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LEONIE HOLTHAUS

PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

L.T. Hobhouse, G.D.H. Cole, and David Mitrany

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Preface

As editors of the Palgrave Macmillan *History of International Thought* series, we aim to publish high-quality research on the intellectual, conceptual, and disciplinary history of international relations (IR). The books in the series assess the contribution that individual writers—academics, publicists, and other significant figures—have made to the development of thinking on IR. Central to this task is the historical reconstruction and interpretation that recovers the intellectual and social milieu within which their subjects were writing. Previous volumes in the series have traced the course of traditions, their shifting grounds or common questions, exploring heretofore neglected pathways of international theory and providing new insight and refreshed context for established approaches such as realism and liberalism. The series embraces the historiographical turn that has taken place within academic IR with the growth of interest in understanding both the disciplinary history of the field and the history of international thought. A critical concern of the series is the institutional and intellectual development of the study of IR as an academic pursuit. The series is expressly pluralist and as such open to both critical and traditional work, work that presents historical reconstruction or an interpretation of the past, as well as genealogical studies that account for the possibilities and constraints of present-day theories.

The series is interdisciplinary in outlook, embracing contributions from IR, international history, political science, political theory, sociology, and law. We seek to explore the mutually constitutive triangular relationship of international relations, theory, and history. We take this to mean the appreciation of the importance of the history in the theory of IR, of theory

in the history of IR, and even of IR in the history of international thought! In this last case, we hope that the series can become more broadly intercultural also, including scholarship from outside Europe and North America and delving into more of the non-Western context of the development of IR theory, though we acknowledge that the Eurocentric/ethnocentric character of the field is presently mirrored in its disciplinary history.

Leonie Holthaus reconstructs the idea of democracy in IR through a comparative analysis of three twentieth-century authors: L.T. Hobhouse, G.D.H. Cole, and David Mitrany. Weaving the common pluralist thread in the work of scholars who, though they moved in similar intellectual circles, have subsequently commonly been separately identified as social liberal, radical socialist, and international functionalist, Holthaus demonstrates their critique of classical liberal ideas of democracy and of IR while highlighting the richness of their thought and the way it unfolded. Along the way, we learn about the influence of the two world wars on democratic thinking in IR and also recover an important reading of the role of the UN in world politics.

The book not only adds to the progressive critique of democratic peace theory and other ideas on democracy in international relations. It also advances our understanding of the course of pluralism as a political theory and its influence on thinking in IR. Frankly, in academic IR, pluralist ideas have been truncated within the narrow ambit of (neo)functionalist ideas of regional integration. This obscures pluralist notions of the broader transnationalism of interests beyond the state that might inform global governance. It also neglects arguments for democracy from below derived from theories of economic democracy that potentially connect to social movements or interest group politics, at odds with liberal constitutional ideals that underlie so much of liberalism and other forms of democratic thought in IR. Through her interpretations of Hobhouse, Cole, and Mitrany, Holthaus shows the greater implications and pertinence of pluralist theoretical insights that might make it an even more important basis from which to understand contemporary global developments and prescribe a democratic future.

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I am very grateful to my friends and would like to give special thanks to Metin for his always smart and exhilarating humor. My parents have supported me in many ways and I am utterly grateful.

Some chapters draw on previous publications, such as Holthaus, L. (2014). G.D.H. Cole's International Thought: the Dilemmas of Justifying

Socialism in the Twentieth Century. The International History Review, 36(5), 858–875 (published by Taylor and Francis); Holthaus, L. (2014). L.T. Hobhouse and the transformation of liberal internationalism. Review of International Studies, 40(04), 705–727 (published by Cambridge University Press); and Holthaus, L. (2015). Prussianism, Hitlerism, Realism: The German Legacy in British International Thought. In I. Hall (Ed.), Radicals and Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century International Thought (pp. 123–144). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Democracy in International Relations

When democracy makes an appearance, it usually does so in several places at once (Tilly 2007: 40). Scholars seeking to explain the transnational dimension of democratisation talk in terms of waves and trace modern democracy's emergence back to an initial surge in the nineteenth century. This original upsurge began with a series of revolts and revolutions against what was perceived to be the extremely arbitrary and unjust exercise of power by monarchies and imperial regimes. Constitutional changes across the world—in Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden, for example—are often read as being linked to these events (Dix 1994: 94). All these developments are proof not only of the transformation of the model of monarchical consultation into representative institutions but also of the increasing tendency to define democracy as representative democracy.

Did that first wave in itself signal the advent of representative democracy? The answer to this question will depend on one's definitions of representative democracy. Some refer to specific levels of (almost always male) suffrage or cite universal suffrage as the key criterion. Applying this last principle, we would be left with no more than a handful of democracies even by the start of the twentieth century (Isakhan 2015: 1). Ultimately, no political system would meet the requirements of any stricter definition than the ones cited. This holds true even for Britain, which is often seen as

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a success story of democracy. The crucial point about the first wave of democracy is that it marked a time when democratic impulses began to play a defining role both in the articulation of modern hopes and in reshaping conceptions of international relations (IR) (Osterhammel 2014). Thus, early democrats demanded not only an end to monarchy but also, in regard to rule within multinational empires, the severing of oligarchic ties between politicians, traders, and white settlers and the opening up of public debate on the democratic control of foreign policy.

Much of the transnational impetus for the first wave of democracy derived from the global empire established by the British and from the politics through which that empire operated (Burroughs 2001). Not only did Britain sanction self-reliance and 'responsible' government in colonies such as Australia and Canada; the actual expansion of the empire was intermeshed with the 'social question' and the democratisation of the core. Thus, the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham, writing from the hub of the empire and from amongst the ranks of the 'mother state's' intellectual elite, viewed democratic and imperial issues as interrelated (Bell 2007: 34; 77; 96). When he pointed to public opinion as the custodian of peace, he did so in relation both to the expansion of empire and to the democratisation of the core.

Three great promises—liberty, equality, and peace—already figured in the earliest wave of democracy. How the last of these might be achieved through democracy was explained in different ways by different intellectuals (Waltz 1968: 538). Alexis de Tocqueville (1998: 33) was struck by the fact that democracy tended only to flourish in industrialising countries. He posited that nations engaged in manufacturing and commerce would come increasingly to resemble one another, develop similar interests, and nurture a common desire for peace. Bentham, for his part, argued that the successful promotion of peace through public opinion depended on achieving a balance of power between the different classes in society and bringing the enlightened self-interest of each of these classes into equilibrium. The complexity of how public opinion might foster peace stems, on the one hand, from the multiplicity of factors that influence such opinion and, on the other, from the great variety of ways in which that opinion can, in its turn, impact political decision-making. In the minds of those who adopted this line of thinking—and who often sought to turn the peace promise into a self-fulfilling theory through academic and public engagements—a democratic, peace-promoting public opinion was one that counterbalanced both elitist state control and the power of popular nationalism.

This book explores the work of pluralist thinkers who took up the ideas of Tocqueville and Bentham on the peace promise and developed them into a framework for the analysis of modern IR. Political theorists paid much attention to pluralism but marginalised its international dimension (Hirst 1989; Laborde 2000; Stears 2002). In the discipline of IR, the term 'pluralism', if it appears at all, generally signals a focus on transnational actors and politics (Little 1996: 68; Sylvest 2007: 81; Schmidt 2002: 20; Cerny 2010; Keohane and Nye 1971). Rather than cast doubt on the validity of this approach, what I aim to do is broaden the understanding of pluralism.

Returning to its origins, I suggest that interest in transnational relations emerged as part of a wider interest in democratisation and IR. Historically speaking, there is no doubt that there was a degree of overlap with liberalism here. However, liberal thinking on war and peace approached democracy as one among several issues—others being trade, interdependence, and law—and remained irresolute (MacMillan 1998). Pluralists distinguished their own approach from that of liberalism. For them, even states with a representative system of government did not represent all entitled social and political interests in IR. They demanded empowerment of marginalised groups through the functional representation of social and economic interests in the state and in international organisations.

Democracy and the Historiography of International Relations

The 1990s saw the rediscovery of democracy as an important theme and research perspective in the study of international affairs. Despite this, few scholars have challenged the widespread assumption of a division of labour between democratic theory and IR theory, and equally few have noted the way in which pluralist preoccupations anticipated present-day debates. For exceptions to this, see Franschet (2000) and Steffek (2015). And yet, the very existence of a pluralist tradition presupposes a substantial period of conjoint development by the two theories in question. Had our discipline not disregarded its own long-standing tradition of pluralist thinking, many of the theoretical and conceptual problems that have afflicted non-statist democratic theory could have been avoided. This tradition—which appears in retrospect to anticipate what has been termed 'democracy in global governance' (Bexell et al. 2010)—endured until the mid-twentieth century, when IR ceased to be a mainly British discipline and, under American influence, began increasingly to identify with scientific positivism.

How was it possible for the democratic theory, which had earlier figured so prominently in the study of IR, to fade into oblivion? Despite the 'historiographical turn' in IR (Bell 2009), and notwithstanding a number of excellent historical studies, definitions of IR based on a negation of democratic theory remain common. On this kind of view—one to which early historiographies lent credibility—IR is an oddity: it is a segment of political science with a logic of its own. It was theorists of the English School, such as Martin Wight (1960), who introduced this way of thinking, on the erroneous premise that classical authors concerned themselves either with international or domestic affairs.

Stanley Hoffmann (1977: 43) accentuated these divisions when he recognised that modernity was defined by the democratisation of the domestic sphere, which then facilitated the evolution of the modern social sciences that are biased in favour of democracy. However, Hoffmann suggests clear inside/outside distinctions as well as a clear distinction between the subject of our discipline and democratic theory: democratic theory is concerned only with orderly life within states because international relations, the preserve of kings and soldiers, lies beyond democratic control. IR's true object of study is thus the power politics engaged in by sovereign states vis-à-vis one another, which remain immune to modern democratisation (Hoffmann 1977: 42). This clear-cut domestic–international distinction—as Alexander Wendt remarks (2000: 61)—meant that IR theorists and democratic theorists could conveniently ignore each other.

Brian Schmidt (1998) refined Hoffmann's account, his approach being to reconstruct the internal discursive processes that preceded theoretical stages in IR and in so doing recall an increasingly presentist American IR of the considerable history underpinning the discipline. While Schmidt provided an overview of complex and shifting interpretations of the concept of anarchy and of the reception of pluralist ideas in the American critique of sovereignty, his argument often boiled down to the assertion that anarchy was all that mattered in IR. As a result, Schmidt's intervention—or rather the reception of it—perpetuated the divisions between IR theory and democratic theory. These divisions have still not been overcome—although Schmidt later conceded that the world never presented itself to British intellectuals as being in a state of anarchy made up by sovereign states (Long and Schmidt 2005: 11).

Given this emphasis, I shall look briefly at the interaction between the discourses on anarchy and democracy. My chief focus, however, will be

British intellectual preoccupation with the latter. Nowadays, different IR theories make different ontological statements and either recognise or deny the existence of international anarchy. In the early days of IR, however, recognition of anarchy and democracy was easily recognizable as a matter of ideology. After the First World War, conservatives sought a return to a situation in which European monarchies could live side by side in a non-judgmental, non-hierarchical anarchy (Tooze 2014).

Others, meanwhile, invoked anarchy in the opposite cause: the purpose of the 1916 book *The European Anarchy* by the British historian Goldsworthy L. Dickinson was to call into question the notion of German war guilt and provide a well-grounded democratic critique of the state, culminating in a proposal envisaging the creation of an international organisation that would oversee the conduct of states (Morefield 2013). As far as Dickinson was concerned, anarchy and balance-of-power politics belonged to a bygone age. According to some, and I include myself here, differences in ideological stance and attitude to democracy continue to play a part in theoretical divergence, albeit less explicitly (Jahn 2009).

In Britain, the study of IR was rooted in the country's imperial history and in the related rise of liberal internationalism (Vitalis 2010: 910). Concurrently with the growth in the new discipline, and in addition to the scholarly interest being shown in the colonies, there was an increasing focus—from historical, sociological, and political-science perspectives—on democracy in civilised states. As a result, public identification with democracy, which gained momentum during the First World War, was something for which British IR was well prepared (Holthaus 2015).

It is often forgotten that IR emerged as a discipline in 1919—just after democratic peace theory had begun to become more politicised. It is surely no coincidence either that Alfred Zimmern, who had recognised a war for democracy, was the first-ever holder of a chair in IR (at Aberystwyth). Zimmern promoted the application of liberal democratic vocabulary to IR while his challenger E.H. Carr sympathised with another democratic tradition. Carr's classic work *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* opened with an exposition of the built-in liberal democratic aspirations that had driven IR thus far. Carr's own leanings, meanwhile, were towards the socialist strain of democratic theory and international planning. The range of purposes to which democratic theory could be put was thus extensive. Originally, American IR was also interested in the international development of democracy. It focused on the state of democracy in Western core states, political developments within the colonies, and the relations

between the centre and the colonies before the discipline drew more specifically on international law and German Staatswissenschaft ('science of the state') (Vitalis 2010: 910). From then on, it distinguished more sharply between domestic and international politics (Gunnell 1993: 22).

The British Pluralist Tradition

Students of IR may intuitively think of realism and liberalism as being, respectively, averse to democracy as a potential threat to the effective management of international realtions IR and welcoming of it as a solution to the core problems bedevilling those relations. These preconceptions owe much to E.H. Carr's simplification of nineteenth-century liberalism and his following express-equation of nineteenth-century liberalism with the Wilsonian promotion of democracy and national self-determination. Liberal attitudes to democracy in that period were ambivalent, and the term was only just beginning to acquire a positive connotation (Gallie 1955–6). Liberal intellectuals, though generally approving of measures that curbed the arbitrary power of monarchs, were uneasy about the possible effects of extending the franchise (Hobson 2009: 641). The prospect of marginal groups, many of them inclined towards socialism, being included, with—in the case of Britain—the possible consequence of a deterioration in the quality of imperial government and a boost to continental European socialism, unnerved not just conservatives but also liberals. The liberal response was to prioritise the rule of law, attempting to subordinate democratic politics to it and relying on it as a solution to international problems. This continued even after the First World War, when national self-determination and representative democracy had been constitutionally enshrined (Mazower 1998: 4–6). Even Woodrow Wilson's stances on national self-determination were complex, and he did not always conceive of national self-determination as a democratic requirement.

It is well known that pluralism is more demanding than liberalism, and it is common to conceive of it as an ideology that is hostile to the state. Pluralists carried out assaults on holistic theories of the state or the idea that states should host homogenous and forever organically related political communities. They called into question both the Hegelian view that states are unitary actors that cannot be subjected to moral or legal restrictions as well as the liberal view that states, even when they are subjected to international law, remain the most important actors in IR and the legitimate representatives of their domestic communities.

Some studies highlight pluralism's critique of liberal legacies (Eisfeld 1972; Laborde 2000) and of representative democracy's 'democratic monism' (Hsiao 2000: 4) and the traditions' handling of the question of what a non-despotic democratic order might look like (Gaus 1983: 205). British pluralists answered this question by demanding a fairer distribution of power among groups accountable to their stakeholders in the domestic sphere (Eisenberg 1995). The empowered groups ought to exert democratic control over a still elitist and oligarchic foreign policy and fight for representation in international organisations. One of the distinguishing traits of pluralism is, hence, its defence of democracy as a normatively based concept and as a means of bringing about improvements in both domestic and international politics.

On the pluralist view, democracy requires considerably more than the occasional choice of representatives and is about participation and deliberation. Indeed, the distinguishing trait of pluralism is its defence of democracy as a normatively based concept and as a means of bringing about improvements in both domestic and international politics. Pluralists support the democratic demands of groups such as trade unions and argue that empowering these groups would enhance the quality of deliberation within representative democracy and help bring about the conditions for peace. At the same time, pluralists are no idealists: they do not believe that democracy advances in a linear fashion, recognising nationalism's mobilising force. Neither did they endorse Woodrow Wilson's definition of democracy as national self-determination. Though acknowledging that democracy expressed itself concretely as representative democracy, they did not believe this marked the end of the process of democratisation. Significantly in this connection, much pluralist analysis covers the 'short twentieth century'—a period emblematic of the triumph of nationalism over democracy.

The interwar crisis of democracy did not cause pluralists to abandon their democratic perspective: they kept up a discourse on the development, diffusion, and internal contradictions of representative democracy and on democratic peace theory and the democratisation of international organisations. Because alignment with the aim of transforming representative democracy into a working system of government was a prerequisite for admission to the evolving discipline of IR, the areas of interest of pluralists and other scholars of the international scene sometimes overlapped. However, the pluralists' continual criticism of representative democracy's own democratic deficit and their calls for democratic systems that were less

territorial and more welfarist in nature often put them at odds with conservative liberals in discipline.

In what follows, I will trace the history of the pluralist tradition and explain the reasons for my choice of L.T. Hobhouse, G.D.H. Cole, and David Mitrany as the three authors of reference for this study. I will then ask why historiographers of IR have neglected the democratic perspective reflected in these writers' works and will follow this with an explanation of my own approach to the study of international thought.

One of the grounds for viewing pluralism as a tradition of thought is the fact that the authors who propounded it were conversant with, and borrowed from, each other's works. During the first half of the twentieth century, the practice of combining democratic and international theory was common amongst pluralists, and they were effectively united in pursuing a distinct analytical approach to transnational politics and to the question of how democracy alters the parameters governing the conduct of state affairs and IR. In their democratically oriented analysis of these issues, however, they did not focus singly on human nature or domestic politics or the international system. Instead, they considered all three of these levels together or, rather, relations between them (Waltz 1968). They posited, for example, that for representative democracy to survive, it was essential that citizens hold multiple loyalties, realising their social nature. Or they analysed the effects that protectionism and declining transnationalism were having on democracy in the 1930s. There is thus good reason to see a tradition here. At the same time, we should remain chary of 'isms' and aware of the ever-present risk of oversimplifying complex life-works in the cause of classification (Booth 2008). Scholars, as political thinkers of the real world, sometimes change their views—a point illustrated in what I have to say later on about Cole.

The British strand of pluralism can be traced back to the late nineteenth century. Its emergence predates that of American (neo-)pluralism, as evident in the writings of Arthur F. Bentley (1870–1957) or David B. Truman (1913–2003) (Cerny 2010). The two traditions are further distinguished by their perspectives on groups—democratic in the first instance and more rationalist in the second (Holthaus and Noetzel 2012; Bevir 2012). A modernisation of American pluralism enables one to see that foreign policies and international processes are not predetermined by the existence of vertically unified nation-states but that they involve a wide range of bargaining groups (Cerny 2010). However, theorists of American pluralism hardly supplement

this analytical innovation with a normative vision and rather negate the option of democratic international organisation (Dahl 1999).

Because of his interest in the domestic and transnational diffusion of power amongst different groups and federalism, Lord Acton (1834–1902) is sometimes thought of as the originator of British pluralism. But Acton never demurred from his identification with liberalism, regarding majoritarian democracy as a potentially dangerous form of rule inimical to diversity and liberty. He saw the risks as particularly great when democracy was combined with ethnically defined or unitary-striving nationalist sentiments (Sylvest 2009: 177). The extent to which Acton anticipated pluralism will be discussed in more detail in Chap. 2.

Most accounts of the origins of British pluralism trace these to J.N. Figgis (1866–1919) and F.W. Maitland (1850–1906) and their critical attitudes to the absolute power of the state. Both scholars drew inspiration from the works of the German jurist Otto von Gierke (1841–1921), author of a seminal study on the place of social groups within the state. Intellectual traditions often originate and diffuse in such a transnational manner (Stears 2002). Pluralists who came after these authors then took on board the concept of democracy, sought to demonstrate the validity of democratic demands, and challenged dominant liberal and state-centric democratic theory. As a result of this heritage, British pluralism is often characterised by antipathy towards the state and support for the strengthening of public, civic, and vocational associations at the domestic level (Bevir 2012; Sylvest 2007).

The narratives leading back to Figgis and Maitland, though accurate in themselves, underplay the importance of the international background against which the British pluralist trend developed. Pluralism turned from conservative or liberal questions of imperial unity to the development of a European labour movement and the domestic effects of empire. These effects included the rise of a statist bureaucracy and the emergence of a variety of problems commonly lumped together as 'the social question' (Bell 2007: 267). Domestically speaking, British pluralism emerged when political rights were being slowly extended but socioeconomic inequality was also on the rise. Now pluralists did not look at the role of churches within states but expected reform from trade unions. British democratisation was 'exceptional' in the sense that trade unionism here preceded the creation of a formal labour party, and British pluralism reflects this fact (Eley 2002: 69).

However, twentieth-century British pluralists were acutely aware of the degree to which democratic rights of association were intertwined with questions of war and peace: even states—like Britain—who went to war in the name of democracy suspended already granted democratic rights in times of war. Pluralists protested against the violation of democratic rights and saw the strengthening of associations such as the unions as a means of ensuring the continuance of democratic deliberation and peace-promoting public discourse. Trade unions then made up a large part of transnational civil society (Davies 2014: 45). Pluralists thus saw social loyalties stemming from the identification with a class or vocation as a way of counterbalancing nationalist forces in society.

These preoccupations are identifiable in the work of all three of the British pluralists discussed in this study: the philosopher and sociologist L.T. Hobhouse; the socialist political theorist G.D.H. Cole; and the IR academic widely seen as the pioneer of functionalism, David Mitrany. Although Hobhouse and Mitrany were reformist scholars and less radical than Cole, self-constituted patterns of exchange emerged. On the basis of this and theoretical emphases, these three scholars may be viewed as representative of a distinct pluralist tradition. Harold Laski, who might be expected to feature here, is not included, since his international thought did not make use of many pluralist ideas and since he converted to Marxism at a rather early stage (Lamb 2004; Sylvest 2007). Mitrany (1975: 79) valued Laski as a friend but pointed to the authoritarian implications of his socialist and Marxist proposals.

My own sympathy for particular pluralist views may be detectable to the reader—notably, perhaps, in my choice of topic and authors. I hope, nonetheless, to have produced a critical, historically aware account of the work of these scholars, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. Though Hobhouse, Cole, and Mitrany were clearly progressives as far as Western democratic theory and the democratisation of the metropole were concerned, there is no doubt that their thinking bore traces of the imperialist and racist legacies of their time.

As the biographies which I shall shortly present will show, besides being established scholars, all three of the chosen pluralists were actively involved in trying to bring about change—working to democratise British foreign policy, for example, or promoting international organisations. Whereas Hobhouse, contributing as he did to academic and public debate, might be described as a 'public moralist', Cole, who was equally active in academia and the world of socialist associations, is perhaps best styled an

'activist scholar'. Mitrany, for his part, was more of a scholar and a practitioner of his own ideas. He advised politicians on the design of international organisations, discussed with international practitioners democratic and international themes, and sought to foster academic understanding of the benefits of international organisations (Steffek and Holthaus 2017).

L.T. Hobhouse

Let us turn first to L.T. Hobhouse. Hobhouse (1864–1929), famously a new liberal and less famously a pluralist, had a particular preoccupation with unrealised liberal and democratic promises. His social and educational background reflects the fact that he, like many British liberals of his time, occupied key academic and journalistic positions that enabled him to speak with authority on political events. Born into a highly politicised family, Hobhouse was active as a social philosopher, university professor, and journalist and could therefore present his arguments from a variety of perspectives (Freeden 2004). Having graduated in Classics ('Literae Humaniores') at Oxford in 1887, he obtained a fellowship at Merton College. Uncomfortable with Oxford's reactionary atmosphere, he began to reflect on issues of democracy and social reform and became interested in the philosophy of T. H. Green. In the early days, Hobhouse espoused the notion of teleological human evolution and was drawn to Mazzini's ideals of co-occurrent national and democratic self-determination and progress towards 'unity in diversity' (Hobhouse 1885).

In the late 1880s, he developed an interest in trade unionism. Although he did not himself become a member of the Fabian Society, he exchanged views with Sidney Webb and other Fabians. Hobhouse's first book—*The Labour Movement* ([1893] 1974)—presented trade unionism, the cooperative movement, and state socialism as compatible means to social reform. Applying the economic theories of Alfred Marshall, he argued that producer surplus belonged to the community and called for the introduction of a minimum wage (Collini 1979: 64). In spite of his early affinity with Fabianism, when the movement considered support of British imperialism, Hobhouse turned away from the society.

In 1897, Hobhouse accepted a post at the *Manchester Guardian*, where he developed a strong friendship with the paper's influential editor, C.P. Scott. Although Hobhouse was originally employed to sharpen the *Guardian*'s New Liberal agenda, the South African War was under way at this time, and Hobhouse began to focus more on international affairs.

Besides maintaining close contact with his peace-activist sister, Emily, during her stay in South Africa, Hobhouse set about learning Dutch in order to be able to produce translations of reports by Dutch writers about British crimes in South Africa. He was also responsible for arranging J.A. Hobson's visit to South Africa—a trip that resulted in the publication of the latter's book *Imperialism* (1902) (Claeys 2010: 274). The liberal weekly *The Speaker* was another publication to which Hobhouse contributed, his articles here being republished in the volume *Democracy and Reaction* (1904). The South African War stoked Hobhouse's hostility to imperialism—though he continued to flirt with the idea of a 'democratic empire'. He believed, as did Hobson, that the problems of social inequality and imperialism were intertwined and that they hampered the achievement of a democratic peace. His chosen point of reference when formulating both his critical reflections on the state of British democracy and his international theory was what we now call monadic democratic peace theory.

As well as writing for the press, Hobhouse continued his investigations in philosophy and sociology. *Mind in Evolution* (1901) and *Morals in Evolution* (1906) were the first two volumes in a trilogy that would be completed, in 1913, with the publication of *Development and Purpose*, although the internationally inclined *Morals in Evolution*, his first philosophical work, sealed his academic reputation. A series of sociological studies reworked inherited philosophical ideas and this pattern continued to characterise his work. In 1907, Hobhouse joined the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) as Britain's first-ever professor of sociology. Taking an opposite course to that of the German sociologist Max Weber, he followed Comte in interpreting sociology as a means of fostering enlightened human progress by indicating concrete ways in which ethical principles might be realised. He conceived of human evolution as a process of increasing differentiation and corresponding integration and, from a normative perspective, as a progression towards moral universalism and greater equality. In contrast to Durkheim, he drew on sociological findings to demonstrate progress towards world society. There is no doubt that, of the three thinkers considered here, Hobhouse was the most internationally minded (Scholte 1993).

In his seminal 1907 work *Liberalism*, Hobhouse redefined the liberal stance as one aimed at the achievement of social cooperation, individual liberty, and social interdependence. He supported the right to work, the right to a living wage, and the right to health insurance and an old-age pension, and he was in favour of the redistribution of wealth through taxation.

He opposed liberal imperialism and made the case for national self-determination—at least in 'white' colonies. In 1911, he was involved in the establishment of an (ultimately short-lived) Foreign Policy Committee, which called for greater parliamentary control over foreign affairs, and in the same year he published *Social Evolution and Political Theory*. Though advocating greater rights for people both at home and abroad, Hobhouse, in common with a number of other British internationalists, struggled to come up with an answer to the problem of democratic despotism—that is to say, the tendency of citizens to lapse into passivity and relinquish their power to centralised authority. At a later stage, Hobhouse rightly pointed out that the future of liberal democracy depended on the cultivation of transnational loyalties as restraints on nationalist forces destructive of democracy.

G.D.H. Cole

Like Hobhouse, Cole (1889–1959) moved between the two worlds of academia and journalism. Cole too worked for the *Manchester Guardian* during the First World War (Ayerst 1971: 434). His radicalism and opposition to British propaganda during the war were, however, too much for both Scott and Hobhouse, who, though critical of liberalism, continued to identify with it and maintained their links to the Liberal Party. Indeed, Scott was a personal friend of Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George, even though he frequently criticised his politics.

Cole pursued a career as a university teacher, engaged in social activism, and was a prolific writer. In my view, he was one of the most incisive democratic theorists of the twentieth century—and sometimes the most strident (Stears 2004). The son of an estate agent, Cole was born in Cambridge in 1889 and—again like Hobhouse—studied Classics at Oxford, graduating in 1912. He was a student of A.D. Lindsay, pluralist and president of the Oxford Fabian Society (Freeden 1986: 41). Although Cole had originally espoused the socialist cause chiefly for aesthetic and ethical reasons following a reading of William Morris's 1890 work *News from Nowhere*, he now joined the Fabians in Oxford (Carpenter 1973: 5). He proved an active and influential recruit to the society but could not be described as either a typical or an unwavering Fabian. In 1912, he became a fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, where he carried out research on theories of trade unionism. This resulted in the 1913 volume *A World of Labour* and led Cole to argue that British socialists should abandon the

idea of parliamentary strategy and instead promote direct trade-union action and direct trade-union control and organisation of industry.

Cole, in his so-called guild socialist period (1913–23), refined this ideology in the London-based weekly *The New Age*. Guild socialism challenged the Fabian doctrine of bureaucratisation, and from 1915 to 1928 Cole, whilst remaining in Fabian research, allowed his membership in the society to lapse (Riddell 1995: 936–7). Along with other contributors to *The New Age*, he formed the National Guilds League (Stears 1998). However, Cole's interpretation of guild ideas differed considerably from that of fellow founders such as S.G. Hobson—who, for his part, approached the matter with communitarian nostalgia for the solid social bonds of a past age. Cole disagreed with Hobson over key questions such as the mode of organisation to be adopted by guilds, which in Cole's view (1914, 1918) must be democratic. He used the guild vocabulary to appreciate small communities and to demand civil activism. At the same time, he adapted the guild analogy to demonstrate that it was possible for a complex society to be brought into being by the conscious effort of autonomous individuals. Despite the differences in approach, the National Guilds League succeeded in establishing cooperative links between intellectuals and trade unionists, and through his work with the league, Cole secured a position as unpaid advisor to the Amalgamated Society of Engineers—an appointment that brought with it exemption from military service in the First World War.

Given that leading British trade unionists such as Arthur Henderson supported the guild socialist movement, Cole also had reason to hope that there might be practical political advances after the war. It was not to be: the labour elite elected in 1918 dissociated itself from radical movements of whatever stamp, and during the 1920s trade-union support for guild socialism dwindled, finally petering out with the collapse of the general strike in 1926. After this, Cole turned once again to academia and in 1925 took up a fellowship at University College, Oxford. Although as an intellectual Cole drew a clear distinction between theory and propaganda, he nonetheless viewed theory as a locus of political action and as a means of addressing contemporary problems and persuading a selected audience of the merits of particular ideas.

Although Cole had in 1913 not conceived of labour as a transnational movement at the expense of nationalism, he developed a democratic argument against conscription and the authority of the state during the war. Cole's political strategy, however, was subject to frequent change, and of

the trilogy of major works he published in 1920—*Chaos and Order in Industry*, *Guild Socialism Restated*, and *Social Theory*—only the last applies Cole's social theory to the international realm. This turn to the international dimension, and similar shifts of focus later on, are picked up by only one of Cole's biographers, A.W. Wright (1979). During the 1930s, especially after Hitler's rise to power, Cole's work dealt increasingly with international topics, considered from economic and democratic perspectives. In 1944, he became the first ever professor of social and political theory at Oxford. In 1952, he took up a post with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and in 1958, despite his antipathy to the United States, visited the country as guest professor at Roosevelt University in Chicago.

David Mitrany

The biographical background of David Mitrany (1888–1975)—a left-leaning expatriate Romanian—differs markedly from that of Hobhouse and Cole. Mitrany depended for a long time on Hobhouse to secure him entry to the circles of the British elite. Although he later enjoyed great popularity, a chair in IR was not amongst the distinctions granted to him (Navari 2013: 201). Born under an anti-Semitic regime in Bucharest, Romania, Mitrany, who was of Jewish origin, left the country after military service in pursuit of opportunities for professional education (Anderson 1998). Initially settling in Hamburg (1908–11), he took classes at the Kolonialinstitut before moving to Britain, where he mixed socially with British internationalists.

In 1912 he began studying sociology and economics at the LSE—the former under L.T. Hobhouse and the latter under Graham Wallace. Following the outbreak of the First World War, he decided to devote his energies to IR and the British war effort. He started to do intelligence work for both the Foreign Office and War Office, witnessed the Battle of the Somme (1916), and became a member of the first League of Nations Society. As an expert on the Balkans, Mitrany helped shape British government policy on the Habsburg monarchy in 1918, advocating the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. He also contributed material for use by the British delegation to the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. Though he served on the influential Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions from 1918 to 1931, Mitrany never became a member of the party itself—or of any other political party—and he refused

to participate in any kind of national organisation or in groups lobbying for the creation of an Israeli state. On the rare occasions he attached a label to himself, it was that of a left-liberal or of a liberal with a strong interest in the labour movement. He was firmly opposed to any kind of ideological rigidity or political dogmatism.

After the war, Hobhouse recommended Mitrany to Scott at the *Manchester Guardian*. Mitrany served on the paper's editorial staff from 1919 to 1922, his particular brief being foreign affairs. Whilst at the *Guardian*, Mitrany spent time in Germany and published an important article on the illegality of France's claim to the Ruhr. Eventually, however, Scott's refusal to allow Mitrany to work independently caused Mitrany to leave—though he maintained close ties with the paper (and with Scott's family) (Mitrany 1921). In 1922, Mitrany worked with US professor James Shotwell on the production of a series of publications—sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—charting the socio-economic history of the war (Anderson 1998: 578). Mitrany travelled to the United States, which deepened his knowledge about international topics such as sanctions, minorities, and nationalism. He also studied agrarian reforms and increasing state interventions in the economy. It was at about this time (1925) that he published *The Problem of International Sanctions*.

Mitrany continued his formal studies at the LSE and, having completed his Ph.D. in 1929, went on, in 1931, to obtain a D.Sc. in economics. At this time, he also married the artist Eva Limbeer and considered applying for a chair at the LSE, but, as Hobhouse and Wallas warned, the school's preference was for someone who could establish close ties with the Foreign Office (Navari 2013: 28). Mitrany set off once more for the United States, first serving as guest lecturer at Harvard University (1931–33). In 1933, he published *The Progress of International Government*, in which he outlined his early pluralist thinking. That same year, he was appointed professor at the School of Economics at Princeton University's Institute of Advanced Studies—the first appointment to be made to the school. While in the United States, he became friendly with US lawyer Felix Frankfurter, a supporter of, and advisor to, Roosevelt in connection with the New Deal (Mitrany 1946: 21). Mitrany made a close study of the New Deal and often cited it as a paradigm for transnational welfarist institutions.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, Mitrany returned to England and worked at the Royal Institute of International Affairs whose director at that time was Arnold Toynbee. Mitrany often found himself at odds with the institute's rather conservative leadership (Mitrany 1975:

40). Towards the end of the war, functionalism became fashionable, and Mitrany reworked his ideas, proposing that functional organisation be adopted as a principle for post-war international organisation. Besides offering a broad defence of the functionalist approach, Mitrany's proposals envisaged the creation of independent functional agencies empowered to act with supranational political authority. In 1943, Mitrany published what has become a functionalist classic—the pamphlet *A Working Peace System*—and in the years to come his ideas were to be found embedded in the statutes of the UN's specialised agencies (Anderson 1998: 580). After the war, Mitrany returned to Princeton, eventually coming back to London to take up a post with the multinational corporation Unilever, a position he held until retirement.

Mitrany continued international political theory. In 1951 he published *Marx against the Peasant,* a critique of Marxist dogmatism that he regarded as one of his most important contributions to the field. His interest in individual rights and the welfare state continued, and he carried out research into the role of trade unions in economic planning. He witnessed—and lamented—the emergence of neo-functionalism and the advance of European integration. Well read in political theory, Mitrany drew on French, German, Romanian, and Anglophone sources. He was familiar with different intellectual traditions, and his Romanian experience allowed him to maintain a critical distance vis-à-vis Western—particularly British—left-liberal thinking (Ashworth 2005). His knowledge of foreign intervention in South-Eastern Europe was also important in shaping his ideas. Holding the French and Russian revolutions to be of equal significance, he considered that the quest for social equality had now become paramount. Mitrany approached theory as a realm for social reflection. Intellectually highly aware, he carefully crafted his arguments in conscious distinction to competing theories. What he wanted to see, ultimately, was international endeavours to bring about social equality and the transformation of political communities in both theory and practice.

The Approach of the Book: A Synthesis of the Cambridge School and the Traditions of Thought Approach

The diverse and, in part, very timely nature of the British pluralists' work casts doubt on its amenability to internal discursive analysis as previously described. This approach views disciplinary debate as a second-order prac-

tice that develops its own distinct logic and self-concept as it considers first-order problems. Accordingly, authors pursue mostly analytical interests and clarify scientific concepts in writing, and the analytical dialogues taking place in the discipline are of vital importance for understanding the produced texts. However, the early discourses about democracy are to different degrees manifestations of theoretical, political, and ideological interventions rather than completely detached discourses.

We turn again to the backgrounds, careers, and target audiences of the early-twentieth-century pioneers of IR. Often Oxbridge-educated, they were active in different areas, most notably academia and journalism. Hobhouse and Cole, as we have seen, operated via both these channels. Others, such as J.A. Hobson and Norman Angell, never became part of the academic establishment, acquiring their considerable influence chiefly through their writing and lecturing. Others again—Leonard Woolf amongst them—garnered experience in colonial administration and spoke from this perspective. It is safe to say, then, that these IR pioneers, all members of an identifiable elite, interpreted political events on a variety of levels and with different audiences in mind (Bourdieu 2001: 42; Murphy 2001). The extent to which they all had absorbed different democratic theories was, however, evident in many pieces. As indicated previously, IR scholars of differing theoretical and ideological persuasions routinely used the language of democratic theory to evaluate contemporary politics and pose urgent normative questions. It was only when moves began to be made in the United States to define IR in positivist terms that these democratic perspectives, and linkage between democratic and international theory, were jettisoned.

The institutionalisation of academic IR that occurred in the interwar period was a transitional process in which elements of political argument persisted. Writers on IR continued to have links not only to political parties but also to early think tanks such as the Royal Institute of International Affairs (commonly known as Chatham House). During this time, scholars of IR started to organise their thoughts along new disciplinary lines, at the same time elaborating, questioning, and remodelling the ideological bases of their thinking. They began to acknowledge the limits of orthodox, ideologically based approaches to international affairs, with the result that interwar IR became what might be described as a trading zone, in which scientific subcultures and new traditions of thought emerged (Ashworth 2012). Scholars formed new communities, interacted with one another in both the academic and private spheres, and together created new vocabularies and bodies

of shared assumptions. As a result, the ideological/scientific distinction in the approach to IR cannot be seen as a straight either/or: the nuances and potential overlaps are many in number.

Although political affiliation continued to be of importance, with all eyes now on the goal of making sense of the international realm, it ceased to be decisive. By way of example: during the 1930s, a study group set up by the RIIA to look into the question of nationalism included amongst its members both the (unorthodox) socialist E.H. Carr and the liberal Morris Ginsberg (Jones 1998: 86). If, as Max Weber posited, the difference between political and scientific reasoning is that the former explicates a point of view and tries to persuade while the latter attempts the thoughtful ordering of reality, then the start of the transition to scientific reasoning must be dated to the time of what realists later dismissed as naïve idealism (Jackson 2011: 20). Ironically, Carr, who is still the best-known critic of the liberal internationalist ideology, was then a rather polemical voice.

Given this background, the method selected in tracing the course of IR must be one that takes into account the political character and precise nature of the intellectual interventions that accompanied the discipline's institutionalisation. A synthesis of the two primary approaches here—the traditions of thought and Cambridge School lines of enquiry—would seem to fit the bill. The Cambridge School approach enjoyed great popularity during the 1990s, in part because it provided the perfect tool for debunking the myth of the First Great Debate and rebutting the realist criticism of idealism (Wilson 1998: 94). A short description follows of both the school and the trends that challenged it—one of which was the traditions of thought approach.

The basic tenet of the Cambridge School—a movement that took shape in protest at the ahistorical approach of American analytical philosophy—is that philosophers only seem to be philosophers and, hence, august, detached, and noble-minded, from a distance: if we look at them more closely, we see that their prime motivations are political, even when they are drafting a philosophical text. To be able to spot this, we need to familiarise ourselves with the political and linguistic contexts in which they were operating and take into account other discourses besides the academic one. Only in this way is it possible to detect purposeful efforts by scholars to endorse or challenge particular political ideas or to change the available vocabulary in their immediate context. Against the background of John Austin's speech-act theory, Max Weber's sociological conjectures, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, the Cambridge School holds that writing is (linguistic) action (Goldie 2006).

Writers who have become 'innovating ideologists' have detectable reasons for writing a text (Vucina et al. 2011). These are of greater importance than the subordinate intentions that evolve whilst the text is being written. Such innovators, the Cambridge School claims, write in order to change the conceptual configuration of an ideology or alter the available political vocabulary. They may do this either by using a common term in an unconventional way or by changing a term's content (Skinner 2004: 151). Such purposive changes may legitimise a political situation or open up new paths of action. It is thus the authorial intention rather than the word's conventional semantic content that is critical in reaching an appropriate understanding of the text. The Cambridge School sets high standards for the study of texts and enables seeing their social context. However, it hardly directs attention to the practical impacts that theoretical innovations have when they alter the political discourse and the normative structure of society (Bell 2002).

One frequently voiced criticism in regard to the Cambridge School is that it focuses attention on subtle intellectual changes rather on far-reaching intellectual developments (Kelly 2011). To take an example from the context of the present study: beginning in 1900, there was a widespread discourse in Britain on the idea of functional democracy (Ashworth 1999: 39–41). At this time, the term functional was used to refer to (then increasingly important) vocational and civic relations as opposed to the territorial or national kind. Functional representation, in the widely recognised sense of representation in a body based on membership in a social or occupational group, was proposed as a remedy to the irrationality of parliamentary democracy. If we took the precepts of the Cambridge School literally here, we would need to study every author's use of the term in minute detail, comparing it to alternative usages and relating it back to the political debates of the day without raising questions of theoretical coherency. We would need to be wary of reading Cole's text as classical critics of representative democracy who outline problems that have remained in place or that have re-emerged in our democratic systems. It would be difficult to explain why contemporary IR should have any interest in these debates.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Cambridge School's methodological claims and its application of speech-act theory to texts and to non-synchronous situations have repeatedly given rise to defences of anachronism or to outright rejections of the Cambridge School (Kelly 2011). One fact these criticisms choose to disregard, however, is that Skinner and his colleagues themselves stressed the need to explore the impact of historical

findings within specific disciplinary contexts (Rorty et al. 2004). Hence, historians need to be both archaeologists and translators. Creating as they do historical and social meanings rather than neutral history, they can themselves exert great power as intellectuals. Skinner's own—and, for some, obviously political—application of his method illustrates this: he recovered republican conceptions of liberty and used them to critique liberalism.

Like the Cambridge School, the traditions of thought approach takes a particular interest in historical contextualisation. In contrast to the Cambridge School, however, it also recognises that historians, like the writers they study, are situated agents (Hall 2017). It is interested primarily in intellectual change and provides better instruments to explain the importance of broader intellectual pathways. It does not think in terms of big 'isms' like liberalism or Marxism but sees traditions as sets of connected beliefs and theories that people inherit from intellectual authorities or their social surroundings.

In this view, it is not possible for perceptions and value judgements to escape the influence of traditions of thought, whether competing or overlapping. The writers of the past necessarily drew on beliefs to make experience meaningful, as do we. The approach in question here sees traditions of thought as starting points and not necessarily as endpoints. Individuals can arrive at new ideas through experience: they can build on available beliefs, revive an idea that was formerly part of a particular tradition, or borrow an idea from another tradition (Bevir 2000). Traditions are thus fluid. They change in response to both intellectual (endogenous) and real-world (exogenous) developments. Indeed, one of the great advantages of the traditions of thought approach is that it allows one to capture theoretical, political, and real-world change. Change is especially likely where new experience ceases to correspond with existing beliefs (Hall 2017). Individuals are then inclined to generate or accept new knowledge or re-accommodate old ideas. Language and political ideas are adapted to new (social) realities, though changes in these domains often lag quite far behind actual events.

Applying the two approaches to our earlier example of functional democracy, we can perhaps appreciate the difference in practical results. In the traditions of thought view, growth in the idea of functional democracy was fostered by perceived deficits in liberal and socialist democratic theory. Cole used the idea both to challenge the principle of territorial organisation and to update aspirations associated with representative democracy.

These had included the hope of ensuring the continuance of communal democratic activism whilst also encouraging public deliberation through the election of competent individuals to parliament. When it became evident that many citizens lacked the material and educational resources needed for democratic activism, trust in the automatic evolution of political deliberation could not be maintained.

The traditions of thought approach helps us understand these debates as discourses that led to the modernisation of democratic theory, at the same time allowing us to judge the originality and coherence of individual contributions. Not only that, it invites us to continue the debate and ask whether the democracies in which we live provide sufficient opportunity for participation and deliberation. The approach of the Cambridge School, meanwhile, counsels us to keep an eye on the authorial motives that drove intellectual changes. Cole, for example, was motivated by a life-long desire to see bureaucracy and democracy reconciled in a decentralised system of public administration that, rather than operating beyond the reach of civic activism and public control, served as a channel of expression for them.

My purpose here is not to pitch these two approaches against each other. Rather, I propose that we develop the competence to be able to approach texts either as historical documents or as classics, depending on the nature of our research question. Specifically for this study, I propose a methodological synthesis.

Methodological synthesis could, for example, be the best tool for highlighting the way in which authors dealt with discrepancies between inherited promises and their analysis of industrialised society at the time the discipline of IR was establishing itself. As we shall see, many of the topics and concepts they worked with had acquired their meanings in the nineteenth century—during what has been called the *Sattelzeit* (an age seeing the emergence of a modern democratic language (Kosselleck 1997)). The significance of this period for the development of modern IR has recently, and rightly, been underlined. Unaccountably, however, this has been done with no mention of the increased overlapping that occurred during that time between international and democratic theory. Such overlaps are of particular interest to those who favour a non-statist democratic theory and accept as normal the notion that it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between the domestic and the international.

One criticism that might be levelled at the synthesising approach is that, although well suited to the task of documenting the history of

ideas, it is ill-suited to that of revealing the power of ideas and norms in international history. In the view of Chris Reus-Smith, critical theory, constructivism, and historical IR are at their best when they challenge mainstream IR on the basis of superior and sustained empirical studies (Reus-Smit 2008: 408). This view has garnered considerable support, including in the domain of international democratic theory (Hobson 2015: 26).

However, while a history-of-ideas perspective that shifts away from international history can be problematic, focusing exclusively on ideas and norms that 'made history' also leads us into risky territory. A study that looked only at the democratic norms that have proved most powerful would perpetuate the identification of democracy with liberal democracy and would leave the challenges that have been mounted to the hegemonic model unacknowledged. Since I believe the word 'democracy' did in fact attract emancipatory power, it makes sense to explore definitions that would otherwise be marginalised. They may very well turn out to be the ones to trust. With this in mind, I propose to look at the academic and political responses to major social transformations and key international events in cases where these responses have been of significance in bringing about reconfigurations, either of a lasting or of a less consequential kind, of the concept of democracy.

Outline of the Chapters

Expanding on the themes of the introduction, I will trace the intertwined origins of modern IR and modern democracy back to the nineteenth century. In Chap. 2, I emphasise the transnational nature of the struggles for democracy and the burgeoning definition of democracy as representative democracy. To introduce the debates that preceded the emergence of pluralism, I focus on the ambiguous relationship between advocacy for democracy and nationalism, Lord Acton's stance on nationalism and representative democracy, and on the British critique of parliamentarianism at the turn of the century.

In the main chapters, I will trace the development of pluralism on the basis of the thought of the three thinkers featured in this chapter. In Chap. 3, I will turn to Hobhouse's pluralism and his understanding of modernity, democracy and social differentiation. The South African War (1898/1899), however, prompted the impression that democratic values

were threatened at all levels and at different places. Hobhouse revealed contradictions between liberal democratic principles and British imperialism and argued that a democratic minimum of socioeconomic equality was critical to the establishment of public opinion as a safeguard of peace. In Chap. 4, I will highlight that Hobhouse temporally abandoned a pluralist perspective when he aligned his thought with the official declaration of Britain's fight for democracy during the First World War. However, after the war and in view of continuing nationalism in Britain and on the European continent, he furthered the development of pluralism when he recognised that democratic attitudes and self-sustaining democratic deliberation depended on transnational loyalties as checks against democracy-destroying nationalism.

In Chap. 5, I will argue that Cole's defences of democracy and his opposition to the reduction of democratic rights during the war are most representative of pluralism. I pause on how Cole developed his case against conscription into a substantial critique of representative democracy and participatory democratic theory. His account of non-state associations as forces of an emerging world society was an intrinsic part of this nascent democratic theory. In Chap. 6, I trace massive changes in Cole's engagements back to his opposition to German fascism. Cole conceived of the Second World War as a necessary war, though he again opposed the wartime restrictions of democratic rights. Towards the war's end, Cole was much concerned with the reconstruction of democracy and asked what a European order might look like after the moderation of nationalism and exaggerated understandings of national self-determination.

In Chap. 7, I will introduce David Mitrany as a theoretically well-versed thinker who modernised the pluralist line within the disciplinary context of IR. During the interwar time, Mitrany warned that national welfare services furthered nationalism rather than a democratic universalism. There will be no lasting democratic peace, Mitrany argued, as long as bounded democracies refuse to establish transnational welfarist institutions. Transnational welfarist institutions ought to provide recurrent impulses to the development and maintenance of social pluralism and democracy in the domestic context. Mitrany's approach influenced the self-legitimation rather than the design of the UN specialised agencies. In the two-part Chap. 8, I will offer the first comprehensive overview of Mitrany's critique of post-war, twentieth-century representative democracy. Its second part uses Mitrany's post-war thought to show that pluralist evaluations of the UN exhibit an indefeasible tension between

discomforts with the course that the UN has taken and a perceived need to defend international organisations in an era of latent nationalism. In the conclusion, I will sum up pluralism as a lost discourse on democracy in domestic and transnational affairs that still speaks to contemporary IR.

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CHAPTER 2

The Nineteenth Century and the Origins of Modern Democracy

Introduction

In this chapter, I trace the intertwined origins of modern democracy and modern international relations (IR) back to the nineteenth century. Some aspects of what I have to say have already gained general acceptance; others will need to be argued in some detail. The less controversial parts of my argument are perhaps those relating to the origins of modern IR: the attention devoted to this topic in recent years allows me to invoke the critique of the 'Westphalian myth' without having to reargue the case (Osiander 2001).

