

# Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process

*The Argentine Senate in  
Comparative Perspective*

Hirokazu Kikuchi



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The Argentine Senate in Comparative  
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Hirokazu Kikuchi  
Institute of Developing Economies  
Japan External Trade Organization  
Chiba, Japan

IDE-JETRO Series

ISBN 978-3-319-90112-1

ISBN 978-3-319-90113-8 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018942211

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Cover illustration: GettyImages/Nikada

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature  
Switzerland AG

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*The original version of the book was revised: For detailed information  
please see Erratum. The erratum to the book is available at  
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7)*

# Acknowledgements

This book relies heavily on my doctoral dissertation, which I submitted to the University of Pittsburgh in 2012. My dissertation defense was at risk of being postponed due to Hurricane Sandy, but fortunately, everyone was able to assemble at the university on November 2nd. After my dissertation defense, the chair, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, suggested that I should publish my dissertation as a book—I assume because my defense went smoothly.

I would, therefore, first like to thank the four members of the dissertation committee: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Scott Morgenstern, Jennifer Nicoll Victor, and Ernesto Calvo. I received tremendous support from Aníbal. He provided very detailed and helpful comments on earlier versions of this work to make sure that every line made sense. He also helped me find contacts and financial resources for field research in Argentina. (I took full advantage of being his student.) Many of the comments and suggestions I received from Scott and Jen helped me avoid serious “Argentine bias” in my arguments and to situate the case of the Argentine Senate in a comparative context. Several of my conversations with Ernesto was so critical that I decided to study senatorial

behavior in committees as well as on the floor simultaneously, which makes this book very original. So I am pleased to finally be able to show this book to these fantastic committee members.

I had opportunities to give presentations on some of the findings of this book at the meetings of American Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Latin American Studies Association, Latin American Association of Political Science (ALACIP), Standing Group on Legislative Studies (GEL) of the ALACIP, Japanese Association for Comparative Politics, and Latin American Politics Research Group of Japan. I would like to express my appreciation for those who listened to my presentations, including David Altman, Régis Dandoy, Taeko Hiroi, Marisa Kellam, Shunta Matsumoto, Juan Pablo Micozzi, Kazuo Ogushi, Isamu Okada, Nils Ringe, Yutaka Shinada, and Yuriko Takahashi, for their critical comments. Special thanks go to Naoya Izuoka, who introduced me to the world of Latin American politics when I was an undergraduate student at Keio University, Japan. Of course, all remaining errors are my own.

Many people supported me during my field trips to Argentina. I would like to thank María Matilde Ollier (Universidad Nacional de San Martín), Pablo Forni (Universidad del Salvador), and Germán Lodola (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) for allowing me to stay at their universities as a visiting scholar. Regarding data collection, I owe a lot to Ana María Borges Diniz, José Corbetta, Miguel De Luca, Matías Dewey, Martín Dinatale, Alberto Di Peco, Guillermo Fernández Pego, Facundo Galván, Carlos Gervasoni, Lucas González, Marcelo Leiras, Mariana Llanos, Germán Lodola, Jorge Mangonnet, Diego Martínez, Juan Massini, Susana Menéndez, Ana María Mustapic, Juan Javier Negri Malbrán, Fernando Righini, Pablo Salinas, Beatriz Torres, and Armando Vidal. I would also like to acknowledge that the following institutions partially financed my field research: the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS, KAKENHI Grant numbers: JP26885124 and JP16K17064), and Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO).



I have always been fortunate to have hardworking and fun colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Tsukuba, and the IDE-JETRO. They have always been professionally and personally supportive. It is impossible to list everyone's name, but I especially would like to thank the Latin Americanists/Latin Americans at Pitt (María José Álvarez Rivadulla, Ronald Alfaro-Redondo, Barry Ames, Ignacio Arana Araya, Douglas Block, Miguel Carreras, María Andrea Castagnola, Néstor Castañeda Angarita, Miguel García Sánchez, Ana Carolina Garriga, Bruno Hoepers, Yasemin Irepoglu, Maricarmen León, Germán Lodola, Alexander Martín, Marilia Mochel, Daniel Moreno, Patricia Otero Felipe, John Polga-Hecimovich, Rosario Queirolo, Lucio Rennó, Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga, Juan Antonio Rodríguez Zepeda, Reynaldo Rojo Mendoza, Sebastián Saiegh, Cassilde Schwartz, Amy Erica Smith, Yen-Pin Su, Alejandro Trelles, Javier Vázquez D'Elía, Sofía Vera, Laura Wills Otero, and Yu Xiao), my non-Latin Americanist cohort at Pitt (Stacy Bondanella Taninchev, Heather Elko McKibben, Myoung-Shik Mason Kim, Daniel London, Melissa Parker, Jung-Won Yang, and Basak Yavcan), the core members of Tsujinaka laboratory at the University of Tsukuba (Joji Kijima, Yohei Kobashi, Yoshiaki Kubo, Hiroyuki Tagawa, and Yutaka Tsujinaka), and the Latin Americanists and my cohort at the IDE-JETRO (Kaori Baba, Fang-Ting Cheng, Taeko Hoshino, Byeongwoo Kang, Koichi Kitano, Ryohei Konta, Lei Lei, Aki Sakaguchi, Tatsuya Shimizu, Naokatsu Uetani, Koichi Usami, Kanako Yamaoka, and Akio Yonemura) for their kindness.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Toshinori Kikuchi and Sayoko Kikuchi, for their support and encouragement. This book is dedicated to them.

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# Abbreviations

## Party Names

### *Argentina*

AC	Acción Chaqueña (Action of Chaco)
ARI	Afirmación para una República Igualitaria (Support for an Egalitarian Republic)
CC	Coalición Cívica (Civic Coalition)
CR	Cruzada Renovadora (Renewal Crusade)
FPV	Frente para la Victoria (Front for Victory)
FR	Fuerza Republicana (Republican Force)
FREPASO	Frente País Solidario (Front for a Country in Solidarity)
MPF	Movimiento Popular Fueguino (Fuego People's Movement)
MPN	Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Neuquén People's Movement)
PA	Partido Autonomista (Autonomist Party)
PAIS	Política Abierta para la Integridad Social (Open Politics for Social Integrity)
PB	Partido Bloquista (Bloc Party)
PD	Partido Demócrata (Democrat Party)
PJ	Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party)

## xiv Abbreviations

PL	Partido Liberal (Liberal Party)
PRO	Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal)
PS	Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)
RS	Renovador de Salta (Salta Renewal)
UCR	Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union)

### *Mexico*

PAN	Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party)
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution)
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)

## Other Abbreviations

ATN	Aportes del Tesoro Nacional (National Treasury Contributions), Argentina
CD	Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies), Argentina
CMV	Categoría más vendida (the best-selling products of each category)
CONINAGRO	Confederación Intercooperativa Agropecuaria Limitada (Inter-Cooperatives Association), Argentina
CPMF	Contribuição Provisória sobre a Movimentação ou Transmissão de Valores e de Créditos e Direitos de Natureza Financeira (Provisional Contribution on the Movement or Transmission of Values, Credits, and Rights of Financial Nature), Brazil
CRA	Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas (Argentine Rural Confederations)
FAA	Federación Agraria Argentina (Argentine Agrarian Federation)
FCTC	Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
FET	Fondo Especial del Tabaco (Tobacco Special Fund)
NGA	National Governors' Association, United States
PAMI	Programa de Asistencia Médica Integral (Integral Medical Attention Program), Argentina

PASOs	Primarias Abiertas Simultáneas y Obligatorias (Open, Simultaneous, and Mandatory Primaries), Argentina
PE	Poder Ejecutivo (Executive Branch), Argentina
PPS	Programmatic party structuration
PR	Proportional representation
SRA	Sociedad Rural Argentina (Argentine Rural Society)

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# 1

## Introduction

Increasing mass protests due to economic crisis and to public distrust in politics forced President of Argentina Fernando De la Rúa (1999–2001) to leave office on December 20, 2001, before the expiration of his presidential term. Opposition governors had a meeting to choose his successor on the same day,<sup>1</sup> and Congress elected Governor of the Province of San Luis Adolfo Rodríguez Saá as the interim president on December 23, 2001.<sup>2</sup> President Rodríguez Saá declared a default on the Argentine national debt, and he sent several bills to Congress for implementing his public policy.<sup>3</sup> In spite of facing such a deep crisis, Congress discussed

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<sup>1</sup>*La Nación*, “Los gobernadores del PJ analizan la situación del país (The PJ governors analyze the situation of the country),” December 20, 2001.

<sup>2</sup>There was no vice-president at that time, since Vice-President Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez also resigned in 2000 due to a vote-buying scandal at the Senate. See Chapter 3. Under such situation, the provisional president of the Senate (the president of the Chamber of Deputies if there is no provisional president of the Senate, or the president of the Supreme Court if there is no provisional president of the Senate and the president of the Chamber of Deputies) assumes the presidency for 48 hours, and he or she is in charge of calling a meeting of the legislative assembly (*asamblea legislativa*), which consists of all senators and deputies, to elect the interim president from senators, deputies, and provincial governors.

<sup>3</sup>In contrast with the US, Article 77 of the Argentine constitution allows the executive branch to initiate its bills in the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies.

none of his bills, since legislators followed the position of his copartisan governors, who immediately started to oppose him. These governors claimed that he tried to hold the presidency until 2003, which broke the initial agreement between him and them at the meeting that he was in charge of calling for presidential election for March, 2002. As a result, he also resigned on December 30, 2001, as the president due to the lack of support from governors,<sup>4</sup> and Argentina suffered from a serious political crisis until Senator and former Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires Eduardo Duhalde's accession to the presidency on January 2, 2002.

One of the important tasks for President of Brazil Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) during his tenure was reforming the Brazilian tax system to achieve fiscal stability of the federal government. However, Congress often blocked his attempts following instead the preferences of governors. In 2003, for example, he proposed a tax reform package, which included a plan to make Provisional Contribution on the Movement or Transmission of Values, Credits, and Rights of Financial Nature (*Contribuição Provisória sobre a Movimentação ou Transmissão de Valores e de Créditos e Direitos de Natureza Financeira*, CPMF) a permanent tax.<sup>5</sup> Governors and legislators strongly opposed the tax reform, complaining that it did not take into account decrease in state revenues that would be caused by federal taxes, such as the CPMF. In consequence, what President Lula could do was get an extension of the CPMF until 2007 (Werneck 2006).<sup>6</sup> As tax reform attempts were a factor that negatively affected his relationship with governors, he invited opposition governors as well as his copartisan governors for lunch and asked for their “legislative” support immediately after his successful reelection bid in 2006. Before the lunch meeting, he emphasized

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<sup>4</sup>*La Nación*, “Sin respaldo, renunció Rodríguez Saá (Without support, Rodríguez Saá resigned),” December 31, 2001.

<sup>5</sup>The CPMF was a federal tax on all financial operations, which was in effect between 1997 and 2007. It intended to finance public health, social insurance, and the Fund to Eradicate Poverty (*Fundo de Combate e Erradicação da Pobreza*), but its revenue was not shared with the states (González 2016).

<sup>6</sup>In 2007, another extension was rejected by the Senate.

the importance of governors' commitment to economic and political reforms: "The election is over and we need to govern Brazil with all the governors".<sup>7</sup>

These two episodes indicate that governors in some federal countries are important political actors at national politics and that the national executive branch needs their support. However, this evidence contradicts a principle of federalism, which distinguishes the jurisdiction of the national government from that of subnational governments. Riker (1975) regarded federalism as a political system in which a central government and regional governments make final decisions in their jurisdictions. For Elazar (1997), a critical component of federalism is that power is distributed among multiple centers. Riker's definition focused on decentralization of power, whereas Elazar's argument emphasized non-centralization of power (Gibson 2004; Lijphart 1999, 2012). Nevertheless, both of them agreed that governors do not hold constitutional powers over the national political process.

I thus ask the following question in this book: Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? Many studies (e.g., Carey and Reinhardt 2004; Cheibub et al. 2009; Gibson 2004; Jones 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Stepan 2004; see also Monaldi 2010) have regarded governors as national veto players even though they do not have such a constitutional status. However, the statistical tests of comparative legislative studies and comparative federalism have not succeeded in showing gubernatorial effects on a national political arena. In this book, I shed light on the conditions under which governors can be national veto players by studying the treatment of presidential bills between 1983 and 2007 in the Argentine Senate, which serves as an arena for subnational governments to influence national politics through their senators. Identifying senators' principals as well as focusing on the sequential flow of the legislative process, I argue that senators change their actions

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<sup>7</sup>Andrea Welsh, "Buoyed by Victory, Brazil's Lula Seeks Allies," *Reuters.com*, November 23, 2006, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/11/23/us-brazil-politics-idUKN2328442620061123>.

according to stages in the legislative process and that longstanding governors can be national veto players, since their tenure power is indispensable for controlling their senators.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first explain why we should rethink gubernatorial effects on a national political arena more in detail. I then introduce my research strategy and organization of this book.

## 1.1 Rethinking Gubernatorial Effects on National Politics

Tsebelis (2002) defined a veto player as a political actor whose support is indispensable for policy change. According to him, policy change becomes more difficult as the number of veto players increases. The numbers of institutional veto players, whose agreement is required by the constitution for a policy change (e.g., the president and the legislative branch), and their relative positions in a policy space influence the implementation of policy reforms. He also claimed that players such as courts, army officials, and individual voters (through referendums) can be potential veto players in some political systems.

The constitution codifies the power of institutional veto players, and thus subnational governments are not such players at the national level. A national polity under federalism consists of multiple levels of government, and each exercises exclusive authority over policy areas that are prescribed by the constitution (Gibson 2004). A federal system may generate more institutional veto players than a unitary system, not because of the constitutional powers of governors, but because of other features of federalism such as bicameralism and qualified majority rules in the upper chamber (e.g., filibusters and cloture in the US Senate) make the status quo more stable (Tsebelis 2002). Federal constitution clearly draws the line between the jurisdiction of the national government and that of subnational governments. Theoretically speaking, subnational governments cannot be institutional veto players at the national level, even though they enjoy exclusive authority over subnational units.

However, some comparativists have considered that subnational governments may act as veto players in national politics. They argue that political careers of national legislators are built at the subnational level in some federal countries and that governors thus are able to control legislators' actions. In Brazil, for example, national legislators address local interests in accordance with the open-list PR system, and they also need financial support from governors for their reelection bid (e.g., Samuels 2003; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004). In Argentina, the closed-list PR system makes subnational party leaders ("provincial party bosses")<sup>8</sup> important because they play a crucial role in crafting party lists for elective offices, and most of the provincial party bosses are governors (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007).<sup>9</sup>

Since chief executives prefer to introduce major reforms by lawmaking rather than by other channels such as executive decrees (Saiegh 2011), legislative support is indispensable for implementing policy reforms (e.g., Jones 2001; Corrales 2002; Eaton 2002a; Llanos 2002), and governors may use national legislators to influence the national political arena (Eaton 2002a; Spiller and Tommasi 2005). However, the findings of comparative legislative studies are contradictory. Jones and Hwang (2005a), for example, hypothesized that deputies in Argentina obey their governors and provincial party bosses, but their statistical models show that there is no gubernatorial impact on the deputies' behavior. In the case of Brazil, Carey and Reinhardt (2004) and Cheibub et al. (2009) failed to uncover governors' influence over deputies, even though they considered that Brazilian congressmen need financial support from governors to be reelected. Even

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<sup>8</sup>Provincial party bosses are a small group of politicians or a single individual who dominates parties at the provincial level (Jones and Hwang 2005b). Governors are provincial party bosses of their parties, but there are also "non-governor" provincial party bosses, as is the case when a party does not have a gubernatorial position. The loyalty of legislators to the governors of their provinces depends on the homogeneity of their parties at the provincial level. See Chapter 2 for more discussion.

<sup>9</sup>Even though Argentina started to use "Open, Simultaneous, and Mandatory Primaries" (*Primarias Abiertas Simultáneas y Obligatorias*, PASOs) in 2011, they still play a crucial role in the candidate selection process. See Chapter 2.

though Rosas and Langston (2011) found that Mexican deputies whose states are administrated by governors with longer remaining tenure are more cohesive than other deputies, it is still not clear if governors may block some reform bills.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the literature on federal transfer programs tends to show that economic variables have more explanatory power than political variables. Remmer (2007) argued that governors' party affiliation has no impact on the amount of transfers for their provinces in Argentina. Even though many comparativists have assumed that subnational governments and governors—through their national legislators—can be veto players under federalism (e.g., Carey and Reinhardt 2004; Cheibub et al. 2009; Gibson 2004; Jones 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Stepan 2004), there is little proof in support of their assertions.<sup>11</sup>

Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? In order to consider this research question, we must study senatorial behavior. According to Lijphart (1999, 2012), federalism is positively correlated with strong bicameralism, which encourages subnational interests to be represented at the upper house. Tsebelis (2002) also argued that federalism may have an impact on policy outcomes because it naturally generates strong bicameralism. Therefore, if subnational governments are to be considered national veto players, they should show their influence over the legislative process through their senators.

It is also important to study senatorial response to chief executives' bills rather than that to legislators' bills, since governors do not usually propose policy reforms at the national level through legislators. Tsebelis' (2002) framework emphasized the importance of agenda setters, and assumed that the executive branch in parliamentary systems and the

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<sup>10</sup>In Mexico, current incumbent deputies are prohibited to run for immediate reelection, while no incumbent governor may run for the governorship for life. However, the 2014 constitutional reform allowed deputies to serve for up to four consecutive terms beginning 2018. See Chapter 6 for more information.

<sup>11</sup>Recently, Kikuchi and Lodola (2014) found that the ideal points of senators from a governor's party tend to be far from those of their national parties. In addition, Gervasoni and Nazareno (2017) argued that legislators from a party of longstanding governors are more likely to feel the governors' control over their votes. However, again, it is still not clear how governors may influence the sequential flow of the legislative process.

legislative branch in presidential systems are agenda setters. Even under presidentialism, however, many constitutions allow presidents to directly introduce their bills,<sup>12</sup> and most reforms are implemented by such bills.<sup>13</sup> In the case of economic reforms, for example, the president has two incentives to push them. First, as a head of government, he or she faces many pressures from foreign governments and international financial institutions for introducing economic adjustment measures. Second, as one of the few political actors who is elected from a nationwide district, he or she prioritizes national economic performance over distributing some particular benefits to a limited number of voters. Consequently, the president acts as a policy entrepreneur to introduce the reforms (Eaton 2002a). By contrast, governors do not take part in the day-to-day work of the national legislatures. Instead, they concentrate on negotiating a limited number of important bills such as fiscal reform bills initiated by the president (Langston 2010). In order to observe gubernatorial influence over the legislative process, therefore, this book should focus on chief executives' bills.<sup>14</sup>

Why do senators sometimes support bills sponsored by the federal executive, but sometimes not, regardless of their party affiliations? Under what conditions do senators, following their subnational governments, oppose chief executives' initiatives? To study the relationship between governors and senatorial behavior toward such bills, I analyze the experience of the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007 using the data on roll-call votes on the floor as well as on each senator's decisions in committees. Developing a theory on the subnational electoral connection, in which national legislators' behavior intends to attract political actors at the

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<sup>12</sup>Even when the constitution prohibits the president from introducing his or her bills (e.g., the US), he or she may set legislative agendas by calling attention of the public through the media (e.g., Canes-Wrone 2001; Cohen 1997; Larocca 2006).

<sup>13</sup>For instance, most of the neoliberal reforms in Argentina during the 1990s were activated by the approval of President Menem's bills (Corrales 2002; Eaton 2002a, b; Llanos 2002).

<sup>14</sup>Regardless of the differences between unitary and federal states, legislators' bills are far less likely to be approved than presidential bills. During the Aylwin administration (1990–1993) in Chile, presidential legislative success rate was 63.4%, which exceeded approval rate of legislators' bills (6.8%) (Siavelis 2002). Alemán and Calvo (2008) also show that presidential legislative success rate in Argentina between 1983 and 2001 was 51.3%, and that only 5% of legislators' bills were approved by Congress.

subnational level for their career advancement, I claim that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process as well as to their institutional positions. More specifically, I hypothesize that senators who depend on longstanding governors are more likely to oppose presidential bills than other senators by shelving the bills in committees. Alternatively, senators with political machines as well as their “subordinates” are more likely to vote against presidential bills than other senators on the floor. Those subordinates also tend to amend the bills in committees. I also hypothesize that all else being equal, senators are more likely to oppose the bills that diminish provincial interests.

Argentina is a presidential and federal country with 23 provinces and the City of Buenos Aires,<sup>15</sup> and the president and provincial governors are directly elected for a four-year term.<sup>16</sup> Its upper chamber is an ideal laboratory for this book. The Argentine Senate allows us to incorporate different types of legislators, because experienced politicians (e.g., former presidents and former governors) as well as inexperienced backbenchers hold senatorial seats. More importantly, it is one of the strong federal chambers from the viewpoint of Lijphart (2012), and many comparativists (e.g., Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Stepan 2004) have assumed that the president needs the support from governors and legislators for national policymaking. In addition, the Argentine federalism consists of a wide variety of provincial politics. Three provinces (Catamarca, Formosa, and Santa Cruz) allow indefinite reelection of governors, whereas the provinces of Mendoza and Santa Fe prohibit immediate reelections of their governors.<sup>17</sup> There are term limits for reelected governors in the other provinces. The effective number of parties at the provincial level ranged from 1.22 to 4.94 in 2003 (Calvo and Escolar 2005). These characteristics of Argentine politics give a

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<sup>15</sup>When Argentina was democratized in 1983, it consisted of 22 provinces and Federal Capital (*Capital Federal*). Tierra del Fuego was declared to be the 23rd province in 1990, whereas the 1994 constitutional reform transformed Federal Capital with an appointed mayor into the City of Buenos Aires with a directly elected chief of the government.

<sup>16</sup>The president used to be elected by an electoral college for a six-year term under the previous constitution until 1994.

<sup>17</sup>This description is based on the information as of January, 2018.



significant variance to variables that should be considered in this study and enable me to compare subunits of the country. Using this within-country comparison, I control country-specific variables that may affect the results of cross-country studies.

Evidence from the Argentine Senate indicates that it is not easy for the president to get his or her bills passed. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Argentina is an ideal type of delegative democracy (O'Donnell 1994), the upper chamber just approved 566 out of 919 bills (61.6%) introduced by the executive branch between 1983 and 2001 (Alemán and Calvo 2008). This legislative success rate was lower than that of other presidents in Latin America such as Brazil (84.9% between 1989 and 2006), Chile (72.6% between 1990 and 2006), and Mexico (94.2% between 1989 and 2002) (Figueiredo et al. 2009). Furthermore, Eaton (2002a, b) described the cases in which senators from the president's party introduced significant amendments to neoliberal reform bills introduced by President Carlos Saúl Menem (1989–1999), while the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill, to which I refer in Chapter 4, reveals that senators from the president's party who represented tobacco-producing provinces successfully defended their provincial interests. Therefore, the Argentine Senate should not be regarded as a rubber stamp.

This book makes four important contributions to the studies on Argentine politics as well as to comparative politics in general. First, this study explains institutional mechanisms that make subnational political players national veto players. Though Tsebelis (2002) theorized that the upper chamber under federalism can be a veto player from the viewpoint of bicameralism, his theory does not connect the upper chamber with the subnational political players. My study fills this gap by identifying the institutional mechanisms.

Second, this book shows that committees are the arena for gubernatorial influence. Comparativists tend to focus on roll-call votes (e.g., Carey and Reinhardt 2004; Cheibub et al. 2009; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Kikuchi and Lodola 2014; Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011) and they rarely study decisions in committees.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Exceptions in the studies on Latin American legislatures include Ames (2001), Calvo (2014), Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011), Eaton (2002a), Londregan (2000), and Samuels (2003).

However, decisions in committees cannot be neglected because committees are places where serious debates take place in the legislatures. Using a novel dataset on committee decisions, I reveal that longstanding governors are veto players at the committee stage.

Third, this book also revises the existing theories of legislative behavior. Comparative legislative studies tend to follow Mayhew's (1974) framework that electoral incentives shape legislative behavior. As a result, scholars in the field tend to assume that all players under the same electoral system behave in the same way. However, legislators confront multiple principals regardless of electoral rules (Carey 2008). As I argue in Chapter 2, all the senators in Argentina may face two competing principals at the national level (national parties and the president) and additional principal at the provincial level (governors, subnational party leaders (provincial party bosses), or voters). Introducing a typology of senators according to their institutional positions at the provincial level, I show that senators from the same party and the same district may behave differently even under the same electoral rules. Some senators claim credit for shelving presidential bills in committees for longstanding governors, whereas some senators prioritize position-taking on the floor for voters over credit-claiming activities.

Fourth, by studying the Senate, which has rarely been studied by comparativists,<sup>19</sup> my study also contributes to our understanding of Argentine politics. This study explains why all governors cannot equally influence legislative behavior. Even though they play a crucial role in choosing candidates for legislative elections (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007), the provincial constitutions prescribe different term limits on them (Calvo and Escolar 2005). Since their success in machine politics depends on their tenure stability, longstanding governors are better at controlling senators than freshmen governors.

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<sup>19</sup>Examples of the studies on the upper chambers in Latin America include Alemán (2008), Crisp and Desposato (2004), Crisp and Ingall (2002), Ingall and Crisp (2001), Kikuchi and Lodola (2014), Micozzi (2012), Neiva (2011), Langston (2006), Llanos and Nolte (2003), Llanos and Sánchez (2006), and Londregan (2000).

## 1.2 Organization of This Book

This book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops a theory on the subnational electoral connection, in which national legislators engage in credit-claiming and position-taking for subnational political actors. Examining the concept of the electoral connection, I argue that the theory development requires two tasks: identifying legislators' principals and taking into account the sequential flow of the legislative process. I then review objectives and resources of four possible principals under federalism in general: voters, national parties, presidents, and governors. Following this consideration, I identify three possible combinations of Argentine senators' principals (national parties, the president, and governors; national parties, the president, and provincial party bosses; or national parties, the president, and voters), and introduce a typology of senators. Identifying these principals allows me to generate a set of hypotheses by which senators strategically choose their behavior according to their principals at the provincial level.

Chapter 3 describes abundant data to study senatorial behavior in Argentina. After introducing a brief history of the Argentine Senate, I explain about the information that can be derived from documents about committees and floor behavior. Using such information, I estimate senators' ideal points. I also identify longstanding governors and each senator's categories, which serve to generate critical independent variables for this book.

Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to hypothesis testing. In Chapter 4, I analyze committee behavior. Focusing on the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill, which was one of the hot issues under the Néstor Kirchner administration (2003–2007), I show how senators from tobacco-producing provinces defend their provincial interests by shelving the presidential bill as well as by introducing amendments to it. From a quantitative perspective, I test my hypotheses by modeling the multi-stage structure of committee decisions. It supports my expectations that longstanding governors may shelve presidential bills through their backbenchers, and that the “subordinates” of the senators with political machines claim credit for amending such bills.

By contrast, Chapter 5 studies floor behavior. Tracing the case of Resolution 125 in 2008, which generated severe conflict between the national government and the agricultural sector as well as serious social unrest, I uncover that high-profile senators such as former governors played a crucial role in the historical rejection of the bill at a floor session. I also analyze senatorial behavior on the floor modeling the two-stage structure of the floor process, which differs from the conventional approaches that just focus on roll-call behavior. This statistical model reveals that the high-profile senators and their subordinates are more likely to engage in position-taking activities than other senators, which is consistent with my theoretical framework.

Chapter 6 concludes this book. After summarizing my arguments, I assess the veto power of governors and senators over presidential initiatives. It shows that longstanding governors have considerable influence over committee decisions through their senators and that the president is much weaker than the conventional wisdom has expected. Referring to the cases of Brazil and Mexico, I also claim that my theoretical framework is plausible beyond the Argentine context. I close this book discussing implications for future research.

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# 2

## Political Careers and the Legislative Process under Federalism

This chapter develops my theoretical framework for understanding legislative behavior in federal countries. In order to develop a theory on the subnational electoral connection, in which national legislators' actions aim at attracting subnational political actors for their career advancement, this study identifies possible competing principals (voters, national parties, the president, and governors) under federalism. In addition, using the Argentine Senate as an example, I show how individual senators act strategically, taking into account their principals as well as the sequential flow of the legislative process.

Focusing on the subnational electoral connection, my theoretical framework offers a revision for existing theories of legislative behavior. Since Mayhew (1974) did not rank the importance of advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking, students of legislative politics tend to consider that legislators do not discriminate between these three types of legislative behavior. However, legislators face various competing principals under any electoral system (Carey 2008). Through this chapter, I argue that experienced legislators with their own political machines and backbenchers have different principals at the subnational level, and that they choose different legislative behaviors toward

president-initiated bills. Therefore, it is theoretically possible—and in fact, likely—that legislators from the same party and the same district will behave differently even under the same electoral rules.

In addition, I underscore the importance of understanding the sequential flow of the legislative process. Legislators have various opportunities to act during the multiple stages of the legislative process. However, they have to choose their strategies carefully according to their institutional positions so that their choices do not cost them their political careers.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, examining the concept of the electoral connection, I explain why we should consider legislators' principals as well as the sequential flow of the legislative process when we analyze legislative behavior. In the second section, I explain the objectives and resources of principals to influence legislative behavior in federal countries. I identify relevant players of legislative politics in the Argentine Senate in the third section. In the fourth section, I introduce my hypotheses that identify conditions under which the senators claim credit or take their positions on presidential bills. The fifth section summarizes the argument of this chapter.

## 2.1 Toward a New Theory on the Subnational Electoral Connection

Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? National governments may introduce their public policies through executive orders, decrees, and international agreements as well as through lawmaking. As policy entrepreneurs, however, chief executives usually prefer lawmaking over the other three channels, since policymaking through the legislative process is less sensitive to judicial review than the other instruments (Saiegh 2011). Therefore, governors may become national veto players if they exercise influence over the legislative process.

My research question thus requires the development of a theory on the “subnational” electoral connection. Such a connection can be defined as a condition under which national legislators' behavior

primarily intends to attract political actors at the subnational level such as governors and subnational party leaders who may influence their political future. Pennings and Hazan (2001) considered that legislators express their greatest loyalties to the locus that has the greatest influence on their reelection. Who can be reelected depends on the interaction between electoral laws and the control of candidate selection (Mitchel 2000). If the control of nomination is decentralized, legislators are not constrained by party leaders at the national level (Samuels 1999). Comparativists have considered that governors in some federal countries have substantial influence over political careers of legislators. For example, governors dominate the candidate selection process for national and subnational offices in Argentina (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007), while their exclusive access to the state-government budget and to jobs in the state bureaucracy is attractive to legislators who want some positions at the state level in Brazil (Samuels 2003; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004). In these countries, national legislators' behavior is expected to take aim at governors rather than at other political actors.

In his seminal work, Mayhew (1974) argued that the electoral connection explains legislative behavior. According to him, the primary goal of legislators is reelection, and they engage in three types of legislative behavior: advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking. He regarded advertising as any effort to remind constituents of a legislator's name, credit-claiming as legislative behaviors that bring some particularized benefits to constituents, and position-taking as public announcements of legislators' positions on national or regional issues. Examples of these activities are sending newsletters to constituents, introducing an amendment to a budget proposal, and casting a roll-call vote, respectively.

Americanists have found supportive evidence for the electoral connection thesis. On the one hand, incumbent legislators claim credit for particularistic spending in their districts to build electoral support (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986; Fiorina 1977). On the other hand, their roll-call behavior is explained by the constituency control (e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963; Hill and Hurley 1999; Kingdon 1977), and they also engage in other types of position-taking activities such as bill

cosponsorship (e.g., Koger 2003; Rocca and Gordon 2010)<sup>1</sup> and floor speeches (e.g., Victor 2011) for their electoral incentives. In addition, many studies confirmed that credit-claiming and position-taking actually help incumbents' reelection (e.g., Bovitz and Carson 2006; Cain et al. 1987; Fenno 1978; Jacobson 1981).<sup>2</sup>

Comparativists have also considered that the electoral connection shapes legislative behavior. Carey and Shugart (1995) argued that legislators' incentives for cultivating a personal vote depend on electoral rules and district magnitude. According to them, the value of personal reputation (*vis-à-vis* party reputation) is the highest under the open-endorsement single non-transferable vote with multimember districts and the lowest under closed-list proportional representation (PR) with multimember districts. By the same token, Crisp et al. (2004) found that legislators in Latin America are more likely to introduce pork-barrel bills when they face candidate-centered electoral systems with multimember districts, whereas Ames (2001) argued that open-list PR with multimember districts encourages Brazilian deputies to claim credit for submitting budgetary amendments for their districts.<sup>3</sup> Candidate-centered electoral systems and decentralized candidate selection promote legislators' defection from their parties in roll-call voting (e.g., Hix 2004; Carey 2008), and legislators who have solid local support bases have incentives to prioritize position-taking for their districts over party unity (e.g., Ames 2001; Tavits 2009).

However, the existing literature has not concluded how legislators split their efforts between credit-claiming and position-taking. Since Mayhew (1974) did not rank the importance of advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking, the students of legislative politics tend to assume that legislators do not discriminate between the three types of legislative behavior. Meanwhile, some studies argued that this is not true. On the one hand, Weaver (1986) insisted that congressmen do

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<sup>1</sup>Alemán et al. (2009) estimated ideal points of legislators using cosponsorship data.

<sup>2</sup>Cain et al. (1987) dealt with the behavior of representatives in the US and the UK.

<sup>3</sup>Samuels (2003) considered that deputies with progressive ambition for governor or mayor are more likely to engage in such credit-claiming.

not necessarily maximize credit-claiming opportunities, since avoiding blame for unpopular decisions is more important than claiming credit for popular ones. On the other hand, Martin (2001) argued that some legislators change their roll-call behavior in a sophisticated (insincere) manner for their legislative accomplishments. That is, the former considered that position-taking is more critical for representatives than credit-claiming, while the latter assumed that legislators prioritize credit-claiming over position-taking.

These two studies showed different dimensions of legislative behavior, since they assumed different players for whom legislators take positions on the floor. Weaver's (1986) argument is based on the assumption that politicians engage in credit-claiming and position-taking for voters. However, voters are more sensitive to real or potential losses than to gains. Consequently, congressmen should prioritize minimizing blame for losses over maximizing credit for gains, and they surrender credit-claiming opportunities if such legislative behavior accompanies high political costs. In Martin's (2001) models, legislators of the first chamber do not necessarily engage in position-taking for voters. Since they cast roll-call votes at an early phase of the legislative process, which is followed by discussion in the second chamber as well as subject to presidential veto and judicial review, they may cast sophisticated votes taking into account the preferences of other actors (i.e., the second chamber, the president, and the Supreme Court) in order to claim credit for better final outcome.

This discussion suggests that the development of a theory on the subnational electoral connection requires the following two considerations. First, legislators' principals should be identified, since legislators engage in credit-claiming and position-taking activities in order to attract them. In comparative legislative studies, principals are defined as political actors who have resources to make legislators represent their interests (Carey 2008). However, principal-agent relationships in legislative politics are not necessarily dyadic. As Carey (2008) pointed out, every legislator under every electoral rule faces "competing principals". Even under the systems that promote the development of a personal reputation among voters for legislators, party leaders may control their legislators

using their exclusive access to resources in the legislatures (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005). Since federalism may increase the number of principals including governors as additional players of national legislative politics, it is important to analyze how legislators behave considering preferences of multiple principals.<sup>4</sup>

One of the reasons why we should identify legislators' principals is that legislators strategically choose between credit-claiming and position-taking activities according to the characteristics of principals. If the political future of legislators highly depends on their personal reputations among voters, they may prioritize position-taking over credit-claiming, since poorly informed voters are more sensitive to their losses than to their gain by good public policy (Weaver 1986). By contrast, governors are well informed. When the legislative branch discusses presidential initiatives, the subnational electoral connection should make legislators focus on credit-claiming, since governors want them to amend or not to approve presidential bills that hurt provincial interests. However, not all the legislators have the same incentives, since some of them are from the provincial opposition. Therefore, different principals encourage legislators to choose different types of legislative behavior.

Second, a theory on the subnational electoral connection should recognize the sequential flow of the legislative process. Martin (2001) implied that the legislative process constrains legislators' choices. For example, floor voting is the final stage of the legislative process at the chamber. It allows legislators to take positions, but they do not have a chance to express their positions on initiatives that are screened out by the agenda-setting offices or committees (e.g., the Rules Committee of the US House). Alternatively, legislators may achieve their goals at other stages. For instance, signing committee reports allows them to announce their positions, while amending some important legislation in a committee also permits them to claim credit. Therefore, the sequential flow of the legislative process should be modeled in order to test hypotheses about the subnational electoral connection.

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<sup>4</sup>For studying political careers of Mexican deputies, Kerevel (2015) identified their competing principals.

In this section, I examined the concept of the electoral connection. In order to enhance political career, legislators engage in advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking. Therefore, my research question requires the development of a theory on the subnational electoral connection, in which legislators should claim credit or take positions for actors such as governors and subnational party leaders. In the following sections, I describe competing principals of legislators in federal countries and identify relevant players of the legislative process in the Argentine Senate. The discussion in the next two sections leads us to the section that poses the hypotheses of this book.

## 2.2 Competing Principals under Federalism

This section describes possible legislators' principals in federal countries. There are various definitions of federalism, but they agree that governors are exclusive authorities of subnational units (e.g., Elazar 1997; Riker 1975). Federalism may make governors additional principals because they have some channel to influence the legislative process. In the remainder of this section, I explain objectives and resources of four possible principals: voters, national parties, presidents, and governors.

### 2.2.1 Voters

Voter-legislator linkages have attracted many political scientists, because members of the lower chamber are directly elected by voters in democratic countries.<sup>5</sup> Voters expect particularistic and programmatic benefits from legislators. On the one hand, they want legislators to offer particularistic benefits such as the delivery of pork as well as casework that helps individual voters. For example, the National Election Study's Senate Election Study conducted between 1988 and 1992 showed

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<sup>5</sup>Members of the upper chamber are not necessarily chosen through direct election. For example, the UK House of Lords consists of Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal. I also discuss the case of unelected senators in federal countries later in this section.



that one of the principal reasons why American constituents contacted senators or representatives was “to seek help with a problem”, even though survey respondents’ answers changed according to constituency size of electoral districts (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999). On the other hand, as many studies about economic voting suggest,<sup>6</sup> voters also expect policy programs that lead to better economic conditions and welfare benefits.

Legislators lose their jobs if voters are not satisfied with them. Incumbents win reelection only when they act in the best interest of citizens (Manin et al. 1999).<sup>7</sup> The findings of some studies on American politics support the idea of constituency control. For example, Miller and Stokes (1963) found that congressmen’s roll-call behavior is explained by their perceptions of constituencies’ preferences as well as their own policy preferences, especially in the case of legislations about civil rights; Hill and Hurley (1999) also supported this argument. Kingdon (1977) found that legislators tend to vote with their constituents on high-salience issues because satisfying their constituencies is the most important goal for legislators who wish to be reelected. In this sense, voters are direct principals when they can reward and punish individual legislators with their votes (Carey 2008).

However, voters are not direct principals of legislators in other countries where the electoral system for choosing legislators is a closed-list PR system. The constituents voting under closed-list PR cannot express their preferences for candidates, because the rankings of candidates are already determined by parties. What the constituents can do is express their preferences for parties. Therefore, legislators under closed-list PR are less sensitive to voters, since their political futures highly depend on their party leaders. Carey and Shugart (1995) considered that electoral systems provide legislators with different incentives. According to them, whether candidates cultivate their personal reputation depends on the characteristics of electoral rules such as party’s control over ballots, the

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<sup>6</sup>See Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) for a good literature review of this topic.

<sup>7</sup>Manin et al. (1999) called this voter-legislator linkage “accountability representation”, and distinguished it from “mandate representation”, which assumes prospective judgments of voters about legislative candidates.

degree to which a candidate can be elected independently from other copartisans, and the number of votes that each voter can cast at elections. In addition, as the district magnitude increases, party reputation dominates personal reputation under closed-list PR, whereas personal reputation comes to be more important under other electoral systems.

## 2.2.2 National Parties

### 2.2.2.1 Function of National Parties

Carey (2008) argues that party leaders are one of the competing principals of legislators under any electoral systems. Parties generally control resources both at the legislative and electoral arenas (Müller 2000), but party organizations are decentralized in some federal countries. Still, national parties can be regarded as a principal because they control resources in the legislatures.

Parties exist both at the legislative and electoral arenas because they solve collective action problems and reduce transaction costs (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Müller 2000). Referring to historical evidence of parties in the US, Aldrich (1995) argued that individual legislators have an incentive to form legislative parties. One of the reasons is solving collective action problems, since cooperation by forming a coalition makes its members better off than acting individually under the prisoner's dilemma. Political entrepreneurs (i.e., party founders who serve as party leaders) monitor the behavior of the members of legislative parties in order to achieve cooperation for collective goals. By sharing information among members, legislative parties also reduce uncertainty over the future. In addition, in terms of transaction costs among legislators, long-term legislative parties are less costly than forming short-term voting blocs for each bill (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993). Members of the majority legislative party are especially rewarded because they control fates of proposed bills. The importance of majority status in the legislatures encourages legislative parties to go to the electoral arena, since it is critical for the parties to get more of their members elected.

From the perspective of individual politicians at the electoral arena, party labels reduce their transaction costs with voters (Aldrich 1995; Müller 2000). It is too costly for individual candidates to advertise their ideological preferences and their ability as legislators. On the other hand, voters may easily identify the ideological preferences of candidates with party affiliation. In the US, voters tend to vote for the candidates chosen by their preferred parties since they do not want to waste their votes for independent candidates whose behavior in Congress is unpredictable. According to Cox and McCubbins (1993), incumbent congressmen in the House also act together to avoid unnecessary legislation that does not maximize their chance of reelection, and thus they try to protect their parties' reputations.

Studies of American politics that emphasize party effects in the House (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Rohde 1991) are based on two important assumptions: parties' reputations increase their members' possibility of being reelected and the reputations depend on their legislative successes. These two assumptions may lead us to the "traveling problem" of theories when we study parties in young democracies. Kitschelt et al. (2010) define programmatic coordination as the degree to which politicians use party labels as coherent policy alternatives in their electoral campaigns, and argue that the degree of programmatic party structuration (PPS) in Latin America is very low. Four federal countries are not exceptions. They regard the degree of PPS in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela as intermediate-low, and that of Brazil as low or absent. One of the reasons for low PPS could be decentralized party organizations. For example, students of Brazilian politics argue that federalism as well as open-list PR system encourages legislators to prioritize pork-barreling efforts over bringing programmatic benefits to their constituents (e.g., Ames 2001; Mainwaring 1999; Samuels 2003).

However, even in the countries with decentralized party organizations, resources in the legislatures are concentrated in national parties. Whenever legislators have to take positions on important initiatives, decisions are made by party group meetings at the national level (Carey 2008). More importantly, committee positions are distributed to legislators by national parties in many countries. For example, in spite of decentralized structure of party organizations, leaders of national party

blocs in Argentina allocate committee positions to their legislators.<sup>8</sup> National party leaders in Brazil also control committee assignments (Desposato 2004; Samuels 2008). In this sense, national parties are one of the principals in every federal country.

### 2.2.2.2 Resources for Party Discipline

National parties maintain their party unity in the legislatures using their resources at the legislative and electoral arenas. However, students of American politics tend to focus on resources in Congress, whereas comparative legislative studies pay attention to the degree to which parties control candidate selection process in the electoral arena.

According to Ansolabehere et al. (2007), almost all the incumbent congressmen in the US do not have difficulty with receiving renomination regardless of their loyalties to national parties. They attributed this incumbency advantage to the decline in intra-party factions. Factional labels and resources determined the outcome of primary elections in the states with persistent factions. However, factionalism has declined, and thus primary elections turned to depend more on personal reputation of candidates. As a consequence, the incumbency advantage is more prominent in primary elections than in general elections.

National parties in the US cannot control candidate selection process in an arbitrary manner due to primary elections,<sup>9</sup> but they manage resources in Congress so that they maintain party unity. Reforms of the House Democrats' internal rules during the 1970s gave the Democratic leaders various resources for controlling their rank-and-file members (Rohde 1991). Since the 1970s, party leaders have had powers over committee assignments. Reviewing the records of potential candidates on leadership votes, party leaders may distribute committee seats to more loyal members so that party positions dominate key committees.

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<sup>8</sup>The units of legislators in the Argentine Congress are legislative party blocs (*bloques*).

<sup>9</sup>However, Cohen et al. (2008) argued that the US presidential nomination process include "invisible primary" in the sense that coalitions between national party elites, associated groups, activists, and other insiders, which is formed before the national party nominating conventions, determine presidential nominations.

Committee and subcommittee chairs often obey their party leaders because they will be replaced by other aspirants if they continuously defect from their parties. More importantly, the majority party may disproportionately fill the Rules Committee, which regulates discussions of bills on the floor, with their loyal members.

Studies of party effects in the House agree that majority status is an important asset for national parties because of the dominance of the majority party over committee seats, but they propose different causal mechanisms. As Cox and McCubbins (2005) summarized, the conditional party government model (e.g., Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995) considers that majority status is important because of “positive agenda power”. When there is a policy agreement among members of the majority party, the members expect their party leaders to control the Rules Committee and a relevant committee. Using proposal powers, the majority party may legislate *what the party wants*. On the other hand, the procedural cartel theory (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) focuses on “negative agenda power”. The dominance of the majority party in the agenda-setting offices (i.e., the Rules Committee and other committees) allows the majority party to block *what the party does not want* (e.g., bills of the minority party). As a result, the majority party is not expected to be rolled on the floor.

Senators are considered to be more individualistic, but recent studies reveal party effects in the Senate (e.g., Pearson 2008; Lee 2009). Agenda powers are more decentralized in the Senate in the sense that there is no Rules Committee and that individual senators may block debates on the floor using filibusters. Sixty votes are required to override filibusters. However, party leaders still possess some disciplinary tools to a lesser extent. For example, the Senate majority leader has the right of first recognition, and it allows him or her to schedule debates and votes on the floor (Pearson 2008). Den Hartog and Monroe (2008) also found that the majority party may kill unwanted amendments by tabling motions.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>According to Lee (2009), party-line votes are more prominent in procedural and parliamentary votes than in substantive votes. She attributes this finding to desire of individual senators rather than the power of party leaders, because individual party members share their electoral fates and thus it is important for both the majority party and the minority party members to influence agenda content.

Comparative legislative studies have also focused on candidate selection to explain party unity. Morgenstern (2004) argued that the interaction of electoral rules and requirements for party endorsement (e.g., lack of open primaries) should influence party unity in the legislatures because they decide the degree to which parties control nominations. Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008) focused more on political recruitment as well as candidate selection. Assuming that candidate types influence legislative behavior, they classified legislative candidates into four ideal types: *party loyalist*, *constituent servant*, *entrepreneur*, and *group delegate*. According to them, party discipline is high among party loyalists, who are generally recruited by centralized party organizations under closed-list system with high district magnitudes. For example, legislative candidates of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI) fit the ideal type of party loyalists (Morgenstern and Siavelis 2008). By contrast, we observe low party discipline and frequent party switching in Brazil because legislative candidates are entrepreneurs (Morgenstern and Siavelis 2008; see also Ames 2001).<sup>11</sup>

## 2.2.3 The President

### 2.2.3.1 Objectives of the President

What are the president's motivations for influencing legislative behavior? The president has ideological preferences that reflect his or her partisan affiliation (Cohen 1997). However, regardless of partisan affiliation, the president always has motivations for intervening in the legislative process because presidentialism naturally generates the executive and legislative branches with different perspectives on public policies. The most important feature of presidentialism is separation of powers.

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<sup>11</sup>We should also take into account that Brazilian open-list PR system requires legislative candidates to be on a party list and to be affiliated with the party for more than one year (Samuels 2008). Desposato (2006) formalized legislators' decisions of party switching, and argued that legislators in Brazil use their parties for pork maximization, ideological consistency, and short-term electoral gain.

The president and legislators are elected separately. The president is directly elected by voters for fixed terms, and thus the president's tenure does not depend on the legislatures.

These institutional characteristics of presidentialism encourage the president and legislators to have different preferences on public policies. Shugart and Haggard (2001) argued that the separate election of the executive and legislative branches lead to a "separation of purpose" so that the two branches have different policy goals. The separate election may generate divided government under which the president and the legislatures have different ideological preferences. In addition, the president and legislators pursue different public policies due to difference in constituencies. The president is elected by a nationwide constituency, while legislators are elected from subnational districts. As a result, even under unified government, the president's legislative programs tend to respond to national policy demands, whereas legislators are more likely to be interested in local issues.<sup>12</sup>

A determinant of the degree of separation of purpose is the congruence of presidential and congressional constituencies, and thus federalism also increases separation of purpose (Shugart and Haggard 2001).<sup>13</sup> Federalism usually creates a malapportioned upper chamber because every subnational unit holds the same number of senators. This malapportionment leads to high incongruence between the president's constituency and that of the upper chamber. Also, subnational governments under federalism may have autonomy over some policy areas.

The premise of the "two presidencies" in American politics also confirms the separation of purpose in federal systems. Wildavsky (1966) claimed that the US has two presidencies: one for domestic policies and the other one for military and foreign affairs. He explained that presidents are more successful in the legislation of foreign policies than domestic

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<sup>12</sup>According to Saiegh (2009), legislative success rates of the presidents are lower than those of prime ministers in Westminster-style parliamentary countries.

<sup>13</sup>Shugart and Haggard (2001) also mentioned electoral cycle (e.g., concurrent or nonconcurrent), staggering of legislative elections (e.g., all renewal or partial renewal), and electoral formula (e.g., party-centered or candidate centered) as other determinants of the degree of separation of powers.

policies. Defense and foreign policies came to be more important after the 1930s. Thus, the president uses more resources for making foreign policies. On the other hand, members of Congress just support the president's foreign policies because they believe that making national defense policy is not their job (Wildavsky 1966). Although many studies (e.g., Edwards 1989; Peterson and Greene 1994) challenged the thesis of the two presidencies and showed that the two presidencies diminished,<sup>14</sup> the concept of the two presidencies suggests that the president and legislators may have different perspectives on national public policies.

### 2.2.3.2 Resources of the President

In spite of potential gridlocks between the executive and legislative branches due to the separation of purpose, some presidents are successful in legislating their policies. What kinds of resources does the president have? Which presidential powers are relevant to presidential legislative success?

The constitution is a resource of presidential powers over executive-legislative relations. According to Shugart and Carey (1992), the powers of the presidency consist of legislative powers and nonlegislative powers. Legislative powers are presidential powers over the legislative process such as package and line-item vetoes, decree authority, budgetary powers, exclusive introduction of legislation in some policy areas, and the power to propose referenda. On the other hand, nonlegislative powers include the power to dissolve the legislatures and presidential powers over the cabinet. Nonlegislative powers are not directly related to the legislative process, but they affect the bargaining powers of the executive and legislative branches (Scartascini 2008).

From constitutional perspective, legislative powers of the president in the US are limited. The president does not possess a line-item veto and any formal power in early stage of the legislative process.

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<sup>14</sup>Edwards (1989) argued that the two presidencies declined after the Eisenhower administration because President Eisenhower was the only president who cultivated bipartisan support for his internationalist foreign policies. On the other hand, Peterson and Green (1994) contended that American politics got more nationalized and less distributive between 1947 and 1990.



However, many studies on American politics agree that the president is a dominant agenda setter of the legislative process. A resource for the president's agenda-setting power is his direct linkage with the public, since the president is directly elected by voters. Calling attention of the public to presidential agendas through the State of the Union address or the media, the president may set the "public agendas" (e.g., Canes-Wrone 2001; Cohen 1997; Larocca 2006).<sup>15</sup> In order to evaluate congressmen's performances, voters use information on their responses to the public agendas. As a consequence, many studies found a positive relationship between presidential approval ratings and presidential legislative success (e.g., Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002; Marshall and Prins 2007). These studies also found that party control in Congress is a critical determinant of presidential legislative success (e.g., Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002; Cohen 1997; Edwards 1989; Marshall and Prins 2007), but public opinion is a valuable resource for the president, especially under divided government.

On the other hand, students of Latin American politics have focused on constitutional powers of the president, since Latin American presidents usually have strong formal powers over the legislative process. Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) argued that the majority status of the president's party in the legislatures (partisan powers) and constitutional legislative powers such as package and line-item vetoes, decree authority, and exclusive introduction of legislation in some policy areas interactively determine the president's ability to influence the legislative process.<sup>16</sup> Evidence from federal countries in Latin America supports this argument. For example, considerable legislative and nonlegislative powers under the 1988 constitution allowed most of the Brazilian presidents to be successful in lawmaking, even though their parties did not hold

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<sup>15</sup>Some studies (e.g., Edwards and Wood 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005) found that the president is mainly responsive to issues covered by the media.

<sup>16</sup>Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) also pointed out that there is a negative correlation between constitutional legislative powers of the president and his or her partisan powers, because the president does not need so much proactive powers over the legislative process when his or her party is dominant in the legislatures.

a majority of seats (Alston et al. 2008). In Mexico, the rise of divided government decreased the number of presidential bills and made the rate of presidential legislative success slightly lower (Lehoucq et al. 2008).

## 2.2.4 Governors

### 2.2.4.1 Objectives of Governors

Federal constitutions differentiate the jurisdiction of the national government from that of the subnational governments. For example, the United States Constitution delegates some specific powers to Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court, but all other powers are reserved to the States (Zimmerman 1992; Hanson 2004). Still, governors have an incentive to influence the national legislative process, especially because of intergovernmental fiscal relations.

Intergovernmental conflicts often arise from intergovernmental fiscal relations. Even though federal constitutions guarantee the autonomy of governors from the center, fiscal authority was centralized in almost all the countries during the twentieth century (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). The degree of the centralization varies from country to country, but revenue centralization is prominent in Latin American federations. According to a calculation by Diaz-Cayeros (2006), subnational governments in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela controlled less than 10% of total revenue collection in 1997, if we regard revenue-sharing systems not as subnational revenue but as federal transfer programs.<sup>17</sup> In addition, about 60% of provincial budgets in Argentina depend on various transfer programs from the national government (Gordin 2004). State governments are less dependent on the federal government in the US, but around 25% of state revenues were transferred from the federal government in the 1990s (Hanson 2004). Federal transfer programs are thus critical for governors to maintain the quality of subnational administration.

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<sup>17</sup>He also points out that fiscal authority in Brazil is less centralized than these three countries.

Since the amount of federal transfers is decided through the budget process, which often involves treatments of relevant bills in the legislatures, governors have an incentive to influence the legislative process. In the US, most of the federal transfer programs are discretionary ones after the elimination of general revenue-sharing grants in 1987. State governments must spend *categorical grants* and *project grants* for some specified policy areas in order to achieve goals of the federal government, whereas state governments may use *block grants* as they want.<sup>18</sup> Congress plays a crucial role in determining the allocation of these “grants-in-aid” because categorical grants and block grants must be approved by Congress (Hanson 2004).

In Latin America, the president dominates the budget formulation (e.g., Santiso 2004; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Weldon 2002). However, the legislatures of Latin American federations are not irrelevant actors in the budget process. As Diaz-Cayeros (2006) reported, several studies found that overrepresentation of states in both chambers has a positive impact on the amount of transfers that states receive (Kraemer 1997; Gibson et al. 2004). Weldon (2002) argued that the Mexican Chamber of Deputies may actively modify the annual budget when the president’s party does not control a majority.<sup>19</sup> In Brazil, deputies often introduce amendments to presidential budget bills so that the bills favor subnational interests (Samuels 2003). Thus, governors have an advantage in intergovernmental negotiations if they have resources to control legislators.

#### 2.2.4.2 Resources of Governors

The objective of bicameralism under federalism is that the upper chamber represents subnational interests, whereas the lower chamber represents nationwide citizens (Tsebelis and Money 1997; Gibson 2004). However, variety in constitutional designs and institutional settings leads to different types of governors’ influence over the legislative process.

