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Political Leadership

A Pragmatic Institutionalist Approach

Robert Elgie

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A Pragmatic Institutionalist Approach

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Preface

The aim of this book is to provide an institutionalist account of political leadership. We have labelled it a pragmatic institutionalist account because it is rooted in a certain version of the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism. This book is a companion piece to our previous volume, *Studying Political Leadership: Foundations and Contending Accounts* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). There, we catalogued the existing scholarship on political leadership according to the competing philosophical foundations on which such work was based. This was the first time that any such exercise had been attempted. We argued that whether authors were aware of it or not, the scholarship on leadership outcomes was founded on certain ontological and epistemological assumptions. By identifying different foundational combinations and by reporting which work was consistent with which combination, we made the claim that we were better placed to understand the scholarship on leadership outcomes than before. More than that, we showed that these different foundational combinations were incompatible with each other. This allowed us to identify the studies that could properly be compared with each other because they were based on the same foundational combination and those that could not because they were based on a different combination, again improving our understanding of the study of this topic. In our previous volume, we merely catalogued the work of others. We did not identify either our preferred foundational combination or our perspective on how best to study leadership outcomes in the context of such a foundation. This is the task we now set ourselves. We proceed in a series of steps.

In Chap. 1, we identify different ontological and epistemological foundations of the world, distinguishing between positivist and constructivist perspectives. We then focus on a third approach, scientific realism, identifying the reasons why we choose to study political leadership from this foundational perspective. We then turn to American pragmatism. We identify two forms of pragmatism and explain why we privilege the Peircean variant. This form of pragmatism aims to arrive at well-settled beliefs about the world through a process of practical inquiry.

In Chap. 2, we turn to the study of political leadership. We begin by identifying the basic interactionist paradigm within which the study of leadership outcomes is conducted. According to this paradigm, leadership outcomes are the result of the interaction of personality and contextual factors. We are interested in one type of contextual factor. Specifically, we are interested in the impact of leadership institutions on various political outcomes. To establish the theoretical basis of this account, we turn to the study of institutionalism. We specify the ontological and epistemological assumptions of our institutionalist account. We show that institutionalism provides us with the opportunity to generate well-settled beliefs about the effect of leadership institutions on various outcomes in a causally complex world.

In Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6, we engage in practical empirical inquiry. We study the effect of institutions on leadership outcomes using a multimethod approach. In Chap. 3, we report the results of a laboratory experiment showing that presidential institutions can shape individual behaviour under certain conditions. In Chap. 4, we engage in a large-n, cross-national observational study, demonstrating that institutions affect the extent to which voters hold incumbent political leaders responsible for the performance of the economy. In Chap. 5, we begin with a medium-n observational study, indicating the predictors of president/cabinet conflict in Europe. We then follow up with a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the same topic, pointing to the particular combination of institutional conditions that are associated with this outcome. In Chap. 6, we apply the same methodological combination, but this time to the study of the institutional sources of presidential control of the cabinet in a single country, France.

In Chaps. 7 and 8, we address the problem of endogenous institutional choice. Up to this point in the book, we have assumed that institutions have an exogenous impact of actor behaviour, shaping leadership outcomes. However, if institutions reflect actor preferences and are chosen

endogenously, then they do not shape behaviour, but merely reflect existing behavioural preferences. Focusing on two in-depth qualitative case studies of institutional choice in France and Romania, we find little evidence to suggest that leadership outcomes are endogenous to institutional choice. This confirms that we have good reason to believe that institutions have an independent effect on leadership outcomes.

In Chap. 9, we revisit the main themes of the book, arguing that scholars should emphasize the study of institutions, but in a way that leads to modest conclusions about their effect under conditions of causal complexity.

Dublin, Ireland Robert Elgie

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During the writing of the book, I have called upon various colleagues to comment on draft chapters. The usual caveat applies. Any mistakes or problems of interpretation are my own responsibility. Nonetheless, I would like to thank Cristina Bucur, Bogdan Dima, Bernard Dolez, David Doyle, Christine Fauvelle-Aymar, Ken McDonagh, Sorina Soare, and Gabriela Tanasescu for their comments. In addition, I would like to give particular thanks to two people. The first is Cristina Manolache, who provided invaluable research assistance for the chapter on Romania. The second is David Doyle, who did all the work arranging the laboratory experiment in Chap. 3 and who helped to design the experiment itself. Dave is a world-class researcher, a fine colleague, and it is always a pleasure working with him.

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CHAPTER 1

Making Sense of the World

How do we make sense of political leadership? All the time, we see presidents and prime ministers on television; we hear them on the radio; we read about them in the newspapers; we see them on billboards; we follow them on social media; we may even come across them in the flesh, sometimes being awed by what we think of as their charisma. We witness them debating with opponents, delivering press conferences, giving short interviews to reporters, visiting workers and patients in hospitals; we even see them holidaying "in private". We parse their words, look at their body language, consider their clothes, examine their haircut, and sometimes even judge them by their spouses, especially if they do not have one. We read about the offices that political leaders occupy; we discover information about their background and personal characteristics; and we learn about the historical, social, cultural, economic, and international context in which they are operating. We call upon theories, ideas, and concepts to describe, understand, and perhaps explain what we observe. In short, we examine political leaders and we study their actions. And yet still the question needs to be asked. How do we make sense of political leadership?

To answer this question, we need to ask a bigger one. How do we make sense of anything? How do we make sense of the world and our experience of it generally? These are philosophical questions. They have nothing to do with political leadership in isolation. Instead, they have to do with the nature of reality and what we can know about the world. Is there a "real world" out there separate from our subjective experience of it? If so, what

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form does it take? Whatever form it takes, what can we know about the world? Can we be sure of everything about it, or just some things and, if the latter, which things can we be sure of and to what extent can we be sure of them? Perhaps we cannot be sure of anything about the world at all. These are long-standing and yet still current philosophical questions. There have been and there remain many different answers to them. The key point is that these questions and the answers to them are prior to any questions we might ask about specific aspects of the world. In other words, before we ask how we can make sense of political leadership, we need to ask how we can make sense of the world more generally.

In this book, we aim to present a philosophically informed study of political leadership. We do so because the study of political leadership is always founded, knowingly or otherwise, on a particular philosophical position. In a previous volume (Elgie 2015), we identified a number of basic philosophical approaches and showed how existing studies of political leadership corresponded to these different approaches. However, in that volume we also showed that in the vast majority of cases the philosophical underpinnings of the studies were only implicit. We had to infer the foundations on which they were based. In this book, rather than leaving such foundations unstated, we prefer to bring them to the front. There is an advantage to this strategy. Some philosophical positions are incompatible with each other. Here, we understand incompatibility to mean that the relative validity of different foundational approaches is not susceptible to empirical testing. By identifying the foundations of our approach, we identify the sorts of studies with which it can reasonably be compared as well as those with which it cannot. We do not claim that everyone should necessarily study political leadership in this way. We are not engaged in a process of foundational imperialism. However, we do hope to present a study of political leadership that is constructed on a very general but nonetheless coherent and logical foundation that could serve as a basis for comparison with other studies built on a similar foundation.

In this chapter, we establish the philosophical foundations of our approach to the study of political leadership. We begin with a general discussion of ontology and epistemology before presenting two basic philosophical positions, positivism and constructivism, demonstrating that they are incompatible with each other. We then focus on a third position, scientific realism, setting out how we understand the world on the basis of it. In philosophy, all terms are loaded. So, we leave it until later in the chapter to state exactly what we mean and do not mean by this term. Within the

framework of scientific realism, we identify with an approach that is consistent with the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism. We present a summary of the pragmatic tradition, distinguishing between two variants of it, and identifying the implications for scientific inquiry of the Peircean version that we prefer to adopt. In these ways, we establish the philosophical foundations of our institutionalist account and the empirical inquiry that we will conduct in subsequent chapters.

1.1 Making Sense of Philosophical Foundations

Philosophical foundations are metaphysical. That is to say, they do not in themselves constitute the world. Instead, they are the basis of our beliefs about how the world is constituted. Philosophical foundations are also meta-theoretical. They are prior to the theories that we might have about how the world works, whatever way we think the world is constituted. More than one theory can be consistent with a given foundation, but the adoption of a certain foundation may necessarily entail the rejection of a particular theory.

Philosophical foundations are important because they shape the way we think about the world. However, they are also highly contested. This point applies to all domains of philosophical inquiry. There are different philosophies, different philosophies of science, different philosophies of social science, and so on. Many of the same philosophical debates are common to each domain of inquiry. Nonetheless, there are different foundational positions whatever the domain. Here, we are interested in the philosophy of science and the social sciences.

Philosophical foundations vary in terms of their ontology and epistemology. Ontology is the study of existence or being. What is the nature of the world? What properties are there in the world? Do the properties of the world exist independently of our own experience, or do we bring the world into existence? Epistemology is the study of knowledge. What can we know about the nature of the world? How do we come to know anything about the world? For both ontology and epistemology, we can distinguish between two opposing sets of assumptions.

Ontologically, there is a fundamental division between what we might call "realism" and "non-realism". Realism "denotes a belief in the reality of something – an existence that does not depend on minds, human or otherwise" (Chakravartty 2007: 8). This may seem like a common-sense belief. Of course, we might say, there is a real world out there. We experi-

ence it every second we are awake. We experience it when we bang our toe against the leg of the table in front of us. However, the radical, non-realist sceptic thinks differently. We experience the world only through our senses. Yet we know that our senses can deceive us. For example, we think we see something in the desert, but it turns out to be a mirage. It is not real. So, how do we know that our senses are not always deceiving us? Maybe we merely think there is a real world out there when we are, in fact, mistaken. Maybe the table in front of me is an illusion and the pain from my toe is just my senses deceiving me? Few people adopt this radically sceptical subjective position that accepts nothing for real outside our own consciousness. However, there is another much more common non-realist position in the social sciences. One version is Laclau and Mouffe's (2001: xiv) "ontology of the social". Here, there are real, mind-independent objects in existence. However, these objects only gain meaning though discursive social activity. In other words, the world exists, but we give meaning to the world only through language. This position avoids the radical metaphysical scepticism of pure subjectivism, but it is still an essentially non-realist perspective. For sure, the material world may have an ontological existence, but it has no meaning outside our engagement with it, outside the language we use to make sense of it. As we shall see, adopting a realist or non-realist position is only a starting point. All the same, it is useful to make a basic distinction between these two ontological positions, not least because, by definition, it is impossible to be simultaneously both a realist and a non-realist.

Epistemologically, there is a division between those who believe we can have objective knowledge about the world and those who believe that all knowledge is essentially subjective or relative. Like the ontological realist, the objectivist seems to adopt a common-sense position. After all, we make knowledge-based claims all the time. We know what the time is. We know the milk is in the fridge. Certainly, we might disagree about what we can claim to know, and about the extent of our knowledge about what we can claim to know, but surely, the objectivist would claim, we can at least know something about the world. Once again, though, the subjectivist or relativist is sceptical. The radical sceptic might again claim that we can come to know things only through our senses. Yet, as we have seen, our senses can deceive us. When we were in the desert, we claimed to know that there was an oasis in front of us, but we were mistaken. Perhaps that experience is more general. Maybe our senses are always deceiving us and we cannot know anything for sure. As before, though, we do not have to

adopt such a radically sceptical position. The subjectivist or relativist might simply argue that if we give meaning to the world, then we can know the meaning we have given to it but no more. This means there can be no objective knowledge, or knowledge that is independent of the meaning we have given to it, but there can be subjective knowledge. Put differently, knowledge exists, but it is a social construction. Again, there are many variants of these arguments, but it helps to distinguish between the claim that there can be objective knowledge and the competing claim that knowledge is purely subjective or relative because, as before, these two positions are mutually exclusive.

Here, and following Elgie (2015: 35), we distinguish between three different foundational positions in the philosophy of social science on the basis of these competing ontological and epistemological assumptions. They are, on the one hand, positivism and, on the other, two post-positivist positions, constructivism,[1] and scientific realism (see Table 1.1.) We acknowledge that these are very broad and highly contested categories. Nonetheless, we are not alone in identifying a tripartite schema of this sort. Similar ones have been proposed by scholars writing from the perspective of social science generally, as well those writing in the disciplines of sociology, political science, and international relations. They include Alvesson and Skoldberg (2010: Chap. 2), Clark (2008: 167), Cruickshank (2012), Kurki (2010: 139), McAnulla (2005: 31–32), Monteiro and Ruby (2009: 16), Rivas (2010: 209), and Shapiro and Wendt (2005).[2] In the rest of this section, we sketch the foundational assumptions of what we label as the positivist and constructivist positions in the natural and social sciences. In the next section, we discuss scientific realism in more detail.

The positivist starts from an objectivist epistemological assumption. This is based on the claim that we can have objective knowledge about the

Table 1.1 Foundational positions based on the combination of different ontological and epistemological assumptions

	Objectivist epistemology	*Relativist epistemology*
Realist ontology	Positivism	Scientific realism
Non-realist ontology	Wendt (1995)[a]	Constructivism

Source: Author

[a]This fourth cell corresponds to a logical, but unusual combination of different ontological and epistemological positions. Rivas (2010: 208–209) categorizes Alexander Wendt's (1995) work in this way. However, we do not follow up on it here

world. However, the positivist also adopts the empiricist position that we can have objective knowledge only on the basis of what we observe with our senses. Unobservable phenomena are unverifiable. This objectivist epistemological position leads to what would appear to be a realist ontological claim that the world consists of real entities, but only ones that are observable to us. In fact, this seemingly realist ontological claim seems to rely on a non-realist foundation (Rivas 2010: 210). After all, if all that exists is what is observed with our senses, then entities do not have an existence that is separate from us. They exist only in so far as they are subjectively observed. For the purposes of this book, we leave aside this issue. The key point is that positivists claim that we can have objective knowledge about observable entities that exist in the world independently from us. These entities include phenomena that can be directly observed, but also ones that are detectable with some form of instrument or device. Thus, positivists are happy to consider radio waves, gravity, atoms, and equivalent entities as ontologically real. This does leave the existence of certain phenomena open to debate. For example, to date the Higgs boson has been detected at the Large Hadron Collider to a six-sigma level of certainty. In other words, its existence remains probabilistic. Most positivists would be willing to accept the existence of the Higgs boson given this extremely high degree of probability, though some might still wish to entertain a certain ontological scepticism. Whatever about the existence of the Higgs boson, the insistence that entities are real only if they are observable or detectable causes a certain problem for positivists in the social sciences. Many of the concepts that are central in this domain, such as power, class, gender, and leadership, are both unobservable and scientifically undetectable. There is no device for detecting leadership. This leads many positivists in the natural sciences to reject the idea that positivism is consistent with social scientific inquiry. That said, there are plenty of social scientists who would nonetheless label themselves as positivists. We leave open the question of whether positivism is compatible with social scientific inquiry. Suffice it to say here that positivists in the social sciences usually adopt an instrumentalist view of ontology. That is, they treat essentially unobservable phenomena "as if" they were ontologically real (Monteiro and Ruby 2009: 27). This move allows positivist social scientific investigation to continue.

Confident that there is the possibility of objective knowledge about observable features that really exist in the world, positivists in both the natural sciences and the social sciences wish to explain how the world works.

Here, though, they face the problem of explaining how one thing causes another. Causation is not an observable entity. It cannot be either directly observed or detected with any sort of special "cause-finding" device. All we can observe is Humean "constant conjunction". Here, we witness one event followed by another event, and we assume that the former causes the latter. Unable to observe or detect causation yet wanting to make causal arguments, positivists typically make the same sort of instrumentalist move that we outlined previously. They treat constant conjunction relations as if they were causal relations. As part of this exercise, positivists also tend to adopt a deductive logic. In both the natural sciences and the social sciences, positivists put forward theories about the world and causal relations in the world and treat these theories "as if" they were ontologically real. Hypotheses can be deduced from these theories. These hypotheses create the expectation that constant conjunctions are likely to be observed in a certain way if the theory is true. If subsequent observations are consistent with the ones that were expected, then the hypothesis is confirmed, causal relations are assumed, and the theory is treated as true. This provides a certain solution to the unobservability of causation. It also provides grounds for the positivist to make the claim that there can be objective knowledge that applies generally, indeed perhaps even universally. If a theory has general, indeed universal implications and if there is observational evidence that the causal relations occur regularly in a manner that is consistent with the theory, then the positivist can claim to have identified a general or universal law. The identification of causal relationships of this sort allows the positivist not only to provide explanations of past outcomes, but also to make predictions about future ones. Thus, from a starting point about the possibility of objective knowledge and a number of instrumentalist moves, positivists propose a scientific method that allows them to make general, potentially universal cause-and-effect statements about the world around us and indeed about the future state of the world, including the social world.

By contrast, the constructivist starts from a subjectivist or relativist epistemological position. Constructivists reject the idea that we can come to have knowledge about the world based simply on observations made via our senses. Instead, they take the position that knowledge is based on language. There may indeed be ontologically real pebbles, stones, boulders, and mountains out there in the world, but we give meaning to these terms and, therefore, to our experience of the world only through the use of language. More than that, we share an experience of the world in this way. We all understand what we mean by pebbles, stones, boulders, and

mountains in pretty much the same way. There are conventional ways in which we understand the world. In other words, the construction of meaning is linguistic, but it is a social rather than a purely individual exercise. This is what is meant when constructivists state that knowledge is a social construction. It follows from this proposition that our knowledge of the world may change as the conventional understanding of the world changes. This point applies both to scientific and social scientific inquiries. For example, we may once have understood Pluto to be a full planet, but now we understand it, at least for the time being, as a dwarf planet. This subjectivist or relativist epistemological position has ontological consequences. The constructivist does not have to take the position that what we understand as pebbles, stones, boulders, and mountains do not exist. In that sense, they can adopt some form of ontologically realist position. However, in the sense that the constructivist argues that we understand the meaning of these and all other objects only through language, then to all intents and purposes these rocky features might as well not really be there (Banta 2012: 385). One way of thinking about the consequence of the constructivist's position is to say that they collapse ontology into epistemology. There is little point in talking about ontology, because it is simply reducible to epistemology. This move has implications for the focus of social scientific inquiry. Constructivists have no ontological or epistemological qualms about studying concepts such as power, class, gender, and leadership. Such concepts may or may not have an ontological reality, but certainly their meaning is socially constructed. Therefore, the constructivist is willing to interrogate and analyse these concepts, even though they are unobservable.

The constructivist's position has consequences for the nature of inquiry. The identification of cause-and-effect relations is premised on the existence of ontologically real, mind-independent entities. Yet, the constructivist collapses ontology into epistemology. The result is that the constructivist rejects the very idea of causality (ibid.: 383). For the constructivist, everything we understand about the world is socially constructed, including claims about causal relations. When we talk about causal relations, we are merely expressing a socially constructed interpretation of socially constructed aspects of the world. The constructivist can show how our socially constructed understanding of the socially constructed world has changed over time and how it can vary from one socially constructed context to another. However, the constructivist cannot provide—and is not interested in providing—a cause-and-effect account of

the world. Instead, the constructivist often adopts a normative or critical perspective of the world, questioning our received wisdoms, and interrogating our socially constructed understandings of the world. For example, the constructivist may take the view that the current socially constructed consensus on a particular issue may come about because some people have more power than others. Wilfully or otherwise, the powerful impose their view of the world on others, constructing an interpretation of the world that suits what they perceive to be their interests. By critiquing the way in which we conventionally view the world, the constructivist creates the potential for social progress and emancipation, for a new and more equitable social construction of the world. In short, the constructivist rejects a scientific method that aims to identify objective cause-and-effect relations, focusing instead on how our understanding of the world is socially constructed, often critiquing conventional ways in which the world is socially constructed.

In the philosophy of the natural and social sciences, positivism and constructivism are incompatible positions. They are incompatible because foundations have no foundations (Monteiro and Ruby 2009: 26). That is to say, the validity of the ontological and epistemological foundations on which the different positions rest is not susceptible to empirical testing. We cannot go out and discover, or observe, which foundation is correct. It is certainly possible to identify logical contradictions in the foundations of any philosophical position. Nonetheless, when philosophical positions rest on logical but mutually exclusive foundations, then no amount of empirical testing will determine which of the two positions is valid. It may be possible to find empirical evidence to refute the real-world implications that are consistent with a given philosophical position, but it is not possible to reject the foundation of that position itself. For example, the implications of certain positivist theories may be empirically testable, but even if they were found to be false, this would not render the foundations of positivism invalid, only the particular positivist theory that is being tested. In short, metaphysical foundations can be philosophically rejected, but not empirically disproved.

In the discipline of International Relations, there is an ongoing philosophical battle between positivists and constructivists as to which is the correct foundation for their subject. Yet, this debate is fundamentally unresolvable, precisely because the two foundational positions are essentially incompatible. The positivist cannot provide empirical evidence to support the claim that there can be objective knowledge of causal relations

in a real social world and, therefore, that scholars of International Relations should study the subject from a positivist perspective. This claim rests on metaphysical rather than empirical foundations. An equivalent point, though, applies to constructivist claims about epistemological and de facto ontological relativism. In other words, in both International Relations and other domains of inquiry, the battle between positivists and constructivists is not empirically winnable. In this context, we could simply ignore such foundational philosophical issues altogether. Indeed, as we noted previously, most scholars of political leadership have adopted precisely this attitude. Here, though, we wish to present a philosophically informed account of political leadership. This means that we have either to choose between one of these two incompatible foundational positions, or to adopt an alternative one. We prefer the latter option, choosing scientific realism as the philosophical foundation for this study.

1.2 Making Sense of Scientific Realism

The origins of scientific realism lie in the study of the philosophy of the natural sciences. Here, scientific realism emerged in the 1960s as a challenge to the dominant positivist paradigm. In this sense, like constructivism, we can think of scientific realism as a form of post-positivism. In the social sciences, the origins of what we are calling "scientific realism" emerged in the 1970s. Here, it roots lie in the work of Roy Bhaskar and his concept of critical realism (1975 [2008], 1979 [2005]). It is an open question as to whether the concepts of scientific and critical realism are compatible. There are authors who consider them to be synonymous (Brown 2007: 409). By contrast, there are those who suggest that they are separate. For example, Bennett (2013: 465) implies that they are quite different, and Kurki (2007: 361) certainly wishes to distinguish between them. More commonly, though, scholars in the social sciences state that critical realism is a form of the type of scientific realism that is found in the natural sciences. For example, Wight and Joseph (2010: 2) state that critical realism "is a very specific development" of scientific realism within the social sciences, even if it is "vital to differentiate" the two (ibid.: 4); Chernoff (2007: 400) believes that critical realism "can be conceived of as a very specific, though quite unusual, sort of" scientific realism; while Patomäki (2002: 9) calls critical realism "a particular form" of scientific realism. That said, there are also scholars who do not particularly distinguish between the two concepts, some using only the term "critical real-

ism", including Alvesson and Sköldberg (2010), Banta (2012), Danermark et al. (2002), and Lewis (2002), and others referring solely to "scientific realism", such as Joseph (2007), Monteiro and Ruby (2009), Rivas (2010), and Shapiro (2005). In this book, we are not concerned with establishing whether or not the concepts of scientific and critical realism are compatible, but, for reasons we identify below, we privilege the term "scientific realism".

In the philosophy of the natural sciences, there is a "bewildering variety of definitions" of scientific realism (Devitt 2005: 770). Indeed, as one of the leading writers on this concept in this area notes, "[i]t is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that scientific realism is characterized differently by every author who discusses it" (Chakravartty 2014). The same can be said of the work in the social sciences too (Maxwell 2012: 4–5). That said, a version of scientific or critical realism has become relatively dominant in the discipline of International Relations in the last couple of decades (Patomäki and Wight 2000; Wight 2006). In this book, we do not simply borrow a version of scientific or critical realism that has been set out elsewhere. Instead, we adopt a new perspective. In so doing, we admit that we are adding yet another characterization of scientific realism to an already long list. That said, even if we are sure that many scholars currently working within the scientific or critical realist paradigm will find differences between their appreciation of the concept and the one presented here, we are also confident that the vast majority of scholars who work within this paradigm will see basic commonalities between their approach and ours. This is because scientific realists share the same basic ontological and epistemological assumptions.

In the natural sciences, scientific realists typically begin with a discussion of epistemology and then move to ontology. Here, scientific realists "share in common the convictions that scientific change is on balance progressive and that science makes possible knowledge of the world beyond its accessible, empirical manifestations" (Leplin 1984: 2). The first conviction refers to the idea that science has developed in a fairly consistent way over time. For example, even Einstein's rejection of Newtonian mechanics did not mean that Newton was entirely wrong in every respect. Instead, Einstein built on Newton, allowing science to move forward. The long process of incremental scientific advancement means that we can have good reason to believe in the scientific enterprise in general. For example, if we were to read an undergraduate physics textbook, we would have good grounds for believing the truth of the basic account of the

world that is presented there (Boyd 2002). Thus, the physicist's textbook is more than a socially constructed interpretation of the world. Instead, the scientific realist wishes to claim that scientific progress has generated at least some objective knowledge about the world. That said, the scientific realist is not necessarily making a claim that we have complete knowledge of the world. After all, even if we have considerable baseline knowledge in areas such as physics and chemistry that is unlikely ever to be completely refuted, even in these domains some of our current scientific wisdom may turn out to be only partially correct and perhaps even incorrect. Thus, we can have knowledge of the world, but we are likely to have only imperfect knowledge. The second conviction is related to this point. If we have good reason to believe the truth or approximate truth of the physicist's basic account of the world, then we also have good reason to accept the existence of the entities that the physicist claims constitute this world. These include not only observable entities, such as pebbles, stones, boulders, and mountains, but also unobservable entities, such as radio waves, gravity, and atoms. We can take it that these entities really exist. From the combination of these two convictions, Chakravartty (2014) sums up the standard scientific realist position in the natural sciences as follows: "our best scientific theories give true or approximately true descriptions of observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world."

In the social sciences, Bhaskar's critical realism takes a different form, but it shares the same basic ontological and epistemological convictions. Bhaskar begins with a consideration of ontology and then moves to epistemology. He adopts a resolutely realist ontology. In a world without people, he states, "[the] tides would still turn and metals conduct electricity in the way that they do" (Bhaskar 1975 [2008]: 12). Moreover, the mechanisms that cause the tides to turn and metals to conduct electricity would also continue to "operate even if unknown, and even if there were no-one to know it" (ibid.: 27). Thus, he adopts the ontological position that both physical phenomena, which are observable, and causal mechanisms, which are unobservable, have a mind-independent existence (ibid.: 37). Bhaskar combines this realist ontology with a relativist epistemology (ibid.: 241). Knowledge of the world, he argues, is a social product (ibid.: 178). There can be no knowledge of the natural world, including the causal mechanisms in the world, without people engaging in the study of it (ibid.: 176). For Bhaskar, though, this does not mean that we can know nothing for certain, or that we can have only socially constructed knowledge. This is at least partly because he places ontology before epistemology. As he puts it, "the ontological independence of the event is a condition

of the intelligibility of its description" (ibid.: 181). In other words, we use words to try to make sense of the world, but we are nonetheless trying to make sense of something that actually exists in the world. We are not merely constructing the world with our words. For Bhaskar, some claims to knowledge about the world will be better than others. Thus, the hard work of science must continue (ibid.). Even so, through such work we can gain at least some degree of what amounts to relatively objective knowledge about the world outside us.

In the study of International Relations, critical realism tends to follow the logic of Bhaskar's argument. For example, Patomäki (2002: 8) and Wight (2006: 26) make three Bhaskar-like metaphysical commitments. They are: "ontological realism (that there is a reality independent of the mind(s) that would wish to come to know it); epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced); and judgemental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible, in principle, to choose between competing theories)" (Wight ibid.). In his version of realism, Wight (ibid: 32), like Bhaskar, believes causal mechanisms to be ontologically real, indicating that he is committed to the position that unobservable phenomena can be considered to have a mind-independent existence, or, as he puts it, that "the world of experiences/appearances does not exhaust the real" (ibid.: 37). Also like Bhaskar, he adopts a fallibilist epistemological position. We should be "continuously critical" (ibid.: 38) of our knowledge claims, he states, but we must acknowledge that some descriptions "seem to be better than others at capturing various aspects of the world" (ibid.: 37). For sure, he claims, "beliefs are socially produced" and it is "conceivable that our current stock of knowledge could be overturned at some point in the future" (ibid.: 39). At the same time, science is an activity that "attempts to articulate in thought the natures and constitutions and ways of acting of things that exist independently of that thought" (ibid.). This leads to the conclusion that "there may be, and often are, good grounds for preferring one theory or account of some aspect of the world to another" (ibid.: 40).

These accounts all have their differences. Moreover, there is much more to any one of them than we have presented here. For example, in the natural sciences, scientific realism is often associated with a number of specific arguments, including the success (Devitt 2005) or no-miracles argument (Okasha 2002). For its part, Bhaskar's critical realism is extremely complex, not least his consideration of three levels of reality, the domains of the real, the actual, and the empirical (Bhaskar 1975 [2008]: 46). Wight's analysis is also very considered, including discussion of con-

trol and causal mechanisms and much more (Wight 2006: 33). While these accounts are different, they resemble each other in two key foundational respects and in ways that mean they differ from both positivism and constructivism. First, they all adopt a realist ontology that includes consideration of unobservable features of the world. Second, even though they adopt a relativist epistemology, they make the claim that we can at least arrive at some more or less objectively correct explanations of the world. These are foundational assumptions. We can infer from them that scientific realism constitutes a philosophical position that is incompatible with positivism and constructivism. This means that it is incorrect to think of either scientific realism or critical realism as a "via media" (Monteiro and Ruby 2009: 21) between positivism and constructivism, or as a "middle-ground" (Rivas 2010: 203), or "compromise" (ibid.: 205) position between the other two. Instead, what we are calling "scientific realism" is a separate and distinct philosophical position in itself.

We adopt an account of political leadership that we believe to be consistent with a scientific realist foundation. Specifically, we make the following ontological and epistemological assumptions.

We adopt a realist ontology. We assume that there are mind-independent entities in the world outside us. These entities include natural phenomena, such as pebbles, stones, boulders, and mountains. They include people. They also include observable human creations, such as buildings. The set of natural phenomena also includes entities that are not directly observable, but that are detectable, such as radio waves, gravity, and atoms. We are agnostic as to whether particular natural phenomena exist. For example, we do not feel the need to take an explicit position on the existence of the Higgs boson. The point is that we assume that unobservable natural entities can and do exist in this regard. In addition, we assume that the set of mind-independent entities includes naturally unobservable and undetectable human creations. They include non-material entities, such as ideas. Ideas are a purely human product. If there had never been any people in the world, there would never have been any ideas in existence about the world. For example, while we are currently agnostic as to the natural existence of the Higgs boson, we are more than happy to accept the existence of the idea of the Higgs boson. Ideas also have purely social consequences. They do not have any direct effect on the natural world. Only people acting upon an idea can have an effect on natural phenomena. Thus, if there were no longer any people in the world, there would no new ideas and nobody to act upon them. Ideas include concepts such as power,

class, gender, and leadership. It is possible for ideas to remain purely subjective. I can have my own ideas that are shared with nobody else, even if I act upon them. These ideas will disappear with me. However, it is also possible for ideas to take on an existence that goes beyond any individual or particular set of people. In this sense, many people can act upon a single idea. Moreover, ideas do not necessarily disappear when the individual or set of people who created them disappears. In this way, they can continue to be acted upon across generations. In both senses, ideas can be said to have an ontological reality.

Ontologically, we also assume that all mind-independent entities are associated with causal processes or causal mechanisms. Causal processes capture the notion that entities are endowed with unobservable causal dispositions that have the potential to bring about particular effects. Such features are ontologically real but essentially latent in entities. Any potential effect is brought about only when the entity interacts with other entities. Thus, a rock is disposed to roll down a hill, but it will not do so unless the force of gravity is acting upon it. One interaction often generates another. One rock with the force of gravity acting upon it may hit another, causing an avalanche. Outcomes can be the result of multiple interactions between multiple entities. The causal process is a description of the interactions that occur between the causal dispositions of entities. Causal mechanisms are slightly different. They are unobservable, ontologically real Bhaskar-like entities that exist separately from other entities. They are intermediary between one entity and another and capture the specific reason(s) why one entity has a causal impact on another (George and Bennett 2005: 137). Causal mechanisms can operate separately or in conjunction with each other. For the purposes of this study, we treat both causal processes, which capture the totality of interactions between the causal dispositions in entities, and causal mechanisms as being equivalent to each other. In whatever way we conceive of them, we assume the existence of an extremely complex world in which outcomes are the result of multiple cause-and-effect relations between ontologically real mind-independent entities, including both humans and humanly created entities, such as ideas.

In addition to this ontological realism, we also adopt a certain epistemological relativism. We assume that knowledge about the world is a human product. The natural world can exist without humans, but knowledge of it cannot. However, we reject the constructivist implications of a purely subjectivist or relativist epistemological position. We assume that

knowledge is more than a social construction. Clearly, knowledge claims are based solely on language or human communication in some broader sense. We reject the idea, though, that knowledge can be reduced to language. Instead, we assume that we can use language in ways that allow us to gain knowledge of the various entities in the world, including ones that are unobservable. To put it differently, we assume that the world takes a particular form and that we can come to know about the form it takes through language. We further assume that we can gain knowledge of both the natural entities in the world and the humanly created entities, such as ideas. We also assume that we can have more than merely descriptive knowledge of these entities. In other words, we assume that we can have knowledge about the effects of causal processes or mechanisms. Thus, we can do more than simply describe the world. We can try to identify cause-and-effect relations to explain why the world comes to take the form that it does.

We assume that we can identify individual causal properties or mechanisms. For example, we can come to know the effect of the force of gravity on a boulder when no other forces are acting upon it in a closed system. We also assume that we can have knowledge of how these individual causal properties or mechanisms combine and interact in an open system. If we can identify such combinations and interactions successfully, then even in a complex world we can explain why individual outcomes have occurred. In other words, we can come to know how avalanches occur. We also assume that we can have knowledge of more regular outcomes. Causal properties or mechanisms are associated with regularities. They are the reason why one event follows another when it is acted upon in a certain way. They are the reason why the boulder rolls downhill when the force of gravity acts upon it. They are the explanation for why A is regularly associated with B. If the cause-and-effect relationship between A and B is very strong, then we might expect to find evidence of regular outcomes in the world, because the strength of this relationship will be greater than other countervailing causal properties or mechanisms to which the cause-and-effect relationship may be subject. Moreover, even if the individual relationship is not particularly strong, if multiple causal properties or mechanisms combine in ways that reinforce a particular cause-and-effect relationship, then again we might expect to find evidence of regular outcomes in the world, because together they may overcome countervailing relationships. Thus, we assume that by identifying causal properties or mechanisms, we have the

potential to explain both individual events and regularities in the world. We may even be able to predict outcomes on the basis of the cause-and-effect relations that we have identified.

While we assume that we can have knowledge of a complex world and that we can have knowledge about both individual and more regular outcomes in such a world, we also assume that we can have only incomplete knowledge of these outcomes and that our explanations will be at best only partial. Given knowledge is a human product and humans are fallible, we are sceptical as to whether we have the capacity for perfect knowledge. More importantly, given such a complex world in which causal relations comprise multiple interactions between multiple entities on an ongoing basis, we are sceptical that we could ever have perfect knowledge of even individual outcomes, even if we were to have the human capacity for it. Further still, even if we can identify causal processes or mechanisms that seem to explain certain regularities in the world, we assume that such explanations will remain limited. At some point, any regular cause-and-effect relationship is likely to be overwhelmed by complex, contingent, countervailing factors. Therefore, while we can have the ambition to make modest generalizations about cause-and-effect relations and to identify causal tendencies, we can have no ambition to make highly generalizable, never mind universal claims about such relations. Put differently, any horizon of predictability will be relatively small.

Within such epistemological limits, we embrace critical inquiry that aims to identify potentially hidden or at least taken-for-granted elements of the world. This can create the potential for better explanation (Shapiro 2005: 36). Yet, while we embrace critical inquiry, we do not restrict ourselves to it. We take the position that we can gain knowledge about causal processes or mechanisms through scientific enterprise in all its forms. This includes work in the natural sciences, as well as rigorous analytical and empirical work in the human and social sciences. The limits to our knowledge mean that there are many things about the world that currently we do not know as well as things we claim to know about the world that are simply incorrect or at best only partially correct. All the same, there are also some things that we can hope to be more or less confident about knowing. Thus, even if we can have only imperfect knowledge and even if we can be mistaken about what we currently take for knowledge, we adopt the position that through the hard work of science and the efforts of communities of scientists, it is still possible for some explanations of the world to be better than others.

It is in this context that we prefer the term "scientific realism" to "critical realism", even though we are applying it solely to the domain of the social sciences. We prefer it, because, as stated above, while we embrace the idea that our conventional understandings of the world need to be critically assessed, we take the position that to arrive at better explanations of the world we need to engage in the hard work of science, including social science, to identify causal processes and mechanisms. The label "scientific realism" underscores this commitment.

The adoption of a scientific realist foundation clearly situates this study relative to both positivist and constructivist studies. While there are no doubt positivist and constructivist scholars in the social sciences, including those who study politics and international relations, we suspect that the majority of social scientists, if pushed to think about the foundations of their inquiry, would probably adopt some form of scientific realist position as we understand it. They would accept a realist view of the world; they would wish to study unobservable aspects of the world; they would believe we can explain why at least certain events occur in this world; and in that sense they would believe that we can have an albeit limited degree of objective knowledge of the world. We will return to this issue in Chap. 9. For now, though, we wish to specify our philosophical position more finely. We adopt an approach that is broadly in line with a certain version of American pragmatism. In the next section, we outline the particular form of pragmatism we are adopting.

1.3 Making Sense of Pragmatism

Pragmatism is a "home-grown" American philosophy (Misak 2013: ix). Its origins lie in the meetings of The Metaphysical Club (Menand 2001) that were held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the 1860s and 1870s. The members of the club included the philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), the philosopher and psychologist, William James (1842–1910), and the lawyer, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (1841–1935), who went on to serve on the US Supreme Court for nearly 30 years. Pragmatism is often associated with what came to be known as the "pragmatic maxim", which was first expounded in an article by Peirce in *Popular Science Monthly* in 1878 (Peirce 1878). Yet, the term "pragmatism" was first used by James only in 1898 (Bacon 2012: 1). Peirce and James are considered to be the founders of American pragmatism. However, the third figure who is traditionally associated with "classical" pragmatism is

the philosopher and educationalist, John Dewey (1859–1952). There are various interpretations of the development of pragmatism since this classical period (Bacon 2012: 7–9). All the same, most observers would agree that pragmatism is still present in contemporary American intellectual life. Indeed, a set of "New Pragmatists" has been identified (Misak 2007).

There is a debate as to what pragmatism constitutes. We have seen that Misak (2013: ixv) calls it a philosophy. Certainly, pragmatism dominates historiographical accounts of American philosophy (Misak 2008b), suggesting that it should be thought of as a distinct philosophical position, school of philosophy, or at least a general philosophical tradition. This interpretation is held not only by philosophers. For example, when applying pragmatism to the study of International Relations, Weber (2013: 35–43) also calls it a philosophy. That said, even eminent philosophers who study the topic acknowledge that there is a persistent "[p]erplexity concerning the nature of pragmatism" (Talisse and Aiken 2008: 2). Hookway (2012: 3), a philosopher, argues that for Peirce pragmatism was both a maxim of logic and a whole system of philosophy. Feilzer (2010), a social scientist, argues that it is a research paradigm that can be applied to the study of the social sciences. Hellmann (2009), a student of International Relations, thinks of pragmatism as a theory with methodological implications more than a philosophy. For their part, Talisse and Aiken, both philosophers, point to the divisions among the very founders of pragmatism as to what it meant. They argue that for Peirce "pragmatism was a simply a logical rule for doing philosophy", whereas for James "pragmatism was *itself* a philosophy" (Talisse and Aiken 2008: 14 [emphasis in the original]). With even the founders of pragmatism disagreeing as to what constitutes the concept, we do not aspire to adjudicate any of these competing claims. Instead, we think of pragmatism simply as a certain philosophical approach that can help us to study a broad set of empirical questions.

With the idea of scientific realism being so contested, and with the concept of pragmatism being persistently perplexing, it is unsurprising that the link between the two is also somewhat ambiguous. For example, Herborth (2012: 238), writing in the context of International Relations, portrays scientific and critical realists as fending off pragmatists, implying that they are different concepts. Writing in the same domain, Rytövuori-Apunen (2005: 161) criticizes the critical realism of scholars such as Wright and Patomäki and proposes a Deweyan form of pragmatism, again perhaps suggesting that the two concepts are separate. By contrast,

Sarsfield (2015), writing from a political science perspective, states that scientific realism "clashes" with pragmatism and identifies differences between them, but nonetheless he notes that they "are not two opposing enterprises". Similarly, Cherryholmes (1992: 13) argues that pragmatism and scientific realism "share a number of assumptions about science, language, and the world", though she adds that in this context "it is surprising that these two schools of thought end up so far apart". More positively, Johnson and Duberley (2000: 161) state that pragmatism is "by no means alien" to the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar and discuss a model of "pragmatic-critical realism" (ibid.: 166), suggesting that the two concepts are compatible. Some International Relations scholars also see links between the two concepts. In contrast to Rytövuori-Apunen, Wight (2006) implies that his own work has certain affinities with pragmatism (ibid: 61) and quotes Peirce approvingly (ibid: 24). Pihlström (2004: 47), writing from a philosophical perspective, notes that scientific realists have become attached to aspects of Peirce's work. Perhaps most notably in the context of this volume, a number of writers have tried to place pragmatism in opposition to both positivism, on the one hand, and some form of constructivism, on the other. For instance, Hellmann (2009: 638–639) argues that "pragmatism promises to steer a clear course between the Scylla of … [positivism] and the Charybdis of [postmodernism]". Weber (2013: 35) is attracted to pragmatism because it offers "a middle road between absolutism and nihilism", meaning positivism and what we think of as constructivism respectively. Equally, the editors of a special issue of pragmatism and International Relations in *Millennium* (Editors 2002: iii) encourage a pragmatic perspective because it looks "beyond the epistemological stalemate opposing positivism and post-positivism". In short, we have good grounds for thinking that it is perfectly compatible both to propose a scientific realist philosophical foundation and to adopt a pragmatic approach to the study of political leadership.

We have already hinted there were divisions among pragmatists even during the classical period. Indeed, as early as 1908, one observer identified no fewer than 13 pragmatisms (Talisse and Aiken 2008: 8). These divisions certainly continue among the "new pragmatists", such that it "is reasonable to suspect that the number of pragmatisms in currency today far exceeds" this number (ibid.). Knight and Johnson (2011: 25) capture these historical and contemporary divisions very directly, labelling pragmatists "an unruly lot" and a "contentious family". Westbrook (2008: 185) uses the same term, calling pragmatists "a loose, contentious family

of thinkers who have always squabbled". Indeed, extending the family metaphor even further, he thinks of pragmatism "as a lineage of contentious siblings, stepchildren, and bastards" (ibid.: 186). The ongoing presence of divisions within pragmatism leads Talisse (2007: 21) to state that there "is no pragmatism *per se* or in general", meaning that there is no single version of this approach. This suggests that when we say we are adopting a pragmatic institutionalist approach to the study of political leadership, we need to specify which sort of pragmatic approach we are adopting.

To do so, we adopt Misak's (2013) interpretation of American pragmatism. In essence, she distinguishes between two competing views of pragmatism.[3] She states that the distinction within pragmatism is:

> roughly … a debate between those who assert (or whose view entails) that there is no truth and objectivity to be had anywhere and those who take pragmatism to promise an account of truth that preserves our aspiration to getting things right. (ibid.: 3)

In the former camp, she places two of the classical pragmatists, James and Dewey, as well as a certain version of new pragmatism typified by the work of the late twentieth-century philosopher, Richard Rorty (ibid.). While some members of this group and those associated with them can be labelled "scientific realists" without much fear of contradiction, including Dewey with his notion of truth as "warranted assertion", there is a reading of the work of scholars such as Rorty and his followers that would place them fully outside the scientific realist foundation and firmly within the constructivist camp. In this volume, we are not concerned with adjudicating where particular scholars in this group lie in this regard or indeed where the group itself lies. We simply note that Misak identifies this group as one of the two main variants of pragmatism. In the latter camp, Misak places the other classical pragmatist, Peirce, as well as his fellow member of The Metaphysical Club, Chauncey Wright (ibid.: 3). In addition, we can place contemporary writers such as Susan Haack and Misak herself in this camp (Bacon 2012: Chap. 6). Peirce has sometimes faced the accusation of being a proto-positivist (Margolis 2006: 6). As we shall see, we do not interpret him as such. Nonetheless, such an accusation does suggest that however else we should think about those associated with this second variant of pragmatism, we should not think of them as constructivists. Overall, while this twofold division is indeed very rough, it does help to

illustrate both why it is sometimes difficult to characterize pragmatism and also why there is a certain ambiguity as to whether scientific realism and pragmatism are compatible.

In the discipline of International Relations, there has been increasing interest in the application of pragmatism to various topics. Here, John Dewey seems to be the pragmatist of choice, with both Festenstein (2002) and Cochran (2002, 2012) privileging a Deweyan perspective. In a different discipline, Knight and Johnson (2011) also adopt a Deweyan account in their study of political theory and US public policy. For their part, and back in the discipline of International Relations, Franke and Weber (2011) have preferred to apply a close reading of James' work.

In this book, by contrast, we adopt an account that we consider to be consistent with a certain Peircean reading of American pragmatism. We apply such an account at a general level. We do not claim to be presenting a strict exegesis of Peirce's work, whatever that would look like. Certainly, there are areas of Peirce's still uncollected writings that have no direct bearing on this study whatsoever, such as his work on semiotics. There are other aspects, such as his insistence on abductive reasoning, that might be relevant to this study and that are most likely consistent with our account, but which we do not dwell upon in any detail. We are also happy to draw on the work of other pragmatists and pragmatist commentators to elucidate our approach. Overall, we adopt a Peircean-like pragmatist approach, but we do so purely instrumentally with a view to showing how it is basically consistent with the scientific realist foundation that we presented in the previous section and how it is useful for the empirical study of political leadership that we will turn to in the chapters that follow.

1.4 Making Sense

There are basic similarities between the pragmatic approach that we are privileging and the scientific realist foundation that we presented earlier in this chapter. In terms of ontology, Peirce believed in the existence of a mind-independent world (Hookway 2012: 7).[4] Indeed, he has been classed as a common-sense realist in this regard, or at least as a "critical common-sense" realist (ibid.: 68). Such common-sense realism is consistent with Peirce's resolutely anti-Cartesian, anti-sceptical approach (ibid.). Peirce believed that we must assume an external reality in the first place in order to engage in practical inquiry about the world (Misak 2013: 40). In this sense, the initial belief in an external world is purely functional

(Rescher 2006: 397) or instrumental. Through inquiry, though, we come to learn about the world, including things that exist in the world. In this way, inquiry "retrojustifies" the initial presumption of realism (Rescher ibid.: 395). While Peirce and other pragmatists come to a common-sense ontological realism through this process of inquiry, they arrive at a position that is different from the positivists. This is because pragmatists can be classed as anti-foundationalists (Misak 2008a: 197), here meaning that they reject the idea that "we might find a foundation for our principles of right belief and of right action in some infallible source – from God, from some special faculty of intuition, or from what is given to us with certainty by experience" (Misak 2000: 2). While positivists hold that we can be certain only of things that we experience, pragmatists believe that through inquiry we can come to know about things we do not directly experience. Thus, Misak (2013: 223) states that for the pragmatist, "if the best science tells us that certain unobservable entities exist, then they exist". This position is exactly the same as the one we presented earlier when discussing the ontology of scientific realism within the natural sciences.

In terms of epistemology, we have just seen that pragmatists reject radical scepticism. Indeed, they demonstrate a general antipathy to all forms of metaphysical speculation (Misak 2013: 163), or what they would see as armchair philosophizing. Such antipathy stems from the pragmatist conviction that philosophical inquiry should not be an end in itself, but should always be related to practice. This conviction is shared by all the classical pragmatists. They believed that "if you try to divorce philosophical concepts from experience and practice, you lose contact with what is real and you sink into useless metaphysics" (ibid.). For this reason, rather than starting from the Cartesian position of universal metaphysical doubt, pragmatists hold to the idea that "inquiry must start with a background of beliefs which are not doubted" (Misak 2004: 13). As we have seen, only on this basis can practical inquiry continue. While pragmatists start from an anti-sceptical position, they also reject the idea that there is any transcendental, or objective, truth that can somehow be discovered through practical inquiry (Misak 2008a: 202). Pragmatists believe that we cannot "step outside our corpus of belief" (ibid.: 203) and adopt a God's-eye perspective on truth. In this sense, for pragmatists there are no certain and infallible epistemological foundations (Misak 2013: 244). Rejecting both scepticism and objectivism, pragmatists adopt a fallibilist epistemology. This is the idea that "belief, though never certain, is not … necessarily dubious" (Westbrook 2008: 189). Pragmatists take the position that through practical inquiry we can come to beliefs about

the world that we can treat as being true, including, as we have seen, beliefs about the mind-independent world. For sure, further inquiry may reveal that we were wrong about what we considered previously to be true. For that reason, pragmatists hold that we should always be willing to doubt the truth of any particular belief, suggesting that a critical perspective is consistent with the process of pragmatic practical inquiry. Misak (2000: 14) sums up the pragmatist epistemological position by saying that they adopt a "low-profile" conception of truth and objectivity. They wish to make truth claims, but they do not wish to claim that such truths apply universally and with complete certainty. This position is shared by all classical pragmatists and is consistent with the epistemological position that we adopted previously.

There is, though, a tension at the heart of pragmatism's epistemological fallibilism. One strand of pragmatism would interpret it to mean that there can be no such thing as truth. Instead, we should "speak rather of justification relative to one group of inquirers or another" (Misak 2000: 13). This is the Rortyan perspective. Here, truth reduces to intersubjective agreement, or agreement between the members of a particular community, or community of inquirers. This perspective is very similar to the constructivist idea that knowledge is merely a social construction. It leads to a certain social, cultural, and, indeed, ethical relativism (ibid.). By contrast, the Peircean strand of pragmatism privileges the idea of truth as a "well-settled" belief (Misak 2013: 81). This is not simply a belief "that fits with the spirit of the times" (ibid.), or with the beliefs and perhaps prejudices of a particular community of inquirers. Instead, a well-settled belief is one that results from an extensive process of inquiry by many minds, or communities of inquirers. For sure, even communities of inquirers can arrive at conclusions that are wrong and that can be held wrongly for long periods. For example, for many centuries we thought we knew that the sun orbited around the earth. However, we now know better. In this context, for Peirce a true belief "is one that would continue to be thought of as right or true, were we able to consider all the evidence and argument" (ibid.: 133). The subjunctive here is important (ibid.). For many issues, we may never be able to consider all the evidence and argument. Therefore, some issues will never be well-settled. All the same, through ongoing inquiry by communities of inquirers, we can still come to at least some beliefs that are genuinely well-settled. In this book, we follow this second strand of pragmatist epistemology.

We can see, then, that Peircean pragmatism is associated with an ongoing process of practical inquiry with a view to arriving at well-settled beliefs

about the world. The pragmatic maxim is Peirce's "methodological rule" (Hookway 2012: 9) for clarifying propositions and arriving at such beliefs. We have already noted that Peirce first formulated the maxim in 1878. Thereafter, he reworked it, arriving at his most helpful formulation in 1903 (ibid.). Put simply, we can think of the maxim as an exhortation to hypothesize. If x were true, what would we need to do to prove it so? Put slightly differently, what are the practical consequences for inquiry of believing x to be true? For Peirce at least, the pragmatic maxim does not mean that x is true if it is useful (and, in that sense, pragmatic) to believe it to be true. This interpretation of the maxim separated Peirce from James, notably regarding the latter's idea that we can treat the belief in the existence of God to be true if it is useful to believe in the existence of God, perhaps because it makes people happy to adopt this belief. Instead, for Peirce, the maxim requires the identification of the sort of practical inquiry that we would need to undertake in order to come to a well-settled belief that x is true.

It is easy to see why Peirce is sometimes accused of being a positivist (Rescher 2006: 14). The exhortation to hypothesize reflects a strong verificationist element in Peircean pragmatism (Misak 2013: 21–25), and verificationism is associated with the early 20th school of logical positivism that the post-positivists railed against. Indeed, the fact that anti-positivist scholars of International Relations turn to Dewey and James for their version of pragmatism might seem to confirm the accusation that Peirce was a proto-positivist. Yet, Peirce is not a positivist. To be a positivist requires more than a predilection to hypothesize. We have already identified basic ontological and epistemological differences between Peircean pragmatism and positivism. In addition, there is a distinct methodological difference too. Peirce believes strongly in the method of science (Talisse and Aikin 2008: 12). This method "involves a commitment to realism, empiricism, and an emphasis on the idea that inquiry contributes to the convergence of opinions by competent inquirers" (Hookway 2012: 4). However, Peirce is not wedded to "scientism", meaning a dogmatic belief in "an ideology of the look-to-science-for-all-the-answers sort" (Rescher 2006: 14). Instead, Peircean pragmatists wish to embrace all methods of inquiry. Misak (2000: 96) puts it as follows:

> The pragmatist … must remain agnostic about the details as to how inquiry (of any kind) should go. She will say that inquirers must expose themselves to new evidence, argument, and perspectives. For if truth is that which

> would best fit with the evidence and argument, were inquiry to have proceeded as far as it could fruitfully go, then the best way to inquire about the truth is to take in as much and as varied evidence and argument as one can.

Thus, method matters for pragmatists. Without the careful consideration of method, we are unlikely to arrive at a well-settled belief. However, there is no single, prescribed method. Indeed, it would be hazardous to rely on just one method. This reluctance to privilege any particular method is characteristic of scientific or critical realism too (Clark 2008: 168; Kurki 2010: 141; Shapiro 2005: 40).

