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Pirkko Pitkänen
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Migration and Transformation

Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism

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Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Pirkko Pitkänen

Along with structural factors, the transnational ties and activities of geographically mobile people are increasingly important factors in the emergence of transnational spaces that transcend geographic, political, social, and cultural borders (Portes et al. 1999). This book focuses on the dynamics of people's transnational practices and the question of how they are connected to the wider processes of political, economic, sociocultural, and educational transformations[1] that are underway. The following questions are posed: What is the role of geographically mobile people in the emergence of transnational spaces? How do the emergent transnational spaces modify people's living conditions? To achieve an understanding of the dynamic interplay between people's border-crossing activities and wider structural factors, four representative cases are scrutinized in detail: the transnational spaces of India–UK, Morocco–France, Turkey–Germany, and Estonia–Finland.

The compilation provides insights on the multilevel transformation processes surrounding transnationalism.[2] Contrary to the binary focus of conventional migration theory on the process of emigration and immigration to and from particular

[1] "Transformation" is used here to describe deep and far-reaching processes that, within a relatively limited time span, change societies and modify people's living conditions. Although transformations do not necessarily result from people's intentional actions, they often develop out of individual and collective short-term actions that are unexpected ways of constituting fundamental and long-term changes (Castles 2001, 2007; Vertovec 2004, 2009).

[2] The concept of "transnationalism" is used as a *perspective* on cross-border migrations and the ties migrants and others forge in the processes connected, as a description of actual *processes* happening, and as a *result* (e.g., desirable state of affairs, transnational social spaces) of cross-border migrations.

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nation-states, migration is understood as a process by which migrants forge and sustain multistranded relations and activities that link together several national territories (Basch et al. 1994; Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen 2004). A further feature of migrant transnationalism is the continuous circulation of goods, money, and information in transnational settings. Various countries or other national territories may become interconnected through these exchanges in such a way that they form a single community. Since the beginning of the 1990s, researchers have underlined the transformative character of emergent transnational spaces by defining them either as "transnational social fields" (Glick Schiller et al. 1992), "transnational social spaces" (Faist 2000; Pries 2001), "transnational migrant circuits" (Rouse 1991), or "transnational communities" (Portes 1997).

It is obvious that migrants are increasingly active agents in transformations on a global scale (Glick Schiller 2009: 17). In today's world, people are moving back and forth over national borders both more frequently and across longer distances than in the past. These movements are occurring between high- and low-income countries, "developed" and "developing" worlds, and also among highly industrialized and developing countries, with different but related impacts and challenges in each case. It is evident that the opportunities for people's transnational ties and activities have increased with the conditions called globalization. Thus, transnational migration may be seen as both a manifestation and a consequence of processes of globalization. This raises questions about understanding transnational migration in the context of the increased global integration of economies, politics, and social relations (Vertovec 2004, 2009; Castles 2007: 12–13).

Conventional wisdom holds that migration is mainly driven by global differences in levels of wealth. People's cross-border mobility has been understood to occur as a consequence of imbalances in material well-being between sending and receiving countries. A similar view is that the question why border-crossing migration takes place is closely linked to the question of demographic transitions. It is true that around the world the demographic profiles of countries are changing, with low-income countries typically having younger populations than Western industrialized societies, but the real situation appears to be more complex. Empirical evidence suggests that many highly industrialized societies tend to experience not only high immigration, but also substantial emigration (de Haas 2010). In practice, most migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries. Rather, economic development may even stimulate transnational migration by raising people's expectations and enhancing the resources needed so as to move. This raises questions about how to broaden the conventional income-focused approach to migration and conceptualize transnational migration as a response to generic opportunity rather than income differentials alone[3] (Sen 1999; de Haas 2010).

[3] The critique has led to the emergence of social transformation studies as a new analytical framework. In particular, Stephen Castles (2001: 18–20) has used the concept of "social transformation" as an analytical tool to move away from earlier simplistic ideas that economic growth is the key to everything and will automatically trickle down to improve living standards for all.

Not only new patterns of migration, but also new types of migrants are emerging. Migrants may be long term or temporary, seasonal, posted, or irregular, moving back and forth between states for different reasons, and sometimes circumventing state controls over borders and taxes. In some cases, transnational spaces may themselves become communities of orientation. For example, high-tech professionals may be "citizens of the world," market-driven migrants whose main objective is to seek career opportunities that will enable them to maximize their earnings and savings in the shortest possible time. Not only labor migrants, but also many asylum seekers are constantly or periodically in motion back and forth across national borders. These phenomena of circular migration, in particular, represent transnational lifestyles that challenge conventional assumptions about clear-cut distinctions between countries of emigration and immigration (Faist 2000: 9–13, 30, 51; Rao 2001; Vertovec 2004: 985, 987).

The emergence of transnational spaces that span two or more nation-states raises several questions about migrants' *political participation* and membership in nationally bounded societies. With the conventional model of the nation-state, some sense of collective identity was assumed to characterize the people believed to be contiguous with a territory, demarcated by a border. Recently, this model has been radically challenged in response to people's transnational commitments. Transnational migrants may claim membership of multiple polities in which they may be residents, part-time residents, or absentees, or they may live in a country in which they do not possess citizenship, or claim citizenship in a country in which they do not live (Fitzgerald 2000: 10; Vertovec 2004: 979). Around the world, a tendency is evolving toward facilitating the attainment of dual citizenship[4] (Held et al. 1999: 9; Faist 2000; Vertovec 2004: 980–984; Kalekin-Fishman and Pitkänen 2006). The essential point here is that dual citizenship recognizes and legitimizes the circumstance that people can entertain multiple ties, some of them extending to other nation-states. Another important factor is that various countries not only offer very different conditions for establishing political participation, but also for specific citizenship rights to accompany transnational lives. These differences have given rise to a series of questions related to state membership. The first question is to whom citizenship is granted and under what conditions. The second question is in regard to tolerance and the implementation of people's participation not only in political, but also economic and social arenas (Icduygu 2005; Pitkänen and Kalekin-Fishman 2007).

Economic participation may mean transnational entrepreneurs who mobilize their contacts across borders in search of suppliers, capital, and/or markets, or enterprises that are based in migrant-sending countries but reach out to customers in diaspora. Yet the most striking feature in today's world is the large-scale transnational movement of labor. Most evidently, the scientific diasporas, global expert

[4] In Europe, an important feature is the establishment of the legal and political concept of *European citizenship* that coexists with the national citizenship and thus in a way represents a certain kind of dual citizenship.

networks, and international recruitment of health professionals play a crucial role when considering the transformation processes under way in the global labor market. Border-crossing migration of highly skilled experts, professional workers, and unskilled workers has become increasingly global because of the economic restructuring that is making hanging onto a job universally precarious. A further issue of current importance concerns the money migrants send to their families and communities of origin. Remittances are sent by all types of migrants: male and female, legal and undocumented, long term and temporary, manual and highly skilled. Especially in many low-income countries, migrant remittances may have major effects, including the stimulation of transformation within a variety of sociocultural institutions, such as local status hierarchies, gender relations, marriage patterns, and consumer habits (Vertovec 2004).

Transnational mobility of people and the transnational fields they gradually create transform not only the living conditions of individual people. Wider *social and cultural patterns* of living are also changing. For instance, diasporic communities are increasingly important agents of change in the contemporary world. A current tendency is that national governments address a range of migrant transnational practices with greater attention and policy intervention. Likewise, an increase in people's transnational activities and the emergent transnational lifestyles has led to alternative integration models and adaptation paths in the countries of residence. Conventionally it has been assumed that, once newcomers arrive, they settle in the host society and undergo a gradual but inevitable process of cultural assimilation. Implicitly, transnational ties are deemed to gradually vanish, often in proportion to the intensity of new ties migrants build in the immigration country. This conception makes allowances for a flow of returnees to their home countries, but not for sizeable back-and-forth movements of people between places of origin and destination (Portes et al. 1999: 228–229).

In past decades, an alternative conception arose with the view that although sharing the values and norms of the mainstream culture, newcomers should have an opportunity to maintain and develop their own cultural characteristics (Pitkänen et al. 2002). Although integration from pluralistic starting points is seen as essential in building a multicultural society, most versions of pluralistic theory say nothing about people's transnational ties (Faist 2000). Pluralistic approaches have also been criticized for a simplistic understanding of culture (Grillo 1998: 195). In recent policy and scientific debates, increasing criticism toward the pluralistic approach has been voiced, and an alternative policy of "return to assimilation" has been introduced (Entzinger 2003; Joppke and Morawaska 2003; Vasta 2007). These neo-assimilationist conceptions may be seen as a reaction to the decreasing social cohesion within national territories, partly resulting from the increase in people's transnational orientations. What is feasible at this point is to ask how people's transnational networks and ties across nationally bounded societies impact on their integration and adaptation in the countries of residence. It seems evident that neither assimilationist, pluralistic, nor neo-assimilationist theories are able to account for the contemporary phenomena surrounding migrant transnationalism.

It is obvious that traditional state-run *education systems,* which both reflect and reinforce existing cleavages based on nation and language, have come under pressure in the wake of phenomena surrounding transnationalism (Mannitz 2002: 5, 16). The core question is whether (private and public) educational institutions and existing services succeed in enabling people to obtain the competences needed to cope in multinational and multicultural living conditions. Despite the increase in transnational migration, very little is known about how to empower people to act and work in transnational settings. A transnational lifestyle as an everyday experience requires special capabilities, such as the capacity to use several languages or cope with the anxiety caused by cultural differences (Koehn and Rosenau 2002, 2009). On the other hand, it can be expected that human development may lead to an increase in transnational mobility. This perspective drives home the point that educational development generally coincides with increasing ability to migrate across larger distances. A further question of current importance is that transnational migration may promote investment in education in sending countries, both by those who have migrated and those who see education as a way to enhance the opportunity of migrating. An expansion of primary, vocational, or higher education may thereby stimulate border-crossing migration. The precise combination of effects is likely to be influenced by local circumstances. For example, although generally it may be believed that education will provide a passport to a better life abroad, in some contexts the implementation of quotas for skilled migrants has led to the development of specific types of schooling or training in sending communities (e.g., information technology colleges in India) (Osella and Osella 2006).

This book presents the findings of an international research project, Transnationalisation, Migration, and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism (TRANS-NET), conducted in 2008–2011. The project was funded by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Research, 7th Framework Programme for Research—Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities.[5] The main research question was, How do people's activities across national borders emerge, function, and change, and how are they related to the processes of governance in an increasingly complex and interconnected world? The project benefited from the worldwide collaboration of multidisciplinary research teams from Africa, Asia, and Europe; UK, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Morocco, and Turkey.

Although the focus of the project was on the characteristics of transnational spaces, it was assumed that transnational migration cannot be conceived of without potential senders and receivers. Whereas conventional migration studies have mainly concentrated on border-crossing migration as unidirectional and one-time changes in location, within the TRANS-NET project, attention was paid to the question of how transnational processes are viewed from the perspectives of migrants' "sending" and "receiving" societies. In the contemporary world, the primary axes of the border-crossing mobility under way are along the states in the

[5] The TRANS-NET project, conducted in 2008–2011, was coordinated by the University of Tampere, Finland (http://www.uta.fi/projects/trans-net).

south to the north and from the east to the west. The countries selected to take part in the study cover both sending (Estonia, India, Morocco, Turkey) and receiving countries (Finland, France, Germany, UK). Some of the participants are also transit countries (Morocco, Turkey). To clarify specific characteristics of the transnational spaces of India–UK, Morocco–France, Turkey–Germany, and Estonia–Finland, research teams from each end of the migration axis were in close collaboration while collecting and analyzing the data.

The eight participating countries offer different cases of interest and relevance for addressing the topic in question. For instance, India has a long history of overseas migration to the UK in spite of the long distances. A parallel example with a colonial background is the case of Morocco–France. Besides common features, differences among the countries appear, too. Although not a European Union (EU) Member State, Turkey is still strongly committed to Europe. Germany has been the main magnet for labor migrants and refugees from Turkey to Europe. In the Turkish case, the issue of identity politics has often become an intrinsic part of the migration debate, ranging from political Islam to ethnic nationalism (the Kurdish question both in the Middle East and diasporas in Europe). Finally, Estonia is a representative of the postcommunist countries. Border-crossing mobility between Estonia and Finland has acquired increasing importance since the collapse of the Soviet Union and after Estonia became an EU Member State in 2004.

1.1 Research Procedure

Although political, economic, social, cultural, and educational transformations fostered by migrant transnationalism constituted the main topic of the TRANSNET project, the initial assumption was that the large-scale institutional and actor-centered patterns of transformation come about through a constellation of parallel processes. Migrant transnationalism alone does not cause transformations; rather, migrant practices draw on and contribute significantly to ongoing processes of transformation, largely associated with facets of globalization already under way (Faist 2004: 17; Vertovec 2009: 24).

Thus, in addition to the broader and highly aggregated structural level (macro), the research focused on an individual decision-making level (micro), and people's transnational ties and networks on the intermediate level (meso). Although conceptually these levels were separated and specified, the final aim was to study their interconnections and interrelationships. In practice, this meant cross-tabulation of the different analytical levels (macro-meso-micro) with regard to the political, economic, sociocultural, and educational domains. The empirical research conducted in Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Morocco, Turkey, and the UK addressed both policy documents and individual people, including both migrants and their significant others "back home." Research data were gathered through content analysis of policy documents and semistructured and life-course interviews. In 2009–2010, 100 interviews were conducted simultaneously in each participating country (800 in total).

In the first phase of the project, the focus was on the development of theoretical and contextual (historical, politico-legal)[6] frameworks for the empirical studies (Faist et al. 2010). In the second phase, each country team sampled 80 persons for the *semi-structured interviews.* The groups of respondents included migrants and their offspring, long-term and temporary migrants, highly and low-skilled labor migrants, posted workers, family-based migrants, humanitarian migrants (refugees, asylum seekers), foreign degree students, as well as nonmigrants with transnational activities. They included men and women, representing diverse national, social, and religious backgrounds. To be selected, a person had to reside in the country in question, must have migrated from the pair country, or conduct any transnational activities in that country. Besides face-to-face interviews, in some cases group or telephone interviews were carried out. In all countries, the interview questions were mainly the same, but owing to the differences in the political, legal, and socio-cultural contexts, there were minor country-specific variations. In addition to personal background information, the respondents' migratory background and their transnational political, economic, sociocultural, and educational activities were elicited. The interviews were carried out either in English, the respondents' mother tongues, or local languages. Interpreters were used when needed. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interview recordings were analyzed qualitatively, using interpretative content analysis. These analytical processes consisted of close reflexive collaboration with the project researchers; the research teams of pair countries were in particularly close cooperation.

In the third phase, *life-course interviews* were conducted so as to gain a more profound understanding of different modes of transnational lifestyles and the transformation processes surrounding them. The emphasis was on people's everyday experiences. We sought to attain an understanding of how transnational lifestyles emerge and change, and how they are maintained and transformed. The respondents were selected from the people taking part in the semistructured interviews. In each country, 20 "attention-grabbing" cases representing different types of transnational activities were selected. Because of the geographical distances, the life-course interviews were carried out in multiple ways: through personal interviews, telephone interviews, or e-mail. To elicit different migratory paths and people's everyday experiences in transnational settings, the interviewees were prompted to narrate their stories relatively freely. Opening questions such as, "Looking back over your life, could you describe your trans-border experiences?" were employed. The interview recordings were transcribed and analyzed qualitatively using interpretative content analysis.[7] To understand the current characteristics of the transnational

[6] The results of these studies are available in the report State of the Art in the Participating Countries of the Project Transnationalisation, Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism (see http://www.uta.fi/laitokset/pdf/TRANS-NET_state_of_the_art_final_3.pdf).

[7] The country-specific results of semistructured and life-course interviews are presented in the Country Reports, produced by each participating country (http://www.uta.fi/laitokset/kasvlait/pdf/countryreportfinland.pdf).

spaces in question and to be able to compare them with each other, the final analytical processes consisted of close reflexive collaboration with the research teams of the pair countries. The space reports presented in this compilation were prepared collaboratively with the pair country teams.

1.2 Structure of the Book

The following chapters describe and compare the complex processes of migrant transnationalism in four transnational spaces: India–UK, Morocco–France, Turkey–Germany, and Estonia–Finland. The first chapter investigates transformations and new developments in the India–UK case, highlighting particularly the border-crossing relationships between the Indian Punjab[8] and UK. The chapter shows that transnationalism appears and works very differently when viewed from the UK or Punjab. The authors demonstrate the complexity of the transnational space in question and argue that transnationalism is not merely produced "from below" by the activities of migrants and diaspora, but is orchestrated and formalized by various arms of the Indian and British states. For instance, illicit flows of people are also produced by the governance of migration. The chapter shows that the question of national identity was met with ambivalence and indifference. It was found that transnational mobility and connectivity do not diminish individuals' desire for a single, solid citizenship and nationality beyond the pragmatism attached to citizenship.

The second chapter introduces transnational connections in the Franco–Moroccan space. According to the authors, colonial and postcolonial connections provide the background for a historical perspective to analyze transformation of migration between Morocco and France. The chapter explores the kind of transnational ties three groups of respondents maintain in the space in question: Moroccans in France; French in Morocco; and Moroccan return migrants. The first part of the chapter briefly describes the emergence of the transnational space by applying historical, sociological, and postcolonial perspectives. The second part describes what kind of transnational flows of ideas, social relations, material, and finances move within the space. Finally, the third part analyzes how the transnational practices construct belonging and identification within the Franco–Moroccan space and what kind of representations are associated with them.

The Turkish–German chapter presents the findings of the interviews conducted among Turkish–German migrants and their significant others in both countries. After introducing the historical background on migration in Turkey and Germany, the authors describe, by means of a typology, the wide variety of transnational

[8] In the Indian case, it became evident that India as a whole is much too large and diverse for a qualitative analysis. Thus it was agreed that the project would focus solely on the Punjab so as to study the largest and most long-standing migration channel between India and the UK.

contacts, activities, and orientations with respect to different migrant categories, migrants' life courses, and different areas of action. An important finding of this study is that stronger transnational activities and orientations are usually embedded in even stronger incorporation-related practices toward the migrants' respective states of residence.

Further, the Estonian–Finnish chapter focuses on the characteristics and dynamics of an emergent transnational space. The authors argue that the Estonian–Finnish space is unique in many respects. Both countries are European and EU Member States, geographically, culturally, and linguistically connected and both are postindustrial societies. Yet Estonia is a postcommunist country that has experienced quite rapid political and economic transitions toward a neoliberal state, whereas Finland can be described as a relatively stable Nordic welfare state that was separated from Estonia for a long time by the Iron Curtain. The authors explore how these macro-level factors have affected the development of people's transnational activities on micro- and meso-levels in the transnational space under study.

Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and compares the transnational spaces under study. According to the research findings, both migratory patterns and people's motivations for departure are in a state of transformation. In addition to new migratory patterns, changes were noted in the extent, intensity, and motivational basis of transnational migration. In all cases, but particularly in the cases of Morocco–France and India–UK, it became evident that the transnational spaces are decidedly asymmetrical. Not only working and educational contexts, but also people's political activities and social support practices are increasingly transnational. In particular, familial and economic ties reveal an expanded or even worldwide field.

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Chapter 2
Migration, Transnationalism, and Ambivalence: The Punjab–United Kingdom Linkage

Kaveri Qureshi, V.J. Varghese, Filippo Osella, and S. Irudaya Rajan

Abbreviations

BNP	British National Party
ECR	Emigration Check Required
ECNR	Emigration Check Not Required
FCNR	Foreign Currency Non Resident Account
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEMA	Foreign Exchange Management Act
HLCID	High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora
IDF	India Development Foundation
IP	Immovable Property
IT	Information Technology
KIP	Know India Programme
MOIA	Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NRE	Non Resident External Rupee Account
NRI	Non Resident Indian
NRP	Non Resident Punjabis
OCI	Overseas Citizen of India

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PIO	Person of Indian Origin
RBI	Reserve Bank of India
RHLCID	Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora
SGPC	Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandakh Committee
SPDC	Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
VDC	Village Development Council

2.1 Introduction

This chapter brings together the main findings of the studies conducted in India and Britain. As it became evident that India as a whole is much too large and diverse for the qualitative analysis in question, it was agreed that the Indian research team would focus solely on the Indian Punjab. Within a broader understanding of Indian migration and transnationalism, this chapter therefore focuses on Punjab–UK linkages, so as to speak to this largest and most long-standing migration channel.

The influence of Indian diaspora has been transformative to the extent of engendering theorizations of reverse colonizations (Ballard 2003, 2009; Lal 2006; Nelson 2008). Indian migration has changed the social fabric of the UK, whether we consider the metropolitan areas of settlement or a broader process of multicultural drift—the increasingly visible presence of black and Asian people in all aspects of British public life, as a natural and inevitable part of the scene, rather than an alien wedge (Hall 1996: 188).

Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) are said to be the single largest ethnic minority in Britain (RHLCID 2001:124). According to the UK National Census of 2001, there are 569,000 Indians in the UK. However this figure includes only so-called nonresident Indians (NRIs) or recent first-generation migrant Indians and not PIOs, who were either born and brought up in or have become full citizens of UK (MOIA 2010: 3). The High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (HLCID) set up by the government of India has estimated the NRIs and PIOs together at 1.2 million, which was 2.11% of the total UK population (RHLCID 2001: 124).

However, the Indian diaspora is not one, but encompasses *diverse configurations* horizontally and vertically. The Indian diaspora can thus be thought of as chaordic (Werbner 2002), with numerous strands running through it, multiple centers and forms of connectivity. Parsis and Bengalis were the dominant groups in emigrations during the colonial era, together with the numerous Indian soldiers who settled in UK following troop deployments during World Wars I and II (RHLCID 2001: 122). The latter group was dominated by Punjabis. The emigrations during the 1950s and 1960s consisted mainly of workers who were absorbed into the massive reconstruction efforts in the industrial sectors in the aftermath of World War II. This stream of emigrations was also dominated by Punjabis, who were reinforced by a ceaseless flow of people from Punjab in the subsequent decades and continuing even today. Punjabis currently constitute about 45% of the Indian community in the UK, with a

Sikh majority (RHLCID 2001: 122–124), and are also known for maintaining strong transnational linkages, whereas the population has entered into the third or fourth generation subsequent to migration. It is estimated that 300,000–500,000 Sikhs and 54,000 Hindus from Punjab live in Britain, which is also the country housing the largest number of Punjabis outside India (Raj 2003; Singh and Tatla 2006).

2.2 Context: Punjab–UK Migration Corridor

Punjabis are one of the most out-migratory communities in present-day India. Being located on the invasion route into India, the people of Punjab often had to leave their homes and adapt to newer locations, which led them to develop an imaginary intrinsic mobility and flexibility (Helweg 1986). Scholarly work traces the antecedents of Punjabi migration to the *Punjabization* of the Indian army, which led to the migration of Punjabi soldiers to North America, East Africa, and the Far East (Tatla 1995; Thandi and Talbot 2004; Metcalfe 2005; Nanda and Veron 2009). During the post-1857 years, Punjabis captured the attention of the British as a “loyal martial race.” By World War I the number of Punjabis in the army has risen to 150,000, on fourth the strength of the Indian army (Tatla 1995). The preference for martial races, as Punjabis were typecast, and the irrigation-driven movements of population and agricultural prosperity prepared the ground for Punjabis to venture out (Tatla 1995: 69). Punjabi migrants to Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were mainly the personal servants of imperial adventurers and administrators; seamen who worked in menial capacities on British merchant ships; and a smaller number of students seeking professional qualifications apart from a few members of the erstwhile royal and aristocratic families (Visram 1986). World War I brought more seamen and soldiers from Punjab to Britain, who slipped quietly away to stay back by making use of the local conditions. By the time of independence Punjabis were a visible presence in Britain’s larger ports and industrial cities, mostly as peddlers (Ghuman 1980).

Leading the massive migrations from post-independent India, during a general economic boom in postwar Britain, Punjabis contributed significantly to the process of so-called *reverse colonization* (Ballard 2003). These migrations of the early 1950s and 1960s consisted mainly of young men and were facilitated by the Commonwealth citizen regime under the 1948 British Nationality Act. With the introduction of the voucher system in 1961 and subsequently limiting it to the skilled categories of labor and with an impending closure of migration, wives, relatives, and friends were sponsored into England in large numbers in the 1960s and 1970s (Helweg 1986). This resulted in an expanding process of chain migration (Ballard 2003). The postwar economic boom in England allowed a much more diversified labor emigration from Punjab, facilitated largely by the existing Punjabi peddler communities in England and informal networks of agents. However, the migration of Punjabis to the UK has been taking place within a wider and complex transnational

field that includes East Africa, East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North America, and continental Europe (Tatla 1999; Brown 2006), which complicates the singular sending-receiving country model. Among the "twice migrants" (Bhachu 1985), are a strong contingent of Punjabis who migrated to the UK from East Africa. The major chunk of Punjabi emigrants to the UK are said to be from the Doaba region; the rural Doaba were swept by migration fever from early the 1960s onward (Ballard 1994). The phenomenon of migration fever continues even today, resulting in diverse forms of informal and formal flows to the UK, facilitated by social and professional networks alongside informal transnational players.

Migration was still a prominent fact in the lives of Punjabis in the UK even though the home ties were changing with time and over generations. Indeed, Punjabis across the diaspora have engaged in refined debates about the apparently intrinsic Punjabi impulse for migration and its consequences for individuals as well as the countries they left behind. This has been expressed in a lively public sphere comprising poetry and oral traditions, songs, newspapers, and magazines such as *Desh Pardesh, Mann Jitt,* and The Asian Express; radio stations such as Sunrise Radio, Raj FM, Punjab Radio, Club Asia and The Asian Network; and TV channels such as the Zee network, Alpha Punjabi, and Brit Asia; as well as films, novels, postings, and clips circulated on the Internet. As Tatla and Singh (1989), Tatla 2002; Kalra (2000b), and Dudrah (2002a, b) have pointed out, these publics have long dwelt on the tumultuous changes wrought by migration on individuals and places, often with an astute political awareness of colonial history, rendering evocatively the unsettling and dislocating effects of migration for individuals' sense of who they are and where they belong. At the same time, these publics are a terrain for cultural entanglements and exchanges, and very local cultural productions, which have played with and reproduced a nostalgic memory of Punjab in the same gesture as creating new musical and cultural products that transform a global "mediascape" (Banerji and Baumann 1990; Back 1995; Appadurai 1996; Sharma et al. 1996; Maira 1998; Dwyer 2000; Bhachu 2004).

2.3 Methods

To provide depth of context, the fieldwork was carried out with a regional/local focus in Punjab and the UK. In Punjab, the field work was carried out in the Doaba region, which is known as the migration belt of Punjab because of the high incidence of migration relative to other regions. This region includes four districts of present-day Punjab: Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala, and Nawanshahr. The city of Jalandhar is the focal point of the region and is known for its flourishing migration economy. The migration economy is predominantly concentrated in urban areas with a variety of service providers related to emigration, which include numerous travel agents, recruitment agents, educational consultants, English training centers, banking institutions, immigration and legal consultants, marriage bureaus, and shops and restaurants catering to nonresident Indian choices and tastes, among others (Fig. 2.1).

Fig. 2.1 District map of Punjab (Source: www.mapsofindia.com)

In the UK, the field work was carried out in the West Midlands, which is one of the country's so-called Little Indias and has been a major area of settlement for Indian Punjabis since World War II. The West Midlands is a sprawling conurbation centered on Birmingham, the second most populous city in the UK with a population of just over a million. Based on projections from the 2001 census, it has been estimated that 20% of the population of Birmingham is now identified as Asian British (Simpson 2007). The West Midlands were the powerhouse of the industrial revolution in England, known as the workshop of the world and the city of a 1,000 trades. Punjabi migrants in the 1950s and 1960s found employment in iron foundries, light engineering, and transport across the West Midlands. Since the 1980s the West Midlands have made a slow transition to the service economy (Dick 2005). Punjabis in the West Midlands have established and maintained multistranded connections with India (McEwan et al. 2005) and the West Midlands is also a center of British Punjabi popular culture and infrastructure (Dudrah 2002a, b). In addition



Source: Singh and Tatla 2006: 61

Fig. 2.2 Geographic distribution of Sikhs in Britain, 2001 census (Source: Singh and Tatla 2006: 61)

to doing field work in the West Midlands, we followed the contacts and interviewed family members and friends in other cities, including London, Bedford, Leicester, Leeds, and Bradford (Fig. 2.2).

In keeping with the TRANS-NET project proposal, we collected data through semistructured and life-course interviews, which ran through a similar range of issues in the Doaba and West Midlands field work. However, the selection of the informants varied. In Punjab and the UK we focused on (1) labor migrants, skilled and unskilled; (2) family migrants, namely spouses and children; (3) student migrants; (4) humanitarian migrants or asylum seekers; (5) irregular migrants; (6) relatives and friends who remained in Punjab; and (7) British-born nonmigrants tracing family heritage to Punjab. However, there were slippages among these categories and they differed between Punjab and the UK. The interviews were conducted at the informants' homes, community centers, or university campuses, and in English, Hindi, or Punjabi. For the 20 life-course interviews, we recruited new informants for the study. The personal characteristics of the interviewees on each site are given in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Characteristics of interviewees in Punjab and the UK

		Punjab	UK
Number of interviewees		84	106
Gender	Female	25	38
	Male	59	68
Age	Below 20	0	10
	20–29	12	33
	30–39	15	15
	40–49	17	16
	50–59	23	15
	60–69	11	10
	70+	6	7
Country of Birth	India	84	55
	UK	0	44
	Other	0	7

It should be noted that the interviewees in Punjab comprised 57 Sikhs, 24 Hindus, and three Christians of different caste backgrounds, whereas the interviewees in the UK comprised 94 orthodox Sikhs, three with affiliation to the Ravidasia or Namdhari traditions (which have been called heterodox sects “within the Sikh universe”) (Leivesley 1986; Singh and Tatla 2006: 80) and nine Hindus, including three who had mixed Sikh and Hindu heritage but identified with their Hindu upbringing. We carried out two interviews with Punjabi Christians that were not tape documented but recorded in field notes. Therefore, the findings presented here concentrate on Sikhs, although also representing the porous and constructed nature of the boundaries around the diverse religious traditions associated with Indian Punjab (Nesbitt 2005).

In addition to the formal semistructured and life course interviews, a wide variety of resource persons or stakeholders were consulted over the course of the research. These included NGOs, educational consultants, police officials, political leaders, travel agents, bankers, money exchange officials, teachers, journalists, local level officials, youth workers, builders, village development council (VDC) members, and beneficiaries. Information was also collected from NRI police stations, the NRI Sabha and the NRI Commissioner’s office in Punjab, and from closely following the media, popular cinema, and music. The field work and archival research were further contextualized through ethnographic observation in villages, workplaces, community organizations, and public events, and through spending extended periods of time informally with a small number of families.

2.4 Nonconforming Typologies: The Heterogeneity of Transnational Space

What is at the center of migration from Punjab to the UK is an entrenched notion of mobility. Poverty or making a living is not the primary compulsion in most cases. A social fantasy in favor of emigration is part of the mental landscape of the region,

in which emigration is seen as the primary conduit to success (Taylor 2004). Such a mental landscape generates manifold processes and channels for materializing the dream of migration, upsetting neat categorizations such as labor, family, or educational migrant. Labor migrants often are seen as family migrants, and family migrants later may turn into labor migrants. In other cases, family migrants' labor is invested in sustaining transnational households and sometimes even businesses. On occasion, current educational migrants are found to be neither international students nor labor migrants per se. Moreover, the research both in Punjab and the UK unravels complex patterns; migrants move into numerous places and positions along their biographies of migration. It is also a transnational space in which back-and-forth human movement takes place in the form of visitors and vacationers, separately from returnees to Punjab. The history of emigrations from Punjab is punctuated with a wide variety of formal and informal flows, direct and indirect, through short or long transits, and with significant differences in how they are viewed from both ends. Such flows are taking place recently despite and against restrictive immigration regimes and migration policing in the West (Anderson 1995; Hill-Maher 2003; Weber and Bowling 2004). There is also a significant difference between which migrant categories are used in the UK and Punjab. This complexity does not derive from the literature on transnationalism, not only because typically research is carried out solely from one location (either the sending or the receiving country) and hence categories are flattened out, but also because categories are accepted as given through "sampling the dependent variable" (Portes 2003), or researching transnationalism through people who are transnational by definition.

To combine the fluid and varied life histories we found in the field with a degree of conceptual focus, we developed contrasting analytic sets of individuals who were in similar circumstances. These are in vivo categories inspired by Kalra's work on the labor experiences of Pakistanis in Oldham (2000a, b: 13), and they confirm the intricacies involved in terms of temporality, spatiality, gender, generation, and type. They draw attention to community narratives about migration and the nature of community life, predicated on normative dominant narrations of stable heterosexual families and a community core comprising old timers and bhijis, who are at the center of cultural, economic, and political axes. The categories are relational; they are not static, but represent people who interact with one another in particular contexts. The "freshies" and "torture victims" are related to Indian Punjabi transnationalism, for example, but are peripheral to the core. The categories are generational. They reflect life-course transitions and community development, and lend dynamism to the model. The categories also draw attention to changing regimes of labor and immigration and signify how state regulation mediates and produces particular identities and subjectivities for migrants.

The old-timers are the first-generation migrant men who came to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s when young. They came through formal and informal channels. They were readily absorbed into the unskilled and semiskilled sectors of industrial labor, and initially sent their earnings back home. They also fostered the so-called chain migration to the UK by sponsoring other young male members of the family and friends in the village. The majority of the old-timers belonged to medium- and

small-scale farming families from Jat castes, accompanied by lesser numbers from artisan Tarkhan or Ramgharia castes, and even lesser numbers of scheduled castes or dalits (so-called Chamars and Chuhras). Although some were well educated with degree-level qualifications, in general they were viewed by the white British as black immigrants lacking education and skills. The old-timers' self-representations are generally within the scope of masculine providers. They revolve around the compelling economic circumstances of migration, hard labor, and recovering the family from poverty to more landholdings, a better house, pleasing marital alliances and life-cycle rituals, and good business—albeit there are specific differences in individual testimonies. The strong-willed masculine subjectivity they construct for themselves hinges around their collective suffering and hardship in the early days, and individual success stories in which they brought prosperity to their families and created transnational households. After the tightening of the voucher system in the mid-1960s, many skilled young Punjabis made their way into the UK, most of whom belonged to Jat families, and were therefore also considered old-timers. On the other hand, in Punjabi imagination in India, emigrants to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s were adulated for their economic success, which was inscribed on the landscape of Punjab with houses, landed property, and so on. These success stories are essential in constructing the social fantasy of migration.

One of the central tropes in the old-timers' masculine stories is their efforts to take their spouses and children to the UK to settle under a single roof. The wives of such migrants, thus called on, are respectfully referred to as *bhijis* (younger people also call them aunties). They were "called" by a sponsorship letter from their husbands, and describe the motivations of their migration in terms of their situation as wives. Many of these "brides of England" waited anxious years before their men "called" them over. Individual narratives revealed that in the years of waiting they tried as hard as they could to persuade their husbands to "call" them. There were also insecurities and questions about their husbands' shenanigans in the UK. Their migration could require concerted pressuring of their husbands and much resourcefulness as they awaited the "call" to Britain and the money for airline tickets. Failing that, bhijis organized their own travel, borrowing money from their natal family or friends. They sometimes traveled even without their husbands being aware of the journey, only to become stranded before being picked up. One of the migrants interviewed on vacation had come to the UK with his mother and two siblings without his father's knowledge or approval, and consequently they were not picked up from the airport and entered police custody. In their situation as for others, the social and religious network came to the rescue.

> Q: During the time when your father was living in UK, he must have been very keen to take you all. … How had this decision been taken [to go without ensuring that his father is aware of it]?
> A: I don't know how, why the decision was taken. … We were three. There was another family from our village. So we were two families. So we were taken to a police station in London and they started asking questions—"Where do you want to go? What you want to do?" We had the address, but there was no phone number, there were telephones and telegrams at that time. The lady that was with my mother, she was a bit more educated than my mother. She said "look, if you could, take us to a *gurdwara*, then it would be fine." And at

> the *gurdwara*, there was a young guy who had come from India to study. The priest of the *gurdwara* was not there. So after some hours he came. Next day, the priest sent the telegraph to my father to come and take us off. The next day he came and we went along with him. (Male, 56, migrant on vacation)

These women were central in sustaining their transnational households and many often were tied to household labor by discrimination against working. Their cooking and performing *seva* for the elders and the community was an everyday act of cultural service. Many women entered the informal and formal labor markets as well as performing their household duties, to contribute to the household finances (Modood and Berthoud 1997; Brown 2000; Platt 2002). The children taken along by them or "called" by their fathers were known as "1.5-ers." Neither first- nor second-generation but 1.5, they also referred to themselves as proper *desi*s (South Asians) because they had strong personal memories of living in Punjab, as well as knowledge of the place and its many language and cultures. Although their lives in Punjab before being called to the UK were prestigious by virtue of their father's emigration to the UK and his periodic visits, they experienced disorientation, bullying, and racism in school after emigration to the UK as immigrant children. There are no special appellations in Punjab for the bhijis and 1.5-ers; they are simply referred to as part of the generic term NRIs, or rarely as oldies. However, they had different experiences because of the bhijis' genders, and also because the 1.5-ers went through the UK school system and thus had distinct linguistic and cultural skills.

East Africans make up a strong contingent of Punjabis in Britain. They are considered twice migrants (Bhachu 1985), who migrated from Punjab to countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania during British colonialism, mainly to develop the physical and commercial infrastructure of East Africa. Africanization policies in postcolonial Africa and the view of Asians as the dregs and stooges of colonialism encouraged the majority of Asians to migrate to Britain or Canada with their British passports. Unlike the old-timers, East African Punjabis migrated as entire families. To regulate the heightened immigration of Asians from East Africa, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act replaced distinctions on country of passport issue with the notion of ancestry, denying entry to passport holders who were not born in Britain or did not have parents or grandparents in Britain. This was further tightened by the Immigration Act of 1971 (Paul 1997; Spencer 1997; Jopke 1999; Hansen 2000). The East African Punjabis are disproportionately affiliated with the Tarkhan/Ramgharia castes and unsurprisingly cherished their life in Africa as part of a "coloured" community without residential demarcations and religious or caste divides. The East African Punjabi respondents who were interviewed had a self-consciously modern outlook and often look down on their counterparts who had migrated directly from Punjab as *pehndoo* (villagey/unsophisticated). However, the informants from Punjab whose East African relatives in turn emigrated to the UK were unenthusiastic about their African life and had some amnesia not only about their life, work, and duration of stay in Africa, but also often about the specific country itself. The African stint was often overlooked or forgotten by their relatives in Punjab, who failed to recall even the name of the African country, although they retained vivid memories of their UK life. However, the East African Punjabis, who

experienced downward mobility during the immediate decades of their re-migration, moved up swiftly in terms of employment, wealth, and authority. They were also reinforced by substantial intergenerational mobility, and reinvented themselves as multiple-migrants (Bhachu 1999).

Mangetars, literally meaning fiancé(e)s, who have recently migrated to Britain for the purpose of marriage, is another group of Punjabi migrants in the UK. The dissolution of the Primary Purpose Rule in 1997, which sought to disallow marriages for the purpose of economic migration, was withdrawn in 1997, led to a sharp rise in the numbers of male spouses granted visas to the UK, to the extent that there is now near parity with the numbers of female marriage migrants (Home Office 2001). However, the assumption that marriage migration is primarily motivated by economic migration continues to inform immigration laws (Menski 1997). The category of *mangetars* is diverse and includes those who came marriage, and those who came on a temporary visit, or a student or work visa, and ended up marrying someone from Britain. There is intense pressure on unauthorized migrants to get their status legalized through the strategy of marriage, which in turn engenders fear among the local Punjabi community, particularly for girls, about youngsters resorting to trickery to become allied with someone who is British-born or British, as well as fears of bogus marriages. *Mangetars*, on the other hand, experience turbulent downward mobility. Their language skills and qualifications are disregarded in Britain, and so they are not impressed with the *rishta* (proposal) when it comes. Most often the *mangetars,* particularly girls, are better qualified than their partners, but end up marrying men with lower educational attainment and family backgrounds, and settle for low-end jobs disproportionate to their qualifications, thus making Britain a *meetha* (sweet) jail for many of them. Contrary to this, Punjabis in India expect their UK *rishtedar* (relatives) to find a match for their sons and daughters from the UK, and often such marriages are facilitated by social and kinship networks. Women with UK citizenship are better placed when it comes to their marriage choices irrespective of their marital status and family life. Punjabi men who marry British Punjabi women find themselves vulnerable, because they do not believe they have adequate control over their wives and thus are often apprehensive about their relations and friendships. On the other hand, there are occasions in which the groom and his family feel that the bride is not loyal and cultured enough and is slightly too smart, particularly when the woman is someone with a high education and class.

The *torture victims* from Punjab form another category of migrants to the UK. In the face of growing state violence to confront the Sikh separatist movement in India, many suspects were forced to flee the country and seek asylum in various countries, including the UK (Keppley 1996; Gayer 2002). They sometimes traveled through transit countries with the help of agents and relatives. However, the torture victims distinguish themselves from ordinary illegals by their descriptions of political activism and the resultant persecution and suffering. They found their honor and niche in the UK through networks sympathetic to the *Damdami Taksal,* and many later became prominent members of *gurdwara* committees and political activists against human rights abuses in Punjab. Their applications for political asylum often become entangled

in the bureaucratic process of proving their claims of physical harm and political threat in Punjab. Apart from contemporary media clippings and other documentary proofs, they often have to undergo clinical tests to establish the physical damage wrought by alleged torture, proving the embodied nature of their predicament. On the other hand, the general discourse in Punjab, where the nation-state is a palpable presence, views torture victims as political asylum seekers who make use of the separatist movement to gain entrance into the UK and other countries. Their stories of heroism are viewed with skepticism. The robust parallel economies of emigration run by agents and other players facilitating the migration of asylum seekers during those years are invoked to reinforce this argument.

The new *professional migrants* from Punjab to the UK are less inclined to live their whole lives in the UK. After a few years in the UK some people migrate to countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia for better economic prospects and sometimes even for a better climate. There are information technology (IT) professionals who plan to return and settle in Indian cities such as Bangalore. A few are waiting for the IT city being built in Mohali. One migrant on vacation who currently works in an international cruise restaurant in the UK reported that he wishes only to continue to work there, but does not want to live in the UK. He is not very keen to have a community life among the UK Punjabis. His family lives in Punjab, and he spends 6 months a year in Punjab and the remainder in Dover.

> I went just for work. Actually I struggled long in Mumbai before. Around six months. I was not very fluent in English and when I attended a couple of interviews people told me that I have to refine my English. So I joined for some course. Then I got appointment s from many companies including the Royal Caribbean. But I choose this because I need to work only 6 months and 6 months I can come back and be with my family. I had to worry about nothing; the company took care of everything. In fact, I love agriculture. But my parents, particularly my mother do not want anyone of us to be here in agriculture because it does not have any respect…. When I got a job without paying anything all my friends were surprised. They asked me how come I got this without spending anything. And when I came back they were even more surprised. They asked me why did I come back when people here are dying to go. (Male, 34, migrant on vacation)

However, emigration of professionals from Punjab, embodying a typical tourist in Bauman's "liquid modernity" (2000), are not closed to the social set-up in the UK. The IT professionals being sent by the Indian corporate sector on specific assignments to the UK, for instance, enter into an alternate Punjabi space, defined by ethnic and kinship networks.

> He went to UK as part of his duty to complete some assignments in UK. He has been working with Wipro. It was thus he married my niece who has been working with a furniture showroom, Ikea. The marriage was arranged by the family. Now both are living there. They have his two sons. All of them live in UK.

Various illegals form another category of Punjabi migrants to the UK. The term *illegal* was highly stigmatized in the UK, although less so in Punjab. Nonetheless, it was widely used in everyday speech and so is retained in this chapter. The illegals include persons crossing borders clandestinely without documents or with forged documents, overstaying visitors, and so on. *Student migrants* have formed a major

category in recent years. Under the new regime of managed migration, in which students and skilled migrants are seen as positive economic assets, education has become a major channel of migration from Punjab. The commoditization has not only generated a robust economy of educational migration in Punjab, but also opened the channel of migration to groups hitherto uninvolved in terms caste, class, and gender. However, it is also true that in the larger global market of education available to Punjabis, countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are more sought after than the UK for their fees, secure prospects for continuation, and so on. The students who came to the UK were mainly attending new universities and backstreet colleges with names such as Brit College, providing diverse and less expensive courses and minimum class hours and thereby tacitly supporting students in working beyond the regulated 20 h a week. They often resort to low-skilled service sector jobs to raise money to earn a living and tuition fees. At the same time they had to make sure that they attended the required number of hours of classes because attendance of international students is monitored, unless they wished to become "illegal" right away. Many are eager to complete the course requirements as something to show their family as a testament to their success. However, it is found that in many cases their families back in India do not even know what sort of course their child is pursuing or the college in which they were studying. For many, the investment was for emigration rather than education. They were indifferent to the news in the Punjabi media about bogus colleges functioning in the UK, but were sometimes worried by the fact that their children were unable to find jobs, particularly in the context of the economic recession of 2009.

New individual migrants, including student migrants, illegals, and so on, are often referred to in the UK as *freshies,* another stigmatized term that derives from the expression "fresh from the boat." The settled and British-born informants tend to look down on them because of their perceived provinciality, lack of local know-how, poor language skills, inappropriate clothing, useless qualifications, and presumed illegality. Freshies are felt to devalue a neighborhood because they do not care about the upkeep of the houses they stay in, live in *dera*s (lodges) crowded with men, drink too much, and keep poor personal hygiene. The label freshie expresses the hierarchical and differentially empowered nature of transnational space, in which British-born is synonymous with authority, modernity, affluence, and status, and "Indian" is synonymous with poverty and backwardness. For example, one female informant criticized another mangetar, a female friend from Punjab, by complaining, "Who does she think she is—British born?" However, the ambivalences around the term freshie are suggestive of complex cultural dynamics within transnational space. The settled and British-born informants expressed stereotypes about freshies "minting it" and sending ill-gotten earnings to Punjab to build lavish mansions. We were told stories of freshies who made their money and returned to India because they said, "Why should I live here when with this money I can live like a king over there?" As one of the 1.5-ers pointed out, "You wouldn't have got that 40 years ago, nowadays people can live with the best of both worlds." However, we found that many of the freshies, rather than hoarding money, were going through the contradictions of the myth of arrival (Ahmad 2008). Unlike the old-timers, who

imagined that they would go to Britain, make money, and return to Punjab, but ended up staying, this was a different configuration of the migration imaginary. For the freshies, getting out of India was an almost compulsory element of youthful masculinity. They perceived that there was no future for them in Punjab and therefore went to huge pains to migrate—only to find there were scant opportunities for residency and their immigration status was perennially precarious.

The ambivalences over the category *British-born* were no less complexly configured over transnational space. Although being British-born connoted authority and status, they were also derided as "confused" and bore the brunt of expectations and disappointments concerning the maintenance of culture and tradition. From the perspective of Punjab, the worrying or sometimes comic figure of the British-born youth, as in the 2009 Punjabi film Munde U.K. De (Fig. 2.3), shows that the British-born generations may only achieve respectability, intelligence, and value to the extent that they disavow their Britishness and embrace their Punjabi heritage.

Our interviews in Punjab testify there is a strong sense of contempt toward the NRIs. Even close relatives are not spared. Nonresident Indians are seen as the primary reason for all vices in Punjabi society, including the increase in drug addiction among youth, violence, inflation, separatism, high land prices, destruction of family values, and exorbitant dowries. They are blamed for throwing Punjab into a stage of insurgency by supporting a separate homeland movement. They are often the butt of jokes for their extravagance and conceit in dress, ornament, and style of homes. They are ridiculed particularly for investing money in sports and festivals just to get their names announced through the microphone. Popular Punjabi films construct such comic figures of NRIs who with their pomp, splendor, and lack of wisdom attempt to lure local girls and disturb the values of Punjabi life. Yet, the desire to go abroad, as well as boys and girls waiting for NRI brides and grooms continues. This simultaneous contempt and desire vividly illustrates the heterogeneity woven into the transnational tapestry and its multiply-inhabited character.

2.5 Against the Duality of Transnational Spaces

The diffuse processes associated with transnationalism might lead us to endorse a vision of transnational spaces (Jackson et al. 2004: 3)—multidimensional and multi-inhabited fields, in which a multitude of actors are seen to operate with different levels of investment and involvement. Walton-Roberts (2004, 2005) shows how entire spaces are reconfigured through transnationalism, opening up the concept beyond migrants to include, for example, the village official who coordinates NRI financial contributions and therefore forms a node in a transnational network although never himself able to travel overseas. However, this literature maintains a stubborn *bipolarity* that is problematic against the extended spatial terrain in which we found transnationalism to operate. Formulations such as "the social space of British-Asian transnationality" (Crang et al. 2003: 451) privilege dyadic relationships between singular sending and receiving countries. Furthermore, we often read

Fig. 2.3 Film poster for Munde U.K. (Source: De 2009)

that this spatial dualism is undergirded by sociocultural dual perspectives or bifocality, opposing the *desh* (home), the locus of personal and social identity and religiosity, with *pardesh* (abroad), conveying material bounty and opportunity (Gardner 1993; Vertovec 2009: 67–68). Thus, it is the *desh* that is privileged with iconic and material value. By contrast, we found that transnationalism took place with in an expanded and more complexly configured spatial and sociocultural landscape, which exceeded these dualistic formations. Meanwhile, studies of diasporal formations stress the imagined connection between "a collectively self-defined ethnic group in a particular setting, the group's co-ethnics in other parts of the world, and the homeland states or local contexts when they or their forebears came" (Vertovec 2000: 7), whereas the actual ongoing exchanges between people scattered across the world are not brought into the frame of reference. We propose a de-centered Punjab, operating not only at the level of cultural productions and their complex spatial entanglements (Sharma et al. 1996), but also in practical and material terms.

From the perspective of Punjab, the UK is just one of a number of countries with which our informants maintained connections, and to which people aspired to migrate. These places were all referred to as "foreign" and seen to be connected to one another. For example, one informant in his late twenties was eager to go to the UK but had no personal connections that would enable him to do so. He explored the possibility of migrating to the UK illegally through agents in Amritsar, but the 10 lakh rupees fee was too much for him to afford. Instead, he took the advice of his wife's cousin-uncle, a factory owner in Malaysia, and invested nearly 1 lakh rupees in a visit to Hong Kong. He was unable to find a job in Hong Kong and took his return flight after 2 weeks, but was happy because he felt the foreign visa in his passport would make his applications for other *vilayti* (Western) countries look credible. He also boasted that he had become confident in speaking English and now looked differently on Punjab. Similarly, the students in Punjab weighed the fee structures, admissions criteria, eligibility requirements, and residency entitlements of universities/colleges in Canada and Australia against those in the UK. When the perspective shifts from a particular destination to the sending context, the transnational field expands considerably. Kelly had a similar insight in her research on Gujarati migration to the UK: "gradually… I realised that Britain was not the centre of their world, and that my country was only one of a number of options which they would consider" (1990: 251). This is not to deny the prominence of the UK in the imaginary of "foreign" places in Punjab. The UK, by virtue of the overlaying of postcolonial migration onto colonial histories, had a specific pull. One relative who had never visited his brother in the UK nonetheless knew the geography of the UK inside out and could render the streets of Bradford where his brother and family lived in vivid detail. Framed photos of London's Tower Bridge can be found hanging on the walls of migrant- and nonmigrant households across Punjab. These were not isolated instances, but reflect the folding of specific foreign locations and countries into the imagination of Punjab.

In the process of migration, we found that there were major circuits of transnational connection among the routes of *transit*. The "illegals" (we again distance ourselves from the stigma of the term) were migrating through two dominant routes.

First, they could travel from India to Turkey, Russia, or a few other ex-Soviet Union countries and make their way toward the UK by crossing numerous national borders (UNODC 2009). The second unauthorized flow went directly from India to southern European countries on visit visas, and then required the migrants to negotiate entry to the UK. These irregular transit routes entailed a perilous *contingency* as the illegals might be caught by border guards and sent back to previous countries of transit, or even to India—from where they might make a second attempt to migrate through the channels of a different agent. Although the illegals who reached Britain stated that they migrated with the intention of coming to Britain, it is clear from the accounts of the returnees and informants in continental Europe that there is a strong blurring of the line between countries of transit and countries of destination. Although France, Italy, and Greece have flows of illegals en route to the UK, there are also substantial populations of Punjabis who have decided to stay and make their future (Bertolani 2010; Moliner 2010). In Poland, by contrast, there are thousands of Punjabis living in a liminal space between transit and settlement. Some have lived for up to 5 years before finding the opportunity and wherewithal to move on. Others fell in love and/or married Polish women who were working with them in restaurants and other service sector jobs across Western Europe, and returned with them to Poland (Igielski 2010). Although the illegals often set out with the hope of getting to the UK, they had to compromise and re-evaluate their prospects in the light of subsequent experiences of settlement; yet still they contemplate onward movement.

Recent migrants communicated as much as they could with their significant others in Punjab, and these linkages were important in the course of transit and settlement. As well as maintaining contact with their families in Punjab, however, recent migrants maintained and actively developed links with people in other countries along these transit routes. One illegal, who had crossed borders in eastern Europe with a motley assortment of Indian Punjabis, Pakistanis, and Iranians, kept in contact with the Pakistanis and sought advice from them about his next move after they had parted company in France. Another, who had overstayed his student visa, was speaking on the phone with some friends from his college in Punjab, who were at that time in Spain and advising him that the Spanish government was likely to have an amnesty for illegal immigrants. For precarious recent migrants, the goal of becoming *pukke* (regularizing) led them to focus their efforts at networking and maintaining relationships in the criss-crossing spaces of transit. This leads us to the question why the transnationalism paradigm seems to fetishise connections with the sending country at the expense of migrants' priorities and efforts to settle in the West.

From the perspective of the UK, too, India was an important node but within an expanded transnational landscape including a range of other diasporal locations arising from colonial and postcolonial movements. Most significant among these was the substantial group of East African *twice migrants* (Bhachu 1985) whose distinctive migration histories produced ongoing familial and economic connections with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. In the UK we also encountered twice migrants from other places associated with colonial indentured labor, such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, who shared with the East Africans the sense of being

more modern than the majority of Punjab–UK migrants and their descendents, having become accustomed to Western lifestyles and standards of living in their previous countries. Many of the recent migrants we encountered through the English classes were not from Punjab but from countries in the transit routes across continental Europe such as Germany, Italy, and Spain. These were families who had moved to the UK to provide young children with an English education in British schools, worried that their children would be limited if they could only speak German or Spanish. Having followed the advice of contacts from their largely Punjabi networks, they ended up living in Asian neighborhoods in ex-industrial localities with weak service industries and poor employment opportunities. Their children ended up studying at inner-city schools with other minority and immigrant children. Finding Britain to be a disappointment, they often had mixed feelings about remaining in the UK, although having sold off assets or put properties to rent, they had burned their bridges and were obliged to give life in the UK a try. Their ambivalence illustrates again the smudged line between countries of transit and countries of destination.

These cross-diasporal connections were important as sources of potential value. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s many of the old-timers were discouraged from establishing businesses that were dependent on importing from or trading with Punjab because of the political instability and intractable problems of corruption, bureaucratic hurdles, and difficulties in enforcing agreements with parties in India. However, they had developed a number of other transnational connections linked with their mobile life histories, building on links to relatives and acquaintances in East Africa, North America, or the Gulf. One old-timer who was an avid *kabaddi* player went to Vancouver for a tournament in the 1980s and found out about polar fleece material by talking to some of the other *kabaddi* competitors. He then made a substantial profit from importing the material into Britain and becoming the first to trade in it: "We got it from Canada very dear, £6 a metre but people paid so much for it in those days it was still worth it, at the peak we had people lining up outside the factory in the morning to get their hands on it (Male, 58, old-timer)." Another old-timer who owned a factory in Birmingham making plastic bags and coat-hangers was going into business with his son, who was in Dubai working for a construction company, but had taken the initiative of establishing and registering a factory making the same products over there. Similarly, transnational property investments were not restricted to India but drew on other opportunities presented to them from their life histories. Twice migrants were continuing to invest in property in East Africa and others were considering investing even further afield, as in the following quote. For such individuals, Punjab therefore comprised only one element of a complex portfolio of transnational investments.

> My son, who is a solicitor, he has bought a land in Mombasa in the last one year. I was wondering, we left our property for nothing there in Nayuki and he's buying now! They have three partners who are going, lot of things here and there and they had interest in there you know. They had interest there because their cousins are there in Mombasa having a big hotel there so I think they've been encouraged by them. So they've bought a piece of land in Mombasa about an acre, they are planning for development for a shopping centre.

