.4
	R	20	33.3
	C	0	0.0
	Left	52	49.1
	Right	263	35.6
	Centre	133	34.5

L Left, *R* Right, *C* Centre
[a]Percentages refer to all ministers appointed

the aftermath of the 1960, 1971 and 1980 democratic regime breakdowns (Fig. 9.1). It is no coincidence, for example, that one of the most 'technocratic' cabinets was formed after the officers ousted Prime Minister Demirel in 1971. In his place, the military appointed Nihat Erim as Prime Minister. Erim was a former law professor at Ankara University. In the late 1940s, he joined the CHP and served first as Minister of Construction and then as Deputy Prime Minister in the last two governments that were formed by the CHP before the 1950 parliamentary election. During the course of the next two decades, Erim maintained his affiliation with the CHP although he was not re-elected to the parliament again. The first of the two cabinets that Erim formed during 1971–1972 was widely publicized in the media as a 'technocratic government' since nearly half of the ministers (16 out of 34) were technocrats with no previous parliamentary or political party experience. The remaining cabinet members were either members of parties or independents. The most prominent technocrat in Erim's cabinet was Atilla Karaosmanoğlu. The holder of a Ph.D. in economics from Istanbul University, Karaosmanoğlu joined a group of young

technocrats and social scientists following the founding of the State Planning Organization (SPO) in 1961. Karaosmanoğlu worked there until 1966 when he joined the staff of the World Bank in Washington, DC. He returned to Turkey in 1971 to serve as Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the Economy in Prime Minister Erim's cabinet. The other notable technocrats in the Erim government included Türkan Akyol, a professor of medicine at Ankara University, who served as the Minister of Health and Social Services. Akyol was the first woman cabinet minister in Turkey's history. Osman Okyar, who became Foreign Minister, was a veteran diplomat with a distinguished ambassadorial career. Other technocrats were put in charge of several key ministries such as industry and technology, finance and foreign economic relations.

Since 1980, Turkey has not experienced another seizure of power by the armed forces. The civilianization of the country's political leadership during the past three decades has been accompanied by the virtual disappearance of the non-partisan technocrats from the cabinets. The proportion of technocrats in the cabinets without previous parliamentary experience or affiliation with parties declined to 0.3 per cent in the 1990s before disappearing altogether during the course of the next decade. Although the proportion of technocratic ministers among the ministerial elites has been sharply reduced, two prominent technocrats were recruited to the government during the economic crises in 1979–1980 and 2001. When Turkey was hit by spiralling inflation, growing unemployment and acute energy shortages in 1979, Prime Minister Demirel appointed Özal to head the SPO to help devise a strategy to arrest the country's economic decline. Özal graduated from the Technical University in Istanbul with a degree in electrical engineering. Like Karaosmanoğlu, Özal had also previously worked at the SPO and at the World Bank. In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the ruling junta asked him to remain in charge of the economy. From 1980 until 1982 when he resigned from the government to form ANAP, Özal was the undisputed 'economic czar' of Turkey. In that position, he managed an IMF backed austerity programme that led to the stabilization of the economy. A decade later Turkey, once again, experienced a severe economic and financial crisis that propelled a technocrat into the top job in the management of the economy. At the time of the crisis during 2001, Turkey was governed by the coalition government of Prime Minister Ecevit. To deal with the deteriorating economic conditions, the Turkish government invited Derviş, a ranking World Bank official, to Turkey. An economist with a Ph.D. from Princeton University,

Derviş assumed the post of State Minister in charge of Economic Policy. He subsequently negotiated with the IMF for a large emergency loan. The IMF bailout plan included a number of austerity measures. Under his guidance, the Turkish economy experienced a speedy recovery. It is worth noting that both Özal and Derviş aspired to become politicians after completing their technocratic missions. While Özal formed his own political party, ANAP, Derviş joined the centre-left CHP. As a politician, Özal had a successful political career: He served as Prime Minister (1983–1989) and then President of Turkey (1989–1993). Derviş, on the other hand, failed to make his mark in electoral politics: After serving briefly as a parliamentarian, he resigned from the National Assembly to become the director of UNDP (United Nation's Development Programme) in New York.

The length of ministerial careers in Turkey is closely associated with cabinet durability. As Turan suggests, 'previous parliamentary experience of ministers increases more rapidly than that of the deputies if a party continues to stay in power' (1986, p. 470). Moreover, some ministers who served in governments that stayed in power longer than the average duration of the cabinets, also had relatively long tenures in office. This has been especially true for the ministers of the majority party governments that managed to stay in power for a lengthy period. For example, a number of individuals in Prime Minister Erdoğan's governments have held ministerial portfolios continuously for more than a decade since 2003.[5] The length of the careers of many other Turkish ministers was cut short as a result of governmental instability, political crises and prime ministerial reshuffles of the cabinet. Not only the politicians, but also the expert ministers were also frequently replaced by others.

The Social Profiles of Ministers Without a Political Background

What are the major characteristics of the outsiders with respect to their ages, education and occupations? Do their social backgrounds display similarities or differences when compared with the holders of ministerial posts who were either recruited from outside the parliament or from among the partisan deputies of the National Assembly? The average age of all ministers who served in Turkish governments is 50. The average age of ministers without a political background is slightly higher (52.9). But outsiders

who joined the ranks of the ministerial elites have a slightly older age profile (53.1). In comparison to Western European countries, the age profile of the non-partisan ministers in Turkey does not display a major difference: The average ages of all the ministers and the non-partisan holders of cabinet posts in Western Europe are 48.8 and 50.1, respectively (de Winter 1991, p. 53).

Gender and education remain constant across time and different types of ministries. Women have been vastly under-represented among Turkey's parliamentary elites since the establishment of the Republic. As a result, they have been under-represented among cabinet ministers as well. The period with the highest percentage of women in the cabinet (6.5 per cent) was under the government of the pro-Islamist AKP between 2002 and 2007. Possibly to refute the criticisms directed by its secularist critics for undermining the role of women in society and politics, the AKP made a symbolic gesture by including more women in its cabinets than any other previous government. The representation of women in the AKP governments, however, has declined since 2007. Among the ministers without former parliamentary experience or political party affiliation, 3 per cent are women, and only one of them qualifies as a technocrat (Table 9.3). Women in the Turkish cabinets have generally received 'soft' or low-prestige portfolios that reflect typical gender roles (e.g., minister of family and social policy). A notable exception to these trends concerning gender and ministerial recruitment was the political career of Çiller who became Turkey's first woman Prime Minister in 1993. After serving in that capacity for the next 2 years, she remained in the cabinet until 1997 first as Deputy Prime Minister, and then as Foreign Minister. Since Çiller, no woman has held such high-profile positions in Turkish cabinets.

Data on the educational backgrounds of expert ministers and their field of study highlight several trends. First, ministers without political background are predominantly university graduates (90.6 per cent). In this respect, their educational background is quite similar to that of the Turkish parliamentary and ministerial elites in general, a great majority of whom have also been the recipients of university degrees. A small portion of them (1.5 per cent) had studied abroad, mostly in the United States and Western Europe. Nearly one-fifth of these cabinet ministers have received doctoral degrees. As can be expected, an even larger proportion of the technocrats (46 per cent) among Turkey's ministerial elites hold doctorates and most have received their advanced degrees in American universities.