There is no doubt that Peirce was mainly concerned with the application of pragmatic inquiry to the natural sciences. However, there is no reason to think that his approach cannot be applied to the social sciences too. Indeed, we have already seen scholars of International Relations, such as Colin Wight, quoting Peirce approvingly. In this book, we take the position that as long as we are sensitive to methodological concerns, then there is no reason why we cannot arrive at well-settled beliefs concerning all types of inquiry, including social scientific inquiry. For her part, Misak (2000) goes further still. She wishes to argue that we can apply the logic of Peircean pragmatism to come to well-settled beliefs about ethical issues too. We do not investigate such issues in this volume, but we would point out that the idea that slavery is immoral and that apartheid is repugnant are themselves surely well-settled beliefs.

1.5 Conclusion

In this volume, we present a study that is based on a scientific realist philosophical foundation. This foundation assumes there is a real world out there, that it comprises observable and unobservable entities, that outcomes are the result of a complex combination and interaction of causal processes or mechanisms between these entities, that through scientific endeavour we can come to know the effect of these processes and mechanisms and arrive at explanations of how the world works including explanations of regular outcomes in the world, but that there are still limits to our ability to explain the world, even if some explanations of the world will be better than others. This foundational position provides us with a general philosophical basis from which to approach the study of the world. That said, it is a position that can accommodate a wide range of approaches to the study of the world. Thus, within this general foundational position,

we privilege an approach that is consistent with a version of American pragmatism. Specifically, we propose an approach that is consistent with a Peircean form of pragmatism. This form of pragmatism aims to arrive at well-settled beliefs about the world. It does so through a process of practical inquiry that privileges hypothesizing about what it means for a belief to be true and that is conducted by many minds or communities of scholars on the basis of varied methodologies. In the next chapter, we indicate how we intend to apply this approach to the study of political leadership.

Notes

1. More so than either positivism or even scientific realism, the term "constructivism" is highly contested. Generally, though, we use constructivism as an overarching term to include work that adopts what might separately or jointly be called a critical, discursive, post-structuralist, interpretivist, relativist, holistic, humanistic, post-colonial, or feminist approach. This list is not exhaustive. We acknowledge that many writers who label themselves as constructivists, notably in international relations, would not necessarily hold to the foundational assumptions that we ascribe to this label here. Indeed, we discuss this issue in Chap. 9. However, there is no consensus as to what labels should be used when discussing foundational issues, particularly in relation to this category, so we are willing to posit the label "constructivism" to this foundational position, even if it will be contested.
2. These authors propose a similar tripartite distinction, but the labels often vary considerably from one author to another and from the ones used here.
3. The identification of two camps is not peculiar to Misak. Talisse and Aikin (2008: 25) draw a similar distinction.
4. Hookway (2012: 4, fn 5) notes that Peirce insisted he was a realist and complained that other pragmatists were not.

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CHAPTER 2

Making Sense of Leadership Outcomes

How do we make sense of political leadership? More and more, we read urgent calls for better and more effective political leadership; we listen to commentators lamenting that our current crop of political leaders is not up to the task before them; we hear people harking back to a golden age of political leadership. We are told how political leaders are increasingly powerless in a globalized world; we are faced with issues that surely require new thinking and yet our leaders seem to repeat the same tired old mantras; we see things on television and in our communities that make our heads spin, our hearts break, and our blood boil, but none of our political leaders appears to be able to change the course of events. We vote long-term incumbent leaders out of office; we vote out the people who replaced the people we voted out only a short while later; we demonstrate in the streets; we gather in solidarity. We are told that things must change, that new solutions must be found, that politics must be done differently, and yet nothing seems to make a difference. In short, we seem to be facing a crisis of political leadership. And yet, the question still needs to be asked: How do we make sense of political leadership?

To answer this question, we need to ask a bigger one. How do we make sense of leadership generally? What is leadership and what does it take to exercise leadership successfully? Whether it is in the domain of whole societies, multi-national corporations, not-for-profit organizations, educational institutions, football clubs, or social events, what do we need to do to exercise leadership? How do we need to behave to encourage people to

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follow us, so that together we can make the world, our country, our locality, our lives a better place? These are questions that people have asked more or less directly for millennia. There are no easy answers to them. There is, though, no shortage of people willing to give us their opinion on the matter. There are how-to manuals, postgraduate courses, continuing-education seminars, and more than just a few academic textbooks that purport to provide solutions to the problem of how to exercise good leadership. And yet, despite all this work, the issue of leadership remains unsettled. What this suggests is that before we can tackle any supposed crisis of political leadership, we need to ask how we can make sense of leadership in general.

In this chapter, we show how contemporary scholars have tried to make sense of the study of political leadership, and we set out how we aim to do so. To this end, we establish the basic interactionist paradigm within which the study of leadership outcomes is generally conducted. We show how this paradigm is consistent with both the basic scientific realist foundation that we presented in the previous chapter and the pragmatic approach that we set out there. We then present the institutional account of political leadership that we are proposing in this book. We are interested in how leadership institutions can help to explain political outcomes. We show how an institutional approach provides us with the conceptual tools to make at least modest claims about the causes of leadership outcomes. We end by identifying how we intend to engage in practical inquiry about the effect of institutions on leadership outcomes in the rest of the book.

2.1 Making Sense of Leadership

To begin to make sense of leadership, we need to draw a basic distinction between positional leaders, on the one hand, and behavioural leaders, on the other, and, by extension, between positional leadership and behavioural leadership (Edinger 1974: 255–256). A positional leader is someone who occupies a top-level position of formal responsibility. In the political domain, positional leaders are people in directly or indirectly elected positions of political authority, such as presidents, prime ministers, ministers, first ministers of devolved governments, presidents of regional councils, mayors, and so on. In short, positional leaders are high-level political office-holders. To say that someone is a positional leader is, in effect, simply to point to an incumbent office-holder. When we talk about positional leadership, we are merely referring to the holding of top-level

political office. To exercise positional leadership is simply to be holding office, or occupying a leadership institution. By contrast, a behavioural leader is someone who behaves in a certain way. To say that someone is exercising behavioural leadership is to imply that they are engaging in a certain type of behaviour.

The concepts of positional and behavioural leadership are separate. There can be positional leaders who exercise behavioural leadership, that is, there can be leaders who lead. Think Prime Minister Winston Churchill or President John F. Kennedy. There can also be behavioural leadership that is not exercised by positional leaders, that is, there can be people who lead, but who are not leaders. Martin Luther King might be a good example. Crucially, though, there can also be positional leaders who are not exercising behavioural leadership, that is, there can be leaders who are not leading. We will not name names, but these are the office-holders that commentators are often referring to when they talk about a current crisis of political leadership. That is to say, there are people holding top-level positions of elected political authority who are not behaving in the way that we would expect of them. But what is this behaviour that they are failing to engage in? What does a person have to do to exercise behavioural leadership? What type of behaviour constitutes behavioural leadership? This is where the problem of studying political leadership starts.

Many scholars have tried to specify the constituent elements of behavioural leadership. For example, Burns (1978: 18—emphasis in the original) stated that "[*l*]*eadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motivations and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers*". Gardner (1990: 1) defined leadership as "the process of persuasion or example by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leaders and his or her followers". Rost (1991: 102) proposed that "Leadership is an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes". Paige (1977: 69) said that political leadership "consists in the interaction of personality, role, organization, task, values, and setting as expressed in the behavior of salient individuals who contribute to variance in a political system (however defined) and in four dimensions of human behavior (power, affect, instrumentality, and association)". For Tucker (1981: 15), a "political leader is one who gives direction, or meaningfully participates in giving direction to the activities of a political community".

Hah and Bartol (1983: 119–120) defined political leadership as "the mobilization and direction, by a person or persons using essentially non-coercive means, of other persons within a society to act in patterned and coherent ways that cause (or prevent) change in the authoritative allocation of values within that society". Blondel (1987: 3) characterized political leadership as "the power exercised by one or a few individuals to direct members of the nation towards action". Nye (2008: 18) has defined a leader as "someone who helps a group create and achieve shared goals" (Nye 2008: 18). The list could go on and on. Indeed, Rost (1991: 44) identified 221 scholarly definitions of leadership that had been provided up to 1990, while Bass (1990: 11) has quipped, only slightly ironically, that "[t]here are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept".

In this book, we do not wish to add another definition of behavioural leadership to this already very long list. We are not concerned with trying to identify what is *really* meant by the term leadership. In fact, we think this is a hopeless exercise. We take this somewhat controversial stance for reasons that go back to the pragmatic approach that we outlined in the previous chapter. There, we saw that pragmatists were opposed to what they thought of as useless metaphysics (Misak 2013: 163). We consider the search for a "true" definition of (behavioural) leadership to be the equivalent of an ultimately pointless exercise in armchair philosophizing. This is consistent with the application of the Peircean pragmatic maxim. For Peirce, arriving at a definition of something is relatively unimportant (Misak 2004: 4–5). He states that "in order to get a complete grasp of a concept, we must go beyond a 'nominal' definition and connect the concept to that with which we have 'dealings'" (Peirce quoted in Misak 2007: 69). In other words, the Peircean pragmatist is always interested in the application of a concept. For Peirce, we will never arrive at a well-settled belief if we stick to purely cognitive inquiry. We have to engage in practical inquiry. We have to think about what the consequences of an idea would be if it were true. Having done so, we can engage in the method of science to advance our knowledge of that idea with the hope of arriving at a well-settled belief about the truth of it. We consider the search for a true definition of behavioural leadership to be a purely cognitive exercise. We see little point in trying to think of a set of criteria that, if met, would *really* constitute leadership, or at least we refuse to limit ourselves to such an exercise. Instead, we need to engage in practical inquiry about leadership, leaving open what we understand by the concept.

We can illustrate this point by returning to the issue of the contemporary crisis of political leadership. We think that it is a futile exercise to try to determine whether or not there *really* is a crisis of political leadership. Whether or not there is depends on how we define political leadership (and what constitutes a crisis). Yet, we have seen that there is no agreement, no well-settled belief about how to define political leadership. Therefore, the answer to whether or not there is a crisis of leadership depends on the scholar's own interpretation. Certainly, there is a community of inquirers studying this issue, but the essentially cognitive nature of the inquiry in which they are engaging means that we arrive at only individual answers to the question. This is not the method of science. It is the method of Descartes for a contemporary age. By contrast, we are more than happy to engage with the hypothesis that there is currently the idea of a crisis of political leadership and that this idea could have an effect on political outcomes. This is consistent with what we argued in the previous chapter. We believe that ideas are real and that they can have a causal impact. In addition, we are happy to engage with the hypothesis that the idea that there is currently a crisis of leadership that could have an effect on outcomes is true without worrying about exactly what we mean by a crisis of leadership. Ideas are often slightly vague, especially when they are widely shared. Furthermore, we accept that we could perhaps engage in practical inquiry to try to study whether or not there is evidence to support the hypothesis that there is currently a crisis of political leadership and that it is having a causal impact on outcomes. For example, we could investigate the extent to which a particular prime minister was brought down by her own political party because of the idea that she was not behaving in a way that was considered to be consistent with exercising behavioural leadership. We might do so on the basis of some sort of survey of public opinion, or, perhaps better still, by a survey of the opinions of the prime minister's parliamentary colleagues who wielded the knife. We might even find ways of investigating the importance of this idea on the downfall of prime ministers more generally. In other words, we are more than happy to accept that the idea of behavioural leadership can have explanatory purchase and that we can find ways of studying the extent to which it explains outcomes. All the same, we reject the notion that we should spend any more time trying to come up with a definition of what *really* constitutes such leadership.

In this book, we are concerned with positional leaders, with people occupying leadership institutions, principally with presidents and prime

ministers. As we have said, though, we are not concerned with arriving at a definition of political leadership in a behavioural sense. We are not interested in determining whether or not presidents and prime ministers are *really* exercising leadership. Instead, we focus on what we can think of as leadership outcomes, meaning the consequences of the variation in leadership institutions on a variety of outcomes. We wish to understand how variation in positional leadership affects such outcomes. The idea of leadership outcomes is deliberately vague. It can refer to many different things. Certainly, we do not wish to expend any cognitive energy trying to determine what is *really* meant by the general idea of a leadership outcome. In fact, we are happy to consider leadership outcomes to be anything that is affected by the actions of positional leaders or that positional leadership has an effect upon. With that in mind, we wish to engage in practical inquiry about the effect of positional leadership on leadership outcomes. The aim of such inquiry is to explain why variation in leadership institutions affects a range of leadership outcomes. In this context, though, we need to deflate certain expectations that we might have inadvertently raised by the discussion up to this point. We will not be trying to explain whether or not the idea that there is currently a crisis of political leadership has had a causal impact on leadership outcomes. This is not our area of specialism. Instead, we will be looking at issues such as whether variation in leadership institutions affects coalition-building in the legislature, economic voting at elections, and conflict between the president and the prime minister within the executive branch of government.

There is a vast literature that addresses the effect of presidents and prime ministers on leadership outcomes. In the next section, we sketch the basic interactionist paradigm within which scholars have studied the impact of positional leadership on leadership outcomes since the mid-1940s; we identify contemporary studies of political leadership within this paradigm; and we state why we wish to present a new theory of leadership outcomes that is consistent with a scientific realist foundation.

2.2 Making Sense of Political Leadership

The study of leadership outcomes assumed its modern form in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To begin, there were two competing views. There were those who thought that outcomes were the result of the actions of "Great Men". This was the view famously proposed by the historian, Thomas Carlyle. He stated that "the history of what man

has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here" (Carlyle 1840/2001: 5). In other words, outcomes are the result of the agency of extraordinary human actors. There were those, though, who took a very different view. They believed that outcomes were the result of the actions of impersonal social forces. This was the view championed by the sociologist, Herbert Spencer. He took direct issue with Carlyle, arguing that "[i]f it be a fact that the great man may modify his nation in its structure and actions, it is also a fact that there must have been those antecedent modifications constituting national progress before he could be evolved. Before he can re-make his society, his society must make him" (Spencer 1873/2010). That is to say, even if human actions bring about events, the actions of those people are determined by broader social factors. Human agency is endogenous to social forces.

In the early twentieth century, the study of leadership focused on the agenda set by Carlyle. This was the era of the so-called trait approach to leadership. Were there certain traits that were common to all leaders? If a person possessed such a trait, would she be able to exercise leadership come what may? After nearly half a century of scholarly research on this topic, Ralph Stogdill reviewed the findings. He concluded that "leadership must be conceived in terms of the interaction of variables which are in constant flux and change" (Stogdill 1948: 64) and stated that "an adequate analysis of leadership involves not only a study of leaders, but also of situations" (ibid: 65). Stogdill's essay marked the beginning of the interactionist paradigm in leadership studies. Prior to this time, scholars had already noted that the exercise of leadership depended at least partly on the context in which the leader was placed. From this point on, though, interactionism became the paradigmatic framework within which the study of leadership took place. Within this paradigm, leadership outcomes are understood as the result of the interaction of personality and context.

We can think of the interactionist paradigm as a well-settled belief. Unfortunately, though, it does not take us very far. This is because it begs a series of very basic questions. What is the overall importance of personality relative to context? Are there circumstances in which personality makes more of a difference relative to context? The interactionist approach does not provide an answer to these or other related questions. It does not even provide a way of thinking about these questions. The interactionist paradigm simply states that when thinking about leadership outcomes we need to consider both personality and context. It is difficult to quibble

with such a banal statement. It means, though, that students of political leadership still have to specify the precise relationship between the two. This leaves plenty of room for scholars to approach the study of leadership outcomes from very different foundational perspectives, while remaining within the basic interactionist paradigm.

In a previous volume (Elgie 2015) we showed that scholars have approached the study of leadership outcomes in ways that are consistent with positivist, constructivist, and scientific realist foundations. In this volume, we do not wish to rehearse all these approaches. Instead, we focus on accounts that are based on a scientific realist foundation. In the rest of this section, we sketch the two general types of scientific realist accounts that we identified in our previous work; we place our account within the family of contextual accounts of leadership outcomes in this regard; and we outline why we wish to present a new contextual account of leadership outcomes.

We identified two general types of studies of leadership outcomes that are consistent with a scientific realist foundation (ibid.: Chaps. 5 and 6). The first comprises a set of political psychology accounts. Political psychology is the application of the principles of psychological reasoning and the methods of psychological analysis to political subjects. While political psychology can be studied from a positivist perspective, there are plenty of political psychology accounts that are consistent with a scientific realist foundation. We identified three such accounts. The first set of studies emphasized psychobiographical accounts of political leaders. These are studies that apply a particular theory of personality, such a Freudian-based theory of personal development, to the study of individual political leaders. These studies often emphasize how important events early on in the subject's life subconsciously shape the leader's subsequent behaviour, including behaviour in office and subsequent leadership outcomes. The second set focused on the effect of specific personality characteristics. These might be heritable traits that are relatively stable over a leader's lifetime, or motives, beliefs, attitudes, and values that can change over the course of a person's life. Again, these studies assume that such personal characteristics can shape outcomes. The third set identified the impact of somewhat more general leadership styles. This work acknowledged that even if leaders have unique personalities, there are also commonalities between leaders in terms of their personality characteristics. With these studies, the task is to identify the type of style that characterizes a particular leader or set of leaders, and then to show how differences in leadership style can at least partly explain differences in leadership outcomes.

The study of political leadership from a political psychology perspective faces a number of challenges. For example, such studies can be accused of making the so-called "fundamental attribution error". This is "the tendency for attributers to underestimate the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional factors in controlling behavior" (Ross 1977). There is now plenty of evidence that we incorrectly believe a person's behaviour to be the result of that person's unique dispositions, rather than the situation with which the person is faced. In the language of interactionism, leadership outcomes may indeed be the result of the interaction of personality and context, but context might matter much more than political psychologists assume. In addition, there is the nagging problem of extended causal antecedence. This is the idea that there is sometimes a long causal lag between the proposed psychological explanation for a leader's behaviour and the outcome that supposedly results from that explanation. For example, George and George's (1964) study of President Wilson is acknowledged as a classic psychobiography, but it still asks us to accept the claim that the president's behaviour in office was caused by events in his childhood some 50 years beforehand. The same logic is present in some studies of leadership style. We acknowledge that political psychologists are well aware of these and other problems and adopt methods to try to overcome them. We also accept that political psychology could provide a coherent account of leadership outcomes from a scientific realist perspective. However, we have to make a choice. For the purposes of this study, we prefer to leave aside political psychology accounts of leadership outcomes.

The second type of study we identified that is consistent with a scientific realist foundation comprises a set of contextual accounts. Whereas political psychology accounts privilege the personality element of the interactionist paradigm, contextual accounts downplay individuals and focus on how elements of the wider context are important in shaping outcomes either alone or in combination with personality factors. We identified five contextual accounts of leadership outcomes. The first was a set of multifactorial accounts. These frameworks identified many different contextual factors, pointing to the multiple interactions between them, refusing or failing to specify the explanatory predominance of any one factor or set of factors, preferring instead to identify a list of resources and constraints that shape leadership outcomes. The second account was Steven Skowronek's (1997) account of leadership in political time. He makes reference to three general factors that influence leadership outcomes: institutions, per-

sonality, and contexts. Among them, he emphasizes the importance of context, pointing out similarities in the types of situations that US presidents face and identifying recurring cycles of political time. The third account was an institutional account of leadership outcomes. Here, we identified one sub-set of accounts that was closely related to multifactorial contextual accounts, except for the way in which they singled out institutions for particular attention. We also identified another sub-set that was based mainly on evidence from the UK and that stressed the importance of the location of the prime minister within the wider governing system. The fourth was the skill-in-context account. As its name suggests, this account was placed firmly within an interactionist framework, singling out the importance of personality factors but situating them explicitly within a broader multifactorial context. The final account looked at the discourse of political leaders, arguing that the language of leadership reflects existing power structures.

The basic critique of contextual accounts is that they are all too general. What do we learn from contextual accounts that we did not already know from the basic interactionist paradigm? We discover that many different contextual factors shape leadership outcomes, but is that intellectual news? We are told that contextual factors include many different institutional, structural, and situational factors, but what does that really add? Even when scholars single out one of these factors for more particular attention, do we come to know very much more? For example, even if we home in on institutions, all we seem to learn is that leadership outcomes are the result of the interaction of personality factors and many different institutions. Are we really any the wiser? Put differently, there is a background worry that most contextual accounts are primarily descriptive rather than explanatory. They identify a set of resources and constraints, whether these are institutional, structural, and/or situational generally, but they fail to go very much beyond such an exercise. In other words, even if we adopt a particular contextual account, we still have to do a lot of theorizing to transform such an account from a general statement about the almost bewildering variety of factors that influence leadership outcomes to an approach that can explain why the world takes on the particular form that it does. This is our aim in this book.

We place this study of political leadership within the family of contextual accounts of leadership outcomes. However, we wish to move beyond existing contextual accounts. We do so by adopting a pragmatic institutional account. We do not claim that this is the only way of understanding leadership outcomes. We do not even claim that from a scientific realist

perspective, institutions are necessarily "the variable that explains *most* of political life" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 199—our emphasis), at least not always and everywhere. All the same, we do believe that by rooting our pragmatic institutional account within a scientific realist foundation, we can engage in practical inquiry that has the potential to provide a better contextual account of leadership outcomes than any that are currently being proposed. Whether or not this ambition is realized will depend on whether the community of inquirers who study leadership outcomes in a manner consistent with a scientific realist foundation come to accept our account. Will we arrive at a well-settled belief that this is a good way of explaining leadership outcomes in the world about us? This is a question that will only be answered in the medium to long term. In the meantime, we detail the pragmatic institutional account we are proposing in the book.

2.3 Making Sense of Institutionalism

In this section, we outline the institutional theory that underpins our pragmatic account of leadership outcomes. According to March and Olsen (2006: 4), the scholars who were primarily responsible for rebooting the study of institutions in the mid-1980s, institutionalism "connotes a general approach to the study of political institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance, and change". Since the resurgence of interest in institutionalism in the mid-1980s many varieties of institutionalism have been proposed, including historical, sociological, and empirical institutionalism among others (Peters 1999). Arguably, though, there is now a greater degree of convergence among institutionalists than was previously the case (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). We believe that our account is consistent with this recent convergence, even if inevitably there are bound to be some differences. We also believe that if there are major differences, then they are most likely to be foundational in form. We begin by identifying our institutionalist ontology; we then outline our institutionalist epistemology.

2.3.1 The Ontology of Institutionalism

We assume a realist institutional ontology. This means we assume that institutions and associated institutional norms and ideas have a mind-independent existence. They are "pre-existing features of the world"

(Joseph 2007: 356). Moreover, they are "*relatively enduring*" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 4—emphasis in the original). They endure "despite changes in the individuals occupying them" (Wight and Joseph 2010: 15). To some, a realist ontology of institutions is almost unquestionable. For example, Peters (1999: 145) states we "all know that institutions exist". However, others take a very different view. For example, some scholars see institutions as being "constituted by discursive struggles and can be understood as sedimented discourses" (Kulavik 2009: 268). There are also post-structuralist institutionalists who argue that "institutions exist only as discursive entities" (Moon 2013: 114). We have little or no foundational point of contact with these constructivist accounts. To the extent that they reduce institutions to language, they are based on a philosophical foundation that is incompatible with the scientific realist foundation of this study.

We assume that institutions have a mind-independent existence that cannot be reduced to language. We further assume that institutions can take an observable, material form. These mind-independent material entities are human creations that possess causal dispositions or that are associated with causal mechanisms. With regard to leadership outcomes, such institutional entities include legislative chambers. For example, Goodsell (1988) has argued that the architecture of parliaments can affect the behaviour of political actors. Legislative chambers in Westminster systems with two opposing rows of benches "invite an atmosphere of confrontation" between the government and opposition, whereas semi-circular chambers in other systems "facilitate ideological debate" (ibid.: 298). They also include presidential and prime ministerial residences. Here again there is great material variation. Some presidents inhabit huge palaces, whereas others occupy much more modest buildings. This does not mean that bigger buildings have a dispositional property that necessarily causes better, stronger, or more effective political leadership. However, a physical entity of this sort may have a causal effect on the behaviour of others, perhaps by instilling a sense that the incumbent has a certain institutional authority that should be respected. Material institutional entities can also include the physical resources of executive offices, such as their informational capacity. The core assumption is that these material entities have a mind-independent existence with potentially causal dispositional properties or associated mechanisms. For sure, actors (or agents) are the only ones who can act upon these properties (or exercise agency) and realize their causal potential. After all, we do not see institutions walking down the street deciding whether or not to exercise their agency. All the same,

we are not willing to reduce institutions simply to discourse or to the meanings that actors give to them. This was the constructivist foundation that we rejected in Chap. 1.

We assume that institutions can take an observable, material form. We also assume that institutions can take what we can think of as an observable, non-material form. Here, we include parchment institutions, such as treaties, constitutions, laws, by-laws, decrees, orders, regulations, and contracts (Carey 2000). They are human creations that in one sense are observable and material. For example, constitutions are usually codified and can be found in book form. However, the key element of parchment institutions is not the paper they are written on, but the formal rules they establish. These rules are unobservable and non-material. They have dispositional properties and/or generate mechanisms with potentially causal powers. The causal power of such rules does not lie in the fact that they are written down. It lies in the belief that they should be followed. Again, though, the basic adage applies. Only actors act. That is to say, only actors can enact the causal potentiality of the rules written down in parchment institutions. Indeed, we discuss the ways in which formal rules cause outcomes to occur below. At this point, we merely wish to stress that any given parchment institution might contain multiple causal potentialities. For example, each clause or sub-clause of a constitution has the potential to have a causal effect. What is more, the causal potentialities of formal rules are not necessarily clearly defined. In fact, they may be deliberately ambiguous. This means that actors often have to interpret formal rules. There may be competing interpretations. This is one of the ways in which institutions and actors interact. Once more, though, we insist that this way of thinking about the ontology of institutions does not reduce such rules to merely the carriers of ideas, interpretations, or language. Parchment rules typically precede the actors that act upon them. They can also outlast them. At any time, they are also linked to a greater or lesser degree to other institutions with similar parchment rules that other actors may be acting upon. For example, laws are linked to enforcement institutions, such as the system of courts. These institutions are associated with their own rules that may (or may not) reinforce those of the parchment institution. This can generate a chain of causal properties or mechanisms.

We assume, then, that institutions can take an observable, non-material form. We further assume that institutions can take an unobservable, non-material form. They include institutional norms and practices. These are the informal rules of the game (Lowndes and

Roberts 2013: 58). They are unwritten, and in that sense they are completely unobservable. They are the ethos of the institution. They are the conventions that have grown up around the institution. This element of institutionalist theory is very long-standing and widespread. For example, norms were central to March and Olsen's (1984) classic statement about the so-called "new institutionalism". They defined what they called "political structure" as "a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals" (ibid.: 741). More recently, Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 727—emphasis in the original) have stressed the importance of informal institutions, which they define as "*socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels*". Indeed, informal rules are now core to almost any contemporary non-positivist institutionalist analysis. For instance, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) have also included practices as part of what they see as the recent theoretical convergence among institutionalists. Similarly, Djelic (2010: 33) has included informal rules as part of what she calls the "emerging compromise" across disciplines about institutionalism. We place our institutional theory within this process of convergence and compromise by emphasizing the importance of informal rules and practices in shaping leadership outcomes.

The unobservable, non-material institutional entities that we consider also include ideas more generally. We imagine a swirl of ideas in the world. For sure, some ideas are more dominant than others. Some ideas have been around for longer than others. Some ideas are clearer than others. New ideas emerge all the time. New or old, ideas are also in competition with each other. Through this competition, some ideas come to shape various aspects of the world. Some ideas are associated with institutions. For example, we have already accepted that the idea of prime ministerial leadership and how it should be exercised can have important consequences for leadership outcomes. Plenty of other ideas are likely to have an effect on such outcomes as well. Like the consideration of norms and practices, ideas have been increasingly incorporated into institutionalist thinking. For example, Lowndes and Roberts (2013: 63–69) emphasize the importance of narratives in the third-wave convergence in institutional analysis, while Djelic (2010: 33) includes cognitive and cultural frames in her presentation of the emerging institutionalist compromise. As with the importance we place on rules and practices, we wish to situate ourselves

within this broad institutionalist consensus by stressing the role of ideas in our account of leadership outcomes.

We understand the ontology of unobservable, non-material institutional entities in the same way that we understand the ontology of observable material entities. We think of them as real in the sense that they have a mind-independent existence. Their existence is "ontologically prior to the individuals who populate them at any given time" (Bell 2011: 891). They also endure beyond the presence of any single individual, or particular group of people. While such entities are clearly human creations, we refuse to reduce their existence merely to language, discourse, or interpretation. We see them as more than mere "social facts" (Schmidt 2008: 318). Instead, we understand them as being associated with dispositional causal properties or with causal mechanisms that have the potential to bring about real causal effects. While only human actors can act upon the causal dispositions or mechanisms associated with material and non-material institutional entities, we do not wish to reduce institutions merely to the actions of agents (Bell 2011: 899). We see agents, including positional leaders such as presidents and prime ministers, as actors who are separate from institutional features, who interact with them, and who help to change them. At the same time, we also see agents as actors whose language, preferences, and behaviour are themselves shaped by institutions. This feature is central both to institutionalism generally and to the account we present here.

The bedrock of institutionalist theory is that institutions "offer opportunities for action and impose constraints" upon actors (Lecours 2003: 9). This observation is extremely pervasive. Indeed, it is so pervasive that it often seems to require no comment. This is the reason why contextual accounts of leadership outcomes sometimes read like little more than a long list of resources and constraints that political leaders are likely to face and why they often come across as being essentially descriptive rather than explanatory. Manifested in this way, institutionalism is a somewhat banal theory. However, we can do better. Institutions matter because the causal properties and mechanisms with which they are associated "shape the choices, behaviour and even the interests and identities of agents" (Bell 2011: 883). In short, institutions exist independently of actors. This independence provides them with the potential to have a causal effect on individuals that creates the potential for institutional analysis to explain outcomes rather than merely to describe how they come about.

Institutions can have a causal effect that is both mechanical and psychological (Duverger 1951). A mechanical effect occurs when "no human

manipulation or strategy is involved" (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 65). The classic example is the effect of different types of electoral systems. With exactly the same percentage of the vote, parties can nonetheless win very different levels of representation in the legislature, depending on the type of electoral institution in place. A similar outcome can occur at presidential elections too. For instance, Donald Trump won the 2016 US presidential election because he won a majority of votes in the electoral college, even though he lost the popular vote to Hilary Clinton. However, if the USA had used a first-past-the-post system to elect its president, then with the same popular vote Clinton would have been returned. Clearly, therefore, the mechanical effects of institutions can be very consequential. In this book, though, we leave them aside, preferring to focus on the psychological effects of institutions.

Material and non-material institutions can shape the behaviour of actors through a series of psychological processes or mechanisms. Jackson (2010: 76) identifies three such mechanisms: regulative, normative, and cognitive. Regulative mechanisms are associated with parchment institutions. As we have seen, these institutions often specify formal rules that prescribe certain behaviours. Agents can always refuse to follow the prescribed behaviour, but there are often sanctions for failing to doing so. If the prescribed behaviour is not followed, then other actors following equivalent rules have to give force to those sanctions. There is always the possibility that these other actors may not do so either, but in that event then they are likely to face sanctions too, and so on. In this situation, we find that the original actor does usually follow the prescribed behaviour precisely because of the belief that they will be sanctioned if they do not do so. In this way, the institution shapes the behaviour of the individual in question. We can apply this logic to political leaders. For example, in parliamentary systems, cabinets often operate according to a principle of collective responsibility. Let us assume that this rule is written down in some form of cabinet rulebook and, therefore, takes the form of a parchment institution. The principle of collective cabinet responsibility means that if a minister disagrees with a cabinet decision in private, she must nonetheless defend the collective decision publicly. The sanction for not doing so is the threat of dismissal by the prime minister. The minister can always exercise agency and decide to flout the rule by speaking out publicly, but she knows that the prime minister is then likely to employ the sanction and dismiss her. With this likelihood in mind, ministers typically decide to follow the rule and defend the government's collective decision in public, even if

they disagree in private. In other words, the parchment institution contains a causal disposition or mechanism, a parchment rule, which shapes the minister's behaviour.

Normative mechanisms are associated with norms and practices. Lowndes and Roberts (2013: 57) show that norms and practices are likely to be transmitted through demonstration effects. They give the example of sexism. If sexism is the pre-existing norm within an institution, then new members of the institution are likely to behave in a sexist manner. This is because sexist behaviour is seen as being legitimate within the context of the institution. Moreover, there are not likely to be any sanctions associated with behaving in a sexist way within such a group. Indeed, in this context sanctions are more likely to occur if individuals do not behave in a manner consistent with group norms. These sanctions may be social. The individual who fails to comply with the norm may be ostracized. They may also have material consequences. The person may not be promoted. Thus, there can be powerful incentives to conform. In this way, the institution contains a causal disposition or mechanism, a norm, which shapes the behaviour of the members of the group. We can illustrate this point in a different but related way. In many countries, there has there been an increase in women's representation in parliament in recent years. Often, though, parliamentary institutions have male-dominated practices. Women entering these institutions can feel obliged to act in a way that is typically practiced in the institution, even if ordinarily they would behave differently. Thus, the behaviour of women legislators can be shaped by the male-centric norms and practices of the institution they have entered.

Cognitive mechanisms affect beliefs, worldviews, and thoughts. Lowndes and Roberts (ibid.: 63) show that ideas and narratives can be transmitted through rituals and ceremonies. Here, we can think of political leaders delivering speeches before the country's flag, creating or reinforcing the idea that they are patriotic in the hope of changing or strengthening existing popular beliefs in a way that is favourable to them. More generally, we can think of political competition at least in part as a battle of ideas. Governments engage in spin doctoring to try to establish the authenticity and legitimacy of their ideas. They hope that people will take up these ideas and change their behaviour accordingly. Let us return to the idea of political leadership to illustrate this point. Let us assume that within a particular country the idea of strong political leadership is seen as a positive quality. Leaders may try to communicate the idea that they are strong perhaps by deepening their voice, or by organizing media events

where they are surrounded by tanks and weaponry. Even so, they may be unable to maintain the cohesion of their party in the legislature. This may counteract the image of strong leadership that the leader is trying to communicate and may encourage the belief that the leader is not matching up to the idea of leadership that is dominant in the country. In this event, the leader may have to resign or be sacked. Here, the institution is associated with an idea that has a certain causal property or mechanism. This feature encourages the leader to behave in a way that she might not otherwise do. Thus, the leader's behaviour has been shaped. This idea may also cause people to judge the leader's behaviour against a certain benchmark, shaping their belief about how well the leader is performing. In both ways, we see the cognitive causal mechanism at work.

Overall, we understand institutions to comprise mind-independent material and, more importantly, non-material entities. These entities are real. They are associated with causal properties or mechanisms that have both mechanical and psychological effects. These features have the potential to shape the behaviour of political actors, including positional leaders. Through this causal process, institutions can be at least the indirect cause of leadership outcomes.

2.3.2 The Epistemology of Institutionalism

The institutionalist ontology we have adopted has a basic epistemological implication. We assume that through practical inquiry into the causal processes associated with institutions, we can do more than merely describe the particular form that the world takes. Instead, we can come to explain why the world takes on the form that it does. Further, we assume that through rigorous practical inquiry by a community, or communities, of scholars, we have at least the potential to arrive at well-settled beliefs about the particular form that the world takes and why it takes that form. In other words, through institutional analysis, we can come to know about why leadership outcomes occur in the world. We can come to know how leadership institutions cause outcomes.

What is more, the institutionalist ontology we have adopted can also help to explain why leadership outcomes occur in relatively regular ways. We have already noted that institutions are relatively enduring. Indeed, the "idea of persistence of some kind is virtually built into the very definition of an institution" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 4). If an institution is associated with a certain causal property or mechanism that shapes the

behaviour of individuals in a particular way and if that institution is relatively enduring, then the behaviour of people will be shaped in the same or a similar way over a certain period of time. On the basis of this logic, institutionalists can happily make the claim that institutions "create greater regularities than would otherwise be found" (Peters 1999: 141). They "create elements of order and predictability" (March and Olsen 2006: 4). More than that, institutionalists can make the more ambitious claim that institutions "enhance the explanatory and predictive capacity of the social sciences" (Peters 2008). The institutional rules of the game can be theorized "as constraining and empowering actors in ways that we can confidently predict into the future, at least, in broad terms" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 198). Thus, institutional analysis not only allows the possibility of explaining particular events by identifying the causal properties and mechanisms through which institutions shape behaviour, it also creates the possibility of arriving at explanations of more regular political outcomes. This explanatory potential is what makes institutionalism such an attractive theory from an epistemological perspective.

That said, there is a severe epistemological danger with institutionalism. The core problem is that institutional theory "often assumes away any complexity in the substance of politics" (Lieberman 2002: 698). It is all too easy to fall into the mindset of institutional determinism, meaning that other causal factors are ignored when explaining outcomes. It is equally easy to assume institutional stability, exaggerating the regularity or path dependence of institutionally generated outcomes. In this context, perhaps the central element of the recent convergence in institutional analysis is the desire to bring explanatory complexity back in. Consistent with this recent convergence in the epistemology of institutionalism, we wish to complexify our institutionalist account of leadership outcomes, thereby specifying the epistemological limits of our such an account. We believe that we can come to have some knowledge about why the world takes on the form that it does, but we also believe that we are unlikely to have complete knowledge of the world in this regard. In other words, we wish to engage in practical institutional inquiry, but we do so on the basis of a certain epistemological scepticism.

We complexify our institutional epistemology by assuming institutions and actors are mutually constitutive or consequential. For Lowndes and Roberts (2013: 48), "institutions can be studied separately from political behaviour", but there is also an "active and reflective" relationship between individuals and institutions. Indeed, this relationship is

"dialectical" (ibid.: 13). For Bell (2011: 892), "[a]gents and environments interact and mutually shape one another over time". For Jackson (2010: 65), "a constitutive approach conceptualizes actors and institutions as being mutually interdependent and reflexively intertwined with one another". Within this approach, "[i]nstitutions shape interaction, but actors retain scope for choice within constraints or even alter those constraints by strategic or interpretative acts" (ibid.: 70). This way of thinking about the relationship between actors and institutions is very similar to how scientific realists think about the relationship between structure and agency. For example, a scientific realist perspective "emphasizes that both social structures and agency exist in society, but that they are two completely separate phenomena with qualitatively different characteristics" (Danermark et al. 2002: 12). Specifically, agents "uniquely possess the powers of self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, cognition and emotionality, things obviously quite distinct from the causal powers of structures" (Joseph 2007: 356). Crucially, the possession of these reflexive, intentional powers means that agents can fail to follow the paths set out by the causal powers of structures. Agents may deliberately decide not to follow rules and norms. They may also simply misunderstand the nature of the institutional incentives with which they are faced. Whatever the reason, the consequence is that the world operates as an open rather than a closed system (Rivas 2010: 218). This way of thinking about the world entails the rejection of structural or institutional determinism. More than that, it means that agents can transform the very structures that are acting upon them (Joseph 2007: 357). For that reason, structures are unlikely to be rigid and unchanging, and the causal effects of structures will not be permanently reproduced. In other words, even if we can identify certain regularities in outcomes brought about by the causal dispositions or mechanisms associated with institutions, these regularities will be limited at least partly because of the impact of human agency on these same institutions.

We further complexify our institutional epistemology by emphasizing the messiness of institutions themselves (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 43). We have already noted that any given institution may include more than one property with a causal disposition or more than one causal mechanism. The overall strength of the institution's effect will depend on the combination of these multiple causal properties or processes. It is possible that they will be mutually reinforcing. However, the effect of any individual causal property or mechanism "can be neutralised, cancelled out,

counteracted, diffused, constrained, modified, or in some manner interfered with, by other mechanisms" (Rivas 2010: 218). We have also noted the mutually constitutive relationship between institutions and agents. However, we need to bear in mind that any single institution is likely to contain multiple agents. The strength of the effect of any single causal property or mechanism in any such institution may vary across this set of agents. For this reason, as Jackson (2010: 70) notes, "institutional analysis must take seriously the constellations of actors within a given institutional domain, and their interactions". More than that, we need to keep in mind that outcomes occur in the context of multiple institutions. The environment "is a dense matrix of institutions" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 140). Further still, institutions and their effects "are also shaped by the environment in which they [are] nested and by their ongoing dynamics with other institutions, which interlock and overlap, complement or contradict, trump or are trumped by them" (Mackay 2014: 553). What emerges is a chain of institutions each of which has its own set of causal properties or mechanisms. Again, it may be that the causal processes associated with these different institutions are mutually reinforcing, or at least that there is a preponderant causal effect across the set of institutions. Equally, though, just as the causal properties or mechanisms within any given institution may work to counteract each other, so the same may occur across the set of institutions as a whole. In other words, "[i]nstitutions can clash with each other" (Lieberman 2002: 703). Finally, not only is it the case that there are likely to be multiple agents in each of the institutions in this causal chain, it is also the case that any given agent may be "embedded in a multiplicity of institutions" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 9). Again, the causal effects on the individual may be reinforcing across these institutions, but they may not. The individual may experience severe cognitive dissonance as the effects of different behavioural incentives clash with each other. As we can see, this way of thinking about the multiplicity of causal institutional processes, actors, and institutions does not eliminate the possibility of regularities within any given institution, or even across the chain of institutions in any system. Nonetheless, countervailing pressures may make such regularities very difficult to achieve, or only relatively weak felt, or it may make them strong at some point only to be curtailed later as a function of the dynamic interaction of the multiple properties, actors, and institutions together.

Finally, we complexify our institutional epistemology by assuming institutions and agents are not the only causal factors that have an influence on

outcomes. We are approaching the study of leadership outcomes from within an interactionist paradigm. This paradigm emphasizes the interaction of personality and context. However, institutions are only part of the context within which agents interact. As Boin and Kuipers (2008: 59) note, institutions "are not designed to explain and account for all the intervening variables that make unintended consequences such a sure thing". In this regard, we disagree with Lowndes and Roberts (2013: 141) when they say that the "boundary between an institution and its environment is a constructed one". Instead, we consider the non-institutional environment to comprise ontologically real, mind-independent material and non-material entities with their own causal properties that can shape behaviour and affect outcomes. For example, while institutions are associated with certain norms, not all norms are rooted there. They may be cultural or social in origin too. Again, institutional and non-institutional factors may align, but they may not. Even if they do, such an alignment may not be long lasting. In short, outcomes are the result of the dynamic interaction of many different causal factors in open, complex systems.

To sum up, we understand institutions to comprise mind-independent material and non-material entities with causal properties or mechanisms that have the potential to shape the behaviour of political actors and affect leadership outcomes. Institutions are relatively enduring. Therefore, their causal effects can also be enduring, creating regularities in leadership outcomes. The leadership environment comprises institutions with multiple causal processes, multiple institutions, and multiple non-institutional material and non-material entities with causal properties or mechanisms. The set of causal processes may combine to generate more-or-less systematic regularities. However, while institutions and actors are independent from each other, both are mutually constitutive and consequential. This means that actors have the potential to shape institutions. Moreover, the causal properties or mechanisms of institutions may not always be clearly defined, creating room for agents to behave in unexpected and novel ways. More than that, the combination of causal properties or mechanisms in any given institution, set of institutions, and the non-institutional environment may work against each other, meaning that regularities may be non-existent, regular but weak, or strong yet fleeting.

Overall, the attraction of an institutional account that is embedded within a scientific realist foundation is that it can provide an account of the more-or-less regular processes by which leadership outcomes occur in the

world, but without falling into deterministic and essentially static accounts of political explanation. In the next section, we outline how we intend to apply our institutionalist account to the study of leadership outcomes. In so doing, we move from ontology and epistemology to methodology (Hay 2002: 64).

2.4 Making Sense of a Pragmatic Institutionalist Account

We are interested in examining the effect of differences in positional leadership, or what we call "leadership institutions" on various outcomes. We have indicated that positional leaders include presidents and prime ministers. In this book, we focus on the consequences of variation in presidential and prime ministerial institutions. We specify the particular presidential and prime ministerial institutions with which we are concerned in the chapters that follow as well as the specific outcomes under investigation. Here, though, we note that we understand positional leadership institutions to comprise not only presidencies and prime ministerships, but also regime-level institutions associated with presidents and prime ministers. That is to say, we are interested in the results of the differences between presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary regimes. We are also interested in the results of institutional differences within these regimes, including variation in presidential power.

When examining the effect of differences in positional leadership on outcomes, we do not privilege any particular method. This is consistent with our scientific realist foundation. A common observation about scientific or critical realism is that it does not necessarily entail any particular methodological choices (Clark 2008: 168; Shapiro 2005: 41). This is also consistent with our pragmatic approach. In the previous chapter, we saw that Peirce privileged the method of science as the best way of arriving at a well-settled belief. However, as Peirce presents it, this mode of investigation still leaves open many different ways of engaging in practical scientific inquiry.[1] Misak (2000: 96) states that the pragmatist should "remain agnostic about the details as to how inquiry (of any kind) should go". However, she nuances this position by saying that in "science the standards will be set by scientists and those few historians and philosophers of science who have an impact on actual inquiry" (ibid.), whereas in morals "the standards will be set by those engaged in moral inquiry" (ibid.). In other words, even if we apply the method of science in broad

terms, it is still not the case that anything goes. We need to root our social scientific inquiry in the context of established social science methods.

We interpret the universe of established social science methods very broadly. We accept that methods associated with the natural sciences are now commonly applied to the study of social questions, even though this position may be at odds with some critical realists working in International Relations. By the same token, we also accept that more discursive methods are now common to social scientific inquiry, even though some scientific realists may be uncomfortable with such ways of investigating. In short, we are methodologically pluralist. We adopt this position not least because we aim to arrive at well-settled beliefs about the consequences of variation in leadership institutions. We assume that a well-settled belief is not one that relies on the application of a single method. Instead, such a belief would be robust to the application of different methods. We are well aware that we cannot generate well-settled beliefs in the space of one book. The settling of any such belief will result from the work of a community or communities of scholars over an extended period of time using different methods of practical inquiry. In this book, though, we can at least partially mimic the work of a community or communities of inquiry by adopting a mixed-method approach. This is consistent with our commitment to methodological pluralism. It is also consistent with the idea that by investigating the effect of differences in leadership institutions using a mixed-method approach, we can increase the overall confidence in our results, even if they remain necessarily provisional.

We have stressed that the advantage of an institutionalist account is that it can help to explain regularities in leadership outcomes without falling into naïve institutional determinism. The multi-method approach we adopt illustrates this point. We apply both an experimental method and regression analytic (or quantitative) methods to identify regularities in leadership outcomes. At the same time, we apply both qualitative configurational analysis (or set-theoretic methods) and a process-tracing (or qualitative) method to show how leadership outcomes are contingent upon particular circumstances. We have also stressed that institutions do not necessarily have a single unidirectional effect and that actors are embedded in the context of multiple institutions. This means that while individual institutional effects may overlap in ways that reinforce each other, they may also cut across each other in ways that offset any particular outcome.

We try to capture this aspect of institutional analysis by employing interaction models when applying regression analytic methods. We also show how various institutional features combine to produce leadership outcomes when applying set-theoretical methods. In short, we place our account of leadership outcomes in the context of a complex institutional environment, and we adopt research methods that are consistent with this perspective.

2.5 Conclusion

Leadership outcomes are the result of the complex interaction of many different factors in open, complex systems. Such causally outcomes are impossible to explain or predict with complete certainty. To make sense of them as best we can, we adopt an institutional approach to the study of such outcomes. The advantage of an institutional approach is that, all else equal, institutions generate behavioural predispositions, inducing certain regularities and reducing the level of causal complexity. However, leadership outcomes are at least partly the result of the complex interaction of many different institutional variables in open, systems where both agents and other non-institutional factors shape outcomes too. This book examines ways in leadership institutions shape outcomes in such systems. We place this institutional account of leadership outcomes in the context of the pragmatic philosophy that we outlined in the previous chapter. We aim to identify the empirical implications of adopting an institutionalist account of leadership outcomes. We also aim to see whether there is evidence to support those implications. We also aim to employ a multimethod approach in order to do so. Such an approach can help to increase confidence in our account of leadership outcomes, encouraging the conclusion that we have arrived at a well-settled belief in this regard. With these aims in mind, we turn to our first empirical investigation, a laboratory experiment concerning the effect of variation in leadership institutions on political behaviour.

Notes

1. For example, Peirce contrasts the method of science to the method of tenacity, which simply means ignoring sources of doubt, and the method of authority, which means believing someone in a position of authority (Talisse and Aikin 2008: 18).

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CHAPTER 3

The Psychological Effects of Presidential Institutions: written by David Doyle and Robert Elgie

This chapter examines whether leadership institutions cause actors to behave in certain ways. This idea underpins the pragmatic institutional account that we are presenting in this book. To examine the causal consequences of leadership institutions, we focus on the psychological effects of presidential versus parliamentary regimes. Is there evidence that this form of institutional variation causes behavioural variation? To test for such evidence, we conduct a laboratory experiment.[1] Operating in a closed system, we see whether participants in the experiment behave differently from each other when faced with different institutional conditions. We find some evidence for our expectations. Under certain institutional conditions, there is a significant difference in participant behaviour. The closed nature of the system means we can be confident that the cause of the behavioural difference is the institutional manipulation, rather than some unobserved phenomenon. In addition, we also find that this institutional effect is itself conditioned by individual-level characteristics. This provides further evidence for our pragmatic institutionalist account. It suggests that institutions and actors are mutually constitutive. In short, institutions shape actor behaviour, but institutional effects remain conditional upon individual-level characteristics.

There are five parts to the chapter. We begin by sketching the long-standing debate about the relative effect of presidential and parliamentary institutions on democratic performance. Then, we identify the psychological

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mechanisms that underpin the argument that presidentialism is likely to be perilous for democratic performance, focusing on the likelihood of conflict between the president and the legislature under presidentialism. Next, we outline the laboratory experiment that tests to see whether there is evidence to support the psychological mechanisms associated with the perils of presidentialism. After presenting the basic results of the experiment, we briefly discuss their implications for both the pragmatic institutionalist account that we are presenting in this book and the more specific debate about the supposed perils of presidentialism.

3.1 The Perils of Presidentialism?

There is a classic distinction between two basic forms of government—presidentialism and parliamentarism. These regimes are characterized by different institutional features. Under presidentialism, there is a directly elected head of state, the president, who serves in office for a fixed term and who cannot be dismissed during that term. For its part, the legislature also serves in office for a fixed period and cannot be dissolved prematurely by the president. There is, thus, the separate origin and survival in office of the executive and legislative branches of government. The USA is the classic example of presidentialism, but it is common in many countries in Central and South America. Under parliamentarism, the head of state is not directly elected. Instead, there is either a hereditary monarch or a president who is elected by either the legislature or a more wide-ranging electoral college. In this way, the legislature is the sole source of popular authority in a parliamentary system. Here, the principal figure within the executive branch is the prime minister, who heads a cabinet that is collectively responsible to the legislature. The cabinet comes to office with at least the tacit support of the legislature and can be dismissed from office at any time thereafter if it loses the legislature's support. The effect is that the cabinet is dependent on the legislature for its origin and survival in office. The UK is the standard example of parliamentarism, but there are many other examples in Europe and elsewhere.

There is a long-standing debate about the relative merits of presidential versus parliamentary forms of government. This debate can be traced back to the deliberations of the so-called Founding Fathers of the US Constitution in 1787 and the publication of *The Federalist Papers* (Hamilton et al. 1999). It was current in the nineteenth century, notably in the work of the British constitutional lawyer, Walter Bagehot

(1865/1964), and in the scholarship of a future president of the USA, Woodrow Wilson (1885). It was also debated by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic in the mid-twentieth century (Price 1943; Laski 1944). More importantly for the purposes of this volume at least, this debate resurfaced in the early 1990s during the wave of democratization at that time. With many new states seeking to craft their first post-independence constitution and with other countries looking to write a new post-communist constitution, or a new constitution in the context of a transition to democracy, the old question resurfaced with a renewed intensity and this time with a very particular focus. Which form of government would best secure the survival of these new democracies—presidentialism or parliamentarism?

In the debate at this time, a consensus quickly emerged. Presidentialism should be avoided. In particular, Juan Linz (1990a, b), drawing largely on his knowledge of Latin America and his experience of Spain, warned of the perils of presidentialism and praised the virtues of parliamentarism. Linz's work was contested (Horowitz 1990), but it set the agenda for the study of this topic. Scott Mainwaring (1993) then made an important contribution based on his interpretation of presidentialism in Latin America. He argued that presidentialism itself was not dangerous for young democracies. Instead, it was the difficult combination of presidentialism and a multi-party system that threatened the survival of democracy. The idea that outcomes were shaped by regime-level institutions plus a sub-regime institutional variable was the standard wisdom for some time thereafter.

José Cheibub (2007) challenged this wisdom. He argued that presidentialism is only dangerous if it is adopted in countries that were previously subject to military rule. In this way, he suggested that presidentialism was not necessarily as perilous as many scholars had suggested. He also argued that the combination of presidentialism and a multi-party system was not as problematic as had often been thought. In fact, he showed that there was good reason to believe that multi-party coalition building was perfectly possible under presidentialism and provided empirical evidence to show that coalition building was common under presidentialism. Cheibub's book was important not only because it rejected the specific idea that the combination of presidential institutions with a sub-regime variable in the form of the party system was dangerous for the survival of democracy, but also because it questioned the basic theoretical underpinning of the debate that had been conducted for so long. He seemed to reject the institutional premise on which such arguments were based. Specifically, he rejected the institutional steps in Linz's argument. Instead,

Cheibub implied that institutions were less important to democratic performance than had previously been assumed. Instead, history, and specifically whether or not countries had experienced military rule, appeared to matter much more.