> My daughter, she was asking me if she can buy land in Brazil! I asked her, why the hell, why would you go to Brazil, it's a South American country you don't know what is there how are you going to keep it there, how are you going to manage it there! But I think it's only for speculation. (Male, 65, East African)

Familial connections also showed an expanded transnational field including locations in North America and Australia. In particular, the British-born informants often had a very different sense of being transnational with respect to India and other places in the diaspora. For example, they might shy away from speaking to relatives in India who they did not know, skulking off instead of talking on the phone. At the same time, they invested time communicating with their cousins in Vancouver or California on social media such as Facebook or MSM messenger, and were often more excited by the prospect of a holiday in North America than in India. Although the idea of a transnational marriage with a partner from India did not appeal to many of the British-born informants, they often said that transnational marriages with diasporal Indians in North America were quite interesting possibilities. North America was also prestigious, and those who were most socially mobile were contemplating moving to Canada or the United States for work, like other British teenagers and young adults who have been transfixed the popular culture of the United States, and who wish for an exciting but reassuringly Anglophile change of scene (Brooks and Waters 2010). There were also some British-born informants who said they thought the United States was a fairer country than Britain, a less racist place where even an African American could become president.

> I think this *is* my home. It's the only home I've got, anyway, I don't fit in there [India] any more either. Maybe that's why I'm drawn to the USA more than here. I could give up Englishness or Indianness and become an American—they allow you to do that. In my mind I think I'm English, but well, am I? Why can't people say yes, be proud this is your home? (Male, 40, British-born)

Religion also provided a major route for "chaordic" transnationalism beyond Punjab. Since the crushing of the Khalistani militancy in Punjab in the late 1990s, Sikh ethno-nationalism in the UK has re-configured under a rubric of human rights, re-working long-standing themes of martyrdom within the Sikh tradition (Fenech 2005). The politics of victimhood has adopted the signs and insignia of international human rights movements (Chopra 2010). In particular, activists have taken up themes relating to the Nazi genocide. The 25th anniversary of the Golden Temple attacks and the Delhi riots was marked in 2009, and was commemorated by awareness-raising publications such as, "1984: The Sikhs' Kristallnacht," horrific exhibitions of human rights abuses in Punjab at Vaisaki celebrations, a surge of Khalistan-oriented talks in gurdware (Sikh temples) and campuses, and the annual rally in Hyde Park in London, at which mourners dressed soberly in black suits, with black turbans and black arm bands. The victimhood theme was the root of a substantial degree of sympathy with the Jewish diaspora and also for the state of Israel. We repeatedly heard Jat Sikhs expressing solidarity with Jewish people as brethren who had been persecuted and subjected to atrocities in the same way as Sikhs, but although the Jewish people got their homeland, the claim for Khalistan was brutally suppressed by the Indian government.

Most recently, Sikhs in the UK have turned their gaze from Punjab homeland politics to other transnational linkages expressed by the conceptualization of the Sikh collectivity as a global qaom (nation) enshrined in the sovereignty of the Khalsa panth (path or community). For example, Sikh groups in the UK have been in the vanguard of a campaign to pressure the French government to withdraw the ban on wearing turbans in public institutions. They made connections with European and North American Sikhs over the problems of multiculturalism in their respective countries. Nonetheless, lest the primacy of the Khalsa image lead us to entertain ideas of a de-territorialized Sikh nation challenging Westphalian notions of sovereign nation-states (Gayer 2002; Shani 2005), the transnational relationships remained tangled. In practice, the promise of a de-territorialized sovereign Khalsa was rejected in favor of allegiance to the Shiromani *Gurdwara* Prabandakh Committee (SGPC) and Akal Takht in Amritsar, which were seen to provide some degree of political centrality. If Akal Takht rulings were controversial and at times unpopular, the alternative prospect of Sikhism being overrun by the popular dalit Ravidasia movement was too awful for Jat Sikhs to contemplate. As one joked, “If we stop engaging with the SGPC then look mate—the dalits are gonna take over!” Heterodox Sikh movements such as the Ravidasia and Namdhari sects were configured differently in transnational space, the gurdware in the UK taking a leadership role over other gurdware across Europe.

Young people’s transnational politics re-worked those of their parents. Although 1984 continued to excite and mobilize young British-born Sikhs, and their organizational life reflected the fault lines between Khalistani-aligned or -opposed sects and *jathe* (Sikh groups and organizations), there was a turn toward de-coupling Sikhism from its provincial concerns with Punjab homeland and re-casting it as a fast-growing “world religion” alongside Christianity and Islam. Youth in the UK were linked to and played an essential part in Sikh revival in Canada, the United States, and continental Europe as well as Punjab. When attending Sikh youth events, it was common to be shown photos and video footage of turbaned and bearded white Sikhs from North America or black Sikhs from East Africa or elsewhere in the diaspora—images that continually provoked strong reactions from Punjabi Sikhs, who were affirmed by this embodied proof of the global reach and significance of their faith. However, against the notion of the de-territorialized Sikh *qaom,* it is important to note that white or black Sikh converts were positioned by Punjabi Sikhs as within, but also outside of the *panth,* which was ethnically Punjabi and implicitly racially profiled. Transnational connectivity therefore appears different from the perspectives of Punjab and the UK, and cannot be reduced to dyadic relationships between the two countries—illustrating the multi-sited and differentially empowered nature of transnational space. The transnationalism literature also typically effaces the complex history of diaspora, in which the UK is but one node. Meanwhile, the literature on diasporal formations gives insights into global ethnic consciousness (Vertovec 2000) and the complex structures of movement, connection, and subordination wherein “a plurality of antagonisms and differences are distinctive features” (Hall 1996), yet the focus is on imagined connections rather than ongoing exchanges. To grapple with these tangible interactions, and capture

simultaneously the de-centering of the Punjab–UK relationship as well as its very specific imaginaries and linkages, we find resonances with Ong and Nonini's (1997) notion of the "chronotope," which describes to how multiple geographies are continually being engaged by ethnic Chinese, whose earlier diasporas are continually evolving into networks throughout regions of dispersal and settlement.

2.6 The State and the Production of Transnationalism

Transnationalism privileges people-to-people contacts across national borders as its fundamental point, resulting in researches on multi-sited lives and ethnoscapes (Marcus 1995; Appadurai 1996). The unbounded/multi-bounded belonging is also understood as making significant shifts in the nation-state model, which has been the ruling mode of political affiliation in the modern world (Vertovec 2009). Early research enthusiastically embraced the idea that migrants were able to transcend state sovereignty through the micro-practices of "transnationalism from below" (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). Later research recognized the many ways in which state policies still matter, "the state is here to stay" (Levitt et al. 2003: 568). However, the fluctuating role of the state within shifting transnational flows, and its political agency in formalizing informal transnational spaces through new institutions and discreet discourses has been overlooked. By contrast, we found that the government of India has re-evaluated its emigrants and transnational citizens as a resource for tapping transnational capital for its development, a resource arguably to counter the ongoing discriminatory globalization. This marked a definitive change in the approach of the nation-state toward its overseas citizens. Similarly, the British government has also institutionalized the exteriority of its Punjabi population through the minoritizing practices of multiculturalism and therefore played its part in producing transnationalism.

The policy of the Nehruvian state toward overseas Indians was one of either returning home or indigenizing themselves in their respective countries of residence, something required not only by the imposing nation-state-framework, but also by a daunting bipolar world under the Cold War (Edwards 2008: 452). The end of the Cold War and the new economic policy in the late 1980s made the Indian state open up itself to overseas Indians. Although significantly late, the realization of strategic importance of the Indian diaspora resulted in concrete steps by the state to promote emotional and economic ties with its overseas citizen (Lall 2001). The rhetoric was to promote a "global Indian family" and citizenship, with which the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora (HLCID) was appointed in 2000 to make recommendations to reinforce the state initiatives in this direction further (Edwards 2008: 444–445). The establishment of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2004, on the recommendation of the HLCID, for specifically looking after the affairs of the overseas Indians is considered to be an important step in this direction. The MOIA is mandated to "promote, nurture and sustain a mutually beneficial and symbolic relationship between India and overseas Indians" (MOIA 2007: 6). It is

expected to ensure the welfare and protection of the overseas Indians while emigrating, while experiencing expatriate life, and after returning from overseas work. It seeks to ensure and promote beneficial relationships with Indian people abroad, the Global Indian citizen. Unsurprisingly, the NRIs, who were seen hitherto as the "not-required Indians," soon experienced a metamorphosis as the national reserve of India in media representations (Edwards 2008: 454).

The resultant statist interventions aimed at institutionalizing transnational ties and structuring what we call national regimes of transnationalism has been more driven by *nationalistic* than transnational considerations. The attempts to attract transnational capital for national development are defined in a framework of mutually beneficial relationships between India and overseas Indians. The statist discourse on this underscores India's credentials as an attractive investment location at one level, but resort to a nationalist rhetoric invoking the original belonging of overseas Indians at another, in an attempt to "try and make the overseas Indian an active participant in the India growth story" (MOIA 2008: 43). To facilitate these mutually sustaining objectives, a liberal policy and institutional framework has been put in place for ensuring NRI investments through the automatic and government route such as the larger liberalized Foreign FDI Regime of India, which offered additional incentives to NRIs (Rajan and Varghese 2010). The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) offers various incentives in the form of tax exemptions and liberal repatriation schemes. Income from the investments made by NRIs/PIOs out of convertible foreign exchange in their NRI Accounts and FCNR accounts are totally exempted from taxation. The RBI also supports NRI investment in India through indirect channels such as loans. Under FEMA regulations, a foreign citizen who is resident in India can purchase Immovable Property (IP) in India without any approval from the RBI. NRI/PIO account holders are also permitted to remit up to $1 million per year out of the balance in their nonresident (ordinary) account/sale proceeds of assets (inclusive of inheritance/settlement). The banks are also permitted to issue international credit cards to NRIs/PIOs without prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India.

In addition to such "services," there were also attempts on the part of the state to systematize and streamline the flow of transnational resources for philanthropic and charity works. The government has put a liberal framework in place for nongovernmental organizations, in the forms of societies, trusts, and nonprofit companies, to receive contributions from overseas to carry out charitable/philanthropic work in India (MOIA 2006: 48–51). More recently, the government of India established an India Development Foundation (IDF) to promote philanthropy among the Indian diaspora, having realized the potential of transnational diaspora resources through the channel of philanthropy. Apart from promoting philanthropy, IDF is supposed to "align diaspora philanthropy with the national development goals and to provide a platform to the diaspora for channelizing their philanthropic initiatives through creditable NGOs and institutions" (from the proposed national migration policy document, as yet unpublished). It is not surprising that with an increasing reliance by nation-states on development, which is fundamental to state-centric biopolitics for its self-legitimization, transnational citizens and nonresident citizens are found

to be highly potent sources of capital generation. Through such initiatives the nation-state also sought to reinforce its foundations by extending itself to a constituency that had hitherto remained outside its fold, by opening up "proper" and new spaces of exchange alongside formalizing diverse forms of hitherto informal and undercover flows into the home country.

This has been accompanied by a new representational regime through the production and reinvention of categories such as NRI, PIO, OCI, as new signifiers and administrative categories. The category of NRI was created by the state in the 1970s in an attempt to interpolate the migrant as an extension of the nation with visible economic intentions (Shukla 2005: 59). Thus, India has actively constituted itself as a homeland through its changing policies toward NRIs, but is not an inevitable homeland for its emigrants (Raj 2003). Although the poorer migrants in the countries in the Middle East and elsewhere were not really built into it, subsequently NRI became the generic term to describe Indian migrants. The appellation gave a new subjectivity to the transmigrant for being abroad, apart from bestowing a few benefits that are not usually available to those living outside the nation-state, including the right to own property (Raj 2003: 10). In the late 1990s the powerful language of nationalism was extended to noncitizens with Indian ancestors by taking concrete measures to strengthen and reinforce the emotional ties that transnational Indian citizens apparently share with their motherland. The category of PIO was invented and a PIO card scheme was introduced in 1999, much before the formation of MOIA, in an effort to give a formal and bureaucratic expression to such enduring bonds. A PIO card holder is entitled to visit India without a visa for 15 years. No separate student visa or employment visa is required for admission to educational institutions and taking up employment in India. PIO card holders are not required to register with the Foreigners' Registration Officer if continuous stay does not exceed 180 days, and they are entitled to get all benefits and facilities available to the NRIs in economic, financial, and educational fields. A gratis PIO card may be issued to an exceptionally eminent person of Indian origin, who plays an important role in building bridges between India and the country of his or her adoption, if he or she expresses a desire to obtain the PIO card.

Further, more recently on the recommendation of the HLCID, the government of India had introduced a scheme of OCI, by which aspiring and eligible PIOs are given overseas citizenship of India. The scheme has been operational from December 2, 2005. Overseas citizen of India has been introduced as a new category of citizenship to facilitate lifelong visas, unrestricted travel to India, and certain economic, educational, and cultural benefits. An OCI is entitled to the benefits of multiple entry, multiple-purpose lifelong visa to visit India, exemption from registration with the police authorities for any length of stay in India, and parity with NRIs in financial, economic, and educational fields except in the acquisition of agricultural or plantation properties. However, "[p]ersons registered as OCI have not been given any voting rights, election to Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha/Legislative Assembly/Council, holding Constitutional posts such as President, Vice President, Judge of Supreme Court/High Court, etc.," although the response by the transnational citizens of India to the scheme has been overwhelming (MOIA 2006: 55). The other important

measures taken by MOIA to reinforce the ties of overseas Indians with a resurgent India are the Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC), the Know India Programme (KIP), and the Tracing the Roots program, apart from instituting the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award (Rajan and Varghese 2010). Arguably, such institutional changes presuppose a redefinition of nation in such a way as to accommodate its transnational citizens, a new state nationalism that is increasingly open to overseas Indians. The statist notion of nation has this undergone re-formalization to take the nation beyond a national space, its territoriality, to a transnational space. However, the rationale that underlies this transnationalization of the nation is primarily national. Further, there is marked statist ambivalence over its transnational citizens, which is clearly visible in the limits of this formal seriality as explicated in the denial of political rights and restrictions on owning property.

Substantial openness to transnational citizens and NRIs are available at the subnational level, too. The Punjabi government has taken steps to encourage overseas Punjabis to invest in the state by making use of the emotional and sentimental ties of the latter with their motherland. It extended incentives to NRPs to invest in the state apart from simplifying the procedures and fastening the processes. The establishment of the Department of NRI Affairs in 2002 was aimed at promoting an advantageous relationship and offering necessary services to the NRPs. Realizing the amount of money being pumped into rural Punjab for philanthropy and village infrastructure, the Department of NRI Affairs sought to incentivize and formalize such transnational contributions by instituting the NRI-GoP Rural Infrastructure Development Fund. Responsively, the government established NRI police stations, fast track court for NRI cases and extended support to the NRI Sabha, an NGO of the NRPs. These interventions on the part of the government of Punjab in turn reinforce a distinct Punjabi cultural identity beyond the territorial confines of the subnation into a global Punjabi identity.

Similarly, the British government has also actively fostered a sense of exteriority for its ethnic minority populations through the institutionalizing policies of *multiculturalism,* and the way it encourages its minoritized subjects to formulate their ethnic and religious identities and engage in civic action. From the 1960s to the late 1990s, British immigration and citizenship policies maintained a double objective: immigration control combined with *anti-discrimination legislation* for migrants once in Britain (e.g., the 1965, 1968, and 1976 Race Relations Acts) (Zetter 2002; Somerville 2007). The legislation actively produces identities for minorities by offering legal entitlements for those who ascribe membership of a group recognized by the government. The institutional practices that define citizenship rights and statuses are what Ong refers to as "subjectification," in the sense of "a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society" (Ong 1996: 263–264). The anti-discrimination legislation subjectifies in particular ways and yet we still find that there is scope for people to subvert and strategically redeploy the terms of debate.

As many have pointed out, Punjabis have been at the forefront of anti-discrimination politics in Britain. The historic Mandla vs. Dowell Lee case (1978), over the right of Sikh men and boys to wear a turban, set a precedent for cases to come. The Race

Relations law of the day provided protection in cases of discrimination against racial or ethnic, but not religious, identity, whereas the House of Lords determined that Sikhs should be protected under this legislation: "the Sikhs… are more than a religious sect, they are almost a race and almost a nation" (Hall 2002: 52). Since then, religious identification has also come under legal protection (e.g., the Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006) and provides a major channel for representation and consultation under the rubric of "faith communities" (Baumann 1996). Therefore, Sikhs have deployed the terms of religious or racial group identity fluidly. Several informants had taken part in the unsuccessful campaign for Sikhs to be recognized as a separate ethnic group in the 1991 census. Latterly, however, the same informants had taken part in campaigns against the French ban on wearing the turban, in which they argued (*contra Mandla vs. Dowell Lee*) that the turban was a cultural, not a religious, requirement. This political fluidity has led Sikhs to be described as a "paradigm case of a special-interest group that can always negotiate an opt-out from general rule making" (Singh and Tatla 2006: 126).

Immigration policy under New Labour grappled with heightened tensions over *citizenship*. National and international events—specifically ethnic riots and terrorism—led to a move toward policies directed toward fostering integration and cohesion, along with the construction of a "core" national identity, the latter entailing citizenship ceremonies, a citizen's test, and the requirement to have some knowledge of English, Gaelic, Scottish, or Welsh. (See the 2003 Report on Life in the UK as a blueprint for recent government policies. For a review of recent policies, see Back et al. 2002; Castles et al. 2002; Flynn 2005; Sales 2005; Zetter 2006; Somerville 2007. The "Life in the UK" classes we observed during the field work, provided by community centers on behalf of the local authority to equip applicants with the skills and practical knowledge to pass the citizenship test, were productive of particular identities. Classroom discussions of set texts clipped from newspapers concerned topics such as human trafficking and gangmasters, which prompted the students to express anti-immigration politics, and encouraged them to place themselves on the side of the rightful British citizen rather than the devious underhand anti-citizen freshie. Discussions repeatedly used the pedagogic device of comparing Britain with the countries of origin, fixing cultural identities and functioning "to understand immigration and movement in the sense of a cultural prior" (Raj 2003: 166). Topics such as the National Health Service and adult education opportunities in Britain invited classroom discussions comparing British services with those in the students' countries of origin, sharpening their sense of the superiority of Britain and heightening desire and feelings of belonging to their new nation-state.

State multiculturalism has come under attack on multiple grounds in the post-9/11, post-7/7 era: for creating "parallel lives" and communities or allowing the nation to "sleepwalk towards segregation," as put by Trevor Phillips, the head of the Equalities Commission, and for infringing the liberal conception of state neutrality (Tomlinson 2008). Meanwhile, schooling continued to be an essential place where children and young people were turned performatively into ethnic minorities. Despite three decades of research criticizing multicultural education policies, pupils and students were still celebrating Black History month with special Multicultural

Days in which they learned about the achievements of well-known black people in art, literature, and dance. During Black History week, schools came together for sessions with choreographers, who showed them, for example, traditional African dance and hip hop moves. They celebrated Multicultural Week by learning about Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, and Sikhism, with trips to local gurdware and synagogues, and held special assemblies in which each of the school years did something ethnic, such as performing a choreographed Bollywood dance. The restriction to special events such as Multicultural Days and Multicultural Weeks normalizes whiteness and/or Christianity and underscores its refusal to be shifted from center stage. Pupils must participate by displaying their difference, celebrating their diversity as long as it remains in the minority, compressed, and flattened into celebratory approaches and synonymous with unpolitical lifestyles sympathetic to progressive liberal sentiments (the saris, samosas, and steel bands, or 3S approach criticized by anti-racists in the 1980s) (Troyna 1987). Each "community" was taught the essence of how they were put in their place, valorized via old stereotypes about religious and hospitable Indians or cutting-edge, cool, hip hop–producing black people: reified, glossing over class, gender, and generational differences and disregarding institutional forms of racism.

> I mean most of it was about black slavery, you know. Obviously. But there was also a certain amount of time spent on colonialism, British India, partition, didn't really go into that much detail and also it was very, incredibly like, simplistic. I do think there's a lot left out of the history books, but a lot of people in the Sikh community don't know either. Everyone relies on the media and that sort of information and a lot of that is very liberal if not to the right and you know, people in the UK don't really talk about Cable Street [an anti-fascist battle in East London in 1936] unless you study something related to it, either, at uni and no-one talks about the other side of partition either, like the movement that really led to total independence and also the trail that led to partition and the politics of it. (Male, 23, British-born)

Moreover, the informal processes of schooling were strongly assimilationist and ensured that pupils developed a sense of being caught between two cultures—a category of practice much discussed in academic writing about young people's everyday negotiations among different cultural orientations or social fields, making use of the sociolinguistic concept of code-switching. Although the metaphor of translation has been used to describe the situational performances of identity through which young people negotiate supposedly opposed social fields of temple, home, or school (Hall 2002), we found the notion of hermetically sealed social fields to be a dangerous fiction. For example, most young people's home environment was what linguists would describe as mixed (Romaine 1995: 183–185), in which Punjabi-speaking grandparents and parents conferred knowledge of English through their own speech as well as media exposure via TV and/or the Internet. Children started schooling as "imbalanced bilinguals," and the intense academic and peer pressures to speak English in a monolingual school set-up led them to respond, not by compartmentalizing their language practices into the domains of home and school, but to invest more in English. Their Punjabi came to be inflected with English phonology, grammar, and loan words. They were also responsible for spreading the use of

English further within their homes. Nonetheless, when asked about it in interviews they consistently divided their lives neatly down the middle between "Punjabi culture" [at home or temple] and "the outside culture" [at school].

More insidiously, we came to appreciate that the very categories of "Asian" and "English" were created for children experientially through the process of schooling. For example, one female migrant was distressed to find her 6-year-old daughter coming home from school saying, "I don't want to wear my Indian clothes, I want to wear my English clothes." She argued that her daughter had worn t-shirts, trousers, frocks, and *salwar kameez* interchangeably and never distinguished between Indian and English items before, so where did this thing about "Indian clothes" and "English clothes" come from all of a sudden? The idea of being caught between two cultures was a discourse through which people were brought into being or subjectified through the process and practices of schooling. Schooling was a complex site in which young people simultaneously developed local belongings through their intermezzo friendship practices and also a sense of not-belonging and perennial exteriority or "immigrant imaginary" (Hesse 2000).

In short, our research on India and the UK confirms that transnationalism cannot be viewed as an autonomous domain created and sustained by the partaking people, nor an exclusive people-to-people informal exchange space, but is significantly produced by other players, including the state. The state not only powerfully mediates the transnational connections of people, but also creates and sustains categories and produces identities and subjectivities alongside formalizing the informal spaces and exchanges.

2.7 Pragmatic Citizenship and Ambivalent Nationality

The literature holds that transnationalism poses a fundamental challenge to traditional citizenship based on an assumed congruence of continuous residence in a given territory, a shared collective identity and participation in, or subjection to a common jurisdiction—dwelling on the increasing incidence of dual citizenship, and potential postnational, transnational, and cosmopolitan citizenships (Gerdes and Faist 2008). However, we found that having transnational links did not mean that people did not think in terms of *a single, solid citizenship.* The settled migrants—the old-timers, bhijis, and 1.5-ers—had long since taken on British citizenship and nationality or more concretely, "the passport," as it offered practical benefits in terms of welfare entitlements in the UK as well as movement between countries for travel. The migrants from East Africa and Hong Kong had opted for British rather than local nationality, being insecure about their future under independent rule. Those who had retained Indian nationality were in a clear minority. Although the old-timers took British citizenship, some encouraged their wives to retain Indian nationality so as to keep ancestral properties and agricultural land under their wife's name—maintaining their wives' dependence as family migrants, a carefully and strategically maintained neither-here-nor-there state. A few of the old-timers

retained Indian nationality out of a sense of loyalty to the country of their birth and as a political objection to British dominance, as dedicated leftists and followers of the *Ghadar* anti-colonial movement.

> I am a patriot. I have always remained as Indian. I and my wife have Indian passports, we have Indian nationality. We have never left it.
> **Q:** You went there in 1968 and your family joined you in 1972, you didn't take citizenship there yet, how did you survive such a long time?
> **A:** I became a citizen after one year. I never changed my nationality. One has to take citizenship otherwise you don't get benefits, even medical benefits. (Male, 70, old-timer on vacation)

With the exception of these few old-timers, the settled migrants had a remarkable lack of concern or indifference to the political implications of giving up Indian nationality. The same was the case for the recent migrants, who either had or were planning to take British citizenship and nationality as soon as they had spent sufficient years in Britain to be eligible for it. Indeed, the inhospitableness of the British state toward even legal immigrants created a sense that the granting of entry clearance and rights to remain in the UK was so whimsical that British citizenship should be secured as quickly as possible. Their adoption of British citizenship/nationality was overwhelmingly explained in terms of *pragmatic* considerations—that the red passport gave them benefits in terms of welfare entitlements and greater ease of applying for visas to travel to third countries. However, interwoven into these pragmatic considerations was a strong sense in which British citizenship was a *symbolic asset,* prized and considered to be superior. There was a clear hierarchical order within transnational space, with Indian nationality ranked below British and other European, North American, and Australian nationalities. Taking British citizenship was a statement expressing their commitment to the country, and was a way of consolidating their belongings (Fig. 2.4).

> I hold an Indian passport. I have applied for a British passport. I stay here and my wife stays here so I want to be a part of England. I won't get to know about India much sitting here. If I stay here, eat here then I want to think about this country. (Male, 31, mangetar)

Most of the migrants we spoke to were not very interested in *dual citizenship,* most of them preferring the red passport over Indian nationality. Even the returnees who had decided to spend the rest of their lives in Punjab wanted to retain their British citizenship because of the practical advantages it conferred. The circular migrants, such as the migrants on vacation who were working on temporary international placements in IT, management, or hospitality, were an exception to this pattern as they wished to retain Indian citizenship, privileging their families, property, and livelihoods in India.

> I don't believe in [dual citizenship]. A man with his feet on two boats is not happy. If you are in India on a dual citizenship and something happens then Britain will not come to your aid but if you visit India as a British citizen then you can turn to Britain for help. If I don't stay there then there is no point of dual citizenship. (Male, 33, East African)

> I have many benefits. I can travel to New Zealand and Canada without a visa. I can travel to many other countries too. In the case of US too, I get a visa on arrival. I can just travel with

Fig. 2.4 Transforming the Indian passport into a British passport (Source: Author)

my passport… Only these advantages make me to keep this passport… I am 100% an Indian. But British passport gives me many facilities. (Male, 74, returnee)

The NRI, PIO, and OCI categories were of interest mainly to those who were traveling regularly to India and purchasing property for their own business interest. In fact, the categories of NRI and OCI were seen as synonymous with wealthy old-timers who had made it as transnational entrepreneurs.

We look at this, should we remain British passports or should we do this dual nationality with India? There's no benefit for me to go and get an Indian passport and in terms of NRI status, India doesn't attract me. I know there are some massive gains to be made though, I know India has really rocketed as has China. (Male, 47, British-born)

Raj stresses that, although the NRI category had a "basis in material concerns, it is also a category fostering an imaginary link" (2003: 177). However, we found that the informants were alert to the Indian state's economic self-interest and responded to these categories with *ambivalence.* The settled migrants saw through the NRI and OCI schemes and took the fact that they were barred from political rights as proof that these categories were intended to entice investment from migrants and diaspora without giving them much in return. As one old-timer put it, "I know I'm an NRI, so why should I pay for it?" The settled migrants' number one criticism was that the NRI Sabha in Punjab had not made it any easier to protect their property rights. If nothing else, they had hoped that the NRI Sabha would lead to progress on this issue.

They haven't given us any facilities, there's no change in the rules. I mean, Punjab is a police state you see. Whatever the police want to do, they do it. I mean I've got a house in Jalandhar and someone is living there. I went to rebuild it but according to law, they said we have occupied for so many years so it's our property now? So we don't get any backing from the government. The government of Punjab makes statements just to attract the money from here. But actually there is no law that they can protect our properties. People are just disappointed when they go there and find that NRI institution whatever it's called, NRI Sabha, it's doing nothing. (Male, 58, East African)

Moreover, there were strong distinctions between citizenship and national identity, which do not always correspond. National identification with India was patterned by

religious and political affiliation. In general, the Hindu Punjabi informants identified more strongly with the Indian nation than the Sikhs (Raj 2003). Indian flags were in evidence in Hindu temples and parents were opting to teach their children Hindi rather than Punjabi because "Punjabi is the language of Punjab but it is not the Indian national language." By contrast, the Sikh informants identified more ambivalently with the Indian nation. The *Ghadar*-affiliated leftists prefigured the role of Sikhs in the struggle for independence from the British—commemorating Bhagat Singh and Udham Singh, for example—and described themselves as "Indian patriots." However, the Sikh ethno-nationalists, following the tensions between the Akali Dal party and the central Congress government in the early 1980s, which culminated in the assault on the Golden Temple in June 1984, could not recognize themselves in the Indian nation. Recalling the anti-Sikh riots in which thousands were killed in pogroms across India in October–November 1984, they felt that they were not recognized within the Indian nation, either.

> I used to get the India News from the Indian High Commission, I used to be proud of every region of India—oh, what's Andhra Pradesh doing, what's that doing, what's up—you know my husband used to say you're mad you are, you know like you'd think you were living in India or something. I love it, I want to know what they're doing! Then 1984 and I cancelled my subscription I thought no. Don't want to know. I'm sorry, but you've let us down. (Female, 59, British-born)

Although the majority of the informants took on British citizenship and nationality, identification with the British nation was also conflicted. Since the 1970s, the main narrative concerning the national identifications of Punjabis in Britain is that after the old-timers recognized that they were not sojourners and reunited their families to make for a more comfortable and permanent residence, their allegiances shifted to Britain (e.g., Anwar 1979). This view was echoed vigorously by the old-timers, the family migrants, and their children, who were often frustrated by questions about their identifications with India and took great pains to stress their Britishness. Often, criticizing the disrespect that freshies showed to Britain—with their supposedly illegal entry, supposed undocumented work, supposed negligence of paying National Insurance and tax, undercutting the minimum wage and sending everything back to India—served as a foil against which their own commitment to Britishness was elaborated and worked out.

> We all came because of poverty, the majority 95% of people. At that time we thought we'll make our money and go back but that never happened and it's not going to happen now, nobody is going to go back, we're now in the third generation and all this. The inside feeling is when we go to India we think we're abroad and we like to come back as soon as possible. (Male, 65, old-timer)

> People come here on six month visas but they end up working here and never go back. Immigration has gone up and it causes too much trouble in this country. The political system is totally wrong. We are living in this country and faithful to this country so we should have rights but then the government gives funds to all these new people. Nobody cares that we worked so hard and contributed to this country. (Male, 70, old-timer)

There was a strong sense of Indian Punjabi exceptionalism that came out in the pervasive moves to represent the community politically as a *model minority.*

The informants pointed out that Indian Punjabis comprised a prosperous, educated, well-integrated, and peaceful community. Often, they compared themselves implicitly or explicitly with Pakistani Muslims, who were a "suspect community" (Hickman and Thomas 2010). This self-conscious representation as a model minority had tangible resonances with colonial constructions of Sikhs as a loyal martial race, and prompted active debate concerning Anglo-Sikh history and its legacy. At the community level, there was a political project of de-centering whiteness. For example, there was a campaign for greater recognition of the contribution that Indians, and specifically Sikhs, had made to British nationhood by fighting against white British and Commonwealth troops in World Wars I and II. Sikhs amassed for Remembrance Sunday or "poppy day" ceremonies and presented wreaths commemorating the Indian soldiers who gave their lives to secure the British nation for generations to come. The historical engagement of Punjabis in the British Indian army was also linked to drives to encourage young Indians to sign up for the army. Community organizations had British army recruitment leaflets; the Birmingham Vaisakhi celebrations had British army stalls to raise support for the armed forces. The widespread passion for Anglo-Sikh history was part of a project redefining Britishness as something that could be claimed by people identified as non-white.

> I've been looking at the 1920s at the colonial aspect. The UK had a massive recession then and lots of people were unemployed. So they went to find some other countries, they went to find India and ripped off the raw materials and then brought them back to the UK to create jobs, like in the textile mills. Then they went back and sold it at 100% profit. I say "Great Britain" but that's because it's the sweat and blood of my forefathers that made this country great. So I have rights in this country. We need to instill this in our kids and give them confidence. (Male, 52, 1.5-er)

Despite this political activity, there was a strong sense in which Britishness or Englishness was not open to identification even for those who had its citizenship. Implicitly, Britishness or Englishness was defined in racial terms and was synonymous with *whiteness.* For instance, British-born Punjabis were still not recognized simply as British. Instead, they were perennially asked the question, "Where are you from?"—to which the correct answer was not "Birmingham"—serving as a constant reminder that whiteness was the cultural center of British citizenship. In everyday speech, the category "English" or "British" was synonymous with "white person." The racism implicit within such constructions of Britishness was remarked on in relation to Gordon Brown's protectionist response to the credit crunch in early 2009, and the high-profile campaigning by the British National Party and the English Defence League in 2009–2010. The informants cited this political rhetoric as proof that at the end of the day there would always be a powerful constituency of people who would not accept that they were British.

> Gordon Brown should have watched his words when he said "British jobs for British workers." You'll notice that you don't see any black or Asian workers on strike. Those people that are striking, they probably see our family as not British. (Male, 40, British-born)

> There is a huge chunk of old people who are above 75 over there. As now there are good medical facilities, people live long. Now the feeling of compassion for old people is decreasing. They are like a burden on the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They are unable to afford

> the expenses. They will get us out. The BNP will do this or we have to come back by ourselves. They say there will be poverty; England will become a third world country. (Male, 70, migrant on vacation)

Citizenship policies were also increasingly pinned to autochthony. Immigration policy under New Labour moved toward fostering integration and cohesion, along with the construction of a "core" national identity, the latter entailing citizenship ceremonies, a citizen's test, and the requirement to have some knowledge of English, Gaelic, Scottish, or Welsh. The "Life in the UK" citizen's test incorporated knowledge of British national and local government institutions such as the parliament, police, and the law, with knowledge of welfare and entitlements, white British culture, and Christian religion (festivals and practices such as Christmas, Pancake day, April Fool's day)—combined with nods toward multiculture, with questions on the history of postwar immigration to Britain and the percentage of the population comprising different ethnic groups. These trends toward a white-coded and assimilationist formation of citizenship were experienced to be *exclusionary.* Although British citizenship was still desirable, some recent migrants were discouraged by the requirement of having to expend so much energy—perhaps fruitlessly—on having to improve their English and so be accredited by a national standardized test.

> The need to take British passports has not arisen as yet. What will we do with British passports? I don't feel any attachment with my Indian passport but I'm scared of taking the English test for citizenship. I cannot take that test. (Female, 39, mangetar)

Although some of the informants did move back and forth, we found that most were committed to a single national citizenship, and to availing the rights and entitlements, or practical benefits associated with it—particularly those concerning mobility across borders. People's engagement with citizenship was therefore overwhelmingly pragmatic. In the case of the British citizens who took NRI or OCI citizenship so as to avail themselves of opportunities for purchasing and dealing in plots, or of families in which members held different political citizenship to safeguard ancestral property, the engagement could also be strategic. The question of national identification, however, was met with ambivalence or indifference. Although most of the informants wanted a solid British citizenship, there was a strong sense of being excluded from the mainstream narration of national identity by virtue of racial imaginaries.

2.8 "Illegality" and Social Licitness

The Punjab–UK transnational space is also known for unauthorized flows of people, which is facilitated by a parallel economy of migration. A UNODC study estimates around 20,000 unauthorized emigrations to UK alone from Punjab annually, and 100,000 are at any point awaiting deportation behind bars (UNODC 2009). A good number of Punjabis continue to immigrate into the UK for work through unauthorized means—entering the country on visit visas and overstaying or getting smuggled

into the country with the help of transnational networks of agents. Such unauthorized flows are made possible not only by a receptive labor market, but also buttressed by the social ties of the emigrant at the destination. The flows though apparently defying the state, make use of the loose spaces and players available within the state mechanism and laws. This involves negotiations through the cumbersome bureaucracy of the state that intentionally excuse the illegal and take full advantage of labor market dynamics in the destination countries. The thick and thin policing of borders by the receiving states and the inconsistencies in the institution of emigration governance in India together facilitate this unauthorized flow. The Emigration Check Required/Emigration Check Not Required (ECNR) regime allows a form of unfettered informality in the case of migration to ECNR countries, which include all European countries, and a form of controlled informality in the case of countries in the Middle East (Kodoth and Varghese 2010; Varghese and Rajan 2010). The unfettered informality allows all emigrations for work to ECNR countries free on the one hand and concedes a space for all sorts of informal practices in the field of emigration on the other. However, the mutually incompatible legalities make a legally emigrated migrant illegal during the journey itself or after arrival at the destination. Such unauthorized flows, on the other hand, enjoy tremendous social sanction in rural Punjab, making it socially licit even while illegal as per the statist vocabulary (Abraham and Schendel 2005).

Contrary to a general perception that cumbersome and dangerous ways of border crossing by the Punjabis have taken the safer routes of educational migration, our research has amply testifies the continuation of such human flows even in recent years. These emigrants not only cross many national borders, but also spent significant amounts of time in transit countries in their attempt to make it to the UK. At least two routes are chosen most often: first, traveling from India to Turkey, Russia or a few other ex-Soviet Union countries and making their way toward the UK by crossing numerous national borders. The second unauthorized flow went directly from India to southern European countries on visit visas, and then required the migrants to negotiate entry to the UK. The former involved more risk as it involves the physical crossing of borders, although the latter was not completely free from risks either as they often involve travel in closed containers for long periods. The emigrants often left India legally on visit visas and become illegal during their border crossings, making the legal/illegal divide in the formal sense itself complex. The case of the following returnee falls under the first category of unauthorized migration.

> It is after two stints of expatriate life in the Middle East the returnee decided to emigrate to Europe in 2000. The deal with the agent was in fact to go to France for 3.5 lakh rupees. He mobilised money from a private money lender on exorbitant interests. He was sent to first by flight to Moscow, from where the agents helped them to travel across different countries to make their way into France. The first task was to cross the border of Russia and to enter Ukraine, which was done by walking during night times in a group of similar people mobilised by the agents from countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and so on. The agents allowed them to take rest during the day time and border crossing was done in the night, which often took hours of walking. After reaching Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, they took a train to the border and crossed over to Slovenia by foot, which again took four hours of walk in the

> midnight. Crossing the border, the agent sent them by taxi to the Slovenian capital. The agents collected the rest of the payment from there and sent them by road to Germany. On the German border the police took their "finger prints" and were caught. The agents were seen nowhere to help out although one of them used to accompany them during the journeys. They were in the detention camp for 2 days and then deported to Prague, where they were ordered to leave the country within 7 days. They were detained, free food was given, and were not allowed go outside. But the representatives of the agents came calling them there and helped them to leave the Czech Republic to Austria by train. They lived in Austria for a week, out of which 1 day in a Gurudwara and surviving with langar. Then the agents sent them to France through Italy. On arrival at France, the returnee called his relatives to come and pick him up. He stayed in France for 3 months and was working as a painter though was earning very less. He met with another agent over there who promised to take him to UK, where he thought the prospects would be better for him. Many people were sent to UK by a ship in a container, which looked like a van for him! But he was sent by air, he don't know how the agents got visa for him for the same. He left his passport with the agents upon his arrival in Moscow. Then given his photo to the agent, with which the latter fabricated identity documents according to the requirements of each country. It seems to him that the agents have many passports with them; they change the photograph and use the same passport for many people. It took about six month on the whole for him to reach UK. (Male, 47, returnee)

As this case reveals, this returnee's destination when he left Punjab was France, and the UK captured his imagination during his life in France, causing France to turn from the country of "reception" to the country of "transit." In the following case, a relative narrates the other route of clandestine emigration to the UK as it happened in the case of her son.

> It was against much of the displeasure the parents, her son decided to go to videsh in 2006. A deal was struck for 9.2 lakh rupees according to which the agent agreed to send him Austria directly without any transit crossings. However, instead he was sent to Greece, from where the agent sent him to Italy, the expenses of which including the flight charges were agreed to be borne by his family. On his arrival in Italy he was received by his relatives and he lived in the country for 1 year doing "third-class kind of jobs" like agricultural work and cattle rearing. The son remained resilient and refuses to return, as he did not want to earn the name of "a son who spoiled the father's hard-earned money." His hardships and paltry earning which was just enough for his survival, made them to decide to leave Italy for good as quickly as possible. He got in touch with an agent to go to UK but ended up in a refugee camp in Belgium. One of his neighbours in Belgium was immediately contacted who took him home from the camp. He remained in Belgium for 3 months without any jobs and continued his effort to go to UK with the help of the same agent. The agent was unable to facilitate his way into UK and hence he contacted another agent who managed to put him in a ship bound for UK. The deal was for 1.5 lakhs on arrival as in the case of the other agent. He had to remain in a container in the ship, but was caught by the British police when the ship touched the shore. As the container was that of France he was deported to France, as the British police who raided the ship assumed that since the containers belongs to France the men inside must be from the same country. He remained imprisoned for 15 days in France, after which he was sent back to Belgium along with two other Punjabi boys who were similarly caught and imprisoned. He remained in Belgium for another month only to contact another agent to make his dream a reality. The tenacity paid off and finally he could make his way into UK through the same channel by ship inside the container. (Female, 46, relative)

In this case the eventful arrival in UK took more than 1½ years with major transitory stints in Italy and Belgium. These "micropractices" of people, as Abraham and

Schendel (2005) call it, assume a number of other forms of clandestine migration. These innovative strategies are continuously re-invented depending on the circumstances. A cursory look at the contemporary media in Punjab would reveal these clandestine micropractices. One commonly reported practice is that of teams traveling to the UK to participate in sporting activities to disappear at their destination. There are cases in which people buy their place into the visiting performing groups so as to make their way into UK. There are umpteen cases reported that youngsters travel as part of *kabaddi,* football, river-rafting, cricket, *gidda* and *bhangra* teams, and a good number of them disappearing on arrival or after a few matches or performances to become part of the gray labor market. Both men and women travel to the UK in this manner. There are agents who facilitate this sort of flow quite efficiently. There are a good number of marriage bureaus arranging brides from the UK for aspiring youngsters to make their way into England. Such "paper marriages" are arranged with consenting British citizens who are paid for their part. As countries like the UK and Canada begin to recognize same-sex partnerships, emigration attempts are also using this legislation. Agents and immigration consultants are responsible for making the same-sex British citizen willing to be party to these paper unions. Religion is also appropriated into migration attempts. There are several reports of people travelling to the UK as *sants* (saints) and priests to improve their financial status. The research team came across a few *raggi* (singers) who made their way into the UK as religious performers, out of whom a few had found unskilled jobs in the country while several worked as religious performers in the UK. There are also reports that in a few cases people donated their kidneys to ailing recipients in the UK to make their way into the country. The opening up of the education market in the UK has been used of late in a big way to emigrate as students and their spouses.

Agents who negotiate their clients' path through different countries to the UK are allegedly collecting between Rs. 500,000 and 1,800,000. On numerous occasions, after receiving payment these agents cheated the aspiring migrants or the kabootar (pigeon, the local appellation for illegal emigrants). There are occasions when the kabootar are stranded in transit countries or have to make their own way into the UK after several trials and tribulations. However, such illegal but licit practices enjoy significant social sanction in Punjab. Negotiating your way into the UK or any other country clandestinely hardly carries the burn of social stigma, as they are seen essentially as strategies of individual mobility. The participants are far from being innocent kabootar, as they are referred to in the local imagination, as most of them are partially or fully aware of the risks involved with the endeavor on which they embark. Perhaps the appellation kabootar itself is an indication of the social approval given to such flows, which therefore cannot be equated with international crimes such as trafficking of drugs, arms, or terrorism across borders. Very often, for many people such informal networks appear more friendly and dependable than the machineries of the state (Varghese and Rajan 2010). It is also important to note that such micropractices run in defiance of a policing nation-state system, in contradiction with the notion of the world in motion associated with contemporary globalization

(Smith and Guarnizo 1998). However, more important, they wilfully utilize the loose spaces conceded by the state and mutually incompatible national legalities.

Such emigrations are not new, either. The emigrations on the banana boat with forged documents and hefty payments to agents were happening even in the 1950s and 1960s, at a time when the immigration law was much more elastic. By the mid-1950s it was difficult for Indians to be issued passports to travel to the UK because India was trying to curb emigration (Josephides 1991: 259). Hence, some aspiring migrants requested passports to first visit other countries—we heard stories about Singapore in particular—and then came to Britain. Such migrations are powerfully bolstered by a social network, established and reinforced over years of Punjabi migrations. The agents who facilitate this operate across national borders in a transnational network. The study in the Doaba region indicates that the network is being run mainly by Punjabis themselves located in different countries, but in coordination with players in the respective transit countries, with Pakistani, Turkish, and European as well as British nationals. We were told of the bribery of the border guards in the UK. The social sanction given comes from the economic prospects of emigration, imagined absence of criminality involved in what they are doing, which is conceived of as vastly different from the trafficking of drugs, arms, or terrorists across borders, the underlying notion of mobility through hard work, and also from the long history of movement of people from Punjab to the UK from colonial times. The social licitness is also informed by the state's unfriendliness even toward genuine, legal prospective emigrants. The social licitness is also attested by the fact that agents who facilitate such unauthorized emigrations have a free spread in the rural Punjab to contact the prospective emigrants and to be contacted by them. The rural suspicion of outsiders and a general refusal to share the migration related details reinforce this social licitness.

Although there is plenty of cheating and defrauding, the network of agents works largely in good coordination and they often stick to an ethics set by themselves in the business. The continuing dependence on such network is a result of the confidence they won over years among the people, apart from the so-called craze for migration. There are enough cases in which the agents returned the money upon their failure to facilitate migration. This market ethicality in many other cases limited the financial loss and safeguarded the emigrants from being cheated through self-imposed ethics and collection methods. In the case of the returnee cited earlier, although the deal was fixed for 3.5 lakh rupees, he was paying the money in specified installments as the journey progressed. He did not pay even a single penny to his agent in France, who facilitated his emigration from France to the UK, before reaching the destination. All of the money was paid after his arrival in the UK, something arranged in confidence with his social support network there. Similarly, in another case, although he lost 50,000 rupees, the amount he advanced in a deal of 1.5 lakh, to the agent who agreed to arrange his emigration from Belgium to the UK, the next agent who successfully arranged for the returnee's way into the UK, collected all of the money upon his arrival in the UK. This was also negotiated with the help of his *rishtedars* in the UK, who paid the money to the agent after his safe arrival. These transnational networks of agents are also known for keeping the

family of the emigrant back at home informed about the progress of the journey. One relative used to get calls from the agents from Italy, Belgium, and the UK and she could also call them to get regular updates about her son's journey. Although the information given by the agent went wrong when her son was arrested in the UK and send back to France, it appeared to her that such agents were much more friendly and dependable than the mechanisms of the state.

As indicated, the social sanction that migration enjoys as a conduit of mobility in the social imagination of Punjab is at the center of this sense of mobility. Irrespective of the channel of emigration chosen, no categories of emigration to the West are stigmatized. The success of an unauthorized migrant is gauged in terms of his ability to get authorized in the destination. Many of the unauthorized emigrants in the UK are on the hunt for British Punjabi brides to get them legal status. One returnee explained his failure in terms of building up relationships leading to marriage. Although his social network could not find him a match, he could not sustain any of the relationships into which he had entered. The social capital of the migrants assumes tremendous importance here. Those who are disabled because of its lack have to return home after their unauthorized life in the UK, a trend that is increasing of late.

This social licitness is not without its own limits. A failed experience of emigration may result in some stigma and the return of the migrant is unappreciated. Only subsequent success could remove the stigma. The returned migrants are essentially viewed as failed subjects, a de/emasculated subjects. The village will have many stories to tell regarding his deportation and a lack of respect is reported even among family members. Our interview with one returnee was virtually stopped by his wife who interceded halfway through our conversation, with the remark that he was discussing unnecessary things and reminding him that he was already late to go and fetch fodder for the cattle. Many returning migrants are isolated from the social activities of the village. Even sports and arts clubs who took handsome help from them during their expatriate life were unenthusiastic toward them after their return.

2.9 Historicizing Networks

Informal ties of family and *ilaaqa* (area) have long been shown to be the building blocks for chain migration (Aurora 1967; Ballard and Ballard 1977; Helweg 1979; Werbner 1990). More recently, sociological work has argued for the centrality of networks to all transnational social formations (Vertovec 2009). However, we found a flexibility and ambivalence in transnational Punjabi networks, which raises questions about the normativity and moral judgement at the heart of these conceptualizations of human relationships.

From the perspective of the Punjab, the families and households that are taken to be the decision-making units in standard narrations of the migration process, are shown to be fictions. Families and households do not exist as unified entities and are internally fractured by relations of *gender* and *generation* (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994;

Westwood and Phizacklea 2000). Collective narratives from the old-timers were that they came to Britain to work and escape poverty, although mostly it seems that their earnings were used to improve landholdings, build better houses, start a business, or provide a dowry. When their narratives are considered individually, however, it seems that many of the old-timers migrated hurriedly, spontaneously, and with family opposition, sometimes raising their own funds by borrowing from friends so as to make their way to the UK independently. Moreover, when they came to the UK, some of them had other ideas about what to do with their time rather than making money and sending it back to the family. For example, one man who migrated in 1963 with the sponsorship of his older brother was supposed to do an apprenticeship as a draughtsman, but gave up his studies, worked as a bhangra singer and played hockey instead. "After six months I decided I can't go with this, always bhangra in my mind, always singing in my mind. So I told my brother sorry, I can't continue with this, it's not for me, leave me alone." Their enjoyment and nostalgia for the *mastane* (fun) early days complicates the corporate explanation of economic migration for the wider family good, and also underlines the narration of strong-willed, independent masculinities. Likewise, the bhijis collective narrative about their migration entirely in terms of their dependent situation as wives was fractured by individual narratives showing women's agency and micropractices on their own terms. That migration was not a straightforward collective decision is underlined by the controversies and disputes among different family and household members.

Definitions of citizenship and nationality from the postwar era onward have manipulated the meanings and legitimacy attached to being a migrant or part of a migrant family, creating a distinctly *state-produced* context for transnational families. During the years of Conservative rule (1979–1997), as the bulk of immigration had shifted to family reunification**,** so the focus of immigration policy shifted to the control of secondary immigration (Jopke 1999). Family reunification was controlled by a narrow, gender-biased, and racially influenced interpretation of the right to family life through legislation such as the Husbands Ban and the Primary Purpose Rule, which critics argue served specifically to restrict South Asian migration through arranged marriage (Menski 1999). During the 1980s immigration legislation was challenged by black women's organizations on the grounds of being sexist and racist, and the European Court of Human Rights eventually ruled against sex discrimination in the Immigration Rules in 1985 (Wilson 1978; WING 1985; Mohanty 1991; Jopke 1999). However, the extent to which immigration and citizenship policies continue to construct subjects in gender-biased and racially prejudiced ways is evinced by the Home Office's preoccupation with female migrants, who are primarily seen as introducing traditional practices such as arranged marriages, authoritarian gender and generational relations, and excessive religiosity into normatively liberal British society (Yuval-Davis et al. 2005; Wilson 2006; Gedalof 2007). In the context of strong controls on marriage migration, the cachet of overseas migration may rework gender relations in complex ways as the micropractices of migrants seek out all available possibilities. A migrant on vacation, who had married

a widow in the UK with three children and was well aware of the social disapproval of such relationships, rationalized his decision in the following manner.

> I never tell a lie as Rambhagat never lies. My wife had three children and her husband had passed away.... After that my sisters said to me that you are a saintly man, you should give protection to these children. First I hesitated, then I determined in my heart and adopted the children. I have no child of my own. This is my motto. I am living for the children. I have built the children up, I have nurtured them up.... At that time, the Conservative party was ruling and when I came back, they did not give me the visa. They said that you were going there to settle permanently. Then I devoted myself to praying and I thought that I would not go anywhere. Then my mother said that you had to go abroad. You are a Rambhagat, if Ram could go to exile on the behest of his step-mother, could you not go abroad on the behest of your real mother. (Male, 47, migrant on vacation)

Moreover, transnational families were not entities that existed a priori but were produced in the context of a complex history of mobility that was many, many generations deep. The connections that are available through the sliding semantic structure (Werbner 1990: 98) of Punjabi kinship were imaginatively made use of with a capacious notion of *rishtedar* (relative). The category remained open to encompass not only blood relatives, close and distant, but also *ilaaqa* (area) based friends, people from the neighborhood and sometimes even indirect contacts. In the UK, local, practical kinship was fluid and assimilative as the old-timers and in particular, the bhijis engaged in the practices of place-making (Gupta and Ferguson 1997), emplacement (Feld and Basso 1996), or frontiering (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002) through which migrants create familial space in a place where kinship connections are sparse. The sensibility of frontiering kinship is captured movingly in the following nostalgic quote from a British-born informant.

> In this one semi-detached house which they were renting, there was my auntie and my uncle, which was my dad's eldest sister and husband, my mum and dad and one other couple I think. So there's like six or seven people kind-of living there and they were living like that for a good couple of years, because they were establishing themselves, you know, getting on their feet, so they were all living together and they've got really, really fond memories of that because they weren't alone or unique in that situation. They're our family friends now, but they have this kind of shared history because they were all of the same ilk and they were all kind of making their own mark, so those bonds are really close and tight now.... In the summer it's just really nice because they all sit around you know, the mums just make some snacks and stuff, the men have like a whisky, they all sit around together and they talk and watch the sun go down. (Female, 31, British-born)

Importantly, *rishtedari* was not a matter of reconstructing relationships that already existed in Punjab, but of creating new relationships akin to kinship. The fact that these were often cross-ethnic has been overlooked in accounts of Punjabi migration and diaspora, resulting in an overwhelming perspective of Punjabi networks as insular and bounded. We found that cross-ethnic friendships were very important for individual identities, in giving people a sense of being multicultural, and emplacement in the UK. For example, one of the bhijis, who had had a stroke, was attending an English class every weekday in a different town. Her sons were unhappy for her to make the half-hour bus journey every day on her own and offered to drive her to the class, but she insisted that she liked to be out and about and independent.

She found the classes difficult because they focused on written English, but she knew a lot of vernacular, spoken English from 30 years of working on a sewing machine in a factory. She was gregarious in the class and fond of inviting other students back to her home. She invited the black Caribbean teacher as well, and took pride in the fact that she had taught her to make chapattis. When we visited her house for an interview, she showed off the wedding album of her eldest granddaughter and pointed out a photo of another black Caribbean friend who had been their neighbor for years. She had moved back to Jamaica, but still had come for the wedding. The old-timers and bhijis had been active participants in creating a convivial and multiracial local culture.

Although local *rishtedari* could be fluid and assimilative, relationships with blood relatives in Punjab often appeared to be strained, worked through with relations of unequal dependency, veiled resentment, and mistrust. Although transnational families are usually defined in terms of love and caring, the obligation that undergirded relations with kin in Punjab highlighted *ambivalence* as the central experience of the transnational family. From the perspective of Punjab, the relatives complained of disappointment that their migrant *rishtedar* had forgotten them and become too busy in their own lives. When their relatives from the UK visited Punjab, they could expect to be reprimanded about the frequency and direction of phone calls: Who called whom? The Punjabi branches of families we knew from Birmingham attended to the cost and thoughtful choice behind each and every gift bought for different family members when family came for visits from the UK. They noted the trust expressed and rights conferred to them by particular vilayti (overseas) kin, for example, whether they were given the keys to their properties in Punjab and permitted to use them. In contrast, the burdens of transnationality weighed heavily on the shoulders of our informants in the UK and they had their own disappointments. Many of the informants in the UK complained about how their remittances had been spent and expressed misgivings about the tensions and dilemmas it had caused. They were proud of having supported their family in Punjab, but came to dread the inevitable letters and phone calls asking for money, "Paaji, brother, send us this, send us that." They were resentful of being treated like a "free fund" and complained about the culture of dependency that their foreign wealth had created among their relatives in Punjab—ingratitude, lack of initiative, irresponsibility—or worse, deceit.

> There were very frequent requests for money on a regular basis. My father wasn't that literate, my mother could read Punjabi and write so she used to read the letters when the letters would come. My mother would sit down with my father and she would read the letter so then they knew what exactly was said, and although my father made most decisions my mother was quite a tough character and again drive by extremely strong values and wanted fairness on both sides. She never said "you can't do this to your family" she only said "reflect on what's happening here as well." So she'd write the letters back, but only whatever my father said. And I remember those letters sometimes caused quite a lot of agro, and some disputes between my mother and father. So in a sense as children we were aware of the relationship of my father and the family in India. (Male, 48, British-born)

Irrespective of the historical period of their migration, the informants in the UK almost unanimously complained of conflicts over the remote management of

existing or newly acquired properties in Punjab. Relationships with siblings had soured over inheritance. Such was the degree of suspicion that could arise between siblings, that one of the old-timers in Birmingham offered to sell us a Dictaphone that he had bought to tap the phone line of his brother in Delhi, whom he suspected might be trying to change the name on the deeds to their father's flat into his own name. The NRI Sabha case files in Jalandhar list a litany of problems from looting of houses through encroachment of property to murders, including back-stabbing among *rishtedar*. There are plenty of complaints made by NRIs against their own relatives, close and distant, for encroaching into or misappropriating their properties. Complaints about forging signatures and documents are another frequent case, as indicated.