Neorealist accounts of modern IR date the origins of modernity to 1648 (Waltz 1979). Orthodox IR and certain constructivist trends (Ruggie 1993) justify a linkage to the Peace of Westphalia on the grounds that the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster brought a war of religion (the Thirty Years' War) to an end, brought forth mutual guarantees of non-interference, and cemented the superiority of political over religious authority (de Carvalho et al. 2011: 4). These standpoints define modernity as an age of sovereign states and hold up the emergence of sovereign states as evidence of the advent of modernity. The argument I present here draws on two aspects of the challenge that has been mounted to these historical claims. Firstly, critics have shown that, far from setting state sovereignty on a clearly defined footing, the treaties in question brought about the gradual consolidation of absolutist dynastic power and

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territorial authority (Reus-Smit 1999: 93). Secondly, those who challenged the Westphalian myth paved the way to a new consensus in which the nineteenth century has come to be recognised as the most appropriate starting point for any reflection on modernity in a substantive sense.

Buzan and Lawson (2013, 2015) give voice to a wider turn when they argue that the tenets of IR theory can be traced back to the (late) nineteenth century. They conceptualise a tripartite transformation interlinking the processes of industrialisation, the establishment of rational states, and the emergence of ideologies of progress that created truly global relations. Much like Robert Cox (1981: 137–138), they focus on how the organisation of production has contributed to the evolution of different forms of states and global institutions. In this view, the Industrial Revolution and British history are critical for understanding the origin of Western modernity. The Industrial Revolution was launched in Britain, and parallel to its domestic democratisation process, Britain became the first truly global empire. The turn, hence, aims at contesting state-centred perspectives and adding to the historical-sociological scholarship that outlines the global dimension of social change (Scholte 1993; Rosenberg 2006: 311).

I support the changed focus, but the perhaps still controversial part of my argument stems from the observation of a lacuna. I postulate that the new perspective has not yet recognised the importance of democracy for the nineteenth century. To be clear from the outset, the period did not witness a single representative democracy living up to contemporary standards, and it is further questionable, with regard to the era as a whole, whether 'democratic progress' occurred. However, since the French Revolution, there have been cycles of de- and re-democratisation in Europe, and it is also well known that Britain played an ambivalent role in the diffusion and repression of representative democracy.

The nineteenth century was a saddle period (*Sattelzeit*), where a host of concepts revolving around the 'modern' were taking shape, and it was democracy that became the most fiercely contested (Kosselleck 1997: xvi; Gallie 1955–56). Since the French Revolution its use was no longer restricted to the rarefied language of scholars. 'Democracy' was interpreted less in a constitutional and more in a social-political spirit and, along with the steady expansion of the franchise, was ideologised and politicised in France and in Europe (Conze et al. 1997). The reforms often changed justificatory practices rather than national and transnational power structures (Markoff 2015a: 69). To some degree, the working of democratic ideas in the nineteenth century might be compared to the impact of beliefs in nationality.

Although 'democracy' and 'nationality' did not describe realities – most people continued to live in multi-ethnic empires and lacked the right to vote – demands of voice prompted revolutions and less intense but long-enduring transnational, 'sub-imperial' and sub-state conflicts. European elites arrived at competing evaluations of democratic and national claims and of their recognition or repression by monarchs or ministers claiming democratic legitimacy.

Anticipating a core theme of this book, European elites often pointed out that democratic and national claims can serve each other or fall apart. They nursed a transnational discourse on the so-called business of kings and soldiers and formed the first transnational democratic groups to put pressure on their governments. Though transnational discourses and initiatives were at first strikingly elitist, they increasingly tried to mobilise different segments of society. When we as students of IR today grapple with 'democracy' instead of another concept, we often continue – consciously and unconsciously – schemes of interpretations that can be traced back to this 'saddle period'.

In what follows, I provide evidence for my claim that modern IR and modern democracy commonly originated in the nineteenth century. I will review the American and French Revolutions as transnational events that made democracy increasingly acceptable by defining it in terms of representative democracy and popular sovereignty. The section 'Empire, Monarchism, and Revolution' will review European elites' stances on nationality and nationalism in relation to proper or 'true' democracy on the basis of J.S. Mill, Lord Acton, and G. Mazzini's writings. Mill and Acton wrote from the centre of power of the British Empire. The final section will zoom in on the democratic debates that accompanied the nineteenth-century transformation of that empire. The installation of 'responsible government' in white settler colonies and the extension of the franchise to moderate socialist demands are here most important. I will end the chapter with a summary of the democratic claims and dilemmas of the nineteenth century and their impact on the pluralist tradition.

Empire, Monarchism, and Revolution

A great benefit of histories of democracy that recognise different waves of democracy is that they account for transnational dynamics in the diffusion of democracy. They avoid the pitfall of approaching democratic transformations as isolated domestic matters or of accessing the American and

French Revolutions as distinct, short, and national events. The revolutions were only retrospectively turned into national events, along with redefinition of the conception of revolution (Osterhammel 2014: 522). Revolutions evolve in a transnational context and are best defined as local events that give voice to universal claims. 'The cause of America', Thomas Paine declared, 'is in the great measure the cause of all mankind' (cited in Osterhammel 2014: 515).

Both the American and French Revolutions established democracy as a countermovement to arbitrary monarchical power and prepared modern conceptions of representative democracy based on the enfranchisement of non-property holders. During the first so-called long wave of democracy (ca. 1780–1921) covering the whole nineteenth century, such definitions of democracy gained acceptance (Huntington 1991: 12; Markoff 2015a: 4; Dix 1994: 94). While different authors provide slightly different dates for the starting and ending points of the process, it is largely agreed that the first wave covered the whole nineteenth century and that democratic claims were previously not widely shared or appreciated, nor in use to describe political realities.

For those who recognise premodern democratic structures, the time preceding the first wave and the nineteenth century as a whole was a deterioration. While precapitalist agrarian property regimes and intersubjective dynastic and Christian values continued to matter, an increase in despotic and infrastructural power benefitted the ruling monarchs. European monarchs dissolved medieval parliaments and ended previous patterns of consultation (Tilly 2007: 14). They could make more decisions than ever, and these decisions had an even greater impact on the lives of their populations. An oft-cited exception to the rule is the English Parliament, which existed almost continuously from the Middle Ages onwards. However, instead of turning the English Parliament into evidence of an exceptional English path to democracy, we would do better to conceive of its development as part of a pattern. This pattern was that parliamentarianism preceded democracy defined as peoples' power (Dahl 2000: 17).

Where parliaments or assemblies existed, they were a long way from satisfying minimal democratic standards (Dahl 2000: 23). They were populated by the aristocracy, noble classes, or parts of the clergy, and other property holders. Feudal authority tended to be spoken of as limited in most parts of Europe, but only towards the end of the eighteenth century did people living in the Low Countries (today's Netherlands and Belgium) introduce 'democracy' into the discourse (Markoff 2015a: 3; 46). They began using

democracy and *aristocracy* as words to denote different segments of society, social movements, and rival ideas on how power should be organised. Yet European intellectuals still thought that democracy meant direct democracy and that it at best formed a part of a mixed constitution.

The American Revolution greatly contributed to sharpening democracy's anti-monarchical thrust. It lasted for about three decades and began as a revolt by the North American colonies against colonial misrule (Hobson 2015: 46). Around 1760, Britain was involved in several colonial wars, and the British Parliament decided to gather taxes from the North American colonies as a result. The colonists conceived of this taxation, especially the Stamp Act of 1765, as a violation of their rights (Shankman 2012: 200). They could not send representatives to Parliament and in turn assumed that taxation unduly interfered with non-voters' property. Even in the absence of democratic structures, the language of rights informed the protest against unjust hereditary rule.

Only during a second phase and the American Revolutionary War (1775–83) did independence become a concern. Debates drew on radical democratic experiments in Pennsylvania and considered that unchecked democracy could turn into a source of instability. Those who thought about the adequate nature and scope of democracy in the post-Revolutionary era followed the lines of Montesquieu. The Federalist papers transgress the boundaries between international and domestic thought to which we are accustomed in their attempt to reconcile the non-avertable demand of democracy with the needs of balance of power and order. The final resolution was a mixed constitution that imposed restrictions upon democracy (Deudney 2009: 164). Although the formulation of the American constitution involved a de-radicalisation of direct conceptions of democracy, the Declaration of Independence (1776) changed the Western horizon of expectations since it marked the arrival of a new form of state: one based on popular sovereignty (Osterhammel 2014: 593).

The French Revolution (1789) and the start of the long nineteenth century in Europe is equally only explainable when we account for transnational factors (Buzan and Lawson 2013). Before the revolution, the French monarchy represented the principle of undividable and powerful monarchical sovereignty (Hobson 2015: 75). However, recognition of anti-monarchical, republican America, financial incapacity to support long-standing allies in the Low Countries, and the rise of patriotic groups in Europe were important factors that led to a steady decline of the French monarchy's factual and symbolic power (Osterhammel 2014: 526–7).

Against this background, many political pamphlets began to circulate, and one of the most important became Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes' *What Is the Third Estate?* (1789). Here Sieyes turned the parliamentarian ideology into a democratic one by beating the ideology with its own weapons and by politicising the concept of the nation (Geschnitzer et al. 1992: 323). Parliaments had evolved and gained power first in European monarchies such as the Low Countries (1581), England (1644), and Sweden (1720) during religious conflicts and civil wars (Keane 2010: xvi). As indicated, so far parliaments had been composed of religious officials and the aristocracy, and parliamentarianism appeared as an ideology defending the aristocracy's corporatist self-interests, even if the aristocracy tried to blur this fact through the politicisation of the formerly culturally understood concept of the nation during the eighteenth century.

Compared to aristocratic conceptions of the nation, which excluded the lower and lowest classes, Sieyes considerably extended the realm of the concept. He conceived of the nation as a voluntary association and political body formed by different corporatist groups. He therewith prepared the idea of a constitutionally organised nation as the source of popular sovereignty and laid the groundwork for a far-reaching decision by the deputies of the Third Estate. Even though they had served with the nobility and the clergy in the king's general assembly, the deputies of the Third Estate finally announced themselves to be the National Assembly in 1789 (Markoff 2015b: 210).

The National Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), a landmark in the history of democracy. It cast aside the belief in a God-given order of social inequality and introduced the idea of a natural equality among men when it asserted that men are born and remain free and equal in rights. The idea of human equality justified revolts against arbitrary monarchical powers yet still carried religious meanings (Conze et al. 1997: 871). Backed by secular and religious ideas, the Declaration, most importantly, stated that French citizens had the right to participate personally or through their representatives in the formation of the new order overcoming monarchy. The Declaration thus confirmed that sovereignty resided in the nation and that any political association ought to preserve the inalienable rights of men, which included liberty, property, and the resistance to oppression (Reus-Smit 1999: 128). However, even though the Declaration adopts a universal language, the subsequent French debates assumed 'inalienable' rights only belonged to white Europeans – colonial slavery was not addressed – and that some but

not all white French citizens had the right to participate in the formation of the new order.

The crux of the Declaration was that it assumed that democracy was best realised through a system of representation while leaving unspecified who had a right to participate and how participation should be organised. The vagueness paved the way for much debate, during which different groups, including a women's movement, defended the right of their members to be allowed to vote. The debate and the high turnouts, particularly in rural France, during the first elections show that democracy became a widely shared ideal and claim (Markoff 2015b: 213). In France and elsewhere in Europe, illiterate peasants made up the mass of the population, but their claim to be represented was often ignored or was a source of dispute (Keane 2010: 480).

In a whole decade of revolution and counterrevolution from 1789 to 1799, debate on proper representation carried on. Revolutionary France eventually abandoned distinctions based on estate and granted voting rights to most male and so-called active citizens who agreed to register in the National Guard (Tilly 2007: 33). From then on, availability for military service began to trump property as a criterion dividing those who had a right to be represented from those who remained disenfranchised. In revolutionary France, 'passive citizens', women, and religious minorities remained disenfranchised, and electoral practices continued to be quite different from secret voting. General Bonaparte's seizure of power in 1799, however, inaugurated the end of electoral experiments and power shifts within revolutionary France. Hence, instead of a linear process of democratic consolidation, France experienced a long period of turmoil and later a plebiscitary dictatorship (Hobsbawm 1975: 125–127; Tilly 2007: 33–36).

Revolutionary France turned into a more serious challenge to the absolutist dynastic principles of the eighteenth century than the American Revolution (Reus-Smit 1999: 32). The French revolutionaries formulated self-conscious democratic attacks on the principle of monarchism and against the aristocratic order in the heart of Europe starting at the very beginning. Monarchism ascribes indivisible sovereignty to the person and body of the king, whereas the French revolutionaries identified the nation as the source of popular sovereignty (Hobson 2015: 75). The combination of popular sovereignty (defining the form of the state) and representative government (defining the form of government) departs from direct democracy and finalises a turn to democracy as a system of modern government (Hobson 2015: 89).

The French revolutionaries also acted along the lines of these conceptual shifts (Markoff 2015b: 217–8). The French National Assembly refused to recognise the international treaties signed by European monarchs, and French revolutionaries declared their intention to export the democratic model if necessary by force (Hobson 2015: 85). In a National Convention (1792), they stated that the French nation 'will grant fraternity and aid to any people that may wish to recover its liberty' (cited in Keane 2010: 480). Such declarations sparked a backlash, and in response to these developments threatening the basis of their political systems, Austria and Prussia turned into outspoken defenders of monarchism. Here and elsewhere, European monarchs arrested democrats whenever possible. The revolutionaries in turn responded by military force and declared war for democracy on Prussia and Austria (1792). France annexed adjoining territory in Belgium (1795) and Piedmont (1802), supported satellite republics allying with democratic movements, and supervised the writing of constitutions enshrining popular sovereignty in satellite states and even among France's foes (Markoff 2015b: 217).

The Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) grew out of the French Revolution, and this shows that democratic claims determined both domestic and international stability at the turn of the century. However, though democratic ideas triggered the conflict, the reforms changing large parts of Europe were imposed by conquest and designed to allow French domination rather than democracy (Keane 2010: 482). Furthermore, the war itself turned into the most important factor hindering the reclaiming of democracy in France itself. Only mass mobilisation and military discipline allowed France's brief domination of Europe from Madrid to Moscow. Napoleon attempted to turn the French from a people of God and democratic nation into soldiers. The Napoleonic Wars transformed into imperial wars until the monarchical regimes were on the surface able to restore the old order at the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). Prince Metternich was the architect of the restoration and, thus, of the first institutionalisation of explicit and deliberatively anti-democratic international norms for European diplomacy.

The Congress of Vienna is often equated with the successful restoration of monarchism as a principle of international legitimacy in the European context. From this perspective, it was again the principle of monarchical right that determined participation in the negotiated system regulating the international balance of power. International politics remained the purview of diplomats, aristocratic experts, and soldiers negotiating the

affairs between empires and states. Other actors, including churches, social movements, or corporations, should not interfere with the dealings fenced off from the public consciousness. Accordingly, nothing destabilised the European order until German unification (1871) and Chancellor Bismarck's agitation of hyper-nationalism made the negotiated balance of power system obsolete. The perspective fits well with a monarchical and, in academic terms, simplified realist view of international politics.

Instead of adopting the perspective sketched earlier, I side with those who argue that the French Revolution permanently changed political thought and practice. The French Revolution represented an assault on contemporary international law, and in retrospect we can see the inauguration of a gradual transformation of international law. Constitutional and democratic states, instead of monarchies, were regarded as legitimate members of Europe's international society at the beginning of the twentieth century (Wight 1977: 152).

Furthermore, and even if the monarchical order was temporarily restored at the international level, the French Revolution inaugurated modern communication about world politics (Albert 2016: 88). Transnational dialogue, a spread of democratic ideas, and public debate of foreign affairs could not be reversed (Osterhammel 2014: 525). Since the eighteenth century, European intellectuals had begun to form a public sphere and paid increasing attention to the politics within the European and Christian communities. They analysed dynastic politics in terms of international and domestic balances of power, since it was obvious that the permanence and efficacy of any given constellation depended on each monarch's ability to maintain domestic equilibrium (Black 1983). Radical intellectuals, including the American revolutionaries, increasingly conceived of Westphalian balance-of-power thinking as an expression of the autocratic monarchical rule that ought to be overcome (MacMillan 1998: 32). In the era of both revolutions, public attention and the production of pamphlets concerning the struggle against monarchism vastly increased, as did politically motivated migration, which further contributed to the circulation of political ideas. The democratic dialogues influenced each other, and the revolutionaries and the elites were highly aware of what was going on elsewhere in the world (Markoff 2015a: 22). Transnational debates furthered the consolidation of 'aristocracy' and 'democracy' as counter-concepts.

Nascent distinctions between right and left and the broad lines of our current ideologies, including liberalism, socialism, and conservatism, were

defined in the era of the French Revolution. Each ideology would assimilate the concept of democracy (Hobsbawm 1989: 77; Conze et al. 1997: 874). Conservatives favoured the preservation of the old order and identified democracy with anarchy. Following Thomas Hobbes, conservatives argued that democracy could never create a stable and good government because it did not impose limits on the ever-present lust for power and the irrational will of the masses, agitated by demagogic manipulation (Isakhan 2015: 5).

Republicans shared conservative concerns but opted for democratic elements in a mixed system of government in which different parts balanced each other out. They approved of the rebellion against arbitrary and exploitive monarchical power (Hobson 2015: 98). Edward Burke is often regarded as a leading conservative because he opposed the revolution in his 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' (1790). Yet the classification ignores the fact that Burke otherwise supported many liberal aims (Pitts 2005: Chapter 3).

Paine, an outspoken critic of Burke's pamphlet, is rightly seen as a well-travelled revolutionary and democrat, opposing monarchism and supporting shifts towards representative democracy (Markoff 2015a: 22). Socialists were among the voices defending the revolution, too (Hobsbawm 1989: 84). Nineteenth-century socialists formed a social movement pursuing democratic goals and had gained considerable power by the middle of the century (Eley 2002: 56) Socialists steered the anti-monarchical revolutions (1848), and their activism shows that the effects of industrialisation greatly contributed to the rise of democratic claims. In addition, the anti-slavery movement was active on a transnational scale and introduced new democratic practices, including the collection of signatories on petitions that were forwarded to Parliament or the organisation of attention-raising public debate (Markoff 2015a: 24).

Nationality, Nationalism, and Representative Democracy

Representative democracy was invented in many places during (broadly speaking) the first half of the nineteenth century (Dahl 2000: 9). Both of the discussed revolutions embraced turns away from direct democracy and to representative government. Paine found that representation was more promising than ancient direct democracy: 'Athens, by representation, would have surpassed their own democracy' (cited in Keane 2010:

xviii). The founders of the American constitution distinguished their ideas from 'simple democracies' and Britain's mixed but still mainly monarchical constitution when they thought about representative government as a part of a distinctively modern constitution (Hobson 2015: 66). The French Revolution further linked democracy to the idea of representation, and though often overlooked, the Low Countries also witnessed debates about what became representative democracy. However, we should not conceive of these inventions as distinct national achievements. There was a transnational discourse about which form of government could prevent monarchical tyranny without resulting in another form of tyranny, the tyranny of the majority, as Tocqueville's influence upon J.S. Mill's thinking about representative democracy show.

However, inventions of representative democracy coincided with changed understandings of the nation. While *nation* previously denoted a cultural group based on shared customs, the term was increasingly used as a matter of political self-identification and to identify political subjects capable of acting after the French Revolution (Conze et al. 1997: 854). For some democratic theorists, a still unresolved construction fault of modern democracy can be traced back to this historical moment. John Keane (2010: 563) states that 'if representative democracy was ideally a continuous struggle against compulsory simplification of the world, then nationalism was a continuous struggle to undo complexity, the desire not to know certain matters.' Others stress that simplifying nationalism marks a departure from the ideals of the French Revolution and that nineteenth-century intellectuals distinguished between the sober principle of nationality as a precondition to representative government and vulgar nationalism or jingoism (Sylvest 2009; Hobson 2015: 95). A third position even values nationalism as an important force in the struggles for representative democracy following the French Revolution (Tamir 1993).

To approach the controversy, let us first have a closer look at how one of the most famous nineteenth-century architects of representative democracy, J.S. Mill (1806–1873), and two of his contemporaries, Lord Acton (1834–1902) and the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872), related the terms of nationality and representative democracy. Mill defended representative democracy as the 'true democracy' and argued that some but not all citizens ought to be allowed to participate in elections as long as they occasionally took over political posts at the local level, too. He thought about the choice of representatives as a means of political education and is well known for advocating a system of weighted votes, limiting the influence of the uneducated members of the working class.

Mill assumed that Parliament ought to supervise an overseeable range of tasks and that Members of Parliament should be entrusted only with the confirmation or rejection of laws formulated by professional lawyers (Varouxakis 2013: 110). Through such a system of representation, Mill hoped, educated men would hold political posts. Later on, and in view of socialism's rising popularity, Mill added that an ideal representative system and parliament would evolve from and allow for a balance of power between the two most important classes. These included the manual labourers and their affinities and the employers of labour on the other side (Morgenthau 1973: 321–2). The original justifications, however, focused on the idea that, if moderated through representation, democracy could become an element of the best conceivable government.

In view of the rise of the nation as a focal point within the popular imagination in Europe, Mill later spoke about nationality in relation to representative government. For Mill (2008: 427), a nationality exists when people are united by common sympathies 'which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be a government by themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively'. Race, language, and custom can stimulate these feelings, though none of them was indispensable. Mill's principle of nationality allowed fluidity and changing self-identifications. However, since representative democracy's self-sustainability and capacity to deliver good decisions rested on the public sphere checking the workings of Parliament, Mill favoured nationalities that were also linguistic communities entertaining a common political discourse (Mill 2008: 428).

Mill found nationalities fit for representative democracy mostly in Europe, and even in this context, the rule that nationalities ought to have their own government is itemised into exceptions. Hungary's composition of Magyars, Slovaks, Croats, and so forth was a case in point illustrating the sheer impossibility of the ideal. Indeed, what is often marginalised is that the bulk of the essay discusses nationality as a theme of multi-ethnic empires governed by a more 'civilised' nationality. Mill (2008: 433) did not conceive of empire as a suppression of nationality but supported the merging of nationalities and found that the backward nationalities here achieved the possibility to civilise: 'No Bas-Beton, nor even any Alsatian, has the smallest wish at the present day to be separated from France.' Furthermore, not all races governed in the British Empire were yet ready for self-government, though they had a right to be treated fairly. Mill's stance is intriguing:

He opposed ethnic and racist definitions of nationality when he identified linguistic communities entertaining a common discourse as important preconditions to representative government. On the other hand, Mill's elaborations are informed by imperial racism and the view that 'civilised' races, such as the French or the English, ought to parent the inferior ones.

Reviewing Acton's response to Mill is worthwhile at this point since Acton, though he called himself a strong liberal, is considered a forerunner of British pluralism. His essay 'Nationality' ([1862] 1907) is a lucid tract that is rather critical of the French Revolution's impact on the meaning of nationality (Nicholls 1994: 32–33). Acton had family ties to the German and Italian aristocracy and, after travels to Germany, spent most of his life as a Catholic historian, writer, and politician in Britain (Lang 2002: 131). He was an advisor to the British Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone and tried to persuade him to grant more self-government to Ireland (Bryce 1904: 703). Acton is canonised as an early critic of nationality as a possible source of undue nationalism.

For Acton, the French Revolution occurred because Christianity ceased to motivate a striving for liberty and because the church lost force as an institution balancing the power of an increasingly absolutist monarchy in France (Himmelfarb 1949: 297–8). As an intellectual devoted to the norm of liberty, he approved to some degree of the revolution, which furthered the triumph of the democracy in France and which made absolutism illegitimate in Europe. However, Acton (1907: 285) critically observed that democracy then allowed a renewal of undemocratic rule and that the following wars nursed a nationalist spirit that had not existed during the revolution in France, and that France's international support of nationalism was driven only by power interests: 'The kingdom of Italy had united all the northern part of the Peninsula in a single State; and the national feelings, which the French repressed elsewhere, were encouraged as a safeguard of their power in Italy and in Poland.'

Under Napoleon, France furthered unifying nationalism, and even though the Congress of Vienna attempted to reverse Napoleon's impact, questions of national unity remained acute in Italy and Germany. However, for Acton, nation-states evolving from hegemonic unification were prone to suppress minorities and to develop a centralist bureaucracy, while those based on only one nationality were too homogenous. Such societies promised democracy's transformation into a tyranny of the majority and, thus, nation-states that impeded any striving for liberty at home and Christian harmony in the world. Later on, Acton's opposition to Italian unification put him at odds with Gladstone and the rest of the Liberal Party.

Acton (1907: 85) found that the American Revolution and the idea of federalism provided a congenial alternative to homogenising nation-states. He appreciated federalism since it avoided centralisation and, thus, the inevitable corruption of power at all levels. Acton, however, believed that power had to be dispersed not only territorially but also amongst different corporatist groups (Lang 2002: 135). When speaking about corporatist groups, he first thought about the aristocracy and the Catholic Church, even though this was highly uncommon for a British liberal. Against this background, the Austrian Empire attracted his sympathy because it allowed for a strong Catholic Church. Drawing on the British and Austrian examples, Acton argued that nationalities should not exercise self-government in distinct states but, alongside corporatist groups, ought to balance each other within multi-ethnic empires. He praised these examples, though he recognised that the current British Parliament did not account properly for the representation of heterogeneous populations. Similar to Mill, Acton assumed that the 'inferior' races would be raised by living in political union with intellectually superior races. Yet, unlike Mill, Acton emphasised that additional checks and balances had to be included in order to secure that representative democracy in the civilised nations could become a self-sustaining force of liberty.

Finally, let us turn to Mazzini, who is commonly regarded as a nineteenth-century champion of nationalism and Italian unity. Mazzini (2009: 55) also conceived of nationality as a fluid and conditioned sentiment based on race and language and, by means of the organic analogy, of nations as parts of the Christian community. Yet, Mazzini (ibid, 54) wrote for 'practical people' and intended to prompt further revolutions in Europe. For him, only nationality and popular nationalism could motivate struggles against monarchism, and he praised such struggles for representative democracy in a rather mythic and Christian vein. Mazzini (2009: 60) forcefully distinguished between despotic and aristocratic nationalism and popular senses of nationality. Nationalists following Mazzini organised in transnational networks and tried to undermine the restoration of the old monarchic order.

Mazzini's republican nationalism, liberalism, and socialism motivated the European Revolutions (1848). Aristocratic European intellectuals such as Alexis de Tocqueville rightly sensed that further revolutions challenging the legitimacy of monarchism were approaching (Hobsbawm 1975: 22). Revolts occurred in the Habsburg Empire, France, and elsewhere in Europe. Most remarkable is that peasants formed a large part of

the revolutionaries and acquired new rights in the Habsburg Empire, and that the revolutions led to further extensions of the franchise (Osterhammel 2014: 544; Rapport 2012: 781). In Germany, about 75% of the male population were allowed to vote in the elections to the Frankfurt Parliament that sought to draft a new constitution.

The revolutions brought about new rights but no victory of democracy over monarchy. They collapsed after a year, and many revolutionaries had to flee to the United States, which praised its own modernity by welcoming many exiled European democrats (Osterhammel 2014: 546). Since the revolutions are often equated with a shift from aristocratic to popular nationalism, it is important to see that the revolutionaries actually subscribed to different ideologies and that intellectuals, including Mazzini, became sceptical of nationalism's looming transformation into an uncontrollable ideology that denied the existence of higher, Christian values (Recchia and Urbinati 2009: 16). Nationalism took different shapes and was linked to different claims: Italian and German nationalists aimed at unification, Czechs, Slovaks, and other nationalities aimed at autonomy within the multi-national Habsburg Empire, and liberal nationalists in Poland and Romania wanted both independence and national unity (Rapport 2012: 282; Buzan and Lawson 2015: 116).

Mazzini's great aim of Italian unification, like German unification spurred by Prussia, was constitutionalised in 1871. Mazzini favoured great over small states, as his refusal to demand national self-determination and independence for Ireland shows (Hobsbawm 1990: 31). While Mill supported Italian unity and the trend towards larger political units, Acton, as indicated, was highly critical of it (Lang 2002: 143). Other British intellectuals, however, began to worry first of all about German nationalism. The British Empire had originated before the rise of nationalism, and British intellectuals assumed that they had been spared nationalism, though they opposed 'jingoism' in their own empire (Osterhammel 2014: 403). To moderate demands for democracy, the German Empire constitutionalised general and male suffrage rather early – a fact that was later often downplayed in the British discourse.

It needs to be emphasised that nineteenth-century thinkers did not necessarily argue that each nationality ought to acquire collective self-determination through representative democracy in distinct states. Such ideas are the product of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's later intervention. But what else can we learn from this brief inspection? The most obvious insight is that nineteenth-century intellectuals' stances on nationality and nationalism

depended on their own national and imperial positions. British liberals who began to defend representative democracy sympathised with fluid conceptions of nationality and opposed ethnic exaggerations of nationalism. Liberal support for nationality was contingent upon its support of representative democracy (MacMillan 1998: 143). Mazzini equally opposed nationalism as an ideology that argues that the citizen's primary and unconditioned loyalty belonged to a certain ethnic community. The example of Mazzini's thought and practice teaches us that nationalism worked towards representative democracy only in combination with substantial ideologies, such as republicanism. As compared to nationalism, socialism accounted for the fact that industrialisation created new class divisions and was perhaps a greater democratic force (Buzan and Lawson 2015: 115; Mayall 1990: Chapter 3). Yet we cannot contrast simplifying nationalism and complexity-recognising representative democracy on the basis of nineteenth-century experiences. It was a century of democratic and, perhaps, national claims, but not of democratic systems in our understanding of the concept.

The British Empire: 'Responsible Government' and the Expansion of Suffrage

Even though the invention was a transnational exercise, Britain is often regarded as the birthplace of representative democracy. Mill's writings and the exceptionally calm and successful extensions of the powers of Westminster contribute to this impression. The British development of representative democracy was characterised by the consolidation of liberal constitutionalism before the political system became more inclusive and competitive, and for many, these historical sequences make up an ideal path to representative democracy (Dix 1994).

Yet, there is a danger in idealising the British experience and overemphasising British liberals' support for representative democracy and universal franchise in retrospect. In 1832, the first reform enfranchised few of the male population (Dahl 2010: 23), but this step is best seen as an instrument to appease turmoil following the French Revolution. Ireland, Yorkshire, and London, and thus the heart of Britain, were affected (Osterhammel 2014: 524–5). The reform was the starting point of a massive transformation of the British Empire due to the further expansion of the franchise and the admission of autonomy to white settler colonies. British liberals' position towards both trends was complex and ambivalent. In this last section, we will pause to discuss the

British experience and the intellectual lines of argument that were used to make sense of it prior to the rise of British pluralism.

Let us recall that the two-stage Industrial Revolution began here in the eighteenth century. The commercialisation of agriculture was followed by the development of industrial capitalism and the competitive and commercialised production of commodities (Buzan and Lawson 2013: 626). Britain's domestic governance system allowed for some political rights secured in a constitutional system, and this contributed to further industrialisation (Gourevitch 1978: 882). However, industrialisation created a process of uneven and combined development on a new, global scale, while the market economy created remarkable wealth but also new class divisions, triggering economic insecurity amongst peasants and bringing about the impoverishment of industrial workers in urban centres such as Manchester (Rosenberg 2006: 317–322). These conditions, the global scope of the empire and rising inequality at home, form the background to British debates.

In Britain, self-described liberals supported the changes that accompanied industrialisation from the 1830s onwards, and liberalism soon became the leading ideology because it served the interests of the upper and middle classes who were profiting from both industrialisation and extension of the empire (Bell 2007a: 8). Patriotic themes were central in the Victorian Liberal Party, which was in power from 1846 to 1874, while the discourse revolved around constitutionalism, tolerance, and the spread of Christian humanitarianism (Hobsbawm 1975: 123; 129). Liberalism favoured a constitutional, representative government by elected assemblies but was sceptical of democracy in the sense of the rule of the multitudinous poor. If British liberals wondered what democracy could bring, they turned to the United States to derive a lesson and often conceived of Tocqueville's (1835/1840) famous study of *On democracy in America* as a look ahead into the future. Toqueville sympathised with social conceptions of democracy and the hope for an egalitarian society but still worried about the rule of the majority and extended statist administration, as did Lord Acton. Political thinkers of the time clearly distinguished between urban industrial workers and classes such as the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie (Hobsbawm 1989: 85).

It is critical to see that democratisation of the white settler colonies proceeded in some respects more quickly than the democratisation of the core, at least if one accepts suffrage reforms prior to independence as an indication of democratic progress. White settler colonies such as Australia (1788) and New Zealand (after 1840) emerged

gradually and rebellions in Canada, motivated by ideas of Jacksonian democracy, created a case in point. Lord Durham investigated the situation and suggested that Britain's political institutions were appropriate for the settler colonies, too. He called the Westminster model 'responsible' government (Osterhammel 2014: 413). A balance of interests between the core and the colony was created within fluid and partly democratic institutions. Though London defended the right to decide military and other questions, the local institutions could enact laws concerning an increasing number of policy fields.

Besides Canada, Australia was considered fit for 'responsible' government. Here, the subsequent franchise reforms motivated considerable debate, since some settlers hoped for a continuation of an oligarchy made up of landowners, senior officials, and the Crown's governor, whereas radical immigrants demanded universal suffrage and the abolishment of property restrictions for Members of Parliament (Rowse 2015: 246). Still, universal male suffrage began in Australian colonies in 1856, and exceptional steps were taken in New Zealand. Women's suffrage was introduced in New Zealand in 1893, and the indigenous population, the Maori, were enfranchised earlier than elsewhere (Markoff 2015a, b: 5). Hence, in political thought, white settler colonies figured as democratic experiments because politics there was more democratic than in the mother state (Bell 2007b: 31).On the other hand, the installation of responsible government in non-white colonies was at best a long-term prospect. The British used different techniques of direct or indirect rule in India or Africa (Buzan and Lawson 2015: 132), but Britain's successful industrialisation depended in any case on the exploitation or the forceful de-industrialisation of dependent states such as India (Hobsbawm 1989: 74; Buzan and Lawson 2015: 1).

It is often assumed that Mill answered the 'democracy for whom and how' question with regard to the colonies in analogy to domestic politics (Jahn 2005: 202). To some extent, this observation holds true. Mill conceived of nationality as a precondition for representative democracy. In analogy to a person's character and capacity for self-determination, Mill assumed that some nations were ready for the institutions of representative democracy while others had yet to civilise (Mill 2008: 229). Mill denied that non-European cultures were capable of self-government because of a lack of education, as he denied the right to equal voting power to uneducated workers. It is often asserted that Mill conceived of bureaucratic despotism as a legitimate way of dealing with the (semi-)barbarous Indian people.

Yet, this emphasis minimises the fact that Mill did not intend to make a case against Indian self-government but against the violent colonial officials in India and that he did not draw clear domestic–international distinctions.

In view of the development of representative democracy in Britain, intellectuals were divided over the most urgent nineteenth-century question: extending the scope of franchise (Habermas 1990: 212). Liberals made up the intellectual and political British elite but viewed the working class with scepticism or assumed that they needed to be educated and managed. Moderate liberals understood good government in the old, constitutional sense and in terms of civil liberties. They harboured a democratic impulse in the sense that they aimed to put limits on the powers of the monarch, but they were unwilling to grant the right to vote to all citizens (Rapport 2012: 282). They formed an important part of an extended public that entertained a discourse in which the coming rule of the many was inevitably linked to diagnoses of intellectual decline (Habermas 1990: 213–218). Recall that Mill sought to reduce the possible impact of the masses on the political system (Hobson 2015: 134).

Only radical liberals such as Jeremy Bentham and socialists demanded universal suffrage. Socialists defined democracy more radically in terms of direct self-organisation and even Lenin later turned democracy into a proletarian principle (Conze et al. 1997: 890). Lord Acton (1878: 136) was therefore right when he recognised that socialism, though relying on a distinct understanding of democracy, became the most important force demanding the extension of the franchise in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. It was not the bourgeoisie and the middle class but the working class that most frequently pressed for electoral rights (Ruschemeyer et al. 1992: 6).

One often neglected feature of the British path to representative democracy is its late development of a labour party. An exception in Europe, the British Parliament had steadily gained power in relation to the executive since 1688, but at the same time the right to vote remained highly restrictive (Zakaria 2003). The extension of the franchise was a matter of tactical concession to appease the labour movement and to avoid socialism. The Liberal Party accepted but also moderated socialist demands, and some say that it slowed down the extension of the franchise (Eley 2002: 67). Expansion of male suffrage was realised only in the second half of the century. Several suffrage reforms (1867, 1884) extended the right to vote for the part of Parliament that was not

made up by hereditary right (Zakaria 2003: 50). The secret ballot box was introduced in 1872, but throughout the nineteenth century, the impact of extended voting rights was blunted by the ways they were put into practice or introduced – many workers did not make use of new rights (Rapport 2012: 285). Unlike other European states, Britain developed a labour party only a considerable time after its industrialisation and even after the legalisation of trade unionism (Eley 2002: 69).

After 1867, liberals frankly discussed political themes only 'behind closed doors', in liberal clubs, for example, since they sought to protect their interests from monarchical interference and from working-class demands. Liberals, however, continued to occupy key positions in the political field, as career politicians or journalists, which allowed them to make sense of political events for the mass of outsiders (Hobsbawm 1989: 88; Bourdieu 2001). In their publications, especially towards the end of the century, they increasingly distinguished between Athens' classical and Britain's modern democracy and began to recognise the arrival of modern democracy as an inevitable and modern form of governance for large states and empires (Conze et al. 1997: 861). The first histories of democracy were published, all written by rich, white, Anglo-Saxon men (Isakhan 2015: 9). Democracy became a sign of civilisation, and the existence or absence of constitutions and voting rights began to make a difference as to whether a European state was seen as legitimate or not (Hobson 2008; Clark 2009).

Criticism of Democracy

The 'democracy as a sign of modernity and civilisation' discourse paved the way for and partly coexisted with another, new line of argument: the criticism of democracy. Liberals here increasingly contrasted classical conceptions of and modern hopes invested in democracy with real-world trends and daily politics. This discursive pattern intensified at the turn of the century, when many publications on the crises of democracy were published in Europe and the United States (Rosanvallon 2011: 3). In his autobiography, Mill (1874: 231) found that British intellectuals were by then much less democratic than he had been fifty years ago, since their attitudes were based on a general scepticism towards the ignorant and hardly educable masses.

Late-nineteenth-century debates about the British Empire and democracy took place against the backdrop of a wider European disillusionment with democracy. In France, the Paris Commune, an experiment in organisation along socialist and radical democratic lines, was brutally put down by the central government in 1871 (Hobsbawm 1989: 84). In addition, the Long Depression (1873–96) resulted in a whole host of social demands and proved to European liberals that democracy was inevitably tied to the social question. In Britain, the public's focus shifted from Europe to issues concerning the empire, and the prevailing optimism began to dissipate. The optimism had stemmed from the simultaneous expansion of the empire, constitutional advances, and the accumulation of wealth. Britain's commercial dominance was now challenged by Germany and the United States, and the unity of the empire appeared necessary in times of global competition when a European core of states ruled almost all parts of the world and were still aiming to broaden their spheres of influence (Bell 2007b: 37–8). Along with these political events, the discourse on democracy changed, but the international and the domestic remained closely interrelated (Bell 2007b: 34). The moral controversies surrounding the British Empire already used the terms of democratic theory.

The debates on the British Empire and the impacts of democracy bred concerns with imperial unity and the state of public opinion, as well as criticism of parliament. Liberals like Spencer posed the 'illiberal democracy' question (Zakaria 2003) and asked whether liberal and democratic trends could fall apart and if liberal constitutionalism was suited for binding the nation for domestic and global purposes (Hobson 2009: 641). Liberals acted as if Britain was a full democracy facing an uncertain future, even if mid- to late-nineteenth-century Britain rather qualifies as a liberal regime and oligarchy (Bell 2007b: 41). Under the stress of the social question, the formulation of proposals on the empire and federation, which were positive in tone, or theories of imperialism, which were negative, grew. In 1895, the imperialist Cecil Rhodes said that only the expansion of the empire would generate sufficient economic benefits to appease the working class at home and avoid civil war (Hobsbawm 1989: 69).

Blurring the lines between philosophical and political tracts, many flirted with the idea of empire and an international federation, even if intellectuals did not clarify concepts such as federation, state, or democracy or use domestic analogies as is done today. Liberal visions of empire were bound up with democratisation in the metropole and at best considered responsible government (meaning parliamentarian rules overseen by

Britain) in the white settler colonies (Pitts 2005: 248). When imperialists such as J.R. Seeley lauded in a highly racist manner the rise of representative institutions and the expansion of the empire, more often than not they conceived of the white settler colonies as part of or an appendix of the British state. In particular, the proposals of liberal imperialists read like homologies, speaking of the world as of the British state, while still embracing internally racist hierarchies (Owens 2015: 1). Federation was conceived of as a means to avert socialism and overpopulation, and emigration was one instrument to solve the social question (Bell 2007b: 47). Yet, state-sponsored emigration targeted in particular the respected artisan class instead of the less respected urban workers.

Mill had already been deeply concerned about enlightened public self-interest, the British Parliament's epistemic capacities, and parliamentarian oversight over colonial administration (Varouxakis 2013: 2). These themes intensified after 1884, when another franchise reform changed the composition of Parliament and furthered the growth of modern political parties. An external observer of British parliamentarianism, Woodrow Wilson (1887: 214), was not particularly impressed by British examples of legislative oversight, nor did he support the view that the people 'need to have their hand everywhere', as Marxists suggested. Although Marxism never gained as much strength in Britain as on the continent, the Independent Labour Party (1893) was created by trade unionists and members of the socialist Fabian Society. The Labour Party was only founded in 1900 and came to power in 1924, in spite of the exceptional development of local trade union activism throughout the nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 1989: 94, 1975: 134). Still, alongside liberals and conservatives, socialists and left liberals including Hobson and Hobhouse began to defend distinctive positions in debates on the legitimacy of empire at the turn of the century. They asked whether democracy allowed for a peace-promoting public opinion and interest in colonial affairs and significantly furthered the criticism of Parliament. Here we find the complex, not always optimistic, and often overlapping roots of democratic peace theory and theories of imperialism.

Both concern with the state of public opinion and a critique of parliamentarianism shape John A. Hobson's left-liberal *Imperialism: A Study* ([1902] 2005). Hobson criticised the British oppression of white settlers of Dutch origin who fought for independence from the British Empire in the South African Wars (1899–1902). The wars attracted much attention and politicised the divide between pro- and anti-imperialists. Previously,

only conservatives such as Benjamin Disraeli had steered the public interests in the colonies, especially as part of broader electoral mobilisation campaigns. Disraeli had been able to organise a coalition of businessmen and working men, who held very different opinions on democracy, in support of empire (Gourevitch 1978: 905).

The neologism 'imperialism' evolved around 1870 and then gained popularity because of Hobson's critique of the conservative position and employment of a democratic vocabulary to theorise linkages between imperialist expansion and domestic democratic degeneration (Hobsbawm 1989: 60). Hobson's thesis identified how domestic inequalities caused overproduction and domestic under-consumption so that an oligarchic alliance of the old aristocracy, businessmen, and military officials pushed for imperialist expansion to further their own interests. Hobson quite rightly observed that just a few businessmen and officials who were removed from the control of the British electorate were effectively exercising authority and employing demagogic techniques to popularise imperialism (Hobsbawm 1989: 81; Hobson 2005: 145). The bureaucracy was more important to the organisation of the empire than Parliament, so Hobson was pessimistic about the public interest in foreign relations and the poor performance of the unstable British Parliament (Hobsbawm 1989: 105).

Hobhouse related the economic inequalities in Britain to the exploitation of the British colonies. His rhetoric linked the 'industrial' to the 'colonial' problem, and he opposed imperial exploitation but attacked the quality of Britain's democracy rather than advocated self-government for all white and non-white British colonies. As opposed to liberal imperialists, Hobhouse and Hobson demanded domestic welfare schemes, and Hobson advocated for a sane, socially minded imperialism as well.

British radicals could hence demand that the franchise be extended, that domestic social reform be implemented, and that international violence be opposed, and yet they could still self-evidently assume the colonial subjects' incapacity for self-government. They wrote democratic theory from the perspective of the metropole and seized the vocabulary of democracy mainly to accommodate the demands of the European labour movement and of British trade unions. Empire and democracy were not contradictory terms but reconciled in different and, as Hobson's intervention illustrates, contingent and incoherent tendencies. What is often missed, however, is that both new liberals rightly accounted for international impacts on the domestic system. The South African Wars fuelled further bureaucratisation at the centre (Buzan and Lawson 2013: 629).

A classical liberal fear came true at the turn of the century, when through imperial wars and social welfare programmes the scope of the bureaucracy in most European core states was expanded. In Britain, government employment tripled between 1891 and 1911, while several welfare measures such as the old-age pension were introduced between 1905 and 1911 (Hobsbawm 1989: 103). For Hobson's left-liberal companion Hobhouse, as for other British pluralists, this created a new democratic problem because of perceived trade-offs between bureaucratisation and democratic activism and deliberation.

Indeed, a particularity of the British discourse is that it does not distinguish between theories of participation and democratic deliberation. Rather, a public sphere is conceived of as an element of the wider growth of civil society (Osterhammel 2014: 596). The Anti-Slavery movement, for instance, directed public attention to parliamentary debates and evaluated them. British newspapers wrote on parliamentary and foreign affairs, and even when their critical edge declined, as the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1990) suggests, critical debates continued in different social localities and associations. These experiences found their way into democratic theory when Mill assumed that participation in local politics or civic associations enhanced an individual's political competence. At best, individuals were involved in different political and civic activities because reflection upon different and possibly conflicting roles furthered autonomy and political competence. Heterogeneity is then a deliberation-promoting condition, and early pluralists first argued that deliberation took place in both parliament and in, as A.D. Lindsay put it, 'non-political' democratic associations such as churches and trade unions. Later pluralists enforced the arguments and diagnosed a decline of proper deliberation in the Parliament (Lindsay 1967: 47). As Cole's arguments will illustrate, British pluralism became an argument for participatory and deliberation-allowing associations to compensate for the loss of deliberation in the political sphere and to assure a rational quality of democratic decision-making.

Conclusion

Those who suggested turning to the nineteenth century rights propose a timeline that begins with the French Revolution. From this moment onwards, democratic claims, revolutions, and their repression structured nineteenth-century conflicts in Europe until democracy became regarded

as a necessary ingredient of modernity. Histories of democracy remain ill-informed when they trace democratic reconfigurations back to transformations of the state as if occurring in an international vacuum. The vocabulary of democracy gained popularity when it motivated mid-nineteenth-century struggles against the rule of allied European monarchs, resulting in a first wave of democracy. A transnational perspective suggests that the period between the French Revolution and the end of the First World War hosted a transition from monarchic to democratic legitimacy.

How can we qualify, on the basis of this chapter, the two-part dictum that democracy progressed in the domestic sphere throughout the nineteenth century while international affairs remained the unaffected sphere of kings and soldiers? To begin with, and from what we have seen, we can criticise the evaluation that domestic democracy progressed during this time as a simplification.

Only several, interconnected redefinitions that occurred in the context or during the afterlife of the American and French Revolutions furthered the beliefs that some citizens ought to receive the right to vote and that elected representatives ought to form a part of the legislature within a mixed constitution. Mill's *Representative Government* (1861) reflects the associated transnational debates without demanding universal franchise. Britain and other European states remained oligarchies, so that it is best to say that the nineteenth century witnessed the multiplication of democratic hopes and fears, evident in modern ideologies' appropriation of the concept, rather than the institutionalisation of representative democracy in our sense of the concept (Osterhammel 2014: 917). However, we inherited from the conceptual innovations surrounding the French Revolution the perpetual question as to whether nationalism and representative democracy are compatible and mutually sustaining.

Although we should not idealise the extent of nineteenth-century domestic democratisation in Europe, it would be equally inadequate to marginalise the transnational dimension of the democratisation process, which formed a continuous challenge to the restoration of the monarchical order. In the era of the American and French Revolutions, a transnational dialogue flourished. The consolidation of 'aristocracy' and democracy as counter-concepts as well as the acceptance of representative democracy emerged. The intellectual elites paid considerable attention to the democratisation of other states, and politicians of various ideological

stripes tried to create a public opinion in favour of their foreign policy. Although the monarchical elites and their allies, the conservatives, restored the old order in 1815, the events around 1848 show that their restoration never gained social legitimacy and that democratic protests were greatly influenced by what happened in other states.

Although it is sometimes assumed that nationalism caused the revolts, socialists and peasants who criticised the effects of industrialisation and ongoing poverty and exploitation were the most important protesting actors. The revolts did not result in a revolution but accelerated liberal constitutionalism and the extension of the franchise and, thus, the domestic erosion of the monarchical order. At the transnational level, conservative and monarchical internationalism also prompted the creation of other political internationalisms, and at the end of the nineteenth century, social movements gave way to the creation of numerous non-governmental international organisations.

Finally, the contrast drawn between domestic democratisation and the undemocratic conduct of international affairs belies nineteenth-century realities. These were characterised less by domestic–international than by civilised–uncivilised distinctions. Most citizens lived in multi-ethnic empires, and in Great Britain, conservatives praised colonialism as a means to prevent socialism at home, while liberals tried to reconcile representative government or democracy with the needs of large empires or states. Democratic progress occurred in a combined but uneven development when the right to vote was extended at the core and in white settler colonies, while other colonies were not considered as fit for 'responsible' or representative institutions. Towards the end of the century, the first critics of democracy and of imperialism appeared in tandem, but they were more devoted to the democratisation of the domestic oligarchy than to the emancipation of the colonies.

Nineteenth-Century Themes and the Pluralist Tradition

After this by no means comprehensive democratic perspective on the nineteenth century, let us consider how nineteenth-century themes influenced the creation of a pluralist tradition of thought in Britain. I suggest that pluralism evolved through further defences of democracy and through reformist and dissenting extensions of the democratic claims. Pluralists continued the emerging identification of modernity as the age

of democracy, while, on the other hand, becoming ever more critical of two nineteenth-century heritages: continental nationalism, the identification of democracy with representation, and British parliamentarianism. For them, political representation was undermined by class divisions and social inequality in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century. Instead of merely backing the franchise reforms, pluralists thought about domestic and transnational systems of functional representation to narrow the gap between democratic and social realities and to increase the power of the British labour movement. As nineteenth-century British progressives, they argued in view of the democratic claims of the European people and the British labour movement in particular.

Pluralists framed balance-of-power politics and exploitive imperialism as outmoded and anti-democratic forms of behaviour. They built on the assumption that only substantial domestic democratisation would create a lasting peace, but their writings also illustrate that the characteristic of the precondition, substantive democracy, is and can be defined in different directions. However, all pluralists contributed as 'public moralists' or 'activist scholars' to the public and academic discourse on international affairs to create an enlightened and peace-promoting public opinion so that democratic peace might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Most important is perhaps that early-twentieth-century nationalism prompted pluralists to depart from earlier democratic optimism and that both democracy and international peace depended on the maintenance of domestic and transnational equilibria between states and social forces, as well as loyalties checking the force of national sentiments.

