# Neoliberalism and U.S. Foreign Policy

## From Carter to Trump

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Catherine V. Scott
Agnes Scott College
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*To Gus Cochran*

# PREFACE

On August 20, 2016, *The New York Times* published two adjacent front page stories, one about Donald Trump's opaque financial holdings and the other detailing the Clinton Foundation's receipt of millions of dollars from foreign donors while Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State (Chozik and Elder 2016; Craig 2016). In Trump's case, debt to foreign lenders could be compromising, and in Clinton's case, dubious donations might have already compromised her ability to act in the public interest. While the two stories highlight more immediate problems posed by a real estate mogul becoming president and the tightly knit relationship between the Clinton Foundation and wealthy donors from Ukraine and Saudi Arabia, at a deeper level they crystallize patterns in foreign policy that have been under way since the Carter era. This book traces these deeper developments, particularly how changes in political economy—from the World War II Keynesian compromise to neoliberalism and austerity—have both reconfigured longstanding categories of analysis such as "tough guy" masculinity and superpatriotism, and make it difficult to compare our current moment with earlier eras of US foreign policy such as the Cold War.

While giving his lectures on emergent neoliberalism in 1978–1979, Foucault identified a bundle of policies, rationalities, and techniques of governance that legitimized the institution of market-friendly policies in domestic politics, such as deregulation and an emphasis on individual freedom defined through the market. Neoliberal policies also found their footing in US foreign policy, a topic that some scholars mention in passing, usually singling out one or two developments, such as the growing significance of private security companies. If we view the operations of

capitalism and foreign policy through a larger lens, however, we see neo-liberal policy and ideology at work in the professional army, the redefini-tion of threats as nimble and globalized, selective humanitarian interventions that emphasize the "caring" aspect of benevolent power, and a drastically altered media environment that personalizes, fragments, and often sensationalizes foreign policy for an increasingly distracted public.

In undertaking this project I hope to complicate, challenge, and offer revisions to those in the scholarly community and the media who reach for earlier eras of foreign policy or undertake institutional analyses to draw connections between the national security state of the Cold War era and today's national security apparatus in order to explain current US foreign policy. While "manly imperialism," captivity and rescue, and other familiar categories remain resonant in many instances, alterations in the operations of contemporary capitalism and its correlative forms of governance have given a different stamp to the workings of both domestic and foreign policy. The framework offered here encourages us to think beyond par-ticular presidencies, wars, and bureaucratic politics, and trains our sights on how long-term and sustained shifts in political economy have emerged to produce new myths of exceptionalism that are more fully coherent with the neoliberal foundations of the US state.

The transformation of the older, more conventional aspects of US for-eign policy ideology and expression traced here make Donald Trump's presidential victory in 2016 more comprehensible. Because of his back-ground in reality television, World Wide Entertainment wrestling, and authorship of numerous books on topics such as *Think Big and Kick Ass in Business and Life* (2007), Trump seemed to be a momentary spectacle among a host of already existing short-lived media obsessions. Viewed more broadly, however, Trump's rise is indicative of transformations in US policy at home and abroad. Trump began his real estate career at about the same time that the old Keynesian order showed its first foundational cracks. He is the apotheosis of what replaced that crumbling structure, and thus far, his foreign policy has made even more visible the features that surfaced with increasing frequency in the long arc stretching from the Carter years to the present. Trump truly is a new figure on the world stage, but as this analysis will clarify, the stage had long been shifting as well.

Decatur, GA                                        Catherine V. Scott

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# Foucault, Carter, and Trump? Neoliberalism and US Foreign Policy

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush explained to *New York Times* reporters that he "wanted justice" for Osama bin Laden. He recalled, "When I was a kid, I remember that—they used to put out there in the Old West a poster. It said, 'Wanted, Dead or Alive.' All I want and America wants him brought to justice. That's what we want" (*The New York Times*, September 18, 2001, B4). While many foreign policy analysts would point to a variety of reasons for Bush's argument for vengeful justice (to establish credibility, or to create and sustain public support), the terrorist attacks activated the longstanding connection between "tough guy" masculinity and successful foreign policy, a relationship many presidents have historically used to outflank their domestic opponents and pursue victory at all costs. Much of the media and a significant portion of the public wholeheartedly accepted Bush's invitation to perceive him as a decisive leader who would fight rather than run away. Three months after the attacks a *New York Times* journalist described the president's routine on his ranch in Crawford Texas, running, fishing, clearing brush, watching a University of Texas football game, reading a biography of Teddy Roosevelt and "getting in a little chainsaw work" (Bumiller 2001, B2). In June 2002 *The Nation* editorialized that intelligence agency mistakes regarding the attacks had diminished Bush's reputation as "the straight talking cowboy" (2002, 3). In March 2003, reporters continued dutifully to recount subsequent memorable "cowboy" moments in the war with Iraq. In July 2003, with

the occupation of Iraq in its fourth month, Bush invited a fight with Sunni insurgents by issuing an invitation to "bring 'em on." He was elated when the soldiers who captured Saddam Hussein brought him the dictator's gun. ("It's the phallic equivalent of a scalp," a scholar told Bumiller 2004.) On a visit to Australia in 2007, he crowed that the US was "kicking ass" in Iraq.

The swirling media commentary on Bush's "manning up" constituted an important component of post-9/11 foreign policy analysis. The historical scholarly literature made connections between imperial and territorial expansion, while feminist-inspired analysis linked this history to contemporary expressions of masculine dominance. Ivie, for example, tells us that the war on terror is a "variation on an old theme of defending civilization against savagery," with the fight against terrorism the "legitimating sign of U.S. empire" (2005, 55; 61). DeGenova globalizes the earlier project of manifest destiny to one of "subjugating and putting in order the wild new frontiers of an unruly planet" (2010, 614). Silliman (2008) found empirical support for the salience of "Indian country," in the war in Iraq by the term's ubiquitous use by soldiers and the media, thereby demonstrating that a national heritage rooted in colonialism and aggression found sure footing in Fallujah and Ramadi. Monten argued that the Bush Doctrine announced in 2002 "provides an essential point of continuity with preceding generations of grand strategy" (2005, 141). Pease's analogy exemplifies and summarizes the connection often drawn between old and new imperialism: "By way of Operation Infinite Justice [Afghanistan] and Operation Iraqi Freedom [Iraq], the Homeland Security State restaged the colonial settlers' conquest of Indians and the acquisition of their homeland" (2009, 172). A significant amount of feminist scholarship gleaned insights from this historical literature to shed light on masculinist, Orientalist, and imperial operations to "save" Afghan women, emasculate opponents through torture, and (re)establish old-style male heroism in film and television (Zine 2006; Richter-Montpetit 2007; Young 2003).

The arguments presented in this and subsequent chapters seek to complicate, challenge, and reformulate the paradigmatic view that US foreign policy in the twenty-first century is a reenactment and replication of frontier stories. While the argument here is not that we have entered a "postnational" era, my thesis is that accounts that find only continuities in expressions of nationalism fail to note how a bundle of older articulations of US nationalism have been refashioned by changes in political economy,

war, and gender and racial politics. This exploration of reframed and reworked nationalism destabilizes efforts to read contemporary US foreign policy through the lens of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and prompts my efforts to suggest an alternative way to consider foreign policy developments in the wake of Vietnam.

In her influential 2003 piece on neoliberalism's displacement of liberal democracy, Wendy Brown argued that the logic of neoliberalism entails "*extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social actions*" (p. 3; emphasis in the original). While Brown mainly analyzed the way neoliberalism has eviscerated institutions of liberal democracy—the legislature, political parties, and the executive—in a few passages she applied neoliberal logic to foreign policy, particularly in the turn to private security and the rationales for the military invasion of Iraq. The former relied upon because commodifying security has been deemed cost-effective and the latter because liberal democratic justifications for invading Afghanistan and Iraq (liberating people from dictatorial rule, installing democracies) were a fig leaf for efforts to remake alleged former terrorist havens into neoliberal spin-offs and projects of American imperium (2003, 9). This book aims to demonstrate how neoliberalism has transformed institutional and societal features of US foreign policy and rendered at least some aspects of historical continuity suspect. The domestic dimensions of neoliberalism have their counterpart in foreign policy and map onto the struggles that emerged in the twilight of the Carter years about the appropriate US response to the failures of Vietnam and the proper response to what many policy-makers and analysts considered a resurgent Soviet threat. The policies embraced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while often contradictory and seemingly adopted from the nineteenth-century playbook, laid the groundwork for accelerating the emergence of neoliberal foreign policy-making.

## President Jimmy Carter and Michel Foucault, 1979

During the last year of Jimmy Carter's presidency Michel Foucault was lecturing on neoliberalism at the College de France, with a special focus on post-war Germany and the US. In Germany, Ordo-liberals (the Freiberg school) devised post-war market-focused economic policy as a government effort to repudiate the national planning represented by Nazism and Soviet systems. In the US, on the other hand, a more thorough going entrenchment of neoliberalism was the predicted

outcome of a society where Keynesianism had long been thought to be "extraneous and threatening" (Foucault 2004, 218). Lemke reads Foucault as differentiating the US from Germany in that the U.S. had more deeply rooted neoliberal affinities for inventing "market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups, and institutions" (Lemke 2001, 197).

At the same time, the Carter administration faced its own set of domestic and foreign policy crises that demanded the implementation of more cost-effective policies to tamp down domestic demands for social welfare and employment. Even though haphazard and partial, the Carter administration increasingly embraced deregulation and a monetarist economic policy, officially declared with the 1979 appointment of Paul Volcker to the Federal Reserve. The Carter administration's inclination, when faced with the crisis of capitalism in the late 1970s, identified so presciently by Foucault, was to usher in new policies and governing strategies that accelerated the domestic weakening of organized labor and sought greater global financial integration that would eventually constrain the state's ability to fulfill the post-World War II Keynesian social contract.

The late Carter domestic crisis had its counterpart in foreign policy, with the Vietnam War a significant signpost of developments that would unfold in the 1980s. The usual framing of the post-Vietnam War foreign policy elite portrays fracture, with "liberal managerialists" favoring US leadership in reconstructing the international monetary order, thereby strengthening and stabilizing global capitalism, opposed to the eventually triumphant conservatives who lamented America's "loss of will" in the face of the Soviet threat. The argument that Reagan's rebooted Cold War policies triumphed over Carter's human rights foreign policy, however, misses a number of important policy emphases during the Carter era that would shape Reagan-era policy and help lay the groundwork for a different foundation for post-Cold War era US hegemony. To label Carter's human rights initiative a failure misses the way it began to undermine East-West Cold War competition with a (neo) liberal plank that resonates with US political culture on a par with anti-communism: individual human rights. Carter's foreign policy was not simply a naïve experiment eventually forced to confront the "realities" of the Cold War. However tentative and incipient, Carter's foreign policy wedded the value of human rights with visions of the market as the most significant site of human flourishing. As Carter put it in his 1978 State of the Union address:

Government cannot solve our problems, it can't set our goals, it cannot define our vision. Government cannot eliminate poverty or provide a bountiful economy or reduce inflation or save our cities or cure illiteracy or provide energy. And government cannot mandate goodness. Only a true partnership between government and the people can ever hope to reach these goals.

Carter's embrace of human rights worked in tandem with post-Vietnam Congressional assertions of authority on the topic of human rights violations in other countries. The Harkin Amendment (1975) banned continued economic assistance to nations that consistently violated human rights, and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (1976) withheld military assistance from governments that consistently violated human rights. With Congressional prompting, Carter also created the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (1977). Annual reports on the state of human rights facilitated the use of them by members of Congress and NGOs to link human rights with foreign aid. Scholars of international relations who study regimes point to human rights under Carter becoming an issue-area where norms and policy priorities are established and gain traction over time. As Schmitz and Walker put it, after Carter's term, "Human rights was now a fixture on the policy agenda and part of both American and world discussions and international relations" (2004, 143).

It is significant that human rights became the nodal point in the unraveling of the post- World War II containment paradigm during the Carter and Reagan years. Republicans had already tried to undermine the Kissinger-led détente strategy, one that hinged on balance of power considerations, with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1975, which, as Romano notes, brought together pro-human rights and anti-détente groups (2009, 719). Perhaps one of the most famous disputes with the Carter administration came from Jeane Kirkpatrick, in a well-known 1979 article in *Commentary*. While lambasting the Carter-Brzezinski vision of international politics driven more by "rational humanism" than "national supremacy," Kirkpatrick argued that human rights violations were more frequent and devastating in Communist countries—one indicator being that communist revolutions produced more refugees fleeing human rights violations than authoritarian regimes (2007, 66). In defending US alliances with autocracies more likely to democratize than communist countries, Kirkpatrick gave the Reagan administration a human rights-based argument for backing insurgencies in places like Nicaragua

and Afghanistan. Modification of a human rights-centered foreign policy met the requirements of the Reagan administration's agenda, which in his first-term was antagonistic toward the Soviet Union. It strengthened the conservatives' hand by allowing them to effectively juxtapose the repression in the Soviet Union with the "hard won" freedoms in the US, and demonstrate that the pursuit of the national interest included championing human rights. The human rights bureaucratic apparatus created by the Carter administration helped institutionalize human rights norms and solidified the Reagan administration efforts to link strategic anti-communism with human rights. Ten years after Reagan's 1980 victory, triumphalist discourse about the fall of the Soviet Union gave credit to the US for its respect for human rights as well as the salutary effects of the market. The meaning of a human rights-directed foreign policy increasingly took on a neoliberal hue, defined by the pursuit of economic opportunity, freedom of choice, and responsibility for one's destiny. While much foreign policy analysis focuses on the discontinuities between Carter and Reagan, taking note of their overlap and resemblances helps to trace the way in which an emphasis on human rights could buttress the priority given to anti- communist insurgencies.

Carter's human rights policies—rhetorical stress, bureaucratic instantiation, and efforts to unevenly prioritize them in both Soviet and non-Western settings—were the first steps in constructing a new basis of legitimacy for the post-Cold War aspirations of global power for the US. In continuing to resist giving priority to social and economic rights Carter's policies contributed to deepening and legitimizing the material relations of the global capitalist economy. The emphasis on civil and political rights made it possible for the Reagan administration to embrace human rights as the moral high ground in its competition with the USSR. Reagan was able to take up Carter's human rights platform and use it to legitimize coming to the aid of "freedom fighters" in Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan. Human rights violations by the contras, the FPLA and the *mujahedeen*, respectively, could be deemed lamentable but of lower priority in the struggle with communism. In addition, the emphasis on civil and individual rights allowed Reagan to incorporate religious freedom into the framework of human rights inherited from Carter. In this sense, Reagan's rhetoric about the Soviet Union as an evil empire continued Carter's human rights policy with noteworthy bellicosity (Odom 2006, 71).

Finally, discussing Soviet human rights violations and extolling the virtues of the market could be coupled in a way that became commonplace as the Cold War wound down. The longstanding claim that capitalism fosters rights-based democracy gradually became one of the strongest criticisms of Soviet communism. The compatibility and mutual constitution of markets and civil and political rights was nearly a truism by the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Likewise, encouraging the flourishing of civil and political rights naturalized the material relations undergirding them.

The period between the collapse of communism and September 11 saw a more tightly sutured emphasis on individual and civil rights and "free markets." Prioritizing human rights in the Carter and Reagan presidencies then helped legitimize humanitarian interventions in the 1990s not as acts of self-defense or retaliation but as concerted efforts, backed by US moral leadership, selectively to address gross human rights violations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While the Carter-Reagan administrations' different emphases on human rights did not cause humanitarian intervention, the normative thrust of the "responsibility to protect" was compatible with military intervention to ameliorate the conditions faced by starving people being attacked by warlords, opponents of a military coup being murdered and detained, and ethnic cleansing and mass rape.

This book traces the way in which the intensification of neoliberalism in foreign policy during the past nearly forty years has eroded and reconfigured the imperial markers so often pointed to in describing and explaining US foreign policy. The four components of American exceptionalism that have received so much attention and that I focus on in this book—masculine toughness, captivity, racism, and hyper nationalism—are at times treated as static and unchanging coordinates of U.S. nationalism. In the last forty years, in other words, a new paradigm consisting of different practices of power and discursive representation has emerged that suggests the waning of old imperialism and its displacement by a new organization and practice of foreign policy. Theorizing with a neoliberal conceptual lens can help explain the seemingly astonishing electoral win by Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Trump capitalized on thirty years of redistributive policies favoring the rich and presented himself as a successful real estate mogul. Trump was intuitively correct in the last debate when he claimed, "If we could run our country the way I've run my company, we would have a country you could be proud of"; sixty-three million

people ignored his numerous bankruptcies and agreed with an argument long made in US politics, including its foreign policy, that business acumen is superior to bureaucratic expertise. While there are particular and noteworthy departures in Trump's policies, and a marked difference in rhetoric and style, his election represents the intensification of patterns outlined below.

## Nation-Building and Masculinity

The frontier expansion and nation-building project had a distinctly gendered dimension; from 1789 until the Civil War, five presidents commanded US forces in war, with many of them having experience fighting Indian wars (Mead 2001, 13). Long after the disappearance of the frontier, presidents have breathed new life into old war stories by invoking war heroes, as George H.W. Bush did when he compared the march to Kuwait City with Teddy Roosevelt's march up San Juan Hill (Jones and Wilhelm 1990, 52). There have been a number of studies about the relationship between masculinity and foreign policy in the US-Philippine war (Hoganson 1998), US-Israel relations (Mart 1996), and the distinctive masculinity embraced by the Kennedy administration (Dean 1998). Slotkin has described this as a "cult of toughness," an iteration of masculinity connected to territorial expansion against an enemy that reinvigorated manly imperialism (1992, 497). Vietnam signified a crisis in the cult of toughness, an erosion periodically restaged in various conflicts and film but further weakened by new modalities of war.

In 2009, President Obama helped explain this shift in the masculine-war connection when he announced a second military surge in Afghanistan: "Unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division in the twentieth century, our efforts will involve disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies" (Obama 2009). In fighting a state-based enemy in Afghanistan while announcing the nature of the threat environment that defied state remedy, President Obama captured the contradictory nature of the war on terror that is not amenable to interstate conventional tactics. In fact, an array of new war-fighting capabilities to combat disorder, state failure, and dispersed enemies gained traction throughout Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies. From Donald Rumsfeld's 2004 "secret order" to attack Al Qaeda in fifteen to twenty countries, to the Navy SEAL attack and killing of Osama bin Laden and violation Pakistan's sovereignty, to the assassination of an American citizen by drones in September 2011, the scale and

breadth of America's wars are truly global and often circumvent sovereignty, with both extended occupation and increasingly with a "light footprint." Furthermore, covert, technologically driven, explained-after-the-fact operations do not elicit much public attention and are constantly touted using cost-benefit analysis. With allegedly small windows of opportunity and a purportedly lower risk of civilian deaths, "shadow wars" steadily play out in "wars with countries we are not at war with (safe havens)" (2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, VI). The more conventional citizen-soldier template jostles against a professional military that has considered (and then withdrew) giving a Distinguished Warfare Medal to drone operators and "cyber warriors." As two former soldiers wrote, "the moment we conflate proficiency with valor, we cheapen the meaning of bravery" (Wood and Harbaugh 2014, A23). New war-fighting strategies give us a different and more expansive vantage point for understanding redefined connections among war, nationalism, and soldiering. This kind of war-fighting does not require a gun-slinging loner who comes to tame a town. Effective foreign policy leadership argues over which benchmarks should be used to assess the consequences of the Iraqi surge, offers assessment and updates on the training of new police officers and army personnel ready to take responsibility for their own security in Afghanistan (to avoid failure "on the installment plan"; Biddle 2013), and carefully deliberates over "kill lists" so as to minimize civilian casualties and carry out a successful mission (President Osama's "targeted killings" list). Cowboys are not concerned with the appearance of competent, effective leadership; evaluation for CEOs, on the other hand, values effectiveness over courage. In further developing his signature strategies in counterterrorism—drones, snatch and grabs, targeted killings, and air strikes—Obama managed to further extend and disseminate market values to the conduct of war (Brown 2003, 3). With the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as unsavory alternatives, he argued that extending forms of violence that appear to kill fewer civilians than conventional war and endanger fewer US soldiers is the better strategy, and the litmus test is the accuracy of the killing and not its legitimacy.

These developments have been at odds with the "cult of toughness" defined by heroism, decisiveness, and the fear of being perceived as "soft" that have long been at the heart of the nation-building project in the United States. The masculinity-foreign policy nexus defined in the context of imperial continental expansion and the Vietnam War weakened with the changing priorities of the neoliberal state, which is to produce subjects in

an environment defined by the market (Dean 2009, 51). Beginning with the Reagan administration, a dimension of masculinity congruent with this project took hold and persisted up to and beyond the events of September 11. At the time of the first Gulf War a number of authors coined terms like "New World Order" masculinity (Niva 1998, 119), "managerial heroism" (Jeffords 1993) and "transnational masculinity" (Connell 1998) in an effort to identify and define projections of masculinity that increasingly relied upon the symbols we associate with corporate-inspired globalization, official multiculturalism, the information age, and the revolution in military affairs. The new modalities of this gradually emergent kind of business masculinity was, of course, upstaged by nostalgia-tinged formulas cued by Presidents who will still sometimes reach for Teddy Roosevelt as a role model, as do observers who describe what they perceive to be frontier masculinity at work. Guerlain called Bush administration neo-conservatives the "neo-Rough Riders," intentionally drawing a link between Teddy Roosevelt's manly imperialism and the take-no-prisoners approach of Cheney, Bush, and Wolfowitz (Guerlain 2006, 110). The call to save Afghan women from the savage clutches of the Taliban, promises of revenge, and celebrations of the 300 male fire-fighters who perished at the World Trade Center, as well as male soldiers, were all familiar stories from the annals of imperial manly adventures.

Nevertheless, we miss a good deal if we only focus on the resurgence of the familiar and traditional markers of manly imperialism in the war on terror. The Bush administration continued and refined many of the policies developed after the first Gulf War. Private security companies, allegedly more efficient and cost-effective than a professional army, played a tremendous role in the "market for force" that emerged in the wake of September 11, fulfilling Donald Rumsfeld's call for the military to take a more "entrepreneurial approach":

> One that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive; and to behave less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be "validated" but rather anticipates them before they appear and develops new capabilities to dissuade and deter them. (Rumsfeld 2002, 29)

Initial US military strategy in Afghanistan reflected this penchant for entrepreneurial war-fighting, emphasizing aerial support, a "light foot-print" by US Special Forces, drones, and precision-guided munitions.

Even the invasion of Iraq with conventional forces did not diminish its appeal, and President Obama increasingly relied on the Rumsfeld goal of projecting power with logistical efficiency, relying heavily on a familiar tactical toolbox consisting of precision-strike aircraft, partners on the ground, CIA teams and special operations forces, and stepped up surveillance capabilities, particularly through the use of drones. Obama broke new ground by ordering a targeted killing of a US citizen in Yemen in September 2011 and expanded JSOC operations to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen.

As if it were akin to hiving off production and assembly offshore, Jane Mayer coined the term "outsourcing torture" to explain the reliance of the US on countries that use torture to extract information from alleged terrorists. Likewise, the construction of the enemy Al Qaeda conformed to a world of networks, flattened organizations, and global flows, with pundits and scholars alike referring to it as a holding company, a Starbucks-like franchise, and, according to the 9/11 Commission Report on the terrorist attacks, "Terrorist Entrepreneurs" (Miller 2001; Iraq Study Group 2006; Kean and Hamilton 2004, 222–223). Analyzing a sheaf of posthumous letters from Osama bin Laden released in May 2012, the journalist Peter Baker noted that bin Laden's frustrations with his far-flung Al Qaeda offshoots "might be familiar to any chief executive trying to keep tabs on a multinational corporation that had grown beyond its modest origins" (Baker 2012, A1). This reach for a vocabulary from the world of business and finance is more than a mere turn of phrase; political leaders and popular culture both posit the conduct of warfare as something that requires business acumen and the ability to meet security challenges with a corporate model, and the terrorist enemy is often framed in the same terms.

American soldiering changed with the increasing prominence of what one observer has defined as "capital intensive rather than labor intensive warfare" (Freedman 2003). Alongside demonstrating heroic masculinity while under fire, soldiers in the professional army are required to demonstrate technological skill and avoid coming under fire in the first place. The combined effects of post-Vietnam casualty aversion, high-tech weaponry such as unmanned aerial vehicles, private security firms, and Special Ops have transformed important aspects of soldiering into neoliberal militarism. The 4497 US soldier deaths in Iraq (as of April 2016) are quite small by comparison with Vietnam War casualties as well as other American wars (and certainly compared with Iraqi civilian and soldier deaths). War

itself increasingly conforms to neoliberal considerations of metrics for measuring success—benchmarks, milestones, and timetables for withdrawal—all important considerations for a government that prides itself on conducting wars "on schedule" (Stahl 2008). President Obama demonstrated the increasing importance of setting deadlines in his speech announcing a 30,000-troop surge for Afghanistan: The troops "will deploy in the first part of 2010 … [This] will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011," another deadline that was not met (Obama 2009, 3). The use of the term "surge" instead of "escalation" is also noteworthy. A surge does not portend imminent victory but rather an intensification of the application of force that temporarily garners attention before the wars fade back to their "normal" stalemates with a new set of contested benchmarks to gauge whether progress is occurring. By the summer of 2017, the Trump government was asking Defense Secretary Jim Mattis for a new strategy for Afghanistan because according to Mattis, "Right now, I believe the enemy is surging" (Gordon 2017). When pressed on what victory would mean, Mattis sounded the fifteen-year refrain: drive down the violence, train Afghan troops more effectively, and offer high-end US capabilities, that is, Special Operations forces and airpower.

During his campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump repeatedly used cost-effectiveness as the "bottom line" for judging many US foreign policy commitments. Sanger and Haberman, reporting for the *New York Times*, listened to Trump frame foreign policy as a series of "deals," and every foreign policy challenge defined through a "prism of a negotiation" (2016). The acumen required in a business deal is very different from older models of masculinity that eschewed foreign policy for "sissies." Although perhaps in short supply in Trump's case, some voters seemed to admire a tough and unpredictable negotiator willing to gamble that allies will pony up more funds to maintain an alliance and who keeps adversaries guessing about how far the president would go to fight ISIS and North Korea. Private security companies like Academi (formerly Blackwater) and Dyncorps have not only bid for contracts. Trump's advisers recruited both companies to offer their private armies as an alternative strategy to ordering troop increases in Afghanistan and Iraq (Landler et al. 2017, A1). The prospect of mercenaries scattered across the globe is not a surprising trend given the longstanding outsourcing of defense to private contractors and is in line with Trump's promise to run the country like a business. He has

stocked his cabinet with "oligarchs and generals" (Bromwich 2017, 5) and prompted uneasy questions about whether Goldman Sachs or the US government is in charge of foreign policy. (The inordinate influence of Goldman Sachs has been around since at least the Clinton administration.) The former CEO of Exxon now does America's State Department business around the world.

## Captivity Narratives Transformed

The captivity narrative is at the center of many accounts of the origins of US settler nationalism as well as explanations for ensuing imperialist expansion. Slotkin identifies colonial Puritan writing about captivity as the "first American mythology," where the hero and particularly the heroine were captured by "devilish American savages" and emotionally tested by Indian barbarism (Slotkin 1973, 21). Jeffords notes the importance of the captivity narrative in reversing the protagonists in frontier encounters, with the settlers the victims of savagery and the native peoples conveniently depicted as the perpetrators of violence (1991, 207). Recurring stories of capture, trial, release, and rebirth "defined the journey of the New England soul and society toward redemption" (Derounian 1987, 86).

The twentieth-century apogee of the captivity narrative was the Iranian hostage crisis of November 1979–January 1981, when revolutionary Iranian students held fifty-two Americans hostage. They were convinced that the US had admitted the former Shah of Iran to the US as a first step in derailing the revolution and putting the Shah back in power. Every element of the settler captivity story played out during the crisis. The hostages were innocent representations of American resolve in the face of humiliation; Iranians were savage barbarians, and their release required a display of tough resolve requiring no apology for previous US interference in Iranian affairs. A.M. Rosenthal of the *New York Times* declared that it was as if "our very government had been taken captive and held in that embassy," and the plight of the hostages became the obsessive focus of popular media for a year (1981, 35).

Captivity narratives often exceed territory and clear borders since the Cold War, however, partly because presidents have recognized the contribution of the Iranian hostage crisis to Jimmy Carter's electoral defeat, but also because the spatial metaphor upon which captivity rests enlarged considerably in the wake of globalization. George H.W. Bush's New World Order was premised on the vision that people can now pursue their "natural

instinct," free enterprise and free markets, which would "naturally" pave the way for liberal democracy (Bush 1991). The government also prepared for the possibility that this optimistic vision would be out of reach. The infamous Defense Planning Guidance document generated by Bush I's Pentagon made the case for "a world dominated by one superpower whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military might to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy" (Tyler 1992). In addition, the Clinton universalizing vision of global markets and liberal democracy is the spatial antithesis of a captivity scenario, which rests on distinct borders between savagery and civilization and innocent national victims yanked from "civilization" and needing rescue from a menacing enemy.

With an imagined borderless world of "deterritorialized capitalism" (Stephanson 1995), and the US aiming to be the unchallenged global power, captured Americans were no longer the sole or even major targets of foreign policy crises. Instead, humanitarian crises, with threatened populations at risk and calls for US leadership in selective interventions, increasingly defined the decade of the 1990s. The language of international rescue suggested that the US could save non-nationals in distress and worry less about its own captured nationals (see e.g., Wheeler 2000). The "responsibility to protect" became an important component of imagining the world as a cosmopolitan unity where states must obey universal justice. Those states that are able to do so should "become a resource for ensuring that all persons rights are protected" (Buchanan 1999, 87). The "rescue" of Kosovo prompted UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to remark that state sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct: "States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa" (Annan 1999, 1).

Children and childhood enhanced the marriage of market capitalism and morality with rescue and humanitarian intervention, and became an important symbol of the imperative of global rescue at work in post-Cold War foreign policy. The US was now the sole superpower capable of restoring childhood to millions deprived of it. *People* magazine put it plaintively in its cover story about the rescue of Kosovars, "Who Will Save the Children?" (Smolowe et al. 1999). Children increasingly have become a central aspect of "branding" war as a rescue mission for innocents and, after the post-September 11 invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, an essential characteristic of the return to normalcy after trauma. As George W. Bush explained:

America is beginning to realize that the dreams of the terrorists and the Taliban were a waking nightmare for Afghan women and their children. The Taliban murdered teenagers for laughing in the presence of soldiers. They jailed children as young as 10 years old, and tortured them for supposed crimes against their parents. (Bush 2001b, 1)

This is a captivity narrative with a different message than those of old. Rescuing children and childhood demonstrates the putatively benevolent reach of US power and the return of normalcy, and the restoration of "normal life" among the world's children. The responsibility to protect and rescue, however selective and self-interested, has been embraced by Clinton, Bush, Obama, and to a certain extent Trump. The images of Kosovar refugees hugged by Clinton, Afghan women unveiling thanks to George W. Bush, and Libyans freed from the yoke of Qaddafi by President Obama resonate with Trump's justification for his April 2017 strike on a Syrian airbase: "That attack on children yesterday had a big impact on me" (Trump 2017).

## Nationalism, Race, Multiculturalism

Critical scholarship on US exceptionalism stresses the centrality of racial othering in the US nation-building endeavor. Historically, the frontier was the literal and metaphorical site of separation between civilization and savagery, and at the heart of the conflict was racial difference. Hunt makes one of the strongest claims about the salience of race in US nationalism, arguing that racial hierarchy (along with claims to national greatness and suspicion of revolutionary change) is a fundamental component of US nationalism since its founding (1987).

State-based nationalist paradigms that rest on a fixed racial hierarchy and uncomplicated white supremacy are at a loss when it comes to explaining the "first black president," women in combat, and Defense Secretary Hagel's 2014 statement indicating that the military was moving closer to accepting transgender people in the ranks (Cooper 2014). In the frontier myth, it was the iconic white male fighter who triumphed over the savage others beyond the frontier, the author of legerdemain that depicted violence and theft as progress. Likewise, the domestic presence of the other fueled virulent racism and constant contrasts between barbarity and civilization, and the presence of the other within churned out Jim Crow, immigration quotas and exclusions, and regular deportations.

The constant generation of laudatory remarks on the inclusive hierarchy that now supposedly defines the US should be included in analysis of nationalism and its accompanying discourses of exceptionalism. Arizona Minutemen, Tea Partiers, and Fox News have targeted President Obama as an other among us, but he succeeded in leveraging his story to fit the American Dream and it helped him win two presidential elections. An important component of neoliberal multiculturalism has been inclusion and the politics of recognition, itself fraught with institutional indifference, sexual violence, racism, nativism, and heterosexism. McAlister has already shown how multicultural patriotic diversity is compatible with the maintenance of US power (2001). Spade and Willse go further and argue that the embrace of gay rights is a branding strategy to make "imperial, racist state violence" somehow seem progressive (2014, 9).

Reconfigured national identity is not only a public relations ploy, however, especially for those seeking equality and recognition. Often occupying a precarious position within complicated operations of power, and experiencing their presence as "supplement, complement, or partial outsider," the politics of recognition produces a continuous loop of the institution (such as the military) and the polity offering partial and episodic recognition while enforcing dominance through a more paradoxical and ambiguous expansive hierarchy (Brown 1993, 391). The latter is fashioned through institutional indifference, sexual violence, racism, and heterosexism, while the former invites membership and a promise of recognition and equal participation in projects that extend American power around the globe. The contradictory quest for recognition affirms US liberalism and the importance of belonging, while the operations of power ensure endless deferment of its realization. Every struggle deemed successful—desegregation, Title IX, immigration statutes—simultaneously and paradoxically affirms societal and institutional capacity for inclusion while dampening the prospects for resisting US militarism.

Two developments in US politics in the past thirty years have reformulated racial logics. The first has been the vigor and partial success of the US civil rights movement in challenging the second-class citizenship of African Americans. While strengthening the relationship between racial justice at home and abroad, whether in South Africa or Haiti, the civil rights call for inclusion had a profound effect on US foreign policy. A number of scholars have shown how the Cold War provided an important opening for domestic civil rights groups to pressure the US to end Jim Crow (Dudziak 2000; Borstelmann 2000). The Vietnam War produced

further indictments of ongoing racism in the US, particularly in the military. African American criticism of US foreign policy in the Middle East, South Africa, and Haiti has effectively demonstrated the racialized intersection between domestic and foreign policy (McAlister 2001; Culverson 1997; Ives 1995).

It is important to recognize the ways in which the demands of the civil rights movement partially succeeded on a number of fronts and unevenly brought into official US ideology more utilitarian and neoliberal aims. Lipson argues, for example, that affirmative action policy has gradually become diversity policy, an instrumental effort "in order to improve national security or corporate sales" (Lipson 2008, 693). In a shift from what he calls "corrective justice to utilitarian diversity," race policies in education and employment (including, importantly, the military) legitimize self-representations of the US state as multicultural and diverse. Diversity policy, in other words, is a component of neoliberal diversity management.

The second development of the past thirty years revolves around immigration and the growing importance of immigration politics that worked to eliminate racial quotas in immigration legislation in 1965. The 1965 act abolished national quotas in place since the 1920s and instead allowed entry based on skills and family connections. The 2000 census estimated that the US population grew from 249 million in 1990 to 275 million in 2000, with 35% of the gain coming from immigration—800,000 documented immigrants arrive in the US every year. Buell argues that by the late 1990s the figure of the immigrant and immigrant diversity "provided new stories for a new America existing in a new world" (1998). US nationalism, in other words, increasingly presented itself after the Cold War as less a nationally bounded entity and more a nation of immigrants, diasporas, and transnational attachments—the US as multicultural superpower. This does not mean the demise of the nation-state or the disappearance of nativism—far from it. It does signal, however, that reformulated expressions of nationalism more congruent with projecting neoliberal global power on the part of the US have become more prominent as a result of the incorporation of civil and immigrant rights in expressions of US nationalism.

In the post-9/11 era, one of the more interesting developments has been commentary about US exceptionalism when it comes to its Muslim population. Observers frequently note that the extensive diversity of the US Muslim community and the more hospitable environment for

religious expression help explain the lack of interest in "jihad" in the US as compared with Muslims in Europe. The July 30, 2007 cover of *Newsweek* titled "Islam in America" pictured a diverse array of Muslims, and Lisa Miller quoted a Homeland Security functionary's reassuring claim that "Most Muslims in America think of themselves as Americans," which explains the dearth of Muslim radicals in the US (2007, 26). Commentators argue that Muslim advocacy is more visible and influential in the US as well. "Good" Muslim immigrants, in other words, perform an important role that earlier immigrants have played in the public's imagination. In Bonnie Honig's (1998) words, when immigrants come to the US they confirm its choice-worthiness and they are often seen as living proof of the supposed universality of America's liberal democratic principles. As one observer put it, "Muslims never sound quite so American as when asserting their rights against government policies they perceive as unjust" (Skerry 2006, 30).

The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and the endless commentary about its significance in realizing the promise of democracy in America is testament to this shifting and contradictory progression of US nationalism. Lauded as a product of transnationalism, Obama came to stand for the diaspora, meritocracy, and increasing alleged upward mobility for all black Americans (Parameswaran 2009, 202). The accolades accorded him in print and broadcast media eventually constituted a (neo) liberal fantasy, with divisions papered over, voters truly color-blind, and a prospect for redemption. As the media celebrated post-racial America, it is interesting to think about the way President Obama himself constructed the nation in his 2012 State of the Union address. After describing the flag that the Navy SEAL Team 6 took with them on the mission to "get bin Laden" as one of his proudest possessions he explained that

> When you put on that uniform, it doesn't matter if you're black or white; Asian or Latino; conservative or liberal; rich or poor; gay or straight … When you're in the thick of a fight, you rise or fall as a unit, serving one Nation, leaving no one behind … All that mattered that day was the mission. No one thought about politics. No one thought about themselves … More than that, the mission only succeeded because every member of that unit trusted each other—because you can't charge up those stairs, into darkness and danger, unless you know that there's someone behind you, watching your back … This Nation is great because we worked as a team. (Obama 2012)

This is a "new face of America," in other words, envisioned as a military organization led by an African American man capable of executing a counterterrorist operation. While denying Bush's gestures to the War on Terror as a religious crusade, Obama would, in the words of one *Newsweek* journalist, use cost-effective "pin prick operations by elite forces" in order to get the job done (Klaidman 2012, 34). Moreover, in some respects, President Obama went further than his predecessors by claiming prerogative powers with respect to targeted killings, state secrets, and indefinite detention in fighting terrorists (Pious 2011). This historic presidency, in other words, has simultaneously affirmed the continued existence of the American Dream as well as the compatibility of multiculturalism with imperial power.

Donald Trump took up the political correctness crucible last used with particular force in the early 1990s. Like then, political correctness reflects defensive resentment of those who imagine they have lost their various privileges (gender, race, ethnicity, sexual identity). From a different angle, political correctness is a challenge to a perceived indication of success by minorities in achieving recognition (but often not access to resources) in institutions such as government and universities, in literature and the arts (thereby displacing mainstays of the canon), and less often, corporations. Trump's label of Mexican immigrants as rapists and murderers, calling for a Muslim ban (first a complete ban, then a temporary ban, and then a halt to immigration from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism), successfully tapped into an evangelical "narrative of injury" (Wehner 2016).

While the challenges to political correctness were not new, Trump was aided in an unprecedented way by an extensive network of support from Fox News and conservative social media with a presence on Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, Reddit, 4chan and 8chan, filled with commentators and trolls blaring what Warzel has called "New Media Upside Down," a deft mimicking of mainstream media formats and graphics while walking the line between salacious innuendo and falsehoods and having some success in labeling mainstream media "fake news" (2017). Trump was not the first politician to use social media as "strategic image management," but he advanced its use tenfold as he tweeted and trolled his way to the White House. Trump's Twitter trolling attacks on minorities, women, and immigrants is homologous with the disciplinary impetus of neoliberalism to blame the disenfranchised for their "irresponsible" behavior. Trump has been able to intensify the racial, misogynist, nativist disciplinary dimension

of neoliberalism by linking it with reality-TV idioms of exaggeration, hyperbole, and excess. Trump was also adept at transforming racial, nativist, and misogynist claims into personalized battles that resembled the fake WWE boxing matches he used to host with Vince McMahon. In addition to nicknaming his opponents, wrestling-style, in the primaries (Low Energy Jeb, Little Marco, Lying Ted, and Crooked Hillary) he was not averse to blasting opponents on twitter. Fox News (especially Sean Hannity, who called liberal opponents "little snowflakes") and websites such as InfoWars and Breitbart pitched in, denouncing anyone who opposed Trump, stoking conspiracy theories, and mockingly condescending anyone who challenged their facts and exposes.

## Nationalism, Patriotism, and Personal Democracy

One of the most important dimensions of state sovereignty is nationalism. State-building and the attendant cultivation of a strong sense of national identity intensified in the US after the Civil War and was an adjunct to the general "state strengthening" that occurred throughout the world of states in the nineteenth century. Adelman and Aron (1999, 816) describe the nineteenth century as an important shift from borderlands to bordered lands, as a general hardening of nationalism accompanied the continued subordination of African Americans, increasingly restrictive immigration, and a host of related developments. Practices of citizenship involved varying intensities of identification with the state, particularly in encounters with state-based threats including secession, expansion (e.g., the US-Mexican War of 1848), rival colonial powers (e.g., Spain in 1898), rising European powers (Japan and Germany in the twentieth century), and of course the Soviet Union during the Cold War. War and the threat of war called forth solidarity, sacrifice, and a common and sustained understanding of enemies and friends.

Since Foucault's lectures on neoliberalism in 1978–1979, thousands of scholars have analyzed the ways capitalism has undergone shifts in production, organization, and spatiality. The material consequences of neoliberal economic policy, particularly income and wealth inequality (exacerbated by race), the predominance of finance capital, the rapid expansion of debt, and incessant warnings and predictions about the next asset bubble bursting, are described everywhere. The financial system has become a constant centerpiece of social and political commentary, whether banks are too big to fail, why derivatives are "weapons of mass destruction," and how bank

leverage ratios have become "the elephant in the room" preoccupy pundits of every mainstream print and online publication and television news show. The heavily financialized neoliberal mindset has left no sector of the economy untouched, including that of foreign policy, most notably in the outsourcing of war, provision of foreign aid, and increasing turn in defense policy toward "economies of force" that maintain military superiority at lower cost.

Accompanying these material changes has been a change in mentality, in ways of thinking and acting that place priority upon individuals, firms, and countries in competition. Researchers have explored the way neoliberal mentalities govern everything from reality and daytime television, positive psychology, feminism, law, policy, and debt. Many of these insights can be adapted to understand disruptions to the foundational nationalism upon which the frontier myth rests. While not denying the elements of a cowboy reenactor in Bush's rhetoric, the operating premises of neoliberalism work against cowboy antics and favor instead the demonstration of effective management through the regular assessment of benchmarks. Furthermore, highly differentiated audiences consuming multiple, often conflicting messages do not resemble the mesmerized audience of a Wild West show. Efficiency and responsibility rather than patriotism and sacrifice define contemporary citizen subjectivity.

Documenting the way citizen-consumers are coaxed to conform to the requirements of neoliberal economic orthodoxy has sometimes missed the way patriotism has been reshaped in ways that juxtapose a "responsible" patriot subject who fails to conform to an imagined and romanticized version of loving one's country. The topic of the "real" meaning of patriotism provides an opportunity to point to nostalgic memories as instructions about how Americans could exercise their duty to country but have forsakenly embraced a neoliberal mentality. For example, in some quarters, President Bush's injunction to go shopping after the terrorist attacks was met with surprise and disdain, providing an opportunity to chastise mindless shopaholics and irresponsible consumers storming malls and websites and racking up debt, while soldiers sacrificed. In addition to feigning outrage about behavior that has been assiduously cultivated by corporations and government for the past thirty years, nostalgic critique allows for judgments about insufficiently responsible citizenship and it works to foster guilty silence rather than critique. Neoliberal moralization about couch potatoes changing channels and crazed shopping zombies on Black Friday also has become a strategic and frequently used justification

for narrowing the space for dissent. The defender of nostalgia sneers that people do not deliberate about targeted killings because, after all, all they want to do is shop at Target. Commentators often wave the specter of nostalgic patriotism to scold and criticize the consumer-citizen for things such as refusing to serve in the military or lacking the perseverance to sustain a long-term counterinsurgency war. Nostalgic patriotism creates individuated guilt and cultivates a mix of indifference and consent; it serves as a preemptive strike against collective action.

Perhaps one of the most astute representative of the nostalgia's lament for patriotic citizenship is Andrew Bacevich, who begins *The Limits of Power* by declaring that "the ethic of self-gratification has firmly entrenched itself as the defining feature of the American way of life" (2008, 16). Instead of living within their means, Americans have pressed politicians to facilitate their infinite urge to spend, which in turn has deepened US commitments abroad, especially energy dependence and an overbearing and increasingly military presence in the Middle East. Likewise, Beinart scolded Americans for their impatience with long lines at airports after September 11 and caustically noted that Pittsburgh International Airport was considering allowing those without tickets to pass through security in order to shop and help airport sales (2004). Like many other commentators, he portrayed a population full of dazed consumer nitwits watching one reality TV show after another, failing to differentiate *Survivor* from the Iraq war. For those bored with Iraq, "you can simply change the channel to some other reality TV show."

Scolding citizens for their flightiness and their willingness to be sideline spectators to the war on terror often includes an implicit criticism of a government that has produced a marked lack of civic duty. Kaplan argues that the Bush administration, "sensing the birth of common purpose after September 11, consciously squashed it" (Kaplan 2005, 21). What Kaplan and others are identifying are a set of governance strategies that conform to the familiar neoliberal metric of effectiveness and responsibility rather than legitimacy. Nostalgic patriot Kaplan in part blames the "garbage" that Americans watch on TV and cites surveys that show that "viewers who imbibed the trashiest fare were the least likely to be engaged in their communities." It was these viewers who two months after the attacks were back to watching "Fear Factor" and the boxing match between Tonya Harding and Paula Jones (2005, 22).

Nostalgia played a similar role in the panicked efforts to stop Trump in the primaries and general election. The establishment foreign policy elite

wrote public letters objecting to Trump as a threat to "U.S. moral authority as the leader of the free world" (*The New York Times* August 8, 2016). Steve Coll of *The New Yorker* declared that Trump's talk of NATO's obsolescence treated defense treaties as a "transactional protection racket" and not the commitment to "sacrifice and die for one another," allegedly their true purpose (2016, 20). Evan Thomas declared that Trumps' anti-establishment stance threated international security and the US needed a "highly trained corps of diplomats, worldly financiers, and academics to steer it straight" (2016). Former acting director of the CIA Michael Morell broke with protocol and endorsed Clinton for president because unlike Trump Clinton realized that "diplomacy without force is ineffective," and "America is an exceptional nation that must lead in the world for the country to remain secure and prosperous" (2016). Trump, however, was exhibiting, no doubt in highly exaggerated style, the very practices and antics circulating in the larger culture for decades. Trump's support sprung from the rage and revenge coursing through George W. Bush supporters rioting over the Florida recount in 2000 all the way to the Tea Party a decade later. John McCain's campaign labeled Obama a celebrity in 2008 and Obama embraced the moniker. Trump's seemingly unmovable base of support responded to fact checkers with reinforced falsely held beliefs. Boasting about his TV ratings, bragging about the size of his inaugural crowd, and denying that Clinton won the popular vote was an enactment of the message that in a hypercompetitive world the ultimate failure is to be a loser. Outsider status, a fractured Republican Party, and notoriety for being a racist birther helped Trump take advantage of decades of relentless messaging about the value of entrepreneurial risk (and the bankruptcies that come with it) in building your brand. The Trump brand is a cartoonish culmination of aggressive individualism and self-promotion.

The ubiquitous use of timetables, deadlines, benchmarks, metrics, announced draw downs, conditions-based draw downs, definitive elections, and arguments about schedules for withdrawal—who set them, whether they are firm—assure that the US wants and demands that Afghans and Iraqis take responsibility for their own security, just as Trump argues that Japan and Korea should take responsibility for their national security. Dueling timetables and spin politics, recalibration of messages, pushback on intelligence reports, and disputes about the number of civilian deaths have transformed war arguments into domestic advertising campaigns and can be analyzed using two lenses. One is the invitation to those following the confusing morass to choose a side to believe and to

root for. It is the public relations equivalent to Fox News's claimed and risible commitment to fair and balanced reporting. The second and more important lens for understanding the arguments is to note the depoliticization of war through a barrage of data, presented as valid and reliable measures of progress or setbacks, and the most valid way to analyze war. Both the either/or argument and the "facts speaking for themselves" has the effect of encouraging viewers to stop listening, reading, or viewing, and to change the channel, click elsewhere, or flip the page because there seems to be no way to resolve or end the dispute. Ironically, the sheer number of choices about how to assess the war's progress seems remote from questions about whether to fight it and the tactics in use. The circulating spin also can also disconnect from electoral and party politics. For example, during the 2006 mid-term elections, Democrats made major gains in what was widely described as a referendum for ending the Iraq war, and three months later President Bush ordered a 30,000-troop surge. When President Obama had a last-minute meeting with Nancy Pelosi to announce his second surge in Afghanistan she emphasized the lack of Democratic Party support, which Obama more or less ignored.

The "caring" aspect of neoliberalism manifests in the humanitarian wars from Haiti to Somalia to Bosnia to Kosovo giving foreign policy a "human face," and eliciting complaints about "compassion fatigue" in the face of horrors such as ethnic cleansing, starvation, population displacement, and civil war. Providing assistance resembles charity: we must intervene where we can, because we can. The prospect of intermittently "saving strangers" has the crucial pastoral element of power from which state power evolved (Foucault 2004, 242). The "benevolent" exercise of power twins with the use of violent mechanisms; benevolent power "humanizes" violence and becomes entangled with its objectives. Conventional war and humanitarian war support each other and each helps contextualize the other. The May 2011 "humanitarian bombing" of Libya was both a violation of state sovereignty and an alleged moral calling to help the innocent victims of Qaddafi's rule. Those who followed Operation Odyssey Dawn were relieved, gratified, appalled, or smug about the culminating murder of Qaddafi and outraged and emotional about the attacks in Benghazi in 2012. While these events invite emotional affect, others, such as the seizure of Qaeda operatives in Tripoli in 2013, reassure that "covert global mini-wars" bind the iron fist to the velvet glove of humanitarian war (Scahill 2012, 10).

If humanitarian "operations other than war" elicit the emotional and "caring" side of neoliberal foreign policy, what Niva calls "disappearing violence" taps into the logics of neoliberalism as efficiency driven with measurable outcomes. Targeted captures and kills, detention, anticipatory defense, drones, and air strikes are all touted as pinpointed, effective, and less costly (although not always accurate). While they are plugged as meeting the terrorist/extremist challenge, they are also often not acknowledged, deemed classified, or off the books. It is important to remember that these tactics were tested and developed during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and that such "lethal counter network operations" operate in countries such as Yemen, Mali, Libya, Niger, Mauritania, and Djibouti (Niva 2013, 198). These US training missions exhort fragile governments to take responsibility for the fight against terrorism, assumed to threaten the US more than the countries where the unit operates. A former Special Operations officer said that while they will need "a lot more adult supervision" from US forces, outsourcing war to elite counterterrorism units in "partner nations" presents less risk to the US while it supposedly increases US security (often at the expense of the partner's; Schmitt 2014, A1).

## Approach: Analysis Beyond Institutions and Eras

Broadly speaking, this work is engaging with foreign policy analysis that falls into one of two categories. The first includes institutional dynamics and the role of societal factors in US foreign policy. With respect to institutional analyses, the study of expanding executive authority since the end of World War II, along with the rise and operation of the Defense Department and National Security Council, for example, is an ongoing concern for much scholarship on US foreign policy. Topics of study range from leadership characteristics, to bureaucratic politics, to group dynamics in foreign policy decision-making. Presidential-Congressional struggles over foreign policy priorities and the role of lobbying groups, think tanks and judicial intervention in foreign policy-making are regular fare in foreign policy textbooks and published scholarship. This scholarship is enormously useful for understanding the immense growth in presidential authority after World War II, the "operational codes" that explain how presidents and other foreign policy leaders understand adversaries and allies, and the way bureaucratic in-fighting and lobbying shape, further, and undermine foreign policy.

The interactive dynamics between society and government in making US foreign policy, especially the role that lobbies, media, and public opinion play in foreign policy-making, constitute another significant area of research. Questions about the uses of US sanctions and foreign aid and its effects on everything from the respect of human rights by aid recipients, the influence of NGOs, and alliance behavior, demonstrate the importance of the intersection between Congress and influential lobbying groups. The extent to which the government is able to cue the media and public or responds to the challenges posed by media coverage, and the public's views on decisions about conventional foreign policy concerns such as war, trade, sanctions, and immigration have preoccupied scholarship, especially with the 24/7 news cycle that emerged in the early 1990s and in the chaotic informational environment today.

A second major approach is more historical, taking a broad look at eras in US foreign policy, with contrasts drawn between the rise of US regional power in Latin America and Asia that overlapped with and followed continental conquest and expansion (the 1898 moment), and the emergence of US global preponderance after World War II, the crisis period ushered in by the Vietnam War, and a post-Vietnam War search for consensus that extended to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Despite some claims that September 11 changed everything, many commentators reached back to the eras of continental expansion and regional power—the era of "manifest destiny"—or the Cold War era of binary good and evil as lenses through which to understand the War on Terror. Two illustrations of thinking about the comparability of the contemporary era with the past are found in Philip Golub's and Condoleeza Rice's takes on post-September 11 US foreign policy. Recalling 1898, Golub writes:

> Seized by an imperialist urge reminiscent of the expansionist euphoria of the late 1890s, when it began its century-long ascent to world hegemony, the United States under George W. Bush has been attempting to reconfigure world affairs through force of arms … In the course of this offensive against a supposed new global totalitarian threat made apparent by the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S has abandoned deterrence in favor of a doctrine of preventive war, trampled the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding state sovereignty, and simply discarded international humanitarian law. (Golub 2004, 763–764)

In early 2002, then Secretary of State Rice turned to the Cold War analogy: "I really think that this period is analogous to 1945 to 1947 in that the events so clearly demonstrated that there is a big global threat, and that it's a big global threat to a lot of countries that you would not have normally thought of as being in the coalition. That has started shifting the tectonic plates in international politics" (cited in Lemann 2002, 44).