Table 9.3 Selected socio-demographic characteristics of first-time ministers without political background, 1950–2011

Variables	*Ministers without political background*		*All ministers*
	Nr.	*%*	*Nr.*
Male	586	97.0	760
Female	18	3.0	16
Mean age	52.9		50
University graduates	547	90.6	772
• With a PhD degree	112	19.0	N/A
Academic field:			
Law	152	25.2	N/A
Engineering/architecture	135	22.4	N/A
Economics/business/finance	74	12.3	N/A
Social sciences	93	15.4	N/A
Others	150	24.8	N/A
Higher education abroad[a]	9	1.5	N/A
Occupation:			
Business, industry, finance	97	16.1	140
Higher civil servant	62	10.3	112
International organization	22	3.6	N/A
Lawyer	87	14.4	204
University professor	71	11.8	101
Others	265	43.9	325

[a]Graduate and/or post-graduate studies

The political science faculty of Ankara University has traditionally been the principal educational institution for the training of Turkish bureaucrats. This is also true for non-partisan cabinet members. For example, of the eight non-partisan finance ministers who were recruited to the cabinet from outside the National Assembly, all but one, are graduates of the political science faculty where their main field of study was finance. Graduates of law faculties have traditionally constituted the largest group of ministers in Europe and Turkey (Sayarı and Dikici Bilgin 2011, pp. 754–755). Law (25.2 per cent) is closely followed by engineering and architecture (22.4 per cent) as the two main undergraduate fields of education among non-partisan ministers with no pre-parliamentary experience (Table 9.3). The importance of technical training among these cabinet members is underscored by the fact that collectively, the proportion of outsiders holding ministerial portfolios with backgrounds in

engineering, architecture, economics and finance, amounts to 34.7 per cent (Table 9.3). Our data show that there has been an important change in the educational backgrounds of the ministerial elites in Turkey: The proportion of those trained in the military and medical schools has declined over the years. While law had the highest share from the 1950s to the 1980s, ministers with an educational background in engineering became the single largest group during the 1980s when Prime Minister Özal, himself an engineer by profession, recruited a large number of engineers to his cabinets. Özal's governments have been referred to as 'engineer cabinets' because 'half the ministers had been trained as engineers' and also because of 'their salient technocratic ideology and pragmatic approach' (Göle 1993, p. 199). The rising prominence of engineers among the ministerial elites is a major indicator of increasing technical training and expertise on the pathway to power in Turkey's governments. Along with engineering and architecture, educational training and expertise in economics and finance have also become very important in appointments to the cabinet.

Explaining the Turkish Case

Previous research on Turkish ministerial elites has shown that the parliament has been the principal pathway to the cabinet (Sayarı and Dikici Bilgin 2011). Our findings in this study also support this trend. Since the 1980s, while the number of non-partisan ministers has steadily declined, the proportion of first time ministers who have specialized technical expertise in fields such as engineering, economics and finance has increased. Moreover, ministerial turnover has been generally high. In every decade, almost half of the ministers were selected from among those who had not served in any previous cabinet. In other words, Turkish Prime Ministers have increasingly tended to select the members of their cabinets from among those party affiliated individuals who have technical expertise but not necessarily legislative experience.

Amorim Neto and Strom (2006) suggest that presidential and semi-presidential systems are more likely to have more non-partisan ministers than parliamentary systems. Under the 1982 Constitution, the Turkish political system has acquired some of the characteristics of semi-presidentialism. However, the number of non-partisan ministers has not increased during the past three decades. This may be partly explained by the fact that the defining characteristics of a parliamentary system, such as

votes of confidence, selection of the cabinet members by the prime minister, the single election for the formation of the legislative and executive branches and concomitant dissolution of them, have also been maintained. Moreover, as is the case in several other European democracies, Turkey too has witnessed the growing personalization of power by the prime minister. But the presidentialization process has not yet been accompanied by the formal adoption of a semi-presidential or presidential system. Consequently, with respect to the process of ministerial recruitment, the parliamentary attributes of the political regime have carried more weight than its semi-presidential features. Another explanation for the increase in the number of non-partisan and expert ministers concerns the effects of political fragmentation on cabinet formation. For example, according to Protsyk (2005), party system fragmentation has contributed to the emergence of technocratic cabinets in Eastern Europe. This finding does not seem to be supported by the findings of this study. While the 1990s witnessed a significant increase in the fragmentation of the Turkish party system, this did not lead to a noticeable rise in the number of technocrats serving in the cabinets. In fact, there is no clear relationship between the type of government (majority party, coalition and minority) and the presence of technically trained non-partisans among the ministerial elites during the past 30 years in Turkish politics. However, the argument that emphasizes the role of critical junctures for the entry of technocrats into the cabinets is supported by the Turkish case. As we have noted earlier, democratic regime breakdowns through military interventions have been one of the major reasons for the entry of the technocrats into the cabinets in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Similarly, the two major economic crises in 1979–1980 and 2001–2002 have led to the entry of technocrats with work experience in international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, into the cabinets where they occupied key ministerial posts in charge of the economy.

We believe that two other major findings of our study—the rise of party-affiliated experts and the relative scarcity of technocrats among Turkey's ministerial elites since the early 1980s—can be explained with reference to the problems that Turkey has had in the consolidating its democracy and its failure to join the European Union as a full member.

The problem of democratic consolidation: The problems that Turkey has experienced in consolidating its democracy and party system have had significant consequences for ministerial recruitment. During the first decade following the transition to democracy in the 1950s, political parties were

the dominant players in Turkish politics. In fact, this period can be characterized as the Turkish version of *partitocrazia* when the penetration of the political institutions and society by parties proceeded rapidly. The strength of the parties was evident in the recruitment of the ministerial elites as well: Between 1950 and 1960, those who served in the governments formed by Prime Minister Menderes were recruited almost entirely from the parliamentary group of the DP.

The centrality of the parties and the consolidation of the party system was undermined, however, during the cycles of military interventions in politics that began in 1960 (Sayarı 2002). The banning of the DP, Turkey's largest political party, in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup represented a major impediment to the natural evolution of party politics and the institutionalization of representative political processes. The cycles of military interventions between 1960 and 1980 destabilized the party system, undermined the organizational strength of the political parties and weakened party identification among the voters. These developments had a strong impact on cabinet dynamics. While the governments that were installed by the military included large numbers of outsiders and nonpartisan technocrats, the cabinets of the elected civilian prime ministers were mostly composed of politicians with formal ties to party organizations. Owing to its mistrust of politicians and preference for technocratic policy-making, the military gave priority in its selection of ministers to technocrats. In this respect, there was a notable similarity between Turkey and Latin America where cabinets that were formed under military rule during the 1960s and 1970s also included large number of technocratic elites (Centeno and Silva 1998).

When electoral politics and party competition resumed after a period of direct or indirect military rule, the elected civilian prime ministers awarded ministerial portfolios mostly to those who were affiliated with political parties. Their choice of partisan ministers reflected three strategic goals. Firstly, party leaders wanted to reinforce the role and legitimacy of civilian politicians vis-à-vis the armed forces. Secondly, given the enormous importance of patronage and clientelism in Turkish political life, party leaders sought to provide the activists in the ranks of the party organizations with access to the resources of the state. One of the common criticisms directed against the governments that were formed after military interventions and which included relatively high number of technocrats was that they were not sufficiently interested in catering to the 'needs of the common people'—a criticism stemmed largely from their reluctance to get involved in

the game of patronage politics like the elected civilian politicians. Thirdly, to broaden their popular support, party elites wanted to disassociate themselves from technocratic governance that had become closely identified with periods of authoritarian military rule.

