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Recentering Africa in International Relations

Beyond Lack, Peripherality, and Failure

Foreword by Robbie Shilliam

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Foreword

There is little to add to Zubairu Wai's comprehensive introduction to this wonderful collection of essays. Wai amply sketches out the double task of deconstruction and reconstruction which the volume attends to. As Wai argues, this task is made all the more difficult because Africa is a parallax—exemplifying at the same time the very best and very worst of the human condition. Indeed, to think of Africa with nuance, with complexity, with opacity, with humanity, would be to dis-orient the basic episteme of International Relations (IR) scholarship.

Considering the daunting nature of this challenge, I would like to preface the chapters that follow with four stories. Two are from contemporary Ghana. One from historical Geneva. One from the contemporary Pacific. Together, I hope that they will provide an "underlabour", that is, help the reader to apprehend the depth of the critique and breadth of the retrieval undertaken in the following pages.

First, a visit to Cape Coast Castle. The guide takes us into the dungeon, comprising three or so chambers. The largest is supposed to hold a hundred men. It is small. Two slits in the wall let in the faintest of breezes, and the spray of rain that enters partly washes away the faeces, urine and vomit down two drains chiselled into the floor. Immediately above the dungeon entrance stands the chapel. The floor of the chapel is the roof of the dungeon. Praises to a white Christ above; cries, arguments, chants, moans of the damned below. It is an intentional design.

The European traders, soldiers and adventurers of this slaving fort are surrounded by Africans who they trade with, sleep with, pass by, converse

with, who serve them, who sometimes praise with them (at one time, one of the pastors of the chapel was an African). And so, it takes an effort—a soul-deep effort—to consign a part of the humanity that surrounds you to hell: to desanctify them, to make of them things, to turn living, breathing, thinking peoples into a colour that represents nothingness. Negre, black. A colour that ultimately returns to represent a whole continent.

Meanwhile, the women captives are placed in a separate prison space away from the chapel. The rite of damnation that the men suffer is horrendous; women are not even considered deserving of that. They are instantly made dehuman. No drains are cut into their prison. Faeces, urine, vomit and menses mix on the floor.

A subterranean passage leads from the men's dungeon to emerge just before the door-of-no-return. Walking through, the kidnapped are deposited on the rocks, by the surf outside of the fort walls, waiting for the boats. After 1833 the dungeon entrance to the passage is bricked up on orders of the governor. The passage behind remains. Abolition plasters over the horror, and that is supposed to be sufficient. In any case, because the women are held captive right by the door-of-no-return there is no passage to block.

The Ghanaian guide must have given this tour countless times. But this time—each time?—he relives the enslavement and trafficking of Africans as a personal affront, a lesson for humanity, a primer for international ethics. Standing outside the fort, he proudly reveals the other side of the once-final exit. From this position, the door acts as an entrance to the continent. It has a label on this side too: "the door-of-return". Heretically, the time of Africa switches, and the world with it. No longer regressing to black emptiness, now full of redemptive potentialities.

The second story is of a visit to the Legon campus of the University of Ghana. Beside the entrance to the Philosophy and Classics building is affixed a large plaque, donated by the German Democratic Republic, an artefact of Cold War politics that saw Ghana fete both West and East. The plaque is dedicated to Anton Wilhelm Amo, born in the early 1700s in Axim (within Ghana's present-day territory) and at the age of four taken to Amsterdam and then Lower Saxony.

Amo studied law at the University of Halle, writing, in the age of enslavement, a now lost dissertation on the rights of Moors (Africans) in Europe. Gaining his doctorate in philosophy at the University of Wittenberg, Amo then taught at Halle and Jena. He made significant

contributions to materialist conceptions of the mind, body and soul relationship, as well as to empiricist epistemologies. When attitudes towards the Black presence hardened, the African-born was compelled to return to his birthplace. Amo was forgotten by—erased from?—the intellectual genealogies that subsequently spun forth Kant, with his racist anthropologies and speculative treatises on perpetual peace. But Amo is remembered, in Ghana, in the Legon School of Philosophy.

Still … an "African" philosopher? Did Amo not, after all, spend his formative intellectual years in the Germanic milieu? And was he not influenced by Gottfried Leibniz and Christian Wolff? Surely, he is better considered a practitioner of European philosophy.

The problem, of course, is the colonial imposition of the choice itself: European (thought) or African (colour). Charitably, we might consider making the colour an adjective that qualifies the purity of thought: African philosopher (in Europe). Heretically, none of this seems to be an intractable problem for the leaders of the Legon School of Philosophy. And why should it? Empiricism, materialism et al are not un-African vectors of inquiry. As if "traditional" systems of knowledge and cosmologies are ignorant of such vectors until European enlightenment. One can think empiricism and materialism through multiple knowledge constellations. Consequently, within the geographical entity now known as Europe lie provinces of thought, no more no less.

Reportedly, Amo's motto was: "he that accommodates himself to necessity is a wise man, and he has an inkling of things divine". Here, we encounter the cosmological roots of realism long before they were expressed by Niebuhr Reinhold.

With this in mind, I want to turn to the third story, set in historical Geneva, June 1936. It is the moment when Haile Selassie I, the Emperor of Ethiopia, confronts the League of Nations with its own duplicities in allowing one member (fascist Italy) to brutally invade another member (sovereign Ethiopia). The Emperor suggests that the fate suffered by Ethiopia will soon be the fate suffered by all "small states". If Africa has always been part of the world, then World War Two begins on 3rd October 1935 in the East African highlands.

Selassie I's speech has historical acuity, rhetorical force, and is theoretically rich in its utilization of two concepts that will become key to IR scholarship: "collective security" and "international morality". Who, though, do students read for this pivotal moment in the inter-war period,

purportedly sparking IR's "first great debate"? Invariably it is the English historian of Russia, E.H. Carr.

In the *Twenty Years Crisis*, written only a few years after the Geneva showdown, Carr ventriloquizes his philosophical critique of realism and idealism through the voices of white European male thinkers. The historical context that these voices emerge from and respond to is rendered as a European world mostly shorn of its colonial and imperial coordinates. The few encounters that Carr makes with these coordinates are, in the main, by way of examples rather than contributions of substance.

World-historical figures, especially Selassie I, are usually received with equal praise and damnation, and their thoughts and actions are evaluated in a multitude of ways and through a wide normative arc. That is all as it must be. The point, though, is that an English historian and expert on Russia, using abstract European thought, has been made a preferable entry point into IR over an African emperor and scholar who expertly explains the African epicentre of the inter-war crisis. Could Carr and Selassie I be required readings in the first week of semester? Would that be too disorienting?

The fourth story takes us to Oceania, also known as the Pacific. Dumont d'Urville, a French naval officer, botanist and cartographer, returns from a voyage across this sea of islands in 1829 and subsequently divides its peoples into racial zones that are organized into a hierarchy of savage inclinations. Melanesia is damned; Polynesia might be saved; Micronesia is between.

Melanesia pertains to Blackness, and d'Urville associates the label with Kaffirs, an Islamic term meaning "one who covers the truth", but that colonial sojourners distil into "African heathen". Teresia Teaiwa, a beloved cultural theorist of Oceania, criticizes the way in which, by the end of the 20th century, scholars began to describe corruption, violence and state failure in Pacific islands as the "Africanization" of the region.

I am presenting my book, *The Black Pacific*, at the University of Hawai'i. In the book I argue that, through the Māori prophetic traditions, the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand had claimed Blackness as a liberating force against colonialism, despite being ostensibly classified by colonisers as Polynesians. I am rightfully reminded by Pacific scholars in attendance that similar dispositions exist across Oceania and perhaps with more force amongst those peoples historically classified as Melanesian.

Te Pō can be glossed as the night (or nights). It is the Blackness that we emerge from and to which we return. By colonial mandate, Black is a colour, while Africa is its (non-)space. But besides that mandate, Black is a cosmological constant. Oceanic teachings confirm that Africa has always created; and it awaits its creators.

London, UK   Robbie Shilliam
November 9, 2017   Queen Mary University of London

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List of Contributors

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Sally Matthews is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political and International Studies, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. Her research focuses on the relationship between poverty, privilege, and social justice. Recent articles explore the operation of privilege in social justice struggles, NGO work, and anti-racist efforts. She is also currently researching the topic of institutional culture in higher education institutions in South Africa, particularly with regard to the operation of white privilege in such institutions. More generally, her research interests are focused on the politics of development, African political economy, and social theory.

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Amy Niang is Senior Lecturer of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. Her research is informed by a broad interest in the history of pre-colonial and postcolonial African state formation and related processes. She also investigates substantive questions around theory formation, representation, and knowledge-making in/on the non-West particularly in reference to "Africa" as a moral, material, and political field of enquiry. Her work has been published in *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, *Politics*, *Afrique Contemporaine*, *African Economic History*, *African Studies*, and in a number of edited books. She has held visiting positions at the universities of Michigan, Princeton, Halle-Wittenberg, and the West African Research Center.

Zubairu Wai is Associate Professor of political science at Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. He is the author of *Epistemologies of African Conflicts: Violence, Evolutionism and the War in Sierra Leone* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) and winner of the ATWS Toyin Falola Africa Book Award for 2013. His research addresses questions about power, knowledge, identity, and representation in the discourses, and political economy of violence, conflicts, state building/formation, and international interventionism, as well as epistemological questions regarding the conditions of Africanist knowledge, and disciplinary practices in African Studies and International Relations.

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Africa in/and International Relations: An Introduction

Zubairu Wai

PROLOGUE: A VIEW FROM LONDON

In his address to the Conservative Party Conference in Manchester on October 4, 2016, the British Foreign Secretary and former Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, made the following remarks:

> I urge you not to look at the problems, but to look at the successes that these free institutions have helped to engender. For all its difficulties, life expectancy in Africa has risen astonishingly as *that country has entered the global economic system.* In 2000, the average Ethiopian lived to only 47—it is now 64 and climbing; in Zambia, the increase has been from 44 years to 60 years. In 1990, 37 percent of the world's population lived in poverty; that is down to 9.6 percent today—and yes, that is partly thanks to UK spending on development aid; £300 million a year to Ethiopia alone. But above all it is our economic ideas, our beliefs, our values that continue to lift the world out of poverty. (My emphasis)

Johnson was rightly mocked for referring to Africa as a country. However, the political punch of his statement was not in what could be regarded as

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a gaffe, no matter how embarrassing, especially coming from the Foreign Secretary of a major European colonial power that formerly colonized nearly half of the continent—referring to Africa as a country is so widespread in everyday speech that it does not, and should not, now surprise any African or student of African affairs. Rather it is, in addition to his stylized rendition of history, and tone-deaf celebration of British imperialism, and neoliberal ideologies of governance and free-market fundamentalism, located in the claim that Africa only recently "entered the global economic system," a statement that in itself is based on a number of problematic assumptions.

First is the widespread belief that the problems typically associated with Africa—poverty, development failure, armed conflict, so-called state failure, and so forth—are partially due to the continent's exclusion from the global economy. This idea, which dominated perceptions of the continent in the 1990s and early 2000s, insists that the global economic system in the age of globalization operates on an inclusion/exclusion logic, and this has, as a result of a combination of factors, revealed the "structural irrelevance" of Africa to the global informational economy (Castells 1996). For example, the perverse idea of war as an alternative system of making profit and for inserting the continent in transnational processes through the shadowy business and criminal activity narrative is informed by this notion. Africa is excluded, the proponents of this perspective maintain, and the only way it can access the global economy is through parallel trans-border criminal activities like gunrunning, blood diamonds, and warlord politics (Berdal and Keen 1997; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2001; Keen 1998; Reno 1998). *The Economist* summed up this perverse perception in a May 2000 cover story that labeled Africa "the hopeless continent," a region plagued by extreme poverty, pervasive development and state failure, armed conflicts that leave genocidal violence in their wake, and so forth. This Africa, as it would come to be understood in not only Western policy making circles but also in everyday speech, media representations, and academic discourses—even those that claim to be critical of these narratives—represents a danger not only to itself but also to the West, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, as conflicts in what is regarded as the continent's failing states came to be defined as "zones of lawlessness open to exploitation by criminals and terrorists" (DFID 2004, p. iii).

Second is the assumption that the salvation of such a troubled continent lies in Western modernist interventions, that is, in Western ideas, values, and belief systems, specifically neoliberal ideologies of governance

and market mechanisms, that according to Johnson are lifting the world out of poverty and helping to engender economic and social progress in Africa. This idea that has now emerged as a parallel discourse to that of "failure and exclusion" is encapsulated in the so-called Africa Rising narrative, which paradoxically gained prominence with a 2011 cover story by the same magazine that had, a decade earlier, declared Africa a "hopeless continent." A 2010 McKinsey Global Institute report titled "Lions on the Move: The Progress and potential of African Economies" had in fact prefigured the arguments that would come to be the mainstay of the "Africa Rising" narrative. The idea is that since 2000, a number of African economies have experienced strong and rapid economic growth and have proved resilient to external shocks, such as the 2008 financial crisis, and this has made the continent an emerging and attractive region for investment, with the potential of becoming a major economic force in the coming decades. Desirous for a different narrative, other than the standard litany of lack, failure, and crises, African governments, which had in fact been attempting to rebrand the continent, seen, for example, in ideas like "African Renaissance," the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and so forth, jumped on this "Africa Rising" bandwagon. In May 2014, for example, the Mozambican government hosted an IMF conference of the same title, intended to take stock of Africa's economic performance, and the key policy challenges they face, as well as consider how to share the purported benefits of such economic progress among its people.

Central to this "Africa Rising" narrative is the assumption that the continent's isolation has ended or is ending and that its economic performance owes to its reintegration in the global economy, an idea that also credits Western liberal governance ideals and market mechanisms and the efforts made by Western governments and their aid agencies to end Africa's isolation, help with governance reform, improve its political and macroeconomic stability, and create a healthier business climate, and these have made or are making Africa "predestined to enjoy a long period of mid-to-high single-digit economic growth, rising incomes and an emerging middle class." If indeed, as the discourses of the 1990s had stressed, the causes of the continent's problems partially owed to its lack and exclusion from the global economy, then one way of regenerating it would be to deal with the lack through its reinsertion into the global economy. This was, for example, the assumption of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had encouraged his Western counterparts to turn their attention to Africa,

the continent he had on another occasion described as "a scar on the conscience of the world" that would get angrier if not rehabilitated through Western modernist interventions and imperialist benevolence. It is the purported result of these engagements that Johnson is partially celebrating: "the free institutions," as well as "our economic ideas, our beliefs, our values," are what he credits for the "strong" economic performance of African countries. It is these engagements, Johnson believes, that have helped to institute neoliberal governance and market mechanisms, which in turn have led to "improved governance" in African states as they are increasingly reintegrated in the global economy.

Johnson's assumptions are symptomatic of the dominant ways discourses are framed about Africa, a continent toward which exists, Christopher Miller (1985) once reminded us, "a striking tendency towards dual, polarized evaluations," so that it is constantly "made to bear a double burden, of monstrousness and nobility, all imposed by a deeper condition of difference and instability" (5). Made possible by the same discursive order, this polarized and conflicting evaluation has always been at odds with itself. The contradictions it represents are, paradoxically, the source and condition of the complementarity of the seemingly opposing narratives it fashions, so that, as V.Y. Mudimbe (1988; see also Hammond & Jablow 1970) once reminded us, ideas about "beastly savages," "barbaric splendor," "the white man's grave," for example, can go hand in hand with theories about "tropical treasure house," "the promises of the Golden Land or New Orphir, and with the humanitarian principles for suppressing the slave trade, and for Christianizing and civilizing the Africans" without necessarily changing the image of the continent as an area of savagery and barbarism (20).

What this means, in essence, is that discourses of Africa's lack and failure on the one hand, and those of the "Africa Rising" narratives on the other, are in fact different sides of the same coin: both are the products of a Eurocentric conception of Africa, a continent that is never allowed to be a contingency, or value in itself, but as a product of a narcissistic obsession with its difference and alterity. These discourses deal with an invented notion of Africa, the continent in relation to which the notion of "absolute otherness" is taken to its farthest possible extreme (Mudimbe 1988, 1994; Mbembe 2001). Making simplistic stereotypical generalizations that are never really about the continent, but about an egotistic obsession with its difference and alterity, these narratives never allow Africa to be complex, layered, nuanced, or differentiated. Rather, it is always presented as a homogenous space submitting to the fidelity of a monolithic reality,

so that developments in one or some states become those of the entire continent. This Africa, seen as static and undifferentiated, can only really inhabit a single reality at a time: it is all at once, either barbarous or noble, failing or succeeding, "rising" or "reeling" as Jeffrey Gettleman (2016) recently asserted in a New York Times article. Lacking independent conceptual existence outside of the memory of the Eurocentric evolutionist gaze through which it is viewed, this Africa is a transparent and uncomplicated space, whose history is modeled on the trajectories of the evolution of European societies. Its relevance is derived not from its existence as a world-historical region but mainly from its peripherality and objecthood, which provides a metaphor for the West to construct and project its cogito; assert the superiority of its historicity, values, norms, and ideals; and celebrate the power of its benevolence and altruism as seen in Johnson's speech.

A Preoccupation: An Intervention

It is these problematic discourses that this volume attempts to contest. Bringing together a number of scholars to stage a critical intervention into the problematic ways the continent is accounted for in international relations and global politics, it asks why is it that after decades of critical work calling into question these problematic discourses on and about Africa, the dominant narratives about the continent continue, almost entirely, as if these interventions never happened. Our focus is the discipline of international relations (IR), which remains a major site for the production of these problematic ideas about Africa. Consistently proving to be incapable of coming to terms with African realities, the discipline constantly resorts to frames that depict Africa in terms of lack, failure, and peripherality, a region that has very little to contribute to world politics other than constituting a headache for Western policy makers, international strategic actors, aid agencies, and global do-gooders. The contributors to this volume ask whether this persistent peripheralization of Africa owes to the fact that it has very little to contribute to global politics or whether it is because the dominant trends, and modalities of the discipline of IR, as well as the ideological concerns of its major practitioners, are such that they consistently obfuscate and write over the very important ways the continent constitutes, and is constitutive, of world politics and global power (Kniwane 2001).

Our aim thus is to examine, within a number of interrelated domains, the complicated relationship between Africa and the power-knowledge

regimes of international relations, and ask how the dominant modalities of the discipline, and the discourses they fashion, construct Africa as an object of knowledge and what the implications of these constructions mean for the continent and its people. By way of epistemological critique, we seek to rethink the discipline of international relations by foregrounding the experiences of Africa to historical and ongoing processes of world order and global power, interrogating the power dynamics and epistemological configurations of the discipline and the fetishes of its dominant practitioners. Through this, we intend to widen the scope of inquiry beyond problematic frames that paradoxically render the singularity of the continent simultaneously transparent and invisible, while imagining and celebrating the value of alternative grids within which the relevance of African political and social life can be apprehended for the international.

We proceed from two important lines of inscriptions. First is that there is an imperative for returning to the issue of how Africa is constructed as an object of discourse in international relations and world politics. It might sound faddist, but as disciplines are never naturally emergent or neutral fields of knowledge production, but political and ideological configurations functioning within "rules" that govern the production of their discourses and within which their truth claims and knowledge regimes are produced, legitimated, and made intelligible, engaging in these critical and reflexive activities allows us to reevaluate our disciplines and trace transformations within their trends and modalities (Grovogui 2006; Trouillot 1995). We know, for example, that IR has, over the past three decades, witnessed unprecedented internal transformations as a result of the convergence of a number of perspectives critical of its Eurocentric and Androcentric foundations, and this has allowed for the assertion of the relevance of voices and experiences previously dismissed as irrelevant for its disciplinary concerns. What has this meant for Africa, a region constantly depicted as lacking meaningful politics for international relations and global politics besides constituting a headache for Western policy makers, international strategic actors, aid agencies, and global do-gooders? Given what appears as the discipline's inability to come to terms with African phenomena, it is important to return to the issue of how IR engages with Africa and specifically ask how, after decades of critical work calling into question the inadequacies of the dominant theoretical and conceptual formulations of IR and their problematic accounting of African political and social life, the discipline constructs the continent as an object of its discourse.

Second, that there is the need to attend, anew, to the issue of the continent's position in world politics. Our position is that Africa is a world-historical region that has, at least in the context of modernity, always been an essential/integral part of the global system and remains a major constitutive site for world politics and global power. However, that it is the specific ways IR frames discourses about the continent, and the theoretical fetishes of the discipline and its major practitioners frame the continent, that constantly peripheralize Africa and write over its contributions to global politics. This position sharply contrasts with the problematic perspectives that approach the continent from a perspective of whether it is included or excluded from world politics. We suggest that the issue of Africa's position in global politics cannot be reduced to discourses of inclusion/exclusion, that idea of the continent's exclusion is in fact a myth, for it has always been a major constitutive part of capitalist modernity. Rather, it should be about how it is inserted in this system and what this has meant for its people. Indeed, as Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (2012) recently reminded us, there are no exteriors to the global capitalist imperium; what we have, instead, are many peripheries and margins which are themselves a necessary "requisite condition for growth of its centers" (11). In fact, if one is to follow the Comaroffs further, it is the global south, specifically Africa, that in the current liberal imperium "affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large," where the effects of world-historical forces are first felt and where "radically new assemblages of capital and labor are taking shape," thus the region that prefigures "the future of the global north" (1, 12). Ignoring, for a moment, the reverse evolutionist premise that informs, and upon which such a theoretical project is inscribed, the claim that Africa is and has always been at the center of world-historical processes is an injunction that the authors of this volume share and privilege.

The Problem of the Colonial Library

An important point to which many of the chapters in this volume return is a very basic but important one: namely, the politicality of IR and how it has, since its inception as an academic field of study, been obsessed with power, but how this obsession with power has itself been a function and reflection of the very power IR seeks to understand, but which it has never really been able to apprehend. Rather, it remains one of the primary sites and mechanisms for the production and justification of violent

and exploitative power relations. Indeed, as E. H. Carr once characterized it in a letter to Stanley Hoffmann, the study of international relations "is simply a study of the best way to run the world from positions of strength" and "of the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger" (quoted in Haslam 2000, pp. 252–253). The dominant modalities and fetishes of IR not only make possible the silencing and marginalization of voices and regions typically constructed as subaltern and therefore peripheral to the inner workings of global power and world politics, they also reproduce them as objects for a western will to power and domination, serving as the intellectual grounds for justifying imperialistic vocations and the fetishes of coloniality. In this sense, the discipline does not merely describe the world but, in fact, actively produces it in line with very specific ideological visions and political agendas.

From heuristic conceptions, the chapters in this volume thus constitute thematic approximations of a variety of issues and qualify dispositions and currents found in emerging decolonial interventions in the discipline of international relations. Despite the internal tensions within the volume between some of the authors on the epistemological question of how to inscribe Africa in world politics, they are united by their collective apprehension of the discipline and its dominant trends, agendas, fetishes, and modalities and the way it renders the contributions of the continent invisible. As well, they demand that the discipline takes responsibility for the discourses it fashions, and the world of meaning it creates, as well as the politics it makes possible, especially in relation to a region that has constantly been rendered peripheral to the concerns of the discipline, and that constantly has violence visited on it as a result of these violent and objectifying discourses. The reason this is important is the fact that IR and its major practitioners are proximate to power: they reflect the concerns and interests of the power that they purport to analyze, and in the corridors of which they seek recognition, and want to be or remain relevant. This is precisely why they focus on the instrumental values of their discourses, which in turn reinforces those very power political inclinations in the service of which they are framed in the first place. This observation recalls an earlier point about the discipline not being a naturally emergent or neutral field of inquiry, but a political and ideological configuration functioning within "rules" submitting to the memory of its region of emergence and the biases, anxieties, and fetishes of its dominant practitioners.

One recalls here critical dispositions current within the discipline, our inscriptions within its traditions, and what it allows in terms of relating to Africa as a global region. An older but still relevant theoretical insight derived from Robert Cox's (1981) useful injunction about the politicality of knowledge captured by the distinction between what he designates as problem-solving theory and critical theory, and how the dominant conceptions of the discipline, implicitly or explicitly, are defined by the theoretical assumptions of the former and its rationalist preconceptions, is relevant to recall here. In that spirit, one can also integrate, among others, Steve Smith's (1996) differentiation between rationalist and positivist approaches on the one hand, and reflexive and post-positive approaches on the other. The contributors to this volume seem to be suggesting, however, that the issues regarding these differing currents within the house of IR, as significant enough insights as they are, might not be as simple and straight forward and should be approached with a little bit of caution when it comes to Africa. Now this is precisely the sense one gets from Craig Murphy's "Foreword" to *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (Dunn and Shaw 2001). The marginalization of Africa in IR, Murphy suggests, is an equal opportunity preoccupation and differs only in terms of degree: realists, liberals, Marxists, and other critical theorists may differ slightly in how much they say about the continent, or how much they believe the continent's experiences are relevant for international relations, but they are likely "to remain silent about why the sum of what they have to say is so small" (2001, p. ix).

In this sense, V.Y. Mudimbe's (1988, 1994) injunctions about the immateriality of what theoretical position one adopts in relation to Africa become apposite for, as he suggests, the existence and intransigence of what he calls the "colonial library"—that is, "the immense body of texts and systems of representation that has over the centuries collectively invented, and continues to invent Africa as a paradigm of difference and alterity" (Wai 2015, p. 270)—means that the meaning and image of Africa as an "invention" of the European ideological, colonial, and epistemic gaze as archived by the library of Africanism hardly change in the Western imagination. The implication of this, among others, is that IR, like the other disciplines within which Africa is produced as an object of knowledge, and within which social scientists try to make sense of African realities, does not come to Africa innocently but through recourse to an already existing archive—the colonial library—whose knowledge capital structures and almost always insinuates itself in, and contaminates, discourses

on and about Africa. Even Africans attempting to speak with their own voice are always under risk of the contaminating violence of the colonial library, for they have had to rely on the foundations of these ideological registers and their power-knowledge regimes in order to interrogate, and within which they have sought to escape the epistemic and colonializing gaze of Western modernity. "It is a paradox to note that African discourses which correct, critically reread, reinterpret, or challenge the colonial library," Mudimbe writes, "are possible and thinkable only insofar as they actualize themselves within those same intellectual fields" authorized by and constitutive of the library (1991, p. 8). In this sense, attempts to transcend the violence of IR and its objectifying discourses are still also always encoded within its frames and rules. And this is precisely what makes the internal critiques of IR manageable and less subversive as practitioners sometimes like to believe.

An issue thus imposes itself; it relates to the question of how to inscribe African voices and experiences in the disciplinary frames of IR without reproducing, in some other guise, the structuring violence of the colonial library and its problematic conceptualities. Is it possible to transcend the violence of the archive of Africanism the discursive frames of which inform disciplinary attempts to come to terms with African phenomena? Put differently, do discourses about the continent always retain the traces of the library, no matter what, or are there ways of transgressing its structuring power? Though the authors of this volume do not necessarily agree on how to answer this question, they are united on the question of the importance of taking the political and epistemological issues of the way Africa is accounted for in the disciplinary frames of IR seriously, since there seems to be a difficulty of talking about Africa without reproducing, in some other guise, that which one is contesting in the first place. Even those who believe and take as their starting point the idea that the continent is capable of generating world-historical events and contributing to global processes ultimately resort to problematic analytical schemas that reproduce Eurocentric thinking proper to the conceptualities of the library.

By Eurocentrism, we do not refer only to the vulgar Hegelian or Weberian types, whereby only Europe is constructed/considered as a world-historical region, that is, the only region capable of self-actualizing progress and transcendental self-consciousness, hence the only region and people capable of producing cultural phenomena and complex evolutionary advance of universal validity, as Weber scandalously states in *The*

Protestant Ethic. Rather, we refer also to the subtler and more insidious "origin-diffusion" problem (Gill, this volume) that even critical and self-reflective accounts are sometimes incapable of transcending. Structured by an evolutionist epistemology, that is, a "first in Europe then elsewhere" structure of time (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 8), which allows for the construction of evolutionist analytical schemas that place Europe at the apex, and Africa at the bottom, of a temporal hierarchy of social progress and human development (Wai 2012), this Eurocentrism simultaneously reproduces Africa as the primitive foundation, or original state of human evolution, and Europe the advanced or civilized state to which it must pass. As well, it constructs the West as the self-actualizing Hegelian historical subject and therefore the origin of world-historical events and processes, while simultaneously relegating the non-West, especially Africa, to a position of abject objecthood, either to be acted upon by a historically stalwart Western agency or as reactive sites responding to external stimuli that always originate from elsewhere, especially, the Euro-American world. Conversely, that though it may generate world-historical events, the non-European world, in this case Africa, cannot ultimately inscribe those events and processes. As well, that its destiny has also already been decided on its behalf in the mode of the evolution of European societies (Mamdani 1996).

This is, for example, the problem with the recent literature attempting to attend to what some observers have come to see as "the emerging political prominence of the African continent on the world stage" (Murithi 2014, p. 1). Informed by the problematic "Africa rising" narrative referred to above, proponents of this discourse contend that strong economic performance has led, or is leading, to changing perceptions of the continent among corporate actors who have come to see Africa as a "global frontier," and this has enabled African agents, state, and non-state actors to engage in and establish a track record of assertive high-level diplomacy that is impacting the international system (Bach 2013; Brown and Harman 2013; Murithi 2014). The problem though is that these studies which are based on, among other things, the inclusion/exclusion logic, that is, focused on showing how the continent is included, or can be included, in global processes, and thus how it too can do international relations, leave undisturbed the structural biases of IR, implicitly accepting the discipline's criteria of what constitutes international politics, and try to fit Africa into these frames. While attempting to highlight what they see as the increasing importance of Africa in international affairs and

show the way African actors engage with and negotiate the international, these studies are ultimately appropriative of and thus fall prey to the origin-diffusion problem, whereby the continent, though seen as an important player in world politics, is not understood as constitutive or inscriptive of these processes but as reactive to the constraints and opportunities that a changing global environment, as well as processes originating elsewhere, present.

Take Brown and Harman (2013), for example, who focus more explicitly on "African agency," in terms of the strategic choices that African actors make in negotiating and reshaping existing relations with Western donors, but who ultimately understand agency as reactive, whereby these actors respond to a constraining international environment, "whether in the form of great powers, structures of economic disadvantage, and disabling discourses" (1). The idea that structural constraints are not haplessly absorbed, but constantly negotiated and redefined, and specifically, that Africans do in fact engage in innovative strategies to negotiate the international, is one that the contributors of this volume applaud. However, limiting "African agency," and with that the continent's contributions to international relations, to such responses is shortsighted for it ultimately suggests that the continent can respond but cannot inscribe or originate such world-historical processes. This argument, which is in a way, evocative of the structural realist position that sees the behavior, choices, preferences, and strategies of state ultimately as a response to the constraints that the structures of world politics places on them, is incapable of understanding the co-constitutive vectors of world politics and the complicated ways Africa is integral to them.

Now this is also the impression one gets from Daniel Bach, who suggests that "the increasing importance of Africa in international relations and the global economy" is due to the fact that it is seen as "the latest global frontier," and this has led to "dramatic shift in perceptions of the continent among corporate players" as well as "the increasing importance of Africa in international relations and the global economy" (Bach 2013, p. 1). This idea of "frontier" according to Bach is "a metaphor" for interpreting the continent's place in the world, but this concept, as he himself recognizes, is a troubled one, connoting among other things, "delimitated borderlines," "territorial limits," and an emerging area open to exploitation. What this means, in essence, is that Africa's importance is tied to and derived from its status as a "frontier": in other words, a peripheral region

on the margins of the world open to exploitation by stalwart corporate actors, be they Western, Asian (especially Chinese and Indian), Latin American (especially Brazilian), and so forth. The racist and imperialistic connotations of such a designation, which has in fact always partially defined perceptions of Africa in the Western imagination, must have been lost on Bach. It is precisely the racist, epistemological, and world ecological groundings of this idea of "Africa as a frontier," an idea that underpins contemporary processes of land grabbing in the post-crisis liberal imperium that Bikrum Gill calls into question in his chapter. At any rate, our focus is on the discipline of IR itself and the kind of discourses it makes possible.

This is partially why we suggest that IR be approached from the perspective of its epistemological region of emergence, that is, from the position that as a social scientific discipline, or specialized discourse, it has a sociohistorical region of emergence and epistemological conditions that make its knowledge possible and intelligible (Mudimbe 1988; Foucault 1970). We suggest that it is only when approached as such that the Eurocentrism of the discipline emerges, not as an accidental mishap or analytical anomaly, but as one of the very signs and conditions of the international relations project—a project predicated, not necessarily on understanding the world, the global, the international, and so forth, but on producing particular visions of it in line with certain entrenched ideological and privileged positions in support of the narrow geopolitical, economic, and ideological interests of hegemonic powers which animate the dominant disciplinary spaces that produce mainstream IR scholarship. It is in this sense that IR constitutes a history of systematic exclusions, silences, and negations, especially of the experiences of areas and regions it constructs as peripheral to its disciplinary concerns, and precisely why Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni suggests that we dispense with the idea of "bringing Africa back in" in international relations (see Chap. 11, this volume). Africa, Sabelo tells us, does not need to be brought back in, in part, because the continent is already situated at the heart of colonial capitalist modernity and its violent structures and processes of domination and exploitation. What we need instead, he suggests, is a displacement of "the global colonial matrices of power" and the fashioning of alternative decolonial visions in which Africa is re-membered as an equal and important part.

Beyond Lack, Peripherality, and Failure

Our project, however, is not a plea for Africa to be included, or be "brought back in" in IR, in the ordinary sense of the word, for as already pointed out, the continent, whether acknowledged or not, has always been a major constitutive part of international relations and capitalist modernity. What we are attempting is a fundamental challenge to the structural and epistemic biases of IR by calling into question the ways it renders the contributions of the continent and other regions it peripheralizes invisible through the "simultaneous racialized appropriation and erasures of its contributions" (Gill, this volume) on the one hand and recentering Africa on the other by situating it as a global region that exists beyond the notions of lack, disorder, and failure, the vectors through which its aberrance, backwardness, and absolute otherness are constantly named, produced, and legislated. Through these interventions, we intend to unmoor the notion that the region's only importance to world politics is its peripherality and that it should be saved through Western modernist interventions. Our overall goal is not to fit Africa into existing frames of analysis. As well, it goes beyond notions of inclusion/exclusion, a dichotomous thinking that is incapable of disturbing the fetishes of the discipline beyond the superficial attempts at fitting African experiences and realities into traditional concepts and frames that are designed to exclude them in the first place, a reality that in turn leaves undisturbed, or even implicitly accepts, the dominant trends of the discipline and the preoccupations of its dominant practitioners as the legitimate starting point of any discussion of world politics.

As well, it also extends beyond engaging with the discipline around the superficial debates about theory, concepts, or methods since, as Mudimbe (1994) suggests, the issue with knowledge about Africa cannot be reduced to questions about theory versus empirical collection or of methods versus concepts in knowledge production. Indeed, it is in vain that we worry about how the empirical aspect of a given discourse attests to the truth of its theoretical or methodological formulations. Rather, the concern should be "about the silent and a priori choice of the truths to which a given discourse aims," the politics which makes it possible, the location of its producers, and the audience to which it speaks. This is because there is always, existing beyond the dichotomy between rudimentary and scientific knowledge, illusion and truth, the differences between conceptual, methodological, theoretical, and empirical choices of practitioners—a major problem concerning the very conditions of knowledge which, in the case of

disciplinary knowledge about Africa, whether in international relations, development studies, political science, anthropology, and so forth, is dependent both on a Western epistemological order and the conceptual vectors of the colonial library and its violent and objectifying discourses (Mudimbe 1994, pp. 39–40).

It is this condition of knowledge that we partially focus on. Our aim, therefore, is among other things epistemological: to interrogate both the structures within which knowledge about Africa is produced in IR, as well as the motives, trends, and modalities of the discipline and its major practitioners, the world of meanings they create about Africa, and the politics that those discourses make possible. We thus attend to questions of power and epistemology, location, and privilege and call into question the Eurocentric foundations of international relations and, in the case of Africa, show how this is tied to and appropriative of the foundational logics of Africanism, which itself is constituted and is constitutive of an archive, the colonial library. And this is partially what the notion of conditions of possibility helps us to grasp for, as used here, it suggests that the way Africa appears in the dominant frames of IR is partially tied to the discipline's epistemological locus and region of emergence from which it cannot be completely cut off and on which it continues to be dependent (Mudimbe 1988). This observation, however, should not be taken to mean that IR or, indeed, any social discipline is unchanging, undiversified, and incapable of critical reflection on its own conflicting modalities, motives, trends, agendas, interests, and so forth, nor should it be taken to mean that international relations is incapable of internal self-transformation or reflecting multiple currents on its contested terrain—the fact that a project such as ours, like several others before it, is at all possible means that IR is neither monolithic nor static but a contested terrain, which has been undergoing transformations occasioned by voices critical of its past and current modalities, self-conception, and agendas.

What we are drawing attention to, however, and Mudimbe implores us to state it anew is the idea that first, like every social discipline, IR only really makes sense within the context of its epistemological region of emergence; second, that as a specialized discourse demanding specialist competence, it functions within specific rules and procedures which make its truth claims intelligible and that without these rules, there is no IR as a "scientific" discipline; finally, that it is only when approached as such, that we may begin to understand not only how and why the discipline still

carries the imprints of its Eurocentric foundations but also how and why it remains committed to its founding myths through which it has come to promote specific visions of the "international." It may also partially explain why after decades of critical work, the dominant trends in the discipline, at least in relation to Africa, continue as if the critiques never happened. In this sense, we can further invoke Mudimbe's critique of the foundations of Africanist discourses.

Designating anthropology as the epistemological locus of Africa's invention, Mudimbe has suggested that it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine Africanist knowledge and the disciplines within which knowledge about Africa is produced without a Western epistemological link: for on the one hand, it is impossible to cut these disciplines off completely from the fields of their epistemological genesis and, on the other, given that their histories, trends, modalities, truths, and so forth are derived from a given space, they speak primarily from, to, and about that space. This dependence on their epistemological region, following Mudimbe further, means that the disciplines through which Africa is studied are by every definition ethnocentric, the two types of which he defines thus:

> an epistemological filiation and an ideological connection. In fact, they are often complementary and inseparable. The first is a link to an *episteme*, that is, an intellectual atmosphere which gives [a discipline] its status as discourse, its significance as a discipline, and its credibility as a science in the field of human experience. The second is an intellectual and behavioral attitude which varies among individuals. Basically, this attitude is both a consequence and an expression of a complex connection between the scholar's projection of consciousness, the scientific models of his[/her] time, and the cultural and social norms of his[/her] society. (1988, p. 19)

It is this attitude that sometimes accounts for differences between individual scholars, even while sharing the same epistemic space. This important insight applies quite accurately to IR and provides a window into the enduring Eurocentrism of the discipline, which even while legitimating itself by disguising its ethnocentric biases in approaches, concepts, and theories it defines as having universal validity for understanding international politics and global power, condemns itself, as Mbembe (2001) notes of disciplinary knowledge on and about Africa generally, to making problematic generalizations from the idioms of a European provincialism (that represents itself as the universal) within

whose dominant paradigms it has sought, but within which it fails, to understand African phenomena and realities, other than constructing the continent as a monument to its power. Posing this question in methodological terms, Mbembe wonders "whether it is possible to offer an intelligible reading of the forms of social and political imagination in contemporary Africa solely through conceptual structures and fictional representation used precisely to deny African societies any historical depth and to define them as radically other, as all that the West is not" (2001, p. 11). The contributors of this volume seem to be suggesting that by remaining dependent on the imprints of its Eurocentric foundations, IR has been incapable or, at the very least, has been unable to transcend, as Mudimbe (2013) notes in a different but related context, the trans-historical lines and their variations without submitting them to the memory of its region of emergence and the biases, anxieties, and fetishes of its ethnos.

Not even reflexive or post-positivist approaches have been able to escape this problem entirely. One can recall here, for example, Steve Smith's efforts in the early 2000s to show, in the passion of Stanley Hoffmann (1977), how IR is an American discipline in the sense that it is not only committed to US academic and policy concerns but in fact tends to explain a narrow range of global politics from a US-centered perspective (Smith 2000, 2002). The irony of this claim, however, is the fact it conceals: the parochialism of IR is not an American property alone. The fact that some currents within the poststructuralist tradition in the discipline, for example, believe that postcolonial perspectives, no matter what one may think of them, are merely derivative discourses with no real value outside of the poststructuralist injunctions that made them possible is an attestation to this fact. This arrogant and unreflective "epistemological ethnocentrism," that is, the idea "that scientifically there is nothing to be learned from 'them' unless it is already 'ours' or comes from 'us'" (Mudimbe 1988, p. 15), always posits a "first in Europe, then elsewhere" structure of thought, and sees non-European thinkers as incapable of independent conceptual formulations or existence. Indeed, what might appear to Smith as a field dominated by the United States does reveal itself to those whose experiences and voices are constantly rendered subaltern to the concerns of the discipline as a field dominated by Euro-American scholarship and concerns. In focusing on the dominance of the United States or North American scholarship, or particular theoretical perspectives in IR, it is sometimes too easy for those scholars, critical of American

domination of both the discipline and the world, to forget their own privileged status and location within it. The relevance of Europe to theory formation or the disciplinary concerns of IR has never been in doubt.

Africa, on the other hand, is an entirely different story. Despite the fact that the continent has been and continues to be an essential part of the making of the modern world, its relevance to IR is not seen as self-evident, and despite years of critical intervention or even attempts to illustrate otherwise, the dominant renditions of IR and world politics still treats Africa, its peoples, cultures, and histories with scant regard; negating its contributions which are either written over or appropriated unacknowledged, while its knowledge, especially that produced by scholars based on the continent, is largely ignored. The occasional publication of volumes making the case for the continent's relevance for international relations, or the occasional ascent of a number of scholars from or with specialist interest in the continent, does not change this reality. In fact, despite recent advances in the discipline, most of what is considered "important" theoretical work within the IR seems to be emergent from scholars located in the imperial citadels of power. Location and positionality, which are ultimately tied to power and privilege, are usually what determine relevance in IR, not necessarily theoretical rigor or cogency of analytical insights.

This brings us to an important point that emerges from this volume: despite the important lines of critiques against its dominant frames, IR remains one of the most compromised disciplines in relation to Africa. In fact, it has come to perhaps occupy the dubious position that nineteenth-century anthropology held in its own imperial moment. This much is apparent once one takes a look at its dominant disciplinary practices, theoretical assumptions, and the discourses they frame about Africa's relation with the international. Indeed, one does not have to look too hard in order to see that most of that which passes as knowledge on and about African states and societies is so problematic that even critical and reflexive scholars have not been able to escape them entirely. For example, such concepts as quasi-state, warlord state, state failure, crisis of neopatrimonialism, ethnic conflict, warlord politics, and so forth, with which discourses about the continent have come to be strongly associated, create the idea that Africa is a strange and peculiar place, thus reinforcing the idea that the continent lacks meaningful politics other than as a headache for Western policy makers, and this carries with it a political punch: it legislates Western imperialist intervention as the solution to the continent's problems. The practical

implications of this can be seen, for example, in the recent uptick in Western interventionism on the continent: Libya, Mali, Ivory Coast, to name a few (Wai 2014).

Many of the chapters in this volume thus suggest a return to epistemology and power and, more specifically, taking histories of colonization, as well as "indigenous" knowledge systems, and their implications, seriously. By drawing attention to how the "independence generation" of African leaders imagined, spoke about, and understood their condition and place in the world, Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Chap. 8), Amy Niang (Chap. 5), and Gemma Bird (Chap. 10) show the importance of anti-colonial histories and knowledges and the lessons that these have for rethinking both the discipline and Africa's place in it. Marta Iñiguez de Heredia (Chap. 3), similarly, calls attention to the necessity of situating contemporary processes, such as war and so-called state failure, within larger historical and structural contexts and processes as a necessary condition for theory formation and for understanding contemporary African phenomena such as conflicts. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Chap. 10) is bullish about "critical resistance thought and self-assertion" as a way of moving beyond "the idea of Africa" (Mudimbe 1994) to what he, after Ngugi wa Thiong'o, calls "the African idea." Zahir Kolia (Chap. 6) invites us to, in the spirit of Biko's injunctions, "dislodge the malignancy of amnesia, unmoor the interpretive force of selective archivization, and refashion new decolonial groundings for the future." In the light of the intransigence of the colonial library, Sally Matthews (Chap. 7), in the context of rethinking development for Africa, in the aftermath of the post-development critiques, calls for epistemological vigilance and creativity in negotiating the contaminated terrains of colonial capitalist modernity, while Bikrum Gill (Chap. 9) suggests a return to the source: rejecting Europocentric accounting of the world and taking indigenous African life-worlds, local knowledge systems, and embodied practices as the starting point of any serious attempt at rethinking IR for Africa.

Now, this latter point could also be deduced from emerging decolonial interventions in the discipline. One recalls here, for example, Robbie Shilliam's (2017) attempt to draw out conceptual, epistemological, and ethical lessons from indigenous African and Haitian cosmologies for international relations. In his fascinating keynote address to the 2016 Millennium Conference, he rereads the voodoo rites at Bwa Kayiman which, informed by these indigenous cosmologies, inaugurated the Haitian Revolution and its ethical lessons for humanity, in order to

reconceptualize ideas about race, the condition of revolutionary praxis and freedom, and the racialized making of the international. A related, but differing, preoccupation could also be found in Siba Grovogui's (2016) attempt to access local knowledge systems, indigenous life-worlds, and embodied practices in Africa for interrogating, as well as reimagining international relations. While these critical preoccupations and the spirits within which they are inscribed do raise questions about translation, in terms of converting indigenous knowledge systems into the epistemic and conceptual frames of IR, they do in fact point to what the future of the discipline weaned off its Eurocentric myths and metaphors might look like. In them, we recognize that our project, in its demand for radically new ways of doing international relations for Africa, may not be too ambitious or farfetched.

Scope and Organization

The chapters in this volume may be loosely grouped into three thematic clusters: refutations, affirmations, and future horizons. The first group of essays offers rigorous critical examinations of the way IR engages with and reproduces Africa in its knowledge capital and discursive frames; the second set asserts the relevance of the continent's experience in world politics, highlighting its centrality to the production of global power; and the third imagines alternative futures for Africa in/and world politics. There are obvious overlaps between these three lines of enquiry, though some of the chapters may accent one aspect than the others, precisely why we did not divide the volume into sections or parts. As specialists in their respective rights, the contributors to this volume bring a range of expertise and, more importantly, intimate knowledge of Africa and the discipline of IR, which are rendered in critical conversations with each other as well as in engagement with the discipline, its motives, fetishes, and agendas. Through an exacting political capacity and critical engagement, they together offer a complex picture of the dynamics of world politics, the larger structures within which it is produced, and Africa's place in it.

The second chapter, which is a substantially revised version of a previously published essay, interrogates the dominant discourses about African regime types and their relationship with what has come to be seen as pervasive state failure on the continent. It argues that through the positing of a vulgar universalism that is incapable of apprehending the singularity of African historical experiences, especially the specificities of its state forms which were constituted under concrete conditions of colonial

domination, the scholars invested in the concepts of state failure and neopatrimonialism, subsume complex political realities, and the histories within which they are produced under the totalitarian grip of a Eurocentric unilinear evolutionist logic. This analytical device functions as a mechanism for ideologically effacing or rendering invisible the relational and structural logic of past histories of colonial domination and contemporary imperial power relations within which the states in Africa have historically been constituted and continue to be reconstituted and reimagined. Through these ideologically disposed interventions and the power relations they make possible, international relations makes itself and the world in which we live, while simultaneously constructing the continent as an object of a Western will to power and domination and imperialistic vocations.

Marta Iñiguez de Heredia extends this critique to the way armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been accounted for in Chap. 3. Though there has been a shift in thinking about the causes of the conflict from a resource war thesis to that of struggle over land and identity as the basis for political mobilization through violence and war making, she suggests, these accounts still remain faithful to problematic tropes that are characteristic of the dominant discourses about African conflicts and societies: that is, the tendency of internalizing the conflict as a localized phenomenon emergent from pathologies stemming from state failure and neopatrimonialism themselves endogenously produced by the internal dysfunction of Congolese society, hence detaching the "local" from broader historical processes and global political and economic structures that condition it. Attempting an alternative interpretation of the political and economic sources of conflict, the chapter contends that neither poverty and lack of access to land nor identity and lack of political representation, if indeed those could be accepted as the root causes of conflict in the DRC, can be detached from historical and ongoing patterns of appropriation and dispossession at the global political economic level. This is illustrated by reference to two concrete policies, the new international stabilization strategy of the UN's mission in Congo and the government's call for agro-businesses and large landowners to invest in the DRC. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the issues at the heart of the conflict in the DRC cannot be divorced from the historical forces that have shaped and continue to shape that country's history and its location in global politics.

In Chap. 4, Kate Manzo takes up the issue of how Africa is imagined and represented in Western texts and discourses. Basing her interventions

on the representations of Africa in Western media and international photography competitions, she plots a critical intervention that reads these texts as geopolitical texts that provide insight into how Africa is positioned and represented in world politics. World Press Photo, the author explains, is the chapter's institutional frame of reference for three reasons: it runs one of the biggest annual photography competitions in the world, its annual global tour of prize-winning photographs is the most popular traveling photo exhibition in the world, and its online archive contains all winning images dating back to the inaugural competition in 1955. These images, she argues, matter because in addition to being featured in charity appeals as well as in the traveling photography exhibition itself, they tell the story of how the enduring image of Africa in the global imaginary is sustained and perpetrated through texts that index age-old colonial stereotypes and representations of Africa. While acknowledging the persistence of the image of Africa in the Western imaginary, the chapter notes that transformations in the way visual journalism represents Africa as seen in changes in the winning images as well as viewer interests in the photo exhibitions of the World Press Photo may be hinting at the overall transformation in the image of Africa in the global imaginary.

In one of the more innovative chapters in the volume, Amy Niang (in Chap. 5) attempts a rethinking of IR for Africa by historicizing the role of "the sovereignty principle" in the making of "the international." Focusing on three distinct moments—(a) the "legal" conventions that guided the Berlin Conference (1884/1885), (b) the context of the short-lived experiment of a Franco-African union (1946–1958), and (c) the various deliberations on self-determination that took place in the inter- and post-war periods—she contends that contrary to conventional wisdom in international relations, sovereignty is not a fixed and unchanging fact but a flexible and layered normative principle with multiple meanings that can be negotiated. In the specific context of the three instances she analyzes, she suggests that sovereignty functions as a "relational" norm (in the context of Berlin), a "divisible" norm (the Franco-African union) and a modernization-bound norm (the United Nations and African self-determination). A major contention of the chapter is that colonialism, as legislated by the Berlin Conference, and decolonization, as conceived and mediated through the Franco-African union, have to be (re)conceptualized and rethought in the manner in which they came to (re)distribute sovereign effects. In showing the frameworks, the constraints, and possibilities released in these various historical moments of African subjugation,

and/or emancipation, the chapter emphasizes patterns of discontinuity that challenge conventional narratives in international relations and global politics and raises questions about temporality and contestation, which links it to the issues addressed in Chap. 8, as well as Chap. 10.

In the following chapter, Zahir Kolia then reads the significance of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in two registers: first as a moment of the production of world politics through the provision of a global template of a politics of reconciliation for fractured societies emerging from conflict and second, as an aporia of the colonial archive that is founded upon the theological-psychoanalytic motifs of confession and atonement. Drawing on a decolonial reading of Derrida's *Archive Fever*, he locates the TRC as a practice that functioned to archive individual testimonies of traumatic violence in order to witness them as redemptive acts of national atonement. Through this process, however, the materiality of trauma, violence, and pain was reconstituted into a pathological discourse of black-on-black violence and as collective monuments of the past excised of the structural condition of state instituted and sanctioned violence against the racialized majority. Understood in this light, the TRC produced a unique archival form indexed by selectively remembering violence in order to forget them through a national form of amnesia. The theologically inscribed nation-building project, problematic in its very articulation and inscription, the chapter suggests, has now been globalized as a model that has continued to inform processes of reconciliation across the world.

Returning to the post-development critiques of the 1990s and their call for alternatives to development, Sally Matthews attempts, in Chap. 7, an interesting dialogic intervention by reading these critiques alongside reflections of African theorists on the difficulty of escaping the colonizing structure and the colonial archive, as a way of appreciating the difficulty that may in fact exist in the way of rethinking IR for Africa. The chapter argues that while it is difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve a past or create a future that is uncontaminated by the vectors of modernity and coloniality and their developmentalist logics, it does not mean that attempts should not be made to disrupt these modernizationist hallucinations that have come to dominate the way Africa is seen and talked about. She proposes three tentative pathways how to both resist and rework development and imagine an alternative future: first, destabilizing development by flourishing in the restrictive, cramped, constrained spaces that characterize the postcolonial condition; second, by engaging with the idea of border

gnosis to consider the possibility of confronting development in a way that is subversive even while it does not fully escape its vectors; and finally, by careful consideration of the way in which development has been reworked on the ground in Africa and how this may help in attempts at resistance and reappropriation in creative ways.

Branwen Gruffydd Jones tackles IR's problem with time and coloniality in Chap. 8. She suggests that part of the discipline's problem with Africa is not only the discipline's failure to understand the centrality of colonialism and its legacies to the making of the modern international order but also to theoretically consider colonialism and anti-colonialism, as experiences and relationships of international relations which demand serious critical reflection. Focusing specifically on Portuguese colonialism in Africa and African anti-colonial responses to it, Gruffydd Jones makes two important claims: first, that it is the discipline's dominant conceptions of time and temporality that serve to marginalize and contain the colonial experience and, second, that the thought and practice of African anti-colonialism may be understood as a radical critique and rejection of IR's dominant conceptions of time and temporality. Gruffydd Jones's intervention is important for a number of reasons. First, it provides critiques of IR's problem with colonialism, and through that, begins to specify the condition of possibility of imagining IR for Africa, which she insists must begin with the colonial question and its temporal valences. Second, her focus on the temporality question is in line with emerging postcolonial/decolonial interventions in the discipline whereby a rethinking of time and temporality in the discipline is beginning to receive renewed attention (see, e.g., Agathangelou and Killian 2016).

It is the issue of the condition of possibility for rethinking IR that unites the chapters of Bikrum Gill (Chap. 9), Gemma K. Bird (Chap. 10), and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (Chap. 11). And though each of these chapters focuses on a different issue, they still are united by their commitment to the politics of the possibility of another IR for Africa. To tackle the recent spike in global agricultural land acquisitions referred to as the global land grab in the post-crisis liberal imperium, Gill focuses on the developmental implications of growing South-South dimensions in the areas of agricultural investments, specifically, on the involvement of the Indian state and capital in the commercialization and industrialization of agriculture in Africa, and considers the epistemological and ecological implications of the construction of Africa as the last frontier of capitalist modernity. His empirical site

is the Gambella province of Ethiopia and the epistemological questions surrounding the rise and fall of the Indian multinational agribusiness firm, Karuturi's efforts to become a leading global supplier of food through the initiation of large-scale industrial agricultural production in the Gambella province of Ethiopia. He suggests that critical to Karuturi's construction of the Gambella land concession as a staging ground for its launch into global prominence in agro-food provisioning is the modernist epistemology that, through processes of racialization, discounts and displaces indigenous peoples and nonhuman life forms as beings that are incapable of efficient and productive economic activity, while conversely privileging the "developmental" knowledge of the Ethiopian state and the "productive" knowledge of Indian capital as central to the urgent task of mastering nature and bringing dormant virgin lands to life. It was this idea, he maintains, that proved fatal to the project, as the epistemological inability to incorporate indigenous knowledge that accounts for "extra-human" agency left the company dramatically unaware of the particular socio-ecological dynamics of the Baro River ecosystem on whose floodplain the land concession was located. In making this argument, the chapter challenges the structural bias of IR by revealing how the socio-ecological knowledge and practice of the peoples and lands of "peripheral" spaces such as Gambella are constitutive sites of global power and demonstrates the significance of "race, nature and coloniality" in the constitution of the international. As well, it revisits the issue of subjugated knowledges and the implications that they have for global processes. A major takeaway from the chapter for the current purpose is the suggestion that any attempt of rethinking IR for Africa must begin with taking indigenous knowledge systems seriously.

In Chap. 10, Gemma Bird considers a related, even if different issue: the political significance of the post-independence attempt by African leaders at Pan-African unity in the 1950s and 1960s for contemporary discussions of continent-wide attempts at regionalization or pan-national federalization. She suggests that though conversations about such processes have often focused on the European Union as the only real attempt to economically or politically federalize, the post-independence era in Africa saw various attempts at continent-wide solidarity and collaboration based on Pan-African ideals. Originating in the 1890s as a scholarly and solidaritist movement of people of African descent, made famous by the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois, the first generation of postcolonial African leaders, she argues, saw in Pan-Africanism a value beyond an imaginary

sense of fraternalism, viewing it instead as a political model for continental unity—an approach that they believed could change the economic and political position of Africa in relation to Western and Eastern powers. Exploring how debates regarding suitable methodology for collaboration ultimately led to the failure to federalize, she suggests that these efforts, which are often ignored in IR scholarship beyond discussions by Africanist scholars, continue to hold important lessons for understanding Africa's relation with the international and may hold a clue about the future trajectories of the African Union, especially in the context of increasing political prominence of the continent in world affairs.

The chapter's call for "bringing African scholarship back in" functions, in Bird's framing, as a condition of possibility of rethinking IR for Africa. It is related both to the interventions of Amy Niang (Chap. 4), Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Chap. 7), and especially, the final chapter by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, who goes against any notion of bringing Africa back in. Africa, Ndlovu-Gatsheni tells us, does not need to be brought back in, for the continent is already in the bowels of colonial capitalist modernity and its violent processes of domination and exploitation. What is needed, he suggests, is a displacement of "the global colonial matrices of power" and the fashioning of alternative decolonial visions. This latter point, that is, fashioning decolonial visions, he calls "re-membering," by which, after Ngugi wa Thiong'o, he refers to as a socio-political restorative initiative aimed at dealing with centuries of dismemberment and fragmentation of Africa. In showing how Africa has been pushed into the margins of world politics, the chapter returns to historical processes such as the Atlantic slave trade, the scramble for and partition of Africa, and the epistemological initiatives that commenced in terms of what he calls epistemicides, linguicides, and so forth through which the dismemberment of Africa has been consolidated. It then makes a strong case for re-membering Africa through a decolonial praxis anchored on a paradigm shift from V.Y. Mudimbe's "idea of Africa" to the decolonial "African idea." This approach, the chapter concludes, is necessary in enabling a shift from the discourses of negativity and alterity to the alternative decolonial ones of Africa as a site of critical thought and self-assertion. Marta Iñiguez de Heredia concludes the book by considering the implications of the volume for international relations and Africa.

If our modest attempt at contributing to ongoing efforts at decolonizing international relations, and especially in foregrounding the experiences and voices of a continent that is persistently rendered subaltern and

peripheral to the concerns of the discipline, were to spark renewed interest in the issue of how practitioners think about their discipline and engage with their objects of study, then, no matter how limited, our intensions may have been realized. Emerging out of an email conversation between the editors, the themes of this volume were first explored in a panel at the 2015 British International Studies Association (BISA) conference. We are grateful to Danielle Beswick and Carl Death for encouraging the constitution of our panel through the BISA Africa and International Studies working group. Without the professionalism, enthusiasm, and forbearance of Anca Pusca, the senior commissioning editor for International Relations and Security Studies at Palgrave and her editorial assistants, Anne Schult and Katelyn Zingg, this volume would never have been seen the light of day. We are especially grateful to the friends, colleagues, and collaborators who agreed to join us in this conversation. They are the very reason this volume even exists. Without their dedication and willingness to work within a very tight schedule, this volume would have never seen the light of day. It has been a pleasure working with Marta, whose idea it was to do this project and whose passion, forbearance, and gracefulness sustained it. I am very grateful for her friendship. Chap. 2 is a substantially revised version of a paper I previously published as 'Neopatrimonialism and the discourse of state failure in Africa,' *Review of African Political Economy*, 39, no. 131 (2012), 27–43. I am grateful to Taylor & Francis for granting me permission to reproduce it in this book.

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International Relations and the Discourse of State Failure in Africa

Zubairu Wai

A Candidate for State Failure?

In a study published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations purporting to explain the causes of the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991–2001), the British Africanist, Christopher Clapham, makes the interesting claim that "Sierra Leone was by no means an obvious candidate for state collapse" (2003, p. 9). (David Keen, another British political scientist, would make a similar claim in his 2005 volume, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*: "Sierra Leone was not a particularly likely candidate for civil war" (Keen 2005, p. 8)—which begs the question what state is a particularly likely candidate for civil war, or what makes a state an obvious candidate for state collapse and what does not?) Clapham's reason for this somewhat bizarre assertion is based on assumptions about what he believes ordinarily allows for successful statehood: Sierra Leone has a favorable political geography in terms of its small size, manageable population, abundant natural resources, and good communication networks which largely frees it from some of "the inherent problems that bedevil massive territories with very poor communication such as Angola, Congo

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or Sudan" (9). But more importantly, it "experienced an exceptionally long period of colonial administration," which gives it "a favorable social endowment" in terms of a long-standing commitment to Western education and a substantial cadre of indigenous lawyers, academics, administrators, and other professionals. Because of these factors, "if you were looking for an African state with the physical, social and economic infrastructure appropriate to success as an independent state, you would have had difficulty finding a better candidate than Sierra Leone" (Clapham 2003, pp. 9–10).

Implicit in Clapham's claims are extremely problematic assumptions, which though stupendous are not immediately discernible. First is the claim to a purported knowledge of what makes a state an "obvious candidate" for "state collapse," "state failure" or civil war, and so on and what does not. In Clapham's imagination, (1) the size of a state matters: the bigger it is—e.g. massive states like DRC and Sudan—the more likely it is to fail; (this rule apparently only applies to African states, which call into question the implicit bias in this formulation, but I digress); (2) the duration of colonial rule matters: the longer the colonial experience, the more likelihood of successful statehood; and (3) the level of exposure to Western civilization, education and lifestyles matter: it helps in bequeathing a favorable political culture and social endowments which contribute to a successful statehood. Irrespective of what his political intensions are, Clapham's notion of statehood, knowingly or unknowingly, implicitly or explicitly, is already constructed on the normative orthodoxy of a Eurocentric model that privileges Western historicity, cultural achievements, political organizations, and systems of governance as the universal standard of statehood. Apparently, exposure to Western civilization, even via the violence of colonial domination, is the key to successful statehood, as if Western states are themselves not constitutive of the violence and disciplinarity constitutive of modern statehood.

Second and more important is the problematic liberal understanding of the political, which pretends that it is possible and, in fact, tries to separate violence from the political, a move that has allowed for the interpretation of political violence and armed conflicts as social pathologies that develop when politics or the state fails or collapses. This problematic liberal understanding of the political, which is incapable of seeing its own complicity in political violence, is, for example, made explicit by Hannah Arendt's *On Violence* (1970) which forcefully argues that no political goal could ever correspond to the destructive potential of violence, no matter how

well-intentioned, well-managed, or controlled. Forgetting that the state can itself only come into being and can only maintain its existence through violence, Arendt argues that violence is "distinct from power, force or strength" for it harbors, in itself, an "element of arbitrariness" that disturbs power and politics (4). Though they are usually linked, she writes, "Power and violence are opposites; where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance" (56). In this framing then, violence is seen as a corruption or "perturbation of the 'normal,' peaceful state of things" (Žižek 2008, p. 2); precisely why armed conflicts have come to be regarded, not as a manifestation of politics but a mark of its failure and, with that, the state.

Since the 1990s, the phenomenon of state failure has taken center stage in global politics and international development discourse and has become, in the dominant academic and policy discussions and debates, the outcome of nearly every form of socio-economic distress, civil strife, and political unrest in the Global South. Given the widespread belief among northern policy makers and academics that these so-called state failures not only pose a humanitarian challenge for the inhabitants of the failed/failing states but also represent a security threat for international peace and security and especially the security of the North, understanding, explaining, predicting, preventing, or reversing state failure have become major policy concerns for northern policy makers, strategic actors, and academics seeking to contain the deleterious consequences of neoliberal globalization. This linking of state failure in the south to the security of the north has also been instrumental in the transformation of international development thinking and the merging of security and development discourse and practices into a neo-imperialist posture now known as liberal peace agenda (Duffield 2001; Dillon and Reid 2000; Wai 2014).

The incidents of armed conflicts, especially in the 1990s and beyond, which the "experts" and strategic actors have been quick to conceptualize as symptomatic of a larger phenomenon of "state failure" or "state collapse," made Africa metaphorically a conceptual guinea pig for the development and application of the various concepts and theories, as well as for the testing of various international policy prescriptions that have developed in response to the phenomenon. Depending on the political interests and ideological commitments of the scholars involved in relation to what they define as a state's claim to, or exercise of authority over its territory

and its citizenry, as well as its capacity to achieve certain given economic, social and political outcomes, a semantic field of concepts has emerged to describe and portray these state forms: failed/failing state, collapsed/collapsing state, fragile/weak state, quasi-state, shadow state, felonious state, warlord state, and so on (see Bøås 2001; Carment 2003; Gros 1996; Helman and Ratner 1993; Lambach et al. 2015; Mazrui 1995; Menkhaus 2003; Migdal 1988; Reno 1998; Rotberg 2004; Taylor 2013; Zartman 1995).

Despite what might appear as conceptual and theoretical differences among the numerous scholars who use the conception of state failure to explain what they see as the political failures of southern societies and the different situations in which they have come to apply the label, they agree that state failure is a reality of world politics and that, to understand it, one needs to focus on a state's "degree of stateness" (Gros 1996), that is, its capability to perform certain functions or achieve certain outcomes. The capability or performance criteria is foundational to most conceptions of successful statehood and, conversely, state failure. The functions or outcomes of state capacity are usually defined in social contractarian terms, in terms of what is described as the coercive and noncoercive functions of the state. The coercive functions of a state are conceptualized in Hobbesian or Weberian terms: that is, in terms of a state's capacity for monopolistic control of violence over its territories and, with that, its capability to enforce contracts, maintain law and order, and provide security—in order words, enforce its rule within its given territory. The noncoercive functions are conceptualized in terms of the provision of social goods and services, the durability and effectiveness of a state's governance institutions, its social and economic redistributive functions, and so forth. A state that performs these functions is successful; those that are unable to perform them are deemed to have failed (Hill 2005).