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<sup>18</sup>Block grants are also known as “special revenue-sharing grants” (Hanson 2004).

<sup>19</sup>In Mexico, budget bills are discussed only in the Chamber of Deputies.

In their seminal work, Filippov et al. (2004) argued that constitutional choice between “direct representation” and “delegated representation” determines the forms of intergovernmental bargaining through the legislative process. Senators are elected by direct election under direct representation, whereas governors or state legislatures choose them under delegated representation. Referring to the change from delegated representation to direct representation in the US, they claimed that the delegated representation allows subnational governments to exercise control over the federal center. By contrast, the direct representation undermines the role of governors and state legislatures in intergovernmental bargaining through the legislative process (Filippov et al. 2004).

In the US, it is difficult for governors to control federal senators from their states because of the direct representation as well as political career structures. Governors and senators are often rivals in their states. Many senators run for the governorship after their terms, whereas many governors have ambition for senatorial seats. As a result, cooperation between governors and senators is difficult to achieve (Beyle 1990).

Thus, the National Governors’ Association (NGA) allows governors to influence the legislative process. This is the interest group of a joint gubernatorial presence in Washington. The number of the staff members of the NGA for lobbying, research, and state service increased to ninety by the mid-1980s, and the NGA is regarded as one of the major public interest groups on Capitol Hill (Beyle 1990). The NGA helps governors to take a visible leading role in negotiation with Washington. In the case of President Nixon’s revenue-sharing bill in 1971, governors took actions together including lobbying of all the House members, and the bill favored state governments. As chief executives of states, governors may mobilize statewide elected officials, nongovernmental interest groups, business associations, and the media so that they can legitimize their demands before Congress (Haider 1974).

We may regard the German *Bundesrat* as an example of a body of delegated representation. This upper chamber allows state governments to be directly involved in the legislative process, because it consists of minister-presidents (chief executives) and their cabinet ministers of 16 states. Each state government appoints its *Bundesrat* members, and they serve for the state administration and the upper chamber

simultaneously. There is no fixed term for them, but they have to resign immediately when they leave the state government.<sup>20</sup> Each state holds three to six votes (seats) according to its population, and cannot split its votes even when the state government is a coalitional one.<sup>21</sup> Swenden (2004) argued that state governments have considerable leverage over intergovernmental negotiations, because all the bills related to subnational administration must be approved by an absolute majority of the *Bundesrat* members.<sup>22</sup>

We could also find cases in which governors might influence the legislative process under federal constitutions with direct representation. Studying the case of the 2003 fiscal reform bill in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, Langston (2010) finds that many PRI deputies cast dissident votes against the bill following the preferences of their governors. She attributes this finding to the prohibition on consecutive reelection of deputies and to governors' control over candidate selection process. Estimating deputies' ideal points, Rosas and Langston (2011) uncover that Mexican governors with longer remaining tenure may make their deputies more cohesive than other governors.<sup>23</sup> However, as they admit, it is still unclear under what conditions governors may reject some initiatives in the legislatures.

## 2.2.5 Summary

In the previous subsections, I explained objectives and resources of voters, national parties, the president, and governors to influence the legislative process in federal countries. Voters expect particularistic and programmatic benefits from legislators, and may reward and

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<sup>20</sup>States also switch their *Bundesrat* members frequently according to agendas of the floor meetings.

<sup>21</sup>However, Shikano (2008) uncovered the growing importance of left-right partisan dimension of policy preference in the German *Bundesrat*.

<sup>22</sup>Bills need not be discussed in the *Bundesrat* if they are not related to subnational administration.

<sup>23</sup>Beginning 2018, deputies are allowed to be reelected for four consecutive terms, whereas gubernatorial reelection is prohibited in Mexico. See Chapter 6 for more information.

punish individual legislators with their votes under electoral rules with candidate-ballots or preference-ballots. National parties solve collective action problems and reduce transaction costs, controlling resources at the legislative and electoral arenas. In the case of a presidential system, different preferences on public policies encourage the president to influence the legislative process using his or her agenda-setting powers. Intergovernmental conflicts also make governors influence the legislative process through a channel prescribed by the constitution.

Given these competing principals, under what conditions can governors be national veto players? In order to analyze this research question, we need two considerations I mentioned earlier. First, legislators' principals should be identified, because legislators under the same electoral rules may face different principals, and they strategically choose their actions according to their institutional positions. Second, the sequential flow of the legislative process should be taken into account for hypothesis testing. The next section is dedicated to the first task: identification of the players of legislative politics in the Argentine Senate.

## 2.3 Players of Legislative Politics in the Argentine Senate

This section identifies relevant players of the legislative process in the Argentine Senate. As I claimed in Chapter 1, the Senate is an ideal case to consider my research question. It consists of experienced politicians such as former presidents and governors and inexperienced backbenchers, while the characteristics of provincial politics vary from province to province.

In addition, bicameral system in Argentina is a strong one from the viewpoint of Lijphart (2012), which should encourage senators to defend their subnational interests. The composition of the two chambers is incongruent, since the Senate is smaller than the Chamber of Deputies, and senators enjoy longer terms than deputies. Beginning in 2001, 72 senators are directly elected through a semi-PR called an incomplete list, which distributes two senators to the first party in the

election and one senator to the second party in each province,<sup>24</sup> from 24 province-wide districts for a six-year term.<sup>25</sup> Using the closed-list PR system, 257 deputies are also directly elected from 24 province-wide districts for a four-year term. The Senate renews one-third of its members (i.e., senators from eight provinces) every two years, whereas the Chamber of Deputies renews one-half of the deputies every two years. In addition, the constitution sets different minimum age requirements for senators and deputies. It also requires a minimal income for senatorial candidates (Llanos and Nolte 2003; Llanos and Sánchez 2006).

Bicameralism in Argentina is also symmetric regarding the formal constitutional powers of the two chambers. Most bills can be initiated in either chamber.<sup>26</sup> In the case of disagreement between the chambers, the originating chamber has an advantage in the *navette* system. When the reviewing chamber amends bills that have already been approved by the originating chamber, just an absolute majority is enough for the originating chamber to insist on its original approvals (Llanos and Nolte 2003; Tsebelis and Money 1997).<sup>27</sup>

Political career structures (e.g., electoral rules and candidate selection procedures) and the institutional characteristics of the legislative process shape the relationship between legislators and their principals (Carey 2008). National parties are principals of Argentine senators, because they control resources in the upper chamber. In addition, we could regard the president as another principal, since he or she could affect senatorial behavior using his or her powers to control the legislative process. As a party leader, he or she may also influence political careers of senators from the governing party.

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<sup>24</sup>Mexico also uses the incomplete list to choose three senators from each state. However, an additional 32 senators are elected through closed-list PR. See Chapter 6 for more information.

<sup>25</sup>The 1994 constitutional reform in Argentina changed the form of the representation of sub-national interests. Before the constitutional reform, each province had two senators, and they were elected indirectly by the provincial legislatures for a nine-year term. During a transitional period between 1995 and the first direct senatorial election in 2001, the legislatures of each province elected three senators.

<sup>26</sup>If bills deal with ratification of international treaties, appointment of justices, military officers, and ambassadors, and the revenue-sharing system, they have to be initiated in the Senate. By contrast, all bills related to taxes and recruitment of troops must be initiated in the Chamber of Deputies.

<sup>27</sup>If the reviewing chamber amends the bills with a two-thirds majority, the originating chamber also needs a two-thirds majority to override the amendments.

More importantly, I argue that former governors and inexperienced backbenchers may have different “third” principals in their provinces. On the one hand, rank-and-file senators are loyal to governors or provincial party bosses (subnational party leaders) rather than to voters because of their dominance over the candidate selection process (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007).<sup>28</sup> We may observe such trend even after the adoption of Open, Simultaneous, and Mandatory Primaries (*Primarias Abiertas Simultáneas y Obligatorias*, PASOs) in 2009, since major parties/electoral coalitions usually do not submit multiple lists of senatorial candidates.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, senators with rich political experience face voters, since they are “visible” to voters as provincial party bosses. Therefore, senators in Argentina have three different combinations of competing principals: national parties, the president, and governors; national parties, the president and provincial party bosses (subnational party leaders); or, national parties, the president, and voters.

Even though national parties in Congress are well-known for high party discipline (Jones 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Morgenstern 2004), evidence from the Argentine Senate shows that conflicts among those principals sometimes lead senators from the president’s party to oppose presidential initiatives. For example, Resolution 125 in 2008, which I study in Chapter 5, generated a severe tension between the president and farmers. Such tension made 13 out of 47 senators from the president’s party cast negative votes against the presidential bill that requested congressional ratification of the resolution, and the vice-president’s historical tie-breaking vote turned down the presidential initiative.

In the remainder of this section, I first describe national parties, the president, governors, provincial party bosses, and voters as principals. Then, after summarizing the conventional wisdom on legislative behavior in Argentina, I introduce a typology of senators.

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<sup>28</sup>Senators were elected indirectly before 2001, and thus such senators were unaccountable to voters.

<sup>29</sup>The first PASOs were held in 2011.



### 2.3.1 National Parties in Argentina

Since the 1983 democratization, two nationwide parties have played a crucial role in Argentine politics: The Radical Civic Union (*Unión Cívica Radical*, UCR) and the Justicialist Party (*Partido Justicialista*, PJ).<sup>30</sup> Except for Mauricio Macri (2015–), who is affiliated with his own party Republican Proposal (*Propuesta Republicana*, PRO), all the presidents after 1983 had been affiliated with one of the two parties. Presidents Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989) and Fernando De la Rúa (1999–2001) were from the UCR,<sup>31</sup> whereas Presidents Carlos Saúl Menem (1989–1999), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (2001), Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015) were from the PJ. Moreover, factionalism is one of the characteristics of current Argentine politics. The 2001 political-economic crisis, which was described earlier in this chapter, triggered the fragmentation of the two parties.<sup>32</sup> In the 2007 presidential election, for example, President Kirchner's Front for Victory (*Frente para la Victoria*, FPV) faction chose his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as a presidential candidate, but her running mate was Julio Cobos, who was affiliated with a UCR faction that supported the Kirchner administration (*Radicales K*). In addition, Alberto Rodríguez Saá ran for the presidency as a candidate from other PJ faction, while other UCR factions supported Roberto Lavagna.

National parties in Argentina do not necessarily succeed in establishing programmatic platforms. Kitschelt et al. (2010) rank Argentina as a country of intermediate-low programmatic party structuration (PPS).<sup>33</sup> Reelection rates of senators and deputies are low, and many

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<sup>30</sup>The UCR is one of the oldest political parties in Latin America formed in 1891, while the PJ was originally founded as the Peronist Party (*Partido Peronista*) by Juan Domingo Perón in 1947.

<sup>31</sup>De la Rúa won the presidency as a candidate from the coalition between the UCR and the Front for a Country in Solidarity (*Frente País Solidario*, FREPASO) called the *Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación*.

<sup>32</sup>See Calvo and Escolar (2005) for a discussion about the changes in party system.

<sup>33</sup>Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela are also ranked as intermediate-low PPS. Uruguay and Chile are ranked as intermediate PPS, whereas Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia fall into low or absent PPS (Kitschelt et al. 2010).

national legislators leave for other offices at the provincial level (Jones 2008). Moreover, party organizations in Argentina are decentralized. Provincial party bosses (subnational party leaders) play a crucial role in the candidate selection process for any election, and machine politics dominate the linkage between governors or provincial party bosses and voters (Jones and Hwang 2005a, b). According to Levitsky (2003), the PJ lacks a national authority structure, a centralized bureaucracy system, and rules of the game. Leiras (2007) studied party organizations of four national parties in Argentina (i.e., the PJ, the UCR, the Broad Front (*Frente Grande*), and the Action for the Republic (*Acción por la República*)), and found that the UCR's National Committee (*Comité Nacional*) is the only central authority whose decisions are relevant for party organizations. Even in the UCR, however, the importance of votes obtained by provincial-level party organizations is increasing.

In spite of decentralized party organizations, however, national party labels reduce transaction costs in Argentina because of the balloting system. Provincial-level party organizations are in charge of providing ballots with the list of their candidates, and voters choose a ballot of their preference (i.e., vote for a party list). Even in the case of concurrent elections, the lists for different offices are printed on the same ballot. Voters have two options in this case: depositing the whole ballot of a party (i.e., voting for candidates for the different offices from the same party), or tearing the ballot to cast a split-ticket vote. Morgenstern (2004) argued that this balloting system leads voters' attention to parties in Argentina, because voters identify the unit of legislative actors ("legislative agents") by ballots.<sup>34</sup>

More importantly, the balloting system in Argentina generates presidential and gubernatorial coattail effects, and thus being a Peronist or Radical is a valuable asset for a candidate seeking any elective office. Even though the importance of national party labels varies across parties and provinces (Leiras 2007),<sup>35</sup> party affiliations of the incumbent

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<sup>34</sup>In the same vein, the balloting systems make voters focus on candidates' coalitions in Chile and candidates' factions in Uruguay (Morgenstern 2004).

<sup>35</sup>The importance of national party labels might be lower in the provinces such as the province of Neuquén where a local party (i.e., Neuquén People's Movement (*Movimiento Popular Neuquino*, MPN)) has dominated the governorship since the democratization in 1983.

president and governors have a positive impact on their parties' vote share at congressional elections (Calvo and Murillo 2004). According to Jones and Hwang (2005a), provincial party bosses delegate their deputies to national parties in order to maintain their machines and to control the governorship. As a result, national deputies tend to be loyal to national parties, and national parties coordinate among the interests of provincial party bosses.

National parties in Argentina also possess tools for maintaining their party unity. They have various exclusive resources in Congress. The principal unit of legislators in the Argentine Congress is legislative party blocs (*bloques*).<sup>36</sup> Jones (2002) argued that the leaders of party blocs in the Chamber of Deputies have several important resources such as control over the legislative process, committee assignments, and financial resources for legislative activities. These resources are also relevant for the blocs in the Senate. For example, floor agendas are determined by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary (*Plenario de Labor Parlamentaria*), which consists of the vice-president of the nation (or the provisional president of the Senate) and the leaders of all party blocs. Bills initiated by senators are less likely to be approved than bills introduced by the president. However, if individual senators want to get their bills passed, they have to ask the leaders of their party blocs to recommend their bills be included in the floor agenda. Otherwise, the bills will not be discussed on the floor.

As in the case of the US Congress, majority status is important for legislative party blocs in the Argentine Senate. Even though decision making at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary is consensus-based,<sup>37</sup> it is also true that the majority party has an advantage in agenda-setting because of the quorum requirement for opening floor sessions.

In addition, the majority party receives more committee seats and committee authority positions such as chair, vice-chair, and secretary. For each committee, these positions are distributed to legislative party blocs in proportion to their share on the Senate floor, and the leaders of party blocs usually decide who gets those positions. On the one hand,

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<sup>36</sup>Sometimes a party is divided into several blocs reflecting factionalism of the party.

<sup>37</sup>See Chapter 5.

the dominance in every committee gives the majority party a significant advantage over the flow of legislation. On the other hand, the majority party can distribute more committee positions as financial resources. As Jones et al. (2002) argued, committees in the Argentine Congress are not a place for legislators to gain their expertise. Rather, senators request more assignments in order to receive additional financial resources for them and their staffs.<sup>38</sup> Senators may receive extra resources when they hold committee authority positions. Reflecting their demands, the number of standing committees in the Senate increased from 29 in 1983 to 47 in 2001 so that most of the senators hold some committee authority positions.<sup>39</sup> Senators may receive better assignments if they are loyal to their national parties. Disloyal committee chairs, in turn, will be replaced. In the case of Resolution 125 in 2008, to which I will refer in Chapter 5, Senator Roberto Urquía (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) had to resign as the chair of the Budget Committee, because he did not accept the recommendation of his party bloc and opposed the president-initiated bill.

In the electoral arena, the influence of national parties on candidate selection is limited because of provincial party bosses' control over the candidate selection process (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007).<sup>40</sup> Still, Jones (2002) argued that national parties have a chance to impose their preferred candidates if (1) the president of a national party is also the president of the nation and (2) provincial party bosses are not unified. These conditions might explain the influence of national-level PJ on senatorial candidate selection under President Kirchner (2003–2007) and his wife President Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015).<sup>41</sup> The PJ did not have primaries for the 2003 presidential election and

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<sup>38</sup>Under current Senate rules, senators may belong to five or six standing committees.

<sup>39</sup>The number of standing committees was reduced to 24 in 2003 because of new Senate rules. As of January, 2018, the Senate had 27 standing committees.

<sup>40</sup>As I argue later in this chapter, open primary elections are now mandatory in Argentina (PASOs). However, provincial party bosses still play a crucial role in selecting candidates for the primary elections.

<sup>41</sup>According to Jones (2002) and Levitsky (2003), President Menem (1989–1999) often tried to impose his preferred candidates on provincial-level organizations, but his attempts were rarely successful.

three candidates of the PJ (Néstor Kirchner, Carlos Menem, and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá) ran for presidency. As a result, the PJ was fragmented at the national and provincial levels during the Kirchner administration, and Kirchner actively imposed his preferred candidates. For example, the PJ at the province of Buenos Aires presented two party lists to the 2005 senatorial election. Hilda González de Duhalde led a list of the PJ with the support of her husband, former President Eduardo Duhalde, an important provincial party boss in the province of Buenos Aires. On the other hand, Kirchner's FPV faction put his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner on the top of another list with the support of Governor Felipe Solá.<sup>42</sup>

In conclusion, national parties generally have resources at the legislative and electoral arenas for maintaining their party unity. National parties in Argentina also have such resources, but they have more exclusive access to those in the legislative arena. Their influence on senatorial candidate selection is limited due to decentralized structures of party organizations. However, they may impose their preferred candidates on provincial-level party organizations when the president of a national party is also the president of the nation and provincial party bosses are not unified.

### 2.3.2 The President of Argentina

Shugart and Haggard (2001) argued that federalism makes the president and legislators have different preferences for public policies, and ranked Argentina as a country with a relatively high degree of separation of purpose. This ranking is consistent with Spiller et al. (2007) description that a characteristic of policymaking in Argentina is the importance of fiscal federalism in almost every policy issue including issue areas that are not directly related to intergovernmental relations. According to them, national senators and deputies tend to work for governors who want to receive fiscal transfers as much as possible,

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<sup>42</sup>Kirchner's list won two seats (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and José Pampuro), whereas Duhalde's list won one seat (Hilda González de Duhalde) in this election.

even when the national economy is close to a terrible crisis. Corrales (2002), Eaton (2002a), and Llanos (2002) also documented many cases in which President Menem and Congress had different preferences for economic reforms under unified government. Therefore, it is expected that presidentialism and federalism in Argentina create a high degree of incongruence in preferences for public policies between the president and senators, and thus the president in Argentina always has motivations for intervening in the legislative process in order to get his or her bills passed.

Argentina experienced a constitutional reform in 1994 and introduced new rules for presidential elections. Before the constitutional reform, the president was elected by an electoral college for a six-year term, and no immediate reelection was allowed. Under the current constitution, the president is elected via a direct election for a four-year term. If none of the presidential candidates win 45% of the valid votes or 40% of the valid votes with a margin of 10%, the two leading vote-getters proceed to a runoff election. The constitution now allows one immediate presidential reelection.

However, the 1994 constitutional reform did not change the strong legislative powers of the president. The constitution allows the executive branch to submit its own bills to Congress and the president has a package veto and a line-item veto. In addition to these formal powers, the president dominates the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, which sets the floor agenda. The vice-president of the nation (i.e., the president of the Senate) or the provisional president of the Senate chairs the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. Contrary to most of the legislatures in the world and to the Chamber of Deputies, the provisional president is traditionally elected not from the majority party but from the president's party. Given the dominance at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary and its majority status, the presidents from the PJ enjoyed considerable agenda-setting power in the Senate.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Calvo (2014) found that partisan environment influences amendment process of presidential bills rather than the bills' overall success.

The president is also able to discipline legislators of his or her party as the leader at the national level. Jones (2002) pointed out that the president has a chance to impose his or her preferred candidates on provincial-level party organizations, and such intervention is increasing under the Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner administrations. It is possible for legislators from the president's party to pay with their political futures if they vote against a presidential bill. As I mentioned in the previous subsection, Senator Roberto Urquía (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) cast a dissident vote against the presidential bill that requested congressional ratification of Resolution 125 in 2008. Even though his Nay vote was because of Governor Juan Schiaretti (PJ-FPV, Córdoba), who openly opposed Resolution 125, he failed to run for any elective position after the expiration of his tenure as a senator. Because the Kirchner family did not want him, the PJ Córdoba did not nominate him for the 2009 elections.

Moreover, recent studies have revealed that the president in Argentina may “go public” for agenda-setting. Calvo (2007, 2014) and Alemán and Calvo (2008) found that a positive image of the president increases the probability of his or her legislative success, as in the case of the US. This finding is especially relevant for the case of President Alfonsín (UCR, 1983–1989), because his legislative success rate was better than that of President Menem (PJ, 1989–1999) even though Alfonsín's UCR did not control a majority of seats in the Senate. Therefore, the president in Argentina may use not only constitutional powers and partisan powers but also his or her dominance at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary and public opinion for influencing senatorial behavior.

### 2.3.3 Governors and Provincial Party Bosses in Argentina

As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, Argentina is a country where provincial-level party organizations are in charge of crafting party lists for elections. This feature makes provincial bosses an additional principal of senators without their own political machines. According to Jones and Hwang (2005b), provincial party bosses are a small group of

politicians or a single individual that dominates parties at the provincial level, and governors are often dominant provincial party bosses of their parties. When parties do not control the governorship, provincial party bosses are a single dominant individual or a small group of party leaders, and they hold other elective offices (Jones and Hwang 2005b).

Governors in Argentina are elected via a direct election for a four-year term. Gubernatorial election years are coincident with presidential election years in most of the provinces after the 1994 constitutional reform, but they are not necessarily conducted on the same day. Provincial constitutions prescribe different gubernatorial term limits. As of January 2018, the provinces of Mendoza and Santa Fe prohibited immediate reelections of their governors, whereas three provinces (Catamarca, Formosa, and Santa Cruz) allowed indefinite reelection of their governors. The other provinces imposed term limits on reelected governors.

Contrary to the president who wants to use federal transfer programs as a tool for territorial coalition building, governors have incentives for influencing the legislative process to maximize available amount of transfers for their provincial-level party organizations (Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011). Federal transfer programs in Argentina consist of various discretionary programs (e.g., the National Treasury Contributions (*Aportes del Tesoro Nacional*, ATN)) as well as nondiscretionary programs (e.g., the Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement (*Coparticipación*)), and they are known as “federal fiscal labyrinth” (Saiegh and Tommasi 1999; Spiller et al. 2007; Bonvecchi and Lodola 2011). Both discretionary and nondiscretionary programs require the approval of Congress.<sup>44</sup> Budget officials in Argentina positively evaluated the capacity of Congress for financial scrutiny at a 2003 survey of budgeting procedures conducted by the OECD and the World Bank. Following this survey, Wehner (2006) constructed an index of legislative budget institutions and gave almost the same score to the Argentine Congress, the Mexican Congress, the German Parliament, and the Japanese Parliament.

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<sup>44</sup>See Jones (2001) and Rodríguez and Bonvecchi (2004) for the budget process in Argentina.



The Argentine constitution requires that all bills regarding the revenue-sharing system must originate in the Senate and must be approved by both chambers. This is one of the important reasons why governors in Argentina are interested in influencing senatorial behavior. The provinces of Buenos Aires and Tierra del Fuego both have three seats in the Senate, even though the population of Buenos Aires is about 200 times larger than the number of people in Tierra del Fuego. Spiller et al. (2007) argued that this constitutional requirement works as a protection for small provinces, because the province of Buenos Aires, which has 27% of all the deputies, or the president (who has various institutional resources over the legislative process) cannot pass a reform of the revenue-sharing system without support from small provinces. Besides bills on the revenue-sharing system, Llanos (2002) and Eaton (2002a, b) described the episodes that senators also amended presidential bills of other areas in order to improve the economic condition of the provinces under the Menem administration.<sup>45</sup>

Besides using federal transfers to finance their administrations, governors in Argentina also need federal transfers for their role as provincial party bosses. The objectives of provincial party bosses are maximizing the performance of their factions at the provincial level and securing their positions as provincial party bosses in provincial-level party organizations (Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007). For these purposes, governors engage in machine politics that combines clientelism with patronage (Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Lodola 2010). In new democratic countries, the relationship between voters and politicians tends to be clientelistic: voters trade political support in exchange for receiving particular goods (Kitschelt 2000). In addition, neoliberalism in developing countries may facilitate clientelism (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes et al. 2013).

Levitsky (2003) illustrated the decentralized structure of the PJ that depends on clientelistic networks. In the case of the PJ, voters are mobilized by base units, which are managed by *punteros* (neighborhood party brokers). Multiple base units frame *agrupaciones* at the municipal level, which aggregate into provincial factions. Since the National Council

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<sup>45</sup>Eaton (2002a) considered that both chambers are the arena for pursuing provincial interests.

of the PJ does not work effectively, the main actors of national party politics are provincial party bosses who lead provincial factions, and national party leaders depend on machines in provinces. The UCR, another nationwide party in Argentina, also relies on its *punteros* for the mobilization of voters.<sup>46</sup>

For provincial party bosses, patronage is the most important currency for maintaining clientelistic networks. Besides vote buying that connects voters to the *punteros* (Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes et al. 2013), patronage serves for mobilizing votes (Calvo and Murillo 2004) and for maintaining the relationship between provincial party bosses and the *punteros* and other party activists (Jones and Hwang 2005b; Levitsky 2003). Since the budget of provincial governments in Argentina highly depends on federal transfers, governors have an incentive to receive federal transfers as much as possible for maintaining their machines.

Provincial party bosses also have incentives to control their senators even when they do not hold the governorship. For one, they do not want senators to pursue political careers independently in Buenos Aires, since independent senators will be potential intra-party rivals at provincial-level party organizations. In addition, they try to coordinate their senators' behavior because of coattail effects. Their primary goal is winning the governorship so that they can construct stronger machines for maximizing the performance of their factions at the national or provincial level. However, the incumbency advantage in gubernatorial elections is outstanding in Argentina. According to De Luca (2008), 84% of incumbents who ran for reelection were successful between 1987 and 2006. Even when incumbent governors do not run for reelection due to term limits, it is highly likely that their intra-party successors win the governorship (Lodola 2010). Thus, it is difficult for opposition party bosses to achieve their goal.

Still, there are cases in which opposition party bosses win the governorship. How do they make it with a reduced chance? The most important factor that explains their success is a presidential coattail

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<sup>46</sup>Machine politics tend to favor the PJ (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Szwarcberg 2015), but the UCR also engages in machine politics to a lesser extent.

effect. As Gélinau and Remmer (2006) showed, presidential as well as gubernatorial approval has a positive impact on gubernatorial vote choice. Among the eight cases in which opposition party bosses beat incumbent governors between 1987 and 2007, three cases were observed in 2003. The victory of Néstor Kirchner (PJ) in the presidential election was confirmed in May, and most of the gubernatorial elections were held after June that year. With Kirchner's support, Mario Das Neves (PJ) defeated incumbent José Lizurume (UCR) in Chubut, and José Luis Gioja (PJ) won against incumbent Wbaldino Acosta (Bloc Party (*Partido Bloquista*, PB)) in San Juan. In Tierra del Fuego, by contrast, incumbent Carlos Manfredotti (PJ) was a victim of a "negative" presidential coattail effect. He lost the gubernatorial race against Mario Colazo (UCR),<sup>47</sup> because he was a passionate supporter of Carlos Menem, who lost the 2003 presidential election against Kirchner. Since a good relationship with a popular president is important for non-gubernatorial provincial party bosses, they have an incentive to control their senators so that they can take full advantage of presidential coattail effects in gubernatorial elections. Thus, both governors and opposition party bosses have incentives to control their senators.

Besides the introduced new rules for presidential elections described in the last subsection, the 1994 constitutional reform in Argentina switched the form of the representation of subnational interests from a delegated representation to a direct representation. Micozzi (2012) found that, all else being equal, senators directly elected after 2001 due to the constitutional reform were more likely to propose general bills as well as the bills that target at their voters. According to Senator and former Governor Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-*Justicialista 8 de octubre*, Salta), this constitutional reform undermined federalism in Argentina. Such reform made it more difficult for governors to control senators from their provinces, because there is no guarantee that their candidates get two seats (or one seat, at least) in direct elections.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>Interestingly, Governor Colazo maintained a good relationship with President Kirchner, and took part in a UCR faction (*Radicales K*) that supported the Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner administrations. Moreover, he won a senatorial seat in 2007 and joined the PJ-FPV bloc.

<sup>48</sup>Author's interview, August 19, 2009.

Even after the introduction of direct election, however, most of the governors in Argentina still exercise a strong influence over senatorial behavior because of their status as provincial party bosses.<sup>49</sup> Many senators (as well as deputies) do not have their own political machines, and their political careers highly depend on provincial party bosses. Provincial party bosses have two channels for controlling those senators: their dominance over the candidate selection process and machine politics.

In Argentina, candidates for elective offices must be affiliated with parties, and legislative elections use party-ballots. Provincial-level party organizations are in charge of creating candidate lists. These features allow provincial party bosses to dominate the candidate selection process (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007). Argentina introduced the PASOs in 2009 and held its first mandatory open primary elections in 2011. However, there were several provinces where each party just provided a unitary list for senatorial seats.<sup>50</sup> In practice, elite arrangement is still the dominant method to choose candidates for the mandatory primaries in a majority of provinces.

The average reelection rate for senatorial seats was 16% between 1983 and 2001. The reelection rate increased to 28% between 2001 and 2007, but almost 39% of incumbent senators ran for a lower office or returned to their provinces (Kikuchi and Lodola 2014). Therefore, it is necessary for the senators to care about their governors in order to pursue their political careers.

In addition, governors' dominance over machine politics attracted incumbent senators without their own political machines, because machines were critical for candidates' success in nonmandatory primary elections. Jones and Hwang (2005b) and Jones (2008) claimed that the result of such primaries totally depended on the ability of machines.

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<sup>49</sup>In Brazil, governors' influence over senatorial nomination is limited, since governors are often required to form multiparty alliances for their electoral success. As a result, candidacies for senatorial seats tend to be reserved for their alliance partners (Lodola 2010).

<sup>50</sup>In this case, primary elections just work as a threshold, because candidate lists that receive less than 1.5% of votes cast must be eliminated.

Candidates had to mobilize electorates as much as possible, but none of them won the primaries without support from machines facing multiple candidate lists for a party. In turn, candidates may maximize the possibility of their success if they are supported by governors' machines.

This logic still works after the introduction of the PASOs, because mandatory primaries as well as general elections require more money for political campaigns. Though each political party may receive financial support from the national government and donations from the private sector, these resources are not sufficient for the political campaigns. This is why most of the campaigns are financed by provincial party bosses (Leiras 2007). Governors enjoy advantages in financing their followers because the provincial governments are the largest employers in most of the provinces. Therefore, governors are important for senators because of their financial support for senators' future political campaigns as well as their control over the candidate selection process. Monopolizing the only access to the provincial budget and employment of the provincial government, governors can build their political machines based on patronage and pork-barrel activities.

To a lesser extent, opposition party bosses may engage in patronage using public employment of municipal governments (Jones and Hwang 2005b). The size of employment for patronage is limited, but this type of patronage still helps provincial party bosses to mobilize sufficient number of voters to gain some share in Congress or provincial legislatures. Even in the provinces where governors' parties are dominant, the opposition governs some important municipalities.

The power of experienced provincial party bosses and that of freshmen (or interim) provincial party bosses should not be the same. Experienced provincial party bosses have solid political machines. One of the conditions that make machines work is that all players believe in the exchange game continuing into the future. With much iteration, machine politics are consolidated into social networks (Stokes 2005). In the case of freshmen provincial party bosses, the possibility of betrayals of some players is high, since players are not sure if the game is indefinitely repeated or is just a one-shot game. As a result, provincial party bosses have the most powerful effect on candidate selection process

when they are incumbent governors whose reelection is not prohibited (De Luca et al. 2002). Since it is clear for all actors that these governors continue to be provincial party bosses, all the actors are willing to be cooperative in the candidate selection process.

In conclusion, governors (and opposition party bosses to a lesser extent) in Argentina may control their senators because of their dominance over candidate selection process and machine politics. This institutional feature makes national legislators in Argentina *party loyalists* to provincial-level party organizations (Morgenstern and Siavelis 2008).

### 2.3.4 Voters in Argentina

Senators with political machines do not need the support from governors for their career advancement, and thus they do not respond to governors. Do they face additional principals besides national parties and the president? Governors and party bosses from the provincial opposition may control rank-and-file senators using their dominance over the candidate selection process as well as their political machines. Instead of them, voters are the “third” principals for senators with rich political experience at the provincial level.

In Argentina, electoral rules generally prevent national legislators from being fully accountable to voters. Since the order of candidates on party lists is predetermined by provincial party bosses under party-centered systems such as the incomplete list (for the Senate) and the closed-list PR (for the Chamber of Deputies), voters cannot change the order according to their preferences. Backbenchers thus have few incentives to cultivate personal reputations among voters (Carey and Shugart 1995).

Voters know that subnational party leaders control the candidate selection process even after the introduction of mandatory open primary elections (PASOs) in 2009, and voting behavior is based on their evaluation on provincial party bosses rather than on individual candidates. They also know that governors have more resources for patronage and pork than opposition party bosses. As a result, the lists of governors' candidates tend to receive more votes than other lists at

congressional elections (Calvo and Murillo 2004). That is, the success of inexperienced candidates at legislative elections depends on their bosses' performance. Campaign advertisements in Argentina clearly reflect this fact. Even when an election is not concurrent with a gubernatorial one, the image of a governor is often larger than that of an actual candidate on campaign posters. In 2009, for example, Governor José Luis Gioja's (PJ-FPV, San Juan) candidates for the Chamber of Deputies used the slogan "*Votálo a Gioja*" (Vote for Gioja) during their campaign. Thanks to Gioja's popularity, their list received 56% of votes, and two of them won seats in the lower chamber.<sup>51</sup>

However, this is not the case when party bosses themselves serve as senators. They are more "visible" to voters than other backbenchers for three reasons. First, they usually occupy the first position on party lists and act as "symbols" in electoral campaigns. Second, they manage their own political machines as provincial party leaders and their actions are often covered by local media. Third, since most of them aspire to be governors or continue to be provincial party bosses, they should maintain their popularity among voters.

Such visibility of senators with political machines implies that they may be rewarded and punished by the electorate with votes, which is a condition for voters to be principals (Carey 2008). When they run for reelection, they are evaluated by voters as the "heads" (i.e., those who are at the first position) of party lists. They face the same province-wide electorate if they have gubernatorial ambitions. Even when they do not run for other offices such as the Chamber of Deputies, voters choose a ballot not because of personal reputations of actual candidates but because of the performance of provincial party bosses. Therefore, the performance of provincial party leaders is one of the important determinants of electoral outcomes.<sup>52</sup> In addition, the *punteros* and other party activists may support other provincial party bosses if they are not

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<sup>51</sup>Lucardi and Micozzi (2016) argue that deputies without executive experience strategically run in midterm elections in order to increase their visibility, whereas those who had an executive experience prefer to run in concurrent elections.

<sup>52</sup>Even when senators were indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures before 2001, therefore, provincial party bosses in the Senate had voters as principals.

satisfied with their current bosses (Szwarcberg 2015). Provincial party bosses in the Senate thus must make efforts to keep their popularity among voters, the *punteros*, and other party activists.

We could find such efforts in the case of Resolution 125 in 2008, to which I refer in Chapter 5. Facing increasing tension between the national government and the agricultural sector, the Senate received President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's (PJ-FPV) bill that requested congressional ratification of the resolution. This situation was especially tough for the PJ-FPV senators from the Pampas (i.e., the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, La Pampa, and Santa Fe), the Argentine agricultural center, and former governors from the president's party such as Senators Rubén Marín (PJ-FPV, La Pampa) and Carlos Reutemann (PJ-FPV, Santa Fe) supported farmers with Nay votes. This episode illustrates that provincial party bosses in the Senate sometimes take positions for voters.

In sum, provincial party leaders in the upper chamber have voters as their third principals in addition to national parties and the president. Contrary to the case of rank-and-file senators, who are not fully accountable to the electorate, voters may reward and punish such leaders with votes. It is thus important for the provincial bosses to cultivate personal reputations among voters.

## 2.3.5 Argentine Senators as Agents

### 2.3.5.1 The Conventional Wisdom on the Argentine Congress

From the perspective of Lijphart (2012), the strong bicameralism in Argentina can be comparable to that in the US. Contrary to the US where reelection rates of senators and representatives are high, most legislators in Argentina do not run for reelection. Reelection rates of senators and deputies are 16% (between 1986 and 2001) and 23% (between 1991 and 1999), respectively (Jones 2008).

The conventional wisdom on the lack of legislative careerism in Argentina is that the closed-list PR system and decentralized structures of party organizations deprive legislators of pursuing a solid legislative career. Due to the dominance of subnational party leaders over the



candidate selection process, legislators spend more time on maintaining a good relationship with provincial party bosses rather than on legislative activities. Such bosses also consider that legislators who seriously pursue legislative careers in Buenos Aires are dangerous, since these legislators will be potential intra-party rivals at the provincial level. As a result, legislators are rotated among the offices offered by provincial party bosses (Jones et al. 2002; Lodola 2010; Spiller et al. 2007).

This evidence has led Latin Americanists to believe that the Argentine deputies are “amateur” legislators (Jones et al. 2002).<sup>53</sup> The data on committee assignments in the Chamber of Deputies between 1987 and 1997 shows that deputies do not have an incentive to gain policy expertise. The number of committees upon which a deputy serves increases as the number of committees in the Chamber grows, since deputies may belong to multiple committees. Moreover, deputies are more likely to be appointed as committee chairs when their provincial party bosses are governors (Jones et al. 2002). Eaton (2002a, b) also cited episodes in which some of the PJ deputies voted against President Menem’s tax reform bills in order to defend their provincial interests.<sup>54</sup>

In spite of the emphasis on provincial party bosses’ control over their deputies (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007), Jones and Hwang’s (2005a) roll-call vote analysis revealed no provincial effect in the Chamber of Deputies. Contrary to their expectation that legislative behavior in Argentina should be explained by a territorial (provincial) dimension as well as a partisan dimension, a one-dimensional model discriminates 95% of roll-call votes in the lower house between 1989 and 2003. Roll-call behavior in the Chamber of Deputies occurs along a partisan dimension. Why is there only a partisan dimension? Jones and Hwang (2005a, b)

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<sup>53</sup>The findings of recent studies challenge this conventional wisdom. In spite of the fact that Congress passes many more presidential bills than legislators’ bills, Alemán and Calvo’s (2008) found that bills sponsored by senior deputies and committee chairs are more likely to be approved than the other deputies’ bills. Moreover, Micozzi’s (2014a, b) findings suggested that deputies with an aspiration to be a mayor strategically submit district-level bills and that deputies with a gubernatorial ambition tend to cooperate each other for cosponsoring bills.

<sup>54</sup>Pezzola (2017) studied the legislative behavior of senators and deputies for protecting the interests of sugar producers.

explained this feature from the viewpoint of the conditional party government theory (e.g., Rohde 1991; Aldrich 1995) and the procedural cartel theory (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). In the US House of Representatives where individual representatives have autonomy, representatives delegate their powers to party leaders in the House so that effective legislation, which also cultivates their parties' reputations, maximizes their chance to be reelected. Not deputies but provincial party bosses have such autonomy in Argentina, and these bosses delegate their power to national party leaders in the Chamber of Deputies.

However, we need additional considerations to study the Senate, since some of the provincial party bosses themselves serve as senators. On average, the social composition of both chambers is similar in Argentina in terms of average age, level of female representation, level of university education, and the percentage of legislators with law degrees (Llanos and Sánchez 2006). However, careful examination of legislators' trajectories reveals that some of the first-tier politicians hold senatorial seats. The Senate was historically regarded as a "conservative institution" due to considerable share of former presidents and former governors (Botana 1977). This tradition is reflected in the senators of the 2001 class even after the introduction of direct election. Among 76 senators between 2001 and 2003,<sup>55</sup> 15 senators (20%) had already occupied or run for the presidency or a governorship before reaching the Senate, and 14 senators (18%) ran for the presidency or a governorship immediately after leaving from the Senate (Kikuchi and Lodola 2008). Given that political career structures in Argentina make all serious presidential and gubernatorial candidates *party insiders* (i.e., undisputed party leaders) or *party adherents* (e.g., faction leaders) at the provincial level (De Luca 2008),<sup>56</sup> we may regard these 26 senators (34%) as provincial party bosses (Kikuchi and Lodola 2008).<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, six senators

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<sup>55</sup>Four senators were replaced by their substitutes in 2002.

<sup>56</sup>Regarding the typology of executive (presidential and gubernatorial) candidates, see Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008).

<sup>57</sup>Three senators of the 2001 class (Jorge Busti (PJ, Entre Ríos), Mario Colazo (UCR, Tierra del Fuego), and Carlos Maestro (UCR, Chubut)) ran for the governorship both before and immediately after their senatorial terms.

(8%) of the 2001 class reached the Senate with no previous political experience. Thus, inexperienced backbenchers and the first-tier politicians coexist in the Senate. This discussion leads to the necessity of a typology of senators, since senators with different backgrounds should behave differently in the upper chamber.

### 2.3.5.2 A Typology of Senators

Contrary to the Chamber of Deputies, the Argentine Senate consists of two types of senators: *subordinates* and *Senate bosses* (Kikuchi and Lodola 2008). Subordinates are the senators who have little access to political resources, while Senate bosses are provincial party bosses who have won seats in the Senate. They are first-tier politicians including former presidents and former governors.<sup>58</sup> Following Kikuchi and Lodola (2008), I regard senators as Senate bosses (a) if they have already occupied or run for the presidency, the vice-presidency, or a governorship before reaching the Senate; or (b) if they run for the presidency, the vice-presidency, or a governorship immediately after leaving the upper chamber.<sup>59</sup>

Table 2.1 summarizes the typology of senators and their principals. Different types of senators have different principals at the subnational level. Subordinates have the following competing principals besides national parties: governors or provincial party bosses at the subnational level, and the president at the national level. Provincial party bosses, who are often governors, play a crucial role in the candidate selection

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<sup>58</sup>Burdman (2010) finds that the number of the first-tier politicians in the Chamber of Deputies has also increased since the 1994 constitutional reform. According to him, however, they just stay there for short periods in order to run for other elective offices.

<sup>59</sup>This operationalization is different from the operationalization of the *political boss* variable in Kikuchi and Lodola (2014). Since Kikuchi and Lodola (2014) wanted to differentiate the effects of previous political trajectory and future political ambitions over senatorial behavior separately, their *political boss* variable only captures if a senator was a former president or a former governor. For this study, however, the purpose of identifying *Senate bosses* is differentiating important figures of provincial politics with machines from other inexperienced senators. I thus follow Kikuchi and Lodola (2008) that simultaneously considered previous political career and future ambition for operationalizing the concept of provincial party boss.

**Table 2.1** Typology of senators and their principals

Type	Principals at the national level	Principals at the subnational level
<b>Subordinates</b>		
Governor's subordinates	National parties, and the president	Governors
Senate bosses' subordinates	National parties, and the president	Senate bosses
Local subordinates	National parties, and the president	Provincial party bosses who are not governors or Senate bosses (e.g., deputies and mayors)
<b>Senate bosses</b>	National parties, and the president	Voters

Source Author's elaboration

process (Jones 2008). In addition, their machines are indispensable for subordinates' campaigns. Therefore, subordinates primarily need to follow their provincial party bosses if they want to pursue their political careers. The president is an additional principal in the Senate, because he or she has agenda power over the legislative process. Moreover, opposing presidential initiatives may cost their political careers if they are affiliated with the president's party. Since subordinates do not have enough political power, they are expected to choose their actions considering the powers of the three competing principals.

Subordinates consist of three subcategories according to their principals in their provinces: *governors' subordinates*, *Senate bosses' subordinates*, and *local subordinates*. Governors' subordinates are the senators who belong to their governors' faction at the provincial level. Senate bosses' subordinates are those who share the same party and factional affiliation with Senate bosses. They usually have run for senatorial seats on the same ticket with Senate bosses. Local subordinates are the senators whose provincial party bosses are not governors or Senate bosses (e.g., they may respond to national deputies and mayors).<sup>60</sup>

<sup>60</sup>An example of local subordinate was Senator Carlos Rossi (*Vecinalista Partido Nuevo*, Córdoba), who responded to Mayor of the City of Córdoba Luis Juez (*Vecinalista Partido Nuevo*, Córdoba).

Though all the three subordinates have national party leaders and the president as their principals at the national level, the third principals at the subnational level are different in each case. Such principals are governors, Senate bosses, and provincial leaders who are not governors or senators, respectively.

By contrast, Senate bosses themselves are provincial party bosses (e.g., former presidents and former governors). Governors are not principals of Senate bosses even when they are affiliated with the same party, because Senate bosses may run for any elective offices without support from governors. Relying on their own political machines, Senate bosses are independent from governors. In some cases, Senate bosses may control governors. Between 1983 and 1987, for example, Senator and former Governor Vicente Saadi (PJ, Catamarca) had considerable influence over provincial politics through his son, Governor Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca).

As important political figures that dominated their provinces for several years, Senate bosses are accountable to province-wide voters.<sup>61</sup> National party leaders and the president are also their principals. However, national parties and the president cannot easily control them. As the first-tier politicians, Senate bosses have already established solid political machines in their provinces, and thus they do not need much support from the president or national parties. Therefore, Senate bosses are more autonomous from such principals than subordinates.

In the remainder of this chapter, I posit hypotheses for understanding how these different types of senators with different competing principals react to bills initiated by the president.

## 2.4 The Legislative Process and Senatorial Behavior

In the previous section, I identified motivations and resources of competing principals as well as the characteristics of senators. National parties have exclusive resources in the Senate for maintaining their party

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<sup>61</sup>Since senators have province-wide districts, voters should be considered principals at the subnational level.

unity, and the unity of the majority party is expected to be higher than that of the other parties. The president may influence senatorial behavior using constitutional and partisan powers, his or her dominance at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, and public opinion. Governors and opposition provincial party bosses may control their senators because of their dominance over the candidate selection process and machine politics. Voters also have chances to reward and punish some senators. However, the Argentine Senate consists of Senate bosses, Senate bosses' subordinates, governors' subordinates, and local subordinates, and they face different combinations of competing principals.

How do these factors interactively condition the attitudes of individual senators towards presidential bills? Using the typology of senators presented in the previous section, this section introduces working hypotheses of this study. I argue that senators choose different strategies according to their institutional positions.

### 2.4.1 Opportunities for Credit-Claiming and Position-Taking in the Legislative Process

Earlier in this chapter, I claimed that we should model the sequential flow of the legislative process to test the subnational electoral connection. Senators should engage in credit-claiming or position-taking in order to enhance their political careers even when they do not run for reelection. However, the characteristics of the legislative process shape opportunities for those activities.

The Argentine constitution allows the executive branch as well as legislators to submit their bills to Congress.<sup>62</sup> All bills should be submitted to the “front desk (*mesa de entradas*)” in one of the two chambers.<sup>63</sup> Then, a bill is assigned to a committee or multiple committees that have jurisdiction over its subject.<sup>64</sup> When it is assigned to multiple

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<sup>62</sup>The constitution also allows citizen's initiatives, but no bills of an initiative were approved by Congress.

<sup>63</sup>Some bills must be initiated exclusively in the Senate, and some bills must be initiated exclusively in the Chamber of Deputies. See note 26.

<sup>64</sup>It is possible to bypass the committee stage by two-thirds of affirmative votes in any floor session (the *sobre tablas* motion or the *preferencia* motion). See Calvo (2014) for more discussion.

committees, the committee that is the most relevant to the bill (*comisión cabecera*) deals with it first. Before having meetings, committees decide if the bill should be discussed at committee meetings (Stage 1a) as well as if it should be amended (Stage 1b). If a committee chair decides not to discuss the bill, it will be kept “in the drawer” (*cajoneado*). The bill will be killed by a time limit if it is shelved for two legislative years without approval. Almost all unapproved presidential bills die at Stage 1a. According to my dataset (Kikuchi 2011), 169 out of 659 presidential bills were shelved to be killed between 1983 and 2007.

After debates in the *comisión cabecera*, the bills go to another committee that has the second order of relevance. The Senate rules allow multiple committees to have joint committee meetings for discussion. In this case, the chair of the *comisión cabecera* presides over the joint meetings of all the committees involved in discussion. Committee meetings are held after these decisions, and individual committee members sign one of the committee reports on the bill (Stage 2). The members who agree with the position of the majority sign a majority report (*dictamen de mayoría*), which will be discussed on the floor.<sup>65</sup> They can also sign the *dictamen de mayoría* with a partial disagreement (*disidencia parcial*). The members who strongly disagree with the *dictamen de mayoría* should write a dissenting minority report (*dictamen de minoría*) or sign no report.

The bill is sent to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary after its passage in committees. The vice-president of the nation (i.e., the president of the Senate) or the provisional president of the Senate chairs the Parliamentary Labor Plenary and plays a crucial role in determining floor agendas (Stage 3). Because every bill should be approved by a chamber within two legislative years, sometimes bills die before reaching the floor—even though they are approved by committees—if the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, which consists of the vice-president of the nation (or the provisional president of the Senate) and the leaders of legislative party blocs, decides not to discuss them. This institution also controls the schedule of the debates at the Senate floor. On the floor,

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<sup>65</sup>When bills are discussed in multiple committees, committees publish joint committee reports. In this case, a majority report is the report that is supported by an aggregate majority of all the committees in discussion.

senators vote if the bills should be approved as a whole (*en general*) and then vote article by article (*en particular*) (Stage 4).

Then the bill is sent to the other chamber, which also treats it in the same way. If the other chamber approves it without amendments, it receives a unique number as a law, and it is passed to the executive branch. If the other chamber amends it, it is sent back to the original chamber for reconsideration.<sup>66</sup> At any stage, bills are not reconsidered in the same legislative year if they are completely turned down.

The president may veto the bill totally or partially using a package veto or a line-item veto. Congress needs two-thirds of votes to override the veto. In the case that Congress cannot override a partial veto, non-vetoed portions of the bill become law.

This description suggests that individual senators may influence the fate of presidential bills in committees at Stages 1a and 1b, and that they can take their positions on the presidential bills in committees at Stage 2 as well as on the floor at Stage 4. We should distinguish two credit-claiming activities from each other. On the one hand, amending presidential bills in committees is a typical legislative behavior all over the world in order to show the effectiveness of legislators' work. I call it "public credit-claiming" in the sense that committee amendments are visible to the public. On the other hand, shelving presidential bills should be named "internal credit-claiming", because people in the Senate know what is going on but the public does not. However, this strategy is more radical than introducing amendments, since it is intended to kill presidential bills using the two-year limit.

Senators may publicize their positions on presidential bills in committees as well as on the floor. Since the floor only discusses majority reports, signing them with a partial disagreement or publishing minority

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<sup>66</sup>In the case that the original chamber accepts the modification of the other chamber or that the other chamber modifies a bill with two-thirds of affirmative votes and the original chamber cannot insist its own version with two-thirds of affirmative votes, the bill modified by the other chamber will be sent to the executive branch. If the modification of the other chamber is just supported by the absolute majority and the original chamber insists its first version with the absolute majority, or if the other chamber modifies a bill with two-thirds of affirmative votes and the original chamber also insists its own version with two-thirds of affirmative votes, the bill that is approved by the original chamber will be sent to the executive branch.



reports does not change content of bills. However, these activities allow senators to express their dissatisfaction with the initiatives. Casting roll-call votes is also a position-taking activity. Because of changes in the Senate rules, the Senate floor started to record almost all votes on February 24, 2004. As a consequence, the number of roll-call votes increased drastically after the implementation of the new Senate rules.

## 2.4.2 Legislative Behavior of Governors' Subordinates

How do senators' institutional positions shape their choices of public credit-claiming, internal credit-claiming, and position-taking? I have already argued that governors have an incentive to influence senatorial behavior because of intergovernmental fiscal relations and their role as provincial party bosses. In Argentina, national policymaking involves fiscal federalism considerations in almost all policy issue areas including those that do not have a direct connection to intergovernmental and provincial issues (Spiller and Tommasi 2007). Consequently, a significant number of presidential bills may have a negative impact on subnational governments and governors do not want such initiatives.<sup>67</sup>

What can governors do if they want to turn down presidential bills? One of the best solutions should be asking their subordinates to shelve the bills in committees.<sup>68</sup> As I described, most of the bills in the drawer are killed by the two-year limit without being discussed. This activity is an internal credit-claiming procedure, which is far less visible from the outside of the Senate. However, it is not a problem for governors' subordinates, since their behavior intends to attract governors, who have

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<sup>67</sup>I do not argue that the president always introduces bills that do not favor subnational governments. However, given that national policy-making in Argentina requires fiscal federalism considerations, the president is expected to initiate a considerable number of initiatives that are not welcomed by governors.

<sup>68</sup>Given that each committee has fifteen members and that many presidential bills are referred to multiple committees, it is not so difficult for governors to have one of their subordinates in committee debates. See Krehbiel (1991), Shepsle (1978), Shepsle and Weingast (1987), and Weingast and Marshall (1988) regarding the importance of committee composition. Krehbiel (1991) was written from the informational perspective, whereas the other works were based on the distributive perspective.

a great influence over their career advancement. Once presidential bills reach the floor, it is difficult for governors and their subordinates to kill the bills, because the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, which is dominated by the president, controls floor agendas.

Can governors really make their subordinates claim credit for shelving presidential bills even though their senators face multiple principals? Provincial budgets in Argentina highly depend on transfers from the national government. This condition creates a dilemma. On the one hand, governors do not want policy proposals by the president that hurt subnational administrations. On the other hand, regardless of party affiliation, governors have an incentive to maintain a good relationship with the president so that they may maximize federal transfers for their provincial administrations and machine politics. However, it is also expected that governors do not feel threatened by the president if they are powerful enough to secure their dominance over provincial politics.

We should thus consider the power of governors to answer this question. Studies on state politics have shed light on the difference in the power of governors, a topic that has not been widely covered in the literature of comparative legislative studies. Following Schlesinger (1965), students of state politics traditionally dealt with the formal dimension of gubernatorial powers. Considering tenure power (length of term and eligibility to be reelected), budget power (degree of gubernatorial control over the budget), appointment power (extent of control over appointment), and veto power, Americanists argued that the power of governors was enhanced between 1960 and 1982 (e.g., Dometrius 1987; Mueller 1985).<sup>69</sup> By contrast, Beyle (1990) introduced the partisan dimension: governor's partisan control over the state legislature. Adding this dimension, he concluded that the power of governors is more sensitive to the results of election and that the power of governors did not change considerably between 1960 and 1990 (Beyle 1990). However, by two-factor analysis tests, Dilger et al. (1995) found that

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<sup>69</sup>The institutional power of governors has an impact on various aspects of state politics in the US. Using the index that consists of tenure power, budget power, and veto power, Dilger et al. (1995) showed that powerful governors succeed in improving their state's economic conditions. Fording et al. (2002), and Ferguson and Barth (2002) found that powerful governors' bills are more likely to be approved in the state legislatures.

the only indicators that always positively related to the latent concept of institutional gubernatorial powers were tenure power and veto power.<sup>70</sup>

Among Dilger et al. (1995) two indicators, I focus on tenure stability. Veto power of governors over the subnational legislatures is not relevant to this study, because it is rare that governors in Argentina suffer from a divided government in their provinces. In order to have a majority in the provincial legislatures, governors can change provincial electoral rules including manipulation of the electoral calendar, introduction of open primaries, and reforming provincial constitutions (Calvo and Escobar 2005).<sup>71</sup>

However, gubernatorial power varies across provinces and over time. The machines of freshmen governors are different from those of longstanding governors in terms of their solidity. According to Stokes (2005), consolidation of machine politics requires much iteration. Given the dominance of the president over intergovernmental relations, governors have incentives to force their subordinates to oppose presidential bills only when their machines are solid. When a governor is a freshman, it is possible that he or she needs some help from the president for future campaigns. By contrast, longstanding governors can control provincial politics better than freshman governors. Especially longstanding “authoritarian” governors can maximize their influence over provincial politics and deprive others of access to national allies and resources (Gibson 2005, 2012).<sup>72</sup> Therefore, the following hypothesis should be considered.