Once established, the practice of selecting ministers, including those with technical training, from the membership of party organizations, proved resistant to change. Irrespective of their ideological or programmatic stands, all political parties continued to use their organizations as the primary source of ministerial recruitment. They also continued the tradition of excluding non-partisan experts and technocrats from the council of ministers when governing alone or sharing power in coalition partnerships. Consequently, political parties have been the principal channels of ministerial recruitment in Turkey since the early 1980s. Although the party system remained highly fragmented and unstable until the 2002 parliamentary elections, political parties nevertheless used the ministerial recruitment process as an important means of building up their electoral and organizational strength by staffing the cabinets with their own members. This trend has become even more evident since 2002 when Turkey witnessed the emergence of a dominant party system following the three successive electoral victories of the Islamist AKP (Gümüşçü 2013). As a result, for the first time since the 1950s, *partitocrazia* has returned to Turkey in full force under the AKP's governance. Although the AKP governments have included a sizeable number of ministers with specialized training and expertise in technical fields, all of them have come from the ranks of Turkey's governing political party. Briefly put, therefore, we believe that the late consolidation of the party system in Turkey provides a useful explanation regarding the dominance of the ministerial recruitment process by political parties and the importance of party affiliation among the rising number of expert ministers.

The centrality of parties in Turkish political life is also highlighted by the fact that in comparison to Europe, trust in political parties in Turkey tends to be relatively high. According to the Eurobarometer findings, trust in parties in Turkey has been considerably higher than in EU countries (Table 9.4). In fact, in several Southern European countries that have been hit hard by the Eurozone economic crisis, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, distrust in political parties reached nearly 90 per cent in 2013. In Turkey, on the other hand, the percentage of people who do not trust parties registered only a slight decrease in the same year. Although a majority of respondents in both Europe and Turkey distrust political

Table 9.4 Trust in political institutions (Tend to Trust) (%)

Period	*Trust in political parties*		*Trust in parliament*		*Trust in government*	
	Turkey	*EU*	*Turkey*	*EU*	*Turkey*	*EU*
October 2004	24	17	76	38	80	34
June 2005	28	19	73	35	76	31
October 2005	25	17	72	35	72	31
April 2006	31	22	68	38	67	35
September 2006	19	17	64	33	63	30
October 2007	23	18	64	35	63	34
April 2008	18	18	47	34	47	32
October 2008	22	20	49	34	48	34
June 2009	26	19	58	32	57	32
November 2009	23	16	51	30	51	29
June 2010	24	18	46	31	43	29
November 2011	27	14	55	27	49	24
May 2012	30	18	44	28	57	28
November 2011	18	15	54	28	45	27
May 2013	27	16	44	26	48	25

Source: Eurobarometer, 2004–2013

parties, there is nevertheless a significant difference in the degree of their anti-party attitudes.

A major reason for the absence of previous legislative experience among Turkey's cabinet ministers is the high degree of turnover among parliamentary elites. The average turnover rate in Turkey in the 15 parliamentary elections held between 1950 and 2007 was 63.3 per cent, or almost double that of the democratic countries in Western Europe and North America (Sayarı and Hasanov 2008, p. 346). Some of the highest rates of turnover among the parliamentary deputies were recorded in the first elections following critical regime changes in 1950, 1961 and 1983. In addition to regime changes, the weak institutionalization of the party system has also contributed to the high-legislative turnover rates. The disappearance of some of the major parties from the political scene and their replacement by new ones, the quick rise and fall of some of the minor parties and the wide swings in the votes between parties from one election to the next have all produced large-scale changes among deputies serving in the legislature. Consequently, although the ministers with technical training and specialization were predominantly drawn from those affiliated with parties, many of them were newcomers to the

National Assembly when they were awarded ministerial portfolios for the first time in their political careers.

Non-membership of the European Union: One of the often cited reasons for the increasing presence of ministers with specialized training in contemporary European democracies is the growing demand for expertise as a result of their membership in the EU. For example, Bermeo notes that following the transition to democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece '… cabinets in all three states had to cope with the broad and highly technical tasks of preparing for EC membership' (Bermeo 2003, p. 216). Clearly, the Europeanization of policy-making has played a significant role in the recruitment of technocrats and experts to the cabinets of the member states of the EU. However, this critical factor is largely missing in the Turkish case since Turkey is not a member of the EU.

Turkey became an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963, with the expectation (shared by Brussels and Ankara at the time) that it would be eligible for full membership within the next two decades. But Turkey's quest for full membership was derailed as a result of both domestic and external problems. After more than half a century, Turkey still remains 'in the queue' while many later applicants have become EU members. Although Turkey was formally declared a candidate for full membership in 2004, there has been only limited progress in the accession talks between Ankara and Brussels. During the past decade, Turkey has undertaken a series of policy changes and constitutional reforms in preparation for EU membership. Until 2010, Turkish cabinets usually included a state minister in charge of EU-Turkey relations. In 2010, a Ministry for European Union Affairs was created for the first time. This ministry has a relatively large staff that specializes in EU legislation, practices and accession negotiations. Prime Minister Erdoğan appointed one of his trusted aides and a ranking official of the AKP, who had no previous technical training or specialized expertise in EU affairs, to this new cabinet post. The analysis of the backgrounds of the cabinet members included in our dataset shows that only 2.2 per cent of the expert ministers in Turkey have had previous experience working in an EU institution.

Conclusion

Cabinets in Turkey presently include substantially larger number of ministers with technical expertise in economic and social policy issues than they did previously. In recent years, many men and women who entered the

council of ministers had backgrounds as university professors, engineers, and managers of public and private economic enterprises. Some of the traditional educational and occupational sources of the cabinet members, such as the legal profession, still continue to be important. But there has been a significant decline in the number of ministerial elites who have backgrounds in the military or the civil service. Nevertheless, the rising degree of technical expertise in Turkish cabinets has not been accompanied by the growing prominence of non-partisan technocrats as has been the case elsewhere in Europe. As noted earlier, the main reason for this concerns the late institutionalization and stabilization of the country's democracy and party system. Both of these problems stemmed largely from the breakdowns of democracy through military interventions between 1960 and 1980. Although they ushered in sizeable numbers of technocrats without party affiliation into the cabinets, these interventions also solidified the determination of the party elites to recruit members from their own organizations and avoid including technocrats without partisan affiliations in the cabinets. Other than military interventions in politics, only severe economic and financial crises have led to the entry of several prominent technocrats into the government. While the ministerial elites in Turkey have been largely recruited from among the members of party organizations, a majority of them were not parliamentarians before entering the government. This means that the ministerial careers of many Turkish politicians began when they were elected to the parliament for the first time. In this respect, Turkey's party-affiliated expert ministers and the technocrats in the European cabinets share something in common, namely, the lack of previous parliamentary experience at the time of their appointment to the government.

The trends concerning government formation and ministerial recruitment in Turkey may undergo major changes if presidentialism or semi-presidentialism is formally adopted through a new constitution. In either case, the likelihood of including individuals from outside the legislature who have competence in technical areas of economic and social policy in the cabinet will increase significantly. This may become even more pronounced if Turkey's current hybrid regime is replaced by presidentialism. But the inclusion of experts from outside the parliament in the government may not necessarily mean that they will be non-partisans as well. Given the importance of partisanship for upward political mobility in Turkey, it would not be surprising if party-affiliation remains a requisite for cabinet membership even under a new constitutional system. If the

experience of the countries that joined the European Union is an indication, Turkey's entry into the EU is also likely to increase the number of technocrats and experts with specialized training in the cabinet. At present, however, Turkey's full membership of the EU remains only a distant possibility.