Neoliberalism is a vast matrix defined by interests, rationalities, and ideology and all three of these dimensions can help make the case for moving beyond more conventional examinations of institutions and societal factors or turn to past eras, whether the era of manifest destiny or the Cold War, in order to understand the contemporary contours of US foreign policy. For purposes here, neoliberalism operates as a class project, as governmentality, and as an ideological formation.

Demenil, Levy, and Harvey define neoliberalism as a class project to shore up capitalist power and reestablish the conditions for capital accumulation, increasingly through financialization and globalization (Levy and Dumenil 2011, 35; Harvey 2007, 28). The imposition of market discipline domestically has included deep cuts to social welfare programs, new regimes of punishment and discipline upon the poor and minorities, and attacks on labor. Structural adjustment programs of the 1980s returned as austerity after 2008, with similar consequences, deepening inequality of wealth and redesigning policies detrimental to most of the population. The domestic and worldwide spread of shadow banking and tax havens in order to ensure return to shareholder investments at the expense of worker welfare was only a glimmer in the waning days of the Carter administration, and the trends spied by various commentators, especially those with renewed interest in the 1970s as the key moment for globalization's initial trajectory, were already underway by 1979. Carter's loosening of the state's (tenuous already, compared with Europe) commitment to compromises with labor and mild redistribution were already being superseded by "embedded financial orthodoxy" to facilitate the movement of capital and weaken regulations allegedly inhibiting business and investment (Cerny 2010, 85). In the realm of defense policy, Sanders described the twin Carter commitment to more military spending, but in the name of a "leaner and meaner" force to project US power (1983, 122). One example of this was the (initially failed) establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force after the failure to rescue the hostages in Iran, with the additional purpose of securing oil supplies in the event of a crisis. With some prescience, Tom Hayden called the proposed RDF a "kind of

international SWAT team, able to move great distances on a moment's notice for an assortment of military emergencies" (1980, 66). Eventually a reconstituted RDF became the Joint Special Forces Operational Command (1986), which gradually became a more flexible and decentralized force designed to work alongside conventional forces that received increased spending during the waning years of the Carter administration.

Neoliberalism as governmentality specifies the market as a "countervailing source of knowledge and moral authority" (Flew 2012, 61). Foucauldian governmentality directs us to look for evidence of the gradual application of market principles to every facet of the economy, including defense and other foreign policy projects such as foreign aid. The domestic commitment during the Clinton years to deregulation of the banking industry and welfare reform designed to discipline the poor have analogues in rhetoric about the benefits of a more connected, open, and integrated global economy. The Clinton administration finessed the GATT to WTO transition, signed NAFTA and other regional trade agreements, and insisted that IMF structural adjustment was the appropriate discipline for developmentalist states in the Third World. Leading foreign policy establishment figures extolled the virtues of US "global leadership," insisting that the US led a "more democratic, open, and connected world" (Zakaria 2008, 143), while Mead assured that US values "informed a global consensus" and its military power was indispensable for the worldwide system of finance, communication, and trade (2001, 10, 28).

In the late 1990s, Thomas P.M. Barnett worked on a partnership between the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) at the Naval War College and Cantor Fitzgerald, an investment bank and brokerage service, to explore how globalization was changing the meaning of national security for the US (2004, 46). In joint long-range planning exercises, Barnett was convinced that the US should extend its "culturally neutral, rules-based civilization called 'globalization'," to the rest of the world. By the time Barnett was extolling the virtues of military planning like an investment bank, market rationality had already been extended, with uneven success, to major facets of military planning, including the much-touted Revolution in Military Affairs, to private security contracting, and to generals touting their expertise through revolving doors from the military to defense contractors (and often contributors to major cable news channels).

Thinking of neoliberalism as an ideological formation sheds light on the way "consumers" of foreign policy want "results," and are primed to think of foreign policy as a matter of a vaguely defined sense of safety,

momentum, success, and magnanimous gestures aimed at selectively saving or rescuing populations at risk. Safety from terrorists, undocumented immigrants, and from rogue foreign powers such as Russia or North Korea help defend "ways of life" (Johnson 2002). At the same time, the pundit class often blames individuals for failing to live up to their responsibilities as citizens—sacrificing, focusing, and paying attention. The racial politics of neoliberalism also applies to citizenship. Called both "neoliberal multiculturalism" and "diversity patriotism," the ideological operation of racial neoliberalism demands overidentification with state goals among minorities and the simultaneous incorporation of both benign and loyal difference and potentially dangerous opposition (often but not exclusively depicted as Muslim; Alsultany 2007; Melamed 2006).

The approach used here does not completely refute many of the explanations that are wedded to either manifest destiny reenactments or the Cold War paradigm but instead works to reframe them by focusing in on the emergence of a neoliberal era in US foreign policy that took a discernible shape during the late Carter-early Reagan era, clearly at the end of the Cold War, and continued apace in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks. Traversing the usual periodization of foreign policy eras, neoliberalism has reshaped foreign policy institutions and government-societal dynamics and suggests that reaching back to the Cold War consensus or the Teddy Roosevelt era to understand the operations of US foreign policy could benefit from an alternative reframing that adds an additional, productive layer to extant analysis of both institutional and historical paradigms.

By way of illustration, three changing aspects of the military—affirmative action, private security companies, and media—indicate how broader societal and economic developments have shaped its operation. While the shift to a volunteer Army was not prompted by neoliberalism per se, the brain trust that helped plan it believed in less government regulation of the market and imagined soldiers joining out of rational interest, crafting a recruitment strategy around the "language of consumer dreams and images of economic opportunity" (Bailey 2007). The volunteer Army then began to market itself as a way to both serve one's country and augment one's human capital. Along with emphasizing the loss of individualism for the sake of the collective, the military became an advertised place of both camaraderie and individual accomplishment. The Reagan administration quietly continued affirmative action in the armed forces and "by the 1990s had remade the face of the officer corps" (Rodgers 2011, 136), thereby also laying the groundwork for significant minority affirmation of

racial progress in the US, often strenuously denying cooptation and the assertion that they were merely being used to legitimize US imperialism. The use of private military companies increased dramatically throughout the 1990s and by 2007, General David Petraeus reported that they were essential to winning the war in Iraq. Media handlers in the military embedded reporters in the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, continuing a legacy of Vietnam, but in a seemingly more authentic way that relied on the immediacy and intimacy of combat to legitimize the invasion.

While conducting research on US foreign policy roughly since 1980, I have used the concepts of globalization, post-Fordism, and neoliberalism to anchor an analytical framework that has three purposes. First, it has helped to generate alternative explanations for understanding why often-used existing categories of US imperialism (manly imperialism, captivity narratives, etc.) need updating and revision. For example, institutional changes in the military have brought to the surface the complications and anxieties about women serving in frontline positions and elicited new rhetoric from the military about managing diversity. A refurbished captivity narrative extends to a global responsibility for saving women and children in other countries.

Second, those interested in various aspects of the domestic dimension of neoliberalism, post-Fordism, and globalization should be interested in gauging the utility of this analytical framework for understanding US foreign policy. Tracing the parallels between the 1970s domestic crisis of capitalism with the Vietnam-era crisis in US foreign policy provides a way to grasp the totality of changes at work in the US and the ways in which this crucial period was a bellwether for what came afterward in both domestic and foreign policy. The increasing inequality of wealth and income distribution facilitated by the rhetoric of deregulation, efficiency, and criticism of bureaucratic government finds its counterpart in foreign policy strategies that rely on think tank cooperation with defense company donors, former government officials who leave office and establish lucrative lobbying firms that pitch contracts to their former departments, and government units such as USAID that have been encouraged to emulate business strategies in the name of "reinventing government."

Finally, those who use paradigms that are more conventional should find alternative or supplemental interpretations to their own work. For example, the study of rallying around the flag might benefit from considering the ways presidential rhetoric as well as public attitudes have changed

or not during times of crisis. The increasing significance of the celebrity-general complex (Colin Powell, David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, and others), and the steady stream of military expertise aired on cable television might shed additional light on the mechanisms that have contributed to the military playing a crucial role in shaping and selling foreign policy.

My main sources for tracing the evolution of US foreign policy around four categories (gender, rescue, race, and nationalism) include, in addition to the scholarly literature, presidential speeches, popular news sources, newspapers, film, the web, and television. This combination of sources provides rich territory for analyzing the textual evidence of how new ways of framing and informing the public about US foreign policy began to gain significance from the late 1970s onward. My use of these various texts has not been haphazard. For example, the interpretation of *24* in Chap. 2 comes from viewing all eight seasons. The analysis of the Iranian hostage crisis required reading the entire coverage of it in *People*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*, and reading all of the known memoirs (eight) of the Iranian hostages. The massive scholarly research that focuses on the cases examined in the book appears throughout the chapters and where appropriate judiciously presented. The suggestion to consider alternative interpretations through a different lens does not require displacing those competing accounts.

## CASE STUDIES

The focus of the book is on seven discrete cases and two corollary important events in US foreign policy-making that demonstrate the broader changes underway in US nationalism and its claims to exceptionalism. Of the seven discrete cases, four are conflicts involving invasion and war (Grenada, the first Persian Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq), and three are crises of varying duration (the Iranian hostage crisis, Bosnia, and Somalia) that included militarized conflict—a failed rescue attempt in Iran, bombing in Bosnia, and a classic "shoot out" in Mogadishu. The two corollaries are the Iran-contra scandal and the Kosovo conflict, which demonstrate the reach and coverage of my thesis. These cases span nearly every post-Vietnam War presidential administration (Carter, Reagan, Bushes, Clinton, and Obama), nearly every region of the world, and almost every kind of conflict. Inevitably, there will be questions raised about missing cases—the inaction in the face of the Rwandan genocide, or the invasion of Haiti in 1994, for example. My

defense is that the theory is the center of the analysis, and the cases illustrate how well the theory works. What follows is a summary of the cases.

## The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Iran-Contra

After President Jimmy Carter decided to admit the former Shah of Iran into the US for cancer treatment in 1979, revolutionary students seized the US embassy in Tehran, and after releasing thirteen hostages in November 1979, held the remaining fifty-two for 444 days. The Iranian hostage crisis is the captivity narrative *par excellence* for the twentieth century, the first and last major post-Vietnam confrontation with a foreign "other" that helped to temporarily reconstitute pre-Vietnam certainties about US identity vis-à-vis what the media consistently portrayed were irrational and fanatical barbarians. In Chap. 3 popular media sources as well as first-person accounts of the hostage crisis that have been published by eight of the captives are used to explore the way media and "ordinary Americans" made sense of the crisis.

Closely on the heels of the Iranian hostage crisis was the arms-for-hostages deal undertaken by the Reagan administration in the late 1980s. The scandal involved what was then tellingly called the "Enterprise," set up to secretly sell weapons to Iran in order to secure the release of hostages held in Lebanon, with the additional bonus of using proceeds from the sales to fund the *contras* in Nicaragua. The scandal signified a number of new developments in US foreign policy that reappeared in subsequent conflicts. One was the noticeable emphasis upon "selling" foreign policy. Parry and Kornbluh point out that "Reagan created what appears to the first peacetime propaganda ministry" in the government in order to sway media and public opinion about Nicaragua (1988, 5). In what now seems like a quaint observation, Kenworthy wrote that Reagan officials saw "the selling of their Central America policy as an advertising campaign" (1987–1988, 111). It was also a foreign policy that was touted as cost-effective, and Reagan's circumvention of Congress was largely attributed to "poor management" rather than constituting an impeachable offense. The scandal also produced live television hearings likened to a soap opera. In addition to the lives-for-weapons dimension of the scandal, Iran-contra also tainted any future use of hostage stories for proclaiming America an innocent victim. Subsequent hostage stories got less media attention, and in the post-Cold War era of humanitarian interventions, saving non-US citizens became a more significant aspect of US foreign policy.

## The Persian Gulf War (1990–1991)

This is the first post-Cold War conflict and serves as a hinge for what follows in US foreign policy. This is also the war where a number of observers took note of the way old-fashioned masculinity morphed into managerial efficacy in the realm of foreign policy. President Bush I marshaled a multinational coalition using "rolodex diplomacy," and presented his concept of a New World Order as a single global space defined by US leadership ordering the world into those that accept its hegemony and those that do not. Soldiers were portrayed through the logics of "militarized multiculturalism," McAlister's apt term for the way the military incorporated domestic culture war concerns into the most obvious "sign of the nation" by portraying it as diverse, professional, and effective (2001, 255). The high-tech quality of the war and the miraculous nature of weapons like the Patriot missile were incessantly touted in the press. The "rape of Kuwait" and the need to save it from Saddam Hussein was a stronger story than the hostages held and released by Hussein in December 1990. The war was "postmodern" because of its staging, the fact that it took place "on schedule," and the public was left with the government announcing a deadline for Saddam Hussein's army to leave Kuwait or face war. As the deadline loomed, Congress passed a resolution endorsing a war that was a foregone conclusion, as it passed two weeks before the air war began; US troops were already massed at the border and would not wait. Stahl has argued that temporal rhetoric was the theme used by authorities to convince the US public and the world that the war was inevitable. This authoritarian use of the clock shows government is "hostile to deliberative possibilities" (2008, 74). Running out of time, timelines, and "real time" defined the war and would come to define subsequent conflicts.

The war also ended with Operation Provide Comfort, an effort to "save" the Kurds in northern Iraq and Shiite Muslims in the south. For the first time in its existence, the United Nations declared that improving human rights in a member state was a contribution to the promotion of international security (Wheeler 2000, 146). While the US did not lead the effort to set up military camps for Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq, and later no-fly zones in both northern and southern Iraq, it eventually did participate in the construction of the camps, and its subsequent role in maintaining no-fly zones set a precedent for future actions that involved armed force in "saving strangers."

## SOMALIA, BOSNIA, AND KOSOVO

The end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War ushered in even more ambitious rhetoric about a new world order, democratic enlargement, and humanitarian intervention. Former neo-conservative Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history as the world allegedly merged into one entity that embraced liberal democracy and market capitalism. Thomas Friedman was one influential news editorial columnist who popularized the imperatives of globalization for all nation-states. His proclamation that there is now "One Road. Different Speeds. But one road," captured the alleged inevitable benefits of the revolution in communications, finance, and technology (2000, 104). In the run-up to the 2000 election campaign writers in *Foreign Affairs* noted that "tension is mounting between the fixed geography of nation-states and the non-territorial nature of global problems and their solutions" (Cutter et al. 2000, 80).

While some analysts argued that national (and imperialist) interests were at work in the 1990s interventions—perhaps oil, struggles within NATO over the US's continuing dominance, and a bald display of post-war power—the cases were presented by both government and media as human emergencies. Ethnic cleansing, refugees, genocide, and war crimes brought forth torrents of human rights language rather than the language of realism and power. The media were usually the only institution that seemed to demand intervention, with domestic and international institutions bypassed. Ignatieff bemoaned that in the case of the Kosovo intervention, "We have allowed ourselves to accept virtual consent in the most important matter of all, war and peace" (2000, 181).

President Clinton's presidency brought together emergent rhetoric on humanitarian intervention as well as the deepening preoccupations with full-spectrum dominance in the global capitalist system. Clinton explained the reason for US intervention in Haiti in 1994 as necessary in upholding democracy: "If this is allowed to stand after all this brutality, all this evidence of violations of international law and human conscience, then democracies elsewhere will be more fragile" (Clinton 1994, 1549). Clinton also directed US foreign policy at world markets, and he gladly admitted to a Seattle audience in 1993, "They said, you know, President Clinton is almost like a rug merchant out there selling American politics. Well, I'm not ashamed that I've asked other countries to buy Boeing and I'll do it again if given half the chance" (Clinton 1993). As the "globalization president" (LaFeber 2002, 23), Clinton signed a record number of

trade agreements and helped lead in the transformation of GATT to the World Trade Organization (WTO). His administration encouraged outsourcing to low-wage countries as well as an enormous asset bubble in technology.

The ferocity of the criticism directed at Clinton was not simply the longstanding penchant of Republicans for faulting Democrats for being weak with respect to national security. Mandelbaum mocked his foreign policy in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti as a form of "social work," insufficiently attentive to the "coming anarchy." (Mandelbaum 1996; Kaplan 1993). When challenged in 1998 by the anti-Saddam lobby to sign into law the Iraq Liberation Act, devoting 100 million dollars to the overthrow of the Iraqi government, he dutifully did so, declaring that Iraqis "deserve and desire freedom like everyone else." George W. Bush's campaign promise to reign in "foreign adventures" ended on September 11.

## September 11 and Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

The terrorist attacks of September 11 brought forth ubiquitous comparisons between previous eras of US imperialist expansion and the Bush administration response to September 11. Wickham argued that the "national conversation after September 11 … has generally indicated conservative rhetoric pining for nostalgic return to the traditions and attitudes of manifest destiny" (2002, 129). McCartney characterized the Bush response to the attacks as having strong ties to the "deep structure of America's global posture," defined by over two hundred years of self-imputed benevolence and a missionary complex (2004, 414).

With reports that Bush was reading a bestseller about Teddy Roosevelt while spending time at his ranch in Crawford Texas chopping wood, it was obvious the president would be cultivating a tough cowboy demeanor. In fact, we learned almost immediately that the White House was self-consciously scripting this image, and revived it in the run-up to the Iraq war, offering an image of the president as a "resolute, manly leader," clearing brush at the Texas ranch and wearing a cowboy hat (Bumiller 2003, 12).

Yet almost immediately, the government also took its lessons from the Reagan administration, assembling a team of marketing experts in brand asset management to craft the administration's message to the world via tightly spun marketing strategies. The administration also intensified the

use of private security companies that had accelerated during the Clinton years (in 2010 Wikileaks revealed that this reliance was even greater than previously thought), taking cost-effectiveness and managerial criteria into account in how to deploy force in both Afghanistan and Iraq, using them as convoy suppliers, prison guards, and protecting Hamid Karzai, the new president of Afghanistan. The media took the government up on its invitation to evaluate it in neoliberal terms. In the 2004 presidential campaign *Newsweek* author Alter subjected Bush's presidency to the "type of rigorous review that, say, Jack Welch (CEO of General Electric) might undertake," concluding that Bush's business acumen in risk management, finance and the "hostile takeover of Iraq" had become less popular with most "shareholders" (i.e., citizens; Alter 2004, 34, 36).

Those expecting hundreds of thousands of US soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan instead observed Special Forces serving as militarized consultants to Northern Alliance rebels seeking to overthrow the Taliban. Green Berets used handheld lasers and satellite equipment to guide US warplanes toward their targets (NYT October 31, 2001, A1). By December 2001 US Central Command reported that US troops were not leading the way into caves or joining anti-Taliban forces searching the caves: "Generally, the people doing that are Afghans" (Schmitt and Gordon 2001, B1). In terms of strategy, in other words, for the first eight years the war in Afghanistan was continuous with wars of the 1990s, relying upon aerial bombing and a light US footprint.

Both Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein were demonized using longstanding racially inflected stereotypes. Afghanistan and the Taliban were neofeudal, backward, and barbaric, and Osama bin Laden's ghostly visage stared back at readers periodically throughout the decade ("Why Can't We Catch Him?" asked *Time* in 2002). In August 2002, *Newsweek* likened the search to "looking for evil in a haystack" (August 19, 38). The mission to kill Osama bin Laden, initially called Operation Geronimo, elicited protest from the Native American community. After President Obama announced the assassination of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, Pennsylvania Avenue turned into a gigantic jubilant party with college students chanting "U.S.A.!" Former Bush administration officials insisted that torture worked because it led them to bin Ladin's courier. Karl Rove told Fox News "tools that President Bush put in place obviously served his successor well."

At the same time, right after 9/11, television almost immediately began to mock bin Laden. *South Park* had an episode where bin Laden had a

penis so small it required a microscope to see it. Jay Leno joked that there is now a five-million-dollar bounty on bin Laden's head, "which marks the first time in history there has ever been a bounty on a guy's head who wears Bounty on his head." Spigel explains that a mere four days after the terrorist attacks television networks "realigned commercial entertainment with the patriotic goals of the nation," another indicator of the limits of nationalist myths in "post network, multichannel, and increasingly global media systems" (2004, 237; 239).

Perhaps most important, the very nature of the threat confronting the US gradually emerged to be a global, networked, and media-savvy foe. One month after the attacks, *Newsweek's* Bartholet pointed out "although he [Osama] may live in a cave or some similarly primitive lair, he's a master at manipulating the modern media" (2001, 55). After an interview with a CNN crew in 1997 his media advisers insisted on editing unflattering shots; he summoned reporters to a cave for interviews to get his message out, "but like the most controlling of C.E.O.'s he insisted on receiving written questions in advance" (Zernike and Kaufman 2012, F6). The assistant editor at *Harper's* analyzed Osama's face in December 2001 and instead of finding it inviting crude racist descriptions he found the face to have, "in features and in fact, the cosmopolitan mien of an Arab ex-playboy, a club-hopper all grown up" (Wasik 2001, 52–53).

C.E.O. Osama bin Laden, in other words, nurtured the Al Qaeda organization, consisting of multiple networks able to loosely coordinate terrorist plots and attacks around the world. As support for Al Qaeda flagged, Osama considered a marketing campaign to change the network's name (Baker 2012, A1). Coll, writing for the *The New Yorker*, pointed out that the "standard caricature of bin Laden places him in a cave, stroking his untrimmed beard, plotting to drag the world backward in time. But a better way to understand his significance might be as a singular and peculiar talent in asymmetric communication and marketing strategies" (2012, 90).

Captivity and rescue emerged as themes but not like those describing white "civilized" women wrenched from the clutches of ruthless barbarians. Like the children of Kosovo two years earlier, the US posited itself as savior of Afghan children. The White House launched "America's Fund for Afghan Children" in October 2001, intentionally modeled on FDR's campaign to eradicate polio. "Comforter in Chief" Laura Bush stressed the importance of saving Afghan women and children. Afghan kids had their childhood stolen by the Taliban, and the US bombing campaign and the overthrow of the Taliban would be the war that would restore it.

There were pictures of children playing on a makeshift carousel, and a young Afghan refugee at a refugee camp in Pakistan drinking a bottle of Coke (*NYT* December 16, 2001, B4; November 18, 2001, 3). President Bush declared at a Minnesota fundraiser in March 2002, "We didn't go in as conquerors, we went in as liberators, and now women and children are free from the clutches of the Taliban" (Bumiller 2002). In the US, kids became "normal" consumers needing comfort in the face of the attacks and then encouraged to resume their enchanted childhoods of consumption.

Creation of the Department of Homeland Security was an important sign of reterritorialization in the aftermath of the attacks, and the indefinite detention of Middle Eastern men by the US government, and "invitations" to local police departments extended to Middle Eastern men to come in for interviews were all familiar nationalist and atavistic reactions to the attacks. On the other hand, as C.E.O. "manager" Bush embraced corporate-style inclusion while simultaneously encouraging and establishing new strategies of surveillance for the entire population after the attacks. Bush insisted that Al Qaeda did not represent most Muslims, and he visited the Islamic Center in Washington D.C. on September 17, 2001, where he declared "America counts millions of Muslims among our citizens and they need to be treated with respect" (2001a, 1). Outbursts of xenophobia/Islamophobia and hate crimes dropped sharply nine weeks after the attacks (Kaplan 2006). The attacks provoked a wave of new efforts to develop surveillance technologies both at home and on the battlefield and citizens were encouraged to invest in surveillance technologies in order to protect themselves instead of relying on the government (Johnson 2011, 151). In other words, racial profiling takes place within a larger effort to cast a broad net to ensnare any potential terrorists who might pose a threat; technological tactics of surveillance are driven by states and corporations that accumulate ever bigger data on the entire population.

Finally, the terrorist attacks produced perhaps the largest rally around the flag response in the history of post-World War II American politics. Bush's popularity ratings in the polls soared, and the flag was ubiquitous. There were huge donations to the Red Cross and other organizations, telethons, a spike in church attendance, and military recruitment centers saw a surge in visits and enlistments. Yet, the consequences of decades of reconfiguring the public sphere to suit consumerist criteria appeared in the injunctions by political leaders to go shopping. Senator John Kyl explained

shortly after the attacks: "The best thing you can do to defeat this enemy is live your normal life, because it will do two important things, keep the economy running and it will demoralize the enemy more than the enemy will demoralize you" (Mitchell 2001, B7). Church attendance fell to pre-9/11 levels within two months of the attacks (Haberman 2001, B1). On the first anniversary of the attacks, Cottle of *The New Republic* declared, "talk of a massive, enduring overhaul of our relationship with God has all but vanished." Poniewozik's review of a sampling of post-9/11 films and television movies finds that they are "not exactly innovations," because docudramas, disaster movies, and inspirational war stories have been around for years. They are not stories of how 9/11 changed us but rather "stories that help us flatter ourselves that it did" (2006, 73).

As this brief discussion demonstrates, stressing the continuity of US foreign policy with earlier eras means that we overlook seismic shifts that have been underway in the usual categories that historically have been at the foundation of US nationalism. The US response to the 9/11 attacks is the perfect "tough case" for making my thesis. That is, because the attack was sudden, devastating, and life-defining for those who died in it or witnessed it, and for all who lived in its wake, it has all of the trappings of the longstanding themes of manifest destiny, expansion, revenge, manly toughness, and intense patriotism. Nevertheless, viewed in the longer context of American policy since the late 1980s and accelerating in the post-Cold War era, the war on terror failed to dislodge the neoliberal logics that increasingly defined the US in the late twentieth century and continue to define it today. By 2001, George W. Bush's vow to "smoke 'em out of their holes" bore a surface resemblance to the Wild West that he remembered from television. The ensemble of policies that his administration undertook in the following seven years extended, deepened, and accelerated the neoliberal policies embraced in the previous twenty years. While terrorists posed a lethal risk, they joined a whole set of diffuse threats that required innovative war fighting. Captives were already another node in the circuits of global capital, and the US culture industry promoted the country as a model of the "freest and most integrated" Muslim population in the West. Finally, September 11 allowed some to offer a glimpse of what patriotism might look like if the structural transformations in both the economy and in changes in the practices of citizenship had never happened.

Continuing to read US foreign policy through more conventional analyses of institutions and eras overlooks two important opportunities. The

first is to step back from institutional and societal factors as discrete variables and identify how the material and ideological transition toward a neoliberal foreign policy find more general expression in broader and longstanding changes in political economy and media that have altered the presidency, the military, media platforms, and citizen engagement with foreign policy. During the past thirty years, different expressions of masculinity and the litmus tests to measure it unfolded alongside the enormous augmentation of presidential authority in foreign policy. Presidents who need to make split-second life-or-death decisions justify their authority in calculative terms, and diminutions of presidential authority threaten executive effectiveness in maintaining security and ways of life. With respect to public opinion, attitudes regarding the use of force and multilateralism as well as assessments of policy occur in a context of individualistic and distracted citizenship. Empty consumption has been a target of criticism since World War II, but this positioning of the actively distracted, impatient, self-directed voter who looks for benchmarks of success and a safely protected way of life is a newer development. Conventional analysis of presidential authority and public opinion are more likely to be enhanced than undermined by a consideration of neoliberalism.

The second important opportunity in such an analysis is to ascertain the extent to which the historical paradigms of either the nineteenth century or the Cold War suffice for describing the uneven unfolding of a new order that jostles against these earlier eras and in the process modify their manifestations while retaining remnants of them as well. The neoliberal turn has produced wealth and income inequality, marketization, and ideological hegemony distinctively different enough from earlier eras to warrant a reexamination of the linkages that have been drawn between foreign policy of the past thirty years, and particularly after September 11, and the foundations of eighteenth-century and Cold War foreign relations. Donald Trump is a symptom rather than the cause of the crisis of both neoliberalism and US foreign policy; his election was a predictable surprise.

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# From Rambo to Jack Bauer: Neoliberal Masculinity in an Age of Terror

Assessments of manliness are a common litmus test for gauging foreign policy success. As Gibson puts it, with the Revolutionary War and going forward "the story of independent gunmen defeating evil enemies and founding a new society became America's creation myth" (1994, 18). Idealized versions of frontier manhood were on display in Vietnam. Hellmann defines the Green Berets as a "reincarnation of the Western hero" (1986, 45). Wilkinson describes the "can-do" spirit of the tough guy tradition, standing as a "living reproach to the approval seeking and plastic soothings of modern social life" (1984, 7). Projections of manly imperialism have worked in all kinds of colonizing projects of seizing territory and "civilizing dependent peoples," through conquest, hierarchy, and control (Nagel 1998, 251).

A number of feminist theorists have argued that post-Vietnam US culture was the site of a gender war in which imperialist and frontier-style masculinity eventually triumphed in the wake of the weakened legitimacy of militarism and the emergence of the so-called Vietnam Syndrome, that is, an aversion to Vietnam-like conflicts abroad. Jeffords has explored how *Rambo* movies rehabilitated the soldier and celebrated traditional gender differences, and Boose explores how both the *Rambo* and *Missing in Action* series replay fantasies of returning, redoing, and of course winning the Vietnam War (Jeffords 1989; Boose 1993, 590). Almost as if he read these scholars, Reagan stood tall, declared Vietnam

a noble cause, and dramatically increased military spending and launched an effort to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union in outer space, its own frontier.

The literature that traces connections between masculinity and foreign policy often implicitly establishes a model of manly imperialism and then describes how various presidents either embody it or fall short and suffer the consequences. Even when not causal, gender is an important "factor" rather than a relational and fluid identity formed in contradictory fashion through engagement with, and resistance from other actors, as well as broader changes in political economy and state power. A more dynamic conceptualization helps avoid constructing a strict divide between "dithering" on the part of Carter, Clinton, and Obama, and "standing tall" by Reagan, H.W. Bush, W. Bush, and perhaps even Trump. The frame of neoliberalism introduces both ambiguity in particular moments as well as incremental and subtle changes in masculine performance.

The focus on the conservative resurgence in popular film and politics, while often well placed, sometimes downplays other forces at work in US foreign policy during the waning years of the Cold War, and which gained momentum all during the 1990s and through the War on Terror. One in particular was the growing significance of capitalist business models in US foreign policy, including war fighting. McNamara brought Ford and Fordist business practices to war fighting during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, and the US military has always relied upon private firms to design and build weapons as well as conduct scientific research (Friedberg 2000, 66). Reich explains how the Cold War inspired the Pentagon and NASA to "great feats of boldness" in the field of technology, which in turn widened the realm of choice for consumers in everything from computers, to the internet, to global positioning systems (2008, 56). In other words, the impulse to appear tough has long coexisted with ideologies and practices that consider the private sector superior to statist policies when it comes to national security. By the late 1990s the relationship between capitalism and war-readiness had reached the point where Ignatieff could note that "When the Marines go to Wall Street to learn about decision-making under stress, and when the military turns to Wal-Mart to learn about logistics—the era of military mobilization of the civilian economy is well and truly over" (2000, 190). By the 1990s, the military increasingly resembled a corporation and the military used corporate governance strategies.

In addition, the attention given to the rehabilitation of the tough soldier at times neglects an important distinction between the soldier and the military as an institution. My argument is that while there was a rehabilitation of the military in the wake of Vietnam, there were important changes in the requisites of good soldiering. By the first Persian Gulf War, militarized multiculturalism was being officially embraced by the military and in the next decade the military forged important alliances with the worlds of gaming and entertainment, adopted savvier marketing techniques in recruitment, and extended neoliberal practices of governance during the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Soldiering became more of a professional career that required less masculine bravado. This chapter explores how the emergence of this corporate-friendly, entrepreneurial, and managerial masculinity outpaced the periodic outbursts against women in the military, opposition to gays in the military, and other policies that we associate with striving to protect the soldier from larger societal forces that threatened conventional masculinity.

## The Foil of Tough Guy Masculinity

Jimmy Carter refused to apologize to the Iranians for the US role in the 1953 coup that overthrow Iran's leader and for then backing the Shah of Iran's dictatorship for the next 25 years. Ronald Reagan vowed that if elected in 1980 he would not negotiate with the "barbarians" who held US citizens hostage in Iran. The "wimp factor" dogged George H.W. Bush. Clinton's 1992 promise to admit gays and lesbians into the US military was met with howls of protest from the military, Congress, and right-wing political organizations, including Phyllis Schlafly's *Concerned Women of America*. George W. Bush promised to "hunt down" the mastermind of the terrorist attacks in 2001, and Barack Obama was regularly challenged to "do something" tough to respond to Iran's alleged nuclear enrichment program. What unites each of these events is a familiar bundle of idea and beliefs that conform to "compulsive masculinity" (Curtis 1989, 46). What follows is a brief discussion of how failing to be a man in foreign policy has served as both foil and increasingly, a default mode for criticizing (usually Democratic) presidential foreign policy. If we focus only on challenges to manhood, however, we miss a number of important developments that have shaped popular perceptions of the military, addressed after discussing more surface level taunts to "man up" in the face of conflict and war.

Almost immediately after the hostage seizure in Iran, Carter claimed that "we must disabuse ourselves of the notion that whenever we assert our interest we inevitably get involved in another Vietnam" (Watson et al. 1979, 49). When opponent Ted Kennedy questioned the wisdom of long-term support for the Shah, Carter snapped, "I don't give a damn whether you like or do not like the Shah … the issue is that Americans have been kidnapped" (Butler et al. 1979, 29). As the conflict dragged on, Republicans and the media both nagged Carter about his allegedly tooth-less foreign policy. In a post-Vietnam atmosphere of angst, *Newsweek*'s cover asked, "Has America Lost its Clout?" (November 26, 1979), while *People* explained that the rallying cry of Islamic revolutionary Khomeini was to "rub America's snout in the dirt" ("Whatever" 1979, 25). *Reader's Digest* reprinted a story that criticized US foreign policy for becoming "less muscular, more accommodating, and lower in profile" after Vietnam (Wattenberg 1979, 86). Ronald Reagan warmed up on the campaign trail by expressing the hope that the USA would not "have to give up too much honor to get them [the hostages] back" (Weinraub 1980, 12).

Ronald Reagan proclaimed that the invasion of Grenada in 1983 demonstrated that "our days of weakness are over. Our military forces are back on their feet and standing tall" (Clines 1983, A20). Reagan described the Grenada government led by Bernard Courd as "thugs" who had a "barbaric shoot to kill curfew" (Reagan 1983a, 1506, 1512). When the UN voted 108 to 9 to condemn the US invasion, Reagan replied that it "did not upset my breakfast at all" (Reagan 1983d). In an eerie premonition of Dick Cheney's promise about Iraq, Reagan repeatedly insisted Grenadians greeted US troops as liberators Grenada. At a ceremony for returning students, Reagan verbally jabbed opponents of the invasion as effete: "It's very easy for some smug know-it-all in a plush, protected quarter to say that you were in no danger" (Reagan 1983e, 1551). The invasion of Grenada was a useful partner to Reagan's broader strategy of "standing up" to communism. One year before the invasion of Grenada Reagan denounced the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," and in selling the war on Grenada made much of Cubans building an airport runway on the island.

The Bush 41 presidency also produced its share of manning up. Three weeks after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the August 20, 1990, cover of *Time* read "Showdown: Can Bush Make Saddam Blink?" In the accompanying story, Bush remarked, "Watch and learn … Maybe I will turn out to be Teddy Roosevelt." In an interview with *People* correspondents in December 1990, Bush again cited Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders as a major source

of inspiration, "Actually, there is a parallel, not an exact parallel, obviously, between San Juan Hill and Kuwait City" (Jones and Wilhelm 1990, 52). *Newsweek* journalists reassured suspicions of a residual wimp by stating that "There is a warrior ethic that runs deep in the values of the old establishment" (Thomas et al. 1991, 33). The Gulf War allowed Bush to go public with his own war experience with *People*:

> But what would it be like to send somebody else's kid to battle? In World War II, I was a part of a squadron. I think we even lost nine out of fourteen pilots, one or another, not all in combat, some were killed a little bit later on. So I've been there, in a sense. That gives me perspective about this that perhaps others might not have. (Jones and Wilhelm 1990, 50)

In the run-up to the war, Bush reported reading "the first fifty pages of a biography of Churchill," Martin Gilbert's *The Second World War*, on the return flight from the Gulf in November 1990, and attending the play Black Eagles about African American airmen in World War II on the eve of the ground war against Iraq (Fineman and Thomas 1991, 37; Mathews et al. 1991, 66).

Goldman and Berman point to the "cottage industry" that developed around the topic of Clinton's foreign policy as "indecisive, incoherent, and confused" (2000, 226). Media reported that foreign diplomats questioned Clinton's backbone, editorials excoriated him for his "faux muscularity," and Christiane Amanpour loudly complained about his "policy flip flops" in Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea (Nelan 1993, 28; Kramer 1993, 29). Clinton was actually portrayed as being afraid of foreign policy. Church declared, "the president's discomfort with security issues is physically visible," while McAllister described Clinton's "agonizing" about Bosnia as acute and "highly visible" (Church 1994, 27; McAllister 1993, 48). Critics used Clinton's military policies as a way to raise questions about his fitness for military leadership. The military leadership's reaction to Clinton's announced policy to lift the ban on gay and lesbians serving in the military resembled Hofstadter's identification of the "apocalyptic and absolutist" framework used in the paranoid style of anti-communists of the 1960s (1964, 81). Concerned Women of America placed an ad in *USA Today* on April 9, 1993, describing homosexual behavior as "promiscuous, compulsive, and uncontrollable," and thus implicit proof of Clinton's link to such behavior as well as its dangers for military discipline and morale. Major General Harold N. Campbell called Clinton a "gay loving, pot smoking,

draft dodging womanizer" and was reprimanded and ordered to retire from the military (Hackworth 1993, 24).

George W. Bush is perhaps the most vivid example of presidential transformation via the September 11 terrorist attacks. Previously ridiculed traits exhibited by Bush in his first year in office became suddenly admirable. After learning of the deaths by accident of Special Operations forces he "didn't bother to vet his thoughts with spin doctors," suggesting a president newly comfortable with deviating from scripted remarks (Fineman and Brant 2001, 32). The multimillionaire former C.E.O. was "not much for fancy parties," preferring instead "to go on walks in the woods or sit around eating chicken fried steak and working on jigsaw puzzles" (Brant 2002, 36). Bush's notorious failure to read suddenly became a virtue; "Bush reads people voraciously, but not much else. He's busy making history, but doesn't look back at his own, or the world's" (Fineman and Brant 2001, 27). Six months after the attacks, Marquand identified the president's persona as a "cowboy Churchill—dividing good and evil in black and white terms" (Marquand 2002, 1).

There was, however, a different model of masculinity taking shape in the post-Vietnam era that while a glimmer in the Carter administration gained momentum during the Reagan administration and became more clearly defined in the post–Cold War era. Throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, the USA positioned itself as the singular global hegemon in the global capitalist economy defined by a more complex milieu of corporations, non-governmental organizations, and new media. A gradual consolidation of neoliberal ideology reached beyond national frontiers to a global world of finance, capital, corporations, and new security concerns. The Enterprise, rolodex diplomacy, and the dot.com and C.E.O. president are all neologisms that capture new expressions of masculinity at work in US foreign policy.

The next section develops an argument that beginning with Carter there was a perceptible shift in the gendered requirements of foreign policy leadership. Gaining momentum during the Reagan administration, masculinity became more congruent with neoliberalism. Just as neoliberalism required complex adjustments between state and market, masculinity increasingly appeared compatible with technology, mobile capital, and concentrated wealth. At the same time, humanitarian war called forth yet another facet of masculine expression. Defined as the "responsibility to protect" by various commissions established by the United Nations in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo intervention, protection

language was scrubbed for paternalism and instead framed as a cosmopolitan effort guided by morality and lying outside of usual market and national security concerns.

## From Warrior to Facilitator

There was a dimension to Carter's approach to the Iranians during the hostage crisis that presaged rhetoric and policy that would gain momentum during the 1990s. The first was of course his rhetorical emphasis upon human rights. At his commencement address at Notre Dame in 1977, Carter explicitly rejected containment, "We have reaffirmed human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy" (Carter 1977). Carter proclaimed the importance of ideas in foreign policy, and his idea about human rights envisaged a civil society with individuals protected from arbitrary state power. International relations scholars would call Carter a "norm entrepreneur" in his insistence on the value of human rights in foreign policy (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Carter explained in his commencement address that the world was moving beyond Cold War superpower concerns and taking up issues of justice, equality, and human rights. Carter's claims about the significance of human rights presaged a growing domestic and international commitment to publicizing rights violations and giving them priority. It also coincided with the growing governmental emphasis on private, individual initiative rather than collective solidarity as a solution to economic difficulty (sluggish economic growth and high inflation).

As noted earlier, Carter sought to institutionalize human rights in foreign policy by creating the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the US State Department, which since then has used its annual report on human rights to document abuses by countries that receive US aid. This institutionalization helped further clarify the meaning of human rights and the kinds of appropriate sanctions against states that violated them. Although Carter's selective targeting of human rights violators and his administration's growing focus on the Soviet Union and the Middle East, and even after the Reagan administration began to reformulate the meaning of human rights to more specifically criticize communist states (as opposed to authoritarian allies of the USA such as South Korea or Argentina), human rights remained a component of official rhetoric and laid the basis for its prominence in foreign policy in the post–Cold War era.

During the hostage crisis Carter supported UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's effort to establish a UN commission to hear Iranian grievances against the Shah (Reagan volunteered to testify before such a commission in defense of the Shah). Although the mission failed, it is significant that Carter endorsed what today we call a truth commission (*Time* 1980, 15). It signaled the potential acceptance of holding the Shah accountable for crimes such as torture, detention, and repression. The US government also gave its informal blessing to a delegation from the Palestine Liberation Organization to travel to Tehran in late November 1979 to try to negotiate the release of the hostages, although this received little attention in US media (Kifner 1979, 1). Carter also sent Ramsey Clark on a mission to negotiate with Iran, a further sign of interest using a sympathetic voice on behalf of the Iranians.

Even though the invasion of Grenada was staged as a case of standing up to Soviet meddling in the Western hemisphere and sending a tough message to Cuba and radicals in Grenada, Engelhardt describes the invasion as a "cartoon-like recreation of victory culture" (1995, 282). The invasion was short-lived, tightly controlled, and heavily scripted. As one medical student rescued during the invasion noted, it was "really thrilling to see, kind of like an old John Wayne movie" (Magnuson et al. 1983a, 23). Rogin argues that in general, Reagan's foreign policy was "conducted by theatrical events ... staged for public consumption" (1990, 116). To stage foreign policy as an "epic action adventure" points to the breakthrough the Reagan administration accomplished, that is, foreign policy as spectacle (Weber 1999, 69).

The Iran-contra scandal also marked an important moment in the privatization of foreign policy, relying upon a secret unit of the government tellingly called The Enterprise. The battle undertaken by The Enterprise was not only about fighting alleged communists in Central America through arms sales to the Iranian government; it also made a profit. Oliver North, code-named "blank check," assembled donors in the US private sector and abroad to raise funds for the contras. Silverstein notes that Iran-contra served as a "mass outing of brokers" whose machinations only came to light during the scandal; arms dealers and businesses without traditional loyalties to a particular state played a major role in the crisis (2000, 49). The Enterprise netted a profit of 16.1 million, and the contras actually only received 3.8 million in arms, with 4.4 million paid as commissions and 2.2 million for personal use—the leftover money unspent because the program was divulged (Sobel 1995, 291, 294). For his role in

facilitating weapons sales and weapons transfers, North got a $16,000 security system, thousands of dollars in traveler's checks, a $200,000 bank account, and a $2 million "reserve fund" he could access if his associate in the scandal, Albert Hakim, died. North's quest for profit was mocked in the third season of *American Dad*!, where Stan goes looking for Ollie's "contra-band" gold under his house (Season 4, May 2008). These images of a private, secret, for-profit foreign policy operation offered a frame quite different from the carefully crafted one offered by North at the Iran-contra hearings. Instead of scripting a "thousand movies" starring Jimmy Stewart and John Wayne, North's starring role in Iran-contra also called to mind a mercenary with divided allegiances to both the country and The Enterprise (Morrow 1987, 13).

*Newsweek*'s Auchincloss claimed that the "New World Order seems to pretty much spring from George Bush's Rolodex," aptly summarizing the managerial features of Bush's orchestration of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, applauding the president's penchant for "consultation" and his adroit elicitation of United Nations approval for war prior to Congressional authorization (1991, 22). Jeffords noted that Bush offered managerial expertise and professionalism in his leadership of the coalition that ousted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait (1993). The administration offered a war "on schedule" for 24/27 cable news and its viewers, and the coalition it led ensured the continued flow of oil in the global capitalist economy. A major player in the war was technology, a sign of US power in the post–Cold War world and powerful portent of future weapon systems spectacles.

The first Persian Gulf War also coincided with the increasing importance of the child consumer, firmly ensconced in marketing after a decade of deregulation of children's television being flooded with commercials. Eric Schlosser quotes one marketing expert who called the 1980s the "decade of the child consumer," thanks to Reagan-era deregulation (Schlosser 2001, 42–43; Kline 1993, 216). Regulations regarding the length of commercials, commercial tie-ins, and "program-length commercials" were all loosened, and coincided with worries about the effects of the Persian Gulf War on the psyches of US children, with *Newsweek* recording the fears of eight-year-olds that their school bus would be blown up, to classroom debates among older children about the war (Gelman et al. 1991). A Rutgers University psychologist counseled candid responses to children that stressed, "Mom and Dad and the country will be safe and taking care of you" (Gelman et al. 1991, 40). An Israeli child gave a

simple assessment of the Scud bombings by Iraq, "I'm mad at Saddam Hussein. He has no right to attack us. He is just a bad man" (Toufexis 1991, 40). Tiny consumers became the topic of therapeutic advice and concern. Children nagged their parents about safety rather than toys. Families turned to psychologists and other experts as they comforted kids and sought to maintain "normal" childhoods for them in the midst of war.

The centerpiece of Bill Clinton's presidency was democratic enlargement, described by his National Security adviser Anthony Lake as a joining of markets and democracy: "To the extent democracy and market economics hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, prosperous, and influential, while the broader world will be more humane and peaceful" (Lake 1993, 21). Clinton placed his faith in the Internet, markets, and democracy at a 1997 speech at the United Nations: "Armed with photocopiers and fax machines, email and the internet, supported by an increasingly important community of non-governmental organization, they [democrats] will make their demands known, spreading the spirit of freedom which as the last ten years has shown us, will ultimately prevail."

In this context of an imagined global community of states, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations like the World Trade Organization were dedicated to furthering the neoliberal conflation of democracy and markets. *Foreign Policy* conducted an evaluation of Clinton's leadership, and one litmus test of it was the foreign policy conducted by multimillionaires George Soros and Ted Turner. Soros had contributed massive funding to post-communist Eastern Europe and Turner had donated one billion dollars to the United Nations. Noting, "the heads of multinational corporations and large investment funds have as much access to governments around the world as most top U.S. officials," Naim implied that like Soros and Turner, Clinton needed to be an effective "chief coordinator" rather than "chief executive" (1997/1998, 39). In fact, Clinton often touted his accomplishments by pointing to the number of trade agreements he had concluded and asserting that as global trade increased, freedom also expanded (e.g., Clinton 2000, 41).

The Clinton administration usually refrained from characterizing US power as unilateral or preordained. Lake acknowledged that some efforts against "backlash" states might be unilateral, but usually "international rules are necessary and may be particularly effective in enforcing sanctions, transparency, and export controls, as the work of the IAEA in Iraq demonstrates" (1993, 8). Lake also characterized humanitarian intervention as cost-effective and worked to remind US citizens of the importance of

engagement abroad. Lake reformulated the nature of the threats facing the USA. Those states that did not converge toward liberal democracy and markets could produce instability and a host of related problems, including terrorism, organized crime, and narco-trafficking. Democratic enlargement would require smooth management and a new mapping that would not rest as heavily on state borders but rather zones of peaceful exchange and an enhanced ability to respond to non-state-based threats.

In both Somalia and Bosnia the ubiquitous images of children—their death, suffering, and plight as refugees—helped to identify the conflicts as humanitarian and requiring what Beck calls "cosmopolitan empathy" (2005, 12). Somali children were described as "survivors of two years of civil war," who often found that the small things bring a smile, "rain falling on an uplifted face; a hug from another child; a game of soccer" (Press 1993, 15). Images of US soldiers with children in faraway places (what Noam Chomsky called *The New Military Humanism* in 1999) worked to legitimize the use of violence for putatively humanitarian aims. Restoring the lost innocence of childhood was a recurring motif in media accounts and in the rhetoric of Clinton officials. Nelan lamented, for example, that Bosnia's "implacable civil war allows no room for childhood" (1994, 40). He described "thin, pasty-skinned children" moving slowly outdoors "to resume games that had been interrupted for months by falling shells and the crack of snipers' bullets." At her 1997 commencement address at Harvard, Albright used an image of reconciled former Yugoslavian children playing on a swing in formerly known "sniper's alley"; because of benevolent US-led intervention, she claimed, they now did not care whether the adjacent child was Muslim, Serb, or Croat (Albright 1997).

At almost the same time that George W. Bush was vowing to hunt down terrorists wanted dead or alive, he also told his national security adviser to seize Al Qaeda sets, "I want their money. I want it now. I Want to hurt them," recognition of the ability of terrorist groups to take advantage of the porous global economy (Hosenball 2002, 8). Al Qaeda, in other words, is able to pose a double threat: spectacular death and a viral ability to disrupt the global economy. Scholars at the RAND think tank had already coined the phrase "netwar" to refer to the growing ability of numerous dispersed small groups or units adept at new communications technologies to disrupt the global North's way of life through hybrid, mobile, and rapid networks. Freezing the assets of organizations believed to be funneling money to Al Qaeda (in November 2001), bribing local Afghans with offers of $40,000 for each Taliban and Al Qaeda leader, and

the botched proposal by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) to run a terrorism futures market (which *Newsweek* praised as a "good concept, bad P.R.") (2003, 18) all reflect efforts not only to close vulnerable global financial loopholes but also to treat the enemy itself as a networked enterprise that threatens the flow of capital in the global economy.

During his 2008 campaign for the Presidency, Barack Obama wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that the Bush administration had responded to the terrorist attacks "with conventional thinking of the past, largely viewing problems as state-based and principally amenable to military solutions" (Obama 2007, 4). In addition to the familiar tough guy rhetoric ("We will kill bin Laden. We will crush Al Qaeda. That has to be our priority" in the second presidential debate in 2008) he also explicitly invited readers to imagine a global field of action, writing for *Time* magazine that if the USA had actionable intelligence on high-level Al Qaeda targets "we must act if Pakistan will not or cannot" ("How to Save Afghanistan" 2008b, 35). He argued against the Iraq war based on cost-benefit analysis, decrying that "we have spent 200 billion more in Iraq than we have budgeted" (Obama 2008a, A21).

Upon taking office, Obama aligned his foreign policy to match the vision he offered in April 2007: "The threats that we face at the dawn of the twenty-first century can no longer be contained by borders and boundaries" (Lemann 2008, 112). He eventually wound down the war in Iraq in December 2011 and often promised a timetable (which was not met) for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2014 and shifted to make foreign policy akin to a series of police actions, extensive drone attacks across the border into Pakistan, targeted killings of suspected terrorists (including a US citizen in September 2011), night raids in Somalia and Libya to kill or capture Al Qaeda-affiliated leaders, and finally, the use of Navy SEALS to kill Osama bin Laden. His support for Libyan rebels during the uprising against Gaddafi in the spring of 2011 resembled the Bosnia model: coordinated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), cost-effective, and with zero US casualties.

In sum, the return of imperialism thesis analyzes masculinity within a context of territoriality, Fordist production, interstate conflicts, and particularly the Cold War. The waning of such politics has produced a remixed masculinity, an assemblage of old and new that jostle against each other in ways that complicate our usual understanding of how gender works with respect to war. The masculine foundations of American exceptionalism

have undergone shifts in response to larger changes in the global arena. These dynamic representations of soldiering as well as the growing institutional influence of the military have occurred in the past 30 years.

## From *Rambo* to *Jack Bauer*: Soldiering After Vietnam

A number of scholars have explored how the US soldier was redeemed after Vietnam through a "redefined masculinity that present[ed] itself as separate from and independent of an opposed feminine" (Jeffords 1989, 168). The rehabilitation of the soldier and the overall reactionary effort to reinvent the Vietnam War through novels and films (many of them haunted by Rambo's question, "Do we get to win this time?") has produced a consensus on how manhood was reconstituted through "feminization of the enemy, the demonization of the media, and the valorization of patriarchy" (Anderegg 1991, 8).

If we only examine representations of the soldier, however, we will miss the institutional transformation of the military that occurred after Vietnam. *Rambo* was a warrior, but after 1973, the US military was composed of professional soldiers. The professional army produced convergence between civilian and military life, as a military career provided an avenue of upward mobility and advanced training. The failed rescue attempt to release US hostages in Iran, Operation Eagle Claw, led to a restructuring of both the US military as well as the creation of the US Special Operations Command, which unified all of the special warfare units of the US military under one command. *Time* declared in the aftermath of the bungled rescue attempt that "a once dominant military machine, first humbled in its agonizing stand-off in Viet Nam [sic] now looked incapable of keeping its aircraft aloft even when no enemy knew they were there, and incapable of keeping them from crashing into each other despite four months of practice for their mission" ("Debacle" 1980, 13). Charles Beckwith (known as "Chargin' Charlie" for his fearless paramilitary exploits in Vietnam) handpicked the soldiers for the mission, all of whom were "highly intelligent, in good physical condition, and could keep their mouths shut," and while they were "waiting for action," the mission was deemed a disaster because of faulty civilian planning (Adler 1980, 29). The failed rescue mission of April 25, 1980, in other words, turned out to be a blessing in disguise for the military and contributed to its continuing organizational and

budgetary influence (Klare 1981, 10). It gave greater clout to those who wanted to supplement nuclear power with a "meaner and leaner force to more selectively and efficiently project global power under the guise of defense reform and foreign policy moderation" (Sanders 1983, 122).