*H1:* Governors’ subordinates are more likely to shelve presidential bills than other senators in committees if their governors have served more than one term in office.

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<sup>70</sup>Other studies attributed the power of governors to other aspects such as personal popularity of governors, gubernatorial enabling resources (support from staff), and the professionalism of the state legislature (e.g., Bernick 1979; Dilger et al. 1995).

<sup>71</sup>González’s (2016) composite index of gubernatorial power consists of institutional resources as well as electoral and partisan resources.

<sup>72</sup>Gibson (2005, 2012) mentioned Carlos Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero) as an example of authoritarian governors. Juárez served as a governor of the province of Santiago del Estero for five terms in total.

### 2.4.3 Legislative Behavior of Senate Bosses

Senate bosses face three principals: national parties, the president, and voters. Such an institutional position encourages them to behave differently from subordinates, who respond to governors or provincial party bosses. Because of their autonomy as well as the necessity of position-taking for voters as provincial party bosses, I argue that Senate bosses are more likely to cast nay votes against presidential bills on the floor.

Under any electoral rules, national party leaders are one of the competing principals of legislators (Carey 2008). They maintain their party unity in the legislatures using their resources at the legislative and electoral arenas. Moreover, several studies found party cohesion in the upper chambers even when weak party discipline is expected (e.g., Lee 2009; Shikano 2008).

However, we may observe many cases in which legislators cast dissident votes against their parties. For instance, Ames (2001) analyzed cooperation and defection of Brazilian deputies from their parties. Deputies in Brazil may defect from their parties, because the open-list PR system allows voters to cast their preferences on individual candidates. That is, the political futures of Brazilian deputies depend on their personal reputations rather than on their parties. He also focused on the autonomy of deputies, since deputies cannot defect from their parties without being autonomous. According to him, this autonomy depends on electoral security of deputies. If deputies are powerful and dominant in the populated municipalities, they have no fear of losing next elections. Their constituents will follow them even when they change their party affiliations. Therefore, deputies are autonomous from their parties if they are dominant in their districts.

Ames' (2001) study focused on the case of the open-list PR system, whereas Tavits (2009) treated five European countries under different electoral rules. She argued that legislators with local ties tend to defect from their parties. Regardless of electoral rules, political experience at the local level allows legislators to expertise in making their decision by themselves. In addition, legislators with local political careers

may construct their individual support bases during their days as local politicians.<sup>73</sup> She tested these propositions with the data on roll-call votes in Estonia, Finland, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland, and found that legislators with local political experience are more likely to defect from their parties under the open-list system (i.e., Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Switzerland) and the closed-list PR system (i.e., Norway).

Ames (2001) and Tavits (2009) suggested that legislators are more likely to cast Nay votes when (a) they have local support bases that make them autonomous from the president and their parties at the national level, and (b) they are in need of position-taking for voters to keep local ties. If legislators meet these two conditions, they engage in position-taking for voters rather than for their parties regardless of electoral rules. These two conditions are relevant for considering senatorial behavior in Argentina, because Senate bosses are autonomous senators who are dominant in provincial politics.

As I have mentioned above, provincial party bosses dominate provincial politics in Argentina (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002). Such dominance is based on their control over the candidate selection process and machine politics. Provincial governments are the largest employers in most of the provinces, and thus provincial party bosses with gubernatorial experience have a huge advantage in constructing their machines (Jones and Hwang 2005a, b). For instance, former President Eduardo Duhalde, who also served as a senator for a short period, succeeded in establishing his strong political machine using his tenure as a governor of the province of Buenos Aires. He served for two terms between 1991 and 1999, and succeeded in constructing a broad coalition that included many mayors. Duhalde also used various resources for patronage. Levitsky (2003) claimed that control over patronage allowed him to establish his “total hegemony” in the province of Buenos Aires. Thus, in accordance with Tavits’ (2009) findings in the case of five European countries,

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<sup>73</sup>She also points out that local ties may increase the vote share for the candidates with local political career or local roots. This point, however, depends if electoral rules allow voters to cast votes for individual candidates.

abundant experience as a governor allows senators to construct their machines that make them autonomous from national parties and the president.

Even when provincial party bosses do not hold the governorship, they may also construct a network for patronage using public employment of municipal governments (Jones and Hwang 2005b). Their dominance over important municipalities allows them to be significant political figures in their provinces. After the constitutional reform in 1994, the number of Senate bosses without gubernatorial experience has increased, because one of the three senatorial seats for each province is automatically allocated to the first runner-up. Therefore, regardless of gubernatorial experience, Senate bosses have their machines, and thus they are more likely to defect from national parties than their copartisans.

An indicator for distinguishing Senate bosses from subordinates is their experience as a candidate for presidential or a gubernatorial position. In Argentina, “progressive” ambitions of senators are influenced by their political power at the provincial level. Argentina is one of the federal countries where presidential and gubernatorial positions are more valuable than national senatorial seats (e.g., Jones 2008; Jones et al. 2002; Leiras 2007). Many politicians want to be the president or a governor. However, not all of them may have the progressive ambitions, because in Argentina it is difficult to run for the governorship without being a provincial party boss. As a result, presidential and gubernatorial candidates are *party insiders* (i.e., undisputed party leaders) or *party adherents* (e.g., faction leaders) at the provincial level (De Luca 2008). In this sense, their future ambitions strongly depend on their previous political trajectories (Kikuchi and Lodola 2008). Following the criteria used in Kikuchi and Lodola (2008), I regard a senator as a *boss* in terms of his or her experience as a candidate for the presidency and the governorship.

Senate bosses prioritize position-taking on the floor over other activities in committees for the following two reasons. First, they have to keep their popularity among voters. Contrary to subordinates, they directly face province-wide voters as provincial party bosses, whose objectives include maximizing the performance of their factions at

the national or provincial level (Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007). Since their performance determines electoral outcomes, it is critical for them to maintain their reputations among voters. Under such situation, position-taking is more important than credit-claiming, since claiming credit for a good public policy does not necessarily attract poorly informed voters (Weaver 1986).

Second, they do not have so much time to spend on committee work. Contrary to US senators, Argentine senators live in their home provinces and travel to Buenos Aires every week. In addition, Senate bosses have to engage in other political activities as provincial party bosses to maximize the performance of their factions at the national or provincial level. According to an anonymous interviewee, who worked as an advisor for a Senate boss from the PJ in the late 90s, his senator spent almost all his time in Buenos Aires on other political activities such as negotiations with federal bureaucrats.<sup>74</sup> Given this schedule, it is too time-consuming for Senate bosses to engage in credit-claiming in committees. Rather, taking positions on the floor is more appealing to voters than expressing their positions in committees, since floor sessions are often televised. As a consequence, Senate bosses rarely work actively in committees.<sup>75</sup>

The case of Senator and former President Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ-*Federalismo y Liberación*, La Rioja) illustrates the effectiveness of this strategy. When he could not win the 2003 presidential election and the 2007 gubernatorial election, many people thought that his political career was over. However, he took advantage of position-taking opportunities on the Senate floor. Even though he missed many committee meetings and floor sessions between 2005 and 2011, he sometimes voted with the opposition on crucial bills such as the law of 82% mobile (*ley del 82% móvil*) that raised pensions to 82% of the minimum wage.<sup>76</sup> This position-taking made the FPV, the president's

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<sup>74</sup>Author's interview, August 30, 2007.

<sup>75</sup>Burdman (2010) argues that the first-tier politicians in the Chamber of Deputies also do not spend so much time on legislative work because running for other elective offices is their priority.

<sup>76</sup>President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner vetoed it immediately after its congressional approval on October 14, 2010.

faction, as well as voters regard him as an unignorable political figure, and the alliance between the FPV and Menem's provincial faction was successful in the 2011 general elections.

It is thus considered that Senate bosses from the president's party are less likely to support presidential bills than their copartisans, because they have solid machines that make them autonomous from the national party and the president, and they have to keep their popularity among voters by position-taking on the floor. The autonomy of Senate bosses from the opposition also makes them less supportive, because of the consensus-based nature of floor agenda-setting by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. According to my dataset (Kikuchi 2012), 71% of presidential bills were voted together by the PJ and the UCR. The second hypothesis for this book should be the following:

*H2:* Senate bosses are less likely to support presidential bills than other senators at the floor voting stage.

#### 2.4.4 Legislative Behavior of Senate Bosses' Subordinates

Senate bosses' subordinates are those who share the same party and factional affiliation with Senate bosses. There were few Senate bosses' subordinates before the introduction of direct election in 2001. All senators were elected by the provincial legislatures until 2001, and the majority of senators were from governors' parties. Beginning in 1995, the third senatorial seat for each province is automatically allocated to the first runner-up. This change increased the number of Senate bosses from the opposition parties at the provincial level, but it was rare for them to have their subordinates in the Senate. However, direct election does not guarantee that governors' candidates (i.e., governors' subordinates) get two seats (or one seat, at least) in the senatorial elections.<sup>77</sup> After 2001, the provincial opposition parties or opposition factions of the governor's

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<sup>77</sup>Author's interview with Senator and former Governor Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta), August 19, 2009.



party sometimes win two senatorial seats, which are distributed to Senate bosses and their subordinates.

Legislative behavior of Senate bosses' subordinates is very unique, due to the dominance of Senate bosses over the candidate selection process and machine politics. Senate bosses are autonomous from the president as well as national parties. More importantly, they have to attract voters. These characteristics make their subordinates' behavior different from that of governors' subordinates at Stages 1a and 1b. The latter engage in internal credit-claiming in order to turn down presidential bills for governors, whereas Senate bosses expect their subordinates to claim credit for voters in ways that help their parties or factions maximize their performance at the national or provincial level. For this purpose, Senate bosses' subordinates prefer public credit-claiming to internal credit-claiming, because their committee work should be visible to the public.<sup>78</sup> On the other hand, they have to support Senate bosses' position-taking with their votes on the floor. This discussion leads to the following two hypotheses.

*H3a:* Senate bosses' subordinates are more likely to introduce amendments to presidential bills than other senators in committees.

*H3b:* Senate bosses' subordinates are less likely to support presidential bills than other senators at the floor voting stage.

### 2.4.5 Content of Presidential Bills and Legislative Behavior

Some studies also consider that legislative behavior in federal countries changes according to content of bills. For example, one of Calvo's (2007) findings is that presidential bills are more likely to be approved if they target the local level. Based on the experiences in the Brazilian Congress, Cheibub et al. (2009) argued that governors are more interested in the bills that change the status quo of federal arrangements

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<sup>78</sup>Senate bosses and their subordinates are usually assigned to different committees because committee assignments take into account each senator's party affiliation and home province.

than other bills. They regarded bills that change the tax system, increase the share of national government's revenue and decrease the share of subnational government's revenue, directly affect the interests of some subnational units, or limit the autonomy of governors and mayors as "centralizing measures", and assumed that such presidential bills should be subnational-depriving. According to them, Brazilian deputies prioritize governors' recommendations over the government recommendations when they vote on centralizing measures.

These "centralizing measures" should also be important for other subnational party leaders. Since those bills include highly controversial ones, Senate bosses and the bosses of local subordinates have incentives to make their subordinates engage in any credit-claiming and position-taking activities so that they can take advantage of opportunities for improving the performance of their parties at the provincial level. Even for Senate bosses, who usually spend less time in committee work, it is worth claiming credit for amending centralizing measures in order to sell themselves as defenders of provincial interests. Analyzing the case of bills that harmed the interests of sugar producers, Pezzola (2017) argues that gubernatorial influence is not sufficient to explain all legislative behavior for protecting the interests of sugar producers.

Facing opposition party bosses' attempts to improve their situations in provincial politics, governors are sometimes forced to take positions on centralizing measures. In the case of Resolution 125 in 2008, to which I will refer in Chapter 5, seven governors publicized their opposition against the national government's policy including two PJ governors and two governors from the UCR-*Radicales K* faction.<sup>79</sup> Eaton (2002a) also described the episodes in which committees amended President Menem's centralizing measures in order to increase the share of revenues that were directed to provincial governments. Therefore, governors' subordinates are also more likely to engage in position-taking and credit-claiming activities when they face centralizing measures.

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<sup>79</sup>The *Radicales K* faction allied with the Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner administrations.

These considerations lead us to expect that centralizing measures tend to make every senator engage in any credit-claiming and position-taking activities for provincial politics:

- H4a:* Senators are more likely to shelve centralizing measures in committees.
- H4b:* Senators are more likely to introduce amendments to centralizing measures in committees.
- H4c:* Senators are less likely to sign majority reports on centralizing measures in committees.
- H4d:* Senators are less likely to support centralizing measures at the floor voting stage.

Table 2.2 summarizes expected senators’ responses to presidential bills according to their type and content of the bills.

**Table 2.2** Expected senators’ responses to presidential bills

Type of senators and content of bills	Expected behavior in committees	Expected behavior on the floor
<b>Type of senators</b>		
Longstanding governors’ subordinates	More likely to shelve (internal credit-claiming, H1)	
Senate bosses		Less likely to support (position-taking, H2)
Senate bosses’ subordinates	More likely to introduce amendments (public credit-claiming, H3a)	Less likely to support (position-taking, H3b)
<b>Content of bills</b>		
Centralizing measures	More likely to shelve (H4a) More likely to introduce amendments (H4b) Less likely to sign majority reports (H4c)	Less likely to support (H4d)

Source Author’s elaboration

## 2.5 Conclusion

Under what conditions do senators oppose presidential bills? To answer this empirical question, I developed a framework for understanding legislative behavior from the viewpoint of the subnational electoral connection. The students of legislative politics have argued that the electoral connection encourages legislators to engage in advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking. However, they tend to consider that legislators do not discriminate between the three types of legislative behavior. In this chapter, by contrast, I showed that different types of legislators face different principals even under the same system, and that legislators choose different strategies through the legislative process according to their institutional positions.

After identifying objectives and resources of principals under federalism as well as relevant players of legislative politics in the Argentine Senate, I posited hypotheses that show how senators' institutional positions and the sequential flow of the legislative process shape individual senators' strategies. I hypothesized that governors' subordinates are more likely to shelve presidential bills than other senators in committees if their governors have served more than one term in office, whereas Senate bosses are less likely to support presidential bills than other senators at the floor voting stage. Senate bosses' subordinates should support their bosses with their votes, but they are more likely to introduce amendments to presidential bills than other senators in committees. When the Senate receives centralizing measures, senators tend to shelve or amend them in committees, whereas they are less likely to sign majority reports on centralizing measures as well as they are less likely to cast Yea votes on the floor.

These working hypotheses will be tested with the data on the Argentine Senate in Chapters 4 and 5.

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# 3

## Committees, Floor, and the Four Types of Senators

This chapter offers background information to understand senatorial behavior in Argentina. According to my theoretical framework, senators from the same party and province behave differently at various stages of the legislative process according to their types. Therefore, hypothesis testing requires three original datasets about roll-call votes, committee decisions, and floor voting in the Senate (Kikuchi 2010, 2011, 2012).

This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I briefly describe history of the Argentine Senate before 1983. Then, in the second section, I show data on committee reports and committee membership. In the third section, I focus on floor sessions, roll-call votes, and legislative party blocs. I also estimate senators' ideal points, and show that the principal dimension of legislative behavior latent in floor voting reflects partisanship. I identify longstanding governors and each senator's type in the fourth section and conclude in the fifth section.

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The original version of this chapter was revised: For detailed information please see Erratum. The erratum to this chapter is available at [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7)



### 3.1 A Brief History of the Argentine Senate Before 1983

Following the constitution approved by the 13 provinces (Catamarca, Córdoba, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, La Rioja, Mendoza, Salta, San Juan, San Luis, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero, and Tucumán) in May, 1853, the Senate of the Argentine Confederation was established at the city of Paraná in the same year. It consisted of 26 senators, two senators from each province elected by provincial legislatures (Dirección de Prensa del Senado de la Nación 1994). The 1853 constitution granted equal powers to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

Argentina experienced a series of civil wars after the 1810 May Revolution, mainly due to conflicts between the Unitarians, those who insisted on a centralized government in Buenos Aires, and the Federalists, who championed a federal government. The 1853 constitution was based on a work by Juan Bautista Alberdi, a Federalist who first tried to assign just one senator to each province (Uzal 2001). We could observe that, despite Unitarian tendencies, the concept of making the upper chamber one of territorial interests informed the drafting of the 1826 constitution. Section 4 of the 1826 constitution posited that deputies were directly elected via a plurality rule, whereas two senators from each province or the capital were indirectly elected for a nine-year term (Cerro de Quintana 2014).<sup>1</sup>

By contrast, the Unitarians tried to form the upper chamber for the privileged class in the 1819 constitution. According to Section 2 of this constitution, the Senate consisted of one senator from each province, three senior military officers, one bishop, three clergymen, one representative from each university, and the former Supreme Director. Even though the membership of the Senate had been changed by the 1826 constitution, the idea of making the Senate an elitist chamber influenced the 1860 constitutional reform that required 30 senators to be (at least) 30 years old and to earn an annual income of 2,000 pesos (Cerro de Quintana 2014).

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<sup>1</sup>According to the 1826 constitution, the Senate renewed one-third of its members every three years as the period 1983–2001.

These two characteristics of the Senate (the chamber of territorial interests and the chamber of the elites) shaped Argentine politics before WWII. After the end of the civil war in 1880, on one hand, governors lost their veto power against the presidential elections, and intergovernmental relations favored the president, who sometimes exercised his constitutional prerogative to intervene in provincial government (*intervención federal*). On the other hand, former governors often moved to the Senate after the expiration of their gubernatorial terms. Such rotations of politicians from the interior privileged class between the governorship and senatorial seats made the upper chamber a “conservative institution”. This characteristic of the same group of political elites controlling various elective offices at the national and subnational levels that should have different electoral origins was due to “the system of governmental hegemony” (Botana 1977).

One of the notable examples of the intensive debates on territorial interests was the case of the 1933 Roca-Runciman Treaty. Under the treaty, the United Kingdom promised a quota for purchasing Argentine beef, whereas Argentina reduced import duties on many British goods and favored British companies in Argentina. Even though this treaty helped some stockbreeders, a group of stockbreeders, which was represented by Senator Lisandro de la Torre (Santa Fe), considered it a nightmare. He launched an investigation committee of the treaty and summoned ministers, including Minister of Finance Federico Pinedo in 1935. A tragedy ended the debate: his colleague, Senator Enzo Bordabehere (Santa Fe), was killed by a hit man on the Senate floor during the summoning (Dirección de Prensa del Senado de la Nación 1992).

The introduction of universal, obligatory, and secret male suffrage by the Sáenz Peña Law in 1912 generated many conflicts between the president and the upper chamber. Leandro N. Alem had already formed the UCR in 1891, recruiting young activists who were not satisfied with traditional politics (Botana 1977). Thanks to the universal male suffrage, the 1916, 1922, and 1928 presidential elections were won by the UCR candidates. However, Presidents Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916–1922, 1928–1930) and Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear (1922–1928) suffered blows from conservative senators (Smith 1974). Since the Senate often blocked the measures proposed by President Yrigoyen, he intervened in provincial governments

20 times during his first term and four times during his second term in order to control the Senate (Goldwert 1972; Alemán and Saiegh 2014). However, Radicals in the Chamber of Deputies could not override a Senate's bill that increased import duties under the Alvear administration, whereas Yrigoyen's efforts for petroleum nationalization were often blocked by the Senate (Goldwert 1972; Alemán and Saiegh 2014).

The 1930 coup by José Félix Uriburu deposed the Yrigoyen government, and Argentine democracy was unstable until 1983. During this period, President Juan Domingo Perón (1946–1955, 1973–1974) took an interesting approach to ensuring the support of the upper chamber. Even though the Senate had already been dominated by senators from his Peronist Party (*Partido Peronista*), the 1949 constitutional reform not only allowed him to be immediately reelected but also introduced direct election of senators.<sup>2</sup> The results of the reform were impressive. Perón got reelected with a huge margin, and the Peronist Party won all the seats in the Senate (Goldwert 1972). However, the de facto President Aramburu, who deposed Perón by coup in 1955, nullified the 1949 constitutional reform, and senators were returned to be indirectly elected by provincial legislatures<sup>3</sup> if the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies were not closed by the military government.

This brief description of the history of the Argentine Senate before 1983 suggests that it was important for the president to control the Senate, since the upper chamber may block presidential measures.

## 3.2 The Senate Committees

How was the Senate after the democratization in 1983? In the last chapter, I hypothesized that longstanding governors' subordinates are more inclined to shelve presidential bills than other senators, whereas Senate bosses'

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
<sup>2</sup>In 1951, Law 14,032 established the new electoral rules corresponding to the 1949 constitutional reform. Under the new rules, two senators were directly elected from each province (or the Federal Capital) using plurality formula, and each voter had two votes to cast.

<sup>3</sup>Since the Federal Capital did not have its legislature, its senators were indirectly elected by an electoral college. The members of such electoral college were elected using plurality formula, but the 1962 reform changed the formula to the closed-list proportional representation (PR).

subordinates tend to amend the bills in committees. In addition, I also claimed that senators are less likely to sign majority reports on centralizing measures. For a better understanding of senatorial behavior in committees, I describe information about committee reports and committee membership.

### 3.2.1 Committee Reports

The Argentine Senate publishes an official document called *Orden del Día*, which contains a committee report (*dictamen de comisión*). Each issue is dedicated to a committee report, and it is possible that a report deals with multiple bills. If a bill receives a majority report (*dictamen de mayoría*) and a minority report (*dictamen de minoría*), all the reports are published under the same issue number. Figure 3.1 shows the number of committee reports on bills and resolutions



**Fig. 3.1** Number of committee reports in the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007

(Source Author's elaboration based on data from *Cámara de Senadores* (Senate), *Orden del Día de la Cámara de Senadores* (Committee Reports of the Senate))

introduced by the president as well as by legislators between the legislative years 1983 and 2007.<sup>4</sup> The Senate published from 93 (in 1983) to 2047 (in 2004) reports in each legislative year.

Committee reports are addressed to the Senate (i.e., the Senate floor), and contain signatures of committee members who support them. Committee members may sign a report with a partial disagreement (*disidencia parcial*) specifying (or not specifying) which part of the report they do not agree with. Committee reports thus provide us with the data on committee decisions such as (a) which bills were reported; (b) if reported bills were amended; (c) how they were amended; (d) who supported the position of majority reports and that of minority reports; and (e) who supported the reports with partial disagreements.

Table 3.1 provides the number of majority reports and minority reports considered in this book.<sup>5</sup> The total number of majority reports in this table (498 reports) is different from the number of presidential bills analyzed in the next chapter (658 bills), because a committee report sometimes treats multiple bills together. Even though many bills die in committees (Alemán and Calvo 2008; Calvo 2007, 2014; Calvo and Sagarzazu 2011), there were only eight majority reports that did not approve critical presidential bills between 1983 and 2007.<sup>6</sup> As I argued in the previous chapter, almost all unapproved bills die at Stage 1a when they are kept in the drawer, on which committees do not publish their reports. In Chapter 4, therefore, I estimate committee decision models using the data on those shelved bills, which were

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<sup>4</sup>Each legislative year starts on March 1, while it began on May 1 before the 1994 constitutional reform.

<sup>5</sup>Since this study focuses on presidential bills, I only collected the information about committee reports on bills initiated by the executive branch. Moreover, I also excluded bills that (a) authorized the president to travel abroad, (b) confirmed presidential appointees, and (c) ratified international treaties on good neighborliness from my data collection, following Calvo (2007). By definition, minority reports always accompany majority reports.

<sup>6</sup>Two majority reports rejected presidential bills, while other two reports suggested return of bills to the executive branch. Two reports were published on President Menem's requests of withdrawal, and the General Legislation Committee published two committee reports to sentence repeal of eleven bills by the two-year time limit.

**Table 3.1** Number of majority reports and minority reports on relevant presidential bills

Legislative year	Majority reports			Minority reports		
	Approval without amendments	Approval with amendments	Non-approval	Approval without amendments	Approval with amendments	Non-approval
1983	14	2	1	1	2	0
1984	13	12	1	0	0	1
1985	36	9	1	3	0	0
1986	10	8	0	1	3	2
1987	11	4	0	0	1	0
1988	12	6	0	0	0	0
1989	12	4	0	0	0	0
1990	19	7	1	0	3	0
1991	17	10	0	0	0	0
1992	19	10	0	0	1	0
1993	14	7	1	0	1	1
1994	16	11	1	0	1	0
1995	20	8	1	0	0	4
1996	8	9	1	0	1	1
1997	10	5	0	1	0	0
1998	7	7	0	0	0	1
1999	10	3	0	0	0	0
2000	9	3	0	0	0	0
2001	1	0	0	0	0	0
2002	6	4	0	0	0	1
2003	7	1	0	0	0	0
2004	22	6	0	0	1	1
2005	8	6	0	0	4	0
2006	18	8	0	0	2	0
2007	15	6	0	0	0	0
Total	334	156	8	6	20	12

*Note* The non-approval category includes rejection of bills, return of bills to the executive branch, withdrawal of bills, and sentence of bills' repeal by the two-year time limit. The 2007 data only include the period between March 1 and December 9

*Source* Author's elaboration based on data from Kikuchi (2011)

collected from Calvo and Sagarzazu's (2011) database and the website of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as the information obtained from committee reports.

The numbers in this table also reflect other interesting characteristics of Argentine politics. For example, it is rare for committee members to publish minority reports, which indicates that decision-making in committees is cooperative rather than competitive.<sup>7</sup> Analyzing committee reports of the two chambers between 1983 and 1989 under the Alfonsín administration, Mustapic and Goretti (1992) found that 89% of committee reports were supported together by the PJ and the UCR. Even though they attributed this tendency to the feature of the post-democratization period in which major political parties should work together not to generate institutional gridlocks, Table 3.1 shows that committee decision-making is still consensus-based. Among 498 majority reports, just 38 reports (7.6%) were accompanied by minority reports between 1983 and 2007.

Moreover, the 2001 political-economic crisis, to which I briefly referred at the beginning of this book, reduced the number of majority reports on important presidential bills. The crisis was triggered by various factors. For instance, a vote-buying scandal in 2000 drastically increased distrust in politics. In April 2000, the Senate approved President De la Rúa's (UCR) labor reform bill (CD-179/99),<sup>8</sup> which should have been killed by the PJ senators. The media started to question if De la Rúa had paid a bribe to some of the PJ senators in exchange for their supportive votes, and Vice-President Carlos "Chacho" Álvarez, who chaired the floor session, as well as some cabinet members including Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers Rodolfo Terragno resigned. In the meantime, foreign debt and the overvalued Argentine peso due to the dollar peg harmed the economy, and the government decided to freeze bank accounts in December 2001 (*corralito*). This situation led to mass popular protests including vandalism, and De la Rúa resigned and left the *Casa Rosada* by helicopter on December 21. Since there was no vice-president at that time, a serious political

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<sup>7</sup>According to Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) and Calvo (2014), committee members from the majority party dominate committee decision-making in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. If no party holds the majority status, however, the position of the overall median committee member comes to be more important than that of the median committee voter of the plurality party.

<sup>8</sup>"CD" means that the bill was originally introduced to the Chamber of Deputies.

crisis took place until Senator Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires) was appointed President of Argentina by the legislative assembly (i.e., a joint session of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies) on January 2, 2002.<sup>9</sup> The executive branch could not engage in lawmaking in an effective manner between late 2000 and 2001, and thus the Senate committees just published one majority report on presidential bills included in my dataset in the legislative year 2001.

### 3.2.2 Committee Membership

According to Article 14 of the Senate rules, the Senate floor or the president of the Senate (i.e., the vice-president of the Nation) nominates members of standing committees in the first session after a partial renewal of the Senate. In practice, however, leaders of legislative party blocs play a crucial role in distributing committee assignments to their copartisans. They hold a meeting to make an agreement on the distribution of committee posts before the first session, since the composition of each committee should reflect the share of each party bloc in the Senate (Article 91 of the Senate rules).<sup>10</sup> Senators may hold their assigned committee seats until the next partial renewal if they do not resign from their blocs.<sup>11</sup>

In Argentina, senators and deputies may serve on multiple committees. Given low reelection rates, legislators have few incentives to

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<sup>9</sup>Argentina had three presidents between December 21, 2001 and January 2, 2002: Provisional President of the Senate Ramón Puerta (PJ, Misiones) between December 21 and 23, Governor of the Province of San Luis Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ) between December 23 and 30, and President of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Camaño (PJ, Buenos Aires) between December 30 and January 2.

<sup>10</sup>It is usually not so difficult to make an agreement among parties, but it took several months to decide the composition of committees after the 2009 elections. Since the president's Front for Victory (*Frente para la Victoria*, FPV) bloc lost the majority status, the opposition parties claimed chairmanships of more than half of 25 standing committees. Senator Pichetto (PJ-FPV, Río Negro), the leader of the FPV bloc, rejected it because the FPV still held more seats (30 senators) than any other party in the Senate. However, on March 3, 2010, the claim of the opposition parties was approved with 37 Yea votes including that of Senator Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ- *Federalismo y Liberación*, La Rioja).

<sup>11</sup>Disloyal committee members are forced to resign. In the case of Resolution 125, which is discussed in the next chapter, Senator Roberto Urquía (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) had to resign from the chair of the Budget Committee, because he openly opposed the presidential bill.



specialize in the jurisdictions of their committees. As a result, seniority is not very relevant for committee assignments. According to Jones et al. (2002), a deputy's seniority just slightly increases his or her probability to be a member of some committees. They also found that the professional background of deputies explains their committee assignments more than other covariates such as their alignments with governors.

The professional background of senators is also a good predictor of their committee assignments. If they are lawyers, they tend to hold their seats in committees such as the General Legislation Committee. If they are medical doctors, they tend to be members of committees such as the Health and Sports Committee. In addition, as Borner et al. (2009) argued, there is a gender bias in committee assignments in the two chambers. For example, 11 out of 17 members of the Education and Culture Committee in 2016 were female senators.

However, there are two important differences between the two chambers in terms of committee assignments. The current Senate rules require senators to serve on five or six committees. Moreover, the size of each committee is limited.<sup>12</sup> Because of these characteristics, each senator's province is taken into account in the distribution of committee positions. The leader of each party bloc distributes committee seats to individual senators so that two senators from the same province and the same party are not assigned to the same committee. In the Chamber of Deputies, by contrast, it is quite possible that a committee has several PJ deputies from the province of Buenos Aires.

Each committee chooses its leaders (chair, vice-chair, and secretary) in its first committee meeting.<sup>13</sup> They are usually approved unanimously, since leaders of legislative party blocs also make an agreement on the distribution of leadership positions before the first meeting. Chairmanships of 27 standing committees are also distributed to each

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<sup>12</sup>Senators' committee memberships were limited to five between 2003 and 2008. As of January, 2018, the Women's Caucus Committee hosted all the female senators, while the size of other committees was limited to 17 except for the four committees that have 19 members: the Constitutional Affairs, the Foreign Relations and Worship, the Mining, Energy and Fuel, and the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committees.

<sup>13</sup>They are elected for one-year terms, and reelection is permitted.

party bloc in proportion to its share in the Senate. If the share of the PJ on the floor is 56%, fifteen standing committees (56% of 27 standing committees) are chaired by PJ senators. A committee's chair and vice-chair should be selected from different parties. As in the case of the Chamber of Deputies, allocation of committee chairmanships is regarded as a distribution of financial resources in the Senate. Senators may receive extra resources for themselves and their staffs when they hold committee leadership positions. This is why senators prefer to be the chair of a less important committee rather than a member of the Budget Committee.<sup>14</sup> Reflecting this preference, the number of standing committees in the Senate increased drastically between 1983 and 2000. Table 3.2 shows the changes in the number and size of standing committees.

The old Senate rules assigned a different number of senators to each committee until 2003. There were 29 standing committees, and each of them had between seven and nine members when democracy came back to Argentina in 1983. On average, each senator was affiliated with 5.43 committees between 1983 and 1986. In 1989, three new committees were added, and the Foreign Relations and Worship Committee started to include fifteen members. The number of standing committees increased to 40 by 1993. Since the number of senators was 48, some senators held two committee chairmanships at that time,<sup>15</sup> and the average number of each senator's committees also went up to 7.45. Following the increase in the number of senators, memberships of each committee were also expanded. For example, the size of the Constitutional Affairs Committee increased from 14 to 21. However, since the constitutional reform distributed three senators to each province beginning in 1995, the average number of a senator's committees decreased to 6.61 in the legislative period 2001–2003 in spite of the increase in the total number of standing committees.

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<sup>14</sup>Author's interview with Advisor for Senator Eduardo Torres (PJ-FPV, Misiones) Pablo Salinas, November 20, 2008. According to him, the Constitutional Affairs Committee, the Budget Committee, and the General Legislation Committee are more prestigious than other committees in the Argentine Senate.

<sup>15</sup>Current Senate rules do not allow a senator to hold multiple chairmanships.

**Table 3.2** Committee membership in the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007

Legislative period	Number of standing committees	Size of each committee	Average number of committees to which a senator serves
1983–1986	29	Between 7 and 9	5.43
1986–1989	29	Between 7 and 9	6.46
1989–1992	32 (1989–1990) 38 (1990–1992)	Between 7 and 15	6.69
1992–1995	38 (1992–1993) 40 (1993–1995)	Between 7 and 15	7.45
1995–1998	41 (1995–1996) 42 (1996–1998)	Between 7 and 21	7.28
1998–2001	43 (1998–2000) 47 (2000–2001)	Between 7 and 21	6.76
2001–2003	47 (2001–2003) 24 (2003)	Between 7 and 21	6.61
2003–2005	24	15	4.41
2005–2007	24	15	4.56

Sources Author's elaboration based on data from Pitt Villegas (2008); *Cámara de Senadores* (Senate), *Listado de Comisiones* (Listing of Committees)

This scenery has changed since 2003 due to the introduction of the new Senate rules. In order to improve the bad public image of the Senate because of the 2000 vote-buying scandal, as well as the 2001 political-economic crisis, the new rules reduced the number of standing committees to 24 and limited the maximum number of each senator's committees to five so that committee members can devote more time to committee work. As a consequence, the average number of a senator's committees dropped below five. The number of standing committees was 27 as of January 2018, and each senator was affiliated with five or six committees because of the revival of the Science and Technology Committee in 2008, the creation of the Women's Caucus Committee in 2011, and the separation of the Sports Committee from the Health Committee in 2014.

In sum, descriptive data presented in this section reflect some interesting features of Argentine politics. The information on committee reports reveals that committee decision-making is consensus-based,

and that almost all unapproved presidential bills were killed at Stage 1a. Meanwhile, senators have few incentives to specialize in the jurisdictions of their committees. Allocation of committee chairmanships is regarded as a distribution of financial resources, and the number of standing committees reached 47 in 2000. However, the 2000 vote-buying scandal and the 2001 political-economic crisis led the Senate to adopt the new rules, which limited the number of each senator's committees.

### 3.3 The Senate Floor

Besides committee decisions, I also theorized that Senate bosses and their subordinates are more likely to cast negative votes against presidential bills on the floor. Moreover, I argued that senators in general tend to oppose centralizing measures for position-taking. Testing these expectations requires the information on roll-call votes and legislative party blocs. I thus describe these information and estimate ideal points of Argentine senators in this section.

#### 3.3.1 Roll-Call Votes

Table 3.3 shows the number of roll-call votes and floor sessions. Since Article 59 of the constitution prescribes that the Senate holds impeachment trials against those who are accused by the Chamber of Deputies, the upper chamber tended to have more floor sessions when it was in charge of such trials. However, the number of floor sessions declined after the introduction of direct election in 2001.

The total number of roll-call votes between 1983 and 2007 was 1160, and such votes have been cast more frequently since the legislative year 2003 because of the new Senate rules. Under the old rules, senators were required to cast them only on veto overrides, impeachment, and the election of their authorities (i.e., the provisional president and vice-presidents).<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>In the case of the election, however, senators followed the requirement only when there were multiple candidates for the authority positions.

**Table 3.3** Number of floor sessions and roll-call votes in the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007

Legislative year	Number of floor sessions	Number of roll-call votes	Legislative year	Number of floor sessions	Number of roll-call votes
1983	22	0	1996*	87	12
1984	38	4	1997*	124	11
1985	34	5	1998*	73	7
1986	43	10	1999*	73	17
1987	35	6	2000*	71	5
1988	40	11	2001*	83	7
1989	39	0	2002	41	5
1990*	60	3	2003	43	53
1991*	63	1	2004*	39	366
1992*	63	11	2005*	45	268
1993*	80	16	2006	33	190
1994*	55	1	2007	19	136
1995*	66	15			

*Note* The number of floor sessions includes sessions “en minoría”, which lack quorum. The Senate held sessions for impeachment trials in the legislative years with an asterisk. The 2007 data only include the period between March 1 and December 9

*Sources* Author’s elaboration based on data from Kikuchi (2010); *Cámara de Senadores* (Senate), *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores* (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate)

Even though a motion with the support of a majority of senators present was enough to request a roll-call, most of the decisions at the Senate floor were made by signal voting (e.g., senators just raised their hands). According to the new rules, by contrast, votes on all bills and the appointment of justices, as well as on impeachment and the election of the authorities must be recorded with some exceptions.<sup>17</sup> As a result, the number of roll-call votes increased drastically since February 24, 2004, when the Senate started to use an electronic voting system.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup>The exceptions include the cases in which (a) a bill has a unanimous committee report; and (b) no senator is going to oppose a bill before the *en general* vote. Even though senators may waive the roll-call requirement with the support of the absolute majority of the senators present in these cases, they rarely do so. By contrast, resolutions, declarations, and communications are usually decided by signal voting.

<sup>18</sup>This fact might bias the statistical results of my floor voting model toward post-2004 data, even though the Heckman procedure employed in Chapter 5 should minimize the problem.

### 3.3.2 Legislative Party Blocs

Legislative party blocs (*bloques*) are the units of groups of legislators in the Argentine Congress. They are equivalent to legislative parties,<sup>19</sup> but it is also possible that senators from the same party belong to different blocs. Even though Article 55 of the (new) Senate rules states that each bloc must have more than one senator, except for the case in which a party or an electoral coalition only wins one senatorial seat, the Senate often approves a request from a senator to create his or her unipersonal bloc. For example, Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja) left the PJ-FPV bloc and formed his unipersonal bloc called *Federalismo y Liberación* in 2006, whereas Luis Falcó (UCR, Río Negro) transferred from the UCR bloc to his *Radical Rionegrino* bloc in 2003. Since being a leader of a bloc allows him or her to attend meetings of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary that schedules bills for floor discussion, senators sometimes leave the main bloc of their party and create their own bloc with one or two senators even when the main bloc holds a majority of seats.<sup>20</sup>

Table 3.4 reports the number of blocs as well as the leaders of the PJ and UCR blocs in each legislative year. The number of legislative party blocs changed many times between 1983 and 2007, reflecting the fragmentation of the party system in Argentina as well as the instability of one-member blocs. In 1983, the Senate consisted of eight blocs including the PJ, the UCR, and the blocs of provincial parties (i.e., province-wide parties) that governed provinces such as Bloc Party (*Partido Bloquista*, PB) at San Juan, Neuquén People's Movement (*Movimiento Popular Neuquino*, MPN) at Neuquén, Autonomist Party (*Partido Autonomista*, PA) and Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal*, PL) at Corrientes.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>The word “*bloques*” is translated as “caucuses” on the website of the Argentine Senate. Contrary to caucuses in the US Congress, however, senators in Argentina cannot be affiliated with multiple blocs.

<sup>20</sup>A disadvantage to forming a unipersonal bloc is that its senator has little chance to hold a committee chairmanship, because committee leadership positions are distributed to legislative party blocs according to their share.

<sup>21</sup>The latter two parties had a coalition in the province of Corrientes until 2000.

**Table 3.4** Number of legislative party blocs and leaders of the PJ and UCR blocs between 1983 and 2007

Legislative year	Number of blocs	Leader of the PJ bloc	Leader of the UCR bloc
1983	8	Vicente Saadi	Antonio Nápoli
1984	8	Vicente Saadi	Antonio Nápoli
1985	8	Vicente Saadi	Antonio Nápoli
1986	8	Vicente Saadi	Antonio Nápoli
1987	8	Vicente Saadi	Antonio Nápoli
		Eduardo Menem (from December)	
1988	8	Eduardo Menem	Antonio Nápoli
1989	7	Eduardo Menem	Antonio Nápoli
		Alberto R. Saá (from December)	Adolfo Gass (from December)
1990	7	Alberto R. Saá	Adolfo Gass
1991	7	Alberto R. Saá	Adolfo Gass
	8 (from February 92)		
1992	8	Alberto R. Saá	Adolfo Gass Conrado Storani (from December)
1993	9	Alberto R. Saá	José Genoud
	10 (from August)	Pedro Molina (from June)	
1994	10	Pedro Molina	José Genoud
	11 (from September)		
	10 (from December)		
1995	10	Pedro Molina	José Genoud
	11 (from December)	Augusto Alasino (from December)	
1996	11	Augusto Alasino	José Genoud
	12 (from July)		
1997	12	Augusto Alasino	José Genoud
	13 (from May)		
1998	13	Augusto Alasino	José Genoud
	12 (from December)		
1999	12	Augusto Alasino	José Genoud
	10 (from December)		Raúl Galván (from December)

(continued)

Table 3.4 (continued)

Legislative year	Number of blocs	Leader of the PJ bloc	Leader of the UCR bloc
2000	11	Augusto Alasino José Luis Gioja (from September)	Raúl Galván Mario Losada (from September) Jorge Agúndez (from October)
2001	11 12 (from April) 13 (from August) 12 (from December)	José Luis Gioja	Jorge Agúndez Carlos Maestro (from December)
2002	12	José Luis Gioja	Carlos Maestro
2003	12 14 (from December)	Miguel Pichetto	Carlos Maestro Mario Losada (from December)
2004	14	Miguel Pichetto	Mario Losada
2005	15 16 (from April) 14 (from December)	Miguel Pichetto	Mario Losada Ernesto Sanz (from December)
2006	16	Miguel Pichetto	Ernesto Sanz
2007	16	Miguel Pichetto	Ernesto Sanz

*Note* The PJ bloc had commonly been called the PJ-FPV (*Frente para la Victoria*) bloc between 2006 and 2017. Senator Pichetto dissolved the bloc after the 2017 elections, but other PJ senators formed a new one named the FPV-PJ bloc  
*Source* Author's elaboration based on data from Kikuchi (2012)

Under the Menem administration, factionalism in the PJ and the UCR began to be prominent on the Senate floor in 1993. On the one hand, Pedro Villaroel, a UCR senator from Catamarca, assumed his seat as a senator from *Frente Cívico y Social de Catamarca*. On the other hand, Alberto Rodríguez Saá (San Luis) left the PJ bloc and formed a one-member bloc called *Bloque Peronista* in order to oppose President



Menem's constitutional reform. The number of blocs increased to 11 in 1994 because of the birth of *Alianza PAIS* bloc, which consisted of José Bordón (Mendoza) and Mario Fadel (Catamarca). In 1997, two PJ senators from the province of Santa Cruz (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Felipe Ludueña) formed their own bloc. Even though one-member blocs tended to disappear when their senators left office, the number of blocs kept increasing during the Menem era.

The 2000 vote-buying scandal and the 2001 political-economic crisis also promoted the fragmentation of the PJ and the UCR blocs. In the PJ, on the one hand, Alberto Rodríguez Saá (San Luis) formed *Justicialista Federal* bloc with Héctor Maya (Entre Ríos) and Daniel Varizat (Santa Cruz) in 2000. However, he left the Senate, and the latter two senators left it to join Antonio Cafiero's (Buenos Aires) *17 de Octubre* in March 2001.<sup>22</sup> Three senators from the Patagonian provinces also transferred from the PJ bloc to the new *Peronista del Interior* in August 2001.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, UCR senators elected through the first direct election in 2001 assumed their seats, forming various blocs such as *Radical Independiente* and *Frente Cívico Jujueño*.<sup>24</sup>

Various PJ senators who opposed the Kirchner administration were affiliated with different blocs. In the period 2005–2007, for example, Roberto Basualdo (San Juan), Hilda González de Duhalde (Buenos Aires), and Carlos Saúl Menem (La Rioja) led their one-member *Producción y Trabajo*, *Justicialista para el Diálogo de los Argentinos*, and *Federalismo y Liberación*, respectively. In addition, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (San Luis) and Liliana Negre de Alonso (San Luis) formed *Justicialista San Luis*. As a result, the number of legislative party blocs came to 16 by 2007.

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<sup>22</sup>This bloc also had Jorge Villaverde (Buenos Aires) as a member.

<sup>23</sup>They were Eduardo Arnold (Santa Cruz), Daniel Baum (Neuquén), and Osvaldo Sala (Chubut).

<sup>24</sup>The former had Rodolfo Terragno (City of Buenos Aires) and Juan Carlos Passo (La Pampa) as its members, whereas the latter included two senators from Jujuy: Gerardo Morales and Lylia Arancio de Beller.

Regarding the leaders of legislative party blocs, the PJ and the UCR respectively had seven and nine leaders between 1983 and 2007. Their replacement usually occurs in December or the end of a legislative year, since most of the new senators assume their seats in December. However, Table 3.4 shows some exceptions. For instance, Alberto Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis) was replaced by Pedro Molina (PJ, Santa Cruz) on June 5, 1993, due to his conflict with President Menem. In September 2000, the leaders of both the PJ and the UCR blocs resigned due to the 2000 vote-buying scandal. Augusto Alasino (PJ, Entre Ríos) was replaced by José Luis Gioja (PJ, San Juan),<sup>25</sup> while Jorge Agúndez (UCR, San Luis) followed Mario Losada (UCR, Misiones), who temporarily served as a replacement for Raúl Galván (UCR, La Rioja).

### 3.3.3 Ideal Point Estimation

The information described above are sufficient to conduct one of the common analyses to study floor voting: ideal point estimation. In this subsection, I estimate senators' ideal points using a unidimensional model, and show that cleavages between them mainly reflect partisanship in the Argentine Senate. The information about those ideal points obtained here is also used to control the degree of preference coherence in statistical models in the next two chapters.

The assumption of ideal point estimation is that each legislator's preference or ideal point can be drawn in a low-dimensional Euclidean space, and his or her utility declines as the distance between his or her ideal point and a policy outcome increases (Clinton et al. 2004). I chose the Bayesian estimation method among the various estimation methods, because it is an appropriate technique to analyze roll-call behavior in (relatively) small legislatures with a limited number of recorded votes.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Ironically, Gioja was one of the PJ senators who were suspected to have accepted bribes.

<sup>26</sup>For example, the NOMINATE method is suitable when more than 50 legislators cast at least 100 votes in each period (Poole 2005).

With a unidimensional model, the utility function of each legislator can be described as Eq. (3.1):

$$y_{ij}^* = U_i(\zeta_j) - U_i(\psi_j) = \beta_j'x_i - \alpha_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (3.1)$$

where  $y_{ij}^*$  is a choice between a Yea position ( $\zeta_j$ ) and a Nay position ( $\psi_j$ ) for the decision of legislator  $i$  on bill  $j$ .  $y_{ij} = 1$  if  $y_{ij}^* > 0$ . Otherwise,  $y_{ij} = 0$ . If we assume that  $\varepsilon_{ij} \sim N(0, 1)$ , we may rewrite the utility function of the legislator as a linear regression (Eq. (3.1)) with the ideal point  $x_i$  and unknown bill specific parameters  $\beta_j$  and  $\alpha_j$  (Jackman 2001; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004).  $\beta_j$  serves as a discrimination parameter. A unidimensional model perfectly fits data if  $\beta_j$  parameters for all bills are distinguishable from zero (Jackman 2001).

Since ideal point estimation assumes a dichotomous choice between Yea and Nay, abstentions are usually treated as missing. In this analysis, however, I regarded thirteen (declared) abstentions under the old Senate rules as negative votes.<sup>27</sup> Article 212 of the new Senate rules clearly states that “abstention votes” do not count toward a quorum, but the old rules did not contain such a statement. However, when Senator Ramón Aguirre Lanari (PL, Corrientes) cast two “abstention votes” at the impeachment trial against Federal Judge of Mendoza Gerardo Walter Rodríguez, Vice-President Carlos Ruckauf (PJ), who chaired the session, clarified that abstentions are considered Nay votes.<sup>28</sup> Abstentions were regarded as negative votes until 2002 as Ruckauf’s interpretation illustrates, and I thus recorded them as Nay votes for this estimation.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>Abstentions and absences are different concepts in the Argentine Congress. A vote is recorded as an abstention only when a legislator clearly declares his or her abstention at the time of voting. If a legislator attends a floor session but is not on the floor at the time of voting, it is regarded as an absence.

<sup>28</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación*, October 2, 1996. This interpretation was also applied to the cases of votes on general bills.

<sup>29</sup>Besides abstentions, Jones and Hwang (2005a) also coded the cases in which deputies attended floor sessions but left the floor at the time of voting (“present but not voting”) as dissident votes against their parties. In Argentina, many legislators express their dissident opinions in a passive way, because legislators who clearly cast dissident votes might be punished by their parties (Jones 2002). However, I did not follow their coding rule, since it is difficult to distinguish the cases of passive dissidence from the cases in which senators just leave the floor to have a break.

Estimation of ideal points also intends to control the degree of preference cohesion among senators in my floor voting and committee decision models. However, estimation with all roll-call data in Kikuchi (2010) may cause a problem of tautology, since one of the dependent variables of the statistical models for Stage 4, which was generated using roll-call data, captures senators' support for presidential bills on the floor. Following Martin and Quinn (2005), therefore, I only considered 739 roll-call votes cast on bills and resolutions introduced by legislators as well as on the election of the Senate's authorities to estimate ideal points.

Because what ideal points tell us is the *relative* position of each legislator in a legislative period, comparing the ideal point of a legislator in 1983 with that of a legislator in 2007 is problematic if they are estimated separately. Recent scholarship has developed two techniques for inter-temporal comparison: identifying "similar bills", or fixing the ideal points of "reference legislators". The former procedure uses the information about vote cutpoints of similar bills across time (e.g., Bailey 2007). The idea behind this solution is that inter-temporal comparison is possible if legislators in different legislative periods vote on the similar bills. By contrast, the latter fixes some players' ideal points for all the legislative periods so that they can be used as reference points. For example, Treier (2011) fixed the position of Americans for Democratic Action at  $-1$  and American Conservative Union at  $1$ , and they were considered additional legislators in every Congress.

I used the latter technique for this estimation. The former technique is not suitable for the case of the Argentine Senate, because there were not "similar bills" on which senators cast roll-call votes in every legislative period. I thus created two imaginary legislators who held senatorial seats between 1983 and 2007, and included them into my roll-call matrix. *UCR loyalist* is a senator who always voted with the leader of the UCR bloc, whereas *PJ loyalist* is a senator who always followed the position of the leader of the PJ bloc. They voted with the majority of the senators of each party if the leader was absent from a session.

In order to identify the unidimensional model, I fixed the position of UCR loyalist at  $-1$  and PJ loyalist at  $1$ . I also constrained the ideal points to have mean zero and standard deviation one across senators as a prior restriction, which is an alternative used by Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004). I then used Gibbs sampler to generate large samples

from the posterior density. 270,000 samples were generated, and the first 5000 iterations were discarded and then every 1000th sample was recorded for inference. The data on 603 roll-call votes were omitted from this estimation, because they were unanimous or lopsided in which fewer than 10% of the senators supported the losing side.<sup>30</sup>

As Jones and Hwang's (2005a, b) studies about the Argentine Chamber of Deputies showed, the unidimensional model also explains roll-call votes in the Senate. Checking  $\beta_j$  allows us to judge if the model fits the data, and the discrimination parameter is distinguishable from zero for 117 roll-call votes among 136 roll-call votes in this estimation. This dimension is considered a partisan dimension: the PJ is on the right end and the UCR is on the left end.<sup>31</sup> Individual senators' ideal points ranged from  $-2.63$  (Carlos Prades (UCR, Santa Cruz) in the period 2003–2005) to  $2.16$  (Edgardo Murguía (PJ, Santa Cruz) in the period 1986–1989). I labeled it as *UCR-PJ dimension*, and included it in the statistical models in Chapters 4 and 5 so that I can control the impact of preference cohesion on each senator's behavior on the floor and in committees.

Point estimates tell us the degree of preference cohesion among legislators.<sup>32</sup> Table 3.5 reports the locations of median Peronist and median Radical as well as the average deviation of the PJ and the UCR senators' ideal points from them.

As the point estimates of the median senators of the two parties suggest, the PJ senators were generally placed on the right side of the spectrum, whereas the UCR senators were located on its left side. On average, the distance between the PJ median and the UCR median was 2.11. Given that the unidimensional model assumes that the locations of the PJ and the UCR are 1 and  $-1$ , respectively, party affiliation was an important predictor of floor voting in the Senate.

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<sup>30</sup>I used the `pscl` package developed by Simon Jackman (2011) for this estimation.

<sup>31</sup>In order to check inter-temporal changes in the dimensionality of roll-call votes, I separately estimated senators' ideal points of each legislative period. This estimation also revealed that the unidimensional model correctly discriminated most of the votes in each period. The rate of correct discrimination ranged from 84.8% (2003–2005) to 100.0% (1983–1986, 1989–1992, 1992–1995, and 2001–2003).

<sup>32</sup>For instance, Desposato (2006) compared party coherence in the Brazilian Senate with that in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies using point estimates.

**Table 3.5** Preference cohesion of senators between 1983 and 2007

Legislative period	PJ senators		UCR senators	
	Median	Ave. deviation	Median	Ave. deviation
1983–1986	1.15	.32	–1.35	.23
1986–1989	.69	.56	–1.29	.43
1989–1992	–.14	.82	–.21	.74
1992–1995	.79	.62	–1.33	.47
1995–1998	.64	.61	–1.24	.56
1998–2001	.70	.49	–1.49	.16
2001–2003	1.01	.64	–1.85	.88
2003–2005	1.04	.56	–1.11	.45
2005–2007	1.36	.22	–1.85	.19

Source Author's elaboration

The degree of party cohesion varied across legislative periods as well as parties. The average deviation of the PJ senators from their median was generally greater than that of the UCR senators. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the PJ lacked an effective decision-making body at the national level, whereas the National Committee (*Comité Nacional*) played a crucial role in the UCR (Levitsky 2003; Leiras 2007). However, Radical senators were less united in the period 2001–2003 due to the influence of the 2000 vote-buying scandal and the 2001 political-economic crisis, which generated several factional blocs within the party. By contrast, Peronists were very cohesive in the period 2005–2007, even though the Kirchner administration facilitated the fragmentation of his party.

The period 1989–1992 was an exception in the sense that the median senators of the PJ and the UCR were very close to each other, and that senators of the two parties were less cohesive. We may still consider that the unidimensional model also uncovered the partisan dimension of this period, because the leaders of the UCR and the PJ blocs, Adolfo Gass (UCR, Buenos Aires) and Alberto Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis), were located on the left side and the right side, respectively. Such point estimates were identified, because most of the roll-call votes between 1989 and 1992 were cast at the impeachment trial against Judge Alberto Oscar Nicosia. Party unity in the Senate tended to be low when senators faced impeachment trials including in this case. As a consequence, senators' roll-call behavior in this period is less united than other periods.