A new theme entered democratic thinking about international relations when formal empires' eventual end became visible and when modern international organisations, beginning with the International Labour Organization, were established. Pluralism was important for designing and publicly evaluating these organisations, though they confronted pluralists with a dilemma. On the one hand, pluralists assumed that international organisations needed to reflect the rise of democratic norms through the allowance of public control and citizen participation, the promotion of transnationalism, and the stabilisation of the (re-)democratisation of domestic systems. These ideals did not materialise at all or only in a fragmentary manner in distinct institutions or international practices. However, at the same time, pluralists were committed to the advocacy of international organisations that still shape our realities, such as the welfarist United Nations (UN) specialised agencies, since they promised to

weaken the exaggerated authority of the nation-state and the appeal of nationalism as a homogenity-celebrating ideology. Hence – and this is often marginalised – pluralists alternated between academic and public advocacy and democratic criticism of the UN.

Pluralists conceived of themselves as antagonists of nationalists and fascists in Britain and Europe. Though early pluralists differed between nationality and sober democratic nationalism and jingoism, later pluralists abandoned this distinction in view of twentieth-century nationalism and fascism. They quite rightly recognised that nationalists argued that loyalty to the nation overrides all other loyalties and that they tried to reverse the rise of international interdependence and transnationalism. Pluralists revised the theme that transnational organisations were vital for democracy-maintaining domestic pluralism, which can be traced back to Bentham and Hobhouse. In the following two chapters, I will discuss the development of Hobhouse's democratic thought in more detail.

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CHAPTER 3

L.T. Hobhouse's Qualification of the Democratic Peace Thesis

Introduction

As we have seen, Stanley Hoffman has argued that modern scientists and sociologists are biased towards democracy but that IR scholars form an exception to the rule because the rise of democracy did not manage to change the patterns of international relations (IR). Hobhouse's philosophy, however, proves Hoffman both right and wrong. On the one hand, it provides examples for the commitment of modern philosophy and sociology to democracy. Hobhouse put forward an evolutionary philosophy that allowed only liberal democracy as a legitimate form of government, and he identified a reformist science (sometimes too easily) with internationalism. Hence, on the other hand, Hobhouse's philosophy shows that democratic considerations did not leave IR unconsidered or, rather, that democratic and international affairs were considered in tandem (Bevir and Hall 2017).

Hobhouse reaffirmed belief in the tandem of human and democratic progress when most of his contemporaries lost faith. The drawbacks of industrial modernity, the social question, and fear of an eventually enfranchised working class contributed to this turn. Though Marxism was not as strong in Britain as on the European continent, many unions, such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (1852), were founded in the second half of the nineteenth century and rather quickly acquired legal rights and the right to strike (Hobsbawm 1975: 134–135). Hobhouse's response to

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these intellectual and political changes is as simple as it is well versed. He interpreted the growth of trade unions not as a potential threat to liberalism but as a sign of liberal progress. He valued trade unions as voluntary associations that provided evidence for the vitality of Britain's democracy and hence reconciled the rise of the labour movement with liberal assumptions. Let us conceive of this as a pluralist (auto-)criticism of liberal internationalism.

However, from an international perspective, Hobhouse allowed for a possible decline of democracy. Democracies, especially when they formed the cores of empires, were committed to the diffusion of civilisation and to the promotion of representative institutions. By the turn of the century, responsible government in white settler colonies had become the norm in the British context. However, as indicated, instead of respecting and promoting white settlers' legitimate attempt at democratic self-government, Britain went to war with two colonies in South Africa. In Hobhouse's multidimensional perspective, democratic values were then threatened at all levels and in different places. He gradually turned away from moral to institutional arguments when he drew contrasts between expected democratic virtues and Britain's violation of human and democratic rights and when he revealed contradictions between liberal democratic principles and current policies (Sylvest 2009a). Though British intellectuals usually assumed that Britain escaped nationalism, Hobhouse diagnosed a rise of jingoistic nationalism in tandem with the violation of human and democratic values. According to Hobouse, the constellation hampered domestic improvement and due progress towards social equality. Yet, when Hobhouse developed the demand of state interference to achieve welfare measures and to remove the roots and the reproduction of imperialism, he did not finally decide the proper relationship between the institutions of the state and the institutions of democratising society.

Before we proceed, a note on Hobhouse's style is advisable. Readers who encounter his writings for the first time may find them suggestive since, Hobhouse always – also in articles written for the British public – employed a characteristic philosophical tone. This style caused different reactions even amongst his contemporaries. Harold J. Laski, an eminent British socialist and internationalist, spoke of Hobhouse as 'the philosopher' and lamented that his writings were 'too full of principles in the abstract with too little institutional background' (Howe 1953: 391). Hobhouse's remaining commitment to philosophy was shared by internationalists such as Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern, yet it distinguishes

him from the younger internationalist generation of Norman Angell or Laski. Hobhouse's philosophical contributions always culminate in political arguments, but this is not always obvious. For example, like other British internationalists, Hobhouse often referred to the concept of the state when discussing the adequacy of Britain's democracy or the legitimacy of the government's foreign policy. However, readers who undertake the effort of familiarising themselves with Hobhouse's style and arguments will meet a congenial thinker who was preoccupied with the modernisation of democratic theory and with the analysis and criticism of Britain's democratising oligarchy.

In what follows, I will introduce the liberal ideas available to Hobhouse and his philosophical reasoning in favour of democracy before I turn to Hobhouse's qualification of democratic peace theory. He used these ideas as a reference point for both his critical reflections about the state of British democracy and his international theory in the context of the South African Wars. Since Hobhouse and J.A. Hobson are often interpreted together, I will accentuate the differences rather than commonalities between them. Though Hobhouse did not fully relinquish self-aggrandising discourses about British society, he was quite aware of the dangers and unintended consequences of paternalist imperialism.

A Liberal Internationalist Commitment to Modernity and Democracy

What were the ideas available to Hobhouse to make sense of current social and political situations within the British Empire? Hobhouse, like most of his contemporaries, subscribed to liberal internationalism, a tradition or 'ideology of progress'. We have briefly discussed how liberal internationalism evolved along with British industrialisation, the extension of the empire, and the rise of democratic theory, and we will take a closer look at liberalism's architecture in what follows (Lawson and Buzan 2015: 102). Liberalism's underlying *Weltanschauung* welcomed and universalised these social transformations and assumed that individuals could engage in character development and rise above animal instincts and passions through the force of will. Human progress – individual and collective – was expected as a result of these efforts (Bellamy 1992: 2).

It has become conventional to begin definitions of liberalism and, correspondingly, of liberal internationalism with the acknowledgement of their fuzzy natures. Only three principles remain unambiguously liberal,

and these are the belief in the individual as the sole unit of moral concern, faith in a free market, and commitment to representative democracy (Lawson and Buzan 2015: 103). A firm belief in representative government was, however, no original or uncontroversial part of liberalism (Zakaria 2003). At first liberals rather believed in constitutionalism and the growing force of international law rather than democracy, which for them meant the increasing power of the working class. John S. Mill furthered the acceptance of democracy when he defined it as representative government, although Mill himself was highly aware of the fact that the logics underlying a free capitalist market (competition) and democracy (equality) were normatively and empirically incomprehensible (Berman 2010: 1).

There are, hence, good reasons to place an emphasis on the fact that classical liberal internationalism evolved in a polyvocal manner (Jönsson 2014). It is best defined as a discourse that is constructed in manifold, contradictory ways and that steadily changes its shape. Its boundaries are only defined by what other self-identified liberal internationalists accept or not (Bell 2014). Victorian liberalism and liberal internationalism referenced a variety of intellectual sources such as utilitarianism, classical political economy, civic humanism, and the historical sociology of the Scottish Enlightenment when they made sense of the political realities within the British Empire and on the European continent. Democracy, defined by national independence and representative government, was vital in both contexts, although this does not mean that British liberals always valued it or that they recognised all communities' and races' fitness for self-government.

Liberal intellectuals, who worked in or were familiar with colonial administration, spurred the generation of liberal internationalism, then reformulated ideas of human progress with regard to the expanding scope of the British Empire. Progress was then identified with the growth of international law, and, in turn, an important discursive feature of liberal internationalism was the growth of legal arguments. Legal arguments gained importance within the vocabulary of evolutionary philosophy that justified European predominance (Sylvest 2008). For liberals, international law was in the process of becoming and resembled primitive law since it equally rested on custom. Because of the continuance of evolutionary philosophy, British liberal internationalists could account for what they already saw as a legalisation of international conduct without using many strictly legal terms. This distinguishes between them and American liberal internationalists, who were preoccupied with international law and formal treaty obligations before

political science became IR's discipline of reference (Knutson 1992: 195). However, the British differed from other empires since it organised authority without a written constitution or clearly defined institutions, and British liberals' conception of international law reflect this fact.

In the British context, the distinction between 'civilised' and 'non-civilised' societies – and, correspondingly, the question of how the empire should be organised in view of these distinctions – was most important (needless to add, British liberals had little use for inside/outside distinctions) (Pitts 2005: 2). The terms of evolutionary philosophy made it possible to conceive of humanity as one progressing community moving towards orderly conduct and ruled by international law while simultaneously drawing distinctions between different degrees of civilisation (Sylvest 2008: 155). Liberal internationalists, however, could make these differentiations and still oppose imperialism (Hobson 2012). Herbert Spencer, for instance, took up evolutionary theory in order to provide a more 'scientific' basis for political theory, conceived of humankind as one entity, and reasoned about moral human evolution. Spencer allowed that other races might auto-develop but still assumed that their developmental path could only repeat British experiences (Hobson 2012: 93).

Civilisation and democracy were increasingly identified with one another and functioned as descriptive and evaluative terms (Hobson 2008: 79; Root 1917). They were the achievements of the developed races. The existence and stage a particular race found itself in determined the distance to the society of civilised states and fitness for 'responsible' or representative government. When British liberals discussed how representative institutions could be installed in Canada and other white-settler colonies, while maintaining order within the empire as a whole, they spoke of responsible government (Bell 2007a: 96). White people and settler colonies were considered to be entitled to have representative institutions, while few British liberals demanded self-government for India. IR scholars have recently put considerable emphasis on the fact that Mill argued that India ought to be governed by an effective bureaucracy (Bell 2010). Some, therefore, began to argue that liberal humanitarianism should not be condemned too easily; many theorists and colonial administers really believed that they were working for the welfare of the colonial people (Barnett 2011: 61). Welfare was then the primary aim, and the introduction of representative institutions constituted a long-term perspective.

Liberal imperialism was supported by an increasing number of theorists, including Mill, Bentham, and Burke, at different levels of thought,

but the most sophisticated were not necessarily the most influential arguments. Robert Seeley (1834–1895), a widely read author and convinced imperialist, straightforwardly provided a manual for 'how to govern India'. Developing such manuals was common among liberal imperialists, who eventually were 'practitioners' (see also Evan Luard). For Seeley, governing India was legitimate because the Indian people did not reveal characteristics of race and thus lacked a precondition for the introduction of representative institutions. Such racist arguments were common and halfway between being a scientific doctrine and modern ideology. Most importantly, little was in fact done to prepare India for independence (Lawson and Buzan 2015: 119). Liberal imperialists such as the South African Jan Smuts (1870–1950) feared that granting democratic rights to non-white people might cause a domino effect and encourage other non-white people to demand the same rights; in South African politics, Smuts supported racial segregation until the mid-twentieth century. However, since ideas of racial equality gained acceptance after 1911, Smuts and others began to moderate their tone in public discourses (Vitalis 2010: 936).

In the reflection of European democratisation and especially Italian struggles for independence in the second half of the nineteenth century, British liberals used a related but still different language. To stick with the introduced examples, Seeley (1883) found that Indian races reacted against each other and that they did not form a single nation, as in Austria or Italy. When thinking about European democratisation, British liberals linked appreciation of nationality, patriotism, and the state (Sylvest 2010: 217). Liberals believed that nation-states provided opportunities for personal development and for collective self-determination in equal measure. They transformed theories of state sovereignty that legitimated monarchical authority and argued that it was consent that united sovereign people (Bell 2007b: 160–5). While these ideas are often attributed to the twin concepts of popular sovereignty and (national) self-determination, Victorian liberals rather elaborated them in discourses about the state or the principle of nationality. Accordingly, states reflect political independence and the moral qualities of the people living within it, and international disputes ultimately had domestic causes, since nothing in a proper internally organised state would call for conflict (Green 1986: 138). The state appeared as an element of order upon which a society of civilised nations could be built. More international order was expected to mean more 'state', in particular with regard to the civilisation of areas perceived to be barbarous up until that point.

Most liberal accounts of nationalism were ambivalent because of a rather obvious gap between the virtues that liberals attributed to nationalism and the real-world materialisation of nationalism (Sylvest 2009a: 161). Liberals, hence, allowed for the fact that nationalism mobilised for democratisation but felt a need to distinguish between proper nationalism and improper nationalism or jingoism. For Mill, as we have seen, nationality was a precondition of representative government, and he believed that a nationality existed when a portion of mankind was united by mutual sympathies, developed from race, descent, language, attachment to a particular geographical space, and a common historical memory (Mill 2008: 229). In the positive, nationalism was a first step towards a self-conscious and enlightened internationalism and, in debates about Italian or German unification, supported the trend towards larger political units (Sylvest 2010: 217).

Green (1986: 134) conceived of patriotism in overall positive terms, objected to the 'cosmopolitan' loss of attachment to cultural bounds, and instead valued communal relationships. Accordingly, communal ties are necessary for the actualisation of human energies, and the Italian nationalist Mazzini likewise viewed patriotism as part of a sentimental education taking place within a national community (Holthaus 2014: 708). Proper educational and democratic progress starts with experiences in a democratic community where every member is respected as a fellow human. Jingoism, on the other hand, was the irrational glorification of one's country and included inherent antipathy towards foreigners (Varouxakis 2006: 102). It led to exclusion instead of integration, and many liberals found it to be embodied in German political thought after 1871. In sum, while liberals appreciated the principle of nationality as a democratising and patriotism as a democracy-maintaining force, they opposed the nationalist ideology's definition of ethnically defined political communities and celebration of the autarkic state (Sylvest 2009b: 45–6).

It has been argued that there occurred a turn from philosophical to institutional arguments within liberal internationalism (Sylvest 2009a). This change occurred gradually from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, but I suppose liberal imperialists have always been more institutionally minded than other liberals such as T.H. Green. Hobhouse's style shares, as indicated, more with that of Green than with the often openly racist tone of liberal imperialists.

From Human Towards Democratic Progress

From the beginning, Hobhouse addressed political questions within his philosophical thought where he pivoted on the idea of human progress. Progress, for Hobhouse, implied steps towards humanitarian principles and social democracy in thought and in political action. His argument, in brief, asserts that rational individuals are capable of self-governing and of controlling their own destiny but that they depend on each other in the effort of common self-realisation. Abstract studies appear to have been vital for him, in Collingwood's (2002: 31) terms, as a mean to address what he perceived to be the most important philosophical and political questions. Eventually, the disappearance of firm belief in progress distinguished Victorian thinking from its aftermath.

Hobhouse's choice to tackle the question of human progress through the use of evolutionary theory reflects a contemporary belief in science and Hobhouse's debt to Spencer. Eventually, Spencer's writings had advanced biology and evolutionary theory to the point where they became the most credible forms of scientific reasoning. Hobhouse adopted Spencer's method by developing his political theory as part of a general philosophy of evolution, yet he sought to question the political implications of Spencer's evolutionary outlook (Freeden 2001: 33).

Hobhouse was repulsed by Spencer's mechanistic worldview and allowed for human rationality to play a far greater role in evolution. He took up Spencer's use of evolutionary philosophy to argue that humankind is essentially one and that it is experiencing a positive or orthogenic evolution (Sylvest 2009a: 109). Orthogenic evolution described trends towards harmony and functioned as a counter-concept to the social Darwinist notion of the never-ending struggle for survival as the only evolutionary possibilities (Hobhouse 1901a: 5). He thus qualified Spencer with moral claims calling for the political and legal recognition of human equality at an international level. Recognition of human self-consciousness is, following Hobhouse (1920a), what distinguishes his from Spencer's evolutionary philosophy. Humans can acquire mental conceptions of their external reality and of their own nature and history (Hobhouse 2003: 595). While other theories viewed lower instincts as a force in evolution, Hobhouse's account re-iterates Victorian beliefs in rationality, character, and the virtue of self-restraint, in personal development within a community, and in scientific progress.

An approach to Hobhouse's evolutionary philosophy best begins with Hobhouse's view on human nature. Hobhouse continued a liberal and Victorian interest in character development. But, unlike the Victorians, he asserted that character development is spurred on not by economic competition but, rather, by social cooperation. Naturalising Aristotle's account of rationality, Hobhouse spoke of rationality as an instinct to create harmony within an inner life of impulses, feelings, and desires, within an outer social life, and within mental conceptions. Simply put, he believed that a happy person was likely to be a responsible member of the community and that there was rational and correlated improvement of the organisation of inner and social life. Though Hobhouse recognised humankind's unsocial traits, he still believed that rational reflection and the identification of social deficits could be applied to dismantle constraints and change human behaviour in the long run. He aimed at this superseding of instincts by reason aiming at personal and social harmony and used the term of harmony as a regulative ideal to evaluate human conduct. Where personal and social harmony grows, human purpose eliminates the struggle for existence.

One can easily see here that Hobhouse's view on human nature is the precise opposite of the conservative and anti-democratic opinion that humans are driven by instincts and the lust for power and thus incapable of deliberative self-government. Hobhouse's anthropology can be approached as a case for democratic activism and deliberation as common self-realisation. On the other side, Hobhouse did not fully endorse radical views, such as those held by exiled anarchist Peter Kropotkin. Even though Hobhouse (1902b) shared Kropotkin's view that humans are social at their core, he countered Kropotkin, who believed that mutual aid rules all natural, socially undistorted relations, when he argued that the conscious institutionalisation of mutual aid is only evident at higher stages of evolution. Mutual aid and its conscious organisation were traits of only advanced civilisations and liberal democratic communities that realised the need for social policies.

For Hobhouse, it was human rationality that enabled mutual aid and that made a difference in history that proved social Darwinist ideas wrong. Likewise, his friend Hobson defended 'the supremacy of reason' and the possibility of 'establishing a system of philosophy and ethics verifiable by experience and independent of all arbitrary assumptions or authority' (Hobson 1933: 9–10). In this spirit, Hobhouse aimed at formulating universal principles while accepting the need to justify them in terms of real human experiences. In practice, this meant that Hobhouse combined biology, history, the

history of ideas, and philosophy to back his claim that human rationality shapes human evolution. For him, the function of human rationality is to organise and unify it to explain the world and to rationalise human conduct. In this effort, unity of thought is more a regulative ideal than an attainable goal (Hobhouse 1901a: 336). At the highest stage, rational systems of knowledge admit the infinity of reality but see that the ways in which reality affects human beings are finite. People in this stage gather facts about the possibilities of the human race that enables them to escape the force of inheritance. As opposed to idealist theories of knowledge, which he perceived as a conservative form of reasoning, Hobhouse aimed at making the case for intellectual critique and progress. Progress denied a repetition of struggle at a higher level, as a rivalry of ideas. However, this definition of intellectual progress largely equated progress with the growing acceptance of (Hobhouse's own) humanitarian ideas.

To illustrate progressive trends in human development, such as those towards harmony, Hobhouse made use of the organic rather than the domestic analogy at the turn of the century. This implies that liberal internationalism owes much less to the attempt to domesticate international affairs than is commonly assumed. It was the organic analogy that made it possible to conceive of humankind as one organism and to outline left-liberal ideals. Hobhouse hence illustrated his left-liberal ideal by means of which he inherited from Herbert Spencer, as J.A. Hobson did (Long 1996: 9). But both turned it into a case for reform. According to Hobhouse's (1898: 145) variation, primitive life resembles a loosely associated cell colony, whereas organic or civilised life is 'an advance in integration', leading to the uncompetitive and 'harmonious concurrence of interdependent parts' comparable to cells that secure 'their own maintenance by co-operating in the support of the entire body'. Similarly to Spencer, Hobhouse valued the increase in differentiation, integration, and interdependence in advanced organisation.

Scholars of Hobhouse's thought have observed that he projected the organic analogy to the international level (Freeden 1996; Long 1996: 8). Their claim holds true inasmuch as Hobhouse conceived of the human race as one body of which different nationalities and groups form a part. Hobhouse perpetually argued that theories of rights and obligations ought to be based on the acknowledgement of human equality and that human equality derives from 'a common humanity deeper than all our superficial distinctions' that are 'relative to and limited by considerations of social welfare' (Hobhouse 1898: 140–141).

However, even though Hobhouse used biological terms, in particular when he stressed the ideas of human self-consciousness and trends towards harmony, he never fully abandoned metaphysical beliefs (Cowen and Shenton 1996: 280). He rather changed his order of arguments in distinction to the philosophical idealists. He started with the empirical instead of the metaphysical in order to answer the question of whether there are signs of a purpose working within human history. The rise of rationalism within Western philosophy gave Hobhouse evidence for the workings of such a purpose. Hobhouse's evolutionary theory thus ends in an argument for the existence of a human purpose working out its course under constraints – a 'conditioned teleology' (Hobhouse et al. 1926: 126).

Hobhouse (1969: 371) connects these metaphysical residues with Auguste Comte's humanitarianism in a somehow religious manner: 'Thus Humanity, in the sense which the best Positive writers have given to that word, Humanity as the spirit of harmony and expanding life, shaping the best actions of the best men and women, is the highest incarnation known to us of the divine.' Human development is not predetermined, but Hobhouse thought that humans should become conscious of their ultimate belonging to humankind and that there is a common good for all humankind. Hobhouse's philosophy of development, which influenced Hobson, is thus a vision of a self-conscious and self-directing humanity whose unity is furthered by a reforming science. It restated Green's conviction that human progress consists of the widening of human association and the extension of the common good in rational terms. And it qualified Green's ethics with an insistence on human self-consciousness in the spirit Comte.

Beneath these philosophical terms, Hobhouse started to question whether the unity of mankind could be realised, without drawbacks, through national self-determination. When Hobhouse began his academic writings, tensions between liberal internationalism's moral praise of widening circles of human organisation and institutional favouring of democratic states become evident (Jönsson 2014: 112–113). Though Hobhouse could hardly imagine a world without nations – and though he valued national sentiments in a liberal manner as expressions of human diversity – Hobhouse (1901a: 349) still noted the problem of recognising different national types while reconciling their claims with wider humanity. Few people could imagine their country as a servant to humanity, as Mazzini proposed. Only briefly, Hobhouse (1899: 155) probed the liberal option to reconcile national claims by international law when he welcomed the

Hague Conventions that established international law for humanitarian treatment in wartime. International law appeared here as a means to define the rights human beings have independently of their citizenship or membership within a particular state.

Rather, Hobhouse justified the need for a reformist science that was committed to humanitarianism and internationalism. It ought to further the unity of mankind in opposition to 'jingoism' and a social understanding of democracy. Hobhouse built on Comte's positivism and, compared to Hobson, placed special emphasis on the study of ideas as the basis of social institutions and on the philosophical defeat of illiberal or nationalistic ideas. Science was both a force working towards internationalism and one that itself had an international character. Although this looks and is to some degree progressive, the downside of his argument is that it involved rather questionable self-congratulatory patterns. Praises of superior, self-consciously humanitarian scientific internationalism reveal both Hobhouse's Eurocentric and anti-German perspective since he blotted out any arguments other than English ones.

There is, hence, some truth to E.H. Carr's critique that liberal internationalists were incapable of self-criticism. Hobhouse's identification of science with internationalism made him a likely candidate object of Carr's polemic. However, Carr (2001: 5) did not attack Hobhouse but took up Hobhouse's conception of intellectual development to disqualify liberal internationalism as an infantile approach. Yet, the manner in which Carr used and reformulated Hobhouse's visions and theories fits well with his dual argument: Carr dismissed utopianism only at the surface before he formulated his own vision, which suggests an internationalisation of social welfare measures that Hobhouse would propose for the domestic realm.

The Pluralist Criticism of the State and of National Democracy

Many IR scholars identify British pluralism with the period that followed the outbreak of the First World War (1914). Hobhouse's writings suggest that there were anticipations of typical pluralist themes earlier on. Hobhouse became highly critical of classical conceptions of democracy and of the strengthening of nationalism in modern democracies. Even prior to 1914, it became apparent that nationalism called into question the compatibility of two liberal aims – the widening of human association and

the furtherance of popular government. Still, in his philosophical writings, Hobhouse addressed this evolving conflict and took a stance on liberal internationalist key concepts such as the state, nationality and national rights, and citizenship. Note here that Hobhouse, like other pluralists who followed, tried to detach democracy from the concept of the state. However, somewhat ironically, his democratic redefinitions often drove abstract discourses about the state that paid far too much attention to this than to any other concept (Bartelson 2001: 81). Hobhouse (1920b) himself would later lament that he could not hear the word 'state' anymore.

Liberal internationalists who were equally philosophical idealists had circumvented the question of how states, the perfect human organisations, came down to earth. Hobhouse, on the other hand, provides one with a narrative, although this narrative somewhat marginalised the British Empire's role in the generation and international diffusion of states. Hobhouse's narrative appears at first rather optimistic since it portrays the state as a liberal attainment and an advanced form of political community.

Accordingly, the smallest social unions are families, clans, and tribes based on blood ties or intermarriage. When geographical expansion and warfare make more efficient organisation necessary, the hierarchical order of despotism emerges (Hobhouse 1922: 128–143). Hobhouse (1951: 55) recognised the principle of despotism primarily in absolutist monarchy, feudal monarchy, and empire. Despotism is based on the principle of authority and the use of force, which demands forcible subjection to a single chief or class in a territory defined by the idea of sovereignty. Here it is important to see that Hobhouse did not believe that feudal monarchy can claim traditional legitimacy or appear as an institution that has always been that way (Weber 1980: 124). Hobhouse stressed that the despotic ruler destroyed the solidarity of the natural group and imposed laws not in accordance with custom. To compensate for the loss of natural solidarity, the despot needed to prove his utility and manipulate religious ideas to portray himself as ruling by divine right to gain support. Ultimately, however, his rule rests on force. In Hobhouse's typology, despotic rule remains inherently unstable, and resistance to it is likely.

Following the liberal distinction between nationality as an observable and valuable social tie and improper nationalism, Hobhouse appreciated national sentiments so long as they contributed to the establishment of democracy or when they mobilised resistance against external rule (perhaps in other than the British Empire). Resistance to despotic rule, Hobhouse observed, springs from nationalism in the modern world.

Nationalism motivates the deposition of despotism, which furthers the evolution of modern social unions based on the principle of citizenship. In such cases, Hobhouse (1902a) invoked the existence of different nationalities rooted in an 'underlying community of character' and patriotism as a 'heritage and a tradition'. Nationality and democracy should go hand in hand to allow democracy to become an expression of the community instead of being the insufficient government of a majority. In this sense, nationality had 'the sympathy of the liberal man' and, in analogy to the individual in a democratic community, a right to well-being. Hobhouse thus rejected suppression of nationality as a dangerous thing, while observing that nationalism and militarism always followed when nations became politically organised in a state.

Nationalism fulfilled for Hobhouse its short-lived purpose when it fought for the principle of citizenship. Hobhouse's account here merges historical and ethical reasoning in a typical liberal manner. In distinction to the former principles of social union (kinship/authority), citizenship describes a normative ideal. Reiterating Aristotle and Green, Hobhouse defined citizenship as the realisation of personality within a community. In this light, the constitutional state is an achievement because it provides rule of law and the best environment for common self-realisation. Only here does the individual become a rights-holder, is protected from arbitrary rule, and has the opportunity to be virtuous by actively contributing to public life (Hobhouse 1951: 66). Hobhouse (1945: 7) acknowledged that the principle of citizenship had so far been best realised in the modern state and praised the state as the 'distinctive product of a unique civilisation' arising from the struggle against authoritarianism. This appreciation of the modern state, however, still attaches its legitimacy to the furtherance of democratic self-government.

On the other hand, Hobhouse allowed that the evolution of states could follow various lines, including the imposition of state institutions by foreign imperial powers. An identification of the state with community or with the normative principle of citizenship was thus not possible. He did not define citizenship as the possession of rights based on membership in a national community. Citizenship is a social status that entitles the individual to certain rights, but the individual holds those rights as a member of the human community and in return for his or her services to the common good. Accordingly, only contributions to the common good are the defining feature and criterion for inclusion or exclusion. These thoughts stand in the radical tradition and bear much normative force. However, Hobhouse's detachment of

citizenship from the nation-state often remained fuzzy and unfinished. Only his argument as a whole suggests that he conceived of citizenship and statehood as rather historically than intrinsically related phenomena.

At the same time, Hobhouse carried on Jeremy Bentham's radical challenge to the intrinsic value of nations and to other collectives. Even if all liberal accounts derive the value of the nation from the individual, some regard nations as rights-holders (Tamir 1993: 9). But Bentham, instead of granting their value, had questioned the utility of nations and subjected them to international law. Hobhouse took up this line, but replaced Bentham's focus on the aggregation of individual interests with an emphasis on the individual as a rights-holder. Thus, Hobhouse (1902a: 416) suggested that national rights had to be continually re-considered: 'It is not a question of the abstract rights of nationality. There are no abstract rights whatever of nationality, or of empire, of liberty, or of property. The rights of an individual are what he may expect from a social organisation based on certain principles, and the test of his rights is this, that their persistent violation is in the end fatal to the principles of organisation.'

The normative value of the state and of nationalism are, hence, bound only by the promotion of democracy and individual rights. Hobhouse's praise of national sentiment as a democratic force did not result in the definition of claims for nationhood. Hobhouse's delicate treatment of the related concepts of the state, nationality, and citizenship was not common. Hobhouse (1901a: 345) was especially critical of the state's treatment of foreigners and behaviour towards other groups since '(N)owhere…is the paradox of the moral consciousness more conspicuous than in the contrast between the relations upon which it insists within a well ordered society, and those which it tolerates or encourages towards the foreigner'. These discrepancies revealed the state's exclusionary nature, which mitigated its democratic achievements. Any state – be it the ancient city or the modern national state – provided the privilege of citizenship only to its members.

Many British liberals continued the nineteenth-century project of defining democracy by the identification with or rejection of the Roman and Athenian examples into the early twentieth century (Wilson 2010; Morefield 2005: 76). Most liberals were educated in classical studies before entering the civil service, journalism, or academia. This circumstance is a likely reason for ongoing liberal reference to classical democratic examples and to comparisons of the British with earlier empires. However, preparation of modern democratic ideals by the rejection of the example set by ancient city-states distinguishes between Hobhouse and

liberal internationalists such as Alfred Zimmern and Gilbert Murray. The latter revealed considerable nostalgia for ancient city-states and viewed the polis as the incarnation of the perfect democracy. Their discomfort with the transformation into nation-states and the extension of the franchise drove their nostalgia for the polis as a small community of virtuous men. Hobhouse, in contrast, recognised that the polis had tolerated slavery, inter-group rivalry, and warfare, while the foreigner was hardly respected as a fellow human. In effect, the polis rather created additional international divisions, instead of furthering the long-term goal of human unification.

Instead, Hobhouse broadened Bentham's radical proposals for denationalising reforms of the state, but his proposals are here clearly shaped by contemporary racism. Hobhouse envisioned the guarantee of a universal right to emigration and immigration, passive suffrage for foreigners, and some inclusion of foreigners in democratic decision-making to enhance the epistemic quality of legislation (Niesen 2012). The alien would be entitled to enjoy the same rights as citizens if he was willing to contribute to the common good. Unlike Bentham, Hobhouse did not care about the foreigner's epistemic capacities. The illegitimate rule of citizens over non-citizens meant, following Hobhouse, that the perfect state needs to be the inverse of the Platonic state. The perfect state would allow border-crossing and grant political rights to aliens. Hence, the self-contained political state cannot be the last word in human history: 'The state as we know it is not a solution, but a problem, not a fixed point that has been attained, but a movement' (Hobhouse 1922: 150). However, when Hobhouse (1951: 316) raised these radical views, he thought of 'fellow white-men' and only, ultimately, fellow men.

What is most important with regard to the development of pluralism is the fact that Hobhouse increasingly merged such philosophically voiced criticism of stark national boundaries with the empirical arguments and typical pluralist ideas. One may recall here that pluralism is largely an account of industrialised societies' diverse nature and that pluralists conceive of this diversity as an enrichment rather than a threat to the existing order. Hobhouse already allowed that humans are shaped by the social environment into which they are born and stressed that this social milieu was in modern liberal societies a pluralistic one. Individuals are thus by birth and association members of many groupings, such as a family, a church, or a political party. Instead of assuming that one group membership comes at the expense of another, Hobhouse perceived these plural

belongings as parts of a multifaceted development. Rational human beings call inherited group memberships into question and associate with others for self-determined purposes. He assumed that the different social roles one performs further each other and facilitate rationality (Gaus 1983: 37; Freeden 2001: 34). Accordingly, a person might reflect as a believer on his duties as a citizen and, shifting his point of view, as a citizen on the proper limits of religious reasoning in politics. Overlapping social belongings then contribute to the individual's ability to weigh competing claims, to formulate criticism, and to reflect on and choose alliances. Society is hence a structure that emerges from individual choices and durable social relationships.

Social relations, however, do not stop at national boundaries, so that neither the state nor domestic society consummates all social relations and identities (Hobhouse 1951: 362). Spencer already observed the growth of voluntary associations in industrial societies, and Hobhouse further spelled out what this meant for IR. He conceived of them as possibly *transnational* voluntary associations and as a means to re-assure liberal trust in the simultaneous furtherance of democracy and the widening circles of belonging. Accordingly, voluntary associations further democracy because they allow democratic activism, which is important to balance bureaucratisation and increasing state action. Furthermore, they provide options to identify with a group beyond the state.

Hobhouse hence argued that the domestic common good and international cooperation depended on increasing voluntary associations. Transnational social relations were morally significant and impacted obligations to compatriots. In more ideological terms, Hobhouse (1945: 104) contrasted liberal appreciation of transnational voluntary organisation as well as recognition of the special right and obligations arising from their conduct with Machiavelli's and Bismarck's adherence to the reasons of state.

The following passage illustrates Hobhouse's (1922: 89) pluralist key ideas:

> Each individual is a member of many societies. He is one of a family; he belongs to a church, to a corporation, to a trade union, to a political party. He is also a citizen of his state, and his state has a place in the commonwealth of states. In so far as the world becomes one, that is to say, as social relations arise which interconnect human beings all the world over, Humanity becomes the supreme society, and all smaller social groupings may be conceived as constituent elements of this supreme whole. […].

> The ideal development of society is not the fashioning of a self-contained political state which should supersede the necessity for all the spontaneous associations of human beings which fill so large a part of actual life. It consists rather in the discovery of the lines upon which these manifold forms of human association can be brought each to its fullest pitch of efficiency as a part of a wider organization.

We can recognise here a pluralist appreciation of voluntary and intermediary organisations as places of civic activism linking the individual to society, a note of how modern complexity called for non-territorially defined IR and a valuation of transnational associations as an anti-nationalist force for greater international cooperation. Though Hobhouse ([1893] 1974) did not stress the labour movement as a transnational force, he made the liberal argument that modern society's growing pluralisation went beyond the scope of the nation after 1900. Pluralism can be traced back to the edge of Hobhouse's philosophy and sociology, which, however, display contemporary racist and Eurocentric ideas.

Liberal Internationalism, Democratic Peace, and the Social Question

We have seen how liberal philosophical writings pivoted on notions of human and possibly democratic progress but found comparatively little elaboration of a liberal or democratic peace. This observation deserves emphasis because IR textbooks sometimes give the impression that democratic peace loomed large in nineteenth-century philosophy. They usually refer to Immanuel Kant's ([1795] 2004) and his thesis that the domestic constitution of a state will determine its external behaviour. The democratic peace thesis then predicts that democracies will only go to war for the purpose of self-defence when there is public control of foreign policy. Questions of war and peace are hence questions of domestic democratisation, and more democracy promises to equate to less war. Such a conventional account, which is the product of steady but superficial re-readings of Kant, however, involves many misconceptions.

Nineteenth-century philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham thought about democratic peace in political and essayistic rather than philosophical writings. In the British context, Bentham ([1843] 2005) first recast Kant's theme in a liberal but fragmentary manner. From the popular support for

the British Empire, Bentham derived the existence of a democratic deficit, and he sought to correct popular misconceptions. Bentham appealed to his contemporaries' enlightened self-interest when he argued that British colonies did not equal economic profit, although he did not suggest the end of imperialism as a step towards democratic peace (Baum 2008). After Bentham, there have been a number of re-formulations of the thesis that fit poorly with the 'Enlightenment fable'. Democratic peace thinking was in part racist or displayed considerable scepticism toward democracy in the sense of the rule of the poor many (Bell 2014). Early monadic democratic peace theories, according to which democracies are more peaceful in general and not only towards other democracies, existed but were not the sole way to link questions of democracy to questions of war and peace. In British debates, themes of democracy, imperialism, and peace were interrelated.

Hobhouse and Hobson continued British traditions of democratic peace thinking in a left-liberal manner in response to the (for both sides) costly South African Wars (1898–1902). In this conflict, white settlers in the South African Republic and the Orange Free State fought for independence from the British Empire (MacMillan 1998: 236–243). The former had received its independence in 1852 but was re-annexed in 1877, whereas the Orange Free State was acknowledged as a sovereign actor, although it remained largely integrated into the British imperial system. Various developments contributed to the re-annexation and the intra-imperial conflict, including the discovery of gold in the South African Republic, the treatment of foreigners, and the war-promoting diplomacy of Sir Alfred Milner, who was appointed Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner in South Africa. By contemporary standards, neither Britain nor the South African republic would qualify as democracies, and the conflict was not international in scope, remaining one between the imperial power and some of its colonies (Russett 1993: 17). Still, it forms the background to Hobhouse's institutionally minded interventions. In this context, international problems were conceived of as being domestic in nature because of public judgements of colonial affairs or because of a war-promoting public opinion.

British public opinion was clearly supportive of Milner's foreign policy. Milner was a self-declared Anglo-Saxon race patriot and argued that supporting the war was a patriotic duty (Thompson 2007: 1). Only Hobhouse and Hobson initiated public opposition to the war, and the conservative press first portrayed them as enemies of their own country. Both men

worked then for the *Manchester Guardian* and contributed to the newspaper's standing as the first newspaper siding with the settlers (Ayerst 1971). Hobhouse initiated Hobson's visit to South Africa, which formed the basis of Hobson's economically minded study 'Imperialism' (1902), cited by Lenin. Hobson forcefully argued that the worker's insufficient payment and consequent domestic under-consumption had caused an aggressive strife for new markets that had to be maintained by all means. Compared to Hobson, Hobhouse rather emphasised ideational and normative changes rather than economic factors. However, both Hobhouse and Hobson probably would have varied their arguments and anti-imperialism in debates about other colonies or non-white people's capacity for self-government (Claeys 2010: 236–276).

When Hobhouse and Hobson began to organise public criticisms of the war, they denounced it as an imperialistic war and linked the as-yet hardly defined term of *imperialism* to the diagnoses of a democratic deficit. As opposed to the positive idea of empire, imperialism began to be used to describe a doctrine of racial ascendency and territorial aggression. Indeed, it is critical to see here that British socialists and Fabians were just about to develop distinct foreign policy proposals as well as a position towards empire. In 1900, Bernard Shaw, a leading Fabian, began to advocate for a welfare-oriented colonialism. In view of this development, Hobhouse in particular feared that British socialists might, in the absence of an elaborated foreign policy tradition, might be vulnerable to nationalistic or imperialistic appeals. He found it likely that the socialists' positive conception of the state and bureaucracy might result in nationalistic support of imperialism.

To some extent, Hobhouse (1899), who was under Fabian influence, agreed with socialist definitions of the causes of imperialism when he diagnosed British society's degeneration into oligarchy. Accordingly, in spite of formal democratic institutions, British society was ruled by a small elite that dominated commerce and that pushed the state to acquire new markets and to secure them by military means. Though Hobhouse believed in the civilising duties of ending the slave trade and improving labour conditions, he repudiated the option to do so and the empirical possibility of a sane imperialism on empirical grounds. Once in place, this commercially motivated imperialism hindered domestic reforms because financial resources required for that were being spent on imperial and military matters and caused international violence. Where Cobden blamed the aristocracy for

pushing its interest at the expense of the common good, Hobhouse (1919) followed Hobson in identifying the commercial elite as one cause of the malady. Free trade was obsolete because commercialism had proven to promote war and not peace. As did Hobson and H.N. Brailsford, an eminent British socialist and internationalist, Hobhouse observed an interrelation between domestic inequality and imperialism.

Linking the South African Wars and Britain's domestic democratic deficit is equally evident in Hobhouse's liberal argument. Hobhouse turned to a liberal audience in a number of essays (1901–1902), which reappeared in the volume *Democracy and Reaction* (1904). On the one hand, he treated the war as a symptom of, in Spencer's terms, re-barbarisation or, in our terms, de-democratisation. Imperialists, Hobhouse argued, betrayed any moral and democratic conceptions when they treated and killed natives like animals. Indeed, his (1901b) articles offered detailed reports of the British crimes in South Africa. Hobhouse identified a lack of democratic standards as the most important cause of imperialism. Qualifying the nineteenth-century liberal internationalist belief that political democracy is a sufficient means of producing international cooperation, Hobhouse argued that a spirit of materialism and the persistence of undemocratic doctrines in IR directly related to domestic democracy.

However, instead of identifying a democratic deficit as the cause of war, Hobhouse also found that imperialism reacted on the (further) degeneration of British democracy. It is critical to see here that the British did not spread modern administration via imperialism in the first place. Rather, a professional civil service had been established in India before it was exported to Britain. The imperial wars then fuelled further bureaucratisation in the so-called mother state (Buzan and Lawson 2013: 629). For Hobhouse, management of Britain's empire overwhelmed political democracy and popularised expert rule. What kept the empire running was in essence a bureaucratic machine, and Hobhouse feared the further rise of calculations of administrative efficiency that do not consider drawbacks for the liberty of British citizens. He therewith opposed liberal imperialists such as Smuts. Smuts defended British imperialism, even if this implied denying democratic freedoms to their own compatriots. Hence, for Hobhouse, the fate of domestic democracy and international relations were mutually linked, because only the application of democratic standards in international affairs would enable domestic reform and the reduction of bureaucracy.

As part of his democratic disillusion in view of the jingoistic press's ability to manipulate public opinion, Hobhouse rethought the democratic

peace thesis. In principle, he found representative democracy to be sound and certainly endorsed the expansion of suffrage to include the working class. But since the South African Wars, men had proven to be not insufficiently rational and educated to recognise how truly selfish their aims would be (Hobhouse 1945: 76). Hobhouse lamented that the average voter had especially little interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs. Voters did not study foreign issues because they felt no direct and clear responsibility for them. Like the liberal internationalist Norman Angell, Hobhouse (1972: 49) argued that the capitalistically organised press did not fill the informational gap to further public deliberation but rather kept step with the political elites' reactionary distraction manoeuvres by publishing uninformed or nationalistic columns: 'Foreign complications proved unfavourable as ever to public discussion, and the determination to rule others had its normal effect on the liberties of the ruling people themselves.'

Hobhouse argued that common men remained too uninformed to withdraw socio-economic matters from oligarchic control and to challenge class ascendency. Political passivity, instead of democratic activism, characterised the daily life of citizens such that 'no social revolution will come from a people so absorbed in cricket and football' (Hobhouse 1972: 76). Hobhouse hence challenged Bentham's idea that men are guided by enlightened self-interest, as well as the core of Kant's perpetual peace thesis, saying that the masses have no interest in war. The democratisation of foreign affairs was far more complicated than Kant had suggested since people made decisions on the basis of their uninformed economic interests. Hobhouse's public critic and nascent theoretical arguments was widely noted and contributed to considerable opposition to the war that ended in 1902 with the surrender of the Boers. Already here, Hobhouse (Hobhouse 1972: 145–146) explicitly referred to Kant's peace theory and Bentham's concept of enlightened (public) self-interest.

Hobhouse resumed his theoretical work on the democratic peace thesis in his seminal *Liberalism* (1911). Similar to Kant and previous British liberals such as Spencer, Hobhouse maintained that the state of domestic democracy determined foreign policies and, ultimately, international peace. However, what Kant's argument did not anticipate was that democratisation would be accompanied by industrialisation and, in effect, domestic inequality and often war-promoting public opinions. Hobhouse found that neither Kant nor a later theorist had yet fully accounted for the Industrial Revolution's meaning for democracy. He did qualify liberal

democratic peace theory in the view of the social question, but this implied a social conception of democracy for Britain and not more democracy abroad (MacMillan 1998: 109–110).

Against the background of the revolution's effects, Hobhouse asked, in (unacknowledged) concert with Durkheim (1949), what society's changed structure implied for individual rights, obligations, and democratic potential (Coser 1997). In a more apologetic tone than used in his political writings, Hobhouse assumed that citizens' democratic potential could not materialise because of socio-economic inequalities (Gutmann 1980: 50). 'Liberty without equality', as he famously wrote, 'is a name of a noble sound and a squalid result' (Berman 2010: 20). Ultimately, '[P]eople are not fully free in their political capacity when they are subject industrially to conditions which take the life and heart out of them' (Hobhouse 1972: 249). Modern economic conditions engendered economic and civic inequalities that 'constantly threaten to reduce political and civic equality to a meaningless form of words'. The political guarantee of equality by the avoidance of the, as Mill had warned, 'tyranny of the majority' had not prevented the resurgence of problems of equality, in the form of wealth and poverty, in a different sphere of economic relations. Natural law and democratic theories derived from the social contract tradition did not account for such inequalities and were thus outdated.

The Industrial Revolution, following Hobhouse, had caused economic progress and social differentiation and widened gaps between rich and poor, and these dual developments were intrinsically tied to questions of justice. Like a number of British progressives, including Christian socialist R.H. Tawney and guild socialist Cole, Hobhouse used the vocabulary of functionalism to revise democratic rights and obligations and ultimately to make a case for redistributive justice and a civic minimum.

For Hobhouse, individuals performed a social function when they, for example, practised a profession that contributed to the common good. He assumed that citizens had a reciprocal 'functional' obligation to do such work and to contribute to the community according to their talents and that performed functions brought about correlative rights. An increase in effort by a worker deserved to be rewarded, and Hobhouse proposed work hours as an indicator for a just desert. Hobhouse (1914: 70) hence used the vocabulary of functionalism still in a liberal manner that can be distinguished from Bernard Shaw's and Cole's socialist use, leading to the suggestion of an unconditional equal income and radical democracy (Jackson 2011: 47).

Citizens, according to Hobhouse, are obliged to contribute to the community by their work but are also entitled to receive in return for that work at least a living wage. The reward should enable a male worker to make life plans, nourish a family, and engage in civic activities. In view of the social determination of values, economic or social inequality would only be allowed when it furthered production or catered to the needs of individuals. Remaining inequalities in rank, office, or income are only legitimate when they contribute to the common good or are at the advantage of those worst off. Hobhouse believed in avoiding too high incomes, promoted the redistribution of inherited wealth, and aimed at overall civic minimum. He justified the satisfaction of basic needs, such as of food or housing, as an essential precondition to the exercise of the rights and duties of democratic citizenship. Citizens' rights entailed the use of available educational and cultural resources, contributions to public deliberation, and political participation. This implies that citizens have a right to a fair share of the community's increasing welfare, manifest in a common infrastructure. Making such definitions on the basis of an individual's contribution to the common wealth and the surplus value, Hobhouse connected a sociological conception of society with an outline of democratic rights and obligations in industrialised society. Hobhouse aimed at a justice-based argument directed at a more egalitarian society in which citizens would have the opportunity to participate in democratic decision-making. However, in elaborating his case, Hobhouse obviously relied on a gendered division of labour, though rejecting formal restrictions to female labour, and suggested that single mothers should also be regarded as capable of making a contribution worth a fair reward (White 2003: 109–110).

Finally, the institution of private property became an object of new liberal redefinition and criticism. For Hobhouse (1966a), there was no ultimate justification of private property. Its legitimacy rather varied from case to case and in relation to the common good. He revealed how different ideas were attached to 'property' in premodern and modern times to show that it was an institution with a changing nature. Hobhouse disputed the legitimacy of (functionless) inherited wealth but drew on the Aristotelian idea that some private property was essential for the expression of individual personality (Jackson 2011: 43). He applied a distinction between property for use, allowing freedom and security, and property for power that led to the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, who were freed from the need to work and who did not contribute to the

common good. Likewise, Hobson spoke of property and improperty. Both questioned an absolute right to private property and found that a redistribution of property was morally defendable to endow all citizens with property needed for use.

A practical question following from the interventions was raised in connection with the organisation of normatively desirable reforms without vastly increasing state activity. It is a critical question since liberals traditionally preferred a small state, arguing that statist bureaucracy would further illiberal tendencies within society. The British jurist A.V. Dicey (1825–1922) already diagnosed an increase of centralised and levelling tyranny because of an increasing number of social reforms (Hobsbawm 1989: 103). It is true that government employment tripled in Britain between 1891 and 1911 and that this (since 1906) was partly due to the Liberal government's social reforms, including old-age pensions, health reforms, and unemployment insurance. Compared to contemporary standards, however, it remained modest.

Hobhouse's position towards the state and a possible increase in state activity was ambivalent and changed over time (Freeden 1996). On the one hand, he allowed that only the state could organise far-ranging social reform and set minimum wage rates (Hobhouse 1966c: 222). On the other hand, he hoped that social equality could be attained without a vast increase in bureaucracy. Consultations between employees and employers and workplace democracy should accompany social reforms and the introduction of public ownership in areas that were critical to the overall economy and public infrastructure. This would moderate the effects of enhanced state intervention and avoid the tendency towards political passivity and democratic despotism.

When thinking about how social reforms necessitated democratic reconfigurations, Hobhouse (1945: 115) followed a line set by Mill. Mill had temporarily suggested co-operative organisation of society, 'in which man would dig and weave for his country, as he is now prepared to fight for it'. Questions of social reform were hence related to questions of a war- or peace-promoting public opinion. Like Mill, Hobhouse favoured a cooperative organisation of society for educative purposes, and the respective arguments reveal some scepticism towards the labouring masses (Pateman 1976: 30). Though a lack of education and socio-economic equality somewhat accounted for the common man's, in Mill's words, ignorance and selfishness, both Mill and Hobhouse believed that men first had to learn to overcome selfishness and act for the common good on the

local level. Hobhouse implied that this education should predate or accompany participation in more important decisions, such as international questions. Otherwise, as liberal internationalist Gilbert Murray also argued, citizens approve of harm abroad when it appeared to serve the national interest. Contra Kant, he believed that socio-economic equality and democratic education had to accompany the introduction of popular control of foreign policy in order to raise a people morally and epistemically capable of deciding in favour of peaceful international relations.