Reagan continued this institutional rehabilitation of the military in the invasion of Grenada. Even though it was difficult to explain how a country with a population of 90,000 posed a security threat that would require disproportionate military force, Reagan recounted the bravery of a sergeant who witnessed the crash of three helicopters and under "intense enemy fire, flying shrapnel, and possible explosion of the burning helicopters" still returned to try and save the soldiers (Reagan 1983e, 1551). Reagan's description presaged what would become a full-blown pattern of war reporting after the Cold War: focusing on the comradeship of battle rather than justifications for the war itself. In an address to the nation on Lebanon and Grenada, Reagan told of how General Paul Kelly visited a wounded marine in the hospital and, while the marine could not speak, he asked for a piece of paper, upon which he wrote, "Semper Fi," prompting General Kelly to weep (Reagan 1983c, 1522). Reagan deferred to the military during the early hours of the invasion by telling reporters, "We are yielding to the influences of General Vessey … we don't think that in these early hours of the landing that we should be on the horn asking the commanders to stop and give us detailed reports" (Reagan 1983b, 1507). Such deference would become the norm as military leadership was increasingly politicized during the 1990s and 2000s and publicly challenged Clinton's policy on gays and lesbians in the military, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's Iraq war strategy, and President Obama's hesitance over sending more troops to Afghanistan in 2009 as portending "Chaosistan" (Wilson 2009).

The post-Vietnam soldier liberator made its debut in Grenada. As one US paratrooper put it in 1983, "We are surrounded by friendlies," while a first lieutenant explained "in Nam people didn't give a damn and wouldn't tell us anything. Here the folks want to clear the country of communism" (Magnuson 1983b, 18; Strasser et al. 1983, 40). The 82nd Airborne left a sign at the St. George airport that read, "Farewell, Grenada. Thanks for your hospitality. God Bless You" (*Time* 1983, 11). Careful military control over the media took place during the invasion of Grenada (as well as in the invasion of Panama). In one vivid casting of the media-as-enemy, *Time* described a scene where journalists floated far off the coast of Grenada and a Navy jet dropped a buoy 30 feet ahead of them, "just to show what else

he could drop and how close he could drop it" (1983, 70). *Time* pictured Mike Wallace and General William Westmoreland with the caption "Fairness can be sacrificed when reporters go into stories with a preconceived thesis," suggesting that Wallace was biased while Westmoreland had not inflated the number of North Vietnamese insurgents killed (Henry et al. 1983, 83). Massive defense spending, new weapons systems, a highly touted and heavily scripted invasion, and a military "standing tall" again helped pave the way for the first post–Cold War conflict in the Persian Gulf.

## Neoliberal Security in the Post–Cold War Era

On March 1, 1991, President George H.W. Bush told the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC):

> I know you share this wonderful feeling that I have of joy in my heart. But it is overwhelmed by the gratitude I feel—not just to the troops overseas but to those who have assisted the United States of America, like our Secretary of Defense, like our Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, and so many other unsung heroes who have made all this possible. It's a proud day for America. And, by God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all. (Bush 1991)

In addition to "kicking" the Vietnam syndrome, the first Persian Gulf War elevated military leadership to unprecedented levels. Military leaders were not only heroes, as Eisenhower and others were in World War II; they were celebrities. Nelan described Dick Cheney (Defense Secretary) and Colin Powell (chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "the savviest pair to lead the Pentagon in years" (Nelan 1990, 26). Vietnam veterans weighed in to praise the professionalism and shrewdness of the military leadership. David Hackworth, a veteran writing for *Newsweek*, exclaimed, "the men and women of our armed forces … are the smartest ever fielded" (1991, 29). John McCain asserted that Colin Powell had a "terrific leadership style" (Nelan 1990, 28). Norman Schwarzkopf received the most effusive accolades, however. He was described as having a "startling, prophetic mind," and his West Point roommate characterized him as having the "tactical brilliance of Patton, the strategic insight of Eisenhower, and the modesty of Bradley" (Birnbaum 1991, 28–29).

As the Gulf War brought entertainment, news, war, and politics closer in proximity, military leadership offered its own new brand of leadership.

In addition to military prowess, Schwarzkopf seemed like a regular guy next door. Corliss reported that upon meeting him "you look for John Wayne and find Jonathan Winters crossed with Willard Scott," that is, a comedian and a weather forecaster (1991, 57). Another reporter explained that "his wife and three children know him as a pussycat; an outdoorsman, an amateur magician, a cookie muncher, a fellow who lulls himself to sleep listening to tapes of Pavarotti or the sounds of honking geese and mountain streams" (Birnbaum 1991, 30). *People* divulged that his nickname was "Bear," referring to both "his grizzly and teddyish sides" ("Stormin" 1991, 34). Schwarzkopf's much remarked upon bodily girth and his professed love for Breyer's mint chocolate chip ice cream was in marked contrast to the hard-bodied soldier body of the *Rambo* era.

The story of Colin Powell's rise from Harlem to all-American general was a prequel to Barack Obama's story. *People* proclaimed that Powell had "taken his influence from Harlem to the White House," while his daughter denied that he had political aspirations because "we never felt that his work was more important than we were" (Kunen et al. 1990, 52–53). The Schwarzkopf-Powell partnership signified the erasure of racial difference in the military, itself a "sign of the nation" that was not figured black as much as it was figured multicultural and open-minded (McAlister 2001, 255). Powell's career symbolically demonstrated how military service could provide a path of upward mobility and assimilation into American society.

Media and the military encouraged spectators of the war to accept women's participation in battle through a complex presentation of women as "regular soldiers" who also retained essential female qualities. *People* portrayed Melissa Rathbun-Nealy's capture by Iraqi soldiers by describing her as strong and resourceful, but it also included in the story her high school graduation picture that "revealed her glamorous side" (Arias and Alexander 1991, 43). *Newsweek* used the case to warn "for women in the military, attaining equality may carry a terrible price" (1991, 18). *People*'s September 10, 1990, cover was "Mom Goes to War," and pictured Captain Joy Johnson in uniform holding her 11-month-old daughter, an apt visual of the lingering ambivalence about women in war.

As a result of the exemplary role that women played in the first Persian Gulf War (40,000, or 7% of those who fought), combat exclusion rules were lifted for women flying combat aircraft in 1991, on combat ships in 1993, and in 1994 more ground combat positions were open to women on the orders of Defense Secretary Les Aspin (Titunik 2008, 142). This

instrumental diversity was important for a military facing staff power shortages, and the scandals of the early 1990s (e.g., harassment at the 1991 Tailhook Convention and the Aberdeen Proving Ground sexual assault cases in 1996) confirmed the masculinist bias and rampant sexism in the military. Yet, the continued recruitment and entry of women into the military enabled it to present itself as a significant institution for upward mobility as well as representative of the society. Military women often testified that the military was more institutionally friendly to gender equality and opportunity for women and minorities than the private sector, and certainly state houses and the US Congress. The war was an important moment in closing the gap between civilian and military worlds and the revaluation of soldiering, as a job and career. In a debate in the pages of the journal *Millennium*, Coker chided Martin van Creveld's lament about the "feminization of the military" with a now-familiar rebuke, "Today we do not have warriors. We have soldiers. Our information societies put a premium on technical versatility and knowledge rather than muscle as a source of power" (Coker 2000, 455).

The "operations other than war" in the 1990s brought forth two more important dimension of soldiering that persisted in the post–9/11 era. The first was the increasing importance placed on fighting for the unit first, with old-fashioned patriotism downplayed. The two heroes who emerged from the Somalia and Bosnia operations, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant and Captain Scott O'Grady, exemplified this aspect of professionalizing military service. Durant was a seasoned soldier, member of the Night Stalkers, and professional. But he was also, according to Mark Bowden, "An emotional man. He fit in with his daring aviation unit, men whose allegiance was as much to action as flag, but the sentiment he felt for his wife and baby son … was closer to the surface than with some of these guys" (1999, 89). The *Atlanta Constitution's* Fred Bayles reported that Durant was the "Son of a military man. A husband. A father. A man who hunted and fished and loved to fly" (1993, 7).

Captain Scott O'Grady was described as "very much a nineties man, not afraid to cry, not afraid to laugh at himself" (McGrory 1995, 2). He described himself as a "scared little bunny rabbit," while his stepfather called him an "improbable *Rambo*," who spent June 2–8, 1995, in the Bosnian countryside (*Chicago-Tribune* 1995, 12; *Baltimore Sun* 1995, 14). O'Grady's 15 minutes of fame resembled celebrity, as one journalist explained that "The handsome 29-year old single fighter pilot with a Tom Cruise smile loves flying, traveling the world, and living on the edge"

(Goldschlag 1995, 3). His family reinforced the O'Grady-Cruise pairing by reporting that "Scott watched *Top Gun* until they thought he would wear it out" (Christiansen 1995, 14). President Clinton declared that O'Grady's story "would make a great movie" (Woolacott 1995, 2).

In addition to relaxing the traditional requirements for soldiering—a tough mien and mettle in battle—the two cases also dovetailed with a new trend in filmmaking, what Wetta and Novelli call "neo-patriotism" (2003). In *Black Hawk Down* as well as *Behind Enemy Lines* (loosely based on O'Grady's experience and for which he sued Twentieth Century Fox for profiting from his experience without his permission), it is the shared experience of battle and the sheer ability to survive in the midst of intense chaos and mayhem that matters more than any "stated or understood national or public rationales for whatever war is being fought" (Wetta and Novelli 2003, 861). *Black Hawk Down* is most noteworthy for its intense and hyperreal combat scenes and general confusion about the purpose of the war. Bowden writes that Operation Restore Hope was launched by those who believed that "America's unrivaled big stick could right the world's wrongs, feed the hungry, and democratize the planet" (1999, 99). For the soldiers fighting it, however, it was a war in which fighting for each other meant more than fighting for a larger cause.

## War on Terror

The US response to the September 11 terrorist attacks represents a continuation rather than departure from post–Gulf War trends in war fighting (Shaw 2005, 26–28). There was no significant introduction of ground troops in the initial phase of the war in Afghanistan but rather, in keeping with 1990s war fighting, there was high-altitude bombing with Special Operations forces working alongside the Northern Alliance, the major opponent of the Taliban. The editors of *The New Republic* complained that the USA was trying to outsource the war (November 2001). Since sending US troops to scour Tora Bora would "expand risks to Americans from sniper attacks, land mines, and booby traps," then it would be Afghans who would do the "dirty, risky work" (Gordon and Schmitt 2001, 1; Ratnesar 2001, 40).

The strategy for the Iraq war that began in 2003 was crafted in the same vein. The plan was to rush to Baghdad with a small force, overthrow Saddam Hussein, and remake Iraq with pliable Iraqi exiles at the helm—the latter strategy was dropped and instead Bush chose "proconsul" Paul Bremer to head the Coalition Provisional Authority. When

faced with looting and then an insurgency, the Coalition Provisional Authority made a series decisions that actually prolonged the war, including purging the national Army of Baathists and postponing elections. In keeping with the growing influence of the military in US foreign policy making, Army General Jack Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and counterinsurgency champions David Petreaus and Ray Odierno crafted and sold the "surge" policy Bush chose in December 2006. In Obama's decision on a second major surge in Afghanistan, Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus were influential proponents for sending 40,000 more troops (eventually reduced to 30,000), with McChrystal taking his pro-surge argument to the media, leaking a bleak report on the prospects of victory over the Taliban without an infusion of troops (Woodward 2009). Despite polls indicating that 57% of the public opposed the war and in November 2009 35% approved of Obama's handling of the war, the president announced the 30,000 troop surge in December. The vocal opposition of at least six former military officers to Rumsfeld's strategy and their calls for his resignation in 2006 were "unprecedented in American history. … The retired officers opposing the war and demanding Rumsfeld's ouster represent a new political force, and therefore a potentially powerful factor in the future of our democracy" (Whalen 2006, 11). The military's politicization, however, had been accelerating since the early twenty-first century. In 2000, the Bush campaign lined up 26 retired generals and admirals to endorse his candidacy. A 2000 study by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies found that half the officers believed they had the right to "insist" on policy decisions to their liking (Wood 2000, 3).

The War on Terror provides a showcase for illuminating the ways in which neoliberal war fighting operates in the twenty-first century. Institutionally, the military's outsourcing of war, shifting more risk to "partners," its concern with time and flexibility, and its overt interest-group politicization shows how it has departed from its usual role of institutional impartiality. In its marketing and recruiting strategies, in the increasing portrayal of soldiers' psychic suffering, and the role of soldiering in new media environments, neoliberal ideology has reworked the old-fashioned John Wayne soldier into a new free agent. After discussing these institutional and subjectivity-crafting developments, this chapter concludes with an analysis of Jack Bauer, the star of the eight-season television show *24*, who signified the new face of heroic masculinity in an era of terror.

## Outsourcing War

The privatization of military force embraced by the Clinton administration throughout the 1990s was a major feature of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an apt formulation of the situation, Rosen argues that the end of the Cold War produced a supply and demand problem (Rosen 2008). By 1995 the USA had a total force structure of 2.4 million soldiers (in 1989 it had 3.2 million). A smaller military, the growth of operations other than war, and the war on terror put further pressure to outsource to the private sector. Between 1994 and 2002 the US government had already signed contracts worth $300 billion with Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs) (Stanger 2009, 87). The use of private forces has been the subject of voluminous commentary, with questions raised about the cost, efficiency, lack of oversight, and weak accountability of private security (Avant 2005; Stanger 2009; Singer 2002). A "managerial understanding of security" is perhaps the most useful way to consider the role that private security companies and personnel play in post-Fordist warfare (Leander and van Munster 2007, 202). Private security, in other words, is a technology of governance, and PMSCs offer their services as representing the very definition of efficiency, entrepreneurship, and expert execution of tasks. As PMSCs argue for their indispensability, they also position themselves as able to act in humanitarian crises when states fail to act. The Swarthmore student activists who formed the Genocide Intervention Network in 2004 found that private security companies were eager to give them estimates for the cost of sending their staff to Darfur to protect refugee camps (Zengerle 2006, 12–13). The spaces into which a mixture of public and private force has expanded blur jurisdictions between state and private power. The death and dismemberment of four Blackwater security guards (the largest PMSC in Iraq in 2004) is a case in point. Their killing became a "Mogadishu test" for the Bush administration and helped spur the first US military siege of Fallujah—"This is for Blackwater," declared the US commander in Fallujah (Scahill 2007, 135).

There are three major ways in which the use of PMSCs works to consolidate trends in neoliberal war fighting. The first is the juxtaposition of a zone of outsourcing impunity with the "lawful" use of force by the US military. Private security companies use "cowboy tactics" and excessive force, while civilian killings by US military personnel fall under the military's rules of engagement and its judicial system, further cementing the military's projected reputation of being full of professionals. This in turn

leads to greater calls for regulation of private companies, but not the termination of their indispensable use. Cohen and Kupcu, for example, call for greater "transparency, accountability, and oversight," for military contractors while recognizing that they are the "backbone of the occupation" in Iraq (2006/2007, 94).

Second, the enormous attention given to the money that lures private contractors to war zones does not single out low pay in both the military and civilian sectors of the US economy, but rather the prudential choice made by individuals who weigh the risks and rewards of operating in war zones. In 2004, a Navy SEAL with 20 years' experience earned $50,000 in base pay and earn $23,000 a year in retirement. In contrast, private security companies in Afghanistan and Iraq offered salaries between 100,000 and 200,000 dollars a year to the most experienced (Schmitt and Shanker 2004, A1). These same individuals are often depicted as calculating the benefits of private security employment because of their economic woes or precarity (e.g., no retirement savings, needing to buy a home, debt, putting kids through college). This shifts attention away from the enormous profits accrued to private military companies as well as the structural conditions that fuel outsourcing war and instead postulates a rational economic actor maximizing interests in the market for war.

Finally, focusing on the "excesses" of private security company wrongdoing puts the spotlight on individual culpability rather than the institutional workings of war and occupation. Sensational stories about a drunken (former) Blackwater employee who allegedly killed the bodyguard of the Vice President of Iraq in December 2006, and the shooting deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians in September 2007 (for which Blackwater guards were tried and convicted eight years later) extends the logic of individualism and individual wrongdoing to private security companies rather than the deeper causes of war and occupation. The focus on extreme private security company behavior also downplays the chaos of 70,000 Afghans belonging to often unregistered security companies controlling large swaths of the country "who answer to no one—and who are being paid for by the United States," who often in turn pay the Taliban for safe passage through war zones (Filkins 2010, A4). In other words, the widespread use of private security companies to fight the Taliban is not only regularly compromised by wrongdoing by US private security contractors: the more obscure policy of funding private security companies in Afghanistan actually ensures that the war continues.

## RISK SHIFT TO CIVILIANS

The risk economy of neoliberal war translates into casualty avoidance for soldiers. Concerns about "force protection," have been an ongoing concern of the military since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began. While there are complaints about the limitations that NATO partners place on their troops—no fighting at night, in the snow, and sometimes not at all—US forces are heavily protected. Heavily fortified operating bases in Iraq "[were] more suited for protecting troops then they [were] for waging effective counterinsurgency" (Smith 2008, 153). Benjamin and Simon complain that a fear of failure and casualties means soldiers rarely carry out the operations necessary to fight terrorism (2007, A23). Many mid-level offers were reportedly leery of the surge for Iraq in 2007 from a "force protection and creature comfort perspective" (Coll 2008, 43).

The related component of US force protection is the application of overwhelming force in attacks on insurgents, often resulting in civilian deaths. American soldiers facing Taliban attacks in Afghanistan often call in artillery and air strikes from B-1 bombers, A-10 and F-15e attack planes, Apache helicopters and drones, often damaging homes and killing civilians. In the case of Iraq, Major General Eldon Bargewell's report on the Haditha massacre noted that "all levels of command tended to view civilian casualties, even significant numbers, as routine and as the natural and intended result of insurgent tactics" (Von Zielbauer 2007, A12). When General Stanley McChrystal took over the war in Afghanistan in 2009, soldiers complained that the tightened rules on air strikes, guided rocket attacks, and artillery barrages meant that war risk had swung too far toward them and away from civilians (Chivers 2010, A11). In the forward to the new *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, the director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government Sarah Sewall, argues that "in order to win, they [U.S. troops] must assume more risk, at least in the short term" (Sewall 2006, xxvi–xxvii). Commanders walk a fine line between soldiers who consider themselves "relatively skilled professionals" whose "ideas of sacrifice have waned" and locals who resent regular collateral damage (Shaw 2005, 79). Discussions of Taliban insurgents killing more civilians than coalition forces have the effect of discounting coalition killing of civilians. There were two stories right next to each other in *The New York Times* on June 20, 2010, that capture the jarring contradictions of risk shifts to civilians in the Afghan war. In one, the NATO spokesperson in Afghanistan pointed

out that civilian casualties caused by the coalition in 2010 were 44% lower than the year before. The other story reported ten civilian deaths, including five women and children, in an air strike. NATO reported that it was reviewing the operational details of the incident (Nordland 2010; "Afghan Civilians" 2010).

## Psychic Suffering and Wounded Minds

The war on terror has extended and deepened the already-existing trend of portraying soldiers in ways that resonate with late capitalism's representations of the inner world and private emotions. Soldiers are strung out on Ritalin, sleeping and anti-anxiety pills, and plagued with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The "democratization of psychic suffering" (Illouz 2007, 42) that is a hallmark of late modernity permeates embedded journalist accounts of one of the many challenges facing US troops. In his book *The Good Soldier*, Finkel (2009, 119) notes that the battalion chaplain was receiving knocks on his door late at night for discreet counseling, and forward operating bases' mental health counselors "were writing an increasing number of prescriptions for sleep aids and antidepressants." Finkel writes in depth about Sergeant Adam Schumann, who after three tours was overwhelmed with combat stress and suicidal thoughts (Finkel 2009, 207–209). Schumann was taking medicine for a racing heart rate, anxiety, and nightmares. Despite the fact that the infantry's "historically preferred diagnosis" for such cases was "he's just a pussy," Schumann had finally walked to the Combat Stress aid station and asked for help (Finkel 2009, 207, 209). Ready acceptance by his squad attests to the growing visibility of soldiers with mental scars who require therapy for psychological wounds acquired in the course of war. Soldier identity, in other words, resembles dominant currents in political economy including the suffering self that requires therapy and personal stories that reflect broken homes, drugs, fights, and failure in school. Spending on psychiatric drugs more than doubled between 2001 and 2010, to $280 million (Dao et al. 2011, A1). The mental health corps of the Army increased by about 60% in the ten years after September 11 (Thompson 2010, 20). Media accounts are also rife with stories about soldier suicides, killings, and drug addiction. The power of pharmaceutical companies and their success in tapping into the huge market of disorders in the military—sleep disorders, anxiety, and depression—is usually not a part of these stories. This dimension of military life reconfigures a soldier at odds with the brave and masculine military

man carrying out courageous feats solo and made whole again by war. Instead, the soldier is part of the general commodification of suffering and mental health with whom a vast number of civilians are invited to identify with and understand, and is a vast market for pharmaceutical companies to treat what *Time* called "wounded minds" in need of medication and therapy (Thompson 2010, 20).

The most vivid example of the flood of neoliberal techniques governing soldier subjectivity in the military is the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) Program, a joint effort by prominent psychologists and the Army to cultivate mental resilience among soldiers. The inventor of "positive psychology," Martin Seligman, received \$125 million from the Army to promote learning optimism by soldiers; he has likened his work with the Army as assisting a large company, describing it thus:

> This is the second largest corporation in the world, he said. (The first is Walmart.) And so a program that involves training for the entire U.S. Army in which its effects on performance are being evaluated should be highly relevant to large corporations. When so many organizations today are still not thinking about the holistic welfare of their workforce, I commend the Army for leading us into this new frontier. (Greenberg 2010, 34)

Based on the precepts of positive psychology, CSF believes that "happiness can be produced by consciously directing one's thoughts to happy subjects" (Binkley 2011, 376). In the January 2011 special issue of the *American Psychologist*, the coordinator of CSF for the Army, Rhonda Cornum, and the chief psychologist developing CSF, Martin Seligman, describe it as "proactive, providing soldiers the skills needed to be more resilient" (Cornum et al. 2011, 6). The goal of the program is to "increase the number of soldiers who derive meaning and personal growth from their combat experience" (Cornum et al. 2011, 6). The authors insist that the focus on PTSD has been excessive and only zeros in on the negatives of combat; we should learn to discuss post-traumatic growth as well. Although the program has not been tested in ways that conform to the methodological requirements and rigor required by psychologists, Seligman cites early findings that soldiers who have participated "are more optimistic" (Seligman 2011, 646). In a broader discussion of the growing significance of resilience, O'Malley pinpoints the purpose of CSF training: "readily acquired, scientifically tested and mutable cognitive maneuvers

appropriate to the governance of the self in conditions of uncertainty" (2010, 489). Cornum, Matthews, and Seligman deem the post-conflict strategies of treatment of combat-related symptoms as a "traditional diagnosis/treatment model," while CSF is comparable to a malaria prevention model—it works on all soldiers to promote general "behavioral, cognitive, and emotional health" (Cornum et al. 2011, 5). In this model, soldiers can "own" their own happiness and assume responsibility for achieving positive mental health while fighting in wars.

Yet another dimension of neoliberalization of the military is the focus on the soldier through the lens of reality television. Soldiers returning from war have PTSD, commit suicides at high rates than the civilian population, and are often violent; in other words, like many of their reality TV counterparts, they are "at risk" individuals. Unable to fight war like "regular" soldiers, and often from "broken homes" with histories of petty criminality and run-ins with police, these soldiers fail to live up to the self-sufficient and self-governing individual that their training was supposed to produce. Alternatively, soldiers are "deeply troubled" with "wounded minds," yet another angle that highlights the individual aspect of war's toll on *American*, not Afghan or Iraqi, lives.

In 2008 MTV aired a show called "Choose or Lose and Kanye West Present: Homecoming," where West, bringing celebrity glamor to the show, met with three veterans who, according to the MTV website, each had their "unique story," but "all had two things in common: they served in Iraq and were now home and struggling" (MTV Newsroom). With MTV correspondent Sway Callaway, West supplies the three veterans with gifts, a reminder that they should not expect state support but rather the goodwill and financial support from foundations (the Dr. Donda West Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and Charles Schwab). Kanye West's show joins up with other reality TV genres that encourage exercising freedom "correctly," that is, by using the gift to undergo makeovers toward being resilient, self-sufficient soldiers. While militarism and economic conscription are social problems, MTV treats PTSD-addled veterans facing economic destitution as moments to provide temporary aid that they can use to recover. The program resonates with welfare reform discourse that stresses temporary and individualized assistance to soldiers who through bad luck or unforeseen circumstances have fallen on hard times. Each of the veterans receives rent, an internship, or college tuition payments, which is a subtle

challenge to the military's claim that joining up is an investment in self-improvement. Instead, it confirms that bad things happen to good soldiers and therefore they deserve to win this random gift, which should translate into an opportunity to triumph over setbacks. Like the MTV example, soldiers' struggles are visible through the reality TV lens of trauma. The reality TV register contributes to the relentless personalization of war. It offers a charity solution to a particular problem that is representative of a larger pattern of unemployment, PTSD, and familial and other personal problems.

In this context, the evocation of the brotherhood of war and the ability of war to melt differences between men rests on nostalgia and even irony, a representation that still parallels the PTSD-addled soldier but is overshadowed by newer subjectivities conveyed by talk therapy and the insistence on psychological analysis of trauma. Ensured overmedication by the pharmaceutical and psychological partnership between the military and corporations, soldiers increasingly display the characteristics of Hardt and Negri's (2000, 2004) post-modern proletariat, defined by emergent subjectivities that are shaped by Dr. Phil rather than John Wayne and Sylvester Stallone.

## GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS AND THE "BRAINIAC BRIGADE"

The generation of military officers struggling to hone US military strategy in the long war hardly resembles eighteenth-century Indian fighters. General David Petraeus, an outsized figure in the war strategies for both Iraq and Afghanistan, rivaled Eisenhower, McArthur, and Patton, not because of his stature but because of media, public relations, and the extension of framing to politicians and generals that had been earlier reserved for celebrity musicians and movie stars. Petraeus's celebrity status had him featured on the cover of *Newsweek* three times and *Time* twice during a public presence that lasted about ten years. Eisenhower and MacArthur in portraiture and close up appeared on the cover of World War II era magazines. The gravitas of their military statesmanship did not require a caption. Petraeus's photos were usually live action, with captions like, "Can this Man Save Iraq?" (July 5, 2004; *Newsweek*) and "How much Longer?" (September 17, 2007; *Time*). *Newsweek* named him sixteenth on its list of Global Elite in 2008, with Fareed Zakaria describing his work as "America's most able general [is] forging a new

approach to the Muslim world" (2008/2009, 48) and in 2009 *Foreign Policy* named him eighth on its list of 100 "Top Global Thinkers," beginning the blurb with "Petraeus is a man of the pen and the sword, an expert on counterinsurgency, a student of history, a Princeton doctorate holder, and an avowed intellectual, committed to revolutionizing how the military conceives of war and tailoring its strategies for the twenty-first century" (p. 39).

The celebrity positioning of Petraeus took place around his alleged successes in the occupation of Mosul (2003–2004), his championing of counterinsurgency strategy, and his leadership in rewriting the FM-4-23 Counterinsurgency Manual. The "four star rock star general" shepherded the Iraq surge in 2007 and, "exercising exceptional judgment and skill" turned Sunni sheikhs against Al Qaeda, shifted the Army's operational approach, and elicited a truce from Muqtada al-Sadr (Gellman 2012, 29; Hammes 2008, 54). Recognizing that "money is the most important ammunition in this [Iraq] war," he placed thousands of Sunnis on the payroll to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq (Polk 2010, 23). He advised young officers to watch *The Sopranos* in order to understand the power dynamics at work in Iraq (Dehghanpisheh and Thomas 2008, 34). Every facet of Petraeus's purportedly astonishing life was tagged by the media. His Princeton Ph.D. on the failures of leadership during the Vietnam War, his maverick military strategy in Mosul in the early years of the Iraq war, and his leadership style of a "corporate chief executive, one influenced by the recent managerial preferences for 'flatness,' or horizontal forms of communication," positioned Petraeus as representing the wave of the military's counterinsurgency future. In an organization that prized "backslapping conformity" Petraeus seemed to shake up an organization that had come to resemble an "all men's golf club" (Coll 2008, 37).

Petraeus was adept at working the media. He demonstrated his entourage-creating skills with his "brainiac brigade" of supporters, the "Coindinistas" who fully supported "King David's" sales job for counterinsurgency-driven surges in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dehghanpisheh and Barry 2007; Ricks 2009, 63). His appearances before Congressional committees to provide vague, arguable, and inexact reports on the progress of the wars received wall-to-wall coverage. Hints of a presidential run augmented his fame. When he replaced Stanley McChrystal as the top officer in Afghanistan (after McChrystal's own scandalous interviews with *Rolling Stone* in May

2010), Jon Stewart of the *Daily Show* called him the "Doc of Iraq," and the "Buddha of Fallujah," a satirical mocking of his fame and status (May 2010).

After his September 2007 Congressional testimony on the progress of the surge, Petraeus enhanced his name recognition "*despite the commentary on the accuracy and truthfulness of his testimony*" (Carroll 2007, 1; my emphasis). His favorability rating went from 47% in August 2007 to 52% in early September 2007, and to 61% in mid-September. Only 18% of those polled had no opinion or had never heard of him. Petraeus's testimony was "calm, courteous, and businesslike as he used giant charts to illustrate signs of progress" (Stanley 2007, A18). As Hastings put it, "One lesson [Petreaus] learned during the surge in Iraq is that it's not what's happening on the battlefield that counts—it's what people in Washington think is happening" (2011, 4). When MoveOn.org ran an ad with the question "General Petraeus or Betray Us?" in the *New York Times* on September 10, 2007 (p. A25), they were roundly condemned by Republicans and mildly condemned by Democrats, with both chambers eventually passing resolutions condemning the advertisement and praising Petraeus for his patriotism. The jousting over an interest group attack ad took attention away from discussing the war, except for the constant narration concerning disputes about the metrics.

Petraeus fell from grace through a common fatal weakness of many celebrities: infidelity. The scandal of an affair between Petraeus and his biographer Paula Broadwell also received celebrity-scale coverage. *Newsweek* listed the "supporting cast" in the drama, including Jill Kelly (the "real housewife of Tampa"), John Allen (her "pen pal"), and the F.B.I. agent who reported on the email communications (the "Whistleblower") (November 26/December 3, 2012), and *Time* called the various characters and complicated machinations the "military-adulterous" complex (2012, 27). Paula Broadwell made the cover of *People* on November 21, 2012, with the story byline promising "flirty emails" and "generals behaving badly." Jon Stewart satirically covered the affair under the byline "Band of Boners" (November 13, 2012). The stalled progress in the wars, the setbacks, the civilian deaths, the displacement of populations, the substandard care for veterans—the grisly details of decade-old conflicts—faded as media shaped the war on terror to conform to market logic about what sells when it comes to war and the military. In an eerie recursive loop, the television show *24* created a character akin to warrior-scholars who demonstrated the necessity of fighting enemies on multiple fronts in a small window of time.

## Jack Bauer, *24*, and Masculinity in Transition

The character of Jack Bauer, star of *24*, a television show launched in November 2001 and called the "Official Cultural Product of the War on Terror," fits easily into the long line of masculine heroes who have helped the USA realize its manifest destiny at home and abroad (Poniewozick 2007). One *New Republic* author describes Bauer as someone who "never wavers, second-guesses, or gives in to criticism, instead doing whatever needs to be done to safeguard American lives, regardless of the costs" (Orr 2006, 16). Bauer's many single-handed shootouts with enemies, piloting airplanes and helicopters under treacherous conditions, and regular sacrifices for the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) and country are almost cartoon-like recreations of the classic Western hero. Bauer, upon first inspection, resembles an updated *Rambo*, this time not refighting and winning the Vietnam War, but fighting and winning the war on terror through hyper masculine exploits.

According to the official *24* website, Bauer has a B.A. in English literature from University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), an MA in Criminology and Law from Berkeley, and training in special weapons and tactics with both the L.A. Police Department and the Army's Delta Force. He was in the army for 15 years and retired at the rank of captain. His positions at CTU have been director of field operations and special agent in charge of the LA domestic unit (http://www.fox.com/24/profiles/jb/htm). Bauer's background, in other words, resembles General David Petraeus's and that of the brainiac brigade.

As much as one would like to agree with many conservative and liberal commentators that Jack Bauer is our twenty-first-century *Rambo*, a closer examination of his mode of operation and the context of his work invite a different interpretation. First of all, Bauer's historical referent in the first season is not *Rambo*'s Vietnam War but rather the more complicated and messy Balkans. The major plotline of Season 1 revolves around a military operation called Operation Nightfall, which took place in Belgrade at an unspecified time. On orders, Bauer and his five-member Delta Force team are to kill Serbian terrorist Victor Drazen, but the mission goes awry and Drazen's wife and daughter are killed. Bauer loses five men during the capture of Drazen. Unlike Rambo, who tried to avenge the US loss in Vietnam, the plotline of *24* in the first season is about personal revenge. Drazen tries to frame Bauer for the assassination of President David Palmer and he aims to kidnap and kill Bauer's wife and daughter. As Bauer puts it, "this is personal." While Rambo films illuminated conservative resentment

and ideological quarrels with liberals, *24*'s plotlines are intertwined stories about murky foreign policy and familial and personal dramas.

Furthermore, Bauer does not always have it out for inept bureaucrats and "lily livered" liberals that the revisionists argued made the military fight Vietnam with one hand tied behind its back. CTU bureaucracy is not composed of smug civilians who stand in the way of Bauer's mission to enact his revenge. In fact, Chloe O'Brien is a techno-wizard and major ally of Bauer. While Bauer is at times arrested, fired, or taken off a case, it is because he has become a free agent who is, incidentally, invariably correct in his reading of the situation and is always eventually welcomed back to CTU. Technology and bureaucracy are not Bauer's enemies, as they are in *Rambo* films, and Bauer does not fault CTU for a failure to recognize the true enemies or its willingness to pursue negotiations when its force that really works. It is not bureaucracy per se but individuals with nefarious, often personal motives who threaten Bauer.

Bauer works with a CTU staff that is diverse and seems to be the model organization, both progressive in its hiring policies and inclusive in its assignments and promotions of women and minorities. Bauer himself embraces multiculturalism and the meritocratic achievements of women and minorities. In addition to heavy reliance on Chloe O'Brian in seasons 3–6, he has had at least three white female bosses, one African American female boss, and one African American male boss at CTU. Race is an incidental aspect of culture on the show, and culture reduced to harmless and benign difference that is no longer a source of workplace discrimination, inequality, and tension. The multicultural workforce feels responsible for the work of CTU and they seem to see past racial and gender differences to ensure its success. This multicultural CTU simultaneously symbolizes multicultural diversity, in other words, and a common mission to impose a perpetual state of fear and anxiety in the face of omnipresent threat. The fact that Bauer is at the center of CTU's work affirms the possibility of successfully incorporating diversity while maintaining a reformatted masculinity.

Perhaps most important, in the first four seasons Bauer works closely with an African American president, President David Palmer. While film has experimented with African American male presidents, *24* is the first television series that I know of to feature an African American president for four seasons (David Palmer's brother Wayne is the president in season 6). As an important sign of the nation, President Palmer rarely discusses the impact that his race has had on US politics; he offers the desire and possibility of colorblindness. In fact, in season 1 he expresses relief that the attempt on his life was the result of a personal vendetta and not because of

race. Palmer lectures his son Keith in the first season of the show, explaining that "part of the importance of getting a second chance is that you take responsibility," and he later tells him to "trust the system," which is risible given the history of African American encounters with the law. Palmer goes to the voters to confess his family's culpability in a cover-up, and the voters love him for his integrity. In season 2, he takes a strong stand against hate crimes against Muslim/Arab Americans, and he resists the drumbeat for war against three unnamed Middle Eastern countries. Journalist Joshua Alston (2008, 55) has noticed the similarities between President David Palmer and Barack Obama, writing in February 2008 that "Obama shares so much with President Palmer," both being suave, polite to a fault, and blessed with a gift for rhetoric." And in yet another example of the blurring of the spheres of entertainment and reality, the actor Dennis Haysbert, who played President David Palmer, said in July 2008 that his portrayal of David Palmer may have helped prove the possibility there could be an "African American president, a female president, any type of president that puts people first" (he was also a major Obama supporter; Reynolds 2008, 2).

Furthermore and finally, the context of Bauer's work differs from Rambo's world. Instead of mass production, regulation, and bureaucratic hierarchy, the world of *24* is post-Fordist, where there is a substitution of fluid and collaborative networks for hierarchical, command and control production. Flexible specialization, market differentiation, and new communications technologies have refigured the landscape of work. Along with post-Fordist work has come greater worker insecurity and greater difficulties in organizing. CTU exemplifies this workplace. Each worker sits at her workstation, with the staff periodically coming together to hear briefings and strategic discussions and obtain the work assignments parceled out. The demands of rapid response foreclose solidarity, and in fact, workers are wary of trusting each other because of the traitors and double agents that abound. The way time and space are experienced by Bauer and CTU produces anxiety, ambivalence, and frustration. The blurring of boundaries between work and home are integral to *24*'s story lines, with workers becoming traitors in order to support their families, families affected by drug addiction and alcoholism, and everyone sacrificing family life for work. Jack Bauer works at the center of this world, displaying what one writer has called "networked subjectivity" (MacPherson 2007, 185). He is constantly available via cell phones, computers, global positioning systems (GPS), PDAs, and he often looks exhausted. Hight describes Bauer thus, "Sutherland perfectly pitches the role of Bauer so that he appears less an

action hero or Bond super spy and more a haggard executive staving off corporate takeover" (Hight 2004, 382). Unlike many Western heroes, he is a failure at protecting his family; his wife dies at the hand of the enemy in the first season and his daughter endures a ridiculous number of kidnappings, chases, and smack-downs at the hands of various villains. When Bauer is revolted at the prospect of torturing yet again in season 6 and groans, "I don't think I can do this anymore," we believe him. Bauer, in short, is overwhelmed.

Of all the dimensions of US foreign policy, masculinity is surely the most resistant. In a crisis *Rambo* masculinity is the go-to frame for analyzing the gender politics of foreign policy. In more than a few instances, however, it is more useful to consider *Rambo* a nostalgic model of normative masculine leadership. What points to the current context as well as the future is Jack Bauer. Bauer's distinctiveness exemplified the tensions between courage and success, from knowing the enemy to technology rescue *ad infinitum*. Bauer's feats take place as an effort to win the race against time, itself the crucial defining feature of late capitalism. The war on terror accelerated the demise of older paradigms centered on the nation-state and their accompanying focus on masculine bravery. The world of foreign policy has been increasingly defined by threat, risk, expendable bodies, and networked and consumerist subjectivity, all of which exceed older state-centric readings of US foreign policy. It is in this sense that *24* outpaced reality because it prefigured our future and it did so through the networked subjectivity of Jack Bauer.

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# From Captives on the Frontier to Saving the World

Slotkin defines the captivity narrative as the "first American mythology" (1973, 21). Captivity narratives served as a useful vehicle for realizing the Puritan special mission in the New World by creating a permanent sense of crisis for settlers who had been lulled into a complacent existence. In the ministers' jeremiads, this complacency is what had caused the Indian ambush, and "whether it was a cabin, wagon train, stage coach, way station, fort or even town that was attacked, the whites were forever inside at home, while the outside was a hell that might someday become a home" (Engelhardt 1995, 40). Between 1673 and 1763, Castiglia estimates that Native Americans took 1041 Europeans hostage, and as of 1995, Buhite counted ninety-seven instances of Americans held hostage "while living or working abroad" (Castiglia 1996, 199; Buhite 1995, 205).

Although the structure of the captivity narrative changed over time, certain themes, symbols, and plot devices explained the larger meaning of captivity. First, captivity stories explained what lay beyond the boundaries of "civilized" life. Sewell argues that captivity stories should be considered ethnographies that reverse the upper hand temporarily enjoyed by the captors: "the captors may have controlled the brute events, but the captive controls the story telling" (1993, 42). The captive, in other words, brings a powerful observational stance to the culture of the Other and helps readers interpret the culture offered by the captive, however distorted.

Second, the assessments of the captive's surroundings and culture were usually an opportunity to "reinforce existing cultural categories

and conceptual systems of exclusion" (Ebersole 1995, 193). Captives confirmed and embellished commonsensical and matter-of-fact assumptions about Native Americans. Indians committing cannibalism and infanticide, for example, were stock in trade, as in Mary Rowlandson's wildly popular chronicle of her captivity in 1682. She described "hellhounds," who "smash out the brains of some children and shoot others" (Rowlandson 1994, 2). Such pervasive descriptions often developed during war and other stressful conditions, helped "fix particular (and ethnocentric) views of the Indian in the American imagination" for subsequent "political and ideological manipulation" by settlers (Ramsey 1994, 55).

Third, descriptions of the captors' behavior and culture at times, as Castiglia argues, signaled conflicts within settler culture, sometimes through captive identification and empathy with the captors' cause. Voicing sympathy for one's captors was a sign that the captive had "gone native," which constituted a major threat to settler security. A perceived irreversible regression to the side of the enemy suggested that the captive was "tempted to remain in the past, become a racial renegade, or on return, [may be] so altered by the experience of regression that the social responsibilities of adult life in civilization are no longer attractive" (Slotkin 1985, 63).

Fourth, settler claims as victims played an important role in decontextualizing conflicts. Questions about settler dispossession of native lands and the thievery and trickery that accompanied Western expansion could be set aside while the community focused on the immediate and obvious outrage of capture. A white American held against his or her will did not seem to need contextualizing. The act of capture and the legitimacy of the captors' cause were conflated and condemned. In addition to being at the mercy of "savage" Indians, Americans moving westward imagined themselves victims of the elements, promoters and con men, and the federal government. Limerick contends, "American history appears to be composed of one, continuous fabric, a fabric in which the figure of the victim is the dominant motif" (1987, 48).

Finally, captivity narratives were declarations of "what constitutes, or should constitute, the American character" (Denn 1980, 575). Mary Rowlandson's narrative demonstrated her piety and suffering; for revolutionary prisoners, it demonstrated their loyalty to the cause of independence and to each other (Denn 1980, 575). Captivity challenged self-image,

but it also guaranteed reinvention of the meaning of being a "true American." Nearly 300 years after Rowlandson's capture, Vietnam POWs were vital "spokesmen for the lost American self" (Gruner 1993, 23).

Captivity was an all-or-nothing story and affirmation of civilization against savagery, a boundary-drawing exercise that facilitated the nation-building project. The very survival of the community was at stake and capture meant war. Current conditions no longer fully resemble the seventeenth century nor even the Cold War era, when President Eisenhower could proclaim "Captive Nations Week," referring to those states behind the Iron Curtain living in a world that was half-free and half-slave. Transformations in war fighting, globalization, and the goals of foreign policy hinder the production of clear-cut and easy to follow stories of captivity. Threats have become more diffuse and subject to the cost-benefit analysis of risk rather than an exercise in nation-building and containment of settler society. Hostages are less likely to be the subject of war and more likely to be commodities exchanged; or, whole nations of women and children are victims of ethnic cleansing, at the mercy of dictators, or debased by feudal regimes. This chapter traces the arc from the sturdy old story of hostage dramas to the global model of humanitarian rescue and release.

The plot devices of the captivity narrative remain powerful but the key players in the formula evolved, particularly after the Iranian hostage crisis and the end of the Cold War. President H.W. Bush announced a new world order, with the US at the helm of a civilized system governed by rules the US helped shape. The rules marked a new binary to replace the Cold War, between "civilization" and an array of rogue states (North Korea, Iran, and assorted others), an aspiring Hitler (Saddam Hussein, Slobodon Milosevic), and in the waning years of the Cold War mad dogs (Qadaffi), and strongmen (Manuel Noriega). Their reigns entailed the savage captivity of the entire population that deserved (selective) rescue either singly or in concert with a coalition of the willing. Intensifying domestic commodification of childhood aided parallel renderings of the world's children suffering from the ravages of invasion (Kuwait), ethnic cleansing (Kosovo), civil war and state collapse (Somalia), and ongoing war (Bosnia, Haiti). Darda notes the crucial role that fifteen-year-old Nayirah played in giving false testimony to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus about Kuwaiti babies ripped from incubators and left to die on a cold floor (2017). Whereas Reagan imagined the horror of children

growing up in the communist world not knowing God, post-Cold War scenarios avowed, as in Nayirah's testimony, to be "saving babies from a Hitler-like menace" (Darda 2017, 80).

## NEGOTIATING WITH CAPTIVITY NARRATIVES: AN OVERVIEW

Nowhere is the enduring story of captivity more prominent than the Iranian hostage crisis. After the flight of the authoritarian Shah in January 1979, who had been in power for twenty-six years and was a loyal client of the US, revolutionary students seized the embassy briefly in February of 1979. In the fall of 1979, after learning of the Shah's impending visit to the US for cancer treatment, students and other activists scaled the walls of the embassy on the morning of November 4, 1979, and refused to surrender their control over it or its personnel until the Shah was returned to Iran for trial. In a daring escape via the Canadian embassy (and the CIA, as somewhat accurately depicted in the film *Argo*), six US personnel escaped Iran. In a gesture of solidarity toward US women and minorities, the leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, announced on November 18, 1979, the release of seven white women and ten black males. For the next 444 days, with one exception (Richard Queen, allowed to return home after suffering signs of multiple sclerosis), fifty-two Americans were held hostage in Iran.

This chapter begins with a reading of the Iranian hostage crisis as a complicated captivity narrative as told by six former hostages who have written books about their captivity; one hostage who co-wrote his account with his wife, and one who has written an extended article about his experience (Daugherty 1998; Kennedy 1986; Koob 1982; Laingen 1992; Queen 1981; Scott 1984; Sickmann 1982; Rosen and Rosen 1982). In addition, *The New York Times* published two lengthy accounts of "the hostages' story," and the key turning points in the fourteen-month crisis (McFadden 1981; Smith et al. 1981). McFadden's *No Hiding Place: Inside Report on the Hostage Crisis*, contains both stories with a bit more detail than the originals (1981). Reading first-person accounts of this event as an updated captivity narrative demonstrates the continuing vitality of myths of American exceptionalism when it came to understanding Third World revolutions after Vietnam.

On the other hand, there are tensions within many of the accounts that complicate reading them as simply replicating the themes of earlier captivity narratives. There are moments during the crisis where the hostages

show empathy for the student revolutionaries and the aims of the new Iranian government. The Iranian hostage crisis was the last full-blown "POW-like" story of the post-Vietnam era. After that, the grip of captivity narratives as a contest between civilization and savagery began to lose its mesmerizing hold. To be certain, politicians learned lessons from President Carter's failed "Rose Garden" strategy (to refrain from campaigning as long as the hostages were in Iran, which he ended in April 1980) and subsequent presidents avoided using the "h-word" to deflect attention from a captivity story. However, more important, the capture-hostage-rescue troika came unglued because of the changing stories about the victims, their locations and context, and the characteristics of the audience, itself influenced by media. With the emergence of the Kofi Annan-inspired doctrine of "responsibility to protect," the older frontier story of captivity was overshadowed by a new one guided by humanitarian communication about the duty, when politically possible, to rescue whole nations (often seemingly composed of only women and children).

While there were efforts to portray the medical students in Grenada as captives, there were disputes about the actual amount danger they faced, and their status as hostages had little sticking power. The Iran-contra affair marked an important shift in the captivity narrative and disrupted a crucial aspect of both black-and-white morality and settler innocence that had been a mainstay of the genre. After vowing never to negotiate with terrorists, the Reagan administration turned its entrepreneurial attention to doing just that, despite the fact that commentators by the mid-1980s were identifying Iran as a major source of Middle Eastern terrorism. A writer for *Reader's Digest*, for example, asserted that Iran had delivered the explosives used to bomb US barracks in Beirut in 1983; he was alarmed that the US had not taken action against Iran in the wake of the attack (Adams 1985, 40–41). Adams did not know it then, but in 1985, the US was trying to sell weapons to Iran in order to obtain the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. The growing privatization of foreign policy during the Reagan era made a clear-cut hostage drama involving opposed states difficult to present in the media. Most accounts focused on the sheer boredom and daily degradations of being a hostage. By the mid-1980s, in other words, hostage-taking as well as hostage deal-making had become more standard fare. One outraged commentator noted that Terry Anderson's release after six years of captivity was carried out by a Bush-Baker team of "fervent deal-makers," ready to negotiate with Syria "despite its longstanding support of terrorists" (Robbins 1991, 6). Ajami

recognized the business acumen of the other side: "It was a joint Iranian-Syrian enterprise, with Lebanese subcontractors" (Ajami 1991, 22). Stories of hostage-taking were also generally dwarfed by the growing concern with Middle East terrorism cum hostage-taking by the mid-1980s, itself described in *U.S. News and World Report* as a "local industry" (Chaze et al. 1985, 27). With the release of seventeen US hostages in December 1991 *Newsweek*'s Nordland did a cost-benefit analysis. In exchange for the seventeen, there were, among other things, eight Western hostages murdered, 278 million dollars released to Iran, and at least one terrorist freed in France (Nordland et al. 1991, 38). The question was not whether these hostages were true Americans, but whether the deals were worth it.

The 1990–1991 Gulf War marked a further weakening of the grip of old-fashioned captivity dramas. Held hostage throughout the fall of 1990, Americans were captives alongside British, Polish, Russian, and other citizens (approximately 3500 people from other countries were captives throughout Iraq and Kuwait). These "human shields," as Saddam Hussein called them, garnered media attention, but their status was ambiguous. As private citizens, they were pursuing their own economic interests in the employ of the Iraqi oil industry, which by 1990 had become a crucial circuit in an increasingly global economy. US dependence on Middle Eastern oil had grown throughout the Reagan years; by the end of his presidency, 41% of the oil consumed domestically came from abroad (Bacevich 2008, 43). Commentators routinely noted that the conflict in the Gulf had "severe implications for the entire world's standard of living" and the importance of Saudi oil led to calls for the US to consider establishing a permanent presence in Saudi Arabia, "a trip-wire force of say 25,000 troops" (Kramer 1990a, 19). The global economy had changed considerably, with dramatic changes occurring in capital mobility, production processes, and as Smith put it, a virtual revolution in "money, messages, and images" (1997, 175). *Time*'s report that 150,000 East European, Arab, and Pakistani workers fled to Jordan after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait made the importance of both remittances and global uneven development obvious (Magnuson 1990, 25). The global economy and deterritorialized capitalism were a different context less amenable to defining conditions as beleaguered US citizens being held in an embassy (staffed by State Department, military, and CIA personnel), but by oil industry and related workers from around the world working for capital *and* country. The end of the war brought a bonanza for US companies. In March 1991, Bechtel

Corporation won a fifteen-million-dollar contract to rebuild Kuwait's oil industry, with Fluor (based in California) and Halliburton winning big contracts (Greenwald 1991, 42).

The post-Gulf War sagas of POW captivity, in the case of Somalia, and the escape from near captivity in Bosnia, contained residues of familiar stories of capture, evasion, and rescue, as the cases of Michael Durant and Scott O'Grady demonstrate. (The latter saga produced O'Grady's book *Return with Honor* and a loosely based film *Behind Enemy Lines.*) While affirming their *bona fides* as talented and professional soldiers and all-American troopers, their ephemeral stories took place in a context of seeming chaos with no clear battle lines and enemies that shifted; the clear boundaries that captivity narratives rely upon had become blurred. In the humanitarian wars of the 1990s entire countries, and particularly the children of those countries, were captives of warlords and dictators, and the victims of famine, ethnic cleansing, and displacement. The evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect were undertaken with mixed motives, unevenly applied, and often failed, and yet with September 11 it was brought to bear on the liberation of women and children from the grip of the Taliban's rule and then on the liberation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein and his diabolical sons. The rest of this chapter provides more detailed evidence of how the bounded territory that captivity stories for so long depended competes with an imagined world of suffering people (especially women and children) deserving humanitarian rescue.

## True Americans: First-Person Accounts from the Hostages in Iran

There are a number of first-person hostage accounts of the Iranian hostage crisis that produce seemingly authoritative anthropological and ethnographic accounts describing the "Persian mind" and Iranian politics. Charles Scott's *Pieces of the Game* chronicles his career in the Army's Foreign Specialist Program where he learned Farsi and "for the next twenty years developed an understanding of the Iranian psyche, mores, and customs" (1984, 8). Scott is so confident in his ethnographic skills that he narrates the life of one of his captors, "Akbar," titling the section about Akbar's early life, "The Making of a Terrorist" (Scott 1984, 74). Here Scott notes that although historians remain divided on the Shah's

chances for victory in his power struggle with Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953, Akbar, like many Iranians, "blamed the United States for the failure of his Nationalists to win in August of 1953" (73). Akbar, in other words, was a resentful Iranian nationalist unwilling to concede that Mossadeq's assertion of control over Iranian oil was a debatable gambit. Instead of recognizing the contribution of the US-UK-backed coup to Iranian resentment and suspicion about external interference in the wake of the 1979 revolution, Scott dismisses such understandable sentiments as emotionally driven and misplaced.

When Scott returns to Iran in September 1979 he makes it clear that the Iran he knew in 1967 as an assistant military attaché had disappeared. Engaging in what Rosaldo (1989) has called "imperialist nostalgia," a location of both innocence and detachment from structures of domination, Scott claims a place of privilege vis-à-vis "his" Iran and laments how it changed with the revolution. He remarks that at the airport in Tehran "the relative neatness and discipline of the Shah's era were gone without a trace" (160). He describes avenues "strewn with garbage," an "aura of abandonment approaching anarchy," and Iranians who "seemed to have taken the departure of the Shah as a license to do exactly as they pleased" (161–162). He only spots "his" Iran while hiking through the mountains, passing through villages that "looked as if they came unchanged from the twelfth century":

> For these poor, illiterate mountain people little had changed in hundreds of years. The revolution did not appear to have touched them, and they were friendly and went out of their way to welcome us … This was the Iran I remembered. This was the Iran I loved. This was the culture that had won my heart and my respect during my trips to the countryside years ago.