> In his complaint dated 4.8.2009 the petitioner complains that his grandfather died in 1997, upon which the property was inherited to his father and two of the latter's brothers. Taking advantage of the petitioner's father being an NRI, his brothers hatched a criminal conspiracy to grab the property of the applicant's father on an agreement dated 10.4.1995 purportedly executed by his grandfather. The complaint says that the said agreement is forged and details proofs pointing to it. The document was forged to sell the land. The civil suit in this connection is going on and the verdict still pending. The brothers and the person who allegedly bought the property threaten the petitioner with dire consequences in case they continue with the case. On this complaint the police conducted an enquiry and found that the agreement/document in question is forged with an intention of grabbing the property of the petitioner's father. (Case file from NRI Sabha, Jalandhar)

The troubled relations between *rishtedar* in Punjab and the UK could be rebuilt for the purposes of emigration. *Rishtedar* were often munificent in their support to needy *rishtedar* even if the connection was distant. It is not that aspiring migrants or their families go in search of their *rishtedar* when they need their support, or to re-establish troubled relationships for the purpose of migration. Through the web of *rishtedar* and its avid generosity, the locality is reinvented and transnational space is thus reconfigured with local connections. Newly arrived, relationships with the *rishtedar* were delicate. They were completely dependent on them for accommodation, food, and guidance in everything. Simultaneously, the *rishtedar* felt overwhelmed by repeated requests for help from distant relatives or indirect contacts, and although they would help out of a deep sense of obligation, they felt under a huge burden to provide hospitality. After eventually becoming independent, standing on their own two feet and moving out, new migrants would maintain strong and respectful connections with their erstwhile patrons or *rishtedar*.

Rishtedar were not merely a form of social capital, however, but highlight the relations of power that are woven into the supposedly neutral and value-free language of networks. Although the language and practices of *rishtedari* contextualized relationships in terms of kinship or fictive kinship, there was huge potential for informality within relationships of *rishtedari* that were by definition unequal. Most of the new migrants were dependent on co-ethnic employers for jobs, following information and contacts from their *rishtedar*. Many of the freshies complained about problematic labor practices whereby they had to put up with infringements of health and safety, low pay, undocumented work, and lack of representation. Such jobs were called "two pounds an hour jobs," implying that they were paid below the

minimum wage. They complained that they should never work for *apne* Asian employers, and sought "English jobs" in the formal, regulated economy. Other freshies did not complain about labor practices as they saw work within ideas about the paternalistic family firm, arguing that their *apne* employers were "like an older brother/sister" to them and that they could not imagine ever needing to protest about conditions at work. The language of *rishtedari* was then a veil for relations of exploitation. Moreover, even fictitious *rishtedar*ship was mostly organized around *caste* lines. New migrants who were Jat Sikh identified were rapidly incorporated within extensive personal networks, whereas migrants identified with backward or scheduled castes had a much more difficult transit through Europe, often failing to reach the UK over land. Studies on Punjabis in Italy and France indicate that the caste profile of settlements in these countries are less dominated by Jats than the UK (Bertolani 2010; Moliner 2010), as migrants identified as backward or scheduled castes turn countries of transit happenstance into countries of settlement.

Our research found that migration and transnational resources were thus reifying as well as unsettling. The dominance of Jat Sikhs in migration continued and their diaspora's resources have been central in reiterating their caste and economic dominance in the new society. The lower caste communities such as Ramgarhias and Ravidasia were in a hurry to catch up with the Jats in emigration. Religious institutions were a tangible site in which competitive investments were made by different caste groups. We came across many villages in which huge *gurdware* were built by different caste groups, mainly with the support of transnational resources, in an attempt to assert their ascendancy over each other. Many of the village development projects initiated by the NRIs seem to reinforce the caste marking of place in different colonies of the villages. Meanwhile, our interviews with actors outside of the main fund-raising circuits suggested that philanthropic activity was as much embedded in immorality as morality. Although Dusenbery and Tatla assert that "in attempting to provide goods and services not provided by others, [the NRIs] have earned a generally positive reputation as 'the good fellas' and 'the new VIPs' of Punjab" (2009: 18), we found a much more uneven judgment including widespread criticism of such individuals in both Punjab and the UK, as some queried the genuineness of the motives of supposed philanthropists, suspected them of being self-publicists or worse, of running corrupt scams and schemes.

> For India: I give very little. For the UK: as much as I can do. The kids will often get me to give money for a puppy or a dog—that makes the kids very happy, that the puppies are being looked after—but Bernardos, all types of registered charities in the UK where I can be assured that what I'm doing is actually going to be useful. I don't give to the *gurdwara* and the *gurdwara* funds and the committees there because I know they're all corrupt there. So although there's a hundred and one things they want to go back and do in India, I know the money gets filtered and nothing ever gets through. So for India I would only ever give something directly I wouldn't go through any—because I know it's not going to happen. (Male, 48, British-born)

Our findings therefore problematize the assumptions underlying the burgeoning literature on transnational networks. First, the family and household do not exist as corporate entities: They are internally fractured by relations of gender and generation.

Second, in attending to the flexibility and capaciousness of practices of family and *rishtedari* we find that transnational families are not entities that exist a priori, but are produced through generations of mobility. Third, the ambivalences, disappointments, and potential for informality, exploitation, and treachery within so-called networks argue for a more nuanced and contextual analysis of relationships that attends to history and power relations as well as relations with the state.

2.10 Conclusions

This chapter has sought to bring together fresh perspectives on the long-standing and well-established transnational space between the Indian Punjab and the UK. Because of our unique study design, involving equal attention to both the sending as well as the receiving contexts, representations of migration and transnationalism may be de-flattened. This comparative analysis points to systematic differences in how these processes are viewed from the perspectives of Punjab and the UK. Transnational space is complex and multiply inhabited, with different sets of "core" categories and peripheral players in each context. There are thus strong grounds to argue that attempts to "manage" migration must engage simultaneously with the sending, intermediary, and receiving contexts. Strategies of "managing" migration are reductive, conceiving of migrants in static categories of desirable highly skilled or professional migration, compared with illegal/irregular, unskilled, or family migration, and failing to appreciate the dynamism through life-course, intergenerational and community developments that we have described, as well as the changing regimes of labor, market, and immigration.

The study advocates not only for an approach giving equal weight to sending and receiving contexts, but also for taking into consideration the wider social space that is produced through transnationalism. Migration between Indian Punjab and the UK forms part of a complex historical diaspora in which Punjabis have created and sustained ties across East Asia, East and Southeast Asia, North America, the Gulf, and continental Europe. Indian Punjabis in the UK have been continually engaging the wider global Punjabi diaspora that was woven into their networks and transnational culture. Researchers and policy makers should be aware of these multiple points of reference rather than assuming the country of origin to be the epicenter of transnationalism. The point is not that analysts need to comprehensively map all the sites of settlement and their interconnections. This would be to offer a "god's eye view" on a process that is necessarily perceived and produced in absentia, a sensibility created through the imagination, through visits between places, retelling stories comparing life in different contexts, and the global mediascapes that intersect with these ethnoscapes (Appadurai 1996).

Although earlier literature suggested that migrant transnationalism was able to transcend the state, this study argues persuasively for a re-centering of the state in the study of migrant transnationalism. This is to go beyond the rebuttal that "the state is here to stay" (Levitt et al. 2003: 568). Rather, the study has demonstrated the

political agency of the state in formalizing transnational spaces through new institutions and discourses, such as the Non-Resident Indian, Person of Indian Origin, and Overseas Citizen of India. This study has also demonstrated the shifting role of the state, within shifting transnational flows. India has not always been their inevitable homeland; this has been actively constructed in the pursuit of new diasporal economic investment. Similarly, policies of multiculturalism have institutionalized ethnic and religious categories in the UK, such that personal identities should not be taken as transcendent but produced and recirculated by the state.

Moreover, we have also drawn attention to the ambivalence and subterfuge with which people respond to state regulation of labor, immigration, citizenship, and nationalist discourses. We found that people's desire to maintain transnational connections and move back and forth did not inevitably translate into a desire for dual citizenship. Rather, people saw citizenship practically, and wanted one solid citizenship that would extend full rights, entitlements, and duties. Moreover, migrants and their children continued to feel that their citizenship was not accepted in the British body politic, pointing to the continued significance of race in shaping their experiences of transnationality. As a corollary, in the post- 9/11 context, questions of multiculturalism in the UK now focus chiefly on British Muslims. Punjabi Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians have progressively sought to differentiate themselves from Muslims at the level of institutions and politics. Counterterrorism policies such as Prevent have had divisive consequences for communities, because they are criticized as demonizing or pandering to Muslims, whereas Sikh and Hindu organizations complain of being left with a crisis of leadership.

New UK policies on immigration have led to the criminalization of illegal/irregular migrants and the multiplication of illicit networks. This has contributed to the establishment of Punjabi settlements across continental Europe, because countries on the transit route are turned into countries of settlement, and develop new bilateral linkages with India. There are interactions between British and European-defined citizenship, with large flows of European national Punjabi migrants moving to the UK. The unregulated and socially approved nature of the informal players points to the need to problematize the opposition between legal/illegal and licit/illicit migration. Illicit flows are conceded by the state for material reasons, in the context of a receptive and exploitative informal labor market in the UK.

Finally, we have shown how within co-ethnic networks, diasporal elites often utilized and profited from an immigrant underclass. There is a need to consider the range of experiences mediated by caste and gender as well as the potential for exploitation, rather than simply assume that networks carry social capital. The flexibility and ambiguity of these networks holds the key to understanding Indian Punjabi transnationalism. For these reasons, we have advanced the notion of ambivalence as an overarching analytic for migrant transnationalism, networks and governance. Yet this ambivalence needs to be tailored by an understanding of how mixed feelings about here, there, and other places change over life courses, between generations, in different historical contexts and different domains. Transnational families and networks are fraught with tensions as much as they are characterized by love; economic exchanges and investments were often embittered, whereas the

nostalgia persisted at the level of cultural productions and public debates. The purpose of further work should be to tease out these textures and nuances, and capture dynamism and unevenness persuasively into the paradigm of transnationalism.

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Chapter 3
Franco–Moroccan Transnational Space: Continuity and Transformations

Anna Virkama, Catherine Therrien, Nouredine Harrami, and Aïssa Kadri

3.1 Introduction

This chapter illustrates transnational activities and mobility in the geographical space between Metropolitan France[1] and Morocco. As shown by several previous studies, Moroccans living abroad engage actively in transnational practices on various levels, from frequent travel, communication, and financial remittances to construction of a home in two spaces and engagement in local development in Morocco (Salih 2003; Lacroix 2005; Fibbi and D'Amato 2008; Harrami and Mahdi 2008; Laffort 2009; Daoud 2011).

The two most important reasons for intensive movement of people, goods, and ideas between France and Morocco are the former French colonial presence in Morocco and the long history of emigration to France. The presence of the "other" is visible in everyday life in both countries: Arab grocery stores and halal butchers, mosques, Arabic language, couscous as a national dish in France and French schools, newspapers, cafés and churches in Morocco. Both countries have enriched each other's languages, music, art, cinema, and literature and generated new hybrid forms of popular culture such as *beur* culture (Rosello and Bjornson 1993; Tarr 2005).

[1] Excluding French overseas *départments* and territories.

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To ascertain what kind of characteristics can be found in the Franco–Moroccan space, we use Faist's (2007: 4) definition of transnational social spaces as cross-border communities including both migrants and non-migrants. They may be for instance professional or family groups that are tied together through a certain regularity of actions and communication. We acknowledge that not all migrants engage in transnational activities in a similar way; rather we aim to explore the *meanings* that transnational migrants attach to their activities. Thus, our approach is narrative: we do not attempt an all-encompassing ethnographic thick description of respondents' transnational activities, but we are looking at their narratives of transnationality.

The first part of the chapter provides an insight into the colonial and migration history of Morocco and France. To understand the current mobility in the Franco–Moroccan space, it is necessary to look back to the connections between the countries in the historical perspective. Some historical elements are presented in the background section to understand the role of Moroccan and French states in channeling transborder migration. The first part presents the history of mobility from France to Morocco; the second part deals with the context of migratory flows from Morocco, while the third part deals with the current situation in the French and Moroccan immigration policies.

We then proceed to the research findings. After describing the scope of transnational activities of the respondents we continue with the analyses of institutional transformations in four focal areas, political, economic, sociocultural, and educational, by looking at how hegemonic power structures are maintained and contested in the Franco–Moroccan transnational space.

3.2 Background

3.2.1 Colonial Past, Migration History, and Current Situation

To understand the current, postcolonial situation with intensive transnational connections it is important to look at the colonial and migration history of the past century. During the first half of the twentieth century, Morocco experienced colonization for a fairly long period. The majority of Morocco's territory was under French occupation from 1912 to 1956. Some other areas in the north and south of the country were Spanish protectorates. Colonization soon triggered important waves of migrants from Europe to Morocco. During the colonial period (1912–1956), the mobility of the French to Morocco kept increasing at a steady pace, whereas in 1955 as Morocco was likely to gain its independence, departures began to outweigh arrivals. Since then the French population in Morocco has been continuously decreasing in size. The independence of Morocco ushered in the "Moroccanization" of a part of the administration, which caused many French people to leave the country. These departures temporarily decreased in the 1960s, and then resumed in the early 1970s with the "Moroccanization" of agricultural lands, putting an end to the last vestiges of the colonial period (Cassaigne 1964). On the other hand, there was also intense

cooperation between the two countries in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, through the scholarship system offered by the French state.

After independence the French came to be legally bound by the rules governing foreigners; however, so far even if these legal rules were theoretically applicable to French nationals, in fact they were not enforced. When the Moroccan government introduced a special registration card for foreigners in 1963, many French people were against this measure, which they considered offensive to them. Yet the measure offered French nationals many privileges as regards residence and employment compared with other foreigners in Morocco (Cassaigne 1964). The overseas migration of Moroccans to France that began in the early twentieth century is related to the colonial history of the region. France, the major colonial European power in North Africa, resorted to workers from North Africa to offset the shortage of labor caused by the general mobilization decreed in 1914. Starting in 1916, the recourse to colonial workers intensified as the demand from armament factories was increasing. A service of colonial workers was created within the War Department to recruit, locate, and manage colonial and Chinese workers (Mauco 1932: 70). This originally civilian workforce was put under the control of the army. At the end of World War I, the number of Moroccan workers introduced into the framework of this operation was estimated at 35,000, which is about 16% of the total Chinese and colonial workforce recruited during that period.

Besides the above-mentioned workers, many soldiers were recruited in Morocco and North Africa at that time under French occupation. In 1918, the number of North African soldiers who joined France during the war was estimated at about 175,000 (Fadloullah 1996: 145). They occupied the lowest positions in the military structure, and were subject to special rules barring any possibility of promotion (Thobie et al. 1990). However, the pressing reconstruction needs of France urged the recruitment of labor from its colonies. According to Ray (1973), the first 6 years following the war were marked by such an influx of migrants to France that it caused a labor shortage in Morocco. This increasing migration continued despite the adoption between 1925 and 1931 of a set of measures limiting the number of Moroccans going to France (Ray 1973: 50–63). In 1924, the number of Moroccans in France neared 10,000, whereas Algerians numbered 100,000 (Rager 1950: 66).

The same scenario occurred again during the Second World War. The number of Moroccan workers introduced into France between 1939 and 1940 was estimated at 30,000 (Sanson 1947: 165), and the Moroccan soldiers mobilized in support of France and the Allies during World War II exceeded 80,000 (Thobie et al. 1990: 341). In the 1960s, some Western European countries living the postwar era commonly known as “The Glorious Thirty” had labor force shortages that drove economic operators to recruit on southern Mediterranean shores. This led to the first wave of emigration, predominantly composed of single males, which greatly contributed to the reconstruction of Europe. To ensure a steady supply of Maghrebi labor, France signed a number of agreements with Morocco and Tunisia in 1963, and with Algeria in 1964.

Moroccan emigration cannot be explained by economic factors alone, without looking at certain political transformations in the country of origin. De Haas (2005, 2007a)

has pointed out that the Moroccan state has an ambivalent position in simultaneously controlling and encouraging emigration. Since the 1960s, the Moroccan state has actively encouraged emigration from certain regions for political and economic reasons. The northern mountain area of Rif, for instance, is well known for active resistance to government as well as for its drug trade and local mafia. The control of migrants was initially in the hands of the Moroccan administration, which issued passports. In short, by sending to Europe the "troublemakers" and those who tried to challenge the power hegemony, the Moroccan power elite consolidated its dominant position.

The outbreak of the economic crisis in European countries in 1974, following the first oil crisis of 1973 and growing unemployment, led these countries to reverse their migration policies. France decided to stop immigration from the Maghreb. However, these restrictive policies did not fully halt immigration; on the contrary, it continued to grow under different forms and strategies (family reunion, undocumented migration, highly skilled labor migration, etc.). Among the migrants there were also politically active individuals, often leftist opponents, who were considered a threat by the ruling class. To control its subjects abroad, the Moroccan state established a control system that expanded its national borders (De Haas 2007b: 12)

Today, statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in Morocco puts the number of Moroccans residing abroad at more than three million individuals. The number has gradually risen from 160,000 in 1968 to 3,185,382 in 2005. More than 2½ million Moroccans were living in Europe in 2005, representing the highest percentage of Moroccans residing abroad (85.9%). Nearly 32.6% of all the Moroccans living abroad are living in France[2]; Spain and Belgium rank second and third; followed by Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. The US comes after Europe, followed by the Arab countries, while only very few Moroccans live in sub-Saharan African countries. The Moroccan immigration population is slightly male dominated, although today women already account for 45% of the total number of Moroccans in Europe (Daoud 2011: 17).

Until the first half of the twentieth century, Morocco was a country of immigration, receiving relatively large migration flows from some European countries, particularly from France. Since then it has become a country of emigration, mainly directed to the EU Member States. For the aforementioned historical reasons, the French presence in Morocco remains important today. The French community is currently the largest foreign presence in Morocco; their number is more than 42,000[3] The French mainly reside in the coastal areas and in large cities, such as Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, Agadir, Fez, and Tangiers. They are mostly expatriates, aid workers, diplomats, business people, international students, retired people, members of mixed couples, and lifestyle migrants. Further, more than a 1,000 French companies

[2] The majority of Moroccans in France (155,674) live in the Ile-de-France (the area around Paris). The second largest population can be found in the Languedoc-Roussillon region (40,547) and the third important area is the Center of France (26,749).

[3] See http://www.ambafrance-ma.org/presence-francaise/index.cfm

are located in Morocco, covering such areas of activity as food, pharmaceuticals, banking, insurance, environment and energy, tourism, telecommunications, electrical and electronic equipment, textiles, and so on.

3.2.2 Migration Policies and Transformation of Migrant Categories

Migration policies in France changed decisively in 1974, when labor migration was officially halted because of increased unemployment among the immigrant population and concern over the Gulf War and oil crisis. At that time, family reunification became the most common type of entry visa, together with students (counted in France as immigrants if staying more than 1 year). After decades of heated public debate on "immigration," following the general European tendency, France is aiming at selective immigration (*l'immigration choisie*) as opposed to enforced immigration (*l'immigration subie*): from family and undocumented migration toward highly skilled migration. It has to be noted that what is commonly referred to as an *immigration* debate in France would be referred to as a debate on *ethnic relations* in Anglo-American discourses, because the populations whose housing, schooling, and integration are in question are usually second and third generation immigrants and mostly French nationals.

In his doctoral dissertation, Bruno Laffort (2009) analyzed former Moroccan students who arrived in France between 1975 and 1983. He comes to the conclusion that the process of immigration and settling down in France of these student migrants was different from what he calls *primo-arrivals*, the first generation of labor migrants, whose migration experience was, as argued by Abdelmalek Sayad (1999), characterized by double absence: being marginalized both in the receiving society and in the sending society. Instead of keeping up the illusion of return to Morocco in the future, these "new" migrants invested in staying by, for example, making mixed marriages. They developed what Laffort calls *third way of integration*, maintaining intensive ties with Morocco. This transformation in profiles and practices of migrants is significant for our study, because most of our respondents are among those who migrated after 1974. Therefore, they belong to the generation of migrants with varied profiles and more intensive transnational ties.

Morocco put in place a very important institutional system to manage and monitor its migrant population. Three government agencies are dedicated to managing the relationships of these migrants with their home country: The Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad, the Advisory Board of the Moroccan Community Abroad, and the Ministry for the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad (CCMRE). Given the economic weight of money transfers made by Moroccans residing abroad, which constitute the first source of foreign currency, the government of Morocco put in place a very important institutional system to manage and monitor its migrant population.

The migratory flows departing from or transiting through Morocco and heading for the southern borders of Europe have become so pressing for both Morocco and Europe that the issue of migration has been taken into account in Moroccan public policies. Indeed, since the 1990s, Moroccan government adopted a security approach to migration issues, with various devices to control the flows of uncontrolled migrants originating from Morocco and sub-Saharan regions. In 2003 a national strategy was adopted to halt undocumented migration on a double basis: an institutional basis (creation of the National Survey of migration and control of borders) and a legal basis (bill 02–03).[4] As the laws about Moroccan migration and foreigners' entry and stay in Morocco went back to the time of the Protectorate, the bill 02–03 aimed at filling a gap and meeting a new situation: Morocco has turned out to be a transit area for migrants from Maghreb and sub-Saharan countries. Beside that restrictive policy, there is no integration procedure in Morocco. No support is given by the State to help the integration of foreigners who wish to settle in the country.

3.3 Data and Methods

This chapter is based on empirical data from a total of 161 qualitative interviews, supplemented by 40 life-course interviews.[5] The data were collected among migrants and nonmigrants who maintain cross-border ties. The respondents differed from each other in terms of political and socioeconomic status. They belonged to three groups: (1) ethnic[6] Moroccans living in France; (2) ethnic French living in Morocco; and (3) ethnic Moroccans having returned to Morocco after emigration to France.

Through its two phases, the study involved altogether 161 persons. We interviewed different categories of migrants: expatriates, retired migrants, students, humanitarian migrants, "guest" migrants, family-based migrants, labor migrants, investing migrants, and Moroccan returnee migrants. We interviewed 41 men and 40 women in Morocco, and 24 women and 56 men in France. The respondents in France were aged between 22 and 60 years and in Morocco between 20 and 74. The majority of French in Morocco had arrived with tourist status. At the time of our research, ten of them still had tourist status, forcing them to leave Moroccan territory every 3 months, whereas the others had obtained a residence permit based on a working contract, investment, marriage to a Moroccan, or retirement.

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[4] See www.justice.gov.ma/fr/legislation/legislation_.aspx?ty=2&id_l=140; www.carim.org/Publications/CARIM-AS04_01-Elmadmad.pdf

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[6] By "ethnic" we refer here to the national culture the person is born into and socialized into in childhood. The division is made for analytical purposes. In this article we describe people's feeling of belonging or identification with an ethnic group; or a person's current nationality may be more complex.

The majority of Moroccans in France had arrived on student visas. The others had moved there and obtained a residence permit thanks to family reunification, an employment contract, or a political refugee status. At the time of our interviews, less than one third had been naturalized. More than one third of the participants were married before migrating. At the time of the interviews, more than half of them were married. Two thirds were living with their spouse, and only one third of them were living with children. All the interviewees had at least the level of secondary school education.

In France, the 20 life-course interviews were conducted with respondents who can be classified as the *new generation* of Moroccan migrants. In the 1960s, when France actively recruited labor migrants from Morocco, most immigrants came from rural, Berber-speaking areas: Souss, Anti-Atlas, and after 1963, from Rif, when a labor agreement was signed with France (Lacroix 2005: 90). In our sample, respondents came primarily from Arabic and often also French-speaking families and from urban areas: Casablanca, Rabat, Tétouan, Marrakech, or Meknes. None of these areas are considered as traditional migration source areas in Morocco. Yet when respondents were questioned about the origin of their parents, it turned out that many of them belonged to the recently urbanized generation. Students were slightly over-represented in the study for many reasons. Because the respondents were found using the snowball method of recruiting, students had the largest social circles and seemed to socialize more with their compatriots. They were also more often available for longer interviews than people with families and full-time occupations.

In Morocco, apart from a few French participants who had been living in Morocco ever since the time of the protectorate, most of the respondents (as well the French migrants as the Moroccan returnees) had settled in Morocco fairly recently. More than half of the interviewees had settled in Morocco after 2000. It is important to note that although all the Moroccans interviewed for this study were of Muslim background (although not always actively religious or religious at all), Morocco had the largest Jewish population of all the Arab countries until the foundation of Israel in 1948, when there was an important Jewish emigration from Morocco, mainly to Israel, France, and Canada. Some, although not many, Moroccan interviewees mentioned the importance of the shared cultural background of Moroccan Jews and Muslims in everyday life, whereas others implicitly associated being Moroccan with being a Muslim.

The respondents were recruited mainly using the snowball sampling technique and interviews were recorded and transcribed. Most interviews were conducted in French. Only six were held in Arabic. All participants were interviewed face to face, except one who was interviewed by telephone. Primarily, we sought to meet individuals who maintained transnational ties or who were involved in transnational economic, political, religious, and family activities. As for the Moroccan returnees, we selected a sample of individuals who maintained transnational ties, so it enabled us to learn about a still largely unexplored category of migrants. The interviews took place in public places such as cafés or parks, but also very often at the respondents' homes. Time spent with respondents allowed us in fact to collect rich ethnographic data with many informal discussions and observations, which cannot all be discussed

within this report but will provide useful data for further studies. The average duration of the interviews was 1 h. As with semistructured interviews, life-course interviews were transcribed and analyzed using the interpretive content analyses method, by looking at different themes emerging from the narratives.

3.4 Effects of State Regulations on Migration Channels

The various migration channels in the Franco–Moroccan space cannot be listed unless the effects of state regulations on mobility are disclosed. Holders of French passports can easily cross Moroccan borders whereas immigration to France is strictly controlled, which determines the configuration of different channels. On the one hand, French natives can freely move between France and Morocco. If they are not residents in Morocco, they must exit the country every 3 months, even if only by going to Ceuta, a Spanish enclave located on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. Thus they can easily build their migration project during their various sojourns, and even start without a defined project. On the other hand, the Moroccans who want to go to France have to work out a precise migration project to apply for a visa[7] allowing them to migrate to France. The differences in the channels followed by French people and Moroccans are therefore closely linked to state regulations.

Regarding the Moroccan migrants we met during the field work, the most common migratory channels had been through studies and family reunification. Because most of the respondents were members of the post–labor-migration generation, they had arrived in France on student visas. In most cases, their migration was based on a concrete study project considered as a part of educational qualification, but for some of them, studies were merely the "official" motive for their settling in France. For example, it was thanks to a student visa that Karim was allowed to leave a social and family context where he did not feel free to live according to his sexual orientation.

> I could not stay in Morocco anymore. I know some people started to have doubts about my sexual orientation. I was afraid my family would find out. I was horrified by this thought. Fortunately I could leave; this way I can keep my secret. (Karim, male, Moroccan living in France)

Because immigration to France has been strictly regulated since 1974, it is legally impossible for a Moroccan to reside in France with the declared purpose of finding a job (except for seasonal employment). This means that the Moroccans who had migrated to France on the strength of an employment contract had migrated before 1974. After 1974, they had to obtain a residence permit in some other way (either studies or family reunification), and only after this procedure were they allowed to take up a legal job.

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[7] According to the French Embassy, there are different types of visas: for family reunifications, tourists, students, scientists, artists, athletes, refugees, persons with health problems, and so on.

Our field work revealed some migration channels that are not often dealt with in research literature: people with health problems (comprising permanent residents in Morocco who frequently travel to France for long periods to undergo their medical treatments, and others who actually settle in France),[8] graduates who went to France to gain professional experience through a training session, and political refugees (both those with residence permits and, in some cases, French nationality thanks to their status and those who considered themselves symbolic refugees, but had not officially been assigned this status). As expected, international marriages also influenced migration. For a Moroccan, marriage to a French national makes it possible to obtain a residence permit.[9] Marriage also stimulates migration (whether desired or not) and can lead to settlement for a long time. Such unions, either before or after migration, facilitate Moroccans' administrative and socioeconomic integration.

For a French man or woman, marriage to a Moroccan national allows him or her to obtain a residence permit in Morocco, because he or she can get it with a contract of employment or an application as an investor or a senior citizen. However, it appeared in our research that because French people can settle in Morocco with mere tourist status (without resident status), marriage was not considered as a migratory channel. Besides, some mixed couples, after living a few years in Morocco, had signed a contract of marriage in the presence of an *adul* (the only legal marriage for Moroccan authorities, to simplify administrative procedures). For these mixed couples, deciding to settle in Morocco marriage was a factor that triggered migration or return to Morocco.

For several French interviewed for this research, migration to Morocco had been stimulated by a professional challenge, whether it was in the frame of an expatriate contract,[10] a local job, a project to create an enterprise, or a religious vocation. Some had moved to Morocco once they had retired. Yet one should be careful in classifying people as "retired" because, in fact, our field work confirmed the findings of previous studies (e.g., O'Reilly 2007): many of the officially retired respondents were working or involved in informal labor activities. Some had moved to Morocco for a training period, but after that period, they were still working in Morocco in local or international organizations.

[8] They arrive either on a tourist visa or a Schengen visa if their state of health is considered serious and incurable in their country. The French authorities decide if a person can be given a visa according to the status of his/her disease and its degree of severity.

[9] The migrants are aware of the suspicions about unconsummated marriages (used as a means to enter the French territory), which are discussed in political debates on mixed marriages. Those obtaining French nationality in some other way prefer to highlight this in discussions. Some others who have acquired a second nationality before coming to France (like Najib who had stayed in Canada) say they feel freer and not suspected when choosing their partner for marriage.

[10] Expatriates work for France in Morocco on fixed term contracts. They include teachers, diplomats, and people working for a French cultural service or French enterprises. Most of them had applied for a position in different countries and were finally sent to Morocco. Many French teachers have a resident or local contract and do not receive comparable salaries and advantages.

3.4.1 Searching for a Better Quality of Life

Regarding the French respondents, it was found that their migration channels reflect the views of O'Reilly (2007) on lifestyle migration. According to O'Reilly (2007: 1), lifestyle migrants are "relatively affluent individuals, moving *en masse*, either part or full-time, permanently or temporarily, to countries where the cost of living and/or the price of property is cheaper, places which, for various reasons, signify something loosely defined as quality of life. The key motivation for those migrations has been the search for something intangible encapsulated in the phrase 'quality of life'." It is possible for them to settle in the country with the only objective to search for a better quality of life. Such a project can take various aspects from an artistic quest to a spiritual vocation, the search for recognition, the desire for a comfortable way of life, or even the attainment of a dream. In our sample, Michel explained his experiences as follows.

> It is the result of the exasperation caused by the entire French system, a system where charges and taxes accumulate. Add all that you have to pay: health insurance, old age, Ursaf,[11] tax paid by professional people, property tax, income tax; at that point you realize you work for the state, and at the end of the year you have no money left to go on vacation. Then you come to think too much is too much. (Michel, male, French living in Morocco)

Indeed, departures were often rooted in individual lives. Many French respondents had made their migratory plans after a hardship which, directly or indirectly, had motivated their departure: a divorce or a separation, a disease, an expropriation, redundancy, a difficult economic situation, bereavement, weariness with life. What seems to be the main characteristic of their migration is a desire for "somewhere else," which, in most cases, refers to a desire for a change of scene. Morocco offers a kind of nearby exoticism and gives those French people an experience of cultural differences within reassuring colonial frames of reference. The search for a better quality of life and/or the strong desire for somewhere else were juxtaposed in their stories with a feeling of weariness owing to the social, economic, and political climate in France (heavy taxes, rise of the right wing, cold human relationships, pace of work, conditions of life). For the Moroccans who migrated to France, the desire for somewhere else was significant too, but it did not have the same meaning. Marwan stated,

> I felt incapable of doing things in Morocco. I still loved to work in trade, but in Morocco I didn't see many openings in that field. I needed some capital to start with…and how to achieve that capital in Morocco? It's really impossible. I needed a visa. I wanted to work for me and my family. I wanted a better future for my children. (Marwan, male, Moroccan, living in France)

It is noteworthy that although "somewhere else" may represent a desire for a different way of life, it was usually linked with the search for social and economic

[11] URSAF stands for L'Union de Recouvrement des Cotisations de Sécurité Sociale et d'Allocations Familiales.

improvement compared with the local social and economic climate, considered frustrating for several reasons: weight of traditions, mistrust of the political system, police controls, lack of future work prospects, social pressure, the difficulty to live freely according to sexual preferences, precarious work situation, and low salaries.

3.4.2 Continuity Through Family History and Connections

Given the colonial history of the Franco–Moroccan space, it was not surprising to note that individual migration projects were often connected to wider historical factors and family memories. In this way, some French migrants made a connection between their presence in Morocco and that of a relative or a grandparent who had lived there during the era of the French protectorate.

> Ever since I was a baby, I had been told stories (mostly by my father) about relatives who were here, and especially one of his uncles, my great uncle, who was a photographer in Fez. I needed to come back here to find my roots, which I had a bit lost and which my family tried to make me forget. (Carl, male, French living in Morocco)

A French female interviewee, Elizabeth, told us that she went to Morocco aiming to recreate the fantasy world of her grandparents' colonial life. She rented a colonial house in Fez and recreated the fanciful world in which they were supposed to have lived, surrounded with objects, pictures, and books of the colonial era. She viewed her migration as "a need for family continuity." In the same way, some Moroccans mentioned links between their departure to France and their family history, intimately connected to the colonial past of Morocco. Some migrants' fathers or grandfathers, for example, had gone to France during the World Wars to fight as soldiers in the French army. Some others had left Morocco as soon as immigration to France had been made possible as a result of international agreements in the wake of the postwar period. After being recruited by French entrepreneurs who had been settled earlier in Morocco, they had been working in France in the building trade. Some of them were still living in France; others used to move between the countries after their retirement.

It is relevant to point out that the transnational networks and links established before departure seem to influence migration patterns. In particular, for Moroccan respondents, the networks of relatives and friends, as well as scholarships or partnerships between French and Moroccan schools and universities, played a crucial role in their migration to France. They were materially and symbolically supported by transnational networks both in France and in Morocco, which helped them to implement their migratory plans.

On the other hand, the migratory projects of the French respondents had been more individual since the beginning, benefiting from very little support from their groups or relationships. Several French interviewees were "initiated" into Morocco through some acquaintances who had been there. Before settling in Morocco, the possibility of frequent trips between France and Morocco for French passport holders had enabled some of them to gradually establish support networks. In the course of

several sojourns in the country before migrating, they had created ties and professional networks. Apart from expatriates and married people who went to Morocco to live with their spouse, such previous relationships had proved to be professionally useful, too. Michel, a French man living in Morocco, stated, “I have absolutely no desire to return to the wolf’s mouth.” For the majority of French living in Morocco the idea of a return did not make a lot of sense, simply because they did not consider they ever really left their homeland. Rather, their life took place in both countries.

> Let’s say I’m like a migratory bird. My roots are on two sides. It looks as if I could do both seasons and have two lives in the same way. It would be impossible today to live in one without the other. (Béatrice, female, French born in Morocco)

Some of the respondents hoped to be able to live both in Morocco and France as long as their health and the political situation allow it. The return was typically mentioned as evident in the cases of health problems or political instability in the country of settlement.

> Anyway, if things turn ugly I will pack up and go back to France. (Gérard, male, French living in Morocco)

For Moroccan labor migrants, migration was usually considered temporary, but for the new generations of Moroccan migrants return was a more ambivalent question. Following their migratory experiences in France, some Moroccans who were interviewed for this study had been motivated to return to Morocco by a work contract with a better economic status improving their image, the opportunities offered by Morocco to start a business, or a desire to help build their own country. Majid said,

> I feel that it is imperative to return to your roots to better build yourself and grow. And back to your past town or village, there are also the people who can recognize you as the son of so and so and see you progress. So in a way I was no longer anonymous. (Majid, male, Moroccan returnee)

The reasons mentioned by the Moroccan respondents often revealed a sense of dissatisfaction with their past experiences in France: “not to be anonymous any longer”; “to be recognized for your diplomas”; “to be your own boss”; “to be able to use your skills and experience to the benefit of the people of your country.” Several Moroccans who had come back to Morocco were offered jobs and a better social status than they could reach in France. For them, it was clear that it would have been much more difficult to obtain an equivalent position in France, unless “you become the eternal interchangeable part timer,” as said by an interviewee who had returned to Morocco because he had found there a position as a university professor. Moroccan returnees continued to maintain contacts with France because they were seen as a source of professional and personal enrichment. Most of them felt they had valuable experiences in France. Some had spent more than half of their lives there. In fact, the majority of the Moroccan returnees could not conceive giving up life in either country.

> I want to continue dividing myself between France and Morocco. (Yacine, male, Moroccan returnee)

It is interesting to scrutinize in detail the cases of the Moroccans who regularly used to go to France. Their reasons were diverse. Some had a wife and/or children living in France; in these cases, their daily life followed the rhythm of regular border crossings. Some retired older people declared a residence in France to get a higher pension; in these cases, they had to go back to France to receive their pension. Some did business with France. Some others had created associations for sport or development necessitating regular mobility between France and Morocco. Even those who had completed their migratory trajectories and seemed to have come back to Morocco did not consider they had really returned, because they continued to maintain transnational links or transnational lifestyles.

3.5 Political Orientation

3.5.1 Nationality and Citizenship: Perceptions and Strategies

The research revealed that, as regards *citizenship*, French and Moroccans moving in the Franco–Moroccan space have different conceptions and strategies. Among the French respondents, the rate of naturalization was very low. This can partly be explained by the restrictive Moroccan laws, in spite of the recent reform of the Code of Nationality.[12] Considering that low rate, it was not surprising to observe that none of the 60 French respondents had taken Moroccan nationality, except for one woman who had dual nationality because her parents were a mixed couple. The restrictive regulations cannot be the only explanation because none of the French respondents had applied for a Moroccan nationality, and only two of them reported that they would like to obtain Moroccan citizenship if it were possible. Some justified their definite rejection by explanations such as "the lack of freedom," "corruption," "women's status," "fatalism," and "subjection to the king." The exceptional character of naturalization among the French residents was also due to the fact that they regarded Moroccan naturalization to be of no use to them, because anyone with French nationality can easily cross the Moroccan borders. Besides, there are only very few impediments due to the status of a foreigner.[13]

Instead, about one third of the Moroccan respondents had taken French nationality, and one third had attained dual nationality. Few Moroccans (most of them married to a French spouse), considered applying for French nationality or had started the naturalization process. Sometimes the Moroccan respondents thought that the naturalization process might be a kind of disloyalty to their country of origin but, in most

[12] The Moroccan Nationality Code was modified on March 23, 2007. Thanks to this reform, Moroccan women can transmit their nationality. So far children have inherited their father's nationality.

[13] Only nationals can acquire farmland or join the Moroccan civil service. Only foreigners married to a Moroccan national are allowed to engage in private practice as lawyers, doctors, chemists, etc.

cases, the advantages conferred by the French nationality overrode the loyalty to their country. In most cases, their points of view and motivations can be explained by pragmatic reasons (freedom of circulation, access to employment sectors reserved for nationals, etc.).

3.5.2 Political Participation

The possibilities for political participation are not the same in France and Morocco. Morocco is a monarchy, in which political practices and democratic means are limited. Therefore, in the Moroccan case, one should be careful in drawing conclusions of people's political commitment solely by looking at formal political activities such as voting or being a member of a political party.

Among the Moroccan respondents, some had a politically oriented background, mainly in the Marxist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The political conditions in Morocco had clearly influenced their desire to migrate. In fact, the political actions of these leftists consisted of defending citizens' rights in Morocco rather than of participating in the political life in France. Only two Moroccans had taken an active part in French politics and had been involved in a political party. The networks of French and international associations for the defence of human rights were of great importance in denouncing the transgression of human rights and supporting Moroccan political prisoners. Another aspect of political participation for Moroccans living in France was their activities in trade unions. Many of them had already been active in trade unions in Morocco, mostly by participating in strikes and demonstrations. The kind of events that motivated such politically active Moroccan participants were demonstrations against racism, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example.

The "Arab Spring" of 2011, with revolts and protests nearly everywhere in the Middle East and North Africa, showed the importance of virtual platforms in the organization of protests. Despite some speculations in the francophone media about Morocco being a stable exception in North Africa, the same elements that brought Tunisians and Egyptians onto the streets can be found in Morocco, too (Telquel 2011a, b). Facebook, Twitter, blogs and various online forums are public spheres of political organization and protest. Although our study did not include Internet ethnography or another type of systematic observation of the use of the Internet among the respondents, it became apparent that particularly among the students the Internet is the main source of information on political events and means of spreading information to contest existing power structures or react to social inequalities. This kind of participation clearly exceeds interest in traditional party politics, particularly among younger interviewees. The Internet was also sometimes present in the interviews. For example, in an interview with two Moroccan students, when discussing corruption in Morocco, their narrative was interacting with videos they showed from YouTube or information they verified through Wikipedia.

The French people interviewed in Morocco did not mention political activity, apart from the right to vote, which a good many of them exercised. Most of them had only little or no interest in Moroccan political life. They did not care about Moroccan citizenship as they did not have the right to vote or participate in a Moroccan political party. If the majority of the French respondents expressed indifference to Moroccan policy, it was not because they were not interested in politics in general—in fact many of them followed the French political news and voted in the presidential elections. Rather, the reason is that many of them felt themselves as outsiders. Although they were residents in Morocco, they did not concern themselves with Moroccan political life: they were not subjects of the king and, with very few exceptions, they were not Muslims. Unlike France, which is a *laïque* (secular) republic in which all legal residents enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations (except the right to vote is only granted to citizens), Morocco is a Muslim monarchy and its legislation is based on different personal status related to religion: Muslim personal status, Jewish personal status, the civil condition of foreigners (such as French residents). Foreigners, except those who are in mixed marriages, are free to benefit from the advantages of the country while keeping at a distance from the legal and religious local system.[14]

Several respondents (Morocccan and French) defined their political participation by way of civic commitment to local or transnational associations. The most important transnational network concerned civil institutions, associations, or NGOs, such as migrants' associations for Maghrebi immigrants in France; French associations for French or French-speaking people in Morocco; associations involved in development with a project located in Morocco; and various associations organizing sports, artistic, and intercultural exchanges between Morocco and France.

3.6 Symbolic Boundaries Through Affiliations

According to the research findings, it seems to be easier to feel at *home* in two countries than to be really affiliated to both states (Rodriguez 2001; Casado Diaz 2006; Lucas and Purkayastha 2007; Gustafon 2008). The affiliations mentioned both by the Moroccan and French respondents showed a variability of the symbolic boundaries (Barth 1969). For instance, the position of the French as "outsiders" in Morocco could be felt in their different affiliations. With the exception of two women (one born in Morocco), none mentioned any affiliation to Morocco or defined themselves as Moroccans. The vast majority regarded themselves as French. However a closer

[14] The Muslim personal status code is valid for the foreigner in a mixed couple. The laws deliver a clear message to those who get married to a Moroccan Muslim (men or women): it is the foreigner who has to get integrated into the Muslim system if he/she wants to have some rights; the country does not have to open up to foreigners. It is imperative to preserve a Muslim country and maintain social cohesion.

analysis leads us to make a distinction between a minority who identified themselves with the French nation and embraced patriotic feelings, and those who defined themselves as French but emphasized that their sense of membership was not connected to an idea of nation or territory. Let us take the first case.

> In France, I find all the values that are mine, republican values, because my family grew up there, and I would say, fought for the country. For me, the feeling of belonging to a nation comes as a result of fighting during a war to stay in this nation, that's all. That's the whole history of my family. This personal history, I bear it in me. My country is France, and it will never be any other country. Never! Even if I have traveled a lot. (Marcelline, female, French living in Morocco)

On the other hand, those French individuals who tended to dissociate their belonging to France from any nationalist connotation attached their sense of affiliation to cultural markers, to the French value system, to the French language, or to a "French mentality," which they often defined as Western.

> Am I French? Yes, I speak French, my parents are French. I have an attachment to France, but I have no patriotic pride. In fact, I think I do reject what is Moroccan. It is a rejection of their values. They are very archaic, and it deeply bothers me. If we speak of values, it would rather be the French values, the values of the Enlightenment, the beautiful French values, the great western philosophical values—undeniably. (Sophie, female, French born in Morocco)

Some French interviewees defined themselves as European, pointing to a wider circle of reference. In their discourse, there were two categories: French and Europeans (we), which referred to an ethnic border rather than a national or territorial border, and differentiated themselves from the Moroccan category (they; the others). On the other hand, for the Moroccans, nationality and sometimes the origins in the same place in Morocco were the primary source of affiliation. For them, local affiliation demonstrated the importance of territorial attachment within a national or transnational context. In addition to national identities, other possible ethnic identifications such as "Arab," "Maghrebi," "North African," "Mediterranean," or "African" were used by the respondents. Surprisingly, identification as a "European" did not appear at all in the narratives of the Moroccan interviewees, although their migratory projects were usually directed toward Europe.

It appeared that state regulations have a clear impact on factors shaping national identification. For example, Françoise, a French woman born in Morocco, stated that it was difficult for her to claim a sense of belonging to Morocco because she was constantly referred to as "a foreigner."

> Here, I'm not at home. I'm in their country.
> Q: Why is it so clear?
> A: I don't have to assert my right; it is not a right. It is their home.
> Q: Why?
> A: Because it's their country.
> Q: But you were born here?
> A: Yes, but I'm not Moroccan; I don't have Moroccan nationality. I cannot get it.

Several authors have pointed out that the identification is plural (Meintel 1992; Mucchielli 2002) and multidimensional (Gallissot 1987). Each individual draws

from a palette of available dimensions and develop his/her own definition of him/herself (Devereux 1970). In the frame of this study, the plurality of identifications was especially apparent in the Moroccan narratives. Most Moroccans who had lived in France for several years identified themselves as French as well as Moroccan.

> I am French and Moroccan and I am fine with it. I feel very well and I am comfortable with this identity. (Touria, female, French–Moroccan returnee)

This was true even for those who had not taken French citizenship. Indeed, even if they could not officially claim to be French,[15] some of them felt as deeply French, finding their identity in the French culture, language, and values.

> I am much more French than Moroccan. Besides, at work I am different, I stick out in the way I dress, I speak, I behave with the others....I show that I come from France. I can't say 'I am French' (I would not allow myself to go that far), but I value my knowledge of French civilization. For me it is a key asset. (Nouha, female, Moroccan returnee)

The respondents with dual citizenship defined themselves as Franco–Moroccan and eagerly supported their belonging to both countries. An important factor in their affiliation was the family. For those respondents whose parents were in Morocco and whose children were born in France, the choice of one country would have been difficult to make.

> Choosing between Morocco and France is like choosing between your mother and your father. (Zakaria, male, French–Moroccan, living in France)

The fact that one feels and defines him- or herself as Franco–Moroccan or as being of French of Moroccan origin does not necessarily mean that other people will recognize him or her as such. Some respondents with dual citizenship expressed their discomfort when they had to cope with what they called *a duty of belonging*. Such persons with multiple affiliations were often confronted with others' desire to give them a single label. Sophie spoke of a great inconsistency between the fact that she considered herself emotionally at home in Morocco (since she was born and raised there), and the fact that she was not granted the opportunity to attain citizenship of the country.

> I feel that there is this duty of belonging. This sense of belonging is supposed to be for me a duty, but I don't feel it that way. All these questions, having to choose something—it makes me flee. For other people, you have to feel you belong. Mom says you must not betray your country. But why is it absolutely necessary to belong to a country? Why? And, with all these problems about migration, you feel the difficulties at the borders and with the administration, you have to be confined to one country; but I do not see it that way. I feel from nowhere, and it makes me feel uncomfortable because I have to choose, I have to belong. (Sophie, female, French born in Morocco)

For Moroccans, the French people born in Morocco and living there were only "French"' or "Gawria" or "Shania." Sophia continued,

[15] This situation clearly shows the impact of state regulations on the construction of identities and the process of identification.

> For the others, I am French, that's all [...]. In the street, I am permanently a gawria (a foreigner), and even in our relationships with customers in our company, I'm the French woman. That's insuperable. Yes, people put you in boxes.

Another French female respondent, Françoise (born in Morocco) said,

> The Moroccans say "You're Moroccan" out of kindness. It's nice, but they do not believe it for a moment.

The same phenomenon was observed among children born in France by Moroccan parents. Though they were French citizens, they were often classified through exclusive categories, such as "Moroccan," "Arab," "Muslim," "Beur," and so on. Those categories obviously indicated a barrier between "them" and "us." Many of the respondents still conceived that the different facets of their affiliations were "a source of richness," although not without ambivalence. For some of them, the discomfort with their identity stemmed from their difficulty in having their mixed heritage recognized.

Finally, the number of French and Moroccans who defined themselves as *world citizens* was quite significant. The respondents did not seem to be tied to any particular country but said that they could live anywhere. Many of them referred to a process of identification beyond national or ethnic limits.

> Q: What is the impact of your religious practice on your identity?
> A: First I think it is what enables me to feel well in the two cultures, I don't have to choose either. It's what makes me feel at peace.
> Q: But why is it a consequence of religion?
> A: Because it enables me to go beyond that attachment to a nation. (Touria, female, French–Moroccan returnee)

3.6.1 Narratives of Home and Belonging

By going deeper into the representations of home, we can see that transnational mobility and the negotiations between several spaces of reference had an impact on the definitions and constructions of a sense of home. More than half of the respondents considered themselves to be at home both in Morocco and France. The identity space was often mentioned related to two countries; a kind of intermediate space, here and over there at the same time (Tarrius 2004). In practice, many of the respondents lived their everyday lives in two countries, but some interviewees were unable to determine their principal place of residence. They could not imagine giving up life in either country because, according to them, it was their mobility between the countries that made their way of life rich. The idea of a return did not make a lot of sense, simply because they did not consider they had really left their homeland.

The multiple representations of home support the ideas about deterritorialized identity, presented by Gupta and Ferguson (1992). In the frame of our study, the sense of feeling at home was associated with atmospheres, familiar smells and landscapes, various ties, a sense of fulfillment, memories, projects, a way of life, and

familiar cultural references. For the great majority of the respondents, these frames of reference were conceived of as plural and movable; they seemed to correspond to symbolic ties[16] rather than roots in a territory or a nation, showing a deterritorialized representation of home. The interviewees often mentioned their house/home, which did not just mean the material house, but also symbolic roots related to their own private lives, the people living with them, some personal items (a box, books, photos, pictures, clothes, etc.), daily routine, and so on.

Border-crossing mobility and other transnational activities had led some respondents to transform their initial cultural references through various experiences, like a conversion or the adoption of new values. According to Guilbert (1993), cultural transformation concerns values and the individual relation to these values. This means an adjustment, an adaptation, a harmonization of original values with another value system. Guilbert warns that one should not confuse the concept of cultural transformation with pragmatic adjustments (integrating new tastes in cooking, listening to "ethnic" music, learning to use a new currency), which are realized through new knowledge. Cultural transformation does not mean something more, but something different. Such cultural transformations analyzed by Therrien (2009) became evident in our study. However, the empirical data prevent us from extolling what Riccio (2006) terms *a nomadic version of the world* or generalizing that search for a sense of plural homes. Indeed, home was sometimes inextricably linked with the homeland and sometimes with the idea of nation. The initial conception of migration projects—whether temporary or long term, either motivated by social and economic advantages or by a wish to live in a different way—was associated with the feeling of a unique home.

In the social sphere of transnational life, presence and distance can be negotiated in different ways. Increased frequency of cross-border visits has often been explained, in a simplifying way, by the development of transport systems and more affordable prices. In fact, the geographical proximity of Morocco and France, and the low cost and speed of means of communication and transport greatly helped the respondents to maintain close cross-border links with friends and relatives.[17] Yet these factors are not enough to explain the vitality of transnational links in the Franco–Moroccan space; emotional ties were also considered important indices as they helped reduce the distance by allowing migrants not to feel too far from home.

Our data suggest that the frequency of visits may depend on other factors, too, such as social constraints. For one homosexual respondent, the return to Morocco was always complicated because he had to face friends and family enquiries about his family life. In fact, moving to France had been the only solution for him to live his life as a homosexual and in a pair relationship with another man without his family in Morocco knowing about it. In this case, the life in France was seen as a

[16] According to Lucas et al. (2007) "home" embodies specific feelings of safety, familiarity, comfort, love, and belonging.

[17] Some French people said that it is not so costly to visit their relatives and clients in France since they reside in Morocco.

strategy to keep up appearances in Morocco and the visits were kept very brief to avoid troublesome inquiries about the respondent's personal life. Some other narratives reflected the respondents' worries over "what people may say" in Morocco. Two student migrants confessed that they preferred not to go to Morocco outside the official holiday season even if they had the opportunity, because this might cause an occasion for some people to gossip that they are "not really doing anything in France," meaning that people there would suspect they are not studying and working. By contrast, some French respondents living in Morocco said that they had become closer with their friends or family members. When they come over for a visit, they stay longer in Morocco because the country is popular as a holiday destination.

The quality of the migrants' welcome had an impact on the sense of home. There was a significant contrast between the discrimination situations experienced by Moroccans in France and the surprise, even embarrassment, of some French people facing positive stereotyping and recognition in Morocco. Such a contrast indicates the different modes of negotiation of the foreign presence, and the way symbolic dominating relations are internalized in the Franco–Moroccan space. Transnational links with familiar sociocultural references (relatives, friends, language, religion, associations, social security, health care) may enable migrants to feel at home even outside their homeland. Regular ties with family and friends[18] were the most often mentioned familiar references. The chance to stay in touch despite the distance greatly helped many respondents not to feel cut off from their home(s) abroad. They all maintained frequent links (even every day in some cases) with relatives or friends in France or Morocco by telephone, Internet, programs such as Skype, VoIP, or MSN Messenger, and so on. Most of the respondents were also very mobile between France and Morocco for personal or professional reasons.

Language is also an important reference point. It is noteworthy that all Moroccans encountered in France or in Morocco could speak French[19] whereas just very few French respondents could speak Moroccan Arabic. Yet those French who were not able to speak Arabic and communicated exclusively in French, even on Moroccan territory (at home, at work, in their children's French schools) did not feel less at home in Morocco. The difficulties in communicating with Moroccans seemed to be a worry for a few of them who were trying to learn the local language. On the other hand, the Moroccans living in France often mentioned the difficulty of passing on the Arabic language to their children, but some Moroccan returnee migrants from France had decided not to teach Arabic to their children.

Religion or spiritual life[20] appeared to be another criterion of familiarity with home. According to the respondents, it was the faith and spirituality much more

[18] We mention relatives and friends in the same way because some French people maintain stronger and more frequent links with their friends than with their family. As for Moroccan returnees, none of them had family in France.

[19] Some had arrived with little knowledge of French, but all of them had made efforts to improve their command of oral and written French.

[20] For this research we did not elicit religious practice, but only transnational links owing to religious or spiritual practice.

than religion that created ties beyond national and cultural borders. For some respondents, belonging to a religious denomination (whether Christian, Baha'i, Muslim, or other) largely contributed to a feeling of closeness with home. For these believers, God united people beyond frontiers and faith created transnational links. Because it is easy to travel between France and Morocco, people can go back to their roots and revitalize their religious practices. They often choose the dates of their journeys in relation with particular periods or religious events (fasting, pilgrimages, ceremonies, rituals, etc.). In some cases, involvement in a religious or spiritual community or a group of common affinities (yoga, members of a fraternity, freemasons) gives spiritual comfort and a fellow feeling wherever the people are. For some respondents, the friendly welcome on their arrival within such a group and the support of such a community had mitigated their impression of distance and facilitated their integration.

An opportunity for the French nationals to maintain links with the French health care system gave them a feeling of security. Many of them had national insurance cover. Some Moroccans who were returning to Morocco applied for residence in France to retain their residence permits, and to be entitled to social security. For them the French health care system was clearly defined as the best preference. The proximity of France and affordable means of transport explain why they could have medical follow-up in France, buy medicines, be operated on, or have their medical tests interpreted by French doctors in France. For some French respondents who had decided to break with the French sociopolitical system and lived in Morocco, the contribution to French mutual insurance was presented as the very last tie.

What is striking is the different ways to connect the feeling of home with the question of integration among the French in Morocco and Moroccans in France. Indeed, even a monolingual French person can feel at home in Morocco, maybe working for a French company or a relocated firm, send his or her children to a French school, follow French media, enjoy French social and medical care, practice religion, or transmit "French" values to his or her children, all the while staying aloof from the Moroccan religious, political, and legal system. Although the Moroccans in France may also keep some religious and cultural references and enjoy Moroccan or Maghrebi social networks, it is difficult for them to reside in France and speak only Arabic; they have to send their children to a French school and they cannot engage in religious practices that break French laws.

In their discourse, the Moroccan respondents insisted that their integration into French society increased their impression of being at home, whereas the French did not draw a parallel between their feeling of home and their integration into Morocco. Moreover, several Moroccans returning to their original homeland explained that they left France because they felt frustrated because there was no real social and economic effort on the part of French society at their integration into the job market.[21] Many of them reported that their job did not correspond to the level of their degrees or qualifications.

[21] Only one French woman had returned to her country of origin because, according to the law, she was not entitled to open a pathology laboratory in Morocco.

It is important to add that through our field work, we also met some French who could speak colloquial Arabic fluently, worked for Moroccan companies, had placed their children in Moroccan private schools, or were integrated into a Moroccan family through marriage.[22] What we try to underline is the difference between the free nature of integration in the Moroccan context and the required (virtually compulsory) nature of integration in the French context. The pattern of assimilation adopted by the integration policy in the French Republic and the policy based on different kinds of status in the Moroccan Muslim monarchy are certainly reflected in these two contexts.