The recruitment of non-partisans and technocrats into the government has been criticized on the grounds that it undermines some of the fundamental democratic practices and processes including accountability, representation, checks and balances and transparency (Williams 2006). Similar criticisms have been raised in Turkey against governance by the technocrats since they are not elected by the people and their policies do not meet the democratic norms for accountability and transparency. Moreover, technocratic governance in Turkey has acquired a somewhat pejorative connotation because of its association with military interventions in politics. But when asked if they viewed 'experts making decisions' as 'a good thing' more than half of the Turkish respondents to a European Values Study (2008–2009) answered in the affirmative. In other words, expertise in the ranks of the ministerial elites is viewed as desirable since it increases the capacity and effectiveness of governance. It is possible to suggest, therefore, that a large segment of the Turkish public would like to see greater expertise among those who serve in the government, preferably chosen from among the democratically elected representatives of the people.

Notes

1. See, e.g. Blondel and Thiébault 1991; Beckman 2006; Protsyk 2005; Reynolds 1999; Woldendrop et al. 2000; Laver and Shepsle 1994.
2. In 1982, General Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup, was directly elected president by the voters. However, the election took place under military rule and it failed to meet the criteria for free and fair conduct of elections.
3. As a result of a cabinet shuffle soon after it came to power, the first Menderes government eventually included 27 ministers.
4. Based on the calculations by the authors using *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining Dataset* (2008). http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html (retrieved 23.12.2009)..
5. However, the ministerial careers of those ministers who served continuously in AKP governments since 2002 may come to an end in 2015. The AKP's

bylaws specify that its parliamentarians can serve only three consecutive terms in the National Assembly.

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CHAPTER 10

Technocratic Government Versus Party Government? Non-partisan Ministers and the Changing Parameters of Political Leadership in European Democracies

Maurizio Cotta

Technocracy and Party Government

Who governs democratic regimes? The empirical analyses of the 14 European cases presented in this book provide a fairly clear answer to the question we raised at the beginning of this book. The cabinets of these countries are composed by a majority of party-men and party-women, but also by a significant proportion of non-partisan technocrats. The recruitment of ministers, the highest-ranking democratic officers of a country, is thus far more varied than the party government model expected.

Should we be surprised by this finding? Or are there some deep reasons that concur to limit the control of parties upon democratic government? What are the explanations of the variable impact over time, and across

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countries, of the technocratic factor? The chapters of this book have addressed these questions through a detailed analysis of a variety of national cases. Before summing up and commenting on the results of the book, we must briefly reflect upon the nature and place of the government in a democratic polity.

The success of democracy, not only as a normative principle, but also as a practical form of political organisation, first in the North Atlantic sphere of the world, but increasingly also in other parts of the world (Huntington 1991), has sometimes led to a simplified interpretation of contemporary political systems as being entirely defined by this regime model. We should not forget however that in any democratic polity the democratic component, however important, is only a partial one. The democratic principles, rules and institutions are, so to say, 'attached' to (or sustained by) the state body, an organisational system which is based largely upon its specific logic, that is, the logic of monopolistic authority over large territorial spaces. Modern democracies should be better described as a 'state+democracy' combination (Tilly 2007), or, to put it differently, a state organisation influenced/controlled by democratic mechanisms.

As 'modern and welfare states' (Poggi 1978; Tilly 1975) contemporary democracies have administrative and policy responsibilities on a grand scale. These are a combined consequence of the need to maintain a sovereign authority over typically large territorial and population extensions, and of the responses which democratically accountable authorities must give to the demands arising from the population.

This means that the democratic side of the state-democracy dyad has extremely significant interactions with its state/bureaucratic counterpart. The government is, by its nature, the main institutional *locus* where this interaction takes place (Blondel and Cotta 2000; Cotta 2000). On the one hand, in a democracy, the government is the final destination of the democratic chain of delegation and accountability (Strøm 2000a); on the other hand, it is the top level of the state administrative machine in charge of managing policies. On the one hand, it has to respond to the (sometimes simplified) demands originating from public opinion; on the other hand, it has to face the (often complex) policy questions that originate from permanent or long-term problems of the country, as well as from crisis situations, and from the need to match ends and means.

These elements put the executive and its members under different types of constraints. Ministers must be responsive to the demand side of the democratic equation (and thus to the pressures of democratic delegation),

but at the same time, being politically in charge of the policy administering departments of the state (the ministries), they are also responsible for the policy supply side (and its functional requirements). The solutions to this potential conflict are not necessarily the same and may lead to different equilibria in the executive. At one extreme there is the pure 'party government' solution, which has party officers (with a shared programmatic identity and trained in electioneering and consensus gathering) occupying all ministerial positions. At the other extreme the 'technocratic' solution, whereby individuals, with a non-political background, and defined by their expertise and experience in business, civil service, think tanks or academia, dominate the executive.

The party government model (Katz 1986) reflects the predominance in the executive, its formation process and composition, of the mechanisms of democratic delegation and of the party as the main agent of this process (Strøm 2000a). The party has gained a predominant role of aggregator/interpreter of popular demands and derives from this its right to guide from within the government policy-making. An important feature of this model is that the party is essentially a collective organisation. There is a leader (who eventually becomes the head of the executive), but this leader is not so much 'over' the party as 'within' the party and belongs to a broader class of party politicians. Ministerial roles (as well as under-secretarial roles) will typically be distributed among this class of politicians. In its strongest versions, the party government model will also extend its influence upon the administrative side of the government by penetrating the high levels (and in some cases also the lower levels) of the bureaucracy with its nominees. The party government model encounters however some limits: Party politicians may need the advice of experts to deal with technically sophisticated issues, but these experts will remain in the background and will not be given direct executive responsibilities. In an extreme party government model (*partitocrazia*) (Cotta 2015), these experts will themselves have a 'party colour'.

At the other extreme, the full technocratic model has high-ranking civil servants, policy experts, people with experience in managing private or public enterprises occupying government positions (the ministries but in some cases even the prime ministership and the presidency). This model privileges the control by the members of the cabinet of special expertise and also a certain degree of separation of the executive from the influence of (short-term) public opinion. At given moments, these qualities may be seen as so important to require keeping party politicians, who are strongly

dependent on the mechanisms of democratic accountability, away from the executive.

It must be remembered, however, that in a democratic regime, the technocratic model can only exist with some important limitations: Technocratic prime ministers and ministers must, in the end, have the support of the parliament in a parliamentary system; a non-political president must have the support of the voters in a presidential system. Technocrats must enjoy at least temporary or indirect democratic delegation (and accountability).

For obvious reasons a fully technocratic model of government should be seen as a rather exceptional event as long as the fundamental institutions of representative democracy are at work. Mechanisms of electoral representation are not particularly congenial for experts and technocrats. Their strength is essentially based on professional reputation among peers or other groups of experts. Their appeal to the average voter is normally not very high due to their limited visibility, their technical and often difficult language, the distance of their worlds (civil service, university, think tanks, big enterprises) to the world of the ordinary citizens. It is therefore more probable to have intermediate solutions, which would balance the two principles (and their advantages). The mechanisms of democratic delegation and accountability need not involve the whole cabinet to the same level. The head of the government and some ministers might be recruited among normal partisan politicians, while other ministers might come from a pool of experts and civil servants without a clear party affiliation.

If we take the party government model, whereby the party as a collective organisation typically recruits the members of the executive, as the normal condition in democratic regimes, what are the factors that might push in a different direction and produce a more significant technocratic presence in the cabinet?