The social problem as a whole, for Hobhouse (1966b), encompassed imperialism, militarism, and class ascendency as well as interrelations amongst these factors. Put in rhetorical terms, questions of industrial and of international liberty referred to different sides of the same problem. With regard to international questions, Hobhouse then, at first glance, chose a different path than Mill. Contra Mill and in contrast to Hobson's support of a paternalist and welfarist government of the colonies, he (1972: 147) stated that even a semi-despotic, non-effective, native government is preferable to an oligarchy of white men. Democracy and imperialism were incompatible. '[…] democracy is government of the people by itself. Imperialism is government of one people by another'. Following this logic, self-government could not be induced but depended on democratic nationalism. Hobhouse was more hesitant than Hobson about sane imperialism in the form of a paternalistic and bureaucratic government of non-white people. The undermining of British democracy by economic elites and the persistence of socioeconomic inequality implied the impossibility of international rule in the name of civilisation and social efficiency.

Still, when Hobhouse flirted with the idea of reforming the empire along the lines of a federal union, he granted the right to national self-determination only to white settler colonies (Bell 2007a: 12). Both Hobhouse and Hobson employed a distinction between the old internationalism of laissez faire and the new internationalism aimed at international institutions (Bell 2009). In contrast to the older liberal internationalism of non-intervention, he and Hobson began to promote a new liberal internationalism aimed at international organisations. Hobhouse insisted on colonial self-rule for white people such as the Boers and proposed federalism to reconcile democracy with large-scale rule. Accordingly, empire or a federation as a loose collection of autonomous parts that joined the federation voluntarily may thus be an engine for bringing about a desired democratic order beyond the state.

Hobhouse neglected the likely possibility that (former) colonies might decide against membership in a previously oppressive empire. He stressed that a federation's greatest advantage would be the regulation of international interdependence and peaceful resolution of international disputes through international rules. Analogous to primitive societies, Hobhouse – like the welfarist lawyer J.L. Brierly – claimed that law could rest on custom even in the absence of a power monopoly. Hence, Hobhouse hoped that deliberate reform might fight the roots of imperialism so that democracy and empire would be compatible (again). Later on, as the next chapter will show, he translated some of these ideas into support for a league of democracies.

Conclusion

With his philosophy embracing a modern commitment to democracy, Hobhouse sought to reconfigure the approach of British liberals to democracy given an industrialised society in the so-called mother state. His conceptual auto-critique of liberalism pivoted around the bundling of democracy, nationality, and territory. Democracy is the key to this conceptual trinity because it connects the ideas of individual autonomy and collective self-determination on the one hand and justifies national claims to territory on the other. Democracy reconciles communities with liberalism's universal aspirations, such as the facilitation of constitutional or human rights and peace. When democracy becomes too nationalistic or bounded, it ceases to survive in a substantial liberal sense (Linklater 2002: 141). Hobhouse did not fully separate the idea of common self-realisation and self-determination from territorially bounded communities but observed that the conjunctures of nationalism and democratisation had always been only short-lived in Western societies.

On the one hand, Hobhouse appreciated the social transformation towards industrial modernity. He supported a transnational conception of the social realm and recognised that modern industrial societies gave rise to social pluralism and, possibly, transnational voluntary associations. Because of his appreciation of social pluralism and transnationalism, he opposed those who conceived of the ancient city as a democratic role model. Hobhouse followed the British liberals' definitions of democracy as representative government but added that a citizen also ought to be active in voluntary associations in a democratic society. A prototypical voluntary association was, for Hobhouse, the labour movement, and his

conceptual reconfigurations certainly rely to a great extent on observations of social relations within the British Empire.

On the other hand, Hobhouse was well aware of the Industrial Revolutions' adverse effects. He criticised the socio-economic inequalities in industrial societies, in particular because these inequalities undermined democracy's peace-promoting qualities, as the South African Wars demonstrated. By contemporary standards, neither Britain nor the South African Republic would qualify as democracies, and the conflict is best conceived as one between an imperial power and some of its colonies. Hobhouse, however, wrote as if Britain was a full-blown democracy and qualified Kant's and Bentham's democratic peace theses. He argued that the public support for the South African Wars in Britain proved that democracies, plagued by socio-economic inequality and bureaucratisation as a result of imperial overstretch and warfare, could not bring about rational foreign policies. While Hobhouse agreed with Hobson that imperialism furthered capitalistic thinking in British society, only Hobhouse opposed imperialism as a trigger of domestic bureaucracy, democratic despotism, and passive citizenship.

Beyond the South African Wars, Hobhouse continued a new liberal reconfiguration of Kant's democratic peace. It stands in the tradition of nineteenth-century radical-liberal thinking about democracy and peace, blaming political and economic elites for the facilitation of militaristic sentiments. In addition, Hobhouse and Hobson included the social question in its domestic and international dimensions. Hobhouse observed linkages between democratisation, industrialisation, and modern IR, marked by imperialism, and distinguished his position from liberal imperialism and from socialist theories that postulated causal relations between capitalism and imperialism. He did not aim at overcoming capitalism but at social reforms to improve socio-economic conditions to allow for deliberate discussions of foreign policy. Hobhouse's revision of Kant's perpetual peace thesis was perhaps at its best when he addressed socio-economic inequalities in Britain. He invested considerable energy in justifying the need for a living wage and democratic minimum. An underlying assumption of his argument is that improvement of socio-economic conditions and democratic education would diffuse nationalist sentiments amongst British citizens.

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CHAPTER 4

Nationalism, Liberal Democracy, and the Prospects for International Cooperation

Introduction

Democratic peace theory and democracy as a war-justifying principle are both nineteenth-century legacies. Hobhouse first remained within the realm of democratic peace theory when he conceived of the rise of vulgar nationalism or jingoism as an urgent problem. However, liberals increasingly conceived of nationalism as a competing and autocracy-promoting ideology, and Hobhouse opted for this line with the outbreak of the First World War.

Hobhouse then attributed nationalism to Germany and treated (German) nationalism as British liberalism's ideological adversary (Sylvest 2009: 173). Hobhouse, like many British and American intellectuals, such as Alfred Zimmern or John Dewey, began to exclude Germany from the European society of civilised states and treated Germany as a modern but autocratic and military power. Theory and journalistic wartime propaganda overlapped to a large extent when these liberals blamed the war on the so-called German theory of the state, and when they contrasted German thought with Western civilisation, democracy, and, finally, Western democracy. British intellectuals often addressed an American audience as well and created important discursive lines before the American entry into the war in 1917 and U.S. President Wilson's official declaration of a war to make the world safe for democracy (Llanque 2015). Towards the end of the war, Hobhouse tried to distance himself again from his

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support for wartime measures in Britain that had put him at odds with British radicals and to reposition himself first as a pluralist. However, when he demanded a league of democracies at the end of the war, Hobhouse argued first of all along liberal lines.

Following the victory over Germany and the creation of the League of Nations (1919), Hobhouse (1993a) advanced pluralism in democratic debates. However, in retrospect, we need to caution against exaggerating the optimism of these debates. They were not characterised by a general optimism about the prospects of democratic development in view of the increasing number of democratic governments in Europe, as is often assumed. In view of their own, the American, and other European societies, British intellectuals instead asked what modern democracy was and whether it was really capable of producing good and peace-promoting governments and societies. Democracy ceased to be an expectation or promise and was now turned into a standard to evaluate post-war trends.

Against this background, Hobhouse readdressed the themes of democracy and peace as intrinsic problems of liberal democratic development. He then diagnosed a rise of nationalism in Britain and in other democracies and conceived of nationalism only as a democracy-consuming sentiment. Reversing the assumption that democracies allow peace-promoting transnationalism, he finally amplified a pluralist perspective. Accordingly, the future of liberal democracy depends on transnational loyalties, as nourished by trade unions, as checks against nationalism. Hobhouse did not ponder the causal impacts of democracy and transnationalism on peace in a mutually exclusive way (Russett 1993: 26). Instead, he thought about liberal democracy and transnationalism as complementary and envisioned the furtherance of democracy-enhancing transnational loyalties in a mixed international order consisting of states and societal associations. His case resonates with both Mitrany's and classical realists' opposition to twentieth-century nationalism. In what follows, I will scrutinise Hobhouse's turn from democratic peace theory to democratic war ideology and his final presentation of a pluralist peace theory.

The First World War: Against Prussian Militarism and for Democracy

Precursors of liberal internationalists' wartime construction of an ideological adversary can be traced back to the nineteenth century (Sylvest 2009: 45). Starting at that time, British views of Germany fluctuated

between admiration and irritation. Ironically, good intellectual relations between Germany and Britain had contributed to British intellectuals' ambivalent stance towards Germany. When liberal historians encountered Heinrich von Treitschke, acknowledgement of his intellectual achievements was accompanied by a rejection of Treitschke's nationalism (Sylvest 2010). Yet, starting with Germany's unification (1871), the tone became more critical, and when Hobhouse resumed liberal democratic peace theory around 1900, he had already incorporated anti-German arguments. In the context of the South African Wars, he had offered the reader two different explanations for British liberalism's moral crisis, namely Britain's democratic degeneration or, put very generally, German thought. Hobhouse had intended to dissociate sober liberalism from violent imperialism, and although his main ideological adversaries had been cruel colonial officials, Hobhouse (1972: 83) tried to formulate an especially devastating criticism of British imperialism by identifying it with German thought. He continued to repudiate British imperialism as an incarnation of the German theory of the omnipotent state. The respective arguments are part of the political origins of academic and allegedly neutral democratic peace thinking (Russett 1993: 33; Llanque 2015).

Prior to the outbreak of the war, Hobhouse had organised a Foreign Policy Committee, a small circle of radicals, in order to put pressure on the government to seek better relations with Germany. Hobhouse also initially joined the British Neutrality Committee, an initiative founded by his London School of Economics (LSE) colleague Graham Wallas (Smith 1973: 262). Like other liberals, Hobhouse began to support the war following the publication of *Manifesto of the Ninety-Three* (1914) in which many German professors declared their support for the government's decision to go to war. Hobhouse was not, like Murray, among the British professors who signed a response that blamed only Germany for the outbreak of war. But he used the manifesto as a piece of evidence for the fact that the war was a conflict between divergent civilisations – a war between liberal, humanitarian civilisation and the German *Kultur* that glorified power, militarism, and the state. Hobhouse then departed from British radicals' opposition to the war and effectively spread anti-German narratives in *The World in Conflict* (1915), *Questions of War and Peace* (1916), and many unsigned letters appearing in the *Manchester Guardian* during the war. Here, he identified liberal internationalism's ideological adversary – German philosophy or the German theory of the state.

In referring to the German theory of the state, Hobhouse organised a set of assumptions that prepared the transformation of the war into a war of ideas between democracy and its adversaries. The German theory of the state allegedly accepted a territorially divided humanity, identified the state with society, and defended a nation-state outlook on society, politics, law, and justice. It became the opposite of the liberal and, in particular, his pluralist expectation of modern society's extension beyond national borders and development towards moral universalism. Like earlier British liberal internationalists, Hobhouse then viewed non-liberal ideas as un-British. To explain the outbreak of World War I and to theorise German war guilt, Hobhouse developed theories of a German *Sonderweg* (special path) (Hoeres 2003). Such theories contrast Germany's abnormal political development with the gradual, successful, and lasting development of British democracy. In that sense, the war began as a conflict between a modern, civilised state and a modern, reactionary one.

Hobhouse in particular targeted Hegel's philosophy, and this performed a vital function. It helped to hide the fact that a German author had provided vital impulses to liberal democratic peace thinking. Although Hobhouse appreciated Kant's humanitarianism, Hobhouse simply argued that this German liberal tradition had ended with the emergence of Hegel's nationalistic philosophy and theory of the state. His *Sonderwegstheorie* excluded Germany and its culture from the realm of liberalism and Western civilisation. After Hegel, Germany allegedly developed its own, illiberal theory of the state (Hobhouse 1915: 54). Accordingly, Hegel's praise of the state as an intrinsic good and as the highest human community effectively mandated a never-ending war in regard to international relations. Nietzsche and Treitschke, Hobhouse argued, likewise glorify the state, going further than Hegel in seeing the power of the state as an end in itself.

In his gloss of Hegel, Treitschke, and Nietzsche, Hobhouse simplified the thought of quite different German philosophers until they all appear as advocates of a doctrine praising the state as the highest good standing above human morality. Hobhouse (1916: 20) suggested a causal relationship between these Hegelian ideas and the German nationalism that brought about the war, maintaining that '[y]ou will find all the essentials of a brutal, autocratic, militant, unscrupulous nationalism tricked out with the finest phrases in the Hegelian philosophy'. Hegel's philosophy became a justification for the aggressive nationalism causing the war. Hobhouse (1996a) further portrayed Nietzsche and Treitschke as opponents of human happiness and British utilitarianism. The employment of

philosophical terms suited Hobhouse's style and offered aesthetic advantages because selective references to and quotations from mainly nineteenth-century German philosophy allowed for the attribution of illiberal traits of choice to the political enemy.

Prominent liberal internationalists contributed to the construction of the war as a conflict between competing philosophies, theories of the state, and, ultimately, to the construction of the war as a conflict between democracy and its adversaries. Hobhouse's narratives are characteristic of IR pioneers' seizure of the wartime rhetoric, even if they differed in their position towards Germans. Angell, Bryce, Hobson, and Zimmern all employed a dichotomy that aligned Germanness, *Kultur*, autocracy, bureaucracy, state discipline, militarism, and international anarchy on the one side and liberalism, civilisation, democracy, and international morality on the other (Holthaus 2015).

Bryce stressed the compatibility of cosmopolitan commitments and liberal democracy, while Angell identified the German theory of the state or, as he called it, Prussianism with an absolute and irrational will to power. Angell argued that Prussianism had been promoted by a number of German thinkers, including Treitschke, Friedrich von Bernhadi, and Friedrich Nietzsche. While Hobhouse greatly shaped arguments that reclassified Germany as a state beyond the realm of Western civilisation, Zimmern managed to praise Britain's democratic war cause without defining democracy in detail (Setson-Watson et al. 2010 [1914]). For Zimmern, democracy was a spirit and involved considerably more than the ballot box. By approaching democracy not in institutional terms but by relating it to the character and self-respect of the British people, Zimmern effectively distracted attention from the fact that Germany had introduced universal manhood suffrage before Britain (Llanque 2015: 70).

However, despite the common construction of a democratic war cause, British intellectuals defended different stances with regard to the war and British government's introduction of wartime measures. Angell and Dickinson were perhaps the least anti-German thinkers since they tried to warn that not only Germans but all European political communities could be manipulated by nationalism. Angell was a key figure in the creation of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC). This group was established in 1914 to press for a more responsive foreign policy, but because of their critique of the war, they also became associated with pro-German views (Wallace 1988: 84). The UDC opposed the war and wartime measures such as the introduction of conscription, wartime censorship, and restrictions of civil liberties.

Angell's invocation of democracy was a means to criticise the British government. Indeed, the government at first refused to issue a set of war aims, and many officials wanted to avoid a discussion of war aims and conceived of it as a sign of a too weak censorship system (MacMillan 1998: 212). British intellectuals could thus legitimate the war as the democratic fight of the Prussian mind in Germany, or they could criticise their own government for the reluctance to strive for a negotiated rather than punitive peace with Germany by identifying Prussianism with British officialdom. Hobhouse went back and forth and temporarily endorsed conscription as a necessity in the war against Germany.

American and British politicians, however, seized on prepared lines and turned the conflict into a war for democracy with the Russian Revolution and the entry of the US in 1917 (Hobson 2015: 140–144). The alliance of Britain, France, and Russia could now represent itself as an alliance of democracies fighting for the democratic cause (Hammond 1934: 121). This portrayal involved considerable simplifications because Russia, also after deposition of the tsar, remained largely an autocratic empire. However, starting in 1917, Wilson began to speak of a war to make the world safe for democracy. He identified autocracy as a root of war and increasingly defined democracy in terms of national self-determination (Hobson 2015: 154). British Prime Minister Lloyd George likewise declared that there would be no war if Germany had a democracy similar to those of Britain, Italy, and France (Llanque 2015: 71). In addition, Wilson's Secretary of War Elihu Root (1917) divided the world into peace-loving democracies and militarist autocracies in order to argue the need for democratic alliances. He intensified the identification of the realm of civilisation with democracy, which had begun already in the nineteenth century (Tocqueville 1998: 8; Root 1917: 9–10; Hobson 2008). However, Root derived democracy's peace-promoting qualities from the domestic rule of law and accountable elites instead of necessarily peace-promoting public opinion. Still, in the US, as in Britain, liberal internationalists such as James Shotwell, originally an historian dedicated to the values of objectivity, were recruited to 'sell' the war to the American public and to justify it abroad (Josephson 1974: 56).

Hobhouse (1917) joined the interpretation of the war as a war for democracy in his temporary support for a league of democracies. Even if he was not as enthusiastic about the Russian Revolution as Scott or some British progressives, he opposed the isolation of revolutionary Russia and argued for its continuing integration in a democratic league (Ayerst 1971: 402).

Although Hobhouse hardly injected meaning into the concept of democracy, it was clear that democracy was an Anglo-Saxon achievement and, in an international perspective, a membership-defining principle. Britain was then a democratic role model, though Hobhouse lamented the lack of a democratic spirit among the governing classes and the absence of a democratic control of foreign policy. Hence his journalism shows that Eurocentric and intra-Western practices of othering could overlap since he worked with two distinctions to differ between liberal Britain and its allies and illiberal Germany and between these Western states and rather passive spheres of influence.

The origins of IR's democratic peace thinking are told differently, and some narratives give credit to the 'noble identity myth' (Hobson 2012: 15). Doyle's (1983) advocatory narrative returns to Kant and downplays the liberal wartime politicisation of democracy. Bruce Russett (1993: 33), on the other hand, rightly traces the theory's political origins back to the First World War. However, he still treats the wartime rhetoric as a pool to gain prescriptive and empirically defendable lessons about democracy's external relations. This downplays the unfinished democratisation of the allies, idealisations of Britain's democracy (universal male suffrage was only introduced during the war to pay respect to the returning soldiers [Halperin 2009]), and the fact that democracy remained ill-defined or was defined in different terms than it is today.

Liberal Internationalism and Pluralism

While he had previously supported pluralist views, Hobhouse had to re-establish himself as a left-liberal and progressive thinker during the heyday of British pluralism. The tradition is often identified with the period surrounding the First World War because many socialists and liberal internationalists nourished the tradition as a form of academic opposition to wartime reforms. Intellectuals including Leonard Woolf (1916) discredited inherited theories of the state to pose questions about wartime obligations. Others, including Bertrand Russell, Norman Angell, G.L. Dickinson, H.N. Brailsford, and R.H. Tawney, were also members of the UDC. His temporary turn to centrist positions and state discipline, conscription, and state control over the economy during the war as a necessity for fighting Germany meant that Hobhouse had to give renewed vigour to re-voice his critique of the state. At first glance, Hobhouse accomplished this task with the publication of his popular philosophical

polemic *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (1918), which became widely cited in the pluralist literature. However, at closer inspection, Hobhouse, like many others, worked with liberal internationalism and pluralism without reconciling them (Sylvest 2007). While the former presumes the existence of states, the latter aims at the diffusion of statist authority. Their logics are ultimately incompatible.

Wartime pluralism was first of all organised through common attacks on the British idealist Bernhard Bosanquet. Hobhouse's decision to contest Bosanquet's allegedly conservative adaptation of German ideas to justify legitimacy of a league of liberal democracies is hence fairly traditional within the pluralist spectrum. The monograph presents two lines of thought that give different answers to the questions of the rights of the individual in relation to the state, political obligations under wartime conditions, and the proper timing of an international organisation. One line summarises Hobhouse's reading of Bosanquet. Following its logic, the state has a unique moral quality and is, in Rousseau's terms, a manifestation of the general will. Accordingly, the individual is only a moral subject when he or she acts in accordance with the state (Hobhouse 1993b: 59). The state is constitutive for the individual's morality so that the individual is only free when his or her will coincides with the will of the state. The ideal is then that citizens consider themselves only as parts of a single political body.

Hobhouse added further credit to Cole's and Laski's disagreement with the idea that the state enjoyed a moral supremacy. For Hobhouse (1993b: 119), the individual is an autonomous moral subject independent of a state or any other form of human association. The state neither has a unique moral quality nor is the ultimate human community. It is just one element in the human society, which transcends the state internationally and domestically. Hobhouse, Laski, Cole, and MacIver all portrayed the state as one association among others, performing specific functions. The state loses any moral supremacy because it is but one side of a pluralistic society constituted by the interactions of various individuals (Freeden 2001: 34). And like any association or individual, pluralists as well as internationalists such as Angell claimed that the state was subject to moral considerations.

Departing from his earlier support of conscription, Hobhouse inquired anew about political obligations under wartime conditions and the nature of war itself. Bosanquet (1915: 145) had dissociated himself from his teacher Green in his discussion of war. Although he disapproved of war, in Green's language as an expression of the lack of statehood, he acknowledged the moral function of war in its capacity to provide an opportunity

through which the individual could fight for his morals and moral life within the state. In contrast, Hobhouse returned to Green's view of war as fundamentally wrong and a violation of the individual's right to live, raising questions of political obligation and even personal guilt (Freeden 1986: 37). Hobhouse alluded to Green's discussion of whether individual soldiers are guilty of murder. Green (1986: 124) had concluded that they are not because soldiers act under the state's authority and are threatened with death if they disobey. Hobhouse (1993b: 119), however, stated that 'every individual supporting the state in its action must be rightly regarded as assuming a personal responsibility in so doing'. Although he weakened the charge because of the impossibility of assigning individual guilt in a system of diffused responsibility, some of Hobhouse's contemporaries read the book as an accusation of soldiers who fought during the war (Taylor 1920).

Finally, Hobhouse disputed the claim that the time for the creation of an international organisation had not yet arrived. Bosanquet objected to any organisation beyond the state as domination and violation of cultural heterogeneity. Accordingly, the great variety of individuals and nations makes it impossible to assume one common human will legitimating an international organisation, or even to speak of humanity as a corporate agent (Bosanquet 1968). Free development is possible only within different, nationally defined communities, at least until a moral entity justifying common organisation becomes concrete. Hobhouse rejected these concerns and, in so doing, recognised social relations beyond the state. For him, however, the main problem was the moral anarchy in international relations; only the immediate creation of political institutions above the sovereign nation-state promised democratic progress. Tying in to the stoic's cosmopolitanism, Hobhouse demanded expression of the moral unity of humankind through a league of states of a priori socio-economic coherence. Simply put, he recognised a socio-political realm beyond the state, but it remained a distinctively liberal one.

Hobhouse thus contested opposition to international organisation by pointing out society's pluralistic nature independent of the state but failed to formulate an international reform proposal reflecting this ontology. The international organisation that Hobhouse suggested in 1918 consisted only of states, even if he advocated some supranational authority limiting the sovereignty of the state. Hobhouse's suggestion is fairly conventional and obviously a result of his use of pluralism and internationalism as distinct principles of liberal ideology (Sylvest 2007). British pluralism is above

all a critical attitude towards the state, including of its authority and finality. It is philosophically supported by Spencer's observation of increasing social differentiation and complexity. Internationalism, on the other hand, is based in the existence of distinct states.

Hobhouse ends his critique somewhat paradoxically with the dissolution of the state internally while suggesting an international order grounded in democratic states and questioning the state's corporate identity while demanding its subjugation to moral and legal laws (Freeden 1986: 364). Though he had earlier lamented liberal ideas had not been applied to the fact of society's increasing differentiation and modernisation, his own argument for a league of democracies praised the British model and remained based on the principle of territorial organisation. These theoretical paradoxes, however, were for Hobhouse less important because he politically opposed – despite strong rhetoric – only overly nationalistic (German) interpretations of the state rather than the state as such. Ultimately, *The Metaphysical Theory* called for liberal democracies as constituent members of an international society.

Modern Democracy and Peace

The end of the First World War is often seen as a moment of democratic triumphalism (Mazower 1998: 3–4). Wilson defined democracy in terms of national self-determination, and open diplomacy was inextricably linked to peace-making and to the constitution of a new international order (Fisher 2012: 296; Hobson 2015: 157). The League of Nations was created and based on a new transparency norm on the basis of which all international treaties had to be formulated. A large and well-resourced information section ought to have made the publics aware of them and educated them with regard to international matters. Furthermore, the Allies found that Germany or rather autocratic Prussia was responsible for the outbreak of the First World War and imposed a system of reparations on the Weimer Republic. Finally, Wilson's support of democracy paved the way for the creation of new republic European states through the dissolution of multinational empires, such as the Austro-Hungarian empire. Their respective constitutions stressed their national, representative, and democratic nature and provide evidence for the climax of the first wave of democracy. These changes unleashed much debate about democracy, and James Bryce's *Modern Democracy* (1921) performed in this context a function comparable to Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History* (1992): it first

served as a point of reference within a complex public-academic debate and then became a symbol for the allegedly universal acceptance of democracy (Hobson 2015: 202).

In our historical perspective, we need to correct the widespread assumption that a general democratic optimism infused Hobhouse and his contemporaries after 1919. Wilson's redefinition of democracy as national self-determination in distinct territorial states was problematical for many British and European intellectuals, including Zimmern (1922: 49). Instead of supporting Wilson's redefinition, they rather asked in what direction modern democracies could develop. All of the new democracies had representative assemblies, and intellectuals were well aware of the fact that representative democracy had to prove to be a good and peace-promoting system of government for the first time in history. Bryce's work included a contestation of liberal democratic peace thinking since it argued that modern democracies do not advance human fraternity (Sylvest 2009: 174). For most intellectuals, it was an open question as to whether representative assemblies were the final institutions of modern democracy. The first democratic self-destruction occurred in 1922 in Italy, and whenever intellectuals dared to make a prognosis, they were not necessarily optimistic.

Likewise, British liberal internationalists' support for the League of Nations, which evolved from international negotiations, is often exaggerated. Many British intellectuals had been involved in the planning of the post-war organisations and went to Paris when the peace negotiations took place, or enjoyed close relations with political circles. Hobhouse was at this time a well-informed and apt international analyst and highly familiar with the plans and negotiations predating the League of Nations. Many ambitious plans were developed along the lines of analogies to domestic democracy and envisaged for example a parliamentary institution. Hobson outlined a league of the people and direct elections of the national representatives in the League's major organs (Long 1996: 151–3). The institutions of the materialising League hardly lived up to progressive hopes.

Although there was little dissidence and complete rejection of the League, considerable debate of the League's democratic legitimacy immediately followed the creation of the organisation (Hobson 1921: 235; Ashworth 2007: 44). British intellectuals raised the question, in Hobson's (1921: 235) words, "Why has the League started wrong?" The League was no organisation of proper democracies only and, what was more important, lacked institutions for the people. Hobhouse had a priori praised the so-called future league of peace as a sign of democratic progress,

but how did he judge the League of Nations that evolved from the international negotiations, the post-war order, and the state of affairs in modern democracies after 1919? He then contributed to the wide-ranging debate about the League's democratic accountability and modern democracy from a liberal-pluralist perspective (McCarthy 2012: 1). Hobhouse, like other left-leaning scholars, targeted in particular the affirmation of national sovereignty, the exclusion of socio-economic questions, and the lack of institutions allowing participation in international affairs.

Hobhouse did not conceive of the League as the successful realisation of liberal ideas and found that the absence of great powers such as the US foiled the League from its beginning. He (1996b) was familiar with the different proposals put forward by Bryce and Wilson at the end of the war and knew that Wilson borrowed heavily from Bryce. To Hobhouse both proposals, and especially the real League, were insufficient, and he disagreed with the injustices of the peace settlement and the reparations imposed on Germany. In spite of his anti-German attitude and support of the exclusion of Germany until 1918, Hobhouse (1919) then endorsed the integration of Germany and rejected the treatment of Germany because it reduced an industrialised people to a tributary position. Furthermore, Hobhouse (1996c), probably in response to Wilson's redefinition of democracy as national self-determination, emphasised nationality's ambivalence. For him, the First World War proved that nationality was Janus-faced, promoting first freedom and self-government, and then international aggression and militarism. In opposition to Mazzini's hopes, adjustment of different national claims remained a problem. Nations and great powers in particular co-operated only in the face of a common enemy and remained unwilling to enter voluntarily into a union that impaired their right to defend their territory. Thus, the League lacked supranational powers and acknowledged state sovereignty instead of bringing nations closer together.

Hobhouse called into question the democratic legitimacy of the League because of the lack of application of democratic principles to the relation of states and because no institution allowed the participation and representation of the people. Continuing his earlier support of colonial self-government for white people and possibly India, Hobhouse (1966a: 298) objected that the League did not include settler colonies as sovereign members. Colonies like Australia gained international credibility because the League acknowledged them as parts of the British empire, but they had not yet aquired the status of fully autonomous political communities within the British Empire.

More specifically, Hobhouse addressed the fact that the League lacked institutions that allowed the participation of the people. He was probably familiar with H.N. Brailsford's suggestion that an international parliament, as part of the League, might strengthen the League's democratic quality and might contribute to the domestic diffusion of nationalism, and he appeared to sympathise temporarily with this view (Ashworth 2007: 44). Brailsford believed that members of that parliament, elected directly or via national parliaments, would represent ideological instead of national views and thus show how international class relationships transcend the boundaries of states. While his proposal was built on a domestic analogy, it aimed at effective transnationalism. Parliamentary patterns for the international level were, however, also suggested from the conservative side. Smuts (1918), who lobbied for a League headed by a few white great powers, considered parliamentary patterns for the international level to mobilise support for the international organisation but found four-year meeting intervals more than sufficient. Proposals that applied the language of democracy to international-level organisations were not necessarily progressive but came from all sides. Yet only radicals contrasted the actually existing League with their proposals for a league of peoples or demanded the direct election of national representatives in the League. They hoped that elections would bring social-democratic or liberal individuals into office and thus turn into a means to weaken conservatism (Long 1996: 152).

Most important for Hobhouse was the League's failure to tackle the problems of international conflict and social inequality. His resumption of his earlier thinking on the interrelations between international and social conflicts certainly added to the left-liberal critique of the League. Beginning with his critique of imperialism, Hobhouse (1966a: 300) remained convinced that both were interwoven and foiled the performance of democracy, since 'class ascendency is the support of militarism, which is also the means of maintaining it, and the "closed state" provides the reasons for maintaining national jealousies and enables class interests to figure as the common good'. G. Tawney (1923) recognised that this implied a complete rejection of the state system maintaining military and economic oppression. Yet, for the critics, the League left this problem unaddressed and did nothing to regain the peace-promoting function of transnational commerce. Hobhouse (1966b: 212) conceived of the immediate post-war period as reflecting a tense world, involving latent international, race, and class conflicts. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the rise of

Bolshevism, of which Hobhouse disapproved, and in view of the national revolutions in Europe, other revolutions appeared likely. The stability, future development, and peace-promoting capacity of modern democracy was amongst the most widely discussed questions of the day.

In his enormously influential *Modern Democracies* (1921) as well as in *International Relations* (1922), Bryce summarised the great lines of the international diffusion of representative democracy (which had just come to an end) and asked whether these modern democracies could be expected to bring about peace. These works illustrate a gradual turn from philosophy to empirical theories of democracy and peace and liberal concerns. Liberals, on the one hand, began to conceive of democracy as the proper form of government for civilised and white communities and assumed that elected elites would overcome the ancient regime's war motives, such as the dynastic lust for power and prestige (Root 1917: 10). Democracy and peace came together, while open diplomacy and secret monarchic diplomacy became opposites. On the other hand, liberals took stock of the widening electorate's reasonability or, in Bryce's (1922: 179) words, 'the fitness of the people to direct foreign policy'. Liberals were not always optimistic about democracy and the state of public deliberations. Because of this characteristic some propose distinguishing between liberal and democratic peace thinking (Zakaria 2003: 117).

Bryce's account of the democratic realities after the suffrage reforms often invoked contrasts between liberal democracy's promises and radical hopes – including human improvement, capable legislation, an uncorrupted civil service, and honest leaders interested in providing a service to the community – and modern democracy's imperfect realisation (Becker 1921: 666–71). As a member of the intellectual establishment, Bryce observed the arrival of mass democracy and of the rise of statist administration with some discomfort. The mass of the people, Bryce noted, desires not to govern but to be well-governed. The uneducated as well as the intelligent parts of the nation found it convenient to leave 'the conduct of State affairs to an intelligent bureaucracy capable of giving business men the sort of administration and legislation they desire, and keeping the multitude in good humour by providing comfort and amusement' (ibid. 671). Bryce thus was suspicious of the increasing bureaucratisation of state affairs, which might benefit an economic elite and the national oligarchy.

Modern democracies, according to Bryce, required representative assemblies, but parliaments had not yet bettered oligarchy in all policy fields. The question was not whether foreign policy was managed by a

small oligarchy – it was – but whether a democratisation of foreign policy promised to bring about better decisions (Bryce 1921: 368). Conservatives and advocates of secret diplomacy still more pointed to the common man's lack of understanding of foreign affairs and the inconstancy in democratic decision-making to oppose claims for the further democratisation of foreign politics.

In response to these conservative sceptics, Bryce refers to a number of historical cases, including the eventual middle- and working-class opposition to the South African Wars, to show that the masses usually make sound political judgements with regard to war and peace. Since 1848, he argued, the opinion of the masses as distinct from the opinion of the propertied and educated classes had become a detectable factor in foreign policy. However, Bryce by no means turned this into an argument for the full democratic control of foreign policy. He suggested only that the people should decide the general ends of foreign policy, that parliaments ought to establish commissions on foreign affairs, and that a League-friendly public opinion had to be created. Though Bryce had always been a centrist liberal employing a fairly racist vocabulary, he further moderated his expectations regarding democratic foreign policies between 1918 and 1922 (Sylvest 2009: 174).

Hobhouse agreed that modern democracies remained oligarchies and, similarly to Bryce's pattern of argument, contrasted expectations of democratic progress with trends in Britain. Accordingly, parliamentary democracy had failed to bring about the expected rationalisation of the public sphere and government. The complexity of modern life, the poor condition of the press, and a lack of political interest hindered citizens from making well-informed choices at the ballot box. Being both ill-informed and uninterested in politics, such men overcame neither their narrow patriotism nor class boundaries. The press remained an instrument of the ruling oligarchy and furthered nationalist sentiments rather than public deliberation. Though recognising that the extension of both space and complexity distinguished ancient and modern democracies, Hobhouse (1921: 133) argued that people remained badly informed and 'do not get the full facts, at bottom because they prefer not to have them'.

Citizens overly appreciated the sovereignty of their state, without realising that strong conceptions of undividable sovereignty were a relic from an authoritarian conception of kinship and now obsolete. In effect, political democracy was insufficient in providing an avenue to internationalism when tied to the principle of ethnic and territorial organisation:

'If confined to the dominant races, or to the independent sovereign state, imperial democracy becomes itself an oligarchy. Sovereign democracy as one among many sovereigns may be as pugnacious or cynical as sovereign aristocracy' (Hobhouse 1921: 129). Democracy appeared to have brought about some liberty, not much equality, and – most importantly – even less human fellowship.

Towards a Pluralist Democratic Peace Proposal

Whereas Bryce argued for the cautious democratisation of foreign policy, Hobhouse developed a more demanding case against modern democracies' territorial bias and for the further democratisation of socio-economic affairs. Although Hobhouse continued to keep a distance from radical democratic demands, he still praised Cole's *Social Theory* (1920) as a coherent masterpiece. Resuming his earlier adaption of Mill's support of the co-operative principle, he suggested extensive reforms to strengthen vocational and civil associations at both the domestic and transnational levels (Hobhouse 1993a: 201). To complement and improve political democracy, vocational and civic (functional) concerns ought to be directed by those participating in its performance.

Functional representatives, Hobhouse assumed, would be more capable of supervising administration than members of parliament. Shifting the democratic principle from the territorial to the vocational field, Hobhouse sought to politicise citizens in areas where they were likely to behave rationally and not nationalistic. He assumed that people maintained a real interest in and adequate knowledge of their vocational concerns and would make better decisions within these communities (Meadowcroft 2001: 123). Though an increase of administration might accompany the introduction of functional organisation, it would be balanced by democratic activism at the workplace and participation in the election of delegates with supervisory responsibilities capable of contributing to effective public control.

For Hobhouse, vocational and civic lines were at odds with the territorial organisation of nation-states and democracy. Like other pluralists, he argued that the existence of classes and occupational groups since the Industrial Revolution were opposed to the liberal assumption of homogenous nations (Becker 1921: 675). Most importantly, social interests and activities were border-crossing and might revitalise democratic interests in international organisation. Borrowing from international and guild socialism, Hobhouse

(1993a: 202) found that vocational and civic interests deserve their own organisation: '[…] most of the interests of mankind transcend state boundaries, and to give to such interests international organisation is a sound element in the "Guild" idea. The miners of the world, the metal-workers, the textile operatives, the agriculturists, have their common interests. […] [T]he Socialist ideal has always comprised an "International" representing all the manual workers of the world'.

One can see here a reconfiguration of liberal ideas of proper representation since Hobhouse argued that representation ought to relate to functional roles instead of only a citizen's territorial location or the principle of nationality. He treated vocation as an indicator for a person's integration in specific affairs and apparently assumed that the institutionalisation of functional representation might be a community-building element, creating a currently lacking transnational, complex (organic) solidarity and some common perspective necessary for effective international organisation. These pluralist claims exposed the liberal principle of national self-determination in the territorial state as a historical impossibility and recognised that social life rested on the combined operation of many activities and that the extension of these activities was at odds with given territorial boundaries.

The revisions cumulate into what might be called a pluralist democratic peace proposal. Earlier perpetual or democratic peace proposals likewise included schemes for international organisations but concentrated on the question of whether there ought to be a federation of sovereign states, a federation with supranational powers, or a federation of peoples (Archibugi 1992). The key to Hobhouse's innovation is, however, the creation of an equilibrium of statist and social power at all levels. In a transnational league of states and civic and vocational associations, the social organisation should jointly introduce some functional representation and international governance. Hobhouse hoped that such a network of transnational association would create various cross-connections so that people who are opposed in one relation need to cooperate in another. Diverse transnational alliances ought to enhance domestic democracy by reducing nationalism and political passivity. Furthermore, they would be forces of peace, because only transnational alliances would guarantee that democratic publics would be really unwilling to go to war.

In contrast to radical ideas, Hobhouse held up reformed, liberal states as necessary components of international organisation and only aimed at mitigating the national antagonism that drove state activities by transnational

organisation. He continued the liberal suspicion that any association, vocational or not, would strive for power and abuse a power monopoly to pursue special interests instead of organising a service for the common good. From this he deduced that it was necessary to transform the state, and to diffuse its power from below and above – but to maintain the domestic rule of law. The pluralist proposal, however, spelled out what Spencer's evolutionary philosophy had always implied, namely that modern society's increasing differentiation and transnational connections necessitated other than territorially defined organisations (Navari 2013: 204–205).

From the created pluralist perspective, enlightened democratic ideals were at odds with narrowly defined national interests. For Hobhouse, men transferred their persistent egoistic motives to the state when they endorsed 'national interests'. A popular lust for power was then little better than a dynastic desire for luxury and prestige. Hobhouse also blamed the 'educated' classes for this modern malady, since increasing the moral and epistemic state of democracy would have been their responsibility, following classical liberal expectations. Drawing on Thucydides, who already noted that democracy interacted with international relations (Hobson 2015: 18), Hobhouse (1921: 131) argued that modern democracies remained oligarchies that acted only in the interest of a minority and ignored the masses of partly conflicting interests. Mill already supported greater association among different groups and classes, though he did not believe that obligations of justice applied to all of humanity (Varouxakis 2013: 12–13). Likewise, Hobhouse blamed the domestic oligarchy and national interests. But he did not, as some propose, argue straightforwardly for global welfare organisations (Weinstei 2007). Nor did he imply transnational vocational association as a means of improving working conditions or the standard of living on an international scale. Hobhouse sought to equilibrate nationalism in order to regain liberal trust in enlightened democratic deliberation and in the will to extend the circles of association beyond the state.

Indeed, Hobhouse (1966a: 300) aimed first of all at the pluralisation of the individual's loyalty to counter nationalism and to further extend human association along the social lines that industrial modernity produced. Rational individuals ought to weigh the competing claims of different groups, formulate criticism towards them, and dissolve inherited group memberships or change their meaning. Hobhouse, hence, conceived of transnational bonds that balance national sentiments as a necessary part of modern democracy to maintain it in a meaningful (liberal) way. In making these arguments,

Hobhouse developed themes that had pre-existed in his philosophy and chose a philosophical language. He presented the pluralist democratic peace proposal as the normative result of his philosophy and a response to a series of perceived liberal dilemmas. The philosophical style was creating an increasingly widening gap between Hobhouse and his contemporaries, but it secured for him a long-term influence upon subsequent pluralists such as Mitrany.

Conclusion

Hobhouse is a formidable example of a thinker whose whole language is pervaded by the democratic vocabulary. However, it is imperative to see that he argued at different levels of thought, that his interventions coincided with a gradual turn away from democratic prescriptions to the organisation of democratic descriptions in liberal circles, and that he used democratic theory with different intentions, for different political means, and in different manners (e.g. charging, criticising, apologising, praising). He ranged between an almost unconditional support of the British government during the First World War to criticism of Britain's post-war democracy.

At the philosophical level, Hobhouse embraced a modern commitment to democracy and appreciated diverse and overlapping group memberships in voluntary association as elements of modern democracy in industrialised societies. In timely contributions to democratic peace debates that evolved along with the intra-imperial South African Wars, however, Hobhouse adopted a different tone and pointed to Britain's democratic deficits and the fact that industrialisation had created unpreceded degrees of socio-economic inequality. In short, he explained public support for the illegitimate war by the power of jingoism and by a lack of a democratic minimum that would allow for democratic education and interest in foreign policy. Hence, Hobhouse further adapted democratic peace theory to the social realities of industrial societies and recognised connections between the domestic social question and insane imperialism.

This chapter has shown that Hobhouse continued to make contributions to theoretical and political debates about democracy's peace-promoting qualities and that he finally reconciled his pluralist philosophy with his democratic proposals after the end of the First World War. In contrast to British radicals, Hobhouse supported the British war cause and provided a stylised account of a German theory of the state that excluded Germany from the realm of Western civilisation. He distinguished between

Britain's liberal nationalism and German's anti-liberal and chauvinistic nationalism. However, towards the end of the war, Hobhouse changed his intellectual role and political position. After writing as an apologist of (British) democracy, he again used democratic theory to tackle the problem nationalism posed to liberal theorising. Like many other liberals or so-called idealists, he was then hardly enthusiastic about the prospects of the League of Nations, US President Wilson's definition of democracy as national self-determination, and Britain's post-war democracy. Politically, Hobhouse stood between centrist liberalism and radical democratic proposals. His critique of the League synthesised liberal and radical ideas, for example in lamenting how the League had not tackled economic problems or diffused statist sovereignty.

When the League was established, seminal liberals such as James Bryce turned to the organisation of descriptions of actually existing democracies. Hobhouse's post-war pluralism equally mediates between expectations attached to democracy and evaluations of British democracy. For Hobhouse, equality, liberty, and peace were equally important democratic promises, and he responded in depth to Bryce's postulate that modern democracies do not advance human fraternity and peace. He agreed with the diagnoses that imperfect modern democracies were not peace-promoting but still tried to make a reform proposal. Hobhouse leaned towards more radical ideas that enabled him to reconcile previously unconnected arguments regarding social pluralism, the state of democracy, and the need for international organisation. Hobhouse's pluralist proposal maintained that states were legitimate components of a complex and balanced international order if and only if they allowed for domestic pluralism.

Against earlier beliefs in democratic nationalism, Hobhouse then, like other liberals and pluralists, conceived of nationalism as a problem all the way down. He argued that the only way to improve domestic democracy was through the introduction of transnational functional representation and the strengthening of transnational association to balance nationalist sentiments and political passivity. Vocational and civic association and cooperation should enable the individual to entertain loyalties to various transnational groups while maintaining the ability to develop rational opinions. The following chapter will turn to G.D.H. Cole's democratic theory, which provided an important stimulus for Hobhouse's pluralist recognition of transnationalism as a democracy-securing element.

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CHAPTER 5

G.D.H. Cole's Wars: At the Homefront

Introduction

So far, we have reviewed L.T. Hobhouse's democratic peace theory and his discussion of the preconditions for democratic and peace-promoting publics. Hobhouse conceived of a democratic minimum of socio-economic equality and of democratic deliberation promoting transnationalism as the most important preconditions. We have seen that George Douglas Howard Cole (1889–1959) influenced Hobhouse's most innovative thoughts, but we have not yet discussed Cole in his own right.

This chapter will now zoom in on how Cole seized pluralism during the First World War. Cole's interventions became at that time representative of pluralist defences of democracy and remind us of the fact that wars for democracy, as any other wars, always mean a reduction of democratic rights at home. Britain was no exception to the rule that wartime democracies first restrict the right to free speech, the public discussion of security questions, the freedom of association, and the right to strike before they even introduce conscription (Johansen 1993: 216). Together with Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, and A.D. Lindsay, Cole attacked the state, or rather the British government, and its introduction of conscription. He was a socialist pluralist who, within his domestic context, vividly opposed the democratic wartime propaganda when he argued that a proper understanding of democracy implied the democratisation of all spheres of life and the establishment of an equilibrium between states and social forces.

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Cole drew on many sources of inspiration to argue that the myth of political democracy implied that there was no obligation to serve the state and no wartime duties. Next to Harold Laski's translations of Leon Duguit, Cole provided the first English translations of Rousseau's writings, and Rousseau's republicanism, together with French syndicalism, greatly influenced Cole. French syndicalism hoped to replace the state with a network of self-governing producer units, and Cole likewise challenged the liberal model of representative democracy. For Cole, the liberal assumption of nations and of proper national self-determination through political democracy did not work because political democracy existed apart from the division of labour and class discrepancies. Taking questions of how classical democratic ideals might be realised under modern conditions at face value, Cole made a strong case for vocational and civic ('functional') participation and representation. He argued that democratic rights ought to be granted in each industrial and social sphere to reverse the rise in unaccountable statist bureaucracy. Instead of Weberian notions of bureaucracy and career politicians, Cole envisaged trade union action and associations established for a common purpose and based on solidarity.

Starting with his opposition to conscription, Cole developed a novel understanding of an emerging world society as an organic part of his democratic theory. Here Cole did not draw qualitative differences between states and possibly transnational non-governmental organisations but instead recognised both as composites of a world society. The German political theorist Carl Schmitt recognised that Cole's argument attacked the superiority of states and beliefs in their insuperable difference. Cole recognised only the sovereignty of the individual, and this turns pluralist democratic theory and Schmitt's realism into political and intellectual opposites. From a realist and conservative perspective, the outbreak of a war means that all domestic matters need to be subordinated to the survival of the state and the necessities of the international situation. Even in democratic states, popular governance needs to be suspended in such states of exception.

Again a note on Cole's particular style and on the perception of it is advisable. Cole wrote for different British classes and audiences and other modern Western societies, and his arguments elicited varied reactions. British liberals and labour politicians including Clement Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1945–1951) and leader of the Labour Party (1935–1955), found Cole too demanding or incomprehensible. Some international historians make a like-minded judgement when they

characterise Cole as unworldly (Sylvest 2007). This evaluation is problematic because it underscores the lucidity of Cole's theory and because it could apply to any dissident perspective. However, within democratic theory, there is a burgeoning re-appreciation of Cole's sharp analysis of representative democracy's own democratic deficit (Masquelier and Dawson 2016; Morefield 2017). In what follows, I will try to do justice to the richness of Cole's democratic theory by discussing his case against conscription and his pluralist reinvention of modern democracy. After these evaluations, I will end the chapter by outlining discontinuities between his theoretical claims and his political strategies.

The Limits of Representative Democracy

The history of Britain's democracy is often told along with the history of the publication of Mill's *Representative Government* (1861) and a series of franchise reforms (1832, 1867, 1884, 1918). These steadily expanded the right to elect representatives for the House of Commons. It is, however, imperative to see that Mill's plea for representative government was conditional and conceived of citizens' frequent and direct involvement in the organisation of local affairs as a democratic necessity. Mill also found room for trade unions as voluntary associations that promote experiences of positive liberty (Baker 1915: 10). Since the legalisation of trade unions in the late nineteenth century, the rights of groups vis-à-vis the state and the integration of trade unions in the political and socio-economic system then became a democratic topic that was at least as important as franchise reforms. The topics could be discussed independently or in relation to one another. However, whereas Hobhouse's pattern of argument suggested reforms to liberal democracy when it did not live up to its promises, and Cole went beyond subsequent reconsiderations or interpretations of the rise of political passivity as a temporal phenomenon.

Cole developed consideration of the claims of trade unions into a full-blown critique of representative democracy when he unsettled the identifications of democracy with the state and liberal notions of political and territorial representation. Like Laski, Cole first defined the approach of pluralism in a socialist manner (Laborde 2000: 69). Contemporaries then began to characterise British pluralism by its opposition to all theories that conceived of the state as a single source of authority (Hsiao 2000: 2). However, the pluralist critique steadily shifted its focus from legal to democratic questions and towards a socialist critique of representative

democracy. Before Cole and Laski, John Neville Figgis argued for a legal and democratic recognition of the rights of groups – but had no socialist interests. It was Cole's tutor, the socialist Christian A.D. Lindsay, who was highly important to the development of Cole's thinking. Lindsay (1914) remained dedicated to Kant's idealism but still allowed for individuals to entertain various loyalties towards a variety of associations, including trade unions and the state. Cole continued this line by exploiting political theory to treat representative democracy as a construction fault that could not claim democratic legitimacy.

At the outset, we need to acknowledge and appreciate that Cole made original use of various sources of inspiration that were uncommon in British thought at the time. Cole (1914a) appreciated syndicalism's democratic theory and conceived of it as an application of Rousseau's democratic theory to groups such as trade unions. For Cole (1950: xvii), Rousseau made enduring contributions when he argued that only rational will, and not just passive consent, was the basis of human association – and that citizens have a right to direct participation in legislation. However, Cole was well aware of shifts within Rousseau's theory and of misguided interpretations of Rousseau. Rousseau later favoured small, republican states over associations, and Cole questioned the rationality of this change in view of modern conditions. French syndicalism, which opposed applying the aims of the French Revolution to modern nation-states, inspired Cole's (1928: 22) rereading of Rousseau. Cole spoke of syndicalism as a school, had detailed knowledge of it, but did not identify with a single thinker, though he probably relied on Georges Sorel (M. Cole 1971: 53). Syndicalism demanded that workers control the conditions of industry by turning trade unions into associations organising industrial conduct. Likewise, Cole and Mellor (1918: 13) argued, 'The purpose of Trade Unionism is to expropriate the Capitalist class. For that purpose an instrument must be fashioned capable not only of being used for attack, but of controlling and organising industry.' Trade unions were seen as places of direct and genuine democratic action and re-organisation, in contrast to insufficient parliamentary democracy. Yet, Cole did not fully subscribe to syndicalism's rejection of the state and of nationalism.