In this section, I introduced the information on roll-call votes and legislative party blocs. The new Senate rules and an electronic voting system introduced in 2004 drastically increased the number of recorded votes, while the fragmentation of the party system in Argentina, as well as the instability of one-member blocs, frequently changed the total number of legislative party blocs. In addition, I estimated senators' ideal points using the data on roll-call votes. Point estimates allow us to measure the degree of preference cohesion between senators as well as to acknowledge that cleavages between them at floor voting mainly reflect partisanship in the Argentine Senate.

### **3.4 Who Is Who?**

The last two sections described official documents that are indispensable for generating the dependent variables of this study. By contrast, I here provide the information about important independent variables by identifying the typology of each senator, since my theoretical framework posited that senators' institutional positions shape their strategies. In the remainder of this section, I first discuss the characteristics of the Argentine federalism, and distinguish longstanding governors from freshmen governors. Then, I identify governors' subordinates, Senate bosses, Senate bosses' subordinates, and local subordinates.

#### **3.4.1 The Argentine Federalism and Governors**

Political scientists have defined federalism in various ways, but all of them acknowledge that the constitution guarantees the autonomy of subnational governments in their jurisdictions. However, the degree of the division of power between the national government and subnational governments varies across countries. In order to capture the variety, Lijphart (1999) measured 36 democracies in terms of the degrees of federalism and decentralization. According to him, Australia, Belgium after 1993, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States were categorized as federal and decentralized countries, whereas Venezuela was regarded as a federal

and centralized country. He also placed Austria and India between these two categories.<sup>33</sup> Following this operationalization, Schiavon (2006) over-viewed 33 democracies in the Americas, and added Argentina and Brazil to the group of federal and decentralized democracies.<sup>34</sup>

However, there are various types of federal and decentralized systems. The Argentine federalism has four prominent characteristics: centralized fiscal authority, overrepresentation of “periphery” provinces due to a huge difference in the population of each subnational unit, decentralized party organizations, and the importance of governors in the national and provincial politics. The first feature is that fiscal authority is highly centralized in Argentina. On the one hand, as Schiavon (2006) classified it into a decentralized democracy, almost half the budget of the federal government was used at the subnational level in 2000. On the other hand, the share of subnational revenues is less than 10% (Diaz-Cayeros 2006), which is very different from Brazil where tax authority is decentralized, and around 60% of the provincial budgets are financed by the federal transfer programs (Gordin 2004). Such fiscal relations give an advantage to the president in intergovernmental negotiations, since governors have an incentive to be cooperative with the president in order to maximize the amount of federal transfers even when they are from the opposition.

The second characteristic is the overrepresentation of the periphery provinces. The province of Buenos Aires had 10,841,711 voters for the 2011 elections, while the province of Tierra del Fuego only had 100,096 voters (Tow 2011). Moreover, economic activities in Argentina are concentrated in urban areas. Gibson et al. (2004) called the City of Buenos Aires as well as the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza “metro” provinces, and found that the share of these provinces’ industrial production and population was 78% and 70%, respectively, in the 1990s. This huge difference in the population of each province, in turn, generates

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<sup>33</sup>In his new book, Lijphart (2012) classified Argentina into the category between “federal and decentralized” and “federal and centralized”.

<sup>34</sup>Mexico and Venezuela were classified as federal and centralized, since subnational share of expenditures in 2000 was below 33.3% in these countries.



the overrepresentation of the periphery provinces.<sup>35</sup> According to Samuels and Snyder (2001), the Argentine Senate is the most malapportioned chamber in the world, because 49% of senatorial seats and 14% of the seats in the lower house are allocated in ways that violate the principle of “one person, one vote” in Argentina.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, governors of the periphery provinces who may control their senators have an advantage in the national politics, because the metro provinces and the periphery provinces have the same weight in the upper chamber.

The third feature of the Argentine federalism is its decentralized party organizations. As I argued in the last chapter, most of the nationwide political parties in Argentina (e.g., the PJ) lack effective decision-making bodies at the national level. Provincial party bosses, who lead party organizations at the provincial level, play a crucial role in Argentine politics, and control the candidate selection process (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007).<sup>37</sup> Such decentralized organizations lead to a “federalized party system”, under which subnational party systems for the capture of subnational offices are organized in addition to the national party system (Gibson and Suarez-Cao 2010). Table 3.6 shows the effective number of parties in presidential and gubernatorial elections between 1983 and 2007.

The effective numbers of parties in presidential elections reflected the changes in party politics. The two nationwide parties (i.e., the UCR and the PJ) had mainly competed for the presidency since the democratization between 1983 and 2007. In the 1990s, the birth of the Front for a Country in Solidarity (*Frente País Solidario*, FREPASO), another nationwide party, increased the effective number of parties in the 1995 election,

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<sup>35</sup>Another consequence is the difference in the dependence of the provincial budget on federal transfers. However, the share of federal transfers in the provincial budget is quite high even in the metro provinces. For instance, federal programs financed 46% of the expenditures of the province of Buenos Aires in 1994, while it subsidized 78% of the budgets of the periphery provinces (Gibson et al. 2004).

<sup>36</sup>Malapportionment is also found in the Chamber of Deputies, since all the provinces are guaranteed to receive five deputies regardless of their population (Gibson et al. 2004). As a result, the province of Buenos Aires is “underrepresented” with 70 deputies, whereas the province of Tierra del Fuego is “overrepresented” with five deputies.

<sup>37</sup>This is still the case even after the introduction of Open, Simultaneous, and Mandatory Primaries (PASOs) in 2009.

**Table 3.6** Effective number of parties in presidential and gubernatorial elections between 1983 and 2007

Districts	1983	1987	1989	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007
<i>Presidential</i>								
Nationwide	2.44		2.79		3.04	2.64	4.64	3.41
<i>Gubernatorial</i>								
Buenos Aires	2.33	2.65		3.48	2.53	3.09	4.26	3.47
City of Bs As					4.62*	3.69*	4.94	3.22
Catamarca	3.16	2.15		2.52	2.11	2.10	2.19	2.02
Chaco	2.28	2.13		3.06	3.24	2.00	2.19	2.28
Chubut	2.98	2.58		1.99	2.25	2.38	2.60	1.64
Córdoba	2.15	2.28		2.45	2.58	3.84*	2.44	3.15
Corrientes	3.17	3.37		2.93	2.61*	3.08*	2.74*	2.10*
Entre Ríos	2.42	2.31		2.23	2.30	2.14	2.86	3.29
Formosa	3.17	2.02		2.89	1.94	1.64	1.74	1.62
Jujuy	2.97	3.00		3.15	2.33	2.00	2.29	3.71
La Pampa	3.22	2.17		2.86	2.75	2.08	2.89	2.37
La Rioja	2.09	1.98		1.53	1.43	1.79	2.02	3.22
Mendoza	2.71	2.68		2.43	3.50	3.34	3.10	3.86
Misiones	2.11	2.25		2.14	2.19	2.00	2.80	3.81
Neuquén	2.52	3.02		2.63	2.40	2.82	2.76	2.74
Río Negro	2.41	3.19		3.15	2.44	2.40	3.98	2.53
Salta	2.79	2.64		2.24	2.42	1.99	2.94	2.45
San Juan	3.41			3.54	2.73	2.04	3.27	2.28
San Luis	3.03	2.57		2.44	1.81	2.01	1.22	1.32
Santa Cruz	2.13	2.11		2.00	1.84	2.02	1.72	2.04
Santa Fe	2.89	3.35		2.55	2.08	1.99	2.15	2.20
Sant. del Estero	2.81	2.23		2.01	2.06	2.73	2.02*	2.60*
Tierra del Fuego				2.49	2.15	2.90	4.20	2.98
Tucumán	2.43	4.03		2.22	2.76	3.19	3.32	1.62

*Note* A number with an asterisk means that that gubernatorial election was held in a different year. The City of Buenos Aires held the first election for choosing its chief of government in 1996, and the second election in 2000. Córdoba called an election in 1998 instead of 1999. Due to the federal interventions, Corrientes held gubernatorial elections in 1993, 1997, 2001, and 2005, whereas Santiago del Estero held them in 2002 and 2005, respectively. The information for the 1987 gubernatorial election in San Juan is missing. Tierra del Fuego held its first gubernatorial election in 1991

*Sources* Author's elaboration based on data from Calvo and Escolar (2005) and Tow (2011)

while the coalition between the UCR and the FREPASO (*Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación*) reduced it to 2.64. However, the 2001 political-economic crisis promoted the fragmentation of the PJ and the UCR, and five candidates including three PJ candidates (Néstor Kirchner, Carlos Menem, and Adolfo Rodríguez Saá) at the 2003 election won more than 14% of votes. The effective number of parties in 2007 was still higher than that of the 1990s due to the factionalism of the PJ as well as the rise of new forces such as the Civic Coalition (*Coalición Cívica*, CC).

Gubernatorial races at the province of Buenos Aires exactly followed this national trend. Party competition in the City of Buenos Aires was also similar in the sense that new parties such as the FREPASO, the Action for the Republic (*Acción por la República*), and the Republican Proposal (*Propuesta Republicana*, PRO) had received a significant portion of votes, even though the PJ had never won the race since 1996. A two-party system of the PJ and the UCR had changed into a multiparty system in Córdoba and Río Negro.

In other provinces, however, party systems at the provincial level significantly deviated from the national party politics. Contrary to the changes in presidential elections, the effective number of parties had declined in some gubernatorial elections. A multiparty system had turned into a two-party system of the PJ and the UCR in Catamarca, Jujuy, La Pampa, and Santiago del Estero, while it had shifted to a predominant party system of the PJ in Chubut, Formosa, San Juan, San Luis, and Tucumán. By contrast, a predominant system of the PJ followed the two-party system in La Rioja, Misiones, and Santa Cruz. Gubernatorial candidates had continued to be recruited from the PJ and the UCR in Entre Ríos, whereas the main competitors of gubernatorial elections in Santa Fe had changed from the PJ and the UCR to the PJ and the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*, PS).<sup>38</sup>

Provincial parties had been important players in some provinces. Neuquén had been governed by the MPN since the democratization in 1983. The Action of Chaco (*Acción Chaqueña*, AC, Chaco), the Salta Renewal (*Renovador de Salta*, RS, Salta), the PB (San Juan),

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<sup>38</sup>In spite of the lack of the double simultaneous vote (*ley de lemas*) system, multiple candidates from the PJ ran for the 2007 gubernatorial elections in Entre Ríos, Jujuy, La Rioja, Misiones, Salta, and San Juan. As a result, the effective number of parties was inflated in these provinces.

the Renewal Crusade (*Cruzada Renovadora*, CR, San Juan), the Fuego People's Movement (*Movimiento Popular Fueguino*, MPF, Tierra del Fuego), and the Republican Force (*Fuerza Republicana*, FR, Tucumán) also had experience being a governor's party, while the Democrat Party (*Partido Demócrata*, PD) had always played a crucial role as the third party of Mendoza politics. Party alignment at Corrientes had been very interesting, since the PJ formed a coalition with the UCR in order to support Arturo Colombi (UCR), who defeated a candidate from *Partido Nuevo* in the 2005 election.

These three characteristics of the Argentine federalism shape its fourth feature: the importance of governors in the national and provincial politics. Centralized fiscal authority not only favors the president in intergovernmental relations, but also allows the dominance of governors over provincial politics. On the one hand, governors' exclusive access to federal transfer programs as well as the concentration of industrial production in the limited urban areas prevents other political actors from acquiring financial resources. On the other hand, politicians depend on province-based patronage networks. As a result, governors in Argentina may enjoy incumbency advantage in gubernatorial elections (Lodola 2010). Since party organizations are decentralized, the president also needs support of governors, who may discipline their troops in Congress, in order to get his or her bills approved.<sup>39</sup> These factors make governors important players of national politics as well as provincial politics in Argentina.

However, governors' tenure stability varies across provinces. Even though incumbent stability of Argentine governors is much higher than that of Brazilian governors (Lodola 2010), not all the provinces generated longstanding governors serving as a governor for more than one term. Distinguishing longstanding governors from freshmen governors is critical for this book, since my theoretical framework predicted that longstanding governors' subordinates are more likely to engage

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<sup>39</sup>The one-week tenure of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ) as the president during the 2001 political-economic crisis also illustrated the role of governors in national politics. He was appointed as the interim president on December 23, 2001, with support of governors. However, contrary to the initial agreement with the governors, he tried to hold the position until 2003. As a result, the governors openly opposed him, and he stepped down as the president on December 30, 2001.

in shelving presidential bills for their governors. Table 3.7 lists all governors and the chiefs of the government of the City of Buenos Aires between 1983 and 2007, except “federal interventors” (*interventores*)<sup>40</sup> and some interim governors who only served for several months.

Nineteen provinces and the City of Buenos Aires generated thirty-one longstanding governors between 1983 and 2007.<sup>41</sup> As this table shows, the same governor or governors from the same family often administered the same province for various terms. Gibson (2005, 2012) regarded such a political system as a “subnational authoritarianism”, and he attributed it to the legacy of authoritarian rules at the national level as well as the monopolization of national-subnational linkages by the limited number of local elites (i.e., provincial party bosses). Contrary to his expectation that such a system tends to be observed in the periphery areas, the metro provinces also had longstanding governors such as Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires), Carlos Reutemann (PJ, Santa Fe),

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<sup>40</sup>Article 6 of the constitution allows the federal government to intervene in the provincial governments to protect the republican form of government or to repel foreign invasions. It is called federal intervention (*intervención federal*), and the president appoints an interventor (*interventor*), who administers the province, after the congressional approval of his or her declaration of the intervention. After the democratization, Catamarca (1991), Corrientes (between 1992 and 1993, and between 1999 and 2001), Santiago del Estero (between 1993 and 1995, and between 2004 and 2005), and Tucumán (1991) experienced such a situation.

<sup>41</sup>I identified Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires, 1991–1999), Felipe Solá (PJ, Buenos Aires, 2002–2007), Aníbal Ibarra (FREPASO-*Frente Grande*, City of Buenos Aires, 2000–2006), Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca, 1983–1987 and 1988–1991), Arnoldo Castillo (UCR-*Frente Cívico y Social de Catamarca*, Catamarca, 1991–1999), Ángel Rozas (UCR, Chaco, 1995–2003), Carlos Maestro (UCR, Chubut, 1991–1999), Eduardo Angeloz (UCR, Córdoba, 1983–1995), José Manuel de la Sota (PJ, Córdoba, 1999–2007), Jorge Busti (PJ, Entre Ríos, 1987–1991, 1995–1999, and 2003–2007), Sergio Montiel (UCR, Entre Ríos, 1983–1987 and 1999–2003), Vicente Joga (PJ, Formosa, 1987–1995), Gildo Insfrán (PJ, Formosa, 1995–), Eduardo Fellner (PJ, Jujuy, 1998–2007), Rubén Marín (PJ, La Pampa, 1983–1987 and 1991–2003), Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja, 1983–1989), Ángel Maza (PJ, La Rioja, 1995–2007), Ramón Puerta (PJ, Misiones, 1991–1999), Carlos Rovira (PJ-*Alianza Frente Renovador de la Concordia*, Misiones, 1999–2007), Felipe Sapag (MPN, Neuquén, 1983–1987 and 1995–1999), Jorge Sobisch (MPN, Neuquén, 1991–1995 and 1999–2007), Horacio Massaccesi (UCR, Río Negro, 1987–1995), Pablo Verani (UCR, Río Negro, 1995–2003), Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta, 1995–2007), Jorge Escobar (PJ, San Juan, 1991–1992 and 1994–1999), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis, 1983–2001), Néstor Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz, 1991–2003), Carlos Reutemann (PJ, Santa Fe, 1991–1995 and 1999–2003), Jorge Obeid (PJ, Santa Fe, 1995–1999 and 2003–2007), Carlos Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero, 1983–1987, 1995–1998, and 1999–2001), and José Estabillo (*Movimiento Popular Fueguino*, Tierra del Fuego, 1992–2000) as longstanding governors.

Table 3.7 Governors between 1983 and 2007

Provinces	83–87	87–91	91–95	95–99	99–03	03–07
Buenos Aires	Armendáriz	Cafiero	Duhalde	Duhalde	Ruckauf/Solá	Solá
City of BsAs				De la Rúa	Olivera/Ibarra	Ibarra/Teleman
Catamarca	R. Saadi	V. Saadi/R. Saadi	A. Castillo	<b>A. Castillo</b>	O. Castillo	B. del Moral
Chaco	Tenev	Baroni	Tanguinas	Roza	<b>Roza</b>	Nikisch
Chubut	Vigilione	Perl/Cosentino	Maestro	<b>Maestro</b>	Lizurume	Das Neves
Córdoba	Angeloz	<b>Angeloz</b>	<b>Angeloz</b>	Mestre	De la Sota	De la Sota
Corrientes	J. Romero Feris	Leconte	R. Romero Feris	R. Romero Feris	R. Colombi	R. Colombi/ A. Colombi
Entre Ríos	Montiel	Busti	Moine	Poccard	<b>Montiel</b>	<b>Busti</b>
Formosa	Bogado	Joga	<b>Joga</b>	Insfrán	<b>Insfrán</b>	<b>Insfrán</b>
Jujuy	C. Snopek	De Aparici/Alderete	Dominguez/ Ficosoco/Perassi	G. Snopek/ Ferraro/Fellner	<b>Fellner</b>	<b>Fellner</b>
La Pampa	Marín	Ahuad	<b>Marín</b>	<b>Marín</b>	<b>Marín</b>	Verna
La Rioja	Menem	<b>Menem</b> /De la Vega	Arnaudo	Maza	<b>Maza</b>	<b>Maza</b>
Mendoza	Llaver	Bordón	Gabrielli	Lafalla	Iglesias	Cobos
Misiones	B. Arrechea	Humada	Puerta	<b>Puerta</b>	Rovira	<b>Rovira</b>
Neuquén	F. Sapag	Salvatori	Sobisch	<b>F. Sapag</b>	<b>Sobisch</b>	<b>Sobisch</b>
Río Negro	A. Guerrero	Massaccesi	<b>Massaccesi</b>	Verani	<b>Verani</b>	Saiz
Salta	R. Romero	Cornejo	Ulloa	J. Romero	<b>J. Romero</b>	<b>J. Romero</b>
San Juan	Bravo/Aguilar	G. Centurión	Escobar/Rojas/ Escobar	<b>Escobar</b>	Avelín/Acosta	Gioja
San Luis	Ad. R. Saá	<b>Ad. R. Saá</b>	<b>Ad. R. Saá</b>	<b>Ad. R. Saá</b>	<b>Ad. R. Saá</b> /Lemme	Al. R. Saá
Santa Cruz	Puricelli	Del Val/Graneros	Kirchner	<b>Kirchner</b>	<b>Kirchner</b>	Acevedo/Sancho
Santa Fe	Vernet	Reviglio	Reutemann	Obeid	<b>Reutemann</b>	<b>Obeid</b>
Sant. del Est.	Juárez	Iturre	Mujica	Juárez/Moreno	Juárez/Díaz/A. de Juárez	A. de Juárez/ Zamora
Tierra del F.			Estabillo	<b>Estabillo</b>	Manfredotti	Colazo/Cóccaro
Tucumán	Riera	Domato	Ortega	Bussi	Miranda	Alperovich

Note Longstanding governors are in bold. Federal intervenors and some interim governors are omitted from the table  
Source Author's elaboration based on data from Tow (2011)

and Jorge Obeid (PJ, Santa Fe), even though governors' tenure stability is not a sufficient condition to define subnational authoritarianism.

By contrast, twenty-seven governors resigned before the expiration of their gubernatorial terms. On the one hand, four governors immediately assumed the presidency,<sup>42</sup> one governor left the province to be a national minister,<sup>43</sup> and two governors died during their tenure.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, four governors were forced to resign due to the federal intervention,<sup>45</sup> while the provincial legislatures impeached and terminated the administrations of six governors.<sup>46</sup> The other ten governors resigned by themselves.<sup>47</sup>

This description implies that governors must put great effort into the maximization of their parties' performance as well as the stabilization of their tenure. Vote buying and patronage serve these purposes (Brusco et al. 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes et al. 2013), but they are not sufficient. Since a multiparty system at the provincial level neutralizes the positive impact of patronage spending on the share of votes for incumbent governors (Lodola 2010), governors have incentives to change gubernatorial term limits and the schedule of provincial elections as well as to introduce the double simultaneous vote (*ley de lemas*) system so that

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<sup>42</sup>Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja) left the province two years before the expiration of his gubernatorial term, since the president was elected for a six-year term at that time. Fernando de la Rúa (UCR, City of Buenos Aires) still had 9 months left as the chief of the government of the City of Buenos Aires due to inconcurrent elections. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis) assumed the presidency on December 23, 2001 during the 2001 political-economic crisis. Néstor Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz) still had six more months as a governor when he left Santa Cruz in 2003.

<sup>43</sup>Carlos Ruckauf (PJ, Buenos Aires) resigned to be the minister of foreign affairs in 2002.

<sup>44</sup>They were Vicente Saadi (PJ, Catamarca) and Guillermo Snopek (PJ, Jujuy).

<sup>45</sup>Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca), Carlos Mujica (PJ, Santiago del Estero), Mercedes Aragonés de Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero), and José Domato (PJ, Tucumán) were replaced by the intervenors.

<sup>46</sup>Aníbal Ibarra (FREPASO-*Frente Grande*, City of Buenos Aires), Pedro Pocard (*Partido Nuevo*, Corrientes), Jorge Escobar (PJ, San Juan), Alfredo Avelín (*Cruzada Renovadora*, San Juan), Ricardo del Val (PJ, Santa Cruz), and Mario Colazo (UCR, Tierra del Fuego) were impeached by the provincial legislatures.

<sup>47</sup>They were Néstor Perl (PJ, Chubut), Eduardo Angeloz (UCR, Córdoba), Ricardo de Aparici (PJ, Jujuy), Roberto Domínguez (PJ, Jujuy), Carlos Ficosco (PJ, Jujuy), Carlos Ferraro (PJ, Jujuy), Leopoldo Bravo (PB, San Juan), Carlos Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero), Carlos Díaz (PJ, Santiago del Estero), and Sergio Acevedo (PJ, Santa Cruz). Most of them resigned due to political crises as well as the loss of support from their parties.

the effective number of parties declines in favor of them. Table 3.8 summarizes rules of gubernatorial elections between 1983 and 2007.

Provincial constitutions prescribe gubernatorial term limits. No constitution allowed immediate reelection of incumbent governors in

**Table 3.8** Rules of gubernatorial elections between 1983 and 2007

Provinces	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2003	2007
Buenos Aires	A	A	A	B	B	B	B
City of Buenos Aires				B	B	B	B
Catamarca	A	A	C	C	C	C	C
Chaco	A	A	A	B	B	B	B
Chubut	A	A	A*	B*	B	B	B
Córdoba	A	B	B	B	B	B	B
Corrientes	A	A	A	A	A	A	B
Entre Ríos	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Formosa	A	A*	B*	B*	B*	C*	C*
Jujuy	A	B	B*	B*	B*	B	B
La Pampa	A	A	A	B	B	B	B
La Rioja	A	C*	C*	C*	C*	C*	B
Mendoza	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Misiones	A	A*	B*	B*	B*	B	B
Neuquén	A	A	A	B	B	B	B
Río Negro	A	A	B	B	B	B	B
Salta	A	A*	A*	A*	B*	B	B
San Juan	A	B	B*	B*	B	B	B
San Luis	A	C	C	C	C	C	B
Santa Cruz	A	A	A*	B*	C*	C	C
Santa Fe	A	A	A*	A*	A*	A*	A
Santiago del Estero	A	A	A*	A*	B	B	B
Tierra del Fuego			B	B	B	B	B
Tucumán	A	A	A	A	A	A	B
% of provinces that held concurrent elections	100	100	87.0	62.5	20.8	8.3	33.3

*Note* A: No immediate reelection was allowed; B: Immediate reelection was possible, but the provincial constitution also imposed some term limits; C: Indefinite reelection was permitted. The double simultaneous vote (*ley de lemas*) system was used at the elections with asterisk. Numbers show the percentage of provinces that held gubernatorial elections and presidential elections (in 1983, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007) or national legislative elections (in 1987 and 1991) concurrently

*Sources* Author's elaboration based on data from Almaraz (2010); Calvo and Escolar (2005); Tow (2011); Tula (2001)



1983, even though former governors were re-eligible after four years out of office in most of the provinces. However, some powerful governors immediately changed provincial constitutions during their first term in order to stabilize their administrations. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis) and Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja) introduced a radical reform to be reelected indefinitely. Thanks to this reform, the former governed San Luis until 2001, whereas the latter left La Rioja for the presidency in 1989. Córdoba, Jujuy, and San Juan also allowed one immediate reelection to incumbent governors, but Eduardo Angeloz (UCR, Córdoba) was the only incumbent who took advantage of it. Moreover, Catamarca introduced unlimited reelection of its governors in 1988 in order to make Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca) the successor of his father Vicente Saadi (PJ, Catamarca), whereas Formosa, Río Negro, and Misiones also changed their constitutions by 1991.

More provincial constitutions were amended following the 1994 constitutional reform at the national level. Six provinces changed them and secured the stability of incumbents' administrations including those of Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires), Carlos Maestro (UCR, Chubut), Rubén Marín (PJ, La Pampa), and Néstor Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz).<sup>48</sup> By contrast, Carlos Reutemann (PJ, Santa Fe) and Ramón Ortega (PJ, Tucumán) failed to introduce constitutional reforms (Tula 2001). Facing this situation, Reutemann assumed a senatorial seat for four years, ran again for the 1999 gubernatorial election, and replaced his successor Jorge Obeid (PJ, Santa Fe). According to Botana (1977), such circulations of gubernatorial and senatorial seats among a limited number of provincial party bosses had been observed since the 1880s.

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<sup>48</sup>Rubén Marín (PJ, La Pampa) ran for his third consecutive term in 1999, even though the provincial constitution only allowed one immediate reelections. His explanation was that it would be his "second" term under the new constitution, and his terms under the previous constitution did not count for new term limits. This logic also allowed Eduardo Angeloz (UCR, Córdoba) and Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta) to serve for their third terms.

Six more provinces relaxed gubernatorial term limits between 1995 and 2006 including Formosa and Santa Cruz, where unlimited reelections were introduced for Gildo Insfrán (PJ, Formosa) and Néstor Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz), respectively. However, the defeat of Carlos Rovira's (PJ-*Alianza Frente Renovador de la Concordia*, Misiones) candidates in an election of the constituent assembly to introduce his indefinite reelection in 2006 as well as the removal of Ángel Maza (PJ-FPV, La Rioja) by the provincial legislature in the early 2007 terminated this trend. These events made President Kirchner pressure the PJ governors not to change their provincial constitutions for reelections. In addition, Alberto Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis) changed the provincial constitutions to prohibit unlimited reelections under such pressure, while La Rioja immediately decided to introduce gubernatorial term limits after the impeachment of Maza. In the 2007 gubernatorial elections, as a result, three provinces allowed indefinite reelections, and eighteen provinces (including the City of Buenos Aires) permitted incumbents' immediate reelections with some term limits. By contrast, in Entre Ríos, Mendoza, and Santa Fe, no immediate reelections were permitted, and former governors could be gubernatorial candidates after four years out of office.<sup>49</sup>

Governors' authority over scheduling provincial elections also serves for their tenure stability. Most provinces have a constitution that is not explicit about the specific date for local elections, and governors may choose between holding concurrent presidential (or national legislative) and gubernatorial elections and scheduling gubernatorial elections for other dates. Since presidential coattail effects are prominent in Argentina (e.g., Gélineau and Remmer 2006), governors' choice between concurrent elections and nonconcurrent elections is important to the maximization of their electoral performance. As Table 3.8 shows, a decline in the dominance of the PJ and the UCR over national politics discouraged incumbent governors from holding concurrent elections. In 2003, all provinces except La Rioja and San Luis scheduled gubernatorial elections for different dates in order to avoid a "negative" coattail effect due to the fragmentation of the PJ and the UCR.

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<sup>49</sup>As of January 2018, the same three provinces (Catamarca, Formosa, and Santa Cruz) allowed indefinite reelections, while no immediate reelections were permitted in Mendoza and Santa Fe.

However, eight provinces, most of which were governed by the PJ-FPV, decided to have the 2007 presidential and gubernatorial elections on the same day so that candidates from the PJ-FPV enjoyed Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's (PJ-FPV) coattail.

The double simultaneous vote system, which is known as "*ley de lemas*", is another tool that saved many incumbent governors. Under this system, each party (*lema*) may present multiple candidates (*suble-mas*) at general elections. Votes are pooled by party, and the winner of an election is the most voted candidate of the most voted party.<sup>50</sup> In other words, it is a system that conducts primaries and general elections simultaneously (De Luca 2008).<sup>51</sup>

In order to solve problems with factionalism of the PJ, four provinces introduced this system to gubernatorial elections in 1987, which was followed by six more provinces in 1991. The defeat of the PJ at the 1983 elections generated a factional group (*Renovadores*) who sought to reform the party, and they confronted the old guard (*Ortodoxos*) (Levitsky 2003). Provincial party bosses were also split between these two national factions. In 1985, the two factions presented different lists of candidates in the majority of provinces, which led to another setback at a national legislative election (Calvo and Escolar 2005). According to De Luca (2008), holding primaries was not an option, since interparty conflicts of the PJ were so severe in many provinces. The double simultaneous vote system attracted the PJ governors, since it allows multiple factions to present their own candidates, while pooled votes for the PJ candidates should help the victory of incumbents' factions.

As the PJ governors expected, the PJ only lost two gubernatorial elections among 23 elections that used double simultaneous vote. However, this system showed two shortcomings. First, it stabilized factionalism at the provincial level. As Morgenstern (2004) argued

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<sup>50</sup>Suppose Party A presents Candidates C and D, while Party B presents Candidates E and F. The share of votes for each candidate is 35% (Candidate C), 20% (Candidate D), 40% (Candidate E), and 5% (Candidate F), respectively. The winner of this election is not Candidate E but Candidate C, since C is the most voted candidate of the most voted party (Party A).

<sup>51</sup>See Morgenstern (2004), Morales (2008), and Buquet and Chasquetti (2008) about the Uruguayan case.

regarding the Uruguayan case, this system made provincial factions visible unit of actors. In consequence, the factions had little incentive to reach a consensus, and factionalism in the provincial legislatures constrained the governability of the PJ governors (De Luca 2008). Second, this system sometimes generated controversial electoral results. One of the famous cases was the 2003 gubernatorial election in Santa Fe. Even though Hermes Binner (PS) was the most voted candidates with 35.9% of votes, Jorge Obeid (PJ) won the election just with 20.7% of votes. Since other four PJ candidates received 22.4% of votes, votes for the PS (38.3%) did not exceed those for the PJ (43.2%). These problems made the PJ governors, as well as the governors from other parties, reconsider the cost and benefit of this system, and the *ley de lemas* for gubernatorial elections was once eliminated in all provinces by 2011. However, Alicia Kirchner (PJ) took advantage of the system in the 2015 Santa Cruz gubernatorial election.

This subsection summarized the characteristics of the Argentine federalism and governors. In Argentina, fiscal authority is centralized, a huge difference in the population of each subnational unit leads to the overrepresentation of the periphery provinces, and party organizations are decentralized. These characteristics interactively make governors important political players at the national level as well as the provincial level. However, even though governors have incentives to change gubernatorial term limits and the schedule of provincial elections as well as to introduce double simultaneous vote, their tenure stability varies considerably across provinces.

### 3.4.2 Who Are Governors' Subordinates?

Which governors have leverage in the legislative process at the Senate? According to my theoretical framework, longstanding governors feel less constrained by the intergovernmental relations than freshmen governors. I thus hypothesized that longstanding governors' subordinates tend to shelve presidential bills in committees, since such senators do not need to publicize their credit-claiming and position-taking activities to voters (H1).

Governors' subordinates are those who unconditionally support their governors' preference. Following Kikuchi and Lodola (2008), I identified a senator as a governor's subordinate if (a) he or she had not run for a gubernatorial election before or immediately after his or her senatorial term, and (b) he or she and an incumbent governor shared the same party and factional affiliation. I classified 129 senators into such a category using Argento and Gerschenson (1999), Baron (2002, 2004, 2006), Baron and Guerra (2000), Brusco (2005), Carrera (2001), Kikuchi (2012), Leiras (2007), Lodola (2010), Nogués (1989), Pousadela (2004), Slipak (2006), Tow (2011), Urquiza (2005), the website of the Argentine Senate, *La Nación*; *Clarín*; *Página12*. The number of governors' subordinates in each gubernatorial period is reported in Table 3.9. The gubernatorial period 1999–2003 is divided into two subperiods (1999–2001 and 2001–2003) in the table, since the first direct election in 2001 renewed all senatorial seats.

Contrary to the case of the Chamber of Deputies, it is difficult for governors to control senators from their provinces. In the lower chamber, deputies are loyal to their governors, who craft party lists as provincial party bosses (De Luca et al. 2002; Jones 2002, 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Jones et al. 2002; Spiller et al. 2007). By contrast, the data in this table show that only 30% of senators unconditionally followed their governors in most of the gubernatorial periods. The introduction of the third senatorial seat in 1995, which is automatically distributed to the first runner-up in each province, as well as that of direct election in 2001 did not change this feature.

However, Table 3.9 also indicates that tenure stability gives governors advantages in the candidate selection process. Longstanding governors are more successful in sending their followers to the Senate than freshmen governors. On average, more than one senator from a longstanding governor's province are his or her subordinates, except in the first gubernatorial term (1983–1987) when there was no such governor by definition. In contrast, an average freshman governor holds less than one subordinate in the upper chamber. Longstanding governors may reduce the number of their competitors by changing rules of provincial elections, and their solid machines attract second-tier politicians. As a result, they are more dominant in the candidate selection process than freshmen governors.

**Table 3.9** Number of governors' subordinates between 1983 and 2007

Provinces	83–87	87–91	91–95	95–99	99–01	01–03	03–07
Buenos Aires	2	0	0	1	1	0	0
City of Buenos Aires	0	0	0	1	0.5	1	0.5
Catamarca	1	1.5	1	1	1	1	0
Chaco	0	0.5	0	0	0	2	2
Chubut	2	0	1	2	0	0	1
Córdoba	2	1.5	1	0.5	1	2	2
Corrientes	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
Entre Ríos	0	0	0.5	1	1	1	1
Formosa	1	1.5	2	1	1	2	2
Jujuy	1	0	0	0.5	0	1	1.5
La Pampa	0	0	1.5	2	2	1	0
La Rioja	1	1	1	0	0	1	1.5
Mendoza	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Misiones	2	0	0	1	0	1	1
Neuquén	2	2	0	2	0	0	0
Río Negro	2	0	0	0	0	2	1
Salta	1	0	0	2	2	2	2
San Juan	1	0.5	0	1	1	0.5	2
San Luis	1	1	1	2	2	2	1*
Santa Cruz	0.5	1	1	2	2	2	0
Santa Fe	0	0	0.5	0	2	2	0
Santiago del Estero	2	0.5	1	1	2	2	1*
Tierra del Fuego			1	1.5	1	1	0.5
Tucumán	1.5	1	0.5	1	1	1	0
% of governors' subordi- nates in the Senate	54.3	28.3	29.2	35.0	29.7	39.3	29.2
Ave. number of long- standing governors' subordinates	0	1.25	1.10	1.46	1.08	1.45	1.05
Ave. number of freshmen governors' subordinates	1.09	0.42	0.45	0.58	0.59	0.88	0.73

*Note* The numbers of longstanding governors' subordinates are in bold. I regarded the provinces where the number of governors' subordinates decreased from 1 to 0 during a gubernatorial period as "0.5", and the cases in which the number changed from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 1 as "1.5". In San Luis and Santiago del Estero, the 2005 senatorial elections reduced the number of such senators from 2 to 0, and thus I assigned 1 (with asterisk) to those cases. The gubernatorial period 1999–2003 is divided into two subperiods, since the 2001 senatorial election (the first direct election) renewed all senatorial seats

*Sources* Author's elaboration based on data from Argento and Gerschenson (1999); Baron (2002, 2004, 2006); Baron and Guerra (2000); Brusco (2005); Carrera (2001); Kikuchi (2012); Leiras (2007); Lodola (2010); Nogués (1989); Pousadela (2004); Slipak (2006); Tow (2011); Urquiza (2005); the website of the Argentine Senate; *La Nación*; *Clarín*; *Página12*

Governors' subordinates are typically recruited from three pools of candidates. First, such senators often include governors' relatives. Longstanding governors often nominate their family members in order to dominate provincial politics. Even when freshmen governors' factions are small and unstable, they can rely on their relatives. Between 1983 and 2007, governors succeeded in giving senatorial seats to their wives (e.g., Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz)), their children (e.g., Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta)), their brothers (e.g., Alberto Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis)), their sisters (e.g., Vilma Ibarra (FREPASO, City of Buenos Aires)), their brothers-in-law (e.g., Pedro Molina (PJ, Santa Cruz), a brother-in-law of Governor Arturo Puricelli), their uncles (e.g., Gabriel Feris (PA, Corrientes), an uncle of Governor José Antonio Romero Feris), and their nephews (e.g., Jorge Mikkelsen Löth (PJ, Santiago del Estero), a nephew of Governor Carlos Juárez).

Second, national deputies, provincial legislators, and mayors are often promoted to the national upper chamber by governors.<sup>52</sup> Most governors' subordinates fall into this type, since governors' success in machine politics depends on their ability to reward politicians from their factions. Longstanding governors are especially good at rotating elective positions of their followers. For example, the province of Buenos Aires is a province where its governors have difficulty in sending their subordinates to the Senate due to its multiparty system. However, as a longstanding governor, Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires) achieved transferring Jorge Villaverde (PJ, Buenos Aires) from the mayor of the municipality of Almirante Brown to a senator for the province of Buenos Aires, and Governor Duhalde could strategically use Senator Villaverde to echo his voice to the Senate.<sup>53</sup>

Third, longstanding governors also preferred to select their vice-governors and ministers as candidates for the Senate. Even when they have governed provinces for multiple terms, they usually shuffle their running mates as well as their cabinets for each term, and former vice-governors and ministers are sometimes sent to the Senate. There are two

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<sup>52</sup>According to Kikuchi and Lodola (2014), these positions are less valuable than senatorial seats in Argentina.

<sup>53</sup>For instance, Villaverde was one of the key players in the Senate who blocked bills that would have allowed President Menem to run for his third term in 1999.

explanations for such preference. On the one hand, those senators have an in-depth knowledge of provincial administration, and thus they can be good delegates who can represent their provincial interests in the intergovernmental negotiations in the legislative process. On the other hand, they can also be potential rivals of incumbent governors at the future elections. Since they may form a coalition with other parties or factions against governors if they have too much power at the provincial level, governors have an incentive to send them to Buenos Aires in order to make them stay out of provincial politics. A good example of such candidate selection is the case of Eduardo Arnold (PJ, Santa Cruz), who left the provincial government for a senatorial seat during his second term as the vice-governor of Governor Néstor Kirchner in 1998 (Lodola 2010).<sup>54</sup>

### 3.4.3 Who Are Senate Bosses and Senate Bosses' Subordinates?

Discussion in the last subsections implied that more than half the senators are not controlled by governors. These senators' behavior should be different from that of governors' subordinates, since they are not constrained by the intergovernmental relations between the president and governors. In Chapter 2, I posited that Senate bosses are less likely to support presidential bills than other senators on the floor, since their machines make them autonomous from national parties and the president, but they should attract voters by position-taking (H2). Moreover, Senate bosses' subordinates not only support this Senate bosses' behavior on the floor with their votes, but also commit to public credit-claiming in order to maximize the performance of their factions at the national or provincial level (H3a and H3b).

Since it is extremely difficult to run for the presidency or the governorship without being a provincial party boss in Argentina, Kikuchi and Lodola (2008) considered Senate bosses (a) those who have already occupied or run for the presidency, the vice-presidency, or the governorship

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<sup>54</sup>According to Lodola (2010), politicians of Formosa called the national legislature "elephants' cemetery".



before reaching the Senate; or (b) those who run for the presidency, the vice-presidency, or the governorship immediately after leaving the upper chamber.<sup>55</sup> It is not a new phenomenon that senators with gubernatorial ambition and former governors coexist in the upper chamber. In his seminal work, Botana (1977) reported that the average share of former governors and presidents in the Senate between 1880 and 1916 was 46%, and that governors of some provinces (e.g., Entre Ríos) served as national senators immediately before and after their gubernatorial terms.

Table 3.10 shows the number of Senate bosses and their subordinates from each province between 1983 and 2007. Using Lodola's (2010) dataset about gubernatorial candidates, I identified 91 senators as Senate bosses.<sup>56</sup> In addition, I considered a senator to be a Senate boss's subordinate if (a) he or she had not run for a gubernatorial election before or immediately after his or her senatorial term, and (b) he or she and a Senate boss shared the same party and factional affiliation. I found that 19 senators were in this category by consulting the same sources used to identify governors' subordinates.<sup>57</sup>

The numbers in this table reveal that the transfers of first-tier politicians between provincial governments and the Senate are still in practice. After democratization, the share of Senate bosses exceeded 30% in all periods except between 1983 and 1987. Between 1983 and 2001, as De Luca (2008) showed, 14 former governors assumed senatorial seats, while 14 senators won the governorship. This trend did not change even after the introduction of direct election in 2001. On the one hand, former Governors Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires), Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca), Jorge Busti (PJ, Entre Ríos), Rubén Marín (PJ, La Pampa), Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja), Ramón Puerta (PJ, Misiones), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis), Carlos Reutemann (PJ, Santa Fe), Carlos Juárez (PJ, Santiago del Estero), Julio Miranda (PJ, Tucumán),

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<sup>55</sup>Again, this operationalization is different from Kikuchi and Lodola's (2014) *political boss* variable. See Chapter 2 for more discussion.

<sup>56</sup>I would like to appreciate Germán Lodola for sharing this dataset.

<sup>57</sup>They are Argento and Gerschenson (1999), Baron (2002, 2004, 2006), Baron and Guerra (2000), Brusco (2005), Carrera (2001), Kikuchi (2012), Leiras (2007), Lodola (2010), Nogués (1989), Pousadela (2004), Slipak (2006), Tow (2011), Urquiza (2005), the website of the Argentine Senate, *La Nación*, *Clarín*, and *Página/12*.

**Table 3.10** Number of Senate bosses and Senate bosses' subordinates between 1983 and 2007

Provinces	83–87	87–91	91–95	95–99	99–01	01–03	03–07
Buenos Aires	0	0	0.5	1	1	1.5 (0.5)	1.5 (0.5)
City of Bs As	0	0	0	0.5	0	1	1
Catamarca	1	0.5	0	0	0	2	2 (1)
Chaco	2	1.5	2	1.5	1	1	1
Chubut	0	1	1	1	1	2	1
Córdoba	0	0.5	1	2.5	1	0	0
Corrientes	1	1	1	1.5	0	0	0.5
Entre Ríos	2	2	1.5	1	1	1 (1)	0
Formosa	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.5
Jujuy	1	1 (0.5)	1 (1)	2	2	1 (1)	1 (0.5)
La Pampa	2	2	0.5	1	0	2	2 (1)
La Rioja	1	1	1	3	3	2	1.5
Mendoza	0	0	0.5	1	1	2 (1)	1
Misiones	0	0.5	1.5	2	2	2	1.5
Neuquén	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Río Negro	0	0.5	1	2 (1)	2 (1)	0	1
Salta	1	1	1.5 (0.5)	1	1	1	1
San Juan	1	1.5	2	2	1	1.5 (1)	1
San Luis	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.5 (0.5)
Santa Cruz	0	0	0	1	0.5	0	1.5 (1.5)
Santa Fe	0	0	0	2 (1)	1	1	2 (1)
Sant. del Est.	0	1 (0.5)	1	0	0	1	1
Tierra del F.			0	1	0	2	1
Tucumán	0.5	0	1	2	1	1	1.5 (1)
% of Senate bosses in the Senate	29.3	33.7	39.6	44.3	31.2	38.6	37.5
% of Senate bosses' subordinates	0	2.2	3.1	2.9	1.4	6.4	9.7

*Note* The number of Senate bosses' subordinates is in each parenthesis. I regarded the provinces where the number of Senate bosses or their subordinates changed from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0 during a gubernatorial period as "0.5", and the cases in which the number changed from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 1 as "1.5". I assigned "2.5" to the period 1995–1999 of Córdoba, since the number of Senate bosses dropped from 3 to 2 in 1998. The gubernatorial period 1999–2003 is divided into two subperiods, since the 2001 senatorial election (the first direct election) renewed all senatorial seats

*Sources* Author's elaboration based on data from Argento and Gerschenson (1999); Baron (2002, 2004, 2006); Baron and Guerra (2000); Brusco (2005); Carrera (2001); Kikuchi (2012); Leiras (2007); Lodola (2010); Nogués (1989); Pousadela (2004); Slipak (2006); Tow (2011); Urquiza (2005); the website of the Argentine Senate; *La Nación*; *Clarín*; *Página12*

Oscar Castillo (UCR, Catamarca), Carlos Maestro (UCR, Chubut), and Pedro Salvatori (MPN, Neuquén) moved to the Senate. On the other hand, Jorge Busti (PJ, Entre Ríos), Carlos Verna (PJ, La Pampa), José Luis Gioja (PJ, San Juan), José Alperovich (PJ, Tucumán), Eduardo Brizuela del Moral (UCR, Catamarca), Mario Colazo (UCR, Tierra del Fuego) successfully jumped from the upper chamber to the governorship.

We can also observe the transfers between the national government and the upper chamber. Among seven presidents of Argentina between 1983 and 2015, Fernando de la Rúa (UCR, City of Buenos Aires), Eduardo Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires), and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ, Santa Cruz/Buenos Aires) were senators before assuming the presidency, and the latter two directly moved up from the Senate. By contrast, Raúl Alfonsín (UCR, Buenos Aires), Carlos Saúl Menem (PJ, La Rioja), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis), and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (FPV, Buenos Aires) were former presidents in the Senate. Therefore, all the presidents but Néstor Kirchner served as senators before or after their presidential terms.<sup>58</sup>

However, we can find two new trends in the career patterns of senators. First, the introduction of the third senatorial seat for each province due to the constitutional reform increased the share of Senate bosses from provincial opposition parties. Just 35% of Senate bosses were not affiliated with governors' parties before 1995. Two senators for each province were elected by the provincial legislatures, and thus the opposition got some seats in the upper chamber only when they had a significant share at the provincial legislative branch. Beginning in 1995, by contrast, the third seat was automatically awarded to the first-runner up of each province.<sup>59</sup> This change made provincial party bosses of the provincial opposition seek senatorial seats, rather than running for a mayor or serving in some jobs at provincial-level party organizations. As a result, the ratio increased to 55%. These Senate bosses from provincial opposition parties include those who had gubernatorial ambition

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<sup>58</sup>The governorship is also considered a springboard position to the presidency. Among these presidents, De la Rúa, Duhalde, Kirchner, Menem, and Rodríguez Saá served as governors before assuming the presidency. It should be noted that the latter four were longstanding governors.

<sup>59</sup>Between 1995 and 2001, this third seat was usually distributed to the first minority party in each provincial legislature. After the introduction of direct election in 2001, the third seat was awarded to the head of the list of the first runner-up regardless of its losing margin.

such as Miguel Ángel Pichetto (PJ, Río Negro) and Juan Carlos Marino (UCR, La Pampa).

Second, the share of Senate bosses' subordinates increased after 2001. Even though the number of senatorial seats for each province was increased to three in 1995, Senate bosses were rarely accompanied by their subordinates, with some exceptions.<sup>60</sup> In contrast, direct senatorial elections sometimes awarded two seats to the lists of Senate bosses rather than to those of governors regardless of their power in provincial politics. For example, Lylia Arancio de Beller (UCR, Jujuy), Graciela Bar (PJ, Entre Ríos), Floriana Martín (PJ, San Juan), María Perceval (PJ, Mendoza), and Delia Pinchetti de Sierra Morales (FR, Tucumán) won their seats with their Senate bosses Gerardo Morales, Jorge Busti, José Luis Gioja, Jorge Pardal, and Ricardo Bussi, respectively, even though they were from the provincial opposition.

The case of Senate boss Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's subordinates also needs special attention. She got a senatorial seat for Santa Cruz in 2001, and Nicolás Fernández (PJ, Santa Cruz) accompanied her. However, she changed her electoral district from Santa Cruz to the province of Buenos Aires, and she won the 2005 senatorial election with her new subordinate José Pampuro (PJ-FPV, Buenos Aires). In turn, she was replaced in her seat for Santa Cruz by her sister-in-law Alicia Kirchner (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz). Between 2005 and 2007, as a consequence, not only Pampuro but also Nicolás Fernández and Alicia Kirchner were subordinates of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. This is the only case in which one Senate boss was followed by multiple subordinates from various provinces.

These new trends increased the share of Senate bosses from the provincial opposition as well as the number of Senate bosses' subordinates. Even though they do not hold a majority of seats in the Senate, their position-taking and public credit-claiming activities have substantive impacts on the legislative process.

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<sup>60</sup>These exceptions were Alfredo Benítez (PJ, Jujuy), Fernando Cabana (PJ, Jujuy), Edgardo Gagliardi (UCR, Río Negro), Jorge Massat (PJ, Santa Fe), Luis Salim (PJ, Santiago del Estero), and Julio San Millán (PJ, Salta).

### 3.4.4 Who Are Local Subordinates?

The other senators, whose provincial party bosses are not governors or Senate bosses, are called in this study “local subordinates”. A senator is thus identified as a local subordinate if (a) he or she had not run for a gubernatorial election before or immediately after his or her senatorial term, and (b) he or she is affiliated with a faction that is not led by an incumbent governor or a Senate boss. Using the sources cited to find governors’ subordinates and Senate bosses’ subordinates, I classified 87 senators into this category.<sup>61</sup> The number of such senators is shown in Table 3.11.

There are two ways in which local subordinates reach a seat in the upper chamber. First, governors’ subordinates are frequently turned into local subordinates due to the difference between the cycle of senatorial terms and that of gubernatorial terms. Governors are elected for four-year terms, while senators are elected for six-year terms under the current constitution and nine-year terms under the previous constitution.<sup>62</sup> Therefore, if an incumbent governor is replaced by a governor from different party or faction, his or her subordinates spend the remainder of their senatorial terms as local subordinates. For example, the legislature of the province of Buenos Aires chose two senators from Governor Alejandro Armendáriz’ (UCR, Buenos Aires) “*Movimiento de Renovación y Cambio*” faction in 1983: Adolfo Gass and Edison Otero.<sup>63</sup> Their terms were fixed to 1983–1992 and 1983–1986, respectively, by a lottery at the first-floor session of the Senate so that they had a staggered cycle. Senator Otero was reelected for a nine-year term in 1986, and they served as Governor Armendáriz’ subordinates between 1983 and 1987. However, they came to be local subordinates in 1987,

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<sup>61</sup>They are Argento and Gerschenson (1999), Baron (2002, 2004, 2006), Baron and Guerra (2000), Brusco (2005), Carrera (2001), Kikuchi (2012), Leiras (2007), Lodola (2010), Nogués (1989), Pousadela (2004), Slipak (2006), Tow (2011), Urquiza (2005), the website of the Argentine Senate, *La Nación*, *Clarín*, and *Página/12*.

<sup>62</sup>The previous constitution prescribed the staggered cycle of senatorial terms to the senators from the same province. Under the current constitution, by contrast, senatorial seats of the same province are renewed in the same year.

<sup>63</sup>One of the leaders of this faction was President Alfonsín.

**Table 3.11** Number of local subordinates between 1983 and 2007

Provinces	83–87	87–91	91–95	95–99	99–01	01–03	03–07
Buenos Aires	0	2	1.5	1	1	1	1*
City of Buenos Aires	2	2	2	1.5	2.5	0	1.5
Catamarca	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Chaco	0	0	0	1.5	2	0	0
Chubut	0	1	0	0	2	1	1
Córdoba	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Corrientes	0	0	0	1.5	3	2	1.5
Entre Ríos	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
Formosa	1	0.5	0	1	1	1	0.5
Jujuy	0	0.5	0	0.5	1	0	0
La Pampa	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
La Rioja	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mendoza	1	2	1.5	1	2	0	2
Misiones	0	1.5	0.5	0	1	0	0.5
Neuquén	0	0	2	1	3	2	2
Río Negro	0	1.5	1	0	0	1	1
Salta	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
San Juan	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
San Luis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Santa Cruz	1.5	1	1	0	0.5	1	0.5
Santa Fe	2	2	1.5	0	0	0	0
Santiago del Estero	0	0	0	2	1	0	1
Tierra del Fuego			1	0.5	2	0	1.5
Tucumán	0	1	0.5	0	0	1	0.5
% of local subordinates in the Senate	16.3	34.8	30.2	17.9	37.7	15.7	24.3

*Note* I regarded the provinces where the number of Senate bosses or their subordinates changed from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0 during a gubernatorial period as “0.5”, and the cases in which the number changed from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 1 as “1.5”. The province of Buenos Aires was regarded as 1 (with asterisk) for the period 2003–2007, since the number of local subordinates decreased from 2 to 0 in 2005. The gubernatorial period 1999–2003 is divided into two subperiods, since the 2001 senatorial election (the first direct election) renewed all senatorial seats. *Sources* Author’s elaboration based on data from Argento and Gerschenson (1999); Baron (2002, 2004, 2006); Baron and Guerra (2000); Brusco (2005); Carrera (2001); Leiras (2007); Lodola (2010); Nogués (1989); Pousadela (2004); Slipak (2006); Tow (2011); and Urquiza (2005); the website of the Argentine Senate; *La Nación*; *Clarín*; *Página12*

since Armendáriz was succeeded by a PJ Governor Antonio Cafiero. He left the governorship for the presidency of the Committee to normalize PAMI (*Comisión Normalizadora del PAMI*), a public health insurance agency, and thus his subordinates should be considered local subordinates after 1987.

The changes from governors' subordinates to local subordinates also happen when a governor is replaced by a new governor from a different faction of the same party. As of 1998, for instance, Governor Felipe Sapag (MPN, Neuquén) held two subordinates in the Senate: his nephew Felipe "Pipe" Sapag and his daughter Silvia Sapag.<sup>64</sup> However, the leader of their rival faction Jorge Sobisch (MPN, Neuquén) won the governorship in 1999, which made them into local subordinates.

These two episodes imply that the number of local subordinates should be lower if a partial renewal of the Senate and provincial elections are held in the same year. Table 3.11 supports this view. Before 2001, one-third of senators were renewed every three years in 1986, 1992, 1995, and 1998. After the total renewal of the Senate in 2001, one-third of senators (senators for eight provinces) were shuffled every two years in 2003, 2005, and 2007. As a result, the share of local subordinates tends to be lower in the gubernatorial periods whose first year was also a year of a partial renewal of the Senate. In addition, the total renewal in 2001 also allowed incumbent governors to replace local subordinates who were selected by former governors.

Second, some local subordinates are originally nominated as senatorial candidates by provincial party bosses who are not governors or Senate bosses. For example, Senator Carlos Rossi (*Vecinalista Partido Nuevo*, Córdoba) depended on Mayor of the City of Córdoba Luis Juez. This type of candidate selection was also observable in the PJ and the UCR including the case of Senator Marta Raso (UCR, Chubut) whose provincial party boss was a former Minister of Social Welfare of the Province of Chubut Mario Cimadevilla.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Felipe "Pipe" Sapag was the vice-governor under Governor Jorge Sobisch between 1991 and 1993. However, he distanced himself from Sobisch and came to be closer to Felipe Sapag by 1995.

<sup>65</sup>Interestingly, Cimadevilla won a national senatorial seat in 2009.