3.7 Employment and Economic Strategies

Although it is clear that the Moroccan and French economies cannot be compared on the same basis; Morocco is a North African developing country and France a Western postindustrial country, there is a lot of economic cooperation between the countries. The economic ties between Morocco and France mainly take the forms of investments, transnational enterprises, and financial and monetary remittances. The French postwar economy was built with a significant contribution of migrant labor, whereas in Morocco the economy rests mostly on three sectors: tourism, migrant remittances, and phosphate as a natural resource. Of these, remittances are by far the most important source of income, exceeding three to four times development aid and representing three times private investments (Daoud 2011: 122).

Several economic agreements have been signed between France and Morocco, and France has traditionally been the most important foreign investor in Morocco with 41% of IDE (Integrated Development Environment) flows for the period of 1998–2003. Several fiscal and financial measures have been established in order to create a proper environment to attract foreign investors, including agreements such as the Accord de Promotion et de Protection des Investissements (APPI). The Moroccan state has actively encouraged Moroccans living abroad to invest in Morocco. As a concrete act of encouragement, special saving accounts for emigrants were established at La Banque Populaire (Lacroix 2005).

Within the TRANS-NET (transnationalization, migration, and transformation: multi-level analysis of migrant transnationalism) study, most of the respondents said they were employed or self-employed, apart from students and those who were permanently or temporarily disabled because of illness.[23] One third of the migrants interviewed in Morocco were employees on fixed-term contracts, one third worked

[22] Therefore they were submitted to the legislation based on Muslim personal status.

[23] One third of the respondents were wage earners; another third were self-employed, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, and craftsmen. Eleven respondents were retired, two women were housewives, three were students (trainees or taking correspondence courses), and three unemployed. Their occupations spanned diverse sectors such as education and research, agriculture, art and culture, tourism, the caregiving field, religion, foreign affairs, trade, or industry.

autonomously as craftsmen, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, for instance. Many returnee migrants interviewed in Morocco had been motivated by the idea of being able to create an enterprise or work independently, projects they felt they could not have realized in France. In France, nearly two thirds of our participants were employees, and 40% of employees had permanent employment, indicating a certain professional stability. One fourth were working half-time or part-time on short-term contracts and were therefore in a more precarious situation. The others were students or working independently; only one person was unemployed. The professional categories in two countries were relatively similar: entrepreneurs, teachers, professors, researchers, film makers, shopkeepers, artists, taxi drivers, consultants, students and PhD students, engineers, hostesses, pharmacists, and blue collar workers. In the Moroccan field, there were more entrepreneurs and independent workers than in France.

As seen previously, in Morocco, the economic and social development rests heavily on migrants' shoulders. Among the so-called first generation, labor migrants who arrived before 1974, the motivation for departure was dictated by strong economic needs, and sometimes hunger and social distress in the country of origin. Because the living conditions in France were rather hard, the only positive future perspective for many immigrants was to invest in Morocco so as to guarantee a better future for their children. Today, the migratory profiles have diversified and extended to other social categories beyond low skilled labor migrants, but still the idea of "migrants debt" to the homeland and those who stayed behind remains important in migrants' narratives (Daoud 2011: 9).

Although it is common to explain the unemployment of Maghrebi women in France by "the cultural norms prevailing in Islamic countries, where female employment outside home is often discouraged" (Hargreaves 1995: 42), our empirical data do not support this conception. All the Moroccan women interviewed were economically active. In some cases, their family had been against their participation in the working life, but this was rather because the work they were doing was perceived as a low status job by their middle-class families and therefore not suitable for them. In some cases, this could also apply to male respondents: some students reported that their families were against the idea to take a part-time job, because they were supposed to study.

In fact, in the Moroccan and French contexts, gender, social class, ethnicity and nationality seemed to affect participation in the economic life differently and in complex ways. Ethnic or national belonging could appear as an asset or a handicap in the labor market. Many French people estimated that they found better opportunities and greater responsibilities in Morocco than in France. A French woman had been offered a job as a teacher while waiting for her child from school, just because she looked French. The same "ethnic advantage" did not apply to Moroccans in France who seemed to have more difficulties in transforming their "ethnic capital" into "economic capital" in the professional fields. Many Moroccans referred to ethnic discrimination in their professional life in France. Some Moroccan students explained that it was difficult for them to find an enterprise for their internship because French nationals were given preference. A Moroccan female IT worker

estimated that she might have an advantage over men in recruitment because she can “mask” her ethnic origin by putting forward her gender identity and dressing up stylishly, in a feminine way. She added that female Arab names have less negative connotations than male ones. In some fields of economic activity, being a Moroccan could be an advantage too, mainly in new innovative professional fields or in the fields with very little competition with French people. A woman working as a cleaner in a hotel responded that a decisive factor in her recruitment was the fact that the manager had lived in Morocco and therefore “loved Moroccans.”

In the Moroccan-French context, some innovative professional activities had emerged thanks to cultural competence put into practice: small-scale enterprises specialized in the organization of wedding ceremonies for mixed couples, clothes, or pottery design drawing inspiration from their origin and “ethnic” restaurants and catering businesses. Artistic and scientific fields were fruitful grounds for transnational cross-border collaboration, and migrants working in those fields could actually benefit from their transnational connections. Morocco, or a migration experience, could serve as a source of inspiration for film-makers, playwrights, musicians, or other artists, and for some researchers, their field work or academic collaboration had taken place in Morocco. These networks were often mentioned in connection with professional activities.

To conclude, the research showed various strategies for dealing with employment and managing transnational lives. Economic motivations to migrate remained important. As mentioned before, the majority of French move to Morocco stimulated by a professional challenge. For their part, a lot of Moroccans still migrate for economic reasons, but after reaching a satisfactory standard of living, they tend to take into account other factors, too, such as quality of life, family life, spirituality, political conditions, and so on.

3.7.1 Importance of Transnational Networks in the Professional Field

On both sides of the Mediterranean, maintaining networks and social relationships across national borders seemed crucial for economic and professional activities. For the French settled in Morocco, their ties with France were mentioned as an advantage or even a necessity in the professional field. In the case of Moroccans in France, personal networks were important to find employment in France, whereas professional nets with Moroccans were a part of a wider strategy to maintain ties with the country of origin. Some French in Morocco had clients or business partners in both countries. The Internet was a crucial, even indispensable, instrument for working in distant and international networks. It was used to communicate with business partners, purchase equipment, consult colleagues, transfer medical records, and create websites. However, the Moroccans in France emphasized their direct physical presence in Morocco rather than communication at a distance in the way they managed their enterprises, property, and investments.

A number of innovations and the latest technological achievements were transferred from France to Morocco, both in scientific, medical, and technical domains. To keep informed about the recent developments in various fields was perceived as a professional asset by both French and returnee Moroccans. The exchange of knowledge and expertise was seen as profitable for all, even if the lack of sufficient material conditions might delay development in some spheres.

The French going to Morocco for a practical training session or a master's degree considered such an experience as a valuable asset, mostly for work in NGOs. In those cases, working experience abroad was a part of their professional strategy. In the same way, Moroccan students returning to Morocco felt that working experience or practical training session in France was highly valued in Morocco.

For French entrepreneurs in Morocco, Morocco was considered a first step toward wider international markets. The fiscal and financial advantages in Morocco were motivating factors for them to create a business or move their enterprises to Morocco. Self-employment seems to be an important source of income both for French settled in Morocco and for Moroccans living in France. Transnational migrants were perceived as a potential market for those Moroccans in France who had founded small businesses based on observations of demands and needs for particular goods or services: grocer's shops, the organization of various celebrations, furniture stores, restaurants, and catering companies. Thus a transnational enterprise created by Moroccans in France typically primarily targets migrant population and perhaps later, once established, will address wider groups of clients.

3.7.2 Remittances, Investments, and Material Flows Across the Borders

The Moroccan economy relies to a large extent on financial remittances from Moroccans abroad. Through remittance revenue many regions of the country have managed to prosper. According to De Haas (2007b: 5), the durability of transnational and transgenerational links is one of the main reasons for the structural solidarity of remittances. The three principal channels of monetary flows are: (1) remittances sent through agencies specialized in money transfers, such as Western Union or Moneygram, or bureau de change that sell these services, most often with high commissions; (2) transfers sent directly through Moroccan banks operating in France; and (3) money brought directly to Morocco in cash or withdrawn in Morocco from migrants' accounts in French banks. Our research revealed that there are financial flows from Morocco *to* France, too. The Moroccan parents finance their children's studies in France, and a number of wealthy Moroccans invest their extra money in France, by buying apartments or businesses. However, the ideal type of migrant who sends money and provides for his family in Morocco was still very strong in the narratives of Moroccan respondents. A migrant is expected to "succeed" and, whether he or she is really well off or not, as evidence of this supposed success, he or she may have to offer material support to relatives living in Morocco.

Apart from the financial flows, different types of material flows move in both directions. However, the material flows from and to Morocco and from and to France are not the same: there are clear preferences regarding what should be purchased and where. Many visitors to Morocco are expected to offer to friends and relatives gifts bought in France. These items, fashionable clothes, perfumes, or household items, must reflect European or French characteristics, such as the latest fashion, a better quality, or technological development, whereas the Moroccan items, such as carpets or jewels, are often valued as precious handmade works of craftsmen. These material cross-border flows reflect an idea of Morocco associated with "leisure," "family," "tradition," "craftsmanship," whereas France is represented through the conceptions of "technology," "professionalism," "style," "fashion," and "modernity."

3.8 Education, Schooling, and Transnational Connections

The educational systems of France and Morocco need to be considered on different bases: whereas in France 99% of girls and 98% of boys are enrolled in primary education, in Morocco there is a high percentage of illiteracy, especially among women and elderly people. In the 2008 UNESCO[24] statistics, literacy rates in Morocco were 56.4% for adults and 76.6% for young people. The gender ratio of education is also slightly different: the rates are 87 for girls and 92 for boys. The average years of education per person in Morocco is 10.2, whereas in France the corresponding number is 16.1 years (2006 statistics, UNESCO).

Today, the network of French schools in Morocco is the densest in the world. French education began in Morocco in the middle of the nineteenth century. At that time, French education was administered by religious denominations. Alongside the French Protectorate system, a public secular education was established in 1912. The independence of Morocco in 1956 brought fundamental changes to the education system in Morocco. The cultural agreement signed between Morocco and France in 1957 gave a new lease on life to French education under the label Mission Universitaire et Culturelle Française au Maroc. Faced with a severe shortage of teachers after independence, Morocco began (and continued for the following 20 years) to recruit French teachers, *coopérants*, for its public schools. The departure of most of those teachers from Moroccan public schools from 1977 to 1979 coincided with the introduction of Arabic language in Moroccan schools. In the Barcelona Declaration for Euro-Mediterranean Collaboration the partner countries, including both France and Morocco, promised to promote cultural and linguistic exchange between participating countries, respecting each partners' cultural identity, and to establish a sustainable policy for cultural and education programs. Under the new agreement of Morocco-European Union Association in February 1996, cultural

[24] See http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=198&IF_Language=fra

cooperation is mentioned, but not as explicitly as in the Barcelona Declaration. Educational activities worth mentioning here include the Arabic language teaching programs financed by the Moroccan state. In 1997/1998, 53,685 Moroccan children were able to follow ELCO classes (*Enseignement de la langue et de la culture de l'origine*) offered by 433 Moroccan teachers and financed by the Moroccan state.

Apart from offering language courses for schoolchildren, associations of Moroccans in France have a strong educational tradition. The activities of these associations have ranged from offering cultural training on Moroccan or Arab Islamic culture, and education against racism and islamophobia. They also offer tutoring for newly arrived Moroccan and other foreign students to help them to adapt to the French university system.

In our research, higher education received more attention than other aspects of the educational domain. There are several reasons for this. Because a significant number of respondents had a university degree,[25] a student visa had been one of the most common types of entry visa to enter France. Among those Moroccan students interviewed by the Moroccan research team as returnee migrants, nearly half had initially moved to France for studies. As noted by Gérard (2008: 13), for Moroccan students France still is an important place, and going to France for studies is perceived as an integral part of the academic career. In Morocco, the French education system is, according to the French embassy in Morocco,[26] more present than elsewhere in the world. This concerns all levels of schooling. Moreover, the influence of French in the socialization process of Moroccans is not limited to formal schooling: francophone media, French music, literature, fashion, and tourism have highlighted the value of France as a country of progress in the eyes of Moroccans (Laffort 2009: 93–95).

It is worth noting that the profile of Moroccan high school students in France has changed considerably during the few past decades. Whereas the post-independence student migrants largely belonged to the elite layer of Moroccan society, since the 1980s the profiles have diversified and a degree from a French university has become an accessible dream for a wider section of the population.[27] Although the education landscape in Morocco has changed in recent decades, with the creation of many institutions of higher education covering all fields of learning, there remains the fact that a French degree is still a definite asset in Morocco. This explains why most Moroccans who can afford it hope to register their children in the French school or university. Some parents are willing to make considerable financial sacrifices to ensure that their children could 1 day gain easier access to the job market. In Morocco, there seem to be promising openings for fresh graduates. After graduation, some applied for employment in Morocco and got an offer even while they

[25] In our data, all the respondents had attended at least secondary level education and had often continued to higher education.

[26] See http: www.ambafrance.ma-org/efmaroc/lycee/index.php

[27] Currently, the United States and Canada have become increasingly popular destinations for the children of the wealthier social classes (Laffort 2009: 85).

were still in France. Moroccan graduates also get information from each other about the employment prospects in Morocco and compare the benefits.

International connections of educational institutions seemed to play an important role in channeling student migration. Several Moroccan respondents who studied in France said that they came to France through bilateral agreements between universities or through transnational study programs.

> I received a scholarship from the Moroccan government, for me that represented a noble and efficient way of studying abroad. It was precisely the idea of going abroad: not necessarily to France. To Europe or to North America—France for its linguistic closeness and also because the Moroccan education system is based on the French model, that's why most people came to France. (Samir, 46 years old, arrived in France as a student)

Highly educated migrants are the target group of the new French migration policy. The current immigration policy follows the general global trend, which emphasizes the educational background of immigrants with a tendency to favor highly skilled and highly educated migrants. In France, this is reflected in the emphasis of *immigration choisi* as opposed to *l'immigration subie*, following the global trends of the knowledge economy, knowledge and innovation being at the top of the EUs Lisbon strategy for growth, and scientific and student mobility, both within Member States and from outside the EU.

Nevertheless, several recent Moroccan graduates complained about difficulties in finding their place in the French employment market, and those who found employment emphasized that they had been "very lucky." Most often the way to employment went through either formal networks (institutional connections between schools and enterprises) or informal networks (through friends or relatives). It was also found that, among all respondents, the Moroccan students in French higher education were those who had most to complain about: housing conditions and discrimination in finding funding, differences in academic practices, cost of living, difficulties in finding employment, and even unpaid internships.

3.9 Migration and Social Mobility

Transnational migration nearly always involves some changes in one's social status. When migrating to another country, individuals need to renegotiate their status in the new host society, but their status also changes in the sending society: they become migrants in the eyes of those who stayed behind. For Moroccans, becoming a legal migrant, i.e., obtaining a visa, is to a large extent a positively perceived issue, suggesting possibilities for social mobility. When a person's status as a migrant is confirmed by a successful visa application, this is sometimes celebrated in the migrant's family with special meals typically used for religious celebrations, for instance cooking a festive meal of méchoui, a lamb roast.

Among Moroccans, the image of France as a source of wealth as discussed previously is today less based on observation of the lifestyle of the French living in Morocco, because the community is considerably smaller than some decades ago.

Apart from media images, perhaps the most important ambassadors of the "French way of life" are the migrants themselves. The return of migrants for the holiday season has traditionally involved the distribution of presents supposed to reflect a migrant's wealth and success abroad. When the migrants return to their home country, their display of consumer goods and way of life (not accessible to those who stayed) may provoke envy but also encourage others to leave, too. Loubna, a 32-year-old female migrant who first moved to Germany as an undocumented migrant and later on to France in 1999 with her French–Moroccan spouse, admitted that already at a young age, she admired immigrants living in France and used to observe them when they returned to Morocco for their summer holidays.

> When I saw all these girls, well dressed with nice make-up, who spoke French to each other, I also wanted to leave and become an immigrant. It was a dream for me.

However, if in the past migration facilitated one's upward social mobility by means of increased consumer power and being able to afford houses, cars, and other objects that were not accessible for those who stayed, in today's increasingly interconnected world, migrants' social position is a much more complex issue. For the blue-collar migrants of the 1960s and 1970s, the hard work in harsh living conditions in France was justified by the hope of achieving better social status for oneself and for one's family in the country of origin. Today, as migrants' sociocultural profiles are more diversified, the more educated migrants critically observe labor migrants' attempts toward upward social mobility.

> There are those who come back [to Morocco] in July and who we call "Tati Migrants." It means those who arrive in cars and who have Tati shopping bags. I've met those people and I wouldn't believe my eyes. I don't want to generalize but those are the people I met when I was in the village and therefore I met people who live abroad but come over for the summer season. Those people have a very schizophrenic relationship with France. Because when they are in France they clean in the subway and all that, but when they are in Morocco they tell something different. Their discourse is not in phase with their lived experiences. Those are people who do not go to the theater; they don't go to the cinema or to see exhibitions. Because why spend money on unnecessary things? All the money has to be sent to Morocco. That is a sign of upward social mobility. (Amine, male, Moroccan)

This interview sample demonstrates a 35-year-old academically educated migrant's vision of "traditional" blue-collar migrants who, as he says, are commonly called "Tati"[28] migrants. For him, the remittance-sending low skilled migrants who save money to buy property in Morocco lack cultural capital (they come from villages, do not care about cultural activities, do not buy designer labels, etc.). Yet the respondent shows that he recognizes their importance to Morocco and to those people who are dependent on the remittances by admitting later on (not without irony) that, "we would all like to be like them." Another point that comes out in Amine's quote is how one's social status is not constructed locally but within a transnational space.

[28] Tati is a French department store known for its cheap prices.

For the older generations, living and working in France was considered to be a temporary phase; they were only aiming to accomplish the objective of saving enough money to buy property in Morocco. Therefore, a migrant's professional success or lifestyle in France had very little importance and most of those who stayed in Morocco had only little knowledge about migrants' living conditions in France. Rather, the economic and social success of migrants was estimated by the wealth displayed during the regular visits. Amine raises this issue of contradiction in his interview: a migrant who works in menial work in France but hides the fact in Morocco by telling something different to the family. It is not known how the situation will change when information flows more frequently across the borders and the diasporic communities will become larger. But our data clearly suggest that the bigger the migrant community is, the more important become the distinctions between migrants belonging to different social classes.

In fact, for educated middle class Moroccan migrants, a life in the Franco-Moroccan transnational space may offer a double challenge: they are not on the margins of the host society, and their social networks most often include many host nationals: colleagues, classmates, and so on. They need to negotiate their social position in *both* societies, whereas the "old" generation of migrants was mainly concerned with their society of origin. For example, Yasmina, a 29-year-old Moroccan engineer confessed how hard it is to live in Paris.

> You have to have everything: a nice apartment, fashionable clothes, and travel frequently abroad….

She did not send remittances, but every now and then she sent presents to her family members in Morocco. She was also saving money to invest 1 day in her home country. Yet there was no question of saving on appearances: former classmates from Morocco may show up at any time in Paris. Yasmina was surprised how often in Paris she met someone who had been studying with her in Morocco.

> It's a bit surprising in a capital city of 14 million people. But it means that we all live more or less in the same neighborhood and move in the same circles. We are either in Opéra, Champs-Elysees or in La Défense. Sometimes I recognize faces in the bus although I don't know their names.

For French residents in Morocco there seemed to be a short-cut available to social positions they could not have imagined in France. Many French respondents said that their Moroccan employers trust them and give them responsibilities that they would never have had in France, or at least not so quickly. Several interviewees said that to be French opens doors in Morocco that would have remained closed to them in France.

> I could do things that are almost impossible to do in France. I even obtained royal sponsorship (from His Majesty) to organize a major sailing event, for example. (Béatrice, born in Morocco)

Likewise, for Moroccans in France migration was generally motivated by prospects of upward social mobility. Still, this did not necessarily mean that people leave

from poor conditions. In fact, several respondents had a relatively stable life situation in Morocco. As Sihame, a Moroccan female respondent said,

> I told myself that since I have a stable professional situation in Morocco, if I will go to France it's not going to be to regress but to progress, to be useful for myself and my family. My travels to this country have allowed me to discover another culture, another way of life, another way of working and freedom to act. (Sihame, female, Moroccan living in France)

This was even more true for the French in Morocco: the departure was expected to bring some kind of improvement in life, but it was not solely explained by upward social mobility in terms of income or social class. Rather it could be related to a willingness to "be somebody" as one French respondent put it. The respondents of Moroccan origin particularly emphasized the role of education as a promoter of upward social mobility. Several respondents mentioned that a university degree was an objective set by their parents; and not just any degree, but preferably one in the field that was considered to offer the best career prospects. A qualification obtained in France was valued, but many students also dreamt about studies in the USA or Canada. Laffort (2009: 85) has observed the increased popularity of the United States as a destination for upper classes, whereas studying in France has become democratized. Nevertheless, for most respondents France seemed to remain the logical or "natural" choice, for geographical proximity, familiarity of language, and existing connections.

3.10 Transformation of Gender Roles

Particularly for Moroccans, migration implies reconfiguration of gender roles and profound changes in the matrimonial institution. This is not to say that other elements do not affect the changes in gender roles: for example, the reform of the Moroccan Family Code in 2003 is an important development that has brought, at least on paper, significant changes to women's position in Morocco (Virkama 2009). Perhaps the most important gender-related legal reform in recent years, thanks to the reform of the nationality Code in 2007, has been the law that allows Moroccan women to pass their nationality on to their children, whereas in the past the nationality was inherited through the father.

The feminization of migration has been observed by many scholars concerned with migrants from Maghreb countries to Europe. Moroccan women migrate independently and not only through family reunification, as was most often the case in 1960s and 1970s (Harrami and Mahdi 2008: 264). In our data, the majority of respondents were male, but the narratives of female respondents were often more rich in detail and offered interesting insights into different sociocultural transformations taking place within transnational settings. Most of the Moroccan women interviewed for this study said that they had migrated on their own initiative, sometimes working hard to achieve what they wanted in life.

For Moroccans, migration impacts the search for a suitable spouse. Traditionally, the demand for ethnic and religious endogamy lies heavily upon women. Today, the average age of marriage has risen in Morocco, partly because of the emigration of young men. Emigrant men are preferred marital partners for many young women and emigrant women are envied by those who stay in the source country (Harrami and Mahdi 2008: 275). Living abroad seems to widen the scope of potential partners for Moroccan women, and among our respondents some had ethnic French partners. The importance of a shared Islamic background was mentioned as a criterion by some, whereas ethnic background seemed to be slightly less important. Changes in attitudes toward spouses of foreign origin seem to take place slowly. In some cases, mixed marriages bring to the surface the colonial power relations as in the case of the Franco–Moroccan-Algerian Samira, herself married to a Frenchman, who remembers her aunt's decision to marry a non-Muslim, foreign man:

> The family in Algeria had turned their back on her—you have to see the things in the context of that time period, the war in Algeria and uncles who have been fighting in that war, so it was quite difficult for her. So she had decided to leave and live elsewhere.

Interestingly, even if for Muslim men there is no religious obstacle to marrying a woman of Christian background, and in fact many of our married respondents had done so, being a migrant seemed to have a rather hindering effect. This is because the marriage migration from North Africa to Europe is often perceived as a covert form of undocumented migration. For fear of being stigmatized, several male respondents mentioned that marrying a woman with French nationality was problematic because they did not want to appear opportunists by seeking nationality through marriage.

Whereas Moroccan male respondents often emphasized political and cultural freedom in France, female respondents particularly mentioned that living abroad meant increased personal freedom. For one young Moroccan female respondent, the first years in Europe were a discovery of personal freedom she was not used to in Morocco. "It was great for me, I had lots of fun, I went out and nobody said anything. Those were great years." Samira, a Moroccan-Algerian returnee migrant married to a Frenchman, described moving abroad as a strategy to escape from the narrow box reserved for girls in Morocco, "…where girls are expected to sit and wait for the prince charming—submission; let's put it the way it is: an education to be submissive." Meryem, 46 years old, came to Paris when she was in her early twenties and moved in with her future husband before they got married, years later. In Morocco, because of the Islamic legislation, the couple would have had to be married to share the same roof.

3.11 Conclusion and Discussion

Thus, how was Franco-Moroccan transnational space narrated in the interviews? The respondents reported that in general they maintained intensive cross-border ties. In this respect, our findings support those of earlier studies conducted on the

Moroccan diaspora in Europe highlighting the fairly active participation in the original home country (Fibbi and D'Amato 2008; Daoud 2011). The transnational ties are not only explained by individual or small group decisions, but are rooted in the colonial and migration history of the countries. Therefore it is not surprising that the migrants' narratives echo the colonial history, although differently at each end of the migration axis. Narrating one's own migration history also means locating oneself in the larger social category of migrants and making either a distinction from or connection with the earlier generation of migrants.

Motivations to migrate seemed to be diverse. It is clear that because a migration project sometimes requires significant financial investment, the departure is often motivated by perspectives of an economically better life. However, a desire for "somewhere else" also came up as an important motivation for departure. Whereas the principal motivation among the French migrants was the search for something intangible encapsulated in the phrase "quality of life," for Moroccans, this desire for "somewhere else" was usually linked with the search for social and economic improvement. Cultural poverty was also mentioned by some respondents. The desire for departure was often embedded in specific events in individual life courses. The search for a better quality of life and or a strong desire for somewhere else were juxtaposed in many stories with a feeling of weariness owing to the social, economic, and political climate in the sending country.

It was found that the migratory plans of Moroccans were often supported by existing transnational networks in Morocco and France. However, in their narratives, the respondents often emphasized individual decision-making processes, and for the new generations, particularly students, the importance of ethnic networks seems to diminish in favor of other types of supporting actors, either professional or institutional. The migratory plans among the French respondents seem to be more individualistic and personal. Premigratory experiences significantly influence their transnational trajectories. This was the case among Moroccans too. Many respondents had previous experiences of traveling or living in another country. For Moroccans, a family history of international or internal migration was an important factor. The colonial history came up in many narratives, explaining why several migration projects were directly connected with historical elements or family memories. This concerned for example a Frenchman whose parents had lived in Morocco under the French protectorate, or a Moroccan whose grandfather was a circular labor migrant, "the one who built France."

Symbolic boundaries were constructed in the migrants' narratives. The vast majority of the French respondents regarded themselves as French without mentioning any affiliation to Morocco. Many of them reported being outsiders in Moroccan society, whereas Moroccan narratives displayed a wider variety of possible identities. Participation in protests and demonstrations was mentioned, too, as well as utilizing virtual social platforms such as Facebook or YouTube to spread political material. Among Moroccans, the practical advantages (freedom of movement, access to certain professions, etc.) of holding a French passport were emphasized, more than associating the nationality with certain values or identity. Conversely, the French living in Morocco did not regard Moroccan naturalization as being useful for them. The low

number of naturalizations among French people can partly be explained by restrictive Moroccan laws, in spite of the recent reform of the Code of Nationality.

Migrants' associations in France have traditionally played a vital role in informing migrants about their rights. The associations have their roots in the political and trade union activism of the 1960s and 1970s. This tradition was still reflected in the respondents' associative activities, although the younger generations of Moroccans seemed to have more interest in professional or hobby clubs than in politically oriented associations.

Most respondents were actively working and represented a variety of professions, yet there appeared to be differences in the status of nationality in the labor market in Morocco and France. Whereas the French had the advantage of being favored for their nationality in Morocco, many Moroccans in France felt that their nationality could be a cause for discrimination. Although the French enjoyed fiscal advantages in Morocco because of the variety of profiles of French residents in the country, it cannot be said that they all had a privileged economic position. For many Moroccans returning to Morocco, the prospects of finding steady employment and better salary were an important motivation to move back. In some cases, cross-border professional activities were used as a strategy to deal with a precarious work situation, and for some, cultural capital acquired during the migration process was converted into economic capital, for example by introducing new, innovative business ideas. In general, professional transnational ties were important, even crucial, for many respondents.

Small scale enterprises and investments were considered an important economic strategy, particularly among Moroccan respondents. As expected, Moroccans in France were active in financing various projects in Morocco and in sending remittances. However, we found that financial and material remittances move both ways, and particularly students regularly received financial assistance from Morocco. The status and image of objects purchased in France and those purchased in Morocco were not the same: French objects were associated with quality, modernity, and the latest technology or fashion, whereas objects purchased in Morocco reflected craftsmanship and exotisized authenticity.

The migration profiles of individuals interviewed in France and Morocco were notably different in terms of the conventional idea of migration as a social mobility strategy determined by economic rationale. For both French in Morocco and Moroccans in France, the possibility to improve one's socioeconomic standing was an important factor, but it does not alone explain the decision to migrate. The considerable differences in sending and receiving contexts, Morocco and France, for example with regard to the migration history, immigration policies, religions, and social status of migrants, naturally have an impact on how the migration experience is narrated.

The French education system was generally valued more highly than the Moroccan one, and university studies and working experience from France were considered as a way to upward social mobility in Morocco. Because most of the respondents were educated and had a wide knowledge of colonial and migration history, in many interview situations, the respondents constructed their own individual migration

narratives by contesting or echoing other possible narratives of migration. The Moroccan migrants acknowledged the importance of labor migration in France, but simultaneously wanted to mark a symbolic departure from this traditional form of migration, for example by putting forward their identity as students, scholars, or artists.

Transnational connections between Moroccan and French educational institutions promote and channel migration between the countries. Universities offer exchange programs and joint degrees, some of the Moroccan students interviewed had started their French curricula in Morocco. The Moroccan state is also engaged in offering Arabic teaching for children of Arabic speaking families in France and provides funding for this. In Morocco, French schools have traditionally been very much present and French education is highly appreciated and sought after by parents. University studies in France are a motivating factor for many migrants. Consequently, the student migration is an important type of migration channel in the Franco–Moroccan space. Moving to France as a student was perceived as an honorable way to migrate.

Migration in general was often referred to as a valuable learning experience. It was said that an adaptation process to the new country helps to open up to unknown practices and ways of thinking. As a result, some respondents claimed they had become bicultural, capable of operating successfully in France and Morocco. In transnational settings, families need to carefully consider where to educate their children. In some cases, this means sacrifices because family members need to live in different countries: a Moroccan returnee migrant woman said that her children stayed in France with their father because of their primary education, whereas the mother took up a job opportunity in Morocco. For many respondents, a firm belief in the superiority of the French education system was present in their narratives. This applied to all educational levels: primary and secondary education in French education institutions in Morocco and tertiary education in France, either at the state universities (*faculté*) or prestigious schools (*grandes écoles*). As expected, familiarity with the French language and socialization through French schooling were factors that motivated migration to France.

For Moroccans, the most common strategy seemed to be to get their diploma and first work experience in France, then return to Morocco for better employment prospects: higher salaries, a more stable professional position, a more socially prestigious profession, or just to find employment in general if in France it seemed difficult. The French in Morocco, however, most of whom had moved for other than professional reasons, felt that it was not so much the degrees they possessed but merely the fact of "being French" that opened up career prospects—even some that they could not have accessed in France.

Transnational mobility and negotiations between several reference spaces have an impact on the definition and construction of a sense of home. More than half of the participants considered themselves at home in both countries. Our empirical data prevent us from extolling what Riccio (2006) calls "a nomadic version of the world" or generalizing the search for a sense of plural homes. Indeed, home is sometimes intrinsically linked with the homeland and sometimes with the idea of nation. The way in which migrants were perceived by the receiving society influenced

their feelings of home. There was a significant contrast between the discriminating situations experienced by some Moroccans in France and the surprise, even embarrassment, of some French people facing positive stereotyping and recognition in Morocco. Such a contrast shows the different modes of negotiation of foreign presence and the way symbolic dominating relations are internalized in the Franco–Moroccan space.

In today's world, possible connections with some familiar sociocultural references enable migrants to feel at home even outside their homeland. The geographic proximity of the countries, and the low cost and speed of means of communication and transport greatly help to maintain close links in the Franco–Moroccan space. Yet these objective factors are not enough to explain the vitality of transnational links: emotional ties are also considered important factors as they help reduce the distance by enabling these people to feel not too far away from home.

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Chapter 4
Varying Transnational and Multicultural Activities in the Turkish–German Migration Context

Jürgen Gerdes, Eveline Reisenauer, and Deniz Sert

4.1 Introduction

The Turkish–German case is a fertile area for the study of border-crossing relationships and practices, because migration and transnational linkages across Turkish and German boundaries entail manifold political, economic, sociocultural, and educational implications. Moreover, Turkish migrants in Germany constitute the largest Turkish migrant group in Europe. This chapter presents findings of qualitative interviews from the TRANS-NET project conducted with Turkish–German migrants and their significant others in both countries. To give a differentiated picture of the complex processes of transnationalization, we generated a typology of transnational and multicultural activities in the political, economic, sociocultural, and educational domains during the course of our empirical analysis. This typology illustrates the great variety of migrants' transnational practices, as well as how these activities and orientations are related to multiculturalism.

First this chapter gives an overview of the historical background on migration in Turkey and Germany. Some general information about migration movements and migration policies in Turkey and Germany are presented. Next it introduces the methods and data used for the Turkish–German part of the TRANS-NET project. It describes how the qualitative interviews in Turkey and Germany were conducted and reports on the personal characteristics of the interviewees. Furthermore, a typology of transnational practices is empirically constructed to capture the intensity and

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other facets of transnational contacts, activities, and orientations. Later the findings in the Turkish–German case are presented on the basis of this typology of transnational and multicultural practices in political, economic, sociocultural, and educational domains. The chapter closes with concluding remarks.

4.2 Historical Background

Migration patterns between Turkey and Germany can be traced to five overlapping periods: During 1923–1960, both Germany and Turkey faced what can be called co-ethnic immigration of people from German and Turkish descent, respectively. For Turkey, these were the years of a grand project of creating a Turkish nation-state, which had begun with the founding of the Republic in 1923. The phenomenon of migration was a large part of these state and nation-building processes as two parallel international migratory movements were taking place: the mass departure of non-Muslim populations to their own motherlands, for example, Greeks moving to Greece, and the influx of Turkish Muslim populations that had migrated during the Ottoman Empire and were left outside of the borders of the young republic (İçduygu and Sirkeci 1999; İçduygu 2007). Thus, these initial years witnessed the homogenization of the population within the borders of the new republic into Turkish-Muslims.

Within the same period, after World War II, the West German state witnessed an influx of displaced persons and so-called *Aussiedler* fleeing persecution in Soviet bloc countries, which amounted to around 12 million people between 1945 and 1955 (Geddes 2003: 80). This immigration of re-settlers of German origin from East European countries continued during the Cold War, when it also had an important ideological function, although it was limited to moderate numbers because of strong exit restrictions in the Soviet bloc states. The extensive immigration of re-settlers was possible, because the newly founded West German state accepted a historical responsibility for unconditionally admitting people of German descent, who were deemed to be victims of persecution, forced resettlement, and expulsion during and after Nazi rule because of their ethnic German origin in several East European states.

During the period 1955–1975, migration between Turkey and Germany was very much defined by the economic considerations of the two nation-states, which resulted in the signing of so-called *guest worker* agreements. On the German side, during the very successful economic restructuring of Germany, known as the *economic miracle,* the need for additional labor, especially in agricultural and industrial sectors, became obvious. Until 1955, German re-settlers filled labor market gaps, but thereafter their numbers were insufficient for maintaining the required level of economic growth. Therefore, between 1955 and 1968, Germany signed several guest worker recruitment agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia (Martin 2004: 225). The recruitment of guest workers was initially regarded primarily as an economic issue to be handled predominantly

within the usual German corporatist institutions; that is, by the Federal Labour Office in collaboration with the employer organizations and trade unions.

On the Turkish side, although the Western European labor market had already started to draw a number of workers from the labor pool in Turkey in the 1950s, the size of this frontier movement was small, sporadic, and relatively unknown because workers often migrated illegally, owing to difficulties in obtaining passports and visas (Abadan-Unat 1976; Lieberman and Gitmez 1979). Only after the new constitution of 1961, when the First Five-Year Development Plan (1962–1967) in Turkey identified the "export of surplus labour power" as an aspect of development policy productive of a return flow of remittances and a reduction in unemployment, did a structurally organized emigration from Turkey become possible. Accordingly, Turkey first signed a bilateral labor recruitment agreement with West Germany in 1961, followed by agreements with Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Sweden, and Australia. Less comprehensive agreements were also signed with the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway (Erhard 1994). In this second period, the assumption that these guest workers would finally return home was initially shared on all sides, namely by the German state, the Turkish state, and the immigrants themselves (Joppke 1999: 65).

However, in the following period of 1975–1980, a new form migration from Turkey to Germany emerged: the migration of family members of the guest workers. Family migration of Turks to Germany increased dramatically after Germany decided to stop foreign recruitment in 1973 because of a second economic recession caused by the oil price crisis and corresponding rising rates of unemployment. Ironically, what was intended to be a tighter immigration control measure led to additional immigration in the name of family unification. Because a policy of forced repatriation was ultimately not a serious political option and the guest workers feared that they would not be permitted to return if they left Germany, many decided to stay and, moreover, to unify with their families as far as that was legally possible. Hence, the foreign population of West Germany grew from a little less than 4 million in 1973 to nearly 4.5 million in 1980. At that time, the largest group of non-Germans in Germany was people of Turkish origin; by 1980, 33% were Turks.

During the same period, emigration from Turkey continued in other directions, because another labor market had formed in the oil exporting countries of the Middle East and North Africa. As stated by Appleyard (1995), after 1973, when oil prices rose dramatically, thus increasing the income of oil-exporting Arab states with very small populations, the demand for labor led to large flows of contract workers to these Arab states from developing countries, such as Turkey.

In the period 1975–1990, Germany and Turkey engaged in intense refugee movements. In this period, Germany, which initially had the most generous asylum law in the Western world, began to face increasing numbers of asylum applications. During the 1970s, many Turkish citizens sought asylum in Western Europe as a result of Turkey's severe left–right divisions, which led to the intervention of the Turkish military in civilian politics in 1980. The same year, Germany witnessed about 110,000 asylum applications and Turks accounted for more than half of these. In the follow-

ing decades, clashes with the Kurdish separatist movement of the PKK = Kurdistan Workers' Party resulted in further asylum applications from Turkey to Germany.

At the same time, Turkey began its transformation from being a country of emigration to one of immigration and transit. In 1979, the first wave of migrants to Turkey arrived from Iran after the regime change in the latter country. For most Iranian migrants, Turkey was a temporary destination on the way to Europe or North America (İçduygu 2004: 90). However, after starting with Iran, following the Iran–Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the latest turmoil in Iraq, Turkey has become a major country of asylum (İçduygu 2004: 90, 2006: 16). Another group of migrants who used Turkey as a means of achieving safety from political persecution are the Bulgarian Turks, who came to Turkey in masses in 1989 (Şen 2005; Karakılıç 2007).

In the period 1990–2010, we observe that both Germany and Turkey are trying to adapt to their new positions in the migratory world scene. On the German side, the official government position that Germany is not and should not be a country of immigration was dominant until the late 1990s. Despite significant amounts of immigration and the fact that what was initially thought of as temporary labor immigration in the 1960s developed into settlement from the 1970s onward, official immigration and immigrant integration policies at the federal level were absent (Bade and Bommes 2000; Geddes 2003; Martin 2004). This first changed with the enactment of a new Nationality Law in 2000 and a comprehensive Immigration Law in 2005. The 2000 Nationality Law accepted the immigrations of the past by substantively easing the conditions for citizenship acquisition for immigrants and their descendants who had already resided in Germany for many years. Furthermore, the 2005 Immigration Law allowed for additional regular immigration as well as defined the integration of immigrants as a responsibility of the state (Groß 2006).

On the Turkish side, besides the refugee movements mentioned, since the fall of the Berlin Wall there have also been economically motivated migrants coming to Turkey from the former Soviet Republics, and more recently, economic immigrants to Turkey have also come from Western Europe. The change from being a country of origin to one of destination and transit put Turkey in a rather awkward position in terms of its own migration policies. Turkey found itself the target of many criticisms that it had directed toward other countries, especially Germany, where there are large groups of Turkish immigrants. To illustrate, like Germany, Turkey is quite unwilling to accept being an immigrant country. It was only under the pressure of European Union (EU) accession negotiations that the necessary policies have begun to take effect. Still, there are many legal limitations to immigrants' political and social integration into Turkish society at large (Kaiser 2007).

Overall, by the end of 2010, there were five transformations of migration regimes involving Turkey and Germany. First, although the official labor movement from Turkey to Germany decreased, migration did not end, but took other forms, such as family reunion, refugee movement, and clandestine labor migration (Böcker 1995; İçduygu 1996). Second, new directions were added to Turkish emigration beginning with the oil-rich MENA = Middle East and North African countries, and continuing with migration to the countries of the former USSR. In a period when a downturn of migratory flows to the labor-receiving Arab countries began during the Gulf Crisis,

the migratory movement to the countries of the former USSR became a remedy for emigration pressures in Turkey (Gökdere 1994). Third, both Germany and Turkey engage in intense movements of asylum seekers, the former being a destination, the latter being a source, transit, *and* destination country. Fourth, Turkey's changing status did not only entail asylum seekers, but the country has also become a destination and transit country for economic migrants. Thus, both countries found themselves in the difficult position of regulating the different migratory flows to which they have been subject. Although Germany has only recently begun to admit its status as a country of immigration, Turkey is under pressure to acknowledge this status. Fifth, in the beginning of the 2000s, Germany witnessed extensive political, public, and academic debates about a comprehensive immigration and integration policy in the context of increasing economic globalization and competition among knowledge-based national economies. In a climate of rising expectations concerning economic growth owing to a boom in the so-called New Economy of information and communication technology sectors, the concept that Germany should join the "race for talent" (Shachar 2006) and canvass for highly skilled migrants gained importance. Since then, public discourses as well as policies in Germany changed significantly, favoring highly skilled immigrants, but restricting access for immigrants who are deemed costly. This also changed the dominant mode of political and public justification of Germany's immigration policy. Although at the beginning of the 1990s, migration policy measures were justified as adjusting and balancing the different interests of migrants, on the one hand, and the state, on the other (Davy and Cinar 2001), since then, immigration rules as well as integration policies are increasingly related to what is deemed to serve the national interest (Gerdes 2010).

4.3 Methods, Data, and a Typology of Transnational Activities

4.3.1 Research Methods

During the semistructured interviews, we addressed experiences and views of transnational activities on an individual level. In all the countries under study, the main topics and the main questions for the country-specific interviews were largely the same. However, the selection of the respondents varied.

In the case of *Turkey,* although the respondents were selected through snowball sampling as in other cases, because of the changing nature of migration in Turkey (from being a country of emigration to becoming a country of transit and immigration), we chose to focus on three distinct groups of respondents: (1) Return migrants: Those who worked, studied, and/or lived in Germany for more than a year, but are currently residing in Turkey. This category also included those who were born in Germany but are currently living in Turkey; that is, the so-called second-generation migrants. (2) Relatives and friends: This includes relatives and/or friends in Turkey

of those migrants still residing in Germany. The assumption here was to collect information on the migrants and observe whether and how they were maintaining their ties with the home country. (3) Ethnic Germans: Germans living, working, and/or studying in Turkey.

In the case of *Germany,* interviews were conducted with (1) Turkish citizens living in Germany, (2) German citizens who were once Turkish citizens, and (3) German citizens with at least one (former) Turkish citizen as parent. Taken together, the German survey includes people with a "Turkish migration background" as they are called, who make up the largest group of immigrants in Germany. The interviewees were recruited through gatekeepers, such as associations (operating especially in the political, economic, sociocultural, and educational domains), Internet platforms, but also through the social networks of the interviewers. After the first interviews, snowball sampling was also used to recruit additional respondents.

Furthermore, life-course interviews were conducted using the aforementioned methodology and again in the categories mentioned for the two countries. Although the initial aim was to choose interesting cases from the semistructured interviews for follow-up interviews, this methodology proved ineffective. Many of the respondents for the semistructured interviews rejected our requests for a second interview based on the claim that they did not have any further information to share. Thus, we had to recruit new respondents for the life-course interviews.

4.3.2 Personal Characteristics of the Interviewees in the Turkish–German Case

Because of the diversity of the subject, both in Turkey and Germany, a predefined sampling plan was not suitable. Rather, the aim was to select different cases with a wide variation (Seipel and Rieker 2003: 110). Thus, we looked for interviewees who were diverse concerning their personal characteristics, such as gender, age, education, marital status, or place of residence. We also considered diversity concerning the type of migration. Both in Germany and Turkey the cases include former guest workers, labor migrants, international students, refugees, marriage migrants, and family reunification migrants. The diversity of interviewees ensures the consideration of combinations of characteristics, but also of contrasts despite the commonalities of migration and transnationality.

The gender distribution of our interviews was balanced, with 34 female and 39 male respondents in Germany, and 56 female and 47 males in Turkey (Table 4.1). In the German context, 60% of the interviewees were between 30 and 50 years old, 18% were younger than 30 years old, and 22% were more than 50 years old. In Turkey, 52% of the interviewees were between 30 and 50 years old, 17% were younger than 30 years old, and 31% were more than 50 years old. In both cases, more than half of the interviewees were married. Migrants' education levels varied from primary school to PhD degrees. As far as their current occupation, 55 interviewees in Germany and 53 in Turkey indicated they were employed; the number of retirees and housewives was much higher in Turkey. In Germany, the place of birth of 51 out

Table 4.1 Data on respondents in Germany and Turkey

		Germany	Turkey
Number of interviews		73	103
Gender	Female	34	56
	Male	39	47
Year of birth	1920–1929	0	1
	1930–1939	2	7
	1940–1949	4	24
	1950–1959	10	16
	1960–1969	17	15
	1970–1979	27	22
	1980–1989	10	17
	1990–1999	3	1
Place of birth	Turkey	51	60
	Germany	19	40
	Others	3	3
Marital status	Single	27	27
	Married	40	62
	Divorced	6	12
	Widowed	0	2
Number of children	0	30	31
	1	8	18
	2	25	17
	3	5	25
	4	4	6
	5	1	3
	7	0	3
Education (last qualification)	None	0	3
	Primary school	5	22
	Middle school[a]	20	5
	High school	18	32
	University degree	30	41
Current employment	Employed	55	53
	Student	8	8
	Housewife	0	10
	Unemployed	5	3
	Retired	5	29
Citizenship status	Turkish	29	68
	German	30	16
	Dual citizenship	14	18
	N/A	0	1

[a]In the German case, this includes both Secondary General School (Hauptschule) and Intermediate School (Realschule)

of 73 interviewees was Turkey; 19 were born in Germany and three in other countries. In Turkey, the place of birth of 60 out of 103 interviewees was Turkey; 40 were born in Germany and three in other countries. Although 97 out of a total of 176 interviewees had Turkish citizenship, 46 had German and 32 had dual citizenship, with one person in Turkey not willing to share this information.

On the whole, the interviews are not representative either for Turkish migrants and children of Turkish migrants living in Germany, or for return migrants, relatives of migrants, and ethnic Germans in Turkey.[1] This chapter makes statements about the social reality of the 176 respondents in Turkey and Germany with the aim of providing a better understanding of typical patterns in people's transnational activities, relationships, and orientations.

4.3.3 A Typology of Transnational and Multicultural Activities

To get a solid overview of the empirical configuration of transnational activities for the respondents on the Turkish and the German side in our sample, we successively constructed a typology of different cross-border activities. As a first step, we followed the research design of the TRANS-NET project and distinguished between different domains of life, namely the political, economic, sociocultural, and educational, to which different transnational activities can be related. This distinction also goes hand in hand with common classifications of transnational spaces in the literature (Faist 2000; Portes 2003; Vertovec 2009). In a second step, we differentiated transnational from what we call multicultural activities. To get a comprehensive picture of migrants' activities in our sample, it proved useful to focus on the relationship between transnationalism and multiculturalism. In a third step, during the analysis, it became evident that the broadly defined concept of transnationalism has to be further refined to shed light on different degrees of transnational activities in the Turkish–German case. Thus, based on the data, we developed the categories of strong, moderate, and weak transnationalism in the four life domains we analyzed. Finally, our analysis of the Turkish–German sample resulted in a comprehensive typology of transnational and multicultural activities (Table 4.2).

4.3.3.1 Different Domains of Life

The differentiation of the various domains arises out of the assumption that there are distinct fields of action within different kinds of social systems. However, the distinction between political, economic, sociocultural, and educational domains is ideal-typical, which means that they are only mutually exclusive according to analytical criteria, but certainly do not occur in such purity in everyday life. In reality, interactions and identifications in the economic, sociocultural, political, and educational realms overlap.

[1] The most obvious example is that we did not have any access to closed communities of Islamic sects.

Table 4.2 Typology of transnational and multicultural activities in different domains

	Transnational activities			
	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Multicultural activities
Political	Membership and/or participation in nonresident state or transnational political associations or organizations; occasional or regular voting in another country	Communication and/or cooperation with parties and organizations abroad as a member of resident state based political actors or organizations; participation in migrant organizations regularly discussing political events in other countries	Interest in and observance of political events in other countries or special attention toward transnational political actors (e.g., Greenpeace, human rights associations) or institutions (e.g., on the EU level)	Political participation or exercising political functions in the context of events pertaining to issues related to migration, integration or intercultural relations within one's residence country
Economic	Transnational entrepreneurship or occupational functions based on cross-border exchange of goods, capital, services, know-how or cross-border deployment of workforce circular migration	Incidental occupational involvement with import/export of goods, capital, services, know-how or cross-border deployment of workforce concrete plans to establish a transnational enterprise, take a related employment, or migrate for work-related reasons	Use of certain transnational competencies or resources within occupational activities vague plans to establish a transnational enterprise or take a related employment	Ethnic entrepreneurship occupational use of ethnic competencies or opportunities without actual relations to other countries
Sociocultural Contacts	Regular and intensive private cross-border contacts (communication and visits), because several significant others live abroad	Less intensive but continuous private cross-border contacts (communication and visits), because few significant others live abroad	Sporadic private cross-border contacts (communication and visits), whereas all significant others live in one's resident state	Continuous interethnic private contacts within the resident country

(continued)

Table 4.2 (continued)

	Transnational activities			
	Strong	Moderate	Weak	Multicultural activities
Sociocultural social engagement	Membership and participation in a nonresident state or transnational associations, organizations or networks continuous participation in organized forms of cross-border help and support	Occasional participation in organizations abroad, transnational networks or migrant organizations cooperating regularly with organizations in other countries continuous informal activities of cross-border help and support (including transnational family care)	Concrete plans to participate in organizations abroad or transnational networks; participation in migrant organizations cooperating occasionally with organizations in other countries sporadic informal activities of cross-border help and support (including transnational family care)	Initiatives (individually or within associations or organizations) of support of migrant integration and interethnic relations within one's resident state (including family care)
Sociocultural identity	Self-description of a binational Turkish–German identity, or of a European or cosmopolitan belonging, or of one beyond ethnic and national identifications (e.g., class, political ideology, biregional, bilocal)	Discrepancy between self-description of identity and long-term residence or future migration (or return) plans	Concomitance of transnational contacts and a commitment to a life perspective in one's resident state	Self-description of a bicultural identity without actual relations to other countries; commitment to a life perspective in one's resident state
Educational	Strong transnational impacts on educational careers: correspondence or contradiction of migration-related socialization processes, attendance at educational institutions in different countries, and educational ambitions	Attendance at educational institutions in different countries without corresponding explicit educational ambitions targeted acquisition or successive unlearning of particular transnational competencies as a consequence of migration-related socialization experiences	Maintenance and transmission of knowledge and competencies suitable for border-crossing contacts, communication and activities without explicit educational ambitions and primarily without actual use outside family relations	Advancement of bi- and multilingual and cultural competencies in the context of increasing factual pluralism and diversity within one's resident state

We analyzed and categorized respective typical interactions within the different social domains according to essential concepts usually applied in social theory and the social sciences in each of these spheres. Thus, in the political sphere, political interest, attention to political events, membership in political organizations and several kinds of political participation are relevant concepts. In the economic domain the focus is on the production and exchange of goods, capital, services, and know-how and the deployment of manpower and personnel. Within the sociocultural sphere, social contacts, communication, family relations, identity, and a personal sense of belonging are important aspects. Finally, in the educational domain, socialization experiences, attendance at educational institutions, acquired knowledge and competencies, and educational ambitions and career plans are the main elements considered. In all of these different social domains the activities and orientations of migrants can more or less cross the borders of their resident nation-states.

4.3.3.2 Transnational and Multicultural Activities

Concerning geographical dimensions, our research data show that it is especially important to distinguish in principle between, on the one hand, intercultural and interethnic activities that take place in the migrants' resident state territory, and on the other hand, contacts, activities, and orientations that transcend the nation-state border. We decided to call only those activities that traverse the nation-state territorial border transnational, while calling transcultural activities within state borders "multicultural."[2] The term *multiculturalism* here primarily refers to the development of increasing ethnic diversity and is less concerned with the mainly normative idea of multiculturalism.[3] This idea of multiculturalism is mainly based on the assumption that enduring patterns of migration have fundamentally altered the ethnic composition of nation-states' populations.[4] Our definition of multiculturalism encapsulates a somewhat wider notion of multiculturalism than is often understood as an alternative program of immigrant incorporation in contrast to assimilation.

[2] We would like to thank the British team of the TRANS-NET consortium, Filippo Osella and Kaveri Harriss, for encouraging us to adhere to this basic distinction between transnationalism and multiculturalism, during discussions at project meetings.

[3] Multiculturalism, in a narrower sense, is often associated with normative theories of intercultural justice for ethnic or other minorities (Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995). According to the general thesis of multicultural citizenship, the established "color-blind" institutional framework of liberal democratic states, which grant individual and formal rights irrespective of the particular characteristics and identities of persons (such as ethnicity and gender) is insufficient to fully accommodate ethnic and national minorities because these institutions, as well as the political cultures, are biased in favor of the dominant classes or the majority's ethnicity and religion. Because of this, multicultural theorists argue for providing group-differentiated rights as an extension of formal citizenship, such as exemption rights for minority religious practices within official institutions and special representation rights for cultural minorities.

[4] That is somewhat similar to "New Assimilation Theory," which describes a multicultural "remaking of the mainstream" in the US context (Alba and Nee 2003).

However, the very recognition of the realities of immigration and its integration-related implications may also lead to policy consequences toward multicultural modes of integration, even if this is not announced officially in such terms (Kymlicka 2007). In Germany, for example, there is acceptance across political party lines that Germany is a country of immigration, which also entails increased efforts toward immigrant integration. Since the debates about a new immigration law from 2001 onward and even more recently during the rule of a Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats from 2005 until 2009, immigrant integration became one of the top themes of political and public debates in Germany. These changes are even expressed in significant shifts in terms and descriptions for immigrants[5] and a resulting increase in efforts to support immigrant integration in different areas, especially regarding migrants' educational performance.[6]

Although current wide-ranging efforts in German politics, as well as in German society, aim to facilitate the integration of immigrants, in some respects they are accompanied with stronger (neo-)assimilationist expectations,[7] which might be called a "return of assimilation" (Brubaker 2001) and the "retreat of multiculturalism" (Joppke 2004). Germany's integration policies at the same time exhibit some multicultural traits, at least in two respects. First, migrant organizations have been increasingly accepted as contact and negotiating partners on an official policy level. For example, their spokespersons are regularly invited to so-called *integration summits,* which have been organized on the federal level since 2006. Second, there is an increased emphasis in integration policy documents and corresponding measures on what is called management diversity or the intercultural opening of organizations and institutions (Gerdes 2010; Schönwälder 2010), according to which the talents and specific competencies of people with different cultural backgrounds are activated and innovatively employed (Faist 2009). These efforts include campaigns for increasing recruitment of migrants in different institutions, such as policing, hospitals, and schools, so as to use them as contact persons for mediating between institutions and migrant milieus and communities. Even if these developments on the level of political

[5] For instance, the term *foreigners* has been changed to *persons with a migration background* and the former *commissioner of foreigners* has been re-titled *integration commissioner*. The Christian Democrats in their party platform now call Germany a *country of integration* (CDU 2007: 88) in order to outdo the "Germany is a country of immigration" catchphrase with which they were criticized in previous decades by nearly all the other parties for their migration-restrictive position and their insinuated ethnocultural understanding of Germany's culture.

[6] One important aspect of these fundamentally altered perceptions is that the importance of integration in official discourse is often illustrated by enumerating the real numbers of so-called "persons with migration background" as about 15 million people, amounting to one fifth of Germany's population and with an even higher share among the younger generation.

[7] The most obvious (neo-)assimilationist aspect of the German understanding of integration concerns the widely held conception that it is mainly the individual migrants, who have to endeavor to adapt to German society, especially by acquiring German language as well as other competencies and educational achievements, which are deemed to be necessary preconditions for their employability (Gerdes 2010; Schönwälder 2010).

semantics are not denoted as multiculturalism,[8] their relation to multiculturalism in substance cannot reasonably be denied (cf. the criteria and list of multicultural policies in Kymlicka 2007: 61ff). By choosing to maintain use of a notion of multiculturalism, our work is in line with a recent evaluation of the multiculturalism backlash discourse in Europe (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), according to which the announced decline of multiculturalism is rhetorically overemphasized and, in many respects, not backed up with corresponding policy shifts.