To Jean-Germain Gros, for example, failed states are those "in which public authorities are either unable or unwilling to carry out their end of what Hobbes long ago called the social contract but which now includes more than maintaining the peace among society's many factions" (1996, p. 456ff). Like Gros, I. William Zartman (1995) conceptualizes state failure in terms of a state's capacity to properly perform those basic functions that he claims are required for a state to qualify as one. When a state can no longer, either with traditional, charismatic, or institutional sources of legitimacy, properly perform these basic functions, or claim legitimacy to

govern, and when it has lost control over its own political and economic spaces, it has failed. To Robert I. Rotberg (2004), states fail when "they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens"; so also does Robert Jackson see state failure as a situation whereby a state "cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil conditions for their populations: domestic peace, law and order, and good governance" (Jackson 2000, p. 296)—bear in mind that this idea of "good governance" as a "necessary" political value that states must possess only emerged in the context of the liberal ascendancy in the 1990s and yet is now theorized as if it is a timeless universal feature of states. The legitimacy of a state then, according to these conceptions, is derived, not from historical contingencies, or the historical factors that give rise to the emergence of the state and the forces that shape its existence, but from the functions it performs and its capacity to perform those functions. In this sense, then, the colonial state, for example, which comes into being through violence and extra-judicial imposition, would irrespective of its fraudulent, illegal, necropolitical, violent, and extra-judicial nature, be legitimate in so far as it can perform certain functions and meet certain outcomes.

Conceptualized thus, a hierarchical stratification of states along a continuum that ranges from strong to fragile/weak to collapsed/failed state is erected (Hill 2005). This hierarchy which is informed by problematic evolutionist preconceptions (Wai 2012) produces a very mechanistic conception of statehood, based mainly on capability. Robert I. Rotberg, for example, constructs his hierarchy of statehood in terms of what he calls "performance criteria," that is, the capabilities of states to effectively deliver what he regards as the most crucial political goods (security, political freedoms, economic well-being, and social welfare such as healthcare and so on): "strong states may be distinguished from weak states and weak states from failed or collapsed ones," in accordance with the degree of their performance and capabilities to deliver these goods (2004, p. 2ff). For Joel Migdal, strong states are those with high capabilities to complete the tasks of successfully penetrating society, regulating social relations, extracting resources, and appropriating or using resources in determined ways, while weak states are on the lower end of the spectrum of such capabilities (1988, pp. 4–5).

Neopatrimonialism as an Explanation of State Failure

With specific reference to Africa, which has been constituted as a conceptual godsend for those invested in the phenomenon of state failure, the economy of discourses which has emerged since the 1990s has tended to largely account for state failure in another troubling but ubiquitous concept: neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism has become a catch-all conceptual staple in Africanist scholarship; it is used to explain every perceived problem in African states and societies—corruption, institutional decay, communication breakdown, authoritarian rule, development failure, economic dysfunction, poor growth, civil and political unrest and, especially, armed conflicts, and so forth. It depicts the states in Africa as undifferentiated and schizophrenic political formation in the sense that rational-bureaucratic institutions formally exist but function through patrimonial rules so that there is limited or no distinction between office and officeholder. While these states have all the formal outward trappings of modern political institutions, they, in reality, function as anachronistic and backward organizations defined by interpersonal rules and patron-client relationships.

These patron-client relations, which are pervasive and permeate the entire political system, are, Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle's insist, "the *core* feature of politics in Africa," constituting, as it were, "the foundation and superstructure of political institutions" and political behavior on the continent (Bratton and van de Walle 1994, p. 459). African states, which according to these scholars and their interlocutors, "are properly speaking, not states at all," but "the private instruments of those powerful enough to rule" (458) are thus depicted as aberrant political formations, pathological constructs, dysfunctional entities, and, recently, (Bayart et al. 1999) criminal enterprises, governed by corrupt, tyrannical, and authoritarian regimes of "big men" whose greed, rent-seeking behaviors, and clientist politics have obstructed the development of these states into modern, rational-bureaucratic states with properly functioning capitalist economies. It is this primary factor, more than anything else, that creates the conditions for fragility and ultimately state failure or collapse on the continent. "These rulers," writes William Reno, "reject pursuit of a broader project of creating a state that serves collective good or even creating institutions that are capable of developing independent perspectives and acting on behalf of interests distinct from their rulers' personal exercise of power" (Reno 1998, p. 1). It is through personal patron-client relationships and informal political and economic networks

that these big men have turned functional states bequeathed to them at independence into dysfunctional entities that function more like criminal enterprises than legitimate political organizations (Bayart et al. 1999). Personalizing the state, and badly weakening its institutions through corrupt and shadowy business dealings, these processes and practices have created or accelerated conditions for fragility and weakness, that in turn have ultimately led to state collapse or failure.

Two major tendencies have been identified in this body of literature: the state-centric and society-centric approaches. The former locates the problem of neopatrimonialism in the state itself: the insatiate desire of "the power elite for popular legitimacy," and their ability to control informal networks that bypass state institutions, nurtures a politics of predation that reconfigures the state as a burden on society; the latter, "best illustrated by Bayart's notion of the politics of the belly, points to practices and norms in African society that prevent the embrace and sustained application of 'rational' policy choices capable of promoting economic development and political liberalization" (Olukoshi 2005, p. 96). Both approaches, which are united by their inability to come to terms with the specificity of African historical realities, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) tells us, resort to problematic Eurocentric tropes that cast African states in the shadow of the evolution of European societies. As well, they see rent-seeking and corruption as inherent African pathologies and patron-client networks pervading the entire socio-economic and political system (Olukoshi 2005). It is this rent-seeking behavior, they argue, that has prevented the building of strong and viable state institutions, and it is what accounts for the crisis of political economy on the continent: it precipitates the decline of African economies and stands in the way of the full realization of the goals that structural adjustment programs. In addition, it is this same rent-seeking behavior that is responsible for the destruction of bureaucratic norms, inhibiting "the emergence of reform-minded coalitions able to initiate and govern far-reaching change in the form of economic and political liberalization" (Olukoshi 2005, p. 97). The intellectual genesis of Afro-pessimism, Olukoshi adds, is partially located in this intellectual tradition, which in seeing neopatrimonial networks everywhere, sees no way out of Africa's development impasse: for if the postcolonial state has been adversely affected by this patrimonial logic, reform efforts (such as the structural adjustment programs spearheaded by the IMF and World Bank) have also failed because of it (96).

It is this problematic logical circularity which posits or infers the cause and effect of weakness, and failure, from the same source—rent-seeking behavior of African political classes and their pursuing of power, influence, and wealth through patron-client relationships and informal networks—that constitutes, at the very basic level, and on its own terms, the primary problem for the neopatrimonialist scholarship. Positing a single conceptual framework to explain a multiplicity of complex and varied sociopolitical realities, neopatrimonialism becomes an impossibly elastic concept that attempts to explain everything: from the form of the state to the nature of politics and the behavior of the political classes, and from the economic performance of these states, their processes of accumulation, and economic rent distribution as well as development practices and failures, to civil strife, political unrest, armed conflicts, and the so-called state failure. This desire to explain everything, however, becomes an end in itself, for in its over-ambitious quest, neopatrimonialism fails to do anything other than erect the continent as a monument of the truth its proponents will, producing, as it were, a pathological conception of African political life devoid of meaning and historical depth (Mkandawire 2001; Mbembe 2001).

This should ordinarily make such a concept collapse under the weight of its own problematic and inconsistent formulations, its selective applications of historical lessons, and the fuzzy thinking on the part of the commentators invested in its use. However, it has, on the contrary, allowed them to absorb or deflect criticisms through conceptual stretching and analytical elasticity, so that a whole range of disparate and contradictory logics and explanations are continuously added to its frame. Thus, stretched beyond its analytical capacity, every political reality on the continent can be, and has been, finessed to appear consistent with a variant of the neopatrimonialist logic: the state is too strong; it is too weak; it is suspended above society and does not sufficiently penetrate it; it over-penetrates society and constitutes a burden on it; conversely, society convolves with the state and does not hold it accountable; it predates on the state and constitutes a burden on it; it prevents the embrace of rational practices and the development of independent bureaucratic perspectives in governments and so on. And these multiple and contradictory realities, as already pointed out, are posited as both the cause and the effect of the rent-seeking behavior of the ruling classes and the clientist politics they practice. One would have expected that after several decades of trial and error, the proponents of the neopatrimonialism thesis would have figured

out exactly what is included in and what is left out of their framework. However, they still have not been able to make up their minds about what to embrace and what to anathematize in their analyses of African state forms and the behavior of the political classes on the continent. As it stands, while everything tends to apply to the neopatrimonialism framework, nothing, save perhaps the rent-seeking behavior of the political elites and the clientist politics they practice, is consistent in their analyses.

Added to this is a vulgar universalism that disregards African societies as contingencies in themselves, or that neglects their specific historical experiences while subsuming them under the totalitarian grip of a Eurocentric evolutionist framework. Explicitly or implicitly, this evolutionist logic produces a conception of history which holds that African phenomena can only really be understood as mirroring an earlier stage of European history. Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has called it "history by analogy," an analytical schema that "privileges the European historical experience as the touchstone, and as the historical expression of the universal" (9ff). Relying on this conception of history, which I have identified elsewhere as a crucial epistemological stance of Africanism and Africanist scholarship (Wai 2012), neopatrimonialism has been unable to come to terms with historically specific African realities and, as such, has not only failed to comprehend, and therefore incorrectly or problematically interpreted these realities, but also produced a particular mechanistic conception of history abstracted from the experience of Europe which is conceptualized as the historical expression of the universal. The narrative produced in this way tends to denigrate social and political realities in Africa, thereby reinforcing the image of the continent as the place for the absurd or aberrant, occurring in the shadow of earlier European experiences. In the process, following Mamdani further, the independent conceptual existence of the continent is denied, and its aberrance is named. While its history is reduced to, or interpreted as an imperfect recurrence of, or deviation from, earlier patterns or stages in the evolution of European societies, its future, which can only really make sense, or can only really be valid if modeled on the trajectories of the evolution of European societies, is supposed to be already determined.

Immanent in this move is the ideological effacement and the rendering invisible, hence, the normalization of the relational and structural logics of past histories of colonial domination and contemporary imperial power relations within which the states in Africa have been historically constituted and continue to be reconstituted and reimagined. Indeed, those

scholars, who have relied on these conceptual and methodological models and have elevated the Western liberal state to the position of the prescriptive norm of state rationality against which the nature of African states is understood, evaluated, and contrasted, do so precisely because it allows them to write over the constitutive relationship between the continent's historical experience with Europe, while privileging those very European states, without accounting for or questioning the socio-historical structures of domination constitutive of the relationship between the two. What this has led to is the casting as deviant, or aberrant, the resultant socio-political formations which emerged out of these relational trajectories, while internalizing the sources of the perceived pathology in the societies in which these forms are found. Neopatrimonialism is thus not only about the lack and failure of Africa, the pathology of its political formations, and the greed and moral bankruptcy of its ruling classes, but also and, more importantly, a strategy for normalizing the historical and structural relations between Africa and Europe.

The Poverty of the State Failure Thesis

Like the discourse of neopatrimonialism which purports to explain it, the discourse of state failure also uses Eurocentric evolutionist lenses to understand African state forms. However, the scholars invested in these concepts do not honor their own theoretical injunctions but, instead, selectively apply the historical lessons that they so problematically claim hold universal validity for understanding the nature of states on the continent. If indeed, as these scholars insist, African state rationality only really makes sense in relation to the histories of the evolution of states in the west, then civil wars should, at least, be understood as part of the process of state formation or state reconfiguration. As processes through which societies continually remake or reorder themselves, wars and conflicts are, and have always been, a central aspect of state formation and reconfiguration (Duffield 2001; Tilly 1975). One immediately recalls here Jan Patočka's rehabilitation and amplification of Heraclitus' injunction about warfare as the central constitutive element of social and political life: "Polemos is the father of all," Patočka tells us. It is that which is "common to all" and that which "lets everything particular be and manifest itself as what it is" (1996, p. 43). Since the ancient Greeks and the Romans, Patočka insists, war has dominated political and social life, constituting the polis and, at the same time, "the primordial insight that makes philosophy

possible." It is the very expression of power and sociality and is situated at the heart of the most "rational" projects for the promotion of peace and stability, so that the same hand that stages orgies is, at the same time, that which also organizes everydayness (114). Indeed, one does not have to look too hard to recognize the significance of Patočka's injunctions for the history of state formation and state reconfiguration in the West, a history perfectly captured by Charles Tilly's (1975) now often-quoted pronouncement: "War made the state and the state made war"—a truism that is forgotten when it comes to Africa. Indeed, one would have hoped that Western scholars sanctimoniously hung up on the state failure discourse would understand the intricacies of their own inglorious histories and show some humility when it comes to judging other societies.

The American Civil War, for example, occurred about a hundred years after the so-called revolutionary war by which the United States secured its independence from Britain. Yet there is hardly a study that refers to the United States during this period as a failed state. What we have instead is treating that event (the civil war) as a pivotal moment in the evolution of the American state as a political formation, when it had to decide the form it will take and the economic system it will adopt, at least in relation to slavery. Similarly, the French Revolution is regarded as the single most important event in the formation of the modern French state. We know that from the initial storming of the Bastille in July 1789 to the defeat and capture of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte at the Battle of Sedan in September 1870, a period of almost one hundred years, France was in a permanent state of turmoil, civil strife, and political unrest. Yet, there is hardly a study that describes the French state during this period as a failed state; rather, this period is treated as the most important moment in the formation of the modern French state. African states on the other hand, which were constituted under concrete conditions of colonial domination, and which have been, on average, 60 years "independent," are already conceptualized as "failed states." Which begs the question: when exactly does a state fail? What is the relationship between state formation and state failure: when exactly does one end and when does the other begin?

These types of questions are hardly considered in studies purporting to explain state failure, in part because of the problematic assumptions that these studies are based on. First is the evolutionist assumptions that underpin contemporary theorizing, whereby Africa is incessantly set up against current conceptions of Western societies. Second is the problematic assumption that the states that emerged out of the colonial imposition in

Africa were complete and fully functioning political entities on the eve of independence. But what if they were not? Can they still be said to be failed states when they are in existence and being reconfigured and contested? The reason why these questions are important owes in part to the history of the colonial genesis of the states in Africa which were arbitrarily and hastily put together under concrete conditions of political domination. Partially owing to their history of constitution, the basic, but fundamental, questions about the nature of the state, the purpose it should serve, as well as questions about citizenship and membership of the political community, especially in these societies with multi-ethnic populations hastily and arbitrarily forced into states that were intended to serve the interests of the colonial powers that created them, remain unsettled, and remain firmly situated at the heart of political struggles and contestations over the states everywhere in Africa. There is hardly a conflict on the continent (even in extreme cases as Rwanda and Somalia) that does not have the legacies of colonialism implicated in them or that does not involve questions of citizenship and membership of the political community as a central aspect. Rather than taking these questions seriously, the numerous Africanists who have come to rely on state failure as analytical concept have tended to not only write over them but have also ignored the histories of Western societies as well as their own very theoretical injunctions, while jumping to hasty conclusions about civil wars or political crises on the continent.

Part of the problem is linked to the conception of state that these scholars privilege and base their analysis on. Like neopatrimonialism which purports to explain it, the reality of state failure has as its conceptual point of departure the Weberian ideal-typical state and the history of the evolution of Western societies as its conceptual and analytical touchstone. "My definition of state," writes William Reno in *Warlord Politics and African States*, "borrows from Max Weber's observation that states vary in their degree of resemblance to an ideal type in which they enforce regulations backed up with a monopoly of violence. I find throughout the four case studies that the exercise of political authority in these countries [Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria] represent nearly the opposite of the Weberian ideal" (Reno 1998, p. 5). A state's "degree of stateness" (whatever that means) can, Jean-Germain Gros maintains, be determined by "using both the classical Weberian definition of the state and its non-coercive public services delivery capacity" (Gros 1996, p. 456). Even scholars such as Jean-François Bayart (1993, 1999)

or Patrick Chabal and Jean Pascal Daloz (1999), who claim to interpret African states and societies on their own terms—not that they ever succeed in doing this—still privilege the Weberian ideal-typical conception of state as foundational, being the modern normative model against which state rationality and performance can be modeled, analyzed, inferred, referenced, compared, and contrasted.

The fact that no modern state has ever, either conceptually or empirically, met the criteria of the Weberian model of statehood seems to be lost on the numerous scholars who scramble so scurrilously to uncritically apply its conceptual parameters to African states. The problem though is that this conception of statehood is not only ahistorical but also mechanistic; it is arrived at by theorizing state capacity retrospectively, that is, substituting what these scholars understand as the current conditions and attributes of the Western liberal state for the Weberian ideal type and taking these attributes as rigid universal standards and analytical points of departure for understanding the nature and rationality of states across space and time, as if the state is not a historical formation, with its own context, contingencies, and trajectories, but one that is unchanging and comes into being fully formed and capable of performing the tasks attributed to it. Anybody vaguely familiar with the Western liberal state will know that most of these attributes themselves only really appeared in the postwar period, when attempts were made to construct the so-called welfare state. Even then, this state has never been able to provide security and social welfare for all its citizens. Rather it has also functioned as a violence displacement mechanism, displacing violence internally on certain segments of its own populations through racialization and externally onto Southern societies through imperialistic vocations. Indeed, how does one explain, for example, the United States' relationship with its black population or the Canadian state's relation with its Indigenous population? As a historical formation, this state has always been a source of violence and precarity even for its own citizens. In fact, since the 1980s, with the advent of neoliberalism, this so-called welfare state has been under siege by its own internal contradictions and forces articulating its demise, and this has affected its capacity for governance and the provision of social goods, while at the same time engineering the production of an army of precarious beings within its borders. That these conditions have not spilled over into civil war owes partially to this state's capacity for displacing violence elsewhere and for brutally exploiting others abroad in order to produce a modicum of social goods for its citizens at home.

It is only by ideologically ignoring or writing over the histories of the emergence of the state as a socio-historical formation, both in the West and in the South, and by rendering invisible the complex socio-historical realities of power, violence, and domination that have historically characterized and defined the dialectical processes within which Western states and their Southern others have been co-constituted and remained enmeshed that the proponents of the state failure thesis would, with a bold face, produce these false narratives and ideologically disposed scholarship that set up southern states against current conceptions of the Western liberal state. In fact, even Weber himself regarded his ideal-typical constructions only as abstract methodological and explanatory devises intended to help bring out the significance and meanings that actors give to their actions. As well, they provide a guide to conducting comparative studies of phenomena, institutions, and so forth. And no matter how useful, they are not a description of any empirically grounded or actual existing reality. In fact, there is always a discrepancy between human social and political action or reality on the one hand and the way they are inscribed, or accounted for, in social scientific discourses on the other: no social scientific description or interpretation could ever account for the disjuncture between how social phenomena are and the way they are accounted for, translated, described, or interpreted in conceptual and theoretical discussions (Mudimbe 1991; Trouillot 1995). However, the proponents of the state failure theses have, by turning abstract methodological or explanatory models into "real" existing types constructed as it were, a false historical narrative about the Western state and elevated it to the universal from which conceptual lessons are drawn for every other form of state rationality and behavior.

How do we move from abstract methodological constructs to actual empirically existing types? First is by ignoring history and pretending that state formation is not a historical process and that a certain type of state has always existed across space and time. Second is by positing Eurocentric models through ideologically disposed narratives that uncritically construct and elevate political formations in the West as the universal standard of statehood. Third is by writing over the co-constitutive vectors within which Western and Southern states are produced and remained embedded. And in the fostering of this Eurocentric vision of the world, Weber is himself complicit. His definition of state, though supposedly based on abstract ideal-typical constructions, defines a framework which is expressed in the service of political formations in the so-called Occident. In this

framework, a particular type of state is privileged and celebrated as the universal standard of statehood. This imposition of a universalizing logic on the nature of political formations and the struggles and histories they encompass negates or denigrates specific historical realities of state formation and minimizes or writes over the specificities of the historical contexts within which they emerge, while disguising the systemic and structural power political webs in which they are enmeshed.

Indeed, what may appear as a misuse of Weber's methods and concepts might not in fact be an accident, for as Kieran Allen (2004) reminds us, Weber himself was "deeply ideological" with the very ideas informing his conceptual presuppositions grounded in specific Western local socio-historical realities that he universalized as the destiny of the world. This immediately recalls Enrique Dussel's (1995) contention that Weber was a hopeless Eurocentric ideologue whose ethnocentric biases blinded him to other historical realities, a factor which pushed him to pose the question of world history from the certainty of a Eurocentric metaphor: that of Europe as the ultimate Hegelian historical subject and, as such, that which offers us conceptual and historical guidance. "Which chain of circumstances," Weber asks in the introduction of his most famous book *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958), "has resulted in the fact that on western soil and only there, cultural phenomena have been produced which, as we represent it, show signs of evolutionary advance and universal validity?" (cited in Dussel 1995, p. 10). Europe, Weber believed, is the touchstone of world history, and only its historical experiences have universal validity to abstract from: "Neither scientific, artistic, governmental nor economic evolution have led elsewhere to the modes of rationalization proper to the Occident" (cited in Dussel 1995, p. 145 n.9). According to this interpretation of history, only Europe qualifies as a world-historical region, and only its experiences have universal validity.

In fact, there is a conspicuous absence of questions about power and colonialism in his work. *The Protestant Ethic*, for example, completely ignores capitalism's bloody history and legacy of violence, genocide, continent-grabbing, commodification of black bodies through plantation slavery, and European imperial expansion and colonial exploitation of non-European societies. Rather it falsely locates capitalism's origins in a rigorous morality of a so-called protestant ethic (Allen 2004). Those of *The Religion of China* (1951) and *The Religion of India* (1958), which were written as part of his sociology of religion that included the afore-

mentioned *The Protestant Ethic* but also as inquiries into why capitalism developed in Europe and not Asia, contain some of the most vexatious orientalist views on Asia in any era. They are extraordinary in their caricature of Indian and Chinese religious and cultural beliefs, which he posits as responsible for their economic stagnation in the same way as the "protestant ethic" is responsible for the development of capitalism in Europe. Throughout these texts, there is a conspicuous absence of the discussion of the colonial question and its impact on these societies. This writing over of the colonial question should not, however, be explained away simply as a nominal oversight on Weber's part. Rather, it should be seen as expressive of a larger problem, that of his ideological and ethnocentric commitment to European superiority, from which he could not free himself. As Allen (2004) rightly points out, Weber was self-admittedly "a class-conscious bourgeois" who advocated for empire, (believing, e.g. that Africans were *kulturlos*, i.e. uncultured or uncivilized and could be legitimately colonized). He ardently supported the carnage of the First World War, regarding Germany's enemies in that war as "composed increasingly of barbarians" and "the flotsam of African and Asiatic savages" (Allen 2004, p. 6). His sociology, however, as Allen rightly points out, disguises its own political hierarchies and ethnocentric biases by defining itself as neutral and value-free science, while presaging some of the most ideological positions and disturbing orientalist ideas on non-Western societies.

There are real problems associated with appropriating abstract methodological conceptions such as ideal types as analytic devices to understand African state forms. For starters, such an appropriation, as already pointed out, tends to not only ignore the violence built in its universalistic pretensions, but it also obscures the socio-historical experiences and realities of the societies under investigation, while privileging Western liberal ideas of governance and state rationality as the normative model against which all other realities are measured and understood, without, as suggested above, accounting for the structural webs of power relations within which both are intricately interconnected and bound. It is this Eurocentric universalistic pretention, for example, that underpins the failed state and neopatrimonialist literature and it is what partially potentiates the pathologization of African state forms. This problematic hierarchical classification of states reinforces a paradigmatic binary opposition between what is constructed as normal and what is pathological: if what is Western is defined as normal, then the non-Western (in this case African) other has to be abnormal, inadequate, deviant, or pathological.

This abnormality or deviance is in turn always explained in negative terms, which drawing on and remaining faithful to the conceptual vectors of the colonial library draw on particular enduring images of the continent as the bizarre, the laughable, and the negation of every "normal" human experience. Indeed, it is in relation to Africa that notions of "absolute otherness" are taken to their farthest possible extremes (Mudimbe 1988, 1994; Mbembe 2001; Wai 2012).

We now know how these ideas of Africa have had historical, and continue to have, constitutive functions for both Western identity as well as its intimate but rejected African Other. Indeed, as Mudimbe suggests, Africa may be an empirical figure, yet as imagined and constituted by Africanism, it is and has always been, by definition, perceived, experienced, and promoted as the sign of absolute otherness, so that changes in the signs and symbols of Africa's representations have never really fundamentally changed the meaning of Africa in the Western imagination. In this sense, Africa is a text: it writes itself. Mentioning "Africa" immediately conjures some of the most perverse and disturbing, yet powerful, images with which the name of the continent has come to be strongly associated: poverty, disease, crime, corruption, repressive regimes, corrupt and incompetent governments, tribalism and tribal conflicts, failed states, hunger and famine (bloated-bellied, fly-covered, malnourished, and emaciated children dying in the arms of their powerless and apathetic mothers), uncivilized or semi-civilized tribes inhabiting jungles with beastly animals, and safaris (of the Madagascar and Lion King types). The neopatrimonialist and state failure literature are part of this textual reproduction of Africa, and they constantly invoke, create, and use these perverse images, even where they pretend to be against them.

This point is adequately illustrated by Jean-Francois Bayart (1993), whose problematic and negative views about Africa are hidden in claims of interpreting the continent on its own terms, a process that has allowed him to reproduce and reinforce some of the most offensive stereotypes about the continent, ridiculing its political and social formations, while, in fact, calling into question the very humanity of the African. Coarsely homogenizing states on the continent under the pejorative moniker "felonious state"—other such offensive labels include "gangster state," "vampire state," "warlord state," "shadow state," and so on—where the logic of rule is based on criminality and a "politics of the belly" (Bayart 1993, 1999), (as if only a single undifferentiated rationality governs the

logic of rule and the behavior of the political classes on a continent with over 50 diverse states; in fact, his entire thesis is a generalization to the continent of a very problematic reading of politics in Cameroon), Bayart claims, in a statement that is as hare-brained and ludicrous, as it is as offensive and prejudicial, that the essence of Africanness is perversity and criminality. He writes, "the 'social capital' of Africa appears to display a marked affinity with the spirit of criminality" (Bayart 1999, p. 34). It is this spirit of criminality as an innate character of Africans, as well as their perverse cultural predisposition that, he claims, allows for, or aids the emergence of clientist politics of big men who, with no interest in, or by deliberately jettisoning the building of strong and viable bureaucratic institutions, make corruption and shadowy business practices pursued through trickery and felonious activities as a social value and informal networks the norm rather than the exception of state behavior and rationality on the continent.

At the heart of Bayart's reading of African politics, as I (Wai 2015) have argued elsewhere in relation to Achille Mbembe's conception of Africa in his *On the Postcolony* (2001), are perverse conceptions of corporality that underpinned nineteenth-century racist ideas about the continent. Exploiting these conceptions, he reconceptualizes the neopatrimonialist thrust in Africanist political science by recasting contemporary African politics as a dramaturgical enterprise of literal corporality based on the baser instincts of Africans as it relates to the mouth, eating, and the belly, a metaphor that Achille Mbembe (2001) would extend to an obsession with body parts, orifices, loud farts, fecal matter, and genital organs. The metaphors and imagery that Bayart uses are of a corporal valency by which African politics becomes an *expérience corporelle* (Mudimbe 2013), generated via bodily schemas that trap the African mainly within ambits of the "biological" through which his or her world is organized, defined, and experienced. *Politics of the Belly* literally collapses alterity into corporeality and sees the African as a physically defined being, driven by his or her baser instincts, that is, literally thinking with his/her stomach. A transparent being defined only by simple physically defined attributes, this African is incapable of exhibiting a complex range of behavior or thought. It thus negates the African as a thinking subject (even though the intention is to illustrate otherwise, i.e. that the African is capable of thought and politics) and reduces him or her to a physical (bodily) entity governed by his or her baser instincts, defined by the mouth, the belly, and eating.

Central to this conception is a silent organizing structure: Cartesian dualism and the separation or opposition of mind and body; on the basis of which Europe constructed and continues to assert "its cogito" toward the peoples, societies, and cultures it has come to see and define as radically different, inferior, and incapable of thinking (Mudimbe 1994). "Politics of the belly" (and its extensions or variants: politics of the anus and phallus) can only really invariably evoke its opposite: a "politics of the mind," which only the Cartesian subject, that is, the self-actualizing European thinking subject capable of transcendental self-conscious, is capable of inscribing. By reinforcing this mind/body dualism that separates the European subject from its negated physically defined African Other, this structure of thought reduces the African to a corporal entity that can act, but not think, and thus is generative of a political script that he/she is incapable of inscribing. Precisely why it is Bayart and his ilk that have taken on the monumental responsibility of describing and theorizing that politics for us, and only he and others like him can serve as the intellectual progenitor(s) of African studies with claim on disciplinary innovation and theoretical advance in the field (Depelchin 2005; Zeleza 2005).

What this suggest as is stressed in the introduction, is that, it is not sufficient to concern ourselves only with questions about methods, theories, and concepts in the production of Africanist knowledge. Rather we should be more concerned about the more fundamental questions regarding epistemology, which Mudimbe tells us always have an ideological connection, as well as with positionality, privilege, and ultimately power. For as Mudimbe has consistently insisted, the issue with Africa and African studies cannot be reduced to questions of theory versus empirical collection or of methods versus concepts in the production of Africanist knowledge. In vain do we worry about how the empirical aspect of a given discourse attests to the truth of its theoretical or methodological formulations. Rather, we should be concerned "about the silent and a priori choice of the truths to which a given discourse aims," the politics which makes it possible and the audience to which it speaks. For there is always, beyond the dichotomy between rudimentary and scientific knowledge, illusion ,and truth, the differences between conceptual, methodological, theoretical, and empirical choices, a major problem concerning the very conditions of knowledge (Mudimbe 1994, pp. 39–40).

That Africanist knowledge only really makes sense within the context of its epistemological region of emergence, and the ideological preference of its authors, is not a radical or controversial claim, but one that defines the condition of possibility of Africanist knowledge. Emergent from and dependent on a Western epistemological order, Africanist knowledge continues to reflect of the power of Western discourses on and about Africa. Insofar as it incessantly deploys tropes that implicitly or otherwise pathologize the continent, its people, and its political, social, and cultural formations and insofar as it vulgarizes the continent's historical experiences while disguising racist and stereotypical veneers in conceptual mumbo jumbos that give academic respectability to the most absurd and preposterous Eurocentric representations, images, biases, and prejudices against the continent and its people, the neopatrimonialist and state failure literature should be called for what it really is and rejected for its racist and Eurocentric biases, which are emergent from within, and faithfully dependent, with almost religious devotion, on the conceptual vectors of the colonial library which epistemologically is the locus of Africa's invention.

IMPLICATIONS OF A VIOLENT DISCOURSE

Ideal types are not real, and even though they are usually uncritically deployed based on what their proponents construct as the certainty of the normative orthodoxy of the historical experience or reality of European states as the universal, they conceptually are not and do not correspond to any historical or actually existing empirically grounded reality. Rather, they are a priori and ahistorical constructs which lay waste to historical specificities and contingencies. The narratives that they produce do not necessarily correspond to the way life is. For example, by enabling the erection of "formal categories around which large segments of history are grouped," specific socio-historical contents of particular societies are over-written, ignored, or negated, even if this allows for the production of certain truths (Allen 2004, p. 80). Anyone can, through the construction of ideal types, easily make arbitrary connections between very diverse and disparate activities, events, or phenomena in completely dissimilar socio-political conditions and historical epochs under one rubric—for example, Pharaonic Egypt and socialism could be linked together under the term bureaucracy, or "the ideal type 'charisma' [can] connect revolutionary leaders and Hindu shamans" (Allen 2004, p. 80). The real danger with these arbitrary and artificial comparisons, however, is that they lead to the production of

a formalistic and formulaic social science that, instead of seeking to understand historical, social, and political transformations in societies as processes, focuses instead on a desire to set up typologies and arrange historical phenomena in accordance with these typologies (Allen 2004, p. 80). What this does is allow for the production of a formalistic and/or formulaic social science (and for our present purpose, the construction of a mechanistic conception of state rationality) that evacuates history, sacks the social, writes over, distorts, obscures, silences, and negates specific experiences, realities, and histories.

This is partially what Mamdani (1996) calls into question with his critique of history by analogy. It is what Kamil Shah (2009) points to when he suggests that "the ontological primacy conferred on the [Weberian] state renders complex trans-boundary social and political relations—and the struggles they encompass—invisible" (16). Such a move, which is "premised on an ahistorical reification and naturalization of the western liberal state," he tells us, "is incapable of registering the possibility that the very [historical] processes of state formation and [contemporary strategies of] state building [favored by the West and international policy community] may themselves be implicated in the production and reproduction of insecurities" (Shah 2009, pp. 16–19). Indeed, as Shah insists, there is a co-constitutive, almost parasitic, relationship between states in the West and the South, which were constituted under concrete conditions of Western colonial domination and which have remained immersed in the politics of global economic and socio-political structures of unequal power relations that produce wealth and affluence on the one hand and conditions of dependence and insecurities on the other. This immediately recalls Frantz Fanon's timeless and incisive observation about a structural relation of power and violence in which the West and non-West are entangled: "Europe is literally the creation of the Third World," Fanon writes, "The wealth which smothers her is that which was stolen from the underdeveloped people" (1963, p. 102). What Fanon is drawing attention to is the intimate relationship that connects the West and the non-West and how they are co-constituted: the structural power which produces Western power, wealth, affluence, and identity on the one hand is at the same time that which reproduces non-Western wretchedness and insecurities on the other.

While any serious attempt at seeking to understand Africa's postcolonial condition must face squarely the issue of how the internal political dynamics in African political life submit to, and amplifies, the continent's historical

and on-going experience with a violent and exploitative world order that has historically violated the integrity of African societies and which continue to stand in the way of African self-determination, this must not be done, as is the case with these legions of Africanists who have made explaining and interpreting Africa to the world their business, at the expense of covering over the continent's violent and destructive relationship with the West. Indeed, as Siba Grovogui (2001) rightly points out, "the usurpation of the popular will by despotic rulers, however significant a violation of the autonomy and dignity of the citizenries" is perhaps the main internal impediment to African self-determination, but the continent's experience in the global political, economic, and ethical orders dominated by the narrow geopolitical, ideological, socio-economic, political, and regional interests of hegemonic powers has been characterized by domination and unequal access to power and wealth (43). And these have had serious consequences on Africa's postcolonial condition, as manifested in conflicts, and other forms of social and economic problems on the continent.

What the dominant perspectives purporting to explain conflicts on the continent do, however, is completely ignore or write over the socio-historical contexts of these political realities and excise the manifestation of the violence that they potentiate from the realm of the political and place them in the realm of the pathological. Through this, conflicts, political unrest, or so-called state failure become an aberration which has nothing to do with past histories of colonial domination; or the structural manifestation of contemporary imperial power relations of unequal exchange, violent appropriation, and global capitalist modernity and its exploitative logics and processes; or the violence embedded in the colonizing structures of everyday social and power relations in states whose genesis is situated in colonialism; or the tensions inherent in power political struggles over the state; or even the violence built in the process of state formation and so forth, but as a result of some primordial orientalist/Africanist pathologies and conflictual instincts innate to the very nature, character, and culture of Africans, instincts that outwardly and more explicitly get expressed in the form of tribalism, unrestrained religious fervor, rapacious greed and corruption, administrative ineptitude, and rampant political failures, all of which are hallmarks of neopatrimonial "big man" politics; the worst expression of which is "warlord politics" (Reno 1998). It seems to me then that it is not the states in Africa that fail, but the poverty of the conceptual and analytical models and their inability to come to terms with contemporary African realities.

The implications of this poverty of imagination and the violent and objectifying discourses it makes possible include the internalization of the causes of the so-called state failure in the states and societies within which they occur. Indeed, whatever explanation is privileged as the cause—poverty or underdevelopment; neo-Malthusian pressures or resource competition; ethno-identitarian rivalries or tribalism; youth marginalization, social exclusion, or criminality; neopatrimonial "big man" politics, corruption, or poor governance; authoritarian misrule; weak and dysfunctional institutions or lack of democratic accountability; lack of rule of law or human rights abuses; rebel greed or political grievance, and so forth—the proponents of the state failure thesis understand the state in terms of a binary logic of success or failure, not as a historically contingent formation socially conditioned and co-produced. As well, they broadly explain the "failure" as a product of some inherent political, economic, cultural, and/or social pathology, malaise, or dysfunction that are endogenously produced within these societies, and these are posited as what constitutionally define their "static," "backward," and "unchanging" social environment and historical reality. The underlying assumption (which is sometimes explicitly stated, though most times implicitly immanent) of these violent and objectifying narratives is that the development or progression of these states and societies from conditions of backwardness, poverty, ignorance, and insecurity to one of enlightenment, modernity, development, prosperity, and security can only be set in motion and driven by the historically dynamic external agency of the West: Western political, economic, social, cultural, and knowledge systems; Western development assistance; international financial institutions and aid agencies, international NGOs, corporate-led foreign direct investment, and so on.

The vision of this "atomistic social ontology" (Dolek 2008), which sees "state failure" mainly in terms of the outgrowth of an inherent internally generated pathology of the states and societies in which they occur, becomes a discursive ploy, a legitimating trope, and political strategy that is deployed in the service of the hegemonic global systems of control, power, violence, and domination. It serves, among other things, the purpose of justifying and legitimating past and on-going imperial power relations and impulses (sometimes disguised under the cloak of humanitarianism) as the West intervenes and pursues its aim of controlling and shaping the histories and destinies of these societies by imposing its preferred political, social, and economic policies and systems on them. Moreover, it helps in absorbing the West and the global system of exploitation, domination, and

control that they preside over from any complicity in the so-called state failure and instead holds the states and societies in which they occur as responsible for its occurrence. In addition to the tropes, they construct for legitimating current and on-going imperial power relations, the narratives that these power/knowledge systems produce, the regimes of truth that they construct, and in terms of policy interventions, the politics that they make possible, the very modalities of those interventions and the power relations that they potentiate, also help in providing a radical revisionist lens through which past histories, past imperial relations of power, past systems of exploitation, in essence past colonial regimes of violence and domination, appropriation and exploitation are viewed, reinterpreted, and reinscribed as the solution to problems the genesis of which are situated in their very modalities.

Coda

Achille Mbembe (2001) has referred to the extraordinary poverty of the political science (of which IR is a privileged part) and development economics literature on and about Africa. This poverty, he tells us, can be seen in the crisis of the "language, procedures and reasonings" (5–9) of these disciplines, as well as, we may add, in the theoretical and methodological pronouncements and assumptions they make about African socio-economic and political life. Stuck in the thralldom of the teleologies of social evolutionism and ideologies of modernization which they use to define conceptions of contemporary life on the continent, these discourses, Mbembe tells us, are "mired in the demands of what is immediately useful" as defined by logics of neoliberalism as the dominant ideological formation of contemporary world order and its hollow depoliticized demands for "market economy," "good governance," "civil society," "conflict resolution," "transition to democracy," and so forth, which are sloganized in everyday media, policy, academic, and street speech. The discourses that these disciplines fashion about Africa are not only contrite and cavalier, "primarily concerned, not with comprehending the political in Africa or with knowledge production in general, but with social engineering," but are also violent and complicit in the politics within which Africa is produced as an object of Western colonial fantasy and imperial vocations. As such, they have undermined the very possibility of understanding African economic and political life as they constantly posit an enterprise in enculturation (Mbembe 2001, pp. 5–9).

This poverty, of which Mbembe speaks, I have suggested in this chapter and elsewhere, is not a mere analytical anomaly or methodological mishap in the production of Africanist knowledge. Rather, it is power political; situated at the very heart of the epistemic structures within which knowledge about Africa is produced in the social and human sciences. Indeed, what Mbembe sees as a theoretical inability of Africanist political science to come to terms with African phenomena is not an accident, but the very condition of possibility of Africanist knowledge, a body of knowledge concerned, not with understanding the continent but with constructing it as an object of knowledge, as a monument of the truth of Africanism, and its will to power and domination, while "producing its own motives, as well as its objects, and fundamentally commenting upon [and justifying] its own being" (Mudimbe 1988, p. xi). What I have tried to do in this chapter is demonstrate how international relations scholarship and the discourses it fashions on and about African political formations and social realities are a function of this power which erects the continent as a monument of the truth it wills in order to justify a will to power and domination.

The concepts of state failure and neopatrimonialism and the discourses which employ them function to create a reality that is in the service of the hegemonic power which makes them possible. Neopatrimonialism and failed states, I have argued, are not merely theoretical concepts; they are also power political tropes for normalizing relations of domination and exploitation, past, and on-going. As such, none of those who employ these concepts to describe Africa can therefore claim to stand outside of the power relations within which the continent continues to be reproduced, because Africanist knowledge, especially those that employ such violent and objectifying narratives, be it in IR, development studies, history, anthropology, and other such disciplines, is always already implicated in the politics within which Africa is fashioned or reproduced as an object of knowledge and power. Its will to truth is indissociably connected with a will to power and domination that potentiates it and produces Africa as a paradigm of difference, an object of Western colonial fantasy, and imperialistic vocations.

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Re-engaging History and Global Politics in the Accounts of the Contemporary Conflict in the DRC

Marta Iñiguez de Heredia

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, a coalition of renegade soldiers and long-time rebels, in alliance with Rwanda, Uganda and Burudi, supported by the UK and the US, entered the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—then Zaire. They dismantled the refugee camps established in the East after the Rwandan genocide and traveled all the way to Kinshasa, where, with the aid of Angola and France, they ousted Mobutu Sese Seko, who had been in power for 32 years. This war, which lasted merely nine months, was the prelude to another even larger and longer conflict that went from 1998 until 2002, involving ten African countries and their respective allies.[1] The opportunity for social change, in addition to patriotic sentiment, pushed thousands of youths and peasants to join the rebellion and later to defend the country from what many saw as foreign invasion. This was especially the case since the second period of war in 1998, once long-time revolutionary leader Laurent Kabila was in government.

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These conflicts have continued ever since, primarily in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, developing into a series of cyclical conflicts. These have featured proxy wars between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC, fighting between different popular militias (Mai-Mai), fighting between these militias and foreign armies, and with the DRC armed forces (the FARDC), even if at times Mai-Mai militias and the FARDC have entered into coalitions. Understanding this conflict is complex. This complexity comes from the myriad of actors involved and the length of the conflict but primarily from the fact that its roots lie in the ways the DRC has been constituted both historically and globally. Underpinning this idea is the fact that the DRC conflict, in any of its forms, is political. It is not an ethnic conflict, nor a story of greed, neither does the concept of the failed state help us to grasp it.

The debate about the sources of conflict in the DRC has featured different tendencies for quite some time, depending on whether they locate its main cause in the issue of resources, in issues of identity, land and power distribution, or in regional dynamics. Despite major differences between all these tendencies, they coincide in identifying the DRC as somehow faulty. Especially since the late 2000s, there has been a shift in thinking about the roots of conflict in the DRC, from a focus on resource exploitation to one on land and identity. Unresolved historical cleavages around land and power distribution, both of which are linked to identity and belonging, create the basis for political mobilization through violence (Autesserre 2010, 2012; Fahey 2010, 2011; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004, 2009). Although these analyses have offered nuanced explanations of the micro-dynamics, two features make them prone to reproducing previous problems. One is the localization of conflict whereby conflicts and their actors emerge from the provincial and village levels and not as much from the regional and international levels. The other is the nature of political authority in the DRC. Neopatrimonialism, or the way political and economic distribution follows a system of patronage rather than meritocracy or any rational legal bureaucratic system, is seen as a major obstacle to legitimacy, democracy, and development.

The localization of conflict is problematic because it detaches the local from its historical and global sources. Similarly, if a large part of the problems the DRC has come down to the nature of political authority, there needs to be an account of the historical and global roots of that authority. The DRC is not a piece one can disconnect from the rest of the world, its history, and context. The other problem is that establishing the sources of

conflict on the framework of neopatrimonialism, which also underpins "failed state" theories, is to rely on explanations that maintain a vision of "Africa" and "Africans" as unfulfilled and not yet properly developed (see Wai's chapter, this volume). These explanations are premised on a normative rather than an analytical paradigm that compares a pathological image of the DRC to an idealized bureaucratic view of politics and the economy. The pathological relationship between violence, extraction, and authority destroys rather than produces state authority. These representations do not necessarily explain the conflict—they reproduce ideas of what proper authority is and what proper institutions of state and state-society relations should be. Moreover, these approaches end up evacuating precisely the politics of the DRC. Such evacuation and the making of the DRC politics as external to world politics tap into what Meera Sabaratnam calls "habits of intellectual Eurocentrism," which has to do with "the sensibility that Europe is historically, economically, culturally and politically distinctive in ways that significantly determine the overall character of world politics" (Sabaratnam 2013, p. 261).

This is not to deny the problems and issues that the Congolese experience on a daily basis. The fact that the country has seen both the bloodiest multistate wars in African history, one of the few of its kind in the continent and one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes since World War II, underscores the scale of the problems facing the country.[2] Nor does this observation imply that all accounts of the conflict so far are flawed, or that there have not been accounts of the DRC that do not have a historical and global orientation in their approach (E.g. Marriage 2013; Ndaywel è Nziem 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Prunier 2009). As noted below, an increasing number of scholars have been studying the conflict in detail, offering very close to the ground analyses and in historical perspective. What the chapter identifies is that accounting for the sources of conflict in the DRC has reproduced the epistemological pitfalls that come from understanding African issues from the perspective of failing or lacking and external to world politics. In contrast, this chapter suggests that the account has to be globalized and historicized in ways that do not reproduce such traits. That is, the roots of conflict in the DRC have to be linked to the ways in which the DRC has been constituted and inserted into the global political economy historically, without premising its reality against idealized Western models.

This undertaking is important considering the progress made in this debate and the practical policy implications derived from it. For that

purpose, the chapter first examines the most influential accounts of the wars in DRC and then reviews the problems of neopatrimonialism and the limitations of localized explanations by analyzing two specific policies, the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy in the DRC (ISSSS) and the government's call for large agribusinesses to invest in the DRC. Both can be seen as stemming from recent debates about the sources of conflict, and both show that an analysis based on the paradigm of lack, failure, and exteriority gives rise to policies that reproduce the patterns that fueled conflict in the first place.

The Debate on the "Sources of Conflict": Different Approaches?

There have been three main explanations of the conflict in the DRC whether they highlight economic, political, or localized social factors.[3] Despite their differences, they coincide in three important aspects: They see the DRC as defective; they evacuate systemic and structural factors that have to do with world politics and the global political economy; and they disregard major historical features that would account for continuities and change in the conflict dynamics of the DRC.

Economic Explanations

Economic explanations became the standard explanation adopted by the UN at the start of the conflict and the one that has prevailed until recently (UN Group of Experts 2017; UN Secretary General 2010, 2017). It was also defended by prominent academic accounts.[4] In essence, they argue that conflict comes down to competition between armed groups, states, and individuals to control the rich natural resources of the DRC. Inspired by the greed/grievance debate around the publications of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, the control of resources acts as much as a catalyst for conflict as for its continuation and in fact, for its stagnation (Collier 2000, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2000). This explanation has also been embraced by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Global Witness and the Enough Project, who managed to lobby the OECD to adopt guidelines for tracing minerals and the US Congress to pass the Dodd-Frank Act (Bafilemba et al. 2012; Global Witness 2011; OECD 2012; The Enough Project Team and Grassroots Reconciliation Group 2009; UN Group of Experts 2010).

Economic explanations are successful in emphasizing how the control of natural resources has played out in the strategy and politics of different actors in conflict. The countries involved in the 1996–1997 and 1998–2003 wars entered a logic of appropriation and looting of resources that not only managed to finance their involvement but also granted them the possibility of developing their own countries (e.g., Rwanda and Uganda).[5] Still, though resources have allowed different armed groups to finance themselves, in general, resources are not their sole source and their contribution has been diminishing, with others such as taxation, roadblocks, donations, looting, and theft being more reliable (UN Group of Experts 2016a, para. 23–28, b, para. 22, 50 and 54).[6]

One of the limitations of this explanation is that it confuses goals with means. As scholars focusing on political and social factors have argued, resources have been prominent in allowing armed groups to maintain a war and can be seen as a lubricant for the engine of conflict, but they are not its cause, nor do they provide a plausible explanation for why conflict continues. Even at the height of the wars of aggression, when the DRC was partitioned and different coalitions were helping themselves to DRC resources, this explanation ignores important security and political goals that prompted their motivation to go to war in the first place. In line with a view that places the sources of conflict in the flawed nature of the DRC, this explanation sees the looting of resources as the result of DRC's impossibility to control and exploit its own resources, yet raw materials have always been characterized by their external exploitation. As David Moore (2013) argues, the causes of the DRC conflicts can be seen as economic, but they cannot be delinked from the politics and sociology of the processes of accumulation inherited in a global capitalist economy. For Moore, the DRC wars are underlined by the triple crisis of primitive accumulation, nation-state formation, and democratization in which the DRC is immersed.

This does not mean that conflict has no impact on the dynamics of extraction in the DRC or that Congolese political and economic elites could not do more to regulate and distribute the costs and benefits of economic extraction. What it means is that the economic dynamics underpinning conflict in the DRC relate to the dynamics of global capitalism, with the way the DRC was inserted into the global economy and with the patterns with which the DRC relates to global markets. They also relate to patterned practices of statecraft, more so in the context of war and the transformation of state authority (Iñiguez de Heredia 2017). Rather than being a malfunction, they are a consequence of systemic patterns.

However, grasping the big picture in the DRC has been limited to refer to state and institutional failure. Paul Collier speaks of the different traps in which countries like the DRC find themselves to get out of poverty: "the conflict trap, the natural resources trap, the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors, and the trap of bad governance" (2007, p. 5). According to Collier, being "virtually landlocked," the DRC would tick off all the boxes (2007, p. 6). What he means is that there is more than the economy and resources that need to be analyzed to understand the cycle of violence, which countries like the DRC are going through. In this line of argument, political explanations came to broaden the view, speaking of a bigger picture that highlights the role of institutions, most prominently, the state, governance, and leadership while not entirely discounting the role played by economic factors and resources.

Political Explanations

Political explanations have included different levels of analysis such as the dynamics of the region as well as the internal dynamics of the DRC. Some have emphasized the role of DRC's neighbors as continuing the predatory dynamics of earlier colonial states (Braeckman 2003). Others have established the weakness of the DRC state as the main destabilizing factor that also has regional consequences. The regional impact of the conflict is due to the intertwined histories of neighboring countries and the dynamics of the 1990s (Lemarchand 2003; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Prunier 2009; Turner 2007). Stearns has also identified donor dynamics, highlighting that lack of interest in the DRC has created a situation in which aid has been part of the problem and not of the solution (Stearns 2011, 2013). Though they analyze the historical roots of current affairs and the trajectory of the Congolese state, they all see that the problems of the DRC are related to the fact that its politics are neopatrimonial. That is, the state and its authority operate on the basis of networks of patronage rather than on rational bureaucratized institutions. The failure of the DRC state comes down to this systematic approach to the distribution of wealth, rights, and privilege, creating not only profound inequalities and hence illegitimacy and sources of contestation but also chronic inefficiency. However, as with the economy, the nature of authority and politics cannot be disconnected from its historical and global roots. States are the products of history, a history that is inextricably linked to the global context from which they emerged. Colonial states such as Congo further experienced a sudden insertion into world politics as particular colonized subjects, whose role

was productive of raw materials as well as of a particular Western image, which is the model to follow.

Authority and the state in the DRC is the result of several sociopolitical struggles forged throughout history. For Turner (2007, 28, 30 & 58), authority should be seen as a trinity of state, church, and companies. This founding authority of the colonial state marks in the first instance what he sees as the economy of pillage that has operated in Congo ever since (see also Kankwenda 2005). The difference for him between the Congo Free State and the postcolonial state that started with Mobutu is that while during the colonial government there was some reinvestment, under Mobutu, all profits were pocketed by authorities and elites (Turner 2007, pp. 44–45). And yet this is not understandable without the full picture of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the military support Mobutu received from the USA (Hartung and Moix 2000). Mobutu was clearly a Janus-faced leader that while pushing for the nationalization of Belgian-owned companies and fostering a pride of being African, he consolidated the state as a gatekeeper for resources to be exported and its benefits to be distributed along elites, family ties, and preferred ethnic groups, that he also managed to delineate and antagonize more firmly. Yet it is not a coincidence that his famous "debrouillez-vous" (fend for yourselves), meaning the withdrawal of the state from public services, came at the same time the SAPs were laid out. These programs required the reduction of state institutions to a minimum—the end of subsidized industries and the cut of many public sector jobs (Moyo 2009, p. 48). Therefore, the dismantling of the state and the transformation of the DRC into an informal rent-seeking economy are as much a consequence of Mobutu's ethnopolitical power games as of the impositions of the international financial institutions (IFIs). Added to this were the de-investments from public mining companies, encouraged by both the Mobutu regime and the IFIs, and the plummeting of the prices of commodities such as copper. These dynamics are far from being simply a Congolese affair and reflect what Ndlovu-Gatsheni in this volume calls the "insideness" and "outsideness" of Africa, as a region of the world that is simultaneously pushed aside while being forcibly kept in.

Localised Social Explanations

In addition to these explanations, in the last few years, there has been a tendency to localize the conflict, identifying local issues and actors, primarily around land, identity, and power, and the nature of local politics, as the sources of conflict. These factors are to be found, not at the national

or regional level but at the village and provincial level, whose dynamics then echo upwards (Autesserre 2010, 2012; Bøås 2010; Vlassenroot 2004). This localized social approach claims to offer a better understanding of conflict as it is close to the real dynamics on the ground. It reveals why conflict persists despite the signature of peace agreements at the national level—it is able to delve into the politics of villagers rather than seeing them as simple pawns of national, regional, or even international actors, and it grasps the historical and symbolic importance of identity and land as sources of political authority.

While these are positive features of this approach, under closer analysis, it shows some of the same traits. The main argument is that a struggle for land, power, and political representation, which is inextricably connected to who is considered to be Congolese and which ethnic groups are perceived as having legitimacy to access and distribute land and political power, is at the root of the conflict. This conflict is therefore not new, and authors such as Autesserre see it as going back to the 1930s (Autesserre 2010). There are different emphases, but in general identity is seen as fixed and paramount in its triangular relationship with land and power.

But as Kankwenda (2005) notes, pre-existing identities are fluid. They have as much to do with parental ties and place of birth as with different religious, mystical, political, and economic social networks (283–285). Importantly, not all of these identities have to do with access to land and power; they also have to do with norms, customs, and roles within groups and were not all territorially linked. Other authors such as Vlassenroot have identified the role played by class and how new elites, politicians, and administrators have made claims to the land, putting even more pressure on peasants. In any case, tracing a continuous line to explain violence from colonial to contemporary times linked to issues of land and identity overlooks the social and political struggles that have taken place, first against colonization and then later against Mobutu (Iñiguez de Heredia 2017, pp. 80–81). Additionally, and most importantly for our purposes, is the fact that the local and the social factors attached to the sparking of conflict seem to operate autonomously.

Yet, it is precisely in questions of identity, land, and power that the construction of the "local" in the DRC is most vividly seen as globally co-constituted. Ethnic identity is a receptacle for multiple political, economic, and social identities but was primarily instrumentalized to simplify the administration of the colony (Vansina 1966). In the case of the DRC, ethnic identities crystallized throughout the era of Mobutu who implanted an ethnically based distribution policy that permeated politics, the economy,

and even the army. Ethnic identities are not some intrinsic Congolese feature: they are very much the result of its history and its political relations. Similarly, land cannot be disconnected from the dynamics of the global capitalist systems. This is vividly shown by Gill in this volume and will be extended later in the chapter. Neither can power nor political representation be understood without a broader analysis of their transversal connections. One thing that all analysts coincide in, for instance, is that if the USA and the UK (as has already happened) were to pressure Rwanda to withdraw aid, "local" dynamics in the DRC will change. This is not to invalidate the importance of understanding what happens locally but to emphasize that the "local" cannot be thought of as an autonomous self-constituting arena.

Finally, the social issues these authors emphasize, like the other two approaches, relate to bad governance, weak statehood, and improper democracy. As noted earlier, the three evacuate from the analysis systemic and structural factors that have to do with global politics and the global economy as well as important historical features. One of these features is the long struggle for democracy that has taken place in the DRC ever since Lumumba was ousted and killed. For Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem, the wars are a giant octopus (2011, p. 282). While many of its tentacles have to do with the reasons why neighbors in the region invaded the DRC and remain in proxy wars ever since, others have to do with the democratization struggles that started most forcefully with the Shaba wars in 1977 (Ndaywel è Nziem 2011, p. 256). The ongoing social struggles, later militarized by the war, are fundamental in understanding the war in the DRC, not as a consequence of intrinsic failures but as a struggle over what the DRC should become.

On the whole, explaining the DRC conflict continues familiar patterns of accounting for the DRC as a "failure of modernity" (Dunn 2003, p. 137). As previously stated, the very possibility of placing the context of the DRC as outside the realm of politics and excluding the power relations that create and sustain poverty and violence in the DRC in the first place does not respond to a simple theoretical or methodological approach, it is in itself the evidence that IR and social sciences at large consider Africa outside of world political dynamics. This externality is considered not only different but also deviant and hence a direct cause of the crises the continent suffers. The solution, as many have already noted, is always to look closer to political ideals forged in the West (Mbembe 2001; Wai 2012b, see also Chap. 2 of this volume). The ISSSS policies and the call for agri-business that we are about to explore are evidence of just that process, therefore also illustrating how Eurocentric academic tropes are passed onto policy and back, reproducing the power of those who can diagnose

and intervene and those who are intervened. Though it is true that not only Western actors are involved, it is the Western image of institutional rationality, modernity, and development that is promoted in policy.

Neopatrimonialism and Understanding the DRC as Failure: The Case of the ISSSS

Current policy in DRC is represented by the founding resolution of MONUSCO (RES 1925), given more detail in RES 2053, and ratified by its latest mandate RES 2348 (UN Security Council 2010, 2012, 2017). These resolutions set the core aims of the mission as stabilization, restoration of state authority, and civilian protection. Resolution 2053 specifies the aims as being the completion of ongoing military operations, minimizing the threat of armed groups and restoring stability, improving government capacity in civilian protection by security sector reform (SSR), and the consolidation of state authority through the deployment of administrators, police, and the rule of law in areas freed from armed groups (UN Security Council 2012, para. 4a, b, and c). The operationalization of these goals and the coordination between the main actors, donors, and international NGOs operating in the DRC have been done through a strategy called International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS or I4s). The original ISSSS was put into place after the escalation of violence between 2006 and 2009, which culminated in the Goma Accords and in an agreement between the government and the rebel movement National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Based primarily on the vision of the DRC as a failed state as the explanation for the conflict, the original ISSSS's main priorities were to get rid of armed groups and to restore state authority. It included military counter-insurgency measures to deal with the remaining armed groups, several packages of civil administration reform, SSR, mineral traceability, the rehabilitation of state infrastructure, and programs for rape survivors (MONUSCO 2009).

Despite these efforts, as ex-MONUSCO officer Hugo de Vries states, between 2009 and 2012, eastern DRC experienced "some of the bloodiest years since the second Congo War (1998–2003)" (2016, p. 2). Main stabilization actors, donors, and the government did not succeed at coordinating their efforts in key areas such as SSR, and some of the strategies in place to solve issues identified have reproduced the problems they wanted to tackle (Boshoff et al. 2010). Military operations have created new sources of violence, and the funding of road and government building constructions has

provoked new sources of elite control and inequality (Iñiguez de Heredia 2017, pp. 94–102; de Vries 2016, p. 2). It took another major crisis, where the rebel movement M-23 and a series of renegade soldiers staged another major revolt, which included the occupation of the Goma airport, the head-quarters of MONUSCO in eastern DRC, to rethink the strategy.

The renewal of the ISSSS in 2013 has marked a before and after in accounting for the sources of conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes region at large. This change follows trends in academic research, which, as seen above, has concentrated on dismantling the view that conflict in the DRC is solely related to the exploitation of natural resources and has focused on local issues regarding land distribution, identity, and power. Academic debates have been crucial to guide policy, permeating all levels and organizations, from MONUSCO, the European Union, and the World Bank to NGOs (EU 2013; World Bank 2013, pp. 2–3). It is now acknowledged that the "resource war thesis" had not provided the right strategy for tackling the real sources of conflict. As MONUSCO officer stated: "I don't think we're in that frame of mind any more … We've now all read Autesserre, Christoph Vogel and others … We understand that minerals are what gives them the means to keep fighting but not the reason to fight."[7] Additionally, there has been a realization that the focus on state-building has had limited results, except for the strengthening of Joseph Kabila. This MONUSCO officer put it this way: "We realized that MONUSCO was supporting a predatory state."[8]

Upon close examination, what has changed is that the DRC has gone from being thought of as a failed state to being thought of as predatory. The paradigm of lack and failure has not been abandoned—it has only been redrawn. The new ISSSS strategy now identifies the ultimate sources of conflict as being the neopatrimonial character of the state, which weak-ens its capacity to respond to external and internal pressures (ISSSS 2013, p. 8). This core source is added to the existence of fragmented identities, lack of leadership, socio-demographic pressures, poverty, and access to land, all of which become explosive in light of the abundance of light weapons, impunity, and the activities of conflict entrepreneurs (ISSSS 2013, p. 8). The policies proposed have focused on enacting village-level democratic dialogues to strengthen political authority, breaking with the personalized neopatrimonial system of rule.

Although the claim is that the drafting of the ISSSS has been done in consultation with local NGOs and community leaders, in my 2014 field trip through the territories of Goma, Nyiragongo, Masisi, Bukavu,

Mwenga, and Uvira, and out of 23 civil society organizations interviewed, only four, in Bukavu, Goma, Mwenga, and Uvira, had heard about ISSSS. This shows that the efforts have been limited and focused on organizations and collectives that already have links to international NGOs or the UN. Most importantly, despite the deep analysis about the nature of political authority in the DRC, nowhere in the new ISSSS is there a reference to patterns of global trade, the historical legacy of structural adjustment programs in dismantling public services, or the legacy of patronage from colonialism. This may be too high an expectation from a policy document, yet the document includes references to important academic texts on neopatrimonialism, conflict, and corruption in the DRC such as Bayart, Chabal, Daloz, and Reno. Moreover, neopatrimonialism and corruption are unmistakably linked and extended to the whole of society. One of the problems is that, as Wai (Chap. 2, this volume) states, "neopatrimonialism" has become "a catch-all conceptual staple in Africanist scholarship, used to explain every problem in African states and societies." From the neopatrimonial analysis, how the USA helped consolidating Mobutu's regime and the repression of pro-democracy struggles does not constitute as much of an explanation for the lack of democracy in the DRC as the patterns of personality cult and the participation in networks by both rich and poor to reach the spoils (Bayart 2009, p. 235; ISSSS 2013). Nor does the neopatrimonial analysis acknowledge accountability channels that already exist in Congolese society or the belief in the direct control of the population over chiefs and authorities.[9] Neither are issues of distribution related to the class structure of society or to the role of the state in managing society to accommodate international market pressures. In the particular example of ISSSS, the result is that the priority is not to address those deep structural issues, less so from the international perspective of interveners, but rather to initiate a series of community dialogues in which local actors can resolve conflicts by peaceful means—that is, something which is ingrained precisely in the "patronage" networks on which DRC politics work.

The implication of this analysis is that international strategy is conceived of as implementing mechanisms of accountability and conflict resolution that disregard any already existing mechanisms. The DRC is taken as a ghost or read solely through the paradigm of failure. This ceases to be a policy or an analytical argument and becomes normative political theory about how society should be organized and about the way political and economic goods should be distributed. The DRC does not work properly, and the roots of conflict have been mixed up with the characteristics of society.

Interestingly, as a MONUSCO officer said, this policy had low impact because it was ultimately a long-term strategy.[10] Even though the neopatrimonial analysis of DRC politics may have resonated with policy makers at the highest levels, what UN Security Council members and donors want to see are things that are more easily measured. Specially in the context of a crisis, the "P-3 were pushing for a quick exit strategy" (MONUSCO Officer (no. 166) 2014). The core response was not community dialogue—it was a new "robust mandate" authorizing the use of force for the purpose of attacking armed groups. First, the UN authorized an International Brigade within MONUSCO to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups in the East (UN 2013). This "robust" approach was the response to the M-23 uprising of 2012. It managed to bring things back to normal, at least in regard to putting down the uprising and recuperating Goma. Yet despite the 3000 troops deployed with an enforcement mandate, instability persisted (Vogel 2014). Additionally, as had been the case with other UN-backed and unitary FARDC military operations, the operations have created greater insecurity and armed groups were not neutralized (Human Rights Watch 2015; UNSG 2015).