In the last three subsections, I identified governors' subordinates, Senate bosses, Senate bosses' subordinates, and local subordinates. Governors may recruit their subordinates from their relatives, national deputies, provincial legislators, mayors, vice-governors, and provincial ministers, but it is especially difficult for freshmen governors to send such senators to Buenos Aires. Moreover, other types of senators who do not depend on their governors have a significant share in the Senate. The upper chamber historically included former governors and presidents as well as senators with gubernatorial ambition, but the introduction of the third senatorial seat for each province in 1995 and that of direct election in 2001 increased the share of Senate bosses from outside of governors' parties and the share of Senate bosses' subordinates, respectively. The difference between the cycle of senatorial terms and that of gubernatorial terms often change governors' subordinates to local subordinates, even though some local subordinates are originally nominated as senatorial candidates by provincial party bosses who are not governors or Senate bosses. This classification of senators helps me test my hypotheses in the next two chapters.

### 3.5 Summary

In this chapter, I described background information to study senatorial behavior in Argentina. After introducing a brief history of the Senate before 1983, the first half of this chapter provided information on committees and the floor. On the one hand, committee decision-making is consensus-based, and Stage 1a killed almost all unapproved presidential initiatives, while the new Senate rules limited the number of each senator's committees even though allocation of committee chairmanships is considered a distribution of financial resources. On the other hand, the number of roll-call votes had increased since 2004 due to an electronic voting system, whereas the total number of legislative party blocs was unstable due to the fragmentation of the party system and one-member blocs.



Roll-call data allow us to calculate senators' ideal points. I also estimated them to control the degree of preference cohesion between senators in the next two chapters. The point estimates of the median senators of the PJ and the UCR suggest that cleavages between senators at floor voting mainly reflect partisanship in the Argentine Senate.

The second half of the chapter in turn described information about important independent variables. Even though centralized fiscal authority, the overrepresentation of the periphery provinces, and decentralized party organizations make Argentine governors important political players at the national and provincial levels, their tenure stability vary considerably across provinces. As provincial party bosses, governors can select their relatives, national deputies, provincial legislators, mayors, vice-governors, and provincial ministers as senatorial candidates. However, the data presented in this chapter revealed that it is very difficult for freshmen governors to send their subordinates to the upper chamber.

In addition, other types of senators who are not unconditionally controlled by governors have a significant share in the Senate. According to Botana (1977), the Senate was traditionally known as a conservative institution inhabited by former governors and presidents as well as senators with gubernatorial ambition. Besides this tendency, the share of Senate bosses from outside of governors' parties and that of Senate bosses' subordinates increased following the introduction of the third senatorial seat for each province in 1995 and direct election in 2001. Moreover, the difference between the cycle of senatorial terms and that of gubernatorial terms often transforms previous governors' subordinates into local subordinates, despite the fact that some local subordinates are originally recruited by provincial party bosses who are not governors or Senate bosses. Therefore, it is important to introduce the typology of senators, since senators are expected to change their legislative behavior based on their institutional positions.

The information above allows me to test my hypotheses in the next two chapters.

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# 4

## The Drawer of Committees

When and how do senators oppose presidential bills? When do senators shelve or amend bills? In this chapter, I answer these questions using an original dataset on committee behavior from qualitative and quantitative perspectives. In order to show the function of the Senate under federalism, I study the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill, which was one of the hot issues under the Néstor Kirchner (PJ-FPV) administration (2003–2007). This is an ideal case to test my theoretical framework, because the presidential bill generated a conflict between the president and some governors. The presidential bill (PE-424/05) titled “Regime of Consumption, Production, and Commercialization of Tobacco Products” (*Régimen de consumo, producción y comercialización de los productos de tabaco*) was going to regulate smoking and advertisement, packets, and sales of tobacco products. However, senators from tobacco-producing provinces expressed strong opposition to the bill, and successfully defended their provincial interests by keeping it “in the drawer” for a while as well as by introducing significant amendments to it.

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The original version of this chapter was revised: For detailed information please see Erratum. The erratum to this chapter is available at [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7)



After showing qualitative evidence, I also quantitatively study senatorial behavior in committees. Based on my novel dataset on committee reports in the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007, I model the multistage structure of committee decisions.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I provide general information about the legislative process in committees in the Argentine Senate in order to study senatorial behavior. The second section is dedicated to a qualitative case study of the 2005 antismoking bill. In the third section, I describe my strategy for modeling the legislative process at the committee stage. Then, I interpret the results of my statistical test in the fourth section. The fifth section summarizes the findings of this chapter, underscoring that governors with tenure stability may shelve unwanted presidential bills through their subordinates, and that Senate bosses' subordinates claim credit for introducing amendments.

## 4.1 The Legislative Process in Committees

Before showing qualitative and quantitative evidence of senatorial behavior, I summarize the multistage nature of the legislative process in committees. Committees first decide if a bill should be discussed at their meetings in order to publish committee reports on it (Stage 1a). Simultaneously, they also decide if the bill should be amended (Stage 1b). They vote on committee reports after making these decisions, and individual committee members sign one of the reports on the bill (Stage 2). A significant number of presidential bills are killed at Stage 1a without being discussed at committee meetings. Therefore, it is important to grasp the multistage nature of committee decisions in order to understand senatorial behavior.

Once a bill is submitted to the front desk (*mesa de entradas*) of the Senate by the executive branch (including the president) or the senators, the Parliamentary Secretary (*Secretaría Parlamentaria*) assigns it to committees.<sup>1</sup> This assignment should depend on the content of the bill, but

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<sup>1</sup>According to Article 39 of the constitution, popular initiatives must be initiated in the Chamber of Deputies.

the Secretary also takes into account requests from committee chairs.<sup>2</sup> As a result, some bills are sent to multiple committees for consideration. If the bill is assigned to multiple committees, it goes first to the committee that is the most relevant to the bill (*comisión cabecera*). After debates in the first committee, the bill is sent to another committee that has the second order of relevance. It is also possible for the committees to have joint meetings for discussing the bill if their chairs make an agreement. In this case, the chair of the first committee is in charge of the joint meetings.<sup>3</sup>

Every committee meets once a week on a fixed day. Since the floor sessions are held on Wednesdays, senators tend to have committee meetings, which include hearings and markups, on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, or Thursdays.<sup>4</sup> However, it is rare that a bill is immediately discussed by committee members, since meetings of advisors (*reuniones de asesores*) are usually held before committee meetings. On average, a senator employs 19.6 advisors to form a “team” (Finn and Karaguezian 2011). For example, Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) had 12 advisors who were lawyers or accountants, and they helped his committee work as a member of the Justice and Criminal Affairs Committee, the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the Human Rights Committee, the General Legislation Committee, and the Special Committee for Supporting the Works of Río Bermejo.<sup>5</sup> Senators also ask for help from specialists from other private organizations when they need technical assistance. Advisors were not necessarily hired because of clientelism, and some of them were not related to senators’ provinces or

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<sup>2</sup>Author’s interview with Senator and former Governor Juan Carlos Romero (PJ, Salta), August 19, 2009.

<sup>3</sup>Regardless of having joint meetings, the committees are required to publish joint committee reports if they approve the bill.

<sup>4</sup>Even though the Senate rules have some articles about public hearings, there is no clear distinction between hearings and markups when committees discuss bills in general. Committees sometimes invite ministers to meetings where they decide to publish committee reports at the same time. By contrast, it is required for the Agreements Committee to hold a public hearing if the president asks the Senate to confirm the appointment of judges.

<sup>5</sup>Author’s interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

parties. It is also worth noting that many junior legislators in Congress had worked as an advisor before running for elective positions.

The meetings of advisors are informal meetings in the sense that the Senate rules say nothing about them, but some committees such as the Federal Tax Revenue-Sharing Committee publish the information of the meetings of advisors on their website. An advisor for the chair of a committee and the secretary of a committee, who also responds to the chair of the committee, organize the meetings. The objective of having such meetings is that advisors consider a bill from their viewpoints as specialists, and they check if the bill should be amended. Advisors must solve problems such as contradictions between the bill and existing laws so that their senators may concentrate on making political decisions on the bill.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, even though advisors just make technical decisions, it is important for them to know how their senators think about the bill. It is also possible that advisors will have to give political advice to their senators,<sup>7</sup> and thus the meetings of advisors are important components of the legislative process.

Senators take advantage of the meetings of advisors, since time for discussing each bill is limited. On the one hand, they cannot use too much time for each committee meeting because most senators are affiliated with five or six committees under the current Senate rules. On the other hand, senators also have to engage in other political activities such as negotiations with federal bureaucrats during their stay in Buenos Aires. They live in their provinces, and most of them stay in Buenos Aires just between Tuesdays and Thursdays.

The chairs of committees are in charge of calling committee meetings. However, because of time constraints, they only select bills that are guaranteed to be supported by the majority of committee members. Since all bills must be approved by one of the chambers within two legislative years, bills that are not picked up by the chairs must “sleep”

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<sup>6</sup>Author's interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

<sup>7</sup>Author's interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

until they are killed by the time limit.<sup>8</sup> Thus, based on the information from the advisors, the bill will be shelved, or in local parlance kept “in the drawer” (*cajoneado*), if the majority of committee members judge a presidential bill as an unacceptable one. This is how presidential bills are killed in committees. According to Kikuchi (2011), 169 out of 659 presidential bills were shelved to be killed between 1983 and 2007.

What factors are important at Stage 1a when committees decide if a bill should be scheduled for their meetings? Advisor for Senator Eduardo Torres (PJ-FPV, Misiones) Pablo Salinas emphasized the importance of committee chairs. The chairs are in charge of calling committee meetings to discuss bills. In addition, when a bill is assigned to multiple committees, it is up to the chairs of those committees if they hold joint meetings to discuss the bill.<sup>9</sup> According to Senator Luis Carlos Petcoff Naidenoff (UCR, Formosa), the chair of the Rights and Guarantees Committee, treatment of bills depends on the chair of each committee. Even though he was a senator from the opposition, he published many committee reports on presidential bills assigned to the Rights and Guarantees Committee: “I do not trample (presidential bills). We (the Rights and Guarantees Committee) discussed and approved a lot of bills submitted by the executive branch and other senators... I do not manage (the committee) with the style of shelving bills (*el estilo de cajoneo*)”.<sup>10</sup>

Chief of Staff to Senator Silvia Giusti (PJ-FPV, Chubut) Andrés Zulueta considered that the preference of the majority of committee members is also important. On the one hand, Article 103 of the Senate rules states that bills must be discussed at committee meetings after three or more senators’ requests. The chairs of committees must pick up these bills for discussion even when they do not like the bills. On the other hand, the quorum of committee meetings is an absolute majority of committee members, and bills need the signatures of the majority

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<sup>8</sup>Author’s interview with Senator Luis Carlos Petcoff Naidenoff (UCR, Formosa), August 18, 2009.

<sup>9</sup>Author’s interview, November 20, 2008.

<sup>10</sup>Author’s interview, August 18, 2009. (Translation by the author.)

of members in order to be discharged.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, at Stage 1a, the chairs of committee choose the bills that are likely to be supported by the majority of committee members. Senator Petcoff Naidenoff (UCR, Formosa) also accepted this view: “If there is not enough number of senators (to support bills), the bills are not discussed”.<sup>12</sup>

Besides deciding if a bill should be scheduled for their meetings, committee members also decide if the bill should be amended (Stage 1b). Taking into account the preferences of senators, their advisors check the possibility of introducing amendments to the bill. According to Eaton (2002a, b), committees in the Senate introduced many significant amendments to bills submitted by President Menem. In the case of the 1989 economic emergency law, for example, the Budget Committee reduced the suspension of tax benefits for companies in the provinces of Catamarca, La Rioja, San Juan, and San Luis, because Senators Horacio Bravo Herrera (PJ, San Juan), Oraldo Britos (PJ, San Luis), and Alberto Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis) amended it (Eaton 2002a, b).

When the chairs of committees call a committee meeting for a bill, the bill is about to be reported to the floor. The committee meeting is the final opportunity for committee members to make their political decision on the bill.<sup>13</sup> After the final debate at the meeting, committee members sign a committee report (*dictamen de comisión*). Senators who agree with the position of the majority are required to sign a majority report (*dictamen de mayoría*), which goes to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary (*Plenario de Labor Parlamentaria*) for floor discussion. They can also sign the majority report with a partial disagreement (*disidencia parcial*). Members who strongly disagree with the majority report write a dissenting minority report (*dictamen de minoría*). It is also possible for them to sign no committee report. Senators sign one of the committee reports on bills during committee meetings. In the case of controversial bills, however, senators are usually allowed a couple of days to sign one of the reports after the meetings.

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<sup>11</sup>Author’s interview, August 14, 2009.

<sup>12</sup>Author’s interview, August 18, 2009. (Translation by the author.)

<sup>13</sup>Author’s interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (RS, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009.

Signing no committee report meant nothing under the old Senate rules, but it affects the fate of bills under the current Senate rules. According to Article 105 of the Senate rules approved on December 18, 2002, majority reports must be supported by more than half of committee members. Therefore, signing no committee report is equivalent to opposing a majority report under the Senate rules after March 1, 2003.

The description of the legislative process in committees above implies that important negotiations occur before bills are scheduled for committee meetings. After collecting information through the meetings of advisors, committee members decide if a bill should be discussed at the meetings (Stage 1a) and if the bill should be amended (Stage 1b). The bill should be ready to be discharged from committees when senators vote on committee reports, and they sign one of the reports on the bill (Stage 2). Considering this multistage nature is important for understanding how committees work in the Argentine Senate.

## 4.2 The Case of the 2005 Anti-Smoking Bill

Under what conditions can governors oppose presidential bills? What kind of techniques do senators use to protect their provincial interests? I answer these questions using the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill (*el proyecto de ley antitabaco*) in this section.<sup>14</sup> This case study shows that governors' subordinates may water down unwelcome presidential bills by shelving and amending them, and that longstanding governors can defend the interests of their provinces through their subordinates.

In December 2003, Argentina signed the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which is the first global public health treaty. The FCTC asks each country to introduce measures that reduce health and economic impacts of tobacco. However, as of January 2018, the treaty has not been ratified by the Senate due to the resistance of senators from tobacco-producing provinces (*provincias tabacaleras*),

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<sup>14</sup>In 2011, Congress approved a different anti-smoking bill introduced by Senator Adriana Bortolozzi de Bogado (PJ-FPV, Formosa). It was also called anti-smoking law (Law 26687).

such as Catamarca, Chaco, Corrientes, Jujuy, Misiones, Salta, and Tucumán. Besides the multinational tobacco industry's lobbying,<sup>15</sup> senators and deputies from those provinces are trying not to ratify the FCTC, because it will lead to the elimination of the Tobacco Special Fund.

Tobacco is one of the important agricultural products in the Northwest and the Northeast regions of Argentina. According to Sawers (1996), it is the second most cultivated crop in the provinces such as Jujuy and Salta, but its commercial value is larger than that of other crops. Moreover, the cultivation of tobacco is very labor intensive, and thus this industry generates many jobs. As a result, senators from seven tobacco-producing provinces regard protecting the tobacco industry as protecting their provincial interests.

The FCTC and the interests of tobacco-producing provinces conflict with each other, because the FCTC requires the abolition of subsidies that promote tobacco production. The tobacco industry in Argentina is supported by a Tobacco Special Fund (*Fondo Especial del Tabaco*, FET). The FET was created in 1972 in order to develop the domestic tobacco industry, which consisted of small farmers (García 2010). Its programs included a huge amount of subsidies to farmers for each kilogram of tobacco they sold, low or zero interest loans, and subsidies to their social welfare fund. Some presidents tried to reduce the budgets for the FET, since it extremely favored tobacco-producing provinces. For example, President Menem cut the FET between 1991 and 1993 especially because it contradicted his neoliberal economic policies. However, due to the pressure of governors and legislators of those provinces, the FET programs were restored in 1994 (Sawers 1996).

Given the FET and labor-intensive nature of tobacco cultivation, economies of some provinces heavily depend on the tobacco industry. Therefore, senators did not ratify the FCTC immediately in 2004, and some of them questioned its negative impact on provincial economies.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>See Mejia et al. (2008).

<sup>16</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "No hay acuerdo en el Senado para tratar proyectos antitabaco" (No agreement in the Senate for dealing with anti-smoking bills), October 3, 2005, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-4422.html>.

### 4.2.1 The 2005 Anti-Smoking Bill and the Conflict Between the President and Governors

Since the FCTC requires the government to introduce policies that reduce tobacco consumption, President Néstor Kirchner submitted an anti-smoking bill (PE-424/05) titled “Regime of Consumption, Production, and Commercialization of Tobacco Products” (*Régimen de consumo, producción y comercialización de los productos de tabaco*). It was cosponsored by the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers Alberto Fernández, the Minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna, and the Minister of Health and Environment Ginés González García, and González García had played an important role in drafting it. The original bill consisted of ten chapters and 54 articles. Chapter 1 presented the objectives of the bill, whereas Chapters 2–5 regulated advertisement, packets, and sales of tobacco products. Chapter 6 prohibited smoking in public places, and Chapters 7, 8, and 10 were about the effects and management of the new anti-smoking system.

Chapter 9 was an “economic chapter” that contained three controversial articles. Article 46 sought to charge “the price of health protection” (*precio de protección salud*) on tobacco products, and Article 47 stated that the price of health protection was equivalent to 1% of the price of the best-selling products of each category (*categoría más vendida*, CMV). Article 45 intended to create a national registry of the tobacco industry for this tax purpose. This presidential bill tried to have domestic farmers in the Northwest and the Northeast regions stop cultivating tobacco so that the national government could abolish the FET in the future.

This economic chapter was not acceptable to the governors of the seven tobacco-producing provinces including three longstanding governors from the president’s party.<sup>17</sup> For example, Governor Romero (PJ, Salta) opposed the economic part of the bill that was going to affect

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<sup>17</sup>They were Eduardo Fellner (Jujuy), Juan Carlos Romero (Salta), and Carlos Rovira (Misiones). José Alperovich (Tucumán) was also from the president’s party, but he was a freshman at that time.



tobacco farmers, even though he did not oppose the other parts: “I think there were two things (that should be considered) separately. The production (of tobacco) must be defended, whereas... smoking must be prohibited so that people have a healthy environment”.<sup>18</sup> According to Senator Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy), her elder brother Governor Eduardo Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy) was also against the economic chapter of the presidential bill, and they worked together to protect provincial interests.

*The author:* How was the position of Governor Fellner about the economic chapter?

*Senator Fellner:* He was also (against the economic chapter)... At that time, we could achieve (the elimination of the economic chapter), and we could increase the amount of the FET. It was very very tough, but finally the president understood the problem and increased it.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, governors of many provinces that do not produce tobacco products also supported this position, because they understood the importance of the tobacco industry for the regional economies of the seven provinces.<sup>20</sup> In turn, Senator Miguel Ángel Pichetto (PJ, Río Negro), the leader of the PJ bloc, did not necessarily try to pressure their copartisans to approve the presidential bill. Therefore, senators had to make a decision on the bill considering the preferences of the president and governors.

#### 4.2.2 The Drawer of Committees and a Counter Proposal

The anti-smoking bill was submitted to the Senate on August 9, 2005, and the Parliamentary Secretary assigned it to six committees: the Health and Sports Committee; the Agriculture, Livestock, and

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<sup>18</sup>Author’s interview, August 19, 2009. (Translation by the author.)

<sup>19</sup>Author’s interview, August 4, 2010. (Translation by the author.)

<sup>20</sup>Author’s interview with Deputy and former Senator Marcelo López Arias (PJ, Salta), July 8, 2009.

Fishing Committee; the Industry and Trade Committee; the Regional Economies, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Committee; the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee; and the Budget Committee.

The committee that had the most relevance among the six committees (*comisión cabecera*) was the Health and Sports Committee. However, there was no committee meeting, because it was just two months before the 2005 general elections. In October, every province and the City of Buenos Aires held an election to choose their deputies. In addition, eight provinces (including Jujuy and Misiones) held a senatorial election, whereas Corrientes chose its governor. The anti-smoking bill was too dangerous to be discussed immediately before these elections, because it could affect their results, especially in tobacco-producing provinces. These provinces had four senators in the Health and Sports Committee at that time, and one of them was the chair. Therefore, Senator Mercedes Oviedo (PJ, Misiones) did not call a meeting to discuss the bill, and the bill was temporarily shelved at Stage 1a.

The president's Front for Victory (*Frente para la Victoria*, FPV) faction won the 2005 elections, and new senators assumed their seats in December. Both the president and governors took actions to deal with the anti-smoking bill effectively. On the one hand, President Kirchner and the FPV bloc decided to choose one of the most reliable senators as the chair of the Health and Sports Committee: Senator Alicia Kirchner (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz). On the other hand, Senator Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy)<sup>21</sup> introduced a bill titled "Law of Prevention and Control of Nicotine Addiction" (*Ley de Prevención y Control del Tabaquismo*) on March 30, 2006 (S-761/06).

Fellner's bill was distributed to the five committees that were almost coincident with the committees for the presidential bill: the Health and Sports Committee; the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee; the Industry and Trade Committee; the Justice and Criminal Affairs Committee; and the Budget Committee. Introducing a similar bill is an effective strategy for

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<sup>21</sup>She was a subordinate of Governor Eduardo Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy) at that time.

senators to amend presidential bills in Argentina, because the similar bills are discussed together in committees. Senator Fellner herself admitted that this bill was a counter proposal against the presidential bill, because it was difficult to oppose the presidential bill without providing an alternative.<sup>22</sup>

She regarded her bill not as an anti-smoking bill (*ley antitabaco*) but as an anti-nicotine addiction bill (*ley antitabaquismo*). Fellner's bill had two important characteristics. First, her bill was less restrictive in terms of the regulations on smoking and advertisement, packets, and sales of tobacco products. Second, her bill eliminated all the articles of the economic chapter in the presidential bill. From her viewpoint, the presidential bill was too restrictive for poor tobacco-producing provinces such as Jujuy.<sup>23</sup>

Her strategy was successful. Facing a one-year delay in the legislative process as well as strong opposition of governors and senators from tobacco-producing provinces, the Minister of Health and Environment González García, decided to abandon the economic chapter, expecting that committees were going to approve the other chapters of the presidential bill after almost one year from the submission of the original bill.

### 4.2.3 Committee Meetings and the Majority Report with Amendments

By the beginning of July 2006, Minister González García informally told the Health and Sports Committee that he could introduce a new proposal. The economic chapter was completely eliminated in the new proposal, but the regulations on smoking and advertisement, packets, and sales of tobacco products were still restrictive, reflecting his preferences. That is, he tried to insist on Chapters 2–6 of the original bill in exchange for cutting the economic chapter. After the meetings of

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<sup>22</sup>Author's interview, August 4, 2010.

<sup>23</sup>Author's interview, August 4, 2010.

advisors, Senator Alicia Kirchner decided to call a committee meeting of the Health and Sports Committee on July 12 in order to invite him. Minister González García expressed his satisfaction after the meeting. He believed that committee members accepted the executive branch's "vocation" to introduce a law to limit advertisement of cigarettes and to protect people from smoke in public spaces.<sup>24</sup>

However, further committee amendments made González García upset. After another meeting of advisors, members of the Health and Sports Committee got together in early August. This committee meeting was exceptional in the sense that the senators present at the meeting intensively discussed a draft of the committee report on the anti-smoking bill. Even though just four out of 15 committee members were from tobacco-producing provinces,<sup>25</sup> they decided to eliminate most of the regulations on the advertisement of tobacco products. In addition, they also eliminated articles that allowed the national government to sanction violators. The Health and Sports Committee was ready to have a joint meeting with other five committees using this draft. However, the joint meeting was suspended, because González García appealed to Senator Pichetto (the leader of the PJ-FPV bloc) that he could not accept such a committee report.<sup>26</sup> In September, he also publicly criticized Senator Fellner and other senators from tobacco-producing provinces.<sup>27</sup>

Besides the change in chairmanship of the Health and Sports Committee,<sup>28</sup> the bill was shelved again due to González García's attitude. At the first joint meeting of the six committees on November 15, many

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<sup>24</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Ley de tabaco y ligadura de trompas" (Anti-smoking bill and tubal ligation), July 12, 2006, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-5389.html>.

<sup>25</sup>They were Senators Oscar Castillo (UCR-Frente Cívico y Social, Catamarca), María Teresita Colombo de Acevedo (UCR-Frente Cívico y Social, Catamarca), Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy), and María Sánchez (UCR, Corrientes).

<sup>26</sup>*La Nación*, "Se demora el proyecto antitabaco en el Senado" (The anti-smoking bill delays in the Senate), November 16, 2006.

<sup>27</sup>Mariana Carbajal, "Ellos defienden grandes negocios" (They defend big business), *Página/12*, September 19, 2006.

<sup>28</sup>Alicia Kirchner (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz) was replaced by Haide Giri (PJ-FPV, Córdoba), because she left from the Senate on August 14 to be the minister of social development.

senators accused him of blaming legislators from tobacco-producing provinces, and some of them indicated a possibility of shelving the presidential bill again.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, González García apologized to the senators, and the discussion of the bill was resumed. Advisors for the members of the Health and Sports Committee held a meeting again to prepare a draft of the committee report, and the first joint meeting was scheduled on November 15. The draft was similar to the one rejected by Minister González García in August. Senator Haide Giri (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) chaired the meeting, and many senators who represented tobacco-producing provinces manifested the importance of defending tobacco farmers. There was no active discussion of the committee report except for some observations by Senator Alicia Mastandrea (UCR, Chaco).

The second joint meeting was held on November 30, and González García was invited as a guest. Since he also submitted written observations to the draft of the committee report, senators discussed the draft article by article. One of the controversial articles was Article 6, which was eliminated from the draft of the committee report in August. However, González García insisted on keeping it. This article was intended to prohibit tobacco producers from sponsoring any cultural or sports events. Senators Marcelo López Arias (PJ-FPV, Salta), Guillermo Jenefes (PJ-FPV, Jujuy), and Alicia Mastandrea (UCR, Chaco) requested the elimination of Article 6, because many events were sponsored by the tobacco industry in tobacco-producing provinces. In addition, Senator Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy) asked to change Article 3 about the prohibition of advertisement so that tobacco products could

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<sup>29</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones Salud y Deporte, de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca, de Industria y Comercio, de Economías Regionales, Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, de Sistemas, Medios de Comunicación y Libertad de expresión y de Presupuesto y Hacienda* (Record of Committee Meetings of the Health and Sports Committee, the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the Industry and Trade Committee, the Regional Economies, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Committee, the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee, and the Budget Committee), November 15, 2006.

be promoted for medical purposes.<sup>30</sup> Article 6 was not eliminated, but Article 3 was amended reflecting Senator Fellner's appeal.

Taking into account a couple of amendments introduced at the meeting on November 30, the six committees published a joint majority report. Compared to the original presidential bill, this committee report was less restrictive in the sense that there were fewer regulations on smoking and advertisement of tobacco products. More importantly, the economic chapter was completely eliminated. Committee members signed the report between November 30 and December 7, and the bill was discharged from the six committees. Table 4.1 shows how members of the six committees signed the joint majority report. Thirty-six senators signed the majority report (including seven senators who signed it with partial disagreements), whereas 21 senators did not sign it.<sup>31</sup> Thus, more than two-thirds of senators had a chance to participate in a discussion on the presidential bill in committees.

The Health and Sports Committee was where the bill was discussed intensively among committee members, and thus 11 senators signed the majority report without partial disagreements. Still, we could observe a division in the UCR. Senator María Teresita Colombo de Acevedo (UCR-*Frente Cívico y Social*, Catamarca) was a subordinate of Senator Oscar Castillo (UCR-*Frente Cívico y Social*, Catamarca). Interestingly, however, the former signed the majority report with no disagreement, but the latter did not. As my theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2 posited, Senator Castillo prioritized position-taking on the floor over credit-claiming in committees, because he did not have time to spend on committee work. By contrast, as his subordinate, Senator Colombo de Acevedo actively participated in committee meetings and claimed credit for amending the bill. Moreover, Senator Liliana Fellner

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<sup>30</sup>*Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones Salud y Deporte, de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca, de Industria y Comercio, de Economías Regionales, Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, de Sistemas, Medios de Comunicación y Libertad de expresión y de Presupuesto y Hacienda* (Record of Committee Meetings of the Health and Sports Committee, the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the Industry and Trade Committee, the Regional Economies, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Committee, the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee, and the Budget Committee), November 30, 2006, 3–9.

<sup>31</sup>Some senators had multiple committee memberships.

**Table 4.1** Committee members and the 2005 anti-smoking bill

Party	Signed the majority report (36 senators)	Did not sign the majority report (21 senators)
PJ	<b>Caparrós</b> (Tierra del Fuego), <b>Fellner</b> (Jujuy), <b>Gallego</b> (La Pampa), <b>Giri</b> (Córdoba), <b>González de Duhalde</b> (Buenos Aires), <b>Latorre</b> (Santa Fe), <b>Maza</b> (La Rioja), <b>Mera</b> (Santiago del Estero), <b>Riofrío</b> (San Juan), Daniele (Tierra del Fuego), Pérsico (San Luis), Reutemann (Santa Fe), Ríos (Corrientes), Urquía (Córdoba), Martínez Pass de Cresto (Entre Ríos), Mayans (Formosa), Saadi (Catamarca), Vigo (Misiones), Gioja (San Juan), Menem (La Rioja), Capitanich (Chaco), Gallia (Neuquén), Miranda (Tucumán), Guinle (Chubut), Jaque (Mendoza), Closs* (Misiones), Giusti* (Chubut), López Arias* (Salta)	Fernández (Santa Cruz), Viana (Misiones), Quintela (La Rioja), Basualdo (San Juan), Castro (Santiago del Estero), Jeneffes (Jujuy), Rodríguez Saá (San Luis), Fernández de Kirchner (Buenos Aires), Perceval (Mendoza)
UCR	<b>Colombo de Acevedo</b> (Catamarca), <b>Falcó</b> (Río Negro), Taffarel* (Entre Ríos), Mastandrea* (Chaco), Petcoff Naidenoff* (Formosa)	<b>Castillo</b> (Catamarca), <b>Sánchez</b> (Corrientes), Marino (La Pampa), Massoni (Chubut), Sanz (Mendoza), Curletti (Chaco), Terragno (City of Buenos Aires), Zavalía (Santiago del Estero), Isidori (Río Negro), Morales (Jujuy)
FR	Bussi (Tucumán)	
FREPASO		Ibarra (City of Buenos Aires)
MPN	Salvatori* (Neuquén)	<b>Sapag</b> (Neuquén)

*Note* Members of the Health and Sports Committee are in bold. Senators with an asterisk signed the majority report with a partial disagreement. Name of senators' provinces are in parentheses

*Source* Author's elaboration based on data from Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Orden del Día de la Cámara de Senadores* (Committee Reports of the Senate), 1362/06, November 30, 2006

(PJ-FPV, Jujuy) signed the majority report, since she could successfully introduce amendments following the preference of her governor.

The alignments I described above were also observable in the other five committees. The majority report did not receive the signatures of

many Senate bosses, such as Senators Roberto Basualdo (PJ-*Producción y Trabajo*, San Juan), Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ-*Justicialista de San Luis*, San Luis), Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV, Buenos Aires), Juan Carlos Marino (UCR, La Pampa), Rodolfo Terragno (UCR-*Radical Independiente*, City of Buenos Aires), José Zavalía (UCR, Santiago del Estero), and Gerardo Morales (UCR, Jujuy). Some of them were clearly prepared for position-taking against the presidential bill on the floor. For example, Senator Morales did not support the amendments introduced by Senator Fellner, since Governor Fellner, her brother, and Morales were expected to compete with each other for the governorship in 2007.<sup>32</sup>

Some senators signed the majority report with a partial disagreement (*disidencia parcial*). Since the 2005 anti-smoking bill was a centralizing measure, senators also had incentives to publicize their dissatisfaction with the bill as my theoretical framework predicted. Senator López Arias (PJ-FPV, Salta) signed with a partial disagreement mainly because of his dissatisfaction with Article 6 that was going to prevent tobacco producers from sponsoring any cultural or sports events.<sup>33</sup> By contrast, Senator Petcoff Naidenoff (UCR, Formosa) claimed that signing while expressing disagreement was a decision of the UCR bloc, even though many senators did not even sign the majority report.<sup>34</sup>

After one year and four months, the six committees finally approved the presidential bill with many amendments on November 30 in 2006. However, it was too late. Even though the official deadline for the bill to be approved by the floor was February 28 of next year (i.e., the end of the legislative year 2006), the bill had to be discussed in December before the summer recess. Therefore, Senator Pichetto, the leader of the PJ-FPV bloc, asked President Kirchner to abandon the bill.<sup>35</sup> As a result, the time limit killed the bill on February 28, 2007.

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<sup>32</sup>Author's interview with Senator Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy), August 4, 2010. In practice, both of them did not run for governor in 2007.

<sup>33</sup>Author's interview with Deputy and former Senator Marcelo López Arias (PJ, Salta), July 8, 2009.

<sup>34</sup>Author's interview, August 18, 2009.

<sup>35</sup>Gustavo Ybarra, "Una norma nacional, archivada" (A national regulation, archived), *La Nación*, December 31, 2006.



The case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill suggests that longstanding governors and their subordinates are able to defend their provincial interests. The committee stage allows them to use two strategies. On the one hand, committee members may keep unwanted bills “in the drawer” (*cajoneado*). This strategy affects the fate of presidential bills, since all bills must be approved by one of the two chambers within two legislative years. This time limit has killed many presidential bills including the 2005 anti-smoking bill. On the other hand, committee members may introduce amendments to unwanted bills in order to protect their provincial interests. In the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill, Senator Fellner succeeded in eliminating the economic chapter that was going to affect the tobacco industry in the seven tobacco-producing provinces. Since senators choose these two strategies before voting on any report, it is important to take into account multistage nature of committee decisions when we study legislative behavior.

### 4.3 Modeling Committee Behavior

Under what conditions do committee members shelve presidential bills? When do they introduce amendments to the bills? How do they publish and sign committee reports after discussing the bills? The remainder of this chapter answers these questions from a quantitative perspective using a novel dataset on committee decisions in the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007 (Kikuchi 2011).

One of the originalities of this statistical analysis is that I model the multistage nature of committee decisions. Once committees receive a bill from the Parliamentary Secretary (*Secretaría Parlamentaria*), they decide if the bill should be discussed (Stage 1a). They simultaneously make a decision about amendments to the bill (Stage 1b). Committee reports on the bill are prepared and voted on after these decisions, and individual committee members sign one of them (Stage 2). The bill cannot proceed to Stage 2 if committees decide to shelve it at Stage 1a,

and it will be killed by the time limit.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, keeping bills “in the drawer” is an effective strategy for committee members to oppose presidential bills, and a serious selection bias problem emerges if we do not take into account these bills.

In order to solve this problem, I ran two models using data on bills shelved in committees as well as information on committee reports. My first model is a multinomial probit model that identifies the conditions under which committee members opt for shelving or amending presidential bills over approving the bills without amendments. Including these factors in the selection equation, my second model predicts how senators sign majority reports on presidential bills as a Heckman probit model. This procedure allows us to consider the two-stage structure of committee decisions in an appropriate manner.

### 4.3.1 Who Keeps Presidential Bills in the Drawer? When Do Senators Amend Them?

In Latin American legislatures, many bills die in committee when they are not scheduled for discussion (Calvo 2007, 2014; Calvo and Sagarzazu 2011). Moreover, as I described, committee members also decide if bills should be amended through the meetings of advisors. Therefore, it is very important to identify the conditions under which senators shelve or amend presidential bills before analyzing committee reports on the bills.

My theoretical framework predicts that senators’ institutional positions as well as, the power of their competing principals shape their committee behavior. Because of intergovernmental relationship and tenure stability of governors, longstanding governors’ subordinates are more likely to shelve presidential bills than other senators (H1). By contrast, Senate bosses do not have so much time for credit-claiming, which is less visible to voters, and thus they are not active in committees. However, their subordinates are more likely to amend the bills

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<sup>36</sup>Bills must be approved by one of the two chambers within two legislative years.

than other senators so that credit-claiming activities are visible to voters (H3a). In addition, senators, in general, tend to shelve and amend centralizing measures in committees, since their political careers are based at the provincial level (H4a and H4b).

I also claim that there are five additional factors that influence committee members' decisions at Stages 1a and 1b. First, bills initiated in the Chamber of Deputies are less likely to be shelved or amended. According to Alemán and Calvo (2008), the Argentine Senate passed more presidential bills than the Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2001, because lower chambers are inclined to be more fragmented than upper chambers. Moreover, Article 81 of the constitution discourages senators from amending the bills that have already been approved by the lower chamber, since the originating house may override amendments introduced by the reviewing house just with an absolute majority.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the bills that have already been approved by the Chamber of Deputies should not be blocked or amended in the Senate.

Second, the success of presidential bills also depends on the majority status of the president's party. In Argentina, committee seats are distributed to each legislative party bloc according to its share. As I described earlier in this chapter, bills are not scheduled for committee discussion if they are unlikely to satisfy a majority of committee members. Referring to the case of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) as well as Calvo (2014) argue that the largest party in a legislature may control committee and floor outcomes only when it hold a majority of seats, and find that the lack of majority status gives an institutional advantage to the median committee voter who is from a minority party. Saiegh (2011) also finds that chief executives' legislative success rate increases as the government's party holds more seats.<sup>38</sup> Given that most of the unsuccessful presidential bills in Argentina

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<sup>37</sup>If the reviewing house introduces the amendments with a two-thirds majority, the originating house also needs a two-thirds majority to override them.

<sup>38</sup>By contrast, Calvo (2007) and Alemán and Calvo (2008) found that the majority status of the president's party had no impact on the success of presidential bills in Argentina between 1983 and 2001.

are screened out at Stage 1a, the bills are less likely to be shelved in committees when the president's party has the majority status.

Third, the party affiliations of committee chairs should be important. As Pablo Salinas, advisor for Senator Eduardo Torres (PJ-FPV, Misiones), claimed, the chairs are key players of the legislative process in committees.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) find that committee chairs from minority parties enjoy more gate-keeping power when no party holds a majority of seats. Therefore, presidential bills are less likely to be shelved or amended when they are discussed at committees where their chairs are affiliated with the president's party.

Fourth, we should also consider the number of committees to which presidential bills are assigned. When the bills are sent to multiple committees, committees are required to publish joint committee reports regardless of holding joint meetings. Since more senators are involved in committee decisions, the bills referred to multiple committees are more likely to be shelved or amended. At one of the committee meetings for the 2005 anti-smoking bill, Senator Haide Giri's (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) referred to the "conventional wisdom" among senators that such bills are difficult to be discharged from committees.<sup>40</sup>

Fifth, fewer presidential bills are expected to be scheduled for committee meetings in election years. Since senators must support campaigns of presidential, gubernatorial, and legislative candidates even when they do not run for elections, they hold fewer committee meetings as well as floor sessions. As a result, more presidential bills are expected to be shelved and to be killed by the two-year time limit.

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<sup>39</sup>Author's interview, November 20, 2008.

<sup>40</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones Salud y Deporte, de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca, de Industria y Comercio, de Economías Regionales, Micro, Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, de Sistemas, Medios de Comunicación y Libertad de expresión y de Presupuesto y Hacienda* (Record of Committee Meetings of the Health and Sports Committee, the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the Industry and Trade Committee, the Regional Economies, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Committee, the Systems, Mass Communication, and Freedom of Expression Committee, and the Budget Committee), December 7, 2006.

### 4.3.1.1 Modeling the Decisions at Stages 1a and 1b

I ran a multinomial probit model for Stages 1a and 1b in order to test the expectations described above. Since it is difficult to observe individual behavior at these stages, the units of analysis are set at the bill level: all presidential bills assigned to committees by the Parliamentary Secretary between 1983 and 2007.

The dependent variable is *committee discussion*. It is a trichotomous variable coded as 2 if a presidential bill  $j$  is scheduled for committee discussion without amendments, 1 if the bill is scheduled for committee meetings with amendments, and 0 if a committee decides to keep the bill “in the drawer” to kill it. As Calvo (2007), I collected data on presidential bills (*proyectos de ley*) except on bills that (a) authorized the president to travel abroad, (b) confirmed presidential appointees, and (c) ratified international treaties on good-neighborliness. This model thus considers 658 bills between 1983 and 2007 including 330 bills (50.2%) that were discussed at committee meetings without introducing amendments, 148 bills (22.5%) that were scheduled for committee discussion with amendments, and 180 bills (27.4%) that were shelved and killed by the time limit.<sup>41</sup> Kikuchi (2011), as well as Calvo and Sagarzazu’s (2011) dataset and the website of the Chamber of Deputies, were used for collecting this information.<sup>42</sup>

The first three independent variables (the *share of longstanding governors’ subordinates*, *share of Senate bosses*, and *share of Senate bosses’ subordinates* variables) serve for identifying who plays a crucial role in keeping presidential bills in the drawer and in amending bills. Since the units of analysis of this model are not individual senators but presidential bills, the information on individual senators should be aggregated into the bill level. In order to generate the three independent variables, first, I used the information on each senator’s category identified in Chapter 3. Then, based on the committee reports (*Orden del*

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<sup>41</sup>There was a bill excluded from this analysis due to the lack of a printed majority report on it.

<sup>42</sup>I would like to thank Ernesto Calvo for generously sharing his datasets on presidential approval rates and bills submitted to the Argentine Congress.

*Día*), listing of committees (*Listado de Comisiones*), Baron and Guerra (2000) and Baron (2002, 2004, 2006), I calculated *share of longstanding governors' subordinates*, *share of Senate bosses*, and *share of Senate bosses' subordinates* in each committee where a presidential bill was discussed or kept in the drawer. *Share of longstanding governors' subordinates* ranged from 0 (various committees) to 54.5% (the Criminal Affairs and Prison Regimes Committee between 1996 and 1997), whereas *share of Senate boss* ranged from 0 (the General Legislation Committee in 1994, the Criminal Affairs and Prison Regimes Committee in 1995, and the Regional Economies, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Committee in 2004) to 71.4% (the Work and Social Welfare Committee between 1989 and 1992). *Share of Senate bosses' subordinates* ranged from 0 (various committees) to 26.7% (the Regional Economies, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Committee in 2004, the Population and Human Development Committee in 2006, the Health and Sports Committee between 2004 and 2006, and the Work and Social Welfare Committee between 2006 and 2007).

My theoretical framework also predicted that senators are more likely to shelve or amend bills that change the status quo of federal arrangements. The *centralizing measure* variable tests this idea. Following Cheibub et al. (2009), I coded this variable as 1 if a presidential bill changes the tax system in general,<sup>43</sup> increases the share of the national government's revenue and decreases the share of subnational governments' revenue, directly affects the interests of some subnational units, or limits the autonomy of governors and mayors.<sup>44</sup> I used Calvo and Sagarzazu's (2011) dataset and the database on the website of the Chamber of Deputies for coding it, and found that the Senate committees received 189 centralizing measures (28.7%) between 1983 and 2007.

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<sup>43</sup>According to Cheibub et al. (2009), these bills should be subnational-depriving legislation.

<sup>44</sup>For example, annual budget bills (including ones introduced by the chief of the cabinet), a bill that tried to relocate the capital to the province of Río Negro (PE-264/86), a bill that established a federal system of fishing regulation (PE-11/91), a bill that amended the value-added tax law (CD-27/04), and a bill that required provincial governments to participate in a new federal system of fiscal responsibility (PE-211/04) should be considered centralizing measures.

I also generated additional five independent variables using Kikuchi (2011), committee reports (*Orden del Día*), listing of committees (*Listado de Comisiones*), Baron and Guerra (2000) and Baron (2002, 2004, 2006). I considered *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* 1 if a presidential bill in question is originally submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, and 303 bills (46.0%) fell into this category. *Majority status of the president's party* is coded as 1 if the president's party holds a majority of seats in the Senate, and 444 bills (67.5%) submitted by Presidents Menem (after December 1989), Duhalde, and Kirchner enjoyed such an advantage. *Committee chair from the president's party* is another dichotomous variable coded as 1 if a bill is assigned to a committee whose chair is a senator from the president's party. I found that 560 bills (6149 cases) were assigned to such committees. The *number of committees* measures the number of committees to which a presidential bill is assigned. This variable ranged from 1 to 6.<sup>45</sup> *Election year* is regarded as 1 if there is a presidential, gubernatorial, or national legislative election when a presidential bill is assigned to a committee. The Parliamentary Secretary sent 329 presidential bills (50.0%) to committees in election years (i.e., in legislative years 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, or 2007).

Equation (4.1) for Stages 1a and 1b looks as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{committee discussion}_j = & b_0 + b_1 (\text{share of longstanding governors' subordinates}_j) \\
 & + b_2 (\text{share of Senates bosses}_j) \\
 & + b_3 (\text{share of Senate bosses' subordinates}_j) \\
 & + b_4 (\text{centralizing measure}_j) \\
 & + b_5 (\text{bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies}_j) \\
 & + b_6 (\text{majority status of the president's party}_j) \\
 & + b_7 (\text{committee chair from the president's party}_j) \\
 & + b_8 (\text{number of committees}_j) + b_9 (\text{election year}_j) \quad (4.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

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<sup>45</sup>There were three presidential bills that were referred to six committees: A bill that tried to enact a national law of ports (PE-268/90), a bill that tried to privatize airports (PE-939/95), and the anti-smoking bill discussed in the last section (PE-424/05). Interestingly, none of them was approved by Congress.

### 4.3.1.2 Statistical Results

I estimated Eq. (4.1) using a multinomial probit model with robust standard errors, because the dependent variable committee discussion is categorical rather than ordinal. I report the results for this equation in Table 4.2.

Since senators may kill presidential bills at Stage 1a by not scheduling them for committee meetings, it is very important for this study to identify who keeps presidential bills “in the drawer”. The positive and significant coefficient for the *share of longstanding governors’ subordinates* indicates that longstanding governors and their subordinates are in charge of such legislative behavior. Supporting H1, Model 4.1 shows that a committee is less likely to report a bill if the bill is sent

**Table 4.2** Determinants of a presidential bill being scheduled for committee meetings

Independent variables	Model 4.1	
	Shelved over discussed without amendments	Discussed with amendments over discussed without amendments
Share of longstanding governors’ subordinates	1.839 (.824)**	.688 (.848)
Share of Senate bosses	−1.178 (.591)**	−1.610 (.647)**
Share of Senate bosses’ subordinates	.734 (1.745)	3.682 (1.842)**
Centralizing measure	.483 (.186)**	.753 (.190)****
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	−1.530 (.180)****	−1.452 (.187)****
Majority status of the president’s party	−.479 (.240)**	−.853 (.245)****
Committee chair from the president’s party	.160 (.191)	.135 (.196)
Number of committees	.123 (.086)	.384 (.089)****
Election year	−.110 (.161)	−.014 (.168)
Constant	.284 (.359)	−.016 (.391)
Wald chi2(18)		148.78
Prob>chi2		0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood		−600.0382
N		658

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*\* $p < .001$

Source Author’s elaboration



to committees in which longstanding governors' subordinates have a greater share of seats. As my theory anticipated, governors need tenure stability so that their subordinates shelve unwelcome presidential bills for them. In this sense, longstanding governors such as Governor Rubén Marín (PJ, 1983–1987 and 1991–2003), who governed the province of La Pampa for four terms in total, had more influence on Stage 1a than other governors such as Governor Arturo Lafalla (PJ, 1995–1999) of the province of Mendoza, whose reelection was prohibited by the provincial constitution. However, the same variable's coefficient for Stage 1b is positive but not significant. As I claimed in Chapter 2, longstanding governors' subordinates are not necessarily interested in publicizing their credit-claiming activities, since they are not fully accountable to voters.

I also argued that Senate bosses prioritize position-taking on the floor over committee work, because their priority is electoral games in their provinces. Since they also have to spend their time at Buenos Aires for political activities outside of Congress in order to maximize the performance of their factions at the national or provincial level, they do not have time for committee work. Model 4.1 supports this claim. The two coefficients for the *share of Senate bosses* are negative and significant suggesting that Senate bosses are less likely to choose shelving or amending presidential bills over just passing them. These findings reveal that Senate bosses tend to approve more presidential bills in committees so that they have more opportunities to take positions on them on the floor.

By contrast, the most important activity for Senate bosses' subordinates is introducing amendments to presidential bills. According to the statistical test, their share in a committee does not influence the committee's choice between shelving a bill and discussing it without amendments. However, as H3a predicted, their greater share in a committee leads to more amendments to the bill. Since Senate bosses are interested in attracting voters, they encourage their subordinates to introduce amendments to the bills rather than to shelve the bills so that credit-claiming activities are visible to the public. The case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill supports this argument. Senator Castillo (UCR-*Frente Cívico y Social*, Catamarca) prioritized position-taking on the floor over credit-claiming in committees as a Senate boss, but his subordinate Senator María Teresita Colombo de Acevedo (UCR-*Frente Cívico y Social*, Catamarca) claimed credit for amending the bill.

Even though the institutional position of each senator shapes committees' decisions at Stages 1a and 1b, controversial bills facilitate any credit-claiming and position-taking activities. The two coefficients for the *centralizing measure* variable are positive and significant, as H4a and H4b anticipated, and thus committees are more likely to shelve and amend presidential bills if they are centralizing measures. Since political careers of senators in Argentina depend on provincial politics, it is natural that senators in general claim credit for amending bills as well as in shelving them.

Among the other five independent variables included in Eq. (4.1), the *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* and *majority status of the president's party* variables generate negative and significant coefficients. As I expected, presidential bills that are originally introduced to the lower chamber are less likely to be shelved or amended. According to Kikuchi (2011), the Senate committees just shelved 45 out of 303 (14.9%) presidential bills (14.9%) that were originally introduced to the Chamber of Deputies as well as 135 out of 355 presidential initiatives (38.0%) that were initiated in the Senate. Moreover, the statistical test also shows that presidential bills are more likely to pass committees without amendments when the president's party holds a majority of seats. The majority status facilitates the departure of presidential bills at Stage 1a and discourages committees from amending the bills at Stage 1b.

The number of committees involved in the discussion also influences the likelihood of committee amendments. Model 4.1 uncovers that presidential bills are more likely to be amended as the number of committees in discussion increases. However, this factor does not necessarily diminish the success of presidential bills at Stage 1a, which contradicts the saying mentioned by Senator Haide Giri (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) at a committee meeting for the 2005 anti-smoking bill. The other two variables (*committee chair from the president's party* and *election year*) do not produce significant coefficients.

Since Model 4.1 is a nonlinear model, Table 4.3 reports predicted probabilities for significant variables so that we can evaluate the degree of the impact of each variable. Imagine the case in which the nine-member Internal Security Committee, which consists of one longstanding governor's subordinate (i.e., the *share of longstanding governors' subordinates* variable set at .111), three Senate bosses (i.e., the *share of Senate bosses* set at .333), and no Senate boss's subordinate (i.e., the *share of Senate bosses'*

*subordinates* set at 0), with a chair from the president's party receives a general bill (i.e., not a centralizing measure) introduced to the Senate in a nonelection year under the majority control of the president's party. In this case, the bill's probabilities of being shelved, discussed with amendments, and discussed without amendments are respectively .398, .153, and .448. If the share of longstanding governor's subordinate is 33.3% (three committee members in the case of a committee with nine members), the probability of being shelved goes up to .507, whereas that of being discussed without amendments decreases to .351. If the share is 0, the former probability drops to .346, and the latter increases to .498.

Contrary to longstanding governors' subordinates, Senate bosses' subordinates prefer public credit-claiming to internal credit-claiming. When their share is 22.2% (two committee members in the case of a committee with nine members), the presidential bill's probability of being discussed with amendments significantly increases to .327, and that of being discussed without amendments falls to .323.

Table 4.3 shows that Senate bosses do not focus on committee work. If they hold two-thirds of committee seats, the bill's probability of being shelved and being discussed with amendments decreases to .324 and .096, and that of being discussed without amendments increases to .580. By contrast, if there is no Senate boss in a committee, the first two probabilities go up to .458 and .222, while the probability of being discussed without amendments drops to .320.

As my theory posited, centralizing measures facilitate any credit-claiming activities. When a committee receives such a bill, its probabilities of shelving it and discussing it with amendments increase to .455 and .262, respectively. However, these probabilities significantly decrease to .115 and .041 if a general bill is initiated in the Chamber of Deputies. They increase to .439 and .289 when the president's party does not hold a majority of seats. These likelihoods suggest that Senate committees infrequently shelve or amend bills as committees in the reviewing house due to less fragmentation of the upper chamber as well as to Article 81 of the constitution that gives an originating chamber a dominant power over the legislative process, and that the majority status has more impact on Stage 1b than on Stage 1a. Bills sent from the Chamber of Deputies are also more likely to receive committee reports.

Table 4.3 Predicted probabilities of a presidential bill being scheduled for committee meetings

	Shelved	Discussed with amendments	Discussed without amendments
Baseline case	.398 (.291–.505)	.153 (.081–.225)	.448 (.341–.556)
Higher share of longstanding governors' subordinates: 33.3% (3 among 9 committee members)	.507 (.389–.626)	.142 (.065–.219)	.351 (.240–.461)
Lower share of longstanding governors' subordinates: 0% (0 among 9 committee members)	.346 (.221–.471)	.156 (.072–.241)	.498 (.365–.630)
Higher share of Senate bosses: 66.7% (6 among 9 committee members)	.324 (.199–.450)	.096 (.032–.159)	.580 (.450–.710)
Lower share of Senate bosses: 0% (0 among 9 committee members)	.458 (.288–.627)	.222 (.080–.364)	.320 (.171–.469)
Higher share of Senate bosses' subordinates: 22.2% (2 among 9 committee members)	.350 (.186–.514)	.327 (.165–.488)	.323 (.162–.485)
Centralizing measure	.455 (.322–.589)	.262 (.145–.379)	.282 (.175–.390)
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	.115 (.051–.179)	.041 (.011–.070)	.844 (.770–.919)
President's party without majority status	.439 (.315–.563)	.289 (.173–.405)	.272 (.167–.378)
More committees: 3 committees	.382 (.272–.492)	.301 (.194–.407)	.317 (.212–.423)

Note 95% confidence interval in parentheses. Baseline assumes the case in which the Internal Security Committee, which consists of one longstanding governor's subordinate (i.e., the *share of longstanding governors' subordinates* variable set at .111), three Senate bosses (i.e., the *share of Senate bosses* set at .333), and no Senate boss's subordinate (i.e., the *share of Senate bosses' subordinates* set at 0), with a chair from the president's party receives a general bill (i.e., not a centralizing measure) introduced to the Senate in a nonelection year under the majority control of the president's party  
Source Author's elaboration

If a general bill is sent to three committees, the bill's probability of being discussed with amendments goes up to .301, while the probability of being discussed without amendments decreases to .317.

In sum, the statistical results for Stages 1a and 1b support my hypotheses. On the one hand, as H1 predicted, governors with tenure stability enable their subordinates to keep presidential bills in the drawer. On the other hand, Senate bosses' subordinates claim credit for amending the bills as H3a anticipated. Model 4.1 also confirms H4a and H4b, and shows that senators are more likely to shelve and amend centralizing measures. Moreover, the statistical test also reveals that Senate bosses are less likely to shelve and amend presidential bills, which is consistent with the expectation of H2 about their behavior on the floor.

### **4.3.2 When Do Senators Sign Majority Reports?**

Once a presidential bill is scheduled for meetings, it is easy for the bill to pass committees. However, committee members sometimes do not sign its majority report to express their dissatisfaction. When do senators sign majority reports? When do they oppose presidential bills at this stage? I expect that senators have an incentive to engage in position-taking when they face majority reports on centralizing measures (H4c). Since provincial politics is crucial for their political careers, any type of senator may sometimes take positions on such bills in committees as the case of Resolution 125 in the next chapter illustrates. By contrast, according to my theoretical framework, governors' subordinates, as well as Senate bosses' subordinates, are not expected to be so active at Stage 2, since their general priority in committees is credit-claiming rather than position-taking. Senate bosses are also not active, because they prefer position-taking on the floor.