Multiculturalism is also an important analytical tool for analyzing the data collected in Turkey. As a result of the nature of the research design chosen for the Turkish case, most of the respondents were Turkish return migrants from Germany, whose transnational ties were diminishing, but who were nonetheless different from the community at large in terms of their multicultural orientations. Thus, including multiculturalism in our typology allows us to analyze the data in a more coherent way so that we are not losing an important finding; that is, the effects of the migration experience on current lifestyles and mindsets. In sum, we define multiculturalism as comprising the whole spectrum of contacts and relations with persons, groups, organizations, and institutions of the majority population within the country of immigration. This definition also includes, importantly for the German side, the different integration-related activities of migrants, which are increasingly encouraged by institutional changes in Germany.

Using the term *multiculturalism* in relation to transnationalism is, of course, partly a matter of terminology. The meaning of *transnational* obviously depends on what we regard as national, namely, whether we think of the nation and the cultural composition of society or whether we focus on the dimensions of territorially demarcated states. If we mean a transformation of the nation away from a previous cultural homogeneity only, we certainly also could speak of this as transnational. In any case, a basic difference between this transcultural and state-internal aspect of transformation and actual state border-crossing activities and orientations remains. Certainly, there might be connections between both kinds of activities if, for instance, Turkish migrant organizations on German territory have regular contacts with partner organizations in Turkey, but these kinds of relations are not at all necessary.[9]

4.3.3.3 Intensity of Transnationalization

During the analysis of the Turkish–German research material it became obvious that in any of the single domains (political, economic, sociocultural, and educational) many different aspects of cross-border activities and orientations are visible.

[8] In official party discourse, multiculturalism is largely portrayed as an endorsement of ethnically segregated societies and the opposite of integration as well as the absence of integration policy (Schönwälder 2010).

[9] For example, it has often been noted that social practices and cultural understandings in Turkey are different from those of Turkish communities in Germany. That the practices and institutions of Turkish migrants in Germany are characterized by a self-perpetuating dynamic, very different from what is going on in Turkey, was also stressed by some of our interviewees.

Going through our interviews we found that differences mainly occur in relation to the extent and intensity of transnational activities. Therefore, we decided to combine the distinctions of four domains with distinctions of different levels of stronger or weaker transnational activities.

The differentiation of transnational activities, according to their respective extent, can be captured with regard to two aspects: first, in terms of the temporal dimension and second, in relation to social intensity and collective and institutional embeddedness. Concerning the time aspect, first, we take the current transnational activities and orientations of the respondents as stronger than those they report in relation to past activities or future plans. We also consider the changes and durability of certain activities in migrants' life-courses, as far we have information on that subject.[10] Second, regarding the social and institutional embeddedness of transnational activities, we assume that these activities are stronger to the extent that they go beyond individual and private behavior and are anchored in broader collectives, such as families, organizations, and institutions and, thus the more they are part of formalized roles and functions and based on shared values and world views. This, by and large, corresponds with existing typologies, which often describe the degree of institutionalization as an import factor for distinguishing different kinds of transnational contacts and ties (Faist 2000, 2004; Pries 2008).

The ideal-typical categories of transnationalism we finally developed consist of strong, moderate, and weak transnational activities[11] in each of our four domains. However, during the analysis of the research data, we had to develop and modify the typology continually. Through constant comparison of the data, new facts gathered from the interviews were included in the typology and the properties of the categories strong, moderate, and weak transnationalism were defined and refined several times. Hence, the typology, as presented in Table 4.2, is the final product of the analysis of our interviews from both the German and the Turkish side. For example, we incorporated the dimension of moderate transnationalism at a later stage, as it turned out that a distinction only between weak and strong transnational activities, as is often made in the literature (see footnote 11), could not adequately capture many cases of continuous, but still occasional, transnational activities in different domains, as well as many transnational practices mediated through occupational or political functions in institutions and organizations located in the respondents' resident state. Another example of a later refinement of our typological criteria concerns the educational domain. The existing literature on transnationalism and education, especially consisting of and inspired by patterns of highly skilled migration, tends to point to a positive correlation between geographical and social mobility, at least in the German context (Fürstenau 2005; Kreutzer and Roth 2006).

[10] The issue of durability of transnational social spaces, in relation to the question of their newness, has often been a matter of controversy within related debates (Kivisto 2001).

[11] Our distinction between strong and weak transnational practices by and large corresponds with similar differentiations between narrow and broad (Itzigsohn et al. 1999), core and expanded (Levitt 2001) or regular and situational transnational activities (Morawska 2004).

Although our sample contains many respondents whose transnational activities obviously contributed to their educational and occupational careers, we also had a considerable number of respondents who reported that transnational attitudes, especially resulting from long-standing return orientations of their former guest worker families, led to difficulties regarding their educational attainments. These are only a few examples, according to which the typology was revised. It also must be emphasized that the differentiation between stronger and weaker forms of transnationalism is certainly not of a categorical kind, but one of degree and relative intensity, which should be understood as a continuum.

For clarity, the properties of each category are described at the beginning of each of the following sections and summarized in Table 4.2. With reference to the relation between transnationalism and multiculturalism, it is important to point out that in all of the four domains we do not treat a classification in one of the transnational categories (strong, moderate, or weak transnationalism) and a categorization as "multicultural" as mutually exclusive, because both kinds of activities and orientations can overlap and indeed coincided in many of our cases. Thus, the opposite of transnationalism is not multiculturalism, but non-transnationalism. However, because among our respondents there are only a few cases of individuals participating in no transnational activities, we did not include an extra category of non-transnationalism into the typology. Moreover, one must keep in mind that our research data only provide information about the participants in the survey and are not representative.

4.4 Research Findings

4.4.1 Transnational and Multicultural Activities in the Political Domain

As indicated, we focus on transnational and multicultural activities in each of our four domains. With regard to transnational activities, we distinguish different categories in terms of degree of transnational involvement. In the political sphere, we take migrants' membership and participation in political organizations and institutions located outside of the territory of their respective resident state as an indication of *strong transnationalism*. Turkish migrants in Germany may be a member of and participate in Turkish political organizations and parties and, correspondingly, return migrants or German immigrants in Turkey may be involved with political institutions in Germany. The modes of political participation can range from involvement in political party affairs to voting, demonstrations, and public campaigns. Furthermore, the same kinds of political participation in countries other than Germany and Turkey will be counted in this category as well as membership and participation in genuine transnational political organizations, such as Greenpeace or international human rights associations.

The category of *moderate transnationalism* comprises the actual and regular cooperation or communication with political organizations abroad on the basis of membership and work in political, administrative, or other organizations of the migrants' respective resident state. In these cases, transnational political contacts and activities are of a rather indirect kind, mediated through the functions of nation-state–based organizations and institutions. This category, of course, also covers participation in migrant organizations if, in these contexts, regular debates on the topic of political events in migrants' origin countries take place. Also, cases are considered in this category if persons are regularly concerned with the organization of politics and policies at the international or European level. The category of *weak transnationalism* simply comprises political interest in and corresponding activities of gathering information about political events in countries other than the respective migrants' resident state, usually by the use of some kind of media, but without further political engagement. Finally, in addition to transnational activities in the political domain, we take the category of *political multiculturalism* to cover all forms of political participation or the exercise of political functions in the context of events and debates pertaining to issues related to politics and policies of migration and integration and inter-ethnic relations within the borders of the German or the Turkish nation-state.

4.4.1.1 Political Interest and Participation

On the German side, most of our cases correspond to the category of weak political transnationalism. A considerable number of Turkish migrants in Germany, with different sociostructural characteristics, more or less regularly follow political events in Turkey by reading Turkish newspapers, watching Turkish TV, using online sources, or keeping informed through conversation with families, without however, participating directly and actively in Turkish politics or some other kind of non-German political organization. As one of our respondents said:

> I'm very interested in Turkish politics, what is going on there, and I read a Turkish newspaper each day to keep track of what's going on there and how it is communicated and so on. (Female, 26, international student in Germany)

Because the majority of these migrants are also not participating to a great extent in German politics, as far as this concerns the official institutions of representative democracy, such as parties and conventional interest group organizations, weak transnational political engagement, to a significant degree, seems to be the result of a low interest in institution-based politics, rather than a low level of concern with Turkish politics more specifically. However, in some cases, in which migrants exhibit political interests that are above average, their transnational political orientations seem to be decreased because of a certain kind of distance from the Turkish political system. Especially those migrants who came to Germany as political refugees or who, although initially migrating through other immigration channels, felt personally affected by the military coup in 1980, or are members of marginalized and

formerly persecuted minorities in Turkey, such as Kurds and Alevis, often turn their political orientations away from Turkish politics entirely. Some respondents also reported serious problems they had had with Turkish authorities and with corruption during longer stays in Turkey as a reason for their diminished interest in Turkish political events. One woman told us:

> I know how it works in Turkey. Who has money comes to power, who has nothing gets nothing. It is the same in any public authority and it is […] not different at the consulate. If you are going there, they will not take you seriously at all. She is slurping her tea or her coffee, 'please just wait,' then she is phoning about a private matter, it's the same as in Turkey, and I don't have respect for that, I must say honestly. (Female, 36, German-born)

These findings clearly point to the necessity of being aware of the emigration countries' political context in addition to the situation of the immigration state, if one is interested in transnational political activities in relation to institutional opportunity structures (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003).[12]

On the Turkish side, most of the cases fall under the category of multiculturalism. Although a considerable number of return migrants, with different sociostructural characteristics, were keen followers of the political events surrounding them, reading and watching the Turkish news daily, they did not show a continuing interest in German politics. Their knowledge of current German politics was limited to whatever was presented in the Turkish media. Very people followed the news in the German media. A certain share of our respondents in Turkey, however, were politically active or exercised political functions in the context of events pertaining to issues of migration, integration, or intercultural relations within their residence country. This was also true for the German citizens residing in Turkey. They are interested in the political events in their immediate surroundings, as a selection of quotes reveals:

> While I was there, I was interested in politics, especially about the laws regarding the rights of migrants, I was also voting in Germany, but I wish I didn't go. I feel like a second-class citizen. (Female, 69, return migrant in Turkey)

> I follow politics in Turkey; I used to follow it in Germany. (Female, 68, return migrant in Turkey)

> I have not voted in Germany since I moved to Turkey. Once I voted in Turkey because I received a voting registry by mistake (laughs). (Female, 51, German citizen living in Turkey)

> I wasn't interested in politics, I didn't vote in Germany because I did not become a citizen. I haven't voted in Turkey in recent years because I missed the elections. (Male, 77, return migrant in Turkey)

Similar patterns of participation in different civil society associations can also be observed in the German sample. Many migrants are actively involved in organizations, associations, and initiatives, including migrant associations involved in

[12] There are some studies that explain transnational political practices and orientations as a mere consequence of the political opportunity structures and immigrant integration regimes in immigration states (Koopmans and Statham 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005). In these studies, a disproportionate share of transnational political claims-making among migrants in Germany has been attributed to Germany's more restrictive model of immigrant inclusion.

multicultural activities in Germany,[13] but unlike respondents in the Turkish sample, in a considerable amount of cases this also entails, to varying degrees, transnational contacts. To a certain extent this is because some of these German-based associations cooperate on a regular basis with associations and organizations in Turkey. A returnee in Turkey said:

> I think even those who state that they are not interested in politics make a political statement. I have always voted in German elections, by mail when in Turkey. (Male, 83, return migrant in Turkey)

Both the Turkish and German samples comprise very few cases of people partaking in some form of institutionally based cross-border political participation. Neither in the German nor in the Turkish context were there respondents who were actual members of a political party, organization, or association, or a transnational political organization in the country other than the country of actual residence. In the Turkish case, 15 out of 18 respondents with dual citizenship; that is, those who have the right to vote in Germany, but who now reside in Turkey, stated that they used to vote in German elections while living in Germany. However, only four underlined that they will continue this activity, either during visits or via mail in the future. In the German case, there were only three migrants who reported that they actually vote in Turkish elections, and we placed them for this reason in the category of strong political transnationalism. An international student in Germany reported as follows:

> Voting, yes. I could vote two times and I've done that. In one case I was in Istanbul, but I had to be in Antalya and I flew there only for this election (laughs). And the second election was in 2006, I think. Yes, I was in Amsterdam, but it was also in summer and I flew to Antalya for this election (laughs). (Female, 27, international student in Germany)

In all three cases, the corresponding migrants came to Germany because they wanted to study at a German university. Thus, they are better-educated first-generation migrants. Second-generation migrants, who are less well educated, do not consider voting in Turkey, because, although actually living in Germany, they simply do not feel affected by Turkish institutional politics. One respondent said:

> Why should I vote there [in Turkey] where I don't know what is going on […] in politics? Who wants what, who claims anything? I am not so eager […] why should I look into another country […] when I'm not there? If the laws are changing there, what do I get out of it here? (Male, 24, German-born)

However, there are still a certain number of cases, which according to our typology have to be classified as instances of moderate political transnationalism. These belong to two categories: first, they are or have been transnational students, on the

[13] Our findings in this respect corroborate previous studies, which also found a relatively high participation rate of Turkish migrants in Germany in voluntary activities in civil society (Halm and Sauer 2005). See our section on social engagement.

one hand, or on the other hand, they are so-called second-generation migrants who were born in Germany or who came to Germany in early childhood and who are quite successful in terms of social upward mobility. Interestingly, in almost all of the cases of higher transnational political activities (strong or moderate political transnationalism), the respective interviewees have strong political interests in general, including concerning German politics and policies, and in some cases also in European and international politics. Hence, high transnational political interests and activities coincide with similarly high levels of interest and patterns of participation that are above average in the German political context. This indicates that political attention and participation should not be regarded as a zero-sum game in general, in the sense that political interest toward events in the country of origin leads to a reduced political interest and participation in Germany and to diminished political loyalty to the German state, as is often assumed in German public discourses, as well as in some prominent versions of German assimilation theory.[14]

By contrast, transnational political activities, which go beyond the mere observance of political events in Turkey through television or other media, are connected to occupational functions or voluntary work in the broad realm of measures, organizations, and activities concerned with the integration of immigrants in Germany. Hence, migrants who have stronger political ties to Turkey often also exercise different kinds of bridging functions between Turkish migrant organizations and the Turkish community in Germany, on the one hand, and German political and administrative institutions, on the other hand. As one migrant said:

> In particular, persons with a Turkish background who act in a bridging role do both, bringing the Turkish position closer to the [German] government, but also affecting the Turkish community. (Male, 37, 1.5 generations in Germany)

Moreover, most of these persons with high patterns of participation in Turkey still participate in the German political context to a far greater extent and identify strongly with the German polity, even if they are concerned with Turkish politics. Their cooperation with Turkish political organizations and institutions in these cases regularly happens in the course of their work in institutions and organizations located in Germany, such as political parties, migrant organizations, or other cultural associations:

> Professional contacts [to Turkey] have increased, since my return [to Germany after studying and working abroad] and the beginning of my activities on behalf of the government. I'm engaged in integration politics and there are a lot of solutions, which can only be resolved with the help of Turkey. (Male, 37, 1.5 generations in Germany)

[14] For example, the most influential assimilation theory in Germany (Esser 2001) assumes from a rational choice perspective that in the face of always scarce resources (such as attention, time, learning capacities, social contacts, money) an investment in ethnic or transnational contexts will lead to a corresponding lack of resources in the national context.

Hence, transnational political contacts in these cases often occur as a kind of by-product of multicultural involvement.[15] Migrants with stronger transnational political interests are also overwhelmingly critical of Turkish politics and policies and can be located rather on the left wing of the political spectrum.

In the German context, political interests in terms of Turkish political affairs are often accompanied by interests in German discourses and policies concerning migration and integration, such as the social situation of migrants, their living conditions, levels of institutional discrimination, educational and occupational careers, and the like. Consequently, we counted more than three fourths of the transnational cases of different kinds simultaneously in what we have called the multicultural dimension of political involvement. On a related subject, another interesting result of our study is that politically active Turkish migrants usually favor an understanding of integration, which can be called much more multicultural (Kymlicka 1995) than that which is currently represented in German politics, policies, and media. Although many migrants are extraordinarily oriented toward the German political context and, in some cases, also explicitly objecting to the predominant political engagements in their country of origin, they nevertheless reject what they regard as immoderate assimilationist expectations. Instead, they overwhelmingly view the recognition of cultural identity—in terms of language, dual citizenship, cultural habits, and religious symbols—as a precondition for successful integration. In many of the German interviews, the respondents reflect intensively on the relation and difference between integration and assimilation. The endorsement of a multicultural mode of integration in Germany seems to contribute to the fact that from the migrants' perspectives and activities, integration and transnational relations do not contradict each other. In the Turkish context, neither the return migrants nor the ethnic Germans residing in Turkey show any levels of transnational political activities. Their political participation falls into our category of multiculturalism, in which their actions only pertain to their immediate surroundings within the country of residence.

4.4.1.2 Citizenship

In the German context, there is no obvious direct correlation between the respondents' citizenship and resident status—that is, whether they have German or Turkish citizenship only or dual citizenship—and the extent of their transnational political

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[15] It should be noted that these patterns of political activity can be, to an important extent, related to the (however fundamentally changed) political opportunity structure in Germany. This is because the issue of immigrant integration became one of the top issues, since the political debates on the new German immigration law from 2001 onward, and nowadays is viewed, above party lines, as a multilevel and cross-sectional task, including the promotion of so-called "diversity management" programs (Gerdes 2010). Additionally, there are a multitude of new possibilities for so-called "persons with a migration background" to work, voluntarily or professionally, in different organizations as contact persons mediating between migrant milieus and communities and German authorities and institutions.

orientations and activities. That, to a significant extent, should be understood in connection with the fact that our respondents attribute very different meanings to citizenship. For many, it is not primarily a matter of political participation and representation, but rather of other rights and opportunities or emotional affiliation and cultural belonging.[16] For instance, German citizenship is valuable for some migrants because of the full spectrum of rights it confers, for others some more specific advantages are of importance, such as full residence rights, job changes, or easier travel opportunities. One migrant told us that citizenship was important for him:

> Mobility, free movement, freedom—what the German government would not have given to me otherwise. (Male, 53, 1.5 generations in Germany)

Simultaneously, Turkish citizenship can also be considered something, which confers certain rights, which Turkish migrants do not want to lose, such as residence rights, inheritance rights, and the right to acquire certain kinds of property. For many Turkish migrants, however, Turkish citizenship has a kind of emotional meaning regarding their self-definition in terms of cultural identity and in connection with social ties they consider important. However, of course, there are also a considerable number of respondents who emphasize their political, cultural, or emotional distance from Turkey, saying that they, for different reasons, would or did not feel any problems when giving up Turkish citizenship. In some cases, migrants' attitudes concerning German citizenship and its acquisition also articulate a sort of protest against German citizenship policies and corresponding political and public discourses on the relation between integration and naturalization. In these objectionable discourses politicians, especially of the Christian Democratic and the Free Democratic Party, continuously emphasize that dual citizenship would be an expression of ambivalent political loyalty and that only renunciation of previous citizenship can be regarded as a sign of migrants' authentic willingness to integrate in Germany (Gerdes et al. 2007).

In this context, some Turkish migrants explained that they would abstain from naturalization as long as Germany will not accept dual citizenship, or they said that they were reluctant to apply for German citizenship in the past because they felt there were disproportionate assimilative expectations connected to naturalization. As one respondent said:

> I mean, do I receive a brainwash after getting the German passport? Do I get a blood infusion? Will my Turkish blood be removed? (Female, 44, 1.5 generations in Germany)

In some cases, experiences of discrimination and xenophobia also played an important role in the decision to postpone naturalization. Maintaining Turkish citizenship, in such instances, was regarded as a kind of insurance enabling return to Turkey if the situation of xenophobia gets worse. In sum, even if there is a considerable variation concerning respective individual reactions, the state and corresponding policies and discourses on integration and citizenship in Germany play a

[16] For this reason, we treat the issue of citizenship not as something relating exclusively to the political domain, but rather as a theme that cuts across the different domains we are dealing with, based on the significance of citizenship from the perspectives of our interviewees.

significant role in shaping the identities of Turkish migrants. In particular, Germany's refusal to accept dual citizenship seems to produce problems of political identification among many migrants and loyalty to the German state, at least in some cases, seems to be impeded, rather than reinforced.

In the Turkish context, our respondents had diverse views on citizenship and belonged to four different citizenship categories, with each category having its own subdivisions. The *first* group consisted of dual citizens. As in the German context, those who could manage to keep dual citizenship emphasized the benefits of dual rights rather than describing dual obligations. This group of dual citizenship holders was divided into two clusters, legitimate and illegitimate dual citizens. The former had acquired their German citizenship before the amended 2000 German nationality and citizenship law and therefore could keep their right to dual citizenship without any problems. One returnee mentioned:

> I feel 'international,' a world citizen (even began singing the anthem of Internationale), I am an 'Alamanci' here, a Turkish migrant in Germany. Unfortunately, everywhere I'm a foreigner. (Male, 83, return migrant in Turkey, dual citizen)

The latter were granted German citizenship after 2000 on denouncing their Turkish citizenship. After a few years, they then regained their Turkish citizenship, thus acting against German law. Therefore, this group—whose number was rather small among our respondents—were rather reluctant to talk about citizenship out of fear of losing their status:

> I'm interested in politics, but I do not want to give any information about voting, or my citizenship status. (Female, 54, return migrant)

The *second* group of those who had returned from Germany without German citizenship had diverse views and positions, depending on different variables: why and how the person took on the return decision, whether his or her expectations were met during the years spent in Germany, whether he or she was content with the return decision, and his or her political views. On the one hand, there were those who regretted that they did not or could not acquire German citizenship. These individuals usually blamed either the Turkish state for not protecting their rights as much as was necessary against Germany, so that they could enjoy dual citizenship, or the German state for not letting them acquire dual citizenship and always treating Turks living in Germany as second-rate residents. Although the former believe that Turkey could have done more to legitimize dual citizenship for Turks in Germany, the latter simply argue that Germany, with its almost racist policies against Turks, would never allow that anyway.

> One cannot become German, even if he stays there for years. (Male, 51, return migrant in Turkey)

> I never felt like a world citizen in Germany, because I was sometimes treated badly as a Turk by Germans and Greeks. (Male, 68, return migrant in Turkey, Turkish citizen)

> I do not feel transnational, due to the fact that Turkish citizens are not given the right to be transnational. (Female, 51, return migrant in Turkey)

On the other hand, there were those who could have acquired German citizenship, but simply did not want to—at least this was what they claimed. These people

were usually those who had always considered their stay in Germany temporary, had internalized their guest worker status, and had waited for the right moment to return with a sufficient amount of savings to buy a house, educate their children, and spend their retirement years in Turkey. Over time, they did not see any benefits to acquiring German citizenship. One returnee commented:

> I shuttle between Berlin and Istanbul. I am not a German citizen, because I do not want to be one. (Male, 63, return migrant)

The *third* group of returnees consists of ethnic Turks with German citizenship. Many of these people were so-called second-generation Turks in Germany—people born in Germany to Turkish parents. They did not or could not acquire Turkish citizenship, but they could easily work, live, and study in Turkey, just like any Turkish citizen, because they hold pink cards (the color of the cards was recently changed to blue; hence, they are now called blue cards). With an amendment to the Turkish citizenship law in 1995, Turkey created a privileged noncitizen status, permitting holders of the pink card (or blue card) to reside, acquire property, inherit, operate businesses, and work in Turkey just like any citizen, but without the right to vote in local or national elections (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007). The motivation behind the amendment was to create a mechanism to allow Turks living in Germany to acquire German citizenship, without renouncing their rights in Turkey (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007). One German citizen with a blue card told us:

> I think living in Turkey as a German is an advantage because people think my educational background is stronger and trust my professional skills more. (Male, 42, return migrant in Turkey)

The *final* group was composed of those return migrants who were back in Turkey but have a permanent residence in Germany. Although these people were actually living in Turkey, they also had a permanent residence in Germany, allowing them to enter the country whenever they wished. They usually had fictitious addresses in their children's, relatives', or friends' places of residence in Germany. In some cases, permanent residence meant more than easy entry to Germany. Sometimes pension rights were associated with permanent residence. In one such case, our respondent described to us how mechanisms to keep a permanent residence in Germany had turned into an industry and that there are agents who provide forged addresses for such purposes. These agents usually utilize a large residence with many rooms, which are rented out to people who do not really live there, but use these places as their permanent addresses:

> There is a sector for residency. People are selling residency. (Male, 80, return migrant residing in Turkey whose permanent residency is in Germany)

For the ethnic Germans residing in Turkey, citizenship is not really an issue. Unless they are married to a Turkish citizen, many of them do not choose to acquire Turkish citizenship, either because they do not feel the need to do so, or because they do not want to. Those who do not feel the need can be considered circular migrants whose stay in Turkey is regulated by their tourist visas. Thus, they leave and enter the country every few months so as not to become irregular migrants.

However, considering the fact that some of them actually take on jobs in Turkey, they sometimes do fall into an irregular status. Those who do not want to acquire Turkish citizenship simply do not see any benefit to acquiring Turkish citizenship. Although they complain about the bureaucratic hurdles of renewing residence and work permits, they do not consider Turkish citizenship an option, mostly because they do not see their stay in Turkey as permanent and/or they do not identify with the country:

> I had no expectations about Turkey, because I had no intention of staying.... I can't have dual citizenship, but I would want to avoid Turkish bureaucracy when renewing my residence permit. (Female, 50, ethnic German working in Turkey)

Thus, considering all of these different positions that migrants choose to take regarding citizenship, the role of the state in regulating migration and producing identities for migrants and minorities seems rather marginal in the case of Turkish–German migration from the side of Turkey. It is true that state regulations do define the limits of different options in terms of choice of an identity; however, the final decision is a result of a combination of very different, and usually very personal, factors. Migrants seem to evaluate their options based on their personal interests and make their decisions accordingly, in ad hoc arrangements that usually entail exploitation of the system to a certain extent.

4.4.2 Transnational and Multicultural Activities in the Economic Domain

In the economic domain, we consider all those transnational and multicultural activities of migrants, which are related to their work and occupational functions.[17] With regard to transnational activities we define *strong transnationalism* as transnational entrepreneurship or occupational functions, which are essentially based on cross-border exchanges of goods, capital, services, know-how, or cross-border deployment of a workforce. Furthermore, the strong category contains cases of intentional circular migration; that is, if our respondents describe their migration strategy as temporary, and envision future changes to their country of residence. As *moderate transnationalism,* we regard incidental occupational involvement of migrants with

[17] However, in contrast to other accounts of economic transnationalism (Vertovec 2009), we left aside economic remittances, which we consider in the sociocultural domain under the heading of transnational social engagement. The primary reason for this is that we are mostly concerned with individual activities rather than with their aggregated effects. From the perspective of individual actors, economic-occupational decisions and remittances relate to different logics of actions, which should not be confused by incorporating them in the same domain of analysis. Although remittances are usually based on some kind of moral commitment and carried out within contexts of reciprocity or solidarity, decisions regarding work and occupations are, at least to a higher probability, a matter of individual self-interest.

the import or export of goods, capital, service, know-how, or workforces, if these activities do not constitute a main function of the respective organizations or occupational activities. In addition, we include in this category respondents' expressions of concrete plans concerning the founding of a transnational enterprise or the taking up of related employment. The category of *weak transnationalism* covers all cases in which migrants, during their occupational work, exert certain single migrant-specific resources, opportunities, or competencies (e.g., language, knowledge, contacts) that have an actual connection to other countries. The difference to the former moderate category here is that these individual resources are not systematically embedded in organizational activities. Also, migrants' rather vague plans of founding a transnational enterprise or taking up a related employment are included here.

Finally, the category of *multicultural activities* means the occupational use of migrant-specific resources, opportunities, or competencies (language, knowledge of other countries, contacts) without any actual relation to cross-border interactions. The related activities correspond with activities envisaged by so-called "diversity management" programs in the private as well as in the public sector that are aimed at activating, recognizing, and using specific competencies of persons based on, among other aspects of individual particularity, ethnic difference and migrant experience. Another obvious example of multicultural economic activities is ethnic entrepreneurship. Although some observers do not consider the provision of goods, services, and employment opportunities to co-ethnics, because of a lack of interactions with the majority population as signs of successful integration (Abadan-Unat 2002), others emphasize that entrepreneurs live and work in a culturally mixed context and must have the necessary skills and cultural competencies to handle this complexity. For example, in an investigation of Turkish entrepreneurs in Berlin, Pecoud (2004) shows that shop owners rely both on co-ethnic and non–co-ethnic resources, and argues that it is the combination of these two sets of resources that enables businesses to survive.

On the German side, in the economic and occupational domain, we observe a much stronger extent of transnational activities on the part of Turkish migrants than in the political sphere. Whereas in the political domain, transnational activities of most migrants are weak and there are few migrants with strong transnational orientations, transnational activities in the economic domain are most frequently located in the strong category and we have the fewest cases in the weak category. Many of those migrants exhibiting higher transnational economic and occupational activities are, however, better educated and have academic degrees.[18] In many cases, the migrants participating in many transnational economic activities are self-employed or are working freelance. A significant share of transnationally active respondents also had transnational educational experiences before employment and had studied in different countries. Interestingly, moderate or strong transnational economic

[18] Because our sample in general comprises a disproportionately large share of migrants having graduated from high school or even university, this probably also contributed to our results concerning a high share of transnationally active migrants in this domain.

activities are also manifested by considerable numbers of so-called second-generation migrants, who regarded and used their migration background and corresponding transnational opportunities as a tool for improving their job chances. In sum, we have comparatively few cases of migrants whose occupational functions show no transnational and multicultural features at all.

On the Turkish side, we cannot say that we observe in the economic and occupational domain a much stronger extent of transnational activities than in the political sphere. Despite the flow of economic ideas across-borders in some cases, in the economic domain the transnational activities of most migrants are again weak or more multicultural, and there are few migrants with strong transnational orientations. A few of those migrants exhibiting higher transnational economic and occupational activities are also the better-educated migrants, as in the German case. Considering the fact that the entire migration system between Turkey and Germany emerged as a result of economic considerations within the guest worker scheme, it is not surprising that transnational economic relations between the two countries are very intense and migrants comprise a large part of this transnational economic space. However, although our respondents' descriptions demonstrate that their rate of participation in economic life during their stay in Germany was very high, we cannot easily say that they were engaged in cross-border transnational economic activities. Turks in Germany, besides being typical factory laborers, were also engaged in high-profile jobs, including working as doctors or nurses. Among our small number of respondents, there were three cases of individuals going to Germany as doctors in the 1960s and 1970s.

Even those who migrated to Germany after 1974—when official labor recruitment by Germany ended and family reunification and marriage migration began—showed a strong sense of adaptation to the German economy, albeit some of them rather informally. One of our respondents described to us how, in addition to occasional construction work that he could find, he sold fruits and vegetables in a pushcart along the streets of a small German town with a large number of Turkish inhabitants. This is a striking example of the informal economy created by the migrants, but also an illustration of migrants' ethnic entrepreneurship in Germany:

> I first went to Germany in 1970 when I was 17. I went as a tourist, overstayed my visa, and I was sent back. I went again, and was sent back again. This happened several times. Then I got married in 1978 to a Turk living in Germany, and I stayed until I got my citizenship.... I was selling fruits and vegetables in a pushcart. (Male, 78, return migrant in Turkey with dual citizenship)

In other cases, Turkish ethnic entrepreneurship was more competent. As time passed, Turks began to provide services to their countrymen in the form of Turkish ethnic enterprises that mostly concentrated on the food industry, food distribution, repair, and greengrocery (Abadan-Unat 2002). A few of our respondents told us about representative cases of such enterprises. One of our respondents told us that her father opened the first Turkish grocery shop in the town where they lived, whereas another's mother is still managing a retail store selling textiles from Turkey, specifically evening dresses and gowns for Turkish weddings and circumcision parties. Another respondent told us how *döner kebap,* a Turkish specialty of pressed lamb

roasted on a large vertical spit, became an industry not only in Germany, but throughout Europe, attracting not only Turkish, but also non-Turkish customers. One return migrant said:

> My father opened the first Turkish grocery in the town in which we were residing. He later handed it over. It was the first of its kind, now there are many. (Female, 55, return migrant in Turkey describing her childhood memories)

There are a few stories of ideas moving across borders. For example, an entrepreneur who went to Germany as a guest worker was a carpenter, but worked in a factory in which he had other responsibilities. Upon his return to Turkey, he opened his own carpentry workshop and began to produce the first pullout couches (sofa beds), which were very common in Germany at the time, but not yet known in Turkey. Another example is a lady who went to Germany to live with her mother, married a German citizen, and completed her university degree in Germany. Upon her return to Turkey, she opened her own business in public relations, serving a clientele that was mostly German. She believes that her observations of German society and the knowledge she gained in Germany regarding the "German way of doing things" made it possible for her to maintain a successful business. A third example is the creation of BİM stores in Turkey, the first model of a hard-discount retail chain in the country. One of our respondents was one of the founders of the chain, and he told us that it developed from an idea he had based on observations in Germany, which he later developed in Turkey. However, even in these cases of economic ideas moving across borders, only in the second and third cases were the cross-border economic transactions continuing.

In the German context, strong transnational economic activities include, first, migrants who are primarily engaged in the cross-border exchange of know-how and import and export of goods and services, while residing in Germany; and second, a few migrants whose occupational functions make it necessary for them to be highly mobile, traveling frequently back and forth between Turkey and Germany. Examples of the latter kind comprise very different service sector–related occupations. In one case, a self-employed political advisor (male, 43, 1.5 generation in Germany) was a member of a consulting consortium that assists companies, public institutions, and administrative bodies in Turkey by introducing strategies of modern organization and project management and conducting staff seminars. He is actually commuting between Berlin and Ankara biweekly. Although he grew up in Germany, his close connection to Turkey stems from a previous period working in Turkey for about 6 years, during which he was employed as the head of the Turkish outpost of a German party foundation. Another respondent (female, 50, former international student in Germany) is currently working in Turkey for a German employer. She is responsible for an advisory program in Turkey, carried out by a German charity organization and supported by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, which informs husbands and wives of migrants who are planning to migrate to Germany where they can take the required language courses and tests in Turkey, and also about living conditions in Germany, the German labor market, and German culture and history. She also very often commutes between Turkey and Germany.

In the second case, economically strong and active transnational migrants have a clear residential focal point in Germany, but are engaged to a far-reaching extent in the cross-border transfer of goods, services, or know-how by cooperating with Turkish business partners. One example is a respondent (female, 53, marriage migrant in Germany) who sells evening and wedding dresses to Turkish migrant customers to a significant extent. The clothes are partly produced in production units in Turkey led by family members or other partners and partly imported from other Turkish firms. The respondent and her husband have numerous business contacts in Turkey, which stem from previous longer residence periods there, where they were self-employed in different branches. Another Turkish migrant of the so-called second generation told her occupational story as an increasing rapprochement with her Turkish origin, from which she had previously tried to escape:

> […] the moment I began working, I became a Turk. (Female, 30, German-born).

She had studied political science and is currently working as an independent journalist at a German newspaper. Because of her Turkish background, during her career, she was always in charge of issues related to Turkish migrants, integration, and the reporting of events in Turkey. Although in earlier times she visited Turkey infrequently and only for private reasons, nowadays she is in Turkey three to five times a year for professional reasons. Still another example is the border-crossing transfer of practical knowledge. A self-employed owner of a surgical clinic, who has many Turkish migrant patients and also has employed some women with a migration background, cooperates closely with a female friend of hers, who also owns a beauty salon in Istanbul. She says that they exchange many ideas and that she has learned important skills from her Turkish friend, which she has adopted into her services. At the moment, together with her friend in Turkey, she is also involved in the import and export of cosmetic products:

> So, there are always many contacts or ideas, I would say, which one makes, where one tries to get some information. But whether or not something follows out of it depends, because customs play a major role, in terms of some things, one has to comply with some rules set by the Turkish health ministry, that may make importing rather expensive. (Female, 36, German-born)

In the category of moderate transnationalism, there are a certain number of migrants whose transnational occupational activities coincide with their political functions. In two cases, the respective migrants are members of regional German State parliaments. In both cases, it is very obvious that their migration background and their engagement with, at least initially, migration and integration policy played an essential role in their occupational and, in this case, also their political careers. One of these respondents (female, 42, 1.5 generation in Germany) manages affairs between the city where she actually lives and a city in Turkey and actively promotes initiatives to stimulate economic cooperation between German and Turkish companies. The other MP (female, 39, 1.5 generation in Germany) is keeping contact with Turkish political organizations and previously worked in the German outpost of a Turkish media company where she was able to use her knowledge of Turkey and

Turkish language competencies, as well as her knowledge of Germany and the situation of Turkish migrants in Germany.

In two other cases, the respective respondents are currently working in or exercising mediating functions on behalf of migrant organizations. In these cases, the fact of being primarily concerned with integration-related and multicultural matters led to some sort of continuous working relations with Turkish partners. In one of these cases, the secretary general of one of the most important Turkish migrant organizations (male, 63, former international student in Germany) has regular contacts with Turkish institutions and political organizations and often attends conferences on topics such as international relations, migration, and the situation of Turks abroad. The other respective respondent (male, 49, former international student in Germany) participates on a part-time basis in many Turkish migrant organizations and is a member of the respective local steering committees in some. Furthermore, he has founded a private sociological institute, with which he collects and distributes information about and to the Turkish community in the city where he is living. He has regular contacts with Turkish media and the Turkish consulate to which he delivers, for example, individual stories of successful integration of Turkish migrants or statistical data about the Turkish community in his city. In some of our other cases, Turkish migrants working in the private sector cooperate occasionally with Turkish companies by importing or exporting various goods.

There are also a considerable number of Turkish migrants who work in occupational functions related to interethnic or intercultural relations in Germany and who perform what we call weak transnational activities. Sometimes they have transnational contacts, in other cases they use some kind of transnational knowledge, because of previous transnational experiences or transnational interests, to bring ideas for transnational activities into their predominantly multicultural workplaces. In a certain number of cases, Turkish migrants in Germany also make use of opportunities related to their migrant background and/or bicultural competencies by working in contexts in which they deal with intercultural relations and/or programs promoting the integration of migrants in Germany, without having transnational relations or orientations in their broader occupational contexts. Examples of multicultural activities range from different kinds of ethnic entrepreneurship in the private sector[19] to jobs in the public sector, in which Turkish migrants, because of their migration background, have been employed as teachers of integration courses, research assistants in migration research, or in the area of job-service and qualification of long-term unemployed persons.

[19] These cases indicate that ethnic entrepreneurship need not necessarily result in an "ethnic mobility trap," as some assimilation theories argue (Goebel and Pries 2006). In particular, Turkish immigrants of the second or third generation, who were successful within the German education system, offer knowledge-based services, such as tax and legal advice, for customers of Turkish background (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung 2005: 11). Even if some migrant entrepreneurs might feel relegated to very specific market and customer segments, many others regard their ethnicity as an extension of their opportunities in terms of choice and action (Pütz 2004: 211).

The overall greater extent of transnationalism in the economic domain in the German context may be traced to different causes. One reason may be simply that these persons have more immediate needs and interests in terms of earning a living and the betterment of their economic situation. This is likely to raise the share of migrants who make use of transnational opportunities, when available in particular occupational contexts. However, the most relevant point seems to be a restructuring of the economy in favor of an expanding service sector and, owing to Germany's acceptance of itself as an immigration country, the simultaneous development of numerous jobs relating in some way to initiatives, projects, and measures facilitating the integration of migrants in Germany. These integration-related jobs that we place in the multicultural category are often accompanied by transnational relations and activities as well. In this sense, many of our respondents told us that their occupational opportunities and orientations are clearly related to their migration background. For example:

> […] my work was always in some way connected to my descent. (Female, 39, 1.5 generations in Germany).

> And then I've changed from [a town in Germany], where I first studied [political science], to [another town in Germany]. And here it was much more extreme, it wasn't easy, all the themes I chose had to do with the politics of migration and integration, although I never consciously decided this. I think about my mother [The respondents' mother worked in a charity organization that provided advice to migrants], so I knew this from below, and I was interested, so to say, in illuminating the whole issue from above. So I knew it from below, how it affects people, but the fact that there are strategies or even discourses and debates at all, I didn't know that, and to illuminate this and now to look at the politics of migration and integration, that was something that I found totally exciting. (Female, 30, German-born)

In this sense, there is a keen similarity in the political and the economic sphere. As in the political domain, we also observe in the economic domain a strong connection between transnational and multicultural activities.

4.4.3 Transnational and Multicultural Activities in the Sociocultural Domain

The sociocultural domain of transnational activities is somewhat more difficult to deal with, because it comprises a host of different aspects, which cannot be easily grasped with basic concepts, as in the political and economic sphere. To avoid a mixing-up of very different aspects of sociocultural transnationalization, we decided to construct three subdimensions of analysis: degree of cross-border social contacts, social engagement, and migrants' identity and residence.

With regard to transnational activities, the extent of migrants' and nonmigrants' transnational contacts depends on the frequency of private cross-border communications and visits and the number of significant persons (nearest family and best friends) they actually have in other countries. Hence, the category of *strong transnationalism* concerns regular and intensive private contacts to persons living in

the respective other country or in third countries, because several of their significant others reside abroad. In the category of *moderate transnationalism,* we count less intensive and regular social contacts, because few significant persons live in the respective other country or third countries. By contrast, the category of *weak transnationalism* means sporadic cross-border social contacts, because all of a migrant's or nonmigrant's significant others live in the respective resident state. Finally, in addition to transnational activities, we speak of *multiculturalism* in cases of interethnic social contacts within the borders of the respective resident state.

In the dimension of social engagement, we consider membership and participation in nonpolitical associations, clubs, organizations, and networks on the one hand, and activities of social support and donations, on the other hand. The category of *strong transnationalism* covers participation in nonresident state or genuine transnational associations abroad. Furthermore, continuous participation in organized forms of cross-border assistance beyond family relations is attached to this category. The category of *moderate transnationalism* is defined by occasional participation in nonresident state or transnational associations and in associations in the resident state, which cooperate regularly with associations abroad. The moderate mode of transnationalism also comprises continuous informal activities of cross-border help outside of the wider family or the regular cross-border support of family members. If migrants have concrete plans to participate in nonresident state or transnational associations, we count that as *weak transnationalism*. This category also includes occasional activities of cross-border help and support of family members and donations to international aid organizations. In contrast with transnational activities, all initiatives and activities, individually or within associations, aimed at supporting migrants' integration in the resident state are classified as *multicultural activities*.

The third dimension in the sociocultural sphere focuses on migrants' statements regarding their sense of belonging, their views of home and perceptions regarding the center of their life in relation to their actual residence, considering expressions of their loci of primary identification, citizenship, and naturalization as well as of their future plans of residence. To avoid methodological nationalism, in our view it is important in this context to also include statements about transcending ethnic and national affiliations if the respondents mention other units of identification. We take as *strong transnationalism* migrants' self-descriptions of a binational German–Turkish identity or of one in-between these two countries, cultures, and societies. We also include expressions of a European or cosmopolitan identity and expressions of identity beyond ethnic and national identifications, such as class, political ideology, or biregional or bilocal identifications in this category. We use the category of *moderate transnationalism,* if a certain discrepancy between a migrant's ethnic-national self-description of identity and their long-term residence is discernible. This includes statements of concrete plans of return to the home country or a further migration to other countries. The category of *weak transnationalism* is defined as a concomitance of transnational contacts and a commitment to a life perspective based in the resident state. Also, if the respondents report only vague plans for return to their home country or migration to other countries in the remote future, that is captured

in this category. However, if the respondents' self-descriptions of a bicultural identity occur without actual relations to their home country or to other countries and with a commitment to a life perspective based in the resident state, we classify that in the category of *multiculturalism*.

4.4.3.1 Cross-Border Social Contacts

In the Turkish context, the level of cross-border communications varied across different categories of respondents. Like their first and 1.5-generation Turkish counterparts in Germany, most of the ethnic Germans living in Turkey state that they have relatives and friends in Germany and these contacts continue after their migration to Turkey. For the return migrants and the relatives of migrants in Germany the frequency and style of communication varied and altered over time. The frequency of cross-border communication varies from every night to once a year depending on the respondent. Those who arrived in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s described to us how they sent letters home or waited in long lines to talk to relatives on the phone for just a few minutes. Thus, the frequency of their transnational communication was low. In the current decade, with major changes in technology, the regularity of communication is facilitated. New technologies, such as cheap calling cards, MSN, Skype, and e-mail make it possible for migrants to maintain their long distance connections more easily. This is especially true for second-generation return migrants. Many of them talk to their relatives and friends over the Internet almost every evening. Their quotes reflect the importance of this communication for them:

> When we were in Germany, we would visit every year. I had 4 weeks off, spent a week on the road, and came for 3 weeks. Now I call my family in Germany over the phone every day. (Male, 83, return migrant in Turkey whose children and grandchildren are still in Germany)

> When I was in Germany, I would visit Turkey three times a year with my daughter.... Now I can talk to my family in Germany for an unlimited amount of time with a 70-euro phone card. I call friends once a month and visit once a year. (Female, 76, return migrant in Turkey whose children and grandchildren are still in Germany)

> At the beginning, I was writing letters once a month, then in 1980, I got a phone line, began to call, and except for the first few years, we always visited. Now, I talk to the children almost every day, and see the grandchildren over the Internet. (Male, 59, return migrant in Turkey whose children and grandchildren are still in Germany)

What these quotes do not capture is that there is a lost generation between the early period of guest worker migrants and today. Those who returned to Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s do not seem to have many transnational contacts. There are several reasons for this: First, as time passes, they have lost the contact information; that is, usually the phone numbers, of people they knew in Germany. Many mentioned that they were originally calling their contacts once every 3 months, but over time, the frequency of the calls declined. Second, this is a generation with little access to and interest in the Internet. They do not have e-mail addresses, Skype, or MSN usernames. Third, these people never considered their stay in Germany

permanent. Their duration of stay as a migrant was shorter, and after returning to Turkey, Germany remains only a past memory. One returnee related:

> When I there, I was calling my mother and siblings almost every week, phone calls.... I used to wait for 5 hours. I could not write letters, as mum was illiterate.... I didn't have many friends to call back then. After I returned I called my friends in Germany 2–3 times, but as time passed relations ended. (Female, 68, return migrant in Turkey)

We observed a similar pattern with traveling. Despite the fact that traveling is much easier and cheaper than in former times, the occurrence of traveling to Germany varies among respondents in Turkey. In other words, not everybody chooses to travel. There seems to be a correlation between the duration of stay in Germany and the amount of traveling that the respondents make after their return. On the one hand, there are first-generation migrants who stayed in Germany for much shorter periods, especially those who returned before retirement, usually with family members, and who are not interested in traveling to Germany. These migrants did not leave any children behind, lost touch with their other contacts over time, and in their mind their Germany story is finished, leaving no reason for visits to Germany. On the other hand, there are first-generation migrants who postponed their return for several reasons; for example, to wait for their retirement in Germany, for their children's education, and so on. These migrants usually have children and grandchildren in Germany whom they visit every year. Even if they do not own any property in Germany, they have a place to stay for longer periods. Among such respondents, there is one interesting case, a man who visits his daughter's grave almost every 2 years. His daughter died a few days after she was born and was immediately buried in Germany. The man still visits her grave and considers this a personal pilgrimage:

> I used to have a German boss in the factory who was very nice to me. He is also buried in the same cemetery. Every time I visit my daughter's grave, I also visit his. (Male, 83, return migrant in Turkey)

Like the respondents in Turkey, on the German side, the interviewees also say that nowadays traveling and communicating with Turkey is easier than in former times because of new and cheaper technologies, such as inexpensive flights or flat rate cell phones that can be used to call Turkey:

> And the contacts now are in fact much more frequent in contrast to former times. Because in the past one could phone one or two times. But now there are these wild cards and you get several hundred thousand Euros worth of minutes to Turkey. Then, one pays only once a month and can call as much as one wants. Or all these cheap flights! So nowadays my parents fly very often to Turkey, three, four times a year, I must say, because they are also retired. (Female, 17, German-born)

Even if it is easier, the frequency and intensity of traveling and communicating with Turkey is very different for different interviewees. With regard to traveling, the frequency varies from several times a year or once a year, especially during the summer holidays, to only every few years. Across a lifetime, the frequency of traveling to Turkey may also change. Retired respondents go to Turkey more often and for longer periods. In other cases, traveling to Turkey diminishes for various reasons, such as

lack of time or money or the death of a significant other in Turkey. A male respondent told us:

> I've been flying [to Turkey] every year in September. But the reason—I have recognized this only later—was my mother, because my mother was always very glad when I was there. As long as my mother was alive and I was living here, I went willingly. And after my mother was dead, I only go every two or three years. For three years I haven't gone at all. It doesn't matter to me whether I go there or not. (Male, 49, refugee in Germany)

When the respondents in the German survey go to Turkey, they often combine visits with relatives and friends with their holidays. For some of the interviewees, it is not easy to combine visits and holidays and they have to make compromises. With regard to communicating by telephone and Internet with Turkey, the frequency varies from several times or once a day to weekly or monthly. In the German survey, most interviewees use phone calls to stay in contact with their relatives and friends abroad. A smaller fraction of the respondents use new communication technologies, such as Internet, e-mail, chat, Messenger, Skype calls, or Facebook.

Regarding different degrees of transnationalism having to do with private contacts and networks, cases are distributed across all categories of transnationalism in both the German and Turkish samples. The intensity of contacts is related to different factors, such as the respondent's center of life and concrete life situation or ownership of property. The category of strong transnationalism especially includes Turkish migrants who keep moving between Germany and Turkey. These can be people who are commuting between Germany and Turkey continuously and thus are embedded in both countries at the same time, but also Turkish migrants who changed their residence between Germany and Turkey several times, whereby they also shift the center of their lives. If interviewees are always commuting or staying for longer periods in Germany and Turkey, they often have regular and intensive private cross-border contacts. Examples include businesspeople and international students. Within the category of strong transnationalism there are also some cases in the German sample of people who have intensive contacts to Turkey because of a strong family bond. These include many respondents who have close family members in Turkey who are dear to them. They regularly go to Turkey to visit their family and telephone almost every day, in one case even up to ten times each day.

Thus, although both samples include several cases that can be classified as strong transnationalism, the categories moderate and weak transnationalism include the largest proportions of the respondents. The interviewees in the category of moderate transnationalism have less intensive but continuous private contacts. Even if their current center of life and also important contacts are in the country of their residence, they maintain contact with a few relatives or friends in the other country, which they describe as an important reference. For instance, one female respondent said:

> But honestly, I've such a great wish—that's mostly if one gets older—more than my mother at present, to visit my former village, to have more time, to care for my grandma's grave, and to visit relatives there, who I love a lot. So, it's due to my everyday life here and my self-employment. But these are all things I now want to catch up on. Also, to visit relatives, not all of them of course, but those who are close to my heart, with whom I've a strong

> relationship also. There are cousins who I love a lot. But there are a few people—as I've noticed too—who, even if we didn't meet three or four years and then we see each other, it's the same as in the beginning, the same closeness, the same warmth, which one feels then, no distance. But I think that these are special friendships. (Female, 44, 1.5 generations in Germany)

In these cases cross-border contacts often increase in a specific life situation, such as a longer stay in Turkey, a retirement, or if the person meets his or her future spouse in the other country. Another aspect, which we should pay attention to when we talk about relationships between Turkey and Germany, is cross-border property ownership. Some of the return migrants interviewed in the Turkish survey own property in both countries:

> Mom and dad met in Germany, got married, had 2 kids, and began living there. My sibling and I went to a private art school, we were the first Turkish students, and there were not many foreigners. Later on, my parents started a tourism company, beginning to bring tours to Turkey and other countries. We have an apartment in Turkey and a house in Germany. A well-organized family life.... (Female, 34, second-generation return migrant in Turkey)

> I decided to return in 1995 when I retired, I wanted to live in Turkey. I travelled all around to find my dream house—nice sea, a nice house with a garage… I found it here. I still go and visit grandchildren in Germany, staying 5–6 months. (Male, 83, return migrant in Turkey)

The residence in Turkey is usually the house in which the person resides, and the property in Germany is where their children live with their spouses and grandchildren, whom they regularly visit. Most interviewees in this group show moderate to strong transnational ties. However, owning property in another country does not necessarily lead to intensive cross-border contacts. For those migrants who are still in Germany, or ethnic Germans in Turkey, the property in Turkey is usually a summerhouse, where they spend 6 months of the year, and the property in Germany is a house where they are officially permanently resident. Thus, many are really circular migrants between Turkey and Germany, but at the same time they tend to have weak transnational interactions.

The category of weak transnationalism includes sporadic private cross-border contacts, whereas nearly all relatives and friends mentioned as significant others are living in the same country as the respondent. When one of our respondents in Germany talks about "holiday-Turks," he seems to have this type of migrant in mind:

> Most Turks living in Germany are 'holiday-Turks.' They go to Turkey each year for four or five weeks but otherwise they don't have detailed knowledge about their home country. […] The holiday-Turk has an idealised picture of Turkey, which does not correspond to reality. (Male, 37, 1.5 generations in Germany)

> So, once a year—Turkey is totally nice, there is beach, the weather is simply bombastic and—. In any case, for holidays, but I won't be able to move and live there. (Female, 19, German-born)

This category includes inter alia interviewees whose cross-border contacts decrease over time. Even if, as in many cases, the family is determined to maintain

cross-border contacts, there are many cases where family contacts become less frequent. A female respondent explained:

> We went to Turkey each year, also after I married. But the last time, for the last three years we can't go there anymore. Now, we go there one year and the other year we don't. [...] Yes, we've bought a condominium, which we have to pay off. And also my masters school costs a lot of money. One cannot have everything at once. (Female, 38, 1.5 generations in Germany)

One of the respondents in the Turkish sample mentioned—albeit only briefly—how he has lost contact with his daughter who did not return with the family and eventually cut the ties:

> When we first moved to Germany, I had no connections with German authorities, but certain Turkish civil society organizations. I was uneasy about the ideological (either far-left or religious) orientation of the organizations. They would say they'd teach German, and then do communist propaganda. They brainwashed my daughter. (Male, 75, return migrant in Turkey)

Another respondent told us that he only saw his brother in Germany occasionally, if he could stop by for business trips. Within the Turkish–German transnational space, even after the right of family reunification was established, many families were divided across borders. One respondent can only go and visit her family in Hamburg—two siblings and parents who are all German citizens—with a visa sponsored by her employer in Turkey. Another respondent completely lost touch with his two children, when he got divorced from his first wife in Turkey, after he migrated to Germany. He has not seen them for years, although he returned in 1980.

Even if nearly all of the respondents in the German survey maintain contacts with Turkey, in whatever form this takes, there are also cases of people having no private relationships with people in Turkey. One interviewee told us as follows:

> We were torn out of this [Turkish] society too early. To be honest, I don't have even true contact to my relatives. I'm more related to my Turkish neighbours in Germany. To my own relatives, I don't have any contact, and I think there is also a cultural difference. (Female, 36, 1.5 generations in Germany)

Thus, this respondent is one of the exceptions in the German sample and is only categorized in the category of multiculturalism. Nearly all of our interviewees maintain private cross-border contacts as well as intraethnic or interethnic social contacts within Germany. Their contacts in Germany can be really different from each other, for example, interviewees describe contacts to their complete extended family living in Germany, to a mixed circle of friends or their German neighborhood.

4.4.3.2 Social Engagement

With regard to social engagement and social activities, the German sample contains no cases of strong transnational activities, according to which individual migrants participate directly in non-German or transnational associations, organizations, or networks. However, there are many migrants participating in professional and

voluntary activities in German organizations or Turkish migrant associations. It is in these contexts that moderate or weak transnational activities take place, because many of these German-based organizations have relationships to Turkey, because of their various functions. Although some of the associations cooperate on a regular basis with associations in Turkey, others have only occasional contacts. Turkish migrant associations in Germany maintain contacts with different facilities in Turkey, such as ministries, cultural associations, or radio stations. They also have contacts with private persons in Turkey, such as artists or lecturers, whom they invite to Germany for special events. For instance, a male respondent reported as follows:

> As manager of the house [German-Turkish association], I actually have to deal with Turkey nearly daily, whether with ministries in Turkey or in particular with organisations in the artistic or cultural area. We closely cooperate with foundations for culture and the arts in Istanbul. We constantly have contact with artists in Turkey whom we invite to events. Also managers, record companies, whatever. The contacts are actually diverse. (Male, 34, German-born)

A smaller proportion of the interviewees are also engaged in associations or initiatives that organize social activities in Turkey. They support social institutions located in Turkey or organize donations for beneficial purposes there. These social activities can take place on a regular or on an only occasional basis. Although in the German sample only a few interviewees could be classified in the categories of moderate and weak transnationalism, a relatively large number of respondents report involvement in associations, institutions, and initiatives in Germany. Some of the interviewees involved with multicultural activities are even involved in different associations at the same time or in one association after another. Among the interviewees are some members of Turkish migrant communities and Turkish–German communities who offer a wide range of support services in the integration sector. These include facilities that provide integration courses for Turkish boys and girls, homework assistance, a women's group, a prayer room, and a dormitory for people who are alone in Germany in which they can live and work while their spouse lives in Turkey. They also organize a number of cultural events. As one male respondent said:

> There is this cultural field addressing cabaret, film, music, and literature. (Male, 33, German-born)

But not all associations perform a wide range of activities; some focus more on specific areas, such as religion, culture, women, or sports. Many of the return migrants in the Turkish sample also mentioned involvement in such activities during their stay in Germany. However, it is not possible to say that their social involvement continued upon their return to Turkey.