Previous discussions of this theme have originated a variety of potential explanations. Some of them refer to systemic, extra-political or societal factors, either long-term or episodic such as the increasing complexity of problems faced by governments or the eruption of an economic crisis requiring special policy skills or greater independence from the electoral cycle to respond to new extraordinary challenges (Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2015). Others refer to factors of a more political nature—from the decline of parties as strong and articulated organisations of recruitment and of policy ideation, to the proliferation of semi-presidential forms of government potentially entailing a stronger and more independent role of a

monocratic authority (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006), to the presidentialisation of parliamentary forms of government (Poguntke and Webb 2005), which entails the rise of the personal authority of the prime minister to the detriment of collegiality. The political composition of cabinets (single-party vs coalitional) and the degree of fragmentation of the majority have also been evoked (Protsyk 2006): Single-party and less fragmented majorities would give prime ministers greater space in recruiting ministers from outside the party logic.

This variety of potential factors suggests two different directions of influence: On the 'demand side', we can detect the need for a special type of ministerial personnel originating under specific socio-economic situations or from political and policy exigencies and on the 'supply side', the availability (or lack thereof) of personnel qualified to occupy certain positions or willing to take them (and to challenge other candidates for them). The meeting of demand and supply will produce the different compositions of ministerial personnel.

The variable institutional mechanisms influencing the formation of governments can be seen as an intervening variable between demand and supply factors. The crucial actors who decide about the selection of ministers (and of the prime minister) will have an impact upon the matching of demand and supply. The structure of the executive and, in particular, the role of the president and of the prime minister, their reciprocal equilibria and their relationship with the party in parliament (and outside) are important intervening factors as they may affect the structure of incentives and the resources available for the subjects in charge of selecting ministers.

Partisan and Non-partisan Ministers in European Countries

It is time to define the confines of our analysis. As indicated in the introduction in this book, we have opted for a mixed research strategy. Without denying the merits of a pooled analysis of the data for a high number of countries, we have preferred a different strategy which enables a deeper analysis of individual country cases but also a comparative discussion of these results. To enable comparability, the country analyses have adopted the same definition of non-political ministers and have followed the same guidelines in the collection and presentation of data.

In this book we are able to provide empirical evidence of the phenomenon of non-partisan ministers in 13 European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden) and Turkey (which, depending on the point of view, can be considered European or non-European). Our sample of countries, conditioned by the availability of satisfactory data sets, is not fully representative of European countries. It covers, however, a good deal of variation—first, second and third wave democracies, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, countries severely affected by the sovereign debt crisis and adjustment programmes and others that escaped economic recession in the same period. Degrees of party system disruption and fragmentation vary significantly as well. Moreover, our cases also enable us to explore both short- and long-term trends as the data collected cover more than 20 years for the CEE countries and an even longer period for Western Europe and Turkey.

The dependent variable, the weight of non-partisan ministers in the cabinet, has been operationalised as follows: We have considered as non-partisan ministers all those who previously to their first selection as minister had not held a national or local leadership position in the party and who had not been members of parliament (except if elected just before their ministerial nomination). They came to the cabinet from outside the world of party politics and, presumably, on the basis of different qualifications (typically, but not exclusively, a specialised expertise in some domain).

The first questions we address are: how important is the non-partisan component in our sample of European governments? How variable is the phenomenon across countries? Can we detect an upward trend over time or is the size of this phenomenon linked to specific moments?

As Table 10.1 shows, the phenomenon, measured by the proportion of non-partisan ministers over the whole population of ministers, recruited during the period considered, is very important in almost all the countries analysed. With the exceptions of France, Italy, and Romania, where the proportion of non-partisan ministers does not cross the 21% threshold, in the other countries, the range is between 24.7% and 51.9%. At least for the countries of this book the party government model of ministerial recruitment which seemed so clearly dominant in the 1980s (Blondel and Thiébault 1991; De Winter 1991) is not unchallenged. In all countries another type of ministerial recruitment has a significant weight and in some it has even gained an almost similar weight to the party centred one. Our data suggest that the phenomenon is more important than other

Table 10.1 Ministers without a political background in selected countries

Country	*Period*	*Number of non-political ministers (all ministers)*	*Percentage of non-political ministers*	*Percentage of ministerial positions*
Czech Republic	1993–2009	57 (138)	41.3	NA
Estonia	1991–2009	43 (110)	39.1	NA
France	1958–2014	98 (602)	16.3	13.3
Hungary	1990–2014	65 (147)	44.2	41.0
Italy	1948–2014	91 (489)	18.6	5.9
Latvia	1991–2009	41 (129)	31.8	NA
Lithuania	1991–2009	69 (133)	51.9	NA
Poland	1991–2014	86 (214)	40.2	NA
Portugal	1976–2015	113 (241)	46.9	42.1
Romania	1990–2014	58 (280)	20.7	18.7
Slovakia	1991–2009	46 (112)	41.0	NA
Spain	1977–2015	68 (187)	36.4	33.9
Sweden	1945–2014	59 (239)	24.7	19.3
Turkey	1950–2011	427 (737)	57.9	42.4

NA non-available data

researchers (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010) had previously envisaged.

For some of these countries another measure is available to assess the same phenomenon. Instead of considering the population of ministers, we can measure the ministerial positions occupied by non-partisans. This measure reflects the fact that the same person may have occupied more than one position in different governments. It is therefore a 'weighted' measure that more accurately reflects the importance of the phenomenon. As could be expected, the available data indicate a not too dissimilar, but somewhat more reduced weight of non-partisan ministers (Table 10.1, last column). We can say that non-partisan ministers, on average, occupy a smaller number of ministerial positions than partisan ministers. Their ability to get a second (or additional) cabinet position after the first is somewhat reduced compared to ministers recruited from a party political background. In Italy the reduction is particularly relevant: The explanation has to do with the instability of cabinets coupled with the much greater stability of the political personnel. Particularly during the so-called First Republic, political ministers were frequently re-nominated from cabinet to cabinet, while this was very uncommon for non-politicians.

As we have mentioned, while the overall picture is quite homogeneous (the proportion of non-political ministers oscillates between a third and a half of all ministers), four cases, France, Italy, Romania and Sweden show a somewhat different pattern. In these cases the weight of career politicians is more clearly predominant. France, Italy and Sweden are also the only cases (together with Turkey) for which our data collection goes back to the 1950s. We might ask, therefore, whether the higher degree of politicisation of ministerial recruitment in these two countries simply reflects the greater weight of a 'partitocratic' past, which the countries having acceded more recently to democracy could not experience. The Turkish and the Romanian cases (in opposite directions) seem, however, to contradict this interpretation. Romania in spite of its recent democratic history has a large proportion of partisan ministers; Turkey with a much longer (albeit discontinuous) democratic track record has on the contrary a large proportion of non-partisan ministers. Since this question is obviously important for a better understanding and explanation of our phenomenon, we must explore more carefully the temporal dynamics of this phenomenon. We will deal with this aspect after having provided some other elements of information to describe the phenomenon.

Non-partisan Ministers: Who Are They and Which Positions They Occupy?

Who are the ministers selected without a significant partisan and parliamentary background? And which are the cabinet positions they are most likely to get?

With regard to the first question, the analyses conducted in this book show some common elements but also significant variations across countries. Not so differently from 'normal' ministers, most of the non-politicians are males and highly educated. As could be expected for individuals who are chosen for their expertise, our data, when available, show a greater percentage of PhDs.