#### **4.3.2.1 Modeling the Two-Stage Structure of the Legislative Process in Committees**

A significant portion of presidential bills are not scheduled for committee discussion and killed by the time limit. If bills do not pass Stage 1a, individual committee members do not have opportunities to sign

committee reports on the bills. Therefore, I took advantage of the Heckman probit technique, which was developed by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). Since the ultimate dependent variable of my committee voting model is a dichotomous variable that captures if a senator signs a majority report without partial disagreements, the Heckman probit is an appropriate method for this study. Contrary to Model 4.1, the units of analysis of this model are set at the individual level: committee members for all the presidential bills on which committee reports were published between 1983 and 2007.

The number of cases in this model is different from the  $N$  of Model 4.1 for the following two reasons. First, the two models use different units of analysis (senator-bills vs. bills). Second, I excluded the cases in which (a) a senator signed no committee report on a bill under the old Senate rules,<sup>46</sup> (b) committees received the same bill for the second time, or (c) a senator's province did not have an elective governor.<sup>47</sup> As a consequence, the  $N$  came to 8458 (659 bills).

Let *committee report* be the dependent variable of the selection equation. It is a dummy variable that captures whether an individual senator  $i$  has an opportunity to sign a committee report on a presidential bill  $j$ . Using Kikuchi (2011), Calvo and Sagarzazu's (2011) dataset, and the website of the Chamber of Deputies, I coded 5845 cases (69.1%) 1.

The first five independent variables and interactions in the selection equation are somewhat different from those of Eq. (4.1) to reflect the change in the units of analysis. Based on Kikuchi and Lodola (2008), I differentiated Senate bosses from subordinates in Chapter 3. Moreover, I also identified three categories of subordinates (i.e., governors' subordinates, Senate bosses' subordinates, and local subordinates). Rather than measuring the aggregate proportion of governors' subordinates at the

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<sup>46</sup>Signing no committee report is equivalent to casting a "Nay" vote under the current Senate rules, since they require majority reports to be published by an absolute majority of all committee members (i.e., not by a majority of committee members present at committee meetings).

<sup>47</sup>Provinces without elective governors include the City of Buenos Aires before 1996, and the provinces under the federal intervention (*intervención federal*) (Catamarca in 1991, Corrientes between 1992 and 1993 and between 1999 and 2001, Santiago del Estero between 1993 and 1995 and between 2004 and 2005, and Tucumán in 1991).

committee level, as in Eq. (4.1), the *governor's subordinate*, *Senate boss*, and *Senate boss's subordinate* variables capture those categories at the individual level.<sup>48</sup> I included 121 governors' subordinates (3046 cases), 90 Senate bosses (3334 cases), and 19 Senate bosses' subordinates (394 cases). Among these variables, *governor's subordinate* is interacted with *longstanding governor*, since my theory posits that governors' tenure stability is crucial for their subordinate to oppose presidential bills. Using Tow (2011), I considered *longstanding governor* 1 if an incumbent governor of a senator's province is in office for more than one gubernatorial term. There were 31 longstanding governors (2842 cases) between 1983 and 2007.

By contrast, the other independent variables in the selection equation are the same variables in Eq. (4.1). The number of cases that were coded as 1 were 2949 (189 bills) for *centralizing measure*, 3656 (303 bills) for *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies*, 6427 (445 bills) for *majority status of the president's party*, 6149 (560 bills) for *committee chair from the president's party*, and 4135 (329 bills) for *election year*, respectively. *Number of committees* ranged from 1 to 6 as in the case of Model 4.1.

Thus, the selection equation is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{committee report}_j = & b_0 + b_1(\text{governor's subordinates}_i) \\
 & + b_2(\text{longstanding governor}_i) \\
 & + b_3(\text{governor's subordinates}_i \times \text{longstanding governor}_i) \\
 & + b_4(\text{Senate boss}_i) + b_5(\text{Senate boss's subordinate}_i) \\
 & + b_6(\text{centralizing measure}_j) \\
 & + b_7(\text{bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies}_j) \\
 & + b_8(\text{majority status of the president's party}_j) \\
 & + b_9(\text{committee chair from the president's party}_j) \\
 & + b_{10}(\text{number of committees}_j) + b_{11}(\text{election year}_j) \quad (4.2)
 \end{aligned}$$

The Heckman technique requires researchers to include at least one exclusion restriction that has an impact not on the dependent variable of the outcome equation but on that of the selection equation. In

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<sup>48</sup>Thus, the baseline category is local subordinate.

Eq. (4.2), the *majority status of the president's party*, *committee chair from the president's party*, and *number of committees* variables serve for this purpose. I expect that these factors influence a presidential bill's likelihood to be scheduled for committee meetings, but not each committee member's position-taking strategy.

In contrast to the selection equation, the outcome equation predicts under what conditions senators express their support for presidential bills at Stage 2. The dependent variable of the outcome equation is *committee support*. Using Kikuchi (2011), I coded it 1 if a senator signs a majority report that discharges a presidential bill from his or her committee without partial disagreements. If a committee member (a) signs a minority report, (b) signs a majority report that blocks a presidential bill,<sup>49</sup> (c) signs no committee report under the new Senate rules after 2003, or (d) signs a majority report with a partial disagreement, it is considered 0. Since the new Senate rules state that a majority report must be signed by an absolute majority of all committee members, signing no report is casting a negative vote against a bill. I also regarded signing a majority report with a partial disagreement as a dissident vote, since it is a position-taking activity. Data on the dependent variable of the outcome equation were treated as missing if a committee decided not to discuss a bill in question. As a consequence, I regarded 4410 cases out of 5845 (75.5%) as 1.

Since decisions at Stages 1a, 1b, and 2 are made by the same committee members, the outcome equation also includes *governor's subordinate*, *longstanding governor* (and their interaction term), *Senate boss*, *Senate boss's subordinate*, and *centralizing measure*. Among these variables, the *centralizing measure* variable is very important for testing H4c, because this hypothesis claims that senators are encouraged to engage in position-taking when they face such presidential bills.

Eleven additional variables are included in the outcome equation as controls. The *Committee amendments* variable is a dichotomous variable

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<sup>49</sup>Five presidential bills were rejected by majority reports between 1984 and 1986. Moreover, Kikuchi (2011) contains 15 majority reports that shelved presidential bills, returned them to the executive branch, or returned them to the Chamber of Deputies.



coded as 1 if a senator faces a majority report with amendments. *Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* and *election year* are included in the outcome equation as well as in Eq. (4.2). According to Kikuchi (2011), 148 bills (2097 cases) out of 659 were amended by committees, 303 bills (3656 cases) were initiated in the Chamber of Deputies, and 329 bills (4135 cases) were introduced in an election year.

Some of the control variables are measured at the senator level rather than at the bill level. *President's party* is coded 1 if a senator is affiliated with the president's party. Because of the dominance of the PJ in the Argentine Senate for many years, 181 out of 255 senators (4881 cases) in this analysis were affiliated with that party.<sup>50</sup> *UCR-PJ dimension* measures the ideal point of a senator on the partisan dimension, which was calculated in Chapter 3. It ranged from  $-2.63$  (Senator Carlos Prades (UCR, Santa Cruz) between 2003 and 2005) to  $2.16$  (Senator Edgardo Murguía (PJ, Santa Cruz) between 1986 and 1989). I coded the *small national parties* variable 1 if a senator is a member of the FREPASO, the PS, or *Recrear*, and *provincial parties* 1 if a senator is not affiliated with national parties (i.e., the PJ, the UCR, the FREPASO, the PS, and *Recrear*). Because committee seats are distributed to each party according to its share, this statistical analysis just includes eight senators (168 cases) from one of the small national parties and 29 senators (729 cases) from one of the provincial parties. *Share of provincial tax revenues* measures the independence of the provincial government from federal transfer programs. It is calculated as the proportion of provincial tax revenues over the total current revenues for a senator's province, which ranged from  $2.62$  (Catamarca in 1984) to  $86.16$  (City of Buenos Aires in 1998). This variable is generated using the information from Lodola (2010) and the website of the Ministry of Interior.<sup>51</sup> *Tenure* captures the number of years for which a senator has served. The maximum of *tenure* was 21 for Eduardo Menem (PJ-*Lealtad y dignidad Peronista*, La Rioja) in 2005, while freshman senators received 0.

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<sup>50</sup>There were 267 senators between 1983 and 2007, but some of them did not have a chance to discuss presidential bills in committees.

<sup>51</sup>I would appreciate Germán Lodola for providing me with this information.

I used Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) to generate *presidential approval*, which measures the percentage of respondents with a positive image of the president in national surveys. This variable ranged from 8 (President De la Rúa in 2001) to 84% (President Menem between 1989 and 1991). I also include the *old Senate rules* variable, which is coded as 1 if a senator faces a majority report on a bill initiated under the old rules before 2003. I found that 545 bills (5801 cases) in this analysis reached committees under the old Senate rules.

The outcome equation contains variables described above and looks as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{committee support}_{ij} = & b_0 + b_1(\text{governor's subordinate}_i) + b_2(\text{longstanding governor}_i) \\
 & + b_3(\text{governor's subordinate}_i \times \text{longstanding governor}_i) \\
 & + b_4(\text{Senate boss}_i) + b_5(\text{Senate boss's subordinate}_i) \\
 & + b_6(\text{centralizing measure}_j) + b_7(\text{committee amendments}_j) \\
 & + b_8(\text{bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies}_j) + b_9(\text{election year}_j) \\
 & + b_{10}(\text{president's party}_i) + b_{11}(\text{UCR-PJ dimension}_i) \\
 & + b_{12}(\text{small national parties}_i) + b_{13}(\text{provincial parties}_i) \\
 & + b_{14}(\text{share of provincial tax revenues}_i) + b_{15}(\text{tenure}_i) \\
 & + b_{16}(\text{presidential approval}_j) + b_{17}(\text{old Senate rules}_j) \quad (4.3)
 \end{aligned}$$

As the selection equation, Eq. (4.2) considers if a senator has an opportunity to face a majority report on a presidential bill  $j$ , whereas Eq. (4.3) predicts if a senator  $i$  signs a majority report to discharge a presidential bill  $j$  from committees without partial disagreements. I estimate these equations simultaneously using the Heckman probit. Because observations in the selection equations are not independent within bills, standard errors were clustered on presidential bills for inference.

#### 4.3.2.2 Statistical Results

Table 4.4 reports statistical results from the Heckman probit model. Reflecting the legislative process in the Argentine Senate, the selection equation predicts whether senators have a chance to publish committee

**Table 4.4** Determinants of support for presidential bills in committees

Independent variables	Model 4.2
<i>Stages 1a and 1b: Scheduling bills for committee discussion</i>	
Governor's subordinate	.198 (.061)***
Longstanding governor	-.009 (.066)
Governor's subordinate × Longstanding governor	-.169 (.071)**
Senate boss	.048 (.042)
Senate boss's subordinate	.145 (.079)*
Centralizing measure	-.114 (.140)
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	.826 (.134)****
Majority status of the president's party	.337 (.138)**
Committee chair from the president's party	-.096 (.087)
Number of committees	.095 (.053)*
Election year	.081 (.126)
Constant	-.275 (.180)
<i>Stage 2: Committee voting</i>	
Governor's subordinate	.004 (.065)
Longstanding governor	-.167 (.053)***
Governor's subordinate × Longstanding governor	.167 (.079)**
Senate boss	.009 (.041)
Senate boss's subordinate	.068 (.079)
Centralizing measure	-.258 (.083)***
Committee amendments	.073 (.072)
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	.453 (.104)****
Election year	.042 (.085)
President's party	.416 (.089)****
UCR-PJ dimension	.135 (.032)****
Small national parties	.213 (.125)*
Provincial parties	.132 (.064)**
Share of provincial tax revenues	-.001 (.001)
Tenure	.005 (.007)
Presidential approval	.002 (.002)
Old Senate rules	.998 (.168)****
Constant	-.759 (.150)****
Wald chi2(17)	173.56
Prob>chi2	0.0000
Rho	.755 (.136)***
Log pseudolikelihood	-7357.662
<i>N</i> (total)	8458
<i>N</i> (censored observations)	2613
<i>N</i> (uncensored observations)	5845

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*\* $p < .001$

Source Author's elaboration

reports on presidential bills. Then, the outcome equation estimates if a committee member signs a majority report without partial disagreements that discharge a bill from his or her committee (Stage 2). Positive and significant rho value of Model 4.2 suggests that running the outcome equations without the selection equations causes selection bias problems. Since 180 presidential bills among 659 bills in my dataset were shelved to be killed at Stage 1a and did not receive committee reports, these unreported bills should be taken into account for understanding senatorial behavior in committees. Therefore, it is essential for committee voting models to take advantage of the Heckman procedure.

Statistical results for Stages 1a and 1b are different from those of Model 4.1 due to the difference in the dependent variables of the two models. Model 4.1 uses the trichotomous variable *committee discussion*, while the dependent variable of Model 4.2 is the dichotomous variable *committee report*. Since presidential bills do not receive committee reports only when *committee discussion* is 0, it is possible that the significance of a variable is washed out if the variable explains both shelving and amending bills in Model 4.1. For example, the share of *Senate bosses* variable generated negative coefficients in Model 4.1 suggesting that Senate bosses are less likely to shelve and amend presidential bills. However, shelving the bills prevents senators from publishing committee reports, whereas amending the bills leads to creating committee reports. As a consequence, *Senate boss* in the selection equation of Model 4.2 does not generate a significant coefficient. By the same token, the coefficient for *centralizing measure* is not significant in the selection equation of this model.

However, this is not the case if the impact of an independent variable on Stage 1a or 1b is sufficiently huge. For instance, both *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* and *majority status of the president's party* produce positive and significant coefficients for Model 4.2, since the former variable drastically decreases a bill's probabilities of being shelved and amended, and the latter variable increases the probability of being amended as Table 4.4 reported. Moreover, independent variables that only influence Stage 1a or 1b also generate significant coefficients. In Eq. (4.2), the coefficient for the interaction term of *governor's subordinate* and *longstanding governor* is negative and significant indicating that

longstanding governors' subordinates tend to shelve presidential bills, whereas *Senate boss's subordinate* and *number of committees* produce positive and significant coefficients because of the impact of these variables on Stage 1b.

The outcome equation of Model 4.2 predicts the conditions under which senators express their support for presidential bills in committees. One of the interesting findings of this model is that senators from longstanding governors' provinces behave differently according to their principals at the provincial level. In order to illustrate the difference, I calculated conditional coefficients, and report them in Table 4.5 following Brambor et al. (2006).

On the one hand, the conditional coefficients in Table 4.5 reveal that governors' subordinates are more likely to sign majority reports than other senators only when they respond to longstanding governors. This finding is consistent with the results for Model 4.1, since it showed that longstanding governors' subordinates are more likely to shelve presidential bills. That is, they only shelve unwelcome bills, and happily discharge other presidential bills from committees without partial disagreements. This story implies that longstanding governors' subordinates play a crucial role in committees, since they may change the fate of presidential bills at Stage 1a.

On the other hand, factional divisions in provincial politics influence senatorial behavior at Stage 2. The negative and significant coefficient for *longstanding governor* in the outcome equation shows that senators from longstanding governors' provinces are less likely to support

**Table 4.5** Conditional coefficients of Stage 2

Main variable	
Intervening conditions	
Governor's subordinate	.004(.065)
Longstanding governor = 0	
Governor's subordinate	.171(.066)**
Longstanding governor = 1	

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\* $p < .05$

Source Author's elaboration

presidential bills at this stage if they do not respond to the governors. This result means local subordinates, Senate bosses, and Senate bosses' subordinates from those provinces engage in position-taking in committees so that their bosses (or they themselves) may compete with long-standing governors in the future elections. Some senators' behavior in the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill also illustrates this. For example, Senator Gerardo Morales (UCR, Jujuy), a Senate boss with gubernatorial ambition, did not sign the majority report, since he did not want to support the amendments introduced by the sister of Governor Eduardo Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy), who had governed Jujuy since 1998.<sup>52</sup>

The coefficient for *centralizing measure* is also negative and significant confirming H4c. Regardless of their principals in their provinces, senators are more likely to engage in position-taking when they face centralizing measures, since these bills are sometimes highly controversial. In the case of Resolution 125 in 2008, to which I refer in Chapter 5, committee members also published four minority reports in order to express their positions against the resolution introduced by the Fernández de Kirchner administration. As a consequence, the majority report that respected the intentions of the original resolution passed committees with a slight margin.

By contrast, the statistical test does not recognize Senate bosses and their subordinates as active players at Stage 2. The variables for them do not generate significant coefficients. On the one hand, as my theory posited, Senate bosses prioritize position-taking on the floor over committee work. On the other hand, the insignificant coefficient for Senate bosses' subordinates means that these senators actively behave in committees only when they claim credit for introducing amendments to presidential bills.

Model 4.2 also shows that party discipline and party cohesion produce high party unity in the Senate committees. The positive and significant coefficient for the *president's party* variable confirms institutional advantages of the president. As I explained in Chapter 2, the president

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<sup>52</sup>Fellner left the governorship in 2007 due to a term limit, but he returned to the same position in 2011. He failed to be reelected in 2015.

in Argentina has various tools to influence the legislative process including the control over the allocations of floor authority positions and committee seats in the Senate through his or her national party. In addition, the tendency of Presidents Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner to impose their preferred candidates on party lists means that they had more advantages in disciplining PJ senators than Presidents Menem and Duhalde. In addition, the coefficient for *UCR-PJ dimension* is also positive and significant. Since most of the presidential bills between 1983 and 2007 were introduced by PJ presidents, this finding implies that preference cohesion also leads to high party unity in committees. Even though small national parties (the FREPASO, the PS, and *Recrear*) and provincial parties are the opposition, the statistical test reveals that they tend to have a good relationship with the president.

Among the other independent variables, the coefficients for *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* and *old Senate rules* are positive and significant at the .001 level. As is the case in Stages 1a and 1b, senators are also more likely to support the bills initiated in the Chamber of Deputies, because they have not been blocked by the lower chamber where more preference fragmentation is expected. Senators are less supportive under the new Senate rules, because these rules require presidential bills to be discharged from committees with the support of an absolute majority of all committee members. As a consequence, senators often sign no committee report when they are not satisfied with majority reports. By contrast, the coefficients for *committee amendments*, *election year*, *share of provincial tax revenues*, *tenure*, and *presidential approval* are not statistically significant.

Table 4.6 reports predicted probabilities for important variables of Stage 2. These probabilities are based on the assumption that the PJ is the president's party, and that the UCR is the opposition (except for the cases of a senator from a small national party or a provincial party). Consider the case in which a PJ local subordinate from the province of La Pampa (i.e., the *share of provincial tax revenues* variable set at 18.42%) with three-year experience in the Senate as a member of a committee chaired by a senator from the president's party faces a general bill (i.e., not a centralizing measure) without committee amendments, which was introduced by a president with average popularity

**Table 4.6** Predicted probabilities of a senator's signature on a majority report

	President's party	Opposition party
Baseline case	.804 (.632–.975)	.567 (.388–.746)
Local subordinate from a longstanding governor's province	.754 (.566–.943)	.501 (.325–.677)
Longstanding governor's subordinate	.805 (.639–.970)	.569 (.395–.742)
Centralizing measure	.725 (.523–.927)	.465 (.291–.638)
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	.905 (.820–.989)	.733 (.621–.845)
Small national party		.697 (.489–.905)
Provincial party		.668 (.480–.856)
New Senate rules	.443 (.313–.573)	.204 (.141–.266)

*Note* 95% confidence interval in parentheses. Baseline assumes the case in which a local subordinate from the province of La Pampa (i.e., the *share of provincial tax revenues* variable set at 18.42%) with three-year experience in the Senate as a member of a committee chaired by a senator from the president's party faces a general bill (i.e., not a centralizing measure) without committee amendments, which was introduced by a president with average popularity (set at 42.72%) in the Senate where the president's party holds a majority of seats, in a nonelection year under the old Senate rules. This simulation considers the PJ (i.e., *UCR-PJ dimension* set at 1) the president's party and the UCR (i.e., *UCR-PJ dimension* set at -1) the opposition except for the cases of senators from a small national party or a provincial party. (In these cases, *UCR-PJ dimension* was set at 0)

*Source* Author's elaboration

(set at 42.72%) in the Senate where the president's party holds a majority of seats, in a nonelection year under the old Senate rules. In this case, the predicted probability of signing the majority report without partial disagreement is .804. This probability decreases to .567 if such a senator is from the opposition.

Provincial politics of longstanding governors' provinces sometimes influence senatorial behavior at Stage 2. The probabilities of the senator from the president's party as well as the opposition decrease to .754 and .501 if the senator is a local subordinate from a longstanding governor's province. However, these small changes in the probabilities suggest that they prioritize party unity over position-taking for voters regardless of their party affiliation. Even when their interest in provincial politics contradicts the position of their party, they carefully choose a limited number of bills on which they express their dissatisfaction as the behavior of Senate bosses from the president's party on the floor, which is



illustrated in the next chapter. Longstanding governors' subordinates also value party unity. The probabilities slightly increase to .805 and .569 if the senator is such a subordinate.

The probabilities of senators from the president's party and the opposition respectively drop to .725 and .465 when they face centralizing measures, which confirms H4c. These changes in the predicted probabilities show that opposition senators take positions more actively than the senators from the president's party. By contrast, the probabilities go up to .905 and .733 if senators discuss bills originally initiated in the lower chamber. There are few committee seats for the senators from small national parties or provincial parties, but they are more likely to support presidential bills than other senators. In these cases, the predicted probabilities increase to .697 and .668 even though they are from the opposition.

Overall, these predicted probabilities show that senators from the president's party as well as from the opposition behave in a coherent manner at Stage 2. However, we may observe less party unity under the new Senate rules. The predicted probabilities of a PJ senator and a UCR senator significantly decrease to .443 and .204. As I mentioned, signing no committee report is equivalent to opposing presidential bills in the new system, since majority reports must be signed by an absolute majority of all committee members to discharge the bills. Even though it is impossible to distinguish the senators who did not sign committee reports because of their dissatisfaction from the senators who just did not show up, which also influences the drastic changes in the predicted probabilities, Senator Gerardo Morales' (UCR, Jujuy) behavior in the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill illustrates that signing no committee report is an alternative for committee members to prepare for position-taking activities on the floor.

In conclusion, the outcome equation for Stage 2 also reveals the evidence that is consistent with my theoretical framework. Longstanding governors' subordinates tend to sign majority reports at Stage 2, since they can shelve unwanted bills at Stage 1a. By contrast, the other senators from the longstanding governors' provinces are less likely to support majority reports. However, predicted probabilities in Table 4.6 shows that these senators carefully choose target bills on which they

take positions. Moreover, the statistical test uncovers that senators are less likely to sign majority reports on centralizing measures as H4c predicted, even though the opposition senators are more likely to engage in position-taking than the senators from the president's party. Under the current Senate rules, signing no committee report is another option for senators who do not satisfied with presidential bills.

## 4.4 Conclusion

When and how do senators oppose presidential bills? When do senators shelve or amend the bills? I tackled these questions using an original dataset on senatorial behavior in committees. Case study and statistical analysis of this chapter suggest that subordinates are key players at the committee stage. In the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill, it was governors' subordinates who played a crucial role in the legislative process. Using the two strategies, longstanding governors of tobacco-producing provinces successfully defended their provincial interests. On the one hand, the Health and Sports Committee kept the bill "in the drawer" for a while. Since bills must be approved by one of the two chambers within two legislative years, this strategy killed the bill on February 28, 2007, even though it was discharged from committees. On the other hand, the amendment proposal introduced by Senator Fellner succeeded in eliminating the economic chapter that was going to damage tobacco industry in Jujuy and other tobacco-producing provinces.

Using an original dataset on committee decisions in Argentina between 1983 and 2007, the latter part of this chapter quantitatively examined senatorial behavior in committees. In order to capture the legislative process in the Argentine Senate in an appropriate manner, I ran the multinomial probit model for Stages 1a and 1b as well as the Heckman probit model for Stage 2. The statistical tests confirmed my hypotheses about the behavior of longstanding governors' subordinates (H1). Tenure stability of those governors make their subordinates keep unwelcome bills "in the drawer" at Stage 1a. At Stage 2, their subordinates value party unity, since their preferences have already been reflected in the legislative process at the previous stage. These findings

support my argument that governors' subordinates are not so interested in public credit-claiming, since their behavior intends to attract governors rather than to voters. By contrast, the priority of Senate bosses' subordinates in committees is public credit-claiming for their bosses. The multinomial probit model revealed that they are more likely to amend presidential bills than other senators, which confirms H3a about their behavior in committees.

My models also showed that Senate bosses are not main actors in committees. These senators are less likely to shelve or amend presidential bills, because they prioritize position-taking on the floor over credit-claiming in committees. However, any type of senator tends to engage in position-taking as well as credit-claiming when they face centralizing measures. As H4a, H4b, and H4c about the impact of content of presidential bills posited, senators are more likely to shelve and amend centralizing measures. Moreover, they are less likely to sign majority reports on centralizing measures. However, predicted probabilities for Model 4.2 indicated that the senators from the president's party are more careful with choosing presidential bills for position-taking than the senators from the opposition.

These findings confirm my claims that legislators' principals should be identified, and that the sequential flow of the legislative process should be taken into account. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that legislators engage in advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking in the same way, I showed that different principals encourage senators to choose different types of legislative behavior. Even in committees, in addition, my analysis revealed that the same type of senators behave differently at Stages 1a, 1b, and 2. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that legislators under the same system behave in the same way in committees.

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# 5

## Bosses at the Frontline

Under what conditions can subnational governments act as national veto players? When do senators oppose presidential bills? In this chapter, I provide qualitative and quantitative evidence of floor voting behavior, paying attention to the sequential nature of the legislative process. For the qualitative study, I focus on the case of Resolution 125 in 2008 to illustrate the relation between senators' institutional positions and their floor behavior. This is a good example to illustrate my argument about senators' position-taking strategy because the preference of the president contrasted that of voters from provinces where soybean is an important crop. The ministerial resolution provoked a conflict between the national government and the agricultural sector because of increasing export duties, and widespread protests generated social unrest. President Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV) submitted a bill requesting congressional ratification of the resolution, but the dissidence of Senate bosses and their subordinates led to a tied vote. In that context, Vice-President Julio Cobos (UCR-Radicales K) cast a historical dissident vote and killed his government's bill.

In addition, I also statistically analyze senatorial behavior on the floor using a novel dataset on floor voting in the Argentine Senate

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The original version of this chapter was revised: For detailed information please see Erratum. The erratum to this chapter is available at [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7)

between 1983 and 2007 (Kikuchi 2012). In contrast to conventional approaches that only consider roll-call behavior, I model a two-stage structure (the Parliamentary Labor Plenary and floor session) of the legislative process on the floor.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, focusing on the Parliamentary Labor Plenary and the floor session, I describe the institutional characteristics of the legislative process on the Senate floor. Then, in the second section, I qualitatively analyze the case of Resolution 125. I explain my approach for modeling the legislative process on the floor and interpret the results of my statistical test in the third section. The fourth section summarizes this chapter's findings, underscoring that Senate bosses and their subordinates behave differently than their copartisans on the floor and that Senate bosses from the opposition have more freedom to defect from their parties and the president than their counterparts from the president's party.

## 5.1 The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor

To analyze floor voting qualitatively and quantitatively, this section summarizes the institutional characteristics of the Senate floor. The legislative process on the floor can be divided into two phases: the Parliamentary Labor Plenary and the floor session. It is important to recognize this two-stage structure of the legislative process because bills will not be subject to a vote on the floor if the Parliamentary Labor Plenary decides to not discuss them. Thus, a severe selection bias problem cannot be avoided if floor voting models are estimated without considering the function of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary.

### 5.1.1 Parliamentary Labor Plenary

Once the majority report on a bill is published by committees, the bill is sent to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary (*Plenario de Labor Parlamentaria*) seven days after publication. This institution plays a crucial role in the legislative process because its responsibilities include

setting the floor agenda. Because every bill must be approved by at least one of the chambers within two legislative years, a bill sometimes dies before reaching the floor—even though it is approved by committees—if the Parliamentary Labor Plenary decides to not discuss it.<sup>1</sup> As Plenary chair, the vice-president of the nation (i.e., president of the Senate) or provisional president of the Senate is required to convoke weekly meetings except during recess periods. The members of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary make a parliamentary action plan (*el plan de labor*), which is a timetable that sets out the order of debate and each senator's speech for the next floor session. This is circulated to senators 24 hours before the floor session begins.

The Argentine president has two institutional advantages for setting the Senate's floor agenda. First, the president has rights to call extraordinary sessions and extend the period of ordinary sessions. In Argentina, the Senate and Chamber of Deputies may discuss any bills during the period of ordinary sessions between March 1 and November 30.<sup>2</sup> However, neither chamber can call a floor session outside of this period. According to the Argentine constitution, it is the president who decides to call congressional sessions after November 30. The president may call extraordinary sessions between December 1 and February 28. He or she may also allow Congress to extend the period of ordinary sessions. In the former case, the president has a right to decide on the issues to be discussed at the meetings. In the latter case, both chambers may discuss any bills. Naturally, the president tends to choose extraordinary sessions over an extension of ordinary sessions so that more presidential bills will receive consideration. If a budget bill is not likely to gain approval before November 30, for example, the president calls for extraordinary sessions in December so that the budget gets passed before the next fiscal year starts in January (Rodríguez and Bonvecchi 2004).

In addition, the composition of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary also favors the Argentine president. Contrary to other types of

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<sup>1</sup>In this sense, it is considered that the Parliamentary Labor Plenary may exercise a pocket veto power.

<sup>2</sup>It was between May 1 and September 30, before the constitutional reform in 1994.



agenda-setting offices, such as the Rules Committee in the US House, the Parliamentary Labor Plenary comprises the country's vice-president and leaders of the legislative party blocs. The provisional president of the Senate chairs a meeting when the country's vice-president cannot attend or the position of vice-president is vacant. The provisional president and other floor authorities (three vice-presidents of the Senate)<sup>3</sup> are elected annually at the beginning of each legislative year, but the same senator usually serves for several years as a provisional president or vice-president of the Senate. The provisional president is traditionally elected not from the majority party but from the president's party.<sup>4</sup> Thus, even when the president's party has a share below 50%, the president keeps his or her agenda-setting power to some extent.<sup>5</sup>

Reflecting the dominance of the Argentine president, the country's vice-president and the leader of the president's party bloc try to put presidential bills on parliamentary action plans.<sup>6</sup> As a result, merely 25 out of 700 presidential bills were blocked by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary between 1983 and 2007 (Kikuchi 2012).<sup>7</sup> This low rate indicates that the risk for presidential bills in the Parliamentary Labor Plenary is minimal but still greater than zero. It is thus sometimes difficult for the president to impose his or her preference without some

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<sup>3</sup>There were two vice-presidents until 1992.

<sup>4</sup>Therefore, it was a surprise when Gerardo Zamora (UCR-*Frente Cívico por Santiago*, Santiago del Estero), former governor of Santiago del Estero, was elected as the provisional president in 2014, even if he was close to President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV). Another exceptional example was the assignment of Ramón Puerta (PJ, Misiones) during the 2001 political crisis.

<sup>5</sup>As I showed in the previous chapter, it is also true that presidential bills are more likely to be unreported or amended at the committee stage if the president's party does not have majority status.

<sup>6</sup>This is not necessarily true for the period between 2008 and 2011. Because the relationship between President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV) and Vice-President Julio Cobos (UCR-*Radicales K*) was complicated after the case of Resolution 125 in 2008, Cobos sometimes called for meetings of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary to attack President Fernández de Kirchner. For example, in 2010, he called for a meeting so that the Senate floor questioned the presidential decree on the removal of President of the Central Bank of Argentina Martín Redrado.

<sup>7</sup>This number does not include bills on (a) authorization of the president to travel abroad, (b) confirmation of the presidential appointees, and (c) ratification of international treaties on good neighborliness.

compromise with the opposition because Senate rules expect all leaders of legislative party blocs to sign parliamentary action plans for the floor meetings.<sup>8</sup> As a consequence, the parliamentary action plans also accommodate the opposition's preferences even when the president's party has a majority in the Senate.

As a compromise, the leader of the president's party bloc sometimes allows opposition leaders to block bills initiated by senators from the president's party so that bills sponsored by opposition senators are scheduled for discussion on the floor. This accommodation especially favors bills sponsored by leaders of opposition party blocs even when the bills are introduced by leaders of unipersonal legislative blocs. For example, the Senate approved nine out of 47 bills introduced by Senator Rubén Giustiniani (PS, Santa Fe) between 2005 and 2007. According to Alemán and Calvo (2008), the average approval rate of each senator's bills in Argentina between 1983 and 2001 was around 8%. Therefore, Giustiniani's success rate (19.1%) was considered to be pretty high, even though he was the leader of his unipersonal legislative bloc.

If the vice-president of the nation (or provisional president of the Senate) and all leaders of legislative party blocs agree on the floor agenda, they sign a parliamentary action plan for the next floor meeting.<sup>9</sup> The floor authorities, such as the vice-president of the nation, provisional president of the Senate, and vice-presidents of the Senate, cannot alter it even when the parliamentary action plan schedules bills that they do not want to discuss. According to Deputy Marcelo López Arias (PJ, Salta), former vice-president of the Senate, they may delay the floor session process by requesting a time to speak up, but this is not an effective strategy.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>According to the Senate rules, proposals of a parliamentary action plan should be analyzed or voted on the Senate floor if the Parliamentary Labor Plenary cannot publish an agreed parliamentary action plan. However, this rarely occurs in practice. Floor meetings are usually not held until all the legislative party blocs agree on a parliamentary action plan.

<sup>9</sup>If the leader of a unipersonal legislative bloc is absent from a Parliamentary Labor Plenary meeting, the parliamentary action plan is published without his or her signature.

<sup>10</sup>Author's interview, July 8, 2009.

### 5.1.2 Floor Sessions

The floor sessions are usually held once a week on Wednesdays. If more than half the senators are present and take their seats, the vice-president of the country or the provisional president of the Senate opens a floor session.<sup>11</sup> He or she invites one of the senators present to raise the national flag, and the parliamentary action plan for the session is announced.

After the announcement, senators may propose *sobre tablas* motions so that their bills are discussed immediately on the floor. Bills normally arrive at the floor after approval from committees and the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, but two types of motions allow bills to bypass those stages. A *sobre tablas* motion requires an immediate discussion of the bill on the floor during the same session, whereas a preferential (*preferencia*) motion requires the bill to be scheduled for discussion at an upcoming session (Calvo 2014). Those motions can be made for bills at any stage (i.e., before bills are assigned to committees, before receiving committee reports, or before they are scheduled by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary for a floor session). In practice, the Parliamentary Labor Plenary controls the filing of those motions, even though any individual senator may introduce them.<sup>12</sup> Because preferential motions for bills without committee reports and all the *sobre tablas* motions must be supported by two-thirds of senators present,<sup>13</sup> the leaders of legislative party blocs discuss them at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary to avoid motion defeats for important bills that bypass debate in committees. The Argentine president often asks senators to make a motion so that his or her bills are approved by the Senate floor in a timely manner. Among the 700 presidential bills introduced to the Parliamentary Labor

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<sup>11</sup>If the number of senators on the floor does not reach a quorum, the session is closed as a *sesión en minoría*.

<sup>12</sup>Most of the *sobre tablas* and preferential motions for presidential bills are scheduled by agreement made at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary.

<sup>13</sup>In the case of preferential motions for bills with committee reports, the support of an absolute majority is required.

Plenary between 1983 and 2007, 219 reached the floor by *sobre tablas* or preferential motions (Kikuchi 2012).

Debate on a bill is led by the country's vice-president and a committee chair in charge of the bill. On the one hand, the country's vice-president chairs the debate. The provisional president or one of the Senate vice-presidents replaces him whenever he is not available. On the other hand, the committee chair is responsible for the amending process on the floor. As a rapporteur, he or she explains the majority report and justifies it.<sup>14</sup> Any senator may propose an amendment to the bill, but the committee chair has the right to reject it. Senators have a chance to vote on an amendment only after the chair accepts it. As a result, it is rare that significant amendments are introduced to presidential bills on the floor.<sup>15</sup> After the committee chair's presentation, the leaders of legislative party blocs defend the positions of their national parties.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the debate is opened to all senators.

After the floor debate, the bill is voted on as a whole (*en general*). Then, it is voted on article by article (*en particular*). This procedure allows senators to support the bill at the *en general* vote yet oppose some of its articles at the *en particular* votes during the same session. If none of the senators are likely to oppose any part of the bill, the country's vice-president (or provisional president) may aggregate the *en general* and *en particular* votes together to expedite the legislative process. If many senators are likely to reject some of the articles, votes on those articles should be separated from votes on the other articles. The country's vice-president (or provisional president) makes these decisions in consultation with the leader of the president's party bloc. In the case of a presidential bill on financing for education (PE-442/05),<sup>17</sup> for example, Vice-President Daniel Scioli (PJ) disaggregated its articles into six segments for the *en particular* votes: Articles 1–3, Article 4, Article 5, Article 6, Article 7, and Articles 8–20.

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<sup>14</sup>There should also be another rapporteur if a bill also has a minority report.

<sup>15</sup>See Alemán (2003) for the floor amending process in the Chamber of Deputies.

<sup>16</sup>The author of the bill also has a chance to speak at this point.

<sup>17</sup>This bill number indicates that it was the 442nd bill submitted by the president to the Senate in the 2005 legislative year.

Most of those votes on presidential bills were not recorded before February 24, 2004. Under the old Senate rules, the dominant procedure for *en general* and *en particular* votes was signal voting (e.g., senators just raised their hands) without keeping individual records. Roll-call voting was used only under exceptional circumstances.<sup>18</sup> Signal voting makes individual senators' positions visible to their colleagues, but outsiders cannot see how they voted (Carey 2008). However, a scandal arose when the Senate floor approved President De la Rúa's (UCR) labor reform bill in April 2000 (CD-179/99). As mentioned in Chapter 3, it was a surprise because the bill should have been blocked by the PJ senators. The problem in this scandal was that there was no way to identify which PJ senators supported the bill because no vote was recorded (Carey 2008).

Senators introduced the new Senate rules in 2002 to improve their image, which had been further damaged by the 2001 political crisis and the scandal described above. One important rule change was the frequent use of roll-call voting. Votes on all bills must be roll-call votes to make each senator's behavior more visible.<sup>19</sup> As a result, the number of roll-call votes increased drastically after the implementation of this rule on February 24, 2004. A modest 169 roll-call votes were recorded between 1983 and 2003, whereas 991 roll-call votes were recorded between 2004 and 2007 (Kikuchi 2010).

If the bill passes the *en general* and *en particular* votes, the country's vice-president or provisional president declares its approval. It is then sent to the other chamber where the bill is discussed in the same way.

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<sup>18</sup>It was required to use roll-call voting when senators vote on impeachment or election of their authorities (provisional president and vice-presidents). However, they rarely cast roll-call votes on the election except for the cases in which there were multiple candidates for the authority positions.

<sup>19</sup>If a bill has a unanimous committee report or no senator is expected to oppose a bill before the *en general* vote, this requirement can be waived with the support of the absolute majority of the senators present. However, senators rarely ask for a waiver. By contrast, resolutions, declarations, and communications are often approved by signal voting.

## 5.2 The Case of Resolution 125

Under what conditions can governors be national veto players? How do senators behave on the floor in terms of signaling their positions? In this section, I tackle these questions using the case of Resolution 125 in 2008 as an example. I chose this case because the rejection of Resolution 125 was one of the most important decisions made by the Senate after the democratization in 1983. More importantly, it generated a confrontation between the preferences of two principals (the president and voters from provinces where soybean is an important product). As my theoretical framework predicted, this example shows that Senate bosses and their subordinates are crucial players on the floor.

Argentina experienced severe social tension between the national government and the agricultural sector in the first half of 2008. This so-called conflict of the countryside (*conflicto del campo*) was triggered by a change in export tax policy by the national government. The Minister of Economy, Martín Lousteau, issued the now famous Resolution 125 on March 11, 2008. The agricultural industry is one of the largest exporters in Argentina, and Fernández de Kirchner's government tried to raise export duties on soybean and sunflower. Before March 11, export duties on soybean, sunflower, corn, and wheat were 35%, 23.5%, 25%, and 28%, respectively (Godio and Robles 2008).<sup>20</sup> Resolution 125 raised export duties on soybean and sunflower to 44.1% and 39.1%, respectively, while it decreased the duties on corn and wheat to 24.2% and 27.1%, respectively. More importantly, these rates were defined to change according to international prices. In the case of soybean, for instance, the export duty rate was going to be 50% if the product's international price increased to USD610 per ton (Barsky and Dávila 2008).

According to Lousteau, this export tax scheme had two goals. First, it was a signal against "soybeanization" (*sojización*) of the countryside. Because the profitability of growing soybean was pretty high, farmers

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<sup>20</sup>"Export withholding taxes" (*retenciones*) was a keyword in the conflict with the countryside because these export duties were withholding taxes.

had preferred growing soybean since the 1990s. In addition, this scheme also tried to find a balance between international and domestic prices so that increasing domestic food prices would not hurt household budgets (Barsky and Dávila 2008).

Article 4 of the Constitution allows the national government to levy import and export duties. However, the agricultural sector reacted sharply in response to the new export tax scheme. The Argentine Rural Society (*Sociedad Rural Argentina*, SRA), Argentine Agrarian Federation (*Federación Agraria Argentina*, FAA), the Argentine Rural Confederations (*Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas*, CRA), and the Inter-Cooperatives Association (CONINAGRO) organized huge protests with strikes and roadblock pickets. The first week of protests led to a lack of food (especially beef and milk) at supermarkets in Buenos Aires because there were approximately 300 roadblock pickets (Barsky and Dávila 2008).

President Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV) accused them of escalating social tension and called them “pickets of abundance” (*los piquetes de la abundancia*),<sup>21</sup> but the national government did not offer a good solution. Lousteau (and Carlos Fernández after his resignation in April) tried to amend Resolution 125 to mitigate the impact of tax changes on small farmers, even though such measures did not dissipate the tension. Despite differences in political positions, the SRA, FAA, CRA, and CONINAGRO worked together to express strong disapproval of Resolution 125 because farmers considered export duty rates too high already. Reflecting neoliberal economic policies, export duties on soybean and sunflower were merely 3.5% each under the Menem administration. However, the currency crisis and debt default in 2001 made the Duhalde government raise the export duty rates. The agricultural sector believed that duty rates should be lowered as the economy recovered (Godio and Robles 2008).

Facing continuous social tension, the opposition asked the executive branch to discuss Resolution 125 in the legislature. Vice-President Julio Cobos (UCR-*Radicales K*) also wrote a letter asking the president

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<sup>21</sup> *Clarín*, “Son piquetes de la abundancia” (They are pickets of abundance), March 26, 2008.

to send a bill to Congress (Castro 2009). Following these requests, Fernández de Kirchner submitted a presidential bill to the Chamber of Deputies on June 19, requesting the ratification of Resolution 125.

### 5.2.1 Preferences of Competing Principals

The original bill, given bill number PE-13/08 at the Chamber of Deputies, contained eight articles. Article 1 asked for the ratification of Resolution 125 and other related resolutions, and Article 2 stated that the administration of Resolution 125 depended on other relevant laws such as the Customs Act (Law 22415). The next four articles sought to create a social redistribution fund to finance infrastructure improvements in the countryside. The last two articles addressed administrative aspects of the bill such as its validation date. The intention of this bill was clear. President Fernández de Kirchner did not want to change the new scheme of export taxes but was open to negotiate how to use the withheld export duties. In an interview with journalist Nelson Castro, Vice-President Julio Cobos recalled a dialogue with the president. According to Cobos, she was originally reluctant to send a bill on Resolution 125 to Congress. However, when he suggested that she could also send a bill on the construction of hospitals and schools using withheld export duties, she seemed to agree with him (Castro 2009).

Following her intention, the president and her party made several efforts to get the bill passed. For example, Senator Roberto Urquía (PJ-FPV, Córdoba) was forced to resign from the chair of the Budget Committee, one of the committees where the bill was to be discussed. He was a member of the president's party bloc. However, due to his status as a subordinate of Governor Juan Schiaretta (PJ-FPV, Córdoba)<sup>22</sup> and an owner of a vegetable oil company, he openly opposed Resolution 125. As a result, on June 25, the president's party bloc replaced him with Senator Fabián Ríos (PJ-FPV, Corrientes) so that the bill was

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<sup>22</sup>He was one of the governors who opposed Resolution 125.



not blocked or significantly amended in committee.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, because the marginal value of each vote on the Senate floor could be extremely high, the president's party bloc asked a senator on leave to return. Senator Eric Calcagno y Maillmann (PJ-FPV, Buenos Aires) was on leave to take the position of Undersecretary of Small and Medium Enterprises (*subsecretario de Pymes*). He immediately handed in his resignation and returned to the Senate on July 6.<sup>24</sup>

Many senators were lobbied by the president and the leader of her party's bloc in the Senate, Senator Miguel Ángel Pichetto (PJ-FPV, Río Negro). For example, President Fernández de Kirchner called Senator Teresita Quintela (PJ-FPV, La Rioja), who was going to cast a dissident vote against Resolution 125, to the *Casa Rosada* to persuade her.<sup>25</sup> Senator Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta) also had a similar but much less volatile story.

*The author:* Did you get any pressure from the executive branch?

*Senator Romero:* The president (Fernández de Kirchner) asked me to cast an affirmative vote, but I did not do that.

*The author:* How about from Senator Pichetto?

*Senator Romero:* Yes. I talked with him before, but I told them (Senator Pichetto and Senator Pampuro, the provisional president) that I was not going to vote with them. I had defended the production of my province, and it was unlikely that I was going to support the bill. They already knew that.<sup>26</sup>

The national parties' positions on Resolution 125 were clear: the PJ supported the presidential bill, whereas the opposition parties opposed it. As for the voters' preferences, mass protests by farmers and workers in related industries (e.g., truck drivers) naturally tended to be


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<sup>23</sup>*La Nación*, "Renunció el presidente de la comisión de Presupuesto y Hacienda en el Senado" (The chair of the Budget Committee in the Senate resigned), June 25, 2008.

<sup>24</sup>Gustavo Ybarra, "Urgente regreso de Calcagno a su banca" (Calcagno's early return to his seat), *La Nación*, July 6, 2008.

<sup>25</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Tratan de convencer a Quintela" (They tried to convince Quintela), July 14, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15950.htm>.

<sup>26</sup>Author's interview, August 19, 2009 (translation by the author).



**Fig. 5.1** Production of soybeans in 15 provinces between 2006 and 2007 (Source Author's elaboration based on data from Godio and Robles (2008))

organized in regions where soybean was an important product. Figure 5.1 reports the production of soybean in 15 provinces between 2006 and 2007, which ranged from 1810 tons (Misiones) to 14,173,030 tons (Córdoba). The Pampas region (i.e., provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, La Pampa, and Santa Fe) has traditionally been the agricultural center, and it produces approximately 90% of Argentina's soybean (Barsky and Dávila 2008). However, these figures also show that soybean became an important crop in other provinces such as Santiago del Estero, Salta, Chaco, and Tucumán.

Contrary to the president, national parties, and voters, the positions of governors were mixed. Although most of them followed their parties, some of them decided to take a different position. Table 5.1 shows the positions of 23 governors and the chief of the government of the City of Buenos Aires. One of the advantages of this case study is the visibility

**Table 5.1** Governors' attitudes toward Resolution 125

Party	Supported	Opposed
PJ	<b>Alperovich</b> (Tucumán), Barrionuevo (Jujuy), <b>Capitanich</b> (Chaco), Closs (Misiones), Das Neves (Chubut), Gioja (San Juan), Herrera* (La Rioja), Insfrán (Formosa), Jaque (Mendoza), <b>Jorge*</b> (La Pampa), Peralta* (Santa Cruz), <b>Scioli</b> (Buenos Aires), <b>Uribarri</b> (Entre Ríos), <b>Urtubey*</b> (Salta)	Rodríguez Saá (San Luis), <b>Schiaretti</b> (Córdoba)
UCR	Saiz (Río Negro), <b>Zamora</b> (Santiago del Estero)	Brizuela del Moral (Catamarca), Colombi (Corrientes)
PS		<b>Binner</b> (Santa Fe)
PRO		Macri (City of Buenos Aires)
ARI		Ríos (Tierra del Fuego)
MPN	Sapag (Neuquén)*	

*Note* Name of governor's province in parentheses. Governors of the provinces where more than 500,000 tons of soybeans were produced between 2006 and 2007 are in bold. Governors with an asterisk did not express their positions clearly

*Source* Author's elaboration

of governors' preferences on the presidential bill. It is usually difficult to identify governors' positions on presidential bills. Nevertheless, many governors clarified their positions in the case of Resolution 125 because it was highly controversial.

This table shows governors' positions toward Resolution 125 immediately before the *en general* vote on the Senate floor on July 17. Some governors only finalized their ultimate position at the last minute. For example, Governor Mario Das Neves (PJ, Chubut) decided to support the presidential bill even though he was not satisfied with the new export tax scheme: "I do not think that the problem with the countryside will be solved just by drafting a law. However, senators from Chubut...will vote in keeping with the position of the majority (the PJ)".<sup>27</sup> Chief of

<sup>27</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Das Neves confirmó que los senadores del PJ chubutense ratificarán las retenciones" (Das Neves confirmed that senators of the PJ Chubut will ratify the export withholding taxes), July 8, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15802.html> (translation by the author).

Staff (*Jefe de Asesores*) to Senator Silvia Giusti (PJ-FPV, Chubut), Andrés Zulueta, clarified the position of the governor. According to him, Governor Das Neves and Senators Giusti and Marcelo Guinle (PJ-FPV, Chubut) supported the presidential bill because they prioritized the problem of governability over that of the new tax scheme: “They did not want to repeat what happened in 2001 [the political crisis] again”.<sup>28</sup> By contrast, Governor Fabiana Ríos (ARI, Tierra del Fuego) broke her silence on July 15. There was a suspicion that her subordinates were going to support the bill in exchange for some transfer programs from the national government, but the governor assured that two ARI senators from Tierra del Fuego were going to oppose Resolution 125.<sup>29</sup>

Two PJ governors opposed the bill: Juan Schiaretti (Córdoba) and Alberto Rodríguez Saá (San Luis). Córdoba is one of the agricultural centers in Argentina, and the new tax scheme was expected to have a huge impact on the provincial economy. Schiaretti insisted on the necessity of lower export taxes and sometimes joined protests such as the *cacerolazo* at Río Cuarto on May 15.<sup>30</sup> Rodríguez Saá was not a member of the president’s faction. At the joint plenary meeting of the Budget Committee and the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee on July 10, to which he was invited, he claimed that withholding export duties was unconstitutional and that such a bill would not solve the conflict facing the countryside.<sup>31</sup>

At the same meeting, Governors José Alperovich (Tucumán) and Jorge Capitanich (Chaco) supported Resolution 125, even though their provinces also depended on soybean production. According to

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<sup>28</sup>Author’s interview, August 14, 2009 (translation by the author).

<sup>29</sup>*La Nación*, “Convocan temprano al debate de las retenciones” (They call early to the debate on the export withholding taxes), July 15, 2008.

<sup>30</sup>*La Voz del Interior*, “Conflicto agrario: Schiaretti reiteró que las retenciones tienen que bajar” (Agricultural conflict: Schiaretti reaffirmed that the export withholding taxes have to be lower), May 16, 2008.

<sup>31</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda* (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 10, 2008. We should bear in mind that Alberto Rodríguez Saá was not a supporter of the 1994 constitutional reforms under the Menem administration.

Alperovich, “soybeanization” decreased the number of available jobs in Tucumán because cultivating soybean requires fewer workers than other crops.<sup>32</sup> Referring to Article 4 of the Constitution, Capitanich defended export taxes as a former cabinet chief in the Duhalde government. Besides Alperovich and Capitanich, other PJ governors, such as Daniel Scioli (Buenos Aires), Sergio Urribarri (Entre Ríos), Celso Jaque (Mendoza), José Luis Gioja (San Juan), Gildo Insfrán (Formosa), Walter Barrionuevo (Jujuy), and Maurice Closs (Misiones), participated in a demonstration organized by former President Néstor Kirchner on July 15 to show their support for Resolution 125.<sup>33</sup> It is worth noting that this demonstration included two governors (Scioli and Urribarri) from the Pampas region.

The other PJ governors tended to be silent. There is no clear record of the positions of Luis Herrera (La Rioja), Oscar Jorge (La Pampa), Daniel Peralta (Santa Cruz), and Juan Manuel Urtubey (Salta). Interestingly, all of them were freshmen governors who had just won gubernatorial elections in 2007 with support from the Kirchner family. As my theoretical framework in Chapter 2 posited, they found it difficult to oppose presidential bills through their subordinates during their first term. According to Senator Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta), for instance, the position of Governor Urtubey was ambiguous: “He did not confront the (national) government, but he did not confront the countryside either. He did not pressure any legislator”.<sup>34</sup>

All UCR governors at that time belonged to the *Radicales K* faction, which supported the Fernández de Kirchner administration. However, just two of the four governors supported the presidential bill. On the one hand, Miguel Saiz (Río Negro) joined Néstor Kirchner’s

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<sup>32</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda* (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 10, 2008.

<sup>33</sup>*La Capital*, “Gobernadores del PJ le dieron un fuerte espaldarazo a la convocatoria” (The PJ governors gave a strong support to the call), July 16, 2008.

<sup>34</sup>Author’s interview, August 19, 2009 (translation by the author). By contrast, Vice-Governor Andrés Zottos (*Renovador de Salta*) opposed Resolution 125.

demonstration with other PJ governors on July 15.<sup>35</sup> Despite the fact that his province produced a significant amount of soybean, Gerardo Zamora (Santiago del Estero) also cooperated with the president, and affirmative votes from *Radicales K* deputies from Santiago del Estero helped the bill win approval from the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, Eduardo Brizuela del Moral (Catamarca) and Arturo Colombi (Corrientes) openly opposed Resolution 125. The former decided to distance themselves from the *Radicales K* faction in the first month of the conflict.<sup>37</sup> The latter's position was ambiguous until the last minute, but he also criticized the presidential bill in July.<sup>38</sup>

Among the other three governors, Hermes Binner (Santa Fe) opposed Resolution 125 from the beginning of the conflict. As in the case of Córdoba, the provincial economy of Santa Fe was also affected by the new tax scheme. He claimed that withheld export duties should be shared with provincial governments (i.e., be *coparticipables*).<sup>39</sup> Mauricio Macri (City of Buenos Aires) also asked the Senate to reject the presidential bill even though no senators from the City of Buenos Aires responded to him.<sup>40</sup> Jorge Sapag (Neuquén) kept his silence and gave his subordinate Senator Horacio Lores "freedom of action".<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>*La Capital*, "Gobernadores del PJ le dieron un fuerte espaldarazo a la convocatoria" (The PJ governors gave a strong support to the call), July 16, 2008.

<sup>36</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Se aprobaron las retenciones móviles en Diputados" (The mobile export withholding taxes were approved at the Chamber of Deputies), July 5, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15879.html>.

<sup>37</sup>*La Nación*, "Se esperan ausencias notorias en la Plaza" (Absences of the well-known politicians from the Plaza de Mayo are expected), June 18, 2008.

<sup>38</sup>Laura Capriata, "Radicales K, lejos de la Casa Rosada en 2009" (The *Radicales K* faction distances themselves from *Casa Rosada*), *La Nación*, July 13, 2008.

<sup>39</sup>*La Nación*, "Binner reclamó un mejor reparto de las retenciones" (Binner claimed a better distribution of the export withholding taxes), April 7, 2008.

<sup>40</sup>*La Nación*, "Macri dice que el kirchnerismo aisló al país" (Macri says that the Kirchner government made the country isolated), July 11, 2008.