Scott's mountain hike takes place in the brief interlude between his return to Iran and the embassy takeover and reflects a yearning for the Iran that he used to know, the one he brought into the twentieth century (14). Scott recites Farsi poetry and from the Koran to his captors, claiming a sophisticated understanding of Iran that matches or exceeds theirs, and he condemns the revolution, "Who would want to be an Iranian in this screwed-up land your revolution has created?" (205).

*Charge D'Affaire* Bruce Laingen, in *Yellow Ribbon*, claims that the US has been a victim and scapegoat for Iranian revolutionaries, which in turn "reflects the preoccupations of most Iranians with themselves, with their

sense of insecurity, and yet also their enormous pride and sense of superiority over their neighbors" (1992, 61). He finds Iranian references to US intervention to be "wearisome," and at several points in his diary he recommends that Iranians work more instead of holding mass demonstrations and "another day of mass fervor" (127, 138). Laingen portrays himself as a rational envoy who believes in hardheaded and realistic diplomacy, while revolutionary Iran is simply not amenable to normal state-to-state relations.

What Scott and Laingen do is reassure themselves and anyone reading about the hostage story about the benevolent intent of the US in the Middle East, thereby slipping into the role of victims of an Iranian backlash in the wake of the Iranian revolution. In a commonly used assessment that things are worse in Iran than before the revolution both writers avoid discussion of Iran's crucial role maintaining US power in the Middle East through most of the twentieth century and the strategic role that the authoritarian Shah played in keeping oil prices stable and the coffers of US weapons manufacturers full. Missing was an opportunity for frank evaluation of US foreign policy, replaced by condemnation of a revolution that threatens those same interests.

The experience of captivity reassured the hostages that they were true Americans and they were proud to be US citizens. Richard Queen reported that on one of his escorted trips to the bathroom he saw decorations for a Marine Corps ball in one of the embassy closets, and he thought, here is "the flag of my country, still here no matter who happened to be occupying the ballroom at the moment" (1981, 79). Daugherty explained that after his release he and a number of other hostages spent a brief time decompressing at West Point. When he dined with the Corps of Cadets, he noted that their intelligence and motivation made him proud to "be an American while in the company of these outstanding men and women" (198, 43). Rocky Sickmann's minister wrote in the prologue of his book, "Rocky's diary is about survival. It is about faith; it is about America" (1982, viii). After President Carter made some brief remarks to the hostages in Weisbaden, Sickmann explained, "it really made me feel good to be an American—anybody that's not an American I feel sorry for, because there's nobody better than us" (320). The hostages confirm that the belief in American exceptionalism begins with the personal traits of its citizens, defined by loyal camaraderie, and a superior character capable of besting any foe. Like many foreign policy crises, the hostage crisis rallied both the hostages and many back home rooting for their release.

Print media dwelled more on the terror of captivity—and hence the barbarity of the Iranians—much more than why they were being held hostage. After the release of thirteen hostages in November 1979, *People* described their physical depravations and psychological dependence: Talbott characterized the hostages as "totally at the whim of their captors" (1979, 21). In *Newsweek* there was an illustration of an "Iranian gunman" in an army uniform interrogating a captive who cowered in a chair. The caption, like the one in *People*, read, "They were our mothers and fathers" (1979, 50). *Time* quoted the director of Michigan's department of public health, who stated, "When someone captures you, he places you in an infantile position" (1979, 49). Statements about the helplessness of the hostages seemed to merge with statements about American helplessness, with magazine covers blaring "Has America Lost Its Clout?" (*Newsweek* November 26, 1979) and "Blackmailing the U.S." (*Time* November 19, 1979). A caption from *People* intoned, "The daily drama of American hostages in Iran was a symbol of American impotence" ("Failure" 1980, 31).

There was frequent near-hysteria surrounding the prospects of the hostages "going native." "Psychologists believe," *Time* warned, that the Stockholm syndrome, defined as "akin to brainwashing" and entailing "identification with the aggressor" had taken hold of the hostages (1979, 59) Richard Queen verified after his release "they were trying to turn us against our government" (Ma 1980, 50). Three weeks into their captivity, *Newsweek* reported that some administration officials believed that the hostages were experiencing "classic brainwashing in many ways more insidious from what we saw in Vietnam and Korea" (Williams and Harper 1979, 50).

At the same time, popular media reached for evidence that the hostages had not "gone native" and were gamely resisting their captors. In January 1980, *Newsweek* reported that letters from the hostages "demonstrated a healthy contempt for their captors" ("Letters from Teheran" 1980, 50). One of the clergy allowed to meet with the captives at Christmas in 1980 reported, "About ten of the hostages were clearly rebellious and tended to say snappy things to their captors" (Deming et al. 1980 23). Released hostages regaled readers with their acts of defiance. *Time* reported that Malcolm Kalp tried to escape several times and was given solitary confinement; Donald Hohman fasted and earned solitary confinement as well. Blucker boasted that he had a "shouting match with the guards about every day" (McFadden et al. 1981, 33).

The hostage crisis also became an important staging ground for displays of American patriotism back home. Richard Hermining planted a flag for each day of his son's captivity, and *The New York Times*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* pictured the rows of flags and mentioned the ritual in a number of their stories (*Newsweek* December 29, 1980, 23; *Time* March 3, 1980; *The New York Times* February 29, 1980). The addition of one flag for each day of captivity was a reminder of the plight of the hostages, and as the superintendent of the park in Pennsylvania put it, "If it takes a thousand flags, we'll get 'em" (*Time* January 5, 1981, 47). Two wives of the hostages, Louisa Kennedy and Penne Laingen, co-founded the Family Liaison Action Group (FLAG), choosing the acronym because of its powerful symbolism. In her afterward to her husband's memoir, Louisa Kennedy explained:

> We noted that Old Glory seemed eerily emblematic of the hostages themselves. There were fifty men and women held captive in the Embassy compound, representing the fifty bright stars in the flag. Thirteen Americans, representing its broad stripes, had been released in late 1979, and Bruce Laingen and two colleagues-confined in the upper room of the Iranian Foreign Ministry—symbolized the flag's three colors. (Kennedy 1986, 228)

McAlister argues that the hostage crisis worked to construct the US as a "nation of innocents," a family under siege, and the crisis was relentlessly presented as a simple story of human suffering (2001, 201; 209). While it is the case that the hostage crisis was often framed in the benign language of emotions and personality, which in turn neutralized the politics behind the seizure of the embassy and the back-story of prior US intervention in Iran, the long captivity also allowed for the emergence of discordant voices from both family members and the hostages themselves. Family members often spoke in anguished as well as angry tones about the crisis, and their voices were the first of what would become a prominent pattern in crisis captivity coverage: the home front and the emotional identification of everyday Americans with what was happening abroad. The emotional connection gave a number of family members a privileged opportunity to criticize US foreign policy. In March 1980, Bonnie Graves, wife of hostage John Graves, called for an inquiry into the Shah's crimes and for an official US apology to Iran for its support of the Shah: "It takes a strong nation and a strong person to be able to say 'I'm sorry,' she declared. 'I hope America hasn't fallen so low that it can't do that'" (Mathews et al.

1980, 26). The mother of twenty-year-old hostage Kevin Hermening, Barbara Timm, flew to Tehran despite the travel ban and managed to meet with her son for forty-five minutes. While stressing her personal interest in seeing her son, she also explained, "We want to understand what happened to make them take over our embassy, why their feelings are deep toward the Shah, what they have against the American people" (Borders 1980, A1). Rocky Sickmann's mother told a reporter that she and two other mothers of hostages were thinking of calling for an international tribunal to try the Shah but later dropped the idea as unworkable (Wald 1980, A20). The hostage crisis provided a way for families to comment on US foreign policy in a way that did not require expert knowledge and presented unvarnished emotional reactions to larger foreign policy concerns. Furthermore, the fact that Barbara Timm could fly to Tehran and ask to meet with her son shrank the literal and metaphorical distance between captors and captives.

The hostage crisis provided another moment for the revolutionary leadership to criticize the US. On November 19, 1979, Khomeini announced that because "women have a special status in Islam" and blacks "have spent ages under American pressure and tyranny," all but two white women were released (Kathryn Koob and Elizabeth Ann Swift). Upon their release, some of the hostages expressed empathy with their captors. Budget officer Terry Robinson declared that while the embassy seizure was against both international law and custom, "based on their beliefs, their feelings with regard to the actions of the Shah, they feel totally justified" (Strasser et al. 1980, 47). Khomeini's announcement and the subsequent release of the thirteen hostages invited transnational identifications across state boundaries between third world peoples, African Americans, and women. Jesse Jackson argued that the release showed that "blacks were the bridges to the poor nations of the world—poor people identify with us" (Dionne 1979). Working against that gesture was the clarion call for minorities to affirm their identity with the US. Vernon Jordan declared that "my view is that black Marines were there not as blacks but as Americans and to make a distinction, it seems to me, is a terribly cynical act," while Gloria Steinem thought the release confirmed Khomeini's inability "to treat people democratically, as individuals," as if this were a widespread practice in the US (Dionne 1979).

Hostage Bruce Laingen in his memoir writes about grappling with the revolution throughout 1980 and concludes, "Must I not concede that a good deal of what has happened here is normal and that we have, through-

out own inability or failure to understand what was evolving, brought it upon ourselves?" (1992, 90). Laingen avers that "no one can question the depth of feeling of many Iranians about the misdeeds of the Shah and his entourage; no one questions Iran's right to seek redress or to pursue the Shah's extradition" (141). He even suggests he would support a public airing of US covert intervention and overt support of the Shah. Similarly, Foreign Service officer Moorehead Kennedy lamented that Iranians "blamed the Westerner for whatever happens," but admitted that the blame "contained a kernel of truth" (118). Kennedy found the students to be optimistic and idealistic, and when it came to the history of US-Iranian relations "while they were often mistaken on the details, there was much that the students told us that was essentially correct" (126). It would be surprising if Foreign Service officers failed to recognize the depth of Iranian nationalism after years of domestic interference in Iranian politics and support for the Shah. It was the embassy seizure, they insisted, that made the reckoning impossible.

Kathyrn Koob provides the most complex, often positive reading of the revolution and the most criticism of US foreign policy toward Iran. She told *The New York Times* that she thought it was "ill-advised" to allow the Shah into the US for cancer treatments, and she "sympathized with the aims, if not the means, of the Iranian revolution," saying that "I think the Shah made a lot of mistakes. If he personally was not cruel, there was a great deal of cruelty done during his reign" (McFadden et al. 1981, 142–143). In her book, Koob explains that she intentionally sought the directorship of the Iran-American society: "I felt the revolution was potentially good for Iran, and I was intrigued by the process by which the nation would rebuild itself" (1982, 16). She compares the embassy during the siege as "almost like a scene out of the sixties in the United States. A group of college kids has suddenly come to power … they were gaining more and more control" (38). During one of her interrogations she thinks, "Why these kids are … so very young, doing something they think is terribly important" (42).

In a perverse way, the focus on the personal and emotional reactions of individuals on the home front meant that the government could not quite achieve full control over the crisis and thus a number of the hostages' families (and later the hostages who wrote memoirs) deviated in important ways from the official script. The media providing hostages and their relatives with a platform introduced discordant voices (weakened of course by loud calls for revenge), and signaled the possibility that future hostage

incidents would produce calls for negotiations with captors. The suffering of relatives and the failure of rescue missions would compete with stories about the treachery of their captors. (This in fact did happen with the rise of ISIS hostage-taking between 2014 and 2016.) The Iranian hostage crisis was a sustained media exposure of the myriad emotions experienced by families back home, some of whom expressed anger about US foreign policy, validating the anger expressed in other quarters (alternative media and political opponents) about past and present US foreign policy. *Nightline*'s blanket coverage and relentless *People* updates on the royal family and fretting hostage families set a personal tone for subsequent hostage crises. At the same time, because the criticism came from individuals its effects tended to be ephemeral or absorbed into a standard account of how free speech in the US afforded every person the right to criticize government policy. The Iranian hostage crisis accelerated a process whereby individualized complaints and criticism could at times get a hearing, but they could also be foils for a defense of the US as a bastion of free speech and exemplar of open debate about the government's foreign policy aims.

## Held Hostage by *People*

The Iranian hostage crisis was the first sustained coverage of a foreign policy crisis by *People*, and its twenty-two stories presaged a distinctive entertainment-style angle on the story that set the stage for the way the magazine would sporadically cover foreign policy for the next twenty-five years. (There were thirty-five stories about the first Gulf War, for example, that followed a pattern similar to the Iranian hostage crisis and close to 100 *in the first year* after the September 11 terrorist attacks.)

One tactic in *People*'s arsenal was to decontextualize the cause of the students' storming of the embassy through an examination of the impact of it upon the Shah of Iran and his family in exile, who provided their point of view in eight stories while safely ensconced in villas and Park Avenue triplexes. Reflecting its awe of celebrity wealth and lifestyles, reporters followed the Shah and his family from Iran, to *Contadora*, to New York. The Shah's wife (called shahbanou, *People* noted in an aside for armchair anthropologists, which means "shah's consort") was interviewed in the December 17, 1979, issue and despite evidence of massive wealth and no hardship, she described each day in exile as a "fresh struggle" (p. 48). Interviewed again in January 1980, in a villa on the island of

*Contadora*, the Shah and shabanou denied he had tortured and executed thousands of his opponents, insisting that most of them were "terrorists" (Desaunois 1980, 21). After the winter holidays their children would all return to colleges and boarding schools in the US, and with the help of an Iranian professor would learn about their country every day, presumably to ready them to take the helm once the revolution was derailed. The Shah's sister was interviewed in her Park Avenue triplex, and after admitting to ten million dollars in assets, and suffering with a lady in waiting, a cook and a butler, she flatly explained that "if Nixon were President, my brother would still be on the throne" (Chambers 1980, 134).

Khomeini, of course, was a mysterious specimen, a religious fanatic, or a lunatic. *People* turned to an expert to describe Khomeini's politics. Jerome W. Clinton, Associate Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, explained the Sunni-Shia schism in Iran and conveyed the depth of opposition to the Shah's rule (an accurate challenge to the Shah and his family's account of their benevolent leadership). Nevertheless, he explained that people supported Khomeini "because there was no one else" (Rein 1979, 66). This brief stab at conveying the complexity of the revolution without making an effort to understand Khomeini's populist and religious appeal intensified when *People* chose Khomeini as one of the twenty-five most intriguing people of 1979. He was described as a "fanatical ruler leading his nation to chaos," and a "tyrannical theocracy." The short article managed to highlight his anti-Semitism and possible contact with Soviet agents. With this tone of coverage, the verdict rendered on Khomeini was anti-climactic; the country had "hardly been saved" by his leadership (*People* 1979).

The second angle that People took to the crisis was a relentless focus on its personal dimension, particularly the suffering the hostages endured and their likely state upon their return to the US. The magazine gave a grim account of what the hostages endured during the initial days of captivity, as told by one of the personnel released November 19, 1979, from which the reader, implicitly generalized to all of the hostages and their likely treatment during their entire captivity,

> The hostages were blindfolded, handcuffed or tied to chairs for up to 16 hours a day, isolated from one another and left entirely to the mercy of their guards. "They were our mothers and fathers," embassy budget officer Terry Robinson said on his release. "We had to ask for everything." (Hall 1979, 39)

*People* turned to professionals who had treated Vietnam POWs, implying similarities between the circumstances and personnel in a war and in an embassy. Psychologist Charles Figley told *People* that he recommended a decompression period for the hostages: "We know that from the experience of Vietnam veterans—they were out of the jungle and back on the street in twenty-four hours" (Witt 1980, 76). Families of the hostages got as much coverage as the speculations about the psychological state of the hostages. Relentlessly personalizing their ordeal offered an important glimmer toward therapeutic culture, which relies upon "the conservative language of coping, adaptation, and restoration of a previously existing order" (Cloud 2014). Hostage relatives were pictured stateside grimacing, crying, and talking on the phone. One hostage, Pat Lee, recounted her life without Gary Lee, her husband and a hostage. With the words "Coping" above the title, Lee recounted her lost weight, tension headaches, vitamin B deficiency, and wavering faith (1980, 39–40). McAlister argues that the hostage crisis helped to construct an altered nationalism conveying the family under siege and insisting on the necessity of retaining the family as a site for the nonpolitical life for individuals (2001, 200–201). Family motifs were indeed prominent in media coverage of the hostage crisis, but *People* suggested that we revel and relish the personal and the familial and promised an authentic examination of the emotional, private, and personal side of the crisis. It not only deflected attention from the politics of the hostage crisis, it offered to funnel to readers what "really" mattered. Moreover, what really mattered was how the drama affected *their* daily lives so you could imagine how it would affect *yours.*

Finally, *People* portrayed government in personal terms as well, with few references to policy debates or ideological positions. Cyrus Vance resigned his post as Secretary of State in April 1980 because of a "feud" with Zbigniev Brzezinski ("The Iran Raid Claims" 1980, 32). *People* gave the failed April 1980 rescue attempt an up-close story via Charles Beckwith, the commander of the mission. The fact that he was "filled with sadness and dismay" about the botched effort, that he sat and cried when he learned of the helicopter crashes, that he was wounded in Vietnam, and that overall he possessed an "aura of mystery" was as close as *People* got to the debacle ("Failure has No Fathers "1980, 30–31). The release of the hostages occurred almost completely through the vantage point of Edmund Muskie. His son Steve provided photos of him catnapping on a couch, consulting with President Carter, in the operations room, and kiss-

ing the wife of a hostage. It was Muskie who led the "virtuoso performance of public servants at the highest level" and not the Algerians—in Algeria, for *People,* Muskie was at the mercy of mercurial Arabs (Clifford et al. 1981, 24).

In reading these accounts from hostages in Iran and the emergence of a distinctive media approach describing their captivity it is indeed the case that their rhetorical strategies, some of their conceptual categories, and frequently their styles of writing share what Spurr, an analyst of colonial writing, found in his research. Colonial writers constructed a "coherent representation out of the strange and (to the writer) often incomprehensible realities confronted in the non- Western world" (1993, 3). Most of them offer readers a view of the Iranian revolution that confirms the superiority of Western-style government and they reinforce perceptions of ineradicable differences between "the West" and other areas of the world. They help to affirm the alleged benevolence of US power abroad.

Yet, the intense media coverage of the plight of the hostages and their families helped set an important precedent for future coverage of hostage dramas. The private, personal travails of the hostages became an important component of a foreign policy crisis that received sustained media coverage for over a year. Family life could now be used to garner empathy and understanding, much in the way that the families of Vietnam POWs were covered, but by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the coverage was at once more intimate and compelling. A family facing an emotional crisis became an ongoing object of interest, an expressive dimension of foreign policy.

Ultimately, the Carter administration did pay a ransom for the hostages by agreeing to unfreeze Iranian assets totaling approximately nine billion in US banks and returning some of the Shah's wealth, a part of the Algiers Accords (Gwertzman 1981, A1). Furthermore, the US government agreed to bar the hostages from seeking damages for their imprisonment. As of 2011, in a class action suit the hostages and their relatives were seeking compensation totaling 10,000 dollars per day of captivity. One former hostage, Barry Rosen, complained that it was not fair that companies could get compensation for Iranian seizures but the hostages could not (Wald 2012, A15). Rosen was right that payments for captivity are now quite common across the world. If hostage-taking can be a boon to the captors, why not the captives? In fact, shortly after the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, paying for the release of hostages by the Reagan administration's "arms for hostages" deals in Lebanon in the mid-1980s made hostage-taking more transactional. This tactic in foreign policy

("making deals, "as Donald Trump would say) helped weaken that "sturdy genre," the captivity narrative, because being the object of a deal was increasingly incompatible with a myth of national innocence.

## HOSTAGE-TAKING AND FOREIGN POLICY AFTER IRAN

Ronald Reagan insisted that there was no comparison between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. The Soviets slaughtered innocent men and women, Reagan explained, while the US was carrying out a "rescue mission, plain and simple" (Reagan 1983, 1595). American medical students seemed to concur when they told a *Time* reporter "they considered themselves in effect hostages on the island" (Magnuson et al. 1983, 28). Reagan explained that the "nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated," and "we weren't about to let the Iran crisis repeat itself, only this time, in our own neighborhood in the Caribbean" (Reagan 1983, 1411, 1541).

This description of the drama of captivity and rescue quickly got undermined, the beginning of a trend in which the alarm and panic accompanying captivity would emerge from saturation coverage and raise questions about the veracity of the spin accompanying war. At the time of the invasion, the medical school's chancellor argued that the students were not in danger until the invasion actually began, and he warned students that they would not receive a tuition refund if they left the island (Magnuson et al. 1983, 25). Another *Time* reporter pointed out that an immigration officer told him that he spotted a US medical student on the way to a hospital to volunteer, an indication that the students were not in danger (Diederich 1983, 30).

A year later at the anniversary of the invasion it seemed that Reagan himself knew that the hostage scenario had been debunked. Always the master of anecdote, he told the story of a young lieutenant marine who wrote to the *Armed Forces Journal* about the oft-repeated line that Grenada produced the most nutmeg of any place on earth, and the marine wanted to break the code about the significance of this:

> [Laughter] So, he said, in breaking the code, number one, that is true—they produce more nutmeg than any other spot on Earth. He said, number two, the Soviets and the Cubans are trying to take Grenada. And number three, you can't have good eggnog without nutmeg. [Laughter] And number four, you can't have Christmas without eggnog. And number five, the

> Soviets and the Cubans were trying to steal Christmas. [Laughter] And number six, we stopped them. [Laughter] (Reagan 1984)

In putting the alleged Grenada-Cuba-Soviet collusion on a par with communists stealing Christmas, even facetiously with artful humor, Reagan was in effect admitting that Grenada hardly posed a security threat. Even in the short time the medical students were in danger, however, the Grenada rescue story also became a personal saga for the 800 students in danger of becoming hostages, and a photo opportunity as they gratefully landed in the US, with one student falling to his knees and kissing the tarmac. Many of the students visited the White House on the first-year anniversary of the invasion to express gratitude to Reagan, a reinforcement, however weak, of the rescue narrative.

On the campaign trail in 1980, Reagan had charged that the hostage crisis in Iran was a "humiliation and disgrace," and he argued against a US apology to the government in Iran (King 1980, A1; Kneeland 1980, A1). In January 1986, however, Reagan signed a presidential finding authorizing the sale of weapons and spare parts to Iran through "selected friendly foreign liaison services," with one purpose being "the release of American hostages in Beirut" (Kornbluh and Byrne 1993, 235). Instead of being the innocent victims of savage barbarians, hostages became the objects of calculative foreign policy. As Reagan put it at a press conference, as long as the kidnappers were not making a profit, there was no problem in using third parties such as Israel to secure the release of the hostages (1987a, 262). He later stressed, "I have often said, I didn't think it was trading arms for hostages when the hostages—or kidnappers—weren't getting anything" (Reagan 1987b, 429).

The Iran-contra hearings revealed, however, that the arms-for-hostages foreign policy did make profits for some. Even though the then Representative Dick Cheney asserted that Oliver North demonstrated that "there's a marine who cares, who spent his life doing what he thought was right the country," *Newsweek* wondered if North saw the Iran operation as a "chance to get rich" (Morganthau et al. 1987, 18–19). One associate of North's established a 200-thousand-dollar personal account for him, and Richard Secord authorized the addition of a 16,000-dollar security system in North's home, with *Newsweek* again posing the pertinent question: was North "a hero or profiteer?" (1987, 19).

Iran-contra marked an important shift in the larger meaning of hostage-taking and captivity that had played such an important role historically.

Long before Donald Trump characterized the Iranian agreement of 2015 a "terrible deal" (Trump 2015, 39), hostages were already less than innocent victims but rather the subject of *deals* with the enemy. Reagan complained that after the initial shipment of 500 TOW missiles to Iran, the Iranians were suddenly "demanding more arms and more deals as to what would be necessary for the hostages and so forth" (Reagan 1987b, 428). Some journalists wondered whether the deals were worth it. Hostages were no longer icons of innocence but objects, perhaps even commodities, and subject to barter and exchange.

Second, hostages historically have spoken with authoritative voices that legitimized American power and affirmed the American nation. In the hostage crises during the Reagan administration, hostages were one link in an extended commodity chain that included private bank accounts, profiteering, mercenaries, and drugs. The National Security Archive, for example, acquired classified documents outlining the role that Iranian weapons sales played in fueling the "contra-cocaine" connection in Central America. In June 1985 North noted in his diary that retired Air Force General Richard Secord told him that weapons in a Honduran warehouse were partially bought with drug money (National Security Archive, no date, 2). Hostage-taking in the Middle East in the mid-1980s became a murky tale of international intrigue involving a truly multinational cast of characters, arms dealers, and Israeli intelligence and US officials—all linked in nefarious and murky ways with what Theodore Draper called "Reagan's junta" (1987). One administration official summed up the confusing nature of the various deals: "It's like a movie that's pretty good and exciting, but the ending leaves you totally disappointed because it doesn't wrap up the plot well" (Morganthau et al. 1987, 13). Captivity narratives historically served to demarcate clear boundaries; privatized foreign policy has blurry edges. Hostages in Lebanon were never solely US citizens either. (This would also be the case in the Gulf War of 1990–1991.) Both the hostage-takers and the hostages themselves signaled a global rather than national threat.

Finally, hostages either were less likely to be akin to the women captives of the nineteenth century or feminized vulnerable men in need of proving their manhood in spite of the humiliation of capture. Hostages had become cogs in a global economy, as interchangeable as other commodities. Portrayals of terrorism as an industry in the Middle East paralleled the arms-for-hostages scheme as a "stand alone commercial venture," that would ultimately be a "revenue producer" according to Oliver North (quoted in Alterman 2004, 277). Hostage-taking no longer corresponded

with boundary-producing state practices that allowed for drawing bright and sharp lines between Americans and others. Instead of creating the "polemical certainty" of the classic captivity narrative, they joined the rest of the confusing and jumbled foreign policy story (Smith-Rosenberg 1993, 179).

The Iran-contra scandal in turn shaped the discourse surrounding the hostage human shields held throughout the fall of 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bush administration officials were at first reluctant to use the "H-word" (as they called it) for the approximately 3100 Americans in Iraq and Kuwait (Freedman and Karsch 1993, 135). At an August 11, 1990, news conference with President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker said he thought, "it would be a mistake to characterize it as a hostage situation and use a word like that since we are in a discussion with respect to this matter" (Bush 1990a, 1126). Three days later, Bush characterized them as "inconvenienced people who want to get out" (Bush 1990b, 1134). At an August 30, 1990, press conference Bush declared, "we cannot permit hostage-taking to shape the foreign policy of this country, and I won't permit it to do that" (Bush 1990c, 1179).

The hostage story in the Gulf failed to garner the amount and type of coverage one might have predicted. For example, *Newsweek* published "The Wrong Place, the Wrong Time," with thirty-two pictures and short blurbs on a number of the American hostages in Iraq and Kuwait. Being in the wrong place at the wrong time hardly warrants a focus on the heroic qualities of the captives, as much hostage-focused journalism is wont to do. Being at the wrong place at the wrong time is akin to a lightning strike or some other seemingly random accident. The hostages in Iraq and Kuwait were not innocent Americans subjected to (allegedly) brutal treatment. As Lawrence points out, the hostages in Iraq and Kuwait were there for their own educational or economic reasons, while the hostages in Iran were doing their duty at the American embassy (1994, 44). Concerns about American innocence shifted instead from hostages to children, in Kuwait, Iraq, and the US.

The babies left to die as Iraqi soldiers ripped them out of incubators is one of the most notorious public relations stunts of the Gulf War and turned out to be decisive in shaping public opinion in favor of war. Children figured in other ways beyond incubators, though. With respect to women and children in Iraq, Margaret Thatcher asserted, "Saddam's efforts to hide behind Western women and children was utterly repulsive" (Beyer 1990, 21). Nelan actually used the phrase "fondling children" to describe Hussein's televised

meeting with the hostages (1990, 37). President Bush confirmed the focus on captivity, children, and family by declaring, "hostage- taking punishes the innocent and separates families. It is barbaric" (Bush 1990d, 1239).

In the US, *Newsweek* ran a story in January 1991 about the array of counseling services available to children and suggested various approaches to different age groups for "helping kids cope," including helping six-to-nine-year-olds sort out what's real about the war and taking the arguments of thirteen-year-olds and older seriously (Gelman et al. 1991, 40). *Life* magazine gathered the stories of thirteen families who "shared their favorite photos and private thoughts about those dear to them now serving in the Gulf" ("Forget me Not" 1991). Five of the photos picture the soldier as a child. Steven Tate, an Air Force pilot, is pictured at age four with his siblings, and his mother explains that they are listening to their uncle on a tape that he sent from Vietnam in 1967. Tate's mother observes, "At that time they didn't know what war was … At that point I had them under my control. They were safe. Sometimes I wish they could be that young again" (1991, 90). In a larger context of relentless marketing to children and constant psychological dissection of their desires and fears, learning about soldiers as "innocent" youngsters would be ripe for both consumption as well as identification by its readers.

The continuing significance of globalization and the further articulation of the principle of humanitarian intervention continued to undermine the traditional captivity narrative in important ways. Tightly drawn boundaries gave way to framings of the world as a confused and muddled place. Olson notes that Clinton's doctrine of democratic enlargement posed "chaos" as the major threat facing US: "Chaos acts as a writhing, many headed creature that shape shifts moment by moment to offer the U.S. endless opportunities to justify getting involved—or not—at the president's discretion" (2004, 316). Threats in Bosnia, for example, were historic ethnic hatreds, a Holocaust, and a possible Vietnam. With chaos anywhere and everywhere, boundaries between the nation and discrete state-based threats were blurrier. Furthermore, while enemies were often engaged in savage practices, what became increasingly important were the ravages of war, famine, displacement, ethnic cleansing, and death.

## Nostalgic Captivity with Short-Term "POWs"

The major facets of the standard captivity narrative emerged with Chief Warrant Officer Durant and Captain Scott O'Grady in Somalia and Bosnia, respectively, as did the waning clarity of the captivity narrative. In Somalia,

Durant became the victim of a "sneak attack" by Somalis, crazed from chewing *khat* and outnumbering the Americans. As one senior military officer noted, "those guys were flat playing Custer's Last Stand" (Lief and Anster 1993, 34). It was as if "bands of brigands have returned from the pages of cheap melodramas, able to face down the political and military might of the world's civilized nations" (Barry et al. 1993, 38). Durant received a hero's welcome and the two Marines who died while saving him were posthumously ordered the Medal of Honor, the first since the Vietnam War. Durant's hometown in New Hampshire festooned a park with yellow ribbons. One sign read, "Support and Prayers for Michael Durant, Somalia POW"; upon his return it was replaced with "Hooray! Mike is Free!" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1993, 9).

The possibility of positioning Durant as a classic hero, however, had a marred back-story. The Somali fighters managed to kill eighteen Marines, and "dozens of cheering, dancing, Somalis dragged the body of a U.S. soldier through the streets" (Pine 1993, 1). Unlike the O'Grady story, the Somalia debacle was a "story of back luck, faulty intelligence, and poor planning" (Schmitt 1993, A1). Durant received a phone call from President Clinton and received a hero's welcome from the Secretaries of State and Defense, but neither a book nor a movie ever panned out, although Clinton said it would make a great movie (Annis 1995, 1). Durant also seems disengaged from fighting for a cause and rather expresses his loyalty foremost to the military. The military reciprocated; when Durant arrived at Fort Campbell his commanding officer reassured him that "This is your family, we're going to take care of you. We're going to get you back on your feet and back in the cockpit" (Des Moines Register 1993, 2).

The brave soldier also takes centerstage in the film *Black Hawk Down*. Released in 2001, three months after September 11, a "bunch of cowboys" were sent to Somalia to "hunt down" Mohamed Farah Aidid; *Black Hawk Down* is the setting for exploring a post-Cold War world of "state failure," separatism and secession, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. The film juxtaposes the chaos and failure of humanitarian intervention with the basic ethos of the US soldier who represents professionalism regardless of the context or cause of exercising US power; Klein calls it a "pro-soldier anti-war film" (Klein 2005, 434). This nostalgic view of soldiers and war offers a sense of stability whereas those requiring rescue inhabit a world that is dangerous and chaotic. Individual soldiers bound by the creed to leave no one behind offer certainty in global borderlands racked by conflicts between warlords, rogue militaries, butchers, and tyrants. Dawson

and others have argued that *Black Hawk Down* reduces Somalis to racial stereotypes, but the stronger theme is to center war films on the civilized soldier bound by duty and sustained by camaraderie in all corners of the globe (Dawson 2011). *Black Hawk Down* gave an early signal that in locations like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo (places where the US intervened) and in places such as East Timor, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan (where it did not intervene) there were seemingly inexplicable horrors that on occasion US soldiers venture into and emerge with their reputation for professionalism intact. This is not to argue that racialized depictions disappeared, or that US interventions are not exercises in paternalism in the guise of humanitarianism. However, alongside these older and more familiar tropes, humanitarian wars of the 1990s justified the extension of US power across the globe while they valorized US soldiers and captured the hearts and minds of the American audiences who attempted to make sense of newer forms of imperial reach.

Captain Scott O'Grady's six days in Bosnia made a gripping story and O'Grady wrote about how he "walked through hell for six days. I should have been killed two or three times, but I kept on walking until … He reached in and grabbed with his hands and pulled me out" (O'Grady 1995, 183). The *Reader's Digest* author McConnell's story of O'Grady's survival and rescue reads like a thriller. Flames sear O'Grady's neck as he is ejected from the F-16; he "burrowed into thick foliage" to escape detection; bullets whipped through nearby brush, and the ants that he ate "crunched in his mouth with a lemony tang" (McConnell 1995, 82, 83, 85, 88). O'Grady's dashing character recalled nineteenth-century heroes who populated dime novels such *The Oregon Trail*, "a hero of romance—handsome, brave, true, skilled in the ways of the plains and the mountains, and even possessed of a natural refinement and delicacy of mind, such as is rare, even in women" (Smith 1950, 51). *Newsweek's* June 19, 1995 cover proclaimed that O'Grady possessed the right stuff, and "it was the stuff of which legends are made," which seemed to indicate that the mythical rescuer of old had been realized again in mountainous Bosnia (Thomas 1995, 24).

By the late twentieth century, however, the hero was actually a "scared bunny rabbit" who briefly appeared in sharp relief and then faded into a complex conflict that many found unfathomable and distant, more amenable to high altitude bombing, unstable peace agreements, and episodic attention. What the incident did do was highlight the professionalism and talent of the US military. Newspapers were full of validations of the Air Force's SERE (survival, resistance, resistance escape) training program

(O'Grady participated in it in 1991), the professionalism of the rescue team (the TRAP team, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft or Personnel), and the way the CH-53 Sea Stallion choppers landed perfectly "despite fog and a tight landing" (Sisk 1995, 5). Defense Secretary William Perry called the rescue a testament of "grit, great training, superior technology and outstanding leadership" (Douglas 1995, 19). The episode also gave the military the opportunity to remind Americans they continued to live in a dangerous and uncertain world, as General Ronald R. Fogelman told the crowd who greeted O'Grady on the tarmac at St. Andrews Air Force Base (Lewis 1995, A3). The importance of maintaining readiness and top-of-the-line technology became even more significant because O'Grady did not have radar-jamming escorts accompany him on the missions over Bosnia; neither was his F-16 armed with anti-radiation missiles that could attack Serb S-A6 tracking radars. The implication was that the military required even further investment in sophisticated weapons technology in order to protect its brave heroes. The *Denver Rocky Mountain News'* (home state of the US Air Force Academy) editorial page reminded readers that the daring rescue would not be possible without the supersonic fighters, attack helicopters, an amphibious assault ship, and Aviano Airbase: "In the euphoria over O'Grady's rescue it is easy to lose sight of the immense resources that were available to bring him safely home" (1995, 28A). One reporter for *The Washington Post* sardonically pointed out that O'Grady was now "a prop, akin to the charts that generals haul before appropriations committees mongering for more weapons money to keep America prepared to face the forces of evil" (McCarthy 1995, C10).

In a telling expose presaging what would occur occasionally in the War on Terror (e.g., in the death of Pat Tillman, the toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue, the Jessica Lynch rescue, and the *Wikileaks* revelations), *The Independent* (London) wrote a story a month after the celebrations disputing most of the story about O'Grady's courage, skills, and intelligence. Reporter Bellamy wrote that O'Grady wore only a tee shirt under his flight suit when he should have been prepared to eject in freezing weather, continued to circle in a predictable pattern, making it easier to blast him out of the sky, and did not know how to operate his survival radio, among other things (p. 7). The military response was that no one is perfect, accompanied by a weak denial of embellishing the incident or using propaganda to obtain more weapons.

The intense media coverage of the O'Grady story pointed to the further deepening of the media-military complex, which upstaged and

exceeded any effort to field a coherent narrative of POW terror and sacrifice. News stories almost immediately after the rescue contained discussions of the prospects of a movie, with Tom Cruise possibly playing O'Grady and no doubt ensuring a Pentagon-Hollywood joint production. (O'Grady later sued Fox for basing the film *Behind Enemy Lines* on his story and settled privately). While the role of spokesperson for BMW did not pan out (O'Grady had totaled his new BMW while at Aviano Air Base in Italy and emerged unscathed), the pilot did star in Air Force recruitment videos (Nasser et al. 1995, 7A). He made appearances on the morning television shows, *Larry King*, and *Nightline*. He had lunch at the White House. O'Grady's first book about the incident was published five months later (*Return with Honor*) and two more after that. The *coup de grace* was becoming a motivational speaker; in 1996 he was making about four speeches a month. In 2004 he questioned presidential candidate John Kerry's heroism in the Vietnam War.

Surviving on rainwater and ants in the Bosnian countryside made O'Grady "one amazing kid," but who remembers these stories and lingers upon them like the readers of Mary Rowlandson, the audience for the POW story in Vietnam, or the listeners tuning into Ted Koppel's nightly countdown of the days of captivity for Americans in Iran? It is not just that Somalia and Bosnia are the limiting case of confusion and chaos. It also opens up possibilities for defining foreign policy as driven at times by humanitarian motives in places of the world too complex, chaotic, and confusing to appreciate the gesture. For the US to step in is risky for its soldiers (we are beyond discussing comparable risks to their populations after years of misery). When such horrors produce sporadic humanitarian rescue, there is no guarantee of either success or a grateful population, but it still demonstrates compassion. In such a chaotic environment the only entity with any agency seems to be the US and its stand-in, the US soldier.

Narratives about the rescue of a country's population, particularly its children, became dominant throughout the 1990s. Clinton argued for a continued presence in Somalia "to ensure that anarchy and starvation do not return to a nation in which over 300,000 have lost their lives, many of them children. If the U.S. left Somalia, "within months Somali children would be dying in the streets" (Clinton 1993a, 1982; 1993b, 1705). In May 1994, Clinton's National Security Adviser Anthony Lake told *The New York Times* that "when I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I

want to work to end every conflict, I want to work to save every child out there" (Sciolino 1994, A1). In Bosnia, major news stories revolved around the fate of children. One *New York Times* reporter chronicled the death and dispersal of families in Srebrenica where approximately one-third of the 5000 refugees were less than five years old (Sudetic 1993, 7). The accompanying picture showed women and children crowded into a bus in Tuzla as they evacuated the city.

The focus on children had an empirical basis. Nelan reported on estimates that 1500 children died in Bosnia between April 1992 and February 1994 (1994, 44). In 1994, the director of the Project for Unaccompanied Children in Exile reported that there were 30,000 Balkan war children living without their parents in thirty-one countries and Bosnia (Kaslow 1994, 10). The 1995 massacre of nearly 8000 men and boys by the Serbian Army was extensively covered.

The October 26, 1998, cover of *The New Republic* described "the Crushing of Kosovo," and pictured a clearly bereft elderly woman sitting next to a sleeping infant. Major newspapers showed pictures of NATO soldiers alongside refugee children, a powerful image of the recipients of protection against chaos. In an early April 1999 radio address, Clinton explained that the bombing campaign against Serbia was an effort to help displaced persons in Kosovo, "among them small children who walked for miles over mountains" (Clinton 1999, 579). Clinton hugged Albanian Kosovar refugee children in June 1999 on the front page of the *Charlotte News-Observer* (June 23, 1999). *People* asked the question in 1999 on one of its stories, "Who Will Save the Children?" (Smolowe et al. 1999, 54). By the time of the Kosovo war, Rieff complained that political conflicts had become "humanitarianized," where the innocent victims are discussed more than the "rights and wrongs" of the dispute (1999, 35). Standing in the midst of this unmanageable chaos stood the child, often with a woman, who needed saving. Women and children constitute important foundations of the new "global community" and saving them required action and leadership on the part of the US. Rescuing in these conflicts depended upon a different national narrative of US greatness, a leader of the global community that endorses and helps implement the emerging ethic of the "responsibility to protect," the title of the UN commission set up to specify the conditions to be met for carrying out humanitarian intervention.

Events after the end of the first Gulf War had actually introduced the outlines of what was to come in the 1990s. After the cessation of hostilities against Iraq in 1991, the US and UK repeatedly violated Iraq's sover-

eignty through both Operation Provide Comfort, starting at the 36th parallel, and a no-fly zone in the south at the 32nd parallel. With Operation Provide Comfort, three-and-a-half million Kurds were protected through safe havens and a no-fly zone. Johnstone noted in his analysis of the aftermath of the war that the British, French, and US right to enforce no-fly zones and create safe havens was controversial and considered illegal in some quarters, and yet their legitimacy was not widely condemned by the international community (1994, 39). Of course this is partly because superpowers need not yield their power but also because the images of Kurds fleeing their homes by the thousands and Shi'ites being ruthlessly slaughtered made it more difficult not to bandwagon with the British, French, and US forces that were "saving strangers."

The US presented itself in the 1990s as a leading power for using selective force for humanitarian ends and facilitating nation-building projects around the world. This required that the US be as mobile and adaptable as the various enemies it confronted. Some might argue that the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo used the colonial-inspired language of rescue as well claiming to endow "benighted" cultures with Western advancement. While there was confusion and inaction in the face of crimes against humanity as well as war crimes, the express purpose was not to "civilize backward peoples." Fleming argues that unlike Saidian Orientalism, the supposedly alien nature of the Balkans "derives not from their distance from Western Europe but rather their proximity to it" (2000, 1229). The intimacy derives from the sense of similarity; estrangement comes from the awkwardness of its occurrence in a supposedly more civilized area of the world. The Balkan crises were important in blurring the radical distance between the US and the world. People in this newly imagined global community benefitted from the civilizing power of markets, elections, and remade political institutions that the US could offer. The bounded territory of captivity had increasingly given way, on the eve of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, to a global spatial dynamic of rescue with its own contradictions.

## Rescuing Afghanistan and Iraq

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the rescue groundwork allowed the Bush administration to selectively hijack liberal feminist rhetoric and argue that it was rescuing the women and children of Afghanistan (Hunt

2006). Young argued that the alignment of "male protector" discourse with Western feminists' "superiority and paternalistic knowledge" regarding Third World women allowed the Bush administration to mix its stated goals of ousting the Taliban and decimating Al Qaeda with rescuing and liberating the Afghan people, particularly its women and children (2003). The administration almost immediately enlisted US children in its efforts to conduct war in Afghanistan. On October 12, 2001, the president gave a speech in Washington in which he likened the Fund for Afghan Children to the March of Dimes from the 1930s. He called upon children in America to identify with Afghan children "who live a world a halfway—around the world—a place a halfway around the world from here" (Bush 2001c, 3).

When Bush announced the bombing campaign against the Taliban he explained that he had received a letter from a fourth-grade girl whose father was in the military: "As much as I don't want my dad to fight," she wrote, "I'm willing to give him to you" (Bush 2001b). Laura Bush led the launch of the Campaign for Afghan Children in October 2001, and in her 2002 address to the United Nations, she praised US children for sending more than four million dollars for food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, and toys for Afghan children (Bush 2002, 2). In his September 20, 2001 address to Congress Bush had already explained, "In Afghanistan we see al Qaeda's vision for the world … women are not allowed to attend school" (Bush 2001a, B4).

Afghan children enjoying a "kid's life" became an important theme in the war against the Taliban government and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. One reporter began a story about Afghan sisters, one of whom was only six when the Taliban came to power: "She never ran down the street to knock on a friend's door, never made up games with the neighbors' kids. There were no playgrounds, no parties. The Taliban had forbidden music and television, but her family had no electricity in any case" (Dominus 2002, 42). By mid-November 2001, boys were watching movies in Kabul, and satellite televisions, cosmetics, DVD players, and videocassettes were "flying off the shelves" (Rohde 2001, B3). Incredulity crept into the tone of some reports, like the following: "Going to the movies, like watching television, flying kites, and listening to music, was forbidden by the Taliban as a superfluous activity" (Rohde 2001, B5). *Time* produced a photo essay on the liberation of Kabul and wrote about how children "climbed to a high windy point atop the ruins to fly the kites that the mul-

lahs had banned as frivolous" (Gibbs 2001, 27). A March 2002 photo in *USA Today* of two boys playing in Kabul wrote a caption that linked soccer, gum, and freedom: "Afghan boys enjoying the weather and their newly found freedoms take a break from kicking a soccer ball to blow bubbles … Soccer was among amusements banned under the Taliban's strict interpretation of Islam" (March 26, 2001, 10A).

Elections in Afghanistan, with the exception of 2009, became signs of important milestones on the road to freedom. Barfield's assessment of the presidential election summarizes their role in conveying progress toward democracy and the Afghan and universal yearning for Western-style elections: "The large turnout of voters indicated that the Afghan people were genuinely and enthusiastically motivated to see the election succeed. It was the Taliban, not Karzai's rival candidates, who were the losers" (2005, 129). Even though there was commentary about Afghanistan being a country on the edge, the parliamentary elections were still described as a sign of progress, as "50% of voters braved threats of insurgent attacks last month to vote in the first national parliamentary elections since 1969" (McGirk 2005, 27).

By early 2002, Bush was "sounding as if liberation itself had been the goal of the war" in Afghanistan (Bumiller 2002a, 8). At a Minnesota fundraiser in 2002 he declared that "we didn't go in as conquerors, we went in as liberators, and now women and children are free from the clutches of these barbaric people" (Bumiller 2002a, 8). By 2007, he simply remarked that the US had liberated twenty-five million people in Afghanistan (Bush 2007, 4). This dovetailed nicely with the shift in military strategy from routing the Taliban to counterinsurgency, itself geared toward trying to reshape the environment through a combination of policing and development for security. There was a short distance between Kosovo and Afghanistan, in other words. Kosovo became essentially a protectorate and Afghanistan a ward of NATO and the UN. In both cases, there was multilateral cooperation, with the US dominating the timing, pace, and final outcome of the wars.

In the case of Iraq, President Bush's chief of staff Andrew Card announced in August 2003 that the administration's campaign for war against Iraq would begin after Labor Day, because "from a marketing point of view you don't introduce new products in August" (Bumiller 2002b, A1). Throughout the fall of 2002, however, the salesmanship was intense, with Saddam Hussein's totalitarian rule with regard to children showcased in numerous speeches, such as one in October 2002:

> The dictator of Iraq is a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool of terror and control within his own cabinet, within his own army and even within his own family. On Saddam Hussein's orders, opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured. (Bush 2002, A12)

Elections in Iraq, much like Afghanistan (at least until the 2009 Afghanistan presidential election) signaled liberation. President Bush compared the Iraqi elections of 2005 with elections that occurred after the fall of communism, proclaiming that for the Iraqi people, "this is their 1989, and they will always remember who stood with them in their quest for freedom" (Bush 2005, 2).

Frequent promises to restore childhood innocence as well as bring freedom in the form of consumption have been an important technique of governmentality in the war on terror. The general message of liberation for the peoples of both Afghanistan and Iraq had important precedents in the earlier wars of the 1990s. A PBS video aptly titled "Give War a Chance," portrayed Clinton and his civilian advisers such as Richard Holbrooke as "compassionate warriors" engaged in "moral imperialism" in Bosnia. They appeared to be having bigger battles with a military resistant to "operations other than war" than with Slobodan Milosevic (PBS 1999). Like the children of Kosovo, who were symbols of innocence and victimhood, children in Afghanistan and Iraq were drawn as innocent victims of either a Nazi-like Taliban or a Hitler-like Saddam Hussein. By the time of the war on terror, in other words, the discourse of human rights had truly penetrated the world (Beck 2005). Human rights discourse worked powerfully for the US in its selective interventions in the 1990s and circulated as a common rhetorical theme in the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq after 2001. It also empowered the wave of organizations, groups, and individuals who flowed into the new spaces of humanitarian war: human rights organizations, development workers, private security companies, the UN and its affiliates, and so forth. These networks of humanitarian relief gave voice to the beleaguered victims on the ground, and media were able to present those voices. When Schear in *Foreign Policy* assessed the success of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia he noted that the peacekeepers, human rights monitors, electoral experts, and engineers "have flooded Bosnia like a vast imperial expedition" (1996, 91). Imperial power, as Hardt and Negri (2000) argue, is different from imperialist

power of the nineteenth century. Imperial power structures conflicts by translating them into trauma events for children and women. Kids being able to play soccer marks a return to normalcy. Charity for those kids on the part of US kids translates into kids' cosmopolitanism.

## CONCLUSION

The binary of the self and the other that underlies orientalist readings of US foreign policy was powerful during the Iranian hostage crisis but increasingly eroded in the post-Cold War era. Rescuing medical students in Grenada was never a powerful story line, and hostage-taking acquired a new meaning during the Iran-contra scandal. Trading arms for captives was part of a much larger drama starring a government within a government that sought to arrange the release of hostages in Lebanon and provide aid to anti-government forces in Nicaragua.

The first Persian Gulf War was the first of many exercises to realize a "Pax Universalis" of "shared responsibilities and aspirations," and which the US would organize and direct (Bush 1991). Politicians and media pundits both explained this world as one where threats were less visible, dispersed, and diverse and no longer confined to "backward" areas of the world. Kurds in northern Iraq and Shi'ites in the south, along with Muslims in Bosnia were forced to flee their homes and were repressed by "tribal gangsters," who "can and will pop up anywhere in the world, in the lands emerging from communism as well as those caught in the mire of Third World poverty" (Jackson 1993, 39).

The course of the wars of the 1990s facilitated the emergence of a powerful discourse around saving children that neutralized criticism from both the right and the left as the world trained its attention the plight of children in a wartime setting or on their worries about war "back home." In 1993 Barbara Ehrenreich noticed an eerie parallel between the assault on David Koresh's compound in Waco, Texas, and intervention in Bosnia. In the case of Waco, overwhelming force saved abused children. Ehrenreich feared the same response in Bosnia (1993). The moral crisis posed by not acting to save children tended to resist political analysis—it called for action, however selective.

The *West Wing* episode that aired on October 3, 2011, was a special one-off segment done especially to address the consequences of the attacks. The episode starred children, stuck in the White House Mess Hall after selection for the "Presidential Classroom." West Wing actors taught

them about the terrorist attacks. Holland reads this as the American public "symbolically embodied in children" (2011, 92). There is also another reading of the schoolchildren as the target of West Wing's lessons, which focuses on the prominent place give to the subjectivity and knowledge of the children. Children are the most traumatized by the attacks and they deserve immediate and reassuring answers. Kids can be kids and lead a normal kid life, the show instructs us, and that life connects with international politics through a frame that requires attention to psychological care and well-being.

Meanwhile, between the start of the Iraq war in March 2003 and May 17, 2006, at least 439 foreigners, the majority of them private contractors and their employees, had an average ransom of 30,000 dollars (Rye and Kang 2006, 23). In the fifteen years since the degeneration of the Iran-contra debacle into a "hostage sale thing," hostage-taking had become a sometime lucrative component of foreign policy for insurgents in Iraq (Reagan 1987b, 428). The figure of the hostage that had played such a prominent role in nation-building has given way to various peoples in distress requiring rescue (however selective). Global in its reach and ambition, US power has turned border-creating practices into rescue efforts that are global in scope and potentially endless in their efforts, saving women and children in the clutches of a "Nazi-like" Taliban to rebels in Benghazi fighting a dictator using wanton violence against them.

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# Exceptionally Diverse: Neoliberal Multiculturalism, Race, and Risk

Race and racism have been at the center of US foreign policy, although much foreign policy literature in political science has tended to bracket race as a domestic issue. The US nation-building project rested on "patriarchal and white supremacist constructions of the 'imperial self' embodied in the frontier myth of the rugged frontiersman articulated by Turner and others" (Janiewski 1998, 81). Historically, the frontier was a literal and metaphorical site of conflict between civilization and savagery, and at the heart of the conflict was racial difference. Hunt makes one of the strongest claims about the role of racial hierarchy in American thinking about foreign policy, at both the elite and popular levels (1987). Racial superiority provided the rationale for expansion and domination over Native Americans and its logic extended to Mexico, Cuba, Spain, China, and particularly Vietnam, as the US moved from being a continental to global power.

There is an abundance of useful literature for understanding the continuing power of racial thinking in US foreign policy. Scholars such as Richard Drinnon stress the powerful "metaphysics of empire building" grounded in racism toward Native Americans and then adapted to various other groups regarded as inferior because of race (1980). Drinnon and others point to the permanence and continuity of US foreign policy centered on providential mission, the superiority of American values, and "a racial hierarchy with Anglo-Saxons on top" (Nayak and Malone 2009, 260). Race hating that began on the continent can then be traced around

the globe, through Mexico, Cuba, the Philippines, right into the 1980s, when descriptions of "thugs" in Grenada, "black on black violence" in South Africa, and crazed warlords in Somalia tapped into longstanding racist beliefs about black inferiority.

The literature on colonial rule and travel also sheds light on US foreign policy as part of a broader "western habit of representing other parts of the world as having no history" (Pratt 1992, 219). Such erasures made possible the savage "race wars" against Native Americans, Filipinos, and the Vietnamese (Slotkin 1992, 651). As shown in the previous chapter, the first-person accounts by US hostages in Iran contain important moments where Iran either had no history or suffered a long chain of autocrats and dictators ruling a neofeudal society. Bewildered by the Iranian revolution, early media accounts of the hostage crisis veered from calling the captors communists to "students," to barbarians, and made very little effort to link what happened to the US embassy in Iran to earlier periods of US interference in Iranian politics. Edward Said's penetrating criticism of neocolonial discourse in how the US mainstream press "covered Islam" has shown the utility of Orientalism as a framework of analysis right up to the present day.