The empirical evidence used to support the arguments for and against presidentialism and parliamentarism has changed over time. In the early 1990s, Linz and others relied on largely anecdotal country-specific or at least regional evidence. Presidentialism collapsed in Venezuela, providing support for the Linzian thesis. However, it had survived for decades in Costa Rica, suggesting that it was not necessarily destructive of democracy. Similarly, the survival of democracy in India may have resulted from the country's parliamentary system, backing up Linz's belief. Yet, the same is not true in Bangladesh, providing support for Horowitz's counterargument. Thus, the anecdotal evidence was contradictory and inconclusive. Gradually, more systematic empirical tests were conducted in the form of large-n controlled comparisons. Unfortunately, though, the findings from these tests have been equally contradictory and inconclusive. For example, with a sample of 123 democratizations from 1960 to 2004, Kapstein and Converse (2008) found that parliamentarism was more dangerous for democracy than presidentialism. By contrast, on the basis of 135 democratic periods from 1800 to 2004, Maeda (2010) found that parliamentarism was better than presidentialism over the long run. For their part, Hiroi and Omori (2009) looking at 131 democracies from 1960 to 2006 found that parliamentarism was more perilous than presidentialism. Sing (2010), though, with a sample of 85 countries from 1946 to 2002 found no relationship between either form of government and the collapse of democracy and no support for Cheibub's claim about the importance of prior military rule. In short, the results of these controlled comparisons are highly sensitive to case selection, estimation technique, and other basic research design choices. Overall, after a quarter of a century of very different types of empirical research, we still do not know whether the evidence confirms that presidentialism is more dangerous for young democracies, whether in fact parliamentarism is more perilous, or whether the choice of regime makes no difference to this outcome.

In this context, how should we interpret the ongoing debate about the relative merits of presidentialism and parliamentarism? To begin, it is important to understand that there are two steps to the argument in the debate. The first step is resolutely institutional. This is the idea that institutions generate incentives for actors to behave in particular ways and specifically

that presidential institutions encourage actors to behave in different ways from parliamentary institutions, or at least the combination of presidential institutions and sub-regime factors such as the party system encourages actors to behave differently under presidentialism than under parliamentarism. Here, institutions are the explanatory variable, and behaviour is the dependent variable. The second step in the argument is the idea that the type of behaviour that is incentivized by presidentialism or the combination of presidentialism and a sub-regime factor is more dangerous for the survival of democracy than the behaviour that is incentivized under parliamentarism. Here, behaviour is the explanatory variable, and democratic performance is the dependent variable.

If we understand the argument in this way, then we can consider the existing scholarship more clearly. Some of the work on the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate is focused primarily on the first step of this argument. For example, Linz was keen to identify the effect of presidentialism on behaviour. He argued that there would be fewer coalitions in presidentialism relative to parliamentarism, because there were fewer incentives for coalition building. However, work in this vein has often remained theoretical, identifying the pros and cons of presidentialism and parliamentarism largely in the abstract. Other work has assumed that institutions have some behavioural effect, but has been concerned with whether or not a correlation can be observed between institutional variation and regime performance. This work is empirical, but it lumps the two steps of the argument together, associating institutions directly with political performance. In this work, institutions are the explanatory variable, and democratic performance is the dependent variable.

In this chapter, we focus on the first of the two steps in the debate about presidentialism versus parliamentarism. We wish to see if there is evidence that presidential institutions do indeed cause the behaviour with which they are typically associated. Investigating the first step of this argument is crucial. If we fail to find evidence that presidential institutions shape behaviour in certain ways, then we can in effect dismiss the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate at that point. For sure, if we do find evidence that presidential institutions incentivize certain types of behaviour, then to draw any conclusions about the impact of presidential institutions on democratic performance we would still need to test the second step of the argument. After all, it is possible that presidential institutions could indeed shape behaviour in certain ways, but that such behaviour had no independent effect on democratic performance, challenging

the overall argument that institutional variation is the cause of the success or failure of democracy. Nonetheless, if we do find support for the idea that presidential institutions incentivize certain types of behaviour, then we can at least keep alive the argument that presidential institutions perhaps mediated through some sub-regime variable may indeed be the cause of variation in democratic performance. Indeed, evidence in support of the first step of the argument would challenge Cheibub's more sceptical position about the effect of institutions generally. We would have support for the basic proposition that institutions matter. This would add to our knowledge about the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate, but it would also provide support for the more general proposition that we set out in the previous chapter, namely that institutions shape leadership outcomes.

3.2 Why Is Presidentialism Perilous?

We wish to investigate whether or not presidential institutions incentivize certain forms of behaviour. To do so, we need to specify what type of behaviour presidentialism is likely to be associated with. Here, we turn to an article by Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart (1997). They identified five arguments that Linz made against presidentialism. Each of these arguments suggests that presidentialism affects the behaviour of political actors in certain ways. They also added to Linz's arguments by specifying two important sub-regime variables that conditioned behaviour under presidentialism.

The first Linzian argument against presidentialism focuses on the consequences of the separate origin feature of this regime (ibid.: 450). The presence of separate presidential and legislative elections can generate competing claims of popular legitimacy. Both the president and the legislature can claim to represent the will of the people. There is no independent way of resolving which claim is superior. If the president and the legislature are opposed to each other and if there is no way of adjudicating which institution should prevail, then there is the potential for them to come into conflict. Indeed, for Linz such conflict is always latent in a presidential regime. By contrast, under parliamentarism there is only one source of popular authority. The cabinet comes to office with the support of the legislature. So, there is no opportunity for competing executive and legislative majorities. Thus, we expect presidentialism to be associated with conflictual behaviour between the president and the legislature.

The second argument follows from the separate survival feature of presidentialism. For Linz, presidentialism introduces a rigidity to the system, because both the executive and the legislature serve in office for a fixed term (ibid.). In the context where the executive and legislature are opposed to each other, the rigidity of the system means that conflict between the two branches of government can be ongoing. By contrast, under parliamentarism there can be conflict between the government and the legislature, but it is likely to be resolved more quickly; the legislature will have to decide whether to work with the cabinet or dismiss it from office. Thus, we expect presidentialism to be associated with ongoing conflictual behaviour between the president and the legislature.

The third argument is that presidentialism generates a "winner-takes-all" element to the system. The presidential office is indivisible. Only one person can be elected president. This feature encourages presidents to act alone. They have won power personally and they feel they have the right to use that power in the way that they see fit. In this way, presidentialism encourages unilateral presidential behaviour. Put differently, presidents will have the "feeling that they need not undertake the tedious process of constructing coalitions and making concessions to the opposition" (ibid.). By contrast, under parliamentarism the prime minister is aware that survival in office depends on maintaining the support of both the legislature and her own party. This encourages prime ministers to engage in coalition building both with other parties and within her own party. Thus, we expect presidentialism to be associated with the situation where the president feels little need to build coalitions with other actors, particularly those in the legislature.

The fourth argument relates to the difference between presidential and legislative elections. There are two sources of legitimacy under presidentialism, but only the president can claim to represent the people as whole, even in the cases where the president has only narrowly won the presidential election (ibid.). For Linz, this further encourages a president to act unilaterally and to be intolerant of opposition, even when the president's electoral majority may be very small. In these circumstances, the president is likely to interpret opposition as an affront to the will of the people. By contrast, under parliamentarism the prime minister's authority comes from the legislature. There is less of a sense that the prime minister is the representative of the country as whole. Instead, the prime minister is the representative of the majority of the members in the legislature and her position in power is contingent upon maintaining the support of that

majority. Thus, we expect presidentialism to be associated with presidents who act unilaterally, even if this means coming into conflict with the legislature.

The final argument relates to the type of candidates who stand for presidential office. Linz argues that presidentialism encourages outsider candidates with little experience of executive office (ibid.: 451). By contrast, parliamentary systems encourage the appointment of prime ministers who are seasoned politicians and long-standing party figures. Certainly, there is plenty of empirical evidence to back up the proposition that presidents are more likely to be outsiders than prime ministers (Samuels and Shugart 2010). In one sense, this argument is slightly different from the others. Ostensibly, it relates to the type of person who is motivated to stand for office, with presidential systems encouraging more populist candidates. In another sense, though, it is related to the previous arguments. We might imagine that once elected outsider presidents are less likely to work with the other institutions in the systems than prime ministers who come to office from within the system itself. So, this argument may still imply that presidents and prime ministers are likely to behave differently from each other in office. Thus, again, we expect presidentialism to be associated with presidents who act individually and who do not try to build coalitions with other actors, notably those in the legislature.

Together, these arguments suggest that presidentialism is likely to generate conflictual behaviour between the executive and the legislature; that this behaviour is likely to be ongoing; and that the president is likely to be the main source of such behaviour. However, as we have seen, there is agreement in the literature that these consequences are mediated by sub-regime variables. Mainwaring and Shugart (ibid.) confirm this idea, noting that "[p]residential systems vary and their dynamics [can] change considerably" (ibid.: 463). They identify two general types of sub-regime variables that condition behaviour under presidential systems: the constitutional power of the president, and the role of the party system.

For Mainwaring and Shugart, behaviour under presidential systems varies according to the constitutional power of the president (ibid.: 463–465). Some presidents have the power to dominate the political process, whereas others do not. If the president has the power to legislate unilaterally and circumvent the legislature in the event of conflict, then there is even less incentive for the president to build coalitions in the legislature and an even greater likelihood of conflictual behaviour between the executive and the legislature. By contrast, when presidents have only weak powers to legislate,

then they must come to some form of working relationship with the legislature if they wish to successfully implement their policy agenda. Thus, while in general presidentialism per se may encourage the president to engage in ongoing conflictual behaviour with the legislature, the power of the president is likely to mediate this behaviour. We expect a strong president to be more willing to engage in such behaviour than a weak president.

Behaviour under presidential systems also varies according to the role of political parties and the party system (ibid.: 465–468). Mainwaring and Shugart reiterate Mainwaring's (1993) argument about the effect of party system fragmentation on presidentialism. They argue that multi-party systems "increase the likelihood of executive-legislative gridlock" (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 466). Where a president lacks a single-party majority and faces a wide array of different parties with competing objectives and ideological positions, then the likelihood of conflictual behaviour is greater. In short, under presidentialism inter-party coalitions "tend to be more fragile" (ibid.: 466). By contrast, when there is a fragmented party system under parliamentarism, the prime minister will have to forge a coalition in order to come to power and will have to maintain that coalition in order to remain in power. Thus, under presidentialism we expect there to be more conflictual behaviour between the executive and the legislature when the president's party fails to enjoy majority support there.

Overall, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that actors are likely to behave in certain ways under presidential institutions, that this behaviour is likely to be mediated through certain sub-regime conditions, and that the resulting behaviour is likely to be different from the behaviour of equivalent actors in the same conditions under parliamentarism. Figure 3.1 captures this general intuition. To date, though, the core



Fig. 3.1 The behavioural consequences of presidential institutions

assumption that institutional format incentivizes divergent behaviour under presidentialism and parliamentarism remains largely assumed. We wish to provide an empirical test of this assumption. If we find support for it, then we will have confirmed the first step in the two-step argument that underpins the long-standing presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate. If we do not, researchers will be encouraged to look at factors other than institutional variation to explain democratic performance.

3.3 Testing the Perils of Presidentialism Under Laboratory Conditions

We wish to test the first step of the presidentialism versus parliamentarism argument in the form of a laboratory experiment. The main advantage of the experimental method is that it has the potential to identify basic cause-and-effect relations. Working within a closed system, it is possible to keep all potentially important confounding factors constant, yet still to manipulate the causal variable of interest to identify whether it has the expected effect of the outcome under consideration. If it does, then we can be sure that the cause of the effect is the variable that was manipulated and not some other factor. This method underpins the accumulation of scientific knowledge in the natural sciences. However, it has also been widely used in the social sciences, notably in psychology. Here, laboratory experiments have long been used to identify the cause of behavioural outcomes. Indeed, there is a history of using laboratory experiments to identify leadership behaviour (Antonakis et al. 2004: 56–57). More recently, this method has been extended to political science. Most notably, scholars have investigated the effect of various types of electoral systems on voting behaviour. Put differently, this work has tried to see whether there is a link between variation in institutional rules and variation in participant behaviour. We wish to engage in a similar exercise. We aim to see whether there is evidence to confirm the idea that there is a link between presidential institutions and certain forms of political behaviour.

There are various forms of laboratory experiment in the social sciences. We test our theoretical expectations about the behavioural effects of presidentialism through a "perspective-taking" experiment. This type of experiment was initially designed to explore prosocial behaviour in children (Kurdek and Rodgon 1975), but it has now been employed to study behaviour in international relations (e.g. Kertzer and McGraw 2012) and comparative politics (e.g. Blais et al. 2011). The central component of perspective-taking experiments is to provide the participants in the experiment

with a basic shared scenario or perspective. They read the scenario and are asked to imagine that they are making decisions in this context. One group is then presented with a conditional scenario. Here, all elements of the basic scenario remain constant, but a condition of interest is changed. All participants in the experiment are then asked the same questions. Typically, they are asked to choose between certain options that correspond to different behavioural outcomes. If we observe a difference in the choices between the participants in the control group who are operating solely under the basic scenario and those in the treatment group who are operating under the conditional scenario, then we can conclude that the behavioural difference was caused by the treatment condition that was introduced. We can use a very simple test to see whether any behavioural differences between the two groups are statistically significant.

We apply the basic rules of this form of perspective-taking laboratory experiment to study the behavioural effects of presidentialism. To begin, we presented all participants with a basic scenario (see Table 3.1). The aim of this scenario was to remove certain potentially confounding issues from

Table 3.1 The basic scenario for studying the behavioural effects of presidentialism

Please read the scenario on your screen.
You are the leader of a country called Livonia.
Livonia is a medium-sized country. It is diplomatically neutral. It does send peacekeepers abroad to trouble spots, but always as part of a UN-backed peacekeeping mission. It is not part of any major international security alliances. Livonia is a democracy and has been a democracy for quite a few years. Its neighbouring countries are also democracies.
Livonia is moderately wealthy overall. There is some social inequality, but it is not very extreme. The inflation rate has been relatively low for some time. There has been some modest economic growth over each of the past few years.
Livonia's economy is a mix of private business, public–private partnerships, and some state-controlled companies. There is a system of state-supported welfare, such as a health service, unemployment benefits, and pensions, but some people do prefer to pay for their own private health and welfare insurance.
The population is relatively homogenous. There is no dominant ethnic or social group. No minority group is systematically discriminated against.
Many of the Livonian population think of themselves as religious, but there is no dominant religion and there are many different religious denominations in the country. There is no official state religion in Livonia.
You have been the leader of Livonia for about a year.
You are hoping to win power again at the next election, but there is no guarantee of doing so.
The legislature serves for a fixed five-year term.

consideration by the participants when they were subsequently asked to make their choices. Thus, they learned that the country is not suffering from economic problems, that social inequality is not extreme, that there is no discrimination against minorities, and so on. In effect, the basic scenario aimed to control for variables that have previously been shown to affect outcomes relating to the effects of presidentialism and parliamentarism on the performance of democracy.

Following this basic scenario, each participant was then given a conditional scenario. These scenarios varied in three ways. The set of conditional scenarios is provided in Table 3.2.

The first variation concerned the basic distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism. One half of the participants were given a conditional scenario that was consistent with a presidential system, and the other half with a parliamentary system. We did not use these terms in the conditional scenarios, but we did word them to reflect the separate origin and survival of the legislature under presidentialism and the dependence of the prime minister and cabinet on the support of parliament under parliamentarism. We should also note that we used the term "leader" in both the basic scenario and all the conditional scenarios, rather than either the term "president" or "prime minister". We made this decision so as to minimize the likelihood that the participants would simply default to their preconceived ways of thinking about the two regimes.

The second variation was related to the nature of the party system. One half of the participants were given a conditional scenario where the leader was operating in a two-party system and where the leader's party was the majority party in the legislature. The other half was given a conditional

Table 3.2 Eight conditional scenarios for studying the behavioural effects of presidentialism

Conditional scenarios	*Regime*	*Party system*	*Leader's power*
1	Parliamentary	Two-party	Weak power
2	Parliamentary	Two-party	Strong power
3	Parliamentary	Multi-party	Weak power
4	Parliamentary	Multi-party	Strong power
5	Presidential	Two-party	Weak power
6	Presidential	Two-party	Strong power
7	Presidential	Multi-party	Weak power
8	Presidential	Multi-party	Strong power

scenario where the leader was faced with a multi-party system and where the leader's party enjoyed only minority support in the legislature.

The third variation addressed the constitutional powers of the leader. One half of the participants was given a conditional scenario that was consistent with a leader with strong constitutional powers, such as the power to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, to decide what bills the legislature should discuss, and so on. The other half was presented with a conditional scenario that was consistent with a leader with very few constitutional powers, including none of those previously mentioned. It should be noted that we decided to control for the leader's power to dissolve the legislature across all conditions. In presidential systems, this power is absent by definition. In some parliamentary systems, this power is also absent. A small number of parliamentary systems operate with fixed-term parliaments that cannot be dissolved prematurely under any circumstances. Other parliamentary countries have parliaments that can be dissolved early, but only under sometimes quite restrictive circumstances. Germany is a long-standing example with its requirements for a constructive vote of no-confidence. The UK's Fixed-Term Parliaments Act (2011) is another recent example. For sure, in some parliamentary countries, prime ministers can dissolve parliament without any effective restriction. Even so, given the institutional variation within parliamentarism in this regard, we decided to simplify the scenarios. We emphasized that leaders under the parliamentary condition came to power only with the support of the legislature and that they could be dismissed by the legislature, but we also made it clear that they did not have the power to dissolve the legislature as a response to any conflict. This also encouraged the participants to think about their immediate survival in office, rather than giving them the opportunity to calculate that calling an election might provide a way of returning to office perhaps through a new coalition arrangement.

The combination of these three institutional differences provided us with the opportunity to compare participant behaviour under eight institutional conditions. To illustrate the conditional scenarios with which participants were presented, Table 3.3 reports the exact wording of conditional scenarios 4 and 8. The former was presented to participants in a parliamentary system with a multi-party system and weak constitutional powers (scenario 4), and the latter to those in a presidential system with a multi-party system and considerable constitutional powers (scenario 8).

Having been presented with the basic and a conditional scenario, each participant was then asked a set of 16 questions. They were all asked the

Table 3.3 The wording of conditional scenarios 4 and 8

Condition 4: parliamentary
Livonia has a multi-party system and you are the leader of one of those parties. Six parties are represented in the legislature in roughly equal numbers. Your party does not have a majority in the legislature. In the first meeting of the new legislature, you were able to form a coalition with other parties to elect you as the leader of the country. You would have to step down as the leader of Livonia if a majority in the legislature voted to dismiss you from office. You have many constitutional powers at your disposal. For example, you have the power to appoint people to your cabinet without them having to be approved by the legislature. You can dismiss people from the cabinet without their replacements having to be approved by the legislature. You have the power to issue decrees that have the force of law. You do have the power to decide what bills the legislature should discuss and when. You have the power to negotiate treaties with foreign countries, and any such treaties do not have to be ratified by the legislature. You have the power to assume emergency law-making powers if the country is faced with a grave crisis. You do not have the power to dissolve the legislature and call early elections. You can resign, but another leader will replace you in office. Your resignation will not trigger an early election.
Condition 8: presidential
Livonia has a multi-party system. Six parties are represented in the legislature in roughly equal numbers. Your party does not have a majority in the legislature. The people of Livonia elected you as the leader of the country in a direct popular election. You serve for a five-year term. The legislature cannot dismiss you as the leader of Livonia during this time. Your election took place at the same time as the legislative election. You have many constitutional powers at your disposal. For example, you have the power to appoint people to your cabinet without them having to be approved by the legislature. You can dismiss people from the cabinet without their replacements having to be approved by the legislature. You have the power to issue decrees that have the force of law. You do have the power to decide what bills the legislature should discuss and when. You have the power to negotiate treaties with foreign countries, and any such treaties do not have to be ratified by the legislature. You have the power to assume emergency law-making powers if the country is faced with a grave crisis. You do not have the power to dissolve the legislature and call early elections. You can resign, but another leader will replace you in office. Your resignation will not trigger an early election.

same questions. The order of the questions was also randomized to prevent any sequential ordering effect. Each question presented a certain situation, to which participants had to provide a response. The questions were worded such that the participants could choose to respond in either a conflictual way or a cooperative way. For example, question 1 presented the following situation: "Members of the opposition in the legislature object to one of the major pieces of reform that you committed yourself to at the election. They claim that as elected legislators they have a mandate from the people to pass legislation and that you should agree to at least some of their demands. However, you believe that you have a mandate to follow through on the reform you promised at the election. What do you do?" In response to this question, participants could choose either to "Agree to accept some of their demands and compromise" or to "Refuse to accept any demands for compromise". Half of the questions, such as question 1, presented situations where leaders were faced with the choice of behaving in either a conflictual or cooperative way with members of the opposition, reflecting whether or not the leader was willing to engage in inter-party coalition building. The other half of the questions presented situations where leaders were faced with the choice of behaving in either a conflictual or cooperative way with members of their own party.

In addition to the perspective-taking exercise, we gathered basic information about the participants. We asked them to record their age and sex. We also asked a number of attitudinal questions, such as whether they saw themselves as the type of person who was willing to take risks, and whether or not most people could be trusted. The participants were also asked to complete a post-survey questionnaire. Here, they were asked to recall the name of the country in the basic scenario (Livonia). They were also asked three questions about their conditional scenario—how many parties are in the party system?; how did you come to power?; and can the legislature dismiss you? These questions were designed to capture whether participants could remember the basic type of scenario under which they were operating, notably whether they were operating in what was effectively a presidential or a parliamentary system.

In total, there were 169 participants in the experiment. There were 22 participants in conditional scenario 1, and 21 in each of the remaining 7 scenarios. The participants were drawn from all sections of the public. On completion of the exercise, they were paid a small fee for their participation. In the next section, we report the results of the experiment.

3.4 The Results

To begin, we examined the post-survey questionnaire to check the extent to which participants had understood the exercise with which they were faced. We found that whereas a large majority could recall the name of the country in the basic scenario in some form or another, many were mistaken about the conditional scenario with which they were faced. Specifically, when asked whether they could be dismissed by the legislature, we identified participants under the presidential condition who responded positively as well as those under the parliamentary condition who responded negatively. We judged that the reliability of the responses provided by these participants could not be ensured. Therefore, we removed their responses from the analysis of the results. This reduced the total number of participants in the exercise to 122.

Figure 3.2 presents the mean level of inter-party and intra-party conflict under each of the eight conditional scenarios with 90 per cent confidence intervals when those who incorrectly answered the post-survey questionnaire were removed from the analysis. The most striking feature is the difference between inter-party conflict and intra-party conflict. Taking all conditions together, participants were much more likely to choose to engage in inter-party conflict (mean = 0.49, SD = 0.02) than intra-party conflict (mean = 0.25, SD = 0.02); t242 = 8.24, $p = 0.00$. This result also applied to each condition separately at the 10 per cent level at least and under some conditions at the 1 per cent level (p values range from 0.00 to 0.08). Thus, while these results did not reveal any significant differences between the conditional scenarios, they did illustrate that participants under all conditions were more likely to privilege inter-party conflict than intra-party conflict.

The other main feature of Fig. 3.2 is that there are few striking differences between the conditional scenarios. In relation to intra-party conflict, it indicates that there are no significant differences between participant responses under any of the conditional scenarios at all. With regard to inter-party conflict, the same point applies with the exception of one condition. We found a significantly higher level of inter-party conflict under condition 8 when there was presidentialism with a multi-party system and a president with strong powers (mean = 0.59, SD = 0.06) than under condition 4 when there was parliamentarism and the same sub-regime variables (mean = 0.42, SD = 0.05); t27 = −2.14, $p = 0.04$. This finding is in the expected direction. We also found some support for a significantly



Fig. 3.2 Mean level of inter-party and intra-party conflict under eight conditional scenarios
Note: The figure reports marginal effects with 95 per cent confidence intervals

higher level of inter-party conflict under condition 8 relative to condition 7 when there was presidentialism and a multi-party system, but when the president had only weak powers (mean = 0.41, SD = 0.07); t30 = −1.93, p = 0.06. Again, this result is in the expected direction. Indeed, we found equivalent support for a significantly higher level of inter-party conflict under condition 8 relative to both the other three conditional scenarios for presidentialism combined (mean = 0.46, SD = 0.03); t26.2 = −1.89, p = 0.07, as well as the other seven conditional scenarios combined (mean = 0.47, SD = 0.02); t21.6 = −1.78, p = 0.09. In the next section, we discuss the implications of these results.

In addition, we also found that the level of inter-party conflict under condition 8 relative to condition 4 was itself conditioned by various personal and attitudinal factors. We found that men were significantly more likely to engage in conflictual behaviour under presidentialism with a multi-party system and a president with strong powers (mean = 0.78, SD = 0.14) than under parliamentarism with the same sub-regime variables (mean = 0.38, SD = 0.09); t6.8 = −2.43, p = 0.05, whereas the same was not true for women (mean = 0.51, SD = 0.05, vs. mean = 0.45, SD = 0.07; t13.5 = −0.75, p = 0.47, respectively). We visualize this result in Fig. 3.3. Again comparing condition 8 with condition 4, we also found that those who self-reported as being more likely to take risks were also significantly more likely to engage in conflictual behaviour under the presidential condition than under the parliamentary condition. This result is best visualized in Fig. 3.4. Similarly, we found that participants who self-reported as having a centrist or right-wing ideological position were also significantly more likely to engage in conflictual behaviour under the presidential condition than under the parliamentary condition. See Fig. 3.5.

Overall, we see that the combination of presidential and sub-regime variables affects behaviour, and we also see that the effect of this combination is further conditioned by individual-level personal and attitudinal factors.

3.5 The Perils of a Certain Form of Presidentialism?

We have found good evidence that under laboratory conditions, the combination of a presidential regime, a multi-party system in which the president's party is in a minority, and a president with strong constitutional



Fig. 3.3 The conditional effect of gender on conflictual behaviour under different institutional conditions
Note: The figure reports marginal effects with 95 per cent confidence intervals

powers is significantly more likely to cause people to engage in conflictual behaviour with representatives of other parties in the legislature than when there is a parliamentary regime and the same sub-regime variables. We have also found evidence to show that individual-level personal and attitudinal factors further condition this institutional difference. We can draw some tentative conclusions from these results.

Most importantly for the purposes of this book, the results suggest that institutions cause changes in behaviour. This is the fundamental premise on which the argument in this book is premised. In the previous chapter, we showed that institutionalism has a long intellectual history. For the most part, though, the causal effect of institutions was merely assumed, or at least it was inferred as the causal mechanism that accounted for an observed correlation between an institutional variable and some dependent variable of interest in an open system. Here, we have provided evidence in a closed system to show that institutional manipulation is associated with behavioural differences. For sure, as noted in Chap. 1, we



Fig. 3.4 The conditional effect of risk on conflictual behaviour under different institutional conditions
Note: The figure reports marginal effects with 90 per cent confidence intervals

cannot directly observe the causal mechanism or disposition at work. We can still only infer its presence. Nonetheless, the nature of a closed system is such that we can be sure that no other factor was associated with the observed difference in behaviour, providing us with strong evidence that the institutional mechanism or process was the cause of the behavioural differences we observed rather than some other unobserved factor.

The results also provide evidence in support of our particular theory of institutionalism. In the previous chapter, we were keen to avoid the idea of institutional determinism. Instead, we argued that while institutions shape behaviour, individuals have to interpret the institutional incentives with which they are faced. This is because institutions do not act. Only actors act. Different people will interpret the institutional incentives with which they are faced in different ways. We have provided evidence to support this claim. We have shown that institutions are not simply deterministic. We have found that the mean level of behaviour is significantly different under a certain institutional condition relative to others. We have



Fig. 3.5 The conditional effect of ideology on conflictual behaviour under different institutional conditions
Note: The figure reports marginal effects with 95 per cent confidence intervals

not found that everybody acts the same way under a given condition. Indeed, we would not have expected such a finding. More notably, though, we have shown that the effects of institutional differences are themselves conditioned by individual-level factors. In other words, institutions can be the cause of a general behavioural effect, but this effect can also be mediated through such individual-level characteristics. This is consistent with the convergent view of institutionalism that we presented in the previous chapter that understands institutions and actors as mutually constitutive or consequential.

More specifically, these results also provide some comfort for the standard Linzian and post-Linzian arguments about the perils of presidentialism that we outlined at the start of this chapter. Following Linz's general warning about presidentialism, recall that Mainwaring argued that presidentialism was most likely to be perilous for democracy when it was combined with a multi-party system. Recall also that Mainwaring and Shugart emphasized the importance of presidential power in this respect. We have

confirmed that the combination of presidentialism, a multi-party system, specifically a president with only minority support in the legislature, and a president with strong powers is precisely the set of factors that caused participants to engage in significantly greater conflictual behaviour than any other combination. This finding provides support for the basic Linzian assumption that institutions matter for the performance of democracy and questions Cheibub's more sceptical position in this regard. That said, we should emphasize that we have not confirmed that either presidentialism or the combination of presidentialism, a multi-party system, and a strong president is perilous for democracy. As noted previously, there are two steps to such an argument. We have provided evidence for only the first step. It remains to be seen whether the conflictual behaviour that we have shown to be caused by such a combination of institutional factors is itself the cause of worse democratic performance. In the end, Cheibub may still be correct to be sceptical about the effect of institutions on democratic performance. At least, though, we can continue to study this issue in the knowledge that there is evidence to suggest that institutions do indeed have the causal effect on behaviour that the Linzian and post-Linzian arguments are premised upon.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided us with evidence to support the micro-level foundations of our pragmatic institutional account. We have shown that institutional differences cause behavioural differences. We have also shown that the effect of institutional differences is conditioned by individual-level characteristics. With evidence to suggest that the foundational grounds of our account are secure, we now proceed to observational studies about the effect of institutional variation. In open systems, what is the evidence that institutions affect leadership outcomes? In the next chapter, we proceed to a large-n study that examines the effect of institutional variation of such outcomes.

Notes

1. The experiment was held at the CESS Lab at Nuffield College Oxford. The experiment received ethical approval from the Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-divisional Research Ethics Committee (IDREC) [CUREC1A, ref. no. R46721/RE001]. The experiment was supported by a grant from the John Fell Fund at Oxford University (Project 133/012).

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CHAPTER 4

Regime Types, Presidential Power, and Clarity of Economic Responsibility

In this chapter, we move from the highly controlled conditions of the laboratory to the complexity of real-world politics. What is the evidence that leadership institutions shape outcomes in open systems? Here, we focus on the ways in which leadership institutions condition the attribution of responsibility for economic performance at elections. Election outcomes are shaped by the state of the economy. When the economy is performing well, incumbent leaders and their parties are rewarded by voters. When the economy is performing badly, they are blamed. However, leadership institutions condition economic voting by clarifying the political responsibility for economic performance. Some institutions sharpen the clarity of responsibility and intensify the degree to which voters reward or blame incumbent leaders and their parties. Other institutions diffuse the clarity of economic policy-making responsibility and reduce the strength of economic voting. We show that accountability for economic performance is conditional upon the institutional features of parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism as well as the constitutional power of presidents in these regimes.

There are four parts to the chapter. In the first part, we sketch the literature on economic voting and the clarity of responsibility, identifying the main institutional features that we expect to condition the strength of accountability for economic performance, focusing on the differences between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism and the effect of presidential power.

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In the second part, we describe the data that we draw upon to test for the impact of these institutional features on economic voting. In the third part, we present the results of the various tests. In the Conclusion, we reflect on the implications of the results for our pragmatic institutional approach to the study of leadership outcomes.

4.1 Institutions and Clarity of Economic Responsibility

The simple proposition that underpins the literature on economic voting is that if the economy is doing well, voters are more likely to reward the incumbent government by supporting it at an election, whereas if the economy is doing badly, they are more likely to blame the government and vote against it. There is now a great deal of evidence that economic performance is one of the main factors influencing voting behaviour (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). There is a vast literature exploring different aspects of this topic. One of the main sub-sets of this literature focuses on the ways in which political context conditions economic voting. Specifically, there is a body of work that shows how institutions can affect the attribution of reward or blame for economic performance. Powell and Whitten (1993) were the first to show that there was a positive association between the so-called clarity of political responsibility and economic voting. In systems where institutional features allowed voters to clearly assign responsibility for economic policy-making to the government, the strength of economic voting was much greater than in systems where policy-making responsibility was blurred between the government and the opposition. The proposition that institutions condition the impact of economic performance on voting behaviour has now been tested many times using various clarity-of-responsibility measures (Whitten and Palmer 1999; Royed et al. 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002; Bengtsson 2004; Hobolt et al. 2012). These tests have been based on both aggregate-level data (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Royed et al. 2000; Bengtsson 2004; Roberts 2008) and individual-level data (Nadeau et al. 2002; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Fisher and Hobolt 2010; Hobolt et al. 2012). In effect, the general idea that institutions condition economic voting is now a well-settled belief.

The question remains, though, as to the how specific institutions condition economic voting. This issue has been addressed in various ways (Campello and Zucco 2016; Carlin and Singh 2015; Singer and Carlin 2013). In this chapter, we base our analysis on a well-known paper by David Samuels and Timothy Hellwig (2010), replicating their study and then

building on it. Specifically, we focus on two institutional features: firstly, regime-level differences between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism, and, secondly, variation in the constitutional power of presidents within these two regimes, particularly within semi-presidentialism.

We begin by considering the effect of regime-level differences on economic voting. In the previous chapter, we defined parliamentarism as the situation where the head of state is either an indirectly elected fixed-term president or a monarch, and where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature. Examples of parliamentary republics include Germany, Hungary, and Italy. Examples of parliamentary monarchies include the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. Here, we follow the now standard practice and define semi-presidentialism as the situation where the head of state is a directly or popularly elected president, and where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature (Elgie 1999: 13; Schleiter and Morgan Jones 2009: 874). Examples of semi-presidential countries include France, Ireland, and Taiwan. These definitions generate clear institutional differences between parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes. We expect these differences to be consequential for economic voting.

The most basic institutional difference between the two regimes is the presence under semi-presidentialism of direct presidential elections. We expect economic voting to be greater at presidential elections relative to legislative elections. This is because the presidency is a single-person institution. All else equal, voters can more easily ascribe responsibility for economic performance to the president personally at a presidential election under semi-presidentialism than to a government collectively at a legislative election under parliamentarism. Scholars have already provided evidence to support this expectation. For example, Samuels (2004: 433) has shown that in presidential regimes, there is a greater level of accountability for economic performance when presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently than when legislative elections are held separately. That said, in their study of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, Hellwig and Samuels (2007: 78) failed to find evidence of electoral accountability when they separated out presidential from legislative elections under semi-presidentialism. This is puzzling. We wish to re-examine their work with the expectation that we will find evidence of greater accountability for electoral performance at presidential elections relative to legislative elections under parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism.

The second main institutional difference between parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes flows directly from the provision for direct presidential elections under semi-presidentialism. Here, the presence of both

presidential and legislative elections creates the potential for them to return opposing majorities. This can lead to what is known as "cohabitation". Under semi-presidentialism, the prime minister and cabinet are responsible to the legislature. This means that if the legislative election returns a majority opposed to the president, then the president has to appoint a prime minister who is supported by the legislature and who is opposed to the president. In French-style systems, responsibility for policy-making typically shifts from the president to the prime minister and government under cohabitation. In this context, we can expect the attribution of responsibility for economic performance to shift as well. After all, if power has shifted from the president to the prime minister and the prime minister is now considered to be responsible for policy-making, then under cohabitation, the prime minister's party should receive the reward/blame for good/bad economic performance. Again, there is already evidence to support this expectation. Whereas Hellwig and Samuels (ibid.) failed to find any evidence of electoral accountability at presidential elections relative to legislative elections under semi-presidentialism, they did find that cohabitation drives accountability in semi-presidential regimes. Specifically, as expected, under cohabitation, accountability for economic performance shifts from the president to the prime minister (ibid.: 83). We expect to confirm this result.

In addition to regime-level differences, we also wish to consider the impact on economic voting of variation in the constitutional power of presidents. We know that the constitutional powers of presidents can differ from one country to another. For instance, the Constitution of Poland states that the President of Poland has the right to send a bill back to the legislature for a second reading, to veto that bill if it has been passed by the legislature at the second reading, and to send a bill that has been passed by the legislature to the Constitutional Court for its constitutionality to be judged and potentially for all or part of the proposed legislation to be quashed. By contrast, the Constitution of Slovenia provides the President of Slovenia with none of the equivalent powers. The presence of this power in one case and its absence in another are potentially consequential for leadership outcomes. Its presence in Poland can shape the behaviour of the president, creating the opportunity for the president to block legislation. Indeed, its presence can shape the behaviour of other political actors there too. For example, deputies are aware that the president has the constitutional power to veto legislation. They may decide to word legislation in a way that encourages the president to accept it, thus discouraging the use of the presidential veto. In both ways, the presence of a certain parchment power can have a causal effect on actor

behaviour, shaping leadership outcomes. In Slovenia, though, the equivalent parchment power is not present, meaning that presidential behaviour does not have the potential to be shaped in the same way, and that leadership outcomes in this regard are likely to be different. In a previous paper (Elgie and Fauvelle-Aymar 2012), we showed that turnout at semi-presidential elections was conditional upon presidential power in various ways. In this chapter, we employ the same logic.

We expect presidential power to be a predictor of differential outcomes for economic voting. The presence of a strong president is likely to sharpen the clarity of institutional responsibility. Therefore, we would expect greater economic voting when there is a strong president relative to when there is a weak president. We expect this proposition to be confirmed within the set of parliamentary and semi-presidential countries when they are pooled together. We also expect it to be confirmed when we focus solely on the set of semi-presidential countries. This is because presidential power varies more within semi-presidentialism than within parliamentarism. When we consider the list of democracies with a semi-presidential constitution (see Table 4.1), we find that there are parliamentary-like countries, such as Austria, Croatia, Iceland,

Table 4.1 List of democracies with a semi-presidential constitution

Austria	Namibia
Bulgaria	Peru
Cabo Verde	Poland
Croatia	Portugal
the Czech Republic	Romania
Finland	São Tomé and Príncipe
France	Senegal
Iceland	Serbia
Ireland	Slovakia
Lithuania	Slovenia
Macedonia	Taiwan
Mongolia	Timor-Leste
Montenegro	Turkey

Sources: The list of semi-presidential countries is taken from http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?p=1053 (accessed 18 January 2016). The list of democracies is taken from the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) dataset (Pemstein et al. 2010). Here, we consider a democracy to be a country where the 95 per cent higher posterior density regions around the mean UDS score were both greater than 0 in 2012, which was the last recorded year in the dataset

Ireland, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, where the directly elected president always operates like an indirectly elected figurehead president. By contrast, we also find that there are also presidential-like countries with an executive presidency, notably Namibia, Peru, Senegal, and Taiwan. In addition, we find that there are countries where the president is generally the most important figure in the system but where the prime minister can sometimes be powerful, including France and Romania, as well as other countries where the prime minister is typically the most influential political actor but where the president can on occasions be active, such as Poland, Portugal, and Timor-Leste. Thus, in addition to the effect of presidential power on economic voting when parliamentary and semi-presidential countries are pooled, we expect variation in presidential power to be consequential when we focus solely on the set of semi-presidential countries as well.

There have been very few cross-national studies of presidential power and economic voting. In their article, Hellwig and Samuels (2007: 81) stated that they found no evidence that presidential power shaped economic voting. However, their tests are not reported. By contrast, in their study of 18 Latin American presidential regimes, Carlin and Singh (2015) found that variation in presidential power conditioned the extent to which individuals sanctioned presidents for the relative performance of the economy. In their study, though, they were concerned with presidential approval rather than votes for the president's party. We wish to explore the degree to which accountability for economic performance is conditional upon variation in presidential power in terms of votes cast for the incumbent leader and the leader's party. All else equal, we expect economic voting in this regard to be greater in countries where presidents are more powerful.

To sum up, we follow the logic of Hellwig and Samuels (2007). We expect to find three different types of results. We expect to find that accountability for economic performance will be greater at direct presidential elections than legislative elections. We expect the attribution of responsibility for economic performance to shift from the president to the prime minister during periods of cohabitation. We also expect economic voting to be conditional upon variation in presidential power, particularly within the set of semi-presidential countries.

4.2 Cases and Variables

We identify parliamentary and semi-presidential countries from the lists provided at www.semipresidentialism.com.[1] While there are studies that include parliamentary monarchies in their dataset even when they are concerned

solely with expectations about presidential politics (e.g. Golder 2006), we focus on the universe of parliamentary republics and semi-presidential regimes. We make no claims that any findings will apply to either parliamentary monarchies or presidential systems.

To identify democracies, we rely on the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) dataset (Pemstein et al. 2010). We privilege the UDS dataset, because it is consistent with one of the principles of the pragmatic approach that we outlined in Chap. 1. A standard problem with identifying democracies from datasets such as Freedom House or Polity is that while there might be a considerable degree of overlap between the different datasets as to which countries should be classed as democratic and which should be classed as non-democratic, there is also disagreement between them. What this means is that different studies rely on different lists of democracies, depending on whether they privilege Freedom House, Polity, or an alternative source. The result, though, is that empirical results are often sensitive to the list of democracies and non-democracies that have been derived from the particular data source that has been used. In one sense, this problem is intractable. There is no definitive agreement as to which countries are democratic. That said, the UDS dataset tries to alleviate this problem by generating a set of democracy scores that synthesizes the equivalent scores in ten existing datasets, including sources such as Freedom House and Polity. In other words, it pools the cumulative knowledge that is already available in the most widely used sources for distinguishing between democracies and non-democracies. This does not mean that the UDS dataset can tell us definitively which countries are democratic and which countries are not. However, it can give us an indication as to the level of agreement between the different sets of experts who are making judgements about whether or not particular countries are democratic. For the purposes of this chapter, we consider a democracy to be a country where the 95 per cent higher posterior density regions around the mean UDS score were both greater than 0 in 2012, which was the last recorded year in the dataset. In practice, what this means is that we are selecting countries that almost all ten of the original sources in the UDS dataset agree to be democratic, even though each source has a somewhat different method for distinguishing between democracies and non-democracies. In short, we end up with a list of countries which we believe to be democratic on the basis of the best available evidence that currently exists within the relevant community of scientific inquirers.

We are concerned with the effect of institutions on economic voting at elections. In general, an electoral cycle is usually around five years. Therefore, to ensure that we maximize the potential to cover at least one electoral cycle from start to finish, we include countries in our dataset that have met the above requirements for democracy in the UDS dataset for at least six consecutive years. The dataset starts to record democracy scores in 1946. This means that some countries are included in our dataset even though they are no longer classed as democracies in 2012 on the basis of the criteria we have identified. However, we can be sure that for at least a period of time between 1946 and 2012, they were classed as democracies by most observers for six consecutive years. We include elections up to the end of 2015 for countries that we identify as democratic on the basis of the UDS dataset in 2012.[2]

We wish to explain the support for incumbent parties or presidential candidates of incumbent parties at all elections in this set of democracies. To do so, we identify the dates of all legislative and presidential elections in the democracies we have previously identified. We then identify the party affiliation of the incumbent prime minister at the time of the legislative election in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, as well as the party of the incumbent president at presidential elections and both the president and prime minister at legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes. In most cases, we were able to take party affiliations from the ParlGov database. Where country information is not available here, we rely on the World Statesmen website.[3]

The dependent variable is the percentage vote (the year t election) won by the party of the incumbent president in the case of presidential elections or the incumbent president or prime minister in the case of parliamentary elections. On the right-hand side, we include the vote in the previous election (or t-1 election) won by the same party.[4] In effect, this allows us to control for the incumbent leader's previous electoral performance. Importantly, we record the vote at comparable elections in this regard. In parliamentary regimes, this process is straightforward as we are simply recording party scores at successive legislative elections. In semi-presidential regimes, though, the process is slightly more complicated. For example, for legislative elections in Austria, we record the support for the president's party at the 2013 legislative election and compare it with the score for the same party at the 2008 legislative election, even though there was a presidential election in 2010. This is because we wish to compare like elections with like. Applying the same rule, for presidential

elections in Austria, we compare the support for the president's party in Austria at the 2010 presidential election and compare it with the score for the same party at the 2004 presidential election, even though there was a legislative election in 2008. We deviate from Hellwig and Samuels (2007) in this regard. They compare the percentage vote at successive elections whatever type of election that might be. For example, they would compare the party vote at the 2013 legislative election in Austria with the same party's vote at the 2010 presidential election. We believe it is important to compare like elections with like and, therefore, compare the percentage vote at successive elections of the same type, that is the legislative election at time t relative to the legislative election at t-1.

We record party scores from the election results in the ParlGov database where available. Otherwise, we rely on the election results that are available at the various country pages of Wikipedia.[5] In most elections, the necessary information is clearly identifiable. In a proportion of elections, though, it is not straightforward to identify a reliable score for the same party at both the t and t-1 elections. For instance, at the 2004 Austrian presidential election Heinz Fischer was elected winning 52.4 per cent of the vote. In 2010, he was re-elected winning 79.33 per cent of the vote. This would suggest a 26.93 per cent increase in his vote from one election to the next. However, in 2004, he was the candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), standing against the candidate of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who won 47.6 per cent of the vote. In 2010, by contrast, President Fischer was, in effect, the joint candidate of both parties, rather than simply the candidate of the SPÖ. He did face competition from two smaller parties, but the increase in his vote in 2010 was at least partly because of the ÖVP's decision not to stand a candidate against him. In this case, and others like it, we have to decide whether to record the scores for the two elections or to exclude this observation from the dataset because arguably the incumbent leader was not representing the same party or coalition at both the t and t-1 elections. We err on the side of caution. Only if we can clearly identify a leader who headed the same party or coalition of parties at the t and t-1 elections do we include them. In other words, we privilege the reliability of the data at the expense of increasing the number of observations with contestable election figures.[6] It is noting that Hellwig and Samuels are willing to include more observations than we are in this regard. In that sense, we are more cautious than they are in terms of assessing whether or not the score for the same party or coalition can be recorded at successive elections.

We are interested in the effect of presidential power on leadership outcomes. We wish to create a binary variable that distinguishes between strong (coded 1) and weak presidents (coded 0). This raises the issue of how we can reliably distinguish between strong and weak presidents. To this end, there are many different measures of presidential power. Indeed, in a recent article, we identified 35 separate cross-national measures of presidential power (Doyle and Elgie 2016). We know that the correlation between some of these measures is very low (ibid.: 733). Not least for that reason, we also know that empirical results are highly sensitive to the particular measure that is used. To address the problem of the reliability of presidential power scores as best we can, we rely on the scores in Doyle and Elgie (ibid.). The advantage of these scores is that, rather like the logic underpinning the UDS dataset, they are derived from the scores recorded in all the existing expert studies of presidential power. Also, and again rather like the UDS dataset, the method by which the presidential power scores are derived means that we are able to identify confidence intervals for any particular country's presidential power score. In the current state of academic knowledge, we believe that this set of presidential power scores is the most reliable. Thus, we rely on the Doyle and Elgie dataset.

Even so, we still need to operationalize the presidential power variable very carefully. The Doyle and Elgie presidential power scores are derived from measures that code the constitutional power of presidents, or parchment powers. In a small number of countries, though, there is a large gap between the president's parchment powers and their power in practice. A good example is Iceland. Here, the president has very important constitutional powers, but in practice the president behaves like a parliamentary-style figurehead. This situation raises an important theoretical issue with coding implications. We do not know whether voters assess presidents on the basis of their parchment powers or their power in practice. Here, we assume it is the latter. A president who is powerful only on parchment will not exercise any economic policy-making responsibility in practice. In that event, though, we would not expect the president to be held electorally accountable for economic performance. Thus, policy-making responsibility in practice seems to be the criterion of interest for the purposes of this study. In most cases, presidential parchment powers and power in practice line up relatively well in the Doyle and Elgie dataset. In some cases, though, they do not. Therefore, we need to operationalize the presidential power variable very carefully.

To maximize the validity of our results, we estimate our models with two different binary indicators of presidential power. This will indicate whether the results are robust to different assessments of strong versus weak presidents in practice. The first indicator (pp1) codes a country as having a strong president (1) if its presidential power score is greater than 0.157 in the Doyle and Elgie dataset and a weak president (0) otherwise.[7] Here, Mongolia, for example, is classed as having a strong president. The second indicator (pp2) codes a country as having a strong president (1) if its presidential power score is greater than 0.346 in the Doyle and Elgie dataset and a weak president (0) otherwise.[8] Here, Mongolia is coded as having a weak president. In the Doyle and Elgie dataset, there are no presidential power scores recorded for Dominica, Serbia, Turkey up to 1977, and Vanuatu. We code all four countries, three of which are parliamentary and another which has a directly elected but figurehead presidency, as having weak presidents for both pp1 and pp2. In addition, we make a small number of country-level adjustments to capture the power of presidents in practice. We recode post-2000 Croatia as having a weak president for both pp1 and pp2. For pp1, we recode France as having a strong president. For pp2, we recode Hungary, Iceland, Italy, and Malta as having a weak president, and Peru from 1980 to 1990 as having a strong president. We consider these changes to be common-sense recodings in that they capture standard interpretations of presidential power in practice in these countries. (For a list of strong and weak presidents under the two measures after the adjustments, see Table 4.2.)

One way of thinking about the difference between the two measures of presidential power is that pp1 codes a slightly larger set of countries as having a strong president than pp2. In other words, the threshold for what counts as a strong president in practice is slightly lower in pp1 than pp2. Another way of thinking about the difference is that whereas some parliamentary presidents are classed as strong under pp1, no parliamentary presidents are classed as strong under pp2, while under pp2 a smaller selection of semi-presidential presidents are classed as strong relative to pp1. For pp1, the idea that some parliamentary presidents can be classed as strong is consistent with the logic of Margit Tavits (2009) work. As we shall see, when all data availability is taken into consideration, we have a maximum of 274 observations. There are 124 observations with strong presidents when we estimate with pp1 and 84 observations with strong presidents with pp2.

Table 4.2 List of strong and weak presidents in the dataset

Presidential power 1 (pp1)		*Presidential power 2 (pp2)*	
Strong	*Weak*	*Strong*	*Weak*
Bulgaria	Albania	Cape Verde	Albania
Cape Verde	Austria	Finland (to 1999)	Austria
Czech Republic (2002–)	Croatia	France	Bulgaria
Estonia	Czech Republic (to 1998)	Lithuania	Croatia
Finland (to 1999)	Dominica	Peru	Czech Republic
France	Finland (2000–)	Poland	Dominica
Hungary	Germany	Portugal	Estonia
Iceland	Greece	Romania	Finland (2000–)
Lithuania	India	São Tomé and Príncipe	Germany
Mauritius	Ireland	Senegal	Greece
Moldova	Israel	Sri Lanka	Hungary
Mongolia	Italy	Turkey (2002–)	Iceland
Peru	Latvia	Ukraine	India
Poland	Macedonia		Ireland
Portugal	Malta		Israel
Romania	Serbia		Italy
São Tomé and Príncipe	Slovenia		Latvia
Senegal	Trinidad and Tobago		Macedonia
Slovakia	Turkey (to 1977)		Malta
Sri Lanka	Vanuatu		Mauritius
Turkey (2002–)			Moldova
Ukraine			Mongolia
			Serbia
			Slovakia
			Slovenia
			Trinidad and Tobago
			Turkey (to 1977)
			Vanuatu

We wish to test for the impact of presidential power on economic voting while controlling for other relevant variables. For the economic performance variable, we follow Hellwig and Samuels (2007). We take the percentage change in real per capita GDP. We record the GDP change in the year t if the election was held in the last six months of the year t, and the change in previous year if the election was held in the first six months of the year t. Like Hellwig and Samuels, we take the figures for GDP per capita from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) and

record the percentage change in the same way.[9] The earliest recorded year in the WDI dataset is 1966. Given an economic performance variable is specified in every model, our dataset effectively begins with elections held in 1966.

In their article, Hellwig and Samuels included two standard control variables. The first is the party's score at the previous election. As discussed above, we included the vote for the party at the equivalent t-1 election in all models. We expect the result for this variable to be positively correlated with the support for the incumbent's party, reflecting an incumbency advantage. The second is an indicator variable capturing whether or not the incumbent president is standing for re-election. This variable is coded as 1 when an incumbent president is running for re-election and 0 otherwise, meaning all parliamentary regimes are coded 0 for this variable. Again, we expect there to be a positive correlation with the support for the incumbent's party, reflecting another aspect of an incumbency advantage.

In addition, Hellwig and Samuels also include a control for the level of democracy in a country. Specifically, they include the age of democracy and its squared term in all specifications. The logic behind this decision is that young democracies are likely to have more volatile election results generally, whereas over time, the level of volatility will decrease. Thus, we would expect the age of democracy variable to be positively signed and its squared term to be negatively signed. We calculate the age of democracy from the UDS dataset.[10]

Finally, we record two other variables. The first is the presence of a one-party government. From Model 5 onwards, we include this variable as a control in all estimations. We do so because it sets the evidential bar a little bit higher. Do we find support for our expectations even when controlling for the standard clarity of responsibility variable? We record this indicator variable from various sources, including the list of cabinets at the ParlGov database, Seki and Williams (2014), and Wikipedia pages for Dominica and Serbia. We also include a cohabitation variable in some estimations. This is an indicator variable coded as 1 when there is a period of cohabitation and 0 otherwise.[11] Cohabitation is present only in semi-presidential systems, meaning that parliamentary systems are given a value of 0 for this variable. Again, following Hellwig and Samuels, we estimate all models using OLS and report country-clustered standard errors.