<sup>41</sup>*La Mañana Neuquén*, "Sapag dio libertad de acción a Lores" (Sapag gave Lores freedom of action), July 10, 2008.

## 5.2.2 Resolution 125 in the Senate Committees

The Budget Committee and the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee of the Chamber of Deputies amended the original presidential bill. The amendments did not challenge the president's preference because they did not change the first two articles of the new tax scheme. However, in addition to the creation of a social redistribution fund, articles on compensation for small farmers and grain transporters were introduced. This amended bill was sent to the floor of the Chamber of Deputies and approved by a slight margin on July 5. Fifteen deputies from the president's party cast Nay votes at the *en general* vote,<sup>42</sup> whereas 11 deputies from the *Radicales K* supported the bill. As a result, the presidential bill passed by a vote of 129 to 122.<sup>43</sup>

The front desk (*mesa de entradas*) of the Senate assigned number CD-42/08 to the bill approved by the Chamber of Deputies, and the Parliamentary Secretary (*Secretaría Parlamentaria*) immediately distributed it to two committees of the Senate: the Budget Committee and the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee. Because the position of Budget Committee chair had already switched from Senator Urquía to Senator Ríos, it was not difficult to organize joint plenary meetings of the two committees. When a bill is assigned to multiple committees, their chairs decide if they discuss the bill together at joint plenary meetings.<sup>44</sup> As I explain later, just seven out of 15 members of the Budget Committee signed a report with no amendment, whereas nine out of 15 members of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee supported it. As a result, the bill was discharged to the floor without amendments because more than half of committee members (15 out of 29) signed the committee report.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>There was also one PJ-FPV deputy who abstained from the *en general* vote.

<sup>43</sup>Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies), *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación* (Record of floor sessions of the Chamber of Deputies), July 5, 2008.

<sup>44</sup>Regardless of holding joint plenary meetings, committees must publish majority (and minority) reports together.

<sup>45</sup>Senator Nicolás Fernández (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz) was affiliated with both of the committees.

The case of Resolution 125 is exceptional in the sense that the Parliamentary Labor Plenary set a strict deadline for the Senate debate on the presidential bill. On July 7, the floor authorities and leaders of legislative party blocs agreed that committee reports on bill CD-42/08 had to be published by July 14 at noon and that the bill was going to be discussed at a floor session on July 16 with a *sobre tablas* motion.<sup>46</sup> Senator Pichetto (PJ-FPV, Río Negro) insisted on having the floor session on July 11 to avoid giving time for the opposition to form a vote coalition against the bill. However, leaders of the other party blocs did not accept such a rush, and the Parliamentary Labor Plenary issued a parliamentary action plan that set July 16 as the day of the floor session.<sup>47</sup> This episode also illustrates the consensus-based nature of floor agenda-setting by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary.

Surprisingly, senators worked on July 9 (Independence Day). The two committees had four joint plenary meetings every day between July 8 and 11 in the Senate's largest meeting room (*Salón Azul*). Not only committee members but also other senators were present, even though non-committee members do not have the right to sign committee reports. The committees invited representatives of the protesters such as Eduardo Buzzi (president of the Argentine Agrarian Federation) and Alfredo De Angeli on July 8. Some economists gave presentations on the effects of Resolution 125 on July 9. Then, on July 10, national government officials such as Javier De Urquiza (Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Fishing, and Foods) and Guillermo Moreno (Secretary of Internal Trade), three governors (Alperovich, Capitanich, and Rodríguez Saá), as well as mayors expressed their opinions.

Following the hearings on July 8–10, committee members started the July 11 meeting by introducing various proposals. First, as the chair of the Budget Committee, Senator Ríos (PJ-FPV, Corrientes) proposed a

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<sup>46</sup>The bill required a *sobre tablas* motion because bills should have been sent to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary seven days after the publication of majority reports on them according to the normal procedure. Senator Rubén Giustiniani (PS, Santa Fe), the leader of his unipersonal bloc, was absent from this meeting.

<sup>47</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "El debate será el miércoles 16" (The debate will be held on Wednesday, 16), July 7, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15775.html>.



report with no amendments. Other proposals were aimed at changing the new tax scheme. Senators Ernesto Sanz (UCR, Mendoza) and Juan Carlos Marino (UCR, La Pampa) presented a proposal that set export duties below 35%. According to Marino, their report would be prepared not only by (those) two senators from the UCR who spoke up but also by every senator from the UCR bloc, the Federal bloc (*Bloque Federal*),<sup>48</sup> senators from the province of Catamarca (i.e., senators from the UCR-*Frente Cívico y Social de Catamarca*), Senator Rossi (*Vecinalista Partido Nuevo*, Córdoba), the Civic Coalition (*Coalición Cívica*, CC), the Socialist Party (PS), and Senators Pinchetti de Sierra Morales (*Fuerza Republicana*, Tucumán), and Duhalde (PJ-*Justicialista para el Dialogo de los Argentinos*, Buenos Aires).<sup>49</sup>

After Marino's speech, Senator Carlos Reutemann (PJ-FPV, Santa Fe) explained his proposal. According to his idea, which was based on a bill (S-2293/08)<sup>50</sup> submitted by Senators Reutemann and Roxana Latorre (PJ-FPV, Santa Fe), export duties on sunflower, corn, and wheat were fixed at 30%, 22%, and 22%, respectively. The duty rate on soybean was not fixed, but it had to be at 40% or lower. The *Radicales K* did not support the proposal by Sanz and Marino and presented another proposal that would not charge export duties to small farms that produced soybean, sunflower, corn, and wheat below 2000 tons, 2000 tons, 4000 tons, and 2000 tons, respectively. Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (*Renovador de Salta*, Salta) also submitted a proposal that introduced zoning for charging export taxes. Even though the media considered this proposal a surprise, it was based on his bill (S-610/08) that reflected the position of Party *Renovador de Salta* on Resolution 125.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>It was not an official legislative bloc but a group led by Senator Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (PJ, San Luis).

<sup>49</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda* (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 11, 2008, 8.

<sup>50</sup>This bill number denotes that the bill was the 2293rd bill submitted by senators in the legislative year 2008.

<sup>51</sup>Author's interview with Director of the Office of Senator Juan Pérez Alsina (*Renovador de Salta*, Salta) Guillermo Fernández Pego, August 5, 2009. This bill was submitted to the Senate on March 26, 2008.

Many senators spoke up after the presentation of proposals for committee reports, but most of them did not deal with content of the reports. Senator Pichetto (PJ-FPV, Río Negro) complained about this debate and claimed the bill's immediate departure.<sup>52</sup> However, the salience of Resolution 125 made many senators prioritize position-taking over credit-claiming. Except for Senator Daniel Pérsico's (PJ-FPV, San Luis) question on Senator Marino's report, and some dialogues between Senators Ríos and Sanz on the amendments introduced by the Chamber of Deputies, most senators simply presented their opinions on Resolution 125. The joint plenary meetings of the two committees were closed on July 11 at 3:13 p.m.

Committee members had three days to sign one of the committee reports following the agreement at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary on July 7. Senator Ríos' proposal (i.e., CD-42/08 with no amendments) received signatures from 15 out of 29 committee members by July 12,<sup>53</sup> and, thus, it was sent to the floor on July 14 as the majority report. Committee members who did not support the majority report were divided between the other four committee reports described above.<sup>54</sup> One of the less-known facts in the case of Resolution 125 is that the majority report was approved with a slight margin.

Table 5.2 shows how 29 committee members from the two committees signed committee reports.<sup>55</sup> Article 105 of the new Senate rules requires majority reports to be signed by more than half of the committee members. The majority report on the presidential bill should not have been approved if the bill had been discussed only at the Budget Committee because only seven among 15 members supported it. However, thanks to the joint plenary meetings with the Agriculture,

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<sup>52</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Versión Taquigráfica/Plenario de las Comisiones de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca y de Presupuesto y Hacienda* (Record of Committee Meetings of the Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee and the Budget Committee), July 11, 2008.

<sup>53</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "El dictamen del oficialismo sobre retenciones se impuso en las comisiones del Senado" (Committee report of the governing party was launched in the Senate committees), July 12, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16057.html>.

<sup>54</sup>Senators Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta) and José Martínez (ARI, Tierra del Fuego) did not sign any committee report.

<sup>55</sup>Senator Nicolás Fernández (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz) was affiliated with both of the committees.

**Table 5.2** Committee members and Resolution 125

Party	Signed the majority report (15 senators)	Signed a minority report or none of the committee reports (14 senators)
<i>The Budget Committee</i>		
PJ	Fernández (Santa Cruz), Mayans (Formosa), Jenefes (Jujuy), Pampuro (Buenos Aires), Parrilli (Neuquén), Ríos (Corrientes), Guinle (Chubut)*	Latorre (Santa Fe), Romero (Salta)
UCR		Morales (Jujuy), Nikisch (Chaco), Sanz (Mendoza), Verani (Río Negro)
FR		Pinchetti de Sierra
CC		Morales (Tucumán) Estenssoro (City of Buenos Aires)
<i>The Agriculture, Livestock, and Fishing Committee</i>		
PJ	Colazo (Tierra del Fuego), Fernández (Santa Cruz), Gallego (La Pampa), Giusti (Chubut), Perceval (Mendoza), Pérsico (San Luis), Torres (Misiones), Viana (Misiones)	Reutemann (Santa Fe)
UCR	Iturrez de Capellini (Santiago del Estero)	Marino (La Pampa), Massoni (Chubut), Sánchez (Corrientes)
RS		Pérez Alsina (Salta)
ARI		Martínez (Tierra del Fuego)

*Note* The senator with an asterisk (Senator Guinle) signed the majority report with a partial disagreement. Senators' provinces are in parentheses

*Source* Author's elaboration based on data from Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Orden del Día de la Cámara de Senadores* (Committee Reports of the Senate), 445/08, July 11, 2008

Livestock, and Fishing Committee, the majority report could receive the minimum required number of signatures (i.e., 15 signatures in this case) to be discussed on the floor.

Many senators signed committee reports with their copartisans, but some committee members defected from their parties. As my theoretical framework predicted, some committee members engaged in position-taking activities even in committees because the presidential bill was so controversial. For example, two senators from Santa Fe, an agricultural center, publicized their support for farmers. Senator Reutemann, a Senate boss, signed a minority report with his subordinate Senator Latorre. Another PJ Senate boss (Senator Romero) from Salta, which produced more than one million tons of soybean between 2006 and 2007, did not sign the majority report. However, Senator Ada Iturrez de Capellini (UCR-*Frente Cívico por Santiago*, Santiago del Estero) did sign even though her province also depended on cultivation of soybean. Because Governor Zamora, one of the *Radicales K* governors, supported Resolution 125, she also cast an affirmative vote as a governor's subordinate.

By contrast, Senator Pablo Verani (UCR-*Concertación Plural*, Río Negro) signed a minority report even though Governor Saiz (UCR-*Radicales K*, Río Negro) joined Kirchner's demonstration with other PJ governors.<sup>56</sup> Verani was a governor for two terms between 1995 and 2003, and he still had a broad support base in his province. As a result, Verani was independent from Saiz in the case of Resolution 125.

### 5.2.3 Resolution 125 on the Senate Floor

Protesters set almost 200 blockades by the middle of June,<sup>57</sup> and social tension continued to grow. While deputies and senators debated the presidential bill, various groups started camping at the *Plaza*

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<sup>56</sup>This minority report was different from the one that was signed by most of the UCR senators. He signed it with Senator María Sánchez (UCR-*Concertación Plural*, Corrientes).

<sup>57</sup>*Ámbito Financiero*, "Hay unos 200 cortes de ruta por transportistas" (There are about 200 blockades by truck drivers), June 11, 2008.

*del Congreso* (i.e., in front of Congress) to show their position on Resolution 125. In Buenos Aires, there were two huge demonstrations on July 15, one day before the Senate floor session. On the one hand, 103,000 people visited the *Plaza del Congreso* to show their support for Resolution 125 and participated in a demonstration organized by Néstor Kirchner. Important participants in this demonstration included nine PJ governors (Alperovich, Barrionuevo, Capitanich, Closs, Gioja, Insfrán, Jaque, Scioli, and Urribarri) and Governor Saiz (UCR-*Radicales K*, Río Negro).<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the SRA, FAA, CRA, and CONINAGRO organized a huge demonstration against Resolution 125. Approximately 237,000 people gathered in front of the *Monumento de los Españoles* at Palermo, Buenos Aires. At this mass demonstration, the presidents of the SRA, FAA, CRA, and CONINAGRO asked the Senate to not approve the presidential bill.<sup>59</sup>

The floor session for discussing the majority report on the bill CD-42/08 started on July 16 at 10:26 a.m. with 45 senators present. It became a historic long-run session and ended on July 17 at 4:21 a.m. with all 72 senators present. The media provided live coverage, and people who came to the two demonstrations stayed outside to watch the proceedings on huge screens.

According to Senate rules, committee reports must be published seven days before being sent to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary for floor debate. However, because the majority report had been published just two days before the session, this bill was brought to the floor by invoking a *sobre tablas* motion. After several senators questioned the allotted time for their speeches, Senators Giusti (PJ-FPV, Chubut) and Ríos (PJ-FPV, Corrientes) defended the majority report as rapporteurs of the two committees. Presentations by rapporteurs for minority reports followed them. Then, the session proceeded to speeches from 45 senators. The order of the speeches had already been fixed by legislative party bloc leaders.

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<sup>58</sup>*La Capital*, “Gobernadores del PJ le dieron un fuerte espaldarazo a la convocatoria” (The PJ governors gave a strong support to the call), July 16, 2008.

<sup>59</sup>*La Nación*, “Contundente acto del agro en Palermo” (Convincing event of the agricultural sector at Palermo), July 16, 2008.

Senators came and went from the floor during the speeches. Some left the floor to take a break, but some left the floor for political negotiations. Most of the senators clarified their positions on the presidential bill before the session started but two senators did not: Senators Ramón Saadi (PJ-FPV, Catamarca) and Emilio Rached (UCR-*Frente Cívico por Santiago*, Santiago del Estero). In addition, some senators from the president's party thought that they may persuade Senator Horacio Lores (*Movimiento Popular Neuquino*, Neuquén) to support the bill, even though he had already publicized his intention to vote against it.<sup>60</sup> The negotiations had to be undertaken before they took their positions on the bill by their speeches. For the opposition, a concern was Senator Carlos Saúl Menem's (PJ-*Federalismo y Liberación*, La Rioja) physical condition because he may not stay on the floor to cast his negative vote.<sup>61</sup>

Vice-President Julio Cobos (UCR-*Radicales K*) revealed that Senator Nicolás Fernández (PJ-FPV, Santa Cruz) sent him a message asking him to hold a secret meeting at approximately 5 p.m. while he was chairing the floor session. He returned to his office half an hour later.<sup>62</sup> Fernández told him that Rached was going to oppose the bill and asked him to persuade Rached to support it because Rached's vote would lead to a tie. However, he answered Fernández that he could not convince Rached. After the secret meeting, Rached also visited Cobos at approximately 6 p.m. and directly told him that he would vote Nay (Castro 2009).

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<sup>60</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Cobos definió en contra del Gobierno y las retenciones no son ley" (Cobos voted against the government, and the export withholding taxes were not enacted into law), July 17, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16026.html>.

<sup>61</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Cobos definió en contra del Gobierno y las retenciones no son ley" (Cobos voted against the government, and the export withholding taxes were not enacted into law), July 17, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16026.html>.

<sup>62</sup>Including this occasion, Cobos went off the floor seven times during the session. Provisional President of the Senate José Pampuro (PJ-FPV, Buenos Aires), Vice-President of the Senate Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta), and First Vice-President of the Senate Juan Carlos Marino (UCR, La Pampa) chaired the session when Cobos was not on the floor. See Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación* (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate), July 16, 2008.

The president's party succeeded in disciplining Saadi.<sup>63</sup> At approximately 8 p.m., he ended his speech on the floor by declaring his support for the bill. It was regarded as a surprise because the media expected him to vote against the bill.<sup>64</sup> By contrast, the president's party failed to convince Lores. He confirmed his Nay vote in his speech at approximately 9:30 p.m. Menem also returned to the floor to cast his vote.<sup>65</sup> These episodes indicate that a few hours before the voting, senators expected a tie.

Cobos recalled that he started receiving phone calls from the executive branch at approximately 9 p.m. He called Senator Verani (UCR-*Concertación Plural*, Río Negro) to seek the possibility of having a recess of the floor session to postpone voting on the bill. Showing his intention to cast a Nay vote, he also asked Senator José Pampuro (PJ-FPV, Buenos Aires) to find some alternative to avoid a tie when Pampuro visited his office (Castro 2009).

On his way from his office to the floor in the morning of July 17, Cobos found that Pampuro was talking on his cell phone at the *Salón Illia*. Pampuro approached him and asked him to talk with Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers Alberto Fernández. According to Cobos, Fernández also tried to persuade him to support the bill. However, Cobos told Fernández that he was not going to cast an affirmative vote without the president's party accepting a recess of the floor session to postpone the floor voting (Castro 2009).

Cobos returned to the floor, and it was time for the floor voting. All 72 senators were present. At that moment, Senator Miguel Ángel Pichetto (PJ-FPV, Río Negro) proposed a motion to aggregate the *en general* and *en particular* votes together, which was rejected immediately. Table 5.3 reports how senators cast the *en general* vote on the presidential bill.

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<sup>63</sup>He was a Senate boss who governed the province of Catamarca between 1983 and 1987 as well as between 1988 and 1991.

<sup>64</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Cobos definió en contra del Gobierno y las retenciones no son ley" (Cobos voted against the government, and the export withholding taxes were not enacted into law), July 17, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16026.html>.

<sup>65</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación* (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate), July 16, 2008.

Table 5.3 Senators' votes on Resolution 125

Party	Yea (36 senators)	Nay (36 senators)
<i>Senate bosses and Senate bosses' subordinates</i>		
PJ	<b>Colazo</b> (Tierra del Fuego), <b>Filmus</b> (City of Buenos Aires), Gallego (La Pampa), <b>Guinle</b> (Chubut), <b>Miranda</b> (Tucumán), <b>Pérsico</b> (San Luis), <b>Pichetto</b> (Río Negro), <b>Ríos</b> (Corrientes), <b>Saadi</b> (Catamarca)	<b>Basualdo</b> (San Juan), Escudero (Salta), Latorre (Santa Fe), <b>Marín</b> (La Pampa), <b>Menem</b> (La Rioja), Negre de Alonso (San Luis), <b>Reutemann</b> (Santa Fe), <b>Rodríguez Saá</b> (San Luis), <b>Romero</b> (Salta)
UCR		<b>Castillo</b> (Catamarca), Colombo de Acevedo (Catamarca), <b>Marino</b> (La Pampa), <b>Martínez</b> (Santa Cruz), <b>Morales</b> (Jujuy), <b>Nikisch</b> (Chaco), <b>Petcoff Naidenoff</b> (Formosa), <b>Verani</b> (Río Negro)
CC		<b>Estenssoro</b> (City of Buenos Aires)
PS		<b>Giustiniani</b> (Santa Fe)
<i>Governors' subordinates</i>		
PJ	Biancalani (Chaco), Bortolozzi (Formosa), Gioja (San Juan), Giusti (Chubut), Mayans (Formosa), Riofrío (San Juan), Torres (Misiones), Troadello (Mendoza), Vigo (Misiones)	Corregido (Chaco), Quintela (La Rioja), Urquía (Córdoba)
UCR	Iturrez de Capellini (Santiago del Estero)	Rached (Santiago del Estero), Sánchez (Corrientes)
ARI		Díaz (Tierra del Fuego), Martínez (Tierra del Fuego)
MPN		Lores (Neuquén)

(continued)



Table 5.3 (continued)

Party	Yea (36 senators)	Nay (36 senators)
<i>Local subordinates</i>		
PJ	Bongiorno (Río Negro), Calcagno y Maillman (Buenos Aires), Corradi de Beltrán (Santiago del Estero), Fellner (Jujuy), Fernández (Santa Cruz), Forstmann (Santa Cruz), Fuentes (Neuquén), Giri (Córdoba), Guastavino (Entre Ríos), Jenefes (Jujuy), Maza (La Rioja), Osuna (Entre Ríos), Pampuro (Buenos Aires), Parrilli (Neuquén), Perceval (Mendoza), Viana (Misiones)	González de Duhalde (Buenos Aires)
UCR		Massoni (Chubut), Sanz (Mendoza), Vera (Entre Ríos)
CC		Cabanchik (City of Buenos Aires)
RS		Pérez Alsina (Salta)
FR		Pinchetti de Sierra Morales (Tucumán), Salazar (Tucumán)
Vecinalista Partido Nuevo Partido Nuevo	Viudes de Damonte (Corrientes)	Rossi (Córdoba)

Note Senate bosses are in bold. Senators' provinces are in parentheses.

Sources Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores* (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate), July 16, 2008; Baron (2008); *Hoy en la Noticia*, "Cómo votará cada uno de los senadores" (How each senator will vote), July 10, 2008.

The *en general* vote on the presidential bill (CD-45/08) was a 36–36 tie.<sup>66</sup> Senate bosses and their subordinates made this result happen. As Table 5.3 shows, half of them from the PJ voted against the bill. It is worth noting that the dissident group included five senators from the president's FPV legislative bloc. In Chapter 2, I argued that Senate bosses prioritize position-taking on the floor over other legislative activities and that their subordinates are also less likely to support presidential bills on the floor. As provincial party bosses, they have to care about their voters. Moreover, because of their dominance over machine politics, their political futures do not depend on governors, and they are relatively autonomous from the president and national parties. As a consequence, they can make decisions without considering the preferences of governors. For instance, Senators Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta) and Sonia Escudero (PJ-FPV, Salta) decided their positions without communicating with Governor Urtubey (PJ-FPV, Salta). Romero was firm against Resolution 125 regardless of the governor's attitude: "I announced (my position) a long time before (the bill arrived at the Senate). I was against Resolution 125 when the (national) government rejected modifying it and said that we had to vote against it when they decided to send it to the Senate".<sup>67</sup> His subordinate Senator Sonia Escudero (PJ-FPV, Salta) also followed his position.

The case of two PJ senators from La Pampa showed an interesting position-taking strategy. Senate bosses and their subordinates usually vote together, but Senators Rubén Marín (PJ-FPV) and Siliva Gallego (PJ-FPV) voted differently on the presidential bill. The former cast a dissident vote against the bill, whereas the latter supported it. However, this result does not necessarily mean that Gallego betrayed her boss, Marín. The Director of Juan Carlos Marino's (UCR, La Pampa) Office in the Senate, Gabriel Bartolomé, considered that they coordinated their choices and that they supported both the president and farmers by splitting their votes in order to maintain relationships with the both sides.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>No committee member changed his or her position.

<sup>67</sup>Author's interview, August 19, 2009 (translation by the author).

<sup>68</sup>Author's interview, August 24, 2009.

Moreover, all the Senate bosses and their subordinates from the opposition voted against the bill. Even though all of these senators voted with their copartisans, it is also true that Senator Verani (UCR-*Concertación Plural*, Río Negro) voted against his governor. As explained in the previous subsection, he opposed the bill despite Governor Saiz's (UCR-*Radicales K*, Río Negro) support for the president. This case illustrates that the status as a former governor also makes an opposition senator autonomous from his or her governor.

We could also observe the cases in which governors' subordinates defected from their governors.<sup>69</sup> On the one hand, longstanding governors such as Gildo Insfrán (PJ-FPV, Formosa) and José Luis Gioja (PJ-FPV, San Juan) perfectly controlled their subordinates' votes. On the other hand, some freshmen governors failed to convince their subordinates. Despite intensive pressure from the president and her boss, Governor Capitanich (PJ-FPV, Chaco), Senator Elena Corregido (PJ-FPV, Chaco) decided to not support Resolution 125 to protect farmers in Chaco.<sup>70</sup> Senator Quintela (PJ-FPV, La Rioja) also cast a dissident vote. As for the *Radicales K* senators, Senator Rached (UCR-*Frente Cívico por Santiago*, Santiago del Estero) voted against the presidential bill, which contradicted the position of Governor Zamora (UCR-*Radicales K*, Santiago del Estero). According to Vice-President Julio Cobos, Zamora completely lost his control over Rached the day of the floor session (Castro 2009). These examples show that tenure stability is important for governors to control the behavior of their subordinates in the Senate.

How about the behavior of local subordinates? Local subordinates' bosses are not governors or Senate bosses. An interesting characteristic in the Argentine Senate after 2007 is the increase in the number of

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<sup>69</sup>Senator Horacio Lores' (*Movimiento Popular Neuquino*, Neuquén) Nay vote is not regarded as a case of defection because his boss Governor Jorge Sapag (*Movimiento Popular Neuquino*, Neuquén) granted him a freedom of action. See *La Mañana Neuquén*, "Sapag dio libertad de acción a Lores" (Sapag gave Lores freedom of action), July 10, 2008.

<sup>70</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, "Empate técnico" (technical tie), July 11, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-16035.html>.

local subordinates.<sup>71</sup> This phenomenon was due to two reasons. First, Néstor Kirchner did not allow some PJ governors to be reelected in 2007. In 2006, Governor Carlos Rovira (*Alianza Frente Renovador de la Concordia*-FPV, Misiones) called an election of the constituent assembly in Misiones to introduce unlimited gubernatorial reelection. Despite Kirchner's support, however, the opposition, led by Bishop Joaquín Piña, defeated Rovira's candidates by 13% of the votes (Quiroga 2010). In La Rioja, Governor Ángel Maza (PJ-FPV) was impeached by the provincial legislature in the early 2007, and his tenure from 1995 finally came to an end. Following these episodes, Kirchner pressured his copartisan governors to not change their provincial constitutions for reelection, and just four PJ-FPV governors were reelected in 2007.<sup>72</sup> As a result, subordinates who responded to former governors rather than to new governors remained in the Senate. For example, the provincial boss of Senators Liliana Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy) and Guillermo Jenefes (PJ-FPV, Jujuy) was not Governor Walter Barrionuevo but Deputy (former Governor) Eduardo Fellner.

From 2005, in addition, Néstor Kirchner imposed his preferred candidates on the party lists for senatorial seats. Both PJ-FPV senators from the province of Buenos Aires depended on him in terms of their political careers. Senator José Pampuro was Minister of Defense between 2003 and 2005 under the Kirchner administration. Senator Eric Calcagno y Maillmann was appointed as Ambassador to France by Kirchner in 2005.<sup>73</sup> In 2007, Neuquén elected two Kirchner's candidates for the Senate: Marcelo Fuentes and Nanci Parrilli. The former was a friend of Kirchner's from college, whereas the latter was a sister of Oscar Parrilli, General Secretary for the Presidency of the Nation. These senators directly responded to Néstor Kirchner rather than to their governors because they obtained senatorial seats thanks to Kirchner.

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<sup>71</sup>This classification of the senators is based on the information from Baron (2008) and *Hoy en la Noticia*, "Cómo votará cada uno de los senadores" (How each senator will vote), July 10, 2008.

<sup>72</sup>Governor José Alperovich (PJ-FPV, Tucumán) succeeded in introducing constitutional amendment for his reelection before the defeat of Rovira in 2006.

<sup>73</sup>He replaced Cristina Fernández de Kirchner when she assumed the presidency in 2007.

Table 5.3 indicates that most local subordinates voted with their copartisans. However, two local subordinates defected from their parties. Senator Hilda “Chiche” González de Duhalde (PJ, Buenos Aires), former President Eduardo Duhalde’s wife, cast a Nay vote as a rival of Kirchner’s faction. By contrast, Senator Isabel Viudes de Demonte (*Partido Nuevo*, Corrientes) supported the presidential bill neglecting her party’s recommendation.<sup>74</sup> As a result, she was expelled from the party and later joined the PJ-FPV.

The result was a tie (36 to 36), and thus Vice-President Julio Cobos had to cast the tie-breaking vote. Even though tie-breaking votes usually favor presidential bills, there was a suspicion that Cobos would not support Resolution 125 before he revealed his position to Pampuro. For example, he had encouraged some deputies to submit an alternative bill that was going to change the new tax scheme.<sup>75</sup> Despite intense pressure from Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers Alberto Fernández and Senator Pichetto, he cast a Nay vote, killing the bill on July 17 at 4:21 a.m.<sup>76</sup> Because of this Nay vote, export duty on soybeans remained at 35% until President Mauricio Macri, who opposed Resolution 125 as the chief of the government of the City of Buenos Aires, announced its decrease to 30% in 2015.

The case of Resolution 125 suggests that Senate bosses and the Senate bosses’ subordinates can be pivotal players on the floor. In contrast to the case of anti-smoking legislation discussed in the last chapter, it was the Senate bosses and their subordinates who mainly cast Nay votes against the presidential bill on the floor in the crucial days of July 2008.

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<sup>74</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, “El Partido Nuevo reclama a su senadora votar en contra” (The *Partido Nuevo* asked their senator to vote against the bill), July 13, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15922.html>.

<sup>75</sup>*Parlamentario.com*, “Cobos apoya proyecto alternativo de retenciones” (Cobos supports an alternative bill of the export withholding taxes), July 3, 2008, <http://www.parlamentario.com/noticia-15654.html>.

<sup>76</sup>Cámara de Senadores (Senate), *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación* (Record of Floor Sessions of the Senate), July 16, 2008.

## 5.3 Determinants of Floor Voting

How do senators vote on presidential bills on the floor in general? I conducted a statistical analysis using a novel dataset on floor voting in the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007 (Kikuchi 2012). The legislative process on the floor consists of two stages. After receiving the majority report on a bill from committees, the Parliamentary Labor Plenary decides if the bill in question should be discussed on the floor (Stage 3). Then, after the floor debate, senators express their positions on the bill during the floor vote (Stage 4). Presidential bills screened out by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary cannot reach the floor. The statistical models for floor voting should reflect this two-stage structure because estimating models using only roll-call data may cause a selection bias problem. To overcome this serious problem, I also collected information on non-voted bills and ran two models. First, I ran a probit model to identify the conditions under which presidential bills are scheduled for a floor debate by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. Second, considering these conditions in the selection equation, I also estimated a Heckman probit model that predicts senators' affirmative votes on presidential bills. This approach helps model the two-stage structure of floor voting in an integrated way.

### 5.3.1 Influences on Decisions of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary

The Parliamentary Labor Plenary is an agenda-setting office comprising the country's vice-president (or provisional president of the Senate if he or she is absent) and leaders of legislative party blocs. What influences the decisions of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary? I assert that four factors influence the fates of presidential bills. First, decisions on scheduling bills for a floor debate depend on content of presidential bills. Parliamentary action plans are expected to be signed by all leaders of the legislative party blocs. Because of this consensus-based nature of floor agenda-setting, controversial bills are more likely to be blocked at this stage, and bills with committee amendments tend to be discussed on

the floor. Bills initiated in the Chamber of Deputies are also likely to be discharged from the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. Alemán and Calvo (2008) argued that lower chambers tend to be more fragmented than upper chambers regarding partisan composition and representational conflicts and found that the Argentine Senate approved more presidential bills than the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, if bills have already passed the more difficult screening process in the Chamber of Deputies, those bills should also be acceptable to the Senate.

Second, the majority status of the president's party should be important. Cox and McCubbins (2005) argued that agenda setters consider the bills' probability of being approved when they schedule bills for floor debates. If a bill is unlikely to be approved on the floor, it should not be scheduled for a floor session. Therefore, the country's vice-president schedules fewer bills for floor debates if the president's party does not hold a majority of seats because the bills are more likely to be voted down on the floor.

Third, the number of legislative party blocs should alter the fates of presidential bills because it changes the number of members in the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. As explained earlier, this agenda-setting office comprises the country's vice-president (or the provisional president of the Senate) and the leaders of all legislative party blocs, and a consensus rule is used in its decision-making. Thus, it becomes more difficult to reach an agreement as the number of leaders of legislative party blocs increases.

Fourth, it should be expected that fewer presidential bills would be discussed on the floor in election years. Even when there is no senatorial election, senators are busy helping presidential, gubernatorial, and deputy candidates' campaigns in election years. Senators tend to hold fewer floor sessions in those years. Because the number of bills that senators may discuss in each session is limited, the Parliamentary Labor Plenary should schedule fewer bills in election years.

### 5.3.1.1 Modeling Decisions of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary

To test these expectations, I estimated a probit model for Stage 3. As is the case of Model 4.1, the behavior of individual members of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary is not observable from the available information presented in Chapter 3. The units of analysis of this model

are thus set at the bill level: all the presidential bills reported to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary between 1983 and 2007.

The dependent variable is *floor discussion*. It is coded as 1 if a presidential bill  $j$  is scheduled for discussion on the floor. Following Calvo (2007), I collected data on presidential bills (*proyectos de ley*), except on bills that (a) authorize the president to travel abroad, (b) confirm presidential appointees, and (c) ratify international treaties on good neighborliness. The number of relevant presidential bills that reached the Parliamentary Labor Plenary was 700 (Kikuchi 2012), and 675 bills were coded as 1 (96.4%).<sup>77</sup> I used Calvo and Sagarzazu's (2011) dataset and the website of the Chamber of Deputies to obtain information on the dependent variable.<sup>78</sup>

The first three independent variables capture content of presidential bills. Expecting that senators are less likely to support bills that negatively impact their provincial interests, I used the coding scheme of Cheibub et al. (2009) for a *centralizing measure*. As was done in Chapter 4, this variable is coded as 1 if a presidential bill changes the tax system in general,<sup>79</sup> increases the share of the national government's revenue and decreases the share of subnational governments' revenue, directly affects the interests of some subnational units, or limits the autonomy of governors and mayors. Using Calvo and Sagarzazu's (2011) dataset and the database provided on the website of the Chamber of Deputies, I coded 244 bills as centralizing measures.

By contrast, presidential bills are expected to be acceptable to most senators if committees have amended them. Moreover, presidential bills initiated in the Chamber of Deputies arrive at the Senate only if they are not screened out by the lower chamber. The *Committee amendments* variable is coded as 1 if a presidential bill has already been amended by committees. Based on an original dataset used in the previous chapter (Kikuchi 2011), 162 bills were coded as 1. *Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* is another dummy variable coded as 1 if the president bill

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<sup>77</sup>I did not exclude presidential bills with successful bypassing (*sobre tablas* or *preferencia*) motions because the leaders of legislative party blocs discuss most of them at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary in order to avoid their defeat.

<sup>78</sup>I would like to thank Ernesto Calvo for generously sharing his datasets.

<sup>79</sup>They considered that presidential bills that change the tax system should be subnational-depriving legislation.



in question is originally submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. I used Calvo and Sagarzazu's (2011) dataset and the database on the website of the Chamber of Deputies for generating this variable. A total of 418 bills in this quantitative analysis were originally initiated in the lower chamber.

The vice-president is expected to schedule fewer bills for floor meetings when the president's party does not hold a majority of seats. To test this dynamic, I included the *majority status of the president's party*. This is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the president's party holds a majority in the Senate. In the dataset used for this analysis, 432 bills were introduced by PJ presidents (Menem after December 1989, Duhalde, and Kirchner) who enjoyed majority status.

The last two independent variables are the *number of legislative party blocs* and *election year*. The former measures the number of legislative party blocs on the Senate floor when a presidential bill reaches the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, which ranged from 7 (between 1989 and 1991) to 16 (between 2005 and 2007) in my dataset (Kikuchi 2012). The latter is coded as 1 if there is a presidential, gubernatorial, or national legislative election when a presidential bill arrived at the Parliamentary Labor Plenary (i.e., in legislative years 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, or 2007). The Parliamentary Labor Plenary received 339 bills in election years.

Equation (5.1) includes the variables described above to predict the decisions of the Parliamentary Labor Plenary:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{floor discussion}_j = & b_0 + b_1(\text{centralizing measure}_j) \\
 & + b_2(\text{committee amendments}_j) \\
 & + b_3(\text{bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies}_j) \\
 & + b_4(\text{majority status of the president's party}_j) \\
 & + b_5(\text{number of legislative party blocs}_j) \\
 & + b_6(\text{election year}_j)
 \end{aligned} \tag{5.1}$$

### 5.3.1.2 Statistical Results

Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I estimated Eq. (5.1) using the probit model with robust standard errors. Table 5.4 reports the results of this statistical test.

**Table 5.4** Determinants of a presidential bill being scheduled for floor discussion

Independent variables	Model 5.1
Centralizing measure	.063 (.211)
Committee amendments	-.598 (.187)***
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	.293 (.204)
Majority status of the president's party	-.131 (.285)
Number of legislative party blocs	-.091 (.040)**
Election year	-.342 (.203)*
Constant	3.145 (.441)****
Wald chi2(6)	27.90
Prob>chi2	.0001
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.1347
Log pseudolikelihood	-93.323655
N	700

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*\* $p < .001$

Source Author's elaboration

Even though it is rare for the Parliamentary Labor Plenary to block presidential bills, this model shows that some factors influence its decisions. Among the three variables that measure content of presidential bills, the coefficient for *committee amendments* is negative and significant at the .01 level. Contrary to my initial expectation, presidential bills are less likely to be discussed on the floor if committees amend them. As my case study about the 2005 anti-smoking bill illustrates, introducing committee amendments is another way of shelving presidential bills because the amendment process in committees is time-consuming. As a consequence, some of the presidential bills with committee amendments are killed by the two-year time limit when they reach the Parliamentary Labor Plenary.<sup>80</sup> By contrast, the coefficients for the *centralizing measure* and *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* variables are not significant.

<sup>80</sup>Another possible causal story would be that the president kills amended bills using his or her agenda-setting power over the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. However, it is unlikely in Argentina because the president possesses line-item veto that allows him or her to deactivate amended parts of presidential bills.

Interestingly, Model 5.1 shows that the share of senators from the president's party does not change the outcomes of presidential bills in the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. The coefficient for *majority status of the president's party* variable is not significant. This finding confirms my intuition that the president may keep his or her agenda-setting power over the floor to some extent even when the president's party does not hold a majority of seats because the Parliamentary Labor Plenary is chaired by the country's vice-president or the provisional president of the Senate, who responds to the president. As a result, regardless of the share of the president's party in the upper chamber, presidential bills are rarely screened out at Stage 3.

Model 5.1 also indicates that the likelihood of presidential bills being discussed on the floor depends on the number of legislative party blocs and electoral calendar. Presidential bills are less likely to be discharged from the Parliamentary Labor Plenary as the number of legislative party blocs increases because it becomes more difficult to develop consensus about parliamentary action plans. The negative and significant coefficient for *election year* confirms that there are fewer floor sessions in election years and that the Parliamentary Labor Plenary schedules fewer bills for floor debates.

I calculated predicted probabilities for the significant variables in Model 5.1, which are reported in Table 5.5. Predicted probabilities indicate the degree of impact exerted by independent variables in non-linear models. Consider the case where the Parliamentary Labor Plenary with 10 legislative party blocs in a non-election year under majority control of the president's party receives a general bill (i.e., not a centralizing measure) without committee amendments initiated in the Senate. In this case, the probability that the bill reaches the floor is .982. This probability decreases to .934 if the bill has been amended by committees. The probability drops to .959 when the floor consists of 14 legislative party blocs, whereas the probability slightly goes up to .991 when there are seven legislative party blocs on the floor. In the case of an election year, the probability decreases to .961. Overall, changes in predicted probabilities are slight because it is rare for the Parliamentary Labor Plenary to block presidential bills.

**Table 5.5** Predicted probabilities of a presidential bill being scheduled for floor discussion

Baseline case	.982 (.963–1.001)
Bill with committee amendments	.934 (.873–.994)
More legislative party blocs: 14 blocs	.959 (.923–.995)
Less legislative party blocs: 7 blocs	.991 (.978–1.005)
Bill in an election year	.961 (.932–.990)

*Note* 95% confidence interval in parentheses. Baseline assumes the case in which the Parliamentary Labor Plenary with 10 legislative party blocs in a non-election year under majority control of the president's party receives a general bill without committee amendments initiated in the Senate

*Source* Author's elaboration

### 5.3.2 How Do Senators Behave on the Floor?

In accordance with parliamentary action plans published by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, senators discuss and cast their votes on presidential bills. How do they behave on the floor? I claim that senators' voting behavior depends on their institutional positions. On the one hand, governors' subordinates should be less active on the floor than in committees because they do not focus on publicizing their legislative activities due to a lack of a direct linkage with voters. On the other hand, Senate bosses' priorities in electoral strategies and their autonomy from both national parties and the president encourage them to engage in position-taking for voters (H2). Senate bosses' subordinates are also expected to behave in the same way (H3b) because their political careers depend on their bosses. Finally, because senators' political careers are based at the provincial level, senators are less likely to support centralizing measures on the floor (H4d) as well as at other stages of the legislative process.

### 5.3.2.1 Modeling the Two-Stage Nature of the Legislative Process on the Floor

How can we test these hypotheses? Senators do not have opportunities to vote on bills that have been screened out by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. I thus used the Heckman probit technique to model the two-stage structure of the legislative process on the floor. The Heckman procedure was originally developed to overcome the problem of selection bias but can also be used to estimate two-stage models. Following Heckman (1976), Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) developed a technique to estimate a probit model with sample selection. This is an appropriate technique for my floor voting model because the ultimate dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that captures whether or not a senator casts a Yea vote on a presidential bill. The units of analysis are senators for all the presidential bills reported to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary between 1983 and 2007.

I used Eq. (5.1) as the selection equation of the floor voting model, but the number of cases included in the selection equation is different from the  $N$  of Model 5.1 for three reasons. First, the units of analysis are different (senator-bills vs. bills). Second, most presidential bills under the old Senate rules before 2004 were not useful to estimate the model because there was no roll-call vote on them.<sup>81</sup> Third, I excluded the cases in which (a) a senator was absent from the session, (b) a senator declared his or her abstention at the session,<sup>82</sup> (c) senators voted on the same bill for the second time, or (d) a senator's province did not have an elected governor. As a result, this analysis considered 125 bills, and the  $N$  came to 6260.

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<sup>81</sup>Heckman's (1976) two-step procedure cannot be used for my analysis because the dependent variable of the outcome equation is not continuous. See Bushway et al. (2007).

<sup>82</sup>Abstention and absence are recorded differently in the Argentine Senate. A senator's behavior is regarded as abstention if (a) he or she speaks up for declaring his or her abstention from voting or (b) he or she pushes the button of "abstention" at his or her desk on the floor. If a senator is not physically present at the moment of voting, it is recorded as absence. The definition of an "abstention votes" differs under the new Senate rules after 2002 and the old rules. Article 212 of the new Senate rules prescribes that "abstention votes" do not count toward a quorum, but they were conventionally regarded as Nay votes under the old rules. See also Chapter 3.

Regarding descriptive statistics for the variables in the selection equation, the frequencies of events (i.e., number of cases coded as 1) were 4769 (100 bills) for *floor discussion*, 2854 (55 bills) for *centralizing measure*, 1930 (38 bills) for *committee amendments*, 2873 (59 bills) for *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies*, 5879 (115 bills) for *majority status of the president's party*, and 2636 (51 bills) for *election year*, respectively. The *number of legislative party blocs* ranged from 8 (between 1983 and 1988 and between 1993 and 1994) to 16 (between 2005 and 2007).

The Heckman procedure requires at least one exclusion restriction that only explains the selection in a model. Among the covariates in Eq. (5.1), the *majority status of the president's party* and *number of legislative party blocs* variables are exclusion restrictions. These variables are expected to influence agenda-setting by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary but not each individual senator's vote on the floor (i.e., dependent variable of the outcome equation).

The outcome equation estimates the conditions under which individual senators support presidential bills on the floor. Let *floor support* be the dependent variable. It captures whether an individual senator casts an affirmative vote on a bill introduced by the president. The value of *floor support* is 1 if a senator casts a Yea vote on a presidential bill at the *en general* vote. Otherwise, it is coded as 0.<sup>83</sup> Data on the dependent variable of the outcome equation are treated as missing if a senator does not have an opportunity to vote on a bill (i.e., the bill is screened out by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary). I coded 4204 cases (88.2%) as 1 using congressional records (*Diario de Sesiones*).

The first five variables and interaction terms in the outcome equation are critical for testing my hypotheses. Based on Kikuchi and Lodola (2008), I identified Senate bosses and subordinates in Chapter 3. I also classified three types of subordinates according to their principals at the provincial level in that chapter. The *governor's subordinate*, *Senate boss*, and *Senate boss's subordinate* variables capture categories of individual senators.<sup>84</sup> This

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<sup>83</sup>I coded as 0 cases in which (a) a senator cast a Nay vote or (b) a senator declared his or her abstention under the old Senate rules.

<sup>84</sup>The baseline category is local subordinate.

statistical test includes 114 governors' subordinates (1890 cases), 86 Senate bosses (2269 cases), and 19 Senate bosses' subordinates (580 cases). The latter two variables test hypotheses H2 and H3b presented in Chapter 2. Senate bosses and their subordinates are expected to cast fewer affirmative votes on presidential bills than other senators.

*Governor's subordinate* is interacted with *longstanding governor* to test my hypothesis about the behavior of governors' subordinates. These variables should not generate significant coefficients because longstanding governors' subordinates prioritize internal credit-claiming in committees by shelving presidential bills over position-taking on the floor. *Longstanding governor* is coded as 1 if an incumbent governor from a senator's province is in office for more than one gubernatorial term. I used Tow (2011) for coding this variable, and 30 longstanding governors (2559 cases) are considered in this statistical test.<sup>85</sup>

The *centralizing measure* variable serves for testing hypothesis H4d. My theoretical framework predicts that senators tend to cast more dissident votes on centralizing measures because their political careers are based at the provincial level. The presidents introduced 55 centralizing measures (2854 cases) on which roll-call votes were taken between 1983 and 2007.

The outcome equation contains 11 further variables as controls. *Committee amendments*, *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies* and *election year* are included in this equation as well as in Eq. (5.1). Among the 125 bills in the analysis, 38 bills (1930 cases) had suffered committee amendments, 59 bills (2873 cases) had been initiated in the Chamber of Deputies, and 51 bills (2636 cases) were introduced by the president in one of the election years.

Some of the control variables are related to the characteristics of senators and their provinces. *President's party* is coded as 1 if a senator is affiliated with the president's party. The president's party has dominated the Argentine Senate for many years, and 150 out of 244 senators (3777

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<sup>85</sup>This number does not include Ramón Saadi (PJ, Catamarca), who was also a longstanding governor between 1988 and 1991. There was no roll call on the *en general* vote during that period.

cases) in this analysis were affiliated with that party.<sup>86</sup> *UCR-PJ dimension* captures the ideal point of a senator on the partisan dimension, which was estimated in Chapter 3. This dimension places Radicals on the low end of the scale and Peronists on the high end of the scale, and the ideal point ranged from  $-2.63$  (Senator Carlos Prades (UCR, Santa Cruz) between 2003 and 2005) to  $2.16$  (Senator Edgardo Murguía (PJ, Santa Cruz) between 1986 and 1989). I coded the *small national parties* variable 1 if a senator is a member of the FREPASO, the Socialist Party, or *Recrear*, and *provincial parties* were coded as 1 if a senator is not affiliated with national parties (i.e., the PJ, UCR, FREPASO, Socialist Party, and *Recrear*). Reflecting small share of those parties, six senators (209 cases) from one of the small national parties and 30 senators (622 cases) from one of the provincial parties are included in this analysis. *Share of provincial tax revenues* captures the provincial government autonomy from federal transfer programs. It is calculated as the proportion of provincial tax revenues over total current revenues for a senator's province, which ranged from  $2.62$  (Catamarca in 1984) to  $86.16$  (City of Buenos Aires in 1998). I obtained information to generate this variable from Lodola (2010) and the website of the Ministry of Interior.<sup>87</sup> *Tenure* measures the number of years for which a senator has served. The value for freshman senators is 0, whereas the maximum of *tenure* was 21 for Eduardo Menem (PJ-*Lealtad y dignidad Peronista*, La Rioja) in 2005.

The last three control variables are based on the information from Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) and the database on the website of the Chamber of Deputies. *Presidential approval* measures the percentage of national survey respondents with a positive image of the president, which ranged from 13% (President Duhalde in 2002) to 72% (President Alfonsín in 1984) in this statistical test. I also generated the *bypassing motion* and *old Senate rules* variables. The former is coded as 1 if a presidential bill bypassed the committee stage with a *sobre tablas* or *preferencia* motion, whereas the latter is coded as 1 if a senator votes on a presidential bill initiated under the old rules before 2004. Among

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<sup>86</sup>There were 267 senators between 1983 and 2007, but some of them were not included in this analysis because they did not have an opportunity to cast roll-call vote or they were from provinces without elected governors.

<sup>87</sup>I appreciate Germán Lodola for sharing his dataset with me.



the 125 presidential bills used for this quantitative analysis, 29 bills reached the floor by bypassing motions (1402 cases), and 23 bills were voted under the old Senate rules (1105 cases).

The outcome equation for the floor voting model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{floor support}_{ij} = & b_0 + b_1(\text{governor's subordinate}_i) + b_2(\text{longstanding governor}_i) \\
 & + b_3(\text{governor's subordinate}_i \times \text{longstanding governor}_i) \\
 & + b_4(\text{Senate boss}_i) + b_5(\text{Senate boss's subordinate}_i) \\
 & + b_6(\text{centralizing measure}_j) \\
 & + b_7(\text{committee amendments}_j) \\
 & + b_8(\text{bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies}_j) \\
 & + b_9(\text{election year}_j) + b_{10}(\text{president's party}_i) \\
 & + b_{11}(\text{UCR-PJ dimension}_i) \\
 & + b_{12}(\text{small national parties}_i) + b_{13}(\text{provincial parties}_i) \\
 & + b_{14}(\text{share of provincial tax revenues}_i) + b_{15}(\text{tenure}_i) \\
 & + b_{16}(\text{presidential approval}_j) + b_{17}(\text{bypassing motion}_j) \\
 & + b_{18}(\text{old Senate rules}_j)
 \end{aligned} \tag{5.2}$$

As a selection equation, Eq. (5.1) estimates if a senator has an opportunity to discuss a presidential bill  $j$ . Then, Eq. (5.2) estimates if a senator  $i$  casts an affirmative vote on a presidential bill  $j$  as an outcome equation. Because each equation has a dichotomous variable as its dependent variable, I ran these equations simultaneously using the Heckman probit. Because observations in the first stage are not independent within bills, standard errors were clustered on presidential bills for inference.

### 5.3.2.2 Statistical Results

The statistical results for my floor voting model are presented in Table 5.6. Model 5.2 used all the available data on floor voting between 1983 and 2007.

Considering the factors that make the Parliamentary Labor Plenary schedule debates on presidential bills (Stage 3), the outcome equation predicts how senators will cast their votes on presidential bills on the

**Table 5.6** Determinants of support for presidential bills on the floor

Independent variables	Model 5.2
<i>Stage 3: The Parliamentary Labor Plenary</i>	
Centralizing measure	.477 (.305)
Committee amendments	-.672 (.417)
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	.390 (.405)
Majority status of the president's party	-1.956 (.799)**
Number of legislative party blocs	.367 (.104)****
Election year	-.814 (.310)***
Constant	-2.368 (.970)**
<i>Stage 4: Floor Voting</i>	
Governor's subordinate	-.062 (.079)
Longstanding governor	.032 (.061)
Governor's subordinate × Longstanding governor	.544 (.279)*
Senate boss	-.311 (.049)****
Senate boss's subordinate	-.300 (.098)***
Centralizing measure	-.696 (.196)****
Committee amendments	.024 (.281)
Bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies	-.234 (.245)
Election year	.238 (.238)
President's party	1.458 (.213)****
UCR-PJ dimension	.180 (.083)**
Small national parties	.229 (.154)
Provincial parties	.271 (.133)**
Share of provincial tax revenues	-.003 (.002)
Tenure	.034 (.015)**
Presidential approval	.002 (.012)
Bypassing motion	.137 (.229)
Old Senate rules	-.838 (.322)***
Constant	1.296 (.577)**
Wald chi2 (18)	287.25
Prob>chi2	.0000
Rho	-.850 (.333)
Log pseudolikelihood	-3542.572
N (total/censored observations/uncensored observations)	6260/1491/4769

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*\* $p < .001$

Source Author's elaboration

floor (Stage 4). Contrary to the committee voting model in the previous chapter, Model 5.2 generates an insignificant rho value, which means that there is no selection bias.<sup>88</sup> In the case of bills submitted by legislators, Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011) as well as Calvo (2014) argue that the Chamber Directorate, the lower house's agenda-setting institution equivalent to the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, plays a crucial role as a gatekeeping authority in the Chamber of Deputies. By contrast, the Parliamentary Labor Plenary in the Senate just blocked 25 out of 700 presidential bills in my 1983-2007 dataset. Because this gatekeeping authority is dominated by the president, its main function is screening out bills initiated by legislators so that the floor has sufficient time to discuss presidential bills. As a consequence, the rho is not significant in Model 5.2.

Statistical results for Stage 3 are different from those given by Model 5.1 because of the dominance of roll-call data under the new Senate rules. Because most floor voting data before 2004 are unavailable due to small number of roll-call votes under the old Senate rules, the results for the selection equation reflect more the period between 2004 and 2007. In Model 5.1, the coefficients for *committee amendments*, *election year*, and *number of legislative party blocs* are negative and significant. *Election year* produces the same result as in Model 5.2, but the significance of the coefficient for *committee amendments* is flashed out, while the coefficient for *number of legislative party blocs* in the selection equation is positive and significant. Moreover, *majority status of the president's party* also generates a significant coefficient in Model 5.2.

The outcome equation of Model 5.2 estimates the conditions under which senators support presidential bills on the floor. Contrary to the committee voting model in the last chapter, the floor voting model shows that Senate bosses and their subordinates are protagonists on the floor. The coefficient for Senate bosses is negative and significant, which confirms my hypothesis regarding legislative behavior of Senate bosses

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<sup>88</sup>A negative rho means that the "true" impacts of covariates on senators' voting choice are underestimated. It is generated because only limited data are available for the floor voting before 2004, but its insignificance indicates that the results for Model 5.2 are not biased.

(H2). As my theory predicts, Senate bosses are more likely to cast a dissident vote against presidential bills than other senators because they do not face the dilemma of intergovernmental relationships, and they are autonomous from the president and national parties. Senate bosses from the president's party do not depend heavily on the president and their parties at the national level because they have personal political machines at the provincial level that help their political campaigns.

Senate bosses from the opposition also maintain greater distance from the president than their copartisans. This tendency reflects the consensus-based nature of floor agenda-setting by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. Out of 100 presidential bills voted on the floor in my dataset, leaders of the PJ and UCR voted together on 71 bills. As a consequence, Senate bosses from opposition parties, who are more autonomous from their parties than their copartisans, are also less likely to support presidential bills on the floor.

My hypothesis about the behavior of Senate bosses' subordinates is also confirmed by Model 5.2. The coefficient for senators in this category is negative and significant at the .01 level. At Stages 1a and 1b, Senate bosses and their subordinates behave differently in committees. By contrast, this floor voting model shows that they vote together on the floor. This finding is consistent with the evidence that there was no case in which Senate bosses' subordinates defected from their bosses on the floor between 1983 and 2007 (Kikuchi 2012).<sup>89</sup>

As in the case of the committee voting model in the last chapter, the *governor's subordinate* variable was interacted with the *longstanding governor* variable to test my conditional hypothesis. Following Brambor et al. (2006), I calculated conditional coefficients, which are reported in Table 5.7.

Interestingly, governors' subordinates' behavior during floor voting is identical to their behavior during committee voting. As in the case of Stage 2 in committees, longstanding governors' subordinates are

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<sup>89</sup>An exception was the case of two PJ senators from La Pampa on Resolution 125 in 2008, which was analyzed in this chapter. However, as I described, Senators Rubén Marín (PJ-FPV) and Siliva Gallego (PJ-FPV) strategically decided to vote differently on the presidential bill.