Demand for communal and civic activism characterises utopian socialism, according to Cole's reading of it. For Cole, men like William Morris or Robert Owen were moralists who rightly asked what makes a good society and how such a society might be realised. Cole (1953) preferred their approach, prescribing what *ought* to happen in order to further social

justice, over Marxist determinism. Even though they were optimists regarding human nature and progress, they critiqued existing capitalistic arrangements. Utopian socialists stressed social arrangements as causes of personal character and good or bad living and thought that the economic doctrine of competition set incorrect incentives for human behaviour and obstructed natural human cooperation and well-being. Owen and early socialists such as Charles Fourier, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Mikhail Bakunin all favoured small, decentralised communities (Bevir 2011: 253).

They believed that communal and civic activism might pave the way to international federalism. Especially Owen viewed patriotism as prejudice and injustice against all countries that ought to be eroded by education and transnational organisation (Claeys 1988). Proudhon, being more radical, argued that anarchy was the natural condition of social life and that federalism – understood as the formalisation of the relative autonomy of towns, regions, and trade unions, for example – would follow after the removal of statist domination (Prichard 2013: 4). Utopian socialists opposed the capitalistic dominance of the state and assumed, as opposed to Marxism, that the state was useless for socialist transformation. Cole continued their appreciation of small communities as vehicles for communal solidarity, moving men to think beyond economic gains. However, he hardly followed suit and rather tried to adapt classical democratic theory to modern conditions of the division of labour (Holthaus 2014).

The starting point for Cole's (1972: 184) theory as well as ideological interventions was the assumption that 'Political democracy is accepted because it has so largely failed: it is the very fact that it has not made efficient the will of the individual citizen that has caused the opposition to it to die down.' What maintained parliamentary democracy was not popular legislation but a vast bureaucracy. It created a new, modern form of tyranny, 'administrative tyranny', since bureaucrats tended to ignore the will of the citizens (Cole 1972: 169). As demagogues, bureaucrats took advantage of the fact that fields such as foreign policy remained removed from democratic control and worked against the common citizen's ability to understand a wide range of issues. The liberal government had inaugurated welfarist reforms since 1906, but members of the working class still had to work for far more than eight hours to cover life's necessities. For Cole, the division of labour had created a class of owners over the means of production who imposed the capitalist regime on a class of dispossessed workers, and representative democracy did not change the distribution of power among the classes (Masquelier 2012: 478). Cole found that British

Fabians and Marxists erred when they asserted that poverty was the fundamental malady of modern capitalistic society. Not poverty but slavery and the reproduction of 'slave virtues' such as passivity were, for Cole, the real problems in political democracy.

Rethinking Liberty

From Cole's perspective, the modern growth of statist bureaucracy in wartime and in peace time was a fundamental democratic problem, and state socialism only promised to make things worse (Laborde 2000: 29). British writers then already called the British a 'servile state' (Belloc 1912), and a further increase of bureaucracy was Cole's personal dystopia. Cole (1972: 143) wanted to reverse the trend that hampered the impulse to self-government. Similar to Hobhouse, he turned officials into pluralism's ideological adversaries. The bureaucrat – even a socialist one, Cole argued – looks at life from the point of view of efficiency, a principle hostile to the democratic spirit. Far more important than economic or means–ends considerations were the recovery of human labour conditions and experiences of autonomy. According to Cole (1918: 210), freedom was 'the greatest of good things' and socialism was 'essentially a theory of democracy and self-government in the fullest sense'.

Cole referred to the common distinction between negative and positive freedom according to which the former describes non-interference and the absence of social constraint. The latter describes the capacity to do something with others and to realise a purpose. For Cole, the inhuman labour conditions under capitalism meant that workers had no negative freedom because they could not make deliberate life choices and were treated like a commodity. Industrialisation and the division of labour resulted in alienation, since dispossessed workers needed to repeat mechanistic action for their economic survival (Schecter 1994: 105). However, Cole was in particular attracted by the idea of liberty as a positive human condition. In this perspective, humans are seen as members of society who are free when they prescribe laws that enable their own and their societies' freedom.

The tandem of capitalism and representative democracy, for Cole, created the most unfavourable conditions for the enjoyment of positive liberty. Cole did not consider intersystem reforms but critiqued the British political system and representative democracy as such. Like many fellow

travellers, Cole (1914–1915: 149) steadily returned to Rousseau, who had famously claimed that the English people were only free in the moment of their vote, after which they returned to a state of slavery since they were governed at the will of others (Urbinati and Warren 2008: 391). Rousseau differed between legitimate direct democracy and law-making, on the one hand, and representation and the judgement of political elites, on the other hand. The latter prevent individuals from constituting themselves as legislaters and – most importantly for Cole – from developing a social spirit. Cole conceived of Rousseau's version of social contract theory as a valuable correction to earlier theories that attached sovereignty to a government standing outside of the contract. Rousseau, in contrast, recognised only people as sovereign so that individuals need not be obligated to a government or the state but only to each other.

Rousseau's approach was attractive for Cole because it allowed non-ideal initial conditions. For Rousseau, men were born free but were everywhere in chains. The social contract, and along with it the evolution of the idea of owning property, created social competition and the division of people into different social classes. Paraphrasing Rousseau, Cole (1918: 25) asserted that human beings were born for freedom – 'a freedom that shall be full and complete'. But people were enslaved by a bureaucratic and capitalist state. Participatory institutions could hence be justified as a demand on their own and as a means to restore human self-knowledge and enlightened sociability, solving the crisis. Following the logic, in order to arrive at common decisions, citizens need to discuss and see problems from different angles and in relation to persons other than themselves. Participation forces individuals to think beyond their egoistic interests, to manage their desires, and to distinguish between but also to reconcile private and public roles. Rousseau expressed the coincidence of individual liberty, sociability, and rational self-government with the term *general will* – a term Cole found confusing and inspiring (Lamb 2005).

Like Lindsay but in contrast to most of his liberal contemporaries, Cole revised but did not abandon the concept of the general will and rather redefined it as the effect of the ability to act purposefully together with others. His reinterpretation of Rousseau even earned the praise of his contemporary theoretical adversary, Bosanquet (1914–15; 161). For Cole, general will denoted the sentiment that humans developed when they associated with others and when their interactions with their fellow humans established an interest that went beyond the individual good, since it was concerned with the general welfare of the whole. Cole assumed

that individuals involved in common decision- and law-making would develop this social sentiment and, in addition, would only obey laws that they prescribed to themselves. Hence, there are huge distinctions between a modern understanding of law-making as the sovereign right of all people and the demands of participatory institutions (Cole 1962: 119). The political system of representative democracy asked citizens to delegate their right to be part of political deliberations and common law-making to others and discouraged political activism. With Rousseau, Cole called into question the notion that modern democracies could rely on political representation at the expense of direct participation and still claim legitimacy (Prichard 2013: 73).

However, Cole faced the need to distinguish between Rousseau's enduring critique of political representation and the by-product of his theory: the modern state. Rousseau died on the eve of the French Revolution in 1778, and his philosophy is commonly seen as a legitimation of the republican state against monarchical rule and, in effect, for the French Revolution. In opposition to Rousseau's later thinking, Cole argued that the state was a bureaucratic machine dominated by the most powerful classes, opposed to civic activism and political institutions. He rejected the claim that the individual developed attitudes concerned with the common good only in relation to the state and instead applied much of Rousseau's philosophy to voluntary associations in modern society at the expense of the state. This required dissociating the notions of general will and state sovereignty because the two perpetuated the state as a superior organisation uniting and representing society as a social whole.

Following Cole, positive liberty could only be enjoyed through common conduct in voluntary associations such as trade unions. They provided scope for individuals to come together and formulate laws that they chose to obey. He emphasised the emancipatory potential of associations founded for a common purpose, to the detriment of inherited group memberships. As Lindsay (1914: 133) put it, people cannot help being dependent on society, but they can decide which of many societies to belong to. For Cole, voluntary associations founded for specific purposes prove Rousseau's insight that rational will, and not passive consent, is the basis of human association. In a large, modern society, only voluntary associations allow civic participation, identification with the common good, and positive liberty in the sense of the management of psychological and internal affairs. For Cole (1914b: 89):

> [F]reedom is not simply the absence of restraint; it assumes a higher form when it becomes self-government. A man is not free in himself while he allows of every idle whim: he is free when he governs his own life according to a dominant purpose or system of purposes.

However, democratic changes with respect to these democratic experiences would only be self-sustaining if they were accompanied by the abolishment of the capitalist system's furtherance of economic competition all the way down the line and its division between propertied classes and a class of wage earners. Cole forcefully attacked the notion that material reproduction followed only the idea of efficiency instead of the considerations of a worthy and dignified life. In modern production, workers cannot identify their contribution to the overall effort and develop feelings of dislocation. So far, representative democracy has allowed economic inequalities to reproduce political inequalities that undermine individuals' ability to meet each other as equals who establish laws that are in the interest of all, not of just one person or a small, lobbying minority.

Redefined in participatory terms, democracy has cognitive and emotional dimensions. To capture the latter, Cole also spoke of 'expressive liberty' (1918: 193). Expressive liberty is the opposite to the slave virtue of self-repression, as spread by industrialisation (Cole 1922). Whereas Kant tended to focus on a state of autonomy based on cognitive discipline, expressive liberty denotes the joy an individual finds in association or creative work. Cole here drew on William Morris,who, as a socialist and art enthusiast, argued that work ought to be a joyful activity. Cole did not share all of Morris's views or his nostalgia for the Middle Ages as a time of beauty and community. Such views were at odds with Cole's preference for rationally chosen over inherited group memberships. Instead, Cole (1972: 45) used the concept of liberty to bundle his normative demand of '[F]reedom for self-expression, freedom at work as well as at leisure, freedom to serve as well as to enjoy', and of an economic system allowing the pleasure of labour. In contrast to Morris, Cole applied the term of expressive liberty not only to creative labour but also to civic and vocational association. However, his conception of positive and expressive liberty does not rid itself of an idealist imprint inasmuch as it assumes that humans have a higher self that can be expressed – all this in spite of his criticism of philosophical idealism (Laborde 2000: 81).

To conclude, Cole ranged widely in political theory, but his refusal to acknowledge territorial representation as a democratic option always served the political legitimation of trade unions, though he was aware of the need to democratise trade unions that had developed bureaucratic tendencies (Cole 1920c). Most important was his reinterpretation of Rousseau's classical theory, which objected to representation and which read positive liberty as being about psychologically and epistemologically beneficial participation in common decision-making.

However, contra Rousseau, Cole argued that in modern times, direct participation needed to take place in voluntary associations and in the industrial sphere. For Cole, a person could not be reduced to being a slave in the economic sphere yet also be expected to behave as a free and autonomous person in the political sphere. In a modern economy, people were divorced from the means of production, which reduced them to machines in the workplace and subordinated their well-being to the rationale of productivity. The economic system made it impossible to experience work as a social service or to make democratic experiences a frequent basis (Cole 1930). To reverse this, Cole sought to return the realm of material reproduction to one that allowed for democratic experiences, social discussion, and the realisation of individuality and talent. These themes are all evident in Cole's early contributions, though Cole would devote most of his life to the claim that we need to go beyond representative democracy to further the materialisation of democratic theory's promises.

The British Conscription Debate

The outbreak of the First World War and its interpretation as a war for democracy raised the most fundamental political and democratic questions. Whereas monarchical or feudal wars were conducted by professional armies to reduce the conflicts' impact on the overall population, a war in the name of democracy pushed these boundaries (Meinecke 1960: 486). The recruitment of volunteers and eventually conscription mobilised the majority of the male population, including members of the working class who had not yet acquired equal voting rights, for war. To fill the gaps, women took over much of the industrial work. We have already seen that Zimmern, Bryce, and (temporarily) Hobhouse defended Britain's democratic war cause from 1914 onwards but learned less about the political and intellectual opposition movement. A cross-ideological key organisation was certainly the Union of Democratic Control (UDC). It fostered

the public critique of the democratic legitimation of the war, the demand for a more accountable foreign policy, and the organisation of opposition to conscription and wartime censorship (Hobson 2015: 143). Some UDC members, such as the Cambridge-based philosopher and radical Bertrand Russell, were imprisoned for their activism.

Cole as well as Woolf (1916), who were both amongst the most influential British intellectuals, justified similar positions without joining the UDC. Cole became a leading figure amongst intellectual critics and laid down the tenets of democratic thought in his essays 'Conflicting Social Obligations' (1914–5) and 'The State in View of Its External Relations' (1915–6). The apparently abstract arguments reflected concrete political positions, including the denial of a democratic war cause and opposition to the political and democratic legitimacy of conscription (Sylvest 2007: 77).

The common starting point for all pluralist interventions that took a critical stance on Britain's democratic war cause was the repudiation of absolute state sovereignty – a concept used to demand absolute loyalty to the state. Compared to Laski, the most important British pluralist next to Cole with whom Cole entertained a rival rather than friendly relation, Cole was less interested in the historical and legal evolution of the idea of state sovereignty. Like Laski, Cole traced the origin of the state back to battles between the church and the nascent state during the Middle Ages (Bartelson 2001: 83). More important for Cole was the French Revolution, which he viewed as a great historical accident. Only during the revolution and subsequent misreading of Rousseau did the state gain supremacy over social groups and come to be seen as a unifying whole. Cole (1928: 422) reiterated that these conceptions become ever more misleading with the emergence of organised labour, which promoted social differentiation and the need to revise theories of state sovereignty. For Cole, republican and liberal philosophers, and Bosanquet in particular, erred when they used Rousseau as a reference to conceive of the state as a sovereign body with a will of its own.

Cole repudiated the idea of absolute state sovereignty by continuing his reinterpretation of Rousseau's philosophy. Cole (1914–1915: 140) opened 'Conflicting Social Obligations' with a quote from Rousseau's *Discourse on Political Economy* (1755), which predated *The Social Contract* (1762):

> The body politic is a moral being possessed of a will; and this general will, which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the source of the laws, constitutes for all the members of the

> State, in their relation to one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust.…Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct; but those societies which everyone perceives, because they have an external and authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State; all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others, either temporary or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent, and the proper observance of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners […].

This quote is vital for Cole's argument because it shows that Rousseau valued the existence of substate associations before he began to fear that particular associations might threaten the common good. The interests of these associations appear important and 'general' to their members while being particular with regard to society as a whole (Pateman 1976: 24). Because of concerns about rising sectional interests and possible social disintegration, Rousseau later dismissed associations other than the state as threats to the common good.

Contra Rousseau, Cole argued that modern states had already become far too big to be identified with a comprehensive conception of the common good. Likewise, Lindsay (1914: 135) argued that the modern state 'is so large and the population so heterogeneous that its sense of common interests is apt to be "watery"'. Hence, Cole proposed to conceive of voluntary associations not as threats to but hubs for democratic education and the development of social sentiments transcending egoism, or what Rousseau and Cole called the general will. Recall here that Cole had already argued before the war that associations such as trade unions allowed individuals to meet as informed and equally affected persons. Cole (1914–1915: 143) assumed that these associations posed no threat to the common good because they evolved on the basis of functional differentiation instead of political interest: 'the division of one corporate will from another by function is a division he never seems to face…'. Cole worried about sectional interests, but assumed that the limitations inherent in functional association – functional associations are responsible only for specific questions – provided a sufficient check to this threat. As against insistence on necessarily small states and democratic communities, Cole proposed a pluralist diffusion of power.

In Cole's and in other pluralist arguments, the repudiation of the state sovereignty prepared a re-evaluation of society, though the various writers still derived different democratic implications from these reconsiderations.

Whereas traditional or monist theories claimed that society depended on the state and that the state represented society as a whole, Cole (1914–1915: 144) defined society as the superior whole, being a 'complex of organised bodies within the national area, including both the State, national and local, and every organised association'. Society thus subsumed the state. He viewed the state as a governmental machine and reduced the state to a single association representing geographical needs among vocational and civic associations. However, these descriptions fail to address the question of whether the state is or shall be a compulsory association that holds a monopoly on force to ensure law and order. Cole (1914–1915: 157) was probably aware of his own vagueness when he wrote that 'the state itself should be regarded only as an association—elder brother, if you will, but certainly in no sense father of the rest [of the other associations]'. Although his identification of the social as the most important democratic realm went beyond what many liberal critics of conscription would allow, Cole did not ultimately define the future role of the state.

What is still unique about Cole's argument is that Cole extended his reconceptualisation of the concepts of the state and society to the international realm. Cole blamed traditional theories for neglecting the point that states were members of international and domestic societies. Accordingly, there were not only relations between states; states were also non-governmental organisations relative to foreigners and to the citizens living in the respective territories. Cole was perhaps the first author who used the term non-governmental to describe the labour movement, which had strong membership numbers, as did religious associations (Davies 2013: 4). Compared to Hobhouse's liberal reconceptualisation, Cole was more willing to upgrade these associations in their relation to states. Cole (1915–1916: 317) claimed that

> The problem of [the state's] external action is not simply that of adjusting its relations with other States, but also its relations with all kinds of bodies and individuals which are not under its control. It cannot simplify its problems into a mere relation between like and like; for it is continually confronted by problems arising out of the relations between disparates. World politics, then, must not be conceived simply in terms of the relation between State and State.

This quote shows that Cole repudiated the supremacy of territorial organisation and that he approached world politics in view of individuals.

From the established perspective, Cole finally conceived of the worker as a citizen in a pluralist and transnational society in which non-governmental associations had a legitimate claim to the loyalties of their members, just as the state does with its citizens. The socialist citizen entertained, then, morally meaningful loyalties to the nation and to the international labour movement, such that war became a case of conflicting cosmopolitan obligations. For Cole (1915–1916: 325)

> the obligation which the State can impose on the citizen is limited both by the duties which the citizen owes to other associations and to himself, and by the democratic or undemocratic character of the State, not only in general, but also in relation to the particular obligation which it seeks to impose.

In contrast to syndicalism and Marxism, Cole did not resolve this conflict at once but approached it through questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability. As other Marxists and socialists, Cole focused his discussion on German Social Democrats, who could conceive of themselves as citizens of the German state or members of an international working class. Although this illustrates Cole's account of the international debate, his avoidance of outlining clear political implications for British citizens can also be seen as an act of philosophical and political self-distancing.

According to Cole's tripartite argument, socialist citizens had no democratic obligation to serve an unaccountable state at war and rather faced a need to consider conscious opposition to the war effort. In a first step, Cole questioned whether representative democracy as such was sufficient to ensure the accountability of the modern state. The representative system produced administrative and political institutions out of touch with society's complex nature and evident class relations. Simple voting procedures in great states mixed the interest of diverse groups and produced a mass of inspirations without cogency. Under these conditions, there were few options to make democratic experiences or to exert democratic control. The removal of foreign policy from democratic control was for Cole (1915–1916: 322) a further point against legitimate conscription: 'The absence of democracy in foreign politics implies also an absence of responsibility on the part of the citizen.' Cole sided here with Russell's radical argument, which assumed that only governing classes' manipulation of the ordinary citizen's desire for security was responsible for international conduct along the theory of balance-of-power politics (Russell 1915–6). If the desire for security were not perverted by democratic unaccountability, it would produce international cooperation.

Lastly, Cole contested the notion of states as representatives of nations in international politics and, thus, the idea that citizens fight for their nation's interest or the survival of domestic democracy during war. Liberals such as Bryce (1921: 607) concealed the realities of wartime compulsion when he exalted soldiers' willingness to sacrifice their lives in the name of democracy as a sign of a universal democratic progress during and even after the war. Cole, on the one hand, challenged precisely this liberal propaganda but, on the other hand, carefully avoided opposing nationalism as such or denying national sentiments. Steering a middle course, Cole (1915–1916: 324) argued that 'Nations cannot themselves be fully represented; they can be, at the most, only partially represented, and this partiality of necessity includes elements of misrepresentation. Not States, but Societies, complexes of national institutions, are therefore the nearest approaches to the representation of Nations'. He thus refuted the liberal narrative, which posits that political democracy turns states into the legitimate representatives of nations. Following Cole, national self-determination becomes impossible with social differentiation and the emergence of modern class distinctions.

The patterns of argument that culminated in the contestation of the democratic legitimacy of conscription crossed the solidified lines at the British home front. Similar to British radicals and UDC members like Russell, Cole repudiated the idea of state sovereignty and pointed to democratic deficits in Britain. The intervention clearly aimed at contesting liberal celebrations of the war as a war for democracy and conciliations of wartime compulsion. Some of his arguments are compatible with the new liberal view that oligarchic dominance undermines parliamentary democracy. Cole's emphasis of pluralism and transnational social relations, on the other hand, already contained a veiled criticism of the liberal and radical advocacy of world government that often followed the opposition to conscription. What Cole apparently intended was a presentation conceived on the basis of Kant's idea of individuals as ends in themselves and as sovereign actors capable of managing and holding diverse and antagonistic positions. In his lucid theoretical intervention, Cole took pluralist assumptions to their logical conclusion (Morefield 2017).

What is often downplayed by political theorists supporting Cole's pluralism is, however, the concomitant existence of philosophically minded and ideological strands in Cole's international thought. The two strands involve different stances on nationalism – the former rejects it, while the latter recognises nationalism as a modern and wartime reality. Cole was a

member of Labour's Advisory Committee on International Questions from 1918 until 1922 and, although he often departed from the party's official lines, struggled with the question of how to confront nationalism. In ideological terms, Cole aimed at the immediate success of the British labour movement and assumed that only capitalism sustained nationalism. For the purpose of socialist mobilisation, Cole had proposed a literally internationalist socialist strategy prior to the war. Its key idea is that the socialist cause had to be won in each state independently since it was highly unlikely at this point that workers would give up patriotism and 'become a citizen of the world of labour' (Cole 1928: 45). Cole then recognised nationalism as an underlying sentiment of belonging and that labour unrest occurred independently in different states. He (ibid. 42–5) expected this pattern to repeat itself because class sentiments were too weak to allow for the effective organisation of the oppressed in different countries.

International kinship did not make a practical difference yet. Hence, Cole promoted separate national socialist struggles and only occasional international cooperation (Wright 1979: 240). His willingness to subordinate the goals of internationalism prompted Mitrany's critique over a longer period (Mitrany 1975: 81).

During the war and in view of rising support for nationalist causes, Cole (1915: 2) saw pessimistic expectations affirmed and continued to question the 'somewhat artificial philosophy of international relations which the Labour movement constructed for itself in times of peace'. That unionists supported their country after the outbreak of the war demonstrated the strength of nationalism and how most workers did not recognise a conflict of loyalties. A national idea building on a community of neighbourhood, blood, tradition, or language proved to be more powerful than abstract cosmopolitanism. The international institutions of the labour movement, such as the International Socialist Bureau, remained inactive. Hence, Cole (ibid. 21) accepted nationalism and the need for socialist internationalism: 'The world will become a Socialist world when, and only when, the nations of the world become Socialist nations. The pure class-consciousness cosmopolitan of some Socialist theory is as unnatural and as unreal as the pure 'economic man' of the older economists.…The way to class emancipation lies through national action'.

Hence, Cole supported a different strategy than radical socialists following Lenin, who suggested turning the war into a war against capitalism. On the one hand, Cole supported the domestic undermining of the

war effort, opposed demands of national unity in wartime, along the same lines of his theoretical writings, and mobilised opposition to the war at the (British) home front. On the other hand, he denied that the conflict between capitalism and labour already interfered with the realities of nationalist wartime mobilisation and thought the chances of an international socialist opposition were low.

Cole (1918) resumed his discussion of internationalism in view of the Russian Revolution and a possible League of Nations. He then continued addressing the British labour movement and warned that rash internationalism might unintentionally lead to the repetition of the old logic of international relations and create balance-of-power politics of different (ideological) alliances. Cole did not follow British Labour's support for Wilson's League of Nations and was familiar with Lenin's (1917) argument that no truly democratic peace could evolve under capitalist conditions. For Lenin, there was an inseparable connection existing between capital and the imperialist war that made it impossible to end the war without revolutionary change. Any other peace would be imposed and not truly democratic. Like Lenin, Cole (1918: 54) argued that only socialism could create a true and durable league of nations, but unlike Lenin, Cole believed that British conditions did not demand a clear commitment to revolutionary instead of reformist change (Hobson 2015: 150). He conceived of domestic homogeneity among the participating nations and socialist reforms as preconditions for successful and democratically legitimate international cooperation.

The Pluralist Reinvention of Democracy

Representative democracy diffused in Europe around 1918 when Britain adopted further franchise reforms and when newly created states adopted republican constitutions and representative institutions. As indicated in the previous chapter, the intellectual response to this trend was cautious or critical rather than laudatory. German intellectuals were very worried about representative democracy's capacity to form a good government and to elicit public support, Lenin's socialism involved stark attacks on parliamentarianism and was widely heard, and British liberals turned to more descriptive and often disillusioned accounts of democracy. Cole was at that time a highly productive writer and continued pluralist arguments that he had begun in his philosophical opposition to conscription in *Guild*

Socialism Restated (1920a) and, most importantly, *Social Theory* (1920b). While the former is a practical recipe of how to attain socialist change, the latter qualifies as a realist utopia that sums up most of Cole's pluralist commitments (Brincat 2009: 581). Cole wrote against the background of the societies of the early twentieth century, outlining what he conceived to be ideal democratic and international institutions.

Cole's intervention is part of a larger debate on proper modern representation (Rehling 2015: 133). Should representation be organised on the principle of territory or belong to a group or vocation? Many European intellectuals believed that it was imperative to involve civic and vocational groups in the political decision-making process and considered functional or tripartite arrangements linking employer and employee organisations with the decision-making structures of the state as sound responses to the social question and modern societies' functional differentiation. Durkheim pointed to ill-informed voters and incompetent deputies and assumed that shifting the democratic principle from a territorial to a functional basis would help to solve this problem (Durkheim 2003: 5; Dawson 2013: 75–78).

In Britain, corporatism was a rarely used term, but various authors suggested different functional arrangements and thereby reconfigured modern interest and attitude representation. Leading socialists and members of the Fabian Society such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb flirted with the idea of producer and consumer representation as a complement to territorial representation. In order to judge the democratic qualities, it is necessary to ask whether the proposals suggested a top-down or bottom-up organisation of functional association and interest representation and whether they thought of functional associations or vocational parliaments as complements or substitutes of parliament. Following Mark Stears (1998: 298), I believe that Cole used functionalism in an individualist manner that is compatible with our contemporary understanding of pluralism, though illiberal and liberal usages of that term existed. Later, Cole carefully delineated his bottom-up conception from Italian fascism's top-down organisation of vocational groups. In what follows, I will revisit Cole's pluralist reinvention of democracy and its international implications.

Cole (1920b: 103) derived the need to reinvent democracy from a denial of representative democracy's legitimacy and proper performance: 'The idea of democracy has become almost inextricably tangled up with

the idea of representative government, or rather with a particular theory of representative government based on a totally false theory of representation.' The theory assumed that an authorised person could represent another person's bundled interests. However, for Cole, human beings as conscious selves could not simply be represented by another, nor could a delegate elected on a territorial basis do justice to their complex interests. While Cole found that representative government could be sound, he identified an urgent need to restate the underlying theory of representation. In complex modern states, territorial representation and large parties with internal oligarchical structures reduced citizens to occasional voters while parliament 'professes to represent all the citizens in all things and therefore, as a rule, represents nothing in anything' (ibid. 109). For Cole, this was not due to faults of the individual Members of Parliament but to representative democracy's construction faults.

The democratic system that Cole proposed differs considerably from representative democracy, and it is best to revisit the proposal step by step. Cole shifted attention away from elections and parliament and instead focused on voluntary associations that could fulfil specific purposes in the network of society. The only legitimate representation for Cole was functional or issue-specific. It represented not a specific person but a purpose. Cole, like Laski (1919), argued that the need for functional representation grew when modern society became larger and more complex. Cole and Laski were amongst the leading intellectuals who used the functional principle as a resolution of modern democracy's exhaustion, although Cole, contra Laski, did not admit the corporate status of these institutions but viewed them only as a means by which individuals expressed their will and organised for a common purpose (Bartelson 2001: 105; Cole 1931). The key to his proposal was a reformed system of interest representation on the basis of diverse voluntary and democratically organised associations. They hold a right but a temporal and defeasible right to represent social, economic, and vocational interests.

Interest and attitude representation would then occur in social realms such as the vocational or the spiritual that existed because of human needs or common purposes in a modern society. Cole assumed that functional differentiation was a process integral to and not antagonistic to society and that the evolving functional spheres were non-competitive (Buzan and Albert 2010: 318). Cole allowed that individuals found and realise their sociability in value-oriented associations. For Cole, the increasing

importance of such associations implied an evolutionary trend towards the replacement of custom by will. According to his proposal, a fully democratic society would consist of a network of democratic associations with the authority to administer specific fields identified along vocational, civic, or spiritual lines. Cole thus applied the democratic principle to all spheres of life in order to improve local governance and to bring about active citizenship.

Through vocational associations, those working in one arena would have the power to organise their discipline. This ought to allow citizens to perform their social functions in a modern society and economy. Teachers would have, for instance, the authority to decide upon curricula, and the length of lessons. Moreover, individuals could establish civic associations, for example for their spiritual needs. When they were active in such associations, individuals would gain correlative participatory and voting rights and rights to retake the authorisation of representatives when they sensed the misrepresentation of their interests. Voting rights were thus linked to active membership in different associations. Functional organisation implied 'the constant participation of the ordinary man in the conduct of those parts of Society with which he is directly concerned, and which he has therefore the best chance of understanding […]. Functional organization gives every one [*sic*] the chance of being, in the measure of his competence and interest, an active citizen' (Cole 1962: 115–6).

Functional representatives were expected to be more competent since they would be rooted in the functional associations that have authority and expertise in only one area. Cases of incompetence or self-interest would become easily publicised because of the contact between the base and their functional representatives. Incompetent or unaccountable leaders could be recalled at any time. On the other hand, Cole's critics argued that his idea of functional representation assumed favourable conditions such as small factories or associations in which everybody knows each other. For them, it was unlikely that functional representatives would restrict themselves to the representation of particular concerns. They also doubted that functional voters would be sufficiently intelligent to identify and respond to cases of misrepresentation (Lippmann 1961: 304). However, in spite of these counter-arguments, even the critics recognised and sympathised with Cole's ambition to rationalise the system of territorial representation.

The radical quality of Cole's reinvention of democracy becomes further evident if one envisions the long-term consequences of a system of functional representation. Eventually, the undemocratic public bureaucracy would be replaced largely by a decentralised public administration that would, owing to the reconciliation of administration and democracy, be an expression of civic activism and public control. There would remain no hierarchically ordered bureaucracy or autocratic civil service since, for Cole (undated), remaining civil servants were also entitled to freedom and self-government at the workplace. He refuted the degradation of humans as labouring beings under the conditions of modern capitalism and bureaucratic rule and intended to reverse that trend. Instead of obeying bureaucratic rule, citizens ought to discuss common problems in specific spheres.

While Cole did not intend to overthrow the state, including its rule of law and monopoly of force, right away, he hoped that in the long run even a minimal state ensuring fair conduct in the civil domain would become superfluous (Bevir 2012: 7). The persistence of the common view of the necessity of the state was for Cole merely an impediment to social imagination and reform; he invited his readers to try to see what forms of organisation and association are necessary in a free society. The state would remain one of many associations with only specific functions in realms affecting all citizens more or less equally. Cole (1920b: 67–68) reduced the functions of the state to 'the social regulation of those personal relationships that arise directly out of the fact that men live together in communities'. The state would, for example, administer marriage certificates.

As compared to the traditional dominance of the state, Cole believed that society could be or become self-regulating (Holthaus 2014). He envisaged associations being organised from the bottom up and their representatives only meeting in guild congresses when coordination is necessary. The absence of a permanent legislative body would necessitate direct and frequent contact between the citizens and the functional associations. Cole identified distinctions between executive and legislative bodies as a cause of inefficiency in modern society. Hence, law-making and law-administering would align in functional associations (Cole 1962: 124–5). This would challenge law as an independent, self-referential system – as it evolved in parallel to modern capitalism, but in opposition to radical-democratic and republican conceptions (Buckel 2011). Associations would gain authority, legislative power, and coercive options in their specific spheres.

In sum, Cole's reinvention of democracy was a conscious objection to illiberal proposals that the state should organise society in a top-down manner into different functional units. For Cole, the bottom-up organisation of voluntary organisations and functional decentralisation promised both the democratisation and rationalisation of complex and large-scale modern societies. Yet Cole made no secret of his wish to continue a liberal and Fabian programme with active participation and democratic competence alike. Functional organisation demands the democratisation of all spheres of life but links participatory rights to vocational or social involvement and competence (Wright 1979: 59–60). He employed a different rhetoric than liberals who quite obviously worried about an extended electorate since he attacked the principle of political representation as such. But Cole remained concerned with the question of whether and how democracy allowed rational responses to the social question and modern conditions.

Having introduced the broad outlines of the envisaged democratic reconfiguration, let us first turn to a review of Cole's ideas and its international implications. Cole's ideas were widely discussed by British trade union leaders, Fabians, and liberals, and, as indicated, his proposal certainly belonged to the most radical ones. Hobhouse's reception of *Social Theory* was favourable even if Hobhouse and Cole disagreed over the proper role of the state. Liberty was, as Hobhouse (1920) righty noted, the background of the book. Cole remained dedicated to the positive liberty that individuals enjoyed when they acted together for a common purpose and focused on the motives that caused men to associate and that held them together in associations. For both Cole and Hobhouse, cooperation among individuals and groups was the substance of society. However, Hobhouse objected to Cole's plan to diffuse the state's legal authority. For Hobhouse, Cole underestimated sectoral interests and failed to recognise that persons performing functional tasks might abuse their power and that a functional congress could not provide for social regulations in the same capacity as the state. In Hobhouse's as well as in some contemporary readings, Cole tended to be too idealistic and overstated the options for genuine democratic reform. However, while Cole's estimation of the prospects for democratic and socialist change varied considerably over time, his pluralist democratic principles still provided a means by which to critically judge the legitimacy of Britain's democracy and the League of Nations.

Although Cole did not outline his international views at length, his pluralist reinvention conveys anti-nationalist implications. Cole did not

lament that modernity brought about decomposition, fragmentation, and a possible loss of community, nor did he conceive of community and society as opposites (Tönnies 2012: 25–26; Cole 1920b). Such distinctions between a somewhat necessarily national community and actual society viewed community as the realm of primordial ties, intimate relationships, and unquestioned values. Accordingly, the individual realises his sociability here and enters the realm of society only when he cannot satisfy his needs alone. Mutual sympathy may be possible in society, but relationships based on means-ends rationality can never reach the quality of natural ones. Although Cole had recognised the strength of national sentiments under wartime conditions, he conceived of this situation rather as a state of alienation that ought to be overcome. Cole's valuation of social and democratic cooperation implies the questioning of inherited identities and the rising importance of transnational conduct.

American commentators of Cole praised his democratic originality but asked how one could conceptualise an empire, a league of nations, or international relations in general after the rejection of the state and the democratisation of all social spheres (Elliot 1925: 494). In the early 1920s, Cole tackled this question when he put forth a pluralist conception for the organisation of a peaceful world society. Like anarchist Peter Kropotkin, Cole (1920a) assumed that mutual aid and solidarity were intrinsic to humanity and would shape social organisation in the absence of domination. In this view, there is the option of a society without government or authority. Such a society would not be disorderly but be regulated by voluntary agreement between various territorial and professional groups that were freely established for the sake of production, consumption, and other civic or cultural interests and needs.

Cole perceived some progress in this direction when he observed that associations gave civic activism a transnational dimension and hoped that this might gradually erode the state institution. Following his conception, local or transnational civic associations could organise social affairs, while the state would be turned into one of many functional associations existing for specific tasks. A society organised along the functional principle in local affairs would thus be represented best by international functional associations. These pluralist conceptions continue Cole's ideas on wartime interventions and align him with Russell's (1918: 155–165) radical demand to overcome the domestic and international causes of conflict, but they remain fairly abstract.

Cole's political judgements of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) emanated from his democratic theory. He stood alone in defending a dissident position that contested the foundations of those organisations, and in that regard departed considerably from British socialists' choice of a more moderate and reformist perspective. Cole (1920b: 143) argued that the League of Nations had to be redesigned and that it ought to

> reproduce in itself the functional structure of the smaller Societies composing it. International functional association would undertake, in the wider sphere, the work undertaken in the narrower sphere by national functional organisation, and the central co-ordinating body would reproduce internationally the federal structure of the national co-ordinating bodies.

Like Laski (1978: 69), Cole recognised that a prospering transnational organisation depended on a minimum of homogeneity among its members. However, unlike Laski, Cole argued that only an undistorted bottom-up democratisation of the domestic, transnational, and international sphere would transform transnational organisations into truly progressive forces working towards a world society.

Deslie Burns (1921: 266), a British new liberal with pluralist sympathies who had joined the critics of conscription, praised the League and in particular the ILO's system of 'functional organisation'. The British government had pushed the creation of the ILO (1919) as a means to moderate possible labour unrest in Europe and, in response to trade union pressure, agreed on a new structure of interest representation that included representatives of states as well as of employee and employer organisation (Hidalgo-Weber 2013). For Burns, the tripartite structure formed a clear and progressive departure from the old state system. Cole, in contrast, did not agree with the idea of acknowledging the ILO as the materialisation of his democratic demands. For Cole (1925: 273), the ILO remained 'primarily a governmental body' because

> (e)ach government sends two representatives of its own to the Conference which controls it, and to these are added one employers' and one workers' representative chosen by the Government on the nomination of representative national bodies. Thus half of the votes belong to Government nominees, and in effect nothing can be done by the I.L.O. without the consent of most governments concerned. The workers and the employers balance each other; the Governments have the deciding choice.

The ILO's representative structure, as Cole rightly noted, continued to favour governmental interests and allowed them to exclude radical trade unions. Cole (ibid.) was, hence, highly sceptical of governments' use of 'brave words' and the promise of a universal peace based on the principle of social justice, as stated in the ILO charter. Britain and the other great powers that praised themselves with the creation of the ILO refused to ratify the conventions worked out by a devoted ILO staff, and in effect, 'public opinion, having lost most of its faith in the ILO, cares less and less what comes to it'.

Cole's stance on the League of Nations and the ILO differed significantly from Laski's evaluation of social policies and welfarist international organisations. Laski was critical of an unaccountable, capitalistic state and the British government, but when writing as an internationalist, he reintroduced the state as a 'public service corporation' of special importance and critical to fair conduct in the international domain (Lamb 2004: 25). Laski distinguished between social, political, and economic functions at the international level and valued the League's performance in most of these fields (Long 1993: 366). Laski (1978: 616) connected pluralism's and common internationalism's anti-nationalist views without considering their ideological incompatibility and sometimes echoed international civil servants', such as Arthur Salter's, praise of the League (Holthaus and Steffek 2016).

Political theorists have recently begun to re-discover the originality and contemporary relevance of Cole's pluralism. An important part of the effort is the repudiation of Carl Schmitt's (1932) common critique and misrepresentation of Cole and Laski. Whereas Hans Morgenthau's discussion of the concept of the political in 1933 made no reference to Cole or Laski, Schmitt, the crony jurist of the Nazis, attacked Cole and Laski forcefully in his polemical tracts *The Concept of the Political* (1927) and *Ethic of State and Pluralist State* (1930) (Behr and Rösch 2012: 7). In the German discourse, left-liberals and socialists did not juxtapose society and the state to call for democratic reform, but rather a *Volksstaat* (state for the people) and *Obrikeitsstaat* (state for the magistracy; translation by author) (Müller 2014: 43).

In contrast to left-liberals and socialists who demanded more socio-economic homogeneity, Schmitt identified racist homogeneity as a precondition of democracy and, through his discussion of Cole, depreciated pluralist demands of social heterogeneity as dangerous and foreign demands. The polemic gained no praise in its immediate context. Schmitt had been asked to write on democracy and international relations, and for Arnold Wolfers (1928), a German intellectual who greatly impacted the

development of classical realism in the United States, he simply missed the point. The Schmittian conception of politics, following Wolfers, was unable to account for the complexity of modern political relations or to shed new light on the League.

Only in retrospect did Schmitt's polemic become a landmark in political theory, and in particular critical scholars have lately begun to re-appreciate Schmitt's critic of liberalism's inherent universalism (Mouffe 2005; Chandler 2008). These valuations completely miss the fact that Schmitt's critique of liberalism really attacked two different socialists and that at least one of them was an outspoken critic of liberal internationalist institutions. There are still good reasons to return to the Schmitt–Cole controversy since nationalist and pluralist conceptions, and the conflict between them, are here taken to an extreme. Cole was not aware of Schmitt himself but attacked Schmittian positions in his conscious definition of an anti-totalitarian pluralism. However, it is imperative to further disentangle Schmitt's multiple misrepresentations.

Following Schmitt, Cole and Laski only replaced the unity of the state with the universality of society or humanity and failed to provide a truly pluralistic philosophy. For Schmitt, both underrated the empirical and ethical value of the state. The state eases the otherwise enigmatic questions of loyalty. The state, according to Schmitt, is the only political association that can make friend–enemy distinctions for its citizens. The criterion for this distinction is not a question of content – religious, economic, and other categories can all contribute – but, rather, the degree of intensity. Questions of war and the willingness of citizens to sacrifice their lives for the survival of the state made up the essence of the political. Schmitt thus defined homogeneity only in racial terms and makes the fear of an external enemy the organising principle of the political (Huysmans 2008). From the established perspective, the proclamation of the state of emergency by the suspension of the rule of law is a political and 'democratic' act because a *Führer* here represents the common will for survival and self-determination.

For Schmitt, democracy thus presupposes ethnic and cultural homogeneity and creates a need to weed out heterogeneity. Schmitt predicted that ethnical lines would remain strong when he claimed that political differentiation into different states, representing different (ethnic) groups, would always outweigh the ontological importance of functional spheres. He claimed that liberals failed to recognise the essence of the political because their universalism knew only economic competitors but no political enemies.

Most importantly, Schmitt attributes such an imperialist liberal position as well as political support of the League to Cole. Schmitt's misrepresentation of Cole allowed a case to be made against German social democrats and socialists with a critique of the League as an imperialist project. Both positions were affiliated with right-wing parties in the Weimar Republic.

In only one respect, Schmitt's interpretation of Cole's political position, is Schmitt's stance sound. Schmitt rightly noted that Cole, as a pacifist and dissident activist and scholar, opposed mass conscription during the First World War. In this context, Cole and Schmitt each defended antagonistic positions since they attributed sovereignty to the individual or to a state. Recall that Cole treated the interests and preferences of individuals and groups, as members of a functionally differentiated and pluralistic social sphere, as existing prior to and independently of nationally defined politics. Cole rejected a political theory that operated within the constraints of the capitalist and national state and aimed at recovering political discussions of social questions that had previously been depoliticised by bureaucratic routine and at revitalising social identifications beyond nationality (Morefield 2009). Following Cole, citizens ought to develop diverse loyalties and were under no obligation to serve an undemocratic state. For Schmitt, such a position was meaningless and apolitical: 'Only if pacifists made war on non-pacifists would they prove their political strength' (Schmitt 1932: 24; translation by author).

Cole's pluralism, however, was not political. Cole (1935: 73) consciously used social instead of political theory to deny the legitimacy of the undemocratic and capitalist state. He recognised that individuals were part of different substate and transnational groups and defended their authority in resolving conflicting obligations (Newman 2011: 269). Cole's social theory is not incapable of including the political but consciously puts forth a politics of anti-nationalism to extend the realm of democracy. What Schmitt could not know in the late 1920s was, however, that Cole would give up his pacifism when he was confronted with the ultra-nationalist claims of German fascism.

Conclusion

Cole's thought shows that the outbreak of war raises the most urgent questions in a democracy. He called into question that the First World War was a war for democracy and developed his opposition to conscription into a general contestation of representative democracy's legitimacy.

Democracy implied far more than representative democracy, and he attacked the misrepresentation of the citizens' interest in the British Parliament. Cole posed fundamental democratic questions anew and approached them from the point of view of the individual while putting special emphasis on the enjoyment of liberty. The democratic question that Cole recurrently addressed, and to which he gave different answers, concerned the furtherance and possible materialisation of active citizenship in modern times.

Following Rousseau, Cole continued a classical insistence on the need for face-to-face discussions as the basis of democratic organisation. However, he objected to Rousseau's demand for small-scale democracies and territorial definitions of democratic units and argued instead that individuals with an active common concern associated in groups like trade unions. In view of this example, Cole reformulated socialism as a theory of democratic liberty that challenged the very foundations of the modern liberal state and the division of labour. For Cole, workers had been reduced to the status of slaves since they had to perform alienating functions in industry and since political democracy promoted passivity and 'slave virtues'. He did not want to return to the strong but unquestioning social ties of former ages but instead made sense of a functionally differentiated and pluralistic society in Rousseauian terms. Accordingly, democracy required changing the structures of authority and decision-making in the industrial and other spheres of life. Cole aimed to re-establish society as a source of a non-capitalist and anti-statist democratic theory.

Cole's interventions have an important international dimension. Cole allowed associations to be as morally important as states and envisaged their growing empirical relevance. He opposed the idea of national self-determination – individuals were not only committed to a single group, and nations were not homogenous but functionally differentiated. Cole thus contested liberal internationalist principles and, during the First World War, the claim that British citizens could fight for democracy and against Prussianism. Cole was perhaps the most lucid and theoretically versed opponent of conscription. Hence, Cole's theoretical writings stand in stark contrast to Carl Schmitt's definitions of democracy and argument for the unconstrained rule of a dictator in times of war.

While Cole's case against conscription attracted academic attention, debate over his other international interventions remained incomplete. Cole's democratic theory amounts to an account of democratised states and voluntary associations as members of an evolving world society.

However, against this background, Cole rejected the League of Nations as a liberal and capitalistic international organisation and was one of the few British critics of the ILO. The greatest difference between Cole and his fellow pluralist Laski concerns probably not their different treatments of the state but their views of international organisations. While Laski legitimated the League's functional branches, Cole, in his early writings, consistently argued for a bottom-up strategy of democratic and international change. Accordingly, only fully democratic (or socialist) governments can form, in agreement with democratised transnational groups, a legitimate international organisation.

American political theory debated Cole's guild socialism as a variant of British pluralism (Ellis 1923; Coker 1921; Elliot 1925). Mary P. Follett (1918: 289) here identified Cole's pluralism with Laksi's and misrepresented Cole when she summarised his contributions to a theory of group relations that misses the fact that the individual's identifications and loyalties must be infinite. However, precisely Cole's defence of the individual's potentially unlimited loyalties was at the centre of Schmitt's attack. Early-twentieth-century American political theorists downplayed the Schmitt–Cole antagonism (Campell 1934; Rockow 1931) and therewith fostered an incomplete reception of Cole's contributions. Contemporary American pluralists reinvented the tradition without acknowledging similarities between Cole's theoretical and political efforts and their own writings against absolute conceptions of sovereignty, which are, again, exposed as intellectual veils of a capitalistic and undemocratic foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 6

Narratives of Democratic Decline and Reconstruction

Introduction

This chapter will explore how Cole dealt with the end of the first wave of democratisation, declining chances of socialist democratisation, and the great catastrophe of the twentieth century – fascist totalitarianism. When the prospects for further and especially socialist democratisation began to look encouraging at the beginning of the interwar period, Cole was an outspoken critic of the League of Nations' liberal bias and the diffusion of representative democracy. In the early 1920s, socialists assumed a transitional equilibrium of class capacities and socialist chances, but instead of socialism the fascist counterrevolution ensued (Eley 2002: 266). Fascism acquired an ideological shape by assaults on democracy and the liberal international order. As we will see, when Hitler celebrated an electoral success (1933), Cole and Cole (1933) became a timely writer and internationalist. Although he had been unaware of Carl Schmitt's attack on his thought, Cole began to identify with what he eventually called anti-totalitarian pluralism. In taking this turn, Cole then added an additional dimension to British pluralism with his academic and political objection to defences of (ethnic) homogeneity.

Representative democracy was constitutionalised during the first wave of democratisation in most European states (Hobson 2015: 176–177). However, the 'first reverse wave' swelled when the first fascist regime came to power in Italy (1922) and when nationalism and

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authoritarianism grew in Central and Eastern Europe (Fisher 2012: 301). Cole (1935a: 538) uneasily watched the electoral success of fascist parties and authoritarianism all over Europe but paid the most attention to the emblematic self-destruction of the Weimar Republic (Fisher 2012: 298). European intellectuals had expected much of Weimar's well-designed democracy, which included far-reaching workplace and trade union legislation, but then began to conceive of democracy as a value that had to be protected at home and abroad in times of crisis. During the so-called hinge years of 1929–1933 (Steiner 2005), the balance of power between nationalism and fascism on the one hand and liberal internationalism and democracy on the other hand was shifting. A whole host of reforms appeared urgently necessary to turn nineteenth-century institutions into modern and legitimate democracies (Wright 1990: 322).

Although intellectuals revised liberal and socialist theories, they still agreed on a common diagnosis: that of a disjuncture between international economic interdependence and democratic progress. The zeitgeist asserted that liberal democracies had lost control over their own destinies. In 1928, Alfred Zimmern (1928: 159) found that 'if the industrial revolution has given us large scale socio-economic problems, the democratic movement proceeding from the French Revolution has given us small-scale political minds'. For Zimmern, the depression proved the reality of international economic interdependence and demanded quick responses to avert the growing popularity of Bolshevism and fascism. Cole and Zimmern respected each other, though Cole was certainly more radical. He called for international planning to create conditions allowing for an international recovery of democracy.

Focus on the failure of the collective security system installed by the League of Nations often led to the marginalisation of the fact that those writing at the time saw economic depression (1929), the rise of unemployment, and de-democratisation as the pressing problems (Runciman 2013: 76). Both Cole (1929) and the American realist Reinhold Niebuhr revived the new liberals' earlier critique of modern democracy and found that traditional liberal justifications of democracy had lost their appeal. The provision of welfare appeared imperative to weaken the emergent anti-liberal ideologies in Britain and Europe. As Cole put it (1937: 8), 'The dramatic change in the entire world situation is due to the rise of fascism….Fascism, acutely nationalistic…counts fundamentally as an international force. It is…an international counter-revolution…directed…against the whole aspiration of democracy'.