In the Turkish context, the participation rate of return migrants in civil society both during their stay in Germany and upon their return to Turkey can be stated as low; cross-border participation is almost nonexistent. Only 17 respondents claimed to have a continuing formal membership in a civil society organization. These organizations in which they participated are grouped around varying topics and interests, including home town associations, professional associations, international NGOs such as

Greenpeace, backgammon, or sports clubs. For example, there were many respondents who donated a certain amount of money to the building of a mosque. In addition, many were involved in activities promoting Turkish culture, such as homemade Turkish food sales attracting German neighbors, in which money collected was used for the next event in the neighborhood. Others were volunteering in language courses, usually teaching German to newly arriving Turkish women. Thus, despite a lack of formal affiliation with a civil society organization, many migrants were rather active in civil society, during their stay in Germany. However, all these activities fall under our typology of multiculturalism, rather than any form or level of transnationalism:

> I was a member of the syndicates in the factories at which I worked in Germany. I was also a member of the SPD until I came back. (Male, 67, return migrant)

Moreover, it is rather difficult to say that these migrants continued such activities upon their return to Turkey. In the Turkish context, there were only four respondents whose civil society activities can be categorized as transnational: One of them is a member of the German Red Cross in Berlin; the other is a founding member of nikfer.de, a home town association based in Germany; the third is a member of the European Association of Turkish Academics and the German–Turkish Forum, both of which are based in Germany; and the final one is a former president of the Edirnespor Soccer Club who had developed cross-border contacts with local German clubs; for example, friendship games.

Besides the social support provided by these associations, family responsibilities also make financial and social remittances necessary. Migrants' remittances are of basically two different kinds. They can take place on a continuous or an only sporadic basis. In the German sample, some of the interviewees give financial support to family members in Turkey:

> I've sent a great deal of money to Turkey, you know? Yes, three hundred or five hundred Marks [the old German currency] once a month, you know? For example, when my daughter wrote a letter, 'Baba, I want to go to school and need five hundred Marks for that,' I sent more money. (Male, 72, former guest worker in Germany)

Besides financial and other forms of material support, interviewees told us about the social support activities of family members, which go in both directions. This is particularly relevant in cases of illness and death, but also in the event of weddings. Although some interviewees travel and phone to support their family members in Turkey, others report that they can never be there for their relatives because of physical distance. Interviewees also described problems within Germany concerning social support. They often reported that Turkish migrants are uninformed about health care institutions in Germany. Thus, family members often give informal support and care:

> My mother told me that back then she didn't even know what the job centre or the social office is or where she can get help anywhere outside of the family. (Female, 29, third generation in Germany)

In the Turkish context, almost all of our return migrant respondents informed us that they were remitting money to Turkey during their stay in Germany. They were either using the Central Bank or the postal services to send their remittances. Some would bring the money themselves during their frequent holiday visits to Turkey.

Thus, the amounts and frequencies of remittances varied from a small amount that is regularly sent, to a large lump sum remitted in case of need or an emergency at home. The recipients were usually the migrants' parents who were typically looking after their grandchildren; thus, the money was used for the education of the next generations. Sometimes the money was used to buy land to build a family house, or to buy an apartment building for the extended family, usually in cities near the emigration locale. In a few cases, such investments were made in the actual home town or village, which is only used as a summer place:

> I used to send 2000 DM to my family, even after my divorce—that's how my kids got such good education. (Male, 84, return migrant in Turkey)

> My family used to bring cash, around 500 Euros, with them when they visited. It was for those family members in need. (Female, 35, second-generation return migrant in Turkey)

> When I was in Germany, I would send 400–500 DM every month. When I first went to Germany, I got some pocket money from Turkey. After my return, I received 55,000 DM as part of the social security cuts. (Male, 67, return migrant in Turkey)

> I used to send 200 DM to my grandmother every month. I never received money from Turkey, while I was in Germany. After I moved back, I received my social security money from Germany; I used it for my wedding. (Male, 51, return migrant in Turkey)

> I see Germany as a river, as long as a retirement pension flows into Turkey, it's good here. (Male, 71, return migrant in Turkey)

There are two groups who still receive money from Germany, thus maintaining a transnational social engagement: those who retired in Germany and who regularly receive pensions and second-generation students in Turkey who receive money from their families in Germany. The direction of these transnational money transactions is usually from Germany to Turkey, rather than the other way around. There were only two respondents who stated that they send money to Germany—one to his children who stayed in Germany, and he does so sporadically when needed. The other sends her parents the rent for an apartment bought by them.

4.4.3.3 Identity and Residence

In a piece reflecting on a quarter century of international migration research and commemorating the 25th anniversary of the International Migration Review, the authors state:

> Today, of course, the German mood towards immigrants has soared. A sizeable fraction of the 'guest-workers' stayed on and many of them were to be joined by their families. Instead of motorbikes and good-natured claps on the back, guest-workers in Germany in 1989, particularly the Turks, are the subject of widespread hostility and a growing anti-immigrant political party. (1989: 393)

A few years later, Abadan-Unat (1992) concluded that a key feature of the post–Cold War period was a resurgence of ethnic identity, as the basis for effective political action in widely divergent societies in which immigrants have been actively involved. Two decades later, things are more complicated. The analysis of the identity dimension

in both cases turns out to be more difficult than the other dimensions for several reasons. First, identity and belonging is described by our respondents in relation to many different aspects, such as cultural identifications, social relations, and understandings of political membership. Second, in most of our interviews, our respondents made many and often different and ambivalent statements concerning their sense of belonging and whether or not they will stay in their current state of residence (Turkey or Germany) or will migrate to another country in the future. Third, the self-descriptions of our respondents' identities have changed to a great extent and often several times at several stages in the course of their lives. Fourth, in many cases it is obvious that both the extensiveness of related statements and their apparent inconsistencies reflect to a significant extent the institutional setting of Germany's long lasting guest worker migration policy regime and migrants' exposure to similar, different, and ambivalent expectations on the part of the German population. These expectations vary between supposed return migration and far-reaching assimilation, and also correspond to experiences of discrimination.[20] Also, migrants' respective self-descriptions are often related to individual reflections upon and reactions to German public and political discourses about integration and the conditions of naturalization.[21] Finally, respondents' feelings of belonging also vary to a great extent. For the respondents in Germany, in many cases, feelings have changed, because of experiences of alienation they felt on the occasion of visits or longer resident periods in Turkey.

In Germany, we have very few cases that can be characterized as having neither transnational nor multicultural aspects. In most of our cases the corresponding migrants describe different aspects of a multicultural identity in relation to their lives in Germany besides their varying degrees of transnational identification. The highest share of cases corresponds with the category of strong transnationalism, where we find cases of basically two different kinds, which, interestingly, appear to a high extent among the so-called second generation. First, we have a number of respondents who positively assess their binational identity and find it advantageous to be able to revert to the experiences, knowledge, and competencies of both countries and cultures. In some cases they even develop a sort of pride regarding their dual identity:

> I find, if one can make good use of taking out the nice things from both cultures, it is really always helpful […] and I'm very pleased to have a migration background. (Female, 36, German-born)

Interestingly, however, many of our respondents with such a self-confident dual self-understanding report at the same time that it took some time to arrive at such a

[20] Because of this complexity, the identity dimension deserves further analysis and interpretation beyond this report.

[21] Concerning citizenship, especially the fact that Germany still does not accept dual citizenship officially and legally, but also the fact that Turkish migrants had to get dual citizenship before Germany's citizenship law reform in 2000 and have the possibility to receive the so-called "pink card" as a reduced kind of Turkish citizenship, seem to have led to a broad spectrum of very different individual responses.

positive attitude and that several propitious circumstances in their individual life courses contributed to this outcome. In a considerable number of cases, the respondents report that at some time they re-discovered their Turkish roots at a later stage in their life course for different reasons, including family events, occupational opportunities, or experiences of xenophobia or discrimination in German society.

Second, we also have a number of respondents who either simply do not primarily identify themselves with an ethnic or national dimension or who even distance themselves explicitly from this kind of identification. In some of these cases, they instead prefer self-descriptions other than or beyond ethnic and national identities, such as in terms of class or belonging in Europe. Transnational entrepreneurs in particular, in some cases, describe themselves as belonging to a kind of transnational business elite:

> I didn't come as a worker, but I came already in 1971 [from Turkey to Germany]. Then I got married, yes, and I have married into a very well off German family. I myself also came from a well-off family, let's say, my father was a factory-owner, and my mother was formerly a civil servant in the municipality. Although my father, who owned a factory in Switzerland, was against this marriage, in a sense, it was because my former husband came from a good family, too. From his father's side they came from East Prussia and his mother's father was a landlord and my mother-in-law was from Westphalia; she was a teacher. So I'm affiliated with a well-off family, and I've never had anything to do with Turks. (Female, 55, marriage migrant in Germany)

Especially among the respondents who are transnational and very politically active, there are some who favor a primary identification with Europe. However, we have very few respondents who say explicitly that they understand themselves as cosmopolitan or global citizens. Some migrants also simply relate their sense of belonging to the location of their friends and important social contacts:

> I've learned that the term 'home' has to do with people—so, for me, home is where the people are that I love, or the people who love me. (Female, 44, 1.5 generations in Germany)

The German sample also consists of a significant number of cases of moderate transnationalism, according to which migrants strongly fluctuate between different and conflicting identifications or migrants' identifications contradict their long-term residence. There are a certain number of migrants who report that they postponed their intended return to Turkey over many years and are still maintaining the idea of returning. In most of these cases, the migrants told us that the main reason for their ambition to return is that they never really felt at home in Germany. In some cases, however, migrants also report feelings of alienation in Turkey, during their visits there. Often, they describe experiences of being relegated to a minority in both contexts or they narrate that they always long for the respective other country. For example:

> I find we're foreigners everywhere. We're foreigners here [in Germany] and we're foreigners in Turkey somehow. (Female, 22, German-born)

> We don't feel good, neither here nor there. We're not from here and we're not from there. (Female, 53, 1.5 generation in Germany)

> When I'm in Turkey I'm longing for Germany and in Germany I'm longing for Turkey. (Female, 58, former international student in Germany)

However, there are also a considerable number of migrants, although mostly of the so-called second generation, who feel a dominant sense of belonging to Germany and usually see their future prospects also in Germany, but who at the same time uphold continuous relations and ties to Turkey or other countries, which they regard as rather unproblematic. These cases correspond with the category of weak transnationalism.

Based on the Turkish sample, we can argue that given the current state of citizenship policy in German–Turkish transnational space, ethnic identity seems to be declining in importance, whereas a sense of belonging among migrants is becoming a more recurrent theme. Surprisingly, as in the German case, the issue is more sensitive among so-called second-generation migrants. Many of the representatives of the second generation are better educated than their Turkish parents. They are better integrated into German society, they speak perfect German, and most are German citizens. However, their Turkish identity seems to be a ghost that follows them. Almost all of the second-generation return migrants in Turkey are in their so-called home country to find out about their roots, and they feel excluded and included, at the same time. They either feel that they belong to neither of the countries or both of them. In both cases, they seem to feel obscure. Despite their German IDs, in Germany, they are Turks. In Turkey they are not Turks, but German–Turks. Surprisingly, the more educated the respondent, the deeper he or she feels this identity crisis. This is somewhat different on the German side, where the better-educated second-generation migrants are those who are the most likely to develop a kind of positive self-relationship toward their binational or bicultural identity, even if they often note that this took a long time. For example:

> After returning, I am an "Alamanci" here, and I'm not "German" in Germany, so I feel in between. (Female, 59, return migrant in Turkey)

> I'm here in Turkey as an exchange student to learn more about my motherland. (Female, 24, Turkish–German exchange student in Turkey)

Our findings in Turkey also show that there is a positive correlation between the duration of stay in the host country and an identity crisis. The more a respondent stayed in Germany, the more he or she has a hard time defining where "home" is. In some cases, the solution is to define home by localities, rather than by obscure transnational concepts. Thus, Istanbul, defined as a cosmopolitan city, was a common example of a place in which respondents felt at home. This was also the case for the ethnic Germans living in Turkey. They would define "home" within their immediate surroundings. "Home" was their apartment, a neighborhood in Istanbul, or the entire city. Interestingly, although they defined "home" by localities, their self-identifications were more international: Many of them indicated that they felt European or German.

The first-generation return migrants in Turkey, regardless of their duration of stay in Germany, and despite their discontent with many things in Turkey; that is, the health system, traffic, people spitting on the streets, etc., identify to the fullest extent as Turks. Their identifications do not alter at any point in time. Among this group of respondents, there were only two cases of people who defined themselves

as Muslims.[22] There were otherwise no class or region-based definitions of identity offered by migrants.

4.4.4 Transnational and Multicultural Activities in the Educational Domain

In the educational domain, we take into consideration different kinds of impacts that transnational activities and orientations have on migrants' educational careers. Transnationalism can influence migrants' educational careers directly if educational institutions, such as schools or universities in other countries are attended, but these influences can also be of an indirect kind, when the transnational activities and orientations of families outside of the educational field have consequences for the educational success or failure of migrants' children. In the category of *strong transnationalism,* we classify cases of attendance at educational institutions in different countries, if these obviously correspond with or contradict the migrants' educational ambitions. In this category, we also include parental strategies of bi- and multilingual and -cultural upbringing to enable the transnational careers of children, or parental influences, which block the educational ambitions of children as a result of transnational or return orientations. In the category of *moderate transnationalism,* we include the attendance of educational institutions in different countries, which results in the formation of certain transnational competencies even if this does not correspond to the explicit educational ambitions of the respondents. In addition, the targeted acquirement or successive unlearning of particular (inter-) cultural and/or transnational competencies or knowledge about certain countries as a consequence of migration-related or transnational socialization experiences is counted here. The category of *weak transnationalism* comprises cases of maintenance and transmission of knowledge and competencies suitable for border-crossing contacts, communication, and activities without explicit educational ambitions and without actual use of these skills outside of family relations. Finally, in contrast to transnational activities, the category of *multiculturalism* includes the advancement of bi- and multilingual and -cultural competencies or those based on different life forms in the context of increasing pluralism and cultural diversity within the resident state. It also includes parental strategies of bi- and multilingual and -cultural upbringing to enhance the occupational or other opportunities of the children within a multicultural resident state.

Both in Germany and Turkey, we arrive at an approximately equal distribution of our cases in each of our four types from strong transnationalism to multiculturalism,

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[22] However, it is important to note that our recruitment strategy of respondents did not include systematic efforts to incorporate members of religious communities. Identifications as Muslims would probably be much more frequent if we could also access Islamic communities of different kinds.

although most Turkish migrants came to Germany for reasons of temporary labor and thus without transnational educational motives of some kind, or they returned at some point without any transnational educational background. In particular, two reasons explain our high share of transnational activities in the educational field. First, we have a significant number of so-called second-generation Turkish migrants both in the Turkish and also German samples. Second, we decided to also include transnational influences originating from motives other than educational motives if these had, from our respondents' perspectives a strong impact on their educational careers. This accounts for the long-standing return orientation of many of the former guest worker families, which had consequences for the educational ambitions (especially regarding language acquisition) of first generation Turkish migrants in Germany, but even more far-reaching impacts on the educational careers of the guest workers children in many cases. Thus, whereas the first-generation guest worker migrants in Germany, as well as the related return migrants in Turkey, show weak or no transnational orientations, so-called second-generation migrants can be found to have a higher share of occurrences in the categories of strong and moderate transnationalism.

In the German case, the topic of education and migration is often discussed with regard to the situation of young migrants in the German public education system. The overall educational attainments of the so-called second migrant generation is the most salient issue in current political and public, as well as in scientific discourses, on immigrant integration in Germany, which is understood primarily in socioeconomic terms.[23] The children of noncitizens, whether they migrated with their parents or were born in Germany, lag behind in education, both in comparison to their native counterparts and in comparison to similar pupil and student populations in other European countries.[24] Educational outcomes in Germany of the so-called second migrant generation vary considerably among different ethnic groups, but the attainments of children of Turkish migrants are clearly below average.[25] Even though the

[23] That education as well as German language acquisition in early childhood is nowadays regarded as the "key to integration" has many different reasons, among them, most importantly, the perceived transformation to service-based economies and so-called "knowledge-based societies," which are deemed to reduce opportunities for low-skilled or unskilled labor.

[24] See the report of the OECD's Programme for International Students Assessment (PISA) in 2001.

[25] The purported explanations for these inequalities in educational attainment relating to ethnic backgrounds are very different. Although the dominant political discourse attributes the failure in significant part to the migrants themselves, scientific explanations range from institutional discrimination in schools (Gomolla and Radtke 2002; Kristen 2006) to the individual qualification deficits of young migrants like the absence of German language skills (Esser 2006). However, cross-country comparisons provide at least strong indications for the significant influence of the German education system, whose institutions were and still are obviously less prepared to accommodate the educational needs of migrant children. For example, compared with second-generation Turks in other European countries, those in Germany are clearly disadvantaged. For example, "only 3% enter higher education in Germany, as compared to almost 40% in Sweden and France" (Crul and Schneider 2010: 1258).

German sample reflects the disadvantages of Turkish migrants in the German education system, among our respondents are many who were fairly successful in terms of educational attainments:

> I have relatives and friends in Germany and also persons in the village [in Turkey], but I'm the first and only one who went to an university. For my family and my parents it was outstanding that I managed it in the end. (Male, 43, 1.5 generations in Germany)

These migrants include international students and the children of highly skilled Turkish migrants, on the one hand, and social climbers among the children of the former Turkish guest workers, on the other hand. These social climbers can be further subdivided into those who initially successfully passed through the German educational system and those who were not successful in the regular German education system but made up for their shortcomings in the second chance educational channel.

In the Turkish case, the topic of education and migration is often discussed with regard to Turkey's position vis à vis the education of emigrant children. Turkey's approach has been to recognize their educational problems and to develop strategies favoring the children of Turkish migrants abroad. There are two illustrative policies: First, Turkey initiated state high schools—Anadolu Lisesi—with German as medium of education, in order to alleviate the adaptation problems of the children of returning Turkish migrants from Germany in the Turkish educational system. Although the policy was surely initiated with good intentions, it was only partially successful. As one female respondent reported:

> Until the 8th class, I went to school in Germany. Before moving back, we received information from the Turkish Consulate that I could continue my education in German to ease my adaptation to the new system. I remember that none of the classes were in German and most of the classes like history, geography, and religion were in Turkish anyway. I did not know who Atatürk was. I had a very hard time. Also, I remember that my parents paid the school some amount of money to be able to register us. They claimed that there wasn't any place for us. (Female, 31, second-generation return migrant in Turkey)

A few of our respondents returned to Turkey with their parents and attended these high schools and almost all of them had problems. The difficulty cited most often was that the medium of education was German only on paper, and in fact, almost all classes were in Turkish. Another problem had to do with the differences in the format and nature of education in the two countries. In Turkey, education was mostly based on memorization, whereas in Germany education was about the actual learning process. Our respondents only praised four high schools, two private (Deutsche Schule Istanbul and St. Georgs-Kolleg Istanbul) and two public (Cagoglu Anadolu and Istanbul Erkek Lisesi) as places where returning children could somehow adapt.

The *second* policy that Turkey began to implement was the *Yurtdışında Çalışanların Çocukları İçin Yükseköğretime Giriş Sınavı (YÇS)*, which can be translated into English as the University Entrance Exam for Children of those Working Abroad. The nationwide university entrance exam is very competitive, and with YÇS, the children of migrants abroad gained a comparative advantage against their non-migrant Turkish counterparts. One of our respondents who went to Germany in 1985 with her family

when she was a 1-month old baby took this exam. She is now a recent graduate with a degree in communications and would like to start her own business, which will be oriented towards Erasmus exchange students.

As in the German sample, in the Turkish sample, there are also return migrants who are fairly successful regarding their educational attainment. Again, these include international students and the children of highly skilled Turkish migrants, on the one hand, and social climbers among the children of the former Turkish guest workers, on the other hand. For the latter group, language is one of the most important channels of mobility. Many second-generation migrants also speak English, French, and/or Spanish in addition to their German and Turkish mother tongues, due to the nature of education in Germany. Upon their return to Turkey, they utilize their knowledge of languages as an efficient form of social capital and a means of social mobility in several ways: *First*, they use their language skills as important assets for finding jobs in relevant fields, such as in German-Turkish companies, civil society organizations, German language schools, consulates, the tourism sector, translation firms, etc. *Secondly*, and this is especially true for those who had to return with their families at an earlier age, they use their German to pursue a university degree. In Turkey, there is a very competitive nationwide university entrance exam. A few of our respondents took the language section of this exam and entered into the German Language and Literature departments of various Turkish universities. Thus, language became an asset that made them more competitive against their Turkish counterparts with non-migrant backgrounds.

To provide empirical evidence of emerging transnational educational spaces, transnational studies often refer to highly skilled migrants.[26] Among the interviewees in both cases we also have highly skilled migrants who went abroad to fulfil explicit educational ambitions and thus exhibit what we would call a strong transnational orientation. This includes international students from Turkey who currently study in Germany, or exchange students from Germany in Turkey, as well as those interviewees who grew up in Germany and who have studied in other countries, for example in the US or in Spain. However, people do not only move abroad with the intention of receiving a university degree, but also to receive degrees at a lower level. For example, one interviewee (female, 45, 1.5 generation in Germany) told us that her son was not successful in the German high school and thus went to Turkey to finish his degree there. But transnational activities do not always result in a successful course of education. In the German sample, we have a considerable number of cases, which show that the return orientation of parents often influenced the education of their children in a negative way. Many migrant children in the German survey talk extensively about the consequences that the permanently postponed

[26] These studies, for example, analyze educational migrants (Martin 2005), international students or professionals (Scheibelhofer 2006; Weiss 2006; Bauschke-Urban 2008). Moreover, they deal with transnational careers (Kreutzer and Roth 2006) and epistemic networks (Faist 2008: 31).

return perspective of their families had on the development of their own life plans and education. For example, one female interviewee explained:

> Yes, and then it [the planned return migration of the family] was postponed to the next year. In this respect, in a sense, we lived out of our suitcases. Everything was prepared for the return next summer. The money was saved, saved and saved. 'Next year we will go back forever.' For me, that had a negative effect, because one could not have firm aims. Also in educational matters, and regarding occupational plans, or concerning friendship bonds one was afraid to develop too strong emotional ties, because of thinking I'll go back next year anyway. Insofar as this is concerned, one could never feel at home properly. (Female, 44, 1.5 generations in Germany)

In some cases, our respondents reported that their parents simply argued that further or more comprehensive education in Germany, either at a higher school or through professional training, would be unprofitable because the family would go back to Turkey soon or a German university degree would not be recognized in Turkey. In other cases, the children of Turkish 'guest-workers' were left for a certain time in Turkey or were even sent back in order to attend a Turkish school and thus to become familiar with Turkish language and culture. In a few cases, the interviewees were sent back and forth several times. The interviewees who came to Germany as children or adolescents often describe that the result of their migration experience was a serious deficit in German language proficiency during their schooldays:

> And then I discovered my next deficits, that I could not speak my mother tongue regularly and that I didn't really know Turkey. And then I've connected all this with my political engagement. I've improved my Turkish language and I've been involved intensively with the Turkish system. That means, thereafter an intensive Turkish period began again, but only since the first years of my twenties. (Female, 42, 1.5 generations in Germany)

Missing German language skills often led to diminished opportunities in educational carriers. A similar influence, as some of our respondents pointed out, was the separation of Turkish children into Turkish classes, which in the early period of Germany's 'guest-worker regime' were aimed at securing their re-integration into Turkish society after their expected return. Because of their own experiences as migrant children, some of the interviewees said that their children are their reason for still staying in Germany. They do not want to pull them out of the school there and plan to return to Turkey only after their children have finished their education and are independent.

The movement between educational institutions in different countries mentioned above is not always motivated by educational ambitions. If the motivation to change the country goes along with factors besides the acquisition of education, we speak of moderate transnationalism. In most cases of Turkish migrants who studied in Germany, the decision to migrate to Germany was made for other reasons. Examples include political refugees and family reunification. Besides students, the second case in this category is that of children of Turkish 'guest-workers' who were pulled out of school in Turkey to follow their parents to Germany, or who were left for a certain period of time in Turkey, or even were sent back for school attendance in Turkey, but who did not mention these experiences as a main factor influencing their educational career in general. A third kind of case, which we collected in the

category of moderate transnationalism, are second generation migrants who made significant efforts in a later period of their lives to (re-)acquire Turkish language or certain kinds of knowledge of Turkish culture, society or politics, as far as these were deemed to be beneficial for transnational occupational or political opportunities:

> And it is simply also important for me that my children know their descent, that they feel their belonging in a way, and that they will have the opportunity to decide themselves on their affiliation. So, this is here and that is there, and they can choose. I would like to convey both to them. I live in both, too. (Female, 39, 1.5 generations in Germany)

If these efforts are primarily made for mere private and family reasons, however, we allocate these cases to the category of weak transnationalism. However, there are also a considerable number of Turkish migrants in Germany who made efforts to acquire certain kinds of knowledge concerning Turkish culture and language or intercultural skills, which they then used or wanted to use within Germany, for occupational, political, or private reasons, and which we therefore classified as multicultural only.

An important additional phenomenon within the educational dimension is parental strategies of bi- and multicultural education for their children. Many migrants emphasize bilingualism as an important capability or even additionally as a prerequisite for other intercultural or transnational competencies. Most of the respondents with children explain that it is important for them that their children learn German as well as Turkish, although there are different practices of bilingualism among Turkish migrants. Whereas some children speak only Turkish until they go to kindergarten or school, others practice Turkish as well as German at home. These different practices of bilingualism are reflected in statements of two fathers:

> Within one year of pre-school my children learned to speak German as well as their classmates, since they already spoke the Turkish language very well (Male, 43, 1.5 generations in Germany).

> You have to think of it like this: me and my wife in one room and my daughter talks to both of us. She turns to me and talks German; she turns around to my wife and talks Turkish. (Male, 44, 1.5 generations in Germany)

The parents also have different reasons for wanting their children to learn two or more languages. Hence, different parental educational motives and strategies can be related to the different categories of our typology as well. Migrant parents who follow an explicit educational strategy aimed at furthering a transnational educational career for their children, for example, by promoting multilingual education even in early childhood or planning to send their children to schools and universities abroad are placed in the category of strong transnationalism. Those who fall under the category of moderate transnationalism have a bi- or multilingual strategy to enable certain transnational orientations and activities for their children. Parents without explicit educational ambitions and largely without actual use of transnational competencies outside of family relations are sorted into the category of weak transnationalism. In the category of multiculturalism are those parents who see bi- and multilingualism neither as an everyday language strategy at home, nor as potential

skill for transnational communication, but as resource to improve the career opportunities of their children in Germany. Also, when interviewees report about themselves, they often mention the important role of multilingual and multicultural competences for their professional life in Germany.

A similar pattern was also observed in the Turkish sample. Overall, the education that second-generation migrants receive in Germany definitely provides them with a competitive advantage and an important form of capital that they can utilize in Turkey; and thus that produces the new phenomenon of a return migration. Their parents' educational ambitions definitely played a role in this transnational mobilization. However, it is rather hard to say that a similar phenomenon of mobility is also observable for the first generation. Within our return migrant respondents, those who had left Turkey during the guest worker scheme already had some vocational training in Turkey. The only training they received in Germany was simple and work-related training in the factories where they were employed, and the only mobility that this kind of training provided them was relative upward mobility within the ranks of factory workers. Otherwise, it is rather impossible to point out any migrants in the guest worker scheme who could utilize education (informal or formal) as a means of social transformation or upward mobility. Education was, and is, something for these migrant children—a benefit, something they can utilize to climb up the social ladder. Thus, almost all of our respondents who had children mentioned providing a good education for their offspring as one of their ultimate future plans. As in the German sample, this parental strategy of "good" education definitely entails learning other languages, but most respondents do not specifically choose German, but English for their children.

4.5 Conclusion

In line with the general framework of the TRANS-NET project, this chapter aims to generate an understanding of the forms of peoples' transnational activities for the German-Turkish case. The research conducted in Germany and Turkey offers insight into the multilevel transformation processes underway stemming from new patterns of migration (e.g., return migration of second-generation migrants from Germany to Turkey) and types of migrants not present in the past (e.g., circular retirement migrants or exchange students). Our study also provides the first systematic analysis of transnational phenomena for the Turkish–German case covering four domains (political, sociocultural, economic, and educational) simultaneously. Moreover, although the primary axis of the current transnational migration is between states in the South and the North, and between the East and the West, the literature is mostly dominated by studies conducted in the North and West. This report is an alternative attempt to look at the phenomenon of transnationalism from both perspectives.

In terms of findings, we found that there are variations in transnationalization in the Turkish–German case with regard to different social domains in our qualitative data. Thus, we distinguished different degrees; that is, strong, moderate, and weak

transnationalism. The interviewees are distinct as far as forms of mobility and social networks in various life domains, such as politics, economics, family, education, and so on are concerned. Moreover, in addition to transnational activities, we focused on multicultural activities in the country of residence of the respondents. By introducing these distinctive categories of transnationalism and multiculturalism, we were able to get a more nuanced picture of how migrants' border-crossing activities are related to and embedded in interethnic and intercultural relations and activities within the respective nation-states' institutional and informal contexts. In the overwhelming majority of our cases, the transnational activities and orientations of migrants, from both sides of the Turkish–German case, are part of efforts toward nation-state–based incorporation, rather than an alternative to it. In the Turkish context, most interviewees' actions can be considered cases of multiculturalism, rather than cases of transnationalism. In the German context, the degree or extent of migrant transnationalism varies more, but multiculturalism is almost always present simultaneously. Migrants' transnational contacts and relations and the competencies they acquire and sustain in these contexts (such as multilingualism, knowledge of different countries' cultures, histories, societies, and institutions) are often beneficial for their educational and occupational success and thus contribute significantly to their integration in Germany. These results underpin arguments for a simultaneity of integration and transnationalization, which has been raised conceptually and in other national contexts (Kivisto 2001, 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Morawska 2004).

The combined transnational-multicultural patterns of migrant activities in Germany, however, are obviously related to the institutional opportunity structure, which today consists, for example, of a growing service-based sector in the economic sphere and a recent politicization and corresponding societal mobilization, regarding immigrant integration in the political sphere. The official and cross-party shared recognition of Germany as an immigration country and corresponding increased efforts to recruit highly skilled migrants, as well as to view the integration of migrants as a nationwide, multilevel and cross-sectional task obviously leads to expanded opportunities for migrants' political and social engagement. It also leads to new job chances, increasingly in the context of so-called diversity management programs, in which migrants are encouraged to bring their particular experiences and competencies based on their migration background to bear in the workplace. Examples of these new opportunity contexts include increased efforts on the part of various administrative and public institutions to recruit employees with migration backgrounds and recent political initiatives aimed at easing the complicated regionally differentiated, corporatist sector- and job-related German recognition procedures for foreign education degrees. These steps will facilitate an adequate labor market integration of well-educated migrants, according to their professional competencies. These kinds of what can be called integration-related (and/or service-sector–oriented and knowledge-based) transnationalism seem to supplement patterns of so-called reactive transnationalism (Portes 1999; Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002), caused by the institutional discrimination of migrants and a rather restrictive migrant incorporation regime, which at least formerly played a certain role in the German–Turkish case (Koopmans and Statham 2003).

However, in our sample, return is also a re-emerging theme. Return in the German–Turkish case is a peculiar concept, which has a kind of institutionally produced, biographical, transnational dimension. The recruited Turkish guest workers were regarded as temporary workers and permanent residence in Germany was not intended on the official side during the early period of guest worker migration. The assumption that Turkish migrants would work in Germany for a limited period of time and then return to Turkey was initially also shared by the guest workers themselves. Thus, much of the life plans and personal projects of Turkish migrants were oriented toward return to Turkey, while they at the same time became increasingly involved in German social and cultural worlds the longer they stayed in Germany. A kind of stable binational or transnational orientation was the logical result of this type of migration. However, as different persons react differently in similar structural situations, the same institutional conditions did not produce the same transnational activities among Turkish migrants. In any case, the return orientation of the guest worker generation had consequences not only for the persons directly concerned—that is, the individual migrant workers of the first generation—but also for their families and especially for their children, the so-called 1.5 and second generations. In our interviews, many second-generation migrants described extensively how the permanently postponed return orientation of their families affected their own life plans, educational careers, and emotional relations.

In general, there are a small number of cases among our respondents that demonstrate explicitly strong transnational activities in the sense that interviewees have high rates of permanent geographical mobility. This seems to indicate that geographical distance plays a certain role. For example, compared with Mexican migration to the United States, which is dominated by circular migration, the case of Turkish migrants in Germany is rather characterized by settlement and whole-family migration, and most of the return migrants interviewed in Turkey are permanent returnees. Most of our interviewees do not establish “mobile livelihoods” and dual home bases in Turkey and Germany. However, even if the majority of the interviewees are not constantly on the move, there are a great number of transnational relations and activities apparent in the German–Turkish case. However, the frequency and intensity of such relations and activities is highly variable.

Moreover, the frequency and intensity of transnational relations and activities does not only vary among migrants but also during the life course. On the one hand, there are some cases in which cross-border contacts decrease over time. This is especially true for those migrants who went to Germany within the guest worker scheme and returned in a relatively short period of time. Their cross-border contacts diminish upon their return. Also, financial matters or the death of a significant other in the respective other country can be a reason for decreasing contacts. On the other hand, there are also cases in which cross-border contacts and stays in the other country are increasing. This applies especially to Turkish migrants after their retirement. Moreover, cases of so-called second-generation interviewees in Germany, who set up or intensify contacts to Turkey only when they are adults, for occupational, educational, or political reasons, illustrate that relationships with Turkey do not necessarily decrease with the duration of stay in Germany. Even if this is true for

a considerable number of cases, in other cases transnational relationships and activities keep rather constant or even increase during a stay in Germany. In sum, cross-border relationships and activities are not static, but variable and change over time.

The results presented in this chapter, are mainly confined to the question of the intensity of transnational activities in different domains. Another important question would certainly concern the extensity dimension of transnational activities, meaning the extent and frequency individual migrants engage in transnational orientations and activities cross-cutting different spheres of social life or concerning different arenas of social action at the same time.[27] In this respect, overall, there are only a few cases, which show strong cross-border relations and activities in nearly all areas. Rather, transnationalism often seems to affect only some or even one life domain.

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[27] A perspective which combines both the dimension of intensity and extensity of transnational practices can be found in Levitt (2001, especially Table 1).

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Chapter 5
The Emergence of Estonian–Finnish Transnational Space

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5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the characteristics and dynamics of the emergent transnational space Estonia–Finland. It is evident that people's opportunities to move back and forth across national borders between Estonia and Finland, and the opportunities for other transnational activities, have notably increased since the Soviet era. Besides the geographical location (proximity) of the countries, another obvious factor increasing people's opportunities for transnational practices is the fact that both Estonia and Finland are European Union (EU) Member States.

In this chapter, we work on the assumption that in addition to structural factors, the cross-border ties and activities of geographically mobile people are important agents in the emergence of the transnational space in question. Today, an increasing number of Estonian and Finnish people transcend the national borders between the countries more frequently than before. The chapter focuses on their cross-border ties, experiences, and engagements. We explore how their transnational political, economic, sociocultural, and educational activities have emerged and changed, and how they are related to macro-level changes and the processes of governance in transnational settings. Conventional thinking maintains the idea of primarily belonging

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to one society and loyalty to just one nation-state; however, in a transnational context identity is not only about location but also about displacement and relocation. Likewise, people's sense of belonging may refer to a diversity of attachments and affiliations, some of which refer to people, places, and traditions outside the constraining limits of nation-state residence (Clifford 1997: 369; Vertovec 2001; Kalekin-Fishman and Pitkänen 2007: 275–276).

Transnational migration may be conceptualized as a function of people's motivations and opportunities to migrate. We assume here that transnational migration and transnational lifestyles both draw upon and contribute to processes of political, economic, and/or sociocultural capacity building. For this purpose, a capability approach to border-crossing migration will be adopted (de Haas 2010). Migration capabilities are defined as the social, human, and material capital individuals are able to mobilize so as to migrate. This perspective drives home the point that increasing social capital generally coincides with increasing capabilities to migrate. As Thomas Faist (2000) has pointed out, social capital can provide transmission belts that link groups and networks in different states and is thus essential in the formation of continuing transnational practices.

In the following sections, we first outline the historical, political-legal, and demographic contexts of the countries involved. Then we introduce the characteristics of migratory processes in the Estonian–Finnish space. We outline the typological and chronological patterns and people's motivations for migration, and examine the channels and networks that have created opportunity structures for border-crossing mobility. Further, potential transnationalization processes within the political domain are examined. We explore possible transformations in political participation and membership(s), both in form and content; socially and legally. We also examine the respondents' participation in economic life, both in the labor market and in entrepreneurial undertakings. We ask whether labor migration and other economic activities in the Estonian–Finnish transnational space feature any special characteristics. We also assess the cross-border movement of capital, such as the flows of financial remittances, issues concerning the ownership of real estate, and so on. Moreover, we focus on the respondents' ethno-national identities, belonging, and orientation as well as on the role of religion in transnational everyday life. We ask how transnational lifestyles affect and transform people's social relations. Finally, we look at the respondents' educational activities and experiences of political, professional, social, and cultural capacity building.

5.2 Contextual Framework

An elementary characteristic of the transnational space Estonia–Finland lies in the geographical and linguistic closeness of the countries that facilitates many transborder practices, such as frequent visits. Still, in terms of continuous movement of people, the Estonian–Finnish transnational space is quite young, reflecting the dramatically different situation of the countries in the second half of the twentieth century.

Because of Estonia's Soviet past, people's opportunities for migration were restricted until the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, early signs of the emergent Estonian–Finnish space were apparent already before the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

5.2.1 Historical Outline of Estonian–Finnish Relations Before the 1990s

The closeness of Estonians and Finnish stems from their common origins. At least 5,000 years ago, the greater part of Northern Europe was already inhabited by proto-Finnish tribes who were ancestors of both contemporary nations, the Estonians and the Finns. For a long time, there was no clear dividing line among various Finnish tribes. For instance, historical findings suggest that the heartland of contemporary Finland (Varsinais-Suomi) was inhabited by people coming from Estonia. The historical trajectories started to diverge after the conquest of Finland by Swedes in the twelfth century and Estonia by Germans in the thirteenth century. From the eighteenth century, Finnish people gradually started to emancipate—a process that was more or less complete by the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After first becoming an autonomous grand duchy of Russia in 1809, Finland has been an independent nation-state since 1917. In Estonia, on the other hand, although serfdom was abolished in 1816–1819, the German domination continued under various sovereigns, and clear estate barriers established the elite as German speaking. The Estonian national awakening in the second half of nineteenth century resulted in a national-cultural identity, but political emancipation did not come until the Russian Revolution of 1917 that wiped out the domination of the German nobles.

Stronger cultural contacts between Estonia and Finland emerged during the Estonian national awakening, in which Finland served as a role model. Economic contacts, in particular, developed because the regions had a common overlord—Sweden in 1560–1710 and Russia in 1809–1917. The break from Russia and the gaining of national independence—Finland in 1917 and Estonia in 1918—enabled the countries to develop a wide array of contacts in various fields, ranging from secret national defense cooperation to transnational "irregular" economic relations, resulting in the smuggling of spirit from Estonia during Finland's prohibition years (the "dry policy") (Roiko-Jokela 1997).

Also, the movement of people was relatively easy throughout the centuries. Thus, many villages were established by Estonians in sparsely populated Finland up to medieval times, until the introduction of serfdom in Estonia largely ended this mobility. After Estonia was devastated during the Great Plague and the Great Northern War, many people moved from Finland to the empty farms in Estonia. In the early eighteenth century, their share reached one fifth of the population in Virumaa (northeastern Estonia). However, thanks to cultural closeness, they easily merged with the mainstream population within a couple of decades. After the nations consolidated, cultural borders became more divisive, and when the modern statehood

and governance techniques were introduced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, cross-border movement became more difficult. Rising nationalism in Finland aroused interest toward the neighboring nation with similar roots and vice versa. Many Estonians sought education in Finland. When an Estonian-speaking university was established after independence in Estonia, many of the first professors came from Finland.

The Soviet occupations of Estonia in 1940–1941 and 1944–1991 stopped most of the contacts, particularly during the repressive years of Stalinism. Transnational activities among Estonian people became very restricted and monitored by the Soviet authorities. Whereas Estonia was a part of the Soviet system, Finland was an independent country widely regarded as being in the sphere of Soviet political influence. As the Soviet regime gradually consolidated and softened, contacts between Estonia and Finland started to re-emerge, especially in sports and culture.

Because of the similarity of the Finnish and Estonian languages, the easily accessible Finnish TV was already an important source of information and inspiration for many Estonian people during the Soviet period. Further, numerous people left Estonia for Finland in the second half of the 1980s, during the period of *détente,* and a considerable number of Finnish tourists were allowed to visit Estonia in the 1980s when the ferry line between the capitals of Helsinki and Tallinn was established. In this context, some illegal small trading emerged to overcome the shortages of the centrally directed economic system, and some Finnish enterprises started to perform contracted work in Estonia. The increasingly frequent contacts led to an increase in transnational marriages; the spouses usually settling in Finland. However, only a limited number of people were involved in these activities. Thus, by and large the Estonian and Finnish societies remained apart until the liberalization of the Soviet regime at the end of the 1980s.

5.2.2 The Postcommunist Period

An explosion in the number of transnational ties and activities became possible after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Consequently, a significant number of people migrated from Estonia to Finland.[1] Although the visa requirement remained rather strict, the first years of the 1990s witnessed diversified flows of migrants in

[1] In the 1990s, the number of Estonians migrating to Finland varied yearly from 800 to 2,600 (the peak years were 1992 and 1993); rising again from 2006 onward, ranging from 2,700 to 3,500 immigrants per year. There were fewer Finns migrating to Estonia: In the 1990s, approximately 200–300 per year. The numbers have been growing since 2004 (around 550–850 yearly) (Statistics Finland 2010a). Note that in addition to these figures, there have also been a large number of temporary Estonian migrants in Finland since the second half of the 2000s. There are no complete statistics available on the temporary foreign labor migrants in Finland, but estimates have varied from 20,000 to 40,000 (Lith 2007; Baltic Sea Labour Network 2010).

both directions; not just family migrants but also students, labor migrants, and businessmen. This first period of comprehensive transnational activities coincided with the establishment a free market economy, democracy and other Western-type societal arrangements in Estonia. In this way, many Finns were involved in setting up new enterprises and companies that became a part of the "winners of transition."

During the last 10–15 years, the Estonia–Finland space has been increasingly characterized by ever deeper and more stable transnational contacts. Many companies have first started to operate in Finland and then opened branch offices in Estonia and other Baltic states. There are also a growing number of "mixed" families and students moving between the two countries. In particular, after Estonia became an EU Member State (2004) and a Schengen country (2009), free movement of people and labor gained further impetus. There are currently thousands of immigrant Finns in Estonia and tens of thousands of Estonians living and working in Finland. These are considerable numbers given the small population of the countries (1.4 million inhabitants in Estonia and five million in Finland). To conclude, it can be said that the Estonian–Finnish transnational space has become quite intense in the last two decades. The precondition for this development is the recent changes in the political-legal framework of the countries involved.

Although Finland is not a postcommunist country, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had a great impact on Finnish policy. The evolving tendency has been toward facilitating immigration to Finland. Since its independence in 1917, Finland has had relatively strict immigration and citizenship policies, but since the beginning of the 1990s, these policies have been reconstituted and restructured. In 1991, Finland signed the Schengen agreement, which allows free movement of people within the Schengen area, and in 1995 Finland joined the European Union. Until the 1980s, Finland was mainly a country of emigration, but as of the early 1990s the number of immigrants started to increase. This was mainly because of humanitarian and family-based migrations. Moreover, people of Finnish origin living in the area of the former Soviet Union (mostly in Russia and Estonia) were allowed to migrate to Finland under special conditions. These so-called Ingrian Finns attained a right to permanent residence in Finland if they could demonstrate their Finnish ancestry.

The number of foreign residents in Finland has almost doubled in 10 years. In 2009, there were 155,000 foreign nationals (2.9% of the total population) in Finland; overall, there were 207,000 residents whose native language was other than the local languages (Finnish, Swedish, Sami). After Russians (54,500), the second largest group of foreign language speakers was Estonians (28,500).[2] Yet in terms of citizenship, the Estonians (29,000) formed the largest group of foreign citizens in

[2] The Estonian population in Finland is ethnically and linguistically diverse, including Estonians, Russians, and so-called Ingrian Finns. There are no official, complete statistics on the number of Ingrian Finns and returnees in Finland because it is not possible to gather data on ethnic grounds. However, it was estimated that by 1997 approximately 20,000 people had moved to Finland as "returnees" (Liebkind et al. 2004: 26–27). Among the Ingrian Finns, there are Finnish, Estonian, and Russian speakers.

Finland in 2010 (Statistics Finland: Population Register, 2010). When Estonia became an EU Member State in 2004, free movement of labor to Finland was not allowed, but a transition phase was imposed by Finnish policymakers until May 1, 2006. Today, people's transnational activities are becoming more diversified, and the numbers of students, labor migrants, as well as temporary migrants are growing. In particular, short-term cross-border mobility of workers between Estonia and Finland has become an issue on the policy agenda. Nevertheless, the focus of the immigration and integration policies lies on long-term migrants. The first immigration program, the Programme on Immigration and Refugee Policy in Finland (1997), mainly focused on the humanitarian and family migrants. The objective of the program was that although migrants dynamically participate in Finnish society they continue to feel connected to their own ethnic groups—without feeling any sense of contradiction. However, in fact, administrative practices were often assimilationist in nature (Pitkänen and Kouki 1999). In 2006, the Finnish government established a new program intended to increase the number of labor migrants. A fundamental aim was active and full membership of society for those who move to Finland from abroad.

An evolving tendency in Finland has been toward facilitating the attainment of multiple state memberships. The current Nationality Act (2003/359) allows dual/multiple citizenship more widely than did the former Act (1984/584). According to the new law, a foreigner who acquires Finnish citizenship is no longer required to renounce his or her previous citizenship, nor will a Finn who acquires a foreign nationality lose his or her Finnish nationality if this is not restricted by the other state. The new citizenship policy has mainly developed as a result of external pressures, in particular of Finnish membership of the European Union. A further influential factor has been the Finnish emigrants who lost their Finnish citizenship and wanted to regain it (Harinen et al. 2006).

Although the Finnish immigration and citizenship policies have become more open, in Estonia the immigration policy is rather restrictive, and multiple citizenship is not legally possible. The overall number of foreign residents in Estonia has been falling steadily in practically all ethnic groups since 1989, when they composed 38% of the total population until 2009, when they composed 31% of the total population (Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 2010). Estonian citizenship and migration policies were significantly influenced by the Soviet annexation between 1940–1944 and 1991. Although the Iron Curtain separated the Estonians from the non-Soviet world (including Finland), there was no effective border between Estonia and other areas of the Soviet Union. An extensive and often forced in-migration of Russian-speaking people (ca. 500,000) during the Soviet period has resulted in a restrictive immigration policy since regaining independence in 1991.

The largest ethnic minorities in Estonia are still Russians (ca. 343,000, 25.6% of the total population), Ukrainians (27,900, 2% of the total population), and Belarusians (15,700, 1.2% of the total population).[3] Even today, the main emphasis of migrant policy is on the integration of the very sizeable groups of incomers from

[3] There were about 10,700 Finns (0.8% of the total population) residing in Estonia in 2009.

the Soviet era. Further, since the early 1990s efforts have been made to re-establish contacts with the Estonian refugees from World War II and the Soviet occupation, and their descendants. In practice, however, only a few 100 ethnic Estonians have returned from the pool of some 100,000 people.[4]

The Estonian policies can largely be characterized by a tension between a desire to undo the Soviet annexation and to recreate an Estonian nation-state, and a desire for open citizenship and naturalization regulations in the process of restoring statehood and interest in integrating into the Western world. The former conception prevailed in the 1990s, resulting in strict immigration and naturalization procedures. The number of immigrants remained low. For instance, it required a national court judgment to allow family reunifications in excess of the annual immigration quota. During the second half of the 1990s the Estonian national program was started accompanied by some alleviation in naturalization examinations and introducing *ius soli* for the children of stateless persons. However, immigration policy remained strict until Estonia's entry into the European Union in 2004. Since then life has stabilized and integration into the Western coalition has become a priority in Estonia; the borders have gradually been opened. An important aspect influencing the integration policy practised in Estonia is the neoliberal conceptualization of individual responsibility for success or failure as a part of the political mainstream in Estonia to date. The general idea is that individual people, including migrants, themselves bear the main responsibility for their integration. Recently, Estonian migration policy has become more liberalized with the introduction of EU rules on free movement and residence of EU citizens and permanent foreign residents.

5.3 Data and Methods

In both participating countries, Estonia and Finland, 80 semistructured and 20 life-course interviews were carried out between 2009 and 2010 (200 interviews in total). The respondents were selected through snowball sampling and with the assistance of migrant associations and educational institutions. Some contacts were gathered by online phishing (pooling respondents from networks such as Facebook) and following media (e.g., politically active individuals and entrepreneurs). Respondents for the life-course interviews were mostly selected from among people taking part in the semi-structured interviews (informants with multiple transnational activities), only a few additional informants were chosen among the Russian-speaking Estonian migrants.

In addition to face-to-face interviews, interviews were carried out by telephone (because of long distances in Finland), and one life-course interview was carried out by e-mail at the request of the respondent. The interviews were conducted in Finnish, Estonian, or English. The length of the interviews was usually 1 h. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The data analysis was based on qualitative methods

[4] During the period 2000–2008, 879 people returned through the Estonian repatriation program (Beusse 2009: 6).

Table 5.1 Age and gender of the respondents[a]

Age[b]	Female			Male		
	Finns	Estonians	Other	Finns	Estonians	Other
20–29	6	17		3	12	1
30–39	6	22	1	8	14	1
40–49	6	17	1	8	10	
50–	5	8		4	8	2

[a]The group of Finns includes those originating in Finland and having migrated from Finland to Estonia or commuting between the countries, whereas the group of Estonian respondents consists of those originating in Estonia and having migrated from Estonia to Finland or commuting between the countries. The group of "other" includes those having moved to Estonia or Finland from a third country, but with ties to the other country in question

[b]At the time of the interviews in 2009

by scrutinizing the interview transcripts carefully and searching for categories based on the common themes agreed with the research teams.

The group of respondents included Estonians living in Finland, Finns living in Estonia, people of multiple ethnic origin,[5] Estonian returnees as well as people commuting regularly between the countries (25 Estonians and 13 Finns). Among the respondents, ten former Soviet/Estonian citizens had obtained Finnish citizenship, eight had dual citizenship,[6] one was without citizenship and the rest had retained their original citizenship (91 Estonian, 49 Finnish, 1 Danish). The group of commuting migrants consisted of people shuttling regularly, often weekly or monthly, between Estonia and Finland owing to their work, studies, business, family reasons, or having a house or residence in both countries. Most of the respondents had worked in various occupations during their careers. Semiqualified migrants had usually completed comprehensive education (9 years) and training courses (e.g., construction workers, bus drivers, factory workers); qualified migrants had obtained a qualification from a vocational institute (e.g., clerical workers, mechanics, nurses); and highly qualified migrants had a university degree or degrees (e.g., managers, academics, information technology specialists, doctors). Concerning education, one should note that both the Finnish and Estonian interviewees were on average well educated in their homelands. More than half of them had an academic degree. The age/gender division, educational backgrounds, and time of migration/transmigration of the respondents[7] are presented in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.[8]

[5] These migrants had migrated from a third country to Estonia or Finland, and had partly Finnish/Estonian background and/or citizenship.

[6] This group consisted of Estonian–Finnish, Estonian–Swedish, and Finnish–Swedish citizens.

[7] To ensure respondents' anonymity, the names given in the citations are not real. In addition to the names, gender, year of birth, and nationality are given.

[8] The respondents were selected with the aim of creating diversity in terms of migrant groups, occupation, age, time of migration, and education. It can be estimated that female and highly educated migrants may be over-represented and Russian-speaking Estonian migrants may be under-represented in this sample. However, there are no complete statistics available concerning the educational or linguistic backgrounds of migrants in these countries to estimate the general share of these groups.

Table 5.2 Educational background of the respondents

Education[a]	Estonians	Finns	Other
Secondary	21	4	
Vocational	31	14	
Bachelor	8	14	
Master	41	10	4
Doctor	7	4	2

[a]Person's highest degree at the time of the interviews in 2009

Table 5.3 Time of migration/transmigration

Time of migration/ transmigration[a]	Estonians	Finns	Other
1986–1991	31	2	1
1992–1997	16	5	1
1998–2003	21	14	–
2004–2009	40	25	4

[a]Year of in-migration or the starting year of commuting/transmigration

5.4 Migratory Processes

5.4.1 Migratory Patterns and Motivations

Although the Estonian–Finnish space is a fairly recent migratory passage, it has undergone a very rapid development in the past two decades. It also has almost all of the classic characteristics conducive to migration—short distance and good connections between the countries, differences in fiscal policies and economic development that offer incentives that not present in the other country, linguistic proximity and the gradual lifting of migration restrictions (Kivisto and Faist 2010). These factors also define the primary characteristics of migratory patterns that characterize the Estonian–Finnish space.

It was discovered that the cross-border migration between Estonia and Finland is, at least to some extent, caused by timely opportunities or necessities. In light of the patterns and motivations mentioned by the respondents, seven main catalysts from the period 1980–2010 for the migration flows can be mentioned:

- Allowing tourism between Finland and Estonia in the 1980s. Although this was guarded by heavy restrictions, some transnational social networks emerged. Nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions (re)established their cross-border contacts in the 1980s.
- The call as of 1990 for the Ingrian Finns to repatriate to Finland. This established an intense flow of immigrants from the territories of the former Soviet Union, especially from Russia and Estonia. Those who could prove their Finnish origin were granted a residence permit in Finland.

- "Early birds" among Finnish businessmen who gained from the emerging market of Estonia and the privatization campaign around 1992.
- Discovering study opportunities in other countries during the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s (first through exchange programs, and later degree studies).
- The economic recession (particularly in the early 1990s, because of the overheating of the internal market and the collapse of the Soviet Union; and again around 1998, after the currency devaluation in Russia) that hit Finland very hard, whereas the Estonian market was still growing.
- The economic growth in Estonia in the 2000s that resulted in several transnational enterprises expanding to Estonia. This was especially important for several posted workers and other top-level specialists who were assigned to Estonia.
- The processes surrounding Estonia's accession to the European Union in 2004 as well as the opening of the Finnish labor market in 2006.

The motives stated for going abroad fall into four main categories: work, studies, family, and emotional attachment to cultural interest in the country in question. Most of the reasons for migration were associated with work: finding a job, getting better paid job, starting up a business or migrating owing to a family member doing so. Even if there were other motives for migration (e.g., family), the final decision to migrate often depended on being able to find a job in the new host country. Among the highly qualified respondents, the reasons mentioned most often for moving abroad were an interest in widening professional competence, finding employment in the area of expertise, and advancing the career by gaining new experiences (Raunio and Forsander 2009: 101–108). For example, an Estonian researcher explained how he looked for an interesting postdoctoral post around the world after completing his doctoral studies in the Netherlands:

> Then I heard that, in Helsinki, there is an excellent Estonian researcher … leading this institute … and I looked at his profile in the Internet, and I contacted him in Estonia … in fact, he seemed to be more charismatic than the top researchers I visited in the USA. … I wanted to move to a place with real winter, nature, forest but I also wanted a good career place. (Margus, Male, 1972, Estonian)[9]

On the other hand, labor migrants with different amounts of vocational training often emphasized economic reasons for migrating to Finland. For instance, Urmo, an Estonian blue collar worker, explained:

> My life has developed in a better direction after I left Estonia. I have a job, a flat and a car and all kind of things. Before I didn't have these, I lived with my mother and life was not as good as now. … If I still lived in Estonia, I would have nothing. (Urmo, Male, 1985, Estonian)

In many cases there was more than one reason for migration, and the motives were mixed. This might depend on the proximity of the countries in question. People had quite a lot of accurate information before their move, which enabled them to

[9] The names of the interviewees are fictional.

process their decisions from different angles. For example, Karin (Female, 1970, Estonian), a blue collar worker, explained how she and her husband moved to Finland mainly because of work, but also

> because we like Finland and it is more peaceful there, and it is a better place for children and … because there are lots of good doctors … also Estonian ones in Finland.

Before the move, the family had visited a doctor in Finland several times because of their child's handicap.