4.3 Clarity of Institutional Responsibility and Economic Accountability

4.3.1 Replicating Hellwig and Samuels: One-Party Government and Economic Accountability

To confirm the basic intuition that electoral accountability for economic performance is sensitive to the clarity of institutional responsibility, we replicate Hellwig and Samuels (2007) study.[12] We begin by replicating the basic model they reported in their 2007 paper (ibid.: 74). This model operationalizes clarity of responsibility in the form of the presence or absence of a single-party government. The model includes presidential regimes, parliamentary monarchies and republics, and semi-presidential countries (Model 1 here). Next, using their dataset and their codings, we report the same model but excluding presidential regimes (Model 2 here). Also using their dataset and their codings, we report the same model, but excluding presidential regimes and parliamentary monarchies, given this is the case selection that we will be relying on in this chapter (Model 3 here). In all three models, we find that under high-clarity elections the economy variable is significant, whereas under low-clarity elections it is not (see Table 4.3). That is to say, both when the estimation is limited to parliamentary and semi-presidential countries, and also when it is further limited to only parliamentary republics and semi-presidential countries, we find essentially the same results as the original Hellwig and Samuels model. In both their original model and its replication excluding presidential regimes (Models 1 and 2 here), the significant result is returned at the 10 per cent level ($p = 0.056$ in Model 1, and $p = 0.067$ in Model 2). This significance threshold is relatively generous. Typically, political science studies now use a 5 per cent ($p < 0.05$) threshold. However, when we limit the cases to parliamentary republics and semi-presidential countries (Model 3 here), it is returned at the 5 per cent level ($p = 0.044$). We should note, though, that the number of high-clarity elections in Model 3 is relatively small compared with Model 2 and especially Model 1. We should also note that somewhat anomalously the party's vote at the previous election does not return a significant result under high-clarity elections in Model 3. Nonetheless, as we would expect, there is evidence from the original Hellwig and Samuels dataset that economic performance affects election results when the clarity of institutional responsibility is high not only when presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential

Table 4.3 Economic accountability and clarity of responsibility using Hellwig and Samuels (2007) dataset

	Model 1		*Model 2*		*Model 3*	
	High-clarity elections	*Low-clarity elections*	*High-clarity elections*	*Low-clarity elections*	*High-clarity elections*	*Low-clarity elections*
Previous vote	0.45**	0.71***	0.25	0.68***	0.27	0.59***
	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.09)
Economy	0.55*	0.28	1.10*	−0.21	2.06**	−0.35
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.57)	(0.42)	(0.93)	(0.49)
Re-election	7.96*	6.31***	11.86**	5.29	12.55*	5.31
	(4.66)	(2.08)	(4.42)	(3.93)	(6.96)	(3.96)
Age of democracy	0.44**	0.02	0.80***	0.17	1.01*	0.14
	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.50)	(0.16)
Age of democracy^2	−0.01**	0.00	−0.01***	−0.00	−0.13*	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Constant	13.60	5.19*	15.37	5.70	8.76	10.55**
	(9.13)	(2.88)	(10.74)	(3.89)	(15.40)	(4.37)
R^2	0.29	0.52	0.27	0.48	0.38	0.39
F-statistic	4.90**	46.54***	10.47***	29.97***	4.55**	18.70***
N	108	318	66	196	32	130

Notes: Model 1—Cases comprise presidential regimes, parliamentary monarchies and republics, and semi-presidential countries. Model 2—Cases comprise parliamentary monarchies and republics, and semi-presidential countries. Model 3—Cases comprise parliamentary republics and semi-presidential countries

In Models 1 and 2, the data and codings are taken from Hellwig and Samuels (2007). In Model 3, the data are taken from Hellwig and Samuels (2007), but a new variable is created, identifying parliamentary republics and semi-presidential regimes

In all models, the dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party at both presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes and for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in parliamentary regimes. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)

regimes are considered together, but also when the universe of cases is confined solely to parliamentary and semi-presidential countries, and, indeed, when it is confined solely to parliamentary republics and semi-presidential countries.

We now turn to our dataset. We begin by replicating Model 3 but with our data[13] (see Table 4.4, Model 4). The main difference is that we now find that economic performance affects elections results at both high and low-clarity elections when the threshold for significance is at the 10 per cent ($p < 0.10$) level. That said, we do still find a considerable difference

Table 4.4 Replicating Hellwig and Samuels using our dataset

	Model 4 *Parliamentary republics and semi-presidential countries*	
	High-clarity elections	*Low-clarity elections*
Previous vote	0.55***	0.59***
	(0.14)	(0.07)
Economy	0.86***	0.55*
	(0.22)	(0.31)
Incumbent	3.58	2.68
	(4.00)	(2.62)
Age of democracy	0.13	0.31***
	(0.32)	(0.10)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	11.36	3.21
	(9.02)	(3.41)
R^2	0.34	0.35
F-statistic	11.22***	16.79***
N	94	180

Note: The dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party at both presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes and for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in parliamentary republics. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)

between the effect of high-clarity relative to low-clarity elections in relation to economic accountability. We find both that the magnitude of the effect is greater at high-clarity elections relative to low-clarity elections and that the result is significant at the 1 per cent level ($p = 0.001$) at the former, whereas it is significant at only the 10 per cent level ($p = 0.084$) at the latter. In addition, the result for the party's vote at the previous election also returns a significant result and in the expected direction under both high- and low-clarity elections in Model 4. Unlike the result in Model 3, this is consistent with expectations. It is also worth noting that the number of observations ($n = 274$) is much greater than the equivalent number in Model 3 ($n = 162$) and that both the number and percentage of observations of high-clarity elections are also greater. Thus, the distribution of the data is more balanced than in Model 3.

Overall, using our dataset and codings we have good reason to believe that clarity of institutional responsibility captured by the one-party government indicator variable affects electoral accountability for economic

performance in a manner that is consistent with Hellwig and Samuels' original result. Thus, even though we are using a new dataset that includes some changes to the method by which data have been recorded, we still return the same basic result as they do. This suggests that the two studies are commensurable.

4.3.2 Parliamentarism, Semi-Presidentialism, and Economic Accountability

We now turn to our institutional variables of interest. From this point on, we rely solely on our dataset and codings and we include a control for the presence of one-party government in all models. As noted previously, this sets a higher inferential bar for our results. We also report the results slightly differently from Models 1–4. Consistent with the way in which Hellwig and Samuels (ibid.) report their results, rather than estimating two separate models, one where a particular institutional variable is present and one where it is absent (one-party government in Models 1–4), we report a single model which includes the interaction of the economy variable with a series of different institutional variables. We report the full model each time, but given we cannot simply read off the effects of an interaction term from the model itself (Brambor et al. 2006), we follow Hellwig and Samuels and report the conditional effects of the interaction terms in a separate figure. This method allows us to report the coefficients and standard errors for a 1 per cent change in GDP per capita on the percentage of votes received by the incumbent leader's party conditional upon these contextual variables.[14] This way we can clearly see the relative effect of the institutional variation under investigation.

We begin by examining the effect of direct presidential elections on economic voting. We expect to find a greater degree of economic accountability at presidential elections relative to legislative elections (see Table 4.5 and Fig. 4.1). Figure 4.1 shows strong support for this expectation.[15] Recall that Hellwig and Samuels failed to find evidence to support this idea. Why do our results differ from theirs? There are three possible reasons, one or a combination of which may account for the difference. First, we include data through 2015, so we have the advantage of being able to include considerably more elections in semi-presidential countries than Hellwig and Samuels. Second, we exclude parliamentary monarchies from our dataset. This has the effect of increasing the percentage of presidential elections in the dataset relative to legislative elections. Third, as noted

Table 4.5 Type of election and economic accountability

	Model 5
Previous vote	0.62***
	(0.07)
Economy	0.79***
	(0.28)
Presidential election	−8.42***
	(2.54)
Legislative election	1.14
	(2.17)
Economy × presidential election	0.25
	(0.40)
Economy × legislative election	−0.54
	(0.36)
Incumbent	9.28***
	(3.02)
One-party government	4.53**
	(1.68)
Age of democracy	0.22**
	(0.11)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00**
	(0.00)
Constant	3.77
	(3.61)
R^2	0.50
F-statistic	55.87***
N	274

Note: The dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party at both presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes and for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in parliamentary republics. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)



Fig. 4.1 The conditional effect of the type of election on economic accountability

previously, we record election results somewhat differently from Hellwig and Samuels. Whereas they record the two most recent elections of whatever type (e.g. presidential relative to legislative), we record the two most recent elections of the same type (e.g. always presidential relative to presidential).[16] While the studies are set up somewhat differently, we believe that our results are valid, perhaps merely because we have the benefit of being able to include more observations than Hellwig and Samuels. That said, we also believe that we are operationalizing the key electoral variable—the score for the incumbent party at election t and t-1—in a more appropriate way. Whatever the reason for the difference between the results in the two studies, we find strong evidence that the basic institutional difference between parliamentary republics and semi-presidential countries, namely the presence of a directly elected president, does condition the effect of economic voting, even controlling for the presence of one-party government.[17]

We now test for the impact of cohabitation.[18] We expect cohabitation to shift the responsibility for economic performance from the president to the prime minister. To test this proposition, we restrict the sample solely to semi-presidential regimes. This is because, by definition, cohabitation is absent from parliamentary regimes. Therefore, semi-presidentialism is the appropriate institutional setting within which to test our expectations about its effect. We estimate three models. The first pools the results for the president's party at all elections under semi-presidentialism (Model 6); the second restricts the sample to the president's party at presidential elections (Model 7); the third takes the results for the prime minister's party at legislative elections under semi-presidentialism (Model 8). The results are presented in Table 4.6 and Fig. 4.2. They show, as expected, that when we consider the vote for the president's party both when all semi-presidential elections are pooled and when we restrict the sample solely to presidential elections (Models 6 and 7), the president's party is held accountable for economic performance only during periods of unified government. By contrast, the results also show, again as expected, that when we consider the vote for the prime minister's party at legislative elections, the prime minister's party is held responsible for economic performance only during periods of cohabitation. Again, we have departed from the precise methodology used by Hellwig and Samuels in a number of respects, but, this time, our results and theirs are more in line. This is reassuring and suggests a basic scientific consensus about the effect of cohabitation on economic voting.[19]

Table 4.6 Cohabitation and electoral accountability in semi-presidential regimes

	Model 6	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
Previous vote	0.49***	0.26	0.70***
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.08)
Economy	0.78***	1.15***	0.37
	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.24)
Cohabitation	6.35	2.90	−4.33**
	(3.76)	(4.37)	(2.06)
Economy × cohabitation	−0.41	−0.56	1.19
	(1.06)	(1.33)	(0.69)
Incumbent	5.51**	9.55**	
	(2.40)	(3.52)	
One-party government	7.26***	8.76**	3.42
	(2.03)	(3.80)	(2.43)
Age of democracy	0.28*	0.08	0.39**
	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.14)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	2.26	10.99	−4.12
	(5.43)	(8.03)	(3.88)
R^2	0.43	0.40	0.55
F-statistic	48.66***	27.18***	47.59***
N	161	58	128

Note: The dependent variable in Model 6 is the percentage vote for the president's party at presidential and legislative elections under semi-presidentialism. The dependent variable in Model 7 is the percentage vote for the president's party at presidential and legislative elections under semi-presidentialism. The dependent variable in Model 8 is the percentage vote for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)

4.3.3 Presidential Power and Economic Accountability

We now turn to the effect of presidential power on economic accountability. We expect presidential power to clarify the responsibility for economic performance. To test this expectation, we go back to Hellwig and Samuels' basic model of economic accountability and the presence of one-party government. Using our dataset, we add a presidential power variable to the specification.[20] As discussed previously, we include two versions of the presidential power variable. Model 9 includes pp1 (the version where the threshold for what counts as a strong president is lower



Fig. 4.2 The conditional effect of cohabitation in semi-presidential regimes on economic accountability

and where some presidents in parliamentary regimes are classed as strong). Model 10 includes pp2 (the version where the threshold for what counts as a strong president is higher and where no presidents in parliamentary regimes are classed as strong). We report the results in Table 4.7 and Fig. 4.3. We see in Fig. 4.3 that presidential power does indeed clarify responsibility and increase economic accountability, though we need to distinguish between the results for the two measures of presidential power. We see from Model 9 that there is electoral accountability for economic performance when there is a strong pp1 president, but not when there is a weak pp1 president. This is exactly what we would expect.

Table 4.7 Presidential power and economic accountability

	Model 9 *pp1*	*Model 10* *pp2*
Previous vote	0.56***	0.56***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economy	0.53	0.53**
	(0.33)	(0.25)
Presidential power	−3.48**	−3.63*
	(1.71)	(1.84)
Economy × presidential power	0.32	0.43
	(0.37)	(0.29)
Incumbent	4.20*	4.31*
	(2.11)	(2.33)
One-party government	5.38***	5.39***
	(1.62)	(1.57)
Age of democracy	0.25**	0.27**
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00**	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	6.34*	5.37*
	(3.38)	(3.09)
R^2	0.48	0.48
F-statistic	60.76***	58.37***
N	274	274

The dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party at both presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes and for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in parliamentary republics. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses.* ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (two-tailed test)

By contrast, we see from Model 10 that there is economic accountability under both strong and weak pp2 presidents. That said, the coefficient is greater under strong pp2 presidents when compared to weak pp2 presidents. Moreover, the result is significant at the 1 per cent level ($p = 0.000$) for strong pp2 presidents compared to the 5 per cent level ($p = 0.041$) for weak pp2 presidents. Overall, we have good support for the idea that presidential power increases economic accountability all else equal, particularly when we operationalize pp1 as our indicator of presidential power.

We turn now to regime-level differences and presidential power. In their study, Hellwig and Samuels (ibid.: 79 [their Model 2a]) find no dif-



Fig. 4.3 The conditional effect of presidential power on economic accountability

ference between parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes in terms of economic accountability. We expect the same result, because, as we noted previously, semi-presidential regimes include a considerable number of countries with figurehead presidents that operate in a parliamentary-like way. Thus, when we pool all elections in parliamentary and semi-presidential countries and without distinguishing between presidential and legislative elections, we would expect the difference between the two regimes to wash out. However, when we add presidential power to the model specification, we would expect the result to change. While presidents in some parliamentary regimes are by no means inconsequential, indeed a number of parliamentary presidents are classed as strong in our pp1 measure of presidential power, the majority of strong pp1 presidents and all strong pp2 presidents are found in semi-presidential countries. For this reason, we expect the clarity of responsibility to increase when there is a strong president. Thus, conditional upon presidential power we expect to observe economic accountability within semi-presidentialism relative to parliamentarism.

We specify the full models in Table 4.8 and report the findings conditional upon presidential power in Fig. 4.4. We see that the results largely confirm our expectations. When we estimate the effect of regime types without including presidential power (Model 11), we find that there is no difference in electoral accountability for economic performance between parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, confirming our expectations and Hellwig and Samuels' result. However, when we include presidential power, regime-level differences appear. Using pp1, we find that under

Table 4.8 Presidential power, regime type, and economic accountability

	Model 11 pp1	*Model 12 pp1*	*Model 13 pp1*	*Model 14 pp2*
Previous vote	0.57***	0.56***	0.56***	0.44***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Economy	0.69***	0.36	0.60*	0.01
	(0.24)	(0.78)	(0.32)	(0.47)
Parliamentary regime	1.90	−0.40		
	(2.05)	(2.69)		
Economy × parliamentary regime	0.10	0.24		
	(0.37)	(0.81)		
Semi-presidential regime			0.40	
			(2.69)	
Economy × semi-presidential regime			−0.24	
			(0.81)	
Presidential power		−3.89	−3.89	−5.92**
		(2.46)	(2.46)	(2.67)
Economy × presidential power		0.37	1.00	0.99*
		(0.75)	(0.68)	(0.49)
Economy × parliamentary regime × presidential power		0.64		
		(0.81)		
Economy × semi-presidential regime × presidential power			−0.64	
			(0.81)	
Incumbent	4.10*	4.68**	4.68**	6.38**
	(2.33)	(2.25)	(2.25)	(2.41)
One-party government	5.21***	5.68***	5.68***	8.52***
	(1.58)	(1.64)	(1.64)	(1.94)
Age of democracy	0.24**	0.27**	0.27**	0.34**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	3.22	6.27	5.87*	8.82*
	(4.00)	(4.67)	(3.37)	(4.43)
R^2	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.42
F-statistic	68.31***	48.17***	48.17***	45.87***
N	274	274	274	161

Note: In Models 11, 12, and 13, the dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party at both presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes and for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in parliamentary republics. In Model 14, the dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party at both presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes only. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)



Fig. 4.4 The conditional effect of presidential power and regime type on economic accountability

semi-presidentialism, there is economic accountability with strong presidents, but not with weak presidents (Model 13). By contrast, under parliamentarism, we find evidence for economic accountability under both strong and weak presidents (Model 12). We should note, though, that there is greater economic accountability under strong pp1 presidents ($p = 0.011$) than under weak pp1 presidents ($p = 0.074$) in parliamentary regimes. Using pp2, we are unable to compare parliamentarism with semi-presidentialism in the same way, because of the absence of strong pp2

presidents in any parliamentary regimes. However, when we restrict the sample to semi-presidential regimes and estimate the effect of pp2 on economic voting, then we confirm the expectation that under semi-presidentialism, presidential power has a strong conditioning effect on the level of accountability for economic performance (Model 14). Overall, we have good support for our basic expectations about the effect of presidential power. There is some evidence of regime-level economic accountability, but only conditional upon presidential power. There is also very good evidence of within-regime economic accountability under semi-presidentialism conditional upon presidential power.

We now turn to the conditional effect of presidential power on electoral accountability for economic performance at presidential and legislative elections. Previously, we found strong evidence for economic voting at presidential elections relative to legislative elections (Model 5). Here, we would expect to find the same result, but we would also expect to find economic voting at presidential elections conditional upon presidential power. This is because, all else equal, when there is a weak president, presidential elections are unlikely to be a referendum on the incumbent president's economic policy performance. Voters will be aware that the president is not responsible for policy-making and, therefore, will not hold the president accountable in this regard. By contrast, when the president is strong, voters are likely to hold the president and the president's party personally accountable for economic performance at the presidential election. Table 4.9 and Fig. 4.5 confirm these expectations. Figure 4.5 shows that with pp1 presidents, there is economic accountability only at presidential elections relative to legislative elections (Models 15 and 16). This is consistent with the finding reported in Model 5. However, Fig. 4.5 also shows that with pp1 presidents, there is economic accountability at presidential elections only when there is a strong president relative to a weak president (Model 15). Models 17 and 18 return largely the same result with pp2 presidents. There is economic accountability at presidential elections only when there is a strong pp2 president relative to a weak president. That said, there is also some evidence for economic voting at legislative elections with a strong pp2 president, albeit only at the 10 per cent level ($p = 0.079$). Overall, we find good evidence that direct presidential elections make a difference to economic accountability conditional upon presidential power.

Table 4.9 Presidential power, type of election, and economic accountability

	Model 15 Presidential elections pp1	*Model 16 Legislative elections pp1*	*Model 17 Presidential elections pp2*	*Model 18 Legislative elections pp2*
Previous vote	0.60***	0.60***	0.61***	0.61***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Economy	0.65**	0.67**	0.80***	0.79***
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Presidential election	−5.73	−6.27**	−6.46	−6.95*
	(4.30)	(2.91)	(4.00)	(3.97)
Legislative election	3.58*	4.28*	3.36	3.68*
	(1.86)	(2.46)	(2.09)	(2.07)
Economy × presidential election	0.01	−0.14	−0.33	−0.31
	(1.10)	(0.57)	(0.76)	(0.74)
Economy × Legislative election	−1.05**	−0.99	−0.89**	−0.89**
	(0.42)	(0.72)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Presidential power	−3.88**	−3.01*	−3.96	−1.19
	(1.58)	(1.75)	(2.95)	(3.43)
Economy × presidential power	0.74*	0.62	0.57	0.88
	(0.43)	(0.55)	(0.37)	(0.71)
Presidential election × presidential power	−0.38		1.92	
	(4.01)		(4.27)	
Legislative election × presidential power		−1.93		−3.33
		(3.34)		(4.37)
Economy × presidential election × presidential power	−0.31		0.30	
	(1.15)		(0.82)	
Economy × legislative election × presidential power		0.04		−0.32
		(0.87)		(0.81)
Incumbent	9.75***	9.46***	9.52***	9.46***
	(3.07)	(2.99)	(2.97)	(2.93)
One-party government	4.99***	5.00***	4.99***	4.94***
	(1.75)	(1.72)	(1.69)	(1.70)
Age of democracy	0.24**	0.24**	0.24**	0.25**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	4.88	4.79	3.76	3.66
	(3.57)	(3.49)	(3.44)	(3.41)
R^2	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51
F-statistic	46.24***	54.20***	45.91***	44.47***

(*continued*)

Table 4.9 (continued)

	Model 15 Presidential elections pp1	*Model 16 Legislative elections pp1*	*Model 17 Presidential elections pp2*	*Model 18 Legislative elections pp2*
N	274	274	274	274

Note: The dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party at both presidential and legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes and for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in parliamentary republics. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)



Fig. 4.5 The conditional effect of presidential power and type of election on economic accountability

Finally, we consider the conditional effect of presidential power on electoral accountability for economic performance during periods of cohabitation in semi-presidential countries. We have already shown that there is economic accountability for the president's party during periods of unified government relative to cohabitation when we pooled all semi-presidential elections (Model 6). We confirmed this result by showing that there was economic accountability for the president's party at presidential elections during unified government relative to cohabitation (Model 7). We expect presidential power to condition both of these results. We expect to return the same basic results. However, we expect presidential power to sharpen the clarity of responsibility in each case. Thus, we expect to find economic accountability for strong presidents relative to weak presidents during periods of unified government when we pool all semi-presidential elections. We also expect to find economic accountability for strong presidents relative to weak presidents during periods of unified government when we focus solely on presidential elections. Previously, we also found that there was economic accountability for the prime minister's party at legislative elections during periods of cohabitation relative to unified government (Model 8). This result further confirmed the idea that accountability for economic performance shifted from the president to the prime minister during periods of cohabitation. We would expect presidential power to condition this result too. When presidents are strong, the shift in policy-making responsibility from the president to the prime minister should also be felt more strongly. Thus, we expect the economic accountability of the prime minister to be greater under cohabitation when there is a strong president relative to when there is a weak president. We report the findings for pp1 presidents in Table 4.10 and Fig. 4.6, and for pp2 presidents in Table 4.11 and Fig. 4.7.

We find strong evidence for the first two expectations when we consider the effect of pp1 presidents. When we pool all elections under semi-presidentialism, there is only economic accountability for the president's party under unified government and then only under strong presidents relative to weak presidents under unified government. We find exactly the same result when we limit the sample to the president's party at presidential elections. However, when we look at the prime minister's party at legislative elections, the situation is slightly different. Again, we find that there is

Table 4.10 Presidential power (pp1), cohabitation, and electoral accountability at different types of elections in semi-presidential regimes

	President's party at all elections		*President's party at presidential elections*		*PM's party at legislative elections*	
	Model 19	*Model 20*	*Model 21*	*Model 22*	*Model 23*	*Model 24*
	Cohabitation	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*
Previous vote	0.48***	0.48***	0.22	0.20	0.70***	0.68***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Economy	0.75***	0.37	1.01***	0.61	0.40	1.57**
	(0.17)	(1.07)	(0.31)	(0.96)	(0.24)	(0.57)
Cohabitation	2.92		−7.19		−6.53*	
	(6.46)		(5.70)		(3.17)	
Economy × cohabitation	−0.75		−0.48		2.32*	
	(1.85)		(1.38)		(1.11)	
Unified government		0.04		12.07		2.36
		(3.97)		(7.48)		(3.54)
Economy × unified government		−0.17		−0.77		−0.97
		(1.15)		(1.29)		(0.93)
Presidential power (pp1)	−5.15**	1.48	−8.18**	5.94	−2.37	−5.49
	(2.04)	(2.57)	(3.77)	(5.25)	(1.52)	(3.30)
Presidential power pp1 × cohabitation	4.27		13.28		1.97	
	(7.70)		(7.99)		(4.45)	
Presidential power pp1 × unified government		−8.73**		19.23*		3.70
		(3.55)		(9.25)		(4.51)

(*continued*)

	President's party at all elections		*President's party at presidential elections*		*PM's party at legislative elections*	
	Model 19	*Model 20*	*Model 21*	*Model 22*	*Model 23*	*Model 24*
	Cohabitation	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*
Economy × presidential power pp1 × cohabitation	0.89		0.35		−1.53	
	(2.03)		(2.00)		(1.36)	
Economy × presidential power pp1 × unified government		0.61		1.26		−0.22
		(0.51)		(1.01)		(0.72)
Incumbent	5.74**	5.98**	9.37**	9.63**		
	(2.46)	(2.51)	(4.02)	(3.68)		
One-party government	8.03***	7.88***	10.38**	10.99***	3.60	4.15
	(2.36)	(2.17)	(3.77)	(3.46)	(2.69)	(2.60)
Age of democracy	0.33**	0.32**	0.12	0.12	0.38***	0.38***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00**	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	5.85	7.89	18.34*	11.98	−2.39	−4.63
	(5.15)	(6.53)	(9.45)	(8.46)	(3.67)	(4.32)
R^2	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.45	0.57	0.57
F-statistic	34.83***	38.77***	34.59***	23.36***	73.83***	57.60***
N	161	161	58	58	128	128

Note: The dependent variable in Models 19 and 20 is the percentage vote for the president's party at presidential and legislative elections under semi-presidentialism. The dependent variable in Models 21 and 22 is the percentage vote for the president's party at presidential and legislative elections under semi-presidentialism. The dependent variable in Models 23 and 24 is the percentage vote for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)



Fig. 4.6 The conditional effect of pp1 presidential power and cohabitation in semi-presidential regimes on economic accountability

accountability only during periods of cohabitation relative to unified government. This time, though, we do not find that presidential power sharpens the clarity of economic accountability. There is greater economic voting when there is a weak president relative to a strong president. We return the equivalent set of results when we estimate the effect of pp2 presidents. Again, at all elections under semi-presidentialism, there is only

Table 4.11 Presidential power (pp2), cohabitation, and electoral accountability at different types of elections in semi-presidential regimes

	President's party at all elections		*President's party at presidential elections*		*PM's party at legislative elections*	
	Model 25	*Model 26*	*Model 27*	*Model 28*	*Model 29*	*Model 30*
	Cohabitation	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*
Previous vote	0.48***	0.47***	0.24	0.21	0.69***	0.69***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Economy	0.74***	0.36	1.07***	0.67	0.37	1.59**
	(0.16)	(1.06)	(0.31)	(1.05)	(0.24)	(0.64)
Cohabitation	6.17		−0.83		−4.38**	
	(5.26)		(6.78)		(1.74)	
Economy × cohabitation	−0.79		−0.66		1.14	
	(1.47)		(1.55)		(0.86)	
Unified government		−2.74		6.02		6.08**
		(4.22)		(6.41)		(2.33)
Economy × unified government		−0.21		−0.51		−1.67**
		(1.10)		(1.31)		(0.74)
Presidential power (pp2)	−2.61	0.63	−2.37	4.84	−1.49	−1.19
	(2.28)	(2.82)	(3.70)	(4.71)	(1.80)	(3.50)
Presidential power pp2 × cohabitation	−2.06		3.79		0.07	
	(6.42)		(8.76)		(3.97)	
Presidential power pp2 × unified government		−4.91		−11.89		−3.34
		(3.87)		(7.55)		(3.43)

(*continued*)

Table 4.11 (continued)

	President's party at all elections		*President's party at presidential elections*		*PM's party at legislative elections*	
	Model 25	*Model 26*	*Model 27*	*Model 28*	*Model 29*	*Model 30*
	Cohabitation	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*	*Cohabitation*	*Unified*
Economy × presidential power pp2 × cohabitation	1.55 (1.75)		1.24 (2.11)		0.10 (1.33)	
Economy × presidential power pp2 × unified government		0.81** (0.29)		1.12 (0.83)		0.88** (0.34)
Incumbent	5.62** (2.46)	6.09** (2.50)	8.84** (3.68)	8.97** (3.48)		
One-party government	7.62*** (2.06)	8.02*** (2.07)	9.05** (3.64)	9.69** (3.56)	3.72 (2.39)	4.06* (2.17)
Age of democracy	0.33** (0.16)	0.33** (0.15)	0.09 (0.26)	0.08 (0.23)	0.39*** (0.13)	0.42*** (0.13)
Age of democracy^2	−0.00* (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00*** (0.00)
Constant	3.57 (4.81)	8.90 (6.37)	13.44 (8.88)	13.29 (7.98)	−3.08 (3.06)	−8.10** (3.44)
R^2	0.44	0.44	0.41	0.42	0.55	0.57
F-statistic	36.64***	52.70***	38.65***	18.76***	36.87***	109.32***
N	161	161	58	58	128	128

Note: The dependent variable in Models 25 and 26 is the percentage vote for the president's party at presidential and legislative elections under semi-presidentialism. The dependent variable in Models 27 and 28 is the percentage vote for the president's party at presidential and legislative elections under semi-presidentialism. The dependent variable in Models 29 and 30 is the percentage vote for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in semi-presidential regimes. Cells report OLS parameter estimates with country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test)



Fig. 4.7 The conditional effect of pp2 presidential power and cohabitation in semi-presidential regimes on economic accountability

economic accountability for the president's party under unified government and then only under strong presidents relative to weak presidents. The same result applies when we consider only the president's party at presidential elections. This is what we expected. By contrast, when we use

the sample of prime ministerial parties at legislative elections, we find that strong presidents sharpen the clarity of responsibility during periods of unified government relative to cohabitation and that there is also greater economic accountability under weak presidents relative to strong presidents during cohabitation.

To summarize, we find good support for almost all our expectations. There is strong evidence that regime-type differences condition economic voting at presidential elections relative to legislative elections under parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. There is also strong evidence that cohabitation conditions economic voting during periods of cohabitation relative to unified government under semi-presidentialism. In addition, there is support for the general idea that presidential power conditions economic accountability. There is also strong support for the idea that presidential power further conditions the effect of regime-type differences under parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism with greater economic voting under strong presidents at presidential elections relative to weak presidents. There is also some evidence that presidential power conditions the effect of cohabitation with greater economic voting for strong presidents relative to weak at all elections under semi-presidentialism and at presidential elections. We should also add that in almost all models, the principal control variables return significant results and in the expected direction. The only results that run resolutely counter to expectations concern how presidential power conditions economic voting for the prime minister's party at legislative elections during periods of cohabitation relative to unified government under semi-presidentialism. This issue needs further investigation.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have been concerned with how the clarity of institutional responsibility conditions the electoral accountability for economic performance. We have shown that differential features of regime types have consequential effects on economic accountability. We have also shown that presidential power further affects the attribution of economic accountability. How should we interpret these results in the context of the pragmatic institutionalist account that we are presenting in this book?

The essence of our institutionalist account is that institutions have causal properties that can shape human behaviour. We have already demonstrated that institutions affect behaviour under laboratory conditions.

We have now found strong evidence that in the real world, voters attribute responsibility for economic performance conditional upon institutional features. We can interpret these results as the manifestation of the direct effect of particular institutional properties on human behaviour. In Chap. 2, though, we were keen to emphasize that institutions are likely to exhibit more than one potentially causal property at any one time. There are likely to be various properties contained within any given parchment institution. These properties may combine, rendering their overall effect greater than any individual effect. We can interpret our results in this way when we look at economic accountability at presidential elections. We showed that regime-type differences condition economic voting. There is greater economic voting at presidential elections relative to legislative elections. However, we then went on to show that economic accountability at presidential elections was itself conditional upon presidential power. There was greater economic voting at presidential elections where there was a strong president relative to a weak president. In other words, we showed that institutional effects can combine to increase the likelihood of certain leadership outcomes.

Overall, this chapter has shown that we can identify the effects of institutions on leadership outcomes in the real world. We have found evidence of direct institutional effects. We have also found evidence that institutional effects often interact, sometimes combining to reinforce individual effects. In other words, leadership outcomes are at least partly the result of a complex institutional context. We can make some sense of this complexity. Indeed, institutions help us to do so. All the same, we have to think carefully about the effect of such institutional complexity. In the next chapter, we take our analysis one stage further, moving beyond the analysis of average institutional effects and focusing on the specific institutional conditions under which certain leadership outcomes emerge.

Notes

1. The list of semi-presidential countries is available at: http://www.semi-presidentialism.com/?p=1053. The list of parliamentary countries is available at: http://www.semipresidentialism.com/?p=195. Both accessed 19 January 2016.
2. Given data availability, the final list of parliamentary countries included in the estimations with the date of the first election in brackets comprises Albania (2001–), the Czech Republic (1996–2010), Dominica (1980–),

Estonia (1995–), France (1946–1962), Germany (1949–), Greece (1974–), Hungary (1990–), India (1957–), Israel (1949–), Italy (1946–), Latvia (1993–), Malta (1976–), Mauritius (1995–), Moldova (2001–2005), Slovakia (1994–1998), Trinidad and Tobago (1976–), Turkey (2002–2007), and Vanuatu (1987–). The list of semi-presidential countries included in the data set with the date of the first election in brackets comprises Austria (1949–), Bulgaria (1992–), Cabo Verde (1991–), Croatia (2000–), the Czech Republic (2013–), Finland (1948–), France (1965–), Iceland (1946–), Ireland (1948–), Lithuania (1992–), Macedonia (1994–), Moldova (1998), Mongolia (1993–), Peru (1980–1990, 2001–), Poland (1991–), Portugal (1976–), Romania (1996–), Senegal (2007), Serbia (2007–), Slovakia (1999–), Slovenia (1992–), Sri Lanka (2001–2005), Taiwan (1996–), and Ukraine (1994–2010).

3. See www.parlgov.org and http://www.worldstatesmen.org
4. If the incumbent president at election t was not a candidate at election t-1, we record the score for the candidate of the incumbent president's party.
5. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_by_country
6. We identify exactly 500 legislative and presidential elections in the democracies under consideration. However, we have only 368 observations for the incumbent's electoral score at both the t and t-1 elections. This is because for some UDS democracies, such as the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Nauru, there are no election data. In other countries where data are available, we omit some observations because we cannot stand over the reliability of the comparison of the party results for elections t and t-1.
7. Specifically, we take the prespow1 scores here. They are available at http://presidential-power.com/?page_id=2154
8. Here, we take the prespow2 scores from http://presidential-power.com/?page_id=2154
9. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed 22 January 2016).
10. The UDS dataset starts in 1946. We consider democracy in Finland to begin in 1919, Iceland in 1918, Ireland in 1921, and Slovakia in 1990.
11. Periods of cohabitation are taken from www.semipresidentialism.com/?p=3099 (accessed 22 January 2016).
12. We wish to acknowledge that Timothy Hellwig and David Samuels kindly shared their original dataset with us and had already reported various model specifications in the Appendices to their 2007 article. This made it possible to replicate their original results and apply the same methods to the dataset that we constructed. Needless to say, any errors or amendments are completely our own responsibility.
13. There are 165 elections common to both our dataset and Hellwig and Samuels' dataset. However, when all data availability is taken into consideration, then only 124 are common to both. When the dependent variable is the percentage vote for the president's party for all elections in semi-

presidential regimes and for the prime minister's party for elections in parliamentary regimes, then 109 of 274 observations in our data set also have recorded values in the Hellwig and Samuels' dataset. When there are values in common for this variable at t and t-1 elections, then the correlation between the recorded values is 77 per cent and 85.9 per cent, respectively. Similar figures apply when other dependent variables are used. In short, even though both datasets are recording the same data, the overlap between the recorded values is relatively small. Thus, when we find the same results as Hellwig and Samuels, we can be confident that we are returning a valid result.

14. If we follow this method and re-estimate Model 4, then we find that the result for high-clarity elections is 0.88***(0.22) $p = 0.000$, while the result for low-clarity elections is 0.53*(0.31) $p = 0.098$. Overall, whichever method we use, we can be confident that there is much stronger economic accountability at high-clarity elections relative to low-clarity elections.
15. If we omit the control for one-party government, the results are substantively the same—presidential elections (1.08***(0.28), $p = 0.000$) relative to legislative elections (0.25(0.23), $p = 0.273$).
16. We note also that they include certain observations that we exclude, such as the equivalent of the Austrian example that we provided previously.
17. Note that if we restrict the sample to prime ministers and the support for the prime minister's party at legislative elections solely in parliamentary republics, then there is strong support for economic voting (coefficient on the economy variable = 0.75***(0.24), $p = 0.007$, $n = 114$), even controlling for one-party government (full model not reported). In other words, we are not claiming that there is not economic accountability for the prime minister's party at legislative elections in parliamentary republics. Instead, we are showing that the level of accountability is significantly greater at presidential elections relative to legislative elections. We posit that the causal mechanism generating this result is the great clarity of institutional responsibility at presidential elections relative to legislative elections.
18. Hellwig and Samuels recorded more periods of cohabitation than we do. Specifically, they seem to record periods of cohabitation during presidencies that we would class as non-partisan, including elections in Lithuania, Macedonia, Portugal from 1979 to 1983, and Slovenia in 1996 and 2000.
19. If, similar to Hellwig and Samuels, we include parliamentary republics in the sample, then we return the same substantive result. There is economic accountability for the president's party when there is unified government (0.75***(0.16), $p = 0.000$), but not when there is cohabitation (0.48(1.09), $p = 0.663$). However, we prefer to report the results for the sample of semi-presidential countries only, because this is the context in which cohabitation occurs.
20. The correlation between the indicator variable for one-party government and the pp1 and pp2 variables is 0.07 and 0.02, respectively.

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CHAPTER 5

Presidential Power and President/Cabinet Conflict

In this chapter, we start to move away from the identification of average institutional effects and consider contingent effects. So far, we have identified the causal effect of leadership institutions on outcomes in closed systems as well as the average effect of leadership institutions in open systems. In this chapter, we think about how local conditions shape general institutional effects? What are the specific conditions under which leadership institutions generate certain outcomes? Focusing on the level of conflict between the president and the cabinet in 21 European countries since 1995, we ask two questions. First, what explains variation in president/cabinet conflict? To help answer this question, we adopt a probabilistic statistical method. Second, under what conditions has president/cabinet conflict occurred? This is a question that cannot be answered using probabilistic methods. Therefore, we turn to the use of set-theoretic methods, specifically crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). Using these methods, we show that presidential power is a significant predictor of president/cabinet conflict, and we identify the specific conditions under which presidential power has an impact on such conflict.

5.1 What Explains President/Cabinet Conflict?

What explains president/cabinet conflict? This is an important issue. We have a strong intuition that conflict within the executive should be avoided. Some might believe that we need strong, single-person leadership that is exercised by either a president or a prime minister. Such leadership, they

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would believe, provides coherence to systems in which there are multiple interests, demands, and concerns. By contrast, others might prefer a collegial style of executive leadership in which decisions are the result of a more consensual decision-making process. Such leadership, they would argue, helps to reconcile the conflicting interests, demands, and concerns in any society. Whichever normative position is preferred, both sets of people are likely to claim that conflict within the executive is problematic. It can slow down and perhaps even halt the governmental decision-making process, weakening a strong leader and perhaps causing policy paralysis; it can also damage the collegial foundations on which government is based, leading political parties and the public to lose faith in the governing process, and perhaps even the regime itself. For these reasons, we should be interested in the issue of conflict within the executive.

There are plenty of books about strong leaders (Brown 2014) and some work on collegial leadership (Baylis 1989). Surprisingly, though, very little work has tried to identify the conditions under which president/cabinet conflict is likely to occur. Typically, this work has focused on such conflict only in semi-presidential regimes. For example, in one study Protsyk (2006) focuses on the distinction between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential forms of semi-presidentialism as a predictor of president/cabinet conflict. Using secondary sources to identify periods of low and high conflict, he compares three president-parliamentary countries (Armenia, Russia, and Ukraine) with five premier-presidential countries (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania) from 1991 to 2002. He finds that conflict is much higher in the latter. In a second study, he focuses solely on the five premier-presidential countries (Protsyk 2006). Here, he finds that conflict increases when presidents had a different political orientation to the cabinet, and when the cabinet enjoyed only minority support in the legislature. He argues that fragmented legislatures reduce the cost of potentially conflictual presidential intervention (ibid.: 153). By contrast, he also finds that the level of conflict was low when there was a technocratic government in office (ibid.). Thomas Sedelius and Olga Mashtaler (2013) have conducted a similar study. Using secondary sources as well as an expert survey, they identify the level of intra-executive conflict in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine from 1991 to 2011. They too find that the level of conflict is somewhat greater in the six premier-presidential regimes (Bulgaria, Croatia after 2000, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania) relative to the president-parliamentary regimes. They also find that in the former the

level of conflict increased during periods of cohabitation when the president is opposed to the cabinet. They found little support for the intuition that the level of conflict declined over the period as democracy in at least most of the countries under consideration became more consolidated.

We add to these studies by focusing on an issue that they do not directly consider, namely presidential power. In the previous chapter, we saw that the parchment power of presidents varies from one country to another. We also showed that presidential power helps to electoral accountability for economic performance. In this chapter, we wish to examine the effect of presidential power on president/cabinet conflict. We assume that when presidents exercise their powers, they often do so against the government or the legislature that supports the government. Accordingly, we expect there to be a greater likelihood of president/cabinet conflict in countries where the president has more parchment powers. This is the basic institutional expectation that we wish to test.

5.1.1 Cases and Variables

To examine the effect of presidential power on president/cabinet conflict, we conduct a comparative study that includes both semi-presidential countries and parliamentary republics.[1] Our cases include all such countries in Europe that had experienced at least five continuous years of democracy since 2008 inclusive. As in the previous chapter, we rely on the UDS dataset (Pemstein et al. 2010) to identify democracies. We consider a country to be democratic when the 95 per cent higher posterior density regions around the mean UDS score are both greater than 0 in any given year.[2] Our unit of observation is a cabinet. We take the list of cabinets for each European democracy from the ParlGov dataset.[3] We exclude cabinets classed by ParlGov as caretaker cabinets. We also exclude all other governments that remained in office for fewer than three months. We include an additional unit of observation (or cabinet unit) if a presidential election returns a new president during a regular cabinet period.[4] We consider the period from 1995 to 2015. We include cabinets prior to this time only if they were formed in late 1994. We exclude them if they had not been in office for at least 18 months prior to 1 August 2015. In total, we have a sample of 235 cabinet units in 21 countries.[5] The number of cabinet units ranges from a low of 7 in Bulgaria to a high of 22 in Latvia. There are 97 cabinet units in 9 parliamentary republics, including the Czech Republic prior to 2013 and Slovakia prior to 1999. There are 138 cabinet units in

14 semi-presidential countries including the Czech Republic and Slovakia following the introduction of the direct election of the president there. All the semi-presidential countries are premier-presidential.

We are concerned with the level of president/cabinet conflict in each of these 235 cabinet units (henceforth cabinets). To identify the level of conflict, we followed the example of Sedelius and Ekman (2010) and Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013) and conducted an expert survey.[6] We contacted academics whom we considered to be experts in executive politics in the particular countries in the study. We asked them to evaluate the level of conflict between the president and the cabinet for each of the cabinet units we identified in their country of expertise. For each cabinet, they were asked to evaluate the level of conflict on a four-point ordinal scale: a High level was indicated as the situation where there was persistent and severe conflict between the president and the cabinet; a Low level was expressed as the situation where there was no significant conflict between the president and the cabinet; and two intermediate levels—a Low-Medium level and a Medium-High level—where the level of conflict was unspecified. The aim was to generate a response about the general level of conflict for the particular cabinet unit, rather than to focus on individual events. The survey was also worded so that the respondents could not simply default to an intermediate or Medium level of conflict. A total of 131 academics were contacted and 105 evaluations were received (80.2 per cent). Four evaluations were not included in the survey because they lacked prima facie reliability, including occasions when the academics themselves expressed severe doubts about the reliability of their own codings. The number of evaluations finally recorded per country ranged from 1 for Malta to 9 for France.

For each expert evaluation, we recorded a value of 1 for a cabinet where an expert identified a High level of conflict, a value of 0 where a Low level was identified, and values of 0.67 and 0.33 where an expert identified a Medium-High and a Low-Medium level, respectively. We then arrived at an overall conflict score for each cabinet by averaging the expert values. For example, in Poland the Buzek II government was in office from 7 June 2000 to 18 October 2001. Seven experts returned judgements about the level of president/cabinet conflict for this government. Two returned a Low-Medium level of conflict (0.33); four a Medium-High level (0.67); and one a High level (1). Accordingly, the average level of president/cabinet conflict for this cabinet was 0.62 $(((2 \times 0.33) + (4 \times 0.67) + 1))/7)$. For each cabinet, we then transformed this average score into a four-point

ordinal scale with a value of 1 (Low) where the average ranged from 0 to <0.25; 2 where the average ranged from >0.25 to <0.5 (Low-Medium); 3 where the average ranged from >0.5 to <0.75 (Medium-High); and 4 where the average ranged was >0.75 (High). In the 17 cases where the average score was either exactly 0.25, 0.5, or 0.75, we consulted secondary sources to decide whether the overall score should be given the higher or lower value.[7] With an average score of 0.62, the Buzek II government recorded a value of 3 (Medium-High). Table 5.1 provides descriptive

Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for the level of president/cabinet conflict using a four-point ordinal scale

	Number of cabinet units	*Number of expert evaluations included*	*Outcome Low conflict (1)*	*Outcome Low-Medium conflict (2)*	*Outcome Medium-High conflict (3)*	*Outcome High conflict (4)*
Austria	10	3/4	6	2	1	1
Bulgaria	7	5/6	3	2	2	0
Croatia	10	4	4	6	0	0
Czech R	12	5	1	4	5	2
Estonia	14	4/5	10	4	0	0
Finland	10	4	5	4	1	0
France	10	9	7	2	0	1
Germany	10	6	9	1	0	0
Greece	9	2	9	0	0	0
Hungary	11	5	5	4	2	0
Iceland	9	4	3	4	0	2
Ireland	8	6	8	0	0	0
Italy	12	6	9	0	3	0
Latvia	22	4	20	2	0	0
Lithuania	15	4	8	4	2	1
Malta	8	1	8	0	0	0
Poland	13	7	7	2	2	2
Portugal	9	4/5	5	2	0	2
Romania	15	7	7	1	2	5
Slovakia	8	5	3	2	2	1
Slovenia	13	2	9	1	1	2
Total	235	101	146	47	23	19

Notes:
Austria—Eight cabinets were evaluated by three experts, the rest by all four
Bulgaria—Two cabinets were evaluated by five experts, the rest by all six
Estonia—Four cabinets were evaluated by four experts, the rest by all five
Portugal—Two cabinets were evaluated by four experts, the rest by all five

statistics regarding the level of president/cabinet conflict for each country on this four-point ordinal scale.

As the Buzek II example shows, experts can vary considerably in their judgements as to the level of conflict for a given cabinet. This aspect was not considered in the expert surveys by Sedelius and Ekman (2010) and Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013). In fact, our survey showed that where a cabinet was evaluated by more than one coder (i.e. all but Malta), experts returned a unanimous judgement in only 51 of 228 cabinet units (22.4 per cent). This relatively low level of unanimity is not entirely surprising. We were asking experts to make judgements about cabinets that were in office up to 20 years ago. We also decided not to give experts a very explicit steer as to what should be counted as a certain level of conflict. This provided plenty of room for different interpretations about what was implied by a Low-Medium or a Medium-High level of conflict. What is more, there was almost certainly some cross-country variation in what was considered to be a certain level of conflict. For example, a Low-Medium level of president/cabinet conflict in France might be considered a High level of conflict in Latvia.

We wish to take account of the variation in expert judgements of individual cabinets. Accordingly, we report figures for Inter-Coder Reliability (ICR) in Table 5.2. There is no consensus in the social sciences as to which measure of ICR should be employed. Here, we report figures for the Average Pairwise Percent Agreement (APPA) and for Krippendorff's Alpha.[8] The basic difference between the two measures is that the latter accounts for chance disagreement, whereas the former does not. There is also no consensus as to how any individual measure should be evaluated. For APPA, we assume that any value below 0.75 indicates a poor level of agreement. For Krippendorff's Alpha, Landis and Koch (1977) suggest that a value from 0.0 to 0.2 indicates slight agreement; 0.21 to 0.40 fair agreement; 0.41 to 0.60 moderate agreement; 0.61 to 0.80 substantial agreement; and 0.81 to 1.0 almost perfect or perfect agreement. We wish to consider countries with at least a moderate level of ICR.

The first two columns of Table 5.2 show that the ICR levels are relatively poor for several countries. This is particularly true for the APPA values, even though the Krippendorff's Alpha values are a little more encouraging for some of these cases. The results imply, though, that we should be wary of the reliability of some of the expert evaluations of president/cabinet conflict using the four-point ordinal scale. For that reason, we created a second measure of the dependent variable, which is binary.

Table 5.2 Inter-coder reliability scores for expert judgements of president/cabinet conflict

	APPA 4-point ordinal values	*Krippendorff's alpha 4-point ordinal values*	*APPA Binary values*	*Krippendorff's alpha Binary values*
Austria 1	0.46	0.52	0.75	0.46
Austria 2	1.00	–	1.00	–
Bulgaria 1	0.40	0.44	0.57	0.18
Bulgaria 2	0.25	−0.13	0.50	−0.07
Bulgaria 3	0.53	0.52	0.89	0.78
Croatia	0.25	−0.31	0.73	−0.02
Czech R	0.40	0.35	0.57	0.11
Estonia 1	0.25	−0.16	0.58	−0.04
Estonia 2	0.65	0.14	0.92	−0.02
Finland	0.43	0.25	0.77	0.11
France	0.54	0.42	0.86	0.51
Germany	0.62	0.16	0.90	−0.035
Greece	1.00	–	1.00	–
Hungary	0.49	0.37	0.75	0.27
Iceland	0.39	0.40	0.75	0.39
Ireland	0.80	0.17	0.95	0
Italy	0.67	0.69	0.90	0.69
Latvia	0.64	0.16	0.97	0.33
Lithuania	0.42	0.31	0.74	0.33
Malta	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Poland	0.70	0.84	0.86	0.66
Portugal 1	0.87	0	1.00	–
Portugal 2	0.80	0.92	1.00	–
Portugal 3	0.70	0.88	1.00	–
Romania	0.65	0.83	0.91	0.82
Slovakia	0.62	0.59	0.70	0.36
Slovenia	0.08	0.22	0.85	0.58

Notes:
Austria 1 refers to the cabinets with three expert evaluations; Austria 2 refers to the cabinets with four expert evaluations (see Table 5.1). The equivalent applies to Bulgaria, Estonia, and Portugal.

Here, we record cabinets with expert evaluations as both Low and Low-Medium simply as 0 (Low) and those with evaluations as both Medium-High and High as 1 (High). We then average the expert scores and record a value of 0 (Low) if it is in the range 0–0.49, and a value of 1 if it was greater than 0.5 (High). For the very small number of cases where the

average score was exactly 0.5, we make a subjective judgement based on the particularities of the case. When we adopt this strategy, we find that the APPA values are generally much higher, even if the Krippendorff's Alpha values are typically less high in this regard partly because of the way in which they are calculated. (The final two columns of Table 5.2 record the ICR values for the binary-dependent variable.) This provides some evidence that the binary measure of the dependent variable may be capturing the general level of president/cabinet conflict more reliably than the four-point scale.

We wish to maximize confidence in our results. The ICR values suggest that to do so we should estimate not only a model based on a four-point ordinal-dependent variable, but also a model with a binary-dependent variable. Even then, some countries return low values for both the APPA and Krippendorff's Alpha ICR measures whether the dependent variable is a four-point scale or a binary indicator. This is notably the case for some Bulgaria and Estonia cabinets, as well as for all the Croatia, Czech Republic, and Lithuania cabinets. None of these cases reaches an APPA value of 0.75 or a Krippendorff's Alpha value of more than 0.40. So, to further increase confidence in the results, we construct another sample that excludes these cabinets.

To sum up, we estimate three models. Two models have the same sample but different forms of the dependent variable: one has a four-point ordinal-dependent variable and another has a binary-dependent variable. The third model has a smaller sample and a binary-dependent variable. Table 5.3 provides descriptive statistics regarding the level of president/cabinet conflict for both samples that employ a binary-dependent variable.

The main explanatory variable of interest is presidential power. As noted in the previous chapter, there are many measures of presidential power, and results can be sensitive to the particular measure that is used (Doyle and Elgie 2016). We apply a measure that attempts to provide a more reliable estimate of presidential power by combining the country-specific knowledge available in existing measures and adjusting them for idiosyncratic scores (ibid.). This method generates a presidential power score for individual countries for any given year within a range 0–1 with lower scores signifying weaker presidents. The scores for most countries are stationary across the period under consideration here, though the scores for the Finnish, Polish, and Slovakian presidents do change as a function of constitutional amendments during this time.[9] In this chapter,

Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics for the level of president/cabinet conflict using a binary-dependent variable

	Full sample			*Smaller sample*		
	Number of cabinet units	*Outcome Low conflict*	*Outcome High conflict*	*Number of cabinet units*	*Outcome Low conflict*	*Outcome High conflict*
Austria	10	7	3	10	7	3
Bulgaria	7	5	2	5	3	2
Croatia	10	10	0			
Czech R	12	3	9			
Estonia	14	14	0	10	10	0
Finland	10	9	1	10	9	1
France	10	9	1	10	9	1
Germany	10	10	0	10	10	0
Greece	9	9	0	9	9	0
Hungary	11	9	2	11	9	2
Iceland	9	7	2	9	7	2
Ireland	8	8	0	8	8	0
Italy	12	9	3	12	9	3
Latvia	22	22	0	22	22	0
Lithuania	15	12	3			
Malta	8	8	0	8	8	0
Poland	13	9	4	13	9	4
Portugal	9	7	2	9	7	2
Romania	15	8	7	15	8	7
Slovakia	8	5	3	8	5	3
Slovenia	13	11	2	13	11	2
Total	235	191	44	192	160	32

we do not make any adjustments to the presidential power scores. As noted previously, we expect presidential power to be positively correlated with the level of president/cabinet conflict.

We wish to include a range of institutional, broader political, as well as economic and social control variables. To decide which to include, we refer back to the studies of president/cabinet conflict that we identified previously (Protsyk 2005, 2006; Sedelius and Ekman 2010; Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013), as well as to studies that have examined president/cabinet relations more broadly (Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009, 2010; and Tavits 2009). These latter studies have all tried to explain

the percentage of non-partisan ministers in the government and/or cabinet coalescence. Typically, the non-partisan ministers' variable is taken as a proxy for the degree of presidential power or activism, where the greater the percentage of non-partisan ministers, the greater the presidential power. In addition, some studies have tried to explain variation in the degree of cabinet coalescence, which is a measure of the extent to which the partisan composition of the cabinet reflects the partisan composition of the legislature. Powerful presidents are likely to be associated with lower degrees of cabinet coalescence as they can have an independent effect of government formation. Even though these studies do not address the issue of president/cabinet conflict directly, they are concerned with presidential power in the cabinet context. For this reason, we can reasonably examine these studies to see which control variables we might wish to include in the study here.