Added to the military operations, the ISSSS strategy developed the concept of islands of stability. It was conceived as a strategy through which the UN would deploy personnel and start rehabilitation projects of roads and buildings in cleared areas (de Vries 2016, p. 3). As de Vries notes,

> The Islands were referred to as a first step towards the I4S, but in reality the choice of Islands was based on military imperatives relating to the joint operations, rather than on addressing local drivers of conflict in a comprehensive manner. Furthermore, the policy focused on urban centers rather than on wider conflicts, and its build-and-train approach had already been tried by the I4S on a much larger scale and found to be wanting. (2016, p. 3)

Still, prioritizing military means over a dialogue-based or community strategy is not just choosing a good or a bad strategy: they are two sides of the same coin. Since the issue to address relies on a vision of the DRC as needing transformation, the move from dialogue to military force is minimal. It reproduces the old pattern through which the West (and the main donors currently in the DRC are Western countries) controls, disciplines, takes over, and changes aspects of African politics.[11] In this case, as seen in other cases such as France's intervention in Mali in 2013, or the EU military response to smugglers and pirates in the Mediterranean and the

Somali coast, the prevalence of military force represents the assertion of might in light of a perceived weakness to confront threats that would ultimately jeopardize Western interests. The implications are once again the exteriorization of Africa as outside the realm of global history and global politics to something that is intrinsically endogenous but fundamentally inappropriate. This opens the capacity to intervene from community dialogue to military actions in ways that only reproduce the power relations that created such images in the first place.

THE LIMITATIONS OF LOCALIZATION: THE CASE OF THE CALL FOR LARGE AGRIBUSINESSES[12]

The neopatrimonial nature of the state is tightly linked to the factors identified in the localized social account of conflict, even if not always explicitly. In a briefing about the role of land in conflict in the DRC, Gillian Mathys and Koen Vlassenroot point out three forms of conflict over land including individual, community level, and intercommunity. The most prevalent are "community-level conflicts between farmers and large-scale concessionaires, between rural communities and mining companies, between pastoralists and farmers, and between national parks and surrounding populations" (Vlassenroot and Mathys 2016, p. 2). Mathys and Vlassenroot see these within what they claim to be the "wider context of patronage politics, state decline and protracted conflict in DRC" which they set as developing with the Mobutu regime (2016). According to the authors, it was during the time of Mobutu that land "integrated into patronage networks," gaining political value as a source of control, power, and material wealth (Vlassenroot and Mathys 2016, p. 4). Land became currency exchange for loyalty with or without customary sanction, which in turn produced two correlated sources of conflict. Firstly, peasants "lost their customary land rights; secondly, it propped up a new class of large-landowners, political and military leaders to which large plots of land were redistributed to" (Vlassenroot and Mathys 2016, p. 4). This practice was accentuated during the wars (1996–1997; 1998–2003), especially under the rebellion of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy) (Vlassenroot and Mathys 2016, p. 4). These conflicts, in an already violent and militarized context, inspired further violence, armed mobilization, which, when added to an increasing polarization of ethnic identity, has also affected intercommunity cohabitation and antagonistic territorial claims (Vlassenroot and Mathys 2016, pp. 5–6).

This is a vivid example of the social explanations for conflict observed above. While its analysis is attuned to DRC's politics and historicity, it maintains the tropes of neopatrimonialism and hence of Eurocentrism, and at the same time it evacuates global power structures as a contributing factor to the relationship between conflict and land. Placing conflicts over land in the context of a more "generalized governance crisis" in the DRC, where any measures to address them "can only be achieved by a responsible and functioning state," implies that the solution is the transformation of the DRC state and not the actors and structures that help in maintaining it that way (Vlassenroot and Mathys 2016, p. 7).

The colonization of the DRC and the rise of the Independent State of Congo (EIC for its acronyms in French) declared land to be the property of the crown, making the state ever since solely responsible for managing competing claims over land, from corporations, medium large pastoralists, agricultural farmers, and artisanal miners and peasants to members of armed groups, foreign countries, and expanding populations. Initially, land was expropriated and transferred to those who had lent money to King Leopold or accepted to be part of the king's enterprises (Kankwenda 2005, p. 22). This continued under the Congo Free State and beyond. From the two colonization periods through to the post-independence and contemporary period, large holdings have been prioritized as the basis for economic production and development. Land underpins the nature of authority, and the dramatic changes to its economic basis transformed into a system of slavery and then, to a system of waged labor. Subsistence farming has existed ever since alongside cash crops as a marginal low-income activity, increasingly dependent on the possibility of renting rather than owning land. This is not just a feature of the way Belgian colonial administration was dealing with the distribution of wealth and rights but also with the particular way products are valued on the global market. Armed conflict, Timothy Raeymaekers writes, has been constitutive of order in the DRC (Raeymaekers 2014, p. 6). "Post-conflict" policies have contributed to strengthen authoritarian rule, mostly around president Kabila, while also giving way to areas of influence and heterogeneous forms of rule around certain commercial hubs (Raeymaekers 2014, p. 6). Land has been central to these processes in so far competing claims to land have been maintained, even backed by force.

A classic example of a conflict about land has taken place in the territory of Masisi—North Kivu (Autesserre 2010, Chap. 2; Vlassenroot 2004). As director of Pole Institute put it: "in Masisi there is an issue about identity,

land and citizenship. People that live in Kigali have their cows in Masisi, that of course clashes with the claims over land from resident populations."[13] In Nyiragongo, also in North Kivu, people, their cattle, and trade go through as if no real boundary is in place. Here too a conflict over the chiefdom confronts two parts of the same family—one that supported the RCD at the time of the rebellion and another that supported Kabila in 1998 that continues until today.[14] The discovery of gold in 2014 in the Basile chiefdom in the territory of Mwenga created a conflict between two communities living in this chiefdom, also attracting the armed group Raïa Mutomboki.[15] This chapter does not discount such facts, and localized social literature has been, as noted, very precise in detailing these conflicts. What it points to is to observe that these have been constrained and shaped historically and globally, starting from colonization to the politics of post-independence and the Cold War to the global economy and the role of IFIs, as much as by the social struggles for democratization, and do not make up the conflict at large. It also highlights how there is a direct passage from reading those identity, land, and citizenship issues as outside the realm of politics and within the realm of ethnic cleavages, state failure and neopatrimonialism, to a solution premised largely on granting land to large agribusiness. Firstly, once determined that domestic potentialities are useless for development and state-building goals, the solution is always external. Secondly, from the moment such policies are based on large investments, they are doomed to reproduce patterns of patronage and long-term systemic factors of authoritarianism, inequality, dispossession, marginalization of rural populations, and the exclusionary dynamics of low wages and export-oriented production that are part of the full picture about what causes violence and instability. Let us examine a few prominent examples of these land deals.

One of these initiatives set up the National Agency for Investment Promotion (ANAPI) in 2003, which made land a primary commodity (FAO 2012). Another initiative is the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), which was launched as an Africa-wide program through the African Union's New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Each country requires its own strategy according to the benchmarks and principles established in this policy. DRC's CAADP was launched in 2010 to establish a framework for public and private investments, including sustainability, support for small landowners, industrialization, and increased productivity. Although pledging to bring 54,000 more jobs, these deals have delivered short-term and narrow benefits for the DRC (FAO 2012, p. 1; Kuditshini 2008).

A recent deal in 2009 allowed Canadian-based Feronia Inc. to purchase 76.17% of Unilever plantations (known as Plantations et Huileries du Congo Sarl (PHC) in DRC), even though the law passed in 2012, "loi portant principes fondamentaux relatifs à l'agriculture," states that only those companies whose majority is owned by national investors can control land in the DRC (Grain 2015, p. 5). Feronia is currently one of the biggest palm oil plantations in the DRC extending over 107,000 hectares (Feronia Inc. 2017).[16] The plantations were a concession by the Belgian government in 1910 to the Lever brothers, who were willing to finance the enterprise King Leopold wanted to develop in the palm oil industry (Grain 2015, p. 3). The major development was to be experienced by Unilever. As Grain notes, "[t]he plantations would eventually fuel a food processing empire and lay the foundations for the development of one of the world's largest food corporations" (2015, p. 3). Residents on the Unilever plantations were forced to relocate to reserves to work for the plantation (Grain 2015, p. 3). Today, given the difficulties due to the loss of traditional forests and farmlands, many community members are forced to work for Feronia for less than the minimum wage. Additionally, though Feronia claims that it has inherited revolving 25-year leases for the three plantations with the acquisition of PHC, community leaders claim that they were never consulted and that Feronia is not able to present valid documentation for those concessions (Grain 2015, pp. 3–4).

SIFORCO is a similar case. It is a Congolese-based timber company acquired by the US-based Groupe Blattner Elwyn from Danzer Group in February 2012 (Groupe Blattner Elwyn 2016). SIFORCO, which acquired the concession under Mobutu in 1972, has 1.9 million hectares in timber exploitation, added to close to 30,000 hectares in palm oil, making it one of the biggest landowners in DRC (Group Blattner Elwyn 2016). However, this company has a deplorable human rights record. In 2011, workers and residents protest against SIFORCO's unfulfilled promises of social services and infrastructure triggered a harsh repression from SIFORCO, including the rape of several women and girls, beatings, property damage, several arrests, and even one dead (Greenpeace 2011, p. 1). These were carried out by police and military personnel, who were later seen as being paid directly by the company (Greenpeace 2011, p. 1). And yet this was not the first time that SIFORCO, or its owner company Danzer, was accused of committing human rights abuses (see reports cited in Greenpeace 2011, p. 11; Global Witness 2011).

Companies also may decide not to operate but still guard the land until it becomes suitable. In 2009, a deal was signed with China over 100,000 hectares to set up a palm oil-producing and storage plant (Brautigam 2011, p. 258). Though different plans were made to sell up to two million hectares, according to Deborah Brautigam, no development of the contracted land took place because of the risks and high investments in infrastructure it would entail (2015, pp. 82–83). The machinery to develop the site as well as the palm oil would have to be transported on the Congo River, and according to experts, developing the river for transport would take "more than hundred years" (Brautigam 2015, p. 83). The project was abandoned (Brautigam 2015, p. 83).

I was able to observe a similar dynamic in the Kamituga gold mine in South Kivu in 2014. The multinational Banro, despite having bought the mine, had not started production. The reasons for this were the huge investments needed to break ground. Instead of negotiating a possible co-exploitation with miners in the region, Banro had closed the mine, expelled all the miners, and warned that they would prosecute any trespassers. Artisanal miners continue to work on the mine, risking both their lives and the small money they make from it. This case is a reflection of the dynamics that are created not just from a corrupt patronage-based government but also from foreign investment. Timothy Raeymaekers has shown how state power in the DRC has been transferred to commercial non-state actors, propped up through transnational capitalist networks. This reflects not so much the patrimonial nature of politics but the patterns of structural violence brought about by the power differentials capitalism creates. As he affirms, "the state is never an autonomous force but it rather represents an effect of a wider negotiation over practices and codes of regulation" (2014, p. 138). In regard to the war, they have played an ambivalent role both as keepers of stability as well as instigators of armed groups and violence (Raeymaekers 2014, pp. 133–145).

Many large plantations and new land deals are based on the Western equatorial province, but as an unquestionable development policy that acts as a catalyst for political and military power, it is not surprising that it has underpinned armed conflict in the eastern provinces (Land Matrix 2016). This policy is applied over and beyond not only residents' claims to land to develop their own subsistence plantations and the possibility to develop their own cash-crop farms but also in spite of the negative impact these plantations have on residents. A recent report studying the terms of land deals in several countries in Africa manifests these concerns:

> A number of the contracts reviewed appear to be short, unspecific documents that grant long-term rights to extensive areas of land, and in some cases priority rights over water, in exchange for seemingly little public revenue and/or apparently vague promises of investment and/or jobs. Also, many deals are being negotiated in legal contexts where safeguards for local interests are weak, and some contracts appear not to properly address social and environmental issues. (Cotula 2011)

This is not just a question of whether the investors come from the West, Arab countries, or China, as it is the very representation of, as Bikrum argues in this volume, border thinking and primitive accumulation. It is visible in the large capital investments continuing the patterns of resource extraction whereby private revenue is prioritized over the improvement of living standards. Additionally, there is the structural violence of inequality and exploitation that some of these companies bring in.

In South Kivu, Pharmakina is one of the "largest private employer with over 700 full-time workers and about 1000 temporary workers occupied on 31 plantations" (Ulloa et al. 2009, p. 321). Its plantations occupy close to 1000 hectares. Pharmakina claims to be "the world's principal producer and processor of quinine," as 80% of the world's quinine comes from the DRC, and Pharmakina is the largest producer in the country (Pharmakina SA 2016). The DRC is also the source of 9% of the malaria cases worldwide and around 10% of deaths caused by malaria by World Health Organization (WHO) estimates (WHO 2016, pp. 41, 44). Only Nigeria has higher figures. A comparative study by Ferrari et al. (2015) analyzed the costs associated with treating severe malaria in eight health centers and hospitals in DRC. Of the six where all cost details are available, the expenses range from US\$14–60 (Ferrari et al. 2015, p. 8). This cost is out of reach of the majority of the Congolese, 87.7% of whom live on less than US\$1.25 a day (UNDP 2015). This is despite the fact that Pharmakina is "the only pharmaceutical enterprise in Africa that produces quinine medicinal products to the shelf" (Pharmakina SA 2016).

Beyond these facts, just a few of many,[17] is the issue of how transfers of wealth give way to particular political and social configurations and how these have underpinned and maintained the context of war in eastern DRC over the past two decades. These configurations have changed overtime, but the results show a pattern. Frank Van Acker, who has studied the commodification of land and its effects on social structure in detail, shows four interrelated processes (2005).[18]

First, the transformation and co-optation of the customary distribution of land through customary chiefs, which transforms land from a public good to which everyone is eligible to access on a relatively equal basis to a "club good" which only some have the possibility of accessing. Second, as a result, this transformation dispossesses peasants, now having to find work, migrate, or rent land, while creating a new bourgeoisie of capitalists and state administrators who can purchase or occupy that land. As mentioned earlier, military elites, police, and armed groups have profited from these dynamics. Other times the heritage of chiefdom has been dealt with through armed confrontation. Third, land becomes more profitable when vacant or unused as it is up for sale, particularly when foreign investors can be brought in. Fourth, it generates a surplus of land for elites and investment and a lack of land for peasants, which, as discussed above, also generates conflict.

From here, it is possible to identify several limitations of the localized social explanations of conflict in the DRC. To start, they waive international actors, corporations, investors, and capitalism of responsibility. They single out locals as the only ones needing change without taking into account the global and historical sources of local configurations of identity, belonging, land distribution, and political representation. They foreclose a needed critical appraisal of the model of economic development that is being applied and of the global political and economic structures that condition the microlevel. They also do not consider historical social struggles for social change as a relevant factor in conflict. The bottom-up approach that has been applied in the localized account has to be rethought to include horizontal bidirectional and co-constituting elements at different levels. Ultimately, placing the problem on the DRC and the solution on the actions of external actors not only reproduces epistemological tropes rooted in colonialism—it also reproduces the very patterns that underpin conflict in the DRC.

CONCLUSION

The conflicts in the DRC illustrate that the DRC is a complex configuration of global, local, and historical elements, which makes it hard to single out elements within the DRC as a cause for conflict. Understanding these conflicts implies a demarcation of the realm of the political from which they have tended to be excluded. The debates on the sources of conflict have increasingly taken the microcosmos of the DRC as the central loca-

tion for conflict and its solution. While this has countered an image of failure, exploitation, and external interference that left actors in the DRC with no agency or only portrayed under a pathological paradigm of greed, the localized social accounts have reproduced some of these same traits. They have produced a simplified image of an autonomous detached local and have singled out local politics and state-society relations as the ones needing reform. The political accounts have partly solved this with a comprehensive analysis that has joined the multiple levels at which politics in the DRC operate. Yet by analyzing politics in the DRC as neopatrimonial, they too have placed the DRC under the paradigm of failure, creating a blanket explanation that ends up being a normative theory for how society should operate.

In the chapter, these two elements of localization and neopatrimonialism have been problematized by examining two sets of policies: the ISSSS from MONUSCO and the call for large investments in agriculture. The ISSSS signals how some policy makers' attempt to participate in the new trend of understanding conflict through localized questions ended up looking at political and social issues in the DRC through the paradigm of neopatrimonialism. The problem ceases to be political and social questions about wealth distribution and social justice and is linked to the dynamics of patronage in Congolese politics: conflict becomes a question of how politics in the DRC do not function in the right-cum-Western way. Interestingly, acceptance of this explanation instead of the mainstream regarding competition over resources does not foster new strategies; it has triggered even more robust military operations. It is not a coincidence that to the construction of Africa as failed, the response is military force to transform it or to achieve external, generally, Western aims.

The new call for agribusinesses to invest in the DRC follows a trend that finds its origin in colonization. Not only land in the DRC has reported high profits for the crops and resources it produces, land in and of itself has become increasingly commodified, transforming with it the social structure and the basis of political authority. Land has been at the center of the conflict in eastern DRC, but it has not been the cause. The cause has to be seen as the intertwinement of the regional invasion of the DRC and the continental response it provoked, with the aspirations for social and political change many had. The conflict in the DRC has been as much a geopolitical game of DRC's elites, DRC's neighbors, and their allies, as a popular revolt in the context of the global political, economic, and security transformations at the turn of the Cold War affecting the

state, its social and economic basis, and its relations inside and outside (Iñiguez de Heredia 2017, Chap. 1). The role of land has to be seen as inscribed in the long-term patterns of dispossession of rural populations and its increasing value as both an economic and political resource. And yet, all of these dynamics are ultimately intrinsic to the modern state and the capitalist system.

The whole picture that comes from this analysis, especially once the connection is made between how the DRC conflict is read and what is done about it, illustrates that once the conflict is premised on the paradigm of failure, observed from the view of faulty characteristics intrinsic to the DRC, the solution is always external intervention, where the use of force and the displacement of local economies are paramount. This clearly exemplifies how epistemological tropes in the social sciences, and IR in particular, reproduce the patterns whereby Africa is constructed as disordered, deviant, or peripheral, needing intervention to be brought to the core and into full realization (Wai, Introduction).

The conclusion to draw is that a comprehensive global and historical approach must be adopted but one that places the politics of Africa at the center. The sources of conflict relate to both agents and structures that go beyond the local and include historical struggles for democracy and social change. These struggles cannot be seen only under the light of ethnicity, local power politics, and state failure but as part of the larger patterns and structures. This is hardly a new learning to IR (or sociology and political science for that matter), but it highlights IR's relation to Africa. Conflicts and their explanations are ultimately a battle over what societies are and what they should become. But it is precisely these politics that are evacuated when explaining conflict. Whereas IR could have been the ready-made field from which to offer nuanced complex analysis from a world politics perspective, in the case of the DRC as others in Africa, it has largely ignored the conflict or provided frameworks that have reproduced Eurocentric traits. And yet as shown by the discussion above and the chapters of this volume, IR is not external to those dynamics but co-constitutive of such epistemic and actual violences.

Notes

1. The countries involved in the 1998–2002 war were Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, supported by the UK and the USA, added to South Africa and Zambia, as anti-Kabila allies, Chad, supported by France and the Central

African Republic, Namibia and Sudan, supported by Libyan aid, Angola, and Zimbabwe, in support of Kabila.

2. The term "multistate war" refers to the 1996–1997 and the 1998–2002 wars, noting the fact that these wars have confronted coalitions of states in the DRC, though at times these states were involved in occupying the territory more than in a military campaign against other states.

3. A similar category but placing the emphasis on actors rather than factors can be found in (Iñiguez de Heredia 2017, pp. 77–85).

4. An overview of academic debates can be found in Afoaku (2002), Clark (2002a, b), Fahey (2010), Kankwenda (2005, pp. 364–82), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002, Ch. 7), and Turner (2007, Ch. 1).

5. See, for instance, (Clark 2002b; UN Panel of Experts 2001).

6. All reports by the Group of Experts concentrate on detailing armed group sources of financing. For the latest, see UN Group of Experts (2016b, para. 50–56, 2017).

7. Interview with MONUSCO ISSSS representative (no. 168), Goma, August 7, 2014.

8. Interview with MONUSCO ISSSS representative (no. 169), Goma, August 7, 2014.

9. Chiefs can play an ambiguous role as authoritarian figures as well as public servants. The point here is to present the possibility of exploring the nature of politics from different perspectives (Appiah 2001; Mamdani 1996; Mappa 1998).

10. Interview with MONUSCO officer (no. 166) 2014, Goma, August 14, 2014.

11. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, China, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, and the USA.

12. I am grateful to Dominique Schmidt for her thorough research assistance to complete this section.

13. Interview with Onesphore Sematombe, Goma, August 2014.

14. Interviews with member of Conseil Territorial de la Jeunesse de Nyiragongo, Nyiragongo; interview with member of Collectif Association Femmenine Nyiragongo, Nyiragongo; chef de groupement Buhumba; president of Nyiragongo civil society—Nyiragongo, August 2014.

15. Interview with finance assistant administrator, Mwenga, September 2014.

16. The Lokutu, Boteka, and Yaligimba plantations.

17. The fact that the DRC is an electricity exporter though only 6% of the population has access to electricity (EU Energy Initiative 2008), that the DRC is one of the fastest-growing economies even if most of the population is poor, or that only 3.9% of the population uses the Internet and is one of the sub-Saharan countries with the least mobile phone users despite being the source of key minerals for their production (Deloitte LLP 2015).

18. The information in the rest of the paragraph draws on this source.

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Images of Africa in World Press Photo

Kate Manzo

Introduction

This chapter asks how Africa has been visualized in the award-winning photographs submitted in the last ten years to the annual World Press Photo (WPP) competition in visual journalism. Specifically, how conventional (in terms of enduring representations of Africa) are the visual elements and themes exhibited in these photographs? How geographically distributed (within Africa itself) are the award-winning images? Are some countries more visually represented than others? And lastly, to what extent do the photographs follow the news, reflecting "episodic coverage" of crises rather than "longer-term examination of causes and effects" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2007, p. 96) or the diverse, lived experiences of ordinary people?

These questions bring together two related branches of literature that are discussed in part one of this chapter: on representations of Africa in Western media and on international photography competitions. Taken together, these show how Africa has been produced both discursively and visually from the perspectives of failure, lack, and pathology in ways that reinforce Eurocentric assumptions about the continent and justify different

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modes of intervention. Along with Africanism, Afro-pessimism is a relevant concept in this regard. It encapsulates the ways in which Africa so often appears in visual journalism as a continent trampled by the so-called Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, that is, disease, death, destitution/poverty, and war.

Photography competitions are important because they are one of the spaces in which popular geopolitical imaginations of Africa are produced and circulated. Photographs used in international news stories and humanitarian communication form part of the "colonial library" that has invented Africa as a paradigm of strangeness and an imperial object in the minds of ordinary people. At the same time, critical reflections on Afro-pessimistic stereotypes of ethnic violence, suffering children, famine, and so on are apparent in photography circles as well as in academic scholarship such as this. The aim of the chapter is therefore not to judge winning photos for artistic or aesthetic quality. It is to read them as popular geopolitical texts, or narratives, and thus as one source of insight into how Africa is visually positioned and represented in world politics.

These particular images (and the questions they raise) matter for a variety of reasons. WPP runs one of the biggest annual photography competitions in the world; its Photo of the Year announcement is a widely reported and newsworthy event. Winning images are discussed on social media and have featured in charity appeals. Some of the most iconic—and contested—photographs taken in Africa have won WPP awards, such as the 1980 shot of the hand of a starving Ugandan boy resting in a Catholic monk's hand (see Fig. 4.1[1]; for a critique of the image as colonial and patronizing, go to https://www.duckrabbit.info/2012/01/many-images-one-view/).   A panel at the 2016 WPP awards days entitled "Diversity: Gender, Geography and How Can We Better Represent the World?" shows that issues of representation are debated by professional photographers.

In terms of its own distributional circuits, WPP runs an annual global tour of prizewinning photographs that starts in its headquarter city of Amsterdam. According to staff at the city's host venue, De Nieuwe Kerk, the opening weekend of the 2016 exhibition drew 4000 visitors alone. The board near the entrance (shown in Fig. 4.2) indicates the broader scale of the exhibition's geographic reach. The traveling exhibition reaches a global annual audience of up to four million people per year (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/exhibitions). The WPP's online archive, furthermore, is a rich and accessible data set, containing as it does all winning images dating back to the inaugural competition in 1955.

Fig. 4.1   1981 World Press Photo of the year. Copyright: Mike Wells

Following the literature review in part one, the next part of the chapter discusses the data collection method and images' coding scheme. The results are presented and discussed in part three, where findings are shown to be consistent to some extent with those of previous research. However, although Afro-pessimism may be alive and well, there are signs in visual journalism of chipping away at the edifice. This is important because if visual media are crucial sites in which popular geopolitical imaginations of Africa are produced and circulated, then they can also be sources or engines of positive change.

Visualizing Africa: A Literature Review

Representations of Africa in Western Media

Africa has had a perverted image in history, rooted by poisonous epistemic foundations and perpetuated by contemporary culture with film and photography as the in-your-face culprits …. The concept of the noble savage, the general dystopian outlook and the consistent overrepresentation of the four Ds—disease, death, destitution and displacement—in international media coverage of Africa is self-perpetuating and vapid. (Nwagbogu 2015, p. 1)

Fig. 4.2 WPP slogan in *De Nieuwe Kerk*, Amsterdam, April 2016

The term "representation" generally entails both image and text, or visualization and narrative, while "media" includes popular film and television as well as photojournalism and charity appeals. Thanks, in part, to the breadth of both concepts, the issue of how Africa has been represented in

Western media is of interest in a range of academic disciplines, such as geography, development studies, and journalism studies. The quote above from Azu Nwagbogu, the director and founder of LagosPhoto, further attests to the salience of the issue within African photography circles. Designed as an antidote to media stereotypes of Africa "nurtured into one ballistic word: Afro-pessimism," LagosPhoto runs a festival aimed at showcasing the diversity of African sensibilities, culture, and realities. Its "incremental aim" is to "chip away at this formidable edifice of hopelessness" (Nwagbogu 2015, p. 1).

Those concerns about overrepresentation, stereotyping, Afro-pessimism, and hopelessness echo in two disciplinary subfields that are most relevant to the current inquiry. One is studies of international news and, within that, the concept of conventionalization. This has been defined as "the tendency of news photographs to exhibit similar visual elements and themes" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2009, p. 141). Conventionalization relates to the first research question about enduring representations of Africa in Western media and to critical questions about ongoing colonial stereotypes. As David Campbell has noted, "the colonial relationship between self and other can be conducted in a number of different modes, from violent suppression to a humanitarian concern with the wellbeing of colonial subjects" (Campbell 2012, p. 84). Whatever the mode, stereotypical colonial images "contrast an adult and superior global North with an infantilized and inferior global South" (Campbell 2012, p. 84).

The other key subfield, which relates to all three research questions, concerns the still images used in humanitarian communication and pleas for humanitarian assistance. Since disasters, emergencies, and famines often drive appeals for such assistance, they frequently appear in tandem with episodic coverage of crises in particular countries. However, when humanitarian communication embraces concepts of solidarity and justice, as well as charity, its frame of reference shifts from short-term relief to long-term development and structural change. The focus then becomes poverty and its associated issues (such as labor relations and commodity production) rather than famine relief.

The following discussion highlights the limited range of visual themes through which Africa has been represented historically in a crucial site of popular geopolitical production, that is, Western media. It also demonstrates how frequently the lone child (or iconography of childhood) has featured in photographic depictions of Africa.

International News

> Sometimes … it seems as if all the media cover are those regions of the world trampled by the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. (Moeller 1999, p. 1)
>
> The salient aspects of international news relate mostly to war and to poverty with a dose of protest and crime thrown in for good measure. (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2007, p. 97)

An earlier quote from Nwagbogu (2015, p. 1) that referred to the "four Ds" of international media coverage of Africa as "disease, death, destitution, and displacement" echoes in the two quotes above. All three studies associate international (or Western) news with a maximum of four visual themes. The book *Compassion Fatigue* by Moeller (1999) identifies the so-called Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse as disease, famine, war, and death. Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007) add protest and crime to the mix. The commonly agreed visual themes are therefore disease, death, destitution/poverty, and war. Even if displacement (possibly due to war), famine, protest, and crime are added to the mix as separate categories, these authors suggest that the total number of visual themes in international news remains in single figures.

Two issues of relevance here are raised by these findings. The first one is geography: the extent to which international news is Afrocentric as well as thematically limited. The second issue, which focuses on conventionality in news stories and photographs, concerns the how and not just the what of media coverage. How, in other words, are themes such as war and death in Africa signified and visually portrayed?

The chapters of *Compassion Fatigue* devoted to each of the "Four Horsemen" are geographically expansive. The chapter on death, for example, features assassinations of political leaders on the Indian subcontinent and in the Middle East. Only the famine chapter is restricted to Africa (i.e. Ethiopia 1984–1985 and Sudan and Somalia 1991–1993). The impression given that international news is not especially Africa-centered is reinforced by the finding that international news is generally "episodic" and "crisis-oriented" and that "the international world" as a whole "is narrowly framed for the audience as a violent, crisis-ridden place" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2007, p. 84). So why then do "photographs depicting Africa represent a major portion of international news photographs taken from the early 1940s to the start of the twenty-first century" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2007, p. 91)? Why does "the international world" so often appear to be a synonym for Africa?

It seems that "the further away from home, the more likely the cameras are lured there by something violent" (Kim and Zoe Smith 2005, p. 311). Distance plus violence equals media coverage. Distant wars that bear the hallmark of genocide or ethnic cleansing are a particular draw. This is evident from the chapter in *Compassion Fatigue* called "Covering War: Getting Graphic about Genocide," which features portrayals of so-called ethnic conflict and atrocities in Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Holocaust metaphors and pictures showing "the dead, preferably in large piles, and the 'hollow-eyed' survivors, preferably women and children" have loomed large in each case (Moeller 1999, p. 234).

So it is not just African states that have been represented as sites of ethnic hatred. The extent to which newsworthy crises in particular parts of the continent are actually understandable in terms of ethnicity is nonetheless contested. It has been argued, for example, that the 1994 Rwandan genocide was mispresented as a Hutu-Tutsi conflict (Chari 2010) and the Darfur crisis of 2003 as a binary Arab versus African struggle (Campbell 2007). Such simplifications of complex situations are not only inaccurate but also consequential. They confirm "the clichés in the minds of many foreigners that Africa is doomed to an eternal hell of ethnic violence" from which it cannot be saved (Moeller 1999, p. 223).

Portrayals of Africa as doomed and hopeless are therefore clearly related to the nature of coverage of two of the Four Horsemen, that is, war and death. There are more than two visual themes in international news, however, and it is arguably combinations of elements that draw the cameras disproportionately to Africa. This is shown by Kim and Zoe Smith (2005, p. 310), who found that "African states dominate the US media when there is ethnic strife and subsequent famine."

I have argued before that the specter of death (if not actual corpses) looms in Western media coverage of African famines (Manzo 2008). There are therefore similarities as well as differences in portrayals of conflict and famine. Moeller (1999) suggests that the latter might be even more newsworthy—and visually powerful—than the former for a couple of reasons. Firstly, there is the greater possibility of coverage. Genocide cannot be predicted as far in advance as a famine; it is also often state-sponsored and therefore officially denied and hidden from view. Secondly, "one can bear witness to a genocide, but … with famine there is at least the prospect of being able to alleviate the suffering of a few" (Moeller 1999, p. 225). Added to that, a genocide and a modern famine are both man made, but only the latter can be scripted (however tangentially) as a

natural disaster. The Niger Crisis Appeal of 2007, for example, was described by the UK's Disasters Emergency Committee as "a major food shortage caused by drought and locust invasion in West Africa" (http://www.dec.org.uk/appeal/appeals-archive). The same could not be said of situations leading to indictments for the crime of genocide in the International Criminal Court.

In sum, famine draws the cameras because it raises the prospect of humanitarian intervention and rescue—especially of suffering children—and not just of coverage. The links between international news and humanitarian communication are explored further in the following section.

Humanitarian Communication

> Photography has been a key component in the creation of what we think of as the modern human-rights consciousness … But though photographs can do much to expose a crisis, they can do little to explain it—and can sometimes actually mislead. (Linfield 2007, pp. 20 and 24)

The above quote (and the article from which it hails) raises an important question about the visual dimensions of humanitarian communication, that is, images that "bring home to us the reality of human suffering" by exposing "human cruelty" and "crimes against the body" (Linfield 2007, p. 16). Is it sufficient for visual journalists to merely record and expose human rights violations or must their pictures explain them as well? Is it the responsibility of the image maker, in other words, to provide understanding? The author seems to suggest not when she argues that "we, the viewers … must look outside the frame to understand the complex political realities that these photographs document" (Linfield 2007, p. 25). The implication is that the responsibility of the photographer is to document complexity, while responsibility for understanding falls elsewhere.

The aforementioned concept of bearing witness encapsulates a widely held understanding of the purpose, or responsibility, of visual journalism in relation to human rights. Photographer Brent Stirton, for example, argues in The Photo Issue of National Geographic that "photography is a weapon against what's wrong out there. It's bearing witness to the truth" (Stirton 2013, p. 37). The witness theme has been embraced more recently by WPP on a dedicated website (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/witness) that includes the image shown in Fig. 4.3.[2] Taken in Chad and submitted as one of a series called "Ivory Wars" about rangers' efforts to thwart ivory poaching and illegal trade, the photograph won a 2016 Nature prize (second prize stories) for Stirton.

Fig. 4.3 Brent Stirton, "Ivory Wars" in Chad (man with tusk) 2016 winner on WPP witness poster. Copyright: Brent Stirton/Reportage by Getty Images for National Geographic Magazine

In an age when digital photographs can be easily manipulated or photoshopped, the idea of photography as not only a witness to atrocity but also a weapon against genocide-related political secrecy and denial remains powerful. Photographer Gilles Peress, for example, whose portfolio of work includes The Silence (photographs taken in Rwanda in 1994), has likened himself to a "police photographer, collecting evidence as a witness … for history, so that we remember" (Peress 2007, pp. 243–244). In a similar vein, underwater photojournalist Brian Skerry describes a photograph as "powerful proof. It's indisputable evidence" (Skerry 2013, p. 65).

Whatever the aims, humanitarian images engage by definition with humanity, human beings, and what it means to be human. It is this very focus—on the human subject as either victim or villain—that has exposed humanitarian communication to "much consternation and inspired sometimes vitriolic attacks" (Linfield 2007, p. 18). A central problematic is the dehumanization or objectification of the suffering person. As summarized by Linfield (2007, p. 18), "critics have charged that the photograph of suffering reduces its subjects to objects … Photographs of war, violence and poverty, especially when depicting the Third World, have been denounced as neo-colonialist, racist, patronizing, obscene." An infamous

exemplar is the starving African child alone in her suffering. Unvarying reliance on such an image to signify famine is aptly illustrated under the heading "Why Famine Persists," a New York Times (NYT) cover montage of famine images shot across Africa between 1968 and 2003 (see http://www.wehaitians.com/why%20famine%20persits.html).

A lone starving child can be a most powerful image and not just because "singular faces" of suffering provoke emotion and stay in the memory (Linfield 2007, p. 17). The figure of a child "is an extremely powerful political metaphor in all its innocence and fragility"; it is a symbol of global humanitarianism or ideas of shared humanity, concerned international community, and "liberal sentimental politics" (Mannevuo 2014, p. 135). Nonetheless the images featured on the NYT cover are now abjured in voluntary codes of conduct on images and messages (for more on these, see Manzo 2008) and remain contested for a couple of reasons. One concerns the objectification and/or dehumanization of the actual person in the photo, while the other relates more to the iconography of childhood that the person herself represents. The anonymity of the photographed is central to both concerns. As noted in an analysis of images of child malnutrition in the WPP competition, "a typical critique of the photographs of suffering African children draws attention to the namelessness of the photographed" (Mannevuo 2014, p. 136).

The problem with nameless singularity is that an unidentified, lone human being ceases to be a unique individual and becomes an icon instead—a generic representation of human vulnerability and a stand-in for all the other suffering, "exploited, oppressed, even exterminated" members of the larger groups to which that person belongs (Linfield 2007, p. 17). In previous research I found the lone child image at work across the full spectrum of humanitarian communication and not just in appeals for emergency relief (Manzo 2008). Child images are used in situations where the issue is human rights and not just children's rights (e.g. campaigns against child labor). Children often feature, for example, in solidarity campaigns such as Make Poverty History (MPH)—which became increasingly focused on Africa (Harrison 2010)—as well as charitable appeals for humanitarian assistance. This is because the iconography of childhood in the West has long connoted human vulnerability, innocence, helplessness and dependence, and a corresponding need for parental guidance, protection, and support. The "familiar imperial legacy which represents Africa as a place of indigence in need of outside assistance" (Harrison 2010, p. 391) is therefore only reinforced by iconic representations of Africa as a singular child (Manzo 2008).

Africa's "perverted image" in Western media (Nwagbogu 2015, p. 1) is thus a consequence of childhood iconography as well as international news coverage of war and conflict. Indeed, the two often go together as the following discussion now shows.

International Photography Competitions

War and coup d'état account for two-thirds (68.3 percent) of the 41 international Pulitzer winners … Africa emerges as the most heavily covered continent … Out of the 41 winners, 12 (29.3 percent) represent news events in Africa, and the major themes are war, coup and famine. (Kim and Zoe Smith 2005, pp. 313–317)

The world as captured through feature photography is likely to be depicted through the experiences of children. The three subgroups of this category reflect different aspects of childhood. (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2009, p. 152)

The three major annual international photography competitions are the Pulitzer Prize, Pictures of the Year International (POYi), and World Press Photo (WPP). Judging of the first two takes place in the United States (at Columbia University and University of Missouri-Columbia, respectively) and the last one in the Netherlands (at WPP headquarters in Amsterdam). The Pulitzer Prize is different from the other two in restricting entries to photographs published in a US daily newspaper.

Relevant findings from studies of all three have been cited already. This section concentrates on different categories of prize within each competition, because there is more to media coverage of Africa than international news. Photographs that win prizes are newsworthy in their own right. Furthermore, this section explores two geographic issues relating to award-winning images. One is the issue of geographic variation within the African continent and the extent to which cameras are lured by episodic crises in particular countries. The other issue relates to domestic versus international differences. How, for example, are the experiences of children from different countries and continents depicted?

Established in 1968, the photography division of the Pulitzer Prize has two categories: one for news (so-called spot news or breaking news) and one for features, which are "not primarily dependent upon the time value of a news event" (Kim and Zoe Smith 2005, p. 307). The POYi contains no less than 40 different categories, including several devoted to news, features, and sports. Entrants can submit single photographs or photo

essays containing three to twelve pictures (http://www.poyi.org/73/Call_for_Entries_73.html). The number of categories for WPP, finally, has varied from year to year but currently stands at eight including two devoted to news (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2016).

As quoted above, Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) found that (a) Africa is the most heavily covered region in Pulitzer Prize-winning photographs over time and (b) that the dominant thematic category by some distance was war and coup. The human subjects of the dominant thematic category were "predominantly refugees or victims of war" (Kim and Zoe Smith 2005, p. 314). The second category—poverty and social problems at 12 percent—contained only five pictures (including famine images). In terms of country subjects, only Angola (with three pictures) and Ethiopia (with two) were portrayed more than once. The other countries photographed were Rhodesia (as Zimbabwe was still in 1978), Rwanda, Rwanda/Burundi, Liberia, South Africa, Somalia, and Sudan.

The POYi news photographs studied by Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007) showed Eastern Europe to be the most heavily covered region (with 14 photographs), followed closely by Africa with 12. Although the geography differs slightly from the earlier study, the visual themes of each competition remain much the same: "Photographs portraying Africa exhibit both of the prominent themes of the analysis, war/coup [Fig. 4.3] and famine [Fig. 4.1]" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2007, p. 89). Furthermore, "the POYi-winning photographs in all categories of visual theme tend to reflect episodic coverage. Poverty and social conditions, for example, are more likely to relate to a refugee crisis in Africa than to any longer-term examination of causes and effects or struggles to improve the social situation" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2007, p. 96).

Notable differences emerge when the focus shifts from news to features and to comparisons between domestic and international photographs. The latter "have been found to represent violence and conflicts such as 'war and coup' more predominantly compared to the domestic photographs" that won a Pulitzer Prize between 1942 and 2002. The major visual themes of the domestic entries are Accidents, Human interest/oddities, Crime/terrorism, Poverty/social problems, and Race/ethnic problems (Kim and Zoe Smith 2005, p. 318). The second of those is also significant in the study of POYi-winning feature photographs by Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009). The authors argue that "the winning photographs are likely to reflect an aspect of life that might be shared by viewers" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2009, p. 153). However, the

category of Work, with which many adults might be expected to identify, accounted for only eight percent of the winners. The top thematic category was labeled "Children" (28 out of 110 pictures, more than 25 percent, followed by "Animals" (20) and "Humor/oddity" (17)). The top three categories together accounted for nearly 60 percent of the images in the sample.

Contrasting images of children highlight the geographical differences identified by different authors. The "Children" category in the POYi study is further divided into three subgroups, that is, children playing, interactions between genders, and the "impact of conflict, disaster or poverty on children" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2009, p. 145). In terms of iconographies of childhood, the first two sub-categories represent "innocence" and "rites of passage," while the last is about victimhood and innocence lost (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2009, p. 152).

Although American children can represent all three sub-categories of childhood, it is foreign (often African) children who disproportionately signify victimhood and innocence lost. They are rarely shown at play with other children, with animals, or in humorous situations because they are the archetypical human subjects of the dominant international visual themes. A possible exception is the photograph of three nameless Angolan children—one of whom is holding a doll—that won World Press Photo of the year in 1997. And yet the children (among them an amputee on crutches) are standing apart and not facing each other. They are identified only as "landmine victims at a center for children suffering war trauma" (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/1997/world-press-photo-year/francesco-zizola).

Adult men and women can be victims as well. A study of all the images of "war, disaster, and atrocity" submitted to the 2009–2011 WPP contest identified male corpses as the dominant trope or photographic convention. The three photos of the year, however, featured "non-Western women" and arguably demonstrated that "the feminine acts as a signifier of cultural and political differences" to Western viewers "conditioned to associate victimhood, death and loss with the feminine" (Zarzycka and Kleppe 2013, p. 989).

Children of either gender are nonetheless iconic representations of the "tragedies, wars and other disasters of human existence" that define international prizewinning photographs (Kim and Zoe Smith 2005, p. 320). Albeit less frequently than adult men, children too have been photographed in death. This is shown in the study of five photographs of child

malnutrition that won World Press Photo of the year awards between 1975 and 2006. Two of them "are built around a dead child in a manner that makes the child look almost like an offering [so] the child becomes a powerful figure of pure innocence trapped in the middle of the turbulences in contemporary world politics" (Mannevuo 2014, p. 142).

A notable exception to the aforementioned namelessness of subjects is the photograph of baby Alassa Galisou and his mother Fatou Ousseini taken at a feeding center in Niger in 2005 (see Fig. 4.4).[3] The single image by Canadian photographer Finbarr O'Reilly further breaks from convention in providing "quite an extensive story around it" and thus giving viewers some context to their suffering as well as the identities of mother and child (Mannevuo 2014, p. 140). A critical reading of the photograph as a signifier of "lack of hope" stems from the way the baby's hand presses against his mother's lips in "an act of silencing" and "a representation of muteness" (Mannevuo 2014, p. 140). Bearing in mind the discursive elements of Africanism and Afro-pessimism, the critique suggests that the winning image represents dominant stereotypes of Africa and not just of famine.

Fig. 4.4 World Press Photo of the year 2006. Copyright: Finbarr O'Reilly, commissioned by Reuters

In sum, the ways in which Africa has been represented in Western media are remarkably consistent over time. However, the winning photograph by Finbarr O'Reilly, which names both subjects and is accompanied by narrative on the WPP website (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2006/world-press-photo-year/finbarr-oreilly), provides at least some evidence of positive change in the last decade. It is to issues of continuity and change in popular representations of Africa that the chapter now turns.

Research Method and Data Collection

Previous studies of international photography competitions vary in terms of temporal span, thematic or event focus, sampling protocols, number of images collected, and visual methods. Studies investigating both change over time and particularly newsworthy events—such as the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 that garnered enormous visual coverage worldwide—generate the largest data sets. The "special September 11th news and feature category of the 2002 POYi competition" alone attracted 667 entries, all of which are analyzed through a content analysis by Kim (2012, p. 160).

Content analysis (and attendant thematic coding) is the method of choice for large data sets. It is used for the 120 images analyzed by Zarzycka and Kleppe (2013), the 98 scrutinized by Kim and Zoe Smith (2005), and the 68 examined by Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007). Slightly different is the constant comparative method employed by Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009) to analyze and code 110 POYi-winning photographs taken at five-year intervals between 1945 and 2005. Different again is Mannevuo (2014), who uses textual analysis to analyze five World Press Photo of the year photographs taken between 1974 and 2005.

The number of award categories investigated will also have a bearing on the number of winning images collected. Two studies by Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007 and 2009) focus on winning entries to POYi and have almost identical time spans (i.e. 1943–2003 and 1945–2005, respectively). And yet the latter has a much larger data set than the former despite its five-year sampling protocol. This is because the earlier study considers only 1st place awards, while the latter includes 2nd, 3rd, and 4th place winners as well.

The WPP archive shows that "not all images made by photojournalists focus on news or sports events as their primary topic" (Greenwood and Zoe Smith 2009, p. 141). The large quantity of archived photographs taken on

the African continent is also consistent with the geographic concentration found in studies of other competitions, notably Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) on 60 years of Pulitzer Prize-winning photographs and Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007) on the Pictures of the Year International (POYi) competition. The sheer wealth of images from Africa across all competition categories in the WPP archive necessitated a sampling protocol.

Bearing in mind previous findings, the paper's own research questions, and the possibility of change over time, I began my investigation in the middle of this decade (where most other cited studies left off). This provided a working time span of ten years, that is, 2006–2016. The aim then—using WWP's online archive as a database—was to create a subset of all the prizewinning still images in all categories (e.g. Contemporary Issues, Spot News) that were taken on the African continent in the eligible years. Multimedia entries were excluded as this category of prize only began in 2011 and therefore did not cover the full chosen time span.

Each category of still image contains six prizes—three for singles and three for stories or photo essays (which are sometimes shot in more than one country). Some submissions are untitled; in others, the place is not mentioned. Geographic identification nonetheless proved straightforward thanks to the location maps on the WPP website that show where each photograph was taken.

The total number of prizes awarded came to 95; hence content analysis was chosen as the appropriate method. Visual analysis of each prize focused on: (a) the visual themes and sub-themes identified from the literature review in part one and b) the distribution of geographic areas within Africa itself. Details of the coding scheme are in Table 4.1. The full data set, including geographic locations and thematic codes assigned, are contained in the appendix.

Results and Analysis

The first research question was: how conventional (in terms of enduring representations of Africa) are the visual elements and themes exhibited in WPP award-winning photographs? Table 4.2 shows that more than two-thirds of the images in the data set fall under two conventional categories, that is, "Poverty/social problems" (including Four Horsemen images of famine and disease) and "Children/childhood." Refugee crises and children as victims (of war, poverty, and disaster) are common sub-themes within each of the dominant categories. Many images covered both themes, as shown in the appendix.

Table 4.1 Coding scheme

Visual theme and illustrative sub-themes	Source	Indicative images
1. War/coup *Armed conflict* *Victims of war*	Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007) Zarzycka and Kleppe (2013)	Battlefields Soldiers in action Executions Corpses Refugees fleeing
2. Poverty/social problems *Public health problems* *Flawed social welfare systems* *Addiction* *Human rights violations* *Displacement*	Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007)	People addicted to narcotics Bankrupt people The unemployed "Famine-stricken refugees" (Kim and Zoe Smith, 2005, p. 316)
3. Demonstration/protest *Political rallies* *Scenes of demonstration*	Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007)	Violent clashes between police and protestors
4. Crime/terrorism *Scenes of violent crime* *Legal activity/proceedings* *Victims of crime/terrorism* *Perpetrators of crime*	Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007)	Street attacks Bombings of public buildings Trials/courtrooms Dead/dying/wounded civilians Hijackers
5. Race/ethnic problems *Racial/ethnic conflict*	Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007)	Clashes between groups Civil rights protests Rival warlords
6. Children/childhood *Play* *Education* *Youth/adolescence*	Manzo (2008) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009) Mannevuo (2014)	Lone child Parent and child Children together Young people under 18
7. Sports *Sports competition/teams* *Individual competitors*	World Press Photo category Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007)	Olympic Games Athletes in action
8. Nature *Natural disaster/weather* *Animals* *Man and nature*	World Press Photo category Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009)	Flora, fauna, landscapes Volcanic eruptions Floods/earthquakes/hurricanes People and animals
9. Prominent persons *National/international leaders* *Entertainers*	Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007)	Famous politicians Actors/actresses Singers

Table 4.1   (continued)

Visual theme and illustrative sub-themes	Source	Indicative images
10. Human interest/ oddities *Humorous scenes/rare incidents*	Kim and Zoe Smith (2005) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2007) Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009)	Man bathing in a livestock tank Dog urinating on a priest's robes
11. Daily Life *Work* *Big events* *Leisure/entertainment*	World Press Photo category Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009)	Workplaces and people Weddings Parties

Conventionality refers to depictions of themes—such as the suffering unnamed child—as well as their presence and here too there are some notable examples. One mentioned in Table 4.2 is the untitled photo of a Ugandan man sheltering beneath a mosquito net with his malarial baby that won the 2008 Contemporary Issues, 3rd prize singles award. Neither subject is named in the accompanying narrative on the WPP website (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2008/contemporary-issues/william-daniels).

That said, in their study of winning photographs in the POYi competition, Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009, p. 156) show that "while the bulk of the awards have been conferred upon photographs in certain thematic categories, there is still room for novelty with the content of the image." The same holds true for the WPP awards analyzed here. Somewhat novel is the photograph that won the Contemporary Issues, 2nd prize singles award in 2016. The viewers shown in silent contemplation of the image in Fig. 4.5 are reading the accompanying story of how seven-year-old Adam Abdel came to be badly burned in the Darfur region of Sudan. The boy's clothes caught fire from the blast of a government bomb dropped near his home. The image was coded as both War/coup and Children/childhood—two conventional thematic categories from the literature review. A young child as a suffering victim of conflict is a familiar human subject within both.

And yet, Adam is not alone, helpless, or waiting in a refugee camp for international assistance. He is outside his own home, with his mother and another child in the background. The reference to forgotten mountains in the title refers to the absence, not presence, of international humanitarian assistance. This is further amplified in the narrative, which explains that

Table 4.2 Distribution of images among visual themes

Category	Number	Indicative image(s) Title/description	Competition date	Location
Poverty/social problems	33	Ebola in Sierra Leone	2015	Sierra Leone
		Niger, "Food Crisis"	2011	Niger
		Darfur refugees	2007	Chad
		Overcrowded prison inmates	2006	Malawi
Children/ childhood	33	Mother and Son	2014	Egypt
		Juveniles Behind Bars in Sierra Leone	2011	Sierra Leone
		Child with malaria + father	2008	Uganda
		Young ballet dancer	2006	Republic of South Africa
Daily Life	22	Signal	2014	Djibouti
		Dakar Fashion Week	2012	Senegal
		Sapeurs	2010	Republic of Congo
		Television viewing	2008	Morocco and Nigeria
Nature	17	Fennec Fox, a Species in Danger	2014	Tunisia
		Journey to the Centre of the Earth	2011	Democratic Republic of Congo
		Leopard Catching a Springbok	2009	Namibia
		Serval cat	2007	Chad
Crime/terrorism	13	Mass Abduction in Nigeria	2015	Nigeria
		Massacre at Westgate Mall	2014	Kenya
		Victim of gang violence	2008	Kenya
		Petrol pipeline explosion	2007	Nigeria
War/coup	12	War and Mental Health after Crisis	2014	South Sudan
		The Last Colony	2011	Western Sahara
		Tuareg rebels	2009	Mali
		Psychiatric patients/war trauma	2007	Burundi
Demonstration/ protest	10	Battle for Libya	2012	Libya
		The Fight for Tahrir Square	2012	Egypt
		Political protest	2008	Zimbabwe
		Political protest	2006	Togo

(*continued*)

Table 4.2   (continued)

Category	Number	Indicative image(s) Title/description	Competition date	Location
Sports	10	The Gris-Gris Wrestlers of Senegal I Just Want to Dunk Football match, FIFA World Cup Amputee sports club	2016 2013 2011 2007	Senegal Somalia Republic of South Africa Sierra Leone
Race/ethnic problems	4	Afrikaner Blood Tribal clash	2012 2009	Republic of South Africa Kenya
Prominent persons	4	Farewell Mandela Mubarak Steps Down	2014 2012	Republic of South Africa Egypt
Human interest/ oddities	3	Man + hyena on a leash	2006	Nigeria

Fig. 4.5 "The Forgotten Mountains of Sudan" on WPP exhibition board, Amsterdam, April 2016

"treatment was hard to obtain, because the government continued to deny NGOs and relief workers access to rebel-held territory" (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2016/contemporary-issues/adriane-ohanesian). Although the question of how this child and his family managed to survive (or receive any form of treatment) in the absence of humanitarian access is not answered directly, the suggestion is clear. Adam survived with the help of his own family, notably his mother.

Survival is more explicitly the theme of the photo essay that won the Sports, 3rd prize stories award in 2016—one year after "Ebola in Sierra Leone" won in the General News, 1st prize stories category. Founded by Ebola survivor Erison Turay, the "Ebola Survivors Football Club" is a sporting organization that "provides a support network for survivors of the disease and helps battle negative stigmas in the community" (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2016/sports/tara-todras-whitehill). Given the social context and the fact that many of the subjects of the pictures are children (as well as adult women and men), the entry was coded as Poverty/social problems as well as Children/childhood and Sports. Although evocative in some ways of the aforementioned 1997 World Press Photo of the year of Angolan children, this portrait of groups of smiling African children playing together in their own community and surroundings (and not standing apart at a center for suffering children) qualifies as an unusual image.

So there are unconventional images within conventional thematic categories. Arguably more significant is the relative dearth of images in the "War/coup" category (12) compared to the number of Daily Life winners (22). The content of the images in the latter category is also notably diverse. Sub-themes (as shown in the appendix) include marriage, fashion, work, media (i.e. television and mobile phones), education, and arts (e.g. music). Unconventional human subjects include the "society of elegant persons of the Congo," also known as Sapeurs. They are the focus of the untitled photo essay that won the Arts and Entertainment, 2nd prize stories award in 2010. More recently the Sapeurs have featured in a Guinness advert that celebrates the men's "way of life" as well as their elegant attire (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-3sVWOxuXc).

Other Daily Life winners are part of larger projects designed to challenge stereotypical Four Horsemen representations of Africa. For example, an untitled photograph of a Mozambican family picnic on a beach that won the Daily Life, 2nd prize singles award in 2010 is part of the five-country "Middle Classes in Africa" project. Its aim is not to inspire

"pity about the continent" but rather to "present a new but realistic vision of Africa to the public of developed countries" (http://www.classesmoy-ennes-afrique.org/en/theproject).

Turning now to the second research question, about geographies of representation, Table 4.3 displays the distribution of winning images by country. Top of the list is Kenya (11) followed closely by Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with ten. The number of visual themes covered there, as well as the sheer number of winners, is immediately evident from the fourth column of the table. Newsworthy events and bloody scenes, such as the 2013 massacre at Kenya's Westgate mall in Nairobi, are certainly represented. So too are "innocence lost" portrayals of children. For example, the untitled winner of the 2007 Contemporary Issues, 3rd prize singles award shows a little girl smoking a cigarette as older friends attend to her hair. The child is identified on the WPP website as nine-year-old Esther Yandakwa, a homeless sex worker in Kinshasa, DRC (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2007/contemporary-issues/anders-pettersson).

However, diverse and sometimes unconventional content is equally apparent from the column labeled "Title/description." A contrasting photograph to that of Esther Yandakwa is another image of street children in Kinshasa taken at roughly the same time. The untitled Daily Life, 2nd prize singles winner of 2006 shows a group of children of similar age taking a communal shower at a care center for homeless youngsters. The scene is one of enjoyment, notably on the part of the unnamed boy in the foreground who throws back his head and laughingly displays a row of perfect teeth to the camera. This is not only a different image of African street children, it is also an unconventional image of African childhood because it does not fit neatly into any of the three sub-categories of the POYi competition reported by Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009). In other words, these rescued children (all of whom appear to be boys) are not playing together (although a keyword under the image on the website is "playing"), interacting with the opposite sex, or noticeably suffering (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2006/daily-life/marcus-bleasdale).

Bearing in mind the relative dearth of award-winning images of work (or labor) in another competition studied by Greenwood and Zoe Smith (2009), the Kenya and DRC collections also contain some unusual images of women. Three in particular not only deviate from the iconography of motherhood so often associated with African women but also from the

Table 4.3   Distribution of images among countries/territories

Country (n = 37)	Number of winning images	Year of prize	Thematic codes covered	Title/description
Kenya	11	2015	8	Orphaned Rhino
		2014	4, 6	Massacre at Westgate Mall
		2013	2, 11	At the Dandora Dump
		2011	2, 4, 6	Poor Choices
		2010 (2)	2, 8	Eyes on a train. Dead giraffe
		2009 (2)	4, 5, 6	Tribal clash. Ethnic violence
		2008 (3)	3, 4, 6	Victim of gang violence. Political protest (2)
Democratic Republic of Congo	10	2014 (2)	2, 8, 11	Living Unnoticed. Bonobos, Our Unknown Cousins
		2012	6, 11	A Mouthful
		2011	2, 8, 11	Woman playing a cello. Journey to the Centre of the Earth
		2008 (2)	1, 6, 4, 8	Rangers carrying dead guerrillas. Dissident soldiers
		2007	2, 6	Child sex worker smoking
		2006 (2)	1, 2, 6, 11	Street children in shower. Dead baby + relatives
Republic of South Africa	8	2014	9	Farewell Mandela
		2012 (2)	4, 5, 6, 8	Afrikaner Blood. Rhino Wars
		2011 (2)	7, 8	Cape gannet. Football match, FIFA world cup
		2009	2	Zimbabwean migrant
		2006 (2)	6, 7, 11	Young ballet dancer. Boxing match
Egypt	6	2014	6, 11	Mother and son
		2012 (4)	3, 4, 6, 9	Mubarak Steps Down. Arriving for Trial. The Fight for Tahir Square. Dawn of a Revolution
		2008	4, 6	Dress on a barbed wire fence
Sierra Leone	6	2016	2, 6, 7	Ebola Survivors Football Club
		2015	2	Ebola in Sierra Leone
		2011	2, 6	Juveniles Behind Bars in Sierra Leone
		2007	1, 7	Amputee sports club
		2006 (2)	1, 2, 6, 11	Amputee father + child. Diamond mining
Chad	4	2016	8	Ivory Wars
		2008	2, 5, 8	Sketch in the sand (Darfur)
		2007 (2)	2, 8	Darfur refugees. Serval cat

Table 4.3   (continued)

Country (n = 37)	Number of winning images	Year of prize	Thematic codes covered	Title/description
Nigeria	4	2015	4, 6	Mass Abduction in Nigeria
		2008	11	Television viewing
		2007	4	Petrol pipeline explosion
		2006	8, 10	Man + hyena on a leash
Senegal	4	2016	2, 6	Talibes, Modern-day Slaves
		2016	7	The Gris-Gris Wrestlers of Senegal
		2012	11	Dakar Fashion Week
		2010	7	Wrestling (laamb)
Somalia	4	2013	2, 7	I Just Want to Dunk
		2011 (2)	2, 10, 11	Escape from Somalia. Man with shark
		2010	2	Man stoned to death
Mali	3	2010	11	Two fashionable men
		2009	1, 10	Tuareg rebels
		2007	6, 11	Mobile cinema
Niger	3	2011	2	Niger, "Food Crisis"
		2007	6, 11	Mobile cinema
		2006	2, 6	Malnourished baby + mother
Djibouti	2	2014	11	Signal
		2009	1, 8	Military training
Guinea-Bissau	2	2013	6, 7	Football in Guinea-Bissau
		2010	2, 4, 9	Cocaine trafficking
Libya	2	2012 (2)	3	Battle for Libya
				On Revolution Road
Morocco	2	2014	11	A Traditional Berber Bride
		2008	11	Television viewing
South Sudan	2	2014	1, 2	War and Mental Health after Crisis
		2011	11	Southern Sudan Challenges
Sudan	2	2016	1, 6	The Forgotten Mountains of Sudan
		2013	1, 2	Sudan Border Wars
Zimbabwe	2	2010	2, 8	Elephant stripped for food
		2008	3	Political protest
Algeria	1	2006	2, 6, 7	Sahara marathon
Angola	1	2009	11	Fashion designer
Benin	1	2007	6, 11	Mobile cinema
Burkina Faso	1	2016	11	Digging the Future
Burundi	1	2007	1, 2	Psychiatric patients/war trauma
Cameroon	1	2006	2	Migration journey to France

Table 4.3   (continued)

Country (n = 37)	Number of winning images	Year of prize	Thematic codes covered	Title/description
Central African Republic	1	2014	1, 3, 4, 6	Chaos in Central African Republic
Eritrea	1	2011	6, 7	Giro d'Eritrea
Guinea	1	2013	2, 6	People of Mercy
Liberia	1	2006	2, 6	Blind people
Madagascar	1	2016	8	Chameleon Under Pressure
Malawi	1	2006	2	Overcrowded prison inmates
Mozambique	1	2010	11	Family picnic on a beach
Namibia	1	2009	8	Leopard catching a springbok
Republic of Congo	1	2010	11	Sapeurs
Tanzania	1	2009	2, 6, 11	Albino people
Togo	1	2006	3, 6	Political protest
Tunisia	1	2014	8	Fennec Fox, a Species in Danger
Uganda	1	2008	2, 6	Child with malaria + father
Western Sahara	1	2011	1, 11	Western Sahara
Zambia	1	2006	8	Fruit bats

conventional tropes of victimhood, death, and loss that Zarzycka and Kleppe (2013) argue are so often feminized. The 2011 Arts and Entertainment, 1st prize singles award went to an untitled photograph of a woman playing a cello outdoors in Kinshasa. The accompanying narrative identifies her as Josephine Nsimba Mpongo, a market trader by day and a member of Central Africa's only symphony orchestra by night (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2011/arts-and-entertainment/andrew-mcconnell). The following year, "A Mouthful" won the Daily Life, 2nd prize singles award. It shows a young (unnamed) girl who has just caught a fish on the Congo River in the DRC holding the catch in her mouth. After that, the 2013 Contemporary Issues, 1st prize singles award went to a photograph taken at a rubbish dump in Nairobi, Kenya. "At the Dandora Dump" shows an unnamed salvager sitting reading a book on top of bags of municipal garbage.

The Kenya and DRC examples might suggest that unconventionality requires quantity, that is, that multiple photographs are needed to break down conventional stereotypes of a place and its people (be that the

African continent as a whole or a particular country). Considering the data set as a whole, however, this does not seem to be the case for a number of reasons. Firstly, even a single (and apparently simple) image such as the untitled winner of the 2008 General News, 2nd prize singles award can reference complex situations and multiple visual themes. The photograph of sketches in the sand (and accompanying narrative) tells a complex story across time and space about war in Darfur, displacement to neighboring Chad, and survivor trauma and memory (http://www.worldpressphoto. org/collection/photo/2008/general-news/stanley-greene).

Secondly, the remainder of Table 4.3 demonstrates a diversity of subject matter and visual tropes within some of the smaller collections. For example, three country subsets are devoid of male corpses or other signifiers of men as victims of war, thus highlighting how representation is about absence as well as presence. Four photographs from Nigeria that span five visual themes include the Portraits, 1st prize singles award of 2006; its subjects are a traveling entertainer called Mallam Galadima Ahamadu and his hyena Jamis (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2006/portraits/pieter-hugo). The three photographs taken in Mali all feature men—two fashionable men, a group of Tuareg rebels, and the multigenerational viewers of a mobile cinema. The Senegal collection also references fashion (with an image of men working as tailors in Dakar), while two of the four image Senegal's most popular sport. The winner of the 2016 Sports, 2nd prize stories award entitled "The Gris-Gris Wrestlers of Senegal" proved highly popular with visitors to the 2016 World Press Photo of the year exhibition in Amsterdam. A clear shot of the photographs shown in Fig. 4.6 took several minutes to achieve due to the crowds of viewers continually blocking the board.

The final reason why quantity does not always equal diversity relates to the third research question, which asked about the newsworthiness or events-driven quality of award-winning photographs. Two countries in the data set, namely, Egypt and Libya, support the view mentioned earlier that international news is episodic and crisis-oriented, following instances of violence, conflict, political protests, and war as they break out around the globe. The time frame of the Egypt and Libya entries and the thematic codes and titles/descriptions listed in Table 4.3 signify coverage mostly of a particular moment in history and set of events. The only photograph in the data set not referencing the so-called Arab Spring political protests is the People in the News, 1st prize singles winner of 2008. The untitled photograph is of a migrant child's dress caught on a barbed wire fence at the Egypt-Israeli border. The accompanying narrative suggests that the unnamed little girl came

Fig. 4.6 "The Gris-Gris Wrestlers of Senegal" on WPP exhibition board, Amsterdam, April 2016

from the Darfur area of Sudan (http://www.worldpressphoto.org/collection/photo/2008/people-news/yonathan-weitzman).

That said, the data set is not restricted to international news because the WPP competition itself is not limited in that way. Africa-based submissions to the full range of eligible categories show that visual journalism addresses different realities and experiences; it is not simply a matter of chasing the Four Horsemen. Daily life, sports, arts and entertainment, and a range of contemporary issues are also of interest—not only to photographers but to viewers drawn to the WPP annual exhibitions of award-winning images.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the ways in which Africa is represented in a particular form of visual journalism, that is, the prizewinning entries to the World Press Photo of the year competition. WPP was selected as the site of investigation because it not only archives winning images and makes them accessible to researchers; it also exhibits photographs globally to

millions of viewers per year. The time frame of 2006–2016 was chosen in light of the temporalities of other large-scale studies referenced throughout. A total of 95 entries (some of which were photo essays or stories) was analyzed via content analysis.

In terms of the research questions, findings were consistent to some extent with those of previous research. The top two visual themes in the data set, by some distance, are Poverty/social problems and Children/childhood. Some countries are more visually represented than others—indeed, a number of countries (e.g. Ethiopia) are not represented at all. Furthermore, there is evidence of the visualization of newsworthy events and moments in history (such as the Arab Spring and the Ebola outbreak). The cameras still follow the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse when they ride across Africa.