Finally, the literature on US-South African relations provides a lens for understanding constructions of whiteness and the operation of racism in US foreign policy in the modern era. Whites in both societies invented an imaginary kinship as they faced a common "black threat" (Nixon 1994, 48). Both countries have mythologies that depend on what Hofmeyr calls "brazen inversions," depicting white settlers as victims of uncivilized barbarism and Native Americans and Africans as the instigators of wars of extermination (1988, 523). Identification with whites in South Africa was evident during the Reagan administration, with Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs urging Americans to "consider the needs and insecurities of whites before endorsing demands for majority rule" (Culverson 1997, 208). Despite the obvious demographic differences, whites in both countries expressed repeated fears of being "submerged" by the black population through "race mixing" and miscegenation. Although there are numerous contrasts between Jim Crow and apartheid, the worldviews that supported them were remarkably similar (Frederickson 1980, 241–250).

Nevertheless, while the unbroken history of US continental, regional, and global expansion, the influence of post-colonial theory, and the US-South African connection in whiteness are all informative for under-

standing key aspects of foreign policy, we need to take into account the increasing official embrace of anti-racism, the contributions of progressive groups in the US to challenging racism in US foreign policy, and the important parallel relationship between the embrace of diversity and the corporate language of pluralistic multiculturalism. In fact, beginning with the first Persian Gulf War, the tight connections between racism and nation-building have been attenuated, as the multicultural themes of diversity and difference were incorporated into the rationale for US hegemony after the Cold War (McAlister 2001, 250). After the Gulf War, powerful discourses of globalization affirmed the importance of difference as capable of incorporation into an American-inspired and managed New World Order. Buell argues that powerful cultural brokers in the culture wars of the 1990s championed the forces of diversity, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism (1998). This shift from a nation-building strategy of racist disavowal, displacement, and exclusion to a globally inspired projection of multicultural superpower identity helps to understand President Barack Obama's achievement as the country's first black president. There were frequent media invocations about Obama's transnational identity (a Kenyan father and white mother, with life experiences across three continents) and affirmed by Obama throughout his campaign. For example, on the campaign trail he told *New York Times* reporter Michael Powell, "I love when I'm shaking hands on a rope line and"—he mimes the motion, hand over hand—"I see little old white ladies and big burly black guys and Latino girls and all their hands are entwining. They're feeding on each other as much as on me" (2008, A18). Obama implies that he has not done anything to facilitate a multicultural America; it already "naturally" existed, and his candidacy merely accentuated and validated it. In addition to attributing his accomplishments to other people, he affirms those politicians before him, from Colin Powell, to Condoleeza Rice, to Hillary Clinton, that the American Dream is possible for all.

Celebrations of a global and inherently diverse world, as Hardt and Negri note, are often compatible with the project of global corporations and government politics that seek to endlessly expand markets. Corporations, marketers, advertisers, and politicians have all developed strategies that help to create and then sell to differentiated segments of the population (Cohen 2003, 407). Using the logic of demographics in order to fuel the consumption cycle has allowed corporate capitalism to target marginalized groups and make them into avid consumers. Varying degrees of race, gender, and working-class consciousness coexist with a

powerfully cultivated consumer consciousness marketed to and managed. Political candidates are marketed with ever greater sophistication; one Republican tactician told Jon Gertner that the goal of a campaign is now "all about talking to those people and giving them information packaged in a way to get them to buy your brand" (Gertner 2004, 44). Naomi Klein's blockbuster *No Logo* bemoaned these developments at the turn of the twenty-first century, arguing that superficial representations of women, minorities, and gays and lesbians in corporate campaigns were perfectly compatible with corporate consolidation and dominance of everyday life (1999, 123). It would be a mistake, however, to consider this broadening corporate net an effort at window dressing. US nationalism is at its most hegemonic when it incorporates the racial and gender logics of identity to facilitate its global reach (McAlister 2001, 306).

One litmus test of the effectiveness of both corporate and state strategies to pursue "diversity friendly" politics was the reception of Samuel Huntington's "The Hispanic Challenge" in *Foreign Policy* magazine in 2004 and the follow-on book entitled *Who are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004). Huntington's lament in *Foreign Policy* about the disappearance of a "distinct Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding settlers," the scale of Mexican migration to the US, and the persistent use of Spanish among immigrants, was met with an overwhelming number of negative letters to *Foreign Policy* in the following issue. Letters to *Foreign Policy* challenged Huntington's history of how immigrants acquired English, his nativism, and his claim that US culture is Anglo-Protestant. As one writer caustically noted, "A disproportionate number of the names on the military casualty lists from Iraq and Afghanistan are Hispanic; the recruiting sergeant did not ask these soldier in what language they dreamed" (Daniels 2004, 10). Louis Menand of the *The New Yorker* explained that Huntington's alarm was old-fashioned by 2004 because cultural pluralism has become an "all but official attribute of national identity" (Menand 2004, 92). The insidious genius of neoliberalism has been its ability to cultivate an ideology of unbounded individual freedom that "appreciates" diversity and revels in the expression of particular identities—greatly facilitated of course by social media and entertainment criteria for what counts as diversity (Harvey 2005, 41–42).

To be sure, tensions remained between boundary maintenance that relied on racism and the threat of immigration and the newer spatial paradigm of "porous boundaries and shifting borderlands" that seemed to define the post-Cold War world (Chase 1998). Colonial and white

supremacists frameworks of analysis help to explain popular and official renderings of the conflicts in Grenada, South Africa, Iran, and to some extent Iraq in both 1991 and 2003. On the other hand, Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, "humanitarian interventions" in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the war on terror demonstrate a more multi-faceted dynamic at work in US foreign policy, one that not only broadens the justification for intervention but also uses universalist claims of human rights to end genocide, ethnic cleansing, starvation, and brutal, dictatorial rule. It is also significant that the executive director of Amnesty International would title a chapter of his book, "Why Human Rights is Good for Business" (Shulz 2001, 66). According to Shulz, respect for human rights contributes to political stability, and respect for the rule of law provides transparent regulations for the conduct of business (Shulz 2001, 73, 81). This marriage of morality and the market dovetails nicely with what Duffield calls a "new complex of global liberal governance" that links leading governments in the North with NGOs, national militaries, and private companies with the aim of stabilizing putatively "dangerous" societies in the name of security. In this context of aiming to transform various areas of the world into stable and cooperative societies, at least some of the language of "race war" has been jettisoned in favor of cooperation, transparency, and more effective self-management in the global market (Duffield 2001, 30).

This chapter traces evolving dimensions of how race and racism work in US foreign policy. The many scholarly commentaries finding portrayals of racial others, both domestically and abroad as menacing, violent, and dangerous are clearly evident in the descriptions of Grenada's "black thuggery," Somalia's "tribalism," and "black on black" violence in South Africa. Identifying the often-egregious racism animating US foreign policy, however, often results in attaching minimal importance to the way the topic of race includes more multivalent discourses. There has been a reassembling and refashioning of what historically had been a very explicit and targeted racialization of foreign policy challenges. Instead of racial hierarchy there is increasingly population sorting that reflects a general and broad-based series of threats, emergencies, and risk that have worked to US advantage when it comes to justifying lone superpower hegemony. The murder, rape, and execution of Kuwaitis, Kurds, and Shias, mass starvation in Somalia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and the Taliban's reprehensible treatment of women were all chronicled by a growing transnational network composed of media, NGOs, the UN, and at times the US government, which often complicated efforts to demonize opponents through

the typically used racial categories. It became more difficult to sustain a critique that racism and Orientalism alone explained US interventions. Opponents of interventions decried US hypocrisy, selectivity, and motives, but accusations of racism were less persuasive when interventions had support from a thick transnational network of humanitarian organizations, even when the intervention was often tardy and ineffective. Large swaths of the US population who supported "doing something" for the victims of starvation, ethnic cleansing, and the violence of a dictatorship (whether it was merely clicking to donate, buying Project Red products, or contributing to Sean Penn's NGO in Haiti), endorsed exercises of so-called benevolent power. While humanitarian war did not cancel out ongoing criticisms of government mendacity, civilian deaths, deaths of US soldiers, and no signs of progress, new idioms emerged that voiced concerns about human rights violations and the responsibility to protect populations at risk.

The emergence of a new kind of threat environment, networked and dispersed, no matter how incapable of threatening the US, made it more difficult to connect longstanding racial categories and impute racial characteristics to a highly mobile, technologically sophisticated, and seemingly omnipresent set of actors and issues. From the early 1990s onward, clans and warlords adept at urban warfare (Somalia), rogue generals and militias terrorizing with detention camps, mass rape, and snipers (Bosnia), and terrorists with tenacious skill at evasion and retaking territory were no doubt framed in racial terms, as this chapter will demonstrate. They also, nonetheless, were a spur for trying to understand the threats posed by the operational environment of asymmetric warfare. While it has turned out to be difficult to implement, the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written in 2004 (the interim copy) to address just these kinds of challenges. While the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq date the manual, its concerns with the threats posed to good order, host governments, and US interests continue to reverberate.

## "THUGS, SAVAGES, AND BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE" IN GRENADA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND SOMALIA

Perceptions and depictions of a "black threat" have a long history in the US, and numerous scholars have traced the imagery from Jim Crow, through the "ghetto" to prisons. Foreign policy challenges that have a

"black threat" dimension to them are historically familiar because they are, in many respects, close to home. White anxiety about being "swamped" by people of color and stories of the white triumph of civilization over non-white barbarism are repetitively familiar and found in all colonial settler societies, including the US. In a further twist, anxiety and civilizational superiority often meld into self-proclaimed benevolence; after a "proper" measure of force, the locals seemed to rejoice in their gift of freedom. The US acquisition of Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines gave it the opportunity to portray the "submissive and pliant" traits of Puerto Ricans, who welcomed Americans "with open arms" (Santiago-Valles 1999, 127). Likewise, commentators pointed to ecstatic Grenadians who welcomed US forces in the October 1983 invasion:

> The zesty beat of steel-band calypso music from radios and portable tape decks followed the U.S. military patrols as smiling Grenadians surged about the Americans. They offered the soldiers fruit and vegetables and serenaded them with guitars. Women rushed to embrace the young paratroopers. (Magnuson et al. 1983, 18–19)

Just as Roosevelt argued that anti-imperialists were traitors to their race, Reagan argued that opponents of the invasion of Grenada were effete snobs and closet communists who were unwilling to recognize that "thugs" governed Grenada (Slotkin 1992, 106). At the same time, Grenadians were subject to Soviet machinations. Hence, the US had an obligation to carry out a Neighborhood Watch Program in the Caribbean. As Reagan explained it, "Because of this aggression, we also support a security shield for the area. The security shield is very much like a Neighborhood Watch. The Neighborhood Watch is where neighbors keep an eye on each other's homes so outside troublemakers and bullies will think twice" (Reagan 1983, 1177). Reagan envisioned a neighborhood in which the US would be the captain while our neighbor Grenada suffered a home invasion by thuggish elements. In this case, calling the police meant calling in the US Marines and Army Rangers.

   In the case of Grenada, security and race were two familiar sides of the same coin. The quest for security vis-à-vis potential communist revolutions in Grenada (as well as in Nicaragua and El Salvador), associated revolution with black thuggery and communism. The Reagan government collapsed the black and communist threat in Grenada, much as Cold War era US governments accused black civil rights activists of being commu-

nists. The implication was that blacks could not organize without outside intervention and manipulation, while the role of "outside agitators" in supporting black aspirations make the threat seem that much more sinister.

The conflation of a black and communist threat did not occur simply because of the proximity of nations in Central American and the Caribbean, however. Chester Crocker, Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State from 1980–1988 titled his memoirs *High Noon in Southern Africa, Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (1992, 257). Crocker described South Africa in the mid-1980s as having "descended into a swamp of mass protest, police repression and black-on-black coercion" (1992, 259). Reagan reminded his critics, "South Africa is an African country as well as a Western country," contrasting an image of a white and civilized South Africa with a black and ungovernable one. Citing British historian Paul Johnson, Reagan pointed to rising black incomes and a growing black middle class as evidence that white rule had made social and economic progress possible for non-whites and shown that capitalism would inevitably erode white supremacy (1986a, 985–986). While condemning apartheid, Reagan asserted that the South African government "is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist violence to achieve it" (Reagan 1986a, 986). He assumed that communists controlled the ANC, a point he made at a 1986 press conference:

> We've had enough experience in our own country with so-called Communist fronts to know that you can have an organization with some well-meaning and fine people, but you have an element in there that has its own agenda. And this is what's happened with the ANC. And right now, the ANC in exile, the ones we're hearing from, that are making the statements, are the members of that African Communist Party (sic). (1986b, 1086)

Popular media also portrayed violence in Grenada and South Africa in similar ways. When South African President P.W. Botha imposed a state of emergency in July 1985, *Time* focused attention on the black townships rather than the white security police, declaring that the townships "were becoming ungovernable" (Watson et al. 1985, 34). Botha, echoing Reagan, accused Communist powers and communist-inspired powers of "murdering blacks" and trying to "disrupt the normal life of black communities" (Iyer 1985, 44). Reagan agreed with Botha's assessment of the

causes of unrest in both black townships and the Caribbean. He asserted that "black on black" violence had caused many deaths during the state of emergency in South Africa just as he implied that "anarchic" conditions in Grenada demanded the US invasion (Reagan 1986b, 1088; Reagan 1983, 1513). Grenada and South Africa were two previously tranquil neighborhoods disrupted not by state violence but by black-on-black violence, aided and abetted by communists. Just as Reagan viewed whites in South Africa as a "force for stability, with Western values and institutions," he viewed the US invasion of Grenada as an important guarantee of restoring order and stability to a violent and chaotic scene.

The domestic and international opposition to Reagan's South Africa policy are significant and worth noting. In 1986, Congress overrode Reagan's veto of their sanctions bill, there were regular protests and arrests in front of the Washington, DC. South African embassy, and domestic groups like Transafrica Forum were important and critical voices in undermining constructive engagement. Black solidarity in the face of white supremacy had long been global, but the strength of the internationalized civil rights movement got a hearing in the halls of Congress, on the streets of Washington, and on the pages of mainstream media. Randall Robinson, for example, the executive director of Transafrica Forum, provided a blistering criticism of Reagan's 1987 report to Congress that sanctions against South Africa were not working (Robinson 1987). The ability of the government to "control the narrative" weakened in the case of South Africa. Global and determined domestic opposition, facilitated by media and the emergence of significant oppositional forces, were effective in challenging white supremacist foreign policy.

## Black Hawk Down but Not Out

Although ostensibly a humanitarian intervention, Somalia too gradually took on the hue of a racial quagmire. After Somalis shot down a Blackhawk helicopter in October 1993, Americans saw "a ghastly photo of a white body," naked except for green underwear, "being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu" (Duffy et al. 1993, 43). Naureckas noticed "one detail of Somali culture that seemed to fascinate journalists—perhaps because it is tied with domestic stereotypes—is the chewing of a plant called khat." (1993, 13). References to khat-chewing warlords were ubiquitous. Perlez pointed out that it was unwise to move around Mogadishu at night because by then the narcotic effect of the "'camel boys' two-

bunch-a-day habit has taken hold" (1992, 1). Bowden wrote that when khat chewers grinned "their teeth were stained black and orange from chewing the weed. It made them look savage, or deranged" (1999, 51). Besteman characterized the media portrayal of Somalia as one of a "country unable to rid itself of ancient rivalries," and of "savages who got ahead of themselves technologically … dutifully following in the factional footsteps of their forefathers" (1996, 121–122). Perlez quoted a late nineteenth-century British consul to Zanzibar, who was impressed with Somali resistance to European imperialism, and pointed out "significantly for Americans, these characteristics persist" (1992, 17).

Like other colonial travel accounts analyzed by Pratt and others, Bowden's description of Mogadishu makes it different but familiar, reminiscent of American inner cities:

> Mogadishu spread beneath them in its awful reality, a catastrophe, the world capital of things-gone-completely-to-hell. It was if the city had been ravaged by some fatal urban disease … Everything of value had been looted, right down to metal window frames, doorknobs, and hinges … Every open space was clotted with the dense makeshift villages of the disinherited, round stick huts covered with layers of rags and shacks made of scavenged scraps of wood and patches of rusted tin. From above they looked like an advanced stage of some festering urban rot. (Bowden 1999, 7)

Somalia became a post-Cold War case that could justify recolonization. Quoting US officials, Sciolino wrote that Somalia should be returned to colonial status: "One state could govern Somalia in a formal 'trusteeship' until it is ready to govern itself, in the same way that Italy administered much of what is now Somalia until it became independent in 1960" (1992, 1). Johnson concurred, asserting that the "country has shown it could not govern itself" (1993, 22). He recommended a mandate of 5, 10, 20 years but perhaps even 50 or 100, if countries like Somalia could not ensure a successful return to stability (1993, 44). Talbott insisted that if the country could not govern itself "the logical and necessary next stage is for the UN to step in and run Somalia, because Somalia and potential Somalias represented a threat to the New World Order," and declared "there is a name for such an administration: trusteeship" (1992, 35). Recognizing that the term trusteeship "smacked of the white man's burden," Talbott declared that coming up with a euphemism would be the easiest part in "pacifying" Somalia.

The post-Cold War intervention in Somalia was also influenced by emergent discourses of humanitarian intervention, and the Bush administration undertook Operation Restore Hope because it was viewed as virtually risk-free, short-term, and unlikely to lead to US soldier deaths (Wheeler 2000, 180–181). In addition, the growing ability of the UN, US government officials, and the media to publicize the crisis and demand action helps to explain the somewhat paradoxical pairing of racially charged descriptions of Somali clans and warlords with discourses of cosmopolitan sympathy for the suffering. While uneven and cut short, US intervention in Somalia took place in a context of a stronger network of actors, which, while co-existing with the impulse to frame the conflict in racial terms, challenged US inaction with humanitarian discourse and assurances that the US could pursue a values-based foreign policy.

The case of Somalia demonstrates how dominant descriptions of a threat have shifted from familiar racial categories to framing it as a failed state colonized by actors able to inflict massive damage against global commerce or populations at risk—not in Somalia, but in the US. Alongside new more dangerous threats that ally themselves with global actors and demonstrate new capabilities, warlords confined to a fixed territory are low-intensity threats. While state collapse, warlordism, piracy, and terrorism all evolved from post-Cold War politics, they present different kinds of threats and risks. In addition to their different spatial operations, they call for more militarized responses that spiral out of Somalia and span oceans and other states such as Kenya in ways that stubbornly resist containment. Neither pirates nor terrorists activate humanitarian rhetoric and neither beseeches the international community for rescue. The lead pirate in *Captain Philips* (played by Barkhad Abi), the 2013 movie about the capture of the MV Maersk Alabama, tells Captain Philips (played by Tom Hanks) that the capture is "business; your fishing boats take all our fish." Delivering food (and at the same time militarizing the mission) is a far cry from imagining an enemy that has threatened to attack the US and could possibly (so it is gauged) have sleeper cells in the US (specifically, Minnesota, where a large segment of the Somali diaspora lives), and require that, as a Somali expert notes, American law enforcement agencies "take preventive actions, including increased community policing, engagement with community leaders, and surveillance within the parameters of the law" (Menkhaus 2013). In a context where surveillance has been more extensively developed in the wake of September 11, the presence of Somalis in the US spurs further profiling, sorting, and observation.

Analysts of Somali piracy frequently point out their backing by criminal syndicates of financiers and investors based in Dubai, London, and Mombasa. More often than not, this is a multimillion-dollar operation that, while risky for the captors, pays significant returns if a ransom is successfully obtained. Piracy threatens a major lifeline of the global economy, with pirates paid 100 million in ransom in 2008 alone (Wadhams 2010, 6). Pirate territory produces well-financed outlaws that do not square with the language of Operation Restore Hope. Pirates are described as adept extortionists and one of the many types of dispersed enemies that threaten global and hence US security, and there seems to be an "inexhaustible supply of willing entrants to the pirate labor market" (Guilfoyle 2012, 769). Dalby described West African pirates as having a "more efficient business model" than their East African counterparts because the turn-around time for profits is much faster for cargo theft (e.g., oil) rather than ransom (2013, 27).

The US has carried out several drone strikes on Al Qaeda operatives and paid off more moderate groups to track down both warlords and al-Shabaab members because, according to one journalist, and a sentiment shared by much mainstream media, Somalia's "most dangerous export is terrorism" (Perry 2008, 43). Private contractors and US Special Forces train troops from other African countries to fight al-Shabaab, described as an Al Qaeda "associate." Somalia has become a frequent site for drone attacks and SEAL operations and by 2007 US private security contractors operated out of Mogadishu International Airport, managing logistics for the African Union Mission in Somalia and by extension, the Transitional Federal Government, only one indicator of the importance of extensive privatization of security in Somalia. Special Operations forces and Dyncorps Security aid and assist local "partners," and the partners are treated as trainable subsidiaries in the fight against extremism rather than "khat-chewing and crazed" Somali warlords.

Counterterrorism operations operate according to a logic quite different from humanitarian interventions designed to save vulnerable women and children. Pirates and terrorists present management problems and different methods for realizing the containment of risk. Pirates require risk insurance and terrorists fought with economy of force and at times pirates and terrorists fought with the same tactics. For example, in January 2012 Navy Seals rescued one American hostage and her Danish counterpart. Speaking with a pirate by phone, *New York Times* reporters learned that the shootout killed nine Somalis. The locals were not angry because

among other things, the pirates' spending of their loot fueled inflation in the local economy (Gettleman, Schmitt and Shanker 2012, A1). The pirates disrupt shipping lanes and al-Shabab's "asymmetrical capabilities" also threaten US military-economic interests in the Horn of Africa. "Evil doers" are evil because of both who they are and what they can do. Commando raids "preserve an American military presence and protect national security interests at relatively low cost" (Shanker 2012, A10).

## Islamic Fanatics and Sinister Villians in Iran and Iraq

When it came to covering Iran's revolution, there were important patterns in media coverage that reveal its similarities with colonial discourses and colonial travel literature. There were repetitive images of Iran in chaos and Khomeini was repeatedly portrayed as an unfathomable and dangerous leader. *Time*, in naming him Man of the Year in 1979, described him thus,

> The dour old man of 79 shuffles in his heel-less slippers to the rooftop and waves apathetically to crowds … The hooded eyes that glare out so balefully from the black turban are often turned upward, as if seeking inspiration from on high … To Iran's Shiite Muslim laity, he is the Imam, an ascetic spiritual leader whose teachings are unquestioned. To hundreds of millions of others, he is a fanatic whose judgments are harsh, reasoning bizarre, and conclusions surreal. (1980, 56)

While conceding that Khomeini might have some legitimacy (however irrationally based), *Time* also cites the hundreds of millions of others who allegedly "know better." In other words, any reasonable person would find him to be insane. In Iran, there was also a sense that "anything can happen," while the US is presented as clearly civilized and thus stronger (Butler et al. 1979, 61). *National Review* was unabashed in its observation that "Much present-day Third World behavior [in this case, Iran's] represents a rebellion of 'culture' against civilization—the scream of Conrad's savages in the *Heart of Darkness* when they see the steamboat" (1980, 200).

Distancing Iran and its revolution was crucial to the construction of US superiority. Fabian has argued that time is a key category used to "conceptualize relationships between us (or our theoretical constructs) and our objects (the Other)" (1983, 28). Phyllis Schafly, of all people, drew attention to the distance between the modern and the traditional in that

Khomeini had "taken women back to the twelfth century, hadn't he?" (Dionne 1979, 15). Morrow noted in *Time* that "in some ways, the US and Iran inhabit different centuries" (1980, 84). Descriptions of the first post-revolutionary parliament elected in April 1980 evoked a discordant image of a modern institution inhabited by "militant mullahs" who wore "beards, turbans, and flowing robes," while Ahmed Khomeini [Khomeini's son] "mentioned God nine times, Islam nineteen times—and the 53 hostages not even once" (Mathews et al. 1980a, 61). The government resembled a "medieval court" (Deming 1980, 61). *Time*'s "Man of the Year" story on Khomeini used nineteenth-century British traveler James Morier's description of Qum to describe the city where the interview with Khomeini took place, as if it had not changed at all in 100 years, "Every man you meet is either a descendant of the Prophet or a man of the law. All wear long mortified faces … These priests will hearken to no medium—either you are a true believer or you are not" (Van Voorst quoting Morier 1980, 26). During negotiations to release the hostages, *Time* compared Iranian diplomats to "rug merchants in a classic Persian bazaar, demanding the maximum but willing to settle for quite a bit less" (Time 1980, 9). In addition, geography accentuated the differences between the modern West and backward Iran: "The Middle East has long been the scene of pacts and battle lines that can shift almost as capriciously as sands in the desert" (Morrow 1980, 36). A content analysis of every story written between November 1979 and January 1981, describing Khomeini, Islam, that the Revolutionary Council (the group in power between the abdication of the Shah and the new constitution and its institutions) in *Time*, *People*, and *Newsweek* is overwhelmingly Orientalist in its fervor. Khomeini is doctrinaire, sinister, enigmatic, and demagogic, a cunning manipulator, and a mystic fundamentalist, eccentric and self-destructive. Shiite Islam is volatile, dogmatic, and hysterical, while Shiites suffer a martyr complex and inexplicably on occasion beat themselves with chains. The Revolutionary Council is something completely alien to the Western mind, stubborn and irrational, holier-than-thou, medieval, and engaged in theocratic totalitarianism. According to various accounts, the new parliament elected in early 1980 wrote messages in "Iranian English," and was akin to a "whirligig," and a "pistol-packin'" body.

Iranians in the US, particularly students, became potential or real threats to American security and often were the targets of threats, expulsion, and somehow held responsible for the seizure of the embassy. The refrain that the US had surrendered its role as "global policeman" some-

how helped explain how Iranians had come to constitute a threat to domestic security (Butler et al. 1979, 62). One of President Carter's first retaliatory actions was to order deportations of Iranian students who were in the US, an order issued after there were a number of demonstrations by Iranian students in support of the Shah's extradition to Iran (Burt 1979, 1). On the other hand, a week later Carter urged Americans not to retaliate against all Iranians living in the US, comparing "Iranians who have lived here for years as responsible citizens" with those Iranians responsible for the takeover (Gwertzman 1979, 4). There were, in other words, "good" Iranian-Americans and "bad" Iranian-Americans. In July 1980, 192 Iranian students were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct after demonstrations against US interference in Iran. They were detained by the INS and later freed after establishing their compliance with US immigration law (Treaster 1980, 16). The males arrested reportedly rejected chess, checker sets, and cards, and "opted instead for prayer, chants, and reading from the Koran" (Strasser et al. 1980b, 36).

Official targeting of Iranians for deportation occurred alongside public attacks on Iranians living in the US. *The New York Times* reported that the homes of Iranians living in California, Colorado, and Ohio had been "pelted with junk and garbage" (Kaiser 1979, 181). A photo in the December 11, 1979, issue of *The New York Times* showed US flag-waving protesters with one bearing a sign reading "Camel Jockeys Go Home" (Rawls 1979, 20). *Newsweek* gave prominent coverage to a small number of Iranian students demanding the extradition of the Shah and implicitly blamed them for the "violent backlash" against Iranians, describing "vengeful Americans" demanding the deportation of Iranian students (Strasser and Ma 1979, 73). Two weeks later the magazine dismissed complaints of reprisals against the students as irrelevant in the "eye for an eye emotions of many Americans" (Williams and Harper 1979, 65). *Time* reported a Columbia University student's taunt to Iranian student demonstrators: "We're gonna ship you back and you ain't gonna like it! No more booze. No more Big Macs. No more rock music … You're gonna get on that plane at Kennedy, and when you get off in Tehran, you're gonna be back in the thirteenth century" (Butler and Whitmore 1979, 14).

*People* treated the Shah and his family as "west-identified," in their hostility toward the Iranian student captors and in their criticism of Carter's weak leadership. The Shah's sister joined the growing chorus of domestic criticism of Carter's handling of the crisis by declaring to *People* that "Jimmy Carter was personally responsible for the downfall of my brother

… If Nixon were president, my brother would still be on the throne" (Chambers 1980, 134). In his discussion of the resumption of the Shah to the throne after the 1953 coup in Iran, Foran labeled the treatment of a Western-oriented and urbane friend of the US "Orientalism in reverse: the Shah possesses the usual vices of the Orient, tempered by his Western education and outlook in a kind of uneasy symbiosis that results in his perception as a weak leader" (2000, 169).

As expected, *People* highlighted the upper-class values and lavish life-style of the Shah and his entourage in exile (their values and lifestyle most resemble Hollywood's, after all), but print media with significant circulations also defended the Shah and discussed his reign in generally positive or equivocal tones. In a December 1979 article, "Is the Shah Guilty?" Butler and Whitmore outlined the major grievances against the Shah and systematically undermined each one of them. Accusations of torture and repression met with dismissal: "The notion that the Shah was uniquely vicious doesn't bear up. There is hardly any Third World government that cannot be accused of similar crimes" (Butler and Whitmore 1979, 44). Evidence of the Shah's enormous wealth gar-nered during his twenty-six-year dictatorship received expert correction from University of California political scientists George Lenozowski: "If anything, the Shah may have increased rather than plundered the wealth of Iran." In a conclusion evoking the tragic, Butler and Whitmore noted that the Shah's only real crime was "blindness" to the "real needs and values of his people … and the consequences of that blindness threaten to be far more horrible than the worst excesses of his regime," thus repeating the common conservative criticism of revolutions usher-ing in far worse conditions from those that preceded them. *Newsweek* caustically referred to the "crimes" committed by the US, including helping the Shah back to his throne and supposedly dominating Iran for twenty-five years (Mathews et al. 1980b, 23). *Newsweek* writers quickly concluded that deporting the Shah would be humiliating for the US, as he had "become a symbol of U.S. determination" (Willey et al. 1979, 41). Richard Nixon attended the Shah's funeral in August 1980 and denounced Carter's "shameful treatment of the former mon-arch" (Strasser et al. 1980a, 38).

When Khomeini signaled his own understanding of US racial politics by releasing eight black men and five white women on November 19, 1979, and declaring that "Islam grants women a special status," and blacks have spent "ages under American pressure and tyranny," the power of

foreign policy crises to dissolve difference and contestation in American politics was on full display (Talbott 1979, 20). When prominent figures in the civil rights and women's movement criticized Khomeini, they did important work affirming US foreign policy during the hostage crisis. Leading figures from the women's movement and civil rights movement who previously often discussed America's history of discrimination and exclusion, proclaimed the unity of the nation in the face of a common threat. In a 1970s display of what Alsultany has called "diversity patriotism," the critique of the Iranian government reinforced allegedly colorblind, commonsense, and conventional views about the rectitude of US foreign policy. Remarks from Steinem, Jordan, and even Jesse Jackson, who accused Khomeini of "shah-like tactics" confirmed the power of liberalism and affirmed that despite all our differences, we share common values and goals as Americans. To be a "normal" American requires one to rally around the flag and support its foreign policy. Foreign policy once again allows marginalized voices to move to the center of a putatively cohesive nation and gives them an opportunity to assert their Americanness. Fousek chronicles a similar dynamic in the early years of the Cold War. While providing "penetrating critiques" of Truman's foreign policy agenda, African American opinion leaders anchored their analysis "firmly in the rhetoric of American nationalism" (Fousek 2000, 140). Accepting the legitimacy of American power from minorities and feminists who do not see themselves oppressed in the context of foreign policy, what Jacobson calls the "homogenizing magic of the home front," is a powerful theme that works itself all the way to the Obama presidency, which combines critical discussions of race while affirming both the American Dream and American global power and dominance (Jacobson 1998, 204).

While at the time of the Iranian revolution and well after the release of the hostages Iran's government was repeatedly defined in media and by government as a rigid theocracy and irrational and volatile, over time it began to be assessed with more nuance, especially by the scholarly community but also by mainstream media and the US government. Divisions and currents within the government get parsing in order to exploit them and challenge Iran's foreign policy toward Israel, its support for Hezbollah and other groups labeled as terrorists, and its status as a nuclear power. Throughout the 1990s and after 2001, analysts identified struggles among reformist, radical, and conservative/pragmatic strands within the government and there were regular assessments of the growing power of paramilitary organizations and the Revolutionary Guards. Many scholars

and policy-makers emphasized the declining significance of melded Shia theology and revolutionary ideology and instead portrayed a Crane Brinton-style spiral toward corruption, inefficiency, and authoritarianism (e.g., Sajadpour 2010, 80).

Ahmadinejad is the perfect pivot for gauging the increasing tendency to pair older images of militancy and theocratic zeal with threat assessment centered on Iran's military capabilities. In a number of respects, Ahmadinejad was demonized more than Khomeini was during the hostage crisis. There were "hidden wars" between George W. Bush and Ahmadinejad (February 19, 2007, *Newsweek* cover), questions about "How dangerous is Iran?" (*Newsweek* cover February 13, 2006), and *The New Republic* April 24, 2006, issue caricatured Ahmadinejad with lower jaw fangs, promising to explain his "demons."

On the other hand, Zakaria challenged Israel's prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu for describing the government as a "messianic, apocalyptic cult," asserting that Iran tended to behave in a "shrewd, calculating manner, advancing its interests when possible, retreating when necessary" (2009, 47). The endless speculation about Iran's nuclear capabilities more often than not appraised it as playing a deft hand, noting, "the Iranians are very able negotiators" (Duffy 2006, 39). In keeping with the tendency to highlight internal Iranian government squabbles, when Ahmadinejad called for "wiping Israel off the map," some Iranian officials suggested it was a sign of his "amateurism" (Fahti 2005, A3). The establishment publication *Foreign Affairs* regularly gave space to analysts who describe a rational actor interested in "regime survival" achieved through a mix of revolutionary agitation and pragmatic adjustment. While the regime may have "messianic pretensions", it has observed limits when supporting militias and terrorist groups in the region (Lindsay and Takeyh 2010, 35, 37).

The disputed June 2009 presidential elections unleashed a torrent of commentary on how in fact all Iranians longed for liberal democracy and the regime's days were numbered. The emergence of "citizen journalism" via YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook gave unmediated evidence of the depth of Iranian longing for more social freedoms, read as synonymous with liberal democratic government. When Neda Agha Soltan's murder by an alleged government paramilitary sniper occurred on June 20, 2009, her boyfriend cemented these convictions (based on sketchy evidence) that all Neda ever wanted was "democracy and freedom for Iran," thereby suturing Iran's protests to US self-representation as a freedom-loving democracy. The scale of the Iranian government's brutal response to the protests,

holding show trials, and meting out draconian punishments for protesting against electoral fraud seemed to cement identification between the US and Iran's liberal democratic forces and inevitable future. No longer described as an "anonymous mob" and no longer interested in waging a "kind of war *against* Iran" media and government fused the American and Iranian longing for freedom with the US naturally in the leading aspirational role and mimetic Iran finally arriving at the endpoint of liberal democracy (Said 1981, 101).

It is with respect to nuclear weapons capability that Iran itself has seemed to become a ticking time bomb without a religion or an ideology. It would be difficult to overstate the endless timelines, deadlines, calendars, and ticking clocks that portend the future—Iran has increasingly been subjected to "discourses of time," rather than dissections of its allegedly Islamic-infected worldview or general kookiness (Stahl 2008). Should the US worry that Iran might use negotiations to "buy time"? (Maloney 2012, 13). Hymans rebutted this possibility with the observation that proliferation in dictatorships, including Iran's, has "gone into slow motion" rather than sped up because dictatorships interfere with the scientific community and thwart its progress in bomb development (2012, 45). The *Iran Watch* website has constant reports on how soon Iran could fuel a nuclear weapon (1.7 months as of February 2014). The Institute for Science and International Security estimates that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium to make a nuclear bomb (website). Deadlines for successfully concluding talks constantly loomed on the horizon. President Obama campaigned on a pledge to negotiate without preconditions but by May 2009 he explained, "It is important for us, I think, without having set an artificial deadline, to be mindful of the fact we're not going to have talks forever" (Obama 2009a).

The controversial conclusion of a nuclear arms agreement between the US and five other great powers and Iran in July 2015 revealed the contradictory and hybrid working out of Iran's signified status. Opponents of the Joint and Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) called for deep revisions in the agreement and restoration of sanctions against a regime governed by "recalcitrant mullahs," and a "second-rate autocracy" (Cohen et al. 2016, 70, 75). At the same time in some cases, Iran achieved significant regional power status and was a worthy opponent, with the leadership having "imperial pretensions" (Cohen et al. 2016, 71). Denunciations of the regime, commentators suggested, should do so in ways akin to Reagan's denunciation of the Soviet Union, long considered

by policy-makers to be a rational and worthy opponent. Whereas "true Americans" were hostages in 1979, the freedom-loving peoples of Iran were hostages in 2015. In *Great Again*, Donald Trump's boastful list of the concessions he could wrest from Iran credits them with being better deal-makers than the Obama administration, which violated the cardinal rule in negotiations: "*The side that needs the deal the most is the one that should walk away with the least*" (Trump 2015, 39–40; emphasis in the original). For all of his bluster about 150 billion Iran received after the agreement was signed, thereby allowing it to fund extremist groups in the Middle East, the Trump administration approved Boeing's sale of a fleet of airliners to Iran, and Trump complained that European countries have benefited from deal-making with Iran while American companies have been banned from doing business there because of Iran's human rights abuses (Bellaigue 2017, 26). In testament to the jostling between Orientalism and risk analysis, Trump provides a final flourish to his promise to make a better deal: "I'd be happy to sit down with the Iranian leaders when they understand that the best course of action, if they want to be a major *player* in the *civilized* world, is to close down their entire nuclear program" (2015, 41; my emphasis).

## Hussein as Hitler in World War II

During the first Persian Gulf War a different assemblage of representations defined Saddam Hussein and his "rape" of Kuwait (Jeffords 1991). Saddam Hussein in many accounts was a new Hitler threatening the New World Order. Nelan likened the invasion of Kuwait with Hitler's invasion of Poland in that "as Germany did after blitzing Poland, Saddam is consolidating his position and gazing across the frontier at his foes" (Nelan 1990, 38). Could Hussein be a "latter day Hitler," a madman, or "a calculating student of power—an Arab Bismarck?" (Lane 1991, 14). McGrath pointed out the ominous detail that Hussein's uncle was "pro-Nazi" and encouraged Hussein to hate the British (McGrath et al. 1991). Goodgame intoned that Bush read Martin Gilbert's *The Second World War*, learning that Churchill wanted Hitler stopped in 1936, thereby blurring the challenge of Kuwait with the Rhineland (1991, 23). President Bush repeatedly drew on the Hitler-Hussein analogy as well, explaining to a veterans' organization that "in World War II, the United States paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who could have been stopped early on" (Bush 1990a, 1400). The president compared Hussein's army in Kuwait

with German regiments in Poland, and in his address to the nation announcing the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush explained that "Iraq's tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours" (Bush 1990b, 1107). Stam notes that the war "disappeared in its Middle Eastern specificity to become a 'second Second World War'" (1992, 119). The World War II analogy also framed the war as a classically and obviously just one that required a military response by collaborating allies who in this Second World War do save Jews in Israel from Scud attacks. Weapons used against Iraq, such as the PATRIOT missile, allowed acts of war to be seen as "nonaggressive defensive necessities rather than as aggressive, initiatory strikes" (Jeffords 1993, 539).

Popular media were rife with images of Hussein as a dictator cum rapist cum rabid animal as well. There was speculation about whether his "thrusts" would be confined only to Kuwait, or whether he might turn "right around and molest his neighbors again" (Beyer 1990a, 23). Hundreds of Iraqi tanks rumbled "down a six-lane highway toward the thinly defended opulence of Kuwait city," and Iraqi tanks "shimmered in the sweltering heat, their cannons pointed toward Kuwaiti refineries and rigs" (Watson et al. 1990, 16; Anderson et al. 1990, 29). Saudi Arabia feared that it might fall to "Saddam's rapacious army" (Goodgame 1991, 23). The Baath Party had become so "'Saddamized' that loyalty to the party has become indistinguishable from loyalty to the leader" (Post et al. 1991, 42). There were images of Kuwait being swallowed, chewed, and gnawed at by Hussein as well. Morrow explained the unfolding of the crisis thus: "The Iraqi came down like a wolf on the fold. The posse formed and then spent five-and-a-half months announcing what would happen to the wolf if the wolf did not stop gnawing on the carcass" (1991, 36). The goal of the war was to induce Hussein to "disgorge Kuwait" (Church 1991a, 19). A content analysis of *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *People* shows that Hussein was no Khomeini. While there are references to irrationality, the three biggest categories classified Hussein as Hitler, a rapist/child molester, or a madman. A White House official told a *Time* journalist, "Saddam is really a made-to-order villain. He's playing his part better than we could have written it" (Church 1991b, 29).

Just war doctrine and universal condemnation of dictatorship highlight the fact that the Gulf War had two distinctly humanitarian intervention dimensions that were missing during the Iranian hostage crisis. The first was the imperative to rescue Kuwaitis (as opposed to the Kuwaiti government). Kuwait hired public relations firms to present the horrors of

the Iraqi attack and occupation of the country. The most notorious was the October 1990 testimony to a congressional caucus by "Nayirah," a member of the Kuwaiti royal family (learned later), who described Iraqi soldiers ripping babies from incubators in a Kuwaiti hospital and leaving them to die on the cold hospital floor (MacArthur 1992). Strasser et al. explained how Iraqi forces "brought a new mother before resistance fighters and stripped her" which was "enough to humiliate the essence of the Kuwaiti spirit" (1991, 36). Beyer lamented that it appeared that no one was "willing to come to the defense of the tiny state and its 1.9 million people" (Beyer 1990b, 18). In the World War II analogies, Kuwait was Czechoslovakia to Hussein's Germany, conjuring a blitzkrieg attack against a weak state only this time Germany/Iraq would face overwhelming U.S. force (Talbott 1990, 36). In fact, presenting the war as an internationally sanctioned rescue effort operated alongside and often displaced depictions of the significance of Kuwaiti oil to the continued functioning of the global economy. President Bush cited Amnesty International's documentation of widespread human rights violations in Kuwait by Iraqis, including arbitrary arrest and detention without trial, torture, and "extrajudicial executions of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children," thereby joining military intervention with an NGO concerned with human rights (Bush 1991, 25). In the Persian Gulf War, in other words, moral intervention became the "frontline force of imperial intervention," legitimizing the use of military force to address human rights violations (Hardt and Negri 2000, 36).

Many of the Iraqi people were victims, which would reappear in the run-up to the 2003 war against Iraq. The eventual establishment of safe havens for the Kurds and no-fly zones in the north and south of the country had already helped to undermine uncomplicated images of all Iraqis as crazed and resonant with earlier depictions of Iranians. The post-war focus on humanitarian aid to the Kurds and Shi'ites, in other words, problematized easier connections that between Islam, backwardness, and difference. It signaled the growing possibility of using humanitarian discourse to rescue peoples in far-off lands regardless of their religious or racial backgrounds. The end of the Gulf War in 1991 introduced new foreign policy tactics and accompanying vocabulary that would become familiar throughout the 1990s: safe havens, no-fly zones, and humanitarian intervention— as well as inaction in the face of genocide in Rwanda. Although members of the UN Security Council and the US President and Congress continued to disagree on the appropriate response to refugee crises, starvation, eth-

nic cleansing, and genocide, the concept of humanitarian intervention and its cultivation of "cosmopolitan empathy" gained appeal as a legitimate aspect of US foreign policy throughout the 1990s. This also helps to explain why the arguments for intervention in Kosovo look notably similar to the arguments for overthrowing the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and invading Iraq in 2003.

At the close of the Gulf War President Bush offered up his administration's vision of a New World Order. Although the phrase never gelled, as a statement of strategy the concept was significant. In his state of the union address in 1991, Bush proclaimed that people in the former Communist states could now pursue their "natural instincts for enterprise," the "age of information will be the age of liberation," and the end of the Cold War brought with it new opportunities for international cooperation. Those countries in the group of "civilized states" would not have to surrender one iota of their sovereignty. The rule of law would prevail and there would be a peaceful resolution of disputes, accompanied by the unstinting championing of human rights (Bush 1991).

Bush stated the meaning of the New World Order a little differently in a February 1, 1991, speech in Georgia before the families of soldiers in Saudi Arabia:

> When we win, and we will, we will have taught a dangerous dictator, and any tyrant tempted to follow in his footsteps, that the U.S. has a new credibility and that what we say goes, and that there is no place for lawless aggression in the Persian Gulf and in this new world order we seek to create … and we mean it. (Kondracke 1991, 15)

These remarks and the criticisms of the transparent strategy at the time the New World Order was being bandied about demonstrate the mixed motives for going to war with Iraq, yet it is still important to take note of the language of human rights and a selective advocacy for protection for those in the world suffering and deemed qualified to receive it. While establishing Pax Americana under the guise of the New World Order, threats extended beyond the usual racial demonizing to encompass a myriad of threats, zones of insecurity, and the appearance of deepening unrest and upheaval that would produce predictions of coming anarchy and a clash of civilizations. In a more explicit linking of military and economic concerns, threat perceptions shifted from specific races and places to the entire globe seeking to challenge US managerial power. Reverberating

through continuing colonial renderings of dangerous Others was a broad and persistent concern with threats that would require constellations of military bases, a broader footprint, and new tactics for monitoring and addressing global threats.

## Both Far and Near: Making Sense of Bosnia and Kosovo

By the early 1990s, globalization's rhetoric as well as a world marked by instant images, significant increases in the number of NGOs, and a more activist United Nations worked to produce a story about the Balkans that oscillated more obviously between racially tinged images of "frozen" and "ancient" hatreds and a Balkans that was much like its European and US counterparts—multicultural, humane, and in need of assistance against war criminals such as Ratko Mladic, the Serb general who ordered the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and was wanted for war crimes, to be brought before the first of what would become many tribunals for trying war criminals. That the conflict occurred in Southern Europe also prompted worried speculation about the commitment of NATO and the US to end conflict in an area of geographical proximity to the rest of Europe. These factors, along with the increasingly invoked norm of collective security that legitimized humanitarian intervention, produced incessant calls for the West to "do something" in Bosnia, and that its failure to do so constituted the worst sort of appeasement, abdication of responsibility, and indifference.

The evidence that the Balkans were a land of ancient hatreds by policymakers and media is of course obvious and startling. Shortly after the fall of Srebrenica, Bosnia, in April 1993, Bill and Hillary Clinton read parts of Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts*, and "for some reason the book had an enormous impact on Clinton, convincing him that the inhabitants of the Balkans were doomed to violence" (Silber and Little 1997, 287). Kaplan in turn explained that his book was inspired by the 1937 travels of Rebecca West, and like her, he found Bosnia to be a "morass of ethnically mixed villages in the mountains" (Kaplan 1993, 22). These presidential and pundit descriptions are not unusual. As Todorova explains it, Western European concepts of progress and evolution helped to carve out Eastern and Southern Europe as places defined by "industrial backwardness, lack of advanced social relations and institutions typical for the developed West,

irrational and superstitious cultures unmarked by Western Enlightenment" (1996, 11). President Clinton echoed these themes when he explained, "When I became president, we found a war going on in Bosnia that was fueled by ancient, bloody divisions among Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats," and that it was "trouble in the Balkans that sparked World War I" (1995b, 804). Clinton declared that the war raged because the Serbs had returned to an era of "medieval barbarism" (1995a, 766). In popular media, Morrow counseled that "in the Balkans, ethnic purity is a primitively overriding value," thereby framing the conflict as driven by biological or genetic impulses (1993, 49). Ajami cautioned "you can't lodge an air strike against the fourteenth century," thus warning that Western intervention was futile (1994, 37). Essentialist renderings of the Balkans appeared in Huntington's wildly influential 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs* on the impending clash of civilization after the Cold War. After identifying the "Slavic-Orthodox" civilization as of seven (or possibly eight) major civilizations, Huntington explained the intractability of ingrained differences: "These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear" (Huntington 1993, 25). It followed that if "war was essentially a clash of ethnic groups that was centuries old and extremely complex, then there was little the United States could do, except provide humanitarian assistance" (Payne 1995, 186).

On the other hand, the Balkan wars became meaningful through a different and ultimately more powerful framework of analysis that made southern Europe similar to Western identity and US self-understandings as a multicultural, tolerant, and successful society. While the war might seem to be a "murky situation with no easy answers," it was also "too close to home for the West to do nothing" (Borden 1992, 196). Indeed, Zimmerman reminded readers that ethnically, Bosnians and Croats are indistinguishable from Serbs, and that religious divisions in the Balkans have been overdrawn. Using Freud's notion of the "narcissism of differences," he argued that it is perhaps the similarities of people "grown too accustomed to living together that should most frighten the West—potential Bosnias could begin at home" (1996, 12). Lewis insisted that Bosnia was an example of "multiculturalism in the finest sense … rather than the separatism that some American multiculturalists want the word to mean" (1995, 29). *The New Republic* editorialized that "there is a profound sense in which the Sarajevan experiment resembles the American experiment. Sarajevo is a tolerant, secular, multiethnic, and multicultural city" (1994, 9). One Yugoslav told *Christian Science Monitor* readers that his mother

raised her children to be "ethnic blind," and they "didn't notice or care whether their friends were Muslims, Serbs, Croats, or Jews." This description would no doubt resonate with many American readers, who also pride themselves on being "color blind" and embracing everyone as the "same" and as human first and members of ethnic or racial groups in apolitical milieus (such as tastes in cuisine or music).

This *doppelganger* aspect of the Balkan wars was reinforced by depictions of seeming normalcy disrupted by inexplicable violence in an otherwise civilized society. *People* began "Kill Thy Neighbor," with this chilling account:

> They went to school together, studied martial arts together and, on occasion, chatted over cups of coffee. Yet when civil war swept the former Yugoslavia, enveloping the Bosnian town of Kozarac in the spring of 1992, Dusko Tadic, an ethnic Serb, turned on Emir Karabasic, a Bosnian Muslim … No single offense, though, approached the savagery of what he did to Karabasic. In the garage of an "ethnic cleansing" concentration camp near Kozarac, Tadic allegedly forced a prisoner to bite off Karabasic's testicles, then allowed his former neighbor to bleed to death. (Rogers 1995, 101)

In the context of the domestic culture wars occurring in the US at the same time, this horror story demonstrated the dangers of identity politics and sharpened the lament that the US was losing its common foundations and risked succumbing to the ugly outcome of "Balkanization." Another description of what happened in the city of Tuzla gave a similar warning. After observing that 40% of Tuzla's married couples were from different ethnic groups who possessed a "European orientation," Lane noted that they had fled the city because of fighting, and those arriving from rural villages were intolerant nationalists taking over a city where "cultural diversity was a hallmark" (1994, 12). Tuzla, in other words, had become the assimilationists' nightmare, an imagined America turned into separatist, chauvinistic enclaves.

The Balkan wars reinforced fears among significant core NATO members that the conflict would threaten the military alliance. A Pentagon study argued that "nothing about Bosnia is worth a serious split in the alliance" (quoted in Waller 1994, 30). Ending the war, in other words, was subordinate to continued Western solidarity, but it was also an important moment in which NATO acted on behalf of Western endorsement of humanitarian intervention, and acting in concert to use force against

Serbia solidified the leadership of leading Western powers in defining the instances that required concerted action. When NATO circumvented United Nations authority and intervened in Kosovo in March 1999 with Operation Allied Force, there certainly was discord within the alliance about the lack of UN authorization. Furthermore, Russia, China, and India vehemently disagreed about the use of force and Russia and China would have used their veto power to prevent authorization of force for humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, the intervention in Kosovo established an important precedent. In 2003, the US argued for military intervention in Iraq on the grounds of non-proliferation rather than humanitarian emergency, but it did so with reasoning that was similar to that used for Kosovo. It did so from its privileged position in a larger network of governments, NGOs, IGOs, and private entities with an interest in addressing increasingly diffuse, indeterminate, non-state-based threats to the global system. September 11 appeared to change these international conditions. Threats seemed to emanate from state-based enemies, and familiar Orientalist discourses seemed to confirm that US foreign policy had returned to its roots in Manifest Destininarian tropes.

## September 11 and the War in Afghanistan

Edward Said is indispensable for understanding Orientalist characterizations of Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden after September 11. As journalists traveled to Afghanistan under the watchful eyes of the US military, their readers beheld a "rocky, primitive land" that was "still dominated by fierce men in turbans and beards who look—and behave—much as their ancestors did" (Hirsh 2002, 26). Even Elizabeth Rubin, a journalist with more appreciation of the complexity of Afghanistan and the war, evoked a nation stuck in another era: "Whether it's 25 years of war or the culture of the mountains, much of Afghanistan still sustains itself as people did in the Middle Ages" (Rubin 2001, 26). Described as a society with warlords, a dizzying array of ethnic groups, and an insane brand of Islam, Afghanistan, like other earlier Middle Eastern foes, was even more impenetrable. The Taliban ordered men to grow beards, banned kite flying and neckties, and non-religious music (Bartholet 2001, 55). Women were kept in "medieval bondage" and no television was allowed by the Taliban (Bartholet 2001, 54). *Newsweek* writers interviewed Russians who had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and they confirmed that Afghans were indeed a formidable yet primitive enemy:

> You will never feel safe. You can be ambushed at any time … The people in Afghanistan are quite dangerous because during the day they are kind, hospitable and friendly. At night they sneak out, pick up their weapons, and attack you. After losing an army in the nineteenth century, the British learned that the best way to run Afghanistan is from a distance, through surrogate rulers. (Thomas and Liu 2001, 53)

Osama bin Laden exceeded Khomeini and Hussein in his diabolicalness: "In history's long list of villains, bin Laden will find a special place" (Thomas et al. 2001, 39). Bin Laden was on the November 26, 2001, covers of *Newsweek* and *Time* in the crosshairs of a rifle and a computer-generated screen with concentric circles ending at his right eye, respectively. *The Globe* tabloid had a field day with an expose of bin Laden's alleged "underdeveloped sexual organs," which pushed him into the arms of prostitutes for help, and then his traumatic love affair in Beirut with a woman from Chicago who eventually spurned him provided readers with the most personal of reasons for hating America, being "rejected as an inadequate lover" (Browne et al. 2001, 8–9).