With regard to professional background three types of experience have a significant weight in many countries: Leading positions in business and industry, high rank in public administration and university professorships. Most of the non-partisan ministers can demonstrate one or another of these types of professional experience (Table 10.2). Across countries the weight of these experiences varies significantly. Businessmen are a strong

group in Portugal and Hungary and also in Estonia and Slovakia, but much weaker in France and Italy. Senior civil servants are particularly numerous in France, Italy, Lithuania, Spain and Sweden, but much less in Estonia and Slovakia. Finally university professorship plays a rather significant role in Italy, Portugal and Romania and a minor role in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Latvia. With the notable exception of Sweden, lawyers are not an important category. In Turkey a military career is the most important experience for non-political ministers.

Non-political ministers do not have a specific common background across countries. What they have in common is a rich professional experience in a number of different fields, which can provide them with special expertise in dealing with technically complex policy problems (or, in any case, can contribute legitimacy to their selection). The type of expertise prevailing in each country presumably depends on the prestige of different professional backgrounds, but also on the availability of individuals to exchange the advantages of their professional careers for the uncertainties

Table 10.2 Profile of non-partisan ministers compared to all ministers (%)

Country	*Business, industry*	*High civil servants*	*University professors*	*Lawyers and other professions*
Czech Republic	20 (18)	40 (33)	11(NA)	2 (NA)
Estonia	25 (21)	17 (25)	33 (NA)	8 (NA)
France	9 (NA)	56 (NA)	8 (NA)	8 (NA)[a]
Hungary	41 (36)	18 (12)	23 (20)	5 (12)[a]
Italy I (1948–1994)	*15 (15)*	*27 (13)*	*42 (38)*	*4 (37)*[a]
Italy II (1994–2014)	*12 (7)*	*39 (15)*	*38 (29)*	*0 (8)*[a]
Latvia	17 (21)	30 (21)	15 (NA)	5 (NA)
Lithuania	16 (16)	49 (31)	10 (NA)	3 (NA)
Poland	16 (13)	30 (19)	27 (NA)	6 (NA)
Portugal	36 (20)	14 (13)	43 (31)	8 (29)[a]
Romania	17 (21)	31 (35)	31 (21)	5 (6)[a]
Slovakia	26 (14)	4 (5)	15 (NA)	2 (NA)
Spain	18 (16)	44 (39)	25 (23)	7 (11)
Sweden	2 (5)	19 (9)	6 (7)	50 (27)
Turkey	16 (18)	10 (14)	12 (13)	14 (26)
Average	19	28	23	8.5

Percentages within brackets are for the total of ministers
[a]Only lawyers

of political life. The greater frequency, on average, of senior servants and university professors compared to business leaders is probably also due to the greater flexibility of the former occupations compared to entrepreneurial and managerial activities.

With regard to the ministries which are allocated to non-politicians, we may expect two criteria to be particularly relevant: The first (positively) is the degree of technical expertise required by a minister (the more technical content a ministry has the more we expect it to be assigned to non-politicians) and the second (negatively) is the patronage potential (the greater the potential for resource allocation a ministry has, the more we expect it to be reserved for politicians). A third factor could be the need to preserve a policy sector from short-term decisions to which elected politicians are more prone. The results of our analysis tend to confirm these expectations. Among the ministries most frequently allocated to non-politicians we find the ministries of finance and/or economy, foreign affairs, justice and health (Table 10.3). All of these ministries have a significant 'expertise requirements'; they also often require decisions which are not too dependent on the electoral game. Finance, foreign affairs and justice are also not strongly endowed with patronage resources. In the

Table 10.3 Ministries most frequently assigned to non-politicians

Country	*First ministry*	*Second ministry*	*Third ministry*
Czech Republic	JUS 57%	DEF/EDU 56%	IA 43%
Estonia	EDU 60%	IA 58%	IUS 40%
France	FA 45%	FIN/JUS 25%	EDU 24%
Hungary	FIN 64%	ECON 57%	IUS 56%
Italy 1 (1948–1994)	FIN 15%	JUS 5%	–
Italy 2 (1994–2014)	FIN 53%	JUS 47%	FA 31%
Latvia	HEA 62%	EDU 40%	ECON 38%
Lithuania	FIN 80%	ECON 57%	HEA 56%
Poland	FA 86%	FIN 69%	TRA 54%
Portugal	FIN 67%	IND 55%	EDU 54%
Romania	HEA 30%	EDU 28%	FA/PW 25%
Slovakia	FIN 75%	IA 63%	FA 57%
Spain	DEF 62%	ECON 56%	EDU 44%
Sweden	JUS 75%	FA 35%	FIN 33%
Turkey	PW 86%	FIN 85%	ECON 61%

DEF Defence, *ECON* Economy, Industry, etc., *EDU* Education, *FA* Foreign affairs, *FIN* Finance, *HEA* Health, *IA* Interior affairs, *IND* Industry, *JUS* Justice, *PW* Public works, *TRA* Transports

case of economy and health, this aspect may be more relevant, but it is possibly counter-balanced by the other two criteria. Finance is the most clearly 'non-partisan' ministry. In 9 countries out of 14, it is either the first or second most frequently delegated to non-politicians. In half of the countries, the ministry of finance was allocated to a non-political minister in a majority of cabinets (85% of the cases in Turkey, 80% in Lithuania and 75% in Slovakia). The need to keep budgets under control and to resist the pressures of expenditure-oriented ministries is probably the reason for the frequent choice of a non-political minister for the not very popular role of guardian of the purse. We may add to this that, particularly after the Maastricht Treaty, finance ministers are the members of the cabinet most involved in the complex supra-national dealings of the EU.

Temporal Change or Stability in Ministerial Recruitment Patterns?

We must now explore some of the factors that might be responsible for this phenomenon. To begin with, we will discuss time. The question is whether it is possible to detect a rising trend of non-political ministers or only short-term oscillations. Three factors, two on the demand side and one on the supply side, could militate in the first direction: The growing complexity of government work, the progressive integration of the EU and the decline of parties. If the job of governing is becoming more technically demanding over time due to the increasing complexity of the national and international environment, the need to enrol technically sophisticated ministers would increase. The same would happen if coping with EU policies and constraints, which increasingly impinge upon national decisions, would require ministers with a greater expertise in dealing with the intricate technicalities of multi-level policy-making. Finally, if we accept the assumption that the heyday of party government are now past and that the grip of parties over processes of elite recruitment has progressively declined, we should also see an increase in non-political ministers over time (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). The consequences of the decline of parties could entail both a diminished ability to constrain the chief executive in the selection of ministers (parties as weaker principals in the democratic delegation process) and also a reduced ability to supply a sufficient number of persons suitable to cover ministerial positions (parties as less efficient incubators of political per-

sonnel). Unfortunately, our group of countries enables only a limited confirmation of these hypotheses. We can analyse more than 50 years of development across only four countries (France, Italy, Sweden and Turkey). Two other countries, Portugal and Spain, offer a democratic experience of approximately 40 years. All other countries have more limited democratic periods. We will first concentrate our analysis on the six countries with the longest experience and, using the early 1990s as the dividing line, we will compare for each of these countries the data for two time periods (Table 10.4). If the hypothesis of party government decline was valid, we should find an increase of non-partisan ministers from the first to the second period.