And yet, the third largest thematic category in the data set is "Daily Life" rather than "War/coup" (which topped the list in other studies). The 22 winners there reflect the fact that the WPP competition invites some breadth of representation by not restricting eligibility solely to news. General News and Spot News are but two of the eight current categories of entry. Where Africa is concerned, the Daily Life subset is significant because it contains some unconventional representations of the working lives and leisure activities of African women and men.

Returning to the more conventional categories, the analysis showed that even a single image (such as that of a horrifically burned child) can be conventional in some ways and unconventional in others. It also uncovered a number of images with unconventional depictions of some familiar subjects and themes (e.g. a woman reading at a municipal garbage dump and a group of street children enjoying a shower).

In a visual economy where images are commodities for sale and consumption, photographers are often commissioned to produce work on assignment. It could be argued that some degree of conventionality is inevitable in this context, that is, to satisfy the expectations of buyers. Picture editors of newspapers and competition juries are other key consumers of images. However, it is important not to forget the wider viewing public or assume that conventional images are all they are willing to consider. Further research is needed to draw robust conclusions about audience response, that is, to determine how the different realities and experiences captured by photographers are interpreted by viewers. A girl who catches a fish in her mouth, for example, might not necessarily be viewed in Africanist terms as strange or pathological. Interesting and skilled are other possible adjectives.

Afro-pessimism may be alive and well in visual journalism but there are certainly signs of chipping away at the edifice. Participant observation at the 2016 WPP exhibition in Amsterdam further demonstrated sustained public engagement with a variety of different photographs and their accompanying narratives. Together these provide at least some evidence of challenges to dominant discourses of Africa's lack, failure, and nonfulfillment.

APPENDIX: WORLD PRESS PHOTO OF THE YEAR, AFRICA (2016–2006)

Country (n = 37)	Number of winning images	Year of prize	Thematic codes covered	Title/description
Kenya	11	2015	8	Orphaned Rhino
		2014	4, 6	Massacre at Westgate Mall
		2013	2, 11	At the Dandora Dump
		2011	2, 4, 6	Poor Choices
		2010 (2)	2, 8	Eyes on a train. Dead giraffe
		2009 (2)	4, 5, 6	Tribal clash. Ethnic violence
		2008 (3)	3, 4, 6	Victim of gang violence. Political protest (2)
Democratic Republic of Congo	10	2014 (2)	2, 8, 11	Living Unnoticed. Bonobos, Our Unknown Cousins
		2012	6, 11	A Mouthful
		2011 (2)	2, 8, 11	Woman playing a cello. Journey to the Centre of the Earth
		2008 (2)	1, 6, 4, 8	Rangers carrying dead guerrillas. Dissident soldiers
		2007	2, 6	Child sex worker smoking
		2006 (2)	1, 2, 6, 11	Street children in shower. Dead baby + relatives
Republic of South Africa	8	2014	9	Farewell Mandela
		2012 (2)	4, 5, 6, 8	Afrikaner Blood. Rhino Wars
		2011 (2)	7, 8	Cape gannet. Football match, FIFA world cup
		2009	2	Zimbabwean migrant
		2006 (2)	6, 7, 11	Young ballet dancer. Boxing match
Egypt	6	2014	6, 11	Mother and son
		2012 (4)	3, 4, 6, 9	Mubarak Steps Down. Arriving for Trial. The Fight for Tahir Square. Dawn of a Revolution
		2008	4, 6	Dress on a barbed wire fence

Country (n = 37)	Number of winning images	Year of prize	Thematic codes covered	Title/description
Sierra Leone	6	2016	2, 6, 7	Ebola Survivors Football Club
		2015	2	Ebola in Sierra Leone
		2011	2, 6	Juveniles Behind Bars in Sierra Leone
		2007	1, 7	
		2006 (2)	1, 2, 6, 11	Amputee sports club
				Amputee father + child. Diamond mining
Chad	4	2016	8	Ivory Wars
		2008	2, 5, 8	Sketch in the sand (Darfur)
		2007 (2)	2, 8	Darfur refugees. Serval cat
Nigeria	4	2015	4, 6	Mass Abduction in Nigeria
		2008	11	Television viewing
		2007	4	Petrol pipeline explosion
		2006	8, 10	Man + hyena on a leash
Senegal	4	2016	2, 6	Talibes, Modern-day Slaves
		2016	7	The Gris-Gris Wrestlers of Senegal
		2012	11	Dakar Fashion Week
		2010	7	Wrestling (laamb)
Somalia	4	2013	2, 7	I Just Want to Dunk
		2011 (2)	2, 10, 11	Escape from Somalia. Man with shark
		2010	2	Man stoned to death
Mali	3	2010	11	Two fashionable men
		2009	1, 10	Tuareg rebels
		2007	6, 11	Mobile cinema
Niger	3	2011	2	Niger, "Food Crisis"
		2007	6, 11	Mobile cinema
		2006	2, 6	Malnourished baby + mother
Djibouti	2	2014	11	Signal
		2009	1, 8	Military training
Guinea-Bissau	2	2013	6, 7	Football in Guinea-Bissau
		2010	2, 4, 9	Cocaine trafficking
Libya	2	2012 (2)	3	Battle for Libya
				On Revolution Road
Morocco	2	2014	11	A Traditional Berber Bride
		2008	11	Television viewing
South Sudan	2	2014	1, 2	War and Mental Health after Crisis
		2011	11	Southern Sudan Challenges
Sudan	2	2016	1, 6	The Forgotten Mountains of Sudan
		2013	1, 2	Sudan Border Wars
Zimbabwe	2	2010	2, 8	Elephant stripped for food
		2008	3	Political protest

Country (n = 37)	Number of winning images	Year of prize	Thematic codes covered	Title/description
Algeria	1	2006	2, 6, 7	Sahara marathon
Angola	1	2009	11	Fashion designer
Benin	1	2007	6, 11	Mobile cinema
Burkina Faso	1	2016	11	Digging the Future
Burundi	1	2007	1, 2	Psychiatric patients/war trauma
Cameroon	1	2006	2	Migration journey to France
Central African Republic	1	2014	1, 3, 4, 6	Chaos in Central African Republic
Eritrea	1	2011	6, 7	Giro d'Eritrea
Guinea	1	2013	2, 6	People of Mercy
Liberia	1	2006	2, 6	Blind people
Madagascar	1	2016	8	Chameleon Under Pressure
Malawi	1	2006	2	Overcrowded prison inmates
Mozambique	1	2010	11	Family picnic on a beach
Namibia	1	2009	8	Leopard catching a springbok
Republic of Congo	1	2010	11	Sapeurs
Tanzania	1	2009	2, 6, 11	Albino people
Togo	1	2006	3, 6	Political protest
Tunisia	1	2014	8	Fennec Fox, a Species in Danger
Uganda	1	2008	2, 6	Child with malaria + father
Western Sahara	1	2011	1, 11	Western Sahara
Zambia	1	2006	8	Fruit bats

NOTES

1. The date on the photo board refers to the year it was taken; the prize was awarded the following year. All photos in the paper were taken by the author in April 2016 during the World Press Photo 16 exhibition and awards days in Amsterdam. Karamoja District, Uganda, date: 00-04-1980. The hand of a severely malnourished boy rests in a Catholic monk's hand in the Karamoja region of northeastern Uganda. Hunger has been a recurrent problem in the drought-prone region of Karamoja. Due to natural, social, and political causes, periods of famine intensified in the 1970s. The famine of 1980 was the worst in the region's history at the time. In less than a year, it killed around 20% of the population, including approximately half of all infants. While the famine also reached other districts, Karamoja was by far the worst affected. Credit: © Mike Wells.

2. Nzara, South Sudan, 17 November 2014: Michael Oryem, 29, is a former Lord's Resistance Army fighter who was involved in the poaching of ivory in Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a former base of operations for the LRA and a major source of financing for the notorious group. Oryem was abducted by the group when he was nine and lived with them for over 17 years in the wild. He was made a commander in the group at the age of 12. The LRA is infamous for the killing and abduction of thousands of civilians across multiple countries. He defected and is now a member of the Ugandan army, UPDF, African Union force hunting the LRA. He is seen with two of six pieces of ivory which he hid and then led the Ugandan forces to inside the border region of the Central African Republic. He claims that the LRA killed many elephants in Garamba and he was ordered by Joseph Kony, the group's notorious leader, to bring the ivory to him in Darfur, South Sudan. Ivory is now a real means of financing for the LRA; it is used for both food and weapon supplies and is traded to the Sudanese army who transports it north to Khartoum.

3. Date: 1/8/2005, Tahoua, Niger. The fingers of malnourished one-year-old Alassa Galisou press against the lips of his mother, Fatou Ousseini, at an emergency feeding center. Drought and a particularly heavy plague of locusts destroyed the previous year's harvest. This left an estimated 3.6 million people severely short of food, including tens of thousands of starving children. Heavy rains promised well for the 2005 crops, but hindered aid workers bringing supplies. Relief had been slow to come.

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Rehistoricizing the Sovereignty Principle: Stature, Decline, and Anxieties About a Foundational Norm

Amy Niang

INTRODUCTION

The chapter explores two aspects of the making of "the international" that require theoretical scrutiny and analytical reconsideration. First, there is the history of participation of a variety of actors and agents whose contribution has largely been rendered invisible or peripheral in the conventional international relations (IR) literature. Second is my fascination with the status of the sovereignty principle in political theory and IR. From the variety of accounts that extoll its necessity or deplore its pregivenness, the fact that it seems to be both the resultant and the instigator of its own legitimizing process is rather problematic. Together, these two aspects point to the need to revisit disciplinary accounts from a historical and comparative perspective. One aim of this chapter therefore is to show a process of discontinuity that has marked the life and trajectory of sovereignty with reference to Africa. I specifically look at two moments. If historically distinct, the Berlin Conference and the period of decolonization are nonethe-

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less very much related in terms of the possibilities, the constraints, the frameworks, and the resources they released or enabled for subjugation or emancipation. Decolonization was in no way a restoration of what was taken away from Africa at Berlin. It spawned however fruitful debates and contested visions over the form and shape that were to embody a new collective desire to build a diverse and inclusive global order.

Sovereignty occupies a conceptual space produced by historical interactions between international law, global politics, and the political expansion of particular ideas to do with the history of institutional development in Europe, the life of these institutions, and the morality of political action. For these reasons, its place in the making of "the international" cannot be underestimated. One dominant, yet questionable account presents the junction between sovereignty and territoriality as an autochthonous European process. One can think away from this view by engaging with a language of translation and a language of mediation that makes more apparent the significance of colonialism in the elaboration of the sovereignty doctrine as a historically contingent process rather than a linear, unproblematic articulation of a European model of territorial governance. The Berlin Conference of Africa (1884–1885) may seem like an implausible place to start thinking about sovereignty given that it initiated a mode of governance that was predicated upon the negation of African sovereignties.[1] I want however to argue that this original negation had important implications for a subsequent pattern of practice of European sovereignty.

On one hand, Berlin has to be seen as a moment that confirmed and validated the sovereignty principle by asserting the civilizational, cultural, racial, and political dominance of Europe over Africa. On another, the Berlin regime and associated processes to a large extent imposed upon Africans bounded identities. Demarcations and subsequent divisions imposed by Berlin were fundamentally violent, artificial, and arbitrary. This observation allows me to make a first argument which I develop below. It is that colonialism as it emanated out of the Berlin convention has to be (re)conceptualized in the manner in which it came to (re)distribute sovereign effects, in terms, for example, of a notion of government without legitimacy.[2] The spirit of Berlin in effect impelled a revision and a redeploying of the principle and doctrine of sovereignty as a mode of political and ideological differentiation even while it was being "standardized." The politicization and the naturalization of sovereignty already took place in this very schematic engagement whereby space (Africa) is

objectivized as political knowledge by a subject (Europe). Berlin was predicated upon the idea of Africa as *tabula rasa* and it was informed by epistemic racism.

To think about sovereignty as norm certainly enables us to understand how ideas about statehood and international subjectivity came to be logged together and how behaviors came to be ordered linearly. It does not however necessarily help us to go beyond. If sovereignty is a result of the Westphalia consensus, it is also what was consolidated after WWII, thus the need to rethink its normative trajectory in relation to temporality and contestation. In the francophone world, one key moment that exemplifies divergence was an attempt to establish a Franco-African Union that would succeed the French empire. I explain below that the idea of a multinational sovereignty was negotiated under concrete conditions of colonial domination. In that sense, the power relationship embedded in the idea of the Franco-African Community was going to be an impediment to the possibility of reforming empire from within.

This chapter seeks to rehistoricize the role of the sovereignty principle in the making of "the international" in three distinct moments: in the legal adjudications that presided over the Berlin Conference (1884/1885), in the context of the short-lived experiment of a Franco-African Union (1946–1958), and in the various deliberations on self-determination that took place in the inter- and post-war period. It thus seeks to explore sovereignty as a relational norm (Berlin), as a "divisible" norm (the Franco-African Union), and a modernization-bound norm (the UN and self-determination). I wish to show that, historically, sovereignty was a flexible and layered norm—that could also be a right, rationality, capacity, framework, morality, or metaphor—this in turn allows me to do three things: firstly, to look beyond a normal vs. aberrant framework and to discuss sovereignty as temporality; secondly, to rethink sovereignty in the emerging postcolonial archive, to imbue this specific archive with a different purpose, that of turning a common legal approach into an ontological discussion; and ultimately to critique a notion of sovereignty as the legal foundation of the contemporary world. Once we have subordinated the legal to the epistemological and the ideological, we can reinscribe sovereignty in a now familiar history of colonial modernity.[3] The chapter presents three sections that correspond to three aspects of the sovereignty problem as (1) a legal problem (i.e. an enduring legal approach to a sociological problem), (2) an ontological question, and (3) a problem of temporality.

The Violence of a Canon

If there is a single concept that has overarched, suffused, and therefore dominated the thinking, the practice, and debates around the state and international relations, it is arguably that of sovereignty. Discussions of the relationship between sovereignty on one hand and imperialism and colonialism on another are however mostly confined among legal scholars. These scholars have mapped out the evolution of international law from its naturalist foundation in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century origin marked by a universalist thinking underpinned by "reason" to a positivist international law that made "civilization" the basis for differentiating between those states fit for inclusion in the family of nations (i.e. European) and the rest. Legal scholars thus usefully demonstrate the complicity between positivist international law and colonialism.[4]

In contrast to the above, the dearth of discussions on the relationship between the notion of sovereignty and colonial government as a form of sovereign power in political science is partly the result of a quasi-consensus on a narrative according to which sovereignty essentially created a space for integration and "protection" for former colonies. For political science and IR specifically, the Berlin moment, despite its historical significance, failed to provide an impetus for rethinking history and theory. In the sovereignty discourse, if Berlin is often recognized as a moment of formal rupture, there has been little engagement with the actual historical content or the historicity of that rupture. For one thing, the denial of interdependence that marks sovereignty processes (i.e. the principle of relationality) produced a fundamental contradiction of liberal thought. In fact, it would not be controversial or wrong to say that we are dealing in this instance with two distinct modes of sovereignty: the one effective (*opérant*), the other intermittent. This distinction makes apparent contrasting instrumentalities and operations of sovereignty in Europe and in the non-Western world. Whereas in the former it empowers and affirms, in the latter, it disempowers, alienates, and erases autonomous existence.

If we accept however that interdependence was the ideal mode that was to mark the end of annexation politics, then it necessarily entails certain equality, at least a degree of agency and participation, whereas dependence works in the benefit of colonial paternalist politics. Interdependence requires that one thinks more carefully about the contribution of the colonized, and the manners in which the concept could be experimented with, and subverted, whereas a history of sovereignty that glosses over the

instrumentalities that molded the latter into a major European norm has led to the elision of the colonial memory from the making of "the international." This operation is profoundly evident in a prevalent inscription of sovereignty in the Hobbesian myth of the state of nature as essentialist outlook that has pervaded a centuries-long obsession with the justification of political authority and the foundation of state power. As a result, the metaphor of sovereign power "has notoriously confined the consideration of international relations to the margin of western philosophical traditions. It has also bequeathed to international thought … a metaphor which is at once powerful and in important respects misleading. International life, we are often told, is like the original state of nature, a state of war ceaseless and unedifying" (Mayall 1982, p. 3).

The sovereignty regime was imposed through various devices to a majority of world societies through a history of colonialism and empire that has had profound impact on the non-West in general and continues to inform the rationalizations of the legal frameworks of rights in global politics. As Nayar puts it eloquently:

> … sovereignty therefore is a performative assertion that repeats the colonial, imperial, globalized rationalization for the (b)ordered architecture of legitimization and normalization—through the constitution of the territorialized legal orders—as a constructed and enforced global system. (Nayar 2014, p. 131)

However, the systemic violence of colonial government is methodically and broadly underplayed in the sovereignty literature. That the fractious, alienating history of colonial encounter and government nowhere features in theoretical musings about the trajectory of the sovereignty principle is not only a testimony of a missing conversation but also of skewed conversations in the literature.

Regardless of the analytical angle, sovereignty has historically been strongly associated with a notion of capacity. The implications are that those incapable of displaying those qualities or producing those values associated with sovereignty should be placed in a special status; the consequence could be for them to be redeemed through "nurturing" to reach a point where they could be (re)integrated in the community of sovereigns or to be simply isolated. Yet, the very absence of a notion of "subjection" in the concerns of IR theories itself is a liability. The sovereignty principle gave the imperial endeavor a drive and sustained its effects, while it rein-

forced a European awareness of the possibility of sovereignty as technology of power erected by a specific logic of differentiation. As a matter of example, further developed below, the assimilation of African peoples into a European government regime and legal framework following Berlin had two fundamental effects. Firstly, it reduced the possibility for African societies to self-govern and sustain themselves on the basis of their own rationalities. Secondly, there were profound encroachments upon areas of communal life that had thus far been the prerogatives of African collectivities. In fact, as Mamdani and others have suggested, European experiments of political order—embodied by the Westphalian state—were not only designed to sustain a specific European cultural framework but also to provide the means and the intellectual resources for Europe's colonial enterprise (Mamdani 1996). These resources were mobilized fundamentally to sustain a colonial order.

The violence of the sovereignty canon can be seen as operating primarily in the distinction that allowed that *jus gentilis* would apply in the regulation of relations among Europeans, while a separate law would regulate relations between Europeans and non-Europeans.[5] The distinction thus justified the denigration of non-Western peoples and their subordination and the legitimation of inhumane practices against them. The asymmetry of conceptual power means that the reality and the imaginary concepts and ideas are made to occupy a disproportionate terrain in our subjective consciousness. Sovereignty is certainly one of those. The bigger point here is that, through international law, sovereignty was made to become a monotonous violence deployed through linguistic, intellectual, and procedural, therefore, epistemic forms that were not always apparent in practice. Beyond, the problem has been to consider no other overarching morality than international law (the law), that is, arbitrary rules formulated by a specific group of stakeholders as discussed below, the first of which was the elevation of the sovereign state as the foundation of the entire global legal and political system.

Berlin: A Sovereign Mandate

The motivation for the convening of the Berlin West Africa Conference was to save Africans from their own barbarity; such a discourse and thinking were characteristic of so-called colonial "pacification." The purpose of the conference was on the one hand to rationalize the colonial enterprise. On the other hand, it was to offer a platform for deliberating on the means

to better organize and systematize the carving up of Africa among European nations. The Berlin Conference consecrated a road map and a legal basis for acquiring sovereignty over Africa underpinned by a philosophy of colonialism, in other words the idea of the white man's burden to civilize and ameliorate the moral condition of the native.[6] Berlin was a consensus that articulated a new humanism that imposed upon some (Europeans) the burden of pulling out of immorality (innocence) the majority of world societies.

Antony Anghie (1999) and a few others have shown how sovereignty was "universalized" by positivist jurisprudence in the nineteenth century.[7] Sovereignty attributed a legal personality to European states while simultaneously suppressing African personality. If the first process is "legal," the second one is eminently "political" for international law was but the extension of a body of rules and practices rooted in European history and culture. One could take the argument further and assert that the political in question is in fact "cultural" and by extension racial. At any rate, sovereignty was to be seen as a princely rule in the sixteenth century before it was a problem of government:

> … while there emerges in the late 16th and 17th centuries systematic disciplinary techniques for working upon latent individual capacities and reconstructing individual behaviors, […] mercantilism by and large remains within the objectives of an older political rationality, that of "sovereignty." This is because the problem of politics remains above all a problem of the preservation and strengthening of the state, the enhancement of the prince's wealth and power against his commercial and military rivals through the conquest, colonization, and exploitation of the non-western world. (Scott 1999, p. 37)[8]

Once the European character of international law has been established, sovereignty becomes a "norm" only because it is sanitized and naturalized by language. As a norm, it relegates the non-West to the periphery of "global" (read European) concerns, both legal and political. Consequently, the operation of sovereignty between the West and the non-West was always going to be one of accommodation (of difference and incompleteness) rather than engagement (of other modes of thinking and practice).

Anghie articulates the view that the mandate system has specifically much to reveal about the making of sovereignty, the establishment of international organizations, and relations between Europe and non-Europeans. Specifically, he contends that the mandate system catalyzes the connections

between these in a specific, if peculiar, manner for "colonialism profoundly shaped the character of international institutions at their formative stage … [thus] by examining the history of how this occurred, [we] might illuminate the operations and character of contemporary international institutions" (Anghie 2002, p. 515). The language of sovereign relations in international law has always been a language of order and an attempt to find an answer to the question how to manage relations between legal equals in a peaceful manner. In reality, the problem of sovereign status and of international relations was never just a problem of ordering (as the colonial and imperial projects demonstrate), but rather a problem of mediating and managing of cultural difference. At the heart of this argument is a reflection on the implications of economic exploitation and cultural and racial subjugations as categories that cannot be seen as "epiphenomenal aberrations" in the history of international law (Anghie 2002, p. 518). In this context, the standardization of sovereign politics has to be seen, in one scholar's words, as "the standardization of inequality structured through the form of equivalence" (Mongia 2007, p. 410). Radhika Mongia, in fact, rightly argues that the paradox of sovereignty as a framework of equivalence, in other words the paradox of similarity in subordination, can be best understood if one rethinks the history of the nation-state not in comparative terms but rather in terms of co-production (Mongia 2007, p. 294). Once this position has been taken, it becomes easy to see how related concepts of development, democracy, humanitarianism, and the regime of inculcating a variety of individual rights in general can be seen as a metaphor for contentless standardizations of normative categories.

Against a body of scholarship that sees sovereignty in the non-West as a derivative process that spread through colonialism and imperialism, postcolonial scholars have closely looked into the import of the colonial encounter for the formulations of the sovereignty principle. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Antony Anghie, and other legal scholars have long supported a view of European sovereignty as different from sovereignty in the non-European world insofar as international sovereignty is conceived as a substance that was once transferred or extended to a variety of states that did not have it before (Anghie 2002; Bedjaoui 1991). Bartelson in turn advances, in contrast to contextualist historians that "the history of sovereignty is more a matter of swift and partly covert epistemic discontinuity than of ceaseless battle of overt opinions taking place within delimited and successive contexts" (Bartelson 1995, p. 2), a history, therefore, of fencing off a domain of order and civilization from a domain of disorder and uncivilization.

African modernity before Berlin was presumably characterized by an absence of ethnographic distance; the implication being that African societies were suddenly made aware of themselves by intimate others, but in the manner that self-criticism would have been allowed, for Africans never had to worry about "their modernity" as a problem. Berlin was convened in a context whereby sovereignty was being consolidated in a transnational drive of appropriation of colonies alongside a widespread exercise of mapping cultures, peoples, and opportunities (Blomley 2003). The structuring role of the resolutions of Berlin was largely obvious in the manner that they delineated African subjectivities literally with a pen and ruler.

Berlin was thus to lift the potential effects of the unresolved ambiguity of sovereignty, specifically conflicts over titles and territories (Anghie 1999, p. 40). Several authors have however pointed out that in reality, two stories of Berlin can be written. The first one would be the official story according to which Berlin was a concerted European effort to regulate European expansion, circulation, and trade on the African continent. In fact, scholars like Watson have extolled Europe's formidable prowess in regulating conflict within Europe and in spreading its civilizational superiority from Oceania to Africa between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries and have no issue with the human, moral, and material costs of the expansion of this "international community" for societies at the receiving end of European magnanimity (Watson 1992, pp. 194–196, 206, 272–273). The other story is a story of how Africa was turned into a playground for a political imagination deeply informed by a sovereignty-thinking: if the conference was famous for the glaring absence of Africans, "the identity of the African was an enduring problem that haunted the proceedings of the Conference" (Anghie 1999, p. 61). The sovereignty imperative became a vital ideology in imperial campaigns. In fact, as part of a broader expansionist process in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, Berlin epitomized a dual sovereignty process: a stabilized sovereignty at home opposed to rising imperialism variously manifest in "mandates, paramountcy, concessions, and franchises, spheres of interest and influence, protectorates and so on" (Seth 2011, p. 173). A consequence of Berlin was also a narrow identification with elite power politics:

> the effect is to focus attention upon a narrow spectrum of great power dominated practices and institutions and to imply that the continuation and adaptation of these practices and institutions offers the greatest promise for satisfactory "management" of the admittedly more complex environment of contemporary worlds politics. (Fitzpatrick 1987, p. 47)

According to structuration theory, sovereignty has no essence, at least there is no "essential sovereignty"; it rather depends on "reflexively monitored sets of relations between states" (Giddens 1987, p. 263) and these sets of relations (i.e. constituting "the international") which produce a reality for the state—sovereignty therefore as both medium and outcome. The astonishing thing is, however, that even as it is often found to be unfounded, sovereignty becomes "the condition of possibility of itself" (Bartelson 1995, p. 48), hence Kant's panergon analogy. In fact, according to Bartelson, "there was no 'international' until this concept [sovereignty] entered political discourse towards the end of the eighteenth century" (Bartelson 1995, p. 60).

A great deal of thinking in the sovereignty literature has consisted in defining and framing boundaries (inside/outside). A standard view of sovereignty however on the basis of the principles of non-interference, territorial integrity, bounded territorial unity, and recognizable rules is little helpful if we are interested in historical experiments in sovereignty. For practices that fall outside of the conventional view are rich instances of political possibilities that are closer to actual negotiations than the ideal forms that are being constantly refined in the literature. There were moments in the history of decolonization that complexify the standard narrative. The project of a Franco-African Union (1946–1960), for instance, enabled visions of a sovereignty that is flexible, layered, and fragmented (Anderson 1974, p. 19).

The Franco-African Community: Sovereignty in a Multinational-State Context

The Franco-African Community provides a context for understanding how an abstract concept and idea was imagined, debated, and deployed within the structures of colonial governance as these were gradually opened to the participation of colonial subjects. The Community was a historical project that emerged out of, on one hand, a French desire to keep control over its colonies at a time when colonies all over world were being gradually freed from colonial domination. On another, African elites in French West Africa sought to reimagine the colonial bond in terms of political equality and emancipation.

The idea of the French-African Union, and later Franco-Africa Community, was primarily to reinvent the relations between metropole and former colonies and protectorates on the basis of an "assimilationist"

or "federationist" inspiration as working framework. From the perspective of the metropole, assimilation was an ideal device that would not only resolve the colonial problem by erasing, in theory, the unequal terms that characterized metropole/colony relations but also to maintain, even expand, the domain of the colonial. In fact, a union of assimilated elements corresponded to an old dream of a Greater France held dear by metropolitan leaders (De Lacharrière 1960, pp. 9–10). The federative model on the other hand was to attenuate the flaws of assimilation by granting a modicum of diversity and autonomy which would maintain unity without imposing an artificial fusion. The two models were famously defended, respectively, by Leopold Sedar Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny on the African side.

The reform of French Empire into a Community therefore required a rethinking of subjectivity and politics. Both metropolitan citizens and colonial subjects (i.e. imperial publics) "were remarkably self-conscious about the structural relationship between the continental nation and its overseas colonies" (Wilder 2005, p. 4). African representatives in metropolitan assemblies in particular had a keen attachment to European Enlightenment ideas. For them, emancipation from the Empire entailed a restoration of "man" of the subject as ontologically constitutive of humanism which had been immensely compromised by the profoundly anti-democratic nature of colonial oppression. Africans and French were therefore actively engaged in a task of transcending the transgressive nature of imperial sovereignty and to rebuilding an interdependent sovereignty as possibility.[9] This possibility was to enable both causal agents and caused processes (in the sense that colonial subjects were not recognized as source of sovereignty) to grasp the volatility of a notion and political practice, to exercise their imaginings usefully, to turn plausibilities into feasibilities. If, as Bartelson contends, "sovereignty and knowledge implicate each other logically and produce each other historically", the idea was precisely here to imagine "a conception of sovereignty as complex divisible and transformable" (Cooper 2014, p. 38). Whether they succeeded or not is immaterial than the fact that they exercised their intellectual and political energies to building a society where difference and equality could coexist. The fact that the history of the Franco-African Community and similar experiments has been written out of the historical record suggests strongly a bias, if not an elision of alternative practices of sovereignty.

The French put forward the idea of a reformed empire as sovereignty. France's logic was for the Communauté to become an imperial global

state: there would be fragments of sovereignty accorded to colonial terri-
tories, but it was to be understood that the Union had to be articulated
around France. Empires were diverse; they attempted to dominate eco-
nomic, political, social, and cultural lives (or aspects of these) of the sub-
jugated. But empires were also characterized by a capacity to morph, to
transform, and to deceive. Two problems were posed to the Communauté
as political project. First there was the epistemological dilemma of the
French imperial nation-state as political form. Second, there was the ques-
tion of how to dismantle empire within empire in a way that was not "self-
reconditioning." French authorities were not exempt of a tendency to
view sovereignty as a quality that was to be acquired as a society demon-
strated development (i.e. maturity) in political governance. De Gaulle
spelt this out clearly at a speech pronounced in Bayeux on June 16, 1946:

> Each territory, in the framework of French sovereignty, should receive its
> own status, depending on the very variable degree of its development, regu-
> lating the ways and means by which the representatives of its French or
> indigenous inhabitants debate among themselves internal affairs and take
> part in their management. (De Gaulle 1946)

Imperial sovereignty was a geographically mobile entity with undefined
borders, "a patchwork of overlapping and parceled sovereignties … and a
general absence of a clear distinction between 'international' and 'domestic'
realms" (Cooper 2014, p. 90). Colonial territories had an ambiguous sta-
tus. This could be in the form of an attenuated autonomy of territories, a
form of autonomy almost abolished within the Union but not yet trans-
formed into free states with populations bearing the status of citizens;
there were territories that were not entirely independent but were no lon-
ger imperial dependencies (e.g. the protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia).
At any rate, the requirement of sociological homogeneity as condition for
a functioning union was never fulfilled.

The difficult formulation of a truly inclusive, multinational community
itself exposed the fallacy of the criterion of "alignment" between society
and community; therefore, the principles of exhaustiveness and exclusiv-
ity conventionally extolled as crucial to the determination of a logical
correspondence between social and political organs (Durand et al. 1992).
The lack of correspondence between state and society in itself was not an
insurmountable problem if it did not have the effect of reducing, in this
instance, territories attached to the Community to European metaphorical

and ideological margins. In a way, metanarratives of modernity, progress, freedom, and so on do little to either help us analytically or understand how Africans engaged these concepts within the material realities of (de) colonization. Africans imagined a political future other than in terms of nation-state, republic, or empire. They found a valuable lever in the constraints of colonial rule. They understood the costs of their choices in terms of political, economic, and ideological future possibilities; but they also had to rethink the possibility of a human exchange after empire, to turn therefore colonialism from an impersonal, dehumanizing, mode of othering into an intimate, humane, common emancipative project.[10] For Senghor, Césaire, and many others, sovereignty was not a sine qua non condition to self-determination. These intellectual activists saw an opportunity to realize humanity's potential and advocated a "situated humanism" as a basis for reinventing post-national and transnational politics (Wilder 2005).

Whether an African could therefore claim sovereignty rights within the context of the Community was dependent on a concerted rupture. Not only claims of citizenship but claims of particularity/particularism were violent constraints to metropolitan recovery of universality. According to Fred Cooper, "as a doctrine, sovereignty is usually regarded as unified and inseparable; as an activity, however, it is plural and divisible" (Sheehan 2006). For Cooper, this "divisibility" was crucial if we are to understand how the French Empire could be dismantled without Africans or French being forced to choose between "French colonialism and national independence, between assimilation and separation" (Cooper 2014, p. 0). For Wilder, this meant that:

> The French nation-state was always a disjointed political form. Its administrative, liber-al, and parliamentary dimensions did not always align with one another. Citizenship, nationality, and the people were at once abstractly human (universalist) and concretely cultural (particularist) categories. Imperialism meant that French territories, populations, and governments did not correspond to one another seamlessly. These obscured structural contradictions became increasingly evident under the Third Republic. (Wilder 2005, p. 7)

In theory, one can compartmentalize resistance and collaboration, nationalism, and empire but only in theory. In reality, historical actors were more nuanced than that and more attuned to sociohistorical contingency given

that neither the terms of history nor the processes were ever settled. To avoid however the difficulty of treating as distinct republicanism and colonialism, universalism and particularism could be "to treat the imperial nation-state as an artefact of colonial modernity" (Wilder 2005, p. 9). The latter "refers variously to the impact of colonial capitalism on local societies and its articulation with other modes of production, colonized peoples' novel and often subversive appropriation of Western institutions, and the constitutive role of colonialism, non-western populations, and their encounter in the making of modern Europe" (Wilder 2005, p. 9). Someone like Gary Wilder in fact sees no contradiction between colonialism and republicanism as supposed distinctive poles between universalism and particularism. He rather sees at once oppressive and emancipatory potential in the operations of both models.

Conventional literature tends to idealize and fetishize republicanism and sees imperial excesses as violations and exceptions of republican reason. The experiment of the Community can however be seen as an attempt, by African intellectual activists and like-minded metropolitan leaders, to disarticulate the republic with the universal, to therefore reinscribe the homogeneity of the universal into the heterogeneity of the multiple. Critics of this reading however point out that the structure of the Community was not too different from that of a protectorate; therefore, Crawford's view of a "split sovereignty" seems to also apply to the Community.[11] These critics point to the fact that protectorates merely extended informal empire (see, e.g. Doyle 1986), in terms similar to current forms of so-called humanitarian intervention and other permissive liberal interpretations of international law. For these critics, the Community was shot through with hypocrisy. In fact, insofar as representation goes, an enduring flaw of the Community was the disproportionate representation of the metropole both internally and externally. The views and positions of the Community in diplomacy and international relations were in reality the views and positions of the French Republic.

On Self-Determination and Sovereignty as Norm

In the aftermath of WWII, sovereignty was made a requirement for entry in the "international community" or the society of "civilized" nations. The implications, cultural, racial, and ideological, were clear for the extension of the language and dynamics of difference into the making of the contemporary world. A main implication was the extension therefore of

categorical thinking in the application of different rapports to different species (states) of the genus (society). This obviously allowed scholars like Robert Jackson to state that the formal, juridical recognition of sovereignty to African states in the 1960s does not/did not take away the fact of their "inferior" status and their defects in meeting the institutional and cultural requirements for membership in the international community. This sociological bias toward the non-West has persisted, laying bare the historical and racist roots of a sanitized language of sovereignty. In fact, the insistence of sovereignty scholars on associating sovereignty to an idea of "community" characterized by a common authority/jurisdiction contributes to perpetuating this tendency (Douzinas 2006).

Insofar as self-determination is concerned, it posed a particular problem to a legal understanding of sovereignty for the challenge was to bring entities that had formerly been denied legal personality into the realm of the community of nations. There were two aspects to this shift: firstly, the determination that natural law was epistemologically superfluous and, secondly, the institutionalization of a racialized international relations in the sense of the elaboration of rules of admission for newcomers which allowed the application of different standards to different societies, and the denial, therefore, of correspondence between European and non-European societies implicitly introduced cultural bias in both disciplinary theory and practice. As discussed below, the recognition doctrine played a crucial role in legitimatizing the moral authority of powerful countries to assess the admissibility of countries emerging out of colonial rule. In sum, there was a cost to the consecration to international sovereignty for formerly colonized and this cost was high. It consisted of a requirement for these nations to shed their identities and adopt a foreign one. From a position of moral subordination, these countries were not going to be able to fully exercise their right to an equal voice. For instance, in matters of rights, they had to acquiesce to a hierarchization of rights whereby economic rights were marginalized in favor of political and civil rights.

Because of the potent way in which it is linked to an idea of capacity of government over self, sovereignty enables a cognitive, then a normative appropriation of a whole world of subjectivities. The sociology of sovereignty as "master norm" however is problematic on many levels. Concepts create cardboard subjectivities rather than moral subjectivities. When it comes to sovereignty specifically, it not only carries an ambition—that of becoming both empirical and transcendental, beyond all spatial and temporal conjunctures, a transcultural norm and regime—and an ideal capable

of instituting a uniform trajectory of our contemporary political experience. Elevated as a mode of control of mortality, morality, and ethics, sovereignty has been made to become the universal, in fact the unthought foundation of our modern political experience (Walker 1993, 1990, pp. 159–85).[12] If, in the nineteenth century, the aim was to deny sovereignty in order to assert conquest, in the 1950s and 1960s, the objective was to identify a ground for "graduation" into sovereignty. In the various deliberations that led to the independence of formerly colonized, the purpose seemed to be the further naturalization of a right to name and dename, to differentiate, and to make subject. The imperative was therefore to subvert the often imagined, often artificially maintained boundary between theory and politics. My argument is that the development of sovereignty is a good example of how historical practice informs theory.

Norms were also meant to normalize what was aberrant, specifically a fallacious comparison that creates imperfect analogies "between experiences considered universal and normal and those seen as residual and pathological" (Mamdani 1996, p. 9). To elevate sovereignty as norm also erases a necessary distinction between species of statehood (of which sovereign statehood is one) and a genus which is the commonly shared experience of sociopolitical formation (polity) (Eckstein 1979). Given the amount of work done on this particular norm, its reality has firmly been etched in our subjective consciousness. Once the idea of sovereignty as a "stable" norm has been established, thanks to positivist international law, it followed that it was generously introduced in the non-Western world, particularly in Africa through colonialism. The upsurge in the debate about sovereignty in the aftermath of WWII articulated a reverse tendency; the task now was to reintegrate the "savage," the "native" that was once excised from the community of the civilized into the very same community.

Sovereignty was made to be a norm that formulated a specific order and consecrated difference. The colonial encounter was therefore not only crucial to the development of a sovereignty "norm" even though it has been made to seem inconsequential and ancillary—it provided a template for the postulation of what Anghie has termed "the dynamics of difference," therefore the basis and the resources for the racialization of the international order and the legitimation of the application of different standards to "uncivilized" societies: legal distinctions (in status) became racial distinctions (Anghie 1999, p. 25). However, once one moves away from the preoccupation of sovereignty as norm, the possibility for critical engagement is more evident.

One way to understand the evolution of the history of sovereignty is by looking at a European attempt to domesticate the threat that unknown societies constituted for the integrity of the epistemological coherence of the knowledge apparatus constructed around sovereignty. The purpose of this apparatus is arguably to perpetuate the idea of Europe as "the Janus-faced, the unique culmination of the long march to historical pluralism and the timeless exemplar of the recurrent and repetitive logic of international anarchy, the still point of the world". The insistence on standardization concealed a deep anxiety that the so-called primitive societies would challenge the constitutive basis of sovereignty. The colonial encounter turned sovereignty from a "philosophical invention" into a reality fundamentally designed to rationalize configurations of differentiation (Nayar 2014, p. 126). At first a negative mechanism meant to preserve European states from mutual encroachment; it became "a positive freedom … to plunder, attack or settle (in non-European regions) without upsetting the peace of Europe (from Wight's dual-state system)", thus sovereignty from principle (of demarcation) to argument (expansion/exploitation).

On one hand, non-European societies had been gradually brought into the realm of "the international" starting from the sixteenth century through the four mechanisms of (1) treaty-making which led to the extraction of concessions to service a new property regime, (2) colonization by conquest, (3) recognition as applied to those societies deemed somewhat civilized such as Japan, and (4) through protectorate agreements or a combination of these (Anaya 2004, pp. 27, 42; Anghie 1999, p. 36).[13] On another, the specific formulation of sovereignty applied to conditions of entry into the society of nations was in reality about policing boundaries, about rehabilitating the West by delimiting a sphere exclusive to it; it was therefore about overcoming the anxieties of confidence. The effects of boundary-policing in the post-war period were evident in the manner that nominal independence was granted to formerly colonized societies at the same time that colonial domination structures were being maintained. As a consequent, subsequent forms of intervention during the decolonization period and the post-decolonization era by Western states through multilateral institutions tended to reflect a practice of "intervention [that was] a colonial-modern technology at its point of departure, specifically, one that erects and polices the difference between sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities via a standard of civilization" (Shilliam 2013, p. 1133).[14] The language of humanitarianism here serves as the device that bridges

the legitimacy deficit (Krasner 1999) and paves the way for forms of "conservatorships" "[vacillating] among trusteeship, paternalism, repression, and paralysis" (Gorman 2012, p. 14). Concomitantly, the disruptive effects of colonial interference with African political processes created space for interventions deemed adequate for societies whose legal personality was not fully recognized but could be rendered fluid and moldable to the colonizer's will.

What happens when we start thinking beyond the modernity argument?[15] The point is that if all societies make history—and this is a basic fact—they produce history in different ways, they produce history differently. In the post-war period, the notion of global order depended on the ability of the United Nations (UN) to discern between an absolute defense of the principle of sovereign integrity and a commitment to self-determination that could overcome a mere sympathy syndrome for the colonized as the oppressed. However, one would be naive to think of the self-determination era as an open field of possibilities untainted by past attempts by European powers to interfere with African sociopolitical processes. Self-determination was inevitably shaped by the exigencies of particular global moral and political economies (Anaya 2004, pp. 124, 173). In fact, using the recognition logic from the comfort of their status of "established" sovereignties, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States sometimes acted on behalf of the international community using the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorization procedure to assess the legal and political validity of a claim for self-determination.

The "possibility" of self-determination and sovereignty could not be a right but a stage of maturity and readiness, the achievement of which would largely depend on the tutorship of white colonizers (Watson 1992, p. 225). The point here is that if the language is a language of right, its enforcement in practice was one of graduation, maturity, and differentiation inspired by Descartes (human divergence required legal diversity), Montesquieu (institutional divergence), and Rousseau (freedom is "not a fruit that grows under all climes"), at least such was the idea. Essentially, the requirements for maturity negated the basis for the very rights which becoming sovereign was going to grant them. Thus, juridical equality could only be established when the indigene became fully assimilated through education and culture (*par les moeurs*).

The task at hand for the postcolonial perspective consists therefore, beyond un-naming norms, of rearticulating a critique of a norm-bound sensitivity which has characterized an understanding of sovereignty, but

also to restore the space-time dimensions of constitutive distinctions that continue to legitimate a hierarchy of/in humanity and to justify a variety of inequalities. Further, there is a necessity, beyond the deconstruction of dominant narratives, to displace an ontology-epistemology infused with colonial thinking even when discussions of colonialism itself are wholly absent in current deliberations and resolutions on, say, humanitarianism, international law, economic autonomy, and so on. To think, obstinately, of sovereignty as a norm is to reject the possibility that it is merely a temporal category, to support, therefore, the idea of sovereignty as a universal time in the political development of world societies. In the three historical periods discussed above, sovereignty became different things, a precept of order, a mode of relational regulation, and ultimately a mode of producing and generating subjectivities. In all three instances, its potency lies in a capacity to tame discontinuity through the naturalization of meaning.

Conclusion

The sovereignty regime emerged out of a European collective desire to emancipate Europe out of recurrent conflicts so as to sustain mutual respect and recognition; this desire was consecrated by a series of treaties that culminated in the Peace of Westphalia. The late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries offer unique historical moments whereby the notion of sovereignty took various, conflicting forms that are indicative of the amount of strategizing that has gone into its various formulations, but also the inconsistency of the concept itself.

This chapter has endeavored to rethink the sovereignty principle in sharper historical and theoretical light specifically in relation to the colonial encounter. It attempted to show that behind the guise of universalism, a set of European cultural values were elevated into a single framework for the integration of non-Western societies into the "international community." Colonialism constructed and exhausted non-Western personality at the same time that it essentialized a European/Western identity as unproblematically homogenous, normal, and universal. Sovereignty thus seems an inadequate concept and experience for accounting or for thinking about the colonial and postcolonial conditions. For one thing, postcolonial sovereignty has largely contributed to the delegitimation of postcolonial stateness in maintaining the epistemic and ideological conditions of state failure as a possibility. There is a need, therefore, to avoid setting the state for a minority discourse complete with labels of the postcolonial,

Third World, even Global South that merely reinforce the predicament of southern scholarship. For the problem of sovereignty in the African state resides with the notion of sovereignty itself, its history; its processes, colonial, capitalist, and imperial; its normative weigh; and its irreversible character as core marker and driving force of modernity.

An obvious implication is that the non-West did not create sovereignty, it inherited it: as a borrowed, alien language, and practice, sovereignty can be mastered to an extent but can never be made one's own. The inequality element has always been there and its pervasive effects suffuse cultural and racial assessments of political experiences. These are often euphemistically framed in legal terms. If the analytical purchase of the sovereignty norm has partly waned, thanks to the work of legal critical and postcolonial scholars, the epistemological privilege attached to the idea of sovereignty or its incontestability is yet to be fully confronted. The key point here is that the sovereignty principle in reality was never decolonized. Even the most radical critics of sovereignty seem unable to go beyond the givenness of sovereignty itself as norm and not as historical process and as a series of strategic interventions. The presumption of sovereignty as something that exists, rather than a very European ideology that has been invested, and mobilized in support of the rise of Europe in world history, continues to validate a single anatomy of encounter—mediated by sovereignty—of world history.

Notes

1. For a discussion of different aspects of the Berlin Africa Conference, see Wesseling (1996), Crowe (1970), and Fisch (1988).
2. For instance, a notion of government without legitimacy.
3. Note that no systematic distinction is made between the effects of colonialism and those of empire.
4. The overarching thrust of this critique can be found among critical legal scholars, the most prominent of which is undoubtedly Antony Angie. See, for instance, Anghie (1999); other notable scholars include Thuo Gathii (1998), Abi-Saab (1994), Esmeir (2012), wa Mutua (1995), Gong (1984), and Riles (1993). Postcolonial scholars have also discussed the centrality of colonialism in articulating the sovereignty doctrine; see among others Mongia (2007). Lydia Liu (1999) has specifically looked at the problem of translation in unpacking the impact of the colonial encounter.
5. If Alexandrowicz (150–157) is mainly concern about how positivist international law factors into the colonial set, one could go further and investigate the role of the sovereignty norm in its constitutive form/structure.

6. An idea that has a long pedigree, see, for instance, Eric Cheyfitz (1997) but which was being articulated for the first time by a collective of European actors. See, in particular, Prince von Bismarck's opening address to the Conference: "all the Governments invited share the wish to bring the natives of Africa within that pale of civilization by opening up the interior of the continent to commerce."

7. Anghie (1999). It is impossible to do justice, in this brief essay, to Anghie's extensive and meticulous argument about the imbrications of international law with the colonial encounter. Anghie is among the prominent scholars who engage international law through the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). More than any other postcolonial legal scholar, he has most powerfully engaged the wide-ranging implications of a history of international relations fraught with methodological and ideological misgivings about the integration of colonial history in the development of IR and international law. A key argument he and others thus make is that one cannot demarcate (legal) norms and praxis without falling into a teleological account of the history of this integration.

8. Scott applies a Foucauldian governmentality reading on governing conduct in Europe, juridically, socially, politically, etc.

9. See debates within Assembly of the French Union between parliamentarians from metropolitan France and representatives of colonial territories, *Archives nationales d'Outre-mer, ANOM, Aix-en-Provence*, BiB/50243/1946–1952.

10. I unpack useful aspects of this discussion by showing how internal disagreements within the decolonization movement in French West Africa also had to do with a difficulty to making various ideological alignments speak to constituencies represented by different African leaders in the French colonial institutions of legislative governance.

11. Alexandrowicz (1973) defines a protectorate as "a split of sovereignty and its purpose is to vest in the Protector rights of external sovereignty while leaving rights of internal sovereignty in the protected entity. In this way the Protector shelters another entity against the external hazards of power politics." Quoted in Anghie (1999, p. 54).

12. As RBJ Walker points out, the practice and aspiration of the (nation) state has increasingly narrowed our political horizon beyond state sovereignty and reinforce the conditions that have come to render the notion of sovereignty seemingly incontestable.

13. Much has been written about the unequal nature of colonial treaties. On one hand, we are told that their legality lies in the fact that they were legal contracts between "sovereign" entities. Yet the same entities were denied any sovereign subjectivity when it came to subjecting them to European colonial domination. Treaties created unequal obligations as much as unequal legal and moral regimes.

14. Shilliam offers a critical discussion of the manner in which the Ethiopian-Italian conflicts of 1935–1936 could be read as an instance of a "colonial-modern" intervention. On the need to restore *the colonial* and the colonial encounter in the constitution of "Europe," see Mignolo (2000).
15. Chakrabarty (2000) among others had offered a strong critique of the normativity of European modernity.

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Archiving Trauma and Amnesia: The Racialized Political Theologies of Reconciliation in South Africa

Zahir Kolia

Introduction

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was tasked with exposing and healing wounds sustained over centuries of inequity between the Indigenous black peoples of South Africa and the settlers who dominated them. The parallels with our own mandate—to inform all Canadians about the Indian Residential Schools and their devastating legacy; to guide and inspire a process of reconciliation based on trust and renewed relationships—are obvious. (Canadian TRC Commissioners, Justice Murray Sinclair, Chair; Chief Wilton Littlechild; Dr. Marie Wilson. http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/index.php?p=8)

The above statement was released by the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Chief Commissioners in recognition of the international example that the South African experience has set. As a model, the South African TRC has been proposed or utilized across the world in post-conflict political contexts that include, among others, Indonesia, Liberia,

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Morocco, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka. One of the earliest models for the truth commission can be traced to the Chilean example, while other early iterations also include Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and the Philippines (Ibhawoh 2014, p. 7). Despite these other instances, however, it has been the South African model that has been hailed as producing a sui generis post-conflict society based upon reconciliation, forgiveness, and futurity indexed by a discourse of unity under the banner of the well-known "rainbow nation." Contrary to celebratory gestures that have implicitly or explicitly positioned the South African TRC as a paragon for post-conflict success, this chapter will suggest that such characterizations require revision and a critical reappraisal.

Emerging from the context in which there was a political compromise to formally end apartheid, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 authorized the South African TRC. Accordingly, there was no revolution, no radical transformation in social and political relations, no land-based redistribution and restitution. Instead, the TRC's mandate was to investigate and provide a truthful account of human rights violations committed between the periods of 1960 and 1994. Born from capitulation, therefore, the political coda of formal apartheid was the TRC's reconciliatory capacity to brokerage negotiations between the existing government and opposition (Graybill 2004, p. 1117; Parry 2004, p. 187).

Under the institutionalized power of the state, the TRC public hearings fell under the aegis of the Interim Government of National Unity that was authorized by the new constitution. Over the course of several months, the Commission held its inquiries and witnesses provided oral testimony of their experiences of brutal violence and traumatic loss. Nationally televised as a live event during the daytime hours, the Commission included re-run broadcast in the evenings. For some, there is no doubt that these broadcasts served as an abysmally dystopic form of reality television. Capturing the attention of the national media, politics, and the artistic community, the TRC operated through a belief that individual expositions and public acknowledgment of craven dehumanization would inaugurate a process of countrywide introspection and heal a fractured nation (Young 2004, pp. 146–147).

The writings produced as a result of the TRC are legion, including the Final Report that is over 3500 pages in length. In this official finalized document, there is an explicit focus upon national development via moving into a religiously inscribed futurity. Chairperson of the TRC, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, would remark, "We will be engaging in what

should be a corporate nationwide process of healing … through contrition, confession and forgiveness" (Young 2004, p. 148, citing Chicester 1999, p. 134). To be sure, it is as if the multivalent experiences of traumatic pain and loss could only find authentic expression through a nation-building exercise organized by a juridical lexicon enmeshed with Christian theological motifs of confession and atonement.

That the TRC translated trauma into legal and theological domains meant that lived experiences of pain was recast with new and different significations. These embodied vocabularies of oppression were captured, archived, and re-signified by an institutional apparatus with a bold reconciliatory mandate. Held in abeyance, suffering was marshaled into a generative and transformative event for healing victims, oppressors, benefactors, and the remaining downtrodden and dispossessed remainders. Invested with the powers of individual and national clemency through a liberal-inflected ecclesiastical episteme, the TRC would usher South Africa into a post-apartheid regime purged of its sins through testimonies of suffering.

On the one hand, transcripts from the TRC illustrate an expiating process of having victim's experiences of violence recognized in a public forum. Also, some victims were finally able to unhinge their anti-apartheid activities from the bogus state ascriptions of criminality. On the other hand, there were many that refused to participate in the TRC or critiqued it as a form of political expediency as did the family of Steve Biko. For many of those who declined to join the hearings, and what other testimonies also reveal, is the intractable dissonance that emerges from seeking to excavate individual experiences of trauma into a memorialized archive of collective consciousness. Unconvinced, many challenged the TRC's aim of national redemption and questioned whose interests were being advanced by the growing chorus for "new futures" in the context of a political compromise. What these tensions reveal is the theological political redemptive function of the TRC sought to selectively propel memory into an archive and, in doing so, generate a temporal transition from a past, characterized by apartheid, to a prospective horizon characterized by reconciliation. And yet, a cursory examination of the social and political relations of the "rainbow nation" begs the question if the social cathexis of individual memorialized trauma and violence helped pave the road to a recalibrated neoliberal apartheid structure.

One may suggest that the retrospective critique of the TRC provides sober grounds through which to cast unrelenting charges of failure and

injustice. In this reading, one could claim that the abject social relations that structure South African society today are not connected to the logics and practices of the TRC and that any negative repercussions cannot be attributed to the principle spirit and intention of its practitioners. While it may be true that those who crafted the TRC within a constrained political atmosphere had "good intentions," this paper seeks to exceed the reductive register of intentionality. While not the focus of this chapter, I move beyond whether specific intentions were good or bad. Rather, a key question is how ethnical, moral, and political sensibilities were made possible by power relations structured by entangled discursive practices of nation-building, theology, and memorialization (Young 2004, p. 146).

Exceeding the stale domains regarding the TRC's self-fashioned representation and those that champion it, I locate the TRC as a practice that functioned, in part, to *archive* individual testimonies of traumatic violence in order to witness them as redemptive acts of national atonement. Through this process, however, the materiality of trauma, violence, and pain was reconstituted into collective monuments of the past. Consequently, I argue that that the TRC organized memory and futurity into a project of national development that has been (mis)represented as a global model for post-conflict societies.

This chapter will be organized into three principle sections. In the first section, I will elucidate the entangled theological and racial filiations of apartheid and, in doing so, claim that the power of the theological political has defined the conditions of possibility for the TRC to articulate itself as a project of national redemption. In the second, I will unpack in further detail how the TRC functioned in relation to individual and collective memory by referring to Jacques Derrida's notion of "archive fever." And, for the final section, I will examine how the theological registers of confession and archivization helped to further individualize experiences of colonial violence, produce a pathological discourse of black violence, and create a sense of pastness.

The Political Theology of Race and Coloniality

Dominant social science literature vis-à-vis state formation in the African continent has been dominated by Marxist and Weberian frames of analysis that fail to adequately account for the theological, colonial, and racial inscriptions of social and political reproduction (Goldberg 2009, p. 515). For instance, Weber's refashioned Hegelian civilizational teleology claims

that states vary according to their resemblance to a universal ideal type. However, this abstracted ideal state is assumed to be the modern European state. Weber's foundational Eurocentrism has informed various prominent Africanists including William Reno, Patrick Chabal, Jean Pascal Daloz, and Jean-Francois Bayart, for instance (Wai 2012, p. 136). As a result, Africanist knowledge production indexed by the dubious conceptual frames of state failure and neopatrimonialism cannot evade the Universalist pretentions of coloniality.

On the other hand, the Marxist frame of state formation and procedure accounts for social and economic reproduction within the materialist scope of political economy. In this reading, the racial and theological vectors of apartheid are reduced to the structures of capital accumulation and the existence of antagonistic class structures. While not surrendering a critique of the interwoven circuits of capital and labor exploitation, the Marxist frame falls short of attending to the theological political and racial domains that underpinned the logic and expression of apartheid. Put directly, apartheid is not reducible to a materialist analysis, in which theology and race are simply located as ideological justifications for capitalist exploitation. Underscoring how South African apartheid exceeds abstract ideal tropes and reductive materialist conceptual frames, I will show how the TRC emerged from a lineage contaminated with the political theology of race. Tracing this genealogy illustrates how South Africa's political landscape cannot be disassociated from the entwined colonial lineage of the Afrikaner and Anglican missiology (Goldberg 2009, p. 515).

The structures of apartheid were put in place well before 1948 with the inauguration of the ruling Nationalist Party—the idea of a theologically ordained Afrikaner "chosen people" can be traced back to the seventeenth century (Ritner 1967, p. 18). Nevertheless, between 1910 and 1948, the British colonial administrative machine set in motion various structures including "segregated Native Reserves, pass laws, job color bars, segregated schools and delimited educational opportunities for those categorized as not white, divided recreational facilities and racially restrictive public accommodations, discrete voters rolls and differentiated political representation" (Goldberg 2009, p. 516). However, these bureaucratic structures were expressed through a racialized messianic political theology of the Dutch Reformed Church (*Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk*)—hereafter referred to as the DRC. The DRC in fact dates back to 1665 and represented about 43 percent of South Africa's white population. While unified under a single institution in 1962, the DRC had previously been

arranged into five different provincial churches. Moreover, there exist smaller Afrikaans Reformed Churches, such as the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerk, which represented under ten percent of South Africa's white population (see Ritner 1967). Almost two decades before the Nationalist government took power, the term "apartheid" was conceived at the DRC conference on missionary activity in 1929. It was then that the Reverend C.J. du Plessis voiced his support for missionary work in "the spirit of apartheid that has always characterized [the Church's] conduct" (Goldberg 2009, p. 516, citing Giliomee 2003). The colonial vocation of trusteeship and tutelage was not lost on du Plessis as he remarked in 1941,

> This trusteeship … means of course that the native population will be kept for an unlimited period in a position of subordination. In the meantime, openings for safe development … will be given, since under white trusteeship opportunities for natives to serve their own race will occur in the separated and differentiated native communities. (Ritner 1967, pp. 27–28, citing *Koers in die Krisis* 1941, p. 232)

The "spirit of apartheid" was expressed through the theological political vectors of race, in which national development was networked by a logic of *eiesoortige ontwikkeling* or "group development" (Ritner 1967, p. 18).

The social ontology of separate development was authorized by colonial Biblical exegesis whereby blacks and whites were conceptualized by a monogenetic structure. However, despite the fact that Christian monogenesis claimed all of the earth's inhabitants derived from the fallen progeny of Adam, the taxonomy of cultural and racial difference, according to the DRC, was organized by an evolutionary diagram. As a result, intellectual ability and cultural advancement could obtain scriptural license by a pliant racialized political theology of separate development,

> After the Fall God, for the honor of His Name, maintained the unity and diversity of man in order to restrict the expansion of the power of mankind in its apostasy and insubordination to Him and to check the expansion of sin in this way. In His mercy, He decreed a multiplicity of tongues and peoples and dispersed the human race over the face of the earth. (Ritner 1967, p. 26, citing *Die Naturellevraags* 1950, p. 13)

Equal before God, yet differentiated by evolutionary typologies, the DRC sought the evangelization and civilization of the "inferior races" through

separate development. To be sure, this ecumenical production of the political did not palliate racial atrocities; instead, it resulted in socializing communities into wretched silos whereby interaction and cultural synthesis was forbidden.

That black and white communities were hierarchically arranged by a logic of separate development meant that radical social, political, and economic inequity was authorized by a brittle juridico-political edifice of legal "equality." In other words, the systematization of racial separation resulted in the equal right of access to unequally organized resources, shelter, and overall conditions of possibility for daily life. Forcible relocations to the most economically unviable and socially depressed geographical locations meant that communities could "equally develop" their own separate lifeworlds in relation to whites. The effect of this, however, was a Fanonian "atmosphere of death" that was kept in place by an ultraviolent state security apparatus. Authorized by the lord of the DRC, the racialized logic of unequal political and social life was policed by the butchering violence of the state and theologically ordained (Goldberg 2009, p. 516).

Speaking of the theological and racial underpinnings of the political, D.F. Malan (Prime Minister 1948–1954) left the pulpit to head the first apartheid government, "It was not the state but the church who [sic] took the lead with apartheid. The state followed the principle laid down by the church in the field of education for the native, the colored and the Asian. The result? Friction was eliminated" (Goldberg 2009, p. 517, citing Giliomee 2003, p. 460). Echoing du Plessis, Malan's messianic discourse of separate development was expressed as being advantageous for each group, despite how the system marshaled souls into an evolutionary taxonomy organized by physiognomic differences.

After declaring itself a republic in 1961, Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd located South Africa within a salvific national development paradigm, "We'll work out our own salvation here on the southern tip of Africa, by the light we have, and with the help of the Almighty" (Goldberg 2009, p. 520). Grounding the political upon a messianic future inscribed by racial sacralization meant that the vitality of the apartheid nation was dependent upon a coercive theological-racial cadence of imagining, managing, and enforcing belonging.

Concealing the violence that underpinned South African social and political relations, the theological filiations of the "spirit of apartheid" operated as a fetish category for the state—while the category of the "fetish" can be read as having a colonial lineage, I am using what can be

called "border gnosis" in order to redeploy this category through a deco-
lonial reading. That is, separate development was valued as a project of
national redemption through a process of detaching it from the social and
political relationships of exploitation and violence that produced it.
Understood in this way, a fetish category or object requires the practice of
substitution and displacement where one attaches transcendent meaning
to some elements of the object while displacing and recoding others
(Ahmed 2000, pp. 14–15).

Through this process of settler colonial fetishism, racial sacralization
was deemed necessary for the salvation of the nation. For instance, black
lives could literally be sacrificed: imprisoned, tortured, immolated, and
then even dismembered by the apartheid security apparatus in order to
ensure the well-being of the state. Also, the demolition of District Six, in
which over 60,000 mainly "colored" residents were forcibly removed, was
met with excitement. Director General for Community Development
Louis Fouché remarked to the newspaper the *Cape Times* in 1982 that
"I'm not ashamed to say I was responsible for District Six being wiped
out—in fact, I'm proud of it" (Gool-Ebrahim 2011, p. 122). The extreme
repression of racial sacralization, which is constitutive of apartheid, was
concealed through the matrices of fetishism and simultaneously autho-
rized as necessary for the salvation of *volk* (Goldberg 2009, p. 522). How
else could the debauched hives of Afrikaner society continue to enjoy their
segregated ballroom dances and watch their children gleefully frolic
around carefully manicured rugby pitches without the fetish status of sep-
arate development? In other words, the "spirit of apartheid" had positive
meaning for many white South Africans through a process by which the
daily atrocities were conscripted into the racialized and theological narra-
tives of national salvation.

As Biko argued so brilliantly, apartheid achieved some of its longevity
by moral expiation, "With their theory of 'separate freedoms for the vari-
ous nations in the multinational state of South Africa' the Nationalists
have gone a long way towards giving most of white South Africa some sort
of moral explanation for what is happening" (Biko 1978, p. 19). The
theological textures of apartheid provided a flexible fetish form for the
most committed white supremacist supporters of the Nationalist Party.
However, as Biko illustrates, the ecclesiastical vintage of apartheid also
articulated itself to white supremacist liberal positions that failed to tran-
scend a fidelity toward du Plessis' miserable discourse of native tutelage:
"In short, these are the people who say that they have black souls wrapped
up in white skins" (Biko 1978, p. 20).

Inherently unstable, the architecture of repression that held apartheid together became a global concern. As a fetish object, the "spirit of apartheid" lost its power to conceal its constitutive atmosphere of death. In the latter half of the 1980s, critical voices from trade unions, artists, musicians, politicians, and religious institutions, including churches, joined in a global chorus to condemn apartheid, at least, in its formal manifestations. The scriptural productions of the DRC came under attack from a variety of other religious institutions into the 1990s. Religious groups working with less constraint than the outlawed groups such as the ANC and South African Communist Party made inroads and produced an alternative theological valency to the discourse of anti-apartheid (Goldberg 2009, pp. 522–523).

Founded in 1983 by religious figures such as Tutu, the United Democratic Front utilized the religious and psychotherapeutic language of national unity. While the new Constitution of 1996 is widely understood as a secular liberal production of the ANC, it is undoubtedly contaminated by the traces of Christian theology. Put directly, religious discourses saturated the political and came to structure the "transition" toward post-apartheid reconciliation via the TRC (Young 2004, p. 148; Goldberg 2009, p. 523).

Turning my attention to the TRC, the choice of Tutu as the chairperson is unsurprising considering the aforementioned political theological structure of South Africa. Operating as a confessional, the hearings were inaugurated by a Eucharist. Attempting to establish the TRC as a confessional as opposed to an inquisition, Tutu subsumed other religious traditions into its Christian vocation by calling upon "our churches, mosques, synagogues and temples … to provide liturgies for corporate confession and absolution" (Young 2004, p. 148, citing Chicester 1999, pp. 134–135). As the TRC final report affirms, a wide range of religious institutions joined in,

> The Chief Rabbi and the Hindu Maha Sabha sent submissions and testified at the hearings, as did the Baha'i Faith. A submission was received from the Buddhist Dharma Centre. The Moulana Ibrahim Bham of the Jamiatul Ulama Transvaal testified, as did Moulana Farid Esack, formerly of the Call of Islam. The Muslim Judicial Council of Cape Town (MJC) attended. Subsequently, the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) made a submission. (Final Report, Volume 4, p. 58)

Variegated religious testimonies were chosen, collected, and articulated to Christian corporate confessionals where they were archived in order to act as an origin point for the post-apartheid nation-building project.