We identify eight additional variables that have been included in at least one of these studies. The first concerns the presence of cohabitation. As we explained in the previous chapter, this is where the president has a partisan affiliation and where the president's party is not included in the government. This situation was typified in France from 1986 to 1988, 1993 to 1995, and 1997 to 2002. These periods coincided with a high level of president/cabinet conflict. We would expect such an outcome more generally. Thus, we include a dummy variable coded 1 for cohabitation. We identify periods of cohabitation from the party affiliations of presidents and the partisan composition of cabinets at the ParlGov dataset.[10] A related variable concerns non-partisan presidents. Some presidents have no partisan affiliation. We would also expect such presidents to be more likely to come into conflict with the cabinet, as, by definition, they have no partisan incentive not to do so. We include a dummy variable coded 1 for non-partisan presidents. Again, we identify such presidents from the ParlGov dataset. Another variable concerns the importance of political time on leadership outcomes. Here, we consider the effect of the presidential term. We might expect newly elected presidents to have an effect on president/cabinet conflict. However, it is not entirely clear what effect they might have. They might feel that they can assert themselves because of the newness of their mandate, in which case the level of conflict might increase. That said, that very newness might encourage the government not to challenge the president, resulting in low levels of conflict. To capture any effect, we include a dummy variable coded 1 for cabinets that were formed within 90 days of a presidential election.

In addition to these institutional factors, there are other factors that relate to what Tavits (2009) calls the political opportunity structure. We include three such variables. The first is the presence of minority government. Previously, we reported that Protsyk found a positive correlation between minority government and increased levels of president/cabinet conflict. We include a dummy variable coded 1 for minority governments, which we identify from the ParlGov dataset. The second is the effective number of political parties in the legislature. Here, there is an expectation that president/cabinet conflict will increase when the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP) is higher. This is because the president may feel that she can or is perhaps even obliged to assert her authority, because of the fragmented nature of the legislature. Again, the costs of presidential activism decline in such circumstances. We take the ENLP from the ParlGov dataset. The third variable is the number of parties in the government. Here, the logic is very similar. As the number of parties in the government increases, we might expect dissent within the cabinet to increase. Faced with a dissensual cabinet, the costs of presidential activism decrease, leading to more president/cabinet conflict. As before, we calculate the number of parties in the government from the ParlGov dataset.

Finally, we include two social variables. It is common for economic circumstances to be taken into account. Typically, a recession variable is included. Here, the likelihood is that a recession may increase president/cabinet conflict as political life generally becomes more tense. In this regard, we follow the work of Octavio Amorim Neto, who usually includes one of two recession variables. We prioritize one of these recession variables (Recession 1), which is a dummy variable coded 1 where GDP per capita growth in the year prior to government formation is 1 per cent below the average growth rate in the previous two years.[11] We take the figures for GDP per capita growth from the World Bank's dataset.[12] In addition, there is general agreement that political systems are likely to be more unstable during the early years of democracy. This leads to the expectation that presidential activism and, hence, president/cabinet conflict in democracies are likely to decrease over time. To capture this expectation, we include the natural log of the age of democracy in the model, where the age of democracy is taken from the UDS dataset as above. We provide descriptive statistics for all the variables in Table 5.4. We report the correlations between the variables in Table 5.5.

As noted above, we estimate the effect of presidential power on president/cabinet conflict using three models. Model 1 employs the full sam-

Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics for explanations of the level of president/cabinet conflict (full sample)

Continuous variables	*Number of observations*	*Mean*	*Standard deviation*	*Lowest value*	*Highest value*
Presidential Power	235	0.33	0.18	0.07	0.85
Effective number of legislative parties	235	4.09	1.29	2	7.6
Number of parties in the cabinet	235	2.75	1.42	1	9
Natural log of age of democracy	235	2.98	0.92	0	4.22

Dummy variables	*Number of observations*	*Number of 0 values*	*Number of 1 values*
Cohabitation	235	169	66
Non-partisan presidents	235	169	66
Cabinet formed after a presidential election	235	178	57
Minority government	235	175	60
Recession1	209	142	67

Table 5.5 Correlations between explanations of the level of president/cabinet conflict (full sample, $n = 209$)

	Pres. pow	*Cohab*	*Non-party*	*Pres elec*	*Min govt*	*ENLP*	*Num part*	*Recess 1*	*Age dem*
Pres. pow	1.00								
Cohab	−0.05	1.00							
Non-party	−0.03	−0.37	1.00						
Pres elec	0.03	−0.07	−0.04	1.00					
Min govt	−0.01	0.17	−0.05	−0.09	1.00				
ENLP	−0.32	−0.04	0.18	−0.05	0.04	1.00			
Num part	−0.15	−0.09	0.14	0.03	−0.10	0.71	1.00		
Recess 1	−0.03	−0.07	−0.01	0.02	−0.00	0.04	−0.00	1.00	
Age dem	0.16	−0.12	0.04	0.01	−0.24	−0.20	−0.08	0.07	1.00

ple and a dependent variable with a four-point ordinal scale. Here, we estimate an ordered logit model. This is an appropriate strategy given the intervals between the different categories are not equal. The second model employs the full sample, but a binary-dependent variable. The third model is based on a smaller sample, but also employs a binary-dependent variable. Models 2 and 3 estimate a simple logit model. We report country-clustered standard errors for all three models. This is appropriate given we might expect systematic differences across countries but not within them.

5.1.2 Results

The results are reported in Table 5.6. They show that in all three models presidential power is a significant predictor of president/cabinet conflict. They also show that it has a strong substantive effect and in the expected direction. The results also confirm the importance of two other variables. They show that cohabitation increases the likelihood of president/cabinet conflict in all three models at the 1 per cent level and with a strong substantive effect. They also show that a government formed soon after a presidential election is a significant predictor of a lower level of president/cabinet conflict in all three models. In addition, the results also suggest that three other variables should be considered. The recession variable is associated with a higher level of president/cabinet conflict in all three models. This seems like a strong finding. However, when we estimate the alternative recession variable (not reported), the results show either that there is no association between recession and president/cabinet conflict in any of the models. This suggests that the effect of the economic context on president/cabinet conflict is sensitive to the way in which the concept of a recession is operationalized. The results also provide evidence that the age of democracy is negatively correlated with conflict, but in only two of the three models. Finally, there is little or no evidence that the presence of a non-partisan president, a minority government, the effective number of legislative parties, or the number of parties in government is associated with president/cabinet conflict in any significant way.

Overall, we demonstrate that presidential power is a good predictor of president/cabinet conflict. This finding is interesting in the context of other work. Earlier in this section, we saw that the small number of studies that had focused on president/cabinet conflict had not included a presidential power variable in their analyses. The findings here suggest that it

Table 5.6 Explaining president/cabinet conflict

	Model 1 Ordered Logit	*Model 2 Logit*	*Model 3 Logit*
Presidential power	43.09***	15.14*	48.84***
	(46.37)	(22.41)	(71.98)
Cohabitation	4.99***	5.74***	9.57***
	(2.32)	(3.06)	(8.28)
Non-partisan president	2.15*	1.89	2.61
	(0.97)	(1.11)	(2.09)
Presidential election	0.23***	0.24***	0.18**
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Minority government	0.79	0.88	1.07
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.59)
ENLP	1.09	0.97	0.64
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.20)
Number of government parties	1.06	1.21	1.63
	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.53)
Age of democracy	0.60***	0.75	0.46**
	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.15)
Recession 1	1.90**	2.74***	4.10***
	(0.50)	(0.87)	(1.43)
Constant cut1	1.22		
	(1.02)		
Constant cut2	2.45		
	(1.08)		
Constant cut3	3.56		
	(1.00)		
Constant		0.06*	0.24*
		(0.09)	(0.20)
Wald chi2	57.78	47.35	71.08
Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Observations	209	209	182

All models report odds-ratios

Robust country-clustered standard errors in *parentheses*

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

should be included. Moreover, those studies showed that president/cabinet conflict was more likely when the government's position viz. the legislature was less secure, notably when there were minority governments and when the party composition of the legislature was more fragmented. However, when we include presidential power and conduct a controlled study with a battery of institutional, political, and social variables, these

factors have no significant explanatory importance. We have also shown that it is important to take account of ICR when relying on an expert survey of president/cabinet conflict. In these ways, then, we are better placed to explain variation in president/cabinet conflict than was previously the case. We know more about this topic than we did previously.

5.2 Under What Conditions Does Presidential Power Affect President/Cabinet Conflict?

We have shown that the average effect of presidential power on the likelihood of president/cabinet conflict is very strong. This is a probabilistic result. It tells us the likelihood that presidential power will shape president/cabinet conflict all else equal. We can extrapolate from this result to point to indicative examples that might illustrate this probabilistic effect. For example, the French president is powerful and students of France will easily be able to point to instances of high president/cabinet conflict, for example, between President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac from 1986 to 1988. Even so, the nature of probabilistic analysis means that we can draw conclusions only at the general level. We cannot apply them to the individual level at the risk of committing the ecological fallacy. So, we can say that there is a certain cross-national average effect, but we cannot expect to see that effect in any given country. More than that, an average effect can tell us nothing about variation within individual countries. For example, students of French politics will be able to point to periods where president/cabinet relations have been harmonious, for example, between President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Bérégovoy from 1992 to 1993. Why is there intra-executive conflict in France at certain times, but not others? In short, we can learn something by identifying the average effect of presidential power. Yet, we may want to know more. We may want to know the specific conditions under which president/cabinet conflict has occurred in Europe over the last 20 years. What are the conditions that have led to the presence of high levels of conflict in some cabinets but not others?

5.2.1 Applying QCA to President/Cabinet Conflict

To identify the conditions under which president/cabinet conflict has occurred, we turn to QCA (Ragin 1987). This method is used to identify whether there are any necessary and/or sufficient conditions for an outcome to occur. If such conditions are present, this method also identifies

the individual cases that are consistent with those conditions, as well as any cases where the conditions are present, but where the outcome is absent. Thus, it provides the opportunity to drill down into individual cases, examining the context in which outcomes occur as well as the circumstances that can confound such outcomes.

There are challenges to the application of QCA when the number of conditions included in the analysis is high. This is because the combination of conditions is calculated by the 2^k rule, whereby the number of truth table rows (or configurations) corresponds to two (the presence (1) or absence (0) of a condition) to the power of the number of conditions included. Thus, the inclusion of three conditions generates eight different configurations. In Models 1–3 in Table 5.6, we included nine variables (or conditions in the language of QCA). This would generate 512 different possible configurations. However, we have a maximum of only 235 cases, meaning that many configurations would necessarily be empty. We wish to use QCA to build on the results in Table 5.6. To do so properly, we need to reduce the number of conditions that we investigate. In this regard, the results from Models 1–3 can help to guide our choice. In this book, we are interested in institutional factors. Table 5.6 tells us that three such conditions need to be considered—presidential power, cohabitation, and whether a government is formed following a presidential election. The results also suggest that the presence of president/cabinet conflict is unlikely to be conditional on other institutional factors, namely the presence of a non-partisan president, a minority government, and a large number of parties in either the government or the legislature. For this reason, we leave them aside. Table 5.6 also reported the results for two contextual variables, the age of democracy and an economic recession. The former was significant in only two of the three models, suggesting that we might wish to leave it aside given the constraints of the QCA analysis. The latter was significant in all three models. We did raise concerns that the impact of this variable was dependent upon how the concept was operationalized. Even so, in addition to the three institutional variables of interest, it seems important to take this condition into account.

To investigate the impact of these conditions on president/cabinet conflict, we employ csQCA. This method requires us to calibrate both the outcome and our explanatory conditions of interest, giving them a value of either 1 when they are present or 0 when they are absent. We have already calibrated president/cabinet conflict in this way for the purposes of Models 2 and 3. Indeed, the presence of cohabitation and whether a

government was formed after a presidential election are also already calibrated in this way. However, we need to calibrate the presidential power condition. Currently, we have a continuous presidential power variable with 21 different values ranging from 0.067 to 0.846 on a scale from 0 to 1. We must calibrate this variable such that strong presidents are given a value of 1 and weak presidents a value of 0. With one exception, we choose to calibrate presidential power as 1 for all cabinet units where the current presidential power variable has a score of 0.443 or more. This means that Finland (1995–1999), France, Iceland, Poland, Portugal, and Romania are calibrated as 1. This list has reasonably good face validity. We calibrate all other cases as 0 along with Malta, which is our exception because it has a presidential power score greater than 0.443. A potential advantage of QCA is that it allows the researcher to use local knowledge to arrive at more accurate calibrations. We can assert very confidently that in practice the president of Malta is merely a figurehead. Therefore, Malta is best calibrated as a case of weak presidential power for the purposes of this csQCA study.

5.2.2 Results

To begin, we report a csQCA analysis of the three institutional conditions alone. We report the truth table for these three conditions in Table 5.7. There are no logical remainders. Given the large number of cases ($n = 235$), we do not report the specific cabinets that correspond to each configuration. We simply report the number of cases for each configuration. The

Table 5.7 Truth table for three conditions of president/cabinet conflict (full sample, $n = 235$)

Row	*Pres. power*	*Cohabitation*	*Pres. election*	*Number of cases*	*Consistency*	*Outcome*
1	1	1	1	1	0.00	False
2	1	1	0	12	0.92	True
3	1	0	1	14	0.07	False
4	1	0	0	30	0.13	False
5	0	1	1	13	0.15	False
6	0	1	0	40	0.20	False
7	0	0	1	29	0.07	False
8	0	0	0	96	0.17	False

tests for necessity show that there are no necessary conditions associated with the presence of president/cabinet conflict. However, the tests for sufficiency reveal that Row 2 has a solution formula with an acceptably high level of consistency (0.92). This result points to a combination of conditions that helps to explain intra-executive conflict. In Boolean algebra terms, this solution is expressed as high presidential power*cohabitation~presidential election. In other words, the presence of both a strong president and cohabitation, but the absence of a cabinet formed immediately after a presidential election, is a sufficient combination of conditions for the presence of president/cabinet conflict to occur. The figure for the raw coverage of this combination of conditions is 0.26.

Table 5.7 shows that there are 12 cases in Row 2, of which 11 are cases where there is the presence of president/cabinet conflict. These 11 cases are Jospin (France 1997–2002), Oleksy (Poland 1995), Buzek I and II (Poland 1997–2001), Tusk Ia (Poland 2007–2010), Santana (Portugal 2004–2005), Socrates II (Portugal 2009–2011), Popescu III (Romania 2007–2008), and Ponta I, II, and III (Romania 2012–2014). These cases all occurred in countries where there is a strong president. However, as we can deduce, not all cabinets in countries with a strong president experienced high levels of president/cabinet conflict. This is because in addition to a strong president, a period of cohabitation is also a condition for a high level of conflict to occur. Again, though, the presence of both a strong president and cohabitation is not a guarantee of the presence of intra-executive conflict. Row 1 illustrates this point. This is the case of the Socrates Ib (Portugal 2005–2006) government, where both conditions were present and yet where a high level of conflict was absent. Instead, these two conditions had to combine in the context of a government that was not formed immediately following a presidential election. For example, in 1997 the strong French president dissolved the legislature two years into his term. The legislative election resulted in cohabitation under the premiership of Lionel Jospin and an intense period of president/cabinet conflict that lasted for nearly five years.

That said, even under these conditions, the presence of conflict was not inevitable. Row 2 includes a case where all three conditions were met, but where president/cabinet conflict was absent. This is the Barroso government (Portugal 2002–2004). The cabinet of Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso was formed after the March 2002 legislative election. The cabinet was a coalition comprising PM Barroso's Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Democrata*—PSD) and the People's Party (*Partido Popular*). The

government came to power in the context of an incumbent president, Jorge Sampaio, from the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*), thus beginning a period of cohabitation. Typically, president/cabinet conflict in Portugal increases during such periods, because the president comes to assume the role of the leader of the opposition within the government (Jalali 2011). However, on this occasion there was somewhat less conflict than usual. On the basis of the csQCA study, we do not know why. We do know, though, that a particular government experienced less president/cabinet conflict than all the other cases where there was a strong president, cohabitation, and where the government was formed outside a presidential election. Perhaps the relative absence of conflict was due to the personality of the prime minister. This was Barroso's only period as head of government. Again, we do not know from this study. Yet we might wish to examine the politics of this cabinet in more depth, including the effect of the personality of PM Barroso himself to understand why there was less conflict in this case. Without the csQCA study, we would not be in a position to think about the utility of investigating this particular case. Certainly, we would not be able to do so from a study identifying the average effects of different variables alone.

Having focused on the three main institutional conditions of interest, we now place them in their economic context. Here, we rely on our smaller sample of countries from Model 3, given that this sample arguably captures outcome of interest most reliably.[13] Table 5.8 reports the truth table for the four conditions of interest. Row 4 shows that the combination of a strong president, cohabitation, a government that is not formed immediately after a presidential election, and the absence of an economic recession is sufficient for the presence of a high level of president/cabinet conflict. Eight cabinets meet this combination of conditions. They are Jospin (France 1997–2002), Oleksy (Poland 1995), Buzek I (Poland 1997–2000), Tusk Ia (Poland 2007–2010), Popescu III (Romania 2007–2008), and Ponta I, II, and III (Romania 2012–2014). This result is particularly interesting because Table 5.6 showed that recession was generally associated with a higher level of conflict. Here, though, conflict is present, even though a recession is absent, emphasizing perhaps the primary importance of the institutional origins of president/cabinet conflict. Row 3 is also instructive in this regard. This shows that when the three previous institutional factors combined and a recession was also present, then a high level of president/cabinet conflict was present in three of four cases. They were Buzek II (2000–2001), Santana (Portugal

Table 5.8 Truth table for four conditions of president/cabinet conflict (smaller sample, $n = 182$)

Row	*Pres. power*	*Cohabitation*	*Pres. election*	*Recession*	*Number of cases*	*Consistency*	*Outcome*
1	1	1	1	1	0	–	Rem
2	1	1	1	0	1	0.00	False
3	1	1	0	1	4	0.75	True
4	1	1	0	0	8	1.00	True
5	1	0	1	1	4	0.25	False
6	1	0	1	0	10	0.00	False
7	1	0	0	1	10	0.40	False
8	1	0	0	0	20	0.00	False
9	0	1	1	1	1	0.00	False
10	0	1	1	0	6	0.00	False
11	0	1	0	1	5	0.40	False
12	0	1	0	0	21	0.14	False
13	0	0	1	1	8	0.00	False
14	0	0	1	0	17	0.06	False
15	0	0	0	1	24	0.17	False
16	0	0	0	0	43	0.12	False

2004–2005), and Socrates II (Portugal 2009–2011). The consistency level of 0.75 is lower than is standardly acceptable. Therefore, we should not draw a specific conclusion from it. However, this finding does perhaps reinforce the point that institutional factors should be the principal focus of investigation. Together with the result from Row 4, it suggests that the inclusion of the recession condition does not really add to what we were able to conclude from Table 5.7. Given a certain combination of institutional conditions, president/cabinet conflict is likely to be present whether or not there is an economic recession and even though the regression results suggested that an economic recession was positively correlated with president/cabinet conflict.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the reasons for cross-country variation in leadership outcomes. We have found that the level of presidential power along with a number of other factors has had a consequential impact on the level of president/cabinet conflict in European democracies since 1995. This finding questions the conclusions that were drawn by the small

number of existing studies on this topic, providing new knowledge in this area. However, we have also gone beyond such a finding. By using csQCA, we have identified the conditions under which intra-executive conflict was likely to occur. Specifically, we have found that the combination of three conditions was largely sufficient to generate the presence of such conflict. We would not have been in a position to reach such a conclusion on the basis of a study of the average effects of individual variables alone. We do not wish to suggest that these results render probabilistic studies either irrelevant or incorrect. We merely aim to show that we can learn more about the effect of institutions on leadership outcomes by adopting different types of studies. This point is consistent with our pragmatic approach. In the next chapter, we examine the institutional sources of within-country variation in leadership outcomes.

NOTES

1. This rule means that we exclude all parliamentary monarchies, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, and Switzerland.
2. This rule means that we exclude Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
3. Available at http://www.parlgov.org (accessed 8 October 2015).
4. Thus, if the incumbent president is returned to office, we do not include a new unit.
5. We also find that we have to exclude both Montenegro and Serbia because we do not have presidential power scores for either country.
6. The survey was conducted between the beginning of August and October 2015. We acknowledge the help of all the respondents in the Introduction to this volume.
7. For example, Sedelius and Ekman (2010) and Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013) make available their evaluations for president/cabinet conflict. In seven cases, we were able to draw on these evaluations to provide an independent judgement as to which score should be recorded in our dataset.
8. Information about the ICR measures used here is presented by Mary Joyce, "Picking the best intercoder reliability statistic for your digital activism content analysis", 11 May 2013, available at: http://bit.ly/2hIvPuy (accessed 13 December 2016).
9. We use the normalized prespow2 scores available from http://presidential-power.com/?page_id=2154 (accessed 13 October 2015).
10. Available at http://www.parlgov.org (accessed 8 October 2015).
11. The second recession variable (Recession 2) is coded 1 where GDP per capita growth in the year of government formation is 1 per cent below the

average growth rate in the previous two years. We do not report the findings for models that include this variable rather than Recession 1. However, we note them below.

12. World Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators (accessed 13 October 2015). The figures for Lithuania are unavailable.
13. The results with the larger sample are the same as those for the smaller sample.

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CHAPTER 6

Party Politics and Presidential Control of the Cabinet in France

This chapter examines the institutional sources of within-country variation in leadership outcomes. So far, we have provided both experimental and observational evidence to demonstrate the impact of leadership institutions on various outcomes. We have also tried to complexify our institutional analysis by identifying not just the average effect of institutional features, but also the combination of institutional conditions under which certain leadership outcomes occur. However, we need to complexify the analysis further still. We wish to explore not just the institutional sources of leadership outcomes on a cross-country basis, but the reasons why such outcomes have occurred both within countries and indeed in individual cases within a particular country. To do so, in this chapter, we combine quantitative, set-theoretic, and qualitative case-study methods. We focus on France and the president's power to control the composition of the cabinet there. In the first section, we use probabilistic methods to examine the party-political sources of presidential power. This allows us to explain why some French presidents have been able to shape the cabinet more to their liking than others. In the second section, we use both csQCA and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) methods to identify the specific combination of conditions that has allowed some French presidents to shape the composition of the cabinet more than others. In this section, we show that the president's control over the cabinet was particularly great during a very specific time period, namely the first four years of the Giscard d'Estaing presidency from 1974 to 1978. In the third section, we explore this period in more detail. We present an in-depth qualitative case study to tease out

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the reasons why presidential control over the cabinet was so strong during this time. We focus on the party politics in the legislature, identifying the specific institutional circumstances that shaped the composition of the cabinet during the first four years of the Giscard presidency. Through this mix of methods, we aim to increase confidence in our institutional account of leadership outcomes.

6.1 What Explains Presidential Control of the Cabinet in France?

To what extent have French presidents controlled cabinet composition? What explains the president's control over cabinet composition? When we ask these questions in the French context, we have to put aside explanations based on both regime-level institutions and the president's constitutional powers. Following the introduction of the direct election of the president in 1962, France has been a semi-presidential regime. We focus on the period after this reform. Given there has been variation in presidential control over the composition of cabinets since this time, the nature of the regime cannot explain why such variation has occurred. What is more, while there have been other constitutional reforms since 1962, arguably the president's constitutional powers have not changed to any significant degree since this time either. In 2000, the presidential term was reduced from seven to five years. By itself, this reform did not increase the president's parchment powers, even if it confirmed the continuing likelihood of a presidentialized political process, especially in a context where presidential elections are now held immediately prior to legislative elections. In 2007, a further suite of constitutional reforms was passed. For example, Article 18 was reworded to give the president the power to speak before a special session of Congress. This might seem to have strengthened the president's parchment powers. At the same time, though, a rewording of Article 16 trammelled any future presidential exercise of emergency powers, thus reducing the president's parchment powers. Other reforms reinforced the organization of parliament, which would seem to have nothing to do with the president's parchment powers. Overall, these reforms left the president's bundle of constitutional powers largely unchanged, even if in practice the president has been the main beneficiary of them (Pierré-Caps 2009). In any event, even if we were to conclude that the 2000 and 2007 reforms had increased the president's parchment powers, there was still variation in the president's control over the cabinet between 1962 and this

time. In short, neither regime-level institutional factors nor the president's parchment powers can explain why presidential control over the cabinet has varied since the introduction of the direct election of the president.

Instead, we focus on the relationship between the president and the party system. Since 1962, institutional factors have helped to shape the party system to the president's advantage. The presidential election is now the key moment of the political process. To build a platform to win the election, would-be presidents have both founded their own parties and taken over existing parties. They have also had to build wider coalitions of party support. The result is that successful presidents have come to power on the back of a so-called presidential majority. Given the centrality of presidential elections and with an electoral system that rewards large parties and party alliances, legislative elections have tended to confirm the result of the presidential contest. Supported by a presidential majority in the legislature, the president has in turn been able to appoint a loyal prime minister, who has governed in a manner that is consistent with the president's wishes. Thus, even though the constitution gives the prime minister almost all policy-making responsibility, with the backing of parliament the president has been able to govern indirectly through the prime minister. Indeed, even though the country's particular type of semi-presidential regime means that the president does not have the constitutional power to dismiss the prime minister, in practice the president has had the de facto power to do so, knowing that the prime minister will accept the request to stand down and that parliament will not challenge any such dismissal. This situation has been overturned only when legislative elections have returned a parliamentary majority opposed to the president at some point during the president's term. During such periods of "cohabitation", the president can no longer rely on parliament, and policy-making responsibilities have passed to the prime minister as per the constitution. As we saw in the previous chapter, cohabitation has conditioned the impact of economic accountability at elections and has led to conflict between the president and the prime minister.

This overview of the French system illustrates that presidential power since 1962 has institutional roots, but they are expressed through party politics in the legislature. We have already seen that a dramatic shift in party politics from unified government to cohabitation has profound political consequences. Yet, there is reason to believe that presidential power has varied more subtly since 1962 as a function of party politics. Maurice Duverger (1980) argued that the president's relations with the

majority were, along with variation in a president's constitutional prerogatives, one of the main determinants of cross-national variation in presidential power. In his work, Olivier Duhamel (1995) has applied Duverger's logic to the French case, charting the varying relationships between the president and party politics in the National Assembly, explicitly linking them to variation in the presidentialization of the regime. In this chapter, we focus on a specific aspect of presidential power in France, namely the president's control over the composition of the cabinet. We ask to what extent has the relationship between the president and party politics and, in particular, party politics in the legislature shaped the exercise of presidential control over cabinet composition since 1962?

6.2 Party Politics and Presidential Control of the Cabinet in France?

We wish to investigate presidential control of the cabinet of France. To do so, we identify all cabinets from the Pompidou II government that was formed in January 1966 to the Valls II government that was formed in August 2014. We begin with the Pompidou II government because even though Prime Minister Georges Pompidou had been in office since November 1962, this government was the first to be formed after the first direct election of the president in December 1965. By examining cabinets formed only after this time, we can keep the wider institutional environment constant. Since this time all cabinets have been formed in the context of a semi-presidential regime. While the identification of prime ministers since 1965 is easy, the same is not true for the number of governments that have been formed under any given prime minister. Indeed, Helen Drake (2011: 970) has commented that there is "no consistent terminology" in this respect. Here, we rely on the numbering from the official government website.[1] In total, we identify 35 governments from 1966 to 2014 inclusive, including a number of what might be called "caretaker" governments, including the short-lived Mauroy I, Rocard I, Raffarin I, Fillon I, and Ayrault I governments that were formed immediately after a presidential election, but that were replaced by a more regular government under the direction of the same prime minister after the ensuing legislative election only a few weeks later.

To capture the presidential control of the cabinet, we focus on the percentage of non-partisan ministers in the government. This is a standard way of assessing the degree of presidential power over the cabinet or the

level of presidential activity in a system generally. For example, Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) think of the percentage of non-partisan ministers in a government as a reflection of the president's bargaining power over the system in general: the greater the president's bargaining power, the higher the percentage of non-partisans. When Tavits (2009) studied presidential activism, she too focused at least in part on the percentage of non-partisan ministers in government: the more active the president, the higher the percentage of non-partisans. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010) asked "who is in charge of semi-presidential cabinets?" To answer this question, they took the percentage of non-partisan ministers in the government as their measure: the more the president is in charge, the higher the percentage of non-partisans. Other studies (Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010; Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter 2015; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009) have followed a similar logic. Thus, we can reasonably explore variation in presidential control of the cabinet by focusing on the percentage of non-partisan ministers in the government. Indeed, Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006: 625–627) explicitly illustrate the theoretical logic behind their decision to focus on non-partisan ministers by referring to the French case.

To identify the percentage of non-partisan ministers, we take the partisan affiliations from www.wikipedia.fr. This source identifies the same 35 governments as the official government website. We record the partisan affiliation of full cabinet ministers in these governments, meaning that we disregard secretaries of state (*secrétaires d'Etat*) and other junior ministers (*ministres délégués*). We include the prime minister in the list of full government members. This process allows us to identify the percentage of non-partisan ministers that we express as a score between 0 and 1. The mean score for the 35 observations is 0.09. The standard deviation is 0.10. The minimum is 0 (for eight governments) and the maximum is 0.38.

We do not aim to offer a new theory of presidential control over cabinet composition. Therefore, we turn to six previous studies that have tried to account for variation in the percentage of non-partisan ministers (Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010; Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009, 2010; Tavits 2009) and rely on the variables that were identified there. When we do so, we find that a number of the variables included in these studies are not applicable to a single-country study during our time frame. Thus, we cannot include variables such as regime type, mode of presidential or legislative election,[2] and presidential (non-)partisanship. We also find that presidential power is

operationalized in some form in all six studies. We have already argued that presidential power cannot explain variation in non-partisanship in our single-country case. To be certain, though, we do include a dummy variable that controls for any potential increase in the president's parchment power following the 2000 and 2007 reforms (coded 1 for governments formed after 2000). However, we do not have any expectation that this variable will return a significant result.

We find that four variables are common to four of the six studies. We include three of these four variables in our estimation. We include a dummy variable for unified government, which is coded 1 if cohabitation is absent. Here, we expect unified government to be positively associated with non-partisanship, because the president will be in a better position to shape the composition of the cabinet. We also include the ENLP. We expect ENLP to be positively associated with non-partisanship, because the president will be able to utilize party fragmentation in the legislature to impose her own non-partisan choices on the cabinet. In addition, we include the equivalent of the Recession 1 variable from the previous chapter (a dummy variable coded 1 when there is a recession as defined in the previous chapter). We expect recessions to be positively associated with non-partisanship because the president may emerge as someone who is expected to take control of the cabinet and manage the crisis. By contrast, we exclude an age of democracy variable, even though it is included in most of the studies that we are following. This is because even though the UDS posterior 2.5 percentile for France is only just above 0 in 1963 (0.05), suggesting that France was on the cusp of democracy at this time, France retains a positive value in this regard for the whole period of the UDS data set (1946–). The inclusion of an age of democracy variable is particularly appropriate for comparisons of old and new democracies, or for a case study of a single new democracy. However, it is less appropriate in the case of an old democracy like France. What is more, there is a strong positive correlation (0.76) between the natural log of the age of democracy and the dummy variable for the 2000 and 2007 constitutional reforms noted above. For that reason, we could not include both variables in the same model and we prefer to include the constitutional reform variable because it has greater theoretical interest for the study here.

We also find that four variables are common to two of the six aforementioned studies. We include two of these four variables. We include a dummy variable for a caretaker government (coded 1 for a government that is in power for less than three months). There are six caretaker gov-

ernments in the data set. These are the five short-lived post-presidential election governments mentioned above, plus Messmer 3, which was formed just before the death in office of President Pompidou in 1974. We have no expectations about the effect of caretaker governments, given that, by definition, they are exceptional and short-lived. We also include a variable that counts the number of parties in government. Here, we would expect the degree of non-partisanship to be negatively correlated with the number of government parties. This is because when the president has to accommodate a larger number of parties in the cabinet, the space for the inclusion of president-inspired non-partisan ministers decreases. The first of the two variables we exclude is the presence of a minority government. This is because there is a very strong negative correlation (−0.7) between the number of government parties and the presence of a minority government, meaning that we can only include one of these two variables. We also exclude a temporal variable because there is no agreement as to how it should be operationalized and because one variation of the coding of this variable is not appropriate in our case. So, Amorim Neto (2006) controls for the temporal distance (in days) between the day on which a cabinet is formed and the day on which the president's term constitutionally ends, while Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010) control for the temporal proximity of government formation to the next presidential election (within 180 days coded as 1). In our study, only Messmer 3 would be coded 1 on the basis of this latter criterion. Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables included in the models. Table 6.2 reports the correlations between the different variables.

We estimate three different models. Following the estimation strategy employed in five of the six papers cited previously (Amorim Neto 2006; Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009, 2010; Tavits 2009), we begin with an extended beta binomial (EBB) model, which is appropriate when we have a proportion variable that is bounded by 0 and 1. We also estimate a tobit model, which was used by Neto and Samuels (2010). We also estimate a generalized linear model (GLM) with a logit link and a binomial family. For each of the three models, we report two estimations. The first estimation excludes either president dummies for both the EBB and tobit models or robust president-clustered standard errors for the GLM model. The second estimation always includes them, though to save space we do not report the coefficients and standard errors for each of the presidents in Models 2 and 4.

Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for explanations of presidential control of the cabinet in France

Continuous variables	*Number of observations*	*Mean*	*Standard deviation*	*Lowest value*	*Highest value*
Effective number of legislative parties	35	3.18	0.78	2.26	4.53
Number of parties in the cabinet	35	2.06	0.68	1	3
Natural log of age of democracy	35	3.71	0.37	3.0	4.22

Dummy variables	*Number of observations*	*Number of 0 values*	*Number of 1 values*
Unified government	35	3	32
Caretaker government	35	29	6
Recession1	35	25	10

Table 6.2 Correlations between explanations of presidential control of the cabinet in France ($n = 35$)

	Post-2000	*Unified govt*	*ENLP*	*Recess 1*	*Caretaker*	*No. of govt parties*
Post-2000	1.00					
Unified govt	0.21	1.00				
ENLP	−0.52	−0.10	1.00			
Recess 1	−0.02	0.19	0.09	1.00		
Caretaker	0.18	0.13	0.18	0.05	1.00	
No. of govt parties	−0.06	−0.13	0.28	−0.05	−0.26	1.00

Table 6.3 reports the results from the various models. As expected, we find consistent support for the effect of unified government and legislative fragmentation. Both variables are positively correlated with non-partisanship in the cabinet to conventional levels of significance and in all six models. We also find consistent support for the impact of the number of parties. As expected, there is a negative correlation between the number of parties in the cabinet and the presence of non-partisan ministers. Again, this result applies across all six models. There is also some evidence that caretaker governments reduce the level of non-partisanship in the

Table 6.3 Explaining presidential control of the cabinet in France

	EBB		*Tobit*		*GLM*	
	Coefficient (standard errors)					
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
Post-2000	0.699	1.765**	0.0623	0.108	0.633*	0.633
	(0.508)	(0.887)	(0.0470)	(0.0684)	(0.384)	(0.494)
Unified govt	2.011*	2.289**	0.138**	0.130*	2.387**	2.387***
	(1.047)	(1.156)	(0.0656)	(0.0691)	(1.124)	(0.183)
ENLP	1.278***	1.157**	0.118***	0.0826**	1.310***	1.310***
	(0.339)	(0.449)	(0.0310)	(0.0339)	(0.257)	(0.165)
Recession 1	−0.160	−0.474	−0.00451	−0.0280	−0.113	−0.113
	(0.321)	(0.318)	(0.0352)	(0.0341)	(0.325)	(0.463)
Caretaker govt	−1.171**	−1.180**	−0.0768	−0.0583	−1.034**	−1.034***
	(0.523)	(0.561)	(0.0479)	(0.0462)	(0.485)	(0.397)
Number of govt parties	−0.855***	−0.909**	−0.0722**	−0.0763*	−0.816***	−0.816***
	(0.314)	(0.404)	(0.0290)	(0.0394)	(0.308)	(0.234)
Constant	−6.698***	−5.977**	−0.283**	−0.280	−7.289***	−7.289***
	(1.362)	(2.747)	(0.106)	(0.180)	(1.331)	(0.672)
Gamma constant	0.0164	0.00152	0.0881***	0.0742***		
	(0.0155)	(0.0118)	(0.0124)	(0.0104)		
Log-Likelihood	−232.01	−227.25	21.28	26.61		
LR chi-squared	45.52	55.04	19.52	30.19		
$p >$ chi-squared	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.003		
Pseudo-r^2	0.09	0.11	−0.85	−1.31		
President dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
President-clustered standard errors	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Observations = 35

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

cabinet. This result is returned in four of the six models. Contrary to expectations, we find limited support for the presidential power variable. In two of the six models, this variable is positively correlated with the incidence of non-partisan ministers in the cabinet to conventional levels of significance, although only at the very limit of conventional standards of significance in Model 5.[3] By contrast, there is no evidence that poor economic conditions had any independent impact. While we do not report the figures, we should note that the inclusion of president dummies in Models 2 and 4 also returns some significant results. In Model 2, we find that there is a negative correlation between President Hollande and non-partisan ministers that is significant at the 5 per cent level, as well as a similar negative correlation between President de Gaulle and ministerial non-partisanship that is significant at the very limit of the 10 per cent level. In Model 4, the Giscard presidency is associated with higher non-partisanship at the 5 per cent level.

These findings tell us something about the relationship between the president and the cabinet in France since 1966. They tell us, completely unsurprisingly, that the president has greater control when there is unified government. More interestingly, they also tell us that the president has greater control when there is a fragmented legislature, presumably because she can take advantage of the more confused situation to appoint non-partisan but president-friendly ministers. By contrast, when the president has to take account of a large number of parties in the cabinet, then presidential control diminishes, again presumably because the space for non-partisans is crowded out. In addition, the findings tell us that we should control for the presence of a caretaker government. They say little, though, about the impact of the constitutional reforms in 2000 and 2007. They also indicate that the economic environment does not shape presidential control of the cabinet at all.

These findings are helpful. After all, while any student of French politics would be aware that presidents are stronger in the absence of cohabitation, standard French-language constitutional law and political institutions textbooks would not necessarily point to the importance of the fragmentation of the legislature. That said, we should interrogate these findings as well. For example, if we assume that non-partisanship captures presidential power or activism, then Model 2 suggests that de Gaulle was a weak president. This finding is puzzling. More fundamentally, though, we should be wary of reading too much into any of these results, even when they correspond to the expectations that we might have

had. This is because they are all based on a very small number of observations ($n = 35$). Small-n studies can inflate the importance of any effects that might be present. What is more, and similar to the point made in the previous chapter, we may want to know something different altogether. Especially when the sample size is very small, we may be more interested in learning about the particular conditions under which certain outcomes occurred, rather than the average effects of individual variables all else equal. To address at least some of these concerns, we turn again to QCA. This method is well suited to small-n studies, and it allows us to identify the conditions under which presidential control occurs.

6.3 Under What Conditions Does Party Politics Affect Presidential Control of the Cabinet in France?

We wish to identify whether there are any necessary and sufficient conditions associated with presidential control of the cabinet in France. To do so, once again we turn to QCA. We begin by applying csQCA. Here, the outcome of interest is the non-partisanship of the cabinet. We record a value of 0 (i.e. a low level of non-partisanship) when the percentage of non-partisan ministers in the cabinet is less than 6 per cent (or a value of 0.06). This leaves 17 governments with a value of 0 and the remaining 18 with a value of 1. As before, we are conscious of the 2^k rule. Therefore, we omit the two factors—constitutional reform and economic recession—for which there was little or no empirical support in the multivariate model. Both the unified government and caretaker government conditions are already calibrated in a form that is consistent with csQCA. However, we need to recalibrate ENLP and the number of parties in government. For ENLP, we record a value of 0 when the ENLP was less than 2.86 and 1 when it was greater than or equal to this figure. There are 16 cases with a value of 0 and 19 with a value of 1. For the number of government parties, there are only three values—1, 2, and 3. Whatever way we code this condition, the distribution will be skewed. We decided to record a value of 0 when there were either one or two parties in government and 1 when there were three parties in government. The main reasons for this choice are, first, that the distribution is slightly less skewed when coded this way and, second, that the smaller set of cases is more empirically interesting when coded this way. If we had recorded a value of 0 simply for those cabinets where there was one party in government, then on the side with fewer

cases, we would have had only seven cabinets, three of which were short-lived, post-presidential election, caretaker governments. By contrast, when we record a value of 1 for cabinets where there were three parties in government, then on the side with fewer cases, we have nine cabinets, only one of which is a short-lived government (Messmer 3).

We report the truth table for these four conditions in Table 6.4. There are 16 configurations, though for sake of space we do not report the particular cases in each one. We find that there are four necessary conditions with a minimum consistency greater than 0.9 (see Table 6.5). This is a relatively high number of necessary conditions. It is worth remembering that in QCA the presence of necessary conditions does not mean that the outcome under investigation is bound to occur. We see this point clearly illustrated in Table 6.5 with the relatively low levels of coverage for the four conditions. Typically, 0.5 is set as the minimum level of coverage for the analysis of necessary conditions in csQCA, but if we had increased the minimum level to 0.6, then we would have identified only one necessary condition, a high number of legislative parties and high number of parties in government. Given the number of necessary conditions is quite sensi-

Table 6.4 Truth table for four csQCA conditions of president control of the cabinet in France

Row	*Unified*	*ENLP*	*Number of govt parties*	*Caretaker*	*Number of cases*	*Consistency*	*Outcome*
1	True	True	True	True	1	1.00	True
2	True	True	True	False	4	1.00	True
3	True	True	False	True	3	0.67	Remainder
4	True	True	False	False	6	0.83	True
5	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Remainder
6	True	False	True	False	5	0.00	False
7	True	False	False	True	2	0.50	Remainder
8	True	False	False	False	11	0.45	Remainder
9	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Remainder
10	False	True	True	False	1	0.00	False
11	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	Remainder
12	False	True	False	False	1	0.00	False
13	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	Remainder
14	False	False	True	False	1	0.00	False
15	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Remainder
16	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Remainder

Table 6.5 Necessary csQCA conditions for presidential control of the cabinet in France

Conditions	*Consistency*	*Coverage*
ENLP*caretaker	0.94	0.52
Number of govt parties*caretaker	0.94	0.50
ENLP*number of govt parties	1.00	0.62
Unified government	1.00	0.56

tive to the minimum level of coverage we choose to employ, we leave aside the analysis of necessary conditions and focus instead on the set of sufficient conditions.

When we focus on sufficient conditions, we find that there are two solution formulas with a very high level of consistency. They can be expressed as ENLP*number of parties in government*unified government*caretaker and ENLP*number of parties in government*unified government~caretaker. What this means is that the presence of non-partisan ministers is high in the presence of a high number of legislative parties, a high number of government parties, and unified government, with or without the presence of a caretaker government. The consistency is 1.00 in both sets of conditions, indicating that there are no inconsistent observations. We find that five cases are consistent with these two sets of conditions. They are Messmer 2 (April 1973–March 1974), Messmer 3 (March 1974–May 1974), Chirac 1 (May 1974–August 1976), Barre 1 (August 1976–March 1977), and Barre 2 (March 1977–April 1978).

These results suggest that csQCA can add to our knowledge of the study of the conditions for presidential control over the cabinet in France in two ways. First, it points to the importance of a particular time period in this regard. The fifth legislature of the Fifth Republic (1973–1978) would seem to be the key period for understanding the conditions for presidential control of the cabinet. There seems to be something peculiar about the set of conditions present at this time.[4] This suggests that this period needs in-depth exploration. Second, in the regression analysis, we found a negative correlation between the number of parties in government and presidential control over the cabinet. This finding was consistent with the basic theoretical proposition that the president had more leeway to appoint non-partisans when there were fewer parties in the cabinet. Here, though, we find that a high number of parties is one of the conditions associated with the presence of a high degree of presidential control over

the cabinet in France. The regression finding might be a spurious artefact of the low *n* in the observational study. However, maybe presidential control is greater on average when the number of parties in the government is low, but maybe there is something particularly unusual about the circumstances in which these governments were formed that trumps this general finding. Again, this suggests that this period is worthy of a more fine-grained investigation.

To explore this issue more thoroughly, we employ fsQCA. The advantage of fsQCA is that the calibration is more fine-tuned. In csQCA, all conditions must be either fully out or fully in and, therefore, must be given values of either 0 or 1, respectively. By contrast, in fsQCA, conditions may take on intermediate values. More specifically, we can think of fsQCA as identifying conditions that are either fully out of a condition (0) or fully in (1), or that are somewhere more out than in (>0 but <0.50) or more in than out (<1 but >0.50). Given we wish to complexify the analysis of institutional effects in this chapter, it is useful to employ fsQCA with a view to arriving at more fine-grained conclusions about the necessary and sufficient conditions for presidential control of the cabinet in France.

To employ fsQCA, we need to recalibrate the conditions in the dataset, bearing in mind that no case should be recalibrated with a value of exactly 0.50. Again, the outcome is the non-partisanship of governments. This time, when a cabinet has no non-partisans, we award a score of 0; when it has a value between 0.01 and 0.06, we award a score of 0.33; when it has a value between 0.0625 and 0.136, we award a score of 0.67; and we award a score of 1 for anything higher than this value. For ENLP, when the fragmentation of parliament has a value between 2.26 and 2.49 inclusive, we award a score of 0; when it has a value between 2.68 and less than 2.86 inclusive, we award a score of 0.33; when it has a value between 2.86 and 3.77, we award a score of 0.67; and we award a score of 1 for any higher value. The unified government and caretaker conditions are dichotomous. So, their values remain as either 0 or 1. The calibration of the number of government parties again poses a certain problem. We follow the logic of the csQCA coding and award a score of 0 when the number is 1; a score of 0.4 when the number is 2; and a score of 1 when the number is 3. We report the truth table for these four conditions in Table 6.6, though again for sake of space we do not report the particular cases in each of the configurations. The results show that there are seven logical remainders. There are also five inconsistent configurations, four of which we recode as False. By contrast, we recode Row 2 as True, because the

Table 6.6 Truth table for four fsQCA conditions of president control of the cabinet in France

Row	*Unified*	*ENLP*	*Number of govt parties*	*Caretaker*	*Number of cases*	*Consistency*	*Outcome*
1	True	True	True	True	1	0.76	False
2	True	True	True	False	4	0.80	True
3	True	True	False	True	3	0.74	Remainder
4	True	True	False	False	8	0.73	Remainder
5	True	False	True	True	0	n/a	Remainder
6	True	False	True	False	3	0.49	False
7	True	False	False	True	2	0.65	Remainder
8	True	False	False	False	11	0.67	Remainder
9	False	True	True	True	0	n/a	Remainder
10	False	True	True	False	1	0.22	False
11	False	True	False	True	0	n/a	False
12	False	True	False	False	2	0.28	Remainder
13	False	False	True	True	0	n/a	False
14	False	False	True	False	0	n/a	Remainder
15	False	False	False	True	0	n/a	Remainder
16	False	False	False	False	0	n/a	Remainder

Table 6.7 Necessary fsQCA conditions for presidential control of the cabinet in France

Conditions	*Consistency*	*Coverage*
ENLP~caretaker	0.94	0.52
Number of govt parties~ENLP~caretaker	0.91	0.51
~number of govt parties~caretaker	0.95	0.52
ENLP~number of govt parties	0.94	0.66
Unified government	0.98	0.55

consistency is relatively high at 0.80. There are five necessary conditions (see Table 6.7). There is also one set of sufficient conditions. Again, we focus on this latter aspect of the results.

In Row 2, the solution formula for sufficiency is the expressed as unified government*ENLP*number of government parties~caretaker government.[5] This means that the combination of the presence of a unified government, a high ENLP, a high number of government parties, and the absence of a caretaker government is sufficient for the presence of the outcome. Three governments are consistent with this set of conditions.

They are Chirac 1 (May 1974–August 1976), Barre 1 (August 1976–March 1977), and Barre 2 (March 1977–April 1978). Again, this is an interesting set of governments. They confirm that the presence of a high number of parties in government is one of the conditions associated with the presence of high presidential control over the cabinet in France. What is more, while this set of governments is consistent with the results of the csQCA analysis, they also allow us to narrow down the period of interest further still. The results suggest that the early period of the Giscard d'Estaing presidency is the period of interest. This point is perhaps confirmed when we also note that there is one inconsistent observation, Messmer 3 (March 1974–May 1974), which is at the very end of the Pompidou presidency. In the csQCA analysis, this case was consistent with the set of sufficient conditions, but here it is inconsistent.[6] In other words, when we use fsQCA to arrive at a more fine-grained explanation of the conditions under which presidential control has occurred, we are encouraged to focus on the first four years of the Giscard d'Estaing presidency.[7] This is the period to which we now turn in the qualitative analysis.[8]

6.4 The Party Sources of Presidential Control Over Cabinet Composition in France, 1974–1978

In March 1973, elections to the *Assemblée nationale* were held at the end of its normal five-year term. They returned a plurality for the *Union des démocrates pour la République* (UDR), the party of the incumbent Gaullist president, Georges Pompidou. They also returned an absolute majority for the outgoing three-party coalition of the UDR, the *Républicains indépendants* (RI), who were associated with the then Economy and Finance Minister, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and the *Centre démocratie et progrès* (CDP), which was one element of the centrist Christian Democrats. The 1973 election also returned another non-left group to the legislature, the so-called *Mouvement réformateur* (MR), which was opposed to President Pompidou. The MR consisted mainly of the *Parti radical* (Radicals) and the *Centre démocrate* (CD), the other element of the Christian Democrats. In addition, the election returned seats for the left-wing opposition parties. (The distribution of seats for each parliamentary party group is given in Table 6.8.) After the election, the Gaullist Prime Minister Pierre Messmer was reappointed to his post by President Pompidou. Messmer's coalition government again comprised the UDR, the RI, and the CDP. The government had the support of 268 of the 490

Table 6.8 Parliamentary party groups in the *Assemblée nationale* following the 1973 election

Parliamentary party group	*Total number of deputies*
Gaullists (UDR)	183
Républicains indépendants (RI)	55
L'Union du centre (CDP)	30
Réformateurs et democrats sociaux (RI and CD)	34
Socialists and Left Radicals	102
Communists	73
Non-aligned	13
Total	490

Adapted from https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Élections_législatives_françaises_de_1973

seats in the new *Assemblée*. In total, non-left groups had the support of 302 seats there.

The 1974 presidential election changed the dynamics of party politics. At the first ballot, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing easily defeated his main challenger on the right, the former Gaullist prime minister and official UDR candidate, Jacques Chaban-Delmas. Giscard won 32.6 per cent of the vote, while Chaban won 15.1 per cent. Giscard was supported by his own RI party, as well as by the MR. Crucially, though, he was also supported by a group of Gaullist deputies led by Jacques Chirac. Chirac was a protégé of the late President Pompidou, who had sacked Chaban-Delmas as prime minister in 1972. Chirac's strategy fatally undermined Chaban-Delmas' campaign, even though it made Chirac many enemies within the UDR. At the second ballot, Giscard won 50.8 per cent of the vote, narrowly defeating his socialist rival, François Mitterrand.

Giscard took office on 27 May 1974 for a seven-year term. The period from 1974 to 1978 was marked by a fluid party system on the right. The first government of the Giscard presidency included representatives of the UDR, the RI, and the MR. The CDP was initially excluded, mainly because they had campaigned for Chaban-Delmas at the first round of the presidential election, even though they had subsequently supported Giscard at the second ballot. However, in July 1974, the CDP and MR groups fused in the *Assemblée nationale*, clearly signalling that the CDP was part of the presidential majority. In December 1974, Chirac was elected as the head of the UDR. In May 1976, the CDP and CD merged to form the *Centre des démocrates sociaux* (CDS). In December 1976, the UDR was reformed as the *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) under Chirac's leadership. In

May 1977, the RI renamed themselves the *Parti républicain* (PR). In February 1978, the CDS, the PR, and the Radicals, along with a small number of other non-Gaullist clubs and movements, came together to form a new party federation, the *Union pour la démocratie française* (UDF), which supported Giscard. In this context, the 1978 legislative election was contested on the basis of a very different and more simplified party system than the 1973 election. There was now a basic cleavage between the left and the right, and within the right, there was competition between two organizations, the UDF, which supported President Giscard d'Estaing, and the RPR, which was headed by Jacques Chirac.

During this four-year period of right-wing party turmoil, there were two prime ministers and three governments. The first prime minister was Jacques Chirac. The Chirac government was in office from 27 May 1974 to 25 August 1976. In addition to the PM, there were 15 other ministers, including 3 non-partisan ministers (18.8 per cent in total).[9] There were several ministerial reshuffles during Chirac's premiership, notably one in January 1976 when four ministerial positions were changed. However, the Chirac premiership is officially counted as comprising only one government. There is good evidence that the non-partisan ministers were close to the new president. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jean Sauvagnargues, was a career diplomat. However, he had been a member of Antoine Pinay's cabinet in the mid-1950s (*Le Monde*, 30 May 1974). Pinay was a member of the forerunner of Giscard's RI party. Sauvagnargues was also the French Ambassador to West Germany prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister. Close relations between France and West Germany were central to Giscard's foreign and European policy. The Minister for Education, René Haby, was an educational administrator. In 1972, he had been appointed as the rector of an academy in Clermont-Ferrand, a town in the Puy-de-Dôme department (*Le Monde*, 30 May 1974). This was Giscard's local fiefdom. Indeed, the president's great grandfather had been the mayor of Clermont-Ferrand and Giscard's parliamentary constituency included the town. Haby went on to join the RI and the UDF, indicating that he was politically close to the president. The Minister for Health, Simone Veil, was a lawyer by training and had previously been the administrative secretary of the *Conseil supérieur de la magistrature* (Higher Council of the Magistrature). She was not obviously associated with Giscard prior to her appointment. However, she went on to head the UDF list at the 1979 European Parliament election, again suggesting that she and the president were politically in tune.