**Table 5.7** Conditional coefficients of the floor voting model

Main variable	
Intervening conditions	
Governor's subordinate	-.062 (.079)
Longstanding governor = 0	
Governor's subordinate	.482 (.254)*
Longstanding governor = 1	

Note Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .10$

Source Author's elaboration

more likely to cast Yea votes than other senators at Stage 4. My theoretical framework predicts that governors' influences on legislative behavior are conditioned by their tenure stability and, thus, I calculated the conditional coefficients under two scenarios: a freshman governor's subordinate and a longstanding governor's subordinate. The conditional coefficient for the former is not significant while that for the latter is positive and significant at the 90% confidence level. Governors' tenure stability shapes their subordinates' behavior on the floor as well as in committees. On the one hand, longstanding governors' subordinates may block unwelcome bills at Stage 1a and willingly support other presidential bills at Stages 2 and 4. These subordinates actively engage in shelving presidential initiatives for their governors, and most bills discussed on the floor have already passed this screening process. On the other hand, freshmen governors do not have enough power to make their subordinates oppose presidential bills on the floor as well as in committees. As a result, they do not have an incentive to be active on the floor.

Content of presidential bills also influences the decisions of individual senators on the floor. The coefficient for the *centralizing measure* variable is negative and significant, which confirms the prediction of H4d. This result indicates that individual senators are less likely to support centralizing measures on the floor regardless of their principals and party affiliations. Because senators' political careers are based at the provincial rather than the national level, it is important for them to claim credit as well as take their positions when the Senate deals with centralizing measures. In the case of the presidential bill on Resolution 125, not only PJ Senate bosses and their subordinates but also governors' subordinates and local subordinates from the president's party cast dissident votes against the bill.

The results for some variables in the outcome equation of Model 5.2 confirm that high party unity in legislative voting in the Argentine Senate is a product of party discipline and party cohesion. On the one hand, the *president's party* generates a positive and significant coefficient, which means that the president has institutional advantages to discipline his or her troops. For example, the president may manage the floor agenda using his or her dominance over the Parliamentary Labor Plenary. He or she also may control allocation of floor authority positions and committee seats in the Senate through the party. Moreover, as Morgenstern (2004) argued, national party endorsement is sometimes important for senators' political careers because of Argentina's balloting system. On the other hand, the coefficient for *UCR-PJ dimension* is positive and significant at the .05 level. Given that most presidential bills in my dataset were introduced by PJ presidents, this finding indicates that preference cohesion is also a source of party unity in the Argentine Senate. The coefficient for *provincial parties* is also positive and significant, indicating that these parties tend to maintain a good relationship with the president. By contrast, the *small national parties* variable does not generate such a coefficient because they tend to be the opposition in provincial politics.

Regarding the other covariates, the positive and significant coefficient for the *tenure* variable shows that the likelihood of a senator voting Yea increases as the number of years serving as a senator increases. It seems that this finding reflects static ambition of some senators. The political value of holding a senatorial seat is not necessarily high in Argentina, and many senators leave the Senate even before the expiration of their terms. However, it is also true that some senators choose to stay in Buenos Aires for many years. It is thus considered that senators with static ambition tend to be cooperative with the president's initiatives so that they can keep their senatorial seats. The *old Senate rules* variable exhibits a negative and significant coefficient because floor votes were recorded only when clear disagreement among the senators was expected under the old rules. By contrast, *committee amendments*, *bill initiated in the Chamber of Deputies*, *election year*, *share of provincial tax revenues*, *presidential approval*, and *bypassing motion* variables do not produce significant coefficients.

**Table 5.8** Predicted probabilities of a senator's Yea vote on a presidential bill

	President's party	Opposition party
Baseline case	.991 (.980–1.002)	.713 (.542–.884)
Longstanding governor's subordinate	.998 (.994–1.002)	.859 (.696–1.023)
Senate boss	.981 (.958–1.003)	.599 (.395–.804)
Senate boss's subordinate	.981 (.957–1.005)	.604 (.388–.819)
General bill	.999 (.997–1.001)	.896 (.810–.982)
Provincial party		.845 (.720–.969)
Experienced senator (with six-year experience in the Senate)	.993 (.985–1.002)	.747 (.586–.908)
Freshman senator	.989 (.975–1.003)	.677 (.492–.862)
Old Senate rules	.938 (.840–1.037)	.391 (.070–.713)

Note 95% confidence interval in parentheses. Baseline assumes the case in which a local subordinate from the province of La Pampa (i.e., *share of provincial tax revenues* variable is set at 18.422) with three-year experience as a senator votes on a centralizing measure without committee amendments and bypassing motions, which was introduced by a president with average popularity (set at 44.36%) in the Senate with 14 legislative party blocs where the president's party holds a majority of seats, in a non-election year under the new Senate rules. This simulation considers the PJ (i.e., *UCR-PJ dimension* set at 1), the president's party, and the UCR (i.e., *UCR-PJ dimension* set at -1) the opposition except for cases of senators from a small national or provincial party

Source Author's elaboration

Predicted probabilities for important independent variables of Stage 4 are presented in Table 5.8 to compare the impact of each variable on the dependent variable. This simulation assumed the PJ (i.e., *UCR-PJ dimension* set at 1) as the president's party and the UCR (i.e., *UCR-PJ dimension* set at -1) as the opposition party except for cases in which a senator is affiliated with a provincial party.<sup>90</sup> Imagine a case in which a local subordinate from the province of La Pampa (i.e.,

<sup>90</sup>In this case, the value of *UCR-PJ dimension* is set at 0.

*share of provincial tax revenues* variable is set at 18.4%)<sup>91</sup> with three years of experience as a senator votes on a centralizing measure without committee amendments or bypassing motions that was introduced by a president with average popularity (set at 44.36%) in a Senate with 14 legislative party blocs, where the president's party holds a majority of seats, in a non-election year, and under the new Senate rules. In this baseline case, the PJ senator's probability of supporting the presidential bill is quite high at .991. It rises higher if this senator is a longstanding governor's subordinate (.998). By contrast, it drops to .981 if he or she is a Senate boss or a Senate boss's subordinate. However, this probability also suggests that they do not always act as an internal opposition. Rather, Senate bosses and their subordinates from the president's party strategically cast their dissident votes in a careful manner.

Predicted probabilities in Table 5.8 also reveal interesting aspects of the behavior of opposition senators. On the one hand, being a longstanding governor's subordinate increases the probability from .713 to .859. Because governors' tenure stability makes their subordinates seek to shelve unwelcome initiatives in committees regardless of their party affiliations, such subordinates have an incentive to support bills on the floor that have not been screened by themselves in committees. On the other hand, being a Senate boss from the opposition significantly decreases his or her likelihood of supporting a presidential bill. The predicted probability of casting a Yea vote drops to .599 if the senator is a boss and to .604 if the senator is a boss's subordinate. These numbers reveal that Senate bosses from the opposition have more freedom to take positions than their counterparts from the president's party and that Senate bosses' subordinates strictly follow their bosses. That is, even when the president's party and the opposition agree on approval of a presidential initiative, it is possible that Senate bosses and their subordinates from the opposition will vote against it.

The latter findings are consistent with Burdman (2010), who found that "*alfas*" (high-profile politicians at the top of the party list) prioritize

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<sup>91</sup>It was the mean of the *share of provincial tax revenues* variable for the province of La Pampa between 1983 and 2007.



electoral games over legislative activities when they hold national legislative seats because they are thinking about resigning to run for presidential or gubernatorial elections before their tenure expires. From this perspective, it seems that opposition Senate bosses play a high-profile electoral game on the floor. Contrary to other opposition senators such as governors' subordinates, who are sometimes forced to support presidential bills to maintain a good relationship between the president and their governors, Senate bosses may adopt position-taking strategies against the president to defeat a candidate from the president's party in the next presidential or gubernatorial elections.

Predicted probabilities underline the consensus-based nature of floor agenda-setting by the Parliamentary Labor Plenary if senators vote on a general bill (i.e., not on a centralizing measure). It will be difficult to find a dissident senator from the president's party because the predicted probability goes up to .999. An opposition senator's likelihood of supporting the bill also increases from .713 to .896.

Senators from provincial parties are more likely to support presidential bills than other senators, even though they are opposition senators. Their likelihood of a Yea vote on a centralizing measure is .845. Because these parties tend to hold governorships, it is important for them to maintain good relations with the president.

The likelihood of a senator's Yea vote on a presidential bill also depends on his or her experience as a senator. If the senator has already served for six years, the likelihood goes up to .993 if a senator is from the president's party and to .747 if a senator is from the opposition. In the case of a freshman senator, by contrast, the likelihood drops to .989 and .677, respectively.

Finally, predicted probabilities reflect the partisan division between the PJ and the UCR. Under the old Senate rules, the likelihood of an affirmative vote on a centralizing measure is .938 in the case of a senator from the president's party and .391 in the case of an opposition senator. Because it was not an obligation to use roll calls before 2004, roll-call votes were requested only when a clear partisan division was expected. As a result, most opposition senators cast negative votes against presidential bills when roll calls were used under the old Senate rules.

In sum, even though this subsection's findings recognize the conventional wisdom that party affiliation explains roll-call behavior in Argentina, the statistical test also reveals which types of senators have an impact on the differences in voting behavior among copartisans. On the one hand, as H2 and H3b predict, Senate bosses and their subordinates are less likely to support presidential bills than other senators. On the other hand, Senate bosses from the opposition may distance themselves from the president and their national parties on the floor. Longstanding governors' subordinates are more likely to support presidential bills during floor voting because they have already screened out unwelcome bills at Stage 1a in committees. These findings indicate that senators adjust their strategies in the legislative process according to their institutional positions.

## 5.4 Conclusion

Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? When do senators oppose presidential bills? I explored these questions using data on senatorial behavior on the floor. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that Senate bosses and Senate bosses' subordinates are very active at the floor stage. In the case of Resolution 125, it was Senate bosses and their subordinates who led to a tied vote. Due to the position-taking strategy of PJ senators from soybean-producing provinces, such as Senators Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta), Rubén Marín (PJ-FPV, La Pampa), and Carlos Reutemann (PJ-FPV, Santa Fe), Vice-President Julio Cobos (UCR-*Radicales K*) had an opportunity to cast a tie-breaking vote. As a consequence, the bill was killed on the floor.

This chapter also showed quantitative evidence on floor voting using an original dataset covering the Argentine Senate between 1983 and 2007. The floor voting model supports my hypotheses about the behavior of Senate bosses and their subordinates (H2 and H3b). Because Senate bosses themselves are provincial party bosses, they have autonomy from the president and national parties. Their subordinates follow

the boss's decisions. However, the statistical test also showed that Senate bosses and their subordinates from the president's party do not always vote against presidential bills in a continuous manner. Rather, they only target a limited number of controversial bills such as the bill on Resolution 125. By contrast, Senate bosses from the opposition have more freedom to engage in position-taking behavior against the president. They are much less likely to support presidential bills than other senators, even when the president's party and the opposition agree on approving the bills. Their subordinates also follow them on the floor in this case. Taking advantage of their autonomy from national parties, they play an electoral game on the floor so that they can win the next presidential or gubernatorial election.

Corresponding to H1, which posited that longstanding governors' subordinates engage in shelving presidential initiatives in committees, the floor voting model shows that such subordinates are more likely to cast Yea votes than other senators. Because they have already blocked unwelcome bills in committees, they promote the approval of other bills on the floor. On the other hand, freshmen governors do not have institutional resources that enable their subordinates to oppose presidential bills; thus, their role is limited on the floor as well as in committees.

As in the case of the legislative process in committees, the content of presidential bills also has an impact on senators' voting behavior on the floor. Senators are less likely to support centralizing measures that undermine their provincial interests. This finding supports H4d and underlines the fact that the political careers of senators in Argentina are based at the provincial level.

In this chapter, I showed unique behavior of senators in Argentina. Senate bosses and their subordinates from the opposition adopt position-taking strategies against the president, even if the president's party and their parties agree on approval of presidential initiatives. By contrast, Senate bosses and their subordinates from the president's party target a limited number of controversial bills. Longstanding governors' subordinates happily support presidential bills during floor voting because they have already blocked unfavorable bills in committees. Even in the legislature where high party unity is expected, intra-party

variances exist in voting behavior. Thus, when we study roll-call vote data, it is important for students of legislative politics to recognize that a legislature may consist of various types of legislators and that they strategically publicize their positions considering their institutional positions.

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# 6

## Conclusion

This book made four contributions to comparative politics and to studies on Argentine politics. First, by developing a theory on the subnational electoral connection, this study shed light on the institutional mechanisms that tenure stability of governors and their control over the candidate selection process, allowing subnational governments to be national veto players through their senators. Second, the book made a strong case that committees are the places where longstanding governors may exercise their power over the national legislative process. Third, it also revealed that legislators under the same electoral rules may face different multiple principals, and that they adjust their credit-claiming and position-taking strategies according to their institutional positions. Fourth, by focusing on committee decisions as well as floor voting in the Senate, this study showed that committees have a considerable influence over the presidents' legislative success in Argentina.

This chapter concludes the discussion about the subnational electoral connection and senatorial behavior. It is divided into three sections. In the first section, I summarize the arguments of this book. I then discuss how changes in the share of each type of senators affect the president's legislative success. Referring to the cases of Brazil and Mexico, the

third section argues the plausibility of my theoretical framework beyond the Argentine context. I argue implications for future research in the fourth section.

## 6.1 Summary of Arguments

Under what conditions can subnational governments be national veto players? Chapter 1 of this book began with such a research question. Even though there are various definitions of federalism, they all agree that a federal constitution clearly draws a line between the jurisdictions of the national government and that of subnational governments. However, comparativists have offered contradictory views about the role of governors in national politics. On the one hand, many studies (e.g., Gibson 2004; Jones 2008; Jones and Hwang 2005a; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004; Spiller and Tommasi 2007; Stepan 2004) have considered governors as national veto players even though they do not have such a constitutional status. On the other hand, statistical models of comparative legislative studies as well as those of comparative federalism (e.g., Ames 2001; Jones and Hwang 2005a; Remmer 2007) have offered little empirical proof for such arguments.

One of the ways to consider this inconsistency is by analyzing the treatment of the chief executives' bills in the upper chamber, which is expected to represent the interests of subnational units. As I mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the Argentine Senate is an ideal case for this study. It is one of the strongest upper chambers in the world, and it consists of experienced senators such as former presidents and governors as well as inexperienced backbenchers. Moreover, tenure stability of governors and the effective number of parties at the provincial level vary a lot across provinces. Taking advantage of such variety in provincial politics, I studied the Senate, controlling country-specific covariates that affect cross-national studies.

In order to study the research question, Chapter 2 developed a theory on the subnational electoral connection and senatorial behavior. Even though both Americanists and comparativists have considered that the electoral connection shapes legislative behavior, the development of



a theory on the subnational electoral connection needs two additional considerations. First, it requires the identification of legislators' principals, because legislators strategically make decisions on credit-claiming and position-taking activities considering the preferences of their "competing" principals. Second, this theoretical framework should take into account the sequential flow of the legislative process, since the characteristics of the legislative process limit legislators' choices between credit-claiming and position-taking.

The first task in Chapter 2 was thus identifying the principals of Argentine senators. Federalism may generate voters, national parties, the president, and governors as principals. National parties in Argentina may keep their unity using resources at the legislative arena (e.g., control over the legislative process, committee assignments, and financial resources for legislative activities) rather than those at the electoral arena due to decentralized structures of party organizations. The president may influence senatorial behavior not only through his or her constitutional and partisan powers but also by using public opinion and his or her dominance over the Parliamentary Labor Plenary, which sets the floor agenda. Governors and opposition party bosses at the provincial level may control their senators because of their dominance over candidate selection process and machine politics.

Senators have been elected using a semi-PR system named "incomplete list" since 2001, while they were indirectly chosen by provincial legislatures before then. Such electoral rules should discourage them from cultivating personal reputations (Carey and Shugart 1995). This is still the case even after the adoption of Open, Simultaneous, and Mandatory Primaries (*Primarias Abiertas Simultáneas y Obligatorias*, PASOs) in 2009, because it is not so common for major parties/electoral coalitions to submit multiple lists of senatorial candidates. However, the upper chamber in Argentina consists of inexperienced backbenchers and of first-tier politicians. Senators are divided into subordinates and Senate bosses. The former are those who have little access to political resources, and they have national parties, the president, and governors or provincial party bosses as principals. By contrast, the latter are provincial party bosses who hold senatorial seats themselves including former presidents and former governors, and they may directly

confront voters as well as national parties and the president. Moreover, subordinates are classified into three categories according to their provincial party bosses: governors' subordinates, Senate bosses' subordinates, and local subordinates.

The second task was considering how these four types of senators use opportunities for credit-claiming and position-taking on presidential bills in the legislative process. The legislative process of the Senate consists of four stages. At Stage 1, based on the information collected through meetings of advisors, committee members decide if a bill should be discussed at the meetings in order to publish committee reports on it (Stage 1a). They also decide if the bill should be amended (Stage 1b). After making these decisions, the chairs of committees call committee meetings, and individual committee members sign one of the committee reports on the bill (Stage 2). Once the committees pass the bill, the Parliamentary Labor Plenary discusses if the bill should be scheduled for a floor meeting (Stage 3). Then, if it is included in the floor agenda, senators vote on it on the floor (Stage 4). Presidential bills are hardly ever defeated on the floor. Therefore, senators may engage in credit-claiming at Stages 1a and 1b, while they may take positions on presidential bills at Stages 2 and 4.

Senators take advantage of these opportunities according to their institutional positions. Behavior of governors' subordinates is constrained by the governors' dilemma. On the one hand, governors do not want presidential bills that change a favorable status quo. On the other hand, they are willing to maintain a good relationship with the president because of the dependence of provincial economies on federal transfers. However, governors do not feel threatened by the president if they have the tenure stability to dominate provincial politics. Longstanding governors thus have incentives to make their subordinates shelve presidential bills and kill them by the two-year time limit. This type of credit-claiming is less visible to the public, but it is not a problem for governors' subordinates, since such subordinates are not fully accountable to voters. Consequently, longstanding governors' subordinates are more likely to shelve presidential bills for their governors than other senators in committees (H1).

By contrast, Senate bosses do not have such incentives, since their political machines make them autonomous from national parties and the president. More importantly, they have to maintain their popularity among voters in order to maximize the performance of their factions at the national or provincial level. However, engaging in committee work is not an effective strategy for them, since it is extremely time-consuming and less visible to the electorate. They thus prioritize position-taking for voters over other legislative activities, and they are less likely to support presidential bills than other senators on the floor (H2).

The behavior of Senate bosses' subordinates is even more unique. Unlike governors, Senate bosses are not constrained by intergovernmental relations. As a result, they make their subordinates engage in public credit-claiming such as amending presidential bills in committees, which demonstrates their factions' effectiveness to voters. Moreover, they want their subordinates to follow their positions on presidential bills on the floor. Consequently, Senate bosses' subordinates are more likely to amend presidential bills than other senators in committees (H3a), while they are less likely to support such bills than other senators at the floor voting (H3b).

Besides their institutional positions, senators also change their behavior according to the content of presidential bills. Since centralizing measures, which change the status quo of federal arrangements, are usually critical for provincial politics, every provincial party boss has incentives to make their subordinates engage in credit-claiming and position-taking activities when such bills are introduced to the upper chamber. Even Senate bosses may claim credit in order to sell themselves as defenders of provincial interests. As a consequence, senators tend to shelve or amend centralizing measures in committees (H4a and H4b), whereas they are less likely to support them in committee reports as well as at the floor voting (H4c and H4d).

Chapter 3 introduced background information to study the Argentine Senate. After presenting a brief history of the Senate before 1983, I showed some descriptive statistics of the legislative process in Argentina. On the one hand, decision-making in committees is consensus-based, and almost all unapproved presidential bills were killed in the very first stage of committees. On the other hand, typical

roll-call analysis revealed that the partisan dimension dominated floor voting in the Senate. More importantly, I identified longstanding governors, governors' subordinates, Senate bosses, Senate bosses' subordinates, and local subordinates in this chapter.

Chapters 4 and 5 were dedicated to testing my hypotheses about senatorial behavior. Using original datasets on committee decisions and floor voting between 1983 and 2007, I ran a multinomial probit model for Stages 1a and 1b, Heckman probit models for Stages 2 and 4, and a probit model for Stage 3, respectively. This estimation strategy allowed me to grasp the sequential flow of the legislative process in an integrated manner.

These statistical models supported my theoretical framework. They showed that longstanding governors' subordinates are more likely to shelve presidential bills than other senators, which confirmed H1. Tenure stability allows such governors to keep unwelcome bills "in the drawer" at Stage 1a through their subordinates. In addition, the statistical tests also uncovered that these subordinates are more likely to support presidential bills at Stages 2 and 4. The logic behind this interesting finding is that these senators shelve unfavorable bills in committees, and they happily support other bills when they publish committee reports or cast roll-call votes. Therefore, the quantitative analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 confirmed my claim that the behavior of longstanding governors' subordinates is for the benefit of governors rather than voters due to the subnational electoral connection.

Contrary to governors' subordinates, Senate bosses prioritize position-taking on the floor over committee work because of their autonomy from national parties and the president as well as due to incentives to maintain their popularity among voters. On the one hand, the multinomial probit model showed that Senate bosses are less likely to shelve or amend presidential bills in committees. On the other hand, supporting H2, the Heckman model for Stage 4 indicated that they are more likely to cast Nay votes against such bills on the floor. This statistical evidence thus implied that taking a position on the original versions of presidential bills is more important for Senate bosses than credit-claiming activities, since their goal is maximizing the performance of their factions at the national or provincial level.

The statistical tests also revealed unique behavior of Senate bosses' subordinates. In committees, they prefer to engage in public credit-claiming, since Senate bosses want them to publicize their effectiveness in the legislative process. The multinomial probit model revealed that they are more likely to amend presidential bills than other senators, which confirms H3a about their behavior in committees. In contrast, as H3b predicted, they are less likely to support presidential bills than other senators on the floor following the positions of their Senate bosses.

Moreover, as H4a, H4b, H4c, and H4d predicted about the impact of content of presidential bills, any type of senator including Senate bosses tends to engage in credit-claiming and position-taking activities when they face centralizing measures, which are sometimes controversial in provincial politics. My statistical models uncovered that senators are more likely to shelve and amend those bills, while they are less likely to sign majority reports or cast affirmative votes on them. However, predicted probabilities for Models 4.2 and 5.2 showed that senators from the president's party are more careful about selecting presidential bills for position-taking than those from the opposition.

My models also showed that Senate bosses and their subordinates do not randomly choose presidential bills on which they take positions. According to predicted probabilities for Model 5.2, those senators from the president's party only choose a limited number of controversial bills on which they announce their dissatisfaction. In contrast, Senate bosses from the opposition have more freedom in position-taking, even when their parties and the president's party have an agreement on the approval of presidential initiatives. They are far less likely to cast Yea votes on presidential bills than other senators, and their subordinates also follow their positions. The statistical tests thus showed that Senate bosses from the opposition are more autonomous from national parties than those from the president's party, and that they play an electoral game in order to win the next presidential or gubernatorial election.

Qualitative evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5 also supported my arguments. My case studies suggested that subordinates play a crucial role in committees, and that Senate bosses and their subordinates are key players on the floor. In the case of the 2005 anti-smoking bill, governors' subordinates from tobacco-producing provinces defended their provincial

interests from such centralizing measure by credit-claiming activities. On the one hand, the Health and Sports Committee shelved the bill for a while, and it was killed by the two-year time limit, even though it was discharged from committees at the last minute. On the other hand, Senator Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy), a sister of Governor Fellner (PJ-FPV, Jujuy), successfully eliminated the economic chapter of the anti-smoking bill, which was going to harm tobacco industries in Jujuy and other tobacco-producing provinces, by introducing an amending proposal. In contrast, Senate bosses and their subordinates were pivotal players in the case of Resolution 125. Growing social tension made Senate bosses and their subordinates from the president's party engage in position-taking, and the first-tier politicians such as Juan Carlos Romero (PJ-FPV, Salta), Rubén Marín (PJ-FPV, La Pampa), and Carlos Reutemann (PJ-FPV, Santa Fe) cast dissident votes against the presidential bill. Their behavior led to a tied vote, and Vice-President Julio Cobos' (UCR-*Radicales K*) tie-breaking Nay vote killed the bill on the floor.

In sum, this study showed that the tenure stability of governors makes them national veto players. In addition, both qualitative and quantitative evidence confirmed my initial claims that legislators' principals should be identified, and that legislative studies should take into account the sequential flow of the legislative process. Contrary to the general assumption that legislators put equal effort into advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking, this book showed that they strategically choose between credit-claiming and position-taking activities considering their institutional positions. Therefore, it is misleading to consider that legislators under the same electoral system should behave in the same way in committees as well as on the floor.

## 6.2 Longstanding Governors and the President's Legislative Success

The statistical models in Chapters 4 and 5 explained how individual senator behave at each stage of the legislative process. However, they did not show the degree to which senatorial behavior diminishes the president's legislative success rate. In this section, I evaluate the overall

veto powers that governors and senators may exercise over the president's legislative agenda. The statistical models of this study allow us to calculate predicted probability of the president's legislative success under different types of upper chambers.

Suppose the Senate (both a committee and the floor) consists of four PJ legislators and three UCR legislators.<sup>1</sup> I consider the following four scenarios regarding the composition of different types of Senates.

- Scenario 1: two longstanding governors' subordinates (one PJ subordinate and one UCR subordinate), three Senate bosses (two PJ bosses and one UCR boss), and two local subordinates (one PJ subordinate and one UCR subordinate)
- Scenario 2: two freshmen governors' subordinates (one PJ subordinate and one UCR subordinate), three Senate bosses (two PJ bosses and one UCR boss), and two local subordinates (one PJ subordinate and one UCR subordinate)
- Scenario 3: five Senate bosses (three PJ bosses and two UCR bosses) and two local subordinates (one PJ subordinate and one UCR subordinate)
- Scenario 4: four Senate bosses (two PJ bosses and two UCR bosses), one Senate boss's subordinate from the PJ, and two local subordinates (one PJ subordinate and one UCR subordinate)

In order to assess the impact of the composition of the upper chamber on the president's legislative success, I calculated the predicted probabilities of a presidential bill's approval at each stage of the legislative process as well as the president's overall legislative success rates under these four scenarios, and show them in Table 6.1. This simulation assumes that senators with three-year experience from provinces of average dependence on federal transfer programs (i.e., the *share of provincial tax revenues* variable set at 18.4%) face a general bill (i.e., not a centralizing measure) without

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<sup>1</sup>This simulation assumes a seven-member Senate rather than a seventy-two-member Senate in order to avoid a heavy burden of calculation. Of course, however, the results of the simulation reflect the reality of Argentine politics, since they are based on the statistical models in Chapters 4 and 5.

**Table 6.1** Predicted probabilities of a presidential bill's approval at four stages of the legislative process and the president's overall legislative success rates under four scenarios

	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Overall
<i>Scenario 1</i>					
without	.407	.883	.982	.998	
amendments	(.299-.515)	(.769-.997)	(.963-1.001)	(.996-1.000)	.461
with	.129	.910	.934	.998	(.265-.709)
amendments	(.061-.197)	(.824-.996)	(.873-.994)	(.996-1.000)	
<i>Scenario 2</i>					
without	.536	.883	.982	.995	
amendments	(.408-.664)	(.769-.997)	(.963-1.001)	(.990-1.000)	.578
with	.137	.910	.934	.995	(.344-.873)
amendments	(.063-.212)	(.824-.996)	(.873-.994)	(.990-1.000)	
<i>Scenario 3</i>					
without	.646	.883	.982	.992	
amendments	(.503-.790)	(.769-.997)	(.963-1.001)	(.984-1.000)	.631
with	.089	.911	.934	.993	(.382-.943)
amendments	(.021-.156)	(.825-.996)	(.873-.994)	(.986-1.000)	
<i>Scenario 4</i>					
without	.514	.887	.982	.992	
amendments	(.359-.668)	(.776-.998)	(.963-1.001)	(.984-1.000)	.614
with	.200	.913	.934	.993	(.325-.980)
amendments	(.085-.316)	(.829-.997)	(.873-.994)	(.986-1.000)	

*Note* Overall legislative success rate under each scenario is the sum of the predicted probability of a general bill's approval without amendments and that of the bill's approval with amendments. The numbers in parentheses in the columns Stage 1, Stage 2, Stage 3, and Stage 4 show 95% confidence interval, while those in the column Overall indicate the range of the success rates based on the 95% confidence interval at each stage. This simulation assumes that senators with three-year experience from provinces of average dependence on federal transfer programs (i.e., the *share of provincial tax revenues* variable set at 18.4%) face a general bill (i.e., not a centralizing measure) without bypassing motions that is originally introduced to the Senate with ten legislative party blocs and the chair of the committee is from the president's party by a PJ president with average popularity (set at 35.09%) in a nonelection year under the old Senate rules

*Source* Author's elaboration

bypassing motions that is originally introduced to the Senate with ten legislative party blocs and the chair of the committee is from the president's party by a PJ president with average popularity (set at 35.09%) in a nonelection year under the old Senate rules. Since my statistical models



distinguish the case in which the Senate discusses a presidential bill without committee amendments from the case in which the upper chamber deals with the bill with committee amendments, Table 6.1 also reports the predicted probabilities for each case.

Predicted probabilities at Stage 1 are based on Model 4.1. As my theoretical framework posited that longstanding governors' subordinates are more likely to shelve presidential bills than other senators at Stage 1a, a general bill's probability of being scheduled for committee meetings with no amendment under Scenario 1 is lower than such probabilities under other scenarios: .407. By contrast, the bill's likelihood of being discussed at committee meetings with amendments is .129. How do these two probabilities change if longstanding governors' subordinates are replaced by freshmen governors' subordinates? The lack of tenure stability discourages new governors from opposing presidential initiatives. Under Scenario 2, as a result, the former probability increases from .407 to .536, while the latter probability slightly changes from .129 to .137.

By contrast, Senate bosses have fewer incentives to engage in committee work, whereas their subordinates are more likely to claim credit for amending presidential bills in committees. The numbers presented in Table 6.1 reflect these tendencies. If five Senate bosses and two local subordinates are committee members (Scenario 3), the bill's probability of being discussed without amendments goes up to .646, and that of being scheduled for committee discussion with amendments drops to .089. Since Senate bosses' subordinates prioritize introducing amendments to presidential bills for their bosses, the former probability decreases to .514 under Scenario 4 when a committee has four Senate bosses, one Senate boss's subordinate, and two local subordinates, but the latter probability significantly increases to .200.

Model 4.2 helps us compute the predicted probability of the bill's approval at Stage 2. Using this model, we can obtain individual committee members' likelihoods of signing a majority report on the bill.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>The likelihoods of a longstanding governor's subordinate, a freshman governor's subordinate, a Senate boss, a Senate boss's subordinate, and a local subordinate supporting the bill without amendments are respectively .801, .801, .803, .819, and .800, if they are from the PJ.

These individual senators' probabilities allow us to calculate the bill's probability of being discharged from a seven-member committee. However, we should be careful with using the individual members' likelihoods to compute the probability of the bill's approval, since the bill just needs to be supported by a majority of committee members. Therefore, the bill's probability of success at Stage 2 is not equal to the average of individual committee members' likelihoods of signing a majority report on the bill. If we assume that committee members confront a binary choice between supporting the bill by signing its majority report with no partial disagreement and opposing it by taking other action, there are 128 possible combinations in which seven individual members take positions, and the bill is approved by an absolute majority of votes in 64 cases.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, a general bill's probability of being supported by a majority report under each of the four scenarios is expressed as the sum of probabilities of all the 64 combinations. The sum of such probabilities under Scenarios 1 and 2 is .883 if senators face a general bill without amendments and .910 if they face the bill with amendments.<sup>4</sup> The former sum is also .883 under Scenario 3, but the latter sum slightly increases to .911. Under Scenario 4, by contrast, the former sum goes up to .887, and the latter sum changes to .913.

According to my theoretical framework, the Parliamentary Labor Plenary's decisions are not influenced by changes in the shares of different types of senators, and the dominance of the president over this agenda-setting office makes it rarely screen out his or her bills. As a result, the bill's probabilities of being successful at Stage 3 do not change between different scenarios. According to Model 5.1, a general

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These probabilities drop to .564, .564, .566, .589, and .562 if they are from the UCR. When senators face the bill with amendments, the probabilities of PJ senators increase to .821, .821, .822, .837, and .820, and those of UCR senators also goes up to .592, .592, .594, .617, and .591.

<sup>3</sup>These 64 cases include one case in which all the seven senators sign a majority report, seven cases in which six out of seven senators sign it, 21 cases in which five out of seven senators sign it, and 35 cases in which four out of seven senators sign it.

<sup>4</sup>These probabilities are lower than actual general bill's probabilities of being supported by a majority report, since Model 4.2 regarded signing a majority report with partial disagreements as a position-taking activity.

bill's probability of being discussed on the floor is .982 if the bill does not contain amendments and .934 if the bill has been amended by committees.

I calculated the predicted probabilities at Stage 4 using the same procedure for computing those at Stage 2. First, I obtained individual senators' likelihoods of casting a Yea vote on the bill from Model 5.2.<sup>5</sup> Senate bosses and their subordinates are less likely to cast a Yea vote than other senators at Stage 4. However, as I argued in Chapter 5, these predicted probabilities shows that such senators from the UCR have more freedom to engage in position-taking than those from the PJ. Moreover, longstanding governors' subordinates are more likely to support presidential bills than other senators on the floor, since they have already screened out unacceptable bills at Stage 1a in committees.

I then computed the bill's probabilities of receiving an absolute majority of votes using these individual senators' probabilities. Such probability is .998 if two longstanding governors' subordinates, three Senate bosses, and two local subordinates hold senatorial seats (Scenario 1), while it changes to .995 if the two longstanding governors' subordinates are replaced by two freshmen governors' subordinates (Scenario 2). Even though Senate bosses and their subordinates engage in position-taking, those activities rarely jeopardize presidents' legislative success. Under Scenarios 3 and 4, it slightly decreases to .993 if the Senate floor discusses a general bill without amendments, while it drops to .992 if the Senate floor faces an amended general bill.

The information described above is enough to assess the president's overall legislative success rates under the four scenarios. In order to compute such rates, I multiplied the predicted probabilities of the bill's approval at the four stages by each other. The sum of the product of such multiplication in the case of the bill without amendments and

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<sup>5</sup>Predicted probabilities of a PJ longstanding governor's subordinate, a PJ freshman governor's subordinate, a PJ Senate boss, a PJ Senate boss's subordinate, and a PJ local subordinate casting an affirmative vote on a general bill without amendments are .997, .985, .972, .973, and .987 when they face the bill without amendments, and .997, .985, .973, .974, and .988 when they vote on an amended general bill. If they are from the UCR, these probabilities change to .820, .633, .536, .541, and .656 when senators deal with a general bill without amendments, and .826, .642, .546, .550, and .665 when they discuss an amended bill.

that of the multiplication in the case of the bill with amendments is the president's success rate under each scenario.

The overall success rates presented in Table 6.1 show that the composition of the upper chamber influences the president's legislative capacity. Under Scenario 1, in which two of seven members in the Senate are longstanding governors' subordinates, the overall legislative success rate is lower than the rates under other scenarios: .461. However, it goes up to .578 if the two longstanding governors' subordinates are replaced by two freshmen governors' subordinates. By contrast, position-taking strategy of Senate bosses and their subordinates does not harm the president's legislative success. The rate increases more to .631 under Scenario 3, in which the Senate is dominated by five Senate bosses. The inclusion of a Senate boss's subordinate from the PJ slightly changes it to .614.

Focusing on roll-call voting, the existing literature has considered that national parties in Argentina are highly disciplined (e.g., Jones 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005a, b; Morgenstern 2004), and that the president may take advantage of such partisan powers to be dominant in the legislative process (e.g., Jones 2002; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). Studying published committee reports, Mustapic and Goretti (1992) assumed that committee decisions are based on partisanship and agreements between legislative parties. This simulation also shows that the president's bills are rarely defeated at Stages 2, 3, and 4 under all the four scenarios, in which a majority of senators are affiliated with the president's party.

However, the numbers in Table 6.1 reveals that the president's legislative capacity is much weaker than the conventional wisdom has expected. The tenure stability of governors hurts the president's legislative success in the Senate.<sup>6</sup> According to the predicted probabilities calculated in this subsection, Stage 1 at the committee level determines the fate of presidential bills regardless of the majority status of the president's party. Less than half of presidential bills (.461) pass the Senate

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<sup>6</sup>Therefore, recent trend of tightening gubernatorial term limits should favor the president, and President Néstor Kirchner's (PJ-FPV) pressure on the PJ governors about the prohibition of relaxing their term limits in 2007 made sense for the legislative success of his successor President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (PJ-FPV).

if two out of seven senators respond to longstanding governors, since 46% of them are shelved by a committee to be killed by the two-year limit. By contrast, the upper chamber approves 63% of presidential bills when it is dominated by five Senate bosses, because their priority in position-taking over committee work makes the Senate committee to shelve just 27% of presidential initiatives. Therefore, studying legislative politics without taking into account the screening process at Stage 1 may be subject to huge selection bias effects.

### 6.3 Senatorial Behavior in Comparative Perspective

In this book, I studied the conditions under which governors can be national veto players focusing on the case of the Argentine Senate. Even though this type of research design allows us to control country-specific factors that may affect the results of cross-country comparisons, it is also important to check the plausibility of my arguments beyond the Argentine context. The arguments of this book can be further illustrated with reference to senatorial behavior in other federal countries with strong bicameralism such as Brazil and Mexico.

#### 6.3.1 Senatorial Behavior in Brazil

Governors in Brazil can be national veto players when senators engage in public credit-claiming for them. Besides provincial governments of Argentina, Stepan (2004) considered that state governments of Brazil are “robust” national veto players in the sense that they have de facto veto over fiscal policy implementation. Brazil consists of 26 states and the Federal District, which contains Brasília. Governors are directly elected for a four-year term, and one immediate reelection is possible.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>No immediate reelection was allowed before 1998. However, former governors could run for the governorship after four years out of office.

They are also protagonists of subnational politics because of their relationships with municipal mayors and their access to the state-government budget as well as to jobs in the state bureaucracy (Samuels 2003; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004).

Even though the constitution gives substantive legislative powers to the president,<sup>8</sup> his or her bills are examined by strong bicameral chambers. The Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are characterized by incongruent compositions and symmetric constitutional powers. Eighty-one senators (each state holds three senatorial seats) are elected for an eight-year term through plurality formula. Due to the staggered cycle of senatorial elections, each state chooses one or two senators every four years. Alternatively, 513 deputies are elected from 27 state-wide districts for a four-year term using the open-list PR system, and district magnitudes range from eight to 70. Moreover, senators and deputies must be older than 34 and 20, respectively. Therefore, Brazilian bicameralism is considered a highly incongruent one (Llanos and Nolte 2003; Llanos and Sánchez 2006).

In terms of the degree of bicameral symmetry, Llanos and Nolte (2003) gave the same score to Brazil and Argentina. Even though presidential and judicial bills must be initiated in the lower house, both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies may reject or amend all types of bills. If the two chambers disagree with each other on presidential vetoes, budget bills, and presidential decrees (*medidas provisórias*), they hold joint sessions to solve disagreements.<sup>9</sup> When they deal with constitutional amendments, the *navette* system is used until they reach an agreement. In the case of other bills, the originating chamber has an advantage in the *navette* system (Llanos and Nolte 2003; Hiroi 2005, 2008a; Tsebelis and Money 1997).

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<sup>8</sup>The president is entitled to introduce his or her bills (including constitutional amendments), and he or she may set an early deadline for the Congress to consider presidential statutory bills. In addition, the president has a package and line-item veto as well as a right to issue presidential decrees in many areas. See Hiroi (2005) for more detailed information.

<sup>9</sup>Even though they hold joint sessions, senators' votes and deputies' votes are counted separately (Llanos and Nolte 2003).

In spite of such strong bicameralism, however, senatorial behavior in Brazil is quite different from that in Argentina. A striking fact is that the Brazilian president tends to be more successful than the Argentine president in the legislative process. Brazil is well-known for a multiparty system that consists of weak parties (e.g., Ames 2001; Mainwaring 1999). No president's party has held a majority of seats in the two houses since the ratification of the 1988 constitution,<sup>10</sup> and thus the president is always forced to form a coalition. According to Figueiredo et al. (2009), however, the legislative branch approved 84.9% of presidential bills between 1989 and 2006.<sup>11</sup> Legislative success rates of the presidents ranged from 70.3 to 92.8%, even though the Fernando Collor de Mello administration (1990–1992) as well as the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration (2003–2010) in the first half of 2003 could not form a majority coalition in both chambers. Given that presidential bills must be initiated in the Chamber of Deputies, and that they are rarely voted down on the floor,<sup>12</sup> high legislative success rates indicate that senators in Brazil are less likely to shelve presidential bills in committees than senators in Argentina, where the upper chamber only approved 61.6% of presidential bills between 1983 and 2001 (Alemán and Calvo 2008).

Why do Brazilian senators have few incentives to shelve presidential initiatives? From the perspective of the subnational electoral connection, three factors shape such tendency. First, as in the case of Argentina, “Senate bosses” have a significant share in the Federal Senate of Brazil. The upper chamber is considered a position for the first-tier politicians (Hiroi 2005; Llanos and Sánchez 2006; Lodola 2010). On average, for example, 34% of senators were former presidents, vice-presidents, governors, and vice-governors in the 1990s (Lemos and Ranincheski 2003).<sup>13</sup> Since they are major figures of political parties, who must engage in various political activities, committee work

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<sup>10</sup>Brazil was democratized in 1985, and the members of the constituent assembly for the 1988 constitution were elected in 1986.

<sup>11</sup>Figueiredo et al. (2009) data include presidential decrees, since the constitution requires presidential decrees to be approved by Congress as ordinary laws.

<sup>12</sup>This information was obtained through personal communication with Taeko Hiroi.

<sup>13</sup>These senators include two former governors who were appointed by the military government.

is too time-consuming for them. As a consequence, they prioritize position-taking on the floor over credit-claiming activities in committees.

Second, gubernatorial tenure in Brazil is less stable than that in Argentina, and the relationship between governors and senators tend to be horizontal rather than vertical. Incumbent governors in Brazil sometimes fail to renew their tenure. According to Lodola (2010), 37 out of 45 incumbents (82.2%) who ran for reelection between 1987 and 2003 were successful in Argentina. By contrast, just 39 out of 60 incumbents (65.0%) who sought reelection between 1986 and 2006 won a gubernatorial race in Brazil. This electoral insecurity is due to the multiparty system with weak parties at the national and state levels. Governors are thus required to construct electoral coalitions, and they often allow their electoral partners to nominate senatorial candidates in exchange for electoral support at gubernatorial elections (Lodola 2010). Therefore, senators are regarded not as governors' subordinates but as governors' partners.<sup>14</sup>

Third, the characteristics of the legislative process make such internal credit-claiming less attractive for senators. Contrary to Argentina where all bills are automatically killed if they are not approved by one of the two chambers in two legislative years, legislators' bills introduced to the Brazilian Congress are not terminated until the next partial renewal of the Senate (i.e., the next total renewal of the Chamber of Deputies). More importantly, legislators' bills that have already been approved by one chamber, all presidential bills, and all judicial bills are exempted from the automatic termination (Hiroi 2005). That is, senators may shelve presidential bills, but the bills do not die until the president actually abandons them.<sup>15</sup> As a result, the Brazilian Congress is still "discussing" bills that were originally initiated in the 1940s.<sup>16</sup>

Three characteristics of Brazilian politics discussed above discourage senators from shelving presidential bills. However, it does not mean that

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<sup>14</sup>This description does not mean that senators never work for governors. As I argue later in this section, senators also engage in the public credit-claiming for governors and voters.

<sup>15</sup>Hiroi's (2005) study on bicameral lawmaking in Brazil implies that legislators shelve presidential bills not for killing them but for amending them or receiving some compensation.

<sup>16</sup>I collected this information through personal communication with Taeko Hiroi.



senators never engage in credit-claiming activities. They also perform public credit-claiming, since electoral rules for executive and legislative offices at the national and subnational levels encourage candidates to cultivate their personal reputations. Historical evidence indicates that they also try to claim credit for amending important presidential bills in favor of subnational interests, and such activities sometimes favor governors. For instance, senators proposed 300 amendments, which include those opposing the subceilings of salaries for each branch of state governments, to President Lula's constitutional amendment bill for pension reform, even though all the amendments were rejected (Hiroi 2005, 2008b). In the case of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (1995-2002) constitutional amendment bill for pension reform, Senator Beni Veras claimed credit for introducing amendments that protected subnational interests (Hiroi 2005, 2008b). After the expiration of his senatorial term, he successfully won the vice-governorship of Ceará in 1999.

My theory also helps us to understand a finding of Desposato (2006) about position-taking on the floor. In order to observe an impact of electoral rules on legislative behavior, he compared roll-call behavior of senators and that of deputies in Brazil between 1991 and 2003. He hypothesized that legislative parties in the Chamber of Deputies show higher level of party unity than those in the Senate, since the open-list PR system with multimember districts generates more intensive intra-party competition than the plurality formula with one or two-member districts. Contrary to his initial expectation, however, he found that Senate parties are significantly less cohesive than those in the Chamber of Deputies in almost all the periods he analyzed.<sup>17</sup>

However, this finding is consistent with my theoretical framework. I argued that Senate bosses prioritize position-taking on the floor over credit-claiming in committees. Since they have a solid support base in their home states, they are autonomous from the president and national parties. As in the case of Argentina, they are more prominent in the upper chamber than the lower chamber. In the 1990s, the share of Senate bosses was 34% in the Brazilian Senate (Lemos and Ranincheski

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<sup>17</sup>Using the data between 1998 and 2009, Neiva (2011) also found the same tendency.

2003). By contrast, such legislators have much smaller share in the Chamber of Deputies (Samuels 2003). Therefore, the lower level of party unity in the Senate should be attributed to the difference in the share of the first-tier politicians between the two chambers.

### 6.3.2 Senatorial Behavior in Mexico

By contrast, Mexico is a federal country where governors cannot be national veto players due to their no reelection rule. Schiavon (2006) argued that Mexico, which consists of 31 states and the Federal District (Mexico City), is another federal country with strong bicameralism. Different electoral rules make the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies highly incongruent chambers.<sup>18</sup> Among 128 senators, 96 senators (each state holds three senatorial seats) are elected for a six-year term through direct election using a semi-PR system (incomplete list), which distributes two senators to the first party in the election and one senator to the second party. The remaining 32 senators are elected for a six-year term from a single nationwide district using the closed-list PR system.<sup>19</sup> The lower house uses a parallel plurality-PR system to choose 500 deputies for a three-year term. Among them, 300 deputies are elected from single-member districts, whereas 200 deputies are elected from five region-wide multimember districts using the closed-list PR system. No incumbent senator or deputy was allowed to run for immediate reelection, and thus legislators were forced to advance their political careers

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<sup>18</sup>Llanos and Nolte (2003) considered that Mexican bicameralism is less incongruent than Argentine and Brazilian ones, since senators in Mexico face no partial renewal of the upper chamber.

<sup>19</sup>This system is due to the 1996 electoral reform. Before 1986, 64 senators (each state had two senators) were directly elected using a plurality rule with binomial formula, under which the winning party in each state took all the two senatorial seats. The 1986 reform introduced a staggered election cycle, and 64 senators were elected through a plurality formula between 1986 and 1993. The 1993 reform abolished the staggered election cycle and doubled the size of the upper chamber. Between 1993 and 1996, all the 128 senators (each state had four senators) were elected using the incomplete list, but this system distributed three senators to the first party and one senator to the second party.

outside of the legislative branch.<sup>20</sup> The 2014 constitutional reform, however, allowed one immediate reelection of senators and three consecutive reelections of deputies, beginning 2018.

Regarding the symmetric-asymmetric dimension of bicameralism, the two houses hold symmetric constitutional powers as those in Argentina and Brazil (Llanos and Nolte 2003). Bills can be initiated and discussed in both chambers with some exceptions.<sup>21</sup> In the case of disagreements between the two chambers, the reviewing chamber has an advantage in the *navette* system (Llanos and Nolte 2003; Tsebelis and Money 1997).

Contrary to the general image, in contrast, constitutional powers of the Mexican president over the legislation are much weaker than those of the Argentine and Brazilian presidents (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and Haggard 2001; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). The president is directly elected for a six-year term, but any reelection is prohibited for life. More importantly, even though he or she may introduce bills to the upper and lower chambers, the constitution does not prescribe presidential decree authority that bypasses congressional discussion as well as a line-item veto (Weldon 1997).<sup>22</sup>

Latin Americanists considered that formally weak presidents overcome their difficulties in Congress because of their partisan powers (e.g., Casar 2002; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Lehoucq et al. 2008; Nacif 2002; Weldon 1997, 2002). The Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI) and its predecessors dominated Mexican politics for 71 years between 1929 and 2000. Its centralized party organization completely controlled the candidate selection process at the national and subnational levels (Langston 2006, 2008, 2010), and thus the PRI legislators were highly disciplined. Under the one-party regime until 1982, all senators and more than 70% of

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<sup>20</sup>Before the 2014 constitutional reform, former senators and deputies were enabled to return to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies seats after six years (senators) or three years (deputies) out of office.

<sup>21</sup>Annual appropriation bills are exclusively discussed in the Chamber of Deputies, while the Senate ratifies international treaties and confirms presidential appointments such as cabinet ministers and justices of the Supreme Court.

<sup>22</sup>The Mexican president may partially object to a bill, but cannot enact other parts of the bill into a law.

deputies were from the PRI. Even in the transitional period between 1982 and 1997, the PRI comfortably held a majority of seats in the two chambers. As a result, the PRI presidents' bills were rarely unsuccessful until 1997 (e.g., Casar 2002; Lehoucq et al. 2008).

The defeat of the PRI in the 1997 midterm elections diminished partisan powers of the president. On the one hand, the effective number of parties in the two chambers increased drastically. As of January 2018, no party had held a majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies since 1997 and in the Senate since 2000. Consequently, the president was forced to deal with Congress under divided government (Lehoucq et al. 2008). On the other hand, especially after the PRI's loss of the presidency in 2000, governors started to have an influence on the candidate selection process. Party organizations at the national level used to choose candidates for legislative elections, and governors were not important actors in the process. However, the defeat in the 1997 elections forced the PRI to choose more candidates with experience in state politics for the upper and lower houses, and the PRI governors started to be able to choose their favorites via elite negotiation or primaries (Langston 2006, 2008, 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011). Candidate selection of other major parties such as National Action Party (*Partido Acción Nacional*, PAN) and Party of the Democratic Revolution (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, PRD), is also decentralized to the state level (Langston 2008; Rosas and Langston 2011).

Governors are directly elected for a six-year term with the possibility of no reelection for life. They share the following two characteristics with their Argentine counterparts. First, fiscal authority is centralized. The national government holds around 90% of fiscal authority, and state governments are highly dependent on federal transfers (Díaz-Cayeros 2006). Therefore, governors have an incentive to be cooperative with the president. Second, governors have exclusive control over thousands of jobs in state governments and party organizations at the subnational level (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011).

However, the emergence of divided government and the rising importance of governors did not harm legislative capacity of the president. Between 1989 and 2002, Mexican presidents' legislative success rates ranged from 81.8 to 98.8% (Figueiredo et al. 2009). Since

their success rates in the Chamber of Deputies also ranged from 82.0 to 98.8% (Lehoucq et al. 2008), these numbers indicate that Mexican senators are much less likely to shelve presidential initiatives than their Argentine counterparts, even though the absence of datasets about committee decisions impedes us from studying the reasons why the legislative success rates dropped by 17 percentage points.

The no reelection rule discouraged senators from shelving presidential bills. Contrary to the upper chambers of Argentina and Brazil, the Mexican Senate tended to host few former governors (Langston 2006, 2008),<sup>23</sup> and senators needed candidacy for other elective offices after the expiration of their six-year tenure due to the no reelection rule until 2018.<sup>24</sup> However, all governors who craft party lists for senatorial elections will be out of office when their senatorial term expires, since gubernatorial reelection is prohibited for life.<sup>25</sup> By contrast, party organizations at the national level finance a large part of campaign costs (Langston 2010; Rosas and Langston 2011), and President Vicente Fox (PAN, 2000–2006) often formed a voting coalition with the PRI or the PRD in order to get his bills passed (Lehoucq et al. 2008). Consequently, it is difficult for governors to make senators shelve presidential bills.

The cases of Brazil and Mexico illustrate that senators in federal countries have a general tendency to choose their actions according to their institutional positions as well as to the characteristics of the legislative process. I thus believe that a broader cross-country comparison about the relationship between the subnational electoral connection and senatorial behavior would be an interesting and necessary topic for the future research.

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<sup>23</sup>Rather, the Senate is one of the springboard positions for winning the governorship (Langston 2008).

<sup>24</sup>Senators elected in 2018 should not face a drastically changed situation, since governors who nominate them will be out of office when the senators run for other positions in 2024 or 2030.

<sup>25</sup>In the case of deputies, who are elected for a three-year term, Rosas and Langston (2011) find that a governor's ability to discipline deputies from his or her party and state depends on his remaining tenure as a governor.

## 6.4 Implications for Future Research

This book suggests three implications for future research. First, it questions the conventional assumption among the studies on legislative politics that legislators under the same electoral rules should behave in the same way. Following Mayhew's (1974) argument that incumbent legislators are single-minded seekers of reelection, both Americanists and comparativists have agreed that electoral incentives shape legislative behavior. Examining diverse electoral systems, Carey and Shugart (1995) also argued that electoral rules and district magnitude determine the degree to which legislators have incentives to cultivate personal reputations. As a result, students of comparative legislative studies tend to explain legislative behavior in terms of candidate-centered and party-centered electoral systems. Even Carey (2008), who recognized that legislators under any electoral system may have multiple principals, assumed that legislators under the same system should act in the same manner, since they should face the same number of competing principals. However, as I have argued, legislators from the same electoral district may behave differently according to their institutional positions. Thus, identifying individual legislators' principals is a necessary step to understand legislative behavior.

Second, this study suggests that committee decisions and floor voting behavior should be studied together in an integrative way. Not only comparativists but also Americanists have a tendency to study legislative behavior just focusing on committees or the floor. More importantly, roll-call analysis is still a dominant approach for comparativists to study legislative behavior. However, legislators cannot take positions on the bills that have already been screened out by committees. As this study has shown, committees often play a crucial role in the legislative process by shelving unwelcome initiatives. Consequently, results of studies that just focus on roll-call votes may be violated by huge selection bias effects. Modeling the sequential flow of the legislative process using the Heckman procedure would be an approach to avoid such problems.

Third, this book calls attention to a need for more research on the upper chambers. Unfortunately, the number of studies on the upper

chambers in comparative perspective is limited. Oppenheimer (2002) pointed out that scholars have paid little attention to the US Senate for the following two reasons: studying the House has advantages in terms of the accessibility to representatives, the activeness of the House committees, and the size of  $N$  for quantitative analyses. In addition, most of the theories on legislative politics are based on the experiences of the House. These claims may also explain why the number of studies on the upper chambers is limited in comparative legislative studies. As evidence from the Argentine Senate suggests, the upper houses in federal countries play a crucial role in the representation of subnational interests. Moreover, intercameral bargaining has a huge impact on policy changes (e.g., Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Money 1997). It is thus indispensable for us to conduct a systematic research on the upper houses for a better understanding of federalism and bicameral politics.

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# Erratum to: Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process

## Erratum to:

H. Kikuchi, *Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process*, IDE-JETRO Series, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8>

The original version of this book was inadvertently published with errors, which have been corrected as follows:

The table alignments in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have been adjusted.  
Eqs 4.3 and 5.2, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, have been updated.  
Duplicated entries in the Index have been removed.

The book has been updated with these changes.

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The updated online version of these chapters can be found at  
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_3), [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_4),  
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_5) and [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90113-8_7)

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