In the next section, I argue the TRC is best understood as unique archival form that presented lived experiences of violence as the origin for collective healing. However, in doing so, I suggest the practice of archiving confessional memories of trauma is inherently unstable and entwined with a political project of national amnesia.

The Feverish Desire of Archivization and the Politics of National Atonement

The field of postcolonial studies has critically engaged with the concept of the archive as being something more than the recorded distillation of events that would have otherwise been lost. Rather, postcolonial theorists have examined how colonial regimes have used the archive as a technology of power for knowledge production that underpins its coercive capacity. Speaking of the "archival turn," Ann Laura Stoler (2002, 2009) suggests that the humanities and social sciences have used the archive as a source of empirical material; however, the archive has also been conceptualized as a discursive object of knowledge production that has enabled the reproduction of colonial rule. In this regard, colonial archives are conceptualized as "artifacts of colonialism rather than simply the repositories where the data pertaining to the colonial past is stored" (Gordon 2014, p. 2, citing Ballantyne 2004, p. 31).

As an object that can be examined for the systemization of colonial rule, the South African state recognized the danger of an official record. Starting in 1989, the military and police took every step to destroy their documented acts of criminal atrocity. In 1993, National Intelligence Service spent over six months incinerating about 44 tons of files, computer records, audio recordings, and microfilm. Rescinded by flames, an Iscor furnace in Pretoria removed evidence of torture, death, collaboration, and every possible memory of violence that found its way into archival citation (Dlamini 2016, p. 777).

While enormously important, this section does not reduce the archive to the physical collection of records that was hastily purged by the state. Rather, in light of viewing the archive as bound with contingent relations of power and coloniality, I focus on the TRC itself. Accordingly, the hearings not only provide a lens through which to examine the coercive security apparatus of apartheid but stand as a unique archival form that is bound with mediating memories of violence through a representational schema that is necessary for collective healing. As an artifact of coloniality,

in other words, the archive articulates memory to the politicized vectors of post-apartheid nation-building. The enunciations of trauma archived by the TRC, I suggest, present itself as an original and authoritative record of the past in order to situate them as an origin or beginning point to generate a monument of collective healing. In the forward to the Final Report on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Tutu claimed,

> The work of the South African Commission has also been far more extensive than that of other commissions. The volume of material that passed through our hands will fill many shelves in the National Archives. This material will be of great value to scholars, journalists and others researching our history for generations to come. From a research point of view, this may the Commission's greatest legacy. (Final Report, Volume 1, pp. 1–2)

Continuing, he links the archive with the institutional directive of state building through political theologies of redemption and atonement:

> My appeal to South Africans as they read this report is not to use it to attack others, but to add to it, correct it and ultimately to share in the process that will lead to national unity through truth and reconciliation. (Final Report, Volume 1, p. 4)

This attempt of the TRC to archive the memory of violence and cathect them into a discourse of religiously inscribed national atonement illustrates the instability of post-apartheid national development. The archivization of living memories of violence is best understood as an aporia of colonial memorialization. The archive is not a stable record of fixed "truthful" memories but is bound with a feverish desire to locate a starting point or origin for the theologically inscribed state protocol for moving into a futurity of collective healing.

In *Archive Fever*, Derrida uses deconstruction and the critique of the metaphysics of presence to unite two seemingly disparate strands, that is, archives and Freudian psychoanalysis. Derrida complicates the presumption that officially transcribing the record of an event produces a fixed representation of reality. The archive, for him, is a deceptive analogue for an elemental foundationalism or an uncontaminated inception of truth (Derrida 1995, p. 10). Freud used the notion of the archive, according to Derrida, as a psychoanalytic metaphor for the origin of the individual subconscious that presumably holds the authentic meaning of human experience and thought (O'Toole 1997, p. 88).

For Derrida, the grammar of the archive, whether testimonial record, or Freudian appellation of the individual subconscious, goes largely unexamined as a repository of stable truth. The archive, in this reading, is part of a dubious system that desires to be fully present as an uncontaminated origin that is unbounded by the force of contingency and play of differences. In this regard, one is left to explore the ways in which archivization is always a political act that encounters meanings and events that it seeks to *feverishly* manage, control, and memorialize.

We can see why Derrida (1995) opens *Archive Fever* by directly stating: "Let us not begin at the beginning, nor even at the archive," and he goes onto state, "a science of the archive must include the theory of this institutionalization, that is to say, at once of the law which begins by inscribing itself there and of the right which authorizes it" (pp. 9–10). Seeking to complicate the notion of an authoritative record that one can petition to acquire truth, Derrida presents the reader with a deconstruction of the word archive, starting with the "arkhe": a place where power finds its genesis or a site where things begin and originate. In a textual detour so characteristic of Derrida's writing, he delves into the words "arkheion" (the location of the superior magistrate's residence, where official records are stored); and "archon" (the magistrate that holds power or hermeneutic right to interpret the official documents into a system of law). The point, for Derrida, is that the arkhe, arkheion, and archon are all bound with a sickness or feverish archival desire of finding, mastering, and possessing the origin or beginnings of things (Derrida 1995, p. 9; Steedman 2001, p. 1161).

Failing to be a solid grounding of inception, the archive is oriented toward the past by controlling what is included within it and, as a result, produces a highly selective production of the future (Naas 2014, p. 28). Consequently, the archive is contingent upon temporality and power, or, as Derrida states, the archive represents a function "in the order of commencement as well as in the order of commandment" (Derrida 1995, p. 9). Never infinite, the archive is contingent upon the political act of selection whereby certain events will live, while others cosigned to the past. Michael Naas (2014) writes:

> It is up to those who constitute, inherit, and then pass on the archive to take upon themselves the responsibility for this selection, this fidelity to the past and this violence with regard to it. Archivization is thus not simply a process of preservation, conservation, or salvation, but one of violence and destruction. (30)

As an order of commencement and commandment, the aporetic political act of choosing what events do not enter the archive leads to the violence of forgetting and destruction, whereas what is chosen for the futurity of memorialization is finite and limited (Naas 2014, p. 29).

Placing this discussion of archivization in relation to the hearings of the TRC, the lived experiences of trauma and pain were not simply transcribed into a historical record that appeared unmediated by the power of selection. The victims of violence did not simply have their memories recorded as "truth" within an authoritative location; rather, the TRC mediated particular experiences to represent the *commencement* of a collective national futurity characterized by an institutionalized nation-building *commandment* of healing and clemency.

As a rickety anchorage point that does not merely function as a repository of unmediated experiences vis-à-vis the violence of apartheid, the archived experiences of violence were networked into the vectors of state power as a starting spot that could be controlled. This desired mastery of the archive of apartheid trauma positions the TRC as a beginning point for collective psychological healing. Just as Derrida critiqued Freudian psychoanalysis for positioning the subconscious as an archival analogue for the origin of human behavior, the TRC has been positioned as the location for the subconscious of the nation and as the origin of collective healing. In doing so, the corporate confessions articulated to the Christian theology of forgiveness and salvation were contingent upon a temporalized politics of producing a future post-apartheid state. This future, however, was bundled with the violence of archival selection enmeshed with the memorialized politics of forgetting.

The Archival Production of Black Pathological Violence and Individualized Confession

In this section, I build upon the above discussion of archivization and delve further into the selective process of choosing individual experiences of violence and the politics of forgetting inscribed in the post-apartheid nation-building project. I suggest that the TRC focus upon individual victim and perpetrator via corporate confessions foreclosed the ability to deal with structural forms of inequality generated by apartheid and, in doing so, created the conditions for a discourse of "pastness." Finally, I close with a consideration of how the political atmosphere of coloniality that the TRC enabled has been presented as an international model of post-conflict society.

Highlighting the singular focus upon victim and perpetrator, the TRC was bound by the protocols of the jurisprudence and Christian confession. Written into the interim constitution, two main processes characterized the relationship between victim and perpetrator. In the first, amnesty was a conditional provision and was not extended to entire groups. As such, each offender would need to be identified on an individual basis so that his or her guilt could be determined and amnesty from legal liability granted. The second provision required the identification of individual victims who would forego their right to prosecute offenders in court. Focused upon corporate confession, the production of justice was pronounced to Christian theological notions of atonement, restoration, and reparations, rather than criminal culpability (Mamdani 2002, p. 33).

Despite this, the vast majority of the security apparatus felt no need to request amnesty, seeking neither responsibility nor any form of expiation. The former President PW Botha defiantly refused to testify as he lampooned the TRC for unjustifiably targeting the Afrikaner community. Conversely, former President FW de Klerk did provide several statements in cooperation with the TRC on behalf of the Nationalist Party; however, he evaded taking full responsibility for the atrocities committed under his reign. In the end, while more than 7000 people applied for amnesty, approximately 3330 submissions were rescinded for not being political, but rather personal in nature. Other applications were subsequently dropped because they did not occur within the time frame assigned by the Commission. With just over 200 amnesty provisions granted, it is clear that most of the harbingers of racial violence that operated under the protection of apartheid rejected the core appeals of the TRC (Campbell 2000, pp. 48, 52).

Mahmood Mamdani (2002) characterizes the legislative directives that underpinned the TRC in the following way,

> Without a comprehensive acknowledgment of victims of apartheid, there would be only a limited identification of perpetrators and only a partial understanding of the legal regime that made possible the 'crime against humanity' … The Commission's analysis reduced apartheid from a relationship between the state and entire communities to one between the state and individual. Where entire communities were victims of gross violations of rights, the Commission acknowledged only individual victims. (pp. 33–34)

While the TRC acknowledged apartheid as constituting crimes against humanity, it did so only formally. One of the central paradoxes is that

while the category of "crimes against humanity" presupposes the targeting of *entire groups* for racial and ethnic cleansing, in addition to repressive surveillance by the state security forces, the TRC limited its scope to *individual* political actors (Mamdani 2002, p. 34). Incarceration without trial, pass laws, forcible population transfer, and other tactics of systemic racial dehumanization were not included with the mandate of the TRC (Campbell 2000, p. 48).

One of the effects of selecting what events entered the registers of archivization was that the Commission produced a limited catalogue of violations that were organized into four time periods:

> From 1960 (Sharpeville) to 1976 (the Soweto Uprising) from 1976 to 1983 (beginning of the state of emergency) from 1983 to 1990 (the unbanning of political parties), and from 1990 to 1994 (the first democratic elections). (Mamdani 2002, p. 35)

Beginning with violations that occurred after the banning of political parties in 1960, with the Sharpeville massacre, the Commission undertook a statistical analysis that closed with the democratic elections of 1994. Through the feverish processes of controlling the meaning of the established record, the Commission concluded that most of the violations took place in the period following the unbanning of political parties (1983–1990) and then during the period where states of emergency were implemented (1990–1994).

This highly selective analysis resulted in the TRC finding that approximately half of all violations transpired during the period of *transition* from apartheid. The commissioners also concluded that 35 percent of violations occurred at the crest of mass struggle against apartheid, followed by the years in which the state of emergency was declared. Conversely, a mere 15 percent of violations were held to have occurred during the height of apartheid's implementation. Astonishingly, "crimes against humanity," as defined by the TRC, is said to have primarily ensued during the years of struggle against apartheid, rather than when it was enforced (Mamdani 2002, p. 35). As a political act of mastering and choosing what events entered the archive of violations, the TRC was founded upon an aporetic absence or destructive force of forgetting the constitutive violence of apartheid that it was established to reconcile.

Finite and partial, the record of violations indexed by the TRC also identified the "major victim organizations" and "perpetrator organizations."

Significantly, the catalogue of victim organizations listed the ANC at the top, followed by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In 7th place was the South African Police (SAP), trailed by the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO). In a puzzling turn, the IFP was then situated atop the list of "perpetrator organizations," followed by the SAP and ANC. Remarkably, the South African Defense Force (SADF) was listed 4th thereby reinforcing the notion that struggling against apartheid was more caustic than its execution (Mamdani 2002, p. 35). In this regard, apartheid's political theology of white supremacy was characterized primarily as a case of pathological black-on-black violence. Put differently, according to the TRC, the principal perpetrators of "crimes against humanity" were in fact black people who were resisting apartheid (Mamdani 2002, p. 36).

It is no wonder that in this context of selecting violations through the political power of archivization, in which the black community was identified as the chief perpetrators of violence, so few prosecutions took place. It also sheds light on why significant political engineers of apartheid outright refused to provide testimony to the TRC. Achille Mbembe remarks that "there have been hardly any acts of public contrition from former executioners and where most killers and torturers have escaped jail time, the persistent denial of white privilege partly explains the acrimonious nature of the controversy" (Mbembe 2008, p. 7). Reconciliation, in this reading, translates into an ethical sensibility that the black community should in fact atone for apartheid violations that have been comfortably projected through the discourse of racialized pathological violence.

The project of national redemption was re-networked through the power of race whereby white South Africans could bear witness to the confessions of victim and perpetrators, both of which were predominantly cast as black. Consequently, the white community could comfortably imagine apartheid as a past event that has been reconciled while reconstituting their sense of belonging in a post-apartheid nation. Mediated and carefully chosen by the protocols of archivization, the events that constituted "crimes against humanity" were articulated to a nation-building project entwined with a politics of forgetting. For many of those in the white community that benefited from the spirit and structure of apartheid, therefore, reconciliation meant that the black community should confess, atone, and ultimately bear the burden of South Africa's mired past and move on (Mbembe 2008, p. 9).

Mamdani suggests that the Commission was unwilling or unable to acknowledge the evidence of "crimes against humanity" because of the

way it defined violence between individual "victims" and "perpetrators." For him, it is crucial to conceptualize apartheid as a form of organized state power over entire groups; that way, violations could not be so easily reduced to the myopic periodization of 1960–1994, let alone the popular struggles against apartheid. Also, essential, however, are the political theologies of redemption and the power of archivization that selectively chose what forms of violence entered the Commission's purview. Defining violations between individual victims and perpetrators was a juridical orientation that followed from organizing the hearings into Christian corporate confessions under a mandate of national atonement.

For the ecumenical vectors of the TRC, the confessional structure of the hearings depended upon a relationship between individual victims and perpetrators, rather than one between the state and entire groups. Tutu punctuates the individuated theological valence of the TRC quite clearly in his remarks, "God bless you all as you share in the journey forward to hope, renewal and reconciliation. May God give us the grace to forgive one another, to love one another and to be sisters and brothers together" (Young 2004, p. 48, citing Chubb and van Dijk 2001, p. xii). The function of confession, as it was produced as an origin for the redemptive national desire to create a temporal transition of pastness, was to release the victim from fantasies of revenge.

Combining Christian ascetical theology with psychotherapy, corporate confessions sought to unhinge forms of affective injury and power that the perpetrator had over their victims. According to this logic, it was through the cultivation of the Christian virtue of "indifference" that feelings of hatred, rage, and desires for violent retribution could be abandoned. This institutionalized structure of confession, via authentic public disclosure of the unspeakable experiences of trauma, was held to be the prerequisite for a radical transformation of the landscape of affectivity (Papanikolaou 2006, p. 119). For Tutu, the expiating force of confession would wither retributive desires and produce a collective atmosphere of love indexed by emotions of familial concord as mentioned above.

The power of confession and its relationship to creating a collective futurity based upon a transition from the past is again described by Tutu:

> However painful the experience, the wounds of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they can heal. This is not to be obsessed with the past. It is to take care that the past is properly dealt with for the sake of the future. (Final Report, Volume 1, p. 7)

The fact that singular experiences of pain can be memorialized and marshaled into a collective form of national catharsis is a central tension of the TRC's individualized mandate. One is left to ask, does the focus upon corporate confessions index a form of institutionalized amnesia? Similarly, whose interests are forwarded by an individualized production of national forgetting (Parry 2004, p. 183)?

Transcending the past through an official state-sanctioned process of truth and reconciliation invited a national collective to witness testimonies of trauma and pleads for atonement. It did so, however, by the morass of projecting violations within a temporalized framework of black pathology. And, it must also be said that the TRC sought to move hastily into future vicissitudes without a robust critique regarding how structural forms of inequality were able to persist through the neocolonial logics of racialized capitalism (Parry 2004, pp. 182–183). For instance, Mbembe has argued that the post-apartheid nation has enabled many former privileged whites, who were sustained by apartheid, to claim that their children should not be held responsible for violations that took place before they were born. Abandoning themselves to the comfort of pastness and the logic of non-culpability, there has been a foreclosure of what decolonization and transformative justice entails: "Born to positions of enormous social and economic advantage, they are reluctant to wash their hands of the privileges they accumulated over three and a half centuries" (Mbembe 2008, p. 9). Archivization, confession, and discourses of national redemption enacted through individual victims and perpetrators index the grim reality of post-apartheid South Africa characterized by the racialized landscape of political power and neoliberalism—processes well beyond the scope of this chapter.

Despite the many problems that associated with the TRC, international relations theory, particularly concerning post-conflict nation-building, continues to grasp upon the South African model as an archetype for success. Speaking to the many virtues of the South African example, the TRC has been described as an "unprecedented exercise of deep remembering" that should continue to be exported globally, "It is a challenge to the realists who say that the only criterion for politics should be the interest of the nations … the South African approach is an important experiment in relating ethics to politics" (Ibhawoh 2014, p. 7, citing Müller Fahrenholz 1996, p. 99). Apparently pushing some of the core tenants of global politics toward ethical forms of governance, the South African TRC has proliferated globally.

International variants of the truth commission model are certainly not lacking. For instance, between 1974 and 2007, 32 commissions were erected in over 28 countries. Over half of these were established in the decade after the South African TRC, which include Canada, Congo, Ecuador, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Sri Lanka, East Timor, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia (Ibhawoh 2014, p. 7, citing Amnesty International 2014). Critical encounters with the TRC's foundational logics and institutional directives have been submerged by hegemonic reconciliatory politics of national atonement and redemption. Despite the international appetite for reconciliatory truth commissions, we must continually assess the extent to which they jettison transformative justice based upon decolonial praxis.

Conclusions and Futures

There is a generative paradox of the TRC that I have highlighted, which is how an entanglement between remembering and forgetting indexes the politics of reconciliation. Haunted by amnesia, individual testimonies of trauma and projections of atonement were marshaled by institutionalized corporate confessions and cathected to a collective national memory. Plunging deeper into functioning of the TRC, I outlined the way in which archivization is contingent upon an elemental violence of selection regarding what events enter the politicized domain of memorialization through the nexus of commencement and commandment. Inherently circumscribed by the narrow parameters of the archive, embodied experiences of trauma entered the institutional protocols of the TRC. While mindful of the juridical enactments that punctuated a limited and individualized conception of crimes against humanity, I suggest that these legal prescriptions were organized by the power of archivization and its attendant ecumenical registers of exculpation.

South Africa is said to have been healed and redeemed. South Africa is said to have moved cooperatively into a future characterized by clemency and forgiveness. Finally, South Africa, and the TRC in particular, has been propelled into the discourse of global politics as a unique post-conflict archetype for brokering stability and peace. Complicating these claims, I end with the reflections of Biko (1978), which remain relevant today when considering the entwinement between the past, present, and future in South Africa,

There is always an interplay between the history of a people i.e. the past, and their faith in themselves and hopes for their future. We are aware of the terrible role played by our education and religion in creating amongst us a false understanding of ourselves. We must therefore work out schemes not only to correct this, but further to be our own authorities rather than wait to be interpreted by others. (52)

The contemporary significance of Black Consciousness invites us to dislodge the malignancy of amnesia, unmoor the interpretive force of selective archivization, and refashion new decolonial groundings for the future of South Africa.

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Alternatives to Development in Africa

Sally Matthews

Introduction

Africa's place in the world has, since the end of colonialism, been closely linked with the idea of development. Africa, along with the rest of the so-called Third World, is typically presented as being in need of development so as to acquire the characteristics of the West which has supposedly already achieved development. Africa's place in international relations theory has, likewise, been one that has highlighted its supposed need for development with development aid being a key instrument through which the international community has related to Africa.

This chapter is premised upon the rejection of the idea that Africa ought to be understood as the epitome of underdevelopment requiring guidance from the supposedly more advanced parts of the world. Building on the post-development critique of development, I argue that thinking of Africa as being underdeveloped entails accounting for the African experience through regarding it as backward or deviant. This way of understanding Africa relegates it to a minor player in the international arena. When viewed through the lens of development discourse, Africa's role in

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international affairs is confined to that of a grateful recipient of the beneficence and guidance offered to it by global powers.

While the chapter adopts a very critical stance toward the idea of development, its focus is not on critiquing development but rather on trying to build on critique of development in order to move beyond accounts that treat Africa as the epitome of underdevelopment. Using scholarship on the broader question of how to think and write differently about Africa, I argue that we cannot step outside of the whole project of development in order to articulate something entirely alternative to it. However, I also argue that recognition of the difficulty—indeed the impossibility—of proposing something entirely "other" than and antithetical to development does not have to mean capitulation to a developmentalist approach to Africa. I tentatively sketch out four interrelated paths forward which acknowledge the inadequacy of the development paradigm while also accepting the impossibility of proposing something entirely alternative to it.

THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

The idea that Africa needs to be developed first emerged during the late colonial era when colonial era policy-makers began to attempt to justify their presence on the continent in the language of development rather than that of the civilizing mission. As Cowen and Shenton (1995, 1996) argue, this idea of development, while newly applied in Africa, was not a new idea but rather drew upon existing discourses about how to manage industrialization in nineteenth-century Europe. When colonialism came under pressure because of increased international acceptance of the idea of self-determination, colonial officials turned to these discourses in order to try to find a progressive basis for continued colonialism (Cooper 1997, p. 67; Ziai 2016, pp. 27–35). While the idea of development was thus intended to reinvigorate colonialism, it was taken up by the colonized in unexpected ways as anti-colonial activists accepted certain aspects of the idea of development while insisting that colonialism was illegitimate (Cooper 1997, p. 85).

In the postcolonial era, the idea of development infused both African governments' programs to improve the lives of their citizens and international discourse about how the former colonizers ought to relate to their former colonies. As the idea of development became more prominent in the arenas of policy-making, competing academic theories of development emerged along with centers for development studies and journals focusing

on development. Indeed, the increased size and scope of interest in development across a variety of sectors led some commentators to talk about the development "machine" (Ferguson 1990) or the development "industry" (Escobar 1995, p. 166; Mitchell 1991).

This new idea of development governed the way in which different parts of the world related to each other. As colonial empires were dismantled, new kinds of international relations needed to be forged and the idea of development played a key role in these new relations. The former colonized entities now became known as the "underdeveloped" or "third" world, and the provision of "development aid" became an important way in which the former colonies (and other global powers) found ways to maintain an influence on the continent.

While the 1990s saw quite some disillusionment with the idea of development in Africa, in the twenty-first century, the notion that Africa can and should become "developed" is receiving something of a revival in discourse about an emerging Africa (see, e.g., The Economist 2011; Guo 2010) and with excitement about the possible ways in which the rise of the BRICS countries could positively impact upon Africa. Proponents of the idea of an emerging Africa wax lyrical about how, despite "setbacks, wars, and turmoil, the overall market development of the continent has moved in one direction—rising" (Mahajan 2009, p. 20). Much is made of the relatively high economic growth rates in some African countries and of the increased involvement of China and other BRICS countries on the continent. However, as critics of this narrative point out, the idea of this rising Africa remains beholden to a notion of development that places economic growth at the center (Sylla 2014; Taylor 2014). Insufficient attention is given to the nature of this growth which often takes forms that undermine African countries' sovereignty and is rooted in the exploitation of natural resources. This "new" discourse about Africa rising continues to present Africa as a continent needing "development" and continues to regard economic growth as central to "development." In this way, it is little different to previous iterations of the idea of development.

The Post-development Critique of Development

Throughout the last 60 or so years, development has been energetically promoted by a range of very different actors, and theories about how development should be achieved have proliferated. There have been pro-capitalist modernization theories which understood the world to con-

sist of two distinct regions: the advanced or developed countries which could be contrasted with the backward or undeveloped countries, the latter of which ought to be assisted along the path of capitalist development to become modern. These theories were prominent in the 1950s and 1960s, but have been revived somewhat with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s and in Africa, with recent talk of "Africa rising." Opposing this kind of approach are approaches using insights from Marxism and related left-wing theories to argue that the poorer parts of the world had become underdeveloped as a consequence of imperialism and that some kind of socialist program is the only secure path to development. While debates between modernization and dependency theorists dominated the Cold War era, as the Cold War petered out, a host of alternative development theories emerged, each suggesting a particular focus or orientation that would allow the so-called developing or underdeveloped world to achieve development. Some examples are the basic needs approach and approaches emphasizing human development, sustainable development, participatory development, or autonomous development. Alongside these many alternatives to development, neoliberal approaches to development, which place economic growth at the center, have continued to play an important role in development discourse. All these different ways of talking about development differ vastly in content and orientation, but all maintain one thing in common: faith in something called development.

However, toward the end of the 1980s, a different approach emerged: one that repeated many of the criticisms of mainstream development made by the proliferation of alternative approaches to development, but took this critique further and, rather than suggesting a new alternative form of development, declared the whole idea of development to be a "myth" (Latouche 1993; Rist 1997), a "ruin in the intellectual landscape" (Sachs 1992, p. 1), and a "poisonous gift" (Rahnema 1997, p. 381). This approach, which became known as "post-development theory," insisted that rather than trying to find new and better ways to achieve development, what was required was the rejection of the whole idea of development. Instead of advancing another alternative way to achieve development, post-development theorists insisted that what was needed was "alternatives to development."

One of the most important contributions of post-development theory was the way in which it revealed the harm that development—a seemingly obviously good thing—had wrought in the so-called "developing" countries. While development appears to break with colonial approaches to

non-Western countries by deeming all parts of the world capable of becoming developed, it has an evolutionist understanding of the process of development and presents Western countries as a model to be emulated by the rest of the world (Ziai 2016, pp. 33–35, 56–60). African countries, in particular, are invariably understood in terms of what they lack and of how they deviate from Western norms, rather than on their own terms. Thus "African politics and economics have been condemned to appear in social theory only as the sign of a lack" (Mbembe 2001, p. 8). Furthermore, development discourse obscures the role of the slave trade, colonialism, and neocolonialism in the creation of the problems development purports to address—problems such as poverty, inequality, hunger, and conflict.

Development is, as many post-development theorists point out, profoundly depoliticizing in that development policy, even while shifting emphasis over time, almost invariably attributes a lack of development to some kind of flaw intrinsic to the underdeveloped society (perhaps inappropriate economic policies, or poor governance, or overpopulation) and then prescribes a technocratic solution (perhaps neoliberal structural adjustment, or "good governance," or family planning initiatives). All the while the question of the power relations between different regions of the world and the role of these power relations in producing global inequalities remains, for the most part, obscured. It should be noted that one variant of development theory—dependency theory—deviates from this approach in that it recognizes the harm of various forms of imperialism. However, dependency theorists (like other Marxist-inspired approaches) still hold Western societies up as models of what it means to be developed (Ziai 2016, p. 32). Thus, development discourse as a whole tends to approach Africa in a way that does not try to understand African experiences on their own terms but rather compares Africa unfavorably to the West which is held up to be emulated. This curtails the possibility of seeing Africa as a site of meaningful politics and reduces Africa's role in international affairs to one in which Africa is the recipient of advice and assistance.

Post-development theory's distinctive difference, then, is that it insists that the Western experience ought not to be admired or taken as a model and that there is no single model of what it means to be developed. Furthermore, post-development theorists' rejection of development is based on the understanding that "not only did development fail to resolve the old problems it was supposed to address, but it brought in new ones of incomparably greater magnitude" (Rahnema 1997, p. 378). Thus, they

declare that development is dead and that it is time "to write its obituary" (Sachs 1992, p. 1). Rather than advocating for some kind of alternative development, they hail the arrival of a post-development era and call for "alternatives to development" (Latouche 1993, p. 159). A further feature that sets post-development theorists apart from most other critics of development is their preoccupation with the discourse of development. Rather than being focused on the failure of development policies or practices (as were many other critics of development), they place emphasis on the failure of development as an idea. A final distinctive feature is that, unlike Marxist and most other left-orientated critiques of development, post-development theory was characterized by a keen interest in and validation of the indigenous, the local, the traditional, and an insistent rejection of the desirability of a Western way of life. Describing the West as "an impersonal machine, devoid of spirit" (Latouche 1993, p. 11), post-development theorists argue in favor of rooting alternatives to development in the practices and traditions of the supposedly underdeveloped.

While debate about post-development theory's contribution to discussions of development continues, it is, I think, fair to say that to some extent it reached an impasse once it became clear that the key contributors to post-development theory were either unable or unwilling to articulate detailed alternatives to development. This is partly because some, like Escobar, do not think it appropriate to try to "spell out" any alternatives at all arguing that we should want to see the flourishing of a range of alternatives to development and that "there are no grand alternatives that can be applied to all places or all situations … One must resist the desire to formulate alternatives at an abstract, macro level" (Escobar 1995, p. 222). This refusal to present a positive project led the post-development critique into something of a corner as it was not clear what was meant by the call for "alternatives to development" making it difficult for post-development theory to move beyond critique.

THINKING THROUGH THE IDEA OF AFRICAN ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT

As post-development theorists make clear, development discourse positions Africa as a site of failure and reinforces the dominance of hegemonic powers. It seems, then, to follow that we ought to reject development and find other ways of understanding the African experience. While the post-development

critique of development was rarely focused particularly on Africa, its critique of development is easily applied to Africa and its call for alternatives to development could potentially be related to the many calls for Afrocentric alternatives in Africa or for an African Renaissance. Indeed, writing on this topic previously (Matthews 2004), I argued that the problem of working out alternatives to development could perhaps be addressed through a consideration of the many alternative ways of being and understanding the world in Africa. However, I want to argue now that this idea of rejecting development and proposing in its place something radically other is not as easy as I suggested it was then. In so doing, I want to draw on the reflections of some African scholars on the difficulty of writing about Africa outside of what Mudimbe (1988) calls the "colonial library."

One of the many consequences of imperialism in Africa was the way in which scholarly writing about Africa came to be dominated by non-Africans. Indeed, even the idea of considering the continent to be a single object of study came about through the imposition of imperialism on the continent. Of course, prior to European imperialism, people living on what later became known as the African continent reflected, spoke, and wrote about their experiences, but the idea that something called "Africa" was a meaningful unit to be studied was a product of imperialism. The origins of the scholarly study of Africa remain evident in contemporary scholarship on Africa. Consequently, as Olukoshi (2006, p. 539) observes, the study of Africa aims "at decoding Africa and Africans for the world and not vice versa, still less the African world for Africans." Scholarship on Africa has, he argues, "constituted itself into a tool for others to master Africa, while offering very little by way of enabling Africa to master the world and its own affairs" (Olukoshi 2006, p. 539). Recognition that Africa has been interpreted by non-Africans for their purposes led to the emergence of a range of African alternative approaches—we can think here of intellectual movements like négritude and Pan-Africanism, attempts to articulate African philosophy and calls for Afrocentricity and an African Renaissance. While very different, all these intellectual movements oppose dominant Western ways of interpreting African experiences and propose alternatives to them. While none of these movements focus specifically on development, it is possible to read into them alternative ways of understanding what it means to be developed.

Like post-development theorists, many advocates of these alternative African approaches sought to do more than just reform or slightly adapt

the approaches they criticized. Rather, they understood their proposed approaches to be substantively different from the hegemonic approaches they opposed. However, critical scholars express skepticism about the ability of these apparently alternative approaches to really step outside of the hegemonic Western approaches they criticize in order to present something entirely different. Mudimbe argues that because of the way in which knowledge about Africa was first produced, because even the very idea of Africa is a "product of the West" (1994, p. xi), attempts by African scholars to orientate themselves away from the West in their writing about Africa fail to fully escape the Western epistemological order they criticize. As he puts it:

> The fact of the matter is that, until now, Western interpreters as well as African analysts have been using categories and conceptual systems which depend on a Western epistemological order. Even in the most explicitly "Afrocentric" descriptions, models of analysis explicitly or implicitly, knowingly or unknowingly, refer to the same order. (Mudimbe 1988, p. 10)

Achille Mbembe (2002, pp. 256–257) makes a similar point, arguing that many attempts to produce authentically African discourses on Africa:

> draw their fundamental categories from the myths they claim to oppose and reproduce their dichotomies: the racial difference between black and white; the cultural confrontation between civilized peoples and savages; the religious opposition between Christians and pagans; the very conviction that race exists and is at the foundation of morality and nationality.

Mbembe argues that attempts by African scholars to produce alternative African approaches which oppose hegemonic Western ones have not really been able to fully step outside of the discourses they proclaim to reject; rather they reiterate some of the core claims of these discourses even while they claim to be completely different to them.

Writing more recently, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, p. 30) reflects on the same problem identified by Mudimbe and Mbembe noting that it seems impossible to step outside what he and others call "coloniality" by which is meant the "long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism but that transcended colonialism to be constituted in culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production." Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, pp. xi, ix) argues that people in the Global South continue to "breathe coloniality on a daily basis" in such a way that even apparently

counter-hegemonic discourses remain "beholden to the immanent logic of colonialism."

It is worth noting that post-development theorists have, like advocates of African alternatives, also been accused of failing to transcend the logic of the discourse they reject. For example, Kiely (1999) accuses post-development theory of leaving intact the binary opposition between the "modern" and the "traditional" which is part of development discourse and of displaying "a reverse Orientalism." Rather than really questioning and challenging the categories established as part of development discourse, he suggests that post-development theory simply turns those categories on their heads—uncritically valuing the "traditional" while rejecting the "modern," for example. The Manicheanism of development discourse is maintained, even though post-development theorists value the non-Western rather than the Western, contrasting "the presumably imperialistic, universal and abstract scientific knowledge of the West, and the presumably benign, situated and embodied knowledges of the non-Western people" (Nanda 1999, p. 6).

It is also worth noting that the argument that critical scholars' attempts to propose alternatives draw on the very discourses they oppose can also be turned the other way around. Just as African alternatives are not purely African, the discourses they oppose are not purely Western. Mbembe (2014) argues that "it is impossible to think of modernity without our labor" and that consequently "we have rights of co-ownership of that modern Western archive and we shouldn't believe anyone who tells us that it is only a property of the West." It is not only that African labor has helped build Western modernity but rather that the West and modernity and our idea about what development is were all co-constructed in interaction with the various people and places that were ultimately declared to be non-Western or traditional or underdeveloped. So, it is not just that there is no pure Africa shorn of all Western influence but also that there is nothing that can properly be understood as purely Western either.

And so our attempts to resist hegemonic discourses will remain entangled with those discourses and, indeed, those discourses are partially shaped by resistance to them. This means that while we can, and should, recognize that the whole idea of development in Africa has played a role in the oppression, denigration, and subordination of African people, we need to be aware that the alternatives which we propose are not able to fully escape the idea of development.

Where to Then?

None of the scholars discussed in the previous section is suggesting that we simply acquiesce in the face of the powerful discourses that have come to dominate the way in which we talk about Africa. Their criticisms of existing attempts to understand Africa differently are not intended as dismissals of the entire project of attempting to challenge and disrupt dominant discourses on Africa, including discourses that continue to portray Africa as the epitome of "underdevelopment." However, the critics discussed here all acknowledge, albeit in different ways, that it is not possible to simply reject dominant discourses and propose in their place discourses which are clearly distinct from and opposed to these discourses. Their critique is very much a lament about the difficulty of escaping coloniality and a warning about the possible dead ends into which some attempts to produce counter-hegemonic alternatives may lead us. Anything we say, warns Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, p. x), is said in a "terrain saturated with 'others' statements." Similarly, Mbembe (2001, p. 5) notes, despairingly, that there is a whole prior discourse about Africa that "every comment by an African about Africa must endlessly eradicate, validate, or ignore, often to his/her cost." Everything that is said is said against a backdrop of the multitude of statements about Africa which have declared the continent and its people deficient, lacking, backward, underdeveloped, barbaric, and deviant. Furthermore, the very possibility of saying anything about Africa and almost any category or concept we might draw on to try to say something meaningful about the African condition seems to be infused in some way with this whole burdensome colonial library.

It is worth illustrating this point with reference to the idea of development. Even while we might acknowledge that the whole idea of development is an "unburied corpse [from which] every pest has started to spread" (Esteva 1992, p. 6), we must also recognize that, as Mbembe notes with anger, "the corpse obstinately persists in getting up again every time it is buried and, year in year out, everyday language and much ostensibly scholarly writing remain largely in thrall" to the idea that Africa epitomizes backwardness, the traditional, and the underdeveloped (Mbembe 2001, p. 3). Attempts to promote alternative approaches to development, including those that attempt to revitalize indigenous ideas and practices, struggle to fully break free of the assumptions informing mainstream development discourse. For example, when validating supposedly traditional ways of life, advocates of alternative approaches often

fail to recognize the extent to which colonialism adapted and (re-) invented traditions. Consequently, the supposedly traditional practices or ideas such approaches seek to revive might well be traditions invented or significantly altered by colonialism and development that advocates of alternatives seek to confront and undo. As Gidwani (2002, pp. 10–12) notes, the "traditional community" that so many post-development theorists celebrate and seek to revive "is, ironically, the discursive product of the very same knowledge-making apparatus of modernity that [post-development theorists] want to discredit." Both the ideas of what traditional communities are and many of the actual practices of the marginalized communities advocates of alternatives to development seek to draw on were at least partially produced by imperialism and the scholarship that justified it.

But then, what do we do? Does such a recognition inevitably lead to a capitulation in the face of the powerful? How can we move forward in a way that recognizes that the idea that Africa needs development is deeply flawed but also acknowledges that a quick rejection of development and a confident assertion of some kind of African alternative to development underestimate the extent of coloniality's reach? I want to suggest that the foregoing does not mean that we ought to capitulate to the power of development, and in a very tentative way, I want to sketch out four possible and interrelated paths forward.

Path 1: Flourishing in Cramped Conditions

Acknowledging that we are steeped in and unable to fully escape coloniality, perhaps we might find a way of using our coloniality-infused position to do something creative and ultimately subversive. We might then recognize, with Quayson, that "[Africans] have always been consigned to responding from the place where we ought not to have been standing" (Quayson 2002, p. 587), but that seen as this is where we are standing, we should try to use our location in ways that are ultimately at least potentially subversive, rather than spending our time longing to be standing elsewhere.

Bruce Janz's (2002, 2012, 2015) discussion of the possible positive project that emerges out of Achille Mbembe's *On the Postcolony* suggests some creative ways forward. Mbembe's *On the Postcolony* adeptly lays out the awfulness and difficulty of life in the postcolony, evocatively describing

the violence, the loss, the suffering, and the absurdity that characterizes the contemporary African condition. However, he does not conclude with much of a positive program, despite some "tantalizing comments about a subjectivity that inverts the negations and the possibilities that such an inversion might offer" (Janz 2002). What Janz does is to try to draw out some of the possibilities hinted at by Mbembe through relating them to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Janz's attempt to distil a positive program out of Mbembe's *On the Postcolony* is useful when trying to think through the question of how best to move post-development theory beyond critique.

Janz argues that what Mbembe is doing in *On the Postcolony* is asking how it is possible to "exercise existence" in conditions as unfavorable as those in contemporary Africa. Mbembe refuses to deny the difficulty of the contemporary African condition (indeed, perhaps he exaggerates it), and he refuses to suggest that this condition will easily be overcome. But then we are left with the question of whether it is possible "to find one's subjectivity in a meaningful manner if overcoming violence seems remote" (Janz 2002).

What is it to find one's subjectivity in the midst of continuing violence, negation, and absurdity? To answer this, Janz turns to Deleuze and Guattari's work, arguing that rather than confronting one "molar system"—by which is meant as "a massive dominant or state-like system that has much invested in its own stability and structures" (Janz 2015, p. 279)—with another, we ought to attempt to unseat the molar system by flourishing in its cracks. According to Janz:

> Mbembe's point is that opposing a molar identity of colonialism or apartheid with another molar identity of "Africanity," established through a process such as instrumentalism or nativism, will doom African thought to conceive of politics as the recovery of an essential but lost identity, rather than the construction of an identity responsive to the contemporary world. (2015, p. 285)

We cannot recover this lost identity, we cannot unearth it and oppose coloniality with it, and so the suggestion is that we ought to rather create something new in the inauspicious place to which coloniality has brought us. By doing so, we can "deterritorialize" and undermine aspects of the molar system through creatively responding to it (Janz 2015, p. 281). In this way, we are able to both undermine and reappropriate the molar system.

If we relate this to development, we could argue that rather than trying to oppose the "development machine" with an "alternative to development" which stands opposed and supposedly completely in contrast to it, we ought to try to destabilize development by flourishing in the restrictive, cramped, constrained spaces that characterize the colonial condition. To do so is not to capitulate to development but to recognize, firstly, the power of development; secondly and relatedly, the ways in which supposed alternatives only partly overcome and oppose development; and, thirdly and finally, that opposition is possible even where escape is not.

Path 2: Border Knowledge

Another possible place to look for ways in which we can oppose the idea of development without imagining that we are able to fully escape it is to look to recent writing on the idea of "border knowledge." Accepting that "there is no absolute outside to this system" (Grosfoguel 2011, p. 24), mostly Latin American scholars who have been developing the idea of "border thinking" seek to use the very fact of their positionality as thinkers in the "borderlands" (Anzaldua 2007) to articulate alternatives. These alternatives, Grosfoguel (2011) argues, are very different from what he calls "Third world fundamentalisms." Third world fundamentalisms respond to Eurocentrism with "the rhetoric of a 'pure, outside space',," which is supposedly untouched by modernity and colonialism and which can be recovered and asserted in opposition to Eurocentric discourses. In a manner similar to the arguments of Mudimbe and Mbembe discussed earlier, Grosfoguel argues that such fundamentalisms reproduce the binary oppositions produced by Eurocentric thinking.

Border epistemologies, in contrast, do not try to purify themselves of everything from the outside but rather "subsume/redefine the emancipatory rhetoric of modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference, towards a decolonial liberation struggle for a world beyond eurocentered modernity" (Grosfoguel 2011). What distinguishes border thinking is the perspective it adopts rather than the identity of those articulating it or the content of what they discuss. Border thinking comes from the "borderlands" and speaks to the world from there, but does not purport to speak in a way that is shorn of all influence from elsewhere or that eschews ideas coming from outside. Indeed, the very idea of being in a "borderland" makes the fact that one is speaking neither from "here" nor "there" clearly.

In terms of thinking about how to use the idea of border thinking to think through alternatives to development in Africa, such an approach would look at the question of development from the perspective of those who have been declared underdeveloped which would inevitably lead to a recognition of the ways in which the idea of development has undermined, oppressed, and denigrated Africans. However, moving forward the approach would not be to try to fully disentangle Africa from development or modernity or coloniality but would rather try to move forward in "subversive complicity" (Grosfoguel 1996) against hegemonic forms of development. To put it in another way, rather than imagining that our choice is between working within and against the "development industry," we need to recognize that while we may not be able to fully escape and stand outside of development, the way we engage with development can undermine it from within.

Path 3: Looking Down

Donald Moore's (1999) response to post-development theory opens up a further possible (and related) way in which we can be attentive to post-development theory's critique of development while also taking on board the critique of it discussed earlier. Moore notes that much post-development writing relies heavily on textual analysis which allows it to view development as homogenous and monolithic, whereas an examination of how development works itself out on the ground results in a very different picture. Moore (1999, p. 258) notes that the "disciplinary effects [of development] confront not docile bodies but the situated cultural practices and sedimented histories of people and place." Consequently, rather than simply dominating and oppressing people, development discourses are "refracted, reworked, and sometimes subverted in particular localities" (Moore 1999, p. 655).

Moore (1999, p. 656) argues that rather than understanding development as a "a machine that secures fixed and determined outcomes" as does James Ferguson in his early work (see Ferguson 1990), we should rather recognize that development is a "site of contestation" and that it works itself out in different ways in different contexts. When we understand development in this way, then we do not have to choose to be either "for" or "against" development but can recognize that development works itself out in different ways in different places and that what we understand by development is changed as it comes into contact with

different contexts, rather than being a single, coherent entity coming from outside and imposing itself upon people.

Moore (1999) discusses this idea of development being a site of contestation in relation to the way in which development has been contested in Kaerezi in Zimbabwe. When development initiatives were brought to Kaerezi, people showed much resistance to some of these initiatives while also being very insistent on their right to certain benefits associated with development. For example, they refused to be resettled into linear residential grids, despite various resettlement attempts by officials of the colonial and postcolonial governments while also very eagerly wanting to acquire certain technologies that would make their day-to-day life easier such as a diesel-powered grinding mill. Moore argues that people's desire for certain benefits associated with development does not mean they are "duped by Western hegemony" (Moore 1999, p. 673) but is rather part of a broader reworking and contestation of development on the ground.

To generalize from Moore's example, we could argue that when moving forward from the critique of development offered by post-development theory, we should recognize that our choice is not really either favoring development or rejecting it. Development is not an "artefact dispatched by a distant West" (Moore 1999, p. 675) but is rather a very heterogeneous set of ideas and practices which take shape in different ways in different places as development is resisted, appropriated, and reworked in a variety of ways. Similarly, the local is not best understood as being "hermetically sealed off" from outside influences (Moore 1999, p. 655). In this way, the interest in the local which is characteristic of much post-development theory can be taken up in ways that do not entail the wholesale rejection of everything development stood for, nor the assumption that development is only and entirely an imposition from outside. This approach also has the advantage that it takes seriously the desire on the part of many people living in "underdeveloped" regions to participate in development, rather than simply dismissing their desire for development as being a product of some kind of false consciousness as some post-development theorists risk doing.

Path 4: Constant Vigilance

The preceding points all suggest that imagining that we can extricate ourselves fully from development is a folly that should be avoided, but as pointed out earlier, there is a risk that the recognition that we cannot fully

step outside development might lead to capitulation—or at least partial capitulation—to dominant ways of interpreting Africa's current condition. If we cannot escape development and if we cannot find some kind of pure, fully African alternative to development, then we might simply join those who seek to reform development. However, as post-development theorists point out, reforming development is insufficient given the way that development is so rooted in an understanding of Africa (and other parts of the so-called Third World) as a place of deviance and deficiency.

Thus, if we are to try to navigate a route that neither succumbs to the fantasy of stepping fully outside coloniality nor capitulates to it, we need to be constantly vigilant of the ways in which the assumptions that inform development theory keep on reemerging in different variants of development theory as well as in critiques of development. In the conclusion to his paper "On the predicament of Africanist knowledge," Wai (2015, p. 287) highlights the importance of such vigilance arguing that because the politics of understanding Africa differently continues to be "contaminated by the power-knowledge regimes of the library of Africanism" and is "dependent on the frames of discursivity whose violence it wants to transcend," we must be constantly vigilant of the ways in which these power-knowledge regimes keep reemerging even in attempts to dismantle them.

This call for vigilance reminds me of a different but not entirely unrelated call for vigilance—that of George Yancy (2008, pp. 227–247) who calls upon white antiracists to be constantly on their guard against being "ambushed" by whiteness. Yancy argues that even white people who have a commitment to ending racism and white privilege, find themselves reacting in ways that betray continued complicity with whiteness. Therefore, rather than imagining that they can step outside of their whiteness in order to contribute to antiracist struggles, Yancy (2008) urges that antiracist whites recognize their continued complicity with whiteness and remain constantly vigilant in order to be able to recognize and respond appropriately when they realize that they have, once again, been ambushed by whiteness (see also Yancy 2015). The point Yancy is making is that we should not too easily assume that we can escape the assumptions of systems we recognize to be oppressive. Assuming that we have become fully free of a particular oppressive system can be dangerous in that it blinds us to the ways in which we continue to succumb to aspects of the system we critique.

If we apply this idea directly to discussions of development in Africa, we can recognize that even the most radical attempts to understand African realities from outside of the assumptions of development discourse end up

reiterating aspects of the discourse they seek to transcend. This means, as I argue above, that we should stop imagining that we can fully extricate ourselves from development, but it also means that we need to constantly be vigilant in order to recognize the continuities between development discourse and our attempts to transcend it. Rather than leading to capitulation, our recognition of the impossibility of fully transcending the discourses we oppose should lead us to adopt a constantly vigilant attitude. When we are too confident about our ability to present "alternatives to development," we will not adopt the vigilance that is required to constantly recognize and uproot the insidious assumptions that inform mainstream discussions of development in Africa.

Conclusion

The idea of development is part of a conceptual web that inappropriately constricts our understanding of Africa. It presents Africa as a site of failure and sets it up as a place of intervention for global powers. Rather than being understood as a site of meaningful politics from which the rest of the world can learn and as a legitimate actor in the international realm, the idea of development relegates Africa to a position of tutelage. Consequently, the argument that we ought to unequivocally reject development in favor of radical alternatives which are untainted by the idea of development is very appealing. Post-development theorists' call for alternatives to development—alternatives which are fundamentally and essentially different to development—is thus a very understandable response to the devastation that development has wrought on Africa.

However, as I have shown above, ultimately, we must recognize that whatever alternatives we seek to articulate cannot be understood as standing entirely outside of (or being entirely alternative to) the development discourse we critique. We cannot retrieve, discover, or create something that is purely not-development, entirely non-Western, and fully outside of coloniality. And so, we have to move forward differently. We have to move forward in a way that properly recognizes where we are and that neither accepts development, nor seeks to fully escape it, nor simply aims to reform it in some way. While this proposition is ultimately more workable than imagining that we can construct an alternative entirely outside of development, it is in some ways conceptually harder to think through. In trying to think of what it would mean to move forward in this way, I tentatively proposed and sketched four very paths forward.

All four paths entail both an understanding of the pervasiveness of coloniality and a commitment to subverting it. The first suggests that learning to flourish in the cramped conditions in which we find ourselves might open up subversive possibilities. The second proposes that we recognize that the position from which we speak is a hybrid, mestizaje one, and that opposition to hegemonic discourses is less about articulating alternatives outside of them and more about speaking to these discourses from where we are, in the borderlands. The third path forward sketched above proposes that the exploration of the way in which development is actually being simultaneously resisted, appropriated, and reworked in particular local places allows us to identify emancipatory possibilities. Finally, I emphasize that only constant vigilance will ensure that we can fight against hegemonic discourses even while not completely escaping them. Together, these paths suggest that African resistance to development (and, more generally, to coloniality) needs to be a resistance that puts aside dreams of the complete undoing of the harm of development without surrendering a subversive and creative spirit of resistance.

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African Anti-colonialism in International Relations: Against the Time of Forgetting

Branwen Gruffydd Jones

INTRODUCTION

Africa's condition and position in the world today is routinely described and analyzed in terms of weakness, fragility, and failure. These categories dominate academic study of Africa's postcolonial condition, especially within IR and cognate fields of political science and development studies,[1] as well as policy and media discourse. Implicit in the broader IR discourse on Africa's "failure" is a rather contemptuous attitude toward and analysis of anti-colonialism and decolonization. The tone of much of the mainstream scholarship about postcolonial African statehood and sovereignty implicitly and at times explicitly endorses colonial rule, apparently lamenting the rushed and ill-informed process of independence (e.g. Hyden 2012). According to Robert Jackson, decolonization is responsible for "bringing into existence a large number of sovereign governments which are limited in their capacity or desire to provide civil and socioeconomic goods for their populations" (Jackson 1990, p. 9). This attitude ensues from the discipline's failure not only to acknowledge the centrality of colonialism and its legacies to the making of the modern international

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order but also to consider colonialism and anti-colonialism in theoretical terms, as experiences and relationships of international relations which demand serious critical reflection (Grovogui 2001).

This chapter develops this line of argument by focusing on notions of time and historical temporality. Scholars have recently started to expose how the discipline of IR has long examined world politics and the international without reflecting critically on assumed and historically specific structures of and ideas about time (Hutchings 2008; Hom 2010; Agathangelou and Killian 2014a). The result is that dominant notions of time and history remain entrenched within analyses of international relations. As Andrew Hom points out, "excluding time from academic investigations of social phenomena prolongs and empowers its hidden influence" (Hom 2010, p. 1146). The chapter first considers the ideas of time and temporality which underpin dominant disciplinary knowledge in IR and examines how IR's notions of temporality serve to marginalize and contain the colonial experience. In order to do so, the chapter examines the character of international discourse during the era of European expansion and colonialism focusing in particular on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The chapter then reflects on the thought and practice of African anti-colonialism and argues that anti-colonialism can be understood as a radical critique and rejection of the dominant international temporality.

This exploration of conceptions of temporality in international discourse and the contrasting temporality of anti-colonialism focuses on the case of Portugal and anti-colonialism in Portugal's African colonies. This is a particularly fruitful case in shedding light on broader and more general characteristics of international discourse especially with regard to temporality. Portugal was the first European power to embark on overseas expansion—the first to establish the path of colonization and enslavement of non-European peoples along which other European powers would soon follow. Five centuries later Portugal was the last, aside from the apartheid regime, to hold on to colonial power in Africa. Far from being an exception, Portugal's discourse and practice as a colonial power manifests in a peculiarly concentrated form features which were shared more broadly by other European powers.

International Relations in the Time of Forgetting

In her exploration of notions of time in IR, Kim Hutchings emphasizes that "different accounts of the present in world politics are shaped by how the temporality of world politics is conceived" (Hutchings 2008, p. 10).

The dominant analysis of Africa's condition in terms of weakness, fragility, and failure is embedded within a broader account of the present which is shaped by an evolutionary and racialized conception of the temporality of world politics inherited from the long era of European expansion and colonialism. Today the language of "development" describing the differentiation of socioeconomic conditions of countries has become so normalized that its underpinning structure of time is rarely considered. It has become routine to think about the unequal and uneven social conditions of the world in terms of a quantified comparative ranking of levels of development measured on the basis of objective empirical indicators, with advanced countries positioned at the forefront and the least developed countries furthest behind, or at the lowest positions in tables and rankings. This forms the contemporary expression of a distinct structure of historical time which has informed the European or Western imagination for several centuries. The contemporary language of international development, with its categories of developed, developing, and least developed countries, is supremely ahistorical. In a masterstroke of technical-empirical redescription, it removes from view the history of colonialism in the relationship between and construction of both "developed" and "developing." Yet, the structure of time now articulated in ahistorical terms through the language of development was central to the consciousness of the colonial project. We could summarize this structure of time as the Time of Civilization. This enabled an originary demarcation, distinguishing the Time of Civilization from the earlier times of pre-history or primitive being. The Time of Civilization necessarily carried a spatial, comparative, and universalizing dimension as it encompassed the whole world and all societies within its purview. Within the Time of Civilization, those countries, societies, or races at the forefront were those which had, through processes of historical development or evolution, become civilized or reached civilization. It was the work of colonialism to bring other societies, which were uncivilized, still primitive, or undeveloped, into the Time of Civilization.

This temporal consciousness of European expansion and the colonial project was inflected in the emergent division of intellectual labor and the articulation of disciplinary fields from the eighteenth century onward. It was explicit, for example, in the field of international law, especially in the nineteenth century, when international law was defined as the law and practice of civilized states (Anghie 2005). Anthropology emerged as a field of enquiry devoted to the study of uncivilized, primitive societies still

existing in a pre-historical or, at least, earlier time (Fabian 2002). The modern discipline of international relations began, from the late nineteenth century, as the study of race relations—the comparative study of the development of and conflicts between more and less advanced races (Vitalis 2015). The promotion of positivism and behaviorism from the 1950s constructed a new scientific basis for the international consciousness in the post-war era (Mirowski 2005; Hauptmann 2012). This international consciousness of the mid-twentieth century, though still colonial, was no longer articulated through the language of civilized and uncivilized. With the removal of race and civilization from the formal discourse and disciplinary fields of international relations and international law, the colonial and racial consciousness was reconfigured on apparently neutral scientific grounds through the lens of comparative enquiry. A new universal conceptual vocabulary emerged, centering on the state, which enabled the comparative analysis of empirically varied units of state, economy, society, culture, sovereignty, democracy, and so on, within general universally valid theoretical schemes. This comparative analytical logic of enquiry, which shaped or defined the fields of international relations, political science, comparative politics and development studies from the 1950s, served to contain the long history of colonialism and the challenge of anti-colonialism within limits consistent with the new international consciousness. In doing so it underpinned the move from the Time of Civilization to the Time of Forgetting. The violence and crimes of colonialism were obscured by the notion of the "expansion of international society" (Bull and Watson 1984); the radical struggles of anti-colonialism and the contested process of decolonization were rendered neutral through the language of New States and the transition from tradition to modernization (Shils 1960; Zartman 1966; Spence 1967). The language of development secured the forgetting of colonialism, as formerly colonized societies were encouraged to move from their natural starting point of tradition toward more advanced and modern modes of organization and being.

COLONIALISM, TIME, AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY

What changed from the era of colonial assertion to the twentieth-century era of development were not the underlying temporal assumptions structuring knowledge of the world and of history but the conceptual vocabulary employed to identify differences, distinctions, and processes. The move from the language of civilization and race to that of modernization

and development gives the appearance of a more far-reaching change in political sensibility and historical consciousness. The lack of such change is manifest in a host of ways, however, from the Eurocentric content of dominant historical narratives and concerns, to the array of visual modes through which the international imagination is presented, now routinely through tables, rankings, and statistics (Gruffydd Jones 2013). The lack of change is underpinned by the endurance of distinct conceptions of time, temporality and history, and associated features of method, analytical, and theoretical work.[2]

These conceptions of time, temporality, and history are more than ideas: they have become entrenched in a range of structures and practices through which social life and international politics are organized (Hom 2010; Hutchings 2008). Many scholars have examined the ways in which historically specific ideas about and technologies of time emerged in and through modernity; indeed, such concepts and practices can be considered constitutive of modernity. Historians and critical theorists have examined the emergence of modern clock time, its linear, atomized and measurable character, and its role in the disciplining of work and life central to capitalism (Rosenberg and Grafton 2010; Thompson 1967; Castree 2009). The notion of time as linear, homogeneous, and uniformly divisible was embedded in a broader epistemology and inherently related to correlating conceptions of space, and the technologies of measuring time and mapping space were integrally related (Kern 2003; Galison 2003; Burnett 2003). These ideas entailed both a universal and abstract and a directional and irreversible quality of time, which resonated with distinct ideas about linear historical movement both as chronology and as progress. The universal character of modern time and space and the directionality or teleology of history was not a given but something to be constructed. The ideas, practices, and technologies of universal modern time were born in and of not only the state and territorial sovereignty (Tilly 1995) but also colonialism (Kern 2003; Hom 2010). European colonial expansion was both the context of and a condition for the scientific development of modern time, and colonial occupation and transformation was the context of and condition for the imposition of modern time.

Colonialism involved the imposition of time in manifold ways.[3] What concerns us here is the over-arching temporal structure underpinning the consciousness and practice of the colonial project, the Time of Civilization. In his critique of anthropology, Johannes Fabian described the emergence

of a new temporal consciousness from the eighteenth century which can be understood as a process of the secularization and universalization of time (Fabian 2002). The secularization of time had a profound spatial dimension, which was intimately connected to colonialism—to the colonial project, the colonial consciousness, colonial ideology, attitude, and practice. The secularization of time emerged through a new approach to knowledge, a tendentially universalizing mode of knowing the world and all things in it. In a reformulation of the previous episteme and political order rooted in the supreme authority of God, the new knowledge of the world sought secure empirical description of entities and their theoretical specification through correct positioning in relation to other entities on the basis of criteria of similarity and difference (Foucault 1970). This was the method of natural history and the natural sciences and informed other newly distinguished fields of enquiry such as geography and anthropology, as well as the development of a theory of race (Gruffydd Jones 2016). The method assumed the possibility and ambition of knowing the whole world—of producing knowledge of all varieties and species of plants and animals and of all societies. Travel and exploration was essential to the practice of this new method of knowledge, and here the intimate relationship with colonialism becomes apparent: "A new discourse is built on an enormous literature of travelogues, collections and syntheses of travel accounts" (Fabian 2002, p. 7).

Hutchings' exploration of conceptions of political time and differing notions of temporality reveals that there is no unified body of European thought in which we can identify a singular notion of time or logic of temporal structure (Hutchings 2008: 28–53). Equally, colonial and racial discourse was elaborated through many debates across Europe drawing on varied intellectual influences and shaped by differing political circumstances and imperatives.[4] European colonialism was always simultaneously a national and broader European endeavor, which is necessarily reflected in the numerous strands of colonial and racial discourse. It is plausible, however, to suggest some over-arching regime of thought or episteme within which distinct and racialized ideas about history, time, progress, and teleology circulated, albeit in plural manifestations, versions, and directions. European powers all subscribed to the general civilizational superiority of Europe in the world, while also, in the context of changing commercial and military rivalries, needing to distinguish the specificity and superiority of their own national practice of colonial rule in comparison with that of other rival colonial powers. In this regard, the reassertion of Portugal's colonial project from the late nineteenth to the twentieth

century was in part informed by fears of the threat to Portugal's claims on African territories by the British, Germans, and French and an awareness of Portugal's relative weakness in terms of financial and military power as well as size. Portuguese colonial consciousness defended the peculiarity and superiority of Portugal's approach to colonialism, which served to bolster the historical legitimacy of Portugal as a colonial power. Portugal's colonial discourse of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries simultaneously positioned Portugal within the broader history and continuity of European colonialism and sought to distinguish its peculiar advantages over the practices of other Europeans.

Portugal and Africa in the Time of Civilization

A distinct Portuguese approach to colonialism was formulated by several authors and administrators from the late nineteenth century which emphasized elements of settlement, miscegenation or racial mixing, agricultural work, and assimilation. The Portuguese, it was claimed, had a long history of practising a mode of colonization based on Portuguese settlement and the establishment of harmonious relations with natives. This was said to be due to the racial and cultural character of the Portuguese, who, as southern Europeans themselves formed through racial mixing, were more easily capable of adapting to tropical climates. While the thesis of a distinct Portuguese character was most famously and extensively elaborated by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre (Freyre 1933, 1940; see Castelo 1998; Cardão and Castelo 2015; Léonard 1997), variants of such a vision had been promoted from the late nineteenth century by numerous Portuguese colonial administrators and scholars. Such ideas were expressed in the nineteenth century in the writings of João de Andrade Corvo and Júlio de Vilhena, both of whom held the role of overseas and naval minister, during the 1870s and 1880s and 1890s, respectively, Henrique de Carvalho, a military officer and explorer who later worked as Director of Public Works in Angola, and Francisco Silva Teles, a naval doctor, anthropologist, and geographer who organized the Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa's first *Congresso Nacional Colonial* in 1901, and in the early twentieth century by Henrique de Paiva Couceiro and Nórton de Matos, both Governor General of Angola, during 1907–1909 (Couceiro) and 1912–1915 and 1921–1924 (Matos) (Ramos 2000, pp. 140–148). In their writings, these figures envisaged a process of populating African colonial territories with Portuguese communities of small landowners who would develop agriculture, bringing with them Portuguese language,

customs, morals, and traditions. Through mixing with, teaching and employing natives, Portuguese settlement had always and would continue to gradually assimilate the backward native populations into the realm of time and civilization. Colonization was a process of economic, cultural, and civilizational improvement, creating an extension of the Portuguese nation in overseas territories. The Portuguese style of colonizing, such figures claimed, was noble and civilizing, in contrast with the more exploitative and commercial practices of other European powers, especially Britain (Ramos 140–153; Alexandre 2000). While thus distinguishing Portuguese colonial practice from other European practices, Portuguese colonial discourse reproduced the over-arching European claim to civilizational superiority.

A changed approach to the question of Portugal's colonial empire, especially in Africa, was a central element of the *Estado Novo* dictatorship which emerged from the military dictatorship following the coup of 1926. This approach sought first to defend Portugal's colonial possessions from being lost to other colonial powers; second, to "renationalize" the colonial territories, bringing an end to the previous regime of legislative autonomy, decentralization, and concessions through which vast areas of the territories, especially in Mozambique, were effectively under the control of British, French, and other foreign capital; and third, to integrate the economies of the colonies more closely with that of the metropole (Santa Rita 1936). The Estado Novo regime under Salazar thus reinvigorated Portugal's colonial project and consciousness. Prior to his appointment as Prime Minister in 1932, António Oliveira de Salazar had served as Finance Minister since 1928 and also briefly Minister of Colonies.[5] In these capacities he drew up the Colonial Act in 1930 and the new constitution of the *Estado Novo* in 1933 which also renewed the Colonial Act. Salazar viewed the colonies and their relationships with Portugal as of central and fundamental importance to the political and economic development of Portugal. Article 2 of the Colonial Act of 1933 proclaimed:

> It is the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation to carry out the historical function of possessing and colonizing overseas dominions and of civilizing the indigenous populations found therein, exerting at the same time the moral influence required [of Portugal] by the *Padroado do Oriente*. (Acto Colonial, Título I, Art. 2.o, Governo de Portugal 1935, p. 59)[6]

By referring to the *Padroado do Oriente*—the "royal patronage" first bestowed in the mid-fifteenth century by the papacy on the kings of

Portugal over missionary activities in the Americas, Africa, and Asia—Salazar located the unquestionable legitimacy of the colonizing essence of the Portuguese nation within an unbroken five centuries of time. This claim was articulated in the international context of the post-First World War creation of the League of Nations and of fears under the Republic of losing Portugal's colonial territories to rival colonial powers (Léonard 1999), a context later summarized by Marcelo Caetano as follows:

> the Conference of Peace, at which Smuts openly posed the question of the incorporation of Mozambique within the Union of South Africa, revealed a state of mind regarding colonial questions in general, and the Portuguese position in particular, which justifiably alarmed the political class of the time. On one side was the theory of international mandates, representative of the tendency to move the sovereignty over colonial territories to the League of Nations; on the other side, the idea that only those Powers who possessed the finances and the skills to tame, improve and civilize backward countries could be mandatory powers, a position which appeared turned against the colonizing mission of Portugal, at the time considered poor, badly governed and incapable.
>
> From Paris, the Portuguese delegation returned with the certainty that either we made a huge effort in our overseas territories, or, sooner or later, our possessions would be expropriated. (Caetano 1951, p. 7)

The colonial relationship was at the heart of the *Estado Novo*'s policy. The role of the colonial territories in Africa as entirely subordinate to and serving the economic and industrial needs of Portugal was explicitly set out in the Colonial Act and subsequent legislation, with regard to the management of investment, economic planning, the management of budgets, and the locus of control and decision-making. The colonial discourse adopted by the Estado Novo from the 1930s assumed a strict racial hierarchy, asserting the racial and civilizational superiority of the Portuguese and the primitive backwardness of Africans. On one hand this was manifest in the *Estado Novo*'s strong reassertion of a Portuguese national identity. This essentially conservative, patriarchal, and catholic identity made specific temporal and historical claims about the Portuguese nation. In contrast to the modernizing industrial discourse of fascist regimes such as Italy, the construction of Portuguese national identity emphasized the centrality of rural life to national culture (Mendes 2008). The role of the Discoveries, Portugal's five centuries of maritime exploration, and, especially, the work of extending civilization through colonization were reasserted as central

to the constitution and very essence of the Portuguese nation (Polanah 2008; Léonard 1999). On the other hand, the Estado Novo's colonial discourse constructed Africans as primitive, as remaining "stationary" or "sleeping" in an endless pre-historic condition. While it was the goal of the Portuguese civilizing task to bring such peoples closer to civilization, such a process would necessarily endure over centuries (Santa Rita 1944).