Apart from the Ingrian Finns, migration was rarely perceived as an irrevocable decision with no turning back. In several cases, migration was gradual; it started for one reason and later another reason emerged that prolonged the stay. For example, Magnus (Male, 1952, Finland), who arrived in Estonia in 2004 explained:

> I came here to help out a friend. First it was for a week or two and now it's been several years. This friend of mine has moved away from Estonia, but I have stayed here. I don't commute a lot and I'm steadily living in Estonia.

Magnus started a family in Estonia; however, a significant number of returnees, or potential returnees, perceived their future elsewhere, especially study migrants.

Some of the respondents initially arrived in Finland or Estonia because of their studies either in vocational or higher education institutions. Many study migrants ended up either working in the country of immigration after finishing their studies, or returned to that country later for professional or family reasons. In the 2000s, many migrants preferred to take a qualification abroad instead of studying as an exchange student. The short distance between Estonia and Finland has also resulted in rather intensive circular migration. Many interviewees were regularly moving between the countries, mainly because of their work, but also because of studies, business, family, and/or having residences in both countries. For example, some Estonians, especially blue collar workers, used to stay 3 weeks in Finland where they worked, and then 1 week with their family in Estonia. Alternatively, some respondents worked during the weekdays in Finland/Estonia and spent the weekends in the other country. The majority of the work-based circular migrants were men. In case of doctoral students, commuting was less frequent because they managed to arrange most of their studies and communication virtually. Some of the circular migrants combined studying and working. For example, Üllar (1980, Estonian), who was working toward his PhD in Finland, was also working at a research facility there, but was simultaneously commuting between Finland and Estonia to be with his family. He had no plans to live in Finland in the future.

Among the respondents, there were some people with previous migratory experiences in third countries. Most of them were highly skilled and had been moving internationally, mainly because of their careers or studies. It can be said that the migrants belonging to this group were rather cosmopolitan: They had lived not only in Europe but also on other continents. For example, Fred (1966, Estonian) had first come to Finland on a student exchange, stayed in the country for 3 years to work, and accomplish his doctoral studies, after that he had worked in Zambia, Belgium, and Estonia, and finally, 8 years later, returned to Finland with his Finnish spouse. In the future, he would like to work in Asia.

Previous experiences in other countries seemed to be a fairly important determinant in making a decision on the future migratory plans. People with previous migratory experiences hesitated less in undertaking further migratory steps, moving on to some other countries if the present conditions were no longer satisfactory for them. In addition, several informants pointed out that moving again to another foreign country would be easier for them because they had already experienced such a move at least once. People with less migratory experience and those who had set up a family or other long-term social ties in the country of settlement were often prone to remain in that country. The more settled groups of migrants were those who in-migrated at the beginning of the 1990s, migrated with their family, or started a family in the new host country. These respondents typically crossed the Gulf of Finland just a few times a year.

In general, transnational migration was undertaken alone. The main groups migrating with family consisted of the Ingrian Finns and younger respondents who had migrated with their families. For example, Tuomo (1972, Finland) arrived in Estonia with his wife and three children, but his family returned to Finland in about a year, because his wife was ending her maternity leave and wanted to return to Finland to resume her professional and social life. Among the Ingrian Finns,[10] one can perceive features of chain migration. The informants often had many relatives in Finland who had moved before or after them. Among family migrants, it was typical that the spouse and/or children joined the migrant later, and labor migrants often worked at least some months or years in another country before the rest of the family joined them. For example, Georg (1973, Estonia) wanted to “see the world” and went to Finland in 1991 “just to do a summer job.” However, because of political unrest in the Soviet Union, his wife and child joined him after some months, and they are still living in Finland.

The most typical family migrant was an Estonian woman married to a Finn. The woman usually moved to the husband’s home country. Their intention was to find work or get a study place in the country of settlement, although in practice, it often took them several years to obtain a similar position in working life than they had had in their country of origin (Forsander 2002; Hyvönen 2009). In the 2000s, Estonian spouses mainly migrated if they could find work or other activities in Finland. For example, Mirjam (1981, Estonia) got a job in 2004 in a corporation operating throughout the Nordic countries. She got to know her future husband in 2004, but did not move to live with him before 2006 when she landed a job in Finland. However, men were usually less prone to join their wives or partners in the other country.

5.4.2 Migratory Channels and Networks

When discussing chain migration and the spread of migration-related information and assistance in the Estonian–Finnish transnational space, one can distinguish four

[10] The respondents belonging to this group often had a multicultural background (Finnish, Estonian, Russian, and/or other national or ethnic roots). In Finland, these migrants are usually called Ingrian Finns or returnees, even if most of them are not return migrants in practice.

types of networks mentioned by the interviewees: personal networks, Internet-based impersonal networks, associational networks, and institutional networks. Especially in the beginning of the 1990s personal networks played an important part for many respondents in establishing themselves in the new contexts. Having contacts from the Soviet time among businessmen, "owning" a "domestic Finn"—a friend or a patron found due to tourism from Finland to Estonia, through their work (if working in the service sector) or by other means was considered by both to be of value. As a Finnish businessman residing in Estonia noted, "An acquaintance is a value in itself." Also, diasporic networks had quite a lot of importance among Ingrian Finns, but also among many other groups, especially labor and family migrants.

Associational and educational networks also played a part in the Estonian–Finnish transnational space. The contacts between Finnish and Estonian associations and organizations, such as parishes, university departments, and sports associations, had supported the migration of some Estonian informants particularly in the 1990s. Also, some associations assisting the migration of Ingrian Finns were reported in Estonia.

> During that time I was the secretary of the [local] Ingrian Finn's association in Estonia. People were keen to go to Finland to learn more language and to work and [to get] money. Money was a difficult issue in the Soviet Union. So we assisted these people to fill in the forms and applications. … The main office [of the organization] was in Tallinn, and they got job offers from Finland. (Svetlana, Female, 1961, Estonian-Finn)

Retrieving information over the Internet and participation in some migration-related virtual networks was also acknowledged, but not seen as very significant. There are several Estonian forums that feature topics related to moving and working in Finland, as well as some communities uniting Estonians living in Finland, but these were not cited very often or were not seen as important. Institutional networks were mentioned primarily in connection with labor migration, for example, with the local offices of the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy as well as Finnish enterprises in Estonia; the cooperation network between the Finnish and Estonian trade union organizations; networks of Finnish and Estonian construction work companies; and job agencies; exchange programs among universities.

In the 2000s, both Finnish and Estonian companies started to recruit workers from Estonia. As some of the respondents explained, the employers had either advertised workplaces in Finnish or Estonian newspapers, organized recruitment campaigns in Estonia or searched for workers through the networks of Estonian migrants in Finland. For example, Taimo (1964, Estonia) described how the representatives of a Finnish transportation company first interviewed job applicants in Estonia. In Finland, the employer offered the recruited workers training, accommodation, and assistance in arranging administrative matters. In some cases, the institutional networks specifically facilitated all assistance needed by the respondents, whereas personal networks or contacts with native citizens or compatriots had either practical or moral significance for some respondents. Nevertheless, some of the interviewees had relied solely on their own personal efforts to find work and organize their move.

5.4.3 Concluding Remarks

Because of geographical proximity, the Estonian–Finnish space accommodates a variety of migratory and transnational practices. Although economic reasons can be seen as driving the process, there is a variety of other aspects and often motivations are mixed. With the exception of Ingrian Finns initially enjoying special treatment, most other forms of migration have developed through individual initiative, but of course, in a positive, regulatory environment. With respect to labor migration, one can perceive how macro-level changes in regulations have affected the flows. The number of labor migrants increased in the second half of the 2000s; in particular, there are more seasonal and temporary migrants who take advantage of the free movement of labor and services. In fact, the Finnish regulations concerning the transitional period (2004–2006)—restricting the movement of individual labor migrants but allowing free movement of services—increased the number of Estonian posted workers in Finland and promoted the operations of labor-force leasing companies as well as Estonian companies contracting blue collar workers to Finland, particularly in the construction sector (Forsander 2008; Kyntäjä 2008).

Transmigration is facilitated thanks to EU regulations, although in practice not all migrants are aware of their rights or obligations. Newcomers can partly rely on existing networks to obtain migration-related information and social support in their new country of residence. However, migrants and their family members make the decision to migrate according to their personal and family needs, aspirations, and conditions. Even though proximity enables circular migration or multiple homes, many respondents opted for transmigration during the first years (or months), and later either returned to their country of origin or settled down more permanently. Some of the informants have been commuting across borders for several years. Regarding both the labor migrants and the students interviewed for this study, one can perceive that particularly highly qualified migrants were considering moving yet again to another foreign country in the future. Some of the respondents had already lived in several foreign countries, whereas some of the younger interviewees had adopted highly mobile and transnational lifestyles. Furthermore, positive experiences of study abroad had fostered self-confidence and transnational competence (Koehn and Rosenau 2010) among some of the informants, and this facilitated their re-migration.

5.5 Political Orientation

5.5.1 Membership

Membership is often regarded as participation-oriented identity (Jenkins 1996), and is contrasted with identity in the more passive form of *belonging* (Stryker 2000), but in some cases it is contrasted with an even more modest level of identification,

which is termed by Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001) a form of plain *being,* which they perceive to be a characteristic of many immigrants who orient themselves to retain their membership of the society of origin (Levitt 2004). In the case of most participants in this study, a more positive stance was expressed toward membership of the host society. Exceptions to this tendency were mainly presented by younger respondents—students and young people who had migrated as children, and some blue collar workers who felt alienated from the mainstream society or totally estranged from the political domain.

Citizenship as a legal, political, and also social form of membership seems to play a fairly distinct part in the Estonian–Finnish transnational space (Faulks 2002; Pitkänen and Kalekin-Fishman 2007). First, for several respondents, citizenship only meant a passport in their pocket, a set of rights and obligations, and thus a rather minimal, legalistic perception of membership. However, even more respondents stressed its cultural and traditional importance; it represented a link to their roots. Thus it is evident that the transnationalist discourse on citizenship, campaigning for citizenship to become more oriented toward participation and less toward national rights and state membership (Sassen 2002; Gerdes and Faist 2010) is somewhat off track in the context of the Estonian–Finnish transnational space. Perhaps even the other way around—in many cases citizenship had a sort of sentimental value; for example, an emotional value "to the land of lakes," as Finland is popularly called. Having rights was perceived as something natural. Yet this situation could be associated with both countries belonging to the EU and holding EU citizenship, which grants almost equal civil and social rights to all in the host country. Such a construction of citizenship could also be associated with the fact that multiple citizenship is not permitted in Estonia.[11] Thus, citizenship is a zero-sum game. One is obliged to assess what he or she might lose by gaining citizenship of another state. This was discussed by a Finnish respondent as follows:

> I was born as Finn. My substance is Finnish. I'd like to take Estonian citizenship as well, if Estonia will allow dual citizenship. (Samuli, Male, 1946, Finn)

Yet even for those with dual citizenship, it was not connected only with a subject in more than one political domain as Bauböck's (1998) idea of social citizenship would imply, but rather with having and retaining a complex cultural and genealogical background. For example, Liisa (1961, Finland-Sweden), a citizen of Finland and Sweden, noted that multiple citizenship was primarily related to her mixed ethnic background. However, in addition to cultural belonging and origins, citizenship was also associated with social practices and loyalty to the state. Several Estonians characterized their subjecthood in Finland as being orderly, law-abiding,

[11] However, in Finland, dual citizenship is allowed and less than 1% of Finnish citizens hold dual citizenship. In 2009, 1,874 persons had obtained Estonian–Finnish dual citizenship (Statistics Finland, 2010a). That means that approximately 7% of Estonians residing permanently in Finland have dual citizenship. In this study, five Estonian respondents residing in Finland held dual citizenship, and several Estonian interviewees living permanently in Finland were interested in obtaining it.

doing one's duty toward the state. This includes, for example, paying one's value added tax (VAT) to Finland when using the social services there, although there would also be an opportunity to pay a much lower VAT to Estonia; or paying the car tax, although the respondent is also allowed to register his or her car in Estonia tax free:

> I thought it necessary to pay officially my taxes there—when I enjoy the benefits of that society, I will contribute there as well. I've never tried to find ways how to pay less taxes or how to enlarge my profits. Maybe it's the Finnish type of attitude I have acquired. Well, Finland does interest me, I don't understand them thoroughly yet. I think it is so because I don't know that much about their historical background. If I will ever have time, I plan to study Finnish history also. (Helen, Female, 1978, Estonian)

Thus, a sentiment of multiple citizenship can be detected where in Bauböck's (1998) terms, one simultaneously holds national citizenship (with an almost primordial citizenship construction) of the state of origin, and social citizenship of the new host society, and these two are not seen as conflicting. It is noteworthy that the Finns interviewed were less prone to feel any loyalty toward the Estonian state. Obviously, their lawfulness and civic behavior rested on other grounds, possibly on a deeper tradition of civic education. The differences in feeling loyal to the host state possibly reflect the asymmetry of the transnational space between a citizen-centered welfare state (Finland) and a neoliberal state (Estonia). This was especially evident among the Finns who had arrived in Estonia before 2004. This cohort even tended to mistrust the Estonian authorities owing to the rather poor treatment by the officials as well as some prejudice toward the Estonian health care system and other services, as can explicitly be seen in the following citation:

> I'm a Finnish citizen. It means safety. It's some kind of a security licence. (Tarja, Female, 1962, Finn)

Yet most Finns who were members of the Estonian Health Care Fund were very satisfied with the local services and even claimed them to be more convenient than in Finland, some critique was also expressed:

> I think my loyalty to the Finnish state has increased here. I think I will gladly pay the 35–40 percent taxes when we go back, because I think we get something for our taxes and here there are still some things that you have to figure out and to manage the money and how to divide it and so on, but I think you`re going there. So free skating areas in winter time, you don`t have them, roads are not so well maintained. (Jenni, Female, 1975, Finn)

To a significant extent loyalty and a feeling of membership depended on the immigration experiences and initial contacts with local authorities. Both Estonians and Finns who migrated in the 1990s felt an unwelcoming aura, especially because of the rigidity of the registration procedures; that is, being sent away to improve the documentation and paperwork five or six times in a row; demanding a tuberculosis test as a precondition for entry to Estonia, although such tests were not performed in Finland; or refusing to grant citizenship to migrants' children based on *ius soli.* Some Estonian respondents also complained of the double standards in social benefits offered to foreigners and Finns. In other fields (e.g., business) some Finns were even surprised by the absence of regulations and restrictions that, on the positive side, meant much more flexibility. Some Estonians, on the other hand, reported that they had been struggling with Finnish bureaucracy.

In general, the Finnish welfare state seems to be more efficient in creating a bond and retaining it than the Estonian neoliberal state strategy. This is evident not only in the labor market and investments in Finnish companies, but also in the conceptions of people leaning toward the Finnish state, whereas their loyalty toward the Estonian state is based on cultural and symbolic belonging. Although the Finnish system is not very supportive of immigrants, because there is no backup scheme from the other side (Estonia), the Finnish system is still fairly efficient in integrating Estonians. Their loyalty stems from a sense of national belonging, but in real terms keeps no ties to the state. They have become moral citizens of Finland.

Among some respondents it was noted that there are signs of developing a diasporic political community. For example, Tarja, a Finn living in Estonia stated:

> I have to say that I have become more Finnish here in Estonia. It's mainly because of the work I've been doing in the Finnish Entrepreneurs' Club of Estonia, where one's Finnish identity was always emphasised. Here I have served for my compatriots and developed an even deeper solidarity; I have experienced a feeling of belonging to a national community. It's about Finnish culture and traditions. We celebrate Finnish Independence Day. (Tarja, Female, 1962, Finn)

At the same time, some of the Estonian respondents living in Finland stressed their identity as Estonians as opposed to other migrants. In comparison with the "others" who were in conflict with the Finnish traditions—pointing out, for example, migrants of Somali origin—they usually wanted to underline that they themselves were very well adapted to Finnish society, to its customs, speaking the language, being law-abiding, and so on.

To conclude, using Levitt's (2001) terms, there tends to be a "master" identity and another, perhaps more latent, although definitely not less important one, that is not practiced as active membership, but rather as a symbolic belonging. In general, these two were seen as compatible for most of the settled migrants originating in either country, their political membership and loyalty to the state was significantly oriented toward the host country (with the exception of Finns rather mistrusting Estonian policy and the political context). Students, returnees, and circular migrants on the other hand, prioritized membership of their society of origin. How do such identification patterns reflect on the idea of transnationalization? Levitt (2001) sees transnational membership as transcending the identity dilemma between master membership and submissive belonging. This, however, did not seem to be the case with the respondents. Also, most of them, especially Finns, stressed that they did not possess a broader political identity; they feel like European or world citizens. Possessing European citizenship identity was more common among Estonians, especially younger respondents with a multinational background.

5.5.2 *Political Participation*

The most popular form of participation mentioned was voting, and as emerged from the answers, voting in the country of residence was more common than in the country

of origin[12] (the country of the respondent's citizenship). Voting in the country of residence was more common among long-term residents, those who had already arrived in the 1990s and who associated their future with that country, whereas circular migrants usually only voted in their country of origin. In general, voting in the EU elections was not seen as very significant, although those respondents who were more active had voted in them, either in their home country or their new host country. In general, the Finnish respondents claimed to be more interested and active in Estonian politics than Estonian respondents in Finnish politics. This difference may be explained by differences in civic education and tradition and hence, in terms of empowerment; but perhaps also because of active engagement in economic life, and thus there was a greater sense of obligation to be politically active.

Among the Finnish respondents, voting was more common among middle-aged or older people, especially women, white collar workers doing simpler jobs. Thus we can assume that participation in politics was associated with the amount of spare time one could devote to keeping up to date with politics in both countries. Among the Estonian respondents, the general tendency was that highly educated migrants were more interested in politics and voting in different elections. Nonvoters, especially among Estonians, had different kinds of educational backgrounds (also doctoral degrees), and although some of them were very well informed about politics in both countries, they preferred not to vote because they did not trust politics or politicians or thought that their vote would not have any significance. Sometimes the reasons for not voting were practical: not being there during the elections, not having enough information about elections and voting, not knowing enough about parties and options, and so on. The Estonian e-voting system that could enable the respondents to vote wherever they are was not reported to be extensively used.

> [Voting] is difficult. You have to go to the embassy and … Also, I don't follow Estonian politics and I don't have very developed opinions on whom to vote for. Well, as a Tallinner, I would vote against Edgar Savisaar.[13] But on parliamentary elections—I don't know it. (Arno, Male, 1972, Estonian)

Among the Finnish respondents, political knowledge did not always prove to be very developed about Estonian politics; therefore, neither were their decisions. Although many respondents, especially those who had migrated in the 2000s, perceived themselves to be fairly well informed about public issues in both countries, because of reading papers online or following Estonian and Finnish television,[14] this

[12] There were some differences in how information about voting was gathered by the country teams. The Finnish team did not ask all respondents about voting in both countries, whereas the Estonian team gathered information on voting from all respondents.

[13] Estonian politician mayor of Tallinn and head of the Centre Party, Edgar Savisaar was by far the politician most often mentioned in the interviews. Most of these mentions—including those by Finns—were usually in the same context as Arno's comment here.

[14] Both are available on the cable TV of both countries, but now for an extra fee Estonian public television is available in one theme set in Finland; four or five Finnish channels were available free of charge in Estonia until 2009, but now are included in the standard set of channels of most service providers.

was not in direct correlation with their political participation. The elaboration of several Finnish respondents was limited to having one negative preference in terms of real choices, especially in the context of the municipal elections of Tallinn.

> I'm very little interested in politics. I do follow the media and what is going on in Estonia, in Finland and then in the rest of the world. I vote at the elections, because every given vote is a vote less to Savisaar. I voted as an Estonian in the elections of the European Parliament. I'm going to vote in the next local elections. I also voted in the previous local elections. (Leena, Female, 1963, Finn)

The usage of alternative forms for political participation was very much backed up by the flourishing associational life among the Finns living in Estonia. The Club of Finnish Entrepreneurs in Estonia (SEKE) and other associations of Finnish entrepreneurs have proved to be fairly active and influential pressure groups not only in organizing meetings with Estonian government officials and Tallinn municipal politicians, but also in maintaining contact with the Finnish authorities. Some Finnish respondents noted having access to top politicians up to the prime minister of Estonia (and thus not valuing the opportunity to vote in local elections). However, in Estonia there are also other platforms for participation; for instance, these include the association of Finnish businesswomen in Estonia, the Finnish church, the Finnish school, and the association of Finnish ladies.

This also shows a very different perception of societal structure and political gateways. As emerges from the interviews, Estonia is very much a network society, in which acquaintances and contacts also influence politics; whereas Finland could be described more as an associational society, in which active pressure groups make their way to the political agenda. As described by one of our respondents:

> Estonia is more network-based society than Finland. Among Russians an acquaintance is a quality itself. I have become a network-based person as well. (Markku, Male, 1962, Finn)

This was also claimed to be the reason that the Finnish respondents (in Estonia) were active only in local diasporic associations. Many of them complained that Estonians remained rather passive in terms of associations, although statistically the picture has improved over the years (Estonian Human Development Report 2008). Yet there still is a significant gap between the countries in the overall political participation and trust, as seen from Table 5.4. Some Finns who owned an apartment in Estonia belonged to a local housing association, and even had become the chair of the organization (because the respondent claimed that none of the locals wanted the responsibility).

Whereas the Estonians' lack of enthusiasm to participate in associational life in Finland has been noted in earlier studies (Liebkind et al. 2004) many of the long-term migrants taking part in this study were members of some associations.[15]

[15] Yet these results are not entirely comparable, because the research techniques were very different.

Table 5.4 Political participation and social and political trust

	Members of the trade union (%)	Has signed a petition (%)	Trust the parliament (%)	Trust people in general (%)	Satisfied with the operation of democracy (%)	N
Finland	58	35	79	86	86	1,792
Estonia	7	8	42	72	53	1,426

Source: European Social Survey (2008)

Perhaps one could assume that their initiative to participate has increased. Several respondents were members of labor unions, although in most cases their participation was passive; and some Estonians took part in the activities of Finnish political parties. Further, many Estonian interviewees belonged to professional associations and networks (e.g., the Association of Doctors, the Association of Estonian Doctors in Finland, the Association of Construction Workers, the Association of Mother-tongue Teachers, the network of entrepreneurs, research networks), student unions, and associated hobby clubs. For instance, forming and belonging to Estonian clubs was quite popular among the respondents. A special feature of these clubs was that Finns were also interested in taking part in Estonian-language activities. Informal activities included, for example, attempts to establish an Estonian school in Finland or promoting an ecological way of life. In addition, a few took part in national or local committees or groups discussing integration of immigrants and multicultural policies in Finland.

However, some Estonian respondents felt unempowered and left on the periphery by both Finnish and Estonian governments. This might result from a weak associational tradition and poor skills for cooperating with the governments. Some of the respondents (both Finnish and Estonian) were members of transnational social movement organizations such as the Red Cross or Amnesty International, or antiracist organizations such as Human Rights Watch. Yet many of them were members of the branch of the country of origin, not the host country (with the exception of some Estonians settled in Finland). Thus, from one perspective, it is a paradox that the so-called transnational social movement organizations do not really function transnationally for the transnationals. On the other hand, it may also have to do with the interviewees' perception of their stay in the other country as temporary.

5.5.3 Concluding Remarks

Although political membership in the Estonian–Finnish space had the same basic structure in the case of most migrants interviewed—a more latent component of belonging to the national/ethnic community, and a more active membership component orientating oneself into the daily political reality—there were still two significant disparities. The first was related to the perception and appreciation of one's role as a citizen. For Finnish respondents, this seemed to be a much more natural context,

whereas Estonians complained about not being accepted as members, and stressed the importance of being politically invisible in Finnish society or remaining alienated altogether.

However, the differences in the political structure begin to work in favor of the Finns. Because of their better preparation and political empowerment, they are simultaneously significant partners both for the Finnish as well as the Estonian government, whereas Estonian respondents remain somewhat in limbo. Welfare strategy is therefore related to more political capacity compared with neoliberalism. All in all, there is not much sign of a transnational political domain developing in the Estonian–Finnish space. Participation remains rather nation-state centered or absent altogether (especially among young people). In fact, this corresponds to the general picture of transnationalism in the research literature. However, it can be noted that a good basis for transnational practices in general is still insufficient to create a more solid political transnationalism.

5.6 Economic Activities

5.6.1 Participation in the Economic Life

The people interviewed in Estonia and Finland mainly belong to a group of active working age (cohorts 20–40 years) and have obtained either some vocational training or a qualification from a vocational institute or university. In general, the development of Estonian and Finnish labor markets has been rather different and to an extent, asymmetric. (This is apparent in the schemata of established networks as well as their experience with training and retraining; see the education section.) It is possible to distinguish among three strata of agents in the Estonian–Finnish transnational economic space: the workers doing rather simple white or blue collar jobs, highly skilled specialists with significant international networks and multiple job opportunities, and transnational entrepreneurs.

The first group was composed of Estonians who were seeking better payment, or who had to move because of an economically difficult situation, such as single parents, divorcees, or widowers who could not support their family or pay debts on the salary they obtained in Estonia. The Finns belonging to this group had fallen into the trap of unemployment. The Estonians in this group were mostly people doing simple jobs, working in construction, agriculture, or industry. Most of them felt that finding a job in Finland was fairly easy. However, several interviewees, especially among the Ingrian Finns and family migrants, had difficulty finding a permanent job in their field or on the same level as they had been working in Estonia. Some of the Estonians reported that they experienced discrimination at the workplace or when applying for a job.

> My friend and I, we applied for the same position but then they [employer] lied to me on the phone and told a different story than they had told to my friend … we had the same kind of

> background and competences … and we could not think of any other reason for this than that I am Estonian and she is a Finn. (Maire, Female, 1972, Estonian)

The Finns in this group did not have many options or contacts in Estonia. They typically did not command Estonian language and usually lacked elementary networks. Most of them had become mid-level managers or people doing simple white collar work, for example, working as an IT administrator. Some of them had been working in blue collar positions before arriving in Estonia. Moving to another country, in this case to Estonia, had not been their initiative for the most part. Their decision was shaped via courses and supplied small resources, but also delivered information.

> Yes, the Finnish state (or the EU) sponsored me through the Employment Office. My training programme took about nine months to complete and during that time I received support from that office. After that I went into work training and in the end I ended up for two years with this company called X. (Jouni, Male, 1962, Finn)

The second strata of labor force were recruited strategically. The Finns in this group were usually top or middle level managers, many were posted workers of transnational companies. Their move to Estonia was largely a part of a wider economic development and colonizing market process. These people were highly qualified and did not need any special training. They often had previous work experience abroad. Their working context was often international, and the working language was English.

> I was working at [Company X] in Finland, but then the company made me a job offer which caused me to come to work in Estonia. I had also a chance to go to Poland but decided to come to Estonia. First, the contract was for two years. I was a finance specialist here. Then I became the financial director. The last two and a half years I've been the plant manager. Now, I've already been living in Estonia for about 10 years. (Aki, Male, 1973, Finn)

The broadly corresponding group of Estonians consisted primarily of people working as highly skilled specialists, for instance, as doctors or research and development workers. Some of them had worked as posted workers in different countries, and had significant international networks. However, some of the highly qualified migrants had to retake exams or re-educate themselves in Finland so as to get a job on a higher level of specialization. The third stratum is entrepreneurs, although in this case, Finns and Estonians had very different stories to tell. Moreover, the experiences of Finnish entrepreneurs in Estonia were somewhat different from those of labor migrants. They had moved to Estonia as opportunities opened up. Some of the new entrepreneurs had had quite a modest start. They moved to Estonia looking for work, but subsequently developed their own business there. Especially in the early 1990s, some Finnish people succeeded in working their way up in Estonia and achieved success.

> The state of the construction business was good here, when I started with my company in Estonia. The competences I had were very much needed here. … At the same time, the situation in the building business in Finland was really bad. There wasn't much work and the markets went down. My business partner had some experience of Estonia and information about the state of things which they shared with me. (Risto, Male, 1938, Finn)

On the other hand, Estonian entrepreneurs started their businesses in Finland more gradually. For some Estonians, starting a business was a way to employ oneself, for example, as a shopkeeper or a hairdresser, whereas some had been working in Finland as specialists for years before founding their own companies. It seems that going into business is a development one undertakes when the ground feels solid under one's feet. For example, Mart (Male, 1973, Estonian) went to Finland to study construction in a vocational school, but later continued with engineering. After that he started working in the same field, and finally founded his own company. Liina (Female, 1972, Estonian), a doctor, married an Estonian living in Finland, specialized while in Finland, and had been working as a doctor there for years. Finally, with a Finnish associate, she decided to start a private clinic in the country.

> I think I wouldn't have started my private business, if I had stayed in Estonia. It is much easier in Finland. It would have been extremely difficult there financially. And a regular intern would not have obtained a loan from the bank in Estonia. … In Finland, a private doctor is better off, I think, than a public one.

Thus the opportunity structures that Finland and Estonia offer for both labor migrants and entrepreneurs are somewhat different. Most of the Finnish entrepreneurs admitted that it was the very open situation of the "Wild Wild East" that attracted them; but their decision to come to Estonia to do business was fairly straightforward. At the same time, the entrepreneurial sector in Estonia was characterized by a corporate model favoring established large enterprises; thus, the "early birds" among Finnish entrepreneurs were well established by now.

The Finns and Estonians stressed differences in the working environments. Many respondents mentioned that Finnish working culture cherishes orderliness, discipline, and obeying orders, but at the same time people are quite aware of employees' rights. The Estonian working culture was mentioned to be much more relaxed and dynamic, but also often disorderly, and thus not as efficient. As also mentioned in the sociocultural domain section, Estonia is fairly network-based, whereas Finland is more true to the associational type of social interaction. This definitely affects business opportunities, although concerning the importance of the Finnish entrepreneurs' associational life in Estonia, this might not be seen as such an obstacle by newcomers.

However, both the Estonian and Finnish labor markets seem to have followed the segmented market model (Piore 1979; Sassen 1988; Kivisto and Faist 2010). It states that the functioning of the transnational labor market is based on demand rather than supply, thus fostering the migration of the labor force most suitable for the jobs available, rather than plain opportunity-seeking by those who are underpaid or have not found a position in the labor market of the sending country. An exception was the group of Finns who migrated to Estonia to get jobs with the aid by the Finnish government either in getting a position or retraining. An example of this was Estonian doctors, who were welcome in Finland, particularly in the 2000s, when a shortage of qualified medical staff occurred there. In the case of Estonian construction workers, the Finnish employers and companies profited from the

opportunity to obtain less expensive and more flexible manpower across borders,[16] whereas Estonian builders could also benefit economically by working abroad. On the other hand, Finnish businessmen found niches (e.g., checking for humidity damage in buildings) in the Estonian market that were still not filled. This also explains why some Estonian respondents reported discrimination in the Finnish labor market.

5.6.1.1 Transnational Networks

As noted in the section on migratory processes, social, associational, and institutional networks played important parts in supplying information and opportunities for migration, and also in sustaining cooperation, including the economy. Associations such as the Estonian-Finnish Chamber of Commerce and the Club of Finnish Entrepreneurs in Estonia (SEKE) provide an important platform for strategic planning as well as identifying recruitment options for Finnish entrepreneurs. This also enables the Finns in Estonia to consolidate their positions on the institutional level, shaping the transnational economic space (Vertovec 2001). The cooperation network among the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, its regional offices, and Finnish enterprises in Estonia as well as the cooperation between the Estonian and Finnish labor unions help to ensure better movement of information on working options and job offers, changes in the labor market, and so on. However, such cooperation has been one-sided to a large extent, or rather recent, because of the decidedly protectionist stance of the Finnish labor market. Personal networks were very important at the beginning of 1990s, when Finnish businessmen with contacts dating from Soviet times[17] found business opportunities through personal networks, but these were also important among Estonians and Ingrian Finns in finding a job in Finland.

Presumably because of geographical and cultural proximity, not many significant consumption networks (Landolt et al. 1999) built up within the diasporas.[18] Thus no "enclave economy" (Portes and Bach 1985) was established. Something like that existed at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when the borders started to open up, but Estonia's internal market was still not functioning according to the rules of market capitalism. Such networks were mainly kept up by

[16] For example, employers could pay the minimum wage to the foreign worker instead of the wage normally requested by native workers. Using subcontractors or leased labor is also more profitable and flexible for companies than employing workers directly. Furthermore, by using foreign posted workers, companies can also gain by paying less in taxes and social security, based on the regulations of the "sending country" (Forsander 2008).

[17] Several projects were completed in Estonia or in cooperation with the Estonian labor force. Such contacts were established and continued to function after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

[18] In recent years several shops selling mainly Estonian food have been opened in the metropolitan region of Finland.

Estonian migrants who constantly commuted between Estonia and Finland or who provided Estonian relatives and friends and their networks mostly with secondhand products, from clothes to household equipment and machines. These networks functioned either with the help of the networks the commuters had founded in Finland or through Finnish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Around the mid-1990s, such networks dissolved or transformed.

The importance and variation among networks, however, ensures that the economic domain is actually grasping for transnational reach, although the systemic differences between the two countries still leave their own traces. In addition to the Estonian–Finnish networks, the respondents—especially top-level specialists, such as academics, doctors, engineers, and entrepreneurs—were characterized by rather wide-ranging international cooperation networks. These networks were mostly Eurocentric, primarily extending to Scandinavia and/or the Baltic countries as their market; but Turkey, Bulgaria, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and other countries were also mentioned, especially as sources of production. Also, most of the Finnish posted workers tended to work for transnational corporations. The respondents with minor economic networks were mainly lower-qualified work migrants and small entrepreneurs. In some cases, for instance, the Finns, using the services of local employment offices, and Estonian seasonal workers, contracted to Finland by labor force agencies or Estonian or Finnish construction companies, more resources were processed through the networks than subjects within these networks. Several people who came to Estonia to escape unemployment in Finland, not intending to become entrepreneurs, also became members of Finnish entrepreneurial associations in Estonia. Thus they maintained networks in order to keep their recruitment options open for their future in Estonia.

5.6.1.2 Financial Remittances

According to the International Organization for Migration (2010), financial remittances in Finland (data for the year 2008) amounted to USD 772 and those in Estonia (data for the year 2007) USD 398. However, such quantitative data do not give a very precise overview of the economic impact and the flow of remittances because they also cover all incomes of the migrants, and thus *cannot* be used as the “measuring stick for the ties connecting migrants with their societies of origin” (Guarnizo 2003: 666; Vertovec 2009: 102) in contrast to what has been proposed by other authors.

According to our findings, the pattern and direction of the flow of money sent by migrants was rather different from what is generally assumed—an unequal flow of remittances from the more affluent country to the poorer one. Rather, in the Estonian–Finnish case, financial and material remittances moved equally in both directions. Some admitted supporting people back home (e.g., some Estonians financially assisted their elderly parents), although this was mostly occasional, rather than regular, and most of the respondents denied that anyone was dependent on them. Many explained that transferring money was more about giving presents

or pocket money than providing serious support. In most cases, the circular labor migrants were men, but in general, their wives residing in Estonia were also working:

> The money usually travels with me. In general, we go to buy things together when I'm in Estonia. (Kristo, Male, 1978, Estonian)

There were also some Finnish posted workers who reported supporting their families in Finland. In some cases, transferring money also had to do with the fear of the Estonian currency being devalued (in 2009):

> I send financial aid to support the family. I have the biggest burden there. Every month I send something. In general about 2/3 of my salary. (Otto, Male, 1972, Finn-Estonian)

The transnational financial flows also concerned students. Scholarships were transferred to the other country and/or study loans issued and spent in the other country. Most study migrants (especially those studying for bachelor's degrees) admitted receiving some financial support from their parents. Estonian students on higher levels usually reported working in Finland. Some of them had gone to study in Finland with a scholarship from the Estonian government requiring them to return after graduation, whereas some had received student benefits from the Finnish state (if they had already been resident in Finland for several years). Most Finns were relying mainly on regular state-funded benefits or they had taken a loan to study. At least at the beginning of their studies, many Finnish young people had summer jobs in Finland to provide support during the term. In addition to transferring money, there was a flow of goods and services, especially among Finnish and Estonian migrants coming to Estonia for medical or beauty services. Some Estonian respondents claimed that many of their trips to Finland had to do with festivals and concerts, but especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, with goods that were not available in Estonia, such as music records, books, designer clothes, and so on.

5.6.1.3 Property Ownership and Management

Owning real estate in the country of residence was fairly common among both Finns and Estonians. Many Finns explained that their purchases had very cheap prices, especially in the 1990s. There were also so-called "sun migrants," Finns with summer holiday homes in Estonia. Some of the Estonian respondents also owned an apartment, house, or piece of land in Estonia. They had often bought it before migrating or inherited it. The main reasons for keeping the property included the possibility of returning to Estonia, allowing their relatives to live there, or because it had belonged to their extended family. Some respondents were interested in buying an apartment or house in Estonia in the future. However, maintaining real estate was also an issue. As noted, some people constantly commuted partly because of their real estate. With Estonians, local or family networks (relatives or neighbors) assisted in maintaining and taking care of their real estate. However, none of the respondents reported having employed a person especially for real estate maintenance.

> I have had bureaucratic problems while living in two countries. I have a house in Finland. Because I have that house there I pay some taxes there, but I can't get any support from the Finnish government. I think it's unfair. (Kaarina, Female, 1974, Finn)

5.6.2 *Concluding Remarks*

The economic domain of the Estonian–Finnish space is perhaps the most transnational among them. Also, it seems largely to be functioning according to the logic of functional differentiation. In 1997, Estonian economic and political researchers (Raagmaa and Terk 1997) outlined four primary future scenarios, one of them about Estonia becoming "southern Finland" economically. In hindsight, this was seen as the closest to the prophecy fulfilled (Terk 2007). As our research has also shown, Estonia is playing the role of the market and a bureau for the Finnish companies. Tallinn has become a sort of suburb of Helsinki. Finland, however, has become a metropolis, in which both blue collar workers and top-level specialists go for a better salary or development conditions. This might also result in the development of a space out of balance, when opportunity seeking on the other side of the Gulf becomes a default strategy both in the eyes of the specialists themselves as well as the politicians, or when the emerging market and more dynamic working conditions are being colonized by Finnish entrepreneurs.

In certain aspects, the Estonian–Finnish space differs from the "traditional" transnational spaces. The flow of remittances is rather untraditional, and the business sector oriented to the diaspora is almost nonexistent because of the geographical proximity, although diasporic contacts themselves play an important role, especially among the Finnish residents of Estonia. However, in every other aspect, the economic domain of the Estonian–Finnish transnational space operates according to rather widespread schemata.

5.7 Sociocultural Engagement

5.7.1 *Sense of Belonging*

Regarding the ethno-national identification of the respondents, for many Finns and Estonians, such identification was rather primordial. People felt they were Estonians or Finns because they were born as such. National identity was also associated with language, cultural mores, historical heritage, citizenship, beliefs, mindset, sports, and festivals. Some of the respondents explained how their identity had been changing over time. A few pointed out how their national identity had been reinforced while living abroad, whereas some underscored how their identity had become binational:

> I feel like a Finnish–Estonian, not Finnish and no longer Estonian. I realised when I moved back here after three years [in Estonia] that something had happened, one could not be like here, it was something in-between. (Minna, Female, 1967, Estonian)

Among the respondents there were some who emphasized their multicultural background (having roots in different ethnic groups or nations). In addition, those few who identified themselves as cosmopolitans, Europeans, or regionals (e.g., as Baltic)

reported that they felt at home everywhere, and did not want to affiliate themselves with any particular nation. Regarding the constructions of "home" the following categories were highlighted: social ties, percentage of time spent in a location, being familiar with the social mores of the society, and owning real estate. Most of the Finns and some of the Estonians (resident in Finland) initially reported that they felt at home in their house or apartment; several also located their home in a specific town or city district. Informants also reported feeling at home in the country of immigration, but also being connected to their homeland because of their roots, or feeling at home in both countries.

> Georg (Male, 1973, Estonian) moved to Finland at the age of 18 as a migrant laborer. He has lived 18 years in Finland, but still feels at home in both countries. He has kept close contacts with his relatives living in Estonia, and now also in Sweden, and appreciates these ties more and more. Georg considers that Estonia will always be a part of him because of his childhood, but over the years he has also become Finnish. Now he has dual citizenship mainly for symbolic reasons, feeling that he belongs to both nations.

Yet there were also a few who felt alienated from their country of origin, its ways, and everyday life:

> I wouldn't really like to go back there. The society has changed so much there, and I have no need, I like it more when I come here, maybe it's because of my age when I moved here, it is the age when people start to study and learn through life how things go and how to arrange all these small things. Through that I have integrated here … I am a stranger there. (Rauha, Female, 1970, Estonian)

The relationship among transnational ties, cross-border activities, and integration into the country of settlement is complex and has been examined, for example, in terms of class, gender, religion, and occupation (Portes 2003; Morawska 2004; Jayaweera and Choudhury 2008; Vertovec 2009). Nevertheless, our results show that most of those respondents who had intense transnational activities in various forms were also actively taking part in the economic, political, and cultural life of the host country. Therefore, as argued by Levitt and Schiller (2004: 1002), "assimilation and enduring transnational ties are neither incompatible nor binary opposites," as this interviewee pointed out:

> Since all the time, in fact, I have had contacts to Estonia through work, this has certainly helped my adaptation here [Finland] so well because the contact to Estonia has never broken … that through work I have always been able to take part in it. (Indrek, Male, 1970, Estonian)

Most of the Finns and Estonians, particularly those who migrated in the 2000s, claimed that they had mostly been treated well, although a few pointed out that the receiving society was not welcoming to foreigners in general. In addition, it was also mentioned how other immigrants, of different physical appearance, had probably experienced more discrimination than the respondents. A discourse of being somewhat inferior as migrants emerged in the descriptions of attitudes Finns have toward Estonians and Russians. In particular, it was associated with a specific segment of the Estonian migrant population in Finland as well as prejudices in the Finnish media (Raittila 2002).

> I listened to the radio there a lot. And as mystical as it seemed, after every couple of weeks, there was some negative announcement about Estonia. Whether it was about the criminals or prostitutes or something that had taken place in Estonia. Perhaps the coverage was even objective, but still, it was always some negative event. And I felt negatively affected. (Liina, Female, 1978, Estonian)

For Estonian informants, strategies for coping with experiences of stigma (Kyntäjä 2005) were "behaving well oneself, working hard and obeying the laws carefully." In addition, many informants with Estonian and Russian roots pointed out in the interviews what diligent workers and good taxpayers they had been, and distinguished themselves from "the other Russian/Estonians" and also from "the other immigrants."

5.7.2 Transnational Social Networks

5.7.2.1 Family Relations

Gouldbourne et al. (2010: 10–11) point out how the institution of the family is a particularly suitable unit of analysis in understanding the sociocultural dimensions of transnationalism as well as the lives of ordinary people, which transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. They also explain how matters such as cultural identities (including religion, language, lifestyles) and care issues are closely linked to transnational families (also Bryceson and Vuorela 2002).

Concerning the descriptions of families given by the participant respondents, some considered that their family consisted of their spouse and children, whereas some thought that their parents, and in some cases, other relatives living in another country also belonged to the family.[19] It was common that migrants kept up frequent cross-border contacts, particularly to their parents and/or children: They phoned or communicated through the Internet (e.g., Skype, Messenger, Facebook), mostly weekly, but sometimes even daily, and visited them regularly (also Liebkind et al. 2004; Hyvönen 2009). The relatives also visited the informants in Finland and Estonia. The overall intensity of family relations often depended on whether or not the informant had started a family him or herself. Women in particular were most keen on keeping rather intensive cross-border contact with their relatives.

Among the Finnish respondents especially, migrating alone and being single was fairly common. In a few cases, Finnish interviewees started a new family in their country of destination. However, this was not a general rule. Several Finnish interviewees living a mobile lifestyle maintained strong family as well as marital relations. The Estonian respondents followed a more traditional family pattern. Although most of them had also been single when emigrating, only few had remained single.

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[19] See Siim (2008) on how familial relationships are constructed in transnational families.

In terms of social status, the "mixed" marriages tended to be formed between people of similar occupational and social class. Only a few Estonian respondents pointed out that marrying a Finn had produced complicated relations with the family members of the Finnish spouse. However, marriage or a partnership with a native citizen had been one means to further the informant's effective inroads into the new society through local, family-based networks.

> I have a lot of friends in Estonia, Estonian friends. My wife's parents live near Tartu. We're there pretty often. I go around Estonia more in the summer time in South Estonia. I enjoy my wife's family and through related networks I got to know her parents' relatives and family friends. (Aki, Male, 1973, Finn)

Among the informants, we identified different kinds of transnational families. The family members of the commuting migrants often lived in Estonia. For example, a male migrant was working in Finland and visited his family once a month or at weekends. Furthermore, because of divorce, for instance, family members lived in different countries. When exploring how migration affects the lives of transnational families, one should not forget the impact of social class and occupation. Although the commuting migrants working in academic or managerial professions could arrange their cross-border movements quite flexibly, the migrants working in the transportation or construction sectors, for example, could spend less time with their family back "home," depending on the working hours. The latter often pointed out how working abroad was an economic necessity, but at the same time constant travel was a burden on family life.

The families were both the sites of cultural reproduction and the reinvention of hybrid cultural traditions. The respondents explained how festivities, such as Christmas and Midsummer *(Juhannus, Jaanipäev),* were typically celebrated with relatives by following the traditions of their country of origin. Some of the respondents had been mixing traditions of both countries. In case of binational or multicultural families, the female partner was often decisive in whether Finnish, Estonian, Russian, or other traditions prevailed, or whether different traditions were combined:

> If we celebrate something in Estonia we do it as we do it in Finland. Even my partner is used to Finnish traditions in celebrating various holidays. Finnish Christmas is a little bit different from Estonian Christmas. The dishes served are different. I try to make sure that my daughter knows and appreciates the Finnish traditions as well. (Leena, Female, 1963, Finn)

Yet there were also difficulties relating to teaching traditions to offspring. For example, some of the Estonian informants felt that important traditions were "lost" during the Soviet era, and they did not want to pass any Soviet traditions to their children. On the other hand, some traditions originating from the Soviet time were perceived with nostalgia. For example, Toivo (Male, 1982, Estonian) explained how he celebrated his birthdays "Estonian style," which also involved potato salad as one of the main dishes. This dish, however, mainly stems from the Soviet time, when there was often nothing else to put on the table. For Toivo, however, this tradition is more connected to his life in Estonia than the Soviet Union, where he was born. In addition, although teaching one's native language to children was considered important,

the respondents felt it challenging to maintain their mother tongue against the influence of dominant language in the country of settlement.

Concerning transborder care, some of the Estonian respondents had been assisting their elderly parents or other relatives during the visits, for example, by doing repairs, organizing affairs, or discussing care arrangements with doctors (see also Zechner 2008, 2010). Regarding Finns, only a few mentioned that they had elderly parents who might need practical assistance in the future. Most of them explained that their relatives rather needed moral support. The Estonians whose parents were in need of assistance described how they often felt anxiety about the situation, but it was also difficult to arrange care across borders.[20] However, despite physical distance the informants were both caring *for* and caring *about* each other (Gouldbourne et al. 2010: 178).

It was not only respondents who were taking care of their elderly relatives. Parents were also caring for their children. Grandparents provided assistance in looking after their grandchildren as well. For example, Maire (Female, 1972, Estonian), who had been a single mother for a while, described how her parents were looking after her child in Estonia when she was working in Finland on weekdays and spending weekends in Estonia. Sara (Female, 1969, Estonian) explained that her 16-year-old son had decided to return to live with his grandmother in Estonia after a 1-year stay with her in Finland because he could not integrate into the Finnish school system. Consequently, responsibilities of caring were reciprocal, multidirectional, and carried out across generations, as also shown by Gouldbourne et al. (2010: 178).

Most of the respondents reported that their contacts in the country of origin had weakened. This depended very much on the content of the networks: whether they contained bonding ties (close friends and family), bridging ties (study mates), or linking ties (neighbors, business associates). In general, the bonding ties survived, although the frequency of contact declined; the bridging ties of one's premigration history in general weakened. Linking ties in the home country were preserved in case of frequent commuters or if the respondents had some other transnational networks besides social (e.g., economic, educational, professional). Particularly the Estonians but also some Finns had close transnational ties to other foreign countries (mainly in Europe but also in other parts of the world): close friends, relatives, or professional acquaintances.

Concerning social networks in the new country of residence, one can distinguish different ways of creating contacts: through associational life, individual networking, or via family ties. In Estonia, several Finnish respondents had extensive diasporic contacts through the associations of Finns.[21] Yet creating close contacts with locals seemed to be more challenging for some respondents. In Finland, joining different

[20] See the TRANS-NET Country Report: Finland (2010); Kröger (2003); Zechner (2010).

[21] Hyvönen (2008) observed in her study on Finnish migrant women in Estonia how some of them were living in a Finnish enclave, whereas others were socially integrated into Estonian society. Those who had few contacts with locals had often followed their husbands on intra-company transfers.

kinds of associations was one of the means for Estonian migrants to establish both diasporic and nondiasporic contacts. Regarding highly qualified migrants, in both countries, contacts with citizens of the host countries often relied on professional ties.

5.7.2.2 Religion

More than half of the Finns interviewed were members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church,[22] whereas only some of the Estonian respondents belonged to religious groups. There is a Finnish parish of St. Peter in Tallinn, and an Estonian Lutheran parish in Helsinki. Some of the respondents replied that religion was of some importance in their daily lives, although they did not actively take part in religious activities; the group consisted mostly of Lutherans. In addition, a few Estonians belonged to the other Christian churches, such as the Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and the Free Church, or practiced Asian religions. In general, no conflict was seen in professing religion in these two countries. However, religious practices were not always similar in the Lutheran churches on different sides of the border:

> When the First of Advent is celebrated I always want to sing the Hoosianna hymn in church. I was shocked to learn that nobody in the Estonian church sang it. Next time I went to the Finnish church here. (Emilia, Female, 1974, Finn)

Many Estonian respondents stated that "they were not religious at all"; but some did mention going to church sometimes, for example, at Christmas. Furthermore, they appreciated that their children could learn Lutheran traditions in daycare and at school in Finland, although they themselves did not become familiar with these during the Soviet time. A few Estonian respondents explained that they had been baptized in Estonia and they had been taking part in religious activities there, but in Finland they no longer went to church. One respondent reflected how immigration had affected her relation to God:

> It is funny but I don't feel here abroad that I have the same kind of relation to God like in Estonia. It is as if my God would live in Estonia and I don't have a similar feeling here in church as in Estonia. I don't know why, maybe that's why I don't go to church here. (Annika, Female, 1981, Estonian)

Among the respondents, there were some Orthodox Christians and Catholics whose religious denominations seemed to be more transnational, by uniting people of different origin, especially in Finland, where the congregations usually consist of foreigners, their Finnish family members as well as other native citizens. To sum up, although most of the religiously oriented respondents were Lutherans, religion was not usually a uniting factor among different national groups. Rather, it provided forums for fostering diasporic contacts.

[22] Although freedom of religion is guaranteed by law in Finland, the Evangelical Lutheran and Orthodox churches have a special position as national churches. Approximately 80% of the population belongs to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland and 1% to the Orthodox Church.

5.7.2.3 Social Remittances

Social remittances are defined by Levitt (1998, 2001) as conceptions, identities, practices, and social capital flowing from host- to sending-country communities. Previous research on social remittances has looked at the transmission processes from a rather "mechanistic" perspective, speaking either of *transferring* or *transmitting* ideas, skills, or values from one nation-state to another. However, our results show that in most cases it is rather a learning process where both migrants and nonmigrants taking part in different kinds of transnational "communities of practice"[23] share, exchange, and gradually adopt new ideas and practices through mutual communication and cooperation. Furthermore, we also underline that these processes are not one-way flows (from receiving to sending country), but rather at least two-way processes, and in some cases multiple, taking place between persons living or having origins in several nation-states. To analyze these processes, one has to investigate the processes of cross-border interaction as well as look at the migrants' accounts of their transnational activities.

According to the results, some of the respondents had shared across national borders ideas, knowledge, and/or practices that were related in particular to occupational, familial, and societal issues. Furthermore, through discussions with their relatives, friends, and colleagues (in various countries) migrants fostered transnational understanding: sharing and exchanging knowledge about social and cultural practices. In addition, those who had already migrated had informed those who were planning to migrate by providing migration-related information.

Regarding the family, the respondents often pointed out the differences in kinship relations between the two countries. It was perceived that in Estonia and the former Soviet Union, people often had closer ties to their family members than in Finland. In addition, some discussed how parents and grandparents were valued and respected more in Estonia than in Finland. In the case of binational families, the rules on how to bring up children were sometimes found to be controversial, and spouses had to negotiate and reconcile the differences (also Suksomboon 2008; Hyvönen 2009).

Concerning work, many respondents had shared skills, practices, and knowledge in transnational spaces. Labor migrants with vocational backgrounds had exchanged practical knowledge with their indigenous colleagues. Highly skilled migrants had, for example, acquired new organizational and professional knowledge. Yet some of the informants also had difficulty applying their skills in another country (see Chapter 5.8). Furthermore, the national differences in occupational practices were also a source of wonder for the respondents.

We identified a few examples of transnational social spaces[24] in which the flow of people, ideas, and goods took place simultaneously, as this Estonian scientist working in Finland explained:

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[23] See Lave and Wenger (1991), Wenger (1998).

[24] As explained by Faist (2000: 309), transnational social spaces are composed of "relatively permanent flows of people, goods, ideas, symbols, and services across international borders that tie stayers and movers and corresponding networks and non-state organisations." Examples of transnational social spaces include communities of scientists, transnational families, trans-state religious organizations, and ethnic communities (Faist 2007: 4).

> The nineties was a difficult time in Estonian society and also in research, so we assisted our colleagues there. Many came here to do a couple of experiments and went back there … and we did a couple of articles together … and when they had difficulties obtaining some research chemicals, we bought them here and donated them, or if they had their own funding but couldn't order it, then we did, and a guy came here to fetch it. … Quite often it was like this: "Well, my experiment will stop if I cannot get this" … so we ordered it … or "Come here and do the experiment here" if a machine broke down there. (Jaan, Male, 1957, Estonian)

Concerning both societies, some of the respondents described how they often discussed and compared the societies with their relatives and friends living in Estonia or Finland, and sometimes with their friends and colleagues in the host country. For example, they discussed how Finnish society was well organized and decisions were deliberated carefully, while in Estonia there were more innovative solutions as well as willingness to implement quick societal changes. In addition, Estonian society seemed to be more open to novel ideas. The interviewees also explained how the issues were examined. For example:

> I have to say that Estonian friends are often on the defensive, "oh yes, we have it, too" Although I can tell that this is arranged much better in Finland [they reply] "we do, we do as well." … but quite often they ask out of curiosity how this social issue has been arranged in Finland, and then I explain a lot, and then [they reply] "why it can't be like that here." We talk about the differences of these two societies quite a lot. (Jaan, Male, 1957, Estonian)

Moreover, some of the respondents had brought up for discussion issues relating to minorities and the interpretation of historical events through their cultural products and societal activities. Therefore, through *cultural remittances* (Flores 2005), ideas can transcend different kinds of boundaries:

> For example, in the USA, where I had lots of performances … Once I met these young people whose parents had to flee from their country to America, or who had lost their parents in war … so we had surprising discussions, even with the Africans, on how to deal with grief and loss of parents, violence … and also in Taiwan, there was an international film festival, and I wondered what these people could understand of an Estonian story but it is a psychological film showing how it is difficult to discuss these experiences … but we got an incredible contact with these young people, the linking aspect was that they had lots of older relatives, grandparents who had fled from China. They still had this fear of China and they could not deal with the losses which had happened to their kin … so, because of this film, there were discussions on how to cope with trauma. (Regina, Female, 1959, Estonian)

5.7.3 Concluding Remarks

The length of stay(s) abroad, motivations for migration, changes in personal and family situations, as well as the perceived attitudes in the receiving society were among the factors affecting the intensity of respondents' sociocultural ties and belonging. For many migrants, home was a locally constructed place in which their immediate family lived. In everyday life, respondents often orientated more to their current country of residence than to their country of origin, except for constant commuters who often had transnational lifestyles. Our findings suggest that

transnational identity is developing gradually among those who have had long-term, sustainable transnational contacts to their former home country while also integrating into the host country as well as among persons engaged in long-term commuting between the countries.

Our results show how societal, familial, as well as professional conceptions and practices were discussed and shared in different kinds of transnational social spaces between migrants and nonmigrants. Cross-border flows of social remittances can be one factor that is gradually fostering the development of the Finnish–Estonian transnational space. Yet the societal differences can complicate the adoption and exchange of ideas. Despite cultural and historical proximities, the social practices to some extent keep the national and ethnic groups apart.

As explained in many studies on migrant transnationalism, maintaining frequent transborder contacts with relatives and friends was the most typical form of transnational activity for the informants. The geographical proximity of the countries facilitated transnational care, although national regulations could also cause obstacles to arranging it. Families were the sites where cultural traditions were both reproduced and mixed. In particular, informants aimed to pass on their native language to their offspring. Yet it remains to be seen whether the next generation will continue to keep up close transnational social ties, or whether new forms of transnationalism will arise.