The second prime minister was Raymond Barre. The first Barre government (Barre 1) was in office from 25 August 1976 to 29 March 1977. There were 18 Ministers, including Barre, 5 of whom were non-partisans (27.8 per cent). Both Haby and Veil remained in the government. For the purposes of this study, the three new non-partisans were Barre himself as prime minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Louis de Guiringaud, and the Minister of Labour, Christian Beullac. Barre had been appointed as Minister for Foreign Commerce in January 1976 during a reshuffle of the Chirac government. From 1967 to 1973, he had been Vice-President of the European Commission with responsibility for Economy and Finance. This was consistent with the president's European priorities. In 1974, Giscard asked Barre write an official report for the new administration and he had also asked him to help to prepare the Rambouillet summit that was held in November 1975 (*Le Monde*, 14 January 1976). In his memoirs, Giscard recalls that he suggested Barre's name to Chirac as Minister for Foreign Commerce (Giscard d'Estaing 1991: 129). Elsewhere, Giscard recounts that he had Barre in mind as a future prime minister from this point on (Berstein et al. 2003: 147). In short, Giscard clearly trusted Barre. There is evidence that Minister de Guiringaud's appointment was suggested to Giscard by Barre (Bothorel 1983: 204). However, Giscard had previously asked the foreign office diplomat to organize the North-South conference that was held in Paris in 1976, again suggesting that the president already had confidence in the new appointee. Minister Beullac was the deputy director of Renault. His appointment was also apparently suggested to the president by Barre (Amouroux 1986: 257), though it is likely that the president would have already been very familiar with someone in such a senior position at one of France's principal and then state-owned industrial companies.

The second Barre government (Barre 2) was in office from 29 March 1977 to 31 March 1978. There were 15 Ministers, including Barre, 4 of whom were non-partisans (26.7 per cent). There were no new non-partisan entries to the government. In addition to the prime minister, Ministers de Guiringaud, Beullac, and Veil were maintained in office. Minister Haby also remained in office. However, he was now labelled as an RI minister, confirming that he was close to the president. In short, there is good evidence from the three governments from 1974 to 1978 that the non-partisan ministers were either chosen by the president or people whom the president felt he could trust. This suggests that the appointment of non-partisans is a reliable proxy for presidential control of the cabinet.

The period from 1974 to 1978 can be interpreted as a period of hyper-presidentialization. Duverger (1996: 535) characterizes it as a period of "Giscardian hegemony" that was comparable to the previous period of "Gaullist hegemony". Indeed, he refers to Giscard as a "super-president" (ibid.: 177), meaning a "super-powerful president". Alain Duhamel (1980) also drew a link between the highly presidentialized Giscardian regime and its Gaullist predecessor. France, he said, "is governed by an elected sovereign, a republican monarch, almost an enlightened despot" (ibid.: 23). This practice, he stated, began with Charles de Gaulle (ibid.). However, Giscard, he argues, "has been drawn … to gather up the reins of power at the Elysée more vigorously than ever before" (ibid.: 24). Similarly, Petitfils (1981: 57) asserted, though in slightly less florid terms, that "it is undeniable that in recent years we have witnessed a growing enlargement of presidential power, which has been at the expense of the prime minister". Writing about the Giscard presidency, Frears (1981: 38) argued that in "every sphere of public life presidential leadership has been emphasized". Vincent Wright (1984: 14–15) made the claim that gradually Giscard "became 'devoured' by the presidential function, and his much-criticised monarchical practices and pretensions emerged". Indeed, he argues that this style of governing was one of the reasons why he was defeated at the 1981 presidential election.

The idea that the 1974–1978 was a high-water mark for presidentialism was at least partly encouraged by Giscard himself. In July 1974 in reply to a question at a press conference to mark the first two months of his presidency, he stated that "[m]y interpretation is the presidentialist interpretation of our institutions".[10] The practical implications of this interpretation were signalled very early on in his presidency. Duverger (1978: 178) remarked on Giscard's use of the first person singular during his televised address on 29 May 1974 when he presented the new government to the country. Here, he stated that he was going to outline "the reasons that led *me* to the choice of the prime minister and the composition of the new government" (emphasis added). Indeed, speaking at the time of the government reshuffle in January 1976, the president made his role in government formation even clearer, stating "when *I* formed the government" (emphasis added).[11] The president's involvement in the ongoing governance of the country was also personally signalled by the so-called *lettres directives* that he issued to the government generally or to specific ministers and in which he outlined various policy objectives, sometimes in considerable detail for the period to come (Maus 2003: 124–127). More

generally, Giscard was certainly a hands-on president. Maus (ibid.: 128–129) notes that he chaired more policy-making meetings (*conseils restreints*) than his two presidential predecessors. Other writers have remarked that Giscard would telephone ministers directly to discuss policy issues, thus by-passing the prime minister (Bernard 2014: 220). Some ministers also had direct access to the president, also "short-circuiting" the prime minister (Petitfils 1981: 59). Given, as we outlined above, the constitution indicates that the prime minister is responsible for the day-to-day business of government; this practice encourages a presidentialized interpretation of the system during the Giscard presidency.

The presence of non-partisan ministers has also been singled out as a specific indicator of the presidentialization of the system during this time. Writing in *Le Monde* (6 June 1974), Frédéric Gaussen wondered whether the appointment of the four non-partisans in the Chirac government meant that the regime "is moving towards a more and more presidential state of affairs?". Jean Bothorel (1983: 76–77) believed that the non-partisan ministers were more likely to by-pass the prime minister and go directly to the president. The position of the non-partisan ministers was also notable because they had no independent political support base of their own. For instance, Gaussen wondered whether the new Minister for Education, René Haby, "who owes his position solely to the man who plucked him from the shadows and who can send him back there at any moment" would have as much independence from the president as his predecessors. More anecdotally, Abadie and Courcelette (1997: 250) recount the time Giscard humiliated Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues in the Council of Ministers, asking whether anyone knew where the Maldives were to be found. The president clearly did, but the Foreign Minister did not. In this way, the president demonstrated his superiority over his colleague.

There is, then, good evidence to suggest both that the president controlled the composition of the cabinet and indeed the political process more generally, and that the presence of non-partisan ministers in the cabinet was an indicator of the extent of such presidential control. The situation was, though, more complex than this thumbnail sketch might indicate. There is a sense in which the appointment of the non-partisan ministers was not so much an expression of a strong president exercising considerable power over the system as the attempt by a relatively weak president to increase his control over that system. This argument has been made by Olivier Duhamel. Writing about the Giscard presidency, he states

that "the absence of power created a thirst for power" (Duhamel 1995: 130). He writes: "The more the appearance of presidentialism increased, the more reality of presidentialism slipped away" (ibid.: 129). For Duhamel (2011: 553), the Giscard presidency remains unique within the Fifth Republic, confirming our QCA results that there is something unusual about this period. Yet, Duhamel places Giscard not at the "strong" end of his presidential power spectrum, but towards the middle, indicating a president whose power was relatively limited, despite the observable manifestations of presidentialization. For Duhamel, the key factor that limited Giscard was his relationship with the legislative majority. We follow Duhamel's logic and focus on this aspect of the leadership environment from 1974 to 1978.

As we have already noted, in 1974, the new president was faced with a legislature that had been elected little more than a year previously and in which the members of his own party, the RI, enjoyed only a small proportion (11.2 per cent) of the total seats. In this context, the first decision Giscard faced was whether or not to dissolve the *Assemblée* in the hope of returning a clear majority for his own party or at least as many supporters as possible. Yet, this was a risky manoeuvre (Becker 2002: 95). We have already seen that Giscard had won the presidency by only a whisker from the left. There was the possibility that the dissolution of the legislature might return a left-wing majority. In addition, even if the left failed to gain a majority, there was no guarantee that the RI would itself win a majority. Indeed, it was quite possible that the election would return the status quo ante, namely another legislature in which there was a right-wing majority, but where the UDR was the largest party on the right. Bernard (2003: 206) also notes that Giscard had promised not to dissolve the legislature during the presidential campaign, making it difficult for him to go back on his word so early on. In the end, the president decided against a dissolution, meaning that he had to work with the existing legislature. However, the legislative arithmetic worked against him there. The non-Gaullist right comprised only around 40 per cent of right-wing deputies in the *Assemblée*, meaning that the president's supporters were only a minority within the majority. For sure, the president could count on their support. The challenge, though, was to build a presidential majority in the legislature that included the Gaullists.

The appointment of Chirac as prime minister was part of the president's strategy to create a loyal parliamentary majority, even though it was also clearly a reward for Chirac's support at the presidential election.

The president appointed five Gaullist ministers to the new cabinet, including Chirac. However, Giscard did not appoint any of the senior Gaullist "barons" to the new government. Instead, the president hoped that Chirac would "Giscardise" the Gaullist party (Becker 2002: 94). This strategy was likened to an "unofficial dissolution" of parliament (Bernard 2003: 194) in that it was an attempt to increase support for the president in the *Assemblée*, but without any of the risks associated with a new election. Vincent Wright (1975: 32) characterizes Giscard's strategy in the following terms:

> His choice of ministers such as Lecanuet, Abelin and Servan-Schreiber – all *bêtes noires* of the Gaullists – and the exclusion from the government of all the Gaullist "barons" [we]re clear signs that he [wa]s intent on governing in the light not of the arithmetic of the National Assembly but of the mathematics of the presidential election.

Becker (2002: 99) goes so far as to say that the "composition of the government was a declaration of war against the Gaullists". However, the UDR was divided. There were considerable tensions between PM Chirac and the party leadership, including most of the party "barons". In May 1974, the UDR secretary general, Alexandre Sanguinetti, stated that party's support for the government was "certainly not unconditional" (*Le Monde*, 28 May 1974). In June, he said that the Gaullist ministers were serving in government only "in a personal capacity" (Abadie and Courcelette 1997: 266). At the same time, Sanguinetti also said that Chirac was not the "natural leader" of the Gaullist movement (ibid.). For the president, though, there was a certain upside to Chirac's relatively weak position within the UDR. The prime minister did not have a strong and independent party-political base with which to challenge the president (Duverger 1978: 192).

The situation changed very rapidly. Chirac used the prime ministership to stop the flow of public money to the Gaullist party, which had election expenses to repay and the day-to-day running costs of the organization to cover (Bothorel 1983: 115). In this context, Sanguinetti did a *volte-face* and in July, he announced his support for Chirac. In December, Chirac went one step further. With Sanguinetti's connivance, the prime minister staged a minor coup, wrong-footing the UDR "barons", and having himself elected as party leader (ibid.: 117–118). At this point, it seemed as if the new president's strategy of "Giscardising" the Gaullist party had

worked. The UDR was now more firmly associated with the presidential majority than before (Bernard 2003: 196). Indeed, Giscard was initially pleased with Chirac's takeover of the party (Petitfils 1981: 47). However, Chirac now had an independent party base that previously he had lacked. Giscard assumed that the prime minister would use it to support his presidency. This was a miscalculation. As early as January 1975, Chirac made it clear to the president that both his support and the support of the UDR were conditional (ibid.). From this point on, Chirac and Giscard were rivals in a battle for the control of the right.

Over time, the relationship between the president and the prime minister deteriorated. Following a poor performance by the right in the March 1976 local elections, Chirac wanted the president to dissolve the legislature. Again, Giscard decided not to do so (Giscard d'Estaing 1991: 90–91). Instead, the president announced that Chirac would henceforth coordinate the majority in the legislature. However, the prime minister faced obstruction from the leaders of the non-Gaullist parties in the legislature (Amouroux 1986: 203). In August 1976, Chirac resigned his post, claiming that he had not been given the means to carry out his role in the office, implicitly targeting the president in that regard. In the new government, Giscard included representatives of the UDR, but he appointed only those who were opposed to Chirac, including some of the party "barons" who had previously been excluded (ibid.: 259–260). This was an attempt to try to split the UDR (Petitfils 1981: 49). For their part, Chirac and the UDR could not bring the government down (Knapp 1994: 44). Had they done so, they would certainly have taken the blame for destabilizing the political situation and may perhaps have facilitated the return of a left-wing majority to the legislature. However, the UDR was critical of the government and was willing to amend government legislation. In this context, Prime Minister Barre had to resort to the use of Article 49-3 of the Constitution. This Article allows a bill to become law in the form that the government wants, unless a motion of no-confidence is tabled and passed. Article 49-3 is typically used to pass legislation that is opposed by members of the majority, rather than being used against the opposition. This was the case here. Whereas Chirac never had recourse to Article 49-3 from 1974 to 1976, Barre applied it to two bills in the period prior to the 1978 election (Maus 1998: 226). Moreover, from 1978 to 1981, the prime minister invoked Article 49-3 a further six times (ibid.). The UDR/RPR never tabled a motion of no-confidence against the government,

knowing that the left-wing opposition usually would. All the same, the point had been made. The president's hopes of "Giscardising" the Gaullist party had failed (Duhamel 1980: 47; Bothorel 1983: 118). For sure, the creation of the UDF in 1978 provided a stronger and somewhat more coherent party-political vehicle for the president and both the UDF and the UDR (now RPR) were allied in their opposition to the left. Yet Giscard was never able to rely on the support of a loyal and cohesive presidential majority in the legislature.

To sum up, if the president had appointed the same proportion of UDR ministers to the cabinet as the party's support among the right-wing majority in the *Assemblée*, then the UDR would have enjoyed around 60 per cent of the total ministerial posts. This situation would have weakened the position of the president vis-à-vis the cabinet and was impossible for him to accept. Therefore, the total proportion of Gaullist ministers in the cabinet had to be reduced. At the same time, though, the proportion of Gaullist ministers still had to be greater than the proportion of ministers from the non-Gaullist right-wing parties, otherwise the president's already difficult relationship with the UDR in parliament would have been even worse. This very specific context provided the president with the unique opportunity to appoint a high proportion of loyal non-partisan ministers. They could be included in the cabinet without compromising the delicate party-political arithmetic that was required (see Table 6.9). At the same time, though, the non-Gaullist parties on the right were divided prior to the creation of the UDF in 1978. The Chirac and Barre governments included representatives of the RI/PR and the CD/CDP/CDS. Again, this very specific context helps to explain why there was a relatively large number of parties in the government, even though there was also a high proportion of non-partisan ministers.

Table 6.9 Representation of party groups in the cabinet, 1974–1978

	Chirac		*Barre I*		*Barre II*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Gaullists	5	31.3	5	27.8	4	26.7
RI	4	25.0	4	22.2	4	26.7
Radicals and Centrists	4	25.0	4	22.2	3	20.0
Non-party	3	18.8	5	27.8	4	26.7
Total	16	100	18	100	15	100

This in-depth qualitative examination of the 1974–1978 period has confirmed the idea that the appointment of non-partisan ministers is a good proxy for presidential control over the cabinet in France. Indeed, this was a period of high presidentialization generally. This in-depth examination has also allowed us to understand the specific circumstances in which the president was able to appoint a high proportion of non-partisans to the government at this time and why this occurred even though there was a relatively high number of parties in the cabinet, something which is contrary to conventional wisdom and to the findings of the initial regression analysis. Indeed, having examined the particularities of this period, we can be somewhat reassured that the regression result was not necessarily a spurious artefact of a small *n*. In fact, we have seen that the early years of the Giscard presidency coincided with an extremely unusual set of party politics. For that reason, we can still say with some degree of conviction that a high number of non-partisan ministers are generally associated with a low number of parties in government. All the same, the in-depth qualitative examination of this period has indicated a certain paradox. This was indeed a period of high presidentialization, but the president was a highly contested figure throughout his term of office. Moreover, he was contested not just by his left-wing opponents, but by a substantial part of his right-wing majority in the *Assemblée*. We have seen that the presidentialization of the regime was perhaps as much as sign of the president's weakness in this regard as his strength. This is a conclusion that we would not have been able to draw from either a regression analysis or a QCA. This suggests that a multi-method approach has the potential to generate a better understanding of the complexity of leadership outcomes, while confirming the importance of institutional factors in the generation of such outcomes.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the reasons for within-country variation in leadership outcomes. We have found that party politics, particularly party politics in the legislature, had a significant impact on the presidential control of the cabinet in France. This finding is consistent with our basic understanding of the dynamics of French presidential politics, though students of French political institutions have perhaps underappreciated certain elements that we have brought to light. More than that, by using csQCA and particularly fsQCA, we have also identified the contingent

conditions under which presidential control has occurred. Most notably, we identified a certain period of the Fifth Republic, namely 1974–1978, when specific conditions seemed to combine to cause presidential control over the cabinet to be strongest, suggesting that this period was worthy of in-depth qualitative investigation. We then presented a case study of this period. We showed that the level of presidentialization was indeed very high. This was reflected in the appointment of loyal non-partisan ministers. However, by contextualizing the study in this way, we were also able to show that the presidentialization of the regime was more a symptom of a fundamental weakness of the Giscard presidency rather than its strength. The president leveraged the specific circumstances of the difficult party-political situation that he faced to exert control over the composition of cabinet, but he remained a highly contested figure in the system overall. Overall, we have shown that we can gain a more fine-grained understanding of the institutional basis of leadership outcomes by using a mix of observational, configurational, and qualitative methods. In so doing, we have increased confidence in our pragmatic institutionalist account. That said, what happens if institutions are merely endogenous to pre-existing social forces, rather than an exogenous factor acting upon them? This is the issue to which we turn in the next two chapters.

Notes

1. The list is available at: http://www.gouvernement.fr/les-gouvernements-de-la-veme-republique (accessed 22 October 2015). We find the same numbering at: https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/composition-des-gouvernements-de-la-veme-republique-1959-2014/ (accessed 22 October 2015).
2. Only the 1986 legislative election was held under a different electoral system from all the other elections since 1962.
3. While there is a strong positive correlation between the values for the presidential power variable and the natural log of democracy variable, we find that the latter variable does not return a significant result if we include it at the expense of the presidential power variable. This suggests that the latter is not merely capturing the effect of the elapse of democratic time.
4. In addition, another set of conditions is also worth noting. This is Row 4. Here, the consistency level is 0.83, which is on the border of acceptability. If we recode this Row as True, then the solution formula is unified government*ENLP~number of parties in government~caretaker, or the presence of both a unified government and a high number of legislative

parties, in the absence of both a large number of parties in government and a caretaker government. Five cabinets meet these conditions, but one does not. The cabinets meeting the conditions where the outcome is present are Pompidou 1 (January 1966–April 1967), Barre 3 (April 1978–May 1981), Rocard 2 (May 1988–May 1991), Cresson (May 1991–April 1992), and Bérégovoy (April 1992–March 1993). The Pompidou 2 government (April 1967–July 1968) also meets these conditions, but the outcome is absent. Again, there seems to be a particular legislature of interest. This is the ninth legislature from 1988 to 1993. All three governments during this legislature meet the conditions in the truth Figure and presidential control of the cabinet was high. Perhaps more importantly, though, this result suggests that the presence of unified government and a high number of legislative parties are the main conditions of interest. They were present in the solution formulas for Rows 1 and 2 and they are present again here.

5. Here, the inclusion of the caretaker government condition does make a substantive difference to the outcome.
6. We note that in the fsQCA analysis, the level of consistency for Row 4 is not high enough to recode this inconsistent set of outcomes as true. This suggests that we are right to focus on the Giscard presidency.
7. The csQCA and the fsQCA results are both highly sensitive to the calibration of the number of parties. As discussed in the text, for the csQCA, we could record a score of 0 when there is only one party in government, and a score of 1 otherwise. Similarly, for the fsQCA, we could record a score of 0 when there is one party in government, a score of 0.6 when there are two, and a score of 1 when there are three. This recalibration generates different sets of sufficient conditions. For the csQCA, there are two sets, one comprising three caretaker governments (Fillon 1, Messmer 3, and Raffarin 1), plus another more potentially interesting set comprising the Fabius cabinet (July 1984–March 1986), plus the Rocard 2, Cresson, and Bérégovoy cabinets (June 1988–March 1993 inclusive). This latter set has a consistency of 1.00 and a raw coverage of 0.22, while the conditions sufficient for the outcome are unified government, a single-party government, and the absence of a caretaker government. When we recalibrate the fsQCA dataset in this way, then the set of sufficient conditions includes only one case, the empirically and theoretically uninteresting Fillon 1 cabinet.
8. It is worth remembering that in Model 6 of the multivariate analysis, there was a significant positive correlation between Giscard and the non-partisanship of the cabinet.
9. In fact, one minister resigned after just 12 days in office and his ministry was abolished. In the statistical analysis, we recorded a figure of 18.75 per cent for the Chirac government, but in practice, the percentage of non-partisans was 20 per cent for most of the period. This simply strengthens the idea that this was an unusual period in terms of non-partisanship from 1962 to 2016.

10. Available at http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/747001600.html, accessed 3 April 2017.
11. Available at http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/767001600.html, accessed 3 April 2017.

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CHAPTER 7

Institutional Choice and Cohabitation in France

In this chapter and the next, we address the issue of whether outcomes that are supposedly the result of exogenous institutional rules are actually endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice. This issue is central to any study purporting to show that institutions have an independent effect on leadership outcomes. So far in this book, we have provided experimental, observational, set-theoretic, and qualitative case-study evidence to show that leadership institutions matter. However, all this evidence is premised on the assumption that institutional effects are exogenous to leadership outcomes. Yet if it is the case that outcomes are actually endogenous to institutional choice, then the validity of these findings would disappear. For this reason, we need to investigate the circumstances in which leadership institutions are chosen and identify whether or not these circumstances are responsible for subsequent outcomes rather than the institutions themselves.

We begin this chapter with a general discussion of the endogeneity problem. We show that to identify whether or not leadership outcomes are endogenous to institutional choice, we need to investigate both the motivations present at the moment of institutional choice and whether these motivations subsequently shaped the outcome under investigation. To do so, we adopt a theory-testing process-tracing method. We show how this method allows us to specify a set of causal mechanisms to identify whether or not outcomes are endogenous to institutional choice. We then apply

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this method to a case study of France. We investigate whether or not there is evidence to suggest that the presence of president/cabinet conflict during the first period of cohabitation in France (1986–1988) was endogenous to the key moments of institutional choice there in 1958 and 1962.

7.1 The Problem of Endogenous Institutions

The assumption that institutions can be treated as an exogenous explanatory variable is common to all contemporary institutionalist analysis, including the pragmatic institutionalist account that we present in this book. This assumption is core to the claim that institutions shape the behaviour of individuals generating outcomes that would not otherwise have occurred (see Fig. 7.1a). The problem with this way of thinking about institutions is that outcomes may be endogenous to institutional choice. As we argued in Chap. 2, institutions are human creations. Institutional rules are the result of human choices. For this reason, we can also think of them as being the product of pre-existing actor preferences. For example, let us assume that a group of people wish to bring about a certain outcome and choose institutional rules that are deliberately designed to facilitate behaviour to generate that outcome. It follows that when those same people behave in ways that are consistent with those rules and the outcome does in fact occur, we cannot say that the institution has shaped their behaviour and brought about the outcome. Instead, the outcome is caused by the preferences of the people who chose the institutional rules in the first place. In this case, we should not think of institutional rules as having an exogenous effect on individual behaviour and the subsequent outcome. Instead, we should think of the outcome as being endogenous to the circumstances of the original institutional choice. This way of thinking about the relationship between institutions and outcomes is expressed generally in Fig. 7.1b.



Fig. 7.1a Institutions as an exogenous explanatory variable



Fig. 7.1b Outcomes as endogenous to institutional choice

The endogeneity issue is a real problem for institutional analysis. It invites the observation that "institutions have no autonomous role to play. Conditions shape institutions and institutions only transmit the causal effects of these conditions" (Przeworski 2004: 527). Certainly, it constitutes a "persistent challenge confronting comparative institutional research" (Carey 2000: 751). Indeed, arguably, it "poses one of the most serious challenges to … studies of … institutional effects" (Shvetsova 2003: 191). More than that, the endogeneity problem is seemingly ubiquitous. For one observer, "everything seems to be endogenous to everything" (Rodden 2009: 335). Without doubt, the problem of endogenous institutions is a challenge to some of the most well-known conclusions that have been drawn from contemporary institutional analysis. For example, do independent central banks control governmental behaviour causing low inflation, or do governments that are already committed to controlling inflation choose independent central banks (Hayo and Hefeker 2002)? In return for financial assistance, do IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes impose conditions on developing countries that cause them to adopt economic reforms, or do developing countries that have already decided to adopt economic reforms go to the IMF and World Bank and seek the financial assistance available in structural adjustment programmes to implement them (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000)? Does a single-member plurality electoral system cause a two-party system, or do countries with a two-party system choose a single-member plurality electoral system because each party knows that it stands to gain the most from such a system (Benoit 2007)? In this book, we have assumed that institutional effects are exogenous. The problem of endogenous institutional choice questions this assumption. Therefore, if we wish to provide a convincing pragmatic institutionalist account of leadership outcomes, we need to address the endogeneity problem.

There are two aspects to the problem of endogenous institutional choice. The first concerns the circumstances under which the institution in question was originally chosen. Was the institution created at time t^1 with the aim of generating a particular behavioural outcome at time t^2? The second concerns the relationship between the circumstances under which the institution was originally chosen and the subsequent outcome under consideration. Was the outcome at time t^2 the product of the aim for which it was originally chosen at time t^1? To address the endogeneity problem, we need to address both issues.

We need to investigate the moment of institutional choice at time t^1. We need to determine whether an institution was created with the aim of generating a particular outcome. For example, imagine a president who has been elected twice, but who faces a constitutional rule that imposes a two-term presidential limit. Towards the end of her second term and being reluctant to stand down, the president proposes a constitutional reform that abolishes term limits. The reform is passed and the president remains in power. It is difficult to imagine a more egregious instance of endogenous institutional choice. However, institutions are not always chosen this way. Imagine the situation where an institution is imposed on a country completely against the will of its people. Here, domestic decision makers lose all control of the process of institutional selection. In this event, we can assume that the institution has an exogenous influence on the subsequent behaviour of domestic decision makers. The institution is indeed the product of human agency, but it is not the product of those who were subsequently obliged to operate under it. Imagine also a very different situation where a country is in a state of near anarchy. Institutional rules are put in place but with little or no thought for their future effect. Stability returns and the rules remain the same. Again, the institutional rules were the product of human agency, but the impact of those rules on subsequent behaviour can be treated as more-or-less exogenous because there was no deliberate intent to generate a particular outcome when they were originally created. These three examples represent extreme cases. The key point, though, is that when investigating the endogeneity problem, we need to examine the specific circumstances surrounding the moment of institutional choice.

We also need to investigate the relationship between the circumstances of institutional choice at time t^1 and the outcome under investigation at time t^2. We need to do so because of the problem of observational equivalence. Let us assume that an institution is chosen at time t^1 to generate a specific outcome at time t^2. Let us further assume that we observe the intended outcome at time t^2. This would suggest that the outcome was endogenous to the circumstances of the original institutional choice. However, we still need to investigate the relationship between the circumstances at time t^1 and time t^2 because these circumstances may have changed. For example, Duverger's Law states that first-past-the-post electoral systems cause a country to have a two-party system. Imagine that a first-past-the-post electoral system was chosen in the nineteenth century when there was already a two-party system in a particular country, that the

same electoral system has remained in place throughout, and that there is still a two-party system in that country. In this example, the electoral system was chosen endogenously at time t^1. Moreover, the outcome under investigation at time t^2—the two-party system—is the same as at time t^1 a century or more beforehand. In this case, we might wish to conclude that the current party system is endogenous to the original choice of the electoral system and that the institutional effect that has been attributed to Duverger's Law is spurious. Nonetheless, in between the moment of institutional choice and today, many aspects of the country will have changed. In this event, we can reasonably ask whether the outcome at time t^2 remains endogenous to the original circumstances of institutional choice a century earlier, or whether it can now be treated as the product of an exogenous institutional effect that has come in to play some time thereafter. John Carey (2000: 754–755) has nicely captured the intuition behind this example. He argues that institutions "may be endogenous to a set of social conditions at the moment of institutional foundation … but the effects of the [institution] may endure even as the social conditions change. In this sense, there is nothing fundamentally contradictory in thinking of institutions as both endogenous and exogenous". We agree with this way of thinking about the problem of endogeneity.

The problem of endogenous institutions is clearly a challenge for institutional analysis. To determine whether or not outcomes are endogenous to institutional choice, we need to investigate both the circumstances under which institutions are chosen at time t^1 and the relationship between those circumstances and the outcome under investigation at time^2. In the next section, we outline how we intend to do so.

7.2 Method, Mechanisms, Case

To investigate whether outcomes are endogenous to institutional choice, we apply a process-tracing method (George and Bennett 2005). The basic ambition of process tracing is "to open up the 'black box' of the causal process" (Beach 2013: 13). In this way, process tracing is explicitly concerned with identifying cause-and-effect relations. To explore these relations, process tracing relies on a mechanistic understanding of causality (Beach and Pedersen 2013). This is consistent with the scientific realist foundation that we identified in Chap. 1. With process tracing, the aim is to specify the causal mechanisms that lie between the purported cause x and the outcome y (see Fig. 7.2). Having identified the causal mechanisms



Fig. 7.2 Specifying causal mechanisms in process tracing

of interest, process tracing privileges primary source material to identify whether or not there is evidence to support the presence of the proposed mechanisms. Process tracing is typically applied to the study of unique outcomes. However, Beach and Pedersen also claim that it can be used both to build theory and to test existing theories in circumstances where the causal mechanisms under investigation "can be expected to be present in a population of cases" (ibid.: 34). In short, process tracing is the application of a qualitative method to identify specific causal mechanisms in individual cases.

We wish to apply theory-testing process tracing to address the problem of endogenous institutions. To do so, we return to the issue of president/cabinet conflict. In Chap. 5, we provided both observational and set-theoretic evidence to show that this outcome was linked to the presence of certain institutional features. Maybe, though, such conflict was endogenous to the circumstances in which those institutions were chosen. For sure, we can assume that decision makers did not deliberately choose institutions in order to facilitate president/cabinet conflict. All the same, such conflict may have been the by-product of institutions that were deliberately chosen to bring about particular outcomes. If so, we would have to conclude that president/cabinet conflict was endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice and that despite the empirical evidence, institutional features were not responsible for the outcome under investigation.

In Chap. 5, we showed that the presence of president/cabinet conflict was linked to three institutional features: a strong president, cohabitation, and a government that was not formed immediately after a presidential election. We need to examine the circumstances that led to the creation of these features. With regard to a strong president, we wish to investigate why decision makers chose to create both a strong presidency and a prime minister and cabinet with consequential powers. Both features are needed for president/cabinet conflict to occur. With regard to cohabitation, we can assume that decision makers did not deliberately set out to generate this situation. However, we can think of cohabitation as being the by-product of other institutional rules. Cohabitation is the situation where a

directly elected president is faced with an opposition majority in the legislature, and where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the legislature, meaning that the majority in the legislature can support a government that is opposed to the president, leaving the president as the sole representative of her party within the executive. This formulation indicates that cohabitation requires the presence of two further institutional rules: the direct election of the president and the collective responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature. Thus, we need to examine the circumstances surrounding the creation of both of these rules to determine whether president/cabinet conflict is endogenous to institutional choice. Finally, with regard to the presence of a government that was not formed immediately after a presidential election, we need to think about the respective lengths of the presidential and legislative terms in office. We know that concurrent elections greatly reduce the risk of cohabitation (Elgie and McMenamin 2011). What were the circumstances behind the decision about whether or not to have concurrent presidential and legislative elections?

In the context of a theory-testing process-tracing method, we need to identify the causal mechanisms that would make the choice of institutions endogenous to the moment of institutional choice. There are no general rules that allow us to identify such mechanisms. The mechanisms are specific to the theory we are testing. That said, we need to identify mechanisms that address both the intentionality of the actors involved at the moment of institutional choice and the information that was available to them at that time. If the actors in question deliberately chose the institutions under investigation, but were unaware of the likely consequences of their choices, then the outcome would not be endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice. Equally, if the actors were aware of certain consequences of their institutional choices, but deliberately chose the institutions for reasons unrelated to those consequences, then, again, the institutional choice would not be endogenous. In short, we are looking for evidence that actors deliberately chose certain institutions in the knowledge that they would be bringing about certain consequences or at least that they would risk bringing about such consequences by choosing them.

We have identified four institutional features that are associated with president/cabinet conflict. We need to specify a set of mechanisms that capture both the intentions of actors at the moment when these features were chosen and the information available to them at that time. To that

end, we propose the following three mechanisms to capture the intentions of the actors involved in the process of institutional choice and the information available to them:

1. Did the actors/parties who chose the institutions deliberately try to create a strong directly elected presidency alongside a prime minister/cabinet with consequential decision-making powers that was responsible to the legislature? If so, then president/cabinet conflict would be endogenous to the choice of institutions in this regard.
2. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions aware that a non-concurrent presidential and legislative electoral cycle could generate mid-presidential term cohabitation and/or that concurrent elections could generate cohabitation at the beginning of the president's term if there was split-ticket voting? If so, then president/cabinet conflict would be endogenous to the choice of institutions.
3. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions aware of the potential for president/cabinet conflict under cohabitation? If so, then such conflict would be endogenous to the choice of institutions.

In the previous section, we showed that the endogeneity issue concerns not only consideration of the circumstances of institutional choice at time t^1, but also the relationship between the circumstances at time t^1 and the outcome at time t^2. Thus, we propose three further mechanisms to identify the extent to which the actors and the circumstances at time t^1 are the same as at time t^2:

4. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions the same actors/parties who were subsequently involved in president/cabinet conflict? If they were, then president/cabinet conflict would be endogenous to the circumstances present at the time of the choice of institutions in this regard.
5. If they were, was there already conflict between them at the moment of institutional choice? In this event, president/cabinet conflict would be endogenous to the circumstances present at the time of the choice of institutions.
6. If there was, was the conflict at that time related to the same issues that were subsequently the source of president/cabinet conflict? If so, then president/cabinet conflict would be endogenous to the circumstances present at the time of the choice of institutions.

Having identified six causal mechanisms to test the endogeneity problem, we apply them to a case study. We take the case of president/cabinet conflict in France. This is a good case to choose because France remains the archetypal case of president/cabinet conflict during cohabitation. We examine the first period of cohabitation there from 1986 to 1988. This period of cohabitation was the first to come to popular and academic attention. Indeed, it remains the classic reference point for studies of cohabitation both in France and generally (Lazardeux 2015). This period was outside the timeframe of our study in Chap. 5. However, we can be sure that it was a period of highly conflictual president/cabinet relations. It has been dubbed a period of "cohabitension" (Morgan 1986). This was a time when the executive was "divided against itself" (Pierce 1991). The president and government clashed on many issues, ranging from the appointment of certain ministers, to the speed with which legislation should be passed, to the content of government bills, to the division of responsibility for European policy, and other issues too (Cohendet 1993). We do not claim that this case is representative of all cases of cohabitation, or even all cases of cohabitation in France. All the same, we would expect an institutional theory of leadership outcomes to be robust to the claim that president/cabinet conflict during this period was endogenous to institutional choice. We now turn to this case.

7.3 Institutional Choice and President/Cabinet Conflict in France, 1986–1988

In May 1981, François Mitterrand was elected as president of the French Fifth Republic, and in the June parliamentary elections, his Socialist party (*Parti socialiste*—PS) won a majority of seats in the *Assemblée nationale*. In March 1986, though, five years into the president's then seven-year term, the right-wing opposition won the scheduled legislative election. This obliged President Mitterrand to appoint a right-wing prime minister. He chose Jacques Chirac, the leader of the Gaullist party, the Rally for the Republic (*Rassemblement pour la République*—RPR). Chirac headed a coalition with the centre-right Union for French Democracy (*l'Union pour la démocratie française*—UDF). In this context, President Mitterrand remained the sole representative of the socialists in government, thus beginning a period of cohabitation. This situation lasted until May 1988 when Mitterrand was re-elected as president. He appointed a caretaker Socialist prime minister and immediately dissolved the *Assemblée*. The ensuing elections returned a relative majority for the PS and its allies. Thus, the first period of cohabitation lasted from March 1986 to May 1988.

We wish to determine whether the high level of president/cabinet conflict from 1986 to 1988 was endogenous to the circumstances of original institutional choice. Two key moments are relevant in this regard. The first concerns the founding of the Fifth Republic itself in 1958. This period spanned the appointment of Charles de Gaulle as the last prime minister of the Fourth Republic on 1 June 1958 to the referendum on the constitution of the Fifth Republic that was held on 28 September 1958 (see the chronology in Table 7.1). There were debates about the relative power of the president and the prime minister/cabinet in the new institutional architecture, the method by which the president of the new Republic would be selected, the responsibility of the government to the legislature, and the length of the presidential term. The second moment of constitutional choice concerns the period that began in effect on 22 August 1962 when President de Gaulle was the target of an assassination attempt and that ended with the holding of a referendum on the direct election of the president on 28 October 1962 (see the chronology in Table 7.2). In contrast to the wide-ranging constitutional discussion that took place in 1958, the debate in this period focused on a single issue, though one that is central to the endogeneity discussion here.

Table 7.1 Chronology of institutional choice in France, June–September 1958

Date (1958)	*Event*
1 June	Charles de Gaulle appointed President of the Council of Ministers (prime minister)
1 June	New government proposes a constitutional law that will allow the swift drafting of a new constitution
1–3 June	The National Assembly and the Council of the Republic (the Senate) debate and approve the constitutional law. This concludes their sittings until after the referendum
June–July	Informal meetings to discuss the constitution
29 July	The government's draft constitution is made public
29 July–14 August	The Consultative Constitutional Committee holds meetings to debate the draft constitution and suggest amendments
25–28 August	The revised draft constitution is discussed in the Council of State
4 September	Following further government amendments, the proposed constitution is officially published
28 September	Referendum on the new constitution

Table 7.2 Chronology of institutional choice in France, August–October 1962

Date (1962)	*Event*
22 August	Assassination attempt on President de Gaulle's life at Le Petit-Clamart
12 September	Government announces that it will propose a referendum to approve the introduction of the direct election of the president
20 September	President de Gaulle presents the reform in a television broadcast
2 October	Government publishes a decree fixing the referendum
2–4 October	National Assembly debates a motion of no-confidence in the government. The motion is passed
7 October	President de Gaulle decrees the dissolution of the National Assembly
9 October	The President of the Senate criticizes the proposed reform
28 October	Referendum on the constitutional reform

To investigate the motivations of the actors involved in these two moments of constitutional choice, we rely almost exclusively on primary sources. For 1958, these sources are now extensive. The parliamentary debates are fully available online.[1] There is also a four-volume collection that collates all the debates in the Consultative Constitutional Committee and the Council of State in July and August 1958.[2] These volumes also provide material relating to a number of unofficial meetings as well as personal documents that were either prepared for the political actors at the time or that record meetings with them. In addition, there are also a number of after-the-fact testimonies from actors who were present during at least part of the original deliberations, plus the papers from two highly prestigious conferences on the writing of the 1958 Constitution.[3] For 1962, there are fewer primary sources, mainly because the timeframe was shorter and the subject of the reform was much more restricted. However, parliamentary debates are publicly available.[4] There is also a special issue of the journal *Parlement[s]*, which includes after-the-fact testimonies from certain actors present at the time.[5] In addition, the transcripts of several television broadcasts from key actors, notably President de Gaulle, are also in the public domain.[6] Using these sources, we now examine whether or not there is evidence to support the first three causal mechanisms that were identified in the previous section.

7.3.1 Endogenous Institutional Choice?

1. Did the actors/parties who chose the institutions deliberately try to create a strong directly elected presidency alongside a prime minister/cabinet with decision-making powers that was responsible to the legislature?

The responsibility of the government to the legislature was decided at a very early stage in the 1958 constitutional process. On 1 June, the new government led by Charles de Gaulle sent a bill to parliament that if passed would, in effect, grant it the power to draw up a new constitution and quickly. The bill comprised a single article, but it was accompanied by a statement that outlined the reasons for the change (*exposé des motifs*).[7] In the statement, the government guaranteed that the new constitution would be consistent with five basic principles, the third of which was that the "Government must be responsible to Parliament".[8] This clause was included at least in part to reassure legislators that the new constitution would not be purely presidential. At the time, there was certainly some scepticism about the government's motivations in this regard. For example, on 2 June, when the bill was being debated in the National Assembly, Jacques Duclos, a leading Communist party figure, accused the government of wanting to introduce a presidential regime.[9] He harkened back to de Gaulle's famous speech at Bayeux in June 1946 when the General outlined his constitutional thoughts and in which the government's responsibility to the legislature was not explicitly signalled. On 3 June, another Communist party spokesperson, Jean Chaintron, made a similar accusation in the upper house.[10] There is no evidence, though, that the government ever envisaged that the government would not be responsible to the legislature. For example, in his reply to Duclos, de Gaulle emphasized that the text of the bill specified that the government must be responsible to parliament and this stipulation was "incompatible with a presidential regime".[11] Similarly, in his speech to the Council of State on 27 August, the then Minister of Justice and one of the main architects of the constitution, Michel Debré, said that a presidential regime "had certain obvious qualities", but reiterated that neither parliament by passing the constitutional law in June nor the government had "succumbed to the temptation" to propose such a regime (Debré 1959: 9). Indeed, Debré was a well-known proponent of a British-style parliamentary system and added in his speech that a presidential regime would be "dangerous to put into

practice" (ibid.: 10). For sure, there was a long debate within the Council of State about whether the pledge of governmental responsibility to parliament in the new regime implied that the government must be responsible to both the National Assembly and the Senate, or solely to the former, which is what the governmental decision makers wanted and which is what ultimately transpired. Overall, though, there is no doubt that the constitution makers deliberately created a system in which the government was responsible to the legislature. This institutional rule, therefore, was chosen endogenously.

The same point applies to the creation of both a strong presidency and a government with decision-making powers. Presenting the bill to the Commission on Universal Suffrage of the Council of the Republic on 2 June, Michel Debré stated clearly that the "the powers of the head of State will be reinforced" in the new constitution.[12] François Luchaire recorded a conversation that he had with General de Gaulle on a plane back from Algiers on 6 June where he was told that the head of State "must be given significant powers" in the new regime.[13] In addition to specific powers such as the ability to dissolve the legislature, time and again the issue of the president's more general power of arbitration (*arbitrage*) was discussed. For example, on 27 August in the general assembly of the Council of State, the government's main spokesperson, Raymond Janot, made it clear that the government wished to use this term in a new way.[14] They did not envisage it being used in a "passive" way, but in a "positive" sense. For Janot, "an arbiter is a person who, in a certain number of specific cases, can take a certain number of decisions".[15] For sure, those opposed to de Gaulle and the new Constitution were keen to accuse the government of wanting to create a presidency that would be too strong. Duclos argued that the aim was to establish "an uncrowned monarch".[16] There was also much discussion of particular powers, such as what became Article 16 and the president's ability to assume emergency powers. All the same, even those most closely associated with the drafting process were happy to admit that a strong presidency was central to the new system that was being envisaged. For example, on 31 July in the Consultative Constitutional Committee, the Gaullist, Raymond Triboulet, called the presidency the "centrepiece" (*pièce maîtresse*) of the constitutional document.[17]

That said, despite certain claims, the aim was never to create an all-powerful presidency. For example, one of the very earliest drafts of the constitution in mid-June proposed the following clause: the President of the Republic "assisted by the Government defines the general orientation

of the country's domestic and external policy".[18] However, by 23 June, this strongly presidential clause had been changed and replaced with a more measured formulation that was very similar to the one found in the final draft a couple of months later.[19] In other words, any temptation to link the president to the day-to-day decision making of the government was rejected at an early stage. Instead, while there was clearly a desire to increase the president's authority, there was an equal desire to reinforce the position of the government, particularly in relation to the legislature. For instance, the second of the five principles that were identified in the 1 June constitutional reform bill stated: "Executive and legislative power must be separated effectively such that both the Government and Parliament assume their own responsibilities and exercise all their powers".[20] The general aim here was to increase the stability of the government by weakening the powers of the legislature. The specific elements of the relationship between the executive and the legislature were debated very thoroughly at all parts of the constitution-making process. The key point, though, is that the government was deliberately designed to be an efficient decision-making body. Admittedly, the role of the prime minister was generally the subject of much less debate. Nonetheless, it was clear that the proposed constitution aimed to create both a strong president and a strong government. This aim generated a certain worry at one point in the deliberations. On 31 July in the Consultative Constitutional Committee, Edmond Barrachin quoted an article written by the constitutional lawyer, Georges Vedel, that had appeared in the *Le Monde* newspaper the previous day. This article accused the constitution makers of creating a "governmental bicephalism", in which power was shared between the president and the government.[21] Barrachin wondered where executive power would lie in such a situation. Replying to this implied criticism of the constitutional draft, Raymond Janot denied that any such bicephalism was present in the document, insisting that the president and prime minister had separate roles.[22] Indeed, he characterized the latter as "the head of the executive power".[23] For the purposes of this study, we do not need to decide whether Vedel's (or Barrachin's) interpretation was correct, or whether Janot's reply was persuasive. We can simply conclude that the constitution drafters deliberately wished to create both a strong president and a strong government. In this sense, the institutional rule with which we are concerned was chosen endogenously.

To this day, it remains a moot point as to whether de Gaulle would have liked to have introduced direct presidential elections in 1958 (Décaumont

1992). In his speech to the Council of State on 27 August, Michel Debré (1959: 23–24) provided a number of reasons, some practical and some theoretical, as to why the idea of direct election had been set aside (*écartée*). This may imply that the issue had been discussed. There is no record, though, that it was ever seriously considered even unofficially. Certainly, it never appears even in the very first and sketchy drafts of the constitution in mid-June. Instead, the election of the president by an electoral college was always the option that was recorded in the draft constitutional documents, even if there was a very extensive set of debates about how the electoral college should be constituted, the government tending to want it to comprise a large number of people so that "it corresponded as closely as possible" (ibid.: 24) to the electoral make up of France as a whole. That said, it is tempting to think that de Gaulle would have liked to have introduced this reform in 1958, but that it was not a realistic option at the time. Many of those who grudgingly supported his return to power in 1958 would have considered the direct election of the president—most likely de Gaulle himself—to have been a step too far. In addition, there was a more general problem with the idea of direct presidential elections. In 1848, the direct election of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte was followed by a *coup d'état* in 1851. For many on the left, such as Jacques Duclos, direct elections were linked to authoritarianism. Thus, when Duclos accused de Gaulle of wanting to install a presidential regime, he was actually implying that the General wanted to abolish democracy. There were many who feared that de Gaulle would behave in an authoritarian manner as president. If he had tried to insist on the direct election of the president in 1958, he would have reinforced this belief and alienated potential support. In addition, Algeria was still an integral part of France in 1958. For that reason, the French in Algeria would have been able to vote in a presidential election. This led to the fear that voters in Algeria would shape the outcome of any such election. For all these reasons, it was simply not feasible to introduce direct presidential elections in 1958 even if de Gaulle had wanted to do so.[24] At the time, the best that could be hoped for was an electoral college that comprised a large number of electors.

This situation changed in 1962. In April, a referendum approving Algerian independence had been passed in France. Thus, the Algerian problem in relation to direct presidential elections had been removed. What is more, de Gaulle had been president for more than three years by this time, so the fear of authoritarian rule had somewhat abated. Moreover, in three successive referendums, de Gaulle had threatened to resign if his

preferred choice was not approved. On each occasion, the results had been overwhelmingly in his favour. Therefore, it was clear that he had great popular support. In this context, the assassination attempt in August 1962 was interpreted by de Gaulle as an opportunity to change the status quo. Specifically, it seemed to focus de Gaulle's mind on the issue of his succession. In his television broadcast on 20 September, de Gaulle announced that he was proposing a constitutional amendment to introduce the direct election of the president, explicitly linking the reform to the desire to ensure that his successors would have sufficient authority to carry out their functions.[25] He reasoned that whereas he enjoyed "an exceptional link" with the people because of the "events of history", it would "not be the same" for those who came after him. Therefore, to ensure that the regime would not return to the weakness and instability of the Third and Fourth Republics, he reasoned that the direct election of the president was now essential. It is worth noting that in the September broadcast, he stated that in 1958, he preferred not to come to power by way of some sort of "formal plebiscite", given some of the "political susceptibilities" that were present at the time. This is a hint that he had wanted to introduce the reform in 1958, but knew that the time was not right.

The reform was supported by the government, though one minister, Pierre Sudreau, did resign over the issue. Supporting the reform, government representatives were keen to insist that it did not imply any increase in the president's powers.[26] In parliament, though, the reform was strongly opposed, partly because of the way in which it was being proposed by de Gaulle,[27] partly because of the fear that it would create a stronger president and increase the potential for authoritarianism in the future, and partly because of the basic republican opposition to direct presidential elections that had been present in 1958. For example, in the National Assembly, Paul Reynaud was particularly critical. He had been the chair of the Consultative Constitutional Committee in 1958. At that time, he had facilitated the drafting of the new constitution and had supported its ratification. However, he spoke out against the introduction of direct election, emphasizing how he believed it went against the principles that had been agreed four years earlier.[28] The president of the upper house, Gaston Monnerville, was also opposed. He, too, invoked the debates that had taken place in 1958, arguing that the idea of direct election had been rejected at that time because "everyone considered that it contained within it the germ of personal power and, in the long run, the possibility of dictatorship".[29] Again, it is questionable whether or not the issue had

been genuinely rejected in 1958, because it was never seriously discussed then. Nonetheless, with de Gaulle being quite clear about the reasons why he was introducing the reform, it is unquestionably the case that in 1962, this institutional rule was endogenously selected.

2. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions aware that a non-concurrent presidential and legislative electoral cycle could generate mid-presidential term cohabitation and/or that concurrent elections could generate cohabitation at the beginning of the president's term if there was split-ticket voting?

The issue of the length of the presidential and legislative terms was scarcely mentioned at any time during the debates surrounding the drafting of the new constitution in 1958. In France, the length of the presidential term had been seven years since the Third Republic in 1875. The idea that this was simply the natural length of the presidential term seemed "to go without saying" (Debré 1974: 167). Certainly, by 19 June 1958, a seven-year term was explicitly mentioned in the draft constitutional documents.[30] In the Consultative Constitutional Committee, there was a proposal to reduce the president's term to six years, but this was rejected without even being debated within the committee as a whole.[31] The length of the National Assembly's five-year term was also simply assumed. At no point was the issue of concurrent or non-concurrent terms explicitly discussed. It was a non-issue. The absence of deliberation at this time suggests that this institutional rule was not chosen endogenously.

The situation in 1962 is only slightly different. As noted above, Pierre Sudreau resigned from the government over the issue of the introduction of the direct election of the president. Looking back on his decision, he has stated that he resigned from the government because he did not believe it was the time to introduce such a reform (Le Béguec 2004: 25). However, he also implies that at least one of the reasons for adopting this position was that the reform was not accompanied by a change to concurrent presidential and legislative elections (ibid.: 25). He indicated that in this regard, he was following the thinking of the President of the Council of State at the time, Alexandre Parodi, who had told him of the need for the two reforms to be introduced simultaneously. Even so, the issue of concurrent elections was not explicitly discussed in the legislative debates. Indeed, as we have seen, the government tried to make a virtue of the fact that the referendum was changing only one element of the constitution.[32]

Again, therefore, the absence of any substantive debate about the effect of non-concurrent elections suggests that this institutional feature was not chosen endogenously.

The contemporary comparative context helps us to understand why this is the case. While the experience of mid-term legislative elections was observable in the US case, decision makers in France were clear that they were not introducing a US-style system. Reasonably enough, therefore, they were not looking to the USA for examples of what might happen as a result of introducing a directly elected president and having mid-term elections. More generally, the concept of "cohabitation" was also scarcely appreciated. The term itself was coined only in 1983 by the Gaullist politician, Édouard Balladur.[33] Moreover, in 1962, only four other countries were constitutionally semi-presidential: Austria, Finland, Iceland, and Ireland, all of which, with the possible exception of Finland, were parliamentary-style semi-presidential regimes where to this day cohabitation remains rare and where it does not have anything like the political consequences that it came to have in 1986. In addition, there is a specific French context that needs to be appreciated.[34] De Gaulle saw himself as someone who was above party politics. The notion of the president as an "arbiter", which had been debated at so much length in 1958, was the constitutional expression of this disinterested presidential relationship with party politics. Yet there can only be "cohabitation" when a president from one party or party block is opposed by a prime minister and cabinet from another party or party block. If the president is above parties, or is officially non-partisan, then there cannot be "cohabitation". With de Gaulle portraying himself as being above political parties, even if parliamentary elections returned a legislature that was opposed to the president, "cohabitation" would still not have occurred. Paradoxically, it was the onset of direct presidential elections that brought the idea of cohabitation to life. This is because presidents require the support of political parties and partisan voters to win the presidential election. This makes it more difficult for them to maintain the idea that they are above parties. Indeed, this was true for de Gaulle after 1965. In this context, it is not surprising that prior to the 1962 constitutional reform the concept of "cohabitation" was not appreciated in the way that it is now. For these reasons, at the key moments of constitutional choice in France, there was little or no awareness of what we now call "cohabitation" and little discussion of the potential for mid-term, non-concurrent elections to generate a period of "cohabitation".

That said, there was nonetheless some appreciation that something we would understand as "cohabitation", or something resembling it, could result from the institutional architecture of the Fifth Republic. For example, on 31 July 1958 in the Consultative Constitutional Committee, René Dejean, referring to a clause in the draft constitution stating that the president appoints the prime minister, asked the following, largely rhetorical question: "I would like to know, because nothing else is indicated, what happens when the President of the Republic is no longer in agreement with the prime minister, the Parliament being put to one side, still expressing confidence in the prime minister".[35] In reply, Raymond Janot merely restated the principle that the president did not have the right to dismiss the prime minister.[36] On 27 August in the Council of State, the issue of whether the president had the right to dismiss the prime minister was also briefly discussed. Without this power, one of the councillors noted that "the prime minister can happily resist the president". However, it was also noted that in a parliamentary regime, this power did not belong to a president and the debate moved along.[37] In short, in 1958, the circumstances in which cohabitation would later occur were alluded to, but there was no substantive discussion of the concept. In 1962, the situation was similar. At that time, though, there was one direct reference to what we would now call "cohabitation". During the debate on the motion of no-confidence in the National Assembly, the Gaullist deputy, Michel Habib-Deloncle, referred to the situation in Austria. Recounting a recent visit there, he states: "Imagine my stupefaction … when I observed that there was a directly elected President of the Republic – a socialist – a head of government appointed by him – a Christian Democrat – and that they both got on perfectly well with Parliament – which seems too good to be true – and that the President of the Republic had the right to dissolve the legislative assembly on one occasion – which is exactly what our Constitution stipulates".[38] The example did not elicit a reply and was not expounded upon further. Nonetheless, in 1962, one person did point to an example of what we would now call "cohabitation". All the same, the concept remained unarticulated. Overall, we can conclude that cohabitation from 1986 to 1988 was not endogenous to the choice of non-concurrent elections in 1958 and 1962.

3. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions aware of the potential for president/cabinet conflict under cohabitation?

There was plenty of talk of conflict both in 1958 and 1962. That said, there is only very limited evidence that mention of such conflict related to the sort of president/cabinet conflict that we identified in the previous chapter during periods of cohabitation. Instead, political actors at this time envisaged a different type of high-level political conflict. For instance, on 31 July 1958 in the Consultative Constitutional Committee, Edmond Barrachin stated that "We have to admit that if the President of the Republic is on the right and the parliament is on the left, then this would inevitably be a source of conflict".[39] In other words, Barrachin was envisaging conflict between the president and the legislature, not between the president and the cabinet. In this context, he went on to say that "The coexistence of a president with important powers and cabinet responsible to the legislature could give rise to complications; the risk of presidential instability would be added to the risk of government instability".[40] The implication here is that if the president was faced with a hostile majority in the legislature, then the president's government might indeed be brought down, but the president would also most likely resign. This was the standard way of thinking about such events at the time. In 1958, the constitution was being drafted against the background of extreme government instability during the Fourth Republic from 1946 to 1958. In 1958, there was no immediate prospect of a stable legislative majority for the government and/or the president in the legislature. This is why governmental decision makers were so keen to reduce the powers of parliament. A weakened parliament would help the government to provide leadership even in the absence of majority support in the legislature. What this meant, though, is that when decision makers were thinking of conflict in 1958, they were thinking less of a hostile parliament leading to a period of cohabitation and more of hostile relations between, on the one hand, the parliament and, on the other hand, the government as a whole, including the president. They were thinking of conflict between the legislature and the executive, rather than conflict within the executive itself.

This prospect was still present in the debates surrounding the 1962 constitutional reform. At this time, the Gaullists were the largest group in the legislature, but they did not have a majority there. It was only following de Gaulle's decision to dissolve the National Assembly after the passage of the vote of no-confidence in the government that the subsequent legislative elections in November 1962 returned a stable presidential majority. Thus, at the time of the August–October debates, political actors were still thinking primarily in terms of the likelihood of hostile relations

between the government and parliament rather than conflict within the executive between the president and the cabinet. What is more, events between 1958 and 1962 had reinforced the idea that in the event of conflict between the executive and the legislature, the president would resign if faced with such a situation. For example, in both the January 1961 and April 1962 referendums, President de Gaulle had threatened to leave office if his preferred outcome was not approved. In the October 1962 referendum on the direct election of the president, he reiterated this threat. For example, on 18 October, ten days before the referendum, he went on television and said that if there was a "no" vote or even a "weak, mediocre, fleeting" "yes" vote, then "it is quite clear that my task will be finished immediately and there will be no going back".[41] In other words, we see another reason why the idea of cohabitation was not really envisaged at the key moments of constitutional choice in France. In the event that the people returned a majority to the legislature that was opposed to the president, the latter would resign before what we now call "cohabitation" would have the chance to occur.

In this general context, the idea of president/cabinet conflict within the executive was hardly envisaged. For sure, writing in *Le Monde* on 17–18 August 1958, Jacques Fauvet warned that such conflict was already "latent" in the wording of the proposed constitution.[42] Indeed, this was implicit in Vedel's claim that the draft constitution would create a form of "governmental bicephalism". In 1962, the idea that the Fifth Republic had created a bicephalous executive was also stronger, no doubt because of presidential/prime ministerial relations since 1958 and particularly the resignation of Michel Debré as prime minister in April 1962. For example, in the National Assembly debates, Paul Reynaud argued that the reform would "generate disorder at the head of the State, and create daily conflict between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. That's bicephalism."[43] Similarly, Maurice Faure, a centre-left deputy, wondered how this "dual executive" would function if the reform was passed.[44] However, it not really until 1967 that the prospect of mid-term legislative elections returning a majority opposed to the president was seriously considered (Gicquel 2009: 304 fn 24) and even then the prospect of the president's resignation was still predominant. Indeed, de Gaulle did resign in 1969 when his proposal to reform the Senate was defeated in a referendum. It was only prior to the 1978 mid-term legislative elections and the very real prospect that these elections would return a political majority opposed to a partisan president that the idea of the head of state not

resigning was explicitly affirmed by President Giscard d'Estaing. Overall, the circumstances of the 1958 and 1962 constitutional moments were such that there was little or no awareness of the prospect of cohabitation and the idea of president/cabinet conflict was scarcely discussed. Therefore, we can conclude that this feature of the Fifth Republic was not endogenously chosen.

To sum up at this point, we can see that there is very good evidence that president/cabinet conflict in 1986–1988 was endogenous to the creation of a strong directly elected presidency alongside a prime minister/cabinet with decision-making powers that was responsible to the legislature. By contrast, there is very little evidence that non-concurrent presidential and legislative elections were chosen with any consideration of the prospect that they would ever lead to what we now call "cohabitation". Equally, there was very little awareness that conflict within the executive between a partisan president and a prime minister from an opposing party would be a likely feature of the Fifth Republic.

7.3.2 Endogenous President/Cabinet Conflict?

We now turn to the context within which the first period of cohabitation occurred. Who were the actors in the 1986–1988 period? What were their concerns? How are both linked to the key moments of institutional choice that we have just examined? To investigate these questions, we return to the second set of causal mechanisms that we identified in the previous section. Here, we do not have the equivalent body of primary material to draw upon as we did for the first three mechanisms. However, we rely as much as possible on evidence drawn from contemporary sources.

4. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions the same actors/parties who were subsequently involved in president/cabinet conflict?

The main protagonists in the period 1986–1988 were different from those who were present in 1958 and 1962. For example, Paul Reynaud died in 1966, President de Gaulle in 1970, and Guy Mollet in 1975. Other major figures at the key moments of institutional choice, such as Michel Debré and Gaston Monnerville, were still alive, but were not active in political life. In short, there had been a certain generational change between the two periods. In addition, some figures, such as François Luchaire, were still very active, but not politically. Others were politically active, but in a

different context. For example, Pierre Marcilhacy, who was a member of the Consultative Constitutional Committee, was serving on the Constitutional Council in 1986, though he died in July 1987. Similarly, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who was a deputy at the time of the 1962 constitutional reform, and who went on to be prime minister from 1969 to 1972, was also still active. However, he was not a member of the government. Instead, he was the president of the National Assembly from 1986 to 1988. In fact, not a single member of the centre-right coalition that came to power in 1986 had served on the Consultative Constitutional Committee in 1958, and none had even been a member of the legislature either in 1958 or in 1962. The only person who was politically active during the two keys moments of constitutional choice and who was still in a position of political responsibility in 1986 was President Mitterrand himself. He had been a minister during the Fourth Republic and was a deputy as the time of the parliamentary debate on the passage of the constitutional law in 1958, though he was not a member of the Consultative Constitutional Committee. He lost his National Assembly seat in the November 1958 legislative election, but was elected to the Senate in April 1959, meaning that he was also present in parliament at the time of the 1962 reform. Thus, only Mitterrand was active at the moments of institutional choice in 1958/1962 and was a direct participant in the president/cabinet conflict in 1986–1988.

That said, there is a slightly greater degree of political continuity over the two periods. In the legislatures elected in 1956 and 1958, party competition in parliament was more fragmented than in the legislature elected in 1986. In both periods, though, political competition was structured on a left/right basis. To the extent that the left/right cleavage was present in 1958/1962 and was dominant in 1986–1988, then we might imagine the same values and ideas to be present across the two periods, even if the people espousing them were different. Even so, it should be noted that only the Communist party (*Parti communiste français*—PCF) was organizationally present across the whole of this period. The non-communist left had been refounded in 1969/1971. The PS dates from this time. There had also been a succession of Gaullist organizations since the early years of the Fifth Republic, the RPR being merely the latest of them, having been founded by Jacques Chirac in 1976. The UDF was also a relatively recent creation, being formed by President Giscard d'Estaing in 1978. Thus, while there was indeed a certain political continuity from 1958/1962 to 1986–1988, there had also been plenty of party political upheaval across

this time. Overall, we can conclude that very few of the actors/parties who were present at the key moments of institutional choice were the same as the ones who were direct participants in the president/cabinet conflict that occurred during the first period of cohabitation.

5. If they were, was there already conflict between them at the moment of institutional choice?

We have already seen that François Mitterrand was the only person who was present at the time of institutional choice and who was also present within the executive during cohabitation. In 1958, he made two interventions in the National Assembly debates. On 1 June, he made a long intervention during the investiture debate for de Gaulle's government. Mitterrand was opposed to de Gaulle's appointment and he voted against it. His opposition was founded on the belief that the General's return constituted a "change of regime".[45] He characterized it as a "forceful takeover" (*coup de force*) and as an act of "sedition".[46] At this time, he was primarily opposed to the manner in which de Gaulle was returning to power, fearing that it would lead to the collapse of democracy and rule by the armed forces. He was aware that a new constitution was going to be drafted, but he did not refer to it at any length, merely suggesting that de Gaulle's Bayeux speech was likely to form a basis for the new document. His second intervention came the next day during the debate on the constitutional amendment that would allow the government to draft the new constitution. Mitterrand voted against the reform, but, again, he did not dwell upon institutional matters. He also voted against the constitution in the September 1958 referendum, though we do not have a record of any interventions he might have made during the campaign. In October 1962, there was no debate in the Senate on the proposed direct election of the president. However, on 4 October, Mitterrand did table a question to the prime minister, challenging the constitutional validity of the way in which the government had proposed the referendum. The question did not receive a reply.[47] In the referendum on 28 October, he was part of the so-called *cartel des non*, who voted against the constitutional reform.

We can see, then, that Mitterrand had very little to say in the legislature about institutional matters during both moments of constitutional choice, though he had little opportunity to intervene there in 1962. Nonetheless, it is clear that he was opposed to de Gaulle and to the institutional reforms that were proposed at the referendums in 1958/1962. He was also clearly

interested in institutional matters. For example, in 1964, he published a well-known book, *Le coup d'État permanent*, in which he provided a critique of the Gaullist regime, including its institutions. Around the same time, he also made a long speech in the National Assembly, having been returned there in November 1962. In this speech, on 24 April 1964, he addressed the Fifth Republic's institutions very directly.[48] In it, he quoted heavily from the June 1958 National Assembly debates as well as from the deliberations of the Consultative Constitutional Committee, making it a useful reference source for the purposes of this chapter. In the speech, Mitterrand began by establishing that de Gaulle and the government made it clear in 1958 that they intended to create a parliamentary regime. For example, he cited the *exposé des motifs* of the 1958 constitutional law, stating that the government would be responsible to the legislature. He also quoted Barrachin's worry about bicephalism and Janot's reply that the president would not be able to dismiss the prime minister.[49] Having established that the aim was to create a parliamentary regime, he then argued that events since this time had changed the situation. Mitterrand also referred to de Gaulle's famous press conference on 31 January 1964, in which the General stated that no ministerial, civil, military, or judicial authority was not maintained by anyone other than the president.[50] Mitterrand argued that this speech signalled that the head of state now claimed the right to change the prime minister and, therefore, that there was no longer a parliamentary system. Instead, Mitterrand claimed, there was a "limited monarchy", a "regime of personal power".[51]

In these ways, we can see that even if François Mitterrand did not dwell upon institutional issues to any great degree in the legislature at the key moments of institutional choice in 1958/1962, there is good evidence that he was opposed to the Gaullist institutional settlement in this era. Indeed, while we cannot present the evolution of his institutional thought from this time until the period of president/cabinet conflict in 1986, it is worth stressing that he maintained his opposition to the institutional architecture of the Fifth Republic relatively consistently thereafter. For example, in a book, *Ici et maintenant* (Mitterrand 1980), that he published just prior to the 1981 presidential election, he again cited the debates in the Consultative Constitutional Committee and de Gaulle's assurance at the time that the government would be responsible to the Assembly (ibid.: 74), and again suggested that the system no longer operated in that way. He also reiterated that the system had become a "monarchy" (ibid.: 73) and he referred readers to his analysis in *Le coup d'État*

permanent on these matters (ibid.: 75). This suggests that there is potentially a link between Mitterrand's institutional analysis around the time of institutional choice and the presence of president/cabinet conflict during the period of cohabitation, providing at least some evidence that president/cabinet conflict from 1986 to 1988 was endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice in 1958/1962 in this regard.

With regard to political parties, the situation is mixed. The Communist party was the only party that systematically opposed de Gaulle's return to power in June 1958, the constitution of the Fifth Republic, and the 1962 constitutional reform. The main element of the non-communist left, the French Section of the Workers' International (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*—SFIO) was opposed to the 1962 reform, but was split in 1958. For example, in the vote in the National Assembly on 3 June, a number of SFIO deputies voted in favour of giving de Gaulle full powers, including Guy Mollet himself, even if most of the party's representatives voted against. On the right, the deputies from the *Indépendants et paysans d'action sociale* voted to give de Gaulle full powers in 1958 and were part of the governing coalition after 1958. However, in 1962, they voted in favour of the censure motion against the Pompidou government. The same point applies to the Christian Democrats from the *Mouvement républicain populaire*. In 1958, the representatives of the *Républicain radical et radical-socialiste* group were very divided, some supporting de Gaulle and some opposing him. Indeed, the Gaullists themselves were not completely united across the whole period. We have already seen that Pierre Sudreau resigned from the government in 1962 over the issue of the direct election of the president. In the debate in the National Assembly, a number of deputies from the Union for the New Republic (*L'Union pour la nouvelle République*—UNR), which was the Gaullist political party at the time, supported the censure motion against the Pompidou government. Overall, it is clear that there was great party political conflict at the key moments of institutional choice. However, with the exception of the PCF and to a lesser extent the Socialists and Gaullists, the parties did not have a consistent position either for or against the reforms proposed by de Gaulle, suggesting only limited evidence for this hypothesis.

6. If there was, was the conflict at that time related to the same issues that were subsequently the source of president/cabinet conflict?

In 1986, President Mitterrand, who, as we have seen, had previously been opposed to the Fifth Republic's institutions of government, was now willing to work with them. Famously, only a couple of months after his election in 1981, he gave an interview to *Le Monde* where he stated that the "institutions weren't made with me in mind. But they suit me very well".[52] Similarly, in his written message to the National Assembly on 8 April 1986, President Mitterrand stated that the new period of cohabitation would require the application of "the Constitution, nothing but the Constitution, the whole Constitution", implying that the president would still have a role to play. In other words, we see that Mitterrand, as president, can now be interpreted as defending an institution that he once criticized. A similar turnaround applies to the Gaullists. Needless to say, in 1958/1962, they were the most supportive of the constitutional reforms, including the establishment of a powerful head of state. In 1986, though, they were happy to lead a period of cohabitation in which the president's functions were weaker than at any other time in the Fifth Republic up to that point. There were calls for the president to resign, but these were merely tactical. If Mitterrand had stepped down, there is little doubt that the socialists would have lost the presidency. That said, the Gaullists did not press this issue too much, not least because opinion polls at the time suggested that the main beneficiary of an early presidential election might be the former prime minister, the centrist Raymond Barre (Habert 1987). In other words, the Gaullists can now be interpreted as defending a parliamentarization of the Fifth Republic, to which previously they had been opposed. In fact, the most "Gaullist" position at the time was taken by Raymond Barre himself. He was associated with the UDF, but he adopted the previously standard Gaullist line that if an election returned a majority to the National Assembly that was opposed to the president, then the president should step down (Barre 1986). Again, though, we should not be ignorant of the self-interested electoral motives of such a call.

We can see, therefore, that similar themes were present both at the time of constitutional choice and during the period of president/cabinet conflict. However, the positions of the main protagonists had flipped over time. For that reason, we cannot observe a direct line between the motivations of the actors present in 1958/1962 and the equivalent actors in 1986–1988, suggesting that there is little support for the idea that president/cabinet conflict during cohabitation was endogenous to the motivations that were present at the time of institutional choice. More than that, the main areas of conflict between the president and cabinet in 1986–1988

Table 7.3 Summary of the evidence that president/cabinet conflict in France (1986–1988) was endogenous to institutional choice (1958 and 1962)

Mechanism	*Evidence*
1	Good evidence. The constitution drafters deliberately aimed to create a strong directly elected president and a government with decision-making powers, though government responsibility to parliament was accepted with little discussion
2	Little evidence. The consequences of concurrent/non-concurrent elections were scarcely considered
3	Limited evidence. The potential for president/cabinet conflict during cohabitation was hardly considered
4	Limited evidence. Only the cohabitation president was present both at the time of constitutional choice and cohabitation
5	Some evidence. The cohabitation president had come into conflict with the cohabitation prime minister's party over the issue of institutional reform at the moment of institutional choice. However, with limited exceptions political parties were either divided or adopted
6	Limited evidence. The positions of the cohabitation president and the cohabitation prime minister's party had switched since the moment of institutional choice

were economic and social. This was the period when the Gaullists and most of the UDF wished to implement a Reagan-, or Thatcher-style form of neo-liberalism. These policies were resolutely opposed by the socialists, including President Mitterrand. Indeed, president/cabinet conflict was at its height when the president used his constitutional powers to slow down the government's privatization programmes, or criticized social reform. For these reasons, there is little evidence to support the idea that president/cabinet conflict in 1986–1988 merely reflected conflict that was expressed by the same or equivalent actors in 1958/1962. Table 7.3 summarizes the evidence from all six causal mechanisms relating president/cabinet conflict in France from 1986 to 1988 to the circumstances of institutional choice in 1958 and 1962.

7.4 Conclusion

The problem of endogenous institutional choice is potentially fatal to any institutionalist account of leadership outcomes. In this chapter, we have begun to address this issue. Through an in-depth theory-testing process-tracing case study, we have examined the circumstances in which

institutions associated with the presence of president/cabinet conflict in France were chosen and the relationship between those circumstances and the subsequent presence of such conflict some years later. We have seen that there is only limited evidence to suggest that president/cabinet conflict was endogenous to institutional choice. Only one of the six mechanisms provided good evidence to this end. Moreover, only one other provided some evidence. The remaining four mechanisms provided little or no convincing evidence. We have also seen that while there is only limited evidence to suggest that president/cabinet conflict was endogenous to institutional choice, we should be careful not to think of the endogeneity issue in binary terms. There was at least some evidence that the outcome was endogenous. Overall, though, we have good reason to believe that the presence of president/cabinet conflict in France from 1986 to 1988 was not seriously endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice, reinforcing the claim that such conflict was predominantly the result of institutional factors exercising an independent effect on political outcomes. Maybe, though, France was an inappropriate case to study this issue. To increase the robustness of our findings, we turn to the case of Romania.

Notes

1. The 1958 debates of the National Assembly are available at: http://archives.assemblee-nationale.fr/0/cri/index.asp, while the 1958 debates for the Council of the Republic are available at: http://www.senat.fr/comptes-rendus-seances/4eme/seances/S195806/S195806.html (both accessed 13 April 2016).
2. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Vᵉ République, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de l'élaboration de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958*, 4 volumes, La Documentation française, 1987–2001.
3. The testimonies include Goguel (1959) and the conferences are *Michel Debré et la Constitution de la Vème République*, *Actes du Colloque organise le samedi 3 octobre 1998 au Palais du Luxembourg*, Paris: Association des Amis de Michel Debré, 1999; and Maus et al. (1992).
4. The debates for the 1962 reform in the National Assembly are available at: http://archives.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/cri/index.asp (both accessed 13 April 2016), while the debates for the 1962 reform in the Senate are available at: www.senat.fr/comptes-rendus-seances/5eme/seances/s196210/s196210.html (both accessed 13 April 2016).

5. *Parlement[s], Revue d'histoire politique*, 2004, 3(HS1), Hors série: Changer de République? [1962–2004].
6. See, for example, the speeches of Charles de Gaulle for both the 1958 and 1962 period that are available at http://bit.ly/1RU2aNo (accessed 13 April 2016).
7. Loi constitutionnelle du 3 juin 1958 portant dérogation transitoire aux dispositions de l'article 90 de la Constitution, *Journal Officiel de la République française*, 4 juin 1958, p. 5326.
8. All translations from the French are by the author.
9. Assemblée nationale, 2ème séance du 2 juin 1958, p. 2621.
10. Conseil de la République, séance du 3 juin 1958, p. 958.
11. Assemblée nationale, 2ème séance du 2 juin 1958, p. 2624.
12. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1987: 191).
13. Ibid.: 235.
14. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1991: 301–302).
15. Ibid.
16. Assemblée nationale, 2ème séance du 2 juin 1958, p. 2620.
17. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1988: 83).
18. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1987: 251).
19. Ibid.: 277–278.
20. Loi constitutionnelle du 3 juin 1958 portant dérogation transitoire aux dispositions de l'article 90 de la Constitution, *Journal Officiel de la République française*, 4 juin 1958, p. 5326.
21. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1988: 89).
22. Ibid.: 95.
23. Ibid.
24. I would like to thank Bernard Dolez for his correspondence on this issue. However, the interpretation of the situation at this time remains entirely my own.
25. Charles de Gaulle, Discours du 20 septembre 1962, available at http://bit.ly/20H6YIi (accessed 15 April 2016).
26. See, for example, the reply by Prime Minister Pompidou to a question on this very issue during a television broadcast on 24 October. See Discours de Georges Pompidou, avril-décembre 1962, Entretien avec un journaliste de la RTF (24 octobre 1962), p. 58, available at www.georges-pompidou.asso.fr/Documentation/Discours/discours_Pompidou_1962.pdf (accessed 15 April 2016).

27. De Gaulle announced the referendum on the basis of Article 11 of the Constitution rather than Article 89, which many believed was the proper constitutional way to propose such a reform.
28. Assemblée nationale, 1ère séance du 4 octobre 1962, p. 3209.
29. Sénat, séance du mardi 9 octobre, p. 1306.
30. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1987: 272).
31. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1988: 310 and 312).
32. Discours de Georges Pompidou, avril-décembre 1962, Entretien avec un journaliste de la RTF (24 octobre 1962), p. 58, available at www.georges-pompidou.asso.fr/Documentation/Discours/discours_Pompidou_1962.pdf
33. See the article by him in *Le Monde*, 16 September 1983.
34. Thanks to Bernard Dolez for raising this issue. The interpretation presented here remains entirely my own.
35. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1988: 77).
36. Ibid.: 96.
37. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1991: 312).
38. Assemblée nationale, 1ère séance du 4 octobre 1962, p. 3227. There is a further reference at Assemblée nationale, 2ème séance du 4 octobre 1962, p. 3251.
39. Comité national chargé de la publication des travaux préparatoires des institutions de la Ve République (1988: 90).
40. Ibid.
41. Charles de Gaulle, Discours sur l'élection du Président au suffrage universel, 18 octobre 1962, available at http://bit.ly/1S54uRZ (accessed 18 April 2016).
42. Cited in François (1992: 132).
43. Assemblée nationale, 1ère séance du 4 octobre 1962, p. 3209.
44. Ibid.: 3218.
45. Assemblée nationale, 1ère séance du 1 juin 1958, p. 2585.
46. Ibid.
47. Sénat, 2ème séance du jeudi 4 octobre, p. 1293.
48. Assemblée nationale, séance du 24 avril 1964, pp. 942–946.
49. Ibid.: 943.
50. The full text of de Gaulle's press conference is available at http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/textes/degaulle31011964.htm (accessed 20 April 2016).
51. Assemblée nationale, séance du 24 avril 1964, p. 946.
52. Interview in *Le Monde*, 2 July 1981.

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CHAPTER 8

Institutional Choice and Cohabitation in Romania

In this chapter, we examine the politics of institutional choice in Romania. We focus on the highly conflictual period of cohabitation in Romania from 2007 to 2008. To what extent was the high degree of intra-executive conflict during this period endogenous to the motivations of political actors during the period of institutional choice from 1989 to 1991? In the previous chapter, we showed that there was only relatively limited evidence to suggest that president/cabinet conflict in France from 1986 to 1988 was endogenous to the circumstances surrounding institutional choice there in 1958 and 1962. Using the same framework to examine the case of Romania, we find even less evidence to suggest that president/cabinet conflict was endogenous in this regard. Overall, we cannot conclude from these two case studies that president/cabinet conflict is never endogenous, never mind that the effect of institutions on leadership outcomes is always completely exogenous. Even so, we would claim that the ground for believing that institutions have an independent effect on leadership outcomes is more fixed than it was previously.

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8.1 President/Cabinet Conflict in Romania, 2007–2008

In the previous chapter, we examined a case in France. The politics of institutional choice is necessarily country-specific, but it is possible that there is something so idiosyncratic about the French case that our results were somehow systematically biased in favour of finding little evidence to suggest that president/cabinet conflict during cohabitation was endogenous to the process of institutional choice. Therefore, we wish to choose a case from another country. In the French case, we found that decision makers did not have a clear concept of what we now understand to be "cohabitation" when they were choosing institutions in 1958/1962. For this reason, we wish to focus on a case from a country that embarked on the process of institutional choice after the first period of cohabitation in France. This way, we can be sure that decision makers had at least the opportunity to consider the potential for cohabitation when choosing institutions.

In Chap. 5, we identified 12 cabinets where there was a high level of president/cabinet conflict. These cabinets were in four countries: France, Poland, Portugal, and Romania. Having excluded France, we can also rule out Portugal, because the process of institutional choice there occurred in the mid-1970s prior to the first period of cohabitation in France. In this context, we focus on Romania rather than Poland. We do so because Poland has had two constitutions since the transition began there in 1989. In 1992, a so-called little constitution was adopted, while in 1997, the current constitution was approved. The 1992 constitution was more than an interim document, but there was always the expectation that it would soon be replaced by a more permanent regime. The presence of two constitutions complicates the type of analysis that we wish to undertake in this chapter. By contrast, Romania adopted its current post-communist constitution in 1991, passing only relatively minor amendments to it on one occasion since in 2003. By selecting Romania, we can focus on a single process of constitutional choice that post-dates the French experience of cohabitation in the knowledge that a period of highly conflictual president/cabinet conflict subsequently occurred there.

We focus on the period of cohabitation in Romania from April 2007 to December 2008. On 28 November and 12 December 2004, Romania held concurrent presidential and legislative elections. The presidential

election was won by Traian Băsescu from the Democratic Party (*Partidul Democrat*—PD). The PD campaigned as part of the Justice and Truth Alliance (*Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr*—DA Alliance) with the National Liberal Party (*Partidul Național Liberal*—PNL). On 29 December, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu from the PNL won an investiture vote in parliament and became prime minister. The government included ministers from the PD and PNL, as well as both the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (*Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România*—UDMR), which had campaigned as a separate party at the elections, and the Romanian Humanist Party (*Partidul Umanist Român*—PUR), which had contested the election against the DA Alliance on a platform with the Social Democratic Party (*Partidul Social Democrat*—PSD). Representatives of the national minorities also supported the government in parliament. In December 2006, the PUR, which at this point had already changed its name to the Conservative Party (*Partidul Conservator*—PC), left the governing coalition. By this time, relations between the president and the prime minister had also become very strained (Dima 2014: 296–297). Events came to a head on 1 April 2007 when Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu dismissed the PD ministers from office. Two days later, the new government won a confidence vote in the legislature with the support of the PSD, even though there was no formal alliance between the two parties in parliament. This began a period of cohabitation between a minority PNL/UDMR government and a PD president that lasted until the legislative elections of December 2008. President/cabinet relations were highly conflictual during this period. Most notably, on 19 April 2007, the Romanian parliament voted to impeach President Băsescu and he was suspended from office. This generated a referendum to confirm the decision. The referendum was held on 19 May 2007, but the impeachment decision was not supported and President Băsescu resumed office (ibid.: 239–240). Nonetheless, there were frequent disagreements between the president and the government over the next 18 months. Indeed, for the comparative study in Chap. 5, we asked seven experts on Romania to assess the level of president/cabinet conflict for all cabinet units from 1994 to 2014. They all returned the highest possible value of conflict for the 2007–2008 cabinet. In short, there is agreement that this was a highly conflictual period of cohabitation.

We wish to determine whether the high level of president/cabinet conflict during this period was endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice. To do so, we turn to the period 1989–1991.

8.2 Institutional Choice in Romania, 1989–1991

The period of institutional choice in Romania spanned the immediate aftermath of the revolution against Nicolae Ceaușescu's communist regime in December 1989 to the approval of the new constitution in a referendum held in December 1991. On 16 December 1989, demonstrations in Timișoara were repressed by the state authorities. However, they continued there, and on 21 December, Ceaușescu gave a speech in Bucharest to denounce the ongoing unrest. The crowd reacted negatively to the speech and demonstrations against the regime began in the capital. Ceaușescu could not control the situation and by lunchtime on 22 December, he decided to flee, though he was very quickly captured. Later that day, a former Communist party official, Ion Iliescu, made a "statement to the country" on behalf of the National Salvation Front (*Frontul Salvării Naționale*—FSN), indicating that the FSN had taken power. Following a brief trial, Ceaușescu and his wife were executed on 25 December. By 27 December, the initial period of the Romanian Revolution was complete. The former regime had completely collapsed, the FSN had assumed control, and the process of institutional reform was about to begin.

The new regime had to engage in a wholesale process of economic, social, and political reform. We focus solely on the process of institutional choice relating to the structure of the executive and executive/legislative relations. In the very early period of the FSN's rule, the two key documents in this regard were Decree Law no. 2/1989 of 27 December 1989, which dissolved the previous regime and established the Council of the FSN as the country's ruling body, and Decree Law no. 10/1989 of 31 December 1989 on the structure of government of the FSN. These Decree Laws included very little organizational detail. The wider political context changed on 23 January when the FSN announced that it was going to participate in the first elections under the new regime, effectively transforming it from a social movement to a political party. The FSN was already highly contested by this time (Siani-Davies 2007). All the same, the decision to organize itself as a political party meant that the FSN could no longer claim to be speaking for all groups in the country. This led to a series of meetings between representatives of the FSN and the other political parties that had emerged in the aftermath of the revolution. These meetings resulted in the creation of the Provisional Council for National Unity (*Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Națională*—CPUN), or parliament

of 100 days, on 9 February 1990. The CPUN contained 150 representatives from the FSN and an equal number from all other parties and groups put together with a maximum of three representatives per party or group. It was an early sign that the main cleavage in the post-communist transition period was the FSN versus everyone else. This cleavage can also be interpreted as pitting the neo-communists in the FSN against the anti-communists in both the historic political parties that had re-emerged after the revolution and the new parties that had formed since this time (Pavel and Huiu 2003: 91–109). On 14 March 1990, the CPUN issued Decree Law no. 92/1990, which was officially published on 18 March. This was an interim constitutional document. It set out in great detail the electoral procedures that would govern the first elections to the new parliament. It also established some basic institutional rules for the governance of the country from the period after the elections until the passage of a new constitution.

The March 1990 Decree Law paved the way for concurrent presidential and legislative elections that were held on 20 May 1990. Ion Iliescu won the presidential election with 85.1 per cent of the vote. The FSN also won a large majority in both houses of parliament. On 11 July 1990, the new parliament met as a Constituent Assembly for the first time. It established a Committee for Drafting the Project of the Constitution (or Constitutional Commission). The Commission comprised 23 deputies and senators from the new legislature, 13 of whom were representatives of the FSN, plus 5 legal experts, including one who was an adviser to the president and another who was an adviser to the prime minister (Iorgovan 1998: 744–745).[1] The chair of the committee, Antonie Iorgovan, was an independent senator, whom many believed to be close to the FSN (Blokker 2013: 191).[2] Overall, the FSN had a bare majority on the Constitutional Commission, but certainly enjoyed a plurality of views there.[3] The Commission drew up a set of Theses, or proposals, that constituted a sort of pre-draft of the new constitution.[4] They were made public on 14 December 1990 and were discussed in the Constituent Assembly from 13 February to 19 June 1991. These discussions resulted in a draft constitution that was published on 2 July 1991. Following proposed amendments from members of the legislature, further plenary debate was held in the Constituent Assembly from 2 September to 21 November 1991, at which time the final draft constitution was approved. This was the document that was put to a vote and ratified in the December 1991 referendum (see the chronology in Table 8.1).

Table 8.1 Chronology of institutional choice in Romania December 1989–December 1991

Date	*Event*
16 December 1989	The Romanian Revolution begins in Timișoara
22 December 1989	Nicolae Ceaușescu flees Bucharest and is captured The FSN makes a statement to the country
25 December 1989	Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife are executed
27 December 1989	The FSN decrees the abolition of the one-party system
23 January 1990	The FSN announces that it will contest elections
9 February 1990	The CPUN is created, meeting until 11 May 1990
18 March 1990	The CPUN decrees new post-electoral government structures
20 May 1990	The FSN wins the presidential and legislative elections
11 July 1990	The Constituent Assembly meets and creates a Constitutional Commission
14 December 1990	The Constitutional Commission presents constitutional Theses to the Constituent Assembly
16–17 April 1991	The Constituent Assembly debates the Theses relating to the presidency
2 July 1991	The draft constitution is published
21 November 1991	The constitution is approved by the Constituent Assembly
8 December 1991	The constitution is approved in a referendum

Having established the period under consideration, we now apply our theory-testing process-tracing method to the events during this time. We are interested in the same outcome as in the previous chapter. Therefore, we focus on the same causal mechanisms as before. What is the evidence that president/cabinet conflict in Romania from 2007 to 2008 was endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice in 1989–1991?

8.3 Institutional Choice and President/Cabinet Conflict in Romania

We wish to investigate the intentions of the actors during the 1989–1991 period. We also wish to rely as far as possible on primary sources. That said, we cannot hope to cover all of the deliberations that occurred throughout this time. Moreover, many of the discussions were either never recorded or remain unavailable. All the same, we do have access to the full transcripts of all of the plenary meetings of the CPUN in early 1990 as well as to the transcripts of all of the plenary meetings of the Constituent Assembly from 13 February 1991 to 21 November 1991.

These are the main documents that we draw upon, though we should note that the meetings of the Assembly after 10 September 1991 were mainly concerned with technical issues relating to the wording of the new constitution rather than set-piece debates. In addition, we also have the full texts of the various Decree Laws, as well as the December 1990 Theses, the July 1991 draft constitution, and, of course, the final document itself. While transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission are not available, we do have a long account of the work of this committee from July 1990 to November 1991 written by its chair, Antonie Iorgovan. This book (Iorgovan 1998) does provide transcripts of some of the discussions that took place within the Commission and also reproduces a number of official documents that were drawn up throughout the course of the drafting process. Using these primary sources, we now examine whether or not there is evidence to suggest that president/cabinet conflict in Romania from 2007 to 2008 was endogenous to the process of constitutional choice there from 1989 to 1991.

8.3.1 Endogenous Institutional Choice?

1. Did the actors/parties who chose the institutions deliberately try to create a strong directly elected presidency alongside a prime minister/cabinet with decision-making powers that was responsible to the legislature?

(i) *Direct presidential elections*

Decree Laws no. 2/1989 and no. 10/1989 established a basic parliamentary system.[5] Decree Law no. 2/1989 of 27 December formalized the Council of the National Salvation Front (*Consiliului Frontului Salvării Naţionale*—CFSN). The CFSN comprised 145 unelected members and was the equivalent of a parliament, having the power to issue decree laws. In turn, the CFSN elected an 11-person executive bureau, including a president. Ion Iliescu was elected as president of the executive bureau on 26 December. In this capacity, he chaired the meetings of the CFSN. This Decree Law also formalized the position of a prime minister. The CFSN was given the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister. Petre Roman was appointed to this office also on 26 December. Decree Law no. 10/1989 of 31 December added a little more detail about the functioning of the government as a whole. However, the basic aspects of the system

were not altered, except that the government was made collectively responsible to the CFSN. Decree Law no. 81/1990 of 9 February that created the CPUN did not change this situation. This Decree Law merely replaced the CFSN with the CPUN and doubled the size of the de facto parliament. This constitutional arrangement lasted until after the first elections under the new regime in May 1990. During this short period, therefore, Petre Roman was the head of a government that was collectively accountable to the de facto parliament, and Ion Iliescu was the equivalent of an indirectly elected president, who also chaired the parliament. In practical terms, though, Ion Iliescu was the most powerful figure in the new regime.

The decision to create a directly elected president was included in Decree Law no. 92/1990 of 14 March 1990 (Art. 3 and Art. 7).[6] When the CPUN considered the draft decree law on 9 March, Iliescu declared that the various elements of the draft had already been debated both in the press and in seven meetings that had taken place between the FSN and nascent political parties (IRRdD 2009b: 314) from 27 January to 21 February (IRRdD 2009a: 92). Perhaps for that reason, there was hardly any discussion of the pros and cons of direct election in the plenary meetings of the CPUN. On 9 March, FSN representative, Marţian Dan, did make a brief case for direct presidential elections, arguing that the will of the people should be trusted after years of authoritarianism (IRRdD 2009b: 330). There were also opposition attempts to delay the presidential election. For example, Mihai Constantinescu, who went on to be an adviser to the prime minister, suggested holding a referendum on the form of government prior to holding general elections (IRRdD 2009b: 328). In the context of early 1990, the idea of the "form of government" usually referred not so much to details about presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, or parliamentarism, but to the idea of a monarchy in place of a republic headed by a president. Some of the liberals in the CPUN and elsewhere were in favour of the restoration of a monarchy. However, this idea was not debated in the CPUN. Indeed, it remained unspoken. There is not a single reference to the monarchy in this respect during the debate on the form of government in the CPUN. So, the idea of creating a monarchy was in the air and had some supporters, but this proposal was not explicitly discussed in the CPUN. Indeed, Constantinescu's proposal about a referendum on the form of government was not even put to a vote. There was a vote on 9 March specifically to delete the proposal to directly elect the president from the draft decree law, but it was easily defeated (ibid.: 331).

The FSN was opposed to the return of the monarchy and clearly hoped to benefit from the introduction of direct presidential elections. Ion Iliescu himself did not speak in support of direct presidential elections. Instead, he spoke in favour of the draft decree law as a whole, which, of course, included the proposal. Given his position in the fledgling regime, there is no doubt that he expected to gain personally from this element of the decree law and he was not disappointed in that regard.[7]

Following Iliescu's election as president in May 1990 and with the prospect that he would also win any direct election under the new constitution, there was little likelihood of reversing the decision to directly elect the president. Iorgovan (1998: 34) notes that the Constitutional Commission was operating in the context where the "formula of a semi-presidential republic" was already in place, singling out the direct election of the president in this regard. The debates in the Commission are not recorded, but there is a sense from Iorgovan's summary that the direct election of the president was never seriously in question. For example, he notes that the briefing document given to the members of the Commission was focused "on the solution already established by the Law-Decree no. 92/1990", including direct election. The bigger issue, as we shall see, was the power of the president in the new constitution. In the end, while the Commission did include alternative propositions for some clauses when presenting the Theses to the Constituent Assembly in December 1990, it did not present an alternative to the direct election of the president.

With the Theses establishing direct presidential elections as the default position, the issue of how the head of state should be selected was debated in the plenary meeting of the Constituent Assembly on 16 April 1991. As President of Romania, Iliescu was not a member of the Assembly, but representatives of the FSN spoke in favour of a directly elected president. For example, one of President Iliescu's advisers, Florin Vasilescu, spoke in favour of the measure, arguing that it would give the presidency the same legitimacy as the legislature (Stănescu-Stanciu et al. 2011: 681). That said, there were still proponents of a return to a monarchy as well as supporters of the indirect election of the president. For instance, György Frunda of the UDMR proposed that the president should be elected by parliament and local authorities, arguing that this was the way in which local actors could express their opinions in the most democratic manner (ibid.: 693). Others argued that a directly elected president would lead to a return to dictatorship and wanted a parliamentary system with an indirectly elected president (Stănescu-Stanciu and Neacşu 2011: 702–703). When a secret

vote was taken on 17 April 1991, the proposal to reject direct elections was easily defeated.[8] From that point on, the matter was definitively resolved.

Overall, the provision for the direct election of the president was a very deliberate act and one that clearly suited both the incumbent leader and most powerful figure in the new regime, Ion Iliescu, and the majority party, the FSN. In this regard, we should consider this institutional feature to have been endogenously chosen.

(ii) *Presidential powers*

The situation with regard to the powers of the president and the government is more complex. As we have already noted, in the immediate post-revolutionary period, executive governance was regulated by Decree Laws no. 2/1989 and no. 10/1989. The wording of these decrees was very general. The latter made provision for the post of a prime minister, but there was no detail about the role of the office. These documents were then effectively superseded by the March 1990 Decree Law, which made mention of a prime minister, but which again provided little information about either the prime minister's role or the responsibilities of the government generally. By contrast, this time reference was made to a president of Romania. Moreover, the future president's role was stipulated in some detail. Chapter 7 (Arts. 81–83) of the March 1990 Decree Law addressed the presidency, with Article 82 containing 13 clauses and a number of subclauses in which the president's powers were set out. These powers were relatively extensive, giving the president a degree of leeway over the appointment of the government, the convocation of parliament, foreign affairs, and so on. By contrast, there was no specific Chapter or Article devoted to either the prime minister or the government collectively. The president's proposed powers were the subject of a short period of debate in the CPUN on 14 March. Notably, Mihai Constantinescu questioned some of the president's prerogatives (IRRdD 2009c: 173), but the vote confirmed the wording of the draft decree law. Overall, we can conclude that the institutional arrangements in place following the May 1990 presidential and parliamentary elections reflected the preferences of Ion Iliescu and those in the FSN who were in power around him.

In contrast to the provision for direct presidential elections, though, the issue of the president's powers was not resolved by the March 1990 Decree Law. In fact, the relative powers of the president and the govern-

ment were considered at length in the Constitutional Commission. Here, there were supporters of a strong presidency. In an interview on 14 September 1990, Iliescu himself said that the constitution-making process would result in an "active presidency" (Sislin 1991: 404). In the Commission, Iorgovan (1998: 76) notes that the president's adviser, Florin Vasilescu, was "on his back", refusing to accept a purely decorative presidency. At the same time, there were also those who wanted the president's powers to be curtailed. They included Mihai Constantinescu, who was an adviser to the FSN Prime Minister, Petre Roman. The competing preferences of the representatives from the presidential and prime ministerial offices led to what Iorgovan calls "the argument of the Gods" (ibid.: 16) and the "war of the roses" (ibid.: 84).[9] More generally, though, Iorgovan (ibid.: 35) states that "all members of the Commission were very concerned that we might make a mistake and arrive at a formula for a President who would, sooner or later, become a dictator". Iorgovan makes his own position very clear in this regard, stating that one of his "obsessions during that entire period" (ibid.) was how to devise a successful strategy to reduce the president's powers. In the end, Mihai Iacobescu, an FSN representative on the Commission, proposed a solution (ibid.). The constitution would be worded such that president would act in a French-style arbiter (or mediator) role, representing the national interest, whereas the government would be explicitly responsible for day-to-day policy matters (ibid.: 106). Iorgovan notes that this solution was maintained for the rest of the constitution-drafting process, though not without "a fierce political fight" (ibid.: 229). It is also worth noting that the president was provided with special responsibilities in the areas of foreign policy, national defence, and public order.[10] This suited Iliescu and his supporters and was undoubtedly necessary for their support.

The December 1990 Theses reflected the solution arrived at in the Commission. What is more, Law no. 30 of 7 December 1990 on the Organization and Functioning of Government specified the role of the prime minister and government much more clearly than before and gave the government considerable policy responsibility.[11] For example, Article 1 stated that the "Government is the central body of executive power", and Article 2 stated that the "Government consists of the Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Ministers and Secretaries of State". Article 4 gave the President no power to dismiss ministers. Article 5 also restricted the occasions when the President could be present at Cabinet meetings. Article 13 stated that the "Prime Minister leads the Government and coordinates the

activities of its members". It is scarcely a coincidence that this Law was drafted at the same time as the Theses were being drawn up. It was consistent with the solution that had been found in the Constitutional Commission, suggesting that both the president and the prime minister and their supporters within the FSN as a whole were willing to accept it.

There are at least three reasons why the FSN refused to insist on a strong president even though they enjoyed a majority on the Constitutional Commission and an overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly. First, the FSN was not united on the issue. There were two clear factions within the movement on the issue of the president's powers. Those within the FSN who were in favour of a weaker presidency were supported by the non-FSN members of the Commission. Therefore, even though Iliescu and his supporters fought for a strong presidency, they were unable simply to force their ideas on the Commission. This leads us to question whether the subsequent period of president/cabinet conflict was endogenous to the circumstances of this element of the original institutional choice. The particular type of constitutional relationship between the president and prime minister that was arrived at in the Commission was necessary for the conflictual period of cohabitation to occur later, but it was not the first-preference institutional choice of anyone on the Constitutional Commission. It was simply a solution that allowed discussion to move on.

Second, there was a strong French influence on the Romanian constitution-making process (Perju 2015). In January 1990, the President of the French Constitutional Council, Robert Badinter, visited Romania and met with Iliescu and the FSN in January 1990 (IRRdD 2009b: 317). From 7 to 13 October 1990, a delegation from France came to Romania to meet with the Constitutional Commission (Iorgovan 1998: 753–754). The composition of this delegation again included Robert Badinter. It also included Guy Braibant, a specialist on public law and member of the Conseil d'État; Didier Maus, a prominent academic whose work focused on the French parliament; and François Luchaire, a constitutional lawyer whom we came across previously as an adviser to General de Gaulle in 1958. In addition, prominent French constitutional lawyers also had an influence through their work with the Council of Europe's Venice Commission. For example, Constantinescu and Muraru (1998: 379) mention the work of Jean Gicquel in this regard. The French model was not "faithfully followed" (Vrabie 2009: 12) by Romanian constitution makers. Indeed, Manuel Guțan (2012: 278) notes that the provision for the president to act as an arbiter, or mediator, was in fact the result of

"selective borrowing from Article 5 of the 1958 French Constitution and Article 56 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution" where the term "mediator" is used.[12] All the same, we can reasonably assume that Romanian decision makers were familiar with the French case. In France, as we saw in the previous chapter, presidential power is primarily exercised through a loyal presidential majority in the legislature, rather than through a president with considerable constitutional powers. In this context, according to Perju (2015: 250), Iliescu calculated "that the semi-presidential model would allow him to exert as much political control as he wanted while maintaining a constitutionalist façade of checks and balances". There was no need for Iliescu and his supporters to insist on wide-ranging presidential prerogatives in the new constitution. It is worth noting that even though the March 1990 Decree Law specified a long list of presidential powers, some of them were already constrained. For example, Article 82 (a) stated that the president appoints the prime minister from the largest group in parliament. Yet, after the May 1990 elections, the president's party was by far the largest group in parliament. So, this *de jure* constraint had little de facto effect. Iliescu probably calculated that the same situation would occur under the new constitution. This helps to explain why he was willing to agree to the solution proposed in the Constitutional Commission. This also reinforces the idea that conflictual cohabitation was not endogenous to the circumstances of this aspect of constitutional choice. The creation of an executive diarchy put in place the institutional conditions for cohabitation to occur, but Iliescu and his supporters were not expecting it to occur at least in the foreseeable future. They expected the president to continue to be supported by a majority in parliament. In this context, they were willing to give away some of the president's constitutional powers, because they believed that the president would retain political authority, governing through a loyal majority and the cabinet. The prospect of cohabitation was absent from their calculations, suggesting future president/cabinet conflict was not endogenous to institutional choice.

Third, constitution makers were subject to international pressure. For many international observers, the Romanian Revolution had not resulted in complete regime change. The majority of leading FSN figures had been second and third-ranking communist officials previously. In addition, the government was also willing to resort to strong-arm tactics to maintain its control on power. For example, in June 1990, miners from outside Bucharest came to the capital and used physical force to help to disperse

anti-government protests. In this context, there was a belief that the incumbent regime might already be drifting towards authoritarianism. It is likely that international observers wanted the constitution to be worded in a way that minimized the likelihood of any such drift occurring in the future. In this regard, meetings with the Council of Europe's Venice Commission were probably important. On 18 October 1990, the Constitutional Commission met with a delegation from the Venice Commission (Iorgovan 1998: 68). The Council also commented on the November Theses. In a note dated 8 January 1991 for a meeting to be held between the Constitutional Commission and the Venice Commission on 8–9 February, Jean-Claude Scholsem, who had been a member of the October delegation, reported that that the president's powers "appear to be very large".[13] He went on to say that the "President's place in the constitutional and political system risks being preponderant and perhaps excessive".[14] In the Conclusion to the note, he identified a number of points that "would appear to be of extreme importance". The first of these was "The place and the role of the President which appears in certain respects to be disproportionate".[15] In this context, it is reasonable to conclude that international pressure may have played a part in creating and/or maintaining the constitutional compromise that reduced the power of the president. If this interpretation is correct, then again it suggests that this aspect of the constitution-making process was not endogenous to the motivations of the incumbent regime.

The Theses may have reflected a compromise on the issue of the president's powers, but the issue was still the subject of debate. On 6 December 1990, Prime Minister Roman sent a long letter to the Constitutional Commission, specifying in detail the ways in which the president's powers should be further reduced.[16] The issue of the president's powers was also hotly debated in the plenary meetings of the Constituent Assembly. On 16 April, Vasilescu expressed the opinion that there was no point in creating a directly elected president and then only giving the institution "second-order attributes" (Stănescu-Stanciu and Neacşu 2011: 682). Interestingly, though, this speech was more a defence of the powers that had already been given to the president than a call for extra powers to be transferred to the office. Certainly, neither Vasilescu nor other representatives of the FSN proposed any significant increase in the president's power from what had been outlined in the Theses. In the end, only relatively minor changes were made to the president's powers. That said, one ongoing issue concerned the president's role in government formation (Iorgovan 1998:

229). In essence, the presidential camp wanted the wording of the government formation clause to remain relatively vague, giving the president the opportunity to intervene if a clear-cut prime minister-designate was not forthcoming after the legislative elections. The other camp wished to specify the process more clearly, reducing the president's leeway. In the end, the wording was closer to the latter option.

When the Constituent Assembly had finished debating the Theses and following a further visit from a delegation from the Council of Europe,[17] the Constitutional Commission drew up a full draft constitution, presenting it to parliamentarians on 2 July 1991.[18] They were then able to propose amendments. More than 1000 were tabled (Iorgovan 1998: 356). Needless to say, the delicate compromise that had been reached on the issue of the president's powers could not simply be unpicked at this stage. However, there were some changes between the July draft and the final document that was approved in November. Notably, whereas it was stated in the July draft that the president had to consult with the presidents of both Chambers of Parliament prior to any parliamentary dissolution, in the final version, it stated that the president had to consult with the leaders of the parliamentary groups as well. In addition, whereas the July draft stated that "The Government is politically responsible for its entire activity before Parliament", the final version added the word "only, such that it read 'only before Parliament'". This made it clear that the government was not even implicitly responsible to the president. Overall, as Ceterchi (1992: 121) states, the final version of the constitution "tended to reinforce the parliament's control over the executive" relative to the July draft.

To sum up, the 1991 Constitution created a limited presidency and a strong government. This is exactly the type of constitutional situation that was necessary for the period of conflictual cohabitation that lay ahead. This might encourage the interpretation that the subsequent presence of cohabitation was endogenous to institutional choice. However, this is not the type of arrangement that might have been predicted after the passage of March 1990 Decree Law, which seemed to presage a powerful presidential institution. Moreover, it is clear that in the Constitutional Commission, the incumbent president and his entourage initially wanted a more powerful president. This suggests that the relationship between the president and cabinet was not endogenous to the preferences of the incumbent leader.[19] Equally, the president's opponents would themselves have preferred a weaker presidency still. For example, Iorgovan (ibid.: 84) remarks wryly that one of the funniest moments of the Commission's

work was when someone proposed deleting the phrase "The President is the supreme head of the army", without specifying who should be the head in the president's place. In short, the constitutional compromise was everyone's second-best solution. It may have created the conditions for the period of conflictual cohabitation in 2007, but it was not the product of the first-preference constitutional choice of the incumbent leaders. Instead, it was agreed in a context where Iliescu believed that he would still be able to govern in a French-style manner through the legislature and government. It was also at least partly the result of international pressure. For these reasons, we conclude that the subsequent presence of cohabitation was not endogenous to institutional choice in this regard.

(iii) *Government responsibility to the legislature*

The issue of the government's responsibility to the legislature needs to be seen in the context of the broader debate about whether the country was going to adopt a presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary system. In the CPUN, there was no real debate on this topic. It was assumed that the Constituent Assembly would address this issue. A high-level FSN representative, Marţian Dan, did show an awareness of the French semi-presidential system, but this was in the context of arguing for direct presidential elections rather than government responsibility as well (IRRdD 2009b: 330). In addition, Grigore Tănăsescu, who represented the Socialist Party of Justice (*Partidul Socialist al Dreptăţii*), argued that a decision needed to be taken as to whether a presidential or parliamentary system was being adopted, noting that in France, a parliamentary system had previously led to years of instability (IRRdD 2009c: 182). That said, there was little debate on this topic. The March 1990 Decree Law included direct presidential elections and specified that the appointment of the government had to be approved by a vote of the National Assembly and the Senate, but made no provision for any government responsibility to the legislature thereafter. In this way, it established a semi-presidential system, even though responsibility to the legislature was a one-shot game at the beginning of the government's term.