This racialized temporal consciousness of the colonial project was articulated across various fields of expression, from the texts of colonial policy and legislation (e.g. Ministério das Colónias 1936) to innumerable journals, magazines, congresses, and exhibitions (Castelo 1998, pp. 45–48). It was articulated in fields of academic research and teaching, such as anthropology and geography. In her study of colonial literature during the period of the *Estado Novo*, Sandra Sousa finds that "a preoccupation with the past, whether more or less recent, is a constant feature" of the works of the vast majority of authors she studied (Sousa 2015, p. 25). And, as Paulo Polanah underlines, the writing of history and, specifically, the "cult of the Discoveries" acquired an important role in the elaboration and consolidation of this national narrative from the 1930s (Polanah 2011). A discourse about the Discoveries had already formed a significant element of Portuguese nationalism during the nineteenth century, but from the 1930s and the rise of the *Estado Novo*, this was explicitly renewed as a central thread linking Portugal's present colonial empire in Africa with the Portuguese nation and state through narrating Portugal's longer history of navigation, expansion, and exploration, dating back in a historical continuity to the early fifteenth century.

The construction of a historical narrative to consolidate the legitimacy of the *Estado Novo* and the Portuguese colonial empire is vividly expressed in the work of Gaspar do Couto Ribeiro Villas, Professor in Portugal's *Escola Superior Colonial* in the 1930s. His two-volume work *Historia Colonial* provides an all-encompassing account of the colonial project, situating Europe's expansion and colonialism, and Portugal's distinct role and contributions, within a comprehensive sweep of world history (Villas 1937, 1938). This work expresses in a self-conscious manner an explicit understanding of world historical time. In other words, Villas presents with confidence and authority an account of the whole of world history with a consciousness of doing so from the position of his own times.

As already noted, there were particular contextual reasons for the form and structure of this narrative, emerging from the need to assert to audiences within and beyond Portugal the unquestioned unity between

Portugal and its colonies and the unquestioned historical authority of Portugal as a colonial power, at a period of political consolidation of the new regime and in the context of threats to Portugal's colonial claims in Africa from rival European powers. Located thus within the contextual specificity of the early *Estado Novo* period, this historical discourse provides a distinct and strong expression of a broader European colonial and temporal consciousness and manifests continuity with previous modes and instances of "history writing" defined by similar character and scope. At the turn of the century, António Enes, High Commissioner of Mozambique in 1891–1892 and again 1894–1895, undertook the task of editing, revising, and amplifying the work of Italian historian Cesare Cantù, written in the 1840s. Cantù's *Storia Universale* (Universal History) was written over six years in 72 volumes, while Enes's work of the 1890s amounted to 20 volumes (Enes 1890). In his introduction Enes discusses the study of history as a modern scientific and theoretical endeavor. The purpose of historical analysis, he argues, is, as in other areas of theoretical inquiry, to trace and understand the fixed and essential laws of the social world. And central to the object of inquiry is the phenomenon of free will characteristic of humanity. The role of historical analysis is to trace, understand, and explain the emergence in the world of conscious self-knowledge, of civilization; to trace how civilization, in its passage from Asia to Europe, began to develop and to liberate its free, conscious, and properly human element; how the realm of human action has developed from the instinct and spontaneity of primitive savages to the conscious exercise of free will characteristic of civilization; and how the idea of abstract universal law and right has emerged as the culmination of the human spirit over history (Enes 1890, pp. 1–8). Enes thus reproduced a much broader European structure of thought and consciousness elaborated from Kant to Hegel and beyond: to write history was to write universal world history (Trüper et al. 2015; Guha 2002, pp. 24–47; Hutchings 2008, pp. 32–46).

Positioning Portugal and, specifically, Portugal's colonial project within this world history, Villas's *História Colonial* begins with an account of the "discoveries"—Portugal's occupation of Ceuta followed by the early maritime voyages of exploration around the coast of Africa and across the ocean to the Americas. Villas documents how Portugal played an original and pioneering role in inaugurating this new enlightened phase of world history. His lengthy treatise provides extensive detailed narration of historical events and description of peoples and places. These accounts function to elaborate and give form to an overall historical continuity and

teleology, a singular, unified process which leads necessarily, directly, and properly over several centuries to the present. This is a great, glorious, and noble process of historical progress and evolution, signaled in the text by the structuring of the books' parts, chapters, and sections, the tremendously dramatic style of expression, and the repeated use of capitalization to indicate the significance of what is being presented: Colonial History, the Colonial Project, and the agent of Progress. Villas's *História Colonial* thus served, along with Lisbon's world exhibition of 1940 and numerous other expressions (Matos 2006), as a grand elaboration of Salazar's punctual claim to the foundational historical legitimacy of Portuguese colonialism within Europe's long Time of Civilization.

FROM CIVILIZATION TO DEVELOPMENT: THE TEMPORALITY OF WAITING

The early decades of the twentieth century saw shifts in the specific content of Europe's colonial consciousness and legitimating discourse, which nevertheless remained consistent with its underlying temporal structure. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has observed, this was, and remains, a temporality of waiting. In the Time of Civilization, non-European societies were destined to wait until they have been civilized by Europe. Chakrabarty uses the term historicism to refer to this temporal consciousness of historical progression, with Europe in the lead and non-European societies being led. Historicism, he says, "came to non-European peoples in the nineteenth century as somebody's way of saying 'not yet' to somebody else." According to this consciousness, this Time of Civilization, "Indians or Africans were not yet civilized enough to rule themselves. Some historical time of development and civilization (colonial rule and education, to be precise) had to elapse before they could be considered prepared for such a task" (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 8). The ideas of civilization and development were always intertwined and shared a common temporal structure, but after the First and, especially, the Second World War, the center of gravity shifted from the more normative and explicitly racialized notion of civilization to the more empirical and implicitly racialized notion of development.

In 1918 President Wilson, as a challenge to Lenin's Russia, elaborated a 14-point proposal in which he advocated that post-war adjustments of rival colonial claims be resolved based on the interests of the native populations and proposed "a general association of nations" to guarantee

"political independence and integrity to great and small alike." Informed by a "subdued hostility" to Wilson's proposals, European powers and South Africa came up with various counterproposals, among which was Prime Minister Jan Smuts' suggestion of mandates (Munene 1995, p. 31). As an alternative to post-war reannexation of territory by the victors, under the proposed mandate system, colonial territories of the losing powers would be allocated to other powers to be supervised on behalf of the League of Nations until such territories were ready for self-rule. Thus, self-rule was articulated as the explicit goal of mandatory tutelage. This proposed system was adjusted, however, according to enduring racialized conceptions of the civilized and uncivilized (Grovogui 1996, pp. 111–142): "neither Wilson nor his European counterparts thought of Africans as capable of self-government, the eventual objective of the mandates in the Middle East. The big powers, therefore, devised categories of 'B' and 'C' mandates which Wilson accepted, to camouflage the annexation and repartitioning of German colonies in Africa" (Munene 1995, p. 31). Indeed, the interwar era of the League of Nations was characterized largely by a continuation of earlier colonial logics, with growing hostility and rivalry between European powers all keen to consolidate and expand their control of colonial territory in Africa and elsewhere.

The Second World War provoked a stronger if still pragmatic resolve on the part of the US government under Roosevelt to promote self-government and independence for all peoples, an ideal explicitly countered by Churchill as he qualified that the ideals of the Atlantic Charter were intended to apply only to Europe under Nazi occupation. At the end of the war, the League of Nations mandate system was replaced by the United Nations Trusteeship system, and by the 1950s European powers gradually, reluctantly, and unevenly began to accept the notion of self-rule as the ultimate goal of colonial governance. Yet this remained strongly tempered by the temporality of waiting, according to which it would take many years before uncivilized African societies under European tutelage would reach the point of maturity sufficient for self-rule (Hailey 1943, 1954). During the conference of the Governors of Britain's African colonial territories held in London, November 1947, it was stated that:

> in Africa, the period before self-government can be granted will be longer than in most other parts of the Colonial Empire. Prophecy as to the length of this period is idle, but it may be said that in the Gold Coast, the territory where Africans are most advanced politically, internal self-government is

unlikely to be achieved in much less than a generation. In the other territories, the process is likely to be considerably slower.

"Constitutional Development in Africa, African Governors' Conference November 1947". (in Hyam et al. 1992, p. 203)

to which the Governor of Sierra Leone, Sir Hubert Stevenson, "urged caution in giving any hope that self-government could come in a generation" (ibid., p. 304). In 1956 van Bilsen, a Belgian professor at the colonial University of Antwerp, published a pamphlet entitled *Thirty Year Plan for the Political Emancipation of Belgian Africa* (Van Bilsen 1956; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p. 81). And in 1959, following the defeat of the Mau Mau, the British Colonial Secretary and the East African Colonial Governors' meeting concluded that majority rule and independence would not be a reality for Kenya within the foreseeable future, looking ahead to 1975 as the earliest possible date for the achievement of independence (Ogot 1995, p. 53).

For Portugal, under the *Estado Novo*, the temporality of its colonial consciousness with regard to Africans was not, however, a temporality of waiting for eventual self-rule. The role of Portuguese colonialism was not to guide its subject African peoples to a point where they were sufficiently mature to govern themselves, but to gradually bring Africans into civilization *within* the sphere of the Portuguese nation. In 1951 Marcelo Caetano, discussing the reform of colonial governance prior to the Colonial Act of 1930, confirmed that it had never been the objective of Portugal's colonial policy to work toward self-government and independence even under white rule (Caetano 1951).[7] Adriano Moreira similarly confirmed that "the meaning of the Colonial Act was not, and nor would later be shown to be, that of leading in such a direction" (Moreira 1951, p. 9).[8] Portugal strongly rejected the new colonial temporality of waiting to be guided toward independence, established first by the League of Nations' mandate system and then renewed and extended by the United Nations Trusteeship system and in the changing discourse of several other European powers. It was considered absolutely contrary to the essential principles of the Portuguese nation. José Gonçalo Santa Rita, legal professor writing in the *Revista do Gabinete de Estudos Ultramarinos* in 1951, commented that the principle underlying these articles of the United Nations—the right of populations to dispose of themselves—"constituted one of the most pompous examples of the new international colonial law" (Santa Rita 1951, p. 14). He went on to explain that citizens of a country whose constitution affirmed that sovereignty resided in the nation could not and

should not contest this founding principle. The principle of the sovereignty of the Portuguese nation was and had been the very essence of Portuguese national identity and being throughout its history; he explained: "The whole of our History is one clamorous cry claiming this right" (ibid.). Ridiculing the new UN doctrine of independence for colonized peoples, Santa Rita reasserted the racialised temporality of civilisation:

> It can however be questioned, very legitimately, whether the populations envisaged in the UN Charter possess the necessary characteristics to be considered as nations and or even that their level of civilization would be comparable to that of Portugal in the 12th, 14th, 16th or 17th centuries. Many of them are merely groupings of tribes, more or less nomadic, with rudimentary political organization, others, despite living over vast expanses of territory, are only chiefdoms, primitive despotic kingdoms, very far from the notion we have of a civilized State. (ibid., p. 15)

In the same journal Trindade provides a discussion of the Natives of Mozambique. It is, perhaps, fascinating to read this today: to witness the recurrence of staple components of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European racial discourse about Africans still being presented in 1951. The first few paragraphs provide short descriptions of the geographical location of different "native" or "tribal" groups, much in the manner and style of a natural historian describing the distribution of flora and fauna across a particular region. The author then proceeds to itemize typical and differing characteristics:

> the Mozambican native, even when muscular, in general lacks the capacity for prolonged work. He can sustain, however, long journeys without tiredness or boredom, especially if he is going to some great feast, as we had various occasions to observe, in which 200 km of journey constituted for him a mere stroll, in his admirable lack of awareness of time.
>   …
>   The first reports provided about the natives of Lourenço Marques date from the shipwreck of Sepúlveda [during the 16th century].[9] The peoples that the castaway sailors encountered were the same as those of today, with the same customs, speaking the same language, and only differing in the mode of organizing their factions. (Trindade 1951, pp. 24–25)

It was these African natives, with their admirable lack of awareness of time, who were gradually being brought closer to civilization within the sphere of the Portuguese nation.

In the face of growing international criticism of colonialism and pressure for self-determination, the regime abandoned the terminology of "colonialism" and, several years later, "indigenous" or "native." The Colonial Act of 1933 was formally revoked in a revision of the constitution in 1951 (Moreira 1951), and Portugal's colonies were officially renamed "overseas provinces"—*Províncias Ultramarinas*.[10] From then on all discussion is referred to "overseas" policy, territories, and populations. A decade later, after Angola's war of liberation had started, the technical and juridical category "*indígena*" was abandoned, and the *Estatuto das Indígenas*, the differential legal regime applicable to "native Africans," was formally revoked. With this legal redefinition of relations, Portugal rejected any accountability toward the United Nations as a colonial power ruling over non-self-governing peoples. It was at this stage that the Estado Novo regime incorporated the thesis of lusotropicalism, as it formally turned away from an official discourse of racial hierarchy to one of racial harmony and equality within a multiracial, pluri-continental national community (Castelo 1998; Léonard 1997). The Minister of Overseas Provinces, Sarmento Rodrigues, organized for Gilberto Freyre to visit Portugal's "overseas provinces," and it was on this visit that Freyre used the term "lusotropical" for the first time (Castelo 1998, pp. 95–101). The regime adopted the content and vocabulary of Freyre's thesis within their official discourse and their defense of Portugal's status as a pluri-continental multiracial nation (Salazar 1961; Caetano 1970). Salazar explained in 1963 the idea informing Portugal's overseas policy: "a multiracial community is not a juridical construction or a conventional regime of minorities but, above all else, a way of life and a disposition of the soul" (Salazar 1963, p. 201).

Needless to say, these terminological changes remained largely cosmetic. Indeed, the legal revision had been much debated within the government at the time. A statement made by Marcello Caetano in the *Câmara Corporativa*[11] in January 1951 clarified the position that while, for pragmatic reasons, this change was acknowledged as necessary—"Such alteration seems justified at the present moment, above all because of the international campaign against the term and political status of colony"—it carried the risk of inaugurating a premature and dangerous process of "assimilation." He explained:

> The *Câmara* calls particular attention to the dangers of a premature assimilation of the overseas territories with the metropole. Their natural conditions are and will remain different; very different, also, for the most part, are

their social and economic conditions. This difference, which leaps to the eyes of the most careless observer, implies the necessity of a specialization of government, of administration and of laws. The process of assimilation must be slow, accompanying the civilization of the natives and the development of the centers of European settlement. (Caetano in *Diário das Sessões* no. 70, de 19 de Janeiro 1951, cited in Torgal 2007)

The overseas policy remained one of gradual administrative decentralization, as elaborated in 1965 by Luís Filipe de Oliveira e Castro, in an article in the journal *Ultramar*. He explained that since 1914, the Overseas Provinces of Mozambique and Angola had enjoyed a form of "limited autonomy" in terms of government. This was effected through the system of legislative councils established in the 1930s, and it continued to evolve over subsequent decades, most recently with the creation of elected municipalities in 1962 and further administrative decentralization introduced with the *Lei Orgânica do Ultramar Português* in 1963. Castro described a process of ongoing administrative decentralization through which greater governmental autonomy was established in Portugal's "Overseas Provinces," explaining:

All of this has been consistent with an idea that the progressive institutionalization of overseas territories should be the direct result of their level of economic development and the level of social and political maturity of the populations, with the objective that the presence of these people in the management of local and collective negotiations would be able to take place in a responsible and conscious manner.

He went on to contrast this steady and gradual approach with the sudden granting of autonomy and independence taking place in the rest of Africa:

This contrasts with the large percentage of other regions of Africa, where the "crisis of decolonization" which affects them is, without doubt, a consequence of the lack of appropriateness of sociological structure to the conditions and demands of strong political organization, because the autonomy granted did not correspond with the prior existence of a well configured national structure; it signified only, in the large majority of cases, a formal transfer of administrative competencies, a transfer which has been shown to be disproportionate to the actual capacity of the people to govern themselves. (Castro 1965, p. 8)

Drawing on various European commentaries on the disappointing after-math of decolonization in Africa, he explained:

> In order to avoid such outcomes, the Portuguese overseas policy aims, before anything else, to create an equilibrium between the formal structure (institutional and administrative) and the actual structure of society; and given that the latter progresses in a continuous manner according to the specific intersecting dynamic between diverse groups and their ongoing cultural development, the former—without jeopardizing the invaluable equilibrium—can never be considered as definite and has, necessarily, to have sufficient vitality to adapt itself, though without counter-productive accelerations, to all beneficial evolutionary tendencies. (ibid., p. 9)

And what does this entail, the adjustment of formal and actual structures? Castro elaborates here on the theme of health and education areas, he notes, of considerable Portuguese investment in its overseas territories:

> The movement of the formal and actual structures of society necessarily require significant effort in the areas of education and health, which constitute the principle vectors of mental and physical maturity of the populations. In Africa, this objective is important when trying to overcome the general condition of underdevelopment, with its roots implanted in the context of the tribe and in the ancestral customs of the natives, conducive to their physical weakening and their mental stagnation. (ibid., p. 11)

These words were written in 1965, by which time Portugal was investing a very considerable proportion of its national budget in brutal colonial wars against the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and Cape Verde, with substantial support from its NATO allies. To the very end of these bitter wars, and across the transition from Salazar to Caetano, Portugal insisted on the essential terms of its colonial consciousness. In November 1968, Caetano explained:

> Portugal has imperturbably maintained its position. And in many countries, there were people who thought this holding-out was due solely to the personal doggedness of Dr. Oliveira Salazar. The truth is, however, that Portugal could not have taken up any other position … we are not defending a civilization but civilization itself. (Caetano in *Diário de Notícias*, cited in Ferreira 1972, p. 19. See also Caetano 1970)

ANTICOLONIAL TIME

It remains a commonplace today, within some strands of academic discourse, the media, and popular common sense, to conclude that in many cases decolonization was too hurried, that independence came too soon, and that the demands made for "independence now" on the part of African nationalists demonstrated their political immaturity. Echoing the sentiments of Luís Filipe de Oliveira e Castro, Goran Hyden observes that:

> The most important aspect of the decolonization process for the purpose of [the comparative analysis of African politics] is the acceleration of the progress to independence that took place in the 1950s. The colonial governments had not anticipated such a quick transition. To the extent that they were planning a peaceful transition during which they could make Africans familiar with principles of governance associated with their own democratic states, they never got time to put it into practice. (Hyden 2012, p. 16)

Such judgments sit squarely within the temporality of the colonial consciousness. If we step outside of that consciousness, the international relations of the twentieth century appear quite different. We might begin to perceive the contours of a global, transcontinental struggle over the future of international relations and world order which pitched the defenders of centuries of European or Western control and exploitation legitimized on the basis of religious, cultural, civilizational, and racial supremacy, against peoples, movements, and projects seeking reform of the social and international order based on values of justice, solidarity, and equality (Drayton 2016; see, e.g. Prashad 2007).

The phenomenon of anti-colonialism, the origins, character, and significance of anticolonial movements, leaders, and struggles, cannot be comprehended either historically or theoretically if analyzed within the framework of the colonial consciousness. Agathangelou and Killian urge that if we rethink international relations in terms of time and temporality, 'we need to re-orient our imaginations to see how in concrete moments' politics and knowledge interact to co-produce distinct normative and practical visions. This requires attention to 'the role of temporality in mutable projects and frames through which people come to imagine and direct their daily lives' (Agathangelou and Killian 2016b: 4–5). The struggles against colonialism in general, and in particular the struggles against Portuguese colonialism waged by FRELIMO, MPLA, and PAIGC, led by

Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Agostinho Neto, and Amílcar Cabral, constituted a radical refusal and rejection of the reigning colonial temporality. If we examine the ideas, statements, speeches, pronouncements, resolutions, slogans, poems, and songs of anti-colonialism, we find a radically different conception of the temporality of world politics. In the imagination and framing of the anticolonial project we find an outright rejection of the European idea of civilization and its temporality, and we find repeated expressions of impatience and refusal—an impatience with the pace of change determined by European powers or indeed by the United Nations, a refusal to wait, a refusal to accept a timeframe set by the external powers.

The anti-colonialists of the Portuguese colonies rejected the legitimacy of Portuguese colonialism in the strongest terms and often with scornful impatience. In a statement circulated in 1960 by the movements' collaborative organisation *Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência National das Colónialias Portuguesas* (FRAIN), they scorned the civilization that Europe sought to bring to them and its temporality:

> After five centuries in Africa, Portuguese colonialism, which is the most backward in regard to material achievements and social and political developments, condemns the Africans to conditions of abject misery, and this *in the name of Christian civilization.* … The colonialists deny the practice of Christian principles in their lack of reverence for the human being. They class 99.7% of the Africans they dominate as "un-civilized," they use all means to hide the effects of their "civilizing influence," they detain and murder African patriots and they are making preparations to launch colonial wars. (FRAIN 1960, p. 1, original emphasis)

In their struggles they articulated consciously their determination to bring an end to five centuries of racialised colonial time. Ten years after FRAIN's denouncement Amílcar Cabral again pointed out that "The time is past when, in an effort to perpetuate the domination of peoples, culture was considered an attribute of privileged peoples or nations, and when, out of either ignorance or malice, culture was confused with technical power, if not with skin color or the shape of one's eyes" (Cabral 1970, p. 6).

The anticolonial movements had taken up arms to fight for their liberation only after attempts at peaceful demonstrations were consistently met with brutal repression and massacres, imprisonment, torture, and the burning of villages (Cabral 1962, pp. 13–14; Mondlane and Machel 1975). This was the concrete experience of colonial time which informed

their radical refusal of that temporality and their professed anticolonial impatience. After providing substantial evidence to the United Nations to explain their plight and to expose the crimes of Portugal and its NATO allies, they noted wearily that "the time for denunciation of Portuguese colonialism and for moral or legal arguments had passed" (Cabral 1962, p. 11). Knowing the suffering of their peoples, the crimes of Portuguese colonialism, and the horrors of the colonial wars, they adamantly refused all suggestions for patience. Speaking to the United Nations Committee on Decolonization in 1962, Amílcar Cabral was asked to tell the Committee what the people of his country thought of the possibility of liberating the Portuguese colonies by peaceful means. He responded:

> If the delegations that urged the people of the Territory to be patient had been in their position, colonized on their own soil by the Portuguese, they could no longer have preached pacifism. When the Nazis had trampled all freedoms under foot, none of those who now preached patience would have found it possible to witness the Hitlerite abuses without reacting. No people loved peace more than the people of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, but not the peace of the cemetery. (Cabral 1962, p. 16)

We have seen that over centuries, Africans and other non-European peoples were positioned in an earlier time by European powers, a temporal positioning which defined and underpinned the conception and practice of international relations. By this method of argument the anticolonialists refused any such temporal differentiation.

The many expressions of the anticolonial struggles articulate a strong sense of the time of anti-colonialism. There is a refusal to endure any more the horrors of colonialism. Eduardo Mondlane explained to the UN Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration that "The people of Mozambique are tired of being used as instruments for producing wealth for foreigners. We feel that we have been kept under oppression for too long, and wish to join the free peoples of the world" (Mondlane 1962, pp. 26–27). This same sentiment recurred in the poetry of the struggles:

> We are men tired of shackles. For us.
> Freedom is worth more than life.
>
> ("Brother from the West," FRELIMO 1973, in Bragança and Wallerstein 1982).

>Enough of these massacres.
>I have suffered for five hundred years.
>I can bear it no longer.
>
>   (Poem by D.S. Maguni reproduced in Bengelsdorf and Roberts 1971, p. 5).

There is a refusal any longer to be taken in by the lies and hypocrisy of the West. Addressing the United Nations, Mondlane rejected Portugal's ridiculous claims to be providing bringing education to its overseas provinces—as elaborated, for example, by Castro—with lengthy details of the almost total absence of educational provision for the vast majority of Africans in Portugal's colonial territories. He then concluded: "We have waited too long for the application of the often-vaunted Judeo-Christian principles of justice, by the same people who are exploiting us. We are tired of preachments about freedom and democracy by the same people who are denying these to us" (Mondlane 1962, p. 27).

There are repeated expressions of impatience with the words and resolutions spoken within the formal arenas of world politics, above all within the UN, while the villages of Guinea Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique continued to be bombed and burned. Addressing the United Nations in 1972, Cabral repeated words from his own speech to the UN ten years previously in 1962.

>We did not come here, we went on to say, to attack Portuguese colonialism with words. We are fed up of attacking and listening to attacks and condemnation of Portuguese colonialism, whose characteristics, subterfuges, methods and acts are now only too well known by the UN and by the world opinion. … For us, for our people and for our Party, the time has come to finish with indecisions and promises, to take definitive decisions and to realize concrete acts. (Cabral 1972, pp. 190–191)

This same sentiment was expressed by Agostinho Neto in his poem *Depressa (Haste)* (Neto 1987, p. 144; Neto 1974, p. 129):

>I am impatient in this historical tepidness
>of delays and lentitude
>when with haste the just are murdered
>when the prisons are bursting with youths
>crushed to death against the wall of violence

> Let us end this tepidness of words and gestures
> and smiles concealed behind book covers
> and the resigned biblical gesture
> of turning the other cheek

Finally, this anticolonial time was conjured already in 1948 in one of the most powerful and raging rejections of the Time of Civilization—as the ultimate Time of Forgetting—in a long poem written by Neto, *Impossible Renunciation*.[12] The first half of the poem, *I-Negation*, can be understood as drawing out and exposing for all the world to see clearly the ultimate logic of Europe's temporal consciousness of civilization and world history. The poem begins "I do not believe in myself./I do not exist./I do not want, I do not want to be. I want to destroy me … Pulverize my being/disappear without leaving the slightest trace of my fleeting presence/in this world" and then situates this sentiment in the world:

> More than a simple suicide
> I want for my death
> to be a true historical novelty
> a total disappearance
> even in the brains
> of those who hate me
> even in time
> and that History should proceed
> and the world continue
> as though I had never existed
> as though I had never produced any work
> as though I had never had any influence on life
> as though instead of a negative value
> I was Zero.

The poem addresses Europe directly and at length:

> Do not count on me
> to serve your meals
> or mine diamonds
> that your wives will flaunt in salons
> or tend to
> your coffee and cotton plantations
> do not count on workers

> to wet-nurse your syphilitic sons
> do not count on
> second grade workers
> to do the work you proudly present as yours
> or on unconscious soldiers
> to yell with an empty stomach
> hail your labors of civilization
> …

Articulating the concluding temporal logic of Europe's colonial consciousness, he proclaimed:

> You can now burn
> the sacred signs
> that at the doors of bars, hotels and public spaces
> announce your egotism
> in the phrases: "WHITES ONLY" or "ONLY TO COLOURED MEN"
> Blacks here. Whites there.
>
> You can put an end to the miserable black quarters
> which embarrass your vanity
> Live satisfied without "color lines"
> without having to tell black customers
> that hotels are full
> that there are no tables free in restaurants
> Bathe without a care
> at your beaches and swimming pools
> for there were never blacks in the world
> to sully the waters
> of your disgusting preconceptions
> with their dark presence.
> …

Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, as the waiting League of Nations' mandate system was replaced with the waiting of UN Trusteeship, Neto threw out to the West the challenge:

> Why do you hesitate now?
> At least you have the opportunity
> to proclaim democracies
> with sincerity

You can invent a new History
Including attributing the creation of the world to yourselves.
Everything was done by you

Ah!
how satisfied I feel
to see you basking in your pride
and crazed in your mania of superiority.

Blacks never existed!
Africa was built just by you
America was colonized just by you
Europe does not know of African civilizations

The poem continues, relentlessly, to expose and elaborate the logic of Europe's consciousness:

Black music does not exist
Batuque rhythms never rang out in the forests of the Congo
Who spoke of spirituals?

Go fill your salons with Debussy, Strauss, Korsakoff.
There are no longer any savages on the earth
Long live the civilization of superior men
without black stains
to disturb their aesthetics!

and of its forgetting, a forgetting which to this day remains necessary to maintain Europe's own peace of mind:

What is colonization?
What are massacres of blacks?
What are confiscations of properties?
Things that nobody has heard of.

History is wrong.
Slavery never existed
minorities never ruled
proud of their strength

…

Blessed be the Hour
of my super-suicide
for you
men who build moral systems
to frame immoralities

The sun shines just for you
the moon reflects light just for you
there never were slave traders
nor massacres
nor occupations of Africa.

Since even History
is transformed into a Moral Treatise
without the need for hasty remedies!

But this of course is an impossible renunciation. The horrors of colonialism, slavery and racial violence and the temporal logic of extermination cannot be forgotten and will always be refused. And so the second, much shorter part of the poem—shorter because, after the lengthy exposure of Europe's consciousness, there is really little to respond—*II-Affirmation*, cries out "Silence the crazy phrases/ of this impossible renunciation. … I-everyone will never deny myself/ I will never coincide with nothing" and announces the impending struggles and determination to bring an end to colonialism, its consciousness and temporality:

My place is marked
on the battlefield
to conquer a lost life

I am. I exist.
My hands placed stones
laying the foundations of the world
I am entitled to my piece of bread

I am a positive value
of Humanity
and I do not abdicate,
I will never abdicate!

Conclusion

It seems extraordinary that the following words could be published in 2012 in a serious scholarly work: "Understanding politics in Africa begins by understanding society and the continued presence of premodern features that determine behavior and choice. Although the colonial powers tried to modernize African society, they did not do enough of it" (Hyden 2012, p. 238). Yet such ideas, whose time surely is long past, remain in respected circulation. As Wai argues in the introduction to this volume and elsewhere, Western experts of "neopatrimonialism" continue to diagnose the lack of fit between modern political institutions and the enduring cultural traditions of African societies (Cammack 2007; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994), in ways which echo the analysis of Luís Filipe de Oliveira e Castro (1965). By delving into the archives of colonial consciousness this chapter has exposed direct echoes and resonances between contemporary Africanist scholarship and earlier colonial discourse. This makes sense because, as we have seen, today's international consciousness shares a common underlying temporal structure with that of previous eras. For centuries Europeans positioned themselves at the front of Time, ahead of non-Europeans due to their racial, cultural, and religious superiority, their Civilization, while Africans were always the furthest behind in an earlier time, remaining still in the backwaters of primitive idleness. From the mid-twentieth century, the language of civilization gave way to that of development. With economic and social indicators now the empirical basis for the comparative measurement of stages of advance, the history of colonialism silently falls from view: "Sub-Saharan Africa's development has lagged behind that of other regions since the end of the colonial period" (Englebert 2000, p. 7), we learn. African states are once again behind, in the early stages of learning, with assistance from the west, how to govern themselves, how to be democratic, and how to respect human rights: "Nearly all of Africa's nations are fairly young, just a few generations since independence, and are still going through what might be called the early growing pains of nation building" (Moss 2007, p. 7).

What becomes strangely apparent when we examine the specifically temporal character of and assumptions underpinning international discourse or consciousness is the articulation of specific temporal ideas in time. It was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the time of

European expansion, colonialism, slavery, and slave trade, that European philosophers articulated a philosophy of universal World History. It was in the uncertain turmoil and rivalry of the interwar period that Portuguese historians and statesmen claimed more strongly than ever an unbroken and universal time of world history and civilization spanning five centuries. And while Portugal continued to elaborate its colonial consciousness of civilization after other European powers had necessarily embraced the new language of independence and development, echoes of this same consciousness resound in contemporary political science and IR. We are so accustomed to think of time as linear and progressive that, as critical as we might be, it is almost instinctive to locate specific ideas in specific temporal periods, within some notion of overall long-term change and improvement toward more enlightened or progressive ideas. It can thus be a shock when we encounter the explicit articulation of ideas which appear to jar with their times, to be "out of time"—ideas of the nineteenth century regarding primitive tribes still being asserted in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, or the essential legitimizing discourse of colonialism still asserted in 2012. It can equally be unnerving to realize the parallels in sentiment and logic of ideas expressed at very different times in quite different terminology, by colonial administrators on one hand and contemporary political scientists on the other. This suggests that the temporality of ideas and international consciousness—or the relation between ideas and their time—is anything but linear and progressive. Rather it can be uneven, circular, at times stationary, and at other times rapidly changing, with multiple flows, layers, and echoes in different directions and moving at cross-purposes.

In her exploration of the various conceptions of world politics in IR, Hutchings concludes that IR theory and scholarship assume the specific "temporal trajectory inherent ... in western modernity," a trajectory of "western political time [that] is presumed to be world-political time, the time that drives or leads historical development." The colonial consciousness is a central element of western political time. Because the mainstream knowledge of IR and related disciplinary fields shares the underlying temporality of the colonial consciousness, it will not be possible for them to grasp the historical or theoretical meaning of the anticolonial challenge and interruption. For, as Hutchings argues, while retaining this singular concept of western political time, "the idea of an alternative temporal perspective on world politics becomes literally unintelligible" (Hutchings 2008, p. 159). The intense struggles over decolonization—the determined struggles to create different and just futures

and the equally determined maneuvers to retain and increase control over former colonial territories and to undermine or ruthlessly quash any such alternatives—these struggles and their defeats barely figure in the Time of Forgetting, which sees only the transition to or granting of independence from colonizer to colonized and subsequent disappointment, weakness, and failure. Scholars of the West seem more intent on analyzing, explaining, and prescribing solutions for the failures of postcolonial African states than on reexamining the history of international relations as a history of colonial violence. While they do so, it will not be possible for them to grasp the historical and theoretical meaning and significance of anticolonial struggle and its articulation and vision of an alternative temporality of world politics. Analyzed within the dominant temporality, anti-colonialism is destined only ever to be understood as a failure or, at best, as a brief but unrealistic moment of utopian hope remembered today only with nostalgia. Instead, Agathangelou and Killian argue, we need to 'think of world politics as political moments of living and active theoretical forms of life' (Agathangelou and Killian 2016b: 6). The struggles against colonialism constituted a set of connected political moments of living and struggle, of active theoretical forms which together amounted to a major dynamic of transformation in and against the international relations and world order of the twentieth century. It is necessary to understand the temporality of anti-colonialism on its own terms in order to grasp the profound challenge these struggles represented, both as modes of international relations and as visions of possibilities of world order, as well as the character of the international relations and world order they struggled against.

The time of anti-colonialism was far more than an alternative, non-Western, local temporality (cf Hutchings 2008, pp. 160–166). It was an alternative vision and practice of world temporality, in and for the world, never just for the colonized. Certainly, while constituting a major rupture in the international relations of the twentieth century, this vision did not triumph, the practices were defeated (Prashad 2007), but it will never be possible to understand how and why if the fundamental character of this anticolonial time and the practices through which it was expressed cannot first be grasped for what they were. To do so, it will be necessary to leave behind, once and for all, the narrow distortions of IR's dominant conception of the time of world politics, from the Time of Civilization to, still today, the Time of Forgetting. If we can do so, we might be able to learn other lessons about the international relations of the twentieth century, which might yet be helpful for all in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. A sample of a long-entrenched tradition includes Ezrow and Frantz (2013), Brookings Institute (2011), Maedla et al. (2011), Naudé et al. (2011), Robb-Jackson (2010), Ndulo and Grieco (2010), Ingram (2010), Stewart and Brown (2009), European Report on Development (2009), Starr (2009), Englebert (2009), Bates (2008), Andersen et al. (2007), Rotberg (2006), Kaarsholm (2006), Herbst (1997), Reno (1997).

2. Many critics have examined these temporal structures of dominant academic knowledge in IR and across the social sciences. See, for example, Helliwell and Hindess (2013) and Inayatullah and Blaney (2004).

3. See, for example, Barak (2013), Mitchell (1991), Kalpagam (1999), and Cooper (1992).

4. See Trüper et al. (2015) and chapters in their volume for a discussion of the plurality of forms teleology took in European thought from the eighteenth century onward.

5. On the significance of Salazar's brief role as Minister of Colonies before assuming the role of Prime Minister, see Alexandre (1993).

6. This and all other quotations from sources in Portuguese are my own translation.

7. Caetano was a Professor of Law, Minister of the Colonies between 1944 and 1947, President of the *Câmara Corporativa* 1955–1958, and succeeded Salazar as Prime Minister of the *Estado Novo* in 1968.

8. Moreira was Professor and Director of the Instituto Superior de Estudos Ultramarinos, and from 1959 Under-Secretary of State for Overseas Administration, and Overseas Minister between 1961 and 1963.

9. Presumably referring to the *História trágico-marítima*, a compilation of accounts of shipwrecks during the sixteenth century, published in 1735 and 1736 by Bernardo Gomes de Brito.

10. This was a return to the terminology employed previously by the monarchical regime of the 1920s. In fact, Torgal reports that Salazar continued into the late 1950s to use the term colony and confirmed in an interview

in 1957: "We believe that there are races, decaying or backwards, as you prefer, in relation to which we uphold the duty to call them to civilisation" "A atmosfera mundial e os problemas nacionais" discurso proferido em 1 de Novembro de 1957, in Salazar (1967); cited in Torgal (2007, p. 68).

11. The *Câmara Corporativa* was a political organ of the government of the Estado Novo, representative of various corporate organizations, which had a consultative role discussing the formulation of legislature within the National Assembly.

12. The poem was published in full in Portuguese in Laban (2000, pp. 89–99) and in English in Neto (2015, pp. 183–194).

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CHAPTER 9

A Decolonial World-Ecological Reading of the Global Land Grab: Gambella, the River, and the Fall of Karuturi

Bikrum Gill

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, the Indian multinational agribusiness firm, Karuturi, made international headlines when it signed an agreement to lease 300,000 hectares of land over a period of 50 years in the Gambella province of Ethiopia (Sethi 2013). Having been offered a huge allotment of prime arable land for next to nothing (one dollar per hectare per year), Karuturi, at the time the world's largest rose producer, framed the deal as key to realizing its ambitions of global supremacy in food production and distribution (Dubey 2012). Dismissing those who questioned the deal as a paradigmatic example of what has now come to be known as global land grabbing, the company, along with the Ethiopian government, claimed the land was either unused or not being put to proper use by the indigenous peoples of the province (Rowden 2011; Dubey 2012). Noting the incredibly rich organic content of Gambella's soils, along with the abundance of water resources available in the Baro-Akobo river basin in which the land was located, Karuturi's management expressed confidence that, with the

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proper application of modern industrial farming technology, the company would be able to extract from the land its full productive potential (Bose and Mehra 2012). Such expectations were frustrated, however, by the very landscape that had seemed so inviting, as the Baro River repeatedly flooded Karuturi's land concession, leaving the future viability of the investment in serious doubt, despite the considerable sum of capital that the company invested in the project (Sethi 2013; Davison 2013a). Rather than serve as the staging ground for its launch into global food supremacy, Gambella's rich soil and abundant water, which had seemed so inviting, sunk Karuturi, as the losses incurred left the company with insufficient capital to carry out the operations at its flagship rose farm in Kenya (Badrinath 2014).

In this chapter, I attempt to make sense of the spectacular rise and dramatic fall of the Karuturi agricultural project through the theoretical and historical framework of what I will call decolonial world-ecological approach to the agrarian question. This chapter considers, as such, how the Gambella land grab, informed by the contradictions posed to Southern states such as India by the neoliberal accumulation crisis, mobilizes racialized world-ecological processes of global primitive accumulation that re-inaugurate the society/nature distinction in forging an emergent frontier zone of appropriation. It does so by focusing, first, on how the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution and the "third movement" force of peasant resistance to the neoliberal zone of appropriation, while bringing the neoliberal accumulation cycle to crisis, pose particular problems, at both national and global scales, of ecological surplus regeneration to Southern states in pursuit of "development as catching-up-with-the-West" (Charkrabarty 2010). Propelled, by the imperative of enhancing the agrarian surplus in order to secure the cheap food basis of capitalist development, the transnationalization of Indian agricultural production into the Gambella province of Ethiopia signifies the "triple movement" logic wherein the hegemonic resolution of the contradictions of primitive accumulation in the core national zone necessitates "global primitive accumulation" in extra-national spaces. The land grab in Gambella thus constructs the necessary frontier zone of unused nature that can be exhaustively drawn upon to provision India's cheap food imperative.

Key to such frontier logic and formation in Gambella, I will further argue, is the central role of racialization in collapsing indigenous peoples into the "inferior" sphere of unthinking "irrational" nature and the corresponding elevation of a "superior" human rationality, embodied in the state-capital

development nexus, uniquely capable of productive and efficient resource mobilization. Such an epistemological framework privileges the "developmental" knowledge of the Ethiopian state and the "productive" knowledge of Indian capital as central to the urgent task of mastering nature and bringing dormant land to life, while at the same time it necessarily discounts the indigenous peoples and nonhuman life forms of Gambella as beings incapable of efficient and productive economic activity. However, such epistemic and ontological denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier, while imperative for the production of nature as cheap or free, ultimately comes to exhaust such surplus provisioning. Thus, while such knowledge production and mobilization has been critical to Karuturi's construction of the Gambella land concession as a staging ground for its launch into global prominence in agro-food provisioning, it has also proved fatal to the project, as the epistemological inability to incorporate indigenous knowledge that accounts for extra-human agency left the company dramatically unaware of the particular socio-ecological dynamics of the Baro River ecosystem on whose floodplain the land concession was located.

In making such an argument, this chapter contributes to the emerging postcolonial/decolonial intervention into the field of international relations (IR). In particular, it challenges IR's foundational premises of Eurocentrism, anthropocentrism, and state-centrism, by centering "South-South" relations—in this case between India and Ethiopia—in the attempted post-crisis reconstitution of the international system. Within this "South-South" framework, this chapter more fundamentally challenges the structural bias of IR by revealing how areas such as Gambella, constantly discarded in discourses of IR, have in fact historically provided the historical foundations and condition of possibility for global capitalist development. The focus here is to illustrate how the socio-ecological knowledge and practices of the peoples and lands of "peripheral" spaces such as Gambella are, through both their racialized appropriation and erasure, constitutive of global processes such as the cheap food basis of global capitalist development. In so doing, this chapter demonstrates the key role played by the co-production of "race and nature" in the constitution of the international system. This, of course, has significant implications for the way we understand or account for global processes and specifically Africa's integral place in them. As well it hints at the possibility of taking indigenous knowledge systems and practices seriously for any attempt at rethinking IR for areas persistently discounted as peripheral to its concerns.

LAND GRABBING AND THE CRISIS OF THE NEOLIBERAL ACCUMULATION CYCLE

The contemporary global land-grabbing phenomenon references the rapid expansion of large-scale agricultural land acquisitions, often of a transnational character, across much of the Global South in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2007–2008. An initial "literature rush" was propelled by journalists, NGOs, policy experts, and academics motivated by immediate empirical questions regarding the scope, actors, location, implementation, and potential consequences of such large-scale land grabbing (Edelman et al. 2013; White et al. 2012; Borras et al. 2011; Wolford et al. 2013). Perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the rapid post-crisis increase in global agricultural land acquisitions was undertaken by the World Bank, in a report titled *Rising Global Interest in Farmland*, where it argued that

> the demand for land has been enormous. Compared to an average annual expansion of global agricultural land of less than 4 million hectares before 2008, approximately 56 million hectares worth of large-scale farmland deals were announced even before the end of 2009. More than 70 percent of such demand has been in Africa; countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan have transferred millions of hectares to investors in recent years. (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. xiv)

The early literature was further able to foreground important links between transnational land deals and the global economic crisis, particularly in terms of the key role played by surging food and commodity prices in motivating states and corporations across North and South to acquire "cheap" land wherever it could be found in order to secure food/fuel security (for states) and/or profits (for both agribusiness and financial corporations). However, the limitations of the immediate empirical focus of this initial "making sense period" were soon noted by critical scholars who sought to initiate a second phase of research more concerned with elaborating the deeper theoretical and historical significance of the land grab (Edelman et al. 2013). The point here was to advance theoretical and historical frameworks through which the immediate crisis context of the global land grab could be apprehended within the "*longue duree* of the development of capitalism" and further elucidated through a "deepened engagement with long-standing discussions in agrarian political economy" (Edelman et al. 2013, p. 1528).

Primitive accumulation, a key concept in historical materialist approaches to the emergence and development of capitalism, has been widely deployed by critical agrarian studies scholars in the efforts to situate land grab research within larger theoretical and historical frameworks (Hall 2013; Borras et al. 2011, 2013; White et al. 2012; Levien 2015; Ince 2014; Makki 2014). However, such attempts, for the most part, have failed to move beyond what I call the "Eurocentric-anthropocentric" frame of primitive accumulation. They have, in particular, interpreted the global rush for land precipitated by the global economic crisis as another moment of the extension of capitalist social relations—conceived narrowly as capital labor—through processes of land enclosure that, in so much as they simultaneously transform land into capital and dispossess local land users, recall the historical origins of capitalism in rural England. The "origins-diffusion" framework suggested by such methodological internalism cannot adequately capture the relational global differentiations and historical specificities of the land grab/crises conjuncture within the *longue duree* of the capitalist world-ecology.

It is for this reason that I elaborate instead a concept of "global primitive accumulation" capable of apprehending the differential ontological categories ascribed, through enclosures, to the core "human" zone of commodification and the peripheral "extra-human" zones of appropriation. A similar critique has been advanced by Onur Ulas Ince (2014), who has undertaken a theoretically sophisticated "decolonial" consideration of the applicability of primitive accumulation to the land grab. Concerned that the critical agrarian political economy approach to the land grab "ultimately risks miring the concept of primitive accumulation in a diffusionist imaginary, first in Europe, then elsewhere," Ince argues that "one way to cast primitive accumulation in a nondiffusionist mold is to decenter the British experience and train our focus on the global topography of primitive accumulation" (p. 109). In so doing, we will be more attentive to how what is at work in the land grab is "less a replay of the English enclosures qua eviction of the peasantry but [more] an articulation of different social forms of production mediated and overdetermined by global circuits of capital" (p. 125).

This expansive concept of global primitive accumulation is central, moreover, to the framework of "decolonial world-ecological agrarian question" through which this chapter situates the land grab/crises conjuncture as a moment of "contested transition" between contending state-capital

blocs over the reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. The conceptualization of the land grab as signifying a historically specific moment of transition between accumulation regimes, rather than standing as a "replay of the English enclosures," has been thus far most significantly developed through Philip McMichael's food regime analysis which, in its foregrounding of the "contradictory dynamics" undermining the neoliberal corporate food regime, "situates the land grab as something other than simply a contemporary enclosure of land for capitalist expansion" (McMichael 2012, p. 682, 2013, 2014). For McMichael, the key point of departure is that the "rush to acquire land … is symptomatic of a crisis of accumulation in the neoliberal globalization project" brought about by three converging forces: ecological exhaustion, agrarian countermovements, and Southern state opposition to the Northern control of global food and agricultural relations via international organizations such as the WTO. These three forces each emphasize a deeper historical context to the food price crisis of 2007/2008 than what was suggested by the early land grab literature's predominant focus on ephemeral factors such as commodity speculation and rising demand from the middle classes of emerging economies. An engagement with the deeper history of the food crisis, through an elaboration of what McMichael has identified as its three underlying forces, can further clarify how it signals both the undoing of the Northern-dominated neoliberal corporate food regime and the "contested transition," embodied in the global land grab, toward an "increasingly multicentric global food system" (McMichael 2013, p. 684).

Ecological Exhaustion of the Long Green Revolution

Informed by Jason Moore's world-ecological account of the rise and fall of successive accumulation cycles, ecological exhaustion as a determinative force of the food crisis references, for McMichael, the rising contradictions of the industrial agricultural production model—what Patel (2013) refers to as the "long green revolution"—which had earlier secured the ecological surplus of cheap food across both the developmental and neoliberal eras of the "long twentieth century" (Arrighi 1994). The cheap food surplus of the long green revolution was provisioned through a furthering of the radical simplification and intensification of many of the frontier lands—from the American Midwest to the Punjab—converted to commercial agricultural production under the British-led accumulation cycle of the long nineteenth century. Within the long green revolution

paradigm, simplification involves the removal of non-value-producing practices and life forms, such as fallow land and polycropping, in favor of the total dedication of land to a single crop (e.g. rice, wheat, corn, soy), which is then productively grown and harvested through the water-intensive application of industrial inputs such as inorganic, petroleum-based fertilizers, chemical pesticides, and hybrid seeds (Moore 2015; Patel 2013; Weis 2010). This institutes, then, a society/nature regime of "metabolic rift" wherein soil minerals and water resources can be intensively appropriated, and weeds/pests exterminated, without having to account for the costs that such appropriation and extermination impose on the reproductive conditions of the fertile soils and abundant waters being acted upon. In its initial stage, as an earlier engagement with Moore's work has shown, such a denial of the reproductive conditions of the frontier lowers production costs in so much as it constructs "extra-human" nature as a provisioner of "free gifts" such as soil fertility. During its specific upward swing from the 1950s to the 1970s, the massive, historically unparalleled, agricultural productivity gains of the long green revolution were achieved through the intensive application of the free gift of cheap oil, in the form of petroleum-based fertilizers and tractors, upon the free gift of fertile soils in the agricultural heartlands of the capitalist world-ecology (Moore 2015, p. 252; Weis 2010, p. 320).

As Moore further argues, however, the industrial model of the long green revolution has not resolved, once and for all, humanity's food problem, as its promoters promised, but rather has increasingly confronted the exhaustion of the "free gifts" and the increasing resistance posed to extermination by extra-human natures such as "super weeds" and "super pests" (2010, p. 400). Thus, the steady deterioration of soil fertility, on account of the disruption to nutrient recycling effected by monocropping and inorganic fertilizer use, contributed, from the mid-1980s onward, to the marked slowdown of global agricultural yield growth in relation to world population growth (Weiss 2010; Patnaik 2009). Of perhaps even greater significance, the capacity to maintain some measure of yield growth has necessitated that declining soil fertility be offset by the even more intensive application of increasingly costly industrial fertilizers and pesticides (Weiss 2010, p. 320). This rising capitalization of industrial agriculture, as capital is now forced to carry the costs that "extra-human" natures increasingly refuse to bear, figures centrally into the reversal of the neoliberal cheap food regime and its ultimate denouement in the food price crisis of 2007/2008 (Moore 2010, p. 391). Such entrenchment of

a secular, or irreversible, rise in agricultural capitalization and food costs, in so much as it further increases the reproductive costs of labor, signals, for Moore, the historical onset of the ecological exhaustion of the accumulation capacity of the neoliberal cycle.

Countermovements to the Neoliberal Agrarian Crisis

In largely focusing on the evident centrality of the ecological exhaustion of industrial agriculture to the neoliberal accumulation crisis, Moore, along with more "eco-centric" analyses (Weis 2010), risks, however, covering over the key role played by cultivators and laborers in the "agrarian South" to both the constitution of the neoliberal cheap food surplus (via the appropriation of national agricultural space) and its potential exhaustion. While Moore does, significantly, link the achievement of the neoliberal cheap food regime to the debt-enforced "structural adjustment" of the national agricultures of the South toward an export orientation (2015, pp. 259–264), he does not take into serious analytical consideration the role played, in bringing the neoliberal regime to crisis, by the determinative resistance exercised by those subject to the "exhaustive appropriation" unleashed by structural adjustment. It is precisely such concerns which have motivated this chapter, to stage a conversation between world-ecology and decolonial theory in order to elaborate a framework—the decolonial world-ecological agrarian question—capable of foregrounding both the racialized/colonial basis of the ecological surplus and the decolonial basis of exhaustion. It locates the neoliberal cheap food regime as an expression of the Northern "reappropriation" of the agricultural surpluses the catch up orientation of Southern states had sought to "protect" and "appropriate" in the service of rapid national industrial development. The racialized dimensions of the neoliberal cheap food regime are expressed both in its organizing conceptual premise regarding the "irrationality" imposed on Southern agricultural land use by protected national agricultural sectors and in the reaffirmation, as a result of the switch from national developmental to export-orientated agriculture, of historical colonial patterns of over/underconsumption (Araghi 2003, p. 2009).

While the neoliberal "reappropriation" of the South's agricultural surplus was vital to the resolution of the "double movement" contradiction in the North between the imperative of wage repression and the "right to live" demand of labor movements, it ultimately had to contend with the "third movement" launched in advocacy of more sustaining "decolonial"

socio-ecological co-productions of the peoples and natures of the "agrarian South." Arising out of the agrarian crisis—rising indebtedness and dispossession, stagnating yields, declining food availability—enveloping much of the South during the neoliberal regime as a result of the removal of protective trade controls and input/output subsidies, peasants across the South collectively organized to pressure their respective states to refuse the dictates of Northern-dominated institutions and further advanced, outside the formal state system, the radical decolonial option of "food sovereignty" in place of the impoverished neoliberal market-based conception of food security. The decolonial character of the food sovereignty movement rejected the racialized premise of the capitalist society/nature distinction by reimagining food production and consumption as socioecological relations co-productively sustaining, through more localized and organic cultivation and circulation of food, the health of "extrahuman" natures, such as soil and water, in addition to the livelihoods of peasants and laborers in the agrarian South.

The force of this "third movement" against the cheap food premise of the neoliberal accumulation cycle manifested in the rising pressure exerted, through protest and ballot, upon the states of the South to more actively contest structural adjustment imperatives, and in the physical disruption of successive WTO ministerial in Seattle (1999), Cancun (2001), and Hong Kong (2005) by large-scale street actions organized by international peasant movements, such as La Via Campesina. Pressured internally by rising peasant protests, and emboldened internationally by the growing consensus among transnational social movements regarding the gross injustice, in favor of Northern states, of the WTO's agricultural regime, Southern states aligned to reject the conditions that were sought to be imposed upon them during the WTO's Doha Round (Hopewell 2015). McMichael (2012) has been exceptional among land grab scholars in foregrounding the role played by the Southern challenge, both at the state and social movement scale, in bringing the neoliberal regime to crisis, arguing succinctly that

> Southern state opposition to the hypocrisy of Northern "food dumping" contributed to the breakdown of the Doha Round and WTO paralysis in the first decade of the twenty-first century, accompanied by a mushrooming "food sovereignty" countermovement with an alternative vision of democratic food security arrangements embedded in socio-ecological relations on local and regional scales. These institutional and political-economic

contradictions combined with the reversal of food price trends in 2007–2008 as cheap food came to an end. (p. 682)

Concretely, the opposition to the Doha Round was accompanied by the reintroduction of a variety of protective measures, ranging from trade controls to input/output subsidies, which further undermined the organizing socio-ecological relations of the neoliberal cheap food regime.

Focusing on the convergence between the Southern challenge to the WTO regime and the ecological exhaustion of the long green revolution in our reading of the neoliberal accumulation crisis clarifies the particular propulsion the latter gives to the global land grab. While the rising capitalization of green revolution agriculture, in the form of intensified fertilizer and pesticide application to offset soil deterioration and "super weeds/super pests," raises food prices and threatens the neoliberal wage repression strategy, the Southern rejection of the unprotected opening of its agricultural sectors to the dictates of the "free" global market problematizes efforts to resecure a global ecological surplus through neoliberal governance technologies. In my estimation, this further exacerbates the existential crisis that Moore (2010) argues the neoliberal crisis poses for the reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. For Moore, as opposed to earlier cycles of surplus and exhaustion, capital, in its post-neoliberal moment, confronts the potential impossibility, on account of the arguably planetary scale of exhaustion, of the reconstruction of the frontier zone of "unused" externalized nature. Such a challenge of constructing and mobilizing the frontier is all the more enhanced in a context in which Southern states increasingly reject dependence upon transnational agricultural markets dominated by Northern agribusinesses, as was witnessed in the increased controls on agricultural trade imposed by Southern states as an initial response to the food crisis. As I will argue further below, the land grab, and particularly its South-South dimensions, is forged out of the capitalist world-ecology's dual necessity, however materially impossible, of constructing the necessary "post-WTO" global governance regime which can legitimize new frontiers of unused nature capable of overcoming the exhaustion of the long green revolution and neoliberal "North-South" geopolitical relations.

Capitalist development's fundamental dependence upon "cheap nature," organized as it is through the racialized society/nature ontology, compels state-capital blocs, seeking hegemony in the reconstituted accumulation

cycle, to attempt to overcome neoliberal exhaustion and forge a new eco-logical surplus through the construction and mobilization of new frontiers of unused nature. This frontier pursuit, I argue, has been a central propulsive force driving the "global land grab" in general, as much of the rapid proliferation in large-scale agricultural investments has been mobilized by the belief, promoted by the World Bank in multiple "post-crisis" reports, that there is tremendous profit to be realized through the closing of what it characterizes as the "yield gap," which represents the difference between current and potential production levels on land identified as either "unused" or "underused" (Deininger and Byerlee 2011, p. xxviii; McMichael 2012). The yield gap conceptual premise functions as a technology of "misanthropic skepticism" enabling the appropriation and erasure of the socio-ecological knowledge and practice of the indigenous inhabitants of those frontier lands whose productive capacity has been hitherto wasted. Beyond the individual profits to be gained, the closing of the yield gap, through the rational application of the necessary capital and scale to "underused" land, is represented as having the potential to satisfy the general systemic demand for affordable food supplies and, in so doing, resolve both capital's accumulation crisis and the developmental crisis of states in the South (Deininger and Byerlee 2011; McMichael 2012).

South-South Relations of Land Grabbing

A key distinction, though, from previous global "transition" conjunctures resolved through conventional "North-South" relations, wherein Northern-based "rational" agencies act upon the "irrational" South as "unit of nature," consists of the evident prominence of "South-South" relations of global land grabbing. Leading Southern states—particularly those included within the BRICS designation—have furthered, it seems, their challenge to the WTO regime by actively seeking to secure a post-crisis world-ecological surplus of "cheap nature" through emergent South-South trade and investment frameworks capable of overriding the domination of the international food trade by Northern agribusiness. This distinctive feature of the contemporary land grab corresponds with the rising geopolitical assertiveness of Southern powers seen more generally in the post-crisis context, and which has generated considerable debate, among critical scholars within the fields of international relations and development studies, regarding the "emancipatory" implications of the "rise of the South" for the international state system and global political

economy. While some have argued that the increased prominence of "South-South" relations embodies the spirit of a "new Bandung" (Arrighi 2007; Desai 2013), wherein the emancipatory promise of Southern "autonomy" and "de-linking" from Northern dominance is finally realized, other positions have emphasized that, in so far as rising Southern assertiveness is invested in the renewal of global capitalist accumulation, it constitutes a fundamental break from the decolonial and anti-capitalist promise of earlier Southern advocacy in support of a "New International Economic Order" (Cammack 2012; Bond 2016; Golub 2013). Advancing such a position, Golub argues that

> the major actors of this systemic shift are realizing what generations of nationalist anti-colonial and postcolonial leaders had fought for—upward mobility and greater international equality through a redistribution of world power at economic and political levels—by embracing and restructuring the world capitalist system from within rather than by exiting it from without. (p. 1002)

It is further argued, by Patrick Bond (2016) and Cammack (2012), that this Southern embrace of global capitalism does not signify a fundamental challenge to Northern imperialism, as the latter instead accepts, and even encourages, the "rise of the South" as a "sub-imperialist" motor necessary for the post-crisis renewal of accumulation. For Golub, this "role of post-colonial states as drivers of a new phase of capitalist globalization has blurred and in some cases completely erased the emancipatory message and critical vision of early anticolonial nationalism" (p. 1002). This erasure reflects, in particular, how such capitalist globalization, even in its "South-South" guise, must reproduce the exhaustive and hierarchical socio-ecological premises of capitalist development.

When the role of Southern states and corporations in advancing the global land grab is taken into account, some IR scholars have argued that the new global inequalities produced through such actions reveal that, rather than presaging a challenge to the injustices of global capitalism, the implications of the "rise of the South," for the transformation of the international political system, consist of the declining relevance of the "North-South" framework for the analysis and interpretation of global poverty and inequality. Margulis and Porter (2013) have, for instance, argued that "the institutional arrangements associated with US dominance and the earlier colonial period of land grabbing are being replaced by more complex,

polycentric ones operating in an increasingly multipolar global political economy, rendering the previous North-South and West-East cleavages less relevant" (66), a key implication of which is that "traditional concepts of South-South solidarity or other traditional forms of interstate political conflict are therefore less relevant to understanding the [contemporary] type of global politics of land grabbing" (79). Furthering such a thesis, McMichael (2013), while centering Southern resistance in the collapse of what he terms the market-based "corporate food regime" of the neoliberal era, expresses concern over the social and ecological implications of transition, embodied in the global land grab, toward what he has identified as a polycentric "security-mercantilist" food regime governing the transnational production and circulation of cheap food. Expressing a deep mistrust of the Northern-dominated global agricultural commodity trade, leading Southern states have engaged, through direct offshore land acquisition "for the purpose of repatriating agricultural products," in a post-crisis project of what McMichael describes as "re-territorialization … designed to avoid dependence on markets, or more particularly, market intermediaries. Thus: 'China wants to cut out the soy middleman. It clearly does not trust the large American-owned commodity traders like Cargill and Bunge'" (2013, pp. 50–51). In so far, however, as such "re-territorialization" is effected through coercive "land grabs," involving the displacement of indigenous peoples in order to make way for the expansion of ecologically destructive large-scale industrial agriculture, the "polycentrism" of the emergent "security-mercantilist" food regime further questions the usefulness of "North-South" as a marker of international inequality and "South-South" as a marker of emancipatory solidarity.

While such skepticism is important, particularly in so much as it helps to uncover the appropriation and exploitation obscured by the language of "South-South" solidarity and cooperation in agriculture (Mittal 2013), it itself risks obscuring, under the guise of an emergent equivalence between North and South, how North-South hierarchies, and the importance of challenging them through South-South trade and partnerships, remain significant, even in the land grab. For Fantu Cheru and his collaborators (2013), who have been prominent among those calling for cautious optimism regarding the emancipatory potential of "South-South" agricultural projects on the African continent, the latter have been unfairly weighed down by the burden of the history of European colonialism in Africa. It should not, in other words, be a priori assumed that the rise in "South-South" transnational agricultural investments in Africa

constitutes a replay of the grossly extractive, rather than productive, role played historically by the "foreign direct investment" of colonial powers in the "underdevelopment" of African agriculture. Cheru et al. further question why the charge of "neocolonialism" has been "disproportionately directed against foreign investors from China and India, while Western investors have not been labelled "neocolonialists" and "land grabbers," even though "Western multinationals are still the largest investors in African agriculture" (26). Troubled by the "infantilization" of Africa that this suggests—namely, that African states are passive in South-South partnerships—Cheru et al. instead seek to center the agency of the African state in attempting to leverage the rising investment capacity of the "emerging economies" of the South in order to overcome the dependence upon Western aid and investment that marked the post-Cold War international order. A key distinction, moreover, between emergent "South-South" partnerships and the North-South investment pattern consists of the unique perspective on appropriate technologies and practices for enhancing agricultural productivity that Southern states can transfer to one another on account of the similar challenges they confront in overcoming the historical declines of their national agricultural sectors during the neoliberal era.

The drive on the part of African states to leverage Southern investment capacity in order to increase agricultural production, and thereby lessen dependence upon Northern-dominated aid and international food markets, might lead us to question the utility of the concept of the "land grab" to describe what are, in fact, consensual transfers of land from host governments to investing states and corporations. However, the utility of the "land grab" concept is better apprehended when we consider that the land identified for transfer reflects the racialized distinctions of frontier formation forged "internally" by states quite explicitly informed by an "agrarian transition" imperative. In other words, the emergence of the "land grab as development strategy" (Lavers 2012) reflects an understanding by African policy makers that "underused" land must be mobilized to provision the cheap food necessary for transition from agrarian- to industrial-based economy. The land identified as such often belongs to communities involved in forms of nomadic pastoralism and shifting cultivation that the state views as an obstacle, in so much as such land uses leave productive land fallow for long periods of time, to productive development. The permanent settlement, or displacement, of these communities, is thus necessary in order to transfer the lands they inhabit to investors.

Rather than the aggressive take-over of land from weaker African states by the emerging economies of the South, the "land grab" is thus better conceptualized as the collaborative appropriation of the lands of marginalized indigenous groups by both host and investor states united in their pursuit of an ecological surplus of "cheap food" capable of initiating, or renewing, the path of industrial capitalist development.