5.8 Transnational Relations in the Field of Education

5.8.1 Experiences of Formal Education

Only a few of the interviewees had migrated in childhood. In general, integration into the school system of the new host society was not found to be difficult; this was partly because of the similarity of the languages. Bullying was mentioned only infrequently.[25] There are two Finnish elementary schools in Estonia. Many Finnish interviewees living in Estonia with their families mentioned this when contemplating their children's education. In Finland there is only one Finnish–Estonian school. The teaching is done in both Estonian and Finnish. However, in Finland it is possible for Estonian and other migrant pupils to study their mother tongue at school a few hours a week if there are at least four pupils willing to attend the class (Ikonen 2007: 48). Because Estonians form the largest group of foreign nationals in Finland, and the Estonian language is taught in several towns. Among the respondents, teaching of the mother tongue given at school was generally deemed crucial to the child's identity and future prospects.

[25] Liebkind et al. (2004) noted in their research that 59% of immigrant children experienced discrimination at Finnish schools because of their background. Immigrants of Finnish ethnic origin were bullied even more (63%) than Estonian immigrants (51%).

For many Estonians residing in Finland, maintaining Estonian language skills was related to the child's awareness of Estonian identity and roots. As an Estonian parent related:

> I wanted to, somehow, keep up Estonian language and culture and all those customs. Although we often visited Estonia, I also wanted Estonian language teaching for my children … and we managed to get it here. (Leila, Female, 1965, Estonian)

Some Estonian respondents thought that the parents alone were responsible for maintaining the Estonian culture and language in the family. Sometimes it was thought that "fussing around with multiculturalism" at school could impede or cause a delay in their children's integration. Furthermore, criticism was voiced about the professional skills of Estonian language teachers in Finland. Generally, Estonian parents were satisfied with the Finnish elementary school system, which differs from that in Estonia in its child-centered teaching methods and flexible school practices. It seems that most Finnish parents living in Estonia prefer Finnish to Estonian school because of keeping options open for the future. Leena described this as follows:

> My daughter goes to the Finnish School in Tallinn. … I put her there to maintain her Finnish language skills. My partner and her au pair are Estonian and they all speak Estonian. I want her to have a choice to continue her studies in Finland. (Leena, Female, 1963, Finn)

For study migrants, collaboration between Estonian and Finnish universities and vocational institutes offered a relatively easy route to go abroad.[26] Besides supportive programs and scholarships, previous experience of Finland, proximity, positive image of a country/university, and studying without study fees attracted Estonian students. Moreover, there was a special group of Estonian students in Finland consisting of physicians who wanted to work and specialize in Finland, and commuting study migrants who could not get a doctoral education in Estonia in their preferred discipline. Finns' reasons for studying in Estonia were somehow different from those of Estonians. Some Finns were not able to get into any Finnish university, and a few had difficulty taking a master's degree at a university after having received a diploma in an applied higher education institution in Finland. It was easier for them to take a higher degree in Estonia. Living expenses were lower in Estonia and tuition fees were reasonable, which in addition to an interest in Estonian culture and history, attracted some Finns.

When pondering the competencies students achieved, it appeared that Estonian students appreciated the Finnish style of teaching and doing research. Some of the informants had been able to utilize in Estonia knowledge and practices they had

[26] In the twenty-first century, 100–150 Estonian academic exchange students per year studied in Finland, whereas there were fewer than 100 Finns per year in Estonian higher education institutions. It seems that for both Estonians and Finns, obtaining a qualification from a foreign university has become more popular than participating in exchange programs. Between 2003 and 2008, Estonians were the third largest student group in Finnish universities (around 600 students per year), and for Finnish students, Estonia is one of the most popular target countries for university studies (after the UK and Sweden), with more than 450 students in 2008 (CIMO 2010).

learned during their studies in Finnish vocational and higher education institutions. Therefore, we also identified some examples of "educational remittances."

For example, Elen (Female, 1941, Estonian), a lecturer in nursing, first went to Finland accompanied by her colleagues in the 1990s to study geriatrics and theory of nursing, which were not part of the curriculum in their institution. She explained how they had learned a great deal from Finland about the nursing profession. In her institution, they used the examples and practices learned during studies and practical training in Finland. In addition, international cooperation projects coordinated by Finns also provided opportunities for knowledge sharing about the development of health care and training nurses.

Most Finnish students appreciated more the skills they had acquired through their everyday lives in Estonia than those learned through formal studies. They obtained new knowledge about how to adapt to everyday work and survive in more challenging circumstances, as a Finnish student expressed:

> I have learnt from people. I have been thinking of many important things. Professionally I haven't learnt a lot in Estonia, I might as well have learnt the same things while living in Finland. (Sonja, Female, 1981, Finn)

In general, young students' thinking and lifestyles were more cosmopolitan than those of the older generation. Most of the younger students preferred and planned to live abroad in the future.

Estonians with academic backgrounds often achieved a satisfying position in the Finnish labor market more easily than those with a vocational education. Some of the respondents noted that an Estonian vocational qualification is not recognized or highly appreciated by Finnish employers (Forsander 2002: 219).[27] However, in Finland, getting a job also depended on the field; for example, labor migrants working in factories or the transportation sector obtained work easily because of their previous working experience and the urgent need for labor. Yet particularly Estonian family migrants and so-called Ingrian Finns had difficulties finding jobs in their field of expertise. An Estonian interviewee told her story about getting a job:

> It was quite difficult, though I obtained a couple of courses, financial statement courses and something else, so that it would be easier to get work, but it was no use. … I was so bored being at home, so I went there (present workplace)and said that I could work even as a free trainee … and that way I got a job … for at least a year I had sent in job applications and there was no reply at all. (Anne, Female, 1974, Estonian)

As a consequence, several vocationally educated Estonians updated their qualifications on various training courses, or qualified for an entirely new occupation years after their in-migration. Some studied the same occupation in Finnish as they already had in Estonia to improve their knowledge of Finnish language (particularly professional vocabulary). In addition, a couple of Estonian respondents had studied alongside their work to obtain a Finnish qualification for the future. The relationship

[27] The significance of education, in particular Finnish education, is highlighted in Finnish working life (Forsander 2002; Heikkilä 2005; Joronen 2005; Sutela 2005; Kyhä 2006; Antikainen 2010).

between training and employment in Finland was a subject of wonder and frustration as the following quote describes:

> Finnish society invests in training and courses, but the educated labour force is not utilised sufficiently. (Silvi, Female, 1962, Estonian)

Quite many Estonian respondents criticized Finnish society and Finnish employers for overvaluing Finnish diplomas, appreciating narrow and formal proficiency and for underestimating their work experience and personal skills. The situation was quite different among the Finnish respondents living and working in Estonia. Although many Finnish migrants, usually businessmen, had an incomplete higher education, this was no disadvantage to Estonian working life.

Many informants underlined that fluent knowledge of local language(s), in-depth professional or vocational skills, as well as knowledge of cultures and societies are needed if one works outside one's country of origin. Furthermore, one should also be tolerant regarding diverse cultural values and behaviors. Not only highly educated migrants but also less qualified people need skills to act in increasingly transnational and multicultural work environments. For example, an Estonian construction worker interviewed for this study explained how construction sites in Finland are international nowadays, and therefore it is useful to know many languages. He sometimes acted as an unofficial interpreter (in Estonian, Russian, Finnish, or English) between workers and middlemen. He also pointed out how language misunderstandings sometimes cause difficulties in workplaces.

5.8.2 Concluding Remarks

The characteristics of the Estonian–Finnish educational space revealed a certain inequality in recognizing educational skills and demands of the labor market. Although the respondents were generally well educated, Finnish migrants seemed to be better qualified for working life in Estonia. They did not complain about changes in the social hierarchy despite their incomplete education, although Estonian degrees were not always an asset in Finland. This was the case particularly in vocational education. What counted were Finnish certificates, qualification tests, and university education. Therefore, the Estonians who obtained a Finnish degree did not have difficulty when applying for a job. In fact, they created connections called "bridging capital" (Putnam 2007) during their studies in Finland, which was later beneficial in working life. In addition, physicians and migrants with wide international experience possessed human capital that supported social mobility.

It appeared that although many Estonians were keen on adult education, to educate themselves more with support from the Finnish state, Finland as a receiving country did not always value their competences. At the same time, in Estonia, Finns were able to transfer and exploit their knowledge. The extent to which previous educational competences and working experience were valued by employers greatly depended on the work domain, and also on the demand for labor. In Estonia, as well

as in Finland, generic competences (including the high level of education) form the foundation for transnational migration, as long as social, economic and political factors allow cross-border movement.

5.9 Discussion

The research findings imply that the migratory patterns in the Estonian–Finnish transnational space are fairly traditional. The main factors behind people's border-crossing activities are related to their work and family relations. The most common types of migrants—labor migrants, family migrants, and students—can also easily be compared with other transnational cases introduced in this volume. Nevertheless, the Estonian–Finnish case is unique in many respects. Both countries are European and EU Member States, geographically, culturally, and linguistically proximate. Both are postindustrial societies. However, Estonia is a postcommunist country that has experienced a rapid political and economic transition toward a neoliberal state, whereas Finland can be characterized as a relatively stable Nordic welfare state. For several decades these countries were separated by the Iron Curtain.

The Estonian post-Soviet background has indeed played an important role in shaping barriers that still exist despite the fact that the physical borders have become almost irrelevant. Piotr Sztompka (1991) formulated the idea of civilizational competences that subsume people's dispositions, habits, and so on—societal culture in general. Despite geographical, linguistic, and cultural closeness, the societal cultures on the two sides of the Gulf of Finland greatly differ. This is because of the different trajectories of statehood development and models of governance. Finland is a consolidated European state with a relatively long tradition of democratic civic participation and an impetus of the Nordic welfare model. Estonia is a post-Soviet nation-state, still wandering in the transitional spiral toward full consolidation, and pursuing a decidedly neoliberal state ideology. This explains why the Estonian–Finnish transnational space has become somewhat unequal, in many respects tilted toward Finland. This also explains why it is difficult for the Finns to adapt to Estonia's lack of associational life, or why some Estonians feel disempowered, unentitled, or simply not willing to participate in Finnish society politically. This may also be the reason why the loyalty of both Estonians and Finns more often belongs to the Finnish state; why many Finns feel that their Finnish citizenship is like insurance even in the more stormy waters of Estonia; and why many Estonians associate law-abiding and civic behavior with "the Finnish way."

In a way, Finland and Estonia are like Putnam's (1993) northern and southern Italy. In spite of similar natural (and cultural) settings, the societies developed differently, becoming associational and cooperative in the North, whereas in the South having experienced a totalitarian and repressive system, remaining passive, somewhat mistrustful, and depending on existing "safe" networks (Howard 2002). Yet striking similarities between the two countries emerge in terms of self-identification.

Despite the intensive processes of transnationalization and globalization,[28] the self-identification and citizen identity among the respondents was dominantly ethnonational (Smith 1995), without causing them any problems or raising tensions. However, according to the research findings, this was not seen to cause conflicting civic affiliations, and in some cases, even aspirations for dual citizenship. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the majority of respondents had resided abroad or engaged in transmigration for a relatively short time, mostly less than a decade. More settled migrants, particularly Estonians, often expressed transnational belonging and identity. Several interviewees had a very primordial identity construction, based on blood lineage, but the same was indicated also about the other group. Estonians and Finns often saw each other as "brothers of the same tribe."[29] Again, cultural proximity is emphasized over societal proximity.

In addition to somewhat similar value bases, both countries have also been noted to be quite individualistic (World Values Survey 1999), possibly their geographical proximity plays an important role. People in general pursue a rather individualistic migratory path. Migration is not seen as determinate, a final decision that will change the individual's life course irrevocably. Often the initial incentive for migration is replaced by another that extends the stay, or people re-migrate after the return to their country of origin. Therefore, despite the short distances, migration tends to finally become terminal. Yet, in some cases, the respondents underlined the temporary nature of migration.

Short distances and the development of ICT have also affected the ways in which social cross-border contacts are maintained. The communication channels have been changing from traditional phone calls (in the 1980s and 1990s) to mostly electronic forms of communication via Skype, Facebook, Internet chats, and e-mail. In addition, frequent ferry connections, particularly between the capitals, different forms of commuting between the countries as well as other transnational activities, such as cross-border care, facilitate visits both ways. Therefore, in this space, cheap telephone calls are not the essential "social glue of migrant transnationalism," as suggested by Vertovec (2009: 54–60).

Regarding the ability to migrate (de Haas 2010), it was noted among the respondents that material capital was less significant than social and human capital. No large savings were needed to cross the bay. Instead, vocational or higher education as well as occupational expertise, in general, supported in-migration of labor migrants. Only Estonian family migrants and most Ingrian Finns experienced difficulty utilizing their competences in Finland, which may be related to the time of migration (mostly in the 1990s) and their Soviet educational backgrounds. Furthermore, the importance of language proficiency was also underlined as a necessary precondition for successful integration into the host country. Social capital, embedded in different kinds of networks, also involving host country nationals, was

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[28] Finland ranked 9th and Estonia 26th in the 2010 KOF Index of Globalization (see http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2010.pdf).

[29] *Heimoveljet* in Finnish.

also an important "transmission belt" (Faist 2000), especially for Ingrian Finns and some study and labor migrants, which also supported them in the practical arrangements of settlement. However, even migrants relying heavily on their social capital do not become as unempowered and dependent on their networks, as for example, in the case of Punjabi migrants (see Chap. 2).

Our findings showed that remittances were flowing in both directions in this transnational space. This concerns both financial and social remittances. Earlier studies examining beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors transmitted by migrants have mainly focused on the cross-border flows of conceptions from receiving to sending countries and the role of migrant organizations (Levitt 2001; Taylor et al. 2006; Suksomboon 2008; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). Our research findings revealed that the flows of ideas and practices are not limited to the exchanges between migrants and their significant others "back home" or within migrant organizations, but also concern the citizens of host countries both in occupational and educational realms. Sharing ideas, information, beliefs, and practices across borders can gradually foster both the human capital of the individuals taking part in these exchanges and the social capital of these groups and networks. The processes of informal learning within transnational communities of practice can also enhance migration capabilities which can support both the in-migration of newcomers and possible re-migration of settled migrants to other destinations.

Moreover, financial remittances were noted to be fairly mobile and not so limited to just one direction. In addition to Estonian (commuting) labor migrants, who would be the natural money-remitters according to mainstream research in this field (Vertovec 2009: 103–118), students, with either private or public funding, and their family members also remitted money. Furthermore, the remittances do not flow in only one direction. There were also some Finnish (commuting) labor migrants or businessmen sending money to Finland. However, these findings account for the specificities of this space as well as the focus of analysis.

It is evident that the Estonian–Finnish transnational space has gone through substantial changes in the past two decades. The migratory pattern itself has been subject to change. The migration of Ingrian Finns, supported by the Finnish state and ethnic associations, exemplifies chain migration patterns. This somewhat resembles the migration practices of many Estonian commuting labor migrants as well as some Finnish migrants, whose activities fit in with the idea of "core transnationalism" (Portes et al. 1999), because their movements are part of the individual's habitual life, undertaken on a regular basis, and therefore are somewhat predictable. Over time, migration tends to become more diverse, also a feature of lifestyle. In addition to economic reasons, several informants pointed out personal motivations, life cycle stage, and family reasons, as well as the influence of chance events in shaping their decision-making process regarding migration. More and more groups, for example, the youth of both countries and highly qualified Estonians, are better described in terms of broad transnational practices (Itzigsohn et al. 1999) than those not well institutionalized, involve only occasional participation and require only sporadic movement. Such practices also seem to be held up even if the person returns to the country of origin.

In addition to migrant networks and associations, there are other actors, such as companies, educational institutions, trade unions, and nongovernmental associations, that shape the Estonian–Finnish space through their cross-border activities. As some of the informants pointed out, there has been cooperation among several Finnish and Estonian schools, vocational, and higher education institutions, NGOs, and Lutheran parishes. Some of the Estonian respondents underlined the importance of these grassroots activities for establishing contacts to Finland before migration and influencing their in-migration. Consequently, this transnational space is not only constructed by the migrants' activities and their cross-border networks, as often underlined in international studies on transnationalism and shaped by other meso-level actors, also involving the indigenous citizens and institutions in the host countries.

Further, the transnational space in question is not hermetic and is becoming less and less so. The arena is also rather wide, especially for people with a broad array of transnational practices. In many cases, respondents also transcend the borders of the EU (to Asia, Africa, or America). However, these practices are usually not as topical as the activities in the Estonia–Finland space, except in the case of Estonian migrants engaged in international business or research collaboration. In general, the scope of activities and especially economic activity remains somewhat regional and mostly connected to Scandinavia or in some cases other parts of Europe.

Thus the Estonian–Finnish transnational space is fairly active in migrants' practices, but its development is also favored by the institutional context. On the macro-level, the space is regulated by the European Union, allowing free movement of labor, capital, and services. Another major institutional change has been the acceptance since 2003 of dual citizenship in Finland. However, this decision has been implemented one way only, and so far does not demonstrate very much change in people's citizenship status or rights and obligations. After Estonia joined the EU and both countries joined the pact, allowing free movement of those economic factors, the flows of migrants increased in both directions. Furthermore, transnational activities are no longer impeded by administrative procedures requiring, for example, visas or work permits. Several respondents who had already migrated in the 1980s and 1990s, complained about the difficulties in arranging all the formalities related not only to in-migration but also to informal visits. In addition, civil and social rights granted to EU citizens facilitated the integration of respondents in the host country.

The meso-level institutions mentioned before also play some part in this transnational space. The scope of these activities regarding, for example, cross-border cooperation of cultural and religious associations may be declining, whereas in the economic domain, the role of companies and networks involved in recruiting labor across borders, particularly in the construction sector, may even strengthen in the future. For a long time, Finland was Estonia's bridge to the Western world (Toots 2009), but now a multiplicity of options is opening up.

Neither the Finnish community in Estonia nor the Estonian community in Finland is a diaspora in the classical sense—meaning it is characterized by dispersion, homeland orientation, and boundary maintenance (Brubaker 2005). In the case of Estonian migrants in Finland, weak associational traditions, the diversified nature of migration, and the short-term existence of more settled groups of migrants seem to

hamper community formation. However, in the Finnish case, one can see rather more intensive state strategies toward its nationals residing abroad. Although none of these activities carry any nationalist connotations or hints at symbolic conflicts, as diasporic politics are often depicted (Faist 2010), they still make it possible to maintain more homeland orientation. In other words, Finland pursues the postmodern statehood strategy as outlined by Sorensen (2004, 2006; see also Kalev et al. 2010)—deriving from the understanding that states have to operate in the context of blurring boundaries and deploying governance and empowerment mechanisms; whereas the Estonian government tends to follow a modern statehood strategy, (re-) building a nation-state situated firmly within its borders, regarding its citizens abroad as expatriates, with whom keeping contact is a vaguely reasonable thing. This creates an interesting situation within this transnational space—also from the micro-level perspective, but even more so from the macro-level: a tilted transnational space.

To conclude, the emergence of the Estonian–Finnish transnational space has been a fairly rapid process, but facilitated by common historical roots and traditions of informal cross-border contacts. There are certainly positive options for further transformations and development in practically all domains of life. Favorable conditions are also facilitated by cultural and linguistic proximity as well as the movement of social remittances, which foster competence and knowledge about the opportunities within this space. However, the future of the Estonian–Finnish transnational space depends on whether or not it becomes internally institutionalized. Moreover, it depends on the institutional development at the European and subregional levels. In addition to wider structural factors, individual migrants and their transnational activities have an important role in these processes.

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Chapter 6
Current Characteristics of Migrant Transnationalism

Pirkko Pitkänen, Ahmet Içduygu, and Deniz Sert

6.1 Introduction

Reflecting on the research findings, it can be said that the current nature of migrant transnationalism is the result of an interplay of various historical, political, economic, and cultural factors. For instance, the characteristics of migration between India and the UK are extensively related to the colonial history of the countries. Similarly, the most important reasons for the intensive movement of people between Morocco and France lie in the past French colonial presence in Morocco and in the long history of emigration to France. The Turkish–German case represents an established transnational connection in which economic migration has a vital role to play. Although the initial assumption was that Turkish "guest workers" would stay in Germany for only a limited period of time and then return to Turkey, this was not the case; many of them settled in Germany. Finally, the Estonian–Finnish space represents an emerging transnational space in which human movement was prevented by political factors for a long time. Although the Estonian–Finnish space is a fairly recent migratory passage, it has undergone remarkable transformation processes during the past few decades.

In all the receiving countries under study, both immigration rules and integration policies have increasingly been related to what is deemed to serve the national interests.

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Although skilled migrants are welcomed as vital in the reproduction of a workforce, asylum seekers and refugees have been seen as a threat to the host country's economy and national security. However, the migratory strategies of individual people are not always in accordance with these endeavors. For instance, the British government's intention to recruit temporary or circular professional migrants on a "win-win" basis fails to consider the changing strategies of people in Punjab. The new professional migrants from Punjab to the UK are less disposed to live the whole of their lives in the UK.

It became evident that there are major circuits in people's cross-border mobility. Students and skilled migrants especially have adopted highly mobile and transnational lifestyles. There are cases in which after a few years in the UK they migrate to other countries, such as the US, Canada, and Australia for better economic prospects and sometimes even for a better climate. There are also information technology (IT) professionals who are planning to return and settle in Indian cities such as Bangalore. The research revealed that student and skilled migration, in particular, is often *circular,* taking place in binational or wider international contexts. This became evident especially among highly skilled respondents, many of whom moved internationally because of their careers or studies. Besides Indian IT professionals in worldwide diaspora, examples include Estonian labor migrants who commute weekly between Estonia and Finland. The short distance between Estonia and Finland has resulted in fairly intensive circular migration. Premigratory experiences significantly influence people's transnational trajectories.

It was noted that, in many cases, transnational migration is *gradual.* Migration started for one reason, after which another reason emerged that prolonged the stay. For instance, students ended up either working in the host country after finishing their studies, or returned later for professional or family reasons. Further, the migratory patterns often appeared to be mixed. Labor migrants often emigrated as family migrants, and family migrants may have later become labor migrants. In other cases, family migrants' labor may be invested in sustaining transnational households and at times also businesses. For instance, among Moroccan labor migrants, the most common channel to France was through studies and family reunification. Because immigration in France has been strictly regulated since 1974, it is legally impossible for a Moroccan to reside in France with the declared purpose of finding a job. Consequently, many Moroccans try to obtain a residence permit in another way, for instance, via a student visa or through family reunification, so as to be allowed to have a legal job.

Thus transnational migration is not static, but *variable* and changes over time. The frequency and intensity of transnational relations and practices do not vary only among migrants but also during their life courses. There are cases in which cross-border contacts and stays in other countries are increasing. This applies especially to migrants after their retirement. Also, in a considerable number of cases, Turkish migrants' children set up or intensify contacts with Turkey as adults, for different occupational, educational, or political reasons. However, there are also cases in which cross-border contacts decrease over time. For example, this is true among those Turkish migrants who went to Germany under the guest worker scheme and

returned in a relatively shorter period of time. Their cross-border contacts diminish on their return. It should further be noted that "return" in the German–Turkish case is a peculiar concept, which has an institutionally produced biographical transnational dimension. The recruited Turkish guest workers were regarded as temporary workers and permanent residence in Germany was not officially intended. The assumption that Turkish migrants would work in Germany for a limited period of time and then return to Turkey was initially also shared by the guest workers themselves. Thus, much of the life plans and personal projects of Turkish migrants were oriented toward a return to Turkey, while at the same time they became increasingly involved with the social and cultural conditions in Germany the longer they stayed.

As expected, international marriages have a significant influence on migration. A typical family migrant is a woman moving to her husband's home country. Moreover, familial ties have long been shown to be the building blocks for chain migration, and arranged marriages are channels for undocumented migration. For a Moroccan, marriage to a French national is a means to obtain a residence permit in France. In the British context, the term *mangetars* is used to describe persons arriving after arranging the marriage or those coming on a temporary visit, or a student or work visa who ended up marrying someone from Britain. There is intense pressure on unauthorized migrants to have their status legalized through the strategy of marriage, which in turn engenders fear among the local Punjabi community, particularly for girls, about youngsters resorting to underhand trickery to form alliances with someone who is British-born or British, alongside fears of bogus marriages. The evidence suggests that transnational migration is being *feminized.* This became evident, in particular, in the case of Morocco. Although it is common to explain unemployment of Maghrebi women in France by "the cultural norms prevailing in Islamic countries, where female employment outside home is often discouraged" (Hargreaves 1995: 42), the empirical evidence does not support this idea. All the Moroccan women interviewed were quite active. In some cases, their family members had been against their participation in working life, but it was mainly because the work was perceived as low status by their middle-class families and therefore not suitable for them. In Finland, it was noted that most Estonian female family migrants intended to find work in Finland but, in practice, it often took them several years to obtain a similar position on the labor market than they had had in their own country.

In all participating countries, there are various categories of *undocumented* migrants, including people crossing national borders clandestinely either without documents or with forged documents, overstaying visitors, those seeking asylum, and so on. In the face of growing state violence to confront the Sikh separatist movement in India, many suspects were forced to flee the country and seek asylum in various countries, including the UK. They sometimes traveled through transit countries with the help of agents and relatives. However, these "torture victims" distinguish themselves from ordinary "illegal migrants" through their accounts of political activism and resultant persecution and suffering. New UK policies on immigration have led to a criminalization of illegal/irregular migrants and the proliferation of illicit networks. This has contributed to the establishment of Punjabi

settlements across continental Europe, as countries on the transit route are turned into countries of settlement. The establishment of Punjabi settlements across continental Europe has led to the creation of new state-to-state linkages, as Turkey and Eastern European countries have been pushed to develop bilateral agreements concerning "irregular" migration and deportation but have also profited from new forms of skilled migration, for example, the growing Eastern European market for international students from the Indian subcontinent. Both men and women travel to the UK in this manner. There are agents who facilitate such flows quite efficiently. There are numerous marriage bureaus arranging UK brides for aspiring youngsters so they can make their way into the UK. Such "paper marriages" are arranged with consenting British citizens who are paid for their participation.

Although people's motivations to migrate seemed to be diverse, poverty or making a living was the primary compulsion in most cases. The departure was often motivated by prospects of an economically better life. However, the desire for "somewhere else" also emerged as an important motivation for departure. The strong desire for somewhere else was sometimes juxtaposed in the respondents' stories with a feeling of weariness because of the social, economic, and political climate in the sending country. In this respect, a difference was apparent between the ends of migratory axes. Although among French people the desire for departure was often embedded in specific events in individuals' life courses (divorce, loss of employment, retirement) or merely general frustration with the society of origin and its politics or cultural environment, for Moroccans the desire for somewhere else was usually linked with a search for a social and economic improvement. For citizens of migrant receiving wealthy countries it is technically possible to settle in another country with the sole objective of seeking experiences or adventures. Such a project can take various forms, an artistic quest, a spiritual vocation, the search for recognition, the desire for a comfortable way of life, or even the attainment of a dream. Many respondents pointed out personal motivations and life-cycle stage reasons in shaping their decision making regarding migration. There were so-called "sun migrants," for example, Finns in Estonia and Germans in Turkey. In all cases under study, there were diverse migratory models that can be gathered under the title *lifestyle* migrants, described by O'Reilly as "relatively affluent individuals, moving 'en masse', either part or full time, permanently or temporarily, to countries where the cost of living and/or the price of property is cheaper, places which, for various reasons, signify something loosely defined as quality of life" (2007). The essential motivation for those migrations has been the search for something intangible, encapsulated in the phrase "quality of life."

6.2 Migrants' Political Participation

In recent years, many migrant sending countries have become increasingly interested in migrant diaspora abroad. In India, the realization of the strategic importance of the Indian diaspora has resulted in concrete steps by the state to promote emotional

and economic ties with its overseas citizens. The establishment of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2004 is considered an important step in this direction. It is expected to ensure the welfare and protection of overseas Indians while emigrating, during expatriation, and after returning from work overseas. More recently, the Indian government established an India Development Foundation (IDF) to promote philanthropy among the Indian diaspora, having realized the potential of transnational diaspora resources through the channel of philanthropy. Attempts to "make the overseas Indian an active participant in the India growth story" (MOIA 2008: 43) has been accompanied by a new "representational regime" through the production and reinvention of categories such as Non-Resident Indian (NRI), Person of Indian Origin (PIO), Overseas Indian Citizen (OCI), and so on, as new signifiers and administrative categories.

At the same time, the British government has institutionalized the exteriority of its Indian population through the minoritizing practices of multiculturalism and therefore played its part in producing transnationalism. On the other hand, Sikhs in the UK have turned their gaze from Punjabi "homeland politics" to other transnational linkages. In particular, young people's transnational politics reworked those of their parents.[1] In spite of their transnational orientation, most Indian migrants were not very interested in *dual citizenship*. Most preferred the "red passport" to Indian nationality. Even the returnees who had decided to spend the rest of their lives in Punjab wanted to retain their British citizenship because of the practical advantages it conferred. Only the circular migrants, such as those on holiday who were working on temporary international assignments in IT, management, or hospitality, were an exception to this pattern because they wished to retain Indian citizenship, privileging their families, property, and livelihoods in India. The citizenship tests and other trends toward a white-coded and assimilationist form of citizenship were felt to be exclusionary. Although British citizenship was still desirable, some recent migrants were discouraged by the requirement of having to expend so much energy—perhaps fruitlessly—on having to improve their English and become accredited by a national standardized test.

Many Indian migrants either had or were planning to obtain British citizenship as soon as they had spent sufficient years in Britain to be eligible for it. The inhospitableness of the British state toward even legal immigrants created a sense that the granting of entry clearance and rights to remain in the UK was so arbitrary that British citizenship should be secured as quickly as possible. Thus, the adoption of British citizenship was overwhelmingly explained in terms of *pragmatic* considerations; that the "red passport" gave them the benefits of welfare entitlements and

[1] Although 1984 continued to excite and mobilize young British-born Sikhs, there was a turn toward decoupling Sikhism from its provincial concerns with the Punjab homeland and recasting it as a fast-growing "world religion" alongside Christianity and Islam. Youth in the UK were linked to, and played an essential part in, the Sikh revival in Canada, the US, and continental Europe as well as Punjab.

greater ease of travel to third countries. Interwoven into these pragmatic considerations was also a strong sense in which British citizenship was a *symbolic* asset, prized and considered to be superior. The question of *national identity,* however, was met with ambivalence or indifference. Although most of the informants wanted solid British citizenship, there was a strong sense of being excluded from the mainstream narration of national identity by virtue of racial images. Even British-born Punjabis are still not recognized simply as British. Instead, in everyday speech, the category "English" or "British" is often synonymous with "white person." The racism implicit within such constructions of Britishness was remarked on in relation to Gordon Brown's protectionist response to the credit crunch in early 2009, and the high-profile campaigning by the British National Party and the English Defence League in 2009–2010. The informants cited this political rhetoric as proof that ultimately there would always be a powerful constituency of people who would not accept that they are British.

There was a clear hierarchical order within the India–UK transnational space, with Indian nationality ranked below British and other European, North American, and Australian nationalities. Likewise, in the Moroccan–French case, the colonial echo could be heard in the respondents' national identity. Moroccans in France strongly defended French values, whereas both Moroccans living in France and Moroccans returning to Morocco generally described their values as a combination of French and Moroccan. The recent measures taken by French politicians reveal an increasingly selective and strict citizenship policy. These measures facilitate expulsion and give the option to withdraw French nationality from a person of foreign origin who has committed a crime against the French authorities. On the other hand, the process of obtaining French nationality has been made easier for qualified immigrants: athletes, scientists, artists, and so on. The candidates applying for French nationality have to sign a contract, called *Contrat d'accueil,* and promise to respect French laws and values.

Whereas immigration to France is strictly controlled, French natives can move freely between France and Morocco. Consequently, obtaining Moroccan nationality did not particularly attract them. The situation appeared to be very different among Moroccans in France. The acquisition of French nationality was high on the agenda for them. Strikingly, many Moroccans with plans to return were willing to acquire French nationality. Usually this was justified as a guarantee to be able to move freely in the future. However, less than one third of the Moroccans either acquired French nationality or attained dual nationality. Few Moroccans (most of them married to a French national) considered that they might apply for French nationality or had started naturalization proceedings. In most cases, the advantages conferred by French nationality triumphed over loyalty to their country of origin. The motivations can be explained mainly by pragmatic reasons, such as freedom of mobility, access to employment sectors reserved for nationals, and so on.

Some Moroccan participants had a politically oriented background, mainly in the Marxist movement of the 1960s and 1970s in Morocco, and these political conditions clearly influenced their desire to migrate. In fact, the political actions of

these leftists consisted of defending citizens' rights in Morocco rather than participating in French political life. The networks of French and international associations for the defense of human rights played a role of great importance in denouncing the violation of human rights and supporting Moroccan political prisoners. The kinds of events that motivated these politically active Moroccan participants were demonstrations against racism, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. An increasingly popular way of expressing one's political opinions, particularly for the younger generation, consists of sending videos and articles through Facebook or other social media. Further recent examples include the role of diasporic communities in drawing the world's attention mainly to the limited political freedom in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, as well as Algeria and Morocco. In fact, this is not a new phenomenon. Among Moroccan respondents there were many political exiles in the 1960s and 1970s who had been engaged in a battle for democracy in Morocco and often engaged in trade union or associated activities in France. The younger generation of Moroccans, students born in the 1980s and 1990s, seemed to be less engaged in party politics, but should not be mistaken to be less politically active. In fact, many were willing to discuss the political problems concerning their own society—corruption, limited personal freedom, unemployment, and so on—or what they considered to be general injustice toward Arabs and Muslims, namely, the occupation of Palestinian territory and islamophobia and discrimination in Europe. For the younger generation, political participation meant, for example, taking part in demonstrations and pledging or posting videos on virtual social platforms such as Facebook.

In the German case, it is crucial that the official government position that Germany is not and should not be a country of immigration was dominant until the late 1990s. The 2000 Nationality Law accepted the immigration processes of the past by substantively easing the conditions of citizenship acquisition of immigrants and their descendants who had already resided in Germany for many years. Furthermore, the 2005 Immigration Law allowed regularly for additional immigration and also defined the integration of immigrants as a responsibility of the state. In the German context, no obvious direct correlation was observed between the respondent's citizenship status (i.e., whether they had German or Turkish citizenship only or dual citizenship) and their transnational political commitment. For many, citizenship was not primarily a matter of political participation, but rather a question of rights and opportunities or emotional affiliation. For many Turkish migrants, Turkish citizenship had a kind of emotional meaning regarding their definition of cultural identity. On the other hand, several Turkish respondents emphasized their political, cultural, or emotional distance from Turkey, saying that for various reasons they would or did not experience problems when giving up Turkish citizenship.

In the Turkish case, the change from being a country of emigration to one of immigration and transit put Turkey in a rather awkward position in terms of its own migration and citizenship policies. Like Germany in the past, Turkey is quite unwilling to accept being an immigrant country. It is only with the pressure of the EU accession negotiations that the necessary policies have begun to take effect. Nevertheless,

there are many legal limits to immigrants' political and social integration into the community at large. With an amendment to the Turkish citizenship law in 1995, Turkey created a privileged noncitizen status, permitting holders of the "pink card" (or "blue card") to reside, acquire property, inherit, operate businesses, and work in Turkey just like any citizen, but without the right to vote in local or national elections. The motivation behind the amendment was to create a mechanism to allow Turks living in Germany to acquire German citizenship without renouncing their rights in Turkey. It was noted that a considerable number of Turkish migrants in Germany, with different sociostructural characteristics, follow political events in Turkey more or less regularly by reading Turkish newspapers, watching Turkish TV, using online sources, or keeping themselves informed through conversation within families, without participating directly and actively in Turkish politics. It was interesting to note that high transnational political interests and activities coincide with similar high interests and patterns of participation in the German political context. This suggests that political alertness and participation should not be regarded as a zero-sum game in general, in the sense that political interest in events in the country of origin would automatically lead to a reduced political interest or a diminished political loyalty toward the country of residence.

Likewise, in the Estonian–Finnish political space, the most popular form of participation mentioned was voting. Voting in the country of residence was more common than in the country of origin (the country whose citizenship the respondent officially held). Although, in most cases, political participation was passive, some Estonians took part in the activities of the Finnish political parties. Some of the Estonian respondents, however, felt unempowered and left on the periphery by both the Finnish and the Estonian political community. It is also noteworthy that the Finns interviewed were less prone to feel any loyalty toward the Estonian state. The differences in feeling loyal to the host state may reflect the asymmetry of the transnational space: differences between a citizen-centered welfare state (Finland) and a neoliberal state (Estonia). It should also be taken into account that the transnational space of Estonia–Finland is fairly new. When Estonia became an EU Member State in 2004, free movement of people was not allowed to Finland, but a transition phase was imposed by Finnish policymakers until May 1, 2006. Today, people's transnational activities are becoming more diversified and, in particular, short-term cross-border mobility of workers between Estonia and Finland has become an issue on the policy agenda. A recent tendency in Finland has been toward facilitating the attainment of multiple state membership. The current Nationality Act (2003/359) allows dual and multiple citizenship more widely than did the former Act (1984/584).

Although Finnish citizenship policy has become more open, the policy in Estonia has remained rather restrictive. Recently, Estonian migration policy has become more liberalized with the introduction of EU rules on free movement and residence of EU citizens and permanent foreign residents. Nevertheless, dual citizenship is not legally possible in Estonia. The overall reason lies in the country's postcommunist background. Estonian citizenship and migration policies were significantly influenced by the Soviet annexation of 1940–1944 and 1991. Although the Iron Curtain

separated the Estonians from the non-Soviet world (including Finland), there was no effective border between Estonia and other areas of the Soviet Union. A current question on policy agenda concerns the relatively large Russian-speaking population in Estonia, as a result of the extensive and often forced in-migration of Russian-speaking people (ca. 500,000) during the Soviet period (in 2009, the share was 31.25% of the total population).

6.3 Economic Domain of Migrant Transnationalism

The research revealed the vital role of transnational economic networks and border-crossing mobility of labor in the emergence of transnational spaces. This became evident, in particular, in the cases of Turkey–Germany and Estonia–Finland. However, the opportunity structures appeared to be very different in each end of the migration axis. In many destination countries, even skilled migrants are discriminated against in the labor market because of the poor recognition of overseas educational qualifications. Self-employment is an important source of income for many transnational migrants. Although other migrants are perceived as a potential market for those immigrants who have created small businesses, in other cases an enterprise in a migrant's sending country may be considered as a first step toward wider international markets. It was found that although, in "old" migrant sending countries such as India, Morocco, and Turkey, the transfer of financial and material remittances plays a vital role, remittances tend not to be channeled toward "productive consumption" in the local communities. Finally, it became apparent that migrant financial and social remittances move not just from the destination to the source, but vice versa as well.

Particularly in the Turkish–German and Estonian–Finnish cases, the research revealed the central role of the economic domain in the emergence of the transnational spaces in question. On the German side, we observed in the economic and occupational domains much stronger transnational activities among Turkish migrants than in the political sphere. In particular, the role of guest workers was vital in the emergence of the transnational space in question. Although the initial assumption was that Turkish migrants would work in Germany for only a limited period of time and then return to Turkey, many of them have become increasingly involved with social and economic life in Germany, and established (service sector) companies, for example. Turks in Germany, besides being typical factory laborers, are also engaged in high-profile jobs, such as doctors and nurses. Because Germany extensively supports migrants' integration, there are increasing opportunities for them to bring in their particular experiences and competencies based on their migratory background. In many cases, this has led to increasing transnational relations. In the German sample, some of the interviewees gave financial support to family members in Turkey. This includes sending money regularly to close family members or having the extended family collect money to finance the children's education.

In the Estonian–Finnish case, remittances flow in both directions. In addition to Estonian labor migrants and their family members who remit money back home, there are also some Finnish (commuting) labor migrants and businessmen sending money back to Finland. The economic domain of the Estonian-Finnish space is perhaps the most transnational. Also, it seems largely to be functioning according to the logic of functional differentiation. Estonia is playing the role of the market and a bureau for the Finnish companies, and Tallinn has become a sort of suburb of Helsinki, while Finland has become a metropolis in which both blue collar workers and top level specialists strive for a better salary or development conditions. It is evident that the migratory practices of Estonian commuting labor migrants as well as some Finnish migrants, whose movements are undertaken on a regular basis, are vital to the emergence of Estonian–Finnish transnational space.

In the Franco–Moroccan space, the economic ties between two countries exist in the form of investments, transnational enterprises, and financial and monetary remittances. Morocco's economy lies mostly in three sectors: tourism, migrants' remittances, and phosphate as a natural resource. Of these, remittances are by far the most important source of income, exceeding development aid three to four times and private investments three times. Yet it was found that financial and material flows move in the opposite direction as well. Moroccan parents also finance their children's studies in France, and a number of wealthy Moroccans invest their extra money in France, buying apartments or businesses. Likewise, in India, migrants' remittances are important in producing economic and social development in the country. It was noted, however, that those regularly sending remittances and contributions back home represent only a small section of Punjabis in the UK. Besides, in India, remittances tend not to be channeled toward "productive consumption" such as education or health care. Furthermore, economic investments in Punjab were fraught with family tensions over property management, inheritance, and cheating, reflected by the thousands of criminal cases presented to NRI police stations and NGOs.

Most evidently, development of the *labor* market in the transnational spaces in question is decidedly asymmetric. Although in some cases ethnic or national background may appear an asset or a handicap in the labor market, in other cases, national background may be an advantage. This became apparent in the schemata of established networks and enterprises, as well as in the job opportunities of migrants. For example, some French people estimated that they could find better opportunities and achieve higher responsibilities in Morocco than in France, and that they had an advantage of being favored by reason of their nationality in Morocco. Instead, many Moroccans in France felt that their nationality could be a source of discrimination. Similarly, some Estonian respondents reported discrimination on the Finnish labor market. Many mentioned that Finnish work culture values orderliness, discipline, and obeying orders, but at the same time they were very much aware of employees' rights. Unemployment and brain-waste are real problems among many transnational migrants, and even some of the highly qualified migrants retake exams or re-educate themselves so as to get a job on a higher level of specialization. However, getting a job also depends on the field of experience; for example, Estonian labor migrants working in factories or the transportation sector obtained work in Finland easily

because of their previous working experience and the urgent need for labor. Still, particularly Estonian family migrants and so-called Ingrian Finns had serious difficulties finding a job in their field of expertise.

In all destination countries, the current tendency is characterized by selective immigration policies and the intention to recruit labor force, especially highly qualified professionals from abroad. International recruitment practices are increasingly commodified as a business, and thousands of informal agents and consultants have mushroomed across the nation-states. In some cases, maintaining transnational networks and social relationships was crucial for getting a job. For example, in the case of Moroccans in France, it was noted that personal networks are important to find employment in the new host country. International recruitment practices may also profit from the widespread desire to migrate overseas because of a receptive gray labor market, and are unregulated by governments. For instance in Britain, illicit flows of people through loopholes in immigration and citizenship laws are condoned by the state for material reasons in the context of a receptive and exploitative informal labor market.

In practice, self-employment is an important source of income for many transnational migrants. For some Estonians, starting a business in Finland is a way to employ oneself, for example, as a shopkeeper or hairdresser, whereas some had been working in Finland for years as specialists before founding their own companies. Just the opportunity structures for *entrepreneurs* are rather different in migrant sending and receiving countries. Most of the Finnish entrepreneurs interviewed admitted that their decision to come to Estonia to do business was fairly straightforward. Later on, many of the companies had extended their activities to other countries outside Estonia. Similarly, for many French entrepreneurs in Morocco, Morocco was considered as a first step toward wider international markets. Instead, enterprises created by Moroccans in France typically targeted migrant population in the first place and perhaps later, once established, would address wider groups of clients. In the Turkish–German case, transnational entrepreneurship is essentially based on cross-border exchange of goods, capital, services, knowledge, or cross-border deployment of the workforce. As time passed, Turks began to provide services to their compatriots by opening Turkish ethnic enterprises that mostly concentrated on the food industry, food distribution, repair, and greengrocery. Likewise in Britain, transnational migrants are perceived as a potential market for those who have created small businesses, based on observations of demands and needs for particular goods or services, such as grocer's shops, celebrations, furniture stores, restaurants, and catering companies.

6.4 Sociocultural Commitment

Familial and kinship networks are of great importance for understanding the current characteristics of migrant transnationalism. Many other factors of the sociocultural dimension of transnationalism, such as cultural identities (including religion,

language, lifestyles) and care issues are often linked to transnational families. According to the research, in addition to familial and kin networks, religion and cultural connections appear to be a major basis for people's transnational commitments.

On the basis of the research results, the *familial ties* revealed an expanded transnational or even worldwide field (especially in the Punjabi case). In practice, however, state governance has a significant influence over transnational families. For example, in the Turkish–German case, it became evident that in spite of the increasing occurrence of transnational families, as an unavoidable outcome of the Turkish–German migration history, border-crossing visits of family members are arduous and have been made conditional on financial preconditions that can only be fulfilled by some of the migrants concerned. In Britain, state governance of family reunification has a significant influence over the families and their informal networks. The definitions of citizenship and nationality have manipulated the meanings and legitimacy attached to being a part of a migrant family, creating a distinctly state-produced context for transnational families. The research revealed that marriages in the UK are increasingly local, encompassing forms such as mixed-faith, mixed-caste, or mixed-race partnerships. Thus the findings problematize assumptions underlying the burgeoning literature on transnational networks. First, the family and household do not exist as corporate entities. They are internally fractured by relations of gender and generation. Second, in attending to the flexibility and capaciousness of practices of family and relatives we find that transnational families are not entities that exist a priori, but are produced through generations of mobility. Third, the ambivalences, disappointments, and potential for informality, exploitation, and treachery within so-called networks argues for a more nuanced and contextual analysis of relationships that attends to history and power relations as well as relations with the state.

Transnational *social care* is increasingly important among transnational migrants and their family and kinship networks. In all cases under study, we saw both transnational care practices, as well as shortages of formal mechanisms regulating social security rights in transnational settings (especially on retirement and health care issues). In practice, many migrants used their ad hoc informal contacts. The respondents also pointed out the differences in kinship relations between the sending and receiving countries. For example, it was perceived that in Estonia/the former Soviet Union, people often had closer ties to their family members than in Finland.

Religion may be an important criterion of familiarity with home. For many respondents, belonging to a religious community (whether Christian, Muslim, or other) largely contributed to a feeling of closeness with home. In respondents' living contexts, religion proved to be a major route for transnational engagement. In these cases, transnational orientation may even obstruct integration into the host society. For instance, in France as well as other European countries, a current problem regards cases of social exclusion among the representatives of Muslim minorities. In the Punjab–UK case, besides its political role, religion also provided a major route for transnational connectivity beyond Punjab. Since the crushing of the Khalistani militancy in Punjab in the late 1990s, Sikh ethno-nationalism in the

UK has reconfigured under a rubric of human rights, reworking longstanding themes of martyrdom within the Sikh tradition.

In the UK sample, the question of *identification* was met with ambivalence or indifference. Although most of the informants wanted British citizenship, there was a strong sense of being excluded from the mainstream narration of national identity by virtue of racial imaginaries. In the Moroccan-French case, more than half of the respondents considered themselves at home in both countries. However, there was a significant contrast between discriminating situations experienced by some Moroccans in France and the surprise, even embarrassment, of French people facing positive stereotyping and recognition in Morocco. Such a contrast shows indices in the way symbolic dominating relations are internalized in the transnational space in question. Several Moroccans who had returned to their initial homeland explained that they left France because they felt frustrated because there was no real effort by French society to promote their integration. Many of them reported that their job did not correspond to the level of their degrees or qualifications. Most of them were very mobile between France and Morocco for personal or professional reasons. The possibility of keeping in touch despite the distance greatly helped them not to feel cut off from their home(s). They all maintained frequent links (even every day for some) with relatives or friends in France or Morocco by telephone, the Internet, and programs such as Skype, Voip, or MSN Messenger.

Although many Estonians living in Finland stressed their engagement with Finnish society, they also underlined their commitment to maintain their Estonian or Russian identity, language, and cultural heritage. In comparison with the "others" who were in conflict with the Finnish traditions—pointing out, for example, migrants of Somali origin—Estonian respondents usually wanted to underline that they themselves were very well adapted to Finnish society and its customs by speaking the language, being law-abiding, and so on. Some of the respondents explained how their identity had changed over time. A few pointed out how their national identity had been reinforced while living abroad. Among the respondents there were some who identified themselves as Europeans or cosmopolitans, or reported that they felt at home everywhere and did not want to affiliate themselves with any particular nation.

6.5 Educational Domain

The role of education has so far predominantly been analyzed from a national perspective, and research within transnational settings has mainly focused on the difficulties experienced by immigrants in formal education or the efforts to support their integration into the host society. Apart from formal education, we find it important to highlight informal learning, particularly the acquisition of skills needed in transnational settings. Not only migrants but also the mainstream people in the receiving countries need skills to function in increasingly transnational and multicultural environments.

The research showed that in many countries, in spite of the multicultural goals of formal education, informal processes of schooling are strongly assimilationist. In the field of *primary education,* it was found in Britain that most young people's home environment was what linguists would describe as "mixed," where Punjabi-speaking grandparents and parents conveyed knowledge of English through their own speech as well as through media exposure via TV and/or the Internet. Children started school as subordinating bilinguals, and the intense academic and peer pressures to speak English in a monolingual school environment led them to respond not by compartmentalizing their language practices into the domains of home and school, but to invest more in English. Their Punjabi came to be contaminated with English phonology, grammar, and loan words. They were also responsible for spreading the use of English further within their homes. Nonetheless, when asked about it in interviews they consistently divided their lives neatly down the middle between Punjabi culture (at home or temple) and the outside culture (at school).

In the German sample, it was noted that the children of noncitizens, whether they migrated with their parents or were born in Germany, lagged behind in education, both in comparison to their native counterparts and in comparison to similar pupil and student populations in other European countries. Educational outcomes in Germany of the so-called second migrant generation vary considerably among different ethnic groups, whereby the attainments of children of Turkish migrants are among the groups who are clearly below average. However, among our respondents there were also migrants who are fairly successful regarding their educational attainments. These include international students and children of highly skilled Turkish migrants, on the one hand, and the upwardly mobile among the children of the former Turkish guest workers, on the other hand. Although in many cases the so-called second generation migrants had severe problems during their school days, they often succeeded finally in their educational and occupational careers because of extraordinary support from outside the school.

In the field of *vocational education,* it was noted that Estonian degrees are not always an asset on the Finnish labor market. However, Estonians who had obtained a Finnish degree did not have similar difficulties when applying for a job. During their sojourn in Finland, many vocationally educated Estonian respondents updated their qualifications via various training courses; or they qualified for an entirely new occupation years after their immigration. Some had studied the same occupation in Finland as they already had in Estonia to get a job in Finland and improve their knowledge of Finnish (particularly professional vocabulary). Very many Estonian respondents criticized Finnish society and Finnish employers for overvaluing Finnish diplomas and for underestimating foreign qualifications and professional skills. The situation was quite different among the Finnish respondents living and working in Estonia. Although many of them, usually businessmen, had incomplete higher education, this was no disadvantage in Estonian working life.

International exchange programs, joint degrees, and other transnational connections existing between *higher education* institutions promote students' opportunities for transnational or even worldwide interaction. These international connections may also play an important role in channeling migration flows. It seems that among

the Moroccans in France, a degree in higher education is the key to gaining a foothold in the French labor markets. French higher education institutes are generally more highly valued than their Moroccan counterparts, and university studies in France are considered as a step to upward social mobility in Morocco. However, several recently graduated Moroccan students complained about difficulties in finding their place in the French employment market, and those who found employment emphasized that they had been "very lucky." The search for employment went through either formal (institutional connections between schools and enterprises) or informal (friends and relatives) networks. In the Moroccan–French case, a strong belief in the superiority of the French educational system was present in the narratives of most respondents. This applied to all educational levels: primary and vocational education in French educational institutions in Morocco and higher education in France. Although the education landscape in Morocco has changed considerably in recent decades, with the creation of many institutions of higher education covering all fields of study, the fact remains that a French degree is a definite asset in Morocco.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

The research findings imply that attempts to "manage" border-crossing migration have to engage simultaneously with the sending, intermediary, and receiving contexts, and to take into account the wider social spaces that are produced through migrant transnationalism. Not just working and educational contexts, but also people's political activities and social support practices are increasingly transnational. In particular, familial and economic ties reveal an expanded or even worldwide field. At the same time, many nation-states portray migrants' transnational ties as a threat to national interests. Against the conventional wisdom, migrants' transnational ties do not automatically impede integration into the host country. According to the research findings, people's transnational and diasporic activities may even support their adaptation to the country of settlement. Rather, the states of settlement should use the human capital (e.g., skills, knowledge) as well as transnational ties and networks migrants have acquired abroad. In the contemporary world, transnational migrants and their diasporic communities are increasingly important agents of transformations on local, national, and global scales.

Besides national interests, policies related to immigration should consider the needs of different migrant groups depending on their life cycle stage. Reflecting the research results, it may be said that conceiving of transnational migrants in static categories is failing to appreciate dynamism through the life-course transitions, intergenerational shifts, and changing labor market conditions. In addition to new migratory patterns, changes have been noted in the extensity, intensity, and motivational basis of transnational migration. Economic motivations to migrate remain important, but after achieving a satisfactory standard of living, the departure is often motivated by a search for the enjoyment of a comfortable way of life (e.g., "lifestyle seekers," pensioners).

A more critical stance should be taken toward asymmetrical transnational spaces so as to observe the dynamic interplay between transnational migration and development on a global scale. Geographically mobile people may be recognized as active agents of development at both ends of the migration axis; not merely by developing economic networks but also by transmitting knowledge and sharing information. International collaboration is needed to observe the international recruitment practices and the cross-border movement of labor in relation to the restructuring of the global economy. Both recruitment practices and people's working contexts reveal an expanded or even worldwide transnational field. The activities of companies sending and leasing manpower across borders should be monitored to ensure the enforcement of regulations concerning taxation and social security payments as well as the protection of workers. In particular, those employees who are neither fluent in domestic languages nor familiar with local regulations may be in a vulnerable position.

6.7 Suggestions for Future Research

Compared with the existing literature, the chapters in this book represent an advance in several aspects. First, unlike conventional migration studies that have mainly concentrated on border-crossing migration as a unidirectional and onetime change in location, within the TRANS-NET project, attention was given to the question about how transnational processes are viewed from the perspectives of "sending" and "receiving" societies. Thus, migration is not just about a one-way flow from "source" to "destination," but there may be major circuit in people's border-crossing mobility. Second, the focus of the project was in the migrants' perspectives rather than those of states or other actors of international migration. The chapters make it evident that the extent and intensity of transnational activities change through migrants' life-course transitions, intergenerational shifts, and changing labor market conditions. Further, contrary to conventional wisdom, migrants' transnational ties do not automatically impede integration into the host country. Rather, the findings in this book demonstrate that transnational activities may even support adaptation to the country of settlement.

Thus, this volume aspires to constitute a significant step toward addressing some aspects of migrant transnationalism associated with the perceptions and experiences of individual migrants and their families. Given the dominant researching and theorizing efforts characterized mostly by the views of so-called "receiving" societies or communities in the North, the chapters in this volume refer to "sending" and "receiving" ones both in the North and the South, as well as in the East and West. The volume does not only try to bridge the diverse perceptions and experiences in the source and destination countries, but also to reflect migrants' voices in the countries that are not frequently heard in the dominant research and theories. Within this context, what could be suggested for future research is to make good use of transnational frameworks or models to elaborate the cases in the South-to-South or East-to-East migrations that are less studied despite its growing importance around the world.

The research revealed that the transnational spaces under study are decidedly asymmetrical. Future research will be needed to explore the existing and potential interconnections between transnational migration and development in the contemporary world (Faist 2007; Glick Schiller and Faist 2009). This implies focusing on the societal transformations not just in a transnational but even in a global context: looking not only at developing and emerging countries,[2] but also at highly industrialized societies. To attain an understanding of the transformation processes underway, the previous findings from migration and development studies should be critically reviewed, theoretical and empirical studies conducted, and worldwide research collaboration established.

Further, and more specific, suggestions for future research can be made. To begin with, the linkage between transnationalism and integration constitutes a fertile area for further research. What kind of transnational activities at what stage in migrants' lives reinforce their adaptation to their country of residence remains to be an interesting question to be explored. How does this relationship alter within other cases of transnational spaces in different parts of the world, especially in the South and East? Furthermore, it is important to analyze transnational networks on a more general level. Do migrants have more transnational networks than nonmigrants given the different processes of globalization? For example, does a Turkish migrant living in Germany have more transnational activities than a German one? Or should we examine transnationalism as a natural outcome of globalization where everybody, not only migrants, are becoming more transnational? Moreover, there is a gap in the literature on the relation between transnationalism and gender. Do gender relations play a role on the emergence or transformation of transnational networks? If so, how? More specifically and very related to the exploration of former points, following the trend of merging quantitative with qualitative research, how can we design a method for large *N* studies to investigate the answers to such questions? Transnationalism continues to be an important concept for further research, albeit if applied to different units of analysis with more diverse research methodologies. Thus, old research issues of international migration literature, such as return migration, and the push-pull factor approach, can encompass new interpretations and approaches through the lens of transnationalism.

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[2] The term *emerging countries* refers here to societies that are undergoing a dynamic and rapid economic change (e.g., China, India, Brazil), and those in transition from a centrally directed political and economic system toward a free market system and processes of liberalization (e.g., Russia, Eastern Europe).

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