The combination of a feudal Taliban (whose leader, after all, was a "one-eyed mullah"), and an evil Osama bin Laden seemed to make the US response to the terrorist attacks comparable to other foreign policy crises such as Pearl Harbor, and Dan Rather said thus, "Remember the Alamo. Remember the Main. Remember Pearl Harbor. Remember the Twin Towers" (DeMille 2001, 3). Once again, Americans were innocent victims, their opponents did not "fight fair," and retaliation would be both swift and violent. Domestically, racial profiling, harassment, and detention of Muslim men were widely reported, and there were hate crimes against Muslims, especially in the first few weeks after the attacks.

Nevertheless, rival interpretations were soon describing a different kind of threat, as media, scholars, and government officials began portraying Al Qaeda as a formidable and technologically advanced adversary. In fact, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda worked like the components of a powerful global corporate-like enterprise, with hubs all over the world. Al Qaeda, in other words, was part and parcel of the restructuring of global politics that had been taking place since the end of the Cold War. Before September 11, commentators had already noticed this network-like aspect of Al Qaeda. After the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, Nelan explained how Osama bin Laden ran Al Qaeda. The Saudi-born millionaire, he explained, "runs a network of Islamic charitable and educational organiza-

tions from a well-equipped headquarters outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan." He described bin Laden as tech-savvy, with an ability to keep in touch with the outside world "via computers and satellite phones and give occasional interviews to international news organizations including *Time* and CNN" (1998, 51). After the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000, journalists recognized the sophistication of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Calling it a David and Goliath problem, Zakaria asserted "globalization helps terrorists" (2000, 37). Today terrorists can get explosives via mail, and the GPS in a Hertz rent a car could be used by terrorists to target enemies, he warned. By 2001, in other words, terrorist "asymmetric methods," relying upon sophisticated technology and network organization, constituted a risk to US and Western dominance, particularly in the Middle East. Paul Pillar's description of Al Qaeda's structure was thus not new but it was nonetheless noteworthy: "This network is something like the Internet; it is a significant transnational phenomenon that has grown in recent years and that some people have used to their advantage, but nobody owns or controls it" (2001, 55). Some descriptions warned the world to remain vigilant in the face of by Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. Bartholet explained that although Osama bin Laden "may live in a cave or some similarly primitive lair, he's a master at manipulating the modern media," and even "produced his own recruitment video" (Bartholet 2001, 55–56). *The Economist* jarringly juxtaposed "satellites and horsemen," to describe the combination required to win against the Taliban and Al Qaeda ("Satellites" 2002).

Other terrorist experts, by 2001 a huge guild offering instant commentary through broadcast media, newspapers, and books, used a similar template for describing the Al Qaeda threat. Benjamin and Simon described Al Qaeda as an "international clearinghouse and bankroller of jihad," and invited us to imagine them with "the Macintosh laptops and encrypted communications, stolen credit cards … jihadists can be everywhere and anywhere" (Benjamin and Simon 2002, 169). The jacket blurb for Peter Bergen's Holy War, Inc. praised the author for helping us see Al Qaeda in a new light, "as a corporation that has exploited modern technology and weaponry in the service of global terrorism and the destruction of the West" (Bergen 2001). Terrorist expert Cronin described terrorists as opportunistic entrepreneurs whose "product" is violence quite consciously "sold," and the 9/11 Commission described the terrorist hijackers of US flights as "Terrorist Entrepreneurs" led by an efficient "manager," Khalid Saheikh Mohamed, who presented himself as an "entrepreneur seeking

venture capital and people" (Cronin 2002; Kean and Hamilton 2004, 210, 222–223). The Former Chief of Counterterrorism for the CIA, Vincent Cannistraro, explained the sophisticated world of terrorist financing to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. After noting that the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia had been a funnel until shut down by the Saudi government, others had emerged to take its place:

> Now, it appears that wealthy individuals are siphoning off funds from their worldwide enterprises in creative and imaginative ways. For example, orders may be given to liquidate a stock portfolio in New York, and have those funds deposited in a Gulf, African, or Hong Kong bank controlled by a Bin Laden associate. Other channels exist for the flow of monies to Bin Laden, through financial entities in the UAE and Qatar … There are some female members of Bin Laden's own family who have been sending cash from Saudi Arabia to his "front" accounts in the Gulf. (Cannistraro 2001, 20)

In the face of a threat posed as resembling the flattened, decentralized modality of a global network enterprise, critics of US terrorist policy responded with exhortations to the government to model its own practices on a corporation in order to respond effectively to this full-blown threat. Analyst Ashton Carter (and later Defense Secretary in the Obama administration) bemoaned the US incapacity to respond with efficiency, calling it a "managerial inadequacy, as basic as that of a corporation with no line manager to oversee the making of its leading product" (Carter 2002, 6). Bobbitt called for a "market state" response, hiving off important functions to the private sector and limiting its welfare function to "increase opportunity and minimize risk for all as best they can" (2002, 84). Rothkopf insisted that old alliances based on nations and treaties could not fight the war on terror. The appropriate terror-fighting stance would be "unconventional, involve millions of disparate actors, and be guided by rules that will be constantly rewritten. It will be an alliance of a motley army of horizontal partnerships, with a nontraditional leadership structure" (2002, 56). The government's role in the fight against terror was thus seen as hierarchical, old-fashioned, and inadequate—no match for the Post-Fordist, networked structure of Al Qaeda and its franchises. Marketing executives on Madison Avenue were brought in to sell a new US foreign policy toward the Muslim world. Charlotte Beers was appointed Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy to "revitalize" US relations

with the Muslim world. She explained the challenges before her in May 2002; she noted that the conversion rate to Islam around the world was 20%, "which is higher than most sales curves we see today" (Beers 2002, 2). She promised to track down the 700,000 former exchange students in the Middle East to serve as conduits for the American message, although she also predicted it to be a daunting task because of the absence of a data base: "We don't have what a local car dealer would have—some idea of who his customers are" (Beers, 6). The defense industry, for its part, almost immediately began reshaping their weaponry as well as sales pitches for the war on terror, a market with both international and domestic clients. The drones, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), lasers, robots, and mind-boggling array of other new weaponry were frequently pictured and explained by elaborate captions. One can find the obsession with drones throughout the 2000s beginning with the November 2002 use of one to kill Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen.

On the domestic front, the Bush administration pursued a range of policies that demonstrated the continuing significance of policing domestic minorities deemed dangerous. Infamous secret detentions were ordered by Attorney General John Ashcroft of over a thousand Arab and South Asian immigrants and began shortly after the terror attacks (Hassan 2002, 17). The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System established at airports singled out "high risk" foreigners from certain countries and required their fingerprint and registration. These policies produced dramatic drops in immigration from Muslim-majority countries in the wake of September 11; by the end of 2002, the number of immigrants arriving from twenty-two Muslim countries had declined by one-third because of both heightened security concerns and few applications, related of course (Elliott 2006, 1). At least five people died and nearly 1000 bias incidents were recorded in the first two months after the terrorist attacks (Ahmad 2002, 2). People were removed from planes for "suspicious activity," Bill Maher lost his job on *Politically Incorrect* for praising the courage of the hijackers, and Ann Coulter wrote that the US should invade Muslim countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to Christianity.

Nevertheless, the September 11 attacks occurred after nearly a decade of important ideological labor had contributed to the gradual transformation of US self-representation. The government insisted in its widely publicized 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States that "America's experience as a great multiethnic democracy affirms our conviction that people of many heritages and faiths can live and prosper in

peace" (p. 3). President Bush visited the Islamic Center in Washington, DC, on September 17, 2001, insisting that "America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens," and "they need to be treated with respect" (Bush 2001, 1). He told Congress and the public on September 20, 2001, "The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself" (Bush 2001).

Immigrants affirming the continuing "choice worthiness," of the US, as Bonnie Honig describes it, played an important role in affirming that the US indeed remains their primary source of identification (1998). The subtext of many of the stories about the immigrant experience after September 11 was often subtle and implicit and therefore all the more powerful—immigrants demonstrate that we all love America. Applications for citizenship surged after the attacks, no doubt partly motivated by anxiety and fear, but also by a reported realization that immigrants felt "truly American" after the attacks (Axtman 2002, 1). The boom in citizenship applications reinforces the image of the US as still offering the promises of the "American Dream" to all who arrive, and reaffirms the image of the US as a country defined by its assimilationist diversity. *Parade Magazine* ran a story on Arab Americans in the military, highlighting the work of one Marine to found the Association of Patriotic Arab Americans in the military. Despite reporting taunts, discrimination, and often disagreeing with US foreign policy, the overall tone of the article conveyed a grateful minority fully embracing what they defined for *Parade* as the heart of US identity: "Our values as Americans—dignity, respect, and fairness—are more valuable than our military might," said Sgt. Omar Masry (Winik 2005, 6). Five years after the attacks the number of permanent legal immigrants from predominately Muslim countries outstripped their pre-9/11 numbers, and their stories echo the classic immigrant stories of seeking political freedom and economic opportunity in the US.

It is important to recognize the links between embracing multicultural superpower identity and consumer culture, with market-driven outreach an important component of diversity cultivation. In other words, one of the key ingredients of post-Fordist marketing has been cultivating the embrace of niche diversity found in everyday life such as international food courts at malls, diversity weeks on college campuses, and marketing campaigns for products that feature diverse ethnic and racial groups and ambiguous sexual identities (Christopherson 1994, 414). The marriage of consumption and diversity took concrete form after September 11 when the Ford Motor Company hosted "An Islamic Perspective on the Events

of September 11," in view of its large Arab-American population in Detroit (Hakim 2001, B6). In the face of criticism from the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Kiefer Sutherland, the star of *24*, itself sponsored by the Ford Motor Company, made a public service announcement during Season 4 (in 2005) that linked all Americans in the fight against terrorism: "it is important to recognize that the American Muslim community stands firmly beside their fellow Americans in denouncing and resisting all forms of terrorism" (CAIR 2005). And as Grewal notes, buying and displaying the flag, taken up enthusiastically by ethnic and racial minorities, were central in producing a simultaneously diverse and patriotic American nation united in the struggle against terrorism (2003, 559).

In the midst of these fervent affirmations of patriotism by many Arab Americans and Muslims the US state treated them as heightened security risks. Surveillance, detention, and eavesdropping were widespread in the aftermath of September 11, and they were in some respects a continuation and deepening of laws passed by the Clinton administration, especially the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), both passed in 1996. Among other things the former expanded the grounds for deportation while the latter introduced the death penalty for terrorist attacks. These acts facilitated the passage of the PATRIOT ACT in 2001, which further increased the state's powers of communication, interception, detention, and search power. Technologies aimed at risky populations likewise extend to populations deemed at risk—technologies of security can eventually extend to entire populations while maintaining "special vigilance" toward what are deemed particularly risky groups. The inexorable increase in the powers of surveillance to some extent dilutes the racial grounding of threats—everyone observed, but of course, some more than others. Likewise, extraordinary rendition, "black sites" Guantanamo Bay, and revising guidelines for "information extraction" follow the logic of not only dehumanizing racialized enemies but precautions in the face of potentially catastrophic events.

## CONCLUSION

The *9/11 Commission Report* offered a global strategy premised on an expansive vision of US power. They wrote, "9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests 'over there' should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America 'over here.' In this same sense, the

American homeland is the planet" (Kean and Hamilton 2004, 517). In other words, there is no inside/outside to the threat facing the US. It is immediate and omnipresent, according the commission, a leading bellwether of thinking about US foreign policy. When Saudi- and Egyptian-born terrorists, trained in Afghanistan, educated in Germany, and funded by various networks, are capable of bombing major US landmarks, racial distancing and ineradicable otherness are hard to sustain.

In many respects, September 11 provided the rationale for the 2003 war against Iraq but this war too has its origins much earlier, in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and before that a ten-year US preoccupation with stability in the Middle East and a growing role for the US military in maintaining it. The Clinton administration had vigorously maintained no-fly zones and bombed Iraq repeatedly throughout the 1990s for its failure to adhere to the inspections regime and an alleged assassination attempt against George H.W. Bush. Clinton had used the language of risk when announcing the bombings of both Iraq and Afghanistan in 1998, and he signed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 that called for regime change (Morrissey 2010, 883). Also in 1998, Clinton signed a "lethal finding" absolving the CIA if bin Laden were killed in a covert operation, and in November 1998 offered a five-million-dollar reward for his capture. The confluence of September 11 and neoconservative prominence no doubt prompted greater threat inflation concerning Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction and links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. Declaring Iraq's membership in the Axis of Evil in 2002 was driven less racial animus and more along the lines of a Kosovo-like threat to global security. The Bush administration promised that disarming Iraq would make the world safer even though polls in the run-up to the war showed that 77% of Americans believed a war with Iraq would make terrorist attacks in the US more likely and most preferred UN backing for any war (Elliott 2003, 26).

The Bush administration linked the threat posed by Iraq with a shrinking window in which to act, which in turn became a key way to foreclose debate domestically and then abandon a second resolution from the United Nations, for which the Kosovo intervention had already set a precedent. Colin Powell debated the French representative to the United Nations by declaring, "We cannot wait for one of these weapons [of mass destruction] to turn up in our cities. More inspections—I am sorry—are not the answer" (Dickey 2003, 36). Bush asserted that Saddam Hussein need not try any "last minute game of deception. The game is over" (Elliott 2003, 26). Hyped fear and an imminent threat in which there was

only a small window, as much as colonial depictions, were what flooded news accounts on the eve of the war. In the March 17, 2003, issue of *Newsweek*, a story on how Iraq would fight the US "over there" sat beside the story "Can Iraq Hit America?" The authors introduced lurid scenarios or Iraqi retaliation "over here," including "isolated assassinations of U.S. citizens overseas to biological or chemical attacks," or an "Iraqi femme fatale" could "slip across the border with a vial of smallpox and contaminate thousands of Americans" (Klaidman and Dickey 2003, 32). *24* could not have scripted it better. Saddam Hussein and Iraqi society partially fit Orientalist and colonial scripts, but the regime also became a generalized source of fear, insecurity, and vulnerability. The Bush Doctrine of preemption merely formalized what had increasingly become the regnant approach to risk management in the Middle East. Formulations of risk are compatible with projections of US power as a force for regulation, management, and inclusion of like-minded states as much as a neo-colonial power defending civilization against barbarism.

When it became official news by the Kay Report in October 2003 and the 9/11 Commission Report in 2004 that Iraq did not have Weapons of Mass Destruction nor were there links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, the ensuing debate became one over whether any government officials had ever actually declared that Iraq was an imminent threat (Stahl 2008, 89). The Bush administration also insisted on the threat even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. When the Kay report was released and showed that Iraq had not been building nuclear weapons, the Bush administration "hyped many of the leads, clues, and suspicions" mentioned in the report (Drogin 2003, 24). When the 9/11 Commission stated definitively that there was no Hussein-Al Qaeda collaboration, Bush pointed to the presence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Northern Iraq and insisted that he had sought help from Al Qaeda, an exercise in hairsplitting over the difference between collaboration and seeking support (Stevenson 2004, A15). These were debates about technicalities and what administration officials "really said," and did not undermine the overall pattern of framing foreign policy in terms of threats, possibilities, and catastrophic consequences resulting from a failure to act. There was no disagreement, in other words, that Iraq posed a threat. The issue was about whether to go to war to address it.

The way in which US policy-makers as well as large swaths of the culture understand and explain foreign policy has changed dramatically since the days of the Iranian hostage crisis. Instead of coded as racially and radi-

cally different and inferior, enemies are adept, protean, and capable of threatening global stability, particularly in the "homeland planet" of America. The Obama administration's extensive use of targeted killings, drone strikes, US Special Forces, and covert operations is testimony to the continuing rationales and patterns of actions that got their start in the 1990s. As Obama explained in his announcement of an additional 30,000 for the Afghanistan surge in December 2009, "unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and *remain a target* for those same extremists who are plotting along its border" and to leave Afghanistan would "create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies" (Obama 2009b, 4; my emphasis). President Obama offers a somewhat different mode for governing risks in the face of potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks, offering a competing interpretation of how to address the threat of terrorism and not a redefinition of the problem. It is significant that the cost-effectiveness of Obama's strategy is a constant source of reflection, debate, and commentary. Keeping Guantanamo Bay open costs the US global legitimacy, while drones are cheap and safe (and debatably precise), while air strikes and invasions are costly and result in too many civilian deaths. The continued occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and Iraq carry their own risks, and as of 2016, the two wars had cost nearly 5 trillion dollars.

Securing stability in the Middle East is not solely based on international racial profiling but rather on the rationale of risk to justify intervention. Domestic profiling and surveillance, furthermore, aim at the entire population, and the threat posed by terrorism is not met solely through internment or deportation. The drive for observation stretches across the world, before passengers even board their planes, "effectively pushing the United States border thousands of miles beyond the country's shores" (Schmidt 2012, A15). The imperative to guard against unknown catastrophe is inexorable, as "uncertainty slowly extends profiling to the entire population" (Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 104). While specific populations are singled out, racially profiled, and at times preemptively deported, the inexorable impulse is generalized and arbitrary surveillance accompanied by calls to the population to take responsibility and remain vigilant. Foreign policy through crisis management has not fully displaced racial politics, but describing threats no longer takes place solely through racial categories. Instead, the parlance of preemption, emergency, danger, and catastrophe has become an important justification for US foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

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# Neoliberal Patriotism

Proponents of the return of imperialism thesis place nationalism and tub-thumping patriotism at the center of their analysis of how the US historically has focused on "subjugating and putting in order" unruly frontiers, first across the continent and now across the world (De Genova 2010, 614). Mead avers that it is "mass popular patriotism and the martial spirit behind it" that explain US power in the execution of its foreign policy (2002, 247). Unending campaigns of military conquest across the continent activate the martial spirit. Ambrose notes that most white Americans conceived of Indian fighters as "the advance agent of civilization, doing good and necessary work for the future benefit and prosperity of the United States" and their conquest consistently provided a way to create and celebrate communal solidarity (1975, 28).

Patriotism is a defining feature of US exceptionalism. When *U.S. News and World Report* explained "Why the U.S. is Unique" in 2004, it provided statistics, without irony, on how Americans produce the most garbage and have fewer paid vacations than their European counterparts, have the largest military in the world, "we save too little and spend too much," and yet in spite of it all, "we wouldn't have it any other way" (Duffy 2004, 40). Janny Scott of *The New York Times* described the lack of subtlety that defines US patriotism: "Most people are extremely proud to be American. The rest are simply very proud" (2003). During foreign policy crises, the rally around the flag effect—dramatic spikes in support of government and displays of unity—has been a topic of extensive research.

Baker and O'Neal conclude that the "size of a rally is significantly related to the means by which the White House presents and interprets the militarized dispute to the media and the public" (2001, 678). In other words, the public responds to the "cues" and "frames" being used by government officials to elicit support. Nowhere is this more evident than in the September 11 terrorist attacks. After President Bush quickly proclaimed a war on terror, a poll taken five days after the attacks showed that 85% of the public favored military action against whoever was responsible for them (Berke and Elder 2001). The public was not only engaging without prompting in a paroxysm of pro-war patriotism; it was responding to what had become, within five days, a decision made by foreign policy-makers: a war against Afghanistan was a *fait accompli*.

A number of important developments have reconfigured the nature of patriotism and nationalism, particularly since the Vietnam War. While it was not the first war in which the government made efforts to shape public opinion, it was the first one in which both television and print media seriously threatened public support for the war and unity was undermined as the war went on. Of course, previous wars produced debate and dissent, but the Vietnam War unraveled the anti-communist consensus and displayed the unraveling on television, in media, and later, in film. The military faced institutional breakdown and emerged from the war with a changed mission as a professional and "all volunteer" force. The military and government together presented a new "business plan" for fighting war in the aftermath of Vietnam. The Powell Doctrine promised to fight wars with clear objectives, the use of overwhelming force, minimal risk to troops, Congressional and public support, and with a clear exit strategy. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the government tightly controlled information and honed its ability to manage, through marketing, branding, public relations, and spin, what the public knew about whether to fight. From Grenada as theater to the 100-hour 1991 Gulf War, these techniques culminated in the now-famous observation one of George W. Bush's aides (later identified as Karl Rove) made to Ron Suskind in 2004: "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors … and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do" (Suskind 2004). When *Time* named Bush its Person of the Year in 2004, it did so partly because he had been able to "reframe reality to match his design" (Gibbs and Dickerson 2004, 34).

Developments in the ability of government to use public relations to fight war are associated with subjectivities congruent with neoliberalism and consumption, which in turn produce neopatriotism, a set of citizenship practices primed for short-term conflict often understood through emotional and individualistic frames. Jodi Dean calls this "consumerist reconfiguration" of the public sphere a reformatting of subjectivity that is increasingly fragmented and networked (2002, 37). Crenson and Ginsberg argue that government now treats citizens as clients or customers because it no longer depends upon collective mobilization to fight its wars. Fried also observes that government encourages citizens to "buy" rather than consider various policies, and "the public does not participate but is instead acted upon" (1997, 8).

The emergence of more brazenly and sophisticated government forms of manipulation as well as the savvy and distracted consumer-citizen landscape is tied to the rise of neoliberalism and its accompanying ideology and policies. Deregulating of markets, scaling back the welfare state, lowering taxes on the wealthy, and creating global rules that systematically favor already-wealthy countries defined government policy since the Carter administration. Accompanying these policies has been a sustained ideological effort to portray consumption, competition, and consumer sovereignty as integral to the definition of the "American way of life," which paradoxically, because of state policy, has become increasingly out of reach. The extensive cultivation of this consumer-citizen subjectivity has had important consequences for the nationalism-citizenship nexus in foreign policy. Citizen-consumers gauge and assess foreign policy in calculative terms, while being promised certain kinds of state actions when it comes to wars: cost-effective and low risk to American soldiers, at-a-distance, and "successful," as measured by government-offered criteria. And perhaps most important of all, government seeks to reassure that war and conflict will not be "another Vietnam."

Assumptions on the part of government and media about short attention spans and the ghosts of Vietnam quagmires explain why it was reported that the public grew impatient within *one week* of the invasion of Iraq. The government promised that the war effort needed fewer than 200,000 troops, Iraqis would greet the US soldiers as liberators, and the invasion would usher in democracy. These primed expectations appeared met when one journalist marveled that ground forces had gotten nearly as far into Iraq in one day, while the same distance had taken four days during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The commander of one brigade assured

the reporter, "We're ahead of schedule" (Myers 2003, B4). A mere five days after the invasion, however, in the face of Iraqi opposition, firefights, and slowdowns in the desert, the military campaign seemed to be turning into "the worst kind of reality television" (Jacobs 2003, B13). The percentage of the public expecting a quick victory fell from 62% on Saturday (four days after the invasion) to 43% on Monday (Nagourney and Elder 2003, B13). In a mini-rehearsal for what would be become the dominant leitmotif of the war, by April 5, as troops arrived on the outskirts of Baghdad, Colin Powell assured, "The day of liberation is drawing near" (Apple 2003, A1). Could the government "deliver" on its promises? What did the public think? How long would the war last?

The proliferation of news sources and the encoding of the political as entertainment in a competitive media environment have produced ever more vivid and often competing descriptions and proliferating sources for understanding foreign policy. The increasingly common presentation of foreign policy as "soft news," that is, often sensationalized and focused on the "human" dimension of conflict encourages spectators of war to view foreign policy as an extension of celebrity or talk show news. Even though television and print initially conjured up the familiar and mythic in their coverage of the September 11 attacks, conventional nationalist myths quickly bled into new genres of television style, including the centrality of celebrity, reality television and talk shows, new modes of information gathering and reporting in print media, and new sources of information, from websites to blogs to Wikileaks.

The Powell Doctrine business plan for war, citizen-consumer subjectivity, and the new media environment for understanding foreign policy have contributed to the creation of a public with more varied attitudes about foreign policy and war. The Cold War consensus unraveled because of Vietnam, and there are now segments of the public that regularly support working with allies and the UN, support humanitarian wars under certain conditions, and often oppose unilateral military action. (Just as there are segments of public opinion that oppose all three.) The fragmented media environment ensures that even when the government is "on message" the public has an array of alternative media sources that allow it to avoid foreign policy news altogether or follow it via alternative sources. Cued to act as calculating actors in a marketplace when it comes to domestic policy and politics, the public increasingly does so with respect to foreign policy as well. Over time, short-lived displays of patriotism have become more common in response to war. Media provide anguished accounts of human

suffering abroad and the toll of war on families back home, and there are usually resolutions to individual travails that require individual efforts to reconcile oneself to reality. Individual stories of hardship and triumph do not require citizen mobilization.

Vietnam provides an important reference point for understanding these reformulations of nationalism and patriotism at work in US foreign policy. In nearly every conflict since 1975, Vietnam looms large because it represents the possible outcome of a foreign policy that the public no longer "buys." The Iranian hostage crisis was a debacle partly because it resembled Vietnam. It took too long to release the hostages and they began to resemble Vietnam POWs. Ayatollah Khomeini, like Ho Chi Minh, had a seemingly inexplicable hold on the population and represented a genuine nationalist strain of opposition to the US based on its semi-colonial subjugation of Iran and the overthrow of its government in 1953. The botched rescue attempt seemed to accentuate the humiliation of defeat in Vietnam. Subsequent administrations until September 11 promised clear plot lines and neat endings if not to the conflict itself certainly to US involvement.

In Grenada, the Reagan administration brought a whole set of strategies to the war that allowed it to reverse Vietnam in a self-consciously scripted manner. This trend in government information management continued with the Gulf War, which also produced short-lived public dissent that quickly coalesced around the troops as the war's deadline neared. Clinton's critics used Vietnam metaphors in both Somalia and the Balkans as a way to challenge his foreign policy. Clinton's embrace of the Powell Doctrine—promising no ground troops in Bosnia, for example—as well as his pursuit of his globalization agenda was an important means of countering efforts to conjure Vietnam ghosts. In fact, Clinton established trade relations with Vietnam, officially recognized Vietnam in 1995 and according to one reporter's irony, he "sent himself to Vietnam" in 2000 to press for more searches for American remains and to strengthen economic ties (Thomma 2000, A3). After September 11, hints of a Vietnam quagmire emerged in Afghanistan, presumably quashed with the routing of the Taliban and then revived with President Obama's surges in 2009. Vietnam analogies were a regular fixture in debates about the war in Iraq, and the numerous corporate-style government campaigns to rename its war strategy—from Operation Forward Together to Plan for Victory—highlight the importance of avoiding Vietnam metaphors.

An important part of the "not another Vietnam" campaign has been to recode the meaning of Vietnam in popular understandings. On the

twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, *People* sent some of its journalists to Vietnam to present a country very different from the one of the 1970s and 1980s. There is the usual focus on human-interest stories and personal triumphs of those who survived the war, but more important, perhaps, is the presentation of Vietnam as a bustling, capitalist country that now presents opportunities for US-based transnationals seeking cheap labor and tourists seeking exotic and different destinations. Its government may still rule through the single communist party, but Vietnam is open for business. The US, in effect, won after all, as Vietnam adopted a market economy and sought to emulate American lifestyles, celebrity culture, and capitalist economy. After tracing the evolution of the nationalism-citizen nexus to neopatriotic-consumer subjectivities, this chapter concludes with an analysis of *People*'s tour of Vietnam on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the US departure, and the new lessons of the war: personal forgiveness, moving on, and investing.

## "Remember the Embassy Patriotism"

The Iranian hostage crisis was a foreign policy media frenzy, with nine covers of *Newsweek* and eleven covers of *Time* featuring graphic pictures and plaintive questions and assertions that summarized the ordeal ("Has America Lost its Clout?" and "Blackmailing America"). ABC's "America Held Hostage" put the crisis on nightly television, with Ted Koppel reminding viewers every night of the number of days Americans were in captivity. Overall, the reading and viewing public got the message that Americans were innocent victims of Iranian barbarism and nativism. Historical ignorance about foreign policy helped, and the hostage crisis restored the unity missing from the Vietnam era. Whereas Vietnam had created some guilt among some people, with the Iranian hostage crisis, the US allegedly had nothing to for which to apologize. Conservatives used the crisis to comment on Carter's alleged liberalism in letting the country's defenses slide—the Committee on the Present Danger, formed in 1976, was a policy-making counterweight to Carter's approach. In May 1980, Evans and Novak announced in *Reader's Digest* that Jimmy Carter was guilty of having four major misconceptions: that the Cold War was over, the US could cut military spending, human rights could be a cornerstone of US foreign policy, and covert actions could cease. They quoted Henry Kissinger, who five years earlier had been the target of anti-Vietnam War protesters, that the problem with Carter was not that he didn't

understand foreign policy but that "he did not understand that he did not understand" (1980, 104). *Reader's Digest* reprinted a Ben Wattenberg article from *The New York Times Magazine* from the summer of 1979 in which he opined that the US reaction to Vietnam had made its foreign policy "less muscular, more accommodating, and lower in profile" (Wattenberg 1979, 86). Republican candidate Reagan asserted in January 1980, "I cannot doubt that our failure to act decisively at the time this happened provided the Russians with the final encouragement to invade Afghanistan" (Weinraub 1980, A12).

During the Iranian hostage crisis the US became again, in the words of Patricia Nelson Limerick, "an empire of innocence" (1987, 35). While Vietnam had created "self-doubts," the hostage crisis demonstrated the continued ability of foreign policy-makers and the press to rename America the victim rather than the villain. If one lesson of Vietnam had been that it was hubris and blindness that led us into that war, "the hostage crisis made arrogance and ignorance acceptable again" (Isaacs 1997, 68). In Nashville, a disc jockey "sent pulses racing over the radio waves with a jingoistic little ballad called 'Drop Four Big Ones,' while barroom brawlers in Houston bellowed, 'Sure, we'll send back the Shah, strapped to a 50-ton nuke" (Mathews 1979, 42). *Newsweek* reported that Americans in Washington, Los Angeles, and Houston burned the Iranian flag, while 800 marchers in Houston "paraded with pictures of John Wayne and posters urging: Don't Buy Iranian oil" (Strasser and Ma 1979, 73). By November 1980, *Newsweek* writers articulated the new commonsense after a year of captivity: signaling that the crisis needed "no muscle" encouraged the Iranian captors to hold Americans longer than they would have otherwise (Mathews et al. 1980, 58). Rawls quoted one person-on-the-street who, like many citizens, couched his reflections in reference to Vietnam: "a lot of my friends who were actively against the war in Vietnam say we should go and bomb the hell out of Iran" (1979, A20). By 1981, Yankelovich and Kaagan could assert that "The conviction that we have in the past few years permitted ourselves to be manipulated, bullied, humiliated, and otherwise abused, has given rise to a powerful urge to vindicate the national honor" (1980, 710).

Amidst this common portrayal and spin of the Republican Party and conservatives as stronger on national security than the Democrats, there was another important dynamic at work that personalized the hostage crisis and encouraged Americans to consider it in intimate rather than historical or geopolitical terms. The intimate aspects of the crisis started

with the President himself, who met with the hostages' families to voice concern and provide assurances to them that he was doing everything possible to free their loved ones (Butler et al. November 19, 1979, 75; Clifford et al. February 2, 1981, 26; both have photos). Carter repeatedly stressed his worry about the safety of the hostages and retreated to the White House as a show of concern (the so-called Rose Garden Strategy much maligned by his opponents, who demanded that he campaign). One of the most personal acts Carter undertook for two years was ordering the Christmas tree to remain dark during the annual ritualistic lighting, with the exception of one star at the top, in tribute to the hostages. *Time* described it with particular emotion: "the nation's official tree is dark except for one star at the top because the hostages in Iran have yet to receive a Christmas gift of Freedom from the unwise men in the East" ("States' Lights" 1979, 11). In 1980, at the lighting of the Christmas tree for 417 seconds to mark the number of days of the hostages' capture, *Newsweek* titled its story "Christmas Held Hostage" (Mathews et al. 1981, 12).

Members of the hostages' families were often pictured "back home" with photographs and mementos of their loved ones. Barbara Timm, the mother of Kevin Hermening, pictured in *Newsweek* with a photo of her son, also appeared in *People* pensively sitting on the couch and looking as if she were trying to sort through why he might be cooperating with his captors (Hall 1979, 41; Deming et al. 1980, 23). After describing her routine of singing spiritual songs in the evening, she assured *People* readers that Kevin could not have written a letter denouncing the Shah and implored Carter to return him home. Timm averred, "It was dictated … He doesn't say things that way. I have gone over every one of his letters, and I'm convinced he was writing under some kind of duress" (Hall 1979, 40). The accompanying first page of the story had photographs of various hostage relatives talking on the phone, holding pictures of relatives, or weeping. Paul Lewis's grandparents were in *Newsweek* with two photos of Paul between them, one at his high school graduation and the other of him in full Marine garb (Levin et al. 1980, 64). In *Time*, Penny Laingen prayed for her husband Bruce (Mathews et al. January 5, 1981, 14). Pat Lee, the wife of career foreign service officer Gary Lee, explained how she "braved her longest year." She recounted her weight loss, tension headaches, and a Vitamin B deficiency, drawing on resources she thought she had never possessed. Photographed in her home on the phone, she called other hostage wives: "We're the only ones who know exactly how the

others feel" (Crawford-Mason 1980, 40). Psychologist Charles Figley was the cited expert when the lead story was about the psychological challenges likely faced by the returning hostages. Figley explained to *People* that the families of hostages were experiencing "extreme traumatic stress reactions" as they rode the rollercoaster of news about their loved ones (Witt 1980, 74). Figley described national trauma as the hostage crisis writ large: "All of us are survivors of this" (p. 76).

Some commentators bemoaned this new penchant of personalization, hype, and turning the crisis into a soap opera. Former Undersecretary of State George Ball contrasted the Iranian hostage crisis with the 1968 Pueblo incident, the captivity of US naval personnel for a year by North Korea. There was very little television coverage, he observed. By 1979, however, wall-to-wall coverage occurred, "largely because we live in a country where people are accustomed to soap operas, and when foreign policy is translated into that idiom, they react accordingly" (Shabad 1980, 57). After Easter 1980, when one network split the screen so the viewer could see the weeping relatives gazing upon their forlorn son, Nicholas von Hoffman in *The New Republic* had had enough. He could not fathom why television would follow Barbara Timm, mother of hostage Kevin Hermening, through the streets of Tehran, sarcastically noting that "we might go to war to insure a strong third quarter for Sinutabs" (1980, 17).

McAlister has argued that the hostage crisis gave media an opportunity to give the image of private domesticity imperiled by Middle East terrorism, but the hostage crisis opened up additional vistas for viewing the connection between family and foreign policy (2001, 233). One was the propensity on the part of the media to dissect familial dynamics, especially psychological ones. The actual reason for the hostage crisis, the negotiations surrounding their release, and the effect of the crisis on domestic politics faded from view, while the personal took precedence in explaining the trauma of captivity. Even the august *New York Times* printed maudlin poems by Anne Marx of Hartsdale, New York, "inspired by the American hostages being held in Tehran" (Weinraub February 10, 1980). Here is one excerpted, titled "Solace for a Hostage":

Target of chants, butt of impassioned cries, the hostage stares at four confining walls resigned to long delayed delivery

    deprived of contact with his peers, he tried to gather strength within when he recalls

    the home that nurtured him, once young and free.

The focus on the psychological dimension of captivity, and emergence of the psychologist expert (often, certainly, alongside an expert on the Middle East or US foreign policy generally), gave the hostage crisis an important element of individualized emotionalism and cast foreign policy in the more benign and personal language of suffering, therapy, and coping. At the risk of being reductive, the repeated focus on Kevin Hermening's father planting an American flag for every day Kevin was in captivity got more attention than the role Rockefeller and Kissinger played in convincing Carter to allow the Shah into the US. And as the more "highbrow" critics lamented, the personal, familial, and emotional coping had wide cultural resonance, offered in large doses in print media as well as on television. Furthermore, the hostage crisis rallied Americans behind the government and provoked unity, the opposite of the Vietnam War. At the same time, the crisis cultivated strong individualized identifications between Americans and the hostages and their families. Revolutionary politics and anti-colonial nationalism in Iran found domestic expression in personalized connections with innocent victims facing emotional trauma.

## Reagan: Patriotic Theater

Weber observes that the "mere swearing in of Reagan was what it seemed to take to free the American hostages in Iran" (1999, 62). Their release and his inauguration, in other words, appeared causally connected, and like much of Reagan's foreign policy, the link was a symbolic fantasy and almost seemed to be a public relations coup. What is striking about popular representations and post-invasion commentary on the invasion of Grenada was the self-conscious awareness that the lessons of Vietnam had been revised and reinvented through government spin. In the Reagan administration story line, Americans must support the troops to overcome the Vietnam syndrome when it came to interventions abroad while also initiating a process of "healing and forgiveness" toward Vietnam veterans at home. Reagan's folksy stories about the Marines and the rescued medical students and his presentation of the invasion as swift and effective cued the public to receive his account as a packaged, salable commodity (with a short shelf life) instead of an opportunity to debate the war (Olson 1991, 74). The New Republic confirmed that the invasion was required to demonstrate renewed American might: "The invasion of Grenada was indeed an expression of emotion, a psychological satisfaction, a use of force by people who enjoy its use, a proof of power by people who need it proved" (1983a, 9).

Eldon Kenworthy called the invasion a docudrama and theater, "reality processed into images that the public can easily absorb while the Executive proceeds to do whatever it planned to do all along" (1984, 636). Central to this effort was the use of personal stories and anecdotes to explain the invasion to the public and the media. When Reagan announced the invasion of Grenada, he told of receiving a message from the father of a Marine in Lebanon about the importance of duty to one's country (Reagan 1983, 1520). When he marked the first anniversary of the invasion with many of the evacuated medical students, he singled out a nurse and medical student who tended to the wounded after the "fighting erupted" (Reagan 1984, 1638). The repeated references to individuals' stories had the effect of framing the details of the invasion as a set of psychological profiles in courage, of how one person or his or her family coped with war. In Reagan's anecdotes, foreign policy became a series of personal challenges and psychological hurdles for the participants and the public rather than a deliberate policy undertaken for political reasons.

The invasion of Grenada was also a self-conscious theatrical production in crisis promotion and management and rated by the press in terms of its persuasiveness rather than veracity. The President placed a total ban on reporter coverage of the invasion and when reporters arrived on the island they observed stockpiles of military arms the US military had captured (Bostdorff 1991, 744). In other words, stage-managed foreign policy orchestrated patriotism and the media judged it as such. In *Newsweek*'s November 7, 1983, story on the invasion, "Americans at War," there was a photo of an American medical student rejoicing upon his return to the US, with the caption, "The danger *appeared* to be real" (my emphasis). *Newsweek* also pictured photos of grateful medical students from Grenada alongside photos of funerals for Marines killed in Lebanon as if to suggest that Grenada had been "rescued" in order to make up for the barracks explosion in Lebanon that killed 241 Marines (*Newsweek* November 7, 1983, 58; November 14, 1983, 39). *The New Republic* repeatedly grappled with the necessity of the invasion, calling the Grenadian revolution a parody and "the military equivalent of rhetoric" (Krauthammer 1984; *The New Republic* 1983b, 12).

Kenworthy also compared the Reagan administration's funding of the Nicaraguan *contras* to a slick advertising campaign, "Arousing the public's fears and frustrations and then offering to assuage these feelings with this packaged and (we are told) affordable product" (1987–1988,

108). Rather than impeach the President for his actions during the Iran-contra scandal, however, the Tower Commission criticized him for his "management style," as if he were the CEO of a large corporation (Draper 1991, 596). When confronted with this finding Reagan told the nation that while "much has been said about my management style," it had served him well until it came to managing the NSC staff (Reagan 1987). Grading and assessing the lead actor, Oliver North, at the hearings, was a common occurrence. North, received the most performance ratings Morrow declared North was "gifted with impeccable theatrical instincts," and his "performance was a complicated masterpiece of rhetoric and evasion, of passion and manipulation" (1987, 13). He was declared telegenic and an "instant celebrity," even though he defied Congressional legislation and official US policy (Hackett et al. 1987, 27). Declaring his testimony before the Senate panel conducting the hearings into wrongdoing to be a "bravura performance," *Time* pointed out that his acting drew a "flood of flowers and yellow telegrams" to the Capitol "to a man who starred at his own show trial" (Magnuson et al. 1987, 24). Morrow gushed that during his testimony, North "played brilliantly upon the collective values of America, upon its nostalgias, its memories of a thousand movies … North's performance was a complicated masterpiece of rhetoric and evasion" (Morrow 1987, 13). Lawmakers who were supposed to grill North instead deferred "gently to his telegenic charm" (Martz et al. 1987, 11). Oliver North became a national security celebrity in a way not possible for a Paul Nitze or George Kennan. The news provided by the hearings, with North as the star witness, was that foreign policy could pack its own drama and perhaps provide a plot for a Tom Clancy novel. Foreign policy could at once be news, entertainment, and spectacle.

Even some in the administration joined in judging the theatrics. One administration official told *Newsweek* that the hearings were "Like a movie that's pretty good and exciting, but the ending leaves you totally disappointed because it doesn't wrap up the plot well" (Morganthau 1987, 13). Hugh Sidey wrote that during the first day of the hearings starring Oliver North, one of Reagan's aides asked him what he thought of the show and he declined to comment. But "by the end of the week, Ronald Reagan could dare hope for the first break in the dismal script that had begun eight months earlier," and by the third day of the hearings, he was "hanging out in his small study … to savor pure chunks of the drama" (Sidey 1987, 26).

Grenada presaged the increasingly scripted character of foreign policy and the cynical, knowing manipulation of identification with American military power. It was also a classic example of diversion, almost fifteen years before the release of *Wag the Dog*, the movie about diversionary war with Albania in the face of scandal. Two days before the invasion of Grenada, 241 US soldiers were killed in Beirut. Oliver North's command performance during the Iran-contra hearings made a mockery of effete liberals overly concerned with legal niceties in the face of the communist threat. Unlike *Rambo*, however, North's outsized performance failed to put distance between his cynical profiting from the "Enterprise," and the administration's willingness to negotiate with "terrorists."

## THE H-WORD

In addition to burying the Vietnam War in the sands of Middle East, the Bush administration offered two categories for citizen allegiance during the first Persian Gulf War, and both were explicitly crafted by the government and military with mainstream media assistance: US permanent postwar dominance (explained as "leadership") of the globe and the "international is personal," with its continuing focus on the personal dimension of foreign policy. Citizens could imagine themselves as members of an emerging global order that required US leadership to rid the world of tyrants and police other kinds of emergencies. As Bush told *People* correspondents in a December 1990 interview, "But with world leadership, we have a disproportionate responsibility to stand against evil, to stand against aggression, to be concerned when humble Kuwaiti women are raped in their homes … So you accept your responsibilities" (Jones and Wilhelm 1990, 53).

While the Reagan administration orchestrated regional unity by using the Organization of East Caribbean States to help legitimize its invasion of Grenada, and ignored international opinion objecting to the violation of Grenada's sovereignty, the Bush administration's post-Cold War strategy used the theme of international cooperation to help bolster support for the war against Iraq, thereby accentuating the idea that the US was the "natural" leader of the global community in the aftermath of the Cold War. A little over a week after the invasion, Bush assured reporters that he was pleased with the "solidarity and cohesiveness" of the NATO alliance (Bush 1990a, 1124). Two weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he explained to the Veterans of Foreign Wars that he was "proud of the support we are

getting around the world" (Bush 1990b, 1147). Linking the Gulf War to World War II, Bush pointed to Gorbachev's support for the war effort as evidence that "nations which joined to fight aggression in World War II can work together to stop the aggressors of today" (Bush 1990b, 1148). Early in his essay in *Newsweek* in which he explained to readers Operation Desert Shield (sending troops to protect Saudi Arabia), the president proclaimed, "I am proud to say that the United States played a key role in building the coalition of nations that forged this response: American leadership remains a positive and constructive force in this changing world" (Bush 1990b, 28). He explained that the entire world was at risk because Iraq invaded Kuwait, from "fledgling democracies" to the "poorest of nations" that stood to particularly suffer from the increase in oil prices caused by the invasion. Iraq's "nuclear arsenal and an army of a million men threatened the future of our children and the entire world" (Bush 1991a, 206). Thirty-seven countries would meet the aggression with "collective resistance" and UN resolutions authorizing "all necessary means to expel Iraq from Kuwait" (Bush 1991b, 206; Lake 1999, 209–210).

Saddam Hussein threatened the American "way of life" as well, one fueled by energy. Bush explained in his 1991 State of the Union that Americans "know instinctively why we are in the Gulf." It was to fight a brutal dictator, and to "make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands only to finance further aggression" (Bush 1991a). When shouts of "no blood for oil" occurred at protests, the message shifted. Bush, honing the timely anecdote like Reagan, quoted a Master Sergeant of the 82nd Airborne who denied an important subtext for the war: "We're here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we're doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next 100 years" (Bush 1991b, 43). Nevertheless, the linkage between international oil supplies and the consumer at home were a powerful subtext of the Gulf War. Securing oil, securing the family, and securing the American way of life were synonymous.

Iraq's threats to the international community found its counterpart in the war's toll on the nation's homes and families. In a *Life* essay, Grunwald explained that "wars start on maps, with armies, but they end in living rooms" (1991, 92). General Schwartzkof reported to *People* that after the war he wanted to "come home and be with my family" (Hewitt and Linda 1990, 69). *People*'s "portrait of our country" when the war began was full of vignettes about soldiers' families, anxious families with parents away at war, and significantly, a story about one family protesting a war that Alex

Molnar, organizer of Military Families Against War, described as a "cynical attempt to restore a corrupt Kuwaiti regime and assure the oil flow to the West" ("The Day" 1991, 36). Reuniting families of those held hostage and released in December 1990 provided an occasion to describe the hostages "home for Christmas" (Hewitt et al. 1990). The war also hit home when Lt. Jeffrey Zaun and other army personnel became prisoners of war, and "like millions of other viewers, the families of the captured men watched the interviews with anguish and anger" (Schneider and Sider 1991, 38). *People* published a sentimental story about Linda Buckholz and Gary Buckholz, who got married (the second time for him and third for her) on August 7, 1990, just before Gary left for the Gulf. Upon his joyful return, Gary reported that "he savored the pleasures of home—taking the kids to dinner, visiting the church where he was married, dreaming of making his race-car driving hobby a career when he retires in 1995" (Kelly 1991, 40).

The death of soldiers brought an intense focus upon families. Explaining that "every nation invents its own style of going to war," Morrow commented on the first US casualty of the war, Air Force Sgt. John Campisi. On the day of Campisi's funeral, "the townspeople turned out in a relatively rare display of community," and their grief had a "touching purity" (1990, 31). When Stephen Bentzlin died in the first ground battle of the war, his hometown of Woodlake, Minnesota was described as itself a family (Schneider et al. 1991, 38). Bentzlin grew up in a troubled family; his biological father was a batterer and his stepfather an alcoholic. After joining the Marines and Alcoholics Anonymous, Bentzlin overcame his problems and was Marine of the Quarter before his death. *Time*'s cover of February 18, 1991, pictured Lance Cpl. Thomas Jenkins and announced "The War Comes Home." From Couterville California, Jenkins was an idealistic young man from small town America. When the town learned of his death, they "circled the wagons around the family … in a show of patriotism and support" (Riley 1991, 15). *Newsweek* reported on "one big family" in Crystal Springs Mississippi, where at least 160 of the town's 5600 residents were deployed to the Persian Gulf. Military wife Bobbie Jones averred, "We're just like one big family trying to make it through" (Smith and Miller 1991, 38). The residents of Crystal Springs made it through by praying together, providing a "proper sendoff" for the troops, and joining support groups for families with relatives in the war.

Disagreement and dissent about the war followed a pattern that would become predictable in the years ahead. One part of the pattern was to shift from the war itself to the personal story behind the dissent, thereby indi-

vidualizing it instead of linking it to evidence of widespread disagreement or misgivings about the war. For example, *People* permeated its coverage of three soldiers stationed in Germany who had gone AWOL with personal details. Denied leave to visit his dying father in 1987, for example, one soldier said he was upset that the Marine Corps had sent him to Okinawa for six months without his wife (Ryan 1991, 48). There was no mention of the soldiers disagreeing with the war aims or its likely consequences, for example, disproportionate civilian deaths. *People* wrote a story on then-Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone, a vocal opponent of the war who tried to debate Bush about the wisdom of war when he visited the White House in early 1991. The story couched the dissent in a personal description of Wellstone's childhood in Virginia, his years as an absent-minded professor at Carleton College, and how he found apartment living in DC (Grogan and Podesta 1991, 45–46). As print media supplied these personal stories, the political angle to the story receded. In the case of *People*'s coverage, the story beckoned the reader to consider the soldiers' grievance against the military and in this particular instance the soldier, who, after all, "volunteered," probably doesn't get a lot of sympathy. Most important, as the *Newsweek* story demonstrates, giving coverage to dissent also winds up affirming the American right to free speech and disagreement with government foreign policy. Dissenters were individuals who had personal reasons for opposing the war and were deluded if they imagined the possibility of collective opposition. The spotlight on individual dissenters for a brief moment, often alongside proponents, conveyed legitimacy for looking at both sides and gave equivalence to pro and con views. The upshot was to make war protests seem rather pointless. Vocal opposition turned back upon itself, that is, the war was fought to protect free speech rights. Besides, division had become a conglomeration of interesting back stories that accompany the opposition to war, or a diverse and heterogeneous collection of individual opinions that do not add up to a collective consensus.

In addition, when magazines did present disagreement about war the case for it invariably hinged upon certain types of arguments, many of them centered on the matter of time and urgency. For example, *Newsweek* polled eighteen people on the prospects for war in November 1990 and it followed a familiar pattern found in popular media. There were two explicit criticisms about the war being for oil but because they lacked a discussion of the broader issues of geopolitics and the longstanding relationship between the US backing dictatorships and stable oil prices, the

comments suggested a conspiracy theory between oil companies, the government, and the military. The number of references to Vietnam suggests that Reagan's inoculation for the "Vietnam Syndrome" was not as powerful as some thought. On the other hand, respondents who raised the specter of Vietnam did so after a decade of recuperating both soldiers with the mantra "support the troops," and a gaggle of revisionist arguments about how the war could have been won but for any number of obstacles—meddling civilians, counterinsurgency mistakes, the liberal media—so that Vietnam ghosts were less imminent because the idea that it was an honorable cause and so was, by extension, the rescue of Kuwait.

A month earlier (October 1990) *Time* had published back-to-back essays for and against the war and they are well worth parsing. With US troops already stationed in the Middle East, the "con" argument predicted the negative consequences of war: Saddam Hussein might attack Israel, and air strikes without consultation with Congress and allies would provoke consternation (p. 25). The "pro" essay on the other hand was adamant about the significance of time and timing. Sanctions were not working quickly enough and would eventually hurt Kuwait, too. A compromise would mean, "we lose," so better make war than sit around and wait for a compromise, thereby risking Americans' safety. One "high ranking Arab" said, "When the shooting starts, everyone has to be able to say, 'We really tried to revolve this peacefully'" (p. 30) And finally, the most pressing argument of all concerned the weather: the window for war was from November to February (p. 30).The argument that there is no time left, as opposed to giving sanctions time to work, is positioned as a more compelling case for war because what looms are a host of possible consequences more severe than a feckless Congress or miffed allies. Not acting might mean further invasions of Iraqi neighbors, the use of chemical weapons, even attacks stateside. Graduated sanctions, embargoes, and regional diplomacy are not bad arguments, but they look ineffective when compared with the possible catastrophe of not acting.

By the first Persian Gulf War, there were advocates for Arab-American rights and proponents of tolerance who cautioned that war on Iraq was not an invitation for domestic attacks on Arab Americans or people from the Middle East generally. *People*'s coverage of the dissent voiced by the president of the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee is a case in point. Albert Mokhiber expressed outrage about racial profiling by Pan Am (banning Iraqis from their planes) and FBI interviews of hundreds of Arab Americans, ostensibly to investigate hate crimes but also possible

domestic terrorist plots. After recounting his immigrant story of growing up in Niagara Falls, New York, and assuring the reader that he had been "fully Americanized," Mokhiber insisted that "like all Americans, we don't want to see our soldiers coming home in body bags. I have a nephew in the reserves" (Cohen 1991, 89). This was hardly a strong dissent from the war. It was instead a plea for recognition that Arab Americans are Americans too, and that patriotism could both include Arab Americans in the nation, often as exemplary individuals, and entitle them to criticize US foreign policy. In other words, the voice of difference enters the debate on war according to the parameters already established by the official debate, that is, the pros and cons of taking more time for sanctions or carrying out the invasion "on schedule" on January 15, 1991. In this way, proponents and spokespeople for tolerance play an important role in legitimizing US hegemony and affirm their allegiance to American benevolence as it wages war.

Likewise, deejay Casey Kasem criticized the years of stereotyping Arabs on television and in film and asked "Where are the Arab policemen? Or Arabs like John Sununu, the President's Chief of Staff, or George Mitchell, the Senate Majority Leader?" (Dougherty and Bacon 1990, 46). Kasem argued for sanctions and diplomacy, and he did so in the context of explaining his own experience growing up suffering few prejudices. Proud of his Arab-American heritage and disavowing American prejudice while making an effort to slow down the clock set for war, Kasem accommodated himself to the war's narrow terms of debate, all the while affirming his gratefulness to a society that allows for dissent. He demonstrated that he is like many Americans: doubtful about the war but also resigned to it. In addition, the criticism of stereotyping Arab Americans was juxtaposed with the further assurance that his father "didn't care if he went back to the old country [Lebanon], he loved American so much" (p. 47).

With respect to public opinion more generally, anti-war sentiment did not pose a "serious political threat to the administration" (Adler et al. 1991, 36). Protest and opposition were framed as a public relations problem for the government and the protesters were constantly portrayed as being divided among themselves, presenting a "baffling array of causes and grievances" (Adler et al. 1991, 38). *Time* reporter Gibbs quoted one Presbyterian minister who explained debate around the war as "not an anti-war movement so much as it is a process question, a sense that we *should* be debating the issues before we act" (Gibbs 1990; my emphasis). Dissent from war became disagreement about its timing, and the minister

seems almost nostalgic in remembering that war should be a topic for debate, dissension, and disagreement. Furthermore, the government was not required to heed protests: Bush had heard them loud and clear, but he just did not agree with them (Gibbs 1991, 35).