Using both the percentage of ministers and of ministerial positions, the picture we find is not as linear as could be expected. Of the four countries with the longest democratic period covered by our data, only the Italian case shows a very clear increase in the proportion of non-political ministers from the first to the second period. When we compare the so-called Italian First Republic with the Second Republic (1994, with important changes in the electoral system and in the party system, can be seen as the turning point between Italy I and Italy II) (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007), we can in fact detect a dramatic change. While in the first period the non-politicians were really *rarae aves*, exceptional cases, in the second they have reached a much more important weight aligning the country with the levels of the more recent democracies of the group. France and Turkey show, on the contrary, an almost opposite picture. In France non-partisan ministers were a significant proportion during the first period, especially in the founding years of the Fifth Republic when the party system was in shambles and a personality above parties such as De Gaulle dominated the scene, but since then they have declined and have become a rather small minority (more or less comparable to the first period of Italy). In Turkey, the level is high in both periods, but in the last two decades the number of partisan ministers has increased and with the last Erdogan cabinets the weight of non-partisan ministers has reached an all-time minimum. We must, however, take into account the fact, that in Turkey, between 1950 and 1983, the normal working of parliamentary democracy was interrupted three times by periods of military governments, which relied fundamentally upon ministers without a political background. If we excluded from our analysis those governments and considered only civilian cabinets (Turkey Ib), the decline in the weight of non-political ministers would be

Table 10.4 Changes over time in ministerial recruitment

Country	*Period*	*Number of non-partisan ministers (all ministers)*	*Percentage of non-partisan ministers*	*Percentage of ministerial positions*
France I	1958–1991	62 (281)	22.1	20.2
France II	1992–2014	36 (321)	11.2	6.8
Italy I	1948–1994	34 (296)	11.5	3.2
Italy II	1994–2014	62 (208)	29.8	17.2
Turkey I	1950–1990	318 (483)	65.8	46.2
Turkey I b[a]	*1950–1990*	*217 (346)*	*62.7*	*35.9*
Turkey II	1991–2011	133 (305)	43.6	35.5
Portugal I	1976–1991	58 (127)	45.7	41.6
Portugal I b[b]	*1976–1991*	*31 (93)*	*33.3*	*29.2*
Portugal II	1991–2015	52 (108)	48.1	37.0
Spain I	1977–1996	39 (103)	37.9	34.6
Spain II	1996–2015	30 (87)	34.5	33.6
Sweden I	1945–1989	34 (138)	24.6	19.8
Sweden II	1990–2014	25 (101)	24.8	18.2

[a]Military governments have been excluded from this count
[b]The three 'governments of the president' under Eanes have been excluded from this count

less pronounced. As for Sweden, the proportion of non-political ministers is almost exactly the same in the two periods.

If we now analyse Portugal and Spain, for which our data go back to the mid-1970s, the results are, at first, not very striking. In Spain there is a small but not very significant decline of non-partisans ministers between the first and the second period. In Portugal there is a small increase in the number of individuals but a slight decrease in the number of cabinet positions. A more careful look suggests, however, that in Portugal the larger average of non-political ministers for the cabinets before 1991 is due, to a significant extent, to the three 'presidential cabinets' of the first period, when between 1978 and 1979, under the presidency of Eanes, non-partisan governments supported by the head of state were in office. This was, however, a rather exceptional experience, a legacy of the regime transition and of the role of the military, which was not repeated in the following years. If we exclude these cabinets from our calculations (Portugal Ib), the proportion of non-politicians indeed increases from the first to the second period.

If we extend our analysis to all the countries, what picture can we draw? Can we detect some kind of association between time (or age of democracy) and the rise of non-partisan ministers? The answer is partially positive. If we leave aside the somewhat special case of Turkey, with its troubled democratic history, the other cases indicate that countries where democracy was established more recently have, in general, a higher proportion of non-partisan ministers (the only exception here is Romania), and that two of the three countries with the longest uninterrupted track record of democracy (France and Italy), also show the highest levels of partisan ministers. As we have seen, a closer look indicates two opposing trends for the 'old democracies': Towards greater partisanship in recruitment in France and towards weaker partisanship in Italy. Finally, the two countries of the Iberian peninsula are not very different in this aspect from the CEE countries. Our cases however do not offer sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis of a generalised decline of partisan recruitment of ministers in countries where party government was rooted in a more distant past. Only Italy goes clearly in this direction, while Sweden shows a stable pattern and France suggests an opposite direction of development, whereby an initially weak party government became stronger over time. Stronger support is received for the hypothesis that more recently established democratic systems (as those CEE countries) have implemented a weaker party government model in the selection of ministers. The open question is whether this is due to the relative youth of these democracies, and thus more politically controlled recruitment should be expected in the future with the maturing of these regimes, or whether these countries share a more stable 'weakly partitocratic' model of democracy which would be typical of recent times. The two cases representing the third wave of democratisation—Spain and Portugal—seem to support the latter answer. In both cases, the passing of time has not significantly changed a model characterised from its beginning by strong non-partisan recruitment. In the most recent democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, patterns of change are variable: If there is a slight trend of political professionalisation until the early 2000s, this is followed by a decline in recent years (Semenova, Ilonski and Stefan, this book).

If we look over a more short-term perspective, we see however that significant changes can happen rapidly in recruitment patterns of ministers when major transformations take place in the party system. We can mention, for instance, the rather abrupt crisis of the Italian partitocratic regime in the early 1990s, the end of the predominance of the Social Democratic

party and the more frequent alternation of right coalition cabinets in Sweden, the rise of Erdogan's AKP in Turkey. In the first case the consequence was an increased frequency of technocratic governments and technocratic ministers; in the other two cases we saw the rise of partisan ministers.

Institutional Factors and the Recruitment of Ministers

As we have mentioned in the first pages of this chapter, institutional configurations are often supposed to have an influence on the profile of ministers, as the different balance between monocratic and collective actors they entail may encourage different choices in the selection of ministers. As suggested in the literature, a semi-presidential regime, where the directly elected president enjoys autonomous political legitimacy, should favour the selection of non-partisan ministers more than a parliamentary regime (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). Such ministers would ensure greater autonomy from parliamentary influence, more reliability in the implementation of the policy priorities of the president and stronger loyalty to the chief. To some extent the same factors could be supposed to be at work in a parliamentary system when the phenomenon of presidentialisation (or prime-ministerialisation) of the prime minister applies (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Dowding 2013). In this case too, a dominant monocratic figure might prefer to choose ministers with a profile less defined by a partisan and parliamentary career and therefore more easy to control. Delegation from the chief executive would prevail over delegation from parliament (and parliamentary parties).

Our cases offer a good variety of institutional configurations to explore the validity of these hypotheses. It must be remembered, however, that the distinction between parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes is fuzzier than sometimes admitted. If we adopt a minimal formal interpretation often used (Elgie 1999; Siaroff 2003), we will have a semi-presidential form of government whenever the head of state is not elected by the parliament but through a separate electoral procedure, which is normally a direct popular election, and when the prime minister and the cabinet must rely upon parliamentary confidence. If this definition is adopted, we have among our sample of countries eight parliamentary systems (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey) and

six semi-presidential systems (France, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia). Recently also the Czech president (2013) and the Turkish president (2014) have come to be directly elected but are not considered in our analysis. Many however would add other elements to this definition: They would require, for instance, that the president plays a political role and has significant powers vis-à-vis the government and/or in the legislative process (Duverger 1980; Sartori 1994). In that case Lithuania, Slovakia and Poland after 1995 would probably not qualify. To complicate things further it must be added that semi-presidential systems may function with a mode of cohabitation (when the president and the parliamentary majority supporting the cabinet have opposing political colours). As the French experience has shown, the cohabitation mode typically produces a clear reduction of the presidential role in government formation and life. On the other hand, in parliamentary systems, we may have cases where the head of state plays (at least temporarily) a more influential role because of the inability of the party system to produce a government effectively. The Italian case after 1992 has repeatedly shown that this possibility is not to be discarded even with a president who is not popularly elected but chosen by the parliament (Table 10.5).