Rather than conclude that such displacement indeed reaffirms the declining relevance of the frames of "North-South" inequality or "South-South" solidarity, my own position is that the "South-South" dimensions of the global land grab reveal the renewed prominence of what, following Walter Mignolo (2011), is identified as the rewestern/dewestern "dispute for the control of coloniality." While this dispute involves, as in the earlier national developmental era, the suspension of the more radical decolonial option, in this case the food sovereignty movement, the dewestern project to re-appropriate Southern lands and resources in the service of the "catch up" imperative constitutes, as Mignolo himself argues, an important challenge to the reduction of the South as "unit of nature" for the North. The land grab signifies, then, a medium of contestation over the control of the production and mobilization of the frontier necessary for underwriting the expanded reconstitution of the accumulation capacity of the capitalist world-ecology. For Southern actors, the significance of such a contestation consists of the degree to which land grabbing potentiates the world-scale relations necessary for overcoming the obstacles that have contributed to what Li identifies as the "truncated agrarian transition" in the South. As we have seen, however, the dewestern project of converging with the North through global "agrarian transition," in so much as it is premised upon a "cheap food strategy," must necessarily reinstantiate the racialized society/nature distinction of capitalist development.

The Rise and Fall of the Land Grab in Gambella

The "Internal" Frontier in the Ethiopian "Land Grab as Development Strategy"

Included within the World Bank's identification of yield gap regions (Deininger et al. 2011, p. 189), the Gambella province of Ethiopia has been a particularly prominent, and controversial, site of the global land grab, due in large measure to the attention it has attracted from international human rights NGOs concerned with questions of rural livelihood

security and environmental sustainability (OI 2011; HRW 2012). While the post-crisis concern with global food production has focused increased attention on fertile lands such as Gambella, the province itself has long existed as a "frontier" within the Ethiopian state. Forcibly incorporated into the highlander-dominated Ethiopian state, via imperial conquests, in the late nineteenth century, Gambella has historically come to be known, by successive governmental regimes, as containing lush and fertile lands that could resolve the land constraint in the northern highlands and potentially serve as a breadbasket region for Ethiopia, provisioning the cheap inputs that could underwrite the desired national transition from agrarian to industrial economy (Makki 2012, pp. 83–84; Markakis 2011, p. 6). Reflecting the integral role of racialization as a condition of possibility for frontier making, the ecological centrality of Gambella's "virgin" lands to the modernizing mission of the Ethiopian state is enabled by an ontological distinction between civilizing highlander elites and the indigenous peoples of Gambella, whom the imperial highlanders have historically considered to be primitive and backward (Makki 2012, p. 84).

While the nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperial regime promoted "settler-colonial" migration of farmers and investors from the land-hungry highlands to Gambella, such initiatives were constrained by the resistance of the indigenous Anywaa people of Gambella and by ecological challenges, particularly the intense heat and the heavy presence of malaria-spreading mosquitos (ibid.). The socialist Derg regime, which overthrew the imperial regime in 1974, was more "successful" in resettling highlanders to Gambella, particularly after the devastating effects of the 1984 famine. For the modernizing Derg, the famine was evidence of the backwardness imposed on Ethiopian society due to the prevalence of low-productivity practices such as nomadic pastoralism, and the regime thus sought to rally Ethiopians to "free farming from the ugly forces of nature" (Scott 1998, p. 248), which, beyond the promotion of settler farmers from the highlands, involved the introduction of large-scale mechanized state farms into Gambella (ibid.). However, as with the earlier efforts of the imperial regime, the Derg's modernizing thrust was constrained by both "ecological" feedback, in the form of the "abnormal" flooding that the deforestation associated with large-scale agriculture triggered in the region (Woube 1999), and by armed indigenous resistance to the resettlement of highlanders and large-scale land appropriation (Markakis 2011).

The current regime of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which overthrew the Derg in 1991, has continued with

the modernizing thrust of the previous regimes, but did initially shift the focus to achieving a program of what they termed "agricultural development-led industrialization" through the empowerment, rather than displacement, of smallholder agriculture which would localize development initiatives through greater political decentralization (Lavers 2012, pp. 108–109). The EPRDF, having come to power on the basis of widespread peasant mobilization and support, believed that the empowerment of small farmers would facilitate increased production and livelihood security and thus offer a more sustainable and equitable path to industrialization than those attempted by previous regimes (Makki 2014, p. 85). However, the failure of this program to achieve the desired gains in productivity and income, and thus facilitate industrial transition, compelled the EPRDF to pursue a dual-track strategy of protecting smallholder agriculture, particularly in the core highland regions, for reasons of livelihood security, while also opening space, through the identification of "unused" lands primarily found in the peripheral Southern lowlands of the country, for the initiation of large-scale agricultural production that could provision the food surplus necessary for underwriting industrialization (Lavers 2012, p. 112; Rahmato 2013). Large-scale agriculture would facilitate the transition by providing cheap food for an emergent industrial proletariat, and by generating foreign exchange, through the export of surplus food, that could then be used to finance the import of the technology and machinery necessary for industrialization (Makki 2014, p. 86).

While the EPRDF began to transition to such a dual-track strategy at the turn of the century, the lack of domestic capital and expertise suitable for large-scale agriculture led the regime to emphasize the importance of attracting foreign capital to undertake such initiatives (Rahmato 2013, p. 96). Thus, when the political fallout of the global food crisis of 2008 manifested itself, and impressed upon global development and governance organizations, such as the World Bank and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, the pressing need to identify and close the remaining yield gaps for the sake of global food security (Makki and Geisler 2011; McMichael 2014), and revealed to transnational capital the enormous profits that could be potentially realized through agricultural investment, the Ethiopian state identified, and acted upon, such opportunities to operationalize its strategy for foreign capital-led large-scale agricultural production (Kebede 2011).

Embracing the so-called Rise of the South narrative, the Ethiopian state has sought to promote such a development strategy through the channel

of South-South solidarity and cooperation. This geopolitical orientation is premised upon the belief that Ethiopia has much to gain by engaging with states and capital from the South who, in contrast to Northern actors, could best apply, owing to the similarity in transition and development challenges across the South, the appropriate practices and technology for enhancing agricultural productivity within Ethiopia (Cheru et al. 2013, pp. 24–33). Within the South-South strategy, India has emerged as a particularly prominent partner in the field of agricultural investment and cooperation, as Ethiopia's desire to attract foreign investment in agriculture has converged with India's growing recognition of the need to secure offshore resources for food production in the face of ecological exhaustion in India as a result of catastrophic consequences of the long green revolution (Rowden 2013, p. 111).

The State-Capital Nexus

The India-Africa forums, along with bilateral trade initiatives signed between India and Ethiopia, helped facilitate an enabling trade and investment framework through which Indian capital seeking to expand into transnational agricultural production could align with the Ethiopian state's aim of seeking foreign investment to transform "unused" arable land into highly productive units of agricultural production. The Ethiopian state, for its part, has sought to attract Indian agricultural investors with the promise of extremely cheap and abundant fertile land, along with cheap labor, in peripheral lowland provinces such as Gambella. In return, the Ethiopian state expects Indian companies to either enhance national food availability or contribute to the state's foreign exchange reserves through commodity exports. For Indian capital, the motivation of expansion has been less the systemic need for capital in general to reconstitute, in the face of ecological exhaustion, the condition of possibility for accumulation, through the forging of the ecological surplus, and more the profits to be gained through accessing cheap, fertile land that could facilitate low-cost (in so much as it requires less capitalization than the lower-quality soils in India), high-productivity agriculture that offers secure and high returns through the increasing global and national demand for cheap food (ibid.). Expansion to Africa, which Indian capital has imagined as a frontier of cheap land and labor (Mitra and Bhuvaa 2011), would also enable Indian agribusiness capital to overcome its own profitability constraints that increasing costs of production—primarily land and labor—have imposed within India.

While the conducive post-crisis investment context has facilitated the expansion of numerous Indian firms into agricultural production in Ethiopia, with several operating in Gambella province alone, the Bangalore-based Karuturi Global has been identified as a pioneer in Indo-African agricultural investment, both for leading the way, in 2008, as the first major investor in Gambella and for the large scale at which it has sought to undertake its project (Dubey 2012; Bose and Mehra 2012). Initially a floricultural firm, specializing in export-oriented rose production in India, Karuturi expanded its operations to Ethiopia and Kenya in the mid-2000s in order to take advantage of cheaper land and labor costs, more productive soils, and the lower tariff rates that the primary export market for roses, the European Union, offers to exporters based in African countries (Dubey 2012). After consolidating itself as the largest rose producer in the world by 2007, Karuturi's ambitions turned to achieving supremacy in global food production, as it looked to capitalize on the convergence of the systemic drive to close the global yield gap, the desire of African states to leverage such an imperative to attract foreign investment that could facilitate the achievement of the agrarian surplus necessary for industrialization, and the push by the Indian state to secure a longer run source of cheap food and biofuel sources necessary for the continuation of its development trajectory (Dubey 2012; Bose and Mehra 2012). For the company's chairman and managing director, Ramakrishna Karuturi, the rising land acquisition difficulties and labor costs associated with MNREGA meant that the "overall cost competitiveness of India for this kind of activity was not what it used to be" (quoted in Ahuja 2014).

In light of such domestic constraints, the huge 300,000 ha concession of prime fertile land in Gambella the company acquired from the Ethiopian state at a rate of one dollar per hectare per year constituted the necessary ground from which such ambitions of global food supremacy could be secured. Furthermore, in contrast to the rising capitalization costs associated with maintaining yield growth on deteriorating soils in India, the company noted that what it was granted in Gambella was "very good land. It's quite cheap. In fact, it is very cheap. We have no land like this in India. There you are lucky to get one percent of organic matter in the soil. Here it is more than five percent. We don't need fertilizer or herbicides. There is absolutely nothing that will not grow on it" (quoted in Vidal 2011). Taking into further account the abundant water resources of the Baro-Akobo river basin in which the land was located, Karuturi's management expressed full confidence that with the proper application of modern

industrial farming technology, the company would be able to extract from the land its full productive potential.

While it is evident that the principal actors of the Gambella land rush are motivated by varying factors, it is my contention that the project as a whole is fundamentally constituted as the penetration of a new untapped frontier, with the aim of constructing an ecological surplus that can provision the cheap food necessary for underwriting a new round of global capitalist accumulation and the development trajectories of the Indian and Ethiopian states. In the process, the principal actor responsible for operationalizing the large-scale agricultural production, Karuturi, envisions that it will be rewarded for its role in such ecological surplus making with sustained and high rates of profit. As this dissertation argues, the historical drive to forge an ecological surplus, whether in order to overcome ecological exhaustion or to initiate agrarian transition and industrialization, calls forth processes of global primitive accumulation that are informed by, and further reaffirm, the racialized society/nature distinction in which the knowing and acting being, the rational human, acts upon the irrational, passive, and "unthinking" nonbeing of nature in order to maximize efficiency through the extractive transfer of resources from low-value nature to higher-value industry. In this particular case, the Ethiopian state's claim that "this land is not used by anybody" and thus "it should be developed" (Rowden 2011, p. 14), alongside the World Bank's emphasis on the "yield gap," and Karuturi's assertion that this is "virgin land, which has never been plowed for hundreds of years" (Maritz 2012), suggests that the indigenous pastoralists and subsistence farmers of Gambella are incapable of generating and deploying the knowledge necessary for most effectively utilizing the "free gift" of nature found in Gambella's rich soils and abundant water resources.

The use here of "global primitive accumulation" to describe the Karuturi land concession in Gambella is distinct from the concept of primitive accumulation that has been widely deployed, and critiqued (Levien 2015; Martin and Palat 2014), in the land-grabbing literature. As mentioned earlier, primitive accumulation has been conceptually deployed to suggest that processes of land grabbing today are informed by the same logic of capital-labor formation first initiated in the English enclosures. By contrast, my argument here is that the land grab in Gambella is better understood as a moment of "global primitive accumulation," which I argue consists of the production and mobilization, via racialized enclosure involving the appropriation and erasure of indigenous knowledge and

practice, of frontiers of unused nature that can be exhaustively appropriated in service of the imperatives of development and accumulation in the core zones. In this case, however, the premise through which Gambella's reproductive conditions were denied, in order to recast its soils and waters as a "free gift" of nature, would rapidly shift the frontier from a condition of "surplus" to "exhaustion" as indigenous resistance and extra-human natures converged to sink the project.

Socio-ecological Formation in Gambella

It is mistaken to assume, as the principal actors in the Gambella agricultural project do, that its rich soils and abundant waters are constitutive of dormant virgin lands whose reproduction is not dependent upon the "primitive" inhabitants. An examination of the socio-ecology of the lands leased by Karuturi, which are located in the Jikaw district of Gambella province, reveals instead that the rich soils and abundant waters coveted by modernizing agents are constituted through a complex diversity of socio-ecological interactions in which the livelihood practices of the Anywaa people play a crucial role. While the Anywaa, depending upon the particular ecological region of Gambella within which they live (forests, grasslands, or riverbanks), practice a diverse array of livelihood strategies, those residing within or adjacent to Karuturi's land concession cultivate land along the banks of the Baro River, where annual floods are determinative in shaping the socio-ecological context. During the rainy season, which generally occurs between May and September, the Baro River rises and eventually inundates the lands in its floodplain. Much of this land is normally covered in dense forests, which perform the crucial function of absorbing much of the floodwaters (Woube 1999, p. 247). The effects on the land vary depending upon the speed and volume with which the floodwaters cover the plains. On the outer curve of the river, where the water moves rapidly and in high volume, it sweeps away much of the nutrients of the land, leading to soil erosion. On the inner curve of the river, by contrast, the floodwaters move slowly over the land, allowing for the gentle depositing of nutrient-rich organic matter (Kurimoto 1996, p. 45; Woube 1999, p. 246).

As Eisei Kurimoto's ethnographic research has shown, the "Anywaa riverbank cultivation is an adaptation to this ecological condition" (Kurimoto 1996, p. 44). Specifically, the Anywaa, utilizing a "folk knowledge of the environment," distinguish between the eroded and fertile soils

by identifying "two different weeds as indicators of the two parts," and they cultivate exclusively on the fertile soils using a hoe to prepare the land for planting (Kurimoto 1996, p. 44). During the rainy season, when the land is submerged underwater for several weeks, Anywaa farmers plant local flood-resistant varieties of maize and sorghum which, over many generations, have "adapted to the wet ecological condition." During the dry season, the post-flood re-fertilized soil retains enough moisture to allow for a second planting, a process known as "flood-retreat cultivation" (Feyissa 2011, p. 81; Kurimoto 1996, p. 45). The flood's annual renewal of the soil's organic content removes the "problem of exhausting soil fertility," allowing for the field to be "continuously cultivated forever unless the river changes its course" (Kurimoto 1996, p. 44). The relatively stable and sufficient production levels have provisioned the subsistence needs of the Anywaa, without, however, producing any significant surplus.

Beyond simply responding to nonhuman ecological forces, the cultivation practices of Anywaa farmers have, in turn, played an important role in reproducing the soil and hydrological properties of the riverbanks on which they live. In an investigation of "sustainable land-water management in the lower Baro-Akobo river basin," Mengistu Woube concluded that "floodwater farming systems have been an indispensable component of this humid tropical zone since the early Anuak [Anywaa] settlement" (Woube 1999, p. 242). Specifically, Woube argues that the Anywaa's hoe-based cultivation, protection of surrounding forests, and management of wetlands have ensured the proper balance between flooding and land infiltration capacity to allow for annual re-fertilization, rather than erosion, of the soil. These particular practices are informed by what we might consider a nonhuman-centered, embedded and relational, epistemology. The Anywaa scholar, Ojut Ojulu (2013), in a recent study on the effects of large-scale land acquisitions on indigenous people in Gambella, has argued that "for the Anywa indigenous people in Gambella land is something more than a productive economic resource" (286) and their concept of territory is "not that of the human being controlling and commanding the way in which the territory and its environment has to be governed and exploited" (289). Rather than celebrating a separation from, and mastery over, nature, for the Anywaa "the human being is only part of the bigger community of the living beings taking care of and benefiting from the territory and its environment." Informed by such an epistemological premise, in which other "living beings" steward, and therefore have a claim over, the territory, Anywaa socio-ecological practices do not accord the

"right to destroy the forest, because it does not belong to them alone but also to the rest of the living beings dwelling in these forests," and they further maintain that the "water resources have to be used in a way that does not disrupt the survival of the fish and other living beings in it" (Ojulu 2013, p. 288).

The inter-constitutive relations between Anywaa socio-ecological practices, epistemology, soil fertility, and water flows were, however, occluded from the Karuturi project's field of vision, which was restricted by what James Scott (1998) has referred to as the "cyclopean short-sightedness of high-modernist agriculture" (264). The narrow focus of high-modernist agriculture on production and profit "casts into relative obscurity all the outcomes lying outside the immediate relationship between farm inputs and yields" such as the long-term effects of agricultural practice on "soil structure, water quality, [and] land tenure relations." Reflective of what Scott has called the "imperialism of high-modernist ideology," which seeks to establish the "mastery of nature" through a process of "radical simplification" of socio-ecological landscapes, Karuturi and the Ethiopian state isolated, and privileged, the ecological inputs of soil fertility and abundant water which were particularly valuable for short-term productionist aims and discounted those factors deemed of less immediate value. Among those factors discounted were the local knowledge and agricultural practices of the Anywaa. During meetings convened in order to inform local communities of the state's intention to lease land to foreign companies for the purpose of large-scale agricultural production, state officials made it clear that the deals were premised upon the Anywaa's incapacity to productively employ the rich resources of Gambella. In one such meeting, the regional governor informed those present that the "lands you are using are not utilized. We have investors coming who will use more efficiently. Those who resist we will take all possible action" (HRW 2012, p. 31). On another occasion, officials made clear that "we will invite investors who will grow cash crops. You do not use the land well. It is lying idle" (HRW 2012, p. 54). Within the epistemic order driving the Ethiopian development project, then, Anywaa land use is necessarily understood as expressive of an irrational, and hence dangerous, misuse of bountiful resources of fertile soils and abundant waters.

In order, then, for the land to be put to rational use, it is necessary for the productive potential of the capital relation to be deepened in Gambella through processes of primitive accumulation that separate indigenous producers from critical means of subsistence, releasing in the process both

land and labor from the "irrational" grip of non-commodified socio-eco-logical regimes. For those living on Karuturi's land concession, this has involved the company's enclosure, and subsequent clearance, of thousands of hectares of forest that are vital to their socio-ecological reproduction. The forests, besides protecting against erosion, windstorms, and severe floods, provide local Anywaa communities with key resources for home building, medicine, and supplemental food gathering. Karuturi's clearance of the forests, in order to make way for large-scale agricultural production, was undertaken without any consultation with, or approval from, the communities on whose territory the forests were located. As a farmer from an affected village pointed out, "the local community was not consulted … we simply see them [Karuturi] cutting down the trees but we don't know who allow them" (field interview April 26, 2014).

Rather than meaningfully consult with local communities, Karuturi's projects necessarily called forth the "civilizing mission" which has been integral to the construction and penetration of the colonial-capitalist fron-tier. In line with the premise that the Anywaa are mired in "backward" or "primitive" agricultural practice, the promoters of this large-scale land deal, including the World Bank, the Ethiopian state, and Karuturi, sug-gested that such a project of agrarian transformation could enhance the livelihood prospects of local communities by facilitating a transition from the poverty trap of subsistence agriculture into better-paying jobs on large-scale farms (HRW 2012, pp. 100, 114–115). In addition, the agri-cultural project promised, through practices of corporate social responsi-bility, to connect hitherto isolated Anywaa villages to modern health, education, transportation, and communication networks.

In rendering the Anywaa people and their lands as passive "irrational" natures awaiting modernization by the superior human rationality embod-ied in state and capital, both the Ethiopian state and Karuturi reveal an epistemic blindness to the complex diversity of mutually constituting human and extra-human ecological actors in Gambella. Such "cyclopean shortsightedness" then allows for "rich" resources, such as fertile soils and abundant water, to be conceived in isolation from less valuable actors, such as the forests and local knowledge systems. Reconfiguring the socio-ecological order, Karuturi sought instead to bring its land to productive life through the introduction of universal industrial farming methods (heavy machinery, chemical pesticides, artificial fertilizers) that they argued had proven their worth in a variety of large-scale farming contexts (Bose and Mehra 2012; Dubey 2012). In order to rationally manage such

a massive and rapid injection of capital, Karuturi, citing again the lack of local expertise, employed experts in the form of agronomists and farm managers who had experience with industrial farming in India and those with experience with large-scale agriculture from Uruguay (Bose and Mehra 2012; Dubey 2012). Armed with the necessary capital and expertise, Karuturi cleared its lands of tens of thousands of hectares of forests, built the necessary dikes to properly harness and restrain the abundant water resources of the Baro River, and declared its intention of having 45,000 hectares under cultivation by 2012 (ICRA 2012a).

Can the River Speak? The Rise of the Baro and the Fall of Karuturi

The potentiality of producing cheap food in Gambella is thus premised upon both the appropriation of Anywaa socio-ecological knowledge and practice, integral as it is to the sustenance of the fertile soils and abundant waters that Karuturi seeks to act upon, and its erasure, as material recognition of the creative socio-ecological agency of local Anywaa communities would compromise the low cost of the land lease. Further, denying Anywaa practice and knowledge, as well as the agency of less important "extra-human" natures such as the forests of Gambella, is necessary to the initiation of the productive powers of the capital relation, as it enables soil fertility to be intensively and exhaustively acted upon without having to account for its reproductive conditions. This denial of the frontier's reproductive conditions, while potentiating capital's productive powers, simultaneously forecloses, however, the possibility of recognizing, and responding to, signals of ecological distress and exhaustion.

Scholars of political ecology are increasingly noting the agency of extra-human natures in escaping projects of mastery and shaping the formation and collapse of socio-ecological regimes. Timothy Mitchell (2002), in his groundbreaking article, "Can the Mosquito Speak?," revealed how massive attempts to master and control nature, such as large-scale irrigation development in mid-twentieth-century Egypt, have been profoundly undone and reshaped by nonhuman natures such as malaria-spreading mosquitos. Mitchell's point is that the success of development projects is not achieved by the application of an exterior human expertise upon passive nonhuman nature but rather involves the formation and deployment of knowledge through a relational ontology in which human and extra-human nature remake one another (2002, p. 37). While modernizing

development projects have been premised upon the epistemic subjugation of the nonhuman, Mitchell argues that it is nonetheless the case that extra-human nature has "never quite accepted this secondary role," and, as was the case with the mosquito in Egypt, the nonhuman often exceeds "human intention" and profoundly reshapes the trajectories of the projects within which human expertise has sought to act upon passive nature (2002, p. 37).

Mitchell's emphasis on nonhuman agency has been reaffirmed in recent years by critical political ecology perspectives which foreground the "limitations of mastery," in so much as they uncover how the subordination of nature is not equivalent to control (Schneider and McMichael 2010, p. 465) and that a "forgotten nature … which could be said to be taking its revenge … is in fact reminding us of its existence" (Serres, cited in Wittman 2009, p. 807). Moore (2010) highlights the constitutive socio-ecological dialectic of capitalism as world-ecology, in which extra-human nature, while epistemologically discounted, continues to shape, and be shaped by, the emergence and reproduction of capitalist accumulation. The moment of neoliberal ecological exhaustion has, in particular, been defined by the "creative responses of extra-human natures to the disciplines of capitalism" (406).

We can identify such a creative response as central to the stark failure of Karuturi's efforts at large-scale agriculture in Gambella where, despite having invested upward of 150 million US dollars in heavy machinery, sprays, fertilizers, clearing operations, dike construction, and so on, the operations were "sunk" as the Baro River repeatedly rose up, breached the flood-control dikes, decimated the company's cultivated area, and paralyzed much of the company's heavy machinery that was not designed to act upon waterlogged land (Sethi 2013; Davison 2013). In early 2011, prior to attempting to cultivate its first harvest, Karuturi was attracting global interest in its shares, which were trading at the time at nearly 40 rupees per share, largely due to its successful rose operations in Kenya and the potential that investors recognized in the low-cost high fertile land that Karuturi had secured in Gambella (ICRA 2012a). Having cultivated 12,000 hectares of corn that year, Karuturi expected to employ the returns on its initial harvest to expand the cultivated area to 45,000 hectares by May 2012 (ICRA 2012a). However, in the fall of 2011, as Karuturi prepared to harvest its initial crop of corn, its entire cultivated area of 12,000 hectares was inundated with flash floods as the Baro River overflowed and breached the dikes that Karuturi had constructed (Davison 2011b). The CEO of the

company, Ramakrishna Karuturi, expressed shock at the power and scale of the flooding, claiming that the floods could not have been predicted, particularly since they were stronger than any flood in recent memory (Bose and Mehra 2012; Davison 2011b). Karuturi, whose epistemological premise rendered him incapable of accounting for such ecological agency or feedback, expressed the limits of his company's expertise in the face of an "irrational" nature, as he claimed that "this kind of flooding we haven't seen before … this is a crazy amount of water" (Davison 2011).

The financial consequences of the flash floods for Karuturi included an immediate 15-million-dollar loss, in the form of expected revenue and damaged machinery, and a rapid 85 percent collapse in its share price, reflecting investor concerns over the future viability of the project, despite the low-cost, high fertile lands on which it was located (Bose and Mehra 2012; ICRA 2012a; Sethi 2013). Karuturi's response was not to consult with indigenous farmers who had deep local knowledge of flood patterns and management but rather to hire expert flood control and drainage firms from India and Holland to assess how best to control any future flooding that might impact its operations (Dubey 2012). Based upon such expert advice, the company moved to fortify its system of dikes, with the intention of completely altering the dynamics of the floodplain by preventing the flow of any floodwater near their land allotment (Bose and Mehra 2012; Sethi 2013). However, the following year, in August 2012, the fortified dikes only aggravated the overflowing waters, first pushing the water back toward the riverbank and causing serious damage to Anywaa villages and farmland, and then eventually, due to the intensification of the force of the water caused by the dikes themselves, the overflowing waters once again breached the dikes and caused substantial damage to the cultivated areas of Karuturi's farm operations (Sethi 2013).

The company could only make sense of the flooding through the same epistemic frames with which they had approached the investment, and which had foreclosed the agency of extra-human nature and indigenous people, as they argued that the floods were only further evidence that the land, while fertile and cheap, had hitherto been unused due to the antagonistic nature of the floodplain, and thus there was no question of any sort of land grabbing. Responding to the land grab narrative in light of the flooding, Karuturi argued that "we have been trying to convince people who've been making these allegations that these are floodplains where nobody stays, where nobody can reside or graze their cattle because most of the time they are under four or five feet of water" (Davison 2013b). At the

same time, Karuturi excused its own apparent incompetence in managing the floods by claiming that it had no prior knowledge of the extent of the flooding, due to a supposed lack of data on past flooding and rainfall in Gambella (Sethi 2013).

In making the floods intelligible in this way, however, Karuturi only further reinforces the epistemic foreclosure of modernist epistemology, as it presents the floods as a natural force that must be subdued by modern human expertise while at the same time denying the presence of indigenous people as thinking and acting beings who have long coexisted with the abundant waters of the Baro River. Contrary to Karuturi's assertions, there have been studies carried out on flood patterns in the Baro Akobo river basin that covers much of Gambella, including one of particular relevance that involved a 15-year study of what were termed "abnormal" flooding patterns between 1985 and 1999 (Woube 1999). The author of the study drew a distinction between normal and abnormal flooding in Gambella and argued that the latter, in the form of severe water overflow that negatively affected the livelihoods of indigenous farmers, could be primarily attributed to the ecological change induced by the Derg regime's attempts to introduce large-scale mechanized agriculture into Gambella. In particular, the study found that the deforestation necessary to make space for large-scale agriculture was a key factor in triggering the abnormal flooding in so much as it reduced the water absorption capacity of the land (Woube 1999).

While the scientific data is not readily available to confirm any link between Karuturi's massive forest clearance and the reduction of water infiltration capacity, affected Anywaa cultivators argue that the floods were intensified by the agricultural practices of the company (Sethi 2013). Besides the effects of forest clearance, the role of the dikes was identified as central to aggravating and intensifying the floodwaters of the Baro. The dikes, they argued, had blocked the natural flow of the waters and consequently effected a reverse flow back to the river (Fieldwork Interviews, April 30, 2014). In the absence of alternative infiltration areas, the floodwaters then gathered in even greater force and overwhelmed the dikes. Thus, far from signifying an "irrational" force of nature, the aggressive floodwaters were co-constitutive forces in an emergent socio-ecology of large-scale industrial agriculture.

From the perspective of the local Anywaa cultivators, the failure of the Karuturi project could be attributed to the epistemic rift that underpinned

its efforts to institute a socio-ecological regime organized around the imperatives of profit-oriented production. As a resident of a village located in the heart of the Karuturi land concession made clear,

> It's because he [Karuturi] never consulted the local people about the seasons of planting, this is why he was victim of flood. There is no problem of Baro River for farming. He doesn't listen to any local people—they listened to the highlander experts, but naturally we know the nature of the land. (Fieldwork Interviews, April 26, 2014)

This discounting of local knowledge left Karuturi unaware of the mutual constitution of a diversity of human and nonhuman ecological actors. Besides drowning Karuturi's project, the aggravated floods wrought by forest clearance and dike construction risk undermining the fertile soils that had mobilized the project in the first place, as the increase in velocity and volume of the floodwaters threaten to carry away, rather than gently deposit, the rich organic nutrients responsible for the annual re-fertilization of the soils.

Beyond aggravating the flooding of the Baro, the failure to involve Anywaa communities as knowledge-producing actors fundamentally exposed the "development" or "civilizing mission" pretense of the Karuturi investment in Gambella. Fieldwork observation and interviews in Anywaa villages along the riverbank directly adjacent to Karuturi's cultivated acreage revealed that, though the project disrupted Anywaa livelihoods, it offered little in the way of secure alternatives pointing to a more prosperous future. (Fieldwork Interviews, April 26–30, 2014; OI 2015 presents similar findings). Significant among the disruptions, in addition to the adverse social impacts of the flooding mentioned earlier, was the extra distance, due to Karuturi's forest clearance, that villagers had to travel to hunt, collect firewood, and gather medicinal plants. The loss of food supplies and materials, whether due to flooding or forest clearance, was not, as promoters of the project had promised, made up for by food provisioned by Karuturi's more productive farming methods. Much of the acreage was dedicated to cash flex crops, destined for extra-local, national, regional, and global markets, rather than the variants of maize and sorghum preferred for local consumption. Locals had little to show, by way of concrete evidence, that could affirm the promises of enhancing village-level infrastructure for the health and education sectors. The limited

employment generated was described by locals as offering insufficient compensation, particularly in comparison to the wages offered for similar work to highlander employees.

Quite often, in fact, wages were simply not paid to Anywaa employees who had worked on the farm. This was reflective, many believed, of the inferiority ascribed to Anywaa labor, as evident most disturbingly in their characterization by Karuturi's farm managers as "non-people" (Oakland Institute 2015, p. 10). Local Anywaa communities, it must be emphasized, have responded with various forms of resistance and opposition to the forms of alienation, exploitation, and exclusion visited upon them by large-scale agricultural schemes. Regarding Karuturi specifically, Anywaa workers collectively filed a lawsuit for unpaid wages in the provincial courts of Gambella, exposing in the process Karuturi's impending financial collapse (Fieldwork Interview, April 27, 2014). More broadly, Anywaa alienation from large-scale agricultural projects has elsewhere been expressed in armed attacks on investors in the heart of "Anywaaland" (Johnson 2012), as well as in the central role played in anti-land-grabbing global shaming campaigns by diasporic Anywaa communities, in collaboration with international NGOs, sharing the stories of those marginalized in Gambella who are unable to speak out directly themselves for fear of state repression (Dubey 2012; Oakland Institute 2013, 2015). As part of such efforts toward building international solidarity, Anywaa diasporic organizations have developed links with anti-land-grabbing peasant organizations in India, gesturing perhaps toward more decolonial South-South relationships (Mittal 2013).

The Anywaa resistance, in exposing the social consequences of the exclusionary premise of Karuturi's venture, works alongside the Baro's floods to caution states and investors against supporting such projects. As a result, Karuturi has been unable to secure financing from creditors increasingly wary of being associated with such a publicized case of land grabbing which, combined with the losses suffered from the persistent flooding detailed above, has significantly hindered the company's ability to continue with operations in Gambella and beyond (Davison 2013a; ICRA 2012b; Balasubramanyam 2013). Forced, by creditors seeking returns on outstanding debts, to relinquish control of its major rose farm in Kenya in 2014 (Wahome 2014), Karuturi, though quite inactive in Gambella since 2013, formally closed down operations and declared bankruptcy there in early 2015 (Fekade 2015).

Conclusion

The underlying epistemological order that informs, and is re-inaugurated by, the strategies of primitive accumulation that have been forwarded in the pursuit of the "new" ecological surplus in the post-crisis context both enabled and undermined Karuturi's attempt to construct Gambella as a staging ground for its launch into global supremacy in food production. While the cheap, fertile land and abundant water resources mobilized Karuturi's investments, the reduction of diverse "natures" to inputs for profit generation left the company unable to account for how such fertility and water abundance had been produced and maintained, rather than simply lying in a dormant, virgin state, through the mutual constitution of human and extra-human natures that was enabled by the Anywaa's broader epistemological and ontological orders of "coexistence." In this case, the attempt to extract "cheap inputs" without accounting for the biophysical foundations of such extraction led to a particularly dramatic and rapid moment of collapse in the attempt to constitute a post-neoliberal socio-ecological regime.

In concluding this chapter, I refer to two significant implications of the failure of the Karuturi investment in Gambella for wider debates on land grabbing, agrarian change, and international development. The first concerns the limitations posed by concepts such as the "yield gap" in determining directives for agricultural investment and development. In assuming a "lack" in local capacity, the yield gap epistemic frame ignores how the space between current and potential production levels is actively produced, rather than passively wasted, in order to sustain a given landbase's socio-ecological conditions of possibility. The second, and related, implication draws primarily from my fieldwork in Gambella, where an overwhelming majority of people I spoke with in Anywaa communities expressed an eagerness to engage projects of agrarian change which would foster local agricultural innovation and further diversify their livelihood sources. Rather than express a resistance to any sort of change, they emphasized that what they were opposed to was their exclusion from efforts to enhance productivity or further regional and national development. If their participation was made more central, Anywaa cultivators insisted that they could facilitate, based upon their own long-standing knowledge systems rooted in the local landbase, more ecologically sensitive and socially inclusive forms of agricultural development that would be less prone to failure than the Karuturi project. Such an approach to agrarian change would, however, require viewing Gambella, not as a frontier of virgin lands and primitive inhabitants but rather as a dynamic socio-ecology of mutually constituting, and sustaining, human and extra-human life forces.

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Bringing African Scholarship Back In: Lessons from the Pan-African Political Project

Gemma K. Bird

Introduction

In discussions of continent-wide models of solidarity and pan-national collaborations, contemporary discussions often refer to the European Union as the only real attempt to economically or politically federalize. Often marginalized, and widely ignored, narratives of a political attempt at collaboration are those of Senegalese president Léopold Sédar Senghor's universal civilization and the pan-African movement of the 1950s and 1960s associated with the work of Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzanian president Julius K. Nyerere. Any reference to the European project is intended only to highlight the narrative focus often found in contemporary discussions, it is not intended to conflate two very different models nor to suggest that the value of analyzing African approaches in anyway depends on the existence of a European alternative. As such not only the similarities but also the differences between these projects will be a key element of the discussion and the lessons taken from this analysis will be intended to stand-alone as valuable interventions to our understanding

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of transnational politics. Building on this, this chapter will ask whether there are lessons to be learnt from a re-reading of this time period for contemporary international relations and will seek to address the often negative discussions associated with the African continent in international discourse. In doing so, the aim is to demonstrate the centrality of Africa to understanding and developing conceptions of pan-national citizenship and ideas of citizenship beyond that of the nation-state.

Associated with the views of the presidents and political class of the newly independent states and attempts at collaboration in Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania, to name just a few, pan-Africanism was a "manifestation of fraternal solidarity among Africans and people of African descent" (Padmore 1972, p. 95). It was, according to George Padmore, viewed by scholars and politicians involved in the movement as an "an aid to the promotion of national self-determination" (Padmore 1972, p. 106). He suggests that, contra to contemporary concerns regarding European integration, pan-Africanism was viewed as an approach to strengthening sovereignty rather than to weakening it, strengthening the economic and political autonomy of member states through a bond of cooperation and collaboration. In making such claims, Kwame Nkrumah recognized that "divided we are weak; unified, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world" (Nkrumah 196, p. xi). Such a bond of cooperation intended not only to strengthen the economic position of member states but also, according to Léopold Sédar Senghor, to present a model of citizenship and collaboration suitable not only to fit "Africa and the twentieth century, but first of all to fit man" (Senghor 1962, p. 17). In making these claims, Senghor talked of the necessary role for African politicians and scholars in shaping and developing what he referred to as the universal civilization; an international community grounded on his view of a "culture in its universal dimensions" (Senghor 1962, p. 90). In his 1962 monograph "Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism," Senghor argued that "Europeans claimed to be the only ones who have envisaged culture in its universal dimensions" but, he argued, that this was, in fact, not the case. Rather, "we had little difficulty in demonstrating that each exotic civilization had also thought in terms of universality, that the only merit of Europe in this regard had been to diffuse her civilization throughout the world, thanks to her conquests" (Senghor 1962, pp. 90–91). Yet even as Senghor made this response to European scholarship in 1962, his model disappeared again from common discourse raising the important question of African narratives being "invisibilized and written over" as suggested by Zubairu

Wai in the introduction to this very volume. There are interesting similarities to be drawn here between Senghor's views and those of contemporary cosmopolitans who recognize a basic universal conception, "a folk philosophy, and implicit in that folk philosophy are all (or many) of the concepts that academic philosophers have made central to their study in the West" (Appiah 1992, p. 87). Rahul Rao suggests that Western cosmopolitanism fails to recognize the value of particularism, fraternity, and solidarity that can be achieved while remaining within a universal or cosmopolitan framework:

> While the material self-sufficiency of elite cosmopolitan theorists confirms them in their individualism and enables them to recommend the repudiation of particularistic attachments such as ethnic solidarities, such attachments are often a resource for effective political action and mutual support among the less powerful. (Rao 2012, p. 170)

In making these claims, the chapter is able to suggest the value of "bringing these scholars back in" to discussions surrounding universal and pannational citizenship and accepting their views as providing lessons for contemporary international relations scholarship. This is not to suggest that a critical engagement with these ideas is not important, in particular the somewhat essentialist claims made by Senghor, Nyerere, and Nkrumah in terms of their reliance on race-based citizenship. While these critiques will play an important role in analyzing the thought and ideas of these thinkers, the importance of reintegrating their voices into discussions of international relations, to reversing the "writing over" process, remains fundamental to our ability to learn and develop. In fact, engagement with these critiques further highlights the importance of these ideas to furthering our understanding, in particular the value of engaging with dialogues emanating from these ideas and the possible influence these broader dialogues, as well as the scholars themselves, can have for our understanding of international relations.

Originating in the 1890s as a scholarly protest movement and engine of solidarity, made famous by the writings of W.E.B. DuBois (1903/2008), the post-colonial African leaders suggested pan-Africanism had value beyond an imaginary sense of fraternalism, viewing it instead as a potential model for political organization on the continent, an approach they believed could change the economic position Africa found itself in in relation to Western and Eastern powers. Julius K. Nyerere and Kwame

Nkrumah were heavily involved in the pan-African movement as well as the continent-wide struggle for independence, while Léopold Sédar Senghor's conception of Négritude heavily emphasized an understanding of identity divorced from national boundaries and borders but attached to a conception of race and a desire to overcome colonial oppression. What makes this element of their political thought particularly interesting is the reliance and emphasis on African values, both within their own political states and as a foundation for the arguments they made for a collaborative African project.

The broader pan-African movement with which Nyerere and Nkrumah are often associated originated in the late 1890s and early 1900s with the first pan-African conference taking place in London in 1900. The movement is associated with a wide range of politicians, activists, and scholars, becoming particularly popular in the 1920s when it was associated with W.E.B DuBois and the activism of Marcus Garvey. It was grounded in a response to oppression, alienation, and a loss of dignity deemed to be shared by all individuals of African descent spread across the globe. Similar to Senghor's Négritude, it relied on a common identity associated with individuals of African descent that tie them together. Scholars such as Peter Esedeke (1977) and Robert Chrisman (1973) recognize that the pan-African vision "has as its basic premise that we the people of African descent throughout the globe constitute a common cultural and political community by virtue of our origin in Africa and our common racial and political oppression" (Chrisman 1973, p. 2). Thus to "regain dignity is the mainspring of all their actions … the intellectual superstructure of Pan-Africanism has meaning only if one constantly reminds oneself that at its roots lie these deep feelings of dispossession, oppression, persecution and rejection" (Legum 1965, p. 15). It is the focus on a shared identity and what this concept actually means that has been a key element in the critique of this approach to transnational politics, in particular the focus on essentialism and race. As such, a detailed discussion of these critiques, focused on the work of Kwame Anthony Appiah, D.A. Masolo, and Achille Mbembe, will be included as well as the potential lessons that can be taken from the existing dialogues highlighted, as, as previously stated, it is not only the successes of the movement but also its critiques and failings that can provide justification for the importance of reintegrating these voices into international scholarship.

Pan-African intentions famously existed in the policies of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K. Nyerere, Ahmed Sékou Touré, Léopold Sédar

Senghor, and Jomo Kenyatta, among others. Debates regarding suitable aims and methodology for collaboration divided the continent, leading not only to the failure to either federalize or cooperate, but in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, a reversal of favorable trade agreements and collaborations, to the extent that "between 1975 and 1985 the East African Community folded, the border between Tanzania and Kenya was closed and Tanzania went to war with Uganda" (Smyth and Seftel 1998, p. 246). Tensions increased around discussions of collaboration and cooperation as suspicions arose surrounding the various motives of the leaders arguing for a federalized continent. Relations with Kwame Nkrumah, in particular, faulted as his intended dominance was recognized by other leaders. It became apparent that as the pan-African movement moved toward a political ideal in the 1960s, there was a noticeable rise in personality politics in which, as already suggested, Nkrumah in particular advocated for a federalized continent in which he was able to play a dominant role. Many of those advocating for a system of collaboration, as with the majority of power politics, saw their own model as superior and themselves at the center. As the West African Pilot observed in the early 1960s, "in Africa a struggle for leadership has already developed; until recently it was a tournament between Nasser and Nkrumah but Africa today contains many stars and meteorites, all of them seeking positions of eminence" (The West African Pilot, cited in Legum 1965, p. 55). As the movement increased in popularity, questions were also raised as to what a pan-African state should look like. Nkrumah argued for a "United States of Africa," while Julius Nyerere supported regionalized blocks, and other leaders such as Ahmed Sékou Touré and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt had yet further ideas. Not only did this lead to problems of leadership but also of vision, and eventually the pan-African movement of that time period began to break down.

That being said, this chapter will argue that taking into account the limitations and failings of the political pan-national project at this time and the critiques of essentialism levied against the approach, there are important lessons to be learnt from the time period, and choosing to "bring Africa back in" to discussions of international collaborations will provide valuable lessons for understanding international relations (both in and with Africa but also elsewhere) in the future. Due to the limited intervention of this chapter into the debate, I will be focusing on the work of only three primary scholars in analyzing the potential lessons for contemporary discussions that can be garnered from a reading of 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s pan-national discourses: Kwame Nkrumah, Julius K. Nyerere, and

Léopold Sédar Senghor. This is not to suggest that the views of thinkers, such as Ahmed Sékou Touré, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Jomo Kenyatta, among others, do not equally provide lessons for understanding ideas of post-national citizenship, rather, that these three scholars provide a broad sample of notions of how collaboration or federation would work and are thus a valid starting point for reintegrating the lessons of the post-colonial period to discussions of post-state citizenship. I am carrying out this work in the context of lessons that can be learnt from these scholars for an understanding of citizenship that goes beyond the borders of the nation-state, concentrating instead on the values of continental and universal models of understanding and collaboration for the betterment of contemporary citizens. The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections: intervening in the current conversation (intended to further ground this discussion in the literature), lessons for cosmopolitanism, lessons for citizenship, and finally, a brief discussion of the legacy of the three scholars on later revolutionary movements on the continent by way of supporting my concluding remarks.

Intervening in the Current Conversation

It is important when advocating for the reintegration of scholars into conversations to be clear about exactly which conversations these particular scholars have something to contribute. As such, this chapter feeds in to recent debates (Stephens and Squire 2012a, b; Isin 2012; Balibar 2012) that aim "to uncover alternative spatialities and temporalities of citizenship" (Stephens and Squire 2012a, p. 434). In doing so the chapter presents an argument for the importance of including previously marginalized voices in these discussions, voices that offer a unique understanding of citizenship guided by cultural, temporal, and political influences and experiences. Borrowing from Ndlovu-Gatsheni's chapter in this volume, the purpose of this discussion is the "reconstitution and reproduction of Africa not as a pupil of Europe but as a site of power, knowledge and influence." The intention of this chapter is not to develop a new model of citizenship or to suggest that discussions of post-national citizenship do not already exist in the literature. Rather it is to build on previous work (Bird 2016) that emphasizes the value of integrating historical understanding of pan-national citizenship emanating from the African continent into contemporary discussions in this area.

When embarking on discussions of successful pan-national collaborations, the most common example discussed, either favorably or negatively, is the European Union. There exists a current literature focusing on a conception of pan-national citizenship within the boundaries of the European Union. For example, in his 2001 discussion of the difference between understanding individuals as members of the European Union or as citizens, Jeffrey Checkel refers to two conceptions of pan-national communities: "(1) they may provide domestic agents and actors with new understandings of interests and identities (constitute them); (2) they may simply constrain the choices and behaviors of self-interested agents with given identities" (Checkel 2001, p. 180). It is in terms of the first conception that I argue Nyerere, Senghor, and Nkrumah intervene on the topic of pan-national citizenship and identity. While EU integration, especially in terms of the recent migration crisis, maintains a strong focus on national borders and identity and is established alongside the rights and duties owed to the state, the initial project set forth by particularly Nkrumah, but also early on, Nyerere, emphasized pan-African citizenship and identities as a positive force for transforming the continent beyond an understanding of the nation-state. They viewed individuals from across the continent as primarily Africans and secondly as having loyalties to particular bordered nations. Senghor even went so far as to critique "territorial nationalism as he strongly believed that the unitary state was now historically outmoded" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, this volume) and could not provide a successful model for the future. Underpinning such thinking is the recognition that "both colonizers and colonized will have to create a new civilization and a new humanism" (Wilder 2015, p. 143) that looks beyond the model of closed national borders and starts to see citizenship as a pan-national project, separate and unique in its origins to the European project, with valuable lessons for our understanding of citizenship beyond national borders.

Lessons for Cosmopolitanism

Pan-Africanism was, for Nkrumah, based on the improved opportunities it had the potential to create for Africans interacting with the rest of the world. He claimed that, "a union of African states will project more effectively the African personality: it will command respect from a world that has regard only for size and influence" (Nkrumah 1961, p. xii). The concept of an "African personality," like similar language discussed by these

scholars such as African identity, is unclear in its definition and often utilized to cover a plethora of ideas. Concepts such as these have, in recent African scholarship (Appiah 1992; Masolo 1994; Mbembe 2001), been broadly critiqued as unhelpful theories, in fact "part of the politics of representing" (Masolo 1994, p. 291) that are often associated with colonialism due to a failure by these scholars to properly critically engage with history becoming instead "a matter of liturgical construction and incantation rather than historical criticism" (Mbembe 2001, p. 2)—critiques which are important to keep in mind while analyzing the concepts presented but do not suggest that said analysis cannot provide lessons for international relations and should thus remain silenced. Nkrumah's usage, whilst unclear regarding what he means by the concept, takes it to refer to all factors he views as specific to, and special about, what it means to live, work, and exist within the African continent. He takes this to be a shared concept, specific not to one country, area, or cultural group but to the continent as a whole which can form the foundations of pan-Africanism. The hope behind pan-Africanism was that it would provide the conditions for Africa to reassert itself in global politics. He supported an African system of government founded on traditional African thought systems, run and dictated by Africans (rather than external colonial rulers), for the benefit of Africa. He suggested that it was clear that the solution to African problems needed to come from Africa, because "divided we are weak; unified, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world" (Nkrumah 1961, p. xi), economically, politically, and culturally. Such a conception of a "force for good in the world" is a theme that is common across the three scholars. The focus beyond the borders of the African continent playing an "essential role in the edification of a new humanism, more human because it will have reunited in their totality the contributions of all continents, of all races, of all nations" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 52) establishes the thinking of the three scholars as being a vision for human, rather than bordered citizenship, demonstrating the importance of these works for contemporary cosmopolitanism's understanding of the "citizen of the world."

Nyerere made similar claims regarding the purpose of unity. A divided continent was, for him, one of the greatest risks facing a newly independent Africa. He strongly believed that squabbling within the continent would weaken the relative position of every nation as well as the continent in its entirety. In his speech "Africa must not fight Africa," Nyerere defended his belief that "the weakness of Africa is a constant invitation and

a constant encouragement to the exploiters of Africa to suck Africa with impunity. Only a strong Africa can stop this. But there can be no strong Africa and no salvation for Africa except in unity" (Nyerere 1968/1973, p. 219). Unity, for him, would provide an opportunity for the citizens of the continent to live a life of fulfillment and growth. It was his belief that the current problems were rooted in Africa's constant economic race to the bottom as a method for encouraging investment, as well as the continent's choice to politically imitate and court the West or East to encourage aid. Nyerere, similarly to Nkrumah, supported a system of unification, although, unlike Nkrumah he supported a project of collaboration rather than federalization as the only solution to these problems. As this chapter will demonstrate in the coming paragraphs, such ideas have even greater prevalence underpinning Senghor's discussions of Négritude.

However, before moving on to a discussion of Senghor's position, it is important to clarify that in discussing a unified African identity, Nyerere, in particular, and Nkrumah to a lesser extent, did not ground their arguments in a denial of difference; they did in fact recognize that Africa was a continent made up of diverse political and cultural situations that should be maintained and in fact glorified. However, it was their argument that these cultural and political differences, rather than being seen as barriers to unification, should in fact be included in a pan-African model that was able to recognize and celebrate them:

> It is no use waiting for differences of approach, or of political belief, to disappear before we think of working for unity in Africa. They will not disappear. If we are ever to unite, the differences must be accommodated within our growing unity, and our growing unity must be shaped in a manner which allows for the existing differences. (Nyerere 1973, p. 13)

In making this claim, Nyerere recognized the political and cultural differences that were causing fractions among those political figureheads supporting collaboration, in particular the differences, previously discussed, in what that form of collaboration would indeed look like and the political differences between socialism and capitalism that existed on the continent. In reality, this escalated to a situation in which between 1975 and 1985, "Julius broke off the East African Community and made it impossible even to send a letter between Kenya and Tanzania, and so it lasted for nearly 10 years" (Bailey 1998, p. vi); while at a similar time, Tanzania went to war with Uganda and the dream of a federation of East Africa was lost

(at least in the time period in which Nyerere remained in power), it is still possible to take lessons from Nyerere's experiment. Not least the need to accept in both theory and practice the importance of recognizing difference when embarking on a model of collaboration. The failure to achieve this in reality for Nyerere in fact in part leading to the fracturing of the East African Community as the political differences between a socialist Tanzania and a capitalist Kenya supported by Eastern and Western powers became too difficult to overcome. The lesson here for contemporary attempts at post-national citizenship is the importance of both recognizing and supporting difference and not using it as a justification to close and strengthen borders. Such lessons are particularly interesting for considering a cosmopolitan political approach.

In contrast to the largely political aims of both Nyerere and Nkrumah, Senghor's views on the value of collaboration were grounded not only in political goals for future development but also in the lessons Africa had to offer for the development of a universal understanding of culture, one based on the premise that "man (not only African man) remains our ultimate concern" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 224). While there is a vast literature on the Négritude movement, it is impossible within the remits of this chapter to consider it in any depth. However, a brief introduction of Senghor's views is required to provide the context for the following argument. As a political, artistic, and cultural movement, Négritude originated among the diaspora communities in Paris in the late 1930s among the elites of West Africa and the Caribbean. It remained a powerful tool of rebellion against the European colonizers until the start of the 1960s (Bird 2017). On becoming the first president of independent Senegal, Senghor maintained a strong political and academic relationship with France, believing in the possibility of a Euro-African partnership. He supported a model of development supported by, and in collaboration with, Europe: "we must build our own development plan, based on European, socialist contributions and also on the best of Negro African civilization" (Senghor 1962, p. 60). This is not to say that he intended to copy the West, but rather that he underwent a process of reimagining development and citizenship as a collaborative project, envisioning an understanding of a universal culture grounded in lessons from a broad range of cultural and societal norms. He suggested that having successfully re-built individual states and a federal state of Africa, the continent should remain "freely associated with France in a Confederation" (Senghor 1962, p. 15).

In making these choices, he was rethinking citizenship beyond the nation-state, envisioning it instead as a process of confederation and collaboration in which he viewed his own citizenship as not being constrained by borders, instead seeing himself as an international citizen, or a citizen of the world, shaped by different cultural, social, and societal experiences associated with his life in both Africa and the West. This ability to blend cultural experience in the creation of his own understanding of citizenship does indeed provide lessons for our conception of citizenship outside of state borders. However, Senghor's ability to establish this blending is based on his own privileged position, and the positive associations he had with French influence may not be shared by the Senegalese citizens who were unable to spend time receiving an education in Paris. This does not detract from the value of his vision for a human civilization, but it does highlight the role that privilege plays in establishing it, feeding quite clearly into contemporary discussions in politics and international relations about individuals who feel that they have lost out in a globalized world, a factor that must take prominence when discussing contemporary cosmopolitanism.

That being said, parallels can be drawn with Senghor's view and a form of moral cosmopolitanism which views the philosophical underpinnings of personhood to be premised on an understanding of individuals as having equal and intrinsic moral worth. As Pauline Kleingeld argues, "moral cosmopolitanism is the view that all human beings are members of a single moral community and that they have moral obligations to all other human beings regardless of their nationality, language, religion, customs, etc." (Kleingeld 1999, p. 505). Senghor's model of a universal civilization recognizes the value of nationality, religion, language, and customs but suggests that these can be celebrated alongside an understanding of human civilization that can be defined in humanist terms as universal. As such, it was Senghor's philosophy that the achievement of African emancipation, as a result of a re-established sense of pride in both individual and collective Négritude, was not the ultimate end of the movement: "unlike so many of his political counterparts elsewhere in Africa, the politics of Senghor does not constitute an end in itself but is geared to the more encompassing aim of cultural liberalization" (van Niekerk 1970, p. 29).

Alternatively, he viewed this as a fundamental first step in the creation of a new universal civilization. A civilization that would benefit not only colonized people but also Western cultures on which the notion of universality was, he argued, founded. It was his opinion that accepting Western

culture as the foundation of a universal civilization was a mistake. What he has been criticized for, however, is rather than offering an alternative understanding of politics, "the idea of a universality different from Western rationality is never considered" (Mbembe 2001, p. 13), rather he contributes an African layer to our understanding of a concept grounded in Western liberalism. The concept of civilization, as it is presented by Senghor, is somewhat vague. However, based on the assertions made regarding its potential universality, it can be assumed that Senghor viewed it as a shared human condition under which different conceptions competed and as such lessons taken from it can be understood on this basis. It is possible to draw similarities with the concept of a "clash of civilizations" as presented by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1993). In contrast to Huntington, Senghor's argument was not that different religious, or cultural, groups should compete until one was deemed superior, but rather, that the hierarchical condition should be reversed and a human, or universal, civilization should be created based on the best elements of all cultures. He viewed Négritude as setting the parameters for the emancipation of Africans to allow them to engage on equal footing with the dominant cultures of the time and to enable just dialogue between civilizations—seeing it as enabling individuals to firstly recognize their own worth and then draw on this to enable them to interact with other cultural groups as equals. His arguments for this will become clear in the following discussion. Similarly, to Kleingeld's definition of moral cosmopolitanism, this model recognized, at least in theory, that "all human beings should be regarded as 'fellow citizens and neighbors' (Plutarch) regardless of their national, ethnic, religious, or other particular affiliations as worthy of equal moral concern and advocate impartiality and tolerance" (Kleingeld 1999, p. 505) in establishing an understanding of what culture should involve.

Not only is it possible to draw parallels between Senghor's conception of a universal civilization and a Western conception of cosmopolitanism, it is also possible to take lessons from his model. Not least his focus on the need to work in collaboration with the ex-colonial states: "freely associated with France in a Confederation" (Senghor 1962, p. 15). He was however clear that that relationship must be based on the grounds of equality, a key lesson from the movement. Senghor believed that the strength of the Négritude movement was in guiding Black people to recognize the value of their Blackness and to use this to contribute to the future of not just Africa but the world more generally. In defining this

mission, he suggested that it was the role of Africans not only to shape their own future but rather to create a model suitable not only to fit "Africa and the twentieth century, but first of all to fit man" (Senghor 1962, p. 17). However, he accepted that this would not be possible unless the various civilizations of the world, as he saw them, engaged with one another as equals.

One of the key criticisms of Senghor's conception of the universal civilization, as well as Négritude more broadly, comes from Achille Mbembe who condemns his focus on race and his approach based on the importance of contributing to a Western dominated notion of universality. As mentioned elsewhere, this chapter argues that it is not only the thinker's successes that provide important lessons for international relations but also the areas in which they have been critiqued. Mbembe condemns Négritude and the "differing variants of pan-Africanism" as emphasizing the notion of race as serving "the moral basis for political solidarity" and in doing so failing to critically engage with the notion of race as a distinguishing factor, fighting instead only against "the prejudice that assigns this race an inferior status" (Mbembe 2001, p. 13) and not against the prejudice that views the notion of race, itself, as holding value at all. In doing so, he suggests that thinkers such as Senghor, Nyerere, and Nkrumah fail in their attempt to reimagine the universal as they fail to imagine it as being "different from Western rationality" (Mbembe 2001, p. 13), seeing it instead as a blending of Black culture with the culture of the West (Mbembe 2001). Mbembe's specific critique of these thinkers provides a valuable lesson for cosmopolitanism more broadly and the continued need to critically engage with the concept of race itself. While understanding of the critique is, as suggested, profoundly important, so is understanding the dialogue surrounding it. As Amy Niang discusses in her chapter in this book, for Senghor and thinkers like him, "emancipation from Empire entailed a restoration of 'Man,' of the subject as ontologically constitutive of Humanism" (this volume), and as such his intention was to present a conception of civilization based on his understanding of man, his focus on race was his approach to achieving this and to readdressing the imbalance and inequality caused by colonialism. It is through discussions of historical, previously marginalized narratives such as these that we can start to have this conversation, understanding why Senghor and the others approached this topic as they did based on the reactionary nature of their thought to the colonial situation but asking how this can be overcome and critically engaged with by contemporary international relations scholarship.

Lessons for Citizenship Studies

Having introduced the conversation into which this chapter fits and discussed this in terms of cosmopolitan interventions associated with Senghor, Nyerere, and Nkrumah, it is important to consider in greater detail how these interventions also relate to the contemporary discussions of citizenship previously referenced, in particular Étienne Balibar and Engin Isin's discussions of post-national citizenship. This section will continue to build on previous work (Bird 2016) that has argued for the relevance of the work of Nyerere and Senghor to contemporary discussions of activist citizenship, suggesting that they, as politicians and thinkers, were able to rethink what it meant to be a citizen, beyond a bounded notion of nationalism and in terms that stood outside the colonial model. The notion of citizenship that will be discussed in what follows is that of the activist citizen as presented by Engin Isin. Isin understands "acts of citizenship" to be those that establish an "actor." He describes acts of citizenship as "those deeds by which actors constitute themselves (and others) as subjects of rights" (Isin 2009, p. 371), without which they would merely be passive citizens living within the conditions set out for them. In contrast:

> Activist citizenship relies on the disruption of the status quo, the undertaking of a process of transformation that alters the framework in which the individual exists: If acts produce actors (or actors are produced through acts) then initially we can define acts of citizenship as those acts that produce citizens and their others. (Isin 2008, p. 37)

Thus, what it means to be a citizen according to Isin is not simply to be a member of a village, a town, a nation, a continent, or even the global community. Rather, citizenship results from a transformative act, a disruptive process through which the individual not only becomes a citizen in their own right but also has an effect on the community or space in which their citizenship is engendered: they transform it in some way (Bird 2016). As Isin argues "the concept of the act of citizenship seeks to address the myriad ways that human beings organize remake and resist their ethical-political relations with others" (2008), thinking about what it means to be political in new and original ways. In what follows I argue that the scholars discussed in this chapter act in a way that disrupts the colonial understanding of citizenship associated with nation-states and individuals and in doing so transforms our understanding of citizenship beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. It is on this justification that I suggest a case can

be made for the necessity of reintegrating these previously marginalized models of thought, "bringing Africa back in" to discussions of citizenship.

At the root of Nyerere and Nkrumah's pan-African solution was what they referred to as a "sentiment of 'Africanness,' a feeling of mutual involvement, which pervades all cultural and political life. There is, in other words, an emotional unity which finds expression in, among other things, concepts such as 'African personality'" (Nyerere 1967, p. 188). It was on the controversial grounds of a shared meaning of what it meant to be African that it was claimed unification could be possible. This understanding of what it meant to be African placed a heavy emphasis on community and mutual involvement, which it was believed were grounds on which political differences between states could potentially be overcome. Nyerere and Nkrumah were arguing that a single African underlying philosophy, a "folk philosophy" (Appiah 1992, p. 87), did exist. Similarities exist here between the views of these two African scholars and the work of contemporary citizenship studies. In particular, the recent conversation between Agamben (1993), Nancy (1991), Esposito (2010) and Isin (2012) focusing on the possibility of post-national citizenship. Each of whom "investigate how community has been mobilized as a strategic concept invoking certain images against others in political struggles" (Isin 2012, p. 450). Engin Isin argues that "to imagine citizens without nations requires a genealogy of fraternity" (Isin 2012, p. 465), a value that I argue is present in Nyerere and Nkrumah's ideas discussed above, in particular in their focus on a shared African identity or unified "African personality." Such an understanding of identity is, as previously suggested, not without its critics. Appiah suggest that "race and history and metaphysics do not enforce an identity ... we can choose, within broad limits set by ecological, political, and economic realities what it will mean to be African in the coming years" (Appiah 1992, p. 176) and, as such, what it means to be African historically. It is the argument of this chapter that Nyerere, in particular, has a response to this concern that ensures his conception of the pan-national citizen does not fall apart on the basis of accepting Appiah's claims. This response will become clear in what follows.

The initial project set forth by Nyerere emphasized pan-African citizenship and identities as a positive force for transforming the continent. It viewed individuals from across the continent as primarily Africans. It is on this basis that the chapter suggests that the model presented by Nyerere and Nkrumah can be viewed as a transformative act of citizenship: the

purpose was in altering the conception of what it means to be a citizen, expanding it beyond the limiting borders of national identity and viewing membership of the broader continent in terms of citizenship. Understanding, like Balibar, that "national identity, however effective it has been in modern history, is only one of the possible institutional forms of the community of citizens, and it neither encapsulates all of its functions nor completely neutralizes its contradictions" (Balibar 2012, p. 438).

In making this claim, it is important to reanalyze Nyerere's views on difference within the context of citizenship rather than cosmopolitan thought. Like contemporary scholars, he recognized that "citizenship as a political principle cannot exist without a community, but this community cannot be completely unified" (Balibar 2012, p. 438). As a reminder, it was his argument that differences, rather than being seen as barriers to unification, should in fact be recognized and valued by a pan-African model. This focus on difference does in some ways allow the theory to respond to Masolo and Appiah's concerns regarding the "re-presentation" of individuals as Africans when they may see themselves in distinct terms:

> It is no use waiting for differences of approach, or of political belief, to disappear before we think of working for unity in Africa. They will not disappear. If we are ever to unite, the differences must be accommodated within our growing unity, and our growing unity must be shaped in a manner which allows for the existing differences. (Nyerere 1973, p. 13)

Such conceptions of citizenship beyond the unified nation-state, instead focusing on differences, provide an example of a disruptive conception that has previously been ignored by traditional citizenship studies. This is not to suggest that these ideas are not being discussed now, as it is clear by the reference to Isin and Balibar that this is not the case, but rather that a re-reading of these African scholars provides a previously marginalized contribution to these discussions. It is possible to make similar claims regarding Kwame Nkrumah's views set out in, "The Revolutionary Path" (1973):

> We know that the traditional African society was founded on principles of egalitarianism. In its actual workings, however, it had various shortcomings. Its humanist impulse, nevertheless, is something that continues to urge us towards our all-African socialist reconstruction. We postulate each man to be an end in himself, not merely a means; and we accept the necessity of

guaranteeing each man equal opportunities for his development … Any meaningful humanism must begin from egalitarianism and must lead to objectively chosen policies for safeguarding and sustaining egalitarianism. (Nkrumah 1963, p. 441)

Throughout "The Revolutionary Path," Nkrumah explicitly states that his interpretation of traditional African society is of a society that was rooted in a sense of humanism. He suggested in the above passage that the notion that traditional African societies were egalitarian was uncontroversial. However, as with descriptions of what it means to be African or have an "African personality" mentioned previously, this is not the case. By failing to recognize the subjectivity of this claim, a situation is created in which his argument is lacking in evidence to support his assertion that traditional African societies were, indeed, egalitarian. However, that being said, the lack of evidence offered for the existence of traditional values does not take away from his argument that future political conditions should respect an egalitarian model and in this sense does not prevent us from drawing conclusions about the disruptive nature of his claims. His view placed a heavy emphasis on the rights of individuals to be viewed as citizens of a state rather than passive members and to treat all on a basis of egalitarianism that was missing from the colonial model. In this sense, not only can we draw parallels between the work of Nkrumah and contemporary discussions of "acts of citizenship," we can also learn from his failures to implement the model he recommended. It is not just the successes associated with the three thinkers that suggest the importance of "bringing Africa back in"; the value of analyzing previously marginalized politics also exists in the opportunity to learn from their failings. In making this claim, it is important to avoid falling into the trap of depicting "the continent in terms of lack" (Wai this volume) but rather to suggest that failures of implementation are a valuable resource for understanding post-national citizenship in the future, in particular Nkrumah's failure to substantiate and support his reading of history.