In the 1930s, Cole (1935a) became a member of the Popular Front in Britain, an alliance to organise opposition to fascism and the appeasement policy that the conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain pursued. Cole rather suggested a broad system of international and domestic planning to cope with the Great Depression and to stop the self-destruction of democracy. However, even though many intellectuals at the time arrived at the belief that too much had been asked of democracy in 1918, Cole still held on to democratic norms and towards the end of the Second World War tried to formulate democratic war aims for the British Labour Party (Runciman 2013: 113). After a war of unknown extent, democracy needed to be reconstructed, though it was agreed that the mistakes of 1918 had to be avoided in any case.

In what follows, I will trace Cole's intellectual and political reorientation back to the rise of fascism. Cole suspended some of his radical and pacifist views to warn of the rising danger of fascism and to exert an influence on the British Labour government. He basically reinvented himself as an academic and proposed international socio-economic reforms to create an international environment stabilising European democracy and to recover democratic claims (Jackson 2011: 119). I am here concerned in particular with the demonstration of the commonalities and differences amongst IR intellectuals with allegedly idealist or realist affiliations. There is an ongoing need to write against presentist assumptions and to acknowledge a common concern with the origins of fascism, vindications of democracy, and post-war order. However, even before the end of the war, Cole turned this argumentative thrust into a critique of American hegemony and post-war international organisations, and I will set his approach in context. Little attention has been paid to how Cole became a major influence upon E.H. Carr and his case against liberal understandings of national self-determination and for European welfare institutions.

The Challenge of Fascism

Cole's intellectual turn and astonishing acceptance of the state as an agent of social reform is often traced back only to the decline of guild socialism in Britain from the early 1920s on. This explanation emphasises that trade unions then lost their strength, former guild fellows joined the Communist Party (established around 1920), the 1926 General Strike failed to bring about political change, and Marxism became increasingly popular

amongst the British left. The example set by Soviet communism, the perceived capitalist dominance of the British state, and the dissatisfaction with Labour in office – and with its resignation (1931) – all contributed to the rise of Marxism (Jackson 2011: 95). To some extent, it is true that these changes motivated Cole's theoretical and ideological redefinitions, although he did not turn to Marxism. Cole continued working as a London-based socialist researcher and retracted guild and revived Fabian ideas. Cole contributed frequently to the left-wing magazine *The New Statesman* and participated in Labour Party Prime Minister MacDonald's National Economic Council alongside John Maynard Keynes (M. Cole 1971: 166–7).

However, what the foregoing narrative marginalises is Cole's sudden turn to international economics and politics and to fascism as an international force. More than anything else, fascist successes and in particular Hitler's rise to power (1933) triggered Cole's intellectual change. In contrast to Marxist explanations, Cole did not view fascism as the final throes of capitalism prior to its decline, nor did he argue that world capitalism inevitably leads to international conflict (Wright 1979: 219). Cole (1951) continued to criticise his former fellow pluralist Harold Laski for turning to Marxism in those times of democratic and economic crisis. Since Cole helped to revive the Fabian Society in 1930 and the New Fabian Research Bureau (1931), he worked alongside prominent socialists and internationalists such as, besides Laski, Leonard Woolf, Henry Brailsford, and David Mitrany (M. Cole 1971: 177). He familiarised himself with the internationalist literature before proposing political strategies to counter the rising appeal of fascist ideas.

In the 1930s, Cole began reading contemporary British and American internationalist literature, including Arthur Salter's and Maynard Keynes' socio-economic thought, Norman Angell's and Henry Brailsford's writings on international affairs, and Pittman Potter's outlines of international organisation. Cole further turned to Fabian internationalism. The Fabian society first addressed international relations with the publication of George Bernhard Shaw's *Fabianism and the Empire* (1900), but only Leonard Woolf's *International Government* (1916), a publication ordered by the Fabian society, turned out to be a lasting contribution. Woolf conceived of international functional cooperation, international law, and cooperation between great powers as steps towards international organisation (Wilson 2003: 26). As did his fellow Fabian J.A. Hobson, Woolf attached much importance to sociological inquiry and questions of social injustice and put much faith in the powers of scientific administration by highly trained experts. Cole was

especially devoted to Hobson, who, as an economic heretic, blended economic and democratic considerations. He drew upon the criticism of the marginal impact of political democracy, the ongoing power of a small oligarchy, and international imperialism. Cole and other left-leaning internationalists found that the German call for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles was legitimate and a matter of international justice but then turned to critics of fascism and the British appeasement policy at different points in time (Bull 1986: 13).

Amongst the intellectuals who were first confronted with Italian and then German fascism, Cole stands out since he opposed fascism as soon as it became a recognisable ideology and political force. Since Italian fascism included corporatist elements, Cole understood that he had to distinguish his anti-statist pluralism from Italian fascism's anti-democratic manipulations. In contrast, Bernhard Shaw, a British socialist, and Maynard Keynes, a British liberal, viewed Mussolini as a democratic visionary or modern priest (Runciman 2013: 83). Italian fascism's corporatist elements and international planning proposals attracted interest amongst British internationalists before fascism was equated with the German variant. Although Cole devoted more energy to mobilisation against German fascism, he began to oppose fascism's ideological claims as soon as they emerged and when it was still uncertain how fascism would develop in the future.

In response to Italian fascism, Cole (1925–1926) revised earlier pluralist and rationalist assumptions and allowed emotionally meaningful loyalties to play a greater role. He ceased to conceive of loyalties as a source of individual autonomy and morality only, as he had done in his case against conscription. Back then, he argued that conflicting loyalties asked the individual to question the legitimate claims of the state. Now, however, Cole drew on Graham Wallace's popular *Human Nature in Politics* (1908) – a book that, according to Cole (1931a), somewhat intended to make people more rational by explaining their own irrationality to them. Like Carr (1936), Cole drew on Wallas to qualify overly optimistic assumptions and views of human loyalties as necessary sources of moral obligations. Citizens' loyalties did not become complex and transnational but rather concentrated in a single group: the nation. Cole distinguished then between rational/social and irrational/unsocial loyalties, and the primary example of an irrational loyalty was nationalism or fascism. That the individual's absorption in a rigidly organised state led to the one-sided growth of a 'fierce nationalistic loyalty' was for Cole (Cole 1925–1926: 167) evident in Mussolini's Italy. Though Italian fascism

claimed to restructure society along corporate and functional lines, Cole saw that it contradicted his pluralist democratic ideas. While pluralist democracy aimed at dissolving the state for the purpose of greater associative life, Italian fascism subordinated all persons and associations to the state (Cole 1931b: 730).

German fascism lacked corporatist elements and instead emerged as an ultra-nationalist and anti-liberal doctrine that repudiated liberal definitions of democracy (Hobson 2015: 178). German fascism attacked parliamentary democracy, combined in an eclectic manner extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism, and other elements, and lauded ethnic and cultural homogeneity as democratic principles (Knutson 1992: 202–204). For Cole (1935b, 1938), the oxymoron of fascist democracy preached obedience to a common will interpreted by a Führer and thus perverted all ideas of self-government. German fascism was populistic and despotic (Urbinati 1998), and many of Cole's interventions addressed the British public in order to refuse German fascism's irrational ideological claims. Cole then defined both nationalism and fascism as a popular, irrational, and immoral commitment to the state and demonstrated that fascism attacked liberal justifications of parliamentary democracy. It seized on dissatisfaction with democracy as a technique for voting only and exploited the mistrust as to whether the political institutions of liberal democracy were fit to perform the socio-economic tasks of the day (Cole 1934a: 62). For Cole, fascism was an anti-democratic doctrine in theory and practice at the core, but he struggled with the fact that men turned to an irrational ideology instead of attacking the injustices of the socio-political order (Carpenter 1973: 187).

German fascism programmatically defended irrationality and demonstrated the power of mass mobilisation and nationalist propaganda. For Cole (undated-b), its success was only explainable by a deep-running incompatibility between modern social structures and humanity's natural sociability. For Cole, huge territorial states and bureaucratic routine had destroyed a social embeddedness that is essential to human well-being and self-control. Cole (1918: 48) noted that the normal social structure had been international prior to the rise of the state and that common people imagined a society of Christendom in the Middle Ages. Only the aristocracy thought in nationalistic terms before the great European revolutions. The state was then based on the aristocratic power of the landed classes, and only the economic elites had an interest in the state because of its protection of property and trade. Hence, nationalism and the bureaucratic state were invented and destroyed a lifeworld in which men had identities linked to social roles and confirmed by their overall world view (Griffith 2001: 268).

Modern democracy – with its acceptance of nationalism and insistence on governing large territories – failed to adequately respond to nationalism's alienating force in the very beginning. Most importantly, it did not allow for small-scale sociability (Cole 1962: 90). A social person is constantly asked to manage her instincts when she gathers with her companions, but under modern circumstances and the influence of nationalist propaganda, Cole suspected, people may respond to irrational appeals. Likewise, Niebuhr (2003) assumed that people adjusted their conduct to the needs of others and that this most likely occurs in small circles, where people have contact and knowledge about how their actions affect others. Larger social groups present a twofold opportunity for self-denial and self-aggrandisement. Fascism, according to Cole, seized on this modern social dislocation by enabling the common man to conceive of himself as a hero, when he was really only an obedient follower of *der Führer*. For Cole (1938), the Nazis played on the human capacity for blind and enthusiastic obedience. They aimed at the dissolution of all individual differences under one authority (Cole 1934b). Fascism exploited the modern dislocation by appealing to the lower desires of non-autonomous individuals to seek power and glory in war (Cole 1931a).

Nationalism and Capitalism

Although fascism took nationalism to an extreme, there was an overall rise of nationalism in Europe, so that Cole conceived of a need to distinguish between different sorts of nationalism. He made a distinction between nationalism in great states, such as Russia and Britain, where nationalism always furthered imperialistic visions of expansion, and nationalism in small states. According to Cole's narrative, the new imperialism that had gained strength with the partition of Africa after 1880 was about economic exploitation and had raised, as a counter-reaction, nationalism in small states demanding political independence. The peace settlement of 1919 enforced the understanding that each nationality had a right to political independence when it created a series of new and small states. But while Cole admitted nationalism's revolt against exploitive imperialism, he still opposed Wilson's liberal support of national self-determination. In an outdated manner, Wilson had assumed that even small states could resist great powers and secure a realm of sovereign self-determination. Following Cole (1933c), Wilson had paid way too little attention to early-twentieth-century economic factors. His peace settlement created a number of small nations that lacked the economic capabilities to create economic and welfarist progress through industrialisation, and such states could not resist the great powers.

Cole and Cole (1934) linked his account of the alienating nature of nationalism to a criticism of international capitalism according to which capitalism was keeping the people artificially poor instead of enabling rational production that makes the best use of all available resources. Large enterprises and core state economic intervention by tariffs and quotas ruled out laissez-faire conditions such that economic self-adjustment became illusory in view of modern international economy. Capitalism produced monopolies that dictate prices and waste available resources, and it in effect leads to imperialism and exploitation of undeveloped countries, in particular when state-led enterprises search for war-relevant materials. So far, international economic organisations proved unable to provide a proper framework for international trade (Cole 1927a). Though some of Cole's contemporaries believed that international cartels could contribute to the planning of international trade in a positive way, Cole refuted the idea. He asserted that international combines – centrally controlled businesses with an international scope – controlled economic intercourse and dictated prices. The Continental Steel Cartel, another form of a combine, aimed at limiting economic competition among different nations. Governments allied with business and raised tariffs, quotas, or import prohibitions. Following Cole (1929), political democracy in core states such as Britain failed to attack the power of a small oligarchy, while the promise of democracy as self-determination never had realistic chances of success.

Cole (1934b: 13) conceived of the socio-economic situation as a stalemate, because 'If men can be made to feel more aggressively Nationalist than class-conscious, they may be induced in the name of the "National idea" and the "Totalitarian State" to refrain from challenging the injustice of the economic order'. Socialist reform in a bottom-up process was highly unlikely, and democracy needed new vindications. Cole (1933b) argued that liberal democracy had always remained an elitist project, even in states such as Britain and the United States, that liberal democracy was impotent in allowing the masses to experience liberty, and that it did not generate a real distribution of political power. Or, as Niebuhr (2003: chapter 1) put it, the increasing centralisation of economic power in the period of modern industrialism had only replaced the earlier centralisation of political power. Economic power had become the driving force in modern society, while nationalism and economic inequalities were mutually re-enforcing under these conditions. As Cole argued in detail, class loyalty was too weak to effectively check nationalism. People obeyed the state, but by obeying the state, they were only re-enforcing the uniting of political and

economic power that used the state as an instrument in the battle for new markets and raw materials in as yet underdeveloped states. Nationalism was then irrational, because it hindered rational economic reform, and unethical, because it accepted the economic exploitation of other territories. Cole's political and ideological strategy towards nationalism had thus changed: he objected to economically irrational and psychologically distorting nationalist obfuscation.

International Planning: Nationalities Versus Needs

In the early 1930s, British liberals, left-liberals, and socialists struggled because they, on the one hand, continued to believe that international trade could be advantageous for the exchanging nations. On the other hand, governments of highly different ideological colour accepted the need for protectionism. In response to the dilemma and to persuade the British government to hold on to an internationalist strategy, Hobson, Brailsford, and Cole all proposed the planning of world trade along the lines of socialist welfare states (Pugh 2012: 116). The unique trait of Cole's argument is that it identified need instead of nationality as the principle that ought to guide political and economic conduct.

In the tradition of J.A. Hobson's characteristic blending of economic and normative arguments, Cole (1934c) developed these ideas along with a critique of classical and Marxist economics. Cole was dissatisfied with the economic assumption that demand determined a good's value, as well as with Ricardo's and Marx's assertion that the amount of labour used in the production of a good was a criterion for its value (Carpenter 1973: 159–160). Most importantly for Cole, Marx also failed in a normative sense because he was concerned with the emancipation and well-being of classes instead of individuals (Wright 1979: 231). Instead, Cole argued that a good's value was best calculated by its utility in relation to a human need. Though Cole (1935c: 224–226, 1935d: 88) was aware of the fact that the definition of a need would always remain an object of political controversy, Cole identified a minimum of food, fuel, clothing, housing, education, and the use of common services as primary needs. The equal satisfaction of primary needs was for Cole not only a desire that any person would agree on as a prerequisite for happiness but also the line setting a limit on the different conceptions of happiness that Cole was willing to tolerate. Indeed, Cole's revision of economic theory implied what he later consistently argued: that human beings have equal rights to the satisfaction

of elementary needs and that any political or economic order – national or international – can only be legitimate when it gives priority to the satisfaction of basic needs. By implication, Cole's economic views entailed a radical approach to international planning that went considerably beyond the aim of mitigating and stabilising international capitalism.

When the effects of the Great Depression were widely felt, Cole worked together with Maynard Keynes and Hobson on Ramsay MacDonald's economic advisory committee. Cole (1932) found it necessary to convince British voters, and the middle class in particular, that socialism was not a disorderly revolution but a rational option capable of dealing with the acute problem of unemployment. Cole built upon Hobson's theory of underconsumption and, like Keynes, recognised the importance of financial and monetary policy and the need for state action. However, Cole (1954a: 138) consistently criticised Keynes for failing to see that the success of the suggested reforms depended on the socialisation of key industries.

Going considerably beyond Keynes, Cole thus suggested common ownership on a large scale in the form of socialising key industries and banking. He sought not to abandon private and small-scale commerce altogether but wanted to enable comprehensive long-term planning, including the control of incomes and prices. The goal was to reorganise the economy until it produced necessary goods for all and to avoid an increase in production at the cost of continuing 'dullness' and 'irksome' work (undated-a). To control quantitative and qualitative changes in the workplace, he proposed the creation of a new profession: the 'public servant'. They ought to be available to workers and employers and function as consultants, inspectors, and advisors taking care of human working conditions.

For the task of domestic planning, Cole proposed the establishment of a National Planning Authority (NPA) that would supervise the economy with the consent of Parliament. The NPA's main task would be the coordination of the various sectional plans that the various, self-governing branches of industry or the common services had worked out. Cole tried to reconcile planning with ideas of worker control and industrial freedom, though his concrete proposals made different suggestions about the best realisation of that aim. One option envisaged a national administration consisting of public corporations with worker participation as an alternative to the common civil service bureaucracy. However, in contrast to his guild proposals, final decisions about, for example, the wages would now

be made by the NPA or a similar authority. Cole assumed that some economic democracy was necessary but that the final decisions had to be made in the interest of the majority of society.

Extending his domestic proposal, Cole suggested a world economic authority and international planning for the greatest possible satisfaction of needs. Conceiving of national planning as a prerequisite for international planning, Cole suggested coordination of the various national economies that were already planning imports and exports. In the context of international coordination, governments ought to represent their societies' plural interests and their specific communal point of view. In international perspective, Cole (1934c) found that international capitalism was most disastrous for small states because they lacked the resources to develop a variety of industries and large-scale production and were exploited by large states through the mechanisms of economic imperialism. However, Cole's arguments represented somewhat a variation on Hobson's paternalism and trust in expert planning as a stimulus of economic growth in yet undeveloped states. Hobson equally advocated a World Economic Council, with delegates from all sides of industry, as part of his planning proposal, though it was less specific on the representation of interests of the people living in undeveloped societies (Pugh 2012: 116).

Furthermore, British socialists, including Cole, and liberal authors called for international planning to save democracy and demonstrated considerable willingness to reduce the powers of their own parliament. In Cole's vision, the NPA would have more authority than Parliament since Parliament appeared unsuitable for the technical task of planning and had proven to be mainly a voting machine (Cole 1930). Cole's proposal that Parliament ought to decide only the broad perspective for future socio-economic development even prompted criticism from Barbara Wootton – a member of the Fabian Society, supporter of an international federal union, and a planning advocate. Whereas Wootton demanded a democratic consensus amongst all political parties regarding socio-economic objectives, Cole (1945a) rejected this proposal as unrealistic because most established political parties represented the rights of property-holders, who would block social reform.

To some degree, Cole's intellectual reorientation and turn to international themes lessened the distance between him and intellectuals such as Salter who were close to the political establishment. Salter, a British civil servant who earlier on influenced Laski's thought, likewise argued that

democracy was everywhere on trial and that democracy had to prove its capacity to master complex problems (Salter et al. 1935: 5). A demand for international planning to cope with the depression and to readjust the economic systems was widespread and involved debate of the necessary reforms within liberal democracies. Intellectuals of different ideological affiliations subscribed to the need to defend democracy and to reconcile liberal or, as Cole hoped, socialist democracy with international socio-economic coordination. Cole and Salter knew and respected each other and both worked in MacDonald's secret economic advisory council, continuing work after 1931. Salter's international economic expertise was a major influence on Cole, while Cole's earlier functional ideas reappear in Salter's suggestions for domestic and international functional reform (Holthaus and Steffek 2016). Yet Cole, who was not asked by Salter to sign the important political agreement *The Next Five Years* (1935), attacked liberal intention to use planning for the moderation and eventual stabilisation of international capitalism.

On the other hand, a lingering distance from the so-called political establishment is evident in Cole's (1927b) account of the World Economic Conference (1933). In particular, the World Economic Conference held in 1933 in London was conceived as a major political event and was symbolically linked to the question whether the remaining democracies (Britain, the United States, France) could agree on a common economic plan (Runciman 2013: 77). On the one hand, Cole (1934c: 53) sympathised with the attempt at international economic regulation and any step towards establishing an international economic authority. Many of Cole's economic interventions aimed at outlining a policy for MacDonald's government, also in expectation of the World Economic Conference (1933). On the other hand, Cole (1927a) objected to the conference's practice that allowed governments to choose the experts attending such international conferences because it made an exclusion of radical ideas likely. Cole (1937: 9) shared H.N. Brailsford's suspicion that capitalistic governments would hardly support far-reaching international economic reforms. In this perspective, the reluctance of the political elites of the established democracies to turn the League into an instrument of international redistribution and justice was a major factor contributing to fascist successes.

European Reconstruction and the Prospects for Democracy

When readers opened the *New Statesmen* in 1939, they found Richard Crossman's review of E.H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) and a promotion of Cole's *New Statesman* pamphlet *War Aims* (1939) on the same page (Coventry 1939). Cole was then a key figure in the British left's debate of the post-war European order. He headed the New Fabian Research Bureau and enjoyed close contacts with many exiled socialists and British internationalists (Minion 2000: 245–247). Carr, on the other hand, proposed ideological and theoretical conundrums. Educated at Cambridge, Carr worked for the Foreign Office, became professor of international politics in 1936 at Aberystwyth, and, besides working in academia, wrote for *The Times* in the early 1940s. He was a provocative intellectual and, since his inaugural lecture, a critic of liberal beliefs in democracy's educative and peace-promoting effects (Jones 1998: 33). In its immediate context, Carr's book (1939) raised different but few favourable interpretations (Wilson 2004).

As Crossman noted, Carr's book and Cole's pamphlet differed in purpose: Carr's book retrospectively legitimated the appeasement policy, while Cole's pamphlet accepted the anti-fascist war cause. At the same time, Cole (1939: 4) forcefully attacked the contradiction between a reduction in democratic rights during the war and the proclaimed defence of democracy in war. Can we fight, Cole asked, a totalitarian enemy without becoming ourselves totalitarian? He assumed a need for democratic reconstruction of democracy in Britain and in Europe and in his pamphlet outlined socialist principles for the post-war order. It was highly popular in 1939 and went through three editions (Carpenter 1973: 195). Contemporaries viewed Cole as a more sophisticated author than Carr because he thought through questions concerning the post-war order (Whidden 1943). In what follows, I will discuss Cole's wartime proposals and his stances on materialising post-war order in terms of their democratic content and compare them to E.H. Carr's interventions.

Cole was perhaps at his best when he tried to undo tangling of the principle of nationality and political and economic self-determination. For Cole (1941a: 14), nationality could not remain a principle for political organisation or basis for the state in the twentieth century. It was, on the one hand, imperative to avoid a repetition of the mistakes of 1919 and, on the other hand, to identify sound national claims that ought to be respected.

For Cole, these national claims were a cultural rather than political matter, and he believed that citizens had to be educated to reconsider the meaning of nationality in order to relinquish thinking in terms of national economic exclusiveness. Considering the possible claims of citizens identifying with a national group, he found that the most important one concerned the use of a particular language; the passing on, especially by education, of a national history and culture; and the practice of a particular religion. These claims implied that educational and cultural matters ought to be organised and decided on the national and local levels. Cole (1962: 203–223) realised that citizens would view any political organisation as legitimate only when it respected their socio-cultural heritage.

Even though Cole expected that especially a supranational institution would at first face legitimacy deficits, he proposed precisely such an organisation for Europe in rather timely contributions. In 1941, the British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union formed an alliance to fight Germany, and this dramatically changed the political and ideological constellations (Wilson 1996: 39). A Nazi-dominated Europe, or one divided through the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, appeared likely (Burridge 1976: 119). Cole thus thought in terms of different international spheres and assumed that regional federations were more likely than a strong universal international organisation. Cole identified the United States, the Soviet Union, Asia, and Europe as distinct political centres and divided Europe into Eastern Europe (possibly becoming a part of an extended Soviet Union), Central Europe, and a rather restrictively defined Western Europe (Minion 2000: 253). The alternative to capitalist exploitation was, for Cole (1941a: 55), a socialist Europe, industrialising the less advanced European states and equalising the standards of living.

Although Cole revised his ideas during the war, he suggested a European planning authority, a mixture of functional and territorial organisation, over the course of years. His proposals were attempts to outline what Europe might look like after revised understandings of nationality, but such proposals are not always well conceived and sometimes have an ideological character. In a Fabian manner, Cole put considerable trust in international administration and socialist experts who should consider many matters and indirect effects, including environmental planning effects, such as polluted water. Cole (1941a: 62) proposed that the European experts should plan in the interest of Europe as a whole: ‘It must be irrelevant to them whether

a development is on this or that side of a particular political frontier; their concern must be to ensure that it is placed where it best serves the common needs of all. This attitude is, of course, the very antithesis of that which is taken up by the Nazi planners.' Furthermore, Cole sought to avoid repeating Soviet authoritarianism by facilitating decentralisation. He seemed to envisage a multifarious system including supranational planning, national administration, and decentralised, issue-specific functional coordination. Cole argued that European supranational authority ought to govern the respect for liberal rights (e.g. freedom of opinion), as guaranteed by a supranational charter. His support of a common European constitution shows that he (Cole 1941a: 137) considered a need for international protection of domestic democracy, and that placed a new emphasis on citizens' rights against the state.

Still, as a contemporary reviewer, Jesse D. Clarkson (1942), noted, Cole put (too) much trust in the future supranational authority's accountability. To some extent, Cole was aware of the paradox that a somewhat undemocratic institution was needed to initiate democratic conduct in formerly totalitarian states. Cole even flirted with the idea of top-down inducement of local democratic activity. However, also at a deeper level, Cole became sceptical of the prospects of democracy. He then began to draw contrasts between the outreach of modern socio-economic activities and the necessary local character of democratic conduct. For Cole (1962: 90), this was the central modern dilemma, and he asked about democracy's future in the face of hugeness. Cole now conceived of the growing complexity of society as a problem and threat to democratic conduct. He continued to value associations as places of democratic conduct but became far more critical of their own bureaucratic and undemocratic developments and pursuit of sectional interests in society. Democratic activity had to remain local, limited to the factory or neighbourhood, because otherwise it would itself necessitate bureaucratisation.

Citizens, in Cole's (1962: 94–95) words

> [C]an control great affairs only by acting together in the control of small affairs, and finding, through the experience of neighbourhood, men whom they can entrust with larger decisions than they can take rationally for themselves. Democracy can work in the great States (and *a fortiori* between great States or over Europe or the world) only if each State is made up of a host of little democracies, and rests finally, not on isolated individuals, but on groups small enough to express the spirit of neighbourhood and personal acquaintance.

The preceding quote implies a territorial bottom-up conception of democratic accountability. Accordingly, democratic villages could make democratic regions, democratic regions democratic states, and democratic states democratic international organisations. Hence, while Cole's conceptual work weakened the (liberal) fusion of national self-determination and statehood, Cole assumed that local loyalties would remain powerful and hardly expected a multiplication of loyalties at the expense of nationalism. His insistence on neighbourhood groups is a return to territorially biased and classical conceptions of small-scale democracies. Humans, for Cole (1941c, d), can only act humanly on a large scale if they learn to do so on a small scale. Cole believed that local experiences were critical to the reconstruction of democracy in Europe but also proposed to redirect tasks from the national to the local level in Britain.

Like Cole, Carr (1941, 1945b: 10) addressed the topics of national self-determination and democracy. He noted that democracy had become an international paradigm during the First World War and that Wilson's advancement of national self-determination strengthened the connection between national self-determination and ultimately nationalism and democracy. Carr (1936) argued that the victors made a major mistake when they imposed liberal democracy on the vanquished states, especially since Britain's own democracy remained too immature to back the League of Nations' collective security system. Carr (1939) closely followed the decline of democracy in Germany and the success of Hitler's propaganda and believed in the intellectual's duty to enlighten a democratic public opinion (Jones 1998: 33). However, Carr's subtle contributions have received less attention than his 'realist' case against national self-determination and Wilson's promotion of democracy and for the appeasement policy. Carr introduced Alfred Zimmern as an academic proponent of Wilsonian principles, but this move hardly convinced his contemporaries.

Against the background of Carr's earlier writings, Zimmern (1939) read *The Twenty Years' Crisis* as a critic of Wilson's trust in an enlightened interest in foreign policy and a peaceful development of national democracy in contemporary international society, instead of an attack on his thought. Zimmern (1922) did not only share but even anticipated Carr's critique of Wilson. About fifteen years before Carr, Zimmern (ibid. p. 49) had already attacked the Wilson and the abstract and exclusive nature of Anglo-Saxon liberalism, which had been out of touch with socio-economic realities in Europe. Carr's reiteration of these positions within a more theoretical framework hardly raised suspicion.

What excited Zimmern, a welfarist liberal, was rather that Carr linked a relativist and retrospective legitimation of the appeasement policy to a morally argued demand for international planning somewhat along the lines of the Soviet Union (Kenealy and Kostagiannis 2013: 237). Carr suggested a European Planning Authority that would resemble the one suggested by Cole to enhance and equalise the European living standard after the exploitation of the Nazis. However, Carr eschewed a discussion on democracy and on how authoritarianism might be avoided and mistrusted the 'men in the street' and militarised electorates and intended to ensure anti-nationalist, socialist reform by suspension of elections after the war. Authors of different ideological affiliation hence agreed in their critiques of Wilson and a need to redefine the principle of national self-determination. The controversies rather pivoted on the right extent of welfarist planning for Europe, the reintegration of Germany, and the post-war status and form of democracy.

Although Carr (1945a: 7) was aware of Soviet totalitarianism, he noted that democracy became 'an operative word' and contrasted British and Soviet stances on the concept. For Carr, the Soviet Union developed different democratic conceptions than the West, and he believed that both the Western and the Soviet claim on democracy were logically and historically tenable. However, since the Western model had failed to bring social welfare and to help the masses, he assumed that the Soviet model was better suited for the age of mass politics. The Soviet version identified democracy with anti-Nazism, social equality, and the destruction of existing class structures, while the English one placed an emphasis on protection against arbitrary statist interventions and on individual and property rights (Linklater 2000: 246). For Carr, the Soviet version rightly stressed that the promise of social equality had been a key element of the democratic rhetoric of the French Revolution. Yet Western democracy had hardly levelled out the living standard of the masses. From Carr's perspective, his proposals for the European post-war order were not anti-democratic but informed by a different conception of democracy.

Like Carr, Cole (1945c) re-evaluated the competing democratic claims in response to American President Roosevelt's introduction of democracy as an aim for the post-war order. In his "Four Freedoms Speech" (1941), Roosevelt distilled four democratic liberties that deserve to be defended: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, from want, and freedom from fear (Hobson 2015: 181–6). Roosevelt and Churchill further identified democracy as a post-war aim at the Casablanca Conference (1943), and Stalin shared their tone at conferences in Teheran (1944) and Yalta (1945).

However, there, democracy was only broadly understood as a liberated people's right to choose a form of government under which they will live and, owing to Stalin's insistence, not defined in liberal terms.

Cole rightly expected that the different ideological positions would prove to be irreconcilable and that they would lead to the divide of Europe. He provided apt contrasts of the British, American, and Soviet conceptions in view of the political discussion of the future order in Eastern Europe after German domination. In his characteristic manner, Cole argued that democracy implied far more than parliamentarian democracy and greater levels of social equality. It was from this perspective that Cole judged the British and American definitions of democracy. Cole vividly opposed both Churchill's conservative reconciliation of democracy with monarchy and imperial unity and American democracy's acceptance of huge socio-economic differences. Furthermore, the question of whether social equality was a precondition of or possible sequel of democracy divided for Cole between both the British and American and the Soviet positions.

The question was also raised by the German lesson, which demonstrated that formal representative institutions cannot gain popular legitimacy when they are cut off from social realities and when they fail to provide for the welfare of the population. For Cole, 'the German lesson' demanded recognition of social equality as a requirement for democratic stability, but he refused to turn the decline of the Weimar Republic into an argument for Soviet totalitarianism. However, in contrast to his earlier democratic optimism, Cole suggested gradual reforms in representative democracy and became an outspoken critic of the 'export' of representative democracy to states without a democratic tradition.

Cole's (1945c) late interventions are characterised by the attempt to defend 'this word democracy' from the political elites' top-down seizures, and from this perspective, he became a general critic of the international organisations emerging under the hegemony of the United States (Carpenter 1973: 194). Cole's (1956: 35–6) underlying principles suggested that affected people ought to be empowered with respect to common international problems and that international organisations ought to promote welfarist aims. Against this background, Cole (1940: 35) opposed institutions such as the Bank for International Settlements because it was not under control by the states affected by its decisions and refuted the founding of similar institutions, 'organizations which the leaders of high finance will use as instruments for defying Governments and flouting the democratic will'.

Cole critiqued – correctly, but in a manner typical for British radicals – that progressive plans shaping the UN debates in the 1940s did not materialise owing to United States' resistance. The Atlantic Charter acknowledged equal access to resources and raw materials vital to any state's economic welfare – but it failed, according to Cole, because it did not put those resources under supranational control. Witnessing the evolution of the Bretton Woods system, Cole conceived of it as an instrument designed to secure American hegemony since it (successfully) necessitated that each country follow suit if the United States were to resort to deflation. He (1954a: 20) supported an International Trade Organisation to develop an international response to unemployment – but the United States blocked the widespread demand for such an institution. Still, Cole tried to use the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the purpose of socialist education and directed his final activism at organising internationally minded socialists, and he produced the short-lived *International Society for Socialist Studies* (1956).

In his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1945, Cole (1945b: 15–16) promised to devote his thought and activities as chair to an anti-totalitarian pluralism that was based on the 'recognition of the positive value of diversity' and the principle that individual beings 'alone have, in truth, the capacity to think, to feel, and to believe, and singly or in association to express their thoughts, feelings, and beliefs in actions'. He continued to defend his choice of social theory as a conscious objection to political theory's implicit preference of the state and national democracy, which stabilised restrictive definitions of the realm of democratic action. Political theory thus fit in with theories of nationalism, national self-determination, and international laissez-faire. Cole's post-war interventions contest these principles, the equation of democracy with representative democracy, and Britain's growing statist bureaucracy. He defended again the principle that the introduction of welfarist institutions had to be accompanied by the introduction of workplace democracy to allow for democratic activism. However, Cole (1955: 45) came to believe that democratic activism and pluralisation of loyalties had to unfold first under favourable conditions at the local level. Cole resumed defences of pluralism as a matter of personal and normative choice to subtend irrationally strong national sentiments and the welfare state's paralysing effects.

Conclusion

If one appreciates an original thinker who refused to subscribe to solidified ideological lines and who conceived of democratic thought as a matter of political action, one is well advised to turn to Cole – in spite of the various shifts in his thinking. I started my discussion of Cole's pluralism by emphasising his opposition to bundling together concepts of democracy and the state and how he insisted that democracy implied more than merely representative government. In doing so, Cole evaded the turn to descriptive democratic theorising and seized democracy as an emancipatory concept for the British trade union movement. However, instead of reducing Cole's pluralism to an opposition to the state, I argued that this was only part of a comprehensive revision of democratic theory undertaken with a view to Britain's industrialised society.

Cole's revision also detailed a seminal case for functional participation and representation in tandem with an appreciation of the potential of transnational organisations. Against the background of his radical democratic claims, Cole thus criticised the League of Nations as a democratically illegitimate and capitalist organisation, a position that was rather uncommon for intellectuals affiliated with the Labour Party. However, I ended the previous chapter by noting that Cole struggled with nationalist sentiments amongst British workers and with the growth of nationalism all over Europe. Akin to Hobhouse, Cole first distinguished between a valuable nationalism as the sign of communal solidarity and jingoism, but he then dropped this distinction and became an outspoken opponent of fascism.

In this chapter I have elaborated how Cole added another dimension to British pluralism when he defined pluralism as anti-totalitarianism. Cole revised his political priorities after Hitler's electoral success in 1933 and was amongst the first outspoken opponents of fascism in Britain. Cole rejected Marxist explanations of fascism, preferring to focus instead on human alienation in modern times, a move that allowed for a consideration of how fascism could appeal to more primitive and vulgar instincts for power and acquiescent obedience. While Cole's wartime proposals for international planning and democratic war aims marked a stark departure from earlier views, he developed them to formulate an anti-totalitarian strategy for the British left.

Anticipating Carr, Cole questioned liberal interpretations of national self-determination and argued for a socialist Europe. At the same time, Cole was more attentive to the dangers of authoritarianism and devoted to

a gradual reconstruction of democratic institutions. In his rather traditional conception, the post-war reconstruction of democracy had to begin with the local domain in states that had gained democratic experience prior to fascism. With regard to the British audience, Cole continued what he had begun in the interwar period: public education in foreign affairs in order to counter nationalist arguments. His work *The Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-War World* (1947) is more than 1000 pages long and includes at least as much information as post-war realist works as well as a chapter on the future of democracy. He remained committed to the idea that facts might convince citizens to give up irrationally nationalist views and create a more sophisticated public discourse and, thus, enlightened public opinion.

After 1945 Cole resumed his characteristic employment of democratic theory as a critic's tool. The future of democracy was for him certainly not representative government. Cole returned to his pluralist opposition to statist bureaucracy and demand for workplace democracy. While with regard to international organisation Cole identified with the principle that those affected ought to be empowered, he hardly explained what this implied in institutional terms. As I will argue in the next chapter, it was David Mitrany rather than Cole who continued pluralist thinking with regard to democratising international organisations.

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CHAPTER 7

David Mitrany and the Purposes of Functional Pluralism

Introduction

The preceding chapters have shown that pluralist responses to theoretical and political developments increasingly merged thinking about democracy, peace, and international organisation. The following chapter will argue that David Mitrany developed this trait when he addressed the question how international organisation might contribute to a lasting reconstruction of democracy after the end of the Second World War. As a result, there are critical differences between pluralists' demands for denationalised interest representation, devolution of political power, and transnational welfare services, on the one hand, and arguments suggesting that representative or social democracies are effective instruments to bring about a lasting peace, on the other (Waltz 1968: 129).

Mitrany developed the tenets of his thought through studies of Southern European history and pluralist democratic theory. In his studies of Southern European history, he asked how liberal democratic promises unfolded beyond Western Europe and developed a critical attitude towards the state and nationalism. He formulated this critical attitude within the terms of pluralism and was much influenced by Hobhouse's critique of parliamentarianism. As Mitrany (1945a) himself noted: 'The redefinition of the relations of individuals and groups to the state, and of states to each other, is beyond doubt the crucial democratic problem of our time [...]. I could write a lot about this, and about the danger for democrats and

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democracy in trying to uphold outworn formulae in the face of utterly changed conditions and needs'. The 'outworn formula' was, of course, representative democracy within artificial national boundaries (Griffith 2001: 192).

Like Hobhouse, Mitrany believed that industrialisation had produced degrees of socio-economic inequality that hindered further democratic progress. However, he went beyond his teacher when he theorised that international organisations ought to contribute to socio-economic equality at the level of citizens (Steffek 2015). When he made this argument, he addressed an Anglo-Saxon international relations (IR) community and made reference to competing IR theories rather than ideological rivals. However, and in spite of this change in style, Mitrany defended a sociological approach to the study of international relations as a means to sustain the legitimacy of democratic criticism within our discipline.

It was Maynard Keynes' temporary approval of protectionism and national self-sufficiency around 1933 that prompted Mitrany to develop these positions. For Mitrany, bounded welfare states marked the end of universal democratic aspirations in Western Europe and the United States and made further substitutions of democracy by dictatorship likely. In South-Eastern Europe, the liberal democratic victors of 1918 had advanced constitutional reforms from outside, but Mitrany (1933a) found that British and American politicians hardly knew the new democracies they had installed. He tried to warn Western intellectuals and officials of the British Foreign Office that there might be further political and social upheavals if they downplayed popular demands for social equality (Pedler 1976: 196). Welfarist international organisations were an empirical necessity and important normative goal.

A note on the reception of Mitrany's thought may help to understand my emphasis on Mitrany's preoccupation with democratic themes. Mitrany has long attracted attention in our discipline, but the reception of his thought poses a conundrum. The dominant view is that Mitrany was a hands-on thinker who defended international technocracy and who deradicalised available democratic ideas (Long 1993). However, a smaller circle of theoretically minded scholars recognises Mitrany as a forerunner of cosmopolitan democracy (Steffek 2015). I side with the second position when I argue that it is due to Mitrany's thought that pluralist ideas gained credibility in our discipline since Mitrany consistently drew attention to conflicts between democratic universalism and the unfolding of democracy in bounded states.

However, I find that even democratic theorists have not yet done justice to the complexity of Mitrany's thought and his theoretical lucidity. Mitrany approached theory as a realm for social reflection and carefully crafted his arguments to call for international efforts at creating social equality and transforming political communities in both theory and in practice. In what follows, I will first explore how Mitrany reflected upon the distinctively British origins of pluralism. I then turn to Mitrany's revision of international theory in view of democratic quests for social equality. Finally, I will turn to his wartime thought and put his proposal of welfarist international organisations, which influenced the creation and legitimation of United Nations (UN) specialised agencies, in context. Towards the end of the war, Mitrany conceived of international functional institutions as a means of furthering the reintroduction of social pluralism in Europe.

British Pluralism Meets Southern European History

The literature on Mitrany is broad and reflects changing ideals of science in IR. The most recent historical studies reintroduced Mitrany and other unduly forgotten authors since the mid-1990s (Ashworth 1999a, b). Amongst these studies, it is generally agreed that Hobhouse's thought and British pluralism had a strong impact upon Mitrany. And indeed, Mitrany (undated) subscribed to Hobhouse's progressive understanding of science. The social scientist has then a vocational duty to reveal underlying retrogressive and progressive reasons for social institutions and to suggest options for social reform. In particular, the discipline of modern sociology was conceived of as a means to reveal how humans may purposively further desirable ends. Hobhouse's and Mitrany's identification with sociology matters because, like many welfarist liberals, it preceded their criticism of the 'the liberalism of privilege' and unmaterialised democratic promises or democratic ruptures (Richardson 1997: 7). Mitrany opposed the suspension of democratic politics in order to guarantee the survival of the state in international power struggles and theorised society as against a realist focus on reason of state politics.

That Mitrany defended a sociological perspective during IR's early years becomes evident when his and American realist Spykman's claims to science are matched against each other. Mitrany (1933b) was a colleague of Spykman at Yale, and both tried to shape scientific self-conceptions of IR. After being part of international law, around 1933,

American IR was increasingly conceived of as political science, and Spykman (1933) advanced the state and the concept of international anarchy as related focal points for IR.

Mitrany (1933b), in contrast, emphasised functional activities rather than territorial borders as ontological facts, denied stark differences between orderly domestic and anarchic international relations, and, like Cole, opposed political science because of the discipline's inherent legitimation of nation states. Mitrany did not examine causes for social differentiation in detail, but, like British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, focused on the satisfaction of human needs. Both treated need satisfaction as a causal explanation of functional activities and a normative ideal (Pentland 1973: 67). Mitrany's approach does not satisfy the demands of a 'value-neutral' sociology, but this does not mean that Mitrany was an 'unscientific' or 'eclectic' thinker. Ernst B. Haas (1964: 20) cited Marxism, pragmatism, utilitarianism, liberalism, radicalism, anarchism, Fabian socialism, Fordism, New Deal enthusiasm, and other influences as grounds for identifying Mitrany as being eclectic. However, Haas therewith downplays Mitrany's self-conscious identification with sociology and attempt at importing different sources of inspiration to a sociological IR approach.

Democratic nationalism was one of the liberal internationalist principles that Hobhouse and Mitrany revised with the help of a sociological and possibly historical approach. In his early Balkan studies, Mitrany briefly appreciated nationalism for its democratising function and considered great power interference in the Balkans as a trigger for the establishment of a European federation. However, Mitrany then became increasingly suspicious of foreign manipulations and turned the experiences of South-Eastern Europe into a case against properly understood nationalism (Alexandrescu 2007: 26–7). For Mitrany (1927), penetration from the great powers distorted life in the Balkans, while the national elites were only too willing to ally with the great powers and to use international conflicts to distract the population from domestic demands when they believed that this furthered their own interests. Because of the great powers, Mitrany (1935a) argued, the Balkans have been 'Europeanised', being rapidly organised along European and, thus, national lines.

In this perspective, Danubian nationalism was thus by no means natural, but rather a political propaganda tool that had been created by the elites against the mass of their people's 'simple wisdom of good neighbourliness'. When nationalism is such a natural and unrestrained sentiment, Mitrany (1935b: 925) rhetorically asked, why do governments need to consistently finance a nationalist propaganda with flags, drums, and trumpets?

Mitrany blamed the great powers and national elites for the artificial boundaries dividing the Balkans and for the poor living standard among the Balkan people. Accordingly, the consolidation of the nation-state was accompanied by the suppression of minorities and marginalisation of social groups such as the Balkan peasants. Mitrany critically observed that the realisation of Mazzinian demands for national unity involved violent processes of national unification and state formation. For Mitrany, nationality was about cultural sentiments and was sound only when its cultivation remained within the private sphere. Thus, in view of cases from beyond Western Europe and liberal internationalism's neglect of the realities of multinational states and empires, Mitrany (1936: 234) considerably complicated the liberal ideal of national self-determination in territorial states. For Mitrany, Hobhouse and other liberal internationalists remained conservatively biased when they detangled their abstract praise of the principle of nationality from their treatment of non-Western cases such as India.

A critical attitude towards the state evolves simultaneously in Mitrany's Balkan studies and in his adaptions of British pluralism (Ashworth 2005: 207). Pluralists straightforwardly rejected the state or contrasted the state 'as it is' with 'as it ought to be'. Most often, this pattern of argumentation served as a means to criticise the respective governments. Mitrany employed a similar pattern of argument but directed his criticism at the Rumanian and other Southern European governments. Mitrany argued that state-led economic planning had never lived up to its promises. Those in power focused on industrial and urban development at the expense of the rural population's local economic structures. He valued the peasants' local organisation and knowledge as a tool in the fight against state powers and claimed that state-led economic planning was a waste of resources and only served the purpose of war. South-Eastern European wartime governments' functional innovations in state-led planning worsened the situation when they brought about a 'Frankenstein of power' that reduced liberal rights and that failed to further material services (Mitrany 1936: 76). On the basis of this case, Mitrany asserted that all autocratic organisation that act despite a disconnect with public opinion will end in inefficiency. However, when comparing the impact of the wartime governments and the League's international administration, Mitrany (1936: 263) arrived at a favourable judgement of the latter because it 'proved that even in a poor province the people can be given the advantage of a civilized material life, if their labour and resources be not absorbed in an extravagant political and military superstructure of the State'.

His perspective differed from that of British liberal internationalists, who took a rather romantic interest in the Balkans. Mitrany (1924, 1935a) paid special attention to the peasant class, the ideological claims of the peasant parties, and to Marxism's ideological oblivion and historical maltreatment of the peasants. The peasants' claims crossed Western ideological divisions because their belief in private property and their demand to own the fruits of their labor were conservative; however, their opposition to accumulated wealth and their call for common ownership of critical resources were progressive. The Balkan peasants experimented with cooperative organisation, but Mitrany (1944a) was sceptical of these attempts. Mitrany approved of cooperative organisation as a means to improve social organisation but not as a principle for all purposes.

However, for Mitrany (1951), the Marxist ideology was equally ill-equipped to cope with the peasant class, and the peasants suffered very much as a result of communism. As a result of his Balkan studies, Mitrany was highly aware of the situatedness of ideological claims and Western ideologies' Eurocentric bias. Instead of imposing a Western perspective on the Balkans, he reversed the logic. He viewed peaceful peasant revolutions (around 1920) in South-East Europe as exemplary for the West and generalised the quest for social equality, which was common in the Balkans, into a universal social force driving all nations.

When Mitrany turned popular welfare demands into the key principle of his theory, he took the Russian Revolution as seriously as the French. Mitrany (1944c) criticised the West for failing to understand the importance of revolution's appeal to social groups such as Balkan peasants – a group to whom the West had little to offer. For Mitrany, the Russian Revolution ended the laissez-faire era and set the goal of social and economic rights. Corresponding with the goals of the French and Russian Revolutions, he drew a key distinction between nineteenth-century national movements, which were concerned with political self-determination, and modern twentieth-century nationalism, which was concerned with welfare (Ashworth 1999a). While the former was a Western European phenomenon, the latter was evident foremost in the newly created European states. For Mitrany, modern nationalism expressed the 'trend of our time' – the universal demand for welfare instead of liberal political rights (Hammerlund 2005: 38–39). Mitrany believed that the deciding criterion for the empirical legitimacy of democratic institutions had become the availability of public services. In sum, in Mitrany's thought, British pluralism and South-Eastern European history relate to each other in manifold ways, and one perspective influenced the others.

Liberal Internationalism and the Quest for Social Equality

It is important to consider differences between British and American audiences and the advent of ideological and disciplinary changes in the discussion to follow. Left-liberal strands were among the most important traditions when British IR became an academic discipline and contacts between American and British internationalists were close at the beginning of the twentieth century. One instance for continuous exchanges is Mitrany's own cooperation with the American historian James Shotwell, who was the most important American historian – and propagandist – of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

However, American liberal internationalism was diverse and developed different patterns than British liberalism. A major ideological difference concerned the liberal recognition of social equality as a democratic right. Whereas a new generation continued Hobhouse's turn to social equality in Britain, left-liberalism was perhaps less strong in America. American liberalism never tried to put limits on the power of the aristocracy and rather reflected a rapid industrialisation process. It was hostile to state intervention or at least preferred minimal intervention. The credo was, as Mitrany (1946a: 9–15) put it, every man for himself and God with all of us. American liberalism was about to change with Roosevelt's New Deal, but liberal emphasis on social equality was no matter of course.

While the New Deal inaugurated ideological change and social reform in America, classical realists began to shift their focus from social themes and towards the study of anarchical relations among states. As indicated, Spykman was a leading figure in this project. To do justice to him, it is critical to see that Spykman was still concerned with how citizens impacted foreign policy and with how they were affected by international affairs. However, Spykman abandoned sociology and began to believe that transnational relations between individuals and groups belonging to different states were less important than national boundaries (Spykman 1933: 61). The relations between states were characterised by competition and power struggles, and because of these non-ideal realities, Spykman asked IR scholars to relativise their Kantian, normative, and democratic perspectives.

These methodological debates had an important political subtext. An implication of Spykman's argument was that American IR scholars may remain interested in how democratic control over foreign policy works, but they should not suggest ends and ideals for international conduct.

Approaching international affairs through democratic lenses increasingly required a justification of its own. Mitrany thought of this as an unfortunate trend and intended to contest it as the final result of the nationalisation of democratic theory following the French Revolution and IR's abandonment of normative arguments. The paradoxical result was that the individual ought to gain rights in the domestic realm, while international thought 'was left to wallow in the slough of vague ethical professions and the juridical formulae of Grotius' (Mitrany 1933c: 33). He (1933c: 53) sought to undue this development by reasoning that international thought should again look at the individual 'as the source and end of government' and at social equality as the most important contemporary democratic value (Suganami 1986: 151).

Mitrany developed a two-step argument in his Dodge Lectures, which he held at Harvard 1932, and published as *The Progress of International Government* (1933) (Steffek 2015). It can be seen as the suggestion of a left-liberal perspective to an American audience and as a contestation of IR as a non-normative discipline. In brief, Mitrany objected to the emerging preoccupation with equality at the level of states, or sovereign equality, and called for a turn to social equality at the level of individuals. However, instead of straightforwardly criticising Wilson's idealism and promotion of national self-determination, as Cole did, Mitrany recognised the progressive origins of the idea of state equality. It was closely linked to rights to national self-determination following natural law's defence of the equality of all people and all political communities. Nineteenth-century revolutionary movements that fought against autocratic rule further endorsed equal rights to national self-determination. Most important became Mazzini's sober conception of a 'liberal nationality merging into humanity at large' (Mitrany 1975: 144).