Following the election of the Constituent Assembly, the Constitutional Commission was left to recommend the specific nature of the regime. Here, the situation was clarified relatively quickly. In his book, Iorgovan (1998: 751) records that one of the issues to be debated from 18 to 27 September 1990 was whether there should be a parliamentary or a semi-

presidential republic. That is to say, presidentialism was not on the table by this time. There was a clear fear that presidential systems had the potential to slip into authoritarianism. For example, Iorgovan records Dan Amedeo Lăzărescu making this argument during the Constitutional Commission's meeting of 20 September 1990. As we have seen, though, the Commission was working in the context of a semi-presidential system that was already in place. This meant that the parliamentary option was unlikely to be adopted. Indeed, during the same speech on 20 September, Lăzărescu also reminded members of the Commission that Romania had bad memories of a previous parliamentary regime—a parliamentary monarchy—in the late nineteenth century (ibid.: 34–35). In the same meeting, Adrian Moțiu linked the authoritarian outcome of Romania's experience of a parliamentary monarchy with Ceaușescu's communist rule in a later period (ibid.: 35). Again, this did little to recommend a parliamentary system to the members of the Commission. With the direct election of the president already entrenched, with the Commission only debating options where the government was responsible to the legislature, and with the parliamentary system historically discredited, a semi-presidential regime had in effect become the natural option. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the FSN would have accepted anything else. Certainly, even though there were divisions within the FSN over the issue of the president's powers, there was no significant division on the issue of either direct presidential elections or government responsibility to the legislature. As we have seen, the main area of contention was how powerful the president should be in such a regime. In this context, the December 1990 Theses included provision for the government's responsibility to the legislature, including specific procedures for parliamentary motions of no-confidence in the government.

In the plenary sessions of the Constituent Assembly, the issue of government responsibility was debated only indirectly. The opponents of direct presidential elections sometimes claimed that a presidential system was being introduced (Stănescu-Stanciu and Neacşu 2011: 708), though it is not always clear whether this was because they simply misunderstood the nature of the regime that was being proposed, or whether, and perhaps more likely, they were trying to frame the proposed regime as presidential in the hope that this would increase support for their preferred parliamentary alternative.[20] Certainly, there was no support for the introduction of a US-style presidential regime without any government responsibility to the legislature. Again, the plenary debates were more

concerned with the issue of direct presidential elections and the president's powers, rather than with the issue of the government's responsibility to the legislature, which was in effect taken for granted.

Overall, we can conclude that the issue of government responsibility to the legislature was a deliberate choice from very early on. For sure, government responsibility was simply taken for granted for the most part. All the same, to the extent that all actors deliberately chose this element of the constitution and were aware that it gave parliament the ability to approve and bring down a government, then the evidence suggests that cohabitation was mainly endogenous to this aspect of constitutional choice.

2. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions aware that a non-concurrent presidential and legislative electoral cycle could generate mid-presidential term cohabitation and/or that concurrent elections could generate cohabitation at the beginning of the president's term if there was split-ticket voting?

Unlike the situation in France in 1958, the issue of concurrent presidential and legislative elections was debated at some length in Romania, but only after the May 1990 elections which themselves were held concurrently. During the January and February 1990 multi-party talks that led to the creation of the CPUN, it was agreed that concurrent presidential and legislative elections would be held in May. In the CPUN itself, this issue was not debated. On 10 March 1990, concern was expressed that elections were being held too swiftly, the subtext being that the FSN was likely to be the main beneficiary given the political climate of the time. However, Iliescu defended the decision to hold the elections in May, noting that Robert Badinter had told him that in the context of a post-revolutionary situation, it was actually quite late to be holding elections at that time (IRRdD 2009b: 317).[21] In fact, the only related issue that was debated in the CPUN concerned the issue of presidential term limits after the May elections. In January 1990, Article 3 of the draft version of what was to become the March 1990 Decree Law included a statement that the president's term would limited to "one or two mandates at most" (IRRdD 2009a: 66). However, following talks between the political parties in early February, it was decided to specify a two-term limit for the president (ibid.: 90). Following further discussions, though, it was agreed that the future Constituent Assembly would be automatically dissolved if a constitution had not been drawn up within 18 months (ibid.: 95). For

that reason, by early March, it had been resolved that there was no need to include any reference to presidential term limits in Article 3 of the Decree Law (ibid.: 101).

In this context, the Constitutional Commission proposed a five-year presidential term and a four-year term for both the National Assembly and the Senate in the December 1990 Theses (Iorgovan 1998: 782, 786). Iorgovan gives no information as to why the Commission decided to recommend non-concurrent terms in the Theses. Whatever the reason for non-concurrent terms, Jean-Claude Scholsem from the Venice Commission mentioned this issue in his 8 January 1991 report. Noting the proposal for non-concurrent terms and also that the president would have the power to dissolve the legislature, he writes, "If the Chambers (or just one them) are elected part way through the president's term and the election marks a change in the political complexion of the electoral body, will the president resign, or will he be forced into a period of cohabitation?".[22] He went on to record that these are among "a number of questions that need to be asked".

With non-concurrent terms now the default position but with the matter having been questioned by international observers, the issue was raised in the plenary debates of the Constituent Assembly on 26 and 27 March and 16 and 17 April 1991. On 26 March, Marian Enache, a deputy from the FSN, argued for concurrent elections, stating that he was indifferent as to whether it was for a four- or five-year term (Stănescu-Stanciu and Neacşu 2011: 542). He framed this argument in terms of the risk of the parliamentary majority being opposed to the president and the "convulsions" that this situation could lead to both between the executive and parliament and within the executive (ibid.). On 27 March, Ioan Deleanu, an expert on the Constitutional Commission, also argued in favour of concurrent terms, because of the prospect of "tense relations" that could occur between the president and the parliamentary majority if elections were non-concurrent (ibid.: 648). On 16 April, Dimitrie-Gabriel Nicolescu from the FSN further argued in favour of concurrent elections because of "political tensions" that might arise between a president and a parliament "and implicitly a government of different political colors" (ibid.: 713). In this context, the issue came to a head on 17 April 1991 when a vote was taken on the matter. A proposal to introduce concurrent presidential and parliamentary terms was approved by a large majority (Stănescu-Stanciu et al. 2011: 46). Again, this vote effectively concluded the debate on the issue.

Overall, we can see that the length of the presidential and parliamentary terms was the subject of quite considerable debate. There was a clear appreciation that non-concurrent presidential and parliamentary terms could lead to cohabitation. This was expressed by international observers and by participants in the debate in the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, concurrent elections were agreed in the Assembly precisely to avoid this problem. In this regard, it is not coincidental that FSN deputies actively supported this provision. They held the presidency. They had the expectation of winning the first presidential election under the new constitution. They wished to maximize the chances of their president holding power in the future by eliminating, as they thought, the potential for mid-term cohabitation later on. In other words, it is clear that the choice of concurrent elections was quite deliberate. It is also clear, though, that concurrent elections were chosen with the explicit desire to avoid what we understand as cohabitation. The incumbent regime believed that the choice of concurrent elections was the best way of preventing cohabitation from occurring.[23] Yet, as we have seen, the 2007–2008 period of cohabitation occurred following concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections. Therefore, we should not think of the subsequent period of president/cabinet conflict as being endogenous to the circumstances of constitutional choice in this regard. In fact, the opposite interpretation seems correct. This institutional feature was deliberately chosen to prevent cohabitation from occurring.

3. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions aware of the potential for president/cabinet conflict under cohabitation?

At no point in the discussions of the CPUN or the Constituent Assembly was the term "cohabitation" actually used. Similarly, the term does not occur in Iorgovan's account of the work of the Constitutional Commission. Furthermore, there is no specific reference to the recent French experience of cohabitation in either the CPUN or the Constituent Assembly debates. This is somewhat puzzling, given the first French period of cohabitation had concluded only two years previously and that there was considerable French involvement in the constitution-making process. That said, we have already seen that constitution makers were aware of what we would understand as the problem of cohabitation, even if they did not use the term. Moreover, at the very close of the debate in the Constituent Assembly on 16 April 1991, Adrian Severin, the Deputy Prime Minister for Reform and Relations with Parliament, warned that "at

some time in the future the President and Government could have different political options, a duplication, a certain parallelism in their functions that could lead to regrettable blockages in the activity of governing" (Stănescu-Stanciu and Neacşu 2011: 759). Again, this description seems to refer to what we would call cohabitation.

Overall, even if they did not use the term, it is clear that actors were aware of the potential for president/cabinet conflict under cohabitation. Indeed, we have seen that they tried to shape institutions so as to avoid it. We can conclude that president/cabinet conflict was clearly endogenous to the circumstances of constitutional choice in this regard.

To sum up this part of the analysis, it is clear that decision makers were aware of the problem of cohabitation. It is also clear that direct presidential elections were included because the incumbent regime believed that they would benefit from them. There is also evidence that government responsibility to the legislature was deliberately chosen, though there was little effective debate on this issue. These features provide evidence for endogenous institutional choice. At the same time, though, we questioned whether the distribution of power within the executive was consistent with president/cabinet conflict being endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice. The same point applies to the choice of concurrent presidential and legislative elections. At this stage, then, there is mixed evidence that president/cabinet conflict was endogenous to the circumstances of constitutional choice.

8.3.2 Endogenous President/Cabinet Conflict?

We now turn to the context within which the period of cohabitation from 2007 to 2008 occurred. Who were the actors and what were their concerns, and how are both linked to the debate about institutional choice that we have just outlined? To investigate these questions, we return to the second set of causal mechanisms that we identified in the previous chapter.

4. Were the actors/parties who chose the institutions the same actors/parties who were subsequently involved in president/cabinet conflict?

There was only a limited connection between the individual actors who chose the institutions from 1989 to 1991 and those who were involved in

the period of cohabitation from April 2007 to December 2008. The cohabitation president, Traian Băsescu, was not a member of the CPUN and he was not elected to the Constituent Assembly in May 1990. However, he did serve as the Under Secretary for Transport from December 1989 and then as the Minister for Transport from April 1991 to December 1992. During this period, he was a member of the FSN. However, he was associated with the first post-communist prime minister, Petre Roman, and in 1992, he was elected as a deputy for what was soon to become the Democratic Party (*Partidul Democrat*—PD), which was led by Roman and which was opposed by Iliescu when his faction split from the FSN (see below). We can reasonably assume that Băsescu supported the March 1990 Decree Law and that he supported the Constitution in the 1991 referendum. However, there is no evidence that he formally contributed to any of the debates during the constitution-making period.

The cohabitation prime minister was Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu. He was not a member of the CPUN, but he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the May 1990 elections and, therefore, was a member of the Constituent Assembly. He was elected as a member of the PNL, which was in opposition to the FSN at the time and its successor parties thereafter. He was not very active in the Constituent Assembly. He did not participate in any of the discussions relating to the presidency, the length of the presidential and legislative terms, and so on. In fact, he intervened on only one brief occasion on a matter unrelated to the constitution (Stănescu-Stanciu et al. 2011: 408). Again, we can assume that Popescu-Tăriceanu supported the PNL's position in the Assembly debates, but there is no evidence that he made any substantive contribution to the constitution-making process. The PNL was divided over whether or not to support the final constitution in November 1991. In the roll call vote on 21 November 1991, Popescu-Tăriceanu was one of the PNL deputies who voted against it.

More widely, the cohabitation government did include a small number of actors who were present in the CPUN and/or the Constituent Assembly. Varujan Vosganian was a member of both. He represented the national minorities in these institutions, specifically the Union of Armenians in Romania (*Uniunea Armenilor din România*). In 2007, Vosganian was the Minister for Economy and Finance in the Popescu-Tăriceanu government, having been elected on the PNL list. He intervened once in the CPUN on minority issues (IRRdD 2009b: 334–335). He also intervened a small number of times in the Constituent Assembly, but again always on minority

issues.[24] In November 1991, he voted in favour of the constitution. In addition, László Borbély and Béla Markó were both elected to the Constituent Assembly, the former as a Deputy and the latter as a Senator. They held the positions of Minister for Communication and Information Technology, and Minister of State for Coordination of Activities in the Field of Culture, Education and European Integration in the cohabitation government. They represented the UDMR. Neither intervened at all in the Assembly's debates on issues relevant to this study. Both voted against the constitution. This was consistent with the UDMR's policy on the final vote.

We can conclude, therefore, that there was an almost no overlap between, on the one hand, the actors who engaged in the process of constitution making in the CPUN, the Constitutional Commission, and Constituent Assembly during the period of constitution making and, on the other hand, the president, the prime minister, and the individual members of the government in the cohabitation period, at least as regards the issues that are relevant to this study.

The situation relating to party actors is somewhat different. The cohabitation government was a minority coalition between the PNL and the UDMR. These parties were both present during the period of constitution making. Indeed, both were represented in the CPUN, the Constituent Assembly, and the Constitutional Commission. The PNL was the third largest party group in parliament after the May 1990 elections, returning 29 deputies and 10 senators.[25] It had two representatives on the 28-person Constitutional Commission (Iorgovan 1998: 744–745).[26] The UDMR was the second largest party in the Constituent Assembly, returning 29 deputies and 11 senators.[27] It too had two representatives on the Constitutional Commission (ibid.). Thus, in terms of both the PNL and the UDMR, there was overlap between these parties during the two periods under consideration.

The PNL/UDMR cohabitation government was supported by the PSD in the legislature and was opposed by the PD president. Both the PSD and the PD were descendants of the original FSN. We have already seen that there were tensions within the FSN between President Iliescu and PM Roman and their respective supporters over the issue of the president's powers in the new constitution. These divisions ran much deeper and increased over time. They became intolerable in late September 1991 when PM Roman was effectively forced to resign (Roper 2005: 70). In early 1992, the FSN split, with Iliescu's faction leaving to form the Democratic National Salvation Front (*Frontul*

Democrat al Salvării Naționale—FDSN). Iliescu won the 1992 presidential election, and the FDSN was the largest party in the new parliament. In 1993, the FDSN merged with a number of smaller parties to form the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (*Partidul Democrației Sociale in România*—PDSR). Following a further merger in 2001, the PDSR became the PSD. For its part, Roman's faction retained the FSN name until May 1993 when under his leadership, it was renamed the Democratic Party—National Salvation Front (*Partidul Democrat–Frontul Salvării Naționale*—PD-FSN). This was subsequently shortened to the PD. In 2001, Traian Băsescu was elected leader of the PD. In 2003, Petre Roman's faction left the PD to form a separate party. The PSD and the PD were always members of opposing electoral alliances in the period from 1992 to 2007. However, both were originally affiliated to the centre-left Party of European Socialists (PES) group in the European Parliament (EP). In 2005, though, the PD decided to switch its affiliation to the centre-right European People's Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED). The two parties have been members of opposing groups in the EP ever since.

This somewhat tortured party political history suggests that there was a degree of overlap between the FSN across the periods of constitution making and cohabitation, but that it was limited. The FSN no longer existed, but the two principal descendants of the party—the PSD and the PD—were present during cohabitation and were opposed to each other then. That said, both the PSD and the PD had themselves either merged with other parties to form a new organization or had undergone another split since 1992, meaning that they were further removed from the original FSN. Moreover, the PD went through a certain official ideological transformation, moving from a centre-left to a centre-right party at least in terms of its official affiliation in the EP. Again, this suggests that the link with the original FSN was relatively weak by this time.

To sum up, there was no significant overlap between the individual actors across the two periods under investigation. In terms of political parties, there was clear evidence that the PNL and UDMR overlapped across the two periods. However, there is only limited evidence that the FSN in the form of the PSD and the PD overlapped in the same way. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that president/cabinet conflict during the period of cohabitation was endogenous to the original circumstances of institutional choice with regard to this mechanism.

5. If they were, was there already conflict between them at the moment of institutional choice?

The PNL was one of the historic parties that re-emerged following the Romanian revolution. It positioned itself as an anti-communist party and campaigned against the FSN in the May 1990 elections. The PNL had two representatives on the Constitutional Commission (Iorgovan 1998: 744–745), one of whom was Dan Amedeo Lăzărescu.[28] He was in favour of limiting the president's powers in the new constitution. This was the PNL's position within the Constituent Assembly too. Indeed, there the PNL's representatives spoke out relatively frequently in favour of a president with fewer powers than those proposed in the Theses. For example, Deputy Mihai Carp argued against the proposal that the president should have the power to propose a referendum (Stănescu-Stanciu and Neacşu 2011: 716). In the same speech, he opposed the proposal that the president should be able to appoint three members of the Constitutional Council (ibid.: 717), and that the president should chair the meetings of the Supreme Council of Defence (ibid.: 718). The PNL's support for a weak presidency was consistent with its position as a much smaller party than the FSN and one that faced the prospect of an FSN president for the foreseeable future. In these ways, the PNL was opposed to the FSN during the constitution-making process. That said, following the collapse of Petre Roman's government in late September 1991, when the debates had effectively finished but when the constitution-making process was nevertheless ongoing, the PNL agreed to enter a coalition government with the FSN under the new prime minister, Theodor Stolojan. Moreover, as noted previously, the PNL was divided on the final vote on the constitution in November 1991. The majority of PNL deputies voted against the document, but a relatively large proportion voted in favour. Thus, by this time, there was at least a degree of ambiguity in terms of the relationship between the PNL and the FSN.

The UDMR was one of the new parties that emerged after the revolution. It was the main voice of minority interests during the constitution-drafting process. The party's representatives intervened regularly on such issues in the Constituent Assembly. However, their interventions were not limited to those issues. They also contributed to some of the discussions relating to this study. We have already seen that on 16 April 1991, György Frunda argued in favour of the indirect election of the president on behalf

of the UDMR (ibid.: 693). He also spoke out in favour of reducing the president's powers, proposing that the president should not have the power to make appointments to the Constitutional Council (ibid.: 694). Another UDMR representative, Senator Toma Ernestin Csiha, spoke out in relation to the process of presidential impeachment (ibid.: 698–701). He questioned the procedure that was eventually invoked in 2007 and again in 2012 against President Băsescu. He noted, very presciently, that the situation might arise where the parliament voted to suspend the president and hold an impeachment referendum, but where the referendum would not be passed, meaning that the president would return to office and face a parliament that had just tried to remove him from power. Senator Csiha called this an "absurd, yet not impossible situation" (ibid.: 699). He was quite correct in that regard. The UDMR did not join PM Stolojan's government in October 1991. The party also voted *en bloc* against the new constitution in the Constituent Assembly, though mainly for reasons relating to minority issues, notably their opposition to Article 1 of the 1991 Constitution, which states that Romania is a "unitary and indivisible" state. In these ways, the UDMR was opposed to the FSN throughout the constitution-making process.

The FSN was clearly the dominant force throughout the period of constitution making. However, we have shown that the FSN was not a united movement on at least one of the key issues with which we are concerned. The faction around Ion Iliescu was in favour of a strong presidency. He was opposed on this issue, though, not just by the PNL and the UDMR, but by elements of the FSN too, notably the faction around PM Roman. The collapse of the Roman government in late September 1991 was a sign that divisions within the FSN were widening more generally. However, as we have seen, the party remained intact until early 1992, by which time the constitution-making process was complete. Indeed, in the final vote on the constitution in the Constituent Assembly, the FSN's representatives fully supported the new constitution. Thus, whatever divisions there may have been in the party, in November 1991, the various protagonists were still willing to unite behind the constitutional agreement that had effectively been reached some months previously.

How should we interpret these party political positions? If president/cabinet conflict during the 2007–2008 cohabitation was endogenous to the features of this mechanism, we would expect to see the same parties that were opposed to each other during the process of institutional choice being opposed during the period of cohabitation as well. In this regard, it

is certainly the case that President Băsescu's PD party had its origins in the FSN and that Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu's PNL and the UDMR were opposed to the FSN in the constitution-making process. However, we have seen that the PNL entered into government with the FSN prior to the end of the process and that some of its members voted in favour of the constitution. Thus, the PNL was not strictly opposed to the FSN throughout the whole period of constitution making and was divided on the final vote. What is more, we have noted that the PNL/UDMR government was supported by the PSD in parliament during the period of cohabitation. As we have seen, though, the PSD was perhaps the most direct descendant of the FSN in the 2007–2008 period. Thus, if we treat the PNL and the UDMR as anti-FSN parties, then for president/cabinet conflict to be endogenous with regard to this mechanism, they should have been opposed to the PSD during the cohabitation period as well. For sure, the PSD's support in parliament was neither formal, systematic, nor fully cohesive. Indeed, the PSD leader, Mircea Geoană, tried unsuccessfully to force a motion of censure against the minority PNL/UDMR government in 2008.[29] Even so, the conflict between the parties during the constitution-making period does not neatly map onto the conflict between them during the period of cohabitation. Perhaps the best evidence relates to the FSN itself. The division between the Iliescu and Roman factions during the constitution-making process does map onto the subsequent division between the PSD and the PD during the cohabitation period. That said, the PSD was not in government. Thus, it was not a direct protagonist in the president/cabinet conflict in that respect, even if it certainly opposed President Băsescu and facilitated president/cabinet conflict by helping to keep the minority PNL/UDMR government in power. Moreover, as we have seen previously, while the PSD and the PD were the principal descendants of the FSN, they were organizationally and/or ideologically different from their common party ancestor.

Overall, we conclude that there is only limited evidence to suggest that party conflict at the time of constitution making maps onto party conflict during the period of cohabitation.

6. If there was, was the conflict at that time related to the same issues that were subsequently the source of president/cabinet conflict?

If president/cabinet conflict during cohabitation was endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice, then we would expect actors and

parties to be opposed in a consistent way across the two periods. To test this mechanism, we refer to the parliamentary debates at the time of the suspension of President Băsescu. What did the parties say about the constitution, the presidency, and president/cabinet relations at this time? Were their positions consistent with those that they adopted during the process of constitution making? If so, we would consider cohabitation to be endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice. If not, then we would have to conclude otherwise.

The UDMR's position across the two periods only partly suggests that the presence of cohabitation was endogenous to institutional choice in this regard. In February 2007, they abstained on the vote to set up a commission of inquiry to investigate whether or not President Băsescu should be impeached. In the debate on the suspension of the president in the joint session of the houses of parliament on 19 April 2007, the party refused to adopt a line for or against the suspension. UDMR members in the legislature were allowed to vote on a personal basis. In the suspension debate, Senator Béla Markó, who had been a member of the Constituent Assembly, was one of the main speakers for the party.[30] In his speech, he was very critical of President Băsescu personally, saying that he had exceeded his powers and had not fulfilled his constitutional duties. However, he did not criticize the presidency generally. In other words, he did not use the situation to revisit the more general issues that were raised by the UDMR in the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, he did not refer back to his own time there. The UDMR had supported a weak presidency during the Constituent Assembly. Subsequently, it was willing to be part of a government that opposed the presidency during cohabitation. However, there was no attempt to link the two positions, or to use the president's impeachment as a way of revisiting this aspect of the constitutional settlement. The same point can be made during the debate in the joint session of the houses of parliament on 11 June when a motion of censure was lodged by the PD against the Popescu-Tăriceanu government following the failure of the referendum to confirm President Băsescu's impeachment.[31] Deputy László Borbély, who was also a member of the Constituent Assembly, spoke briefly, but he did not raise any constitutional issues. The same point applies to Árpád-Francisc Márton, the other UDMR speaker in the debate on the censure motion. His intervention was also brief and focused on policy issues. In short, there is little to link the UDMR's position during the process of constitution making to their stance during the debate surrounding the impeachment of the president in 2007.

There is only somewhat more evidence with regard to the PNL. Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu did not speak in the suspension debate on 19 April 2007. Naturally, though, he did intervene in support of his own government during the censure motion on 11 June.[32] In this speech, his position was in one sense consistent with the PNL's position during the constitution-making process some years earlier. For example, he took the opportunity to criticize the exercise of what he considered to be the excessive use of presidential power. He stated that there had been an "imbalance of institutions" the previous year and argued that the "European model of democracy rests on the control of state powers". However, he did not propose any constitutional amendments to change the situation. Moreover, it is clear that his criticisms were aimed more at President Băsescu's exercise of leadership rather than the presidency itself.[33] He accused Băsescu of turning the presidential institution "from a player to a destroyer". He also associated Băsescu's regime with those in "Venezuela, Cuba or the former Soviet Republics", contrasting it to those in Germany, Italy, and France. In other words, while Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu was critical of the dangers of a strong presidency in a manner that was consistent with the PNL's position during the constitution-making process, he did not engage in a debate about the merits of different constitutional systems or suggest that the constitution should be reformed to weaken the presidency or perhaps even replace the directly elected president with an indirectly elected president. Instead, he tried to portray President Băsescu as an authoritarian communist-style dictator in contrast to democratic leaders in Europe whether or not those leaders headed traditional parliamentary systems with weak presidents or semi-presidential systems with stronger presidents. Again, this suggests that the PNL's position during cohabitation was only indirectly related to the position it took during the constitution-making process.

The leader of the PSD during the period of cohabitation was Mircea Geoană. He opened the suspension debate on 19 April.[34] Unsurprisingly, he was highly critical of President Băsescu personally. However, consistent with other speeches he made during his time as PSD party leader, Mircea Geoană was also critical of the political system generally. He said that Băsescu's presidency demonstrated the "limits and weaknesses of the current system". He reinforced this argument, saying that the "time has come to recognize that our political and institutional system has reached its limits". He went on to argue that "the current political system was useful in a certain stage in the development of Romania", but that now it was

"time to build a new Romania, with a new constitution, a new institutional structure". In other words, the PSD, whose forerunner party had been most associated with the choice of the constitution, was now arguing that it should be changed, though he was not necessarily suggesting that the presidency should be weakened. After all, the PSD hoped to win back the presidency at the 2009 election. In the debate on the censure motion on 11 June, the PSD took a back seat. Geoană did not intervene in the debate at all. The main PSD speaker, Victor Ponta, did not raise any constitutional issues, merely arguing that the party would not vote against the Popescu-Tăriceanu government because it did not want to be linked to the PD-sponsored motion of no-confidence. At the same time, though, he refused to support the government. This position allowed the government to survive in office. Again, at this point, there was little incentive for the PSD to call for institutional reforms that would weaken the presidency. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Ponta did not raise this issue.

Finally, the PD did not make any connection between the 1991 constitution and the period of cohabitation. In the suspension debate on 19 April, the main PD speaker, Vasile Blaga, concentrated on defending the president personally, claiming that he had done no wrong and that the Constitutional Council supported this interpretation. He was critical of all other parties, but did not address any wider constitutional issues. The same point applies to the second PD speaker, Cristian Rădulescu. Indeed, he stated that the opposition parties had made no attempt to "polish up" the country's institutions and that they were only concerned with having their revenge on President Băsescu. On 11 June, Petru Nicolae Ioţcu opened the debate on the no-confidence motion. His speech was very similar to the PD speakers in the suspension debate. He criticized the other parties, arguing that they were acting out of self-interest. He did not raise any broader constitutional issues and he did not refer back to the constitutional settlement of 1991.

Overall, there is very limited evidence to show that the parties were in conflict on the same issues during the process of institutional choice as during the period of cohabitation with regard to this mechanism. The parties did not refer back to the debates at the time of the constitutional choice. Instead, they more focused on supporting or criticizing President Băsescu personally. We would do better to see them as manoeuvring to maximize political support in the context of contemporary events, rather than rehearsing old debates. This does not mean they were unconcerned with institutional issues. Indeed, in 2008, President Băsescu set up the

Table 8.2 Summary of the evidence that president/cabinet conflict in Romania (2007–2008) was endogenous to institutional choice (1989–1991)

Mechanism	*Evidence*
1	Strong evidence that direct presidential elections and government responsibility to the legislature were endogenous, but little evidence that presidential powers were chosen endogenously
2	No evidence that concurrent elections were chosen endogenously
3	Good evidence of the awareness of the possibility of cohabitation
4	Very limited evidence that individual actors were the same in the two periods. Some evidence that party actors were the same
5	Limited evidence that the party actors during cohabitation had also opposed each other during the process of constitution making
6	Very limited evidence that conflict between the parties was on the same issues during both periods

Presidential Commission for Analysis of the Political and Constitutional Regime in Romania. However, we need to place any debates about institutional change in their contemporary context, rather than thinking they map onto older debates at the time of the original constitutional choice. Table 8.2 sums up the evidence from the six mechanisms that we have focused on in this chapter.

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the problem of institutional choice. On the basis of a second theory-testing process-tracing case study, we have investigated the extent to which president/cabinet conflict in Romania from 2007 to 2008 was endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice there from 1989 to 1991. As with the French case, we found evidence that president/cabinet conflict was neither completely endogenous to the circumstances of institutional choice nor totally exogenous. There is an element of endogeneity. This is what we would expect in a complex world where institutions are human creations and where the problem of endogeneity is always present, but where they are only one factor that has the potential to shape leadership outcomes. Also like the French case, we found that the degree of endogeneity is limited. There was good evidence of endogeneity for only one of the six mechanisms and strong evidence for only two of the three elements of one of the other mechanisms. By contrast, there was no evidence of endogeneity for one of the mechanisms, only very limited evi-

dence for two others, and limited evidence for the final mechanism. As before, we cannot make any general claims from these two process-tracing studies. Maybe we have just stumbled upon two cases where evidence for the endogeneity problem was not very strong. Nonetheless, we have at least found little evidence to question our belief that leadership institutions can have an exogenous causal effect on a variety of outcomes.

Notes

1. Iorgovan (1998: 12) notes that two members of the Commission never attended meetings, meaning that in practice, there were only 21 voting members. Both of the missing members were from the FSN.
2. Iorgovan was elected as an independent senator in 1990, but the website of the Romanian parliament records him as a member of the PNL parliamentary group for that period. In 2000 and 2004 he was elected as a senator for the PSD, the successor party to the FSN. See www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura2015.mp?idm=42&leg=1990&cam=1&idl=1, accessed 27 July 2016.
3. The FSN had two representatives on the Commission's five-person coordinating bureau (Iorgovan 1998: 13–14).
4. The Theses are available in Ioncică (1998).
5. Decret-Lege nr. 2 din 27 decembrie 1989 privind constituirea, organizarea şi funcţionarea Consiliului Frontului Salvării Naţionale şi a consiliilor teritoriale ale Frontului Salvării Naţionale, available at: www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/decret-lege-nr-2-din-27-decembrie-1989-privind-constituirea-organizarea-si-functionarea-consiliului-frontului-salvarii-nationale-si-a-consiliilor-teritoriale-ale-frontului-salvarii-nationale-emitent-20050.html, accessed 22 June 2016, and Decret-Lege nr. 10 din 31 decembrie 1989 privind constituirea, organizarea si functionarea Guvernului Romaniei, available at: http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gy3dsnrz/decretul-lege-nr-10-1989-privind-constituirea-organizarea-si-functionarea-guvernului-romaniei, accessed 22 June 2016.
6. Decret-Lege Nr. 92 din 14 martie 1990 pentru alegerea parlamentului si a Presedintelui Romaniei, available at: www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=7528, accessed 22 June 2016.
7. Weber (2001: 217) states that the election of the president "was tailor made to suit Iliescu".
8. The 17 April vote in the Constituent Assembly was the first to be taken by a secret ballot.
9. This is a reference to the rose emblem of the FSN (Roper 2005: 70).
10. Thanks to Bogdan Dima for this point.

11. Legea nr. 37 din 7 decembrie 1990 pentru organizarea și functionarea Guvernului, available at: www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=7862, accessed 22 June 2016.
12. The 1991 Romanian Constitution uses the phrase "mediator", rather than "arbiter" in relation the president. This wording reflects the Spanish Constitution. Iorgovan (1998: 66) states that Spain "had the best Constitution in Europe". In addition to meetings with French experts, there were also meetings with Italian, Spanish, and US constitutionalists (ibid.: 66–67). Overall, Iorgovan (ibid.: 94) states: "which constitution did we take as a model? I have to answer: all and none".
13. Council of Europe, Venice Commission, CDL (1991)001-e, Projet de Constitution Roumaine, Avis soumis à la Commission européenne pour la Démocratie par le Droit (reunion des 8 et 9 février 1991). Rapporteur: J.-C. Scholsem (Belgique), p. 2, available at: www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1991)001-e, accessed 27 July 2016.
14. Ibid.: p. 3.
15. Ibid.: p. 9.
16. The text is reproduced in Iorgovan (1998: 763–767).
17. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Strasbourg, 18 December 1991, Romania, State of Relations with the Council of Europe. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804ca755, accessed 29 July 2016.
18. The July draft was translated by the Joint Publications Research Service and published on 7 August 1991 as *East Europe, Supplement, Romania: Draft Constitution*, JPRS-EER-91-117-S.
19. This interpretation is consistent with the one presented by Guțan (2012: 283) when he states that "it is too much to say the 1991 Constitution 'was designed to facilitate the ascendancy of Ion Iliescu'".
20. Guțan (2012: 98) notes that even though the concept of semi-presidentialism was in use in the early 1990s, there was much less specialist literature on the topic then relative to now.
21. In response to a question from the floor, Iliescu refers to Badinter as the French Minister of Justice. In fact, he had ceased to hold this position in 1986.
22. Council of Europe, Venice Commission, CDL (1991)001-e, Projet de Constitution Roumaine, Avis soumis à la Commission européenne pour la Démocratie par le Droit (reunion des 8 et 9 février 1991). Rapporteur: J.-C. Scholsem (Belgique), p. 3, available at: www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1991)001-e, accessed 27 July 2016.
23. Concurrent elections were subsequently abolished, but the 2007 period of cohabitation occurred before the first non-concurrent elections were held in 2008.

24. See, for example, Stănescu-Stanciu and Neacşu (2011: 547–550), and Stănescu-Stanciu, and Neacşu (2015: 245–246).
25. Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.home?leg=1990&idl=2, accessed 7 October 2016.
26. We have already noted that Antonie Iorgovan was appointed as an independent jurist on the Constitutional Commission, but he was affiliated with the PNL parliamentary group from 1990 to 1992. Information on party groups following the 1990 election is available at: www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.home?leg=1990, accessed 22 July 2016.
27. Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/structura.home?leg=1990&idl=2, accessed 7 October 2016.
28. Incidentally, Dan Amedeo Lăzărescu was also the stepfather of PM Popescu-Tăriceanu. Thanks to Bogdan Dima for this point.
29. Thanks to Bogdan Dima for this point.
30. The full text of the speech is available at: www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=6286&idm=5&idl=1, accessed 22 July 2016.
31. See www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno2015.stenograma?ids=6332&idm=2&idl=1, accessed 24 July 2016.
32. (Ibid.).
33. Dima (2009: 47) argues that the conflict between the president and prime minister was at least partly caused by the personal relationship between Băsescu and Popescu-Tăriceanu respectively.
34. http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno2015.stenograma?ids=6286&idm=5&idl=1

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

In this chapter, we reflect very briefly on some of the general themes of this volume. We consider the relationship between philosophy and empirical inquiry, institutions and empirical inquiry, and more specifically the study of leadership institutions and empirical inquiry. What does the work in this book tell us about these themes?

9.1 Philosophy and Empirical Inquiry

With this book, we have presented a philosophically informed account of political leadership. We believe there are advantages to making explicit the philosophical foundations of empirical inquiry. One is that such an exercise can clarify the boundaries of such inquiry. Notably, it allows us to identify the studies that are philosophically commensurable with each other and those that are not. This gives us the opportunity to distinguish between the situations where scholars are simply talking past each other because their work is based on incompatible foundational assumptions and those where they are genuinely disagreeing with each other because they share a common foundation. We believe that scholarly inquiry is likely to be more fruitful when scholars are debating with each other on common foundational terms—positivists with positivists, constructivists with constructivists—rather than when they are doing so on the basis of incompatible foundational assumptions. The latter debates are either fundamentally incoherent precisely because the foundations are incompatible,

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or they reduce to essentially unresolvable debates about the relative merits of incompatible foundational positions. Some of the work in International Relations has this latter flavour. Here, constructivists berate positivists for adopting the wrong foundational position and vice versa in a way that can become quite wearisome. Another advantage to making explicit the philosophical foundations of empirical inquiry is that scholars may be either unaware of or confused about the foundational assumptions that underpin their work. In our previous volume (Elgie 2015), we showed that very few scholars of leadership identify the foundational assumptions on which their studies are based. This point certainly extends beyond the study of leadership. By making foundational assumptions clear, individual scholars can become more aware of where their work sits relative to others. This may encourage a process of individual foundational reflexivity. Some scholars may find that they are uncomfortable with the approach that they have perhaps unwittingly been taking. If so, they may decide to reposition themselves foundationally. This can create the potential for better scholarship both individually and collectively.

In this book, we have proposed an account of political leadership that is compatible with what we have called a "scientific realist" approach. We do not wish to rehearse the reasons why we decided to adopt this approach. However, following the empirical work in the preceding chapters, we would like to reflect briefly on the consequences of adopting such a position, especially in relation to the empirical work on leadership by positivists and constructivists of the sort that we reviewed in our previous book (ibid.).

We believe that many self-styled positivist students of leadership can do more. In the way that we have portrayed it, positivism is a very ambitious approach. It generates general theories of social and political explanation. It assumes that we have the potential to identify evidence that can confirm the validity of such theories. If we do find such evidence, then we can conclude that the cause-and-effect relationship that has been identified applies deterministically. These are grand ambitions, but they are problematic. Should we really seek out and expect to find evidence for general theories of political explanation? Would we really expect cause-and-effect relationships to apply deterministically in political life? What is more, strictly speaking positivists must confine themselves to the study of observable properties of the world when thinking about and testing such theories. This is a limiting condition in the study of social and political outcomes. There is clearly room for positivist inquiry in fundamental physics and most of the special sciences. In the social sciences, there are

genuine questions to be asked about its applicability. We do not think the evidence in this volume supports a positivist approach to empirical inquiry. For example, even under laboratory conditions, we have found that the effect of presidentialism on behaviour was shaped by the particular institutional form that it took and by the interaction between this institutional form and individual-level attitudinal characteristics. We interpreted these findings as evidence that institutions can shape behaviour, but we would not want to suggest that they support a general theory of presidential institutions or that institutional effects have a deterministic effect on behaviour.

That said, we wonder whether most students of political leadership who call themselves positivists or who are called positivists by others really merit this label. We suspect that if such scholars were to think carefully about the foundational assumptions to which they were willing to commit themselves, then they would probably classify themselves as what we would think of as scientific realists. This is partly because most positivist scholars are willing to study unobservable features of the world and not just for reasons of "as if" convenience. More than that, most positivist political scientists are not primarily concerned with either formulating or testing general theories of political life. Instead, they are typically concerned with seeking better explanations for much more discrete, context-specific outcomes. This ambition is compatible with scientific realism. For sure, there are political scientists who would want to maintain the positivist label for themselves. However, this is perhaps because of foundational ignorance, or most likely out of a misplaced desire to convince others that political science should be given entry to the elite class of special sciences. We can do little about the latter motivation, but we can encourage positivist political scientists to reflect on their foundational assumptions. This is the context in which we believe that many self-styled positivists can do more. If they do find that their assumptions are more consistent with a scientific realist foundation, then we would encourage them to frame their work accordingly. This is not so much a matter of labelling themselves as scientific realists. More importantly, it is a matter of explicitly accepting causal complexity, placing explanatory claims in their appropriate context, and accepting the epistemological limits of empirical inquiry. If we are right and most self-styled positivists are really scientific realists, then in one sense this is not asking very much. It is largely a matter of framing studies somewhat differently and interpreting findings more carefully, though there are important matters of method and attitude to research to which we shall return shortly.

Likewise, we believe that many self-styled constructivist students of leadership can also do more. We have portrayed constructivism as an approach that refuses to entertain the objective nature of political explanation, preferring to think of claims about the nature of the world as being mere social constructions. In this volume, by contrast, we have tried to provide evidence to show that we can make causal claims about the effect of institutions on the world in a way that generates well-settled beliefs about the validity of those claims. Whether we have been successful in so doing is a matter for those in the community of inquiry who share our ontological and epistemological commitments to decide. The constructivist, who rejects these foundational commitments, can simply ignore our work and move on.

As with the positivist, though, we are sceptical that the majority of scholars who call themselves constructivists really merit this label at least in the way that we have presented it. We suspect that most self-styled constructivist scholars of political leadership do believe there are facts about the world that can be discovered, that at least some causal claims can be made, and that we can be at least relatively sure of the validity of some of these claims. If we are correct, then in our terminology these scholars should be classed as scientific realists rather than constructivists. This is the context in which we believe that constructivists can do more. If they accept that it is possible to make causal claims about the world that have at least some degree of validity, then it is incumbent on them to try to make the best possible claims. In other words, it is not the case that anything goes in this regard. A truth claim about the world is not always a valid truth claim. To maximize the validity of any such claim, to arrive at a well-settled belief, we have to engage in systematic inquiry. To be very clear, this does mean that constructivists need to become positivists! It does mean, though, that they have to engage with the scientific method. This is consistent with accepting that there is causal complexity, including a role for human agency. It is consistent with accepting that there are limits to the truth value of the claims that we wish to make about the world. It is also consistent with accepting that there is a room for critical inquiry. All the same, it does require an engagement with a process of investigation that maximizes the validity of any causal claim. This is the choice that those who typically call themselves constructivists must make. They can accept the philosophical foundations of what we have called constructivism and refuse to accept that we can make any truth claims about the world, or they can accept that such claims can be made but in which case they must

also accept that they need to engage in the type of inquiry that maximizes the validity of those claims.

If we are correct to think that the majority of scholars of political leadership who are currently classed as positivists and constructivists are making foundational assumptions that are consistent with scientific realism, then this philosophical approach contains scholars who are engaging in a very wide range of inquiry. We believe that academic pluralism of this sort is a good thing, creating the opportunity for more varied forms of debate but on the same foundational terms, and holding out the hope of arriving at better explanations of political events. The danger, though, is that the range of scientific realist inquiry will become so broad that debates between different types of such inquiry will be treated as being just as incompatible with each other as debates between "pure" positivists on the one hand and "pure" constructivists on the other. We believe this danger is unfounded. After all, scientific realists share core foundational beliefs. This means that their studies are inherently compatible, even if they are conducted in different ways. However, we believe this danger is also real. If scientific realism is a broad church of inquiry, the risk is that a scholarly schism will immediately set in.

One strategy to avoid such a schism is not to see scientific realism as a spectrum of inquiry ranging from positivist-like scientific realists at one end to constructivist-like scientific realists at the other and where the risk is that those situated at the two extremes never engage with each other. Instead, we should see scientific realism as a shared foundational space in which scholars can move around with a view to arriving at better explanations of political life. There is plenty of space in which to engage in scholarly exploration of this sort. Those who might seem to be positivist-like scientific realists would benefit from moving to a place that avoids the fetishization of the statistical method; that addresses the so-called file-drawer problem; that commits to the DA-RT agenda; that engages with training in qualitative methods with a view to presenting rigorous qualitative analysis, rather than just relying on correlational vignettes; and that shows respect for all their scientific realist colleagues, including those who wish to critique the reliability of data, the operationalization of concepts, the interpretation of statistical results, the generalizability of findings, and so forth. For their part, those who might seem to be constructivist-like scientific realists would benefit from moving to a place that engages fully with the scientific method, including training in statistical methods, research design, and logical reasoning, and that combines critical inquiry

with political explanation rather than seeing critical inquiry as an end in itself. We would encourage scholars who share a scientific realist foundation to move around this foundational space and engage with each other.

Overall, we have presented a philosophically informed account of political leadership. However, in so doing, we have no ambitions to contribute to the study of philosophy in general, to the study of scientific realism more specifically, or to the study of American pragmatism in particular. Instead, we have adopted such an account to encourage scholars to reflect on their foundational assumptions and to engage with those who share common assumptions. We believe that many scholars of political leadership work in a way that is consistent with a scientific realist foundation. We believe that there is the potential to arrive at more well-settled beliefs if all scholars who share this foundational space work together more closely.

9.2 Institutions and Empirical Inquiry

This is not our first book on political leadership. In fact, it is not even our second. A long time ago, and in what feels like a galaxy far, far away, we presented the first version of our institutionalist account of political leadership (Elgie 1995). This book was written at a point when there had been a shift towards institutional analysis in the social sciences generally, including political science. At that time, and in the period immediately thereafter, institutionalism in one form or another (Peters 1999) seemed to be the mainstream approach to the study of political life. Institutionalism was particularly popular among positivists. Institutions were observable. They were enduring. Their effects on behaviour were assumed to be regular. The effects of different institutional rules could be compared. For positivists, institutional analysis provided the prospect of identifying regular, indeed universal laws of political life. They also opened up the potential for creating a better world. If we could identify the effect of institutions on economic, social, and political outcomes, then we could craft institutions in a way that generated better outcomes. Institutions, particularly the positivist study of institutions, seemed to be the way forward.

This situation did not last. There were problems with institutional analysis. Questions were raised about what constituted an institution; institutions associated with certain outcomes were found not to produce those outcomes; institutions were introduced and the world did not seem to improve; institutionalists relegated the role of social and individual actors to secondary factors when there was evidence that they were important for

outcomes; the choice of institutions seemed to be endogenous to the preferences of those actors, suggesting that institutionalists had the line of causation the wrong way around; and so on. In this context, scholars became less concerned with studying top-down institutional design and more interested in bottom-up studies of social movements, grass-root actors, and so forth. In short, institutionalism fell out of favour with many scholars, particularly those entering the profession.

This brief intellectual history is full of caricature and empty of almost any citations, but it sketches the background context in which we wrote this current book. Over the course of the last six chapters, we have tried to provide evidence to show that institutions can help to explain leadership outcomes. We believe that whereas such an exercise would have been part of the scholarly mainstream nearly a quarter of a century ago, it has now become relatively marginal. With this book, we wish to place institutions at the forefront of the study of political life once again, including the study of political leadership.

While we wish to encourage a return to institutionalism, we also wish to encourage a new type of institutional analysis. We have already signalled that the study of institutions was particularly attractive to positivists. On the basis of their work, they proposed general recommendations for institutional reform that were often taken on board by international organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD. Indeed, Dani Rodrik (2013: 161) has described how these organizations often promoted a "universal recipe" for institutional reform. The problem was that these recommendations were applied with scant regard for the context in which they were implemented. The subsequent failure of institutional reforms to deliver the outcomes that were promised led to a general decline in the confidence in institutional remedies and institutionalism more generally. This failure also encouraged many scholars to adopt a post-positivist foundational approach. As we have seen, such an approach is more sensitive to context and does not make any universal claims to applicability. Thus, the decline in institutionalism chimed with the rise of post-positivism in the study of political life. More than that, the institutional recommendations proposed by the international organizations that were part of the "Washington Consensus" were seen to be based on a liberal ideology and a set of neo-liberal economic principles. Given countries who needed financial assistance had no option but to implement these recommendations, there was a feeling that the "Washington Consensus" was imposing a set of ideologically motivated reforms on

countries who had no choice but to accept them. This smacked of a certain neo-imperialism, reinforcing a critical analysis of institutions that was consistent with a post-positivist philosophy. If this story is in any way correct, then it helps to explain why many scholars have adopted a critical post-positivist perspective generally. Such scholars have little interest in the study of institutions, except to see them as carriers of a certain ideological baggage that needs to be opposed.

In this book, we have adopted a post-positivist institutional account of leadership outcomes. We have done so precisely to avoid the problems of positivist institutional analysis. We are not concerned with providing a general theory of institutions, identifying general institutional effects, or arriving at policy recommendations that have universal applicability. Instead, we believe that outcomes are the result of causal complexity. Institutions provide us with a way of cutting through some of this complexity. Nonetheless, we have to be very careful when generalizing about the institutional effects that we identify. We believe that there might be occasions when institutional advice can be given, but we have tried to show that institutional effects are highly conditional. They are conditional on other institutions, such as bundles of varying presidential powers and the configuration of party politics; non-institutional factors, such as the state of the economy; individual-level factors, such as gender and attitudinal characteristics; and idiosyncratic country-specific factors, such as the circumstances in which institutions are chosen. We believe that institutions are only one causal factor among many, that institutional regularities only apply in the context in which they have been identified, and that the impact of agency means that any such regularities are unlikely to be permanently enduring even in that context. Thus, we want to bring institutions back into the mainstream of political analysis, but with a view to drawing only modest conclusions about the limited and conditional effects of institutions on leadership outcomes.

We have also adopted a post-positivist institutional account to address the critical element of post-positivist analysis. We have rejected the foundational position of constructivists. However, we have argued that scientific realism is consistent with a critical perspective. We have also argued that many scholars who call themselves constructivists are engaging in political explanation that is consistent with a scientific realist approach. These scholars bring a critical perspective to their work. We support such a perspective. We believe it is important to engage in political investigation to discover the unobserved normative bases of various features in the

world. That said, we wish to do more than merely criticize. The pragmatic maxim indicates that armchair philosophizing is largely a waste of time. We can engage in philosophy, but soon enough we need to go out and inquire. We can say the same about adopting a critical approach. We need to be critical, but we also need to go out and explain. Thus, we have adopted an institutional account of leadership outcomes that can incorporate a critical element, but we wish to engage in more than just critical studies. We wish to engage in institutional analysis to explain leadership outcomes.

Summing up, we have presented an institutional account of leadership outcomes because we believe that many in the academic community have forgotten, rejected, or deliberately downplayed the study of institutions and their importance. To counter this trend, we have provided empirical evidence to try to show that institutions can help us to explain leadership outcomes. However, by approaching the study of institutions from a post-positivist, scientific realist, pragmatic perspective, we wish to emphasize that we need to be modest about the conclusions we can draw from institutional analysis.

9.3 Institutions, Leadership, and Empirical Inquiry

The study of leadership takes place within an interactionist paradigm. This is a well-settled belief that leadership is the product of both personality and contextual factors, where the latter simply refers to everything that is not personality related. Within this paradigm, leadership is often studied as the dependent variable. Why do some people exercise leadership but not others, or in the language of our study, why is the idea that some people are exercising leadership present in some cases but not others? In this book, we have not engaged with the study of leadership as the dependent variable. For this reason, we understand that some scholars of leadership will claim that this is not a book about leadership at all. In this sense, they are entirely correct.

Instead, we have focused on the explanatory aspect of the interactionist paradigm. This way of thinking about interactionism considers outcomes to be the product of both personality and contextual factors. Here, some scholars believe that the ability to exercise leadership is a personal trait that some people possess and others do not. We have not engaged with this debate. Equally, some scholars believe that the idea of leadership is a con-

textual factor that can explain outcomes. We have not engaged with this debate either. In both respects, we understand that some scholars of leadership will claim that this is not a book about leadership at all. Again, in this sense, they would be entirely correct to do so.

Focusing on the explanatory aspect of the interactionist paradigm, we have privileged leadership institutions as an explanatory contextual factor. We are interested in presidents and prime ministers, but we are not concerned with the impact of their personal characteristics, including some or other personal leadership trait. Instead, we are interested in leadership in a positional sense. We are interested in the impact of the institutional characteristics of the offices occupied by presidents and prime ministers. We have provided empirical evidence to show that these characteristics can shape various outcomes, including presidential cooperation with the legislature, president/cabinet conflict, government formation, and economic voting. This is the sense and the only sense in which we have written a book about political leadership.

We have placed the empirical emphasis on leadership institutions, because we believe that they can help to generate well-founded beliefs about the causes of various leadership outcomes. We cannot conclude from our study that contextual factors have a greater effect on leadership outcomes than personality factors, not least because we have hardly focused on individual leaders at all in this book. Equally, we cannot conclude that leadership institutions have a greater effect on outcomes than other contextual factors, including the idea of leadership. We have merely presented empirical evidence to show that leadership institutions are consequential for the outcomes we have studied.

We are not the first to present an institutional account of political leadership. Indeed, in our previous volume (Elgie 2015: Chap. 6), we identified institutional accounts as a discrete category of studies in the work on leadership outcomes. There, though, we saw that such accounts typically do little more than present a long list of leadership institutions with potentially causal effects (ibid.: 169). In this book, we have tried to do more. We have engaged in empirical inquiry to support the claim that leadership institutions affect a wide range of outcomes. We have also presented evidence to refute the claim that institutional effects are merely endogenous to institutional choice. For sure, we have shown that institutional effects are conditional and contextual. We are also perfectly willing to concede that leadership institutions do not necessarily affect all outcomes everywhere, or the same outcomes everywhere to the same degree. All the

same, we believe that we have presented sufficient evidence to show that leadership institutions are consequential for a wide range of outcomes.

In this regard, we wish to do more than make the banal claim that leaders, or rather leadership institutions matter. We wish to show that we can come to well-settled beliefs about the effects of specific leadership institutions on various outcomes. There is a debate about whether presidential and parliamentary institutions shape behaviour. We have provided evidence under laboratory conditions that in certain circumstances they do. There is a debate about the effect of parliamentary and semi-presidential institutions on economic voting in democracies. We have shown that institutional features can have an effect in this area and that this effect is sensitive to the constitutional power of presidents. There is a debate about the sources of president/cabinet conflict in Europe. We have identified both the factors associated with such conflict generally and the specific conditions under which it has occurred in certain cabinets. There is a debate about the president's ability to shape the composition of the cabinet in France. We have identified the conditions that explain why the president's power to do so was greater at one particular time during the last 50 years than at any other. Finally, there is scepticism that institutions matter at all because they are chosen endogenously. We have provided evidence from two countries at different time periods to allay such fears. In short, we have shown not only that leadership institutions matter, but that they matter in certain ways, and under certain conditions. In this way, we hope to have made a contribution to the study of the effects of leadership institutions.

9.4 Conclusion

In this book, we have presented a philosophically rooted institutionalist account of leadership outcomes. We have established the philosophical foundations of our pragmatic approach. We have specified a theory of why we would expect institutions to share leadership outcomes. We have also engaged in empirical inquiry. We have done so using experimental methods, large- and medium-*n* observational studies, set-theoretic work, in-depth single-country case studies, and process-tracing. We have presented work that assumes institutions have an exogenous impact on leadership outcomes and we have backed up this work with studies that defend this assumption from the charge that institutions are endogenously chosen. We believe that recent scholarship has downplayed the importance of

institutional factors. We wish to redress that balance with our account. We have made it clear that institutions are not the only source of leadership outcomes and that there are limits to institutional analysis. Yet, we have tried to show that leadership institutions matter. Whether or not our account forms the basis of a well-settled belief that institutions matter will depend on the future work of the community of scholars. We believe that our philosophical foundation is consistent with the foundational assumptions of many, if not most scholars of political science, including those currently labelled as positivists and constructivists alike. By making these foundations clear, we hope to spark further empirical work that is consistent with the foundational assumptions we have outlined. This requires a commitment to the basic methods of science, but it also requires an equivalent commitment to reject naïve scientism. It requires a willingness to be critical, but the ambition to do more than engage in purely critical inquiry. We believe that this agenda is consistent with the basic principles that most researchers hold. In this context, we look forward to engaging in further debate about leadership institutions over the years to come.

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