To build on a discussion of the lessons that can be garnered from the thinkers' failures, it is important to focus in more detail on the events that led to Nkrumah's exile. His party (the CPP) was widely associated with corruption. It was suggested early on in his rule that the officials around him were more interested in personal, material wealth than in the protection and development of the people. Manning Marable (referencing Makonnen) concluded that "the rhetoric of the CPP was socialist. But

watching the evolution of the regime from 1957 to 1966 … virtually none of the CPP leadership was really interested in defending the material interests of workers and peasants" (Marable 1987, p. 93) and, in fact, the ideology was being used not to deliver favorable political conditions to the people but rather to enhance the material wealth of high-ranking party officials. Discussions of the failings of Nkrumah and his regime are included to highlight the distinction between theory and practice—in the case of Nkrumah, his failure to utilize his socialist model to deliver the correct political conditions under which the citizens could realize a condition of equality. The distinction between theory and practice, also referenced in the previous section in relation to Nyerere's abandonment of the East African Community, is a key lesson to be taken from the pan-African movement. As Tom Young argues, there are a number of factors that affected the ability of these thinkers to transfer theory into practice in relation to both their national and, more relevantly to this chapter, their pan-national projects:

> Nkrumah spoke for many when he demanded social change 'like jet propulsion' but the harsh judgement must be that African elites understood as little of the former as they did of the latter … But it is also because the laws do not fit local communities and cultures who have alternative traditions and therefore other options. (Young 2003, p. 5)

Young's focus on the thinkers' lack of knowledge and experience, alongside local traditions and communities, suggests that while it is impossible to ignore individual agency while discussing the failings of Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Senghor, the distinction between their theoretical claims and the practical implementation of their policies may in fact stem from other concerns, and it is these concerns that provide lessons for contemporary international relations in the need to understand the requirements of social change, the effects of local traditions, and the construction of communities when thinking in terms of citizenship.

Legacy in Africa and Concluding Remarks

In concluding this chapter, I return firstly to the claims made in the introduction, of the value of reintegrating previously marginalized voices in discussions of international relations. The chapter has discussed the arguments of the post-colonial presidents that pan-Africanism had value beyond an imaginary sense of fraternalism, viewing it instead as a potential

model for political organization on the continent—an approach they believed could change the economic position Africa found itself in in relation to Western and Eastern powers. In doing so, it has highlighted not only the role this model played in 1950s and 1960s Africa but the lessons for contemporary discussions of both cosmopolitanism and activist citizenship that can be garnered from a reintegration of the work of Léopold Sédar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, and Julius K. Nyerere into the contemporary international relations literature. In carrying out these discussions, the chapter has engaged not only with the scholars themselves but also with their critics, suggesting that lessons can be learnt not only from the scholars but also from those that have engaged with them. This has not been intended to highlight the notion of "lack" within the continent but rather the existence of engaging dialogues that have value as a guiding framework for contemporary international relations.

In ending this chapter, I want to refer to the legacy of the pan-African movement in Africa and on the movements that followed, in particular the revolutionary movement of Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso in the 1980s. He argued that, "it falls to all Pan-Africanist people to give Africa hope by taking up the torch of Nkrumah" (Sankara 2007, p. 247). Similarly, much of his rhetoric parallels the views of Senghor, specifically the continued hope for the achievement of a universal civilization: "for we are convinced that we are headed toward a universal civilization that will lead us to a universal language" (Sankara 2007, p. 269). And, similarly to all three of his predecessors, he argued for the importance of unity: "we firmly believe in unity between peoples. This unity will emerge from shared convictions, because we all suffer the same exploitation and the same oppression, no matter the social forms or how it may be dressed up over the course of time" (Sankara 2007, p. 268). It has been the claim of this chapter that these lessons have the opportunity to step beyond the boundaries of the African continent of the 1980s, as seen by Sankara, and that bringing the voices of the pan-African movement "back in" offers lessons for contemporary discussions of citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and international relations more broadly.

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CHAPTER 11

Against Bringing Africa "Back-In"

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni

Introduction

This chapter deploys Ngugi wa Thiong'o's concept of "dismemberment" and "re-membering" as useful metaphors for thinking through the historical processes that have defined Africa's marginalization in the world, as well as a strategy for refining that place beyond notions of lack and peripherality. The former is an encapsulation of enslavement, mercantilism, colonialism, boundary making, genocides, epistemicides, linguicides, and Europhonism that contributed to the marginalization of Africa in world politics while at the same time keeping Africa within the nexus of the evolving capitalist world system. The latter highlights how these inimical processes of coloniality locked horns with decolonial initiatives predicated on decolonizing the mind, moving the center, and globalectics that continue work toward re-building Africa as a powerful and legitimate epistemic, political, economic, and social center of the world. Ironically, the processes of "dismemberment" unfolded simultaneously with the forcible incorporation of Africa into the evolving Euro-North American-centric world system and its ever-shifting global imperial/colonial orders.

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The chapter returns to these "dismemberment" and "re-membering" issues with a view to demonstrate the necessity for a paradigm shift from V. Y. Mudimbe's (1994) "idea of Africa" to the "African idea" advanced by Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009a, b). This approach is necessary in enabling a shift from the simplistic discourses of negativity, alterity, peripherality, and marginality to the complex alternative decolonial ones of Africa that was both "inside" and "outside" simultaneously and that continued to be a site of critical resistance thought and self-assertion. Both the "inside-ness" and "outside-ness" of Africa are determined by coloniality giving it the character of an insider who is pushed outside and an outsider who is kept inside forcibly. This complexity is missing in existing studies of international relations and conventional understanding of the position of Africa within the modern world system.

This complexity arises from a situation that Ali Mazrui captures in the epigraph above of a coloniality that delivered a double blow on Africa. The reality which is often missed in studies of Africa from the vantage point of international relations is that while initially Africa was dragged kicking and screaming into the nexus of Euro-North American-centric world system, its global orders and capitalist economy, once it was inside the bowels of the beast of coloniality, the African mental universe was fundamentally and deliberately changed to the extent that later the Africans imagined freedom and liberation in modernist and colonial terms of seeking deeper admission into the existing Euro-North American-centric modern world system. This was largely because the immanent logic of coloniality had successfully shaped even the terms of decolonization and African nationalism. This chapter, therefore, challenges the very premise of the politics of bringing Africa back-in as misguided and missing the complexity of Africa's position within the modern world system, world capitalist economy, and global imperial/colonial orders. Theoretically, the chapter is informed by decolonial epistemic perspective, which must not be taken as a singular school of thought but a broad family of decolonial thought, to which the pioneering work of Ngugi wa Thiong'o belongs as it is concerned about colonialism/coloniality/neo-colonialism as the foundational problem in Africa.

AGAINST BRINGING AFRICA BACK-IN

African cannot be brought "back in" to the bowels of Euro-North American-centric beast. It is already inside as a swallowed victim. Africa has to be rescued from "entrapment within the global colonial matrices of

power'" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014). The bid to help Africa escape from colonial entrapment motivated Samir Amin to write *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (1985) in which he urged Africa and other ex-colonized world to delink from the logic of the global system through privileging the logic of domestic development priorities so as to neutralize the immanent logic of colonialism/coloniality.

Fundamentally, Africa's modern behavior is inevitably shaped by the immanent logic of modernity, imperialism, colonialism, and neo-liberalism—in totality constituting "coloniality" as a global power structure (Quijano 2000). If we pay due attention to the role of the immanent logic of colonialism in Africa, it becomes clear that the continent and its people have over the past 500 years been dragged kicking and screaming into the bowels of the beast of Euro-North American-centric world system. The Asian decolonial-cultural theorist, Kuan-Hsing Chen, emphasized the long-standing impact of colonialism in these revealing words:

> Shaped by the immanent logic of colonialism, Third World nationalism could not escape from reproducing racial and ethnic discrimination; a price to be paid by the colonizer as well as the colonized selves. (Chen 1998, p. 14)

Departing from this point about the immanent logic of colonialism, the question of voluntary reproduction of coloniality by Africa and its willingness to be part of modern system of sovereign states deserves a critical decolonial analysis. It does not take away the dragging of Africa screaming and kicking but confirms its success as a technology of subjugation and domination (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014). The forcible dragging of Africa into a foreign political, economic, social, moral, and epistemological power structure intensified since the beginning of the fifteenth century. Politically and economically speaking, the technologies used to incorporate Africa into the nexus of an evolving modern, imperial, capitalist, colonial, Christian-centric, patriarchal, hetero-normative, and racial world system included mercantilism, the slave trade, colonization, neo-colonization, underdevelopment, structural adjustment programs, and neo-liberalism (Nkrumah 1965; Rodney 1972; Grosfoguel 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a, 2015a).

Ali A. Mazrui (1986, p. 13) highlighted five ways in which Africa was incorporated into the modern Euro-North American-centric world system. First, it was dragged into a discursive terrain of European-derived

ideologies (liberalism, capitalism, socialism, Marxism, communism, and fascism). Second, Africa was drawn into the orbit European languages. Third, Africa was pulled into a Euro-North American-centric "international law." Fourth, Africa has been problematically incorporated into a North American-centric technological age. Fifth, Africa has been disciplined and conquered so as to accept Euro-North American-centric moral order underpinned by Christianity. Building on this analysis, Mazrui (1986, p. 13) concluded that "What Africa knows about itself, what different parts of Africa known about each other, have been profoundly influenced by the West." This epic school on the impact of modernity and colonialism in Africa emphasizes the important fact that the continent and its people were forcible dragged into the modern world system and African people are entrapped within it.

Epistemologically speaking, the historicization and theorization of Africa ignored it as a legitimate unit of study and assumed what Mahmood Mamdani (1996) described as articulating African history "by analogy" using Europe and North America as historical templates. First, there was usurpation if not outright stealing of human history so as to re-articulate it in Eurocentric terms in which Europe became not only the center of the world but the repository of human history and human values. The result was what James M. Blaut (1993) described as the rise of "the colonizer's model of the world," and Paul T. Zeleza (1997) termed the "Athens-to-Washington" historiographical narrative of modern world history. Second, here was born what I have termed the "Hegelian-Conradian-Hugh Trevor Ropian" denial of existence of African history and the negativizing trope of a people without history (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015a).

The anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century were part of "bringing Africa back-in" rather than delinking and genuine decolonization. What emerged as African nationalism was itself shot through by the immanent logic of colonialism. Inevitably, as noted by Ramon Grosfoguel (2011, p. 18), nationalism provided "Eurocentric solutions to a Eurocentric global problem" particularly reinforcement of the notion of "the nation-state as the political institutional form par excellence of the modern/colonial/capitalist/patriarchal world system." It was, therefore, inevitable that even anti-colonial struggles that were mistaken for decolonization constituted "the most powerful myths of the twentieth century" (that of a "postcolonial world") (Grosfoguel 2007, p. 219) when in reality:

> The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live under the same "colonial power matrix." With juridical-political decolonization we moved from a period of 'global colonialism' to the current period of "global coloniality". (Grosfoguel 2007, p. 219)

In light of this reality of global coloniality, it is important to reflect more critically on the complex position of Africa in today's world politics so as to redefine a better intervention beyond the one determined by coloniality of "bringing Africa back-in." The key problem facing Africa which makes it fail to flex its muscles as a major constitutive site for the production of world politics and global power is that of "dismemberment" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2009a, b). The dismemberment and fragmentation invoked here is traceable to the very forcible dragging of Africa into the bowels of the Euro-North America-centric beast of coloniality. It speaks directly to the often-ignored foundational problem of first inventing blackness and whiteness and secondly pushing the invented black race out of the human family of not consigning it to the lowest echelons of the constructed racial human hierarchy and social classification of human species.

Dismemberment of Africa

Dismemberment is a concept developed by Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009a, b) to highlight the depth of colonialism as a fragmenting and alienation process in Africa. While those who have internalized colonially imposed slave mentality have simplistically and wrongly criticized Ngugi wa Thiong'o as an essentialist advocate of nativism and Afrocentric fundamentalism, here he is read as a leading and consistent decolonial theorist committed to the struggles of "re-membering" Africa and transcendence of entrapments of coloniality. Ngugi wa Thiong'o's scholarly interventions capture most succinctly not only the realities of physical fragmentation of Africa but also depth of epistemological colonization of the mind as well as "cultural decapitation" that resulted in deep forms of alienation and mental dislocation among Africans.

We have to take Ngugi wa Thiong'o seriously if we have to understand the complex position of Africa in the modern world system. Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009b) posited that the contact between Africa and Europe was "characterized by dismemberment" which he defined as an act of absolute social engineering. To Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009b, p. 5), the

African continent's dismemberment was "simultaneously the foundation, fuel, and consequence of Europe's capitalist modernity." He noted that "dismemberment of Africa occurred in two stages" covering the age of the reduction of black people to commodities that were available for sale on the global market (the Atlantic slave trade) during which "the African personhood was divided into two halves: the continental and its diaspora" and the Berlin Conference of 1884, which "literally fragmented and reconstituted Africa into British, French, Portuguese, German, Belgian, and Spanish Africa" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2009b, p. 5).

While Ngugi wa Thiong'o identified these two dismemberment processes correctly, he missed others. The first is what I have termed the "foundational dismemberment" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015b) which encapsulates the "color line" (that inscribed fundamental racial differences) as advanced by William E. B. Du Bois (1903), "imperial/racist reason" (that left black people out in the cold) as defined by Lewis R. Gordon (1995), "imperial Manichean misanthropic skepticism" (that questioned the very humanity of black people) as articulated by Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007), and "abyssal thinking" (that bifurcated humanity into two) as understood by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007). This "foundational dismemberment" entailed the very act of doubting the humanity of black people and justifications of pushing black people out of the human family and consigning them to what Frantz Fanon (1968) named as the "zone of non-being." This is where the beginning of understanding of dismemberment is traceable genealogically and historically speaking. It unfolded in terms of racial hierarchization of human species and social classification in accordance with assumed, imagined, and invented differential ontological densities. Race and scientific racism were effectively mobilized and deployed to sustain this imperial lie that wanted to be accepted as scientific reason.

The second form of dismemberment took the form of theft of history of Africa and the denial of its existence prior to the colonial encounters. This form of dismemberment was meant to deliberately disconnect African people from history, culture, and memory so as to "define and rule" them in accordance with the imperatives of coloniality (Mamdani 2013). As part of pushing forward the frontiers of this form of dismemberment, the racist German philosopher Hegel actively promoted the idea of a people without history and who possessed an underdeveloped spirit. He put it this way:

> At this point, we leave Africa not to mention it again. For it is not historical part of the world: it has no movement or development to exhibit […] what we properly understand by Africa is the Unhistorical, Underdeveloped spirit,

still involved in the conditions of mere nature, which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the world's history. (Hegel 1944, p. 99)

A "Hegelian-Conradian-Hugh Trevor Ropian" racist imperial discourse of writing Africa "out" of human history and reducing it to a site dominated by nothing other than darkness is part of the long-standing process of dismemberment (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015a). This form of dismemberment goes as far back as the era of commodification, dehumanization, and "thingification" (Césaire 1995) of black people (in what became known as the trans-Atlantic slave trade) during which enslaved black people were forcibly made to undergo a process of forgetting not only their original names but also their languages. V.Y. Mudimbe (1994, p. xii) understood this form of dismemberment very well to the extent of positing that "The geographical expansion of Europe and its civilization […] submitted the world to its memory."

According to Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009b, p. 9), the colonialist in his "attempt to remake the land and its people in his image" gave himself the power and right "to name the lands and its subjects, demanding that the subjugated accept the names and culture of the conqueror." In this process, even African "bodies" became "branded with a European memory" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2009b, p. 10). Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009b, p. 21) explained this destruction of memory and history in this illuminating way: "Get a few of the natives, empty their hard disk of previous memory, and download into them a software of European memory." The long-term consequences of this dismemberment process were human being out of sync with their history and memory, out of sync with their being, and human beings who have lost name, language, culture, and identity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015b). At play here were broader processes of mapping, naming, and owning as part of inscription of coloniality and dismemberment of Africanity.

The processes of dismemberment that cascades from modernity, enslavement, and colonialism are today produced and reproduced by the so-called postcolonial nation-states under the leadership black political elites. This is inevitable because the so-called postcolonial nation-states are an inherited colonially constructed institution, and the so-called black political elites in charge of these institutions are direct products of "westernized" schools, churches, and universities (Grosfoguel 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). It takes the form of dismemberment of ordinary people, that is, their continual reduction into rightless "subjects" rather than "citizens" (Mamdani 1996). At play in this form of dismemberment are authoritarianism and

repression as well as ethnic, gender, and class discrimination reminiscent of the age of direct juridical colonialism. Patriarchy continues as part of this "postcolonial" form of dismemberment with women and youth remaining very marginal in the corridors of power. But gain a deeper understanding of "dismemberment" of Africa, there is need to underscore the epic perspective on colonialism.

The Episodic Versus Epic Schools of Colonialism

The episodic school on colonialism was well represented by the Nigerian historian Jacob Ade Ajayi of the Ibadan History School. It took dates and periodization "as strong virtues in historiography" and calculated that colonialism only lasted for about 75 years (from 1884 to 1885 when Africa was partitioned to 1960 when many African countries gained political independence) (Osaghae 1991, p. 24). The episodic school minimizes the colonial impact on Africa as having been "shallow rather than deep, transitional rather than long-lasting" (Mazrui 1986, p. 13). For Ajayi (1969), colonialism is "an episode in African history." The episodic school underscored the role of African agency and initiative in the making of history even under the constrained circumstances of colonial rule. This nationalist school was ranged against the imperialist-colonial historiographical school that denied the existence of African history.

While the episodic school of colonialism helped to counter the colonial and imperialist technology of dismemberment that tried to erase and silence African history prior to colonial encounters, it fell into a trap of decoupling of colonialism from the broader wave of Euro-North American-centric modernity that radically transformed human history. Colonialism did not start in 1884–1885 as presented by Ajayi. Colonialism is a constitutive part of Euro-North American-centric modernity. Understood from this perspective, colonialism cannot be considered as an event/episode. Colonialism was a major part of what Walter D. Mignolo termed "global designs" that became entangled with "local histories."

The epic school of colonialism is more persuasive and useful in gaining a deeper understanding of dismemberment as a constitutive part of colonialism/coloniality. For episodic school to try and deny that colonialism marked an epochal watershed in African historical experience is tantamount to misunderstanding what fundamentally is colonialism—a question that was posed in 19,955 by the Caribbean poet and decolonial theorist Aimé Césaire in his *Discourse on Colonialism* (1995).

Colonialism is not just an episode. If it is understood as coloniality, then colonialism is as old as modernity. It is at once a practice of power and a reconstitution of society as well as a production of knowledge and subjectivity (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2012, p. 32). Fanon (1968, p. 210) understood colonialism deeper when he described it this way:

> Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it.

But is it Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2012, pp. 38–39) who eloquently presented the colonialism's long-term alienating effects:

> Your past must give way to my past, your literature must give way to my literature, my way is the high way, in fact the only way. […]. The colonial process dislocates the traveler' s mind from the place he or she already know to a foreign starting point even with the body still remaining in his or her homeland. It is a process of continuous alienation from the base, a continuous process of looking at oneself from outside of self or with the lenses of a stranger. One may end up identifying with the foreign base as the starting point toward self, that is, from another self towards one self, rather than the local being the starting point, from self to other selves.

Having taken these deeper understandings of colonialism cannot continue to simplistically understand it as an event of conquest and rule over Africa by Europeans. This argument is well articulated by the Nigerian sociologist Peter Ekeh who distinguished "colonialism" from "colonization." Even though they are connected, Ekeh emphasizes that "colonization" is an event/episode, whereas "colonialism" is a process/movement and elaborates on this distinction this way:

> In addition to the disparate activities of the colonizers and the colonized, and in addition to the […] colonial situation, colonialism may be considered as a *social movement* of epochal dimensions whose enduring significance, beyond the life-span of the colonial situation, lies in the *social formations* of supraindividual entities and constructs. These supraindividual formations developed from the volcano-sized social changes provoked into existence by the confrontations, contradictions, and incompatibilities in the colonial situation (emphasis is in the original text). (Ekeh 1983, p. 5)

What emerges clearly here is that while Africans can easily give a date of when they were colonized and when colonization (understood simplistically as the dismantling of direct colonial rule) ended, it is not easy for Africans to understand the depth of colonialism in their psyche and its real epochal dimensions. The work of Ali A. Mazrui (1986, p. 12) supports the epic school of colonialism just like Ekeh. This school underscored the fact that colonialism amounted to "a revolution of epic propositions."

Mazrui identified some of the long-term consequences of colonialism. For example, colonialism and capitalism forcibly incorporated Africa into the world economy, beginning with the trans-Atlantic slave trade, "which dragged African labor itself into the emerging international capitalist system" (Mazrui 1986, p. 12). African labor contributed immensely to the economic rise of a Euro-North American-centric trans-Atlantic commerce. At another level, Africa which had been excluded from the post-1648 Westphalian sovereign state system and that was physically partitioned after the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, was later incorporated into the post-1945 United Nations sovereignty state system (Mazrui 1986, p. 13). One can add that the fragmented and weak African "postcolonial" states were admitted into the lowest echelons of the Euro-North American dominated state system of the world as (Clapham 1996).

With this background in mind, it is easier to understand that even decolonization struggles of the twentieth century failed to substantially "move the center" and to effectively "re-member" Africa after over 500 years of "dismemberment" to use Ngugi wa Thiong'o's (1993, 2009b) terminology. What happened as a consequence of decolonization is that the dismantling of direct colonial administrations did not give rise to a "postcolonial world," rather as noted by Grosfoguel (2007), global coloniality ensued. Global coloniality cannot be separated from Euro-North American-centric modernity. Today, African leaders continue to manage and maintain the global system after replacing direct colonial rulers.

Grosfoguel (2007, 2011) used the term "hetararchies" of power to underscore the complex vertical, horizontal, and crisscrossing invisible entanglements in the configuration of modern global power structure that emerged from colonial encounters. Globalization, is today, still driven by coloniality on a world scale. As long back as 1955, Césaire (1955) understood colonialism to be a disruptive, "decivilizing," dehumanizing, exploitative, racist, violent, brutal, covetous, and "thingfying" system.

To reinforce the epic school's understanding of colonialism and its long-term implications, Ngugi wa Thiong'o emphasized the psychological/epistemological as well as cultural and linguistic impact of these processes:

> The biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other people's languages rather than their own. It makes them identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants serious doubt about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are despair, despondency and a collective death-wish. Amidst this wasteland which it has created; imperialism presents itself as the cure and demands that the dependent sing hymns of praise with the constant refrain: 'Theft is holy.' Indeed, this refrain sums up the new creed of neo-colonial bourgeoisie in many 'independent' African states. (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1986, p. 3)

Bringing Africa "back-in" reinforces rather than diluting coloniality as a dismembering project. Africa has to get out. This must not be confused with ideas of absolute autarchy. It is a plea for reconstruction of the world on the basis of what Amin (1985) termed "polycentrism." This "polycentrism" is impossible without "re-membering" Africa. "Polycentrism" is possible under the conditions of "globalectics" or "pluriversality," in which difference is not used to enslave, colonize, and dehumanize (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2012). Under "globalectics"/"pluriversality," many worlds are possible. Particularities are considered a virtue.

Re-membering Instead of Bringing Africa Back-In

"Re-membering" is defined by Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009a, b) as a quest for wholeness. In this quest, there is a strong African desire for self-definition and attainment of sovereign subjectivity. At the present moment, Africa is constituted as "something torn" or "dismembered" as a conse-

quence of colonialism (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2009a, b). "Re-membering" is, therefore, that overarching project and struggle aimed at addressing problems of colonization of the mind, alienation, fragmentation, dependence, and peripherization. It is a restorative and recovery project that is ranged against "dismemberment" and "Europhonism" (Ngugi wa Thiongo 2009b). The inscription of Europhonism took the form of mapping, owning, and naming. These imperial and colonial processes were underpinned by genocides (killing of colonized people in large numbers), epistemicides (killing and expropriation of colonized people's knowledge and history), and linguicides (destruction of colonized people's languages and cultures/communal memory and their replacement with colonial names and foreign cultures/religions) (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 2009a, b). Re-membering is meant to deal with these forms of "dismemberment."

Analytically speaking, re-membering as a decolonial process is premised on three concepts/units of analysis. The first concept is that of *coloniality of power*. It helps in investigating into how the current "global political" was constructed, constituted, and configured into a racially hierarchized, Euro-American-centric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, sexist, capitalist, hetero-normative, hegemonic, asymmetrical, modern, colonial, and imperial power structure (Grosfoguel 2007, 2011). The concept of coloniality of power enables us to delve deeper into how the world was bifurcated into "zone of being" (the world of those in charge of global power structures and beneficiaries of modernity) and "zone of non-being" (the invented world that was the source of slaves and abode of victims of imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid). Fanon (1968) maintained what Santos (2007) termed "abyssal thinking." Abyssal thinking is informed by imperial reason and manifests itself in bifurcation of the world into "this side" (the side of complete beings governed according to dictates of emancipation, law, and ethics) and "that side" (the side of incomplete beings governed according to expropriation and violence) (Santos 2007, p. 45).

In short, coloniality of power is a concept that is useful in analyzing the modern global cartography of power and understanding how the modern world works and produces world orders. Henry Kissinger defines the world order this way:

> World order describes the concept held by a region or civilization about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to the entire world. An international order is the practical applica-

tion of these concepts to a substantial part of the globe—large enough to affect the global balance of power. Regional orders involve the same principles applied to a defined geographical area. (Kissinger 2014, p. 9)

What Kissinger does not reveal who is responsible for constructing world orders and how these world orders have been proposed from Europe and North America and imposed on the rest of the world by force of Euro-North America-centric international law and force of weapons of mass destruction accumulated by Europe and North America.

The second concept is that of *coloniality of knowledge*, which focuses on teasing out epistemological issues, politics of knowledge generation, as well as questions of who generates which knowledge, and for what purpose (Quijano 2007). Coloniality of knowledge is useful in enabling decolonial thinkers to understand how endogenous and indigenous knowledges have been pushed to what came to be deemed as "the barbarian margins of society" where they subsisted as folk lore and superstitions. Africa is today saddled with irrelevant knowledge that saves to disempower rather than empower as well as alienate rather re-member individuals and communities. Claude Ake (1979) emphasized that Africa had to seriously engage in struggles to free itself from "knowledge of equilibrium," that is, knowledge that serves the present asymmetrical power-structured world. On the sphere of knowledge, decolonial theorists are at the forefront of decolonizing what they have termed "Westernized" universities that have been built throughout the world (Grosfoguel 2013).

The third concept is that of *coloniality of being*, which gestures into the pertinent questions of the making of modern subjectivities and into issues of human ontology (Maldonado-Torres 2007). African decolonial scholars engaged with the question of coloniality of being from the vantage point of what they termed "African personality" and Negritude among many other registers used in the search for restoration of denied ontological density, sovereign subjectivity as well as self-pride and self-assertion (Blyden 1967; Nkrumah 1964). Both "African personality" and Negritude were concepts developed in struggle by Africans as they tried to make sense of their predicaments within a context of dehumanizing colonialism. Coloniality of being is very important because it assists in investigating how African humanity was questioned as well as into processes that contributed toward "objectification"/"thingification"/"commodification" of Africans (Césaire 1955). One of the continuing struggles in Africa and the Diaspora is focused on resisting objectification and dehumanization of

black people on a world scale. It is a struggle to regain lost subjecthood and eventually citizenship as well as many other questions to do with being and humanism as politicized states of existence.

Empirically speaking, what occupied the minds of early decolonial thinkers, such as Marcus Garvey, Edward Wilmot Blyden, William E. B. Du Bois as well as later ones such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Kwame Nkrumah, and Leopold Sedar Senghor, to mention but a few, were such issues as the common destiny of the black race, distinctive mentality of Africans (African personality/Negritude), place of religion in African lives, and African values and societal principles (immanent socialist nature of African society) as well as black consciousness, self-determination, and pan-African unity (Blyden 1967; Frenkel 1974). Taken together, these concerns gave rise to such movements as Garveyism, Negritude, Ethiopianism, Black Consciousness Movement, and African Renaissance and many others. For example, while Garveyism was geologically rooted in the Caribbean and the USA, it was aimed at re-membering black people of the Diaspora and those from the continent. Its three core calls were for black self-improvement/black self-pride, "Africa for Africans," and "back to Africa" (Garvey 1969). Ethiopianism, Garveyism, Negritude, and Pan-Africanism intersected tendentiously as re-membering visions. For example, Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association aimed at inspiring black people:

> […] with pride in self and with determination of going ahead in the creation of those ideas that will lift them to the unprejudiced company of races and nations. There is no desire for hate or malice, but every wish to see all mankind linked into a common fraternity of progress and achievement that will wipe away the odor of prejudice, and elevate the human race to the height of real godly love and satisfaction. (Garvey 1969, pp. 25–26)

Garvey highlighted a planetary dimension of decoloniality of not only seeking "re-membering" black races but the entirety of the human races that have been fragmented by race and class. Decoloniality has always been subversive of the hierarchization and social classification of human races in accordance with invented racial ontological densities. Wiping away "the odor of prejudice" continues to be one of the consistent demands of decoloniality from as far back as the time of the slave trade.

Ethiopianism is another early decolonial-re-membering initiative that converted the biblical verse: "Princes shall come from Egypt; Ethiopia

shall soon stretch out hands unto God" (Psalms 68 verse 31) into an ideology of liberation of re-membering and self-discovery in the domains of religion and politics. Ethiopia, because it was not colonized, became a symbol of black pride and black capacity for self-rule in a context of colonialism (Muchie 2013). Ethiopia's defeat of Italians at the Battle of Adowa in 1896 further boosted its image among Africans—a people "who were experiencing the full shock of European conquest, and were beginning to search for an answer to the myth of African inferiority" (Asante in Worrell 2005, p. 5). But the most successful manifestation of Ethiopianism was in the creation of what became known as African independent churches that were headed by Africans and that embraced African cultures, customs, and values as part of indigenization of Christianity (Ayandele 1971).

The glue that brought together Ethiopianism, Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, Black Consciousness Movement, and even African Renaissance is what can be termed "black race consciousness." This is why Toyin Falola (2001) concluded that Blyden's consistent demand for self-pride and self-assertion for Africans in the context of ambiguities of modernity and tradition influenced later intellectual discourses of liberation. This is how he put it: "His sociology of race anticipated later works of Negritude, Pan-Africanism, and the African Personality" (Falola 2001, p. 35). Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009b, p. 38) also articulated the connections this way:

> Negritude is the intellectual and literary reflection of Pan-Africanism. Garveyism centres on race; Pan-Africanism, on Africa and blackness; and Negritude on blackness. Afro-centrism, a method of viewing the world, is the opposite of Euro-centrism.

Anti-Eurocentrism was also another glue that brought together advocates of Ethiopianism, Garveyism, Negritude, African personality, African socialism, Pan-Africanism, and Black Consciousness Movement ideologically. African socialism as articulated by such thinkers and politicians as Julius Nyerere and Leopold Sedar Senghor was aimed at reconstituting and re-articulating humanism in a situation where capitalism and colonialism had authorized and enabled exploitation of some human beings by others. African humanism, which is different from Western anthropocentric, elitist, and racist articulation, becomes another concern that cut across all the decolonial initiatives.

Decoloniality as a movement also has a strong cultural component. This is logical because colonialism was an alienating process. Negritude and African personality were meant to address the challenges of cultural alienation. Five elements were identified as constitutive of African personality: humanism, communalism, spirituality, cooperation, and intuition. These were to be the basis of African harmony (Falola 2001, p. 38). All these distinctive features were distilled as part of decolonial struggle to launch Africanity into the world.

Senghor explained that he and Aime Cesaire had to launch the Negritude movement between 1933 and 1935 because they were plunged into a "pan-stricken despair" as "No reform was in sight and the colonizers were justifying our political and economic dependence by the theory of the *tabula rasa*" (Senghor in Ahluwalia 2003, p. 32). He elaborated that "In order to establish an effective revolution, our revolution, we had first to divest ourselves of our borrowed attire—that of assimilation—and assert our being; that is to say our *negritude*" (Senghor in Ahluwalia 2001, p. 32).

Gary Wilder dug into the planetary dimension of Negritude particularly its focus on restructuring of the imperial world. He emphasized how Senghor and Cesaire deploy Negritude ideas to "unthink France" (Wilder 2015). To Wilder (2015, p. 8), Negritude was not a simple "affirmative theory of Africanity" but rather was also "a critical theory of modernity." Senghor had this to say about the struggle for inclusive civilization that transcended both "abstract universalism" and "concrete particularism":

> I believe that in the Civilization of the Universal into which we entered in the last quarter of century, Negritude will constitute, or already constitutes […] an assemble of essential contributions […] it will again play its essential role in the edification of a new humanism, more human because it will have reunited in their totality the contributions of all continents, of all races, of all nations. (Senghor in Wilder 2015, pp. 51–52)

Senghor articulated that Negritude began as a search for the "return to [our] sources and the discovery of the black Grail" (ghetto-Negritude he termed it) tainted by racism before moving forward to "open-Negritude" (planetary Negritude) (Wilder 2015, p. 52). Building on "open-Negritude," Senghor understood "decolonization as a process of global restructuring wherein the fate of humanity and the future of the world were at stake" (Wilder 2015, p. 59). However painful the experiences of imperialism and colonialism were according to Senghor, they brought

colonizers and colonized peoples together, and the way forward was to create new inclusive transnational democratic arrangements as the colonized and the colonizers worlds remain entangled forever (Wilder 2015).

Senghor remained critical of the Cartesian notion of being that privileged rationality and reason that was dissociated from emotion, intuition, and spirituality as a sole marker of being human. He said this notion reproduced the human as a "reasonable animal," and he proceeded to spell out the gift of Negritude: "to remake the unity of man and the World; to link flesh to spirit, man to his fellow man, the pebble to God" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 61). Senghor envisaged a postcolonial world as "a global mélange to which each civilization contributed its most distinctive and fully realized attributes" (Wilder 2015, p. 61). Politically, Senghor favored a democratic union of people irrespective of color rather than territorial political independence, and this made him to be criticized as an apologist of colonialism in some quarters. Senghor, just like Fanon and Cesaire, emphasized human liberation over sovereignty of states ("*Man* remains our ultimate concern, our *measure*") (Senghor in Winder 2015, p. 224). He elaborated that:

> *Man* must be the center of our preoccupations. One does not construct a modern State for the pleasure of constructing it. The action is not an end in itself. We must therefore protect ourselves from will to power that define the State, that crushes *Man* beneath the state. It is, in fact, about creating the black man within a humanity marching towards its total realization in time and space (emphasis is in the original text). (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 230)

Senghor's idea was informed by four broad propositions: the first is that the world is composed of many distinct civilizations each of which placed the accent on a singular aspect of the human condition, the second is that every great civilization is a cultural crucible that accommodates contributions from other civilizations, the third was that imperialism created a situation of intense cultural interaction in which metropolitan and African peoples had a historic opportunity to fertilize each other, and finally, that both colonizers and colonized will have to create a new civilization and a new humanism (Wilder 2015, pp. 142–143).

The essential pre-requisite for this was "we must all kill the piece of him [Hitler] that lives within us" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 143). To Senghor, for a new humanism to emerge, there was need for a double decolonization involving colonizers abandoning their "superiority

complex" so as to recognize the colonized as equal human beings and the colonized rising up from imposed "inferiority complex" (Wilder 2015, p. 162). These ideas led Senghor to present the idea of decolonization as "a dialogical and dialectical 'gift between partners'" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 162). More profoundly, Senghor understood decolonization as a third revolution ranged against "capitalist and communist materialisms" and aimed at bringing moral and religious to the center of the world while at the same time enabling "peoples of color" to play their role and "contribute to the construction of the new planetary civilization" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 228).

Senghor pushed for a combination of Negritude (old African collectivism) with socialism (scientific socialism) as building blocks in the creation of a better world (better than the colonially created one) and also "better than our world before European conquest" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 149). Consequently, Senghor also became a critique of both colonialism and territorial nationalism as he strongly believed that the unitary state was now historically outmoded. He pushed for a common French citizenship not as an ethnicity or race but as a political product of empirical realities of encounters and interactions. His warming to fellow Africans was that even European nations were gravitating toward a larger pan-European community (European Union) and that small colonies would never be "truly independent" rather independence would be "a poison gift" (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 152). He explained that:

> [...] a mere nominal independence is a false independence. It can satisfy national pride, but it does not abolish the consciousness of alienation, the feeling of frustration, the inferiority complex, since it does not resolve the concrete problems facing the underdeveloped countries: to house, clothe, feed, cure, and educate the masses. (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 244)

Senghor envisaged a world that was not wholly African or European, but "it will be a Métis world" (sort of Eurafrique) (Senghor in Wilder 2015, p. 161). Based on this understanding of Senghor's version of decolonization, Wilder concluded that:

> An independent Senegal marked not the realization but the eclipse of his ultimate vision for decolonization. Rather than condemn Senghor as a failed national president, we should remember his warning that the form of freedom promised by territorial nationalism for African people was bound to fail. (Wilder 2015, p. 244)

The decolonial interventions of Senghor indicate that there was no singular understanding of decoloniality. It also highlights the planetary quality of decoloniality whereby it was pitched at the level of human redemption and re-making of the world.

It would seem that today the key problem facing Africa is well-captured by Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2013, p. x) who argues that while "the physical empire" has been pushed back through the anti-colonial struggles, "the metaphysical empire remains." He emphasized that "imperialism is not a slogan. It is real; it is palpable in content and form and in its methods and effects" and elaborated that imperialism is total as it impinged on economic, political, military, cultural, and psychological lives of the people (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1986, p. 2).

Since 1962, Ngugi wa Thiong'o has been at the forefront of decolonial struggles arguing for cultural and linguistic freedom (reversal of cultural imperialism and restoration of African languages), decolonization of the minds (psychological rehabilitation, relevance, and identity reconstruction), moving the center (shifting from bondages of Eurocentrism and narrow nationalism), re-membering Africa (pushing forward the quest for wholeness and unity), and globalectics/pluriversality (fighting for a plural world in which all human beings, cultures, and worlds have equal space and recognition) (Ngugi wa Thiong'o 1986, 1993, 2012).

Part of struggles of re-membering Africa today are taking epistemic forms with an emphasis on the recovery of displaced epistemologies of the South and the importance of shifting the "geography" and "biography" of knowledge as part of decolonial subversion of the "epistemic scaffolding" on which Western enlightenment thought is "erected" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Hoppers and Richards 2012; Santos 2014). This shifting of geography and biography of knowledge is happening within a context in which the Global South is being recognized as the epistemic site from which "privileged insight into the workings of the world at large" can be better understood (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012, pp. 1–2).

CONCLUSION: FROM THE IDEA OF AFRICA TO THE AFRICAN IDEA

The initiatives aimed at re-membering Africa seem to be gravitating toward a new "African idea" formulated, defined, and pushed forward by Africans themselves predicated on African knowledges. This marks a fundamental if not paradigmatic shift from the "idea of Africa" that was

determined from outside. It would seem Africa is actively being re-defined as a center of power, knowledge, and influence.

This re-claiming and re-launching Africa is taking the form of an epistemological rebellion involving not only critical questioning of received ideologies but also knowledge and institutions. As empirically demonstrated by the rise of Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) movement in South Africa, Africans are actively making history informed by the spirit of decolonization and deimperialization of the world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 2016). These new decolonial-re-membering struggles are not aimed at "bringing Africa back-in" but at reconstitution and reproduction of Africa not as pupil of Europe but as a site of power, knowledge, and influence.

This is possible with the current global conjecture of epistemic break, whereby the previously hegemonic and confident Euro-North American-centric knowledge is facing deep crisis and exhaustion. At this moment when even liberal democracy is proving inadequate in resolving core problems of inequality and poverty, the received theory of democracy is being challenges, within a broader context of a modernity that has created numerous modern problems of which it has no effective modern solutions. Africa cannot, therefore, be invited "in" but has to find ways of escaping from this alienating modernity and this decadent civilization that has failed in its promises to overcome all human problems.

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Conclusion: Reappraising Africa's Place in International Relations

Marta Iñiguez de Heredia

Jean-Marc Ela ([1998](#)) highlighted how survival in Africa is a constant exercise of innovation and creativity. This is however overlooked by the humanitarian mind-set with which many NGOs, development agencies, and humanitarian organizations in Africa operate in asking why people die and not how they survive or, in fact, live (Raeymaekers [2014](#), p. 6). Understanding the politics of Africa requires understanding of this exercise, not just as a form of navigating hardship, but as an insight into the histories, struggles, and resistance that make Africa. The fact that international relations (IR) continues to ignore these factors and constantly represents Africa through the prism of failure and lack demands critical engagement. The chapters of this volume take up that challenge, not as a new undertaking, but as part of a larger and ongoing attempt at decolonizing IR and, more specifically, recentering Africa within the discipline by calling attention to the centrality of the continent to global power and world politics. What they are concerned with is IR's persistence in using these tropes and discourses about Africa.

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The problem, as all of the chapters note, is not just that this picture of African politics is "perverse and stereotypical" (Wai, introduction). This vision further obscures the reality of African politics and helps in reproducing the power dynamics that maintain Africa's subjugation materially, politically, and symbolically while upholding an idealized and sanitized vision of Western politics as the prescriptive norm. The contradiction between reality and scholarship creates what Leonhard Praeg sees as an encounter with the sublime, where there is an "uncontrollable oscillation between the recognition that our capacity for understanding is being violated and our attempt, nonetheless, to comprehend, in its totality, that which violates our understanding" (2014, p. 203). In this volume, the inseparable relation between how Africa is known and what actions, policies, and discourses are mobilized around such knowledge has unleashed a series of critical interventions and alternatives that offer guidance to maintain such critique alive and contribute to knowing African politics in more sober ways while destabilizing the very idea of Africa as constructed by the colonial library and its problematic vectors of coloniality.

The specter of V.Y. Mudimbe, in some Deleuzian ways, haunts such goal, sometimes explicitly, other implicitly, with various and diverging conclusions. Not all authors agree with each other, and thus, part of the achievement of this volume is to have created opportunities for debate by advancing the debate itself. Sally Matthews (Chap. 7) and Zubairu Wai (Chap. 1), for instance, argue that we cannot do away with the colonial library. Gemma Bird and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni argue we can. Bikrum Gill gestures towards the indigenous as a possible starting point in rethinking Africa's place in IR, but as Mathews and Wai suggest, can such a preoccupation avoid the vectors of the colonial library which they argue continue to inform the way Africa is understood in IR? Early on in the process of thinking about this volume, the phrase "bringing something back in," in the form that Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (1985), claimed to bring the state back in, set some basis for thinking about the focus of the volume. For Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, bringing the state back into IR was to recognize the state as an actor despite the complexity of international relations and the transversality of other actors such as international organizations, corporations, and so on. As Zubairu Wai states in the introduction, the volume however did not stem from thinking that Africa ever left international relations or that it is marginal to global politics. Quite the contrary (and hence the choice of the theme

of "recentering" for the volume), the aim has been to reaffirm Africa's central role in the constitution of the international and world politics. Even then, this does not stop Ndlovu-Gatsheni to make a plea to give up the task of making Africa central to the processes that created violence and poverty in Africa in the first place.

These central concerns could be summarized in five themes that run through the chapters and that are worth highlighting in bringing this book to a close: power, and how it is exercised, especially through the production of knowledge about Africa; the centrality of Africa to world politics as a co-constitutive actor; the materialization of discourses; history, as a vehicle for understanding the present but also as a construct of the ideas of progress and backwardness; and resistance, as a constitutive element of current power relations as well as an engine for change and reaffirmation. This chapter will be structured around these five themes accordingly.

The Power of Knowledge

The triad of power, knowledge, and epistemology, that is, the ways in which Africa is acted upon, known, and spoken about, produces Africa in ways that simultaneously deny its own being, and constitute it as an object of lack, hence needing modernist intervention. The dynamics of denial and imposition are present not only in the political, economic, and social relations that Africa has with the rest of the world but also in the discourses in policy and academic research about Africa. So, for instance, for Wai, in Chap. 2, "[n]eopatrimonialism and failed states are not merely theoretical concepts; they are also power political tropes for normalizing relations of domination and exploitation, past and on-going" (p. x). Similarly, Manzo shows that pictures of Africa in the media are not mere images, but geopolitical texts that represent the gaze that constructs Africa according to such power political tropes (p. x). Niang articulates how the negation of African polities' sovereignty at the time of the Berlin conference was "informed by epistemic racism" and gave the rise to the consolidation of illegitimate forms of governments throughout the continent (p. x). For Gill, the possibility of exploiting agricultural production in the Ethiopian province of Gambella, and its failure, emerges out of the racialized logics of declaring industrial capitalist forms of production as superior and denying the value of traditional modes of production. The denial of African alternatives such as those from the Pan-African project, or the

affirmation of European developmental models as an emancipatory avenue, maintains the constraints of the triad well and alive (Bird; Matthews).

Africa's reality is also denied by obscuring the historical relations of exploitation that have contributed to its forging. This is shown in how the violence of colonialism has been absent from several historical accounts about European state formation (Wai and Gruffydd Jones, this volume). It is also shown in the destruction of records of "criminal atrocity [...] as an object that can be examined for the systematization of colonial rule" in South Africa (Kolia, p. x). The power to deny and define Africa taps into Weber's notion of authority, as it carries with it a claim to produce knowledge and hence to legitimacy. This claim to knowledge is part and parcel of a logic of making Africa an object of experimentation and the embodiment of inadequacy (Mbembe 2001, p. 1–2). For Mbembe this is actually a feature not of Africa, but of Western political and philosophical thought, where "Africa [...] stands out as the supreme receptacle of the West's obsession with [...] 'absence,' 'lack,' and 'non-being,' [...]—in short, of nothingness" (2001, p. 4). Once defined as an object to be transformed and protected, any actions towards development, peace, or democracy can claim legitimacy even if they fail to address or reproduce the very issues they were deemed to solve.

Similarly, none of the actors involved in the several forms of interventions take responsibility for any of the conditions they are complicit in fashioning on the ground and rather assert their capacity to improve Africans' condition, in light of Africans' lack of something. Therefore, the claim is not just to define the problem, constructed on an image of lack, but to define the solution both in technical and ethical ways. The technocraticism infused in policies is also based on an ethics of "doing something." As David Chandler argues, "[t]his simplistic focus sets up an interventionist discourse where western governments are seen to have the solution to problems of non-western states and where any western government action, regardless of its outcome, can generally be portrayed as better than acquiescence and passivity" (2003, p. 305). The underlying construction of inadequacy reifies simultaneously an image of responsibility, knowledge, and capacity.

But since the interventions and dealings with Africa are based on a flawed understanding of Africa, they can never step out of the power relations that those interventions and dealings gave rise to. Thus, any claims to establish relations as partnerships or based on ownership in international relations, even in South-South relations, as Gill explains in Chap. 9, are not but iterations of the dynamics of denial and imposition as well as

the logics of coloniality. The problem is therefore not with Africa, but with the ways power is reproduced in Africa. Breaking this up needs a reaffirmation of Africa's own being. Part of this reaffirmation implies an acknowledgment of Africa's singularity as well as its centrality to world politics and its history.

Africa's Centrality

The construction of boundaries around a core and a periphery in world politics is a metaphor for the implications of IR as a discipline. This theme has structured the chapters that make up this volume in different ways, but they present a common voice in pointing out that seeing Africa as a peripheral region is ultimately a construction. The chapters also agree that this construction is both epistemological and material, tied to the process of colonization. IR has played out these dynamics of centrality and marginalization in making colonization central to Africa's constitution but peripheral to the constitution of modernity, the West, and industrialization. Yet as several chapters show, the colonial ventures, in Africa in particular, were central to Western states' nation-building, to the process of industrialization and to central elements like sovereignty and citizenship. The very marginalization of Africa and the construction of its problems as its own failures set the condition for the production of a European self as central, distinct, great, and opulent.

Africa was and has been a major trading center for millennia through its main coastlines in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Swahili Coast. Trade was also undertaken through Berbers and Tuaregs traveling south of the Sahelian and from traders across major rivers such as the Nile, the Congo, or the Zambezi (Iliffe 1995; Muiu and Martin 2009; Ndaywel è Nziem 2009). St. Augustine was able to reach Europe from Algeria and become one of the most important influences of Western thought, precisely due to the ways in which Africa was communicated to major political and economic centers in its immediate and far neighborhood (Kiros 2000). What colonization did was to transform Africa's economies and polities in ways that made it subservient to European economies, polities, and ways of knowing. Africa entered a particular market, particular trade, and political flows and relations that transformed its political and economic outlook. In so doing, it became central, together with other colonial ventures such as in India and East Asia, to the economic, social, and political development of Europe.

France, for instance, took about 70% of the profit from cotton exports and 50% of collected taxes from Africa (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985). Gross figures indicate that Britain made a total of about £3.8 million from slave-based planting and commercial profits. There was a triangular trade between Britain, African posts, and the Caribbean that reported gross benefits to the British crown. Bristol and Liverpool merchants bartered goods for people in African coast, sold them in the West Indies or North America, and took plantation produce back to England. After abolition of slavery, the government gave an equivalent of £17 billion to slave owners, constituting the major government bailout before the 2008 crisis and the bailout to banks (UCL-British Slave-ownership 2015). Britain also benefited from selling 70.5% of iron in its colonies and 2/3 of its textile exports to Africa. This is especially considerable, taking into account that by the beginning of the twentieth century, exports accounted for 80% of the growth of British output (Blackburn 1997; Lovejoy 2000). Colonialism therefore opened a process of mutual transformation and mutual dependency and, as such, of co-constitution between colonies and metropolis.

Thus observed, Africa becomes a place that is made up of its history and relations. Poverty, underdevelopment, conflict, bad governance, and all the tags Africa is described with do not signal a condition, they imply a relationship. As my chapter shows in relation to the DRC, the fact that Africa's role in the world economy continues to be that of providing raw materials at a low price and purchasing manufactured goods at a high cost is not because nothing has changed since colonization, but due to global patterns of wealth extraction, distribution, and production. Moreover, it manifests the centrality of African subdued economies to the smooth workings of the current global economy. This is added to Africa's role as a recipient of aid and a provider of debt repayments. Since the start of the aid industry in the 1960s, Africa has turned into a major aid consumer. This means that aid has turned into a commodity that is sold at a particular price and has its producers and consumers, generally these corresponding to Northern and Southern countries respectively. Africa takes 25.8% of the total aid, being the region that takes the largest share of aid in the world. Four out of the top ten recipients of aid are African (Kenya, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, and Ethiopia) (OECD 2015). This does not mean that Africa has been aided the most. It just means that Africa continues to pay a high share of the total aid-related accumulated debt. In fact, according to new research, not even aid balances out Africa's shortages. Just in 2015, whereas African countries received a total of "$161.6 billion mainly in

loans, personal remittances and aid grants […] $203 billion were taken from Africa, either directly or by costs imposed by the rest of the world through climate change" (Jubilee Debt Campaign 2017, p. 2). Observing these patterns is necessary to understand the global economy. But they are also necessary to understand the discursive tropes about Africa that, as previously stated, are central for the production of the West as the model upon which proper statehood, development, and democracy are constructed. But denying Africa's centrality to the actual workings of the global economy and world politics does not signal what Africa "is" intrinsically but what Africa has become through its material relations and discursive constructions.

The Materialization of Discourses

In the opening epigraph to this volume, Wai reminds us with Mudimbe that the ways in which beings and societies have been classified may be an even more determinant factor for Africa to have become a continent that is better known for what it lacks than for what it has. This volume as a whole has critically inquired about the ways in which a similar classification has been done within IR. Yet, though a special focus has been put on discourses and tropes, this has been in tandem with the material implications.

Apartheid in South Africa was the result of a racialized theological approach of nation-building in which the development of both white settlers and black native population needed to hierarchically structure society placing whites as superior tutors and developers and blacks as inferior tutees, instigating the violence that comes with such process (Kolia, Chap. 6). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a form of rationalizing this foundational institution in South Africa's society whereby society can move on through a process of reconciling oppression and trauma. Nation-building or the "salvation of the nation" could "sacrifice" black lives, who could be "imprisoned, tortured, immolated, and then even dismembered by the apartheid security apparatus in order to ensure the wellbeing of the state" (Kolia, p. x).

How the triad of power, knowledge, and epistemology racializes the ways in which Africa is thought and acted upon implies forms of exploitation that those very forms of knowing and acting attempt to legitimize. Gill starkly highlights that the production of an imagined unused, unproductive, or unfulfilled zone, underpinned by a racialized thinking that

constructs capitalist or state-controlled uses of nature as superior and indigenous uses of nature as inferior, gives way to forms of dispossession and violence. The result of the activities of Karuturi not only provoked the transfer of land from state, small owners, and traditional peasants to the corporation but also the destruction of much of the habitat and ecological dynamics to which traditional forms of cultivation had been adapting to. What this does is to highlight the implications of such constructions. As Gill states, "[s]uch a epistemological framework privileges the 'developmental' knowledge of the Ethiopian state and the 'productive' knowledge of Indian capital as central to the urgent task of mastering nature and bringing dormant land to life, while at the same time it necessarily discounts the indigenous peoples and non-human life forms of Gambella as beings incapable of efficient and productive economic activity" (p. x).

The issue of land grabbing and the continuation of the patterns of dispossession and accumulation are also taken up in chapter two which explores how land grabbing is not a new phenomenon but follows from singling out, as Gill, capitalist state-led forms of development as the only ones able to carry out "development," understood in the modern colonial way. Additionally, many corporations now operating in the DRC, as chapter two shows, are the fruit of colonial ventures or are old colonial ventures now sold to new corporations. The fact that these now come from a variety of actors, including the USA, China, or India, does not change the fact that their activities are premised on long-term patterns of exploitation. But this is obscured, and instead these companies represent the avenue for economic and institutional development in the context of policies based on the construction of the DRC as failed. Of course, as Gill states, this is not without change or a simple reproduction of the ways in which, for instance, England was industrialized; the issue of land grabbing responds to the ways neoliberalism necessitates new frontiers in order to accumulate. These frontiers are openly racialized and based on a society/nature divide and the positing of indigenous people as collapsible into nature and therefore incapable of mastering nature to its full productive capacity (Gill, p. x).

Development provokes different forms of intervention, which are always premised on notions of racialized successes and failures. Manzo tells us that "famine draws the cameras because it raises the prospects of humanitarian intervention and rescue—especially of suffering children—and not just of coverage" (p. x). That is why, as Matthews discusses, critical voices have

been for long wanting to do away with the concept of development and trying to draft alternatives. The very notion of an alternative highlights the institutionalized power "development" has, as every alternative would have to prove to be better, or superior, to the norm.

The relatively recent concern with failed states has also triggered new forms of intervention in the form of liberal peace and contemporary state-building policies favored by the international policy community led by the United Nations and the major Western capitalist countries. These are also premised on racialized notions of successful and failing states, which by default normalize Western states and pathologize African states. Moreover, as Wai shows in his chapter, linked to a liberal idea of politics, it pathologizes violence, whereas it was otherwise seen as the fulcrum of state-making in Europe. It also makes European states the universal standard default of successful statehood (Wai, p. x).

This is not the first time that the sanitized form of European state is portrayed as the solution for African problems. According to Basil Davidson, at the time of independence "the doctrine of the sovereign nation-state in Europe was accepted as the supreme problem-solving formula for peoples emerging from foreign rule" (Davidson 1992, p. 267). This nation-statism, premised on the idea of the nation-state with Europe as the model, became the doctrine that was supposed to fix everyone and everything. However, as Davidson points out, the nation-statist ideology "was not a restoration of Africa to Africa's own history, but the onset of a new period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe" and what looked like "liberation [,] led to alienation" (1992, p. 10). The flip side of this, as again Davidson noted, is that state-building, once constructed as the panacea for all sorts of maladies, takes precedence over those maladies. For Davidson, by the 1980s, the experiments of nation-building had left one thing clear that "the 'national question' of state power had overridden the 'social question' of moral and material improvement" (1992, p. 270). The prioritization of forms of military force to address issues, for example, in the DRC, as suggested in my chapter, is evidence that once again Africa's direction is marked by the racialized hierarchization of beings and societies backed by military might. The amnesia, or as we have learned through the chapters of this volume, the purposeful obscuring of African history, underpins the very possibility of thinking these issues in such a way and thus carrying out these reform policies.

History

This leads to the issue of history and how it is accounted for. Gruffydd Jones states in her chapter that history and temporality are part of the structures that organize social life and international relations. They are central to the constitution of Africa as backward in the modern notions of statehood, development, and democracy. They can be seen as "iterations of colonialism," the "Time of Civilization to which colonies had to be brought in" (Gruffydd Jones, Chap. 3). Thus, added to the power to deny and define is the power to impose time and to withdraw history (Gruffydd Jones, p. x). The very notion of progress to which Africa is only related when it takes steps towards doing, acting, or being in ways that resemble the idealized notions of statehood, development, and democracy is part of that denial of Africa's own history.

But as several chapters have argued, even when Africa seems to follow the path of European states, the miseries of that path are not seen as essential to becoming fulfilled, these miseries are again made the evidence of Africa's inadequateness. This again is well shown by Wai regarding the violence and disarray throughout the process of European state formation, something that is not read in the same manner when it comes to African state formation. As already pointed out, violence seems to always serve a higher goal in European history, yet it is abhorrent and despicable when it is part of African history.

Lack and failure not only negate what Africa is, they set the path to follow as necessarily that which Europeans did, and more, it situates its peoples as desiring to become European and have the things Europeans have. It also writes off Europe of anything to do with poverty and underdevelopment, making underdevelopment and conflict a condition and not a relation. History is transformed for ideology, and instead an imaginary progressive time, set by Europe's experience, is set as the one to follow and colonialization as the time to forget.

And despite some changes in vocabulary, it is ironic to realize that there has not been much progress in Europe's self-consciousness about race or colonialism. As Gruffydd Jones states, "it is fascinating 'to witness the recurrence of staple components of nineteenth and early twentieth century European racial discourse about Africans still being present in 1951" (p. x). The recent events in Europe, the USA, and elsewhere in regard to one of the most racist border controls highlight that these discourses continue to inform policy.

Time is entangled (Mbembe 2001). Africa cannot be a yet-to-be Europe for Africa and Europe are the result of the current time and their own co-constitutedness. If anything, Africa is the future and signals the path other countries in the world would have to go through in the upcoming years regarding economic adjustments, withdrawal of the state, and even conflict (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012). This goes back to the notion of co-constitutiveness. Gruffydd Jones identifies it well in showing how Portugal as a nation needed the colonies and the colonial adventure, to emerge itself as the civilized nation it purported to be. South Africa needed apartheid as a vehicle for nation-building (Kolia). My chapter also shows that states and their economies are the products of global history. Sovereignty, as Niang argues, is relational and the product of historical processes. In fact, the actual historical location of sovereignty is the time when African sovereignties were negated (Niang). Moreover, she argues, "[t]he presumption of sovereignty as something that exists, rather than a very European ideology that has been in-vested, and mobilized in support of the rise of Europe in world history, continues to validate a single anatomy of encounter—mediated by sovereignty—of world history" (p. x).

Even the idea of legitimate government is an invention that hides the permanent dissent and violence that there is both in its affirmation and its contestation. The history that is remembered is a reproduction of the sanitized version of the West as some universal model. The case that Kolia brings up about South Africa is symptomatic of greater patterns about history-making, path-setting, and power. For him, "the archive is oriented towards the past by controlling what is included within it, and, as a result, produces a highly selective production of the future" (Kolia, p. x). Against this forgetting, Africa, Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues with Ngugi wa Thiong'o, needs to be remembered.

RESISTANCE

And yet one wonders, as Matthews forcefully does, whether the archive or colonial library in its many incarnations and forms—in terms of development and political formation, that is, the state, conceptions of justice, citizenship, peace, and so forth—is escapable and whether the questions around them may be as simple as imagined given the histories of entanglement and co-contamination between Africa and the West. Matthew argues it is not, but forms of emancipatory resistance are possible. In fact, following Bhabha's notion of resistance as not necessarily an oppositional force,

even surviving creatively in the postcolony, Matthews states, is itself a form of resistance. "The time of resistance" goes always there in parallel, shaping and taming "the time of colonial" (Gruffydd Jones). It therefore takes many forms.

One of these forms is a refusal to be what Africa has been externally determined (Ndlovu-Gatsheni). This refusal comes from the fostering of critical resistance thought and self-assertion, in ways that remembers and reconstitutes Africa's own idiosyncrasy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni). It also comes from reaffirming the importance of historical anti-colonial struggles and how the leaders of that generation spoke about and understood their condition and place in the world (Branwen, Gemma, Amy). It also comes from upholding indigenous life-worlds and local knowledges (Gill) and from "taking indigenous knowledge systems seriously" (Wai). It requires a dislodging of amnesia of coloniality and selective archivization (Kolia). These forms of resistance are not a historical legacy or a statement of future intentions, they are alive and present as we speak. Manzo points out that the subversion of the media by showing other images that recuperate Africa's own image is already a practice. As she illustrates, the LagosPhoto Festival features "the diversity of African sensibilities, culture and realities" (p. x). They show new unconventional images about daily life in Africa beyond suffering, refusing to be enclosed within the monolithic view of victims and villains (Manzo, p. x).

The struggles against colonialism were not just a rejection of forms of exploitation during colonialism, they already represented a "refusal to wait, to follow a path, and to look like Europe" (Gruffydd Jones). Similarly, the food sovereignty movement was the Southern response to the neoliberal imposition of removing trade controls, input/output subsidies, and debt (Gill). Yet it also "rejected the racialized premise of the capitalist society/nature distinction by reimagining food production and consumption as socio-ecological relations co-productively sustaining" (Gill, p. x). Against the operations of Karuturi in the Gambella province of Ethiopia, Anywaa resistance was not only a form to resist dispossession but a defense of their habitat and ways of living (Gill). The recovery of dignity, like Pan-Africanists said, has to rely on the unity of black people under the recognition of the common experience of oppression and exploitation and on reclaiming one's own right in the world as black people (Bird). One of the problems resistance finds in Africa is that the very structures that create Africa as an empty receptacle make any resistance illegitimate and further invisibilize it, placing it under irrational, depoliticized, or ethnicized

struggles (Bird). The task of scholars should be to make this resistance visible and further amplify it.

CONCLUSION

Critical scholarship about Africa has many times argued that the problem of Africa is not its exclusion, but in fact the ways in which it has been inserted in world politics and its web of trade, institutions, and knowledge production mechanisms (Grovogui 1996; Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2001). Contesting the construction of Africa as relegated to a subjected place implies rethinking the basis on which knowledge about the continent is produced, destabilizing IR's Eurocentric and racist basis and upholding Africa in its own terms. This is precisely what this volume has attempted to do, to bring knowledge about Africa to light, to critically explore it, and to reaffirm the continent's continuous centrality to world politics. But in so doing, several chapters proposed different pathways and highlight different implications about what such recentering might mean for the relationship between IR and Africa. For some authors, the way forward is about the sources from which we draw from. In that sense, Bird suggests a move to anti-colonial thought and ideas about Pan-African unity; Bikrum suggests upholding indigenous knowledge systems. For other authors it is about addressing particular questions and aspects, for instance, Gruffydd Jones requires addressing and embracing the question of coloniality and temporality within IR; I have suggested going back to history and account for broader structures. Other authors suggest a particular mechanism. For Amy, for instance, it is about tackling what Agamben (1998) would call as inclusion by exclusion, that is, the forms through which marginalization, exteriority, and negation create the very conditions for Africa to be in IR. For Sally, it is a work from within to subvert it. Finally, Wai and Ndlovu-Gatsheni in different ways invite us to give up IR altogether. In any of these forms, recentering Africa means recentering IR, showing in the process that they are co-constitutive.

But we need to remain critical of our own reflections. For Wai, following Mudimbe, how to know Africa is the most fundamental task in order to start understanding Africa, its history and present. For Amina Mama (2007, p. 2), who poses the question of whether it is at all ethical to study Africa, the answer is necessarily complex because, as Mama states, and this volume has shown, it takes particular understandings to produce a counter-weight to the unethical ways in which Africa is generally studied.

What Mama argues is that studying Africa can be ethical if it is self-reflective of the reproduction of tropes and forms of exploitation and also if it works towards social justice. That is, for Mama, studying Africa risks reproducing the same issues that were the object of the critique if we are not conscious of the unequal system in which such knowledge is produced. This systemic constrain places upon us obligations to challenge our own assumptions as well as to think ways in which our scholarship can contribute to social change and shift, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues, from the idea of Africa to the African idea (Chap. 10).

In fact, it is the realization that IR continues to reproduce such constructions of Africa, and the intricate ways in which scholarship relates to policy when it comes to politics, that the idea of bringing scholars together to reflect on it started to resonate. Starting as an initial email conversation with Zubairu Wai, the journey this volume has followed has been both passionate and challenging. Throughout that journey not only have I had the chance to be enlightened through the contributions the different authors have made to it, I have also had the opportunity to work hand by hand with one of the most brilliant intellectuals IR has. It has been through this work that I have come to understand in deeper and nuanced ways the importance of exposing the relationship between IR's Eurocentrism and the racist exploitative relations embedded in world politics. I would like to thank Zubairu Wai for the enormous amount of work he has put into this volume, not least for his understanding and extra work as a result of my maternity leave and continuous childcare commitments, while he was attending his own childcare commitments. I have been humbled for his generosity, understanding, kindness, and professionality. It is thanks to Zubairu that this volume has seen the light in a timely manner with the depth and quality it has. With it, the hope is that the book contributes, in the spirit of Agostinho Neto's poem brought by Gruffydd Jones, to put an end to a world that continues to act as if Africa and its people never existed and bring in the time of consciousness.

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