Narrating developments along the lines of a domestic analogy, Mitrany found that nationality had contributed to collective rights, just as democracy had contributed to the recognition of the rights of the individual irrespective of political power or wealth. In a liberal vein, Mitrany (1930) here valued nationality and recognised that democracy could not have evolved from egoistic individualism. It presupposed feelings of community. Democracy was identified with the possession of rights against arbitrary interference, and Mitrany valued the sentiment of nationality for creating an international consciousness against the arbitrary use of force by great powers.

Nationalism, however, abandoned universalistic democratic aspirations after the French Revolution and then became an obstacle to international progress. Indeed, one cannot overemphasise the importance that Mitrany attached to the course of the revolution and its impact on democratic thought. For Mitrany, the most problematical French Revolution development was the attachment of democratic quests to culturally defined groups. It is telling that he considered the French Revolution as an intellectual crisis in whose course the cosmopolitan conception of the individual as a member of humanity at large was replaced by its conception as the citizen of a state.

In this perspective, nineteenth-century national movements ceased to be progressive democratic forces because they linked cultural identity and political aspirations for popular mobilisation against autocratic rule. Mitrany varied the criticism of the Wilsonian identification of national self-determination as a democratic value justifying sovereign equality. Instead of disagreeing with the idea, he provided a historical survey, showing that sovereign equality had neither secured the people in small states against arbitrary interference nor furthered the growth of orderly international conduct. International power inequalities and international economic inequalities obscured sovereign equality: great powers continued to act arbitrarily. Especially at the international conferences between 1815 and 1919, the great powers acted like an uncontrollable directorate so that attempts at creating binding international rules remained largely ineffective.

The doctrine of state equality impeded progress at the international level and resulted in national egoism and – as an organisational complement to this concept – a balance of power politics. Mitrany (1933c: 99) blamed liberal internationalists from Comte to Spencer for the naïve expectation that industrialisation would pave the way for peaceful states rather than militaristic states. In the early 1930s, most states adopted policies of economic planning, which suggested an extension of power politics to the economic realm. Mitrany predicted that national economic planning would result in systematic destruction in the name of the state, just as the territorially motivated wars between barons and kings had caused destruction earlier. National planning turned the executive's economic policies into political decisions that, at best, led to protectionism and, at worst, prompted preparations for military conflict (Mitrany 1937a; Wolin 1987). Mitrany harshly criticised the idea of sovereign equality and the state fixation on any international thought and liberal internationalism in particular.

The overall argument reveals an attempt at making left-liberalism acceptable in an American context and in particular with regard to American pluralists. Mitrany ranged widely in international thought to bridge American pluralists' interest in international legalisation of international conduct with his own emphasis on welfare. For the former, the absence of a formal and superior command did not deny the mutual obligations of states that entered into bi- or multilateral treaties (Schmidt 2002: 21). American IR scholars and international lawyers such as Edwin Borchard objected to state sovereignty as a half-ideological doctrine and as an obstacle to international law because it reduced international law to rules on which states voluntarily agreed. Mitrany argued with their critique, but he emphasised international law as a means towards welfare at the level of individuals. He (1933c: 69) focused on administrative law, regulating social activities, to which states should contribute according to their capacities. The idea of an (unwritten) universal legal order from which states could derive competence in internal affairs and belief in international customary law and treaties allowed Mitrany to point to progress towards an evolving international welfarist legal order. However, in doing so, he failed to soberly distinguish between the (redefined) rights of states and the rights of individuals vis-à-vis their states (Steffek 2015: 37).

According to Mitrany's (1933c: 117) 'social' theory of sovereign equality, states – through membership in a world society – had a duty to further the progressive growth of international law and welfare-directed cooperation. However, whereas Hobhouse had addressed questions of welfare rather as questions of collective rights, welfare, for Mitrany (1933c: 79), ought to address peoples instead of states:

> But the moment we speak of the satisfaction of actual needs it becomes clear that the people themselves, and not the formal States, are the rightful claimants and beneficiaries. And if their claims may go beyond the ordinary functions of the national State, then clearly the method of satisfying those claims may pass, if need be, above the authority of that State.

Hence, and going here beyond Hobhouse's earlier qualifications, Mitrany (1933c: 85) derived social equality at the level of individuals from democratic theory as the most important ideal. This means that Mitrany did not only argue along the lines of domestic analogies but that he also relied on logical deductions (Suganami 1986). Like other British left-liberals and socialists such as Cole (1953: 284) and Thomas Marshall (1973: 8), Mitrany (1933c: 87) defined democratic progress as the steadily

growing recognition of social rights: 'We now accept the view that political equality is needed not merely for negative ends, for the preservation of traditional abstract rights, but for the creation of fresh rights, so that the resources of society may be used to satisfy actual needs.' While he did not properly define political, legal, and social rights, he argued broadly along the lines of the classical definitions – civic and political rights then include freedom of speech, equality before the law, property rights, and the right to political participation through election.

By implication, the purpose of international cooperation included the organisation of law and order and the guarantee of the free development of minorities and individuals as well as the advance of social and material progress. As against liberal internationalism, Mitrany argued that progress towards social rights is a principle for international, as well as for domestic, organisation. At all levels, a legitimate economic order ought to be organised for the purpose of service rather than for private profit. From this it follows that international redistribution is necessary to mitigate standard-of-living inequalities amongst citizens from different states and that it is equally necessary to improve the living conditions of those who are worst off.

The argument reflects the intensification of the ideological divide between nationalism and internationalism. From the early 1930s on, Mitrany found that state sovereignty and nationalism had to be attacked to prevent a looming catastrophe. For Mitrany (1947), ideological conflicts between nationalism and internationalism replaced earlier ideological conflicts between the left's support of socialisation and the conservative protection of negative rights and the private sphere: 'the governing condition is not public versus private, but national versus international'.

On the nationalist right, there was at first reluctance to embrace socio-economic planning. Carl Schmitt vigorously opposed the social-democratic claim that the state ought to further socio-economic homogeneity. For Schmitt, the state was the authority deciding the ultimate questions of war and peace, and he was highly sceptical that any measure could be taken to reduce the antagonism between different domestic groups and classes. However, fascist realities soon disappointed right-wing intellectuals such as Schmitt (Mazower 1998: 26–7). Fascist regimes soon began to conceive planning as inevitable (Noel and Therien 2008: 112). In both Italy and Germany, a command economy planned autarkic development and a racist distribution of welfare. Eventually, German fascism's utopia of a racially purified German empire was partly realised during the Second World War (Mazower 1998: xiii).

In view of the fascist domination of Europe and racist welfare states, Mitrany inquired into the causes of such extreme nationalism, intensified his commitment to the fight of nationalism, and, throughout the Second World War, gathered with people of diverse professional backgrounds and political affiliations to think about a denationalised post-war Europe. He developed the architecture of what might be called functional pluralism. Functional pluralism is driven by both the preceding summarised normative commitments and by an attempt to counter implicit and extreme nationalism(s).

The Invention of Functional Pluralism

Towards the end of the war, planning became the order of the day since socio-economic stability was viewed as being important for both domestic democracy and international security (Chap. 6). In the United States, a generation of New Deal officials diffused left-liberal ideas and projected the American experiment onto the global level when they argued that American planning for post-war Europe had to include welfare (Barnett 2011: 99). When President Roosevelt elaborated on the significance of the Atlantic Charter, after the British government had pushed welfarist clauses, he conceived of it as proof that the lessons of history had been learnt. 'The well-intended but ill-fated experiments of the former years did not work' (cited in Clavin 2001: 200). In contrast to Wilson, Roosevelt promised that American support of democracy would be accompanied by economic reconstruction.

As we have already seen, the British left equally debated the proper extent of planning, as shown by the proposals written in expectation of another peace conference open to the intellectual elites. As Mitrany (1975: 20) recorded, intellectuals and international civil servants who thought of the work that had to be done on the ground addressed the same topic but then often thought in different directions. In retrospect, these differences disappear behind the overall popularity of functionalist ideas. They were *en vogue* among the British left, American New Dealers, civil servants, and theorists when thinking about European reconstruction, the post-war world order, and the international organisation following the League of Nations.

Mitrany's *A Working Peace System* (1943) was and perhaps remains equivocal. It be read as a 'peace-through-prosperity' (Richmond 2005: 8) and as a pragmatic proposal, learning from the failure of the League of

Nations, for task-specific international organisations that had a real chance of success in spite of the increasing hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. The organisation of transnational welfare would then be the task of an international technocracy largely removed from democratic control (Herz 1959: 326). However, when his contemporaries interpreted the pamphlet along these lines, ignoring underlying democratic considerations, Mitrany (1945b) felt severely misrepresented. He conceived of his functional pluralism as a response to the question of how transnational welfare might be organised in a denationalising and democracy- and social-pluralism-enhancing way.

To be clear, what Mitrany later published began as a commissioned work written for Chatham House's Foreign Press and Research Section, which was then part of the British Foreign Office's war effort (Ashworth 2013). Although Chatham House had begun to include left-liberal and radical thinkers in the 1930s, a fully radical proposal would have found little support. On the other hand, Mitrany always managed to defend a distinct position and refused ideological or political monopolisations of this work. In what follows, I will suggest a reading that puts emphasis on Mitrany's pluralist opposition to liberal world government proposals and on concerns with social equality, citizen representation, and democratic control.

Prior to the formulation of his own institutional proposal, Mitrany derived different forms of international organisations from constant peace thinking (Archibugi 1992). On the surface, he questioned their rationality and chances of success, but looking a bit deeper it is clear that he also refined common understandings of the relationship between the spread of representative democracy and international peace, presenting a complicated picture. The proposed international organisations differed in their scope (universal or regional) and had varied criteria for selection (league of democracies or league of ideologically likeminded states) and electoral policies (representation of states or of citizens). However, none of the proposed models suited the needs of the approaching post-war order and the need for socio-economic planning in particular (Mitrany 1966: 52).

One reason for the immediate success of Mitrany's pamphlet was his case against federalism, as suggested by Clarence Streit (Ashworth 2013). Streit (1939) suggested a league of democracies as a nucleus for an international federation and an international rule of law that would be comparable to domestic experiences. Very different circles, including some British socialists, American realists, and international officials, agreed on

the undesirability and unlikeliness of an international federation. A universal federation appeared to be even more unlikely in view of the growing ideological divide between the Western allies and the Soviet Union.

Few contemporaries and theoretical commentators recognised that Mitrany's arguments against federalism were first of all concerned with its underlying democratic theory. For Mitrany, Streit's reading of Tocqueville understated nineteenth-century authors' ambivalent attitude towards democracy and, as a result, placed too much trust in representative democracy's self-sustaining capabilities. Streit failed to appreciate that the twentieth century's key problem was the absence of an international social policy to secure the welfare of populations. Federalist arguments failed to modernise liberal democratic theory in the face of the recent social transformations that had allowed the rise of nationalism and fascism.

Furthermore, the method on which federalism relied, the domestic analogy, extrapolated proposals from a view of domestic institutions with a territorial base and usually suggests the extension of domestic institutions or procedures to the international arena (Suganami 1989: 104–8). For Mitrany (1933b) 'we have probably been led astray by working with a plausible but false analogy with national territorial authority, on the assumption that all that was needed was to adapt the traditional conceptions and national organisation to a wider field'. Like Cole, Mitrany (1966: 40) opposed the federalist flirting with the idea of a world state that implied the suppression of social differences. Mitrany cautioned that its vast organisation would be ill-suited to deal quickly with complex, fragmented, and changing modern problems (Trachtman 2013: 16–19).

A world state or even a political authority with the power to make comprehensive planning decisions also contained a tyrannical danger since its accumulation of power would be beyond the individual's effective control to resist. The individual would become absorbed in an anonymous mass, making understanding and criticism of executive authority impossible. Federalist schemes of representation offered no resolution of this problem. Even if they suggested the representation of peoples, they still adhered to parliamentarism. Accordingly, an international assembly should be composed of delegates elected popularly or by national parliaments. Mitrany, however, doubted that such a legislative body would turn into an organ that could control the politics conducted by the heads of state. British internationalists agreed with Mitrany that democracy and world government with a body constituted by plebiscites of unimaginably many votes were simply counterparts (Dawson and Spencer 1945: 16). From a

pluralist-democratic perspective, democracy was about the rights of individuals who were seen as active citizens and critics of the political life, and not about mass voting on a global scale.

Less well known than the functionalist case against federalism is that Mitrany equally objected to regional or ideological unions. He believed that they would promote a sense of 'group patriotism' and encourage the formation of other international groups to counter-balance their influence. Those who proposed a league of democracies erred in their belief in democratic self-preservation and in the democratisation of autocratic states as a sufficient condition for the establishment of an enduring peace. For Mitrany (1966: 48), Weimar's formal democracy had self-destructed under the pressures of the Great Depression. By implication, the further democratisation of domestic systems could again lead to adventurous quests to secure the general welfare of the population and the pursuit of latently aggressive economic-political foreign policies. In other words, the absence of war no longer equated to peace because national planning eroded the distinction between the economic and the political spheres and often implied international harm (Mitrany 1937b). Even a league of social democracies with harmonious policies could only secure peace within its own borders and would probably spark conflicts and motivate backlash beyond them.

As a result of the survey, Mitrany found that the available democratic peace theories offered no adequate schemes to tackle modern problems. Mismatches between the social and the political orders were evident within states and in international affairs. In an age of international interdependence, transnational activities, and transborder problems, local quests for social equality amongst individuals required abandoning thinking in terms of the formal equality amongst states. The circumstances required a readjustment between the social life and the range of authority, and Mitrany assumed that this was also desirable. He never provided a general definition of functional authorities but did stress that these institutions needed to vary because of their responses to different social activities. According to the classical functional idea, authority ought to be linked to a specific activity, instead of to a territory, and should serve a human need (Mitrany 1966: 27). Functional organisation ought to organise, and thus protect, social activities against the alienating political and territorial authority of the state.

How precisely did Mitrany imagine the transformation of political into functional authority? He provided a quite detailed picture that pivots on the introduction of executive authority through a decentralised network of

supranational, functional organisations. In theory, these organisations would entail not only democracies but all states concerned with a task regardless of regime type. Authority would not be linked to territory but to performance. Because they only have power in a particular field, functional agencies would not be compulsory. They would account for modern society's differentiated and complex social structure by providing services that reflected modern needs and by steadily reorganising alongside dynamic social changes. Mitrany assumed that this would be possible because they would not require states to submit sovereignty to an all-encompassing political institution that would hamper the process of reorganisation. Functional agencies should work on an international scale to allow for the regulation and peaceful change of the socio-economic order.

In response to Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter (1941), Mitrany further detailed how functional agencies might underlie socio-economic planning for democratic and international stability. He (1945c; f) proposed a tripartite outline according to which there would be functional agencies in three forms: functional organisations with advisory and coordinating authority (e.g. agriculture), those with executive control over the distribution of general means (e.g. oil, rubber), and those with powers of direct administration where the issue itself is international (e.g. transport). The tripartite outline deviates from Mitrany's acknowledgement of the principle of subsidiarity, which stated that only transborder problems ought to be solved under international control – functional organisation would affect most realms of life. It rather reflected Roosevelt's emphasis on the need to provide fair access to and redistribution of raw materials. This was an attempt at breaking with long-standing practices of imperial competition, leading to the exploitation of colonies for the purpose of waging war. Mitrany supported this turn, assuming that questions of justice were international questions and that functional agencies were best suited to deal with international investment, basic resources, migration, and technology transfer (McCarthy 1998: 102–103).

For Mitrany, the idea of withdrawing raw materials from political and, in particular, nationalist control was also appealing because it promised more peaceful relations. In the case of political tensions, functional agencies could deny a service, and Mitrany (1966: 62–74) believed that international officials entrusted with decision-making power would not hesitate to impose sanctions. They would possess the competence to judge situations neutrally, and their 'international loyalty' would prevent national influence. In this respect, Mitrany speaks positively of the role of international officials.

After Mitrany's vigorous critique of federalism, the question of how functional agencies with such vast competencies might be democratically controlled of course arises. Although Mitrany separated his proposal from the liberal principle of 'one state, one vote', he argued that functional organisations relied on a different democratic principle. They constituted a 'working' instead of voting for democracy. Membership and participatory rights in functional organisations would realise what he called functional equality at the level of states. States would remain equal before the law but would gain different participatory rights and duties in international bodies either in proportion to their epistemic and material contributions to task performance or in proportion to their involvement. Benefits would be fairly distributed among all of the respective states.

Mitrany (ibid.: 77), like Cole or Hobson, remained equivocal with regard to the rights of small states. On the one hand, he stressed that small states might be capable of participating in control and might commonly balance a great power's accumulation of power. There was a concern with breaking with the practices of uncontrolled colonial exploitation, and Mitrany represented international technocracy as a necessary institution to check power politics. Mitrany (1944b) conceived of the empowerment of an international technocracy as a disempowerment of the British Colonial Office and as a 'means for economic development which would bring in the necessary foreign capital without political strings, but which would also be a means of seeing that the job would be done as a real service to the people and not left into the hands of corrupt ruling cliques and incompetent administrators.'

Mitrany (1966: 79) radicalised the welfarist Zeitgeist and advocated using international wealth for the well-being of the inhabitants of small, undeveloped states in the long term: '[I]n that way the less powerful and less wealthy peoples would at least get some of the reality of equality, for limitation in executive control does not imply exclusion from participation in the work and in its benefits, or indeed in the shaping of more general lines of policy'. His aim was to encourage – in view of small or undeveloped states – a gradual distribution of supplies according to needs. Weakening the formula of state equality and the national executive's participatory rights in functional organisations should allow for more socio-economic equality among peoples. However, on the other hand, Mitrany admitted that small, underdeveloped states were probably incapable of providing civil servants, scientists, and budgetary contributions and would have little voice in decision-making or controlling functional bodies.

Functional organisations would be largely run by an independent and technocratic secretariat, staffed by Western experts maintaining the day-to-day business.

Functional Pluralism Versus Realist Functionalism

Mitrany (1946b, 1966: 84) ultimately aimed at the democratisation of these bureaucratic structures, but this was a long-term perspective: 'The functional structure could be made a real union of peoples, not of states, but of the people directly concerned in any specific function, by giving them functional representation somewhat on the lines of the governing organ of the ILO.' Mitrany originally hoped that the people would be represented by their governments only in the founding process of international functional organisations. Afterwards, direct representatives of the people ought to confirm these organisations and receive, through an institutionalised process, a position within their framework. He later mitigated demands of bottom-up democratisation but continued to think about the possible democratisation of international functional organisations.

While Mitrany recognised the Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC), the international public unions, and the League's functional organisations as examples of functional organisation, most often he referred to the ILO. Compared to Cole's view of the ILO's representative architecture, Mitrany's judgement was favourable. Mitrany celebrated the fact that the ILO included organised labour groups and conceived of its tripartite conditions and the functional representation of (employer, labour, and national) interests in the governing organs of the ILO as a democratic model that ought to be extended to other international functional organisations. The ILO did not live up to radical demands, as Mitrany knew, but its representational system formed an attack on the principle that only governmental and national interests deserve to be represented. It allowed the expression of transnational interests and flourishing of transnational cross-connections at the expense of nationalism. Following Mitrany, the ILO's 'functional democracy' was seen as a role model (Dawson and Spencer 1945).

To promote functional pluralism in the United States, Mitrany borrowed from the New Deal and highlighted the parallels between the two programmes (Ekbladh 2010: 62). The references to the New Deal are domestic analogies, but they work without the personification of the state and differ greatly from those of the federalists (Suganami 1989: 193).

Instead of constitutional progress towards a law-making authority, which would in turn be attached to a centralised authority, there ought to be social and experimental reform along the lines of the New Deal. The New Deal did not involve constitutional changes, and Mitrany (1950) stressed the fact that functional change did not presume a political constitution.

A case in point was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which was designed to concentrate on a single task (Mitrany 1945d). The TVA transcended state boundaries, was controlled by the executive branch instead of Congress, and employed scientific and administrative skills to stimulate growth in an underdeveloped area. Mitrany assumed that complex socio-economic tasks necessitated new linkages between executive control and functional administration, which would come at the expense of legislative control. Copying Roosevelt's piecemeal approach that enabled the New Deal, Mitrany assumed that the executive branch could push through treaties, which allowed for functional organisation, although the United States had never joined the League because the Senate had declined to ratify the relevant treaties.

References to the New Deal proved Mitrany's left-liberal and pro-American identity in an univocal manner, and this probably made his suggestions more acceptable for British and American policy circles than Carr's. Carr (1947: 252) echoed Mitrany's emphasis on social equality, but Carr's implicit reliance on the Soviet model revealed a different ideological affiliation. Carr straightforwardly argued that small states were outdated and that they should be attached to greater powers in military and economic terms. It outraged Carr (1943) that small nations such as Slovakia wanted to have their own railways or electricity supply systems, and, as indicated, Carr attacked small states' right to self-determination by comparing it to the outdated principle of bourgeoisie democracy (Cox 1999: 650).

The critical distinction between realist functionalism and functional pluralism is, then, that the former envisioned a continuing disproportionate influence of great powers in international functional organisations, while the latter only allowed for the great powers' initiative in the founding of functional organisations, which should then enjoy the utmost administrative independence (Scheuerman 2011: 76). States in both cases would lose sovereignty, but they would be subject either to the influence of arbitrary great powers or to a rational international administration. Carr arguably failed to break with authoritarian methods of economic penetration.

Aware of Carr's borrowings, Mitrany (1943, 1945c) argued that Carr's critique of the nation-state – a unit that was according to Carr simply too small for the modern era – failed to reason in normative terms how overcoming the nation-state was ethically sound. Mitrany was perhaps aware of the fact that Carr had proposed to offer national minorities economic incentives in order to persuade them to return to their state when he worked for the Foreign Office (Mazower 1998: 53). For Mitrany, Carr understated the complexities of the problem of nationalism, and he understood that he failed to use functionalism as a tool to further truly post-national communities. Nationalities would still determine political and territorial borders, and nationalities could continue pursuing their national interests in an empire or socialist union as outlined by Carr.

Carr's role model, the Soviet Union, was for Mitrany not an example of international planning or an example of a post-national union. Instead, it represented an extremely nationalistic state that repeated the practices of exclusive nationalism at a higher level. He doubted that a system of dominant and satellite states could allow for effective international social reform because it would always exclude actors involved in a certain socio-economic problem. Mitrany legitimated greater economic interference to redress transnational inequalities, qualifications to the formula 'one state, one vote', and a shift of decision-making power from national politicians to international civil servants because of his welfarist commitments (Doyle 1983: 334). Yet, in comparison to Carr, Mitrany continued liberal concerns for minority rights and protections against arbitrary international domination.

Debates about the relocation of populations with respect to the Sudeten Germans show further that Mitrany opposed national definitions of political community and territorial revisions amongst states. For him, even a peaceful change of frontiers constituted a harmful disturbance of social life for the affected people. Mitrany strenuously opposed territorial resettlement that involved transfers of populations because they rested on the idea of a pure racist state (Fisher and Mitrany 1943). Such policies accepted the Nazis' definitions of political community and interfered with citizens' liberty. Mitrany argued that persons cannot be forced to immigrate to autocratic or poor states that would disrespect their rights. For Mitrany, individuals had a right to choose their place of residency, and under no circumstances should they be deported to a state with frequent human rights violations.

Functional Pluralism and the Origins of United Nations Specialised Agencies

The preamble to the charter of the UN begins with the words 'We the peoples' (MacDonald 2008: 83). The phrase replaced the statist language of the 'High Contracting Parties' that opened the covenant of the League of Nations and entails a democratic claim. It suggests that it was the self-governing nations of the world who created the UN. Although the phrase can be seen as a 'rhetorical flourish' (ibid.) – neither democratic constitutions nor intergovernmental organisations have ever been created by a democratic act – it signals a commitment to democracy for the future UN. And indeed, the commitment has been often recalled and redefined in line with the demands of a more democratic UN.

However, while a comparison of the changing preambles indicates democratic progress, a comparison of the founding processes points to a different direction. It is often missed that the creation of the League of Nations and of the UN followed different patterns. In 1919, commitments to democracy and transparency in international affairs were stressed and peace making was made accessible to a wider range of actors. The elites who had supported or at least not opposed the democratic war cause were allowed to pay close attention to the negotiations. The American and British government travelled with large delegations, and Mitrany was among the many observers of the following Paris Peace Conference. Critical contract negotiations self-evidently occurred behind closed borders but the event was, compared to the preceding era of secret treaty making, relatively transparent.

The creation of the UN, on the other hand, was a prolonged and less transparent process (Grigorescu 2015: 145). Starting in 1942, the Allied forces had been calling themselves the UN and set up specialised agencies that would later became parts of the officially created, in 1945, UN (Plesch and Weiss 2015). However, only a small circle of experts and delegates participated in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, which established the institutional architecture of the UN (Salter 1945). In view of this historical origin, the question arises as to what role functionalism played in the process leading to the UN specialised agencies and for the practitioners involved in it (Burton 1972: 100–111). Instead of suggesting that it played a clearly identifiable role (or not), I like to conceive of functional pluralism as an approach that used the same language as the international officials preparing the UN charter. However, functional pluralism's democratic concerns also reduced its acceptability in these circles.

To approach the topic, it is helpful to remember that Mitrany enjoyed close relations with international officials who worked first for the League and then for the UN. Although their ideas and impacts have long been neglected, we now know that the design of the UN cannot be explained without considering their influence (Johnson 2014). Historians of 'objective' internationalism or official functionalism (Sluga 2013: 13; Rietzler 2011) who studied the thoughts and policy proposals of international civil servants implied this for long. Since 1919, those working in the League's functional organisations elaborated on the virtues of international administration and contributed to the creation of the stylised figure of free-thinking and unbiased international experts. Reworking their organisation's ideology and enjoyment of the 'Geneva spirit' into theoretical claims, they praised international functional organisation as a resolution for the increasingly complicated tasks of modern government. Mitrany's (1936: 263) thought varies some of the arguments because he viewed international administration as more efficient and transparent than domestic political systems that were still in the process of democratisation and that were infused by nationalist views.

In the 1940s, many international civil servants supported international functional organisation. The group included Eric Drummond et al. (1944), the League's first secretary-general, Arthur Salter (1945), a former head of the League's Economic and Financial Section and future deputy director general of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Frank G. Boudreau (1945), a member of the League's secretariat, and John Boyd Orr (1945), who became the first director general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. For them, however, a strong political authority directing international functional organisations or comprehensive planning agencies with authority in many fields were imperative for the success of international planning.

The competing proposals become intelligible if one conceives of them as reflections of organisational loyalties and past experiences. As the League's secretary-general, Drummond cooperated closely with heads of state. Drummond et al. (1944) hence supported a universal international organisation and, as part of it, international organisations that would be similar to the wartime agencies that were created to manage problematic issues such as raw materials, shipping, production, or food distribution. He envisioned that ad hoc agencies might be expanded into permanent, task-specific international bodies. Drummond, as well as ILO Secretary-General Wilfried Jenks (1943: 94), however, stressed that the final responsibility for the policy and the control of the agencies had to rest with intergovernmental bodies.

Salter (1945), whose first experiences of international administration can be traced to transgovernmental wartime planning (1917–19), equally conceived of functional organisations as part of a universal international organisation, but he thought that coordination amongst the functional agencies ought to take place in transgovernmental bodies. From the perspective of international officials, some independence from political interferences was positive, while insulation was viewed as dangerous and counterproductive (Johnson 2014: 33). Mitrany's primary concern, on the other hand, was the avoidance of accumulations of political power in his original proposal of fragmented responsibilities, implying that some issues would be dealt with at the global level while others would remain a matter of local administration. Functional pluralism embraced the view that there ought to remain segmented responsibilities among international organisations with specific tasks, and that any international organisation ought to institutionalise the functional representation of individual and group interests. International officials rather advocated for transgovernmental or intergovernmental functional organisations.

Robert Cox (1968: 326) was the first to recognise that Mitrany placed special emphasis on the reconstruction of social pluralism, especially in those societies that had been under totalitarian rule. In this perspective, international organisations ought to entertain close relations with subnational groups to secure their flourishing and to protect them as far as possible from undue statist interference. In this view, the ILO could be of special importance. It advocated the freedom of association and strong trade unions and – more than any other organisation – enabled contact between unions and other functional groups. Its representative architecture demanded that citizens – through intermediary organisations – ought to play an active part. Again, the goal, was, as Mitrany's countless excerpts from Hobhouse demonstrate, to create transnational connections so that men who had just fought one another would finally find themselves interrelated in various ways.

Furthermore, for Mitrany and Salter, international civil servants and other individuals working for functional organisation were equally important for the reconstruction and strengthening of pluralism. Accordingly, international functional organisations provided space for face-to-face contacts and democratic debates and allowed for identification with a social, vocational, or administrative aim (Murphy 1999). Individuals are expected to promote these interests and, by definition, anti-nationalist views in the native political communities. Mitrany assumed that the reconstruction of democracy in Germany

depended to a large degree on winning over the administration. Only if officials identified with democratic values and were embedded in a transnational network was long-term democratic consolidation conceivable. Functional pluralism hence aimed at strengthening multiple identifications amongst all segments of society at the expense of nationalism. Mitrany's student P. Taylor summarised the logic as follows: 'Man can be weaned away from his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fruitful international organisation [...]. Individuals and groups could begin to learn the benefits of cooperation [...] creating interdependencies and undermining the most important basis of the nation state" (cited in Griffith 2001: 192).

In view of Mitrany's pluralist intentions, it needs to be stressed that Mitrany did not assume the possibility of drawing clear lines between political and non-political issues (the so-called separability thesis), as is frequently suggested. He acknowledged the importance of the public administration for the survival of any political order and, in a deliberate and political act, suggested denationalising organisations that might contribute to the reconstruction and consolidation of democracy. The anti-nationalist attitude suited Western circles well following the experience of totalitarianism but would soon be at odds with the rise of colonial nationalism.

However, when the UN charter came into being, Mitrany (1945b) was rather disappointed and found that one could only hope to make the best of conservative ingredients. Repeating the mistakes of the League, the charter reaffirmed national sovereignty and great power dominance. For Mitrany (1955), the Security Council was an 'illegitimate oligarchy' while outlines for specialised agencies remained too vague. This made it impossible to predict whether future functional cooperation had a real chance of success.

Assessing the impact of the different variants of functionalism on the UN, Cox arrived at the conclusion that functional views remained the doctrine of a minority, but an influential minority (Cox and Jakobson 1973: 402–404). Mitrany and international officials provided the institutional blueprints for a new system of socio-economic cooperation and for the UN specialised agencies. Mitrany's extension of Western democratic theory attracted the interest of American intellectuals, while the proposed erosion of sovereignty was acceptable neither to the United States nor to the Soviet Union. However, his welfarist vocabulary was taken up by international officials and significantly shaped the self-conception and legitimation of the UN specialised agencies (Piquet 1945).

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to introduce Mitrany as a theoretically well-versed and pluralist thinker. Mitrany carried on the pluralist tradition of thought and reflected upon its cogency in view of examples from beyond Western Europe. He was already critical of the state and nationalism in his Balkan studies, and his survey of foreign manipulations of Balkan nationalism prompted him to regard liberal beliefs in democratic nationalism as an abstract ideal. Although representative democracy was installed in South-Eastern Europe after 1919, Mitrany argued that this was only a formal change, and Western social democrats missed the chance to promote democratic consolidation. Western social democrats did not see that they had to e.g. mobilise the peasants – who were first of all concerned with social equality – to turn representative democracy into a reality.

In view of Western experiences, Mitrany equally went beyond Hobhouse's criticism of the modern trinity of nationality, territory, and democracy. Mitrany was deeply suspicious of the liberal narrative of democratic nationalism – legitimating democracy within clear frontiers – because of its moral particularism. Mitrany aimed at shifting the attention of Western intellectuals and policymakers to popular demands of welfare, which were inevitably linked to dissatisfaction with the slow and ineffective work of representative democracy in the 1930s. He was convinced that popular demand for socio-economic equality, and meeting that demand, would determine the future of representative democracy regardless of its locality.

When Mitrany first addressed an American audience, he varied the pluralist use of democratic theory. Instead of returning to classical democratic theory, he deduced social equality as a key value from contemporary democratic theory and argued that transnational welfare was the proper objective of international cooperation. In *A Working Peace System* (1943), Mitrany carried on and developed his criticism of centrist liberalism, available democratic peace theories, and proposals of a league of democracies as a nucleus of a world state. For Mitrany, these theories failed to address the problem of the reconstruction of domestic democracy and social pluralism after the war, erred in their assumption of democratic self-preservation, and overlooked the fact that national planning had eroded distinctions between the economic and political spheres. Representative institutions were no longer guarantors of peace because the provision of welfare changed domestic balances of power and reduced the scope of transnational contacts.

Concern with the reconstruction of democracy-securing transnationalism is a unique feature of Mitrany's wartime thought. He hoped that international officials and social groups working in a network of functional organisation might contribute to the reconstruction of anti-nationalist social pluralism in societies that had once been under totalitarian rule. Whereas Carr assumed that citizens living in territories defined by the principle of the nation would shift their loyalties to international organisations if they provided for their welfare, Mitrany aimed at strengthening active citizenship and social pluralism at the local and transnational levels. It is well known that Mitrany's and not Carr's opposition to nationalism was well received by Hans Morgenthau (1966) and other realists.

Finally, Mitrany's functional pluralism assumed that the design and future course of international organisations ought to reflect the rise of democratic values. He wedded his support for supranational but task-specific functional organisations to an advocacy for the institutionalisation of functional representation and face-to-face discussion amongst leaders of various groups. His institutional proposals formed an important part of the functionalist thinking preceding and influencing the UN, but his demanding democratic ideas were quickly marginalised. A new generation of UN officials seized upon Mitrany's welfarist language but neglected Mitrany's case against nationalism and sovereignty. After the early 1940s, which witnessed the production of various world order proposals, Mitrany lobbied for the development of gradual functional reform and deepened his considerations of representative democracy and the emerging UN bureaucracy, as I will show in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER 8

Twentieth-Century Representative Democracy and the Democratic Legitimacy of the United Nations

Introduction

In this chapter, I will revive Mitrany's pluralist stance of the democratic deficit of Western welfare states and the United Nations (UN). For Mitrany, it was not a truly democratic peace that had begun after 1945 since citizens were accustomed to overly nationalist conceptions of political community and to the depoliticising levels of domestic and transnational bureaucracy. Pluralism's earlier bearer of hope, European trade unions, which had long forged democracy, stopped 'carrying the hopes of the poor' and hardly demanded further democratic participation (Eley 2002, 402). Yet the question of participation divided, and continues to divide, advocates of electoral democracy and substantive democracy.

Mitrany (1957a) focused on the development of British democracy after the suspension of wartime restrictions and parliamentarianism. On the basis of this example, he diagnosed a disturbing transformation of representative democracy into what he aptly called poll democracy and what is generally known as Schumpeterian or electoral democracy (Schumpeter 2003: 284). The term *poll democracy* rightly implies that people are mobilised only during election times to accept or reject the elites who rule them, while for most of the time, political and administrative elites manage an expanding welfare state without disruption. The elites, or Western governments concretely, assert their democratic legitimacy, even though the state of society betrays older and more demanding democratic ideals of active

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citizenship. While Mitrany (1937: 641) otherwise showed little interest in premodern ideas, he now returned to classical discourse on self-government in the polis in his use of a familiar technique: He contrasted the revolutionary promises and hopes invested in democracy with the actual materialisation of representative democracy and the depoliticising effects of the welfare state.

Pluralist criticism became an exception amongst British leftists. The British left accepted that nationalisation proceeded without the introduction of worker control and did not protest against paternalistic and bureaucratic visions of social security (Eley 2002: 291; Hall 2012: 120–125). Labour celebrated a clear electoral victory in 1945, and British citizens appeared to expect rewards after many wartime sacrifices (Runciman 2013: 113). However, Mitrany's democratic concerns had much in common with classical realists' debate over the need for a critical public discourse (Tjalve 2013). Democracy, for Mitrany, implied active individuals who entertained multiple, overlapping loyalties and who exercised democratic control over administrative conduct within the welfare state so that the political systems' outputs are sufficient to satisfy the needs of the people. The exercise of such democratic control was inextricably linked with the representation of transnational interests that, at best, denationalised the public discourses (Wollf 2013: 10).

The second part of this chapter revives Mitrany's pluralist judgements of the UN. Whereas the League of Nations had rested on a Western-centric conception of international society, the UN turned into the first almost universal international organisation and quickly expanded its bureaucratic system. In the pluralist evaluations, there is an indefeasible tension between democratic discomfort with the course that the UN was taking and a perceived need to defend the organisation against those demanding a return to isolated nation-states. At first, Mitrany legitimated welfarist UN agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). However, Mitrany later became highly sceptical of the development discourse and the rise of modernisation theory among UN officials who supported the top-down managed industrialisation of African and Asian states. His left-liberalism is clearly evident in the contestation of the equation of development with industrialisation and in his proposals for a more democratic UN.

Few studies of Mitrany consider his oeuvre as a whole, with the grave consequence that pamphlets such as *Food and Freedom* (1954) are usually

marginalised. A reason for this lack of scholarly interest might be that Mitrany did not modernise his theoretical and empirical views concurrently with changing events or trends (Keohane 1976). Although this charge holds true to some extent, the neglect can also be explained by the fact that Mitrany ceased to be a representative of a popular approach. In our and perhaps other disciplines, there is a tendency to focus on defending new theories at the expense of taking into account later auto-criticism or changes of opinion. Consideration of Mitrany's post-1945 contributions shows that there is no simple narrative connecting functionalism with the support of the UN specialised agencies.

Twentieth-Century Representative Democracy

Unlike the first one, the second attempt at the consolidation of representative democracy in Europe was based on the acceptance of the need for social security. After the end of the Second Word War, and at the beginning of a second wave of democracy, representative democracy was again constitutionalised in Germany and other European states. There was fuller suffrage, and, after the bitter experience of fascism, citizens gained constitutionally guaranteed rights against the state (Mazower 1998: 290). At the same time, the architects of the Western European post-war democracies assumed that the parliaments had previously possessed too much power. In the new constellations, parliaments possessed less power vis-à-vis the executive but, because of a widely shared commitment to social reform, had to supervise an increasing number of decisions and the social conditions surrounding them (Mazower 1998: 291).

Mitrany, however, continued to be a critic of national welfare from the interwar and wartime onwards. From the 1930s he was suspicious of the growth of state power and administration in Western Europe. For Mitrany, the national organisation of welfare went beyond the properly defined purposes of the state, even if a new consensus among Western ideologies stated the opposite. Here it is critical to see that Mitrany (1935a) developed the tenets of this perspective in view of German fascism's preparation and justification of a racist war state and the international rise of protectionism. For Mitrany, Western thinking about the Western state observed how states overcame other forms of social organisation because they could offer their inhabitants security and sustain social life in general. Yet, for Mitrany, Western states in general and fascist states in particular had lost this capacity. They hampered social security and social intercourse by

building up rigid national boundaries under the conditions of twentieth-century international economic interdependence. The German totalitarian state became the prime example of a perverse threat to democracy and enlightened understandings of security. It penetrated into the fabric of social life and interfered with the liberty of the individual for the sake of military planning. From slightly different angles, Cole and Mitrany both opposed Nazi ideological claims.

After this shared opposition to German fascism, Mitrany and Cole pursued different political projects, and Mitrany somewhat sought to monopolise pluralism. Mitrany (1975b) identified an increasing impotency in political theory to provide an adequate vocabulary for the problems besetting modern democracy. Political theory had always pivoted on the concept of the state, even if it did so in a critical manner. Because of this fixation on the state, whenever liberal states developed into bureaucratic autocracies, political theory had failed to mobilise intellectual and political opposition. Mitrany had a point when he argued that the democratic vocabulary that democratic theory inherited from the nineteenth century had to be modernised further. However, his decision to (unduly) criticise other pluralists and democratic theorists may explain why his writings failed to find wider reception. Mitrany understated Cole's socialist post-1945 resumption of pluralism, which is evident in his critique of representative democracy and the welfare state. He rather tried to turn the pluralist vocabulary against Cole and Laski. For Mitrany (1957b), Cole and Laski accepted the growth of the state's welfarist administration without problematising the fact that this bureaucracy was beyond public control and that it hampered citizens' democratic activism. While the charge is certainly overdue with regard to Cole, it shows that Mitrany struggled greatly with the socialist acceptance of the state after the institutionalisation of national welfare as well as with the decline of socialist internationalism.

Mitrany's own criticism begins with a familiar diagnosis, in which a disjuncture is discerned between the consolidation of representative democracy and the welfare state's accumulation of functions. Mitrany found that the principle of representation had been well justified in liberal theory but, identifying with Hobhouse, traced his disillusion with representative democracy back to the current deterioration of public opinion. Accordingly, advocates of representative democracy, such as Mill, intended representation as a means – besides local government and public deliberation – to put able men in public positions. Their argument presumed an educated electorate with a sensible view of things, democratically organised political

parties bunching together important arguments to facilitate the decision-making process, and the existence of public discourse that deliberately contested the government's work. Yet, for Mitrany (1948a: 93), the evolution of British parliamentarianism was by no means a paradigmatic example of success, but rather illustrated a modern dilemma: 'The representative chambers which have developed out of the British Parliament came into being when, on the whole, the functions of government were very limited and when parliaments were called upon to determine great but general issues which lent themselves to being debated and decided on general principles.' The welfare state's accumulation of functions hence overloaded representative democracy.

Modern nationalism had caused a transformation from the nineteenth-century police state, which protected liberal political rights, to the twentieth-century welfare state, which provided different kinds of social services. Yet, along with this development, the British Parliament had contributed to its own disempowerment because it surrendered ever more power to the executive and civil servants. The British parliament, for Mitrany (1957a: 113), had ceased to be able to perform its two core functions, the representation of citizens' interests and the control of the executive. Although Parliament ought to discuss public manners in view of the common good, it instead had become a stage where competing interests vied for attention, while 'in the name of social justice' the state had become both the maker and breaker of rights. Democracy and good government had drifted apart.

For Mitrany, representative democracy had been taken on a downward spiral. Those depending on electoral success often avoided decisions that promised to be unpopular, even if they would be in the best interest of citizens in the long run. Against his earlier emphasis on social rights, Mitrany returned to a traditional, liberal understanding of negative rights to criticise the state's excessive growth of functions. Mitrany (1960: 548) attacked those of his contemporaries who believed that 'effective popular control' was in place in British democracy and opposed the identification of democracy with a particular kind of representative system. Mitrany (1969) found that the executive had gained so much authority that it routinely approved spending public funds on irrational projects such as the Concorde (an airliner developed jointly by Britain and France) without consulting Parliament. The individual, Mitrany (1960: 548) claimed, was now utterly helpless 'against the flood of government controls and group domination'. Mitrany was thus more

concerned with the questions of active and competent citizenship than with the improvement of parliamentary oversight. He hardly considered the latter as an option for regaining control over the executive and the statist bureaucracy.

The waning of parliamentary control was for Mitrany accompanied by another trend, no less alarming – the increasing depoliticisation of the electorate. When putting forward this diagnosis, Mitrany failed to mention that he had earlier opposed the nationalism of the nineteenth-century movements. His criticism of representative democracy included new and conservative idealisation of nineteenth-century liberalism, one that fit in well with F. Hayek's (1944) nostalgia. Mitrany now relied on an exaggerated contrast between the virtuous fight for political democracy and twentieth-century electorates. Mitrany (1948a: 93; 1935b) found that national welfare had benefited and extended the middle class. By then, however, most citizens remained apathetic and participated only in elections. For Mitrany, the depoliticisation of twentieth-century electorates was a direct effect of national welfare because this had paved the way for national homogeneity and turned citizens into passive inhabitants who uncritically observed the increasing power of the state (Cox 1968: 327). While class consciousness acted as an antidote to nationalism, national welfare mitigated this threat to the rationale of state politics and nationalism. The state's infiltration of social life exposed citizens to the appeals of nationalist ideology – coming often as a handmaiden of the state – and other irrational promises. Mitrany (1949) conceived of totalitarian regimes as extreme cases of the general growth of apathy and national conformity. In view of both Britain and the United States, Mitrany (1955a) argued that post-war representative democracy had deteriorated into poll democracies shaped by a vast uninformed voting power.

The materialisation of representative democracy after 1945 triggered a wave of intellectual doubts about public rationality. Many IR intellectuals returned to the nineteenth-liberal question of whether, under the conditions of an extended or mass electorate, democracy could be a good and peace-promoting political system. Walther Lippmann (1955: 14), for instance, argued that uninformed voters pursued conflicting interests and that a propagandistic press further impeded liberal democracy's ability to produce rational decisions. Lippmann viewed the masses as politically illiterate, in particular when it came to foreign policy. Schumpeter held the electorate in equally low esteem but had not translated this into a diagnosis of democratic deterioration. Departing from older democratic ideas,

he accepted that modern electorates were only mobilised during an election and that most of the time a professional elite was running the statist bureaucracy. Yet Schumpeter still believed that modern democracies would be peaceful, simply because their capitalist economic system necessitated rational calculation (Doyle 1997: 245). In contrast to Schumpeter, Mitrany (1957a: 111) rather warned that a society that takes on a pre-democratic, Hobbesian character would equally accept Hobbes's international ideas and international power struggles.

Mitrany's demanding approach to democracy is the opposite of the Schumpeterian acceptance of electoral democracy. For Mitrany, representative democracy's division of labour between the masses and their delegates raised the question as to whether a democratic culture could be self-sustaining; eventually, most individuals did not need to engage in democratic discussions. Articulating a substantial definition of democracy, he described democracy in terms of a constitutional protection from arbitrary rule, underscored the individual's ability to actively control public decision-making, and appreciated social pluralism and autonomous, rational, and democratically active individuals. In this vein, loyalties other than nationalism are critical because they prompt other points of view beyond nationalism and thus enable citizens to think critically about the state and political authority.

In contrast to Levine (2012: 171), I believe that Mitrany, like Hobhouse, transcended the communitarian–liberal divide. Both shared the ideal of rational individuals entertaining various overlapping loyalties without favouring a single one – such as patriotism – at the expense of others. Mitrany (1949) began to approve of the former individualist liberalism precisely because it enabled the individual 'socially to distribute his interests and activities and attachments in free choice, and not as before to have them predetermined by class or estate or occupation. The characteristic of the democratic individual is precisely this plural group relationship – his freedom to belong to a variety of religions, political, professional social leisure and leisure groups which may take him, and usually do take him, into different directions and dimensions'.

However, whereas early pluralism conceived of groups and trade unions in particular as necessarily anti-nationalist actors and sources of individual freedom, a new strand within pluralist theory is evident in Cole's and Mitrany' stances on the development of British trade unions. This change of opinion developed along with changes in British trade unions' political role. Between 1933 and 1950 trade union membership increased,

and around 1950 trade unions organised a great part of the labour force (Jackson 2012: 106–7). New theories of trade unionism moved away from the ideas of industrial control and, on the basis of the democratic realism of Schumpeter, rather treated them as interest groups that could complement the planning efforts of the state.

Mitrany equally observed British trade unions' development into bureaucratic, 'goal-oriented' organisations and worried especially about nationalist trends within them. Eventually, British trade unions supported the British war effort during the Second World War and did not protest against the Labour Party's highly bureaucratic organisation of social security and acceptance of Britain's post-war military obligations (Cox 1971: 568; Eley 2002: 303; Mitrany 1957a). Mitrany here agreed with the classical realist Reinhold Niebuhr, who recognised that liberals had understated the challenge that competing class and group interests posed to national democracy. Still, both Niebuhr and Mitrany assumed that social pluralism and multifarious class and group struggles, when channelled into different institutions, might be turned into a source of individual rationality and democratic vitality. Post-war pluralism hence considered that groups may well turn into a source of domination, but it retained a role for them in the democratisation of the state.

The Redemocratisation of the Western Welfare State

On this view, the redemocratisation of Western states depended on the revival of social pluralism and on the denationalisation of the respective electorates, for this would revive a public discourse that deliberately contested the claims statist institutions. To further this objective, Mitrany suggested the introduction of functional devolution and representation at the substate level. For Mitrany, substate developments lagged behind the institutionalisation of functional representation at the international level. The argument is an instance of 'international analogies' since it reverts the 'domestic analogy', which extends institutions or procedures from the domestic to the international arena. It praises developments at the level of international organisations that institutionalised functional representation, such as the UN Charter (Art. 71) to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), seeing it as an advance compared to representative democracy (Holthaus and Steffek 2016). The analogy may

appear unconventional by now. However, for a period it was commonly invoked by British thinkers who had gained practical international experience before they turned into democratic theorists.

According to Mitrany, there ought to be, firstly, a functional devolution of authority so that the scope of authority would be defined by a task or social service. Mitrany assumed that this would allow for greater public control because citizens could then identify poor or negligent administrative performances, which up to this point had remained invisible within the welfarist bureaucracy. Secondly, functional groups such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that focus on one domain ought to play a greater role in the public control of authority (Bartelson 2014; Mitrany 1975b). While Mitrany did not give up his concern for the representation of labour interests, he became rather critical of the development of the British trade unions. After their support of the war effort, the quickly growing unions entered into corporatist relations with the state. Criticism from the unions themselves accords with Mitrany's views. As one unionist put it: 'It is all right having the national interest in mind but we are not the right people to have it' (cited in Middleton 2016: 9). Hence, diverse civil society organisations were needed to oppose easy definitions of the national interest and to counterbalance the state.

Like Cole, Mitrany continued to approve of representation but argued that representative principles needed to be adapted to fit the state's accumulation of functions, which had created unprecedented control of the state over socio-economic factors. For Mitrany, this necessitated reposing the central question of 'authority versus the individual' and reconsidering relationships between citizens and the bureaucracy, which the representative principle had previously settled (Steffek 2015: 33). Accordingly, the proper means for the re-empowerment of the individual was the introduction of functional participation and representation in decision-making committees or (at least) committees responsible for the control over a specific administrative agency or field. Mitrany relied on a rather broad definition of functional representation as the representation of affected individuals and groups in general, dropping Cole's early insistence on the democratic structures of accountability within groups. He did not consider processes of authorisation or actions for the case of misrepresentation. Mitrany rather assumed that members of a group would represent functional views in a deliberative discourse.