Looming over the Persian Gulf War was Vietnam. Of the 106 articles published about the war in *Time*, Vietnam appeared approximately 96 times: its lessons, its failures, and its folly. Above all else, the Persian Gulf War became a contest over whether it looked like Vietnam or not. Colin Powell (Chair of the Joint Chiefs) and Norman Schwarzkopf (head of US forces in the Gulf) had both served two tours in Vietnam, and they denied the analogy fit even though a number of Vietnam vets found them comparable. The protests against the two wars were regularly compared, with most concluding that what distinguished them was that there was no draft in the 1990 war, the protesters in 1990 were divided among themselves, and the Persian Gulf War was not one of slow escalation but rather a *fait accompli* that was carefully planned and staged to start on schedule rather than be the subject of gradual drift—as Bush said in an interview on CNN, there is a "ticking of the clock toward war" (CQ Almanac online 1990). Congressional acquiescence followed by resistance and resurgent efforts to reign in executive power prompted a last-minute and close vote authorizing the use of force. Even though he insisted he did not need Congressional authorization, the President got it (52–47 in the Senate; 283–150 in the House).

The President repeatedly assured the country that this would not be another Vietnam and that he would not "micromanage" the war, thereby leaving it to the generals, and the war would be a quick one, as he knew the nation would not accept a stalemate. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein, the press declared, was no Ho Chi Minh; the Persian Gulf War had a moral clarity and fit just war doctrine precepts. While Vietnam was a long war, the Persian Gulf War lasted six weeks, including a 100-hour ground war. US battle deaths were 148 compared with 58,000 in Vietnam. Unlike many Vietnamese, Kuwaitis seemed to greet US soldiers as liberators. An important blow to the Vietnam analogy went through Jane Fonda. Whereas during the Vietnam War she visited Hanoi and sympathized with the Vietcong, during the Gulf War her spouse Ted Turner told her to "keep her mouth shut," according to the *National Enquirer* (Rifas 1994, 232). The moral anxiety expressed about the war as well as the disputed and unstable meanings of Vietnam prompted cues to the public to see the Persian Gulf War as fundamentally different from Vietnam. These expres-

sions of concern about another Vietnam followed by reassurances that it was not worked to deflect deeper questions about why this war, at this time, with this enemy. The citizen-state call and response produced circumscribed suggestions by some that "this looks like Vietnam," to which the government responded "no it does not."

One of the important and certainly lasting Gulf War effect was the constant injunction to support the troops, an important post-Vietnam development noted by many. The invocation to support the troops worked to depoliticize the war and reposition the citizen as someone who supports the soldier no matter what the context or justification for war. Stahl calls this a practice of disassociation of the citizen from the soldier, which "disciplines the citizen by painting democratic deliberation as a particularly heinous act of aggression against the already embattled soldier" (2009b, 548). This is the "real" legacy of Vietnam, a Boston business consultant told *Time*: "People seem determined this time never to blame the troops, never to leave them unsupported" (Gibbs 1990, 33). Historian Robert Dallek told *Newsweek* that the yellow ribbons that sprouted up after the war began reflected a "desire to make up for the way the military was treated after Vietnam" (*Newsweek* 1991, 51). *People*'s coverage of the a "star studded musical tribute to American soldiers in the gulf," described an array of celebrities who showed up in Burbank, California, to sing "Voices that Care," an apolitical song written by Linda Thompson Jenner and inspired by a Boeing TV commercial. David Cassidy declared, "Whether or not I agree with the decision to be there, they have my support" ("Posting" 1991, 38). A celebrity "troop booster" who made a vague gesture toward dissent was one more demonstration of what had solidified into an ideology, a mantra, and an order: you might oppose the war, but you must support the troops.

## Vietnams in Africa and the Balkans

The Balkan Wars differed in a particularly crucial way from the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991. In 1990–1991, the military had used the pool system for reporters, used censorship extensively, and often took an explicitly hostile stance toward some reporters. Zoglin pointed out that after the war many journalists had an uneasy feeling that they had been routed nearly as decisively as Iraq (1991, 56). There were frequent references to the paradox of saturation coverage yet little knowledge of what was really happening in the war. Critical analysts argued that citizens had become

spectators of war (Kellner 1992; Stahl 2009a, 25). The cast of characters who conducted the war performed theatrically and their performances were rated. Engelhardt likened the war to a program-like commercial for arms and entertainment (1994, 87).

With the Balkan Wars, censorship was more difficult and the media was often providing daring and shocking exposes of concentration camps, rape victims, evictions from homes, civilian atrocities committed by roving Serbian militias, artillery and sniper fire, and elderly men collecting twigs to make fires. Reporters filed stories from cities such as Mostar, seized by Croat forces in 1993, its majority Muslim inhabitants facing horrific conditions. Leads promised immediate and on-the-ground reports on brutal massacres in Bosnian villages, and the UN quickly arrived to document the war crimes (Nordland 1993, 49). An official from the UN High Commission for Refugees was soon on the scene to interview the Croatian colonel allegedly responsible for the massacre. Round-the-clock reporting of the seven-month siege of Mostar produced wrenching reports about starving people digging up tree roots for fuel and people freezing to death in winter. For viewers the war seemed to be happening in real time. Furthermore, particularly after 1995, the Internet became one of the most popular and effective means of conveying information about the war. The media became a field that the military could no longer completely control; blackouts and censorship became difficult. The Internet also became an important tool for activists, news groups, and email lists to communicate about not only relief efforts but also conditions on the ground (Castonguay 2002, 163). These developments in communications helped to transform the audience for war into a new public marketplace of ideas powerfully shaped by the paradoxical twin forces of greater corporate consolidation and fragmented and niche media markets.

Demonstrating the staying power of the Vietnam War in shaping US foreign policy debates, both the media and critics of Clinton's foreign policy proclaimed that Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were all potential or actual Vietnams. Dead soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and Michael Durant as a Vietnam-style POW made "the visual argument that Somalia is Vietnam" (Dauber 2001, 3). Elliott began his account of the October 1993 shootout in Mogadishu by comparing the photograph of dead Rangers on the streets of Mogadishu to the Vietnam War photo of General Loan shooting a "Viet Cong" suspect during the Tet offensive: "Like the photograph of the Vietnamese police chief blowing out the brains of a suspect, they were the images that define the horror of an

unpopular war … The popular reaction was one of rage, of revenge—but also of retreat, of a desire to get young lives out of Somalia" (1993, 34). The photograph and caption accompanying David Hackworth's screed against Defense Secretary Les Aspin's lack of understanding of all matters military shows "U.S. Marines under artillery attack in Vietnam" (1993, 43). Anonymous Pentagon brass characterized the effort to hunt down warlord Aidid as "mission creep," a conventional criticism of Vietnam War escalation. Three days after the firefight in Mogadishu, Senator Henry Hyde complained "we need an exit strategy, and I don't see one. That is compounding the Johnsonian error in Vietnam of incrementally deploying forces." In a bipartisan demonstration of agreement, Republican Ernest Hollings declared it was "Vietnam all over again" (Krauss 1993, A16). Roberts warned that the images coming from Mogadishu were "calling up old nightmares imbedded (sic) too deeply to forget completely: wounded hostages, angry crowds, threatened diplomats, soldiers shipping out to face a dangerous, shadowy foe" (1993, 9).

After the shootout in Mogadishu, former President Bush explicitly applied the Powell Doctrine to Clinton's foreign policy in Somalia while meeting with schoolchildren on October 16, 1993. Bush explained that Presidents have to answer three questions before putting someone's son or daughter in harm's way, into battle: What is the mission, what is the strategic objective, and what is the exit strategy? (Friedman 1993, 1). The implication was that Clinton had failed the test. Although Clinton was angered by the comments, on October 20, 1993, he announced that US forces were shifting to a defensive role in Somalia and that same week he announced that all troops would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994 (Jehl 1993, 1). Henceforth the goal in Somalia would be force protection, that is, reducing risk to soldiers' lives and limiting their activities to guarding convoys and monitoring. At the end of October, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake admitted that the US needed to do a better job at explaining the costs of involvement to the public and coming up with clear goals in explaining the reasons for intervention in places like Somalia (Friedman 1993, 8).

Bosnia also became a potential Vietnam. As Clinton contemplated lifting the embargo against the Bosnians, striking the Serbs, and sending in troops to guard impending peace agreements, the May 17, 1993, *Time* issue made the connection explicit, "Anguish over Bosnia: Will it Be Clinton's Vietnam?" The French complained that they heard a lot from the Americans about "avoiding another Vietnam War" (Barry and Watson

1993, 31). The notorious Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic warned that sending in ground troops would risk another Vietnam (Post et al. 1993, 32). Church explained that in the case of Bosnia, "successful intervention requires strong leadership that sets clear and achievable political objectives and assembles sufficient forces—conditions met in Desert Storm but not so far in the Balkans" (Church 1992, 60). After embracing and then jettisoning the "lift and strike" option (i.e., lift the weapons embargo against the Bosnians and strike the Serbs), *Newsweek* writers accused Secretary of State Christopher of "faulty salesmanship" of US policy in Bosnia (Post et al. 1993, 20). McAlister announced that foreign policy requires "deeper thought and more salesmanship now that the Cold War has evaporated" (1993, 33).

Clinton dispelled the ghosts of Vietnam and the dilemmas posed by humanitarian war in two important ways. In Somalia he announced the withdrawal of US forces, and in Bosnia he announced that the US would not introduce ground troops into the murky conflict. In 1999, he announced the bombing campaign against Serbia to "rescue" Kosovo, accomplished without a single US battle casualty. In the absence of a clear objective, support from Congress and the public, and without a clear exit strategy, the Clinton administration pursued bombing for a limited amount of time and peace agreements to enforce shaky truces. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement was imperfect and flawed but it appeared to signal that the US would not escalate. The seventy-eight-day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 ended with a peace accord. While US troops remained stationed in both Bosnia to enforce Dayton and in Kosovo to maintain the peace there, and while both wars witnessed stalemated settlements and war criminals remained at large, for the public US involvement seemed to have a definitive conclusion.

The second important development was a gradual shift in aspects of the military's mission in an era globalization. John Shalikashvili, who had commanded Operation Provide Comfort to the Kurds in northern Iraq, became the new chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Described as someone who understood how to create safe havens and no-fly zones, provide humanitarian relief, and work with allies to "intimidate, but not actually engage, potential aggressors," Shalikashvili had both digested the lessons of Vietnam but also understood the necessity of defense and security. He understood that the introduction of ground troops constituted "unacceptably high political risks to Clinton" yet was capable of modifying the Powell Doctrine to argue for the more flexible use of US forces in

"Operations Other Than War" (Post et al. 1993, 46). For example, Shalikashvili argued for the use of US troops in the Dayton peacekeeping mission and he worked to change the top personnel in the army to support his goals (Halberstam 2001, 391). General Anthony Zinni, who took over Central Command Operations in 1997, was an active supporter of a military strategy that could take into account the post-Cold War security environment. By Clinton's second term, Zinni had promoted military officers less resistant to Clinton's strategy of enlargement and engagement. By 1996, the Army Chief of Staff defined the US Army as the "rapid reaction force for the global village" (Worth 1998, 47). The former head of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations teamed up to argue that the purpose of US forces around the world was to keep markets open for American trade and encourage democracy (Worth 1998, 47).

On the eve of September 11, government had extended its neoliberal interventions in economy and society to the realm of foreign policy. Foreign interventions were the opposite of Vietnam (which liberals proclaimed was a disaster and conservatives claimed suffered from civilian interference). As the decade of the 1990s ended, wars were either quick with a clear exit strategy or part of the price of being a "caring hegemon," delivering food to the starving and saving childhood. While some pundits lamented the consumerist turn away from patriotic sacrifice, government and mainstream media stressed the moral obligation to support humanitarian war and to fight wars on schedule. Neoliberalism even called for a reexamination of the Vietnam War.

## INTERLUDE: PEOPLE GOES TO VIETNAM

In the fall of 1999, *People* sent eight reporters and seven photographers to work on its special May 2000 issue commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. The articles are presented in an interesting pattern, with the more "hard-nosed" pieces presented early in the issue As would be expected, the US took centerstage about what was ostensibly an issue on Vietnam as a "Country Full of Surprises—And Remarkable Stories" (*Cover*, May 1, 2000). The first story is about the continuing search for MIAs, although "most authorities agree there is next to no chance any American MIAs are still alive in Vietnam," and the US Ambassador to Vietnam Pete Peterson assured that "there is not a shred of evidence" that any are alive (Fields-Meyer and Sider 2000, 54, 57). Two sidebar stories provide short blurbs on the quest of a Vietnamese

mother's efforts to find her son's remains (he died in battle in 1972) and a former National Liberation Front fighter who has spent his post-war life identifying the remains of Vietnamese soldiers. There is thus recognition, although literally marginal, of the suffering of the Vietnamese, who after all lost millions in the war. The suffering still at the center of the war, however, is American suffering, and the *People* story about MIAs never alludes to the role the myth of the MIA played in continuing discord in US-Vietnamese relations after 1975—in fact, the myth of MIAs played a crucial role in the refusal to diplomatically recognize Vietnam until 1995 (Franklin 1992). The next story, on General VO Nguyen Giap, is a tribute to his brilliance in humbling the French and American militaries, but at the same time, that he is different from any Western military commander because he was willing to sacrifice so many lives. The authors quote General William Westmoreland who confirms Giap's radical unintelligibility by noting: "He was an outstanding soldier," and yet, "An American commander who suffered losses of the magnitude of Gap's probably would have been relieved of duty" (Hewitt et al. 2000, 59). This is an updated and toned-down version of Westmoreland's statement in the 1974 documentary *Hearts and Minds*: "The Oriental doesn't put the same high price on life as does a Westerner. Life is plentiful. Life is cheap in the Orient." In the very next paragraph, the authors describe Giap as a regular watcher of CNN and a listener to the BBC News. As for American movies about Vietnam, he avers, "Most are accurate, but some don't fully represent Vietnam properly" (p. 59). *People* performs important ideological work in this story, making Giap seem distant and inscrutable in his devaluing of life (and by implication, suggesting that the US values it more) while making him a contemporary consumer of global communications and someone with "no interest in wallowing in the past" (p. 59). It became possible for the reader to know about the war through Vietnamese general, so different and yet so similar to us. And that he wants to move on relieves us, too, because after all, what he would most like to see is "American money to aid in his country's reconstruction" (p. 59). He has clearly reconciled himself to the war, made peace with it, and that relieves us of having to consider Vietnam as anything other than a country striving into the future and uninterested in holding the US to account for the death, destruction, and mayhem it rained upon the country for over a decade.

The next five stories convey the new Vietnam in vintage *People* idiom. They are about a "Mel Gibson of Vietnam," (film star Don Duong), per-

sonal triumph by an Amerasian woman who makes it big as a singer, a woman fashion designer in the "new" post-Communist Vietnam, an American woman's efforts to eradicate landmines in Vietnam, and the career of supermodel My Uyen. These are stories that focus on the lives of celebrities who often overcome adversity (e.g., the "once-scorned daughter of a U.S. soldier hits the top of the charts") and often carry out selfless good deeds. The fact that three of the five stories focus on Vietnamese women conveys a Vietnam that conforms to domestic stereotypes about the alluring and feminine Asian woman. Phuong Thao, the Amerasian Mariah Carey, is photographed singing to a young and adoring audience; the designer of fashion, Minh Hanh, is pictured between models in colorful and form-fitting patterned tunics, and the supermodel is in a swimming pool and photographed from above, laughing and standing with her head thrown back, wearing a revealing swimsuit. Each has an up-by-her-bootstraps story that resonates with Asian American "model minority" stories in the US while also showing the success of Vietnamese entrepreneurs in a now capitalist-oriented Vietnam.

The story about American Jerilyn Brusseau's efforts to eradicate unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Vietnam captures the theme of reconciliation (Le Espiritu 2006). Noting that Vietnamese officials estimate that 4000 people were killed and maimed in Quang Tri Province alone, Bressau explains that "about one child a week is killed or injured from a UXO, not to mention the accidents in remote areas that are never reported" (O'Neill and Arias 2000, 74). Bressau was motivated in her work by the death of her brother in Vietnam in 1969, and the discussion of his death and Bressau's ensuing trauma veer the story back to America and the efforts of Americans to reconcile themselves to the war and its devastation to *them*. That Bressau can now return to Vietnam and work through her organization Peacetrees to demine and plant trees in Quang Tri also demonstrates that individual acts of kindness and generosity rather than official government apologies or aid programs are ways to reconcile both American and Vietnamese losses after the war.

The third section, entitled "Then and Now," gives an update on the subjects of some of the most memorable images in photographs of the war. *People* reporters interview the widow of the "Viet Cong" officer assassinated by South Vietnam's police chief, survivors of the My Lai massacre, the pilot of the helicopter photographed on the rooftop of the Pittman building turning away hundreds of desperate Vietnamese fearing the NLF victory, and Phan Thi Kim Phuc, the little girl who ran screaming

down a road with burns from a napalm attack. All of the stories are personal and emotional accounts of what the subject experienced at the time and the course of their lives after the photo. The commentary avoids analysis of the politics surrounding the pictures, never raising questions about the frequency of summary executions by South Vietnamese security forces, the widespread use of napalm the US used in bombing campaigns, or the extent to which civilian deaths were a common occurrence instead of an aberration. In fact, the writers often empathize with the Americans. In My Lai, for example, the soldiers had recently suffered heavy losses and "believed a battalion of up to 400 hundred Viet Cong (sic) was in the area" (Brady et al. 2000, 93). The napalmed little girl is a victim of a South Vietnamese air strike, as if this were not a common practice by the US Air Force (p. 96).

The special issue ends with two optimistic stories. One is about the potential for tourism to transform Vietnam's economy: "Today it's troops of travelers who are signing up for tours of Vietnam's still untouched (and relatively inexpensive) hotspots" ("In a New Light" 2000, 101). Upbeat about the potential for Vietnam to find its niche in the tourist industry, the reporter quotes a tourist who reassures yet again that "I don't think of Vietnam in terms of the war anymore" ("In a New Light," 102). Rebranded Vietnam is a destination and site for investment, not a country devastated by thirty years of war. *People*'s coverage upgrades Vietnam's assets even more.

In addition, there are two stories that feature Vietnamese people that reinforce the choice-worthiness of the US. A family adopts a Vietnamese boy and takes him to live in Cascade, Iowa. With his all-American name, Sam quickly adjusts to his new American home, and the adoption agency social worker notes in amazement that "after six months he's being completely absorbed by American culture" (Jerome and Fowler 2000, 86). His adoptive parents are astonished at his acculturation, exclaiming, "it's as if he's been here forever" (p. 89). This all-American family rescued Sam and he naturally has embraced the life of abundance it offers. After five months he already nurses passions for the Lion King and McDonald's (Jerome and Fowler 2000, 86). Neighbors in the small homogeneously white town treat Sam with warmth. Sam will become, in other words, one of the many Vietnamese refugees who have come to the US and rapidly flourished.

Julie K.L. Dam's return to Vietnam, both a refugee and senior writer for *People*, wrote "Coming Home," for the issue. A graduate of Harvard

University, she and her siblings spent a month in Vietnam in 1993, and she returned for the *People* story in November of 1999. Her family escaped the country in 1975, and Dam revels in visiting the homes where her mother and father grew up in Hanoi, and then travels south to Hanoi—formerly Saigon—where she grew up. She mentions that her father, a US-educated linguistics professor "had become friendly with several of the American officers and CIA agents he taught," which explains why her family fled the country in 1975 (Dam 2000, 109). She notes the difference between the bustling, modern southern part of the country, the part that had the most contact with the West, and the very different Hanoi, "where most of the women wore drab-colored clothes" (p. 109). She reports that none of her relatives resented her luck (some of them had been imprisoned and sent to reeducation camps): "They were proud that I had assimilated in America, that I had gone to Harvard, that I had a good job and most of all that I had returned" (p. 110). Dam's life could only look like this in America. She felt "so grateful—and so guilty" (p. 110). Dam does not explore the relationship between her father and the US military or the job that her cousin had at the Saigon police academy. Instead, she homes in on the suffering that ensued after unification of the country.

The issue concludes with an essay by then-Senator John McCain who announces that "He's made his peace with Vietnam," in the title. He never considers whether Vietnam has made its peace with the US—only that normal diplomatic relations might allow "some Vietnamese to reconcile their lingering grievances" (McCain 2000, 118). The Vietnamese are not yet free, but perhaps with normal diplomatic relations the US can help Vietnam "find a better future than its hard, war-torn past." The reader gets the impression that POWs like McCain were the only sufferers in the war, rather than the regular drafted poor and minority men who bore the heaviest burden. There is not one story about economic conscription, unemployment, and the absence of many benefits for veterans who fought in the war.

Both the US and Vietnam have come to terms with the Vietnam War, according to *People*. The US can move on and need no longer re-fight and win the war through *Rambo*. Vietnam still labors under a communist government, but with its neoliberal economic reforms is beginning to enjoy what everyone in the US enjoys—celebrities, cell phones, motion pictures, rock stars, and fashion designers. Vietnam is positioned as a product of globalization, a force that communism cannot withstand.

While the relations between states continue to be marked by hierarchies of power and influence, and corporations concentrate their power and search for cheaper labor markets, the US and Vietnam coexist in a world united in its pursuit of consumer abundance and individual achievement. According to *People*, this common experience of abundance in the US, with the pursuit of a similar abundance on the part of Vietnam, produces a commonality between the US and Vietnam; each appears to re-imagine a fractious past papered over with a vision of a cordial future.

### September 11, 2001

There was both an outpouring of patriotism on September 12 and an outpouring of critical commentary on how this patriotism resembled the jingoistic, bellicose, Jacksonian patriotism of the past. Myths of innocence, sacred covenants, and exceptionalism seemed to circulate faster than the critical alternative media could keep up with them. In poll after poll, the public supported a military response against Afghanistan, and the mainstream media was unfailingly supportive of the government, at times astonishingly so. Fox News Channel anchor Brit Hume told *The New York Times*, "Look, neutrality as a general principle is an appropriate concept for journalists who are covering institutions of some comparable quality … This is a conflict between the U.S. and murdering barbarians" (Rutenberg and Carter 2001, B2).

By 2001, however, citizenship in the US was transformed by two decades of recalibrated state power and neoliberal governance. Practices of citizenship were thoroughly saturated and burdened by the steady redistribution of wealth upward, consumer debt, outsourcing, massive defense spending, and a political system corrupted by money that kept unrepresentative and unresponsive governments in power. Commentators were now arguing that Americans were "bowling alone," thereby downplaying the extent to which the interpellation of citizens as consumers was a product of massively transformed state power and techniques of governance that demanded citizens take responsibility for themselves, view foreign policy as a conglomeration of individual stories, and expect wars to be short and seem successful.

In light of these reconfigurations the nostalgia was predictable. There was moving commentary on how the attacks might actually have a restorative effect and help rebuild a sense of community. Brooks thought that fear might serve as a "morning cleanser, washing away a lot of self-indulgence" of the 1990s (2001, 69). A Boston dockworker told *Newsweek* that this is the "Re-United States of America" (Auchincloss 2001, 18).

Cowley speculated that the experience would probably restore a "long neglected sense of community" (2001, 74). Without even a hint of irony, *Newsweek* reporter David Gates explained that "Ever since September 11, America has been doing all the things it can remember from World War II, whether the real one or the Tom Hanks one: standing united, flying the flag, praying, God—blessing itself," elevating Tom Hanks's portrayal of the Greatest Generation with the Greatest Generation itself (2001, 54–55). Bill Moyers was gratified by the outpouring of solidarity after the attacks, arguing that it demonstrated that Americans have "refused to accept the notion, promoted so diligently by our friends at the Heritage Foundation, that government should be shrunk to the size where, as Grover Norquist put it, they can drown it in a bathtub" (2001, 11). All of these commentators imagined how the nation would act if decades of state policy had not frayed and then reconstituted relations between the citizen/nation and the sovereign/state. They offered a nostalgic vision of what a common good might look like, especially in contrast to what citizenship had become—an ensemble of practices and expectations of viewing war as a dimension of personal drama for individuals and packaged as the antithesis of Vietnam by the government On the eve of the Iraq war historian David Kennedy wondered if the US could have patriotism without sacrifice. The answer, it turned out, was in the affirmative, because war no longer required patriotism but acquiescence (2003).

The government did not introduce a massive stimulus bill, enact plans to reduce the country's dependence on oil, or increase veteran's benefits. Dick Armey said that it "wouldn't be commensurate with the American spirit" to provide unemployment and other benefits to airline workers. Senators John McCain and Evan Bayh proposed doubling the funding for *Americorps* and it went nowhere. On the day Saddam Hussein's statue fell, George W. Bush touted his economic stimulus package, the center of which was a 726-billion-dollar tax cut (Fineman 2003). It took Jon Stewart (the host of fake news *Daily Show*) to prompt the government to finally pay the medical bills of first responders at the Ground Zero attacks (in December 2010).

On a number of fronts it was quickly business as usual. By the weekend of September 15, 2001, television news anchors announced that it was the "duty" of television to return to normal programming—and try to recover the 320 million in lost advertising revenue accompanying the constant coverage of the attacks (Spigel 2004, 237). Baseball owners combined patriotism with restarting the games; a week after the attacks

the baseball players on the Colorado Rockies and Arizona Diamondback baseball teams held a giant flag on the field before the game began. Many commentators have noted that the directive to "go shopping" quickly became a dominant theme in the anti-terror campaign (Grewal 2003, 55). After all, one of the things that makes America unique is the belief that "buying is an essential expression of freedom and individualism" (Kulman 2004, 59). Citizens got an invitation and sometimes an order to resume their role as consumers. After the stock market closed for a week, President Bush expressed his faith not in citizen sacrifice but in the resiliency of the economy: "And no question about it, this incident affected our economy, but the markets open tomorrow, people go back to work, and we'll show the world" (Bush 2001). Support for war through acts of consumption foreclosed debates about what whether war requires paying higher taxes (especially by the wealthy), joining the military or participating in some other form of service, or perhaps even foregoing some comforts, as old-fashioned as that may seem. When Tom Brokaw proposed his twenty-first century equivalent of World War II victory gardens, which were grown because of rationing, it had this distinctly consumerist dimension:

> American corporations, service clubs, education, and health organizations could adopt villages and provide each with a generator to power donated computers and large-screen televisions. Then American and Afghan doctors, teachers, carpenters, soccer coaches and the like could appear in instructive software, videotape, or television programming to supplement military efforts. Another possibility would be to convert one of those go-anywhere trucks into a classroom. Load it with computers and conferencing equipment and go from village to village. (Brokaw 2004)

Brokaw's vision of patriotism and nationalism imagines it as bringing US-based cutting-edge technologies as a gift of development to countries like Afghanistan. Like Vietnam, Afghanistan has no history worth exploring or retelling, and the connections between the wars in Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks fade away with suggestions that it move forward with all of the markers of US consumer abundance.

Expressions of nationalism are the product of a government effort since 1980 to increasingly position citizens as subjects encouraged to view foreign policy in a neoliberal mode. By 2001, foreign policy had been reframed as both personal and distant, with wars fought "on schedule"

with minimal disruption to the American way of life. By 2001, the media environment and government-media intertwinement had changed significantly and it produced an intensification of the previous decades, not a departure. Think tanks, often funded by the defense industry, were regularly used by government to sell policies to the public, the opposition, and even other members of the government itself. Hodge describes how General Stanley McChrystal, the commander in Afghanistan in 2009–2010, hired friendlies from the Center for a New American Security to do public relations and sell an Afghanistan surge to President Obama (2010). Retired military were on the payroll of defense contractors and went on-air as "message force multipliers" explaining the necessity of surges and extensions of deadlines.

The endless effort on the part of the government to punctuate two long wars with turning corners and drawing down comes from the decades-long practice of promising clear endings and no Vietnams. The government supplied a constant barrage of assurances that they had "seized the momentum," reached "turning points," and declared that the "days of providing a blank check" to Iraq and Afghanistan were over. The alleged success of the Iraq surge would work in Afghanistan even though many doubted it. Not only did the government identify impending success, but it regularly debated it and cast doubt upon them in order to reply with a rebuttal. As foreign leaders gathered in Kabul to pledge their support to Afghanistan's security, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mused that "citizens of many nations represented here, including my own, wonder whether success is even possible" (Oppel and Landler 2010, A10). Almost a year later, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reported on the "dramatic turnaround" in Sangin, Afghanistan (Bumiller 2011, A12).

The reassurance of no more Vietnams, definable (yet moving target) metrics, and assumptions about short attention spans were all at work a decade later in Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. Obama stressed that after the clearly defined goal of enforcing an arms embargo and establishing a no-fly zone allies and partners would take responsibility, thus reducing both the costs and risks of the operation (Obama 2011). In *Great Again*, Trump delivers the same message about burden and cost-sharing: "If other countries are depending on us to protect them, shouldn't they be willing to make sure we have the capability to do it?" (2015, 34). While Trump's style is surely different, he too has embraced the need for clear objectives, a plan to win, and a plan to get out (2015, 36). While eschew-

ing a timetable for withdrawal in Afghanistan Trump announced a "conditions-based" strategy that would require an unspecified number of troops, and a tougher policy toward Pakistan, a policy that Obama embraced throughout his tenure. Erik Prince, the chairman of Frontier Services Group (formerly Blackwater) criticized Trump's August 2017 speech promising a "new" strategy for Afghanistan, and he took his criticism straight from the Trump playbook. Using contractors, Prince argued, would "cost less than 20 percent of current spending and saves American taxpayers more than $40 billion a year" (Prince 2017, A23). Trump may finally, in the face of failure in Afghanistan, be the first president to implement a plan for a private security war.

Dean describes the government's ability to spread, reinforce, and intensify the velocity of punctuated promises of success and closure as "communication for its own sake" (Dean 2010, 27). Less concerned with image control as in Grenada and the first Persian Gulf War, the slogans, assessments, and announcements operate on the possibility that one's opponents and the listening and viewing public will add them to their stock of knowledge about the wars. The media role is to report what the government guarantees, and then report that some have doubts, and the cycle begins again. The point is not to determine who is more accurate. It is to take note of a seemingly irresolvable difference and move on. In such a communication environment, the release of 92,000 cables via *Wikileaks* on the bleak situation in Afghanistan simply added to the swirling assertions and retorts. Eventually, the allegations about Assange's personal life and whether he would ever leave the Ecuadoran embassy overshadowed the meaning of the document dump.

Popular engagement with foreign policy throughout the post-Vietnam era took place through the prism of that conflict. Press pools, the Powell Doctrine, and the end of the Cold War created a context for the emergence of a new ensemble of citizenship practices. Citizens evaluated the government's ability to begin and end war on schedule while continuing to promise "no more Vietnams." While September 11 seemed to change everything, replacing the Powell Doctrine with counterinsurgency and nation-building, neoliberalism remained the most powerful strain in practices of citizenship. September 11 and the war in Iraq appeared to revive a pre-Vietnam War nation, but in fact both of the wars accelerated and deepened the changes taking place with respect to masculinity, rescue, race, and citizenship.

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# The Trump Test: Neoliberalism, Foreign Policy, and the 2016 Election

Six days after the terrorist attacks, George W. Bush conveyed his determination to avenge them with a personalized and strongly masculine call that "We want justice … Dead or Alive." On the very same day, Secretary of State Powell described Osama bin Laden as but one leader of the Al Qaeda network: "It's not one individual; it's lots of individuals, and it's lots of cells. Osama bin Laden is the chairman of a holding company, and within that holding company are terrorist cells and organizations in dozens of countries around the world, any one of them capable of committing a terrorist act" (Drehle 2011, 26). Almost immediately these two terror-fighting idioms—one on the frontier between civilization and barbarity and the other imaginatively dissolving clear-cut borders to understand a networked threat—competed to define the type of war confronting the US. Bush described a Wild West with a clear enemy on a most wanted poster. Colin Powell described a diffuse enemy that refused easy elimination. "Wanted Dead or Alive" was more newsworthy and joined with the burst of popular demonizing of the individual "madman" who the *National Enquirer* declared had a disease that was making him "insane" (Haley et al. 2001, 60–61). Newsmagazines persisted in creating the classic villain and asked "Why Can't We Find bin Laden?" as if finding him would rid the world of terrorism (McGreary and Waller 2002).

It was Powell's vision of the enemy that encapsulated the military shift long underway in imagining a different kind of war, one that dovetailed with network-centric and post-Fordist descriptions of Al Qaeda's

terrorism as a "warped mirror image of the new economy," with Osama bin Laden a CEO "bringing in consultants and freelancers to perform specific jobs" (Van Natta 2001, 5). Even as the US fought what appeared to be a counterinsurgency (Afghanistan) and conventional (Iraq) war, the military continued trying to shift its stance to address the nature of a non-conventional, protean threat facing the US. Even though the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review undertaken during the Clinton administration did not have a singular focus on terrorism, it did stress the necessity of multiple, concurrent small-scale operations worldwide and the need to operate in an "asymmetrical" environment (Report of the QDR 1997). The Bush Administration embraced this position with the added urgency of the September 11 attacks. Using the repetition of "defending, preserving, and extending" the peace that Bush used in his 2002 address at West Point announcing the new doctrine of preemption, the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) cited the importance of both deterrence and preemption against an enemy that is neither "generally status quo" nor "risk averse" (NSS 2002, 9). Placing the US in the crosshairs of "radicalism and technology," (p. 1) the document described how every facet of the foreign policy apparatus must prepare for an enemy that poses a constant and imminent threat. In a sweeping outline of the necessary transformation of that apparatus, the document calls for innovations in the conduct of warfare and the reform of intelligence to fight terror, new methods of collecting information, new ways of developing warning systems through intelligence, and dissolving the distinction between the domestic and foreign in order to ensure "the proper fusion of information between intelligence and law enforcement" (NSS 2002, 19). Subsequent documents also dissolved domestic and foreign distinctions because of the omnipresent threat. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review offered a series of contrasting juxtaposition in order to explain a threat that no longer allowed "peace time tempo," or "predictability," but instead produced a "sense of urgency" and "surprise and uncertainty" (QDR 2006, VI). With endless diffuse threats and the need for "global force management," The reproduction of boundary-drawing that had preoccupied the state in earlier eras had become difficult to sustain in the war on terror, which required a "less stable imaginative structure" (Kahn 2013, 200).

Adapting Foucault's late 1970s prescient analysis of the emergence of neoliberalism to the field of US foreign policy helps highlight this gradual emergence of a government style or a style of thought, analysis, and

imagination that in turn has reshaped the usual markers that many scholars and commentators point to when they seek to explain the operations of US power in the world (Foucault 2004, 242). The foreign policy domain for years was treated as reenactments of manly imperialism, rescue across a civilization divide, white supremacy, and bellicose patriotism. Over the past thirty years these categories have been gradually transformed, and while each has retained remnants of the older pattern and is interrupted by ephemeral expressions of it, each major category reflects new modalities of gender, race, war-fighting, and patriotism. President Obama's promise to develop a "stronger, smarter, and comprehensive strategy" in Afghanistan points to an important shift in the expectations of masculine leadership and managerial control and the development of tactics that allow the US to strike anywhere in the world. (Obama 2009c). With respect to rescue, the focus is now much less upon saving nationals from the barbarians and more upon the selective saving of the world with inconsistent displays of compassion and benevolence—the demonstration of the "soft" side of global power that accompanies its "hard" use. With respect to race, the old rigid hierarchies of racial dominance are being, displaced by a more inclusive, flexible, and hybrid structure of race relations. Members of underrepresented groups provide testimony about upward mobility and accessibility and the white males at the top of the hierarchy celebrate the virtues of meritocratic worth. When it comes to the foreign other, government and media are just as likely to use the terms of risk and uncertainty, and to be awed and baffled by the acumen of the enemy as they are to engage in racial profiling. Finally, neoliberal foreign policy presupposes a certain type of audience and subject. On the one hand, it needs reassurance that wars and violence will be short-lived and necessary for national and personal security (no more Vietnams). On the other hand, the populace should expect unprecedented levels of surveillance and managerial control, with some groups singled out for particularly extensive oversight. One important facet of control is the hearkening back to earlier times when America united in solidarity, purpose, and sacrifice. A contrast is drawn with the supposedly selfish shoppers and slackers who refuse to do her part in the war effort. As a technique of governance, nostalgia dampens dissent and encourages subjects to compare themselves with a utopian depiction of citizenship and repeatedly come up short. What these four changes add up to is a new grid or schema for understanding how US foreign policy operates.

Studies of neoliberalism are often keen to emphasize that a scaled-back state or one "removed" from the economy does not capture the emergent order that Foucault described so lucidly and with impressive forethought in 1979. This is also the case with US foreign policy. Despite the torrent of commentary on outsourcing security, using contractors to fight wars, seeking private-public ventures in foreign aid, and hiving off former state functions to the NGO-industrial complex, the US state remains strong across a number of dimensions. Hacker and Pierson have convincingly argued that "politics as organized combat" has allowed cohesive and vocal groups to have command over taxation policy, labor relations, and financial deregulation. The state's extensive involvement directing the economy in favor of the ruling class is both wide and deep (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 169–170). This is also the case in foreign policy, where the term military-industrial complex still has merit. The military's dominant role in the US economy matches its ubiquity around the globe, with bases, prepositioning sites, and status of forces agreements to ensure stability and the maintenance of US interests. Cohen points out that it was during the Clinton years that Combatant Commanders took on a wider range of responsibilities, giving them both global influence but also budgetary clout (2009, 71).The military assiduously works to cultivate an image of indispensability and it has become more adept at advertising and marketing its necessary and authoritative control over the global commons. The rest of this chapter updates and extends analysis of the four major coordinates of US power that have been previously addressed, all the way to the election of Donald Trump in November 2016.

## Managerial Masculinity

Killing Osama bin Laden in May 2011 provides an important moment for analyzing the extent to which warrior prowess took a backseat to evaluations of exacting technique. In a vestigial reflex of a tough-guy approach, and no doubt in response to Republican mockery of President Obama's embrace of "leading from behind" and 2008 Republican candidate Rick Santorum (among others) labeling him an appeaser of radical Islamic jihadists, Obama responded with a proudly owned kill list: "Ask Osama bin Laden and 22 out of the top 30 Al Qaeda leaders who have been taken off the field whether I engage in appeasement" (Obama 2011). As pointed out in Chap. 1, Obama's 2012 State of the Union address constructed the US as a diverse, multicultural, militaristic hegemon. Like Jack Bauer's

CTU in *24*, the mission can be carried out by a country in which everyone is eligible to help demonstrate the reach and capabilities of American power. And like the Navy SEALS, dissidence and discord might have their limited place before the mission is carried out, but once it is launched it becomes apolitical or else the mission will fail. Within the space of two paragraphs, Obama refers to now owning the NAVY Seal American flag that was used in the raid and looking at the American flag as a symbol of how the country is stitched together "like those 50 stars and 13 stripes," thus conflating a symbol of American military power with a symbol of the nation itself (Obama 2012). Managerial militarism does not require tough-guy antics. It requires the assessment of risk, a decisive choice, and the adept use of lethal violence. Managerial militarism will keep the country safe.

The most ubiquitous assessments in the media followed the president's lead by using a now familiar set of metrics for evaluating Operation Neptune Spear. Zakaria gushed that "the image of a smart, wise, and supremely competent U.S. flashed across the globe" (2011, 51). One senior intelligence official told *Newsweek* that Obama's style was "calculating, technocratic and goal-oriented"; He didn't need "Mission Accomplished theatrics" (Romano and Klaidman 2011, 28). Not to be outdone, *Time*'s Joe Klein called Obama's decision to use a SEAL attack rather than bombing the Abottabad compound as "discreet, precise, and patient" (2011, 32). Smart, precise, competent, calculating, and technocratic are a far cry from Theodore Roosevelt's *Rough Riders* manly imperialism. In marching up San Juan Hill, Roosevelt exhibited bravery. In Operation Neptune Spear, Obama took a risk by ordering the commando raid and was shown a live-feed update of its unfolding (and broadcast with a now ubiquitous photo of the President seeming to watch the unfolding drama with his close cabinet/platoon members).

In addition to lauding the effectiveness of the President's leadership style, three other important themes worked to make the counterterrorism operation appear to be a more successful strategy in a global war on violent extremism. First of all, it affirmed that the huge investment in the military and special forces units like the SEALS was a "good deal." There were numerous remarks about the technological sophistication, capabilities of military equipment, and the talent of the SEALs. Numerous descriptions of Neptune Spear compared it with the failed April 1980 hostage attempt in Iran, and used it to claim that the elevation of the Joint Special Operations Command to the status of the military's other regional

military commands help to explain how they "got him." Thanks to the training of Special Operations forces, when one of the Black Hawk helicopters malfunctioned, the SEALS were able to continue to storm the house and complete the mission. The fact that one of the helicopters hit a wall of the compound and lost its propeller, in other words, did not condemn the mission because the SEALS inside were able to continue and kill bin Laden. SEAL Team Six seemed to match the qualities attributed to the president: stealthy, methodical, and accurate. Bin Laden's Abottabad compound was thus figuratively a long way from Carter's "desert debacle" and a military described in 1980 as "incapable of keeping its aircraft aloft, even when no enemy knew they were there" ("Debacle" 1980, 12). The White House spin provided by then-chief counterterrorism appointee John O. Brennan emphasized that the military "is without doubt, even stronger after this operation" (Schmidle 2011, 45).

Second, the iconic photo of the President and some of his administration receiving live-feed updates of the mission captured the symbiotic relationship between the government and the military in executing global war. Alongside Vice President Joe Biden and the President, and sitting at the head of the table, was Brigadier General Marshall Bradley "Brad" Webb, at the time the Assistant Commanding General of Joint Special Operations Command. As such, he helped direct the work of "operators" who "took down" two thousand or more targets every year, "with an 84% probability that they will get their man" (Boot 2012, 44). The visual representation is a powerful symbol of the way civilian and military power have merged in the foreign policy domain (government members with security responsibilities, including two members of the military, roughly number the same as civilians). Webb is the only one at the table working at his laptop, apparently opening multiple chat windows to connect with Leon Panetta at C.I.A. headquarters, William McRaven in Afghanistan, and the real-time footage being transmitted by a RQ170 drone (Schmidle 2011, 40). Kennedy interprets the photo as an illustration of the "sovereign power of the United States to extend violence with impunity" (Kennedy 2012, 270–271). It is also a stark reminder of the extent to which US foreign policy has been militarized and how former military personnel now occupy a number of national security positions and diplomatic posts, thereby ensuring continuing military influence in shaping war strategies.

Finally, the fact that the bin Laden raid was a targeted killing challenged the government during the remainder of 2011 and through 2012

to clarify the conditions under which such killings would take place. This legal liberalism is a dimension of neoliberal policy-making that a number of scholars have addressed, particularly on the topic of torture. Lokaneeta has argued that the liberal state must distance itself from violence of torture because its legitimacy rests on the rule of law and consent and torture undermines that legitimacy (2010, 2). In the case of targeted killings the government was also eventually compelled, after months of denial and equivocation, to provide a legalistic justification. Working in a context of what Hussain (2007) calls hyperlegality, the use of legal definitions, administrative rules, and webs of policy directives that constitute the heart of neoliberal governmentality, Attorney General Eric Holder's speech at Northwestern Law School on March 5, 2012, can be regarded as an important moment in the legal justification for timely and targeted killings. Buttressing his more specific justifications, Holder cited Congressional authorization to use all necessary and appropriate force against Al Qaeda and its affiliates as support for targeted killing. Holder then further specified the conditions under which targeted killings would be authorized: when an individual poses an imminent threat (the evaluation of which is done by the government), capture is not feasible (again, decided by the government), and lastly, the operation could be conducted observing the laws of war (necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity) (Holder 2012, 6). Such principles, conditions, and rules not only serve to contrast the current government with its predecessor; they solidify the reputation the government for precision, effectiveness, and legal certitude and give war the mantle of legitimacy. When the Bush administration targeted and killed six members of Al Qaeda in Yemen in November 2002 one person in the car was an American citizen. At the time, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claimed to be signaling the world that the US had the capacity to "reach out and touch 'em" (Hersh 2002, 66; Thomas and Hosenball 2002, 49). Holder gave surer legalistic footing to targeted killings around the world and helped lodge them more securely in the array of counterterrorist operations in use, thereby helping to normalize and legitimize such killings. President Obama further wrapped targeted killing in a mantle of legitimacy in 2013 by signing a Presidential Directive that set "clear guidelines, oversight and accountability" that supposedly made civilian death less likely (2013, 4).

Vrasti argues that Foucault (and others) underestimated the power of neoliberal ideology to put forth credible affective structures that provide a "caring" dimension to capitalism. In other words, instead of interpreting

neoliberalism as solely policies and techniques of governance, neoliberalism in practice creates "moral legitimating structures" that help it garner consent (2011, 1). In the realm of foreign policy this is also the case, with displays of emotion that garner public support if not indifference to the uses of violence. The lamentations that accompany the legal-liberal defense of counterterrorism give its executors (not its recipients) a human side, a side that seems to be painfully aware of the costs of violence and the suffering that accompanies its use. On a larger scale, humanitarian war provides a context for asking and answering questions about the US global responsibility to selectively come to the aid of victims of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and civil war. Humanitarian war affirms the benevolent intent of US power in a world that many in the US believe turn to America to save them, thereby prompting the question, why must the US solve the world's problems? Humanitarian interventions make it possible to unproblematically pose that question and it induces the historical amnesia that is required to ignore the role of the US in often creating the conditions that it seeks to ameliorate.

But it is at the level of displaying personal and emotional grappling with violence where important "microphysics of power" operates. Depictions of an upset president who worried aloud about unnecessary deaths occurred early in the Obama administration. Tribal elders and members of a pro-government peace committee were killed as a consequence of a drone attack in Pakistan, and the President was reported to be "understandably disturbed. How could this happen?" (Klaidman 2012b, 40). Because of the moral qualms caused by the collateral damage every targeted killing henceforth allegedly had to be "lawyered," that is, supposedly given a thorough vetting by perhaps a dozen lawyers. McKelvey for *Newsweek* described the process of vetting lists as "multilayered and methodical, run by a corps of civil servants, who carry out their duties in a methodical manner" (2011, 34). One CIA lawyer who deliberated over the kill lists assured McKelvey that he even watched videos of the killings to make sure they were done in "the cleanest way possible" (2011, 36). While critical United Nations, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International reports on the civilian deaths by drones were often justified by the administration with a utilitarian metric (fewer civilians were killed than if aerial bombing were used), just as often there was a profession of deep concern and regret about the unnecessary deaths. A report on a 68-year-old grandmother dying by drone while she picked vegetables from her garden with her grandchildren nearby requires an emotional and caring response (Walsh and

Mehsud 2013, A1). In other words, making apparently painful moral decisions is the flipside of the utilitarian coin. After finally officially acknowledging the use of drone strikes in January 2012, in May 2013 the President admitted that civilian deaths from drones would haunt him and others in the chain of command "for as long as we live" (Obama 2013). The media reported the President "deeply conflicted" and according to his press secretary, ordering drone strikes was "one of the most difficult exercises President Obama has to go through" (Baker and Davis 2015, A7). Anguish about the death of innocent civilians from drone strikes is the flipside of anguished and emotional calls for the necessity of humanitarian war.

## An Army of Singular, "Wounded" Soldiers

Since the inception of the all-volunteer military the symbol of the manly, courageous, obedient soldier has been increasingly in tension with the emergence of an individual soldier who has freely chosen a career or is using military enlistment as a way to further their post-military civilian ambitions. It was ironic but not unexpected to hear a reservist tell a reporter that "Nobody thinks when they sign up that they'll be going to war" (Adler 2003, 32). Shaw argues that soldiers in the US as well as other countries consider themselves skilled professionals who accept the risks of their profession but loudly complain if their lives are put in too much danger. This is especially the case since the military recruits like a corporation, promising thirty days of annual paid vacation, free medical care, competitive retirement benefits, and a home loan program (Herbert 2005, A17). Feaver notes that during the Bosnia operation, NATO allied soldiers called US forces ninja turtles, "overly laden with body armor and hunkered down on base rather than mixing with the population and keeping the peace" (2003, 17). In Iraq, Smith observed that "forward operating bases are more suited for protecting troops than they are for waging effective counterinsurgency" (2008, 153). Military service, in other words, is framed to be a freely chosen career, and like some disgruntled employees facing the potential of retaliation, soldiers were often outspoken in their criticism of how the war was being managed. While hardly apolitical before September 11, the war deepened the military's participation in the deliberative process even further. Soldiers wrote editorials that criticized the "American centered" framework being used to assess progress in Iraq, mid-career officers criticized the leadership

for lacking creativity, and 1700 soldiers signed an appeal for redress in 2007 that read in part "Staying in Iraq will not work and is not worth the price. It is time for U.S. troops to come home" (Jayamaha et al. 2007; Bacevich 2007).

The military's advertising, which stresses that enlistment cultivates individualism and self-entrepreneurship ("An Army of One"), has had consequences in the way soldiers have often reconceived duty as achieving their own singular career ambitions. In other words, the precarious economic conditions facing many soldiers push them toward enlistment. Of course wars have been always fought by the poor, the dispossessed, and the lost. But since there is no draft, and in a context of growing inequality and decreasing educational and job prospects, many recruits are more likely to view enlistment as both a way to start over and a chance to serve in what Massing calls "the last outpost of the welfare state in America" (2008, 35). At various points during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military was willing to issue "moral waivers." There were 80,403 waivers granted between 2004 and 2010, with 47,418 of them to people with a "history of drug or alcohol abuse, misdemeanors, or 'serious misconduct,' defined as a felony," an indirect indicator that at least some of those who enlisted looked to the military to give order and meaning to their lives (Bumiller 2010, A10). Much of the book length reporting from embedded journalists portrays many soldiers as the product of "broken" homes, the beneficiaries of waivers for mental and psychological problems, slow learners with bad scores on aptitude tests, and convicted criminals who have been charged with "burglary, theft, aggravated assault, and even a few cases of involuntary manslaughter" (Finkel 2009, 120).Of course, these waivers were given at the height of the war when the military regularly failed to meet its enlistment quotas, but it also increased perceptions that the military (rather than widely available education and decent healthcare) could turn things around for those in an endless cycle of petty criminality, dead-end jobs, and dysfunctional personal or familial relationships.

To be sure, there continued to be popular images of brave soldiers fighting the war on terror the way Rambo re-fought the Vietnam War. Troops were pictured playing football, skyping with the womenfolk and children back home, and undergoing urban night training. Balancing

this old-fashioned portrait, however, were numerous stories about soldiers' personal struggles and the frequent commentary on PTSD and suicide rates that had reached epidemic proportions. Troops were reported to be taking daily doses of anti-depressants, and the combination of anti-depressant drugs and PTSD helped to create their "wounded minds" (Thompson 2010, 20). The inexorable personalizing logic of neoliberal war led to persistent investigations and commentary on how soldiers and veterans were personally coping with war. Even though the media covered the effects of multiple deployments, inadequate equipment, and deeply unpopular stop-loss policies, the central topic was the individual, coping soldier. To borrow from Illouz's analysis of the Oprah Winfrey show format, stories about addled soldiers point to solutions to problems through the personal transformation of the dysfunctional soldier rather than reformation of the structural conditions that produced war in the first place (2003). Since enlistment is widely considered a "choice," bad decisions come out of the life the individual has chosen; choice is the starting assumption for understanding soldiers' troubles. As such, they are considered akin to people suffering a natural disaster rather than a war deliberately planned by political actors with power and interests seeking to accomplish foreign policy objectives that illuminate larger structural forces rather than individual challenges and failings. The grid through which soldiering is understood resembles many features of the neoliberal turn that can be found in civilian life. The mantra to support the troops shows some concern for adequate medical treatment and decent jobs after military service, but often the travails of soldiers are understood through personal solutions to be found in responsibility and coping.

Accelerating the dynamics of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, the military continued to serve as an important arena for demonstrating that America was a liberal, multicultural country capable of both continuous incorporation of difference while simultaneously denying and affirming its significance. Under conditions of permanent war, women soldiers continually testify in support of the liberal reading of military service; that is, war-fighting is gender-blind and the military is an institution that on the whole offers opportunity and satisfaction. From Staff Sergeants to four-star generals, many women in the military stake claims to being soldiers first and women second. Female soldiers tell the media that "when

someone is shooting at you, you don't say, 'Stop the War, I'm a girl,'" and "an "IED or bullet doesn't have its gender marked on it" (Lee 2008, 1; McGirk 2005, 38). When Teresa L. King was made the first woman to head a school for drill instructors for the entire Army at Fort Jackson, S.C., she denied her promotion occurred because she is a woman: "When I look in the mirror, I don't see a female … I see a soldier" (Dao 2009). She maintained that women should be in frontline combat positions as long as they met the same standards as men. Two years later King would file a complaint against two of her superiors engaged in a year-long campaign to undermine her authority.

Military women in visible high-level positions reaffirm the liberal myth of equal opportunity and merit, with implicit contrasts with the civilian world highlighting the accolades. After noting the great feats of Major General Maggie Woodard during the war on Libya (watching F-15Es take out tanks of Qaddafi's forces, ordering B-2 bombers to destroy Libyan aircraft on the ground in Misrata), Woodward starts the interview with a question, "We're not going to get into the first-woman thing, are we?" (Thompson 2011, 28). One of 612 women in the Air Force's 13,000 pilots, the first woman to run the 89th Airlift Wing, and the first woman to command a military campaign, Woodward's response as to whether she was a role model for little girls hit a liberal high note: "I hope I'm an inspiring figure to lots of little boys and girls" (38).This is the same person who was appointed to investigate sexual assaults by the military trainers at Lackland Air Force Base and did not interview a single victim (Forsyth 2013). When Adm. Michelle J. Howard made Naval history in becoming the first female to receive four stars and the highest ranking African American woman in the entire military, her teacher at the Naval Academy in the early 1980s explained that Howard "is all about capability, not that she's a woman or that she's African American" (Schneider 2014, A12). Howard told *Time*'s Thompson that "What's great about the Navy is that despite the few knuckleheads that exist, there are a lot of folks who are professional, and will grade you on your performance and not how you look" (Thompson 2013). These statements are not expressions of false consciousness (even if they are, what good does it do to write them all off as such?) and they are not read as such in popular accounts of various female military "firsts." They provide testimony of successful struggles for recognition and affirm the institution's capacity for inclusion even when plenty of women soldiers may know that the institution falls far short of its institutional claims.