The evidence from our studies is far from conclusive. Contrary to expectations, France, the clearest case of strong semi-presidentialism, the one for which the concept itself was developed (Duverger 1980), is in fact one of the countries with the lowest level of non-partisan ministers, fol-

Table 10.5 The role of the head of state in government formation and non-partisan ministers (ministries)

	Strong directly elected presidents	*Weak(ened) directly elected presidents*	*Parliamentary systems*
High level of non-partisan ministers (>30%)	Portugal I 45.7%	Lithuania 51.9% Portugal II 48.1% Slovakia 41.0% Poland 40.2%	Turkey 57.9% Hungary 43.5% Czech R. 41.3% Estonia 39.1% Spain 36.9% Latvia 31.8% Italy II 28.9%
Low level (<30%)	Romania 19.6% France 16%		Sweden 24.7% Italy I 11.5%
Average level of non-partisan ministers	27.1%	45.3%	35.2%

lowed by Romania. Among the countries with the highest levels of technocratic ministers, we have parliamentary systems and countries where semi-presidentialism did not work as expected, that is, the directly elected president does not play a decisive role in government formation and ministerial selection either because of formal power limitations or because of other political factors. On average weak semi-presidentialism shows the highest numbers of non-partisan ministers, followed by parliamentary systems and then by the few strong (true) semi-presidential countries. In our sample of countries at least, the type of institutional framework does not seem sufficient to produce a clear impact on the recruitment of ministers.

An alternative suggestion is that in parliamentary systems the increased weight of the prime minister vis-à-vis the cabinet as a collective body may have produced an effect not too different from that of the direct election of the president. In both cases, an individual authority may have acquired a greater freedom to choose from a wider pool of potential candidates than that of party people, and according to his/her needs selects party people when partisan cohesion is paramount, non-partisan ministers when special expertise is required or when personal loyalty may be more important. Some of our cases seem to support this interpretation. The strong role of the prime minister is quite clear in Hungary and Spain (and also in Estonia during the Reform party's long period in power) where the leader of the main, or only, government party enjoys a privileged political position. The constructive no-confidence vote rule may have contributed in these countries to this effect. In Italy the role of the prime minister has clearly increased from the First to the Second Republic, but the rise of non-partisan ministers is more clearly attributable (Verzichelli and Cotta, this book) to the augmented role of the (indirectly elected) president of the Republic during repeated situations of crisis in which parties were unable to produce a government. The effect of the prime minister's role is less clear in the Czech Republic or Latvia. As for Turkey, the strengthening of the Prime Ministership under Erdogan has in fact increased rather than decreased the partisan recruitment of ministers (Sayari and Bilgin, this book). Clearly Erdogan trusts more his party fellows that independent and secularist technocrats. The findings of Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006), based on a different sample of countries and on a somewhat different definition of non-political ministers, are not supported by our data, which suggest that this practice is to be found under rather different institutional arrangements. A more recent study by Amorim Neto and Samuels (2010) was, however, closer to our results.

Should we look then to the features of the system of parties? Unfortunately we do not have sufficiently systematic evidence to test the hypothesis that the organisational decline of parties resulting in a diminished supply of sufficiently competent and ambitious party professionals could explain the increased role of non-partisan ministers. Yet some hints in this direction can be gleaned from some of our country studies. In Italy, the crisis of the traditional *partitocrazia* has gone hand in hand with an increased role for technocratic ministers after 1992. In the opposite direction, in France, the revitalisation of the party system after the first 'anti-party' years of the Fifth Republic is accompanied by the decrease of non-partisan ministers and the same can be said of Turkey, where the rise of a true mass party with a strong identity, the AKP of Erdogan, has had the same consequences. In other countries changes over time have been less significant and cannot be clearly matched with changes in the parties.

Crisis Effects

We must finally explore to what extent a crisis situation may enhance the demand for expertise and thus open an unprecedented space for non-partisan ministers. The economic and financial crisis of recent years provides an opportunity to test this hypothesis comparatively. With the exception of Poland, all of our countries have experienced one or two moments of stagnation or recession during the 2008–2014 period. If we use GDP growth rates, all our countries, again with the exception of Poland, experienced a strong dip in 2009; the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal and Spain also faced a second prolonged recession (and France faced stagnation) between 2011 and 2014. In most of these countries recession also translated into large increases in unemployment.

The evidence is again rather inconclusive. The Italian case is the one where the serious budgetary and economic crisis exploding in the end of 2011 has more clearly produced an enhanced role for technocrats, starting with a non-partisan prime minister (Monti) and a fully non-partisan cabinet. The two other countries of the Eurozone heavily affected by the crisis—Portugal and Spain—do not confirm this pattern. In Spain the Zapatero cabinet had a strong technocratic tinge at the beginning of the crisis but the following Rajoy cabinet drastically reversed the trend (Rodriguez and Jerez, this book). Also in Portugal, the more technocratic cabinet of Socrates was followed by the more political cabinet of Passos Coelho in 2011 (Costa Pinto and Tavares de Almeida, this book). Contrary

to expectations in both cases, the rightist governments were more partisan in outlook than the socialist governments. A somewhat similar pattern can be found in Romania where we have cabinets with a lower partisan character at the beginning of the crisis and more partisan ones in the following years (Ilonski and Stefan, this book). In France, the crisis years see some of the most partitocratic cabinets of the last decades (Bruyère and Gaxie, this book). The economic crisis does not seem to have produced a systematic increase in the existing degree of non-partisanship of cabinets.

Final Remarks

At the end of this exploration a few issues have been clarified but we are still far from a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon. The first point to be stressed is the importance of the phenomenon: Ministers (and sometimes also heads of the executive) without a truly political background and with a technocratic experience are a frequent feature of cabinets in most of the countries examined. France seems to be the only real exception; we might however consider it somewhat less of an outlier if we took into account the fact that in this country many partisan ministers also have a significant technocratic component in their background (ENA training and senior bureaucratic offices). Partisan and technocratic experience seems to combine in a quite peculiar fashion in this country. In all the other countries the weight of technocratic ministers is particularly relevant; in some cases, technocratic ministers are even dominant in crucial ministries such as finance and economy, foreign affairs, justice, defence where technical expertise is an important asset.

Behind this important phenomenon there seem to be problems both on the supply and on the demand side. On the supply side the transformations of contemporary parties, their increasing detachment from their old societal roots and the thinning of their organisation have in many countries reduced their ability to provide a sufficiently strong pool of qualified personnel to face the challenges of policy-making (and also to act as the dominant principals in the democratic delegation process). On the demand side the increased role in the chain of democratic delegation of strong monocratic heads of the executive (be they elected presidents or prime ministers) and their search for competent and personally loyal ministers together with the increasingly technical requirements of some ministerial jobs have opened a wider space for personalities who can bring as their main asset sophisticated policy-making and administrative competences.

These are probably the factors which, combined, provide the best explanation of the phenomenon we have analysed in this book. To some extent the phenomenon is due to long-term processes of change, but short-term critical episodes can significantly enhance these effects.

If we want to understand the composition of cabinets the party government model is not sufficient anymore. It must be complemented with other models based on different political criteria. This obviously raises serious questions about the outcomes of this situation and about its potential impact upon the quality of democracy: but this is a territory still largely unmapped and which will require a specific exploration.

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