How did Mitrany conceive of functional representation and deliberation-promoting arrangements? For Mitrany, civil servants, consumers, producers

or labour groups, or affected persons would at best meet in functional committees responsible for the supervision of one particular administrative agency (Willetts 2006: 312). His examples always included the discursive representation of labour interests, while he also found it necessary to impose checks upon the possible pursuit of sectional interests. Mitrany sympathised with conceptions that gave equal voting powers to included groups so that no sectional interest could gain unchecked power at the expense of other interests. Under these favourable conditions, functional committees promised to be places of critical deliberation and allow for the inclusion of the different social perspectives of those involved in or affected by a policy. Mitrany thought of groups as vehicles for the democratic action of individuals and critical deliberation and less as competing actors within a political system (Nicholls 1994: 135).

Hence, Mitrany (1934) thought about administration as part of an overall attempt at social reform and therewith continued a tradition established by British socialists such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the French progressive Leon Duguit. Efficiency and instrumental rationality are then not the highest goods because 'expert knowledge' could be a matter of professional qualification or of personal involvement – 'every individual', Mitrany claimed, 'is something of a specialist' (cited in Steffek 2015: 34). Civil servants, in Mitrany's view, ought to maintain the virtues of honesty and competence but also undergo special education to make them sensible for social questions. They ought to keep in touch with the public and civic sphere. Otherwise, the people affected might cease to understand bureaucratic decisions and see bureaucratic rule as imposed, while the bureaucracy would lack transparency and become ineffective. Mitrany assumed that exchange and interaction between vocational and civic groups would ensure the administration's democratic accountability, flexibility, and readiness for constructive change, but he was still aware these debates remained political in the sense that they included groups that might pursue sectional interests.

Because of his dissatisfaction with British institutions, Mitrany studied at his own expense the institution of the ombudsman (Anderson 1998: 581). It was first tried out in Scandinavian countries and then copied by West Germany, where a commissioner of the armed forces (*Wehrbeauftragter*) was directly accessible to soldiers and under duty to investigate their complaints (Mitrany 1957d). Mitrany (1957e) appreciated the fact that the institution allowed individuals to make sure that administrations complied with their mandate but also saw that an ombudsman responsible for a

functionally diverse institution received many ill-informed complaints. When he suggested introducing to the British system locally available ombudsmen who would prosecute administrative transgressions infringing citizens' legally granted rights, he was ahead of other theoretical and public proposals in the 1950s.

Liberal Democracy Promotion

Under the lasting impression of fascism, Mitrany thought that the established democracies ought to be denationalised and feared that the promotion of representative democracy in non-Western states would only allow for the growth of nationalism, thereby creating new local and international divides. With regard to the latter, Mitrany actualised the argument that formal democratic institutions remain hollow as long as there is no democratic minimum that enables citizens to educate themselves and to follow political debates. Accordingly, elections and parliamentary institutions cannot be an effective means of collective self-determination when electorates live in poverty and remain illiterate. Conditions of underdevelopment made it unlikely that citizens would make informed and autonomous decisions and, thus, behave more rationally than Western electorates when choosing their members of parliament. The introduction of democratic institutions would only lead to the empowerment of the people if economic inequalities were significantly reduced. Mitrany was hostile to liberal imperialists such as Lionel Curtis and rejected their lip service to democracy as a farce (Mitrany 1943). He also (1948b) opposed European federalists' plans to bring the colonies into the Western system and to install likeminded parliamentary institutions there. For Mitrany, a sound promotion of democracy would begin by building up a local administration that identified with democracy, for democratic consolidation had earlier failed whenever there had been a failure to win over an administration. Democracy, without a democratic administration and a self-maintaining democratic culture, had already proved too fragile in the case of Weimar.

For the most part, Mitrany (1969) remained an (auto-)critic of Western liberalism when he called into question the authority of Western parliaments to speak on decolonisation. Decolonisation had hardly been a central concern of Western voters, and, for Mitrany, liberals erred in advocating democratic self-government in Africa without considering the need for welfare. It gave dependent people votes but no vocations and created a situation of formal political independence but stark socio-economic

dependence, especially in the Middle East and Africa (Mitrany 1975a: 212–215). The formal establishment of self-government was really administered by foreign lawyers and politicians and left the concerned countries further dependent on foreign technicians for their socio-economic development (Mitrany 1952; 1953).

Mitrany (1954: 8) cited the speaker of the Indian parliament to emphasise the position that political independence would remain meaningless if it was not accompanied by a minimum of welfare services for the masses of citizens. For India, Mitrany (1947a: 121) suggested political independence and representative democracy, even though he warned that democratic rights would here gain different meanings. With respect to the Indian case, he allowed for the simultaneous introduction of domestic democracy and welfare. On the other hand, and in view of former African colonies, paternalistic views became obvious in his emphasis on the necessary introduction of functionally organised welfare prior to domestic democratisation. Accordingly, functional agencies such as the Commonwealth Telecommunications Board had the virtue of being effective and indifferent to colour. Their organisation of welfare promised to do more for the actual equality of citizens than voting mechanisms. Here, Mitrany called into question the people's democratic capacities instead of opposing the enduring colour lines within Western liberalism.

The Democratic Legitimacy of the United Nations

Along with the democratisation of Western societies, or at least the rise of the view that only democratic government is legitimate government, ideas about legitimate international organisations reveal a likeminded transition (Suganami 1989: 202). Democratic discussions drove pluralist and competing proposals for a United Europe and for post-war international organisations. Within these discussions, Mitrany put special emphasis on functional representation and on the promotion of social pluralism and active citizenship. These democratic norms are critical to his international pleas, his evaluations of domestic institutions, and, as the following chapter will seek to show, to his democratic judgement of the developments within the UN. Revisiting these judgements will show that Mitrany's position on the UN was far more complex and critical than 'functionalism advocates technocracy' interpretations or presentist monopolisations of Mitrany as a clear advocate of the UN suggest (Devin 2008). Although Mitrany had called for welfarist and social-pluralism-promoting international organisations, he

diagnosed a need to enhance the transparency and accountability of the UN bureaucracy, from the 1950s onwards.

Mitrany's position is best characterised as an ambivalent one because he moved between appraisal and critic of the inter- and post-war UN. Mitrany was more willing than most leftist British internationalists to approve of American hegemony and conceived of it as a needed counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Recall here that Cole rejected international organisations evolving under American hegemony as undemocratic instruments of high finance. Mitrany (1975a: 219), in contrast, lauded the goal of promoting a higher living standard, which was included in the UN Charter and the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (1949). The programme was carried out by the Technical Assistance Administration and UN specialised agencies such as the WHO or FAO. The UN Expanded Technical Assistance Programme is commonly seen as a forerunner of the UN Development Programme (1965), and for Mitrany it implied a move from the welfare state to a welfare world. He mandated UN intervention especially in those cases where developing states had failed to provide the people with the very basic necessities to live.

During the war and in the early post-war period, the assumption that the future democratic consolidation in Europe and the stabilisation of Asia and Africa would depend on the satisfaction of basic needs became common. Mitrany added to this line when he argued that an enlightened great power such as the United States ought to take leadership in furthering a better standard of living (Imber 1989: 20). For Mitrany, the Great Powers had social duties and ought to contribute to the stabilisation and improvement of international society. He critically observed the ideological rival of the United States, the Soviet Union, and conceived of it as an illegitimate great power that had betrayed the social expectation of welfare and turned Marxism into a dogma stabilising an increasingly totalitarian political system. Merging political and academic arguments, Mitrany found that the universal quests for social security underlined the new nationalism in the former colonies and expected it to become a threat to international stability.

Mitrany responded to realist thinking about international balances of power by arguing that the new nationalism could not be tamed by international political balancing because this hindered material prosperity. Accordingly, a focus on national security is self-defeating when states are internally challenged by the demand for social welfare, which they could not satisfy in an internationally interdependent world. As a result, dictators

of different ideological strains might use social frustration to consolidate their regimes. He revised the balance of power terminology and, in doing so, included an analysis of the co-constitutive relationship between the international and domestic realms and an analysis of state-society relations (Hobson and Seabrooke 2001: 240). Mitrany (1947b) introduced the term 'social balance of power' to denote social (im)balances of power between the popular quest for welfare and statist authority and to refer to international Great Power balancing. In his view, the Soviet Union, thinking in spheres of power and influence, was about to exploit social discontent and to use that discontent against the West. South-Eastern European history taught that the Western neglect of welfare demands and refusal to cooperate with local regimes and socialist or peasant parties had contributed to the ultimate collapse of democracy in the interwar period (Mitrany 1950: 9). Hence, the United States should finance and strengthen UN special agencies, as it had done in the case of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

British socialists such as H.N. Brailsford were, as indicated, highly sceptical of UNRRA and of Mitrany's praise of it. According to them, UNRRA and the early UN lacked democratic legitimacy. Mitrany (1944: 50) recalled their response: 'I remember very well how, when the first draft was published [about UNRRA; remark of the author], I was criticised by a great many of my friends on the left for feeling rather satisfied with it. They regarded it as highly undemocratic because it gave such a predominant position to a few Great Powers, and they would have little to do with it.' Hence, it is true to a certain degree that Mitrany (1947b) legitimated American initiatives and UNRRA without paying sufficient attention to the question of how the created agency might be controlled by the states and people affected. He was rather aware of UNRRA's fragile nature and argued that it ought to be turned into a permanent welfarist agency using Western wealth for the welfare of the people in undeveloped states. The expectation only partially materialised – the UNRRA worked only until 1946/47 but paved the way for the establishment of subsequent welfarist agencies, including the FAO (1945) and the WHO (1948).

However, it is critical to see that Mitrany's full-fledged support of the UN was only temporary – there is also a different and far more critical line in Mitrany's political judgements of the UN. From the 1950s onwards, he became increasingly dissatisfied with the work done on the ground, arguing that it was lagging behind that of the League of Nations. There is a certain irony at work because Mitrany's disillusion increased when a new

generation of UN officials took up functionalism. In view of the Technical Assistance Programme, Mitrany objected to the reliance of UN officials on modernisation theory and the UN's increasingly bureaucratic and opaque conduct. Modernisation theory can be understood as the narrative of Western industrialisation as a progressive transformation from premodern to modern societies. It postulates hierarchical differentiations between 'developed' states and 'undeveloped' states that still need to go through Western experiences and follow the proper sequence of economic and social changes (Rist 2008: 98). In UN agencies, the rise of modernisation theory posited economic knowledge as the most important epistemological resource and legitimated comprehensive top-down planning. Important British politicians and intellectuals supported this turn and even argued that the UN should repress native 'social reactions' if they hampered development (Mitrany 1975a: 80).

Mitrany, like Cole (1945), objected to this turn to economic top-down planning that they sensed in the proposals of John Boyd Orr, the director of the FAO. Orr's pre-1945 proposals already revealed considerable planning enthusiasm: he had proposed a World Food Board to plan global food policies in the long term, an idea implying technocratic top-down regulations in the financial and agricultural sectors (Johnson 2014: 20). For Cole, Orr therewith called for the international rule of technicians who believed in capitalist growth and who had no intention to change the global economic regime. Although Orr's idea failed to gain American support, technocratic ideas shaped the FAO's World Food Programme (1961), while modernisation theory increasingly informed the staff of the World Bank from the 1950s onwards (Guilhot 2005: 190). The World Bank then put much faith in Western experts and their capacity to launch and direct an industrialisation process along Western lines (Williams 2011: 42). Modernisation theory involved a particular conception of development according to which progress would not occur naturally in the global South; international action was needed to promote the welfare of its inhabitants. The UN's reliance on this theory and its declaration to promote development and welfare materialised in a new wave of UN development agencies.

One needs to read *Food and Freedom* (1954) against this background. Here, Mitrany in particular targeted the FAO expert's suggestion of industrialisation and mass production as a means of development for undeveloped states. His (1954: 23) statement that 'food cannot be produced in mass production' can be seen as a reply to adherents of modernisation theory within the FAO (Johnson 2014: 146). For Mitrany (1954: 22), FAO and

other UN reports were written from a purely economic point of view and simply suggested a quick industrialisation process to overcome poverty in developing states. This implied the destruction of indigenous peasant farming and the enforced industrialisation of Asia and Africa. Mitrany vigorously attacked the Western scholars' and practitioners' ignorance about local conditions and their neglect of peasants as both affected and important actors in national and international politics. What was suggested was likely to result in a repetition of Western nineteenth-century experiences when industrialisation was linked with a high mortality rate and social alienation. Mitrany, hence, called into question those positive readings of Western industrialisation that legitimated the increasing power of the UN. For him, UN reports ought to include social perspectives on land reform while UN work ought to promote a wide-ranging system of cooperatives and other local organisations in the process of social change and the combination of smallholding with technical innovation. Such arguments reveal Mitrany's left-liberal commitments and a position that ranged from demanding international expert assistance for the purpose of socio-economic development to criticism of the UN.

Mitrany's post-war thought directs attention to the fact that the most rapid bureaucratisation occurred at the transnational level after 1945. Specialised agencies that work on socio-economic 'low-politics' issues make up the major part of the UN system (Pollitt 1986: 161; Johnson 2014: 14). Mitrany sensed that the related expansion of a bureaucracy out of touch with citizens turned into a democratic problem at both the domestic and transnational levels. As soon as UN bureaucratisation announced itself, Mitrany (1953) warned that the expansion of the UN was about to result in a network of excessive, uncoordinated, and rather inefficient bureaucracies. He observed a growing tendency to 'lock up reports and other relevant correspondence and documents in the always capacious cupboards' and a tendency to hide failures 'behind the bureaucratic curtain' (ibid. 153). The UN retrogressed in terms of transparency and public visibility, and Mitrany steadily actualised his account of the diagnosed democratic deficits.

We need to keep in mind Mitrany's critical account of the development of the UN when we return to his delayed praise of the UN charter. Although he first rejected the conservative design of the UN, he praised the UN Charter (Art. 71) to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from the 1950s on. The reason for this was that it empowered the ECOSOC to consult with NGOs that are concerned with matters of its

competence (Davies 2013: 3). Mitrany appreciated the implied institutionalisation of functional representation, though he continued to refer most often to the ILO's more comprehensive allowance of functional representation. These references indicate a preference for institutionalised civil society involvement over ad hoc arrangements.

For Mitrany, NGOs were most important for the improvement of the UN's external transparency. Mitrany (1966: 122–4) found it necessary to improve the public availability of information about international institutions and emphasised the importance of intermediate actors such as critical journalists and NGOs. The latter might function as a two-way channel between public opinion and the international institutions. NGOs ought to watch over international institutions and, additionally, inform the public about important decisions to sustain a critical public discourse. 'Leaders hate people who understand the problems', and NGOs promised to provide a contribution, igniting public interest and debate (Mitrany undated a). Mitrany, hence, envisioned NGOs in the role of the critical observer who watches intergovernmental conservatism and non-transparent conduct (Hutschings 1999: 168). At the same time, he was concerned with NGOs' pursuit of sectional interests and warned that they could promote a one-sided public discourse if their power was not checked.

Questions of Functional Representation

Apart from the UN system, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1951) probed new and valuable forms of functional representation. Mitrany (undated b) was highly interested in its complex architecture. Its organs included, amongst others, a high authority, a common assembly composed of national parliamentarians, and a consultative council composed of NGOs and producers and consumers related to the coal and steel sector. For Mitrany, 'The common assembly has the power of control and parliamentary, not necessarily expert representation; the Consultative Council has expert representation but no power of control' (ibid.). Mitrany appreciated that the work in the assembly brought parliamentarians with competing ideological interests or from divided nations closer together and hoped that it could thereby become a force of transnationalism. But he still preferred the consultative council's principle of

representation, approving of it as a sign of democratic progress: 'The historical picture has shown a clear evolution from the absolutism of the common superior to the present experiment with an organic representative system' (Mitrany 1955b).

Although Mitrany approved of the ECSC's design, he became an outspoken critic of the subsequent European integration process. This has often been acknowledged and explained by Mitrany's hostility to nationalism and to the repetition of nationalism's core – bounded, identity-freezing, and territorial thinking – at a larger scale (Mitrany 1930). While this is correct, Mitrany's critique also addressed the democratic deficit of the European integration process. When it became clear that the ECSC functioned as a nucleus for further, insufficiently legitimated European integration, he ceased to be a supporter of the international experiment. He disapproved of the fact that the Treaty of Rome (1957), which established the European Economic Community, was signed by the executives and not put to a popular vote (Mitrany 1969). At that time, the British government already supported a democratisation of the institutions just set in place and pushed for the idea of a European parliament along the lines of the House of Commons (Mitrany 1957c). However, as against these plans, Mitrany maintained that a replication of parliamentary democracy could not create a link between the citizens and the European organisation. Instead, he considered the establishment of functional committees along the lines of an ECSC consultative council with the authority to sanction executive organs.

Today, pluralist ideas are once again being widely discussed amongst democrats concerned about the global governance's democratic deficit and the democratisation of international organisations (Steffek 2015: 35; Willetts 2006). Pluralist ideas are attractive in this context because they do not conceive of the state or of demos or ethnic and cultural homogeneity as necessary preconditions to democratic practices. Some commentators rightly state that Mitrany's non-statist democratic theory, his emphasis on the mismatch between the territorial bias of democratic theories and the functional differentiation and social pluralism of modern societies, and his suggestion to disperse power amongst diverse self-regulating associations and agencies anticipated much of the most important of contemporary reform proposals (Franschet 2000: 292). However, for a long time, pluralists believed in a labourist path to transnational democracy, where international unions push a progressive coalition for the democratisation of world politics (Archibugi 2012: 178).

Even if contemporary democrats conceive of Mitrany as an important forerunner, some of his ideas tend to be misrepresented. The pluralist legacy in Mitrany's thought is marginalised when his functionalism is viewed as an approach valuing the depoliticising and output-enhancing capacities of NGO personal and other experts included in the UN (Nasiritousi et al. 2015: 6). There is hence an ongoing need to acknowledge Mitrany's interest in the representation of labour and social interests. Functional pluralism recognises the potentially conflicting interests of market and civil society and does not conceive of them as apolitical actors. Mitrany's examples imply that he favoured an institutionalised and balanced inclusion of affected interests over ad hoc inclusions because this prohibited the dominance of one stakeholder's interests over others'. The key to a 'working democracy' is citizen representation through civil society organisations such as peasant groups, trade unions, consumers, and employer organisations in formal contact with international institutions. These 'pressure groups' are vital to check the growth of executive and bureaucratic authority. Mitrany's 'working democracy' assumes an equilibrium among the functional groups cooperating and deliberating to hold an administrative agency accountable.

However, it is true that Mitrany's functional pluralism lessened the criteria for legitimate functional representation. Cole assumed that functional representatives had to be authorised by their constituencies and that the constituencies ought to possess the power to recall their representatives if they did not act according to their mandate. Mitrany, in contrast, approved of what he conceived of as deliberation- and transnationalism-promoting functional representation and paid less attention to the democratic organisation of groups. Probably as a result of the popularity of the binary distinctions between territorial and functional representations and the application of the concept to a wide range of non-state actors, intra-pluralist disagreement over the question of legitimate functional representations has gone unnoticed (Ottoway 2001: 267–268).

Conclusion

I revived Mitrany as a pluralist thinker who called into question the modern trinity of nationality, territory, and democracy. Discerning a totalitarian tendency in nationalism, he understood it as an ideology that demanded the individual's dedication to the state and that denied transnational obligations. By implication, nationalism is a modern disease. As an antidote, his functionalist pluralist proposal advocated

welfarist and task-specific international institutions, entrusting them with post-war reconstruction and strengthening social pluralism after the experience of fascism. In this chapter, I differentiated between this a priori legitimation of the UN and Mitrany's later stances on the basis of his marginalised post-war writings. They show that Mitrany opposed institutions that reduce the scope and vitality of democratic practices at all levels.

In the first part of this chapter, I identified commonalities between Hobhouse's and Mitrany's left-liberal critics on the course that representative democracy had taken. Liberal justification of the principle of representation and parliamentary democracy may have been sound under nineteenth-century conditions, but Mitrany found that the state's subsequent accumulation of functions and parliament's self-disempowerment at the benefit of the executive necessitated a reform of existing institutions. For Mitrany, territorial organisation in domestic parliamentary democracy almost inevitably ended in ineffectiveness and the domination of citizens. Citizens ought to realise themselves as active, rational, and multiply embedded individuals and Mitrany conceived of the welfare state as a threat to this democratic ideal. Hence, instead of improving the shortcomings of the parliamentary model, Mitrany focused on questions of accountability and citizens' concrete opportunities to exercise control over the statist bureaucracy. He advocated concretely the functional devolution of authority, the strengthening of functional representation and groups such as NGOs, and the introduction of the institution of the ombudsman to the British system.

In the second part of the chapter, I first differentiated between Mitrany' early appreciation of the UN and socialist or dissident British intellectuals' attack on the democratic legitimacy of the UN. Recall that Cole called the UN's specialised agencies 'undemocratic' because they were established under American hegemony and with the help of economic and financial elites. Mitrany only became a critic of them in the 1950s when UN staff turned to modernisation theory and the UN greatly expanded its bureaucracy. In response to the agencies' turn to top-down planning and their increasing lack of transparency, he advocated for institutionalised cooperation amongst international civil servants and local experts and civic and labour groups. Concern with a balance of power among the included groups indicates that Mitrany looked with sympathy on the institutions of the ILO, which allowed more or less for balanced functional representation. Mitrany (1969, 1976) continued commenting on the UN from a critical distance.

During the Cold War, Mitrany reaffirmed his criticism of representative democracy in Western welfare states. At the same time, he became an academic and public critic of the Soviet claim on 'people's democracy' and conceived of the related work as the most valuable art of his whole oeuvre. Mitrany was hence preoccupied with critiquing democratic developments, or the manipulation of democratisation, in various national contexts and with the diagnoses of an international democratic deficit. Still, the analysis of these democratic problems continued to be based on the underlying assumption that recognising and responding to democratic deficits might contribute to more peaceful and just international relations.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

Democracy in Twentieth-Century International Relations

Any theory about the role of democracy in international relations (IR) will be expected to answer the question of whether the former has improved the latter. The self-evident nature of this question points to the continuing importance of a phenomenon that emerged during the nineteenth century: the democratic peace promise. As indicated, however, that century alone cannot provide us with definitive answers because what the first wave of transnational democratisation signalled was the unstoppable demand for democracy per se rather than the advent of its representative manifestation in particular states. For fuller answers, and for a more solid footing in reappraising the pluralist tradition, we need to begin at a later date, with the changes in the short twentieth century.

The early part of this phase saw three developments of relevance in relation to the democratic peace promise. The first was the decision by socialist parties to support participation in the First World War despite their movement's call for the boycott of capitalist and imperialist warfare (Waltz 1968: 125). The second was the reiteration of the democratic peace promise in Wilsonian peacemaking and, alongside this, the creation of the League of Nations and the introduction of representative constitutions in the new states that emerged from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Wilson believed that the League would only function if all Great Powers

L. Holthaus, *Pluralist Democracy in International Relations*,
The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought,
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became stable, constitutional states (Moravsik 1997: 545). However, espousal of democratic peace was not a Wilsonian preserve: social democrats too called for the further democratisation of foreign policy, pointing to the inseparability of international and social peace. The third and final stage of this early phase saw the advent of Italian fascism, the emblematic self-destruction of the Weimar Republic, and the revival of authoritarianism in Europe (Hobson 2015: 176). This revival, in conjunction with the mobilisation of illiberal and nationalist forces, also marked the end of burgeoning transnationalism (Davies 2013: 111). IR theorists and historians have repeatedly revisited these developments and have increasingly come to acknowledge the interrelations that exist between democratisation and international change (Mazower 1998; Tooze 2014).

The creation of the UN after the Second World War was again based on the promise of peace and democracy and came at the start of a second wave of transnational democratisation. However, both the promise and the resultant democratic institutions differed significantly from earlier counterparts. There was acceptance that this second attempt at democratic consolidation must be backed by transnational reconstruction and a focus on welfare. It was also recognised that European parliaments and the parliament of the Weimar Republic in particular had been too powerful and too unstable. In tandem with domestic wealth redistribution, representative democracy then acquired considerable stability and social legitimacy (Berman 2010).

What such a brief overview hardly captures, however, are changes within representative democracies and changes in democratic peace thinking. Democratic peace thinking is diverse, and, as one part of it, pluralism does not provide a definitive answer to the question of whether democracy promotes peace. What it does, rather, is to direct attention to representative democracy's democratic deficits and to the question as to how transnational actors and international organisations have been related to the peace promise. On this view, democratic peace is a far-away horizon of expectation.

The tradition itself reflects both the democratisation of Britain – as manifested in the early rise of trade unionism and the late establishment of the Independent Labour Party – and progressive interests in international affairs. Pluralists were deeply involved in political, public, and academic discourse on the relevant issues, frequently pamphleteering on subjects such as the League of Nations and the development of democracy on the Continent (Ashworth 2007: 164). Because the issue of democracy

intersected with numerous social and international questions, pluralists' interest in it led them to a broad perspective on IR. Having witnessed the mobilising power of illiberal nationalism and the crisis undergone by representative democracy, they came to the common view that peace depended on the pursuit of transnationalism, the adoption of welfarist objectives by international organisations, and the existence of citizenries with diverse loyalties. In the course of defining these core beliefs, they grappled with the notion of the democratic peace promise, ultimately reaffirming it and honing it into something much more nuanced.

A Reappraisal of Pluralism

I started with the observation that British academia's debate on democracy revolved around the consolidation of the discipline during the first half of the twentieth century. Let me now further recall the origins and most important traits of the pluralist tradition before I begin a reappraisal of the three pluralists' oeuvres. As I have emphasised, the intellectual background to the development of pluralism was British internationalism's turn from philosophical to institutional arguments (Sylvest 2009). The most important political change was the ongoing democratisation of Britain, British settler colonies, and a few powerful European states.

Pluralism, as a tradition, accompanied these changes. It originated through modernisations of democratic prescriptions in view of internationally embedded but domestically divided industrialised societies. After the (unfinished) extension of suffrage, a key twentieth-century democratic question concerned the relationship between groups and the state, and the state of transnational civil society and trade unions in particular. Pluralists thus placed an empirical emphasis on the transformation of the state, transnationalism (embodied first of all in transnational civil society but also in transgovernmental networks and international corporations), and the creation of modern international organisations from international public unions to the UN. The focus and recognition of states and non-statist actors justifies speaking of pluralism as a tradition that accounted for the evolution of modern international relations (Buzan and Lawson 2015: 3).

However, the pluralist account is far from value-neutral. Pluralists subscribed to the expectation that civil society was critical to the improvement of representative democracy and to the materialisation of welfarist and democratic international organisations. They not only believed that individual and group identities and interests preceded the identity of states but

were also interested in the empowerment of marginalised groups. The global governance institution that comes closest to pluralist ideals is probably the ILO, since it is devoted to functional representation, social democracy, and international peace. Pluralists, however, stressed the many conditions of peace. Hence, what may sound idealistic to some can also be put in the negative. If the international environment is hostile to democratisation or if nationalism distorts domestic and transitional balances of power, de-democratisation and even withdrawal from international organisations become likely.

Although pluralism ought not to be misrepresented as an idealist or naive tradition, it is surely an inherently normative one. Pluralism is part of a liberal *Weltanschauung* that values modernity and human self-direction through democratic institutions (Bell 2014). With respect to domestic democracy, pluralism conceives of a democratic minimum and democratic participation and deliberation as critical complements to formal, representative institutions. Pluralists prepared the contemporary debate about democracy beyond the state when they argued that democratic values ought to shape the design of international organisations and self-evidently used democratic language to evaluate the League and, later, the UN. (Social) equality and participation then replace collective national self-determination as democracy-defining norms. However, what cannot be dropped from the agenda of a reappraisal is that pluralism was mostly about the democratisation of the metropole. Pluralists were not free of contemporary paternalism, even if Mitrany contested Eurocentric assumptions by asking about social democracy's ideological appeal beyond Western Europe. As I have emphasised, I conceive of the three pluralists as situated theorists.

L.T. Hobhouse

Hobhouse is best characterised as a public moralist who turned democratic peace into a modern horizon of expectation while at the same time directing attention to democracy's unredeemed promises. His philosophy well illustrates the nineteenth-century turn to democracy since it embraced a distinctively modern commitment to democracy. As part of his liberal auto-criticism, he objected to other British intellectuals' idealisation of ancient democracy. In his view, Greek city-states such as Athens were symbols of ethnic definitions of citizenship and social homogeneity and of immoral foreign policies. By implication, bounded democracies are as eager for war as non-democracies. Against the background of his early

studies on the European labour movement, Hobhouse argued that membership in transnational associations interfered with the rights and duties that citizens have towards each other. Accordingly, sub- and transnational loyalties were intrinsically valuable and offered the potential to spur widened circles of human belonging.

Hobhouse developed his revision of available democratic peace considerations during the first wave of democracy and when the British Empire still defined global hierarchies. Although there was no formal democratic control over foreign policy in the contemporary sense in nineteenth-century Britain, British politicians tried to sell their foreign and colonial policies to the different and only partly enfranchised classes of British society, while the intellectual elite tried to maintain a critical discourse on foreign affairs. Liberals such as Jeremy Bentham had thus already asked whether democracy in the so-called mother state necessarily produces an enlightened public that opposes the violent acquisition or maintenance of colonies, or whether democratic publics were more interested in material gains than ethical foreign policies. Hobhouse developed Bentham's line of thought when he criticised the decline of public contestation and the rise of a materialist spirit and nationalist public opinion in favour of war in the context of the South African Wars. His criticism of the democratic peace thesis was linked to the diagnoses of oligarchic rule in Britain and a plea for a democratic minimum to allow for democratic education and participation in the public discourse for the marginalised classes and, thus, to further the materialisation of a peace-promoting representative democracy.

Although Hobhouse did not develop pluralism during the First World War – he temporary supported the democratic war cause without condemning conscription – he resumed pluralist thinking about a democratic and peaceful international order after the war. He became critical of the materialisation of modern democracies and of Britain's post-war democracy in particular, as well as of the core of U.S. President Wilson's democratic peace politics. The Wilsonian logic defined democracy as national self-determination, conceived of public opinion as a sanction of war, and linked democratic peace theory to the promotion of the League of Nations and a European order based on the principle of national sovereignty.

Hobhouse, on the other hand, questioned the likelihood of the spontaneous generation of democratic and pacifistic public opinions in view of wartime nationalism's lasting effects. His resumption of democratic peace theory was now driven by the perception of nationalism as an inherently anti-democratic attitude, since the easy acceptance of 'national interests'

formulated by the political elites hampered critical public discourse on foreign policy. Whereas earlier liberals argued that representative democracy allowed for transnationalism, Hobhouse reversed the dependency relationship and postulated that domestic democracy depended on transnational loyalties based on membership in corporations or social groups to balance national sentiments and to secure critical public deliberation. Creating a pluralist core assumption, he argued that transnational loyalties were essential to check nationalist sentiments and to re-establish a social equilibrium in domestic society. His democratic peace thinking acknowledged that states were legitimate components of a complex and balanced international order if and only if they allowed for domestic pluralism and transnational associations.

G.D.H. Cole

Whereas Hobhouse's expectation was that improved representative democracies would become the cornerstones of a peaceful European and perhaps global order, Cole's pluralism stems from contestations of representative democracy as – in J.S. Mill's words – a 'true' democracy. Cole reread democratic theory in light of a socialist conception of Britain's industrialised society. The starting point for Cole was the French Revolution and the unintended attachment of democracy to the concept of the state at the expense of other socio-political associations. The reversal of this development and the recognition of sub- and transnational associations as democratic representatives of manifold interests formed an important part of his agenda.

Questions of obligations towards the state or transnational movements became urgent when Britain introduced conscription during the First World War. In the debate over it, Cole claimed that the state was just one association amongst others and that democratically organised civic and vocational groups ought to take over functions from the state. Hence, Cole conceived of trade unions and religious associations as legitimate representatives of citizens' interests. Only by functional participation and representation in democratic groups making up a wider federation, the argument goes, can a truly democratic representation of interests be realised. Representative democracy's architecture was ill-equipped for representing the diverse objectives of modern citizens because of the severe mismatch between its territorial principle and a citizen's vocational and civic concerns. As representative democracy lacked democratic legitimacy

and democratic control over foreign policy, citizens were under no obligation to serve the war effort. By implication, there was rather a democratic duty to oppose it.

Cole's wartime interventions are still classics that theorise functional representation as the representation of individuals with an active common concern through sub- and transnational associations. What is often overlooked is that Cole was continuing a classical preference for small groups allowing face-to-face discussions but that he refused to define democratic units in territorial terms. He conceived of groups as vehicles for citizens' democratic activism and representation without attaching an unchangeable corporate identity to them. Although Cole proposed different roles for the state, his overall pluralist concern was the strengthening of civil society to counter the power of the bureaucratic and political elites governing the state and the multiplication of representative bodies within and beyond representative democracy. A political order progressing towards this ideal would eliminate the cause of war, which was the capitalist elites' pursuit of class interest and related manipulation of public opinion.

During the interwar period, the European order developed in a very different direction after the start of the first reverse wave of democracy and the emergence of Italian and German fascism. Historians often argue that the *Zeitzeugen* (contemporary witnesses) were not alarmed by Hitler's electoral success, but this does not hold true for Cole. He broadened his perspective and studied the socio-economic background against which fascism evolved, and he formulated goals for an anti-fascist British and international policy after 1933. For Cole, nationalism's apparent ability to absorb citizens' loyalties and destroy a democracy-maintaining civil society suggested the need for international economic planning to weaken nationalism and to reinforce socialist and other loyalties. Cole forcefully opposed fascist claims on the concept of democracy, identified with an anti-totalitarian pluralism, and, especially towards the end of the Second World War, thought about the reconstruction of democracy in Europe. The example of the course the Weimar Republic had taken made the importance of the satisfaction of social demands only too visible, so a reconstruction of European democracy needed to account for them. With regard to democracy in Britain, Cole constantly reiterated that democracy implied more than representative government in domestic affairs, and he tried to further an enlightened public opinion on post-war international organisations through the production of massive volumes.

David Mitrany

My approach to Mitrany emphasised his theoretical literacy and self-reflection throughout his overall oeuvre. While Mitrany is well known for providing designs of international organisations that anticipated UN specialised agencies, very different interpretations of his democratic conceptions exist. My interpretation argues that his pluralist arguments begin with the deduction of social equality as a key value from contemporary (pluralist) democratic theory to argue, against the background of the 1930s, that transnational welfare was the proper objective of international cooperation. Mitrany maintained a normative commitment to social equality but also predicted that representative democracy would always lead to popular welfare demands. However, available democratic peace theories considered neither national welfare's strengthening of nationalism and option of democratic self-destruction nor the impossibility of drawing clear boundaries between political and economic questions in modern IR.

Mitrany's much-discussed institutional proposal was no 'peace through prosperity' argument but rather a situated reflection on the relationship between democratisation and the consolidation of national welfare. It culminated in the argument that task-specific international organisations could restrain the scope of the decision-making of (possibly nationalist) politicians and, as meeting spaces for officials and civic actors, could further deliberation and specific social interests at the expense of nationalism in Germany and the states that had been under German rule. This argument is similar but not identical to international officials' valuation of transgovernmentalism as a means to overcome nationalism amongst state officials. Besides, the argument is unique in its emphasis of the tripartite ILO, which included functional representation of (employer, labour, and national or governmental) interests as a means to strengthen transnationalism and the domestic rights of trade unions in the post-war era. His judgement of the ILO was more positive than Cole's, and this illustrates that the ILO could still be seen a democratic role model (Bexell et al. 2010: 87) or as a corporatist organisation that pursued the moderation of the labour movement (Ottoway 2001: 270).

Mitrany's stances on the UN specialised agencies illustrate that pluralists often face a dilemma because, on the one hand, they identify a democratic deficit in global governance while, on the other hand, they accept the need to defend the existing UN system against conservative and

nationalist contestations. Mitrany became a critic even of the welfarist UN agencies after their reconstruction of Europe and turn to the 'development' of non-Western states. The reason for this change of opinion was the rising popularity of modernisation theory amongst UN staff members and a considerable and uncoordinated expansion of the UN bureaucracy. To compensate for the democratic deficit, Mitrany advocated for institutionalised and balanced cooperation among international civil servants and local experts, civic groups, and labour groups. He greatly advanced the democratic evaluation of modern international organisation in academic and British discourse but also continued to justify the need for international welfarist institutions.

From the 1950s onwards, Mitrany turned to the effects of national welfare upon the course of Western democracies and British representative democracy in particular. He explicitly identified with the pluralist ideal of the active, rational, and multiply embedded individual but conceived of the welfare state as a threat to this democratic ideal. For Mitrany, the state's accumulation of functions and the parliament's self-disempowerment to the benefit of the executive had not spurred democratic protest because welfare services simultaneously evoked ritualised and passive obedience to the bureaucratic welfare state. By implication, democratic restoration necessitated the weakening of nationalism, the activation of depoliticised citizens to re-establish administrative accountability, and the strengthening of transnational interests that were then better represented by NGOs than by trade unions in public discourse. British trade unions' contribution to the war effort, their quickly rising membership numbers, their transformation into corporatist actors, and their pursuit of sectional interests caused pluralist re-evaluations of their democratic agency. For Mitrany, NGOs and other civil society organisations ought to assume the task of the functional representation of diverse interests to counterbalance the state too. Although Mitrany downplayed commonalities, his argument shared with Cole's critique of representative democracy an interest in a democratisation of the administrative structure. Furthermore, in view of British trade unions' transformation into bargaining bureaucratic organisations that allied with the state, both became more critical of the unions and considered the possible domination of one group by another, or the domination of the individual.

Pluralism, Liberalism, and Classical Realism

Some academic commentators conceived of the advocacy of civil society associations and the acceptance of the state as an element of international order as an inconsistency within pluralism, overlooking the fact that pluralists only accepted democratic states with strong civil societies (Sylvest 2007). Other academic commentators did not contextualise pluralism and, as a result, did not recognise that the pluralist critique of the state was part of a wider critique of representative democracy (Bartelson 2001). However, the discussed pluralists were situated, both radical and reformist theorists who addressed different audiences and who responded to changing political constellations. They influenced the British and IR discourses as well as the political theorists and practitioners who were concerned with the reconstruction of representative democracy in Germany after 1945. It is hence best to look for consistent pluralist themes but not for a degree of theoretical coherency that meets the standards of the natural sciences.

According to the contemporary German reception of pluralism, it is best understood as a social modernisation of democratic theory that is hostile to nationalist defences of homogeneity (Fraenkel 1991: 209). Accordingly, pluralists paid due attention to how nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism was able to absorb and harness the loyalty of populations at the expense of transnational socialist loyalties. The German reception further recalls pluralism's political dimension and the rise of an avowedly anti-pluralist German fascism. The German crown jurist of the Third Reich, Carl Schmitt, defined democracy as an expression of ethnic homogeneity in an attack on Cole, and Schmitt's references to a *Volk* and Cole's thinking about the representation of the individual as a member of a diverse society are clearly antagonistic. However, the German reception has not yet recognised that Schmitt misrepresented the pluralists as advocates of the contemporary liberal world order.

Still, in the main, the German reception is compatible with my emphasis on pluralism's non-statist democratic theory and concern with the strengthening of civil and labour groups as a complement to representative democracy's formal institutions, as well as the pluralist conception of transnational associations as peace-promoting components of modern international relations. Peace is related to the balance of power amongst social and political actors at all levels. Democratic activism and deliberation become unlikely if one sentiment, class, or organisation is dominant.

On the one hand, pluralism's anti-nationalist engagement deserves appreciation. On the other, it is critical to see that the rise of fixed and, perhaps, simplifying conceptions of nationalism within pluralism contributed to ideological rather than nuanced theoretical interventions. Pluralists struggled mightily with the fact that socialist internationalism, the historical counterpart to nationalism, lost its mobilising force. The ideological reconfiguration Mitrany suggested, nationalism versus internationalism, best illustrates his own commitment to the fight of any nationalism. However, Mitrany too captured that the broad lines of nineteenth-century ideologies, and the right-and-left distinction ceased to be an intelligent means to make sense of the domestic effects of globalisation. Conservative and various progressive positions or new ideological coalitions arose from different answers to the question of equality and answers to the question of the scope of the political community that ought to further the ideal of social equality. Recent studies indicate that people only choose equality as the principle for distributing rewards when they conceive of the would-be recipients as members of a common community or when they feel affiliated with the would-be recipients (Lebow 2016: 6).

How does pluralism, defined in this manner, behave with regard to the liberal internationalist and classical realist tradition of thought? Let me begin by reviewing the relationship between liberal internationalism and pluralism. I have already indicated that pluralism subscribed to a liberal *Weltanschauung*, and some studies do treat pluralism as a part of liberal internationalism (Bell 2014; MacMillan 1998). Along this line, the liberal support for the nation-state and national sovereignty was contingent upon this being conducive to the development of nineteenth-century promises, including peace. Liberals then thought about civil society as a counterweight to militarism and about the extension and deepening of representative practices as pluralists did.

However, apart from these important commonalities between (left-) liberalism and pluralism, pluralism developed a distinctive line of argument and did so most often through a self-conscious critique of liberal internationalism. Compared to British liberals, pluralists turned from questions of imperial unity to the domestic effects of empire and to the 'social question'. They proclaimed an ill-informed conceptual linkage between the concept of the state and democracy and turned from democracy as a form of government to democratic conceptions of society. Pluralists consistently argued that the materialisation of representative

democracy betrayed the promises of liberty, equality, and peace and that further democratic participation and deliberation were needed. Representative democracy works through territorial representation and, in the pluralist view, does not allow for the representation of the modern individual's manifold interests.

The First World War and Wilsonian peace-making prompted liberal rethinking of national self-determination. British liberals thought that the organisation of nationality in distinct territorial states could become problematic and worried whether representative democracy could become a form of government gaining social legitimacy. However, whereas liberals were concerned with the empirical aspects and the stabilisation of representative democracy, pluralists reaffirmed their normative critique of it. They added to this line opposition to the liberal acceptance of the organisation of welfare along national boundaries. In view of reinvigorated European nationalism, their thinking about a democratic but denationalised European and global order produced visions very different from the liberal ones. Demand for the functional representation of corporate and civic interests in the domestic context and in modern international organisations possibly along the lines of the ILO, on the one hand, and opposition to liberal world state proposals, federalism, and global parliament proposals, on the other, make a clear distinction between pluralism and liberalism. Whereas liberals defended democratic governments as legitimate representatives of their national constituencies and granted them the right to select the personnel for international organisations, pluralists diffused public information about the League and the UN and demanded inclusion of representatives of affected interests.

Simplifications of classical realism as an inherently conservative, antidemocratic paradigm are still common. Classical realism is then defined by an interest in power politics and the view that international relations are characterised by the persistent chance of war. By implication, international relations are best managed by self-restrictive political elites, and democracy is a threat to this effective management of international relations. I tried to discredit this view by acknowledging diversity within realism and mutual influences between realism and pluralism. Reinhold Niebuhr's search for a socialised vindication of democracy after Hitler's rise to power impressed Mitrany, and Niebuhr, for his part, lauded the *Working Peace System* (Thompson 1979: 61). He subscribed to pluralist core assumptions when he conceived of democracy as a form of government and a way of life. Accordingly, a democratic society is only maintained by individuals who

are aware of their complementary and contradictory loyalties and who are willing to oppose political authority when it violates democratic standards (Niebuhr 2008: 125). The concern with pluralism- and democracy-devouring nationalism was a major reason for classical realism's positive reception of Mitrany. Besides Niebuhr's positive reception, E.H. Carr and Hans G. Morgenthau borrowed from pluralism when they suggested transnational welfare services as a means to diffuse nationalism.

Classical realists and, especially, Morgenthau followed Friedrich Meinecke's thinking about how the democratisation of the state paved the way to nationalism and populist foreign policies from the early twentieth century onwards. For Meinecke (1960: 497), the victory of an irrational 'reason of the *Volk*' replaced the undemocratic but predictable and self-restricting reason of the state. To some degree, it thus holds true that classical realists, especially after 1945, were sceptical of democracy's impact on the conduct of foreign affairs and the ideologisation of foreign policy in an age of mass democracy (Tjalve 2008). Yet classical realists' concern with the revival of critical public contestation and with the education of civic personalities proves that they were committed to the improvement of representative democracy in states such as the United States, Britain, and Germany. What they opposed and what pluralists equally criticised was instead the U.S.-led turn to the promotion and installation of formal democratic institutions in developing states without a democratic tradition. Here, it is critical to see that the pluralist use of democratic peace as a horizon of expectation involved emphasis of the distance between the social realities in Britain and democratic promises, and this strategy shares many commonalities with classical realists' embedded critique of American democracy promotion. According to recent actualisations, these embedded and humble critiques of democracy constitute a lost pattern of argument that ought to be revived (Tjalve 2008; Hobson 2015).

Pluralism: Exclusion and Rediscovery

Conflict between pluralism and classical realism did not lead to the temporary elimination of the pluralist approach to world politics. How both classical realists and pluralists attached their analysis of transnational and international relations to normative and public interventions was disposed of by the rise of behaviourism in a discipline that was increasingly defined as an American social science (Hollis and Smith 1990: 28). The rise of behaviourism is linked to the 'second great debate', and

although conventional historiographies' great debate narratives are more often wrong than right, it holds true that positivist and rationalist theories have dominated. As Brian Schmidt (1998: 24) observes, rationalist interdependence theory reformulated many pluralist lessons and explained the need for a renewal by partly incorrect historical representations of classical pluralism.

Both my claim that the pluralists' democratic perspective made it possible to account for much of modern transnational and international relations, and Schmidt's appreciation of tradition emphasises that pluralism created a vocabulary that is suitable for describing contemporary politics. Pluralists recognised interplays between transnational civil society organisations, international corporations, states with different domestic systems, and intergovernmental and supranational organisations. I also agree with the lesson that Schmidt derives from the reformulation of pluralism: there is a tendency in our discipline to ignore past achievements, to reinvent the wheel, and to proclaim great turns. However, the positivist and rationalist dominance led to further unnoticed changes in disciplinary thinking about democracy. It is my premise that through recognition of what faded into oblivion, we can acquire a new perspective on contemporary democratic debates.

To understand what has changed, we first need to see that positivist and rationalist thinking about democracy unfolded during the Cold War and that each Great Power promoted a different version of democracy. Beneath the rationalist language, grand theories advanced critiques or justifications of representative democracy and of the international promotion of it. (Neo-)liberals moved away from a classical preference for constitutionalism and approved of representative democracy. The twentieth century is said to be the century of democratisation, and many scholars paid considerable attention to the third wave of democratisation, which began in the 1970s, and to the promotion of democracy by the U.S. (Craig 2005: 134). Furthermore, in the 1980s, liberals revived the theme of democratic peace and, in doing so, turned it into a verifiable hypothesis. As a result mainly of the growth in democracy and data on war and peace since the second wave of democratisation, scientific peace theory has come up with definitive answers concerning the relationship between democracy and peace (Russett 1993). It has confirmed that democracies do not go to war with one another and that they establish a separate peace. However, as critics (Brock et al. 2006) have noted, a correlation between representative electoral structures and peaceful foreign policy is assumed even in the absence of adequate public control over foreign policy.

Compared to what this book has discussed, liberal democratic peace thinking thus inaugurated two great changes. A widely noted change concerns the creation of an academic field of study that often provides legitimations for American and Western foreign policy and democracy promotion (Guilhot 2005). This is a move away from pluralists' and classical realists' use of democratic peace as a means of critique, and it was further spurred by the end of the Cold War (Tjalve 2008). Changes in international law then considerably narrowed the range of legitimate democratic models, so that only liberal-democratic constitutions are recognised as legitimate (Clark 2009: 570). At the peak of the third wave of democratisation around 1990, liberals claimed that democracy was universally accepted and democratic peace was a verified law.

An additional but barely noted change is evident in the new separation of theories about domestic democracy from theories of international organisations, and vice versa. Liberal democratic peace theory introduced new inside/outside distinctions and separations between different levels of analysis that did not exist in this form previously. Liberalism became a 'second image' theory that observes a one-way street, or that the domestic constitution of a state influences its international behaviour. Now, normative pluralist assumptions have identified a need to democratise domestic and international relations or the authority exercised by international organisations to make progress towards a democratic peace. Liberals, on the other hand, have observed that democracies do not fight each other and conceived of international organisations as alternative and equally peace-promoting institutions.

The stark and mono-causal separation between theories about democracy and international organisations provoked liberal auto-criticism (Keohane et al. 2009), but liberals continue to conceive of democracy as a norm applying first of all to states and only in moderated forms to international organisations. My observation resonates with those who argue that the liberal focus on democracy within states involved a distraction from substantial demands of democracy within, amongst, and beyond states (Clark 2009).

Impulses to conceive of pluralism as a lost tradition that speaks to contemporary debates come from history and political theory. Historians have recognised the importance of pluralism (broadly understood) in international thought, and political theorists, still under the sway of liberal triumphalism, have found the pluralist reminder that democracy requires considerably more than representation to be topical (Masquelier

and Dawson 2016; Rosenboim 2017: 10). They have found that pluralists addressed what we might call a 'perpetual problem' when they made apparent that states with representative constitutions remain in their international relations less democratic than in their domestic affairs (Morefield 2017).

Against the background of this book, we can confirm this claim by adding that most pluralist contributions aimed at creating public awareness of undemocratic foreign policies and international organisations. Those who are dissatisfied with the contemporary state of pluralism direct attention to the fact that classical pluralists also illustrated how unbounded democratic action might unfold when they defended trade union activism (ibid.). Although this claim holds true, we should, at the same time, avoid adding further credence to the idea that pluralism is an overly optimistic theory about civil society. The study of Hobhouse, Cole, and Mitrany together calls this into question. As we have seen, only dissatisfaction with the new corporatism of British trade unions prompted positive pluralist evaluations of post-1945 NGOs and of their activism as a venue to transnational change. Pluralists were affiliated with the anti-nationalist left, questioned nationalist claims, and targeted a wide array of actors beyond heads of state. Amongst their targets were associations that put themselves at the service of undemocratic national politics. From this practice we might derive the lesson that transnational civil society organisations are diverse and not per se democratising agents, so that we can judge their democratising or de-democratising effects as any other actors' only in retrospect.

In sum, what the discipline has temporarily lost is an approach to modern international politics that holds on to the assumption that only democratisation of all levels gives credence to democratic peace, while at the same time observing interplays between the different images and circles of de- and re-democratisation. Some currently find that such democratic approaches to international relations face many difficulties, ranging from rising degrees of socio-economic inequality to the nationalist and populist contestation of representative democracy and liberal international organisations (Runciman 2013; Müller 2016). However, given that pluralism gained shape when representative democracy was frequently challenged by unrivalled nationalist mobilisation, students of IR are well advised to return to the tradition particularly in these moments. Those who identify with pluralism's normative core might also face a recurring dilemma when they conceive of a need to defend undemocratic international organisations against the critics who demand a return to the nation-state.

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