The media focus on femininity is reinforced through assumptions and discussions about women soldiers' ongoing concerns about both feminine

appearance and motherhood. In December 2005 *Good Housekeeping* gave four women at Fort Sam Houston a makeover for Christmas. While lauding the short layers and highlights in the Captain's hair, and eye-defining make up and brighter lipstick in a Sgt. First Class and Colonel, *Good Housekeeping* also provided Lt. Colonel Andrea Jeannie Talifero, an African American woman whose husband also serves in the Middle East, a forum for affirming the American Dream: "The Army has made my family very well-rounded. My kids have benefited from opportunities I never had—and now my son wants to go to Harvard!" A Manhattan designer was so moved by the stories of separation and sacrifice endured by military brides that she offered to custom-design wedding gowns for them at no cost (Jerome et al. 2005, 1). In a story in *Time* about both parents being deployed, Laura Richardson, the commander of a battalion of Black Hawk helicopters, got kudos from her mother-in-law: "she has so much stamina, but at the same time she is very feminine" (Gibbs 2003, 32).

The twenty-eighth woman to be killed in Afghanistan in 2011, we are assured, "definitely had her feminine side," carrying a hot pink pocket knife and pink duct tape; "even her tattoos were all flowers and girlie things" (Nordland 2011, A4).

One of the most fascinating military experiments that captures the perplexing vacillations between sameness and difference was launched in the spring of 2010. One of General Stanley McChyrstal's ideas, women marines were attached to all-male combat units in Helmand province (southern Afghanistan) to interact with women in villages, assess their needs, and gather intelligence. This supposedly demonstrated respect for local gender customs while also placing the women detachments in combat situations, where, according to First Lt. Riannon Blaisdell-Black, "out here we don't see gender, we don't see race" (Nordland 2011, A4). At the same time, the women distributed stuffed animals to the children in the villages and one explained that she was just "too much of a girl to see these guys getting killed" (Bumiller 2010, A1). One sergeant reported that what he could hear through the wall of separation between the men and the women soldiers and Afghan women villagers was "normal girls-just-hanging-out type of conversation, giggling and everything" (Bumiller 2010, A1).

There is thus a complex oscillation between trivializing or denying the differences between men and women soldiers when it comes to recruitment, combat, and then reaffirming difference when institutional masculinity is threatened. Gender is depoliticized on the battlefield and then repoliticized by reassuring that after all women will never lose their

femininity—and by implication, men's masculinity remains intact. When gender is trivialized, the gender neutrality of the military is affirmed. When gender difference is affirmed, the military is shown to be an institution that allows for difference. The military as an institution of destruction serves as a taken-for-granted backdrop for this recurring and endless process of denying and then reclaiming gender (and racial) difference.

The endless oscillation between sameness and difference goes some way toward explaining the rampant sexual harassment, violence, assault, and rape that many women face in the US military. Dichter and True in qualitative interviews found that women joined up because they had an orientation toward military life at an early age, they sought opportunities for travel, adventure, and new experiences, it increased their access to education and employment, and it allowed escape from adverse life circumstances (Dichter and True 2014, 4). In other words, they viewed the opportunities of military service in ways similar to many men who enlist. Liberal reformers like Senator Kirsten Gillibrand of New York (a champion of taking sexual violence cases out of the adjudication of the chain of command) assume an institution run on a conception of the universal soldier, a conception that is gender-blind. Her liberal framework for analyzing sexual violence in the military emerged in her opening remarks at a Congressional hearing:

> The U.S. military is the best in the world and the overwhelming majority of our brave men and women serving in uniform do so honorably and bravely … sexual assault in the military threatens our unit cohesion and national security … our best and brightest join our military for all the right reasons, to serve our country, to protect our freedom, and to keep America safe. (Hearings 2013, 2)

Yet, in the way the military accommodates women through institutionally modulating sameness and difference, sexual violence will continue to frustrate, undermine, and thwart efforts to move beyond the military's continuing reproduction of an inclusive hierarchy that simultaneously embraces and disavows equality.

## Captivity, Inc.

For years, captivity anchored the settler US national identity. It served to define the community by drawing boundaries, requiring daring rescues, and building national solidarity. As noted in Chap. 3, the Reagan

administration's arms-for-hostages effort was an early glimpse of how hostage-taking gradually lost its boundary-drawing function, reflecting the transnational economy and the increasing significance of the hostage business. For instance, in May 2006, Rye and Kang presented a graphic depiction of kidnappings that had taken place in Iraq since the start of the war. Approximately 439 people were kidnapped from 60 different countries, with the largest group being private contractors, dwarfing the number of hostages in the Persian Gulf on the eve of the 1990–1991 war. The average ransom paid was 30,000 dollars (2006, A23). In 2012 *The Economist* explained that "almost all kidnapping is a business and cases are dealt with in a business-like manner—using what are known as risk-management firms," run by former Special Forces soldiers, intelligence analysts, and lawyers (2012, 65). The traditional national narrative has not been invoked to make sense of hostage-taking in either Afghanistan or Iraq. Instead, like hostages in the first Gulf War, hostages in the twenty-first century are either professionals seeking better opportunities in the global economy, NGO workers, or reporters. Eugene Armstrong, for example, held hostage and beheaded in the fall of 2004 in Iraq, was working for Gulf Supplies and Commercial Services, a company based in the United Arab Emirates with contracts with the US to undertake work in Iraq (Wong 2004). The aims of the kidnappers, in many cases successful, were to disrupt reconstruction, shut down companies doing business in Iraq, and convince the US government of the futility of the occupation.

A kidnapping and captivity industry is a far cry from the binding work done historically by captivity narratives. Money, rather than imagining the ordeal of the innocent hostage, is the most significant challenge facing those trying to release hostages. Arriving at an agreed price that is usually "lower than the gang's opening bid" takes precedence over using the hostage episode as an opportunity to describe the kidnappers' savagery and self-representations of the innocent settler in the wilderness, beyond the pale of civilization (*The Economist* 2012, 65). Using hostages as an excuse for jeremiads on the backsliding ways of Americans has been trumped by emphasis on the dangers of traveling, working, and doing business in the Middle East and the costly consequences of a ransom. Between 2008 and 2014 the US government estimates that radical Islamist groups collected more than 200 million dollars in ransoms (Wright 2015, 55–56). While the US initially refused to allow either the government or the families of ISIS captors to pay ransom, by the summer of 2015 the government relented and told the families of US hostages it would not interfere in

ransom payments. The government also announced the formation of a "fusion center" to coordinate dealings with hostages and ransoms (Davis 2015, A6).

A number of commentators pointed to the Jessica Lynch capture in the early stages of the Iraq war and subsequent guns a-blazing rescue as an important captivity story that riveted the nation and recycled longstanding stories about Americans in danger across a treacherous frontier. Melani McAlister wrote that the celebration of her release resonated so much because it was the "latest iteration of a classic American war fantasy, the captivity narrative" (2003). Tucker and Walton suggest that the saga "may well have moved the captivity narrative into a new form of imperial myth making," with hierarchies of race and gender in the homeland deemphasized while Lynch still signified the white innocent female victim threatened by Arab men (2006, 326).

Yet two dynamics were at work that weakened the power of the Lynch story as the perfect script for resurrecting captivity tales of horror, trial, and release. The first was that almost immediately the story of savage brutality by Iraqi forces was debunked. The debunking started abroad with *The Guardian* and then was gradually addressed by the US media throughout the summer of 2003. Her wounds were probably received in the vehicle crash rather than by live fire, for example. In October 2003 *The New York Times* wrote a story on "Saving Private Lynch from Misinformation" and juxtaposed two columns on what was reported in the news about the event and what appears in the script for the NBC movie. By the time the movie was aired in November 2003, there was no shootout during her capture, and Special Operations Forces were not met with Iraqi army fire during the rescue. *Time*'s reviewer declared that it "would have been a better movie had the truth not got in the way" (Poniewozik 2003). The rescue, in other words, was the product of the media-military effort to *stage* the classic captivity narrative, just as the story of the former football star Pat Tillman's courage in the face of Afghan enemy fire turned out to be friendly fire and the military was exposed for its inept myth-making. As it turned out, Lynch was not rescued according to a classic script, but it looked like it enough at the time to present it as such. While self-serving, of course, the Army insistence that the phony narrative was a "product of politicians and the hero-hungry news media" is further demonstration of military participation in presenting a saleable story at the expense of accuracy (Alter 2007, 37). And of course, that script was initially successful because Lynch was a "damsel in distress." Historically,

however, part of the explanation for the tenacity of the captivity narrative was its persuasiveness. The Lynch story lacked this, partly because she did not write it the way Mary Rowlandson did, and partly because it was crafted as a pat story that was then accurately debunked and gradually received with cynicism and questions about its veracity. Lynch told Diane Sawyer in an interview in November 2003 that her weapon *did* jam and "I did not shoot. Not a round, nothing." The writer of the script for the NBC movie, after ten drafts, finally concluded that the rescue was really about "an Iraqi civilian [who] risked his life to save an American because he had a daughter and when he saw this young woman in the hospital, he had to save her," referring to Mohammed al-Rehaief, the Iraqi lawyer who saw Lynch in the hospital (Fasano 2003, 26). In fact, Mr. al-Rehaief is the hero of the made-for-TV movie. While a cooperative, concerned Iraqi was certainly not the usual depiction of insurgents fighting against the US occupation, Kirn argued that he punctured preconceptions about "monolithic Islamic anti-Americanism" (Kirn 2003, 110). While this is probably not the case, the erosion of the military and government ability to present a pat narrative about Jessica Lynch is noteworthy in its contrast with the sticking power of the classic captivity narrative.

The capture and rescue of Lynch played another important role in the war narrative that has not been explicitly noted. The Jessica Lynch story was designed to give the war the *appearance* of momentum a week after it had begun. McAlister noted this in passing: "Yet the ecstatic media response cries out for an explanation larger than the celebration of good news, even in a war that has taken longer than many expected" (2003). It seemed to be one of the "first bright spots in a war bogged down in heavy fighting and uncertainty" (Jonsson 2003, 3). *Time* declared that the rescue "buoyed a nation wondering what had happened to the short, neat liberation of Iraq" (Morse 2003, 66). Orecklin stated that Lynch was a much-needed hero in a war "that seemed in danger of bogging down" (2003, 33). The Jessica Lynch story evoked the appearance of accomplishment in what was sold to be a quick and professionally executed war. The Lynch rescue was evidence that the war was going according to schedule more than it was a replaying of longstanding popular myths.

The killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 may presage a more frequent raft of cynical and staged stories about military feats, followed by debunking and denial. On a scale massively larger than the toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue, saving Private Lynch, and implanting the rule of law through the execution of Saddam Hussein, veteran investigative

reporter Seymour Hersh discovered that Pakistan helped the US stage the killing, the Navy Seals did not engage in a heated gunfight, and it is unlikely that bin Laden had a proper burial at sea. The government crafted a story for the optics, and when challenged insisted the raid was the result of "years of careful and highly advanced intelligence work" (Hersh 2015, 9). The political theater of the Grenada invasion looks amateurish compared with the bin Laden assassination story. Former government officials and many in the mainstream media disparaged the story, and it was no match for *Zero Dark Thirty*, Kathyrn Bigelow's account of the raid as "the greatest manhunt in history."

We need to turn to the humanitarian wars of the 1990s in order to contextualize the way the trope of rescue worked in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The images of women and children as helpless victims facing state collapse and warlords (Somalia), a military coup and wanton military violence (Haiti), and ethnic cleansing (Bosnia and Kosovo) all appeared during the early days of the war on terror. One need only compare Clinton's justification for the bombing of Serbia in 1999 with Bush's partial humanitarian justification for the war in Afghanistan to note the similarities. On the eve of the bombing, Clinton endorsed preemptory action to protect US interests: "I believe the real challenge of our foreign policy today is to deal with problems before they do permanent harm to our vital interests" (Clinton 1999, 471). Clinton also asked the audience to imagine "the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children," and how he would "hate to see a lot of other little children die" because of inaction in Kosovo (1999, 471, 475).

Eventually, though, the thousands of refugee women and children in the Balkans shrunk in magnitude compared with Afghanistan. Existing refugee camps swelled and sprang up (some partly because of a massive drought in Afghanistan as soon as the US bombing campaign began on October 7, 2001). The photos were familiar from other catastrophes; one mother was pictured at a refugee camp with eight of her children, for example, "two of whom have been vomiting blood" (Waldman 2001, B5). The Fund For Afghan Children established by President Bush in October 2001, in which every child should send a dollar, "right here to the White House," had raised 1.5 million by late November 2001, and resembled earlier calls by H.W. Bush and Clinton to "save" the children of Somalia and Bosnia ("Gift Tally" 2001, B6). Afghan children were often pictured clinging to their mothers, crying in the camps, and living on the brink of starvation. As the bombing campaign progressed, news

accounts began to mention their dilatory effects. The staff of various NGOs were cut in half because of Taliban and US bombing raids, and stories of the horrific consequences of errant bombs began to appear, with passive reporting that, for example, stated "The villagers say that thirty people died," because the Taliban had dug ridges above the homes thus making both Taliban fighters and civilians targets (Chivers 2001, B4). As the war progressed, civilian deaths were numbing in their frequency and magnitude.

Iraq's freedom from the clutches of the dictator Saddam Hussein became a centralpiece of justification for the invasion. The April 21, 2003, cover of *Newsweek* proclaimed "Freedom!" and pictured a young Iraqi male civilian kissing the cheek of an American soldier. In 2003 the White House website had a report entitled, "Results in Iraq: Ten Ways in which the Liberation of Iraq Supports the War on Terror," highlighting the "successes shared by post-Saddam Iraqis and their partners in the renewal of their nation" (White House 2003, 4). Kids, the reader is told, had received not only textbooks and food, but 3000 soccer balls had already been delivered and 60,000 more were on the way. The report also stated that women from all walks of life had met with the Coalitional Provisional Authority so it could "hear their concerns and [to] listen to their ideas for the future development of their country." When President Bush met with Iraqi women leaders in November 2003 he asserted that "A free part of Iraq in a part of the world [that] is troublesome and dangerous will set such a good example. We are talking about an historic opportunity change parts of the world, and Iraq will be the leader of that change" (2003, 2).

Transferring the nationalist rescue paradigm abroad has been only partial, however, because the women and children of Afghanistan and Iraq are distant sufferers. Americans might be able to buy their way out of captivity or be rescued in a daring raid, but given that the purpose of war is to kill terrorists, insurgents, conventionally armed soldiers, and suicide bombers, it is more likely that saving or rescuing women and children (or "strangers") will be used as a strategic justification to garner domestic and international support. In addition, the images of women and children being held captive by brutal "medieval" Taliban fighters or ruthless dictators meshes well with already existing frames of reference centered around coping, innocence, caring, and emotion.

In some respects, the promises of liberation for the women of Iraq and Afghanistan can be usefully compared with the promises that revolutionary governments have made to women and gender equality. In both cases,

women's needs and interests were given symbolic significance, but in fact their interests were rarely if ever addressed. Just as in revolutions, the promises of liberation and attention to women's issues quickly became subordinate to larger goals of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, including working with avowed enemies of women's rights, negotiating with the Taliban, pursuing counterinsurgency strategies that disproportionately harmed women and their families (night raids, bombings), and opening it up for business. This is what made the August 9, 2010, cover of *Time* magazine doubly shocking. It pictured 18-year-old Aisha whose nose had been brutally cut off because she tried to run away from the in-laws who abused her. The question the *Time* reporter asked was, "What Happens if We Leave Afghanistan?" as if the US presence was preventing more of these crimes against women. In fact, by 2010, US air strikes had killed thousands of Afghan women and children, civilian deaths were a major source of contention between the US government and Afghanistan's, and although General Stanley McChrystal promised a reduction in civilian deaths in 2009, they continued apace.

The carjackings, night raids, lootings, prostitution, bombings, summary executions, and rampant kidnappings in Iraq were accompanied by yet another effort to portray the US as responsible for rescuing the country from dictatorship in order to become a liberal democracy that respected the rule of law, elections, and constitutions, and the trial of Saddam Hussein would mark this transition. President Bush likened the elections for the transitional government in January 2005 to the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, calling it the Iraqi "purple" revolution in reference to the purple ink stain on the fingers of Iraqi citizens registered to vote. While in Bratislava, Slovakia in February 2005, Bush compared the fall of communism with Iraq's transnational government elections a month earlier:

> As you watched jubilant Iraqis dancing in the streets last month, holding up ink-stained fingers, you remembered Velvet Days. For the Iraqi people, this is their 1989, and they will always remember who stood with them in their quest for freedom. In recent times, we have witnessed landmark events in the history of liberty, a Rose Revolution in Georgia, an Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and now, a Purple Revolution in Iraq. (Bush 2005, 2)

Sunni participation in the parliamentary elections at the end of 2005 was supposed to confirm that "even some Sunni insurgents and their

sympathizers are beginning to acknowledge the power of the ballot box" (Hammer and Johnson 2005, 46). *The Economist* announced that on December 15, 2005, "streets were festooned with banners, people waited happily in queues outside polling stations, and celebrated in jubilation after exercising their right to vote" (2005, 61). These alleged signs of liberation and rescue via the ballot box competed with regular reports of unfair practices on the part of the electoral commission, intimidation, and faulty reporting. The protracted effort to form a government in 2011 wrung out any remaining hope of elections serving as an indicator of liberation; in fact, elections were a vehicle for prolonging sectarian tensions and instability.

The trial of Saddam Hussein (captured in December 2003) constituted yet another key hailed moment in the liberation of Iraq, rescued by the US from the clutches of a ruthless dictator and eager to be introduced to the rule of law. The head of the CPA's crimes against humanity division enthused that a "televised judicial procedure conducted according to internationally acceptable standards will become a civics class for the whole country" (Parker 2004, A23). The judges and prosecutor for the trials met with veterans of war crimes tribunals from the Balkans, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda, and US officials met with senior Iraqi officials to urge them to observe the new Constitution that required all three members of the three-person presidency to agree to an execution (Simons 2004, A9; Burns and Santora 2007, A1). The tribunal was to be a sort of mini-Truth Commission, like the numerous more elaborate ones for the former Yugoslavia, Chile, and other countries that have brought tyrants to justice. The trial, however, turned out to be deeply flawed, with three of Hussein's defense attorneys murdered, judges were deemed too lenient, and nine staff members of the commission were fired for scheming to delay the proceedings against him (Dickey 2007, 20; Liu 2005, 41). Hussein's execution on December 30, 2006, further undermined this optimistic narrative. While not shown on the officially released video, pictures from cell phones posted on the Internet "portrayed the entire judicial exercise for the lynch party that it was" (Shapiro 2007, 4). *Time* also called the execution a lynching carried out by a "vengeful, U.S.-backed Shi'ite government" (Ghosh 2007, 36). Hertzberg called it a "brutal spectacle" that itself "bore an irresistible resemblance to a video from some terrorist website" (2007, 21). Like the Lynch story and countless other government-directed stories of success, momentum, and progress in the war on terror, the Hussein execution called into question the righteous celebrations

accompanying the rescue of a country from a dictator. Rescuing Iraqis from a brutal dictator and liberating them to respect the rule of law was a disastrous portend of what was to come: sectarian violence, Shi'ite militias able to take nearly complete control of key government ministries, and Sunnis aided and abetted by the US in their battles with both Al Qaeda and Shia opponents. In an ominous portent of the emergence of ISIS in the summer of 2014, the Mujahadin Shura Council announced the formation of an Islamic state in the Sunni provinces of Iraq in the fall of 2006 (Ghosh 2014).

Elections in Afghanistan also were supposed to serve as a rescue operation to liberate the country from the Taliban via western-style democracy. After three postponements, the first of several rounds of Presidential elections were held in October 2004 and parliamentary elections in September 2005. Some assessments seemed to confirm that indeed Afghans were liberated from the Taliban by the election of Hamid Karzai: "The large turnout of voters indicated that the Afghan people were genuinely and enthusiastically motivated to see the election succeed. It was the Taliban, not Karzai's rival candidates, who were the losers" (Barfield 2005, 129). More cautious assessments insisted nevertheless that since the last parliamentary elections were in 1969, it was certainly a "sign of progress" that "50% of voters had braved insurgent attacks last month to vote" (McGirk 2005, 27). Just as in Iraq, Afghanistan's disastrous 2009 elections did more to convince observers that elections were actually a hindrance for realizing either security or democracy. By 2009, turnout for the presidential election was miniscule in Helmand and Kandahar and the overall turnout was estimated at between 30 and 40% as opposed to an estimated 70% in 2004 (Rashid 2009, 44). In parliamentary elections in 2010, half of the newly elected MPs in Kandahar were the owners of contracting companies with ties to the US military. Two-thirds of the incumbents lost and were replaced by MPs connected to warlords or the ruling class (Aikins 2011, 44).

In many respects, the two wars increasingly resembled the post-conflict and often "failing" states of the 1990s, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. All of them qualified as "failing" or "fragile" states, with ongoing violence, weak state structures and shaky territorial control, challenges to state authority and legitimacy, and ongoing human suffering. What is noteworthy is that the US had thousands of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq involved in ongoing counterinsurgency operations, including night raids, assassinations, and air strikes. Counterinsurgency tactics failed to weaken the Taliban and prevent the explosive emergence of the Islamic state. The Iraq described by the Iraq Study Group in 2006 (when there were 140,000 US

troops in the country) looked remarkably similar to the Iraq of 2014 on the eve of the country's ISIS-induced implosion. The report described armed Sunni tribes, Al Qaeda fights, criminals, and an erratically and Janus-faced Iraqi police and army. Wikileaks documents released in 2010 described nearly the same conditions, with the added information that civilian deaths had been much higher than previously thought.

President Obama was no exception to the pattern of metaphorically rescuing entire countries from war, dictatorship, and instability. President Obama took partial credit for the rescue of Libyans during the US-NATO intervention in March 2011. Implicitly juxtaposing the intervention with the failed militarized humanitarian operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, he stressed that US action was a response to appeals by the rebels, the "world community" gave the intervention legitimacy, and it demonstrated that the US and NATO would not turn a blind eye to atrocities (Obama 2011). The rescue of thousands of vulnerable civilians captivated the public as well, with overall support for the operation. Throughout the following year, many declared that NATO's efforts were a success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove Qaddafi (Western and Goldstein 2011, 48–49). Daalder and Stavridis declared that the operation had rightly been hailed as a model intervention (2012). On the political front, the overthrow of Qaddafi was followed by "unexpected smoothness," with elections for parliament in 2012 and the alleged gradual erosion of militia power (Vandewalle 2012, 12). Saving Libya also provided an anodyne contrast to US unilateral counterterrorist operations that violated national and international law. Instead of criticism, Operation Unified Protector was composed of eighteen countries and other states made "indispensable contributions" to the operation (Daalder and Stavridis 2012, 4). The participation of Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, and the UAE provided a welcome contrast to the criticisms of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Like its predecessor humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia, the emotional response to visual catastrophe conjured rhetoric filled with emotion and valorized a dimension of US power that is not invisible, violent, illegal, and beyond the reach of liberal democratic politics.

If the Libyan operation was designed to rewrite the Iraq script, as some have argued (e.g., Kuperman 2013), it failed. After Qaddafi's murder, Libya gradually spiraled into reprisal killings, the collapse of the state, and control of the territory by lawless militias. It jumped 16 places to rank number 50 on *Foreign Policy's* annual "failed state" index, "jolted by civil war and post-Qaddafi instability" (2012, 87). With no obvious boots on

the ground, however, the government was relieved of having to promise turning points, conditions-based progress, steady but uneven progress, timetables for handing over authority, time to begin a process of transitions, setting clear metrics for measuring progress, and effective benchmarks for measuring success, all phrases used during both wars to indefinitely defer a reckoning.

## Multicultural Superpower, Planetary President

Barack Obama's election coincided with a raft of commentary in the media about the changing racial and ethnic demographic of the US. The Population Reference Bureau identified an emerging racial generation gap as the number of non-white Americans passed the 100-million mark in 2006, while 80% of all Americans over sixty were white (Roberts 2007, A19). By 2007, minorities constituted a majority in California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas. To much fanfare, the Census Bureau predicted that by 2050, one in twenty Americans would identify themselves as multiracial, and by 2042, Americans who identified themselves as Hispanic, black, Asian American, Indian, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander would constitute a majority. Surveys furthermore showed that younger Americans' attitudes about interracial relationships were overwhelmingly accepting, much more so than Americans over the age of 64 (e.g., Cose 2010, 22). No doubt reflecting anxiety about national foundations, these changing demographics have been linked to everything from the Arizona Minutemen, the Tea Party, and Donald Trump's railings about "illegal aliens" from Mexico who are rapists, drug runners, and generally criminals. The intensity of the opposition to both multiracial America as well as immigration often drowned out the broader, at least more ambivalent acceptance and receptivity of the electorate interested in a presidential candidate who had the right attitude, could make smart decisions, and had taken responsibility for his own life and achieved, through assumed meritocratic assimilation, the highest office in the land.

President Obama promised a foreign policy different from his predecessor, one that reflected his own multiracial and cosmopolitan mien. His announcement that he would negotiate with enemies like Iran without preconditions, his June 2009 speech in Cairo to reconnect with the Muslim world, and his policy to support and protect Muslims in Libya in 2011 seemed to offer a new doctrine. In his 2009 speech in Cairo, Obama offered tolerance to the Muslim world as long as it partnered with the US to combat violent extremism:

So America will defend itself, respectful of the sovereignty of nations and the rule of law. And we will do so in partnership with Muslim communities, which are also threatened. The sooner the extremists are isolated and unwelcome in Muslim communities, the sooner we will all be safer. (2009, 3)

In addition to offering a partnership to the Muslim world in order to defend America, Obama withdrew combat troops from Iraq. In his speech at Fort Bragg on December 15, 2011, he embraced the opening days of the Iraq war while eliding the ensuing days of chaos, massive destruction, and thousands of innocents killed: "In battles from Nasiriyah to Karbala to Baghdad, American troops broke the back of a brutal dictator in less than a month," once again professing his respect for the US military and its exalted place in US politics (Obama 2011). When he announced a new historic agreement with Afghanistan in May 2012, he claimed victory: "the tide has turned. The Taliban's momentum has been broken, and 20 out of 30 of Al Qaeda's leadership has been taken out" (Obama 2012, 1). Afghanistan henceforth would have to take responsibility for itself, US troop reductions would take place on schedule, and "by the end of 2014 the Afghans will be fully responsible for the security of their country." By the end of 2009 without a hint of irony, Howard Fineman declared that in addition to being the "president of planet earth," Obama was a "man who thought of the whole world first and viewed it as one multicultural family" (2009, 21).

Some aspects of the pattern of requiring repeated Arab-American and Muslim professions of loyalty that was established during the first Persian Gulf War continued after September 11, but there were also some significant alterations. As Arab Americans, Middle Easterners, and Muslims reaffirmed and reassured those who might hold them suspect, state institutions defined them as potential criminal terrorists. Three days after the September 11 attacks, *New York Times* reporter Purdy remarked on the American flags prominently displayed along a strip of stores with Arab-American owners in Paterson New Jersey. Said one Arab (sic) businessman, "It's a contest. Whose flag is bigger?" (Purdy 2001, A14). Some in the Dearborn Michigan Shia Muslim community turned out for an anti-Hussein rally in February 2003 and chanted "Saddam Must Go!" in order to demonstrate loyalty and support for the invasion (Ackerman 2006, 6). In December 2001 *Newsweek* presented the story of Mohammed Irshaid, a civil engineer working in New York. He was arrested on November 6, 2001, and held for three weeks. Upon his release he reassured that "this

does not change my love of America" (Thomas and Isikoff 2001, 37). As *People* presented its cross-section of heroic American deeds after 9/11, it interviewed Saade Mustafa, a Gulf War veteran who promised, "I am 100% American," emphasizing that his Muslim faith was a world apart from the terrorists, "who have a really warped view of how we're supposed to lives our lives in the world today" (Precious Mettle 2001, 34). Mohammed Tabibi, an Afghan American who immigrated to the US in the 1970s, complained that "People look at us and say 'They did this,' not seeing who we are … We didn't do this. We're Americans" (Lending 2001, 50). Randall Hamud defended the families of three Arab-American young men who knew the hijackers and later defended the mother of the "twentieth hijacker," Zacarias Moussouai; therefore he too was "considered a terrorist." The thesis of his *Newsweek* essay was that this was unfair because after all he attended UCLA Law School, belonged to the National Rifle Association, and was a "secularized Muslim" (Hamud 2003, 11).

While hardly collaborating in creating their own predicament, and no doubt often done out of fear, some Arab/Muslim/South Asian or any other category of person profiled often granted the citizenry and the state the necessary emergency powers to make the country secure. The concession works to reassure "authentic" citizens, that is, those under "ordinary" surveillance, that their fears are understandable. Conceding to understandable fears in an emergency relieves the state of having to justify its increasingly aggressive monitoring and has the effect of submitting to the differential operation of security, surveillance, and profiling. After a financial services officer was pulled off an Amtrak train bound for Providence three days after the September 11 attacks, he began with a concession, "We're in a terrible emergency but I am a full fledged tax paying American citizen like anyone else" (Goodstein and Niebuhr 2001, 14). When Snowden provided information on five prominent activist American Muslims spied on by the NSA between 2002 and 2008, one (the president of the American Iranian Council) said that he understood why the US government would want to monitor him and he was proud that they had found nothing (Savage and Appuzo 2014, A16). Granting the government emergency powers and then insisting that these powers not be used unfairly or indiscriminately assumes that both are possible rather than inherently contradictory.

On the eve of the Iraq war the Department of Homeland Security, through a program called Operation Liberty Shield, planned to interview 15,000 Muslims in the US. A spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic

Relations stated, "We want to be helpful. In the end it is our country too, and we want to be safe." Bassam Alhussaini echoed the sentiments: "We made our allegiance to the United States. We love this country. Now we feel our freedoms are at risk again" (Ali 2003, 50). Two years before the Park51 mosque controversy in New York, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf and Daisy Khan wrote in a guest column in *Newsweek*, "American basic ideals and those of classical Islam are similar … they both believe that strength comes from embracing diversity" (2007, 32). After the Fort Hood shootings in 2009 by Nidal Hassan, Imam Mohamed Mardini of the American Muslim Center in Dearborn offered prayers for those killed and injured with the reminder that "It is important for everyone to know we are grieving as Americans" (Ghosh 2009, 6). The recriminations, in other words, were based on a belief in the inclusionary promise of US society and gave speakers the chance to remind other citizens that "Muslims are just like you. Incredible? No, just true" (Lalami 2012, 22).

It is reasonable to assume that conceding to emergency powers and demonstrating support for the government's war might lessen the prospects or prevent further surveillance, profiling, detention, or deportation. For example, just before the Iraq war the presidents of the Islamic Council and Islamic Center in Pittsburgh announced their joint cooperation with the FBI to interview 397 Muslims in Western Pennsylvania (Goodstein 2003, B11). In fact it seemed like a case of quid pro quo, with the Muslim community cooperating in identifying interviewees and the government protecting them against potential bias and hate crimes. Thus the Muslim community in Pittsburgh seemed to have confidence in the government, and it appeared that the government treated a suspected terrorist threat on par with profiling and harassment, which is simply false.

As Mamdani argues, all Muslims have been under an obligation to prove their credentials by joining in a war against "bad" Muslims (2004, 15). The working assumption is that there is room for Muslims and Arab Americans in the US as long as they uphold an understanding of Islam that is in accord with US interests and that demonstrates the resilience of the longstanding American assimilationist model. At the same time, Arab Americans and Muslims must accept that they are the specific targets especially scrutinized in a system of generalized surveillance and that their presence spurs the impulse to constantly police and profile. Somewhere close to 1000 Muslim men were indefinitely detained after September 11 and in one well-known case claimed subjection to daily body-cavity searches, beatings, and extremes of hot and cold (Greenhouse 2008,

A16). The Department of Homeland Security attempted to thwart alleged terrorist plots in 2004 because it believed they were being planned to coincide with the Presidential election. Using ethnic profiling to identify 2500 people, 80% of whom were from Muslim-majority countries, the interviewers asked the respondents what they thought of America and whether they owned any chemical or biological explosives (Lichtblau 2008). The New York City Police Department created what Kassem calls the "largest spying program by a local law enforcement agency on record" (2012). The impulse of securing identities of one specific group has inevitably expanded to include others. The FBI, for example, has collected information about African Americans, Arab Americans, Latinos, and Russian and Chinese groups in order to study black separatism, potential terrorists, Central American gangs, and organized crime syndicates, respectively (Savage 2011, A20).

Ongoing securitization is portrayed as necessary for the maintenance of America as a diverse, heterogeneous nation forever improving what President Obama in 2008 called a "more perfect union." The refrain "We Are All Americans" delineates citizenship practices as a field where there are some taken-for-granted citizens and then there are other citizens who must both reassure and persistently and non-violently demand inclusion, a process built upon permanent deferrals of what those excluded consider a promise unfulfilled. Public debate takes place around longstanding liberal concerns with religious tolerance and overt discrimination, and commentators often reach for comparisons with earlier successful assimilation by the Irish and Jews. Security practices, on the other hand, politicize citizenship by maintaining and reproducing exclusions—deportations, detentions, surveillance, and profiling as a form of population management carried out with ever more sophisticated technologies that hold out their own promise of eventually becoming universally deployed against the entire population. It is this recursive relationship between exclusionary security and inclusionary multiculturalism that helps to sustain practices of citizenship. As Muller expresses it, identity management both restricts and preserves certain rights and entitlements (2004, 284).

## "Beat the Clock" Patriotism

When President Bush stood on the USS *Abraham Lincoln* on May 1, 2003, and announced "Mission Accomplished," it must have appeared to be the case. US ground forces went nearly as deep into Iraq in one day as

a larger force had in the first Gulf War, leading Colonel William F. Grimsley to declare, "We're ahead of schedule" (Myers 2003, B4). Shock and Awe, as the campaign was called, was described as fifty strikes in a ten-minute volley of "almost Biblical power" (Burns 2003, A1). The president of MSNBC declared that "this may be one time where the sequel is better than the original" (Kakutani 2003, E1). US casualties were 139 on May 1, 2003, comparable to the earlier wars of the 1990s and while higher than in Afghanistan, still relatively low (Shaw 2005, 109). Private estimates were that 10,000 Iraqi troops and 2000 Iraqi civilians died in the same period (Kluger 2003, 49). Because the administration had primed the public for the expectation that wars would be brief, almost immediately the clock began to tick and the media began the first questioning of what would eventually become a pattern of using time and metrics in symbolic contests over the war's progress and its likely end. The war in Iraq began on Wednesday, March 19, 2003. In a *New York Times/CBS* poll taken one week later, respondents were only given the possibility of a war that would take place in weeks or months only, not years (Nagourney and Elder 2003, B13). *New York Times* reporter Andrew Jacobs on Tuesday, March 25, announced that although it had looked as if the war would be a cakewalk, it was "turning into the worst kind of reality television" (2003, B13). As if on cue, the President began reminding the country that it was going to "take a while to achieve our objective," but he could "assure the American people we're making good progress and I can assure this is the beginning of a tough fight" (Apple 2003, A1).

Offering promised progress in response to media commentators wielding the Vietnam analogy, which began during the first weeks of the war, would establish the pattern for the rest of it. The debate was dominated by arguing about whether the President's characterizations were correct, whether Iraq was in the midst of a civil war, how to measure success, and how to end it responsibly. Examining how this unfolded is a powerful lens for viewing the way in which war-making seamlessly conformed to considerations primarily of time and flexibility and invariably got enmeshed in competing metrics for measuring success Looming as a possibility for both the Bush and Obama administrations was another Vietnam, which made the defense of progress even more paramount.

The phrase "Mission Accomplished" was the first to serve as a contested metric and reminder that the President had promised an end to a war that now seemed endless. Reporters began to note that more troops had died between the declaration of Mission Accomplished and August

27, 2003, than had died in the first two months of the war (138 between March 19 and April 30; 139 between May 1 and August 26). The Bush administration rebuttal was that forty-two of fifty-five most wanted Iraqis had been captured and Vice President Cheney dismissed its critics as "retired military officers embedded in TV studios" (Tierney 2003; Bumiller and Jehl 2003, A1). *Newsweek*, with its "Top Gun—or Top Op?" commentary on May 12, 2003, captured the growing skepticism about the claim, and *The New Republic* crystallized the growing consensus with its cover on May 26, 2003, "Mission NOT Accomplished," while *Time* did so on its October 6, 2003, cover. In June 2003, *New York Times* reporter Davey noted that most Americans considered the war to be over and could not understand why troops continued to die (2003, A11). The administration complained that the media were all reporting negative news and used military public relations to paint an optimistic picture. In October 2003 the US Central Command website deleted all mention of coalition deaths from its homepage and in November the White House banned media coverage of coffins returning from Iraq. Five hundred letters appeared in hometown newspapers praising the progress being made in Iraq—the letters were nearly identical and an obvious exercise in military perception management (Hammer 2003, 31).

Another punctuation in the effort to hasten the end of war and occupation occurred when Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, ordered a change in the timeline for handing over authority to the Iraqi governing council, which would make the US occupation look more like a partnership. As Elliott put it, "the clock would move at a speed of the administration's choosing," thereby allowing for elections first and then writing the constitution instead of vice versa (2003, 37). This would allow the US, in Bremer's words, to "continue to have an agreement with the new Iraqi government in which it will continue to ask for our assistance." By 2006, the debate was about whether Iraq was embroiled in a civil war or not, with scholars insisting that it met the definition and the White House insisting it did not (e.g., Wong 2006).

The Iraq Study Group Report, the subsequent Iraq surge, and the Afghanistan surges demonstrate the way in which leaders now point to contested measures of success to appeal to an audience it assumes to be distracted and therefore receptive to clearly stated benchmarks as measures of progress. The Iraq Study Group's report had 79 recommendations, which were condensed to a call for a timetable of withdrawal and the establishment of "specific objectives—or milestones—on national

reconciliation, security, and governance" (Iraq Study Group 2006, 59). Reversing the report's recommendations in December 2006, the Bush administration instead announced a surge of troops for Iraq, to which Congress then proposed a set of benchmarks for assessing the progress of the war—Bush made it clear that he would not accept a timetable for withdrawal. It was the benchmarks that then became the centerpiece in debates about progress and success. The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq for 2007, the Government Accounting Office Report, and a commission established by Congress to study the Iraqi police all provided dire assessments of progress, prompting the Bush administration to argue there was "definable progress" on "nearly half" of the eighteen benchmarks and then later offering a new gauge of success: the new alliance between the US and the local Sunni tribes in Iraq, particularly in Anbar province (Sanger 2007, A10).

President Obama also sought to control the script of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through time management and effective assessment in order to give the impression that the wars were perpetually winding down and not worth debate. After a small surge in Afghanistan in the spring of 2009, he turned to lengthier deliberations about how to address the stalemate. After taking ninety days to deliberate (and the amount of time he took was a constant source of commentary), he announced, in the same speech in December 2009, a 30,000 troop increase and a deadline for withdrawal:

> The 30,000 additional troops that I am announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 … these additional American and international will allow us to accelerate handing responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. (Obama 2009b)

In March of 2009, he promised to "set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable," and to "consistently assess our efforts to train Afghan security forces" (Obama 2009a). This unleashed a torrent of commentary about proper metrics and whether progress had been made in meeting their goals. The measures eventually became the centerpiece of debates about the success of the second surge.

War by formula, metric, and audit using performance-related criteria helps to convince the media and in turn the public that the management techniques of war are congruent with the management techniques of

enterprises. Managerial war posits a rational consumer attuned to recalibrated messages, new gauges for assessing strategy, accelerated timetables and, as Obama reassured in 2009, settling on the surge strategy was "an entirely transparent process," and there was no "Gulf of Tonkin here" (Ambinder 2009). Maintaining support if not indifference, new benchmarks, timetables, and deadlines are often based on consumerist criteria; taxpayers are entitled to know how their money is being spent and, as Massing put it, "Politically active Americans seem interested in one question: is it working?" (2008, 17). The Iraqi surge was supposed to "buy time" for the Iraqi government to achieve reconciliation but the Iraqis scored low on reconciliation benchmarks (Kaplow and Dickey 2007, 30). The rebuttal to this claim is that "the overall trajectory has been encouraging … The progress, to be sure, has not been uniform" (Gordon 2007, A1).

The September 11 attacks brought forth a torrent of commentary about civic life, community, and collectivity that phantasmagorically existed in the past but had evaporated, and thus Americans were deemed incapable of exhibiting the stamina required by wars on terror; our "we" had steadily shriveled (Putnam 2002, 20). After September 11, Putnam and his colleagues found that Americans had more trust in government and greater interest in public affairs, although they cautioned that attitudes seemed to have shifted more than behavior. Kaplan was puzzled about why civic attachments, a sense of shared purpose, and a propensity to sacrifice for the common good were not renewed in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks (2005, 20). By 2011 he was furious that the few who did die for the country did so for a citizenry that had "anesthetized itself with Abilify and reruns of *Desperate Housewives.*" Todd Gitlin lectured the left, arguing that it should not blame American imperialism for blowback for prompting the attacks and instead focus on remaking the tools of our public life—our schools, social services, and transportation (2002, A13). Gitlin failed to suggest how decades of hollowed out social services, stunningly high levels of military spending, and the neglect of transportation might be reversed beyond individual voluntary effort. Capping the decade and commenting on the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama invoked his own nostalgia: "On September 11, 2001, in our time of grief, the American people came together. We offered our neighbors a hand … And tonight, let us think back to that sense of unity that prevailed on 9/11" (Obama 2011). Bacevich maintains that Obama is engaged in wishful thinking. By 2001, citizens were ready to ignore war and return to

the shopping mall, and "most Americans subscribed to a limited-liability version of patriotism, one that emphasized the display of bumper stickers in preference to shouldering a rucksack" (2008, 63). Freedom for Americans, wrote Nunberg, means "a choice of SUVs or an end to the double taxation of benefits" (2003, 6).

Popular and scholarly nostalgic scolding about the loss of citizen sacrifice (or even attention) entails a refusal to discuss not only the conditions under which the economy has long been organized but the way subjectivity itself has been saturated with models of rationality that define the individual as an "entrepreneur of himself" (Foucault 2004, 226). The imagined evaporation of civility and community spirit in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks actually demonstrates the success of neoliberalism in constructing a society of individual capitalists governed through isolation and dispersion (Read 2009, 33–34). Neoliberalism also explains the failure of so many commentators to reflect on how disconnection, consumption, and even growing incivility are a manifestation of the thoroughgoing restructuring of the economy over the past thirty years. Nostalgia attempts to define what citizenship "really" means by criticizing compulsions to consume without recognizing how perverse it is to demand mutual responsibility and collective sacrifice in a neoliberal context that for the past thirty years has valued neither.

If nostalgia is a spectral effect of the consolidation of the neoliberal consumer-citizen, then irony is the effect of nostalgia. Kaplan turns his irony toward President Bush when he quotes him on the meaning of sacrifice: "I think the American people are sacrificing now. I think they're waiting in airport lines longer than they were before" (2005, 21). Kaplan fails to entertain the possibility that people married consumption and patriotism because they had been endlessly primed to consider it as an investment in the future of the country as well as their way of life. For the richest ironic commentary on the reconfigured public sphere as the location for civic entrepreneurship, however, one needs to turn to comedy and satirical news. When Joe Scarborough interviewed Bill Maher about President Obama's deference to the generals for the Afghanistan surge, he asked him whether he felt betrayed (thus assuming that Maher and other Obama supporters somehow believed he would not send 47,000 additional troops to Afghanistan). Maher's (2009) response is instructive:

> I don't feel betrayed. I feel disappointed. I don't feel betrayed because he did run on the idea that, well, we've got to have some war. I mean, come on,

we're Americans. So he was not untrue to what the campaign said. But things haven't changed in Afghanistan. Mostly we found out that the government was even more corrupt than we thought. [Laughs]

This statement about constant war gestures toward a serious opening for criticism of not only a specific Presidential foreign policy; it also points to a deeper and troubling realization that constant war transcends partisan politics and is a structural consequence of policies carried out by the military, corporations, and a network of actors who organize and benefit from war. Maher steps back from this analysis, however, with the resigned observation that things have not only not changed in Afghanistan; they are worse.

Baym argues that underlying the entertainment and pop culture satire of *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report* is an "interrogation of political power that rests on a firm belief in fact, accountability, and reason in public discourse" (in Jones and Baym 2010, 281). Colbert's concept of truthiness nostalgically points to a time when we could distinguish between a Fox News claim about weapons of mass destruction and the facts behind such a claim. Some critics argue satirical news promotes cynicism rather than irony, but this confuses the perpetrators of cynicism—political communications generally and most of the media, who have genuinely lost any faith in the existence of truth—with those who think it is still available to be unmasked. For example, as guest editor of *Newsweek* the week of June 15, 2009, Stephen Colbert explained that he had brought his hit TV broadcast to Iraq to support the troops, and "I figure if I do this, I can finally take that yellow-ribbon magnet off my Audi without looking like a jerk. God knows what it did to my paint job," and pointed out that Americans cannot find Iraq on a map (2009, 5). Colbert embraces the Bacevich criticism of limited-liability patriotism, and suggests that "support the troops" has become a fake mantra mouthed by people who would not sacrifice a thing for the war in Iraq because they see through the phony metrics. It also suggests that there might be wars worth sacrificing for and that such a war indeed would elicit sacrifice, perhaps like World War II, a "good war." Colbert suggests through irony the nostalgia associated with a time when citizenship meant more than banal displays of patriotism and being expected to follow corporate-style campaigns to convince shareholders to buy the wars. The endlessly ironic comparisons between idealized meanings of citizenship, deliberation, and reason, with the prominence of irony, cynicism, and occasional voting are at the heart of satirical news.

## Conclusion

A defined (yet expanding) territory, boundaries, and sovereignty form the backdrop to some of the most cogent analyses of US manifest destiny and its trajectory from the European founding to the present. Territories, boundaries, and nation-building form the centerpiece of Slotkin's analysis of the myth of the frontier (Slotkin 1992). Michael Hunt's delineation of the heart of US nationalism revolves around an expansionary impulse as the definition of national greatness, racial hierarchy, and the fear of disorder (1987). Anders Stephanson's sacred-secular matrix, which he argues defines American nationalism, rests on territoriality.

The practices that sustained this space revolved around gender, rescue narratives, race, and nationalism. Writing shortly after the first Gulf War, some of these authors recognize that these practices were undergoing revision and reconfiguration in light of transformations in the global economy as well as the nation. Slotkin points out that "*so long as* the nation-state remains the prevalent form of social organization, something like a national myth will be crucial," and he sensed a "liminal moment" where the old myths no longer helped us "see our way through the modern world" (my emphasis) (1992, 654). Stephenson concludes that "we are perhaps on the verge of some new and diffuse epoch where … all that matters is the perpetual present, a virtual reality empty of value, a postmodern world where destiny cannot be manifest and certainly not managed" (1995, 129).

This book has been an effort to illustrate the new configuration of those practices that sustained the US nation during the era of territoriality. The concepts of post-Fordism and neoliberalism can shed a great deal of light upon how the war on terror accelerated and deepened patterns that have been in the making for the past thirty years. George W. Bush's initial bellicosity and framing of the threat facing the US distracted from the newer paradigm for fighting war that even he relied upon almost from the beginning of his declaration of war. His administration turned to strategies of the past twenty years and honed new ones to fit the requirements of fighting a transnational terrorist network, including extensive private outsourcing, torture at so-called black sites, new technologies for surveillance and profiling, and domestic campaigns to control the timing and duration of war. Guantanamo Bay, embedded journalism, drones for assassination, and the planting of news stories in the US and Iraq and Afghanistan are continuous with rather than breaks from these practices.

Also in this light, we should consider President Obama's war-on-terror strategy a more cost-effective neoliberal paradigm for war. It offered managerial efficiency and legal exactitude as its *modus operandi*. Drone strikes increased dramatically during his tenure and we were assured that they meet the strictest standards. After all, "In an era of dwindling budgets and dispersed, hidden enemies, when Americans have become fatigued by disastrous military operations, the value of pinprick operations by elite forces is clear" (Klaidman 2012a, 34). In 2007, one militant was struck by a drone strike; in 2010, 423 had been struck (Shah 2012, 58). This war-fighting strategy does not rest upon Teddy Roosevelt imperialist masculinity, rallying for the release of captured Americans, racialized fear, and bellicose nationalism. President Obama has deepened and extended the logic of neoliberalism, which in turn suggests new ways of thinking about US foreign policy in an era of neoliberal, semi-permanent war.

## US Foreign Policy, Trumped

Aspects of early Trump foreign policy have been already alluded to in previous chapters, but it is useful to briefly consider its emerging shape in the wake of the analytical framework that has guided the book.

Trump's early steering at the helm of foreign policy in many respects has intensified and illuminated patterns that began thirty-five years ago. Like previous presidents (Carter and Obama) Trump claimed to be an outsider with the business acumen that will make America great again (George W. Bush), and most important, his flourishes of exaggerated hyperbole recall Reagan's masterful manipulation of the media. As he explained in *Think Big and Kicking Ass*, "Often times, perception is more important than fact" (2007, 273). His business bankruptcies, government perks such as tax abatements, deregulated banks willing to loan him yet more money, and buying at bargain basement prices from bankrupt businesses, track the myriad policies that have benefited the ultrarich over the past decades. While his administration indeed "resembles a Byzantine Court led by a reality television star, family members, and a circle of ideologues and loyalists," it is also one that proudly touts the truism that market thinking and the world of finance should be running affairs of state (Schmidle 2017, 40). Top-level officials such as Steven Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, profited from the 2008 housing crisis, and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, a venture capitalist, has dismantled numerous companies and then sold them at a handsome profit. The foreign-policy

apparatus is staffed by personnel who formerly worked at Goldman Sachs, Thiel Macro LLC, and Warburg Pincus. As one writer explained, Trump took office as if "orchestrating a hostile corporate takeover and his cabinet is composed of some of the wealthiest shareholders in the country" (Michaels 2017, 52). The mindset of the government was summarized by hedge fund investor Ray Dallo: "This new administration hates weak, unproductive, socialist people and policies," and it "admires strong, can-do profit makers" (Stewart 2017).

Alongside his corporate cabinet Trump has promoted military personnel even more extensively than his predecessors. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, Defense Secretary James Mattis, and Chief of Staff John Kelly are regularly referred to as the sage voices of reason in the administration. According to Duffy, Kelly was approached by Mattis, McMaster, and Joseph Dunford, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and told "unless someone takes over, this White House cannot handle a real crisis" (2017, 28). The dominance of old hands in the War on Terror helps explain Trump's approach to Afghanistan, which recapitulates most aspects of his predecessors. The allegedly major departures he announced in August 2017 include having a "conditions based" instead of "timeline" for withdrawal, but these have both long been part of the metric-seeking tactic used by administrations to announce allegedly new war strategies. Two departures that might occur include the relaxation of the rules of engagement, producing more civilian deaths and a deepening of support for the Taliban, and a greater chance that arguments by Erik Prince and other private security companies promising a less expensive private contracting war will get a better hearing.

In other areas of foreign policy Trump initiatives have pushed for a cost-benefit foreign policy by slashing funds for the World Bank, reducing the size of the State Department, cutting funds for programs dedicated to women's empowerment, and eliminating the position of Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues, all recipients of miniscule amounts of funding to begin with but treated as obstacles to the planned fifty-four-billion dollar increase in military spending (Matfess 2017, 10). Just as funding for women's programs have often been expressed in terms of cost-benefit analysis and in terms of their serving US national security interests, the ban on transgender service, announced in July 2017, has been opposed with a combination of cost-benefit calculation and the right of all Americans to serve US power interests. Davis and Cooper, for example, cite a Rand Study that concluded transgender service would have

"minimal impact on readiness and service," and the military spends much more on Viagra than the cost of medical services to transgender service members (Davis and Cooper 2017).

In some respects Trump is redefining the arguments put forward by McAlister, Melamed, Um, and others, who demonstrate how the incorporation of difference has strengthened the operation of US imperial power (McAlister 2001, Melamed 2011, Um 2012). Trump brings a hard-edged competitive emphasis that promotes "natural hierarchy" and cut-throat survival strategies that have included mercilessly attacking the parents of slain soldier Humayan Khan, whom had defended their son at the Democratic National Convention in July 2016, with the argument that the ultimate sacrifice is blind to race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Trump claimed that he too had made sacrifices by building tall buildings and he scolded the Khans by telling them to focus on Islamic terror rather than their son's death. We should note, however, that Trump's effort to put a limit on inclusive incorporation has been met with resistance from both the military and media, both of whom are partial to the stable and "productive" vision of a social order defined by instrumentalized difference. For example, former JCS General Martin Dempsey rebuked the transgender ban with "The service of men and women who volunteer and who meet our standards of service is a blessing, not a burden" (Cooper 2017, A17). Thomas Friedman visited the US military bases dotting the Middle East in 2017 and marveled at the diversity on display: a Lutheran Air Force chaplain accommodating Jewish holidays, a female pilot, and a military as "diverse as the colors on a Syrian map" he had viewed earlier during a military briefing (Friedman 2017, A23).

US elections, as Klein notes, had long crossed over into "ratings driven infotainment" (2017, 12). Trump accomplished the final feat of transforming public opinion into audience ratings. Trump boasts in *Great Again*, "I use the media the way the media uses me—to attract attention" (Trump 2015, 10). This in turn echoes one of the most successful troll supporters of Trump, Mike Cernovich, that "conflict is attention," and "attention is influence" (Marantz 2016, 42). Trump has extended his brand into his presidency, entertaining his like-minded supporters at campaign-like rally events, basking in free media coverage, and tweeting and trolling his way to the next crisis. The next few years will reveal whether Trump's presidency has produced a crisis point for US foreign policy. Meanwhile, it is more fruitful to look for continuities in his foreign policy than it is to treat him as a shock from nowhere. He was a predictable surprise.

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